

Florida State University Libraries

Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations

The Graduate School

2012

Twentieth-Century Western Scholarly, Artistic, and Journalistic Perspectives on the Middle East: Bernard Lewis, David Douglas Duncan, and Sandra MacKey

Defne Bilir



THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

TWENTIETH-CENTURY WESTERN SCHOLARLY, ARTISTIC, AND JOURNALISTIC
PERSPECTIVES ON THE MIDDLE EAST: BERNARD LEWIS, DAVID DOUGLAS
DUNCAN, AND SANDRA MACKEY

By

DEFNE BILIR

A Dissertation submitted to the
Program in Interdisciplinary Humanities
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Awarded
Summer, 2012

The members of the Committee approved dissertation of Defne Bilir defended on April, 24, 2012.

The members of the supervisory committee were:

Eugene Crook
Professor Directing Dissertation

David Johnson
Professor Co-Directing Dissertation

Delia Poey
University Representative

Daniel Vitkus
Committee Member

Will Hanley
Committee Member

Reinier Leushuis
Committee Member

The Graduate School has verified and approved the above-named committee members, and certifies that the dissertation has been approved in accordance with university requirements.



Dedicated to my beloved family,

Fatma Saadet, Ali Ihsan Bilir

&

Tanla, Kuzey, Can Bilir

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my sincere thanks to my major professor and committee chair Dr. Eugene Crook. I have learned from him how to establish, maintain, and improve different skills in academia. If I had not been under his wing, benefitting from his constant support, insightful guidance, and inspiration this dissertation would have not been possible. I will never be able to thank him for his encouragement, patience, and compassionate human spirit. I am extremely grateful to Dr. David Johnson, co-director of my dissertation, for his immense support and guidance. I have been fortunate to work with him throughout my doctoral education. My appreciation to Dr. Maricarmen Martinez is endless. She has been not only a mentor for me, but also an inspiration.

I would like to thank to my committee members, Dr. Daniel Vitkus, Dr. Will Hanley, Dr. Delia Poey, and Dr. Reinier Leushuis. Special thanks to Dr. Vitkus for his perceptive comments throughout my doctoral education, which have encouraged me to improve my research and writing skills. His deep intellect and dedication to excellence have been an inspiration. Dr. Hanley has provided invaluable insight with knowledge of literature; working with him has helped me to find direction in my academic pursuits. I am privileged to have Dr. Leushuis and Dr. Poey on my doctoral committee, who have supported and encouraged me in my goals. I am also thankful to Dr. Zeina Tamer Schlenoff for the guidance and wealth of knowledge, helping me through this process.

I would like to genuinely thank to Sandra Mackey. Her correspondence opened my way to write the third chapter of this dissertation, in which I examine her journalistic practices in the Middle East. I also wish to remember Mary Alice Harper, Photographic Archivist, and Linda Briscoe Myers, Assistant Curator of Photography at the Harry Ransom Center of the University of Texas, Austin, where I conducted my archival research to analyze David Douglas Duncan's photojournalism, placed in the second chapter. Many thanks are due to Louise Crook for her great hospitality while I was conducting my research in Austin.

My special thanks go to Ryan Shea for his endless support by providing high quality editing. He has read every single word of this project with earnest regard, and his intellectual contributions to my thought processes have been enormously helpful. I also would like to thank my friends, Jerrie Del-Vecchio, Secil Poyraz, and Simon Dutton. Jerrie provided essential editing during the formative stages of my writing, yet above this, she has supported my dream, as Secil has. The time that they have shared with me, in guidance and in intellectual discussion, will always be remembered. Simon has provided valuable suggestions and editorial assistance. Also, many thanks to Charlene Crump, whose support and enthusiasm are greatly appreciated.

My dear family has taken me by the hand, in love, throughout my long journey. Being an inspiration in my life is my mother, Fatma Saadet, and my father, Ali Ihsan. In every step of my life you walk with me. When you are here you bring the soul of my longed for home country, Turkey, and memories of loved ones I have long missed. And when we are apart, you live in distance with your wisdom, support, and belief. My dearest brother Kuzey and sister Tanla, bringing *Can* to my life, thank you for always being there for me. Love.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	x
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 1	9
1.1. Bernard Lewis' Historical and Intellectual Discourses	9
1.1.1. Biography: Bernard Lewis	9
1.1.2. An Overview of Source Materials on Lewis' Discourse Concerning the Middle East ..	11
1.1.3. Selection of the Source Materials for This Study	12
1.1.4. Summary of Lewis' Books and Analysis of his Representations of the Middle East through his Historical and Intellectual Discourses.....	14
1.2. Summary of Lewis' Books	14
1.2.1. Relationships in Religion, Society, and Politics within the Islamic World	15
1.2.2. The Rise and Decline of the Islamic Civilization	21
1.2.3. The Rise of the West, from Influence to Affluence—Dominating the Middle East.....	27
1.2.4. Ideological Aspirations and Political Practices during the Twentieth Century in the Middle East	35
1.2.5. Search for the Culprit and the Search for the Remedy in the Islamic World.....	43
1.3. Analysis of Lewis' Representations of the Middle East through his Historical and Intellectual Discourses	50
1.3.1. Absence and Rejection of Secularism and Rationalistic Thinking—Challenges of Modernity in Arab Countries and the Wider Islamic World.....	51
1.3.1.1. Islam, Secularism, and the Modern Middle East	51
1.3.1.2. Rejection of Rationalistic Thinking in Islam and Contemporary Arab World	59
1.3.2. Transformation from Traditional Autocratic State to One Party Ideological Dictatorship—Modernization Taking Forms under the Parameters of Essence of Islam.....	66
1.3.2.1. One Party Ideological Dictatorship, by-product of Modernization.....	67
1.3.2.2. One Party Ideological Dictatorship presented with anti-Western Islamic Sentiments	73
1.3.3. The Arab World—an Outlook Depicting the Legacy of European Colonialism.....	79
1.3.3.1. Creation of the Modern Political Map: “A Civilizational View of History”	80
1.3.3.2. European Territorial Rule and Political Modernization in the Arab World.....	88
1.3.3.3. A Conception of Eastern Inferiority and Mission to Civilize	92
1.3.4. Decline in Islamic Civilization, Its Failure in Modernizing, and Its Transformation into the Modern Middle East.....	93
1.3.4.1. The Status of Women in Presenting the Decline and Inability to Progress in Islam	94
1.3.4.2. The Manner of Superciliousness in Imparting the Decline in Islam.....	99
1.3.4.3. Periodization of Ottoman History Typifying the Decline in Islam	102
1.3.4.4. External Factors in Islam's Decline and in the Creation of a Modern Existence	105
1.3.4.5. The Problem of Amendment in a New Relationship and the Collapse of the Empire	108
1.3.4.6. Transformation into the Modern Middle East.....	114
1.3.5. Clash between Islam and Modernity Becoming the “Clash of Civilizations,” and the War on Terror Bringing Democratic Transformation to the Middle East	119

1.3.5.1. Search for Culprits in the Decolonized Arab World and Forecasting the Future	120
1.3.5.2. Muslim Rage and its Roots within the Context of the Islamic Revolution of Iran	124
1.3.5.3. Arab World within the Sphere of the Islamic Revolution of Iran	132
1.3.5.4. The Jihad being enacted against the Infidel, Crusader, and the Imperialist West	136
1.3.5.5. Turkish Democracy and Iranian Theocracy—Two Models for an Arab Future..	143
1.4. Chapter Conclusion	154
CHAPTER 2	160
2.1. David Douglas Duncan’s Artistic and Media Discourses	160
2.1.1. Biography: David Douglas Duncan	160
2.1.2. An Overview of Source Materials on Duncan’s Coverage of the Middle East	163
2.1.3. Selection of the Source Materials for This Study	164
2.1.4. Synopsis of Duncan’s Pictorial Stories and Analysis of his Representations of the Middle East through His Artistic and Media Discourses	165
2.2. Synopsis of Duncan’s Pictorial Stories on Iran	166
2.2.1. Iran’s Intra/Inter-National Politics in spring 1946	166
2.2.1.1. The Shah and the Imperial Palace	167
2.2.1.2. The Iranian Government and the Iranian Crisis	167
2.2.1.3. The Tudeh Party	168
2.2.1.4. The Labor Workers	170
2.2.1.5. The City, Tehran	171
2.2.1.6. The Grand Land Holders	172
2.2.1.7. The Peasantry	173
2.2.2. The Semi-Annual Qashqai Migration in Persia, Spring 1946	174
2.3. Analysis of Duncan’s Pictorial Stories on Iran	176
2.3.1. An Outlook on the Dynastic Traits and on Imperialistic Configurations within Iranian History	176
2.3.2. The Iranian Crisis in an Internal and International Scope, spring of 1946	178
2.3.3. Iran’s Political Traits within the Context of its ‘Repressive Regime’ in spring, 1946	181
2.3.4. The Socio-Cultural, -Economic, and -Political Climate in Iran during the spring of 1946 in Alignment with Modernization, Westernization, and Class Divisions	185
2.3.5. Semi-Annual Qashqai Migration in Persia of the spring of 1946	188
2.4. Intentions in Coverage of Iran Appearing in the Media Outlets	191
2.4.1. Conclusion	195
2.5. Synopsis of Duncan’s Pictorial Stories on the Palestinian Territories	197
2.5.1. Socio-Political and Ideological Surroundings within the Palestinian Territories in 1946	197
2.5.1.1. The Acts of Terrorism for Jewish Causes vs. British Military Operations	198
2.5.1.2. Illegal Jewish Immigration to Palestine	202
2.5.1.3. Palestine, a Land of Trouble	204
2.5.2. The Gaza Strip in June 1956	206
2.5.2.1. The Gaza-Jerusalem-Cairo Road and Railway	207
2.5.2.2. Kilometer 95, a Secondary Road	208
2.5.2.3. Gaza under the Control and Protection of the Egyptian Military	209
2.5.2.4. The Long since Established Inhabitants of the Gaza Strip	211
2.5.2.5. The Gaza Beach and Jabalia Refugee Camps	213

2.5.2.6. The Society Based on Gaza Town and the Gaza Strip.....	214
2.5.2.7. The American Baptist Hospital.....	216
2.6. Analysis of Duncan's Pictorial Stories on the Palestinian Territories.....	217
2.6.1. The State of Militarism in Palestine, 1946, within the Context of Anglo-Zionist Disputes.....	218
2.6.2. Anglo-Zionist Disputes Taking Form as Militarism in Palestine, 1946, within the Context of Jewish Illegal Immigration.....	225
2.6.3. Power Changing Hands from British Colonial Forces to Zionists in Palestine, 1946, within the Context of Jewish Illegal Immigration	227
2.6.4. The Socio-Cultural, -Economic, and -Political Climate in Palestine, Created amongst the British, Zionists, and Palestinian Arabs, in 1946	231
2.6.5. The Holy Land, 1946, an outlook on Palestine.....	233
2.6.6. A Decade After, the Gaza Strip.....	234
2.6.7. The Holy Land, 1956, an Outlook on the Gaza Strip.....	236
2.6.8. The Gaza Strip along the Mediterranean Sea, a Home for Natives and Refugees since 1948.....	238
2.6.9. Classification of the Strip's 'Natives' and 'Refugees' between 1948 and 1956.....	242
2.6.10. Arab Nationalism and Palestinian Arab Nationalism Taking Form under the Parameters of Egyptian Influence, the Gaza Strip, in the Mid-1950s.....	246
2.6.11. Regional and Global Extrapolations of the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict Taking Shape in Reference to the Strip, 1948-1956	250
2.7. Intentions in Coverage of Palestinian Territories Appearing in the Media Outlets.....	258
2.7.1. Conclusion	265
2.8. Synopsis of Duncan's Pictorial Stories on Saudi Arabia.....	267
2.8.1. ARAMCO Operating in Saudi Arabia, 1947-1948.....	267
2.8.1.1. Saudi Government-ARAMCO Relations in Saudi Arabia.....	268
2.8.1.2. ARAMCO's Oil Operations at Dhahran	269
2.8.2. Royal Visit of King Abdullah of Jordan to Ibn Saud in Riyadh, in 1948.....	271
2.8.3. The World and Heritage of King Saud, 1953	272
2.8.3.1. King Saud and the Ruling Family in Saudi Arabia.....	273
2.8.3.2. Arab Envoys and Western Dignitaries at Khuzam Palace	275
2.8.3.3. Non-Members of the Royal Family, Serving within or for the House of Saud ...	276
2.8.3.4. Khuzam Palace, from Saudi Administration to Saudi Court Life.....	277
2.8.3.5. The City, Jeddah.....	279
2.8.3.6. Developing Arabia through the Arabian-American Oil Company Income	281
2.9. Analysis of Duncan's Pictorial Stories on Saudi Arabia	282
2.9.1. Saudi Arabia, 1947 and 1948, within the Context of the Saudi-US Oil Partnership ...	283
2.9.2. Saudi-U.S. Oil Partnership in 1947 and Saudi-Jordanian Political Relations in 1948, Presenting the Context for the Emergence of the Modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	289
2.9.3. The Saudi State, its System of Government and Court Culture, from Foundation until 1953.....	294
2.9.4. Regional Extrapolations in Reference to Developing Saudi Arabia, 1953.....	306
2.10. Intentions in Coverage of Saudi Arabia Appearing in the Media Outlets	309
2.10.1. Conclusion	315
2.11. Synopsis of Duncan's Pictorial Stories on Turkey	317
2.11.1. Turkey's Intra/Inter-National Politics between 1947 and 1954.....	317

2.11.1.1. Russian Pressure on the Turkish Straits	318
2.11.1.2. Turkish Army Receiving Marshall Aid from the U.S.	319
2.11.1.3. Turkey, as a Member of NATO	322
2.11.1.4. Failures of Turkey Pertaining to the Utilization of US Economic Aid	325
2.11.1.5. Russian Venture into Turkish Trade, Challenging the U.S. Hold on Turkey	327
2.12. Analysis of Duncan's Pictorial Stories on Turkey	329
2.12.1. Prospects of the Turkish Straits, 1947	329
2.12.2. Present Tensions—Old Enmities: Russian Demands on the Turkish Straits and on the Eastern Anatolian Territories, 1947 and 1948	332
2.12.3. The Context of Marshall Aid and Russian Expansionist Policy towards Turkey, 1948	338
2.12.4. A Snapshot of Turkey; a Member of NATO, 1952	342
2.12.5. Parameters of the Turkish Economy, and Turkey in an International Trade System Driven by Economic Arrangements of the West and of the Communist Bloc, 1954	344
2.13. Intentions in Coverage of Turkey Appearing in the Media Outlets	348
2.13.1. Conclusion	351
2.14. Chapter Conclusion	352
CHAPTER 3	359
3.1. Sandra Mackey's Media and Intellectual Discourses	359
3.1.1. Biography: Sandra Mackey	359
3.1.2. An Overview of Source Materials on Mackey's Coverage of the Middle East	361
3.1.3. Selection of the Source Materials for This Study	365
3.1.4. Summary of Mackey's News Articles and Analysis of her Representations of the Middle East through her Journalistic and Intellectual Discourses	366
3.2. Summary of Mackey's News Articles	366
3.2.1. The Islamic Republic of Iran	367
3.2.1.1. Iran Benefits From the Gulf Panic	367
3.2.1.2. Fear of Enemies isn't Paranoia	370
3.2.1.3. A Culture, More Than a State, Reaches out—Iran	372
3.2.2. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	374
3.2.2.1. The Saudi Monarchy's Paranoia Rules out Development of a National Army Capable of Defending the Country	374
3.2.2.2. The House of Saud	376
3.2.2.3. Welcome or Not, We're In for Keeps	378
3.2.2.4. Winds of Change in the Desert	380
3.2.3. The Republic of Iraq	383
3.2.3.1. Get Rid of Saddam—and Then What?	384
3.2.3.2. Think Globally, Act Tribally	385
3.2.3.3. Two articles appearing in the Guardian	388
3.2.3.4. Better Alive Than Dead	391
3.2.3.5. Iraq's Dangerous Identity Crisis	393
3.2.3.6. Echoes of Iran	395
3.2.3.7. A City That Lives for Revenge	397
3.2.3.8. The Coming Clash over Kirkuk	398
3.3. Analysis of Mackey's Representations of the Persian Gulf Region through her Journalistic and Intellectual Discourses	401

3.3.1. Prospect of the Persian Gulf.....	401
3.3.1.1. Iran, a Bastion of anti-American Sentiments	402
3.3.1.2. Iranian Fear of Enemies	407
3.3.1.3. Iran’s Cultural Pattern in Ancient Persia, Shia Islam, and Western Liberalism ..	413
3.3.1.4. Saudi Arabia becoming a Regional Player following the Persian Gulf War of 1990-1	418
3.3.1.5. An Outlook of Iraq—A State not a Nation	425
3.3.1.6. The U.S. Invasion of Iraq, 2003	431
3.3.1.7. An Outlook of Complexities in an Occupational Conundrum—Iraq	435
3.4. Chapter Conclusion.....	441
CONCLUSION.....	445
WORKS CITED	460
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH	473

ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines twentieth-century Western scholarly, artistic, and journalistic perspectives on the Middle East. The Middle East has been a constant topic of research in academia throughout the centuries, in which Orientalism is one of the leading enterprises, studying and presenting the region through theoretical frameworks and influential ideologies. As Edward W. Said noted in *Orientalism* (1978), the common trend in this discipline is to show the purported binary, the dichotomizing of the Islamic East and the Christian West, which is discernible through visual art forms and various literatures projecting the Eastern world as often exotic and dangerous. With its Eurocentric perspective, Orientalism's influence is evident in several other fields, perhaps most notably in media practices seen through assorted biased reporting. The callous evaluations and assessments of the Middle East are perpetuated in the productions of many scholars, correspondents, and photographers since early post-WWII, when the area studies began taking on a new direction, renewed while changing hands from Britain to the U.S., where ideology and decision making have met.

This dissertation focuses on three expert communicators, and investigates how the modern Middle East is presented in their works—the academic treatments of Bernard Lewis, the photojournalism of David Douglas Duncan, and the journalism of Sandra Mackey. Their contributions have been critical and, in a very real sense, have created the Western view of the Middle East, making them worthy subjects of close scrutiny. Examination of their conceptualizations of the region and their perspectives on Islam delineates how the Middle East has been perceived, to what extent their positions in presenting the situation on the ground have contributed to the world shaping decisions of the policy makers, which have often rested more on myth and nostalgia than the facts, and how they have served to influence the shaping of knowledge about the East in the West, particularly in the U.S.

INTRODUCTION

The primary motivation for researching the contemporary Middle East lies in its natural, economical, and cultural riches, which have made it an essential territory throughout the centuries, but particularly in the twentieth century's petroleum centered economy. The historical importance of the Middle East reaches back to the beginning of civilization. The invention of writing by the Sumerians has been dated to 3500 BCE in Mesopotamia. The Middle East, the cradle of the most influential religions of the world, was also home to some of the earliest urban settlements of humanity including those of the Phoenicians, the Babylonians, the Egyptians, et al. While it was being ruled by different empires including the Egyptians, Romans, Greeks, Persians, Turks, Arabs, Jews, and Europeans, the region was the epicenter of numerous internal and external conflicts, in which not only its own settlements but also European, or what are termed today Western societies, were involved throughout its history. The Crusades for example, which dated between the eleventh and the thirteenth centuries, reflected the European interest in and turbulent relationship with the Middle East. Today, more than ever, the region remains significant due to its place at the center of the world's geopolitical, economical, and natural resource relations. This position within the global scheme is at the heart of what has brought conflict to this region, culminating even in the unscrupulous misnomer *the clash of civilizations*, making the Middle East worthy of examination.

This dissertation focuses on the twentieth-century Western scholarly, artistic, and journalistic perspective on the Middle East. The dissertation takes as its object of study the "Middle East" as defined by, apart from Turkey, major oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq. The research attempts to assess and respond to misconceptions about the ideological, political, religious, and socio-economic and cultural reasons for the East's attractions from the Western perspective throughout the twentieth century, emerging from a tumultuous past and culminating in the present. In this study, the term *the West* refers to several capitalist countries including the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and the United States—the countries that have incubated and borne the Western ideology in terms of their economic, political, martial, and cultural globe-spanning expansions.

By critically examining and comparing two different forms of discourse—scholarly historical analysis and media practices (which includes photojournalism and journalism) the

research attempts to determine to what extent colonialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism, capitalism, and globalization have impacted the Western views and their representations of the Middle East. The Western perceptions of the Middle East have been intensified by their own representations of the region. These representations are formed along the national boundaries of the West and the East, based on the opposition in the conflicts between Western and Islamic countries. Thus, this study investigates the Western views of the Middle East within a comparative and multidisciplinary framework from a dialectic perspective. In aiming to fulfill this, the study focuses on the works of Bernard Lewis, David Douglas Duncan, and Sandra Mackey, making up the body of my dissertation, comprising three chapters.

In the first chapter, I examine Bernard Lewis' historical and intellectual discourses. Bernard Lewis, the Cleveland E. Dodge Professor of Near Eastern Studies, Emeritus, at Princeton University, Orientalist, and political commentator of British origin (b. 1916) counts among some of the most highly respected, as well as most controversial scholars on the Middle East. Having studied at the University of London, in the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), where he obtained his MA and PhD in 1936 and 1938 respectively, Lewis stepped into the world of academics with a specific focus, medieval Arab and Islamic history. His knowledge of numerous languages, some of which were learned at an early age and some were improved later, including Hebrew, Arabic, and Turkish, became one of the key identifiers of his explorations of the Middle East. Though an impressive linguistic achievement, it lacks significant anchorage in genuine practice. He had not lived in the region other than during brief visits or while conducting research.

While his first book was written in 1940, his third book, *The Arabs in History*, published in 1950, crystallized his reputation as an Orientalist and an influential scholar to the general public. This crucial time frame in fact marks the outset of the new global power structure of the world, in which the balance of domination divided into the two competing super powers, the U.S. and the USSR, and their clashing ideologies. Three years after publishing the aforementioned book, Lewis delivered his famed lecture at Chatham House in London on the topic, which would soon be turned into an article, "Communism and Islam." This was, as noted by Zachary Lockman, the author of *Contending Vision of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism*, a testifying framework, drawing its motivation from "an urgent Cold War policy-related concern" (131). The manner in which Lewis explored what qualities of Islam

might prepare Islamic societies to lean towards embracing Communist principles and its method of government has focused his discourse throughout his academic career, which brought about countless books and articles. While conflating the history of Medieval Islam with that of the modern Middle East, and by attributing to the modern Arab mind his knowledge of a period long passed, he has framed every single topic in examination with an essentialist stance, revealing the region's undertakings through the trajectory of Islamic history and by means of Muslim experience accrued throughout the centuries. Lewis is clearly a party to modernization theory, “[a] dominant paradigm in US area studies in general and Middle Eastern studies in particular [from the early 1950s into the 1970s], informing a mass of research and writing in political change, economic development and social transformation, and interacting with Orientalism in complex ways” (Lockman, 135), his discourse has exclusively leaned on Islam's incompatibility with modernity, which is presented as an explanation of why Islamic states and societies were in need of a master to transform them from a mode of medieval existence to a modern way of *being*. In his perception, Turkey is an exceptional case with its secular democracy—a country, where he conducted his extensive research within the Ottoman archives, which were opened for the Western scholars in the early 1950s.

Throughout his tenure in the U.S. on the faculty of Princeton University, his rhetoric on the West and East dichotomy became stronger still, variously realized, perhaps most notably in *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East* (1998), informed by European colonialism and Western imperialism enacted in the region by U.S. foreign policy, to support pro-Western regimes in its competition with the USSR. Upon the manifestation of political Islam by the end of the 1970s, Lewis published “The Return of Islam” (1976), since then it has become a major source. Accompanied by another article, “The Roots of Muslim Rage” (1990), the discussions have been reintegrated into many of his books published in the later periods, such as *Crises of Islam* (2003). As a public intellectual, his discourse has been transmitted through debates and speeches, circulating in printed and electronic media and has transcended beyond academia. *Crises of Islam*, gaining renown in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, is one of the best examples conceptualizing Lewis' understanding of Islamic revival, or rather, in his own words, *Islamic fundamentalism*, referencing the Islamic Revolution of 1979. In exploring this “return” and this “rage,” he has mixed the knowledge of medieval history with his modernizing approach, suggesting the “Muslim failure of modernization” and “Muslim search for culpability” is to

blame for the decline of the Islamic civilization evident since the sixteenth century. He further delves into why being under alien rule and influence has reignited the old concept of *jihad*, manifest in the person of Usama bin Ladin and Islamic terrorism. Lewis has placed Samuel Huntington's theory on *the clash of civilizations* into a perspective, which perfectly serves to justify *the war on terror* declared by the U.S. leading into the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

The second chapter of this dissertation concentrates on David Douglas Duncan's artistic and media discourses. As a noted American photojournalist (b. 1916), his career started on his eighteenth birthday, when his sister Jean gifted him with a camera, unaware that it would have propelled her brother to distant lands. Through his innate artistry and talent, Duncan progressed in this profession by the 1940s as he was able to mix the aesthetic style and the factual content of his subject through words and images. Owing to his deft ability, his work was featured in various national magazines. He served as a combat photographer for the U.S. Marine Corps until the end of WWII, an experience which later contributed to his preeminence in the field when he became *Life* magazine's correspondent to the Middle East, a position which he held for ten years.

Through *Life* assignments he traveled nomadically to far-flung places between 1946 and 1956, bearing witness to the far-ranging changes around the globe, a period which would later be called the Cold War. In addition to his coverage on the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the civil wars in Palestine and Greece, he had opportunities to observe and capture the internal and external dynamics of the sum of Middle Eastern issues. These include the escalation of the Iranian Crisis of 1946, when the Russian invasion of Iranian Azerbaijan menaced the Persian Gulf Abadan oil fields; Russian pressure on the Turkish Straits and its Eastern Anatolian territories in the early post-WWII period during which Turkey became an ally of the U.S. while gradually becoming a NATO country; intensified tensions amongst the British armed forces, Israelis, and Arabs in the British mandate of Palestine in 1946, when illegal immigration to the Holy Lands reached its apex, while Holocaust atrocities were serving as a base for the Zionist dream that gained worldwide support; and flourishing Saudi royal family-ARAMCO relations, indicative of Saudi-U.S. partnership helping the U.S. to place its influence in the Middle East while Arabia was integrated into the Western world of the oil concession. Presumably Duncan did not regret living abroad through assignments despite the fact that there existed some contentions between him and the magazine's editors, who would occasionally misrepresent images and/or combined textual materials submitted by the photojournalist. He once decided to

quit *Life* upon seeing his Palestinian essay appearing in the magazine as an unfair and insincere portrayal of Palestinian Arabs. However, even if they had their disagreements on an issue, a common ground was eventually found. It was in 1956 that the photojournalist quit *Life*, the year that marks the outset of his freelance career. In that year, he covered a story for *Collier's* on the Gaza Strip, which had become a space of dubious proprietary claim owing to the truce lines of Arab-Israeli armistice of 1949, and its original Arab settlers and Palestinian refugees who were ruled and defended by an interim Egyptian military government. In conjunction with his Palestinian coverage (1946), this Gaza story is well worth examining with consideration of ongoing Palestine-Israeli conflicts, well anchored in the region, where Palestinians have still remained a stateless society in the second decade of the twenty-first century. While spending a week in Gaza, Duncan produced a photographic essay to be written and then run by the magazine's editors. This last experience of his in the Middle East, just like with the preceding ones, is eternalized in his photo-autobiographic books, *Yankee Nomad: a Photographic Odyssey*, *The World of Allah*, and *Photo Nomad*.

The focus on Duncan, whose productions on the Middle East have yet to be studied in an academic setting, provides a unique perspective to this dissertation. This is not only because of his large body of testimony, giving an extensive amount of perspectives within the core of exposures, which turned out to be source materials in the area of study, but also because of his unique position in photojournalism, allowing us to better investigate the complex relation between the general streams of Western media, the decision-making, and the target reader. While serving the national interests, he played roles as a mediator between the host and home countries, which is evident in the collections of his published and unpublished materials. Of his unpublished materials, that I collected through archival research conducted at the Harry Ransom Center of the University of Texas, Austin, to which Duncan has donated entire collections of his works in 1985, the caption books and correspondences are significant constituents of this study, enabling us to examine his concern that an audience might stray from his intended conception, as the publishing process of *Life* might be biased by the broadly Eurocentric perspective of the magazine. Above all, Duncan's work is examined in its capacity to reach the general public either through *Life* and *Collier's*, or his books, presenting cultural dynamics in line with the political affairs of the Middle East, where the East and the West coalesce.

In the third chapter, I examine Sandra Mackey's media and intellectual discourses.

The works of political writer and commentator Sandra Mackey (b. 1937) highlights another angle of the issue of Western representations of the Middle East, namely that of an American female, a veteran freelance journalist and an award-winning writer, as well as a highly regarded expert on Middle Eastern culture and politics. Upon receiving her M.A. degree in Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia (UVA) in 1966, she spent a year, teaching political science at Georgia State University in Atlanta, and her academic expertise would later lead her to serve as a visiting scholar at UVA (1994-1996). Her journalistic career began in the late 1970s in Saudi Arabia, where she spent four years while working as an underground journalist, reporting diverse issues from the region's political undertakings to its culture, when the oil embargo of 1973, which brought about an oil boom almost overnight, transformed the country immensely. While this early experience would later transform into a book format, *The Saudis: Inside the Desert Kingdom* (1987), her explorations of the Middle East as well as book-writing continued in the decades that followed, living in countries as Iran, Lebanon, Iraq, Oman, and Jordan, traveling around the region witnessing diverse range of cultural practices while also visiting the most secret places like the guerilla bases and hideaway of Yasser Arafat.

Her journey has allowed her to be preeminent as a journalist, contributor for various national and international news media periodicals (e.g., *Los Angeles Times*, *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *The Guardian*) and commentator of television broadcasts (e.g., ABC News with Peter Jennings, Nightline, BBC, CNN, CBS, NPR, and Monitor Radio), reporting about the most complex issues, ranging from the Saudi oil bonanza of the 1970s to the Palestine Israeli conflicts and the Lebanese Civil War of 1975-1990, from the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-8 to the Persian Gulf Wars of 1990-1 and U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.

The above sequence of war affairs commonly points at the Persian Gulf, which is perhaps, apart from Lebanon, Mackey's most frequently covered region, dealing with the issues involved with and experienced by the petroleum-exporting countries Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait, as well as the two superpowers, the U.S. and the USSR. She has served as a political commentator of the Middle East, when capitalism's external operations pointed out an enemy, whether communism or Islam, and the resulting competitions stimulate the economies to greater effort on the part of the constituents. As a result of the collapse of the Soviets, the new target became radical Islam, which was manifested in the Ayatollah Khomeini's attempts of exporting

Islamic revolution of Iran to the Arab world, and more recently, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 inspired the response of the U.S. as the *war on terror*, which has been justified under the name of freedom, democracy, and human rights, and provides new debates on U.S. foreign policy parameters. International political and cultural relations of the West have subsequently been called into question, as well as the economic reasons of this interference. Mackey's position, as she has had personal contact to the region gaining firsthand experience, allows for valuable observations on the region and its issues. In her reportage she frequently remarks on the poor understanding shown by Western policy makers about the region while planning their containment policies and war affairs. Examination of her works on this often-misunderstood region, where conflict under the effects of egregious Western imperialism and complex internal Arab politics has been evolved, brings about a view critical of American action and involvement, albeit from the Western perspective, which is valuable in creating understanding and fostering coalescence.

By focusing on the works of Lewis, Duncan, and Mackey, the objective of this dissertation is to investigate the economical, ideological, political, religious, and socio-cultural reasons behind the attraction of the Middle East for the West, and to what extent these reasons influence Western writers and communicators' understanding of the Middle East. Each chapter draws its objective from the following primary research question: what is the information the Western reader receives from his/her writer and communicator about the Middle East, and how could this transmission shape Western public opinion about the Middle East? The adequacy of the Western understanding of the region and whether this understanding has been objectively evaluated is deeply analyzed, and in this analysis outside sources are largely referenced as they provide a framework allowing us to assess critically how Western discourses and their theoretical understanding about the Middle East compare to and hold up against our findings. This analysis provides an opportunity to revisit and propose critical adjustments and updates to this body of discourses concerning their impacts on the foreign policies of the decision-making and Western public opinion. In doing so, and in a larger cultural context, this dissertation provides a critical comparison of representations and perspectives, which through the twentieth century, the West and the East harbor about each other and thus continues the debate over *the clash of civilizations* from a fresh angle.

As a person who grew up in Turkey, a society unique for its blend of Western and Eastern cultures, and as a person who received her higher education in a Western society, the United States, I have had an unparalleled opportunity to observe cultural differences between the West and the East, and I have been exposed to the core values of each culture.



CHAPTER 1

1.1. Bernard Lewis' Historical and Intellectual Discourses

1.1.1. Biography: Bernard Lewis

Bernard Lewis, Cleveland E. Dodge Professor of Near Eastern Studies, Emeritus, at Princeton University, was born to Jewish parents, in London, on May 31, 1916. Lewis, an American historian, scholar in Oriental studies, and political commentator of British origin, received his B.A. on Near and Middle Eastern studies in History in 1936 from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), of the University of London. While completing part of his graduate studies at the University of Paris, he obtained *the Diplôme des Études Sémitiques* in 1937. He received his first teaching appointment in 1938, as an assistant lecturer in Islamic History at SOAS, from where he received his PhD in the History of Islam in 1939. His doctoral dissertation topic was *Studies on the History of the Qarmati and Ismaili Movements from the Eighth to the Eleventh Centuries*.

Lewis served in the Royal Armoured Corps and Intelligence Corps of the British Army between 1940 and 1941, and then served in the Foreign Office from 1941 until 1945. When his appointment with the Foreign Office expired, he returned to SOAS, where, in 1949, he was appointed the Chair of Near and Middle Eastern History, and taught until 1974. He received an invitation from Princeton University to conduct research in 1974, and from then until his formal retirement in 1986, he served there as a faculty member who was instrumental in the success of many graduate students. While working in a joint position between Princeton and the Institute for Advanced Study, he published respected articles and books, which impacted his career greatly. In 1982 he became a naturalized citizen of the U.S., and from 1986 until 1990 he served as a member of the faculty at Cornell University.

Medieval Arab-Islamic history was Lewis' first research area with a specific focus on Ismailis and Assassins, investigating the religious movements. As he would have been denied a visa in many Arab countries in the late 1940s, when Israel was becoming an independent state,

he shifted his research interest towards the history of Turkey with a focus on the Ottoman period. Thus, he began conducting extensive research within the Ottoman archives, which had been recently opened to Western scholars in Istanbul. The lasting impact WWII internationally had also led Lewis to broaden his research to all of the contemporary Middle East. Since then, he has merged these three subjects of study, studying the history of interaction between Islam and the West, from early eras, through the Ottoman period, and into modern times. Lewis' interest in history coalesced with that of learning foreign languages, placing him squarely in his element in these studies. He learned Hebrew at an early age, engaged in studying Aramaic, Latin, Greek, and Classical Arabic; and he enhanced his study of Arabic, while also learning Persian and Turkish during later periods.

Lewis has written and published the following books, most of which have been translated into multiple languages including Arabic, Persian, and Turkish: *The Origins of Ismailism: A Study of the Historical Background of the Fatimid Caliphate* (1940), *A Handbook of Diplomatic and Political Arabic* (1947), *The Arabs in History* (1950), *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (1961), *Istanbul and the Civilizations of the Ottoman Empire* (1963), *The Middle East and the West* (1964) [revised as *The Shaping of the Middle East* (1994)], *The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam* (1967), *Race and Color in Islam* (1971) [revised and expanded as *Race and Slavery in the Middle East: An Historical Enquiry* (1990)], *Islam in History: Ideas, People, and Events in the Middle East* (1973), *History — Remembered, Recovered, Invented* (1975), *Studies in Classical and Ottoman Islam, 7th-16th Centuries* (1976), *Islam and the Arab World: Faith, People, Culture* (1976), *The Muslim Discovery of Europe* (1982), *The Jews of Islam* (1984), *Semites and Anti-Semites: An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice* (1986), *The Political Language of Islam* (1988), *Islam and the West* (1993), *Cultures in Conflict: Christians, Muslims, and Jews in the Age of Discovery* (1995), *The Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2,000 Years* (1995) [in the UK as *The Middle East: 2,000 Years of History from the Rise of Christianity to the Present Day* (1995)], *The Future of the Middle East* (1997), *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East* (1998), *A Middle East Mosaic: Fragments of Life, Letters and History* (2000), *What Went Wrong?: The Clash, Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East* (2002) [alternative title in the British edition: *What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response* (2001)], *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror* (2003), *From Babel to Dragomans: Interpreting the Middle East* (2005), *Europe and Islam* (2007), *Political Words and Ideas in*

Islam (2008), *Faith and Power: Religion and Politics in the Middle East* (2010), *The End of Modern History in the Middle East* (2011).

Lewis's name has also appeared in many books as an editor, translator, and/or co-author, including the following: *Historians of the Middle East* (1962, eds. Lewis and P.M. Holt), *The Cambridge History of Islam*, 2 Vols. (1970, eds. P. M. Holt, Ann K. S. Lambton, and Lewis), *The World of Islam: Faith, People, Culture* (1992, ed. Lewis), *Islam from the Prophet Muhammad to the Capture of Constantinople*, 2 Vols. (1974, ed. and trans. Lewis), *Population & Revenue in the Towns of Palestine in the Sixteenth Century* (1978, co-authors, Amnon Cohen and Lewis), *Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law*, by Ignaz Goldziher (1981, ed. Lewis), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society*, 2 Vols. (1982, eds. Benjamin Braude and Lewis), *Muslims in Europe* (1994, eds. Lewis and Dominique Schnapper), *Music of a Distant Drum: Classical Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and Hebrew Poems* (2001, trans. Lewis), *The New Terrorism: Threat And Response* (2002, co-author Lewis), *Islam: The Religion and the People* (2008, co-authors Buntzie Ellis Churchill and Lewis).

Lewis visited the Middle East several times from 1938 on, either to tour or conduct research in Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iran. The last two countries were where he spent 1949-1950 academic year to conduct research. He received awards for his scholarly attributions, including the Universality of Civilization & Peace Award from the Atatürk Society of America (2002) and the annual Irvin Kristol Award from the American Enterprise Institute (2007). He has also been awarded honorary doctorates by fifteen universities for his contributions to the understanding of history. Due to his position of high esteem in the scholarly community and within the realm of Middle Eastern affairs, several groups of U.S. policymakers, including the George W. Bush administration, have often sought Lewis' advice.

1.1.2. An Overview of Source Materials on Lewis' Discourse Concerning the Middle East

Since the late 1930s, Lewis has been a published historian, and the source materials typifying his Middle Eastern coverage in historical and intellectual discourses can be found in an array of media outlets, which are, for the most part, in circulation and accessible. Along with the books, he has written a great number of articles, seminar papers, and lecture notes, issued in well-read academic journals, which are all reflective of the research conducted over seventy

years of his academic career. As his works have progressed and been recognized, Lewis has become a public intellectual in the U.S., and his debates, speeches, and interviews have appeared in printed and electronic media; thus, his discourse has proceeded beyond the academic circle.

1.1.3. Selection of the Source Materials for This Study

Most of Lewis' scholarly works (e.g., journal articles, conference papers, and lecture notes) have been transformed into book formats with certain ones recognized as influential to the general public, and some others were published after the 9/11 attacks, from whence the interest in Lewis' books have grown along with the topic. The books published by him form the focus of this study, within which particular attention is given to *The Arabs in History*, *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East*, and *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror*; yet, in the following analyses, other books and scholarly papers by Lewis as well as his public debates, speeches, and interviews are occasionally drawn on.

The Arabs in History is one of Lewis' early books, first published in Great Britain in 1950, five years after the end of WWII and two years after the foundation of the State of Israel, which was then slightly revised and expanded several times by the end of the twentieth century, and recognized as one of his more influential books comprehensible to the non-expert on the Middle East. In the preface to the first edition, Lewis writes that "this is not so much a history of the Arabs as an essay in interpretation, [wherein] I have sought to isolate and examine certain basic issues—the place of the Arabs in human history, their identity, their achievement, and the salient characteristics of the several ages of their development" (v). Its sixth edition was first issued as an Oxford University Press paperback in 1993, and reissued in 2002. In it Lewis traces the history of the Arabs from the pre-Islamic era into the early 1990s, exposing the profound implications at the regional, national, and international levels that not only involved Arab states and societies, but also other Middle Eastern countries, the Eastern Bloc, and the West, including the U.S. The book consists of ten chapters, and their titles are as follows: "Arabia Before Islam," "Muhammad and the Rise of Islam," "The Age of the Conquests," "The Arab Kingdom," "The Islamic Empire," "The Revolt of Islam," "The Arabs in Europe," "Islamic Civilization," "The Arabs in Eclipse," and "The Impact of the West."

Originally published in Great Britain (1998), and then in the U.S. (1999), *The Multiple*

Identities of the Middle East was constituted mainly in three scholarly papers by Lewis delivered at conferences in Wolfenbüttel, Rome, and Castelgandolfo in 1989, 1993, and 1995 respectively, and also included additional lectures, articles, and conference papers. Lewis indicates in its introductory chapter that “What I want to convey by this title is something of the complexity and variety of the different identities [...] the constant change and evolution of identity in the Middle East, of the ways in which the peoples of the region perceive themselves, the groups to which they belong, and the difference between self and other” (3). In the book, the author elucidates the identity formation within diverse contexts of the Middle East while examining the notion of race, language, ethnicity, religion, country, as well as nationhood and statehood. Also examining Western imported ideas in the twentieth century such as patriotism, nationalism, socialism, fascism, liberalism, secularism, and democracy, he argues their impacts on the transformation of the Middle East and on the conflicts surrounding the region and its peoples upon the regional, national, and international level. It contains nine chapters that are titled as, “Definitions,” “Religion,” “Race and Language,” “Country,” “Nation,” “The State,” “Symbols,” “Aliens and Infidels,” and “Aspirations.”

The Crisis of Islam was published in the U.S. in the early twenty-first century (2003), following the 9/11 attacks, and its foundation was the George Polk Award-winning article, “The Revolt of Islam,” by Lewis, which appeared in *The New Yorker* in 2001; yet, he also adopted several passages from his published articles which appeared in the media including *Foreign Affairs* and *The Atlantic Monthly*. In the book, Lewis traces the history of Islam, from its foundation in the seventh century, which includes its expansion in the Middle East and beyond, and its confrontations with the West, while examining the routes towards the rise of extremism within Islam that manifested itself in the late twentieth century and into the early twenty first century. In its introductory chapter, the author compares and contrasts the proclaimed ideology between *the war on terror* led by Western politicians, particularly President George W. Bush, and *war for Islam* led by Usama bin Ladin. The former is engaged against terrorism, “not a war against Arabs, nor, more generally, against Muslims.” Whereas, the latter is a religious war against infidels; “therefore, inevitably, against the United States, the greatest power in the world of the infidels” (xv). The themes are explored throughout the nine chapters, entitled as “Defining Islam,” “The House of War,” “From Crusaders to Imperialists,” “Discovering America,” “Satan and the Soviets,” “Double Standards,” “A Failure of Modernity,” “The Marriage of Saudi Power

and Wahhabi Teaching,” and “The Rise of Terrorism.”

1.1.4. Summary of Lewis’ Books and Analysis of his Representations of the Middle East through his Historical and Intellectual Discourses

This study first provides a summary of *The Arabs in History* (sixth edition-reissued 2002), *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East* (1999), and *Crisis of Islam* (2003). The aim of each summary is to point out Lewis’ specific choices and emphases in his representations of Middle Eastern socio-economic, -political, -cultural, and -religious history, standing in connection with global economic, political, and international systems. The summary section is followed by an in-depth analysis, in order to investigate how Lewis “represents” the Middle East while also incorporating some of his other works, which have been circulating in academia and mass media, in order to strengthen some points in discussion, to inquire upon the extent of his exploration within academic and journalistic combinations of representation, and to assess whether his discourse has changed over time. This study, in particular, aims to explore Lewis’ discourses, while driving its objective from the following primary research question: *what is the information the Western reader receives from his/her writer and communicator about the Middle East, and how could this transmission shape Western public opinion about the Middle East?*

1.2. Summary of Lewis’ Books

This section of the study intends to provide a summary of *The Arabs in History*, *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East* and *Crisis of Islam* in line with the following themes, shared within and exposed through these books:

- 1) Relationships in Religion, Society, and Politics within the Islamic World
- 2) The Rise and Decline of the Islamic Civilization
- 3) The Rise of the West, from influence to affluence—domineering the Middle East

- 4) Ideological Aspirations and Political Practices during the Twentieth Century in the Middle East
- 5) Search for the Culprit and the Search for the Remedy in the Islamic World

1.2.1. Relationships in Religion, Society, and Politics within the Islamic World

In examining the political role of Islam functioning within states and societies in modern times, Lewis states that the perceptions and models stemming from Islamic antiquity still have significant consequences in present time (*Multiple*, 30). In order to corroborate this sentiment, the author traces the history of Islam, one of the three monotheistic religions—along with Judaism and Christianity—appearing with strikingly similar traditions while being theologically akin; for example, in Judaism and Islam a divine law regulates all aspects of human activity, including even rituals and dietary restrictions, and both Christians and Muslims believe that they alone are the receivers of God’s final revelation, and their task is to bring it into all humanity. In this examination, Lewis focuses on a profound difference between Islam and Christianity—the relation between religion, society, and politics, showing itself through their authorized exponents, meaning their measure of clout in these three spheres (*Crisis*, 5-6), while also addressing the same relation in Judaism with a specific focus on Israel where, “there have of the late been increasing signs of Middle Eastern attitudes on these matters” (*Multiple*, 39).

The author points out that the Prophet Muhammad had provided Islam with a revelation in the seventh century, which was to be followed as a guide through the centuries by its countless believers, while also establishing a community as well as a well-structured and armed state, whose prestige and power made Islam a foremost factor in Arabia (*Arabs*, 45). Unlike earlier prophets [i.e., “Christ was crucified, Moses died without entering the promised land” (*Crisis*, 10)], Muhammad established and governed a polity, promulgating laws, dispensing justice, commanding armies, making war and peace, and collecting taxes (*Multiple*, 28). From whence the Islamic society had a dual character; it was a polity that was to become a state and then an empire, but also it was a religious community founded by Muhammad and ruled by his deputies, the caliphs (*Crisis*, 10). The repeated injunction in the Qur’an [“3:104, 110; 7; 157; 22:41, etc.” (*Multiple*, 27)] instructs Muslims regarding their basic duty that is “to command good and forbid

evil,” which surpasses personal duty demanded in other religions, while implying to exercise authority for that duty. Transformation of the Prophet’s state into an empire by his deputies proves that from the outset there is an interpenetration of belief and power in Islam, “which has some parallel in Old Testament Judaism but not in any subsequent form” (*Multiple*, 28).

Lewis explains that unlike Islam, Christian theory and practice have developed through “Render unto to Caesar the things which are Caesar’s and unto God the things which are God’s” and this was the principle laid down since its inception, which remained basic in thought and practice throughout Christian history. Sometimes in association and sometimes in conflict there have always been two authorities, God and Caesar, dealing with different matters in Christianity (*Multiple*, 28). “For Christians, there is a choice between God and Caesar, and endless generations of Christians have been ensnared in that choice” (*Crisis*, 6-7). In Islam “state” and “church” are unified and not separable institutions; regardless of classical Islamic thought and practice that differentiate between “the things of this world” and “the things of the other” that both are regulated by the Holy Law—the *Shari‘a*, regulating “every aspect of life, not only belief and cult, but also public law, constitutional and international, and private law, criminal and civil” (*Multiple*, 28; *Arabs*, 145). According to a doctrine, furnished in the early centuries of Islam, the Qur‘an is eternal and absolute; whereas, the Old and New Testament comprise a collection of different books conceived over an expanse of time, recognized by believers as representing divine revelation. The mosque is where communal worship takes place; yet it is not an institution like the Church with its own hierarchy and law that is in contrast to the state. The *ulema*, in a sociological sense, is seen as clergy; but priesthood does not exist in Islam, and “in the past, one would have added that there are no councils or synods, no bishops to define and inquisitors to enforce orthodoxy; [at] least in Iran, this is no longer entirely true” (*Crisis*, 9). However, Iranian rulers claim both spiritual and temporal authority while creating an Islamic church (*Multiple*, 32). Thus, in the Islamic world, the dichotomy expressed through pairings of deeply rooted words in Christendom, such as “lay and ecclesiastical,” “sacred and profane,” “spiritual and temporal,” appear as relatively new, introduced through external influences. Yet, these influences have been attacked and weakened in recent years; as a result, the ideas accepted only by minority group of elites seem fleeting. “And as external influences lose their appeal, there is an inevitable return to older, more deep-rooted perceptions” (*Multiple*, 29).

According to Lewis, in Muslim perception of the universal Islamic polity, there is only

God, no Caesar, the only sovereign and source of law; His Prophet was Muhammad, who had taught and ruled on His behalf, completed his spiritual and prophetic mission upon death, and what he left was the task of dispersing God's message until the whole world accepted it; this would be succeeded through the extension of authority and that of the membership of the community; for which the accession of Abu Bakr to the headship of the community brought the historic institution of the Caliphate into existence. While conquering the Middle East, Muslim Arab invaders created their own polity with a new set of laws with a new imperial structure and language headed by the caliph, and they defined this state and polity by Islam. In the experience of this Muslim explosion, the religious truth sanctified the political power and that power sustained the religious truth. This is, to the author, the prime reason behind the sentiment, "Islam is politics or it is nothing," remarked by the Ayatollah Khomeini; despite this being extreme rhetoric that not all Muslims would agree with, it alludes to the powerful political machine begetting itself in the Middle East and most of them would agree that God is involved in politics, as confirmed and sustained by the *Shari'a* (*Crisis*, 7-10).

While further comparing the rise of Islam with that of Christianity, the author narrates that, unlike Islam, that brought about the birth of an empire, and became the faith of a vast, dominant, and thriving realm, expressed in the language of new revelation (Arabic), the rise of Christianity was analogous with the decline of Rome, when the church formed its own structure out of necessity. When Christianity was "a persecuted faith of the downtrodden" God was recognized as subjecting the followers to test and purify their faith; Christians, when it became a state religion, attempted to take over and re-modify their institutions along with the language of Rome. Thus in opposition to early Christian thought, in which the state was a lesser evil, for Muslims, the (Islamic) state was a divine good (*Multiple*, 29). Since the advent of Islam, in most circumstances, there have been only Islamic states within the Middle East being to some degree separated, where "in principle, there was only one universal Islamic state; [ideally], and for a while even in practice, the Islamic polity was a single state bounded together by the faith and law of Islam and ruled by a single sovereign, the caliph" (*Multiple*, 91-2); the desire to grasp this ideal is a recurring theme and powerful motive throughout Islamic history. The state was ordained by the *Shari'a* to spread God's faith, enforce His law, and shield and increase His people; in this conceptualization of the universe, God is recognized as helping the believers, not testing, as He desires their accomplishment in this world while showing His approval by success

and dominance, for His army, community, and state. In this triumphalism, to which a partial exception is constituted by the Shi‘a—the defeated splinter group in the early struggle for the caliphate, whose conception of suffering, passion, and martyrdom was almost Christian-like, martyrdom means death in battle in a holy war; in modern times, this has united with new ideologies and technologies, generating an explosively social force (*Multiple*, 29-30).

As exploratory of the political role of Islam on the international, regional, and domestic levels, projecting major differences between Islam and the rest of the world, Lewis provides two examples on the ground and discusses as follows. First, it is neither customary for the politicians of the Scandinavian countries and those of Germany to gather in a Lutheran summit conference, nor the leaders of the Soviet Union, when it existed, to join with those of Yugoslavia and Greece, temporarily putting up their ideological differences, to hold recurring meetings based upon their adherence to the Orthodox Church. This sort of consorting might be absurd to many modern Westerners; yet it is not so in relation to Islam, as some fifty-five Muslim governments (e.g., monarchies, republics, conservatives, radicals, practitioners of capitalism and that of socialism), attempt to achieve deterministic agreements and cooperative actions, regardless of their differences on state structures, and ideological and political traits. It is just like the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) that was duly set and developed in the 1970s with consideration of poor Muslim countries, Muslim minorities in non-Muslim countries, as well as the international position of Islam and Muslims. Now numbering fifty-seven member states along with three observer states, the OIC have showed its ineffectiveness in international and regional politics (e.g., during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and during the Iraq-Iran War of 1980-88). Unlike the Organization of American State, the OIC does not concern itself with human rights abuses and others domestic problems occurring in the member states with exception of the issue Palestine (*Crisis*, 13-16).

Second, religion functions as the most powerful factor in the internal affairs of most Islamic countries, which is unlike the rest of the world, where there are few political parties, referring to themselves as Buddhist or Christian in Asia and Europe, and in the strict sense, religious motives play either little or no part in their appeals to the electorate (*Multiple*, 26-27). Despite the Christian clergy, who are still a force to be reckoned with in many countries, there is now no Christian country, in which religious leaders can commend the degree of the belief and that of religious participation of the followers that is common in the Muslim lands. They, with

few exceptions, neither exercise nor claim a public authority, which is yet usual and recognized as proper in most Muslim countries (*Crisis*, 16-7).

In questioning in the realm of politics, why Islam differs from the rest of the world, Lewis recommends we trace back to the origination of these various religions which provide adequate explanations for the unique Muslim attitude towards politics, showing an intimate relationship between religion and politics in Islam “that has no parallel in other major religions” (*Multiple*, 27). Within this context, it appears that “Islam is not only a matter of faith and practice; it is also an identity and a loyalty—for many, an identity and loyalty that transcend all others” (*Crisis*, 17). According to the author, while paving the way in the creation of a sequence of modern nation states all over the region, importation of the Western ideas such as patriotism and nationalism changed this reality only on the surface in the region; there are only a few exceptions in this regard as in the case of Turkey acknowledging Western democracy, where until very recently the state-issued identity card had a line for religion (*Crisis*, 17-9).

In this examination on the impact the storied Islamic past had on the present time, Lewis focuses on the consequence of such an impact in shaping the Muslim self-awareness; “For most of the recorded history of most of Muslim world, the primary and basic definition of identity, both adoptive and ascriptive, is religion; for Muslims, that of course means Islam or, more specifically the particular version of Islam to which they adhere.” To him, this leads to another significant difference, as in the Muslim perception that “the world is divided into religions, and these may be subdivided into nations and, by abuse, states”; this is quite opposite to the secular West and the regions that have accepted Western ways, in which “the world is divided into nations, and the nation may be subdivided into different religious communities” (*Multiple*, 30). In most Muslim countries, where Islam is recognized as the main marker of identity, the main claim to loyalty is constituted with Islam, as in Islam the prime test is more of communal loyalty and conformity than that of devotion to correct belief and doctrine. This is, to Lewis, another impact remaining from Classical Islam, which had no hierarchic institution to describe and oblige correct belief and to detect and penalize the incorrect one, when the consensus was that practice was a source of guidance and basis for legitimacy. In spite of many changes that occurred since the nineteenth century, Islam itself has remained a recognized form of consensus; “Islamic symbols and appeals are still the most effective for social mobilization” (*Multiple*, 31).

Lewis states that Islamic identity is not of singular origin while providing basic

identification of sects and deviant groups within Islam and details the distribution of their population based upon regions, such as the Shi'a (populated in Iraq, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia), the mainstream (Twelver) Shi'a (the official established faith in Iran, where there is a substantial Sunni minority), the Alawis (a deviant faction within the Shi'a camp, residing within predominantly Sunni populated Syria and Turkey), the Isma'ili sect (deviated from the mainstream Shi'a, residing in central Syria), the Druze (an offshoot of the Isma'ili sect, living in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Israel). He also places an emphasis on Islam as a religion of the majority in every country of the Middle East, except Israel and, until recently, Lebanon. He explains that in Saudi Arabia, no other religion is acceptable; Christians, but not Jews, are admitted in the country to the designated areas and as temporary visitors, where also the Holy cities of Mecca and Medina are closed to the non-Muslims. A small portion of Jewish and Christian populations reside in both Turkey and Iran—in the former with official status of equal citizenship, while in the latter as tolerated and protected subjects of an Islamic state (*Multiple*, 32-6). While also focusing on the general trend portrayed by Christians and Jews in the region, Lewis points out that Christians surviving in the Middle East (Fertile Crescent, Egypt, etc.) display a variety of sectarian traits, Protestants and Catholics alike. Whereas, the Jews populating Israel, exhibit their divergence through cultural traits as a mixed result of Indigenous Middle Eastern Jews; the Sephardim or Jews of the Iberian Peninsula—historically and culturally recognized as part of Islam; and of the continental European Jews (Ashkenazim—as part of Christendom whose distinction is neither based on the theology nor legal significance, but on what they brought with them. “The many contrasts and occasional clashes between these two groups reflect, in miniature, the larger confrontation of Christendom and Islam” (*Multiple*, 37), forecasting the portentous conflict occurring between the religious and secular interpretations of Israeli identity.

In concluding, the author says that the current problem in Israel is the rising sign of Middle Eastern attitudes on relations between politics and religion, power and wealth, and on the manner in which the power is achieved, practiced, and transformed. Without any living traditions in the course of the absence of any sovereign state since the destruction of the ancient Jewish State, Israel presents the Jews, for the first time, the issue of relation between religion and state, “in Muslim terms, between the affairs of this world and the next, in Christian terms, between God and Caesar.” In Muslim countries, the leaders have been confronted with this as a new

problem due to the rapid transformation of society, culture, and state, and for the remedy, no precedent is offered by their own history and no explicit guidance by their traditional literature. Though it happened after the centuries of bitter religious wars and persecutions, by separating church and state, Christians solved this dilemma, and most Christian countries, if not always law, but always in practice, have accepted this paradigm by now. “Looking at the contemporary Middle East, both Muslim and Jewish, one must ask [...] whether Muslims and Jews, having perhaps caught a Christian disease, might consider a Christian remedy” (*Multiple*, 39).

1.2.2. The Rise and Decline of the Islamic Civilization

Lewis emphasizes that Islam is generally used in two different but interrelated meanings, as corresponding to Christianity—the religion, and that of Christendom—the civilization growing up and prospering under the auspices of that religion. Islam, the author remarks, signifies more than fourteen centuries of history, more than a billion people, and a religious-cultural tradition of colossal diversity, while Christianity and Christendom denote more than twenty centuries of history, and more than two billion people, and an even bigger diversity. In situ, Islam’s realm extends from Northern and Western Africa to Southeastern and Central Asia; in time it goes back more than fourteen centuries, to the advent and mission of the Prophet and the creation of the Islamic community and state. It was a leading civilization in times, when a mixed interlude occurred between the decline of the ancient civilization of Rome and the rise of the modern civilization of Europe. It played a role as intermediary between the ancient East and the modern West, while contributing to Western culture into modern times. However, throughout the last three centuries, the Islamic world has lost its leadership along with its ascendancy, falling behind not only the modern West but also the hastily modernizing East (*Crisis*, 3-4).

In inquiring the reasons behind the rise of Islamic Civilization, Lewis revisits the political, economic, and cultural milieu of the Middle East, dating back to the advent of Islam, where three consecutive processes, namely Hellenization, Romanization, and Christianization, had imposed varying measures of unity as well as some essentials of society in parts of the region; yet Islam was the first that embraced the whole region, implementing the only common identity it has ever known (*Multiple* 131). The author asserts that the dominant feature of population located in central and northern Arabia before the rise of Islam was Bedouin tribalism,

in which the group was held together internally by blood-ties of descent in the male line, and externally by the need for self-defense against the hardships of desert life. The political organization of the Bedouins was rudimentary, in which leaders were elected by the elders mostly from among the members of a single family, possessing no coercive power, following the tribal opinion, ruling through arbitration rather than commanding. Their pattern of life was regulated by customs; their religion was not personal but communal, adhering to various forms of paganism; their badge of identity, ideological expression of unity, and cohesion of the tribe was God and cult, while political loyalty was expressed through conformity to the tribal cult. In the oases, however, there were small sedentary communities that formed a rudimentary political organization carried out as petty kingships, and the towns of the settled nomads in the region functioned as more advanced stages of society, like Mecca. Penetration of Persian and Byzantine culture in material and moral forms to the nomadic or settled population occurred through several channels (e.g., the settlement of foreign colonies, Arab border-states, and direct foreign rule), most of which connected with trans-Arabian trade routes; for example, the settlements of Jews and Christians were spreading Aramaic and Hellenistic culture, while the former advanced a sort of political life, and the latter were mainly agriculturalists and artisans. It was in this era that the direction of the history of Arabia changed, and the constant shift of the trans-Arabian trade route due to the long running Perso-Byzantine Wars played a vital role in determining this direction. In the absence of an alternative, the city of Mecca took the opportunity, becoming a trade center, while Meccans were able to establish an administration, unique in nomadic idealism regulated by wealthy businessmen. This commercial experience demonstrating the power of cooperation, organization, and discipline (rare amongst the Arabs) would later function well, when the vast Arab empire fell under their rule, paving the way to the creation of Islamic civilization (*Arabs*, 24-31). In depicting this setting, in which Muhammad was born, Lewis indicates that “the latent forces of an Arab national revival and expansion” were aroused and redirected by the Prophet, whose death was followed by “a new burst of activity,” signifying his career as “the answer to a great political, social, and moral need” (*Arabs*, 46).

The author places a specific emphasis on language while outlining the process of Arab revival and expansion in the Middle East, where Hellenization, Romanization, and Christianization had combined to wipe out much of the ancient languages—thus cultures and identities—and this process was completed by Arabization and Islamization. Throughout the

period of Christianization many ancient languages (e.g., forms of Persian, old Egyptian hieroglyphic writing, Assyrian, Babylonian, and Phoenician) were replaced with three indigenous languages (Persian, Coptic, and Aramaic). Hebrew was the lone survivor among all the other Canaanite languages in script and prayer, with the help of the Torah. With the Arab conquest in the seventh century, Arabic has been on the rise ever since; it came about as the majority language in the Middle East, where Latin and Greek disappeared; yet, Aramaic and Coptic survived mostly through religious traditions. By the eleventh century, even Christians and Jews in the region had adopted Arabic, not only as a language of communication and commerce, but also as the language maintaining much of their own religious literatures while retaining their own alphabet, and producing substantial literature in Arabic language (*Multiple*, 48-51). Lewis refers to the aforementioned process as the true wonder of the Arab expansion—not the military conquest but the Arabization of the conquered provinces (*Arabs*, 143). There were yet some other factors at work in this progression, such as Persians and Turks. The author explains that the Arab conquest of Persia marked the transformation from Zoroastrian culture to Islamic Persian, and despite the adaptation of Arabic as the language of religion and law, and that of culture and science, the Iranians, unlike their neighbors, neither lost their language or cultural identity, nor did they become an Arabic-speaking people, while sharing the Arabic script. “In time, Persian joined Arabic as the second major classical language of Islamic civilization [...]” By the eleventh century the Turks were stepping into the world of Islam from Central Asia, by migration as whole tribes, and soon became the invaders of Islam. Like Persians, they did not become Arabic-speaking people; yet, unlike them, the Turks abandoned their older alphabet upon the conversion to Islam, adopting an Arabic one in unison with an extensive vocabulary of Arabic and that of Persian: “If Arabic was the language of religion and law, and Persian the language of love and of polite letters, Turkish soon became the language of command and of rule” (*Multiple*, 54). In this examination of the tremendous influence of Arabic on what Lewis calls, “other Muslim languages: Muslim Persian and Turkish” (*Arabs*, 144), the author illustrates the process of Islamization going along with Arab revival through Arabic, as the Qur‘an made it the language of scripture, the Shari‘a that of law, and the Arab empire that of government and administration, while the new civilization flourishing under the leadership of the caliphs made it a bastion of literature, scholarship, and science (*Multiple* 50).

In depicting the flourishing civilization that was maturing during the period of the Arab and Islamic Empires under the Umayyad and Abbasid reigns—the classical period, Lewis points out that at the outset, unification of the vast territories spanning from Asia to Europe achieved political power and military means, and left lasting impressions on language and religion. In the process, the Arabs united formerly conflicting cultures within a single society—the Mediterranean tradition drawing upon Greece, Rome, Israel, and the ancient Near East, including the great civilization of Iran, with its own ways of life, thought, and its prolific connections with the rich cultures of the Far East. A new civilization was born by this cohabitation of many peoples, faiths, and cultures, within the boundaries of the Islamic society (*Arabs*, 151-2). During this period, Islamic society was a complex development as it incorporated many different elements of diverse origin such as Christian, Jewish, and Zoroastrian ideas of prophecy, legal religion, eschatology, mysticism, Sassanid and Byzantine administrative and imperial practices, as well as Hellenism (*Arabs*, 146). In looking deeper into the extents of the highest achievements of the Arabs occurring in this classical era, from poetry, prose, and rhyme to science and learning, Lewis turns to studies conducted on the interpretation of the Qur‘an, the formulation of dogma, and the codification of the tradition, last of which brought about the Islamic schools of jurisprudence and history. Also, a movement of translation was launched, for which even a school was established for translators in Baghdad; Christians and Jews were the early translators and soon a generation of original Muslim writers emerged; translation of Greek books eventually became the cornerstone of intensified learning in philosophy and all sciences including mathematics, astronomy, geography, chemistry, physics, natural history, and medicine, in the ninth and tenth centuries. Along with Greco-Roman traditions, Iranian and Chinese influences played important roles in the development of Islamic art and architecture; while the idea of book-making came from older civilizations, the process was vastly helped by the introduction of paper from China that had occurred in the eighth century. Lewis concludes with a suggestion as to the reason for the ending of such a prolific process, and thus in turn the period: “The acceptance of the Greek heritage by Islam gave rise to a struggle between the scientific rationalist tendency of the new learning on the one hand, and the atomistic and intuitive quality of Islamic religious thought on the other” (*Arabs*, 150). Both schools of thought produced a rich and diverse culture in the course of struggle that ended with the dominance of a stricter more purely Islamic point of view. “Islam, a religiously conditioned community, rejected values that challenged its

fundamental postulates, while accepting their results, and even developing them by experiment and observation” (*Arabs*, 151).

In order to endorse the idea attested to in the most recent above excerpt, more specifically to trace the ideological motivations behind the decline of high Islamic civilization, the author aims at providing some examples, isolating certain typical characteristics of, if not the Arabs as a whole, the dominant civilization of medieval Islam. One of these characteristics is the unique assimilative power of Arab culture that brought about the unification of vast territories, blending the Eastern and Western cultures in a single society, into which a new civilization was being born, assorted in its origins and its creators, “yet bearing on all its manifestations the characteristic imprint of Arab Islam” (*Arabs*, 152). Another attribute is the comparative tolerance given within diversity of the Islamic society. Unlike Christians, Medieval Muslims found no point in anticipating divine judgment in this world; thus, they rarely imposed their faith by force on all, subjected to their rule. Instead, as a dominant faith in the society and as expressive of their own primacy within it, they admitted the qualified subjects for tolerance to the *dhimma* [“a pact between the Muslim state and a non-Muslim community” (*Multiple*, 120)], implementing specified social and legal disabilities to them (*dhimmi*) [“who have a book and profess what Islam recognizes as a divine religion” (*Multiple*, 122)], and in turn left them free in their religious, economic, and intellectual modes of life, providing them ample opportunity to make contributions to the civilization. The third essentiality marking medieval Islam is that it was convinced of its own superiority as well as its self-sufficiency. Due to the historical view of prophecy, Muslims recognized the Jew and the Christian, as the possessors of early and imperfect versions of the divine revelation, which they alone possessed its final perfection. Also, the conquests of Islam made by the first formative generations marked the confidence of divine favor on the believer’s mind, which was given to them by the power and success of the only community in this world, standing up by the divine law. “Muslim might learn much from wise infidels of other faiths, but the final touchstone of the validity of the lesson was the *Shari‘a*, hallowed by direct revelation and confirmed by the success of its followers” (*Arabs*, 153).

All in all, Lewis regards the Muslim outlook as atomistic, meaning the “tendency to view life and the universe as a series of static, concrete, and disjunctive entities, loosely linked in a sort of mechanical or even causal association by circumstances or the mind of an individual, but having no organic interrelation of their own” (*Arabs*, 153). This is, to him, identifiable in some

aspects of the civilization of the Arabs, particularly in its post-classical stages. In inquiring into the extent of the impact this tendency had on medieval Arabs, who looked upon society not as an organic whole, consisting of interconnected and interacting components, but as an association of groups separated in religion, nation, and class, coming together on the earth beneath, ruled by the government above; Lewis provides examples. Unlike the works of the scientists, philosophers, and the mystics, those of the orthodox theologians, scholars, and litterateurs established the same quality in their approach to knowledge. Each of the various disciplines followed the same method in their contribution to the learning, pooling their findings in an integrated whole through separate and self-contained sections, each of which provides a limited piece of knowledge. Arabic poems consisted of a series of separate lines, each was like strung pearls, showing perfection in themselves. Applied and decorative arts were produced in forms, recognizable rather by their minuteness and perfection of details than by perspective. To the author, all these examples are also reflective of the existence of impersonality and collectivism, a persistent trait of Arabic prose literature, too. This collectivist approach comes into view in an array of Islamic thought and institutions, “perhaps more clearly in the Muslim ideals of the Perfect Man and the Perfect State as externally applied patterns to which all must in theory attempt to conform by imitation rather than by developing their own individual potentialities from within” (*Arabs*, 154).

Lewis remarks that this atomistic view of life and of the universe received “its complete expression in systems of dogmatic theology,” which was determinist, occasional, and authoritarian—denying secondary causes, calling God as the author rather than the causal factor, and demanding the unquestioning acceptance of the divine revelation and divine law. To the author, the general acceptance of the final and deliberate rejection of all causality, in one way or another, marked not only the final triumph of the reaction against free speculation and research, but also the end of free inquiry in philosophy and in natural sciences, while frustrating the promising progress of Arab historiography. “It fitted well the needs of an Islamic society in which the freer social and economic life of a great commercial age was giving way to a quasi-feudal order that changed very little in the course of centuries.” This form of Islam had not been earnestly challenged until the nineteenth century, from that day onwards the impact of the West “that [was] its intellectual counterpart” has threatened the whole traditional construction of Islamic society and its modes of thought (*Arabs*, 155). In losing its leadership and dominance, and falling behind the modern West and the increasingly modernizing East, the widening gap

between Islamic world and the West generates problems of many kinds, such as emotional and practical, and for which there have been no effective answer found yet by the rulers, intellectuals, and rebels of Islam (*Crisis*, 4).

1.2.3. The Rise of the West, from Influence to Affluence—Dominating the Middle East

Looking deeper into the reasons behind the rise of the West paving the way towards forcing the Middle East into its economic, political, and cultural orbit, eventually creating the Modern Middle East, Lewis writes, “under the medieval caliphate, and again under the Persian and Turkish dynasties, the empire of Islam was the richest, most powerful, most creative, most enlightened region in the world [...]” (*Crisis*, 51). He explains that since the first Arab conquest of Europe, marking the Arab rule over Western European populations in Spain, Portugal, and Sicily that was maintained over a long period when they also ruled and dominated military, diplomatic, and commercial relations with other Western European states, the contacts between the Arabs and Western Europeans have continued, yet the dynamics of the relationships between them have been subject to change and have been evolving since. One of the specific emphases of Lewis regarding this changing form of relationship is contact with the Crusaders, who, to the author, brought a piece of Western Europe to the Arab East, which yet had little impact on the Arabs, while the Crusaders learned much from them. His example in this matter is the medieval geographical and historical literature of the Arabs, projecting their lack of interest in Western Europeans, “which they regarded as an outer darkness of barbarism from which the sunlit world of Islam had little to fear and less to learn” (*Arabs*, 180).

Yet, more specifically Lewis places an emphasis on the early sixteenth century, marking the new start on the relationship between Islam and the West, stemming from a chain of interrelated phenomenon achieved in the West, including technological advances in the crafts of war and peace, the Renaissance and the Reformation, the discovery and exploitation of the New World, the breaking up of the feudal order freeing trade and unleashing enterprise, and the consolidation of centralized nation states providing solid political instruments. In referring to these achievements as devices for Christian Europe to complete their long struggle for the reconquest of the Iberian peninsula and in Russia, and to end the centuries of Muslim rule over these territories, pursuing their former masters into their homelands, the author depicts the milieu

suggestive of the first signs of European expansion, “which by the twentieth century had forced the whole world into its economic, political, and cultural orbit” (*Arabs*, 182). He notes that despite this expansion, in southern Europe Muslim power prevailed by means of the Ottoman Empire, and as late as the seventeenth century the Turks still ruled these areas, yet the change arose in the course of the second Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683, ending with the defeat and the retreat of the Ottomans. The defeat suffered lowered the durability of the major military power of the Muslim world, while sparking a new debate among the Ottoman military, political and intellectual elite, and the questions asked by them were followed by similar ones, in increasingly wider circles, in many countries of the modern world, coping with ever broadening issues—“Why had the once ever-victorious Ottoman armies been vanquished by the despised Christian enemy; [how] could they restore their previous dominance?” (*Crisis*, 52).

Lewis explains that since the sixteenth century, trade with the Middle East turned out to be a major concern for the European countries, where factories, the oceangoing cargo ships, and the joint stock companies made it possible (*Crisis*, 53). A trade pact, namely the Capitulations of 1535, is provided as an example, reflective of the new type of European expansion, which was signed between the Ottoman Empire and the French, providing certain rights and privileges to French traders within the Empire’s territories (e.g., exempting them from tax, and assuring their safety in persons, property, and freedom of worship). New Capitulations arose, such as to the English (1580) and the Dutch (1612), and with the French efforts prospects developed rapidly (*Arabs*, 182). In also depicting economic change in Islamic lands that brought about political change in parallel, the author touches upon the shortage of competition in trade due to lack of technological progress and absence of the emergence of a class of educated gentlemen farmers, like those, who contributed heavily to the technological revolution in seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe (*Arabs*, 204). This enabled the producer-oriented European trading states to establish cooperation and competition, which, by the eighteenth century, launched exports of traditional Middle Eastern products to the Middle East from their new colonies in Asia and the Americas (*Crisis*, 54). A set of political and military factors played roles in their supremacy; while the Turks, Iranians, and Arabs were receding in terms of naval power, stronger Western ships were sailing, carrying much larger armaments, and establishing their naval and military bases in south and south-east Asia, which led them to use armed forces and economic strength together to dominate trade within Europe and increasingly around the world (*Arabs*, 204).

While shifting his focus from commerce to the military expansion of Europe in the Middle East, Lewis indicates that this was, by the nineteenth century, limited to the northern borders of the Ottoman Empire, where Austria and Russia systematically expanded into the Balkans as well as the northern and eastern shores of the Black Sea. Yet, the occupation of Egypt by Napoleon Bonaparte in 1789 dramatically altered the direction of European expansion. Despite its brief duration, this occupation marked not only the first armed penetration on the region since the Crusades, but also the direct Western intervention with significant economic and social outcomes. “By the easy victory which they won the French shattered the illusion of the unchallengeable superiority of the Islamic world to the infidel West, thus posing a profound problem of readjustment to a new relationship” (*Arabs*, 183). Also the departure of the French was brought about neither by Egyptians nor Ottomans, but by the British, and this was a bitter lesson for the Muslims. “Not only could a Western power arrive, invade, and rule at will but only another Western power could get it out” (*Crisis*, 55). Indicative of the process of the readjustment, occurrences subsequent to the French withdrawal, provide examples for Lewis as follows: the first functioning program of reforms in the Middle East came from Egypt, from military to economic and educational measures, under the Muhammad ‘Ali reign, who made himself a virtually independent ruler of Egypt and, for a while, of some parts of the Arab East, particularly Syria, into which he provided some degree of political independence; he then, with the intervention of European powers, succeeded only in establishing a hereditary governorship of Egypt, an autonomous Ottoman province. Subsequently, the Ottoman reforms implemented a large measure of centralization, as the salaried officials of the central government were now governing administrative districts; yet, landowners still kept their social and economic supremacy functioning as the dominant class in the economy and in administration (*Arabs*, 184). In the early nineteenth century, the introduction of the European practice of conscription paved the way for peasants and townsfolk, for the first time, to have close and continuing relations with the Ottoman state, whose direct connection with its officials had yet been limited to the collection of taxes and the enforcement of law, both of which demanded obedience, not loyalty. Within the imposed process of conscription, lay people not only became part of the state apparatus, but also brought them to associate themselves with people and places outside of their settlement. In time, and for the first time, the state directly involved itself in education in light of the need for new army and civil officers, which brought about a massive increase in literacy on

the one hand, while playing roles in the emergence of the media on the other (*Multiple*, 94-5).

Lewis says that the military expedition by Bonaparte shifted the European economic penetration; the more Europeans gained power the more they concerned themselves with the development of resources and services and made efforts to control outcomes, which was achieved either through concessions or by loans provided to the governments in the region. With the advent of the steamship, they planned on restoring the ancient overland highways for trade, linking the Red Sea and Persian Gulf; and accordingly making the region once again the trade route with new establishments such as the opening of the Suez Canal (1869) and the building of the railways, one of which, the Hijaz railway, was contributed by the Ottomans. Other endeavors such as ports, bridges, and telegraphs worked towards shoring up the infrastructure along their purported trade routes, and from the 1860s European firms launched efforts to install amenities (e.g., water, gas, and municipal transport); yet considerations were limited to transit; “less progress was made in the development of capital resources in the Arab lands” (*Arabs*, 187).

The discussion on the changing course of the relations between Islam and the West is not limited to European economic and military expansion; he provides rather a wealth of details on the issue of cultural and ideological penetration and the impacts of this on the region and its peoples. His starting point regarding this is the sixteenth century, when cultural incursion took forms that were religious in origin, operating through the Christian minorities (e.g., contact between Lebanese Maronites and the Vatican, operations of Italian and French Capuchins and Jesuits in Syria), which resulted in the establishment of the first printing presses in Hebrew, Greek, and Syriac, used by the Jewish and Christian minorities. He proposes how these inclinations evolved through time as follows: the first Turkish printing press was established in Istanbul in 1729, producing Arabic, Turkish, and Persian books in Arabic script. The first Arabic press occurred through Bonaparte’s administration in Egypt, printing newspapers in Arabic and Turkish. “The first Muslim printing press in the Arabs’ world was that of Muhammad ‘Ali in Egypt,” which between 1822 and 1842 printed 243 books, most of them were the textbooks for his new schools (*Arabs*, 189). Other periodicals and newspapers published as European enterprises and due to Christian missions with yet limited readership, were overshadowed in the course of the nineteenth century by the newspapers issued in Egypt and Anatolia and then all over the region, appearing as state enterprises to attain goals of the state (*Multiple*, 95-6).

In the nineteenth century, the attempts at protecting holy places and Christian minorities

was strengthened by the great Powers, for which French and American missionaries established schools, training a new generation of Arabs, conscious of their Arab heritage and affected by Western influences. The mission-educated new local middle class emerged within Arabic-speaking minorities, who issued newspapers and periodicals in Egypt and Syria, reaching a wider public affected by economic and social change. This period brought about Arab nationalism that was of mixed origin. “To the growing Arab resentment of Turkish domination and the urgent mistrust of the encroaching and alien West were added the European idea of nationality and a revival of the Arabic language and culture.” Due to economic change and Western cultural influence, the Christian demand for nationalism was stronger than that of the Muslims. As they found a new expression, out of religion, signifying their solidarity with the East against the invading West, and yet they could not be adherents of pan-Islamism—the modern political expression of the Muslims, for whom the two forms of expression were never distinguished: “The basic sentiment of identity was religious and social, the complete society of Islam expressed sometimes in national terms, sometimes in religious terms as synonymous and interchangeable sets of words denoting the same basic reality” (*Arabs*, 190).

In elucidating the reasons behind the shallow impact Westernization had on the public, and the gradual evolution of nationalist reactions amongst Muslim Arabs against Ottoman rule, Lewis conveys that in spite of increases in numbers of Muslim traders in the cities and seaports, the expansion of European trade still provided better benefits to the non-Muslims, who were yet excluded from playing significant roles in society, preventing them from partaking in a rise of the bourgeoisie in reshaping the public structure to their needs. Thus the final storehouse of political power was still the old ruling factors, namely the military, the bureaucrats, the religious hierarchy, and the landowners, who only slowly take action towards modernization. In these conditions, Western political institutions and establishments (e.g., parliament, party politics, and election) borrowed ready-made, and superimposed an ideology that did not correspond with the foundations of social reality. The effort of replacing the old Islamic solidarity and dynastic loyalty that had kept the Arabs faithful to the Ottoman Sultans, by means of somewhat modernized Ottoman patriotism was not received in the Arab provinces, where, also, the constitutional revolution of 1908 met active opposition. “The attempt to replace both Islamic and Ottoman loyalties by Turkish nationalism inevitably provoked a nationalist reaction among Arabs and other non-Turkish Ottomans” (*Arabs*, 192). It was in the late nineteenth century, the

society united in the brotherhood of Islam was in flux, when non-Turkish speaking, particularly Arabic speaking, Muslims began regarding the empire, in which membership of the ruling elite was open to all Ottoman subjects professing Islam and using the Turkish language, as a Turkish empire, while recognizing their places in the Ottoman polity as unequal participants. A severe anti-Turkish stance amongst Arabs was due to foreign influences; “on the one hand the new idea of nationalism and consequently of a greater Arab nation suppressed by alien Turkish domination; on the other the direct incitement and intervention of outside powers” (*Multiple*, 90), which all led to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the dismemberment of its territories, creating not a greater Arab nation, but a sequence of Arab states.

While referring to the modern political map of the Middle East, the boundaries and areas of sovereign states, many of which are new and reflect the legacy of European colonialism, Lewis narrates the following: until very recently the ancient civilizations were all but forgotten, as the advent of Islam and the adoption of Arabic formed new identities along with a new suggested memory in the region, where, with few exceptions (e.g., Egypt), boundaries of the areas were designated in less definite terms. Some names of these new states are derivative of Greek usage, adopted by the Romans as administrative terms, disappearing in the Middle Ages, if not before in the first Arab conquest, only reappearing in the West due to the spread of the classical learning. These labels were eventually adopted by the Ottomans in the naming of provinces under the Western influence, ultimately becoming official names in the twentieth century as in the case of Syria and Palestine. While dividing the former province of Syria and creating the republic of Lebanon out of which, the French Mandate retained the name Syria in the remaining parts, where a republic defined by them was the first sovereign state ever to use the name, Syria “[and] its persistence in a light Arabic disguise at the present day attests the continuing power of European modes of thought even in so intimate a matter as national identity” (*Multiple*, 62). Also, separating trans-Jordanian Palestine, which later became the Hashemite monarchy, the British Mandate retained the name Palestine for the remaining areas, where the imperial policy provided it a government for the first time ever; the ensuing occurrences removing this government have created a Palestinian nation and the name Palestine has remained with its connotation, reflective of the demand for a Palestinian state. Of the countries in the Middle East, Iraq is unique; the new state was established by the British, through combining three Ottoman vilayets—Mosul, Basra, and Bagdad, each one of which has

distinctive traditions—today a citizen might define himself by region or ethnicity or religion (Arab, Kurdish, Muslim, Christian, Sunni and Shi‘a, etc.). There, the ethnic and sectarian appeals as well as the lack of patriotic loyalty proved insufficient, as displayed during the Iraq-Iran War of 1980-88, when the vast majority of Shi‘a population of Iraq remained faithful to their country, and did not rally to the cause of the Shi‘a Islamic republic (*Multiple*, 61-72).

In evaluating the visible changes taking place within the Islamic world as it was becoming the Modern Middle East, one of the specific emphases of Lewis is the idea of the nation or the national homeland as the basis of political identity and sovereignty that was introduced through the first real intellectual and ideological impacts of the French Revolution within the region. Until then, the author recounts, the dignity of fighting and dying for one’s country, which is a familiar concept to the West from Homer and Horace, was unknown in the Islamic world. There were always attachments to the land of one’s birth; for example, ‘local pride’ and ‘rivalry’ were as familiar in Islamic literature (e.g., the Egyptian writings) as in Western literature, produced throughout the Muslim period, emphasizing a natural pride in glories of their homeland, yet without modern political connotations, and without emphasizing their ancient, namely pagan, ancestors (*Multiple*, 58). The word *watan*, used in classical literature, more often referred to merely a place (town, province, village), rather than a *country* in modern sense, and the difference in conceptualization between Christians and Muslims appears most clearly in titulature and historiography, showing that English or French monarchs reigned as kings, while their historians wrote the history of their countries. Whereas respectively, Muslim historians wrote of their dynasties, whose dynasts specified neither their own cause nor that of their enemies in connection with the term, country, as it is seen through the letters exchanged between the Ottoman Sultan and the Shah of Persia in the sixteenth century, signed by each one of them as the sole legitimate sovereign of Islam—the ruler of believers. Yet, from the nineteenth century onwards, this situation has drastically changed, as Muslim rulers, under either external influence, or in some cases pressure, have expressed their leadership in national and territorial terms, and *watan*, along with its various equivalents, has obtained all political and emotional content of country in the region (*Multiple*, 57-8).

Bearing in mind that many words such as *nation* have undergone substantial changes until their latest connotations accepted in the Western world, the author discusses the language of the modern political discourse in the Middle East that is all Western, and provides several

examples reflecting either the semantic evolution of certain terms and the old words injected with new meanings (e.g., government and freedom) or loanwords in use with new notions: the term *milla*, denoting a religious community in classical Arabic, was adopted in Persian and Turkish and applied to the officially recognized religious communities (e.g., the Orthodox, the Jews), and in modern usage it has taken new meanings (e.g., *millet*-nation, *milli*-national, and only in Turkish *milliyetci* nationalist). Likewise, the term of recent origin, *qawmiyya*, has undergone several changes of meaning, which is now commonly used in Arabic, referring to ethnic nationality or nationalism, particularly in a pan-Arab sense (*Multiple*, 81-2). The terms, *nationality*, *citizenship*, *nationalism*, and *patriotism* are the loanwords functioning as devices to denote new ideas, which is overtly seen through the Lausanne Protocol of 1923 signed between the governments of Turkey and Greece while exchanging the minorities, who were not described as Greeks and Turks, but as “The Turkish subjects of the Greek Orthodox religion residing in Turkey” and “Greek subjects of the Muslim religion residing in Greece” (*Multiple*, 10), recognizing two types of identities, adherents of a religion and subjects of a state; like in Turkey (and Greece) *citizen* has by now replaced *subject* which is even true in surviving monarchies in the Middle East. *Patriotism*, introduced in the nineteenth century, had colossal impacts on the region in defining identity and loyalty by country; this took firm root after WWI, bringing about a Turkish nation state emerging from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, whose perception of group solidarity relies upon the base of country—sustained by a sentiment of nationhood and upheld by long lasting sovereign independent statehood—and a shared memory of a recent past, the establishment of a secular republic in Turkey (*Multiple*, 17-23).

Lewis regards much of the symbolic language of identity and its recognition as additional evidence of the palpable impact of the West, such as national anthems and national flags, indicating that these are the outcomes of a long evolution in the West based on the old roots; yet are new in the Middle East as either being imposed or being copied from outside. In regards to the introduction of national anthems and the use of brass bands that occurred in the course of the nineteenth century, when the Ottoman Sultan, Mahmud II, while modernizing his army requested the Sardinian ambassador to provide him with a bandmaster, who (Giuseppe Donizetti) formed the Ottoman Imperial Music, the author says that each state has by now a national anthem in the region. In regards to the national flags, symbolizing national identity both in color and design in the region, where in earlier times coats of arms were used, he explains that the pennants and

battle flags with single colors were commonly used, presenting either an individual ruler, or dynasty, as seen in the flags of the three major Arab dynasties, the Ummayyads (white flag), the Abbasids (black), and the House of the Prophet (green). All three colors are combined in several ways and employed in the flags of many present day Arab states. Now every state in the region, even patriarchal sheikhdoms, has a national flag; “most of these, like the flags of Western nations, consist of selected colors arranged in rectangles and triangles, and national flags and colors have an increasingly important part in a wide range of public events” (*Multiple*, 106).

To Lewis, unlike flags and national anthems alien to Middle Eastern tradition, the practice of distinctive dress, indicating identity for both self-assertion and mutual recognition, is very old in the region, and this survives to the present day. He expounds that authorities of both rabbinic and Islamic establishment specified for the faithful to maintain an apparent difference between themselves and others in dress. The headgear itself had a special status, used as indicator of one’s religious affiliation, and social and occupational status, within which the turban obtained a special significance; “a tradition ascribed to the Prophet defines the turban as a barrier between belief and unbelief” (*Multiple*, 109). The early nineteenth century hallmarks the beginning of Westernization, when soldiers in the new Western style army began to wear Western style tunics, trousers, and boots, while the headgear remained. In Turkey, any traditional dress including the turban and fezzes were replaced by an assortment of European style hats and caps through the reforms made by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. In discussing the revolution in dress for women, Lewis concludes that, “it was more dramatic and also more dangerous,” remaining so in some parts of the region, remarkably in Iran and Afghanistan, to the present days. Two garments in particular, the veil (hiding the face) and the scarf (hiding the hair), have acquired a special symbolic importance. “For women in the East, they are emblems, for the pious, of submission, for the emancipated, of repression; [for] Muslim women in the West, they have sometimes become the blazons of a proud assertion of identity” (*Multiple*, 110).

1.2.4. Ideological Aspirations and Political Practices during the Twentieth Century in the Middle East

In his evaluation reflective of ideological aspirations and political practices taking place in the course of the twentieth century within the states and societies, particularly in the Arab

world, one of the specific focuses of Lewis is post-WWI, when the peace settlement did not impart what Arabs fully hoped, but nonetheless provided them much through the establishment of new political entities, while desired independence was deferred. Lewis narrates that during the interwar years Arab disappointment was expressed in a series of popular nationalist movements—true in their time as influential to each facet of society, ranging from the politically cognizant minorities to the uneducated and unhappy peasant, despite “still religiously colored and still conditioned in their leadership and many of their policies by the old social order” (*Arabs*, 194). In pursuing their political objective, these nationalists were successful; with the outbreak of WWI, with few exceptions in places too poor and remote to be worth policing, there was not a single sovereign, independent Arab state in existence; yet, by WWII, the situation had already changed. The countries Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt alike had been already recognized as sovereign states, while Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan already had their own governments and governmental apparatus despite still being under mandatory authority, and were on the verge of gaining their sovereign independence, which was the ultimate goal of the mandatory powers. Arab nationalists at that time perceived all these changes as too little and too late and far short of Western promises. To them, even nominally independent Iraq and Egypt were bound to their former European masters through unequal treaties by means of economics and military agreements, and in Palestine the formal promise, made by the Balfour Declaration in 1917, supporting the policy for a national home for the Jews in Palestine, was incorporated in the League of Nations mandate for Palestine, where the discontent of the Arab population was brought to the boiling point through the Zionist agenda (e.g., Jewish immigration and settlement), whose armed rebellion against the British stopped when World War II broke out (*Arabs*, 195).

In tracing the historic aftermath of WWII, when with few exclusions (e.g., Algeria) sovereign independence arrived in the region, where the League of Arab States was constituted in 1945, Lewis examines the conflicts and problems, playing roles in the formation of new ideas and political aspirations, one of which is the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1948, a leading incident in the region, where population altercation occurred because of the lost territories by Arabs, and as a result of fleeing Palestinian Arabs from Israel. In this regard, he compares and contrasts the conditions between those who fled from Eastern Europe, the Indian subcontinent, and elsewhere in the aftermath of WWII, and the Palestinian refugees, while stressing to point out that “UN

peacemaking could stop fighting, but not make peace, and thus prevented a decisive outcome one way or another.” In Arab countries, the United Nations financed and operated the camps, keeping the refugees alive, and sparing them and the governments; many of them found new careers, but even generations later, a large portion remain stateless refugees in Arab countries (except in Jordan). This provides a striking contrast with the partition of British India, where the issue ended with mutual recognition and resulted in the resettlement of the greater numbers of refugees as citizens (*Arabs*, 198). Referring back to the author’s examination on the conflicts and problems, influential on social, economic, and political life, he pays attention to what WWII brought about to the Arab lands in its course, which later deeply affected the states and societies. Allied and Axis powers fought on their territories, and in the process they employed Arabs, some of whom were enriched, while the lives of others were dislocated. Economic change though industrialization and war as well as the spread of education brought about the emergence of new ideas, interests, and leaders dissatisfied with purely political liberation, “which many of them felt to be a sham, challenging the still unbroken domination of old rulers and leaders” (*Arabs*, 199).

In depicting the Arab world, and in a larger context the Middle East, where almost throughout the twentieth century two crucial Western ideologies dominated opinions—socialism and nationalism, Lewis states that both ideologies have been discredited by the twenty-first century; the former by its failure and the latter by its success. Neither socialist plans brought prosperity nor national independence brought freedom, and one party ideological dictatorship promoted only tyranny, and “no [Arab] leader has dared to submit his attainment or retention of power to the genuinely free choice of his people” (*Arabs*, 208). The political parties emerged only in several countries during brief intervals of parliamentary democracy established in Turkey and Iran by revolutionary movements and in the Fertile Crescent by foreign rulers. *The party* and *the leader* were brought as new models in the 1930s and 1940s from the Communist Party in the Soviet Union, the Fascist Party in Italy, and the Nazi Party in Germany. Many nationalists looked to German and Italian fascist models in order to achieve and exercise authority, and such an ideology was brought to new heights by the Baath Party, established in Vichy-controlled Syria in 1941 to support the pro-Axis Rashid Ali regime in Iraq; the rival branches of the Baath would later continue to rule and serve their leaders, Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Hafiz al-Assad in Syria, where in both countries allegiance to these leaders was the definition of membership in the national community (*Multiple*, 101-2). Though the Third Reich collapsed and direct German

influence ended, the contact with Germany in the 1930s and 1940s, particularly German philosophy (with its philosophic anti-Americanism), had already produced influences on many intellectuals and leaders, bringing about significant manifestation in time. For example the theme of American artificiality and its lack of a genuine national identity was recurrently used by the Baath, and also time to time mentioned by Saddam Hussein, as seen in his speech in 2002. To Lewis, the end of German influence was followed by another philosophy in the most advanced and dangerous form: the accusation of Western capitalism and America—Soviet Marxism. Despite the unsuccessful rule of the Russians in Asia, their anti-imperialist movements were spreading throughout the world, particularly in the Middle East (*Crisis*, 69-71). There, in one form or another, socialism became the predominant ideology in the second half of the twentieth century (*Multiple*, 102).

According to Lewis, Middle Eastern anti-Americanism, after the collapse of Western European dominance in the region, was attributed to economic exploitation, to the support of corrupt local tyrants, and to American support for Israel. In exploring Middle Eastern resentment against imperial powers, inconsistency amongst Arabs is a parameter focused on by Lewis, as he explains that their experience of imperialism, unlike that of the Turks and Iranians, was exclusively Western; thus, they were predisposed to look more favorably upon the Soviets. In this suggested reasoning the author depicts a place where anti-American attitudes brought about a new set of political practices and foreign policies. The leading Soviet role in the region was launched by Egyptian-Russian arms deals in 1955, when the U.S. containment policy, which had saved Turkey and Iran from Russian expansionism, extended to the Arab world by the Baghdad Pack, received resentment from most of the Arabs. In contrast, neither the ineffectual protectorate role of Russia in the course of the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 and of 1973, nor Soviet imperial conquest in Central Asia and the Caucasus along with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, received similar backlashes of anger from the Arab community and Islamic world. There the main concern was the Palestine-Israeli conflict, functioning at the heart of anti-American discourse, in spite of many other conflicts and wars occurring between one and another Muslim state. In fact, the U.S. reluctantly gave de facto recognition to Israel at the outset, while the Soviet Union played a significant role not only on the establishment of the State of Israel (as a strategic act), but also upon the delivery of the arms supplies to Israel. Unlike the Russians, the Americans intervened to withdraw the Israeli, British, and French forces from

Egyptian territory in the Suez War of 1956, and only then did the USSR come to the side of the Arabs. Even during the War of 1967, Israel was receiving military support from the French and Britain, not from the U.S.; yet, the more active Russian role in the regional affairs brought about an eager response from Arabs, whose arms deals with Russia aimed at squarely slapping the face of the West. All these actions encouraged the U.S. to look more favorably on Israel, promoting a new American-Israeli relationship based on two considerations: one was ideological or sentimental, and the other, strategic, which began in the 1960s, thriving in the 1970s and 1980s, fluctuating in the 1990s, and then obtaining a new meaning, when the U.S. confronted the simultaneous threats placed by Saddam Hussein's hegemonic ambition, al-Qaida's fundamentalist terror, and growing discontents among America's Arab allies. Lewis says that the U.S. foreign policy worked well in the region as it neither became a Vietnam nor a Cuba, enabling American political, economic, ideological, and cultural presences in several countries without military intervention until the Gulf War, despite it not always producing positive results [i.e., "by embracing the shah, the U.S. produced his overthrow; by fostering Saddam Hussein, it nurtured a monster" (*Crisis*, 101)]. Until the collapse of the USSR, Arab alliance with the West and the USSR shifted constantly because of change in regime or ruler and a change in outlook, as it occurred in Iran and Iraq, while correspondingly the U.S. ended the allegiance, when it became too bothersome just like in Lebanon. To the author, there was yet another type of alliance that functioned as based upon a genuine likeness of institutions, aspirations, and a way of life, which was less subject to change, and the Soviets being aware of this, attempted to create communist dictatorships, which fortified the power of the state as well as its focus of activity, exercising tremendous control over its people (*Crisis*, 87-102).

Lewis questions why the state became more of a powerful force in modern times, where the extraordinary persistence of the states once created is surprising as all had no experience of separate statehood or experience in exercising political sovereignty before WWI, with few exceptions. According to him, in the various stages of development of the state from past to present, water and oil played significant roles in the strengthening and retention of power, and modern technologies have also furthered this (*Multiple*, 91-2). As it happened during the last stages of the Ottoman Empire, when new armies and ministers and the advanced circulation of communication enabled the state to consolidate its power even in the remote areas, in the new century, radio and then television supplemented the printing press, which further worked to

control the minds and sentiments of the people within the state. In fact, the traditional Islamic state was not despotic, though it may have been autocratic, as the power of the state and sovereign was not only restricted by the *Shari'a*, but also by well entrenched interests and intermediate powers (military and religious establishments in all times and places, and a rural aristocracy and urban patriarchy in the eighteenth and nineteenth century). These powers were gradually taken over with the process of modernization, “the result is that present-day states in the Islamic world, even those claiming to be progressive and democratic, are—in their domestic affairs at least—vastly stronger than the so-called tyrannies of the past” (*Multiple*, 99). Even in Turkey and Iran, where political independence was retained, the effect of modernization fortified the state authority by “the reinforcement of the apparatus of surveillance, repression, and indoctrination,” in the process of eliminating the aforementioned intermediate powers. Breakdown of old social relationships together with the social change produced new relationships, blended with new ideologies from Europe, that differ from the old ones, which to Lewis is reflective of what a British observer called in the nineteenth century, the old nobility and the new nobility; “the old nobility, he said, lived on their estates; [for] the new nobility, the state was their estate, [which remains] true in much of the region today” (*Crisis*, 58).

Another emphasis of Lewis is the practice of dynasticism as a powerful force in modern times, obtaining a religious implication in the Middle East, where at the outset the Sunni had rejected the hereditary principle that the Shi'a offered for the headship of the Islamic community and had exercised instead a system of election; yet, as the rule of the elected caliphs was finalized in a series of regicides and civil wars, dynastic rule applied to sovereignty. This was practiced even in the self-styled revolutionary republics, where in twentieth century Iraq and Syria Saddam Hussein and Hafiz al-Assad groomed their sons to succeed them. Since the end of the caliphate era, there have been only two forces applied to change government, either dynastic succession with a ruling family or removal and replacement of the ruler by force (e.g., conspiracy, assassination, or coup d'état), and in the modern age hereditary revolutionary leadership falls into this set of practices. Both hereditary and elective succession remains as the only accepted, legitimate forms; the latter has never been explored as an option (*Multiple*, 96-7).

Focusing on the electoral democracy that has had a brief history in the Middle East, Lewis explains that many Arab countries hold elections—as it is a trendy occurrence of the modern world and also a necessary qualification to receive international aid and other benefits.

Though there are signs of change in several Arab countries, where human rights and political participation have been progressively discussed more and traditional Islamic values such as dignity and consultation have been employed with new meaning in the likes of Jordan, Egypt, and some Gulf countries; “there is as yet no Arab country in which the government may be changed by means of an election, but an increasing measure of opposition, and with it of freedom of expression, is being permitted” (*Multiple*, 137). Two elections can be seen as extreme cases, both occurring because of inherent circumstances in 1969; one was organized by the Lebanese government that was a prearranged ceremony; and the other by the Palestine Authority that was the freest and fairest election to date in the Arab world (*Multiple*, 138). In Lebanon electoral democracy was practiced for a while, and then ended by internal dissension and foreign invasion. In Iran, genuinely contested, regular elections are held; but candidates for both presidency and parliament must be approved by a committee of religious experts, upon which the elected president ranks third in its hierarchy, after two unelected senior officials with total executive control. Despite these limitations, giving no chance to a secular party or program residing within the opposition, their system still allows freedom of debate and dissent comparatively to Arab countries (*Multiple*, 98). Of the countries, genuine elections are held only in Turkey and Israel. “Israeli democracy has for long been something of an anomaly in the region” (*Multiple*, 132). Isolation of the Jewish state due to the Arab boycott, cutting its interaction with its neighbors, is changing recently. The Middle Eastern Jews have by now constituted a majority of the population inside. Also the peace process and commercial relations with the Arab countries in spite of many complexities and its involvement with the Palestinians have not only altered some Palestinian and Arab observers to the merit of a liberal economy and polity, but these incidents have also affected the nature of Israeli self-identity, their perceptions on faith, state, and country.

According to Lewis, in an environment where democracy in a Western sense is a rare political system, there are only two countries functioning as models to the Arab world, Turkey and Iran, the region’s major powers. Their differences are based upon their ideological directions; in the past it was between Sunni Islam and Shia Islam, but now between secular democracy and Islamic theocracy. In Turkey Ataturk established a secular democracy in place of the Sultanate, and in Iran the Ayatollah Khomeini established a theocracy in the place of the shah. “Their teachings and programs, Kemalism and Khomeinism, are seen by many as the two main alternative futures for the region.” The author clarifies that secularism means neither the

abandonment nor the suppression of the faith in Turkey, but a separation between religion and politics. Democracy is not yet immune to the attraction of the adherents of fundamentalist ideology in the country, where a political party of that ideology won 21 percent of the votes nationwide in 1995 elections, some of which came as “protest votes,” but it proved the existence of the support for the fundamentalist agenda. The multiparty system facilitated a coalition between the fundamentalist leader and one of the secular parties for a while, which was ended by pressure from the military, whose members defined their duty as the protection of the constitution and secularism, while the fundamentalist religious opposition still keeps itself intact both in parliament and in the country. The Islamic revolution in Iran yet offers “a different diagnosis of the ills of Middle Eastern society,” and “different perception for their cure” (*Multiple*, 134). Once this genuine revolution was succeeded by the aspirations of the great masses, it had no clear direction to see whether the changes that it brought about in every facet of national life would be better or worse for the future. At first it had evoked an enthusiastic response in the world of Islam, and then the enthusiasm was diminished by the actions of revolutionary leaders at home and abroad. Under the impact of modern communications connecting Iranians to the outside world, the disillusionment and disaffection among its own population have found expression within limited freedom. Yet, people seem willing to excuse and even to copy their sins, dreaming of a just and pure society that would be governed in line with the *Shari‘a*. What differs in Iran from Turkey remains that the rulers work for a movement of Muslim self-awareness, for which they encourage and promote radical movements, encompassing Muslim minorities in Europe, America, and elsewhere. In Turkey, there is no such a program, where the main aim is protecting their land and embattled democracy from external and internal enemies. “Yet the Turkish model is not without impact; [twice] before the Turks have offered leadership to the region—under the Ottoman sultans in Islamic jihad, under Kemal Atatürk in national self-liberation; [they] may do so again” (*Multiple*, 137).

In this examination of Middle Eastern political practices taking place in the twentieth century, Lewis states that there is a common pattern in which political loyalty is claimed and given at three levels in the Arab world, each one of which is interacting, sometimes in harmony and sometimes in conflict. The lowest level can be called ‘local’—a group is held together by common descent, by sectarian or religious bonds, by a regional tie, or by any combination of these, through which people may dominate political life; for example, in Iraq the regime for a

long time rested on people from the town of Takrik, and in Syria, from the Alawis in the northeast. The intermediate level can be called the sovereign state, and the third level exceeds it while expressing the aspiration towards a greater unity, which might be called in national terms, pan-Arabism, or religious terms, pan-Islamism. Pan-Arabism was one of the most potent aspirations in the twentieth century; but, as much as the Arab states clearly defined their own national interests, and in the course of a series of inter-Arab conflicts their dedication to pan-Arabism tapered off. Now, linked by language, culture, history and religion, they show no desire of forming a political bloc for a great Arab union, which may yet happen. Pan-Islamism has still been effective, providing two essential trends among many. “One is political in aspiration, diplomatic in method, and usually conservative in policy; [the] other is popular, usually radical, often subversive.” Both have governmental support, one from patriarchal and the other from revolutionary regimes, while also receiving financial supports from private individuals mostly in Arabia and in the Gulf. “There is of course no clear differentiation [between them], since governments try to exploit popular movements elsewhere, while popular movements seek to influence or even control government” (*Multiple* 141). Lewis writes, “Democracy in its Western forms is making progress among Arabs; [so], too, is Islamic fundamentalism” (*Multiple*, 138). In the eclipse of pan-Arabism, fundamentalism remain as an attractive alternative to those, who assume that “there has to be something better, truer, and more helpful than the inept tyrannies of their rulers and the bankrupt ideologies foisted on them from outside” (*Crisis*, 132).

1.2.5. Search for the Culprit and the Search for the Remedy in the Islamic World

Lewis counts the following as factors behind the emergence of a troubled society “with manifold and growing discontents” during the Cold War: “the stresses of rapid modernization fuelled by oil and powered by money,” “the threats and intrigue of regional and external powers serving for their own interests,” “the sense of humiliation at the perceived inability of the Arab states, not coping with even the minor enemies or basic issues,” “the resentment against regimes bringing poverty and tyranny, whose armies defeated abroad while exacting repression at home,” which altogether left people resorting to searches for saviors and for culprits (*Arabs*, 200).

Discussing the way in which Arabs have searched for the culprits, Lewis turns his attentions to Arab intellectuals, who much of the time since the nineteenth century have provided

explanations, in the context of political and military means, regarding the weakness and poverty of their country comparative to the rest of the world, placing the blame on the shoulders of foreign invaders, ranging from Mongol invaders to the Ottomans and Western powers. In responding to all these explanations, one specific emphasis of Lewis is that political, military explanations are not that simple and one-sided as asserted; because both the Turkish domination over Arabs, and then the European domination of the larger Islamic world were part of a larger process, dating back to the seventh century, when the power of Islam carried its *jihad* against Christendom from the once Christian lands into the European mainland, and in the process Islam almost conquered Europe twice, and the re-conquest brought about a conquest and eventually world domination by the West. Lewis says, the significant question should thus not be “why European attempted to dominate the Muslims” as this had been ordinary activity on both sides; but, it should be “why Europeans achieved.” “And for this, answers may be sought both in European strength and Muslim weakness” (*Arabs*, 202). For which the reason should be traced back through the social institutions and attitudes obtained from past and kept with rigidity, which neither allowed them to become accustomed to altering conditions and to fashion new political and economic institutions, nor enabled them to shift their attitudes towards unbelievers, “varied from condescension in good times, to hostility and mistrust in bad times,” so they had no reason to attempt to learn from them. Traditional household practices (e.g., polygamy, concubines, and slavery) did not work to make progress from cultural to political modernization. These all played roles in rising discrepancies between the Islamic and Western worlds both in wealth and power and in the ability to generate wealth and to achieve and employ power beneficially (*Arabs*, 202-5).

Further responding to the aforementioned Arab perception, Lewis deems that the British and French powers dominated almost the whole of the Arab world, which was a stage, preparing the next period into which formal independence occurred. These powers attempted to sign treaties with the newly independent states to protect their interests; yet their aim to gain the Arab lands as allies failed, as they only secured the use of Arab territories during WWII. Also, Western endeavors in keeping Arab states in the defensive alliance system did not work during the Cold War, which resulted in the overthrow of pro-Western regimes. In the process of the penetration, the Soviets made the same mistake, attempting to sign treaties with governments and demanding to use their territories as military bases, which produced suspicion and hostility too,

as it occurred in Egypt, where the ‘friendship and cooperation treaty’ was signed in 1971 and ended in 1972, when president Sadat asked Soviet military experts to leave his country. This event created a growing American involvement in the Arab world within a period, encompassing the dissolving of the USSR and Gulf War of 1991. The swift withdrawal of the U.S. forces in 1991 marked the inauguration of a new stage; “the United States, by the very nature of its society and institutions, has no desire, and certainly no aptitude, for the imperial game; [the] older imperial powers of the West have long since abandoned any such ambitions [...]” (*Arabs*, 207); thus, the region’s countries, for the first time in centuries, are on their own to shape their own future.

The author explains that poverty and tyranny are afflicting much of the Muslim world, and these two problems are attributed particularly but not exclusively by those whose interest is to divert the attention from themselves to America in the region, where the Arab media have employed *globalization* as a theme associating American economic penetration with support from Muslim tyrants due to their selfish reasons. As indicative of where to direct the blame and the resulting hostility, the author exemplifies some statistical studies conducted by institutions (e.g., the UN, the World Bank) comparing the figures on the performance of Muslim countries, which reflect high illiteracy, as well as the limits of job creation, education, technology, and productivity that all remain behind the West, and those, engaging Western style modernity. To Lewis, the increasing Middle Eastern awareness of the wide gap between the Western world and themselves, in terms of economic wealth and disparity, results in anger directed against their rulers and against the West (*Crisis*, 113-9).

In this context, the author explores the issue of radical Islamism (“to which it has become customary to give the name Islamic fundamentalism”), while looking deeper into the characteristics of Islamic fundamentalism, which functions not as a homogeneous movement, but differs in countries and even within a single country. The genuine popular movements are exemplified by the Islamic Revolution in Iran. The state-sponsored movements (of many kinds), promoted by Muslim governments seeking to protect themselves from the revolutionary wave, are exemplified with the ones that had occurred in Saudi Arabia and Egypt (*Crisis*, 23). In Saudi Arabia the rejection of modernity for Islamic causes has gone along with a series of Islamic movements since the eighteenth century, and in the twentieth century, when King Saud entered into the Western world of oil concessions, the revenue enabled Wahhabi preachers to spread

their faith through the schools they established world-wide, while prompting rapid modernization, as well as inducing bitter social tensions surrounding the issue of unequal distribution of the wealth and of the destruction of traditional social bonds. All of this has bred new and receptive spectators for Wahhabi teachings, similar to those of like-minded groups—the Muslim Brothers in Egypt and Syria, the Taliban in Afghanistan (*Crisis*, 120-130).

The author clarifies that in the broadest sense the main critique of the fundamentalist is societal, believing that the Islamic world has taken a turn for the worst. In their view, the West is the source of evil, decaying Muslim society (*Crises*, 24). Their anger against the “Westerner,” regarded as the immemorial enemy of Islam since the first clashes that had occurred between the Muslim caliphs and the Christian emperors (*Crisis*, 132). Yet, their major attack is against their own ruler, regarded as a device of the West and as a betrayer to his own people and faith, as occurred through the overthrow of the shah of Iran in 1979 and the murder of President Sadat of Egypt in 1981 (*Crisis*, 24). As it is readily lucid to educated and uneducated Muslims, fundamentalists offer a set of familiar themes and slogans, working effectively in mobilizing support, particularly in the mosque — the only place in the country, where the dictator can ban parties and meetings, but not public worship. While referring to excessive modernization as their sickness, they offer a remedy, returning to authentic Islam (*Crisis*, 132-4).

Lewis lists the main components of the revolutionary wave in Islam that found expressions in the region. *A sense of humiliation* that is “a feeling of a community of people, accustomed to regard themselves as the sole custodians of God’s truth, commanded by Him to bring it to the infidels, who suddenly find themselves dominated and exploited by those same infidels [...]”; *frustration*, due to the failed remedies imported from the West; *a new confidence and sense of power* that was formed for the resurgence as occurred during the oil crisis of 1973 when Egypt’s war against Israel was supported by the oil-producing Arab countries as an effective weapon; and lastly, *contempt* stemming from the resulting wealth, pride, and self-assurance that fired up the old vocabulary describing the West as the source of moral degeneracy (*Crisis*, 22).

The author says that in the Middle East there have been many Western policies, which were expressed in various struggles [e.g., “to oust rulers and regimes seen as agents or imitators” (*Crisis*, 72)]. When these policies were abandoned, only temporary alleviation occurred as in the case of Iran, where the Westernizing Shah left; but, the general resentment of the fundamentalists

and other extremists never ceased against the West. For example, the shah was called by many of his people 'the puppet' in 1953, when the U.S. and the British, in agreement with him, involved themselves in the overthrow of the Iranian Prime Minister Mosaddeq, who attempted to nationalize the oil; yet, the puppeteers did not save him during the revolution. These two events were interpreted in the region that Americans may install their own puppet by force, but they are not dependable patrons; "the one evoked hatred, the other contempt—a dangerous combination." There is yet something deeply involved in these particular accusations, "which turns every disagreement into a problem and makes every problem insoluble" (*Crisis*, 76); this is what the West confronts, a rejection and condemnation of everything that America represents. Such a development in attitudes began back in the early 1950s, when Egyptian Sayyid Qutb, a leading ideologue of the Islamic fundamentalism and active member of Muslim Brothers, proclaimed the American way of life as degeneracy, offering a threat to Islam. His rhetoric has by now become a standard in the Islamic fundamentalist vocabulary, and notably, in the language of the Iranian Revolution. In fact, the U.S. was infrequently mentioned in Khomeini's earlier writings appearing in the context of imperialism; yet in 1979 the U.S. turned out to be an enemy of God—the Great Satan, a seducer, while Anwar Sadat and Saddam Hussein turned out to be the servants and agents of America; the former made peace with Israel, and the latter served America by making war on Iran. The confrontation with the U.S. on occasions from the hostage crises to the Iraqi invasion and from economic to diplomatic battlefields defines "Khomeini's judgment of America's position in the struggle between Islam and the West." America was the Great Satan, Israel was the Little Satan, the death to America was the order, which was the slogan shouted in the anti-American demonstrations of 1979, e.g., when religious radicals seized the Great Mosque in Mecca (*Crisis*, 76-86).

In defining the anger directed against the U.S., Lewis states that "Islam is one of the world's great religions," giving dignity and meaning to many, teaching how to live side by side in relative tolerance; but, it has had eras, like the other religions, inspiring hatred and brutality in some of its followers. "It is our misfortune that we have to confront part of the Muslim world while it is going through such a period, and when most—though by no means all—of that hatred is directed against us" (*Crisis*, 25). For the Western policy makers the key question might be, "Is Islam, whether fundamentalist or other, a threat to the West?" Various answers have been provided to such a simple question. For some, Islam and Islamic fundamentalism have replaced

Communism after the collapse of USSR as the main threat to the West. For others, Muslims that include radical fundamentalists are peace-loving and pious people; yet “some of whom have been driven beyond endurance by all the dreadful things that we of the West have done to them; [we] choose to see them as enemies because we have a psychological need of an enemy to replace the defunct Soviet Union.” In telling that both stances contain elements of truth, yet both are also wrong, he indicates that “Islam as such is not an enemy of the West, and there are growing numbers of Muslims” (*Crisis*, 27) desiring better and more friendly relationships with the West. Yet a considerable portion of Muslims, mostly but not exclusively fundamentalist, is aggressive and dangerous, “not because we need an enemy but because they do” (*Crisis*, 28).

Lastly, Lewis addresses the *war for Islam* declared by Usama bin Ladin against the U.S. In this regards one specific emphasis is the Muslim complaint of the media, speaking of terrorist movements and actions as ‘Islamic;’ without similarly defining Irish and Basque terrorists as ‘Christian.’ To the author, this complaint is understandable, and its answer is simple, because they identify themselves as Muslims; thus it should be addressed to them, who make the news, not those, who report it (*Crisis*, 137). Yet, Lewis specifically focuses on bin Ladin’s terror campaign, and indicates that the beginning of a new and threatening phase was inaugurated in the history of both Islam and terrorism by the foundation of al-Qa’ida in 1991 and by bin Ladin’s declarations of war. For bin Ladin and his followers, America is a symbol of Christendom, “the Land of Unbelievers.” They regard the American presidency as the successor of Christian rulers, from Byzantine Emperors to Queen Victoria and her imperial successors, and believe that Christians are resisting and delaying, but would not prevent the spread of Islam to its universal triumph, an aim undertook in the seventh century (*Crisis*, 160). Concerning the chain of the events, the author turns to the collapse of the USSR, which was, to him, an event that brought devastation to secular nationalist movements. He articulates that in the absence of the Soviet support and lack of financial aid from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the PLO participated in the peace process with Israel, which in the eyes of the fundamentalists was a rescue of the PLO by the West forcing it into a humiliating dialogue with Israel, providing a plea to the fundamentalist cause. While interpreting the collapse of the USSR as their own victory against atheism, the oppressor of Muslims, and against the invaders of Afghanistan, fundamentalists, particularly bin Ladin, claimed that their struggle in Afghanistan defeated the Soviet Army and prompted its collapse; their new duty was to get rid of the other infidel and its agents (*Crisis*, 62-3). In

defining the declared war, Lewis addresses “A letter to America,” published in 2002, wherein bin Ladin presents seven headings, while also claiming American way of life as crimes and sins from their liberation of women to free elections: “embrace Islam,” “stop your oppressions, lies, immorality, and debauchery,” “admit that America is ‘a nation without principles or manners,’” “stop supporting Israel,” “‘pack your luggage and get out of our lands’ [...] ‘do not force us to send you back as cargo in coffins,’” “end your support of corrupt leaders in our countries [and] do not interfere in our politics and methods of education [otherwise] expect us in New York and Washington,” and “deal and interact with Muslims on the bases of mutual interests and benefits, rather than the policies of subjugation, theft, and occupation,” otherwise your defeat will be similar to the previous Crusaders, and your fate will be that of the Soviets (*Crisis*, 157-8). The declared war was in the principle of the defensive *jihad*, literally meaning striving or effort, which has yet been used in a primarily military sense for most of the recorded history of Islam, since the lifetime of the Prophet, but there is no point that Islam enjoins terrorism (*Crisis*, 29-39). Retaining much of the tactics that nationalist terrorists had employed in targeting civilians (e.g., Swiss, British, and American aircraft, hijacked by the PLO in 1970), bin Ladin’s campaign also engaged, what Islam bans, suicide, using it in the 1990s and carried out in their attacks on September 11 (*Crisis*, 147-154).

In concluding *The Arabs in History*, Lewis touches upon the two competing diagnoses of the ills that are offered in the region, each with its own cure—returning to authenticity and arrival at democracy, and states that “the future place of the Arabs in history, will depend, in no small measure, on the outcome of the struggle between them” (208). While concluding *The Multiple Identities in the Middle East*, the author addresses the blood that has never stopped flowing since more than a century ago in the region, where even a relatively stable state of affairs has not yet been achieved, “All these states, whatever their real shape or self-image, are being changed, at different speeds and in different ways, by modernization, bringing with it wider literacy, the information revolution, and the long delayed emancipation and participation of women” which will help to transform, and may even lead to the emergence of free societies; yet it will take time and by then interaction of often conflicted identities are tormented (142). In *Crisis in Islam*, Lewis suggests that had Al-Qa‘ida enabled the world of Islam to persuade their leadership, a long and bitter struggle would be aroused, threatening the U.S. and Europe, where Muslim population is dense and getting denser, and many Europeans are in stages of seeing this

(164). “If the fundamentalists are correct in their calculations and succeed in their war, then a dark future awaits the world, especially the part of it that embraces Islam” (163) Yet, there are others—a rising number of people, who are tempted by the American offer, namely the promise of human rights, free institutions, representative government; many are now undertaking such a complex task to introduce Western forms; yet such attempts had brought about the current corrupt regimes. Of the Middle Eastern countries, Iran and Iraq have anti-American regimes; yet even there, there are democratic oppositions that are increasingly able to form governments, for which the West has done little to help, though it could do much. There are other countries in the region, where some people desire to share the Western way of life, desiring democracy at home; “it is more difficult for us to help those people, but at least we should not hinder them” (164).

1.3. Analysis of Lewis’ Representations of the Middle East through his Historical and Intellectual Discourses

This in-depth analysis draws from the above summary that has been set out to identify Lewis’ specific choices and emphases in his representations of Middle Eastern socio-economic, -political, -cultural, and -religious history, centered on the themes explored in *The Arabs in History*, *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East*, and *Crisis of Islam*. The aim of this analysis is to examine how Lewis represents the region, and in order to enhance some points in the examination, this section also incorporates some other works by Lewis as indicative of his academic and journalistic combination of representations, which in turn enable us to assess the extent of consistency throughout his discourses. Accordingly, this analysis completes its emphasis taking its objective from the primary research question of this study: *What is the information the Western reader receives from his/her writer and communicator about the Middle East, and how could this transmission shape Western public opinion about the Middle East?*

1.3.1. Absence and Rejection of Secularism and Rationalistic Thinking—Challenges of Modernity in Arab Countries and the Wider Islamic World

Placed in *The Arabs in History*, *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East*, and *Crisis of Islam*, Lewis' accounts address the political role of Islam functioning within states and societies in the Arab and a wider Islamic world and flow in concurrence. In this he explores the reasons behind the failures of modernization in alignment with the struggles for democracy in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. At the nucleus of this exploration, focusing on the issues pertaining to the absence of secularism and rationalistic thinking, is a set of traditions inherent in Islam, portrayed as taking their roots from seventh-century Arabia, evolving linearly through the centuries, and accompanied by the Muslim experience accrued through time—as a set of universal Islamic outlooks, which have regressed in terms of Muslim civil, political, and high culture. Framing his discourse from this perspective, Lewis intends to specify the ethos of Islam as intrinsically existing as a religion, culture, and civilization.

1.3.1.1. Islam, Secularism, and the Modern Middle East

Illustrating the tenacious relation between religion and politics in Islam, which is recited almost identically in *Multiple Identities of the Middle East* and *Crisis of Islam*, is a sequence of crisscrossing comparisons between Islam and Christianity. Lewis wants his readers to understand that Islam has developed in isolation from Christian theory and practice, which has evolved under an intrinsically distinct paradigm; “Render unto to Caesar the things which are Caesar’s and unto God the things which are God’s” (*Multiple*, 28; *Crisis*, 6).

The author portrays the Prophet Muhammad’s role as a head of community and as a ruler of state; he depicts the formative period of Islamic doctrine and law, when the immediate successors of the Prophet transformed his state into an empire; and he references the Qur’an, instructing Muslims to their basic task of commanding good and forbidding evil, which exceeds a personal duty imposed by all religions, as it suggests exercising authority to that end (*Multiple*, 28). In writing that endless generations of Christians have been attentive to a choice between God and Caesar, the author also depicts the universal Islamic polity, in which there is only God as a sovereign and source of law and the caliphate is its institution established to achieve the duty

of spreading God's revelation to the whole world at that time. As left by the Prophet, religious truth sanctioned the political power and in turn the latter sustained the former; thus most Muslims today accept that politics is concerned with God, as it is sustained by the Holy Law, the *Shari'a*. The central tenet of Islam, adopted in the early centuries and accepting the Qur'an as divine, eternal, and immutable, is another point emphasized by the author along with other disparities between Islam and Christianity. The Mosque is not an institution that has its own hierarchy and law; there is no priesthood in Islam; and the new institutions and professions, developed in modern times similar to churches and clerics of Christendom are reflective of a departure from classical Islam (*Crisis* 8-10). Pairings of words, such as "lay and ecclesiastical" and "spiritual and temporal," have no equivalent in classical Arabic, which have been introduced to Muslims by external influences along with other modern, secular ideas, embraced only by small groups of elites. Yet, these influences have been attacked, and along the way the elite has been weakened; the result is "an inevitable return to older, more deeply rooted perceptions" (*Multiple*, 29). In all, Lewis exposes the Middle East as it catches a Christian disease, telling that the rapid transformation of society, culture, and state present new problems to the leaders of organized religion in Muslim countries; thus he offers a Christian remedy—separation of the state and religion, which had arrived at the Western lands only after centuries of resentful religious war and persecution (*Multiple*, 39).

The aforementioned assertions provided by Lewis form a theoretical framework concerning the core reasons behind the two phenomena—the lack of political secularism and the rejection of secularism in Muslim societies, where religion plays a significant role in politics, in local and international spheres. This theoretical framework, portraying an anti-modern nature of Islam, suggests that from its outset Islamic society has had a dual character in which politics and faith intersect with each other, and Muslims, without any informative (traditional) source and experience of their own, are not compatible with modern secular ideas, thus naturally clashing with liberal democracy. A similar approach is also set forth by the author in many of his other works, including "Secularism in the Middle East," and *What Went Wrong: The Clash between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East* [alternative title: *What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response*]. In the latter he writes,

The reasons why Muslims developed no secularist movement of their own, and reacted sharply against attempts to introduce one from abroad, will thus be clear from

the contrasts between Christian and Muslim history and experience. From the beginning, Christians were taught both by precept and practice, to distinguish between God and Caesar, and between the different duties owed to each of the two. Muslims received no such instruction (103).

This constructed framework is disputed by Nader Hashemi in his article, “The multiple histories of secularism: Muslim societies in comparison,” wherein a tentative answer is sought to the question: “why did political secularism not emerge in Muslim societies?” (325). Hashemi states that one must turn to the examples of early modern and modern history, “rather than relying on an analytical approach that emphasizes the inner theological doctrine of Islam/Christianity or the early religious history of Christians and Muslims to explain the question of comparative secularism (as Bernard Lewis [... has] done), [which] is fundamentally misleading and misguided” (335-336). Thus, it is helpful for us to take Hashemi’s article into account before analyzing Lewis’ representations of the issue of secularism and that of Muslim hostility against it, as it brings about an external viewpoint on the topic in presentation.

In discussing the question of secularism and that of discontent in Muslim societies towards it, Hashemi references *A Secular Age* by Charles Taylor and addresses four discernible developments that had secularizing outcomes for the West: “the rise of modern capitalism,” “the rise of modern nation-states and nationalism,” “the Scientific Revolution,” and “the Protestant Reformation and the wars of religion during the 16th and 17th centuries” (331). At the axis of the latter development, which is integral to the rise of political secularism, particularly in the Anglo-American tradition, the question of religion–state relations in Muslim societies is discussed. Emergence of political secularism was closely and indelibly connected to the “transformative events in the early modern period of Europe, or, as Taylor has written, ‘the origin point of modern Western secularism was the Wars of Religion [...]’” With the absence of “the same all-consuming wars of religion and debates over religious toleration and political order,” which brought about the rise of secularism in Europe during the 17th century, there was no inner dynamic emerging in the Middle East, necessitating the development of intellectual debates in favor of religion–state separation (332). Emergence of secularism in Europe was a bottom up process; yet in Muslim societies, secularism was imposed from the top down by the colonial state and then maintained by local elites ruling the post-colonial regimes. An autocratic and modernizing state, receiving external support, smothered civil society, while forcing opposition

groups towards the Mosque, unintentionally contributing to political Islam. State-imposed secularization and Westernization policies engendered widespread social and psychological isolation and dislocation; rapid urbanization, shifting patterns on cultural and socio-economic relationships together with increasing corruption, economic mismanagement, mounting poverty, and income disparity diluted the outlook for these ideas. While secularism came to be associated with dictatorship and human rights abuses by a generation of Muslims growing up in the post-colonial era, “Muslim political activists who experienced oppression at the hands of secular national governments logically concluded that secularism is an ideology of repression” (334). In concluding, Hashemi refers to “Multiple Modernities” by S. N. Eisenstadt, and writes, “There is more than one path to modernity [...] that are fundamentally based on different historical experiences.” This is applicable not only in the case of the West, where various models of state-religion relations and different degrees of religiosity occur between the U.S. and Europe, but also for wide-ranging sections of the non-Western world. “The Muslim experiences with modernity, of which there are several, need to be factored into any serious inquiry on modernity on a global level—especially with respect to the topic of political secularism and its discontents” (335).

With the above clarification, in conjunction with the statement: “the role of religion in any society is best understood by examining the specific historical conditions that constitute that society,” by Deepa Kumar in “Islam and Islamophobia,” we can better define Lewis’ representations of the topic under examination, and how it would possibly affect the readers’ thought process. His readers are neither given details about the extent to which the disease of the Middle East (that he addresses) is analogous to the one that Christians had once suffered; nor are they provided “a study,” within local and global contexts, that would be helpful to grasp analytically new problems that he mentions as stemming from rapid transformation (of society, culture, and state in Muslim countries), but never defines in their own context. Subsequently there is no definitive formula provided, other than suggesting a “Christian remedy,” to explain how it would work to solve such “undefined” problems. Lewis portrays a region, which for the most part has remained under foreign domination in one way or another, without specifying the processes of introduction that brought these secular ideas to the Islamic world by what he calls external influences. He mentions a small circle of elite, which indeed was composed of Christian Arab intellectuals embracing the secular ideas, which has been weakened along the way while the external influences have been attacked; yet, he never describes who does the attacking. In

this, with Ilan Pappé's description, an "elitist attitude" appears shown with a methodological fixation among some historians to whom "a society's ability to become fully Westernized dependent to a large extent on its elites," and Lewis' concept of the elite refers to "Islamized Christians" (*The Modern Middle East*, 5). Nevertheless, in referencing history, other groups of elites, leaders of the post-colonial regimes being wooed by foreign influence, and their implications of secular policies are never addressed. This selectiveness does not work to construct broad enough perceptions about experiences of Muslim societies with modernism and secularism, with due respects paid to colonialism, imperialism, and postcolonial developments. It rather imposes the notion of Islam's hostile and unreceptive nature, as a strong impediment on modern values and ideas. This is an attitude of the "pessimists," a term taken from Ilan Pappé, referring to historians seeing the area "as doomed to remain 'primitive' and 'traditional'" (Pappé, 5). Such an attitude of Lewis, drawn with an essentialist rhetoric telling of the essence of Islam, if absorbed by less expertise as it is, shapes minds towards Muslim societies, as standing firm against secularism due to Islam's innate anti-modern stance. The attitude, and its affinity for the antiquated, might be well transmitted to readers, once seeing that the scholar draws his sources exclusively from the Qur'an, and the traditions of the Prophet, Medieval Islam, and classical Arabic, while discussing the modern era—without touching upon inner conflicts that plague every modern nation state regardless of religious or political affiliations—by providing perceived contrasts between Islam and Christianity based upon the foundational doctrines and early religious history. After all, in what is sometimes referred to as "the West and the rest" discourse, it happens to be a hallmark—representing Christianity versus Islam: "[unlike in the modern secular West and other regions that have accepted Western ways] in the Muslim perception, the world is divided into religions, and these may be subdivided into nations and by abuse, states" (*Multiple*, 30), Lewis views the outlook, as if shared by all, as an oddity—backwards and coming from a general negative mindedness.

Indeed, secularism graces the history of humanity—a turning point within the contexts of liberal ideas and democratization produced by the Christian West. Yet oversimplified statements squeezing more than one millennium of Western history into sentences which flow too abstractly, failing to explain that secularism was the outcome of capitalist progression, only promoting the West as an innate democracy in all times and spaces as it has been achieved through continuing dualism between the Church and the State from the day, when Christians

were instructed, “Render unto to Caesar the things which are Caesar’s and unto God the things which are God’s.” Ironically, however, once telling that separation of the state and religion had arrived at the Western lands only after centuries of resentful religious war and persecution, Lewis contradicts his vague analysis. Nevertheless, the overall discourse is an isolation of thoroughly investigative history, reminiscent of what is stated by Hashemi, “Lewis’s argument boils down to a claim that history is destiny,” in *Islam, Secularism and Liberal Democracy Toward a Democratic Theory for Muslim Societies*; “This claim runs contrary, however, to the fact that for over a millennium, Christendom, notwithstanding Jesus’ famous instruction [...], is marked by a very long history of the mutual interdependence and sometimes union of church and state [...]

 (19). Lewis’ snapshots of the history of Christianity, just like those of Islam, dividing the globe into civilizations, serve to build up a perception of the continuity of Western and Islamic civilizations, each with its own unbroken cohesion from early history to modern times, with Lewis’ own definition, “grew up and flourished under the aegis of that religion” (*Crisis*, 3). In this, what makes Western civilization sharply distinctive from “the other” is its quality of being progressive due to its dynamic feature marching towards the modern and along the way forming a secular, open, and free society, as well as political order. This is a classic example of Orientalism’s essentialist standpoint, suggesting, with Edward W. Said’s depiction, “both an enduring Oriental reality and opposing but no less enduring Western essence, which observes the Orient from afar, and from, so to speak, above” (*Orientalism*, 333). With his exclusion of divergence and the non-unitary history of the West, Lewis opens the way for his readers to see a revisionist history of the West as a whole and to isolate Islam from these occurrences, as its case, in this framework, is an exception, not fitting in any modernist inclination due to the essence, in which Islam is a static fact under the sovereignty of God. If this is well received by readers, it is inevitable for them to admit that the road to modernization is the only way, for the Muslims that would entail following the Western footprints.

In questioning the realm of politics and religion in the Middle East—including Turkey and Israel alike—Lewis’ conceptualizations of why Muslims are not compatible with modern secular ideas work towards contrasting his depiction of Islam and Islamic identity. On the one hand, he depicts Islam with “a billion and a third people, and a religious and cultural tradition of enormous diversity” (*Crisis*, 3), extending from Morocco to Indonesia and from Kazakhstan to Senegal. Acknowledging that “Islamic identity is not monolithic” (*Multiple*, 32), he gives

examples through basic identification of sects and deviant groups within Islam such as Sunni, Shi'a, the mainstream (Twelver) Shi'a, Alawi, Ismaili, and the Druze, and based upon demographic distributions of people in countries like Iraq, Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. On the other, he opts to focus on the time frame encompassing more than a thousand years in which Islam has provided "the only universal acceptable set of rules and principles" (*Crisis*, 13), while "Muslim self-awareness" was being shaped in terms of the primary and basic definition of identity. "For Muslims [...] whatever other factors may have been at work, in order to become effective they had to assume a religious or at least a sectarian form" (*Multiple*, 30), and "Islam is not only a matter of faith and practice; it is also an identity and a loyalty—for many, an identity and loyalty that transcend all others" (*Crisis*, 17). After all, Islam turns out to be a "monolithic existence" with its believers and practitioners in labeling these human mosaics as Muslim without considering local customs and traditions, as well as socio-economic and political circumstances that have produced diversity in Islamic practice.

In reading history from this perspective to provide "adequate" explanations for the unique Muslim attitude towards politics "that has no parallel in other major religions" (*Multiple*, 27), the author takes the importation of the Western notions of patriotism and nationalism into account, which led to the creation of a sequence of modern-nation states across the Islamic world; yet, it has not changed religion's role of mobilization only with few exceptions in places—like Turkey (*Crisis*, 17-9). While making an attempt to promote Turkey with its secular and Westernized democracy, Lewis states that the state-issued identity card does not have a line for religion as a recent development, which happens to be in fact an outright fallacy; one minor detail, but symptomatic of the integrity of his overall discourse. The real problem framing Lewis' discourse is how he provides an exceptional outlook towards the region with the essence of Islam that maintains Muslims stand at odds with Western secularism, and another exceptional outlook towards Turkey. If it were Islam that produces all social and political behavior, how would Turkey's secularization have been explained? Does it mean that Islam with its holy book and its historical trajectory is not the same religion for Turkey? Or, taking another look at the region, does it mean that the characters paving the way for creation of secular ideas in other countries, like Iran and Iraq, cannot fall into the categorization of being Muslim? As noted, "the secularist wing of Iran's National Front in the 1940s and 1950s was developed by Muslims"; "the secularist policies of Muhammad Reza Pahlavi were developed by his circle of Muslim

technocrats”; and “although the Baath Party was initially the brainchild of Christian Arabs, its secularist ideology was taken up with alacrity by Syrian and Iraqi Muslims in large numbers,” all provided as an alternative view by Juan Cole in the “Review of Bernard Lewis’ *What Went Wrong: Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response*.” While leaving these questions unanswered for the earnest readers, Turkey’s case of exception lacks specific contextual outline. Despite narrating that the Turks managed to liberate their country “not in the name of Islam but through a secular nationalist movement [led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk]” (*Crisis*, xvii), whose revolution ended the Sultanate while taking decisive steps in a direction towards the West and a Western identity (*Multiple*, 134), Lewis neglects to distinguish the specific history in regards to Turkey. He fills this gap with “To be sure, Atatürk’s reforms were outward looking and European-oriented. But they nonetheless came from within Turkish society, not from outside” (87-7), extracted from Noah Feldman’s *The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State*, properly attuned to the ideology of Lewis in content.

The exceptional case of Turkey—or rather to say its success in terms of secularism—is not wholly reliant on the leadership and intellectual elites’ conscious effort towards being like the West. Instead, it is more related to the economic tendencies of the country and the various obstacles it was confronted with in its efforts as a liberal economy in the first half of the twentieth century, unlike those experienced in Arab countries.

This brings about another question in line with Lewis’ exploration of Israel; “there have of late been increasing signs of Middle Eastern attitudes on [the relations between politics and religion]” (*Multiple*, 39). The author accurately explains the cultural differences among Indigenous Middle Eastern Jews, the Sephardim of Iberia, and the European Jews (Ashkenazim). Each brought the characteristic of their host civilizations, Islam and Christianity. Yet, once it comes time to speak of the many contrasting and occasional clashes between these two groups, he neither places the issues in a historical context being specific in time, nor attempts to be interpretive of Judaism as he has done with that of Islam; at best his reader is provided with this: “in Islam there was from the beginning an interpretation of religion and government [...], which has some parallel in Old Testament Judaism but not in any subsequent form” (*Multiple*, 28). Forecasting the portentous conflict occurring between the religious and secular interpretations of Israeli identity, or a definition of the state, that was to be promoted by those, whose background is attested to in Islamic civilization, the question arose, isn’t it the same background that these

people share with people in secular Turkey—a place, once located at the heart of the same civilization? Lewis' ultimate device found in his explorations into the struggle between secular and religious in Israel is understood through “The many contrasts and occasional clashes between these two groups reflect, in miniature, the larger confrontation of Christendom and Islam” (*Multiple*, 37) tying its utility into his construct of thought.

1.3.1.2. Rejection of Rationalistic Thinking in Islam and Contemporary Arab World

The nucleus of Lewis' exploration—Islam's unchangeable fate tied to its ancient roots—is also key in portraying its deterministic, occasionalist, and authoritarian, thus static, theology, that denies secondary causes, calling God the author rather than the causal factor, and demanding unquestioned acceptance of divine revelation and divine law, thoughts all expressed in *The Arabs in History*. In referencing Medieval Islam, as this theology is rooted from “the atomistic and intuitive quality of Islamic religious thought” that was to be the winning side in its struggle with “the scientific [Greco-rooted] rationalist tendency of the new learning,” Lewis tells us that this victory marked the final and deliberate rejection of all causality and decided against free speculation and research, thus bringing the end of free inquiry into philosophy and natural sciences. This is the background provided to expose Islam with its atomistic outlook, that is to say “the tendency to view life and universe as a series of static, concrete, and disjunct entities, loosely linked in a sort of mechanical or even casual association by circumstances or the mind of an individual, but having no organic interrelation of their own” (153).

Pertaining to the atomism that is to be conceptualized, examples are extracted from the life of medieval Arabs, whose literary and artistic traditions, from their poetry to prose and historiography to applied-decorative arts, purveys only minute particulars, impersonality, collectivism, and the Perfection of God; whose town was a combination of quarters, guilds, clans, houses, lacking in civic identity of its own; who considered his society not “as an organic whole” but “as an association of separate groups—religions, nations, classes—held together only by the ground beneath and the government above” (*Arabs*, 153). The atomistic trait is yet, to the author, more apparent in the post-classical stages of Arab history, appearing in many aspects of Islamic thought and institutions, “perhaps most clearly in the Muslim ideal of the Perfect Man and the Perfect State [...] to which all must in theory attempt to conform by imitation rather than

by developing their own individual potentialities from within” (*Arabs*, 154). In depicting Islam’s theology as widely approved and enduring, Lewis provides a conception of the decline of Islamic civilization, presenting much of its classical heritage suggesting a golden age, since neglected, forgotten, or misunderstood among the descendants of who had created it. “This new version of Islam” has been seriously challenged only by “its intellectual counterpart,” in the impact of the West in the nineteenth century, threatening “the whole traditional structure of Islamic society and the modes of thought” (*Arabs*, 155).

Lewis is not the only scholar seeking to identify the problem of contemporary Arab world with due respect to Medieval Islamic thought; he has been one amongst many. One of these scholars is H. A. R. Gibb, who is referenced in Lewis’ book with his definition of “Arab”: “All those are Arabs for whom the central fact of history is the mission of Muhammad and the memory of the Arab Empire and who in addition cherish the Arabic tongue and its cultural heritage as their common possession” (*Arabs*, 2). As noted by Zachary Lockman in *Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism*, H. A. R. Gibb inquired (in *Modern Trends in Islam*, published in 1947) why the Arab mind cannot get rid of its strong feeling for “the separateness and individuality of the concrete events,” which is because of “‘lack of a sense of law’” (109), and this, to Gibb, explains why Muslims dislike the thought-process of rationalism. It was in this inquiry, Gibb addressed the defeat of rationalist schools of thought that occurred in the early centuries of Islam, as it not only conditioned the formulation of Islamic theology but it also set an everlasting stamp upon Islamic culture; “‘the rejection of rationalist modes of thought and of the utilitarian ethic which is inseparable from them has its roots, therefore, not in the so-called ‘obscurantism’ of the Muslim theologians but in the atomism and discreteness of the Arab imagination’” (110). What is more significant for us to grasp from Lockman’s study is that Gibb was the one, later leaving Oxford to Harvard (1955), at a time when post war years paved the way of expansion of area studies in the U.S., brought about a new vision, suggesting to both Orientalists and social scientists to work together to produce comprehensive knowledge about the Middle East and Islam useful to policymakers, while yet insisting that only the Orientalist could understand the essential traits of Islamic civilization (130-1). Upon his illness, Gibb’s involvement in this vision ended and the developing events changed the direction of the field; but his stress placed on Orientalists’ deep understanding of the essence of Islam was perpetuated, as it is seen in much of the scholarly work of Bernard Lewis,

“who by the 1970s had stepped into Gibb’s shoes as the doyen of Anglo-American Orientalism” (131).

One of these scholarly works of Lewis is *The Arabs in History* (published three years after Gibb produced *Modern Trends in Islam*, and reissued several times by 2002). Wherein, as we have outlined, he not only speaks about Islamic atomism-occasionalism that was embodied in Islamic theology in the classical era, bringing about a fixed and rigid Muslim paradigm, an obstacle for the emergence of rationalist thinking and reasoning in post-classical stages of Arab history—encompassing time frames up until the end of the twentieth century. He also touches upon Arab politics; allegedly composed of anti-democratic values, because of that theology, building a universal truth—what Lewis calls the Muslim ideal of the Perfect Man and the Perfect State. Reducing Arab mind and politics into an essence of Islam, and in delving into Medieval Islam and its socio-cultural milieu, Lewis isolates his readers from the amply transparent lens of history as a whole. Once paying mind to the author’s skill for using eloquent language, we come across selectiveness, in commonality and in discourse, which can be exemplified in three interrelated cases, generating, if nothing else, inspired viewpoints.

First, Lewis attempts to provide signs of occasionalist personification in Medieval Islam, drawing readers to examples, whether it be God-centered literary tradition or that of artistic production; all cases are exposed with his genius for promoting evocative illustrations of Medieval Europe without a single word. What the exact traits differentiating Medieval Europe from “the other,” or where the precise coalescence occurring between them at a time, when cultural alteration took place, is never addressed. On one hand, this exclusion helps us to associate Lewis’ place in European scholarship, with Maria Rosa Menocal’s statement, “European scholarship has an a priori view of, and set of assumptions that, its medieval past is far from conducive to viewing its Semitic components as formative and central” (*Arabic Role*, xiii). On the other, accompanied by well-entrenched examples from classical literature, arts, historiography, and philosophy, while yet suddenly drawing the reader’s attention to the post-classical era, the aforementioned exclusion serves to give an understanding of the timeless quality of the Arab civilization. In seeing this, it is quite possible for a reader, whose understanding of modernity is constructed through the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, to read the history of Arabs, or Islam, as backwards, and that of the West forward. In this mindset many of the contributions made by Western philosopher and scientists into modern world would

be remembered as rightly deserving of their notoriety and venerated, such as Giordano Bruno, while forgetting their fates drawn by the Roman Inquisition.

Second, and again, Lewis represents Islam going beyond perceived limits, especially once he takes a drastic shift in depicting the post-classical stages of Arab civilization; now his discourse wholly relies on Islamic thought and institutions in confirming the universal truth found in the Muslim ideal—without any earnest attempts at exemplifying other facets in Arab life from literary tradition to popular culture of the vast territories. There yet existed the emergence of new literary genres and techniques; the formation of the drama, short story, and novel; as well as the inception of Arab cinema, which undoubtedly would serve well in further understanding these people. Unquestionably, Western influence on, and contribution into this whole process of reconfiguration and reconstitution from the nineteenth century onwards is immense; yet themes explored by them with new ideas and new forms of artistic awareness corresponding to changing socio-economic and political conditions deserved to be addressed. Had Lewis filled this gap, his accounts regarding unitary Islamic-Arab existence, whose traditional structure and modes of thought reside at odds with the West, would be placed into another framework; living traditions and humanity existing and assimilating into the global community. Lewis' aim is certain, not to explore Arab and Islamic world, but to deem it unchangeable even in the face of grave circumstances through its own design, and thus lacking in a quality paramount to success in the Western perspective—the ability to adapt. In referencing Said's *Culture and Imperialism*, wherein two definitions of culture are provided—an expended one, encompassing life itself, and a limited one, referring to “all those practices, like arts of description, communication and representation, that have relative autonomy from the economics, social, and political realm, and that often exist in aesthetic forms, one whose principle aim is pleasure,” Pappe states, “Culture in its limited form has a story[;] this story of culture in the Middle East as in so many parts of the world, has until recently been told by outsiders” (Pappe, 163). It is perceivable for us to observe that Lewis' disposition is akin to that of these outsiders, whose ideology oriented discourse places Islam at the center of every issue, while depicting a polarizing picture—the enlightened West and the Islamic Arab world set in its primordial ways.

In the third case, the exhibited selectiveness in the discourse needs to be analyzed at length. Lewis elucidates a significant topic, onto which scholarly attentions have always turned, from both the West and East, which is the change of the epistemological course of Islamic

thought occurring during the classical era, when the debate between free speculation and divine predestination ended in victory for the latter. This elucidates the two schools of thought, the rationalist and the traditionalist, best signified in the Mu‘tazila—influenced by ancient Greek logic and philosophy—and in the Ash‘ariyya—influential in change on the direction of Islamic theology. Lewis is telling us what history has shown. Islam of the traditionalists has domineered thought and actions in history and in modernity, bringing about substantial outcomes. Arab civilization has long since been looking behind at its greatest accomplishments and glorified era, due to the rejection of independent rational reasoning. While poised to be a predicament within modernity, the dogma of the traditionalists is a source for polarization with the West and secular view of the universe. Yet, in conjunction with the representation of Islamic polity and society based upon an atomistic outlook receiving its complete expression and experience from dogmatic theology, Lewis aims to provide a hint towards the concept of “Oriental despotism.”

Placing this concept into a perspective with Huri İslamoğlu-İnan’s articulations, “Oriental descriptions of Islamic polity and society closely approximate to the conceptions of ‘Oriental despotism’ that dominated the Enlightenment and the nineteenth-century European intellectual discourse” (4), written in *The Ottoman Empire and the World-Economy*. İslamoğlu notes that unlike Enlightenment thinkers, like Montesquieu, whose notion of despotism described all Asian polities based on geographical determinants (3), or nineteenth century theorists, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, whose assumptions of the Asiatic Mode of Production regarding “stationariness of the East and its despotic political structure” were carried into the post-World War II analysis of Asian societies, the Orientalist explanation of Oriental despotism drives its focus neither from geography, nor from socio-economic structure, but from cultural properties inherent to Islam. “Thus in this conception Islamic society is viewed as a cellular structure in which village communities, tribes, guilds, ethnic and religious groupings constitute separate and autonomous units that are integrated only on the level of religious ideology and institutions,” from which the political structure is depicted as superimposed on the society by force, “as such, it is external to the society’s integration” (4), as seen in the works of H. A. R. Gibb and H. Bowen (e.g., *Islamic Society and the West*). Working in tandem with this conception of Islamic society are Lewis’ examples extracted from the life of medieval Arabs, whose mind is pictured as conceiving their society and the world around them not as an organic whole but associations of separate groups held together by the ground beneath and the government above. These are the

examples of an atomistic society, lacking in qualities of civil character and political awareness, suggestive of the existence of the repressive state ruled by those, “[whose] authority lay in the sheer exercise of force and in the flawed Islamic political theory that recognized the legitimacy of *de facto* ruler” (İslamoğlu, 4). In totality, Lewis fails to emphasize the role of the rationalist in intellectualizing the political sphere by promoting reasoning as an impedance to despotism in medieval Islam and the pragmatism of the ruling elite on drawing Islam’s future, chipping away at free will—this pragmatism, still is held intact, as rationalist inquiry does not reach dictators. This failure works to promote his dual objectives: to portray the Arab world as to where free speculation and research had utterly ended in Islam’s Medieval era, and to depict the Muslim mind as if the ideal of the Perfect Man and the Perfect State has universally operated with collective obedience thus passivism, excluding any sort of rational thinking and individual act within the political process.

As stated by Asma Afsaruddin, in *The First Muslims: History and Memory*, “It has been convincingly suggested that the free will vs. predestination debate at [Medieval Islam] was politically motivated.” It is because, “proponents of free will were more likely to be inclined to oppose governments perceived as unrighteous and thus illegitimate, whereas those in favor of predestination would lean toward political quietism and acceptance of the status quo” (86-7). One of the scholars convincingly asserting this is Fatema Mernissi, a Moroccan sociologist and writer of *Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World*. Wherein the struggle between pen and political despotism is discussed; “the struggle between on the one hand, the intellectuals, the *qadis* (judges) thirsting for justice, the Sufis thirsting for freedom, and the poets who tried to express their individuality; and on the other hand, the caliphs and their *shari’a*, their very authoritarian reading of divine law” (19). Endeavoring to take her suggestions and guidance not only proves advantageous as to understanding an insider’s voice, but also offers an additional outlook for us in referencing and in distinguishing Lewis’ double objectives mentioned above.

Mernissi writes, “Democracy is like that sovereign boat that floats on the river of time, obliging us to face what we have been unable to contemplate up to now in our Muslim culture: ‘*aql* (reason) and *ra’y* (personal opinion or judgment)’” (18). From the beginning Muslims have engaged in posing and solving the question that still remains—to obey or to reason. “The individual and his freedom,” regarded as the sole property of the West, is actually at the heart of our tradition; yet, “it has been submerged in incessant bloodbaths” (19). In the early centuries,

introduction of reason into politics by the Hellenized philosophers and the Sufis (e.g., the Mu‘tazila) forced Islam to think of new relationship between ruler and ruled, bringing the idea that all believers are competent in reasoning, which was opposed to the Kharijite tradition of political subversion, of using force for political challenge. Despite their different lines [“the obedience/revolt patten of the Kharijites” and “obedience/reason [pattern of the Mu‘tazila” (35)], there existed a merging point: the leader must be modest and by no means turn to despotism. Once the Abbasid dynasty fell into palace intrigues, the Mu‘tazila began to be condemned as a foreign enterprise; in order to strengthen their despotic rule the Abbasids now enlisted their thinkers from the tradition of knowledge, a tradition called *shari‘a*. Such condemnation of the humanistic spirit has continued, and still remains; Muslim politicians have censored intellectuals by labeling them as polluting the dynamic of all civilization: “Nevertheless, the fact that the rationalist, humanistic tradition was rejected by despotic politicians does not mean that it doesn’t exist” (27). Many occasions have convalesced from past to present in line with post-colonial developments that brought about activism, despotism, and militancy. “The latter, the heir of the rebel fringe, the Kharijite tradition, is the inevitable offspring of the official despotism disguising itself as obedience to the divine will” (37-8). In light of this, Arab intellectuals defending the opening to all humanistic thought is evident, while the rationalist past and leading light of Western humanism has been reclaimed. Amongst many contemporary philosophers well known in the Arab world are Muhammad ‘Amara, Husayn Mruwa, and Muhammad al Jabiri, the latter, who died in 2010, being likely the most read by Arab youths. In devouring Jabiri’s books e.g., *The Process of the Formation of Arab Thought* that has reconciled “millions of Arab young people to modernity and raised their democratic aspirations,” the youth understand Islam “in which openness and personal opinion are an integral part of our tradition.” Yet, the West ignores this aspect of openness, while consorting with the leaders of fanatical movements, not Arab intellectuals subsequently ignoring “the whole progressive movement” (38).

In fact both Lewis and Mernissi are discussing the same topic—the issue of modernity; its bond with rationalist thinking, one of the prerequisites of democracy, just like secularism, giving life to the universe of earthly reasons, meanings, and values, thus progress, and in many aspects both discussions have certain agreements with each other. Failing to provide certain nuances in understanding Islam, a problem arises with Lewis’ discourse; self-confidence, or haughtiness surrounds his skilled writing; yet, the representations arrive remiss of certain

contextual particulars. It is foreseeable for a reader to conclude that Islam is Islam, with its theology that wholly closed the door for rational reasoning, and with its believers, collectively obedient to their ideal of Perfect Man and the Perfect State. Stemming from exclusions of the insiders' voice, whether they be intellectuals or laymen, telling of their own struggles—there still existed people striving for free speculation and research, and for individual action within political process, this conclusion might well entrench the outsider to see this part of the world as antithetic with its atomism, universally conducting the whole civilization.

Without reflecting the human experience or offering a perspective from which to empathize with a culture, in which diverse practices, wishes, and identities have comprised the makeup of vast territories, Lewis replicates his themes in elucidating the rejection of rationalistic thinking in Islam, presented as a challenge of modernity, allowing readers of *The Arabs in History* to effectively antipathize with the subject of the discourse, anti-democratic Arabs wholly religiously conditioned, developing only through observation and inevitability, rejecting the values that challenge its being in all times. Following this methodology, his efforts of constructing history with a deep focus on Islam are almost identical when compared with those embodied in *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East* and *Crisis of Islam*, both of which have been subject to this study with Lewis' conceptualization of the absence of secularism, shown as resulting from Islam's historical trajectory and as the cause behind failures in reform initiatives and institutionalization, subsequently in attempting transition to liberal democracy. Bearing in mind the highlighted outcomes of the study revealing to us a blatantly Eurocentric viewpoint, telling that Muslim states and societies, particularly in Arab countries, on a diverse spectrum failed, this study now intends to examine the way the author represents the state in its various stages of development in the Middle East.

1.3.2. Transformation from Traditional Autocratic State to One Party Ideological Dictatorship—Modernization Taking Forms under the Parameters of Essence of Islam

In presenting the emergence of one-party, ideological-dictatorship in the Arab world, Lewis' main focus is religious and political thinking in Islam, which is to him totalitarian in character, compatible most with twentieth century innovations the likes of Italian fascist and Soviet communist models. In *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East* effective importation of

these models to the region is presented as a part of the process of “problematic modernization,” taking its roots in the nineteenth century, when autocratic state for the first time appeared as being despotic. Importation of these models is also subject of discussion in *Crisis of Islam* and *The Arabs in History*; in the former, this is portrayed accompanied by an “anti-Western ideological sentiment and in the latter with an “Arab attitude” rooted in Islam exposing struggles for democracy.

1.3.2.1. One Party Ideological Dictatorship, by-product of Modernization

In *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East*, Lewis mentions the universal Islamic state, which was the only one in principle; ideally and even in practice for a while, the Islamic polity was a single state ruled by a single sovereign, the caliph, and along these lines the reader is informed that “the desire to realize this ideal remained a recurring theme and a powerful motive through the centuries of Islamic history” (92). He also touches upon the emergence of many Islamic states, whose interaction with each other in peace and war and in commerce and diplomacy was regulated by a sort of Muslim international law, while emphasizing the collapse of the last universal Islamic empire, the Ottomans, setting the time frame as when “the dream of unity was for a while abandoned, and Muslims sought to adjust to changed circumstances” (93).

This is the rhetoric of the author, lacking a broad enough perception to properly understand the development of various political institutions, traditions, and systems throughout the centuries in which a variety of Shia and Sunni doctrines and practices played roles. This rhetoric simplistically presents the state established by the Prophet, being enacted by Muslims as a model in all times, and fails to depict the characteristics of political and religious institutions created subsequent to the decline of power of the caliphate, which would have been insightful to acknowledge what Adam Sabra calls, “the flexible character of Islamic legal practice,” extracted from “What Is Wrong with *What Went Wrong?*” In it the complex relationship between the power of the sultans and the religious authority of the *ulama* is addressed as an alternative view of what Lewis attempts to inspire, with Sabra’s statement, “a utopian ideal of divine, unchanging law, occasionally counteracted by a wink and a nod.” Such an attempt, which is also evident in the book subjected to this study (*Multiple*), works in tandem with Lewis’ recurring expressions regarding the Muslim desire and dream of unity, lacking any specific references to time and

space, which serves to coax Western readers into constructing an image, reminiscent of an unbroken Muslim mode of thought, which is far from reconcilable with theirs, portraying the ideological threat as present, fundamentally opposing the West and its modern values. It is a vital shortcoming, suggesting that the reader keep in mind the historical trajectory of Muslims while reading the lines of this book, essentially forcing their hand towards judgmental speculation about what the future might hold in terms of their relations with the Middle East.

Bringing summation into some of these lines, in order to unfold how Muslims sought to adjust to altered circumstances since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Lewis turns to deeply rooted habits and institutions, like the state and the army—the two vital elements making up the traditional Islamic autocracy, in which dynasticism has been a powerful force often acquiring religious connotation in the region. How the modern age is portrayed, as it has brought about an astonishing feature to the state, tyranny along with the persistency of the state, is outline below and reverberates the author's particular attention to the Arab world, a component of the Middle East, where “electoral democracy [...] has had a brief and checkered history” (*Multiple*, 97).

To Lewis, the problem is overt. As it had occurred in the previous century, when the process of modernization was taking its course, in the twentieth century the army continued to serve for survival of the state, while the advancement of modern technologies such as transportation and communication sustains the coercive power of the state, which by now means a ruler and his cliques helping him to exercise autocratic power that had never been enjoyed before. Also, attempts at eliminating both legal and social factors were launched in the late nineteenth century; these factors had yet worked to restrict the power of the sovereign, and the result is the present-day states with colossal control in the Islamic world, “even those claiming to be progressive and democratic, are—in their domestic affairs at least—vastly stronger than the so-called tyrannies of the past” (*Multiple*, 99). These all explain not only an extraordinary persistence of the state, even if there existed no experience of separate statehood until it was created, but also an extraordinary ability of the state, as either a genuine historical entity or artificial, to control its subjects. Moreover, brought into the region in the 1930s and 1940s, first in the form of German and Italian fascist models, and then the Soviet model of Communist dictatorship, the single party system set this extraordinary persistence and ability on a rising path, as in the case of the Baath Party, founded in 1941 in Vichy-controlled Syria in order to support the pro-Axis Rashid ‘Ali regime in Iraq; later it exercised authority both in Iraq and Syria, where

its rival branches contained Saddam Hussein and Hafiz al-Assad (*Multiple*, 101-2).

These portrayals are verbatim in Lewis' accounts expressed in responding to a question at length concerning the issue of democracy (i.e., "how realistic a policy of spreading democracy in the Islamic world is it at this point?"), asked by a *TIME* correspondent, when he was hosted by the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, in 2006, to which the forum is titled "Islam and the West: A Conversation with Bernard Lewis." Extracted from that response, he states that the despotic regime of Saddam Hussein and that of Hafiz al-Assad emerged due to "an importation from Europe, which comes in two phases." The first phase is marked with the late nineteenth century, "when [Muslims] are becoming aware of their falling behind the modern world and need desperately to catch up, so they adopt all kinds of European devices with the best of intentions, which nevertheless have two harmful effects"—placing weaponry and communication in the hands of the ruler and eliminating established orders that had restricted a sovereign's power. The second phase is dated to 1940, when the region was wide open to Nazi Germany, from which Baathism took its root that ultimately developed into the Baath Party, and after WWII, "to switch from the Nazi to the communist model required only minor adjustments." These accounts work to grasp a consistency in Lewis' approach to the region in displaying a deadlock of political modernization working seamlessly with the portrayals in the book, wherein he provides the reader still more: in the process, hereditary revolutionary leadership emerged as a product of the modern age, joining the previous two trends of changing governments, which have been occurring in most parts of the region either through succession within a ruling family or the removal and replacement of the ruler by use or threat of force (e.g., conspiracy, assassination, coup, or armed rebellion). Reflecting these two trends is Islamic tradition, in which the Sunni established a rule of election by rejecting hereditary headship offered by the Shi'a; yet each early elective caliphate ended in regicide and civil wars; thus sovereignty turned out to be dynastic in every Muslim state, just like in the self-styled revolutionary republics in Iraq and Syria, where Saddam Hussein and Hafiz al-Assad groomed their sons to succeed them (*Multiple*, 93-9).

It needs to be stated that each of the addressed phenomena contains a certain amount of accuracy, shedding light on struggles for democracy. However, in unison with a purported rhetoric, representations of them flow as partial towards an underlying structure, especially once they are treated as representative information for readers to conceptualize further articulations regarding a short and inconsistent history of electoral democracy in the region. The author's

starting point is a question about how Muslims sought to adjust to changed circumstances upon the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and in its aftermath. In this, the subject “Muslims,” is a vague descriptor used as a vehicle where Lewis draws the state into focus. Accompanied with what the modern age has brought to Islam, that is tyranny, “Muslims” have turned out to be ruled, signifying the obedient, and ruler, whether it be activist or quietist, upon resuming control within the dynastic succession, the despot. Time and space is all but ignored in a whizzing blur of plucked answers, offered to such a question, indicative of an “ongoing process,” and despite the author mentioning the process of modernization, it lacks the contextual outline to place the issue of political transformation into a perspective, which would be analytical in due respect to political history in the region. Therefore, Lewis exposes very little on the topics of a broad spectrum, not only in explaining the replacement of old devices with new but wrong ones, but also in attempting to direct the attention towards the emergence of the Baath Party, founded in Vichy-controlled Syria to support the pro-Axis Rashid ‘Ali regime in Iraq. Serving to mislead the reader is this discourse, which furthermore associates the revolutionary dynamics of the so-called countries wholly with Saddam Hussein and Hafiz al-Assad and with the rebellious nature of the Arab past anchored in the Islamic history of the territory, while also being suggestive of an autocratic spirit in Islam as compatible with that of fascist and communist models. In conjunction with what Lewis suggests the reader to keep in mind (above)—an unbroken Muslim mode of thought presented along with an existence of a rigid, utopian ideal of divine law, all these representations work to compose the concept of Oriental despotism quite succinctly. Reading into İslamoğlu’s *The Ottoman Empire and the World-Economy*, we see how this concept is employed when delving into Oriental studies, which reason the absence of civil society, liberalism, humanism, and parliamentarianism as concurrent with Islamic cultural traits, and in turn they bear political instability and disorder “as witnessed in the circulation of dynasties and in sporadic revolts” (5), while describing this story, they focus on repressive political institutions (e.g., army and bureaucracy) and on religious-cultural institutions (e.g., Islamic law and the religious scholars) that function to legitimate this repression. This is evocative of the way Lewis tells his readers of the totalitarian characteristics of Islamic political thinking, verified conclusively with the regimes of Saddam Hussein and Hafiz al-Assad.

If Lewis had taken into account a diverse assortment of matters relevant to colonial power-led creation of armies, its integration into politics during the post-colonial era, its self-

imposed role in the 'nation building' process, as well as unresolved and on-going problems with the neighboring countries that brought the army to the centre of national politics and its security in the second half of the twentieth century, the discourse would be drastically forced into another direction. Then, a dialectic approach to local history would be provided to the reader in conjunction with knowledge of the Middle East's ascribed position in international systems brought about through their complex and fluctuating states and roles in politics.

Endeavoring to reassess this history by means of different methodological approaches proves insightful when grasping Lewis' objectives behind his selective writings. In his book *Western Imperialism in the Middle East: 1914-1958*, D. K. Fieldhouse examines the process of the formation of the national army that took different courses under British mandated Iraq and French mandated Syria, and suggests that the formation of the army during that era prompted "petty bourgeoisie" in both countries; "this had the long term result that the army after independence came to see itself as an agent for social and political reform ready to overthrow the traditional social and political structure" (260). Taking into consideration only Iraq, to see how an army functioned as an agent for state purposes, we can take scholarly contributions of William L. Cleveland placed in *A History of the Modern Middle East*: Upon the sudden death of the British imposed king (Faisal), who had ruled the Hashemite Monarchy in Iraq from 1921 to 1933, the political sphere was corrupted in the hands of inexperienced cliques of elites distinct with their attitudes towards Iraq's relation with Britain, ranging from moderate to oppositionist. Moderates were reluctant to irritate Britain, not only because the country recently had gained independence through the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1930, but also they had just found better positions within the state, while the opposition desiring full independence by cutting the remaining ties from their imperial master regulated firmly through the so-called treaty. Amongst the oppositionists were younger military officers, who regarded the army as the true symbol of the new Iraqi nation; "imbued with sentiments of nationalism and pan-Arabism, the army leaders were eager to assert Iraq's role in the Middle East as an independent nation" (210). Receiving confidence from its massacre of Assyrian civilians in 1933 in the name of protecting national interest, the army came to the central position in politics, leading the first of a sequence of military coups in Iraqi history overthrowing the governments in power between 1936 and 1941, during a time when the politics were controlled by shifting coalitions of military personnel and civilian politicians: "As Britain prepared for war with Adolph Hitler's Germany in 1939, a

politically unstable Iraq was gripped by a wave of Fascist-inspired paramilitary youth movements and increasing anti-British sentiments” (211). In the course of WWII, in 1941 the Four Colonels staged a coup that overthrew the pro-British Iraqi regime and led the formation of pro-Axis Rashid ‘Ali government with an objective that was to remove the British influence from the country. Denying Britain’s right to use Iraq as a military base, the army surrounded the British air base in the country, and this act resulted in the Anglo-Iraqi War of 1941. Such a war with the defeat of the Iraqi army not only brought the country under British military occupation spanning through 1945, but also brought reestablishment of the previous pro-British coalition into power. “Although [this] was a minor episode in the overall scope of [WWII], it was an important event in Iraqi history and revealed the measures of frustration and disillusionment felt in both civilian and military quarters over Britain’s continuing interference in Iraqi affairs.” More significantly, the young officers who carried out another coup in 1958, overthrowing not only the pro-British government but also the British-led Hashemite monarchy in Iraq, proclaimed that “they were only carrying out unfinished business of 1941” (213).

By the same token, in his book *State, Power and Politics in Making of the Modern Middle East*, Roger Owen looks at the issue from the framework of continuing problems with the neighboring countries, while articulating that, during the 1958 coup in Iraq and during the 1963 coup in Syria, the military corps had already been highly politicized, and in the meantime the military officers became more involved in domestic affairs accompanied with the war affairs of Israel. One of the examples provided in this regard is the Arab defeat in the 1967 War, which was followed by the formation of new military-led regimes both in Iraq (1968) and in Syria (1970), “paving the way for yet another shift in balance between the army and the state” (181). While bolstering and better outfitting their armies, becoming more professional organizations in a sort, ready to fight against what they called the external enemies, while also developing paramilitary organizations to deal with internal security, in Iraq and Syria (just like in Egypt) the new regimes formulated their own methods to control the military, and thus the “final result of all such measures was to make the larger Arab regimes more or less coup-proof” (182).

In being exposed to different approaches towards the same matter, we can better assert Lewis’ narrative of the cause and effect on the emergence of the one party dictatorships, making the late nineteenth century and the 1930s-1940s deterministic, excluding an array of time frames, from the creation of the state as an artificial entity to emergence of these figures in the political

arena, and neglecting the colonial past and post-colonial developments. Accompanied by his further statements, this mode of negligence becomes more apparent. A relaxed approach to transition appears from “political parties” (as they were introduced by foreign rulers in the Fertile Crescent) to “the system of the single party” (*Multiple*, 101). In seeing neither Iraqi nor Syrian politics taking shape from the 1920s onward, a description of National Socialism as the “bastard offspring” of nationalism and socialism, referring to the one-party dictatorships that ruled in Syria and Iraq, functions as more of a slogan than that of a historical inquiry, especially reading that “these two crawled out of the ruins of failed and collapsed democracies” (*Multiple*, 132).

Far from conveying a balanced knowledge, Lewis exposes his scholarly view by means of a methodology formulated to explain “failure” in political modernization, through which the question of adjustment finds its own answer. Instead of adjusting to changed circumstances in line with modernity, they have adjusted some values of the modern world into their own practices rooted in Islam, either wielding modern technology and communication methods to strengthen the coercive power of the state, or exploiting the depraved political systems of Italy and Germany, and later that of the Soviets to suppress. The intention within the selectivity is certain—to suggest to the reader that Islam is not despotic though it is autocratic; despotism in this case is a by-product of modernization but it stems from innate authoritarian/totalitarian traits of the traditional Islamic state internalized and experienced until the last universal Islamic Empire collapsed; and one party dictatorship has no roots in Islamic past, but Islam is rooted in centuries-old institutions, ideas, and experiences stimulating political elites to lean towards wrong inclinations, causing the emergence of such regimes and political traditions.

1.3.2.2. One Party Ideological Dictatorship presented with anti-Western Islamic Sentiments

In *Crisis of Islam*, too, a reprisal of his far-fetched assertions is transmitted. Lewis writes, “Western-style parties and parliaments almost invariably ended in corrupt tyrannies, maintained by repression and indoctrination,” with a central focus—the rival branches of the Baath Party in Iraq and Syria, reflecting “the worst features of its Nazi and Soviet models” (118). Taking a closer look at the portrayals on the emergence of a one party dictatorship, apart from *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East*, we notice a motive expressed as an “anti-Western

ideological sentiment,” stirring in the Arab world and within a wider Islamic world, materializing anti-Western reactions, particularly in anti-Americanism.

It is worth mentioning that this motive takes its root from Lewis’ essay, “Communism and Islam,” published in 1954, one year after he delivered a lecture on this topic at Chatham House. In review, the point of intersection between *Crises of Islam* and *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East* can be found in this essay, where the following question is considered.

[I]n the present competition between the Western democracies and Soviet Communism for the support of the Islamic world, what factors or qualities are there in Islamic tradition or in the present state of Islamic society and opinion, which might prepare the intellectually and politically active groups to embrace Communist principles and methods of government, and the rest to accept them? (1).

Lewis proposes several elements as favoring the Soviets centered on two headings: “first the accidentals, those that are part of the present historical situation, and then the essentials, those which are innate or inherent in the very quality of Islamic institutions and ideas.” The most crucial accidental factor amongst many (e.g., abject poverty) is Communism’s anti-Western motif, receiving appeal just as the Nazi movement had once received. “After the period of admiration and imitation of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there is now a general and growing revulsion.” The current anti-Western reactions and attitudes of Muslims in reality are “symptoms or aspects of a fundamental universal revulsion from all that is Western” (3). Turning from the accidental to the essential factors, “deriving from the very nature of Islamic society, tradition and thought,” the first of these is the authoritarianism—totalitarianism of Islamic political tradition. “The political experience and traditions of Islam, though very different from those of Eastern Europe, do nevertheless contain elements which, might in certain circumstances, prepare the way for Communism (7).

In view of this distinction between accidental and essential factors, we can better argue Lewis’ understanding of anti-Western ideological sentiments, predominantly in the form of anti-Americanism. Amongst this milieu he depicts the process of the entry of America into Islamic lands stating that it occurred through the second world war, the oil industry, and the postwar developments, as well as through cinema and television, at a time—when America represented for some freedom, justice, and opportunity, and for some other wealth, power, and success—

when these qualities were neither considered as sins nor crimes (*Crisis*, 69). He continues,

And then came the great change, when leaders of a widespread and widening religious revival sought out and identified their enemies as the enemies of God and gave them ‘a local habitation and a name’ in the Western Hemisphere. Suddenly, or so it seemed, America had become the archenemy, the incarnation of evil, the diabolic opponent of all that is good, and specifically, for Muslims, of Islam. Why?

These words were initially written more than a decade ago appearing in “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” Lewis’ *Atlantic Monthly* article (1990), afterwards to be integrated into his book; wherein, in aiming to explain this concept, his discourse relies on “anti” (in the eyes of Muslims) pertaining to everything that America represents. Before we examine to what extent Lewis elaborates his responses in answering “Why”—the question, provided with an exposure of the birth of Arab dictatorships, it would be beneficial for us to tackle the rhetoric employed in the above excerpt.

With “the enemies of God,” Muslims are molded into an exotic cast, mixing Iranians, Arabs, and everyone else in hatred, as this phrase is explained as recurring in the voice of the Iranian leadership; the concept of which appears in the Qur’an; and in Islam, “the struggle of good and evil acquired, from the start, political and military dimensions [...] the duty of God’s soldiers is to dispatch God’s enemies [...]” (*Crisis*, 26-7). While juxtaposing the past with the present, coupled with the assertion that the archenemy in the eyes of Muslims is incarnate evil, “suddenly” drastically turns out to be “eternal,” which most likely results in “[...] the reader will logically conclude that Muslims have a historic propensity to violence against and hatred for the West, [...]” (221), written by John L. Esposito, in *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* Referencing the process of entry of America into Islamic lands as the starting point in historical considerations, there is no room left, while exploring a confounded essence, to speak historically. No tangible state of affairs is portrayed within the course of action in line with WWII, the oil industry, and the postwar developments. Subsequently, no balanced account emerges to explain where the tensions occur to what causality and participation had effects and to what end. Lewis’ talent for using words meaningfully, coupled with his knowledge and expertise of Islam, as well as his ability to direct the focus steers one convincingly on a path, (in this case) with an objective, resonating in his representations on the fundamentally driven political culture of Muslims—alluring, authentic, and complete. Presumably only hatred is left in minds with the

additional menace of fear; the “clash of civilizations” is placed into a mode of reality.

The discourse is encircled with this perspective. In answering the aforesaid question Lewis reveals the intellectual influences coming to the Arab world, from Germany in the 1930s and early 1940s, and then from the Soviets. With its philosophy and philosophy of education, the former is argued as one of the sources in employing an anti-American discourse notably by the founders and followers of the Baath Party, whose rhetoric frequently addresses “the theme of American artificiality and lack of a genuine national identity like that of the Arabs” (*Crisis*, 70). The Soviet Marxism affirmed by Lewis is the most perilous source that denounced Western capitalism and America while triggering anti-imperialist movements in the region, where Arab governments genuinely cherished assorted forms of socialism. In conjunction with the fact that Nazi race theory had little appeal for Arabs and Soviet atheistic Communism had no appeal for Muslims, he explains the base for Arab sympathy towards Germany and Russia, whose opposition to the West provided collaboration to those who saw the West as their principle enemy (*Crisis*, 71-2); as the age old adage goes—the enemy of my enemy is my friend. “The principle enemy” gives explanation for the sudden change, stemming from Islam’s innate antagonism against the West, now personified in the U.S. and everything it represents. If inclinations towards, for example, German ideologies had happened because of Islam, how could Lewis explain National Socialism, sharing common roots in German National Socialism typified through the Jewish youth movement within Anglo-Zionist disputes in Palestine?

Therefore, Lewis’ representations of the birth of oppressive Arab states have forceful impacts for the reader to acknowledge an accidental inception coinciding with the modern era, due to the unyielding essence of Islam. This essence once enabled Arabs to look towards the Germans and then the Soviets, the former’s fascist model allowed for a quick refitting for Communist dictatorship, embraced more willingly than the democratic alternative in principles and methods with anti-Western feelings and reactions; and now, it is exploited by those whose competing ideology is opposing secular democracy within the Islamic fundamentalist agenda. Ultimately, Islam is personified as a twofold threat, religious and political, at odds with the West.

1.3.2.3. One Party Ideological Dictatorship exposed with an Arab/Islamic Attitude

Within *The Arabs in History*, Lewis exhibits the period of the British and French rule

over the Arab world as a time in which new institutions were formed and new ideas were expressed, which prepared the way for legal independence. He does this without addressing how these institutions were operated, or better yet enacted. This omission not only serves to expose that, however independent they were, neither did their nationalist project bring about freedom; nor did their socialist plan produce prosperity, while one party ideological dictatorship generated only tyranny. But it works too well with a leading motive of this book, to omit an “Arab attitude,” served up to the reader as relevant to Islam and in firm relation with failed democracies (205-8).

The corrupt practices of the one party dictatorship, particularly that of Saddam Hussein, are obliquely placed into a perspective. The period marking the end of the Anglo-French rule in the region is mentioned with the influence of Nazi Germany, and with new dangers coming from a new alignment with outside superpowers filling the Arab world with a clash of conflicting interests and ideologies (*Arabs*, 199-200). This whole period is detailed by means of an Arab attitude, inherited from the past and upheld with rigidity, “making it difficult to adapt to changing circumstances or create new political and economic institutions which would facilitate such an adaptation.” This is the attitude of seeing unbelievers with condescension (in good times) and with hostility and mistrust (in bad times), making no allowance to learn from them, or understand them, “at a time, when it was the West, and not as previously the Islamic world, that had something to teach” (*Arabs*, 205). It is easy for a reader to grasp without repetition that this attitude is rooted in Medieval Islam, as it has been already depicted with its own primacy, superiority, and self-sufficiency at a time, when understanding of these qualities stimulated that “Muslims might learn much from wise infidels of other faiths, but the final touchstone by direct revelation and confirmed by the success of its followers” (*Arabs*, 152-3). Evidently, to Lewis, this attitude distinct to Islam evolving in the contemporary circumstances fabricates some accidental results. The extent in which Arabs maintain their attitude towards unbelievers is addressed through three cases. First being, the failed treaties and alliances that occurred subsequent to WWII between the Anglo-French empires and Arab states, wherein the treaties had been inked when the colonial masters had been in control. Second, the failed Western attempts to organize Arab states in a defensive alliance system in the Middle East with the U.S., which resulted in the overthrow of pro-Western regimes, bringing about cultivating relations between the Soviets and a number of Arab states like Syria, Iraq, Egypt, etc. Third, the failed

attempts of Soviet treaty-base domination over Arab countries that spanned only one year with Egypt initiated in 1971 and ended in 1972; the year marks a period of growing American involvement in the Arab world, resulting in the collapse of USSR and also the U.S.-led military victory of the Arab allies against Saddam Hussein's Iraq (*Arabs*, 206).

In explaining the “attitude of bad times,” the characteristics of these treaties and alliance schemes do not come into sight, and the growing importance of oil for world powers as well as the globalization of the Cold War's rearranging international system is ignored. Seemingly, this attitude was a remarkably dynamic factor, playing its part in world politics, while forming the Arab political history of the second half of the twentieth century with its rigidity—suspicious and hostile. Ian Buruma criticizes this sort of conceptualization provided by Lewis, “when it comes to politics, a great scholarly mind, surveying the grand sweep of history from Olympian heights, can sometimes overlook matters closer to earth,” from his *New Yorker* article, “Lost In Translation—The Two Minds of Bernard Lewis.” Buruma's work provides an alternative, focusing on the near, well defined historical fact: “Arbitrary colonial borders, coups engineered by British and American secret services, and Western manipulation of local despots, including Saddam Hussein, played some role in creating failed states and tyrannies.” Through the observational analysis Lewis suggests, it is now easy for the reader to perceive that if the Arab attitude had not been so prevalent or all-encompassing, failures in European ventures of gaining the Arab states as allies by their treaties would not have occurred, democratic promotional efforts of the West would have been more successful, and ultimately the Arabs would not have been provoked to overthrow pro-Western regimes leaving the door wide open for Russian misleading. What was left behind was an imitation of corrupt practices; engendering tyrannies lead by the likes of Saddam Hussein, a proliferation that could not have been, as there would be no reason for the U.S. to intervene, cleaning the region from the Communist influence while aiming to bring democratic practices. All of this is recited in another point of Buruma; “[Lewis'] writings give the impression that British and French imperialism, United States interventions, [...] are simply alibis for the region's political failings[;] the real reasons for the Middle Eastern mess, he suggests, are deeper, older, grander.”

It can be asserted that Lewis' aim in framing the problem through what he calls accidental and essential factors, in “Communism and Islam,” is also manifested in *The Arabs in History*. “It was this framing of the problem which made it possible for Lewis to largely ignore

local contexts and histories as well as the very different ways in which contemporary Muslims might perceive the world and act in it [...]” (Lockman, 132). This manner of construction serves to keep the reader in line with the general tendency of Orientalist discourse in passing knowledge about the Arab and Islamic world. Edward Said describes this tendency as “The Orientalists—from Renan to Goldziher to Macdonald to von Grunebaum, Gibb, and Bernard Lewis—saw Islam, for example, as a ‘cultural synthesis’ (the phrase is P. M. Holt’s) that could be studied apart from the economics, sociology, and politics of Islamic peoples” (*Orientalism*, 105).

With a lack of comprehensive analysis on socio-cultural, economical, and political changes swiping the region since WWI, it is not easily achievable for lesser experts to perceive that despite sharing many similarities, each nation state has its own unique history, just like Syria and Iraq, frequently given as prime examples by Lewis in the three books; thus inquiries on modern political cultures should be engaged within their own historical context, reflective of the colonial, rather than state building, past. This would have been insightful in understanding political trend progressions featured in the independent era when the ideology construction process has evolved along the history of nation-building’s guidance. This concurs with the statement of Rashid Khalidi, “The modern political culture of many countries of this region is still rooted in [popular movements ... to ending colonial control], often in the forms of parties and groups founded in colonial era that continue to play a role in politics today, like ... the Ba‘th in Syria and Iraq” (*Resurrecting*, 29). Nevertheless, Lewis does place emphasis on the period of European colonialism and its impacts on the region, and the objective of the analysis below is to distinguish what the information transmitted to the reader in this regard, notably about Syria and Iraq, while questioning what the main motivations are behind this transmission.

1.3.3. The Arab World—an Outlook Depicting the Legacy of European Colonialism

Lewis’ representations of the Arab World and its modern edifice by means of European colonialism exclusively lean on claims of an astonishing legacy of colonial masters brought into the malfunctioning civilization, incapable of renewing itself from within. This claim takes into consideration every one of positive facets of modern civilization, with a sequence of policies and explained motivations that expose a “civilizing mission,” convincingly presented in the three books. Providing a snapshot representative of a story, which is by most accounts, drawn by the

best ability of selectiveness without any academic concern, each of the selections focus on political and cultural benefits gained by Arabs in their relations with European colonialism and imperialism; out of which the author's conceptualization of modernization and Westernization process of traditional Muslim societies comes into sight as a positive crusade of sorts.

1.3.3.1. Creation of the Modern Political Map: "A Civilizational View of History"

The themes of a civilizing mission are abundant in *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East*, wherein the exposures of the recovery of the ancient past work to rationalize the drastic creation of a political map that was reality after the allied victory of WWI. In depicting this recovery that was provoked in the nineteenth century, when the first real intellectual and ideological impacts of the French Revolution brought to the region the European idea of the fatherland, Lewis writes that it was made possible by forces beyond Muslims, "who neither read the classics nor the Bible [...] and relied for what little they knew on Qur'anic versions of Biblical stories," but by "the pertinacity of their own non-Muslim minorities and the curiosity and persistence of strangers who came from Europe" (67). With this, he is hinting towards *homo islamicus*, taking its root as a term in the nineteenth century Oriental scholarship, referring to a distinctive *Islamic man* with his rigid mind-set, opposing himself from Western man through civilization-specific conditioning.

Based on this understanding Lewis places an emphasis on the term *watan* that can be most easily seen, in its original meaning, amongst classical Islamic literature when referring to merely a place (town, province, village) rather than a *country* in the modern sense, while also explaining the "nobility of fighting and dying for one's country," which was an unknown concept in the Islamic world until the impacts of the French Revolution arrived at the region; yet, "[it] is familiar to Westerners from Homer and Horace and a thousand poets and orators from all over Europe." Reading into the underlined fact that the idea of the national homeland as the basis of political identity and sovereignty was brought into the region along with the likes of patriotism, the reader come across a crystallization of Western ideals with roots tracing back to the pre-Christian era, into antiquity. A similar idealization is also seen in the representation of "a natural attachment to the land of one's birth." Lewis states, in Islamic literature the themes of "local pride" and "rivalry" appear as in Western literature, but without political messages;

writers mentioned these themes as a natural pride in glories and beauties of their homeland, “but they knew little and cared less about their ignorant, pagan ancestors” (*Multiple*, 58). What is more ironic in this idealization is that while giving a timeless quality to the Western and Eastern civilizations, the latter is portrayed with its ignorant essence, as Lewis himself ignores an era and area, forgetting the trajectory of high culture in Medieval Europe in his crisscrossing comparisons. Despite stating that “the word ‘NATION’ EVEN IN ENGLISH, HAS GONE THROUGH a number of substantial changes,” i.e., “in the medieval universities, the ‘nations’ were the quarters in which students of various origins were lodge, according to their places of origin” (*Multiple*, 80), which has nothing to do with the political configurations in Medieval Europe, there is little to no room afforded in the book to address what sort of political impetus medieval litterateurs carried with them in their writings.

This manner of unawareness is also seen in narrating the further differences between Christians and Muslims: as seen through titulature and historiography, unlike English or French historians who wrote of the history of their countries where monarchs reigned as kings, Muslim historians wrote of their dynasties, whose dynasts specified neither their own cause nor that of their enemies in connection with the term, country, while proclaiming themselves as the rulers of believers, which can be found in the letters exchanged between the Ottoman Sultan and the Shah of Persia that were signed by each one of them as the sole legitimate sovereign of Islam, in the sixteenth century (*Multiple*, 57-58). While focusing in on his examples, Lewis does not bother to mention “the divine right of kings” a theory developed in Europe; amongst its practitioners was Louis XIV, whose long spanned absolute rule in France (1661-1715) can be defined best with his declaration, “I am the State,” and in glorifying himself as the Sun King, the objective of Louis XIV was a divine right—“one king, one law, and one faith.” Accordingly, provided examples endorse an impression that since Homer and Horace, identification of any cause in connection with the terms, country, patriotism, and nationalism had been a common ground with Europe and in this there has been no role of the Church; there existed the idea of the nation states in all places, projecting a civil society that is secular in nature back to antiquity.

Within all of the examined studies Lewis skillfully excludes the fact that the transformation from empire to nation-state was a long term process, and rise of nation states was an outcome of the transformative events marking the movement from the early modern to modern period in Europe; thus the decline of feudalism, the Reformation, the scientific

revolution, and the rise of modern capitalism are never addressed. Writing that, “only in the nineteenth and twentieth century, under the European influence and sometimes pressure, did Muslim rulers begin to describe their ruler ships in national or territorial, that is to say in Western, terms” (*Multiple*, 58), the idealization completes its emphasis, signifying the West as a superior civilization based on an “assertion of an essential continuity and coherence across vast stretches of time and space, from the purported birth of that civilization in ancient Greece through almost twenty centuries to its reemergence and flowering in the modern age” (Lockman, 56).

In this assertion Lewis presents the Middle East as an area of ancient civilizations, which had been buried due to the advent of Islam and the adoption of Arabic that brought about a new set of memories, as he proudly unfolds a tale of the emergence of the new frontiers and their legitimated existence in this region that can be seen in two cases. First, the restorations or reconstruction of ancient names in delving into their etymology, like Palestine and Syria, taking their present forms from Greek origins—administrative terms in Roman times—that project a golden standard set forth in a time marked by the height of collusion with the West. Second is the preservation of the medieval names, as in the case of Iraq—the name of a medieval caliphal province of the region—where the pre-classical names almost all disappeared (*Multiple*, 62-4).

In conjunction with the information provided about the long forgotten ancient past, like the names, Palestine and Syria, the imagery of a civilizing mission of the West is placed into a favourable context. The names only reappeared in Europe due to the spread of the classical learning, then adopted by the Ottomans in the designating provinces under Western influence, and ultimately becoming official names in the twentieth century (*Multiple*, 62-3). In reflecting the West as the only intellectual counterpart, enabling the East to recover its ancient history during the process of gaining the idea of nation and national homeland as basis of political identity and sovereignty, this portrayal draws an image of “the other,” as in “‘the Other’ was the ‘dark’ side—forgotten, repressed, and denied; the reverse image of enlightenment and modernity” (221), written by Stuart Hall in “The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power,” placed in *Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies*.

It is in this contextual outline, Lewis only slightly touches upon the divide and rule policy enacted by colonialism in writing, “The British separated Transjordanian Palestine [...] and retained the name Palestine for the cisjordanian districts” (*Multiple*, 77). Yet he exposes, “British

imperial policy made Palestine, for the first time since the early Middle Ages, the name of a definite territory, [...] also provided it for the first time ever, with a ‘government of Palestine[;]’ subsequent events, while removing this, have created a Palestinian nation” (*Multiple*, 63). How could it be expected of general readers to conceptualize precisely what the subsequent events were, and further, their particulars, if their scholar neglects to place them in his book? In lieu of Lewis’ knack for glancing over certain background information or segments of historical progression in any given particular region of focus, another question could be asked—are Lewis’ assertions of a general “bad attitude” filling a void of his own creation through this selective writing? If the author had intended to remark upon these absent reference points, his readers would have been provided the background information necessary to understand a progression reflective of cause and effect—the previous state of affairs, setting in motion the ensuing events.

Jewish immigration into Palestine is one of these affairs, dating back to the First ‘Aliya occurring between 1882 and 1903, when some thirty thousand Jews were brought to the territory with a will to establish what Deni Morris calls, “productive Jewish towns and agricultural settlements” that would eventually bring about establishment of an independent Jewish state with a Jewish majority in all of Palestine, defined “in line with the Bible and subsequent Jewish conquest in the second century BCE” (2), written in *1948: The First Arab-Israeli War*. Morris continues, “In hindsight, what was effectively a demographic-geographic contest for the lowlands, between 1882 and 1947, was won by the Zionist movement and gave the Zionists the territorial base for statehood” (4). In Palestine, which was cut off from Damascus and Beirut its formal provincial capitals—now under French rule—“1920 was to prove crucial in the emergence of a separate Palestinian Arab national movement and a decisive moment in evolving Zionist-Arab conflict” (11). Coupled with the fragmentation of the Palestinians as a voice [“Palestinian Arab society was acutely fragmented, and British Mandatory rule aggravated this divisiveness” (12)], British policy was identified by the Palestinians as the catalyst of the success Zionism. The tension reached its apogee especially after the Holocaust atrocity, speeded up the process of the foundation of the State of Israel in Palestine under a supportive program of the Western Jewry and with support of WWII Western allies. Churchill’s following indication addressed in 1941, “‘If Britain and the United States emerge victorious from the war, the creation of a great Jewish state in Palestine inhabited [...] by millions of Jews will be one of the leading features of the Peace Conference discussions’” (22), works sufficiently to display

Britain's stance and understandable role in the process. These and similar omissions work to prevent one from grasping the idea that pulling the name Palestine from antiquity and refining it into a definite territory and a government of a modern era might be an achievement of Western imperialism; yet it does not change the fact that the eventual removal of this territory from the political map was achieved by the same force, which played a role in what Lewis calls the subsequent events that removed the government of Palestine—something that had never been for Palestinian Arabs.

Likewise, the subdivision within Syria is slightly addressed by Lewis [i.e., “French created a separate republic of Lebanon [...] they retained the name Syria for the remainder” (*Multiple*, 77)], as his intention is to expose that republic of Syria established and defined by the French Mandate is “the first sovereign state ever to use the name ‘Syria,’ and its persistence in a light Arabic disguise at the present day attests to the continuing power of European modes of thought even in so intimate a matter as national identity” (*Multiple*, 62). In this acclamation of the idea and practice of colonial rule, the author does not bother to consider any other explanations regarding “national identity,” signifying homogeneity, apparent “at the present day.”

One of the explanations can be found in Yahya Sadowski's “The Evolution of Political Identity in Syria” (in *Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East*), depicting that the pattern of identity produced by “a complex variety of social structures” has diversified dramatically from one period to another over the last two centuries. In referencing James L. Gelvin's *Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire*, Sadowski states that with the French rule in Syria, “urban elites transferred their loyalty to Arabism; the lower classes—urban and rural—began to experiment with new, farther-ranging political identities: pan-Arabist, pan-Syrianist, Islamist, sectarian, and city patriotic, to name a few” (138-9). Sadowski further explains that after 1946, dating Syrian independence, the slow and irregular process of homogenization started by means of the state promulgating Arabist identity within the media, schools, and national policy. “[...] State institutions, sometimes bolstered by economic trends, seem to be gradually bringing about a homogenization of Syrian population; parochial identities are slowly declining” (139). One specific emphasis of Sadowski regarding the process of homogenization is industrialization, brought about through the economic crises of 1985. Policy change towards a liberal economy started in 1991 and its renewal proved economic

prosperity, which in turn stimulated public and elitist support for further reforms in the end of 1990s: “Under the reforms, the boundaries between [old bourgeoisie, new industrialists, state bourgeoisie, and new commercial class] began to blur” (143). In concluding Sadowski suggests, “People attempting to understand the evolution of nationalism and identity in Syria would do well to attend the work of the late Ernest Gellner,” whose structural reason (in *Nations and Nationalism*) enables one to understand that “nationalism would follow whenever a society began to industrialize” (153). After all, Lewis’ selectiveness in representing Syria and its persistence turns out to be an omission which can be numbered in the decades; its firmness in terms of national identity at what he calls, the present day, might be reflective of the continuing European modes of thought; yet it neither changes the fact that European activities during their heyday played their roles towards prompting heterogeneity within a society, nor does it necessitate neglect in a country’s own nationalist attempts, demands, and passion.

A set of omissions is the natural result of Lewis’ aim that is to help readers to better idealize the basis of modern Western civilization; giving them a conception of a European, or rather Western, *self*, rooted in the ancient Greek and Roman cultures, just like the names Palestine and Syria. This is evocative of what Deepa Kumar calls “a ‘civilizational’ view of history.” Referencing Lockman’s book, wherein such a view of history is interpreted, the origins of the West are traced back to ancient Greece which sets forth the idea of uniqueness in developing the attitudes, ideas, technologies, and institutions, to which Kumar writes, “Every other civilization was then defined in relation to this notion of a superior West.” Lewis connects ancient to modern in terms of this Western *self*, in mentioning the frontiers and names, telling of the modern, but alien, creation of the Middle East. This is a recurring theme articulated by him, as seen in his speech given when hosted in a forum conducted by the Carnegie Council in 2002, receiving its name from Lewis’ book “What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response” [alternative title in the American Edition: *What Went Wrong?: The Clash between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East*]: “The Middle East is the region of the most ancient civilizations in the world. If you look at a map, almost all the states are new identities with new frontiers and names, because this whole idea of the nation state is alien.” He continues, “And the lines on the map are straight lines because, as they are on the map of North America and for the same reason, they were drawn by administrators in offices on maps with rulers and pencils.” This corresponds with idealizing a timeless quality of the Western civilization in exploring Palestine

and Syria, corroborating a notion that an intellectual curiosity and the ability to transform, progress, and rule with new ideas and institutions was a necessary element to bring the Arabs into the modern world.

A similar manor of regard is upheld in examining a revival of sorts in the distinct history, when the kingdom of Iraq, later to be the republic, is subject to analysis, as Iraqis now could claim their ancient ancestors, or at least predecessors to be the likes of the Sumerians, the Assyrians, and the Babylonians. This ascertainment of status perpetuated by the recovery of history is portrayed as a part of the whole process of the formation of the disciplines like Egyptology, Assyriology, and Iranology, which was exclusively the preoccupation first of European and then American scholars, whose findings had, for a long time, no impact on Muslims, whose lack of interest in the pagan past was due to Islam, as to them its advent marked the true history with values and lesson to teach (*Multiple*, 67-8). Thus, the intention of rationalizing colonial activities over the region remains his resounding constant yet the author differentiates this specific country, Iraq, from the others, with its complexity of identities. It is where a citizen can identify himself by region, ethnicity, or religion, as it was erected by the British imperial policy through combination of the three ex-Ottoman provinces of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra, each with its distinctive local traditions composed through diverse ethnic and religious groups of people, Arabs-Kurds and Sunni-Shi'a alike (*Multiple*, 76).

In spite of this outline, reflecting the modern creation of Iraq, Lewis opts to explain the modern day's regional and local solidarities as well as hostilities between Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra, through classical literature in which such rivalries and solidarities were expressed, as if "[they] continue to play a significant part in modern politics" (*Multiple*, 66). This is the rhetoric reminding us of what Owen calls, "giving [the issues] a timeless quality," attested to in many analyses of Middle Eastern politics, "in which the same conflicts over differences in communal allegiance and belief are endlessly repeated in patterns that have little to do with national boundaries and national politics" (Owen, 15). Interestingly however, in providing his readers with a fixed and unchanging expression of a quality of being of identities and in politics, Lewis then promotes the idea that both ethnic and sectarian appeals proved themselves insufficient, as demonstrated during the Iraq-Iran War of 1980-88, when most Shi'a population of Iraq, just like the Arabic speaking population in Iran, remained faithful to their country, signifying the power of patriotic loyalty (*Multiple*, 79). These portrayals only speak to the conflict as rooted in

Medieval Islam, and in speaking of national, or at least patriotic construction, it is the achievement of those bringing the Western mode of thought into the region. Each conveyed piece of information would be valuable if it had not been called upon to prevent the reader from conceptualizing one of the most significant errors that the British colonial administration made; merging an ethnic and religious heterogenic population into a single political community, which has been followed by failure embodied in the numerous sullied relationships during the colonial and independent era, played significant role in shaping the conflict over these territories, where the blood never ceased throughout the twentieth century.

As noted by Added Dawisha, “Iraq was created in 1921 as part of the reorganization of British interests in the Middle East [...] it was a forced and artificial creation, lacking the essential underpinnings of nationhood” (119), extracted from “Footprints in the Sand: The Definition and Redefinition of Identity in Iraq’s Foreign Policy” (in *Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East*). Seen through Fieldhouse’ indication, the British navy’s dependency on the oil refineries at Abadan due to the Western defence system from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean is one explanation of these interests; thus, “whatever form of government emerged there, it was essential that the British armed forces should have secure bases and that no other power should be able to intrude” (Fieldhouse, 71). In this, articulated by Cleveland, Sunni minority were empowered and dominated in the centralized state, suppressing the Shia majority; the presence of Assyrians included another factor in terms of religious and ethnic tensions; and “the Kurd’s resistance to centralizing efforts of new Iraqi state and their unwillingness to assimilate into the majority Arab outlook shaped the pattern of conflict through the history of modern Iraq” (Cleveland, 205). These are significant parts of the whole picture; Lewis excludes all in showing his readers the formation of the political map in which Iraq has its place. Only now, after giving some indication of the historical trajectory of state-building in Iraq, the following sentiment is revealed as meaningful, “the concept of an ancient Iraqi nation, territorially defined, with roots reaching back to remote antiquity, could be a powerful unifying force, and it is not surprising that Iraqi leaders have had frequent recourse to it” (*Multiple*, 71), leaving readers ultimately to their own devices, reducing the issues surrounding this region, boasting perhaps a grander history than any other, to nagging propensities, rooted in Islamic past and destined to stay there.

1.3.3.2. European Territorial Rule and Political Modernization in the Arab World

In *The Arabs in History*, too, the divide and rule policy of European colonialism over the Fertile Crescent (and elsewhere in the Arab world) is faintly touched upon in terms of geography as where Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan came into being as sovereign states under mandatory rule. Yet, in this book, Lewis presents foreign territorial rule in company with the existence of Arab disappointment, which aroused once the peace settlement fell far short of what Arabs had fully hoped for—an Arab independence—a promise [“somewhat vague promise [...] perhaps intentionally ambiguous” (192)], given to them by Britain during the Arab Revolt of 1916. Before we look into the depictions of the Arab standpoint in their disappointment, it would be constructive for us to examine how Lewis places the issue of disappointment into a context, exemplified as a causality in a series of movements pursuing national independence during the inter-war years in larger Arab world: despite still being religiously coloured, conditioned in their leadership and many of their policies by the old social order, these were the true movements in their times (194). What makes these movements, namely the local resistances, authentic in the eyes of Lewis is provided in two case in point pictures.

First, they were authentic as their strengths stemmed from rapid economic and cultural development (*Arabs*, 194). With a lack of tangible examples to serve as a proper barometer of history, the spread of modernization is discussed associated with European territorial rule as it brought about an environment for Arab political efflorescence with economic transformation and the concept of Western nationalism. This is an intellectual endeavour shown among proponents of modernization, to whom, as Pappe clarifies, “such resistance was always nationalist and nationalism was an integral part of Westernization”; therefore, the idea is given that “with the coming of nationalism to the region, two of the three stages modernity requires were complete—technology and economic transformation being the first, institutional and ideological imports being the second” (Pappe, 4-5). Second, authenticity of the nationalist movements came from their progressive impacts on every facet of Arab society “from the educated and politically conscious minorities who gave them their leadership and ideology” to “the illiterate and unhappy peasant whom they served as a mouthpiece for his inarticulate mingling of resentment and fear in the presence of alien and incomprehensible forces.” Together with Lewis’ approach on modernization, this works to draw a clear distinction between the various people playing roles

within a traditional society, whose progress might rely on an ability of Arab nationalist leaders imitating to their best capacity the alien ideas; but, it was really dependent on the educated and politically conscious minorities, namely the Christian intellectual elites—an elitist attitude yet again. Coupled with the sentiment of “in the pursuit of their political objectives the nationalists were in the main successful” (*Arabs*, 194), Lewis’ concept of authenticity greatly confirms the beneficiary nature within Arab progress, as the success is the legacy of the colonial enterprise: when WWI broke out, there was not a single independent sovereign Arab state in the region; yet, by WWII many states including Iraq and Egypt had already been recognized as sovereign and independent, and admitted to membership of the League of Nations; while Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, despite still remaining under mandatory rule, had their own governments and governmental apparatus and were in reaching distance of their own sovereignty, “the achievement of which was recognized by mandatory powers as the ultimate goal of the mandates” (*Arabs*, 195). Bringing into summation, while exposing the “idea of a defined frontier is an alien imposition on the region. And so is the idea of nationality defined in those terms. The aim of nationalism was independence” (extracted from Lewis’ enunciation in the Carnegie Council forum), Lewis’ articulations serve to teach the reader what was bestowed to Muslim Arabs—ideologies, institutions, and economic developments—something never enjoyed until they turned into a colonized item—a process, followed by a legitimated sovereign independence.

This is a method of Lewis’ writing of history; in framing the issue from this perspective he explains that all these were, from the nationalists’ standpoint, “too little and too late.” As to them, there existed places still under mandatory rule like Syria and Lebanon; and even Iraq and Egypt were bonded to their former imperial masters by unequal treaties that endured the presence of foreign bases and troops. Also to them, the situation was getting intricate in Palestine due to the emergence of the rival nationalism of the Jews, which stemmed from the Zionist settlement dated in the late nineteenth century and due to the incorporation of the formal promise given through the Balfour Declaration of 1917 in colonial policy—supporting the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. This all occurred at a time, when “the rise of militant anti-Semitism on continental Europe, and the flood of desperate refugees, who [...] could find no refuge, gave a new urgency to the Zionist ideal of the Jewish state in ancient Jewish homeland” (*Arabs*, 195), bringing Arab population closer to a boiling point, whose extensive armed rebellion against the mandatory power started in 1939 and ended with the outbreak of WWII in 1939. Despite the

method mentioned above, Lewis certainly provides more to his readers, displaying the history of the territory within a more global context. Nevertheless, accompanied with his (above) conceptualization of the time frames between WWI and WWII, the displayed history still is comprised of certain flaws; paying attention only to the two, he neither depicts the governments and governmental apparatus in mentioning the countries such as Syria (just like Lebanon) still remaining under mandatory rule, nor does he elaborate the theme of early independence—what the objective of Britain was in paving the way for early independence in Iraq (like Egypt)?

As contributed by Fieldhouse, the French ruled Syria with an inadequate knowledge on the nature of the society, and based on the models taken from the Ottomans and their own notion of state and nation, together with two dominant concepts in mind; “First, Syria should be divided into segments to block nationalist sentiments and actions[;] second, there should be an indigenous façade behind which the French would pull the string [thus] Syria would be ruled as a group of states under the control of the High Commissioner” (Fieldhouse, 254-5). Corresponding to this is the inputs reflective of the country, where under a loose federative system the French provided almost no right to exercise a self-governing system down to local politicians; “the result in Syria was that neither the political leaders nor the population at large gained a stake in the preservation of the French-imposed parliamentary system, [which] was without local legitimacy and did not long survive the withdrawal of the French in 1946” (Cleveland, 217).

Turning to our focus on the theme of early independence, Lewis’ oversight can be seen as a failure to allow for broad enough insight into understanding the treaty creation base of Iraq. “[There], a tribal revolt in 1920 against British military operation, with overtones of nationalism, was followed by an attempt to set up institutions of self-government under British control” (319), stated by Albert Hourani in *A History of the Arab Peoples*. Cleveland refers to this as “a system of alliance building that has been called empire by treaty,” originated due to the heavy cost that had challenged the British apparatus during the aforesaid local revolt; they produced the treaty, signed several times until 1930, which approved “a limited form of ‘independence’” to Iraq in its domestic political affairs, while guaranteeing British military presence over the territory, and requiring the country to adopt a foreign policy pleasing Britain. “By this means, Britain secured its essential strategic needs without incurring the expenses of directly governing the territories” (Cleveland, 193). Looking at Fieldhouse’s examination on the British approach to the Iraqi constitution that was shaped out of early independence concept; they constructed a mechanism,

patch-working together a political structure functional to operate as façade for British rule until a treaty was inked to make Iraq independent, leaving the country then to its own devices. “The British could only adapt their strategies to the basic social realities; and the Iraqis who drew up the constitution were not interested in liberal innovations” (Fieldhouse, 98). Leaving the weak middle class as it was, practicing the Ottoman system of a two-tier election, and employing networking and patron-client relationships, until the official independence in 1932, two main political systems were in operation. In the towns, the politics was led by the urban aristocracy professionals, wealthy businessmen, and the new professional politicians (e.g., the ex-Sharifians), and in the countryside the system functioned based on the traditionally constructed power of the landed classes (e.g., the sheikhs, aghast, and other tribal chiefs), of whom also constituted a dependable backing in the parliamentary politics supporting British interest. “In short, from the start the state of Iraq was a caricature of a liberal western sense” (Fieldhouse, 101); the constitution ratified in 1924 was not democratic in operation, as the state was exploited by a small group of elites and its end with the 1958 coup was inevitable.

If Lewis had delved into history in a more dialectic perspective readers would have gained insight on the history of colonial rule with more balanced accounts. Dividing the territory into separate political entities, well enough to compete with each other, the French rule rather sponsored ethnic, regional, and religious fragmentations than national unity, which had vital, maybe to be deemed catastrophic, outcomes in the long term. This is also evocative of Iraq yet it could be better typify as a two-sided coin; one side reflective of the country that became the first independent state in a region with almost no democratic character, the second projecting the country with limits on its full sovereignty, seeding never ending conflicts experienced by local politicians on the one hand, and also on an international stage as in the case of Iraq and Britain, which led to distinct outcomes. The untouched nature of certain contexts serves adequately for Lewis, conveying a message that neither foreign rule nor foreign domination had anything to do with the causal factors surrounding any of the presented issues, which have since been analysed, in considering the post-colonial developments and in terms of failed democracies. True that colonialism and imperialism could not be provided as the singular explanation for the failures; yet their roles cannot be ignored in attempting to interpret history. Speaking to the selective accounts, Lewis at best promotes the European rule as a necessity for the emergence of political modernization in the Arab world and for the creation of modern nation states.

1.3.3.3. A Conception of Eastern Inferiority and Mission to Civilize

Extracted from *Crisis of Islam*, “the impact and the damage [of imperialism] were both no doubt considerable, but probably less extensive and less one-sided than the nationalist mythologies would have it.” This is written in exemplifying the opportunities bestowed upon the colonized—infrastructure, educational and public service, as well as certain social changes, such as the abolition of slavery and the substantial reduction of polygamy. “The contrasts can be seen very clearly by comparing the countries that suffered under the imperial yoke, like Egypt and Algeria, with those that never lost their independence, like Arabia and Afghanistan” (57).

All these accounts provide a conception of civilizing mission of the West along with the idea of Western superiority and Eastern inferiority, evocative of, what Said states, “not only of a highly inflated sense of Western exclusivity in cultural accomplishment, but also of a tremendously limited, almost hysterically antagonistic view of the rest of the world” (*Culture*, 37). A single-minded focal point colours these accounts with tones that identify stability, primordial intimacy, and sexually decadency, efficiently placing readers in the enterprise of colonialism’s shoes. Now the discourse intensively serves for, what is called, “a system of representation,” simply dividing the world with the dichotomy of the west and the rest; “that is what makes the discourse [...] so destructive—it draws crude and simplistic distinctions and constructs an over-simplified conception of ‘difference’” (Hall, 189).

As expected, Lewis neither depicts territorial colonial practices—patterns of power construction—nor provides any data demonstrative of the positive effects felt in the educational and public service sectors. Surely, every earnest student of the Middle East finds studies deviating from Lewis’ in ample supply. One of which is provided by Roger Owen; referencing to Nachum T. Gross and Jacob Metzger’s “Public finance in the Jewish economy in interwar Palestine,” Owen offers a table in his book, examining the budget of the periods based on certain countries under colonial rule, through which we can see “some two-thirds of total expenditure was security related,” namely the police force and to some extent local army, as it was “the key to continued political control”; “such emphasis on security left little money for education, public health and welfare” (Owen, 10). This finding stands at odds with the purported viewpoint concerning one-sided beneficiary nature experienced during the examined period—indicative of

Lewis' blunder, as it would suggest. Yet, concerning Lewis' general readers, vague statements on the relation between the colonizer and the colonized, depictive of them in a harmonious relationship, could at best bring one to the conclusion that without the West the Arab world would have been even worse off.

In an all-encompassing conclusion, Lewis' methods in writing the history of the Arab world under European colonialism and imperialism are constructed with ideological aims; this is evident in all three books. The selectiveness in contextual outlines meaningfully serves to impose the ideas of success and of failure. This success is attested to as everything that colonial masters had brought into and pursued within the region, and in turn left upon departing—the modern edifice of this part of the world with territorially defined identities rooted in remote antiquity corresponding to the modern definition of nation; with ideas and institutions alien in origin but as a powerful unifying force; and with a pious mission of civilization and improvement. The failure presented serves to leave the reader with feelings of incongruence or disorder, endorsing notions of the backwardness of a people, whose malfunctioning as a civilization was being brought to a head through modernization and the Westernization process—reasoning for colonial rule's arrival in the region. As discussed below, this rule to Lewis signifies only one episode of the history of world domination, taking its root first from the seventh century and then from the sixteenth century, when the relation between the West and East began to be enacted again, power changing hands with the superiors being “European strength” and “Muslim weakness.”

1.3.4. Decline in Islamic Civilization, Its Failure in Modernizing, and Its Transformation into the Modern Middle East

European strength and Muslim weakness is directly indicated in *The Arabs in History*, employed with “the important question for the historians to ask is not why the Europeans tried to dominate the Muslims—this had been the normal behavior of both sides—but why they succeeded. And for this, answer may be sought both in European strength and Muslim weakness” (202). This is provided in the conceptual framework in *Crises of Islam*, too, in exploring changing course of power relations between the West and the East. While highlighting marginalization of women and a manner of superciliousness, these books remains firm with “what went wrong?” referring to Islam, the leading civilization and of the world, that has the long since failed to renew itself, also failing to adjust to the new circumstances brought through

scientific, economic, and political modernization in the West. A set of periods taking root in the early sixteenth century is a specific focus, offered with a structural narrative, in which the defeat of the Ottomans in the second siege of Vienna in 1683 and the Napoleonic Invasion of Egypt in 1798 are keys in terms of identifying the progression of events portrayed as to be conceptualized, or rather to say theorized as the decline of the Ottoman Empire, which happens to be the hallmark in exposing the decline of the Islamic civilization. The last of these aforementioned events is also a point of interception in the three books, where the failure in modernizing is exposed to grasp the whole idea pertaining to the decline, giving way to the rise of the West, from influence to affluence, domineering what turned out to be the Modern Middle East.

1.3.4.1. The Status of Women in Presenting the Decline and Inability to Progress in Islam

At first glance, Lewis seems to take a strong stand in exhibiting economic and political configurations around the globe, presented to the readers of *The Arabs in History*. Giving more insights into the ingredients of these representations, the author connects eras and areas with lucidity. Alluding to this are the illustrations of Western Europe, from long standing Arab conquest in Spain, Portugal, and Sicily—in a time when conquerors ruled and dominated military, diplomatic, and commercial relations with other Western European states. Then followed a European re-conquest at both ends of Europe, in the Iberian Peninsula and in Russia—from where the Moors and Tatars were sent back to their homelands, signifying the initial stages of European expansion, “which by the twentieth century had forced the whole world into its economic, political, and cultural orbit” (180-2).

What makes these illustrations striking is that the power changing hands is placed into a context, corresponding to a chain of interrelated phenomenon associated with the rise of the West launched in the early sixteenth century. This is exemplified with achievements in terms of the Renaissance and the Reformation, the discovery and exploitation of the New World, and the breaking up of the feudal order freeing trade and unleashing enterprise, “for which the consolidation of centralized nation states provided solid and reliable political instruments” (*Arabs*, 181). Consequently, Lewis’ historical outlines come into view as an example of technological and economic progress that brought political change in parallel throughout the

globe. While Muslims were losing their naval powers bringing about the shortage of competition in trade due to lack of technological progress notably in agriculture, European ships were sailing from the Mediterranean sea to the Indian Ocean, carrying goods and armament, establishing their naval and military bases in south and south-east Asia, dominating around the world including the Islamic lands by the twentieth century (*Arabs*, 204).

Within these and other relevant descriptive outlines, an additional interpretive step is taken in exploring the decline of the Islamic civilization, and its contemporary failures, leaving one to beg the question “What went wrong?”—the question, literally asked by Lewis with *What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response*. [Alternative title in the American edition: *What Went Wrong?: The Clash between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East*.] This in turn allows the author to step into the void, which he in fact himself has created. Accordingly, his lucidity in terms of depicting economic and political configurations fades away paving the way for pejorative speculation in a discourse that serves to contribute the idea of Muslim weakness, shown due to Islam; which was the causality of malaise and backwardness affecting the region and its people, in direct opposition to an adventurous and progressive nature in the West. This conjecture is led in responding to the Arab intellectuals, who have placed the blame on the shoulders of foreign occupiers since the nineteenth century, in their search for the culprit behind “the relative weakness and poverty of their countries as contrasted with the rest of the world” (*Arabs*, 200). To Lewis, “subsequent historical research and reflection have shown that other factors besides the political and military were at work” (*Arabs*, 201). Without identifying what the subsequent historical research and reflections are, he draws upon the aforementioned milieu revealing causality for the lack of technological progress, the decline of agriculture, and the problem of competitiveness in trade. Then, in conjunction with the presentation of, what we have previously emphasized, Muslim attitudes in times of bad and good towards unbelievers, he portrays social institutions with, “The traditional household, based on polygamy, concubinage, and domestic slavery, was well ill-suited to the progress of social and cultural, and therefore also of political and economic modernization.” The discourse is now constructed for readers to conceptualize the author’s rationalization of why Europeans succeeded to dominate the Muslims with a crude conclusion, absolving the free thinkers of the world of any notion of guilt: “all these factors combined to accelerate and accentuate the growing disparity between the Islamic and Western worlds, not only in wealth and power, but also, indeed more especially, in the ability to

create wealth and to attain and use power constructively” (*Arabs*, 205).

Endeavoring to promote an incapability to attain all that has been accomplished by the West and an inability to keep up with its exponential rise, Lewis thus sets the time frame encompassing four hundred years, from sixteenth to twentieth centuries, and then reduces his discussion into the traditional household presented in a sentence based on polygamy, concubines, and domestic slavery—qualities he suggests as inherent in Islam. The aim is to provide an impression of indisputable, irreconcilable isolation of Muslim women from social and economic strata suggestive of an ample answer to his question, while generating a view of a polarized world with the status of women in Muslim societies and that of Christian West, offered to the reader as a basis of decline and rise. Preceding the analysis of how the author elaborates on this polarization, it is noteworthy to address the extent of omissions appearing within this reductionist rhetoric referencing the status of Muslim women.

Allegorically, as a scholar drawing his sources from the early Islamic history, the Qur‘an, and the tradition of Muhammad, when it seems to him appropriate, Lewis now prefers not to refer to these sources. In her book, *Muhammad: A Biography of the Prophet*, Karen Armstrong reveals what Muhammad achieved for women that was extraordinary and revolutionary in the seventh century, comparing the pre-Islamic condition of women, in Arabia. “The very idea that a woman could be witness [in law—(although) their witness is only half as valuable as that of man] or could inherit anything at all in her own right was astonishing.” To Armstrong, “in Christian Europe, women had to wait until the nineteenth century before they had anything similar: even then, the law remained heavily weighted towards men” (191). As noted by Deepa Kumar, “There has been much debate about the role of women in Islam,” written in “Islam and Islamophobia.” Wherein the works of Dilip Hiro and Maxime Rodinson are addressed to explain multiple passages appearing in the Qur‘an; some grant women the same rights as men to have, while some others not only condone polygamy but also restrict women’s inheritance rights to only half of what a man possesses. Seeing the Qur‘an, as Kumar states, lending itself to multiple interpretations due to contradictory passages, and bearing in mind the fact that such interpretations differ from one society to another and even in the same society, how could a realistic portrayal of the status of Muslim women be based in Lewis’ snapshot of the traditional household. This snapshot is provided in terms of presenting the Islamic essence with a potential to mislead the reader with what it bears, nothing but all sexist images.

Even with no particular examples extracted by Lewis that would work for his readers to gain insight into which areas of the traditional household that could be characterized with polygamy, concubines, and domestic slavery, he attests that—to what extent the failure of the progress of social, cultural, political, and economic modernization could be explained with such a social institution. Reading into Lewis' snapshot equipped with "Histories of Middle Eastern Women" a chapter, written in length by Ilan Pappé (placed in *The Modern Middle East*) proves advantageous for us to see "[their history] in the twentieth century Middle East can be written in more than one way" (223). Pappé integrates an array of contexts, from "micro-historical," focusing on the individual efforts of women dealing with a male-dominated society, to "a Marxist context" emphasizing the impact of economic developments on the fortunes of women in general, serving to expose the complexity and variety of experiences at different times and in different places (224-5), connoting a much less simplistic picture. Without seeing history in earnest, Lewis' readers are forced to deem Islam a sexist religion while placing Muslim women in an exotic vacuum as collective docile bodies, almost willingly subjugated, irreconcilable with the ideals of the Renaissance and the American dream; but, there is a human experience faced, tasted, and lived throughout the centuries by both women and men in this region. Places where—women served as elected prime ministers such as Pakistan and Bangladesh in the twentieth century—women contributed to high culture all the while being a figurehead, or even a role model, with their productions in nationalism and feminism—and the nameless women bearing a part in their national economy, education, and public services. How could it be possible to reduce all of this into a characterization of a traditional household? It is not possible at all and this is yet another example of selectiveness that works perfectly in tandem with what Lewis aims to intensify, simplistic discrepancies between Muslim and Western societies based on gender inequality among other themes as presented below.

The discussion of the decline and the lack of ability to catch up with the West is reduced to the level of the traditional household, which is to form a symbolic representation of the status of women—that is of course, to be taken literally. This is one of Lewis' favorite themes, provided in similar tones in many of his works including *What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response* [alternative title in the American edition: *What Went Wrong?: The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East*]: "The status of women, though probably the most profound single difference between the two civilizations, attracted far less attention than

such matters as guns, factories, and parliaments” (67). As distinguished by Kazem Alamdari, “[Lewis] attempts to attribute the Middle East’s backwardness on the one hand and the West’s advancements on the other to the treatment and perception of women; but there is no rational or scientific foundation in making such a connection” (180) written in “Terrorism Cuts across the East and the West: Deconstructing Lewis’s Orientalism.” Alamdari states that polygamy in Islam is a fact, but its relation to societal norms in Lewis’ discourse is unclear; thus he asks, “how, if polygamy and sexism are the main reasons for Muslims’ backward status, one can explain their dominance during the Middle Ages? Didn’t oppression of women and their subordinate social status and legal rights exist then?” (181). All these aforementioned inconclusive connections and motives surrounding women’s suffrage in the Middle East, or the lack thereof, provide a tone and manor of conduct similar to that of the American campaign trail; heavy on talking points, registering emotive responses—divisive in nature. In addition to this, we can still offer more. Seemingly, in understanding Lewis’ cause and effect based assertions, long before the age of exploration, led first by the Portugal and Spain, and then Britain, France, and Holland, paving the way for the creation of capitalism as a global market, Western women had already gained their rights and were liberalized, not the other way around. Or, if the decline is because of such characteristics that Islam has produced, placing the status of Muslim women at the odds with that of Western women, what explains the conditions of other non-Western regions populated by non-Muslims; what due cause was behind their systemic failure in falling behind the West?

Within these distorted representations, there is no room left by Lewis to be interpretive of cause and effect within a global context to instruct his readers that exploration of the New World was an inevitable result. Dominated by the Islamic Empire in terms of commerce were the trade routes between the Far East and Europe by the fifteenth century, which was an essential, leading factor for the Western European powers to search for alternative routes to India and Indonesia, resulting in the discovery of new territories, peoples, goods, raw materials, and new markets. Coupled with this the ensuing events brought about a new order in the axis of capital accumulation and technological improvements, while trade was diverted from the territories of the Ottoman Empire. If Lewis had intended to explain these fine lines, then his readers would have been provided that the presence of a forcing impact was one of the most crucial factors in the decision to explore new markets, creating essential differences between the Muslim East and the Christian West at a time. This aforementioned progression triggered further differences

between the East, operating still within the Asiatic mode of production, and the West, whose culminating growth stemming from capitalist and industrial expansion going along with the annexing of territories, leading the trends of imperialism up to WWI. If this was provided, it would have been more likely for a reader to come to a conclusion similar to the idea attested to through, “Once Western Europe began to make the transition from a feudal-agrarian to a capitalist-industrial society, starting in the sixteenth century, the millennial balance of power among the world’s major civilizations shifted inexorably in favor of Western Europe” from M. Shahid Alam’s “Scholarship or Sophistry? Bernard Lewis and the New Orientalism.” Alam states, “Under the circumstances, it was unlikely that non-Western societies could simultaneously alter the foundations of their societies while also fending off attacks from Western states whose social power was expanding at an ever-increasing rate.” This asymmetric power construction is what Lewis calls, European strength and Muslim weakness—the rhetoric of the discourse, through which a culturist approach is taken, isolating readers from world history with an impression that decline and contemporary failure is unique and intrinsic in Islam.

1.3.4.2. The Manner of Superciliousness in Imparting the Decline in Islam

Within the aforementioned isolation, it is not possible for a reader of *The Arabs in History*, unless having some background in the field of Ottoman studies, to conceptualize the Capitulations of 1535, illustrated in explaining the new type of European expansion towards the Middle East. It was a trade pact signed between the Ottoman Empire and France, providing certain privileges to French traders within the empire’s territories; for example, exempting them from taxation. With the author’s description, “It was at first not a concession wrung from a weak non-Western power;” it was the granting “by a gesture almost of condescension, of the rights of *Dhimmis* in Muslim society, extended by the inner logic of the Muslim code to foreign Christians and since their presence was temporary—without the disabilities to which *Dhimmis* were subject.” While the French economic penetration into the region developed, other capitulations were given to the British (1580) and the Holland (1612), and “during the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries European trade grew steadily and numerous colonies of traders settled in the ports and other towns of Syria and Egypt under the protection of their consuls” (182).

Without any further contextual outline, all is provided in conjunction with Napoleon’s

expedition to Egypt in 1798, marking the first direct European intervention since the Crusades—a period in Lewis’ history portrayed with significant economic and social consequences. In terms of economic outcomes, parallel to European hegemony along the eastern seas, examples are extracted from European activities, as they now concerned to develop resources, services, and communications, making efforts to control outcomes, which was achieved either through concessions or by loans provided to local governments in the region: the constructions of new roads and railways as overland links between the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, and the restoration of the Egypt-Red Sea highway, as well as the building of ports/bridges and the installation of amenities such as water and gas, working towards shoring up the infrastructure along the trade routes. These developments were yet limited to transit; “less progress was made in the development of capital resources in the Arab lands” (*Arabs*, 187). All these examples are representative of an economic stagnation and institutional deterioration leaning towards what Lewis implies, the decline of the Ottoman Empire, serving to legitimate imperialism on grounds of modernity.

This particular menace latent in the discourse relies on loose connections in terms of contextualization between the Capitulations of the Ottoman Empire and European economic activities entering upon another new phase following the Napoleonic invasion, registering another answer as to why things went wrong. The capitulations were granted from a position of strength in a manner of superciliousness at a time, the golden age of the empire, when institutional strength was performed; yet such a sloppily given, favorable positioning faded away in the face of European ability to construct wealth and employ power constructively. Lewis’ theory on the decline of the empire is placed into a perspective, as it was well enough and customary to feel superior, rejecting to learn much from infidels until “the French shattered the illusion of the unchallengeable superiority of the Islamic world” (*Arabs*, 183). This is reminiscent of the Orientalist’s view of history; a view noted as suggestive of “[...] the Ottoman golden age in the sixteenth century characterized by institutional flourishing was followed by a period of institutional decline owing to a flawed cultural essence or to Islam” (İslamoğlu, 5).

Lewis takes the capitulations into account in explaining the new type of European expansion launched in the early sixteenth century; yet he opts not to address that when Süleyman the Magnificent granted the capitulations to France, the commerce was an integral part of the Ottoman economy, and the desire was mutually inclusive—to promote commercial exchange

between the West and the East. Initially, both parties were on the winning side of this free trade agreement; yet in a long term, the capitulations brought about detrimental outcomes squarely upon the Ottoman Empire. Exempting foreign merchants from taxation undermined the status of the Muslim merchants, whose local manufacturers and their goods disparaged. Cleveland states that when the capitulations were renegotiated in the eighteenth century, new privileges were granted to European powers, “among them was the right to grant certificates of protection to non-Muslim Ottoman subjects, [allowing] their holders to receive the same protection that European nationals had” (Cleveland, 59). When the military balance between Europe and the Ottomans twisted in favor of Europe, European merchants, backed by the power of their states, began to exploit the capitulations to the disadvantage of the empire. “By granting the various consuls jurisdiction over their nationals within the Ottoman Empire, the Capitulations accorded the consuls extraordinary powers that they abused with increasing frequency in the course of the nineteenth century” (Cleveland, 50). As noted by Feroz Ahmad, the Great Powers filibustered, refusing to abolish the capitulations; under these treaties the empire remained a virtual semi-colony until the Sublime Port abolished the capitulations unilaterally in 1914 (55), expressed in *Turkey: The Quest for Identity*. Exclusion of contextual information, as seen in Lewis’ history, works to prevent proper insight concerning the domino effect of results brought through the capitulations bringing foreign capital that had controlling impacts on economy and politics, which played roles within larger sequential events occurring not only between European powers and the Ottomans but also within the territories of the empire.

This exclusion yet works with Lewis’ theory, insisting that what happened to the Ottoman Empire should be called a “decline” that was continually evident since the sixteenth century due to Islam’s cultural assets. In this theorization, there is indeed no information addressed as hints in understanding of the transition of the Ottoman Empire from a world empire to its peripheral status in a capitalist world economy. This topic can be found in many earnest studies, including *The Ottoman Empire and the World-Economy*, in which various scholars contribute theoretical approaches and case studies. While addressing these contributions, in its introduction chapter İslamoğlu touches upon the demand for the Ottoman agricultural goods and the consequent high prices of these goods in European markets in the late sixteenth century, which attracted the Ottoman merchant capital to these markets generating the decrease of the state control over internal trade. As a result of this, “merchant capital was increasingly integrated

into economic division of labor of the European market;” “internal trade and network declined relative to foreign trade;” “trade shifted from inland centers to coastal towns;” and “the indigenous and predominantly Muslim merchant classes were dealt a blow as foreign merchants or their agents—the Christian minorities—gained precedence.” In showing that it was thus not so much Islamic ideology causing the changes in the structure of trade, but the rise of the world economy, İslamoğlu writes, “the history of the Ottoman Empire after the sixteenth century is not one of the continual decline to be shaken by sudden Western penetration in the nineteenth century; its history [...] is one of its ‘incorporation’ into the world-system or of ‘peripheralization’” (11). Obviously, to Lewis, such incorporation had not occurred, as in his theorization the focus is shifted from the notion of superiority to shocking impact of Napoleonic invasion of Egypt bringing “a profound problem of readjustment to a new relationship” (*Arabs*, 183). How the author explores the problem of readjustment is discussed below with rhetoric being extracted from *Crises of Islam* and *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East*.

1.3.4.3. Periodization of Ottoman History Typifying the Decline in Islam

In *Crises of Islam*, Lewis exhibits economic and political reconfigurations around the globe progressing since the early sixteenth century with the same contextually estranged outlining we have seen in *The Arabs in History*. He first turns the focus towards the expansion of the Islamic empire, whether under the rule of the medieval Arab caliphate or that of Persian and Ottoman dynasties; even as late as the seventeenth century the Ottomans were still ruling Budapest and Belgrade. Then the focus is directed towards the expansion of European powers exposed with their trading cooperation and competition. This, innocently enough, is representative of technological and economic progress bringing political change in parallel, while also depicting Muslims losing their naval power due to lack of technological progress, bringing a failure in commerce, with Europeans sailing from the Mediterranean to India expanded their military bases in proximity to the Islamic lands by the twentieth century (51-57).

What differentiates this book from *The Arabs in History* can be found in Lewis’ additional interpretive step, bringing about another outlook on his conceptualization of the things that went wrong, portrayed with two events that had occurred in accord with loss of power in commerce. First, the defeat on the battlefield; the first of its kind was the second Turkish siege of

Vienna in 1683, marking the retreat of the Ottoman Empire that lowered the durability of the military power of the Muslim world, which was followed by additional defeats, and the second being the first European invasion (1798), marking the conventional beginning of modern history in the Middle East, “when the French Revolution, in the person of a young general called Napoleon Bonaparte, landed in Egypt” (*Crisis*, 54). What makes for issues in the discourse is that the author refers to these historical facts in order to draw a periodic table, expressive of totality, and presents these snippets as idiosyncratically linked with the progression of history, as if they were as important to the progression of events as they are crucial examples of the essence of Islam, presented in the power changing hands around the globe.

In speaking on the decline of the Ottoman Empire, the author pictures an isolated entity and a static fact, the latter is provided, hinting towards his regards for the contemporary Islamic world and its inability to progress. This is seen through the exemplification of the second Turkish siege of Vienna, a defining event which prompted the Ottoman military, political, and intellectual elite to ask, “Why had the once ever-victorious Ottoman armies been vanquished by the despised Christian enemy? And how could they restore their previous dominance?” (*Crisis*, 52). Correspondingly, “Why is it that in the past we were always able to defeat the infidels; now the infidels are defeating us? In the past, we always captured territory from the infidels; now they are capturing territory from us”? As articulated by Lewis in equating them to his own design, “What went wrong?” when hosted by the Carnegie Council. Only a slice of the information is conveyed to the reader without any earnest attempt to pay respects to the course of actions the Ottomans had taken in responding to their questions concerning their perceived failures, such as launching military reforms. The first was dated to the late 1700s, when Sultan Selim III established the Nizam-i Cedid army, a unit trained and equipped in a European fashion; yet under the severe pressure coming from domestic opposition, in which the empire’s old army establishment (the Janissaries) took its part, he was deposed and his army was disbanded in the early 1800s. With omissions, Lewis makes the empire a case study that is purpose is to present the current political and cultural failures, providing a viewpoint on the things that are still going wrong, not in Turkey but in contemporary Muslim societies. Along these lines he indicates that the aforementioned question initially set forth by the Ottoman Turks has spread from Turkey to many countries within the region dealing with ever broadening issues “going on ever since” (*Crisis*, 52). Lewis gives it straight from the horse’s mouth, so to speak, as he equips the reader

with his own culturist approach, drawing his ideas and that of a Muslim's on common ground, providing a sound, easily regurgitated argument for his readers to comprehend.

Placing the issue of the loss of battlefield into a historical perspective works to better understand the author's negligence towards presenting the external economic factors in a shifting international setting. Neither the penetration of foreign merchant capital into Ottoman territories, nor trade with Europe, is a point of emphasis, which would have proven insightful along with displaying the decline in state revenues occurring in unison with the Ottoman economy. "Without these revenues, the institutions that supported the Ottoman system, especially the armed forces, were undermined" (Cleveland, 49). In reading into this episode of history combined with the assorted domestic problems, reflecting on why the various components of the Ottoman system were becoming less cohesive than they had been before, Cleveland addresses "the rule of incompetent sultans," "the presence of struggles over the succession," and "the rise of political discord within the court" as factors on the weakening of the central government. Then he underlines "the shortage of revenue" and "the rise of inflation" that played devastating roles on a great number of fixed salary state employee's livelihoods, bringing about various forms of corruption. "And finally, the government's inability to make regular payments to the Janissaries or to fund the acquisition of new military equipment meant that the Ottoman armed forces lost the absolute dominance that they had earlier possessed" (Cleveland, 50). In confronting the complex factors on the loss of dominance that manifested during the second siege of Vienna, these accounts also shed light on the composite relation rounded out between additional defeats and intensified external/internal pressures. For example, the provisions given to the Russians with the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarja (1774) laid the foundation for their claim to be the protector of the entire Greek Orthodox *millet* within the empire, and Russia used this claim as a pretext for interventions in Ottoman internal affairs in the following decades. In the course of the territorial losses sustained in the second half of the eighteenth century, "the entrenched interests groups within the empire refused to surrender their privileges" and "the administration was paralyzed by the intransigence of the Janissaries, the self-aggrandizement of the *derebeys*, and the self-serving practices of influential officials and ulama" (Cleveland, 58). Seeing none of these combined reasons behind the empire's incapability of taking crucial steps to stopgap and retain its strength at a time, when the ineffectiveness of its military was a fact, but only snippets suggestive of a simplistic table, dividing the Ottoman history with 1683 and with

1798, it is an inevitable conclusion that along with the idea of Muslim weakness and European strength, something innate played a part in the paths of these representative civilizations.

Meager portrayals lacking contextual outline, such as Napoleon's invasion of Egypt which is addressed at best with ideological aspirations, serve to help conceptualize a static specificity provided as a framework with a reference to Islam's unitary being, which yet stands at odds with the reality of an heterogeneous and multicultural existence. In this framework, the defeat of the second Turkish siege of Vienna is shown as the first sign of the decline on the face of Europe's advanced military technology, and Napoleon's invasion of Egypt is pointed to as evidence of the persistence in decline. External factors, to Lewis, played roles on this decline only in the aftermath of 1798, until when the region had been isolated from the civilized world—the first and fortunate contact resulted in the transmitting of ideas associated with the French Revolution. This specific simplistic table, or order of operations, is in fact representative of, not history in a transparent lens, but a shift in Lewis' approach from culturist to modernizer.

1.3.4.4. External Factors in Islam's Decline and in the Creation of a Modern Existence

Lewis' use of the external factors representative of decline designates the Western ideological and institutional impacts on the transformation of a traditional state towards one more modern, and this can be best exemplified through *The Arabs in History*. The first European military penetration, France's, is defined as the background, or a good starting point in understanding, as the author exposes this as a gathering of momentum with assorted consequences. Like the economic outcomes (outlined earlier), the state-sponsored reforms are central to his exposures, which were launched first in Egypt and then by the central government of the Ottoman Empire during the post-Napoleonic era. To better conceptualize this, it would prove beneficial to pay attention to how the withdrawal of French troops from Egypt is presented, as it is a microcosm of the overall discourse—suggestive of the problem of adjustment to a new relationship in the process of transformation.

The author only misguides his readers in telling that the territorial hegemony of Bonaparte in Egypt was forced out neither by Egyptians nor Ottomans, but by the British (*Arabs*, 183); thus it was a bitter lesson for Muslims [i.e., “not only could a Western power arrive,

invade, and rule at will but only another Western power could get it out” (*Crisis*, 55)]. In this, he neglects to mention Egyptian revolts against the French rule, and does not take into account an Ottoman defense at Akka, where the troops of Jezzar Ahmad Pasha stopped the expansion of the French in 1799. The French rule was brought to an end in 1801 by a joint British-Ottoman alliance and its undertakings. This alliance, as Juan Cole notes in his review, was mutually inclusive; as much as the Ottomans were in need of the British—they were forced to “call upon a British pied piper who would rid them of the French rats,” Britain was also in need of an Ottoman alliance to protect their Indian trade routes from the lure of French hegemony. With unfounded contextual information and without exposing particular objectives behind Bonaparte’s expedition such as ceasing British supremacy over the Mediterranean and India, Lewis manages to evoke what Cole calls, (“a problematic”) “West/East dichotomy.”

Once framing the discourse with this dichotomy, it is now easy to present the post Napoleonic era, with one-sided historical accounts, when the reign of Muhammad Ali emerged subsequent to French withdrawal, which made himself a virtually independent ruler of Egypt and for a while in Arabia and Syria until European powers intervened. “[His] efforts at independence and expansion were frustrated by the Powers; he succeeded only a hereditary governorship of [...] Egypt” (*Arabs*, 183). The state sponsored reforms led by him are exemplified as the first of their kind in the Middle East, military in origin to create a European-type army, which yet made room for economic and educational measures as his programs paved the way for the opening of new schools and sponsored the translation of Western books printed in Cairo, while student missions were sent to Europe. His efforts to break up the feudal order and to centralize bureaucracy achieved some success as well yet his industrialization project failed, though “the extension of cotton cultivation in Egypt under [his] and his successors led to closer economic links with Western Europe and especially with England, the main market of Egyptian cotton” (*Arabs*, 184). Each of these bits of information reflects historical accuracies, but are presented without giving a broader outlook to the reader to correlate one to another appropriately; for example, what caused the failure of the industrialization project in Egypt, to what extent it was related to frustrations of European powers stemming from Muhammad Ali’s political objective, and in which degree the importance of cotton triggered European intervention.

He attempted to fill this gap with *The Earth and Its Peoples: A Global History*, “Muhammad Ali’s efforts fell afoul of the British, who did not want a powerful country

threatening to interrupt the flow of travelers and mail across Egypt, the shortest route between Europe and India.” In his effort of constructing an economy and military, fit to be independent from the Ottoman Empire, Muhammad Ali expanded diplomatic and commercial contact with Europe, from where he imported advisers and technicians to build industrial enterprises including cotton mills and weapons factories. In order to pay for it all, his government bought wheat and cotton from the peasants at a low price and then exported at a profit, while also imposing high tariffs on imported goods to force the pace of industrialization. Britain intervened, when Ali’s army went to war against the Ottoman Empire in 1839, forcing him to remove all import duties in the name of free trade: “Unprotected, Egypt’s fledgling industries could not compete with flood of cheap British products; thereafter, Egypt exported raw cotton, imported manufactured goods, and became an economic dependency of Britain” (562).

As seen that history of the post Napoleonic era in Egypt is more complicated than what is portrayed by Lewis. What makes this complicated is the integration of Egypt into the world-economic system with cotton production and its geopolitical importance within international order. In this isolation of larger economic implications, the author portrays the reforms led by Muhammad Ali as a local, limited, and incomplete response to a new reality being faced, in order to show the first stage of borrowing ideas and institutions from Europe inspired by the French Revolution—this, being Ali’s course of action, is a vehicle for the author, used to reduce the efforts of a revolutionary leader to a mirror image of the Ottomans in all of their misgivings despite that “[their] reforms brought an increased measure of centralization” (*Arabs*, 184).

In aiming to construct the history of the Ottoman Empire with a reference to Islam, Lewis sets the French invasion of Egypt as a time frame to mark the integration of the Ottoman Empire with the Western world and into its system of operation that is to signify its transformation from an imperial to a more modern state. Consequently, it is unavoidable for his readers, granted they are non-experts, to come away with the idea that “progress and development were achieved as long as the Islamic culture and civilization in general, and that of the Ottoman Empire in particular, decline” which set the stages for “a more modern, advanced and Europeanized way of life, inspired by the French Revolution, the rise of secularism in Europe and the Enlightenment” (Pappe, 16), written to elucidate the root of current misconceptions about the Middle East, forged in the image of the Ottoman Empire by Orientalist scholars.

1.3.4.5. The Problem of Amendment in a New Relationship and the Collapse of the Empire

Lewis's blunder, in terms of isolating economic history and in generating distorted images with a mix of culturist and modernizing approaches, is also manifested in *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East* as in *The Arabs in History*. Despite this, the provided examples within both books, in reference to European-oriented reforms and intensified missionary activities of Western power, shed light on the far-reaching impacts of the transformation sweeping the region up until the total collapse of the Ottoman Empire. This is seen in illustrating the introduction of the European practice of conscription, which enabled lay people, peasants and town folks alike, to associate themselves for the first time with places outside of their settlement, who became part of the state apparatus, while also paving the way for the opening of new schools to create new army and civil officers that brought about a massive increase in literacy and played a major role in the emergence of the media (*Multiple*, 94-5). Regardless of his selective word usage bordering on absurdity i.e. "the first Muslim printing press," Lewis still explores more into the effects of changes brought through the emergence of media, which took its roots in the sixteenth century when missionary activities brought the first printing press into the region used by local Jews and Christians, as "the Ottoman Sultans for long banned printing in Arabic or Turkish" (*Arabs*, 189). Finally, in the nineteenth century the first newspapers published by the French embassy in Istanbul and Bonaparte's administration in Egypt were followed by those circulated all over the region as state enterprises (*Multiple*, 95).

Nevertheless, it can be asserted that each one of these examples appear as part of a methodologically designed set of elements comprising the discourse in entirety, serving up Lewis' ideological intention and this is attested to in presenting these bits of history as he turns the focus on the existence of a coercive state. The printing press, deserving of Lewis' attention, is portrayed as machinery for gaining control of the masses, overshadowing publications conducted as European enterprise and due to Christian missions, while receiving momentum with other developments in communication such as national postal service, telegraphy, and railways; and in the twentieth century, state enterprise newspapers were supplemented by radio and television stations, which all together, like armies and ministers, served to extend the state power (*Multiple*, 95-6). With this, the author not only highlights a political underdevelopment,

inexorable even in the face of modernization attempts, but he also suggests this particular Ottoman history to be seen as symptomatic of a problem taking shapes in the twentieth century Middle East, all provided with the concept of Oriental despotism.

In evaluating the reforms occurring within the despotic rule, and bearing in mind that this rule, to him, is a causality of political thinking in Islam that produced no such things as party, parliament, and public opinion, he provides a plane logic to his readers: the corrupt practices of the state showing signs of autocracy had to be amended; however, due to the underlined social structure, the reforms had to be superimposed on the society by the state in order to bring about transformation; but this necessary step came out not because the ruling elites embraced the idea of transformation as a whole, but because they were faced with a new reality. Based on Lewis' assertion, this new reality is defined more by Western superiority than with the challenges stemming from economic change around the globe in which the empire tried to find its place through its incorporation. In viewing this, it is striking to mention that the long-term process of this incorporation stimulated transformations on a political level; the centralized state was first weakened due to a loss of its control on the economy that had far-reaching impacts, which eventually resulted in the creation of a new centralized state led by Mahmud II, who inaugurated the period known as the Tanzimat (1839-1876). This period is subjected to Lewis' book with an emphasis on the introduction of European practice of conscription and on the emergence of media with the highlighted motivations; yet, readers are provided no more, to conclude with an idea corresponding with "The Tanzimat were meant to put the Empire in a better economic and strategic position to compete in the world" (Pappe, 16). Therefore, Lewis meaningfully ascribes instigation of the reforms to a compulsory Muslim contact with European enlightenment; this gives way to reasoning why they were enacted on a partial scale by the elites, and coupled with the purported idea that the reforms were not easily understood or received by the people they ruled over, ineffective results in totality ensued. All of these materials provided in a conclusive manner are forceful for readers to conceive *homo islamicus*, who was stimulated to change only by the West, as Islam was an impediment to a full transformation in institutions and attitudes.

A comparable persuasive writing, pleading for similar conclusions, can also be recognized as a representation of a milieu, witnessing the birth of "pan-Islamic ideology" and that of "Arab nationalism"; the latter being of mixed origin—the Arab resentment of Turkish domination, urgent mistrust of the encroaching West, idea of nationality, and a revival of the

Arab culture. Focal to this representation is the emergence of a new generation of Arabs, conscious of their Arab heritage and language, whose half-forgotten classics were restored by periodicals and books circulated as missionary enterprise. They were trained in missionary schools in Syria and coupled with the economic change brought by the new local middle class of traders and intellectuals, mostly from Arabic-speaking minorities, the intellectual contributions of these Syrian Christians, reaching a wider public from Syria to Egypt, prompted social change (*Arabs*, 189-90). These are insightful in identifying the roots of Arab nationalism in its pre-colonial stage, showing ever-increasing contact between the Arabic-speaking Christians and the Europeans in the Levant, where awareness of the importance of Arabic was increased and the medium of Arabic channeled knowledge, intellectual life, and new expressions spread by the French Revolution. Nevertheless, in response to why the Christian demand on nationalism was stronger than that of the Muslim within the empire's territory, in expressing their solidarity against the invading West, or *vice versa*, Lewis' attitude towards the pan-Islamic idea is suggestive of the integrity of this representation, defined as "the modern political expression of old community of Islam" (*Arabs*, 190). Juxtaposing this bit of information with above portrayals prompts the notion of a simple dichotomy between Christians and Muslims, while he gives ample recognition to the home team recognizing their promising social foundations priming them for an effective transformation, and undermines history in providing a society's paradigm.

Developed in the late Tanzimat era and employed within the reign of Abdulhamid II (1876 to 1909) the idea of pan-Islamism is expanded upon as articulated by Feroz Ahmad, "The sultan exploited the office of caliph to bolster his position against the West, and used political Islam as an ideology in the struggle against imperialism." This corresponded with a historical reality in an alienation from the West and Westernization due to European hegemony that led people to turn to their indigenous traditions and nativism as they were being marginalized, "Muslims around the world saw the Ottoman Empire as the last remaining Islamic power capable of standing up to the West, and the Sultan Abdulhamid as the universal caliph of the Islamic world leading the resistance" (Ahmad, 43). Thus, re-conception of religion at that time was not much of a product of Islam itself, but that of historical conjuncture. While deliberately omitting this fine line, Lewis undoubtedly knows that save discussing the issue of European imperialism enacted under the name of the protecting the Christian minorities, the issue at hand would fall under the wing of the Eastern Question now being repeated with none of the perspective

afforded—thus, there could be no efficient discussion on Pan-Islamism. To him, there is no need to delve into this, because in speaking of the Muslim the following is all-encompassing: “The basic sentiment of identity was religious and social; the complete society of Islam expressed sometimes in national terms, sometimes in religious terms as synonymous and interchangeable sets of words denoting the same basic reality” (*Arabs*, 190). In reducing the discussion to the ideas suggested in this sentiment—that Muslims internalized nationalism with qualities distinct to Islam thus they would not be capable to possess two distinguished forms of expression, Lewis provides a seemingly “appropriate” answer to the question of why Muslim demand on nationalism was weak in comparison with Christianity’s.

This mode of attribution to history allows him to draw a picture in the discourse while reasoning the shallow impact of Westernization on the public within the empire. It is the picture of the society, where—Muslims resided with the presented qualifications; the status of being non-Muslim prevented Christian minorities from playing a role in the rising bourgeoisie; and the final storehouse of political power lied in the military officials, the bureaucrats, the religious hierarchy, and the landowners, but the action of these old ruling groups towards modernization was slow and constructed with long since retained interests (*Arabs*, 191). In exposing the society under transformation with these groupings and their personifications, this image has the potency to stick with readers when they come across such a complex and delicate issues as democratic transformation of, and religious revivals within, the Middle East. It is subtly aligned with a set of portrayals from “the Wahhabi movements,” resulting in the emergence of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the 1920s, to “the militant religious movements,” rising in Arab countries after WWII—implicitly being used to bridge the presented time frame to the future. In turn, this is wrapped up in rationalizing the Ottoman Empire heading towards its final stage, where borrowed, readymade, and superimposed ideology and political institutions (e.g., parliament, party, election, and public opinion) did not correspond with the foundations of social reality, and “strong religious character of such movements as went beyond small cliques” (*Arabs*, 192).

Although this Middle Eastern roundup has certain accuracy, as the reforms did not prove democratizing to the empire, the outlined phenomena are remiss in contextual particulars in reference to this particular society. While taking the status of minorities into account, Lewis ignores the various developments that had occurred within the empire. In taking a closer look at some of these developments, there existed two royal decrees, the Hatt-i Sharif of Gülhane (1839)

and the Hatt-i Hümayan (1856), and as noted by Cleveland, both of these are suggestive of “the very essence of the Tanzimat.” In brief, both decrees worked towards pledging “the guaranties of the equality of all subjects,” regardless of their religious affiliations; “The pledges were not fully implemented, as much due to Christian preference for new nationalist affiliations as to lingering Muslim feelings of superiority, but the attempt to replace religious affiliation with secular identity continued with the proclamation of a National Law in 1869” (Cleveland, 83). Filling this void brings about a question. Lewis portrays the Muslim lacking in civil identity, thus the modern policies were implemented top-down as implied; yet, when he dares to explore the particulars of the reform period to reflect history thoroughly he ignores major factors—to what extent success was gained, where the failures occurred, and in which areas the resistance brought that end. In attempting to bridge this gap with a specific focus on Lewis’ concluding sentiments above (i.e., strong religious character of such movements as went beyond small cliques); another question arises as to whom Lewis is talking about. He is referring to the members of the rival bodies such as the *ulama* and the old aristocracy. Pappe refers to this rival grouping as “the disadvantaged groups,” who produced a counter discourse on tradition and religion, fabricating their counter modernization movement in a fear of losing their dominant position that they had obtained for centuries, and “Abdulhamid II, became “protagonist” of such views—undermining the powers of those upholding the reforming strategies and discourse” (Pappe, 18). Or, Lewis is addressing intellectual elites such as the *Young Turks*, “[who] called for the revitalization of the empire through the incorporation of selected European models and at the same time insisted on the retention of the Islamic foundations of state and society” (Cleveland, 85). Their causes had colossal impacts; which produced Ottoman patriotism while also paving the way for opening the first constitutional era, inaugurated in 1876 by Abdulhamid II, who then suspended the constitution in 1878. The *Yung Turk* revolution put the constitution into effect in 1908—the date marks a new era that spanned until the collapse of the empire in 1918.

All this ambiguity in the discourse works suspiciously well with generating a viewpoint, to which a complete emphasis can be found in Lewis’ *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*:

The cultural [and] political traditions of the Ottoman Empire were conducive neither to the formulation not to the expression of new political theories or programs. As so often happens, the first appearance of heterodox ideas in an authoritarian society is known only from refutations and condemnations; when

positive responses appear, they are sporadic and furtive, and, in Islamic societies especially, assume traditional disguise of a return to the sanctified past (72-73).

Thus, in the course of implementing new policies by the men of the Tanzimat no insight was developed on the principles of the French Revolution to meet the needs of the modern world, as Lewis' selectiveness would suggest, leaving the reader without any other possibilities to think off. Accordingly, an old Turkish adage goes "Balık baştan kokar, su dipten bulanır" [Trouble starts either by senseless leadership or because of underground activities] as he is picturing that society; yet in this picture there is only a unified entity desiring to Islamize not to democratize.

Generating this viewpoint is a conscious effort, performed as a display of causality on the gradual evolution of nationalist reactions amongst Muslim Arabs against the Ottoman rule, and unquestionably Lewis addresses these nationalist reactions in precise terms. The replacement of old Islamic solidarity and dynastic loyalty by somewhat modernized Ottoman patriotism did not work in the Arab provinces, where the constitutional revolution of 1908 met active opposition; the replacement of both Islamic and Ottoman loyalties by Turkish nationalism provoked an anti-Turkish feeling among Muslim Arabs; and despite the predominant Muslim feeling still overt when WWI broke out, pressure of the war combined with activities of the Allied powers led the rapid development of Arab nationalism (*Arabs*, 192). Yet, in this review, retrospective of the course of actions leading up to the collapse of the empire and dismemberment of its territories, the author's focus is again ideological. Oversimplified statements prevent one from better comprehending an ambiance that was heavily entrenched, and in conjunction with the presented desire of Muslims to Islamize, this serves to coax readers into seeing the cause and effect as fervent engagement of imperial powers in the separatism movements of Muslim Arabs, whose unbroken mode of thought is presented as being close to sustained, while further justifying colonial rule with a full modernization optic so to speak of the creation of a set of Arab states, territorially defined and in modern standards.

Lewis' culturist approach concerning failed attempts in reformation juxtaposes well with an idea that is intensively imposed in both books, and can be succinctly represented in "nationhood and statehood are or should be identical, that loyalty to the nation and allegiance to the state should coincide, and that if they do not this is a fault which should be remedied" (*Multiple*, 80). This juxtaposition effectively places readers in a position to perceive the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and dismemberment of its territories as "remedying" the problem, while

enabling them to conceptualize this remedy as a result of the efforts of European powers, rooted in Bonaparte's invasion of Egypt and its causality in the emergence of the Modern Middle East. In speaking on *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East*, in this conceptualization, Turkey also has a place, as the idea of patriotism took firm root after WWI setting off the emergence of a relatively homogenous nation state from the ruins of the empire (23), becoming a Turkish civilization with new roots and in presenting the region that has undergone crucial changes, but still the old and deep-rooted identities are substantial as an inevitable result of Islam.

1.3.4.6. Transformation into the Modern Middle East

Giving some insight into Lewis' modernization snapshot through *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East*, he presents the language as one of the prime markers of identity in the region, in times when "If Arabic was the language of religion and law, and Persian the language of love and of polite letters, Turkish soon became the language of command and of rule" (*Multiple*, 54), as it was shared by Arabs, Turks and Persians in many aspects through a common scripture and the Shari'a, which politically and culturally intertwined them throughout the centuries. With a mix of wise and astute linguistic study he delves into the old words injected with new meanings, loanwords/neologisms denoting new ideas, and the semantic evolution of certain terms, such as *milla* denoting a religious community in classical Arabic, applied as *millet* in Persian and Turkish to denote the officially recognized religious communities (Muslims and non-Muslims), and now in Turkey like in Iran it is taken with new meanings like *millet*-nation and *milli*-national (*Multiple*, 83). All these referenced points are suggestive of the changes sweeping the region, where Western influence made the replacement of the old perceptions with the new ones possible. One striking example in this regard is *citizen* replacing *subject*—a term, still effective in 1923, when the Lausanne Protocol termed the minorities to be exchanged as adherents of a religion and subjects of a state (i.e., "The Turkish subjects of the Greek Orthodox religion residing in Turkey" and "Greek subjects of the Muslim religion residing in Greece"). The reader is given insight on the evolution of identities as described, while Lewis endeavors to show "the legacy of the Middle Eastern past," and "the realities of the Middle Eastern present" (*Multiple*, 10), while this reality of the present is provided within a Eurocentric worldview.

This Euro centrism is yet more apparent when the author tries to endorse his claim that

unlike in the modern West, where symbolic language of identity has old roots and resulted from a long evolution, in the modern Middle East much of it is new, either imposed or copied from outside. Trendy writing employs a variety of metaphors, as seen in the portrayal of the introduction of national anthems and the brass band, which had occurred when Mahmud II, while modernizing his army, requested the Sardinian ambassador to provide him with a bandmaster, and the chosen person Giuseppe Donizetti formed the Ottoman Imperial Music; to which Lewis concludes, “by now every sovereign state in the [region], as elsewhere, has a national anthem” (*Multiple*, 106). While sighting a palpable impact of the West under the paradigm of nationalism, he undermines certain particulars yet again. As historical records have shown, symbolic language of identity, in this context, is not new, which in fact has been evolving with very old roots, and this can be exemplified through the Ottoman military bands—the *mehters*. The *mehter* is recognized as the oldest military marching or brass band in the world, which its origin might date back to the eighth century, to the Orkhon inscriptions. It was part of the tradition since the foundation of the Ottoman state in the late thirteenth century, being performed in increasing scales up until the nineteenth century, marching during military affairs for inspiration. Becoming a model for rhythm and style, it paved the way for the spread of military marching bands all over Europe, and charmed by this music were well-known composers such as Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven, who played roles on the integration of Turkish percussion instruments into the Western orchestra. The *mehter* lost its popularity following the slaughter of the Janissary corps (by Mahmud II) who were the hallmarks of the band. Thus, the composing of a national anthem might have started with the European nation-state formation; however, the idea of preparing and composing marches for brass instruments is by no means a foreign concept or notion, and in influencing European musicians who in turn brought ideas to Europe, it can be seen that this relationship could be presented in inverse. As it would be imagined, excluded facts preclude one from an understanding of world people assimilated into each other’s cultures and ideas—something giving the meaning and significance to humanities, and in Lewis’ perception the humanities can be inclusively depicted in Western principles.

A similar metaphoric representation appears in the narrations of the usage of national flags in the Middle East, where pennants and battle flags in a single color and without any design were known since earlier times, as seen in those of the Umayyads (white), the Abbasids (black), and the House of the Prophet (green), as all three colors are combined in several ways

and employed in the flags of many present day Arab states. “Today, every state in the [region] has a national flag [and most] of these, like the flags of Western nations, consist of selected colors arranged in rectangles and triangles, and national flags and colors have an increasingly important part in a wide range of public events” (*Multiple*, 106). In presenting the fact that the flag as indicator of national identity is an alien concept to the Middle Eastern tradition, Lewis’ hierarchal designation between Muslim and Western forms of expressions emerges. The virtue of the nationalist paradigm is linked to the patterns borrowed from the Western flag, incorporated into the exemplified, faithfully significant colors, which would otherwise signify the wholly religiously conditioned community. Thus, the existence of the flag being old and in use throughout the centuries is not a concern for the author, but the integration into the Western traditions and this occurrence is not a result from an unavoidable continuation of a living organism renewing itself with its traditions and expressions, as his narrations would suggest.

Lewis desires for his readers to comprehend that however this integration was achieved, the issue is not as positively constructed as one would assume, because some countries use the emblems in their flags as an assertion of religion central to their identity. Apart from the shield of David appearing in the Israeli flag, a provided example is the crescent moon, with a specific reference to the Turks (whose usage of the emblem is followed by some other Muslim countries): “some have seen this use of the crescent as an affirmation of the centrality of Islam in their identity; others as meaning no more than the use of cross [placed] in the flags of such unfanatical Christian nations as the British and the Scandinavians” (*Multiple*, 107). He explains; the idea that the crescent (and the Shield of David) has the same significance for followers of the ascribed faith as does the cross for Christians is a false assumption, as the cross signifies the core of religious identity but the others have decorative significance in history. The sacralization of the crescent was due to a false analogy as Christians ascribed to it a status like that of the cross, dating back to at least the sixteenth century. In time, in a world dominated by the Western attitude Muslims (and Jews) adopted the religious emblems having been assigned to them, and “by the present day they are universally recognized by followers of both religions” (*Multiple*, 108). Lewis tells us of the long lasting Ottoman rule and its equally durable encounter with European powers that has brought a vision unto the surface, and in try to denounce sacralization of the crescent, he abbreviates the discussion upon the Muslim minds, who are placed in an exotic vacuum in the absence of any source materials referenced to talk on their behalf.

Does the author mention Muslims composing larger populations in some forty countries, where the national flags do not fly any form of the crescent moon, or the Muslims who reside in the other ten countries that follow a Turkish example in forming their flags? Or does his focus of emphasis on Turkey supersede this, where the generations have been taught from the elementary school years the complexity of the origin of their national flag: as the crescent might be associated with their pre-Islamic, shaman culture anchored in the Central Asia. The legend states that the founder of the Ottoman state, Osman I, employed crescent moon as the insignia of his dynasty upon having a dream envisioning this emblem. When the Ottomans conquered Constantinople in 1453, they adopted the city's symbols like the crescent moon and star, since then a crescent was included into the flag. During the reformation period of Selim III (1793) an eight-pointed star was incorporated and during the Tanzimat a five-pointed star was utilized (1884), from which the national flag of the Turkish Republic took its form. None of these explanations take an Islamic identity into account while students are further provided with national awareness in a modern sense. Nevertheless, it is certain that design and colour choices of national flags signify the importance of historical and cultural heritage that might be incorporated with religious undertones in places and in perceptions; yet, making generalizations about Muslims as collectively operated constructs is only misleading and deceptive. The irony behind Lewis' writing in this regard lies in that as he attempts to denounce sacralization of the crescent, while the rhetoric he creates rather constructs an Islamic significance in relation to the crescent. In unison with the juxtaposed depictions, "the use of the crescent as an affirmation of the centrality of Islam" and "the use of cross [in] the flags of such unfanatical Christian nations," this rhetoric segments the modern world into two competing ideas, peoples, and faiths. If his metaphoric representation is well received by the reader of the information age, in which images and symbols are now accessible in transmitting knowledge throughout the globe, it is inevitable that they come away from his writings with preconceived notions or biases concerning Muslims.

Despite the above mentioned reference to the Turks, bringing to mind an identity question in terms of their Islamic specificity and national being, the author flawlessly differentiates this country from the others while further articulating his subject of analysis—the symbolic language of identity in the Middle East. It is where, unlike flags and national anthems, the practice of distinctive dress is not alien to people, taking roots through old social codes and religious obligations as an internal need in indicating identity for both self-assertion and to

differentiate one's religious affiliation and social or occupational status from the other. What was alien to these people is Western style tunics, slacks, and boots imposed while modernizing the army in the nineteenth century, when headgear was still in use as "the last bastion of the old order" (*Multiple*, 109), within which the turban obtained a significance due to the tradition, defining it as a barrier between believer and unbeliever. This last bastion was removed in Turkey during the dress revolution made by Kemal Atatürk, replaced by European style hats and caps. What proves problematic in this informative entry is Lewis' objective that enables his readers to associate those who have recently donned the traditional garment to the idea of a return to the authentic past, as he links it with present-day movements of religious revival, a notion that again is too broad and ambiguous to be accepted in good reasoning. The selectiveness coaxes the reader easily while reading into the focus on "the necktie" that, the author says, has been perceived as a Christian emblem due to its vaguely cruciform shape, thus "a mark of obeisance to Western hegemony." While reducing this issue into a single image of a pious Muslim who avoids wearing a tie—"who otherwise wear Western coats, shirts, trousers," he suggests all who do not commonly use the so-called Western garments to be adhering to his proposed ideology. Last but not least, the revolution in dress for women is addressed as "it was more dramatic and also more dangerous" and "in some parts of the Islamic world it remains so to present day," exemplified through Iran and Afghanistan and based on the veil and the scarf; he concludes, "For women in the East, they are emblems; for the pious, of submission, for the emancipated, of repression. For Muslim women in the West; they have sometimes become the blazons of a proud assertion of identity" (*Multiple*, 110). A clear-cut writing about the two garments acquiring a crucial symbolic importance in places works as a slam dunk for Lewis, and is often used by many scholars and media representations presenting material akin to that of his own, as it is illustrative of a difference in culture to be inevitably received by a Westerner as inhumane.

In elucidating Islam as a civilization transforming into the Modern Middle East, either through linguistic explanations or by means of an inquiry on the symbolic language of identity, Lewis' method of writing history work towards his ideologically constructed objectives, presenting the region and its peoples with a mixed optimistic and pessimistic manner—the former stems from a modernizing approach, and the latter from his culturist stance. This method is obvious in the three books, serving for his structuralist explanations in showing the decline of Islam and its failure in modernizing. The reader is provided to a prolific extent history

encompassing four hundred years, and while exploring the themes centered on Islam, it is associated with the decline of the civilization. In depicting the process that was going towards the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the themes are replicated over and over to eternalize this particular history into the future developments, or rather to say to reason the contemporary failings of the Arab world with its Islamic past. In this reasoning, Lewis offers a standpoint; the far-reaching changes sweeping this region are Western in nature and secular in outlook, and the colonial paradigm produces awakening of national consciousness in people, Arabs and Turks alike, and in the former's case it is delineated by means of European territorial rule that has been previously analyzed. These structural narratives are the building blocks aimed at epitomizing the ideology construction process of Muslims and their relation with the West featured in the post-WWII era. This occurs in revealing the widening gap between the Islamic world and the modern West, the loss of its leadership, and falling behind the increasingly modernizing East, depicted as generating emotional and practical problems, for which there have been no effective answers found yet by the rulers, intellectuals, and rebels of Islam; examined below.

1.3.5. Clash between Islam and Modernity Becoming the “Clash of Civilizations,” and the War on Terror Bringing Democratic Transformation to the Middle East

Lewis repeatedly mentions the failure of reconciling with modernity in the post-WWII Middle East, which turns out to be a strong theme utilized in representing the Muslim search for the culprits, save humiliation, and offered remedies, while exploring the Arab countries and Iran. In portraying the region, where anti-Americanism after the collapse of Western European dominance has been attributed to the issue of economic exploitation as well as support of corrupt tyrants and of Israel, the author aims to show the role of the perceived decline since the sixteenth century in reaction to modernity and Christianity. His point of departure is exploring the Muslim rage directed against the West specifically to the U.S., delving into the roots of this rage, while highlighting the idea that Islam and the West are two millennial adversaries; all of this is evident in the three books despite different tonality. Lewis' intellectual ability gives off an air of “objectivity” while he places the “clash of civilizations” into perspective, intending to characterize Islam as in a stage, ready to exact its revenge on who had destroyed it, unless the real superiors were to intervene, to Westernize and democratize. The discourse in *The Multiple*

Identities of the Middle East and *Crises of Islam* concentrates highly on the ideology of *jihad*, and in the latter this is evaluated with the topic of *war on terror*. In both books, Iranian theocracy and Turkish democracy, the two models on the ground for the Arab future, are another focus of emphasis, and in the latter the Turkish example is of elevated importance in the context of the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

1.3.5.1. Search for Culprits in the Decolonized Arab World and Forecasting the Future

In *The Arabs in History*, the issue of failure to modernize in the decolonized Arab world is unfolded in portraying the emergence of a troubled society with manifold and increasing discontent that occurred when a new alignment scheme of superpowers was taking a definitive form, filling the lands with the clash over conflicting ideologies while also bringing new dangers and tempting interests aimed at short-term political advantage (199-200). This exploration is led with “the search for a culprit” which provides the conceptual framework, and with this, the author is not only hinting towards the clash between Islam and modernity—between Islam and the free world, but is also trying to imply what the future might hold in this region.

The factors behind the birth of such a depressive society is remarked on as “the strains and stresses of rapid modernization, fuelled by oil and powered by money,” “the threats and plots and blandishments of regional and external powers each pursuing its own interests,” “the sense of humiliation and frustration at the perceived inability of the Arab states, despite independence, to deal with even the smallest of enemies or solve even the simplest of problems,” and “the mounting anger against self-proclaimed innovative regimes whose economics brought poverty, whose politics brought tyranny, whose armies suffered defeat abroad and inflicted repression at home” (*Arabs*, 200). Lewis lists them all as in combination, leaving people to resort to searches for culprits behind their troubles; yet, he never dares to discuss about the multifaceted impacts on the creation of these factors, preventing one from gaining insight on the most significant components of the region’s political undertakings. Even taking only the Palestine-Israeli conflict into account would be insightful in itself to see the panorama and indeed he addresses this, but the aforementioned context is completely remiss, as seen below.

The author highlights the rise of militant anti-Semitism in continental Europe leading to

the flood of refugees into the British mandate of Palestine while also telling that neither the partition plan of the UN dividing the territory into three segments, nor the foundation of the Israel as a state was accepted by the Palestinian leadership or the Arab states who went to war to stop this implementation; “The unresolved Palestine problem led to a succession of further Arab-Israel wars—in 1956, 1967, 1973, and 1982” (*Arabs*, 198). Juan Cole notes in his review a standpoint completely ignored by Lewis, “while one certainly cheers the British for giving refuge in Palestine to Jews fleeing Hitler, it would have been nobler yet to admit them to the British Isles rather than saddling a small, poor peasant country with 500,000 immigrants hungry to make the place their own,” and he continues, “Nor was it a good idea, having created such a situation, to simply leave and let the two populations fight it out.” Seemingly adequate local history, Lewis turns his focus on the refugee problem, comparing the fate of the Palestinian refugees with that of millions of others who fled or were driven from their homes in Eastern Europe or the Indian subcontinent. Except for in Jordan, they were neither repatriated nor settled in Arab countries, but remained as refugees in UN financed camps, which spared the stateless refugees and governments who were concerned with the need to meet the alternatives of resettlement or repartition suggestive of a striking difference with partition of British India, “which ended with mutual recognition and the resettlement as citizens of vastly greater numbers of refugees” (*Arabs*, 198). Within the discourse, exuding impartiality in its skilfulness in exploring the exceptional Muslim case, opposing the West and its modern values, this history serves to define from where the problem between the Arabs and Israelites comes from. As explained by M. Shahid Alam in his review, “Lewis can write ‘objectively’ about the Arab’s ‘ingrained’ opposition to Israel without ever telling his readers that Israel is an imperialist creation, and an expansionist, colonial-settler state that was founded on terror, wars, and ethnic cleansing.” After all, Lewis’ reader is charmed into thinking that there is no need to delve into “minor particulars” as the Arabs themselves have written their own recent history; “the Arab-Israeli conflict has been by far the most publicized of the Middle Eastern conflicts[;but] it is not the only conflict, still less the only problem of the Arab world”—amongst these struggles were the Lebanese and Sudanese civil wars of 1975-90, the Iraq-Iran wars of 1980-8, and the Gulf War of 1990-1 “when the United States and other outside powers became involved in what began and ended as an inter-Arab conflict” (*Arabs*, 199). Within this mode of conveying information that continues to arrive remiss of certain contextual particulars, the author portrays the materialization of a

troubled society in the decolonized Arab world with increasing discontent. In listing individually the aforementioned factors as the reasons behind this, he knowingly reduces the issue to an inability to progress—neither had socialism brought an economic wellbeing nor had nationalism brought freedom, and although fueled by oil money the Arabs fell behind the rapidly modernizing West, epitomizing how it has set the stage for practical and emotive problems.

This now apparent void is intentionally created, and in turn it is intensively filled under the mask of responding to the explanations provided by Arab intellectuals in their search since the nineteenth century when “they first became aware of the relative weakness and poverty of their countries as contrasted with the rest of the world” (*Arabs*, 200). In focusing on these explanations placing the blame on the shoulders of foreign occupiers, Lewis first addresses a chain of victims falling into the blame games of the Arabs, from the Mongols—regarded as the devastators of the Islamic civilization of the Caliphate, to the superpowers—viewed as dominating the Arab lands with their local puppets and protégés. Then in responding, he reminds us that the classical Islamic civilization had been in decline before the Mongol invasions came onto the scene; the Ottoman conquest was a liberation of the Arabs from the late Mamluk rule; the period of European rule was very brief, spanned in the central lands only between the two world wars, and ended with failed treaties; and after all, the U.S. cannot be blamed, as their attempt to keep the Arab world in a defensive alliance system proved self-defeated and resulted in filling the area with Soviet domination. In addition, military explanations are not as simple and one sided as asserted; both the Turkish domination over Arabs and then the European domination of the larger Islamic world were part of a larger process, dating back to the seventh century, when the power of Islam began carrying its *jihad* against Christendom from the once Christian territories into the European mainland, and almost conquering Europe twice; the reconquest brought about a conquest and eventually world domination by the West (*Arabs*, 200-206). This attempt of filling the void is not only suggestive of the troubles which landed in the Arab world long before the arrival of European colonialism, but it is also implicative of what Lewis frequently articulates in many of his works—as long as Arabs fail to reverse the question from “Who did this to us?” to “What did we do wrong?” this progression will never end. The intention is thus not to explore the subject of discussion, the emergence of a troubled society, as it is, to him, an accidental result of the progression of history coincident to post-WWII era, but to deconstruct the Arab explanations, or rather to say their conceptualization of Western

imperialism. Along these lines, in highlighting the failure to modernize as resulting from the region's malaise, grander assumptions can be made about the origins of this problem; the aim is to pinpoint what aggravated the antiquated Muslim rage into a fire standing against the West.

Within this framework Lewis steps into presenting a new era, inaugurated with the swift withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Iraq in 1991, to which he writes, "the United States, by the very nature of its society and institutions, has no desire, and certainly no aptitude, for the imperial game; [the] older imperial powers of the West have long since abandoned any such ambitions [...]" (*Arabs*, 207). This provides a complete emphasis in writing, and if the knowledge is perceived by the reader as transmitted, it is inevitable to conclude with the idea that Middle Eastern countries, for the first time in centuries, are on their own to shape their own future, as Western foreign policies on the Middle East have long since been drawn on to defeat Communism which is now a non-factor, and in this there is no role of geopolitical importance on the region, even in hosting the largest oil reserves on the globe, which Lewis neglects to mention completely. This future is most likely imagined by one having absorbed the discourse as an "uncertainty," with all the negative connotations, while the author displays Islam as it now stands face to face not with a classical imperial game, but with an alien civilization challenging many of its basic values and tempting many Muslims with altruistic promises. This uncertainty is given meaning in viewing "the traditional structure of life," which has been shattered beyond repair by the impact of the West "with its printing-press and computers, aero-planes and cinemas, factories and universities, oil-prospectors and archeologists, machine-guns and ideas," demanding a readjustment of the inherent socio-cultural and political formations. Lewis helps readers to better imagine, "Islam is no longer a new faith, hot and malleable from the Arab crucible, but an old and institutionalized religion, set by centuries of usage and tradition into rigid patterns of conduct and belief" (*Arabs*, 207), in connecting an Arab future with seventh century Arabia.

In concluding, the two competing diagnoses made by Muslims are portrayed as being offered in the region, each with its own cure. One, that "the trouble is all due to infidel and their local dupes and imitators, and to the aping of infidel way," with its remedy being "a resumption of the millennial struggle against the infidel adversary in the West, and a return to authenticity, to their God-given laws and tradition which they have foolishly and sinfully abandoned." The other suggests the arrival at democracy as cure, "openness and freedom in the economy, the society, and the state" (*Arabs*, 208). While placing Islam on a collision course with the Western ideals as

a “millennial enemy”—repeated in many of his works, the most popularized one being “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” which is remarked on as, “the vision of an impending conflict between Islam and the West as but another stage in a historic (if not inevitable) pattern of confrontation is reinforced by Bernard Lewis” (Esposito, 220), the reader of *The Arabs in History* is given no choice but to envision a future “clash of civilizations” without increased intervention. Islam being now the only power in the region gives justification in advance for the future foreign policy of the U.S., making the collateral damage associated with an “intervention” acceptable to the reader of this early-published book, last issued in 2002—on the eve of U.S. invasion of Iraq.

1.3.5.2. Muslim Rage and its Roots within the Context of the Islamic Revolution of Iran

While attempting to define the problem of the region in *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East* and in *Crises of Islam*, the discussion almost exclusively leans on Islamic fundamentalism, where ineffective modernization has proven itself and brought about societal and logistical predicaments in the second half of the twentieth century. In *Crisis of Islam*, Lewis explains the main critiques of fundamentalists, to whom the Islamic world has taken a turn for the worst—the source being the West with the guilty party within the society being the political leaders, who call themselves Muslims but in fact are apostates in abrogating the *Shari‘a* and in adopting foreign laws and customs; their solution is a return to authenticity while removing the apostate governments as a crucial step (24). The author also pays credence to the triggers of anti-Western reactions through the depiction of themes; American economic exploitation in the region resulting in poverty, its support of corrupt tyrants for their own self-interests creating injustice, and its support of Israel in its conflict with the Palestinian Arabs and the larger Islamic world (93-4). In showing how fundamentalists have exploited all of these themes in mobilizing the masses, the author aims at presenting the roots of Muslim rage, through which the Islamic Revolution of Iran is portrayed as radical political Islam, achieving its first triumph in 1979, leading suppression at home with classical weapons of autocracy, accompanied by terror and subversion abroad (*Multiple*, 135; *Crises*, 21).

Taking a closer look at *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East*, the countries mentioned, Sudan, Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Morocco, and the kingdoms and

the principles of Arabia it can be seen that these prime examples are representative of where fundamentalists either already control much of the country, or seek by means of terror to overthrow the existing government as well as where fundamentalists are either waging *jihad* against neighboring areas populated by Christians or animists, or have incorporated themselves into the political process to a certain extent. In order to answer why in all of these assertions, Lewis offers to the reader only the tip of the iceberg as he undermines the region's political undertakings, while reducing the discussion to observable facts depicting the Arab world with "a common pattern," in which political loyalty is claimed and doled out at three levels; interacting with each other, sometimes in accordance and otherwise in conflict. He calls the lowest level "local" (as politics may be shaped by group solidarity e.g., tribal, ethnic, sectarian, regional, or a combination) and the intermediate level "the sovereign state," while the third level is designated as transcending all with the aspirations towards a greater unity, suggestive of pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism. The complexity of pan-Islam is explained with its two trends, both have governmental support while also receiving financial support from private donations, "the one is political in inspiration, sometimes diplomatic in method, and usually conservative in policy" and "the other is popular, usually radical, often subversive"; in exemplifying this radical Islam centered on the Islamic Revolution of Iran, provided as representative of current wave of religious militancy, "one of many in Islamic history," Lewis suggests "it may well engulf more Muslim countries before its force is spent" (141).

This serves as a clear warning concerning the Arab world, as it is readily intelligible and well equipped to fall under the sphere of revolutionary Iran due to basic religious identity, exposed as still persisting in popular sentiment. What is greatly neglected by Lewis is the question of why the religious revival had not been manifested subsequent to the removal of European colonial troops from Arab territories, but in the last quarter of the twentieth century—what has been the succession of events proliferating into the post WWII Middle East. This would be a good jump off point in examining the background of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, in terms of the country's socio-economic and political settings, left untouched in his book but where amply sufficient materials are provided for the reader to treat the parallel revolutionary movements with what Prophet Muhammad had exercised as instructed in the Qur'an "to commend good and forbid evil" (*Multiple*, 28), easily connecting the issue to Iran, where the revolutionary leader Ayatollah Khomeini denounced the U.S. as the "Great Satan" although

Satan is depicted in the Qur'an neither as an imperialist or an exploiter, but a seducer and tempter (*Multiple*, 135). The selectiveness on historical treatments, providing no alternative narrative, is to be simply digested by the target reader, who, with the absence of a foundation of multi-faceted constructiveness in knowledge, would in all probability bring conceptualization of the Iranian Revolution as wholly a product of Islamic fundamentalism, without questioning if wider social, political, and economic factors bore a part in Iran's domestic affairs. This understanding would easily assist one to interpret a rebellion going on in any part of the Islamic world in the same way, without considering the particulars associated with a country or region that has its own past in need of examination in order to provide historical context, despite political Islam's undeniable role in the region, to which Lewis refers as Islamic fundamentalism, yet it can be seen in varying degrees. "Iranian Islamism, for example, has been reactive and proactive, reactionary and innovative, repressive and reforming; it differs from Afghan Islamism, which lacks modernizing features" (43), from "Feminism and Islamic Fundamentalism: A Secularist Interpretation" by Valentine M. Moghadam, a testament to the importance of the aforementioned context.

In turning our focus to *Crises of Islam*, Lewis remarks on radical Islamism "to which it has been customary to give the name Islamic fundamentalism" (23), while also instructing the reader on fundamentalism as a term, "unfortunate," as it has been generalized from its original meaning (relevant to a movement in 20th century Protestantism) to define extreme religious-political movements demanding a strict adherence to specific theological doctrines. Instead of rectifying this political incorrectness the scholar sticks with the term, justifying its use through its quality of being commonplace (131). "[...] as Sami Zubaida clearly articulates, seeing Islam as fundamentalist is an essentialist way of looking at a phenomenon that is heterogeneous and varied" (Pappe, 270). Under these parameters the revolutionary wave of Islam is revealed as being comprised of several components: *a sense of humiliation*, suggestive of Muslims who conceptualize themselves as "the sole custodians of God's truth, commanded by Him to bring it to the infidels," and then suddenly find themselves dominated by those infidels, and "even when no longer dominated, still profoundly affected in ways that change their lives, moving them from the true Islamic to other path"; *frustration*, coming from the failed remedies imported from the West; *a new confidence and sense of power* that was formed during the resurgence of Muslim solidarity—the oil crisis of 1973 when Egypt's war against Israel was supported by the oil-

producing Arab countries as an effective bargaining weapon; and *contempt* resulting from increased awareness conceived through the wealth, pride, and self-assurance established in the crisis, which all at once fired up old vocabulary, describing the West as moral degeneracy (21-2). From the outset the author offers local history of sorts with historical trajectory of Islam, and in delving further, he looks into this matter of contempt focusing on Egyptian Sayyid Qutb, ideologue of Islamic fundamentalism and an active member of the Muslim Brothers. Qutb's classically formulated themes developed in the 1950s were centred on the American support for "a Jewish onslaught on Islam, with Christian complicity;" on the American way of life "principally its sinfulness and degeneracy and its addiction to what he saw as sexual promiscuity;" and on Eastern spirituality and Western materialism "describing America as a particularly extreme form of the latter" (78-9). In showing these themes becoming part of the vocabulary of fundamentalism, the focus is turned towards the actions of the leaders in the Islamic Revolution, as the U.S. turned out to be the successor of the British Empire becoming the principle enemy and the main target for Muslim fury and contempt (81-4). Familiar to the reader is this principle enemy (enemy of God), presented through Muhammad's struggle between good and evil, seen in the two phases of his life; the first phase portrays him as an opponent of the reign of a pagan oligarchy, while the second is indicative of him as the head of state—one is suggestive of disobedience to the Pharaoh, (the Pharaoh of the Exodus, unjust and tyrannical ruler appearing in the Qur'an), while the other exudes obey God's representative, inspiring two traditions in Islam; authoritarian/quietist, and radical/activist (11-2), becoming a conceptual framework in Lewis' exploration of post-WWII Middle East.

This above-outlined information is provided as the background for reading further into the Islamic Revolution of Iran; in this, there is also other information conveyed, with intension to promote that the influence of the West in the region is fact, but although the West ceased to practice some policies which had received strong protest from the local people, only temporary alleviation occurred in the region as a result. Taking its pedigree from "The Roots of Muslim Rage" Lewis continues to write in the book

The British left Egypt, the French left Algeria, both left their other possessions, the monarchies were overthrown in Iraq and in Egypt, the westernizing Shah left Iran, Western oil companies relinquished control of the oil wells that they had discovered and developed and content themselves with best

arrangements they could make with the governments of these countries—yet the general resentment of the fundamentalist and other extremist against the West remains and grows and is not appeased (72-3).

Indeed to the author something deeper is involved in this process; hatred evolved with contempt in “a dangerous combination,” and in exhibiting this specific grievance as it turns every dispute into a problem and makes every problem insoluble, he writes, “What we confront now is not just a complaint about one or another American policy but rather a rejection and condemnation, at once angry and contemptuous, of all that America is seen to represent in the modern world” (*Crisis*, 76). As stated by C. M. Naim, “one can’t help but feel sympathy for Lewis’s bafflement. The active West pursues policies and actions upon a passive East; then, when it realizes that its efforts are not being appreciated, the West, being also singularly wise and just, abandons those policies and resolves all problems” (118), written in “The Outrage of Bernard Lewis.” Lewis charms readers with the idea of nicety in the implementations and removals of Western policies, which allows him to place Islam as a predestined archenemy with the West, personified as the U.S., because the universal Muslim outlook has been involved into the issue, adopted in the modern age through the efforts of the ideologue, Qutb.

In order to place this polarization of two civilizations into perspective, the author cannot resist mentioning the 1953 Iranian coup d’état, designed to usurp the power of Prime Minister Mosaddeq in reaction to his attempt on oil nationalization, which was set in motion by the U.S. as an ally of Britain because of increasing fear of Soviet competition for control of Mosaddeq’s government, conducted in an agreement with the Shah, and resulting in the placement of him on the throne, who was then denounced almost universally by Iranians as a puppet of the British and the U.S. (*Crisis*, 73-4). The irony behind this event is presented by Cole that in 2006, over five decades after the 1953 Iranian coup, the U.S. Congress funded around \$ 66.1 million to the Bush administration, as they were asked to appropriate \$75 million for the administration’s democracy-promoting programs in Iran; “that is, the U.S. government opined that its dearest wish for Iran was the establishment of a parliamentary democracy, just like the one the Eisenhower administration had overthrown” (*Engaging*, 214). In Lewis’s discourse the 1953 Iranian coup serves to explain the bitterness that has never ceased to be, exemplified through the revolution. The two events produced two lessons as well as two feelings amidst in the region: America might involve itself into the installation of a puppet ruler in countries of interest—

evoking hatred; yet they were not dependable patrons, simply abandoning their puppet when the social climate might seem to grave, as in the case of the Shah—evoking contempt (*Crisis*, 76).

With flaws and gaps in contextual continuity glaringly apparent in Lewis' writing, placing emphasis on the missing issues in historical context allows us to better analyse his discourse, ultimately fostering a more balanced perspective while increasing awareness of the Western perspective. Lewis neglects to elaborate adequately on the attempt to nationalize Iranian oil by Mosaddeq, which was an effort aimed at retaining a portion of the robust profits which had been received in staggering disparity by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) resulting from unequal terms of concession signed upon by Reza Shah in 1933. Through discontent in the Iranian government its revision was negotiated in the late 1940s, and in the early 1950s, upon being elected, Mosaddeq attempted to rupture ties with the overwhelming foreign interest in the country. His wide ranged reform plans and programs were to be implemented within state and society which not only generated a power struggle with the Shah, but also suffered due to the worldwide oil boycott led by the AIOC and subsequently by the U.S. Another flaw or critical oversight in Lewis' writing also eradicates the history from the discussion in terms of the transformation of Iran from a constitutional to an authoritarian monarchy. This leaves his readers clueless as the 1953 Iranian coup overthrown the democratically elected prime minister of Iran by parliament, Mosaddeq, whose nationalization attempt on oil was assumed to be heading towards socialism. Iran, in fact, turned out to be an absolute monarchy under the Shah in the wake of these events, and "soon thereafter [he] gave a consortium of European and US oil companies access Iran's oil on advantageous terms" (Lockman, 121). "The United States put the shah back on the throne in 1953, helped train his secret police, and enabled one of the more repressive capitalist dictatorships in modern history" (*Engaging*, 214). More Ironically, Lewis ignores to address the other side of the coin in his examination of the two lessons and two feelings being evoked in the region in parallel with the coup and the revolution. As articulated by Khalidi, the 1953 coup publicized to the Middle East what the main criteria was for receiving American support: "receptiveness to Western economic demands" and "rigid, kneejerk anticommunism," which was a message quickly understood by regional economic elites who learned to tell Americans what they desired to hear. "American approval was what these elites themselves generally wanted in any case," as they wanted not only a share of the profits from the free market, but also American support in order to properly oppress their domestic rivals. "These

rivals could easily be painted as communist or communist sympathizers to a receptive audience in Washington in situations where an insufficiently threatening number of genuine communist existed, guaranteeing the supportive Western response that local elites desired” (*Sowing*, 174-5).

In undermining other aspects of the rhetoric of the Islamic Revolution, besides contempt, *social justice* took its place in mobilizing the masses; Lewis prevents his readers to gain insight on this side of Iran, left open to foreign activity being more dependent on external sources; the foreign aid and oil revenue. Roger Owen explains that the decrease of revenues created an economic crisis and popular discontent in Iran between 1960 and 1963, during when additional loans from the U.S. and IMF were provided with the Shah’s promise of economic programs, marking wide-ranged economic cutbacks. “Pressure from Washington for more comprehensive reforms followed, as part of the new Kennedy administration’s general campaign to persuade America’s authoritarian allies to pre-empt popular opposition by social reform.” Following the proclamation of the White Revolution by the Shah, in which land distribution was most essential, demonstrations broke out, which united an array of urban groups, secularist, nationalist, and clerical (headed by Khomeini) alike, protesting against American interference and the Shah’s tyranny, but in the end the social unrest was crushed heavily by the military. Increased foreign support and oil revenue as well as the program of land reform allowed the Shah to consolidate his power further; “this was, as before, on a continuous expansion of the army, the bureaucracy and the security services, with the number of civil servants doubling between 1963 and 1977” (Owen, 81). While the land reform left peasants with what is called, “dashed hopes,” industrial enterprise invested in heavily by the state and the regime’s support of foreign investment lessened the “traditional bazaar economy” and shattered the “handicraft industry” (Cleveland, 297). Viewing this milieu, from which the Iranians were to enter into the revolution, proves to be telling of the rebellion against the Shah, whom they regarded with avarice, along with America who was meddling in their domestic affairs, standing at odds with Lewis’ Iran, presenting the nation in the axis of the Ayatollah Khomeini, who skilfully projected the context of Western imperialism; “Then, as in the past, this world of unbelievers was seen as the only serious force rivaling and preventing the divinely ordained spread and triumph of Islam” (*Crisis*, 84).

Lewis’ oversimplification, not only in history but also in presenting Iran’s longstanding cravings for independence, results in a lack of essential details. Most likely fueling the fire of his perception and explanation of spontaneous “anger” that had united great masses of people in

1979, diverse in their aspirations, but whose unification made this genuine revolution possible. While lacking acknowledgment of the concept of the call for social justice, which yet played a significant role, used as a crucial weapon by Shi'a clerics, a reader can easily be led to understand that religion is the only stimulating issue, forcing Iranians to rebel for what they saw as an insult against their faith under the leadership of Khomeini, for whom “‘Islam is politics or it is nothing’” (*Crises*, 8). Exclusive of shedding light on the issue of independence that Iranians had pursued long since the advent of capricious imperial interventions, wherein domestic affairs in sorts were decreed upon by external powers to be carried out by internal representatives, which in fact, through proper evaluation, appears as a significant hindrance to social welfare and modernization—what Lewis deems himself to be the most crucial need of Middle East, the discourse provides everything in black and white, leading to grave misconception.

This black and white understanding is what Lewis endeavors to achieve, while keeping the reader from perceiving a clear depiction of the history of modern Iran, driving his objective home in telling readers what fundamentalists blame for the sickness of their society—excessive modernization rather than inadequate modernization, offering the alternative, a return to authentic Islam as a remedy (*Crisis*, 132-4). This completely disregards difference of perception, a definite reality; as one with empathetic skills would easily surmise, given all the aforementioned material, that the perception of the word “modernity” would be vastly different in these interacting societies, with the general trend of positive connotations being attached within the Western perspective while, due to their experience, Iran would attach only negativity to this idea, a label under which all misdeeds done upon them in recent memory would fall under. “As might have been expected, the undermining of a shaky but potentially viable liberal, democratic system, [the U.S. and Britain] two states that were great apostles of liberal and democratic values, naturally produced and authoritarian and illiberal reaction in Iran” (*Sowing*, 173-4). In viewing Lewis’ Iran, and in further reading into the success of American foreign policy on the Middle East, as it neither became a Vietnam nor Cuba, and implemented without military presence until the Gulf War of 1991, despite that it sometimes did not produce results positively “by embracing the Shah, the United States produces his overthrow; by fostering Saddam Hussein, it nurtured a monster” (*Crises*, 101), readers are left with a working, seemingly balanced account of the historical representation of Iran and the Middle East.

1.3.5.3. Arab World within the Sphere of the Islamic Revolution of Iran

Under the parameters of the Iranian Revolution reducing the issue to Khomeini's actions and then reducing his actions to the trajectory of Islamic history in *Crises of Islam* Lewis proposes his argument on the Middle Eastern perception of America's new role as illustrated in 1979. This was the time in which the Hostage Crises took place in Iran, religious radicals seized the Great Mosque in Mecca, and rebellions occurred in Islamabad. While Khomeini was denouncing Israel as "Little Satan" and deemed Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Saddam Hussein of Iraq as servants and agents of the U.S., "Sadat served America by making peace with Israel; Saddam Hussein did America's work by making war on Iran," his slogan "death to America" was brandished and then shouted in the anti-American demonstrations with feverish vigor (86). In inquiring as to why this hatred was being intensified in the Middle East, or rather to say, was Western imperialism really as negative and as crucial of a contributor as fundamentalists asserted in their support of the tyrants as well as Israel, the author covers specific certainties in the region's history, which turns out to be politically significant, exemplified in two cases.

In the first case, the discussion focuses on proving that the context of Western imperialism is not sufficient enough to be given as the sole, or even most significant reason for the region's current woes and climate, and thus examples are drawn on to illustrate the inconsistency of Arab resentment against imperialism. Lewis writes, neither the ineffectual protectorate role of Russia in the course of the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973, nor Soviet conquest in Central Asia and the Caucasus received similar backlash or anger from the Arab community, and even the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was contributed to with Saudi money, Egyptian weapons, and Arab volunteers, leaving U.S. to organize an Islamic counterattack against Soviet imperialism in Afghanistan (*Crises*, 87-92). It is hard to swallow due to many omissions in the representation of these historical facts, paying a specific attention to the one, the author undermines the U.S. designed *Islamic Green Belt* project, theorized in the 1950s and implemented in the 1980s, a time frame coincident with what Lewis calls, Islamic attack that the U.S. had organized against Soviet imperialism. The implementation of the *Green Belt* was to bring a halt to Communist expansion in the Middle East which resulted in the flourishing of political Islam in its diverse forms, notably but not exclusively militancy, a mistake, as it was a designed not based on a supporting of democracy as a countermeasure to

Communism, but based on the reinforcement of the Islamic paradigm within the Muslim countries surrounding Soviet Russia. Lewis, in discussing the inconsistency of Arab resentment against imperialism, disregards what would have been perfect to address, as there are many inconsistencies in the policy, enacted by the West, in the Middle East and around the globe.

The second case centers its discussion on the Israeli-U.S. alliance, and again the issue is elaborated through the inconsistency of Arab attitude, suggestive of how easily they are misled. Lewis writes that the Arabs (and Palestinian leadership) supported the Germans, who sent the Jews into Palestine, not the British, who had tried to keep them out, and then repeated the same mistake in supporting the USSR, the one giving immediate recognition to the State of Israel while delivering military supply for its survival. From this point, forgetting that the U.S. was the one, who gave only *de facto* recognition, maintained a partial arms embargo upon Israel, and intervened to force the withdrawal of Israeli, British, and French forces from Egyptian territory in the Suez War of 1956, would seem a necessary compromise in keeping their pride and apparent resoluteness, as the decision was made a long time ago as to who was to be hated versus applauded. Without informing the reader that U.S. support of Egypt during the Suez War was the part of the progression of events—an attempt to prevent Egypt from becoming more closer to the Soviets, which resulted in emergence of the Nasser phenomenon as a by-product, the author further elaborates upon the issue, this time, centered on the arms deal signed between Egypt and the USSR in 1955. This event was seen by the Arabs as vindication, squarely slapping the face of the West, which encouraged the U.S. to look more favorably on Israel promoting a new American-Israeli relationship, that was flourishing heading towards the 1990s, acquiring a new meaning, upon confronting the threats of Saddam Hussein's hegemonic ambition, of al-Qaida's fundamentalist terror, and of deep seated, growing discontent among America's Arab allies (*Crises*, 93-7). In reading into these historical interpretations, the question arises if Lewis is writing a historical analysis or simply retorting in a tit for tat fashion under the garment of examining why the hatred is intensified in the Middle East, absolving the U.S. of their purported responsibility, while degrading Middle Eastern conceptualization of Western imperialism—not necessarily just a response to the fundamentalist but also to anyone who shares in this conceptualization, a group that finds its strength in diversity as much as in its numbers.

These exemplified cases function as structural representation, ideologically designed to sell the reader on the peaceful ideologies the West had attempted to create, and in the process the

U.S.-Israeli alliance came out of consequence in Soviet penetration into the region, as “The Soviets in their heyday [...] tried to create communist dictatorships wherever they went,” and “Democracies are more difficult to create; they are also more difficult to destroyed” (*Crises*, 102). Disarming the reader without context (also seen in the case of Iran), Lewis highlights what went wrong in this part of the globe and what the future would hold, “For Islamist, democracy, expressing the will of people, is the road to power, but it is a one-way road, on which there is no return, no rejection of the sovereignty of God, as exercised through His chosen representatives” indicative of ““One man (men only), one vote, once” (*Crises*, 111-2). Thus, in calling the state of affairs taking place based on region, portrayed as key in defining the confrontation between Islam and the West, the manner of declension serves for Lewis to step into his own favorable representation provided with amply afforded generalization. This misleads readers save informing them, “Within political Islam, some advocate the establishment of an Islamic state [...], while others promotes the notion of an Islamic society or community within a secular state” while “still others, and this is more a phenomenon of late Islamism (1990s), behave politically to achieve the personal freedom to express their religious identity in public as they see fit” (48), articulated by Margot Badran in “Understanding Islam, Islamism, and Islamic Feminism.”

This mentioned quality of generalization can also be seen in the illustrations of Saudi Arabia, the custodian of Holy places, explored within a conceptual framework—the rejection of modernity in favouring the return to a sacred past. First, this rejection is traced within history as it has risen through a sequence of movements rooted in the eighteenth century, when the Saudi rulers of Najd embraced the Wahhabi cause, and upon entrance into the Western world of oil concession, its revenues enabled Wahhabi preachers to spread their faith through the schools established worldwide. Then, the role of oil is addressed as it has brought immense change to the kingdom along with bitter social tension; the universality of media made the inequalities of wealth visible in a society where the old social bonds were being destroyed, all of which has bred new and receptive spectators of Wahhabi teachings, similar to those of like-minded groups—the Muslim Brothers in Egypt and Syria, and the Taliban in Afghanistan. In presenting the complexity of the issue, these illustrations appear insightful as not only representative of “significant elements in the regime itself [which] seem[s] at times to share and foster hostility” (*Crisis*, 119), but also indicative of the Wahhabi cause, spreading their message all over the world, through the graces of oil money, ultimately fueling fundamentalism. Yet in reading into

“The custodianship of the holy places and the revenues of oil have given worldwide impact to what would otherwise have been an extremist fringe in an marginal country” (*Crisis*, 130), in which the extreme fringe is telling of Usama bin Ladin, the discourse begins to emerge as selective, firing up anxiety in response to Wahhabi puritanism, its power backed by oil and its influence in the Islamic and Western world. This reminds us of what Cole states “explaining everything with reference to a single religious tradition [...] reduces Saudi Arabia to a caricature” while “It is not the only Wahhabi society, and only a minority of Muslim terrorists have come from that branch of Islam” (*Engaging*, 83). In further undermining the issue that the West actively promoted Wahhabism as a crucial insurgency against Nasser’s Arab nationalism [“Ironically, the United States is responsible for significant past efforts to make Wahhabi Saudi Arabia the spiritual leader of the Muslim world” (*Engaging*, 87)], it is absolved of any responsibility in defining the causality, as Lewis reinforces his framework while providing an allegorical example of Saudi Wahhabism as a microcosm, representative of the Middle East.

Manifestation of Islamic fundamentalism is further evaluated while addressing its prescribers, who have attributed both poverty and tyranny through Arab media and with a particular interest, that is to divert the attention from themselves to the U.S. in blaming “the first to American economic dominance and exploitation, now thinly disguised as ‘globalization’”—“the second to America’s support for many so-called Muslim tyrants who serve its purposes” (*Crises*, 113). In order to counter this attribution, Lewis exemplifies some statistical studies conducted by the UN and the World Bank, comparing the figures on the performance of Muslim countries that reflect high illiteracy, as well as their numbers in job creation, education, technology, productivity, and modernization in politics—as evidence of their positions remaining behind not only the West but also the rapidly developing economies of the Far East. The author says, “Thanks to modern media” (*Crises*, 117), the wide gap between them and the free world is now clearly noticed by “the people of the Middle East” (*Crises*, 119); however, the exemplified statistical research is indicative of where to direct the blame and resulting hostility.

While mentioning globalization, and in addressing modern communication technologies, Lewis himself wholly ignores to bring a comparative study into account, figuring in the external debts and its implication to politics creating dependency, linked between political reforms and foreign aids. More crucially, while writing in the global age where interaction and exchange occurs, and people share and taste together, the presence of communication technology also

makes them aware of being presented as a Muslim fundamentalist, which through proxy can be deemed a threat to world peace. The author deliberately omits this fine line while he himself contributes to this Western stereotyping, as he exemplifies the aforementioned result of anger the people of the Middle East directed against the U.S. with “It is surely significant that all the terrorists who have been intensified in the September 11 attacks [...] came from Saudi Arabia and Egypt—that is, countries whose rulers are deemed friendly to the United States” (*Crisis*, 119). While characterizing the anger of populace with 9/11, he logically works to place the Muslim stereotype into a mode of reality, postulating to all a status of terrorist.

In speaking about the popular sentiments, the issue is once again elaborated upon with Middle Eastern people as focus, yet the examples drawn consist of the murder of Westernized President Sadat, which occurred when Sadat was making peace with Israel and whose instigator spelled out “I have killed [the] Pharaoh,” as well as Usama bin Ladin “[who] spoke of President Bush as the Pharaoh of our day” (*Crisis*, 135). As articulated by Michael Hirsh, it is right to explain the “bin Laden phenomenon as a reaction against corrupt tyrannies like Egypt’s and Saudi Arabia’s, and ultimately against American support for those regimes” but it is wrong to conclude that “it was a mainstream phenomenon welling up from the anti-modern character of Islam, or that the only immediate solution lay in Western-style democracy,” extracted from his Washington Monthly article “Bernard Lewis Revisited.” Hirsh adds, “it was, instead, a reaction that came out of an Islam misshapen by modern political developments,” but it needs to be stated that “many of [these developments] emanating from Western influences, outright invasion by British, French, and Italian colonialists, and finally the U.S.-Soviet clash that helped create the mujahadeen jihad in Afghanistan” (16). The issue of anger in the general population turning towards terrorism is highlighted in a discourse written to inhibit one from seeing the actual progression of the events taking shape in the second half of the twentieth century, which is Lewis’ objective, achieved through all the classic devices of argument, not examination, in presenting the Arab world within the sphere of Islamic Revolution of Iran.

1.3.5.4. The Jihad being enacted against the Infidel, Crusader, and the Imperialist West

In both *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East* and *Crises of Islam*, Lewis links any

Islamic cause occurring in post-WWII Middle East to Muslim conceptualization of the Crusade and the disappearance of the Caliphate institution, and in turn these ideas are linked to their conceptualization of Western imperialism. In this, while exploring the ideology of *jihad*, with the first of its kind being waged by Prophet Muhammad over Mecca, and as it has been evolving into Islamic fundamentalism and further to terrorism, the discourse is critical of Muslims as a general population leaving Islam to come into sight as a base prescribing its followers to a never-ending antagonism clashing with the West. It is from this perspective that the author ventures to address the *war on terror*.

“The Crusades figure very predominantly in modern Middle Eastern consciousness and discourse, both of the Arab nationalists and of Islamic fundamentalist, notably Usama bin Ladin [...]” (*Crisis*, 45), corresponding to “Muslims denounce Christians for the aggressive fanaticism of the Crusades, forgetting that the Crusade itself was a long-delayed and limited response to the *jihad* [...]” Though the author seems to present an equal comparison by surmising, “Christian [too] accuse Muslim of bigotry, and forget that for many centuries Muslim lands provided of refugee for victims of Christian persecution [...]” (*Multiple*, 117), the discourse still creates an image of the brutality of *jihad* in a distorted comparative mode, standing at odds with “Even though Christians were fighting their own holy wars in the Middle East at [that] time,” violence and intolerance became motives “that [have] dogged Islam in the Christian West ever since the Middle Ages” (Armstrong, 164). This image of brutality is enhanced within further comparisons that unlike the Crusade, which has lost its religious connotations [i.e., “One may wage a crusade for the environment, for clean water, for better social services, for women’s rights, and for a whole range of other causes” (*Crises*, 38)], *jihad* still retains its original meaning, supported by the holy book, the tradition of the Prophet, the *Shari’a*, and the Islamic tradition. It is that tradition dividing the world into *The House of Islam*—“in which a Muslim government rules and the Holy Law of Islam prevails,” and *The House of War*—“the outside world, which has not yet been subjugated (*Multiple*, 121-2); and in this the *jihad* is described as both offensive and defensive—the latter, a principle invoked by bin Ladin through his declaration of war against the U.S. “For most of the fourteenth centuries of recorded Muslim history, jihad was most commonly interpreted to mean armed struggle for the defense or advancement of Muslim power” (*Crisis*, 31), reducing Islam to the religion of the sword and the struggle with aggressiveness being an unavoidable propensity.

While taking the term *jihad* into account through the trajectory of Islamic history and largely undermining its commonly used meaning despite mentioning it; a moral striving or struggle, Lewis indicates that the Qur'an supports *jihad* in the context of religious war, leaving no room for open interpretation, like in the case of bin Ladin. There existed and still exists diverse interpretations of the term appearing in the Qur'an, and as any of its verses could be misinterpreted or manipulated to suit one's goals, like all religions of power throughout history; however, the author implores the reader not to see any other possibilities in translation. One alternative is articulated by Armstrong, "but it was and remains a duty for Muslims to commit themselves to a struggle on all fronts—moral, spiritual and political—to create a just and decent society, where the poor and vulnerable are not exploited, in the way that God had intended man to live." Similarly, in portraying the term with the wars in Muhammad's life time, Lewis does not mention the peace time of Muhammad, which was remarked on by him as "'we return from the little *jihad* to the greater *jihad*'" and can also be described as "the more difficult and crucial effort to conquer the forces of evil in oneself and in one's own society in all the details of daily life" (Armstrong, 168). Also, there is no real perception afforded on the lay people of the Muslim societies and while articulating Muslim conceptualization of the Crusade, Lewis makes *jihad* a leading characterization of Muslim life since the day the Prophet established the state, presenting bin Ladin as carrying out a tradition making the Muslim's image out to be one of danger and resolution; forcing one to perceive the interaction between Islam and the West as one of rage and hatred, spelling warfare and terror.

A similar method of writing is evident in his articulations concerning the disappearance of the caliphate as "under the double assault of foreign imperialists and domestic modernist" Lewis writes; "Muslims are still painfully conscious of this void, and it is said that Usama bin Ladin himself had—or has—aspirations to the caliphate" (*Crisis*, xviii). In the absence of any reference point to endorse this claim, as there has been by now neither a leader who has ascribed himself the title of the caliph, nor any collective action amongst people to find a "solution" for this "void," the author lumps the entirety of Islam into one group implying as to where this rage is anchored, and in repetitively referencing bin Ladin he presents him as leader or figurehead of this umbrella civilization. This attempt of ascribing to all—democrat, nationalist, Islamist, fundamentalist, and terrorist—a status of irrationality and a threatening demeanor works perfectly in tandem with other repetitively used narrative devices, becoming the established

terminology, such as “the long struggle of *jihad* and Crusade,” “conquest and re-conquest,” “three major Muslim attacks on Europe,” “Christendom on the defensive,” “Christian counterattack expanded” and “defeat followed defeat” (*Multiple*, 115; *Crises*, 51-52). Dividing the globe between the civilizations to exhibit dueling adversaries, Lewis writes the history all in “the crusading mode;” an expression of Alam’s, who explains that “[it] purports to resume the Crusades-interrupted in the thirteenth century-and carry them to their unfinished conclusion, the triumph of the West or, conversely, the humiliation and defeat of Middle Eastern Islam.” This sort of treatment of history is more visible in *Crises of Islam* than in *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East*, which is naturally a result of publishing time frames. Published in 1992, the latter book presents Islam as the sole source of danger with the fall of Communism, and concludes its emphasis with “Since then more than a century has passed; the blood still flows, [transformation by modernization] will take time, and meanwhile they are tormented by the interaction of multiple and often conflicted identities” (142), while the former, published in 2003, falls under the paradigm of post September 11th America.

In promoting Usama bin Ladin as a motivational figure to “all” Muslims, while exposing deep-rooted “violence” in Islam through the Al-Qaida, Lewis writes, “Islam, no doubt owing to the political and military involvement of its Founder, takes what one might call a more pragmatic view than the Gospels of the realities of societal and state relationships” (*Crises*, 143). Despite clearly stating that “at no point do the basic text of Islam enjoin terrorism and murder[;] at no point [...] do they even consider the random slaughter of uninvolved bystanders” (*Crises*, 39), each case of selectiveness in the discourse makes out Islam and its followers to be an explicit threat to the world peace and Western piece of mind. This is clarified in revisiting history, specifically that of Spain, leading up to the Second Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683, in which the fall of Crusader Jerusalem in 1187 is a specific emphasis. It is depicted as a source of inspiration for Arab leaders like Saddam Hussein, and in speaking of the awareness of the Crusade dating from the nineteenth century, Lewis remarks “since then, there is new perception of the Crusade as an early prototype of expansion of European imperialism into the Islamic world” (*Crises*, 51). While providing an understanding on the source of the Muslim resentment to the West, the juxtaposition of the idea of Muslim triumph with that of European prevalence works to draw a picture in one’s mind, and in unison with the materials afforded throughout the book, deeper assumptions can be made in imagining what would be if Muslims power had not been impeded

upon. In this attempt at generating *Islamophobia*, the author condenses the centuries of history (of imperialism) into one sentence, “the era of Middle Eastern history that had been inaugurated by Bonaparte and Nelson in 1798 was ended by Mikhail Gorbachev and the elder George Bush” (*Crises*, 61); a forceful narrative imploring the reader to feel comfortable in their conception of progression of events while reading into the topic of the *war for Islam*, declared by bin Ladin against the U.S.

It was when the entry of the PLO into peace talks with Israel provided additional grounds for dissension among fundamentalists, who understood the process as the PLO being rescued by the U.S., while bin Ladin, claiming the collapse of the USSR as their own victory succeeded in their own fight, declared “having deposed of the more ferocious and more dangerous of the two infidels superpowers, their next task was to deal with the other, the United States, and in this war the compromisers were tools and agents of the infidel enemy” (*Crises*, 63). Placing this snapshot in another perspective, it was also when, “The threat of terrorism perpetrated by radical Islamist groups naturally came to loom increasingly large for policy makers and scholars alike [...]” and “Those we might term hard-liners—generally on the political right—tended to argue that terrorism perpetrated by Muslims had strong roots in Islam” (Lockman, 233). The “letter to America,” attributed to bin Ladin, is exemplified by Lewis to provide an understanding of the “purported reason” behind this menace, wherein various offenses are listed and detailed as committed by the American government and by Americans, ranging from its support of Israel to its presence in Middle Eastern territories such as Saudi Arabia and Iraq, and from its liberation of women to its practice of free elections, representative of contempt (*Crises*, 157-9). In suggesting to the reader that the “basic reason” is far from just what the U.S. has done, but is much more related to what it personifies, the author writes that in the eyes of fundamentalist’s, the American president is perceived as the latest successor in a long line of rulers, from Byzantine Emperors to Queen Victoria and further, and the West, “the Lands of Unbelievers” (*The House of War*) resisting and delaying the divinely ordained sprawl, “but not preventing [Islam’s] final inevitable, universal triumph” (*Crisis*, 160). Although this is provided, there is no effort afforded in the discourse to address the cause and effect stimuli associated with the Afghan resistance pursued by volunteer Arabs who had been armed and financed by the U.S., though “Ironically, US support for the resistance to the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan that began in 1979 helped create this new and much more serious menace” (Lockman, 232). As a hard-liner,

Lewis offers an outlook on this menace to be perceived within the context of the “clash of civilizations” as *jihad* being enacted, becoming Islamic terrorism in the course of the struggle for world domination, electing not to mention Western involvement in a retro-temporal sense.

The reader is assured that in this new era, marked with the collapse of the USSR, leaving the U.S. to be the sole superpower, “America did not, and showed that they had neither the desire nor the aptitude for an imperial role” (*Crises*, 61). Thus, the declared war of bin Ladin is the inauguration of “[an] ominous phase in the history of both Islam and terrorism” (*Crises*, 160); it is not against imperialism but against the infidel, marking the “resumption of the struggle for religious dominance of the world that began in the seventh century” (*Crisis*, 162). Under these forethoughts bin Ladin’s campaign is portrayed; retaining many of the old tactics but in a more aggressive form, adopting the PLO’s hijacking methods while engaging in what Islam bans, martyrdom murder or suicide-bombing, as it is often referred to, pioneered by Hamas and Hizbullah and employed by Al-Qaida in its attacks on September 11 (*Crisis*, 147-154). Undoubtedly brutal and still vivid in memory for many this “catalyzing event,” as it would be defined by members of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), could be effortlessly used for political gain, more specifically to be used as grounds for action, selling the public on ideas that would not be as easily received if not for the shocked, fearful, and vindictive attitudes resulting from this atrocity, thus the public was convinced of the sudden need to implement new policies, taking on a newfound conception of a culture in the process. In this hijacking of a national tragedy to advance political agendas Lewis has his own role within the complex interplay of policymakers, media, and academia, and in his dedication of *Crises of Islam* to “Harold Rhode in friendship” a testimony to his own intellectual influence on the administration is presented, leaving his discourse to be plainly seen as an effort to endow his readers with the mind-set of the new U.S. foreign policy, one of sustained dominance.

Reading into the response of the Muslim world regarding the 9/11 attacks, by design in the discourse and showing exultation as a popular reaction to this tragedy as it appeared in Western media, “Muslims rejoicing in the streets in Arab and other Muslim cities at the news from New York,” and in Arab media, “Neither Muslims nor Arabs could have done this” (*Crisis*, 155), while regarded to in Hamas weekly as, “Allah has answered our prayers” (*Crisis*, 157), there is no alternative outlook to be taken, but instead, just further affirmation of the “Islamic threat.” As Said says, the media is not only composed of profit seeking corporations but also

quite understandably has interest in promoting certain images as reality rather than others and “they do so within a political context made active and effective by an unconscious ideology, which the media disseminate without serious reservations or opposition” (*Covering*, 49), leaving no room for negative and sympathetic responses within the Muslim populace to be represented either in the media or Bernard Lewis’ treatments. Lewis instead argues against Muslim complaints on the media’s classification of terrorist actions as “Islamic,” and responds, “[this] complaint is understandable, but it should be addressed to those who make the news [in the name of Islam], not to those who report it.” This attempt of normalizing the idea of “Islamic” being adjunct to terrorism is supported with cliché rhetoric, “most Muslims are not fundamentalist, and most fundamentalist are not terrorist, but most present-day-terrorists are Muslims and proudly identify themselves as such,” instructing the reader how to identify the aforementioned Islamic threat—not with those engaging in terrorism as a minority of Muslim population, but with “being Muslim” pictured as quite uniform against the presented background of Middle Eastern history.

Ultimately fulfilling Lewis’ aim is this statement, “Usama bin Ladin and his Al-Qa‘ida followers may not represent Islam, and many of their statements and their actions directly contradict basic Islamic principles and teachings, but they do arise from within Islamic civilization [...]” (*Crises*, 137). Proposing bin Ladin as symptomatic of a derelict civilization oversimplifies a complicated matter while overshadowing the idea attested to in “Islam is one of the world’s great religions; it has given dignity and meaning to drab and impoverished lives [an] it has taught men of different races to live in brotherhood and people of different creeds to live side by side in reasonable tolerance.” Rather, it works in tandem with “It is our misfortune that we have to confront part of the Muslim world while it is going through [a period of inspired hatred and violence], and when most—though by no means all—of that hatred is directed against us” (*Crisis*, 25). Under the shocking impact of 9/11, readily intelligible to American readers is “this period,” depicted by an academic authority and intellectual figurehead as he advocates “If the fundamentalists are correct in their calculations and succeed in their war, then a dark future awaits the world, especially the part of it that embraces Islam” (*Crises*, 164). In all of this Lewis writes to justify *the war on terror* declared by the U.S., which serves up legitimization for him and his readers regarding the U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan, and then Iraq.

The author desires his readers to see the larger picture—“Khomeini’s designation of the United States an ‘the Great Satan’ was telling, and for the members of Al-Qaida it is the

seduction of America and of its profligate, dissolute way of life that represents the greatest threat to the kind of Islam they wish to impose on their fellow Muslims.” This call upon Khomeini, reminding us of the American loss of a westernized Shah and ensuing events, beckons towards seeing the region and its peoples entering into yet another mode of hostility and brutality, solidified through 9/11. These are what Richard W. Bulliet calls, dramatic events, “[giving] us a twenty-year head start on worrying about Muslims conspiring to carry out violent political acts professedly based on religious principles” (7), written in *The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization*. Lewis’ insistence on maintaining himself as still “worrying” works well in selling the two declared objectives behind military intervention in Afghanistan and in Iraq: “the first and more immediate, to deter and defeat terrorism; the second to bring freedom, to the people of these countries and beyond” (*Crises*, 165). After all, in writing about the “Islamic civilization,” with each one of its highlighted characterizations, pointing out Islam’s incompatible nature with democracy, he all but directly contradicts the underlined objective of seeding democracy in the Middle East, to which an earnest reader might ask, why does the U.S. even bother in the face of these irreconcilable differences? While remedying this inconsistency, the author works to provide an answer: “But there are others for whom America offers a different kind of temptation—the promise of human rights, of free institutions, and of a responsible and representative government,” standing at odds with his proclamations on the “rigidity of Muslim mind.” Following one self-imposed paradox with another, Lewis continues to mention the growing number of individuals and movements undertaking the task of introducing democratic institutions in their own countries, bringing about a more somber question as if this was the case, what warranted U.S. involvement in what was to be a costly foreign adventure. He, of course, provides an answer, “It is not easy; similar attempts, as notes, led to many of today’s corrupt regimes” (*Crises*, 163), meaning that the U.S. had little to no hope that self-imposed democratization in the region would be achieved by the aforementioned people and groupings, appearing in retrospect as a unfounded but working argument for the invasion of Iraq.

1.3.5.5. Turkish Democracy and Iranian Theocracy—Two Models for an Arab Future

In its very nature of the contextual framework, Turkey and Iran, the region’s two major

powers, are not a direct emphasis in *The Arabs in History*, yet they are in the other books. For example, “Their teachings and programs, Kemalism and Khomeinism, are seen by many as the two main alternative futures for the region” (134) is employed in *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East*. This is imparted within the conceptual framework of *Crises of Islam* too, in revealing the region, through which Turkey and Iran are depicted as the two prime alternatives that would be modelled after in the Arab world; the former with its secularism-oriented developments has had a tendency of success, catching up to a Western identity due to the conscious choice made under Kemal Atatürk’s leadership. This representation of Turkish democracy is politically significant and is essential in conceptualizing the whole idea of Lewis’ “Arab democracy.”

Exemplification of Turkey as the only democratic member state of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, out of fifty-seven members, implies that neither this country’s democratic institutions that have operated factually despite many setbacks and hard-fought struggles, nor its progress in establishing a liberal economy as well as a free society and political order is attractive to Arab states (*Multiple*, 134/*Crisis*, 163). Thus, Iran remains as the only alternative with its post-revolutionary aspiration, presented as a well-built source of “terror.” The handicap within this issue of being a role model is further elaborated upon in *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East*, while exposing Turkey as “a reluctant candidate for any Middle Eastern role” (134), to which Lewis writes, “yet the Turkish model is not without impact; twice before the Turks have offered leadership to the region—under the Ottoman sultans in Islamic *jihad*, under Kemal Atatürk in national self-liberation; they may do so again” (137). This commentary narration hints towards the idea of a need to give Turkey a wakeup call, stimulating it to fulfill the duty, which might otherwise disaffect, or even fall into the fundamentalist progressions within the region. It also reflects Lewis’ own diagnosis of the ills on the region and his perception of a cure, which is best described through “Lewis’s Kemalist vision of a secularized, Westernized Arab democracy that casts off the medieval shackles of Islam and enters modernity at last,” written to the question, “What if Islam isn’t an obstacle to democracy in the Middle East, but the secret to achieving it?” (Hirsh, 13).

With his Kemalist vision of democracy, which for all intents and purposes means Western, Lewis suggests to the reader to take another look at *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East*, projecting, “Of far greater relevance to the experience, needs, and possibilities of the region is the example of Turkish democracy,” further explained through

Today once again, as in the past, the two countries embody ideological choices—this time not between Sunni and Shi‘a Islam, but between secular democracy and Islamic theocracy. Both are republican in form, both installed by charismatic leaders who overthrew the previous regimes. Kemal Atatürk established a secular democracy in place of the sultan; the Ayatollah Khomeini founded an Islamic theocracy in place of Shah” (133).

What makes for absurdity in this, especially in speaking of “experience,” “needs,” and “possibilities,” is that Lewis highlights Iran’s political history in its revolution, largely isolating it from the country’s roots, while making a contrast with Atatürk’s Turkey established in the early 1920s, allowing his writing to travel back and forth through time to prove his point. All is provided alongside another comparative mode of narration, telling that like Turkey, Iran never entirely lost its independence throughout the period of European domination; the founder of modern Iran fought to retain its place in the 1920s; and the country resumed its inescapable regional role again following the end of foreign domination. As relatively outlined subjects serve to mislead the reader, the writing begins to create a selectively constructed panoramic view of history, offering only fallacy as conceptualization within certain historical accuracies, as despite great similarities that they shared Iranian history took a different course in comparison to Turkey. This can be represented with what Lewis calls foreign imperial domination while claiming that it had ended in both countries, an unfounded assertion dissected below.

No specific argument is made in viewing the Constitutional Revolution of Iran brought upon the absolute monarch of the Qajar Dynasty between 1905 and 1911, when, both the British and the Russia supported the monarch while partitioning the country into two zones. Despite this external support, as articulated by Cole, Iranian were burgeoning to set up a constitution and gain their right to elect a parliament in 1906; yet, “in the wake of the revolution, [they] were dismayed to discover that parliamentarians could be bribed and pressured by the Russians and British just as easily as the shah had been when he was absolute monarch” (*Engaging*, 212). As the British and the Soviet were competing for Iran; the latter encouraged peasant guerrilla revolts in the north of the country, while the former, enthusiastic about Iranian petroleum, promoted Reza Shah all the way to the throne, who not only defeated the pro-Soviet Iranian leftists, but also deposed the last Qajar dynast, establishing the Pahlavi dynasty in 1925, and transforming the parliament into a “debating society that never dared defy him” (*Engaging*, 213). Likewise the

abdication of Reza Shah suspected of being an Axis sympathizer is not mentioned by Lewis, which occurred in the course of WWII, subsequently his son Mohammad Reza was put on the throne by Britain, the U.S., and the USSR while occupying Iran together. The country's political history was taking shape within the absolutely undeniable foreign constraints that became an overburdening issue and a recurring theme uniting many Iranians while subjecting the Shah to their criticism into the early 1950s. "Had it not been for Anglo-US intervention in 1953, the Shah might have lost his throne, and the course of postwar Iranian history would have taken a different direction" (Cleveland, 288).

The selectiveness in the contextual outline leaves us to question how Lewis' comparative mode of writing in terms of Iran and Turkey appears in *Crisis of Islam* while stimulating the reader to see their history as parallel. In portraying the course of WWII and its aftermath, he describes the joint British and Russian occupation of Iran as wartime necessity, while leaving out the issue of neutrality, which was declared by Iran and Turkey alike, but unlike Turkey, Iran's was not recognized by the foreign powers. Furthermore, the milieu of the entry of Turkey and Iran into the Western alliance system is addressed, while the impact of the U.S. containment policy upon the domestic and foreign policy arrangements of Iran, which took a different course comparatively to that in Turkey, is left untouched (88-9).

In seeing all excluded proceedings, it comes into view that the perceived resemblances and contrasts between Turkey and Iran are not based on solid historical representations but rather particulars. Indeed both countries entered into the modern era through their revolutionary movements in the 1920s; yet Atatürk's Turkey was established based on a principle of political and economic independency. Atatürk was written by Lenin offering him to establish socialism as an economic policy for the new republic; yet, he gathered the Izmir Economic Congress, held several months before the actual birth of the republic in 1923, where Turkey developed neither capitalist nor socialist but a mixed economic model with the mission of full independence: limited state intervention in economic activity and a liberal economy based upon the activities of Turkish entrepreneurs, in which foreign capital and investment would be welcomed unless it would be a threat. This economic model was replaced by a state controlled economic plan, thus a policy of *statism (etatism)* was integrated into the economy during the course of the world's great depression of the late 1920s, and this was kept intact until Soviet pressure on the Turkish Straits and its eastern frontier territories was accelerated in early post-WWII. It was at that time

Turkey's self-established isolation from any sort of severe western alliance scheme was finalized, and as it would be seen, such isolation was to be one of the most significant differences in comparing Turkey with Reza Shah's Iran.

While Reza Shah was personally dominating the parliament, concerning himself with securing his and his son's place on the throne, Turkey had twice attempted to establish a multi-party system by 1950, and it was in this year the actual transformation towards the multiparty democracy and electoral reform was cemented. This was, in part, the mixed result of pressure stemming from political opposition groups and necessity, which could not be rejected, being required by the social, political, and economic ambience of Turkey's post-war years. Yet, there were some other factors that kept Turkey enticed with political liberalization setting the stage for a free election, as noted by Andrew Mango in *The Turks Today*; Turkey had appealed to NATO and foreign money from supporters of democracy continued to pour into the country while America was disapproving of the bureaucratic constraints on the Turkish economy which all combined to prove that Turkey could not ignore "foreign advice" (45). As it would be inferred, Turkey acquired a different role within the Western alignment scheme, and in the meantime anti-American rhetoric and attitudes took a different course in this country, compared to Iran, from where the oil was a fortifying force in world markets, and "Eventually, within the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79, the inevitable happened, producing an incandescent eruption of anger at the United States that has continued for many years, that had helped to produce the grim, theocratic regime in power today in Tehran" (Khalidi, *Sowing*, 173). What Lewis outlines, the ideological choice between the path of Turkey and Iran, that is to say, between secular democracy and Islamic theocracy, was not a reality for Arabs, whose modern political history had a different course, and certainly is not the crux of the issue in the Middle East, as in fact, Iran has never been a democratic country despite the yearnings of a nation while Turkey has been enjoying its democratic independence for quite some time. In fact, both of these occurrences have been allowed if not wholly dictated by the Western imperial powers which gives credence to the popular sentiments in Muslim societies that the West is responsible for the current woes, and thus is deserved of contempt, especially in denying it, something Lewis' whole treatment of the Middle East is attempting to discredit. His discourse, existing with certain contextual particulars remiss, paints a "complete" picture, diagnosing and prescribing solutions to problems, while posing as a principle empirical source of consensus, which breeds misconception and

works to shift public opinion into the realm of misinformation and manipulation.

Speaking of the experience, needs, and possibilities that refer to the Arab world for which the shining example is Turkish democracy, offering the idea that Turkey has once achieved this pinnacle thus it would be possible for Arab countries to make good on similar achievements, one would assume that a scholar would evaluate Turkish democracy in a larger context. Yet, there is little to no room afforded in either book for this evaluation, only selectively touching on its positive progression through time; at best the 1995 general elections are addressed in *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East* as caution that even in Turkey, democracy is not immune to the seduction of the other, called by Lewis, the fundamentalist.

While presenting the general elections held in 1995, when a political party of Islamist ideology won, receiving 21 per cent of the votes nationwide, Lewis says, the multiple party system of the country enabled them to set a coalition government between an Islamist party leader and a leader of a secular party, which was ended under military pressure, as the men of action regarded to the preservation of secularism and constitution as their principle duty. Despite that some portion of these votes emerged as protest against the older parties in service, the election itself showed a definitive affirmation of support for the fundamentalist agenda in the country, and this is evident as religious opposition still remains in parliament (*Multiple*, 136). In this exploration the author remarks on the Refahyol (Welfare Path) coalition set between the Welfare Party (WP) and True Path Party (TPP) by chairman of the WP, Necmettin Erbakan, which was finalized by what was called the February 28 operation, a military act which took place in 1997. Referencing the February 28 operation, without making any reference to the previous military interferences against the democratically elected civilian governments [the coup of May 27, 1960, the coup of March 12, 1971, and the coup of September 12, 1980] might leave the reader clueless in regards to a succession of events taking place in the modern political history of Turkey. Also, mentioning a noticeable Islamic appeal in the country that had proven itself in the result of the election, without questioning or examining as to why it had happened within such a peculiar timeframe (the 1990s), does not provide appropriate insight. This negation leaves him—but in this case us—to fill the gaps in order to better confer how the transmitted information without context effect the reader's thought process concerning the prescribed imposition of democracy in the region as well as the assertion of Turkey as a model for all.

As history has shown, since the multiparty system of the 1950s, the conflict was not

necessarily been only between secular and religious groups in Turkey, but between leftist and rightist ideologies, reaching its apex when economic catastrophe was an inevitability, resulting from decisive amounts of foreign debt and deteriorating social and political order. This on-going power struggle brought about military intervention, one being the coup of 1960, unseating the Democrat Party government. Roger Owen confirms this in his examination of the aftermath of the coup, “influential groups of intellectuals and officials took advantage of the situation to introduce programs of reform of their own;” one of which was the formation of a new constitution, approved by a referendum in 1961. The constitution of 1961 leaning on liberal ideas transformed Turkey bringing it into a democratic stage; “The result was the creation of new social strata (including an increasingly militant working class), new relationships between interests groups and government and, at a national level, a new political and electoral geography” (Owen, 86). Reading into contributions of Feroz Ahmad, it is seen that “the military had become the guardians of a system burgeoning capitalism rather than such abstractions as the ‘nation’ or ‘Kemalism,’ though the rhetoric of the past has been retained” (Ahmad, 124), while the progression of the events transpiring in the Middle East within the Cold War settings influenced the political scheme in Turkey. Due to the increase in nationalist appeal in the region, being seen as threat to Western interest, “in November 1958, the US government issued an international document—National Security Agency document 5820/1—arguing that Islam could be used as an antidote to nationalism and communism” (Ahmad, 128). The U.S. foreign policy and Turkish government’s loyalty to it led to protests from Turkish nationalists, and in time the issues blended with Turkey’s foreign relations brought about anti-American demonstrations, which continued until the second military intervention (by memorandum) in 1971. “Anti-Americanism polarized society into conservative Right and a nationalist and radical Left, sometimes described as neo-Kemalist; the left viewed the US as the leader of capitalist world upon which Turkey had become dependent” (Ahmad, 130). Seeing the nationalist discourse of the left as communist propaganda, the right turned to Islam, regarding to it as an ideology, which was also exhibited by the provincial lower middle class for their own causes as the rapid industrialization and the growth of monopolies diluted markets and local craft and while anti-Americanism continued to evolve through world events, together with influence of the student and worker acts taking place in Paris, the fragmentation in the country brought political instability. “By the early 1970s, the situation in Turkey had become explosive; student and working-class militancy, social and

economic changes, growing political conflict, and the world situation proved to be dangerous mix” (Ahmad, 132). Unlike the coup of 1960, which brought about many radical reforms with it, the coup of 1971, restrained many laws established through the constitution of 1961, which brought about a crushing of the Left (Ahmad, 133).

In these circumstances Turkey stepped in around 1980, when the right wing military junta took over the ineffectual civilian government, yet the issue was not limited to internal settings but relevant to the country’s renewed strategic importance to the West, coinciding with the time frame when the Islamic revolution in Iran and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan took place. In this renewed state of importance, the anarchy had to be ended while the economy needed to be disciplined; “The West needed a stable regime in Turkey, something the political parties had been unable to provide it with; perhaps the generals could” (Ahmad, 145). While the on-going violence formed grounds for military intervention, the coup drew its objective from depoliticizing the society—parliament was dissolved; the constitution was suspended; martial law was declared nationwide; and political activities, trade unions, as well as many newspapers were banned. In crushing the leftists, the junta also crushed the right; yet, the same junta also embraced the ideology of the right, and “designated it as the ‘Turkish-Islamic synthesis’” (Ahmad, 150). The junta ruled the country for three years while appointing a committee to draft a new constitution and upon its acceptance by the 1982 referendum, a free election would be held in late 1983. The irony in the returning of power to the civilians was palpable; the junta leader (as a retired general) was appointed as the president of the country; political parties in existence were banned thus only new parties established with the approval of the junta were permitted to be involved with the coming election; one of these was the Mother Land Party of Turgut Özal, which “had he been elected, he too would have been disqualified by the generals, but US support and intervention saved him from veto” (Ahmad, 153). Özal had already been in the scenario before the junta took power as he was appointed as a deputy counsellor to the prime ministry upon IMF’s recommendation to implement an economic package, namely the January 24 economic measures, in order to shift the country’s economy to export-oriented growth, to reduce inflation, and to progress payment towards outstanding balances. To achieve this whole package, not only a new type of relation between the state and the economic interest groups was necessary, but also, what Özal had asked for, a stable environment spanning over five years, which was provided by the generals through depoliticizing the society. “Turkey was thrown open

to the capitalist world and globalization” (Ahmad, 147).

Lewis deliberately excludes all of this, leaving his readers oblivious to the placement of Turkey within a set of military interventions representative of global conflict—competing ideologies of capitalist West and Communist Russia clashed, as they competed for world domination, when capitalism was being transformed into a process of globalization. This exclusion on his part can be considered as a failure, not creating a broad enough perception about Turkish democracy, into which foreign influence had played its part. It needs to be reiterated that the heightening of political Islam in this country occurred subsequent to the military junta of 1980, as a pushing back of sorts by the people of Turkey; in order to seize the ideological influence of the leftists, the established system found a solution, which was to support Islamic trends. The formulation of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis on the domestic scene, producing a mix of nationalist religious ideologies, coincided with the implementation of the Islamic *Green Belt* project enacted in an attempt to cut off the communist influence on the region, and one result of this implementation was the polarization between the Islamist and secular groups. Although the results were different in Turkey, such a polarization brought yet another extrapolation in places like Iran and in Afghanistan, as has been previously discussed. In Turkey neighbouring Soviet Russia, *tariqats* were placed around the country, controlling all facets of state and society from bureaucratic municipalities to economic establishments and schools. In accordance with this, Lewis pays proper attention to the February 28 operation that occurred against the *Welfare Party*, more specifically Erbakan, to cut off support towards the anti-secular groups in 1997. What he neglects to explore is that the program was designated during this time to weaken “the influence of political Islam by purging its supporters from the state apparatus and curbing the schools for prayer leaders and preachers, schools whose expansion the generals had legislated for after September 1980 in order to counter the influence of ‘leftist ideologies’” (Ahmad, 172). Indeed, Turkey has made great strives to democratize; however, the process has not been completed. In order to successfully complete this process, which Lewis also fails to discuss, a productive middle class is necessary, while continuing to economically, politically, socially, and culturally exchange ideas, becoming a partner with European countries as well as the U.S., but this cannot be completed in the presence of foreign interferences and stipulations within internal politics, as is the case throughout the Middle East, becoming increasingly apparent through time.

“Lewis’ Kemalist vision of a secularized, Westernized Arab democracy” is even better

enacted in *Crises of Islam*: “the experience of the Turkish republic over the last half century and of some other Muslim countries more recently has demonstrated two things: first, that it is indeed very difficult to create a democracy in such a society, and second, that although difficult, it is not impossible” (168).

In “Bernard Lewis Revisited,” Michael Hirsh remarks on this vision of Lewis, as remaining at “the core of George W. Bush’s faltering vision in Iraq,” whose administration’s official goal is still in 2004 determined by what The Wall Street Journal called, the “Lewis Doctrine,” or in other words, “a Westernized polity, reconstituted and imposed from above like Kemal’s Turkey, that is to become a bulwark of security for America and a model for the region” (13). With the Lewis Doctrine, Hirsh refers to Peter Waldman’s article, titled “Bernard Lewis’s Blueprint: Sowing Arab Democracy Is Facing a Test in Iraq,” wherein the so-called doctrine is placed into a perspective; “Though never debated in Congress or sanctified by presidential decree, Mr. Lewis’s diagnosis of the Muslim world’s malaise, and his call for a U.S. military invasion to seed democracy in the Mideast, have helped define the boldest shift in U.S. foreign policy in 50 years,” and now “The occupation of Iraq is putting the doctrine to the test.” The ironic representation of Hirsh, “America’s misreading of the Arab world—and our current misadventure in Iraq—may have really begun in 1950,” is closely knit with Lewis’ career that had took turn in the same year, as he was on a sabbatical, visiting Turkey, doing research on the Ottoman archives, to which he was granted access as the first Western scholar. “[...] what Lewis saw happening outside his study window was just as exciting, he later wrote. There in Istanbul, in the heart of what once was a Muslim empire, a Western-style democracy was being born” (13). Hirsh endorses his stance by referencing Richard Bulliet, “[who] argues that Lewis has been getting his ‘master narrative’ about the Islamic world wrong since his early epiphanic days in Turkey—and he’s still getting it wrong today” (14).

Lewis’ vision on Turkey—as an open and free society, which was seeded at the middle of the twentieth century and has remained throughout the following decades, being seen through *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* and “Why Turkey Is the only Muslim Democracy,” becomes the part of his ideologically constructed book, *Crisis of Islam*, which can be best characterized with the “Lewis Doctrine” that reaches to the reader with

In two countries, Iraq and Iran, where the regimes are strongly anti-American, there are democratic oppositions capable of taking over and forming

governments. We, in what we like to call the free world, could do much to help them, and have done little. In most other countries in the region, there are people who [...] understand freedom and want to enjoy it at home. It is more difficult for us to help those people, but at least we should not hinder them” (163-4).

While justifying a military venture, and in presenting to the reader the idea of creating an Iraqi democracy, just like the one that has operated in Turkey, the author neglects to project Turkish democracy on the eve of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, this also is suggestive of the seemingly ever present gap in his discourse.

As it occurred in the 1980s, the IMF again assisted the residing coalition government in 2001, and this time, Turkish economist Kemal Derviş from the World Bank was appointed to solve the devastating economic crisis at hand, reaching its apex due to an unstable political setting within the state-governmental level on February 2001. The implementation of the economic development plan was successfully achieved up until 2002, when one of the coalition partners abruptly decided to resign from the government for undisclosed reasons. This brought about a political crisis, leading the country to set up a new election in November 2002, when the Justice and Development Party won the election as a moderate Islamic entity, adherents to a liberal economy. Owen remarks on the atmosphere resulting from the defeat of the aforementioned reform coalition in the elections, “followed closely by the worries induced by the breakdown of relations with the United States consequent on the Turkish parliament’s vote not to allow American troops to use the country as a base for an attack on northern Iraq” (Owen, 125). Khalidi also portrays this atmosphere as he turns his attention to the manner in which the U.S. tried to force the recently elected Turkish government to allow their territory to be used as a base for the war in Iraq, pushing them to act against the polls that showed, by February 2003, 96 percent of the country’s citizens were in opposition to a war against Iraq. “The pique of official Washington (“one administration official” fulminated that “the Turks seem to think we’ll keep the bazaar open all night”) when Turkish leaders dragged their feet in acceding to U.S. demands, was, to say the least, unseemly,” to which Khalidi adds, “It indicated how shallow the democratic inclinations of leaders of the American administration were they did not get their way” (*Resurrecting*, 45).

This example brings us to question; what democracy Lewis is discussing, and to whom this democracy was to serve, as all of these untouched or unnoticed gaps when filled present a

common theme of the West, acting in their best interests while serving for the greater good promoting democracy in general, but in actuality, on a specific case basis. Without knowledge on the fact that when the West involved itself into domestic politics the issue went worse than one would assume, as they also played their part in the galvanization of Islamism, the reader is left with only one option—to agree with Lewis’ assertions and applaud his proactive and humanistic stance on the issue, which predestines the West to repeat mistakes, leading to the realization of a society unable to acknowledge its own faults or differences in opinion.

To sum up these treatments in entirety, the method that Lewis adopts in exploring the post-WWII Middle East is indistinguishable in the three books, in which Islam remains the core motive in projecting the roots of Muslim rage directed against the West particularly the U.S. through trajectory of the Islamic history, portrayed as a reaction to modernity and Christianity. While depicting *jihad* as leaning towards Islamic terrorism, with the offered remedies being a return to an authentic past in conjunction with the arrival of democracy, this method enables the author to implement his ideology centered upon a “clash of civilizations.” *The Arabs in History* and *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East* work to persuade the reader to imagine an uncertain future without empathizing with Muslim people, Arabs and Iranians alike, but instead regard to them with feelings of menace, threatening their peaceful world increasingly in step with the widening gap between the Islamic world and the modern West. Juxtaposition of the representations of Iranian theocracy and Turkish democracy enables readers of *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East* and *Crises of Islam* to perceive the solution offered by Lewis to this severe problem. Finally, in promoting Turkey’s democracy, the selectiveness in the contextual outline especially in the latter book projects a democratic transformation of the Middle East as a necessity in both a pragmatic and altruistic sense, to support the fight against terrorism, the military invasion of Iraq, and any other future endeavor, canonizing Western culture and practice as the infallible standard.

1.4. Chapter Conclusion

Bernard Lewis is a well-known published historian and expert communicator of the Middle East, whose discourse has transcended beyond academia while he has become a public figurehead as an intellectual in the U.S. In examining Lewis historical and intellectual discourse, this study has first set out to summarize *The Arabs in History*, *The Multiple Identities of the*

Middle East, and *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror*, in accordance with the themes, shared in and exposed through these books, as follows: 1) relationships in religion, society, and politics within the Islamic World, 2) the rise and decline of the Islamic Civilization, 3) the rise of the West, from influence to affluence—domineering the Middle East, 4) ideological aspirations and political practices during the twentieth century in the Middle East, 5) search for the culprit and the search for the remedy in the Islamic World. The aim of each summary is to point out Lewis' specific choices and emphases in his representations of Middle Eastern socio-economic, -political, -cultural, and -religious history, standing in connection with global economic, political, and international systems.

As an additional step, this study has provided an in-depth analysis to examine how Lewis represents the Middle East. While almost exclusively relying on the points highlighted in the summary, this analysis has also incorporated some other works, indicative of his academic and journalistic combination of representations. In addition to this, the section has also incorporated outside sources, largely referenced as they provide a framework allowing us to assess critically how Western discourse and its theoretical understanding of the Middle East compares to other treatments and our own understanding.

The conceptual framework of Lewis' explorations, placed in *The Arabs in History*, *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East*, and *Crises of Islam*, is representative of the entire collection of works produced over seventy years of his academic career, which are startlingly consistent as his outlook to the region and Islam has never changed, resting on Orientalist stance. Lewis conveys the knowledge of his early expertise, history of Medieval Arabs and Islam, in revealing the modern Middle East through diverse topics, whether it be the political role of Islam active within states and societies in the Arab and wider Islamic world, or the rejection of rationalist thinking in Islam presented as a challenge to modernity thus an obstacle for a transition to liberal democracy. By doing so, his arguments point to seventh century Arabia, when Prophet Muhammad established his state with a dual character (politics and religion), and in framing his discourse within the trajectory of Islamic history, he portrays the universal Muslim outlook as it has been formed by experience accumulated throughout centuries and guided by the framework set forth by the Prophet. This Muslim outlook, to Lewis, is a casualty of the retrogression of Islam as a culture and civilization as determined by Islam's occasionalist and atomistic theology set forth in its middle ages, when the debate over "predestination" or

“free will” brought to an end free speculation and research. In delving specifically into the early history, the author entangles his readers in crude comparisons between Islam and Christianity, through which he not only remarks on the absence of informative sourcing and experience as a main reason behind the lack of political secularism and the rejection of secularism in Muslim societies, but also portrays the West as Islam’s intellectual counterpart—the revisionist challenging its traditional structure and mode of thought.

This study has suggested that the readers of these passages are deeply exposed to Islam’s incompatibility with modern secular ideas, while being isolated from a sequence of specific conditions that would be thought of as synonymous with secularization brought by the West. Equally they are isolated from the debate questioning that if in the Middle East any inner dynamic has emerged to favor the separation of state and religion, produced through internal circumspect. Furthermore, they are not provided a lens to the “obey” vs. “disobey” debate as to what extent it had been politically motivated at that time. It has been asserted that Lewis knowingly avoids this, if he had not done so, he would have to address modern Arab politics within the context of this debate as it still exists and is politically motivated. This indeed would precede a different perspective towards the discussion, further necessitating Lewis to touch upon the reclamation of the rationalist past and the shining example of Western humanism by Arab intellectuals as a response to the turmoil created by activism, despotism, and militancy evident in the post-colonial era. Above all, he does not provide an eyewitness account to the eventful modern political history for conceptualizing the region, where importation of modern secular ideas by colonial forces and implementation of these ideas by autocratic leaders of post-colonial regimes, encouraged through remaining foreign control, have created a story, telling of Muslim discontent due to the experiences gained in association with modernization. The outcome of this is subjected to Lewis’ works, rationalized with Islam’s hostile and unreceptive nature to modern values of Western men, opposing himself from Muslim; collectively obedient to his ideal of Perfect Man and the Perfect State enjoyed due to its dogmatic theology.

In general, it seems that while shaping minds towards Muslim societies, with essentialist rhetoric, the reader is solicited to see the globe not as an intact but as being composed of divided and conflicting civilizations—Islam vs. Christianity. In view of the West, promoted as an innate democracy through its revisionist history, the idea of the *other* is easy to be conceptualized by those, whose perception of modernity is constructed within that paradigm. That is unless his/her

communicator stimulates the mind to understand that modernization is brought along through the needs of societies, these occurrences are time and area specific, thus each encounter is created in its own demand, patent, pace, and passion. Yet, this works against what Lewis aims to show—Islam's exceptional case, not fitting any modernist inclinations due to its static nature. Albeit in a distorted fashion, he perfectly elaborates this, making a working argument for mitigating Western encroachment towards traditional societies to transform and modernize. Focusing on only differences, not similarities, an attempt to enforce Islam being at odds with the West, he neglects to mention at any point that operating under the parameters of the superior West seems to have shaped outcomes of hostility more than anything else in this region. His selectiveness in historical support echoes this lack of consideration of Western superiority as a molding force.

Lewis' understanding of modernity enables him to cover the vast territories, from Morocco to Indonesia and Kazakhstan to Senegal, in the same mode of treatment, while giving an exception to Turkey because of its Western oriented practices achieved through the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. But yet again he fails to expose to the reader history; what differs Turkey's situation from the Arab countries, its liberty in economics and politics, whose Western ideas were not being imposed from the outside but from within the nation itself. In a discourse of contradiction (had Islam been the causality of all problems how could Turkey's secularization is accounted for?) and omission (recognizing none of the region's many issues, nor cultural nuances not corroborating his vision) the content of his coverage allows one to conceptualize a monolithic existence, rather than proving insightful on the region and its people as diverse and hybridized as the region's complex history.

Rather than giving a fresh perspective to the non-experts, Lewis replicates his themes, which are identical in assorted representations suggesting his confidence in his assertions while providing an enhancement to the discussion. The points that he highlights on the rejection of rationalistic thinking such as existence of atomistic society, lacking in civic identity and political awareness, are forced into the concept of "Oriental despotism," telling of Islam's totalitarian character. This further enables him not only to examine the reasons behind the decline of Islamic civilization, in which the Ottoman Empire had its place, but also to reason Islam's compatibility with Italian fascist and Soviet communist models evident in exploring the emergence of one-party ideological dictatorship in the Arab world of the twentieth century. The issue of importation of these models into the Arab land comprises a large portion of Lewis' writings,

through which he addresses a variety of issues, from the universal Islamic state to the collapse of the last universal Islamic Empire, of the Ottomans; yet in all of this he fails to allow a broad enough perception on the development of various political institutions, traditions, and systems. In Lewis' discourse there is no proper delineation between Shia and Sunni while remarking on this human mosaic as Muslim, whose desire of unification is exposed as a recurring theme without any solid showing as to whom or what this may be attached to. His ideologically constructed rhetoric, lacking in contextual empiricism, explores one-party ideological Arab dictatorships either from the angle of Muslim failure to modernize, or through exposing innate anti-Western ideological sentiments, or an Arab attitude. This is evident in every single instance; pointing out Saddam Hussein's Iraq and Baser Assad's Syria, perfect examples, rather than the region's political undertakings as well as the history of Iraq and Syria. Neither the nation building process, nor state formation is within the scope of the Lewis analysis, which plays its part to contribute to polarization of the West and East.

Lewis' modernizing approach and culturist stance, coupled with his confident understanding of Islam, serves towards establishing his structuralist discourse. This is evident in the examinations of the decline of the Islamic civilization, depicted as process punctuated by the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. In constructing this he uses the hot button issues of women's rights and civil liberties to emotively capture his audience, playing even further towards polarization, away from reconciliation. He also presents issues within the Ottoman Empire as symptomatic of the decline of Islam, ignoring the internal and external economic pressures that had much more to do with these issues, while using an example that is not at all representative of Islamic society but rather more of a hybrid of European and Muslim ideals. These aforementioned structural narratives, the building blocks aimed at epitomizing the ideology construction process of Muslims and their relation with the West occurring in the post-WWII era, are exposed through the widening gap between the Islamic world and the modern West, depicted as generating emotional and practical problems, leaning these societies towards the rebels of Islam.

As has been underlined, in Lewis' discourse there is no place to discuss about local history within a global context, rather he opts to have his readers understand how Islam evolved as a whole, within the centuries following falling behind the West, and in this evolution, Muslim rage directed against the West, specifically to the U.S. While revealing the idea of Islam and the

West as two millennial adversaries, and in placing the “clash of civilizations” into perspective, he claims that Islam is inherently violent, brought about through its *jihadism*, exposing *jihad* only through its tangible extrapolations, meaning warfare, terrorism, rioting, etc., ignoring the esoteric aspects of this idea which is much more applicable to Muslims as a whole.

A conclusion can be drawn from the present study that Lewis’ presentation of U.S. foreign policy seems identical to how it is presented by the American government, making no attempt to understand or reference the negative effects caused by, in most cases, military incursions, which as people across all cultures know, brings terrible, calamitous outcomes. In his treatments, which supposedly should bring an increased understanding of foreign lands and sentiments, he works only to divide and delineate the differences between his society and that of the *other*, distinguishing the West as a worldwide educator and liberator, leading the downtrodden out of their history of barbarism into the realm of reason, creating a dichotomy of superiority. In some cases he provides incorrect information and often contradicts himself in his struggle to present his framework, yet his reputation precedes him still, possibly more so than anyone else in his field, so much so that members of the later Bush administration have been referred to as Lewisites, highlighting his tremendous effect on Western formulations of the East/West dichotomy.

CHAPTER 2

2.1. David Douglas Duncan's Artistic and Media Discourses

2.1.1. Biography: David Douglas Duncan

David Douglas Duncan is a veteran photojournalist, who was born in Kansas City, Missouri on January 23, 1916. He received his BA degree in 1938 in the field of Zoology and Spanish at the University of Miami. Duncan's career in photojournalism started in 1934, after receiving a camera, a gift given to him by his sister, Jean, for his eighteenth birthday. At that time he was an archaeology student at the University of Arizona. The late 1930s and early 1940s signify his amateur years in photojournalism; during this time, he sold his picture stories to various American newspapers and magazines (e.g., *Baltimore Sun*, *Kansas City Star*, *Chicago Sunday Tribune*, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, *Washington Star*, *Detroit News*, *Miami News*, *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, *Family Circle*, and *National Geographic Magazine*).

In February 1940, Duncan was invited by the notable offshore game fishermen, Mike and Helen Lerner, to photograph their six-month long travels to Bimini in the Bahamas, and off the coast of Peru and Chile. He then went to the Caribbean, the West Indies, and northern South America in November 1940, from where he shot advertisement photography for almost six months for Pan-American Airways. Next he received an assignment from Nelson Rockefeller's Office of Inter-American Affairs (OIAA) in December 1941, which was to travel throughout Mexico, Central America (e.g., Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica), Panama, and Colombia, and to produce photographs that were to be featured in the Department of Commerce's weekly magazine, *Foreign Commerce*. After coming back to the U.S. in December 1942, Duncan received a rejection from the Coordinator's Office to his request for an extension to finish his photographic coverage of Costa Rica and Panama. Consequently, he sent a telegram to President Franklin D. Roosevelt on January 16, 1943, stating: "Having just returned from a year photographing Mexico and Central America for the Office of Coordinator of Inter-

American Affairs, during which time presidents Camacho, Ubico, Martinez, Carias, and Somoza gave me every assistance in fulfilling my mission, it has been with tremendous disappointment that I have discovered the barriers confronting my meeting you, my own president, while seeking your advice and assistance pertaining to the pursuance of my work in Latin America” (*Yankee Nomad*, 106). Edwin M. Watson, the personal secretary of the President, replied to his request on February 2, 1943. Watson’s correspondence was as follows: “[...] regret to inform you it will be impossible [to] grant special deferment as you request. Also regret [to advise] you impossible [to] arrange appointment with the president just now.” Duncan would later reflect in his book that “And it was indeed impossible for *any* American to meet President Roosevelt in the White House, at that time. He was at the super-secret Casablanca Conference with Winston Churchill, where the Prime Minister, and then the world, first heard of his terms for defeating the Nazis and Axis Powers: ‘Unconditional Surrender!’” (*Yankee Nomad*, 109).

On February 17, 1943, the day when Duncan enlisted as a Second Lieutenant in the U.S. Marine Corps in Miami, he sent a telegram to his parents saying, “Childhood and my youth are finished. Only He knows how much my race has been run” (*Yankee Nomad*, 111). After having completed basic training at Marine Corps Air Station, Quantico, VA, and received short-term posts at San Francisco and Hawaii, he was assigned in January 1944 to serve as a combat photographer throughout the Solomon Islands and the Western Pacific. Thereby, his amateur status in photojournalism ended. He covered the South Pacific Combat Air Transport Command (SCAT)’s war operations behind the Japanese lines in diverse locations and military bases, both on the ground and in the air. He was able to photograph the Japanese surrender aboard the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay on September 2, 1945.

Having served his time in the Marines as of February 1946, Duncan was introduced by Jay Eyerman, *Life*’s chief photographer, to the magazine’s editor, Wilson Hicks. As a staff photographer, Duncan’s early profession in commercial photojournalism took place from March 1946 in *Life*, which was a weekly, picture-driven magazine at that time. His previous experience as a combat photographer during WWII had prepared him to become preeminent in his profession while serving as *Life*’s correspondent to the Middle East between 1946 and 1956. Through a wide range of assignments—which sometimes expanded past the borders of the Middle East (e.g., the end of the British Raj in India, some issues in Central Asia, the Korean War, selected conflicts in Eastern Europe and Africa)—Duncan traveled to far-flung places as if

he were a nomad. He witnessed firsthand a variety of facets of life from high politics to the daily activities of lay people within many countries and societies, including Iran, Palestine, Israel, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, which were undergoing a transformation by integrating into world economic and political systems.

After leaving *Life* magazine in February 1956, Duncan started to work for *Collier's*, which ceased publication within that year. He took several trips to Russia between 1956 and 1958 as a freelance photojournalist and sold his picture stories about Moscow and the Kremlin to the *Saturday Evening Post* and *Life* respectively. He spent the late 1950s and early 1960s photographing Pablo Picasso (e.g., his works and his personal and family life), during which these two famous visual artists of the twentieth century, masters of their fields, became very good friends. Duncan reported on the war in Vietnam between 1967 and 1968 with joint backing from *Life* magazine and *ABC-TV*. He also sold his Vietnam works to *NBC News*, for whom he likewise captured the large-scale still-images for the National Republican and Democratic Conventions in August 1968 in Miami Beach and Chicago. Duncan retired from all his photographic assignments in the commercial media in the early 1970s; yet he has continued to develop books in France, where he resides with his wife Sheila.

Most of Duncan's works were transformed into book formats and published: *This Is War! A Photo Narrative in Three Parts* (1951), *This is War!: A Photo-narrative of the Korean War* (1951), *The Private World of Pablo Picasso: The Intimate Photographic Profile of the World's Greatest Artist* (1958), *The Kremlin* (1960), *Picasso's Picassos* (1961), *Yankee Nomad: a Photographic Odyssey* (1966), *Great Treasures of the Kremlin* (1968), *I Protest!* (1968), *Self-Portrait: U.S.A.* (1969), *War Without Heroes* (1970), *David Douglas Duncan Portfolio* (1972), *Prismatics: Exploring a New World* (1972), *Goodbye Picasso* (1974), *The Silent Studio* (1976), *Magic Worlds of Fantasy* (1978), *The Fragile Miracle of Martin Gray* (1979), *Viva Picasso: Centennial Celebration 1881-1981* (1981), *The World of Allah* (1982), *New York, New York: Masterworks of a Street Peddler* (1984), *Sunflowers for Van Gogh* (1986), *Picasso and Jacqueline* (1988), *A Secret Garden* (1992), *Thor* (1993), *Picasso Paints a Portrait* (1996), *Yo-Yo: Kidnapped in Provence* (1999), *Faceless: The Most Famous Photographer in the World* (2001), *Photo Nomad* (2003), and *Picasso & Lump* (2006).

He has received awards including the second prize from the Annual National Newspaper Snapshot Awards (1937), the Citation of Excellence from the Overseas Press Club of America

for Best Photographic Reporting from Abroad (1959), the Photographer of the Year Award from the American Society of Magazine Photographers for his coverage of Vietnam for *Life* magazine and for *I Protest!* (1968), and the Joseph Sprague Award from the National Press Photographers Association (1991).

2.1.2. An Overview of Source Materials on Duncan's Coverage of the Middle East

The source materials that characterize Duncan's Middle Eastern coverage in photojournalism fall into two categories: unpublished and published materials produced by him mostly through assignments for *Life* between 1946 and 1956, and through an assignment for *Collier's* in 1956. These materials have been available in the Harry Ransom Center (HRC) of the University of Texas, Austin, since 1995, to which Duncan has donated entire collections of his works (e.g., photographic works, textual materials, and correspondences).

Unpublished materials include most of Duncan's photographs (in the form of contact sheets, negatives, transparencies, printed pictures); all textual materials (caption books) written by him; most of the correspondences either written or received by him; and all personal notes placed in his field notebooks.

Published materials appeared in three media outlets: *Life*, which issued picture stories, between 1946 and 1956, that were produced by the magazine's editors based on submitted images and/or combined textual materials by Duncan; *Collier's*, which issued a picture story in 1956, that was written by the magazine's editor based on the images and captions provided by Duncan; and the books by Duncan, *Yankee Nomad: a Photographic Odyssey*, *The World of Allah*, and *Photo Nomad*.

Regarding the books, *Yankee Nomad* and *Photo Nomad* are the first and second comprehensive photo-autobiographies published in 1966 and 2000, respectively. While the former exposes the first three decades of Duncan's career, the latter reflects seven decades of his body of work through immense numbers of visual images, selected correspondences, and written words, which all exhibit his explorations of the globe (e.g., the U.S., the South America, the Far East, Europe, the Central Asia, the Middle East), intra-/inter-national war and peace affairs, and a diverse scope of cultural traditions and belief systems.

The nine chapters of *Yankee Nomad*, out of a total of twenty five, are reflective of

Duncan's Middle Eastern coverage during 1946-1956, and their titles are as follows: "New York-Iran," "Palestine," "Turkey-Bulgaria-India," "Egypt-Saudi Arabia," "Turkey-Greece-India," "Hong Kong-Burma-India-Iran-Greece-Egypt," "Egypt-Germany-South Africa," "Egypt-Indonesia-Jordan-Pakistan-Morocco-Spain-Germany," and "Afghanistan."

The content of *Photo Nomad* is not arranged in chapters but through the page-line numbers, with a total of 463. Twelve of these page-lines are dedicated to his coverage of the Middle East: "Palestine/Jerusalem 1946/farming/dreaming/murder/Old City," "First LIFE covers/Palestine 1946/Birth of India and Pakistan 1947," "General 'Black Avni' Mizrak/cavalry legions/1948/Turkey-Russia frontier," "North Africa/1949/debris Italian Empire/Mecca pilgrims," "Dwight Eisenhower/Commander NATO/Athens-Istanbul 1952," "Dome of Rock Mosque/Jerusalem at peace/1954/sacred place Moslem-Jew," "Dawn/Ramadan/women on painted canvas/Cairo/Abdine Palace of Kings," "Tranquil Afghanistan/1955/Band-e-Amir lake/Hindu Kush mountains," "High Atlas Berbers/of Morocco 1954/still-today Shangri-La," "Gaza Strip/1956/nourished men's dreams on sand," and "Saudi prince-American chief/desert-mountain-men/search for lost horizons."

The World of Allah, published in 1982, exclusively demonstrates Duncan's exploration of the Muslim world over vast territories, where he lived and traveled during assignments (1946 to 1956). The book, in which Duncan gives the reader little to no written words, consists of more than 200 picture images, which are the signifiers of the nations' high politics and indicative of diverse cultural traditions, nomadic/sedentary life styles, and belief systems. It contains twenty five chapters that are titled as, "Jerusalem," "Spain," "Morocco," "Algeria," "Libya," "Egypt," "Gaza Strip," "Palestine," "Turkey," "Iran," "Saudi Arabia," "Nigeria," "Kenya & Uganda," "Isfahan," "Pakistan," "Cairo Museum," "Soviet Union," "Afghanistan," "Malaya," "Indonesia," "Indochina," "Suez Canal," "Mount of Olives," "The Shepherd," and "The Koran."

2.1.3. Selection of the Source Materials for This Study

Duncan's assorted pictorial stories, produced during his area studies (1946-1956) within Iran, Palestinian territories, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, form the focus of this study, which mostly draws upon the archival source materials, since most of these materials exist unpublished. Simultaneously, some segments of his books are frequently referenced, not only because they are

indicative of Duncan's exploration of the Middle East within the artistic and journalistic combinations of image and word, but also they are tools in assessing whether his discourses have changed over time. Also, a certain number of picture stories *run* by *Life* and a picture story *run* by *Collier's* are referenced to better describe visual productions submitted by Duncan to the magazines with no accompanying text, and to inquire whether his journalistic combination of materials were issued with due respect to his intentions. Lastly, a few correspondences of Duncan are drawn on in order to strengthen some points in discussion.

2.1.4. Synopsis of Duncan's Pictorial Stories and Analysis of his Representations of the Middle East through His Artistic and Media Discourses

This study first provides a synopsis of Duncan's pictorial stories consistent with the sequence of his area studies, as seen in the following:

- 1) Iran: April-May 1946
- 2) Palestinian territories: June-October 1946, and June 1956
- 3) Saudi Arabia: January 1947, June-August 1948, and November 1953
- 4) Turkey: February 1947, October-December 1948, March 1952, and August 1954

The objective of each synopsis according to the above sequence is to highlight Duncan's specific choices and emphases in his representations of Middle Eastern socio-economic, -political, -cultural, and -religious history, standing in connection with global economic, political, and international systems. Each of these sections is followed by an in-depth analysis that looks to examine how Duncan 'represents' the Middle East. Subsequently, a segment follows each analysis section to investigate the way and how Duncan's representations appear in the media outlets, either in *Life* or *Collier's*, while acknowledging his correspondences with these outlets and in accordance to his books. In particular, this research intends to explore Duncan's discourses, attempting to answer the following primary research question: *what is the information the Western reader receives from his/her writer and communicator about the Middle East, and how could this transmission shape Western public opinion about the Middle East?*

2.2. Synopsis of Duncan's Pictorial Stories on Iran

Duncan arrived in Iran on his first assignment for *Life* in April 1946. During his stay, until May of that year, he covered three stories. While the first and second stories pertained to his assignment reflective of Iran's intra/inter-national politics, the third one is on the topic of the semi-annual Qashqai migration in Persia, and emerged spontaneously.

2.2.1. Iran's Intra/Inter-National Politics in spring 1946

Duncan constructed his representative works in photojournalism in respect to the intra- and inter-national politics of Iran in spring 1946. During this assignment, he compiled his area study into two files consisting of two different yet interrelated stories for *Life*. The first file appeared only in image form [*May Day in Teheran* (May 1946): 2 rolls of b/w 120 film], which was neither employed by *Life*, nor was it utilized in Duncan's books published in later periods. Thereby, only the second file that encompasses the following item is made use of in this dissertation: *Political Iranian Round-up* (name of the caption book), and 2 frames of b/w 35mm film and 14 rolls of b/w 120 film. These items led *Life* to issue the picture story, "Iran: Two worlds collide in a rich and troubled land" on May 20, 1946.

Written with a mix of essay format and caption layout supportive of the image coverage, *Political Iranian Round-up* is not only reflective of the escalation of the Iranian Crisis of 1946, when the Russian invasion of Iran from Azerbaijan was menacing to the Persian Gulf Abadan oil fields, but it is also telling of, what Duncan writes, "The story of one generation trying to fire the desire and will of an entire land that change it must the slave-creating system of a thousand years, as run by habit, and a few strong, well-entrenched men of a self-propagating class."

The artistic and journalistic combinations of image and word productions, coming out of this particular field study, fall into the following classification:

1. The Shah and the Imperial Palace
2. The Iranian government and the Iranian crisis
3. The Tudeh Party and the Labor Union
4. The labor workers

5. The city, Tehran
6. The landed aristocracy
7. The peasantry

2.2.1.1. The Shah and the Imperial Palace

Duncan's style of reportage endorses the idea that a collection of portraits can be taken to stand for a complete story. One might say that the whole becomes greater than the sum of the parts. Such a collection made of twenty-seven year old Mohammad Reza Shah was the only one permitted to be taken since the Iranian crisis began in the spring of 1946, when U.S. action in the UN forced the USSR to withdraw its military forces from Iran—since when, the Shah has had little control over the government. These portraits are captured in the exotic location of the Imperial Palace, the residence of the Shah and his family, which is deemed by the photojournalist as a “luxurious yet not lavish” complex, built in 1939.

In accompanying captions Duncan describes the young Shah, the son of Reza Shah, the former military man of Iran and the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty as well as the Imperial State of Iran, who had captured governmental control from the Qajar dynasty of Persian kings in 1926 and who died in South Africa in 1944, while in exile. By placing a specific emphasis on the Imperial Guards serving in the palace, whose uniforms are regarded as “still showing the German influences, from the days before the allied occupation of Iran,” the journalist aims at depicting Iran's national history. The country was ruled by the Imperial family, brought closer to Germany by the former Shah during WWII, and faced foreign occupation.

2.2.1.2. The Iranian Government and the Iranian Crisis

The government that runs Iran temporarily and the Iranian crisis that deadlocks both internal and international politics can be visualized through image productions of the Prime Minister Ahmed Ghavam, Mosaffar Firouz (Political Under Secretary of State to the Prime Minister and Director General of Propaganda, Press and Radio), and of the Iranian-Russian luncheon that is attended by the top men of Iran and Russia at the Foreign Ministry on April 18th.

By photographing Prime Minister Ghavam in various locations (e.g., at his desk, at the

cabinet in session), Duncan intends to underline the role of the central government, which is to remove Russian troops from Iran, and to depict the internal scope of the crisis of 1946: the quasi-parliamentary regime is now interrupted, and the government is run by a single man. “It’s a one man show, at least until the coming elections, with Ghavam facing the Tudeh after that.”

One particular image, a portrait of Mosaffar Firouz, is requested by Duncan to be used by *Life* in full page with a sub-headline, “Iran Front Man;” yet it is not granted. The reporting style of Duncan is exemplified in this request because Firouz, a Prince Qajar, is significant in current politics. Since the former Shah had his father killed, Firouz has publicly declared that he would take his revenge upon the present day Shah. Described as “the most feared and despised man,” and “treacherous, intelligent, and vicious character,” Firouz is now the second man in power, and will be head of a political party that is to be established by Ghavam before the elections.

The pictures, taken before the evacuation of the Russian tanks from Iranian territory, exposing the Iranian-Russian luncheon, serve as the only documentation of that moment in history, because Firouz, who is called “Foxy” by foreign journalists, recently proclaimed what he adopted from the Madrid Convention of 1932, “blind censorship.” Duncan is the sole journalist, foreign or Iranian, permitted to be present at the affair, and reports that the three-hour-lunch is provided by Ghavam for the honor of the Russian Ambassador with whom he, in the previous week, framed and signed the ‘3 Point Treaty’ that includes the formation of a Russo-Iranian Oil Company, outlining the struggle for control of oil resources in Iran.

2.2.1.3. The Tudeh Party

The effects of photographs regarding the Tudeh Party are strengthened by their captions, serving as illustrations of the modern political history of Iran. Irej Iskendari, the Secretary of the Central Committee of Tudeh, is one of Duncan’s specific emphases because of Iskendari’s key position in the party, and because of his father’s role in the existence of the Tudeh. The father, Soleiman Mirza Iskendari, originated the idea of the Tudeh after WWI; yet he was forced to abandon his liberal thinking and activities by the reign of Reza Shah.

The journalist narrates the following for his image productions of Tudeh’s central committee members: ranging in profession (e.g., cobblers, doctors, masons, engineers, cabbies, journalist, social workers, a few radicals, a few princes) they currently work for the Tudeh with

no salary; they follow their professions in the mornings, and devote their afternoons and Fridays to the Party's activities. "Any claim that the top men get paid by the Russians has no reasonable evidence in its favor." Some of these members received their education in Paris, Iran, Azerbaijan, Moscow, and Czarist Russia, and some of them elected deputies to the Fourteenth *Majlis* in 1944. Their ideological adherences range from weak to strong as sympathizers of Russian or leftist ideas. Except one, all of them were arrested during Reza Shah's reign in the early 1930s as being accused as participants in Communist ideology, and most were released in 1941, during the Anglo-Russian occupation of Iran, and thus re-organized in the form of Tudeh.

Duncan also describes the structure of the party and its activities as follows, and his photographs prove that this story is real. The central committee members (9-11 men) are the only voice of Tudeh, who are the policy makers. Yet, they also follow the opinion of the sub-committee members, who are the representatives of the workers from all over Iran. The Trade Union is the official labor unit, from which the party gains its strength. The official media outlet of the central committee, *Rahbar*, becomes the voice of the party and laborers. The party's membership is reported as 1,000,000 men all over Iran, and its Tehran Chapter plans to hold a meeting of 50,000 members on 1 May, Labor Day in Iran.

The images, captured during the Friday meetings conducted by the Tudeh Party, elucidate the institution's heavy focus on its public relations. It is reported that during these meetings that are held in different venues all over Tehran, the speakers of the central committee and the visiting members from other sections of Iran address Tudeh's success and its future goals (e.g., the rights for laborer, women rights for their active participation in politics and labor activities) to the participants numbered between 1000 and 2000 Iranians. "None are trained speakers and yet, even though I don't speak Persian or Turkish, I know that they are unusually convincing on the platform." The participations of the party's non-members and its opponents to the Friday meetings can be envisaged from two particular displays. One of them is a picture of a shoemaker, who speaks of the influence of the party and, as a result, the improved working conditions in his factory, whereas the other is an image of a student, who criticizes the early policy of Tudeh for accepting support from Russia. Also, specific emphasis is given to the participation of women in Friday meetings of the Tudeh, as the party has a Women's Club, "which is showing more and more influence in national thinking." This can be seen in photographs, displaying women (the wives of the party members), who are sitting either at the side or behind the speaker's table. One

particular image of this kind is a representation of a worker's wife, who listens to the speech from the second-story window that overlooks her yard, where the speech is taking place. She appears in a chador; for a caption Duncan writes, "Reza Shah banned this type of women's dress, but since he was exiled, it has started a rebirth among the older women of Iran today."

Lastly, Duncan reports on the Tudeh, as having supported Ghavam during the crisis with Russia, but returning to their ways of dissention because of Ghavam's policy of running Iran as a dictatorship, and because of his refusal to institute immediately needed reforms, "which could be done very easily during this period of no Majlis." Newspapers carrying cartoons inside on the door of Tudeh Headquarters are photographed by Duncan to put this issue into a perspective. One of these cartoons reflects Sayad Zia, a right wing oppositionist to Tudeh, who is shown being hanged, exhibiting a "quite violent nature" in Iranian politics, as Zia is currently in jail for "fomenting anti-Russian propaganda," "creating inflammatory agitation against government," and "perhaps because he threw Ghavam in jail in twenty years ago."

2.2.1.4. The Labor Workers

The process of communication by Duncan through visuals combined with words in respect to the labor workers in Tehran falls into two categories, adult and child laborers. A sequence of pictures exhibits brick makers, stonecutters, and their families, who live in caves under the hills in the poorest parts of Tehran. In regards to them, the photographer says, "I've seen lots of destitute people in my life, in Latin America, China and Japan, but never such a people with most of the humor and hope beaten out of them [...]." An image of a brick maker, who is shown with his son helping the father all day long for no pay, serves as articulation of the socio-economic living experience in a certain environment. The written report regarding another visual subject, a brick maker and stone cutter, exposes that he works from sunrise to dusk, earning at most 20 rials—around 60 U.S. cents in a day. He has received a salary increase twice; yet in Tehran, the living cost has risen 8 to 10 times since WWII, and the estimated cost of living is now around 100 rials a day. Presumably, Tehran is Duncan's case study; yet his narrative allows Iran to be seen in its totality: "there are thousands in Iran just like [these brick laborers]," and "Tudeh and the Trade Union get its strength from helping men like this."

Duncan's snapshots, which critically represent the everyday experience of a diverse range

of working class people, can be considered as collections of historical records; and his written accounts serve as accompanying evidence of the socio-economic circumstances. It is reported that the laborers, who have unionized, have better working conditions, as seen in the following cases: locomotive engineers (earning 120 rials per day), cobblers and cigarette factory laborers (working in good hours and clean places for 30-35 rials), textile workers (working in fair conditions for 30 rials), carpet menders (working long hours, but in clean places, for 60 rials), and cab drivers (66 rials). The photographer also reports that the resistance of the working class, organized in Unions, has already created tensions, as seen in the case of the textile workers of Iran, where weaving and spinning is done mostly by hand. For example, in Isfahan, the center of textiles in Iran, strife has already started between the laborers and factory owners, who hire gunmen for protection, and the tensions should only increase with the coming election.

Pictorial displays of the child laborers in Tehran are the signifiers of socio-economic reality that is faced by an entire nation. As it stands currently, written narrations of this subject are as follows: glass blowers range in age from seven to twenty, to which Duncan says, "Never had I seen furnaces being run by babies, but it's done here." Boys work in match factories ranging from five to nine, "making the boxes for nearly all matches sold in Tehran," working in dirty, cold, and ill-lighted rooms for ten hours, earning 8 rials (24 cents) for every 1,000 boxes, while little girls work in these factories earn 8 rials filling those 1,000 boxes. Duncan wants *Life* to use a specific image exhibiting a little girl employed by a match factory, but to no avail. The girl, "pouring her soul down the lens," is meaningful to him, as it represents "the present crime against the kids," under Tudeh's agenda, as the party plans to send them to school by law.

2.2.1.5. The City, Tehran

Duncan's image representations of the capital of Iran, Tehran, are the signifiers of the dynamic structure of Iranian society in 1946, where 'modern' and 'traditional,' 'poor' and 'rich,' and 'domestic' and 'foreign' reside side by side. His visual subjects are as follows: the Metropole Theater building, the statue of Reza Shah, the Government Communications building, downtown (exhibiting Ford roadsters, Droshkies (Russian cars), veiled women, and people of various economic standings), street vendors selling American candy bars, razor blades, and Dixon pencils, wide streets (where traffic scrapes people's shoulders), the narrow streets (where

truck drivers, droshky pilots, chauffeurs, and cabbies take off), city workmen cleaning out a jube pipe (an open watercourse in the city), people sitting on the pavement and arguing politics, a boy shining up his shoes around the jube, well-dressed business people at the Imperial Bank (where money brokers deal in dollars, pounds, francs, and tomans), modern women prodding a country boy comfortably sleeping on the sidewalk, and an eight year old beggar on a street. These images are the indicators of the existence of class divisions and the issues of modernity and Westernization clashing with the impacts imperialism and colonialism had on Iranian society.

To Duncan, “the truest picture” of the city is an image, showing two country boys, who “sprawl” happily on the curbside, next to the jube, and carelessly people-watch. It is an essential display as it exhibits both “the contrasts of the only two walks of life in Iranian society” and “the heart of Tehran,” which is the *jube*, and around it “everything revolves” in the city of Tehran.

2.2.1.6. The Grand Land Holders

The pictures of the grand landholders—the landed aristocrats in Tehran—are aided with the captions dealing with the issue of modernization and class divisions in Iran. A specific snapshot reflects a family group, whose members dress up European style and are sitting in a room of modern design. This picture signifies the upper class existence, whose members are living in a mix of modern and Western standards, about whom Duncan remarks as follows: “in contrast to the hand-to-mouth existence of the laborers, there is, in Tehran, the life of comfort and physical security.” Producing this image at a home (of Colonel Hassen Amini, a cavalry officer of the Iranian army) is meaningful, because its interior represents secure and comfortable living conditions, while the family group represents the grand land holders, most of whom serve within the state apparatus, either in the military or in the civil ruling structure. Duncan reports regarding the established aristocrats, whose wealth is generally inherited: they send their children to either America or Europe for education, drive imported cars, and seldom visit the villages that yet are the sources of their income. They are divided within the current political climate. While some of them gingerly show support towards the reforms offered by the Tudeh for the creation of an infrastructure for all Iran, the others fight against the change; and some others, like in the aforementioned family picture, fall in the middle of these two stances.

Another snapshot, exhibiting the two sisters (Miss Pari Riahi and Fachri Amini), is

complementary of the journalist's narratives in examination of the landholders. Fachri Amini is presented with her jewelry (e.g., 3 carat solitaire diamonds and an emerald and diamond brooch pin), gifts from her husband, Colonel Amini. The visual representation of these sisters, who were closely "chaperoned" until their marriage and quickly modernized after Reza Shah abolished the veil, serves as an example of what Duncan refers to as, "the cream of the top of Iranian society.

2.2.1.7. The Peasantry

The images, reflective of the peasants and the socio-cultural and economic circumstances surrounding them, which are accompanied with captions, are the vital components of the entire display of Iran: "Back of all the workers, Labor Party, Tudeh, Grand Landholders, Prime Minister, and the Shah are the peasant people and the vast, sweeping land which is Persia."

The diverse range of pictures portrays the vast Iranian territory that encompasses deserted areas, mountains, high plateaus, etc.: Elburz Mountain; Mt. Demavend (the highest peak in the Middle East); camel caravans (crossing the southeastern wastes and deserted areas); the highway to the Caspian (where the trucks haul coal from local mines to Tehran); a valley, "like Eden," (nearby mountains, where snow waters are melting and nature gives wheat, rice, peach trees, and apple blossoms in spring). Duncan's descriptions of the camel caravans (i.e., "camel bells tinkle under their necks") and the valleys (i.e., "the fragrance of jasmine in the air") make his visual narratives more effectual as they allow one to hear and smell the described phenomena.

The effects of a sequence of visual illustrations are enhanced with Duncan's words as they compromise human experiences. For example, a particular picture represents two peasants walking back home from the bazaar in Tehran; for a caption, Duncan says, "It's a land of great loneliness, sky, time to think, and sand between your toes." Another image is reflective of a twelve-year-old boy walking back from the Bazaar, where he exchanges his produce (e.g., cheese, a couple jugs of goats milk) with goods in need, and then sleeping in open night "before finally getting home." A photograph of road menders (working for the National Roads Commission, earning 30 rials a day, and living in villages nearby) serves not only as the indicator of a moment, as the workers are having a lunch break under a beautiful, old, and leafless tree of the territory up around 7,000-8,000 feet of altitude, but also as the reflection of the natural settings framing them: "it was a tree, with no other between [the village of Gilard and

Mt. Demavend] and the snow it seemed, naturally the only place to stop.” Multiple images of a nine-year-old boy are another case in point. The photographer utters the following regarding the boy, who herds flock with his dog on the slopes of the Elburz Mountain for an “absent landlord” and earns 3 rials in a month and his food ration: “Pretty touch and lonely life, but at least better than working at the glass works or match factory in the city.” Equally, a five-year-old shepherd of Mt. Demavend is captured in several pictures with a lamb in his arms, like he is babying it, under the rain. Lastly, numerous shots, displaying the village Gilard on the slopes of Mt. Demavend, where men dress in heavy woolen socks woven by their women, are iconic reflections of the residents: two village men having daily conversations; merchants of the village coming back from a market in a neighboring town; and the village head (who is also a storyteller) trying to convince his stubborn camel to move away from the village water mill. What makes these displays significant to Duncan is that they are produced on an Easter morning, “in a little world all its own,” where the Muslim community experience their own cycle of life.

2.2.2. The Semi-Annual Qashqai Migration in Persia, Spring 1946

After having fulfilled his assignment reporting Iran’s inter/intra-national politics, Duncan received an invitation from Malik Mansour, one of the Khans of the Qashqai nomads of Iran, which allowed him to photograph a part of a semi-annual tribal migration of these pastoral people across the Persian desert in spring 1946. Without any associated captions, he submitted these un-commissioned image productions (*Qashqai Migration*: 20 rolls of b/w 120 film) to *Life*, which was issued as “*Life goes on a migration with Persian tribesmen*,” on July 29, 1946.

Duncan employs these image productions exposing the Qashqai in migration in his books in greater detail than when presented in *Life’s* pages. In *Photo Nomad*, he regards the activity that he joins as “the history-fabled semiannual tribal migration” occurring indiscriminate of gender and age and on horseback, camel, or donkey in which he roams amongst the ruins of Persepolis, “where Alexander the Great also camped [in 331 B.C.],” in order to hunt for a few days; and then reconvenes with the tribes to drive their flocks toward Isfahan, “which might take some time” (107). A picture capturing the people heading in their predestined direction is revealed through their eternal cycle in nature, “In Spring and again Autumn as far back as any grandfather of all grandfathers could remember it was unwritten law of nature and

tribe...grasslands of April – flee ice storms of Winter” (*Photo*, 117). In *Yankee Nomad*, Duncan writes, “Tribesmen *everywhere* ... 200,000 Qashqai nomads migrate—plus one Yankee nomad from faraway Missouri.” While utilizing a snapshot of Malik Mansour Khan on horseback, leading and overseeing the flow of the migration, and also awaiting the Qashqai cavalry squadrons, “just as his ancestors once watched over their tribes on the wind-torn steppes of Turkistan,” which occurred even “before the Vikings sailed down from the north, or the Roman legions landed in England” (*Yankee*, 211), the origin of the migration activity and that of the Qashqai is placed in historical context. This context also appears in *The World of Allah*, wherein images showing tribesmen who moved their tents going to their summer meadows are exhibited with a headline, “Asia’s Medieval Spectacle” (140), while a picture of the cavalymen with rifles on horsebacks is displayed with “Descendants of the Horde of Genghis Khan” (147).

The Qashqai speaking a Turcoman dialect are explained as divided into forty-four sub-tribes, each having its own khan, migrating across about 32,000 square miles of southern and central Iran semi-annually and controlling another 50,000 square miles of bordering deserts, mountains, and meadows (*The World*, 271). Duncan aims to clarify the role of Qashqai in Iran’s politics by photographing Mohammed Nasser (the Khan of Khans), as one of the images show the moment of his participation to the migration that is acclaimed by the tribesmen who lift their rifles, while another presents him with sub-khans and tribesmen, captured in his colossal black goat-hair tent covered with Qashqai carpets, functioning as his great *majlis* in his summer camp in the Zagros Mountains (*The World*, 150-2). It is explicated that after the death of Nasser Khan’s father in prison during WWII, as he had been jailed during Reza Shah’s rein, the Qashqai were ruled by Nasser Khan and his three brothers, and his mother, the ‘Khan Mother,’ who bound the nomads in a closely knit community. Malik Mansur and Mohammad Hosein, the next two brothers, were Oxford graduates, and Khorso, the youngest Khan, on two occasions, routed the government’s troops sent to restrain the Qashqai. Just like Reza Shah, his son also tried to prohibit the migration of the nomadic tribes, as it was considered by the government “an anachronism reflecting decadence in Iranian character” (*The World*, 271). While portraying Nasser Khan’s summer domain through images that show tribesmen settling in their own tents; boys growing up with army rifles; girls riding horses; women weaving carpets; and the khans gaining their power from the armed cavalymen, Duncan states that despite their reluctance to admit to any sovereign—except the sky—tribesmen respect Nasser Khan and willingly share

three percent of their flocks and herds with him in exchange for the protection that he offers from the meddling of senators in Tehran, “who view the tribal lands with avarice—leaving each Qashqai free to pursue his lonely, unsheltered, wandering life” (*Yankee*, 217).

2.3. Analysis of Duncan’s Pictorial Stories on Iran

Duncan’s photographic contributions in the alignment of the inter and intra-national politics of Iran were created for *Life* in the spring 1946; yet his journalism explores Iran’s status between 1926 and 1946 ranging in diverse subject matters from the country’s modern socio-political, -economic, and -cultural history to its ascribed position of importance for Britain and the USSR in the course of WWII, and for the USSR and the U.S. in the early post-WWII. Also, his coverage of the semi-annual Qashqai migration, which occurred in the spring 1946, illustrates Iran in a historical context in the Middle East, as the territory has become the focal point of various people, in exposing the Qashqais, who migrated from Central Asia thousands years ago, and then turned out to be an essential peripheral component of the various sorts of ethnicities with their tribal identities and their complex roles in politics within the Imperial State of Iran.

2.3.1. An Outlook on the Dynastic Traits and on Imperialistic Configurations within Iranian History

Duncan explores Iran through an assignment for *Life*, when the Iranian Crisis of 1946 was escalating in diverse ranges, and this exploration is evident in his *Political Iranian Round-up*. Wherein, by using photographic display as an instrument of conveying his knowledge, the journalist touches upon two phenomena integral to his entire presentations. The first is the dynastic tradition in Iran that obtained its strength from the Persian history, and second, the imperialistic configurations of Britain and Russia that intently altered the direction of Iran’s political history in the course of WWII.

The display of the Imperial Palace can be considered as retrospective on Iran’s dynastic personification. Built by and lived in by Mohammad Reza Shah (later Shah), the palace is photographed by Duncan, whose written narrations unfold the history of the Pahlavi dynasty, that had been established by the former military man, Reza Shah, who usurped governmental

control in 1926 from the Qajar Dynasty of Persia (whose last ruler had been weakened during the British-Soviet occupation of Iran in WWI) and ruled his Imperial State of Iran till 1941. In this contextualization, the collection of images exposes the palace functioning as a symbolic icon, exhibiting the legitimization of the deep-rooted dynastic configurations of Persia, mirroring what Sandra Mackey utters in *The Iranians*: “From the time their ancestors gathered into social units at the dawn of history, the Iranians as individuals and as people have lived and died within the overlapped orbits of the powerful authority figures” (93).

In the affiliation with the dynastic characterization of Iran, the display of the Imperial Guards, who served in the Imperial Palace and whose uniforms are regarded by Duncan as “still” exposing the German influence, is indicative of the reasoning behind imperial ventures of Britain and Russia against Iran to exact control on its territory. While unearthing one of the origins of Anglo-Russian (allied) occupation of Iran during WWII—the country’s pro-German sentiments, Duncan’s representation stands in link with Louise Fawcett’s inputs, the author of *Iran and the Cold War: The Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946*, discussing what made Britain and the USSR alert and aggressive towards Iran, its cultivated economic and diplomatic partnership with Germany (1). Illustrative of this same notion are the accompanying captions of the images, exhibiting the later Shah, proclaiming the banishment of Reza Shah, who had passed away in exile in South Africa (1944). This is also a symbolic representation, working in tandem with what Fawcett further articulates, explaining Iran’s integration into the WWII forced by Britain and the USSR despite the Shah’s attempts at keeping neutrality. They justified their occupation as those of wartime necessity to use Iranian territory as a vital route to transport war supplies to the USSR, and in the course of the resistance of Reza Shah against the occupation, they abdicated and sent him in exile; and in turn forced his son, Mohammad Reza, to succeed him and take the throne (Fawcett, 1).

The context of dynastic traits and that of imperial configurations are employed by Duncan as subsidiary. His figurative yet profound representations encased within the images prove insightful on the modern political history of Iran. Dynastic establishment, well anchored in the history of the territory, brought about the Imperial State of Iran founded by Reza Shah; yet, after his abdication and exile, his state and its power had been reduced to a symbolic existence run by his son, Mohammad Reza, under the allied powers’ supervision in the course of WWII. This is a background provided by the journalist, assisting us to conceptualize his further

articulations about Iran, where the inner political stance continued to evolve accompanied by the sustained foreign interference in the early post WWII, when the Iranian Crisis of 1946 had taken its course in the international arena. The objective of the analysis below is to discern to what extent his discourse is telling of the economic, political, and ideological measures of the crisis, as well as, who held distinctive and essential roles and played a part in that region, while the history of the Middle East was evolving during post-WWII.

2.3.2. The Iranian Crisis in an Internal and International Scope, spring of 1946

As it is explained in *Political Iranian Round-up*, Duncan was the only photojournalist, foreign or Iranian, with access to many key affairs in the spring of the Iranian Crisis, 1946 (Iran-Azerbaijan Crisis). One of these affairs is the Iranian-Russian luncheon, given as a symbolic gesture by Prime Minister Ahmed Ghavam to the Russians, and held on April 18th, when “in New York the Iranian question was still bouncing around the Security Council.” The pictures taken during the luncheon aided by the written reports underlining that as a result of the diplomatic confrontations between Iran, the U.S., and the UN Security Council and the USSR, in conjunction with ‘the 3 Points Treaty’ that allowed the USSR oil concessions, signed a week before the luncheon, work to provide reasoning as to why the Soviets finally were ready to evacuate their troops from Iranian territory. Standing in connection with this reportage are Duncan’s narratives in his books and in explaining the tendency of his field study, he writes, in *Photo Nomad*, “grabbing shots of a Russian invasion from Azerbaijan threatening Persian Gulf Abadan oil fields” (107), additionally, while in describing the Tehran of 27 April 1946 as quiet and peaceful, in *Yankee Nomad*, his reasoning reads “the Russians loaded their tanks on flatcars and hauled them back into Soviet Azerbaijan, after the UN Security Council members stood up to them” (209). The exemplified style of reportage to *Life* and that of his narratives in the books provides a conception of what led up to the Iranian Crisis, as it was crucial to its complete understanding.

In view of the scholarly treatments of William L. Cleveland, the author of *A History of the Modern Middle East*, “Iran’s crisis with the Soviet Union was occasioned by Soviet behavior in the Iranian province of Azerbaijan.” The USSR violated ‘the 1942 treaty’ by neglecting to withdraw its troops from Iranian territory after the end of the war, and it also played a supportive

role on intra-territorial separation movements within the Iranian province of Azerbaijan, where the provincial government of Azerbaijan in the north and the Kurdish separatists in the southwest proclaimed their own autonomies in 1945. “The Iranian government, with strong backing from the United States, lodged a complaint with the UN Security Council, and in spring 1946, the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw its forces from Iranian territory” (276).

In understanding these scholastic inputs, Duncan certainly portrays the Iranian Crisis within the context of Russian expansionist policy, all the while providing a notion regarding the involvement of all parties into the matter, which is implicative of the growing significance of Persian Gulf oil for world powers that were in the process of re-structuring international order in the early post-WWII era, when prospective oil reserves were being snatched up exponentially. This implication today comes into view as a representation of the growing demands of the newly emerged superpowers, the U.S. and the USSR, and their allies in the Middle East engaged in a ‘war’ stage, which can be deemed symptomatic of this new global climate as “Iran was an early model of how the United States would meet the Soviet challenge and forge new regional partnership in the developing world” (Fawcett, 181). Thus, Duncan’s testimonial, displaying the end result of the U.S. action in the UN in the spring of 1946, can be found in the photographs exposing the Russian tanks retreating from Iran; yet more crucially, his testimonial makes us bear witness to what associated literature would later call, the early stages of the Cold War, as through this action of the U.S. the globalization of the Cold War was gathering momentum.

Despite great contributions in explaining the background of the Iranian crisis, Duncan’s explorations are lacking, as he neither places an emphasis on the changing course of foreign intervention towards Iran stemming from the involvement of the U.S. into the war, nor does he underline the impact of this change, together with persistence of occupation, on the internal politics of Iran, while ultimately, Russian behavior triggered the events and set them in motion. This absence in the books can be justified as Duncan published them as photo-autobiographical, aiming to expose the matter, not its origin, within a time frame, reflective of his presence in Iran as if the events were still current and developing. Yet such an absence placed in *Political Iranian Round-up* is significant, wherein the internal scope of the crisis is the subject of examination. He alludes to this change in course in depicting a governmental meeting headed by Prime Minister Ghavam, whose cabinet is reported as weak, “the weakest [cabinet] on the record according to top men in U.S. embassy,” but does not adequately promote the totality of the Iranian problem as

he regards to the exit of Russian troops from the region as a solution to their problem.

It is seen in presenting the temporarily established Iranian government, upon which the Shah had little control since the crisis had occurred, during when the quasi-parliamentary regime was interrupted, that the paramount goal of this disenfranchised ruling body was to achieve the complete evacuation of the Russian troops from Iran. Endeavoring to bridge the gap through historical literature brings about an external viewpoint, assisting us to comprehend Duncan's conceptualization of the internal scope in presentation. In tracing the history of Iran back to 1941, when Reza Shah had abdicated under pressure by allied powers and Mohammad Reza was crowned, it is seen that "For four years—1941 to 1945—the shah watched in the wings as his country struggled with the grim products of wartime—occupation, shortages, hunger, and chaos" (*Iranians*, 188). There were two new factors in the occupation of Iran by Britain and the USSR introduced in this time frame, one was "the entry of an entirely new power onto the Iranian stage, the United States," and the other, "the further post-World War II enhancement of the importance of oil resources, control of which had played a vital role in the Allied victory" (89), written by Rashid Khalidi, the author of *Western Footprints and American's Perilous Path in the Middle East: Resurrecting Empire*. After having sent its troops to the territory in 1942 as a war ally of Britain and the USSR, the integration of the U.S. into the war resulted in its involvement into Iran's internal politics, which laid "the groundwork" for American involvement in postwar Iranian affairs; "US civilian and military personnel assumed influential positions as advisors to the Iranian government [...]" (Cleveland, 191). Foreign interventions largely partaking in the internal politics triggered the ill equipped Shah's domestic problems; and when the time came in 1946, in the weakness of the crisis, he was confronted with "all the elements of opposition suppressed over twenty years of Pahlavi rule" (*Iranians*, 189).

Only in light of these scholarly contributions on the international affairs of Iran ranging in a wide spectrum, spanning from WWII to the post war era, Duncan's aforementioned representation of the Iranian government shed light on the weakness of the central government at the time, which was the partial product of the country's political trend under the sustained foreign occupations and pressures since 1941. During the crisis in the spring 1946, the Shah's limited central power collapsed and the temporarily restored central government of Ghavam, under the U.S. surveillance, was not able to cope with what is called, "a succession of the crisis, in large part the product of foreign intervention, with which the Iranian government was ill

equipped to deal, led to a final denouement in 1946” (Fawcett, 2).

Therefore, while presenting the international order first constructed through Anglo-Russian occupation of Iran, and re-configured with the involvement of the U.S. that kept manifesting itself within the post-war setting as oil took an increasingly essential place in a globalized economy, it would have been perceptive had Duncan touched upon the impacts miscellaneous foreign interests on Iranian territory had on Iran’s internal political traits, and to what extent it cultivated Iran’s inability to solve the crisis. Thus, in describing Tehran on the 27th of April, 1946 as previously stated, ‘quiet’ and ‘peaceful’ as the Russians hauled their tanks back into Soviet Azerbaijan (Yankee, 209), had Duncan addressed that Iran was yet still in turmoil, overburdened in socio-political and -economic matters it would have been well suited and would better explain the proliferations of these issues that have occurred to this day.

2.3.3. Iran’s Political Traits within the Context of its ‘Repressive Regime’ in spring, 1946

Both the Iranian government in place in the spring of 1946, and the Tudeh Party, the strong opposition group to the current political order, are Duncan’s specific points of emphasis in *Political Iranian Round-up*, through which he represents Iran’s internal political traits as a whole and within the context of coercion. What makes these representations essential is the journalist’s ability to connect present with past, and then suggesting through panorama Iran’s close future.

The display of the cabinet in night session with Prime Minister Ghavam, regarded by Duncan to as reflecting “their self-designed holy of holies,” is an allegorical representation of the absence of transparency in contemporary Iranian politics, and that of the existence of the anti-democratic and repressive habits of the ruling body in Iranian state. The entire reportage suggests that this absence of transparency was partly the product of the Iranian Crisis of 1946, and largely the outcome of the natural characteristic of the country’s modern political history. This is seen in exhibiting the crisis that cemented the internal order; the *Majlis* (Iranian National Assembly) was temporarily abolished, the central government was run by one man, and censorship was issued to both Iranian and foreign media by the second man in power, Mosaffar Firouz, serving as Political Under Secretary of State to the Prime Minister and Director General of Propaganda, Press and Radio. In conjunction with the illustrations of misfortunes of the Tudeh’s central

committee members, who had been accused of being Communist during the reign of Reza Shah in the early 1930s, and arrested as the “Constitution [had made] a communist charge a penitentiary offense,” the journalist covers a larger topic expressive of the authoritarianism that had been constructed long since in Iran.

In presenting the previously eluded to political prisoners, incarcerated from one to ten years, and in unison with the display of Soleiman Mirza Iskendari, the originator of the idea of the Tudeh after WWI, who had been forced to abandon his liberal thinking and activities publicly, Duncan’s journalism is exemplary of the institutionalized state identity constructed and defined through Reza Shah’s legitimatization of power, “[the Shah’s] personal power was enforced by the use of censorship, the abolition of opposition parties, the banning of trade unions, and the arrest and occasional murder of high ranking officials who incurred his displeasure” (Cleveland, 186). While illustrating the autocratic rule of the Shah that spanned from 1926 to 1941, the latter time frame marks the release of the political prisoners, in the course of Anglo-Russian occupation of Iran, who then became active participants in Iranian politics. Duncan details the events following Reza Shah’s fall suggesting the restoration of the power of the *Majlis* in Iran, where the active parliamentary setting resumed in 1941; yet the legal executive powers were retained by the crowned Shah, Mohammad Reza, until spring 1946, from whence the state became an entity and the assigned government of Ghavam ran the country in a dictatorial manner.

In displaying the body politics implemented by Ghavam’s government in Iran, where oppositions were not tolerated and power was legitimated through oppression and suppression, Duncan uses his camera objectively as a means of communication. This is epitomized through the photographs of the political cartoons hanging on Tudeh Headquarters’ walls, illustrating the political prisoners of the time. Appearing in one of the cartoons is Sayad Zia, currently in prison, as reported by the journalist, because he was accused of fomenting anti-Russian propaganda and creating provocative agitation against the government; and “perhaps because he threw Ghavam in jail twenty years ago.” This is telling of what Duncan calls the “quite violent nature” within Iranian politics, and clearly displays the current stance of the government with strong ties to Russia. Furthering this sentiment, a portrayal of Firouz, whose father had been assassinated by the Reza Shah and he overtly stated his plan of taking his revenge upon the current Shah, hints that political revenge is a common mannerism in Iran of 1946.

As exemplified thus far, Duncan provides the context of coercion by portraying the time frame, marking the reign of Reza Shah and that of Ghavam, presenting the institutionalization of the state identity, an apparatus conceived to assert and legitimize the authority in Iran, wherein all dissenting opinions could be ignored if not silenced. Within the scope of his reportage additionally, yet only slightly, is the reign of Mohammad Reza, but the effects of foreign intervention during this reign are unexplored, which is yet noteworthy. This exclusion on Duncan's part can be considered as a failure, not creating a broad enough perception promoting Iran as an 'immature democracy,' into which the foreign occupation had played its part in legitimizing the state's power, further separating them from the people of Iran. In associated literature, it appears that "[the abdication of Reza Shah] paved the way for an incoherent period of political pluralism in which politicians vied with each other for power in an area heavily dominated by the representatives of occupying powers and by the young shah, stripped of much of his father's power [...]" (22), written by Roger Owen in *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East*. Under the intersection of domestic unrest and foreign pressures, the crowned Shah faced "the storm of political dissent," which existed in a wide spectrum from "the Marxist Left" to "the democratic center" to "a cluster of clergy on the right" (*Iranians*, 191). While elites (e.g., the officer corps of the armed forces), who maintained control during his father's reign, insisted on retaining their powers, the previously silenced groups (e.g., the tribal leaders, the *ulama*, the traditional landowners) demanded the restoration of their powers they had enjoyed prior to 1926. At the same time, the new socio-economic and ideological interest groups stepped into the political scene demanding reforms. They ranged from "the emergent labor movement" to "the new class of professionals" to "older generation of constitutional liberals" (Cleveland, 288). The practice of politics was also surrounded by the vigor of the regional separatists along with the rapid expansion in industrialization and in education and all at once, there was generated an array of socio-political forces that yearned for "some kind of parliamentary representation" (Owen, 22). In theory, the setting of a parliament might be good medicine as the Shah began sharing power with other institutions including the Tudeh, "[his] most virulent opposition" (*Iranians*, 191). Yet in practice, the politicians were grouped in particular factions rather than in political parties, which triggered instability in politics as the cabinets swiftly turned over due to the fact that the serving prime minister was replaced with a new one almost every eight months which had been occurring since 1941 (Owen,

22). Crucially, in order to consolidate their own interests, the outsiders influenced each of these domestic factions. Britain encouraged collaboration between the monarchy and status quo-oriented groups (landowners and powerful tribes). The USSR on the other hand, supported the Tudeh. However, the newly arriving presence of the U.S. in Iran developed a close relationship with the Iranian armed forces and also supported any constituency that was anti-Russian (Cleveland, 289). In the meantime, a few skilled politicians were able to set short-term coalitions, “but a sustained effort to dominate the system long enough to build up a permanent political force, which could change the balance of power, was impossible” (Owen, 22).

Regardless of the outlined facts isolated from the media reportage—an inevitable result of Duncan’s Western perspective, his coverage in consideration of Iran’s future political arena is intensively exposed and telling of his humanistic outlooks developed on a multitude of issues facing this country. Despite the pessimistic review of Iran’s political climate, Duncan’s overall conceptualization appears to have altered radically in presenting the Tudeh Party that was ready to faceoff with Ghavam in the coming election. While explicitly asserting the stance of the Tudeh in the spring of 1946, as if it had a potential to change the country’s complex undemocratic political philosophy, his discourse stands in connection with what Mackey later uttered regarding the operation of the Tudeh as an authentic party for and by middle class intellectuals, touching upon their clearly defined social and economic agenda that was articulated through newspapers reaching the Iranian populace, “unlike the usual political group that clustered around the personality of one man” (*Iranians*, 191). Also, Duncan’s description of the unique characterization of the Tudeh, who were obliged to cut ties with the government because of Ghavam’s dictatorial policy and his refusal towards immediate reforms, is evocative of the scholastic contributions presenting Tudeh as reformists promising political organization in Iran (and in the Middle East) through which they promised “labor legislation and land reform for workers and peasants,” “political rights for women,” and “improved wages for lower-level civil servants” (Cleveland, 289). In elucidating the Tudeh’s voice and articulations within Iran, which came out of a context centered on Marxism and vowed to alleviate the societal dissatisfactions, Duncan assists us to visualize the Iranian state and society in spring 1946. By obtaining its strength from the labor Unions, lower class laborers, and the peasants, the Tudeh was the most powerful opponent to the current ruling body of Iran supported by the landed aristocracy and moneyed interest groups. By also promoting the idea of “for all Iran,” the party had a potential to

transform the country in a context that might be characterized by terms such as social justice, progress, and equality in economics and politics without gender and class separation—ideas uncannily similar with those occurring in Western civil rights reform.

2.3.4. The Socio-Cultural, -Economic, and -Political Climate in Iran during the spring of 1946 in Alignment with Modernization, Westernization, and Class Divisions

Coming out of *Political Iranian Round-up*, Duncan's most effective illustrations are from within the city of Tehran, Iran's capital, and from the periphery in the spring of 1946. These illustrations, being strongly indicative of Iran's inner political ambiance in pre- and post-WWII, are best reflective of every aspect of life flowing throughout Iran.

Here the products of the class divisions, gender separations, and injustice in economics and politics, coupled with the issues of modernization and Westernization becoming a factor since 1926, stressed and drove apart citizens. This is seen in image representations of Tehran that are reflective of the diverse Iranian societal ranking occupying two opposite ends of the socio-political spectrum: women dressed in a modern style, business men, and money brokers on one end, while country people, street vendors, and beggar boys make up the other; for a caption Duncan writes, "one half of life in Iran seems to be flat on its back, and the other half tears around it." Also, pictures of the *jube*, a motif for Duncan, demonstrates what is explained by him as "the contrasts of the only two walks of life in Iranian society;" as this open water conduit system, which splits the city, streams through the pavement, as its water; accompanying the flowing filth, and around which the life of all lower class people revolve. This is also similarly described in the textual combinations of visual works concerning the brick makers that unfold the socio-economic circumstances of their everyday lives. The effects of such images are strengthened by means of the specific backgrounds, which function as symbolic iconography. For instance, the outskirts of Tehran, which are shown as barren territory with the white, calcic soil in the background, becomes an indicator of the poverty surrounding the brick laborers. Whereas in another picture, modern Tehran is set at a distance (background) signifying class division; as it occurs in the picture, these workforces were removed away from the modern way of life. Lastly, the stresses of imperialism and its proliferations are constantly portrayed as it shaped the society deeply and intensively, as seen in snapshots of Tehran, where German Ford

roadsters and Russian Droshkies appeared, and the street venders were selling American candy bars and Dixon pencils.

Dealing with the issue of modernization and class division, just as in the above exemplified cases, the images of child laborers, such as match-box makers in the city and goat herders in the periphery, who were partaking in the cheap labor system of the country, in conjunction with photos of the beggar boys wandering the streets of Tehran, are inseparable fundamentals of Duncan's representation of the politics and the general milieu surrounding Iran as a whole, ranging from the landed aristocracy and moneyed interests in power to their most influential rival—the Tudeh. A glimpse is given with “there is no law giving [the beggar] a shelter or means of going to school [yet] the Tudeh platform promises schooling and health safeguards, if nothing else, for kids like this.” A vision is also given in his articulations on the Tudeh promise that was to place child laborers in schools through a law, which would be “one of [the] first written laws,” if the party would win the coming election and would have a majority in the *majlis*. These notions work to reveal the idea that “[The Tudeh was] stimulating the masses to think and act politically for the first time” (300), stated by a reporter for the New York Times, in May 1946, as noted by Ervand Abrahamian in *Iran Between Two Revolutions*.

Moreover, while illustrating the rhythm of socio-economic ambiance surrounding the peasants, Duncan's figurative works generate an inspired outlook that in spite of its remoteness from modern life, the people of the periphery kept themselves intact with peace and civility. This is exemplified in his symbolic description of valleys (“much like Eden”) and also seen through an array of poetic imagery in presenting the photographs of the village Gilard, where the village head attempting to convince his stubborn camel to move away from the water mill wears heavy woolen socks, as many of the men dress in, woven by their women, and “now with the sun shining after three days and nights of freezing rain, all of the men were out drying out and sunning.” In further articulating the notion of peace a photo epitomizes the atmosphere in this vast openness with a display of two peasants, photographed while walking back home from the bazaar in Tehran over “a land of great loneliness, sky, time to think, and sand between your toes.” Yet, in conjunction with the visual portrayals of the wage laborers (locomotive engineers, cobblers, textile workers, carpet menders, and cab drivers), the displays of the peasants turn out to be an allegorical definition of Iran's capitalistic system, where the exemplified subordinate socio-economic groups worked for the landlords and moneyed interests in industry, which were

the indicators of the prime economic basics of work and property, presenting a hospitable environment for colonial capitalism to thrive. This conjunction of images in examination also symbolically stresses that Iranian society was split through ‘capital’ and ‘modernization,’ just as the vast Iranian territory; divided through climate, geography, and topographic settings photographed through deserted areas, mountains, and high plateaus. Thereupon, all at once, Duncan’s photojournalism is reflective of a sequence of binary oppositions: ‘modern’ vs. ‘traditional,’ ‘aristocracy’ vs. ‘lower class,’ ‘rich’ vs. ‘poor,’ ‘urban’ vs. ‘rural,’ and ‘city’ vs. ‘village,’ which seemed to live adjacently, yet were falling apart as the aristocrats—stratified through Western education—separated themselves from the majority of people, the Iranians. This is exemplified in an image of a family group, taken in the home of Colonel Hassen Amini, a cavalry officer of the Iranian army, representative of the grand landholders and their mode of living in a mix of modern and Western standards.

In elucidating the oncoming changes, in reference to Iranian women and their historically alternating roles in public and private, two specific image productions are good examples to investigate how his discourse conceptualizes the issue. One demonstrates a worker’s wife, dressed in a white chador, participating in Tudeh’s Friday meetings; for a caption Duncan writes that this woman resumed using a chador, which had been banned during Reza Shah’s reign. Yet, the other example illustrates the upper class women dressed in the Western fashion, Misses Pari Riahi and Fachri Amini, the latter being a colonel’s wife. The reflections of the participation of the woman in chador at the Friday meetings have several objectives; the first being, to underline the existence of the Women’s Club of the Tudeh and its impact on national thinking. The second aims to highlight a notion attested to with ‘the more the party extended its influence within the intellectual community the more powerfully it organized the women’s section’ (Abrahamian, 301). Finally, the third aim of this suggestive presentation is to provide a notion regarding an active rejection of Reza Shah’s implementation of nationalism, who had transformed Iran into a setting characterized by popular participation and gender relations, which was merged with a complex mix of modernization, Westernization, and secularization; out of this framework, the Shah functioned and acted upon his agenda, which included separating the women of Iran from its politics. Regardless of the lack of information concerning the reasons why the chador reappeared in Iran, Duncan’s review of women’s historically altering place in public and private life is essential, because it helps us to understand within a historical context; unveiling the new

Shah's motivation—the need to strengthen his delicate place on the throne, and “tearing away the blanket of repression that Reza Shah had spread over Shia Islam, his son allowed women to emerge from their houses wrapped in the chador [...]” (*Iranians*, 189). Certainly, the exemplified review of Duncan aids us to recognize the strong link with his display of Pari Riahi and Fachri Amini, who were closely “chaperoned” until their marriages, and then ‘modernized’ after Reza Shah abolished the veil. Ironically enough, these particular productions in representing the female subjects appear to have accurately characterized the Iranian women of the spring of 1946, who were, in a large part, residing in two opposite ends of the spectrum in society. While the worker's wife was associating with the forward national thinking and demanding her rights in politics, Fachri Amini appearing in the photograph with her extravagant jewelry associated herself with politics solely through her husband's current role in the state. Within a larger context, Duncan's examination implies the country's awkward position in modernization under the Pahlavi era (1926-1946), which came to exist through reforms within a political ethos of personal gain. Yet as it was isolated the majority of the society, it fashioned a mix of Western and European settings in education as well as in dressing and life style for the upper class people, who did not take a stand for progress in political culture and economics, and never initiated a true modernization, the creation of the bourgeoisie that they were never a part of.

2.3.5. Semi-Annual Qashqai Migration in Persia of the spring of 1946

Duncan's image productions, transpired for *Qashqai Migration*, and reflective of the semi-annual migration activities of the Qashqai nomads of Persia, are especially insightful as his representations came out of his travels throughout far-flung places in Persia, where he lived a nomadic existence, just as the Qashqai, in the spring of 1946. This, needless to say, led him to develop insights in respect to the people and their cultures in his books, the only sources to obtain his written accounts on the topic; wherein, he also contextualizes his contributions relating them to the region.

Due to the nature of Duncan's body of work, the illustrations of the Qashqai nomads resemble those of the sedentary peasantry of Iran (discussed above). The ‘nature,’ ‘land,’ ‘mounts,’ and ‘flocks’ along with ‘herding and weaving traditions’ are shown by the photographer as the greatest commonalities of both categorized groups of people. This

resemblance is however used by him to reflect the diversity of the lifestyles of the periphery. The seasonal changes impacted both groups in different manners as “the Qashqai *must* follow the sun and new-born grass, and the eternal cycle of their own rootless lives—or die.” They temporarily settled in their tents over the summer or winter, only after spreading out over vast territories, while migrating each autumn and spring from north to south or vice versa, as relayed in an image presented with “Donkeys, camels, huntsmen, mothers with infants or lambkins—and sometimes both—surge past amid pageantry and din on a colossal scale” (*Yankee*, 211). Despite sharing the common practice of weaving in Persia, the women of Qashqai differed from those of the sedentary population, as migration traditions were partaken in by all; seen in a picture entitled as “The search for grass” (*The World*, 141). Also, Qashqai boys grew up with army rifles while girls rode horses, an idea conveyed in snapshots depicting their summer domain, “where children learn of life with army rifles and pureblooded horses as companions” (*Yankee*, 217), unlike the children of villages, who were, in varying degrees, a part of the (child) laboring system of Iran. Thus, the illustrations allow us to be convinced that these socially constructed two classified communes were strong components of the heterogeneous Iranian nationhood; yet their functions and their ascribed values within the socio-economic discourse were vastly different.

Duncan explains the ruling structure of ‘the Qashqai empire,’ which had been, since the death of the Khan of Khans during his imprisonment by Reza Shah during WWII, ruled by four brother khans and their mother, who each played roles significantly within the Qashqai (*The World*, 271). He also rationalizes the Qashqai nomads’ acquiesce of being under the authority of Mohammed Nasser, the new Khan of Khans and the eldest brother: “[...] every man bows to Nasser Khan [...] willingly give him three percent of their flocks and herds[;] in turn he shields the nomads from government senators in Tehran.” Placing this actively functioning and crucial social device in a political context, this statement not only unfolds Nasser Khan’s strong preventative role in the state apparatus in Tehran, surrounded with ruling elites, who regarded “the tribal lands with avarice,” but also exhibits an unwritten mutual agreement of the nomads with Nasser Khan that allowed for the Qashqai to be “free to pursue his lonely, unsheltered, wandering life” (*Yankee*, 217). Promoting the interactions of high politicians towards the tribal culture in Iran, Duncan’s portrayals of the Qashqai appear to remain in relation with his illustrations of Iran’s intra-national politics. Corresponding with the context, previously given through the displays of Reza Shah’s implementation of nationalization coupled with his

centralization of the state, “The late Shah of Iran, as his father had before him, attempted to prohibit the annual migration of the great nomadic tribes [as they viewed nomadic migration as] an anachronism reflecting decadence in Iranian character [...]” (*The World*, 270-1). While echoing the scholarly account on the former Shah’s institutionalization of central control, who stationed military garrisons in the tribal regions after WWI, “forcibly disarming the tribes, confiscating their lands, and restricting their migration patterns” (Cleveland, 187), the above sentiment represents the aspirations of the ruling elites to create a society compatible with the throne, willing to isolate its members from their own ethnic and cultural traits in the process. Yet, the characterization of the rulers’ methods, which strengthened the state bureaucracy, did not subsume the diverse components of the Iranian nation like the Qashqai; thus, as implied by Duncan, the rapid decentralization of the tribes followed by the weakness of the state within allied occupation in Iran brought about an inevitable result; “In the vacuum of power, the tribes dug up their long-buried guns [and then] they declared their freedom from Tehran” (*Iranian*, 189). This is evident in the photos capturing Nasser Khan’s summer tent, functioning as his great *majlis*, wherein he met with his sub-khans and tribesmen, in front of which his armed cavalymen in great numbers stand at the salute. No less crucial, an aspect of Duncan’s account can be found in his presentation of the youngest (brother) Khan, who twice had routed governmental troops in attempts to subdue the Qashqai, proving insightful on why “there was rarely a night when he neglected the diagramming ambushes throughout the entire tribal domain, to be activated should the Shah’s troops ever again try to breach his stronghold” (*The World*, 271), while also displaying an uncertain and cautious relationship between the Qashqai’s and the ruling regime in the spring of 1946.

Crucially enough, Duncan’s entire portrayal assists us to envision Iran’s geographical position that made its vast territories a crossroad for great migratory populations and a meeting place of rival civilizations within the course of Middle Eastern history. This is exposed through the Qashqai’s ancestral ties exemplified with an image displaying the migration activity entitled “[Central] Asia’s Medieval Spectacle” (*The World*, 140). While underlining the Qashqais’ preceding homeland and the origin of their migration being practiced in the Persia of the twentieth century, this title serves as the identifier of the pivotal role the vast Middle Eastern territories have played in the course of history. Coupling this with his statement, “Tribesmen *everywhere* ... 200,000 Qashqai nomads migrate—plus one Yankee nomad from faraway

Missouri” (*Yankee*, 211), Duncan makes the point that the Middle East has coalesced not only the continents but also the civilizations of Eurasia while also promoting the magnitude of this procession. Just as it connected the Qashqai of Asia, centuries ago, to the Persians, it now associated the representative of the Western world, Duncan, to the Qashqais.

A similar tone flows in describing the ruins of Persepolis, a campsite of the Qashqais in spring 1946, where Alexander the Great camped in 331 B.C. “with his eastbound legions during his thrust to conquer India” (*Photo*, 107). Duncan’s recollection of Persepolis works as the reminder of Persian identity, which had been forged in a mix of Persian and Greek ideals close to the dawn of history, and has continually evolved in step with the territory, riddled with a history of subjugation. Keeping with the historical tone is the representation of Malik Mansour Khan photographed on the horseback, awaiting the Qashqai cavalry squadrons, “just as his ancestors once watched over their tribes on the wind-torn steppes of Turkistan” (*Yankee*, 211), while another’s headline reads, “Descendants of the horde of the Genghis Khan” (*The World*, 147), accompanying a photo exhibiting the cavalymen, who joined the migration and hunting activity with Nasser Khan. As identifiers of these nomadic, pastoral people’s ethnic milieu, these examples function as symbolic iconography with an aim to reveal the confrontation between the Mongol and Persian cultures, as at the beginning of the thirteenth century the Mongol army of Genghis Khan impaired Persian culture by occupying the area with the same ferocity as it did in all of its commandeered territories. Accompanied with the display of aforementioned cavalymen, these examples also place the existence of the Qashqais’ warrior tradition in a historical context, which is reminiscent of Genghis Khan’s implementation of classical military configurations into his tribesmen’s traditional way of life, playing to their strengths (*Iranians*, 8). Thus, Duncan’s representation allows his readers to acknowledge that history was echoing in the Persian territory; just as Genghis Khan constructed his power from his horsemen, his descendant, Nasser Khan extended and displayed his strength with his cavalry.

2.4. Intentions in Coverage of Iran Appearing in the Media Outlets

In reading into Duncan’s explorations of Iran, this study has thus far set out to understand the journalist’s pictorial stories that were materialized through his field studies carried out in that country. First, it has underlined the photojournalist’s particular choices and points of emphasis in the representations of consequential events stirring in this region, and then, it has analyzed how

Iran is represented. Equipped with the highlighted outcomes of the research, this section of the study now intends to provide an outlook on the way Duncan's representations appeared in *Life*, by providing an understanding of: to what extent the magazine's picture stories are representative of his mastery of photojournalism; what the objectives were in transmitting his productions to the readers of the magazine; and in what degree these objectives are in coherence with Duncan's intentions, either exemplified in his captions for *Life*, or shown in his books.

Bearing in mind the synopsis section of this study delineating Duncan's photojournalism in Iran, and in viewing "Iran: Two worlds collide in a rich and troubled land" (May 1946), the construction of this story by *Life* is almost completely in congruence with his combined image and word coverage (caption book), elucidating the crux of his field study that was converted into an on the ground project for the magazine's editors to extract their story. The editorial accounts, drawing attention to the ancient land of Iran that has long been a land of trouble for the world and its own people, cover the post-war international crisis dictated through Soviet behavior that "opposed the rest of the Security Council," and was about to create "a new Serbia" out of Iranian territory, as it would "be the starting place of another world war" (61). A photograph exhibiting the Iranian-Russian luncheon, which was printed with "Russia and Iran had signed their oil agreement" (62), functions to promote a notion about oil's growing importance in the world, spelling trouble in developing Iran. Yet more significantly, in exposing the public to Iran's recent trouble, which hung over the UN, displaying its foreseeable destruction, "threatening darkly to disrupt the organization in which lies a hope of world peace" (61), another snapshot showing the Russians moving out of Iran, displayed with "Life's photographer catches them loading tanks, material and troops on flatcars at siding south of Russian Baku" (63), works to sell the West as attempting to create peace and impose ideology opposing Communism and the aggression of the Soviets. These topics appearing in *Life*'s pages are repeated by Duncan with the same intention and correlative expressions for the readers of his books (see analysis).

The images of three vital figures were utilized in *Life* to assist the Western reader to grasp the meaning of the inner political stance in presentation while keeping this part of the Middle East in the news. The portrait of the Shah, who had a negligible role in politics, is presented with "For decades, through Iran's political faces and even its shahs changed, the country was controlled by a few, ultraconservative landowners" (62). Also, the portrait of Prime Minister Ahmed Ghavam displayed as a strong man in Iran, works to explain the basis, from which he

gained the credit from both leftists and right wingers, “for making the arrangement with Russians and also for contriving to bring back into the central government the rebellious Azerbaijan separatists in the north” (62). Finally, the portrait of Irej Iskendari (secretary) is representative of the Tudeh Party “which before 1941 was scattered, spineless and without direction,” and is portrayed through its pro-Russian sentiments, its attempts at “organizing the country’s small but strategically placed poor working class into trade unions” (62), and its endeavors to keep the parliament of a right-wing majority for the coming elections. While suggesting that “[in Iran] the left-wing, Communist-backed parties were gaining political ascendancy” (62), these examples certainly fulfill Duncan’s aims of what has been previously stated in analyzing his representations; transmitting knowledge of Iran’s stormy political history through its current power struggles and its societal delineations.

The pictures exhibiting the geographic diversity of Iran, and most of the snapshots capturing the city, Tehran, were not employed in the story. Yet, the editorial accounts allow its readers to envision Iran straddling two continents, where divergences of nature provided the icy mountains, waterless plateaus, and deserted areas (61). Just like the city, divided into two, one of its segments is reflective of the European face of Iran, “which the old shah tried to graft onto his country” (64) that neither embraced the majority, nor was it embraced by them, which is all mirrored in Duncan’s photocompositions, captured as evidence in constructing a broad perspective paying heed to geography and history (see synopsis). The exemplified cases were printed with “The thin veneer of modernity which ambitious Reza Shah [...] daubed onto his capital city of Tehran does not hide the colorful filth and misery of the Orient” (64), and in unison with the displays of the *jubes*, “whose muddy waters are used for drinking, washing, and cooking” (64), these together work to reveal the depressing impoverished, regarded as “sit[ting] in the streets of Tehran and looking toward an uncertain future” (64). This point corresponds with Duncan’s intention of creating a collective conception regarding Reza Shah’s reign; yet the rhetoric used by *Life* differs from Duncan’s as he avoids using any generalization in his reportage. His words do not oversimplify the issues in Iran or prescribe them to a specific group, the Middle East, as *Life* may have with “the colorful filth and misery of the Orient.” Also *Life*’s representation has appeared to deviate from Duncan’s by surmising that the oblique outlook shared within the Iranian populous was an indicator of an uncertain future, as he was more optimistic once taking into consideration his report on the Tudeh (see analysis).

Representative of upper class people is a photograph of a family group—women and men, portrayed through “[the family] wears Western cloths, educates its children in Europe or the U.S., [and] seldom visits landholdings outside city” (65). This photo is placed adjacent to one that portrays a political crowd listening to Tudeh’s speaker while also covering a worker’s wife in white chador. Despite her being depicted as “still wearing ancient dress” (64), which is certainly outside of Duncan’s rhetoric, as he does not refer to any of his subject’s customs as ancient oversimplifying the dress style (see synopsis), *Life*’s reportage regarding these two groups on opposite ends of the spectrum still works in presenting Iran’s current political atmosphere, as it is signified through Tudeh’s efforts at providing women an active role in politics. Also, drawing the readers to camera objectivity and authenticity, whether it be the aforementioned ruling class or their subordinates ranging from working class people to peasantry, all of the images are exposed with the photographer’s aptitude for promoting evocative elucidations of Iran, assisting his viewers to conceptualize the land and its people, and bringing about clarity in regards to the inner pattern of the politics, which is an intellectual effort of Duncan, whose voice was brought out in *Life*’s story, as discussed in the analysis section of this study.

Duncan’s solely photographic reportage is presented to the reader in “*Life* goes on a migration with Persian tribesmen” (July 1946), wherein the photocompositions were printed with “this year’s migration was made by 200,000 Qashqai tribesmen and one outsider LIFE’s David Duncan” (100). His ability to provide the atmosphere of the Qashqai migration without a single word is displayed in the editorial story through two images; one reads “horses, donkeys, and camels carry tribal family, including mothers with babies in their laps, through dusty tablelands of central Iran” (99), and the other exhibits a sheep “munching a leafless plant in grassless waste” (102), revealing why the Qashqai went north each summer. Most crucially the images taken for *Life* evoke an examination of other cultures, which exposes Western viewers to tribal and regional motives in every frame. While providing instructive knowledge on the Qashqai’s eternal cycle of life accompanying nature, whose way of life occurred for countless centuries in Iran (99), the editorial accounts present Qashqai’s summer domain through pictures. In explaining the role and power of Nasser Khan in politics, whose strength lay with his 10,000 armed horsemen, the notion is visually suggested to the readers that “After years of unsuccessful fighting, the central government in Tehran no longer attempts even to collect taxes from these

determined nomads” (99). Also, in framing Qashqai cavalrymen, accompanied with the explanation “like the Turkomen hordes who swept across this part of the world in the Middle Ages” (100), the entire story allows the reader to conceptualize the territory as a whole, and to sympathize with the Qashqai, “who wish most of all to be left alone in their mountains” (101). All these representations appearing in the magazine, while showing us a professional press photographer whose determination brought this un-commissioned story to life which fit *Life*’s publishing agenda well, are akin to those placed in his books, wherein he provides the reader still more information about the history, culture, and uncertainty of these people’s place in Iran and its future (see analysis).

2.4.1. Conclusion

Duncan’s explorations of Iran in photojournalism that occurred in 1946 brought about two different stories; both appearing in *Life* Magazine as well as in Duncan’s books, either in *Yankee Nomad*, *The World of Allah*, or *Photo Nomad*.

As it has been understood in the current study, the fundamental attribute of Duncan’s unpublished and published materials identifying his representations of Iran is his usage of image productions as a means of communication. Just as the exchange between the visual subjects and Duncan’s camera occurs objectively, his photographs deliver messages to his addressees; while some images sufficiently expose the whole story, others were completed by means of written narrations—inseparable elements of the visual productions, through which he transferred the knowledge of the subject matter. Thus, in the essence of his exposures, Duncan enriched the content as he provided a comprehensive perspective on Iran, its political culture and state identity. In his journalism he provided, to a prolific extent, an outlook in understanding the unique position of Iranian territory and its strategic importance in the Middle East, upon the globe, and through geography and history—its heterogeneity due to the cultural alteration and circulation of diverse population, its pattern of integration into global military conflict, and then, its penetration into an international crisis in the age of oil, becoming a venue for Cold War politics and tensions.

In consideration of the information, intended to be received by Western readers from Duncan’s discourse about Iran, this study has underlined that the commonalities of both stories

verify and justify Iran's eventful modern political history, in which recurring belligerence was the norm, the national identity remained ambiguous, without direction, and the unfair modernization process, class divisions, and inequality in economics and politics were created by the long ruling elites who sought to suppress the wishes of the country's many ethnic and cultural groups. Despite thoroughness, the contributions, in this regard, isolated themselves from the mixed results of imperialism and colonialism in Duncan's works, presented in *Life*, placing blame squarely on the Iranian government by not acknowledging the West's negative effects on this society. The first story reveals consequential dealings in the region in the axis of oil's growing significance around the globe during early post WWII; surely from the Western perspective, serving the Western nationalistic view in media circulation, whether it promoted Western public opinion, enforced its ideals, or projected these ideals onto the people and places of Iran to 'help readers find common ground.' This is (additionally) displayed through *Life's* degradation of Iranian culture and customs (i.e., referring to them as ancient) or in their portrayal of Tudeh, selectively focusing on their proliferating the communist agenda. Tudeh's socially constructed economic and political agenda and their role in the country as a positive one is little seen in *Life's* pages, which is a topic largely covered by Duncan in his caption book, providing thoroughness and fairness in spite of the party's strong ties with the USSR and its Marxist ideology to present Iran in an optimistic manner.

Though Duncan's journalism is somewhat skewed towards Western centrist ideals, his first-hand experience allows his readers some deviation towards a more objective, purely historical snapshot of Iran in the spring of 1946. Both stories do well to instruct the reader to dissatisfactions within the Iranian populace, considerably accounting for all subordinate groups including women and labouring class of people and peasants, as well as ethnic and cultural minorities (the Qashqai). By doing this Duncan was able to reflect human experience, offering a standpoint from which to empathize with the people of Iran, whose diversity and multiplicity in cultural practices, wishes, and identities have constituted the indigenous Persians, who all functioned with strong codes and value systems and through their own territorial roots and traits. The juxtapositions of his artistic and journalistic discourses certainly eternalize the history for posterity and breathe life into his complex pictorial stories, which is an essential component of any research or earnest inquiry regarding Iran and the Middle East, and in connecting the past, present, and future—its socio-cultural, -political, and -economic transformation—within the

period of globalization.

2.5. Synopsis of Duncan's Pictorial Stories on the Palestinian Territories

Duncan arrived in Palestine on his second assignment for *Life*, in June 1946, and there he covered seven stories by October of that year. The collections of these stories, pertaining to his mission, reflect the issues of diverse ranges from 'military operations launched by the British occupying powers' to 'terrorists attacks led by Zionist paramilitary organizations within the territory,' and from 'illegal Jewish immigration into Palestine' to 'every day of life experienced by the Arabs and Jews,' coalescing while illustrating socio-political and ideological state of affairs taking place in the Palestinian territories. Also, as a correspondent for *Collier's*, in June 1956, Duncan visited the Gaza Strip, where he covered a story pertaining to the area, which was his last work in regards to Palestine and the Middle East.

2.5.1. Socio-Political and Ideological Surroundings within the Palestinian Territories in 1946

Duncan's artistic and journalistic pursuits on a diverse scope of issues occurring within the Palestinian lands were produced between June and October 1946, when Palestine was under British occupation, and the power conflicts among Palestinian Arabs, the Jews, and the occupying forces were escalating. During this assignment, Duncan compiled his field study into seven files that encompass seven different stories. The collections of two files out of the seven are in solely image form [*Jerusalem Curfew* (July 1946): 3 rolls of b/w 120 film, and *Rafa Detention Camp* (July 1946): 1 rolls of b/w 120 film]. Several of these images were included in *Life's* stories and in Duncan's books to help illustrate points in other stories but were not given their own designation. They are thus not explored in this dissertation in that manner. The remaining five files include the items as follows:

- a) *Yajur (Yagour) Search* (caption book), and 4 rolls of b/w 120 film.
- b) *King David Hotel* (caption book), and 7 rolls of b/w 120 film. On August 12, 1946,

Life issued the picture story, “Blood runs in Palestine violence,” which also includes Duncan’s coverage of *Yajur Search*.

c) *Illegal Immigration* (caption book), and 16 rolls of b/w 120 film. Published by *Life* as “Civil war threatens in Palestine as British start ‘Operation Igloo,’” on September 2, 1946.

d) *Jaffa Bank Robbery & Shooting* (caption book), and 2 rolls of b/w 120 film. Published by *Life* as “Life photographer gets into Jaffa street battle,” or “Shooting in Jaffa,” September 30, 1946.

e) *Palestine: the Problem Land* (caption book), and 73 rolls of b/w 120 film, and 30 rolls of b/w 120 film. Published as “Palestine: new type of peasant Jew fights for a homeland,” by *Life*, on November 4, 1946, which is the first cover story selected from Duncan’s field study.

Each one of the above-italicized subjects can be distinguished as a member of the following three classifications into which Duncan’s representations fall:

1. The acts of terrorism for the Jewish cause vs. British military operations
2. Illegal Jewish immigration to Palestine
3. Palestine, a land of trouble

2.5.1.1. The Acts of Terrorism for Jewish Causes vs. British Military Operations

Duncan’s representative works regarding the issue of terrorism led by the Zionist paramilitary union (namely Irgun) and military operations carried out by the British armed forces within the British mandate of Palestine in 1946 emerge from the following stories: *Yajur Search*, *King David Hotel*, *Jaffa Bank Robbery & Shooting*, and *Palestine: the Problem Land*.

In *Yajur Search*, Duncan identifies the main story, which is the military operation launched on the morning of June 29, 1946 in Yajur village by British armed forces in cooperation with the Palestinian Police department, with an aim to identify and interrogate Jewish terrorists and to find their weapons. He clarifies that the photographic coverage of the search at Yajur (the largest kibbutz: an Israeli collective farm and settlement, cooperatively owned and operated) is representative of a succession of military operations starting on that same day, in twenty-five Jewish towns and villages, in central and northern Palestine.

The visualization of the search at Yajur can be separated into three sets, each having several objectives that outline the photojournalist's standpoints. Within the first set, multiple snapshots illustrate how the British troops enter into the village with *brengun* carriers, due to the strong resistance from the settlers. Numerous images of the operation are indicative of the arms caches found by the British soldiers through use of mine detectors, which were hidden in the different locations (e.g., either in masonry of the bridges, or under the houses, the landing of the stairs in the children's house, and the tool house). Duncan reports that "the entire settlement was just one huge arms dump, with many of the houses built right around the caches"; the following is found after four days of searching: 357 rifles, 46 pistols, 3 Lewis machineguns, 3 Brenguns, 2 shotguns, 89 two-inch mortars, 2 three-inch mortars, 5714 grenades, 17 signal pistols, 258,207 rounds ammunition, 970 pounds gelignite, and 311 bullet cartridges. His reporting style exemplifies why the outcome of the search of Yajur is very essential: it not only allows the British to justify their actions as purely military operations, but also exhibits a model for future searches; every corner of any cooperative commune (e.g., living quarters, playgrounds of the children) liable to search, as the pattern of hiding arms would likely be the same as in Yajur.

The buildings and the residents of the village fall into the second set of Duncan's visual depictions. The efficacy of the images of the village buildings is strengthened by their captions, through which the photographer aims to show that in opposition to the representations of the local news (i.e., "according to the local press the place doesn't exist anymore"), there is no serious damage incurred during the process of searching. With the exception of the exact location of each arms cache, neither the village, nor its infrastructure is destroyed (i.e., soldiers having farming experience temporarily complete domestic duties, e.g., tending to animals/crop products). Similarly, the pictures of residents of the village are complementary to the written narratives in examination, and the following report is presented by Duncan to display that there is no serious injury incurred; the older people along with the entire population of women and children (around 300 and 500, respectively) are also left undisturbed; yet around 500 men (working or of military age) are taken to Haifa for identification and interrogation.

The image-word compositions of the military headquarters at Haifa (the third set), where the men of Yajur are taken for trial and where the illegal arms and ammunition under examination are kept as evidence, are the vital components of the entire representation of Yajur, which serves as the signifier of a political reality—what Duncan sees as, "the complete parting of

the ways between the British military and the Jews in Palestine.”

In *King David Hotel*, Duncan covers the story of the bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem (noon of July 22, 1946), in which the main offices of the British mandatory authorities, the secretariat of the government, and headquarters of the British forces are located. The documentary style of this work is constructed in the form of a news report, through which the journalist conveys that the explosion of the dynamite, carried by the Irgun in milk cans into the bar area of the basement, results in the collapse of a wing of the seven-floor concrete building, where ninety-one people are killed, and numerous people are injured.

The image productions and their associated captions exclusively reflect the rescue operation (between noon and midnight) led by the British troops and Palestinian police forces within the ruins of the hotel. Several snapshots demonstrate Arab laborers, who form “lines of basket-brigades,” to clear the way to extract the dead or wounded bodies, while numerous images are taken inside the ruins of the ground floor to display the attempts to uncover bodies, either injured or deceased. Duncan’s visualization of three wounded soldiers being rescued is touching, just as that of a little Arab messenger boy: after his body is extracted, his father is comforted by other Arabs to no avail—“but their words aren’t even penetrating.” The strong effect of the incident is visualized in a particular representation, displayed is a splotch of blood on the wall of the Jerusalem’s famous YMCA tower, located 75 yards across the street from the target building, to where the explosion blew the body of Mr. F. W. Keyes (Chief of Government Finances and former assistant Chief Secretary of Palestine Government). As outlined, these works are illustrative of the climate surrounding Palestine, and show the resistance of some Zionists against the mandated rule of Britain. Such a resistance, in this case, is manifested in the form of terrorism—the actual targets are the officers of the government and those of the British military headquarters; yet, the acts also harm and kill innocent civilians, Jews and Arabs alike.

Jaffa Bank Robbery & Shooting is Duncan’s exclusive coverage regarding the raid of the Jewish terrorists, who attempt to rob the Ottoman Bank of Jaffa (around 11:20 am, on September 13, 1946). The textual materials explicate that this reportage emerges coincidentally as Duncan is visiting Jaffa with his Arab friend, and walking on a street close by the bank at the exact instant of the event. Coinciding with *King David Hotel*, the style of this story is constructed in the form of a news report; yet this time, the photojournalist explores minute by minute the act of terrorism, which harms bank officials and civilians alike.

Multiple images expose the beginnings of the incident as they display the civilians, who are running away from the area of the bank because of the explosion of an oil bomb, “as a diversionary measure,” in close proximity to the bank’s entrance. Duncan reports the following regarding the continuity of time: the street is emptied because people associate the explosion with that of the King David Hotel. It is also because the terrorists open fire in the street. Along with three Arabs, Duncan hides in the corner of the street, from where he views a green Chevrolet sedan “parked at the intersection one block to the right [...] of the target [...].” The driver of the Chevy waves Duncan to photograph them, while at the same time two men at the rear seat open fire towards the Arabs, standing just behind him (killing one of them and injuring the others). This report makes the image coverage of the Chevy (before it pulls away to pick up the other terrorists escaping from the bank) more effectual, as it allows one to feel the fear of the described moment. Duncan also portrays the operations of the Palestinian policemen, who arrive at the location swiftly, and those of the agents of the British Criminal Investigation Department, who arrest three suspects. Yet, his ironic portrayal appears in the picture of the banner that exhibits the movie of the day, “a thriller of two gun *Captain Midnight!*” hanging on the entrance of a movie theatre, into which the soldiers pursue the suspects. All the same, these image collections can be considered as historical records, and their effects are enhanced through a caption stating, “Palestine [will be] settled again into the pattern of road blocks and curfews.”

A short segment within *Palestine: the Problem Land* is both reflective of the sole interview conducted with the top men of Irgun, and illustrative of the sole picture coverage of the headquarters of the Irgun Zvai Leumi (October, 1946). Written more in the form of a story, the captions of this coverage explain that Duncan is not permitted to show the “face” or “anything,” which might be identifiable during a police search; and his report is written on Irgun’s letterhead and typed by one of its members. There is no information imparted regarding how it is achieved; yet, Duncan clarifies that it takes for him nearly four months to receive Irgun’s permission into their hideaway; “[...] the specific way in which I happened to be there was discussed, and they too [like the Palestine Police] are now satisfied that it was simply a case of Duncan’s luck.”

Duncan’s specific point of emphasis is ‘a map,’ drawn by Irgun, whose members claim that “it is rightfully Jewish” and “they’ll continue to fight until it is [a] free Jewish State.” To him, “this map, more than any other one thing [he shoots] during this assignment bares the very heart of things to come, as far as the Jews are concerned.” A particular image of these kind

exhibits the hand of an operations expert of Irgun Zvai Leumi who points out the map (drawn in English for Duncan) that includes the entire Trans-Jordan and its extension goes out to Iraq. The original map (in Hebrew), which appears in an image taken on the door of Irgun's hideout, is requested by Duncan to be translated. His reporting style is exemplified in this request because he desires *Life* to disclose "how these men feel their ancestry ties in with places quite far removed from the Palestine which is causing so many headaches today [...]," and to consider how these men are "responsible for most of the attacks against the British." The following statement makes the entire representations of Irgun more effective as the journalist predicts the persistence of terrorism in Palestine of 1946: "[The map], together with outline of policy and plans, [provided to Duncan], should explode, once and for ever, the starry-eyed reports of some 'experts' that peace will come with the Hundred Thousand."

2.5.1.2. Illegal Jewish Immigration to Palestine

Duncan conveys that the story that he covers in *Illegal Immigration* is reflective of the banned immigration of the Jews to the Holy Land in the standpoint of "Britain's new 'anti-illegal' policy for Palestine." Effective on the midnight of August 11, 1946, illegal immigrants were not permitted to enter into Palestinian territory, until some permanent solution is defined. The photographs of this story are the sole coverage made by any photojournalist, which thus serve as the historical records. The collection of the image and word narrations can be grouped into two sections. The first section is reflective of the course of action, which is the relocation of a large group of illegal immigrants by Palestinian Police of the Marine Division to the Atlit detention camp in Palestine. They have come to Haifa harbor by a ship (*Jewish Soldier*) before the deadline, midnight of August 11th. Whereas, the second one mirrors the interception of the two vessels (*Yajur* and *Henrietta Szold*), which arrive in Palestinian waters at 12:30 am and on the morning of August 12th, respectively, and the transfer of the Jews to the shore at Haifa and the eventual transporting by ship (*Empire Rival*) to a camp in Cyprus.

A sequence of images within the first section is taken aboard *Jewish Soldier* with an aim to depict Jewish immigrants, the majority of whom are "under twenty-five years old," and "formerly guerillas from Poland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, etc." Duncan's written accounts regarding the images, reflective of the transportation of the Jews to shore in barbed-wire barges,

and then to Atlit Camp in buses (in the afternoon of August 14th), mirror the following: four young refugees (whose forearms had been tattooed by the Germans Nazis in concentration camps, where one of them lost his eye); a refugee (who formerly served in the British Army as an MP. in Italy—yet “his service had given no chance for citizenship, anywhere, under the Union Jack”); the excitement of the Jews (they kiss the ground on the shore); and the silent happiness at the moment of the arrival at the Atlit Camp (that will be “a tent home” for months, until they become residents; then they will be aided to reside in either collective or cooperative settlements by the Jewish Agency). As seen, these accounts not only outline the diverse array of life experiences of the Jews connecting with ‘the Jewish cause’ in Europe prior to their immigration, but also articulate their future within the socio-political environment in Palestine.

The captions accompanying the visual coverage of the illegal ships, *Yajur* and *Henrietta Szold* (within the second section), while exposing each step of the course of operation from interception to deportation of the immigrants, serve as historical documentations: generally the illegal ships are intercepted 50-74 miles off the shore of Palestine without a regular crew or paperwork by the Palestine Police, as the immigrants coming from different ships are packed aboard one vessel when about four days from Palestine, where the crew take all instruments, papers, and identification (except name) and abandon the vessel, and the immigrants sail it into port. Yet, *Yajur* carrying 758 immigrants arrives with a Turkish crew, who claims that they were first chartered to Beirut, yet the passengers forced them to change their route to Haifa. As the *Henrietta Szold*, which carries around 500 people (half of them children, 30 babies in arms) and arrives without a crew, breaks down upon reaching the shore, it is towed next to *Yajur*. Once both ships come together, their passengers sing the Jewish anthem. The illegal immigrants aboard the two vessels are the first refugees who are deported to Cyprus.

The entire collection of the story deals with a larger issue—the process of promoting Jewish illegal immigration by the Jewish Agency that serves for immigrants in diverse ranges (e.g., providing clothes to them after their arrivals, supplying the medical care along with doctors to all aboard). For example, a particular photograph displays an agent serving for the agency, who interrupts the attempt of picturing a group of Jews playing cards on board the *Jewish Soldier*. The agent, while stopping the group, tells Duncan not to reflect this genial mood of the people, ““because it [is] contrary publicity for the Jewish immigrants’ cause.”” Through this occurrence the photojournalist aims to show the general patterns into which the immigrants are

forced to conform. Also, a specific emphasis is given to a boy aboard the same ship, who is eating a loaf of bread in his hammock, to Duncan, this is “a deceptive picture,” because all illegal ships coming into Palestine had “plenty of food” that was mostly UNRRA supplied. In a caption, the journalist adds, “the question of water was a problem, no doubt, but there is absolutely no truth in the Agency’s statement that they [the immigrants] have been arriving in half-starved conditions.” Moreover, he states that in opposition to the agency’s claim, only some immigrants are married to the girls with whom they are living with aboard, and the majority of the pregnant women are not married. Lastly, he describes *Yajur* as “the foulest ship,” and expresses that “[...] the filthy condition of these illegal vessels arriving in Palestine is strictly according to an over-all plan to exploit the condition of the illegals as a heartbreaking piece of blackmail [...]” By providing these auxiliary reports, Duncan unveils the issue of “blackmail” on the part of the organization, as they send the illegal immigrants “in [large] numbers” and “such conditions” to Palestine, “in an effort to break the back of immigration quotas and resettlement policy.”

The *Jewish Soldier*, *Yajur*, and *Henrietta Szold* are Duncan’s case study; yet, the report regarding the forged immigration cards, the supplement of his narratives in examination, allows the immigration issue to be seen in its entirety. The cards, “sold to the illegals en route,” mark the nationality of a Jew by birth, which, to the journalist, echoes “National Socialism in Palestine,” which is “comparable to Germany at the peak of her Youth Movements, et al.”

2.5.1.3. Palestine, a Land of Trouble

Palestine: the Problem Land written in more of an essay format, rather than in caption layout, serves as a complement to Duncan’s works portraying the issue of the illegal Jewish immigration and the measure of the violence and retaliation. Yet, to a great extent, it explains the Palestine of 1946, where Duncan photographs numerous settlements (Arab or Jewish), and diverse groups of people from sheikhs to the High Commissioner (General Sir Alan Cunningham) and to the President of the Jewish Agency and World Zionists (Dr. Chaim Weizman).

Some of the images assisted by the captions are the reflection of Duncan’s figurative works as seen in the following examples. The pictures of Herod’s Gate that predominantly portray Arab peasants going to market with their sheep and goats are symbolic representations, as this gate adjoining the Muslim Quarter (one of the quarters, e.g., Jewish, Christian) exposes

the division of the populace through their religious adherence in the ancient walls of the Old City of Jerusalem. Also, the picture of “the long panels of name plates of American Hadassah groups” in the Hadassah Hospital in Jerusalem is indicative of the impacts the Zionist Organizations of America had on Palestine, such as the *Hadassah* that makes this medical institute available. Likewise, the photographic coverage of the Graves of Palestine Police at Mount Zion Cemetery in Jerusalem, memorializing the police forces that have been killed while maintaining order, serves as a symbolic icon for the Holy Land, a land of trouble.

A collection of images of the local top Arabs in the dedication ceremony while showing where “the Arab boycott on Jewish land sales breaks down,” deals with the issue of the land purchase made by the Jewish National Fund. To Duncan, such a ceremony is “good publicity for the Jewish cause”; yet, “it’s not mentioned that the Arabs, after selling the land [...] got the hell out of Palestine and went to Syria to live.” Also, the snapshots of a seventeen-year-old Danny Newman are indicative of the Zionist law in Palestine, which requires anyone, like Newman, for one year to serve in a new settlement site that is “toward building the national home.” Moreover, the picture of a tractor plowing soil is reflective of the countryside, where ‘the common denominator’ is ‘the soil’ and ‘the paramount interest’ is ‘the tractor’ for both the new settlers and the Palestinian Arabs. The photojournalist expresses that the soil binds the two factions within the country together in a competition against nature, with the exception of a few families, “who have lived and brought their children up side-by-side for several generations.”

The visual subjects of the photographic coverage of the city, Tel-Aviv, which exhibits a life of harmony, a perfect depiction of peace and joy, are as follows: Hayarkon Street in Tel-Aviv (where the architecture of all apartment houses and hotels is German styled); promenade along the Tel-Aviv beach, Jaffa in far background, (where the entire population—about 200,000 stroll each evening); London Park in Tel-Aviv (where mothers take their babies); the Yarkon River in Tel-Aviv (where young Jewish boys practice racing their shells); sidewalk cafes (which stay crowded until late evening). A particular group of images taken at the Tel-Aviv beach on the Jewish New Year’s afternoon does not only show the holiday crowds (e.g., swimmers in abbreviated trunks), but also exhibits a religious ceremony, called “Tashlich” or “The Throwing Away:” the Orthodox Jews, staying upon the edge of the surf, chant towards the sea, reading from their prayer books, and bobbing from side-to-side until the sun has completely set, in order to cast the previous year’s sins into the water. Duncan writes, “I had never even heard of such a

custom before, and rate it, in picture merit, far above anything I saw at the Wailing Wall.”

The visualization of an Arab agricultural school, *Deir Amr*, located on a mountain to the west of Jerusalem, predominantly portrays the students and teachers conducting the class, and is aided with Duncan’s accounts, which touch upon the history of the territory, and also emphasize the essential nature of such an institution for the future development of the Palestinian Arabs: possessing 600 acres, 6,000 olive trees, and thousands of young trees (e.g., apple, pear trees), the school is endowed through private Arab donations, and dedicated to the sons, whose fathers were killed during the 1936-1939 disturbances with the British. Having operated for four years with three teachers for seventy students (aged between 8-15), the school integrates a curriculum that enhances student’s learning experience not only through practical trade oriented classes (terracing the land, cultivating and grafting trees, milking a cow) but also by means of a traditional academic base of study (e.g., history, knowledge of theory). The collection of the image representations of this foundation is evocative, because, to Duncan, it shows “the finest Arab effort being aimed at the future in Palestine” that serves as a model for a similar institution, an agricultural school for girls being built in the near future.

2.5.2. The Gaza Strip in June 1956

Ten years after fulfilling his assignment in the Palestinian territories for *Life*, Duncan covered another story in regards to Palestine in June 1956, which was eight years after the foundation of the State of Israel (1948). This time, he was in the Gaza Strip as a photojournalist working with *Collier’s*, with whom his correspondence was not unlike that with *Life*. Duncan amassed the productions of this field study in a file comprised of the following materials: *Gaza Strip Caption* (caption book), and the photographs (that can be now found through transparencies—841 color 35mm slides. Then *Collier’s* published the cover story, “Gaza Strip” on August 3, 1956.

Written in the often utilized essay format, *Gaza Strip Caption* brought about through Duncan’s one-week visit in the area, while producing photographs in color for the first time, is a story about Gaza, which became a home for Palestinian Arab refugees, who were exiled from other Palestinian territories subsequent to the Arab defeat of the Palestinian War of 1948.

The images, combined with word representations, making up this coverage, fall into the

following categories:

1. The Gaza-Jerusalem-Cairo road and railway,
2. Kilometer 95, a secondary road
3. Gaza under the control and protection of the Egyptian military
4. The long since established inhabitants of the Gaza Strip,
5. The Gaza Beach and Jabalia refugee camps,
6. The society based on Gaza town and the Gaza Strip,
7. The American Baptist Hospital

2.5.2.1. The Gaza-Jerusalem-Cairo Road and Railway

By photographing the Cairo-Gaza-Jerusalem road, Duncan aims to illustrate the history of the Holy Land from antiquity to the present. He explains that such an ancient road felt the footsteps of, namely, the Greeks, the Persians, and the Roman Legions, who all drove towards the valleys of the Nile, just as it felt “the hoof beats of the patient little Palestinian donkeys” that carried Mary, Joseph, and the infant Jesus during the Flight to Egypt. Yet in a larger context, by shooting the Cairo-Gaza-Jerusalem road/railway, which winds amongst deserted areas, high plateaus, and fertile soils, Duncan intends to expose the territorial division between the Israelis and Arabs, as the southern extension of both the road and the railway is still in use and connect Gaza to Egypt, while their northern extensions are closed, which otherwise link Gaza to Israel.

The written accounts regarding the photographs of the southern end of the Gaza road allow us to visualize this highway, where, each night, the Egyptian army launches strict roadblocks that even trap official cars. Local taxis operating on special permits only make their final trips at sunset as, until morning, the land stays under curfew— “nothing, non-official, moves.” The image-word narratives regarding the northern end of the Gaza-Jerusalem road, where the Demarcation Line (DL) separates Gaza from Israel, emerges as an ironic depiction, as Duncan demonstrates “the men’s land,” with Palestinian Arab farmers and shepherds, who either thresh wheat, or herd animals, while upon the unused road, on the other side, it is “no man’s land.” Likewise, the image portrayal of the northern end of the Gaza-Jerusalem railway, where the steel knots of the rail are twisted back upon themselves, serves as a metaphor of an abandonment of the land, as there has been no rail traffic to Jerusalem since before the outbreak

of the Palestine War in 1948. Hence, these works are illustrative of what Duncan deems, the complete rupture between two Palestinian lands, the Gaza Strip and Jerusalem.

2.5.2.2. Kilometer 95, a Secondary Road

The photographic coverage of ‘the kilometer 95’ is produced from the Egyptian edge of the DL. Duncan notes that the UN Truce Commission had drawn the line in 1949, not based on geographic, ethnic, or political necessity, but on the contemporary military topicality. Some of these images exhibit demarcation barrels and a ditch (1/2 meter wide), which separate Gaza from Jerusalem. Accompanying reports of these photographs, while assisting us to conceptualize the Israeli land (i.e., “Israeli territory begins just beyond the barricades which flank the road”), unveil the importance of the kilometer 95: which is on a secondary road that runs northeast from Gaza’s front door towards Jerusalem, precisely 95 kilometers, along which numerous Egyptian and Israeli checkpoints are set. The kilometer 95 designates the disputed borderland, and is in use only by the UN Truce teams, as the sole open road between the Gaza Strip and Israel.

Duncan’s specific visual expressions are the forlorn shacks, located at kilometer 95, where Israel is just behind the roadblocks. His reporting style exemplifies the essentiality of these productions, which serves as a documentation of the deeply intensified and recently triggered Israeli-Egyptian border dispute: until 1955, these shacks were the meeting places of the representatives of two countries on the Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission, which was established through the Egyptian and Israeli General Armistice agreement of the UN at Rhodes, in 1949. This agreement permitted the Mixed Armistice Commission to maintain its headquarters at El Auja, which was a “demilitarized zone” along the southern edge of no man’s land between Egyptian and Israeli military forces. Yet, in 1955, by claiming that the Egyptians moved their military forces roughly ten miles inside the demilitarized zone, Israel launched an operation and occupied the entire zone. Being in Israeli hands, El Auja has never been used since for Truce discussions, as even UN officers have been restricted in their movements in this site; but the Egyptians offered to re-use these forlorn shacks for the future meetings.

Moreover, a sequence of the pictures is indicative of the UN Truce observers (from Norway, Belgium and Canada), who are accompanied by members of the Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission in field uniforms. These pictures are taken from the Egyptian edge of the

kilometer 95, where “high grass and an occasional barrel mark the frontier of the two deeply troubled countries,” and serve as example of such a highly dangerous and disputed area, where neutral officers sometimes get bullet holes in their jeeps, though the jeeps are painted in white and crested with white flags. For a caption Duncan writes, “the Belgian who drove me on this little trip laughingly recalled, with a shrug, that he’d been under Egyptian fire six months earlier, in the Demilitarized Zone in the south—and had picked up 11 machinegun holes in his jeep.” Also a supplementary report outlines the attempts for a remedy of this border issue that is a catalyst for violence: the Israelis agreed to the Egyptians’ suggestion—the frontier should be marked by adequate pylons. Now the UN Truce teams survey the sites for the replacement of oil barrels, “painted with black and white rings.”

2.5.2.3. Gaza under the Control and Protection of the Egyptian Military

The pictorial representations of the Gaza Strip, which is under Egypt’s control and protection, serve as the sole documentation of that moment in history, because Duncan, as the only foreign journalist, was permitted to be present at any affair conducted by the Egyptian Army. The collection of these images displays the army’s frontline positions, the newly imposed Palestine Brigade Program, and the Egyptian Desert Camel Forces (namely, the Haggana).

In regards to the frontline positions of the Egyptian soldiers, who are photographed in their observation posts that are connected with the other positions by trenches “across the hills deeper in Gaza Strip,” Duncan says, “Not unlike the forward positions separated the sides between South and North Korea.” These photographs show the moment, which is dead quiet, to which the photographer remarks, “no one knows about tomorrow.” The effects of these depictive works are enhanced by the written reports, which illustrate the international disputes that currently stand in politics and military means: After Nasser’s recent arms deal with the Czechs, which had strengthened the Egyptian Army, “all frontier incidents have been confined to artillery shelling, violating the frontier and Demarcation Line by air... without a single major Israeli infantry violation.” To the Egyptians, this result alone well justifies their affiliations with the Soviet-Bloc, as “the West refused to heed their arms pleas.” Having much legal proof sustaining its claim of Israeli aggression on Gaza’s front (e.g., military action across the DL), Egypt has launched retaliatory shelling and commando attacks. Yet, the UN Security Council has only

condemned Israel. To Duncan, “The innocent of both sides are always the victims.”

A diverse array of photographs, reflective of the newly imposed Palestine Brigade Program, serves as the signifier of what Duncan calls—the first military effort encompassing political potentialities made by the Palestinians to revive themselves, since 1948. The written accounts of the images that reveal the Brigade soldiers (e.g., under training in combat camps, located across the different dunes of the southern sector of the Gaza Strip) elucidate the following: these volunteer Palestinian soldiers are in uniforms during the last six months, and are even paid by the Egyptian Army, as it supports the entire Brigade program (e.g., gear, uniforms, training methods). Refugee men constitute the largest portion of these soldiers. Eighty percent of them are educated. They are formed into units based on their hometowns or districts in Palestine so that in case of a recapturing war effort, they would be deeply acquainted with their targets as well as their comrades within enemy territory. What makes one of these pictures significant to Duncan is that it is produced with a background exhibiting the Sinai Desert, which seems like “a Sahara desert Hollywood movie set;” yet there, the Brigade soldiers train in rifle skills. Duncan’s photographs also demonstrate the high ranking officers of the Brigade Program, who are watching the training with binoculars, commending the soldiers, or working at their desks inside the command headquarters. It is reported that these officers are currently appointed from the ranks of the Egyptian Army; yet in the near future, many of them were to be Palestinians. The Brigade bases, where armed soldiers are intensively trained around the clock, and also where the original Palestinian flag is rippling for the first time since 1948, are supplementary of Duncan’s image representations in examination. These are reflective of the newly emerged energy—partly the result of Nasser’s influence that now organizes the Palestinian Arabs, who were not united during the end of the British Mandate in Palestine.

By also presenting the Palestine Brigade as follows, the journalist provides insight into the future political developments, and allows the Palestinian cause to be seen in entirety: as a vigorous state, Israel is a reality and is strong enough with its well-trained soldiers, each one of whom are both physically and emotionally dedicated to “the defense of their newly-won bit of the Middle East.” It is now difficult to foresee the result of a war, should it again break out between the Israelis and the Arabs. Yet, considering Egypt’s well-equipped military, its alignment with Palestinians, and the current temper of Egyptian soldiers and leaders, it is predictable that “such a war would quickly become a very nasty affair.” Duncan’s further

narratives serve as suggestive reportage, in reference to Nasser's future plan, which is to form a sort of "Palestine Government in Refuge," elected from the refugees in Gaza Strip. To the journalist, instead of war, such a government would be a political revival for the refugees, who are also living in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, and waiting the day, "when they can 'go Home'... to Palestine." Also to him, that government, which is "backed by a small, well-trained army," the Palestinians would possibly increase their bargaining prestige, "should their case ever again get to the UN for final settlement."

In respect to his visual subjects, the Egyptian Desert Camel Forces (Haggana), Duncan remarks the followings: all Sudanese, these men are considered as the finest desert trackers of the Sahara—"the most rigidly disciplined troops in uniforms anywhere." Being on duty all night with their camels, and returning to their base at daylight, the major objective of Haggana is to intercept smugglers, who are either trying to run the Arab blockade of Israel, or trying to run hashish into Egypt. A specific emphasis is given to the sergeant of these forces, Suliman Saleh Ahmed, who controls his men riding in silence "with only the slightest of movement of his hand." Yet, Duncan's metaphoric representation appears in an image of the camel soldiers, who are cutting across the dunes, with a background that is filled with the Mediterranean far below. Duncan's request to have this image used as a double truck opener was granted by *Collier's*, as at one glance it demonstrates "Middle East...Military...Pageantry...Contrast—Gaza Strip."

2.5.2.4. The Long since Established Inhabitants of the Gaza Strip

The process of visualization in respect to the time-honored dwellers of Gaza is evocative of what Duncan accentuates regarding the "men of the Holy Land:" they have been 'the men of the field' and 'men of the sea' through the course of history, and amongst them, the others – blacksmiths, stonemasons, and carpenters alike. The visual productions are enhanced with the written narrations that are not only descriptive of the socio-economic and -cultural stances upheld by the contemporary native Gaza people (sedentary or nomad), but are also indicative of their long since established roots with such an ancient territory and the Mediterranean Sea.

A visual subject, an elderly Arab, who is sifting his wheat as he works on this year's harvest, is representative of "the dignity of work" and "the yield of the earth," which both together become "a[n] [integral] part of the rural world." In regards to him, Duncan says, "No

refugee, he and his ancestors have lived on Gaza Strip land for countless generations...a part of the landscape since almost the beginning of historic time.” The photographer’s poetic description, “the sunlight turns the land into carpets of rich orange and topaz,” makes his image representations of the Palestinian shepherds herding flocks on the rolling plains more effective, as it allows us to visualize the eternal cycles of this ancient land, to which he deduces, “[it] must have looked the same in the days of both Testaments.” Nonetheless, a collection of the image-word productions displaying an old Bedouin shepherd (his wife and goats in the backdrop) is vital, because it reveals a sense of freedom that the man has, as he tolerates Duncan’s attempts to take his pictures for a while, and then with a hand gesture, he implies, “Okay, Son, on thy way, on thy way.” It is also because, these displays of the man, who dismissed the photographer completely from his world, have drastically turned towards an implication of the liberties that exist for the native Gaza people, unlike the refugees, as Duncan says, “How wonderful, really! A man almost completely free [and] thoroughly happy, too!”

In regards to the Bedouin women and girls represented in a sequence of pictures, Duncan conveys that “[they] are the walking, living, heritage of the first days of Palestine, when other Bible Land women clutched the baby animals of the flocks in their arms so that they not be left behind, and lost.” An older Bedouin woman, the photographer’s particular emphasis, is portrayed as follows: “[she] kept laughing and joking, and smoking rough cigarettes under her veil, while the choking clouds poured up and around her bright, tattooed eyes.” This picturesque portrayal creates a photograph itself without a camera, and combined with the image, it serves as a representation of all Bedouin women, who are cultural mainstays in the Gaza plains, where they either herd their goats, or sift chaff from grains, with their extremely shy demeanors and glittering eyes, partly hidden behind their black veils, fringed with coins and ember beads.

Furthermore, the photocompositions that exhibit the men of the Gaza sardine fleet (e.g., spreading their nets to dry, selling the fish that they caught to the town people) are signifiers of the sea and its bounty, as these men set sail each day in the late afternoon. More significantly, these illustrations are indicative of the deeply rooted connections of these men with the sea, to which Duncan concludes, “except for the gear being used, and clothes being worn, it is a scene that has probably changed very little since Bible times.”

2.5.2.5. The Gaza Beach and Jabalia Refugee Camps

Duncan's images, reflective of the everyday experiences of the adult refugees, are mostly set in the Gaza Beach Refugee Camp, yet these displays are also representative of Jabalia Refugee Camp, in which over 17,000 and 22,600 people settle, respectively. A photograph of several refugee men, who sit in front of a hut, where also a goat wanders and looks for food in the sand, is a figurative illustration of the substandard lifestyle of these refugees, without a job or crucial amenities available to them. The background for this picture seems to be deliberately selected, as it exhibits a portion of an endless array of refugee huts stretched out across the landscape, constructed with "tiny, concrete block-and-sheet-metal roofed, and behind that the Mediterranean Sea."

The pictorial representation of several refugee women, who look like "the slender peasant girls of the Indochinese rice paddies" with their "enormously wide-brimmed straw hats," while signifying the shared labors without gender separation, serve as the articulation of the socio-economic living experience in a certain environment, as these women carry sea sand with big head-trays, which is used for the huts' constructions. Also, the written expressions of other visual subjects, several refugee mothers, who are protesting the newly imposed milk ration policy at UNRWA milk point in the camp, serve as accompanying evidence of the socio-economic circumstances surrounding all refugees. Duncan reports that in the past, the UNRWA officials assigned several families to draw milk rations for their neighbors; yet some of these families drew extra rations although their neighbors' need for milk was finished. Since there is almost no, or very limited sources of income, they made cheese from the extra milk if they did not trade it. It is also reported that the new milk ration policy is found very fair by most of the refugees, as anyone within an immediate family is now permitted to apply for the milk ration.

The picture coverage depicting children from both Gaza Beach and Jabalia Camps demonstrates the environmental reality of a child-refugee lifestyle. Children are visualized while making sand castles in the dunes, playing a game of jacks and ball on the sand, and laughing together since the surf swamps their old, broken rowboat. Accompanying captions regarding these "game-loving children" reveal that though their environments are surrounded with poverty and barbed wire fences, their souls are not isolated from humanitarian values, just like a little refugee girl, who brought iodine and cotton after having realized Duncan's hand was injured

while he was climbing over a barbed-wire fence that surrounds the UNRWA milk ration point.

Moreover, the refugee students are shot either on unused railways, where they sit to study, or on the main lanes of the Strip's roads, where they use the asphalt as a huge blackboard, ignoring the passing traffic, because of the fact that there is no appropriate room for them in the camps to prepare for their final exams. For one student, who writes, "Palestine is a Good Country," Duncan conveys, "[This student is] right! Gaza Strip is still Palestine...its scenery...its people...its way of life—even to the tragedy which has plagued The Land for 2,000 years."

2.5.2.6. The Society Based on Gaza Town and the Gaza Strip

The photographic representations of Gaza town are descriptive of both divergence and convergence within the Gaza Strip of 1956 through socio-economics, politics, and military means, where 'local residents' and 'refugees,' 'poor' and 'rich,' and 'civil' and 'army officials' reside side by side, while at the same time 'domestic' and 'foreign,' subsist together. The images, exhibiting the modern two lane main street connecting the new Gaza town with the beach area, while showing modern buildings and Gaza itself in the background, serve as implicative of the town's need for expansion. Duncan reports that the population was 70,000 in 1948; yet it has increased to over 100,000, mostly because of refugee immigration. In the Gaza Strip at that time there were 210,000 refugees.

A collection of the pictures, reflecting the local businesses in Gaza town, can be visualized as follows: the livestock market (where men buy or sell sheep, goats, donkeys and horses each Friday morning); a tiny shack (in front of which, the owner, the Barber of Gaza sits and waits for his clients); and a coffee shop (where men drinks Turkish coffee, in the new section of town). These illustrations in the conjunction with those displaying cotton-yarn dyers, who are considered by Duncan as "the lucky refugee men with work," expose the socio-economic disparity surrounding Gaza's contemporary folks. The natives of Gaza (e.g., farmers, Bedouins) have ample job opportunities, limited to positions at market centers and a few other places; but there is not an industry that would be capable to employ the "thousands of able-bodies."

Similarly, a fishtail Cadillac, which is parked among the refugees' carts and peddlers' wagons on a street, is a pictorial expression, through which Duncan aims to reveal "the paradox" that is visible in Gaza's diverse ranges. In this case, such a paradox is exhibited by means of the

owner of the Cadillac, the town's sole rich man, who is currently building the largest clinic in town. Yet in Gaza eight years after their arrival, there is almost no building for the able refugee merchants to open a shop, which otherwise would be a part of an infrastructure promoting economic activity and survival within the community. Also a refugee man on his donkey carrying the tin lids of milk cans to market, where these lids are cut and shaped into household utensils and trays, serve as a complementary figure of Duncan's accounts in examination; "Nothing is wasted in Gaza Strip... that is, nothing but life itself."

One of the visual treatments demonstrates the Administrative Governor of the Gaza Strip—Mohammed Fuad Degwi, who is also a Major General of the Egyptian Army. Regarding Degwi, who is photographed in a staff house, the photographer remarks, "A man is on the run, with a jovial twinkle, but no time to fool around with matters not related to improving the lot of the refugees." Also, a sequence of the images, which exhibits the Australian UNRWA director, David Campbell Stephen, along with UNRWA jeeps, is reflective of the convergence within the society in the Gaza Strip—a divided land, where the members of the Western humanitarian organizations serve for stateless Palestinian Arabs. Duncan reports that the director is a vital figure "in keeping nearly one quarter of a million people alive for years," as he has been working in the Middle East for eleven years, and serving for UNRWA in the Gaza Strip for more than five years, just as the UNRWA jeeps, which have formed "the bulk of the traffic on Strip roads" within the last five years. Yet, Duncan's allegorical view comes into illustration in a picture, showing two "pastel-hued beach umbrellas," that are stuck in the sand, just next to an Egyptian army unit positioned in Gaza. This image exhibiting beach umbrellas and barbed wire together signifies another paradox, which, to Duncan, embodies the Gaza Strip.

Once, stopping beside the Gaza road in order to photograph the refugee children, Duncan is reminded of a Greer Garson film, *Blossoms in the Dust*. His aim of portraying a refugee baby boy is to demonstrate a negation of a common belief—like this baby, a great number of children in this part of the Holy Land, without any external parental pigmentation, are not "swarthy and black-haired"—not all Semitic. He writes, "[...] the same extraordinary phenomenon is being seen among the newly arrived Central European Jewish couples, on the Israeli side of the Demarcation Line—their children are likely to arrive blonde, blue-eyed, freckled and pug-nosed." Also, Duncan's accounts regarding a visual subject, a young-wandering refugee living at the Gaza-Egypt border, serve as illustrations of the ethnic divergence occurring in Gaza. This

wandering refugee, who seems reminiscent of *The Kid* (1921) with his “long-visored cap pulled to one side, and a bag of earthly possessions almost dragging [to] the ground,” looks like the famed American child actor, Jackie Coogan, yet “this time [he is] in the Holy Land.”

2.5.2.7. The American Baptist Hospital

Duncan’s illustrations regarding the American Baptist Hospital, founded eighty years ago by the Church Missionary Society of England and acquired by the Baptists two years ago, exhibit the missionary service program effective in the Gaza of 1956. The written reports in regards to this 92-bed mission hospital endorse the institution’s heavy focus on refugees: being run by five doctors (American and Egyptian), nine nurses (American, Danish, Syrian, Lebanese, Egyptian, and Palestinian) and a British sister-tutor, this institution is currently supported by the Southern Baptist Foreign Mission Board and UNRWA. The latter sustains the 80 beds allocated for the use of refugees, who comprise the greater number of the patients. “Only [...] 3% of the patients [non-refugees] pay for their medical care.”

The collections of images captured in this hospital expose the Palestinian border problem, through which Duncan intends to unveil the impacts the most recent Israeli shelling (April 5, 1956) had on the people of Gaza. He reports that the Baptist hospital tended to the casualties (nearly 100 children, women, and older men), who were hit by dozens of 120mm mortar bombs, either in their homes, or the market square. A number of Egyptian military personnel were also wounded as the bombing struck the Egyptian Military emergency hospital. Such a military attack was justified by Israel with their claim—the existence of Arab military positions held in the town’s central section. Yet, this claim, after an investigation, was found “absolutely untrue” by the American Chairman of the UN Truce Commission, who considers Israel’s “premeditated bombing of an open city” to be “in violation of all recognized military and international law.”

A specific emphasis is placed on both Dr. James Young, directing surgeon of the hospital, and the two casualties of the aforementioned bombing, the daughters of a policeman of Gaza, seven-year-old Radia (had her right leg broken) and eleven-year-old Ikram (lost a toe from her left foot and her right leg almost up to the thigh). In the moment, once Ikram is taken to the surgery room for the operation, Duncan says, “It [is] impossible to photograph her in tears, for she tries so hard not to show how she [feels]...especially in front of a stranger: Truly

heartbreaking!” This exposure displays humanitarian perspectives, allowing us to feel the pain and sorrow, just as Ikram does. Yet, the entire collection, coupled with Duncan’s stance, deals with the issue of war: “Worse, there [is] no more sense, or reason, for her being crippled forever, than if the thing had happened to a little American kid of the same age, who, by chance, might have been forced to live on our frontiers during troubled times with our neighbors.” Finally, Duncan’s accounts serve as accompanying evidence of the impacts the Palestinian border problem had on both sides, as he touches upon the fact that Israeli children, “just a few miles away,” are also in a hospital, as they were wounded by Arab counter-fire. To him, “What possible difference could it make to these wounded whether one side, or the other, fired first!”

2.6. Analysis of Duncan’s Pictorial Stories on the Palestinian Territories

Through five different stories for *Life*, by using photography as a means of communication, Duncan exposes topics over a broad spectrum, encompassing acts of militancy, Jewish immigration, and land purchase, while presenting the way of life practiced by the Palestinian Arabs and Jews, which all took place in the British Mandate of Palestine, between July and October of 1946. Yet, as a journalist, his use of words, while connecting Holocaust violence with the Jews’ pre-existing and contemporary conditions in both Europe and Palestine, aims to scrutinize the Palestine—its deeply intensified position in the Middle East with British and Zionist, as well as Arab forces playing out through politics, economics, and military means.

At the same time, Duncan’s coverage of the Gaza Strip in photojournalism, which occurred in July 1956 for *Collier’s*, explores a diverse assortment of subject matter, from Arab-Israeli tensions to the Palestinian cause by means of Gaza’s ascribed position in the Middle East since 1948—where Palestinian Arab refugees have turned out to be significant components of the Strip through their complex state of roles in economics and politics, while this land has become the focal meeting point of the representatives of various internationally relevant institutions, such as the Egyptian military, the Egypt-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission, UNRWA, and the Baptist mission hospital.

Yet, more significantly, Duncan’s journalistic accounts, accompanied with his artistic productions, both in 1946 and 1956, illustrate the history of Palestine and its people’s socio-cultural, religious, and ethnic traits since antiquity.

2.6.1. The State of Militarism in Palestine, 1946, within the Context of Anglo-Zionist Disputes

Duncan's inseparable image-word reportage, which came out of the stories, *Yajur Search*, *King David Hotel*, *Jaffa Bank Robbery & Shooting*, and *Palestine: the Problem Land*, serves as an indicator of the climax of power conflicts between British colonialism and political Zionism, which manifested itself in a range of forms in Palestine, in 1946. What makes the collection of these portrayals essential is his unique position; while producing the pictures exposing a range of themes and motifs, he, either through permission or serendipity, became a witness of the events, which partly yet significantly played roles in the shift within the course of Palestinian history.

The image representations of the British military operation launched in Yajur village (a component of military operations initiated on the same day, June 29, in twenty-five Jewish towns and villages across Palestine) are aided by Duncan's report, which strives to point out that the main objective of such a military maneuver was to identify and interrogate Jewish terrorists and unearth their arms caches. Standing in connection with this suggestive report are Duncan's statements from his book, *Yankee Nomad*: "Irgun, Jewish terrorists who are battling the British Army [...], local Arab (here by birth), other Jews who abhor fighting or *anyone* who gets in the way. [...] Less extreme—as dedicated—Haganah, the Jews' clandestine army, has made arsenals of kibbutz (raided by British soldiers who interned the men) [...]" (224). The juxtapositions of this report and statement provide the conception of militant relations between the Jewish paramilitary outfits and British colonial forces. Yet, Duncan's journalism does not specify the background of a succession of such military operations, which was named by Britain as *Operation Agatha* and by the Jews as *Black Sabbath*.

The aforementioned absence in the media discourse can be understood as the journalist was reporting the circumstances of the fact, while the current and still developing events occurred within the British Mandate of Palestine. However, briefly reported facts assist us today to re-examine the first half of the 1940s. The scholarly treatment of Charles K. Rowley and Jennis Taylor, the writers of "The Israel and Palestine Land Settlement Problem: An Analytical History, 4000 B.C.E.-1948 C.E.," proves insightful: "From 1939 onwards, there existed three schools of thought about the British" (65). The President of Jewish Agency and World Zionist, Chaim Wietzmann, who believed in Britain's good faith, was the representative of the 'first

school,' while David Ben-Gurion, who desired to win the war first, was in the second one. Ben-Gurion's clarification regarding the distinction between resistance and terrorism appeared in the policy of Haganah, which was formerly established as a small military unit in 1920 in order to protect the Yishuv (the name of the Jewish community, used until 1948) from Arab attacks. Yet by the 1940s, Haganah had become the defense force of the Jewish Agency, which was constituted through the political parties, and held a balanced diplomatic approach to politics. The third school of thought (which was originated by Vladimir Jabotinsky—founder of revisionist Zionism) was represented through Menachem Begin, Avraham Stern, and Yitzhak Shamir, who were either practitioners or leaders of Irgun and Lehi, the paramilitary groups that aimed to achieve their political objectives through acts of terrorism. Coming into existence by means of breaking away from Haganah in the early 1930s, Irgun increased terrorist activity by launching attacks in 1939 against both British forces and Arabs, yet it moderated its agenda in respect to Britain in 1940. This resulted in the emergence of Lehi in 1940, as a split underground outfit of Irgun, whose target was the British. In the late 1940s, Lehi offered Germany active participation in the war in return for laying a foundation of a Jewish toleration state in Palestine. While this contact was not taken into consideration by Germany, it resulted in the capture of Lehi's leader by the British with the assistance of both Haganah and Irgun. In 1944, Lehi assassinated Lord Moyne (the British Minister Resident in Cairo) as it blamed him for the White Paper of 1939, which limited Jewish immigration into Palestine. "This [assassination] act led to full co-operation of [the traditional] Zionists with the British (for the remainder of the war) to crush Jewish terrorism in Palestine." Thus, Haganah initiated 'the Saison' against Irgun and Lehi through cooperation with Britain as they handed over the members of these underground outfits to the British authorities. Yet, October 1945 became a turning point, as Ben-Gurion "without consulting with Weitzmann" generated a united Jewish Resistance Movement against British forces, while re-initiating connections with Irgun, Lehi, and Haganah. "A vicious assault now began [...] designed to weaken the resolve of the British to fulfill their Mandate" (66).

By the same token, Joseph Heller, in his article, "Neither Masada- Nor Vichy: Diplomacy and Resistance in Zionist Politics, 1945-1947" discusses the impact the Jewish Resistance Movements had on the emergence of the British's military operation—*Operation Agatha (Black Sabbath)*: During the so-called resistance, the targets of united paramilitary groups were many (e.g., destruction of railway communication network and the main bridges connecting the

territory with the neighboring countries; murdering British paratroopers in their beds; abduction of British officers). Yet, “the Jewish Agency was careful to disassociate itself from the terrorist methods employed by both the Irgun and the [Lehi]; the Hagana took great care not to get involved in the killing of British military and police” (554-5). The British military planners discussed Haganah’s position in this vicious altercation. Being aware of the fact that the Jewish Agency still acted as a moderating force, they extrapolated that the Agency’s military arm, Hagana, would never “openly stir up” a general revolt; yet it might participate “in anti-Government activities in certain circumstances” (552). This matter of opinion then drastically changed as the British came to the conclusion that, “if the Hagana could be liquidated, the Yishuv would entirely collapse, leaving no hope for the survival of the Irgun and the [Lehi]” (553). The British military, therefore, set a campaign named *Operation Broadsides*, which aimed to round up Haganah. After eight months, on June 29, 1946, it was implemented as *Operation Agatha*, through which “17,000 British soldiers raided the Yishuv’s institutions and arrested the leadership and 2,718 suspected activists [...]” (555).

The point of intersection between the above provided scholarly accounts and Duncan’s discourse is underlined in *Yankee Nomad*: “[Weizmann] surely understands that violence is the way to his State. Like the light at dusk, the idea seems more than he can bear” (*Yankee*, 224). Equipped with the aforementioned contextual historical knowledge, one can find that Duncan’s image representations of the British military search in Yajur, while serving as an indicator of *Operation Agatha*, assist us to better perceive the impacts the split in Zionist leadership had on military-political dimensions in the Anglo-Zionist struggle, which earnestly transpired altering the direction of the course of Palestinian history. The implementation of tactics, coupled with the difference of outlook within the Zionist agenda, created a sort of divergence amongst the paramilitary outfits accompanied by a convergence between Haganah and the British during WWII. Yet, this convergence was an artificial outcome of the necessity of war. Hence, the rapid disintegration of relations between the Jews and the British was an inevitable result of the post war era—just as the swift junction that proceeded amongst paramilitary units, which all at once joined the Jewish Resistance Movements in 1945. They manifested their actions in the form of terrorism as a response to British presence within Palestine, where the contributions of the vast majority of the Yishuv towards the resistance movement was fundamental. Placed in a historical context, Duncan’s image portrayals of military operation in Yajur have turned out to be

illustrations of what academia has largely examined as an era, during which the impacts the Zionist activist leaders had on the Jews' inclination towards extremism took effect. This inclination took form in diverse ranges, from political violence to radicalism, drawing power from the various sectors of Yishuv, all the while receiving fierce military response from British colonial forces. This is clearly displayed in image portrayals of Yajur village, where the British military forces entered with *brengun* carriers and found the settlement to be a huge arms dump. Duncan's photojournalism today makes us bear witness to the Jewish Resistance Movement, which spread from the top, as it was drawn by the Zionists, to the bottom, as seen in the case of Yajur village, which became involved in such a resistance movement through full cooperation.

Duncan takes a strong stand as he exhibits the domestic farming arrangements in Yajur, where Jews' resistance movements against the British was collectively taking place, and from where the entire population of working or military age men was taken to Haifa for identification and interrogation. By placing 'Yajur village' in a socio-economic context, he makes 'the village' his visual subject, used as a symbolic icon, representative of all kibbutzim (the collective farms/settlements). This portrayal works in tandem with academic inputs of William L. Cleveland, placed in *A History of Modern Middle East*, which highlight the significance of kibbutzim, "a symbol of the cooperative communal order" in the development of the Yishuv: while being extensively protected by Haganah, the Yishuv gained its strength through kibbutz movement and Histadrut (the Federation of Jewish Labor, founded in 1920), which together made the Yishuv economically orientated as a socialist community (251). This historical account, in conjunction with image displays of arm caches founded in almost every quarter of Yajur, verifies Duncan's representation of such a collective commune, where notion and practice of cooperativeness confirmed each one of its members not only by means of paramilitary piece of mind but also socio-economically. Thus, Duncan's Yajur village considerably comes into view as an example of the distinctive and fundamental roles that kibbutzim had played in the foundation of the State of Israel in 1948, just as it occurred in this village—an organized community functioning in Palestine through an awareness of a common identity, in conjunction with the configuration of a public body and armed power as well as financial support.

The juxtapositions in the media discourse of *Yajur Search* and those placed in *King David Hotel* and *Jaffa Bank Robbery & Shooting* well characterize the palpable friction between British colonialism and Zionism. This can be glimpsed in illustrations of the terrorist attack on

the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, which occurred on July 22, 1946, almost one month after *Operation Agatha* had taken place. In spite of Duncan's intention that was to exclusively illustrate the impacts the explosion had altogether on civilians, military members, and governmental officers, this coverage of the King David Hotel attack substantiates the themes of his report, previously written in *Yajur Search*—"the complete parting of the ways between the British military and the Jews in Palestine." In its role of utilization as the Secretariat of the government and headquarters of the British military, the targeted building, King David Hotel, turned out to be a visual subject—representative of the attacks as a response to *Operation Agatha*. Such an interaction between opposing forces within the presented events has already been validated by scholars, as seen, for example, in the sentiments of Benny Morris, the author of *1948: The First Arab-Israeli War*: "[Operation Agatha] provoked vengeance, with [Irgun], ironically, taking up the cudgel for its sometime enemy, the Haganah. With faulty coordination with the Haganah, [Irgun] sappers on 22 July placed a number of bomb-laden milk containers in the basement of the King David Hotel [...]" (35). Certainly, Duncan's discourse helps us to conceptualize the Palestine, where the Jewish Resistance Movement intensified in diverse forms, begetting increased British military operations and vice versa. This is exemplified further with the photographer's exclusive coverage of the robbery and shooting at Ottoman Bank in Jaffa (September 13, 1946) through which he predicts the event's future outcome: "Palestine [would be] settled again into the pattern of road blocks and curfews."

The focal point of the image coverage placed in *King David Hotel* and *Jaffa Bank Robbery & Shooting* are the people, the visual subjects, demonstrated in a diverse range, from civilians, Arabs and Jews alike (e.g., wounded and dead, or running away from the shooting) to military and policemen (e.g., wounded, dead, in rescue operation, or running to find terrorists). These images, in tandem with pictures of 'barbed wire' that is abundantly presented in Duncan's supplementary pictorial story, *Palestine: the Problem Land*, are utilized to epitomize the Palestine of summer and fall, 1946; the land—restricted by the British colonialism, just as barbed wire that constrained the life of people—and the chaos, seeming ready to envelope everything in explosion, wired like a bomb, just as it occurred at the King David Hotel. This evocative representation, generated from the photographs that were produced for *Life*, has a similar tone to Duncan's written narrations placed in the books, *Yankee Nomad* and *Photo Nomad*. In the former, the journalist notes, "Every time I start out the door, something blows up" (221). In this

book, “the danger” is associated with the existence of “barbed wire” and “guys with burp guns,” which altogether surrounded Palestine. To Duncan, everyone (e.g., Orthodox Jews, Arabs donkey drivers, kids, girls) got caught up on the wire; yet possibly they could not “smell” the danger, or “[they] just ignore[d] it, like out in the islands during the war” (122). This commentary narration, while allowing us to look upon ‘the war’ as a universal concept, as it is regarded by John Keegan as “a universal phenomenon” (*History of Warfare*), appears as if it is the allegorical exhibition of this land that was on an unrelenting course towards imminent warfare. In *Photo Nomad*, a suggestive headline well predicts what this war was to be, for “The Holy Land? / ‘The Bloody Holy Land!’” (124).

Coupled with the issues of Anglo-Zionist disputes running throughout a broad spectrum, the journalist’s illustrative coverage, the first ever composed in Irgun’s hideout for *Life*, is best reflective of such a war from the viewpoint of Irgun, with whose top men (e.g., Menachem Begin—the master tactician) Duncan conducted the sole interview. The irony of the journalist’s presence in this hideaway relies on his ‘coincidental survival’ from gunfire opened up by an operative of Irgun, which had occurred only two weeks before this interview was conducted, when Irgun had launched the bank robbery in Jaffa. Duncan was taking photographs of a portion of the robbery, as he was asked to do so by the aforementioned gunman as he sat in the back seat of a green Chevrolet. During the process, as this man took Duncan for “a Jew, in khaki” (*Yankee*, 227), while “dancing his fire around [him]” (*Photo*, 125), he shot the three Arabs standing just behind the photographer. Nevertheless, having made in Irgun’s hideaway, a photographic representation of a rough Palestinian map, which includes the entirety of the Trans-Jordan area into the territory, greatly exposes how Irgun, representative of the Revisionist camp of Zionism, conceptualized ‘Palestine.’ Duncan regards this as “*their* Israel—Mediterranean to Euphrates” (*Yankee*, 224), which mirrors the scholarly accounts outlining what was claimed in regards to ‘historical’ Palestine by the revisionist leader Vladimir Jabotinsky in 1929, at the annual Zionist Congress: “Palestine is a territory whose chief geographical feature is this: that the River Jordan does not delineate its frontier, but flows through its center” (Cleveland, 253). No less crucial an aspect was Irgun’s assertion, which is reported by Duncan, that the map shows what was deemed regarding the territory—“rightfully Jewish”—for which they would keep fighting until making it “a free Jewish state.” This reportage suggests two states of condition. The first one is ‘a notion’ of an eternal connection between the Jews and the Holy Land, destined to be a land of trouble.

This echoes what is affirmed in “The Bible and Israeli Identity” by Anita Shapira: “a symbiotic relationship between the Jewish people and the land of Israel,” postulated by the Zionist leaders, like Jabotinsky, and some others (11). The second one is ‘a possibility’ of a military escalation for which the support by many is palpable within the region that is regarded as rightfully Jewish. This generates an allegorical representation of the Holy Land, in accordance with an annotation, placed in *Yankee Nomad*: “Jerusalem looks better over the cupolas of the church in the Garden of Gethsemane, from the rocky slopes on the Mount of Olives, and perhaps a bit as it did when Jesus met with His disciples for the last time, where the cypress now grow—the night before He was crucified” (222). Duncan’s reminiscence of a sequence of historical events—the betrayal and crucifixion of Jesus—while surely serving as indicators of the cradle of great religions that the Holy Land is, has appeared as if it is intended to be a representation of ‘anger,’ ‘pain,’ ‘sorrow,’ in tandem with ‘persecution’ and ‘disgrace,’ which all blended with ‘faith,’ and tremendously encouraged and triggered violence in the course of the Holy Land’s history. This representation assists us to bear witness to the British Mandate of Palestine, which was in a state of increasing exacerbation—just as Jerusalem was in “the night before Jesus was crucified.” It was less than two years before Palestine became “a free Jewish State,” which was what Irgun was fighting for.

Duncan’s discourse in representing the upsurge of militancy in Zionism’s pathway drastically shifts in *Palestine: the Problem Land*, when he represents a life of harmony, peace, and joy, through his photographs taken in a highly populated Jewish city, Tel-Aviv, which became his visual subject along with its Jewish settlers, as follows: city dwellers strolling along the beach; mothers taking their babies to park; young boys practicing in racing shells along the river; crowds of people sitting in sidewalk cafes; swimmers at the beach; and the Orthodox Jews observing their religious traditions at the beach (practicing a ceremony “Tashlich” on the Jewish New Year’s afternoon). Extremism is highlighted and over displayed in the media discourse; yet it also overtly alleges that not all Jews for that matter were Zionists, and moderation could be found in the bulk of things.

2.6.2. Anglo-Zionist Disputes Taking Form as Militarism in Palestine, 1946, within the Context of Jewish Illegal Immigration

Neither in his representative works placed in *Yajur Search*, nor in his accounts in *King David Hotel* and *Jaffa Bank Robbery & Shooting*, does Duncan emphasize that in the progression of the acts and counter acts, driven by both the activist camp of Zionism and by British colonial forces, the issue of Jewish illegal immigration appears. Such a junction can be described by the scholars as, “Zionist leaders in Palestine, now [1945-48] more than ever guided by the views of Ben-Gurion concluded that because Britain would not sponsor the gradual development of a Jewish national home by eliminating immigration quotas, the Jewish state would have to be seized by force” (Cleveland, 263). Duncan’s neglect in representing the links between the activist movements and the issue of Jewish immigration is also seen in his *Illegal Immigration*; wherein the photographer exclusively demonstrates the subject matter within the framework of ‘Britain’s newly emerged anti-illegal policy,’ which was enacted on midnight, August 11, 1946.

This absence in the contextual information could stem from the fact that Duncan was covering the issues within a time frame, during which this progression had already started, but this progression can be grasped through the scholarly treatments of Arie J. Kochavi, the author of “The Struggle against Jewish Immigration to Palestine.” Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry was established in 1946 to consult with representatives, Jews and Arabs, in order to arbitrate acceptable arrangements regarding the immigration. In the summer of that year, when the committee conducted its negotiations, the British faced a tremendous increase in illegal immigration. “The practice at that time was to intern the illegal immigrants in Atlit and to release them against the monthly immigration quota.” Yet, in early July, based on their claims, which included lack of certificate (because of the increase on refugees that resulted in filling the quotas months in advance) and shortage of space (either in Atlit, or in other possible locations, where around 2,700 Jews were under arrest after Operation Agatha), British Mandatory Government began establishing policy entailing a state of non-permission for entry of illegal immigrants to Atlit. “The immediate cause was [...] an explosion in the King David Hotel (22 July 1946) in Jerusalem that was executed by the Irgun Zvai Leumi [...]” In order to stop immigration into Palestine, the High Commissioner of Palestine (General Sir Alan Cunningham) proposed that: following their arrival, a significant number of illegal immigrants joined underground outfits,

namely Irgun and Lehi; therefore, “illegal-immigrant vessels that had embarked from ports under Western control be returned to their points of embarkation and that ships arriving from Balkan ports under Russian control be sent to Tripoli or to Cyprus” (153).

In viewing these historical inputs, Duncan’s illustrations of Jewish illegal immigration appears sturdily connected with the explosion at King David Hotel, and the robbery and shooting at the Ottoman Bank in Jaffa, which all at once are reflective of his intention; exposing the measure of violence and retaliation that took place in Palestine. Also, while Duncan’s accounts in *Illegal Immigration* are examined in good care within historical context, it appears as they indirectly, yet undeniably, work in tandem with his contributions placed in *Yajur Search*. In this regard, particular selections in representing the immigrants aboard an illegal vessel, *Jewish Soldier* (e.g., “under twenty-five years old,” and “formerly guerillas from Poland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria”) would be good cases for examination. The depictions of these figures, bearing in mind the subjects’ ages and previous experiences, serve as implications of what is pointed out in Kochavi’s article regarding ‘youthful illegal immigrants,’ most of whom were claimed by Britain as they simultaneously joined in underground organizations following their arrival to Palestine, most likely more than a coincidence. Standing in connection with these implicative depictions is Duncan’s supplementary report regarding the forged immigration certificates that were sold to the illegal immigrants en route. Through this report, while showing us “part of the root of all the trouble of the Jewish people trying to enter Palestine” (i.e., “under nationality by birth, every card is the same—Jewish—with no thought of it as a religion”), the journalist exemplifies what such an ideology, behind this mass immigration movement, reverberates—National Socialism in Palestine, that was comparable to Germany “at the peak of her Youth Movements, et al.” This interpretation comes to view as a connotation of the Jewish/Zionist youth movement of post-WWII, which had taken its ideological root in orientation to Eastern Europe (e.g., Germany), where the Jewish youth also resisted against the Nazis through organized militia activities; their ideology was to return to Palestine causing a national revival of the Jews and a creation of a natural-simplistic way of life by means of measuring activities (e.g., community organization, educational development, political realization, Zionist consciousness). *Illegal Immigration* together with *Yajur Search* confirms that in Palestine, the ideals of the Jewish youth were still in flux, as these people (mostly the survivors of the Holocaust) immensely impacted the establishment of the socially oriented collective farming community, the kibbutz, where the

influence of Labor Zionists (Histadrut) and their socialist economic orientation played roles, while at the same time the revisionist camp of Zionism made military training for the youth available—where “a glorification of the new Jewish self-image in which the passive and oppressed ghetto dwellers of Europe gave way to the self-confident, physically active workers, farmers, and soldiers of Palestine capable of determining their own destinies” (Cleveland, 251).

Subsequently, the journalism represents a diverse array of opinions within a broad spectrum of Zionism, which merged through the entangled practices in the kibbutz, where Jewish National Socialism shared common roots with German National Socialism. These roots come into view through Duncan’s report in describing forged immigration certificates, which clearly resonate what had already been grouped together by a Jewish philosopher, Moses Hess: ‘race,’ ‘people,’ and ‘nation,’ referring to both as ‘the chosen’ and ‘the purity of Jewish race’—similar to “the purity of Aryan race,” a talking point in Hitler’s Socialist Nationalism. Thus, Duncan’s commentaries appear in accordance with the prospective military discourse that would be taking place within Anglo-Zionist disputes in Palestine, because the immigrants arrived there through politically and ideologically organized movements, by means of a birthright; and because Palestine was the land, idealized by the Jewish youth in the movement; yet it was still politically functioning under British Mandatory rule, in 1946.

2.6.3. Power Changing Hands from British Colonial Forces to Zionists in Palestine, 1946, within the Context of Jewish Illegal Immigration

Images combined with words, reflective of the illegal immigrants, who were either permitted to pass into Palestine, or were deported to Cyprus, are insightful regarding the impact Britain’s newly enacted anti-illegal policy had on the state of conditions that the Jewish immigrants were in, during the summer of 1946. Regardless of the absence of background information, which might yet be exemplary of the historically driven causes and motivations behind both the inundation of Jewish immigration into the land since the eve of WWII and the constant shifts on Britain’s policy towards illegal immigration during and post WWII, the collection of these works is still vital. It is contributory for us to associate them with historical literature, which enables us to better comprehend the context, and in turn assists us to develop an external perception in respect to Duncan’s conceptualization of affairs in his presentation.

Regarding the lack of context in Duncan's references to illegal immigration, reference to the article by Kochavi proves advantageous, as it is a good evaluation in this reassessment of the history: "The 1936-39 Palestine revolt against the British Mandate was a direct outcome of the dramatic increase in Jewish immigration during the first three years of Adolf Hitler's reign" (146). Between 1933 and 1936, while more than 130,000 Jews reached the territory, the population of Yishuv enlarged drastically (about 80 percent). Yet, through the White Paper of 1939, the British drastically limited the scope of Jewish immigration (e.g., setting the immigration quota at 75,000 Jews for five years, after which it would be conditional upon Arab allowance). After the war, with the 'five years requirement' proclaimed upon the White Paper having passed, Britain decided to extend the restriction on immigration and offered 1,500 visas per month in order to fill the quota (75,000). The Zionists rejected this with a demand of 100,000 Jewish displaced persons to enter into Palestine. Britain attempted to solve the dilemma without confronting the Jews in Palestine as well as the Arabs throughout the Middle East, and the U.S.—for the latter, the issue was attached to the electoral process of the White House, where both Republicans and Democrats tried to capture the American Jewish vote, and Truman's proposal that granted 100,000 immigration certificates for Jewish displaced persons. After being offered by the British, an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry was established by Britain and the U.S. in 1946. Yet, the two countries' approached the issue with different outlooks; while Truman supported his proposal, Britain declared, "the Jews should not be driven out from Europe and that Palestine alone could not present a solution for the Jewish problem" (149). The joint committee finalized its report in April 1946 with a decision of 100,000 certificates that would authorize the Jews' admission into Palestine, "who have been the victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution" (151), which referred to those, who were displaced in the camps and to those, who were liberated either in Germany or Austria. While Arab leaders condemned the decision, Britain, in order to postpone the entry of such large number of immigrants into Palestine, declared, "...until the illegal armies in Palestine were disbanded, the Mandatory Government could not absorb such a large number of immigrants" (152). Britain's policy on stopping Jewish immigration into Palestine, driven by Alan Cunningham's proposal (aforementioned and occurring in response to the bombing in the King David Hotel), officially emerged on August 12, 1946, which was the day when Truman rejected the 'Morrison-Grady plan' (the provincial-autonomy plan that would allow Britain's continuation of the Mandate, and

its use of Palestine as a military base). By justifying their reasons through many claims, i.e., “the illegal immigrants [were] exacerbating the tension between Arabs and Jews” (153), the British declared its new anti-illegal immigration policy— “[...] 754 illegal immigrants who had arrived from France and 536 who had come from Greece were deported to Cyprus” (156).

The assortment of image coverage made in Haifa Harbor works in conjunction with the associated literature (above). Duncan was permitted to record that moment in history by means of his camera, during the course of two operations carried out by Palestinian Police of the Marine Division: the relocation of a large group of immigrants from the illegal vessel *Jewish Soldier* to the Atlit camp in Palestine and the deportation of the immigrants to Cyprus from the two intercepted illegal ships, *Yajur* and *Henrietta Szold*. This indeed exceeded the scope of historical writings as his photographs serve as definitive proof of his testimony of historical facts, while his accounts provide an assertion of firsthand authentication regarding the specified events.

The selection of the visual subjects, aided with the written reports, allows Duncan to crucially expose the state of political affairs into which the illegal immigrants have been thrust through the following: anti-Semitic discourse in Europe, anti-Semitic discourse of Hitler’s Germany, the imperial discourse of Great Britain, and finally, the Zionist discourse of the Jewish Agency, which all at once seemed to take hold in shaping Palestinian history in the summer of 1946. This is clearly seen in a sequence of image representations, reflective of illegal immigrants, who arrived into Palestine via the *Jewish Soldier*. A picture is given in representing a refugee, who had served in the British Army in Italy during WWII against the Nazi Germany; yet “his service had given no chance for citizenship, anywhere, under the Union Jack.” This appeared as a figurative representation of ‘the stateless existence of Diaspora Jewry,’ which echoes to what is regarded as, “Discriminated against by governments and private individuals alike, European Jews were subjected to restrictions forbidding them from entering certain professions, [...] barring them from state employment, and confining them to specific areas of residence” (Cleveland, 240). A glimpse is also given in the photocomposition regarding four young refugees, whose forearms had been tattooed by the Nazis in concentration camps, where one of them also had lost an eye. In conjunction with the aforementioned visual subjects, the image portrayal of barb-wired barges, which helped all refugees aboard the ship to be transferred to shore, from where they were interned to Atlit, generates an allegorical representation of ‘complex position of repressive state of affairs’ towards the Jews, which took a course within a

diverse scope through the ideological-political hegemony of power. Just as it had occurred for the Jews in the Diaspora, where anti-Semitism was getting increasingly bitter during WWII, it occurred in the British Mandate of Palestine in the summer of 1946. What strongly differentiates the former from the latter was the ideological set caused by the atrocities that resulted in the systematic murders of a countless number of European Jews in Nazi concentration camps—the Holocaust. Finally, the subsequent photographs, reflective of the refugees entering into the Atlit camp, fulfill Duncan's aims of representing the state of political affairs, into which the illegal immigrants were unavoidably entangled. As the photographer articulates, Atlit would become a “tent of home” for several months for the refugees, who then would become the residents in Palestine, where they would reside in Jewish collective settlements with the help of the Jewish Agency. Thus, Duncan uses his camera as a means of communication between his visual subjects and us, and his textual contributions naturally enrich the content. While greatly exposing how the Jewish illegal immigrants were bound to their own past and future in Palestine, he also exhibits the power changing hands among the components of the international system. Just as it had shifted with the defeat of Hitler's Germany in WWII, a power struggle was now occurring between the two observable rivals, the British and the Zionists, both of whom were heavily invested in institutional politics that took place in Palestine.

Furthermore, the contributions, reflective of the Jewish Agency's role in promoting immigration into Palestine, significantly depict the triumph of Zionism. This is recognizable in the textual combinations to the visual works, through which, while exhibiting the agency's service to the immigrants aboard all illegal vessels (e.g., supplying medical care, food, blankets, etc.), Duncan also demonstrates the Agency's efforts to blackmail, and win the war of public opinion. In this respect, he endeavors to point out that except for their ‘filth,’ the immigrants arrived in Palestine just ‘fine.’ This works to represent a part of, what the journalist calls, the “over-all plan” of the well-organized mass immigration movement, as he regards the ‘filth’ as a point of interest for the public, to take advantage of the conditions of the illegal immigrants by the Agency—in order to break “immigration quotas and resettlement policy.” Striking a link with this interpretation is a depictive report, taken from Duncan's own experience that occurred aboard an illegal vessel, where an agent of the Jewish Agency, while stopping a group of immigrants, who were playing cards on board, told the photographer not to shoot this genial mood of the people, ““because it [is] contrary publicity for the Jewish immigrants' cause.”” In

unveiling ‘the general pattern’ of ideologically driven codes into which immigrants were forced to conform, Duncan provides a notion that not all immigrants were Zionist; yet, they have to obey commands, as they were in need of land, home, and citizenship, which would be gained with the help of the Jewish Agency. It was a case in point—regimented and institutionalized Zionism functioning to perfection against the colonial legitimacy of Britain in Palestine.

2.6.4. The Socio-Cultural, -Economic, and -Political Climate in Palestine, Created amongst the British, Zionists, and Palestinian Arabs, in 1946

Duncan’s entire image-word coverage placed in *Illegal Immigration* and part of his illustrative works existing within *Palestine: the Problem Land* either directly or figuratively reverberate the socio-cultural, -economic, and –political ambiance surrounding Palestine, under the British mandatory rule, during summer and fall, 1946. It was when the sources of discord were intensely being strengthening through a multitude of the attributions that were colonial attitudes (British), the nationalistic-religious postures of the Zionists, and the territorial attachments of the Palestinian Arabs ‘towards and ‘within’ Palestine.

The juxtapositions of visual works reflective of the two groups of illegal immigrants, who arrived in Palestine aboard the *Jewish Soldier*, and those aboard *Yajur* and *Henrietta Szold*, enormously reveal the phenomena that separated and unified these two groups of people in Palestine. The deviation between these two groups is visualized through the depictions of the deportation of illegal immigrants aboard *Yajur* and *Henrietta Szold* to Cyprus, which was the end result of a showdown in regards to Jewish immigration, the British against the increasing power of the Zionists. What Duncan neglected to exemplify in this representation is the main motivation behind this action, which was Britain’s heavily weighted imperial outlook and paramount interest towards Palestine, heartland of the Middle East.

The unifications of these illegal immigrants, either deported or permitted to pass in Palestine, are exposed from their demonstrations of the affective expressions—the emotions, indicative of their cheerfulness, upon arrival. Yet, in accordance with Duncan’s written narratives, these expositions turn out to be a representation of the connectivity that the immigrants had with each other, through the deeply rooted self-image forged by the Israelis, through their own international political outfits and identity as well as the trials and tribulations

their people had undergone (e.g., the Holocaust), blended with their history, culture and religion, as well as their spiritual connections with the Holy Land. An example in this regard can be found in a sequence of images exposing that the first group of illegal immigrants, arriving in Palestine via the *Jewish Soldier*, show their cheerfulness by kissing the ground on the shore; and the second group, aboard *Yajur* and *Henrietta Szold*, demonstrate it by singing the Jewish national anthem (“Hatikvah to each other”) when their vessels come together in the seaport at Haifa. At a first glance, the image portrayals of such emotive acts signifies the triumph of ‘Diaspora Jewry,’ for whom, being in Palestine was a ‘hope’ for the ‘future,’ especially after having faced discrimination and prejudice for centuries, even persecution. Yet, in conjunction with the following expressions placed in the books, these images appear as illustrations of joyfulness towards the achievement of the Israelis, as their dream of centuries, ‘returning to the Promised Land,’ came true: “... despite all terror, others kept pouring out of shattered Europe aboard vessels [...] there would be the fulfillment of a promise that was repeated each year for nearly two thousand Passovers—‘Next year, Jerusalem!’” (*Yankee*, 227). Corresponding with this, “End of Their Exodus/ Their Dream Almost Home (*Photo*, 123), descriptive of the illegal immigrants aboard the *Yajur* and *Henrietta Szold*, when the two ships came together at Haifa port. While reverberating the story of the Exodus, this definition exhibits the Jewish history that has been replicated in Palestine—just as the Israelites had departed from ancient Egypt to Palestinian territory as described in the Hebrew Bible, now in 1946, they again departed, this time from Europe, to Palestine. What differentiated this exodus from the first is well exemplified in Duncan’s aforementioned supplementary report regarding the forged immigration certificates. All in all, the journalist exemplifies the achievement of ‘political Zionism,’ though it was divided amongst diverse branches, which all served the same agenda, it made possible the Jewish exodus to British Mandated Palestine in the middle of the twentieth century, indubitably a rallying and unifying event for Zionism, a part of the nation building process, integral for the foundation of a legitimate Jewish state, over Palestinian territory.

Subsequently, Duncan’s discourse, to an extent, exposes ‘two sides of the coin,’ immigration into Palestine and land settlement through immigration, which seems to reverberate one of the often-used slogans of Zionism: ‘A land without people for a people without land.’ In displaying the issue of the land settlement movement of the Jews in *Palestine: the Problem Land*, the journalist finally shifts his focus from Anglo-Zionist disputes to Zionist-Arab

dissentions. His illustrations, depictive of the top local Arabs in a dedication ceremony in town, serve as examples of where “the Arab boycotts on Jewish land sales breaks down,” intensified with the sentiments of “the Arab, after selling the land to the Jewish National Fund as a settlement site, got hell out of the Palestine and went to Syria to live.” This reportage serves not only as implicative of the extent of Arab resistance against the Zionist aim at making Palestine the Jew’s national home, but as expressive of a phenomenon, stating an equation; ‘selling the land’ – ‘leaving Palestine.’ Such an equation, in juxtaposition with the snapshots of a seventeen-year-old Danny Newman turns out to be a representation of reciprocity, ‘buying the land’ and ‘building a national home,’ because Duncan utilizes Newman as representative of all Jews, who were obliged through Zionist Law in Palestine to serve for one year in a new settlement site “toward building the national home.” Though the journalist leaves a question of why the land was not in majority bought by private owners but by the Jewish National Fund unanswered, the juxtapositions of his illustrations demonstrate the national contemplations of the Zionist program. This question can be answered through the scholarly treatments of Jacob Metzer, the writer of “Economic Structure and National Goals—The Jewish National Home in Interwar Palestine.” Because an old biblical principle relied on a notion, “the land of Israel is divine property,” the Jewish National Fund came into existence in the early 1900s, “as a fund-raising body for purpose of public purchase of land [...]” (112). Under this relative information, while revealing the Jewish National Fund that made land purchase possible in Palestine, Duncan also provides a notion attested to through “Having as much of Palestine’s land as possible in Jewish possession was regarded as a complement to agricultural settlement in establishing the territorial basis for the Jewish national home” (Metzer, 108). From this, his displays of the countryside, where the common dominator was the soil and the paramount interest was the tractor, help us to better perceive the socio-cultural and economically driven and ideologically determined reality—it was the land that held the history of Palestinian Arabs and the Jews together, “who have lived and brought their children up side-by-side for several generations;” and the land, which would bring the future to the Palestinian Arabs and the new comers (the Jews); yet there was a doubt that, this time, these two factions would raise their children side by side.

2.6.5. The Holy Land, 1946, an outlook on Palestine

What works in tandem with Duncan’s entire image-word coverage, discussed thus far in

this study, is his representations of the Herod's Gate of the Old City (of Jerusalem), of Hadassah Hospital in Jerusalem, of an Arab agricultural school (*Deir Amr*) on the west side of Jerusalem, and of the Graves of Palestine Police at Mount Zion Cemetery in Jerusalem. These all work together as exemplary depictions of the Holy Land, which came into existence as a merging of Jewish, Christian, and Muslim ideals handed down throughout history. This land, where identities gradually evolved through religious adherents, gave a notion of separation and division just like the Old City of Jerusalem, where ancient walls divided the populace in structural quarters for the Jews, Muslims, and Christians. It was a land, where the separation of the different religious groups gathered strength through the temporal political affairs, while the territory's history was riddled with examples of subjugation and territorial altercations (e.g., British occupation). It was where modern political affairs blended with ideologies like Zionism functioning through well organized, politically motivated, and strongly backed institutions, effectively having operated through worldwide support, like the Zionist Organizations of America, whose support made Hadassah Hospital possible. Unlike Zionism's power of unification, the Arabs were attempting to develop their territorial existence, agricultural settings, historical awareness, and intellectual enrichment for future generations through private capital, in places like the Arab agricultural school, *Deir Amr*, which was endowed through private Arab donations. The land is where the 1936-1939 disturbances enacted by Arabs—likely the fathers of the students of Deir Amr agricultural school—against the British took place. These were partly in reaction to increased Jewish immigration and the land settlement policy allowed by colonial forces. The Holy Land, where Arabs and Jews fought against the British, all the while fighting against each other, living and dying for land, while fallen Palestinian Policemen rested in their graves, a testament to the undying turbulence surrounding this land called Palestine, just less than two years before its resignation, becoming the State of Israel.

2.6.6. A Decade After, the Gaza Strip

Duncan would probably never have imagined that ten years after completing his assignment for *Life*, he would be in the Holy Land again, yet this time he would be in the Gaza Strip (in June 1956 for *Collier's*), a divided portion of Palestine since 1948; the year marks the end of direct colonial rule of the British over this land, as Britain withdrew its authorities and

forces in May 15. This date also marks both the proclamation of the State of Israel and declaration of Egypt, Transjordan, and Syria a war against Israel (the Arab-Israeli War of 1948).

Gaza Strip Caption accompanied with photographic works authenticates Duncan's predictions that he had made in 1946 (to *Life*) regarding Palestine's near future (e.g., tenacious ruptures amongst the Jews, Palestinians Arabs, and British). It also reveals the catastrophic moment that brought about the defeat of the Arab states in the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, as it turned the countless Palestinian Arabs into a people, labeled refugees. Juxtaposed with the Palestinian coverage that exhibits the impacts the Holocaust had on the triumph of the political Zionism, the Gaza coverage demonstrates an allegory within the reality, which resonates what is affirmed in *Passion and Politics* by Sandra Mackey: "[...] the world wide revulsion at the Nazi death camps that secured wholesale Western political support for Palestine as a homeland for the Jews and, in the process, turned the Palestinians into a nation of refugees and the Arabs into a people united in anger against Zionism" (125). More significantly, the Gaza story conveys the territorial division over Palestine, which took a different course in the second half of the twentieth century, especially with the defeat of the Arab states in the 1948 War. Presented as integral in the Gaza Strip, this matter of the changing course of the territorial split is perceived in Duncan's depictions of the Strip, which correspond with those written by both Nur Masalha in "The 1956-57 Occupation of the Gaza Strip: Israeli Proposals to Resettle the Palestinian Refugees," and Ilena Feldman in "Difficult Distinctions: Refugee Law, Humanitarian Practice, and Political Identification in Gaza": Gaza was originally a district located on the southern section of the coastal plain of the British Mandate of Palestine. Under the UN partition plan of 1947, it had planned to be one of the three parts of the Arab state. Yet, during the 1948 War, while Israel seized the larger portion of this district, Egypt occupied the remaining segments that included Gaza City, two towns, and a few villages, which all together formed "what came to be known as the Gaza Strip" (Masalha, 55). Never having claimed sovereignty, but serving as a "caretaker of a Palestinian space," Egypt governed the Strip, which turned out to be "an anomalous space," as "it has not been the sovereign territory of any state—a condition that has meant that its residents have not been citizens of any existing state" (Feldman, 129-130).

As suggested above, addressing the full range of military confrontations taking place between Egypt and Israel from 1948 and up until June 1956, 'Gaza Strip' is Duncan's case study, which reflects in a larger context the Arab-Israeli conflict, all the while connecting us to a decade

back, Palestine in 1946. Placing the matter of territorial subjugation into a historical context, he provides the idea regarding a domino effect of results brought through the defeat of Egypt in the 1948 War, as follows: on-going border issues based on the 1949 Israeli-Egyptian Armistice Agreement that placed the Gaza Strip under Egyptian administration, while drawing the Demarcation Line (DL) by the UN Truce Commission; acceleration of antagonism prompted between Egypt and Israel by means of military actions; exodus of Palestinian Arabs from what came to be known as Israel to Egyptian held Gaza, where these Palestinians turned out to be refugees; dispossession of most of Gaza's native dwellers, who lost their livelihood in the part that became the land of Israel; and an emergence of humanitarian crisis experienced by the Palestinian Diaspora in the Strip, where UNRWA provided aid to the displaced.

2.6.7. The Holy Land, 1956, an Outlook on the Gaza Strip

In presenting the aforementioned domino effects of the Arab defeat in the Palestinian War, Duncan, to a great extent, exhibits the Holy Land (i.e., "It is an old, old land—old when Samson destroyed the Temple"), where history was reverberating in Gaza in diverse ranges. One example in this regard is the presentation of both the southern and northern extensions of the Gaza road, while the former was in use and connecting Gaza to Egypt, the latter was closed since 1948, which otherwise connected Gaza to Israel. At first glance, such an illustration seems to underline a historical reality—after the foundation of the State of Israel and consequently the Arab defeat in the war with Israel, Palestine became a divided land. While framing that moment in history, the journalist's illustration drastically juxtaposes the ancient with the present appearing as an array of figurative portrayals of the Holy Land and its people by means of his narrative style. For example, usage of the ancient road of importance emerges as reminiscent of a biblical event, 'The Flight into Egypt' (Gospel of Matthew-2:13-23), as Duncan says, "[this road] heard the foot beats of the patient little Palestinian donkey carrying Mary and Joseph, and the infant Jesus." This account, in the conjunction with the visualization of a refugee Palestinian Arab boy in Gaza of 1956, rolling his mother's wheat-sifting screen, serve as an indication of the commonality that people living in Palestine have faced throughout history—just as the infant Jesus, who fled to Egypt with his mother because of Jerusalem's only ruler, Herod the Great—this Arab refugee child, when he was a baby boy in 1948, fled to Egyptian held Gaza.

Another example is the display of parallels between the existence of Egyptian military over the Gaza road (exhibited in picture images, e.g., through road blocks) with the presence of the Greeks of Alexander the Great, Persians, and Roman Legions, which “all drove into the valleys of the Nile.” While reverberating what Oroub El-Abed indicates in *Unprotected Palestinians in Egypt since 1948*, “Palestine and Egypt, although separated by desert, have been linked by millennial trade routes, shared history, and culture” (11), this display, proposed to *Collier’s*, is comparable to those inserted in *Photo Nomad*. Wherein, the author’s exemplifications of the history of the land with “Alexander the Great’s squadrons,” “cross-bearing probably seasick land-lubber Crusaders,” and “savage horn-helmeted Norsemen” (271) help the reader to conceptualize Palestine in the course of the Middle Eastern history with a unique and pivotal role. While it has been through its eventful existence—serving as a patchwork of continents and civilizations because of its geopolitical essentiality, its Holy identity also made Palestine a confluence of the Occident and Orient, whose people together have taken part in history, and re-fragmented the cultures and identities along with the territory. Coupling with the illustrations of a refugee baby boy in Gaza in 1956 (to *Collier’s*), exhibited with his blond hair and fair skin without any external parental pigmentation (not “swarthy and black-haired”), Duncan’s recollection of Greeks, Crusaders, and Norsemen works as an identifier of Palestine’s ethnic milieu. His attempt to negate a common misconception regarding the Holy Land’s people as Semitic works in tandem with his demonstration of a young-wandering refugee living in the Egyptian border of Gaza, who reminds the photographer of a famous American child actor, Jackie Coogan. His report regarding the newly arrived European Jewish couples’ children (e.g., “blond,” “blue-eyed,” “freckled and pug-nosed”), settling on the Israeli side of the Demarcation Line (DL), creates the irony within reality. Israel attempted the ‘ethnic cleansing,’ a policy that brought about the visual subjects in the aforementioned images ‘displaced’ in the Gaza Strip. Yet, coinciding with the earlier subjugation history of the land, many incidences (e.g., interracial marriages) inevitably occurred through history leading to ethnically mixed people settling on either the Israeli or Egyptian side of DL, which functions as a symbolic iconography that connects the present with the past while separating people over this non-monolithic terrain.

As it is presented in the Gaza coverage, in his book, Duncan regards Gaza, and to a larger extent Palestine, as a terrain, where “[...] history’s ageless always changing drama [has been] performed by ever-different casts playing roles long-forgotten or never forgotten...Phoenician

searches-of-discovery [...]” (*Photo*, 227). This context, either in the captions, or in the book, provide the idea that such a terrain along the Mediterranean has borne witness to a procession of drama and conflict in the course of history through the imperial rivalries, whose colonial legacies have been to a certain extent blended with religious doctrines. As it had occurred in the distant past, it happened in the first half of the twentieth century through the presence of Britain’s high authority, and then again; “where, now, Arabs and Israelis fight and falter and live and perish and try, each of them, to find the road to personal salvation” (*The World*, 270). Duncan certainly exhibits what differentiates the later time frame from the previous ones in focusing on the Gaza Strip — largely within the context of the ‘Egyptian-Israeli conflict,’ and framing his representations within a period comprising between 1948 and 1956, the former year laying the stage for the whole ‘Palestinian experience.’ To what extent his journalistic and artistic discourses display social, cultural, economic, ideological, and political measures (trials and tribulations placing effects on states and societies [and stateless societies]), and who cast and bore a part in that region, where the Middle Eastern history was taking shape during post WWII settings is the subject of this analysis.

2.6.8. The Gaza Strip along the Mediterranean Sea, a Home for Natives and Refugees since 1948

Duncan’s most effective image and word productions are centered primarily on Gaza’s natives. It stems from the fact that while exploring the state of conditions surrounding the Gaza Strip politically and from a military perspective during the post-1948 War, these works are best reflective of the everyday life experiences bounded with social culture and economics, and occurring in every corner of such a tiny terrain, where the products of the political strains (martial and geographic separation) altered the paths of the indigenous Gazans along with that of the people, who came to be known as refugees.

Due to the nature of Duncan’s body of works, the visual illustrations of Gaza’s natives, which examine socio-cultural and –economic ambiance surrounding these people in 1956, have moved into a context, which displays the Holy Land and its peoples’ tenacious connections with their land and sea in the course of history. By making these natives his point of focus, the journalist represents “men of the Holy Land,” and refers to them as “the men of the field” and

“the men of the sea,” along with “the others,” like blacksmiths, stonemasons, and carpenters etc. This indication not only implies a culture of admiration for the existence of a middle class, but also draws a sort of boundary between ‘urban’ and ‘rural’ in the Strip, where, in accordance with the photographer’s portrayals, the pastoral rhythm of life was a more prevalent adherence.

The irrevocable motive of the representations is ‘nature,’ through which photographer produces artistic works, while examining the subject matter within a historical context. This is seen in his depictions of the land (i.e., “the sunlight turns [it] into carpets of rich orange and topaz”) and the sea (i.e., “the sunlight has turned [it] molten copper”), with reminiscences of an artist’s paintings. Such depictions are enhanced with the following, which juxtaposes the ancient with the present coming into view as a metaphoric definition of the people of the Holy Land living along the Mediterranean Sea: “This is [...] the Sea of Phoenician and Homer and Saint Paul—and of the sardine fishermen of Gaza. [...] deserts...barren rocky crags...sheltering dust-deep caves...miraculously earthy slopes planted to things green—these are the Holy Land, yet so is the Sea.” Duncan’s further elucidation of the subject matter in reference to Gaza’s historically alternating roles since 1948 is apparent in his conceptualization of this area, which is also regarded by him as “more than a land” and “more than a sea”; it is “a pathetic pen for people [...] who fled [...] when Israeli infantry shattered their eastern villages and their means of live.” Under this conceptualization, his characterizations of the sea as “rhythmic,” “serene,” and “benevolent”—the sea, “wedded to her men [...], for through every night of every year of every century of every generation of all fishermen on her shore, [...] she has loved and embraced and protected and fed her men and their families,” seemed to overcome the immense gravity of those turbulent times, bearing witness to that sea. In 1956 the sea was still ‘rhythmic’ for Gaza’s fishermen, who sailed out each late afternoon, and backed on the beach at dawn, selling the fish to earn their meager living, mending the nets to dry, sitting quietly with their baby sons, and waiting for another afternoon while they were resting. It still kept itself ‘benevolent’ and ‘serene,’ yet this time not only was it for the Gaza’s sardine men, but also for the refugees (women carrying sea sand for their huts’ construction, or naked kids laughing when the surf swamps their broken boat), Duncan’s visual subjects.

In respect to the peasantry, the journalist remarks, “[...] Neolithic Man tamed the fields and the grain-plants of the meadows, and began sifting kernels for trash—just as gnarl-fingered, gold-turbaned patriarchs still work for their daily bread today.” While exhibiting the daily work

of a young Palestinian Arab boy, whose donkeys' hoofs helped him to free the wheat kernels for tomorrow's bread, only resting when the work was done, Duncan signifies 'fertility' and 'eternal circle' of mother earth, which provides "the food and the rhythm of life throughout the thousands of Palestine years." Dealing with the issue of social culture and economics, just as the case presented above, the image fabrications of Bedouin women and girls (e.g., sifting chaff from grains, herding flocks), in conjunction with those of Palestinian Arab farmers and shepherds (e.g., working in this year's harvest, and herding animals), serve as inseparable components of his representations of Gaza's local inhabitants of the periphery. The 'nature,' 'land,' and 'working traditions' are exhibited as tied to the utmost cohesion of the two groups of people, sedentary and nomad. The seasonal changes impacted the two classified groups of people in the same manner. Yet, unlike sedentary peasants, the Bedouins are exhibited through their women, whose black veils were ornamented with coins and amber beads. These illustrations, while serving as indicators of Bedouin's participation of socio-economic life turn out to be representations of all Bedouins, to whom Duncan comments, "[they] have always lived in the Gaza Strip belt of arid fertility." They are just as the sedentary peasants, like in the aforementioned images, who were the descendent of the Strip—a landscape, which has been the same "since almost the beginning of historic time." While assisting us to distinguish the mainstay of ancient Gaza, the socio-culturally and economically constructed commune—the peasantry, the above examined illustrations allow us to breath peace—just as the visual subjects, who kept themselves intact with an air of serenity. Yet, in tandem with Duncan's additional report on Gaza's peasants, who cultivated the land up to the last inch of the DL, and considered the untilled acres in "no man's land" with bitterness (i.e., "to see any going to waste on the other side seems, to them, as criminal as the fact that the Israelis are on [their] land at all"), these visual subjects are placed into a context of the political reality of Arab-Israeli tensions, as these people, who, since 1948, turned out to be a part of the prime example of colonialism—land and military suppression, as most of them might adhere and not lose their homes like refugees, but they were not spared their means of livelihood, which were now under Israeli control.

While dealing with the issue of colonialism, Duncan's image-word productions of the rural traits, in conjunction with those of urban characteristics, expose the internal divisions between rural and urban socio-economic spaces in the Strip, in 1956; with the latter additionally divided. These additional contextual clues are explanatory of economic activities driven either by

‘regional practices in the periphery,’ or ‘personal practices in the city’ (pictured either through the owners of the private-tiny-local businesses, e.g., store and coffee shop, or through the indulgences of ‘urbanized’ figures, e.g., the owner of a fishtail Cadillac). It is a clear case in point that neither of their current economic systems was integrated either with each other, or within the world capitalistic system. Working in tandem with these displays are the illustrations of the refugees, whose states of condition in the Strip’s economic climate were undefined as of 1956, which generates the idea that in Gaza, socio-economic disparity between urban and rural spaces was also a reality between the local inhabitants and refugees. This disparity can be grasped in Duncan’s commentary on the cotton-yarn dyers, the visual subjects, regarded as “the lucky refugee men with work.” This discrepancy can also be inferred in pictorial expression of the fishtail Cadillac that was parked among the refugees’ carts and peddlers’ wagons, through which the journalist places emphasis on the owner of this car, who planned to open the largest clinic in the town, where since 1948, there has been no building for the able refugee merchants to lay foundations for a livelihood. Lastly, this disproportion can be grasped in the portrayals of the Strip, where the natives have attained job opportunities, which were already limited to certain hotspots like market centers for the Bedouins and farmers, and where “there wasn’t an industry capable of employing the tens of thousands of able-bodied, willing men who suddenly appeared on the doorstep.” Exposing such dilemmas, Duncan remembers with poignancy what was articulated by General Glubb Pasha, ex-chief of the Arab Legion, “mass unemployment of the refugee men as the most lethal source of danger to lasting Middle East peace.”

Each of the exemplified illustrations, addressing the ‘land’ and the ‘sea’ and its ‘pathetic pen for people,’ are repeated in *The World of Allah*. Wherein, a suggestive headline, “The Forgotten Land: Gaza Strip” (114), is utilized as a chapter opener, and followed by the selected images; the journalist concludes his story with “if this country has a soul, it must be about crushed by the endless load of heartbreak it has borne” (270). Assisting us to get a feel for the Gaza space and its downtrodden people in 1956, where divergence and convergence have taken place without discrimination since 1948, as it occurred with ‘native and refugee,’ ‘poor and rich,’ ‘rural and urban,’ and ‘domestic and foreign,’ these illustrations, either in the captions or in the book, all at once, help us to construct a perception regarding what Duncan articulates—“Nothing [was] wasted in Gaza Strip [...], nothing but life itself.” In light of his articulation, the crux of the *Gaza Strip Caption*; his productions depictive of the Administrative Governor of Gaza Strip

(the Major General of the Egyptian Army), of representatives of the Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission, and of the UN Truce observers, form a combination that begs the question—to what extent and who is to be deemed responsible for such a result?

2.6.9. Classification of the Strip's 'Natives' and 'Refugees' between 1948 and 1956

The image and word productions that are in the center of Gaza's demographic feature was created in 1956; yet are investigative of the Strip since 1948, the year that marks the emergence of such a unique and anomalous space, where being 'Gazan' and being 'displaced' was not as descriptive as being a 'native' and 'refugee.'

While reporting on the numbers of refugees living in 1956 within two refugee camps out of eight (Gaza Beach—over 17,000—and Jabalia—22,600) and the entire population in Gaza town both in 1948 (70,000 people) and in 1956 (over 100,000), Duncan aims to show what made the Gaza Strip distinctive in 1956; the refugees (200,000) outnumbering the local Gazan inhabitants. His accounts regarding two hundred thousand refugee Palestinian Arabs, who have moved to this small terrain from the east, "a few miles east, from land which until eight years ago was also Palestine," expose the unique position of the Strip, where the divergence of opinions and a convergence of people was taking place, mirroring the scholarly inputs: "Unlike many other refugee situations, in which refugees are 'out of place' not only because they are away from home, but also because they have different nationalities, ethnicities, and/or material conditions from the native population, in Gaza the entire population is Palestinian" (Feldman, 130). This is a clear example of what distinguished refugees from the tenured dwellers, which was neither ethnicity nor language; but what had brought them to the Strip. The armistice agreement (1949) not only resulted in the alteration of territories and the displacement of people, but also in the newly formed classifications over Palestinian Arab identity; while Gaza's time-honored dwellers were 'natives,' the new comers were labeled as 'refugees,' as the Gaza Strip became an 'out of place' location for them.

Correspondingly, the 'barbed-wire fences' lining the refugee camps exhibit a metaphoric separation within Gaza society ranking on two opposite ends of the spectrum in (conservative) political vocabulary: natives and refugees. Functioning as symbolic iconography, the images of the barbed wire fences work in tandem with those of 'demarcation barrels' that oppressed all and

sundry in the Gaza Strip, while separating them from the land of Israel. The usage of both the fences and barrels, in conjunction with the journalist's repetitive wording, "eight year," allows us to comprehend the strong connections between long-term restrictions and Gaza space. The camps, where packed-in refugees resided, turned out to be a sort of open prison, just as the Strip itself, where everyone and everything were squeezed together since the end result of the 1948 War. Under this contextualization, Duncan's narratives regarding an old Bedouin shepherd are explanatory of how the notion of 'freedom' can be applied to natives and refugees, who both turned out to be inseparable fundamental factors in this land. Duncan is accurate that this shepherd (tolerating the journalist's attempts of taking his picture for a while, and then dismissing the photographer from his world, with a hand gesture implying "Okay, Son, on thy way, on thy way"), was in fact "almost completely free [and] thoroughly happy, too!" Yet, such a freedom is only comparable with that which is missing for the refugees in Gaza, space. These are clear instances of what distinguished the original Gazans from the displaced—a semblance of freedom in the Strip, which became an 'out of space in space' for the natives since 1948.

Furthermore, Duncan regards the Strip as a place that was even "barely capable of supporting the original hundred thousand inhabitants," most of whom turned out to be 'dispossessed' by the war. His estimate of about 200,000 refugees is explanatory that these displaced people were still, in 1956, forced to the edges of their homeland, with "black frustration upon looking at [themselves] living on charity" as their huts provided by the UN, and their basic needs—wheat, meat, milk, salt, sugar—was rationed by UNRWA. These indications echo what is affirmed by Feldman: both the colossal influx of people and the isolation from the former hinterland devastated Gaza space economically henceforth from the 1948 War, where almost everyone, either dispossessed or displaced, was in need of relief. Yet, UNRWA formalized the eligibility for relief to those, "[...] who, as a result of [the 1948] conflict, ha[d] lost both his home and his means of livelihood (UNRWA 1955)" (Feldman, 134). This is also an apparent case in point of what distinguished refugees from the natives in Gaza, which was how these two categorized people were delineated through humanitarian practices.

Despite the context that is provided regarding how the delineation of both 'native' and 'refugee' was constructed, by means of war (1948) and of territorial split (the 1949 Armistice agreement) and through the humanitarian practices (of UNRWA), Duncan's illustrations are incomplete because of his terse discourse. First, he fails to point out what sorts of roles the early

humanitarian practices (of AFSC—American Friends Service Committee/the first organized aid program in Gaza) played in the classification of people as native and refugee, and what types of political and economic circumstances affected the AFSC's roles on that matter. Once the gap in the contextual framework is bridged through scholarly inputs, it appears clear that there was an absence of a clear framework that either codified universally or in regards to Gaza who would be an eligible subject for aid within a defined time frame, between late 1948 and 1950, when the AFSC was serving in Gaza (Feldman, 139). It also appears clear that the AFSC was put under restraints by the UN, which required the aid to be delivered to 'only refugees,' and this limitation was never modified in spite of the AFSC's following economic report (July 1949): "the people at the bottom of the income pyramid, in real danger of starvation, [were] at present not the refugees at all but resident workers who receive[d] only the going wage and [could not] qualify for [...] rations" (Feldman, 138). Such failures on Duncan's part can be considered as a failure of creating a broad perception in understanding of the AFSC's relief practices, which eventually participated in the formation of setting apart Gaza's population through categorization in terms. In the absence of legal codes, being faced with immense need, under the mandate from the UN (required to prevent "full-blown crisis" and to relieve those in need of immediate assistance), and having to make do with limited resources (the UN's limitation of the aid requiring it to be delivered to 'only refugees'), the AFSC's debate about "how to deal with natives' needs," resulted in generating the questions: "Who [was] a refugee?" "Or, as seemed more a propos to the Gazan context: Who [was] not a refugee?" (Feldman, 138).

Second, Duncan fails to place emphasis on the re-codifications of the legal and bureaucratic humanitarian apparatuses (e.g., the 1951 International Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the UN High Commission for Refugees/UNHCR) by the post-WWII international refugee regime, and to what extent these 'helping hands' included Gaza's case into their missions. Yet, it would have been more instrumental, if he had brought out that the attempts of determination conducted by the AFSC about the eligibility of a subject for aid coincided with those managed by the post-WWII international refugee regime, because the Palestinian cause occurred within a time frame when displacements in great numbers were taking place as a global phenomenon (e.g., in Europe, India, Hong Kong). It would have also been helpful had Duncan generated an outlook regarding a new (universal) definition of a refugee, which culminated at the 1951 Convention; yet the result was far from being universal (Feldman, 132-3), as in Gaza, the

question of eligibility remained unanswered when UNRWA took over the AFSC's place in 1950, and even later, in 1955. The latter portion of the time frame marks when UNRWA was bound within a policy that contradicted its own humanitarian principles, as its following report was not considered by the UN to extend the aid policy to the dispossessed: "Nearly the whole population [was] in need as result of the establishment of the demarcation line and of the impossibility of moving goods and persons across it legally (UNRWA 1955:10)" (Feldman, 141). Such absence of information on the media discourse can be considered as a failure of creating awareness in understanding the alienation of not only natives, but also, to a certain extent, refugees from the international humanitarian practices. Duncan, additionally, neglects to explain that the 1951 Convention developed specific parameters in order to acquire one's refugee status (e.g., "persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, or membership in a particular social group"). Yet, having considered the UN responsibility that the Palestinian refugee problem had to be taken care of, the 1951 Convention excluded the Palestinian case "temporarily" (Feldman, 133). Under these circumstances, rather than coming under the authority or protection of the UNHCR, the refugees in the Strip, received both relief and legal protection from UNRWA, and to a limited extent, such protection was derived from the UN Resolution 194. "Gaza's population categories have been derived from legal definitions that do not quite apply in this territory (international refugee conventions), shaped by institutions that do not have jurisdiction over it (UNHCR), and influenced by long absent political forms (the sovereign state)" (Feldman, 134).

In summarizing, Duncan's reportage that binds the present with the past, greatly exposes Gaza's space, which in the aftermath of the 1948 War began playing a crucial role as a political and a socio-economic entity, where identification of Palestinian Arabs as either dispossessed or displaced created a split on political identities, which mirrors the split of Palestinian territories and the creation of separated political 'selves' of state or territorial base (the State of Israel, Egyptian held-Gaza Strip). Yet, with clarification from the other scholarly contributions, his discourse presents 'in depth' the diverse components of foreign influence in miscellaneous forms that played crucial roles in the delineation of the identities in Gaza, which were placed in unresolved tribulations, energetically growing and blaming both the UN and all other interests responsible for the results in the Strip. Thus, including the historical context would have been essential to better comprehend Duncan's conceptualization of the subjects in his presentation. An example could be a collection of images, reflective of a refugee camp in diverse sorts (e.g., an

endless array of refugee huts; refugee men sitting in front of a hut with no work; refugee women carrying sea sand for the huts' constructions; game-loving refugee children with no playground, making sand castles or playing jacks, and with an old-broken rowboat swamped in the surf) and that of refugee students (e.g., preparing for their final exams not in a study room, but on unused railways or on the asphalt of the Strip roads). While exposing restrictions, in terms of encroachments on civil rights and socio-economic means, without age and gender specifics that the refugees faced, the effects of such images are enhanced by means of specific backgrounds. For instance, the refugee huts are shown with the Mediterranean Sea as a background; which is clear in exposing that the UN huts, to Duncan "just huts, nothing more," became shelters for the refugees, and as it occurred in the picture, these people were removed away from liberty and infinity, though both of which together stay just behind them, like the blue and endless, stretching Mediterranean Sea. Also, juxtaposing with pictures of the Australian UNRWA director (keeping nearly one quarter of a million people alive for years) and those of UNRWA jeeps (forming the bulk of traffic on Gaza's roads in the last five years), the aforementioned images exposing the abject poverty and substandard lifestyle turn out to be suggestive of such a restricted life, surrounding the refugees still in 1956, even though the relief was just behind them. The journalist displays such occurrences as the outcomes of the political storms brought though the proclamation of the State of Israel, Egypt's defeat in the 1948 War, and the armistice agreement signed in 1949, while also reflecting multi-faceted and intricate compounds of fundamental foreign influence in the Strip. Yet, he does not allow one to evaluate the Stripe, where the segregation of both the indigenous population and the refugees from the standardized treatment of refugees around the world took place, and where the UN played an incompetent role on coping with both the natives' and refugees' misfortunes since 1948, once the issue of humanity is considered, which were all together put both Gaza space and its people in an awkward position in the Middle East.

2.6.10. Arab Nationalism and Palestinian Arab Nationalism Taking Form under the Parameters of Egyptian Influence, the Gaza Strip, in the Mid-1950s

Coupled with the issues of the ambiguous state of conditions that the Palestinian Diaspora faced since the 1948 War in Transjordan, Syria and Lebanon—just like in the Strip,

where in almost all cases ‘being exiled’ was regarded as an impermanent situation—Duncan places the matter of territorial dispute occurring between Egypt and Israel into a context that is reminiscent of the nationalistic sentiment of Colonel Abd al-Nasser’s Egypt in the mid-1950s that spurred the ‘Pan-Arab movement.’ Egypt at that time established its position in the greater Arab world as a rallying force behind the Palestinian issue, all the while helping Palestinians to establish their national ‘selves’ within an environment signifying an absence of a legitimated state and its accompanying apparatuses for them.

In presenting Egypt’s strong stance on the Palestinian cause, ‘1948’ emerges as Duncan’s iconographic focal point. Providing the conception of the Palestine War of 1948, his journalism assists us to firmly grasp the issues and facts of the time, not only with his Palestinian coverage (made in 1946 to *Life*), but also with the historical literature, which all-together help us understand the cause and effect on the nascence surrounding presented issues. The context of the Palestine and Gaza story provides the notion of two deeply seeded ideological positions that were behind the 1948 War—Palestine for Palestinian Arabs, and Palestine for Israelis. This is in correspondence with the information placed by Mackey: During the 1936-1939 Arab Revolt, Palestine paused “between its past and its future.” The former was “the Palestinians’ shackled effort to preserve Palestine and its Arab character” whereas the latter was “the Zionists’ zealous determination to possess Palestine, to create within it the Jewish homeland” (*Passion*, 125). In light of this elaborated concept—reflective of what Palestine was meant to be, Duncan’s displays of the Palestine War help to construct a broader outlook regarding the Arabs: their deeply rooted self-image forged through their own connections to the land and identity, mixed with their shared history, culture, and religion in the Middle East, brought about a new type of vigor and political unification along with a joint effort to save Palestine, where the end of Britain’s direct colonial rule was shifted to the presence of Israel; then, “[...] in the loss of Palestine, the Arab found in the state of Israel the most visceral symbol of their unity” (*Mackey*, 125). Surely, Duncan’s representation of ‘1948’ points out a collective identity, which brought about a shared memory binding Palestinians and Arabs with each other emotionally if not also politically, and at the same time created palpable frictions between the Arabs and Israelis during the post-1948 War era. Equipped with this outline, the displays of military incursions occurring between Egypt and Israel is a testament to the struggle for ‘identity’ and ‘power’ surrounding the Strip, where identity turned out to be an ideological machine churning out the formation of unity, or rupture.

Recalling a collection of photographs exhibiting the Egyptian-Gaza-Jerusalem road and railway, captured in 1956 looking both towards the south, coming into view as a binder of the Strip to Egypt, just like the thoroughfare itself, and towards the north, emerging as a dead end, Duncan well describes the manifestation of a rupture taking place as opposed to a unification connecting the Egyptians and Palestinian Arabs with each other.

Ironically, both an image exhibiting the Gaza-Egypt border, separating the Gaza space from the Egyptian domain, and a written report regarding a rumor, referring to Nasser's future plan, that was to establish a sort of 'Palestine Government in Refuge,' elected from the refugees in the Strip, vividly disclose the phenomena that separated the Egyptians from the Palestinian Arabs within the attempts of unification. Taking into consideration the physical separation in the image as it epitomizes an exclusion of the Strip's Palestinian Arabs from the citizenship status of Egypt, the written expression regarding Nasser's plan serves as an exclusive example in presenting the liaison between Egypt's Strip that was regarded as 'a separate Palestinian body' and Nasser's rhetoric, which promised liberation and self-determination to the Palestinian Arabs. This is a topic that scholarly attention has turned to; as seen, for example, "Although Egypt maintained a very tight grip on the territory, [...] ideologically, for the Egyptian regime, the Gaza Strip was Palestine, the part of the country that had been preserved pending Palestine's liberation as promised by the rhetoric of the Arab regimes" (El-Abed, 38). Duncan's additional reportage shows that his own conceptualization of the Gaza Strip is comparable to that of Egypt's, as he utters that a plausible refugee government in the Strip (planned by Nasser) that would be accompanied by a small but well-trained army did not only bear a hope for the refugees in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, as they were waiting on the day to "'go Home' ... to Palestine," but might also foster bargaining prestige "should [the Palestinian] case ever again get to the UN for final settlement." Not within the scope of Duncan's media report is the historical existence of the Government of All Palestine (GAP): which was established as an official Palestinian government with Egypt's effort during the 1948 War, and headed by Hajj Amin al-Husseini to govern the parts of Palestine that would remain in the Arab's hand after the end of the war; yet, the annexation of the West Bank by Jordan (1950) made the Gaza Strip the GAP's sole "sovereign territory," while the 1949 Armistice agreement that placed the Strip under Egyptian military government reduced the GAP to a "virtually paper existence" (El-Abed, 39). In spite of his oversights, Duncan's contributions are still vital as they serve as an implication of 'Nasser's

Palestine policy' in mid-1950s. This not only points out Egypt's nationalistic sentiment that distinguished the country functioning as a separate nation-state, but also refers Egypt's Arab nationalism, as if it echoes what is indicated by Ibrahim A. Karavan in "Identity and Foreign Policy: The Case of Egypt." Nasser regarded Arab nationalism "as a relevant dimension of Egypt's identity in light of his experience in the Palestine War" (157). Thus, Duncan's discourse provides an outlook on the reformulation of Arab nationalism by Nasser, who placed himself in a position to step up as a leading figurehead in the larger Arab world by sparking interest in the Palestinian cause, in the name of defense of the dignity of Arabs, from his own country.

While signifying a form of alliance taking shape between the Egyptians and Palestinian Arabs, the newly imposed Palestine Brigade Program is best reflective of Egypt's constructive role on the newly emerged energy, through which the Palestinian Arabs revitalized their 'selves' in the Strip in 1956. This is seen in Duncan's textual combinations of the visual works, exhibiting the Brigade Program, as it was wholly supported by the Egyptian Army, under which the volunteer soldiers, who were mostly educated and encompassing mostly the refugee Palestinians, were trained by the ranks of the Egyptian commanders. Adjunct to the Brigade soldiers (trained around the clock in the Strip's dunes), the displays of the original Palestinian flag that was flying high for the first time since 1948 in the Brigade's training bases is explanatory of Egypt's influence on a military effort made by the Palestinian Arabs expressing their political potentialities as well as national awareness in an organized manner for the first time since the Palestinian War; representing the timeframe between 1948 and 1956, just as it is called, the "lost years of Palestinian nationalism," by Mehran Kamrava in *The Modern Middle East* (84). Duncan's coverage undeniably brings us to witness the mid-1950s, when Egypt's state policy, rhetoric, and practices, provided a positive outlook promoting humane treatment to Palestinian refugees, who were in a stage of expanding consciousness to establish their roles within their nation. His discourse depicts the time frame as if he were bearing hope for a swelling of Palestinian Arab Nationalism. Yet, the forthcoming history proved that although Duncan's presence in the Strip painted a picture of vigor within Nasser's Arab persona that was on the cusp of achieving a great Arab dignity and liberation, through anticipation for the new Arab future, he was found to be an opportunist attempting to ride the coattails of chaos to power. Therefore, the hope that was shared waned, and the new energy buzzing amongst the Palestinians receded towards what is translated into historical literature as an "eclipse," while Nasser was

turning out to be what is called “Palestine’s self-appointed liberator” (Kamrava, 84). With this elucidation, and reinforced with Charles D. Smith’s assertion in “Palestine And The Arab-Israeli Conflict: 1948–1970,” referring to the Arab-Israeli conflict in which the Palestinians played significant yet secondary roles between 1948 and 1970 (1), Duncan’s portrayal of the revitalization of the Palestinian refugees today emerges as an illustration of the lost years of the Palestinian Arab nationalism, which within the time created a collective anxiety and despondence among the people, who entangled with external solutions to cure Palestinian cause occupying the places just like the Strip.

2.6.11. Regional and Global Extrapolations of the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict Taking Shape in Reference to the Strip, 1948-1956

One can find that a significant portion of Duncan’s works creates artistic and figurative portrayals in presenting the current border issues that were in fact explanatory of the on-going military agitation occurring between Egypt and Israel ever since the 1949 Armistice agreement was inked. His affinity to promote these ideas is displayed through an image representation of the frontline positions of the Egyptian Army, exhibiting the Egyptian soldiers overlooking Israel in their observation posts. While covering, far in the background horizon, the hills of Israel rolling away toward the biblical Beersheeba (an Arab town until the 1948 War), this work takes on an ironic representation, as it exhibits the ‘sun’ spreading out its rich glow across the whole land on a summer afternoon, seemingly challenging the man-made territorial split and ignoring the army’s frontline positions.

Descriptive of what Duncan deems “danger” and “fear,” shared sentiments of the Arabs and Jews over their disputed territory—the demilitarized zone—the aforementioned pictorial representation is evocative of what is stated, “the Armistice itself proved to be worthless”(79), written by Charles K. Rowley and Jennis Taylor, in “The Israel and Palestine Land Settlement Problem, 1948-2005: An Analytical History.” This is depicted in presenting the ‘forlorn shacks’ located in what was supposed to be a demilitarized zone, where the Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission had held the truce discussions accompanied by the UN Truce observers up until late 1955. This time frame marks Israeli occupation of the entire demilitarized zone based upon a claim that Egypt moved in a few miles inside the zone. While providing a notion of

the extent of ineffectiveness that the 1949 Armistice agreement has had, with the border dispute never arbitrated, and relentless frictions and endless clashes continuing to take course, this style of reportage is juxtaposed with illustrations of seven-year-old Radia and eleven-year-old Ikram, two casualties from the Israeli shelling of Gaza town that occurred in April 1956. Through these illustrations, Duncan implies that the UN Truce Commission's consideration of this shelling 'as a violation of recognized military and international laws' would not change the actuality for these children and their families, particularly for Ikram, being handicapped as she lost her right leg almost up to the thigh along with a toe from her left foot. By drawing attention to Israeli children, who were also injured on the other side of the DL from the Arab counter-fire, the journalist not only provides a balanced historical account, but he also engenders an age old adage regarding the consequences of war and of a lost generation from each side: surrounded by 'the codes and practices of the war' and 'culture and identity conflicts,' their memories will shape the future and its conflicts, which would possibly turn to a generational cycle, all the while they would reject the other's self and their hardships.

Serving as an example of the border clashes running through the inter-state bases and in reference to interstate violence, which subjected a society and a stateless society to menace and apprehension, Duncan's discerning outlook on this conflict is on display in the following caption accompanying his visual subject, Ikram: "Worse, there [was] no more sense, or reason, for her being crippled forever, than if the thing had happened to a little American kid of the same age, who, by chance, might have been forced to live on our frontiers during troubled times with our neighbors." While dealing universally with the issue of war, this statement, together with the displays of an American surgeon, with whom Ikram was photographed in the American Baptist Hospital, forms an allegorical exhibition of the Gaza Strip, where the East and West met. The allegory is also grasped within the images of both the UN Truce observers (from America, Norway, Belgium, and Canada) and the members of the Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission, who were captured where the aforementioned forlorn shacks were located. These visual subjects in unison with an Australian UNRWA director and with Egyptian military commanders are utilized to characterize a paradox standing just in the Gaza Strip, where the violence was still very much alive despite these men's dispositions regarded as "serene" and "reserved" by Duncan. Taking into consideration the essentiality of these people that stems from their national identity, and through their internationalized institutions they represented, such a

paradox appears as a representation of this land—part of the ancient Palestine—where internationalization brought about by modern political affairs shifted the mode of Western presence. Unlike the Greeks or Romans, and Britain, the West was not itself a partaker of the direct colonial rule over that region, yet through its representatives, they remained an influence in the course taken by the land and its people, while territorial demand for the State of Israel and that of Egypt took form in competing national ideologies functioning within the new international system in the Gaza Strip, where history's ageless drama continued to evolve through 1956, and continued to shape the Middle East.

As suggested above, while placing the matter of territorial subjugation occurring between 1948 and 1956 into a context that is descriptive of the climax of power conflicts between Israel and Egypt, Duncan depicts the implementations of the regional affairs into the international system, which took place centered on the Strip in various extrapolations, undoubtedly a catalyst dictating policies of Eastern and Western powers in this region. This can be exemplified through the journalist's notion of a resemblance of the frontline positions of Egyptian soldiers with those in Korea, which registers a response in his American readers regarding the effects the polarization of the democratic West and the communist bloc had on regional wars: just as it had occurred in Asia (Korea) now the Middle East was to take part in the superpowers' polarization. The written themes utilized in demonstrating the topic, to a certain extent, point out Egypt's new foreign policy as if it were being shaped within the course of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict and setting the country on a path coming closer to Soviet Russia. This is grasped in explaining Nasser's arms deal with the Czechs (1955), unveiling Egypt's orientation to the Soviet Bloc in their own standpoint: the country's arms pleas were rejected by the West; but, it was in need of military support, to match the might of Israel, in order to prevent frontier incidents occurring through Israeli aggression on the Gaza-Sinai front. In spite of this crucial information on the subject matters, Duncan's journalism neither specifies the background of such an essential change in course that Egypt suddenly made, once the parameters of the Western and Eastern relationship were considered, nor does it begin to emphasize a significant event, Israel's 'February 1955 raid' on the Egyptian military outpost in Gaza city that was the keystone of Egypt's new foreign policy intertwined with its 'separate' Palestine policy.

This absence in the journalistic accounts most likely stemmed from the fact that Duncan planned to make an additional story for *Collier's*, which would be separate from the Gaza

coverage and in reference to 'Nasser's Egypt.' This can be documented through what he notes at the head of *Gaza Strip Caption*, in which the first 36 rolls of the images are explained as follows: "All pix taken at ceremony where Nasser received a plane from Russians. No bearing on this Gaza Strip story: Shall caption later, to tie in with possible Nasser coverage later." However, taking into consideration a planned story, independently run and published in a different time frame by the magazine, which would perhaps reach to a certain number of different audiences, it would have been more insightful had Duncan been more specific on the concisely underscored essentials, as they are a large and integral part of the story, not only because of their relations to the complexity of the unresolved issues in the Strip having occurred long since, but also because of their connections to the current strains at hand. They were setting in motion the coming events, thus providing the background, a context for the future.

Once the gap in contextual content on the February 1955 raid is bridged through scholarly accounts, it becomes clear that that specific event became the watershed for Nasser to alter his precedence "from the domestic arena to inter-Arab politics and the wider conflict with Israel" (El-Abed, 42). The raid was rooted in the issue of infiltrations of the Palestinian refugees having attempted to cross the armistice line to Israel for many reasons since 1949, one of which was to pursue guerilla activities against the Israeli forces and settlements. From the outset, Egyptian governments sturdily discouraged such activities in order to avoid any possible confrontation with Israel. "The Israeli government, while well aware of Egyptian opposition to the raids, used the guerrilla activity as an excuse to launch disproportionately deadly retaliatory strikes." Following the February 1955 incident, resulting in the death of thirty-nine Egyptian soldiers, "the Egyptian authorities not only ended their opposition to the [Palestinian] guerrilla raids, but themselves became involved in sponsoring them" (El-Abed, 21); for example, Palestine battalions and brigade programs were constructed as elements of the Egyptian forces in the Strip. This major raid, which was in part a reflection of Israeli domestic political instability, subsequently Egypt turned to the Soviet bloc for military support (Smith, 3). Coupled with this amplification, Duncan's visual subjects, intensively trained and adequately armed Brigade soldiers, turned out to be Palestinians, who were formalized to penetrate into the state-based marshal conflict with Israel, by means of a policy change that Egypt made. Duncan's conceptualization of the Brigade Program, as if it was becoming a source for the Arab-Israeli tensions, is better understood through these scholarly assertions. Having influenced Egypt's

political orientation, Israel's raid remains not only relevant to Egypt's state centered 'Pan-Arab' activities, with the Strip well in reach, but also pertinent to the construction of a foreign policy, intending to mark an 'Arab identity' while responding to Israel. This was an attempt to characterize a political prestige that not only Nasser tried to obtain, but also his country, both in the Strip and in the Arab East, through a political ideology that Nasser's state entitled 'Arabism.' The ideology expressed its distinct contrast to Zionism, which was considered as an expansion of Western imperialism.

Also, lacking in essential details on the progressions of Nasser's turning to the Soviet bloc, Duncan's portrayals have appeared to remain wholly related to the associated literature that examines the subject matter within the Cold War context: both "the cold war diplomacy of the Western alliance" and "Nasser's attempt to adopt a policy of nonalignment" (Cleveland, 309) had measures within the Arab-Israeli conflict by playing prompting roles on the enduring and unsolved tribulations occurring since 1949. The U.S. attempted to construct an alliance system with countries such as Turkey and Iran in order to formulate a blockade to Soviet expansion in the Middle East. The Baghdad Pact was a part of this attempt that aimed to extend such a policy towards the Arab states through the use of British influence. Nasser's consideration of the Baghdad Pact as an extension of the Western imperialism in the Arab world and his refusal to join the Pact resulted in Egypt's isolation from the Anglo-U.S. configuration. Following the 1955 Israeli raid, Nasser desired to replace "the outmoded equipment left to them by the British," in order to cope with "the scale of the Israeli incursions and the ease with which Israeli forces carried out their missions emphasized their military superiority." While destabilizing the U.S. construction of a methodological alliance system, Nasser's maneuver with the Czechs received immediate attention from the Arab press; he was acclaimed as "acquiring the image of a Pan-Arab leader" (310), who would be able to shatter the West's imperial domination, and to use the new military aid to avenge the Arab defeat in the 1948 War. In accordance with the comprehension of that history, Duncan's journalism better enables one to conceptualize the Egyptian-Israeli conflict that transpired and reallocated the course of Middle Eastern history, while the conflict itself changed its dimensions by means of the attitudes of its partakers. It was when the West was attempting to magnetize the Arab East from the Soviet bloc, and Nasser's anti-imperialist posture was implementing the Palestine cause into the global context of the Cold War; by all means these were the most essential basics for the aggravations, once the Strip was

taken into account. Presumably, about to be ‘a hot war,’ an element of their wide-ranging escalations, as it is implied with Duncan’s displays of ‘the forward position of the Egyptian soldiers,’ enabling us to envision the region as though it was being prepared to engage in a battle.

Duncan greatly foresees imminent warfare within the context of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict, and endeavors to point out that it would be difficult to foresee its outcomes; yet, it would be predictable that if it occurred, it would quickly become “a very nasty affair.” Coupled with a balanced journalistic account, his peerless position in the Strip as the only foreign photojournalist being permitted to present the affairs conducted by the Egyptian Army, allowed him to rationalize his predictions as follows: the current temper of Egyptian soldiers and leaders as well as the well-equipped Egyptian military aligned with the Palestinians brought out a dynamic that was opposed to the vigor during the 1948 War—when the efforts of the Arab’s shoddy, disorganized army and “factions and counter factions split the country itself, and Palestine from the others of the Arab Bloc.” Yet, Israel was currently a real and vigorous state with its well-trained soldiers, each one of whom was both physically and emotionally dedicated to “the defense of their newly-won bit of the Middle East.” Such commentaries suitably address the full range of mutually inclusive military confrontations as though they were in a state of increasing exacerbation. Not within the scope of Duncan’s representation is the extent of the effect the Cold War had on reality. However, it would have been suitably incorporated into the equation by placing an emphasis on Egypt’s colonial past and current anti-colonial discourse, as well as the possible outcomes of Nasser’s foreign policy change upon the on-going political actualities surrounding the region, where Egypt and the West were showing a ‘real’ showdown to each other. Had the journalist construed that the policy was a means of Nasser’s maneuvering to acquire himself the position of absolute Arab leader, while bringing out a new configuration on the Western and Eastern relationship that aimed at shocking the West’s imperial outlook on the Middle East, Duncan’s attempt of conceptualization of the forthcoming war would prove insightful on the attitudes of Egypt and Israel since 1948, which continued to contrast within the Cold War ambiance in 1955-56. As a matter of fact, without doubting that Duncan had been capable of articulating all these points, as he had done so once, when conducting an area study in Egypt during March-April 1956 (this time to *Life*), and from Cairo he reported that, “[Nasser’s] word and convictions are now almost the unwritten law of Egypt, where it appears every group supports him[; his] Egypt looks like a full blown test case of where West and East are going and

who is wining this part of Africa and Middle East today.”

In spite of sketchy accounts, Duncan’s predictions on the escalating situation proved true, as only several months after fulfilling his assignment for *Collier’s* in the Strip, the region was entrenched in a state of war. On October 29, 1956, Israeli armed forces invaded the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip as a part of the Suez War (the tripartite invasion of Egypt by Britain, France, and Israel), which was in correspondence with Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal that occurred following the U.S.’s verdict of withdrawing Egypt from a major economic aid program to build the Aswan High Dam (July 1956). It is affirmed by Barry M. Blechman that, “The invasion capped along (1948-1956) buildup of tensions which, in the months immediately preceding the invasion, had been greatly aggravated by sudden changes in the Middle Eastern arms race, the increased frequency and magnitude both of Egyptian Fedayeen (commando) raids and of Israeli reprisals, increasingly aggressive speeches by both Arab and Israeli leaders, and other factors” (403), written in “The Quantitative Evaluation of foreign policy alternatives: Sinai, 1956.” By the same token it is remarked that, “Although the infiltrations and growing tensions on the Sinai/Gaza front were undoubtedly a factor in setting the stage for the Suez war [...] it was Nasser’s conclusion of the Czech arms deal in September 1955 and his nationalization of the Suez Canal Company in July 1956 that constituted the most immediate triggers” (El-Abed, 22). In an attempt to interrogate a sequence of history providing contextual clarification, one can come to the conclusion that Duncan’s media discourse bridges not only the presented time frame to the past but also to the future, all the while enabling us to conceptualize state of affairs progressing in the Gaza Strip.

It was when Egypt’s identity politics, particularly the ‘state identity,’ worked in tandem with the ‘national identity’ on the one hand, and the ‘state’s transnational status quo’ taking place outside of its borders, on the other. While entangled with domestic political and economic practices in Egypt, a sequence of foreign relations was taking place within the regional platform referring to the Strip. The conflict with Israel was a significant part in the integration of the Arab East into Cold War politics; the border clashes together with the West’s containment policy formed a culture; and Egypt’s ruling elites legitimated their foreign policy that placed the country in the crux of the Arab world. During that time, the climax of power conflicts among the participants of the international system manifested itself ranging broadly from diplomacy politics to military aggression that took effect in different forms; just as it occurred once between the

British and Zionists, a power struggle now occurred between Egypt and the Western pole of the Cold War panorama. While the West's heavily weighted paramount interest was clashing together with Nasser's heavily invested foreign policy and demand towards the Arab East, Duncan's visual subject, 'a student,' after eight years as a refugee in the Strip, described Palestine as "a Good Country," despite what the photographer calls, a tragedy, that has plagued the land for nearly two thousand years. While the Strip kept on as a hotspot of the world, another visual subject, 'the twin pastel-hued beach umbrellas' [entitled in *The World of Allah* as "Flowers in the sand" (119)] situated just behind a barbed wire fence standing between them and an Egyptian army unit, remarks on the Strip as it would supposedly be, and regarded to by Duncan as "a superb resort" of the modern world with its surpassing beauty along the Mediterranean Sea. Thus, while serving as a vortex of aggression for both the West and East, the Strip turned out to be a symbol of what Duncan deems, "rapidly submerging island of race or color or politics upon which most of us lived [currently]—Arab or Israeli, Democrat or Communist, Negro or White—each watching his familiar under-foot world, shrinking, watching apprehensively [...]." Yet, such dramatic scenes have seemed ever present in Palestine, as the 1956 invasion was sending the region into the third Arab-Israeli War, fought in June 1967 (Six-Days War). While marking the end of Nasser's era, June 1967 became a symbol of 'the showdown;' a swift Israeli victory took control of the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula (and the West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights), which since have all been largely referred to as 'the occupied territories.'

Once the intensified Western imperial interest towards the Middle East is considered, Duncan fails to bring us up to date in *Photo Nomad*, namely, the impacts the Cold War had on the Gaza Strip. Yet, the below exemplification of his sentiment on the Strip, where "history's ageless always changing drama [has been] performed by ever-different casts" (227), overtly displays the crucial role that the West has played in the constant shifts of direction within the course of the Middle Eastern history.

Alexander the Great's squadrons of vast conquest; cross-bearing probably seasick land-lubber Crusaders [...]; also savage horn-helmeted Norsemen who preceded by perhaps a millennium the sinister-silent-single-periscope horn of also arctic steel-skinned narwhals lifting one-eye, probing, reed-thin horns above usually calm water soon to erupt into horrific geysers of just-fragmented ships and

men when the U-boats' torpedoes found their quarry—not all that long before the 6000-men-crew-atomic-powered aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln's jets catapulted tons of its unwanted gifts to Saddam Hussein and then sailed through these very waters for California with every sailor then on the deck to welcome unlikely visitor who tail-fork-landed aboard—their Commander-in-Chief: The President of the United States.

This example shows Duncan's strong standing in his profession, as he connects his illustrations of 1956, in a book format in 2003, with the most recent historical event, the U.S. invasion of Iraqi. While doing so, his historical recollections emerge as a metaphor of the Western empires, whose deeply intensified imperial mannerism towards the Middle East has been carried out through techniques that have been shifted to keep pace with scientific developments. What differentiates the modern West from the ancient world is well described by Duncan through the achievement of the Industrial Revolution. While such an accomplishment produced positive progressions in human history, its products also took form in the armaments of modern conquerors, who justified their policies of military occupation in far-reaching territories, such as Iraq, with promises of 'liberation to people' and 'democracy to state and societies'—without considering the humanitarian devastation that occurs within a stateless society, the Palestinian Arabs of the twenty first century, in an ancient land—Palestine—where the legacies of Britain's colonial forces remain although they withdrew on May 15, 1946.

2.7. Intentions in Coverage of Palestinian Territories Appearing in the Media Outlets

Looking deeper into Duncan's explorations of Palestinian territories through his field studies in the British Mandate of Palestine and in the Gaza Strip, this study has thus far outlined the photojournalist's particular choices and points of emphasis in the representations of the state of affairs taking place in this region, and then, it has analyzed how Palestinian territories are represented. This section of the study identifies the way Duncan's representations come out in *Life* and *Collier's*, while questioning the extent to which his contributions in photojournalism played a role in the magazine's image stories; what the intents were in imparting his productions

in the magazine; and the scope of cohesion in these intents with that of Duncan's own placed in the captions and in his books.

Considering the synopsis section of this study outlining Duncan's work in Palestine, and reading into the "Blood runs in Palestine violence," "Civil war threatens in Palestine as British start 'Operation Igloo,'" and "Shooting in Jaffa," issued by *Life*, the compositions of these stories appear as conclusively based on Duncan's photographic combinations of textual reportage (caption books), explaining the vitalities of each snapshot and the core of each coverage, that became confirmatory instruments advocating an 'on the ground' view of what *Life* editors would consider necessary to report.

In framing "Blood runs in Palestine violence" (August 1946), the editorial accounts brought to life the issue of British military operations, conducted in Yajur village where they searched for illegal arms and ammunitions, and that of a terrorist attack, targeting headquarters of the Palestinian government and British army in the King David Hotel; it is seen that Duncan strived to expose the reader to the climate in which militant relations occurring between British colonialism and Zionism took shape in far reaching impacts. The photographs, exhibiting the British search in Yajur, printed with "According to LIFE Photographer David Duncan, no shots were fired, no property needlessly harmed," are exemplary of Duncan's photojournalism that was well adhered to within *Life*'s pages. Accordingly, an image, taken in a British detention camp where young Jewish men from Yajur (and elsewhere) were taken for interrogation, is presented with "Twenty detainees claimed to have been beaten but [Duncan] found only one man with marks of any kind on his body." Integrally, these snapshots function as truthful and thus valuable in displaying Yajur, where British troops found "the biggest single cache of arms so far [in Palestine]" (24). These are employed in the magazine aiding the Western public to come to grips with the meaning of the events in presentation, while in addition visually suggesting the Jewish collective farm settlements playing roles in the Jewish cause, where resistance took forms in cooperation against Britain's mandatory rule. Also, embedding the innards of the story are the pictures, enabling one to see the rescue operations conducted at King David Hotel, signifying Palestine, "the overly promised Promised Land" (21), where each act of palpable friction was the basis of relentless retaliation and parting of the ways between the British and the Zionists. These are also the subjects covered in Duncan's books with a similar quality of voice and tendency; wherein, despite being concise, he provides his readers with more still, detailing the differences

of opinion within the Zionist agenda working towards presenting all outlooks within a very tumultuous situation. He also shed light on the Holy Land, “Birthplace of Prophets and Poets/ Wars and Dreams (*The World*, 129), with its history of never ending turmoil (see analysis).

“Civil war threatens in Palestine as British start ‘Operation Igloo’” (September 1946) provides instructive knowledge on the events progressing in Palestine while presenting the newly imposed British policy; beginning with midnight August 11th, “all Jews attempting to land illegally were forcibly transshipped to the nearby island of Cyprus for indefinite internment behind wire” (34). Readers are drawn to Duncan’s camera objective, presenting authenticity in two shiploads of illegal Jews deported abroad. An image, displaying Jews aboard *Henrietta Szold* and *Yajur*, was printed with “both ships had sailed more than two weeks before from near Marseilles with 1300 Eastern European Jews, many of whom had fought as guerillas during the war,” and with “Some British officials claim Zionist overcrowd refugee ships and also keep them unsanitary by dumping refuse on deck in order to win the world’s sympathy” (35). Also, a snapshot of a woman was depicted with “[she] wails upon learning that she cannot land” while an image of wire cages was displayed “with barbed wire overhead, served as a home for 1,300 Jewish illegals during the 150-mile trip on *Empire Rival* [towards Cyprus]” (36). Certainly this story is provided to the reader with a balanced, objective approach and deviates from a significant constituent of Duncan’s collection, displaying the Jewish refugees, who were allowed to enter into Palestine (Atlit Camp) before midnight August 11th, and the issues surrounding these people, taking neither the Colonialist nor Zionist causes into account in presenting his coverage, a feat that *Life* could not achieve as these particular topics were not included in their story. Also this story, although unpopular to produce, as provided by Duncan is more about the ‘self-image’ forged by the Jewish immigrants through their journeys and according to the Zionist agenda, and a more complete story providing a better understanding of the entirety of the situation in Palestine (see synopsis). Yet, in explaining the measures applied by the British against Jewish refugees as a response to extremism and, in part, a retaliation (34), all presented examples, exhibiting the hope and sorrow surrounding these survivors of the Holocaust atrocity as well as political and ideological state of affairs, serve to fulfill Duncan’s aim to expose the land. All these themes provided by *Life* are echoed in Duncan’s books where he provides more information regarding the Jews spiritual connection to this troubled land (see analysis).

Duncan’s skill in news reportage is presented in “Shooting in Jaffa” (September 1946),

where the photocompositions were printed with “On the morning of Sept. 13 David Duncan, LIFE’s photographer in Palestine, was strolling in Jaffa [then suddenly the peaceful streets] were transformed into a bloody setting for another murderous morning [...]” (37). His images occupying the central part of this editorial story allow the readers to sympathize with Duncan, who was waved down by a terrorist sitting in a green sedan imploring him to photograph their acts and the events (36), and emphasize with the territory as a whole, through the photos of the raid by Jewish terrorists on the Ottoman Bank detailing everything (36-7). These representations materialized in *Life*’s pages are reproduced almost verbatim in *Yankee Nomad*, and are akin to those in *Photo Nomad*. Duncan regards the day as “what a beautiful day still to be alive” (227/125), a feeling elaborated upon in both of his books while providing the reader an amply transparent lens to the land and the feelings of uncertainty and humbleness it provoked.

“Palestine: new type of peasant Jew fights for a homeland” (November 1946) is the fourth and last editorial story (only cover story) presenting Palestine in 1946, into which Duncan’s profusion of image productions along with a collection of written accounts were utilized. What differentiates this story from the previous ones is that in presenting fear and hope mingling together in Palestine, where “the resentment has broken into open violence on both sides and into underground terrorism, plaguing the British who hold [it] uneasily under a League of Nations mandate” (107), the readers are, in certain measures, exposed to an account of Duncan’s intention, providing a balanced historical account in regards to Jews and Arabs, imparting both sides’ conceptualization of the issues developing in and towards Palestine.

In exhibiting the divergence in Jewish paramilitary organizations taking parts in acts of violence in varying degrees in Palestine, the image of Irgun’s map, taken in their headquarter was printed with “Palestine and Transjordan united into Jewish state” and with “Irgun leaders told Duncan, ‘We fight because we must; bitter experience has taught us that Jewish repatriation to Palestine will be balked by British authorities’” (108). This is a great example of Duncan’s photojournalism that was included in *Life*’s pages upon his request and his requested intention (see synopsis). In viewing the previously summarized caption layout of this coverage and bearing in mind the analysis section of this study, other examples providing the reader broad perceptions of the land with respect to Duncan are many: “[The pioneer Jews’] long trial and tribulation has been epic,” and their most astonishing triumph in Palestine was large-scale farming in an effort to support the millions of Jews, “who hope someday to inhabit their

Promised Land” (111). Likewise, a snapshot of a young Jew, representative of “a new type of Jew” that had been born out of terrorism in Palestine, employed with “For him the Jewish struggle is not an abstract debate over the merits of Zionism or fulfillment of centuries-old dream [that] is a fight for the only home he has ever known” (107,” displays the moderate approach that was found along the path of perceptions and practices amongst the Jews. Moreover, the images taken at Tel-Aviv beach, exhibiting two Jews performing “holy rite of casting old year’s sins into sea” (115) as well as the holiday crowds, are exemplary of a notion attested to in the caption, “Surveying [their] accomplishments [in industry, education, arts and sciences in Palestine], Jews, for whom Palestine has for centuries been a promised land of tradition [...] can envision it also as a promised land of fact” (114). Lastly, the display of how Arabs perceived the Jewish progress in Palestine (e.g., supported financially with outside capital), and how they associated Jewish immigration into the land as their marginalization and their losing of the ‘their’ land “before they really were able to develop it,” is descriptive of the Arab communities realization of its struggles and efforts to catch up with “the modern Western world” and their conceptualizations of the Jewish community as “an object of envy” (114).

In viewing Duncan’s aims of presenting the land through the rural sections of Palestine, there are some other examples found in *Life’s* story. An image is referred to showing some progress that Arab farmers had made by adopting new farm methods, while several snapshots are exhibited with “the gap between Arab and Jew [was] still great, but among workers of the soil that Arab-Jew friendship most often sprung” (112). However, there is a significant gap between Duncan’s skill of reportage and *Life’s*, once presenting Palestinian Arabs in particular cases. A suggestive headline “The Arabs [...] struggle against curse of medievalism” is followed by “The Palestine Arab is separated from the Palestine Jew not only by religion but also by the gap of centuries” (112). Also, an image showing two Jewish women sitting on beach chairs is translated onto the page as, “Modern ‘immodesty’ of female colonists angers Arabs, whose women are veiled or heavily clothed” (112), and another image, exhibiting Arab farmers working with the soil in an old fashion, was printed with “owner unwittingly demonstrates his people’s greatest evil; farm ownership is concentrated in wealthy effendi class, which has no incentive for modernization” (113). These displays not only exemplify the rhetoric constructed into Duncan’s discourse, but also characterize the omissions and partialities deliberately and selectively practiced; thus not exhibiting the Arab side, a subject he had addressed in his area study. The

journalist's opinions relating to this matter were later exhibited to the reader of *Yankee Nomad* through "I [was] quitting *Life*. That Palestinian essay seemed both unfair and misused. I knew of no other way in the future to ask for help in portraying confused issues between two or more factions, unless this [was] fought out right now, in the beginning" (232).

The correspondence sent by Duncan to Wilson Hick (November 27, 1946) typifies the relationship, putting the disparities of the representations into context:

Hicks: Just received copy of Palestine essay. Stunned. How it can be offered as coverage of Palestine problem is beyond comprehension. You printed 18 pix: 11 Jewish, 4 Arab, 3 general. 11 paragraphs of text: 10 Jewish, 1 Arab. You lead with text from Partisan author, label whole thing 'Palestine' then have the guts to sign my name to it. Where are the million and half other people whose representatives I imposed upon, in their shops, schools, clinics, at their dinner tables, and at whose side I was standing when members of other side turned their machine guns loose? Surely they deserve some voice. [...] You still have an untouched story on Arab Palestine, just as newsworthy as when taken, so how about now showing their side of the issue and their country?

Duncan's relation with *Life* in accordance with this communication printed in the book is a classic example—showing us the media outfits' publishing agenda. The correspondence he received (December 5th) from Wilson Hicks explained and reasoned in length the framing process of the story i.e., "It is not likely we can get balancing Arab story from material now at hand but I can assure you [that] Life will print other Arab stories which might well include more of your pictures." This exchange not only highlights Duncan's integrity as a journalist, but also shows his role as a mediator only wishing the best, attempting to alleviate some of the stress in Palestine by strong-arming the magazine into publishing another story. Although they had their disagreements, Duncan and *Life* eventually found common ground, "*when choosing photographs for Nomad taken in Palestine during those final months before Israel was born, emphasis would again fall upon a phenomenon unseen for two thousand years—Militant Jewry[:]* Life's editors had been on solid ground, the week their story was published" (*Yankee*, 233).

"Gaza Strip" (August 1956) is the cover story issued by *Collier's* through "12 pages of exclusive color photos on the Middle East Tinderbox by David Douglas Duncan." Looking deeper into "Gaza Strip" in view of Duncan's caption book, the editorial layout integrated the

journalist's rhetoric and his sentiments as almost exactly in the same format, which is telling of what differentiates this coverage in *Collier's* from those issued by *Life*; this is a photographic essay not a picture story. While displaying the Gaza Strip, where the area came into existence by the truce lines of Arab-Israeli armistice of 1949, its Arab population (original settlers and refugees) was ruled and defended by an interim Egyptian military government, the story recollects earlier records of "man's violence toward man" played out in this region of strategic and spiritual vitality for many, and suggests, "today, once again, violence pervades Gaza" (57). In defining the issues keeping this part of the world in the news, this style of reportage is representative of Duncan's aptitude for covering the matters from a broad perspective paying heed to geography and history respectively (see analysis). By exhibiting violence through people, "the Arabs bereft of their homes, the Israelis within sighting distance across the mere furrow of the border" and in showing its "ugly outbreaks" (57) in the patterns of raids, attacking patrols, and casual deaths attributed to a border problem breeding violations, the photo essay compiles to evoke emotions in the reader. While explaining the dilemma, "not only the refugees, torn from their moorings, still—after eight years—awaiting the day when they can "go home," but also the original Gaza residents whose meager country they must now share" (62), the images of gold turban patriarchs, Bedouin shepherds, peasant farmer, and sardine fishermen, displayed by Duncan—evoking feelings of majesty and bewilderment in every frame, vividly present the heritage of the Biblical days of Gaza, being exposed through nature's eternal cycle and their dilemmas. The images of the refugees living in the camps with provided medical care, schooling, and food from UNRWA, are exposed through their absence of livelihoods, helping the viewer to empathize, "Most are without hope; few are without anger; and none without black frustration" (62).

The Palestinian Brigade, bearing the original Palestinian flag, formulated by Egypt through which the volunteer soldiers (mostly refugees) were trained in the Sinai desert by Egyptian Army officers, presents another dimension of the essay, allowing the reader to see not only the revitalization of Palestinian nationalism occurring for the first time since 1948, but also an insight into future tensions as "the brigade itself may soon be a force to consider in Arab-Israeli tensions" (67). While depicting the no man's land (kilometer 95), where the UN truce observers' jeeps sometimes get shot at and where the border shacks that had been used for many armistice commission meetings are now left undisturbed (65), and in exhibiting the frontline

position of the Egyptian Army where the mood is described as, “no one knows about tomorrow” (64), the photo essay, along with an image of wounded children from the recent Gaza shelling, depicts the danger, fear, and sorrow, displaying personified aggression.

Moreover, in remarking on a rumor regarding President Nasser of Egypt’s intention to form a Palestine Government-in-Refuge, elected from the refugees themselves, readers are given, “Until some such means is found to lift the spirit, the prolonged idleness of the able-bodied will remain perhaps the greatest single threat to peace in the Middle East” (62). Finally, readers are exposed to “A land in convulsion seeks the answer to its survival—and maybe ours” (57), exemplary of Duncan’s aim to make them participators in the story and the issue to find a solution, one that has evaded the powers that be in this troubled region. All these themes presented in *Collier’s* are naturally provided similarly in Duncan’s books but with a greater attention to detail (see analysis).

2.7.1. Conclusion

Duncan’s representations of Palestinian Territories and the Gaza Strip in photojournalism were composed in 1946 and 1956, respectively. In the former time frame, he produced five stories appearing in *Life*; in the latter he materialized one story for *Collier’s*; all were employed in Duncan’s books, either in *Yankee Nomad*, *the World of Allah*, or *Photo Nomad*.

The present study has provided an account of Duncan’s testimonial in investigating the collections of his unpublished and published materials. While photographing the course of events as they progressed and recording his stories, he enriched the contents through recollections and first hand authentication, presenting both Palestine of 1946 and Gaza Strip of 1956, which bring about a large product of testimony, providing an extensive amount of viewpoints within the core of his exposures. In association with his account, this study has also implied that these materials, serving as both illustrations and ascertainties of the circumstances, come into sight as source materials through which a scholar can revisit, examine, or disprove how the issues and conflicts in scrutiny were presented and actually occurred.

Bearing in mind the information that the Western reader receives from Duncan’s discourse about Palestine and Gaza, this study has established that the intersecting points of the context provided through the representative works produced in both 1946 and 1956 prove

insightful on the Holy Land (and its peoples' spiritual connections to the land), where the British mandate was dissolving while participating in the already existing hostilities between Israelis and Palestinian/Arabs in this troubled region where cyclical violence was the established norm. All stories produced in 1946 present the tension and danger engulfing the region; display the progress or perceived progress in opposing forces agendas (Jew vs. Arabs, Zionist vs. British); and reveal how the West, when misled, could exacerbate problems in regions or situations that they attempted to bring reprieve, as seen in the case of the Jews being promised, or that of British mishandling the region and being incapable of controlling a situation they, in part, created and had vowed to see through. Moreover, all stories endorse that there was no right or wrong side, only a conundrum, which required mutual understanding and sacrifice to be righted, not a military victory as it would be a 'call to arms' for a global cultural community depending on who won, while also imparting that the state of Israel was gifted to the Jews, and the Zionist movement by the Western world as reparations for what they endured through the Holocaust.

Despite Duncan's endlessly proving himself as a non-partisan journalist, one of his stories was presented in a slanted view by *Life* touching upon Palestinian Arabs, their conditions, practices and way of life. His disagreement with *Life* displayed in *Yankee Nomad* proves to his readers his tenacity as a journalist; standing up for what he believes is right and standing behind his work, and ultimately, most likely, fueled his wanting to present his Gaza story (1956) in *Collier's*, in an unadulterated voice. Through all this time during which events were steadily progressing towards disaster, Duncan remained true to his integrity and humanitarian propensities, with a never faltering outlook for a solution. His discourse in presenting the story on Gaza Strip at a time, when Egyptian/Palestinian-Israeli conflict was highly strung, withheld from making the reader participants of Western political rhetoric of the time. Rather he provided an apt display of the land and its people, creating nuance oriented, picturesque representations on the everlasting hostility anchored in this region's 'man made' history. By displaying Gaza Strip in an intellectual and immensely humanitarian manner, he attempted to inspire his readers to be more sensitive to the plights of this part of the world and to not see issues in black and white, and also to impel the Western world to see and understand, something he achieved with the same consideration and poignancy again in the twenty-first century as displayed in his *Photo Nomad*.

2.8. Synopsis of Duncan's Pictorial Stories on Saudi Arabia

Having served as *Life* magazine's blue chip correspondent in the Middle East, Duncan covered four stories in Saudi Arabia, between 1947 and 1953. The first and second stories pertaining to his mission focus on the topic of the Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) operating in Saudi Arabia. Having emerged spontaneously, the third and fourth stories are in regards to a royal visit of King Abdullah of Jordan to King Abdalaziz bin Saud (Ibn Saud) in Riyadh and to the world and heritage of King Saud Ibn Abdul Aziz, respectively.

2.8.1. ARAMCO Operating in Saudi Arabia, 1947-1948

Indicative of the issues, related to ARAMCO operating in Saudi Arabia, Duncan produced his works, during January 1947 and June-August 1948. Within each one of these time frames, he amassed his productions into a file for *Life*, including the materials as follows:

- a) *Ibn Saud visits Arabian-American Oil Co. [i.e., ARAMCO] at Dhahran*: 20 rolls of b/w 120 film, and 1 frame of b/w 4 x 5" film. On February 17, 1947, *Life* issued "Ibn Saud visits American partners."
- b) *King Abdullah visits Ibn Saud (including ARAMCO, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia)*: 12 rolls of b/w 120 film. Published by *Life* as "Two Arab kings end an old feud" on July 19, 1948, and as "ARAMCO: an Arabian-American partnership develops desert oil and places U.S. influence and power in Middle East" on March 28, 1949.

These two collections, whose names convey how *Life* referred to these assignments, are solely in image form, and regardless of the absence of written captions, a certain number of images are explored in this dissertation since they were utilized both by *Life* and in Duncan's books published in later periods. As its name refers, the second file (above b.) encompasses two segments, each one of which covers different stories; with its second segment, related to the ARAMCO coverage is taken into account.

Duncan's illustrative works emerging from the above-italicized subjects fall into the subsequent classifications:

1. Saudi government-ARAMCO relations in Saudi Arabia

2. ARAMCO's oil operations at Dhahran

2.8.1.1. Saudi Government-ARAMCO Relations in Saudi Arabia

The *Ibn Saud visits Arabian-American Oil Co. [i.e., ARAMCO] at Dhahran* came into existence in January 1947, through an assignment of photographing a royal visit placed by King Ibn Saud (for five days), from his capital to ARAMCO's still budding business, Western built installations at Dhahran, an oil boom district on the Persian Gulf. Duncan writes in *The World of Allah* that this visit is made from "[Ibn Saud's] still-forbidden-without-royal-invitation palace in Riyadh" to "the mysterious new world of the Arabian-American Oil Company [...]" (272). One can find more details in *Life*'s image story, "Ibn Saud visits American partners," which displays him making use of a plane, that had been gifted to him by President Roosevelt, flown to Dhahran, where the king, his thirteen sons, and a sufficient number of courtiers are welcomed by American Minister to Saudi Arabia (24). While covering the royal family-ARAMCO relations, the photojournalist also displays the Saudi nomads, the subjects of Ibn Saud, whom are photographed in Dhahran, where the journalist regards to himself as "another nomad, with a camera, met [Ibn Saud] for the first time" (*The World*, 272).

Described in depth in the aforementioned story (by *Life*), Duncan's pictures for this coverage can be visualized as follows: a motor caravan guarded by armed jeeps and carrying King Ibn Saud and the royal party (rolling from Dhahran airport to oil town); Ibn Saud touring at one of the facilities of the oil company by car (accompanied by his finance minister); the king at a banquet provided by a sheik (where whole roast sheep and roasted hump of young camel is served to the royal party and officials of the oil company); Ibn Saud at another banquet given by the oil company as a retributive gesture (at which chicken, roast beef, and steamed corn are the accompaniments of an American-style dinner); and turbaned Ibn Saud together with Western diplomats wearing hats. A photograph of this kind, shot from a distance, shows the rows of brick dormitories built on vast barren soil for the Arab employees of the company, which are not only located near the oil refinery (in backdrop) but also are clustered around a mosque (at the center).

Taken in a room, in which the walls and floors are decorated with an overall Middle Eastern style and designed carpets, a specific snapshot exhibits Ibn Saud, sitting on a throne like chair covered with a rug, and behind him on the wall, there is a circular coat of arms brandishing

an enormous palm tree and two crossed swords, a symbol of his reign. This picture also covers the oil company's executives (Thomas V. Stapleton and James MacPherson) and courtiers, who are all sitting close by the king, as well as an Arab interpreter, who is shown crouching on the floor, just in front of Ibn Saud's feet. Duncan utilizes this image in *Photo Nomad* along with the sentiment of "King Abdalaziz ibn Saud conquered this fearsome land almost alone" (143); whereas, in *The World of Allah*, it appears together with a title, depicting Ibn Saud as "Last of Legendary Desert Kings" (159). The strength of this visual portrayal is brought to poignancy in *Yankee Nomad* through Duncan's own memoir that happens during the picture taking: "I unfastened St. Christopher that I had worn through the war—and dropped it into the King's hand. [...] I had touched the guardian of Mecca with an infidel's talisman. Ibn Saud lifted the worn bit of silver to his one good eye...then slipped it inside his gold-and-camel hair robes with a smile. 'Ashkurak'—Thank you [...]" (253).

In this coverage, another specific point of emphasis is Western women (e.g., the wives of oil company employees), who are accepted by Ibn Saud for the first time, unveiled, in 1947. While one of the images shows a female figure holding her baby and talking to the king, the other exhibits the women crowded around the 'king's impromptu tennis court throne,' with their children playing games around Ibn Saud, working to signify, "the Arabian-American Oil Company [...] already was changing traditional life in desert" (*The World*, 272).

2.8.1.2. ARAMCO's Oil Operations at Dhahran

A large segment of the *King Abdullah visits Ibn Saud (including ARAMCO, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia)* is demonstrative of an assignment, which is the only color coverage displaying Saudi Arabia, pertaining to ARAMCO's oil operations at Dhahran between June and August 1948. With the aid of "ARAMCO: an Arabian-American partnership develops desert oil and places U.S. influence and power in Middle East" issued by *Life*, the photocompositions can be sorted out into three groups; each reflecting several objectives depicting Duncan's perspectives.

The images of American employees of the oil company performing field work upon the desert make up the first group that can be visualized as: the portraits of drillers and welders; men, changing a 200-pound super reinforced yet still flat tire off a huge truck (loaded with sections of nearly one hundred foot long steel pipes); workers welding a broken pipeline (that carries

500,000 barrels a day from Dhahran to Kuwait); engineers setting oil afire at Abqaiq 44 (a new well); an oil caravan prospecting; and seismographers, measuring earth strata with vibrators and testing to blast open a hole the sand. A snapshot, showing the Trans-Arabian Pipeline (Dhahran to Kuwait) along with an airplane and a red scout car (patrolling the area) and a red turbaned Saudi (in white robe standing barefoot on the top of the pipeline) is employed in *Yankee Nomad* with the context: Trans-Arabian Pipeline under construction to be extended to 1,100 miles to carry 300,000 barrels of oil pumping per day, from Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean (259), wholly exposing ARAMCO's operations for what they are in this desert land.

ARAMCO's Arab workers, either under training or working as experts in the oil fields, are the visual subjects of the second part of the photographic representations, which exhibit the following: 'yesterday's camel herder today's expert pipe fitter' (in American dungarees and using U.S. made goggles to deflect sandy dust); a crew of five men working on fitting a new pipe to the drill casing at Abqaiq well; a student practicing with gas analysis equipment in oil company's training lab; and two turbaned Saudis along with a blacked skinned Sudanese, all dressing in Western style and practicing ironwork, led by an American ironmonger, at the training school of ARAMCO. Working together with these photographs is an image of an Arab merchant (sitting on a desk at his office, and resting his feet on the top of bags of silver coins, his profit of selling goods) and that of Arab employees being paid in a bank office, projecting the impacts ARAMCO had on the new economic activities and creation of Arabia's working class.

Images narrating the 'slice of life' at Dhahran for ARAMCO's American personals and their families fall into the last group of the visual representations, reflecting the following: a group of men and a woman playing golf around a pair of pipelines; women shopping in the oil company's store (designed like a U.S. food market); a couple with their elementary school age daughter and son (hanging in front of an American style home built by the company); a twenty-four year old female stenographer, wearing a swim suit bra and cap of Arab style (sitting at the Persian Gulf beach); a group of female and male figures sitting in front of the first swimming pool in country; elementary school children performing at the school play (enacting the Arabian Nights tale of Scheherazade and the Caliph); and four couples eating an American style dinner in a dining room of the house of the manager of oil company, depicting the segment of Dhahran, reserved for the American personnel of the company.

As subsidiary, a particular picture displaying a desert picnic—hosted by male Bedouins

in a tent, and attended by American men and their unveiled wives—portray joy and peace as well as a life of harmony, created and shared by the Americans and Saudis in Dhahran.

2.8.2. Royal Visit of King Abdullah of Jordan to Ibn Saud in Riyadh, in 1948

The first segment of the *King Abdullah visits Ibn Saud (including ARAMCO, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia)* came about spontaneously, as Duncan, while photographing ARAMCO's oil operations at Dhahran, received an invitation from Ibn Saud to be a guest at the fortress-capital of Riyadh, to capture his greetings towards King Abdullah of Jordan, started in June 25, 1948.

It is elucidated in Duncan's books that Ibn Saud, the guardian of Mecca, who conquered this desert peninsula that now bears his name, invited King Abdullah, the direct descendent of Prophet Mohammad, to Riyadh for reconciliation—ending the political feud of thirty years between these two desert dynasties (*The World*, 273). “With the Arab world now fighting Israel, practical Abdullah is apparently coming to patch his fences with Ibn Saud [...]” (*Yankee*, 253). After the arrival of the Royal Jordanian Air Force flagship (“a war surplus U.S. Army DC-3”) to Riyadh's Royal Airport, the two kings meet for the first time in their lifetimes around thousands of spectating tribesmen. While clamping his hand around Abdullah's fingers, Ibn Saud escorts him into a 1920 Rolls Royce in waiting, to carry them to the turreted adobe royal palace. This first meeting is exposed in a photograph captured in front of Ibn Saud's black goat-hair Bedouin tent, located at the edge of the airport, where the carpets laid; a picture of the two desert dynasties hand in hand, who are portrayed by Duncan as: “Abdullah diminutive but resplendent in pure white *abba*, embroidered gold-and-silk turban, a golden gagger glittering in his sash: massive Ibn Saud, wearing a Bedouin's red-and-white checkered *keffie*, his old-fashioned spectacles, comfortable palace slipper, and carrying his *cane*” (*The World*, 273). He has created a photograph itself without a still camera. This scenic depiction functions as a representation of all desert dynasties and their cultural mainstays.

Narrating such a visit lasted three days as customary amongst the Arab headmen, the images within this coverage are also evocative of “traditional Moslem three days of festivities celebrating an honored guest” (*The World*, 273). These festivities can be visualized through pictures of a tremendous number of Saudi tribesmen (running with rifles to follow the royal caravan carrying the two kings from the airport to Ibn Saud's palace), of the royal palace rooftop

banquet (at which roasted baby camel and skyscraper cake are served), and of the palace garden (where Eastern poems are recited). As the only non-Muslim participator, on his own presence at these celebrations, Duncan remarks, “it is great to have as a friend one of the last monarchs on this earth!” (*Yankee*, 253). Corresponding with this, “I had just made a flash shot, [Abdullah] glared toward me, ‘Who is that?’ Ibn Saud raised his massive head: ‘My friend’” (*Yankee*, 254).

2.8.3. The World and Heritage of King Saud, 1953

Five years after fulfilling his assignment on ARAMCO’s oil operations at Dhahran, Duncan covered another story regarding Saudi Arabia in November 1953, just subsequent to the inauguration of Saud Ibn Abdul Aziz as the new king, and of Amir Faisal Ibn Abdul Aziz as the crown prince, following the loss of King Ibn Saud. This time, he was reporting in Jeddah and in the oil rich Eastern Province of Arabia, where he amassed the productions of this un-commissioned field study in a file, containing the following materials: *The world and heritage of Saud Ibn Abdul Aziz, King of Saudi Arabia* (caption book), and 33 rolls of b/w 35mm film, which led *Life* to publish “The house of Saud” on December 21, 1953.

Written in a caption layout, *The world and heritage of Saud Ibn Abdul Aziz, King of Saudi Arabia* reveals how this story emerged through luck. Duncan came to Jeddah with an expired visa from Arab Jerusalem to try his chance to be accepted by the royal family. The chance came up spontaneously; when his flight landed at Jeddah airport, the right front tire of his plane blew out, which provides him ample time to communicate with immigration authorities, who took a dim view of his presence on Saudi soil without visa; yet they allowed him to use phone and contact an old friend of previous days, during when he made his ARAMCO story. His friend got him in touch with the top man of ARAMCO, Garry Owen. ARAMCO personnel rushed to the field with the commanding general of the Saudi Arabian army, who made arrangements for the journalist to be cleared and out of the airport within ten minutes through the grace of Crown Prince Faisal. In a special note, Duncan writes to *Life* that these ARAMCO officials want him to provide a story of the new king, without much reference to the oil company, as any story that is good for the king is worth working towards for them. He also adds that, “[...] such a story has never been permitted before...even around the palaces of Ibn Saud, and that is probable that such a coverage will not be possible again. Times are changing very

quickly in Saudi Arabia, and obstacles will soon appear to prevent any such coverage in the future. In fact they already have begun to appear.”

The collection of the image and word representations in this coverage, compiled in almost two weeks, fall into the following subcategories:

1. King Saud and the Ruling Family in Saudi Arabia
2. Arab envoys and Western dignitaries at Khuzam Palace
3. Non-members of the royal family, serving within or for the House of Saud
4. Khuzam Palace, from Saudi Administration to Saudi Court Life
5. The City, Jeddah
6. Developing Arabia through the Arabian-American Oil Company Income

2.8.3.1. King Saud and the Ruling Family in Saudi Arabia

Duncan’s style of reportage outlines that a collection of the portraits made of King Saud emerged on November 13 for the first time since his father King Ibn Saud had died and he had inherited the throne. These are captured, just before Saud is driven into Mecca to attend his first Friday prayers as the new king of Arabia, on the second floor terrace of Khuzam Palace in Jeddah—the palace, built by the old king for the current king, is now regarded to as the ‘royal palace,’ where all official calls are received and all administrative works are carried out.

Captured one week after King Saud’s first Friday prayers at Mecca, the photographs of Saud’s attendance of the first Friday prayers in Jeddah’s old mosque as a ruling monarch depict the troops shooing much of the local folk, just before the arrival of royal cars (none of which have a license plate) into a narrow street in the old Jeddah district; around where several hundred people living in the immediate area begin to clap when king’s maroon Cadillac appears. To the journalist, these are not very demonstrative people; their manners show that they neither regard Saud as a national hero nor as a saint, “out of memory of old Ibn Saud;” yet they do greatly accept and respect him as their king. Corresponding and aiding in this sentiment of general congruence among the Saudi populous, a few days after Saud inherited the throne, a huge rainstorm struck Jeddah, where the water flooded the streets, which had not happened in Saudis’ memory, taken by the people “as omens of heavenly goodwill for his reign.”

King Saud's adult brothers are also a specific point of emphasis of Duncan, as they are part of the legacy that had been left to the king by his father, Ibn Saud. Thirty-six brothers out of forty-four are still alive at this point; one of them is Prince Faisal, whose portraits are captured for the first time, in his own home, since he had been crowned. Accompanying captions for these portraits outline that, Crown Prince Faisal seems badly affected by the death of his father, more so than any of the other princes, as he had spent all of his time with his father during his last days, while the Crown Prince Saud was running the country in his father's stead. Unlike King Saud, who has several wives, Faisal has only one wife—he also speaks English fluently, a skill the king is yet to master. Retaining his post as the Minister of Foreign Affairs and serving as a member of the newly established cabinet of the king, Faisal has had far more experience with outside world in comparison to the rest of the royal family members.

It is reported that, just like everyone else in Arabia, in the House of Saud, all royal princes absolutely accept Saud as their king, and Faisal as their crown prince. Taken in Khuzam Palace, an image covers Saud along with his sixteen brothers and one of his nephews, in their white robes standing together, posing for the camera. Described as three cabinet members out of six and as the prospective powers in the Saudi court, the visual subjects are Prince Mish'al (Minister of Defense), Prince Abdullah Faisal (Minister of Interior and Health, the son of Crown Prince Faisal), and Prince Talal (Minister of Communications), who all speak English fluently, a commonality among younger generations within royal family. As a desert monarchy dabbling in Westernization, the uniqueness of the House of Saud is depicted through these figures, promoting the notion of what Duncan utters: "When one stops to remember the economic situation in Saud Arabia only ten years ago, and then visits it now... and then recalls that most of the governing talents, for leading the country into a modern way of life, came from one family—then the whole social pattern of government here stands out as unique in our time [and] in any time of history." Seemingly, the photographs of the six-year old Prince Mansur and four-year old Prince Abdullah, reportedly the pride of the new king out of his twenty-two sons, captured in the king's residential palace, support the idea that such a uniqueness of the House of Saud will continue with these baby princes in the future.

2.8.3.2. Arab Envoys and Western Dignitaries at Khuzam Palace

A sequence of images and their accompanying captions reflect the receptions at Khuzam, where the royal family is receiving condolences for the loss of Ibn Saud and congratulations for the inauguration of the new king from the Arab envoys staying there for three days according to proper Moslem protocol, as well as Western dignitaries living in Arabia. These condolences, as Duncan explains, are “here in the Moslem world, almost nothing is ever said again of the former king when he has died. [...] It is especially true here in Saudi Arabia where only Mohammed and Allah are reserved. [...] no effort is made to pay homage to the old king. He is buried in the family burial ground in Riyadh, in a simple grave at which no one calls.”

As seen in the photographic narrations, King Saud is the main figure of these official receptions, either receiving visitors in the great *Majlis* (where each country’s chief delegate is seated at King Saud’s right in the chair of honor for fifteen minutes), or attending banquets in the palace given for the honor of the chief delegate (at which typically Eastern banquet dishes such as whole roast sheep and rice are served in a Western fashion), and entertaining the guests by way of the court poet (who dreams up verse to be read). Yet, the actual guest greeter for the king and for the Saudi Arabia is Crown Prince Faisal, either welcoming the Arab envoys, or greeting non Arabs, just like Karl S. Twitchell, the senior American operating in Saudi Arabia, who has played a major role in this country’s developing mining industry.

The official delegations coming to Jeddah include the envoys of Egypt (e.g., Vice-President Jamal Abdul Nasir), Lebanon (e.g., Prime Minister Abdullah Yafi), Syria (e.g., Minister of Agriculture Abdul Rahim Hunaid), Jordan (e.g., Sharif Nasir Ibn Jamil), and Qatar (e.g., the Sheik Ali Ibn Abdullah). The guests considered as an unofficial delegation are namely the former President of Syria (Shukri Quwwatli, served for “Greater Syria”), former prime minister of Syria (Gamil Mardam), accompanied by the former Mufti of Jerusalem (Hajj Amin Husseini, “powerful men in the Arab world”), and former secretary general of the Arab League (Abdul Rahman Azzam). For one of the pictures showing Quwwatli kissing King Saud on his nose in condolence, Duncan explains this is a manner of expression of great respect in Arab lands, and requests to *Life*, “when writing the captions for this story please make every effort to writes them with the same restraint as though covering the death and inauguration of an

American president and Vice President. Be [...] careful of using any sort of slang in these captions... [Remember] I was allowed to stay here as a friend...not as a correspondent.”

2.8.3.3. Non-Members of the Royal Family, Serving within or for the House of Saud

Duncan presents non-royal figures that bring influences to the House of Saud either through wealth, like a member of a merchant family from east coast of Arabia, or through connection with the royal family by marriage, like the Sheik of Medina. He also places a specific emphasis on those of alternative descent, who are serving either directly within or as an apparatus of the hierarchic House of Saud. His written accounts are explicative of these very few men, photographed with royal family members spanning from the king to lesser princes in diverse occasions at Khuzam, which can be grouped as representations of the cabinet members, court members, counselors, and governors. The first two of these groupings can be represented through Mohamed Surur, (Minister of State/cabinet member); Abdullah Balkhair (private secretary to King Saud/power in the court); Rushdi Malhas (Director of Political Branch of Royal Court); and Sheik Abdullah Sulaiman (Minister of Finance/cabinet member). Regarding Sulaiman, who had helped write the original oil contracts for the ARAMCO concession, and having had led the real estate boom in Jeddah, it is reported, “As the Saudi Arab government grew from being just a remote desert kingdom, Sheik Abdullah grew with it...until, for years, he was considered as the Prime Minister, but without holding any such title.”

Amongst the other recorded people; the counselors, include Rashid Ali Gilani (former prime minister of Iraq), Palestinian Jamal Bey Hussein, and Tripolitanian Khalid Abdul Walid Qargani, who has been taking sanctuary in Saudi Arabia for many years. While describing these men, all of who are famous with their anti-British sentiments and serving as the top advisors to the Saudi throne, the journalist places an emphasis on Hussein and recalls him as “one of the most brilliant and articulate leaders of Palestinian Arab [intellectual] resistance to the British in the Holy Land Mandate trouble times,” who appeared in the Saudi court in 1950.

Falling into the last group is the old warrior Emir Saud Ibn Jiluwi, the Governor of the Eastern Province, where the bulk of ARAMCO’s concessions are based. It is explained that Faisal, as a diplomat, keeps close relations with his father’s old friends, for example Jiluwi, who is recognized as the right hand of Ibn Saud during the early battles that had unified the Saudis.

2.8.3.4. Khuzam Palace, from Saudi Administration to Saudi Court Life

In order to demonstrate some semblance of an idea of the daily activities encircling King Saud, Duncan photographs him from his residential palace, located on the northern outskirts of Jeddah, to Khuzam Palace, situated outside of town on the southern edge. Khuzam is where, each afternoon, Saud gets all the latest in worldwide news from a Palestinian reporter, who is attached to the Saudi court; while the reporter reads to the news, he kneels at the king's feet on the floor, as one of the images displays. The written captions aid one to envisage the other pictures just as follows: King Saud leaves the residential palace in a huge maroon Cadillac, surrounded by escorts, and during the king's arrival at Khuzam, the palace transforms from a courtyard to a place on the brink of chaos, as cars, motorcycles, soldiers, guards, drivers, princes, and everyday Saudi Arabs rush around every direction. Among them only the soldiers are in uniforms, and the guards carrying rifles and swords are in traditional desert gear and sandals. After his car drives up the ramp, and around, and then parks on the second floor deck of Khuzam (to backdoor of the public *Majlis*), where Persian carpets cover the concrete floor, guards run to attend to the arrival, as the princes line the way to the doorway. Upon the king's entrance to the *Majlis*, everything turns to quiet again, as everyone waits for his departure back to the residential palace, and then, it starts all over again. The guards are regarded by the photographer as the descendants of previous guards having held the same post before them ("probably beginning back in the early slave days"), and to him, their presence amongst the second floor doorways, corridors, and staircases during these repeated precessions is reflective of a panorama, just as seen in "some of the great old castles" of the Middle Ages. He also considers the entirety of these snapshots as demonstrative of the "Wonderful atmosphere!" surrounding Khuzam Palace, where "except for the brand new cars, all the most expensive made in America, this is just about the same scene that has been enacted at Arab palaces for the last several hundred years."

As the image-word narrations display, the second floor of Khuzam is "the heart and most private section" of the palace. There, two *Majlis* are situated; the 'public *Majlis*,' functioning as a Saudi court, is referred to as the great *Majlis* (roughly 70 feet by 30 feet and cooled by two enormous air conditioning units) and the 'private *Majlis*' is where all sorts of private businesses from economics to politics are carried out. There, also two of the most essential of its political

cogs are situated: the office of the king's private secretary and that of the Minister of Finance. The former is only of less importance to the king himself than his own quarters and the latter is ironically considered as the 'House of Suleiman,' both of which is loaded with diplomatic and business representatives from within the community of Saudi Arabia and of the outside world.

An assortment of images exhibits the public *Majlis* in action, where King Saud is sitting in his chair at one far end, where the floor is covered in Middle Eastern designed carpets, and the walls are surrounded by empty chairs to be occupied only by very important visitors, and then everyone else sitting around the edge of the room, either in other chairs or on the floor, according to rank and importance. These visual narrations display Saud, either working in administrative purposes, or conducting court as the general activity of each day. How Saud carries out the administrative works in this *Majlis* can be exemplified in three images; one of which displays a secretary sitting on the floor at the king's feet passing papers to him; whereas, another shows king's private secretary, who is receiving word from the king and passing to him many messages from the others by whispering in his ear. Regarding this circuit of information, Duncan writes, "it is really amazing how well and rapidly court matters get handled in this very fashion." The last remark covers Ibn Saud together with Garry Owen, the chief of relations between ARAMCO and the Saudi government, conducting business talk while an interpreter sits at their feet beside them.

Representative of the Saudi court, the public *Majlis* is shot displaying visitors of a diverse range from tribesmen to nobles, many of whom come to Khuzam in fine automobiles. To Duncan, "there is no other court like this on Earth today," at which the most direct form of political democracy is practiced at a level of relations between ruler and ruled, as the *Majlis* kept open daily is attended by any Saudi, who is allowed to walk up, and talk about any matter that could be only solved by the king. This is portrayed in a picture, displaying a tribesman, taking the king's hand ("out-of-door kind of shake") and asking for his help. Also, signifiers of all tribal delegates sitting in the public *Majlis* are members of the Utaibah tribe, whose chief was a close pal of the old king during hunting trips; for a caption it is written that seeing the tribesmen sitting around the wall with swords and daggers in the air-conditioned *Majlis* makes the court life so fabulous; these men dressing in the style of Biblical times project the court life of the Saud reign centuries back. Moreover, through depicting the highest-ranking hooded nobles, Duncan presents, "the days of King Arthur and his Knights of the roundtable;" yet, he requests *Life* not to refer these men "as looking monk-like" as "it would be a grave affront to their religion." Lastly,

British historian St. John Philby, who is an anti-British and devout Moslem, as well as the writer of a number of books on Arabia and Ibn Saud (e.g., *Arabian Jubilee*), is shown sitting in the public *Majlis* at home amongst any of his Arab acquaintances, as he is accepted as one of them.

Illustrative of the private *Majlis* is a collection of pictures as essential as that of the public *Majlis*, not only because it is reflective of the most secluded section of Khuzam, where all matters deemed crucial enough are conducted directly with the king, as seen in the images, showing German businessmen talking business with him. Also because, it is representative of all *Majlis* like this in any other Arab country, in which, as Duncan deems, “much of Arab and Middle East policy is made.” As he has no knowledge of Arabic, Duncan is allowed to be present in several meetings held in this *Majlis*, where he captured the king with Arab delegates.

As contributory, an array of images is taken in the second floor hall outside the public and private *Majlis* in order to illustrate an everyday scene of Khuzam through the activities of the clerks, secretaries, sheiks, and guards, who sit and wander around, and stand up when either the princes appear or the king passes from one *Majlis* to another. Also, a specific snapshot illustrates the king’s chief aide de camp, guards, secretaries, sheiks, and Bedouin chiefs, which aids one to envision the atmosphere of the court through the robed figures and pattern on the walls of the palace, where only the dress of chief aide de camp resembles Western dress. Lastly, Duncan writes, “except for the air conditioning, the fine automobiles and the rather exotic garb that they wear, there is nothing about the court life, which could be considered as luxurious.”

2.8.3.5. The City, Jeddah

The images of the city, Jeddah, and their captions are illustrative of the Saudi society, where ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ reside side by side, just like the Saudi people, ‘ruler’ and ‘ruled,’ ‘rich’ and ‘poor,’ and ‘men’ and ‘women’ live together, experiencing a sort of divergence in Saudi soils. This is seen in two groups of visual productions, evocative of the road traffic in Jeddah. One exhibits King Saud on the move, as a light pickup truck goes ahead of the royal motorcade to stop the running traffic until after the king had passed. The other shows the traffic stopping as several shepherds drive their goats across the main streets of Jeddah, to which Duncan remarks to *Life*, “be careful unless it is not used in the same layout with traffic stopped for the king. To make an [...] comparison between the two reasons for traffic stoppage might

bring the rest of the story down on our heads...as far as the Saudis are concerned.”

The journalist's reporting style exemplifies why the photographic coverage of Jeddah, a diplomatic and business capitol of Saudi Arabia, is very significant, as it is representative of the vast changes, which have swept across Saudi Arabia within the eight years, since the end of WWII. The new construction, having been raised beyond the limits of ancient Jeddah and made using the 'ancient methods' yet created with the style of "Egyptian Modern ...which, in turn, in modern German," is one of the many emphasis of this coverage of Jeddah, where most of the newly raised homes have air condition units, just like palaces of the royal family members and those of wealthier yet mostly illiterate merchants. Following are the visual subjects, reflective of a sort of binary opposition residing in this specific city that is evocative of the other towns and villages, where the changes are coming at diminished speed: King Saud's residential palace (next to its wall are the tents of his guard companies); the modern faces of the newly raised apartment houses and private homes (next to them are colorful yet shoddy houses that are being demolished to make room for modern buildings, and the tents of tribesmen); the traditional laborer (working for a new construction company); new cars parked amongst the old houses; an ancient vender sitting on a frame bed near his stall (near him a new British Jaguar, sitting in the shade while its owner is having a siesta); and a new Volkswagen agency in the ancient city. Through these images Duncan points out that the old colorful Arabia will soon be disappearing, just as camels plodding through the streets of the towns straight from caravans in the desert; yet "ancient Arabia and modern Arabia seem to still meet," as it is seen in the pictures, displaying the visit of Faisal's six-year old son to two falconers in their tents that are located just behind the Western style home of Faisal, where they take care of the royal falcons, the symbol of the monarchy.

The Jeddah Ophthalmic Hospital is another visual subject utilized as a signifier of the foundation of a nationalized medical service having functioned countrywide in the form of the hospitals in the major towns and as smaller clinics in remote areas that are free to anyone without nationality separation. It is explained that this institution was established through the efforts of old king, who, just like the current king and many of his Bedouin subjects, had an eye problem. The hospital is run by a British eye-specialist and surgeon, and also by either Saudi doctors, or doctors coming from the neighboring Arab states, who emphasize efforts to stamp out eye afflictions that have been real scourges in this land for centuries. The hospital brings about a different flavor to the city.

Jeddah is also photographed through female figures; yet this time the journalist aims at showing traditional life conditions surrounding Arabia. The efficacy of these visual narrations are strengthened by the captions, through which he writes to *Life*, “never use the word “Women” in the captions...just refer to “families” or Saudi Arabs” or the like. I shouldn’t have “pixed” any of the womenfolk, actually, but here they seemed not to care.” Reflective of a practice, initiated by Ibn Saud and still performed on each Saturday morning, a particular snapshot exhibits a number of poor women out of nearly 5,000, sitting on the soil in vast lines, close by Khuzam, to receive one rial apiece from the palace, from where all silver rials are hauled by a truck, and given by the king’s agent to each open palm, without touching their hands. Duncan writes, “handle this caption with greatest care [as they] are most sensitive on this point of poor folks.”

2.8.3.6. Developing Arabia through the Arabian-American Oil Company Income

The textual materials explicate that, during his stay in Arabia, Duncan travels from Jeddah to the oil rich eastern province of Arabia, where near 3000 non-military American personnel are based. By photographing the oil refineries, he aims to expose the most valuable family heirloom left by Ibn Saud, to the king and to Saudi Arabia, which is oil royalties paid by ARAMCO to the Saudi government that was set at about \$5 million in 1945; yet now in 1953, it would be around \$150 million. It is reported that the strength of the Saudi economy is entirely based upon oil, and with much of the oil money having been invested in Egypt and Lebanon, it is now integrating the mushrooming businesses of economy, transportation, and public service cultivating on-going developments. This is seen in the images of the new roads, either designed as regular surfaced highways, or specifically for oil transportation purposes, which are all cutting through the hostile desert in many directions, just as the Saudi Government Railroad.

The photojournalist endorses that the Saudi Government Railroad, providing now daily service between the oil rich eastern provinces and the central section of Arabia (housing the capital Riyadh), had been the dream of old King Ibn Saud, who verbally stated to the ARAMCO vice-president early during his railroad dreaming stage, “If your experts come back with reports that such a plan is impossible tell them to go back out and look again, for they will be wrong.” The entire railroad has been built with Saudi funds from oil money, for which ARAMCO has only helped them to contact railroad experts in the U.S. To Duncan, who visited this land in the

previous years and witnessed the people traveling mostly in camel caravans, it is impossible to grasp the immensity of the changes that have swept this place, such as the railroad, which opens the heart of the peninsula, nor is it possible to predict the future that will be “a very great distance from the picture book Arabia such as we could still shoot there today.” This is why, he deems that one particular picture, showing a train, flowing across the desert, is even more essential than that exhibiting an oil derrick silhouetted against the desert sky, as it tells the story of the enormous strides being made in Arabia. Also, in order to prove the above consideration, he photographs the Saudis jumping off a train, which brought them from their jobs in Dammam to Dhahran where they live, and writes, “They are running to catch their buses home just like passengers and commuters in any American or European city.”

Lastly, while illustrating the Ras Tanura refinery, Duncan photographs two Saudi Arab workmen, taking a break to perform prayer on the soil, just nearby an oil operation field. For a caption, it is written that this is the most delicate subject matter of the story, and it is requested that the editorial layout must follow exactly the context as follows: the men from the desert working in modern industry have retained their extreme devotion to their God, all of which is a part of the heritage from Ibn Saud, as he was a deeply religious man, yet he also desired his country to take part in the modern world. He adds, “By printing the wrong caption under one of these pix old “DDD” will be finished forever in this part of the world, so I’m depending upon you to handle it with great tact and careful wording. [Remember] I landed [here] without even a visa [and] these people in the royal court trust me to try to tell their story as they feel it themselves.”

2.9. Analysis of Duncan’s Pictorial Stories on Saudi Arabia

Duncan’s photographic narrations, coming out of four different stories produced for *Life* in 1947, 1948, and 1953, characterize the oil rich Saudi state and its society through an assortment of subjects, spanning from political to tribal figures and from Arabs to Westerners, who either directly or indirectly played roles in this country’s complex socio-political, -economic, and -cultural state of affairs. Corresponding with these images, the journalist’s use of words, while serving as evocative of Saudi Arabia’s political history back in the early twentieth century, exposes the country’s attributed position in the Arab Peninsula through the Arabian

American Oil Company operating in the Saudi soils during post WWII era, and reflects the Saudis' socio-political, cultural, and religious traits evolving from antiquity into modern times, when the state and society strived towards modernization.

2.9.1. Saudi Arabia, 1947 and 1948, within the Context of the Saudi-US Oil Partnership

Named accordingly and presented, the images for *Life* magazine with no accompanying text are Duncan's *Ibn Saud visits Arabian-American Oil Co. [i.e., ARAMCO] at Dhahran* and *King Abdullah visits Ibn Saud (including ARAMCO, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia)*, they emerged in 1947 and 1948, respectively. The photographs, compiled in the former and the second segment of the latter coverage, generate either direct or figurative representations, depicting a Saudi Arabia in transformation. This transformation having manifested itself in a range of forms in the milieu of oil concession with ARAMCO, these representations also provide a conception on Arabia's geopolitical location along the Persia Gulf and its strategic importance in the Middle East and within the globe.

Exhibiting Ibn Saud's (King Abdalaziz) royal visit from his capital, Riyadh, to ARAMCO's Western built and still developing installations situated at Dhahran, an oil boom district along the Persian Gulf, a collection of images enormously reveals the 'institutionalized' Saudi-U.S. partnership coming about through the production of the oil, proceeding in the Saudi soils. This affiliation can be visualized in presenting Ibn Saud and his royal party, welcomed by the American Minister to Saudi Arabia upon the arrival of the royal motor caravan rolling from Dhahran airport to the oil vicinity. This can be also envisaged in showing the king together with the ARAMCO's executives, all sitting in designated chairs around the room, decorated with Middle Eastern carpets all over, and also where an Arab interpreter is crouching on the floor, in front of the king's feet. Together with a display of turbaned Ibn Saud, with American diplomats wearing hats, photographed while touring the oil company's amenities, the scope of the Saudi-U.S. joint venture can be glimpsed from the visual narrations, exhibiting the banquets that were provided either by a sheik on behalf of the king to oil company officials, or by the oil company as a retributive gesture. Through these snapshots, by focusing his camera objective on both the dressing styles of each categorized group of people, Arabs and Westerners alike, and the food being served in the banquets (in the first, e.g., roasted hump of young camel cooked in the

Eastern style; in the second, e.g., roast beef and steamed corn were the accompaniments of an American-style dinner), the photographer enhances the context, providing a sequence of symbolic representations personifying the Saudi territories, at which the East and West met. Working in tandem with these representations is an image showing the rows of brick dormitories built by the oil company for its Arab employees that are clustered around a mosque located near the oil refinery, in which, just as it is stated by Richard H. Sanger, this once nomadic workforce met for the first time with “running water” and “electric lights,” (182) written in “Ibn Saud’s Program for Arabia.” Certainly, Duncan suggests oil as dominator on such coalescence taking forms not only between Washington (ARAMCO) and the Saudi government, but also between the cultures, as the oil concession opened the way for the Saudis and Americans to mix and intermingle, sharing ideas and gaining perspective.

Standing in connection with these suggestive illustrations are the journalist’s statements, written well after the production of these images in his books that function as the only textual sources to obtain his expressions on the presented events. This can be seen in *Yankee Nomad*, wherein one of the above referenced images (exhibiting the king with the oil company’s executives in a room) is exploited accompanied with the journalist’s own memoir that had happened during the picture taking: “I unfastened St. Christopher that I had worn through the war—and dropped it into the King’s hand. [...] I had touched the guardian of Mecca with an infidel’s talisman. Ibn Saud lifted the worn bit of silver to his one good eye...then slipped it inside his gold-and-camel hair robes with a smile. ‘Ashkurak’—Thank you [...]” (253). Bringing poignancy into the account is this narrative style, recounting a humanitarian and traditional Bedouin ‘gift’ exchange occurring between the photographer and the king, exposing their ability to share values despite the disparities on their value systems constructed within the worlds that they represented in our examination. Yet, best reflective of the assimilation between the East and the West taking shapes in the Saudi Arabia can be found in *The World of Allah*, where the journalist portrays Ibn Saud’s Bedouin subjects as the significant peripheral components of Arabia with and by their tribal identities, and writes “another nomad, with a camera, met [Ibn Saud] for the first time” (272), as a modest depiction of himself. Duncan would later deem this first meeting as opening a way for them to be friends, “It’s great to have as a friend one of the last monarchs in this earth!” (*Yankee*, 253). Nevertheless, the above excerpt promotes the journalist’s nomadic existence, traveling throughout far-flung places in the Middle East, just as it

is seen in Dhahran from where his journey in Saudi Arabia started in 1947. All together, the point is made that this oil rich country was becoming a melting pot for the distinctive representatives of the Eastern and Western worlds, like Duncan, a ‘Yankee’ nomad associating himself with the Saudi nomads, during when the king placed a royal visit to “the mysterious new world of the Arabian-American Oil Company” (*The World*, 272), situated in his own territory.

Despite the photojournalist making available his written accounts pertinent to Ibn Saud’s visit to Dhahran, i.e., as it was made from “his still-forbidden-without-royal-invitation palace in Riyadh” (*The World*, 272), suggesting the degree of the Saudi government-oil company relations, he does not address the background behind the oil concession granted to ARAMCO in any of his books. The absence of such historical information can be understood as the journalist intending to cover the matters as reflective of the certain time period, marking his presence in Saudi Arabia to photograph the current and still developing circumstances of the facts relevant to the topic of the Saudi-U.S. oil partnership, and not its origins. Attempting to bridge the gap in his discourse not only provides an understanding of Saudi Arabia that had been integrated into the world economy more than a decade before Duncan’s arrival to this country, but also offers an external outlook in reference to his elaboration, all the while contributing better comprehension of his visual productions. The scholarly article “A Prospect of Saudi Arabia” by T. R. McHale and *Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East* by Rashid Khalidi would be good sources for reassessment of the history: during the throws of the great depression in the early 1930s, the financial crisis was a recurring problem for Ibn Saud’s territories, as the annual *Haj* pilgrimage, the state’s only potential source of income, decreased drastically. In 1932, in need of new sources of funds, Ibn Saud, who had been always reluctant to permit foreigners (e.g., Western non-Muslims) into his kingdom, declared his willingness towards entertaining offers from Western interests of oil exploration rights in his country. In 1933, the Saudi government signed an accordance with Standard Oil of California (SoCal), the only company ready to make a large signature payment; granting a concession to explore all of Saudi Arabia, and promising royalty payments to the Saudis on any oil found or produced (McHale, 627-8). “This consortium formed by Standard Oil of California [enabled] the powerful U.S. oil industry to break a near complete British stranglehold on Middle Eastern oil dating back to the World War I” (Khalidi, 47). When SoCal made a major oil discovery in the Eastern region of Arabia in 1938, Ibn Saud pushed for California Arabian Standard Oil Company, “a new firm

organized by SoCal jointly with Texaco” (McHale, 628), to launch oil production. Following the outbreak of WWII, development plans for the Saudi oil industry for additional exploration and the development of production facilities were interrupted, because of the shortages in personnel and materials. When WWII was approaching its end, the California Arabian Standard Oil Company, renamed as Arabian American Oil Company, or ARAMCO, restarted the delayed oil development plans in 1944 (McHale, 629).

Equipped with this contextual information, and in conjunction with the image portrayals exemplified thus far, Duncan’s above displayed account on Ibn Saud’s palace as “still-forbidden-without-royal-invitation” not only serves as an indicator of the Saudi government’s early conscious policy on its self-imposed isolation from the outer world going beyond the boundaries of their legitimated territories, but it also echoes what Sandra Mackey utters in *Passion and Politics*: “the discovery of oil and oil’s escalating importance to the global economy began to end Saudi Arabia’s self-imposed isolation” (220). The juxtaposition of the images, taken in 1947, and those, captured in 1948 (when Duncan made the only color coverage of Saudi Arabia pertaining to the company’s oil operations at Dhahran), well characterizes the scale of the abrupt end to the isolation policy in Saudi Arabia. This can be glimpsed in illustrations of the unveiled Western women, photographed in 1947 in a crowd around the ‘king’s impromptu tennis court throne,’ either with their husbands or with their children playing games around Ibn Saud, exposing what is written in “Ibn Saud visits American partners” issued by *Life*: “precedent is broken” as “in his lifetime Ibn Saud [...] had granted audience to only 12 foreign women, all of them heavily veiled” (26). This can also be seen in presenting the slice of life at Dhahran for ARAMCO’s American workforce in 1948, epitomized in a series of pictures, reflecting the following: a group of men and women either playing golf around a pair of pipelines or socializing around a swimming pool; women shopping in the company’s American designed store; a family with their children posing in front of company built-American style home; and elementary school children performing at the school play. Depicting ARAMCO, bringing about a more suburban outlook to that segment of Dhahran, reserved for the American personnel, who were upholding their life standards far away from their native lands to the best of their abilities, are these snapshots that can be read accompanied with “Even with the development of the oil industry, [...] the ‘Western’ Aramco oil community lived an isolated life in their own ‘camp’ community in Dhahran” (McHale, 622-23). Placed in a historical context, the displayed

phenomenon in the aforementioned photographs comes into view as an example of the fundamental roles that the oil had played in Saudis' integration into the Western world, as the country's financial deficits that had been experienced in the 1930s forced the Saudi government to sign the oil concession with the American oil company, whose demand for Saudi oil had been also an inevitable result of this integration. This stimulated new implementations on the part of the government within its foreign policy objectives, leading to an influx of skilled laborers in the Saudi Arabia; yet there were still strong elements of isolation that kept the Saudis intact in their own inner dimensions. In this framework, Duncan's representative works, displaying the dualities standing at the heart of Saudi Arabia, not only imply the government's desires and attempts of minimizing the effects of its involvements into international affairs and its effect on the society at large, as seen in the case of ARAMCO's American community, being segregated from the Saudi society. They also provide an outlook attested to in "[oil company] already was changing traditional life in desert—probing under the sand, where they soon were tap treasures in such profusion, and release a genie of such gigantic proportions, as to eclipse anything ever imagined in even the most exaggerated tales of Ali Baba—or Midas" (*The World*, 272). Serving as subsidiary, a specific image captured during a desert picnic, attended by the oil company's American employees and their unveiled wives, hosted by the male Bedouins, comes into sight as an implication of "In the eyes of Saudi leaders, there is much of value in the old way of life—and much to be avoided in the new. And they believe, with some reason, that they will be able to pick the right path between the two" (72) stated in "A Tale of Two Houses" by William A. Rugh. All in all, Duncan's discourse well suggests the isolation policy of Saudi Arabia that revolved within two dimensions, one resultant on its social implications within a domestic level, the other wholly remained relevant to the country's petrodollars, stemming from the Persian Gulf, "another world from the birthplace of the Prophet of Mecca" (*Photo*, 133) and governed from Riyadh that was "soon to vanish Mud bricks to Petro-billions" (*Yankee*, 170).

While viewing Saudi Arabia in transition, the image productions of ARAMCO's Arab employees, displayed either under training or working as experts in the oil fields (e.g., practicing with gas analysis equipment in a training lab, fitting a new pipe to the drill casing at the Abqaiq well, or working as an expert pipe fitter), work to gain insight on the oil's far reaching effects sweeping Saudi society. Accompanied with Duncan's brief expressions in his book, "Pearl fishermen have now beached their *dhow*s to work in the refinery; shepherds herding trucks;

cameleers welding pipe” (*Yankee*, 259), it appears that these visual subjects signify the members of yesterday’s ‘classless society,’ and displays of their participations in petroleum industry present the postwar expansion, the emergence of what is called by William Rugh, “lower class worker status” (8), written in “Emergence of a New Middle Class in Saudi Arabia.” In unison with Duncan’s statement, “Sudanese, Somalis, Arabs, Eritreans and men from as far as Afghanistan, learn of a new life with other men who will never speak their tongues, but whose knowledge of their crafts is so profound that almost no barrier prevents total communication” (*Yankee*, 262), a specific image captured at the training school of ARAMCO, exhibiting two Saudis and a Sudanese practicing ironwork led by an American ironmonger, prove insightful on the texture of the country’s fresh blue-collar class. While illustrating the amalgamation between Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries from where labor forces were employed, this image, just like the others, reveal the oil industry situated in the Eastern province of Saudi Arabia, where the country was integrated into the Western way through its advancing technology and workforce as well as its dollar economy. This generated an environment for the Saudis to gain the skills, while contributing to the national economy, as seen in a snapshot, displaying Arab workers being paid in a bank, and in a picture, exhibiting a local merchant with his profits from selling goods, keeping bags of money under his naked feet, as banks were new in this country. All these displays work as evidence of the shared prosperity between the Saudi governing body and its peoples, whom not only were bettering themselves and their families financially but also learning a new trade that would make them, their country, and everyone around them rich.

In demonstrating oil as a significant component of the Saudi territories, which earnestly altered the direction of the course of Arabia’s history, the photocompositions also provide a conception regarding integral roles that the commercial exploitation of oil in this country had played in international economics. This is grasped from the images, showing oil company’s American crew performing field work upon the desert in 1948, when “Arabia’s midday summer can broil a man alive before nightfall” (*Yankee*, 261): changing a 200-pound flat tire off a huge truck loaded with sections of nearly one hundred foot long steel pipes; welding a broken pipeline which carried 500,000 barrels a day from Dhahran to Kuwait; setting oil afire at a new well; prospecting for oil; measuring earth strata with vibrators and testing to blast open a hole the sand; and patrolling the area along the Trans-Arabian Pipeline (TAP) with an airplane and a scout car. What Duncan strived for by photographing these men’s oil operations in this desert

land can be found in *Yankee Nomad*: in order to depict the TAP, under construction to be extended to 1,100 miles to carry 300,000 barrels of oil pumping per day, from Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean (259), a depiction of oil of Arabia that would be well fortifying its position in world markets. Though the journalist presents the TAP through commercial figures and pipeline routes, he omits addressing the issues, considerably relevant to his account on this pipeline project; for example, he does not mention that it had been conceived as a wartime project. Additionally, he does not implicate that it came into life as a postwar project with certain delay and that the delay stemmed from a complex mix of reasons including commercial and political calculations on the route of pipeline made by Washington and ARAMCO (e.g., to avert the impacts of Arab-Jewish conflict on the development of the project, and to exclude corporations with the British control oil companies). The shortcomings prevent one from grasping what is deemed in “Saudi Arabia’s ‘Vital Link to the West:’ Some Political, Strategic and Tribal Aspects of the Trans Arabian Pipeline (TAP) in the Stage of Planning 1942-1950” by Helmut Mejcher: “[...] a purely technical question of locating [...] pipelines was in fact an issue of importance in the development of Middle Eastern politics and power relationships” (375). Thus, while projecting the oil as an international commodity and an American economic interest, it would have been insightful had Duncan addressed the background of the pipeline project, its complex implications and influences in global politics, as these occurrences missing in his discourse had been very recent developments. When he photographed the TAP, within the time frame of these recent developments, it would have been best suited in his books, while employing the pictures, to emphasize the whole process of the international economics that were inseparable constituents of the global drama playing out in and around Saudi Arabia.

2.9.2. Saudi-U.S. Oil Partnership in 1947 and Saudi-Jordanian Political Relations in 1948, Presenting the Context for the Emergence of the Modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

It can be asserted that once producing a set of photographs, components of the *Ibn Saud visits Arabian-American Oil Co. [i.e., ARAMCO] at Dhahran* and the first segment of *King Abdullah visits Ibn Saud (including ARAMCO, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia)*, Duncan not only aimed at covering the matters in the frameworks of his assignments, but also intended to generate a series of metaphorical representations, telling of the foundation of the present day Saudi

Kingdom. This assertion can be proven through a careful examination on the journalist's brief use of words, accompanying these photographs and placed in his books.

This can be exemplified through the image (mentioned previously), displaying Ibn Saud sitting in his throne like chair, next to him ARAMCO's executives, who sit in their designated chairs, and behind the king the symbol of his reign, hanging on the wall, 'a gigantic circular coat of arms brandishing two crossed swords and an enormous palm tree.' It appears in *Photo Nomad*, together with the sentiment of "King Abdlaziz ibn Saud conquered this fearsome land almost alone" (143), and in *The World of Allah*, with both "Last of Legendary Desert Kings" (159), and "the last warrior on horseback to create a kingdom then name[d] it after his family" (272), as complementary descriptions of Ibn Saud. These accounts appear to flow too short, missing essential particulars; yet once the gap in contextual information is filled through associated literature, it has come out that they serve as implicative of the entirety of Ibn Saud's legendary history, which took its political origin back to the eighteenth century. It was when, as stated by Peter Mansfield in *A History of the Middle East*, Ibn Saud's ancestors (al Saud family) established the 'first Saudi state' around Riyadh in 1744 through an alliance with the theocratic leader and founder of the Wahhabi movement Muhammad Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab. Such an alliance between al Saud and al Wahhab, made more than a hundred year before, became the basis of the political-religious forces propelling Ibn Saud's expansionism across the Arab Peninsula, which eventually came to fruition in 1932 (40).

Placed in an additional historical context, Christopher Catherwood, the author of *A Brief History of the Middle East*, explains that the first Saudi state was destroyed by the Ottoman Empire in 1818, as it expanded its influence to the domains of the empire, namely the Hejaz (136) that was ruled by the Sharif of Mecca—a title, held by the official guardian of the sacred cities of Islam, Mecca and Medina, who were, as customary, members of the Hashemite family, the direct descendants of Prophet Mohammed (166). Less than a hundred years after the destruction of the first Saudi state, as William L. Cleveland endorses in *A History of the Modern Middle East*, Ibn Saud captured Riyadh in 1902, which was the first of a sequence of dynastic conquests that aimed at restoring a political revival of Wahhabism over the peninsula. It lasted through the end of WWI, throughout when Ibn Saud gained his strength from a myriad of factors including; the alliance with the Bedouin tribes and religious leaders (*ulama*), and also from the Ikhwan movement, which had been formed by forcing the tribes to settle in small agricultural

communities, inside which mosques were built and *ulama* were sent to manifest the Wahhabi doctrine, and material assistance were provided, which all would be returned in the form of warriors, fighting men, for Ibn Saud, who had already proclaimed himself as the Sultan of Najd by 1924. When the end of the war brought elevated positions to his rival clan, the Hashemite; Sharif Hussein (a leading figure of the Arab revolt led by Britain) became the King of Hejaz, and his sons, Faisal and Abdullah, were installed by the British into the thrones of Iraq and Transjordan, respectively; and once Hussein claimed the title of caliphate for himself in 1924, Ibn Saud sent his Ikhwan warriors to capture Hejaz, and in this course of events Britain had not connived them. Upon capturing Hejaz, he received the title of the guardian of Mecca and Medina, which concluded the systematic conquests started in 1902. Arabia had a new ruler now, as the head of the House of Saud and that of the Wahhabi religious order. In 1932, Ibn Saud united his Hijazi kingdom and Najd, and formed his kingdom, which marked the foundation of the modern House of Saud, the third Saudi state in its history (231-2).

Working in conjunction with Duncan's aforementioned annotations depicting Ibn Saud is this contextual outline, which assists us to recognize that the journalist's use of camera objective is more of telling the emergence of the Saudi Kingdom than that of his pen. This is seen in the exemplified image (exhibiting the king, oil company's executives, and the state coat of arms), in which while presenting a certain moment, the particular selections and emphasis reference indirectly, but undeniably, to passing times. This is a symbolic representation, a perfect binding of 1947's Arabia, oil rich-U.S. partner country, with the past's remote desert land, redolent of 'that legendary history,' in which, as circular coat of arms overtly exhibits, Ibn Saud, in the axis of a previously attained merging between the al Sauds and al Wahhabs, coalesced in his warriors and played a major role in consolidating his power, all the while uniting his territories, which brought about the present Saudi state, named accordingly, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Another example with reference to Duncan's objective of representing the epic past on Saudi Kingdom's rise can be found in a display of Ibn Saud, photographed together with King Abdullah of Jordan. This is engaged in the journalist's book accompanied with a suggestive headline, "Reconciliation of Two Desert Dynasties" (*The World*, 162), that took place in Riyadh, in June 1948, when he produced the *King Abdullah visits Ibn Saud*. Revealing the cultural mainstays of all desert dynasties is this image, showing massive Ibn Saud with, what Duncan calls, his "Bedouin's red-and-white checkered *keffie*," "old-fashioned spectacles," "palace

slipper,” and “*cane*, ” and tiny Abdullah with his “pure white *abba*,” “embroidered gold-and-silk turban,” and “a golden gagger glittering in his sash” (*The World*, 273), both standing outside of Ibn Saud’s black goat-hair Bedouin tent attached to the Riyadh royal airport, where the ground under their feet is covered with Middle Eastern fashion carpets. This specific picture also eternalizes the moment for posterity, marking a royal meeting of the two kings conducted for the first time in their lifetime, as Ibn Saud’s call of invitation received answer from Abdullah. More significantly this is a picture of metaphor, exhibiting King Ibn Saud and King Abdullah hand in hand, the former is “the guardian of Mecca,” and the latter “the direct descendant of Prophet” (*The World*, 273)—titles, associating them by means of their dynasties’ histories and attached to them through their religious postures. It is reminiscence of the conquest history of Mecca and Medina, through which not only Ibn Saud had obtained the title (custodian of Mecca) from Abdullah’s father (Sharif Hussein), but also control of the sacred cities of Islam, where until oil was discovered the economic revenue had been based on the annual Muslim pilgrimage, had ultimately changed hands, from the Sunnis to the Wahhabis. Within this contextualization, the visual subjects, demonstrated in other snapshots, namely a tremendous number of Saudi tribesmen, either watching the two kings hand in hand with joy, or running with rifles to follow the royal caravan carrying them from airport to the king’s turreted adobe royal palace, appear in striking similarity to Ibn Saud’s warriors, who had accompanied him throughout his journey—seizing the peninsula, lasted with the capture of Mecca. They all were now ready to celebrate the “traditional Moslem three days of festivities” for their “honored guest” (*The World*, 273), King Abdullah of Jordan. Thus, presenting the old ‘enmities’ through present ‘peace’ brings into focus a collection of photographs, redolent of the history of Arabia, produced for *Life* by Duncan, the only non-Muslim attendant of these festivities, taking place from the royal palace rooftop banquet to the palace garden, where Eastern poems were recited.

Accompanying the aforementioned picture of the two desert dynasties is the following elucidation: “For an instant, when [Ibn Saud and Abdullah] were seen together, one of the last pageant pages in mankind’s history lay open—Macedonian generals...Incan emperors...Mongol khans...Knights of the Round Table...Persian poets...and the first shepherd kings—only to close again the moment they had passed” (*The World*, 273). While taking us beyond the moment in time and space and allowing us to look upon the contexts of ‘war’ and ‘peace’ from a universal perspective by reminiscing on sequence of notable historical figures, this commentary

corresponds perfectly with what is projected through the first shepherd kings clamping hands: Saudi—Hashemite reconciliation. Together with the remark of “With the Arab world now fighting Israel, practical Abdullah is apparently coming to patch his fences with Ibn Saud after feuds of a quarter-century” (*Yankee*, 253), it appears as if it is intended to be a representation of what this reconciliation was to be, the reconciliation of Arab-Islamic world towards the Palestinian cause. Though Duncan leaves the questions relevant to the political sequels of this meeting that took place during the course of the Palestine-Arab War of 1948 unanswered, he depicts Ibn Saud’s attempt at solidifying his power in the eve of the creation of the State of Israel as it was an unquestionably unifying event for him and Abdullah, a member of his rival clan of old, the Hashemite, whom he had once consolidated his power against. This finally engendered the modern day House of Saud with no legacy of colonialism behind to recover from, during the course of European colonialism, which was spreading all over the Middle East.

Certainly, Duncan covered two independent stories effectively without ancillary captions for *Life*, while illustrating Saudi-U.S. oil partnership, and exhibiting the Saudi attempt of political reconciliation with its neighboring country, Jordan. Once the opportunity came for it, the journalist, as the writer of his own books, makes his objectives for producing a number of pictures within these stories more deliberate. The contextual historical frameworks, addressed through the aid of scholastic inputs, and in association with the aforesaid display of Ibn Saud with his state’s coat of arms and that of him with King Abdullah, endorse the idea that the utilization of these two stories in the books works perfectly together, as the exemplified representations within them, in unison, promote a broader ‘portrait,’ signifying a unique characterization of Saudi Arabia’s historical past. Endeavoring to fill the gap in his discourse he stresses to place emphasis on history and tradition, which can be explained through: “Much that happens in contemporary Saudi Arabia, and many of the emerging patterns of its political and social development, can be understood only through reference to the historic past of the area and its people” (McHale, 624). Coupled with the information regarding the death of Ibn Saud, which occurred five years after he hosted Abdullah, leaving an remarkable legacy, his kingdom, to his more than thirty sons to be carried on into the future (*The World*, 273), it can be asserted that Duncan’s overall discourse binds not only the presented time frame to the past but also to the future, while all the while, helping us to conceptualize the legendary history of the Saudis. This conceptualization provides a background to better comprehend to what extent his

photojournalism presents economic, political, cultural, and religious components that were a part of the House of Saud, and in which, who cast and bore a part during and after the Ibn Saud era, and how these components evolving through the oil concession with the U.S. shaped the society and its relation with the state; the subjects of the analysis below.

2.9.3. The Saudi State, its System of Government and Court Culture, from Foundation until 1953

Duncan's inseparable image-word reportage came into existence in *The World and Heritage of Saud Ibn Abdul Aziz, King of Saudi Arabia*, in November 1953. A significant portion of the displays in this coverage are reflective of the royal palace, Khuzam, in Jeddah, portraying the royal family receiving the official calls of condolence for the loss of Ibn Saud and congratulations for the inauguration of the new king, while the Saudi government carried out its operations. These displays work to gain insight on the revitalization of the Saudi political system that occurred just after the ascent of Saud to the throne as the king and that of Faisal as the crown prince, while all the while exposing the thoroughly ingrained Saudi state and its system of government that took root from the rudimentary government formed by Ibn Saud, in the early twentieth century, in Riyadh.

The image representation of King Saud along with sixteen of his brothers out of forty-four, thirty six of whom were alive when the journalist produced this image, is implicative of "[Ibn Saud had] contracted several dynastic marriages with the daughters of the leaders of important tribal configurations, which practically explains why forty-four sons survived him [...]" (Mansfield, 187). Working as subsidiary, an image of the two-baby princes, reportedly the pride of the new king, out of his twenty-two sons from multiple marriages, explains the Saudi marriage institution, having served to the House of Saud for its political proceedings to expand its influence over the territory. Standing in connection with the aforementioned royal princes lined up from wall to wall is Duncan's remark from his book, "what a legacy," commenting on the practice of family rule in Arabia, where princesses too were the part of this legacy, "however in this court they really [did] not count" (*Yankee*, 257), and is reminiscent of the sentiment of "the Saudi royal family was very much larger and thus able to dominate all the senior civil and

military posts itself' (48-49) written by Roger Owen in *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East*. Surely, the family regime is characterized in Duncan's written reports for *Life* on the senior princes, which describes visual subjects in the same photograph, namely Crown Prince Faisal (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Prince Mish'al (Minister of Defense), Prince Talal (Minister of Communications), and Prince Abdullah Faisal (Minister of Interior and Health); who all speak English fluently, and amongst them, Faisal is a distinctive Saudi diplomat. Taking into consideration the assigned duties of these four senior princes, each one of who was serving for the newly established 'cabinet of the king' (council of ministers), their illustrations together with King Saud function as suggestive of a Saudi political system under transformation in 1953. This suggestive display corresponds with Owen's inputs touching upon the two essential preparations made by Ibn Saud during his last days, for the future of the House of Saud: the first being, endeavoring to regulate the line of succession, not from father to son but from his son to his son, and to provide the leadership for the future by assuring that Saud, his eldest son, became king in order to consolidate the royal court; yet he would work in cooperation with Faisal, his second son (and second in line for the throne), who would be the Crown Prince with his diplomatic and administrative skills, making up for Saud's shortcomings. The second being the formation of a cabinet of the king, constructed by Faisal, which would function as a major state apparatus to provide "senior princes with administrative experience," to supervise "the activities of the various ministers," and to direct "the work of the inevitable expansion of the bureaucracy as oil royalties began to mount" (Owen, 49). In light of this elaborated and thoughtful concept, Duncan's exemplified reports allow us to be cognizant of the fact that the absolute power, which King Ibn Saud had exercised during his reign, was not transferred to his son and heir, King Saud. His successor, rather, would be expected to share his responsibilities with the senior princes to a certain degree. Apparently, the journalistic discourse works in unison with the historical writing. Yet the photographic narration, produced for the first time shortly after the new administrative code had been formed in 1953, undeniably goes beyond the scope of scholastic accounts and serves as documentations of history stemming from firsthand authentication. While evoking the idea that "[Ibn Saud's] own marriage alliances alone [...] enabled him to make the royal family a true ruling house whose members viewed their welfare and that of the kingdom as identical" (Cleveland, 233), the above mentioned image, exhibiting the royal family ranging from King Saud to lesser princes, standing together and posing for the

camera, implore us to witness an opening of a new page. After the inauguration of King Saud to the throne, the royal family was ready to carry on the government of Ibn Saud towards the more developed one of the future, with the most talented princes, with a background of secular education that many of them had received from the foreign countries, by forming the cabinet of the king—a new, institutionalized state apparatus that had never seen in this country before.

Juxtapositions of the visual works, displaying the senior princes, and those, exhibiting the non-royal members of the cabinet, namely Sheik Abdullah Sulaiman (Minister of Finance) and Mohamed Surur (Minister of State) enormously reveal the reality that regardless of the royal families' dominating of politics through their assigned posts, there was still intact a strong constituency of "non-royal technocrats with no power base of their own" (Owen, 49). Duncan's simultaneous reportage enables us to understand that consolidation of power within the outer circle had always been a phenomenon in the House of Saud, as seen in the case of Sulaiman, who had been a close friend of Ibn Saud, and during whose reign, had served as the Minister of Finance, while taking part in writing the original oil contracts for the ARAMCO concession, and initiating and playing a pivotal role in the real estate boom in Jeddah that accompanied the oil boom in the country. Together with a caption, "As the Saudi Arab government grew from being just a remote desert kingdom, Sheik Abdullah grew with it [...]," the journalist's reportage coalesces the following scholastic inputs: "incorporation [with] subsidiary member of the ruling elite was based on almost exclusively on loyalty to the family and a shared perception of the values of Saudi culture and pride in its own special achievements" (Owen, 49). Nevertheless, what differentiated Sulaiman's current status from the previous one can be found in Duncan's demonstrations of the recently emerged cabinet of the king, within which power was distributed amongst its members, who were classified in senior royal rankings and as senior technocrats. In viewing the widely accepted conception that "Before 1939, the only government 'officials' besides the king himself were two of his sons (Crown Prince Saud and Foreign Minister Faisal) and Finance Minister Sulayman" (*A Tale of Two Houses*, 68), Duncan's demonstrations of the two classified groups of influence externalize a palpable political makeover stirring in the House of Saud in 1953. It came about through the formation of the cabinet, which was the hallmark of the state and a symbol of its institutionalization, all the while being designed to foster the central authority and supremacy of the royal family.

The journalist takes a strong stand as he correlates the issue of political transformation

with that of the oil royalties paid by ARAMCO to the Saudi government, the only source of income for the Saudi Arabia and the most valuable asset of King Saud's left by Ibn Saud, which had been worth about \$5 million in 1945, and in 1953 was appraised at around \$150 million. His aim at exposing the topic from a socio-economic context, comparing present with the past through the economic figures and describing the existence of the upwelling of infrastructure, strengthens his discourse, assisting one to perceive the impacts the oil economy had on the transformation within Saudi political system. For example, revealing the vast changes that have swept across Saudi Arabia since the end of WWII are these accounts, depicting the swift increase in Saudi businesses sector (e.g., construction business), transportation (e.g., roads and railroads), and public service (e.g., nationalized medical service), into which much of the oil income has been integrated by 1953. The time frame, as portrayed, marks the turning point, as each one of these sectors began to be governed by the members of the recently established cabinet, as seen in the display of Prince Talal, in charge of the public roads and government railroads that have been expanding rapidly along with the mounting oil revenue. In conjunction with a caption, "When one stops to remember the economic situation in Saud Arabia only ten years ago, and then visits it now... and then recalls that most of the governing talents, for leading the country into a modern way of life, came from one family—then the whole social pattern of government here stands out as unique," the above exemplified demonstrations serve as implicative of the crucial role that oil had played in the creation and expansion of this seemingly healthy bureaucracy. Surely, Duncan provides a commentary on the increasing oil revenue, as it was the cornerstone of the new configurations within the bureaucratic functions, which in turn became the stimulus behind the institutional building within the state, transpiring a need for the cabinet of the king, enacted by the Saudis in 1953 with intentions to govern and prosper. Thus, his discourse exhibits the revitalization of the Saudi political system into which oil and its accompanying revenues have been channeled and have permeated everything, all the while echoing what Ghassane Salameh and Vivian Steir affirm in "Political Power and the Saudi State," that petrol has been one face of the two sided coin of influence in politics in Saudi Arabia (5).

Regardless of the political makeover within the state, there were still deeply rooted ruling configurations in practice in 1953, as these configurations have been tenacious components of the political history of Saudi Arabia, steeped in regional culture and religion, dating back to the beginning of the 1900s, if not earlier. This is revealed through a diverse array of visual

expressions, telling of King Saud's far-reaching authorities as the head of state and the government. In conjunction with the brief reports on Saud's attendance to his first Friday prayer in Mecca, and then one week later in Jeddah's old mosque as the new monarch of Arabia, these images simultaneously function as symbolic iconography, denoting the two pillars of responsibility, the 'secular' and the 'religious,' that a Saudi king bears. Such a dual role derives itself from back, in what is previously mentioned in this research, the eighteenth century alliance between the al Saud and al-Wahhab families, which resulted in the twentieth century Saudi political expansionism that went along with the expansionism of Wahhabism, and subsequently, upon seizing the Holy Cities of Islam, brought about the birth of Ibn Saud as the head of the House of Saud and that of the Wahhabi religious order. In this context, the displays, suggesting both the secular position and religious status that King Saud proliferated upon himself, work to signify a vital political framework that is the Islamic creed's quality of being centrally important to the Saudi regime by Ibn Saud's design, as it had been the foundation stone upon which his centralized authority was built, and surely through which he had further legitimated his status and enhanced the support of his subjects, while placing himself in direct control over the extreme devotees to God, up until his heir, Saud, succeeded the throne. This signification is echoed with the scholarly inputs, as seen in the article, "Religion and National Identity in Saudi Arabia," written by Joseph Nevo: "Wahhabism has provided the House of Saud not only with military successes and territorial gains" (45), but also with "a major and almost exclusive source of legitimacy for [its] rule" (34). In light of this conceptualization, Saud's attendance to the Friday prayers, coming into view as a significant theme in this story, exposes the identifier of the Saudi people's religious milieu, all the while providing a conception of what is articulated by Salameh and Steir: in opposition to oil, Mecca, referring to the religion of Arabia, or Wahhabi sect of Islam, was the other face of the previously mentioned two sided coin that profoundly influenced Saudi politics (Political Power and the Saudi State, 5). What differentiates the religion from the oil is well implied by Duncan in presenting the Saudi people, who were photographed while clapping for Saud as their new monarch, upon his royal car's arrival at the street of Jeddah's old mosque. Through which the religion is suggested as if it was the essential gears making up the collective identity; as a fundamental, discernible ingredient of this land, a rallying and unifying phenomenon, integral to the foundation of a legitimate kingdom and its society. More significantly this representation is an example of an indivisible bond between the rulers and

ruled, that is, religion, a constituent of an astonishing legacy left by Ibn Saud. What Ibn Saud did not leave to his heir can be found in Duncan's written assumption in presenting the same people, which is the 'reputation' out of history, as they recognized Saud as their king within a dual role; yet not "a national hero or saint, out of memory of old Ibn Saud."

In reference to the deep-rooted and almost unchangeable ruling mechanisms, other examples can be seen in images combined with words, displaying King Saud in, what the journalist refers to as, "the heart and most private section" of the Khuzam, the second floor of the palace, where administration offices along with both the private and public *Majlis* were situated. Amongst them, the public *Majlis* is the centralized focus of emphasis, as it functioned as the Saudi court, opened each day for the general activity of the king and those surrounding him, wherein the diverse ranges of visitors were received, and also where governmental matters were addressed by the king. Two pictures, captured in this specific room, decorated with Middle Eastern carpets, would be good subjects to reference in discussing the journalist's representations, characterizing the constituents of the firm ruling configurations. One of which presents King Saud, sitting in his chair at the far end of the room, and receiving the administrative papers from a secretary, who is sitting on the floor, in front of the king's feet; whereas, the other displays the king, sitting in his chair and receiving the words whispered to his ear by his private secretary, who remains standing. One point of intersection exposed through these snapshots can be seen in the written captions, outlining the fact that there was almost no red tape within the Saudi government; thus both governmental issues and court matters were mostly carried out in this exemplified fashion, as seen, the matters came directly to the king's attention to be decided and acted upon. Another point of intersection, or idea, can be grasped within the snapshots themselves, displaying the position of the subjects, just like the secretary sitting at the king's feet, and the private secretary who is remained standing in front of the king. Typifying the status of people, who attached themselves to the Saudi government or its court in one way or another, is their positions, or more specifically their orientation towards the king, which is commonly seen in most of Duncan's photographs. As it is also glimpsed in an image, exhibiting an interpreter, seated on the floor helping the king to communicate during his business talks with ARAMCO man Garry Owen, and in yet another photograph, showing a Palestinian reporter, kneeling on the floor and reading all the latest in worldwide news to the king. While serving as a sequence of plots in composing the journalist's story, these pictures form metaphoric

representations of the presence of ‘hierarchy,’ a significant theme of this story, as it was intrinsic within the operations of the ruling mechanism.

The following four groupings of the illustrations further aid one to envision the scope of the hierarchic structure. The first, containing two of the most significant political cogs located next to the public *Majlis*, namely the office of the king’s private secretary and that of the Minister of Finance (Sulaiman). The former was second in importance to that of the king’s quarters; considered as the ‘House of Suleiman,’ in reference to the significant influence the Minister of Finance had on politics and economics in the House of Saud, the other. The second grouping consists of the images displaying the seated clerks, secretaries, sheiks, and guards, who stood at attention upon seeing either the king or royal family members approaching. The third demonstrates a lesser prince, kissing Prince Faisal’s hand, out of respect. The last grouping displays the environment of the second floor deck of Khuzam, where Persian carpets create a pathway across the concrete floor, to backdoor of the public *Majlis*, expecting the arrival of king’s huge maroon Cadillac, as guards run to attend to the arrival and the princes line the way to the doorway. Through these illustrations, Duncan reflects the normative hierarchy surrounding not only the politics of Saudi Arabia but also the culture, as it is what these people were accustomed to and had become their mode of operation, as exemplified in the kissing of the hand of a dignitary whom is older and/or in a higher position, or in the guards and princes, who remained standing as superiors passed by, which all are connotations of a set of rituals practiced in this land through gesture, displaying respect, graciousness, generosity, and courtesy.

The extent of the hierarchic arrangements can also be perceived from a collection of images revealing the public *Majlis*, filled by vacant chairs (“chair of honor”) as designated for the notable visitors, while subsequently everyone else sat around the edges of the room either in other chairs or on the floor according to rank and importance. In conjunction with a display of a tribesman in traditional desert wears, who was photographed in this room while asking King Saud’s help for his personal matter of urgency, the aforementioned images appear to have altered from the representations of the subsistence of hierarchy to those of the two larger and interrelated topics, in reference to the function of the public *Majlis*. One epitomizes the Saudi court, headed by the monarch and functioning as the session of a judicial assembly through his high authority, as he sit to hear and then judged the matter, as seen in the case of the exemplified tribesman. The accompanying caption reads “[people’s] problem get cared for, too...maybe not always to their

liking, but given attention, directly, under orders of the King,” which yet forms a vague representation, as it does neither reference to the specific content of *Sharia*, nor does it address to what extent the religious law was involved in the secular court procedures. The other topic embodies the Saudi court, operating as an instrument of what is regarded to as, “the basic means of communication between the rulers and the ruled” (McHale, 643). This exposes the accessibility of the king to everyone, regardless of their rank or importance, including every day Saudis; yet, pecking order was still kept effective within the described phenomenon, as seen in the case of the above mentioned tribesman, holding the king’s hand after his matter was heard, which is held equivalent to the kissing of the hand. Expository of the level of accessibility to the king is Duncan’s following report, “Tribesmen straight from the desert enter the everyday, public Majlis,” which answers the question of why the court procedures were kept as simple as possible, a notion attested to in, “to enable the most ignorant Bedouin to come out of the desert, lay his complaint [...]” (116), written in *King Faisal and the Modernization of Saudi Arabia*, edited by Willard A. Beling. While presenting the direct access to King Saud was not a new reality; but was standard practice, Duncan deems that the Saudi court was where “the most direct form of political democracy [were taken place], at the level of relations between ruler and ruled, I’ve seen,” to which, “where the king is more accessible to his subjects than is any Western head of state, and with virtually no ceremony” (*A Tale of Two Houses*, 61), echoes this sentiment.

Accompanied by the displays of the presence of numerous alternative descents at Khuzam, who had retained their clicks and influence within the inner circle of the Saudi court, Duncan shifts his direct point of emphasis to the topics, relevant to the basics concerning the established operating system of the Saudi government. Thus, the above presented chain of command regarded to by him as a direct form of democracy can be closely associated with a conception presented in “the government of Saudi Arabia is characterized by endless consultation between the rulers and all facets of society” (205), written by Sandra Mackey in *The Saudis: Inside the Desert Kingdom*. This can be epitomized through the illustrations of the Sheik of Medina; a chief of the Utaibah tribe; the old warrior Emir Saud Ibn Jiluwi; the highest-ranking hooded nobles; and of a member of a merchant family from the east coast of Arabia. The representatives of the indigenous and heterogeneous Saudi people within all times are these figures, whose Saudi identities have been formed through and defined by a mix of the tribal, religious, and economic attributes and from regional engagements, blended with the Arab

character that they inherently possessed. By placing an emphasis on most of these figures' long since established affiliations with the House of Saud, Duncan intends to present the auxiliary branches of the royal family, like 'important families,' 'tribal chieftains,' and the '*ulama* class,' whose members' immense support to Ibn Saud's early efforts of power consolidation were later awarded. As seen in the case of the member of the Jiluwi family, who was reported by the journalist as the right hand of Ibn Saud during the early battles that had unified Arabia, and subsequently had been assigned as the Governor of its Eastern Province, which is an example of what is explored by Mordechai Abir in "The Consolidation of the Ruling Class and the New Elites in Saudi Arabia:" influential rudiments on the composition of the kingdom's ruling class (150). As also seen in presenting the highest-ranking hooded nobles and the chief of Utaibah tribe along with his tribe members dressing in the style of Biblical times carrying swords and daggers. The display of their attendance in the *Majlis* is to exemplify what is referred to as the "part of the Saudi ruling class" (Abir, 150)—positions of power no doubt given in good faith by Ibn Saud for debts unpaid. What is more to the point, by placing an emphasis on these peoples attachments to the throne anchored in the centuries, Duncan presents the interest groups, whose search for political alliance and a secure network of relationships with the inner circle of the Saudi court has always been mutually inclusive. This signifies the underlying fact behind the supremacy of the ruling family that has been the solid alliances with other groups of people within the territory in diverse forms including, what we referred to before, the marriage arrangements; thus another example in this regard can be the Sheik of Medina, whose family was connected with the royal family by marriage. In understanding this 'quid pro quo' culture, the demonstrations of these people can be read together with what is written about the way Ibn Saud had conceived a territorial state out of numerous tribal factions by making use of "consummate skills" such as "negotiation," "marriage alliances," and "religious values," through which "[his] accessibility won him the alliance of his subject" (Cleveland, 232-3). In tandem with what Duncan states in regards to Prince Faisal, endeavoring to maintain intimate relationships with his father's companions, like Jiluwi, these demonstrations assist us to conceptualize the Saudi court in 1953. It functioned as mechanism of popular consultation through which King Saud played the role of politician, being handy to each one of his subjects in the age old style; otherwise, it would not be possible to put his indigenous people, components of the heterogeneous social structure, under his government's central authority that would enable him to propagate his

hereditary monarchy. This not only answers why the most direct form of political democracy at the level of relations between ruler and ruled had taken place in this country, but also presents an impression verified succinctly, “The essence of the monarchy as forged by [Ibn Saud] has survived [and still] the government that he put in place was simple, direct, unorganized, and exceedingly democratic” (*The Saudis*, 196).

No less crucial an aspect of Duncan’s representations of the unique characterization of the Saudi system of government can be found other than in the illustrations of the other tenacious fixtures of the court, serving as the top counselors of the throne with Arab origin: Iraqi Rashid Ali Gilani, Palestinian Jamal Bey Husseini, and Tripolitanian Khalid Abdul Walid Qargani, amongst these exiled figures only Husseini, the leader of the Palestinian Arab intellectual resistance towards the British during the mandate era, appeared in the Saudi court lately (1950). The outlined resemblance between these advisors and St. John Philby, who was another visual subject attached to the court long since as a British historian, devout Muslim, and also a writer of a number of books on Arabia, provides a perception on the Saudi government’s posture towards European imperialism, as all of these men were famous in their anti-British sentiments. Nevertheless, while taking us back to Riyadh, where “[Ibn Saud]’ rudimentary governmental apparatus was [...] staffed by bureaucrats from other Arab countries [...]” (Cleveland, 233), the displays of the aforesaid counselors, now serving for King Saud, are imploring examples of the way the royal family has consolidated their power, by keeping the outer circle intact within the House of Saud. Duncan’s accumulation of these counselors, who were the most essential figures with tremendous influence within the heart of the court, is implicative of the political responsibilities of the counselors, which included not only the matters surrounding the House of Saud inside the country, but also those exceeding the country’s boundary. This helps us to understand that the same political affiliations and standpoints that had made them a target for exile in their home country were, in Saudi government, considered positive attributes as being anti-British imperialist was not only accepted but also lauded by the king and his people.

Duncan’s point of emphasis is not limited to exposing the operating system of Saudi government, but it also proves insightful on how such a system functioned once the relations between the House of Saud and diplomatic and business sector representatives from the outside world are taken into account. Examples in this regard can be grasped in representations of the most private section of the palace, the private *Majlis*, through which the journalist not only

exhibits the king, conducting a meeting with German businessmen, but also typifies all *Majlis* in any other Arab country, where much of the Arab and Middle Eastern policy has been made, by exhibiting the king in meetings carried out with the delegates of the Arab countries, each one of who took part in crucial movements within the Middle East, like Vice-President Jamal Abdul Nasir, the former President of Syria Shukri Quwwatli, and the former Mufti of Jerusalem Hajj Amin Husseini. Providing a view on the international relations of the Saudi government in the axis of its diplomatic and business oriented exploits are these portrayals of the private *Majlis* that bear resemblance with those of the public *Majlis*. Those illustrations exhibit the official receptions held for receiving the condolences for the loss of Ibn Saud and as congratulations for the inauguration of the new king either from the Western dignitaries, or by the Arab delegates. While exhibiting the presented good will visits, these resembled illustrations allow us to witness the king's quarters that played host to the endless succession of consultations not only with all facets of the Saudi society, but also with the outside world.

Duncan's strength in his profession stems from his ability to, while presenting the facts and events in referencing the Saudi state and its system of government, depict the land of the Saudis through its religious and cultural practices and preconceptions, as well as its history, in such a way as to provide the most charming, seemingly authentic representations, making this unknown world, to the West, atypical. A glimpse is given in describing the simplicities of religious observances while exhibiting the receiving of condolences: "here in the Moslem world, almost nothing is ever said again of the former king when he has died. [...] It is especially true here in Saudi Arabia where only Mohammed and Allah are reserved. [...] no effort is made to pay homage to the old king. He is buried in the family burial ground in Riyadh, in a simple grave at which no one calls." This is descriptive of Wahhabi interpretation of Islam; in which "the faithful concentrate their devotion solely on God" (A Tale of Two Houses, 69), worship towards anything other than God has been banned (no tomb visitation); thus, this explains the reasoning behind why Ibn Saud was buried in what Duncan refers to as, a simple and unmarked grave, in Riyadh. While connoting the disparities on basic principles between Wahhabism and the other sects of Islam, the journalist also shows us the existence of shared morals that the adherences of these distinct sects still held, as it is seen in a display of Syrian delegate, Quwwatli, kissing King Saud on his nose as condolence and congratulate, signifying that these morals have driven their importance not from religion, but from culture in the Arab lands, where kissing the nose

expresses, what Duncan calls, “great respect.” Moreover, an exemplified perception of the Saudis, displaying an unprecedented and enormous rainstorm that, a few days after the king inherited the throne, struck Jeddah, where the water flooded the streets, where it was taken “as omens of heavenly goodwill for Saud’s reign,” is a significant constituent of the discourse. It aids the journalist to exhibit Arabia, where rain falls rarely thus, it was viewed by the Saudis with respect and a mercy from God upon humankind; their conceptualization of any new start accompanied with rain as a mercy from God is an inevitable result of living in this desert land.

Another striking example, in regards to Duncan’s ability to form fascinating and authentic representations in exhibiting this land can be found in portrayal of the guards, carrying rifles and swords in traditional desert gear and sandals. This considerably juxtaposes the ancient with the present, as these men considered by the journalist as the descendants of previous guards having held the same post before them most likely beginning back in the early slave days of Arabia, and in understanding these repeated precessions, their presence at Khuzam Palace is deemed as projecting scenes from the noble old castles of the Middle Ages. Lastly, the depiction of the previously mentioned two groups of people sitting in the public *Majlis* cooling down by enormous dual air-conditioning units: the tribesmen dressing in the style of Biblical times accompanied by the highest ranking hooded nobles. Through them a panoramic mix of medieval Arabia and Europe is displayed, as Duncan regards the tribesmen’s presence at Khuzam as reminiscent of “back whole centuries to step in the court life of the Saud reign” and the nobles’ as appearing in recollection of “the days of King Arthur and his Knights of the Roundtable.” In conjunction with the portraits of the robed figures (e.g., chief aide de camp, clerks, secretaries) amongst them only the dress of chief aide de camp resembles a Western garb, the journalist exposes what he calls, a “Wonderful atmosphere!” This atmosphere surrounded the Saudi court in 1953, where “except for the air conditioning, the fine automobiles and the rather exotic garb that they wear, there [was] nothing about the court life, which could be considered as luxurious,” a suggestion hard to swallow considering the regions seemingly exponential growth in both the political and economic sectors. Yet it would seem that Arabia’s rich culture and tradition had withstood the dilutive properties that massive wealth accrue often has and “except for the brand new cars, all the most expensive made in America, this [court culture was] just about the same scene that has been enacted at Arab palaces for the last several hundred years.”

2.9.4. Regional Extrapolations in Reference to Developing Saudi Arabia, 1953

Focusing on the city of Jeddah, the diplomatic and business capitol of Saudi Arabia, and alternately the Eastern Province of Arabia, where the petroleum industry was based, a significant portion of the images, coming out of *The World and Heritage of Saud Ibn Abdul Aziz, King of Saudi Arabia*, appear as effective representations. Aided with Duncan's reports, these visual narrations, formed in 1953, serve as indicators of the vast and rigid changes having swept across the country since the end of WWII, while also deeply mirroring every aspect of life standing at the heart of Arabia, pulling from the present and past and drawing a larger picture for the future.

Dealing with the issue of massive transformation, a product of oil's rapid expansion in world markets, Duncan's presentations can be read together with "Oil wealth [...] played its part [forcing the royal house] to spend part of their wealth on programs of welfare for their own citizens" (Owen, 23). A vision of this is given in presenting the Jeddah Ophthalmic Hospital, which not only articulates the effects of a scourge on this land for centuries—eye afflictions, but also assists us to conceptualize the budding nationalized Saudi medical service, initiated by Ibn Saud, just like this medical institution, provided for by the nations ever increasing oil economy.

A view is also given in presenting the country's transportation system, either through infant roads (designed as regular surfaced highways, or used for oil purposes) cutting through the desert in many directions, or by means of Saudi Government Railroad. Duncan's commentary on the emergence of the railroads, as a major part of the ambitious development and oil distribution programs having been launched by Ibn Saud, well corresponds with scholarly sentiments, "Of all projects the closest to the heart of the King [had been] the modernization of transport within his realm" (Sanger, 187). A depictive report on the expansions of the railroads, which was, in 1953, providing daily service between the oil rich Eastern province of Arabia and Riyadh, 'opening the heart of the peninsula,' displays the economic growth that made it achievable for the Saudis to merge their vast territories increasing commerce and communication within the nation. What most efficiently signifies Arabia in this context is a display of Saudi passengers, representatives from formerly isolated populations residing in remote locals, jumping off a train that brought them from their jobs in Dammam to Dhahran where they lived; seemingly proper commuters. These passengers are definitive proof of the journalist's testimonial account, stated as, for a person like Duncan, who visited this land just several years ago, where the cornerstone of

transportation had been camel caravans, it was impossible to grasp in entirety the impacts of the changes in this place. Equipped with this framework, Duncan's consideration of a picture, showing a train flowing across the desert, that it is even more essential than a picture of an oil derrick silhouetted against the desert sky, exposes his realization of the progress in Saudi Arabia and its social and economic implications, sweeping this country in magnanimous strides. In viewing Ibn Saud's efforts as a leader, and the effects they had on his country, it is seen that the decisions he made not only improved the lives of his citizens but also cemented the power structure he had created, allowing future leaders to expand on his improvements, essentially setting Saudi Arabia up for the coming years with his notoriety as a true and successful king.

One can also find examples in illustrations of the old city, Jeddah, in accordance with government-led development plans, as they echo the process of urbanization that was encouraged and supported by the state in light of mounting oil revenue. By placing a specific emphasis on Jeddah, the photojournalist not only makes the city his visual subject, representative of the other towns where the changes were coming about more gradually, but also, he takes a drastic shift in his discourse, in confirming that despite the influx of progress, there were still unbroken traditions, taking part in shaping this country. Duncan's Jeddah proves insightful on Arabia, being reshaped within the 'traditional' and 'modern;' as it is seen through the new constructions raised in the old city, for which colorful yet shoddy houses were being demolished to build homes, apartment buildings, and palaces. An instructive report, in regards to recently raised modern buildings, which had been made with the 'ancient methods' but created with the style of "Egyptian Modern ... which, in turn, in modern German," signifies an opposition residing in diverse arrays within the city. The two opposite ends of the spectrum can be envisioned through the images displaying King Saud's residential palace standing next to the tents of his guard companies; modern apartments built upwards next to the tents of tribesmen; a Volkswagen agency standing in the ancient city; and an ancient vender, nearby him the owner of a new British Jaguar. While presenting the old colorful Arabia soon to disappear, not only through the old Jeddah incorporating the newfangled houses and business sectors, but also through the camels plodding through the streets of the town straight from caravans in the desert, the journalist's additional report, "ancient Arabia and modern Arabia seemed to still meet" perfectly depicts the intentions of this coverage. This is not to reveal traditional values clashing with modernization, but to portray the fundamental position of this country, the old and new

intertwining with each other; the heritage from the past would not be completely lost, as both old and new would provide the heritage for the future.

In presenting Jeddah as if it was in a state of increasing dualism—a condition set in motion through the modernization process—prominent instances are exposed from illustrations of the road traffic of Jeddah and those of the positions of Saudi women. The juxtaposition of the images, displaying a light pickup truck going ahead of the King Saud's Cadillac to stop the running traffic until after the king had passed, and those, exhibiting several shepherds caused to stop the traffic while driving their goats across the main streets, is telling of the merger between the old Arabia and its new façade. The accompanying script to *Life* reads “be sure to be careful unless it is not used in the same layout with traffic stopped for the king. To make an editorial layout comparison between the two reasons for traffic stoppage might bring the rest of the story down on our heads...as far as the Saudis are concerned.” The crux of the exemplified illustrations is this notice, which is metaphoric and politically significant, ascribing a meaning in regards to whole idea of Arabia's improvement. It is likely to be said that the economy oriented colossal developments took forms from a propensity towards elevating ancient Arabia, catching up to the first-world standard of living, not from a tendency of stimulating individual consciousness, or towards invigorating bourgeoisie, as the ruling texture. Woven with a mix of material benefits from oil and traditionally oriented sentiments, from both of which the House of Saud gained its power, they worked to dominate everything within the kingdom, including this coverage of Duncan, controlling how it would be presented as their progress to the West.

While providing an outlook on the basic fabrication of this new Saudi state, Duncan elucidates the context in reference to what he views as a delicate subject, the position of women in the public sphere. An excellent example of this provided to *Life* is a picture of a number of poor women in black chadors, shown from behind, sitting on the soil in long lines to receive one silver rial apiece (given by the king's agent to each open palm without touching their hands). Revealing a practice, initiated by Ibn Saud and still performed by King Saud on each Saturday morning, is this example, printed in *Photo Nomad* with “widows await King's coins [on the] road to Mecca” (172), and presented in *Yankee Nomad* as part of the “legacy” (257), helping us to grasp the puritanical rules surrounding Arabia's silent figures, whose benevolent statuses have been shaped and controlled by traditional and religious codes, more specifically through Wahhabi interpretation of Islam. These womenfolk, whose unproductive existence was not

unlike that of the princesses of the Saudi court, also assists us to understand the Saudi society as gender specific, where separation of sexes in public was maintained rigorously by the state. This not only reasons the absence of women in Duncan's presentations of oil industry of Arabia and its labor market, but also evinces, "the public Saudi society which confronts [the] colossal transformation is composed almost exclusively of men" (Political Power and the Saudi State, 18). This also functions in Duncan's discourse as if it intends to provide a perception, attested to while presenting Arabia in transition, "It was the House of Saud's own unique way of insuring that modernization continued, while at the same time protecting the traditional values of its people and its own political survivors" (*Saudis*, 97).

While concluding, Duncan offers several shots, exhibiting two Saudi Arab workmen from the oil company, performing ritual prayer of Islam just next to an oil operation field after a shift change. Presenting what he calls, the most delicate subject matter of the entire story, his request for these images, to be covered by *Life* only exactly in the context of what he highlights, exposes a notion of these men, whose extreme spirituality was neither an obstacle for their partaking in modern industry, nor the inverse. Despite that he omits addressing the fact that "every move towards modernization made by government had to be justified in religious terms" (*Saudis*, 98), his accounts are still informative for us to conceptualize *The World and Heritage of Saud Ibn Abdul Aziz, King of Saudi Arabia*. It was heritage from Ibn Saud, a religious man desiring for his country to take part in the modern world and its affairs, which certainly brought progressive concepts that could be found in all facets of society; yet, tenacious historic ties revolving around and within the state brought about perplexity, challenges, and inconsistency, which together would play roles in shaping the future of this country, which, to Duncan, no doubt would be "a very great distance from the picture book Arabia such as [he] could still shoot there today." With oil "nature's legacy—seemingly eternal," Arabia was being made into a place unknown by Ibn Saud, "whose world [would] vanish when he [was] gone" (*Yankee*, 257).

2.10. Intentions in Coverage of Saudi Arabia Appearing in the Media Outlets

In examining Duncan's explorations of Saudi Arabia through his area studies carried out in this country this study has so far specified the photojournalist's specific selections and points of emphasis in the representations of the state of affairs progressing in Arabia, and subsequently,

it has analyzed how he represents Saudi Arabia. This examination now aims to provide an account of the way Duncan's representations were materialized in *Life*, while questioning to what extent his proficiency in photojournalism played an integral role in the magazine's image stories; what the objectives were in conveying his representative works to the readers of the magazine; and to what extent these objectives are in accord with his own objectives accentuated either in the captions, or in his books.

"Ibn Saud visits American partners" (1947) and "ARAMCO: an Arabian-American partnership develops desert oil and places U.S. influence and power in Middle East" (1949) are *Life*'s editorial stories, covering the similar topics exposed to Duncan's readers in his plentiful image narrations. Duncan's ability of reaching deeper into content, going beyond perceived limits without a single word, is exemplified in the former story, wherein, a specific image of Ibn Saud, described as "In his throne-like chair, [...] King Ibn Saud sits beneath his circular coat-of-arms bearing desert palm tree and crossed swords" (23), appeals to the reader to understand eye-witnessing history, giving clues on the epic past of the Saudis while freezing the moment for posterity. This is a view, eagerly used in Duncan's books with complementary descriptions of Ibn Saud, entreating his readers to comprehend what this epic past was meant to be—the birth of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of the modern age, brought about through the unification of the House of Saud with the Wahhabi sect of Islam (see analysis).

Considering the entirety of both these stories, Duncan's photocompositions, in presenting an inter-reliant world and its institutionalized endeavors, contained a variety of motives and themes that were proficiently utilized in stimulating Western public perceptions on the state of affairs occurring in an environment far in distance and distinctive in way of life. In exhibiting "the mutual necessity of maintaining [...] a fruitful partnership between East and West" (23) through Ibn Saud's royal visit to the U.S.-owned ARAMCO amenities based in Saudi-U.S. mutually controlled oil boomtown of Dhahran, the images of the former story serve to show off ARAMCO playing a dual role in Saudi Arabia. This presence, which occurred through the Saudi's integration into the West with an oil concession signed in 1933, transformed the barren Arabia into one of the greatest oil producing lands of the world since 1945 (23), and changing the way of life in this medieval kingdom, where impoverished and nomadic natives have been provided "a fixed occupation and wages" (24), while Ibn Saud began to receive Western women for the first time in an unveiled face, which might be "the beginning of the end for an ancient

Arab taboo” (25). Correspondingly, in providing a background on Saudi-American oil concession (1933), and verifying the Saudi oil reserves operated by ARAMCO as a strategic resource and concern of the U.S., the latter story displays the images to sell to the American readers on ARAMCO as “a spectacular example of American enterprise at work abroad” and as “a prototype of [President Truman’s] ‘bold new program’ of American guidance for ‘underdeveloped areas’” (62). Impressing the public with ARAMCO’s success as “justifiable U.S. pride” (i.e., “it has projected the century of technology into and beyond an ancient world”), Duncan’s image narrations function to publicize the far-reaching impacts the Western meditated petroleum industry had on the alteration of “the daily lives of many of the subjects of a primitive kingdom” (62). Furthermore, while assuring the reader on the company’s attempt of respecting Arab customs [i.e., avoiding “the odium of old-style colonialism” (66)], the snapshots present a perfect collaboration of ARAMCO’s American and Saudi employees despite the language barrier, and their private lives being maintained apart from each other, as they were “as different as desert oil and oasis water” (74). In allowing American readers to visualize their compatriots’ modes of living in Arabia, the images are emphatically displayed through “Despite all ARAMCO can do for them, long duty in a primitive country makes for periods of boredom and occasional feeling that they are living in an exotic vacuum” (74). All these concepts appearing in *Life*’s image stories, in presenting the U.S. economic interest as serving Saudi Arabia’s own national agenda, are reiterated in Duncan’s books; yet in a more moderate sense. The journalist avoids any of the rhetoric that *Life* uses referring to camera objectives as “primitive” inducing an emotively pleasing idea for American readers of a mysterious, strange, and exotic land, being civilized through Western trade treaties and its stipulations. Also, Duncan averts any sort of generalization from the discourse, like, what is referred to by *Life* as an “ancient Arab taboo,” oversimplifying the issue of veiling in the Muslim world, lumping vast Arab territories and various sects of the religion. Rather, the readers of his books are provided political and economic implications of oil in Saudi Arabia, providing the makings of a melting pot, where cultural and communicational exchange occurred interchangeably with Saudis’ reaping the benefits (see analysis).

Another editorial story, representative of Duncan’s exclusively photographic reportage on Saudi Arabia, is “Two Arab kings end an old feud” (1948); wherein, a picture of two desert dynasties, displaying King Ibn Saud and King Abdullah of Jordan hand in hand, was printed

together with “The two kings [...] had hated each other cordially ever since Ibn Saud ousted Abdullah’s family from the Hejaz throne 42 years ago” and with “Now [in the course of Palestinian-Israeli War] these old foes greeted each other like long separated brothers” (28). Through this photo and accompanying text, the reader is exposed to the photographer’s talent for composing meaningful visual representations, providing ironic elucidation of Saudi history within its political reality. As crucial as this talent is the photographer’s selections of the subjects, such as ‘Middle Eastern designed carpets,’ ‘cheering rifle-carrying Bedouins,’ ‘banquets tendered and poetry readings recited,’ displayed along with “For three ceremonial days the two kings talked and feasted while LIFE Photographer [...] made the photographs on these pages” (28), bring about the visual explorations of the cultural mainstays of the Arab lands. These underlined points are also presented in Duncan’s books, in which the journalist’s succinct but strong articulations display an intellectual effort, depicting Saudi political history molded through religious parameters and regional practices, and revealing cultural implications of an environment and its people, whose values system differed in many ways from the Western readers, who are thus aided to understand ‘the other’ to deconstruct any myths that may have been constructed previously (see analysis).

The production of “The house of Saud” (1953) unquestionably rested upon the journalist’s intense and instructive caption book that offered a transparent lens to *Life* magazine’s editors to write this image story (see synopsis). The entirety of the story evinces an informative outlook on the socio-cultural, -political, and -economic conditions in Saudi Arabia at a specific historical moment, marking not only the end of the fifty year old rule of Ibn Saud, whose “sword” had created the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (66), but also the expansion of the old warrior’s kingdom “from a one-man realm into a family corporation” (72). While providing a perception of the fact that “the new Saud inherits his father’s enormous weight of authority in an all-male world,” the story aids the reader to recognize the distinctive roles that the founder of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had played valiantly and incisively in the power consolidation and its legitimacy over the territory [i.e., “by surrounding himself with fiercely loyal associates and advisors, still in the court today” and “by marrying often into the tribes of his realm” (72)]. Presenting Saudi tribesmen together with envoys from the neighboring Arab countries judging the strength and abilities of a new king, the photocompositions taken in Khuzam Palace suggests the Saudi court as constructed in “a curious mixture of ancient practices and modern needs” (66).

Moreover, in displaying the king with, “The modern world was pressing hard on the new king’s realm” (70), a king who was in strict Islamic faith like his father, and also like him, was eager to meet the challenge of modern society and to complete his father’s development projects, the story visually suggests Saudi Arabia, where the areas of specific concern (e.g., transportations) have been cautiously renewed in partaking in the modern world’s petroleum economy, continuing their development (70-1). The books purvey a similar story, written in a brief and intensive manor, and promoting Duncan’s own words (see analysis).

Although the ideas promoted by *Life* in “The house of Saud,” specifically referenced thus far, are in accordance with Duncan’s wishes and intentions, he worried some would stray from his conceptions he formulated during his stay in Saudi Arabia, pandering more towards the previously mentioned Western perspective. The state of conditions surrounding Saudi subordinate groups is an example of this, and Duncan correspondence with *Life* helps to put this matter into perspective: “Please, [...] never use the word “Women” in the captions...just refer to “families” or Saudi Arabs” or the like. I shouldn’t have pixed any of the womenfolk, actually, but here they seemed not to care; handle this caption with greatest care [...]. They are most sensitive on this point of poor folks...and since I also have pixed poor women I’ll be a finished character in these parts unless you are ingenious.” While corroborating the journalist’s uncanny ability to deliver pictures and information despite the described circumstances in order not to ignore women folk, the idea attested to in this dispatch certainly brought Duncan’s voice to front and center in *Life*’s page. An image of women in black chador sitting in a line, captured with a background of newly built apartments, offered with “old rite brings out the poor [women] to await king’s largess each Saturday [awaiting a royal agent to] pass along the line, handling one silver rial to each petitioner” (71), signifies Saudi women’s place in public sphere, while verifying the areas untouched by the regions modernization, such as women’s rights, not fitting into the molding pattern of developing Arabia. Resemblances in the style of this representation is found in Duncan’s books; wherein, the metaphoric descriptions embedded are yet more telling of the Saudis’ tenacious cultural and religious codes that had withstood modifications (a lacking context for the reader of the magazine), providing a logical reasoning behind the balancing act that Saudi leadership performed towards their modernization endeavors in an environment upon which the legitimacy of the Saudi rule was established (see analysis).

In exemplifying Duncan’s concerns regarding how his productions would be transmitted

into *Life*'s pages, another instance is the issue of 'kissing the nose.' Associated postulations with this unfamiliar concept in the West were read in a caption, "[...] make every effort to write [the custom of kissing] with the same restraint as though covering the death and inauguration of an American president and Vice President. Be especially careful of using any sort of slang in these captions...for if you do, it will be the last story I'll ever be given down here." Duncan's desire of keeping the discourse away from the lens of the Western *Orientalist* portrayal was acted upon. Appearing in the editorial story is an image, printed with "Respectful guest, Syria's ex-President Shukri Quwwatli, prepares to honor king by kiss on nose" (71), giving a nudge to the reader to consider mindfully this part of the world, and the cultural codes shared by Arabs.

Certainly, Duncan created a story behind the story while corresponding to *Life*'s editors, repetitively outlining his concerns in areas that needed careful understanding and good wording; another example of this is the issue of religious practices. A collection of images, exposing ARAMCO's Saudi employees, performing the ritual prayer of Islam nearby an oil operation field, were submitted to *Life* along with, "[...] I've never before asked for so much care to be exercised in one story, but this time I am... First because I am a guest in this country, in every sense of the word, for remember I landed without even a visa... and, secondly, because these people in the royal court trust me to try to tell their story as they feel it themselves—and that [issue of praying men], after all, happens to be the very heart of this story." Neither of these images appeared in *Life*, but in Duncan's *Yankee Nomad*, printed with "Regardless of what [American and Arab workforce] share while working together, or how easily each adjusts to the other's life, it is after their shifts change [...] fundamental differences in Aramco-men show" (267). In writing this Duncan proposes what has been previously touched upon in analyzing his caption layouts, the Saudis' world, where being an extreme devotee to God was neither a barrier for being involved in modern industry, nor the inverse, as it was an essential part of their identity giving them direction, piety, and solace—an account happily conveyed in the editorial story.

While showing us an aptitude for compromise, Duncan had played mediator between general streams of Western media and its collective codes, the host country's expectations, and his own principles in his profession. This exemplified style of reportage through the captions brings about a question regarding the extent of objectivity that Duncan's coverage displays, as he was clearly at the mercy of his point of interest, the Saudi government, more so than on any other assignment. Duncan in fact made an almost impossible coverage achievable, in his own

description “such a story has never been permitted before...even around the palaces of Ibn Saud;” he landed Jeddah without a valid visa, used personal connections through ARAMCO, and being permitted to stay in the country through the grace of Crown Prince Faisal and to cover the House of Saud and Saudi Arabia for *Life*, began shooting the story “The house of Saud” (see synopsis). Presumably, his dedication to his profession would have been tested with the desire of the ruling family to be represented in the Western world with its new ruling body, and the good impression that he had made on the royal house during his early presence in Saudi Arabia in the days of Ibn Saud surely played an additional role in the emergence of this story. The nature of the region’s government, its remoteness, and the unresolved visa predicament all compounded placing the photojournalist at the mercy of the Saud family. Upon meeting him with open arms, he was in a state of immense gratitude. In these circumstances, framing the coverage, in which pragmatism was used as an instrument, aimed at keeping and maintaining the relationship between the West and Saudis undisturbed and open, hoping to conduct further future coverage. This indeed affected the process of transmitting his complete explorations to *Life*’s readers, whose understanding of some issues relied on contextual outlines that were missing from the discourse, as they were considered as delicate for the royal house. Yet, Duncan was professional and a humanitarian, allowing him to give an accurate presentation of Saudi Arabia despite his friendship with, and concerns towards the power structure; this is why, the reader of image story visually perceives and reads informative signs on each topic touched upon in the captions about Saudi Arabia, despite the circumstances at home and abroad.

2.10.1. Conclusion

Duncan’s representations of Saudi Arabia in photojournalism, generated in 1947, 1948, and 1953, comprised of four different stories, which appear in Life Magazine and Duncan’s books, (*Yankee Nomad*, *The World of Allah*, or *Photo Nomad*).

Duncan’s strength as a journalist, exemplified in this study, is reliant on his affinity for directing both his camera and his pen, presenting his stories and viewpoints with precision. Considering the entirety of his representations (archival and published materials) composed in Saudi Arabia, one of two central implements, Duncan’s knack for enthusiastic focusing on specific selections and subjects, usage of camera objective, is easily seen. This imparts a

boundless scope of viewpoints in understanding the milieu of Saudi territories through history and culture, as he intended to enhance the content by displaying inseparability in a set of value systems from the history, and by rationalizing its thoroughly integrated patterns penetrating the Saudi state in the age of modern oil industry. The second implementation is Duncan's usage of pen, both in the caption book (one in all Saudi coverage) and in his books. Intently written captions evince an ample outlook on his visual displays, his objectives in the coverage, and his desires pertaining to how his story needed to be transmitted in *Life's* pages. Naturally, the books are great sources for readers, demonstrating Duncan's brief yet richly depictive writing, explicative of the core values embedded in each visual representation, covering the era and area; 1947-1953, Saudi Arabia.

Taking into account the information that the Western reader receives from Duncan's discourse about Saudi Arabia, this study has shown that the intersecting points of three stories reveal the state of affairs progressing in Saudi Arabia in the axis of oil that held supreme significance as a parameter of global and national economy, while all stories expose the House of Saud, either through its international relations with the U.S. or with the East (Arab countries), or its relation with its Saudi society. All these stories at once play to the attributes of previously elaborated Western motives, some of which were focused on more by *Life* in exerting public opinion and promoting that Western society was doing well for Saudis, just as it was doing well for all undeveloped world. Yet also, all stories exhibit humanitarian consideration of the *other*, efficiently enabling readers to sympathize with Saudi state and society, allowing them to understand Saudi's own perception and standpoints on life in every facet. By doing this in a time when little was known of Saudi Arabia and well formulated opinions on its inhabitants were few and far between, Duncan displayed his capability of connecting two different worlds, already connected, but only through economic parameters and politics, inspiring a more in depth international relationship. Doing this he displayed Saudi Arabia in a sophisticated and amiable manner, making this unfamiliar society knowable and reachable, and comprehensible to Western awareness, while also regarding the way of life characterizing the identities of Saudis, of which they were very proud. Due to this social accomplishment Western views on Saudis and the Middle East are urged to change for the better as Duncan presented such a convincingly dignified and 'human' way of life.

2.11. Synopsis of Duncan's Pictorial Stories on Turkey

Turkey is one of the countries, like Egypt, that Duncan passed through many times while serving as *Life* magazine's correspondent in the Middle East, acting as a bridge in terms of geographical, and social qualities assisting the photojournalist in accessing to the Middle East. Between 1947 and 1954, he covered four stories in Turkey; while the first three pertained to his assignment, the fourth emerged spontaneously. The collected works in these stories demonstrate an assortment of subjects ranging from 'Russian threat to the Turkish Straits' to 'Turkish Army, modernized through the Marshall Aid Program,' and from 'Turkey, a member country of NATO' to 'Turkey's place in the world's trade market,' which in conjunction are explanatory of this country's intra/inter-national politics.

2.11.1. Turkey's Intra/Inter-National Politics between 1947 and 1954

Duncan composed his productions in photojournalism regarding intra- and inter-national politics of Turkey in February 1947, October-December 1948, March 1952, and August 1954. During each one of these time frames, he compiled his materials into a file consisting of one story for *Life*. The collections of these files are comprised of the following items:

- a) *Turkish Straits Essay (Aegean to Black Sea) (personalities, portraits)*: 3 rolls of b/w 35mm film, 26 rolls of b/w 120 film, 2 frames of b/w 5x7" film. On March 17, 1947, *Life* issued "U.S. faces up to a diplomatic crisis" or "Next problem for U.S.: the Straits."
- b) *Turkish essay (including images of Taksim Square in Istanbul)*: 3 rolls of b/w 35mm film, 51 rolls of b/w 120 film. Published as "Turkey's army" by *Life* on January 31, 1949.
- c) *Eisenhower the tourist and politico-general* (caption book), and 11 rolls of b/w 35mm film. Published by *Life* as "Ike campaigns—but it's for NATO" on March 17, 1952.
- d) *Izmir Trade Fair* (captions book), and 21 rolls of b/w 35mm film. Published by *Life* as "Fair face for Soviets: Well-stocked Russians star at a Turkish bazaar," on September 27, 1954.

The first two collections are entitled as 'essay' though there are no text documents written by Duncan (their titles are a result of how *Life* referred to these assignments). Despite the

absence of captions, a number of images from these files are made use of in this dissertation as they were not only employed by *Life*, but also explored in Duncan's books. In regards to the last file (above listed d.), Duncan's self-regulatory productions in both image and word forms were utilized sparingly by *Life*. By focusing mostly on the captions, rather than the images, his contributions in this particular field study are utilized in the dissertation, as they prove insightful on the changing course of Turkey's economic and political position in the region and globe.

Duncan's representative works, brought about through the above-italicized subjects, can be classified as

1. Russian pressure on the Turkish Straits
2. Turkish army receiving the Marshall Aid from the U.S.
3. Turkey, as a member of NATO
4. Failures of Turkey pertaining to the utilization of US Economic Aid
5. Russian Venture into Turkish trade, challenging the U.S. hold on Turkey

2.11.1.1. Russian Pressure on the Turkish Straits

The *Turkish Straits Essay* emerged in regards to an assignment of covering the matters related to Russian demands on the Turkish Straits—the straits include the Bosphorus (Istanbul Strait), and its counterpart, the Dardanelles (Canakkale Strait), forming together a crucial international waterway. For this task, in February 1947, Duncan voyaged from the Aegean to the Black Sea with permission from the maritime municipalities of Turkey, and, as the only foreign journalist, photographed the straits. Along with the images of his sea voyage, he captured the city, Istanbul, along where the Bosphorus connects both Eastern Thrace and the Asiatic segment of the city, while bounding the Sea of Marmara with the Black Sea on its northern edge. One of these images is employed by the photographer in *The World of Allah* with a short title, “The Bosphorus Straits: Crossroad of Conquerors—Muslim and Christian” (135). Duncan also shot the Gallipoli Peninsula located on the European landmass of the country, and its opposite side (Anatolian Peninsula), along where the Dardanelles meet the Sea of Marmara with the Aegean section of the Mediterranean Sea on its southern edge.

One particular picture of the Bosphorus covers a mine net (foreground) that is the last barrier to the Black Sea, and Russia beyond. It is taken from the middle of the sea, from where

the water flows towards the south, to the Dardanelles, a strategic waterway for Russia to access the Mediterranean Sea. Duncan utilizes this image along with the following sentiment in *Yankee Nomad* in order to expose Stalin's pressure for shared control of the Turkish straits: "Nothing moves as night sifts down upon the winter world where Europe and Asia nearly join—nothing but glacial water and Russians mines, which flow from the Black Sea and Stalin's darkness beyond" (235). In *Photo Nomad* the reader is ensured that the Russian demand on the straits is not a new phenomenon, which is a "historic dream of Russians for five hundred years" (147).

The photographer places a specific emphasis on the Turkish officers, who are described in the pictorial story, "U.S. faces up to a diplomatic crisis" (or "Next problem for U.S.: The Straits") by *Life*, as the defenders of the strait: the members of the staff of the commander of the Gallipoli Line, Lieutenant General Feyzi Menguch (34). Exhibiting the so-called officers in a staff meeting around a table, a specific image also covers two portraits hung proudly on the wall. One of these portraits shows Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey, whereas the other exhibits Ismet Inonu, the second president of the country, in active duty.

As explained in the above-entitled story (by *Life*), a picture of the Dardanelles captured from a lighthouse at the Gallipoli Peninsula (European segment) displays Britain's memorial in the far background (34), which was built well after the Gallipoli Campaign (1915-1916) that took place as a joint taskforce of Britain and France, which tried to break Turkish holds on the straits during WWI. Yet other images show both the site of ancient Troy standing on the Asiatic site of the Dardanelles, and a Turkish shrine, the tomb of Gazi Suleiman, who conquered the Gallipoli Peninsula in 1353, and added this segment of the European continent to the lands of the Ottoman State that was ruled from Anatolia. These photographs serves as subsidiary, displaying the strategic importance of the Turkish Straits and its surrounding mainland, enveloped in an ongoing struggle for control by Western and Eastern civilizations since antiquity, explaining Russia's pressure for control, and currently creating a diplomatic crisis in Turkey.

2.11.1.2. Turkish Army Receiving Marshall Aid from the U.S.

Functioning as if it were a component of the *Turkish Straits Essay*, the *Turkish essay* is reflective of an assignment, for which the Turkish army general staff provided Duncan a "carte blanche," as it is referred to by *Life*, in order to photograph their country for the magazine that

aimed to run a pictorial story on the Turkish army having received military aid from the U.S. (the Marshall Aid Plan). For this project, between October and December 1948, Duncan took pictures of an assortment of subjects ranging from the entire Turkish general staff to the Turkish-Russian border (the first ever photos captured by a foreigner), and from the Turkish-Bulgarian border to the Turkish-Greek border. Written by *Life* editors with a heading, “Duncan among the Turks,” a half page memo proves insightful in understanding his travels this particular go around: the Turkish cavalymen answered the journalist’s questions freely and they also assigned a rifleman to protect him from wolves during his travels towards the borderland in the severe winter.

The strength of an image portrayal, reflective of barbed wire on the Turkish-Russian border, is enhanced through the written accounts in *Yankee Nomad*, where the frontier is described as follows: while on the right Mount Ararat hides the Noah’s Ark, and on the left the territory of where Stalin was born (Caucasus), and just right ahead, behind the barbed wire, Russian soldiers patrol with dogs at night, and shoot anyone, “who steps upon their well-raked strip of earth;” which is a borderland regarded to by the Turks as “the carpet of death” (235). This is indicative of the Russian demand on Turkish territories in the Eastern Anatolia (Kars and Ardahan provinces) that form the eastern frontiers, mirroring the acceleration of the political crisis between the two countries, accompanied by the Russian demand on the Turkish Straits.

Taken in Erzurum province, neighboring Kars and Ardahan provinces, a photograph exhibits the Turkish cavalymen riding out into blizzards amongst the icy forest, and maneuvering from their posts with their Brigadier, Avni Mizrak (foreground). “Watching [these men] wind through the storm, it seemed much like seeing some of the famous old war paintings come to life, during the early battles across Europe” (p. 66-7), which is Duncan’s sentiment accompanying this picture printed by *Life* in “Turkish Army.” In his books, the journalist makes use of the same visual product, and explains the following: the Russians have called Avni Mizrak as ‘Kara Avni’ (Black Avni), “because of the ferocity of his cavalry charges in the First World War” (*Photo*, 147). These cavaliers regard “each storm” as “an ally” that is crucial to the country’s defense on this Eastern Anatolia region, along where nine invasions coming from the east have been endured long since. As weapons of modern armies come into Turkey through the Marshall Plan, “Black Avni’s cavalry columns [now] appear to be headed toward the pages of history” (*Yankee*, 269). Through the Marshall aid, provided to Turkey along with Greece, bearing hope for both nation states, as it did for all other war devastated lands, President Truman

most likely impairs the USSR's plan to dominate all of Europe (*Photo*, 147). During WWII President Inonu had refused both Churchill and Roosevelt to either declare a war against Germany or send troops to the eastern front; yet currently Truman and Inonu are aligned through increased necessity against Russia, as Inonu considers that "the Red Army would have moved, as in the Balkans to occupy both the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus" (*Yankee*, 269).

The displays of the Turkish Army members scanning from generals to soldiers, who are photographed in various locations and on different occasions, are implicative of the effectiveness the Marshall Aid Plan had on Turkey. Working as a collection of historical records, Duncan's visual subjects (which appear also in "Turkish Army") are as follows: a commander to all armor on the eastern frontier of Turkey (reading U.S. tank manuals); a Turkish soldier (practicing use of a walkie-talkie radio at the Anatolia communications school); a group of second lieutenants (using interphones to study a relief map of Turkey under the direction of their captain at army tank school in the capital of Turkey, Ankara); Turkish infantrymen (patrolling the frontier near the Caucasus, who are led by their American trained officers, and supported by the U.S.-supplied motor transport convoys); supply expert Colonel William Littell (serving as a trainer to the Turkish Army members). A specific image of this kind depicts a meeting headed by a Turkish general and attended by both the Turkish General Staff and a U.S. Army mission commander, the coordinator of the Marshall Aid Program. While portraying both the Turkish and the American flag standing at the background, this picture, just like the others, exposes an alliance between Turkey and the U.S., which takes shape within the course of post-WWII.

Captured in Kars province, a picture exhibits a sign displaying the words "Kars-Soviet Sınırı" (Kars-Soviet border), and behind that a train bound for Russia. This picture appears in the above-entitled picture story (by *Life*), which reveals that "[the train] enters Russia under heavy guard, backs out after discharging diplomatic passengers and mail" (68). Taken in a mountain section of Kars, another photograph demonstrates a group of local people traveling by means of an oxcart, and upon the road a sequence of American supplied army tanks driven by Turkish soldiers heading in yet another direction, over a snowy valley. Exemplary of the local folk, the visual subjects are as follows: three women sitting on the oxcart, one of them in a veil of blue (holding her little son wrapped in blankets); the father of the child, afoot (leading the cattle); and three men (helping these people in their journey). In *Yankee Nomad*, Duncan regards this specific photograph as one of artistic quality and dynamics by stating, "Any Renaissance painter would

have shared my surprise.” Conceiving the soldiers in the tank as “steel-chested soldiers,” he deems, “[they] in another time would have been centurions searching for one Child, whose family was seeking refugee beyond the night” (272).

The visual narrations, displaying Turkey’s borders with the neighboring countries in the northwest (Bulgaria and Greece), signify the present-day tensions between Turkey and its so-called neighbors—the tensions, presenting themselves through the impacts of Soviet Russia on the Balkans: Bulgaria having been communized, and the Greek Army receiving the Marshall aids in order to cope with the civil war triggered by the adherents of Communism, who have been involved with the guerilla skirmishes in Greece. Shot on the border with Bulgaria, a photo displays the Turkish troops guarding the frontier around their outpost employing trenches. The tense relations between the Turks and Bulgarians can be exemplified through the previously mentioned memo, in which the magazine’s editors recorded the following: at the Turkish border, Bulgarian lookouts screamed furiously to Duncan not to capture their post (“a simple tower”); yet, the commanding officer of the Turkish border post screamed right back by stating “Turkey was a ‘free country where I could [...] well do as I pleased, and if they didn’t like it...to move their (censored) tower.’” Contrasting such an experience on the Turkish-Bulgarian border, an image captured on the frontier with Greece is depictive of cordial relations between the officers of Turkey and those of Greece, as it illustrates two Greek guards visiting the Turkish border: while two Turkish soldiers are sitting with the Greek guards on a table and having tea and cookies together, two Turkish officers (standing) make conversation with them. This scene, interpreted in “Turkish Army” as, “The Greek guests are welcomed partly because they give the Turks useful information about civil war and the whereabouts of Communist guerillas near the border” (69). Subsequently, a picture of three Turkish officers watching just across the border is expressive of what keeps the Turks on alert; a guerilla outfit, burning a Greek village.

2.11.1.3. Turkey, as a Member of NATO

The image-word portrayals in regards to Turkey, a new member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), emerge from *Eisenhower the tourist and politico-general*, written as a mix of news report format and caption layout. Wherein, the main story is described as “the trip of General Eisenhower to the most recent member countries of NATO, Turkey and Greece.”

Duncan reports that Dwight David Eisenhower (Ike), as the commander of NATO, executes his diplomatic-military campaign in Turkey and Greece; while welcoming these countries to NATO, he inspects their military infrastructures. His reports also provide a timetable showing that Ike and his party (including Mamie Eisenhower, who plays no role in this trip) arrived in Esenboga airfield, located outside the capital of Turkey, Ankara (March 3, 1952, at 17:00pm). The next day, Ike took part in a meeting with the top men of Turkey, including Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and President Celal Bayar, and he also visited the Hittite Museum and the Armored Units Training School of the Turkish Army. The following morning (March 5th), he flew to Istanbul, and the same day after visiting Hagia Sophia, the Blue Mosque, and one of the arms and porcelain museums, he arrived in Athens (17:30pm). For a caption, Duncan writes, “[this] story seem[s] to break down into two levels...Ike the General working as a politician, and Ike the Tourist,” which is granted by *Life* in “Ike campaigns—but it’s for NATO.”

Once the visualization of the trip that Eisenhower made to Turkey is classified into two segments as suggested by Duncan (Ike the General and Ike the tourist), it becomes visible that each segment displays several objectives revealing the journalist’s standpoints. Multiple snapshots, reflective of a diverse array of moments ranging from Eisenhower’s arrival to Esenboga airfield to his meetings with leading officials, and to his visit to the Armoured Units Training School of the Turkish Army, fall into the first set. The written descriptions of the visual subjects assists one to envision some of these images, just as follows: welcoming committee (including Canadian Ambassador to Turkey, Turkish Admiral Aziz Ulusan, and Ali Enver, whose father-in-law was Enver Pasha, one of the founders of the Republic of Turkey); arrival of Eisenhower to the airfield (greeting the Turks); Eisenhower and Turkish General Nuri Yamut (saluting during American and Turkish anthems at the airfield); Ike (with Turkish press at the airfield); Ike attending a conference at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (together with Prime Minister Menderes, General Yamut, Minister of National Defense, and Minister of Foreign Affairs, etc.); Ike meeting with the Presidency, conducted with interpreter (with President Bayar, Prime Minister Menderes, U.S. Ambassador George McGhee, and General Gruenther, etc.); and the U.S. presidential candidate and President of Turkey (Eisenhower and Bayar). Duncan requested *Life* to print one of the photographs, displaying Celal Bayar, through a special note written just as follows: “THIS IS THE THIRD TIME LIFE HAS PHOTOGRAPHED TURKEY’S PRESIDENT... THIS TIME PLEASE TRY TO PRINT ONE OF THEM. IT

MAKES WORKING IN THE COUNTRY SO MUCH EASIER, BESIDES HE'S INTERESTING." As outlined above, while the images serve as explicative of Ike's visit to Ankara, the written accounts do not impart any information regarding either the conference at the Foreign Affairs or the meeting at the Presidency, with one exception: "every type of camera, flashgun, floodlight and time exposure was used" at the conference by the Turkish and foreign pressmen, who sat outside the residence during the luncheon.

A sequence of photographs displays the visit that Eisenhower made to the Armoured Units Training School. One of these shots exhibits Eisenhower being welcomed by the school commander, Major General Tahsin Yazici, who is depicted by Duncan as the Turks' first commander in Korea. It is reported that Ike spends much more time in this school than in any other place, being shown the work of the soldier-students with weapons or machinery, which is undoubtedly a result of the appealing prospect of seeing the constructive impacts the U.S. aid had on the Turkish Army.

While 'Ike the tourist' falls into the second sets of the image portrayals, the effects of these pictures are enhanced by the written expressions, which demonstrate not only Eisenhower and his party's visit to the museums, but also Turkey's multi-cultural settings stemming from the course of Anatolian history. This can be exemplified through Ankara's famed Hittite Museum, where Ike is photographed (e.g., with Mamie, General Gruenther, a wife of a Turkish officer, etc.) along with the Hittite relics of the thousands years old. Likewise in Istanbul, while photographing Ike's visit to the Hagia Sophia, Duncan's specific point of emphasis is the mosaics and paintings near the marvelous ceilings, "over 180 feet above," as well as the glowing ancient relief of Christ. While covering in the background the famed Blue Mosque, one of these snapshots exhibits Ike, as he is entering the Hagia Sophia. Whereas the other demonstrates him saluting the Turkish Army honor guards outside the gate of the Hagia Sophia. The following statement makes the representation of 'Ike the tourist' more influential still, as it describes General Eisenhower's picture taking of the monolithic minarets of the Hagia Sophia with a stereo camera; for a caption Duncan says, this is "the heart of the entire take:" "After some head-scratching he spun the dials, cranked the film, took a bead on the various people and minarets around him, then suddenly yanked the camera away from his eye and almost danced with delight. [...] he actually made his picture...but, for a moment, he almost became fluorescent and was the happiest photographer I've ever seen. He hollered, "It's EASY!" This is a unique

characterization of Ike, visiting Turkey, a country of bewildering cultural assets.

2.11.1.4. Failures of Turkey Pertaining to the Utilization of US Economic Aid

Within a four-pages section, titled as “Note” with an *Izmir Trade Fair* heading, Duncan specifies the reason of his presence in Turkey in August 1954: in order to pay a highly desired visit to one of his friends in this country. After having seen the Turk’s combat record in the Korean War (“as though they had been US Marines”), and having been convinced that the Turkish soldiers were a valiant and worthwhile point of interest, Duncan welcomes his opportunity to return. Yet, this visit is a complete surprise for him, as Turkey was not the same as he had known. In his own descriptions he portrays the state of Turkey as, “morally sick,” “economically nearly paralyzed,” and “a rapidly weakening friend trapped in deep and extremely dangerous quicksand.” “To ignore her, or close [the] eyes to her condition, might easily bring disaster upon all countries of the West.”

He explains that back in 1947, before the implementation of the Truman Aid Program, the means of domestic production had been geared more towards agricultural endeavors than industrial in Turkey, where the sturdy peasants farmed their soils employing traditional methods, the vast sections of its economic activities being limited to the village bazaar. Also trade, both inter- and intra-national, had been limited to the sale of tobacco, some grains, ores, and hides. Within a couple years of the inauguration of the aid program, an “almost magical transformation amazed and delighted everyone...it seemed too good to be true,” a result of the implementations of new infrastructure such as modern factories, municipal improvements, road networks, airfields and harbor facilities, schools, and updated mining equipment. Yet, “it seems that it was too good, and perhaps, not quite true,” as Turkey is now in a stage of almost complete bankruptcy in the European Payments Union (EPU), which the country joined in 1950. While welcoming the influx of dollars coming through the Truman Aid Program, Turkish government officials had resented the requirement to impose a sort of import-export control over the economy by 1954. The General Bank of Turkey (Central Bank) had played the role of an agent for both Turkey and Turkish businessmen; all imports and exports had to be routed through this bank. In the country, imports of every description kept rising, while wheat turned out to be the only crop highly exported by 1952; thus, Turkey had spent all of its foreign exchange coming from the sale of

their sole substantial export. After having received Turkish Lira from the importer for the value of the desired product, the Central Bank had not paid the foreign manufacturers; rather it had used these liras for business loans of the Bank itself. "There simply was no foreign exchange in the central bank with which to pay Turkey's obligation to the EPU." Turkish lira, which had been deposited by the Turkish importers for payment of the desired import product to be brought in, had not been converted into foreign exchange to pay off the foreign exporter. Increase of lira in circulation has contributed to spiraling inflation since 1951. In late 1952, Turkey's shocking financial-trade difficulties had begun to become known among a limited number of government officials and Turkish and European businessmen. When the situation came to light openly by the end of 1953, Turkish trade with Britain, France and Germany was halted.

Now in 1954, "the Turkish government is issuing decrees prohibiting the use of Turkish importers liras [...] for ordinary lending and banking purposes...as though these funds had come into the banks as deposits." Yet, it is very late, as the country is in heavy debt to leading European nations by way of the EPU (owing an estimated \$150,000,000). By now, the US dollar is equal to 6 liras on the Istanbul black-market, which is almost the only place that foreign currency was obtainable in the crumbling economy; yet, Turkey has no foreign exchange (including Pounds Sterling, Deutschmarks, and French Francs) as well as no credit within the EPU. In order to stay within the Western market, Turkey and several European countries are attempting to sign bilateral deals. One of which is the Bonn Agreement signed with Germany (1954), through which Germany sets up a fund to pay off the Turkish debt to German exporters, "leaving the Turkish Government indebted to the Bonn Republic." Such a deal keeps Turkey in the world market, absolved of its debt to the EPU; but, it does not solve its problem, as nearly all exports and imports are at a standstill, and the newly constructed industrial complexes demand imported goods that are not yet manufactured in this country. Now the Russians appear on the trade horizon, "[...] the big unknown is whether the Communists can deliver the goods required by Turkey to support the economy built with Western funds, technology and guidance."

To Duncan, after President Bayar and Prime Minister Menderes returned back from the U.S. (1954), failing to bring "unlimited dollars gifted from the American government," the Turks begin to emphasize their record of having dealt with thirteen Russian invasions; yet they fail to address the amount of economic aid granted to Turkey by the U.S. Except for the efforts showed by Turkey and America, the Turks are now disdainful of the Korean efforts paid by all other

nations. They stress the size of their army and ask, other than Turkey, who else has such an army in Europe, ready to fight “for the American fight for freedom?” The Turks have always been proud of their fighting traditions; but, this patriotic mannerism is more of a commercial now, rather than being a matter of pride. “The bulk of the Turks who are aware of their nation’s economic plight actually contribute to the situation [...], for underlying the whole problem is the recently-developed Turkish conviction that they are so important to the West that, sooner or later, we will bail them out of their financial and trade difficulties.”

2.11.1.5. Russian Venture into Turkish Trade, Challenging the U.S. Hold on Turkey

Written in more of an essay format rather than in caption layout, the *Izmir Trade Fair*, to considerable extent, exposes first several days of Turkey’s leading international trade fair, opened on August 20, 1954, lasting for one month every year, at Izmir (Smyrna), a harbor city in Western Anatolia. Yet, in a larger more implicative context, this is the story of “Turkey, the main defense anchor upon which much of American policy in the Middle East is built, is being forced into Communist relationships, and into the Communist economic sphere, even though much against her will...and unbeknown to most Turks, and Westerners.”

Duncan’s combined image word portrayals regarding Russian efforts on Turkish commerce can be classified into three groups. The first being the illustrations of the Izmir Trade Fair; the smallest portion of the images reflects a series of festival activities and carnivals, which are conducted upon the open section of the fair ground, and attract popular interests, without age, gender, and socio-economic separation. While the greatest portion of the pictures displays the pavilions of each attendant country on the trade fair, where their import and export products are exhibited (e.g., Hungarian, Polish, Spanish, Greek, Belgian, British, French, German, and Russian). The photojournalist reports that the Russian pavilion (rented for one year), adjunct to the carnival grounds, can be seen from every angle with a great Russian steeple and Red Star, second in size only to the German pavilion (rented for eight years); yet because of its high quality design and the presented products, Russia’s pavilion attracted tremendous numbers within the low-income peasant class of Turkey, along with many Turkish businessmen.

Falling into the second group are the depictive works, exhibiting the U.S. submarines (battle units of the 6th Fleet), which were tied up for five days at the Izmir waterfront. While

emphasizing that the U.S. battle units had come into the port before participating in a training operation, called “Keystone,” that would be conducted at Turkish cost, Duncan writes the following: “it was a sad oversight (or worse, if international) that made the U.S. State Department and Navy Department order these warships into Izmir during the Trade Fair...when all that the Russians had on display was an enormous building loaded with evidences of the good life in Russia... food, grains, tools and trucks, farm implements, textiles, furs and huge photo-murals of even greater production (all peaceful)—and not a sign of a man in uniform, nor any display of pictures of Lenin or Stalin or Malenkov, or any leader.”

The third group of image-word narrations exposes a cocktail party given at the U.S. Consulate for the officers of the U.S. taskforce in order to have them meet with Turkish officers. Duncan evinces that “Almost to the man the American servicemen agreed that it was a most unfortunate time for such a visit—but high policymakers, in Washington, had either overlooked the Fair, or believed that such a visit at this time might be just the right thing to keep the Turks impressed with US good intentions and strength.” Yet, not the US submarines, but the show in Russia pavilion impresses Izmir and much of the rest of Turkey, as the Russians sent by the Kremlin sold “a good impression of the USSR” and mirrored “a richly laden peacetime world.” Now, the subject of conversation and divergence in Turkey is the contrast of these two visits made by the U.S. and the USSR, “most of it loaded with questions harmful to the United States.”

By stating, “American policy is again many jumps behind that of the Communists, at least re selling herself in the Middle East,” the photojournalist explains his point of emphasis as follows: the U.S. has no pavilion at the Izmir Fair to exhibit the wealth of American industrial and agricultural production. This absence stems from the facts that there is no agency setup in the U.S. State Department to exhibit American produce; there is no funding ascribed by the American Chamber of Commerce to attend such a show; and American manufacturers were poorly informed that it would be a fair displaying local agents. The result of such a non-attendance is a gap that is then filled by the Iron Curtain countries. Had average American manufacturers and farmers known “what a battle there is for foreign markets, and that more than just foreign sales is involved,” they would contribute their stock items to the fair, and if their displays are sold, the Congress might consider to be billed for setting up pavilions and to pay the cost of the exhibition at such fairs. “The final benefits for the US could be enormous.”

Finally, Duncan verifies that some U.S. experts still believe that the Turk’s long-

established mistrust and dislike towards the Russians will be maintained; whereas, others read the signs of a storm, as the Turks are in an economic corner with the Western world. To him, the timetable of a crisis is not overt, from the explained events, yet the individual elements of a crisis can be seen and understood for what it is. “To know and recognize the elements of the force required to prevent such a crisis is more difficult—yet Turkey’s friends in the Western world had better attempt it soon...while there still remain time, and, probably, several courses of action.”

2.12. Analysis of Duncan’s Pictorial Stories on Turkey

Emerging through four different stories that were composed for *Life* in Turkey (1947, 1948, 1952, and 1954), Duncan’s artistic and journalistic contributions on the topics related to inter- and intra-national politics of Turkey are telling of the country’s ascribed position in the Middle East and its place within the international system between WWI and post-WWII era. The early portion of the latter time frame marks Russian demands on the Turkish Straits and on the Eastern Anatolian territories, which triggered events changing the course of Turkish political history, and was also accompanied with the polarization of the U.S. and USSR that took its own course. Simultaneously, a collection of the visual narrations emerged from these stories, corresponds perfectly with the history of Turkish territory, situated between Europe and Asia, the strategic geopolitical position that became a crucial intersection for ranges of civilizations throughout antiquity into modern times.

2.12.1. Prospects of the Turkish Straits, 1947

As assigned by *Life* in February 1947, Duncan composed his *Turkish Strait Essay*, including no accompanying captions but scenic photos of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, as well as the surrounding mainland, to expose Russian demands for shared control of the Turkish Straits, forming a crucial international waterway. Yet, the selection of visual subjects shows that without using his pen, by using pictures as a means of communication, the photojournalist enhances the content, as he provides the conception of the strategic importance of the straits, which dominated its history since antiquity, considering the relation of Occident and Orient.

This is exemplified in presenting the Dardanelles in an assortment of images, which cover not only ancient Troy on the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles, but also the tomb of Gazi Suleiman on the Gallipoli Peninsula, all the while demonstrating the passage's narrowness. The display of the Hellenic city, Troy, juxtaposes ancient with present, as it emerges as reminiscent of the ten years war (Trojan War) that symbolizes a historical penetration of the West towards Asia Minor, which in the later periods played host to Alexander the Great, who defeated the Persians in this same region, as his army crossed the Dardanelles heading towards the Middle East. Whereas, the image of Gazi Suleiman's tomb resonates the history of the Ottoman Empire's penetration towards the West, as in 1353 Gazi Suleiman, in light of the weakness of the crumbling Byzantine Empire, crossed the Dardanelles and invaded the Gallipoli Peninsula, the first captured European territory by this eastern empire that meant to serve as a foothold to expand far into the West in the coming centuries. Duncan transferred his knowledge of the subject matter, exposed the territory, and gathered together not only the continents but also the rival civilizations, whose people together have taken part in history and made this region a veritable confluence of West and East. This promotes the notion that, without understanding the geopolitical position of the straits, in a historical perspective, the contemporary crisis brought about through the Russian ambition on the Turkish Straits cannot be straightforwardly elucidated or comprehended.

This idea is epitomized in presenting an image displaying the Bosphorus on a snowy day, which is accompanied in Duncan's book, *The World of Allah*, with a short title, "The Bosphorus Straits: Crossroad of Conquerors—Muslim and Christian" (135). This headline comes into view as a metaphoric definition of the city, Istanbul, along the Bosphorus, whose identity has been forged and has constantly evolved within a mix of Christian and Muslim ideals. This is a nostalgic look at Istanbul, formerly Constantinople, where the products of imperial rivalry blended with the religious identity of the West and East altering the history of the city, riddled with a history of subjugation. Constantinople had been established (AD 330) by Constantine, the first Roman Emperor converted to Christianity, and had served as the capital of the Eastern Roman Empire up until 1453, when the Ottoman Empire captured it and it became their capital respectively until its fall in 1922. Thus, Duncan exposes the region's propensity towards being a melting pot for Eastern and Western civilizations controlling this strategic venue, at which Europe and Asia met, and where influxes of diverse and distinctive populations took place.

While displaying the venue of perfect intersection, naturally having attracted the imperial powers of land and sea long since, the photographer also aims to cover the strategic role of the Turkish Straits within the context of the international system of the modern era. A vision can be given through an image of the Dardanelles, covering at a far distance a British memorial, one of the many war memorials constructed in Gallipoli. This image of Britain's memorial serves not only as representative of the Gallipoli Campaign pursued jointly by Britain and France against the Ottoman Empire during WWI, but also as an indicator of the Battle of Gallipoli that was the war of the defense of the motherland for the Turks resulting in Turkish victory (1915-1916). In consideration of the objective of the campaign, "force open the Dardanelles and capture Istanbul, thereby cutting the Ottomans off from Germany and opening Russia to Entente supply lines through the Black Sea" (152), written by William L. Cleveland in *A History of the Modern Middle East*, Duncan's use of the British memorial assists us to conceptualize the extent of importance such a narrow strait played within the procession of conflict occurring within the context of the imperial and colonial aspirations of the Triple Entente (Britain, France, and Russia) towards the Ottoman Empire. It was when the long decline of the Ottomans prompted the deeply intensified 'Eastern Question' and brought the empire to the attention of the Great Powers; each one of which now took sides within the war of capability to gain the lion's share of the Ottoman territories situated in the Balkans, and elsewhere.

Working in tandem with the display of Britain's memorial is a sequence of visual subjects covered in a photograph, exhibiting the Turkish army officers serving the commander of the Gallipoli Line, Lieutenant General Feyzi Menguch, conducting a meeting in a hall, where on the wall a portrait was hung of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. This photograph is of the defenders of the Dardanelles. Ataturk, the commander of Gallipoli secured the line during the Battle of Gallipoli, which laid the foundation for the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923). In combination with Ataturk, the man in the picture as well as the founder of the Republic of Turkey, are the names of the aforementioned army officers, who were on active duty in 1947, when the Russian ambitions on the Turkish Straits deepened the diplomatic crisis between the two countries. The juxtapositions of these visual subjects are redolent of the Republic of Turkey, where the straits have always been a major concern as they have always been synonymous with national security, defense, independence, and identity, resulting from the political rivalries of outside powers, demanding easy access to either the Mediterranean or the Black Sea through this

great, strategic passage. Yet, in a larger context, this juxtaposition exposes the existence of deep-seated imperial configurations and their impacts on the questions eternally surrounding the straits since the early twentieth century.

It can be asserted that the collection of images, produced by Duncan in 1947, serves as a contribution. They in reference to passing history flawlessly touch upon a unique characterization of the Turkish Straits, being a molding force in rival civilizations of the West and the East, since antiquity, becoming an increasing concern for European powers, particularly for Britain, the time honored ally of Russia, in the early twentieth century. This contribution allows us to better conceptualize the journalist's representative works in regards to the pivotal role that Russia played in relevance to the straits question, manifested through the Soviet expansionist policy taking place immediately after WWII.

2.12.2. Present Tensions—Old Enmities: Russian Demands on the Turkish Straits and on the Eastern Anatolian Territories, 1947 and 1948

Duncan's *Turkish Essay*, like the *Turkish Straits Essay*, encircles the images with no text, shot in fall and winter 1948 through an assignment aimed at exposing Turkey under the Marshall Aid Plan. Coming out of these two stories, a collection of photographs displaying both the straits and eastern frontiers of Turkey with Soviet Russia provides the concept of Turkey's geopolitical position in the Balkan, Black Sea, and Mediterranean regions, and in the Middle East; its strategic importance within the globe; and its relation with Russia—Turkey's immediate neighbor to the north by the Black Sea, and on the northeast by the Caucasus. More significantly, aided with Duncan's journalistic accounts placed in his books, these pictures emerge as indicators of the present tensions within old enmities, stemming from the Soviets.

Duncan's assertion of Soviet ambition to gain control on the Turkish Straits as a "historic dream of Russians for five hundred years" (*Photo*, 147) resonates with what is stated by Martin E. Goldstein, in *American Policy toward Laos*: "For centuries Russia has sought to control the Dardanelles, [as it] would give Russia a warm water port and unrestricted access to the Mediterranean Sea, traditional objectives of Russian policy from the times of the Tsars" (32). The critical position of the straits within Russian foreign policy becomes more noticeable once the photographs of the Bosphorus and those of the Dardanelles are examined while considering

geography and history. Placed side by side, these images assist us to envision the passage of water and its inferred importance—the sole outlet for Russia to exit via the Black Sea towards the Mediterranean—over which Russia gained commercial access in 1774; yet, “the straits remained closed to non-Turkish warships,” which was based upon the “ancient rule” of the Ottoman Empire, and that, until the end of WWI, continued to be “the law” (58), as written by Yücel Güçlü in “The Uneasy Relationship: Turkey’s Foreign Policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union at the Outbreak of the Second World War.” Despite this the Lausanne Straits Convention (1922) altered this rule, as it demilitarized the straits, guaranteeing their international usage for commercial purposes, and allowing outside powers limited military access to the Black Sea. Once the Montreux Straits Convention (1936) reestablished Turkish sovereignty over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles on the eve of WWII, leaving Russia insecure about those southern borders, as Turkey obtained the right to “rearm the zone,” “close the straits in time of war or of an imminent threat of war,” and “allow or impede passage according to its interests.” For the Soviet Union, thus, “the problem of security in the Black Sea remained tied to its political relations with Turkey and with Turkey’s relations with Russia’s long-time rivals” (Güçlü, 63). This history provides an extensive backdrop for Duncan’s above mentioned assertion, while also remaining supportive to his additional account, “Aegean—Dardanelles—Marmara—Bosphorus—Black Sea...the all weather channel, ever-nagging dream of each ruler of every Kremlin dynasty” (*The World*, 270).

In unison with the post-WWII ambiance, Duncan’s testimonial appears in *Yankee Nomad*. Wherein the image of a ‘mine net,’ which was used as a representative last barrier to the Black Sea on the Bosphorus, emerges as symbolic iconography, as it is associated with *mines* that have flowed into the waters of the Black Sea since WWII: “After daylight, [Turkish] lookouts stand on every prow [to] watch for those monsters (mines) lost during wartime, which too often still lurk below” (135), corresponding with the statement, “Nothing moves as night sifts down upon the winter world where Europe and Asia nearly join—nothing but glacial water and Russians mines, which flow from the Black Sea and Stalin’s darkness beyond” (235). These descriptions not only promote conceptualization from the outset of the contemporary straits crisis, as it originated in the course of WWII, but they also well characterize the ‘paramilitary piece of mind,’ expansionist policies emerging from Stalin’s Russia, begetting intensified friction with Turkey.

As seen thus far, the associated chapters of the books lack the background information necessary for fully understanding the straits' crisis; yet, the written themes enable the researchers of Duncan's body of work to affiliate them with historical literature, which develops an insight regarding his conceptualization in the presented events. *Sowing crisis: the Cold War and American dominance in the Middle East* by Rashid Khalidi and "The Straits Question at the Potsdam Conference: The British Position" by A. L. MacFie prove as advantageous aids in comprehending the extent and dimensions of the matter, how the Russian challenge for the straits had been shaped during WWII, and intensified immediately after. Cordial relations that had been maintained during the interwar period between Turkey and Russia were now deteriorating under the stresses of WWII, for two main reasons: The first being the Soviets' attempting to obtain revisions from Turkey in its favor to use the straits during time of war failed, and the second, Turkey maintained its neutrality for almost the entirety of the duration of WWII keeping the straits closed to shipment of war supplies to the USSR (*Sowing*, 62-3). As Stalin was seeking a revision of the Convention of Montreux, the Russians raised the question of the straits both at the Conference of Tehran (1943) and at the Conference of Yalta (1945). In reference to the latter, both the U.S. and Britain approved Russia to prepare a proposal on its request of revision of Montreux agreement; however, the proposal went beyond the expectancy of a revision with the expiration of the 1925 Russo-Turkish Non-Aggression Agreement. The Soviets declared that the new pact would be considered only if Turkey agreed upon allowing the establishment of Russian military bases along the straits, and upon the contingency of Turkey's forfeiture of the border provinces of Kars and Ardahan to Russia, which had been conceded inversely through the Russo-Turkish Treaty in 1921 (MacFie, 75).

Standing in connection with the aforementioned scholarly inputs, Duncan's representations of the contemporary straits crisis work in tandem with those exhibiting the Turkish-Russian border, evincing the sturdy connection between Soviet demand on the Turkish Straits in the west and that on the Turkish territories in the east. Certainly, the former demand signifies the international relations among Turkey, Russia, and other powers; yet, the latter is suggestive of a direct Turkish-Russian relation, of palpable diplomatic and military means. A potential military incursion is well characterized by the journalist through the use of "the carpet of death" (*Yankee*, 235), referring to the eastern border, where the Russian soldiers patrolling with dogs shot anyone stepping upon their lands. While exhibiting this jeopardy, the term allows

the reader to be exposed to the measures of Russian pressure exacted on the frontier districts of Turkey that were allegedly poised to be enveloped in a warfare, just like in the west, where the mines originating in the Black Sea were moving to envelope the straits in explosion.

One can find that an image of the Turkish cavalrymen riding out into blizzards and maneuvering from their posts in Erzurum province, in close proximity to both Kars and Ardahan, is a suggestive representation of the military relations between Turkey and Russia taking place in 1948. Yet, in conjunction with Duncan's reminiscence of the region, along where a staggering number of invasions coming from the Russian Empire were endured through the course of history (*Photo*, 147), and with information delivered as "Russians—1877; Russians—1878 (Kars ceded to Moscow [...]); 1918—Kars returned to Turkey [...]" (*The World*, 270), this picture alters in context, as it turns into an illustration of a sequence of events played out shaping the history of this region between 1877 and 1918. The former date marks the outbreak of Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, fought in far reaching areas including the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire (e.g., Erzurum, Kars, Ardahan), and resulted in the Russian occupation of Kars and Ardahan (Cleveland, 87-89). While referencing these areas of frontier, as they have been the subject of quarrel between the Russians and Turks, Duncan authenticates that, even if the current claim for the frontier provinces was successful through the straits crisis, it was an old antagonism that had brought about the imperial impulse of the Russian Empire, which, by capturing Kars and Ardahan in the Russo-Turkish War, forced Erzurum into becoming a vital frontier of the Ottomans. Erzurum was where Duncan captured the aforesaid Turkish cavalrymen accompanying their Brigadier Avni Mizrak, a specific emphasis, as he has long since been referred to as 'Black Avni' by the Russians, "because of the ferocity of his cavalry charges in the First World War" (*Photo*, 147). This is a representation of the contemporary Russian ambition, stemming from an old enmity, redolent of the Caucasus Campaign of 1914-1918, part of the campaigns executed by the allied powers within the Middle Eastern theatre of WWI, from where Black Avni gained his reputation among the Russians because of the seemingly fearless role he had played in the defensive struggle within the eastern frontier territory, Erzurum.

It can be asserted that Duncan's journalism recollecting the passing history well instructs the reader, as it provides as many details as seemingly possible through its compendious words accompanying a single image. This is firmly grasped in a title block, "Two Thousand Cavalrymen Disappear into a blizzard then Forever" (*The World*, 139) appearing alongside the

image of Avni Mizrak's cavalry columns. This headline is suggestive of 'Sarikamis disaster,' which occurred in the Battle of Sarikamis (December 1914-January 1915). It took place in the early throws of the Caucasus Campaign—the disastrous event, onto which scholarly attention has often turned, was “an impetuous drive east by Enver Pasha December 1914 to block the Russians advancing from the Caucasus [...which] led to the annihilation during a battle through the mountains of a Turkish army of nearly 100,000 men, most of whom froze to death in Sarikamis east of Erzurum [...]" (34), written by Nicole and Hugh Pope in *Turkey Unveiled: A History of Modern Turkey*. In combination with this historical framework, Duncan's sentiment regarding each storm, and that it reassured Turkish cavalymen of an ally long considered vital to the country's defense on this Eastern Anatolia region (*Yankee*, 269), suggests a lesson well learned by Turkish army officials, who would never again repeat the mistake of Enver Pasha, but rather put these regions extreme weather conditions to good use as an instrument of defense.

The above assertion regarding Duncan's journalism is also understood through a brief portrayal of a group of local people, covered in a photograph shot in 1948, exhibiting them traveling by means of an oxcart through a snowy valley in the vicinity of Kars, while upon the road (American supplied) army tanks driven by the Turkish soldiers heading in the other direction: “There was the child, wrapped in swaddling clothes, and his mother in a veil of blue [...]. There was his father, afoot, leading cattle [...]. There were his father's friends, helping them in their flight” (*Yankee*, 272). Although this depiction bears in mind the subjects' ages and their current actions, it neither explains the meaning of the term ‘flight’ used in this context, nor does it imply where the journey was to be taking place, and furthermore, its destination. Yet, together with the following personification, this image forms a series intertwined allegorical representations, fulfilling Duncan's aims of generating a time warp throughout the vast Middle Eastern territories: “And upon the road itself, there were steel-chested soldiers who in another time would have been centurions searching for one Child, whose family was seeking refuge beyond the night” (*Yankee*, 272). While the context of exile and that of violence in this commentary bridges the gap of centuries, Duncan's image appears evocative of a great number of ‘migrations,’ ‘exiles,’ and ‘relocations,’ experienced by *Muslim* and *non-Muslim millet* (namely the Turks, Kurds, and Armenians) either through force or in attempts to retreat, and in need, when the Eastern Anatolian territories were engaged in WWI through the Caucasus Campaign. It is a reminiscence of the progression of the war, when Russian invasion in the

region prompted Armenian revolts that went along with extensive murder of Muslims civilians and with their fleeing westwards, many were either starved or killed by disease during their forced march (4) as stated by Justin McCarthy in “Forced Migration and Mortality in the Ottoman Empire-An Annotated Map.” It was also when the Ottoman’s relocation policy was put into effect, and a substantial proportion of Armenians remained in the territory were murdered by the other civilians, or fled with the same consequences. As many as 40,000 Armenians out of 200,000 perished while fleeing behind the retreating Russian forces into the Caucasus when the Ottoman forces pushed the Russo-Armenian army back (315-6), as indicated in *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey* by Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw. Thus, Duncan’s image of a handful of local people headed down the road near the border with Russia, together with his account on the aforesaid similarity between the soldiers and centurions, while exposing religious-ethnic carnage and exodus, fell into cadence with the cyclical falling and rising of empires. So that we envisage a sequence of slaughters and mass population movements, Armenians and Turks alike as a mixed result of ethnic-nationalistic demands and Russian imperial impulse towards Eastern Anatolia in the course of WWI, riddled with the interactive parameters of the imperial politics of that time.

Lastly, the following data record, in conjunction with an image of Turkish infantrymen patrolling the frontier in Kars in 1948, details the Turkish-Russian relations reaching back in history: “1918-Kars returned to Turkey under Treaty of Brest-Litovich [Litovsk], at the end of the First World War” (*The World*, 270). This not only serves as an implication of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 that had changed the course of the Caucasus Campaign, as it resulted in the exit of the Russian Empire from WWI and brought about the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Kars and Ardahan (Pope, 34), but it also shows us Duncan’s attempt at bringing the reader up to date: conquered in 1878, ceded to Turkey in 1921, the areas of the eastern frontiers turned back to their original status of the pre-Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78. Thereupon, the image of the Turkish infantrymen guarding the Kars border demonstrates the Russian revitalization of the historic rivalry, which again placed the region into the focus of the Soviets, as a by-product of their aggression towards the Turkish Straits.

In conjunction with the content underscored earlier through the pictures recollecting the Gallipoli Campaign of the British allied forces, Duncan’s representations of the Soviet aggression on Turkey in his books prove insightful of the notion that—just as it had happened in

WWI, the straits played a critical role in shaping the course of events during and after WWII. This conjunction also assists one to conceptualize Turkey in the first half of the twentieth century, which was consistently, either directly or indirectly, engaged in a world war, a result of lingering between the two orbits of the penetrative Great Powers, Britain and Russia. While transforming historical knowledge, the journalist deeply renders the Russian behavior as a revival of an old enmity, exacted through an expansionist policy; the mixed results of Western imperialism, colonialism, nostalgia, and the long since established political culture. Yet, the crux of his story, coming out of the *Turkish essay*, is placed both in the Russian policy playing distinctive and essential roles in Turkish foreign policy, and in the ideological and political measures of the crisis occurring between Turkey and Russia intently transpired, altering the course of history, bringing about involvement of the U.S. To what extent Duncan represents these topics are the subject of the analysis below.

2.12.3. The Context of Marshall Aid and Russian Expansionist Policy towards Turkey, 1948

Duncan's pessimistic review of the diplomatic crisis exacerbated between Turkey and Russia appears to have shifted radically, as he places an emphasis on the positive impacts the Marshall Aid had on the Turkish military, as if it were bearing hope for Turkey to deal with any military incursion, if the country had to be entrenched in a state of war in close proximity with Russia. This is apparent in *Yankee Nomad*, in presenting the Avni Mizrak's cavalry columns, which, to Duncan, "appeared to be headed towards the pages of history [in 1948]" (269), because of the weapons of a modern army coming into Turkey through American aid. This is the illustration of the Turkish army that, in accordance with the journalist's portrayals, had an aptitude to mix its deep-rooted time-honored war skills with the modern army outfits provided by the U.S.; so that Black Avni's cavalymen would be ready again to defend the eastern provinces in case of any need, just as they had done during the Caucasus Campaign. Likewise, the photograph exhibiting a group of local people traveling by an oxcart, and upon where a sequence of American supplied army tanks driven by Turkish soldiers well embodies the 'change in tune' that Duncan displays in his discourse. Providing a glimpse into a series of far back historical events as exemplified earlier, these visual narrations eternalize the moment marking Turkish-

American joint venture, displayed as an outcome of Russian expansionist behavior.

Coupled with the context of the Marshall Plan, the juxtapositions in the media discourse placed in both *Yankee Nomad* and *Photo Nomad* well typify the shift of Turkish foreign policy subsequent to the end of WWII that made Turkey a potential postwar partner of the U.S. This is seen in presenting Ismet Inonu, the President of Turkey, who refused to join WWII, when Churchill and Roosevelt asked him to declare a war against Germany, or to send Turkish troops to the eastern front; yet, he now worked in tandem with Harry Truman, as “he was sure the Red Army would have soon moved, as in the Balkans now, to occupy both the Dardanelles and Bosphorus” (*Yankee*, 269). Corresponding with this, “President Truman probably wrecked plans of the Soviet Union to dominate all of Europe, when he launched the Marshall Aid Plan for Turkey and Greece. It surely gave all other war ravaged lands cause for hope, too” (*Photo*, 147). Despite missing particulars regarding the political transition of Turkey, the progressions of the country are owed to the U.S. containment policy; these assertions of Duncan are intensive and explanatory, corresponding with associated literature within the Cold War context.

Once attempting to reassess that history through Pope’s articulations, it comes into view that after the Soviets request for establishing their military bases within the Turkish Straits and asking that the border provinces of Kars and Ardahan be conceded, Turkey tried to attract the attention of both Britain and the U.S. towards a threat exerted from Moscow. At the Potsdam meeting (July-August 1945), though Churchill still felt sympathy for Russia, both the British and the Americans were gradually becoming suspicious of the Russian request, and began questioning how the Soviets would in the future utilize the power that they had gained in the war. The diplomatic circles within the allied powers came to the conclusion by the end of 1945 that the Soviets presumably would attempt to turn Turkey into one of their satellites, as they had achieved over the other Balkan countries (Pope, 81). The Soviet invasion of Iranian Azerbaijan in March 1946 became an alarm bell for the Anglo-American configuration fearing that Soviet imperialism might grasp its own southern territory in addition to the Balkans. This, followed by Britain’s declaration of its incapability in early 1947 to provide further economic and military assistance to the nationalist Greek government, fighting with the communist guerillas, marked the point in time when power changed hands, as the U.S. took over duty from the British, and began policing the region through swift policy change. In August 1946, a US memorandum admitted that if Moscow had attained its goal of controlling Turkey, it would be difficult to

prevent Russia from exacting control of the Near and Middle East. American administration developed the 'Truman Doctrine' (March 1947) to support financial and military aid to the countries resisting subjugation stemming from either outside forces, like Turkey, or armed minorities like Greece. "The [new U.S.] policy was to affect more than just Turkey: what was to be known as the Cold War, the latent conflict that dominated the world for more than four decades, had just started" (Pope, 82).

The confluences in the contextual information, appearing between these scholarly accounts and Duncan's exemplified assertions addressing the flourishing postwar alliance between Turkey and the U.S., work together with the contents displayed through the photographic narrations of Turkey's frontiers with both Bulgaria and Greece. While epitomizing the Soviet expansionist policy that worked as a domino effect exacerbating a sequence of crises, these photographs also expose the tense relations between Turkey and its so-called neighbors. The disparity on the degrees of anxious relations is greatly revealed by the photojournalist; for example, a snapshot of the border with already communized Bulgaria demonstrates the Turkish troops guarding the area employing trenches. Whereas, the picture of the frontier with Greece exhibits a visit made by two Greek Guards to the Turkish officers: while having tea and cookies together with their visitors, Turkish officers were receiving information from their visitors regarding the waging of the continuing conflict launched between the communist guerillas and the nationalist Greek army, both were striving to gain clear political control in Greece. While echoing well established anti-communist sentiments in Turkey, Duncan's point of focus, in reference to the latter image, is apparently what keeps the Turks on alert—an apprehension: what if the strain that engaged Greece in a civil war impacted or even spread to Turkey. All in all, the photocompositions of the northeastern edge of Turkey bordering with both Bulgaria and Greece appear as testimonial records. Just like those of the frontier provinces with Russia, these are inherited from a time frame, marking the birth of the Iron Curtain countries, which corresponded with the U.S. aiming to fill the vacuum left by the fleeing British over the region, where Turkey, like Greece, was now given and receiving Marshall Aid, as further implementation of the Truman Doctrine. In light of this outline, Duncan presents Turkey, becoming a regional player within the outset of the superpowers' polarization, to serve as a kind of blockade to communist influence coming through the Soviets, as he also exposes a promoted ideology that can be explained through "If Greece fell under the control of an armed minority, the effect on Turkey

would be immediate and serious [...]” (110), written by Theodora Kalaitzaki in “US Mediation in Greek-Turkish Disputes since 1954.”

A researcher of Duncan’s body of works well understands what complicated the above underlined patterns of political-ideological-military connections surrounding the area from the Caucasus to Balkans, the Turkish Straits. Accompanied by what is stated (above) regarding economically and militarily weak Turkey, frightened from a prospective Soviet occupation on the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, and also regarding President Truman’s intention of wrecking the Soviet Plan to dominate Europe, the journalist displays the foundation of concurrence between Turkey and the U.S.: reciprocal desires and provisions overcoming the divergence in each party’s contextualization of the Soviet expansion policy. This is an implicative display of the significant role the strategic vitalities had in the forming of foreign policies and alliance affairs.

Presenting the implementations of the U.S. foreign policy, the context of the Marshall Aid Plan assists us to perceive the early containment policy of the U.S., brought about through the Truman Doctrine, which was formulated upon the notion that without U.S. intervention, Turkey (and Greece) and then the entirety of Europe would fall into the sphere of communist influence. Despite the great contributions on media discourse, this contextual information flows as impartial, as Duncan excludes addressing a significant phenomenon. Even though the Soviets had put pressure on Turkey, there was no actual military incursion; yet, Turkey was given aid in great measures. It was because of a long-term strategic war planning against the possibility of a Soviet offensive, which might surround the Mediterranean as well as the oil rich territories—“because of Turkey’s potential utility in waging war, protecting air bases, and safeguarding Middle Eastern oil resources” (824), written by Melvyn P. Leffler in “Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952.” The absence of such information prevents one from understanding the whole process of the alliance system in this context. It was initiated from Turkey (and Greece), and spread to the Middle East through the further formulation of a set of alliances knit with several Middle Eastern states, marking a power change not only in the Balkans but also in the Middle East (Cleveland, 277). The shortcomings in the media discourse can be justified as if Duncan intends to write his books in the form of photo-autobiography; his focus is to display the matters in time frames encompassing 1947-1948. Yet, it would have been telling if he touched upon how the covered issues referenced in his presence in Turkey turned out to be a backdrop provided for the future political arena in the

Middle East. These missing outlines would greatly fit in his books, written well after his production of the photographs, which would have brought about a certain artistic flare as well as a better conceptualization, just as his recollection of the passing history does.

Despite the understated flow in the above underscored contextual outlines, Duncan's accounts well evoke the 'ultimate' finalization in the loss of Turkey's self-established isolation from any sort of severe western alliance scheme taking shape in the course of WWII. The matter of self-isolation refers to the long since established policy of *statism* formulated through the ultimate goal of Turkish political and economic independency. Thus, the journalism places us as witnesses of a moment, when the statist economic and political structure of the Republic of Turkey was eventually defeated, exhibiting the origins of the enduring postwar alliance between Turkey and the U.S., which laid the foundation for Turkey's involvement within the Western world, and resulted in its induction as a member of NATO.

2.12.4. A Snapshot of Turkey; a Member of NATO, 1952

The images, combined with word representations, taken from *Eisenhower the tourist and politico-general*, reveal a short but crucial visit that General Eisenhower (Ike) made to the most recent member countries of NATO, Turkey and Greece, in March 1952—the visit, encompassed both diplomatic and military objectives, as well as touristic pursuits. In conjunction with Duncan's early photojournalism covering Turkey within the context of the Marshall Aid Plan, this story promotes the notion that the U.S. policy of containment eventually took its shape in the form of NATO (1949), a collective military defense system of the democratic Western world against communist influence of the USSR, into which Turkey eventually became a full member (February 1952). While also suggesting the foreign policy objectives of Turkey and the U.S. as being set in motion during the progression of Soviet's pressure on Turkey and when Russia and the U.S. were deadlocked in cold war, this story is best reflective of the triumph the initiatives employed by both Turkey and the U.S. had on Turkey's integration into the West.

This matter of integration is understood in presenting General Eisenhower, Commander of NATO, visiting to the Armoured Units Training School, where he spends a great amount of time while being shown the work of the soldier-students handling weapons or machinery. Serving as a representation of the mission accomplished, marking the constructive impacts U.S.

aid had on the modernized and fortified Turkish military, this illustration of Eisenhower works well with Duncan's sentiment, "Ike seemed profoundly impressed by the Turks, their devotion to fighting the problems of the future... and their ignoring any reference to their historic past, filled as it was with great fighting men." This commentary, in the company of a display of Major General Tahsin Yazici, the school's commander who is depicted as the Turks' ranking commander in Korea, is redolent of Turkey. The country, on the Soviet border, became a member of NATO, with its strong, modernized, and fortified combat ready army—and it was that army that displayed its strength in the Korean War.

Duncan's specific emphasis on the Korean War in this context is lacking. This epigrammatic style of reportage is a result of the propensity of this field study, which is to compose an exclusive coverage on Eisenhower's visit to Turkey, synchronized with this country's admission to NATO. Attempting to fill this gap through the historical recounts of Behçet K. Yesilbursa, the writer of "Turkey's Participation in the Middle East Command and Its Admission to NATO, 1950-52," an external outlook to understand Duncan's conceptualization in the presented topic is brought to light: in light of the war in Korea, the U.S. considered that the worldwide struggles between the West and East had just started and would most likely spread throughout the Middle East. This was decided in measuring that Britain's ability to protect the Middle East against possible Soviet aggression would end in failure, thus a need arose for a wider collective defense system in the Middle East. During a sequence of Anglo-American defense talks, divergence on the strategic preoccupations emerged; unlike Britain, the U.S. was determined on configuring a Middle East defense scheme encompassing Turkey (72-4). This coincided with Turkey's persistence in its desire to be admitted to NATO; bearing hope that Turkey's case would be more seriously considered this time in NATO, the newly elected President Adnan Menderes announced his decision to send Turkish troops to Korea. While receiving another rejection for its renewed application, Turkey (like Greece) was accepted into NATO as an 'associate member,' and under pressure from the U.S., Anglo-American defense talks were concluded in favor of Turkey's full admission to NATO (75-82).

In light of this contextual framework, Duncan's display of the Korean War serves as implicative of "Turkey's determination to be accepted [to NATO], combined with the bravery of Turkish troops in Korea [...], finally bore fruit" (Pope, 89). Signifying constituents of the strategic urgencies that played integral parts in Turkey's entry into NATO, this display also

works in tandem with a sequence of image portrayals of the Prime Minister of Turkey, Adnan Menderes, whose earnest initiatives also played an additional part, setting this result in a motion. Exhibiting Menderes conducting meetings with Eisenhower are these images, forming metaphoric representations as the crux of this story, and telling of Turkey: having turned from an assisted and aided country to a formal ally in the U.S., the country further secured its position within the Western security system, while it became a foothold to NATO for the Middle East.

No less crucial a facet of this story is the unique characterization of Eisenhower, pursuing his diplomatic-military campaign in Turkey, while at the same time presenting himself as a proper tourist in this country. This can be understood in displaying either Eisenhower's visit to Ankara's Hittite Museum, where an extensive collection of the Hittite's artifacts are exhibited, or to the Hagia Sophia, which had been an Eastern Orthodox Church, later become a mosque, and finally a museum, in Istanbul. This is also seen in exhibiting Eisenhower's attempts at taking pictures of the minarets of the Hagia Sophia with a stereo camera, for which the journalist writes, "[Ike] almost became fluorescent and was the happiest photographer I've ever seen;" he hollered, "It's EASY!" While exposing Eisenhower, the commander of NATO, a five star general, a candidate for the presidency in the U.S., and a distinct diplomat with a unique character leading a campaign in Turkey, Duncan's journalism is not only telling of the current dominant ideology of the West, codified through and oriented with a mix of principle ideas and practices representative of a society; but it is also implicative of a new feature of American diplomacy, bringing an optimistic uncertainty to U.S.-Turkish relations.

2.12.5. Parameters of the Turkish Economy, and Turkey in an International Trade System Driven by Economic Arrangements of the West and of the Communist Bloc, 1954

Composed in August 1954, the un-commissioned *Izmir Trade Fair* is Duncan's only image story portraying domestic economics in Turkey. Exposing Turkey's oldest and leading international trade fair held yearly, having attracted popular interest, without age, gender, and socio-economic class separation, boasting a series of festival activities and carnivals, the journalist makes 'Izmir Trade Fair' his subject of discourse. In this, he provides a story of testimony, presenting two folds of an imminent crisis that was to be at the heart of Turkey's situation: The first being, Turkey, transforming into another small country engaged in severe

financial difficulties. Secondly, economically paralyzed Turkey in order to make business moved from their 'old friend' towards their 'most ancient enemy,' the Soviets. What differentiates this story from the previous ones was the journalist objective of composing this coverage for *Life*, to draw attentions of the U.S. foreign policy makers towards Turkey, one of the cornerstones in American Middle East diplomatic and military policy.

In displaying pre- and post- 1947 in Turkey, the latter marks the outset of the Truman aid that brought about modernization and mechanization along with rapid developments in diverse areas ranging from agriculture to industry and public service, Duncan remarks at the magical transformation taking place in the country that amazed and delighted everyone as, "it seemed too good to be true." Yet, considering Turkish economy that between 1951 and 1954 was in a stage of complete bankruptcy in the European Payments Union (EPU), his optimistic considerations regarding Turkey's promising economic philosophy appear to have altered drastically, as he interprets such a transformation as, "it was too good, and perhaps, not quite true." Turkey's bankruptcy in the EPU is a significant theme explained well with the domino effect (e.g., misuse of investment, high import-less export activities, spiraling inflation, the trade deficiency, a lack of foreign exchange) brought about through both the failure of the government to control import and export trade mechanisms in the country as well as the mismanagement of capital by the Central Bank of Turkey, eventually manifesting as national debt, estimated at \$150,000,000, owed to the leading European nations through the EPU. In revealing the pattern of Turkey's bankruptcy, the journalist, in fact, presents a significant topic onto which scholarly attentions has frequently landed, that is the 'rapid growth policy' formulated by the Democrat Party (DP) government in 1950 based upon a liberal economic model. As outlined by Erik J. Zürcher, the author of *Turkey: A Modern History*, the policy drew its objective from "jump-start the economy" and to gain "a high level of growth," rather than to secure "long-term improvements" (236). This explains the speedy collapse of the economy both at home and abroad that Duncan portrays while aiming to justifying his aforementioned claim in regards to Turkey's promising economic philosophy, having nourished through foreign aid since 1947, yet transfiguring into an artifice since 1950.

Depicting the bankruptcy in the EPU as a grave problem for the government in 1954, the journalist shifts his focus to the government's endeavors towards solving the crisis. This is envisioned in presenting both the bilateral deals made with European countries with an aim to

keep the debt away from the EPU, and in issuing decrees over a considerable portion of economic activities, thus transforming the liberal economic policy into what is recalled by Roger Owen “more openly statist measures involving a reinforcement of bureaucratic control” (86) in *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East*. These were yet tardy and provisional solutions to Duncan, as Turkey’s idle investments and massive budget deficits would still be forcing factors that pushed the country to look for new import-export markets that would not consider their credit history as it had happened in Europe, and subsequently he exposes the current dilemma in the Turkish economy.

The journalist evinces what Turkey’s economic plight might be, while epitomizing the issue of Turkish bitterness to America, of the Soviet attendance to the Izmir Trade Fair, and of the U.S. failure to secure a pavilion at the fair. Instead of this, the U.S. presented their submarines (battle units of the 6th Fleet) to the Izmir waterfront. The issue of Turkish bitterness is exemplified through President Bayar and Prime Minister Menderes, who recently returned back from the U.S., failing to obtain “unlimited dollars gifted from the American government.” Addressing the assertion that such a failure was the foundation of conviction developed by the Turkish political figures, the journalist displays the matter from the point of view of the Turks, who conceptualize themselves as supremely important to the West, because of the size of their army, the only one in Europe ready to fight “for the American fight for freedom,” displaying their resentments through their deservedness of much more U.S. support, assisting them in their financial and trade difficulties. In conjunction with the illustrations of the U.S. submarines, which were tied up at the Izmir waterfront nearly at the same pier, where the Russians unload their trade goods (e.g., food, grain, and textile), a forthcoming crisis seated in Turkey is conceptualized. The country’s inability to buy and sell products due to currency shortage would be a molding factor, prodding it into the Communist economic sphere, while it was also becoming a peaceful entrance for the old archenemy, who capitalized on the U.S. absence at the fair, and presented themselves in an entirely new light to Turkey. This typifies Duncan’s story, redolent of Turkey—the anchor for the U.S. upon which American policy in the Middle East was being built—left open to the idea of the Soviets, who offered a sympathetic friendship, as partners in trade.

The juxtapositions in the images exhibiting the Russian pavilion at the trade fair, which attracted an ample amount of lower and upper socio-economic class people, and those displaying

the U.S. battle units of the 6th Fleet, fulfill Duncan's aim to characterize the Turkish-American relationship at that time as 'military' in comparison to the one offered by Russia and its satellite countries. While exhibiting the contrast within the presented relationships, one displaying 'war time' and other 'peace time,' the journalist challenges the U.S. foreign policy. This is seen in presenting the comparisons between policy makers of Washington and those of the Kremlin, the former is regarded to as "either overlooked the Fair, or believed that such a visit at this time might be just the right thing to keep the Turks impressed with US good intentions and strength;" whereas, the latter is considered as, having planned to sell "a good impression" and to present "a richly laden peacetime world" together with the Red Star. By also stressing to remark on what was left by the Russians in people's mind, a far different picture, compared to the one that had been shaped by the press reports and by the national history existing before, Duncan's discourse serves as suggestive of the U.S. policy makers thought process, "To ignore [Turkey], or close [the] eyes to her condition, might easily bring disaster upon all countries of the West, [...] Turkey's friends in the Western world had better attempt it soon...while there still remains time, and, probably, several courses of action." Thus, a suggestion simultaneously offered relevant to circumstances of the facts surrounding Turkey and subsequently the U.S. is presented; waging a cold war, dealing in possibilities, capabilities, and public opinion, could not be won if its economic layers were isolated from its military and political reality.

What is left out by Duncan in presenting Turkey's economic panorama through two time tables, 'pre- to post—1947' and 'between 1951 and 1954,' along with the context of the Truman Aid Program, and in unison with the country's bankruptcy in Europe, its bitterness to America, and its weak and opened position towards Soviet offer for trade partnership, is a significant topic—the culture of dependency that Turkey began to develop in the early 1950s. Once placing a specific emphasis on the aforementioned time frames, it becomes apparent that the former coincided with 1948, when Duncan exposed the abrupt end of Turkey's long since established statist policy, as Ismet Inonu, the head of the Republican People's Party (RPP), linked the country with the Truman Doctrine, accompanied with accelerated Soviet pressure on Turkey. It was when, as uttered by Feroz Ahmad in *Turkey: The Quest for Identity*, both RPP and the U.S. believed that "Turkey required foreign capital investment for rapid economic growth, and this would only be forthcoming if Turkey joined the West and served its interests in the Middle East" (105-6). Likewise the latter time frame corresponded with 1952, when Duncan

covered Turkey as a member of NATO, photographing Adnan Menderes, the head of the Democrat Party, who further linked Turkey with the West, as the subject of foreign policy, which had linked Turkey to the Truman aids, while this alliance remained as the central element of his rule. In essence both the RPP and the DP aimed at reducing the state role in economic activities, leading to diverse scope of free enterprise in market and industry, and assuring agricultural reforms. Yet, unlike the ‘cautious liberal economic policy’ of the RPP, the ‘rapid growth policy’ of the DP proliferated a culture of dependency, as the rapid growth, as stated by Andrew Mango in *The Turks Today*, could only be sustained through deficit financing, “by printing money at home and accumulating debts abroad,” and functioned only until the resources at home and the patience of the foreign creditors outside would be exhausted (47). The concept of dependency, ironically omitted by Duncan, not only answers what he deems in regards to Turkish economic philosophy that seemed at the outset of Truman aid, “too good to be true;” predictably turning out to be “too good, and perhaps, not quite true,” but it also rationalizes Turkey’s bankruptcy in the EPU from a larger perspective. While remaining wholly related to what he aims to cover in *Izmir Trade Fair*, the future economic circumstances that would surround Turkey and its foreign relation both with the West and with the East.

2.13. Intentions in Coverage of Turkey Appearing in the Media Outlets

In reviewing Duncan’s exploration of Turkey that were materialized through his field studies carried out in this country, this study has first provided an account of the photojournalist’s specific choices and points of emphasis in the representations of the progression of events going on in Turkey, and consequently has discussed how Turkey is represented. This section of the study now strives to determine the way Duncan’s representations appeared in *Life* while providing an understanding of his photojournalism; to what extent his contributions played a primary role in the magazine’s image stories; what the intentions were in transmitting the collections of his productions to the readers of the magazine; and in what degree these intentions correspond with his own underlined either in the captions, or in his books.

Duncan’s skill of photographic reportage, displayed to the reader of “U.S. Faces up to a Diplomatic Crisis” (or “Next Problem for the U.S.: The Straits”) (1947), wherein, the

photographs recollecting the passing history were printed with, “Soviet demands on Turkey revive ancient issue of who shall have power over Dardanelles and Bosphorus” (35) is exemplary of what has been previously pointed to in reviewing his representations, an ability to provide a substantial ambience without a single word (see analysis). Yet, more significantly, Duncan’s photocompositions, brought about through his voyage from the Aegean to the Black Sea, taken for *Life* “to give Americans a look at this well-guarded, seldom photographed but important area” (35), display a milieu of regional, intellectual motives that were subtly and expertly exacted upon. While selling the public on the sudden allegiance made in the U.S. congress (Truman Doctrine) (31) and verifying why the U.S. was compelled to intensify their interest in Turkey’s inherent problems [i.e., “Modern warfare has robbed the straits of some of their strategic military value” (35)], his photographs serve to justify U.S. economic and military aid to Turkey (and Greece) as a political maneuver preventing the area from falling into a military incursion through Russian expansionism (35), and to impose the ideology to the readers that “Unless the U.S. was prepared to take over [the duty from Britain], Russia would soon have two new satellites and the Iron Curtain would stretch down to the Mediterranean” (31). All these themes presented in *Life*’s reports on the Turkish situation are reiterated, if not elaborated upon, by Duncan, in his books in a similar tone and a seemingly similar intention (see analysis).

Coming into contact with Duncan’s ample photographic treatments, utilized by *Life* to show the tensions on Turkey’s frontiers with Russia, Bulgaria, and Greece, readers of “Turkey’s Army” (1948) are aided to visually perceive the succession of the events in Turkey that were cyclically intensified since 1947. The magazine’s sentiment of “Life photographer found reflections of old enmities and present tensions” (68) is descriptive of Duncan’s intention of conveying a knowledge of history, which is also an objective in publishing his books, whose readers find the journalist’s talent of promoting old animosity emerging through brief yet intense writing (see analysis). A crucial portion of the images, provided to *Life* to prove to the American readers “the testimony of U.S. officials from ex-Secretary Marshall” (67), laden with symbolism and iconographic meanings, was made use of as historical evidence in forming the collective conception. While suggesting to the general public to consider Turkey’s geographic position between Russia and the oil rich Middle East as crucial, as “in the event of a hot war the U.S. wants a Turkish army that could delay a Soviet push toward the oil fields and bases near Suez” (67), these images function to show that the American aid program has well-fortified the Turks

strengthening their Soviet borders since 1947. It also brings clarity in viewing excellent Turkish cooperation in political, ideological and military parameters against on-going Communist aggression spreading through the Balkans (68). These premises appearing in *Life*'s pages are synonymous with Duncan's own placed in his books, eternalizing the moment in regards to Turkey's condition for posterity almost certainly within the context of the struggle of democratic West and Communist East (see analysis).

"Ike Campaigns-But It's For NATO" (1952), in which the images of Eisenhower, displayed together with the President of Turkey and Turkish army officials, remarked upon as "Both Turkey and Greece [new members of NATO], their modern armies developed with U.S. aid, were out to impress Eisenhower" (32), serves as evidence of the skilled caption writer that Duncan was. Cohesively and intelligently set up, highlighting the core values in each photographic representation, the photojournalist's brief yet informative caption books contribute and delineate providing a basis for the editorial accounts of this story (see synopsis). These accounts pledge to the public that "in Turkey and Greece, NATO had a strong right flank: between them the nations have more combat-ready divisions than all the Western European NATO countries combined" (32), while introducing Turkey to the Western readers not only as a military but also a cultural asset, through 'Ike's the tourist' (34). This provides a patriotic display of the dominant ideology of the West and its supporters like Turkey, while reinforcing the discourse through a mix of humanistic and cultural motives as inseparable constituents of that ideology. *Life*'s image story corresponding with Duncan's *Photo Nomad*, wherein the images, displaying Eisenhower's 'picture taking' in uniform around Hagia Sophia, are the central focus, presented with a suggestive headline, "Ike/Athens-Istanbul/1952/Welcome [...] to NATO/ as photographer [Ike] shouted '—it's easy'" (209), the entirety of Duncan's field study in Turkey is brought to summation.

Another example showing Duncan's artistic combinations of word materials (captions), as partakers in *Life* pages, is "Fair face for Soviets: Well-stocked Russians star at a Turkish bazaar" (1954), whose readers are partially allowed an understanding of the changing course of events progressing in Turkey. Occupying a central place in exhibiting the Soviets' presence in Izmir Trade Fair, the visual displays together with "The Russians, striving to present a fetching face to the outside world, were showing off their newest tricks at an international trade fair in Izmir, Turkey, [where they had] succeeded in selling a better impression of the U.S.S.R. to the

traditionally anti-Russian Turks” (31), are telling of Duncan’s photojournalism that was stylishly integrated into the story with due respect to his intention (see synopsis). In viewing the previously outlined whole caption layout of this particular coverage, *Life*’s rhetoric, “[...] the U.S., with little budgetary provision for fairs, had no [exhibits]. Its only counter to this exhibit of ‘peace-loving’ manufacturers was a badly timed visit of the U.S. Sixth Fleet” (31), is descriptive of the magazine’s moderately articulated accounts in transmitting Duncan’s discourse, keenly challenging the U.S. policy makers of that time in respect to the U.S.’ non-attendance to the trade fair, keeping its relation with Turkey as military. In addition, Duncan’s specific emphasis in exhibiting the matter of Turkey’s mismanaged economy and other pertinent topics, such as the country’s newly emerging bitter political rhetoric towards the U.S. and its economic bankruptcy, bearing down on potential crisis, placing Russia in the axis of Turkey in turn forcing out the Western alliance system, were absent from the *Life*’s narratives. *Life*’s readers, thus, do not come across what is put forward in Duncan’s delving into the Turkish situation (see analysis). The question, why these topics are missing from the magazine, is easily understood in considering what was at stake for the U.S. In considering this, one can truly appreciate Duncan as an uncompromising photojournalist, a quality highly revered in the field.

2.13.1. Conclusion

Duncan’s explorations of Turkey in photojournalism were composed in 1947, 1948, 1952, and 1954; in each year he produced one story. While all appearing in *Life* Magazine, only the first three of these stories materialized in Duncan’s books, either in *Yankee Nomad* or *The World of Allah*, or *Photo Nomad*.

In viewing the entirety of Duncan’s representative works conducted in Turkey, through archival materials and published productions, one of the most significant instruments in conveying these stories emerging from this dissertation is the photojournalist’s particular selection of the visual subjects, which provided to a prolific extent an outlook in understanding Turkish territory through geography and history, as he aimed at exhibiting the core of his exposures by presenting the strategic importance of the territory. It was, after all, host to arguably the most important waterway in holding Soviet economic and paramilitary maneuverability at bay, and thus of paramount importance to the Cold War. Also, through the

course of presenting these stories, Duncan's own discrepancies concerning America's involvement in Turkish affairs are presented with restraint in *Life*, and only in conjunction with pertinent displays of Turkey and its situation (e.g. photo of U.S. naval forces present at the Izmir Trade Fair).

Taking into consideration the information that the Western reader receives from Duncan's artistic and journalistic discourse about Turkey, this study has concluded that all the stories expose the progressions of the events going on in Turkey in the course of post-WWII; indeed from the Western perspective and serving Western motives whether it be to sway public opinion or to promote Western society as doing good for the world, while also displaying a humanistic side providing an ability to empathize with the political discourse of Turkish political figures running the country, effectively placing readers in their shoes. In doing this he was able to bridge the gap between cultures and enrich an international relationship; presenting Turkey in a nostalgic and optimistic manor, making it accessible to Western sensibility, while also respecting the practices, wishes, and identities of the people of Turkey.

2.14. Chapter Conclusion

David Douglas Duncan served as *Life* Magazine's staff photographer and correspondent in the Middle East between March 1946 and February 1956, and after leaving *Life*, had a brief stint in commercial photojournalism with *Collier's* in 1956. His explorations of the Middle East that appeared in these media outlets were later included in his books, when Duncan transformed his body of work—reflective of his explorations of the globe—into book formats, appearing in his comprehensive photo-autobiographies *Yankee Nomad*, *The World of Allah*, and *Photo Nomad*.

The conceptual frameworks of Duncan's photojournalism reflective of his coverage that occurred in Iran, Palestine territories (including the Gaza Strip), Saudi Arabia, and Turkey provide the account of an eyewitness to man-made history, encapsulating the affairs leading to the reordering politics, economics, and subsequently socio-cultures within the interdependent world in the process of globalization. While providing this, he enhanced the context transferring the knowledge of the eventful history of the Middle East. His discourse verifies the unique

position of the Middle East, upon the globe where its territories have connected the continents as well as trade routes, a region that sustained successive invasions and occupations by Eastern and Western Empires since ancient times, while in the process each conqueror left its footprint of legitimacy over the region—the cradle of the great religions. This is displayed either directly or figuratively in presenting Palestine, Turkey, and Iran—each had its own uniqueness brought about through the common roots that they shared within the tumultuous history of the Middle East. The prime examples of this can be found in recollecting the passing history, as seen in presenting the Holy Land from the days, either when Samson destroyed the Temple, or crucifixion of Jesus; and in exhibiting the territory that played host to the Greeks of Alexander the Great, Persians, Roman Legions, the Crusaders, and Norsemen, working to negate a common belief regarding Palestinian people as all Semitic. This uniqueness is also seen through the recollections of Troy, Gazi Sulaiman's tomb, and Persepolis, working as the reminder of identities that had been forged in a mix of Eastern and Greek ideals, much like in describing the identity of Istanbul that has molded within itself a mix of Christian and Muslim ideals, and in presenting the ancestral ties of the Qashqai nomads of Persia, the descendants of Genghis Khan and the origin of their traditional (migration) practices in Central Asia. In displaying the Middle East, an intersection for migratory populations and place of encounter for rival civilizations, Duncan's journalism extensively assist the non-expert to recognize the stimulus behind this region's many issues as well as the heterogeneity of its societies, whose identities and cultural nuances are not monolithic; but rather have been a diverse, hybrid, and mixed aggregation as rich as the Middle East's complex history.

Duncan also exposed this notion of non-unitary existence in the Middle East in covering modern political history of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. In viewing each one of these collections, we see that the Imperial State of Iran came into existence with a military coup executed by Reza Shah against the Qajar dynasty in the weakness brought about by British and Russian invasion in WWI, while the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, that took its origin from tribalism (and Wahhabism) and from its long-running successive expansion over the Arab Peninsula, came into being when Ibn Saud defeated his rival clan (Hashemite) securing Mecca as its ruler, from those who had played roles in the Arab revolt in WWI and had subsequently lost support from the British. The Republic of Turkey accordingly is portrayed as being born from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, where the national awareness was the result, in part, of military campaigns of

the Triple Entente encircling its territory in the course of WWI. The contents of these exposures proves insightful on each of these countries, whose state identities emerged from their own regional practices and national perceptions at a time when European colonialism was striving towards its own objectives in dictating the future of the Middle East. In understanding of this relation between the Middle Eastern theater of WWI and the drastic shift in the balance of power of the region, Duncan's productions relying on communication and content are testimony of the consolidation of major global powers directed through ideologies and economics, identifying those with control and influence over territories exceeding their borders increasingly within the new schemes of alliance-building that occurred and were later set in stone with the advent of an allied victory in WWII.

While revealing the progressive deconstruction of British colonialism over Palestinian territories, Duncan's Palestine coverage suggests the detriment of and even the eventual dependence on foreign occupation over the land, where power conflicts concerning three groups produced social and political upheaval and fragmentation; all in light of the Zionist agenda proliferating Jewish immigration and land purchase in this troubled land where acts of terrorism and paramilitary activity had become the norm. His coverage of Iran depicts its territory that became a strategic venue in the course of WWII, when Anglo-Russian occupation of this pro-German country shattered the national sovereignty and stratified domestic politics, and in the wake of the war, became a 'sandbox' for Cold War staging as Soviet expansionism and U.S. interest towards oil rich Iran entered into collision course through their vying for power and resources. Similarly, the Turkish coverage, illustrating the position of strategic importance that the Turkish territories had, provides the context of the Cold War and its regional impacts through the early U.S. policy of containing the USSR established with the formulation of aid and assistance program (Truman Doctrine) and that of Western security system (NATO). In showing the rivalry between Western capitalism and communist bloc, dividing and buying up regional supports and economic rights forcing the host countries into altercations while integrating their economies abruptly into a greater world economy in flux, this coverage of Turkey displays foreign policies and popular conceptions within the indigenous population that were all shaped through this vying for control in a post-WWII world. The interlocking alliance systems of these global forces are also the subjects of Duncan's coverage of Saudi Arabia; yet this time a different end of the spectrum within imperialistic effects is exposed, providing an account of ARAMCO's

positive contributions within an imperialistic system, while indicating oil as a facet for progression in a stable strong ruling body of Saudi Arabia, whose self-isolation policy had ended coinciding with the world's greatest economic crisis, which then integrated Saudi Arabia into Western capitalist system, and elevated the country as full diplomatic-economic partner of the U.S. in the Middle East all within a short timeframe. Lastly, Duncan's Gaza coverage depicts the Egyptian controlled Strip as part of Palestinian territories that became the prime example of global powers involving themselves in shaping regional affairs in the early post-WWII settings, taking part as a source of the conflict steadily evolving ever since, where the Palestinian Arab populace turned out to be either displaced or dispossessed, and power conflicts between Egypt and Israel continued to evolve within the polarization of the Middle East that was brought about through the Cold War's acceleration. Comparison of the exemplified coverage reveals that the classical example of Western colonialism came to an end after WWII, and in the new era the Middle East was to play host to the U.S. and its interests as it assumed Britain's former role functioning as the Western imperial power domineering the regions. In viewing this coverage as representative of the Middle East in the post-WWII era, common themes of regional instability and social unrest stemming from both imperialist influence and the effort to modernize are plain to see—in seeing this one can better understand the problems surrounding the Middle East in history and today.

In reviewing the representations of the position of U.S. in the Middle East, Duncan's discourse serves for the Western national norms and its ideals, imposing the ideologies that opposed Communism while exposing Western attempts of doing good for the world displayed either through combating Soviet expansionism, or through the 'cultivation' of areas untouched and untamed such as Saudi Arabia, surely providing ample common ground for policy makers, the media outlet, and its readers. Also, his coverage of Iran flows only partially as he leaves out the context pertaining to the U.S. involvement over the national politics that played parts exacerbating domestic unrest (e.g., immature democracy, unfair class divisions and modernization process). Thus, a collection of his explorations in a certain degree lacked the circumstance to be impartial as his readers were participants of Western society, as was he, and views on imperialism and its lasting effects on the world would undoubtedly differ within the two societies (the U.S. and the Middle East). This aside, Duncan was no average American, but one who had visited countless countries gathering experiences, where-with-all, and a broader

perspective equipping him with the necessary tools for understanding and conveying the problems and developments in the Middle East. Seen in his fairness while displaying the Tudeh and its agenda for all Iran, regardless of the party's closeness with the USSR-led ideology, Duncan's presentations suggest positive social progress being made for the people of Iran in a true grassroots movement, something largely omitted by *Life* when drawing from his submitted materials. Moreover, his developed understanding and opinions on U.S. policy in the Middle East are best exposed in seeing his unpublished materials in regards to Turkey, and through this it becomes apparent that his critiques to policy makers were intuitive, as America's involvement in Turkish affairs protecting them from the familiar Soviet expansionism was not enough to prevent them from turning to the USSR in economic crisis ultimately worsening this country's problems, placing it squarely within the white hot tensions of the Cold War.

Considering the productions for the magazines, none of Duncan's voice would be heard without *Life's* and *Collier's* influence. *Life* was a weekly, picture-driven magazine, for middle class Americans within the time frame of production, and it can be surmised that the outlet had a substantial effect on American opinions. Because of its position as one of the foremost news magazine in the U.S., its Western centralized views are understandable as they were in touch with their readers. Duncan understood this relationship and did a good job of increasing understanding without providing contention or grounds for rejecting his arguments; a very skillful feat. Examples in this regard can be found in reviewing unpublished materials produced in Saudi Arabia, providing Duncan's unadulterated voice, through which he held the role of mediator between the expectations of the House of Saud and the Western collective codes of the media outlet. In extracting this information from the materials in examination, Duncan's mission and conviction as a journalist is brought out in earnest—to provide as fair and unbiased coverage as possible. His intentions, concerning how his productions and conceptions would be the subjects of reportage (e.g., women folk, poverty, kissing the nose, and praying men) relied on his ability to sidestep offending the ruling house while setting parameters for the magazine to prevent a Eurocentric representation; only through executing this could Duncan achieve success in accordance with his journalistic morals. Besides this, Duncan's displays of the Saudis attempting to live out a peaceful existence while presenting a proud, honorable, and tradition-oriented people, coupled with his rationalization of a set of values characterizing the identities over the state and society through history and political culture, work to promote increased

Western awareness, when little was known about Saudis regardless of oil's global and national importance that had already connected these two different worlds to each other. His intelligence and humanitarian thinking reaches to the reader, imploring them to understand this territory for more than just its oil industry, while stimulating interest in international relations, making a society more self-aware.

Most likely, because of Duncan's multicultural enlightenment, he was at odds with *Life* in certain circumstances regarding portrayals of visual subjects and the words used to describe them. His unadulterated (and non-partisan) voice, from which deviations in the media outlet occurred, is seen in *Yankee Nomad*; revealing the dissention between them over the Palestine coverage. Duncan's tenacity was the victory of his representations, as his good intention and unfaltering stance aimed at working towards a brighter future for the Middle East. This bright future would coincide with a rise from 'primitiveness' and being 'uncivilized' to 'proper society' in the Western conception of the Palestinian Arabs, whose world was displayed by Duncan in understanding of their frustrations. Apart from this, his articulations that were delivered by *Life* prove insightful on the conundrum cultivated by British mismanagement of the land and by the Western world, whose promise as reparations for Holocaust atrocity to the international Jewish community fostered hostility, while offering to the Western world a chance to pause and see not military but plausible, discreet, and humanitarian solutions. In also reviewing Duncan's unmodified voice presented by *Collier's* (Gaza Strip), it is seen that as the disaster progressively increased, Duncan's journalism reflected his trueness in his expertise even more. His objectivity, humanitarian tendency, and isolation from Western political rhetoric of the time, did not falter in understanding in this quagmire in which everyone played roles in shaping the 'identity' that became an ideological machine and within the process, the 'national selves' of the Palestinian Arabs remained ambiguous. His proclamation to the international community calling for a real solution stimulates his readers to be sensitive towards the awkward predicament of Gaza, representative of Palestinian experience.

Duncan's reportage for *Life* and *Collier's* coincided with a time frame, when photojournalism was in its golden age. His nomadic existence allowing him to become acquainted with people and their culture, in unison with his eagerness to discover more and to convey information into his complex picture stories accurately and without bias, laid the foundation for his social accomplishment. His fabulous collections serve for humanity to

alleviate “*othering*” and to provide a stage for viewing *other*’s thoughts in a globalized world. His sophistication and intellectual being imparts a diverse scope of perspectives and understanding of the fabric of the Middle East. His photographs eternalize the moment, and his writing connecting the past, present, and future, serves to connect continents and peoples of diverse nature for Western consciousness, urging on thought directed at bettering conception and international relations. In understanding Duncan’s focus in his photojournalism—to present an exotic unknown people increasing understanding and decreasing misconceptions as well as *Orientalist* implications of the representations, one can find an alleviation to the Middle Eastern problem as a whole; enhancing knowledge and cultural awareness to empathize with the many peoples and modes of living upon this diverse planet. The potential effects of this are better understood in juxtaposition with the modern obstacle of terrorism operating in the Middle East as it further polarizes two perspectives, the same perspectives he was attempting to bring together, decreasing understanding and dismantling attempts at arbitration.

CHAPTER 3

3.1. Sandra Mackey's Media and Intellectual Discourses

3.1.1. Biography: Sandra Mackey

Sandra Mackey, a veteran and freelance American journalist as well as an award-winning author specializing on the Middle East, was born in Oklahoma City, OK, on September 13, 1937. Mackey received her M.A. in Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia (UVA) in 1966. She taught political science at Georgia State University in Atlanta, 1967-1968. She also served as a visiting scholar at UVA between 1994 and 1996 while working with R. K. Ramazani, Professor Emeritus of Government and Foreign Affairs.

In our correspondence contributing to my research, Mackey explains that during the oil boom of the early 1970s, several business professionals in Atlanta with trade relations in the Persian Gulf approached her; she quickly realized a cultural and historical ignorance towards the Arab world. Subsequently she was persuaded to conduct a series of seminars in which she aimed to expose these intelligent, educated people to the intricacies of the Middle East. Through this experience she conceived a need to make Middle Eastern topics accessible to non-specialists.

In 1977, Mackey and her husband, Dan Michael, arrived at the decision to spend some time abroad before their son, Michael Colin, advanced too far in school. The venue was to be Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, where her husband ended up an employee as a physician in the King Faisal Specialist Hospital, which proved a rare opportunity for her to do field work pertaining to her academic expertise. Before leaving, Mackey received a phone call from Gail Evans, who had recently been in Saudi Arabia for a few days, working under the auspices of the Ministry of Information as a journalist, and who later would be amongst the co-founders of CNN. Her intention was to persuade Mackey to write for Western newspapers from Saudi Arabia. Open to the idea she left for Riyadh with a portable typewriter, where her career in journalism began. As an underground journalist with the male pseudonyms Michael Collins and Justin Coe, Mackey

spent four years of her life, first from 1978 to 1980, and then from 1982 to 1984, in Saudi Arabia. Recognized by her as an incredible experience—being in the kingdom when the Saudis made the leap into the twentieth century with the oil boom, while “all of the reporting at the time was about the bonanza of wealth that had descended on xenophobic people most of whom had little in the material possessions or education.” She reported mainly for the *Christian Science Monitor*, and despite writing about economics, military affairs, and foreign policy, her interest was to explain to Westerners that “more was going on in the Arabian Peninsula besides a party funded by oil”—the impact of wealth and Westernization, under which the Saudi society was on the brink of bursting. This early experience abroad later led her to publish *The Saudis: Inside the Desert Kingdom*, her first venture into the world of book writing.

Mackey’s residency in the Persian Gulf region ended in 1984, and it took eight years for her to return, yet this time in the east, the Islamic Republic of Iran. In the early 1990s, during a visit that Mackey paid to R. K. Ramazani, she was graciously asked to write a book on Iran due to a desperate need for coverage of an otherwise unacknowledged issue to general readers. Agreeing upon this idea she began a four year tutorial with professor Ramazani while also making three trips to Iran traveling all over the country, which brought to fruition her fourth book, *The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation*.

In April 1997, Mackey received a call from a friend, who like herself was acquainted with President Bill Clinton, as the president was inquisitive as to whether a conversation could be opened up with Saddam Hussein. This was to be a secret mission under the facade of the delivery of medical supplies to Iraq; she was asked to go along as an observer who had no connection with the government. Officials of a humanitarian organization carried out the talks, and Mackey’s direct knowledge of these conversations was not of those with Saddam Hussein, but of Tariq Aziz’s. She returned to home within ten days with an awareness of the two problems that the U.S. had in Iraq: Saddam Hussein being the one and Iraq itself the other. Mackey’s next visit to Iraq occurred in 1999 when she obtained a visa through Iraq’s UN mission. She did not go there under the auspices of the Ministry of Information; but she was allotted a government “minder” from the Foreign Ministry, who had lived in the U.S. for three years as part of the UN mission, with whom she developed a good relationship, enabling her to travel throughout the country with relative ease while also giving her leeway to move around Baghdad by herself, furthered by her connections with the CNN bureau in Baghdad. Although her intention was to

make future trips to Iraq, but realized that any further research on the ground could not be accomplished, as the people she involved in interviews would be in more danger than she was, due to the harsh political atmosphere surrounding Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

Starting in Arabia, Mackey's explorations of the Middle East continued in the decades that followed. Traveling to different countries in the region allowed her to visit places as divergent as Bedouin camps, guerilla bases, crowded cities, and remote villages, while also observing a variety of life styles, cultural traditions, and belief systems. She witnessed firsthand a variety of Middle Eastern affairs, which were under the impact of and transformed within world economic and political systems, making her a genuine authority with highly sought after insight.

Mackey has spoken frequently to several groups of U.S. foreign policy makers as well as civic groups while also doing a myriad of media interviews as an expert on the Middle East. She has appeared on ABC News with Peter Jennings, Nightline, BBC, CNN, CBS, NPR, and Monitor Radio, and served as a commentator on the first Gulf War for CNN. She has written numerous news articles featured in national and international periodicals including *Los Angeles Times*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *Chicago Tribune*, *The Christian Science Monitor*, *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, and *The Guardian*. She wrote a chapter on Arab politics of the 20th century, "Century of Strife 1920 to 2002," for the National Geographic book, *Cradle and Crucible: History and Faith in the Middle East* (2002). None of her articles appearing in news media have been transformed into book format. The books written and published by her, some of which has been translated into German, Spanish, Portuguese, Croatian, and Arabic, are as follows: *The Saudis: Inside the Desert Kingdom* (1987) [with a new introduction and afterword in 2002], *Lebanon: Death of a Nation* (1989) [with a new introduction appearing as *Lebanon: A House Divided* (2006)], *Passion and Politics: The Turbulent World of the Arabs* (1992), *The Iranians: Persia, Islam, and the Soul of a Nation* (1996), *The Reckoning: Iraq and the Legacy of Saddam Hussein* (2003), *Mirror of the Arab World: Lebanon in Conflict* (2008).

3.1.2. An Overview of Source Materials on Mackey's Coverage of the Middle East

Mackey came late to writing, and as her audience is the non-specialist reader, she has not written academic articles with two exceptions, both of which were materialized in Saudi Arabia;

one contributed to the *Washington Quarterly*, published by Georgetown Center for Strategic Studies, and the other to the Army War College. The source materials embodying her journalistic and intellectual discourses on the Middle East are located in a multidimensional array of outlets channeled through print and electronic media. Together with an academic background and enhanced knowledge, the firsthand experience gained since the late 1970s became the foundation of her books. While becoming a widely respected journalist in the U.S., she has reached the wider public through articles, speeches, and interviews featured in well-read newspapers and newsmagazines as well as on noteworthy broadcast news.

Concerning her books, she wrote *The Saudis: Inside the Desert Kingdom* in a memoir and analysis format, and it was published in 1987. At that time no publisher was interested in an account of Saudi Arabia in the axis of the oil boom if it was not presented through a personal, more emotive lens. In the book Mackey clarifies “Saudi authorities had no idea that a political scientist by training and a journalist by inclination—and as an indignity, a woman—had penetrated the carefully constructed and relentlessly patrolled walls [...]” (3), to which she adds, “[...] being a woman gave me access to the secluded world of Saudi women” (4). Mackey would later describe (in our correspondence) how much she enjoyed sharing her memories through composing this book, challenging and interesting, but at the same time had some regrets after publishing it. This regret came to fruition upon receiving a letter from a dear Muslim friend, who voiced her distaste regarding a chapter of the book, in which the author’s intension was misconstrued as she related the collision between the Wahhabis and the outside world, while attempting to be mindful not to denigrate Islam. Subsequently she noted, “Perhaps that is when I realized the importance of speaking to my audience from not only my viewpoint but the viewpoint of the people and culture about which I was writing.” The book draws a picture of Saudi Arabia, its transformation from a desert kingdom to an oil producer through which the country found a new position within the international order. It also offers an outlook on Saudi culture and psyche, struggling in the face of modernization. Themes are explored in eighteen chapters titled as “The Coming of a Foreigner,” “The Magic Kingdom,” “Managing the Boom,” “Servants of God,” “Living with Islam,” “Bedouin Pride,” “The Shackles of Sex,” “Mysteries of *Hareem*,” “Putting the Saudis to Work,” “The Royal Tribe,” “There was No Tomorrow,” “The Press: Pride and Denial,” “Jail: A Clear and Present Danger,” “Swords and Missiles: The Search for Security,” “The World Creeps Closer,” “The New Realities,” “Castle of Sand,” and “Stalled

Between Seasons.”

Having published a successful book, *The Saudis*, Mackey was provided more freedom to write what she wished and to get it published, transpiring in *Lebanon: Death of a Nation*, which was named to the Notable Books list in the *New York Times* in the year that it was published (1989). This treatment was written when Lebanon was in the last throws of a civil war, and in the Author’s Note, she says, “This is not a history of the Lebanese civil war [:] I feel that task is better left to the historians” (ix). Her objective is to elucidate to the non-specialist Western reader what was going on in the country as the Lebanon of the 1960s and early 1970s, “which they perceived as a magical playground proudly touting its Western ways,” and now was a hotbed of hostility, sealing it off from the West. She described the war, as a war of identity, not a religious war, occurring between those who saw the country as part of the Arab world and those who saw it as part of the West. The book consists of twelve chapters, titled as “Beirut: Paris of the East,” “The Levant,” “The Christians,” “The Muslims,” “Culture and Conflict,” “The French Legacy,” “Outsiders, Insiders—The Palestinians,” “The Foreign Powers,” “The War Against the West: The Hostages,” “Cry, Lebanon,” “A House Divided,” and “Closing the Crossroads.”

Passion and Politics: The Turbulent World of the Arabs was published in 1992, two years after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. In our correspondence, Mackey clarified that the catalyst of this book was a call paid by Dutton, a division of Penguin, asking her to write a book on the Middle East on a subject of her own choice. She decided to write about what Westerners most needed to understand: “the Arab world was not a monolith” and “the Arabs were trapped between the mythology of Arab unity and the reality of local and national interests.” In the Author’s Note, it is highlighted that “this is not another examination of the Arab-Israeli dispute; rather it is an exploration of the Arab’s relationship with each other and their relationship with the West” (xiii-xiv). It is added that writing about the Arab world without touching on Israel is impossible; in portraying Israel, no attempt is made to argue the Israeli points of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which would need to be examined in a separate study, but the Arab perspective of how the Jewish state contributes to aggression between Arab and Arab and between Arabs and the West. Also, no attempt is made to bring a full account of relations between the U.S. and Israel, while demonstrating American ignorance towards Arab concerns discussed within the context of the U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. In addition to an interlude (“Unity and Division”) and a conclusion (“The Arab Reality, the American Response”) the book contains twelve chapters,

named as follows: “The Noble Bedouin,” “The Sons of Ismail,” “Invasion of the Infidel,” “Nation and Colony,” “The War for Palestine,” “Nasser: The Arab Messiah,” “King Hussein: The Enduring Monarch,” “The House of Saud: The Collective Monarchy,” “Anwar Sadat: Return of the Pharaoh,” “Hafiz Assad: The Lion of Damascus,” “Saddam Hussein: The Butcher of Baghdad,” and “Yasser Arafat: The Chairman.”

The Iranians: Persia, Islam, and the Soul of a Nation, published in 1996, chronicles the history of Iran through its two dimensional culture; one reflects Iran with its ancient Persian identity and the other with its Islamic propensity. Within this contextual framework, Mackey explores pre-revolutionary Iran and the aftermath of 1979 while enhancing the discussion through its relation with the West, particularly the U.S. In its Acknowledgements, addressing the trips that she made in preparation of the book, the author writes, “Instead of government, my shield was protected by the people of Iran [...] I appreciate their kindness and all that they did for an American in what Westerners assume is the universally hostile environment of the Islamic Republic” (ix). The book is composed of thirteenth chapters appearing as, “The Glory of Persia,” “The Invasion of Islam,” “God and State,” “The Faces of Authority: Father, King, and Cleric,” “King and Nation: Iran’s First Revolution,” “Reza Shah: To the Glory of the Nation,” “The Shah and the Prime Minister: Iran’s Second Revolution,” “The Shah and the Ayatollah: Persia and Islam,” “The Persian Empire of Muhammad Reza Shah,” “The Double Revolution,” “The Internal and External: Wars for the Iranian Nation,” “Islamic Government: Religion, Culture, and Power,” “The Islamic Republic of Iran: Failed Quest for Justice.”

Underpinning *The Reckoning: Iraq and the Legacy of Saddam Hussein*, published in 2003, are the trips Mackey had made to Iraq. In the Preface, she mentions the political climate bringing with it restriction and a domineering security situation, which made having real conversations with ordinary Iraqis basically impossible. Through her letter Mackey suggests towards this impossibility as a causality of the “imperfect research model” that she had to use in the preparation process of the book. This condition led her to conduct interviews outside the country, particularly in Jordan, involving people who were not in political exile, as she had tried to avoid, but non-elites who had left the country for different reasons. In the process, she also talked to people, who had belonged to the old elite of the pre-Saddam days and those, who were dealt out during his regime. The book presents Iraq, a prison for all but the elite for three decades under the rule of Saddam Hussein, and in examining “the nature and experience of Iraq before

and after the founding of the Iraqi state” as an attempt to answer “how it all happened,” it aims to reveal “what it all will mean to Iraq, the Persian Gulf, and the United States after the political and physical demise of Saddam Hussein” (12). The themes are explored in twelve chapters that are entitled “The Land between Two Rivers,” “The Human Mosaic of Iraq,” “The Improbable Country,” “Three Kings: Monarchical Iraq,” “Identity in a Decade of Disorder,” “The Triumph of the Baath,” “The War of Identity,” “Aggression and Rebellion,” “Broken Babylon,” “America between the Two Rivers,” “The War of Containment,” “The Road to Baghdad.”

Mackey’s most recent book *Mirror of the Arab World: Lebanon in Conflict* was published in 2008. In our correspondence, she annotated the root of this book, stemming mainly from three factors, increasingly observed within a broad time period, marking the aftermath of the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the September 11 attacks—first being, “how lost people are but how eager they are for some clues about a region that continues to baffle them and to frighten them”; second being “the growing discomfort with American support of Israel yet the feeling that this is somehow ‘wrong’”; and third “the fear, resentment, and hostility toward Islam, which had replaced simple ignorance.” In the Author’s Note, the objective is explained as to help the layperson to come away with an understanding of the Arab world, “[which] confronts the West with a range of challenges, from political and social instability in a region vital to the global economy, to the security of people living within the borders of Western nations” (3). Lebanon, despite being as unique as it is, provides a case study in terms of the many characteristics that it shares with other Arab countries due to the “complexities,” “frustrations,” and “virtues” plaguing the region. “[...] the Lebanese have run the gamut of national experience, from the conflicts of family and group to civil war to near destruction at the hands of domestic and foreign forces, to the practice of politics through Islam, in its Shia form” (4). The book contains eight chapters and their titles are as follows: “A Collection of Tribes,” “The Hollow State,” “The Palestinians: Victims and Villains,” “Woe be to the State,” “Identity in Pursuit of a Nation,” “The Rise of the Shia,” “A Tale of Four Countries,” and “Islam as Politics.”

3.1.3. Selection of the Source Materials for This Study

A sequence of news articles by Mackey, circulating in mass media between 1987 and 2005, form the focus of this study, exploring the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Kingdom of Saudi

Arabia, and the Republic of Iraq—the larger oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf, the hearth of the Middle East and the hallmark of the global energy supply. Yet in the following analysis Mackey's books are occasionally taken into account, while also referencing a certain number of speeches and interviews delivered by and conducted with her, as they are all representative of her journalistic exploration of the region produced with reciprocated interest, helping ordinary people to grasp the region in which Western interests are so closely tied.

3.1.4. Summary of Mackey's News Articles and Analysis of her Representations of the Middle East through her Journalistic and Intellectual Discourses

This study first provides a rundown of Mackey's news articles, suggestive of her major coverage of Middle Eastern politics, concerning Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. The summary of the articles attempts to underline the journalist's specific choices and emphasis in the representations of Middle Eastern socio-economic, -political, -cultural, and -religious history, standing in connection with global economic, political, and international systems. This section is followed by an in-depth analysis, and while inquiring upon how Mackey "represents" the Middle East, it takes account of some of her other works in order to examine the extent of her explorations and the scope of their consistency within the journalistic and intellectual combinations of representation, and to strengthen some points in discussion. In particular, the purpose of this study is to explore Mackey's discourses according to the following primary research question: *what is the information the Western reader receives from his/her writer and communicator about the Middle East, and how could this transmission shape Western public opinion about the Middle East?*

3.2. Summary of Mackey's News Articles

The purpose of this section is to provide a summary of Mackey's news articles, more specifically according to the parameters of the Persian Gulf. During the Cold War, by the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the Shah of Iran was appointed by the U.S. as the policeman of the Gulf, and

in the aftermath of the revolution it became the venue for the Iraq-Iran War of 1980-88, which was followed by the Gulf War of 1990-1, during when Saudi Arabia turned out to be a significant regional player, and then followed by the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. The reportage surrounding each of the particular conflict laden regions is outlined in order as follows: The Islamic Republic of Iran, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and The Republic of Iraq.

3.2.1. The Islamic Republic of Iran

Iran is one of the countries within the scope of Mackey's interest—a country with a long and complex history, becoming regionally and globally relevant again in the last quarter of the twentieth century with its revolution. The Iraq-Iran War of 1980-8 followed, and simultaneously the country was most commonly reported on within the context of its nuclear program, its support for international terrorism, and its rhetoric of reformation. The following articles are indicative of the journalist's coverage on Iran with reference to the country's intra/international politics, its marginalization and isolation within the U.S. foreign policy, and its inevitable position within the Persian Gulf region.

1. "Iran Benefits from the Gulf Panic," issued in *Chicago Tribune* on June 24, 1987.
2. "Fear of Enemies Isn't Paranoia; U.S. Policy Invites Disaster: After suffering centuries of invasion, Iranians may consider nuclear development both prudent and mandatory," in *Los Angeles Times*, on June 07, 1995.
3. "A Culture, More Than a State, Reaches Out—Iran: The president expresses a wish for two peoples to converse, a small step the U.S. can afford," in *Los Angeles Times*, on January 09, 1998.

3.2.1.1. Iran Benefits From the Gulf Panic

This article was issued in June 1987, when the Iraq-Iran war was in its final throws. It details the U.S. engagement into the war, sending ships to the Persian Gulf to cooperate with its allies in the region, to which Mackey comments, "the United States is charging into the Persian Gulf with as little logic as Don Quixote attacking windmills." She explains that the U.S. decided

to stay disengaged throughout six and a half years of the duration of the war due to it being less than enamored with either participant, “but following Iranian advances in January and February [...], the United States became aroused and Kuwaiti and Saudi anxieties escalated dramatically.” Suddenly a two-headed threat from Iran immediately was aroused, “a military threat to Iraq” and “a political threat to the ruling regimes of the [other] Gulf states,” both of which can be seen as a hazardous to Western oil supply. There are persuasive arguments favoring an American presence in the Gulf, as 60 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves are present leaving neither the U.S. nor its Western allies to be able to simply ignore the region and its issues; yet the commitment of American forces, “the nature of the present urgency,” is harmful to long-term American interests in the Gulf and the greater region.

The concern of the journalist is the lack of understanding on the predominate threat to U.S. interests in the Gulf that is not military but ideological. “With all of its military posturing, the United States is nourishing that threat rather than thwarting it.” In the use of ideology she intends to place focus on the different viewpoints of the adversaries in the Iraq-Iran conflict, as to Iraq, this war is about protecting territory while ensuring the political survival of Saddam Hussein; yet to the Iranian leadership, it is a war fought through the spread of slogans and symbols—“the war in terms of the broad and long-range expansion of the Islamic revolution throughout the Moslem world.” To her, Iran is not able to gain a military victory over Iraq and the Gulf states; its victory, however, can come through the spread of the Islamic revolution. Since 1979, the prime objective of Iran’s ayatollahs has been to establish Islamic republics throughout the Islamic world, based on “Mohammed’s teachings of societal organization and social justice.” While attempting to offer this “ideal” to the Islamic world, the Iranian leadership calls for overthrow of secular rulers “whom they see as having broken with the faith” and Saddam Hussein, the emir of Kuwait, and the House of Saud round out the top of their list. This is the first mission of the revolution. The second one is the promise to drive “Western imperialism” out of the region. Within the terminology of the revolution, the U.S. and the USSR are “infidels” to be eliminated from the world of Islam and “it is in this sense of a religious crusade that Iran wars against the Iraqis, the monarchies of the Gulf and the West.”

While making ideology the main driving force of the war rather than the military, the most minor success that Iran gains fuels their objective, the revolution. Since 1979, Iran has achieved victory in a sequence of symbolic actions against its enemies, specifically the U.S.

During the Reagan administration, Iran ignored rising American anger, while establishing itself as source of change in the region and supporting terrorist actions against the U.S. and American installations. This occurred, for example, in Lebanon, far from the borders of Iran, where groups seized Western hostages; these same groups now sit as the power brokers in that country. “And the United States, in perhaps Iran’s greatest propaganda coup, suffered irreparable damage from the revelations that the Great Satan was supplying arms to the Ayatollah’s government.” Shortly after the Iraqi attack on Iran across the Shatt al-Arab, Iranians managed to stop the invasion while also turning it into the symbol of Islamic revolution. “Khomeini declared the attack a sign that God had called on Iran to rid Iraq of the secular, infidel Saddam Hussein.” Since then, Iran has been incorporated with Iraq’s recurring calls for peace. But, “now Iraq’s firing on the American ship, the USS Stark, leaves Iraq shamefaced and embarrassed while the United States scrambles to figure out a way both to stay in the Gulf and out of the line of fire.” Also, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, “plump targets for Islamic revolution,” worry about the safety of their oil commerce and their own borders and public opinion.

While addressing the military victory that Iran has yet to achieve, Mackey endorses the idea that each success Iran gains, either by means of military, or through the political and symbolic, proves helpful to nourish its revolution, allowing for the perception that “Iran can deliver on its promises to return Moslem countries to their religious heritage.” This is effective throughout the region especially for those, “who see themselves in the great mass of the dispossessed to their rightful place in an egalitarian society.” This is the real success of the ayatollahs, generating a messianic appeal. “It is as if Iran is fighting for God Himself—a message not lost on Moslems from Egypt to Lebanon, to Iraq, to Saudi Arabia.” Rampaging Islamic ideology is the menace that the U.S. faces in the Gulf, striking against the perceived injustices of ruling regimes, which are blamed for humiliating their people and religion with Westernization. Today, what gives Iran another symbolic strength is the action of the U.S. and Russia, both of which maneuver their ships and deploy their air cover in order to protect the oil tankers departing from the region’s governances that are under attack from Iran’s ideology. “It is as if every country involved is reacting to the power of the revolution.” This provides Iran a prestige to continue its ideological war against the West, placing whomever they see fit under that designation.

3.2.1.2. Fear of Enemies isn't Paranoia

Issued in June 1995, "Fear of Enemies" reads with its very first sentence, "Robert McNamara's book on the Vietnam War is more than history." In stating that the subject of U.S. misconception is now Iran, Mackey cleverly asserts, "the acknowledgment of the former secretary of defense that American policy-makers overestimated the ultimate goals of the enemy and misunderstood their adversaries is as applicable to the Clinton Administration as the former Kennedy and Johnson administrations." According to her, the mistake made during the Vietnam War harmed the social bond between the U.S. government and Americans while wounding the nation in a more spiritual manor than that of material. Yet today's miscalculations endanger the well-being of the Persian Gulf, possibly the most integral region tied to American commerce in the world, "And this time, the enemy exaggerated by American perception is not a peasant army. It is a strategically located nation apparently reaching for nuclear capabilities in what the Islamic republic sees as the survival of Iran."

According to Mackey, "before policy-makers move past the point of no return," the hawks in demand of U.S. containment of Iran need to acknowledge three strong forces, shaping and hardening Iran's situation: "fear of invasion," "pride of nation," and "the conviction that foreign-driven conspiracies are always operating against them." She continues that the fear of invasion stems from historical experience, thus it is not unfounded paranoia. Being at the point of intersection between the West and the East, the territories were invaded by the ancient Romans and Greeks, the Arabs (the 7th century), and the Mongols (the 13th century) who left the region so devastated it took Iran six millennium to restore its previous population levels. It was later brought into the sphere of Russian and British influence in the 19th century, debilitating its politics and economics. "In the 20th Century, what had become modern Iran was invaded in all but name by the West, and by what is now seen as the especially corrupting influence of the United States."

While each of these foreign activities worked to nourish a distinct sense of resilient nationalism, the zealous pride of a nation exists in the uniqueness of Iranian culture, constructed through a mix of ancient Persian influence and Shia Islam. Iran differs itself linguistically, ethnically, and religiously from those adjacent to its borders, the Arab Middle East, Asia, and Turkey. This powerful sense of identity has resulted in Iran laying claim to its distinction in the

world. After each of these invasions, Iranians set a cultural renaissance into motion, reaffirming their unique identity while effecting its occupiers, and “this sense of nation, as much as religion, fed the revolution of 1979 that gave birth to the Islamic Republic.”

The third force is an obsession with foreign-driven conspiracy, which is interrelated with the first two, but still definably separate as its proliferations are plain to see, “because Iranian society has always been hierarchic, in which the strong traditionally feed on the weak, nothing happens in Iran that Iranians do not somehow perceive as conspiracy.” What makes matters worse is that their own affinity for intrigue feeds into the conspiracies ascribed to foreign forces. Britain and Russia worked against the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1911; the CIA involved into the coup of 1953, restoring Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi to the throne; and the CIA trained much of the Shah’s infamous security force SAVAK that served to maintain order and keep the political opposition in line. “Now, in Iranian eyes, the United States is conspiring to destroy the Islamic Republic.”

In concluding, Mackey endorses the idea that although the U.S. regards to its containment policy as being “a legitimate means of addressing its legitimate concerns,” to Iranians, this policy stinks of economic and political quarantine, considered as an effort towards subjugation and the disassembling of their nation. “Here is the parallel with Vietnam: The United States is in danger of creating a monster from an adversary.” Mackey looks to evoke historical reference and a considerable source in drawing parallels with Vietnam; a platform from which she states, “Isolation to force Iran to alter its behavior in the murky area of terrorism and to renounce nuclear armament indicates an unrealistic assessment of the Islamic Republic and the Iranian people.” Iran has a distinctive culture in the region, in terms of religion it is heretical to the predominant Sunni constituent of Islam, and thus “the Islamic Republic cannot lead a unified movement of militant Islam against the West even if it wanted to.” While the U.S. regards to Iran’s nuclear program as an offensive or predatory maneuver, Iranians consider it as defensive—a response to the deep fear of invasion, a testament to their wish to survive, and a result and further evidence of their belief on conspiracy functioning against them. “That the United States continues to pursue the diplomatic and economic isolation of Iran even against the collective will of its European allies only exacerbates these emotions and perceptions.” Similar to the miscalculation exhibited by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations in Asia, the Clinton Administration is generating an incumbent catastrophe for future U.S. foreign policy. But, “this

time, the theater of calamity won't be as easily limited."

3.2.1.3. A Culture, More Than a State, Reaches out—Iran

This article was published in January 1998, shortly after the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Mohammad Khatami appeared on the CNN broadcast, "praising both American and Iranian cultures and acknowledging the hurts that Iran and the U.S. have inflicted on each other," and in an extraordinary act of diplomacy he delivered his message in terms of culture, not politics, to which Mackey remarks "and it is only in terms of culture that America can understand what is happening in Iran and what it means to U.S. interests."

Framing the article with this action of the nationalist Khatami, the journalist focuses on an old and complex Iranian culture, comprising three competing but interlocking identities. The first of the constituents of this identity dated back to the 4th century BC marking the establishment of the mighty Persian Empire by Cyrus the Great, "into the soil of its heartland were planted the seeds of intellectual inquiry, artistic excellence, tolerance and assimilation." The second constituent dates back to the 7th century AD, when Iranians embraced Islam, acquiring a second identity; to which Mackey adds, "although Persia, the nation, had fallen to Arab conquest, Persian culture fed Islam's great intellectual achievements." The Iranians had been instituted into Shia Islam by the 16th century, becoming a vehicle for them to maintain their unique identity as Persian-Islam, under which the legacies of both ancient Persia and Shia Islam intermingled, creating "what we now know as the Iranian nation." The Iranians embraced Western political ideas in the 19th century, when they embedded representative government and the rule of law into their culture, which developed the third element of Iranian identity. Throughout the centuries, Iran functioned perfectly, "when [the] various parts of Iranian identity maintained balance."

This balance, although, has tipped in one direction and then another in the twentieth century. "Before 1979, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi pushed the Iranians to the extreme of their Persian identity, and after 1979, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini pushed them to the extreme of their Islamic identity." However, neither of the leaders attained internal peace and external security. Like the shah, who broke the cultural pattern composed of Persia, Islam and Western liberalism, the ayatollah imposed his own fleeting vision of Iranian culture. Currently,

Mohammad Khatami intends to instill the delicate balance amongst the three identities that Iran obtained. “This is why the United States must take seriously what he says.” He attempts to place the interests of the nation first, meaning before that of Islam, by recognizing that “if Iran is to achieve prosperity, security and social order, the Islamic Republic must change course.” Being aware of the fact that such a change cannot be only political, but must also be cultural, he is attempting to place the concept of tolerance into the inflexible frame of political Islam. “And into the vitriolic anger of the revolution, he is pouring the oil of Persian assimilation that embraces the Western concept of civil society and the rule of law.” In placing internal reform and external accommodation into his agenda, he is reiterating the ethos of the successful ancient Iranian culture, which is reasserting itself after two decades of rigid Islamic rule. This is the reason why Khatami took action to open lines of communication with Americans hoping to create an understanding between cultures, “in which the old civilization of the East engages the new civilization of the West.”

Mackey suggests that in facing Khatami’s brave and intentional gesture, the Clinton administration cannot stay bogged down in the same cliché stance regarding relations between the United States and Iran. “That formula, restated by the State Department’s official response to the Iranian president, maintains that improved relations between the two countries can begin only with official government-to-government engagement.” President Khatami shows perhaps a greater propensity for understanding than President Clinton; that both Iran and the U.S. have vilified each other for such a long time that on a political level neither government could embrace the other without seeming weak in a way. “That is why what Khatami terms ‘the crack in the wall’ must be expanded by scholars, traders, artists and tourists. This is something that Americans, as eager entrepreneurs and highly successful exporters of popular culture, can understand. So must the American government.” By allowing the concession of a cultural dialogue, the U.S. will walk through the door, which has been opened for a new relationship between “revolutionary Iran” and “its Great Satan.” Like Khatami, Mackey believes it would be beneficial if the flow of ideas between the ancient Iranian civilization and the new American civilization could take place as “that in turn will result in the government-to-government relationship that the United States demands.”

3.2.2. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

The articles listed below are representative of Mackey's outlook on Saudi Arabia, reflecting the escalation of the Gulf crisis in 1990 and then in 2003. 1990 marks the arrival of a colossal number of foreign troops to Saudi Arabia, from where the U.S.-led Gulf War was operated by 1991. The presence of U.S. military on Saudi soils continued in the decade that followed, an irritating presence for many Saudis bringing about assorted conflicts negatively impacting the image and legitimacy of the House of Saud. Following the 9/11 attacks, creating a strain between the U.S. and the Kingdom, officials of both countries negotiated a withdrawal of American troops from Saudi territories in 2003.

1. "The Saudi monarchy's paranoia rules out development of a national army capable of defending the country: The Billion-Dollar Two-Bit Army," appeared in *Los Angeles Times*, on August 15, 1990
2. "The House Of Saud: Will It Remain A Grateful Host?" in *Chicago Tribune* on August 29, 1990
3. "Welcome or Not, We're In for Keeps: The changes imposed on the Saudi people can't be undone. And we've nowhere else to go to defend the West's oil" in *Los Angeles Times*, on June 28, 1996
4. "Winds of Change in the Desert," in *Los Angeles Times*, on May 04, 2003

3.2.2.1. The Saudi Monarchy's Paranoia Rules out Development of a National Army Capable of Defending the Country

This article was published in August 1990, when American military command was on the ground in Saudi Arabia due to the imperativeness of the Gulf War, and Mackey says that "along with the daunting problems of logistics and desert heat, [they] must also face the grim realities of its new partner—the Saudi army." In providing an outlook on Saudi Kingdom, spending billions of dollars since 1974 to build defense establishments assuming that "it could never fight a war," the journalist remarks on the crux of kingdom's defense strategy that relies on American commitment to its survival as an independent state, having to defend 872,722 square miles, encompassing three coastlines and a northern border stretching the width of the Arab Peninsula,

with a small population of men, who are eligible for military service. “But Saudi Arabia’s defense problems go even deeper, into the very nature of its society and political system.”

In order to place the above sentiment into a perspective, Mackey highlights both the cultural implications within the country and the political formulations of the House of Saud as being a fragile collection of independent individuals, as opposed to a true nation of Saudi Arabia, where resistance incorporation into institutions is obvious. The Bedouin ethos is the leading cultural identifier of Saudis, “which holds that a man bows to no master, not even his government.” They have lived within a state order since 1924, when the Bedouin army of Abdul Aziz ibn Saud proclaimed the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia upon seizing Mecca and the Western coastal plain with the help of his Bedouin army. Without any fiscal resources to structure a nation, ibn Saud succeeded to assemble the Bedouin of the desert and the merchants of the towns together by means of a string of alliances built through “religious orthodoxy” and “the monarch’s own 300 marriages into the kingdom’s major families.” In this system, relationships with the ruler and ruled were not institutional but personal and loyalty of Saudis existed within individual families, while identity lingered with regional basis in this vast country. The established system, though, continued to work; “the king ruled by drawing the people into the political system through their tribal chieftains and religious leaders.” In the aftermath of the 1973 oil embargo, transformation occurred only economically, not politically. In lieu of modernizing the political system through a division of power, “the House of Saud simply turned its network of alliances into a golden pipeline through which the largess of the oil bonanza flowed to the citizenry. Dispensing electricity, water wells, housing, education, health care, grants and loans, the House of Saud held power unto itself.”

While aiming at assuring its survival, the royal house adjusted its military establishment unique in its own right, constituted of two distinct factions. The first faction is the regular forces (army, navy, and air), whose mission is to defend Saudi Arabia from foreign threats. The regular forces are composed of 50,000 men, either from the urban class or of ambition, but with no family bonds to the ruling house. They are the new elite living with attractive salaries and special privileges as well as “under the cloud of the ruling family’s paranoia.” Members of the royal family serve in the top positions; both the non-royal brigade members and wing commanders are regularly shuffled, adverting personal attachments between officers and soldiers. “For non-royals, initiative or efficiency elicits attention and arouses suspicion of clandestine motives,

blocking the way to further promotion [thus] an armed force equipped with the best from the world's arms manufacturers atrophies as an organization." The second faction is the National Guard, who are armed with sophisticated weaponry and trained by former U.S. military personnel, with their mission, to protect the House of Saud against coups that might be originating within the regular armed forces. Composing the National Guard are 25,000-men, who are descendants of those who had fought in Ibn Saud's Bedouin army, and their loyalty stems from tribal alliances, "through which the first Saud ruled." The contention between the regular forces and the national guard may bring about crisis, as it occurred in 1979, when both groups were called on to dislodge religious fanatics, seizing the Grand Mosque at Mecca, yet the rivalry between the units paralyzed the operation until the royal minister of defense personally took command.

According to Mackey, the royal house is always cognizant of the Saudis' resistance to the institution, and subdues it through the power of the national army. They are also aware of the weakness of the military formations yet are reluctant to sacrifice their own security in the process of building a more comprehensive and cohesive defense force with the country's limited populace. "Instead, Saudi Arabia's rulers adopted in 1974 what remains its basic plan of defense: Rush all available manpower to a handful of fortified locations and hold on until the Americans arrive." Now, the American soldiers are on their soil for the joint operation that bears incalculable risk, having to deal with the Saudi military directly, in all of its inefficiencies and ineptitude.

3.2.2.2. The House of Saud

Another article materialized in August 1990 is "The House of Saud" through which Mackey remarks that the royal house has been secured by U.S. troops, yet it faces the "complex task of containing internal political problems" stimulated by a colossal military intervention by a Western power. In order to provide a better understanding for these internally driven problems, the journalist addresses "perplexities of a political system" that the royal house is tangled in, which are overburdened by the xenophobia of the Saudis. This fear of all things foreign is safeguarded by its military force rooted in Bedouin culture, while being authorized and sanctified by a council of religious leaders, the *ulema*, fanatically committed to the fortification of the ultra-orthodox Wahabbi sect of Islam. How Mackey covers these intertwined elements within the

auspices of the framed topic is outlined below.

Saudi's profound xenophobia is a natural result of living within the desert for centuries, and mindful to this feeling of the people, the original al-Saud king Abdul Aziz, kept foreigners, working on oil installations after WWII, confined to a narrow strip of land along the Gulf. This policy was changed very little by his successor, King Saud, and in the late 1960s, only 13 foreigners were living in the capital of Riyadh. In facing the economic boom resulting from the 1973 oil embargo, the ruling house coaxed the Saudis to deal with their hostility toward foreigners in order to profit in terms of technological advances that needed to could only be attained by aliens, thus, the colossal influx of foreigners occurred; Westerners, Arabs, and Asians alike worked to build a modern infrastructure. However the Saudis have never accepted outsiders, particularly Westerners. "Offended that few of their highly paid Westerners understand the teachings of Islam or exhibit any respect for its practices, the Saudis charge Westerners with corrupting the values and traditions of their society."

"By its decision to call in American military support, the House of Saud has in effect unleashed the Western monster." The impact can be quickly felt amongst the National Guard, whose members are drawn from the Bedouin tribes that had fought with the first Saudi king, with their imperative being to protect the royal house against internal enemies. In northern Saudi Arabia, part of the National Guard is mobilized alongside the U.S. armed forces, with American commanders calling the shots; "The Guardsmen will regard this not as an expedient in the defense of Saudi Arabia but as an affront to personal honor, the undercutting of self-esteem [and] they will complain loudly and bitterly to those they protect in the House of Saud."

Widespread popular unrest can be exacerbated or quelled only by the *ulema*, as the people are their "all-important source of its ruling authority." The delicate relations between the House of Saud and the *ulema* may dematerialize, once the *ulema* learns of the massive size of the foreign invasion, bringing with it not only female soldiers but also suspected quantities of alcohol. "Through the widespread network of imams and the devout, the religious leaders can inflame a population already convinced that the West poses a mortal danger to Islam." If the U.S. takes into consideration the propensities of the royal house, "On orders from Saudi Arabia's nervous rulers, much of the American military may well find itself bottled up in the desert to keep it out of the sight and mind of the general population." The ruling family can yet pacify the religious authorities and by proxy the people, as they have particular disdain for the secularist

Saddam rivaling that towards the proposed infidels as “they can be quieted with religious rhetoric from the throne and money for their favorite causes.”

Apart from the cultural repercussions, the House of Saud must still worry about widespread but unorganized political opposition that will arise due to the arrival of the American soldiers. The source for the political opposition would be at the hands of the royals, who's political and economic power remain. The ruling king, Fahd, is often perceived as morally corrupt, accused of being detrimental to the very fabric of society due to his close relation with the West, which is seen as being maintained for his own personal benefits. His political oppositions circulate the conviction that the U.S. was summoned to protect the House of Saud, not Saudi Arabia. The most organized opposition against the royal family is from the Eastern province, in which population resides with almost no family ties to the House of Saud. The Eastern province is from where the kingdom's wealth stems, but has been denied the copious public projects for betterment that the interior enjoys. Living in this section of the kingdom is a mixture of Wahhabi, Sunni, and Shiite populations, lacking a fair share of the wealth it creates. “This is the area in which the oil fields the Americans are to protect and the ports needed for their logistical support are located.” It would be impossible to hide the size of the U.S. operation in this region, and it is not possible to drive out the perceptions of those believing that the U.S. is there to protect only the royal family.

Mackey sums up, “Fahd's critics are right in that the king, while certainly fearing for the security of Saudi Arabia, called in the United States because he also feared for the House of Saud,” and the survival of the ruling family will regulate the future decisions of King Fahd. If American military presence escalates and its duration on Saudi soils extends indefinitely, the king may come to a conclusion that the U.S. intervention is an unbearable political risk to the royal house. If it happens, the grateful host, the kingdom will ask to reduce the American presence. “American policy planners must be aware that Fahd may ultimately choose to take his chances negotiating with Saddam Hussein rather than face the wrath of his own people.”

3.2.2.3. Welcome or Not, We're In for Keeps

This article is about a terrorist attack on the Khobar Towers, a compound housing for American military personnel in Dhahran that happened on June 25, 1996, to which Mackey

writes, "From the dust and blood of the bombed out ruins of a compound housing [for] American military personnel in Saudi Arabia, Americans must draw not only anger and sorrow; they must also realize that the United States is facing a budding crisis at the core of its strategic interests: the Persian Gulf." While covering the issue of the bombing the journalist also touches upon the U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, writing, "Designating Iran a 'rogue state,' isolating Iraq and unable to employ the tiny principalities of Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates as military staging areas, the Clinton administration has placed American defense of the Persian Gulf in Saudi Arabia." Saudi Arabia is yet too fragile both psychologically and politically to bear this role, which bears a palpable threat to "the orderly flow of oil vital to the economic health of the industrialized world."

In elaborating her article, Mackey proves insightful on Saudis, who were secluded in their own world as a traditional society, functioning within the Bedouin values, which remained relatively undisturbed up until the fall of 1973, when "the industrialized world's need for oil and the oil producers' desire for income met." Suddenly, wealth flowed into the region, where people in most parts were living in mud houses or tents while, subsisting on only lamb, rice and dates. Despite poverty, the Saudis were extremely proud of their identity drawn from a culture rooted in both the tribe and the Wahhabi sect of Islam. "Claiming to be the keepers of Islam in its purest form, they resented the outsider, Westerner and non-Westerner alike." However, the foreigners continued to come, as the industrialized world was demanding Saudi Arabia to spend its petrodollars as rapidly as possible to ensure a sound international financial system. It is in this milieu the royal house bargained with its fearful subjects and promised that Saudi Arabia would retain its traditional values while simultaneously building a high-tech infrastructure.

The changes within the traditional society came rapidly but the creation of the government by consensus held onto the old tribal patterns, which paved the way for the formation of new bureaucratic structures. Generational conflicts began to divide families as young men were provided government scholarships to receive education in the West and returned back with shades of western ideas, while young women going to school in Saudi Arabia began to develop their own image distancing themselves from the harem. "In this rapidly changing value system, the religious establishment that for generations had served as the moral guide of the society found itself co-opted by the political needs of the House of Saud." On the one hand, princes and clerics "slid into the cesspool of corruption," and on the other, they

refused to open the power structure to the other, the new middle class and the restive traditionalists alike: “Then came the Gulf War.”

“The Saudis, who wanted nothing more than to be left alone, found themselves on the front line of the 1991 war for Persian Gulf oil.” 500,000 predominantly American foreign troops landed on their soil, which resulted in the population being torn between two threats, “fear of Iraq” and “dread of alien invasion.” When the war was over, the Saudi government approved American demand and “contingents of U.S. troops remain in Saudi Arabia to enforce the uneasy peace.” In seeing the compound houses of the American military personnel in Dhahran, most Saudis remembered their anxieties of 1973: “a foreign presence in a reclusive society and the ceaseless erosion of traditional values.” At the same time they conceptualized the foreign military power as the keeper and protector of the discredited Saudi regime in power. “On Tuesday, a group of men did what most Saudis would never do—exploded a bomb outside an apartment building housing symbols of their resentments.”

According to Mackey, “what the United States must learn from the horror of the Khobar Towers goes beyond Saudi Arabia to the entire Persian Gulf.” Prior to 1979, the administrations of Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter ignored the political discontent occurring in Iran where Muhammad Reza Shah was assigned as policeman of the Gulf. Today, the Clinton administration is placing the vital interests of the U.S. in a country, Saudi Arabia, lacking the desire and political stability to implement the role that is assigned to it. “If Saudi Arabia under the House of Saud flounders as the shah's Iran did, the United States has nowhere else to place the military forces intended to keep the oil of the Persian Gulf flowing.” The U.S. must consider an even larger issue while expressing anger about the aforementioned act of terrorism: “how to begin the arduous process of devising a Persian Gulf policy that engages the region as a whole rather than pitting one state against another: To do less, courts disaster.”

3.2.2.4. Winds of Change in the Desert

Published in May 2003, this article explores the announcement of the U.S.’s course of action, withdrawing almost all American troops from Saudi Arabia by August of that year, to which Mackey points out that after the tension escalated between the U.S. and the Arab world throughout the months, the Bush administration is suggesting some sensitivity to the political

realities there; “it is advancing the political needs of the House of Saud and, in doing so, promoting American interests by pursuing stability in the Persian Gulf.” Washington is acknowledging that certain fixtures have proven to be good politicians in the upper echelons of the House of Saud.

In covering the framed topic, Mackey also highlights the cultural and political history of Saudi Arabia, a vast country with its distinct regions, religious sects, urban areas, and tribes. There was no unity in this territory until the early 1920s, when Abdul Aziz ibn Saud established the kingdom while claiming legitimacy through the defense of Islam, specifically the Wahhabi sect. He proved himself as a master politician in building and retaining his power, and in order to achieve this he regularly moved across the desert between the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, carrying his treasury on camels. While living like a Bedouin in his tent, he received tribal leaders, passing out gifts, and arranging marriages with the daughters of these key leaders on the tribal level to assure allegiance to his legitimacy.

In the 1960s, the importance of Arabia’s oil necessitated the established system to adapt, as the heirs of Abdul Aziz could no longer keep this xenophobic country isolated from the outside world. Yet the real pressure was exacted upon the Arab oil embargo of 1973. “Money poured into the kingdom, and with it came legions of foreigners who built an infrastructure and stamped Saudi society with the veneer, if not the substance, of Western culture.” Oil revenue was used to create a welfare state by the royal family, which also carefully acted, balancing between progression of modernization and the defense of traditional codes. It was this commitment to Saudi culture that helped shield the ruling house against the Islamic fervor raised under the impact of the Iranian Revolution of 1979. However, neither the provided service (e.g., housing, education, and health care), nor the defense of the culture was enough to assure the legitimacy of the ruling family. “Oil revenues were falling by the mid-1980s. The welfare state's generous benefits were cut despite the popular perception of rampant greed in the royal family, particularly among the regime’s lesser figures.” Ascending to the throne in 1982, King Fahd, lacking in the political touch of his predecessors, would prove instrumental in the exacerbation of his countries entrenchment.

In 1990, alarmed by the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, the royal family granted the U.S. to use their soil as a military base, hosting 500,000 coalition forces, composed mostly of American soldiers. “The Saudis, who had convinced themselves that they could have the technology of

modernization and still not be westernized, now confronted the presence of a U.S.-led armed force in the shadows of Islam's holiest sites, Mecca and Medina." After the Gulf War, thousands of American troops stayed in Saudi Arabia to keep tabs on Saddam, and in order to repair political fences the royal house poured money into Islamic causes, most of which went to legitimate programs and charities while some "ended up in the schools and coffers of Islamic militants who provided most of the 9/11 hijackers." Suddenly the House of Saud turned out to be the target of critics rather than the traditionalist bastion demanding an Islamic republic. While angry Americans believed that the royal family had sent those terrorists against them, and simultaneously Saudi modernizers pushed for liberal political reforms. Speculation has proliferated in the U.S. that "the days of the House of Saud are numbered," yet the princes of Riyadh have answered this doubt, proving their talents as politicians. This occurred at a time, when crown Prince Abdullah was the de facto head of state due to Fahd's poor health condition. Possessing the al-Saud political touch, being in touch with the tribes while seeming devoid of greed and corruption, Abdullah claims of legitimacy are upheld amongst a large wedge of population. His purported vision for the country includes promising necessary reforms to be implemented on broad spectrum, ranging from enabling the middle class to enter into politics, to economic privatization, job growth, modification of the education system, and increased opportunities for Saudi women. The de facto king acknowledges that all these changes have to come within the context of Saudi norms not under what Saudis perceives as the demands of the U.S. "That means that the large U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia since the 1991 Gulf War needs to end before the reforms are put into place."

The journalist deems that Americans need to understand two points with the departure of the U.S. military. The first being, "the House of Saud is not kicking America out of Saudi Arabia"; it rather should signify the success in war in Iraq, as "the U.S. no longer needs to maintain its presence in the kingdom." Second, "the United State is neither punishing the ruling family nor writing it off." In essence, the administration must understand that the U.S. security can be succeeded by both disengagement and engagement; "by pursuing disengagement, Washington is allowing the House of Saud to go to its people as politicians rather than as clients of the United States."

3.2.3. The Republic of Iraq

Iraq is perhaps Mackey's most frequently covered country since the 1990s, when it was becoming an issue within the international community with the annexation of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein's armed forces. The strain continued throughout the decade, due to the highlighted reasons as the dictatorial rule of Hussein, his violation of the weapons requirements set down by the UN, and his support for al-Qaida's terrorism, which brought about the U.S. invasion of Iraq and its continuing occupation. The following articles are representative of Mackey's outlook concerning Iraq, which she addresses with an identifiable formula present in her other treatments on the Middle East as well.

1. "Get Rid of Saddam—and Then What?: Iraq: His departure would leave a volatile vacuum because there's no sign of consensus among the country's long-hostile ethnic and religious groups" published in *Los Angeles Times*, on August 25, 1992.
2. "Think Globally, Act Tribally: If Hussein is forced to admit inspectors, Iraq's clans may desert him—toppling the dictator without a U.S. attack" in *Los Angeles Times*, on October 20, 2002.
3. Two articles with no proper titles, but accompanied with "Sandra Mackey Middle East writer and author of *The Reckoning: Iraq and the Legacy of Saddam Hussein*" on guardian.co.uk, posted on February 17, 2003 and May 20, 2003.
4. "Better Alive Than Dead" in *The New York Times*, on July 24, 2003.
5. "Iraq's Dangerous Identity Crisis: Turning over power to people who lack a sense of national unity won't work" in *Los Angeles Times*, on November 16, 2003.
6. "Echoes of Iran: Muqtada Sadr's revolt may lead to an Islamic republic" in *Los Angeles Times*, on April 11, 2004.
7. "A City That Lives for Revenge" in *The New York Times*, on April 29, 2004.
8. "The Coming Clash Over Kirkuk" in *The New York Times*, on February 9, 2005.

3.2.3.1. Get Rid of Saddam—and Then What?

This article was materialized in August 1992, in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War taking place between August 2, 1990 and February 28, 1991—the war, waged against Iraq by the UN-authorized coalition force, composed of thirty-four nations led by the U.S., following Iraqi invasion and annexation of Kuwait. The crux of the article can be promoted with Mackey's sentiment that “before the issue of what to do about Saddam Hussein becomes a lashing foil in the U.S. presidential campaign, candidates and voters alike need to consider the root problem—the nature of Iraq itself—and the perils that would follow the villainous leader's ouster.”

Mackey provides a brief history describing what Iraq is now, which had been a provincial outpost of the Ottoman Empire for five hundred years before coming under the protectorate of Britain after WWI. Britain created it to be a modern state, into which three groups of people were consolidated, who shared common ground in either religion, ethnicity, or language, but not on all fronts; thus, “Iraq was denied at birth the most basic element of nationhood—a common identity among its people.” When it became an independent state in 1932, the majority of population, around 60%, was Shia Muslim of mixed origin, indigenous Arabs and non-Arabs who had migrated from Iran over the centuries. “As adherents to the Shiite sect of Islam, which claims only 10% of all Muslims, they were vilified as heretics by the mainstream Sunnis.” Constituting 20% of population, the Kurds with Indo-European rooted language and Sunni religion demanded separate nationhood, while the remaining group was composed of Sunni Arabs. Each of these groups was further divided by regional isolation, as the Shia resided in the south, “between the border of Iran and what was then Transjordan” the Kurds populated in the north, “in areas adjacent to Turkey, Syria, the Soviet Union and Iran,” where the Kurdish minorities also wished for cultural unity through an autonomous Kurd state, while the Sunni Arabs lived in the geographic center of Iraq, granted political power by the occupying British.

Framing the writing with the aforementioned demographic scene, which remained static more or less into the early 1990s, where hostility to foreign occupation has kept all intact while the torture of the people has come out of the political and militarily dominant Sunni area, the journalist shows the fragility of the Iraqi nation, indicative of the reason for the Gulf War stopping short of Baghdad. The allies in the coalition were wary of the power vacuum that might have occurred subsequent to removal of Hussein. Having their own Kurdish constituency, for

Turkey and Syria visioning declaration of nationhood by the Iraqi Kurds was more frightening than the continuing existence of Hussein. The ensuing chaos on the shores of the Persian Gulf, as groups would claim sovereignty over pieces of a disintegrating Iraq, was a frightening potential proliferation for the U.S. Thus, the allied powers stopped south of Baghdad, hoping instead a disgruntled military would perform a coupe to topple Hussein's regime. To Mackey this plan might have worked had there been no revolts simultaneously rising in the Kurdish and Shia dominated regions, which resulted in the military, dominated by Sunnis, to protect Hussein out of necessity for survival. "For even without Hussein, Iraq remains Iraq, a country of hostile groups capable of ripping itself apart and throwing the whole region into turmoil."

In addressing the political and strategic planning in the U.S. as many republicans advice a strike on Iraq for reconciliation and a clear victory of the Gulf War, while the democrats and the administration have been encouraging Kurdish opposition to which there is even gossip of the U.S. arming the Kurds as had occurred in Afghanistan, Mackey writes, "but if the Kurds are armed, why not the Shiites? Will anyone win, or at the end of a decade of civil war, will some only lose less than others, as has happened in Afghanistan?" The Gulf War, from its inception, was a no-win situation; as a result, decisions were made under the paradigm of damage control. The same measures need to be applied to the current situation in Iraq. She strongly suggests that removal of Saddam Hussein is not a solution without the existence of a viable governmental structure to take his place. In Iraq opposition groups are largely fragmented either through religion or by ethnicity, while some might imagine a coalition, there is yet another factor—the imperative of tribal politics, waiting to come to the surface with Hussein's removal. Within this current dilemma there is only one certainty; "politicians who score points on the sole issue of dispatching Saddam Hussein run the grave risk of igniting yet another crisis in the Persian Gulf by ignoring the realities of Iraq itself."

3.2.3.2. Think Globally, Act Tribally

Published in October 2002, on the eve of the U.S. invasion of Iraq (2003), this article describes what has happened in Iraq since the Gulf War of 1991, when Shiites and Kurds rebelled against Saddam Hussein, whose only support came from the Sunni constituency. Subsequently, he wiped out all the efforts working towards nurturing an Iraqi nation which had

been an endeavor attempted by Iraqi kings, military dictators, the Baath, and even Saddam himself within an eighty year span. While keeping his police state as it was, Hussein also kept his political power by reviving tribalism—the most basic building block of Iraqi identity.

The reporting style of Mackey is exemplified in her representation of tribal structure, significant in understanding the political composition of Iraq, where “the tribes could bring about the collapse of Hussein without America having to fire a shot.” This is a perspective standing at odds with the Bush administration’s evaluation of Hussein’s power through its now familiar elements; “the Republican Guard, the internal security system and the stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons.” She explains that in this headlong rush to war, ignoring another element of Hussein’s power, “an intricate set of alliances with Iraqi tribal leaders,” led to the conclusion of the administration that “Hussein is so entrenched that only U.S. military power can remove him.”

The journalist places a specific emphasis on history in order to place the issue into perspective, telling of the nature of Hussein’s regime that is rooted in the nature of Iraq, the state into which a cluster of ethnic and sectarian groups, apart from, but still including Sunni and Shiite Arabs were jammed together by Britain in the aftermath of WWI. Containing powerful tribal elements, this human mosaic was forced into existence, despite the strong urban tradition evident within each of these groups, particularly among Sunnis. From the day of his ascension to the throne in 1921, a conception British in origin, Faisal I faced the same challenged, the tribal configurations, each claiming its own law and leadership. His successors in the monarchy and in each government after the 1958 revolution faced the same challenge; “control of the tribes.” Since the days of the Ottoman Empire the urban tradition counterbalanced tribalism in the periphery, and throughout the 1950s-1960s, each regime attempted to increase urbanite population to move Iraq from its tribal roots towards a more united nation. Particularly the Baath government, in which Hussein played a part, achieved a level of success in this; while using the explosion of oil prices in the 1970s the party enlarged public service and infrastructure which had benefits for most of the ethnic, sectarian and tribal groups. The Baathists even imagined a new identity for Iraq crossing the barriers of sect and tribe in declaring all Iraqis as direct descendants of ancient Mesopotamia; yet they ignored the history that “most Iraqis are either of mixed heritage born of centuries of conquest or are immigrants who arrived as late as the early years of the 20th century.” Following this ideology, the Baath government spent millions of dollars on archeological explorations in and around the ancient Assyrian capital and Babylon.

“Tying these symbols of ancient history to a socialist economic system, the rulers in Baghdad sold the idea that ethnic, sectarian and tribal rivalries should give way to Iraqi nationalism.” Despite this, tribalism continued to challenge the state as the Sunni tribes continued their influence over the desert in the west while the Shiites of the south still provided allegiance to their tribal leaders. Between 1970 and 1975, the Kurds of the north waged another rebellion against Baghdad, and in this tribal politics was the vehicle despite the main cause that was a demand for autonomy or independent state. In the cities, rural migrants pursuing economic promise replicated their tribal formation as pledging loyalty to their tribal leaders. During the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88, as sole authority Hussein relinquished the idea of Mesopotamian unity as he opted instead to acknowledge the war a rivalry between himself and the Ayatollah Khomeini, shifting the battlefield to stage the epic struggle between Arabs and Persians; in this equation the Kurds had not part. “But neither was it a great national cause, only a bloodbath in which government conscription and tribal leaders sent Iraqis into the trenches to die.”

Immediately after the Gulf War of 1991, and upon being called upon, the tribal sheiks both from the Shiite south and the Sunni midlands publically pledged their allegiance to the president, which was a deal made in mutual benefit. The tribal leaders gained money, favor and arms from the government, and in return gave control of their people to Hussein. This was the new mode of existence as “even in what became the Kurdish autonomous zone patrolled by U.S. military aircraft, one Kurdish faction allied with Baghdad in 1996 to gain advantage over a rival Kurdish group.” The urban neighborhoods, which had been organized themselves within the tribal scheme of the 1950s, have been woven into a network of tribal alliances designed by and serving Hussein, who also helped to produce new types of tribes that required no kinship under the labels of any conceivable economic or social organization such as a labor union, professional organization, trade association, student group, or art school. “The result is that Iraq today is a more tribal society than it was at the time the country was pasted together by the British.”

Mackey intends to underline that despite the above-mentioned fact, the tribes have never entirely been under Hussein’s control, as they have also governed him on occasion. Even with the disputes that have occurred between them; if they choose, the tribes can be a threatening factor to the regime, as it occurred in 1996 when “one of these tribes, the Dalaim, is suspected of seriously wounding the president’s oldest son, Uday, [...] in retaliation for the arrest and execution of its principal sheik.” The journalist’s point is that Hussein keeps tribal alliances as

long as individual leaders gain benefit in this relationship; weakness on Saddam's part would lead the whole alliance away as the tribes ally themselves only with the well-built power. "This is where the Bush administration has an opportunity to achieve regime change in Iraq without a war." Her suggestion to war planners—re-impose UN arms inspections in Iraq, as their presence instills the notion of the waning power of Hussein, which in turn would clash with interests bringing about the withdrawal of tribal support from the government. Consequently, Hussein's control is not retained in the periphery, only in the center, but even this clout would begin to diminish if he was made out to be diminishing in power himself. This is a time intensive plan to topple the regime through the forces of tribalism—a plan, "for the Bush administration to think about before it commits the lives of unknown numbers of American soldiers and billions of dollars to a war in the Persian Gulf, with all of its unintended consequences."

3.2.3.3. Two articles appearing in the Guardian

Posted on the guardian's website, two articles have many similarities in content and in terms of the way Mackey frames her writings. In both articles, the journalist addresses the necessities of dealing with Saddam Hussein. The one posted on the page in February 2003, before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, serves as cautionary on what would happen if the U.S. were to go to war with a lack of understanding of Iraq, while the other posted on May 2003 functions as critical analysis of the war that had started and suggests as to what the future would hold.

In February, Mackey underlines that "the question of whether an invasion is justified is a difficult issue," as Hussein has violated the weapons requirements set down by the UN and he will continue to do so; thus "there's every reason for the international community to clamp down on him and his plans." Also to her, Iraqis would be much better off without him, a tyrant, who devastated a country that has so much potential including water resources which could be utilized for agricultural expansion, overshadowed perpetually by the issue of oil. Yet, she has concerns regarding the idea of military invasion described in three case in point examples.

First being the challenge of the political repercussions, as Iraq is ethnically divided, and though it is a state, it has never been a nation. Throughout its history each group has competed with the other for the right to define the state without success. Thus, when you go into Iraq via military invasion for the purpose of regime change and bring on the process of nation-building,

you have a colossal problem; “there is no consensus among the people about what they want this state to look like, what they want its political culture to be and how the political institutions are going to be structured in order to actually govern the country.” Second, the poor preparation and position of the U.S. and Britain in this potential war, particularly exemplified in the Bush administration being simply unwilling to even address the Palestinian issue. Yet it was what was needed, “because it would have given the US some political cover for what we’re getting ready to do.” Instead, the administration has given the Israeli government *carte blanche* to deal with the Palestinian uprising however it deems necessary, to which she adds, “We’re going to pay a price for that.” The third issue is presented questioning how the U.S. would go about heading into the war, as it seemed a unilateral approach would be their sole option, without consensus in the international community, which had been achieved in the Gulf War of 1991.

To Mackey, if this war was not to occur in a very quick, surgical manner, and turned out to be long-term effort, a humanitarian problem would arise as it is not clear to what extent humanitarian organizations would be able to operate when a battle was still raging on the ground, “particularly if you get into chemical and biological weapons.” Saddam Hussein certainly knows that he is going to be toppled, thus he is ready to strike back, throwing everything he has at American invading forces, patterned in his behavior. “Certainly it’s for everybody’s benefit for him to be gone: it’s just that, again, have we really thought through what’s going to come next?” One thing that we need to remember, despite that Iraqis do not carry a deep sense of nationalism, they have a deep hostility against colonialism, bequeathed to them during the colonial period. “Yes, the Iraqi people are going to see an American invasion as liberation from Saddam Hussein—but they’re also going to see it as an occupation by a colonial power.”

In May Mackey writes, “no one could quibble with the idea that getting rid of Saddam Hussein has been beneficial,” while elaborating on her disagreements with the war-hawks of the Bush administration: “one, how we went about it, on an almost unilateral basis; and, second, that we really did not understand how difficult Iraq was going to be to deal with after the fact, [which has] certainly been borne out by what we’ve seen in Iraq since the end of the fighting.” Iraqis are now having to go through the process of defining the state, something that the nation has never come to terms with—a mutual agreement on what a common identity would be: “Is Iraq an Arab country that reflects Arab culture and Arab political aspirations, or is it a country that is unique;

both an Arab country and not an Arab country? And should Iraq be a secular state or should it be a theocracy?” Before moving on to structuring the state, you have to define its purpose.

This dilemma on the common identity is now in its eighth decade of prevalence, and it is certain that Iraqis are not going to come up with a solution under the auspices of a foreign invasion, where the public order is now the main challenge and dealing with it may require the imposition of an occupational government. In this circumstance, the paradox surrounding Iraq is personified with a lack of nationalism, which would be a molding force to bring all towards working for the common good, to which Mackey adds, any semblance of nationalism would vanish upon the U.S.’s exiting, as it was only “a negative nationalism of opposition to outside forces.” Islamists, who are the best-organized people, have the opportunity to take the leadership of this opposition as they are proclaiming to Iraqis: “We want the west out of our lives.” Islam, particularly Shia Islam, has a very strong social message, best served for Shia controlled areas but also in other urban settings. In ordinary circumstances, an emergence of an Islamic government is unlikely, as Iraq has always been governed by the secular and there are many people from all religious groupings frightened of a theocracy; yet, “that’s not to say there isn’t a danger that the Islamics can capture the leadership of this anti-occupation sentiment.” Mackey further provides that if the U.S. was to promote a system of three autonomous regions, where the country’s oil resources are located in the north and in the south, “how are you going to ensure that the center of the country gets its fair share of the oil revenues?”

According to the journalist, both the U.S. and Britain can bring some order to Iraq in the short term, yet the reconstruction effort will fade away in time. Britain had accomplished an open public debate on whether to go to war, which was never afforded in the U.S.; spelling “a failure of the politicians, of the media, and just of the general level of interest on the part of the American public,” leaving the average American without a clue as to how peace would be accomplished. Mackey draws a picture of Iraq, where the occupation forces are in grave danger, susceptible to suicide, sniper, and guerrilla attacks, while questioning “how you’re going to politically sustain the idea of taking \$20bn (£12bn) of American tax revenues and pouring them into Iraq, year after year after year” and “if the body bags start coming home and the economic situation in the US doesn't start to improve, [...] how you're going to sustain this occupation.”

In telling that she is becoming a pessimist about what is behind the action—the ideology in American policy in the Middle East, as the U.S. is in danger of thinking that the solution to all

problems come in lieu of military power, Mackey notes, “the hardliners in the Pentagon, who tend to be very, very pro-Israeli, [feel] that if you’ve taken out Saddam Hussein, if you take out the government of Syria and you overthrow the Islamic republic in Iran, then you’ve eliminated all of the real threats to Israel.” She adds, there is no clue on “how far this campaign is going to go” but it is certain that once comparing the situation as a whole with that in Iraq, where troop surges seem to implicate only the need for another, there would be serious hesitation to try to do the same in Iran—a vast country “that would be, in my opinion, just impossible to occupy.”

3.2.3.4. Better Alive Than Dead

This article, issued in July 2003, is about the murder of the two sons of Saddam Hussein, Uday and Qusay, which is considered by Mackey as a tactical victory, gained by the U.S. occupation of Iraq, but not a strategic one. She reports that the evidence, which the U.S. presented in proving that “the brothers were indeed killed in a firefight with American forces,” did not persuade many Iraqis while some others voiced their disappointment. Capturing the two brothers alive and putting them on display would have been a chance for the U.S. occupation authority to show “absolute proof of their demise.” It also would have been an opportunity for Iraqis to face their tormentors in court to satisfy their will for vengeance. “By denying Iraqis their revenge [...], the American authorities have overlooked the needs of a society dominated by the rural values of the diverse tribes that make up much of the country’s population.”

The journalist touches upon what is currently predicted by the U.S. officials with the death of Uday and Qusay, as to them in the short term the supporters of Saddam Hussein may increase their guerilla attacks on American troops; yet soon they will lose their energy to resist, to which she says, there is yet other possibilities that should not be ignored: the strikes of Hussein’s supporters may decline immediately to reignite later as they may want revenge for their diminished status in the power scheme. Also, the tribal conventions opposing Hussein’s regime may see the U.S. as responsible for denying them the opportunity to exact their own vengeance on the brothers, as these odious symbols of the old regime ought to have been subjected to something more akin to what they had brought to their victims. Furthermore, it is uncertain whether the U.S. will be able to coax Iraqis in regards to its story, as their flow of information is under the control of the Iraqi media, distributing its own narrative of the firefight

and in this there is a big possibility the U.S. would not be painted in a favorable light, “even the American release of photographs may not confirm that the brothers were killed.” With this elaborated reportage, Mackey explains that the U.S. still forgets what it deals with—a culture far older and different from its own, where suspicion and distrust of authority, especially Western, has become a deeply seated common motive.

Throughout history, conqueror followed conqueror in what turned out to be Iraq in 1921, where people sought security in family and tribe. Although the elite run the country with urban attitudes after their independence in 1932, the ties of family and group remained crucial, and when the Baath came to power (1968), tribalism was intensified. “The Baath Party itself was the purview of one tribe, the Bu Nasir, the tribe of Saddam Hussein.” Following the Gulf War of 1991, Hussein promoted tribalism as a means of survival, giving it a status that had never been enjoyed since the inception of the state. During this time the old urban elite and much of the urban middle class, a byproduct of the oil boom of the 1970s, were driven out due to repressive politics and economic hardship. Hussein recreated Iraq within the last decade of his reign; “operating according to the values of the tribe, the system sanctioned the age-old principle of revenge.” While Hussein doled out revenge on people defying the regime, sending them into torture chambers and prisons, the tribes brought revenge to the regime in the name of honor and in retaliation for the punishment of their members. The concept of revenge needs to be understood very well Mackey says, as in late-20th-century Iraq it was not unlike it had been for the tribes living for generations over these lands.

Mackey concludes that in scrapping the attempt to detain Uday and Qusay, deeming it as too risky, the U.S. administration in Iraq has ignored the needs of Iraqi culture and it also undermines what is wished upon Iraq, to become one nation, built around the rule of law. Yet, “Under Mr. Hussein’s reign, justice, to the extent it existed, was consistently perverted. It was erratic, violent and retributive, a tool of Mr. Hussein and his Baath Party.” Thus, by not working harder towards the Hussein brothers’ surrender, the U.S. missed a chance to show Iraqis that perpetrators of the most heinous of crimes could still be brought to justice under their wing. On trial in Baghdad, the brothers could have been held accountable and forced to confess the regime’s crimes, bringing results that would have been more permanent, and a possible expedition to efforts on the ground in many ways. The deaths of the Husseins are being declared a victory, but it is only temporary and the mode in which they were killed will be another long-

term complication for American occupation.

3.2.3.5. Iraq's Dangerous Identity Crisis

Mackey identifies the crux of the issue that she is writing on in this article, published in November 2003, with the term “Iraqification” referring to the latest plan of the Bush administration that is to accelerate the transfer of the power to Iraqis while withdrawing a major portion of American soldiers from Iraq. “After hastily arranged meetings with L. Paul Bremer III, the top U.S. official in Iraq, the White House announced a political version last week.” The goal is to create an interim government by the summer of 2004 ““that can bear the weight of sovereignty and authority,”” to which the journalist comments “no matter how much political power and military responsibility are transferred to the Iraqis, the situation in Iraq will not dramatically improve until Iraqis agree on a national identity, a goal that has eluded them since the state was created by British diplomats some 80 years ago.”

In informing as to what is going on in Iraq, centering the discussion on persistent violence, which is more of challenge on the U.S.-led occupation than just the guerilla campaign lead by supporters of former regime and ethereal foreign terrorists, Mackey reports that the violence involves a bloody struggle among factions of the Iraqi population, each demanding the right to define the Iraqi state—a contest, going towards the constitutional process. There is still no consensus within the populace, where apart from the three major delineations there are others; Turkomans wish protection of their rights from Arabs and Kurds while Christian Assyrians and Armenians seek both protection from the Muslim majority and recognition of their religion and culture. To this she provides a brief history, indicative of the shift on the definition of the state to better elaborate the current dilemma in Iraq, which was declared by the monarchy rewarding only the vision of Arab Sunnis between 1921 and 1958 as “an Arab country in the larger Arab world.” It was defined by the first military government after the revolution, with a consideration of the country’s demographic reality, as “as separate and distinct from the predominantly Sunni Arab countries to the west.” Subsequent military governments placed the monarchy’s definition onto Iraq. Hussein first claimed Iraqis to be “the heir of ancient Mesopotamia,” but then revived Iraq’s Arab identity with his invasion of Iran in 1980, to put spin on the war as an Arab-Persian conflict. “With Hussein removed from power, the Iraqis have been free to define themselves,

which has caused much of the violence ensnaring U.S. soldiers.”

On the Sunni side, those loyal to Hussein are now attacking against both Americans and their coalition partners, trying to reclaim their former positions as the privileged minority of the country; “shut out of post-Hussein Iraq, they fantasize about driving out the American occupiers.” Respectively, the majority-Shiites have assumed the dominant role in the country’s political arena; yet they are fighting as well in hopes of determining the direction of the future government, as it will be secular, theocratic, or a blend of the two, one in which Islam functions as the moral basis of the system. Maintaining a firewall between politics and religion are the traditional Shiites with their most-respected clerics, to whom most Iraqi Shiites are attached, who condone the U.S.-led occupation through a projection of indifference. Yet, Muqtader Sadr, a crucial character in Shia leadership, has declared war against the coalition under the banner of the Islamic revolution. This is a social and theological conflict. Sadr has agitated the poor, urban Shia of Baghdad against the elite of his own confessional. “Even if Sadr flounders in his call for an Islamic state, Shiites still face the question of who among them has the right to define the Shiite version of the Iraqi state—urban intellectuals, the clerical elite, rural tribal sheiks or the urban underclass.” Concerning the Kurds, their unity is on the surface, resulting from their belief of being close to the ascertainment of what they have long sought after—autonomy; “but beyond that, rural and urban Kurds are divided on how the new state should be structured.”

Mackey makes it clear that “before the war, the Bush administration pledged that the U.S. mission in Iraq would end when the Iraqis wrote a constitution, held elections and installed a government.” The Iraqi Governing Council was to be the vehicle for this hope, assigned with the exile-dominated members representing Iraq’s demographic mix; yet, it has not devised a transition plan, which was in part the result of its inability to resolve the well-entrenched identity conflicts. Today, blaming Hussein’s loyalists and foreign terrorists is an easy way to explain the increasing violence in Iraq but the reality is that without consensus on the definition of the state as well as on how political and economic power will be distributed, this violence will never end. “Choosing a new council to write a constitution, or creating a provisional government along the lines of President Hamid Karzai’s in Afghanistan, will not automatically hasten the day that Iraqis agree on a national identity.” After all, “the longer it takes to define the Iraqi state, the longer the United States will be trapped in Iraq”; spending money, killing and being killed, and proliferating avarice on all sides, around the world.

3.2.3.6. Echoes of Iran

“Unless Washington can delicately finesse its confrontation with the Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr, President Bush could become the war president whose blindness to the political complexities in postwar Iraq created an Islamic republic in the country,” writes Mackey as she further elucidates her thinking in this article, published in April 2004: “That’s because the Bush administration is staring at the reality that Sadr, who seeks to replicate in Iraq the governing model of the Islamic Republic of Iran, is taking command of two of the three factors that triggered Iran’s 1979 revolution.” Centered on this, she covers U.S.-occupied Iraq where, “since unleashing his militia and supporters in four Iraqi cities last Sunday, [Sadr] has become a key player in the unfolding drama that will determine the definition of the new Iraqi state.”

As the current political climate in Iraq echoes the circumstances once in Iran, Mackey remarks on “triumphant entry of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini into Tehran” that was signaled for most Americans as “the victory of religion over politics.” She adds, “But the 1979 revolution against the shah arose from the confluence of three forces—nationalism, social revolution and the presence of a religious authority figure who was able to call thousands into the streets to protest the status quo.” Believed to be a puppet of the U.S., the Shah was usurped by Iranians of a broad spectrum, including the middle class who had been kept away from the political system, as well as the urban and rural poor, whose demand was social justice. “Most accepted Khomeini, the voice of Iranian nationalism and longtime opponent of the shah, as their symbolic leader.” It was a social revolution in many aspects, coming from the lower echelons of Iranian society, who found the means of this revolution in the rhetoric and spiritual authority of Khomeini. Seizing social justice central to Shiite ideology, Khomeini and his followers sheared off the top of the social pyramid, and transformed the secular republic into an Islamic one in 1981.

The journalist reminds that a transition in Iraq to some form of representative government depends on the Shia composing 60% of the population. In nearly a year of occupation, presence of American troops on Iraqi soils has received acceptance from the Shiite religious leadership, with the exception of Sadr. He raised the banner of rebellion, and is now calling for the end of the occupation. His rhetoric just like that of Khomeini is both religion and fervently nationalistic. “‘America has shown its evil intentions, and the proud Iraqi people cannot accept it,’ Sadr proclaimed last week. The poor performance of the Coalition Provisional Authority in providing

security and fixing the economy has redounded to Sadr's favor.” Another point strengthening Sadr’s position is his social message, promising the urban masses of Baghdad a rescue from poverty. In order to support his message he provides services to Shia population, something that had been refused by Hussein and has not been offered by the U.S. for fear of being seen exhibiting favoritism. The outcome of this is that since August 2003, Sadr’s militia, the Al Mahdi army, has doubled in size, and now some of his followers are chanting his name, Sadr, as the son of the Mahdi, the Shiites’ savior. The third element that shifted Iran to a theocracy is now missing in Sadr’s position, spiritual authority, as he resides in the lower rungs of the hierarchy in Shiite Islam. “Thought to be only 30 years old, he lacks the religious credentials, bestowed by clerical peers and lay followers that recognize years of study, writing and teaching.” Before the invasion, his notoriety resulted from his birthright being from one of Iraq's most distinguished clerical families. His religious leadership was undercut upon being detested by the grand ayatollahs in Iraq as he is challenging the clerical establishment apart from the U.S.; “whether Sadr becomes the major player hinges on his ability to claim the third foundation block in the Iranian model—religious legitimacy.”

In this presented complexity of Sadr’s position, Mackey suggests “whether Sadr becomes the irresistible force in the Shiite community depends on how the U.S. deals with his challenge.” After demonstrations taking place, Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, the top U.S. military spokesman in Iraq, announced that ““individuals who create violence, who incite violence, who execute violence against persons inside of Iraq will be hunted down and captured or killed.”” However, this threat evokes for Sadr and his followers “the Shiite concept of martyrdom” and “the Shiite history of struggle against superior power” to which he answered, “I am with you, and I hope I will be about to join you, and then we shall ascend into exalted heavens.” U.S. officials must be aware of the fact that only with the permission and direction of the Shiite religious establishment Sadr can be arrested as “although it’s in the interests of traditional grand ayatollahs, such as Ali Sistani, to be rid of Sadr, they know that Shiite clerics claim and retain religious authority only by winning over the allegiance of their followers.” Also, the ayatollahs have to worry about Sadr’s passionate opposition to the foreign occupation as it may force them to become more anti-American to maintain their congregations. The dilemma for the U.S. is acute; they have the choice to either leave Sadr alone with his ever-elevating political standing, or arrest/kill him, turning him into a martyr, while uniting Shiites against the occupation. “What’s at stake is

whether the new Iraq will emerge as a secular state, as the Bush administration promises, or as some form of Islamic republic stridently opposed to the United States.”

3.2.3.7. A City That Lives for Revenge

This article is about Falluja, a city of 300,000 people in tribal territory, where the U.S. is in “a no-win situation.” In describing the fights increasing in and around Falluja, bringing about devastating results like in the case of the four civilian contractors who were burned alive in March 2004, one month before this article was issued, Mackey states, “Even if American forces storm and subdue the town, it is unlikely that there will be peace there anytime soon.” To her, the current showdown would have been avoided if the U.S. had taken some time to understand Falluja, “a place where even Saddam Hussein ventured cautiously.” The Pentagon perceives the situation in Falluja by naming “die-hards of Saddam Hussein's regime” as well as “foreigners promoting the ideology of Al Qaeda.” What the Pentagon neglects is the third group—the tribes of central Iraq. “They are a tough lot with a long history of resistance to any outside authority.”

The journalist proves insightful on the tribes of Falluja through history. “For hundreds of years, the people of the high desert north and west of Baghdad survived waves of conquerors by joining with their kin for defense.” In the 16th century the territory became part of the Ottoman Empire; rather than conquering them the Ottomans co-opted the tribes, as well as the Sunni Triangle. This allowed them to exist independently, governing their own affairs within the empire fixed together by orthodox Islam. When Britain appeared on the scene at the end of WWI, the tribes rebelled against the non-Muslim foreign rule; despite achieving suppression of the uprising the British never gained complete control. The monarchy (1921-1958) endeavored to keep those tribes in check by granting land and other financial motivations yet it only managed in renting their support, not buying it. This situation changed between 1963 and 1966, when Iraq was ruled by General Abdul Salam Arif, who had his own praetorian guard functioning within the military. “Its members protected him not because of any political program but simply because, like them, he belonged to the Jumaila tribe, which has its roots in the area around Falluja.” Just like Arif's town, Falluja was tied to the tribal leader, not to the state. Saddam Hussein, a member of the Bu Nasir tribe, replicated Arif's model in Tikrit, which was his own tribal homeland. As the Jumaila remained outside his bounds of kinship, he never trusted

the tribesmen of Falluja. In employing men from the Bu Nasir and their close allies to make up his Republican Guards and security service, Hussein excluded Falluja from his inner circle. “But because Hussein harbored a prudent fear of Falluja’s tribesmen, he gave them perks. The government invested heavily in construction projects. Tribal leaders were paid off with allowances [but] Mr. Hussein never fully won their loyalty.”

In light of this elaboration, Mackey refers to what she had questioned—a question that will remain un-answered forever: “whether the tribes on which Saddam Hussein was dependent but could not totally control might have been wooed away from him in the months leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq” while adding that “now it is the American occupation that the tribes of Falluja resist.” This tribal territory functions with tribal rules, personified with “expectations of hospitality,” “practices for settling disputes,” and “obligations of revenge against anyone committing an offense against a member of the tribe.” Posing a devastating problem for the U.S. is the concept of revenge as the kinship group is obligated to avenge every tribesman who is killed. This makes the journalist to be suggestive of a strategic plan; stepping back from Falluja and negotiating with tribal leaders while transferring the responsibility to them for keeping the security in the city, to which she writes, “It’s doubtful, though, that the Bush administration would be willing to even consider this approach.”

Mackey comments that Falluja can be militarily taken but at the cost of American lives; like many other issues, the civilian war planners ignored the challenge of governing the tribes, which has been considered as a minor detail while planning to recreate Iraq and the Middle East. The responsibility of protecting the troops is now left to uniformed military commanders, but still this protection depends on civilian policymakers who make the decision of when and how to deploy the troops. “In Falluja, the policymakers failed before the war began. Those in the field, along with the occupation itself, will pay the price.”

3.2.3.8. The Coming Clash over Kirkuk

In this article published, February 2005, Mackey focuses on the political circumstances surrounding Iraq: “as the Iraqis turn their focus from holding elections to writing a constitution, the make-or-break issue for their nation may be the city of Kirkuk.” The city is located next to the northern oil fields of the country and is a breeding ground for all sorts of ethnic and sectarian

conflicts, representative of Iraq's historic reality: "Muslim against Christian, Sunni against Shiite, and Kurd against Arab." While being a "touchstone of Kurdish identity," Kirkuk is also "the center of the Turkmen population." From where the Turkmens, the ethnic relatives of the Turks, see Turkey as their protector, to which Turkey is willing. The journalist addresses the trip that she made to Kirkuk a year before writing this article, and speaks to her observation on Turkmens and Kurds, both of whom feel the pride and passion associated with ownership of this city built upon ancient ruins. "In their fierce competition for the right to claim Kirkuk, the Turkmens and the Kurds threaten to turn Iraqi internal politics into a regional conflict."

While delving into the history and demographic realities, Mackey reports that according to the last official census dated in 1957, Turkmens composed 40% of Kirkuk's population, Kurds 35%, and the rest were Arabs, Assyrians, and Armenians, among others. In the current estimates, the population is around 850,000 and Arab population has drastically increased, most likely driving the percentages of Turkmen and Kurdish population down. In March 2003, when the U.S. invasion launched, coming from the Kurdish autonomous zone established in 1991, the Kurdish militias advanced southward and entered Kirkuk. "Since then they have used their position as American allies to bring in Kurdish families and thus bolster their demand that Kirkuk be incorporated in the Kurds' autonomous zone." Their cause is both emotive and economic; as the controller of this city holds the key to oilfields that represent 40 percent of Iraq's proven petroleum reserves. In any case, this wealth in natural resources embodies an enormous bargaining chip in the negotiations over the future of the country; while it could become the economic safety net for a future Kurdish autonomy. The increased number of the Kurds, who lay claim to the city, have intensified the already strong hostilities between the Kurds and Arabs that date back to the late 1980s, when Saddam Hussein exiled many Kurds from the city, replacing them with Arab population. "But it is the contest for Kirkuk being waged between the Kurds and Turkmens that is the far more serious problem for the United States because the only card the Turkmens of Kirkuk have to play against the Kurds is Turkey. It is a card Ankara is willing to allow them to put on the table."

Historically, as a consequence of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, Kirkuk was taken from Turkey, but Turkish nationalists consider the city as a historical part of their country, providing ample reasoning for Ankara to assert stewardship over the Turkmen minority in northern Iraq. "What is mainly driving Turkey's interest in Kirkuk is the long-term problem of Turkey's own

rebellious Kurdish minority, which is 20 percent of its population.” Since 1999, Turkish Kurds have launched attacks on Turkey from militia bases in northern Iraq. “To Turkey’s frustration, Iraqi Kurd officials turn a blind eye to their Turkish Kurd cousins’ activities, while the Americans have been reluctant to move against the bases for fear of damaging their relationship with the Iraqi Kurds.” The Turkish military has occasionally crossed the Iraqi border to battle the rebels. But more important and dangerous for the American efforts of stabilization is the possibility that the Kurds would make Kirkuk part of their autonomous zone. “For Ankara, this would constitute excessive Kurdish autonomy, its red line in Iraq.”

Disturbed from the changing demographic setting of Kirkuk, the Turkish military has repetitively warned Iraqi Kurds, and although they understand that the future of this specific city is an internal matter for Iraq, the military has made it apparent that they would have their hand forced if Kirkuk was to fall under exclusive Kurdish control. “To underline the point, the military makes no effort to hide its plans to send troops if needed to thwart the Kurds’ claim to Kirkuk.” Military intervention in northern Iraq would be diplomatically risky for Turkey, especially in light of Europe’s agreement to open dialogue about membership in the European Union. Yet Ankara might see the establishment of an oil-rich Kurdish political entity on its borders as commanding more concern than membership of the union, while Europe may consider keeping the Iraqi Kurds within Iraq, “thus promoting stability in the Persian Gulf and in oil markets,” as paramount, turning a blind eye to a Turkish military incursion.

In all of this, “Washington has quietly said that the Kurds will not be allowed to take control of Kirkuk” Mackey says, adding, “American military bases in northern Iraq are discreetly being reinforced. And the First Infantry Division that has been in charge of Kirkuk for the last year has balanced the rights of the Turkmen and Arabs against those of the Kurds.” Thus, the threat of full-blown Kurdish unrest and militarization is duly noted by U.S. officials, as the increasingly emboldened Kurds descend upon the new Iraqi Parliament, making a crisis in Kirkuk all the more possible. The question now becomes whether the U.S. and non-Kurdish members of the new Iraqi government can diffuse this situation, as the striving for Kurdish autonomy sees its truest disciples in the youngest members of this once marginalized culture, roaring now with its newfound voice. Mackey suggests, even with the Bush administration’s declared victory, residing in the completion of the nation’s first democratic elections, “if the Kurds try to change the status of Kirkuk, the United States may find itself forced to turn its

military power on them. But if America does nothing to hold Kirkuk, it may well find itself in another crisis. Only this one would not be confined to Iraq.”

3.3. Analysis of Mackey’s Representations of the Persian Gulf Region through her Journalistic and Intellectual Discourses

This in-depth analysis relies on the above summary highlighting specific choices and emphases in Mackey’s representation of the Middle Eastern socio-economic, -political, -cultural, and -religious history, provided through her news articles centered on the Persian Gulf and exploring Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. The purpose of this section is to analyze how she represents the Middle East, so in order to propose an enhanced evaluation, some of her other works, either books or journalistic productions, are also incorporated in the examination. Above all, the objective of this analysis is to perform a query concerning the primary research question of this study: *What is the information the Western reader receives from his/her writer and communicator about the Middle East, and how could this transmission shape Western public opinion about the Middle East*

3.3.1. Prospect of the Persian Gulf

The collections of Mackey’s news articles on Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq expose a picture of the Persian Gulf, coming into sight as a hot-spot due to its strategic position, playing roles in a variety of complex issues including border disputes, security strategies, and foreign policy implications drawn by regional and foreign players in line with economic, political, and ideological considerations. In reviewing them, two essential features are seen as integral in the journalist’s representations. First being, her approach to the U.S. foreign policy in the region, and second, her treatment of the indigenous perspective, taking into account the viewpoints of the laymen, the possessors of power, and any disenfranchised political opposition presenting a well-rounded outlook with which to view the region. While illustrating the framed topic reflective of the progression of events gathering local and foreign players within the region, Mackey’s

explorations of the U.S. foreign policy parameters, giving U.S. reasoning for meddling in affairs, functions as a vehicle, through which she presents her own stance and concerns about what she claims this will accomplish—menace to American interests in the long-term. By using her pen as a means of communication, the journalist integrates otherwise unconsidered issues into each and every framed topic, creating her own counter argument while portraying the region in an assortment of ways, allowing the truth to come out through a wealth of opinions fostering a more sound understanding.

3.3.1.1. Iran, a Bastion of anti-American Sentiments

It can be asserted that “Iran Benefits From The Gulf Panic” is representative of what is written about in “Identity and Change in Iran’s Foreign Policy” by Suzanne Maloney; “the Iraqi invasion of Iran on September 22, 1980, was a turning point in the foreign policies and domestic positions of both belligerent nations and for the Persian Gulf region as a whole” placed in *Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East* (106). Issued in June 1987, Mackey’s article covers the climax of the power conflict in the Iraq-Iran War, as Iran’s advancement in January and February of that year brought about a dual threat—“a military threat to Iraq” and “a political threat to the ruling regimes of the Gulf states [Kuwait and Saudi Arabia],” both of which were regarded as hazardous to Western oil supplies, begetting overt U.S. engagement in the war that they had been disengaged in since the beginning in 1980. Through this the journalist not only keeps her audience informed about what she calls in one of her books, “the longest conventional war of the twentieth century” (*Reckoning*, 235), but she also exposes what is elaborated on in another, “The Soviet Union made noises of intervention; [but] it was the mighty ship of the West, led by the United States, that went on patrol” (*Iranians*, 329). The U.S. strategy along the shores of the Gulf tipping the balance against the Islamic Republic of Iran is illustrated with “charging into the Persian Gulf with as little logic as Don Quixote attacking windmills.” This is not easy to swallow for any American, as it typifies the futility of the efforts of the U.S., while also standing at odds with what Mackey calls the persuasive arguments, made under the name of current urgency, approving American military presence in the Gulf, where 60 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves lie buried. In order to coax the audience into seeing what the effects of the fervent engagement of the U.S. would end up being, the journalist turns her focus on the

ambiance in which ideology was the vehicle of revolutionary Iran.

Hinting towards the background of the Iraq-Iran War, launched with the Iraqi attack on Iran across the Shatt al-Arab, the sentiment of “Khomeini declared the attack a sign that God had called on Iran to rid Iraq of the secular, infidel Saddam Hussein” clarifies what is meant with the use of ideology—turning the war into a symbol of the Islamic Revolution. This is echoed by Gary Sick in “Trial by Error: Reflections on the Iran-Iraq War”; “the attack helped Khomeini to consolidate his control by rallying nationalist sentiments around the revolution, suppressing internal critics, and accelerating efforts to rebuild an effective military machine along Islamic lines” (234), written in explaining a set of results ironically producing the opposite of what was intended in the Iraqi invasion. Mackey’s reportage on this matter is centered more specifically on the aid given inadvertently to the Islamic Republic of Iran helping them to gain regional influence, as it is seen in her exploration of the two prime objectives of Iran’s ayatollahs, which exceeded the parameters of the Iraq-Iran War. The first of these objectives was the offering of their model as ideal to spur the region’s people to establish Islamic republics “patterned on Mohammed’s teachings of societal organization and social justice”; upon this basis they called for the overthrow of secular rulers whom they regarded as having broken with the faith, like Saddam Hussein, the emir of Kuwait, and the House of Saud. The second was their promise of driving Western imperialism out of the region, and in labeling both the U.S. and the USSR as infidels to be eliminated from the Islamic world; they maintained the war in the sense of a religious crusade not only against Iraq, but also against the region’s monarchies and the West. The two objectives set forth by them work to divulge the complexities surrounding the Persian Gulf, through which the journalist hints at a potential change of course in politicized Islam within the Arab world that might well fall under the dominant influence of Iran. This however, would only occur in response to an event or succession of events such as prolonged and debilitating Western intervention, allowing the proponents of the Islamic Revolution to mold social unrest and aversion into a uniting force. Yet, what is missing in this reportage is a clear definition of the roots of conflict between Iraq and Iran, leaving one to bridge this gap through Mackey’s own book, which in turn enables us to better evaluate her representations under examination.

Placed in historical context, the culmination of the power struggle between Iran and Iraq was not a new phenomenon, rather it was old and deep, anchored not only in “the Persian

conquest of Mesopotamia in the fourth century B.C.” but also in “the competition for control of Mesopotamia between the Sunni Ottoman Empire and the Shia dynasties of Persia” (*Reckoning*, 240). It was cultivated throughout the centuries of continual dispute over borders and sovereignty, and was blended with clashes of identity in ethnicity, religion, and culture, which pitted Semitic Arab vs. Aryan Persian and Sunni vs. Shia. Both countries entered in a new phase of conflict in 1969, when Muhammad Reza Shah challenged Iraq’s claim to the Shatt al Arab, which was followed by his further attempts of establishing hegemony in the Persian Gulf, in which he disrupted commerce in Iraq’s sole outlet to the Indian Ocean. Between 1971 and 1975, while posing a threat to Iraq’s oil industry, Iran also weakened the state apparatus by spurring Kurdish unrest in its territory, conducting a surrogate war, which was concluded with the Algiers Agreement of 1975. All previous discrepancies between the two countries were revived with the Islamic Revolution of 1979, “added to the bitter mix was Iranian incitement of religious revolution among the Shia of Iraq against the secular Baath government sitting in Baghdad” (*Reckoning*, 241).

What is more essential for us to grasp from Mackey’s treatments placed in the book is her elaboration of the issue within the context of the contest between Muhammad Reza Shah and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini performed to determine whether Iran remained as a secular state or a theocracy, which provides a broad perspective for understanding the Iraq-Iran War, as in a sense it had begun within the course of their quarrels. Thus, the author touches upon Khomeini’s exile from Najaf, the theological center of Shia Islam in Iraq, where he lived for fourteen years while promoting upheaval against the Shah, and during his attempt of building support for revolution, the Shah exerted pressure on Saddam Hussein to force him out of the city in 1978; “fearful of the cleric’s presence in the midst of his own Shia population, Hussein complied.” The later episode of this complex history is addressed by Mackey in referencing *Saddam Hussein: The Politics of Revenge* by Said K. Aburish, as Hussein’s outreach to revolutionary Iran, expressing hope for regional peace, was returned with the answer, ““Peace is with those who follow the righteous path”” (*Reckoning*, 243). However, the actual deterioration of the relation began in the early 1980s, when the feud between the secularists of Baath and the *mujtahids* of shrine cities resulted in the expelling of over fifteen thousand Iranian nationals, which in turn brought about intensified Shia political movement in Iraq that was suppressed by Baghdad through torture and persecution, bringing Khomeini to deliver a warning to the Iraqi military as

he would protect the persecuted Shia constituents. With this in mind Mackey's account completes its emphasis on a cataclysmic war waged through "the symbols of ethnicity, piety, and identity" (*Reckoning*, 250). Equipped with these contextual clues, it can be articulated that "Iran Benefits From The Gulf Panic," serves as indicator of what Mackey calls, the symbol of ethnicity, piety and identity, depicting the spirit of the wide spanning Iraq-Iran War, which turned out to be "a test of wills between two commanding authority figures—Saddam Hussein and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini" (*Reckoning*, 235).

The aforementioned idea detailing the milieu of the region integrated into the article is elaborated upon, focusing on Iran, through which Mackey's audience is exposed to "the basic problem with current strategic thinking about the Gulf war"—a lack of understanding on the differences in standpoints of the adversaries of its participants: it was waged by Iraq with a defined objective, to protect the territorial integrity of the fragile state and ensure the political endurance of Saddam Hussein, while Iranian leadership carried out their exploits through the usage of ideology, in which Islamic slogans and symbols were employed as the main weapons to bring about support for the expansion of the Islamic revolution throughout the Middle East. This is the crux of the journalist's portrayal, reminding us of Maloney's statement, "the themes that the regime employed resonated with an Islamic ethical framework, and the circumstances of the war's inception fit well within the themes of martyrdom, sacrifice, and struggle—prominent features in the discourse of the revolution and the Shia history" (106). In this display of the Iraq-Iran War, the reportage serves to confirm that "the predominate threat to U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf is ideological, not military" and "with all of its military posturing, the United States is nourishing that threat rather than thwarting it." Mackey works towards strengthening her point in the eyes of her readers by providing support to the idea of symbolism being more essential than a military success for Iran, displayed through addressing a sequence of impressive symbolic triumphs gained since 1979. In urging them to recall the U.S. Hostage crisis she explores this specifically with Lebanon, where Iran established itself as a source for change, supporting the terrorist actions launched against the U.S. and American installations while Hezbollah seized Western hostages—presented in *The Iranians*, "seeking to prove its relevancy to a broader sphere, the ideology of revolutionary Islam was pushed by Ayatollah Khomeini and the political clerics into the Persian Gulf and on to Lebanon" (302). These are all solid examples to persuade

the public to come to grips with her claim that a U.S. military venture into the region would be detrimental, as it would have fueled the objectives of Iranian leadership.

As seen thus far, a general tendency is explored in Mackey's discernments and treatments of the Persian Gulf relating to the trends set into action by the Islamic Revolution of Iran. In light of this the journalist turns her focus on the Muslim majority in the Arab East, and by doing so she prevents us from attaching ourselves to the mainstream treatment, identifying the Middle East as synonymous with Islamic fundamentalism, and equating it with, as Ilan Pappé explains, "terror, dogmatism, inflexibility and a threat to the world's stability and peace" (*The Modern Middle East*, 269). Rather, she attempts to be cautious in revealing these dynamics within the context of political Islam, and takes care not to present the trajectory of Islamic history as leading intensively to this antagonistic existence, distancing herself from her colleagues who present an essentialist view of Islam. Her discourse portrays the complexity of Arab societies, to petition against generating what Said calls, a provocative hostility between a Western spokesperson and a self-appointed Muslim (*Covering*, xvi). In Mackey's rendering, Islamism is shown as the overture, yet anti-Western sentiments are held by those who perceived themselves to be "in the great mass of the dispossessed to their rightful place in an egalitarian society," suggestive of her own articulations placed in "Century of Strife 1920 to 2002," explaining the reasoning of the societies in conflict with "increasing wealth, unevenly distributed between states and within states, called the masses to question the justice of the social order and the legitimacy of their governments" extracted from *History and Faith: Cradle & Crucible in the Middle East* (96). In unison, her further elucidation concerns the perceived injustice of the regimes in power, being accused of humiliating their own people and the faith with their movements toward Westernization, in which Mackey tells her audience of the widespread isolation and dislocation amongst the people, who had come to associate Western ideals with subjugation. While leaning the discussion on political Islam, in responding to what was going on in the Middle East, she does not reduce the issue into just Khomeini's action, instead she draws a picture of the people's readiness, a near complete prerequisite for these societies to fall under the sphere of revolutionary Iran. Her clear warning to the U.S. is implicative of the key factors shaping the Middle Eastern reality in the twentieth century, just as articulated in a scholarly account; "the economic integration of the area into the global system," "the political and physical interventions of Western powers in local politics," and "nationalization of the societies as a whole" (Pappé,

271). In view of this mode of treatment, Mackey's aforementioned usage of Lebanon draws a line between Islamism and militant Islam, and in giving an insider's perception, she reiterates her concern with reference to the Persian Gulf, where any further symbolic victory gained by the Republic of Iran could set fire to the Islamic ideology against the U.S., i.e., "It is as if Iran is fighting for God Himself—a message not lost on Moslems from Egypt to Lebanon, to Iraq, to Saudi Arabia."

The Iranian government had figured to use the avarice and mistrust of the West, so prevalent in the region, as a means of motivation to exact control and spread their influence. This is perhaps the most serious issue for the American government to consider when planning their actions in the region as they must understand that these parameters will shape public opinion more so than anything else in the Gulf, and as the Iranian power has so cleverly manipulated the occurrence of events in their cause's favor before, they will do so again, which truly puts American armed forces on the ground in that region in a no-win situation. This is the suggestion of Mackey, displaying in circumspect the futile nature of U.S. involvement, as they by now have spent countless dollars and lost numerous sons and daughters in a process, that in all actuality may turn out as an exacerbation of the issues in the region, and wind up furthering the hatred of America abroad coinciding with a rise in control of the Iranian Government, a bastion of anti-American sentiments.

3.3.1.2. Iranian Fear of Enemies

In review of "Fear of Enemies Isn't Paranoia" in conjunction with "Iran Benefits from the Gulf Panic" one can easily grasp the striking similarities in Mackey's treatments and approach towards U.S. foreign policymaking, repeatedly referencing a lack of understanding as its primary downfall. "Fear of Enemies" was published in 1995 when the U.S. containment policy on Iran was enacted due to the continuation of its nuclear program, through which she defends her standpoint with the use of a notable source remarking on an emotively charged issue for Americans—*Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lesson of Vietnam* by Robert McNamara, the former U.S. Secretary of Defense under John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, to which she states, "the acknowledgment of [McNamara] that American policy-makers overestimated the ultimate goals of the enemy and misunderstood their adversaries is as applicable to the Clinton

Administration as the former Kennedy and Johnson administrations.” The usage of this outside source begins to convince the audience of her assertions before they are even stated, as the element of trust is secured in citing McNamara while the content of his reviewed treatments remind us of a low point in American military history, wished never to be repeated and stated to have striking similarities with the current engagement by both writers. The Persian Gulf, as Mackey states, is where any miscalculation would wound the nation not only spiritually but also materially.

Bearing in mind the U.S. containment policy “as to be a legitimate means of addressing its legitimate concerns,” Mackey’s journalism creates a critical stance in offering the need for the administration to acknowledge three constituents, shaping and galvanizing Iran’s situation, before advancing their efforts towards diplomatic and economic isolation of Iran—“fear of invasion,” “pride of nation,” and “the conviction that foreign-driven conspiracies are always operating against them.” In elaborating on all three components through “historical experience,” the discourse draws on the Iranian point of view that works to help the audience to see a representation quite different, compared to those found in mainstream media presenting the very same topic and very same people, invoking, with Mackey’s own description in *The Iranians*, “the fear-inspiring image of revolutionary Iran” (384). She challenges those, associating Iranian identity with Khomeini’s rhetoric “death to America” chanted vigorously in the anti-American demonstrations of 1979, naturally, a turning point that drastically shifted the position of Iran from ally to enemy of the U.S., and in presenting the world of these people, the journalist opts to turn the tables by illustrating the reasoning behind the Iranian fear of enemies.

Depicting the fear of invasion brings into focus the territory of Iran, a meeting point between the West and East, which has played host to consequential invasions since antiquity. At first, it was the Greeks and Romans, and then the Arab invaders in the seventh century, followed by the Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century, “after which it took 600 years for Iran just to recover its previous population level.” In the nineteenth century, through being drawn into the sphere of Russia and Britain, it was economically and politically weakened, and in looking into the twentieth century “what had become modern Iran was invaded in all but name by the West, and by what is now seen as the especially corrupting influence of the United States.” These all provide an account of the reasoning behind the Iranian fear of invasion as it was not paranoia, but a solid reality, anchored in history. Mackey’s outlook to this reality draws a picture of the

Middle East, where, throughout the centuries, regional, national, and international conflicts have been fueled by differences in interest from diverse groups of people, native and foreign. This picture is reminiscent of Edward W. Said's exposures on imperialism as "an experience with crucial cultural dimensions," speaking of "overlapping territories" and "intertwined histories," which connect "past as well as present and future"; "these territories and histories can only be seen from the perspective of the whole secular human history" (*Culture*, 61), corroborating Mackey's reportage to the fullest degree. In correlating the exaggerated enemy of the past, a peasant army of Vietnam, to the enemy of present, a strategically located nation in the Persian Gulf, isolated and ignorant, the journalist provides insight on the undeniable relation between Iran's demand on maintaining independence and its pursuit of reaching nuclear capabilities, as a vehicle of survival, an understandable defensive response to protect against sort of treatments experienced throughout their history.

A similar tone flows in enunciating the pride of a nation, portrayed in conjunction with the fear of invasion, as each foreign incursion generated a cultural renaissance, while nourishing a distinct sense of nationalism woven within the assertion of uniqueness in Iranian culture; a culture composed of a mixed origin in ancient Persia and Shia Islam. This is a topic, largely covered in *The Iranians*, wherein the author writes, "[...] Iranian has survived since the seventh century with its Persian and Islamic faces sometimes relaxed in harmony but as often creased with tension" (5). The book delves into the Islamic conquest, reaching vast territories within and beyond the Middle East, through which Arab warriors imposed their codes and value systems to all but Persia, where adaptation of Islam and the incorporation of numerous elements of the Arabic language into Farsi did not Arabize Iranians, instead they maintained their pre-Islamic values, morals, and aesthetics, while carrying Islam into its golden age between the eighth and eleventh centuries (41). Despite failing to pay close attention to the impact the ancient Greeks had on Persia, which is expounded upon in "Lost Empire," Firuz Kazemzadeh's *New York Times* book review, suggesting that "in squeezing the Iranian soul into [the] bipolarity [of Persia versus Islam] she ignores other fundamental elements of Iranian culture," as "that culture is inconceivable without Greek thought, the common foundation of Western and Muslim philosophy," Mackey still succeeds to expose the exceptional cultural identity that Iranians obtained. Ever since Persia officially adapted the Shia form of Islam in the early sixteenth century, it has been noticeably distinct from Islam's main body of believers; "Sunni orthodoxy

portrays Arab culture, Shia nonconformity mirrors Persian culture” (41). This perspective in values is telling of a linguistic, ethnic, and religious disparity between Iranians and those living adjunct, referred to in the article as Arabs, Asians, and Turks, promoting a Western awareness of non-monolithic existence in this specific region, while recognizing Iranians, who laid claim to their own place within the world.

These accounts are echoed in Mackey’s statements provided in responding to, “Iran’s cultural heritage is Persian. How does this distinguish the country from the rest of the Arab world?” asked of her by Sean Markey during an interview conducted for *National Geographic News* in 2002. In this, she not only highlights the characteristics of Persia, an ancient civilization with a continuing history, but also exposes the unified linguistic and mixed ethnic trends of Iranians, despite their explicit qualities, “they all identify themselves with this concept of Persia, of being a special place, of holding a special position in the world.” Her additional explanations on being Muslim do not prevent Iranians to define themselves as Persians, where around ninety five percent of the population adheres to the Shia branch of Islam, remarked on with, “you definitely have a different culture, a different history, a different tradition in Iran than you have in the Arab world.” Testifying to the journalist’s universal outlook are her assertions that can be found in wide-ranging outlets deemed as integral in defining “culture” as the hallmark of maintaining the globe’s cohesion. Back in reference to the article under analysis, wherein Iranian culture is the point of departure, she produces presumably the most effective illustration, centering the issue on the Islamic Revolution of 1979, a dramatic event helping to catalyze the notion of *Islamophobia*. In recollecting a recent and bitter memory, the journalist desires for the American public to reconsider from a multidimensional perspective, as this force was fed not only by religion but also by the passionate pride of the nation, which brought into existence what the U.S. was now dealing with, the Islamic Republic.

What is provoking the public to question their own experiences with the famed Iranians, driving anxiety towards Islam with their revolution and God-centered government, can be found in representations of the third constituent, forming and galvanizing Iran’s situation—an obsession with foreign-driven conspiracy. This is typified through British and Russian agitation of the Constitutional Revolution of Iran that took place between 1906 and 1911, and, by means of the CIA involvement in the coup of 1953, which not only restored Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi to the throne, but also resulted in creation of his infamous SAVAK, who served to keep

the political opposition in line, as a CIA trained security force. Presumably not familiar to many Western audiences are both examples, “tangled within the Iranians’ pride of nation and fear of invasion is an obsession with conspiracy.” With a clear objective, the discourse aids one to empathize with the long-winded Iranian search for independence, while paving the way for re-conceptualizing the position of these people, who grappled with the Western mode of life and its code of law at the beginning of twentieth century, incurring wounds at the hands of Britain and Russia. This pattern was repeated similarly with the overthrow of the democratically elected Prime Minister, Mohammad Mosaddeq, a nationalist and reformer, deposed through foreign intervention bringing about tyranny and injustice in the mid-twentieth century, as each Britain, Russia, and the U.S., played a role in spurring the Islamic Revolution into motion. While placing Iranian obsession of foreign-driven conspiracy in a historical context, this forceful elaboration stands in connection with the sentiment of “Iran’s sense of its own victimization and humiliation by others is both genuine and an essential prerequisite to understanding Iranian foreign policy” (65), proposed by Jerrold D. Green the author of “Ideology and Pragmatism in Iranian Foreign Policy.” Apart from turning the focus on foreign policy parameters, the aforementioned examples function as a deliberate set of elements, serving to fulfill Mackey’s intention of generating a consideration on the current circumstances faced by the Iranian people; “now, in Iranian eyes, the United States is conspiring to destroy the Islamic Republic”—a treatment, which had shown no signs of stopping, and was now being reverberated, seen as a means of economic and political subjugation, destructive to their nation.

Through understanding this milieu, Mackey’s stance seems merited in criticizing the U.S. aim of keeping Iran isolated, “to alter its behavior in the murky area of terrorism” and “to renounce nuclear armament,” as it appears to not be a viable judgment on the Islamic Republic and Iranians. In exhibiting the distinguishable nuance between a *state* and a *nation*, despite their undeniable association, the journalist also endeavors to deconstruct a misconception about this very specific country. Such a misconception is illustrated in her book as “Regardless of the range of grievances and geography of militant Islamic groups, the American minds sees the Islamic Republic of Iran as the front of Islamic extremism” (*Iranians*, 384). Iran, promoted as a well-built terror to which a nuclear program was often associated, is depicted with a highly balanced objective showing a separate culture, “religiously heretical to Islam’s predominant Sunni adherents,” regarded as an obstacle for its regime to lead a unified militancy movement against

the West, “even if it wanted to.” Through this Mackey not only implores her reader to see the complexities of militant Islam that need to be examined through a careful separation between its Sunni and Shia form, since each one has its own multi-faceted and intricate classifications and compounds, but also echoes what Carl W. Ernst indicates in *Following Muhammad: Rethinking Islam in the Contemporary World*: “Although [Ayatollah Khomeini’s] opinions were considered binding by a minority of Muslims who are Shi‘i, and despite the international administration he attracted for his anti-imperialist stand, his religious authority had no currency for the majority of Muslims who consider themselves Sunni” (32). Yet more significantly this depiction of Iran as a separate culture works to promote a Western consciousness on what the U.S. was in confrontation with in its rejection of the Iranian claim to security and movement towards independence, which in turn was firing up the people’s nationalism and stimulating their obsession with the idea of foreign conspiracy.

It can be argued that Mackey’s coverage exceeds the framed topic, subjecting Iran and the U.S. to her reportage, turning out to be a genuine representation of the globe, or at least this global issue, as in a sense, this representation mirrors a complex reality that can be best described through “the Muslim world and the West are at a standoff,” written by Juan Cole in detailing the distrust between the Muslim and North Atlantic societies towards each other, stemming from Western fear of Islamic terror, and it’s inverse, Muslim anxiety towards “neo-imperialism,” “ridicule,” and “discrimination” (*Engaging the Muslim World*, 1). This is a concern, covered by Mackey frequently through her debates that can be exemplified with her speech delivered when she was hosted on the *Paula Gordon Show* in 2003, addressing the contest of religious ideologies between the West and the East—a product of fear materialized as people sense that their identity is under attack. In terms of Western approach to the Middle East her solution to this specific problem can be grasped from a response given by her to a question, “What should people in the West understand about the Middle East?,” asked by Sean Markey in a previously mentioned interview (*National Geographic News*), in which she highlights the importance of being empathetic to the people of this tormented region— because of its geography and its history of being conquered, and as they are currently defining their culture while learning to function within the international community. She adds, rather than looking at them as “a bunch of religious fanatics” we need to question, what these people are trying to accomplish, and attempting to achieve in their present and future, “rather than just assume that the instability of

the region is somehow directed at the United States or at the West or that it is a culture war” because, while discussing about militant Islam, we are not talking about religion, but a political ideology.

This is the underlying point of “Fear of Enemies Isn’t Paranoia” in which Mackey demonstrates her journalistic disciplines as distinctive, serving to mediate between Americans and Iranians, clarifying each party’s perception, defining its own world and actions with the others. In this, providing comparisons between the mistakes of the Vietnam War and the current miscalculation endangering the Persian Gulf, while seeing the progression of events as ready to bring on a theatre of calamity with the notion that “the United States is in danger of creating a monster from an adversary,” Mackey certainly acts as a conscientious journalist, not only for the national interest but also for the global good.

3.3.1.3. Iran’s Cultural Pattern in Ancient Persia, Shia Islam, and Western Liberalism

The best insight of Mackey’s ideological construct on culture can be seen through “A Culture, More Than a State, Reaches Out—Iran,” which ran on January 9, 1998, two days after the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Mohammad Khatami, elected in May 1997, had appeared on a CNN broadcast in an interview conducted by Christiane Amanpour to deliver his message that both Iranians and Americans should foster a dialogue. With Khomeini’s own statements extracted from the transcript of the interview appearing on the CNN webpage, “nothing should prevent dialogue and understanding between two nations, especially between their scholars and thinkers [...] the exchange of professors, writers, scholars, artists, journalists, and tourists,” to which he adds “but the dialogue between civilizations and nations is different from political relations. In regard to political relations, we have to consider the factors which lead to their severance.” This is to Mackey an extraordinary act of diplomacy, and in referencing Khatami’s message centering on cultural, not political, exchange, she states, “[...] it is only in terms of culture that America can understand what is happening in Iran and what it means to U.S. interests.”

According to Mackey, President Khatami’s formula on dialogue, which the Clinton administration responded to with, “improved relations between the two countries can begin only

with official government-to-government engagement,” is reflective of Khatami’s better understanding on the idea that “Iran and the United States have demonized each other so long that neither government is in a position politically or emotionally to embrace the other.” In exhibiting this consideration as the core reasoning behind why Khatami wished to “crack” the “wall of mistrust” between the two nations through cultural ties, the journalist turns the focus on Americans, “eager entrepreneurs and highly successful exporters of popular culture.” This becomes a confirmatory instrument on the grounds that the diplomatic relationship demanded by the U.S. could be brought about through bridging the gap between “the ancient Iranian civilization” and “the new American civilization,” which suitably fits into the discourse, rejecting the *clash of civilizations* while promoting the idea of a cross-cultural dialogue.

Indeed, Khatami’s presence on the medium of global television generated differences in opinion at the time, some of which stand at odds with Mackey’s perceptions, as can be exemplified through “New Day Coming?” by Bruce W. Nelan TIME Magazine’s senior writer. In this, Khatami’s statements were interpreted as “Everything was America’s fault, he insisted,” and while focusing on his wish to crack the “wall of mistrust” despite that it was assumed as “caused by American misdeeds,” Nelan points out “So, while government-to-government talks were not on the agenda, a ‘dialogue’ could begin with cultural exchanges among scholars, journalists, artists and tourists” and then asks, “Who knows, he implied, where that might lead?” Yet at the same time, Mackey’s standpoint has found common ground with some, seen in the articulations of Juan Cole, in referencing Khatami’s repeated attempt to reach out to the U.S., “suggesting vigorous people-to-people exchanges to begin,” to which Washington presented little interest; Cole depicts the leader as the one who insisted on “a more open society in Iran and a dialogue of civilizations” (*Engaging*, 200). This issue of dialogue between civilizations is the leading motif in “A Culture, More Than a State, Reaches Out—Iran,” helping to acknowledge Iranian national *being*, in which Mackey aims to exhibit this world devoid of its stereotypes, very frightened of Americans.

A sequence of portrayals revealing the complexity of Iranian culture, composed of three competing but intertwined identities, serve to construct a “new” reality, as it explores much of the neglected history of Iran and the salience of cultural patterns, bringing about an understanding of identity construction, its evolution, and inevitable bond with developments within politics which gives it a meaning, value, and significance. When we embed this into the

examination of a globally relevant matter, it works towards producing an exposure of Iran suggesting that target readers take a second look at the country. By doing so Mackey sets out with her position in journalism as what is deemed by Stuart Hall, “a social constructionist approach,” the author of *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices*. It is this approach that enables her to support the idea of an open dialogue, as it would have been the key for achieving empathy with what has come to be termed, the *other*, creating a mutual respect between these two conflicting cultures.

Under these parameters, she portrays the three components of Iranian identity, flawed in a similar way with what is placed in “Fear of Enemies Isn’t Paranoia,” touching upon ancient Persia, dating back to the fourth century BC, when Cyrus the Great established the powerful Persian Empire, seeding “intellectual inquiry,” “artistic excellence,” “tolerance,” and “assimilation.” She then turns the focus on the seventh century, when Islam added to the cultural patterns while Iranians were contributing to Islam’s intellectual achievements and in the sixteenth century the legacies of both ancient Persia and Shia Islam began to amalgamate, generating today’s Iranian nation. These are all evocative of the proclamations of Maloney, revealing the country with a legacy of territorial integrity reaching back several millennia, along with its relatively unified political culture and religious heritage. By referencing to Shahram Chubin’s “Iran’s Strategic Predicament,” Maloney further exposes it as a country, “‘blessed’ by ‘a strong sense of identity, a notable culture and ancient civilization from which it takes aspiration’” (92). What is additionally contributed is this strong sense of identity, being the third component developed in the nineteenth century. Mackey takes the adaptation of Western political ideas into account, as a marker to when the representative government and the rule of law were implanted into Iranian culture. All in all, the journalist does not treat her subject of analysis solely as a territorial unit, but a cultural *being* in need of proper understanding, as exemplified through Iran, presented on CNN by Khatami—“first and foremost a nationalist.”

Taking a closer look at this cultural pattern constructed in the triangle of “Persia,” “Islam,” and “Western liberalism,” we are shown the ethos of what Khatami carried out, with Mackey’s statement, “it is Mohammad Khatami who now, in the interest of the nation, seeks to instill the delicate balance between the Iranians’ three identities.” This becomes a base, for the journalist to justify why “the United States must take seriously what he says,” and in enhancing the content with the idea of “over the centuries, Iran functioned best when the various parts of

Iranian identity maintained balance,” she proposes working examples to better perceive how this balance was ripped apart during the larger part of the twentieth century. The discourse now exclusively leans on the shift of outlook, providing a lens to see what differentiated Khatami from Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, both of whom failed to attain internal peace and external security; the former forced the nation to “the extreme of their Persian identity” and the latter to “the extreme of their Islamic identity.” Further elaborating the issue with a conceptualization of Khatami, presented as a leading figure recognizing the necessity for the Islamic Republic to change course in order to attain affluence, security, and social order, and being cognizant that such a change could not simply be political but must also be cultural, Mackey offers, what most journalist at the time called, an optimistic view. She draws a snapshot of Iran, where the new president was attempting to place “the tolerance of Persia” into “the inflexible frame of political Islam” while “pouring the oil of Persian assimilation [that embraced Western liberalism]” into “the vitriolic anger of the revolution,” proposing the capacity for change within Iranian political landscape.

This picture is akin to what is captured in *The Iranians* and in an article, appearing in *The Los Angeles Times* as “A Crack in the Clerics’ Control, Gradually Widening.” In the book Mackey writes, “[...] the Iranians in the presidential election of May 23, 1997, delivered not only a new leader but a strong message that both supported the revolution and demanded far-reaching reforms aimed at securing the ideals of 1979” (394), and in the article she notes, “the Islamic Republic continue to move from theocracy toward democracy and by evolution, not revolution.” In placing post-revolutionary Iran’s internal politics in a historical context, the author outlines that it was Ayatollah Khomeini who converted religion into politics and revolutionized Shia Islam in Iran through his theory of government, known as the Velayat-e Faqih (guardianship of the jurist), which was run by a man considered as the most learned of the clergy. Yet, he failed to gain overwhelming support for his idea of government especially from the Shia religious hierarchy, which brought about the two camps, between which the author states, the West never made a distinction. However, “the opponents of Islamic government withdrew behind the walls of the religious schools, and the political mullahs took their place at the controls of the Islamic Republic of Iran” (*A Crack in the Clerics’ Control*). With the death in 1989 of Khomeini, who held the all-inclusive power of “the imam,” the differing interpretations regarding Iran’s theocratic state started to emerge, and in the ensuing years, especially during Hashemi

Rafsanjani's eight years in the presidency, reformation took its course, paving the way for Khatami to be elected. "[...] Iranians who supported Khatami were asking the ultimate question—will Iran reach the level of democracy hungered for by the Iranians since the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-11" (*Iranians*, 405).

By the same token, Mackey highlights that within that political system the president shared power not only with an elected parliament but also with the appointed council of a religious leader, Ali Khamenei, who reigned supreme; thus in order to achieve the goal for change demanded by secular and religious groups, they had to win Khamenei's support, otherwise the whole concept of the faqih would remain (*Iranians*, 406; A Crack in the Clerics' Control). In allowing the reader to question their conceptualizations concerning the realm of politics and religion in Iran, these representations work towards showing the contrast in the depiction of a power struggle between the reformers and the Islamists, over control of the Iranian state. This power struggle is reflective of the basics of the country's political odyssey in the twentieth century—"the rights of the people as expressed in the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911, the nature of authority as demonstrated by the revolution against the shah and the place of religion in the state as defined by the Velayat-e Faqih"—seen through the announcement made by the president, seeking a new relationship with the U.S., "the conservatives' Great Satan" (A Crack in the Clerics' Control). Mackey remarks, it was that president, chosen by Iranians, who saw the world in a different way than Khomeini once did—"the clash of the cultures of the East and the West" (*Iranians*, 410).

The point of intersection between the above referenced points and "A Culture, More Than a State, Reaches out—Iran" depicts a new turn for the Islamic Revolution, telling of the change in outlook, which would be promising for liberal political practices. While revealing Iran as a living organism not a static entity, and in showing the three components of Iranian culture reasserting themselves at the end of the twentieth century, she endorses her approach on cultural dialogue, seen through open lines of communication with the American people, bringing on an engagement of the old civilization of the East with the new civilization of the West, which would affect the personalities of Iran and America. She warns is to keep away from repeating what happened between America and Iran since 1979 and to be constructive in approaching this issue of animosity, as her optimism regarding the issue would need to be mimicked by both sides if reconciliation was to be in the cards.

3.3.1.4. Saudi Arabia becoming a Regional Player following the Persian Gulf War of 1990-1

Mackey covers Saudi Arabia through four different articles issued between 1990 and 2003. At the nucleus of these commentaries is the arrival of American troops to Saudi Arabia, which occurred subsequent to a Saudi request for U.S. aid when an Iraqi threat to Saudi territories was showing signs of acceleration in the course of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. There was a U.S.-Saudi informal agreement on using Saudi territories for an American base in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War of 1990-91, which led to a general societal disturbance due to the continued presence of American troops on Saudi soils, bringing with it terrorist attacks, targeting an American military base. This was followed by the departure of American troops from Saudi Arabia after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, when the U.S. Saudi partnership turned into a delicate position after the September 11th attacks, in which many of the terrorists involved were originally Saudi citizens. The journalist exposes topics over a broad spectrum, encompassing Saudi Arabian disjunction at all levels, exemplified through the power of the state and its military structure; social strata and Bedouin tradition; Saudi psyche and aversion to change; and the voice of people and the relationship with the U.S. All serve as representative of an ambiance in which not only the East and West coalesced, but also all sorts of problems and anxieties banded together along the Persian Gulf, as Saudi Arabia's position was amplified through the playing out of politics, economics, as well as ideological and military means.

The two articles, "The Saudi monarchy's paranoia rules out development of a national army capable of defending the country" and "The House Of Saud," function as a duality, reflective of the House of Saud's external and internal trials and tribulations, issued within two weeks of each other in August 1990, when foreign troops had already landed in Saudi Arabia with the intension of cooperating with the Saudi army in the Persian Gulf War. In the first article Mackey remarks on the crux of the Saudi Kingdom's defense strategy, "[laid] in reliance on the American commitment to the survival of an independent Saudi Arabia," through which its defense problems are illustrated corresponding to characteristics in Saudi society and its political system. In the second one, while exhibiting the House of Saud as it was, brought security with the aid of the U.S., the journalist takes a strong stand by turning her focus on the internal problems, stimulated by "a massive military intervention by a Western power," through which

she reports on what the complex task at hand was for the royal house. Simultaneously, she exhibits the enigmas of a political system, “restrained by the Saudis’ xenophobia,” “defended by a military force rooted in Bedouin culture” and “authorized by the Ulema, a council of religious leaders fanatically committed to the protection of the ultra-orthodox Wahabbi sect of Islam.”

“More than a nation, Saudi Arabia is a fragile collection of fiercely independent individuals who resist incorporation into institutions,” can be considered the leading sentiment for Mackey in the article, “The Saudi monarchy’s paranoia,” from which she dresses her arguments with reference to the deep-seated Saudi resistance against institutional order and discipline necessitating a national army, while also developing her comments on cause and effect in terms of the weakness of kingdom’s military structure. Taking a closer look at her treatments on Saudi resistance to institutions, we come across the depiction of Bedouin culture, a strong constituent of Saudi identity, to which neither a master nor a government, only living in fervently independent existence, made their life sensible and meaningful. Mackey enhances her writing while rationalizing the Bedouin ethos, carried out by all, regardless of being sedentary or not, as a natural result of living in a desert environment, isolated and alone, throughout the centuries. This ethos turned into an essential part of the social construct after the foundation of the state in 1924, when Abdul Aziz ibn Saud eventually seized Mecca and the Western coastal plain of the peninsula with the aid of his Bedouin army, and later in 1932, declared the birth of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. During the nation building process, people’s acquiesce of being under authority was achieved not as a fiscal source but rather an ability to consolidate power—with the expression of Mackey’s book “a political genius” (*Saudis*, 196)—who united people of the desert and those of the towns together by means of a string of loose alliances; resting on the religious principles of Wahhabism and on the countless arrangements of dynastic marriages made with daughters of the kingdom’s major families. This is echoed in “Abdul Aziz was able to unite and rule the fiercely independent Bedouins and the more numerous townsmen through an indigenous combination of piety and patronage” (*Saudis*, 67). Mackey’s audience is not only exposed to the crux of the relation between the ruler and the ruled, which functioned on a personal level, not institutional, they are also revealed why loyalty was retained within the walls of individual families; thus identity remained as it was over this vast and largely vacant territory. Similarly remarked on, “Beyond the structure of family and tribe, the Saudi’s Bedouin ancestors have left the modern-day Saudi with much of his value system” (*Saudis*, 115). All in all, while hinting

towards seeing one of the most significant factors, restricting the operations of the House of Saud—in religious orthodoxy, the journalist illustrates another hindrance—the Bedouin ethos, presented a forceful part of culture and politics in Saudi Arabia. This works as a crucial component for understanding the modern political situation in the country and the view of the *other*, the laymen, bringing their seemingly confounded ideas out of ambiguity.

No less crucial an aspect can be found in Mackey's narration of how the established system continued to be practiced even in the early 1970s, when the oil embargo transformed Saudi Arabia economically. "Rather than modernizing the political system through power sharing, the House of Saud simply turned its network of alliances into a golden pipeline through which the largeness of the oil bonanza flowed to the citizenry." This narrative of the royal house holding the power unto itself, in conjunction with the display of geopolitics in the country, residing atop the oil assets surrounded by long borders and three coastlines, is telling of the kingdom's multiple vulnerabilities—external attacks to country and internal attacks to the royal family. It was because of these vulnerabilities, Mackey says, that Saudis began pouring billions of dollars since 1974 to invigorate its unique defense establishment, constituted of two distinctive factions. First being, the professional armed forces being charged with defending the country, whose members were restricted in many ways, living under the ruling family's paranoia, and second, the national guards composed of the descendants of the members of first Saud's Bedouin army, whose loyalty lay in old tribal alliances, with their primary duty, to protect the House of Saud against any possible coup that might be originating within the professional armed forces. All of this is informative, keeping American audience connected with their soldiers abroad and with conditions they faced on the ground; "along with the daunting problems of logistics and desert heat, the American military command now on the ground in Saudi Arabia must also face the grim realities of its new partner—the Saudi army." Yet, this reportage is also weak as Mackey neglects to elaborate on the issue of Saudi security in a retroactive manner, failing to bring proper understanding of the region, where the superpowers' polarization had taken its course while the Arab Cold War played roles within it. The USSR-backed secular-socialist Arab regimes are not within the scope of her inquiry, neither is revolutionary Iran, and the events reflective of U.S.-Saudi relations are entirely isolated, which would have yet been insightful to see the region's undertakings and its relations developing towards the Persian Gulf War.

Placed in a historical context through “Trends in Saudi National Security” by Joseph A. Kechichian, in the 1960s, when Nasserism was domineering Arab political discourse bringing with it a split between conservative and radical regimes, Saudi Arabia was in the category of the most conservative (233). One of the major foreign crises that occurred during this time frame was found in the overthrown regime in Yemen by Nasserite officers in 1962, which, as explained by Roger Owen, was a stimulus for the House of Saud to take on military expansion; “[...] the Saudi royal family proceeded with its usual care, aware of the importance of great caution at a time when the presence of Nasser’s army so close to its border had encouraged at least two serious plots against it” (190), from *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East*. While the threat of Arab radicalism was diminishing at a nice pace, the new challenge appeared on the horizon in the late 1970s, when the Islamic Republic of Iran began attempting to export its revolution within the region (Kechichian, 233-4). These are the focal points, taken into account also in *The Saudis*, wherein additionally she discusses the pre-revolution era in line with the Saudi conceptualization of the U.S., the guarantor of its security, “Although the Saudis were wary, they saw Iran as an important part of their security shield and also as a test of American honor of its commitments” (314). However, with the fall of the Shah, the House of Saud came to a conclusion that “by tying themselves too closely to the United States they were guaranteeing neither their throne nor the personal protection in case of political turmoil.” At the beginning of the 1980s the ambivalence of American and Saudi policy towards one another was overt, the causalities of which were numerous, coming into each other from the oil embargo’s onset, amongst them, “the Soviet threat,” “Saudi nationalism,” and “the United States’ reluctance to push Israel on a solution for the Palestinians,” which was later followed by the Saudi denial of pleas to station U.S. troops on Saudi territories. In order to avoid the political risk of “fearing the reaction of the radical Arab states,” the royal house decided to buttress its defenses by pouring money into sophisticated hardware, purchased from the U.S., “which it would use to erect its own protective umbrella over the Arabian Peninsula.” It was clear that, “for the United States, the commitment to defend Saudi Arabia was still a vital part of its military policy in the Arabian Gulf[;] but for Saudi Arabia, the United States as the ultimate security guarantor in a grand strategic design was a concept that had failed” (315).

Mackey wrote these passages in 1987, three years before reporting about the defense problem of Saudi Arabia through “The Saudi monarchy’s paranoia.” She validates her problem

on Saudi conceptualization of America as a rescuer, while proving to be adventurous on her treatments of the recurring dilemma—the royal house’s unwillingness to sacrifice its own security at the cost of the interest of the country, failing to construct an effective defense force that could be created with its finite population. Yet in revealing that “instead, Saudi Arabia’s rulers adopted in 1974 what remains its basic plan of defense: Rush all available manpower to a handful of fortified locations and hold on until the Americans arrive,” the journalist proves herself as one sided as she does not explore the issue of the Saudi request for U.S. help within the context of post-Cold War parameters. What it meant for the U.S., as articulated by Rashid Khalidi, the author of *Sowing Crises*, “immediately subsequent to the rapid disappearance of its Soviet rival, in 1990-91, the United States engaged in an extraordinarily confident assertion of its suddenly unrivaled power in the Middle East via its leadership of a grant coalition against Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in the Gulf War of 1991 [...]” (*Sowing*, 6). Likewise, in *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?*, John L. Esposito writes “for many Muslims, the buildup of foreign troops, announced after the American elections in November 1990, transformed the nature of the conflict from a defensive operation to an offensive force” (253). While Operation Desert Shield had turned into Operation Desert Storm, the defense of Saudi Arabia and liberation of Kuwait transformed into an attempt to destroy Iraq both politically and militarily, to which Esposito adds, “Who was thought to benefit most from the resulting power vacuum? America and its ally Israel” (254). Despite selling the public on this war abroad as a necessity born out of Saudi weakness, providing military strength to prevent any possible incursions, the arrival of foreign military troops to Saudi territory turned out to provide the backbone of Mackey’s later productions in presenting the progression of events within and around Saudi Arabia. In these productions she presents a more complete view of these issues as is discussed below.

Upon turning our focus to “The House of Saud,” we can easily grasp the intention of supplementary reports on many issues, integral to “The Saudi monarchy’s paranoia.” This time, the journalist elaborates her concerns within the context of Saudi xenophobia as it is seen in her sentiment of “by its decision to call in American military support, the House of Saud has in effect unleashed the Western monster.” While placing the issue of xenophobia in historical context, the reportage draws a picture of “oceans of desert,” which became a wall for Saudis throughout the centuries shielding them from the world outside. Indeed their religious belief and practice added to this anxiety, as the followers of the Wahhabi sect of Islam, whose puritan way

of life was protected by desert, was being deconstructed by oil wealth which brought about an influx of foreigners to the territory. “Offended that few of their highly paid Westerners understand the teachings of Islam or exhibit any respect for its practices, the Saudis charge Westerners with corrupting the values and traditions of their society.” The first Saud, mindful to his people’s sensitiveness, kept foreign employees of oil installation confined to a narrow strip along the Gulf, and even in the late 1960s, only thirteen foreigners were allowed to live in Riyadh. In keeping us in touch with Saudi’s self-isolation and their entry into the Western world of the oil concession subsequent to WWII, this picture is later painted, reflecting the economic boom of 1973 and what it brought with it. This was when this isolated and ignored country dramatically turned out to be of worldly prominence, further elaborated in *The Saudis* with “[...] a deeply traditional society now struggled to define itself while trying to cope with an influx of enormous wealth and the arrival of legions of foreigners”— giving the upswing in the struggle between tradition and modernization. This is the heart of the issue that she presents, telling from what the Saudi’s profound xenophobia began to explode, referring to this matter, Mackey tells her audience how these people were coaxed with the idea of the opening of the doors for outsiders in the course of the oil bonanza; “the House of Saud persuaded the Saudis to swallow their hostility toward foreigners to gain the technological rewards the aliens could provide,” to which she adds, “But the Saudis have never accepted the foreigners, especially the Westerners.”

In conjunction with this conveyed knowledge, the extent in which Saudis maintained their attitude towards the foreign presence in their territories is addressed through three cases. First is the National Guard, whose members were at this time mobilized under the order of American commanders calling the shots, revealed as being regarded by them as an affront to personal honor, “the undercutting of self-esteem.” Second is the widespread popular unrest that could be exacerbated or quelled only by the *ulema*, particularly upon understanding the massiveness of the foreign invasion’s incursions that brought with it female soldiers as well as alcohol. In response to this the religious authority might inflame the reservations of the population who were already convinced of the idea that “the West poses a mortal danger to Islam.” The third exposes the existence of political opposition, amongst which the most organized hailed from the Eastern province of Saudi Arabia, in which a mixture of Wahhabi, Sunni, and Shiite populations resided with little family ties to the royal house. This is where the oil fields of Saudi Arabia located, which were under the protection of the American troops, yet as

the place from where Arabia's richness stemmed, it was denied the copious public projects for betterment enjoyed in the interior.

Together with the depiction of the ruling king, Fahd, who was already under the attack of accusation due to his close relation with the West, seen as being morally corrupt and unfavorable to the very fabric of society, all information provided above work to conceptualize Saudi Arabia in terms of its cultural attributes and political structure as well as its delicate position between the East and the West. The journalist hints towards the Bedouin honor codes, as seen in the case of the National Guards as an example. In this value system, superiority is one of the leading elements that has flourished over the centuries in many settings, from family to larger social and political groups, still very present when explaining their way of life—illustrated with “Soiled as the Bedouin may be by materialism generated by oil money and development, belittled as he may be by the more sophisticated urban dwellers, it is the Bedouin's idealized values of courage, bravery, hospitality, and honor that underlie all of Saudi society—urban, rural, nomadic” (*Saudis*, 115). This is explanatory of how these subjects were able to restrict the House of Saud, while the display of the *ulama* completes this emphasis on cultural repercussions.

The *ulama* was the most significant source of power for the ruling house, an exclusive source to legitimate its authority in this society, where if oil was one of the primary signifiers of the system of operation, religion was the other. This can be further seen in explaining such a delicate balance between the royals and the *ulama*, unveiling the ruling family's ability at pacifying the religious authorities on occasion. In this time frame, Mackey suggests, it might come from their disdain for secular regimes like that of Saddam Hussein, to whom Americans and Saudis were mobilized together to get rid of, but it might also come from the pouring of money into the Wahhabi cause. It can be asserted that this is most representative of the political atmosphere, or more its mode of operation in this place and time, as the corrupting force of staggering oil revenues proved that even the most pious of Saudi Arabian constituents had a price, feeding into the aversion towards the alien invaders, who permeated their sacred institutions with their wretched capitalistic absolutes. This in extension brought about silence within all segments of the society, but not certain political oppositions—an essential component of the journalist's analysis.

The portrayals of this political rivalry enables the audience to understand the concept of nation-state as in the case of the Saudi Arabia, largely made up of the royals and their allies,

where unequal distribution of oil income and isolation of people from public services added into the fragility of a nation's security, as the harmony and egalitarianism presented by the ruling house turned out not to be the whole reality. What is more significant for the reader to understand from this reportage is an additional remark on an ability of the opposition groups to re-circulate what had already been an established idea; the U.S. was summoned to protect the House of Saud, not Saudi Arabia. Seeing the environment exposed to us, it can be understood that the actions of the House of Saud did not always garner support from its people, who in fact felt disenfranchised in view of the House's actions which seemed only to be concerned with self-preservation, brought into action as transparently so or as an effort to quiet the mob and give in to their demands. In view of the complexities of this environment, we can see the background setting the table for the events that Mackey covers in the articles, "Welcome or Not, We're In for Keeps" and "Winds of Change in the Desert."

3.3.1.5. An Outlook of Iraq—A State not a Nation

The most essential point of intersection observed in Mackey's journalistic treatments is her explorations of the absence of a common identity in Iraq, by its nature and through its conception. In reporting on the country, either in 1992, when providing reasoning for stopping short of Baghdad by the U.S.-led allied coalition during the Persian Gulf War, or in the 2000s, by presenting the progression of events before and after the U.S. invasion of Iraq took place, she repetitively gives credence to the multiplicity of Iraqi identities and their effect on outcomes. These reports can be considered as retrospective on Iraq's identity crises, allowing the journalist to generate her main discussion on the fragility of the country. Through this, she attempts to negate the idea of simply removing Saddam Hussein from the political scheme to solve problems, largely promoted by the U.S. political apparatus as a remedy for the regional instability and to alleviate the challenges that his regime posed to the U.S. in the Persian Gulf.

The aforementioned style of reportage can be exemplified through "Get Rid of Saddam—and Then What?" Published in 1992—in the early post-Gulf War settings—the article reads into "before the issue of what to do about Saddam Hussein becomes a lashing foil in the U.S. presidential campaign, candidates and voters alike need to consider the root problem—the nature of Iraq itself—and the perils that would follow the villainous leader's ouster." While hinting

towards the issue of Iraq's dangerous identity crises, "the root problem," this sentiment is implicative of what is revealed in *A History of the Modern Middle East*; "The President's decision to halt Operation Desert Storm without ensuing the overthrow of Saddam Husayn and his regime became the subject of much controversy in the years that followed" (Cleveland, 485). Mackey keeps her readers in touch with the political debates familiar to them, enacted at a time when the nation was moving towards the presidential election of 1992, and Saddam Hussein, left in power despite the outcome of the Gulf War, became a prevailing issue in the electoral process, i.e., "Many Republicans are urging their slipping President to strike Iraq to reclaim the victory of the Gulf War [while] both the Democrats and the Administration have been publicly encouraging the Kurdish opposition in exile." In providing an understanding of the relation between U.S. presidential elections at home and its military interventions abroad, her report works to unfold the overall tendency in thinking displayed as, "'get rid of Saddam,' politically or physically, has become for many the sure answer to peace in the Gulf." This becomes a basis for the journalist to be cautionary, opposing not exactly the idea of the removal of Hussein (i.e., "[he] can be removed with impunity") but the misconceptions of what this would bring about, without the presence of exceptional preparation and timing in execution (i.e., "only when there is some viable government structure to take his place"); otherwise, "for even without [him], Iraq remains Iraq, a country of hostile groups capable of ripping itself apart and throwing the whole region into turmoil."

What makes this envisioning of post-Saddam Iraq essential is Mackey's acknowledgment of the history, utilized as a device facilitating proper understanding of the framed topic. Through this, she plainly exposes what is meant by the root problem—the nature of Iraq itself, a state not a nation, created after WWI by Britain, who consolidated three major groups of people sharing common ground either in religion, ethnicity, or language, but not on all fronts. The country's demographics have remained almost static since it became an independent state in 1932, where regional isolation has divided each of these hostile groups in addition to their irreconcilable outlook. The Shia Muslims, residing in the south, composed 60% of the population with mixed origins of indigenous Arabs and non-Arabs, who had migrated principally from Iran over the centuries. The Kurds, living in the north, Sunni in religion with Indo-European rooted language, constituted 20% of population who were demanding a separate nationhood. The Sunni Arabs, residing in the geographic center, fell into the remaining 20%, whose political dominance over

the Shia majority and Kurdish minority endowed to them by the occupying British was enlarged upon the attainment of independence. Not within the scale of this record are the Assyrians and Turkmens, but despite this, these provided ratios still work to gain a better understanding of an Iraq “[which] was denied at birth the most basic element of nationhood—a common identity among its people.” Standing in connection with these illustrations are the accounts placed in both *The Reckoning: Iraq and the Legacy of Saddam Hussein* and *Passion and Politics: The Turbulent World of the Arabs*. In the former, Mackey writes, “[...] the tragedy that Iraq is still living began in the mandate [...]” (118), and in the latter “patched together by imperial fiat at the end of World War I, Iraq is constantly strained by powerful centrifugal forces within a population sharing neither a common identity nor mutual ideals” (312). While discussing the issue of toppling the regime in Baghdad—the U.S.’ sole concentration, she relates the current panorama to the creation of Iraq as a modern state, revealing what had been bequeathed to this country by British colonialism—apart from a Sunni dominance in which Saddam Hussein now took part, a lack of common identity. In seeing this, one can come to the conclusion that, as noted by Paul William Roberts in “His Way,” the book review of *The Reckoning*, “[Mackey] fails to take into account the very historical forces she presents so well, acting as if the future were all contained in the past, rather than shaped by the past,” the article contains these explained inadequacies. Nevertheless, drawing attention to the passing history provides to non-experts rational explanations of the instability anchored in this country, where identity crises have been part of the overall mode of existence for quite some time. These defined characteristics work to endorse the arguments in her coverage of Iraq—the nation, where neither national leaders nor ethnic or sectarian groupings have succeeded to create consensus—the state, which the U.S. has been actively attempting to deal with since the Gulf War of 1991.

While providing a historical awareness in line with the rhetoric on the absence of common identity, Mackey portrays the fragility of Iraq. Through these portrayals, she implores the reader to understand the reasons behind stopping short of Baghdad—because of the fears that were shared by the members of the U.S.-led coalition despite their differences in outlook. First, the fear of “especially Turkey, Syria, and Saudi Arabia” that the potential power vacuum created with the removal of Saddam Hussein would have been filled by each of the ethnic and sectarian groups, proclaiming sovereignty while fragmenting Iraqi territories. Despite never being addressed, the pro-Sunni Saudi stance wished to safeguard against the prospect of Shia

dominancy in Iraqi politics as it could pose a threat to their own regime. The displayed position of Turkey and Syria greatly exemplifies the security agenda of the neighboring countries that had played significant roles on the decision taken within this global war effort as the prospect of a declared nationhood by Iraqi Kurds would have fomented Kurdish separatist movements in other countries, namely the aforementioned two, posing a threat to them more frightening than the regime ruled by Hussein. Second, the fear of everyone, including the U.S., that not only groups but also countries would lay claim to pieces of a disintegrating Iraq, bringing about the disorder and instability within the Persian Gulf. This underlined dread echoes to what the journalist emphasizes in *The Reckoning*, referring to Christine Moss Helms' *Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab World* while writing that the dismemberment of Iraq was seen as “‘tantamount to opening a Pandora’s box, creating a large, unstable frontier region in which the surrounding states would have conflicting claims, both to territory and to religious and ethnic groups’” (353). However insightful this is, she neglects to address what was at stake for the U.S in envisioning Iraq falling apart. The answer of this question can be found in “His Way,” wherein Roberts calls the U.S. administration of that time “the House of Bush,” likening it to the oil rich regimes in the Middle East, “troubled by the prospect of uncertainty over the ownership of the planet’s richest sources of fossil fuel.” Mackey fails to promote a broad enough perspective, particularly when presenting specific interests in the discourse, while addressing the mutually inclusive concerns of the fragility of Iraq that resulted in stopping short of Baghdad, lacking the context of capitalistic U.S. oil imperialism, which entered into a new stage along the shores of Persian Gulf in the early post-Cold War settings.

Within the framework of these concerns she explains the political maneuver, which aimed not to keep Saddam Hussein in power but rather to allow the Sunni dominated Iraqi military to topple him and then to become the sole power policing Iraq—a plan that would have perfectly worked to the coalition’s advantage, as it would assure territorial integrity. The plan, however, did not work because of the simultaneous uprisings of the Shiites and Kurds against the government in Baghdad, which had brought Iraqi military to protect Hussein out of necessity for survival. “As a result, Iraq’s president still reigns in Baghdad, rearming his country, defying the United Nations and denying George Bush a tidy end to the Gulf War.” This reportage of the decision that had been made in the name of damage control unfolds the dual objectives of the action—deposing Hussein with the aid of a military coup and keeping the Iraqi territory intact; in

the end the former was left unaccomplished in favor of the assured success of the latter. One can easily understand what a successful Shia or Kurdish uprising would have meant for the members of the Iraqi military, losing their ascendancy over the territory as it was disintegrating, the fear of the Sunni minority as a whole, which added into the anxiety of international community. Yet, in mentioning the uprisings as the causality of Hussein's political survival, effectively placing the Iraqi military in his shoes, the journalist opts not to place the issue in a larger context, explanatory of how these segments of the society had been bloodily suppressed by Hussein while being betrayed by the U.S.

It would have been insightful had Mackey addressed what she would later expose in *The Reckoning*: "the tragedy of the Shia and Kurds in that reckless, heroic spring of 1991 is also the tragedy of Iraq" (297). It was when the Kurds, who had been encouraged by the U.S. to revolt, left alone at the mercy of Hussein's army, bringing about the carnage along with a Kurdish refugee crisis that "in the corridors of Washington and on the op-ed pages of newspapers across the country, Americans wrestled with their responsibility in the Kurdish rebellion." While the Bush administration enunciated the decision of staying clear of the fight between the Kurds and Hussein, American opinion on the concerns of the prospect Kurdish autonomy was voiced by a senior Middle East analyst in *Newsweek* that "It's autonomy today, but a separate state tomorrow. We all know that" (350). It was also when the Shia had been abandoned while being slaughtered by the Iraqi army: "[...] we stood aside in the uprisings. We let one Iraqi division go through our lines to get Basra [to stop the Shia] because the United States did not want the regime to collapse," quoted from William Quandt's interview while explaining the U.S. mentality that it has been locked in since 1979 dictated by "the fear of Islamic Republic of Iran." Indeed the U.S. did not desire to see an Iraq ruled by Shia clergy as it has occurred in Iran, to which Mackey writes "rather than recognizing the Shia as predominantly Arabs who held genuine, long-term grievances against Baghdad, the United States failed to allow the process of reform of the Iraqi political system to begin" (353).

Had Mackey integrated this aforementioned contextual information into "Get Rid of Saddam—and Then What?," written when electoral campaigns urged Americans to enter into another confrontation with Saddam Hussein's Iraq, she would have brought about a more complete picture of the recent past while bringing more clarity to the reasoning behind the events of present. In neglecting to cover a milieu of the Shia and Kurdish rebellions, she in fact

overlooks the position of the U.S. in this global war effort. There had certainly been regional influences, such as Turkey and Syria, on the decision of stopping short of Baghdad, as well as the local dynamics of the failed plan of toppling Hussein by Iraqi military. There had yet existed other basics like the U.S. fear of envisioning a pro-Iranian Islamic state in Iraq, which had far-reaching impacts on the realities on the ground in handling the rebellions being staged against the regime in Baghdad. Mackey as well as the majority of those involved seem not to be concerned with the well-being of the people of Iraq, as it apparently plays as little a role in the decision making processes of foreign bodies as in her own judgments on how to address this paradoxical situation. After all, in depicting the two factors, as combination of which has kept Iraq intact—“a bitter hostility to foreign occupation” and “the iron heel of powerful men,” the former is associated with British colonialism and the latter with Hussein’s oppressive regime, she only absolves the U.S. of their purported responsibility on the destabilizing consequences of the more recent imperial history.

Mackey falls short in depicting the whole situation, neglecting the complexities of the international relations, specifically her neglect of oil and Iran as factors weighing in the decision making process of the U.S. surrounding the Gulf War. Despite this, her article proves to be insightful due to her ability of reaching deeper into the matter by the use of passing history and its everlasting effects on local dynamics, providing an understanding of the setting—Iraq, bearing neither a common identity, nor an inclination to create one. This is also because of her aptitude for covering the current modes of operation exhibited by a range of U.S. politicians, focusing exclusively on the issue of dispatching Hussein, telling how little was known of the reality in Iraq by the U.S. leaders and general public, ignorant of the region’s intrinsic issues, and lacking in discernment while formulating opinions. Particularly insightful is the discourse, looking towards the future on the shores of the Persian Gulf in referring to the talks of the U.S. arming the Kurds, i.e., “but if the Kurds are armed, why not the Shiites? Will anyone win, or at the end of a decade of civil war, will some only lose less than others, as has happened in Afghanistan?” In conjunction with the display of a debate, hoping to implement a coalition government in Iraq without consideration of another divisive factor—“the imperative of tribal politics,” waiting to surface upon the departure of Hussein, this serves well in understanding what Mackey deems as “the great risk of igniting yet another crisis in the Persian Gulf.”

3.3.1.6. The U.S. Invasion of Iraq, 2003

In reviewing “Think Globally, Act Tribally” together with two articles posted on *The Guardian*’s webpage with no proper title (the first two issued on the eve of, and the last shortly after, the U.S. invasion of Iraq), in line with “Get Rid of Saddam—and Then What?,” one can assert that neither Mackey’s approach nor the U.S.’s understanding of Hussein’s Iraq has changed within the decade since the inception of the Gulf War. A motive in the discourse is the absence of common identity in Iraq. Through this, the journalist endorses her arguments against U.S. planning a hasty invasion of Iraq for the regime change, while expressing her concerns as it was inevitably entailing a subsequent occupation promising only “no exit” due to the strategy and methods driven seemingly with a lack of understanding about this country.

“Think Globally, Act Tribally” was written in the late of 2002, when the Bush administration was planning its military operation on the basis of the well-known elements fueling the power of Saddam Hussein—“the Republican Guard,” “the internal security system,” and “the stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons,” which lead them to conclude, “Hussein is so entrenched that only U.S. military power can remove him.” To Mackey, there had yet existed another element, being ignored, strengthening Hussein’s power—“an intricate set of alliances with Iraqi tribal leaders.” This becomes the starting point of the discourse, as she suggests towards the administration and the war planners that “the tribes could bring about the collapse of Hussein without America having to fire a shot.”

The journalist enriches the context in revisiting the history, from which one can gain insight on “the nature of Hussein’s regime [that] was rooted in the nature of Iraq,” where multiple identities have reproduced the unification and division within a social structure, from tribe to larger social and political units. An underlining point of the journalist is the creation of Iraq, as a contrived political entity, into which a collection of ethnic and sectarian groups was jammed, a representation that is akin to that placed in “Get Rid of Hussein and then What?” Differing this reportage from the other is its objective, which provides a comprehensive account of this human mosaic, the mix of Sunni, Shia, Arab, and Kurd, etc., who have further differentiated themselves, despite strong urban traditions inherited from the Ottoman Empire, within rural rudiments—tribal configurations, each claiming its own law and leadership. Interwoven throughout the article is the aspect of Iraq, where from the days of Faisal I’s

crowning as a king in 1921 to Iraq's foundation as a republic in 1958 and the inception of the Gulf War in 1991, each political leader had confronted the challenges of tribalism. In order to maintain control, they had either placed efforts in negotiations, keeping the tribes loyal, or implored support from an increasing number of urbanites to carry Iraq towards being more of a nation. A level of success was achieved, in terms of wooing Iraqis to a central authority, with the explosion of oil prices in the 1970s, when service and infrastructure was provided to all Iraqis by the Baath government, in which Hussein played his part. Placing ancient Mesopotamia in the political rhetoric was another attempt of the Baathists to merge all under an umbrella, which ultimately failed due to the country's reality. While tribalism continued to challenge the state from every corner of the society, regardless of being Sunni, Shia, and Kurd in rural and urban areas, Hussein, now as the sole power relinquished the Mesopotamian identity in elevating Iraq's *Arabness* during the Iraq-Iran war of 1980-88, shifting the dichotomy of the battlefield towards the epic struggle that played out between Arabs and Persians. Mackey makes a strong stand as she also draws attention to the aftermath of the Gulf War, when "no longer commanding enough loyalists to man either the military forces or security services necessary to police the country, the Iraqi president held on to political power by reviving the most basic element of Iraqi identity—tribalism." In gaining allegiance not only from Shia and Sunni tribal sheiks, "[who] won money, favors and guns from Hussein in return for holding their people in check for the Iraqi dictator," but also from one of the Kurdish factions "[who] gained advantage over a rival Kurdish group," Hussein restructured urban neighborhoods, woven into a network of tribal alliances, where he helped also to produce a new tribalism within professional, economic, and social organizations, requiring no kinship but an alliance to him. "The result is that Iraq today is a more tribal society than it was at the time the country was pasted together by the British."

Mackey in fact offers a larger picture in displaying the challenges of tribalism, deeply rooted and historically motivated, existing as an obstacle, among many others, for the development of modern political culture in Iraq. This picture reflects the various stages of transformation in the country, from monarchy to republic, and from a national socialist regime to a dictatorship, while exposing what is echoed by Adeed Dawisha, "[...] the many reconstructions and redefinitions of the country's identity resulted from the impact of domestic imperatives and/or international events and phenomena" (136), from "Footprint in the Sand: The Definition and Redefinition of Identity in Iraq's Foreign Policy" placed in *Identity and Foreign Policy in*

the Middle East. Significant in understanding the political composition of Iraq is the lack of necessary underpinnings of a common good, “[which] has afforded the ruling elites countless opportunities to define and redefine the country’s identity in accordance with their own interest and dictated policy at any given time” (Dawisha, 118). Mackey’s informed narrative brings the complicated political and cultural factors into account in depicting current Iraq, where Hussein has wiped out of the success gained from more than eighty years efforts to nurture a common identity in reviewing tribalism. Offering unknown characteristics of the country works to provide a new outlook on the larger consequences of toppling Hussein, if the action were taken by the U.S. military power, as the complexity of Iraq was deeper than one would assume at first glance. The action would have proven for a difficult aftermath, which was what the U.S. policy makers neglected in selling the public on their plan, while ignoring to see an essential pillar of Hussein’s power—tribal alliances, capable of eliminating Hussein if the U.S. had employed a correct strategy using this tribalism to their advantage.

Within this framework, and in conjunction with the representations of how tribal alliances function in Iraqi politics, i.e., “because tribes ally themselves only with the strong, Hussein commands their allegiance only as long as individual leaders gain advantage in the relationship,” Mackey suggests a time-consuming strategy, requiring a created perception of Hussein’s weakening power in the eyes of his allied tribes. This could have been achieved through a re-imposition of the U.N. arms inspectors in Iraq, as it would have brought about such a perception, resulting in withdrawal of tribal support, as an alliance would seem increasingly worthless. “This is where the Bush administration has an opportunity to achieve regime change in Iraq without a war.” While the U.S. was rushing into a war, Mackey widely and similarly presented this very same idea, citing similar examples on various occasions, as seen in her lecture delivered when being hosted by IHC at University of California at Santa Barbara; “we could conceivably get rid of Saddam Hussein without having to invade.” However practical this may have appeared, she neglects to address who would cast and bear part in the process of regime change, where Iraqi history was taking shape during post-Saddam era. While in further writing about the idea of toppling Hussein by forces of tribalism to be considered by the administration “before it commits the lives of unknown numbers of American soldiers and billions of dollars to a war in the Persian Gulf, with all of its unintended consequences,” she only proves herself as helping to formulate a better foreign policy without explaining to her readers

what such a war would have meant for the Iraqis themselves. “It is hard to see ourselves as living in what will one day be history, but it is vital that we do so, and it is the job of journalists and writers to see that we can,” writes Roberts in his book review, which also expresses that “if Mackey could bring to bear on the present the clarity she has about the past, she would surely see that, with regard to Iraq, we are continuing to act as imperialists or colonizers in a post-colonial age.” The consequences of this neo-colonialism for the colonizer can be explained with his further elucidation; “the more we attempt to remake the world in our own image, the deeper the resentment against us will grow.” The history of the early twentieth century of Iraq is being repeated in the early twenty first century in the eyes of those who live there, which Mackey does not properly elucidate for the Western reader; what an Iraqi invasion would be in reality, a new age colonization.

A striking similarity, in terms of the expressions of ideas, between “Think Globally, Act Tribally” and “Get Rid of Saddam—and Then What?” (1992), can be found in Mackey’s position in journalism while depicting the situation on the ground, regarding not Washington’s interests, but the US national interests. Mackey was not, and has never been, in disagreement with the idea of the removal of Hussein; her disagreement was with the judgment—no comprehension of the complications that it would follow. Taking two of Mackey’s online articles appearing in *The Guardian* into this discussion, we come to see a discourse, placing the issue in a larger context. Apart from emphasizing the impossibility of stabilizing the region under a foreign rule, due to the lack of common identity, Mackey also points out the administration’s shortfalls on its preparations to go into Iraq. This is exemplified with its rush into war “on [an] almost unilateral basis,” without a consensus of the international community as the one that had been achieved in the Gulf War of 1991 (*Guardian*, May 2003). This is also exemplified with its unwillingness to engage in the Palestinian issue, something that would have provided the notion that “the U.S. is at least concerned with addressing the Palestinian issue,” which would have yet given some political impunity. “But instead the Bush administration has just given the Sharon government carte blanche to handle the Palestinian uprising any way it choose” (*Guardian*, February 2003). While being implicative of the U.S.’s objective—providing to Israel protection without forcing its government to address Palestinian rights, Mackey shows how the U.S. has failed to understand a very strong element of the whole puzzle in speaking about the region—the Palestine-Israeli conflict. This flows with a similar tone to the discourse placed in *Passion and*

Politics, pointing to a warning that was originally issued in the newspaper *al-Akhbar* and then cited in *The New York Times* in 1991: “If [the Palestinian issue] remains unsolved, the twenty Saddams, not one Saddam, will appear, and the region will be marked by instability and coups” (405). The journalist endorses the fact that without a resolution in the Palestinian issue, an attempt to invade Iraq would yet create more Arab hostility and less Arab support towards the U.S.

Apparently Mackey was becoming pessimistic in seeing ideology in the U.S. policy in the Middle East, a forceful impact in thinking that the solution to all problems come through military power, i.e., “the hardliners in the Pentagon, who tend to be very, very pro-Israeli, [feel] that if you’ve taken out Saddam Hussein, if you take out the government of Syria and you overthrow the Islamic republic in Iran, then you’ve eliminated all of the real threats to Israel.” This altogether helps to place the conflict in Iraq into perspective, as it so interrelated to the countries in proximity as well the interests of the U.S. and its government, whether they be political or economic in nature. By attempting to provide this milieu in which the conflict in Iraq is set in the aforementioned *Guardian* articles Mackey fosters an understanding of the issue and the region as a whole that is both informative and provocative as it begs the question—is a reexamining of the mode of operations of the U.S. government in order? As the long term proliferations of their actions seem to be stacking upon one another further entrenching the sides in this conflict over the Middle East.

3.3.1.7. An Outlook of Complexities in an Occupational Conundrum—Iraq

In view of Mackey’s rhetoric written before the U.S. invasion of Iraq took place, asserting that its current dilemma cannot be solved by simply a military intervention, or any length of subsequent occupation, and in understanding Iraq’s situation through the additional reportage issued in the aftermath of the invasion, her value as a journalist is corroborated with her ability of foreseeing the future. The ensuing events prove beyond any reasonable doubt that toppling Hussein did not dramatically improve the situation in the country. While the collection of the articles, “Better Alive Than Dead,” “Iraq’s Dangerous Identity Crisis,” “Echoes of Iran: Muqtada Sadr’s revolt may lead to an Islamic republic,” “A City That Lives for Revenge,” and “The Coming Clash Over Kirkuk,” authenticate Mackey’s predictions, each one of which is

reflective of the journalist's ability to expose the ethos of the land, from which a tribal society appears as the only static component.

"Better Alive Than Dead" was published in Summer 2003, when the U.S. authorities announced the death of Uday and Qusay, the two sons of Saddam Hussein, as they were killed in a firefight with American forces. In considering the demise of the two brothers, "odious symbols of the old regime alive," as a tactical but not strategic victory gained by the U.S. occupation of Iraq, Mackey displays the country with its tribalism—the ancient fabric of an Iraqi identity. The journalist's strength lies not only in her explanations of the patterns of tribal codes functioning within the state and society, but also in how she covers the issue in a sophisticated way, from which Western readers can become privy to the inner workings of an Iraq, far different than the one promoted by the U.S.' authorities in promising to build up democracy, by exporting it to Iraq. The irrevocable motive of the representations is "revenge"—a significant identifier of tribalism. Through this Mackey covers the U.S. failure of capturing the Hussein brothers alive and placing them on display, overlooking "the needs of a society dominated by the rural values of the diverse tribes that make up much of the country's population," by denying the Iraqi public its due justice, which would otherwise "give absolute proof of their demise to a society that rejects authority."

Mackey places the importance of tribalism in a historical context, and while referencing to the history of subjugation in Iraq, which brought about a necessity for people finding their security in family and tribe, she also exposes how this keystone of the society had been intensified by Saddam Hussein, who in the meantime drove the people further towards their tribal ties through his repressive politics. After the Gulf War, Hussein repaired the power structure of Iraq, by utilizing these same rural values of tribalism, enacting the age-old principle of revenge to advance his authority. All these explanations shed light on how the U.S. administration's lack of understanding impacted the country they attempted to deal with, not giving credence to the fact that "the imperative of revenge was no different in late-20th-century Iraq than it had been for the tribes living for generations on the land of Iraq."

In underlining the U.S. official's optimistic predictions on the dispatching of the Hussein brothers as "in the short run the deaths may result in increased guerrilla attacks on American troops, [but] soon those passions will be spent," Mackey objects to this idea as "strikes against the American military in Iraq may decline immediately only to re-ignite later." How she

endorses her objection is insightful in unfolding the salient characteristics of Iraq, where supporters of Hussein might wait before seeking their revenge “for what the American invasion of Iraq has done to their status in the power structure,” while the tribal conventions opposing Hussein’s regime may accuse the U.S. of denying them the opportunity to exact their own vengeance on the brothers. These two proliferations are critical exposures, personifying the U.S.’ position in something, the Iraqi people believed, they did not belong. In this exposure of “the dictates of Iraqi culture,” Mackey succinctly presents that “by not doing more to allow Uday and Qusay Hussein to surrender, the United States lost an opportunity to show Iraqis that those who have committed the most heinous of crimes can still be brought to justice.” This challenges the reader to question the U.S. failure of bringing the two brothers on display, as if it runs counter to the idea of building an Iraq around the rule of law.

A striking similarity between “Better Alive Than Dead” and “A City That Lives for Revenge” can be found in Mackey’s coverage of the city of Falluja—a tribal society with its 3,000,000 people; the sole subject of the latter article. In reporting on the city in Spring 2004, when the resistance against the U.S. occupation forces was still active, and the increased fight brought about unconventional violence as in the case of the four civilian contractors, who were burned alive, Mackey claims that “even if American forces storm and subdue the town, it is unlikely that there will be peace there anytime soon.” The way she endorses her claim is politically significant, as she again attempts to force her readers attention towards the Pentagon, which perceived, or at least promoted the idea that the on-going violence was to be blamed on “die-hards of Saddam Hussein’s regime” and “foreigners promoting the ideology of Al Qaeda,” but neglected a third, much more prevalent group, namely the tribes of central Iraq. “They are a tough lot with a long history of resistance to any outside authority.”

As has been articulated, revisiting history is a common devise in Mackey’s discourse to place the issue in a context, generating a broad enough perception in understanding Falluja—a place, “where even Saddam Hussein ventured cautiously.” She covers the hundred years of history in her brief but informative skill of writing, from the days of the Ottoman rule to that of Britain, and from the rule of General Abdul Salam Arif (receiving protection from his tribal land as a member of the Jumaila tribe) and that of Saddam Hussein (a member of the Bu Nasir tribe, who replicated Arif’s model in Tikrit). In providing rational explanations on why tribalism is a keystone of the society, deeply rooted and difficult to control even in the twenty-first century,

when the U.S. attempted to occupy, this Falluja coverage serves Mackey as it typifies the value systems of tribalism, displayed with “expectations of hospitality,” “practices for settling disputes,” and “obligations of revenge against anyone committing an offense against a member of the tribe.”

The American readers are coaxed to see what was at stake for the U.S. in Fallujah, where their daughters and sons were on the ground—the concept of revenge, awaiting if the military stepped up its assault on this territory, as “for every tribesman who is killed, the kinship group remains, obligated to avenge his death.” In light of such conditions, the journalist becomes suggestive of a strategic plan as to step back from Falluja and transfer the responsibility to the tribal leaders while negotiating with them, to which she adds, “It’s doubtful, though, that the Bush administration would be willing to even consider this approach.” What is more significant to understand from this reportage is Mackey’s harsh criticism, while drawing a picture of the milieu, she poses her argument on the U.S. occupation of Iraq, a failed attempt even before the war began whose price would be paid by those in the field, and to a lesser extent those paying taxes. “Like so much else that was ignored by the civilian war planners, the challenge of governing the tribes seems to have been considered a minor detail in their plan to remake Iraq and the Middle East.”

In fact, the issue of the U.S. failure in pursuing an occupation in Iraq is the crux of each one of Mackey’s articles, which is also seen in delving into “Iraq’s Dangerous Identity Crisis” (November 2003) and “Echoes of Iran” (April 2004). In the former the journalist addresses the latest plan of the Bush administration, creating an interim government in Iraq by Summer 2004 while withdrawing a major portion of American soldiers from the territory. Such a plan for Mackey is an illusion, in terms of its objective; “no matter how much political power and military responsibility are transferred to the Iraqis, the situation in Iraq will not dramatically improve until Iraqis agree on a national identity, a goal that has eluded them since the state was created by British diplomats some 80 years ago.” All explanations bring the clarity in envisioning a U.S. occupied Iraq, which was supposedly moving towards the constitutional process, where, yet, there existed a bloody struggle among factions of the population, each vying for the right to define the Iraqi state, apart from the highly publicized guerilla campaign lead by supporters of the former regime and ethereal foreign terrorists. Even this picture itself works to endorse what Mackey has frequently stated in her articles before the invasion had taken place, and now is a

reality as she reports “with Hussein removed from power, the Iraqis have been free to define themselves, which has caused much of the violence ensnaring U.S. soldiers.”

She allows her readers to grasp the nature of such violence, as in Iraq the Sunni minority were trying to reclaim their former privileged positions, and the Shia majority now assuming the dominant role in the political arena fought in hopes of determining the direction of the future government, while posing the question of what was to be the nature of this government—secular, theocratic, or a blend of the two, in which Islam functions as the moral basis of the system. While the traditional Shiites upheld a firewall between politics and religion with their most-respected clerics (who condone the U.S.-led occupation through a projection of indifference), Muqtada Sadr a crucial member of the Shia leadership has declared war against the coalition under the banner of the Islamic revolution. Concerning the Kurds, there was a belief of being close to the ascertainment of autonomy, yet there was still discrepancy on how the new Iraqi state should have been structured. In conjunction with the illustrations of the illusion of yesterday’s goal (“before the war, the Bush administration pledged that the U.S. mission in Iraq would end when the Iraqis wrote a constitution, held elections and installed a government”) and today’s misconception (“Hussein’s loyalists and foreign terrorists is an easy way to explain the increasing violence”), Mackey’s discourse attempts to expose the reality: “Choosing a new council to write a constitution, or creating a provisional government along the lines of President Hamid Karzai’s in Afghanistan, will not automatically hasten the day that Iraqis agree on a national identity.” This clearly shows us an attempt by the U.S. to find an exit strategy; yet, “the longer it takes to define the Iraqi state, the longer the United States will be trapped in Iraq.”

Apparently such an attempt, resulting from the U.S. illusion of “military invasion” as the solution of all problems, was proven accomplished in reading “Echoes of Iran,” an article published in 2004, when the Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr sought to replicate in Iraq the governing model of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Mackey states, “Unless Washington can delicately finesse its confrontation with the Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr, President Bush could become the war president whose blindness to the political complexities in postwar Iraq created an Islamic republic in the country,” while reporting on the country, where Sadr recently unleashed his militia and supporters in four Iraqi cities. On the one hand, the journalist unfolds the drama on the fight stemming from who would take part in the definition of the new Iraqi state. On the other she endorses the idea that the U.S. was still trapped in its own delusions as it announced

against Sadr action that “individuals who create violence, who incite violence, who execute violence against persons inside of Iraq will be hunted down and captured or killed.” While reminding the U.S. policy makers of the three pillars that had triggered an Islamic revolution, a social revolution in many aspects, in Iran—nationalism, the concept of social justice, and the presence of a religious authority figure—and in remarking on Sadr’s rhetoric and action, as he was delivering all but spiritual authority, Mackey writes “whether Sadr becomes the irresistible force in the Shiite community depends on how the U.S. deals with his challenge.”

The success in this reportage not only comes from the reporter’s knowledge of the subject matter, but also through her expression of ideas and concerns, successful in enriching the content when placing Iraq in perspective, alluding to outcomes in referencing Iran. In presenting the complexity of Sadr’s position, she explains how the aforementioned threat announced by the U.S. evoked for Sadr and his followers “the Shiite concept of martyrdom” and “the Shiite history of struggle against superior power,” becoming a clear warning for the rest of Iraq, where its transformation to some form of representative government depended on the Shia, composing 60% of the population. Thus, any attempt at either capturing or killing Sadr, would be as risky as they would assume, and cannot be conducted without the permission and direction of the Shiite clerics, whose religious authority was retained only by winning over the allegiance of their follower. From this representation of the dilemma; to either leave Sadr alone with his escalating political power, or to arrest or kill him, turning him into a martyr, which would only work to unite the Shiites against the occupation, one can easily see the conundrum the U.S. has gotten themselves into. Still there was no certainty on whether a new Iraq would emerge as a secular state, promised by the Bush administration, or a form of Islamic state was to take power, galvanized through the woes of the foreign occupation which would stridently opposed to the U.S., with more fervor even than the Republic of Iran.

In taking a closer look at “The Coming Clash Over Kirkuk” published in February 2005, we see the complexities of the issues surrounding the deposing of Saddam Hussein and the subsequent occupation delving deeper still as the impending power vacuum has fed the flames of countless ethnic and territorial disputes around the country. The article focuses on the city of Kirkuk and the potential problems it posed to a stable nationhood in Iraq. It is a city that held the key to nearly 40% of Iraq’s oil reserves while playing host to a predominantly Turkmen and Kurdish population, both of whom were vying for control of the city and its resources, making it

a possible catalyst for international dispute. The Turkmen were supported by the Turkish government, who was dually invested in their participation in Kirkuk's authority and power sharing, as domination by the Kurds in this regard could advance their aspirations of autonomy, spelling disaster for the Turkish government due to its substantial Kurdish minority population. While highlighting the Kurdish issue and the problems it poses for a stable Iraqi, this treatment also exposes the intrinsic issues involved with the competition for power and natural resources that inevitably were to occur after the dismemberment of Hussein's dictatorship.

In an age of information and globalization, when the occupation of Iraq was viewed by many as a transformation of the country from evil of sorts, Mackey aimed to point out the fallacy of the idea of exporting democracy and the catastrophes it could set in motion. "With a few notable exceptions, the media have acted for more than a decade, and continue to act, as little more than propagandists and apologists for the largely Western-held—and U.S.-led—position that Iraq merely got what was coming to it and that Saddam Hussein is really to blame," as Roberts states while adding that "Sandra Mackey, a superb journalist and author of several other books on the Middle East, has always been one of the most notable exceptions to the rule of a dumbed-down media [...]." Although Mackey does not place the issue in an adequately global perspective, the realities of Iraq are delivered with unflinching accuracy providing a more balanced perspective than many others afforded to the American public. Mackey challenges her readers to confront the methods of the ongoing military occupation and the issues that feed into its lack of success by referencing history, culture, and many other pertinent facets of this country, Iraq.

3.4. Chapter Conclusion

Sandra Mackey's treatments on Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq draw a focus on a locally and globally relevant progression of events, taking shape since the late 1980s and evolving into the middle of the 2000s. In each one of her articles she focuses on a particular issue with her style of reportage firmly standing in relation to the reported country's history, from ancient to modern. Her aim is to provide a proper and more complete understanding of the framed topic. The selections and emphasis in the representations of these countries' socio-economic, -political, -religious, and -cultural history work to investigate the multi-layers of reasons and outcomes on

the region's undertakings. Though the journalist is very thorough and fair in these representations, in some cases she neglects to elaborate the topics within the economic history evolving in line with oil production. Yet, her accounts verify and justify the evolvement and on-going changes on foreign policy parameters of the reported countries and the ideologies that have been molded within it, as well as the political practices from local to national and international levels that have played roles in this process.

The interconnectedness of the three presented countries within the region clearly come into sight in presenting Iran as a social force, Saudi Arabia with its disjunction and social strata, and Iraq as a catalyst of calamity. The reports on Iran deeply evaluate the country's position within the context of Islamic Revolution. Coupled with the provided examples such as the contra efforts in Lebanon and fluctuations in leadership from extreme to moderate, Mackey deconstructs the myth on Persian identity, a scapegoat for the Western community. The illustrations of Saudi Arabia expose the power of the state, voice of the people, aversion to change, the Bedouin tradition, and the military structure, helping one to familiarize themselves with the reasons behind the Saudi paranoia at all levels, spurred by the Western military presence brought about through the Saudi-U.S. alliance scheme. Likewise the reportage on Iraq portrays the power structures out of subjugation along with the salient characteristics of the country, underlining how groups of people have been left unaccounted for by both the host governments and the U.S.

While maintaining her expertise and professionalism on objectivity, Mackey's journalism proves insightful in understanding the complex realities of the reported countries in general, and the region's intricate undertakings fed into by foreign interests, in particular. This is seen in her reportage on the Persian Gulf exposing the progressions of events since the last episode of the Iraq-Iran War of 1980-8. Her professionalism is evident as she explores the underlying issues that have created mutual hostilities and mistrust, which allowed a vacuum within the region that was exploited not only by the native competing groups but also by the outsiders. Her treatments allow one to understand how the complexities surrounding this conflict-laden region have been fed by the concerns and interests of the neighboring countries that coalesce with those of the West, particularly the U.S.

In illustrating the implications of U.S. foreign policy in the Persian Gulf, Mackey's discourse is highly critical, providing a conception on what was at stake for the U.S. behind the

action. This is explanatory of her standpoint on the U.S. policy, while speaking to the geopolitical importance of the Persian Gulf and its strategic significance to the Western communities. In playing the role of journalist serving for the national interest, her approach serves as suggestive of the key problem in the U.S. government's strategic thinking—a lack of understanding on the real threat faced in the Middle East. This is glimpsed in representing the U.S. engagement into regional affairs, as in the case of the Iraq-Iran War, through which she passes judgment on this engagement. This is also glimpsed in the illustrations of the U.S. containment policy on Iran, referencing it as firmly within “the axis of evil” in line with what it would have brought about—a triggered Islamic ideology throughout the region. All are provided to address the negative impacts on the long-term U.S. objectives in the region due to an essential foreign-policy choice set into motion. In tracing Mackey's commentaries, underlining what must be comprehended by the U.S. administration in the midst of an effort to influence the Persian Gulf, other examples can also be found in her reportage on Saudi Arabia. The U.S. military forces remained in Saudi territories more than a decade, which is illustrated as potential for inflammation of Saudi nationalism in the name of religion—disastrous for the countries international relations and alliance system by seeming as if the U.S. was to stay longer on the ground, a more severe reaction might possibly arise. While further providing examples, we can also address Mackey's reportage on Iraq, tracing what would have been the real risk behind the military invasion—turning out to be an enduring occupation. Again, such a real risk stemming from the lack in understanding the region, its history and its people, only brings about additional instability in the Persian Gulf region, to which Mackey's stance has never been changed since the Iraq-Iran War.

Mackey criticizes the U.S. foreign policy and reports its physical involvements in Middle Eastern affairs, which are often lacking in precise objectives, showing an ineffective understanding of cause and effect. As she analyzes the regional instability, the reader is assisted to recognize the complexity of the conflicts, which have not only been created by insiders, but also by Eastern and/or Western outsiders. The journalist yet does not clearly reveal the importance of the territory for the U.S., failing to elaborate the presented conflicts within the context of the Cold War and the post-Cold War—what it would have meant for the U.S.

Despite the highlighted omission, Mackey demonstrates a wealth of knowledge that is not only historically precise, but also shows her training as a journalist, as she has carefully

investigated the political issues of this region. The transmission of her knowledge and historical overviews work to shape Western public opinion about the Middle East without generalization, because her viewpoints shows an objectivity as a writer and journalist who is interested in reporting both perceptions of the Middle Easterners and the Westerners as accurately and unbiased, as possible. Her intellectual and journalistic accounts are not isolated, one sided, or dramatized. Her goal is to deconstruct the academic and media's stereotypes about the Middle East, which is in most cases is indirectly or directly responsible for creating unfair or misleading images. Thereby, her discourses challenge the standard Western national norms through alternative viewpoints on the sources, constructions, and components of the region—the subject of her reportage.

CONCLUSION

This dissertation has examined twentieth century Western scholarly, artistic, and journalistic perspectives on the Middle East. The primary motivation undertaking this study was to contribute to the understanding of how the modern Middle East has been perceived, studied, and represented by the West, because gaining an awareness of this is imperative, today more than ever. As America progressed into the new millennium under the shocking impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, it declared a *war on terror* that lead eventually to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Memories of a century old tumultuous imperial past have reemerged in the interaction of the East and West, particularly in the U.S. Simultaneously, the unscrupulous misnomer *clash of civilizations* has been proliferated in the political arena. It has been elaborated upon in the essentialist viewpoints of many scholars, adhering to the paradigm of Anglo-American Orientalism. In this, the media also play a role in the framing of news and information that have fed into the composite relationship between power and knowledge, transmitting the ideology of Orientalism to the public sphere, fortifying stereotypical dichotomies like Islam vs. West and stimulating *Islamophobia*. All have worked to skew a complex reality out of focus, while distorting the possibility for global understanding and a global awareness within Western societies.

Despite signifying the new direction in the Middle East and within U.S. foreign policy, none of the current progressions and events can be isolated from those that happened in the previous century, since the engagement of the outside powers has persisted in the region that remains at the crossroads of the world's geopolitical, economical, and natural resource relations—first through European colonialism, then Cold War rivalry, and finally by the sole foreign power, the U.S. “That engagement [of the U.S.], which goes back more than a half century, has had complex political, military, economic and cultural dimensions and powerful consequences, not only for the peoples of the Middle East but also for ourselves, as the events of September 11, 2001 brought home all too tragically” (Lockman, 1). Since early post-WWII, when Middle Eastern studies changed hands from Britain to the U.S., inadequate evaluations and assessments of the region have been repeated in the productions of many scholars, writers, correspondents, and photographers, failing to address particular aspects of socio-political and – economic issues, which seem to work towards refuting any shared responsibility or

acknowledgement of the causality behind these conflicts. Certainly, there have been attempts at negating ignorant perceptions of the *other*, Arabs and Iranians alike, both in academia and in the media providing alternative approaches in their studies and portrayals of politics, societies, and cultures in the Middle East and Islam. However, the world-shaping decisions of the policy makers have frequently rested their faith in myth and nostalgic treatments rather than the facts that lie in balanced approaches, which have concurrently served to influence the shaping of opinions about the Middle East in the West, especially in America. This was the point of departure in this dissertation as we have attempted to foster a better understanding while defining our misgivings of an Orientalist viewpoint and to elucidate its proliferations.

Intending to highlight what has gone wrong, and to a lesser degree what has gone right, with Western understanding of the Middle East, and the reasons and sources of the continuation of misconceptions, this dissertation has focused on the works of three expert communicators: the academic treatments of Bernard Lewis, the photojournalism of David Douglas Duncan, and the journalism of Sandra Mackey. Constituting the body of the dissertation are three chapters; each can be referred to as a case study, self-contained, and standing independently from one another. Each chapter has been analyzed in accordance with the following primary research question: *What is the information the Western reader receives from his/her writer and communicator about the Middle East, and how could this transmission shape Western public opinion about the Middle East?*

Chapter one evaluated the reception of the academic analyses of Bernard Lewis, who has achieved a renowned authority on Middle Eastern studies since the early 1950s. His Orientalist eminence began to crystallize through his treatments of Islam and of the region's political undertakings evolving during the Cold War. Lewis has elaborated on these treatments in a vast number of articles, seminar papers, lectures, and books, with an academic expertise and a remarkable linguistic knowledge, ancient and modern, Eastern and Western, but lacking in genuine real-world experience; although he paid brief visits and conducted research in libraries and archives, he has not lived in the region nor in contact with average people. This lack of experience is essential, distinguishing him from David Douglas Duncan and Sandra Mackey. Despite having received a number of criticisms from academic experts and media investigators because of his articulations on the issues, especially that of Islamism, Lewis has managed to retain a prestigious reputation since the mid-1970s, when he began to take part in formulating an

Anglo-American Orientalism. In the decades that followed, while becoming a publicly esteemed intellectual as his discourse has gone beyond academia, a variety of Lewis' early assertions have been proven wrong; but, he has never attempted to reevaluate his research for new and better conclusions, retaining instead the same stances on the issues he addresses.

Lewis' consistency stems from his persistent outlook on the ethos of Islam, seen as existing as a religion, culture, and civilization, through which he explores the modern Middle East. In these explorations, resting on his expertise of Medieval Arabs and Islam, the author repeatedly focuses on seventh century Arabia, which deludes him to portray a string of traditions as inherent in Islam, evolving throughout the centuries along with the Muslim experience and comprising a set of universal Islamic outlooks while impeding a genuine appraisal of Muslim civil, political, and high culture. Coupled with the topic of Islam's occasionalist and atomistic theology set forth in the middle-ages, and the Muslim failure of reconciling with modernity, these portrayals become the foundations in exposing the issues relevant to the political role of Islam in the Arab and wider Islamic world.

Lewis' one-sided approach to the Muslim experience is overt. It can be explained not with respect paid to colonialism, imperialism, and postcolonial developments, but within the trajectory of Islamic history, pointing out a characteristic of Islamic society in terms of religion and politics intersecting with each other from the outset. For example, he provides this reason for the aversion of Muslim societies towards secularism. The vague treatments in speaking on the modern era are blended with his selectivity in providing examples either from the time frame coinciding with Prophet Muhammad's lifetime, or the socio-cultural milieu of Medieval Arabs, all of which is suggestive of Lewis' faults and misgivings. While emphasizing perceived contrasts between Islam and Christianity, centered on early religious history and foundational doctrines, without addressing specific historical conditions, Lewis divides the globe into distinct civilizations, contributing to his *the West and the rest* approach. This view of the globe provides a perception of unbroken cohesion within Western and Islamic civilizations, and in promoting the West as an innate democracy, Islam's unchangeable fortune anchored in ancient roots comes into sight, forcing the reader to conceptualize a rigid Muslim paradigm, collectively obedient to their ideal of the Perfect Man and the Perfect State, whose political affairs are supposedly compelled by anti-democratic values typifying Islam's incompatibility with modernity. Also, while reading into the modern Muslim mind based on the life of medieval Arabs, Lewis does not

consider it important to expose the different forms of contemporary Arab and Muslim life. Moreover he neglects to take into account the voice of contemporary people living in the Middle East, surely something worth considering, telling their own conceptualizations of their struggles. It is clear upon examination that these omissions are not mistakes of a writer, but rather intentional exclusions—the un-presented phenomena would stand at odds with what he aims to promote: a unitary Islamic-Arab existence and their inability to adapt.

These points referenced above are in fact representative of Lewis' structural analysis. In giving a timeless quality to the Islamic civilization in its backwardness, opposing itself to purported Western revisionism, the author not only hints towards Islamic exceptionalism, as it is not compatible with any modernist tendency, but he also promotes the idea that there is only one way on the road to modernization, thus Muslims have to follow the path of Westernization in order to reach modernity. In this approach, Turkey is given another exceptional outlook due to its Western oriented political system and mode of life; yet again Lewis fails to place the issue in a historical context, passing up on the chance at revealing what makes Turkey's case distinctive from that of the Arab states. Also in this approach, lacking in consideration of diversity in local customs and traditions, presenting Islam as monolithic, there is no room to endorse the idea of a possible indigenous modernization. Rather it provides reasoning for the failures in reform initiatives and institutionalization while promoting Western superiority, which serves to justify the direct rule of colonial enterprise in the region. Under these parameters, Lewis covers the decline of Islamic civilization, and in questioning "what went wrong?" he allows for pejorative speculation ranging from highlighting the status of Muslim women to suggesting an innate inability to progress, generating an idea of Muslim weakness while depicting Islam as morally incohesive with the West. Instead of educating his readers to foster their own individual judgments, the author places religion at the centre of everything. He depicts Islam's totalitarian character, proliferating itself through Oriental despotism, as a causality for the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of one party ideological dictatorships in the Arab states. In building up his arguments, based on Islam's compatibility with Italian fascist and Soviet communist models, the existence of Arab dictatorships is not depicted within the context of the respective state's formation process, or within the context of the Cold War parameters, but through Islam's innate anti-Western ideological sentiments and its attitude against the democratic Western community. Likewise, the present-day conditions of the Arab world are not

exposed within their own context, but through the periodic defining of Ottoman history, shown as symptomatic of the decline of Islam. In this, the widening gap between the Islamic world and the modern West is taken into account in order to better expose Islam's anti-modern nature. He has blamed anti-modernism for the generation of emotional and practical problems in Muslim society's leaning towards the extremist rebels of Islam.

The issue of rebels in Islam is one of Lewis' favorite themes, through which he discusses the Islamic Revolution of Iran, its impacts on the Muslim Arab world, and the terrorist campaign of Usama bin Laden. As a man of authority, Lewis labels his understanding of the clash between Islam and modernity as *the clash of civilizations*, analyzed through the perceived decline since the sixteenth century in reaction to modernity and Christianity. While promoting the idea that Islam and the West are two millennial adversaries, and in aiming to personify Islam as in a stage to exact its revenge on the West, he presents Islam as an inherently violent religion due to its *jihadism*, ignoring the esoteric aspects of this idea that is yet much more applicable to Muslims and people in general. His treatment of issues, as if he were a representative in a forum of debate presenting only his stance, might be appropriate in many venues, but it is not analytical, educative, or constructive. As a proponent of the Western paradigm, he neglects to cultivate self-sufficient critical thinking in his readers, rather he sows contempt in their hearts, while priming American minds to accept the reasoning behind military intervention for "nation-building," to Westernize and democratize. This discourse is in many ways indistinguishable from the political discourse of the later Bush administration, whose members have been referred to as Lewisites, who fail to understand the implausibility of an "exportation" of democracy to a society, or across the Middle East, as it would bring outcomes similar to those brought through the importation of secularism by European colonialism, especially if it had occurred through a military incursion, as this would appear to be neo-colonialism rather than an attempt at keeping humanity intact for the global good. Exalted as a "doyen of Middle Eastern studies," Lewis supposedly should bring an amplified understanding of foreign lands, yet conversely his position serves the nationally proliferated norms delineating the West and the *other*, promoting the West as a worldwide liberator, and the Middle East as ignorantly problematic. Still his reputation allows him preeminence in his field, as this global engagement plays out, bringing with it awareness of differences, respects, and tolerances, his name will retain notoriety only as propagandist of

military incursion, canonizing Western culture and practice as the infallible standard while creating formulations of the East/West dichotomy from an easily definable Western perspective.

The second chapter captured the artistic and journalistic combinations in David Douglas Duncan's discourse, which provided groundbreaking coverage of a region unseen by millions before his work in the Middle East. He was on the ground with his camera between 1946 and 1956, contributing his image productions often combined with textual materials (caption books) to *Life* magazine, serving as its reliable correspondent in the Middle East, and then he went on to *Collier's* as a freelance photojournalist in 1956. While a myriad of photographs and their associated captions, as well as a number of correspondences written or received have by now reached the public either through the editorial stories of *Life* and *Collier's*, or by means of Duncan's photo-autobiographical books, with some others remaining in the archives, yet none of his collections representative of the Middle East have been studied in academia. However, these collections in many ways exceed the scope of historical analysis appearing in academic journals and books.

The fundamental characteristic of Duncan's unpublished and published materials is his image productions, his photos, utilized as a means of communication to convey his messages. He principally let his pictures tell the story; yet as if that were even needed, he utilized well-written commentaries to heighten the drama of the pictures, through which he communicated the knowledge of the subject matter. Working as inclusive identifiers of Duncan's vision, the pictures serve as distinctive evidence of his testimony on Middle Eastern socio-economic, -political, -cultural, and -religious history, while the words provide an account of firsthand authentication. All were composed during his exploration of the wide-ranging changes in the region and around the globe shown through the particular events that had occurred in the first decade of post-WWII settings, involving countries and places such as Iran, the British Mandate of Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egyptian controlled Gaza Strip, and Israel, as well as the U.S. and the USSR.

In consideration of the information transmitted to Western readers, Duncan exceeds the perceived limits of his assignments, not only in terms of a sequence of his coverage that spontaneously emerged in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, but also in terms of his exposures, providing a prolific extent in understanding the eventful history of the Middle East. As an eye witness to man-made history in capturing events, which contributed to reordering international

systems, his productions verify the unique position of the region and its strategic importance on the globe—crossroads of civilization and the cradle of the great religions—connecting the continents and trade routes, where successive invasions and occupations by Eastern and Western Empires have been sustained since antiquity. This was proven in examining the stories on Iran, Palestine, Gaza Strip, and Turkey; the uniqueness of each appears in line with their commonality stemming from the region's turbulent history. Duncan recollects the passing history, for example, the ancestral ties of the Qashqais of Persia, the descendants of Genghis Khan and the origin of their migration tradition in Central Asia. Another example would be the Holy Land, where Samson destroyed the Temple and Jesus was crucified, while the land played host to Alexander the Great, Persians, Roman Legions, Crusaders, and Norsemen. Each exemplified case shows the region's heterogeneity, due to circulation of diverse populations and cultural alterations, working as suggestive of identities being forged in a mix of Eastern and Greek ideals at the dawn of history, or being molded within a mix of Christian and Muslim ideals in the later periods. His synchronous depiction of passing history provides a fresh perspective of the Middle East to the non-experts, who are forced to understand the stimulus behind this region's many issues while being provided a notion of its non-unitary existence.

This non-unitary *existence* is also revealed in depicting the deconstruction of British colonialism over Palestinian territories, exposed through the detrimental dependence on foreign occupation, where power conflicts between the British, Jews, and Arabs, produced upheaval and fragmentation at a time when the Zionist agenda supported Jewish immigration and land purchase in this land, where paramilitary activity had become the norm. Similarly, Duncan's stories on Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey confirm diversities over territories, portrayed with the roles of internal and external factors behind the modern origination of these countries. The contents of these exposures are explanatory of state identities, emerged from regional practices and national perceptions, when European colonialism was dictating the future of the region. He acknowledges the impact of the Middle Eastern theater of WWI, where the consolidation of global powers set forth new schemes of alliance-building. Shortly after WWII, Duncan's productions are testimony of identifying foreign influence over territories, becoming a venue for Cold War politics and tensions.

The Iranian coverage depicts this pro-German, oil rich country, which became a strategic location during WWII, when Anglo-Russian occupation traumatized its national sovereignty, and

devastated its domestic politics, while in the early post-WWII it was subjected to Soviet expansionism and U.S. interest, stepping into collision course through their contest for power and natural resources. Likewise, the Turkish coverage exposes the strategic importance of this country, where the Cold War parameters impacted the region greatly by means of the early U.S. policy of containing the USSR, which kept Turkey intact with U.S. aid and assistance program (Truman Doctrine) and with Western security system (NATO). The intermingled alliance scheme is also exposed through coverage of Saudi Arabia, providing an account of ARAMCO's positive impacts within an imperialistic system, where oil concessions brought about progress to Saudi Arabia, in terms of politics and culture, whose self-isolation policy was abruptly ended while the country was integrated into Western capitalist system, which made Arabia a diplomatic-economic partner of the U.S. Lastly, the Gaza coverage illustrates how the global powers involved themselves in shaping regional affairs, by taking part they were a source of the conflict, where the Palestinian Arab populace drastically turned into either displaced or dispossessed, while the conflicts between Egypt and Israel evolved within the Cold War's acceleration. The collection of these stories proves insightful on a new era, in which the region was to play host to the U.S. and its interests, assuming Britain's former role as an imperial power domineering the territories.

In presenting the position of the U.S. in the Middle East, Duncan's discourse serves for Western national norms and ideals, such as negating Communism. In this, the U.S. integration into the region is promoted with a feeling of doing good, depicted either with negative impacts of the Soviet expansionism, or positive impacts of the free world, as if the West was cultivating areas untouched like Saudi Arabia, providing a common ground for decision makers, *Life*, and its readers. The Iranian coverage also flowed partially due to a lack of context on the U.S. involvement over the national politics that played roles on the aggravation of domestic unrest. Despite this, Duncan was no average American. He visited numerous countries, which enabled him to gain a broad perspective on the diversities of people whom he became acquainted with, which enabled him fair and unbiased coverage. This is seen in his fairness while illustrating the Tudeh Party and its socio-political agenda for all Iran and the country's positive progress, despite its ties with the USSR, which were yet largely omitted by *Life* when drawing from his submitted materials. Also, his understanding on U.S. policy in the Middle East is best seen in his unpublished materials on one of the Turkish stories, wherein his critiques to policy makers were

intuitive, as the U.S. involvement in Turkish affairs by means of the military in the name of protecting this country from Soviet expansionism was not enough to prevent them from turning to the USSR in an economic crisis, ultimately placing Turkey within the tensions of the Cold War. Certainly, Duncan's voice could not be heard without *Life's* and *Collier's* influence, which had a considerable effect on American opinions. Duncan understood this effect and attempted to increase the understanding of people at home. This can be seen in unpublished materials, and one of the Saudi coverage is a good example, as through it he assumed the role of mediator between the expectations of the host country and the Western collective codes pursued by *Life*. His concern regarding how his productions would be reported is suggestive of his journalistic morals, as he placed every effort to force the magazine from representing his materials as a Eurocentric representation. This was an attempt to project peaceful existence of Saudis and their proud, honorable, and tradition-oriented way of life, promoting increased Western awareness, imploring them to understand this land for more than just its oil industry, while stimulating interest in international relations.

Duncan's multicultural enlightenment sometimes resulted in certain disagreements that he experienced with *Life* as it occurred over the Palestine coverage, which deviated from the journalist's non-partisan stance, bringing about a contention between him and the magazine, as he desired to illustrate Palestinian Arab society not as primitive and uncivilized but as a proper society, exposed with their frustrations. Despite their differences over the intention for this particular issue, Duncan's voice was properly delivered by *Life* in covering the conundrum cultivated by British mismanagement of the land, offering to the Western world a chance to pause and see humanitarian solutions, not military. Upon working with *Collier's* Duncan found more freedom as his unmodified voice reached the public, but on a diminished platform. His Gaza coverage for *Collier's* is suggestive of his objectivity and humanitarian tendency, as it never faltered in understanding their predicament, in which both Eastern and Western powers played roles in placing Palestinian Arabs in an ambiguous position. His sensitivity in the proclamation to the international community for a real solution asks his readers to be responsive towards the awkward position of Gaza, representative of Palestinian experience. In reporting for *Life* and *Collier's*, when photojournalism was in its golden age, Duncan's eagerness to discover more and to transmit information into his complex picture stories without bias brought about fundamental documents that served to alleviate *othering* while providing an understanding of the

fabric of the Middle East. Duncan's focus in his photojournalism was to present an unknown people, decreasing misconceptions of Orientalist viewpoints, enhancing knowledge and cultural awareness to empathize with them and their modes of life. The potential beneficial effects of this are better understood in juxtaposition with Lewis' presentations, as the latter served to polarize cultures.

Chapter three highlighted another angle of the issue of Western representations of the Middle East in examining Sandra Mackey's journalistic discourse. She has had unique insights as a female, freelance journalist, specializing in the Middle East with academic expertise as a political scientist, a combination which made her voice distinctive from both Lewis and Duncan's. Being a woman enabled her to access more restricted places without raising suspicion (e.g., headquarters of Palestine Liberation Organization, conducting an interview with its chief in Saudi Arabia), while also allowing her contact with the secluded world of women in Saudi Arabia, which became a springboard—marking her first entry into the Middle East that occurred in 1978, and her first endeavor into journalism serving there as an underground reporter until 1980 and then between 1982 and 1984, which was then followed by her first venture into book writing. She became acquainted with the region, its people, and their cultures, gaining firsthand experience in exploring the changing course of Middle Eastern domestic and international politics, presented from the late 1970s on, through a variety of events and relations evolving between and among the Persian Gulf states (e.g., Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq), non-oil producers (e.g., Lebanon, Israel, and non-state Palestine), and Western countries including the U.S. and the former USSR.

Mackey's news articles keep us intact with internal and international politics of the larger oil producing countries of the Persian Gulf, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the Republic of Iraq. The objective of the reportage can be seen in her interest of helping ordinary people to grasp the region in which Western interests are so closely tied, while exposing it as a hot-spot because of geopolitical importance, a merging point of complexities within international relations, including foreign policy parameters drawn by regional and foreign players according to economic, political, and ideological considerations. In providing a comprehensive perspective on the U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, her journalism also affords, to a prolific extent, a viewpoint in understanding the indigenous perspective, taking into

account the perspective of the laymen, the possessors of power, and disenfranchised political opposition, presenting a fair account with which to view the region.

The collections of articles exploring the region according to the parameters of the Persian Gulf suggest Mackey's position in her profession serving as a political observer, if not an activist. Her keen critiques against the U.S. foreign policy delineate her pragmatic yet humanistic approach to the issues taking place in the region. In writing about the frame topic, whether the U.S. policy of containment, or its military incursion, Mackey's explorations of U.S. reasoning for meddling in regional affairs serve as a vehicle, through which she highlights her own outlooks and concerns about poor understanding of the region, as it will menace U.S. interests in the long-term. The contents of her articles prove insightful on the mistakes made in the previous eras by the West, either Britain or the U.S., which enables one to see the shared responsibilities in the region's instability and disorder. This is seen in her exposures of how the U.S. policy has pitted one state against another, as in the case of Iraq and Iran. During the Cold War and the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the Shah of Iran was supported by the U.S., the self-assigned policeman of the Gulf, yet subsequent to the Islamic Revolution of Iraq, especially in the last throws of the Iraq-Iran War, Saddam Hussein was elevated in a position of power, against whom the U.S. later campaigned to oust. These machinations are representative of what Mackey repeatedly underlines—temporarily solutions promoted by the U.S. caused by the reiteration of the mistakes.

A collection of articles on Iran is reflective of Mackey's open-mindedness and skillful self-positioning allowing the journalist to see the mutability of the world around her, and the area, the subject of her analysis. While in 1987 she was reporting on the ideological threat that Iran's mullahs posed to the region's pro-Western government in general, and the West in particular, in 1998, she reported on the gradual transformation of the Islamic Republic moving toward democracy not by revolution but evolution. In her representations of the Islamic Revolution, Mackey proves herself to be a distinctive journalist, looking at the issue not within the parameters of the Iranian Hostage Crisis or Khomeini's rhetoric of the "Great Satan," but with an understanding of a complex reality, in which the West also took its part in producing hatred. Her discourse verifies how the insiders conceptualize the issue within the context of Western imperialism. In verifying the region's eventful history, she forces her readers not to look at these people as a bunch of fanatics, but as people refuting the controlling mechanisms of

outside power while attempting to establish their own legitimacy within the boundaries of their own territory. This is telling of Mackey's conviction, bringing out an earnest unbiased coverage as possible through which she endorses the idea of cross-cultural dialogue while negating the *clash of civilizations*, which was greatly promoted by Lewis.

Mackey's articles on Saudi Arabia work to gain insight on another conflict-laden region in the Persian Gulf—a country, becoming a significant regional player in the aftermath of the Gulf War of 1990-91—when a colossal number of foreign troops arrived in Saudi Arabia, and the presence of the U.S. military on Saudi soils continued in the decade that followed. This is the crux of Mackey's reportage, through which she exposes the unknown Saudi society and culture to the West, aiming at promoting better understanding the milieu of Saudi territories through history and culture, its integrated patterns into the Western capitalism in the age of the modern oil industry, while rationalizing a general societal disturbance stemming from the continued presence of American troops. However, the journalist proves herself also one-sided as she does not explore the issue of the Saudi request for U.S. military help within the context of post-Cold War parameters—i.e., what it meant to the U.S.—in exhibiting the Saudi psyche and aversion to change. In line with its religious orthodoxy (Wahhabism), Bedouin ethos, and Saudi political culture, she presents a more complete view of these issues. Her attempt to provide the voice of people and their conceptualization of the Saudi-U.S. partnership, is telling of her humanitarian consideration of the *other*, enabling her readers to empathize with Saudi society, allowing them to understand Saudi perceptions and viewpoints on life in every facet. Her article revealing the issue of the terrorist act targeting the Khobar Towers is far from generalizing the Saudis as a collection of terrorists, rather it delineates their identities within a society. In this, she plainly explains widespread Saudi resentments against the foreign military power, as the keeper and protector of the discredited Saudi regime in power. A similar attitude is also shown while exploring the departure of American troops from Saudi Arabia after the September 11th attacks, at a time when most of Western reportage placed the blame on the shoulder of the Saudi state. Through her fair reportage, Mackey displays how all sorts of problems and anxieties banded together along the Persian Gulf, which were in part due to the U.S. foreign policymaking, repeatedly referencing a lack of understanding as its primary downfall.

Mackey's journalistic treatments on Iraq portray her outlook on the issue of military incursion. One of the most essential points of intersection observed in these treatments is her

acknowledgment of history. In reporting on Iraq, either in 1992 or in the 2000s, she draws attention to the passing history, from which one can find the rational explanations of instability anchored in this country, where oppressive regimes and identity crisis have been part of the realities of Iraq. The country's demographics with its fractured groups (e.g., Sunni, Shia, and Kurds) and regional political undertakings is a common theme in Mackey's reportage, enabling one to gain an understanding of an Iraq lacking in a common identity. The most basic element of constructing nationhood in Mackey's point of view is common identity. She believes it is not possible to export democracy under a foreign rule to a nation lacking common identity.

It can be asserted that the ability of the journalist comes not only from her knowledge of the subject matter, but also from how she uses her pen, through the expression of ideas and concerns, to enrich the content of her explorations. This can be seen in the illustration of the fragility of Iraq, through which Mackey assures the public on the reasoning behind what a military incursion would negatively generate in this specific country and at home—a disorder and instability along the Persian Gulf. Coupled with her representation of Iraqi hostility to foreign occupation, her suggestion is not to forget the nature of Iraq, as simply a military intervention, or any length of subsequent occupation cannot solve its current dilemma.

Taking into consideration Mackey's articles produced in the 2000s, they prove insightful on the socio-political structure of what is now Iraq, where prior to its new border drawn by British colonial ambitions, this had already been constructed centered on family relationship and tribalism, which coalesced in some degree with the extended leadership provided by the Ottoman state. When Iraq began to adopt the concept of modern statehood, there was an absence of experience on how to govern, and what complicated the future of this artificial entity was the diversity between the groups of people Sunni, Shi, and Kurds alike. This human mosaic, containing strong tribal basics, was forced into existence, and despite the strong urban tradition within each group, particularly among Sunnis, which worked to counterbalance tribalism in the periphery, the British mandate promoted the previously constructed political culture, centered on family, tribe, and sect, which was to be linked to the modern state institutions. With these problems of internal conflict due to a lack of consideration of cultural realities in the region, which have not subsided with the passing of time but rather have become further entrenched, as a result, their proliferation, seen in acts of violence, insubordination, and rebellion, it could be surmised that this ailment may possibly be intrinsic to Iraq's continuation as a nationhood. The

fact is that this lack of consideration in building a nation has run rampant in the colonized world, as can be seen in various venues; in Asia, Africa, and other places, bearing its head with the boiling over of frustrations, manifesting in violence, disorder, and sometimes genocide, which can all be seen as a proliferation of the West's meddling in affairs that they are not properly acquainted with in all of its parameters, but just the ones that concern them, e.g., natural resources. In light of this, any consideration of the West that it may be able to fix or help mend a situation like this in order to insure its recovery of resources seems terribly ill founded, as in the same paradigm, the West powers are predestined to make the same mistakes; something that can already be seen as happening in Iraq, as the West attaches our perceptions of important things like a free election to them, believing it is a crucial step in the right direction, while in all actuality it could very well be the staging ground, or catharsis, for open conflict between the warring factions of Iraq.

In comparing the discourses of Lewis, Duncan, and Mackey, we come across a greater disparity in their acknowledgment of history. Lewis utilizes a set of chronological narratives, to explain the present's events from which he underlines "Muslim failure," and to larger extent "Muslim rage." Duncan uses the passing history as a device, reflecting his humanitarian outlook, from which Western readers can empathize with what frequently has come to be termed—*the other*, whose diversity and multiplicity in cultural practices and identities have been maintained through their own territorial roots and traits. In Mackey's representations, the history is utilized to foster a more practical outlook rather than focusing on humanitarian considerations, through which she provides rational explanations on the conflicts surrounding the Persian Gulf while offering commentary on the strategies used by Western policy makers in their involvement to the region's political undertakings. Yet still, the historical knowledge transferred by her work helps to deconstruct the myth of a unitary existence in the Middle East, while inspiring her readers to see and understand the plights of this part of the world. The discourses of Duncan and Mackey lack generalization, yet Lewis makes an extensive and authoritative claim, using it as an affirmation for his extravagant diagnoses and prescriptions with his rhetoric also differing itself from that of Duncan and Mackey's. While maintaining his core message, consistent over more than a half-century, Lewis shifts his rhetoric to meet the demands of changes happening around the world. In writing during the Cold War era, he paid much more attention to the threat of communism, which then faded away as the topic of Islamic terrorism and *jihadism* took its place.

Likewise, the issue of women and civil liberties are not key themes to explored in his early works such as *The Arabs in History*, but emerge later in publishing *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East* and *Crises of Islam*. Unlike Duncan and Mackey, Lewis has been the subject of intensive critiquing for decades; but despite this he remains considered an authority on the Middle East, playing a significant role in the decision-making of Western government and in shaping public opinion.

While drawing its focus from investigating the contributions of these three expert communicators, Lewis, Duncan, and Mackey, whose discourses are significant and have substantially played a part in forming Western views of the Middle East, this dissertation has attempted to determine the extent in which colonialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism, capitalism, and globalization have influenced the shaping of Western perspectives and their understanding of the region. It also endeavored to assess and respond to misconceptions concerning ideological, political, economic, cultural, and religious reasoning behind the East's exotic allure for the Western perception throughout the twentieth century, stemming from a turbulent past, culminating in the present, and possibly leaning towards the future. In reviewing these three difference voices, it seems that Lewis starts from a remote past and continues his narrative into the present in an unchanged flow of events from which he can predict a future unchanged flow of events. David Douglas Duncan looks at the present around him with the keen and objective observation of the camera lens, providing only the necessary background to understand the picture. Sandra Mackey has lived among the people, talked to them, listened to their differing voices and created her pragmatic perception of what would be in their best interests. It can be understood that Lewis lies in one camp while Mackey and Duncan reside in another; they are forces in opposition, Orientalist vs. constructivist. Each account is for the looming prospect of globalization but would find its achievement through different means. The established, old camp would achieve this feat through a singular power bringing the rest of the world under wing into a brave new world, while the resisting constructivist mode of thought would seek full globalization through a more humanitarian approach, with the capacity for empathy and understanding being the vehicle bringing humanity into a more egalitarian and self-aware existence.

WORKS CITED

Abir, Mordechai. "The Consolidation of the Ruling Class and the New Elites in Saudi Arabia." *Middle Eastern Studies* 23.2 (1987): 150-71. print.

Abrahamian, Ervand. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982. print.

Aburish, Said K. *Saddam Hussein: The Politics of Revenge*. New York: Bloomsbury, 2000. print.

Afsaruddin, Asma. *The First Muslims: History and Memory*. Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2008. print.

Ahmad, Feroz. *Turkey: The Quest for Identity*. Oxford: Oneworld, 2005. print.

Alam, M. Shahid. "Scholarship or Sophistry? Bernard Lewis and the New Orientalism." *Counterpunch* 27-29 June 2003. web. <<http://www.counterpunch.org/2003/06/27/bernard-lewis>>.

al-Jabiri, Muhammad. *Taqwin al-'arabi* (The Process of the Formation of Arab Thought. Beirut: Dar al-Tali'a, 1980. Quoted in Mernissi, *Islam and Democracy* on p. 38.

Almadari, Kazem. "Terrorism Cuts across the East and the West: Deconstructing Lewis's Orientalism." *Third World Quarterly* 24.1 (2003): 177-86. print.

Amanpour, Christiane. "Transcript of Interview with Iranian President Mohammad Khatami." TV interview transcript. 1998. web. <<http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9801/07/iran/interview.html>>.

Armstrong, Karen. *Muhammad: A Biography of the Prophet*. New York: Harper Collins, 1992. print.

Badran, Margot. "Understanding Islam, Islamism, and Islamic Feminism." *Journal of Women's History* 13.1 (2001): 47-54. print.

Beling, Willard A. *King Faisal and the Modernization of Saudi Arabia*. Louisville: Fons Vitae, 2007. print.

Blechman, Barry M. "The Quantitative Evaluation of Foreign Policy Alternatives: Sinai, 1956." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 10.4 (1966): 408-26. print.

Bulliet, Richard W. *The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization*. New York: Columbia University

Press, 2004. print.

Bulliet, Richard W., et al. *The Earth and Its Peoples: A Global History*. Boston: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2010. print.

Buruma, Ian. "Lost in Translation--The Two Minds of Bernard Lewis." *New Yorker* 14 June 2004. web. <http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/06/14/040614crbo_books>.

Catherwood, Christopher. *A Brief History of the Middle East*. Philadelphia: Running Press, 2007. print.

Chubin, Shahram. "Iran's Strategic Predicament." *Middle East Journal* 54.1 (2000): 10-24. print.

Cleveland, William L. *A History of the Modern Middle East*. Boulder: Westview Press, 2004. print.

Cole, Juan. *Engaging the Muslim World*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. print.

—. "Review of Bernard Lewis's *What Went Wrong: Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response*." *Global Dialogue* 27 January 2003. web. <<http://electronicintifada.net/content/review-bernard-lewis-what-went-wrong-western-impact-and-middle-eastern-response/3441>>.

Dawisha, Added. "Footprints in the Sand: The Definition and Redefinition of Identity in Iraq's Foreign Policy." Telhami, Shibley and Michael Barnett. *Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002. 117-36. print.

Duncan, David Douglas. "ARAMCO: An Arabian-American partnership develops desert oil and places U.S. influence and power in Middle East." *Life* 28 March 1949: 62-79. print.

—. "Blood runs in Palestine violence." *Life* 12 August 1946: 21-25. print.

—. "Civil war threatens in Palestine as British start 'Operation Igloo'." *Life* 2 September 1946: 34-35. print.

—. "Eisenhower the Tourist and Politico-General [Captions]." Negs.--11 rolls of b/w 35mm film (314 frames) for LIFE . March 1952. digital from Harry Ransom Center.

—. "Fair face for Soviets: Well-stocked Russians star at a Turkish bazaar." *Life* 27 September 1954: 30-31. print.

—. "Gaza Strip Caption: Egypt/Gaza Strip." Transparencies--841 color 35mm slides (Rolls 1-25) for Collier's as freelance. June 1956. digital from Harry Ransom Center.

—. "Ibn Saud visits American partners." *Life* 17 February 1947: 23-27. print.

- "Ibn Saud Visits Arabian-American Oil Co. [i.e., ARAMCO] at Dhahran." Negs.--20 rolls of b/w 120 film (224 frames); 1 frame of b/w 4 x 5" film for LIFE. February 1947. digital from Harry Ransom Center.
- "Ike campaigns--but it's for NATO." Life 17 March 1952: 31-35. print.
- "Illegal Immigration [Captions] (Palestine)." Negs.--16 rolls of b/w 120 film (175 frames) for LIFE. 14 August 1946. digital from Harry Ransom Center.
- "Iran: Two worlds collide in a rich and troubled Land." Life 20 May 1946: 61-67. print.
- "Izmir Trade Fair [Captions]." Negs.--21 rolls of b/w 35mm film (732 frames) for LIFE. 1954. digital from Harry Ransom Center.
- "Jaffa Band Robbery & Shooting [Captions]." Negs.--2 rolls of b/w 120 film (18 frames) for LIFE. 13 September 1946. digital from Harry Ransom Center.
- "King Abdullah Visits Ibn Saud: Includes ARAMCO, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia." Negs.--12 rolls of b/w 120 film (124 frames) for LIFE . July 1948. digital from Harry Ransom Center.
- "King David Hotel [Captions] (Jerusalem)." Negs.--7 rolls of b/w 120 film (82 frames) for LIFE. 22 July 1946. digital from Harry Ransom Center.
- "LIFE goes on a migration with Persian tribesmen." Life 29 July 1946: 99-105. print.
- "Palestine: New type of peasant Jew fights for a homeland." Life 4 November 1946: 107-15. print.
- "Palestine: The Problem Land/Palestine Essay." Negs.--73 rolls of b/w 120 film (336 frames) [Rolls 1-8, 25-45; lacking film for Rolls R9-R24]; Negs--30 rolls of b/w 120 film (337 frames) [Rolls 46-73X] for LIFE. 28 September 1946. digital from Harry Ransom Center.
- Photo Nomad. 1st ed. Scranton: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003. print.
- "Political Iranian Round-up [Captions]." Negs.--2 frames of b/w 35mm film; 14 rolls of b/w 120 film (162 frames). 1946. digital from Harry Ransom Center.
- "Qashqai Migration (Persia)." Negs.--20 rolls of b/w 120 film (233 frames) for LIFE. Summer 1946. digital from Harry Ransom Center.
- "Shooting in Jaffa: LIFE photographer runs into morning of murder in Palestine." Life 30 September 1946: 36-37. print.
- "The house of Saud." Life 21 December 1953: 66-73. print.

—. "The Irgun Explains What it is Fighting for [Captions]." Negs.--73 rolls of b/w film (336 frames) [Rolls 1-8, 25-45; lacking film for Rolls R9-R24]; Negs.--30 rolls of b/w 120 film (337 frames) Rolls 46-73X] for LIFE. 7 October 1946. digital from Harry Ransom Center.

—. "The World and Heritage of Saud Ibn Abdul Aziz, King of Saudi Arabia: An Outline of the Story as Seen by DDD [Captions]." Negs.--33 rolls of b/w 35mm film (1,042 frames) for LIFE. 1953. digital from Harry Ransom Center.

—. *The World of Allah*. 1st ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982. print.

—. "Turkey's army." *Life* 31 January 1949: 66-71. print.

—. "Turkish Essay: includes Images of Taksim Square in Istanbul." Negs.--3 rolls (CA-CC) of b/w 35mm film (100 frames; 51 rolls (R1-R51) of b/w 120 film (567 frames) for LIFE. 1948. digital from Harry Ransom Center.

—. "Turkish Straits Essay (Aegean to Black Sea--Personalities, Portraits)." Negs.--3 rolls of b/w 35mm film (112 frames); 26 rolls of b/w 120 film (311 frames; 2 frames of b/w 5 x 7" film for LIFE. February 1947. digital from Harry Ransom Center.

—. "Two Arab kings end an old feud." *Life* 19 July 1948: 28-29. print.

—. "U.S. faces up to a diplomatic crisis [Next problem for U.S.: The Straits]." *Life* 17 March 1947: 31-37. print.

—. "Yajur (Yagour) Search [Captions] (Palestine)." Negs.--4 rolls of b/w 120 film (42 frames) for LIFE. 29 June 1946. digital from Harry Ransom Center.

—. *Yankee Nomad: A Photographic Odyssey*. 1st ed. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1966. print.

Eisenstadt, S. N. "Multiple Modernities." *Daedalus* 129.1 (2000): 1-29. Quoted in Hashemi, "The Multiple Histories of Secularism" on p. 335.

El-Abed, Oroub. *Unprotected Palestinians in Egypt since 1948*. Washington: Institute of Palestine Studies, 2009. print.

Ernst, Carl W. *Following Muhammad: Rethinking Islam in the Contemporary World*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004. print.

Esposito, John L. *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. print.

Fawcett, Louise L'Estrange. *Iran and the Cold War: The Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946*. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2009. print.

Feldman, Ilana. "Difficult Distinctions: Refugee Law, Humanitarian Practice, and Political Identification in Gaza." *Cultural Anthropology* 22.1 (2007): 129-69. print.

Feldman, Noah. *The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008. print.

Fieldhouse, D. K. *Western Imperialism in the Middle East: 1914-1958*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. print.

"Gaza Strip." *Collier's* 3 August 1956: 56-67. print.

Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983. quoted in Sadowski, "The Evolution of Political Identity in Syria," on p. 153.

Gelvin, James L. *Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. Quoted in Sadowski on p. 139.

Gibb, H. A. R. and H. Bowen. *Islamic Society and the West: A Study of the Impact of Western Civilization on Moslem Culture in the Near East*. 2 vols. London: Oxford University Press, 1950 and 1957. Quoted in İslamoğlu-İnan, *The Ottoman Empire and the World-Economy* on p. 4.

Gibb, H. A. R. *Modern Trends in Islam*. New York: Octagon Books, 1972. quoted in Lewis, *Arabs* on p. 2; Lockman, *Contending Visions* on p. 109-10.

Green, Jerrold D. "Ideology and Pragmatism in Iranian Foreign Policy." *Middle East Journal* 58.4 (2004): 549-59. print.

Gross, Nachum T. and Jacob Metzer. "Public finance in the Jewish economy in interwar Palestine." *Research in Economic History* 3 (1978): 87-159. quoted in Owen, *State, Power and Politics* on p. 11.

Güçlü, Yücel. "The Uneasy Relationship: Turkey's Foreign Policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union at the Outbreak of the Second World War." *Mediterranean Quarterly* 13.3 (2002): 58-93. print.

Hall, Stuart. *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices*. New York: Sage Publications & Open University, 1997. print.

Hall, Stuart. "The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power." Hall, Stuart and et al. *Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2004. 184-227. print.

Hashemi, Nader. *Islam, Secularism, and Liberal Democracy: Toward a Democratic Theory for*

Muslim Societies. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. print.

—. "The Multiple Histories of Secularism: Muslim Societies in Comparison." *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 36.3-4 (2010): 325-38. Print.

Heller, Joseph. "Neither Masada - Nor Vichy: Diplomacy and Resistance in Zionist Politics, 1945-1947." *The International History Review* 3.4 (1981): 540-64. print.

Helms, Christine Moss. *Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab World*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1984. quoted in Mackey, *Reckoning* on p. 353.

Hindley, Donald. "Review of Martin E. Goldstein: American Policy toward Laos." *The American Political Science Review* 71.2 (1977): 827-828. print.

Hiro, Dilip. *Holy Wars: The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism*. New York: Routledge, 1989. Quoted in Kumar, "Islam and Islamophobia".

Hirsh, Michael. "Bernard Lewis Revisited." *Washington Monthly* November 2004. web. <<http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2004/0411.hirsh.html>>.

Hourani, Albert. *A History of the Arab People*. New York: Warner Books, 1992. print.

İslamoğlu-Inan, Huri. *The Ottoman Empire and the World-Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. print.

Kalaitzaki, Theodora. "US Mediation in Green-Turkish Disputes since 1954." *Mediterranean Quarterly* 16.2 (2005): 106-24. print.

Kamrava, Mehran. *The Modern Middle East: A Political History Since the First World War*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005. print.

Karavan, Ibrahim A. "Identity and Foreign Policy: The Case of Egypt." Telhami, Shibley and Michael Barnett. *Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002. 155-68. print.

Kazemzadeh, Firuz. "Lost Empire." *The New York Times* 25 August 1996. web. <<http://www.nytimes.com/1996/08/25/books/lost-empire.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>>.

Kechichian, Joseph A. "Trends in Saudi National Security." *Middle East Journal* 53.2 (1999): 232-53. print.

Keegan, John. *History of Warfare*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf: Distributed by Random House, Inc., 1993. print.

Khalidi, Rashid. *Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints and America's Perilous Path in the Middle East*. Boston: Beacon Press, 2004. print.

—. *Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East*. Boston: Beacon Press, 2009. print.

Kochavi, Arie J. "The Struggle against Jewish Immigration to Palestine." *Middle Eastern Studies* 34.3 (1998): 146-67. print.

Kumar, Deepa. "Islam and Islamophobia." *Institute for Social Research* 52 (2007). web. <<http://www.isreview.org/issues/52/islamophobia.shtml>>.

Leffler, Melvyn P. "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952." *The Journal of American History* 71.4 (1985): 807-25. print.

Lewis, Bernard. "Communism and Islam." *International Affairs* 30.1 (1954): 1-12. print.

—. *Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror*. New York: Random House, 2003. print. Cited as *Crisis*.

—. "Secularism in the Middle East." *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* 100.2, LA SECULARIZATION (1995): 151-64. print.

—. *The Arabs in History*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1950-2002. print. Cited as *Arabs*.

—. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. print.

—. *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East*. New York: Schocken Books, 1998-1999. print. Cited as *Multiple*.

—. "The Roots of Muslim Rage." *Atlantic Monthly* September 1990. web. <<http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1990/09/the-roots-of-muslim-rage/4643/>>.

—. "What Went Wrong?" *Carnegie Council*. March 26, 2002. web. <<http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/transcripts/131.html>>.

—. *What Went Wrong? The Clash between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East*. New York: Harper Perennial, 2003. print. American Edition.

—. *What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. print. British edition.

—. "Why Turkey is the only Muslim Democracy." *Middle East Quarterly* 1.1 (1994): 41-49. print.

Lockman, Zachary. *Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. print.

MacFie, A. L. "The Straits Question at the Potsdam Conference: The British Position." *Middle Eastern Studies* 23.1 (1987): 75-82. print.

Mackey, Sandra. "A City That Lives for Revenge." *The New York Times* 29 April 2004. web. <<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/29/opinion/a-city-that-lives-for-revenge.html>>.

—. "A Crack in the Clerics' Control." *The Los Angeles Times* 2 January 1998. web. <articles.latimes.com/1998/jan/02/local/me-4252>.

—. "A Culture, More Than a State, Reaches Out—Iran: The president expresses a wish for two peoples to converse, a small step the U.S. can afford." *The Los Angeles Times* 9 January 1998. web. <<http://articles.latimes.com/1998/jan/09/local/me-6592>>.

—. *A House Divided*. New York: Norton, 2006. print.

—. "Better Alive Than Dead." *The New York Times* 24 July 2003. web. <<http://www.commondreams.org/views03/0724-03.htm>>.

Mackey, Sandra. "Century of Strife 1920-2002." Fromkin, David. *History and Faith: Cradle and Crucible in the Middle East*. Washington, D.C.: National Geographic Society, 2004. 78-102. print.

—. "Echoes of Iran: Muqtada Sadr's revolt may lead to an Islamic republic." *The Los Angeles Times* 11 April 2004. web. <<http://articles.latimes.com/2004/apr/11/opinion/op-mackey11>>.

—. "Fear of Enemies Isn't Paranoia: U.S. Policy Invites Disaster: After suffering centuries of invasion, Iranians may consider nuclear development both prudent and mandatory." *The Los Angeles Times* 7 June 1995. web. <articles.latimes.com/1995-06-07/local/me-10295_1_united-states>.

—. *Fundamentalists*. web interview. Atlanta: Paula Gordon Show, 2003. web.

—. "Get Rid of Saddam--and Then What?: Iraq: His departure would leave a volatile vacuum because there's no sign of consensus among the country's long-hostile ethnic and religious groups." *The Los Angeles Times* 25 August 1992. web. <http://articles.latimes.com/1992-08-25/local/me-6013_1_saddam-hussein>.

—. *Global Peace, Security, and Human Rights*. lecture. University of California, Santa Barbara, 2002. web.

- . "I spent some time in Iraq but soon I found that I had gotten all I could get there." *The Guardian* 17 February 2003. web. <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/feb/17/iraq>>.
- . "Iran Benefits from the Gulf Panic." *The Chicago Tribune* 24 June 1987. web. <http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1987-06-24/news/8702160589_1_gulf-war-western-oil-supplies-iraq-iran-war>.
- . "Iran Holds Postwar Dilemma for U.S." *The Los Angeles Times* 15 December 2002. web. <<http://articles.latimes.com/2002/dec/15/opinion/op-mackey15>>.
- . "Iraq's Dangerous Identity Crisis: Turning over power to people who lack a sense of national unity won't work." *The Los Angeles Times* 16 November 2003. web. <articles.latimes.com/2003/nov/16/opinion/op-mackey16>.
- . *Lebanon: Death of a Nation*. New York: Congdon & Weed, 1989. print.
- . *Mirror of the Arab World: Lebanon in Conflict*. New York: Norton, 2008. print.
- . "No one could quibble with the idea that getting rid of Saddam Hussein has been beneficial." *The Guardian* 20 May 2003. web. <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/may/21/iraq>>.
- . *Passion and Politics: The Turbulent World of the Arabs*. New York: Dutton, 1992. print.
- . "The Coming Clash Over Kirkuk." *The New York Times* 9 February 2005. web. <<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/09/opinion/09mackey.html?pagewanted=print&position=>>.
- . "The House of Saud: Will It Remain a Grateful Host?" *The Chicago Tribune* 29 August 1990. web. <http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1990-08-29/news/9003130114_1_saudi-arabia-western-power-king-saud>.
- . *The Iranians: Persia, Islam, and the Soul of a Nation*. New York: Dutton, 1996. print.
- . *The Reckoning: Iraq and the Legacy of Saddam Hussein*. New York: Norton, 2002. print.
- . "The Saudi monarchy's paranoia rules out development of a national army capable of defending the country: The Billion-Dollar Two-Bit Army." *The Los Angeles Times* 15 August 1990. web. <articles.latimes.com/1990-08-15/local/me-488_1_saudi-arabia>.
- . *The Saudis: Inside the Desert Kingdom*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2002. print.
- . "Think Globally, Act Tribally: If Hussein is forced to admit inspectors, Iraq's clans may desert him--toppling the dictator without a U.S. attack." *The Los Angeles Times* 20 October 2002. web. <<http://articles.latimes.com/2002/oct/20/opinion/op-mackey20>>.

—. "Welcome or Not, We're in for Keeps: The changes imposed on the Saudi people can't be undone. And we've nowhere else to go to defend the West's oil." *The Los Angeles Times* 28 June 1996. web. <http://articles.latimes.com/1996-06-28/local/me-19270_1_saudi-arabia>.

—. "Winds of Change in the Desert." *The Los Angeles Times* 4 May 2003. web. <articles.latimes.com/2003/may/04/opinion/op-mackey4>.

Maloney, Suzanne. "Identity and Change in Iran's Foreign Policy." Telhami, Shibley and Michael Barnett. *Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002. 88-116. print.

Mango, Andrew. *The Turks Today*. New York: Overlook Press, 2006. print.

Mansfield, Peter. *A History of the Middle East*. New York: Penguin Books, 2004. print.

Markey, Sean. Middle East Expert Discusses Islamic Extremism. interview. Washington, D.C.: National Geographic News, 2002. web. <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2002/12/1211_021211_mideast.html>.

Masalha, Nur. "The 1956-57 Occupation of the Gaza Strip: Israeli Proposals to Resettle the Palestinian Refugees." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 23.1 (1996): 55-68. print.

McCarthy. "Forced Migration and Mortality in the Ottoman Empire." *An Annotated Map*. 2010. web. <http://a.pk40.net/m/fd/Forced_Displacement.pdf>.

McHale, T. R. "A Prospect of Saudi Arabia." *International Affairs* 56.4 (1980): 622-47. print.

McNamara, Robert. *Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lesson of Vietnam*. New York: Vintage, 1996. print.

Mejcher, Helmut. "Saudi Arabia's 'Vital Link to the West': Some Political, Strategic and Tribal Aspects of the Trans Arabian Pipeline (TAP) in the Stage of Planning 1942." *Middle Eastern Studies* 18.4 (1982): 359-377. print.

Menocal, Maria Rosa. *The Arabic Role in Medieval Literary History*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990. print.

Mernissi, Fatema. *Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World*. Basic Books, New York. print.

Metzer, Jacob. "Economic Structure and National Goals--The Jewish National Home in Interwar Palestine." *The Journal of Economic History* 38.1 (1978): 101-19. print.

Moghadam, Valentine M. "Feminism and Islamic Fundamentalism: A Secularist Interpretation."

Journal of Women's History 13.1 (2001): 42-45. print.

Morris, Benny. 1948: The First Arab-Israeli War. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008. print.

Naim, C. M. "The Outrage of Bernard Lewis." Social Text 30 (1992): 114-120. print.

Nelan, Bruce W. "Iran: New Day Coming?" Time 19 January 1998. web.
<www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,987678,00.html>.

Nevo, Joseph. "Religion and National Identity in Saudi Arabia." Middle Eastern Studies 34.3 (1998): 34-53. print.

Owen, Roger. State, Power and Politics in Making of the Modern Middle East. New York: Routledge, 2009. print.

Pappe, Ilan. The Modern Middle East. London: Routledge, 2005. print.

Pope, Nicole and Hugh Pope. Turkey Unveiled: A History of Modern Turkey. New York: Overlook Press, 2000. print.

Quandt, William. Interview with (Charlottesville, Virginia, April 3, 2001). quoted in Mackey, Reckoning on p. 353.

Roberts, Paul William. "His Way" The Washington Post 2 June 2002. web.
<<http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-361865.html>>.

Rodinson, Maxime. Muhammad. New York: New Press, 2002. Quoted in Kumar, "Islam and Islamophobia".

Rowley, Charles K. and Jennis Taylor. "The Israel and Palestine Land Settlement Problem: An Analytical History, 4000 BCE-1948 CE." Public Choice 128.1/2 The Political Economy of Terrorism (2006): 77-90. print.

Rugh, William A. "Emergence of a New Middle Class in Saudi Arabia." Middle East Journal 27.1 (1973): 7-20. print.

—. "Saudi Arabia: A Tale of Two Houses." The Wilson Quarterly 3.1 (1979): 58-72. print.

Sabra, Adam. "What is Wrong with What Went Wrong?" Middle East Report Online (2003). web. <<http://www.merip.org/mero/interventions/what-wrong-what-went-wrong>>.

Sadowski, Yahya. "The Evolution of Political Identity in Syria." Telhami, Shibley and Michael Barnett. Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002.

137-54. print.

Said, Edward. *Covering Islam*. New York: Vintage Books, 1997. print.

Said, Edward W. *Culture and Imperialism*. New York: Harvard University Press, 1994. print.

—. *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage Books, 1979. print.

Salameh, Ghassane. "Political Power and the Saudi State." *Middle East Research and Information Project Reports* 91 (1980): 5-22. print.

Salameh, Ghassane. "Political Power and the Saudi State." Berberoglu, Berch. *Power and Stability in the Middle East*. London: Zed Books, 1989. 70-89. print.

Sanger, Richard H. "Ibn Saud's Program for Arabia." *Middle East Journal* 1.2 (1947): 180-90. print.

Shapira, Anita. "The Bible and Israeli Identity." *Association for Jewish Studies Review* 28.1 (2004): 11-41. print.

Shaw, Stanford J. and Ezel Kural Shaw. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976-77. print.

Smith, Charles D. "Palestine and The Arab-Israeli Conflict: 1948-1970." n.d. web. <<http://www.tlemea.com/middleeast/essay1.asp>>.

Taylor, Charles. *A Secular Age*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007. Quoted in Hashemi, "The Multiple Histories of Secularism" on p. 331.

The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life. *Islam and the West: A Conversation with Bernard Lewis*. 2006. web. <<http://www.pewforum.org/Politics-and-Elections/Islam-and-the-West-A-Conversation-with-Bernard-Lewis.aspx>>.

Waldman, Peter. "Bernard Lewis's Blueprint: Sowing Arab Democracy is Facing a Test in Iraq." *The Wall Street Journal* 3 February 2004. web. <<http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB107576070484918411-search,00.html>>.

Yeşilbursa, Behçet K. "Turkey's Participation in the Middle East Command and Its Admission to NATO, 1950-52." *Middle Eastern Studies* 35.4, *Seventy-Five Years of the Turkish Republic* (1999): 70-102. print.

Zubaida, Sami. "Religion, the State, and Democracy: Conceptions of Society in Egypt." Beinin, Joel and Joe Stork. *Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Report*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997. 51-63. Quoted in Pappe, *The Modern Middle East* on p. 270.

Zurcher, Erik J. Turkey: A Modern History. New York: I. B. Tauris, Distributed by St. Martin's Press, 1998. print.



BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

DEFNE BILIR

EDUCATION

- Ph.D.* **Florida State University**, Tallahassee, FL (Interdisciplinary Studies in Humanities, Expected Graduation: Summer 2012)
Program in Interdisciplinary Humanities, College of Arts and Sciences
Major in Middle Eastern Studies
Minor in Cultural Studies
Dissertation: *Twentieth-Century Western Scholarly, Artistic, and Journalistic Perspectives on the Middle East: Bernard Lewis, Sandra Mackey, and David Douglas Duncan* (Advisors: Eugene Crook and David Johnson, Defended in Spring 2012).
- M.A.* **Hacettepe University**, Ankara, Turkey (Modern Turkish Literature, 2001).
- B.A.* **Hacettepe University**, Ankara, Turkey (Turkish Language and Literature, 1997).
Received the title of Turkish Philologist, 1997.

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCES

- Aug. 2005 to* **Florida State University**, Tallahassee, FL
Jan. 2009 Teaching Assistant and Instructor

Responsibilities

- Teaching Assistant for
 - HUM 3324 “Cultural Imperialism,” Fall 2005
 - HUM 3324 “Cultural Imperialism: The Middle East,” Spring 2006

Assisted instructors of the above classes and lectured twice in each class during the semester, and advised undergraduate students enrolled in them.

- Instructor of

- HUM 3321: Multicultural Film, Fall 2006

This was an undergraduate-level, Gordon rule course offered by the Program in Interdisciplinary Humanities. Topics focused on a matrix of movie history, movie genres, and approaches to multiculturalism, cultural representations and the cultural experiences in the United States.

- HUM 3930: Modern Middle East, Spring 2007

I created the curriculum for this undergraduate level course upon the request of the Program in Interdisciplinary Humanities. I developed the course syllabus, its objectives and contents. Films were obligatory components of this course, designed to cover the Middle Eastern history from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire leading to the emergence of the modern Middle East and into the 21st century.

- HUM 3930: Middle Eastern Culture, Fall 2007, Spring 2008, and Fall 2008

I created the curriculum for this undergraduate level course upon the request of the Program in Interdisciplinary Humanities. I developed the course syllabus, its objectives and

contents. Components of this course included films, projecting similarities and diversities of Middle Eastern cultural landscapes, in unison with the history of the Modern Middle East from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire to the 21st century.

- HUM 3930: Traditions and Rituals in the Middle East, Spring 2009 and Fall 2009

I created the curriculum for this undergraduate level course upon the request of the Program in Interdisciplinary Humanities. I developed the course syllabus, its objectives and contents. Films were mandatory components of this course, which explored rich and complex traditions and rituals of the Middle East constructed based on geographic locations, natural settings, ethnic and linguistic traits, religious belief systems, and political and economic structures, with the identities claimed by the Arabic, Turkish, Persian, and Hebrew-speaking peoples of the Middle East.

*Apr. 2005 to
Current*

Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL
Information Technology Services Computer Labs
Lab Support Specialist/ Assistant Manager

Responsibilities

- I have been assisting and coordinating computer lab employees, as well as assisting with basic to medium technical problems by communicating with tech support staff when needed.

*Oct. 2003 to
Apr. 2005*

Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL
Information Technology Services Computer Labs

Computer Lab Monitor

Responsibilities

- I monitored the computer labs, assisted computer lab patrons, and communicated with Lab Support Specialist for further assistance.

Jul. 2001 to

Gazi Çiftliği State High School, Ankara, Turkey

Dec. 2001

Turkish Language and Literature Teacher

Responsibilities

- **Taught Turkish Language and Literature**

Taught tenth and eleventh grades 1) the history, formation, and associated texts of the Turkish Literature (encompassing Folk Literature and Modern and Contemporary Turkish Literature); 2) compositional planning to develop reading, speaking, self-expression and creative-writing skills within the rules of syntax, spelling, and pronunciation.

Taught sixth grade Turkish poetry and prose (including short story, memoir, fable, folk tale, legend, and prose of journey) to lead the students: 1) to see multiplicity and the formation of the Turkish written tradition, and 2) to develop oral and written expression and reading skills within the basic rules of Turkish Grammar.

Oct. 2000 to

Şabanözü State High School, Şabanözü—Çankırı, Turkey

Jul. 2001

Turkish Language and Literature Teacher

Responsibilities

- **Taught Turkish Language and Literature**

Taught ninth to eleventh grades 1) the history, formation, and associated texts of Turkish Literary traditions prior to and after the adoption of Islam, Classical Turkish Literature, Folk Literature, Modern Turkish Literature, and Contemporary Turkish Literature; 2) compositional planning in text (context and paragraph relations); 3) Turkish grammar, spelling, and pronunciation for the development of oral and written expression.

- **Served in Development of Social Skills Program**

Mentored high school students to become active participants of their community by building problem solving and communication skills.

*Aug. 1999 to
Oct. 2000*

Private Tevfik Fikret Schools, Ankara, Turkey

Turkish Language and Literature Teacher

Responsibilities

- **Taught Turkish Language**

Taught sixth to eighth grades and provided students with skills 1) to identify the multiplicity and formation of basic and intermediate level Turkish written products including poetry, short story, memoir, fable, folk tale, legend, or prose of journey; 2) to develop self-expression and reading skills in oral and written mediums; 3) to improve oral and written expression through compositional planning as well as spelling and pronunciation.

- **Taught Creative Drama**

Taught creative drama class in which story enactment, imagination journeys, and theatre games were utilized for the sixth to eleventh grades. Developed students' creative thinking skills, body awareness, imaginations, and confidence, and enhanced their expressions by using voice, face, and body language.

- **Served in Curriculum Development and Test Preparation Committee**

Participated in the curriculum development project for Turkish Language courses taught to grades six through eight. Served in the Test Preparation Committee for Turkish Language and Literature courses (sixth to eleventh grade) in cooperation with the Measurement and Evaluation Committee to prepare the students for the nationwide central exams.

Aug. 1998 to **Private Arı Schools, Ankara, Turkey**

Aug. 1999 Turkish Language and Literature Teacher

Responsibilities

- **Taught Turkish Language**

Taught sixth to eighth grades and provided students with skills 1) to identify the multiplicity and formation of basic and intermediate level Turkish written texts, which were selected from poetry and prose; 2) to develop self-expression and reading skills in oral and written contexts; 3) to improve oral and written expressions through compositional planning with a foundation of grammar, spelling, and pronunciation.

ACADEMIC WORK

Publications

Bilir, D. “Süleyman Kazmaz’ın Romanları Üzerine.” *Süleyman Kazmaz’a Armağan. “In Regards to Novels Written by Süleyman Kazmaz.” Bestowed to Süleyman Kazmaz.* Ed. Kamil Toygar and Nimet Berkok Toygar. Ankara, Türkiye: Türk Halk Kültürünü Araştırma ve Tanıtma Vakfı Yayınları, 2009. 43- 97.

Bilir, D. “Alacakaranlık.” “Twilight.” Translated Poem by Susan Bright. Gülnar Gazetesi [Gülnar, Mersin, Türkiye] 31 October 2007: 6.

Bilir, D. “Yaşlı Büyükanne’nin Düşü.” “Old Grandmother’s Dream.” Translated Poem by Susan Bright. Gülnar Gazetesi [Gülnar, Mersin, Türkiye] 25 October 2007: 6.

Bilir, D. “Şiirler.” “Poems.” Translated Poems by Susan Bright. Cumhuriyet Kitap 18 October 2007: 38.

Bilir, D. “Amerika Mektubu: ABD Vatandaşları Türkiye Trafikğine Karşı Neden Uyarıldı?.” “Letter from America: Why U.S. Citizens Were Warned Regarding Traffic in Turkey?” Yeni Gazete [Mersin, Türkiye] 3 June 2004: 4.

Bilir, D. “Üstün Dökmen’e Göre İletişimde Empatinin Rolü.” “Considerations of Üstün Dökmen in Regards to Role of Empathy in Effective Communication.” Öğretmen Dünyası 250 (2000): 22-23.

Bilir, D. “Sevgi Soysal’ın Romanlarında İnsan ve Toplum İlişkisi.” “Human and Society Relations in the Novels by Sevgi Soysal.” Çağdaş Türk Dili 122 (1988): 15-19.

Thesis

Bilir, D. “12 Mart Romanları- Tematik İnceleme, 1970-1980” “The Novels Narrating the Impacts of March 12th Period, 1970-1980.” M.A. Thesis. Hacettepe University, 2001.

Bilir, D. “Sevgi Soysal’ın Romanlarında İnsan ve Toplum İlişkisi.”
“Human and Society Relations in the Novels by Sevgi Soysal.” B.A.
Thesis. Hacettepe University, 1997.

PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS

The Middle East Institute (MEI) at Washington, DC
The Middle East Studies Association (MESA) at UA
Humanities Education and Research Association at Pacifica, CA
Trans-cultural Research and Education Consortium (TREC) at FSU
Interdisciplinary Teaching Society (ITS) at FSU
Center for Global Engagement (CGE) at FSU

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

Certificates

- **Global Pathways Certificate* (GPC)** (**currently enrolled—expected completion: Spring 2011*) offered by Center for Global Engagement at Florida State University (Tallahassee, Florida).
- **Program for Instructional Excellence (PIE) Certificate**, presented by the Center for Teaching & Learning at Florida State University (Tallahassee, Florida, 2010).
- **Teaching Development Certificate** presented by Ministry of National Education: Çankırı Province National Education Directorate (Çankırı, Turkey, 2001).
- **Drama and Theater** presented by Stage Art House. (Ankara, Turkey, 1999).

- **Teaching Certificate** from Hacettepe University. (Ankara, Turkey, 1997).
- **Effective Speech** presented by Tömer-Ankara University. (Ankara, Turkey, 1997).
- **Pencil Drawing** presented by Mersin Art Gallery. (Mersin, Turkey, 1993).

