The State Formation in Eastern Provinces in the Early Republican Era: The Case of the People's Houses

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The intellectual content of this dissertation, which has been written by me and for which I take full responsibility, is my own, original work, and it has not been previously or concurrently submitted elsewhere for any other examination or degree of higher education. The sources of all paraphrased and quoted materials, concepts, and ideas are fully cited, and the admissible contributions and assistance of others with respect to the conception of the work as well as to linguistic expression are explicitly acknowledged herein.

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Abstract

The State Formation in Eastern Provinces in the Early Republican era:
The Case of the People's Houses

Zehra Ayman Güz, Doctoral Candidate at the Atatürk Institute
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This dissertation examines the complex historical dimensions of state formation in the Republican era in massively Kurdish populated Eastern provinces focusing on the institutionalization of the People's Houses (Halkevleri), between 1932 and 1951. In the literature even though there are varying interpretations as to how successful or failed the state in Eastern localities it tries to penetrate, People's Houses have been put forward empirical evidences of an independently existing central and autonomous state. This study examines how the People's Houses in the Eastern provinces ruled by the exceptional state regime functioned and existed in encountering spaces, beyond binary oppositions such as success/failure, strong/weak of the state or mere obedience and silence or resistance of the people. This thesis first analyzes the discursive, political and administrative organization of the People's Houses in the East within the limits of the struggle and negotiation of state and local residents. Secondly, it draws an analytical picture of the dynamic and contested relations and phenomena in the physical space of Halkevleri. Third, it analyzes everyday forms of publicness and socialization in which the tactics and strategies of actors producing People's Houses' space are more salient. Finally, it examines the People's Houses and the state's violent practices of linguistic assimilation in the context of the state's boundaries of "inclusion and exclusion" and the subjects' multiple ways of coping. This dissertation demonstrates that People's Houses and the East are shaped and produced by multiple interactions and power relations in spaces of encounter.

154.720 words

Özet

Erken Cumhuriyet Döneminde Doğu Vilayetlerinde Devlet Oluşumu: Halkevleri Örneği

Zehra Ayman Güz, Doktora Adayı, 2023
Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü

Doçent Dr. Ziya Umut Türem

Bu tez, erken cumhuriyet döneminde Kürt nüfusun yoğun olarak yaşadığı Doğu illerinde devlet oluşumunun karmaşık tarihsel boyutlarını, 1932-1951 yılları arasında Halkevleri'nin kurumsallaşmasına odaklanarak incelemektedir. Literatürde, devletin nüfuz etmeye çalıştığı Doğu yerellerinde ne kadar başarılı ya da başarısız olduğuna dair farklı yorumlar olsa da, Halkevleri bağımsız olarak var olan merkezi ve özerk bir devletin ampirik bir kanıtı olarak öne sürülmüştür. Bu çalışma, istisnai devlet rejimiyle yönetilen Doğu vilayetlerindeki Halkevlerinin, başarı/başarısızlık, devletin güçlü/zayıf olması ya da halkın salt itaati ve sessizliği veya direnişi gibi ikili karşıtlıkların ötesinde, karşılaşma alanlarında nasıl işlediğini ve var olduğunu incelemektedir. Bu tez, ilk olarak, Doğu'daki Halkevleri'nin söylemsel, siyasi ve idari örgütlenmesini devlet ve yerel halkın mücadele ve müzakere sınırları içinde analiz etmektedir. İkinci olarak, Halkevleri'nin fiziksel mekânındaki dinamik ve tartışmalı ilişki ve olguların analitik bir resmini çizmektedir. Üçüncü olarak, Halkevleri mekânını üreten çeşitli aktörlerin taktik ve stratejilerinin daha belirgin olduğu gündelik kamusallık ve toplumsallaşmayı analiz etmektedir. Son olarak, Halkevleri ve devletin şiddetli dilsel asimilasyon uygulamalarını, devletin "içerme ve dışlama" sınırları ve öznelerin çoklu başa çıkma yolları bağlamında incelemektdir. Bu tez, Halkevleri ve Doğu'nun karşılaşma alanlarındaki çoklu etkileşimler ve güç ilişkileri tarafından şekillendiğini ve üretildiğini göstermektedir.

154.720 kelime

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To my son Mem Çınar, my love Serdar and my mother Belqîza

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

RPP	Republican People's Party
CUP	Committee of Union and Progress
GNAT	Grand National Assembly of Turkey
DP	Democrat Party
TLA	Turkish Language Association

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with her endless sisterly support, but also by taking on the task of the technical formatting of this dissertation. I am very grateful to both of them. I would also like to thank Robert Lewis for proofreading the manuscript and his supportive encouraging approach.

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1

Introduction

"To be or not to be, that is not the only question", said the garbage collector, looking absent-mindedly at the skull he was holding up, "Beyond the mere question 'What?', the researcher feels obliged to find answers to the questions 'How?' and 'Why?

– Ali Teoman, *Uykuda Çocuk Ölümleri* [1]

What the historian must do is to create the mood of history in reverse.

– Walter Benjamin, *VII. Thesis*

The main problematics of this chapter is first what kind of discursive his thesis aims to analyze the historical aspects of the state formation in the massively Kurdish-populated provinces focusing on the formation of single-party state institution People's Houses (Halkevleri),

1 Cited by Eyüp Aygün Tayşir, *Bu Tez Nasıl Bitecek? Lisanüstü Öğrencileri İçin Araştırma Kılavuzu* (İstanbul: İletişim Yay. 2019), 59.

between 1932 and 1951.[2] Provinces with substantial Kurdish populations namely, Vilayat-ı Şarkiyye, Şark vilayetleri, (Eastern provinces) Şark-i Anadolu (Eastern Anatolia) and Kurdistan[3], even during the early years of the Turkish nation-state contained the cities of Diyarbakır, Mardin, Van, Urfa, Elazığ, Tunceli, Siirt, Hakkâri, Bitlis, Ağrı, Bingöl, and Muş. They were located in the regions newly formed as South and East Anatolian Regions in 1941.[4] These provinces, having a Kurdish population of over ninety per cent in some places, were governed by an exceptional state regime implemented mainly by General Inspectorates after 1925.

The Republican People's Party (CHP – Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, RPP henceforth), which governed the state, dissolved the local organizations in these provinces, and appointed People's Houses as the principal representative and missionary agent of the single party and the state. The People's Houses were the main political, cultural and social organization in the early Republican period in Turkey founded by the RPP as a cultural branch (*kültür kolu*) of the party and were closed by the Democrat Party (DP – Demokrat Parti, DP henceforth) in 1951 on the grounds of its organic institutional connection with the RPP.[5] This institution inherited

2 In the thesis, People's Houses will be used to include People's Rooms (Halkodaları), a small version of them opened in villages, towns and neighborhoods after 1940. People's Room or *Halkodası* will be used when referring specifically to them. In the usage of the period, the words Houses and in Turkish, *Halkevi* (People's House) will be used from time to time instead of People's Houses.

3 For the history of the official usage of Kurdistan for some Kurdish provinces see Osmanlı Kürdistanı Kürdoloji Çalışma Gurubu, *Osmanlı Kürdistanı/Kurdistana Osmanî*, (İstanbul: Bgst yayınları, 2011).

4 For this issue see *Birinci Coğrafya Kongresi, 6-21 Haziran 1941, Haritalarıyla Birlikte,* (Ankara: Maarif Vekilliği, 1941). Instead of the already mentioned twelve provinces, I will utilize different appellations such as Eastern/Kurdish provinces, East, Kurdish provinces, Kurdish dominated provinces and Kurdish inhabited provinces, etc.

5 Between 1963 and 1980, the People's Houses continued to exist as an independent "democratic mass organization" in contact with the labor and socialist movements, with some continuity with the first period. The legacy of the second phase of the People's Houses, which were closed down by the military coup in 1980, was taken on by the third stage of the People's Houses, which were re-established in 1988. This association, which

a noteworthy ideological and insititutional legacy, and had intentions, projects and practices aimed at nationalizing, centralizing, secularizing, and civilizing[6] all citizens, and assimilating non Turkish people into the new Turkish identity. It acquired the mission of *halk eğitimi* (public education) and to re-produce a new *people* and citizens in all aspects, according to the modernization principles of Kemalism which became the official ideology of the state. Meanwhile, these policies had different meanings, translations and perceptions in twelve highly Kurdish inhabited provinces in the first years of the Turkish Republic governed by a separate military/administrative regime similar to a colonial one. Most of the Kemalist state actors of the period saw these policies as the main methods for "solving" the "Kurdish and Kurdishness issue", mainly in these provinces where Kurdish ethno-political challenges were embedded in the contestation to centralist, nationalist, secularist and capitalist policies were apparent.

In this context, representing the single-party state, the People's Houses were constructed as one of the spaces for the penetration and production of the nation-state in a region with a strong memory of administrative autonomy that had been gradually weakened during the imperial period. In this more "incompatible" region of the new nation-state, the People's Houses began to spread, in order to establish its authority, to demonstrate its *devlet kudreti* (state power) and to achieve

continues to exist today, is an independent association with 73 branches that "defends rights" from a socialist perspective. These associations, which gradually lost their intellectual connection with the People's Houses, are outside the scope of this thesis. For this issue also see Anıl Çeçen, Atatürk'ün Kültür Kurumu, *Halkevleri*, (Ankara: Gündoğan Yayınları, 1990). For today's *Halkevleri* see https://halkevleri.org.tr.

6 For general purposes, discourses and practices of People's Houses see Anıl Çeçen, 1990; Kemal Karpat, "The People's Houses in Turkey: Establishment and Growth", *Middle Eastern Journal* 17, no.1/2, (1963), 55-67; Kebikeç İnsan Bilimleri Kaynak Araştırmaları Dergisi, *Halkevleri Issue*, no. 3, (1996); Tevfik Çavdar, "Halkevleri", *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 4, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları), 878-884.

its aims of sovereignty not only through physical violence but also through symbolic violence and power.[7]

The discursive practices of centralization and nationalization that would ensure adherence to the national identity defined as Turkishness on the agenda of Republican administrators, bureaucrats and intellectuals began to take shape with disciplinary and exile-oriented measures motivated by the efforts of *temsil* (assimilation-representation) and *temdin* (civilization) after the Sheikh Said Rebellion (1925) (Chapter 2).[8] The inclusion of Vilayat-ı Şarkiyye into the nation-state and the solution of the "Kurdishness and the Eastern problem" were aimed at making Turkish culture and the Turkish language dominant as the mother tongue through the People's Houses and formal education (Chapter 5). In the meantime, politics of inclusion and a form of citizenship based on the acceptance of assimilation and the exclusion of the Kurdish ethnicity, the so-called *ayırma siyaseti* (politics of separation/segregation) emerged, which also formed the limits of participation in every field. Secondly, based on this objective, it was important for the provinces to be physically distinguishable, manageable, controllable, and ultimately accessible, as it was for the state for People's Houses institutions to be visible in the region (Chapter 3 and 4). Thirdly, most of the provinces were governed by a special security and administration regime, where the objectives of public order and security *(asayiş)* seemed to overlap.[9]

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7 Mesut Yeğen, *Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999); Senem Aslan, *Nation-Building in Turkey and Morocco: Governing Kurdish and Berber Dissent,* (Cambridge University Press, 2014).

8 See Hamit Bozarslan, "Türkiye'de Kürt Milliyetçiliği, Zımni Sözleşmeden Ayaklanmaya (1919-1925)," in E. J. Zurcher, *İmparatorluktan Cumhuriyete Türkiye'de Etnik Çatışma,* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008), 89-121; Martin Van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan*. (London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1992) and *Ağa, Şeyh ve Devlet,* (Ankara: Özge Yayınları, 1994), 327-370; Mehmet Bayrak, *Kürtlere Vurulan Kelepçe: Şark Islahat Planı*, (Ankara: Özge Yayınları, 2009), 15-17.

9 For more on this topic see Jandarma Umum Kumandanlığı, "Dersim", in *Doğu Anadolu'da Toplumsal Mühendislik Dersim-Sason (1934-1946),* ed. Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2010; Muazzez Pervan and Tuğba Akekmekçi, ed.

In the existing literature, the People's Houses have generally been depicted either as a part of the modernization project of the single-party state early Republican era or particularly in the East as an instrument the oppressive, racist or colonialist state uses to control an area where it can otherwise not penetrate. Even though there are varying interpretations as to how successful such a state is in shaping the local societies it tries to penetrate, the People's Houses have been put forward as an empirical piece of evidence of the character of an independently existing central and autonomous state. Therefore, how the People's Houses in the "Kurdish East" functioned, and through which discourses and practices they reflexively constructed their relationships with local social, cultural and state actors at the everyday, local and micro levels has not been investigated. Hence, it has also not been sufficiently and comprehensively analyzed as to how statecraft implemented these policies on daily, local and micro levels and how different segments of the local society responded to the practices of the Houses.

Hence, due to moving beyond the essentially static and incomplete view based on primarily measuring the success and capacity level of the state and the responses of the historical subjects placed on the bipolar axes in the encountering spaces, this study tries to elaborate the generative and productive aspects and effects of the weaknesses or failures of the state.[10] Instead of appreciating the failure or success, strength or capacity problems of the state as the "endpoints" of the state formation, comparing this with an ideal and normative form, this study claims that they can reveal complex workings of the state interrelated with the society, culture and space. They can also crystallize the effects

Doğu Sorunu: Necmeddin Sahir Sılan Raporları (1939-1953), İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2010. See also Zafer Toprak, "Toplumsal Mühendislik ve Necmeddin Sahir Sılan" in *Doğu Sorunu Necmeddin Sahir Sılan Raporları*, 9-23; Bilmez Bülent Can, *Demiryolundan Petrole Chester Projesi (1908-1923),* 2nd ed., İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2010; and Hande Özkan, "Türkiye'de Tek Parti Dönemi Coğrafya ve Mekân Anlayışları: Yatay Bir Dönemlendirme Denemesi," *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 94, (2002), 143-174.

10 Stein Sundtøl Eriksen, "State Failure' in Theory and Practice: The Idea of the State and the Contradictions of State Formation", *Review of International Studies*, 37, (2011), 246.

and consequences of state formation against the backdrop of interacting formation in the East, and legitimize the new state strategies to overcome them.[11]

I want to offer some other questions such as: How and what are the everyday practices, experiences and effects of the assimilation on Kurds and the Eastern region? In what ways was the central power of the nation-state dispersed throughout the everyday state formation, aiming at Turkification, assimilation and civilization? What were the roles of the People's Houses in this process? What were the different interpretations, suggestions, and practices of state staff through the state penetration process in the central-local line in the Kurdish *East* via the People's Houses and what were their effects? What were the specific administrative, social, cultural and spatial practices implying overt violence, through the different social and cultural groups and individuals in the localities? What were the responses and reactions of the different sections of local people in the context of the state-culture, state-space and state-society relations? Which types of struggles, negotiations or reappropration produced by the state occurred? What does it mean to claim that the People's Houses and state succeeded or failed in the "arduous" process? I also ask these questions: How do Kemalist/Republican reforms and discourse, especially about Eastern and Kurdish issues have some key continuities with the past executed by party-statecraft and reacted/responded to by "ordinary perceptors" and "people" and even by the local party or state members? Also how and in which liminalities are they spontaneously or implicitly reacted/resisted or accepted and also negotiated for? Finally, the basic question of this dissertation can be formulated such as: is it possible to portray the People's Houses' formation, a relatively widespread, visible, dynamic party-state institutionalization in the Eastern/Kurdish provinces, beyond binary oppositions such as a total success/failure, homogenous,

11 Hirozaku Miyazaki and Annelise Riles, "Failure as an Endpoint", In *Global Assemblages, Technology, Politics, and Ethics as Anthropological Problems*, Aihwa Ong and Stephen J. Collier (eds.), (Blackwell, 2008), 320-331.

monolithic, strong/weak state, and beyond the formulations of a totally resistant, silent or compliant and obedient society?

To develop answers to these questions, this study goes beyond the centralized and macro processes glorified by current historical scholarship, to contribute to filling a gap in the literature. *Firstly,,* based on comprehensive archival research, this study will reveal the local, daily and micro-level discourses, practices and experiences of the administrators and members of the People's Houses and the receptors' responses in the Kurdish/Eastern regions about the most important aspects and practices such as their political and administrative, spatial, and cultural/linguistic space. Additionally, the relations between the local people and the local/central[12] state agents, as well as the spaces of such encounters will be analyzed, without ignoring the power dynamics that exist between the state and society in Eastern Turkey. *Secondly*, the problem of how local people perceived the cultural and social activities and political and administrative discourse and practices of the local People's Houses, and what kinds of responses they made to them is the focus of this study. The dissertation also seeks to analyze how the positions people in different ethnic, class and social groups occupied affected the way they experienced the People's Houses' practices. How such varying processes of experience would affect the People's Houses' practices, in turn, will also be taken into consideration.

In other words, I am trying to scrutinize the "civilizing" and assimilationist activities of People's Houses as a party-state institution utilizing a complex modern state's power techniques, aiming to render dominant the new Turkish citizenship and culture in the localities of Kurdish Eastern provinces, and the responses of the subjects to them, on an everyday basis. I seek to establish that sophisticated everyday power techniques implying the cultural violence of the People Houses with the

12 In this thesis, the term "center" is used to refer to the RPP General Secretariat, to which the People's Houses were affiliated, government bodies and other decision-making state institutions in Ankara. However, this does not imply an omnipotent state center that could determine and direct all practices and processes.

diversified statecraft in Eastern localities shows the forms of the re-production of the (nation)-state formation beyond the successful/unsuccessful, powerful/powerless dichotomies. Also assuming that this re-production is completely relational with cultural and societal domains, with the complex reactions of local perceptors which cannot be evaluated as obedient/disobedient, silent/unsilent, resistant/non-resistant and also monolithic, homogeneous, even unambiguous. Thus, the positions and responses of perceptors, as statecrafts and local elites and local Kurdish statements having differentiated social and cultural positions and power and capital baggages are the focus of the study. Also there is an attempt to render visible the self-adaptation, self-avoidance, resistance or appropriation, accommodation or imminent counter struggles, due to increasing their symbolic, cultural/linguistic, political, and economic capitals. It can be assumed that their attitudes changed according to variables of power techniques and relations/struggles, state-led interventions, class and gender differences, the types of physical, cultural and symbolic violence, and the perceptions of civilization, modernity and capitalism in different contexts.

As a result of this research, the People's Houses' experience in the Kurdish East will be exposed to a new interpretation in terms of the political, social, and cultural history which contribute to Ottoman-Turkish, Kurdish Studies, and Middle Eastern literature. This new interpretation will shed light on how both the single-party government and the region named as the *East* have gone through a historical process of formation and reproduction by being in a mutual relationship and interaction with each other symmetrically to the power dynamics and power relations, through local-central political and cultural axes.

§ 1.1 Literature Review and Contribution

In mainstream Ottoman-Turkish historiography, the early Republican years, including the single-party years, have largely been analyzed in terms of binary oppositions between state institutions and the policies

and the discourses and practices of the Republican elites. Predominantly centered on the sphere of high politics, macro-economic, diplomatic and administrative developments have been given a certain autonomy, and the state institutions have been normatively constructed as autonomous, strong and homogeneous. State actors, intellectuals and the upper classes in general are positioned as active and often monolithic, while less influential social and cultural subjects are positioned as passive, silent or resistant.[13] From this perspective, which argues that the authoritarian modernization approach of the period, which involved violence and oppression, led to the dualism of state-society, state-culture, ruling elites-people, the political, social, cultural and spatial fields could not overcome rigid binary oppositions such as traditional/modern, secular/religious, feudal/capitalist, center/periphery, and east/west.

In both official and nationalist historiography, as well as in critical and analytical historiography, the fixation of placing historical facts and subjects within these binaries is a parallel phenomenon to the institutional practice of constructing an autonomous, unitary and monolithic state. On a global scale, the question of how the sovereign and disciplinary power of the state, which is the focus of this thesis, is disseminated through the multilayeredness and everydayness of different localities and parameters, interactions with mechanisms of power and control, and the complex reciprocity and reproduction of subjects has only recently come to the fore.[14]

A historical perspective on the People's Houses has generally been based on these dichotomies. In the literature written from an official and nationalist perspective, the People's Houses played a pioneering role in the socialization of the nation-state and its ideology through the bureaucracy and intellectuals, and they became the main institution that mediated between the state and society, and the elites and the people, as

13 For a critical analysis of the strong state/passive society thesis, see Demet Dinler, "Türkiye'de Güçlü Devlet Tezinin Eleştirisi", *Praksis 9*, (Winter-Spring 2003), 17-54.

14 For a discussion on this issue see Elif Babül, "Devlet, Bürokrasi, Siyaset ve Antropoloji", in *Kültür Denen Şey, Antropolojik Yaklaşımlar*, Ayfer Bartu Candan, Cenk Özbay (eds.) (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2018), 31-50.

defined by the Turkish national identity.[15] According to these studies, the People's Houses constituted a success story, even though they did not receive the targeted attention at high levels, due to the lack of a modern and secular structure of society, budgetary inadequacies and power conflicts between parties, especially just prior to their closure. In these approaches, the dualism of the modernizing elites and the people, and the natural autonomy of the state, are established as a given reality. Moreover, in order to eliminate the feudal structure in the East and the reactionary response based on Kurdish nationalism, the Peoples' Houses had to inculcate Turkishness and the principles of the modern world in the Kurds and the people of the East, who were backward due to their Ottoman heritage and feudalism, in order to "civilize" them and ensure a state-society fusion.[16]

Critical studies that see the People's Houses as a result of authoritarian modernization and nationalization practices, argue that Kemalist administrators and intellectuals, who claimed to be populist but were in fact elitist, approached society through top-down social engineering methods. As seen in the People's Houses experience, Kemalist indoctrinization based on non-conformist policies were rigidly dictated to the whole society, but this form of modernization was not effective and successful, because they did not have the imagination and practice to transform the political, social and economic spheres all at the same time.[17] In the East, the Republic's actors failed to transform feudal relations into capitalist ones, which was necessary for the reception of modernization, and also failed to penetrate in attempts to improve education, transportation and communication. Thus, the mostly peasant, relatively closed Eastern society continued to maintain relations and

15 See Anıl Çeçen, *Atatürk'ün Kültür Kurumu*: *Halkevleri*; Şerafettin Zeyrek, *Türkiye'de Halkevleri ve Halkodaları,* (Ankara: Anı Yayıncılık, 2006); Nurcan Toksoy, *Halkevleri, Bir Kültürel Kalkınma Modeli Olarak*, (Ankara: Orion Kitabevi, 2007).

16 Ibid.

17 Kemal Karpat, "The People's Houses in Turkey Establishment and Growth"; Mehmet Asım Karaömerlioğlu, *Orada Bir Köy Var Uzakta, Erken Cumhuriyet Döneminde Köycü Söylem*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006); Sefa Şimşek, *Bir İdeolojik Seferberlik Deneyimi Halkevleri 1932-1951,* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 2002).

communication with the state through the feudal aghas – local village headmen –, and thus did not/could not establish a relationship with the People's Houses.[18] Although there are approaches in this literature that are also adopted in this thesis, in the case of the People's Houses, the state-society relationship was based on the assumption that there should be harmony between the two, and both are defined in autonomous spheres. Research and analysis on the cultural and artistic practices as well as architectural and spatial representations of the People's Houses have similar trajectories. In these studies, the People's Houses are generally positioned as an autonomous ideological apparatus operating to shape society culturally, artistically and spatially by combining western, modernist and nationalist styles in the formation of the authoritarian nation-state.[19]

In recent years, a number of studies on state formation and state-society relations in the early Republican period have focused not only on the ideologies and discourses of the state but also on its practices, and there has been an increase in micro, everyday and locally-oriented studies on the non-autonomous state-society relationship and the agency of society. Based on first-hand archival sources and memory sources. According to some of these studies, the state and the single-party/ Republican People's Party's actors had to recognize a certain space for social objections and influences in order to establish legitimacy. Peasants, merchants, local politicians and other social actors also demonstrated their power, voice and forms of resistance not only through more overt forms of resistance such as riots and protests, but also within the limits of the official channels and means.[20] The state

18 Serdar Öztürk, *Cumhuriyet Türkiye'sinde Kahvehane ve İktidar (1930-1950),* (İstanbul: Kırmızı Yayınları, 2005).

19 For some of these Neşe Gürallar Yeşilkaya, *Halkevleri: İdeoloji ve Mimarlık,* İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1st ed. 1999, 2nd ed. 2013). Esra Dicle Başbuğ, *Resmi İdeoloji Sahnede*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2013).

20 On this issue see Murat Metinsoy, *Everyday Politics of Ordinary People: Public Opinion, Dissent and Resistance in Early Republican Turkey, 1923-1939* (PhD diss. Boğaziçi Üniversity, 2010). Ayrıca Yiğit Akın, "Fazilet Değil Vazife İstiyoruz': Erken Cumhuriyet

actors also heard the social voices within the framework of the legitimacy of their new policies, as well as the motto of "knowing in order to govern", and responded within certain limits.[21] Contesting the passivity of society in the face of the Kemalist reforms, Yılmaz, inspired by the anthropology of the state, analyzed various social responses to state practices, from Kemalist language reform to modernizing impositions in dress and ceremonies. Including the experiences of Kurdish and Eastern subjects to some extent, she argues that social subjects from different gender groups, generations and classes produce and negotiate responses that vary according to locality and subjectivity, from approval and cooperation to resistance, defiance and reversal.[22] Adak, in her study that prioritizes a gender perspective, argues that secularism was not implemented homogeneously, and she notes that secular reforms on clothing were implemented in different and complex ways at the initiative of local state institutions, not the central state, and that social actors responded to them in different ways.[23]

Lamprou, who focuses on the People's Houses, argues that the People's Houses, the practitioners of the social engineering of the one-party state, should not be analyzed within the framework of an autonomous and closed-circuit state, and a society detached from it. A true social and political analysis of the People's Houses must also look at the local and everyday encounters through which the conflicts within the state and elites took place, and the ways in which the social sphere intervened. In this respect, the researcher has argued that the different perceptions, attitudes and experiences of the People's Houses' administrators and other local actors, sometimes conflicting and sometimes reconciling with each other on issues such as local politics

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Dönemi Sosyal Tarihçiliğinde Dilekçeler", *Toplum ve Bilim*, 99, (Winter 2003/2004): 98-128.

21 Akın, 103-104.

22 Hale Yılmaz, *Becoming Turkish: Nationalist Reforms and Cultural Negotiations in Early Republican Turkey 1923-1945*, 1st ed. (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2013).

23 Sevgi Adak Turan, "Kemalism in the Periphery: Anti-Veiling Campaigns and State-Society Relations in 1930s Turkey", (PhD diss., Leiden University, 2015).

and gender, had meaningful effects on the local-central relationship.[24] According to Lamprou, the Kurdish provinces did not experience a dynamic and complicated process of state-society interrelationship as elsewhere. The reasons for this are that the People's Houses envisaged a purely top-down assimilation and the "civilizing" of the dominant Kurdish-speaking population; the local population had very low levels of Turkish and lacked the literacy required to participate in the activities of the People's Houses, and therefore could not become actors in the People's Houses. Furthermore, the lack of infrastructure and capacity of the state to penetrate and reach out to society, the absence of a middle class and local elites to implement and spread the practices, and the lack of administrative and political representation prevented participation. Therefore, the People's Houses did not reach many local social strata in the East as much as they did in the western provinces and could only commonly be the meeting ground of state officials.

Analytical studies on governmental practices and technologies of power in the fields of space, demography, economic and social development, gender, citizenship, and the technologies of power toward Kurds in the early Republic and beyond have been increasing.[25] These studies read the revolts and resistances and their violent suppression in the East and Kurdish geography since the republic, the practices of assimilation and civilization in a tightly secured area, and the state's codification of a backward area as a practice of objectification. How the

24 Alexandros Lamprou, *Between Central State and Local Society. The People's Houses Institution and the Domestication of Reform in Turkey (1932 - 1951)*, (Leiden University 2009); Lamprou, *Nation-Building in Modern Turkey, 'The People's Houses, The State and The Citizen,* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2015).

25 For some of these see Kerem Öktem. "Creating the Turk's Homeland: Modernization, Nationalism and Geography in Southeast Turkey in the late 19th and 20th Centuries," in *Socrates Kokkalis Graduate Workshop, The City: Urban Culture Architecture and Society*, (2003); Jorgenden, Joost. "Crafting Space, Making People: The Spatial Design of Making Nation in Modern Turkey", In *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, (10) (2009) and Jongerden, "Yer Siyaseti: Türkiye Kürdistan'ında Devlet ve Toplumun Mekansal Düzenlenişi," *Toplum ve Kuram*, 2 (2009): 213-231; Nilay Özok, "Social Development as a Governmental Strategy in the Southeastern Anatolian Project", (MA Thesis in Boğaziçi University, 2004).

autonomous and non-homogeneous state, including its practices of violence and security, was constituted in relation to society, culture and space in local, micro and everyday terms is not the main focus.

Uğur Ümit Üngör's *The Making of Modern Turkey: Nation and State in Eastern Anatolia*, *1913-1950,* following the same line of thought as historian Erik Jan Zürcher, examines how the Turkish nation-state was established in Eastern Anatolia during the period of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP henceforth), which he divides up into the Young Turk period, and the Kemalist single-party period.[26] In a comprehensive study that situates the process of state formation within the framework of demographic and social engineering, Üngör reveals the attempts of the CUP and its successor, the RPP rulers, to homogenize the demographic structure of multi-ethnic Eastern Anatolia through violent practices such as the Armenian genocide, followed by the physical massacre and exile of the Kurds, within their local relations, focusing on Diyarbakır. In addition, it shows that these attempts were culturally and spatially supported by the People's Houses, formal education, memory and space policies. While Üngör presents a historical narrative that includes the role of local actors and provides examples of the state being shaped on a daily and local basis by power dynamics, changing historical contexts, intra-state contradictions and conflicts, and local interventions and negotiations, the emphasis on the autonomous state shaped by social engineering is at the forefront. In other studies, that examine Kurds and the geographies they inhabit as an analytical unit, the People's Houses are generally one of the agents of the repressive, centralist, racist state, aiming to reform and control the East, which it identifies with Kurdish nationalism, backwardness and banditry. To this end, the People's Houses, which practiced assimilation and "civilization" of Turks, tried to represent the state in the region and legitimize its practices.[27] According to studies that

26 Uğur Ümit Üngör, *The Making of Modern Turkey: Nation and State in Eastern Anatolia, 1913–1950*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) and *Modern Türkiye'nin İnşası: Doğu Anadolu'da Ulus, Devlet ve Şiddet (1913-1950)*, trans. Ali İhsan Dalgıç (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2021).

27 Mesut Yeğen, *Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu*.

emphasize that the dynamics of the project of "civilizing" the Kurds in the Ottoman period and the project of "doing so" by Turkifying them in the Republican period were Orientalist discourses, the East produced by these discourses was constructed in a wide range of fields from the political sphere to that of literature. The actors of this construction, which is one of the main dynamics of the autonomously positioned state's strategy of governing the Kurds are institutions such as the People's Houses and their predessesor Turkish Hearths (Türk Ocakları).[28]

The limits of the power and effectiveness of the People's Houses and the state have also been discussed in this literature. According to İsmail Beşikçi, the Republican bureaucracy chose to cooperate with feudal forces in order to prevent Kurdish nationalism, and instead of changing the feudal socio-economic structure in order not to break the cooperation with them, it aimed to destroy and assimilate Kurdish culture. However, the failure to change the relations of production led to the society's inability to establish a relationship with the state, and the assimilation practices in which the People's Houses were actors were not effective in the short term.[29] According to more recent approaches, the single-party state sought to extend to the Kurdish regions not only its despotic power, with which it achieved autonomy through force and violence, but also its infrastructural power to transform the civilian sphere through its administrative and financial capacity, networks and resources.[30] However, as in the case of the People's Houses, it could not be effective due to its inability to spread its financial and administrative

28 Welat Zeydanlıoğlu, "Kemalism's Others: The Reproduction of Orientalism in Turkey", (PhD diss. Cambridge: Anglia Ruskin University, 2007) and "Beyaz Türk'ün Yükü: Oryantalizm, Kemalizm ve Türkiye'de Kürtler", *Toplum Kuram*, no.2, (2009), 195-211; Sabri Ateş, "Oryantalizm ve Bizim 'Doğumuz", *Doğudan*, no. 1, (2007): 1-19.

29 İsmail Beşikçi, *Doğu Anadolu'nun Düzeni*, *Sosyo Ekonomik ve Etnik Temeller*, İstanbul: E Yayınları, 1969.

30 For the theoretical elaboration that the state exists through despotic and infrastructural power see Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms, and Results," in *States in History*, ed. John A. Hall, (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 109–136.

resources, the sharp distinction between the bureaucracy and society, and its weakness in establishing control over the Kurdish society.[31]

Besides, there is a growing body of work and debate on the historicization and conceptualization of state formation beyond the state-society dichotomy in the Kurdish field, which has inspired this study.[32] According to Watts, the Kurds' relationship with the state is also a complex one and requires an anthropological perspective on a local and micro scale. It is a totalistic approach to consider even the single-party period as years of silence for the Kurds, despite intense repression, mass killings, policies of exile, and forced assimilation.[33] Both the single-party period and the post-1980s, with its state of emergency regimes and practices of effective repression and violence, present an exceptional situation, but the exact practices of power within this situation and their different effects and experiences are worth exploring. This requires further analysis of the reasons why, for example, some Kurds support the mainstream parties and the principal policies of the state, while others engage in armed rebellion. Place, people, and contexts of events are therefore important.[34]

In Tezcür's approach, Kurdish identity is shaped, lived and articulated within the state in different ways. The fact that Kurds vote on the basis of local politics and interests, with or without ethnic motives, and the forms and experiences of articulation with the state in the municipalities won by the Kurdish movement in recent years show that this process is not a

31 Harun Ercan, "Türkiye'de Ulus-Devlet Oluşumu, Kürt Direnişi ve Dönüşüm Pratikleri", *Toplum ve Kuram*, no. 1, (2009): 23-53.

32 For a broader discussion in the context of state-society and the East and the Kurds, see *European Journal of Turkish Studies, State-Society Relations in the Southeast, (2009)*, *http://ejts.revues.org/4006.*

33 Nicole F. Watts, "Re-Considering State-Society Dynamics in Turkey's Kurdish Southeast", in *European Journal of Turkish Studies, State-Society Relations in the Southeast,* no.10 (2009): 1-18, *http://ejts.revues.org/4196).*

34 Ibid.

binary opposition or a static process.[35] In fact, the judges' different rulings in favor of and against the plaintiffs in cases regarding the translation of Turkish names into Kurdish[36]; and the case of the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP - *Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi*), the processes of cooperation with some Kurds from Urfa, based on Turkishness and pro-development state discourse and practices, are examples of the fragmented structure of the state in practice and the non-homogeneous attitudes of the Kurds.[37] In another study, which shows that, in the early republican years, there was a struggle between republican actors and Kurdish nationalist actors over how the East should be defined, it is explained that these two opposing wings tried to develop arguments for each other, thus constructing their discourses through relationship and interaction. [38]

Senem Aslan's study, which examines the practices of the early Republican administration regarding the Kurds, apart from the intentions and discourses of the People's Houses and other state institutions, from the perspective of state anthropology, is directly related to this thesis.[39] According to Aslan's comprehensive analysis, based on first-hand sources, the effectiveness of the state is questionable, due to its extremely violent security policies, strict nationalist and secularist ideology, administrative and financial inadequacies, as well as the resistance and interventions of local forces. For instance, the non-participation of the public, most of whom did not speak Turkish, in the

35 Güneş Murat Tezcür, "Kurdish Nationalism and Identity in Turkey: A Conceptual Reinterpretation", in *European Journal of Turkish Studies, vol: 10, State-Society Relations in the Southeast,* (2009): 1-17. (*https://journals.openedition.org/ejts/4008).*

36 Senem Aslan, "Incoherent State: The Controversy over Kurdish Naming in Turkey", *State-Society Relations in the Southeast,* (2009): 1-17, *(http://ejts.revues.org/4142).*

37 Leila M. Harris, "States at the Limit: Tracing Contemporary State-Society Relations in the Borderlands of Southeastern Turkey", *State-Society Relations in the Southeast,* (2009): 1-17. (*http://ejts.revues.org/4122).*

38 Jordi Tejel Gorgas, "The Shared Political Production of 'the East' as a 'Resistant' Territory and Cultural Sphere in the Kemalist Era, 1923-1938", *State-Society Relations in the Southeast,* (2009): 1-18. (*http://ejts.revues.org/4064).*

39 Senem Aslan, *Nation-Building in Turkey and Morocco: Governing Kurdish and Berber Dissent*.

activities of the People's Houses, the deviation of state practices in daily processes from their intended purpose, and the use of state administrators by local forces show the limits of the state's capacity.[40] Aslan's study has opened a new chapter in terms of evaluating the experience of the People's Houses in the East, through the effects of cultural and social forces in the local and everyday context. She focuses on the strengths and successes of the People's Houses and the state's penetration into the East.

In the Kurdish provinces, and in the East and Southeast regions in general, studies on state practices and subjective experiences in the fields of education, culture and social affairs during the single-party era are scarce. [41] As to studies on the nearly seventy People's Houses and nearly 700 People's Rooms in the two regions, they are predominantly descriptive historical studies.[42] Çağlayan's more analytical study, in which he examines how the construction of a new identity based on the Turkification and secularization policies of the early Republican years

40 Senem Aslan, "Everyday Forms of State Power and the Kurds in the Early Turkish Republic", *Int. J. Middle East Stud*., no: 43, (2011): 75-93.

41 Sevim Yeşil's MA's thesis and part of Elif Ekin Akşit's study examined how Kurdish female students at the Elazığ Girls' Institute in the 1940s experienced nationalist and modernizing education on a daily basis and its complex effects on their later lives. See Sevim Yeşil "Unfolding Republican Patriarchy: The Case of Young Kurdish Women at the Girls' Vocational Boarding School in Elazığ" (MA Thesis, Middle Eastern Technical University, 2003) and Elif Ekin Akşit, *Kızların Sessizliği: Kız Enstitülerinin Uzun Tarihi*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005).

42 These studies are descriptive in nature, based on the Republican Archives and People's Houses publications, interpreting official data on the aims, administrative staff, activities, building status and attendance rates of the People's Houses in the East, and are mostly MA studies, usually produced at universities in the Eastern provinces. For a couple of these see İsmail Özer, "Türk Modernleşmesinde Halkevleri ve Diyarbakır Örneği", (PhD diss., Gazi Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2010); Sinan Ergen, "Türkiye'de Halkevleri ve Elazığ Örneği", (MA thesis, Fırat Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Elazığ 2007); Canser Kardaş, "Diyarbakır Halkevi ve Karacadağ Dergisinin Halkbilimi Açısından Değerlendirmesi (1932-1951)", (MA thesis, Erciyes Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Kayseri 2007). Bilal Altan's MA study on social reactions based on verbal memory has been an important source for this study. Bilal Altan, "Halkevleri Sürecinde Cizre Halkevi Örneği", (MA Thesis, Dicle University, 2012).

took place in different spheres in Diyarbakır, also includes a micro and local focus. In this study, in the case of Diyarbakır, security, resettlement and deportation, transportation policies, modern city design, public works, political participation and indoctrination, and the Turkish Hearth and People's House within the scope of education are examined. Çağlayan concludes that the Diyarbakır People's House worked as an *ideological apparatus* of the state to Turkify and "civilize" the region.[43] Turan, on the other hand, draws attention to the substitution of the People's Houses for the RPP by the single-party state, which gradually closed down even the RPP organizations after the Sheikh Said Rebellion (1925) in order not to create political activity, or it allowed them to fade away. Turan refers to one of the major arguments of this thesis, which is that the People's Houses constituted a ground for the political and cultural inspection of the securitized East and the Kurds and for the surveillance, legibility and control of the Kurds through periodic reports, as well as a ground for political communication and relationship building.[44]

In the aforementioned wide-ranging literature, it can be said that the state and the People's Houses, with the exception of some recent studies, are mostly theoretically evaluated as autonomous, centralized and strong, or supposed to be strong, while society, culture and space are conceptualized and historicized within a dichotomy such as autonomous and weak/passive or resistant, and thus in a field that is opposed to or external to the state.[45] This analysis of the state and society has been influenced by the intensity of the social effects of physical and symbolic violence in the practices of discipline and control implemented through institutional actors and methods in the process of authoritarian modernization and nation-statization. However, while this perspective contains some truth, it lacks both theoretical and historical insights into how the authoritarian state was constructed. As Watts points out, the

43 Ercan Çağlayan, *Cumhuriyet'in Diyarbakır'da Kimlik İnşası (1923-1950),* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014).

44 Murat Turan, *CHP'nin Doğu'da Teşkilatlanması (1923-1950),* (İstanbul: Libra Yayıncılık, 2011).

45 See Dinler, "Türkiye'de Güçlü Devlet Tezinin Eleştirisi".

failure to address the practices and effects of the authoritarian state in relation to the ways in which they are responded to and experienced within state institutions and in spaces of encounter, while neglecting the processes of administrative functioning, is a fundamental theoretical and empirical shortcoming of such an administration. Conceptualizations of the state have produced a historicization centered on the ruling classes with omnipotence or, conversely, with limited substructural capacity. Moreover, they have generally projected these classes as monolithic, and state formation in a static and straight line that excludes the complex historicity of practical processes. Thus, despite empirical evidence to the contrary, the state or the People's House administrators in the focus of this study have not been made visible through issues such as the lines of conflict and reconciliation in the center/local matrix, and society, culture and space have been positioned as given and dependent variables in the binary oppositions mentioned above. When these lines are made visible, it is concluded that the state's influence in the areas of encounter was minimal and unsuccessful. It is obvious that all of this opens the door to a weak and incomplete historicity of the state, People's Houses and society, culture and space's roles and responses in the East.

The fact that the existing literature is mostly shaped around the question of whether the state was successful or not in the context of the People's Houses is related to a questioning of the capacity of state power. However, this thesis explores how these capacity problems are differently understood and functioned in interaction with complex and asymmetrical political and social power relations and related experiences in historical processes, rather than their consequences defined by a binary opposition. In addition, in order to fill the aforementioned gap in the literature, this study does not treat the People's Houses in the Eastern provinces as an autonomous state apparatus and an object to prove the nature of the state. The institutions that give the state and the People's House the appearance of autonomy[46],

46 For debates on state autonomy and *state effects* see Timothy Mitchell, "Society, Economy and State Effect", in *State/Culture: State Formation after Cultural Turn,* ed. George Steinmetz (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 76-9.; See also Michel-Rolph

the state effects established through practices and representations; changing power practices in local, daily and micro senses, the meaning, perception, experience and responses of the administrative functioning of the People's House in spatial, social and cultural encounter areas will be analyzed with their macro and micro causality. In this study, in which everyday actors will be made visible to the extent resources allow, there will be an attempt to see the power and power relations between these actors, the unequal power fields, the struggles related to this, and the boundaries produced in this regard beyond the problematic of success and failure. It is argued that the state should be defined as a unit that is constructed through social relations in the field of practices. It is argued that this is also the case in Kurdish regions where the state's political and cultural apparatuses based on coercion and violence are dominant. In this context, the political and administrative establishment processes, structure and functioning, physical and public/social spatiality, and linguistic/cultural practices of the People's Houses have been identified as the main themes within this framework.

§ 1.2 Conceptual and Historiographical Framework

1.2.1 *State Theories*

In the twelve Kurdish provinces under the special security zone where RPP offices were not established, the People's Houses, which were designated as the main representative and practical productive institution of the one-party state, are seen as an institutionalization through which state formation can be traced. For this reason, this study draws on conceptualizations and theories of state formation and the state.

It has already been mentioned that essentialist and reductionist definitions of the state as a homogeneous, powerful, once-formed, given and natural entity, completely controlled by a certain group or class,

Trouillot "The Anthropology of the State in the Age of Globalisation", *Current Anthropology,* 42 (1), (2001): 38-125.

autonomous from social, cultural and spatial spaces, forces and struggles, are popular in theories and historiography of the state.[47] In recent years, however, there has been a growing emphasis on the idea that the state, with its institutional and bureaucratic structure and functioning, need not be normatively self-sufficient, monolithic, powerful or successful, and that society, culture and space are merely dependent variables interacting with it.[48] Alongside this "turn" in the political science parallel to the other disciplines, the most important entity of the political scene and the political science state has been theorized and historicized as a unit in relation to historical processes and all other fields. According to Timothy Mitchell, the state is not an autonomous and static structure separate from social, economic, cultural and many other spheres, but is constituted in relation to them, both materially and imaginatively, and through *state effects*. These effects give it the appearance of an external, durable structure, separate from society.[49] Hence, Mitchell states that we should address the state as an effect of mundane processes of spatial organization, temporal arrangement, functional specification, supervision and surveillance and representation, that create the appearance of a world fundamentally divided into state and society or state and economy. Mitchell also argues that a cultural "state effect" - the perceived distinction between state and society - is produced along with various symbolic and ideological techniques.[50] Hence, the principal definition of "*the state* would thus include not just the reference to 'coercion wielding organizations'", but also the claim that the distinctness of the state and its priority over other entities is the result of cultural

47 On the history of the evolution of the concept of the state see Steinmetz, ed. *State/Culture: State Formation after the Cultural Turn*, (London: Cornell University Press, 1999).

48 Ibid.

49 T. Mitchell, "Society, Economy and State Effect", State/Culture: State Formation after the Cultural Turn".

50 T. Mitchell, "The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics", *American Political Science Review*, 85 (1), (1991): 77-96.

techniques.[51] Besides, culture not as significant a determinant of the state - as Marxist or Weberian approaches claim - but rather as a sort of "dependent variable" or *effect* of the state. [52] Additionally, for him, the essence of modern politics is not policies formed on one side of this division being applied to or shaped by the other, but the producing and reproducing of these lines of difference. At the same time, the material and intellectual manifestations of a state are inextricably intertwined; the real and the unreal cannot be distinguished. The state-idea and the state system are better seen as two aspects of the same process. He notes that:

> "To be more precise, the phenomenon we name 'the state' arises from techniques that enable mundane material practices to take on the appearance of an abstract, nonmaterial form. Any attempt to distinguish the abstract or ideal appearance of the state from its material reality, in taking for granted this distinction, will fail to understand it. The task of a theory of the state is not to clarify such distinctions but to historicize them".[53]

In conclusion, Mitchell argues that the state is not just a subjective belief or idea[54], but is capable of having material consequences in everyday life, and that it exists through ideological and symbolic techniques and empirical effects such as institutional buildings, uniforms, law, language, etc., which present the state as an objective reality separate from society. If the social scientist wants to understand the state, he must look at these effects. In this thesis, instead of

51 G. Steinmetz, "Introduction: Culture and the State" in *State/Culture: State-Formation After the Cultural Turn*, 8.

52 Ibid., 12-13.

53 Ibid.

54 One of the objections to the state as an institution with a harmonious and autonomous integrity comes from Philip Abrams prior to Mitchell. Abrams argues that the state is a state-idea in which its coherence and incoherence are masked and presented as opposites. Philip Abrams, "Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State", *Journal of Historical Sociology* 1 (1), (1998): 58-89.

illuminating a distinction between the ideal state and the People's Houses and the material forms of the state, and weighing whether the practices were realized according to ideals and intentions, there will be an attempt to historicize the techniques used to produce a state that is autonomous from society, culture and space by considering the interactions rather than the distinction between the two.

M.R. Trouillot proposes a strategy that goes beyond governmental or national institutions and focuses on the multiple locations where state processes and practices can be identified by their effects. These effects include i) *an isolation effect*, that is, the production of atomized individualized subjects, molded and modeled for governance as part of an undifferentiated but specific "public"; ii) *an identification effect*, that is, a realignment of the atomized subjectivities along collective lines, within which individuals recognize themselves as the same; iii) *a legibility effect*, that is, the production of both a language and a knowledge for governance and of theoretical and empirical tools that classify and regulate collectivities; and iv) *a spatialization effect*, that is, the production of boundaries and jurisdiction.[55] Instead of fetishizing the state and studying it as a closed construction, Trouillot proposes in his article to analyze from an anthropological perspective how state effects are diffused and experienced in their specific contexts.[56]

According to Hansen and Stepputat, the state is produced through cultural actions and techniques with symbolic and ideological content in the process of *governance,* with intentions such as monopolizing violence, territorial sovereignty, security, population control, and

55 Trouillot "The Anthropology of the State in the Age of Globalisation", 38-125. One of the objections to the state as a harmonious and autonomous institutionalization comes from Philip Abrams prior to Mitchell and Trouillot. Abrams argues that the state is an idea (state-idea) that presents a reverse image of its current incoherence. Philip Abrams, "Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State", *Journal of Historical Sociology* 1, 1, (1998), 58-89.

56 Trouillot "The Anthropology of the State in the Age of Globalisation".

development of the national economy for the welfare of the population.[57] The second of these processes takes place through the three main categories of the "symbolic languages of authority". These are, *firstly*, authoritarian discourses in the legal and legislative sphere; *secondly*, permanent symbols and rituals produced on a wide range of surfaces, from architectural structures, monuments, fences, road signs, stamps and uniforms; and *finally*, in the context of the nation-state, the nationalization of land and the creation of a common history and community. All these processes, as seen in the approaches above, point to the fact that the state is not a fixed structure, but rather an entity that is formed and constituted in the process, with ongoing relations between *institutional structure*, *cultural forms* and *regimes of power*.[58]

On the other hand, there is a line within this literature that emphasizes the actors. Accordingly, it is emphasized that the formation of the state, as well as the "borders" produced between it and society, are produced in relation to discourses, images and representations, as well as social perceptions and responses to the everyday and local practices of the state bureaucracy.[59] This means that the power techniques and operational processes of state institutionalities, characterized by rules and regulations, are produced in different ways in the spaces of encounter where their social, cultural and also spatial actors become visible.[60] In this process, the emphasis is on researching and making visible the practices and effects of the state in its *everydayness* and

57 Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat, "Introduction. States of Imagination", in *States of Imagination: Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State*, ed. Hansen and Stepputat, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), 7-8.

58 Ibid., 8.

59 Christian Krohn-Hansen, and Knut G. Nustad "Introduction," in *State Formation: Anthropological Perspectives*, ed. C. Krohn-Hansen and K.G. Nustad, (London: Pluto Press, 2005), 3-26.

60 Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta, "Introduction: Rethinking Theories of the State in An Age of Globalisation," in *Anthropology of the State*, ed. A. Sharma and A. Gupta, (Malden, Oxford, Victoria: Blackwell, 2006), 8.

locality.[61] The state and its institutions and practices are produced, not only within a centralized, national or international framework, but also by institutional or non-institutional actors at micro-scales in everyday spaces of encounter in different localities. In the meantime, through processes of reproduction, negotiation, struggle, appropriation, reversal, conflict and reconciliation, they become visible and materialized, producing different and unexpected outcomes beyond what was intended. Therefore, it is necessary to go beyond describing the state in terms of fixed institutions and regulations emanating from an autonomous center, and analyze the state and state formation through the different processes of formation and experience in these fields of encounter.[62]

Joel Migdal, one of the most prominent figures in the theories and historical studies of state formation that can be counted among the aforementioned literature, asserts that state formation is realized through the "image of the state" and the "actual practices of the state" intertwined with the social sphere. For Migdal, the state is "a field of power characterized by the use of violence and the threat of violence, and is a representation of the people shaped by and bounded by a coherent, territorially controlling image, as well as the actual practices of these multiple parts".[63] The image of the state, composed of discourses and representations of state projects, is "a dominant, holistic, autonomous unit that controls rule-making and demarcated rules". This image is reinforced by the routine practices of state institutions and actors, passports, visas, censuses, taxation, or police or military forces. This definition recalls Mitchell's reference to the metaphysical and powerful effects of practices that give the state the appearance of autonomy.[64] Like

61 For various approaches and studies on this issue, see again Christian Krohn-Hansen and Knut G. Nustad, "Introduction," in *State Formation: Anthropological Perspectives*; Krohn-Hansen, and Blom, *States of Imagination: Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State.*

62 See ibid.

63 Joel Migdal, *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1-30.

64 Timothy Mitchell, "Society, Economy and State Effect", 76-97.

the dominant approach in the anthropological literature on the state, Migdal argues that the actual practices of the bureaucracy can have contradictory or complex consequences for this image. State formation should therefore be studied by looking at how the everyday practices and customary practices of bureaucracy and state actors interact with those of social actors. For this, we need to look at the spaces where this interaction takes place. In this context, he calls for the seeing of the different strategies of negotiation, resistance and appropriation at the "crossroads where state policies reach society" and where "state and society meet".[65]

In this study, a theoretical and historiographical discussion will be made in relation to the aforementioned conceptualizations of the state. Thus, while adopting Mitchell and Trouillot's approach that the state is not a given and autonomous unit, but materialized not only in the imaginary but also in its practices and effects, and therefore should be studied within these, the study also draws on Hansen and Stepputat's approach that the state is constituted through the ongoing relations between *institutional structure*, *cultural forms* and *regimes of power*, in the sense that the People's Houses were an institution that produced both ideology and representations and cultural forms. There is an attempt to establish a dialogue with state anthropology literature in terms of analyzing the institutional practices and influences of the People's Houses in the East, through the everyday, local and micro processes of institutional and social experience and formation.

It is possible to say that the representation and power practices of state institutionalities in both geography and zoning are not established and produced in an abstract and fixed space, but in a spatiality that is intertwined with these fields of encounter.[66] I have been determined that evaluating the People's Houses as a spatiality, which is also at the center

65 Migdal, *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*.

66 On this issue see Sarah Anne Radcliffe "Imagining the State as a Space: Territoriality and the Formation of the State in Ecuador" in *States of Imagination: Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State*, 123.

of the spatial discourses of the state, is contributory and pioneering in terms of both its theoretical and empirical foundations. In addition, the spatiality of the People's Houses is the subject of another part of the study, in terms of physical and public/social aspects. Henri Lefebvre, one of the pioneering theorists on space, concludes that space is not a fixed and passive physical place or area, but a unit with physical, mental and social contents that interact with each other, and his analysis has been found meaningful at this point.[67] Lefebvre has the following to say about how physical, mental and social spaces can be analyzed:

> "What should we call the distinction that keeps the various spaces, physical, mental and social, at a distance from each other? As dissonance, difference, rupture, fracture? The name is of little importance. What matters is the distance that separates the 'ideal' space, which is related to mental (logical-mathematical) categories, from the 'real' space, which belongs to social practice. Each of these contains, reveals, presupposes the other."[68]

Finding these sentences meaningful, I will examine what kind of spaces the People's Houses in the East were, both physically, mentally and socially, and how the distance between their 'ideal' envisioning and the 'real' practices and experiences of the social was constructed and formed, through what kinds of practices and experiences. Anthony Giddens, inspired by M. Foucault, argues that schools, prisons, hospitals, commercial firms and other organizations, which he calls *power containers,* where the sources of power and authority are concentrated, and the nation-state as the highest level, should be seen as *locales*. It is through these locales that the state maintains surveillance, monitoring, information gathering and control over social gatherings and actions on a daily basis in these places with defined borders.[69] Sarah A. Radcliffe argues that, as state formation has recently been analyzed as an ongoing

67 Henri Lefebvre, *Production of Space*, (UK: Cambridge, USA: Blackwell, 1991), 11-12.

68 Ibid., 45.

69 Anthony Giddens, *Ulus-Devlet ve Şiddet*, (İstanbul: Kalkedon Yayınları, 2008), 23-26.

series of cultural acts and material practices, it is also possible to investigate the process of *spatial* formation of the state, or how the state is made as a space. She adds that we are dealing not only with the creation of abstract space, but also the practices through which space is consumed and its organization disrupted as Michel De Certeaux points out. [70]

This thesis will try to trace how the "image of the state" and the "actual practices of the state" mentioned by Migdal are experienced in the People's House, which the state wants to establish as a *container of power* and a *locale,* as mentioned by Giddens, and how the process of producing each other, including social responses, is experienced. It will be discussed how Lefebvre's space, which is not free from power networks, where the social is emphasized, and which is also produced physically and mentally/imaginatively, is established in the example of the People's House. This is in line with Mitchell's conclusion that the state is defined by what happens in the distance between the imaginary realm of discourse and representations, and the realm of material practices. This study also adopts French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu's definition of *cultural capital, linguistic capital* and *symbolic capital*, which goes beyond the reduction of social actors' capital to economic capital. According to him, in modern societies, there are two distinct systems of social hierarchization. The first is economic, in which position and power are determined by money and property, and the capital one has at one's command. The second system is cultural or symbolic. In this system, one's status is determined by how much cultural or "*symbolic capital*" one possesses. On this point, the *doxas* which are reproduced in social discursive context and indicate a sense of limits causing the strict ideatical and discursive positions are an element of symbolic order. Culture is also a source of domination, in which intellectuals are in the key role as specialists of cultural production and creators of symbolic

70 Radcliffe "Imagining the State as a Space: Territoriality and the Formation of the State in Ecuador", 123.

power.[71] The concept of *habitus* in the thesis, to quote Bourdieu directly, is "the matrix of perceptions, appreciations and actions that are the result of an agent's individual and social history and that condition their practices".[72]

The study is also inspired by the anthropological perspectives and does not see ethnicity or group identity, subjectivity and the cultural field in general as given, fixed and static structures. It is thought that these, like culture, like the state, are not free from the unequal distribution of various networks and relations of power and power networks and relations under the rule of a securitized state in which the use of violence is an important means. Thus, identities and subjectivities are assumed to be relational and processual units that are shaped by practices and experiences derived from violence, power and power relations and are thus politically, culturally and socially constructed.[73]

With the empirical data obtained, based on this theoretical background, it has been seen that in the East, where the People's Houses had a more widespread organization than the RPP, the thesis will go beyond the fiction of a strong or weak state and a weak or strong society

71 Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of Theory of Practice*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 159-197.

72 P. Bourdieu and Loïc J.D. Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology,* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 126.

73 F. Barth points out that ethnic groups are units that are constructed in a process of socio-economic and socio-political context, and that intergroup interaction with mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion is a fundamental element of this construction process. See Fredrik Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, The Social Organisation of Cultural Difference,* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1969: 9-38); Barth, *Etnik Gruplar ve Sınırları,* (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 2011). Brubaker too emphasizes that the construction of collective identities and groups should be analyzed by looking at the processes and the relationships between its actors. Roger Brubaker, "Ethnicity Without Groups", *Archives Europeennes de Sociologies* XLIII, no.2 (2002): 163-189. In reality, an ethnic group is a "state of being a group" (groupness) constructed in political, social, cultural and psychological processes, dynamic, relational, heterogeneous" variable actions, and constructed in a non-given, homogeneous and non-integrated manner, as well as an ethnicized group. Ibid: 167-168. See also Brubaker, "The Return of Assimilation? Changing perspectives on immigration and its sequels in France, Germany, and the United States." *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 24/4, (December 2010), 531-548.

achieved through the People's Houses. Thus, through the example of the People's Houses, what will be included is the history of how state institutionalizations are formed in a field of encounter that encompasses all these processes, rather than being external, existing and experienced with effects open to various interventions in the social, cultural and spatial spheres. For this purpose, the practices and effects of People's Houses in different localities, their complexities within everydayness[74], their responses including opposition, reproduction, consensus and performance will be seen with an approach that takes into account both micro and macro processes. The study, which makes visible the unequal field of forces created by the technologies of power and the processes of subjectification, the role of power relations, and violent and oppressive regulations and practices, proposes to read this process not in terms of its homogeneous whole but as changing historicity.

1.2.2 *Voices of Historical Subjects and Subaltern Studies*

The single-party state, in general, used its despotic power intensively against the Kurdish population, in particular with the motive of establishing security, and produced practices aimed at pacifying the social sphere by spreading control and surveillance mechanisms. On the other hand, M. Foucault argues that the sovereign power of the state, similar to despotic power, produces constraint, prohibition and violent practices through its military and legal institutions that restrict the individual, in order to ensure security. However, he states that another

74 Everydayness will be read through a "multilayered historical everydayness" through the processes and practices of everyday use, habits and actions of spatial and temporal processes and the residues left by them. See Harry Harootunian, *Tarihin Huzursuzluğu, Modernlik, Kültürel Pratik ve Gündelik Hayat Sorunu,* trans. Mehmet Evren Dinçer (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınevi, 2006). Focusing on everydayness and everyday encounters and experiences challenges the notion of time moving in a certain line and through the actions of rational reason, which is implicit in modern and nationalist understandings. Moreover, by inviting us to a dynamic and complex understanding of time, it can offer the possibility of seeing the time of the “now” in the past. Ibid.

type of power gained importance with modernity. This is disciplinary power, which transcends the boundaries of the state apparatus and is more indistinctly distributed to the individual sphere through various micro-power methods and finer channels.[75] Unlike sovereign power, disciplinary power is a power that does not restrict the individual produced in the details, but rather produces him/her and makes him/her its object. In this context, modern government refers not to the institutions of the state, but to the management tactics and security methods that make the population its object.[76] Foucault suggests that in order to understand the state, we should look not at a closed institutional analysis of it, but at the management tactics and security methods through which we will see disciplinary power in micro spheres of power and how it is produced in various institutions such as hospitals, prisons, schools, and in all social spheres. In fact, the fields and methods of disciplinary power are linked to Mitchell's conceptualization of state effect, which establishes the state as a separate structure.

In addition to the sovereign power of the state, this thesis also examines the power practices and methods of the state and the People's Houses, which were cultural security institutions with the mission of spreading Turkification and "civilization", and which were seen as a security issue, as they allegedly spread disciplinary power. Therefore, the focus is on how the process of establishing a Turkified and "civilized" modern and national subject, which was intended and imagined through the People's Houses, spread in complex ways to micro spheres of power through both despotic and disciplinary power practices, and what kind of subjects it sought to construct. However, in the process of making individuals subjects of power, subjects are not constructed as completely passive entities, but as units that both produce that power in complex ways rather than linearly, and are produced by it. In this sense, one

75 Michel Foucault, ''Questions on Geography,'' in *Power/Knowledge*. (New York: Pantheon, 1980), 72.

76 M. Faucault, ''Governmentality" in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality,* ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 93.

wonders how and within what frameworks state and historical subjects encounter and relate to each other, how they experience the forms of power between and within themselves, and how different forms of subjectivity emerge. In this context, the responses and experiences of social subjects, who are also social and cultural subjects and who have been coded as the "surplus" that Ahıska draws attention to, rather than as homogeneous administrators, civil servants and local elites, are included despite the limitations of the available resources.[77]

In fact, the ways in which gender categories, other than the ruling or upper class, colonial peoples, peasants or men are included in the dominant and mainstream history, has long been debated in historiography. Inspired by the work of British Marxists, whose "history from below" approach has reflected the experiences of workers and peasants, the Subaltern School within Postcolonial Studies made breakthroughs in this regard in the 1970s. According to the early members of this school, which opposed colonial and Indian nationalist historiography in India, nationalist historians constructed the Indian elites and upper classes as the main perpetrators of the struggle against colonialism, and the creation of the "modern Indian nation". This debate has also been an important problematic and area of discussion in critical social science in Turkey.[78] Hence, they are elitist and Eurocentric and have not been able to break away from the colonial historians' perspective. Both historiographies have ignored the autonomous political space of India's subaltern[79] or subordinate classes/groups of people outside the dominant groups or colonial administrators. Historians in subaltern studies, on the other hand, have sought to explore

77 Meltem Ahıska, "Türkiye'de İktidar ve Gerçeklik", *Defter* 33, (Spring 1998): 19-40. See also Ahıska, *Radyonun Sihirli Kapısı*, (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları. 2005).

78 See Reşat Kasaba and Sibel Bozdoğan eds., *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2011).

79 The concept of *subaltern* describes those below in terms of class, caste, gender, constituting a minority. For an article discussing the potential interaction between Subaltern Studies and Ottoman History see Boğaç A. Ergene "Maduniyet Okulu, Post-Kolonyal Eleştiri ve Tarihte Bilgi-Özne Sorunu: Osmanlı Tarihçiliği için Yeni Dersler mi?", *Toplum ve Bilim,* 83, (Winter 1999-2000): 32-46.

the identity of the indigenous subaltern that existed in the past.[80] According to them, "...if history is to be more than a narrative celebrating the parade of some triumphant concepts and forces such as the nation-state, bureaucratic rationality, capitalism, science and progress, the historian must strive to recover/rediscover "marginal" voices and memories, forgotten dreams and signs of resistance."[81] Because the voices of the subaltern - peasant, woman, worker - have been denied the possibility of being heard in official documents by both colonial western and nationalist paradigms, therefore, these voices need to be appropriated by history. Guha, one of the pioneers of this school, historicizes the 19th century Santal peasant revolts against the British and non-Indian groups as having spiritual and religious motivations that cannot be explained by the modern, secular and rational minds of Eurocentric history.[82] Again, studies that argue that castes and their religious content can allow for an India-specific class analysis challenge the classical description of a secularist and class-conscious working class in Marxist historiography, as well as upper class and elite-centered nationalist historiography.[83]

The important point in these approaches is the claim that the consciousness of the subaltern subject, albeit in an autonomous sphere, cannot be understood without understanding the consciousness of the elite. This is because the voices of subaltern subjects who have not had the opportunity to express themselves can only be heard through a new and critical reading of the documents in the archives written by the elite.[84] G. Spivak, who belongs to the same school, has challenged this

80 Ranajit Guha, "On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India", in *Subaltern Studies I*, ed. Ranajit Guha, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1982, 37-44.

81 Gyanendra Pandey, "The Prose of Otherness", In *Subaltern Studies VII*, eds. David Arnold and David Hardiman, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994), 214.

82 R. Guha, *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India*, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983).

83 Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Rethinking Working Class History: Bengal 1890-1940*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989).

84 Gyan Prakash, "Subaltern Studies as Postcolonial Criticism," *American Historical Review*, vol. 99 (5), (1994): 1489.

perspective and method through her analysis of *sati,* the custom of Hindu widows immolating themselves after the death of their husbands.[85] According to Spivak, archival documents on *sati* bear traces of colonial as well as indigenous, patriarchal discourses which debated the legitimacy of this custom in the 19th century, and the fact that widows lacked the ability and position to make their voices heard.[86] According to Spivak, the silence of subaltern women in documents shows the limit of what is knowable in history, since they are not alive. If subalternity, which is determined by the consciousness of the elite, also means not being able to speak, it is necessary to abandon the claim that the subaltern subject is autonomous.[87]

According to Chakrabarty, even if the modern and non-rational subject that dominates the discipline of history is recognized and documented, the subaltern cannot theoretically speak within these procedures. This subject, in the final analysis, has no choice but to be the subject for or about which the narrative of the transition from traditional to modern or capitalism, which glorifies the modern (i.e. Europe), speaks.[88] It can even characterize the state within narratives of citizenship and modernity that legitimize the state in line with the nation-state process.[89] Therefore, the discipline of history is not inclined to give legitimate space to subaltern voices that it does not consider rational and modern, and which are also beyond the narrative of the nation-state. However, Chakrabarty emphasizes that such an endeavor is not entirely pointless. For, focusing on subaltern pasts pushes the boundaries of the discipline of history, as it does not offer a rational narrative principle, and it raises awareness of the limited resource of modern-approach historical consciousness. It also makes us question the

85 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?", in *Marxism and Interpretation of Culture*, eds. Cary Nelson ve Lawrence Grossberg, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 271-313.

86 Ibid.

87 Ibid., 276.

88 Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Avrupa'yı Taşralaştırmak, Postkolonyal Düşünce ve Tarihsel Farklılık,* trans. İlker Cörüt, (Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınevi: 2012), 86.

89 Ibid., 87

modern and rational boundaries of the present and their historical meaning, by making us question whether voices that are deemed to be far from rational are in fact so.[90]

As a result, in addition to the approach represented by Spivak and, to some extent, Chakrabarty, theoretical and empirical historical studies have provided an important opening to the possibility of tracing the subaltern through multiple strategies by unmasking and archaeologizing the dominant historical knowledge produced in the relation between knowledge and power. According to the early researchers of the School of Subalternity, the subalterns and subalternity, a category dependent on the elite, are also manifested among the layers of the discourse of state actors, in their silences, blindness and ideologically determined pronunciations.[91] Therefore, one should insist on staying within the discipline and methods of history, digging deeper into the official archives, recognizing the contradictions, ambiguities and gaps in historical knowledge and national narratives, and working toward a rewriting of them.[92] At this point, the memory of the subalterns is considered as another important source for the displacement and rewriting of historical records in these ways.[93]

The ways in which state practices were experienced by social subjects in the early Republican years, especially in the Kurdish regions, across binaries in local and everyday contexts, has received limited historiographical attention. Due to this gap, this study, based on archival documents, problematizes the inclusion in history of the voices of not only the members of the People's Houses and other state officials in the East, but also the Kurdish ethnicity, Kurdish speakers, women and peasants, for example, within or outside of these groups, whom this institution was theoretically envisaged to subjectify, in terms of state formation. To the extent that this is a theoretical question about how the

90 Ibid., 174-176

91 Prakash, "Subaltern Studies as Postcolonial Criticism", 1482.

92 Ibid., 1489.

93 See Shadid Amin, *Events, Memory, Metaphor*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995).

subject is defined, it also demands methodological answers in terms of the ways and means by which it can be researched and analyzed. By keeping alive Spivak's and Chakrabarty's question of whether it would be a legitimate endeavor to seek the voices of the owners of these voices in the hegemony of the elite and the rational world, we will move beyond the question of whether these voices are authentic and real, and whether these individuals or groups are genuine subjects. For, as Subaltern Studies has argued in its later years, definitions of the static subaltern subject as essential and autonomous and in binary opposition to the state or elites are contested.[94] In this respect, it was aimed to pursue how these groups were represented by institutional actors and how they represented and translated themselves in the official archives and publications, which are the main written sources of the period, as well as in some memory sources.

Therefore, emphasis is not on what kinds of subjects they were, and what kinds of forms of subjectivity were produced, which also varied according to processes and contexts, and thus their interaction with the process of state formation, their meanings and consequences. In the context of our subject, it is not argued that groups such as state administrators and members of the People's House, civil servants or gentry, who were nationalist elites belonging to the middle and upper classes, were in an absolute duality with other social groups. If we refer to T. Mitchell, it is more meaningful to focus on how this duality cannot be possible as a given, but how it is created in social, cultural, and other spheres through the practices and effects of administrative power, and its changing boundaries and processes of experience. However, more relevant is the subalternization policy implemented by the state itself, on the basis of both physical and symbolic violence, domination, inequality,

94 According to H. Bhabba, who belongs to this school, instead of defining the subaltern in terms of forms of resistance with negative consciousness like Guha or in two extreme cases such as the impossibility of being a subject like Spivak, it is more appropriate to define the subaltern in terms of an 'in-betweenness' that imitates the language, culture, and thought patterns of the colonizer and sometimes shows this through forms of resistance such as humor. Homi Bhabba, *Location of Culture*, (Routledge, London, New York, 1994), 86.

and so the prevention of Kurdish voices from being heard in the public sphere, which is directly embodied in the language policy, and the processes of its evolution have been identified. Thus, in the case of the People's Houses, it has become important to evaluate the strategies of the state and the subalterns regarding the establishment and overcoming of subalternization within the relations of domination and power. Subalternity studies promises to provide theoretical and methodological suggestions that can be utilized and discussed in order to in Chakrabatry's words, "uncover and interpret the different voices of the subaltern from within rational and modern narratives". Moreover, it is also meaningful to question how the rational and modern character of these narratives is constructed and what they mean.

§ 1.3 Methodology and Sources

This interdisciplinary study, which establishes a dialogue with the social and human sciences, falls within the scope of political, cultural, social, and spatial history. It is also based on archival research, and adopts the method of historical ethnography. At the beginning of the study, it was determined that first-hand archival sources on the People's Houses were relatively rich, even though they were subjected to eradication and concealment. However, as mentioned above, the predominant methodology in archival studies has been the search for a methodology that would go beyond writing a history of the People's Houses and state formation centered on political and administrative elites and based on the thesis of an autonomous and strong state and a weak society. Therefore, in line with the conceptual and historiographical framework on which this thesis is based, the archive has been an important source of data in terms of centralized discourses, legal and institutional regulations, and practices in official publications, as well as local and everyday ones, contrasting and complex attitudes within the state, and different forms of interaction. In this respect, the methodological recommendations of the Subaltern School mentioned above were utilized. In addition to archival sources, memory sources such as

memoirs, biographies and oral history interviews were also included in the study to the greatest extent possible, especially, in order to understand how official discourses and practices were received and how they were affected.[95]

On a global scale, especially in postcolonial studies, the use of state archives as the main source of data to understand how social segments outside the ruling and upper classes perceive daily life practices in general and state practices in particular, has been observed in recent years.[96] According to them, the language in official documents is not only constructed in a static process of language consolidation, but can also reflect power struggles within the state, as well as different social voices. By adding publications, memoirs and memory sources to these sources, it is possible to access data on state-society relations and social life.[97] As mentioned in the literature review, according to a growing body of similar studies in Turkey, peasants, merchants, local politicians and other social actors also demonstrated their power, voice and overt or covert resistance within the limits of official means and opportunities during the single-party period.[98] In the context of the East and the Kurds, it is possible to use state archives to write a history that makes room for different forms of resistance and intervention in the social sphere.[99]

In this dissertation, in addition to the members of the People's Houses and state officials in the East, a methodological problematic is how all subjects who spoke other languages, especially Kurdish speakers, but also groups such as women and peasants, were positioned in terms of the encounter between the state, elites and society, and how their voices

95 Shadid Amin, *Events, Memory, Metaphor*.

96 For an example on this issue, see Avi Rubin. *Ottoman Nizamiye Courts, Law and Modernity*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

97 Ann Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense,* (Princeton&Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009).

98 Murat Metinsoy, *Everyday Politics of Ordinary People: Public Opinion, Dissent and Resistance in Early Rupublican Turkey;* Yiğit Akın, "Fazilet Değil Vazife İstiyoruz': Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Sosyal Tarihçiliğinde Dilekçeler".

99 Senem Aslan, "Everyday Forms of State Power and the Kurds in the Early Turkish Republic".

were included in history. Considering only one of the most basic forms of expression, spoken language, more than half of the region was banned from expressing themselves and publishing in their mother tongue, Kurdish, followed by Arabic and other languages. It is also observed that the rate of literacy in Turkish, the official language, and the rate of expressing oneself in writing was lower, especially among women. Accessing the voices of these people through the oral history method is difficult, due to the fact that the vast majority of those who lived through the period are no longer alive. Considering that written sources were organized under the supervision of state administrators, and that a significant portion of memoirs and biographies were prepared by middle- and upper-class people and administrators, the methodological suggestions mentioned above have gained importance to interpret the voices of others. It was therefore inevitable to archaeologize all these documents, and to study them in a comparative way.

At this point, the method of analyzing historical texts with a "dialogical" approach, which has begun to gain ground in historiography and the social sciences, and is more clearly seen in Mikhail Bakhtin's formulation, has been found meaningful. Criticizing structuralism, and proposing a new linguistics and discourse analysis, Bakhtin argues that there is a network of references and relations between all source texts and that they should be understood in the context of the political, social and ultimately historical relations in which they were produced.[100] Bakhtin also stresses multivocality of the words and discourses that are open to several meanings and interpretations, according to the different contexts and intentions of their appropriators.[101] In this study, it is envisaged that the conclusions on the People's Houses in the East will be reached and analyzed through a cross-cutting and comparative method, that establishes a dialogue between the documents being multivocal in the archive and those in other sources. This approach, in a non-

100 Mikhail Bakhtin, *Karnavaldan Romana: Edebiyat Teorisinden Dil Felsefesine Seçme Yazılar*, trans. Cem Soydemir, (İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, 2001).

101 M. Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 401.

essentialist manner, allows for the tracing of the perceptions and actions of groups other than state administrators and elites, including their "silences and unspoken or contradictory words". Therefore, it has an interface with Subaltern Studies to a considerable extent. Hence, the post-structuralist approaches of linguistic studies and cultural studies shed light on the analysis of discourses. On the other hand, in addition to the power of writing and the spoken word, images, representations and forms of expression in creative products are also included in the study as sources and forms of analysis. At this point, along with the aforementioned methods, post-structuralist approaches such as semiotics are particularly relevant in analyzing the available source photographs and other visual materials.

In order to examine the primary sources on which this thesis is based, I conducted an extensive study of the People's Houses in twelve Kurdish provinces in archives and libraries in Ankara and Istanbul. In order to make a comparison with the twelve provinces, I also examined a considerable number of documents related to the People's Houses in the five provinces with RPP organizations, namely Erzurum, Kars, Malatya, Erzincan, Gaziantep, which were administered by the General Inspectorates, except Malatya and Gaziantep. I also found a lot of data on other provinces, a significant part of which is used in the thesis. The primary sources I examined as a result of the research are roughly as follows: i) Archival documents in the *Cumhurbaşkanlığı Cumhuriyet Arşivi* (Presidential Republican Archive), specifically related to the People's Houses in the Eastern provinces, the RPP and the General Inspectorate organizations to which they were affiliated, ii) *Şark/Kürt raporları* (Eastern/Kurdish reports) of state administrators, iii) RPP's regulations, annual reports, guidebooks and brochures on People's Houses, iv) Publications of the People's Houses and the General Inspectorates in the Eastern provinces on the People's Houses and the Eastern provinces, v) In terms of periodicals, the People's House magazines published in these provinces; all issues of *Ülkü* magazine, the central publication organ of the People's Houses; some issues of local/national newspapers and magazines, vi) Statistics on People's Houses and education, vii) Articles

and books by bureaucrats and intellectuals of the period, viii) Memoirs and biographies on the subject and the period, and vii) Oral history interviews. More detailed information about these sources can be found below:

i) One of the main sources are the *Halkevleri faaliyet ve çalışma raporları* (People's Houses' activity and work reports) sent to the RPP General Secretariat by the administrators of the People's Houses in the twelve provinces of Diyarbakır, Van, Mardin, Elazığ, Urfa, Siirt, Ağrı, Muş, Bitlis, Bingöl, Hakkari and Tunceli, which are included in the *RPP Catalog* of the Presidential Republican Archives (CCA).

These reports reflect the activities carried out by the nine branches of the People's Houses and where, the profiles of the administrators and members, statistical data on the number, occupation and gender of the participants, the administrative and financial structure and status, and the process of functioning. Other important sources are the extensive *correspondences* of the General Inspectorates, the local administrators of these People's Houses, as well as the correspondence of the People's Houses and state administrators with the RPP General Secretariat, as well as the Secretariat's extensive correspondence with central and local state institutions on administration and functioning. Therefore, after this date I also scanned the documents of the RPP organizations in these provinces related to the People's Houses. The correspondences of the People's Houses with the RPP headquarters is about the routine administrative functioning of the People's Houses. This routine administrative mechanism allows us to comment on the routine state formation process. It is not, of course, quantitative data that is meaningless, but the perspectives, observations, comments, or denunciations of the authors about the locality, and their complicated relations with other state institutions. The attitude of the center is another aspect of this process in need of analysis. How it directed this traffic and how it established control involves processes of struggle and negotiation. In this context, for example, even brief correspondence, such as the repeated requests for in-kind and cash aid by a large number of People's Houses, and the rhetoric and language they used in this process

provided important data. As the People's Houses were a party-state institution, the correspondence between the General Secretariat of the RPP and central and local state administrators regarding routine operations and conflict resolution are also useful sources.

ii) Inspection reports are among the archival documents that contain the most data. I analyzed the *İntihap Dairesi Raporları* (Election Office Reports) of RPP deputies in the RPP Documents and the *Parti İnspekteri* (Party Inspector), *Parti Müfettişi* (Party Inspector) or *Parti Denetçisi Raporları* (Party Auditor Reports) based on the inspections of RPP deputies outside their electoral districts, which increased from 1940 and which I made the most use of in this thesis. Another important source is the multi-province inspection trips of high-level state administrators and the *Şark/Kürt (*Orient/Kurd) reports. Among these reports, the Election Department Reports and the Party Inspectorate Reports aimed at establishing a central control mechanism over RPP provincial organizations and state institutions, as well as to measure public perceptions and develop state and party policies accordingly.[102] In these reports, which were to be submitted to the RPP General Secretariat every six months, MPs and inspectors were asked to report on the work of the party, Halkevleri and state institutions at the local level in the inspection areas, whether their functioning was in accordance with the norm, their relations with each other, and the profiles of the administrators and their appropriate/inappropriate actions. It aimed to provide impartial and objective information on the complaints, wishes and needs of the State and People's Houses, their relations with society, and how these institutions were perceived by society. In these reports, Party inspectors and deputies reflected their observations, feelings and intelligence about the social, political, economic, cultural and administrative situation of the inspection sites, adding their own interpretations.

Another source is the semi-annual *çalışma raporları (*work reports) of RPP party organizations, which also include the activities of the People's Houses. However, since there was no RPP organization in the

102 Murat Metinsoy, "Erken Cumhuriyet Döneminde Mebusların 'İntihap Bölgesi' ve 'Teftiş Bölgesi' Raporları", *Tarih ve Toplum*, no. 3, (Spring 2006), 122.

twelve Kurdish-populated provinces until 1944, the main sources are the reports of the General Inspectorate, the reports of the RPP MPs, and the reports of party inspectors, which are considered to be more objective. All these reports, aimed at monitoring the effectiveness and control of state institutions and practices, as well as the extent of citizen consent and participation in the authoritarian regime, with the aim of monitoring society, sought to record and report the actions of different political, cultural, and social groups, to make them more readable. The main sources are the Orient/Kurdish reports and *teftiş seyahati raporları* (inspection trip reports) of high-level state and party executives such as the prime minister, ministers, the chief of general staff, the gendarmerie general command, the president of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT henceforth) and RPP general secretaries to multiple provinces, which also constitute an overview of all inspections that have been systematically produced since the 1920s, with a focus on the Orient/Kurdish region. These reports, which remained "secret" for a long time, were extremely important in terms of reflecting the "in-state" discourse on Kurdish and Eastern policy. Another group of primary sources analyzed are the reports, correspondence, and meeting minutes of the three General Inspectorates, which were authorized to establish and supervise the People's Houses, with the mission of representing the state and the RPP, the administrative regime of the Eastern provinces, in the *Başbakanlık Muamelat Genel Müdürlüğü Arşivi* (Archive of the Prime Ministry General Directorate of Public Relations).

iii) In terms of how the local administrators of the People's Houses and local recipients perceived and interpreted the functioning and activities of the People's Houses and the responses they gave, these documents, as well as the correspondence they sent to central and local institutions regarding their *dilek ve şikayetler* (petitions and complaints), were meaningful sources of data.[103] The majority of the petitions were

103 For this issue see Alexandros Lamprou, "CHP Genel Sekreterliği Yüksek Makamına": 30'lu ve 40'lı Yıllarda Halkevleri'yle İlgili CHP'ye Gönderilen Şikayet ve Dilek Mektupları Üzerine Kısa Bir Söz", *Kebikeç* 23, (2007) 381-392 and "Political Petitioning,

related to administrative and financial matters, such as permission to establish a People's House or People's Room; financial aid for the construction of buildings and fixtures; payment of the rent of the buildings and salaries of the staff; and the sending of materials for sports, theater, cinema, library, and other activities. Complaints, on the other hand, were generally based on allegations of irregular behavior and "inappropriate" profiles of the administrators, misuse of People's House premises, corruption, and other violations of the norms of the People's House and the state. In addition, there are frequent complaints of political, social and cultural conflicts and compromises, such as conflicts between People's House and RPP administrators and members, conflicts between families, and fights at People's House meetings. Hence the Republican Archives are full of such documents, which provide a great deal of information about state formation and society, space, culture and their relations with the state in the Eastern/Kurdish localities in the case of the People's Houses. These documents will be analyzed in the "against the grain" reading style outlined in the methodology, with careful reading between the lines and cross-reading from as many different sources as possible. Moreover, in these readings, attention will be paid to what, whom, when and how these official documents, produced and made available within a certain discourse, represent, rather than claiming that they directly reflect historical truths. It should also be noted that as much as possible, comparative interpretations will be made in relation to historical contexts and locations.

It should be noted that, as many researchers have pointed out, due to the intervention of political powers in the archives in general, the archives of important state institutions, which are the focus of our subject, are either closed or almost closed, due to the obstacles imposed on their access, which is a very important factor limiting research. This is because the use of the archives of institutions such as the General Staff or the Ministry of Interior, the General Directorate of Security Archive, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is discouraged for researchers through the

Denunciation, and State–Society Relations During the Single-party Period in Turkey", *Turkish Studies* 8, no. 3, (2017): 514-541.

imposition of heavy procedures, and there is no easily accessible classification of the documents. Therefore, the condition of the archives, which a few researchers have partially accessed through personal relationships, prevents a holistic evaluation of the People's Houses and Eastern/Kurdish policy in particular, the daily practices of state formation, and their local reflections and effects.[104] It is common for the archives to be destroyed if they are not well kept, and especially in extraordinary circumstances such as periods of military coups. For example, we were informed by those working in the RPP Library that the RPP Archive was largely destroyed during the 1980 military coup. Another issue is the sorting out of documents that contain contradictory and dissenting opinions and are "objectionable" in terms of national security, which is an obstacle to the adequate utilization of the official archives in general. Although the Republican Archive is more easily accessible and contains a large number of documents, not all documents are archived or made available for use here for the reasons mentioned above.

In fact, during my research, I found that some important documents related to the People's Houses and the East, which had been used in previous studies, were not accessible during my research. According to the information I have obtained, these documents have either been removed from the archive with the stamp "confidential" or they are periodically or permanently inaccessible because they are said to be undergoing technical work. It is noteworthy that among the documents that were used in some previous studies but were removed from the archive after a while, there are documents that reflect the state-society relationship in the Kurdish region and the reflexes of the social sphere, especially those that reflect "requests and complaints".[105] Archival

104 For information on interventions in the state archives in Turkey, information on different institutional archives, and a source on the relationship between archives, politics and historiography, see Oktay Özel, "Arşivler Meselemiz: Siyaset Kurumunun Arşivlerle Tehlikeli Dansı ve Meşruiyet Kaybı", *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 217, (2010): 24-33.

105 For example: "Muş Halkevi'nin Faaliyetlerine Dair İstek ve Şikayetler", CCA.490.01/841.326.2; "CHP Genel Sekreterliği'ne Gelen İstek ve Şikayet Mektupları, CCA. 490.01/540.2160. 2, (17.06.1938); "Diyarbakır Karaköprü Mevkiinde Soygun ve

officials have offered the rationale that the explicit mention of personal names in these documents may have been removed because it violates personal rights. A few of these were obtained from researchers who had access to these documents before they were made "secret".

iv) During the research, the RPP's *regulations*, *guidelines* and *manuals* on People's Houses published by the RPP in different years were also analyzed. Through these, the criteria according to which People's Houses are to be opened, their political, administrative, financial structure and functioning, and their activities are subject to order and control. The annual activity reports of the People's Houses, published by the RPP every year, contain summarized quantitative and qualitative information on what kinds of activities took place in which provinces across the country and the local responses, as well as the evaluations of the "center". In addition, the *CHP Genel Sekreterliği Parti Teşkilatlarına Umumi Tebligatları* (the General Secretariat of the RPP's General Notifications to Party Organizations) regarding the People's Houses, RPP programs and regulations, congress minutes and petitions were examined.

v) Official publications on the Eastern provinces, including the activities of the People's Houses, were also analyzed. Publications from the First General Inspectorate and the Third General Inspectorate, such as "Southeast First General Inspectorate Region", "East in the 15th Year of the Republic", and "Eastern Anatolia Geography, Natural, Agricultural, Humanitarian, Veterinary" are among them. They describe how the party-state rulers initiated a process of nationalization, “civilization” and development in the Eastern provinces through health, public works, transportation, education, geography, and cultural activities. In these publications, it is observed how a spatial and temporal legibility, visibility and control of the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolian region, which was named Kurdistan, Vilayat-ı Şarkiyye, Şark, Şark-i Anadolu, Kurdish provinces, and from the 1930s onwards more often referred to as the East and sometimes the Southeast, was envisioned and practiced at the local level. In these publications, which are observed not to have

Umumi Müfettişlik Bölgesinde Alınması Gereken Tedbirler.” CCA MGMK 30.01 /128.923.19.

been published after 1940, the main role of the People's Houses in this process is presented with a large amount of data. The brochures of the People's Houses in the East, such as "Mardin Halkevi Broşürü-1935 ve 1938" (Mardin People's House Brochure, 1935 and 1938), "Urfa Halkevi'nin Bir Yıllık İş Sayımı-1935-1936" (Urfa People's House's One Year Work Count -1935-1936), "Cumhuriyet'in 15. Yılında Diyarbakır -1938" (Diyarbakır in the 15th Year of the Republic -1938), Elaziz Halkevi -1935 (Elazığ People's House -1935) as well as the books published by the People's Houses are other important sources.

vi) In terms of periodicals, I examined all issues of the *Ülkü* magazine published by the Ankara People's House, which was published in three series between 1933 and 1950 and is considered the central publication organ of the People's Houses and examined the articles on the subject. Also examined were all the issues of the Diyarbakır and Elazığ People's House magazines published in the Eastern provinces, some of which were published intermittently, and most other magazines.[106] I have also made use of national magazines on the subject.[107] I would also like to point out that the presentation of the photos in the dissertation I scanned

106 These are as follows: *Karacadağ* (Diyarbakır), 134 issues, between 1938-1950; *Altan* (Elazığ): 47 issues, 1935-1939; *Doğuş* (Kars): 54 issues, 1933-1941; *Derme* (Malatya): 20 issues, 1937-1947; *Başpınar* (Gaziantep): 104 issues 1939-1948; *Atayolu* (Erzurum): 2 issues, 1939; *Yayla* (Erzurum): 11 issues, 1944,. The names and years of the local newspapers analyzed are as follows: *Yeni Yurd* (Van),1938; *Van*, 1939; *Kars*,1939; *Erzurum*, 1943; *Tunceli Postası*, 1947; *Turan* (Elazığ), 1944. Since there were few periodicals in these provinces, especially until the multi-party period, I scanned *Işık* magazine in Mardin, 1947; Diyarbakır High School's magazine *Dicle Kaynağı* between 1934-1935 and *Gaziantep Lisesi Mecmuası*, between 1933-1934.

107 I used some issues of *Yurt*, a newspaper published every 15 days by the RPP for villagers, and some issues of *Mimar* and its inheritor *Arkitekt*, Turkey's first architectural magazine, which was published from 1931 to 1981, specifically those from 1932 to 1951. I examined some articles such as the article by Abidin Özmen, who served as General Inspector, in *İdare Dergisi* (the Journal of Administration), which was published in 1928 and continues to be published today as *Türk İdare Dergisi* (the Turkish Journal of Administration). I researched some of the 124 issues of *Halk Bilgisi Haberleri* (the Public Knowledge News) published by the Eminönü People's House in Istanbul between 1929 and 1942, and some magazines on villages and villagers.

from many different sources varied. The appendices to this thesis provide a small sample of thousands of first-hand archival written and visual documents.

vii) The increasing number of memoirs by state administrators, the local bureaucracy, especially teachers, and politicians, journalists, writers, and lawyers who were involved with the People's Houses in the Eastern provinces, or who witnessed the period, and the books in which these memoirs are included, contain data on local perceptions. The memoirs and testimonies of people such as Şevket Beysanoğlu, who took part in the activities of the People's Houses, and wrote for the People's House magazines, and Tarık Ziya Ekinci, Musa Anter and Canip Yıldırım, who later became involved in the Kurdish national movement and the socialist movement, were analyzed. The memoirs of civil servants, bureaucrats, and intellectuals of the period, which focus on the relationship between the People's Houses and society in the East, and state institutions and the People's Houses, were also consulted.

I planned to conduct field research centered in Diyarbakır, Mardin and Elazığ, to access the resources in the libraries in these regions, in order to obtain written and visual data from local researchers and sources, to conduct oral history interviews and to conduct spatial investigations in the remaining People's House buildings. However, due to the security problems in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia, the field research with academic funding had to be canceled. For this reason, some of the written documents expected to be obtained from local people were obtained during field research in Istanbul and Ankara. Oral history interviews and interviews with local historians were limited due to the above-mentioned reasons, and the limitations of possibilities in the following period; limited research was conducted only in Kars, and researchers were consulted about the sources of memory and local history in provinces such as Diyarbakır, Muş, Tunceli, Urfa and Mardin. On the other hand, another limitation was the minimal number of survivors who lived through the period. However, a prominent political figure, my mother Belqîza Ayman, contributed to the study by continuously sharing her testimonies of the 1950s in the predominantly

Kurdish village of Mevrek in the Digor district of Kars, and I made use of my deceased father-in-law Abdul Galip Güz's testimonies of the 1940s in the Çermik district of Diyarbakır, as well as the memory of previous generations. Kurdish linguist Zana Farqînî and Kurdish musician Celal Ekin shared their past memories and testimonies of the assimilation policies against the Kurdish population in and around Diyarbakır during the period covered by this thesis. I conducted telephone and e-mail interviews with academic and local researcher Bilal Altan about the Cizre People's House, and with researcher Mesut Özcan about the Tunceli People's House and its effects and the processes of forced assimilation. In addition, I conducted short interviews with many people involved in this issue, in which they reflected on the memory of previous generations and their own experiences.

One of the main personal sources in this thesis has been my own memory and experiences. As a person who personally experienced the practices of forced assimilation and "civilization" into Turkishness in the predominantly Kurdish district of Digor in Kars, where I spent my childhood and adolescence, my own memory and testimonies shed light on the experiences of myself, my family and my environment. My parents' tendency to speak Turkish with their children to help them adapt during and after the education process, and to create different capitals for assimilation, which they later questioned and criticized, was stronger for a while, especially under the influence of the violent environment of the 1980 military coup. In a small town where the dominant languages were Turkish and Kurdish, and the dominant ethnicity was Turkishness, the relationship with the state and officials was in all respects an extremely vital area of capital and power acquisition for my parents, who were both professionals and political figures, for themselves and for their relatives. For me, the different linguistic and ethnic universe in the villages and among our relatives, which was more Kurdish-identified, created confusion, alienation, questioning, contestation, adaptation and in-betweenness. Even though I grew up in this political, social and cultural process, in which participation, integration and assimilation were considered more beneficial in all areas, the tensions of political and

cultural articulation, physical, symbolic and cultural violence, and patterns of relationship with the state, centered around the People's Houses 40-50 years before this period, presented patterns that were very familiar, and in which I grew up.

These memories and experiences are vividly reproduced through my close connection to the region and my experience of different layers of modernization in Ankara and Istanbul. In this sense, my political and cultural subjectivity can also be considered one of the agents of this thesis. In this context, I think that I have approached the subject with the method of "critical intimacy" mentioned by Abbas, which is a similar position to that of my MA thesis.[108] This is a critical and dynamic position in which I move away as I approach the data, themes and cases, and when I feel that I have moved away, I feel the need to approach them again. For me, *critical intimacy* has been a more descriptive method than *critical distance* in this study, which involves emotional dimensions as well as intellectual ones, in which I am outside of it more than I can be in it, and yet inside it more than I can be outside of it.

§ 1.4 The Organization of the Study and Main Arguments

This dissertation consists of four chapters arising from the trajectories of historiographical, empirical and theoretical gaps in the concerning literature. In the second chapter of the dissertation, I examine firstly the ideological and institutional genealogy of the People's House from Ottoman to Republican period as an institutionalization that blended nationalism, populism and other Kemalist principles. Also, I re-historicise the implementation processes of Eastern/Kurdish policies and why and how the People's Houses were appointed as an executive institution in this process. At this point, I show how *temsil* (assimilation) *temdin* (civilization) have become an important prescription for the early republican rulers' security policies in the Orient/East ruled by an exceptional state regime, which interacted with nationalist populism,

108 Asuman Suner and Halil Nalçaoğlu, "Yamuk Mekânları Okuma Stratejileri Üzerine Ackbar Abbas ile Söyleşi", *Defter*, no. 38, (Winter 2000): 85.

becoming the main mission of People's Houses. Here, I claim that the People's Houses existed and were shaped primarily as sites of regime propaganda and *halk terbiyesi* (public education), secondarily as sites of state visibility, control, discipline and making the population and space decipherable, and thirdly as sites of political and administrative participation. This process was intertwined with security-oriented policies of *temdin*, *tedip* (edification) and *tenkil* (banishment) against the Kurdish ethnicity. However, I argue that this policy also oscillated between the inclusion and exclusion of Kurds, which was evident in the legal structure and intra-state disagreements, and that it not only affected the social legitimacy, power and capacity of the People's Houses and the state, but also functioned as a context for a striving for control that was the scene of struggles.

At this point, I analyze the specific political, administrative and controlling mechanisms of the Houses and their close and problematic relationship with political and administrative participation, and representation in People's Houses in these provinces comparing them with other localities in the country. I suggest that there were everyday tussles and negotiations over administrative and political participation and representation along local and central lines in the framework of the structural premises which interacted with other historical dynamics in the era. In the Second World War, the multi-party regime and noteworthy part of the Kurdish population's non-consent, the indecisive or compromising attitude toward the state's and People's Houses' practices may be determined as the main dynamics of this process. Non-homogenous intra-state performances, both on the political and administrative level, is another substantial dynamic.

In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, I scrutinize the architectural and physical space, and public and socializing space of the People's Houses, focusing on the twelve provinces inhabited by Kurds. How these forms of spatiality were embodied and experienced not only discursively and representationally, but also through actual practices on the local and everyday axis will be analyzed by considering the relationality of state institutions to space, society and culture. In Chapter three the focus will

first be on how the People's House buildings in the Eastern provinces were designed in parallel with the discourses, practices and processes regarding space and architecture in this period, and how they created a space within the architectural and construction processes in the spatial planning of the state. In this scope, the political, social, cultural and spatial contexts of the process of projecting, constructing and acquiring the People's House space, the daily and local reactions, perceptions and responses, forms of conflict, reconciliation and negotiation over People's Houses' physical space that emerged on the central-local line will be analyzed. Therefore, through the People's House buildings, which should be considered as one of the surfaces of the settlement, visibility and establishment of the state in the East, I will analyze how the twelve provinces responded to this process.

Then, on the same theme, in Chapter 4 the processes of public use of the People's House space in the East will be analyzed. Within the framework of discipline and control over the use of People's Houses, an attempt will be made to reveal how they were perceived and used in daily public life in different localities, and how they were a space for gathering, coming together and socializing. In this scope, it will be examined with the causal contexts in which practitioners and receivers in different socio-cultural and political positions struggle and negotiate with whatever kind of appropriation and reproduction through the practices included and excluded by the spatial rules and regulations of the People's Houses. In this context, the forms of compromise, conflict and negotiation between central and local state actors and between them and other groups will be made visible. Within these two main themes, I will comment on the intricate correspondences of groups with variables such as ethnicity, identity, gender, religion and class, such as "adaptation, resistance, indifference, cynicism, appropriation, negotiation, and struggle". Thus, I argue that the process of the spatial formation of the state and the process of the spatial productions of the *East* in the case of the People's House goes beyond dichotomies such as strength/weakness, success/failure, or obedience/resistance of social subjects. As a conclusion, I also argue that a complex and reflexive People's House

spatiality was produced at the intersection of colonial practices that exclude differences for security purposes, power interventions in the pendulum of inclusive "civilization" and assimilation, everyday life and local responses. This process has become an important component of the production of the state and the East, in which representatives of the state could play a role, in ways that were not in line with the normative framework of the state and the People's House, in ways that undermined the state's power of control and produced it asymmetrically.

As a result, the spatiality of the People's Houses in the Kurdish provinces revealed to a certain extent that space, like the state, as well as society and culture, was not an ideal and autonomous structure. The state and its institutions were constantly being formed and constructed through interactions within power and power relations, with successes and failures, contradictions and ambiguities that both corresponded to and did not correspond to what was intended.

In Chapter 5, I scrutinize the nationalist/populist duality, in a sense assimilationist and "civilising" the cultural/linguistic activities and practices of People's Houses in the securitized Kurdish populated provinces. This section focuses on the discourses and practices of the People's Houses, the main missionary institution for ending the hegemony of the Kurdish language as a security problem in every field, and making Turkish dominant, which also entered the People's Houses and state institutions in order to take the Kurdish language out of the clutches of the settled Turks in the East, where the state tested its successes the most rigorously. Here, it is seen that the debates and discourses on making *temsil* effective as a security practice in the 1930s, in relation to the process of establishing security/public order, materialized in the field in different ways, depending on the city, village, ethnic and class units. At this point, sophisticated practices of the power techniques of the modern state at the local level have been identified and discussed. I argue that the success or failure of the state during this encounter should be seen in terms of its ever-productive and intricate micro and macro political, social and cultural effects. Even though the state seems to have failed because the target language was not spoken,

the fact that it has not focused on this in a fully determined manner weakens the argument that it has failed. Instead, with all its discourses and practices, strategies and technical productions, it created effects through this with all its discourses and practices, strategies and technical productions regarding the prohibition, punishment, denial and eventual annihilation of other languages with a social Darwinist attitude, and it was in these processes and in this way that it was trying to create its own East, in a way that encompassed different tendencies within it. At the point where it seemed to be failing, it also managed to give itself the appearance of autonomy through state influences such as identification and assimilation based on the state language. Whether the issue of success is an issue that contains asymmetrical elements that do not need to proceed along certain lines for the receivers, and what can happen beyond binary oppositions, were the specific problematics of this section.

As a general argument of this study, I can argue that this indecisive and hesitant process is not accidental, but precisely the dynamics of state formation, and that the desire for assimilation, which is most prominently seen in the People's Houses, is norm-establishing in some localities and merges with areas of social power. I claim also that while the official reports, discourses and modern techniques of power contain complicated, non-linear and non-homogenous trajectories aimed at constructing a modern state in the East, in the case of the People's Houses they also served to produce a republican East. At the same time, this process implies complex coping strategies, so as not to become subaltern subjects, and struggles and negotiations about political/administrative, spatial and forced assimilation and "civilising" practices pioneered by the People's Houses. And within certain constraints, power baggage, and capitals, this phenomenon emerged through responses like approbation, indifference, silence, involvement, self-optimization, and implicit rejection, which varied depending on class and gender disparities.

2

The People's Houses and the *East*: Political and Administrative Formations and Contexts

"The state's policies regarding the Kurds were shaped by Fevzi Çakmak's harsh approach and Interior Minister Avni Doğan's statement, 'They should be melted and fused within us. We must do this. We can't get results with harshness'...On the other hand, when I was working in the police force in the Southeast, I noticed this. The residents would not walk on the asphalt road. They would walk on the dirt road next to it. One day I asked them "why?" They said, "That's a state road, we walk on our own road. They always saw themselves different from us."[1]

– İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, *Chief of police, Governor and Minister*

"In an age of Western-dominated modernity, every nation creates its own Orient"

– Ussama Makdisi, *Ottoman Orientalism, 768*

The main problematics of this chapter is first what kind of discursive and bureaucratic/administrative institutionalization baggage the People's Houses, as one of the sites and mediators of the process of the establishment of the East, inherited. Second, how this baggage was produced within the historical context, and the interactions within the dynamics of central/local interventions in the political, social, cultural sphere, power and power relations and everyday life, in the specific case of the Kurds.

In order to find an answer to this problematic, firstly, the ideological and institutional genealogy of the Peoples' Houses, an institution of the early Republican one-party state, dating back to the late Ottoman period, with aspects such as populism, nationalism, solidarism and statism, is mapped in terms of its parallels with the Peoples' Houses themselves. This legacy of the People's Houses, which merges with the antecedents of the new regime, is examined in terms of its continuities and ruptures in relation to the political, cultural and social domestic and international events and phenomena, shaped by power dynamics and interventions, in the history of Ottoman Turkey, and in particular the relationship between the state and the Kurds.

Secondly, a framework of historical analysis is presented on the process of state production in a discursive, legal, institutional, demographic, social and cultural sphere, in the twelve provinces in the East. These provinces, RPP' organizations were abolished after the Sheikh Said Rebellion (1925) and the state of emergency was established in the Kurdish-dominated provinces, with the People's Houses institutionalization part of this process. Thirdly, the basic discursive field of the People's Houses at the macro level, and specifically in the Eastern provinces, is examined, in terms of its political, administrative, financial, institutional and supervisory structure, the way it functioned, the central and local power interventions, and everyday dynamics. In order to make sense of the functioning, practices and processes of the People's Houses,

1 Mehmet Ali Birand, *Apo ve PKK*, 12th ed., (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları: 1993), 55-56.

the limits of inclusion and exclusion of political and administrative representation and participation are looked at. They are analyzed in the context of central and local power interventions, struggles, negotiations, and everyday dynamics. In this context, the findings on the selection and appointment of People's House administrators in the East, the moments of change in the Kurdish and Eastern policies of the party-state, and the role and place of the People's Houses in these processes, in interaction with local dynamics, are analyzed. Finally, the findings on the macro- and micro-scale ruptures that occurred with the end of World War II, and the transition to the multi-party era, the changes in the state's Kurdish and Eastern policy, and how the People's Houses were transformed into a different actor, plus the lines of struggle and negotiation during this phase are interpreted.

In these contexts, within the framework of the general argument of the thesis, this chapter also envisages not getting stuck on the evaluation of the People's Houses as a field of state control, according to the criteria of power and success. Rather, by focusing on the daily and local materialization processes within the institutional/administrative private security regime of the single party institutionalized People's Houses, in relation to the Kurdish issue, I argue that this is determined by the processes of producing the boundaries of exclusion and inclusion, in interaction with the discourses. I also claim that the colonialist politics of separation and exclusion on the one hand, and the politics of selective inclusion and exclusion on the other, or of being "left on the threshold and unable to make decisions" toward the Kurds, have transformed into strategies of governance and power determined by local and central struggles. In addition, in relation to this phenomenon, I attempted to confirm that phenomena such as the People's Houses and the "unsuccessful" and meritless attitudes of state actors, conflicts and struggles, which are seen in the literature as "deviations" from autonomous and ideal state formation, are in fact integral parts that

characterize the production of the state with the aforementioned qualities, and its process in the East.[2]

Such an analytical and argumentative historicization promises not only to analyze the ideological and institutional roots of the People's Houses, and how they materialized in the East, from a new perspective, but also to contribute to the apparent gap in the literature on the production of the East and the Kurdish issue. In this respect, it aims to make visible unique and common patterns. Further, it is anticipated that these forms of historicization will facilitate the fulfillment of the promise of facilitating an understanding of the discourse, representation, and practices of the People's Houses in the spatial, corporeal, linguistic, and artistic spheres, and the ways in which they were responded to, received, and interpreted within central and local administrative and political creations.

§ 2.1 From Empire to Republic: Ideological and Institutional Genealogy of the People's Houses

People (halk) is a word that came into Turkish from Arabic, and etymologically means "creation, to be created, people, a company of people". It is also a political discourse at a global level, created and filled out in different ways by political/intellectual currents/movements and social segments, thus oscillating "between metaphor and reality".[3] As seen in the Ottoman-Turkish context, the 'people', which by being modernized would be articulated with the concepts of nation and citizen and by the tensions and possibilities opened up by its evocative content

2 For an approach seeing "deviations" and "failures" as integral parts of state formation, see Stein Sundtøl Eriksen, "State Failure', in *Theory and Practice: The Idea of the State and the Contradictions of State Formation*, 229-247.

3 For the dictionary meaning of *Halk*, see Ferit Devellioğlu, *Osmanlıca-Türkçe Ansiklopedik Lugat*, 29th ed. (Ankara: Aydın Kitabevi, 2009), 318. "People" in English or the masculine "le peuple" in French comes from the Latin "populus", which, like its Arabic meaning, came to mean "a crowd of people", but later came to mean "nation" and "ethnicity". This shows first-hand the influence of nation and nationalism in the evolution of the word.

and meaning, has been the source of many political projects and practices. The discourse of the *people* is one of the key concepts in understanding the political ideology in which populism is one of the main patterns in the People's Houses, designed as "the people's house" and their appearances in the East, as well as the state formation shaped by the state-society, state-culture and state-space relations that are articulated along with it. Simply put, who was and who is now the "people" who were invited to Halkevleri, the cultural, social/public space/area deemed acceptable by the state, the "new home" of the nation and the state? By whom and for what reasons and historical circumstances were they invited? What is the discursive and institutional background of the set of discourses, official and intellectual, that correspond to them?

In this background, which fundamentally dates back to the Second Constitutional Period (*II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi*), and to the ruling years of the Committee of Union and Progress (1913-1918) which was the RPP's antecedent, what kind of decisive moments, different periods and transformations took place in both discursive and practical processes? In what ways might these have been transferred to the new Republic? In the case of the eastern provinces, what were the answers to all these questions, their reflections, meanings? I will try to provide answers to these questions under this heading.

2.1.1 *People and Populism in the Second Constitutional Period*

In the history of Ottoman-Turkey, the discourse of the people with modern contents began to emerge in the mid-19th century, with the Tanzimat (Reforms), also under the influence of internal and external pressures-, when the foundations of modern Ottoman citizenship were laid, within the framework of political populism. According to Toprak, this period constituted "an intermediate stage on the bumpy road from servant to citizen".[4]

4 Zafer Toprak, "Halk Fırkası'nın Kuruluş Evresi: Halkçılık Programı ve 1923 Nizamnamesi", *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 213, (September 2011), 22.

Cultural/linguistic populism, on the other hand, emerged more prominently on the political and cultural scene in the second half of the 19th century, when Turkish was included in the constitution as the official language, under the leadership of the Neo-Ottomans (*Yeni Osmanlılar*), who advocated the simplification of Turkish, and its approximation to the vernacular. It became more visible and influential thanks to the magazine Young Pens (*Genç Kalemler*) (1910-1912), published in Thessaloniki by Unionist intellectuals such as Ziya Gökalp, Ömer Seyfettin and Ali Canip, who were united in the New Language (*Yeni Lisan*) movement.[5] More assertively, this movement emphasized the disconnect between the Ottoman rulers and the people, arguing that this disconnect could not be bridged by the Constitution or parliamentary representation alone, and they defended the predominance of the Turkish language being used by the people instead of Ottoman Turkish, as essential for "real" communication, both culturally and politically. In the state sphere of early Republican Turkey, and in the People's Houses, the disconnect of the "palace language" Ottoman Turkish, a hybrid language, from the language of the Turkish ethnicity was constantly emphasized. The production of New Turkish takes place in interaction with the dual character of Turkish nationalism and modernization, on the localist/essentialist axis of westernization. The People's Houses, too, collected words in Turkish-speaking localities to be submitted to the Turkish Language Association (*Türk Dil Kurumu* – TLA henceforth), which they considered to be authentic Turkish, and believed this necessary for the construction of Turkish literature and folklore, and thus, took cultural populism in a similar vein as a premise.[6] Newly produced by the TLA and derived from compilations that were considered authentic Turkish, but which were not common, and words borrowed from Western languages, would lead to the contention that "the public is experiencing a new linguistic alienation" (Ch 5).

5 François Georgeon, *Osmanlı Türk Modernleşmesi* (1900-1930), 3rd ed., (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2013), 34.

6 İlhan Tekeli and Gencay Şaylan, "Türkiye'de Halkçılık İdeolojisinin Evrimi", *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 6-7, (Summer-Autumn, 1978): 59.

The source of the Second Constitutional populism was the *Narodnik*, literally "populist" movement that emerged in the 19th century Russia as a reaction to the dissolution of the peasantry caused by the spread of capitalism based on the "people" being coded as peasantry, and the intellectuals who would lead it.[7] It is observed that "non-Western" populisms and nationalisms in and around the empire, such as the Balkan and Armenian nationalisms that took this movement as their basic inspiration, were also influential in Ottoman-Turkish populism.[8] In a universe where populism has become the main hegemonic political trend and movement regionally and globally, especially following Narodnism's slogan of "going to the people", which includes the support, education and creation of a majority peasant population, had begun to be seen as a recipe for salvation around the CUP, which was in tension and struggle with the imperial powers and the monarchy. Thus it became one of the main discourses of many political ideas and movements, such as the Istanbul-based Kurdish and Armenian political actors who advocated both Ottomanism and the nationalism of their own ethnicity.[9]

7 Toprak, "Osmanlı Narodnikleri: Halka Doğru Gidenler", *Toplum ve Bilim*, 24, (Winter 1984), 69. With the revolution of 1917, the Norodnik movement succumbed to Bolshevism's criticism that they represented the "petty bourgeoisie" and wanted to restore capitalism, not overthrow it, but it emerged as the most important model, especially in non-Western countries such as the Ottoman Empire, which sought to restore capitalism, not overthrow it. The panturkist Muslim-Turkish intellectuals within the Turkist movement, led by important figures in the CUP such as Hüseyinzade Ali (Turan) and Yusuf Akçura, who came from Russia and the Balkans, were influenced by the Narodnik movement, socialism and panislamism, and blended panturkism with the Ottoman experience of accelerated capitalization, the dissolution of the empire and the rise of nation-states, and became the source of social, political and cultural populism based on the peasantry. See Zafer Toprak, "Popülizm ve Türkiye'deki Boyutları", in *Tarih ve Demokrasi - Tarik Zafer Tunaya'ya Armağan*, (Istanbul; Cem Yayınları: Üniversite Öğretim Üyeleri Dernegi: 1992), 53.

8 Asım Karaömerlioğlu, *Orada Bir Köy Var Uzakta, Erken Cumhuriyet Döneminde Köycü Söylem*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları: 2006) 26-32; İlhan Tekeli and Gencay Şaylan, "Türkiye'de Halkçılık İdeolojisinin Evrimi", 57.

9 In this period, it is possible to see populism in the societies and publications established on behalf of Armenians and Kurds, which had constitutionalist, Ottomanist and nationalist elements, advocating the limitation of the powers of the Ottoman monarchy,

Ultimately, in the "Ottoman enlightenment era", from 1908 until 1920, especially during the one-party rule of the CUP, the main inspiration stemming from European countries, the discourse of the people and populism - with their new contents - as a source of political legitimacy, was then sovereign. On the other hand, with the successive loss of territory and population that the empire suffered through wars with devastating regional and global effects, such as the Balkan War and World War I, the question of "how to save the state and the country" and the principles and alliances by which it should be designed were vital problematics in which all ethnic and social segments were engaged in a feverish debate and struggle.

For the political movements and actors who started to glorify Turkishness, it is possible to observe an approach that non-Muslim groups benefited from their close relations with the West, capital accumulation increased in their favor, some of them even established nation-states; moreover, Muslims other than Turks started to mobilize, but the Ottoman Turks lagged behind. According to this view, the Turks, in their attempt to save the empire by substituting Ottomanism and Islamism for Turkish nationalism, suffered losses in every way.

State administrators, on the other hand, were able to act according to conditions and developments, for example in World War I; on one hand while they tried to realize an *ittihad* (unity) that would include the

in favor of parliament, and constitutional citizenship. The Ottoman Kurdish Union and Progress Society (1908) was followed by Kurdish associations that had good relations with the Union and Progress Party and were closed down by the Union and Progress Party in the Constitutional Period and Kurdish deputies in the Parliamentary Assembly. They advocated Ottoman nationalism, Kurdish nationalism, populism and western progress together. On this subject see Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler* 1: *İkinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi*, 5th ed., (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2015), 430-434. Unlike the Armenians and Arabs, and unlike the Armistice period, Tunaya argues that Kurdish deputies in this period demanded "the correction of the very bad socio-economic situation of the people of *Vilayat-ı Şarkiyye,* rather than political rights. In the motion they submitted to Parliament, Hakkâri MPs Münip and Mehmet Hamza Bey said: "Instead of allocating 900 liras for automobiles, if this money were allocated to Kurdistan's education, Kurdistan would advance and be saved from every disaster." Ibid., 433.

Muslim peoples of the Ottoman Empire and marginalize and violently exterminate non-Muslims, on the other hand they exhibited multiple discourses and practices that oscillated between political, cultural and social populism and nationalism, based solely on the Turkish race. Through popular upbringing/education, formal education and propaganda, the culturalization and socialization of populism and nationalism (which were on the cusp between Ottomanism and Turkism) began. Also, social populism, in the form of solidarism, aimed at preventing class conflict by embracing professional solidarity, as well as the creation of a national economy and a national bourgeoisie within the Turkish-Islamic pendulum, came to the fore in interactions with each other during the war years.

In such a context, these alloys of populism and nationalism/Turkism, as well as the debates about them, were covered in Turkish Homeland (*Türk Yurdu*-1911), the organ of the Turkish Hearths (*Türk Ocakları*), which was replaced by the Halkevleri (People's Houses) in 1932, and in the magazine Towards the People (*Halka Doğru*-1912), which was published by the same circle as the publishers of this magazine. In *Türk Yurdu*, politicians and intellectuals such as Ziya Gökalp, Yusuf Akçura, Halide Edip, Hamdullah Suphi and Hüseyinzade Ali sought to shape the people and populism. For them, the public seemed to constitute all segments of society except for the educated elite. Similar to the populism that would be effective in the People's Houses, the Ottoman-Turkish intellectual elites, who were asked to go "towards the people", were to "see and know the people". With this motto, the national identity should be established with the "essence of the people", and by bringing civilized life to the people they should progress from a situation of poverty, ill health and ignorance to one of health and education and this "should be a remedy" for the problems of poverty.[10] In the journal *Halka Doğru*, Akçura, in contrast to the consensus that was to develop under Ziya Gökalp's leadership, gave more space to class and sociological analyses, stating that by the word "people" he meant "small landowners or completely landless farmers living in the countryside" and "small

10 Toprak, *Türkiye'de Popülizm*, 1908-1923, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2013), 173.

artisans, daily laborers and farmhands living in the cities". However, he also argued that the base of modern states was essentially composed of peasants and tradesmen, and that they were founded under the leadership of the national bourgeoisie, and that the Turkish bourgeoisie, which would adopt Turkish nationalism, should also assume this role.[11] These views were, in fact, integrated with the process of nationalization of the economy, and the confiscation of the capital of Greek, Armenian, Jewish and other non-Muslim groups, as well as dissident Muslim ethnic groups, which the CUP supported, especially during World War I, and which the Republic would perpetuate.[12]

As a result, the popular Turkists of the Second Constitutional period began to agree that a nationalism integrated with Turkish popularism could be established by feeding on the "people", whose base they defined in nuanced ways, and by instilling consciousness and civilization in the people, even if they changed their emphasis on one side of this exchange, as was the case with peripheral nationalisms. The question of how Anatolia, the last remaining piece of land, and the state could be saved in this traumatic process, and the separation of the Ottoman Arabs in World War I, either through nation-state formation or mandate administrations, began to bring about a historical evolution that legitimized the use of the word “people” for the remaining communities in a similar sense to the word “nation”. In the years between 1913 and 1918, when the CUP came to power alone, centralist, populist/nationalist, secularist, statist, ethnic and demographic "cleansing" discourses, regulations, and practices began to crystallize more radically in the pendulum of Turkism and

11 Toprak, “Osmanlı Narodnikleri: Halka Doğru Gidenler”, 69-81.

12 Akçura also emphasizes the de facto side of the People’s Houses’ main mission of "going to the people" and cites Germany, Russia, and also Serbian and Greek youth in the empire, who rushed to the villages and took care of the peasants' needs such as education and health, and gave them a national consciousness, which enabled them to establish their national states. Ibid. 71-72. During these years, as in the village trips to Anatolian villages organized by the People’s Houses, the young people, with great enthusiasm, took their medical supplies with them and set off with nationalist, populist, peasant-like, progressive and civilizing feelings and thoughts, saying that it was the duty of young people to lead the establishment of national life. Ibid. 72-73.

Ottomanism in many areas, such as intensive population and settlement, law, education and gender, and the economy.

Tekeli and Şenay summarize how this historicity, which began with the rupture caused by the Balkan defeat in 1912 and was shaped by World War I, led to an evolution in Turkist populism and nationalism:

> "The ideology of the Committee of Union and Progress, which was dominated by Ottomanist, Islamist and decentralist features, suddenly underwent a transformation and acquired Turkist, Westernist and centralist features, and the populism movement also took its share from this transformation, partially moving away from its socialist content and acquiring a Turkist content synthesized by Ziya Gökalp, and even identifying with him."[13]

2.1.2 *From Ziya Gökalp to the Republic: Solidarist and Cultural Populism*

Ziya Gökalp, who would become one of the most influential ideologues of the CUP, came to prominence with his activism in Diyarbakır. He progressed to the organization's headquarters in Thessaloniki, where he was elected as a member of the central general assembly and became more interested in its ideological structure; after 1918, he combined the language/culture populism with a broad repertoire of populism, which had race-based motifs within the constitutionalist populism of the Second Constitutional Period. After the fall of the CUP from power with the defeat in World War I, and the signing of the Armistice of Mondros by the Ottoman Empire, populism tended to merge with nationalism, and the nation-state imaginary. Gökalp, whom Mustafa Kemal himself claimed as "the father of my ideas", articulated his formulation, which provided a clearer answer to the ongoing debates on the definitions of populism, nationalism and westernization, Turkish folk heritage (culture) and civilization, and the relationship between them, with principles of solidarism, corporatism, statism and national upbringing

13 Tekeli and Şaylan, "Türkiye'de Halkçılık İdeolojisinin Evrimi", 59.

that would be in harmony with each other. Gökalp's distinctive feature is his proposals on how to resolve the tension and conflict between nationalism and westernization, or in this context between local culture and western civilization, and his solidarist and corporatist conception of society and state which, unlike the influential Turkist Akçura, rejects class distinctions and replaces them with occupations.[14] Saying "There is no class, there is profession!", Gökalp emphasized equality, solidarity and division of labor among professions instead of social classes, while integrating nationalism with a populism that would unite all classes.[15] This formulation is based on the articulation of political populism, which advocates political sovereignty in the people, social populism, which envisages cohesion and equality among professional groups, and cultural populism, which involves preserving the national heritage/culture of the people, and technically adopting western civilization.[16]

According to Gökalp's cultural populism, while culture is national, civilization is international. Culture is "the harmonious sum of a nation's religious, moral, legal, intellectual, aesthetic, linguistic, economic and technical life", while civilization is the common creation of all nations in the fields of religion, language, science, technical skills, law, fine arts and economics.[17] Unlike civilization, culture includes intrinsic and fixed values that change through popular use such as language, not by the will of individuals. In this sense, for example, Ottoman Turkish is the language of civilization, while Turkish is the language of the people; Turkish music

14 For this issue see specifically Taha Parla, Ziya Gökalp, *Kemalizm ve Türkiye'de Korporatizm*, 2nd ed., (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2021).

15 Niyazi Berkes points out how, with Gökalp, constitutionalist populism broke away from socialism and turned towards sociologism: "Ziya Gökalp separated populism from Marxist socialism, smeared it with Durkheim's sociologism and brought it to the ideology of solidarism and professional representation, which he called solidarism just as the Ottoman Empire was about to collapse.", Niyazi Berkes, *Türk Düşününde Batı Sorunu*, (Ankara: 1975): 231-232.

16 Z. Toprak, "II. Meşrutiyet'te Solidarist Düşünce: Halkçılık", *Toplum ve Bilim*, no:1, (Spring 1977): 100; Tekeli and Şaylan, "Türkiye'de Halkçılık İdeolojisinin Evrimi", 61-64.

17 Ziya Gökalp, "Hars ve Medeniyet", in *Türkçülüğün Esasları- Kitaplar*, (İstanbul: YKY, 2007): 190-198.

belongs to the people, while Ottoman music was taken from Byzantium. Gökalp extends the same pattern to areas such as literature and morality, identifying what belongs to the people with Turkishness.[18] In such a situation, the Turkists should completely abandon this Eastern civilization created by the Ottoman Empire, which had adopted the civilization of the Eastern Roman Empire, and should seek and find the Turkish culture among the people and instill in them the Western civilization that prevails everywhere, provided that they remain Turkish and Muslim.[19] This is because the people are the "living museum" of the Turkish national culture, which the elites have not encountered in their educational lives, and the elites have a civilization that the people do not possess.[20] In fact, according to Gökalp, the distinction between elite and commoners corresponds to civilization and culture.[21]

Nationality, which he uses in the modern sense of nationhood, is also established within a cycle of taking the original folk heritage and instilling western civilization in the people, with a populist understanding. Also, with the separation of Christian ethnicities and the forming of their own nation-states, Ottomanism ceased to be a viable identity, and in the age of nation-state formation, not only Turks, but also Muslims, including Kurds, whom the nation system recognizes as *millet-i hakime* (sovereign nation), must now come under the umbrella of the Turkish identity. According to Gökalp, who based the folk culture on the Turkish-speaking and Turkish ethnicity, this would not alienate Islamic communities, even if their languages differed, because, for example, the folklore, religious and cultural beliefs and values, ways of life and even appearance of the Kurds are almost identical to the Turks, so there is no harm in their Turkification. The motto of “Turkification, Islamization and Modernization” can be considered the sum of all these thoughts.[22]

18 ibid.

19 ibid.,198.

20 Z. Gökalp, “Halka Doğru”, *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, 199-201.

21 Georgeon, *Osmanlı Türk Modernleşmesi* (1900-1930), 35.

22 Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları.*

After all, Gökalp's ideas, with the exception of some aspects of cultural populism influenced by German and non-Western nationalisms, solidarism and corporatism influenced by French modernization and nation-building, and Islamization, is a fundamental reference point in the intellectual and political universe of Kemalism and the early Republic. However, it should be noted that there are different views on Gökalp as the direct source of Kemalist cultural populism. For example, Asım Karaömerlioğlu argues that in the Republican period, especially the ruling elite largely abandoned the idea that the national culture should be based on the folklore of the people, as this would shield against the hegemony of modern civilization and the protection of the national essence and nationality. Indeed, in this period dominated by the politics of westernization, especially state administrators took the West as a whole as a model, including not only its civilization but also its culture, thus emphasizing less and less the distinction between civilization and culture.[23] Arzu Öztürkmen, on the other hand, refers to the People's Houses, which had the mission of initiating and carrying out artistic and cultural activities that would put the Westernization project into practice, as a project in which Gökalp's formulation of culture and civilization was attempted to be realized.[24] However, the People's Houses were faced with the dilemma of having to reconcile the state's efforts to promote and disseminate Western forms of culture with its dependence on local manifestations, to create a national cultural repertoire.[25]

In my opinion, both of these perspectives are correct. For, as I argue in the following pages, as seen in the case of the People's Houses, it was a process of "national culture" production based on the "dilemma" and tension mentioned by Öztürkmen, not in an autonomous sphere, but under the influence of historical internal and external events, dynamics and power relations. As observed in the People's Houses in the East, the classification, performance and production of space, language, art and

23 Karaömerlioğlu, *Orada Bir Köy Var Uzakta*, 39.

24 Arzu Öztürkmen, *Türkiye'de Folklor ve Milliyetçilik*, 4th ed., (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014), 71.

25 Ibid. 70.

folklore in a new order on the axis of the relationship between the "local" and the modeling of western forms of culture, and the limits of this, are woven within the framework of spatial/social/cultural/artistic forms, power relations, the capacity of the state, the center-local relationship, the actors and the time period. In parallel with Turkist populism, discourse, representation, image, and practices, based solely on Turkish ethnicity and culture, as well as the Turkish language, are acceptable and legitimate for the creation of the popular and folk culture in the People's Houses. For we witness Kurdish, Arabic, Circassian, Armenian and Greek ethnic/cultural products being banned, made invisible and even destroyed, while at the same time being "Turkified" through translation and appropriation. In Chapter Five, I will try to focus on how, by whom, and under what changing conditions the boundaries of this reproduction materialized in the eastern provinces, and how they were experienced in complex forms of conflict, compromise, and appropriation.

2.1.3 *Institutional Antecedents of the People's Houses*

Ismayıl Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, one of the most important intellectuals of the Republican period, who was also interested in education/training and pedagogy, states in his 1950 guidebook on the People's Houses that Turkism passed through three intellectual phases to reach the People's Houses: The first was Intellectual Turkism, which produced a nationalism of language and culture in literary circles at the end of the 19th century, as national consciousness surfaced, and emerged around the Genç Kalemler (Young Pens) magazine. The second Turkism was the romantic nationalism that he himself witnessed, which glorified Turkishness romantically, which was determined by a sense of pan-Islamism and panturkism, and which dealt with its "misery and suffering", and in which the Turkish Hearths were at the center. However, despite Gökalp's significant contributions to the second phase, the "nationalism consciousness" reached its final and most advanced stage with the voluntary nationalism represented by the People's Houses, in

other words, Atatürkism.[26] Baltacıoğlu argues that voluntary nationalism reached its most mature stage by incorporating the essence of the first two phases, and with the People's Houses becoming the pioneering force, "the nation ceased to be an object and became a subject that directly constructed nationalism by asserting its own will".[27] As the predecessors of the People's Houses, institutions in the Second Constitutional Period, he points to institutions that aimed at public education, or in the parlance of the period, “public upbringing”. The first of these was the Union and Progress Party, which prioritized education.

In fact, one of the two principles that "characterized the ideology of culture" of the CUP was " *İttihad-ı anasır* (unity of elements) based on Ottoman elements, and the other was "neşr-i maarif" (dissemination of education).[28] In big cities such as Istanbul and Edirne, the party opened free schools under the name of *Ittihat ve Terakki Mektebi* (Union and Progress School), and offered night classes for the public in the clubs it opened, and members of the party gave free lectures. Secondly, in addition to formal educational institutions with secular contents, the CUP also established various clubs and associations, or supported autonomous institutions such as Turkish Hearths, which would form an alloy of party propaganda and "upbringing" for adults, just as the RPP established the People's Houses.[29] In this regard, *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti Kulübü* (The Club of Union and Progress Committee), led by civil servants, teachers and other local elites, organized activities similar to those of the People's Houses, such as giving night classes to youth, apprentices and prisoners, distributing medicine to peasants and the urban poor, providing them with medical examinations, and assisting

26 İsmayıl Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, *Halkın Evi-C.H.P. Halkevleri Bürosu*, *Kılavuz Kitaplar: 29*, (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1950): 34-39.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid., 22. This is similar in terms of the framework that was projected to the public in the People's Houses, at least in the "external discourse", with the aim of uniting all Muslim elements, regardless of race and class, under the umbrella of Turkishness as a "mass of people" and educating them around the modern and national imaginary of the regime.

29 Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler 1,* 440-524.

them in their relations with state institutions.[30] Apart from these, the Istanbul-based *Milli Maarif ve Terbiye Cemiyeti* (National Education and Training Society -1916) which operated within the scope of public education with nationalist motives, should be considered among the predecessors of the People's Houses.[31] Founded in Izmir in 1917, the *Halka Doğru Cemiyeti* (Towards the People Association) was established as a result of the efforts of M. Celal Bayar, the Izmir officer of the CUP, and aimed to "spread scientific and cultural education among the people, to generalize it and to raise the ideas, morals, economics and sociality of the people and to publish in an understandable language for the enlightenment and progress of the people".[32]

Those who went "towards the people" in the Second Constitutional Period also established youth associations aimed at "making the youth a pioneering force, freeing them from mental and spiritual stagnation, and raising them as responsible citizens".[33] Organizations such as the *Türk Gücü Cemiyeti* (Turkish Power Society) (1913), the *Dinç Dernekleri* (Vigorous Associations) and *Gürbüz Dernekleri* (Robust Associations) within *Osmanlı Güç Dernekleri* (Ottoman Power Associations-1914), the *Genç Dernekleri* (Youth Associations, 1916), *Mektep Gücü Dernekleri* (School Power Associations), and *İzcilik Dernekleri* (Scouting Associations) were subsidiary organizations of the Committee of Union

30 Alexandros Lamprou, *Between Central State and Local Society.* 26.

31 In the branches it would open in the provinces, it would give lectures, publish material on national education and “upbringing”, establish national schools and institutions, provide aid to orphans including orphans in schools, and open workhouses for poor boys, girls and women. Baltacıoğlu, *Halkın Evi*, 22-23; *Tunaya Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler,* 502.

32 For the first two articles of the Regulation in old Turkish, see Toprak, *Türkiye’de Popülizm*, *1908-1923*, 194.

33 Ibid., 218. These associations, founded under the names of Turkish Forces, Boy Scouts, and Training Dormitories, which envisioned as "mental and physical training", aimed to "awaken Anatolia" and "raise the Turkish Youth to be strong" with the support of the *Türk Ocakları*. As the country was permanently at war after the Tripoli and Balkan Wars, they turned to paramilitary organizations that would prepare the youth for war like their counterparts in Europe. Ibid., 199.

and Progress, and came under the control of the Ministry of War.[34] In order to organize the youth under military discipline, these organizations had military training, sports, war-related conferences, and educational activities for the advancement and civilization of the village before conscription.[35]

Among the associations founded or run by members of the CUP, the "cultural associations" that advocated a panturkist line and populism can be considered the institutional predecessors of the People's Houses: The *Türk Derneği* (Turkish Association), which is also shown as the first organization of Turkism, founded in 1908, and the *Türk Yurdu Derneği* (Turkish Homeland Society) in 1911. Both associations carried out activities based on cultural nationalism, such as the simplification and comprehensibility of Ottoman Turkish, and the "ethnic and racial research of Turks", referring to all Turks in the world, and were closed down with the establishment of the Turkish Hearths.[36] From its official establishment in 1912 to its first period in 1920, the Turkish Hearth, which was forcibly closed down after taking over all the material, political, cultural and spiritual heritage of the People's Houses, in terms of administrators and members, turned into a center where different Turkisms coexisted, with twenty-eight branches and more than two thousand members locally. Unlike the People's Houses, Gökalp envisioned the “upbringing” of Turks, whom he saw as the pillars of Islamic society, through Anatolian-centered populism and a panturkist and Turanist nationalism.[37] In the Turkish Hearths, Turkish nationalism based on an understanding of "towards the people", such as Istanbul-based intellectuals meeting with the people, "traveling, learning and

34 Toprak, *Türkiye’de Popülizm*, 199, Tunaya, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler,* 483-500.

35 Tunaya, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler*, 475-500.

36 For Turkish Hearths see specifically Füsun Üstel, *İmparatorluktan Ulus-Devlete Türk Milliyetçiliği: Türk Ocakları* (1912-1931), 3rd ed., (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2010).

37 This first article of the Turkish Hearths Regulations is translated into Turkish as follows: “To work for the development of the Turkish race and language through the advancement and improvement of the national upbringing and the scientific, social and economic level of the Turks, who are the most important of the Islamic tribes.” Tevfik Çavdar, “Halkevleri” *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, 30.

loving Anatolia", and healing its wounds, and directing young people and intellectuals to Anatolia, was emphasized.[38]

Although its regulations state that "the Hearths do not engage in politics", just like the People's Houses, its members were mostly members of the CUP, it received financial support, and in its local branches, in cooperation with the CUP organizations, it brought together young people and "intellectuals", and also organized activities such as conferences, theater plays, and sports to encourage the participation of women, and published books and pamphlets.[39] In the revised charter of the Hearths at the congress in 1918, the Turkist emphasis was increased by saying "The purpose of the Hearth is to work for the national unity and civilization of the Turks"; instead of the Turks, who were called "the pillar of the Islamic tribes", and the aim of including Muslims with the reference to Islam beginning to fade, the emphasis on "race" was brought to the fore. The Turkish Hearths would be closed down with the occupation of Istanbul in 1920, and its members would join or support the war of independence led by the Unionists. As will be explained in more detail below, this would begin to be reorganized in 1923 with the proclamation of the Republic, and assimilation in the Eastern provinces would be seen as one of its most important missions, and would be financially supported by state administrators. However, in 1931, it was forced by Mustafa Kemal to dissolve itself by transferring all its property and assets to the People's Houses and the RPP. This was on the grounds that its members and branches had supported the short-lived *Serbest Fırka* (Free Party), that it had a racially-oriented emphasis, and that the legitimacy of the regime and its reforms, and the popular support for them, was more of an organic entity, and absolutely within the line and control of the single-party RPP. This could be gained by educating and remodelling the population.

On the other hand, in the groupings within the Turkish Hearths, embodied in Gökalp's unsuccessful presidential candidacy in 1918,

38 Toprak, "Osmanlı Narodnikleri: Halka Doğru Gidenler", 73.

39 Alexandros Lamprou, "Between Central State and Local Society. The People's Houses Institution and the Domestication of Reform in Turkey (1932 -1951)", 28.

which aimed to establish the Unionist domination more directly, two different perspectives emerged, which continued in the Republican period, more intertwined but with their own tensions.[40] While the group headed by Hamdullah Suphi, in which Gökalp was a member, emphasized the Turkish Hearths as a "center of culture", the group composed of Dr. Reşit Galip, Halide Edip, and the young doctors, with a Narodnikist perspective, considered the peasants as the main base of the people and emphasized that "bringing civilization to the people" - like Akçura - should be realized in daily practice. Under the leadership of the future Minister of Education R. Galip, who would pave the way for the establishment of the People's Houses in place of the Turkish Hearths, the Villagers' Association (1919) was founded, criticizing the Turkish Hearths for becoming a "literary salon", and aiming to carry out social reform projects through the "dispersal of faithful youth to the villages" and by meeting with the people in the field.[41] We see that the aims and criticisms of the Villagers' Association continued in the Republican period and there was an attempt to implement them in the People's Houses, especially in the example of the 1940s People's Rooms and even more so in the Village Institute (Köy Enstitüsü-1940), which had a peasantist and practitioner perspective, which considered the villagers as agents within the universe they lived in.

40 Üstel, *Türk Ocakları*, 111-112. According to Füsun Üstel, the Unionists had a fluctuating relationship with the Hearths, especially after the Bab-Ali Raid of 1913, due to their authoritarian practices that demanded more control. Although almost all of the young members were also members and sympathizers of the CUP, relations were strained due to their shift to a more panturkist line and their criticism of the CUP's Ottomanist policies during World War I. The CUP began to see the Hearths as rivals. Finally, the power of the Unionists was diminished when the attempt of Gökalp, a member of the CUP, to become the president of the Turkish Hearths failed. Ibid., 75. However, the authoritarian and repressive practices of the one-party rule of the CUP until 1918 against organizations and the press, which the CUP considered as opposition, did not affect the Turkish Hearths, where the Unionists could be effective, and even the President of the Turkish Hearths, H. Suphi, continued to ask for financial aid from the CUP. Ibid., 77.

41 Ibid., 115.

Finally, it is worth mentioning the *Türk Foklor Derneği* (*Turkish Folklore Association*, 1927), which was founded in Istanbul in the Republican period to conduct folklore research; this was another organization that, like the Turkish Hearths, was replaced by the People's Houses. Through its branches throughout the country, the Association set its goals as assembling folklore compilations, publishing materials, organizing conferences and festivals, travelling, and establishing relations with the relevant scientific institutions. Therefore, the People's Houses were entrusted with missions such as "the establishment of national identity through folklore and related social activities". After the association decided to merge with the Istanbul People's House, the magazine *Halk Bilgisi Haberleri* (Public Knowledge News), published by the association, became the magazine of the Eminönü People's House.[42] Ziyaeddin Fındıkoğlu, one of the founders of this association, cited the Turkish Hearths and the Turkish Folklore Association as the institutional origins of the People's Houses, and stated that the People's Houses were established through the fusion of these two institutions.[43]

§ 2.2 Transition from People to Nation: *Temsil* and *Temdin* of Kurds and the People's Houses

> "In Turkey, the sword of Allah was in the grip of the populists and the pen of Allah was in the hands of the Turkists. When the Turkish homeland was in danger, this sword and this pen married. From this marriage, a society was born, which is called the Turkish nation. In the future, populism and Turkism will always march hand in hand towards the same realm of aspirations. Every Turkist will remain a populist on the political stage; every populist will be a Turkist in the field of culture. Our profession in politics is populism and our profession in culture is Turkism".[44]

42 Öztürkmen, *Türkiye'de Folklor ve Milliyetçilik*, 55-65.

43 Nurcan Toksoy, *Halkevleri*, *Bir Kültürel Kalkınma Modeli Olarak*, 29.

44 Ziya Gökalp, "Siyasi Türkçülük", 288-289.

In the aftermath of the fall of the CUP government and the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, which resulted in the deaths of millions of people and catastrophic destruction, the Armistice of Mondros (1918), which envisaged the occupation of different parts of the empire by the victorious states, came into force. Gökalp, who was also famous for his poetry and eloquent descriptions of thoughts and events, penned the above lines at a time when most of the CUP cadres were joining the Ankara-centered movement initiated by the Unionists, led by Mustafa Kemal and his leading cadre in opposition to the armistice. Here, Gökalp is also expressing the idea that the "marriage of populism and Turkism", on the one hand, "populism with wider participation", which the Republican state would legalize more boldly, and Turkism based on Turkish culture, in which Muslim ethnicities would be forcibly called to Turkishness, was finally realized in this period.

In this period, national resistance was declared with the slogan of "saving the homeland, the state, the people, even the caliphate and the sultanate" by nullifying the Treaty of Sèvres (10 August 1920) in order to save the country from the occupation of the great western powers, and to eliminate the political and territorial demands of the Armenians, Greeks and nationalist Kurdish groups. In this resistance, an alliance was formed with Muslim groups that had not seceded from the empire, such as the Kurds, Circassians and Laz, who belonged to the Sunni sect of Islam and were considered as part of the Ottoman *millet-i hakime* (sovereign nation), with the aim of liberating the country from the Christians. Just as Gökalp had advocated, a populism and nationalism that did not exclude Islamic unity among different ethnic groups and classes within Muslims and Islamic "aspirations" was on the agenda, without publicly referring to racial and Turanian Turkism and secularism.[45] In his speeches at the meetings of the Association for the Defence of National Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia (*Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti*) in Sivas in 1919, Mustafa Kemal, the head of the Committee of Representatives,

45 For a reference among the extended literature on this subject, see. Sina Akşin, *Kısa Türkiye Tarihi*, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2007).

declared that "the sovereignty of the people will be based on the opinion, thoughts and feelings of the people, and that the sovereignty of the people will be taken as a basis and will proceed in this way", which he based on the nation he defined with Islamic reference.[46] In other statements and interviews, he also emphasizes an ethnic equality, in which Turks will not be privileged, including by taking away the arguments of the Kurdish nationalists and those who might support them.[47] Moreover, The Constitution of 1921 (*Teşkilat-ı Esasiye Kanunu*) states that local governments will be strong, giving the message from the central government, for recognition by the local authorities, that the traditional practices and demands of the Kurds, who were expected to be included in this nation and people, would be satisfied.[48]

In addition, the consensus populism based on the elite, workers, bourgeoisie, merchants and war-weary peasants, was combined with socialist populism and "populism" based on the Islamic peoples. Within this framework, anti-imperialism was also emphasized, with the aim of keeping the support of the Bolsheviks who had seized power in the Soviet Union, and the newly established state was declared to be "the state of the people of Turkey, the state of people's labor".[49] On the other hand, the "Declaration of Populism" (Halkçılık Beyannamesi) which would form the basis of the constitution adopted by the GNAT contained messages of "Islamic unity of the people of Turkey" without any emphasis on Turkishness.[50] Within the framework of political populism,

46 Mete Tunçay, *TC'inde Tek Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması* (1923-1931), 3rd ed., (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi 1992), 212; see also Sina Akşin, *Kısa Türkiye Tarihi*, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2007).

47 In his speech at GNAT on 1 May 1920, Mustafa Kemal said: "The members of your Grand Assembly are not only Circassians, not only Kurds, not only Laz. But they are Islamic elements consisting of all of them, a sincere community...these various Islamic elements, who are citizens, respect each other with mutual respect and always respect each other's all kinds of laws; racial, social, geographical laws". *Atatürk'ün Kaleminden 6, Kürtler,* 2nd ed., (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2019), 104.

48 *Atatürk'ün Kaleminden 6, Kürtler,* 130.

49 Tekeli ve Şaylan, "Türkiye'de Halkçılık İdeolojisinin Evrimi", 66-71.

50 In summary, the declaration states, "In the name of ensuring the life and independence of the Islamic majority within the national borders of the Grand National Assembly of

the political, social and cultural "detached from the people" policy of the Ottoman government in Istanbul, which did not recognize the sovereignty of the people, was criticized in the GNAT in an anti-civil servant discourse, and the concepts of the sovereignty of the people defined by all classes outside of the bureaucracy were glorified. As a result, populism, which took on political, class/social and religious connotations according to internal and external conflicts and alliances, took center stage during the Islamic-motivated national struggle years of the "people of Turkey" as a useful discourse that expanded its room for maneuver by being shaped according to political needs in this multi-layered and difficult period.

In 1922, when the occupation of the country ended, and victory was declared after the pacification of the Armenians and Greeks, it was considered that the defensive mission of the Association for the Defence of National Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia was over, and the question of how to reshape the ideology, legal and institutional structure of the regime and the state came to the fore.[51] In the declaration issued by Mustafa Kemal on September 7, 1922, he announced that it was necessary to work within the framework of a long-term program for the construction and development of the country, and that in order to achieve this, he would establish the "People's Party based on the principle of populism" to govern the state, thus starting the new adventure of both populism and the regime.[52] At the beginning of 1923, in his speech in Izmir, after stating that the People's Party governing the state would be a party that would look after the interests of the whole country without

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Turkey, saving the sultanate and the Khilafat, freeing the people of Turkey from the oppression and domination of imperialism and capitalism and making them the owners of will and sovereignty; to make innovations in land, education, justice, economics and housing affairs according to the needs of the people for the welfare and happiness of the people, and to take the political and social principles from the spirit of the nation for this purpose". Toprak, "Halk Fırkasının Kuruluş Evresi: Halkçılık Programı ve 1923 Nizamnamesi", *Toplumsal Tarih*, no.213, (September 2011): 20-29.

51 Fahir Giritlioğlu, *Türk Siyasi Hayatında Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'nin Mevkii,* (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1965).

52 Ibid.

being a "party of a class or caste", he explained and declared with examples the necessity of a solidarist populism in which all classes would be supported equally in a poor country where there is no major land ownership or bourgeoisie, and therefore no serious class differences.[53] In this speech, he also discussed the cultural populism that would become more visible in the 1930s, in which he assigned the duty of enlightening and civilizing to the intellectuals and ulama. At the Izmir Economic Congress convened in the same year, on the one hand, equal professional representation was taken as a basis, and on the other hand, liberalist policies for the creation of a national bourgeoisie were adopted in line with global processes.[54]

This period leading up to the proclamation of the Republic was also, as Bozarslan argues, a period in which the Kemalist government, the successor of the CUP, set about redefining the borders separating non-Turkish Muslims, especially Kurds, from Turks.[55] Then, in 1916, as Russia's offensive in the region continued, the Kurdish population, which it "did not find loyal enough", numbering in the hundreds of thousands, was deported to central and western Anatolian provinces and villages that had been cleared of Armenians. He envisaged their Turkification by checking whether they spoke Turkish or not, and initiated a process of settling the vacant places with Balkan muhajirs of Turkish origin, as was the practice of the RPP.[56] However, as mentioned above, both during the period of CUP rule and during the war of the independence, the fear of

53 Toprak, "Halk Fırkasının Kuruluş Evresi: Halkçılık Programı ve 1923 Nizamnamesi", 25-27. In the statute of the Halk Fırkası (People's Party) in 1923, after stating that "the concept of the people is not specific to any class, that individuals who do not claim any privilege and who accept absolute equality in the eyes of the law belong to the people", the People's Party was defined as "individuals who do not accept the privileges of any family, class, community or individual and who recognize absolute freedom and independence in making laws". İsmail Beşikçi, *Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası'nın* Tüzüğü (1927) *ve Kürt Sorunu,* (İstanbul: İsmail Beşikçi Vakfı Yayınları, 2013), 67.

54 Toprak, "Halk Fırkası'nın Kuruluş Evresi: Halkçılık Programı ve 1923 Nizamnamesi", 25-27.

55 Hamit Bozarslan, *Türkiye Tarihi: İmparatorluktan Günümüze,* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2015), 297.

56 Naci Kutlay, *İttihat Terakki ve Kürtler*, (Ankara: Dipnot Yayınları, 2010), 277-293.

Russian occupation and displacement through the establishment of an Armenian state was combined with the bonds of Islam and the Caliphate, and the soldiers of the former Hamidiye Regiments (*Hamidiye Alayları*), most of the Kurdish tribes and clergy in Vilayat-ı Şarkiyye and/or Kurdistan joined the wars on the basis of the common defense of the homeland and religion, "rejecting the separatist option" as Mustafa Kemal put it in his *Nutuk* (Speech).[57]

In this historical context, the first parliament, which also led the national struggle in 1920-1923, was relatively more heterogeneous and polyphonic, granting powers to local governments even under wartime conditions, with anti-bureaucratic tendencies, liberal Islamist, pro-sultanate and small left-leaning groups, where Muslim ethnicities were visible and others were excluded.[58] However, the 1923 parliament, which was formed after the end of the occupations, was a parliament in which deputies seen as "dissidents" or "potential dissidents" were purged and more loyal ones were appointed. In addition, until the multi-party era, like subsequent assemblies, it was a two-tier electoral system in which parliamentary candidates were nominated by the President of the Republic, and put to the vote of the first voters, i.e. the Party delegates of the citizens, who gave their approval, usually without fail. It was a parliament in which most of the deputies, especially those from Vilayat-ı Şarkiyye, with whom an alliance was formed during the war of independence, were not re-elected before the Lausanne Conference, and

57 Bozarslan, 298.

58 For the opposition deputies in the first parliament opened in 1920, referred to as the "Second Group", notably see Ahmet Demirel, *Birinci Meclis'te Muhalefet, İkinci Grup,* 7th edition, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2015). Demirel writes that this group directed its opposition to the authoritarian structure that tended to be institutionalized in domestic politics rather than war policy, took a stand against personal sovereignty over the parliament, was sensitive to issues related to the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms and a law-based understanding of governance in the country, and was liquidated in the 1923 elections with the initiatives of the People's Party. Ibid.

the rate of localism of those who were elected was reduced by half and they would start to have lower participation.[59]

In the summer of 1923, the negotiations on the Treaty of Lausanne and the subsequent proclamation of the Republic on October 29, after the dust and smoke of the wars, the regime and the definition of citizenship determined the position of the country's second largest territorial, linguistic and ethnic community, the Kurds, who had been promised a small degree of autonomy in the Treaty of Sèvres, and who had been promised autonomy and independence in the past, in the new Turkey and in the Kurdish-populated Mosul province to be ceded to the British mandate of Iraq. In the Lausanne negotiations, which were based on national identity, the status of those who were not considered Turks, how and according to what criteria, was the subject of fierce debate within the country. This merges with the debates in the GNAT on who can be a member of the party that governs the state, which will determine the nature of citizenship and national identity.[60] Deciding this would answer the question of what kind of status the Kurds and other minorities would be given in Lausanne. The resulting decision, as Toprak points out, contained dramatic turning points in terms of the course of the Kurdish issue, the position of the Kurds and also those who were not considered Turks in the new state, and thus the fate of the Eastern provinces.[61] In the first version of the *The Regulations of the Republican People's Party* (Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası Nizamnamesi), it was sufficient to be a Turkish citizen in order to become a member of the party that ruled the state; however, this was changed and the condition of "having accepted the Turkish culture" was stipulated in addition to being a Turkish citizen. In the final version, the condition of "accepting the Turkish culture" was abolished, and the membership requirement was changed to "being a

59 For the profiles of parliamentarians in the TBMM in the early Republican years, the historical transformation processes of localization rates and detailed statistics, see A. Demirel, *Tek Partinin İktidarı, Türkiye'de Seçimler ve* Siyaset (1923-1946), 2nd ed. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014).

60 Toprak, "Halk Fırkası'nın Kuruluş Evresi: Halkçılık Programı ve 1923 Nizamnamesi", 28-29.

61 Ibid.

Turk", due to concerns that Kurds and other minorities and ethnicities would be granted special status. Thus, for the first time, Turkishness was so clearly formalized as a category that it encompassed all citizens in the country.[62]

This fluctuating process, in fact, reflects the difficulties and contradictions of the state officials and intellectuals in coming up with a clear answer to the question "Who is and who should be a Turk?" in the face of the heterogeneous ethnic and religious structure of the country, the supporters of the sultanate, and different national and regional demands, despite the elimination of diversity in the parliament after the war of independence. Ultimately, however, these stages of debate and decision-making symbolize the moments when the definition of a people and a nation as consisting of those who follow the Islamic religion, as well as the exclusion of the ethnic identities of all Muslim groups and their equating them with the Turkish identity, became a thing of the past.

At the same time, Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, the representative of the Turkish delegation at the Lausanne negotiations, in response to questions from the opposing delegation on whether the Kurds should be granted minority status, argued that "the Turkish delegation represents the Kurds as well as the Turks, that Muslims have equal citizenship rights with the Turks, that the Kurds, as Muslims, are the main element and do not want minority rights, and that minority status should be given to non-Muslims". Against the "exterior", this united the Muslim nation, which actually meant the form of government of the communities defined by the Ottoman Empire based on religion, under the same umbrella of national identity/Turkishness. İnönü presented as evidence Zülfü Tigrel from the Tigrel family, one of the Kurdish deputies in Lausanne with him, whom he would continue to cooperate with in the years to come, and the statements made in the GNAT at the same time that "Turks and Kurds cannot be separated and Kurds are the main element". Since granting the Kurds an autonomous ethnic, political and territorial status was not in

62 Ibid.; İsmail Beşikçi, *Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası'nın Tüzüğü (1927) ve Kürt Sorunu*, 67.

line with the regional interests of the Western imperialist states, İnönü's delegation was able to get these concepts accepted.[63]

On the other hand, although Islam was used as an argument against the "exterior", the condition of membership of the People's Party, which ruled the state within the country, was now Turkishness as defined by Gökalp, and the opinion along the lines of the CUP, which was produced in such a way that it was both inclusive and exclusive at the same time. This change was further crystallized in the 1924 Constitution, with the article "In Turkey, everyone is called a Turk in terms of citizenship, regardless of religion or race", and the national identity of the people became Turkish, not Islamic. In line with Lausanne, citizenship was now equated with Turkish national identity, and a definition that could include Muslims and non-Turks was envisaged, thus indicating that a person who is a Turk in terms of citizenship does not have to be Turkish by descent. However, in violation of Lausanne, discourses and practices that refer to being a Turkish citizen based on lineage would show that the new definition of citizenship, which did not include "racial discrimination", was not consistent and worked differently in practice. To give a few examples, "being of the Turkish race" was added to the requirement of being a citizen of the Republic of Turkey, to enter institutions such as the Air Force Academy and the Military Veterinary School.[64]

In the Plan for the Reform in the East (Şark Islahat Planı 1925), which outlined the state's Kurdish policy, Kurds were excluded from state jobs and not given high ranks in the army because they were deemed unreliable, while reservations were made about non-Muslims and "non-Turkish" Muslims, especially in the army and certain state positions, The RPP organization was not opened in 12 provinces with a majority Kurdish population, the opening of primary schools in villages with a mainly Kurdish population would not be functional until the 1940s due

63 On this issue see Baskın Oran, "Lozan'ın 'Azınlıkların Korunması' Bölümünü Yeniden Okurken", *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* 49, no. 3-4, (1994): 283-301.

64 Soner Çağaptay, "Citizenship Policies in Interwar Turkey", *Nations and Nationalism 9*, no.4, (2003), 603.

to the homogeneous population, and the concern that the enlightenment of Kurds, in the view of militant actors, could strengthen their national identity. All these discriminatory decisions and practices, which seem to be contrary to political populism, which envisages popular sovereignty and political equality, and cultural populism, which promises assimilation and civilization to the people, continued for many years. As will be discussed below, this research has revealed that until the 1940s, very few people from the "local community" were included in the administration of the People's Houses, and the ancestry of applicants was investigated and reported. Beyond the characterization of a weak, incapacitated and failed state, citizenship practices, which are characterized by contradictions and inconsistencies between republican citizenship and ethnic and lineage-based citizenship, as well as discourses, regulations and practices that oscillate between lineage-based national identity and cultural national identity,[65] have been produced as a functional means within the framework of internal and external dynamics. These practices, with racist, colonial and discriminatory tones, on the one hand, would continue in the following years, by moving forward together with practices that prioritized inclusive/assimilative cultural Turkish nationalism, and would continue up to the present day to cause problems, discussion and conflict/reconciliation areas.

2.2.1 *Temsil and Temdin of the Vilayat-ı Şarkiyye: Continuities and Ruptures*

Although there have been more serious ruptures with the Kemalist government, the secular Turkish nation-state's production of these multiple strategies is related to continuities in state and social memory, given that at least a significant number of the political rulers of the Ottoman and CUP governments were still alive. While Turkishness was always present at the core of Abdülhamit II's pan-Islamism; the CUP,

65 Mesut Yeğen, "Türklük Daireleri ve Kürtler", in *Ne Mutlu Eşitim Diyene: Milliyetçilik Tartışmaları,* eds. Yasemin Çongar, Mustafa Arslantulı, Lebriz İsvan, (İstanbul: Kıraathane Kitapları, 2021), 284-295.

which had organic ties with Turkist ideology, strategically utilized Ottoman citizenship and identity, while carrying out ethnic and demographic "cleansing" of the segments it considered Islamic communities. We can say that the Republican state benefited from this legacy, even though it declared the Ottoman identity as its "other". I would like to elaborate on this point below. So far, I have tried to analyze how the historicity of the construction of the people and national identity, which began in the imperial period and played a role in the discourses and practices of the state, was transferred to the Republican period, especially around the theme of populism, by interacting with different and exclusive discourses in the East, which also affected the Kurds and other ethnic elements, and by including some ruptures and continuities. In the context of world history, it should be noted that there are monist nation-states that exclude minority rights, colonialism governed by nation-states, and in the socialist world, a process supported by the global "spirit of the times" in which "socialism in one country" has become a creed.[66] There is a discursive, practical and actor-based legacy that is transferred from the imperial period to the new state formation and regime.

Due to the weakening of state control and power throughout the Ottoman Empire and increasing territorial losses, the process of accepting western-centered centralization, modernization and capitalization process and its institutional and legal dimension began in the 1800s. In the 19th century, and during the reign of Abdulhamid II, the Ottoman central administration adopted and implemented the policy of spreading and producing a modernized and centralized state administration, political, military, administrative, financial, economic and cultural administration, and control over the peripheral populations and geographies. This was accomplished with the discourse of vazife-i temdin (civilizing mission-civilisatory mission) and the technique of "civilization" in perspective with territorial security, which was followed globally by modern and colonial states. On this axis, the continued

66 For this period see Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century,* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1999).

pruning of traditional Kurdish local authority areas, directly independent, autonomous or semi-autonomous, the support of new Kurdish authorities and the control of outbreaks of violence through militia forces such as the Hamidiye Regiments, and the interlocution of sheikhs and tribal chiefs were combined with public order/security and administrative practices such as military service and taxation. A policy of "borrowed colonialism", i.e. civilization/urbanization, i.e. "temeddün or temdin", became visible, in order to settle, educate, and attempt to establish a modern and centralized tax system, to make remote provinces accessible, especially through railroads, and to make the administrative/bureaucratic structure systematic and centralized. The intention was to settle and civilize especially nomadic Kurds and Arabs and other rural communities, and to create Ottoman administrators and loyal subjects by Ottomanizing Islamic communities under the hegemony of "Turkishness", much like the devshirme system applied to other communities.[67]

In this period, the children of the powerful and influential families of these communities would be Ottomanized through education, and become ruling elites loyal to Abdülhamid in their respective regions.[68] Efforts were made to expand formal education, but it also encountered local resistance in Kurdish provinces; for example, in many places, such as the Sanjak of Beyazıt, there were examples of objections or resistance to the practice of opening schools.[69] However, it is important to note that the state administration, especially in view of the "threat" of the Russian and Armenian national movement and presence, cared about the

67 For this issue see Selim Deringil, *İktidarın Sembolleri ve İdeoloji: II. Abdülhamid Dönemi (1876-1909),* trans. Gül Çağalı Güven, 3rd ed. (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2007). Selçuk Akşin Somel, *The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire, 1839-1908: Islamization, Autocracy, and Discipline*, (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2001).

68 Eugene L. Rogan, "Aşiret Mektebi: Abdulhamid II's School for Tribes", *International Journal of Middle East Studies 28* (1996): 83-107; Alişan Akpınar and Eugene L. Rogan, *Aşiret, Mektep, Devlet; Osmanlı Devleti'nde Aşiret Mektebi*, (İstanbul: Aram Yayınları, 2001).

69 Somel, *The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire, 1839-1908: Islamization, Autocracy, and Discipline.*

presence and local spheres of influence of the Kurds and other ethnic groups in the East and Kurdistan, and although the Ottoman language was centralized, it did not exclude the status of Kurdish, which, like other languages, was accepted in the public sphere and was used and produced in written form, especially in madrasas, in all areas from jurisprudence to literature.

As mentioned above, in the midst of the ongoing wars, the rulers of the CUP also followed the "Armenian issue" and especially the Russian occupation and the attitudes of the Kurds and other elements, and put forward discourses and practices in the pendulum of Ottomanist and assimilative Turkic population engineering that would be shaped according to realpolitik. Indeed, there is increasing historical evidence that during World War I, the CUP deported Kurds in large numbers from the east to the western provinces, and that hundreds of thousands of lives were lost in the process.[70] Moreover, in the repressive regime established by the CUP after the coup d'état of 1913, its relations with the political actors, most of whom came from Kurdish aristocratic families, and who were carrying out political activities on the Istanbul-based Ottomanist/Kurdish axis, (they had cooperated to end Abdulhamid's rule during the Second Constitutional Period), deteriorated.[71] During the period of the national struggle, while Islamic unity and populism were emphasized in the public discourse, we learn from what we can call internal correspondences of Party and state members that due to the fear that the Kurds, would revolt and secede due to nationalist sentiments, the policies of appropriation and Turkification of the Kurds.[72] This happening in continuity with the late Ottoman and CUP periods raised concerns, and serious efforts were made in this regard. The consent of the Kurds' sedentary religious and tribal leaders and the peasant

70 See Celal Temel*, I. Dünya Savaşı Yıllarında 1916 Kürt Tehciri ve İttihat Terakki'nin İskân ve Nüfus Politikaları, (1913-1918),* (İstanbul: İsmail Beşikçi Vakfı, 2019); Uğur Ümit Üngör, *The Making of Modern Turkey, Nation and State in Eastern Anatolia, 1913-1950.*

71 Hakan Özoğlu, *Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State: Evolving Identities, Competing Loyalties, and Shifting Boundaries*, (New York: Suny Press, 2004).

72 See Chapter 1, 41-44.

population to join the national struggle and to be persuaded to fight was also achieved through the call for a kind of jihad. These groups were also concerned about protecting their lands and thus their homeland and status, and Kurdish independence and autonomist demands were not dominant. However, in the Treaty of Sèvres, the promise of an autonomous Kurdistan emerged, with the efforts of the Kurdish political elites in favor of independence and autonomy. Then the anti-centralist, nationalist and socio-economically motivated opposition of the Kurdish elites based in Istanbul, Europe and the Middle East became visible, embodied in the Koçgiri Rebellion[73].



Figure 2.1 Kurdish inhabited areas: Areas with Kurdish majority; Boundaries for independent Kurdistan and Armenia in Treaty of Sèvres in 1920. SOURCE: https://www.institutkurde.org/en/kurdorama/map_of_kurdistan.php.

In this historical context, in his report prepared in 1920/21, Kâzım Karabekir, who commanded the Eastern regiments under the Ottoman

73 Dilek Soileau Kızıldağ, *Koçgiri İsyanı: Sosyo-Tarihsel Analiz*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2021).

administration, stated: "I consider it very necessary that the development of Kurds and Kurdistan should be examined as one of the first tasks of the Military Council and that a principle should be determined with the relevant ministries and that it should be carried out as a small and large program."[74] Karabekir states that it would be unfavorable to enlist Kurds in the army because their enlistment could lead them to revolt at a time when the issue of Kurdishness was being "scrutinized".[75] To prevent this, he suggests that "the administration in Kurdistan, governors and district governors should be soldiers, a strong administrative organization, the division of Kurdistan into three parts through the Turkish channel by settling Turkish villages and disrupting the connection and unity between them, roads, bridges, passes and agriculture should be improved". Because if the people were conscripted seeing that nothing was being done, they may have been fooled by the propaganda of foreign powers, saying "What have the Turks done to you, everything is in ruins and they will conscript your young people and kill them" and they may have revolted, and it would then be difficult to suppress the revolt because they would have been practiced in warfare.[76]

Karabekir's policy of civilization, which incorporated the Ottoman experience and whose parallels with the Republic were evident, and which he proposed during the course of the war of indepence, also involved the reorganization of space and population, which was articulated with the issue of security within historical continuity, and included the dominance of the Turkish population in the region, military administration, public works and agricultural policies. The Karabekir report tells the story of the state formation in Kurdistan in 1920/21 in

74 Kâzım Karabekir, *Kürt Meselesi,* (İstanbul: Emre Yayınları, 1994), 45.

75 Ibid., 46-47.

76 Ibid., 48-49. Karabekir, complaining that not enough measures were taken for the "rehabilitation of the Kurds", states that "these Kurds can also do dangerous things", because the reason why they did not rebel in the War of Independence was "due to the fundamental measures taken by him personally and the fact that this environment, in which he had been involved since he was a child and which had been under his command during the World War, remained respectful to him". Because "personal trust in them is as effective as measures!" he adds. Ibid., 157.

the context of state-society relations, reflecting the very delicate forms of alliance, incompatibility and deep mistrust between the two, and the tactics by which this could be overcome, from a military security and colonial point of view.

Immediately after Karabekir, the Ankara government's Deputy Minister of Health and Social Welfare, Rıza Nur, also a prominent Turkist, asked Gökalp, the author of the above formulation, to conduct research into how Kurdish tribes could be represented and "tamed" and "how to save the Turks who had become Kurds under their auspices", fearing that "Kurds would take up the national cause". In his letter to Gökalp, he wrote, "Kurdistan is not out of our hands yet. But we have left the Turks in the homeland to Kurdification".[77] In 1926, Nur parted ways with the RPP government. The centuries-long "Kurdification" of the Turkish population in Eastern Anatolia, where Kurds and Kurdish-speaking populations predominated," which is also an important theme in this thesis, points to the debate and problem that marked the Republic on the axis of how Kurds could be Turkified. Gökalp then conducted his famous research titled Sociological Investigations on Kurdish Tribes (*Kürt Aşiretleri Hakkında Sosyolojik Tetkikler*) in which he examined in detail the Kurdish population, which he positioned as a separate ethnic group, that had previously been Turkish but had been forced to become Kurdish, and concluded that the establishment of relations between the state and the Kurds could not overcome the strong tribal system.[78] For this to happen, in addition to civilization practices such as the sedentarization of the nomadic population attached to the tribe, he reiterates - with more detailed cultural, social and linguistic empirical evidence - that since Kurds and Turks, whose religions and cultural values cannot be separated apart from their languages, and have been living for centuries by adopting each other's ethnic identity, the Turkification of the Kurds is possible and, especially in this age of nationalism, is a must.[79]

77 Ziya Gökalp "Kürt Aşiretleri Hakkında Sosyolojik Tetkikler", In *Kitaplar*, 559-629.

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid., 559. In his article titled "Istimlal" (assimilation), written from 1923 and especially in his last year of life after the proclamation of the Republic, Gökalp reiterates that the

As for the Republic, it can be determined that the Kurdish policy of the nation-state, which included the transfer of the Ottoman citizen Muslims and their ethnic heterogeneity, expressed through populism, to ethnic and religious homogeneity, did not suddenly begin to emerge, but inherited the Ottoman experience and the prescriptions offered by Karabekir and Gökalp, as mentioned above. The difference between the two has been identified in this study as the emphasis on security-oriented civilization and the security-motivated policy of cultural representation, which would continue in reports of the Republican period. Although Gökalp proposed a similar policy of civilization, it is possible to observe that he suggested more emphatically the management of the Kurds by assimilating them into a national Turkishness, while Karabekir proposed a policy based on the subjugation and management of the Kurdish population with a military, administrative, demographic and socio-economic focus rather than cultural measures. As a result, we see that the central and local rulers of the early republic tried to implement the politics of appropriation, representation, resettlement and reparation with changing priorities, more modern, comprehensive, organized and "sophisticated" methods of power that would include both continuities and ruptures with the past.

Perhaps more pointedly and harshly than the Ottoman experience, it can be said that the relationship between a significant intersection of the Kurds and the state had evolved into an axis of division and conflict. The Treaty of Lausanne, the Declaration of the Republic, the abolition of the Caliphate, the new legal, political, cultural, social, economic and citizenship regime articulated with the new constitution had further

fact that Kurds and Turks had stood side by side in wars for centuries, that they belonged to the same religion and culture, and that they could easily become subordinate to each other, as was the case with the tribes in *Vilayat-Şarkiyye,* necessitated the "istimlal" of Kurds to Turkishness. Gökalp, "Istimlal", Articles VII, cited in Rohat, *Ziya Gökalp'in Büyük Çilesi, Kürtler*, (İstanbul: Fırat Yayınları, 1992), 98-101. In his article "Türk kimdir?" (Who is a Turk?), he expresses in a more commanding tone that the "istimlal" of Kurds and other Muslims in the new Turkey is now a necessity for them. Gökalp, "Türk Kimdir?", *Articles IX* in Rohat, *Ziya Gökalp'in Büyük Çilesi, Kürtler,* 101-103.

shaken the order of relations that had reached conflictual dimensions in the previous century. While a portion of the Kurdish side continued to look for allegiance, the responses and reactions of an influential minority evolved into armed rebellion and resistance. The reasons for this were Mustafa Kemal's decentralist messages, such as the promise of local autonomy seen in the Ottoman period, the recognition of traditional authorities in the region, the explicit or implicit promises such as calling them the people of Turkey instead of Turks, and mention of the Islamic alliance to save the homeland from Christians, alongside Kurdish nationalist and Islamist politicization.

Citizenship, which legally forms the state-society relationship, seems to have been one of the areas of tension toward a citizenship based on homogenous national identity and secularism. For, as Üstel points out, "the nationalism on which Turkish citizenship is based, on the one hand, offers an "inclusive" identity that unites different ethnicities under the super-identity of "Turkish" instead of Islam and the Ottoman Empire, similar to the French and Western European understanding of nationalism and republican citizenship. On the other hand, it places the language and culture of the Turkish ethnicity at the center of the collective culture, even though it explicitly states that it is based on descent".[80]

Those who were dissatisfied or disillusioned with these transformations faced purges, quit the regime and their posts, or sought to establish legal organizations, leading to more violent and armed reactions, especially in the Kurdish provinces. Of the law-breaking "18 incidents" that took place, 16 of them, excluding Menemen and the Nestorian Uprising, were accepted or introduced as rebellions based on the Kurdish population, some of which were declared to be rebellions.[81] In my opinion, some of these revolts were motivated by Kurdish

80 Füsun Üstel, "Türk Milliyetçiliği ya da Vatandaşlığın Kültürel Boyutu", in *Türkiye'nin Kürt Sorunu,* (İstanbul: Türkiye Sosyal Ekonomik Siyasal Araştırmalar Vakfı-TÜSES, 1996), 29-30.

81 Mahmut Akyürekli, *Kürtler ve Türkler, Bin Yıllık Geçmişin Kısa Tarihi*, (İstanbul: Tarih Kulübü Yayınları, 2016), 163-164.

nationalism, religious motives, recognition of the authority of traditional local authorities, the continuity and change of the socio-economic structure, centralist practices such as compulsory taxation and military service, and they also developed on the axis of daily tensions.[82] State officials were engaged in intense activity and debate on how to suppress armed rebellion, civil resistance and forms of reaction, the most effective of which were the Sheikh Said Rebellion (1925), the Ararat Rebellion (1927-30) and Dersim (1937-38), how to control and contain the Kurdish population in the new nation-state, and how to demonstrate and assert "state power" in the East. In this process, the discourse of "reforming the East", which started to become more prominent in the 19th century, came to the fore in terms of the penetration of state institutions in the region, their control over the region and, in parallel, the nation-building process. In this context, the successive operations of the army forces in the 1920s and 1930s under the name of "tenkil ve tedip harekâtleri" (the transfer of the population/training and punishment of the population) -an Ottoman-era imperial strategy- became routine, against everyday forms of unarmed resistance, against the expectation of resistance, or against places that were perceived as not submitting to state authority.[83]

In this process, in addition to high security and resettlement policies, the decision and opinion, which was always more prominent in the "internal agenda" of the Unionists, to remain within an ultra-security state of exception regime, to ensure dominance of the Turkish population in this direction, the exile of the Kurdish population to the West, the "representation of Kurds to Turkishness" (assimilation), and to make the politics of culture, society and space based on temdin (civilization) more effective in practice, came to the fore. On the other hand, the punitive security-fixated perspective of Çakmak, the Chief of General Staff, with its "separation policy", which was mostly directed in a stringent manner against Kurdish participation and development, was

82 For a source about the military perspective on that issue see *Genelkurmay Belgelerinde Kürt İsyanları*, vol. I/II, (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2011).

83 See ibid.; Mete Tunçay, *Tek Parti*, 127-128.

also dominant.[84] The axes of discussion within state officials were, roughly speaking, the limits of the dosage of violence, how and to what extent assimilation and civilization would be realized, what the politics of development and investment would be, with whom they would cooperate, and the limits of local participation in this process. Based on my historical analysis I argue that the state officials were not absolutely homogeneous on these issues.

However, in the face of forms of rebellion, disobedience and resistance against the sovereignty of the state, a process began in which the "tacit contract"[85] that had been the Ottoman policy of establishing negotiation lines and "making concessions", sometimes accompanied by a violent response, became invalidated. The nation-state model, motivated by colonialism in the era, being on the pendulum of the politics of separation and homogenisation of the Kurds, based on more uncompromising violence was legitimised by security-centered prescriptions that spanned culture, society and space. In fact, the dismissal of Fethi Okyar by Mustafa Kemal and the appointment of Ismet Inönü as prime minister, who was expected to intervene more forcefully, at the outbreak of the Sheikh Said Rebellion, is an important indication that there was not much scope for any other method. More "moderate" methods would be discussed in later years when open resistance and rebellions were pacified.

84 It should be added that Kazım Karabekir, the leader of the Progressive Republican Party, which was able to remain in opposition for a short period of time and was shut down in the process of silencing all opposition with the extraordinary regime after the Sheikh Said Rebellion, had also previously defended this view.

85 Bozarslan states that even in the past series of rebellions in which the 19th century Kurdish local authorities' reaction to centralization and related modernization was dominant, the Ottoman state authorities did not react as harshly as the Republican administration and did not engage in massacres. This is because there was a "tacit contract" between the state and the local authorities on how this process would proceed, and the "tacit contract" was based on years of "rebellion followed by negotiation" and did not involve such massive massacres. Bozarslan, “Türkiye’de Kürt Milliyetçiliği: Zımni Sözleşmeden Ayaklanmaya (1919-1925)”.

2.2.2 *The Plan for the Reform in the East, General Inspectorship and Turkish Hearths*

It is certain that 1925 was a critical year in the reproduction and institutionalization of the social, demographic, cultural and economic engineering project, to incorporate the Vilayat-ı Şarkiyye and Kurdistan into the new nation-state and keep them under control.

In the spring of that year, the Sheikh Said Rebellion, led by the *Azadî* (Freedom-Liberation) organization, reached the gates of Diyarbakır, and all the communities in Elazığ, Diyarbakır and Bingöl, where it took place or which were affected, were declared "criminal spaces" and all of its protagonists were declared "criminal elements". Traumatizing public order practices were implemented, in which thousands of people, both armed and civilian, were killed by intense military violence and whole villages were wiped out. Sheikhs, tribal chiefs and others with local influence and leadership, directly or not directly related to the rebellion, were exiled to western provinces, and their lands were taken away from them. Micro rebellions and resistances against the nation-state and instances of "disobedience against the might of the state" would justify the terrorization of the entire Kurdish area and the regime's militarization and police authoritarianism.[86] As such, the rebellion became an excuse for a comprehensive intimidation campaign by the administration that spread across the country.[87]

86 For the Sheikh Said Rebellion, see Robert Olson, *The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880-1925*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989). Tunçay, 127-149; For specifically the post-rebellion forced resettlement practices, see. Uğur Ümit Üngör, Modern Türkiye'nin İnşası, *Doğu Anadolu'da Ulus, Devlet, Şiddet* (1913-1950), (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2016), 216-256. On the terrifying violence of the state's practices after the Kurdish rebeillons or disobedience as the "integrated colonial practices" see Naif Bezwan, "The State and Violence in Kurdistan: A Conceptual Framework", *Kurdish Studies* 9, no. 1, (May 2021): 11-36

87 The Sheikh Said Rebellion became an important argument for the consolidation of authoritarian and centralist state rule and modernization across the country. The Takrir-i Sükun Law was used as a legal basis to go beyond the suppression of opposition and resistance against the authoritarian regime and modernization across the country. In addition to the Azadi movement that organized the Sheikh Said Rebellion, the newly

The Court for the Reform in the East (Şark Islahat Mahkemesi), established after the uprising, declared that it had concluded that the rebellion was "a national movement under the guise of religion". Faced for the first time with a widespread uprising with a national context based on the Kurds, which had not received much social support until then, the rulers of the nation-state concentrated on the eradication of Kurdism and Kurdish ethnic existence, and the urgent rehabilitation of the East. In this context, central state administrators traveled to the Orient and Kurdistan, to *survey and inspect* the region and prepare reports. Among these reports, Mustafa Abdulhalik Renda's report points out that "special attention should be paid to education...in order to teach Turkish and to turn away from Kurdish tendencies towards Turkism". Cemil Uybadin's report, on the other hand, emphasized that "a strong national organization and educational propaganda would eliminate the concept of Kurdism".[88] *The Council for the Reform in the East* (Şark Islahat Encümeni), composed of high-ranking political and military officials such as the prime minister and the chief of general staff, combined these reports into The Plan for Reform in the East which can be considered as the reference document for these policies and the subsequent series of Eastern/Kurdish reports.[89] The plan, which had a very broad scope, and included severe administrative techniques and practices that were urgently demanded to be put into practice, included the administration of the Kurdish-populated provinces east of the Euphrates by the General Inspectorate, the exclusion of Kurds from the civil service, the declaration of the region as a restricted area to be entered and left only with permission, the prohibition of non-Turkish languages and Kurdish, and the punishment of those who spoke these languages. In addition, within

established opposition party, the Progressive Republican Party (PRP) and the press were also included in this suppression operation. For more on this topic see Hakan Özoğlu, *Cumhuriyet Kuruluşunda İktidar Kavgası, 150'likler, Takrir-i Sükun ve İzmir Suikastı,* (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2016).

88 See. Mehmet Bayrak ed., *Kürtler ve Ulusal Demokratik Mücadeleleri: Gizli Belgeler-Araştırmalar-Notlar*, (Ankara: Özge Yayınları, 1993), 460, 475.

89 Mehmet Bayrak, *Kürtlere Vurulan Kelepçe, Şark Islahat Planı.* (Ankara: Özge Yayınları, 2009).

the scope of the population change, it included provisions such as forced resettlement in the western provinces, as well as the Turkification of the region's population through the resettlement of Turkish immigrants, the refusal to give the *emval-i metruke* (abandoned property) of the Armenians to the Kurds, and the construction of state buildings and railways to ensure the visibility of the state.

The central state administrators who prepared and approved the plan, aimed to continue imposing physical violence and coercion with impunity, by establishing a state of emergency regime. Secondly, it can be clearly seen that the policy of not only open physical violence, but also the violent and forced pruning and appropriation of the political, economic, cultural and spatial capitals of the Kurdish ethnicity, especially those who were considered to be disloyal to the state, was to be made systematic and sustainable. In this sense, the aim was to end the authority of the Kurdish elites and factions with political, religious, socio-economic, cultural and military power, influence and authority, as well as establishing a monopoly of violence, thereby disrupting the systems and forms of Kurdish ethnic relations considered uncivilized, by eliminating local power centers equivalent to the state. These aims became discursive, especially in the state discourse of the 1920s and 1930s, with a strong historical memory of the policies of *temsil* (assimilation), *temdin* (civilization-civilizing), *tenkil* and *tedip* (taming-training-chastening).[90]

It can be read as a redesign of the old forms of alliances, conflicts and negotiations with the Kurdish elites and various social and cultural subjects, within the changing power relations and dynamics and in a distinct nation-state format, as was the case during the Ottoman Empire, the CUP era and the national struggle for independence. With the principles of political populism, social populism and egalitarian republican citizenship, the Republic's imagined new East, in which "colonial-style rule" with its ambiguous and contradictory points could be openly defended, entered the process of being established. In addition, the boundaries with the state, which was becoming a nation-state, were rigorously reformulated in terms of where the relationship between the

90 Ibid.

Kurds and the state and between the Orient and the state could begin and end. All these formulations, as we have seen in the case of the People's Houses, would come into existence through local and central historical dynamics, discourses and practices, interventions by historical actors, and power relations, not only at the macro but also at the everyday and micro levels.

Perhaps one of the actors that most determined the boundaries of the relationship with the state in question was the General Inspectorate Organization (Umumi/Genel Müfettişlik Teşkilatı), established in 1927 with the aim of governing the region and parts of the country with extraordinary military and administrative powers and control. The first of the inspectorates, which was reminiscent of colonial governorships as the local representative of the central government, covered the nine Eastern provinces of Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Van, Bitlis, Muş, Siirt, Mardin, Urfa and Karaköse (so far Ağrı), which were governed under martial law, with the highest proportion of the Kurdish population. The Diyarbakır-based First General Inspectorate was headed by İbrahim Tali Öngören, who had served as a military physician in the army, and was elected as an MP for Diyarbakır in 1932. In addition to the First General Inspectorate, four more general inspectorate regions would be established in most of the East and in a significant part of the Thrace and Eastern Black Sea regions on the grounds of "insurrection, non-compliance with state authority, border security, ethnic and religious heterogeneity".[91]

If we present official data on the Kurdish-speaking population in this period, according to the 1927 and 1935 censuses' "division by language", 1,844,446 out of a total population of 13,629,488 in the 1927 census and 1,430,246 out of a total population of 16,157,450 in 1935 declared that their mother tongue was Kurdish. Approximately 70 percent of Kurdish

91 Tunçay, *Tek Parti Yönetimi*, 127-183. The Elazığ-based Fourth General Inspectorate, established in 1935 to replace the Dersim province due to security concerns, included Tunçeli and Bingöl. The Third General Inspectorate would include Erzurum, Kars, Çoruh (Artvin), Gümüşane, Trabzon and later Ağrı. For the general inspectorates, see also Cemil Koçak, *Umumi Müfettişlikler (1923-1952),* (İstanbul: İletişim yayınları, 2003), ed. Bülent Varlık, *Umumi Müfettişler Toplantı Tutanakları-1936*, (Ankara: Dipnot Yayınları, 2010).

speakers said that they did not speak Turkish, while those whose mother tongue was Kurdish were the group with the lowest rate of knowing Turkish. It is observed that 75 percent of these people lived in the provinces identified as the Eastern and Southeastern Regions.[92] In the 1927 census, Kurdish speakers constituted the majority in the eight provinces of the First General Inspectorate, which was established in the same year and included Diyarbakır, Urfa, Bitlis, Ağrı, Mardin, Siirt, Van and Hakkâri. According to the figures, out of a total population of 850,000 in these provinces, 543,000 spoke Kurdish, 206,000 Turkish and 100,000 Arabic as a first language. There were 1,318 Armenian speakers and 296 Greek speakers.[93]

Table 2.1 Population ratios in the provinces with the highest Kurdish population density from the report of I. Inspector Avni Doğan, 1943.

City	Kurdish	Turkish
Hakkari	98.85%	0.45%
Bingöl	94.40%	4.66%
Van	74.57%	24.55%
Diyarbakır	70.41%	28.10%
Siirt	64.40%	19.41%
Bitlis	67.74%	27.70%
Muş	64.70%	31.96%
Urfa	61.80%	32.77%
Mardin	61.80%	11.60%
Elazığ	51.88%	47,60%

SOURCE: Belma Akçura, *Devletin Kürt Filmi, 1925-2011 Kürt Raporları*, 3rd edition, (İstanbul: Postiga Yayınları, 2014), 149.

92 Fuat Dündar, *Türkiye Nüfus Sayımlarında Azınlıklar,* (İstanbul: Doz Yayınları, 1999), 101-16.

93 See Bülent Varlık, ed., *Umumi Müfettişler Toplantı Tutanakları-1936*, 119.

Even after the plan, in the reports of prime ministers, ministers, the chief of general staff, general inspectors, senior members of the army, the gendarmerie general command, senior politicians, MPs and RPP inspectors, the emphasis on a more civilian administrative approach occasionally emerged. However, it should be noted that there was a consensus on the administration of the region by the general inspectorates that began to break down after 1945, when single-party rule ended. In addition to the General Inspectorate Organization, when it was reopened in 1923, the Turkish Hearths, which Mustafa Kemal charged with the "mission of introducing Turks to themselves", were intended to spread rapidly.[94] During a visit by the Turkish Hearths officials in the days following the Sheikh Said Rebellion, in which it could be easily observed that the state officials were in a very angry mood, Prime Minister İnönü, who ordered the suppression of the rebellion with great violence, declared that "the administrative policy of the state is to realize Turkish nationalization by violence and force":[95]

In such a political atmosphere, the Turkish Hearths interpreted İnönü's message correctly, organized demonstrations condemning the rebellion, and began to adopt the mission of "introducing Turkishness to Turks" as well as "forcing Kurds to adopt Turkishness", that is, representation/assimilation in the *Vilayat'ı Şarkiyye*. In this period, on

94 Üstel, Türk Ocakları, 126. Mustafa Kemal's statement actually reminds us of the process of "Frenchization of the peasants", which, as E. Weber points out, was undertaken in western countries such as France, especially through education, in response to their lack of national consciousness and their inability to lead a civilized life. According to Weber, in late 19th century France, teaching French peasants the new French language was an important aspect of nationalizing and "civilizing" them. Eugene Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen, *The Modernisation of Rural France 1870-1914*, (Stanford University Press, 1976).

95 "Nationality is our only means of association. Other nationalities have no influence over the Turkish majority. Our duty is to make all those in the Turkish homeland Turks. We will cut out those who will oppose Turks and Turkism. The qualities we will look for in those who will serve the homeland is that they are Turks and Turkists...We understand that if the politics of religion is a politics of command, the politics of nationality is a politics of administration." *Vakit*, 27 April 1925, cited in Füsun Üstel, "Türk Milliyetçiliği ya da Vatandaşlığın Kültürel Boyutu", 31.

the other hand, the Turkish Hearths began to adapt to and accept the control of the post-republican single-party RPP.[96] At its congresses in 1924, 1925 and 1927, when the direct control of the RPP through inspectors became legal, and then at its congress in 1928, the articles of its charter gradually began to conform to the RPP line. In this respect, it began to shift away from the irredentist and Turanist line and toward defining Turkish national identity not only on the basis of race and blood ties, but also on the basis of cultural identity.[97] In this context, the fiery debates around the question "Who is a Turk?" at the first General Congress of the Turkish Hearths in 1924, were a turning point.[98] Those led by "Ocak" President Tanrıöver took a stand in favor of the acceptance of non-Turkish ethnic groups and individuals, including non-Muslim communities, as Turks, as long as they adopted the Turkish culture and language, that is, as long as they assimilated to Turkishness, and declared that one of the new duties of the Hearths would be "the duty of *temsil*".[99] In response to a delegate's question "is what the people call a Turk called a Turk?", the delegate stated that "the people discriminate some elements of Turkish origin living in various parts of Anatolia under the names of Laz, Circassian, Kurdish, etc., therefore, taking such a criterion as a basis would lead to harmful consequences, and that the duty of the Turkish Hearths was to increase the number of Turks, not to decrease it", which is an example of the inconsistent nature of Turkish nationalism based on lineage. Although inclusive, assimilationist cultural nationalism

96 Türk Ocakları nizamnameleri için see İbrahim Karaer, *Türk Ocakları (1912-1931),* (Ankara: Türk Yurdu Neşriyatı, 1992) 30-31.

97 Before the republic, the Turkish Hearths first announced its purpose as "to work for the unity and civilization of the Turkish nationality among Turks all over the world", but later declared its purpose as "to strengthen national consciousness, to ensure civilized and sanitary development and to develop the national economy". Thus, it evolved into the RPP's line of nationalism, populism, national economics and "national public education". It also signals a break with Turanist Turkism by stating that its field of activity would be within the borders of the Republic of Turkey. Ibid. 31.

98 Birinci Türk Ocakları Umumi Kongresi Zabıtları, (İstanbul: 1924)

99 Ibid., 45-46. Tanrıöver, the president of the Turkish Hearths, said, "If the Hearths do not have a representative duty, it means that we do not trust our own fire and strength." Ibid.

and the policy of Turkification of the population were being pursued, being Turkish by descent was considered acceptable, important and dominant.[100]

Article 15 of The Plan for the Reform in the East adopted in 1925, also emphasized the necessity of founding Turkish Hearths before schools: "Turkish Hearths and schools should be opened in areas that were originally Turkish but are about to become Kurdish, and in Arabic-speaking areas such as Siirt, Mardin and Savur".[101] After that, the number of Turkish Centers, which had been minimal, would gradually increase in the East and would be financially supported.[102] In fact, 40 percent of the 250 branches opened between 1925 and 1931 in cities and some towns were on the eastern side of the line north and south between Trabzon and Adana, where the goal was to Turkify even the Greek-speaking population.[103] At the 1926 Congress, where the issue of the Orient and *temsil* was an important agenda item, the Laz, Georgians and Circassians speaking their own languages and the "Greek voices" of the Balkan immigrant Bosniaks and Albanians in the cities were raised as problems, but the biggest problem was the dominance of Kurdish in the Orient.[104] The delegates of the Eastern provinces pointed out that 50 percent of the population in Mardin did not speak Turkish, that the entire population of Siirt spoke Kurdish and Arabic, that the regions of Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Urfa, Siverek and Karacadağ were completely Kurdified, and that as much as 30 percent of the population consisted of Kurdified Turks.[105]

100 Birinci Türk Ocakları Umumi Kongresi Zabıtları, 50.

101 M. Bayrak, Kürtlere Vurulan Kelepçe, 130.

102 Georgeon, "Kemalist Dönemde Türk Ocakları (1923-1931)", in *Osmanlı-Türk* Modernleşmesi, 59.

103 Ibid, 43-44.

104 Ibid. 58.

105 At this congress, the prevalence of Arabic in Adana was identified as another problem, and it was pointed out that there was a serious problem of public order and disobedience to the state in the Orient: for example, in Siirt, 5,000 suspects and criminals had taken refuge in the mountains and there were as many armed deserters. Ibid.

At the 1926 congress of the Hearths which I mentioned above, Sami Bey, a delegate from Bitlis, proposed the establishment of a special Turkish Hearth organization for the Eastern provinces, with the Ahlat district, symbolized in the People's House reports as the "center of Turkishness" where Turkish was spoken the most, as its center. He also called for a 5 percent budget to be allocated to this organization, and for a Hearth building to be constructed in Ahlat. By saying that with the help of the building to be constructed, "we will save the Turks here who are doomed to Kurdification we will take the Turks who are tainted with Kurdishness into our hands and we will ensure a significant Turkish majority in the Eastern provinces", he seemed to be responding to the concerns of Rıza Nur and Gökalp that were mentioned above.[106] Perhaps due to this demand, in 1926, the Turkish Hearths established the "Eastern Bureau" in Ankara to deal specifically with the problems of the Eastern provinces. In the same year, it was decided that 5 percent of the income of all the Hearths would be allotted to the Eastern branches.[107]

On the other hand, the Bitlis delegate suggested that this policy should be reinforced with a resettlement policy. This proposal coincided with the repression (tedip) of the rebellions and resistance (1926-1930) centered on Mount Ararat, in which reactions to the anti-centralist, socio-economic policies of secular Kurdish nationalists in the leadership were also shaped by tribal positioning and the mass murder of thousands of villagers in the Zilan Valley in the Van Erciş region, followed by the

106 Üstel, *Türk Ocakları*, 307. It was a dominant tendency to define nationalism and membership of a nation in terms of cultural nationalism, which could be realized through assimilation, and to evaluate the "Kurdishized Turks in the Eastern provinces" on the basis of their Turkish ancestry. However, from the perspective of cultural nationalism, if they were culturally Kurdified, it was possible for them to be accepted as Kurds. Or there was a similar contradiction between "Turkified Kurds" and Kurds who were said to be Turkish by descent and discriminated against in practice. This is a striking feature of the state's Turkish nationalism and citizenship, which included both cultural nationalism and nationalism based on lineage and blood, and the use of one or the other depending on the situation. For a discussion on this issue, see Tanıl Bora, "İnşa Döneminde Türk Milli Kimliği", *Toplum ve Bilim*, no: 71, (Winter 1996):168-194.

107 Georgeon, "Kemalist Dönemde Türk Ocakları (1923-1931)", 59.

transfer of the population to western provinces (tenkil).[108] Like the leaders of the People's Houses, most of whom were civil servants, the delegates of the Turkish Hearths shared the same emphasis on population and resettlement policy in the Turkification of the region.

In the Turkish Hearths, a proposal specific to the Orient was put on the agenda, that the "backward" Eastern and Central Anatolia, where Kurdish was predominant but historically heterogeneous and also linguistically/culturally/religiously heterogeneous, should be kept separate and that "special delegations with selected militants should be sent to these regions to train them for the most advanced Hearths".[109]

These proposals, evaluations, and "different from the West" institutions and arrangements, such as the Eastern bureau in the Turkish Hearths, continued in the People's Houses in the twelve Eastern provinces. The inspection of the Houses by the General Inspectorates, which institutionalized martial law, as well as the RPP's special "inspection instructions" seem to be related to the perception and

108 For the Ağrı Rebellions see. Rohat Alakom, *Hoybun Örgütü ve Ağrı Ayaklanması*, (İstanbul: Avesta Yayınları, 2020).

109 Georgeon, "Kemalist Dönemde Türk Ocakları (1923-1931)", 60. The motion drew attention to the problem of the "number of conscious personnel" in the localities, mostly civil servants, which was also raised in the reports of the People's Houses in the East, as was the problem of the existing ones transforming the local environment instead of transforming it themselves, and the drawbacks of being intellectual-centered. İbid. According to Mehmet Emin Erişgil, one of the active leaders of the Hearths, "the Eastern Hearths required the mobilization of other means and the development of a new type of militant, close to the "missionary", fully dedicated to the cause of Turkishness". Moreover, the objectives of the Hearths in the western provinces and those in the East had to be different: "In the Eastern provinces, the Hearths are a very important field of activity for strengthening national unity and spreading the Turkish culture and the true and pure Turkish language. (...) As for the Hearths in the Eastern provinces, the clear direction to be given to them should be to help the intellectual and physical upbringing of the youth... "On the other hand, Erişgil complains that the explicit purpose of the Hearths in the Western provinces was not fully grasped and that they were only intended to be used as "clubs" and that the "training and education" seen in this Society was neglected in the Hearths, citing the example of the Sokol Society in Czechoslovakia, which also inspired the People's Houses. However, he adds, "an association that is a national temple cannot be transformed into a 'club'." Üstel, *Türk Ocakları*, 228-229.

reproduction of the Eastern/Kurdish area as a "sensitive and dangerous" region, disconnected and different from the rest of the country, which needed to be managed and inspected in a special way because it could not be internalized, and was "open to the influences of the Kurdish national cause".

The need for more detailed research on the activities of the Turkish Hearths in the provinces that are the focus of this research is also evident in this study. However, even with this much data, it can be clearly seen that from 1927, when its ties with the RPP were officially strengthened, until 1931, it was in cooperation with the main policy, especially in the East.[110] We observe that delegates and members, most of whom were already in line with the CUP, continued as administrators and members of the Turkish Hearths. However, even though the Hearths gradually developed an image in line with the RPP, they were forced to be dissolved due to multiple reasons, such as the fact that they had members who supported the Free Party[111] in the municipal elections of 1931, that "politics interfered" with the Hearths, a cultural institution, and that they could not be supervised and made operational by the Party due to their autonomous structure.[112] It would be replaced by a more pro-regime, direct representative and executive institution of the party-state, a cultural institution focused on "national popular upbringing" under the direct management of RPP members and civil servants who were considered natural members. In terms of a search for a more centralized

110 Hasan Reşit Tankut, who was appointed as the Eastern Regional Inspector of the Turkish Hearths at the 1930 Assembly of the Turkish Hearths, stated that, although the teaching of the Turkish language and culture to the eastern population was still limited, there had been progress in the construction of the Hearth buildings, their financial autonomy and various cultural and social activities, and he painted a more "optimistic" picture in terms of the Turkification of the Kurds and the region. Georgeon, "Kemalist Dönemde Türk Ocakları (1923-1931)", 60.

111 For the Free Party, see Cem Emrence, *99 Günlük Muhalefet, Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası*, 4th ed., (İstanbul: İleitişim Yayınları, 2021).

112 For the reasons for the closure of the Turkish Hearths, see. Georgeon, Kemalist Dönemde Türk Ocakları (1923-1931)", 67-72; Üstel, *Türk Ocakları*, 321-286; Şimşek, *Bir İdeolojik Seferberlik Denemesi*, 28-43.

and widespread Turkification and civilization policy in which "politics will not be involved" in the Kurdish/Orient issue, the closure of the Turkish Hearths was likely to be effective.

2.2.3 *Ambivalent Trajectories of Statecraft on the Drastic Solution of the "Kurdishness Issue"*

By the mid-1930s, the more central issue of how to achieve lasting forms of overt or covert resistance, disobedience and non-compliance from members of the Kurdish society, in reaction to the more radically centralizing and inclusive violent modern state practices of the nation-state was being debated. On the other hand, explicit violent acts, such as the removal and relocation of bodies, as well as forms of political, social and cultural symbolic violence based on prohibition and coercion, were considered to be difficult for the state to use to gain widespread political, social and cultural legitimacy, through the forced dissemination of these methods of domination and control.

The Kurds, one of the pioneering warrior communities of the empire, consisting of tribal and kinship-oriented communities, turned into an insecure and dangerous other for the state in this period, with their attitudes and actions, which were challenging the state's monopoly on violence and control.[113] They had been living intensively for centuries in a certain territory with strong ethnic relations, and began to galvanize more prominently as a reaction to Turkish nationalism and the nation-state. Moreover, the fact that the Kurds within the Turkish nation-state had real and metaphorical relations and interactions with the Kurdish minorities in Syria, Iraq, Iran and the Soviet Union was also "worrisome" for their calls for nationhood. This process seems to have led the state rulers to the search for a permanent and sustainable solution not only to

113 The sharing of the monopoly of violence with the local Kurdish armed forces, famous for their "warriorism", with concrete and implicit agreements that became more evident in the 1500s, became a problem for the modern state. It can be clearly observed in the events of the period and their interpretations that the evolution of the practice of compulsory military service in the formation of the nation-state was an important breaking point for both sides as to who would control the land and space.

Kurdism but also to the "Kurdish issue", that is, the weakening and suppression of the ethnic and national existence of the Kurds. Also in Kurdish terrain modern types of responses started to rised.

Therefore, as would become more evident in the 1940s, predominantly "civilian" bureaucrats and politicians, and military officers and those with military backgrounds who cared about legitimacy in the social sphere, considered how more sophisticated and organized spatial, symbolic and cultural techniques of violence and power could be incorporated alongside physical violence. These discussions did not analyze the failure of military violence, but rather how to construct political, social and cultural legitimacies to match it, at a time when populism was also a motor discourse. It was not that the state was successful or unsuccessful or simply incompetent in these practices, but rather, with reference to Eriksen, it can be said that in this case the state again played a productive role in redefining the boundaries of a broader production of violence and legitimate capitals and diffrent segments of Kurdish etnicitiy responded and challenged complicately across them.[114]

On the other hand, it is not difficult to link this process with the formation of a state based on a "radically assimilationist and hierarchical understanding of culture" that would become a new source of governance and legitimacy and a criterion for citizens' participation in the state and the public sector, in an environment of increasing economic crisis after the world economic crisis of 1929, which was felt throughout the country.[115] As the new agenda of the 1930s, the conceptions of culture in the tension between culture and civilization identifying with the West, and the establishment of a cultural power regime based on it, began to take precedence over the earlier civilizing reforms and socio-economic infrastructural transformation that had accelerated in the years after 1923. In the 1930s, producing the imagined modern and national subject by applying a cultural "identity" not only to those who were seen as linguistically and ethnically different, but also to those who

114 Eriksen, “State Failure’ in Theory and Practice”.

115 Yılmaz Çolak, *Türkiye’de Kültürel İktidarın Kuruluşu, 1923-1945*, (Ankara: Liberte Yayınları, 2017) 19-28.

were considered Turkish, became an important goal. There was now a more consolidated administration of scientific discourse, reforms and regulations under the leadership of the party-state, and the emergence of new institutionalizations in all fields, in addition to the People's Houses, the TLA and the Turkish Historical Society (Türk Tarih Kurumu). It was thought that realization of these formations at local, daily and micro levels would produce more lasting results. This can be called a period in which the proposals in the The Plan for the Reform in the East, a manifesto of regulation for the Kurds and the East, were reorganized in such a way that the settlement of the "Kurdishness issue" was legitimized, by entering into detailed, micro, everyday life, while the process of the construction of Turkishness was accomplished through scientific and institutional legitimacy.

For example, Prime Minister İnönü, in his 1935 report after his trip to the East, continued to include railways and other development proposals that prioritized military techniques, but would provide military and economic access within the scope of civilization. However, his main emphasis was that these and other measures were aimed at resolving the Kurdism and "Kurdishness issue" (Kürtlük Meselesi). In this context, he stated that it was imperative to establish centers of Turkishness such as Diyarbakır, Bitlis and Van, which would ensure that "Turkishness and the Turkish population prevail" in the region. This is the changement of the "millet-i hakime" concept in Ottoman time. From now on, only Turks could be *millet-i hakime*. In order to rescue the "Turks left to Kurdification" it is necessery dominate the Kurds and other ethnic groups. Secondly, he emphasized practices of administrative division, such as the Turkification of the Kurdish population by deporting them to places with Turkish culture, and changing the borders of provinces such as Erzincan, in favor of reducing the Kurdish population, which were also seen in the 1934 Settlement Law.[116] In his "Oriental Report" of 1936, Celal Bayar, the Minister of Economy who would become Prime Minister a year later and oversee the eradication of Dersim, argued that not only military order and resettlement policies, but also a broad and inclusive

116 Saygı Öztürk, *İsmet Paşa'nın Kürt Raporu*, 5th ed. (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2008).

policy of assimilation and civilization, such as the mobilization of economic resources in the East in favor of the state and the people, and socio-economic and cultural/educational development, would ensure the state's penetration into the region. [117]

Within this line, it is possible to see the traces of the "politics of separation" in the *Şark Islahat Planı*, which envisaged an intensive Turkification and the production of citizens loyal to the state through recruitment, by establishing centers of Turkishness, providing primary school education mainly in Turkish villages, and investing in boarding schools. Although İnönü later showed a tendency toward more inclusive assimilation, he seemed to have been closer to the view that the Turkish population was gaining dominance, that they were conceived as the state elite, and that Kurds could only be admitted into the state and legitimate socio-economic and cultural sphere with a strong allegiance to Turkishness and state authority through a level-headed choice, and that they could benefit from equal and rights-based citizenship only in this way. This seems to have marked the 1930s more forcibly.[118]

The days-long General Inspectors' Meeting in Ankara in 1936, chaired by Minister of Interior Şükrü Kaya, who had played a key role in the demographic engineering practices in the East during the CUP period, can be seen as a meeting where these policies were discussed at length and roadmaps were crystallized. The meeting in Ankara, attended by three general inspectors representing the one-party state in the East, is quite striking in terms of the "temsil" mission they attributed to the People's Houses, and the wide-ranging discussions they held on the axis of "the material construction of the East" and the resolution of the "Kurdish issue", covering matters such as settlements, transportation, security organization and smuggling.[119] This is because it also reflected important decisions of local/central state administrators that dealt with the divergence of views between those who favored assimilation and

117 See Ruşen Arslan, *Devletin İç Düşmanı Kürtler*, (İstanbul: İsmail Beşikçi Vakfı yayınları, 2021), see also Mehmet Ali Birand, *Apo ve PKK*.

118 Ibid.

119 See Bülent Varlık, ed., *Umumi Müfettişler Toplantı Tutanakları*.

development, and those who favored security. In this scope, detailed discussions were held and decisions were made between the center and the local representatives on what kind of power techniques should be applied to resolve the "Kurdishness issue", and what kind of cultural, social, spatial and economic policy the East of the Republic was to have and how it would be constructed. The outcomes of the implementation of the Plan for the Reform in the East, the patterns of successes and failures that emerged, and what the lasting solutions to these might be were discussed.[120] It is interesting to note that by 1936, the three general inspectors stated that by the time the demographic interventions based on physical violence and coercion had yielded results, order had mostly been restored in the region, and that the state now had to decide "whether to use only physical violence or go for *temsil*". In particular, First General Inspector Abidin Özmen emphasized the seriousness with which the "temsil" of such a large Kurdish population should be carried out, placing a great responsibility on the People's Houses, rather than focusing on repression and reparations. In his 1937 report, he emphasized the necessity of recognizing "the Kurdish issue, which is a long-standing issue in the Eastern provinces" and stated that "we are therefore facing the issue of temsil".[121]

In fact, it is possible to conclude that the primary issue for the central and local state administrators of this period was the "Kurdishness issue", and the fact that the Kurds, who had socio-economic, cultural and spatial structures, and relations that were difficult for the state to control and reach, continued their existence by adhering to these structures was "a

120 Ibid. At the meeting, many "public order issues" were on the agenda, such as the dissolution of the tribal structure in favor of the state, which was a project inherited from the Ottoman Empire, the settlement of the nomadic population, the dissolution of the tribal structure being integrated with religiosity in which the leadership of the Sheikhs, who were also behind the revolts, was seen, and the severing of ties with the Kurds across the border to keep them away from the Kurdish movements. Ibid.

121 In his report Özmen writes the following: "The volume of this note, which I prepared in a hurry during my journey, is not suitable for a lengthy description of this issue. However, I hope that our elders will accept that there is such an issue. If so, we are facing a matter of *temsil*." Cemil Koçak, *Umumi Müfettişlikler (1923-1952),* 100-101.

public order problem in itself". According to Özmen, the dissolution of these structures and relations and the establishment of state sovereignty were possible not only through military solutions, but also through the Turkification of the Kurds.




Figure 2.2 First General Inspectorate and other local dignitaries inspecting Bitlis. SOURCE: *Güneydoğu Birinci Genel Müfettişlik Bölgesi,* (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1939), 112.

Temdin (civilization), on the other hand, should focus primarily on secularizing Islamic ethnic networks of life to the extent acceptable to the state, whereby sheikhs, who can be the bearers of Kurdish nationalism, are influential; establishing transportation networks, expanding police stations, activating People's Houses in cities and towns, and prioritizing boarding schools, rather than making major socio-economic and cultural development moves. At the meeting, while the security strategy was emphasized as the main reason why *temsil* became so prominent and more effective, it was also considered important to remain within the scope of an extreme security state of exception regime, to ensure the dominance of the Turkish population in this direction, and to exile the Kurdish population to the West. However, what stands out is the decision and view that the cultural, social and spatial politics based on the

"representation of Kurds to Turkishness" i.e *temsil* and *temdin* (civilization) should be made more effective, in a more balanced manner, through these practices. Besides, the "politics of structural exclusion and segregation", which was also manifested at this meeting, and the punitive, militarist perspective, which contradicts the principles of populism and republicanism of the early years, would be in constant tension with the "politics of structural exclusion and segregation", which was directed in a harsh manner rather than involving the participation and development of the Kurds in politics.[122] On the other hand, there was also a stance like that of Cemal Bardakçı, who had a military background, which emphasized not prioritizing military violence, but winning over citizens through persuasion and inclusion.[123]

Throughout the thesis, I will argue that different policy proposals and conflicts regarding inclusion and exclusion, and how they were to be achieved, as well as a lack of decision-making or a dual strategy, were reflected in the People's Houses. As a result, the axes of debate within the state officialdom were, roughly speaking, about the limits of the violence, how and to what extent assimilation and civilization would be realized, what the policies of development and investment would be, with whom to cooperate, and the limits of local participation in this process. Therefore, I argue that while state officials were in agreement on the main line of the Eastern policy, they were not absolutely homogeneous in terms of emphases, priorities and alliance-seeking.

This does not mean that the "tacit contract" that had been the Ottoman policy of establishing lines of negotiation and "compromise" on a broader front, accompanied by a violent response to forms of rebellion, disobedience and resistance to state sovereignty, would continue. The new contract seems to have been shaped by a limited circle, and within

122 It should be added that Kazım Karabekir, the leader of the Progressive Republican Party, which was able to remain in opposition for a short period of time and was shut down in the process of silencing all opposition through the extraordinary regime after the Sheikh Said Rebellion, had also previously defended this view.

123 See "Ali Cemal Bardakçı Raporu (1926)," in Hüseyin Yayman *Türkiye'nin Kürt Sorunu Hafızası*, (Istanbul, Doğan Kitap, 2016), 99-103.

stricter cultural and social boundaries. The aim of establishing a more uncompromising monopoly of violence was dominated by the security-centered prescriptions of the nation-state model, whose colonial motifs were highly visible, spanning the planes of culture, society and space. In fact, the dismissal of Fethi Okyar by Mustafa Kemal, and the appointment of İsmet İnönü as prime minister, who was expected to intervene more aggressively, at the outbreak of the Sheikh Said Rebellion, is an important indication that there was not much room for any other method. More "moderate" methods would be discussed in later years, when open resistance and rebellions were pacified.

2.2.4 *The Establishment of Kurdishness as an Oriental and Colonial Category*

The 1920s and 1930s were more strongly marked by the structural exclusion, subalternization or subclassization of Kurds in their access to and utilization of the state and public sphere. The assumed social and cultural characteristics of the Kurdish ethnicity were directly related to the political anger and hatred toward the rebellious segments of the Kurdish ethnicity, which was considered in an extremely negative vein, and which excluded even the assimilation and civilization of the Kurds, and could only lead to destruction and pacification by force. At the beginning of the 1930s, when unrest was considered to be at its peak, there was an increase in racist discourses on Kurds around the theme of "civilization". In newspapers and magazines, which were not required to "act politically" in public opinion as much as state administrators - they seemed to have little choice - articles containing hatred and insults against the Kurds, were the extreme result of this. Yusuf Mazhar (Arel), whose series of articles in Cumhuriyet, one of the biggest newspapers of the period, on the Ağrı Rebellion, as also cited in many other sources, called the Kurds "vermin", and he directly advocated that they should be "wiped out", in other words, he was calling for genocide.[124] The author also said the following about the Kurds:

124 Yusuf Mazhar, "Ararat Eteklerinde", *Cumhuriyet*, 13 July 1930.

> "They are -as history testifies- more talented than the red skinned people of America, yet they are extremely cruel and brutal...They are cruel and completely devoid of artistic senses and civilized inclinations. They have plagued our race for centuries... These creatures, who were deprived of some human and civilized rights under the rule of the Russians and were not allowed to come down from the mountains, are truly incapable of enjoying civilized rights... I am convinced that it is not possible to break the dark spirit, the crude sentiment, the cruel tendencies of this Kurdish mass."[125]

The Kurds' "deceitfulness, lack of good feelings, and cruelty" was described as the background for their rebellion and betrayal. In these writings, in which Africans and Native Americans are also denigrated, the Kurds, even more than them, could not go beyond the position of "naked human beings" in Agamben's conceptualization, where genocide and the slaughter practiced by their colonizers was legitimate.[126] Because a "sub-human" category was constructed that was not even fit for civilization.[127] This racist and colonialist discourse produced by the state memory and its organic intellectuals overlapped with Social Darwinism, which saw nations as biological species in a struggle for survival. Nevcihan Karaosman shows that in these years the modern Republican representation of and struggle with locusts to its homogenious nation-

125 *Cumhuriyet,* (18,19,20 August), 3: "The manifestations of their senses and minds, which function with simple impulses like ordinary animals, show how crude and even stupid their thinking is. These men who mix raw meat with a little bulgur and eat it just like that are no different from African savages and cannibals." Ibid.

126 Giorgio Agamben, *Kutsal İnsan* (İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, 2001).

127 In fact, this discourse has its roots even before the establishment of the Republic. In the reports he wrote in 1920/21, Karabekir praises Kurdish tribal leaders for ruling their clans with the power and skill of overlords; while referring to tribal villagers, he writes, in summary and in a nutshell, that "Kurds are plunderers and thieves in tribal life, that they dislike law and order, that they are hypocritical to government officials, that they are deceitful and liars, that they can be easily corrupted and that they suck up to those who are stronger than them". Karabekir, *Kürt Meselesi,* 52.

building project in which Kurds are represented as beast-human. Imagined as beast-human, Ağrı revolt was also supressed by the same military strategy deployed to suppress the swarms of locusts.[128] In line with these approaches, the Kurd, who is categorized as an ahistorical, uncivilized, sub-human, uncanny creature, must be destroyed, subjugated and ruled in order for Turkishness to survive. As Bozarslan points out, İnönü's statement after the Sheikh Said Rebellion that "those who are against Turkishness and Turkism should be exterminated"; Cemil Uybadın, the Minister of Interior, pointing to the existence of a strong Kurdish nationalism in 1926 and saying that "killing Kurdishness" was imperative; Şükrü Kaya arguing that "Turkey must be cleansed of Kurds in order to create a state that is one hundred percent Turkish"; these sentences, which "cannot be interpreted as a slip of the tongue".[129]

To sum up, it is possible to say that this "internal discourse" of the state rulers on the Kurds and the Orient actually started to become clearer in the 1920s and became further publicized in the early 1930s. Moreover, in the 1920s, the discourse on the Orient and the East, which

128 Nevcihan Karaosman, "Doğa, Toplum ve Modern Devlet: Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemine Yeniden Bakmak" (MA Thesis, Hacettepe University, 2015); Nevcihan Özbilge, Çekirgeler, Kürtler ve Devlet: Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemine Yeniden Bakmak, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2020).

129 Hamit Bozarslan, "Söyleyenler ve Söylenenler: Kemalist Türkiye'de Tarihyazımı, Tarih Söylemi ve Kürdlerin Varlığı Sorunu," in *Cumhuriyet Tarihinin Tartışmalı Konuları*, ed. Bülent Bilmez (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2013), 132-133. Bozarslan also notes that along with Kurdishness, Ottomanism, "reactionaries" and in some periods "liberals" were coded as enemies of "revolution-civilization-nation" and considered as diseased cells that threatened Turkishness or weakened Turkishness as an organic body. In the struggle between them and Turkishness, two types of atavism emerge, where the parties to this struggle "believe in and protect the heritage of previous generations (ancestors). According to Bozarslan, Turkishness is positioned on the positive side of atavism such as "civilization, progressivism, revolutionism, secularism, perfect physical form, egalitarianism". Ibid., 135. The negative atavism of the enemies of Turks (and Kurds), as Yeğen points out, is characterized by "feudalism, usurping the rights of others, meanness, ugliness, imperfection, counter-revolutionism, reactionarism and religiosity, barbarism, brutality, treachery, insidiousness, inability to determine one's own destiny and a structure suitable for subcontracting". Mesut Yeğen, *Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu,* 129.

had a negative contents based on physical violence, and was also said to require a colonial-style administration, was adopted. The words “Kurdish” and “Kurdistan”, which were frequently heard and sympathized with in the First Parliament during this period, were almost never used in the GNAT after 1927, especially after the rebellions that challenged the state, such as the Sheikh Said Rebellion (1925) and the Ağrı rebellions (1927-30), and the prominent words used for the Easterners were "rebel, shaki, bandit".[130] Although not openly expressed in the parliament, these epithets were often generated as identical to Kurdish ethnicity and identity. From the mid-1930s onwards, we see denominations that have no linguistic origin, such as Mountain Turk and Mountain Turkish, or the Kirman dialect, which is in fact a Turkish dialect. In 1941, Vilayat-ı Şarkiyye, partly Kurdistan and partly what Armenians called Western Armenia, would become Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia.

Most modern European sovereign colonial powers claim that history has given them a civilizing mission, to control and exploit the colonial natives, providing legitimacy through the universal principles of the European positivist enlightenment tradition. This colonial mission, which was also transferred to nation-states, was conceptualized as "The White Man's Burden which he carries on his shoulders".[131] Zeydanlıoğlu translates the similar mission that Kemalist state administrators and intellectuals assigned to themselves in this period, especially with regard to the East and the Kurds, as "The White Turk's Burden".[132] From an Orientalist perspective, with similar motives to the colonialists, it was rationalized that white Turkish elites would carry civilization to Tunceli, which was thought to be "more susceptible to Turkification" and ethnically and religiously differentiated from the Kurds of the Sunni and Kurmanç branches, due to its high proportion of "Mountain Turk" Kurds,

130 Demirel, *Tek Partinin Yükselişi*, 228-230.

131 Marc Ferro, “Uygarlık ve Irkçılık”, *Sömürgecilik Tarihi, Fetihlerden Bağımsızlık Hareketlerine Kadar*, 13.-20. Yüzyıl (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2002), 51-54.

132 Welat Zeydanlıoğlu, “Kemalism‟s Others: The Reproduction of Orientalism in Turkey”; “Beyaz Türkün Yükü: Oryantalizm, Kemalizm ve Türkiye’de Türkler”.

Arabs and Turkish-speaking Kurds. Thus, for example, the Tunceli/Dersim region was transformed into a place where a security-based development-civilization equation around the construction of police stations, roads and schools crystallized into an overarching power strategy. For state officials, however, this region remained an incurable "boil" that continued to resist "state power" even as late as the mid-1930s. Therefore, with the White Turk's Burden, in addition to the more military-motivated attitude, the political, socio-economic and cultural resistance areas of some seyits, tribal chieftains and clansmen, based on the "undeveloped, feudal, bandit" Alevi beliefs were targeted interactively. The burden of civilization includes efforts to legitimize the elimination of enemies, which was a pillar of the policy of eliminating Kurdishness with genocidal violence in 1937 and 1938.[133] Therefore, the White Turk's Burden, in this case, not only encompassed open practices that were mostly military motivated, but also, interactively, practices that legitimized the eradication of the political, socio-economic and cultural resistance of the "backward, feudal, bandit" Alevi faith elites, seyits, tribal chieftains and their followers, through high levels of violence.

In recent years, it has become more widespread in the literature to posit that the state bureaucracy and intellectuals had an orientalist view, not only of the East and the Kurds, but also of the sections of the peasant population, more than 80 percent of whom were considered Turkish. According to this nationalist-orientalist view, the Turkish peasantry was isolated from the national consciousness and the civilized world, due to the underdevelopment stemming from the Ottoman period, positioning them as the "other" of the Republic, at a distance from civilization, and with persistence of a heterogeneous and cosmopolitan ethnic and

133 See Naşit Hakkı Uluğ, *Tunceli Medeniyete Açılıyor*, (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2007). In his doctoral study, Devres argues that the civilizing mission of the Republican state in Dersim was not carried out with the aim of developing the region and helping it to prosper, but rather, the civilizing side of this process was characterized by intense violence and terrorization. Murat S. Devres, "The Turkish Mission Civilisatrice? Governance of Dersim as an Internal Colony (1927-1952)", (PhD diss. Boğaziçi University, 2021).

religious life, differentiated from an Islamic lifestyle and structures. This was also inherent in the peasantist view, which would find a more prominent vanguard of discourse and practice in the 1940s, which saw the peasant as the pillar of the national essence and economy, and was orientalist and civilizing. According to some researchers, internal colonialism applied not only to Kurds but also to the Turkish ethnicity.[134] This view is linked to the new populism imagined by the Republic's rulers and intellectuals, which aimed to set an example of the contemporary western civilization it aimed to achieve, for the benefit of the people or "for the people despite the people". This imaginary intended to institutionalize and implement formal education and "popular upbringing", in order to transform the people into a nation under the hegemony and control of the state power legitimized by Kemalism's principle of statism. While the rebellion processes reinforced this view, the development of Turkish nationalism in the 1930s with new institutions on the basis of Turkish language, history and ethnicity constructed through new myths, produced effective results in the establishment of this view.

In this process, populism retained its past meaning in terms of popular sovereignty and the protectionist economic approach of the 1930s, and a solidarist, corporatist and supra-class egalitarianism, but was transformed into a new governance strategy by reflecting Kemalism's other ideals, especially nationalism and secularism, in close connection with peasantism. In addition, cultural populism, which was close to the Gökalp line, but in a much more secularist, civilizational missionary pendulum, in which folk heritage was designated as the essence of national identity and western civilization was the reference, was to be established more systematically and widely in the People's Houses. In the East, while Kurdish and other languages and cultures were

134 Zeydanlıoğlu, "Beyaz Türkün Yükü: Oryantalizm, Kemalizm ve Türkiye'de Türkler", 195-211. Irvin Cemil Schick argues that the internal orientalist, civilizing policy toward the Turks can be interpreted as internal colonialism. See Schick, "Kemalizm, Şarkiyatçılık, Garbiyatçılık", in *Ne Mutlu Eşitim Diyene: Milliyetçilik Tartışmaları,* eds. Yasemin Çongar, Mustafa Arslantulı, Lebriz İsvan, (İstanbul: Kıraathane Kitapları): 80-98.

to be excluded and abolished, on the basis of the folklore of the Turkish-speaking population, bringing civilization and Turkification to the non-Turkish-speaking population was interpreted as populism.

Populism, a rising discourse for the "settlement of the Kurdish issue", which was placed at the center of all issues in the East, was articulated along with assimilation and civilization. In line with the basic populism of the regime, as detailed above, the people in the East were imagined to be civilized in a pendulum of dialogue and tension with Western forms through multiple cultural practices, with the intention of cultural assimilation based on the teaching of the newly produced Turkish language and national heritage. In this sense, civilization/*temdin* and Turkification were intertwined with Turkish nationalism and the secularization of networks of life, with ethnic and Islamic resistance motifs, and with an imagined westernization along the lines of western Turkey and Europe.

Around the Halkevi, this imaginary was defined by a populism that called for physical violence as well as symbolic violence. In Ülkü, the central organ of the People's Houses, K. Naci, in his article titled " Populism in the Turkish State" written in 1933, when the People's Houses had just been founded, justifies the imposition of civilization on the people with the sword and bayonet if necessary, based on historical precedent.[135] Accordingly, for those who were not Turkish and therefore lacked civilization, populism would also be based on civilization and Turkification, in which force and violence were legitimate. In the East, while Kurdish and other languages and cultures were to be excluded and abolished, based on the folklore of the Turkish-speaking population, bringing civilization and Turkification to the non-Turkish-speaking population was translated as populism. In the magazine Altan, published between 1935 and 1939 by the People's House in Elazığ, which was also within the scope of the General Inspectorates, it was stated that "one of the most beautiful works of the Republican era and its revolutionary party is the People's Houses. It is an institution that will spread Turkish culture to the widest layer of the people and develop it. It is an

135 K. Naci, "Türk Devletinde Halkçılık", *Ülkü* 2, no.3, April 1933, 191.

organization that every class of people can gladly enter and benefit from infinitely."[136]

Here, we see a perspective that is in line with the aim of spreading Turkish culture and revolution and eliminating the class differences and conflicts underlying the idea of populism.[137] Furthermore, by stating that "the People's House marches towards the people with an infallible march, and the people receive civilized and national knowledge from it", the cultural populism within the framework of the civilizing mission was clearly put forward.[138] Naşit Uluğ, a pro-regime intellectual whose articles also appeared in the same magazine, argued that in order to civilize Dersim, the power of the aghas and seyyits, who were also enemies of the people not finding the Turkish revolution in their interests, had to be eliminated, and that a military operation would finally achieve this.[139] The 1926 official report titled "On the Kurds", the author of which is not specified, actually summarizes the social populism specific to the East: "the people must be liberated from captivity by the state against the Kurdists who deceive the people and the tyrants who exploit them, and they must attain a civilized and national identity".[140]

136 "Halkevleri Cümhuriyetin Eseridir", *Altan*, no: 39-40-41-42, June, July, August, September, 1938, 27.

137 The Fourth General Inspectorate stated that a significant portion of the population in the center of Elazığ was of Turkish origin, citing it as one of the places where "Turkishness" spread. In Elazığ, there were 38 primary schools with 38 teachers and 38 elementary schools with 3,490 students and 800 students, while there were 5 elementary schools in Bingöl and 10 elementary schools in Tunceli, two neighboring provinces with limited budgets in 1936. According to the inspectorate, it also requested that these schools be assisted from the budget of the Ministry of Education. Bülent Varlık, ed., Umumi Müfettişler Toplantı Tutanakları-1936, 154.

138 In the February 1936 issue, which describes the first year's activities, the "towards the people" approach is clearly stated: "Our People's House has always been known as a home for the people in the city and its neighborhood. People of Elazığ come to the People's House. While they received civilized and national information in many ways, the People's House marched towards the People with an infallible march." *Altan*, "1935 yılı çalışmaları", no: 13, February 1936, 1.

139 Naşit Uluğ, "Dersim Medeniyete Açılıyor", *Altan*, no: 39-40-41-42, 27-28, May 1938.

140 "Kürdlere Dair", in *Kürt Sorunu ve Devlet, Tedip ve Tenkil Politikaları (1925-1947)*, Tuğba Yıldırım, eds., (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2011),41. The report, whose author

The report in question is dominated by the security perspective that "in order for the Kurds to be Turkified, they must be subdued", and that for Turkification, it was necessary to make the rescue of the Turks in the east, who were forced to become Kurds due to their Ottoman-endowed influence, a priority; for this purpose, it was recommended that "officers who will know this secret and who are familiar with the administrative methods followed in the colonies should be sent to the eastern provinces".[141] These sentences clearly demonstrate the common discourse of this period that populism and civilization would be possible through a colonial-style administration.

On the other hand, within the direct orientalist construction of the Kurds and the Orient, the orientation seen in the Gökalp line that the Kurds were similar to the Turks and therefore needed to be Turkified evolves into the discourse that Anatolia had been Turkish since time immemorial, and what was wanted from the People's Houses was to spread in the localities, without mentioning the common Islamic past. This discourse would be supported scientifically by the *Sun-Language Theory* (Güneş-Dil Teorisi) and the *Turkish History Thesis* (Türk Tarih Tezi).[142] Based on these, it would be argued that Kurds are also Turks in terms of lineage, which was reinforced by the thesis that the source of all civilizations, languages and history is Turkishness. In addition, Kurds are in need of civilization due to their confused and difficult to understand

cannot be identified, summarizes the rightist-nationalist-civilizationalist, anti-feudalist-peasant and security-based perspectives of this period: "The people are nothing but a toy, a prisoner, a herd of animals in the hands of two groups, namely the Kurdists and the group of families who benefit from the government. Both those who rely on the Kurdish majority and pursue benefits from the government out of a customary impulse, and those who are friends of the government, are all just a bunch of parasites living off the backs of the people. In addition to these, there are other chiefs, sheikhs, aghas, and all of them live like parasites but very comfortably; they become rich, they live in splendor and magnificence, and they leave the same amount of inheritance to their children."

141 Ibid.,65.

142 For a detailed review on this issue, see. Etienne Copeaux, *Tarih Ders Kitaplarında (1931-1993), Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk İslam Sentezi'ne*, trans. Ali Berktay, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006).

language, and their "savage" and "primitive" way of life under the rule of feudal lords, tribal aghas and sheikhs. For this, they should forget their Kurdishness and Kurdish language and adopt Turkish, the source of western civilization and the source of all languages. Ultimately, I identify the strategic use of cultural nationalism and populism and the above-mentioned nationalism based on race, which oscillated between a colonial exclusion and subordination of the Kurds in the Republic's imagination of the new "East" and their rehabilitation, subjugation, and forced submission to state power and civilization through Turkification.

In order to achieve this, we observe that the bureaucratic state was engaged in policy-making through systematic reporting, classification and listing techniques. For example, out of concern over some Dersim tribes that were disobedient to the state and defensive of local authority and habitat, the attitudes of the tribes in the Ottoman-era greater Dersim, which extended to Bingöl, Erzincan and Muş, towards the state were investigated and reported. In the 1932 *Gendarmerie General Command Report* (Jandarma Umum Komutanlığı Raporu), dozens of groups of tribes were listed as "loyal", "neutral" and "the enemy", with their whereabouts written down one by one.[143] We see that this turned into the ordinary, routine activities of the state, and that this routine, in its many connotations, characterized the process of state formation in terms of its functions of classifying, listing, deciding who was who, granting legitimacy, and setting boundaries. Under the following heading, and in the chapters of the thesis, in the case of the People's Houses, which were missionary party-state organizations in Kurdish-majority localities, it will be analyzed how this routine process was realized in the case of the People's Houses, which had the mission of monitoring and auditing the institution and the locality, reporting, and conveying requests and complaints. It will also be seen that this routine process of monitoring, supervising and actually producing the intra-state space and the locality/the East is a component of state formation.

143 *Dersim Jandarma Umum Kumandanlığı Raporu (1932),* (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2012), 111-152 cited by Murat S. Devres, "The Turkish Mission Civilisatrice?"

It should be noted that there were no static and unchanging attitudes toward the state that could be polarized into homogeneous or oppositional polarities such as loyal, hostile or neutral, within such a hegemony of violence, within the Kurdish population, as well as within the actors of the nation-state, regarding the responses produced to these new discourses and practices. This seems to be related to the legacy of past relations between clans and prominent families and the state, based on their local political, social and economic interests, as well as the historical dynamics of inter-actor competition, conflict and compromise that determine the relationship with the state. For example, in addition to the violent actions of the security forces in suppressing the uprisings, there was a significant proportion of people who withdrew from the uprisings or did not participate at the beginning of the uprisings for local reasons and others such as religious, sectarian, class, tribal differences and various alliances and compromises. Due to the Zaza and Sunni character of the Sheikh Said Rebellion, which was considered as stemming from a branch of the Kurds, the Alevi Kurds did not participate, and many tribal chiefs in the region sent notification to the GNAT that they would help to suppress the rebellion.[144] The state rulers achieved results through their promises and practices, such as pardoning those involved in the rebellions, in exchange for the cooperation of some tribal leaders and local elites, and arming them to fight the rebels.[145]

As Denise Natali points out, just as state rulers found it functional for tribal chieftains to mediate in various conflicts while they were trying to establish control in the Orient, it also became a case of the state sharing its legal authority with them. In addition, in areas where the Kurdish-Islamic identity was maintained, by measures such as the harsh purges of madrassas that offered Kurdish-language education, as well as

144 Martin Van Bruinessen, *Kürdistan Üzerine Yazılar,* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1993), 155. During this period, Alevis from Dersim were allegedly told by state administrators that Atatürk was an Alevi and they were promised schools, roads and to land distribution. Denise Natali, *Kürtler ve Devlet, Irak, Türkiye ve İran'da Ulusal Kimliğin Gelişmesi,* (İstanbul: Avesta Yayınları, 2009) 140.

145 Ibid.

instances where they were allowed to operate in a limited and underground manner, this also became a line of engagement and negotiation. All these can be shown as examples that the daily, local and micro implementation processes of the new mutual boundaries between state, society and culture, which seem incompatible with the discursive mindset, were not homogeneous, univocal and linear.[146] In the process of state-controlled economic development and industrialization in the 1930s, while there was no serious economic development in the East under the state of emergency, the continuation of the feudal structure, despite the populist rhetoric, created an order in which the landowners would be making profits, and in fact, it was preferred for national and security politics that the position of these people, with whom the RPP collaborated, was left untouched.[147]

These alliances began to change and deflect more towards multi-party life. Therefore, this thesis argues that when we focus on practical processes, groups, identities, and institutions, social responses and historical processes cannot be constructed with a totalizing view as homogeneous, static, or passive structures, but need to be evaluated in a more nuanced way. In order to pursue this, this study aims to analyze the daily encounters and communication processes between state administrators and social groups, the power interventions, negotiations and their limits through the People's Houses as an institutional actor of the discourses and practices of assimilation and civilization in the East, and in this respect, the discursive, administrative structure and functioning of the People's Houses are primarily investigated.

§ 2.3 The *Halkevleri* as an Absolute and Ambiguous Institution and Their Appearance in the *East*

Up until now, I have mostly focused on the period up to the establishment of the People's Houses, and I have attempted to examine the institutional

146 Ibid., 134-135 and 140-141.

147 Devres, "The Turkish Mission Civilisatrice? Governance of Dersim as an Internal Colony."

and non-institutional discourses and practices in the Eastern/Kurdish region, in relation to the general discourses and policies of the state. I have tried to show the historical context, relations and interactions through which the People's Houses undertook the mission of both representing the one-party state in the twelve Eastern provinces, and civilizing the people by Turkifying them, and Turkifying them by civilizing them. Under this section, I aim to analyze how the discursive and administrative structures of the People's Houses, which were prioritized over the establishment of RPP organizations in the case of the mostly Kurdish provinces, were established, and how they operated in areas of encounter between state and society, in order to understand how they performed their mission. In this context, after analytically presenting the purpose, discourse and fields of practice, general institutional structure, functioning, supervision and control of the People's Houses established in 1932, I will examine the specific manifestations of these aspects of the People's Houses in the Eastern provinces. The aims and activities of the People's Houses in the East, where we can trace the formation of the state, will be examined, along with what kind of control system was produced, the political/administrative participation of state elites and "the people" in the management and activities of the People's Houses; also, the profiles of the administrators and the transformation processes in these profiles and their relationship with political representation and cultural representation will be explored. With these facts, the relationship between exclusionary and inclusive citizenship, populism, nationalism and state formation, and forms of intervention and negotiation along the center-local line will attempt to be established.

All these parameters, especially the relationship between the dynamics of the changing Kurdish and Eastern politics toward multi-party life, will be interpreted with their causality, effects and consequences established in national and global historical contexts. It should be noted again that these themes will be interpreted in the light of the problematic of how the state and the East were constructed in the center-local line, in the power dynamics and relations within the state

and in the social sphere, and how they interacted with everyday and subjective grounds. In this way, it will be possible to see how the boundaries of encounter and communication between state administrators, social and cultural spatial agents were produced.

More explicitly than for the Turkish Hearths, which they replaced, the People's Houses were established on February 19, 1932 as the cultural arm of the RPP, as a result of the decision taken at the RPP's 1931 Congress, which heralded the de facto establishment of the one-party state. The People's Houses can be characterized as an institutionalization that was the product of the single-party government's authoritarian, statist and centralist policies, to keep the political, social and cultural spheres under its management and control and to extend this control to the localities. Deriving its legitimacy from the global legitimization of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, the state under the RPP and Kemalism aimed to shape the mentioned spheres with an authoritarian modernizing attitude, through the use of legal, symbolic and cultural forms of violence. Public education and cultural institutions in places such as the Soviet Union, European countries, China, and the United States, which worked with similar discourses and methods, were examined on site, and accepted as models for the People's Houses.

On the other hand, it is possible to say that the aims, methods and activities of the People's Houses were determined by reinterpreting the ideological and institutional heritage of nationalism, populism, national popular education, peasantism, statism, solidarism and secularism. Indeed, in the first instructions of the People's Houses in 1932 and 1935, the main purpose was declared as the adoption of the basic principles of Kemalism (the Six Arrows), which were to be included in the constitution in 1937: republicanism, populism, nationalism, laisizm, statism, and revolutionism, through national public education practices that would include propaganda.[148] It can be said that from a positivist perspective, the People's Houses undertook the radical and comprehensive shaping and transformation of a wide range of areas such as society, people, culture, economy, space, body, art, and sports, in order to make them

148 *CHP Halkevleri Öğreneği,* (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1935): 3-4.

compatible with the national/native, western modernity and the statist capitalist system, while following the Six Arrows.[149]

In the instructions of the People's Houses in 1935 and 1938, a parallel was drawn between the Six Arrows and the six "conditions of faith" in Islam[150], and it was stated that the aim of the People's Houses was to "rivet the principles of the Republic and the revolution as sacred conditions of faith that dominate all souls and ideas".[151] In addition, in order for the formation of the Turkish nation-state and the modernization process to coincide with these "conditions of faith", the aim was to "equalize" the people as a "classless and privileged mass" around the Turkish identity and transform them into a "national mass of people".[152] Thus, solidarist populism along the Gökalp line and the people, populism and citizenship based on ethnic and culturally based Turkish national identity, were overlapped with the production of a homogeneous national mass.

In fact, the stated aim was for the People's Houses to be the bearer of the process of establishing a "new national subject" that would support the RPP and the discourses of the nation-state through the upbringing of "the people and the revolution", and to achieve this through a party-state-

149 For the relationship between Kemalism and positivism see Nuray Karaca, Pozitivizmin Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi'ne *Etkisi,* 2nd ed. (Ankara: Anı Yayıncılık, 2015).

150 In Islam, faith means believing in the principles of Islam. The six pillars of faith are: Belief in the existence and unity of Allah, His angels, His prophets, His books, the hereafter, chance and destiny.

151 *CHP Halkevleri Öğreneği,* 1935; *CHP Halkevleri Öğreneği*, (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1938). Karpat emphasises the filling of the religious sphere with ideology by stating that Halkevleri set out to convince individuals from cities to villages that their "new religion" was Turkish nationalism and their modern political identity was republicanism. Kemal H. Karpat, "Türkiye'de İletişimin Gelişmesinde Halkevleri'nin Etkisi (1931-1951)", *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Kimlik ve İdeoloji*, (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2009), 333-334.

152 For a novel study on Kemalism's functionalisation and reproduction of religious motifs and the "transfer of sanctity" from the universe of traditional religion to Kemalist concepts and the eventual rise of Kemalism as a civil religion see Onur Atalay, *Türk'e Tapmak: Seküler Din ve İki Savaş Arası Kemalizm,* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2022).

centered organization and discourse production.[153] In addition, it seems to have been aimed at the people adopting more cultural *temsil*, image and multifaceted modernist practices, to ensure administrative, institutional and widespread participation in the People's Houses, and thus to ensure the visibility, legitimacy and approval of the state and to make the public amenable. By allowing those who were affiliated with the RPP but not RPP members to easily participate in its activities, the RPP would be able to ensure the inclusion of non-RPP members in the process of nationalization and modernization, and thus the RPP would be identified with the subjugated people and the nation, and obtain their consent.

Ultimately, the People's Houses, which had no legal standing of their own, became de facto subordinate to the RPP, which was positioned as the "absolute ruler" of the state in accordance with the party-state integration that was constitutionalized in 1935. The early 1930s was a period when anti-government tendencies were on the rise, due to the World Economic Depression of 1929; Kurdish rebellions and forms of resistance did not subside, and resistance to radical modernist reforms became visible throughout the country, all of which caused anxiety in the ruling party. In order to prevent this, as Timur points out, authoritarian cultural and social modernization was preferred over democratic politics.[154] In this scope, in addition to the Turkish Hearths, associations and foundations such as the Free Party, which was only a brief attempt at establishing a multi-party regime, professional organizations, trade unions, and women's rights organizations began to be closed down or redesigned. The People's Houses, which were intended to replace some of these, were positioned as one of the absolute and non-negotiable institutions of the cultural and social sphere, loyally affiliated to the RPP.

153 In the 1940 Working Instructions of the People's Houses, the main purpose of the People's Houses is more clearly stated as adopting these principles through "upbringing", "public education" and "indoctrination", led by local intellectuals, mostly civil servants.

154 Taner Timur, *Türk Devrimi ve Sonrası*, (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2018).

The aims, fields of activity, structure, functioning and supervision of the People's Houses, which were positioned as the houses of the people and the state, were determined by the RPP's General Secretariat in certain years, by means of the regulations or directives it issued, and the notifications it sent to the provincial organizations.

RPP provincial organizations and the 12 eastern provinces where there were no RPP organizations were run both administratively and financially by the General Inspectorates, which also housed the RPP party bureau. The People's Houses received financial support from the RPP General Secretariat, especially for the financing of the buildings of the People's Houses in the cities, which could not be built using the local budget. However, they were expected to be financed primarily through the budgets allocated to the People's Houses by RPP local organizations, governorships and municipalities. They were also theoretically positioned in collaboration with all state institutions such as municipalities and governorships in all matters. Therefore, according to the state-party integration, this can be seen as one of the most important venues for the process and debates on party-state integration with its structure and functioning, where governors and other local functionaries, who were considered RPP members, were also administrators and could intervene.

It was often emphasized that the Halkevleri's loyalty to the RPP was not based on party concerns, but on national concerns, and that they were cultural institutions open to all members of the nation, whether they were affiliated with the Party or not, without discrimination. In this context, RPP administrators, as well as bureaucrats, tried to establish a space of legitimacy on the grounds that the affiliation of the People's Houses to the RPP meant that they were already affiliated to the state, and therefore not a political party. They presented the requirement of being a member of the RPP in order to become a member of the board of directors and branch committees of the People's Houses, as well as the fact that "there is no legal impediment for civil servants to join the boards

of directors and branch committees" as normal and legitimate consequences of RPP-state integration.[155]

Attributing to the People's Houses the mission of a state organization affiliated to the RPP, but beyond party lines, and giving it the appearance of an autonomous and absolute structure, reminds us of T. Mitchell's conceptualization of the state as an autonomous and self-secure structure, in which a structure effect is produced. However, in the process of materialization of the discourses and practices in the fields of encounter, its positioning as an independent state or public institution on the one hand, and an unincorporated party organ on the other, would lead to its being treated as an "ambiguous and in-between" institution. This phenomenon shows that the effect of absolute and autonomous structure needs to be anthropologically analyzed in the experiential field, as Trouillot points out. In order to examine this phenomenon more closely throughout the thesis, I decided that an analytical summary of the main aims, discursive field, and fields of activity of the People's Houses, as well as the problematics and axes of debate on which they were based, would be instructive:

i) One of the main objectives of the People's Houses was to popularize Turkish national identity as a collective identity. According to Karpat, the Halkevleri set out to convince individuals from cities to villages that their "new religion" was Turkish nationalism, and their modern political identity was republicanism.[156] It is possible to detect that the envisioned national and modern identity, as in the East, has a conflictual and negative relationship with different ethnic and linguistic groups and with the republican and cultural conception of citizenship. The contradictory relationship of the people here, such as the fact that they were considered Turkish in the "external discourse" of the state, but were not seen as bearers of the core culture due to the fact that they did not speak Turkish, and also their rate of participation in this process, can be considered among the main problematic issues.

155 Ibid.

156 Kemal H. Karpat, "Türkiye'de İletişimin Gelişmesinde Halkevleri'nin Etkisi (1931-1951)", 333-334.

ii) Among the many intertwined aims of the People's Houses, popularizing Western-oriented secular and civilized values and lifestyles was an important goal. In this context, for example, women were required to be visible in areas of socialization such as at gatherings with music and dance, balls and festivals where Western music played an important role, and women were required to play women's roles in artistic activities such as theater, where religious and traditional dress was not allowed. In addition to increasing their public visibility as subjects of the republic, the People's Houses also assigned a mission to women in areas such as modern health, hygiene, and childcare.

It was aimed to reconstruct the daily life of "Turkish society", which had been left underdeveloped and far from the values of modern and contemporary civilization, with secular elements and to serve as a model for the West. It is possible to say that these areas were dynamic in practice and had complex patterns. This is because, with their state-controlled secularist and westernizing aspects, they seem to have elicited responses such as resistance, appropriation or reversal to radical reforms and practices. On the other hand, there are, of course, degrees of consent, including tension, especially from the notables and elites of the cities and towns, who were also seen to be allied in the national struggle.[157]

iii) At the time of the establishment of the People's Houses, the prioritized modern cultural and social transformation axis was characterized by a literacy rate of around 10 percent, concentrated in cities and towns, and a low schooling rate and number of teachers. The aim was to spread the newly-established Turkish language, which was to be adopted as the official language and mother tongue, and literacy, and in parallel, to form the educated and qualified people needed. In addition to literacy courses for adults over 18, the inclusion of other artistic and cultural activities such as farming, handicrafts, needlework and typing courses would serve this purpose. In practice, financial and

157 Hale Yılmaz, *Becoming Turkish: Nationalist Reforms and Cultural Negotiations in Early Republican Turkey;* Michael Meeker, *Nation of Empire, The Ottoman Legacy of Turkish Modernity,* (California: University of California Press, 2002).

administrative issues, and the low participation rates in these vocational courses, especially in the East, where education in Kurdish and other languages was banned because the courses were taught in Turkish, and where the rate of speaking and reading Turkish was even lower due to the introduction of the Latin alphabet, could also be identified as a problematic area.[158] This is not surprising in the East, where formal education was the least common, alongside the lack of public education institutions. In 1940, while there was a high rate of schooling in the big cities, this rate decreased dramatically as one travelled eastwards. Istanbul had an enrolment rate of 80 per cent, Izmir 53 per cent, Çanakkale 38 per cent, Çankırı 24 per cent, Kars 22 per cent, Diyarbakır 13 per cent, Urfa 12 per cent, and the lowest rate in Hakkâri was 6 per cent.[159]

iv) While many Western-based cultural, artistic and physical activities ranging from the fine arts to cinema, from theater to sports were carried out in the People's Houses, it is also possible to observe in the references the discussions and efforts to rediscover and synthesize local and authentic Turkish culture, which would become increasingly important. Another important goal was to use the data obtained through local folklore, language, oral arts and culture studies, to create national canons through a modern synthesis. When we look at where the non-Turkish and non-Turkish-speaking populations fitted into this process, we see that in the East, too, music and oral culture in Kurdish and other old and new languages were ignored, excluded or assimilated. The People's Houses aimed to bring these areas under the hegemony of core and authentic Turkish culture.

v) The modern and national architecture of the People's House, and the construction of ideal People's House buildings was planned accordingly, especially in the city centers, and seem to have been prioritized, although

158 Metin Yüksel, "Training Kurdish Men and Women in Turkey: Mobile Village Courses in the 'Eastern Provinces", *Hrandt Dink Memorial Workshop: Gender, Ethnicity and the Nation-state: Anatolia and its Neighboring Regions,* May 22-24, 2009, Sabancı University.

159 Başvekalet İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, *Maarif Ilk Tahsil Çağındaki Çocuklar İstatistiği 1940*.

not as much as in the western provinces, both as a model modern space and in terms of physically establishing the state and ensuring its presence and visibility. Since Halkevleri did not want to be portrayed as neither autonomous nor fully dependent, they could not acquire property. The title deeds of their properties belonged to the RPP. The space of the People's House was also positioned as the new sacred public space/area where civil servants and the public would gather in their own 'House' to socialize and spend time in the intimacy of a family, around party-state-controlled activities.

vi) There was a vision of the People's Houses where local administrators and civil servants, intellectuals, professionals and notables developed initiatives that could solve their problems locally. In this sense, the People's Houses would also reduce the burden of the RPP and state institutions. Also, the local acceptance and establishment of People's Houses' practices and discourses, and the creation of a new history, memory and identity as part of daily life and routine, would have a deeper impact on the desired processes of subjectivization, and thus create more long-lasting and long-term effects. For many years in the Kurdish-inhabited provinces, the administration of the People's Houses rarely involved Kurdish residents that could be seen in state institutions, and the local bureaucracy was envisioned as dominating the administration. However, in general terms, the People's Houses were designed as a public network that would ensure an omnipotent, absolute and acceptable state-society relationship between the center and the local, bureaucratically and administratively, as well as socially and culturally. Moreover, as one of the most important encounter spaces of the local within itself and with the center, in addition to its effect of absoluteness, its "in-between and ambiguous" structure and appearance crystallized in the administrative, spatial, social and cultural encounter spaces, and its "non-hierarchical" features, such as the promise of being open to every citizen at all hours, seem to have further enabled it to be a space of contention, struggle and appropriation within power dynamics. On the other hand, the fact that it was caught between a structure that prioritized the needs of civil servants and the people, and a top-down

bureaucratic functioning, may have further led to its objectives being associated with ambiguity and in-betweenness. However, all of these have produced complex and major results and experiences in terms of the negotiation, opening and closing of boundaries in local and everyday processes.

vii) In order to open a People's House in a locality, three criteria were set out in the instructions of the People's Houses. These were to be able to establish three of its nine branches: Language, Literature and History, Fine Arts, Representation (*Temsil*: theater, cinema), Public Classrooms and Courses, Bookstore and Publication, Sports, Peasantry, Social Assistance, Museum and Exhibition; to have a suitable building and to provide a budget that would cover at least one janitor or clerk's salary and other necessary expenses. The responsibility for ensuring the minimum criteria for the opening of a People's House, electing the head of the People's House, organizing its budget and carrying out its local supervision was given to the local RPP organization. The members of the branch committee elected by the members registered in that People's House elected the Board of Directors of the People's House. At the RPP's Fifth General Congress in 1939, it was decided to open People's Rooms in small towns and villages, where the conditions for the opening of People's Houses could not be fulfilled, and to open People's Rooms in small towns and villages where a living room and a reading room or even a single living room were considered sufficient. A separate instruction manual was created, to regulate the opening conditions, administrative and financial structure, activities and supervision system of People's Rooms.[160] Rather than not having any People's Rooms, which were subject to the organization of village teachers, mukhtars and members, it seems to have been deemed sufficient to have one room, a library and a reading room with tables and chairs, especially if it was in a village. From research, it seems that there were reading activities, so-called "state conversations" with villagers, conferences, notably radio broadcasts, performances of folk music, dance, and occasionally theater. The number of People's Rooms reached 4,322 in 1951, when the People's Houses were

160 *CHP Halkodaları Talimatnamesi*, (Ankara: 1940).

closed down, while the number of People's Houses was 478. After 1940, in parallel with the rise of the peasant movement, there was a rapid increase in the number of People's Rooms, which were easier to establish due to the policy of development in the villages, while it is possible to see that People's Houses remained in the background due to the difficulties caused by the political, social and economic conditions of World War II.

In the few years following the end of World War II, although the number of People's Houses began to increase, it can be said that the spread of primary schools, Village Institutes, People's Rooms and RPP organizations in small towns and villages was prioritized as a process that was also evident in the East. Meanwhile, with the onset of multi-party politics in 1945, it is possible to observe that the People's Houses began to lose their position as political and cultural intermediaries and performers, and citizens prioritized participation in the RPP and DP more. It should be added that the DP-led smear campaign claiming that the People's Houses functioned not as an impartial state institution but as an agent of the RPP and should not benefit from the state budget, was operative in this.

The provinces that attract attention, with their Kurdish population density being more than half, are the 12 provinces of Diyarbakir, Mardin, Urfa, Van, Siirt, Hakkari, Bitlis, Bingöl, Tunceli, Muş, Ağrı and Elazığ, corresponding more or less to Ottoman Kurdistan, Bilad-ı Ekrad (Kurdish Land), and Vilayat-i Şarkiyye. The regions that would be called East and Southeast Anatolia in 1941 include 17 provinces. Among these provinces, the provinces that were part of the RPP Organization were Gaziantep and Malatya, which were not part of the General Inspectorate, and Erzurum, Kars and Erzincan which were within the General Inspectorate.

According to the numbers published in the RPP publications in 1948, it was determined how many People's Houses and Rooms were in the 12 provinces and in the other 5 Eastern provinces, which were part of the other RPP organizations. Based on the documents in the Republican Archives, it has been observed that these numbers did not show a major leap forward until 1951, when the Peoples' Houses were closed down. Until their closure, approximately 478 Houses and 4,322 People's Rooms,

mostly small models in villages, had been established throughout the country. In 1948, 70 of the 469 People's Houses and 696 of the 4,200 People's Rooms in 63 provinces across the country seem to have been located in the 17 Eastern provinces. In the 12 Eastern/Kurdish dominated provinces, the number of Houses was just 44 and the number of Rooms was 305. The number of *People's* Houses and People's Rooms in each province is given below.[161]

Table 2.2 Number of People's Houses in twelve Kurdish provinces of Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia.

City	People's Houses	People's Rooms
Ağrı	4	18
Bingöl	3	27
Bitlis	3	11
Diyarbakır	6	14
Elazığ	4	62
Hakkari	1	7
Mardin	7	26
Muş	3	31
Siirt	2	19
Tunceli	3	55
Urfa	6	18
Van	2	17
	44	305

SOURCE : *CHP 25. Yıl*, (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1948), 25.

161 *CHP 25. yıl*, Ulus Basımevi, Ankara: 1948, 25.

Table 2.3 Number of People's Houses in the other five provinces of Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia.

City	People's Houses	People's Rooms
Erzincan	4	53
Erzurum	5	113
Gaziantep	5	48
Malatya	5	54
Kars	7	123
Total	26	391

SOURCE : *CHP 25. Yıl*, (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1948), 25.

2.3.1 *Inspection and Political/Administrative Communication*

I will now try to explain how the People's Houses were positioned as a space for inspection/supervision and political and administrative communication, and its meaning in terms of state formation. As mentioned, the People's Houses were an institutionalization that was called on to produce solutions to both the material needs and all other problems of the People's Houses in their own locality, without going beyond the RPP instructions and notifications. Therefore, although the RPP General Secretariat, which supervised the People's Houses, advised them to establish a self-regulatory system, it also planned to establish a centralized administration and supervision mechanism in a more effective and systematic manner, with the rapid spread of the People's Rooms across the country.

The previous practice was that People's Houses were expected to submit annual reports to the RPP General Secretariat, providing information on the types of activities, the conditions of the building, the number of participants, and many other areas. In these reports, it was also expected that the existing People's House would display the scale of "success and activity" in its local area. In these reports, which are seen as the report cards of the People's Houses, the most striking element is that the larger People's Houses began to do so through statistics and graphs.

Although, as in other actions, a People's House's failure to submit its activity report was not sanctioned, this process was effective in controlling the provision of in-kind and cash aid by the RPP General Secretariat, which led to a competition among the especially large and active People's Houses. However, when these reports, which were insistently requested to be sent periodically, are analyzed in terms of the administrative functioning of the modern and rational state, it is seen that they were not sent to the desired extent. Even if it was not periodic or its contents were weak or strong, it was an important theme and problematic area in terms of disciplinary communication with state and party institutions; collecting data and information about the People's House and its location; and ensuring a proficient bureaucratic administration, functioning and supervision system. In addition, they are basic sources of information for researchers.

The second system of supervision of the People's Houses was based on the reports of the centralized Party Inspectors, MPs and other local state and party administrators. The party inspectors inspected the People's Houses according to the articles of the RPP Inspection Instructions, published by the RPP General Secretariat in 1939 and 1943.[162] In the 12 provinces in the East, where I found that the activity reports of the People's Houses were not periodic or were not sent at all, one of the most important documents obtained in this research, The Directive for the Inspection of the People's Houses and Rooms in the Provinces where RPP Organizations were not established *(CHP Teşkilatı Kurulmamış Vilayetlerdeki Halkevleri ve Odaları Teftiş Talimatnamesi),* issued in 1940 was significant.[163] This directive once again reveals that the provinces of Diyarbakır, Mardin, Tunceli, Urfa, Bingöl, Elazığ, Siirt, Bitlis, Van, Ağrı, and the People's Houses, which were seen as the RPP's substitute organization in the region, were held in a special position as an area of control. The directive stipulated that the People's Houses and People's Rooms were to be especially monitored in terms of the status of

162 *CHP Teftiş Talimatnamesi,* (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1939/1943).

163 *CHP Teşkilatı Kurulmamış Vilayetlerdeki Halkevleri ve Odaları Teftiş Talimatnamesi*, (Ankara: Zerbamat, 1940).

their activities in teaching Turkish literacy, the perceptions and attitudes of the People's House administrators and officials towards the party and state institutions, if not the RPP organization itself, their relations with the public, and the conflicts that arose. In addition, it emphasized "warming up the public to the state, and especially identifying those who carry out activities against the state".[164] This way, it was hoped that the inspectors would closely monitor the People's Houses and "look for ways to make them work better, so that a new vitality would be created in these regions with the People's Houses and it would be possible to reach the people of that region."[165]

Party inspectors, who made inspection trips to twelve provinces on a semi-annual or annual basis, wrote their reports after their inspections in accordance with the aforementioned articles of instruction. The reports clearly show that the party-state administrators viewed the People's Houses as both state and party institutions, positioning them as a political and administrative intermediary between the center and the local, an institution of visibility and performance, a space and a field of encounter.

However, state documents reveal that RPP executives argued that the reports of the Party Inspectors and the inspection process did not yield the expected results. RPP Secretary General Memduh Şevket Esendal, who went on an inspection trip in 1942 to establish RPP organizations in the East, mentions this issue in his comprehensive report.[166] In addition to the fact that these reports were not periodic or systematized, Esendal states that some Party Inspectors carried out short-term and superficial inspections due to serious logistical problems such as transportation and accommodation. He further emphasizes that they behaved in the places they visited not as administrators and politicians representing the Party,

164 Ibid.

165 Anıl Çeçen, *Halkevleri,* 191-2.

166 "CHP Genel Sekreteri Memduh Şevket Esendal'ın Doğu İllerine Yaptığı Gezinin Raporu." CCA.490.01/571.2274.1, (14.06.1945)

but as civil servants who wanted to complete their duties as soon as possible.[167]

Apart from the reports, another important pillar of their administration was the petition and correspondence mechanism, which included "wishes and complaints" sent to the General Secretariat of the RPP and which has only recently begun to be given importance in the literature on the subject. These letters and petitions included requests for the financial and in-kind needs of the People's Houses, as well as complaints about their functioning and activities, and the processes of conflict and reconciliation between the local state and RPP administrators regarding their administration. Research in the Republican Archives reveals that in the eastern provinces, social groups other than People's House administrators and civil servants mostly sent these letters in the 1940s, when the RPP offices began to be established. As a result, although the structure and functioning of the People's Houses were governed through regulations, their daily practices, administrative and financial functioning were also determined and controlled through the aforementioned reports and petition traffic. The process of producing local and centralized responses to reports and petitions on localities was also part of the reproduction of discourses and practices. Thus, as will be illustrated in the following pages, I can claim that the routine bureaucratic system and functioning in the field of the People's Houses, including their shortcomings and irregularities, shaped the administrative and political presence of the modern state in the East, as a field of state-society relations and interaction, including power relations, and produced "inputs and outputs" that shaped them.

There is no need to reiterate that the vast pool of information generated through these inspection mechanisms served the state authorities not only with information on the People's Houses' activities and participation, but also with strategies to manage, control and supervise the localities in the socio-economic crisis environment of the war years. In addition, the state's political and administrative communication process with the localities through the People's Houses,

167 Ibid.

which were positioned as an intermediary, enabled the negotiation of the limits and forms of intervention, prohibition and authorization. Therefore, the activity reports prepared by the People's Houses, the inspections and reports of RPP deputies and inspectors, as well as the letters of petition and complaint, were mechanisms of communication, and interaction through which both the centralized management and supervision of the locale and its limits were constantly carried out. In this sense, it is necessary to say once again that there were channels that produced *state effect* which gave the state a the appearance of an autonomous structure, and that their complicated meanings should be studied more ethnographically.

2.3.2 *Everyday Production of the Limits of Administrative/Political Representation and Participation*

In the first years of the republic, authoritarian and punitive practices were quickly put into effect across the country, on the grounds that there was or might be opposition to the new regulations and practices. In this process, political participation and representation in parliamentary and local politics were also subject to centralized management and control, in order to avoid encountering the "self-resistant" attitudes of the peasantry, which is notoriously particularly injudicious and difficult to control. There was a system in which parliamentary candidates who could not be directly elected were appointed from the center, without taking into account the criteria of the locality for a long time.[168]

The color of this structure was further darkened in the Kurdish East of the country, coded as even more imprudent by its social, cultural, territorial and demographic presence. This was because, in the Eastern provinces, where the party-state was positioned as the sole legitimate political authority, political participation and representation in the parliamentary system was further restricted for many years within the limits of centralization. It should be emphasized that in these provinces,

168 For more details on this issue, see Esat Öz, *Tek Parti Yönetimi ve Siyasal Katılım*, (Ankara: Gündoğan Yayınları, 1992).

where members of the military and civilian bureaucracy were nominated as candidates, and approved in two-tier elections, the localization rate of MPs was at its lowest level.[169] Moreover, the most effective political and administrative practice of this structure was the fact that the RPP, even though it was officially and de facto the single party. It gradually closed down its organizations in the provinces where Kurds were concentrated and did not open them up again until the 1940s, and preferred to exclude primarily Kurds in the administrative structure of the People's Houses for many years. After all, the People's Houses, which were positioned as the counterparts of the RPP organizations in terms of social communication and participation, had exceptional characteristics in terms of structure, functioning, supervision, administrative and political participation, representation, and executive elections.

However, as will be elucidated below, the first claim under this sub-heading is that this process in the region in a state of exception was not uniform in the early years as well, as it evolved into a new policy of limited and controlled "inclusion" after 1943, also officially, with exceptional experiences according to place and time. On the other hand, the state's intention of establishing centers of Turkishness in the East was to produce civil servants and natives of Turkish ancestry or those whom it believed represented Turkishness as ideal elites. The second claim is that the presence of the executive representatives elected to the People's Houses, both as practitioners and as cultural and social receptors, with their less than ideal positions and actions, established a political space of struggle and negotiation where centralist boundaries were discussed and reproduced at the center-local level. This was related to the establishment of states through assimilation and civilization.

This is not to say, of course, that the sharper disparity in political representation and participation in the East, with its over-controlled creation of inclusions and exclusions that continued after the initiation of a multi-party system, was not problematic for the republican citizenship and political populism summarized in the constitutional

169 Ahmet Demirel, *Tek Parti'nin İktidarı, Türkiye'de Seçimler ve Siyaset,* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014).

article "sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation".[170] Nevertheless, it is possible to outline the fact that the definition of "nation" in this case, by identifying it with Turkish national identity and loyalty to the state as its standard bearer, produced internal coherence, and conveyed the message that those who positioned themselves outside of this definition would not be considered "appropriate and reliable."

In the twelve provinces with a majority Kurdish population, the definition of nationhood, which was also a criterion for RPP membership, had a considerable impact on the administrative structure of the People's Houses. After the Sheikh Said Rebellion, RPP central administrators, party inspectors, and general inspectors attributed the public discourse on the main reason for not establishing RPP organizations in these provinces to a lack of "suitable" and "reliable" personnel to establish organizations in these provinces. In addition, this issue was not limited to the people. Based on their findings that there was a group of civil servants and bureaucrats who collaborated with the rebels in the Sheikh Said Rebellion, they also did not have absolute trust in their own civil servants.[171] Another important justification was based on the fear that the RPP organizations would turn into a space for political struggle and conflict, especially among the tribes, and that this political mobility would open up space for new "nationalist and separatist" actions and ideas. We can easily see from the documents that this area of distrust was the primary criterion for the complaints of both the locals and the bureaucracy, members of the People's House and RPP, village headmen and "commoners" to the center, the authenticity of which was also questioned by those in the center.[172]

170 Emre Erkan, "Türkiye'de Çok Partili Hayata Geçişte Taşrada Muhalefet (1945-1950)", (PhD diss., Marmara University, 2021).

171 For a detailed examination of the RPP's hesitation and failure to organize in the twelve Kurdish-populated provinces, see Murat Turan, *CHP'nin Doğu'da Teşkilatlanması (1923-1950).*

172 For example, in a petition of complaint written in 1936 on behalf of retired district governor doctor Rafet Gündoğdu, it was written that İlyas Sami, who had served as a member of parliament, had given underhanded support to the Kurdish Rebellion (referring to the Sheikh Said Rebellion), had taken bribes from his neighborhood, had

In such a historical context established between fiction and reality, in order to create a culturally safe East where there would be no political uprising in the twelve provinces, and where Turks and Turkishness were dominant, the first thing to do before the organization of the RPP was to ensure the existence and organization of the institutions of the party-state.[173] The political legitimacy of this was based on the discourse that the priority was to establish the East of the Republic with the military, administrative, judicial, cultural, economic and spatial power and organization of the state, instead of that of the East, which was registered as unreliable, and that it was objectionable to establish RPP organizations instead of that. This is related to the decision to prioritize the effectiveness of the General Inspectorates and the People's Houses, the exceptional state institutions representing the party-state structure, over the RPP organizations. In fact, according to the official archival documents, it is possible to say that rebuilding the RPP organizations was not a prominent theme until the 1940s. On the other hand, the party and state leaders and state authorities made insinuations, and referred to the immaturity of the "people" who did not fully submit to Turkishness, who could not even speak Turkish and therefore could not represent themselves politically.[174]

In fact, RPP Secretary General Mahmut Şevket Esendal, on a trip to the East in 1942 to investigate whether RPP organizations could be established, was astonished by the fact that despite the passage of years, there were still "Kurdish voices everywhere", and he despaired of being

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no human characteristics, no love for the homeland, and was far from money and benefits. In the same document, we see that Ali Çetinkaya, the Deputy Minister of Nafia (The Minister of Public Works), reports that the same person stole money from a lawyer's pocket during a train trip and that this was officially reported. CCA. 490.01/ 344. 1440 4.

173 *CHP 25. yıl.*

174 On the relationship between the production of a common language and politics and political representation, as well as a meaningful Kurdish interpretation of this, see. Nesrin Uçarlar, "Kürtçenin Direnişi ve Siyasalın Geri Dönüşü", in *Türkiye Siyasetinde Kürtler, Direniş, Hak Arayışı, Katılım*, ed. Büşra Ersanlı, Günay Göksu Özdoğan, Nesrin Uçarlar, 3rd ed. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2016): 251-297.

able to establish an organization.[175] According to him, "Kurds have penetrated into the cities and are still spreading the Kurdish language and Kurdishness", while Turkish settlements are few. It is difficult to move this vast population across borders, hence it is critical to establish the People's Houses, which will Turkify the Kurds and Arabs through language assimilation, prior to organization of the party. Esendal states: "In this vast region of the country, there are few provincial centers with Turkish colonies and district centers like Ahlat, Erciş, and Bismil. For this reason, the People's Houses, which are cultural institutions rather than party structures, should be made effective". Moreover, even among the civil servants in these provinces, idealistic and meritorious personnel were scarce, and it did not seem possible to find suitable and reliable personnel for RPP organizations from such human capital.



Figure 2.3 Bismil People's Room Administrative Board, 1941. SOURCE: "Elazığ İlinde Bulunan Halkevleri'nin Teftiş Raporları", CCA, 490. 01/997.852.1. (10.08.1945). Photographed by RPP Party Inspector Münir Soykam.

175 "CHP Genel Sekreteri Memduh Şevket Esendal'ın Doğu İllerine Yaptığı Gezinin Raporu", CCA.490. 01/571.2274.1, (14.06.1945).

Since, as a general rule, one had to be an RPP member to become a director of the People's Houses, and given the lack of party organizations in the twelve provinces in our focus, local participation in the leadership of the People's Houses was also a complicated issue. Before and even after the establishment of party organizations in 1943, civil servants, who were also considered members of the RPP, which wanted to keep them under constant control, were put forward as plausible Halkevi administrators in the Kurdish East. In accordance with the basic criterion that "the chairmen of the People's Houses must have national qualifications for their extremely important duties", which RPP Secretary General Recep Peker articulated in 1934, the candidates for the chairmanship of the People's Houses were bureaucrats representing the state.[176] Local bureaucrats such as the heads of education, registration offices, agriculture, public works, or postal organizations, as well as teachers, who were considered natural members of the People's Houses, were appointed as People's House presidents, whilst village teachers and village heads were appointed as People's Rooms presidents. In those provinces with the lowest school enrollment, however, the number of teachers was low, and this group, which was expected to be the most active, was not visible in the People's Houses, particularly in rural areas. Especially in the years of official party-state amalgamation in places where there was no suitable person for the position of mayor, the man served both as mayor and head of the People's House.

As will be seen in the succeeding chapters, this intense position of authority and power, particularly concentrated in local administrators, resulted in acts of arbitrariness, and generated conflict dynamics within the state and with social actors. Similarly to the expectations of the Turkish Hearths, the officials expected to be active in the People's Houses had to overcome "underdevelopment and scarce resources" in the region, be loyal to the regime and its ideals, and be idealistic and with a sense of mission.[177]

176 CCA.490.01/1487.65.1

177 *Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası Kâtibiumumiliğinin Fırka Teşkilatı'na Umumi Tebligâtı, Mayıs 1931'den Birincikânun 1932 Nihayetine kadar,* vol: 1, 80-81.

While even civil servants were approached with caution, the entry of the resident population into the administration of the People's Houses was restricted, on the condition that they had "national qualities," spoke Turkish, were educated, literate, and cultured, were not classist, and supported the party. Local elites with "Kurdish ancestry" and other ethnic groups whose loyalty to the state and the regime was not ascertained, and who might also represent local dynamics and interests, were subjected to a strict filtering process. In fact, this is in line with the "non-involvement of Kurds in the affairs of the state" in the Plan for the Reform in the East and many other internal state reports. If the State meant the Party, it was a consistent decision in itself that they should not be involved in party affairs. However, in the case of the People's Houses, documents show that, in addition to those of Turkish ethnicity who were primarily settled in city centers prior to the establishment of the party organizations, Kurds and Arabs who were loyal to the party and the regime, who had accepted Turkification, and who had been involved in the Associations for Defence of National Rights (*Mudafa-i Hukuk Cemiyetleri*) during the “struggle of independence” of the country and RPP branches before they were closed down, were able to become administrators. In addition to the People's House, which was in alliance with the party-state. It is possible to observe that the aforementioned notables, officials and local intellectuals, especially those selected from the Kurdish population, who took positions in local administrations and later RPP organizations, were also kept under constant surveillance and control through periodic inspections.

Although "Turkish ancestry" was prioritized, the general characteristics of these individuals, who came from noble and influential families in the cities and some towns in these provinces where the Kurdish population was predominant, can be pinpointed. What scholars have so far agreed on is that these groups engaged in social engineering together with the CUP and then the Kemalists who took over their legacy, using deportation, Turkification, resettlement and other violent

techniques.[178] Together with Balkan and Caucasian refugees, their alliance was founded on the utilization of Armenian property, having a privileged economic situation, and other state capital.[179] Among the Kurdish population, sergeants who had served in the army, educators who received special training and had had three years of basic education, and local civil servants were also able to enter the state's elite formation domain. Some of the younger educated people who were not part of the upper class, such as the offspring of the aforementioned people who had received formal education, or public education after the Republic, would not be considered "suitable" employees until the 1940s or even beyond.

When we look at the People's House in Diyarbakır, the center of the First General Inspectorate, we see that the first director of this People's House, which opened in 1932 and won the admiration of Ankara for a while as the most effective People's House in the region, was Şükrü Sökmensüer, the temporarily appointed Director of Public Order of the General Inspectorate. This is a clear and symbolic example of the concretization of establishing a cultural order in tandem with the military order in the People's House administration. Two years later, Tahsin Cahit Çubukçu from the Çubukçuoğlu family, the owner and editor-in-chief of the newspaper *Diyarbekir*, who seemed to be in tune with the state officials, was elected as the head of the People's House. Çubukçu, who was not only an administrator but also an active intellectual and writer, was elected as a member of parliament in 1939, perhaps due to the fact that being a director of the People's Houses was a kind of stepping stone on the path to becoming a member of parliament. Çubukçu has a changing political profile such as can be seen in many politicians and bureaucrats of the period, ranging from People's House director to the RPP and then the DP. Even though the rate of localism increased from the opening of the RPP organization, on the basis of branch committee members as well as the chairmen of the Diyarbakır People's House, it is still possible to detect the influence of bureaucrats

178 Üngör, *Modern Türkiye'nin İnşası: Doğu Anadolu'da Ulus, Devlet ve Şiddet (1913-1950)*, 399-405.

179 Ibid.

nominated from outside the province.[180] It was even reported that the fact that more than half of the heads of the People's Houses were not from Diyarbakır caused resentment among the people of that city.[181]

Although there were groups active in the state and the People's Houses, such as those in local alliance with the state, which were more visible in the city centers, the preference was for the state's own idealistic and missionary-minded civil servants and bureaucrats. In provinces the rate of speaking Turkish was extremely low, it is possible to see that localization rates were at minimum levels. In Hakkâri, where more than 90 percent of the population spoke Kurdish, and which had the lowest Turkish literacy and schooling rates, not only citizens but also civil servants were indifferent and uninterested in the People's House, and even refused to join its administrative committee.[182] It was also reported that the frequent transfers of civil servants who did not want to serve in these provinces for a long time were also influential in this. In addition, after the first head of the People's House, Governor Sadullah Kololu, the majority of the 12 heads of the Hakkâri People's House who served until its closure in 1951 were members of the local bureaucracy, such as the notary public, health director, teacher, population director, etc., until the years when local people were formally designated as administrators. Finding suitable people who spoke Turkish and had "national qualities" seems to have become possible for the state in the 1940s.

According to the People's House directive, People's House presidents were appointed after their curriculum vitae and registered photo were sent to the RPP General Secretariat. In 1934, Kâmil Kotan, who would later become a member of parliament, was appointed as the head of the

180 After that, Necati Üster, a doctor; Osman Ocak, a teacher from Diyarbakır; Agâh, a lawyer; Bedri Noyan, an ENT specialist at the Numune Hospital; Reşit İskenderoğlu, a lawyer appointed by the provincial administrative board after the establishment of the RPP; and Aziz Tulgar, a retired officer. İsmail Özer, "Türk Modernleşmesinde Halkevleri ve Diyarbakır Örneği", 367-370.

181 Ibid., 189


182 For Hakkâri Halkevi see also Ahmet İlyas, "Cumhuriyet'in Yitik Modernleşme Mirasına Bir Örnek: Hakkâri Halkevi ve Çalışmaları", *Çağdaş Türkiye Araştırmaları Dergisi*, XVIII/37, (Autumn, 2018): 589-603.

People's House in Muş, a city where resident families had long-established ties with the RPP and the state.[183] Kotan, a member of the permanent council of the Provincial General Assembly who was a native of Muş, also sent a registration certificate with a photo[184] to the RPP General Secretariat. He presents an "appropriate" profile by listing that he graduated from the Muş Middle School, that he was a member of the *Mudafa-i Milli Cemiyeti* and participated in the war, and that he later served as the mayor of Muş and provincial chairman of the RPP.[185]

183 "Muş İli Kaza ve Nahiyelerindeki Halkevleri Başkanlarına Mahsus Sicil Cetvelleri", CCA, 490.01/945.666.1, 1947.

184 In these years when photography was not widespread, the RPP headquarters' insistence on this practice can be considered a modern state and modernization practice in terms of increasing visibility and recognition. It is reported that since the presidents could not have new photographs taken, they had to remove their photographs from other official documents and paste them into these registers.

185 "Muş İli Kaza ve Nahiyelerindeki Halkevleri Başkanlarına Mahsus Sicil Cetvelleri", CCA, 490.01/945.666.1, (1947) The Muş People's House was headed by Kamil Kotan from 1934-1943, Abdullah Karasu from 1943-1945, Hamdi Dayı from 1946-1950, and Zekeriya Karahasanoğlu from 1950 to August 1951. İrşad Sami Yuca, "Muş Halkevi ve Faaliyetleri (1934-1951)", *International Journal of Social Science*, 35 (Summer 2015), 231, Doi number: http://dx.doi.org/10.9761/JASSS2933.




SİCİL SURETİ

ADI ve SOY ADI	Kamil Kotan .
Doğduğu yer ve tarihi	Muş 308
Tahsil derecesi, hangi okullardan kaç yıl tarihlerde diploma aldığı:	Muş Rüştiye mektebi mezunlarından .
Meslekî	Muş halkevi Başkanı ve daimî encümen üyesi .
Partiye girdiği tarih	5 ikinci teşrin 926
Partide aldığı fasl vazifeler (tarih-leriyle beraber)	926 senesinden I/3/933 tarihine kadar Muş halk partisi başkanlığında ve 1/3/933 tarihinden itibaren halkevi başkanlığında
Parti zamanı bulunduğu hizmetler (ayrılmışsa sebepleri)	Daima başkan olarak partide bulunmuş ve hiç bir sebeple ayrılmamışım .
Devlet teşkilâtında bulunduğu vazifeler ve bu vazifelerden ayrılış ve başlayış tarihleri	9 ikinci kânun 339 tarihinde Muş meclisi idare azalığına intihap edilmiş ve 24/ tarihinde intihap müddetinin iki sene olması hasebile vazifeden ayrılmış ve ehemmiyetle istifayı ettim . 1930 tarihinde Muş belediye riyasetine intihap edildim . belediye reisliklerinin Valiler uhdesine verilmesi dolayısile 18/II/933 tarihinde ayrıldım . 8/12/932 tarihinde Muş umumî meclisi ve daimî encümen azalığına intihap edildim ve halenda daimî encümen üyesi olarak bulunuyorum.
Daha önce başka bir siyasî partiye girmişmidir? Ne vakit, nasıl ayrılmıştır.	Başka bir siyasî partiye girmemişim .
Millî mücadelede nerelerde ve hangi vazifelerde bulunmuştur.	Millî mücadelede Muş müdafaai hukuk azalığında bulunmuşum .
Yabancı lisanlardan hangisini bilir, emeleri varmıdır?	yabancı lisana bilmem ve emrimde yoktur .
Askerlik hizmetini nerede ve nasıl yapmıştır?	Uzunî harpte Erzurum ve van vilayetlerinde vazifei askeriyemi ifa etmişim . ve vazicamda hicret dolayisile rivsa oğramıştır .
Bu çerçeve dışında genel itahlar ve düşünceler.	Müdafaai hukuk cemiyetinin ilk teşekkülünde Uşe ve halk partisinin teşekkülünde başkan olarak intihap edilmişim . halk partisinin Uşşak kaldırılmasından dolayı halkevi başkanlığını deruhde edereâ bugünde mealiftihar bu vazifeyi de bulunmaktayım . hayatım memleket idare , memleket umumî, müdafaai hukuk üyeliklerile halk partisi, belediye ve halkevi başkanlıklarında geçmiştir ? fikir ve ahvali memleketim ve içtimai mevkiim yüksek partimizin kıymetli prensipleri dahilindedir .

Figure 2.4 The registration certificate of the Head of Muş's People's House Kamil Kotan. SOURCE: "Muş İli Kaza ve Nahiyelerindeki Halkevleri Başkanlarına Mahsus Sicil Cetvelleri", CCA 490.01/945.666.1, (1947).

In the same year, the names of Hüsnü Söylemez, Director of Culture, Halil Bozkurt, Chief Administrative Clerk of the Assembly, İsmail Ağar, Science Officer, and members of the Dede family are found on the administrative board and branches of the Muş People's House. According to the 1936 table reported to the RPP General Secretariat, AbdulBari Dede, a merchant who would later become an MP, and his relatives, Merchant Zeki Dede and Vahap Dede in 1938, were among the executives of the RPP organization in the 1940s.



MUŞ : Halkevi . 23 şubat 1936 pazar günü şubeler kayit olan üye adedile komite üyelerini gösterir cetveldir .

DEVLET ARŞİVLERİ GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ

Şubenin adı	Komite başkan ve üyelerinin iş ve adları .	Şubelere kayit olan üye adedi . Memur	Avkat	Muhtar	Esnaf	Sporcu	Kençber	Sair mesleksiz erbabı	Yekün	MÜŞAHEDELER
Kitapsaray ve yayın	Üye : Edebiyat direktörü Hüsnü Söylemez . Üye : Saytar müdürü Hulusi Tüser . Üye : Eski umumi meclis üyesi Nevzat Güngör .	18	0	4	0	8	0		88	
Sosyal yardım	Üye : Tüccardan Abdulbari Dede . Üye : Sıhhat memuru Resul Çelikel . Üye : Sıhhat katibi Naci Özkan . Üye : Tüccardan Hay Vahhap . Üye : Belediye üyesi Abdulbaki Çağlayan .	20	I	36	0	II2	0		169	
Gösterit .	Üye : İlk okul müfettişi Sirel Astemi Üye : Varlık vergi memuru İsmail . Üye : Maliyeden varidat katibi Revzik Çağlayan .	27	0	0	8	0	0		35	
Köycülük	Üye : Edebiyat öğretmeni Celal Güngör . Üye : Tüccardan Bidki Arıtlı . Üye : Belediye üyesi Leoip Bingöl . Üye : Umumi meclis üyesi Nurullah Bingöl . Üye : Eski meclis katibi Halil Sözkurt .	28	2	I3	0	20	0		63	
Müze ve sergi	Üye : Daimi encümen üyesi ve halkevi başkanı Kamil Kotan . Üye : Tüccardan Zeki Gece . Üye : Kültür müfettişi Örüt . Üye : Dava vekili Musa Şekip Üye : Tüccardan Fetullah .	I2	2	20	0	250	90		374	
	YEKÛN	I05	5	7I	8	390	90		669	

Aslının aynıdır . I/4/936

Kamil Kotan

Figure 2.5 Names and Occupations of the Committee Members of Muş People's House, 1935. SOURCE: "Muş Halkevi'nde Faaliyet Gösteren Şube Kollarına Ait Yazışmalar", CCA, 490.01/ 973.765.2, (1943).

As seen in the table, when we look at the professions of the twenty-two administrators of the People's House, which had five branches, we see that there were members of the local state bureaucracy, members of the municipal and provincial general assemblies, merchants, a retired villager, and a lawyer. When we look at the distribution of 669 members registered in the branches and their occupations, a questionable phenomenon emerges. This is due to the fact that while the number of members in other branches was exceedingly low, the Museum and Exhibition Branch, which was not particularly active in these provinces, had about 250 farmers registered. [186] The 112 registered farmer members in the Social Support Branch can be considered more

186 Ibid.

reasonable, but nevertheless, the exaggeration and imbalance in the distribution of members appears to be related to the tendency to present oneself as active, in order to comply with the expectations of the RPP General Secretariat while quickly fulfilling the formalities. It is noteworthy that 621 of the 969 members of the Urfa People's House, only 33 of whom were "women", were registered as workers. Of the rest, 221 are farmers and 48 are teachers.[187]

In fact, given the RPP General Secretariat's warnings about exaggerations and inconsistencies in this regard, it can be said that this picture we encounter in many People's Houses is not unusual or unique to the places in focus. Indeed, folklore and education historian İlhan Başgöz points out that although he saw almost no workers in the Ankara People's House, which can be considered as the central hub of the People's Houses, the number of worker members and participants was high, and he refers to the fact that these statistics do not reflect the reality.[188] According to these and similar records, what was acceptable in order to become an administrator at the People's House was to be Turkish by descent, to identify oneself culturally with the Turkish national identity, to have an appropriate background, and to be politically loyal to the RPP, the regime, and the state, in accordance with the Six Arrows principles, and populism. Moreover, on a social and class basis, belonging to the bureaucracy and upper-middle class appears to be a crucial fact and criterion. Even if women's administrative participation was desired, the gendered preference for men placed constraints on women's agency due to dilemmas of ideology and everyday practices,

187 Ibid.

188 Berkes notes that poor Ankara villagers who came to Samanpazar to shop were not permitted near the People's House for fear that they might encounter state officials, particularly foreign diplomats, who might visit the Ankara People's House. Niyazi Berkes *Unutulan Yıllar*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005). Also, İlhan Başgöz states that he did not see a single worker in the Ankara People's House, which was recorded to have 3,339 worker members in 1934, even though he had attended for five years. This was because the administrators of the People's House were trying to prove how effective their work was with fictitious and inflated figures. Başgöz, *Türkiye'nin Eğitim Çıkmazı ve Atatürk*, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Pan Yayıncılık, 2004), 216.

social and cultural barriers and flexibilities. Mostly peasants, workers and a small number of women could become members if they met the existing forms of capital ownership and other criteria, and they seem to have participated within a certain hierarchy, especially in the 1930s, as masses following the ruling elites, subject to the aforementioned stratified elimination process. Hence, in the Kurdish provinces, in addition to administrative participation, daily social participation, with its limitations in areas of encounter such as in the preceding example, also demonstrates variable and more inflexible characteristics. Disciplinary rules that regulate women's visibility, such as not speaking Kurdish and other languages, and not organizing activities in this regard, wearing modern clothes instead of religious or traditional clothes, and elite men not being allowed to attend certain meetings without their wives, are just some of the disciplinary rules that also turn into a field of struggle and negotiation, such as violation, adaptation, appropriation similar to the other provinces in some degree. These phenomena will be further elaborated on.

I have already stated that the election of local elites as administrators of the People's Houses was not considered acceptable, and that the supervision of this by the General Inspectorate, other inspectors and deputies, and by officials from the center was a fundamental issue. However, considering that in other provinces, People's House administrators were required to be RPP members, we have found that groups other than civil servants, who were considered natural members due to the lack of RPP organizations in the 12 Eastern provinces, found a place in the People's Houses until the 1940s. Meanwhile, until the closure of the People's Houses, the ethnic origin of those who served in the leadership and on executive committees of the People's Houses and RPP organizations, as well as their spouses, continued to be the dominant area of scrutiny, and the dominant theme of letters of complaint. In the internal state correspondences, information such as "he is a pure Turkish

son" or "he is pure Turk" or "he is essentially Turk" and "he is a Kurd" or "he speaks Kurdish at home" was provided about these individuals.[189]

In addition to the fact that the relationship of the administrators of the People's Houses in the East with the state was shaped by historical multi-layered alliances and later alliances, it should be added that this cooperation was also subject to change with new dynamics. Moreover, not only their interest in benefitting from the state, the party and the opportunities and capital forms of Turkishness, and the modernity defined by it, but also the state's inquiries and concerns seem to have been effective in this cooperation. In order for the state to establish itself locally, and establish its own legitimacy, particularly in the region where there were few civil servants in the early years, it is clear that through the People's Houses, the state sought to meet with those it deemed distinguished and suitable, "despite being Kurds." These case is also analyzed for "ordinary" people throughout the thesis. As a result, despite the efforts of the Kurdish and Arab elements to prove their political loyalty, they were "not considered fully Turkish" in terms of culture, ethnicity and ancestry, kept "in a gray area, on the threshold" or "kept in a state of ambiguity in which it was possible for them to be Turkish".

On the other hand, it is possible to say that in these processes, a continuously controlled negotiation space was produced through the assimilation and inclusion of the state policy on Kurds. For the state, a policy shaped by indecisiveness and situationalism on how to position the Kurds, as Yeğen puts it, seems to have worked better than a stable power strategy in terms of political and administrative participation in the People's Houses. In addition, it seems to be a historically valid fact that the party-state may prefer to loosen its bipolar policy within certain limits, with the agenda of reinstating it at any time, within the changing developments. As is common in these reports, an inspection report written in 1945 contains an orientalist and civilizationalist denigration of the Kurds, indicating that they were not considered appropriate at that

189 For exemple see “Muş İli Kaza ve Nahiyelerindeki Halkevleri Başkanlarına Mahsus Sicil Cetvelleri”, CCA 490.01/945.666.1, (1947).

time either.[190] Referring to the Turkish immigrants who had also been settled in Muş as part of the policy of establishing Turkish colonies, it is stated that "the local Turks had better manners while the Kurds had no manners and lived under earthen roofs". At this point, it should be noted that in many places, for example, "immigrant houses" and villages were built for the resettled Turkish population and the property left by the Armenians was given mostly to the Turkish population, including villagers.

As stated, the mechanism of local political participation in favor of local representation was regarded with skepticism in the Kurdish provinces, and thus there were no RPP party offices. After 1938, when Ismet Inönü became president of the republic, regulations that permitted local people to become MPs, albeit on a limited basis, as opposed to an absolute central determination, began to take effect in other provinces.[191] However, it cannot be said that this was not as effective as in the eastern provinces and western provinces, where local actors were less represented, and there were no RPP organizations to operate this mechanism.[192] In 1940, since the chairmen of the People's Houses, who were elected from within the RPP administrative committee in areas with a RPP presence, were responsible for both party and People's House affairs, the principle that "the elements in the neighborhood who would take up the cause and accomplish work should be put in charge" was adopted in order to conduct more careful elections.[193] These regulations opened up a more effective space for the People's Houses administrators as a different political actor. In the case of individuals such as Çubukçu and Kotan, this led to a mobilization in the representation of not only

190 "Muş ilinin Teftiş ve Çalışma Raporlarının Genel Sekreterliğe Sunulduğu" CCA, 490.01/692.352.1, (1945).

191 For a recent review on this issue, see. Alexandros Lamprou, "Dilekçe Gönderme, İhbar ve Türkiye'de Tek Parti Döneminde Devlet-Toplum İlişkileri: 1939 Genel Seçimi Örneği", in *Tek Parti Dönemini Yeniden Düşünmek, Devlet, Toplum Siyaset*, ed. Sevgi Adak and Alexandros Lamprou, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2022), 93-128.

192 Ibid, 102, 105.

193 *CHP Halkevleri ve Halkodaları'nın 1940 Çalışmaları,* (Ankara: 1941).

bureaucrats in the region but also local elites from prominent families, who served as administrators of the People's Houses.

In the same year, another important development was the petition written to the RPP General Secretariat by First General Inspector Abidin Özmenwho insistently advocated cultural assimilation as the main method to ensure security.[194] Özmen argues here that opening the administration of the People's House to local groups other than civil servants, who lacked adequate public relations skills, would also increase participation in the People's House. Özmen states that, "Instead of civil servants, it would be preferable to open the administration of the People's House to the mayor, members of the municipal council, and especially to locals, especially young people who have good relations with state institutions, a good security status, and are resourceful."[195] At this time, there was an increase in requests for the opening of RPP offices in the Eastern provinces. For example, Diyarbakır Deputy Çubukçu reported on December 5, 1941 that local members who participated in the activities of the People's House and were not civil servants could not be elected to the administration of the People's House, which required RPP membership or civil servant status, since there was no RPP office. He writes that due to the lack of a RPP office, the People's Houses could not be efficient enough, and that the people of Diyarbakır were "upset" by this.[196]

Under the influence of the dynamics of World War II, Özmen was concerned about the cultural and political influence of Kurdish national movements on neighboring countries, and instead of physical violence, the views of the faction led by Avni Doğan and earlier Cemal Bardakçı, who advocated the predominant spread of state practices aimed at the

194 For Abdin Özmen's views, see. “Abidin Özmen Raporu”, in *Türkiye’nin Kürt Sorunu Hafızası*, Hüseyin Yayman (ed), 144-152; Bülent Varlık, ed., *Umumi Müfettişler Toplantı Tutanakları.*

195 “Diyarbakır İli Kaza ve Nahiyelerindeki Halkevleri Bakanlarına Mahsus Sicil Cetvelleri” CCA. 490.01/ 937.638.1. (23.08.1950).

196 CCA.490.01/269.1072.1

"inclusion" of Kurds, began to gain more weight.[197] This view was further bolstered by the argument that rebellion and disobedience were reduced to the west of the Euphrates, most recently in Dersim, as a result of the "operations of repression and destruction" that resulted in mass slaughter. Therefore, due to these factors and local demands, the RPP General Secretariat announced in a letter dated 1943 that people from the provincial and municipal councils were now allowed to be members or chairmen of the administrative committees of the People's Houses.[198] In this way, local elites with experience in relations and cooperation with the state would gradually begin to enter the administration of the People's Houses. Immediately after this, RPP offices would begin to open, first in Diyarbakır and gradually in all twelve provinces. Documents in the Republican Archive of the mid-1940s, and especially the records and reports of the administrators of the People's Houses, show that local professionals, notables, or "educated" people allied with the RPP, as well as a younger generation, were elected as administrators of the People's Houses for the first time, or more often. As a matter of fact, in 1945, the Hakkâri RPP Provincial Administrative Committee unanimously elected Ubeydullah Mümtaz Seven, "a local and high school graduate with a good track record" as the chairman of the Hakkâri People's House, which, as mentioned above, had always been run by bureaucrats and was last headed by the director of the civil registry.[199]

After the RPP party offices were opened, we observe that the General Inspectorates continued to be the actors in the supervision and control system regarding the records, profiles and activities of the administrators of the People's Houses and RPP organizations. In point of fact, after the RPP offices were opened, the rule that the head of the People's House "must be appointed by the provincial administrative board of the RPP upon the proposal of the General Inspectorate to which the province is

197 See "Ali Cemal Bardakçı Raporu (1926)", 99-103 and "Umumi Müfettiş Avni Doğan raporu (1943)", in *Türkiye'nin Kürt Sorunu Hafızası,* 167-173.

198 CCA. 490.01/1063.1080.2

199 "Hakkâri İli Kaza ve Nahiyelerindeki Halkevleri Başkanlarına Mahsus Sicil Cetvelleri", CCA.490.01/940.647.1.

affiliated" was established. This would show that the General Inspectorate had authority over the RPP, and that the identity of the administrators of the Halkevi was perceived by the RPP as a security issue and was constantly scrutinized and negotiated in this context.[200]

2.3.3 *(In-)Appropriateness of Rulers: Struggles, Interventions and Responses*

In the predominantly Kurdish provinces, People's House administrators, whether civil servants or not, who were categorized as having a vision, being suitable, trustworthy, and meritorious; or else as having practices such as "having a mixed and tainted past," using or abusing their duties and powers for their own benefit, embezzling money and property, bribery, and corruption. These were among the dominant themes that played a role in the practices of the People's Houses. In addition, the People's House administrators frequently took different power and interest related positions, maneuvered and interacted with the political, economic and cultural authority not only in the RPP, but also the DP, which was founded in 1945. In the following sections, this theme will continue to be explored, but will be limited it to some examples that reflect common patterns.

The correspondence regarding the head of the People's House in the town of Bitlis, which was once part of Muş, can be cited as an example of the phenomenon of local people who were deemed unsuitable for the chairmanship of a People's House. In the report dated June 3, 1934 of a Muş MP, whose name could not be ascertained due to the lack of a subsequent archival document, it is stated that "the most vibrant facilities to promote the meaning and value of our great ideal are the People's Houses and schools". [201] Then, the deputy states that "Arif, who had somehow become a MP in the past, was not suitable for the Bitlis People's House because his past was 'mixed and stained', that the fact that

200 For an example, see "Hakkâri İli Kaza ve Nahiyelerindeki Halkevleri Başkanlarına Mahsus Sicil Cetvelleri". CCA, 490.01/940.647.1.

201 "Muş İli Kaza ve Nahiyelerindeki Halkevleri Başkanlarına Mahsus Sicil Cetvelleri", 490.01/945.666.1, (1947).

no one went to the People's House because of him. Thus, it was necessary to appoint an idealistic and faithful middle school director in his place." The RPP General Secretariat asked the General Inspectorate, which appointed the heads of the People's Houses, to investigate this incident and, if necessary, to dismiss the head of the People's House.[202] The rest of the document is not available, but as seen in similar examples, these accusations against an elected parliamentarian suggest that the issue of eligibility may have passed through a complicated network of local relations. It also demonstrates that the position of head of the People's House was subject to constant struggle and negotiation among the local

202 The MP adds that in Bitlis: "As in many other places, there is rivalry, envy, jealousy, gossip and the final stage of enmity, but it is obvious that Mr. Arif lacks knowledge and culture." Besides, when he asked why they did not attempt to file an application for the election of an MP from the people of the province, he was answered as follows: "There is no need for an MP from us. It would be better if an MP is elected from other places; as long as our MPs are interested in us and our wishes". The answer attributes the reason for not electing MPs from the locals in Bitlis to their unwillingness to do so. As reiterated in official reports and correspondence, the MP for Muş, who also traveled to other provinces in the region, stated that during his tour of the Eastern provinces, the people were united in an unprecedented level of public order and justice, and that they were united in gratitude and appreciation for the government of the republic. He added that the people of Bitlis were very pleased that for the first time a member of parliament had visited Bitlis and listened to them, and that they wanted a factory in this war-torn town. He writes that although the people of Bitlis were entirely Turkish, they also spoke kurdish ("kurdish" is usually written with a lower-case letter), and that he found the same situation in Diyarbakır and among the intellectuals in Mardin, who spoke Arabic in their homes and among themselves, but called themselves Turks. He continued as follows: "Considering the Turkish names given to the mountains, streams and villages in this province, the center of which is Muş, there is no doubt that these were Turkish homelands; how kurdishness entered these places is a matter worthy of research and deepening. If education and guidance are introduced in these places as soon as possible, both our language will take root and those who have forgotten what they are will find themselves." The Muş MP had included the transportation situation, which had an impact on the process of governing and supervising. He said that the 230-kilometer journey from Diyarbakır to Bitlis in two days and eighteen hours with a powerful automobile was an indication of the state of the roads, adding that the same was true in Mardin and many other places. “Muş İli Kaza ve Nahiyelerindeki Halkevleri Başkanlarına Mahsus Sicil Cetvelleri”, CCA, 490.01/945.666.1 (1947).

and central state actors and the local population. In the early years of the People's Houses, although the preference for the state bureaucracy to run the People's Houses in the East was predominant, as seen above, hundreds of issues and inappropriate situations would arise.

In the above example, it was stated that it was essential to bring an idealistic middle school director, who was considered to be reliable and meritorious by default, to the office of the Bitlis Halkevi. However, the clash between the schoolmaster and the district governor in the Bulanık district of Muş in 1941, which was monitored and interrogated by Muş governor Tevfik Gür and the first general inspector Abidin Özmen, shows that the fact that the head of the People's House was a civil servant and an educator were not considered sufficient criteria for being suitable. The issue came to the fore when the schoolmaster complained about the district governor to the Secretary General. Muş governor Gür states that it was unacceptable that the schoolmaster, who was often disrespectful to his superior, the district governor, did not want to interfere in the affairs of the People's House, even though he was a representative of the government, and that it was wrong for him to complain about the district governor for this reason. Gür, with great anger, characterizes the schoolmaster head of the People's House as "mystical and egoistically incapacitated" (Mistik ve aczile hodkam), and adds that it is unacceptable for this person to act against the district governor as often as he can, based on his position as the head of the People's House, and he then demands that this person be dismissed in order to protect the district governor's authority. Abidin Özmen, the First General Inspector, assumed the role of arbitrator in accordance with his position of representing both the state and the party, admitting that "the head of the People's House had gone too far" and stating that "some unnecessary interventions by the district governor were also noticeable".[203]

During his inspection in Siirt in 1941, Party Inspector Hasip Aytuna found the work of the People's House in the provincial center, which "generally worked well", promising. However, the picture changed as he

203 "Muş İli Kaza ve Nahiyelerindeki Halkevleri Başkanlarına Mahsus Sicil Cetvelleri", CCA, 490.01/945.666.1

traveled to the districts and villages. Here again, one of the main issues was the quality of administrators and civil servants.[204] In the districts and villages of Siirt, where Turkish was mostly unknown except for the civil servants, he says that he was pained to see civil servants who did not get along well with each other, as in Garzan (changed name is Kurtalan), learning Kurdish instead of teaching Turkish to the people in order to serve and communicate with them. In fact, the people who had access to the state through influential people such as aghas, sheikhs and seyits who used religion, the state and the people to their advantage were not in opposition to the state. Therefore, if more idealistic administrators and specially trained civil servants who got along well with each other were appointed to these places, it would not be surprising to see that "a generation or two later, Western Turkish would be spoken as if it were the mother tongue".[205] Aytuna says that the people who spoke Kurdish, a language mixed with Syriac and Persian, were essentially Turkish, and that "state officials should explain this with a convincing and misleading propaganda, and words such as Kurd and Kurdish should be removed as soon as possible". He adds that in areas where the influence of the aghas and sheikhs had been quashed, "the people had become calmer towards the state; they now understood better that the reason they had previously opposed state authority was because the state did not make them feel the warmth of the state and also because of the oppression of the gendarmerie, their lack of attachment to the land, infertile soil, and their difficulties with livelihood, transportation, and education."[206]

204 "Siirt İlinde Bulunan Teftiş Raporları" CCA, 490.01/1002.871.2, (04.11.1945).

205 Aytuna noted that the people of the province had registered themselves as Kurds or Arabs in the census and that there were very few girls attending primary schools. For example, only 11 of the 65 students in the primary school in Garzan were girls. Two of the three teachers were soldiers. It is possible to think that soldiers were teaching in these provinces because this was where the teacher scarcity was at its highest level. Ibid.

206 Aytuna says the following: "But now the people believe in the republic and say 'God forbid that the republic and the state are destroyed'. They've calmed down. Especially in places where the authority of the aghas, seyits and sheikhs has been violently broken,

Among the RPP party inspectors in the region, the Elazığ regional inspector Münir Soykam, a doctor and Antalya MP stood out with his meticulous inspections and detailed reports in the early 1940s, and conducted inspections in 1942 in the Hozat district of Tunceli, formerly the center of Dersim province. Soykam reported that the People's House under the direction of the young and assertive district governor was a good meeting place, that the people in the center and in the Zeranik district spoke good Turkish, and that they faithfully obeyed the Republic and their superiors.[207] In the sequel of his report, he states that "it is certain that this people will easily become attached to our ideal. But only on condition that our officials treat them well and make them forget the past", thereby acknowledging that in Dersim, where thousands of people were killed and exiled, officials had mistreated the people in 1937/38. He then argues that this past could be forgotten, on condition that officials would now treat the people well, and that this would make it easier for an already receptive public to become attached to the ideals of the republic.[208]

In fact, this is not a perspective unique to Soykam or Aytuna. In most of the inspection reports of the 1940s, the predominant theme was that in the "Underdeveloped Orient which is deprived of Turkishness", state officials had mistreated and intimidated the people in the past and continued to at that time, and that the people could now be assimilated into obedient Turkism, if the officials with a sense of purpose worked voluntarily with determination and treated the people well from a populist perspective. As a result, the determinants of the state's and People's Houses' effectiveness, and obtaining the consent of the people, were the administrators and civil servants who were expected to have the will and determination to overcome the difficult conditions and

the good manners and mild nature of the people seem to have undergone a great transformation". Ibid.

207 "Tunceli İlinde Bulunan Halkevleri'nin Teftiş Raporları", CCA, 490.01/1003. 874.1 (19.02.1943)

208 Ibid.

transform the East from an underdeveloped and uncivilized political, social, cultural and economic structure.[209]

In the Şırnak district of Siirt, a complaint filed in 1950 alleging that the head of the People's House, together with the director of finance, had created a rift between civil servants, engaged in gossip, made a false report against the deputy commander of the regiment for placing gendarmes with bayonets in the People's House, and abused his position as head, paints another portrait of an unfavorable People's House head and civil servant.[210] In this year, when the DP was about to come to power, conflicts, struggles and wrangling within the state actors over the use of authority and power through the People's Houses and other institutions intensified, in line with the political debates and conflicts in the country. In the period after the 1946 elections, in which the harsh practices of the general inspectorates and the gendarmerie in the East were severely criticized under the leadership of the DP, and the inspectorates and there were demands for the People's Houses to be abolished, local complaints about the army and the gendarmerie began to become notable.

As another issue, in the twelve provinces, where the financial capacity of the state institutions was also at its lowest, due to the rule that the People's Houses were to be mostly self-funded through the local state budget, the RPP General Secretariat was constantly asked for help due to the insufficiency of local resources. The appeal conveying this request may contain a kind of threat and a secret bargain, in its wording that "if no aid is sent, there will be no People's Houses in the neighborhood to defend the state and the regime, and if this is desired, aid must be sent as soon as possible". In addition, the request that the headquarters report the budget and accounts of each House and Room periodically, in

209 Aytuna, discussing discord among administrative supervisors in Garzan: "Although People's Rooms and People's Houses in places speaking languages other than Turkish seem to be subject to the fate of not being able to work in accordance with the provisions of the working instructions and the minimum working plan, there is efficiency in places where there are energetic heads and cooperation between them...." "Siirt İlinde Bulunan Halkevleri'nin Teftiş Raporları", CCA,490.01/1002.871.2, (04.11.1945).

210 "Siirt Halkevi'nin Faaliyetleriyle İlgili İstek ve Şikâyetler", CCA, 490.01/843.332.1, (04.08.1950).

addition to other documents and reports, was a demand that was constantly on the agenda and often not met by "managers who were not doing their job".[211] It was also typical that routine bureaucratic procedures such as registering members, registering inventory and books, preparing work schedules, and submitting budget statements were done inadequately or improperly by the administrators and staff of the People's Houses. Embezzlement of People's House money by the heads and administrators, corruption,[212] and misuse or arbitrary use of People's House money, as in Bulanık, were also common cases and facts.[213] The non-delivery or late delivery of the sums sent to the People's Houses from the headquarters or allocated by the RPP provincial administrative office to the People's Houses and People's Rooms is an area of complaint and conflict.[214] This could be caused by a conflict or

211 "Siirt İlinde Bulunan Halkevleri'nin Teftiş Raporları", 490.01/1002.871.2, (04.11.1945). In 1939, the RPP General Secretariat asked the Tunceli governor for a chart showing the donations of the People's Houses and other organizations in the province. The governor of Tunceli, on the other hand, stated that Tunceli, which became a province in 1935, did not have a municipality and could not issue such figures, as the provincial center of the province was currently (temporarily) located in Elazığ. Funds were allocated from Tunceli special administration and municipality budgets to parties, People's Houses and charitable organizations. "Tunceli hususi idare ve belediye bütçelerinden parti, halkevi ve hayır kurumlarına ayrılan tahsisat", CCA, 490.01/1530.224.1 (30.09.1939).

212 According to a complaint from Urfa, the "Arab degenerate" head of the People's House did not take care of the affairs of the House and engaged in corruption at the People's House. "Urfa Halkevi'nin Faaliyetleriyle İlgili İstek ve Şikâyetler", CCA, 490.01/844.339.2, (09.07.1935)

213 For example, in his report dated 1944, Feyzi Kalfagil states that he had found that the head of the Muş Bulanık People's House had spent money improperly. "Muş İlinde Bulunan Halkevleri'nin Teftiş Raporları", CCA, 490.01/1001.868.1 (1947).

214 A complaint was filed against the RPP office for failing to deliver 500 liras sent by the RPP General Secretariat to the People's House in the Pülümür district of Tunceli. Funds allocated for the general needs of the People's Houses and People's Rooms in Tunceli. "Tunceli'deki halkevleri ve halkodalarının genel ihtiyaçlarına yardım olarak gönderilen tahsisat", CCA, 490.01/1530.226.1 (28.03.1951). Sıdıka Avar, the director of the Elazığ Girls' Institute, who was highly acclaimed for her missionary and idealistic attitudes, sent a hasty telegram to the RPP General Secretariat, complaining that the money sent for a fine arts course teacher had been held up by the head of the Pertek RPP for four

rivalry, often familial or personal, between the RPP provincial administrative boards and the head or administrators of the People's House or People's Room. In the People's Houses in these areas, the inability to pay the salaries and wages of clerks, chambermaids, librarians, arts and course teachers, even though they were not in large numbers, due to financial difficulties, and the heavy traffic of correspondence and money transfers regarding the sections sent by the General Secretariat, plus the slowness and disruptions in the bureaucratic and paperwork-intensive traffic related to all these, were areas of interaction that sometimes involved conflict and tension.[215]

In the People's Houses, civil servants did not want to stay in the East due to transportation and other infrastructural issues, cultural incompatibility with the people, especially because they did not speak Turkish, and reasons such as military service and ill health, and they tried to relocate by transfer.[216] Another significant criticism was that administrators and civil servants were not fully engaged in the work of the People's House due to excessive workloads or arbitrariness, or that they quit their positions as a result.[217] Consequently, due to these reasons, there was a high rate of complaints about the unsatisfactory number of long-term, stable and idealistic administrators of the People's Houses.

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months. "Funds allocated for the general needs of the People's Houses and People's Rooms in Tunceli". CCA, 490.01/1530.226.1 (28.03.1951)

215 At the Siirt People's House, when the band teacher's payment could not be made due to a lack of funds, methods of "overcoming impossibility" such as the donation of the House's camera in exchange for elimination of the debt were encountered. "Siirt İlinde Bulunan Halkevleri'nin Teftiş Raporları" CCA, 490.01/1002.871.2, (04.11.1945)

216 "Tunceli İli Kaza ve Nahiyelerindeki Halkevleri Başkanlarına Mahsus Sicil Cetvelleri", CCA. 490.01/949.678.1, (27.07.1951); "Urfa İlinde Bulunan Halkevleri'nin Teftiş Raporları", CCA, 490.01/ 1004.875.1, (14.03.1946).

217 Halis Güven, the provincial chairman of the Tunceli RPP, reports that "although the chairman of the Tahsini People's Room was notified not to leave his post, he abandoned the work of the People's Room and joined the municipal clerk's office, and since there was no one in the Tahsini district who could accomplish this task, the position remained vacant." "Tunceli İli Kaza ve Nahiyelerindeki Halkevleri Başkanlarına Mahsus Sicil Cetvelleri", CCA, 490.01/949.678.1 – (27.07.1951).

Inappropriate individuals and out-of-control incidents abounded, not only among those in charge, authorized and involved in the People's Houses, but also among "local civil servants", who were considered natural members, as well as in all sectors of the military and civilian bureaucracy. The accusations against these actors included abusing their positions and powers for the benefit of themselves and their relatives, maintaining their allegiance to the Sheikh Said rebels, distancing themselves from the state and the People's Houses, cooperating with unacceptable local influencers and the public,[218] collecting taxes by force, cooperating with smugglers at the borders,[219] and taking bribes.[220]

2.3.4 *Multi-Party Regime, People's Houses and Eastern and Kurdish Politics*

After the adoption of the multi-party system in 1945, political change also affected the People's Houses and their administration in the East.The emergence on the political scene in 1945 of the Democrat Party, which was founded by a group that had left the RPP with democracy and liberalism-oriented rhetoric, in the backdrop of the global winds of change, initiated a vibrant political process that would involve various ruptures in the twelve provinces, where RPP organizations were newly

218 In another report on the town of Hani, one of the centers of the Sheikh Said Revolt, RPP inspector Münir Soykam wrote about a schoolteacher who was indifferent to the activities of the local People's Room. The teacher was the brother-in-law of a sheikh who was hanged after the revolt and became friends with members of other families that had fought against the state. The inspector was also bothered by the gendarmerie officer, who had lived in the town for a long time and established close relations with the town's residents. He suggested that both be appointed to other provinces to prevent them from acting against republican principles. "Diyarbakır İlinde Bulunan Halkevleri'nin Teftiş Raporları." CCA, 490 01/996.850.1, (10.08.1945).

219 An RPP parliamentarian who inspected the People's House in Hakkari in 1942 reported widespread rumors that many gendarmerie officers allied with smugglers to accumulate personal wealth. He added that this was why smuggling continued. Another RPP inspector called attention to similar illicit acts by the gendarmerie in 1944. "Hakkari İlinde Bulunan Halkevlerinin Teftiş Raporları", 490.01/998.856.1.

220 Ibid.

established.[221] With the multi-party regime, the signs of change in the politics of exclusion, invisibility, or keeping at the threshold of political participation and representation of different groups within the Kurdish community, as in the cultural sphere, began to materialize in complex ways. In addition, although the hegemony of military domination and minimum representation actors did not come to an end in this phase, there were historical ruptures in the decade when the DP came to power, and especially between 1950 and 1955, which would turn into an important problematic.

In fact, when the DP had just been founded, President İsmet İnönü met with DP Chairman Celal Bayar, and made a critical suggestion that included the argument for not establishing RPP offices for many years. This was that both parties should not establish offices in the Eastern provinces due to "the sensitivity of the political situation in these provinces and the danger that they could be used for other purposes that could threaten national integrity".[222] Bayar, thinking that this was a tactic of sorts, rejected the proposal on the grounds that the RPP, which had already established hegemony in the East with its state institutions such as the General Inspectorate, People's Houses and the offices that the RPP had already begun to establish, would benefit from this situation compared to the DP, which was not yet organized, and that the realization of this would mean inequality between the regions.[223] Inönü's proposal included the solution of sacrificing political representation and participation, which could also involve the state, on the grounds of public order, responding to the fear that the hegemony maintained by force and violence in the East would not be approved.

221 On the Democrat Party, see Cem Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti Tarihi ve İdeolojisi*, 3rd ed. (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 1998).

222 Resul Köse, "CHP ve DP Hükümetleri Döneminde Doğu ve Güneydoğu Anadolu Politikaları" (PhD diss. İstanbul University, 2019), 260.

223 Ibid.

Until 1950, the DP rapidly organized itself throughout the country, despite the RPP and security forces' obstructions[224] and formed alliances with different factions in the country opposed to the RPP's political, economic and cultural policies. The RPP drafted the Farmers' Land Law (*Çiftçiyi Topraklandırma Kanunu*), which could not be enacted, but which was one of the reasons for the DP's defection from their party, the RPP, in 1945. Large landowners in the East who did not want their land to be confiscated, peasants who paid the price for the economic depression of the Second World War, and large and small capitalists who suffered from statism shifted to the DP. It also began to garner the support of many of the electorate who were not in agreement with RPP policies, such as those who experienced various incompatibilities with authoritarian and security modernization and state practices, and influential political and religious representatives who were acting under pressure. Meanwhile, in order to win over these parts of the population, it based its political discourse on promises of democracy and more liberal practices. In the course of a year, although it was less organized in the East, it received nearly half of the votes and won all the parliamentary seats in most of the provinces of Southeastern Anatolia, especially with the block votes it received in the Eastern provinces, despite the majority system, which was the RPP's electoral system to win.[225]

After the deportations to the western provinces by the one-party state following the uprisings, the persistent demands of DP actors for the return of the population, including families and individuals with traditional influence and power, to their lands, had both socio-economic and political effects. Reactions to the violent practices of the military and gendarmerie in the region, as well as to the harsh punitive practices targeting the Kurdish cultural sphere with its high interaction with Islamic institutionalization, began to appear. Influential elites from the last mentioned groups, including relatives of the leading cadres who had

224 Bayar states that the RPP assigned 23 inspectors across the country to stop the shift towards the DP, and that they were met with obstructions by security forces in the places where they organized. Ibid., 260-61.

225 Ibid., 684.

participated in the Sheikh Said Rebellion, also became DP deputies. Particularly after 1950, RPP actors, in collaboration with the military and bureaucracy, would oppose the DP on public order grounds, as well as "red lines of the state" such as secularism, accusing the DP of fueling Kurdism.[226] On the other hand, it should also be noted that between 1945 and 1950, the RPP started infrastructural investments in the region, expanding Turkish literacy courses through the People's Houses, and taking a more integrationist approach by increasing the rate of schooling, the difference with the West being obvious.

On the other hand, although their numbers and activities declined after 1946, the People's Houses, with their thousands of People's Rooms and extensive organization across the country, became a public actor in a different phase, whose status and activities became highly controversial.[227] Between 1944 and 1947, when the RPP was able to complete its organization mostly in urban centers and districts, being the administrator of the People's Houses was still an important position in the East. Under the control of local political actors who were members of the RPP, and under the continued control of the General Inspectorates, the People's Houses were affected by inter-party rivalries and the changes in RPP and state policies, in addition to the fact that their familiar institutional activities were gradually weakening. With the growing strength of the DP, it became an institution that the RPP tried to keep under control in order to make this an arena for the struggle against the DP. The critical situation of the RPP, which was said to have won the 1946 elections in a shady manner, and the organization of both parties, would lead to the formation of new capital, position, struggle and maneuvering space in the relations between the People's Houses and state institutions. In the East, where the implementation and supervision of the general

226 See Fuat Uçar, "Demokrat Parti Döneminde Kürt Sorunu: Gelişimi ve Etkileri", *The Journal of Academic Social Science Studies,* no. 43, (Spring 2016), 183.

227 Adnan Menderes, one of the four founders of the DP after leaving the RPP with the "quadruple statement", who became prime minister for ten years in 1950 and was sentenced to death after the 1960 military coup, also served as the head of the Aydın People's House and praised the People's Houses.

inspectorate was ongoing. these processes took place in different trajectories.

For the Democrat Party, the Inspectorats and especially the People's Houses which the RPP defined as supra-partisan, yet continued to be de facto affiliated to them, and to which the state budget was transferred, were the political propaganda arena and agent of the RPP in the East. The DP's arguments included the fact that the People's Houses were allowed to host RPP congresses and events, that high-ranking state officials from Ankara would make RPP propaganda while meeting with citizens, and that DP members could not use the People's Houses' buildings and were administratively excluded. Besides, party inspectors inspecting the People's Houses reported on the political attitudes of the administrators of the People's Houses, both civil servants and social groups, and on the activities and influence of the DP. Likewise, People's House and RPP members, civil servants, local administrators and various social groupings, in addition to old complaints, reported to the RPP General Secretariat about the DP's activities in the Eastern provinces and those who supported them, presenting the appearance of a boiling cauldron in the twelve provinces. Meanwhile, the liberalization of the press and broadcasting reinforced this picture. The combination of these with more specific areas of competition, struggle and conflict at the local level created an even more complex picture.

Some of the common themes of these reports and denunciation letters included the fact that there were political defectors in the administration of the People's Houses while working for the RPP, that there was rivalry and discord between the heads of the People's Houses, RPP administrators and civil servants over the People's Houses and the DP,[228] that there were party members within the RPP who did not work

228 In 1950, Hıdır Öztürk, the chairman of the Mazgirt RPP district committee, complained to the RPP General Secretariat that the chairman of the People's House gave the main materials of the closed People's House to Hüseyin Çakmak, a coffeehouse owner and one of the DP deputy district chairmen, to use in his coffeehouse free of charge, and that the chairman of the People's House took away the newspapers sent to the People's House and did not show them to anyone. Öztürk asked the secretariat to send the newspapers back on behalf of the party organization. One of the main topics of the

for the RPP sufficiently, such as in Tunceli, who were spying for the DP,[229] and that Naime Sungur, a course teacher working at the Pertek People's House, who was expected to support the RPP by default, joined the struggle of political parties and worked for the DP[230]. Again, in Urfa, inter-party fights were reported to have escalated into "fights between family and school children over party affiliation" in the Birecik district[231] and there were reports of clashes that grew into more serious acts of violence, as in Hakkâri. During this fierce rivalry and struggle, DP supporters also displayed practices such as bringing up the use of not only the People's House buildings but also mosques by the state and the RPP, thereby gaining the sympathy of religious voters who did not consent to this[232] (Ch 3). Through these cases, it is possible to observe that the People's Houses transformed into a space where the DP members questioned the party-state structure, and where both parties saw it as a surface to validate their arguments on this issue.

On the other hand, between 1945 and 1950, central and local actors of the DP, seeing the orientation of the twelve provinces, diversified their effective special promises that would appeal to this region and gain support. These included the abolition of the excessive security practices of the single-party era that had harassed the population under the state

correspondence between the General Secretariat and the party and the members of the People's Houses was the rent for the party building, and the fact that he drew special attention to the fact that the RPP received the highest number of votes in the local elections and that the DP suffered from weakness implies that they deserved this financial support. "CHP Tunceli İl İdare Kurulu Kongre Zabıtları", CCA, 490.01/191.758.2 (01.02.1950). For an example of a conflict between the local People's House, RPP and members of the state over the use of the People's House building for other purposes, see also "Siirt Halkevi binasının Tamir ve Tadilatı", 490.01/1781.1219. (08.06.1951).

229 "Tunceli İl İdare Kurulu'nun Genel Sekreterlikten İstek ve Şikâyetleri", CCA, 490.01/191.759.1 (24.03.1952), "Siirt Halkevi'nin Tamir ve Tadilatı".

230 "Tunceli İl İdare Kurulu'nun Genel Sekreterlikten İstek ve Şikâyetleri".

231 "Urfa ilinin teftiş ve çalışma raporlarının Genel Sekreterliğe sunulduğu", CCA, 490.01/717.451.2 (20.09.1950)

232 "Siirt'te 8. Seyyar Jandarma Alayı tarafından kullanılmakta olan Münkedir ve Cumhuriyet camilerinin tahliye edilmesi.". 30.01/66.414.7 (01.09.1950)

of emergency, and the prosecution of those who used extra-legal violence, equality between regions, socio-economic development, and the expansion of schooling that had been denied to the region. In addition, the lands of large landowners to be left untouched and those who were exiled to be resettled on their lands.[233]

DP administrators also criticized and made accusations about some of the civilizing practices based on secularism and westernization, which they emphasized more than nationalism, as well as the processes of its implementation in the East by the RPP and People's Houses in an elitist and Jacobin manner. By opening discourse on the policy of assimilation to Turkishness through egalitarian cultural development, they advocated formal education as the main method to be used in the region, and implemented it effectively during their rule. By then, a more urban and elite Kurdish ethnic rights-sensitive grouping emerged, painting a more secular portrait that criticized the politics of inequality and exclusion, and the practices of the military forces and the general inspectorate. These highly educated local elites from influential families, such as Yusuf Azizoğlu, Mustafa Remzi Bucak and Mustafa Ekinci, who embraced the DP's emphasis on democracy alongside liberalism, also became influential in the DP.[234] In the 1950 elections, due to its continued alliance with influential clans, the RPP again received more than half of the votes in the East, but suffered a sharp decline in number of parliamentary seats due to its self-organized majority system. The DP's practices, activities and promises enabled it to increase its votes in the Eastern provinces.[235] One year after coming to power in these elections, the DP closed down

233 Yeğen, *Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu*, 217.

234 Some time after the DP came to power, with the initiatives of these people, there were even military trials, such as the trial of Muğlalı, in order to push the CHP further into a corner. There may even be trials against the military to further corner the CHP. General Mustafa Muğlalı ordered the shooting of 33 villagers in the Van town of Özalp for crossing the Iranian border to trade livestock. For a political anthropological analysis of the incident. see Neşe Özgen, *Van-Özalp ve 33 Kurşun Olayı, Toplumsal Hafızanın Hatırlama ve Unutma Biçimleri,* (İstanbul: Sosyal Tarih Yayınları, 2011).

235 Kemal Kirişçi and Gareth M. Winrow, *Kürt Sorunu, Kökeni ve Gelişimi,* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1997), 112-113.

the People's Houses and the General Inspectorate Organization in 1952, on the basis that the RPP was using the People's Houses for its own party interests. Under these conditions, the DP received more than half of the votes in the Eastern provinces in the 1954 elections, despite the lack of economic development for landless peasants. In the 1957 elections, this support continued, despite the DP's authoritarian political practices toward the opposition, which did not coincide with the democracy and liberalism that started to increase after 1954.[236]

Another important point here is that the DP administrators took care to distinguish between the state and the RPP, and to emphasize that their criticisms and accusations were not directed against state institutions, but against the RPP's misguided "Eastern" policy in the actual processes. As a result, under the influence of the liberal and developmentalist political and economic environment in the western part of the world, the "East" of the DP government began to be defined as an East that was not underdeveloped, but was itself made underdeveloped by the RPP, where equality between regions was not practiced. This, in fact, meant the breaking of the essential orientalist perspective, and the colonialist perspective that did not prioritize development. It can be seen that this period coincided with the post-World War II decolonization process in the world, and that this could turn into a source of legitimacy. In this case, the new east of the DP and the republic began to be produced through an inclusionist, integrationist politics of representation and appropriation, that was more likely to reach the capitalist networks and all forms of capital in the rest of the country, which would be achieved through social and cultural development, beginning in a more assertive manner under the RPP in the 1940s.

Although it was not explicitly stated, it was an East in which the predominantly Kurdish-dominated milieu or spatiality was meant, and it would be produced with a new understanding of truth that would emphasize ethnic and linguistic rights, starting in the 1950s and continuing in the 1960s. As long as it does not contain an ethnic and national reference, it is possible to say that the East is a legitimate,

236 Ibid., 113.

acceptable and very powerful axis of discourse and practice production for state institutions and regulations, which continues to this day. On the other hand, such an East, in relation to the aforementioned continuous state formation, has become a legitimate and normative category in which subjects can legitimize their responses in various forms, including contradictive and negotiated asymmetries in relation to their creation of boundaries.

§ 2.4 Concluding Remarks

This chapter first analyzes the historical background of the People's House discourses, which trace their roots back to the 19th century. Thus, it is seen that this institutionalization is not “absolute", nor can it be "self-evident", that it has strong intellectual roots and that it has inherited the accumulated background and legacy of many predecessors. In this context, the definitions of the people, populism and nationalism during the Ottoman period, the national struggle and the Republican period have been analyzed in terms of their articulation and rupture through a wide range of phenomena such as ethnic and religious identities, class positions, and how they evolved as far as the 1930s. In this context, for example, the definition of the people, which was nourished by a solidarism that envisaged interprofessional solidarity and emphasized popular sovereignty, was based on the Ottoman nation and the Turkish population under the Constitutional Monarchy, and Islamic unity and solidarity in the national struggle. In the Republic, on the other hand, the people and populism were seen to involve the integration of Islamic ethnic groups into a definition of nation centered on the Turkish ethnicity. It is seen that the implementation of state policy based on assimilation and representation in the People's Houses in the East was united with the discourse of civilizing the East and the Kurds in particular, since populism was an alloy of Turkish nationalism and included the mission of bringing civilization to the people. In this process, state administrators and intellectuals close to them imagined and constructed a new East, and accordingly marginalized the ethnic

existence of Kurds and other non-Turkish groups in the macro sense and even envisioned a colonial yoke. In this framework, civilization and progress, which developed in line with Western Enlightenment thought and had Social Darwinist, Orientalist and colonialist implications; Turkish national identity, which inherently embodied these; and the mission of civilization, which included assimilation and rehabilitation, were legitimized. I determined that the People's Houses were prioritized to replace the RPP offices in the East, to institutionalize under the leadership of the local bureaucracy, which was deemed to be distinguished, as the missionary representative of the party-state and the regime, and to realize its intermediary position with the state, within the framework of these goals.

In the first years of the Republic, I found that the predominant view among state actors was that of cultural, social, spatial and economic civilization under the priorities and guidance of military domination, the dominance of the Turkish population and the minimal inclusion of Kurds in the state, civil citizenship and national identity. In the 1930s, when the cultural power of the party-state was prioritized throughout the country, the civilian bureaucracy and politicians more effectively advocated for the more effective implementation of the politics of representation to include Kurds in the context of Turkishness and citizenship, in order to end actual Kurdishness and Kurdism. In this process, it is observed that an "in-between and according to the situation" strategy, oscillating between inclusion and domination and exclusion, and relatedly between lineage-based and cultural nationalism and populism, was implemented, with the People's Houses as the main medium, political and administrative actor, and venue. Therefore, it was observed that these two views were effective and practiced in complex ways, depending on the place, time and the nature of the actors. In addition, it was found that derivatives of these views were discussed and strengthened according to the situation, and that this situation turned into a fundamental dynamic in the People's Houses along the local-central line.

In the 1940s, a second view began to gain weight, in order to ensure the legitimacy of the party-state, by arguing that public order had been

maintained to a large extent. In fact, with the influence of the demands of the General Inspectors and local actors who had formed or were willing to form alliances with the state, the administration of the People's Houses began to give more space to the "appropriate" sections of the local population and to establish an RPP party organization. It has been revealed that in the 1940s, the one-party state filtered needs and demands within its own basic discourses and boundaries such as Turkish nationalism, civilization, hegemony of the central state, and national security, and began to allow a new line of negotiation by producing responses to them.

The permission for the participation of “suitable” local actors in the administration of People’s Houses may be literally considered as a success of the state and also of some local people. But after that we will see that these “suitable” people would be insulted as allies of the DP, sometimes being accused of being pro-Kurdish movements. Finally, it was not possible to ban the participation of the local Eastern people, on the contrary a rivalry occurred between the two parties to gain the support and votes of local people. According to the new political system, every citizen had the right to elect the local and central political representatives. This process may have seen some fall in results for the RPP, but for state policies aiming to gain the consent or compliance of the Kurdish speaking subjects to participate in state institutions - through demands to transform them into “acceptable” national citizens - they may be generally considered as the success of state hegemonic goals and also the result of the Eastern local official and non-official actors pressures.

With the multi-party regime, until closure by the DP in 1951, the fact that the People's Houses were a site of competition and conflict between the RPP and the DP increased the capacity of local groups to struggle and negotiate, and transformed the spaces and capitals for producing political and social positions along the center/local line. During the 1946-50 period, and the DP rule between 1950-54, a period of accusation and questioning of the RPP's Eastern and Kurdish policy, which included the motive of weakening the RPP in the East, emerged. The abolition of the General Inspectorates, which were established in anticipation of the

state's penetration into the region in every sense, and which were the executors of the state of emergency regime, and the accusations and trials of members of the army for acts of violence, had significant effects on state formation. There was also the moderation of secularization and westernization, which was seen as problematic for the East and for a significant number of Kurds, and the recalling of the model of solidarity with the Kurds through Islamic motives. In this context, the emphasis on socio-economic and cultural development, based on cooperation with different clans, sheikhs and peasant groups, who were more rural oriented, brought the state's relationship with the Kurds and the East to a different phase until 1960, when the military coup took place. Meanwhile, the DP also emphasized not only a government determined by despotic power, exclusionary assimilation and civilization, but also the assimilation and civilization of the infrastructurally underdeveloped East and the Kurds. This was to reorganize the contents and methods in line with the relatively liberal, developmentalist and democratic discourses of the period. Moreover, in this process, there were struggles over the limits of and interventions in the wider field of capital, where alliances and actors change periodically.

As can be seen, the multi-actor developments in the East, which became more visible in the social and public sphere during the DP government, included punishments and restrictions on the Kurdish language, and defence of their ethnic and linguistic rights among the Kurds. However, the arguments that the East was not naturally underdeveloped but not particularly developed by the state, as it became even more evident by the 1960s, had also become significantly entrenched in Turkish public opinion in a world undergoing a process of decolonization. In addition, this “Eastern question” which would transformed “Kurdish question” became the legitimate basis for a new Kurdish and some left-wing political movements’ political struggle that would also include emphases on ethnicity and class, and new state interventions emerged in this regard.

3

Spatiality of Eastern/Kurdish People's Houses: Representations, Practices and Responses

Just as none of us is outside or beyond geography, none of us is completely free from the struggles over geography. It is a complex and interesting struggle because it is not only about soldiers, cannon and rifle, but also about ideas, forms, images and imaginaries.

– E. W. Said*, Kültür ve Emperyalizm: 1998, 42*

"The People's House building, which is located on one of the most beautiful and high hills of Siirt, makes a very good impression on people with its beautiful view from a distance, but when you get closer to it, this good impression immediately turns into sadness with its ruins."

– RPP Party Inspector Aytuna, *1942 Inspection Report*
490.01/1002.871.2, (04.11.1945)

The main problematics of this chapter is first what kind of discursive in the next two chapters, I examine how the People's Houses in the East, whose main purpose was to civilize and Turkify the region during the Eastern incorporation process, were re-produced as the physical, conceptual and public/social spatialities interacting with everday, local, micro and macro dynamics, and encounterings.

Until now, studies on the architecture of the Halkevleri, which are considered symbols of the modern and national state, have predominantly focused on symbolic examples in urban centers, and analytical studies on their ideological and representational features.[1] Analytical studies are lacking on the settlement, embodiment, and visibility of the party-state in different localities through the People's Houses, as well as the daily materialization processes, actual practices, and their effects on the production of the spatial modernization project. The People's Houses in the East, on the other hand, have been covered in a similar framework and to a lesser extent in such studies.[2] In addition, how the People's House was organized as a public space and a space for socialization, its practices, the reactions and responses of local state officials, both implementers and receivers, and the social, spatial, and cultural receptors across dichotomies are only now becoming visible.[3]

This part of the study, which will make a comprehensive contribution to the literature, will examine the spatiality, architectural and physical

1 For the most important of these, see for example; Gürallar-Yeşilkaya, *Halkevleri: İdeoloji ve Mimarlık*; Sibel Bozdoğan, *Modernizm ve Ulusun İnşası, Erken Cumhuriyet Türkiye'sinde Mimari Kültür,* (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2002).

2 The following studies have taken a closer look at the architecture and construction process of the People's House in Diyarbakır: Neslihan Dalkılıç, ve F. Meral Halifeoğlu, "Cumhuriyet Dönemi Mimarlığı, Erken Cumhuriyet Döneminde Diyarbakır'da Kamu Binaları, 1923-1950 dönemi", *Mimarlık*, no: 358, (March, April 2011), http://www.mimarlikdergisi.com/index.cfm?sayfa=mimarlik&DergiSayi=372&RecID=2615; Ercan Çağlayan, *Cumhuriyet'in Diyarbakır'da Kimlik İnşası* (1923-1950), (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014), 225-245.

3 For the experience of People's Houses as a complicated public space all over the country, see Alexandros Lamprou 2009 and 2015. For some examples in the Kurdish provinces in a similar context, see Senem Aslan 2011 and 2014.

space, and public and socializing space of the People's Houses in the main twelve provinces inhabited by Kurds. How these forms of spatiality were embodied and experienced not only discursively and representationally, but also through actual practices on the local and everyday axis will be analyzed, by considering the relationship of state institutions to space, society and culture.

As elaborated in the introduction to the study, the concepts of *space* and *spatiality* are not treated as an essential, fixed and passive structure or simply as a place, just as we can say the same about the state, society and culture.[4] The space of the People's House is also seen as a unit that was interfered with by political power and disciplinary techniques, and was produced in a way that intertwined all physical, mental and social, as well as cultural, economic, historical and memorial processes. In addition, it has been evaluated as a unit through which power relations pass and its actors are visible, and as a unit within the everyday and the local.

In Chapter 3 the focus will be on how the People's House buildings in the Eastern provinces were designed in parallel with the discourses, practices and processes regarding space and architecture in this period, and how they created a space within the architectural and construction processes, in the spatial planning of the state. In this context, the political, social, cultural and spatial contexts of the process of projecting, constructing and acquiring the People's House space, the daily and local attitudes, perceptions and responses, and the forms of conflict, reconciliation and negotiation that emerged on the central-local line will be analyzed. Therefore, through the People's House buildings, which should be considered as one of the surfaces of the settlement, visibility and establishment of the State in the East, it will also be analyzed how

4 According to Michel de Certeau, place refers to the momentary appearance and stasis of postures in a certain location, while space, by including the variable of time, refers to mobility and orientation. In other words space is an intersection of moving elements, it is a functioning place, and narrators can transform place into space and space into place. See Michel de Certeau, *The Practices of Everyday Life* (Los Angeles: UCP, 1988).

the twelve provinces with a predominantly Kurdish population responded in interaction.

Then, in Chapter 4, the processes of public use of the People's House space in the East will be focused on. Within the framework of discipline and control over the use of People's Houses, there will be an attempt to reveal how they were perceived and used in daily public life in different localities, and how they were a space for gathering, coming together and socializing. In this scope, it will be examined through the causal contexts in which practitioners and receivers in different socio-cultural and political positions struggle and negotiate with whatever kind of appropriation and reproduction there was through the practices which were included and excluded by the spatial regulations and rules of the People's House. Also, the forms of compromise, conflict and negotiation between central and local state actors and between them and other groups will be made visible. Within these two main themes, I will comment on the intricate correspondence of these groups with variables such as ethnicity, identity, gender, religion and class, such as "adaptation, resistance, indifference, resistance, cynicism, appropriation, negotiation, struggle".

Thus, in the case of the People's Houses, I will discuss how conclusions can be drawn about the process of the spatial formation of the state, and the process of the spatial productions of the East that can go beyond dichotomies such as strength-weakness, success-failure, or obedience-resistance of social subjects. As a conclusion, I claim that a complex and reflexive People's House spatiality was produced at the intersection of colonial practices that exclude differences for security purposes, power interventions in the pendulum of inclusive civilization and assimilation, together with everyday life and local responses.

§ 3.1 People's Houses Architecture and Buildings: Imagination, Practices and Responses

Considering that the state, nation, and spatiality shape each other, the rulers of the early Republic prioritized both symbolic and material

shaping within a national, modern, capitalist framework, such as its reorganization. By preserving the security-based borders of physical space, the patriotization of geography, its administrative division, new urban and village planning, industrial facilities and the exploitation of underground and surface resources accelerated.[5] This policy was embodied in a wide range of areas, from the construction of state buildings and citizen-produced buildings such as schools and People's Houses, to the expansion of the railway network and the construction of official and private residences. The relocation of the capital to the small city of Ankara, as an alternative to the Ottoman-embedded Istanbul, had multiple facets: its geographical location was more accessible, it was safe, and it contained vacant land suitable for modern organization and construction. The establishment of the nation state as a model in the modern capital with its wide boulevards, new buildings and parks signifies the establishment of a new state and regime.[6] Therefore, the fact that the single-party government saw the construction of Ankara in this way, not only as a matter of urbanism but also as a "state issue"[7] seems to be related to the goal of spreading this city image into the political, historical, social and cultural every day. Therefore, modern architectural practices that can be called functional and geometric, such as expansive squares, wide and planned avenues, and buildings based on western architecture, show that the nation-state aimed to carry the social and cultural program of the nation-state through space to a material ground for implementation, legitimization, adoption and approval.[8] This was

5 For a recent review on this issue, see Zeynep Kezer, *Building Modern Turkey, State, Space, and Ideology in the Early Republic*, (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 2015).

6 Ibid., 17-76.

7 Cantek writes that Ankara, which was designed by the single-party government as a place that would set an example for "spatial organizations" across the country, was now "a source for the government to create the ideal Turkish citizen, a daily life in which the Republic's goal of modernization and Westernization was put into practice, and a homogeneous population that would facilitate the construction of the nation-state as an imaginary community." L. Funda Şenol Cantek, *"Yabanlar ve Yerliler/Başkent Olma Sürecinde Ankara*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003), 42.

8 Ibid.

because the new state evangelized gathering together and spending time in the state-built People's Houses, City Clubs (Şehir Kulüpleri), train stations or parks, rather than mosques, coffeehouses and homes as public spaces. Therefore, evoking Gaston Bachelard's statement that "space keeps time compressed in a thousand compartments of its honeycombs"[9], new development areas and architectural space was intended to frame a new understanding of time.

In this process, which accelerated in the 1930s, in all twelve predominantly Kurdish provinces, and more typically in Elazığ and Diyarbakır, the old city center, which had a limited physical structure, was relocated to a new empty space (tabula rasa). In this new cityscape, a pattern of planning and zoning was established, based on the construction of wide boulevards, a republican square with the Atatürk statue at its center, and the government house, municipality, school and eventually the People's House building surrounding it.[10] In addition, within the changing political, socio-economic and cultural processes, in the modern and capitalist sense, there was a mobilization for the construction of new police stations, prisons, railway stations, post offices, agricultural and single use buildings, civil servants' houses and state institutions such as the Village Institutes in the 1940s.[11] In addition to the reconstruction activities, the "national *chemins de fer* policy" was accelerated throughout the country and the country's railway networks, all of which converged in Ankara, were increased countrywide, and lines extending to Elazığ, Diyarbakır and Erzurum in the East were laid. In this way, it was thought that "national unity" was ensured for military security, as well as contributing to civilization and modernization in economic and socio-cultural terms.[12] In the villages, village houses in

9 Gaston Bachelard, *Mekânın Poetikası*, Çev. Aykut Derman (İstanbul: Kesit Yayıncılık, 1996).

10 Gürallar Yeşilkaya, *Halkevleri: İdeoloji ve Mimarlık*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999), 110.

11 Ibid., 111.

12 For the railroad policy of the Republic, see Zafer Toprak, "Cumhuriyet, Demiryolu ve Laiklik: Bir 'Modernite' Metaforu", *Toplumsal Tarih*, no.168, (December 2007), 26-31. Also see İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, "Cumhuriyet'in Demiryolu Politikalarının Oluşumu

accordance with modern architecture, planning, projects and practices for the establishment of the new villages stood out.[13]

If we focus on the architecture of the People's Houses, the buildings constructed in the 1930s were typically characterized by architectural features along the Westernist modernist line. According to Bozdoğan, the People's Houses were the Turkish equivalents of the Italian *casa del fascio* movement, the most succinct expression of the brief overlap between the ideals of rationalist architects and authoritarian regimes in the 1930s. He states that the People's Houses were built in representative city squares or on the most important streets of the city. The quality of the materials used and the meticulous detail work, as well as their strong modernism gave them distinctiveness. Bozdoğan states that most of the public buildings constructed in the 1930s were designed in classical form, and that the unadorned, simple facades of these static, axial and mostly symmetrical buildings gained importance with their cubic and quadrangular volumes. However, the characteristics of the modern movement in Europe were clearly felt, especially in the People's House buildings constructed through competitions and on commission. With their spatial fluidity, free plan character and open facades, which are found in many examples, the People's House buildings were a very close follower of the modern architectural language.[14] The practical realization of these features of the People's Houses mentioned by Bozdoğan is on the other side of architectural history. This chapter will focus on this process in the case of the Eastern provinces.

In this process, on the one hand, radical Westernist modernist practices, as seen more clearly in the large People's House buildings in

ve Uygulanması" In *Cumhuriyetin Harcı Modernitenin Altyapısı Oluşurken*, vol.3, İlhan Tekeli ve Selim İlkin (eds.), 2nd ed. (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları: 2010), 271-323. For the state's railway practices in the East, see Ercan Çağlayan, *Cumhuriyet'in Diyarbakır'da Kimlik İnşası (1923-1950)*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014), 225-245.

13 Sibel Bozdoğan, *Modernizm ve Ulusun İnşası, Erken Cumhuriyet Türkiye'sinde Mimari Kültür,* 114-121. Ülkü magazine gave extensive coverage to this issue throughout the 1930s and 1940s. For an example, see Abdullah Ziya, "Cumhuriyet'te Köy yapımı", *Ülkü*, no:10, 1933, 333-336.

14 Ibid., 109-112.

the cities mentioned by Bozdoğan, are observed, while on the other hand, the republic's quest for a national version of modern architecture is praised, as the Ottoman Empire did not contribute much to national architecture.[15] For example, according to *Mimar* (Architect) magazine, although original works were created from the Orkhon period to the Seljuks and up to halfway through the Ottoman period, when the influence of the West penetrated the Ottoman Empire during the Tulip Era (Lale Devri), the sultans handed over Turkish architecture to European artists and Armenian craftsmen, and failed to realize the beauty of Mimar Sinan's (Sinan the Architect) works.[16] The Republican era, on the other hand, put an end to this confusion and enabled the emergence of real Turkish works, with the rational and characteristic Turkish revolution.[17] Similarly, Uğur Tanyeli argues that the architecture of this era is to be examined through the shadow of the ideological sphere, whereas a closer look at the ordinary and local everyday dimensions reveals that local architectural forms cannot be labeled as radical modernist or avant-garde, but rather produced hybrid forms with both European and Ottoman forms that were hesitant or envious of modernism.[18] Tanyeli also points out that a single ideological center shaped the whole country architecturally from the center, and that this period has been over-ideologized, and an extraordinary historiographical fiction has been made from it.[19]

15 For the meanings of architectural understanding and practices in the late Ottoman period in the context of locality, as well as the influence of western architecture and transformations and the role of the state and society in these processes, see Göksun Akyürek, *Bilgiyi Yeniden İnşa Etmek, Tanzimat Döneminde Mimarlık, Bilgi ve İktidar*, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2011).

16 "Cumhuriyet'in On Senelik San'at Hayatı", *Mimar,* no: 9-10, 1933, 263-264. It is ironic that Sinan the Architect was a devshirme (a child taken from a Christian family) Armenian from Kayseri, and that the Armenian community played a leading role in architecture and construction.

17 Ibid.

18 See Uğur Tanyeli, *Yıkarak Yapmak, Anarşist bir Mimarlık Kuramı İçin Altlık*, (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2017).

19 Ibid.

It is observed that the pro-regime architects of this period problematized the European-influenced modernist architectural practices more typical of the People's Houses. Just as in almost every other field of art, language, clothing, entertainment, etc., the discussion in the field of architecture was constantly negotiated and put into practice, intertwined with debates on modern, civilized and national identity. It would not be wrong to say that in the 1930s, when the influence of the radical modernist movement was strong, how the architecture of the national revolution should look was discussed around the motto "the technique is universal, the spirit is Turkish" (Teknik beynelmilel ruh Türk), based on Gökalp's definition of culture and civilization, and that it gradually began to take shape in practice, in this manner.[20] In the 1940s, during İnönü's presidency, the possibility of establishing a western-inspired modern architectural style with a national and indigenous character in terms of accuracy, knowledge, technique, materials and budget was discussed more prominently. For example, Sedat Hakkı Eldem, one of the leading architects, with his populist emphasis, referred to the need to establish an exchange and

20 B. O. Celal, one of the architects of the period, in a similar line with Gökalp, says the following: "As a matter of fact, today, all lands are subject to more or less the same standards, the ways of living, the laws of life are generalized. But in spite of this, there is still a core that does not disappear or dissolve in that international liquid, and this is the true self of the nations, and it is this (idol's) beloved that is the spirit of art, and it manifests itself only in the colors, shapes and clothes that she likes. I believe this is the hallmark of national taste." Celal gives examples of the national feelings and national direction in modern architecture in Russia, Germany and Italy. Architect B. O. Celal, "Büyük İnkılap Yönünde Milli Mimari Meselesi", *Mimar*, no. 6, 1933, 163. The words of architects Behçet and Bedrettin follow a similar trajectory: "We should only benefit from the technique of Europe and experts. Turkish feeling and manners are at a height they cannot reach. In terms of refinement and sense of art, Turkishness has an exceptional efficiency. In this respect, why shouldn't all government buildings and ministry buildings be built through competition? This is very necessary for the manifestation of the truth." In order to ensure this, he points out that the state should involve a large number of architects through competitions in order to increase the chance of selection. Mimarlar Behçet and Bedrettin, "Türk İnkılap Mimarisi", *Mimar,* no: 9-10, October 1933, 265.

balance between the people's or locality's own architectural heritage and civilization in architecture.[21]

Another hegemonic discourse in architecture, an important motif in the People's Houses, is that both the architect and architecture contributed to this process, in terms of bringing order by ending the chaos to be found in life.[22] At this point, it is possible to say that architecture and fine art are accepted as a clear and comprehensible language and space for the visibility, representation and control of the state, in addition to providing order, establishing reforms and ensuring this through the "national upbringing" of the people. In this context, it is also emphasized that "serious and dignified" state buildings have a crucial role in the establishment of state authority.[23] Ultimately, this is the general outline of the architectural understanding of those architects who also produced projects for the Ministry of Public Works, the Republican People's Party (RPP) or other institutions in the early years of the republic, and especially in the 1930s.[24]

On the other hand, the source of political reference and legitimacy for these architects is the description of the arts, including architecture, as a powerful pedagogical means of educating the people, and making them embrace the revolution, as seen in the 1935 party program of the ruling

21 Arkitekt, "Milli Mimari Meselesi-Sedat Hakkı Eldem ile Konuşma", *Arkitekt*, no: 9-10, 1939, 220-223.

22 Architects Behçet and Bedrettin express this as follows: "Architecture was born out of life's need for order and harmony...Without order (ordre), we would be in turmoil (desordre). The architect is a poet of nature, a classifier and constructor of beauty". Behçet ve Bedrettin, "Kimlere Mimar Diyoruz", *Mimar*, no: 7, 1933, 199.

23 A. Mortaş expresses this as follows: "These buildings, which represent the authority of the state in every corner of the country, and which are supposed to inspire respect and loyalty among the people, should be dignified and serious, and should have an architectural value equivalent to the cultural level of the Republican era." A. Mortaş, "Hükümet Konakları", *Arkitekt*, no: 11-12, r1944, 250.

24 The Ministry of Public Works (Nafia Vekaleti), which is responsible for zoning works, also endeavors to develop national architecture and employ architects within the framework of national architecture. Gürallar Yeşilkaya, *Halkevleri: İdeoloji ve Mimarlık*, 129.

RPP.[25] Moreover, the prominence of the People's House buildings as a symbol of western modernist architecture in the 1930s is related to the fact that they also symbolized state authority, and the ideas of the revolution. In fact, the People's House, which it was hoped would replace many of the old places, was considered to have a building style suitable for its mission as an ideal and acceptable public space, as one of the first conditions for opening, but which would be difficult to fulfill in practice. In the 1932 and 1935 instructions for the People's Houses, it is stated that "in the establishment and organization of the People's Houses, the elements that will ensure the activities of its nine branches and the building, money and other material means suitable for their work shall be sought", making the provision of a building one of the three conditions for the opening of the People's Houses.[26] While the construction and organization of the People's Houses was under the responsibility of the RPP General Secretariat and RPP organizations, in the twelve provinces where there was no RPP office until the mid-1940s, it was under the authority of the First, Fourth and Third General Inspectorates, to which the provinces were affiliated.[27]

As can be seen, while the cosmopolitan architectural heritage symbolized in the Ottoman Empire was negated, those who maintained or defended it were thus excluded, and the message was given that different forms with ethnic and cultural characteristics other than those considered to be Turkish would also be excluded. On the other hand, Dalkılıç and Halifeoğlu state that in the early years of the Republic, when the "First National Architecture" movement was influential, buildings were constructed with westernized function and mass organization,

25 *CHP Programı, Partinin Dördüncü Büyük Kurultayı Onaylamıştır,* (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, May 1935), 46. The People's Houses also had various activities related to architecture. To give a few examples, according to the activity report of the People's Houses between 1932 and 1935, the People's Houses commemorated Sinan the Architect, and started to provide training and consultancy for the standardization of new spatial designs in villages, houses and all spaces. *Halkevleri 1932-1935, 103 Halkevi Geçen Yıllarda Nasıl Çalıştı*, (Ankara:1935), 47-8.

26 *Halkevleri İdare ve Teşkilat Talimatnamesi*, 1932; *CHP Halkevleri Öğreneği*, 1935.

27 Ibid.

symmetrical and axial plan arrangements, and construction systems such as those using steel and reinforced concrete. However, they also state that arches, columns and moldings taken from Seljuk, Ottoman and Islamic architecture were also used in their exteriors and decoration. This should be noted, as it shows that there was no uniform architecture in this period, and that radical modernist architectural movements and practices were not applied to the letter, especially as one moves away from the center.[28]

Between 1935 and 1939, when the party-state integration was formalized, the RPP General Secretariat, the RPP Administrative Committee in the provinces and the governorships, as well as the General Inspectorates where there was no office, and the Special Administration in all provinces, allocated budgets to municipalities and other state institutions and constructions. In addition, donations collected from the public were also used in the construction process. Once private or public land was secured for construction, the building project was put on the agenda, for which either a project competition was held, an architect was commissioned, or the Ministry of Public Works would provide the project.

During the period dominated by authoritarian modernization, a partisan public opinion was formed, in which the planning and aesthetic dimension of People's House architecture was positioned in parallel with the political, socio-economic and cultural spheres. According to *Arkitekt*, the only architectural magazine of the period, "People's Houses became an example of the improvements that the Republican regime bestowed upon the country in every field" and at this point, the buildings of the People's Houses had a duty in the process of fostering "a sense of unity and nationality", educating the public through "indoctrination" and "upbringing", and instilling manners and architectural taste.[29]

In their early years, most of the People's Houses, especially in the twelve provinces, operated out of Turkish Hearths or other state

28 Dalkılıç and Halifeoğlu, "Cumhuriyet Dönemi Mimarlığı, Erken Cumhuriyet Döneminde Diyarbakır'da Kamu Binaları, 1923-1950 dönemi", 5.

29 Gürallar Yeşilkaya, 138.

buildings.[30] However, the positioning of the People's Houses as the main symbols of republican architecture and the visibility of the state, the increasing number of People's Houses and the need for buildings, which was caused by the lack of suitable modern buildings in the country, led to an increase in the construction of People's Houses. This process should be considered in parallel with the general acceleration of public works across the country and in the twelve provinces, especially in Diyarbakır and Elazığ, which were posited as "centers of Turkishness". In 1939, *Ülkü* magazine, the central publication of the People's Houses, urged everyone to take part in the construction of convenient, new and well-organized People's House buildings and the necessity for the ownership of these buildings by the people of the neighborhood, "with the awareness that a People's House is as necessary and essential for a neighborhood as an electricity factory, a park, an army barracks and a temple".[31] In the 1940 People's Houses Administration and Organization By-law (*Halkevleri İdare ve Teşkilat Talimatnamesi*), a more detailed building description is provided than in previous directives. According to this, it is necessary to "find a building consisting of a hall that can accommodate at least (200) people, a library and one or two study rooms, and a courtyard suitable for outdoor gymnastics, and furnish it in the most useful and economical way".[32] It was the duty of the RPP provincial, district, town and sub-district organizations, the administrative committees of the Hearths

30 For the transfer of the Turkish Hearths buildings to the People's Houses see Mustafa Arıkan and Ahmet Deniz, "Türk Ocakları'nın Kapatılışı, Borçları ve Emlakının Tasfiyesi", *Selçuk Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi*, (2004), 401-432.

31 The article in Ülkü included the following sentences: "It is a very desirable thing for every People's House to have a new and well-organized building suitable for the meetings, performances, readings and lectures, concerts and courses it will organize to raise the cultural level of the people. It is time to recognize that a People's House is as necessary and essential a building for a neighborhood as an electricity factory, a park, a barracks and a temple, and it is time for the people of that neighborhood to make it their mission to have a new People's House building with the conscious and persistent efforts of a family building their own House." "Halkevleri Postası; Halkevleri'nin Yeni Binalara Kavuşması", *Ülkü*, no: 89, 1939, 457.

32 *C.H.P. Halkevleri İdare ve Teşkilat Talimatnamesi*, (Ankara: 1940).

established in the villages, and the public to provide these.[33] As the need for new buildings increased with the opening of the People's Rooms in 1939, the RPP government, which began to centralize the management and supervision of the People's Houses in 1940, decided to construct the buildings of the People's Houses according to a central plan and program. In this context, the RPP established a Consultant Architecture Office (*Müşavir Mimarlık Bürosu*) within the General Secretariat of the RPP.[34] The reasons for the establishment of the bureau were the increasing demands for the construction of new ones, as the old People's House buildings as we will see in the Diyarbakır example, were deemed cramped and inappropriate, plus the desire to standardize the architecture of the People's House, and the difficulty in finding architects to produce projects locally. Architectural and artistic concerns also played a role in this.[35] Sabri Oran, who was appointed as Consultant Architect, emphasizes that, unlike in the previous period, the People's Houses in both the city and the provinces should not only be "places of education" but also a place that would meet the cultural and social needs of "ordinary people". Oran argues that since People's Houses were different in structure and organization from other official buildings, they should not be built in the city center, where it was difficult to find land, but on the outskirts where there was more space.[36] This new perspective,

33 Ibid.

34 *CHP Halkevleri Halkodaları, 1932-1942*, (Ankara: 1942), 18.

35 The Consultant Architecture Office would be responsible for the detailed preparation of the projects and construction plans of all the Public House buildings "in order to ensure that the People's House buildings are constructed in such a way as to meet the needs for the diversified activities and to give these buildings a good shape in terms of art and architecture". Ibid.

36 A. Sabri Oran, "Kaza Merkezlerinde yapılacak Halkevi Tip Projeleri Hakkında Rapor", *Ülkü* 16, no. 89, (July 1940), 457. Oran writes the following: "The People's House buildings in the provincial centers, will be the most important and honorable buildings of our country. In many places, it is the People's Houses that will meet all cultural needs, introduce the people and the youth to the principles and spirit of our Republican revolution and give them a noble upbringing... These buildings contain many branches of culture and are above all a school. Therefore, they need tranquility, large gardens and

in which political, spatial, and social motives were interwoven, and which called for the People's Houses to be located closer to residences and to have a much larger usable area, was in line with the building plan envisioned by the RPP General Secretariat for the provinces.[37]

The People's House and the RPP local office were designed and constructed to be located in the same building. In these buildings, workrooms and one or two guest rooms were provided for the party office, the People's House and the party inspectors who supervised the local administration. The "Gazi statue" and the Turkish flag at the entrance, as well as flags and symbols with six arrows, directly symbolized that the People's Houses were affiliated with the RPP.[38] The addition of towers to some People's Houses also stands out as a symbol of modernity and secularism in some other buildings of the period. The attribution of sanctity to the People's Houses, which are often referred to as the "places of worship" of the new life, as an alternative to religious spaces, also coincides with a symbolism intertwined with economic modernism and capitalism in the case of İzmit.[39] While a more flexible

playgrounds the most. These types of buildings that were prepared were set back from the street." Ibid.

37 According to this plan, the People's House buildings in the provinces should have a performance and conference hall, an indoor gymnastics and sports hall, a reading room, a library, and a ceremony hall, commonly called a gazino, which would be "a family and intimate meeting hall of the People's House". C.H.P. *Halkevleri ve Halkodaları*, "Halkevi Binalarının Planlaştırılması", 1932-1942, (Ankara:1942), 20. In 1940, the RPP General Secretariat announced that 50 People's Houses had halls suitable for gymnastics or fencing or wrestling, and 60 had courtyards with gymnastics facilities. *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Halkevleri 1940,* (Ankara: Ulusal Matbaa, 1940), 17.

38 Ibid.

39 Gürallar Yeşilkaya says that the high tower of the People's House, which was built close to the mosque and within the factories, as in İzmit, is symbolic both in terms of the construction of the People's House as an alternative space to the mosque and the industrializationist economic policy of the period: "While the People's House marks the 'national temple', on the other hand, it takes its place among the industrial buildings of the city full of chimneys, perhaps the People's House is perceived as a factory where spiritual values are produced". The People's House in Mersin is also located near a church, while the People's Houses in Adana and Isparta, like Izmit, are built near mosques. The Kars People's House in the East, on the other hand, is built near a church

building plan was envisaged for the new buildings in the provincial centers, some of which were examples of radical modernism, such as Izmit and Mersin People's Houses, which were grand, solemn and large with towers, the basic structure of the buildings in the district centers was required to have a modernist scheme. It was thought that the construction of simple and more functional buildings shaped like the letters L, T, and I, would meet the need.[40]

Meanwhile, according to the planning of the party secretariat, the new People's Houses, which had no buildings and needed them to be built, would be constructed within 8-10 years. In the first stage, building construction was planned in 3 provincial centers and 50 districts. However, due to the economic crisis during World War II, the number of districts was reduced to 15, while priority was given to the provinces, and the number of provinces to receive new buildings was increased from 3 to 6, including Diyarbakır and Van People's Houses.[41] It cannot be said that the construction of buildings for the People's Rooms, the number of which multiplied by thousands in the 1940s, was prioritized. In 1945, the RPP General Secretariat reported that only 150 of the thousands of People's Rooms planned, had been completed, while 455 were nearing completion.[42] Some of the People's Room buildings belonging to the village legal entity were "party" property, and in some places there were rented buildings that were not suitable to be used as People's Rooms.[43] In this situation, the General Secretariat announced that it would take

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and has a tower. Ibid., 153. While the church opposite the Kars People's House building was demolished, the large People's House building with its clock tower is currently used as a Public Education center.

40 A. Sabri Oran, "Kaza Merkezlerinde yapılacak Halkevi Tip Projeleri Hakkında Rapor", 457-466.

41 Gürallar Yeşilkaya, *Halkevleri: İdeoloji ve Mimarlık* ,137.

42 *CHP Halkodaları Talimatnamesi*, Ankara: 1940, 1.

43 In 1945, the RPP General Secretariat stated the following about the rented People's Rooms: "...Most of these last ones are not suitable for People's Rooms. They consist of a single hall or a small room and a hall. In many places, libraries and reading rooms are not separate. In a few places, village rooms belonging to individuals are used as People's Rooms." C.H.P., *1945 Yılında Halkevleri ve Halkodaları*, (Ankara: 1946), 6.

time for the People's Rooms to have suitable and exemplary structures.[44] However, in the following years, priority was given to urban and suburban centers and no serious investments were made. The construction of People's Rooms was put on the back burner due to the prioritization of the construction of village primary schools, teachers' houses and workshops everywhere, due to the primary education mobilization.[45] Also, in 1945, the RPP General Secretariat stated the following regarding the issue of resources for the construction of buildings: "We must remember that the main thing in the People's Houses and Rooms is not the 'building' but the 'work'. The building is finally one of the means of enabling work. Many of our People's Houses have shown us that a new, spacious and convenient building is not an absolute condition for efficient work."[46] As an example of how spatial encumbrances can be overcome through hard work, he cites the People's Room in the village of Poyracık in the Kınık sub-district of Bergama. The members of this People's Room expanded the building of the People's Room, which belonged to the municipality and was too narrow for

44 Ibid. As was written in the Instructions for the People's Rooms, the People's Rooms had to have at least one meeting room and a reading room. In practice, however, those people that did not have a reading room were content to create a library or bookshelf in a corner of the hall. The sample building types prepared for the RPP's People's Rooms were based on the population, living conditions and building materials of the places where they were to be constructed. These were divided into three types: large, small and medium. In addition, separate plans were prepared for warm and cold places or for forested regions. Large-type People's Rooms had a meeting and reading room and a study room. They also had necessary facilities such as a stage, a guard room, a footpath, and a storage room. Ibid., 6-7.

45 In the On Beşinci Yıl Kitabı (*Fifteenth Year Book)*, which covers the actions of the single-party state in fifteen years, it is stated that for the construction of modern school buildings, the Architectural Department was established in the Ministry of National Education at an earlier date than the People's Houses, that experts from Western countries were brought to this department, and that plans for school buildings were prepared in this department. The Ministry distributed plans for inexpensive urban and rural primary school buildings in various provinces using local materials. This department was later transferred to the Ministry of Public Works. *On Beşinci Yıl Kitabı*, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, (Ankara: 1938), 201.

46 C.H.P., *1945 Yılında Halkevleri ve Halkodaları*, Ankara: 1946, 7.

meetings, by partially removing the wall of the adjacent café, which also belonged to the municipality, and compensated for the deficiencies of the room with the support of the villagers.[47] The General Secretariat states that this example proves that "People's Houses and People's Rooms are the work and property of the places where they are located and that it is necessary to expect them to become self-sufficient." The General Secretariat states that the duty of the center is only to guide and encourage to a certain extent.[48] From these words, it is possible to see that, as expected in the activities of the People's Houses, citizens were expected to see the People's Houses as a service, to embrace them, and to establish them in every sense.

During the war years, even though the construction of the People's House buildings was prioritized within a centralized architectural planning program to have a wide area of usage, due to the problem of local budgets all over the country and the General Secretariat's inability to allocate a budget, the construction of People's Houses spread over years and could still not be completed. In the face of this situation, new and need-oriented solutions emerged, such as the People's Room in the village of Poyracık, which the secretariat gave as an example above. While the large People's House buildings were generally constructed in reinforced concrete, the use of local forms and materials began to come to the forefront in smaller places due to budgetary issues, the increasing emphasis on local national architecture, and considerations of climate and geographical suitability. As Dalkılıç and Halifeoğlu point out, in this period, in places where there was plenty of stone, there was no need for plaster and cement, and "stone buildings combined with modern forms that did not imitate the past were also preferred, both for the beauty of traditional Turkish stone art and for a good harmony with nature".[49]

47 Ibid., The General Secretariat states that the average budget of the People's Rooms is between 200-300 liras, and that while there are places below this, in some districts and wealthy regions, the budgets of sub-district and village People's Rooms are much higher than this. C.H.P., *1945 Yılında Halkevleri ve Halkodaları*, 7.

48 Ibid.

49 Dalkılıç and Halifeoğlu say that the Second National Architecture Movement was influential between 1940-50 as a reaction to the more westernized modernist

Thus, since the shortage of materials would be minimized, more People's Houses and People's Rooms could be built and, as mentioned earlier, the aim of bringing local art together with modern art in terms of architecture would be achieved. As a result, it is possible to say that in this period, especially in the 1940s, when the peasant movement and the discourse of the development of the village came to the fore, spatial imaginations and practices that include local and "Turkish" architecture much more began to be prioritized, with the style of architecture that includes functionality, following the western and modernist architecture that came to the fore in the 1930s.[50] Thus, in the intermediate zones between western and national architecture, examples of national architecture emerged, some of which were predominantly modernist western architecture, mostly in the provincial People's Houses, while

movement. This movement, which did not reject modernism, found modernity in reinterpreting historical examples. In this period, the stylistic features of the Anatolian Seljuks, whose symbols remain only within the borders of Turkey, and elements taken from civilian buildings, especially the Turkish house, were applied in a simpler way. Instead of many building materials imported from abroad due to the unfavorable conditions caused by the war, local materials were used, as seen in the People's Houses. This movement, characterized by stone-clad facades and a monumental expression, lasted until the 1950s as it failed to adapt to the new technology and needs of the period. Dalkılıç and Halifeoğlu, "Cumhuriyet Dönemi Mimarlığı, Erken Cumhuriyet Döneminde Diyarbakır'da Kamu Binaları, 1923-1950 dönemi".

50 The Consultant Architecture Bureau, which designed the People's Houses, was criticized sometimes for not being national enough, sometimes for following the cubic architecture that the said bureau avoided. At other times, it was criticized for being an imitation of Western architecture, as seen in the example of İsmail Baltacıoğlu's comparison of the People's House building he visited during his trip to Adana to a Greek temple. Therefore, it was expected from architecture that the technique should be taken from the West and the "essence" should be Turkish. Other issues of criticism include the People's Houses being larger than needed, aesthetic problems, the fact that they were not built in accordance with the climatic conditions of the regions, as in the case of Kars, and the fact that the projects of the People's Houses were left to the Consultant Architecture Bureau. In this period, it was also argued that it would produce more efficient results if the projects were done through a competition rather than by the Consultant Architecture Bureau. See. Gürallar Yeşilkaya, *Halkevleri, İdeoloji ve Mimarlık*, 182-185.

others were close to local elements in the towns and villages. With the increase in the number of People's Houses and People's Rooms in the 1940s, there was a lack of budget and material supply in the war economy, and the use of local architecture and materials in newly constructed buildings, especially in places outside the provinces, emerged as a major solution. Thus, during the war years, when racist and nationalist ideologies were on the rise both globally and in Turkey, the issue of how national architecture should be defined, in parallel with the debates on what constitutes national identity, including tensions with westernization, was combined with material reasons.

In 1946, it was reported that the construction of People's Houses had been completed in 20 districts, including Doğubeyazıt and Pülümür, and that the construction of 25 People's Houses was ongoing. Nusaybin People's House was among these. In 1940, the groundbreaking ceremonies for the construction of the Diyarbakır People's House and the new buildings of the Malatya, Urfa, Bafra, Konya, Sivas and Trabzon People's Houses were held.[51] On the other hand, it is noteworthy that the RPP General Secretariat allocated the most significant portion of the central budget for People's Houses to the construction and furnishing of buildings, even though it did not meet the needs, at its highest level in 1947. In fact, in that year, when the number of People's Houses reached 463 and the number of People's Rooms reached 4,170, approximately 75 percent of the budget allocated to the People's Houses was allocated to the construction of People's Houses and People's Rooms.[52] Toward 1950,

51 Ibid. As will be explained below, the construction of the second new building of the Diyarbakır People's House, which was included in the program, did not materialize.

52 The RPP General Secretariat announced this budget in 1948: "The amount of aid from the General Secretariat is 2,647,155 liras. Of this amount, 658,979 liras were spent on various administrative and cultural affairs of the People's Houses and People's Rooms, and 1,988,176 liras were spent on the buildings of the People's Houses and People's Rooms." *C.H.P. 1946 Yılında Halkevleri ve Halkodaları*, (Ankara:1947), 6. In 1948, the following was said: "The money invested in People's Houses and People's Rooms for the furnishing of their buildings, all kinds of equipment and working tools amounts to a considerable sum. If these institutions are not as efficient as they should be, the 'national wealth' allocated for this purpose will not be able to provide the expected

as the activities of the People's Houses stagnated due to economic reasons, the RPP's tripling of the budget for the construction of the People's Houses caused controversy. As an argument that would also be effective in the closure of the People's Houses, the Democrat Party made the accusation that too much of the budget was allocated to the construction of the buildings of the People's Houses, and that corruption was allowed to occur in this process. Just as the RPP seized the buildings of the Turkish Hearths, when the DP government came to power in 1950, before closing down the People's Houses in 1951, it halted the construction of the buildings of the People's Houses, and in a short period of time the buildings of the People's Houses were vacated and opened for the use of other state institutions, especially schools.[53]

In the eastern/Kurdish provinces, it does not seem possible to say that there was an investment mobilization for the construction of People's Houses and People's Rooms, which were prioritized by the state in the context of assimilation and civilization. The reasons for this are reflected in the lack of local state budget allocated for the construction of a building with modern criteria, the problem of project design, citizens' lack of interest, and their inability or unwillingness to donate money for this purpose. In addition, the lack of materials suitable for the building criteria. and the lack of access to these materials due to the unfavorable transportation network, and the inadequate support of the center, are also reflected in the documents. The following section will examine in more detail how the field of imagination, discourse, regulation and practices summarized in relation to the physical space of the People's House, which was also shaped according to the period and the actors involved, produced a field of encounter in the Eastern/Kurdish provinces

service. It is a national obligation to search for and find ways to make the widest possible use of these institutions, which have been created with great difficulty and great sacrifices and are in a position to meet a real need." *C.H.P. XVI. yıldönümünde Halkevleri ve Halkodaları*, (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1948), 9.

53 Çeçen, *Halkevleri*. As in the case of Diyarbakır, the destruction and disappearance of the belongings of the People's Houses, and especially the thousands of books in the libraries of the People's Houses, during this evacuation process was criticized. See Şevket Beysanoğlu, "Anılarımda Diyarbakır Halkevi", *Kebikeç*, no.3, (1996), 167.

within the context of the state's Kurdish policy, intentions and expectations, positions within the state, and the responses of the people. Through the People's House buildings, which should be considered as one of the external manifestations of the settlement, visibility and establishment of the state in the East, I will analyze how the twelve provinces with a predominantly Kurdish population responded with their interactions.

§ 3.2 Production of the Physical Space of the Eastern People's Houses: Greatness *Versus* Lack and Rack and Ruin

After the War of Independence in Turkey, which was supported by the Kurds, the aim was to dominate the territory that the state had gained control over after the war, especially the Kurdish-populated space, where the state considered it had concerns about control and problems over the existence and functioning of the modern state. This particular area in the East has had an independent administration and spatiality that varies from province to province over a period of four hundred years, although this has begun to change in the last century. The Republican government, legitimizing the space with the discourse of civilization and Turkification, made an urgent effort to symbolically and materially settle the issue in these provinces where it had problems of control, sovereignty and functioning, to make its authority visible and present, and to exclude different spatialities. In the twelve provinces in the East, the executive General Inspectorates, representing the state and the party, were established, in order to establish both the despotic and infrastructural power of the state; they would manage and supervise spatial design, and in particular architecture and public works. At a meeting held in Ankara in 1936, attended by the first eight provinces with the highest Kurdish ethno-linguistic population and two inspectors from other provinces, crucial discussions and decisions on themes related to the organization

of space within their regions took place.[54] These included the resettlement of the Kurdish population, especially in the areas of rebellion, to be replaced by immigrants with a Turkish cultural background; the fortification of territorial borders and the prevention of smuggling; the expansion of public works, transportation and modern urbanism; and the construction of new "government buildings". For these reasons, state buildings in disrepair or in ruins were a sore point for state officials. The third General Inspector Tahsin Uzer, who governed the Northeastern Anatolia and Eastern Black Sea provinces, including Ağrı, where, according to official figures, the assimilation of the 25 percent Kurdish population, territorial border security, control of the ethnic and religiously heterogeneous population, and suppression of opponents of secularism were prioritized, said the following, which reflected a commonly held view:

> "The issue of permanent government buildings is very important. In many places, people live in bad, places like pigsties, rather than in homes. There are almost no government buildings in our towns. Those that exist are dilapidated. However, both peasants and all classes of people first look at the government building to see the presence of the government. The houses of the people are much better than government offices. This need must be compensated for in time with a program and a plan."[55]

In this process, the First General Inspectorate announced that urban development plans were being made for the cities of Diyarbakır, Urfa and Van, with wide boulevards and modern buildings, and that planning would also be carried out in the provinces.[56] Throughout the First

54 Bülent Varlık (haz.), *Umumi Müfettişler Toplantı Tutanakları-1936*, 127-128.

55 Ibid.

56 Architectural and public works activities in the region in the 1930s, as well as investments and activities of state institutions in education, culture, agriculture, justice and public order and public works are included in the following publications: *Güneydoğu Birinci Genel Müfettişlik Bölgesi*, (Cumhuriyet Matbaası, İstanbul: 1939); *Doğu, Cumhuriyetin 15. Yılında*, (Üçüncü Umumi Müfettişlik Neşriyatından: 1938).

General Inspectorate, official buildings such as the governor's mansion, municipality, school, police station and civil servants' houses, which were essential for the arrival of civil servants in the region, were said to have been constructed, while the foundations of some others were said to have been laid.[57] In addition, as mentioned above, during these years when the RPP decided to effectively manage the construction of People's Houses through centralized coordination, it was announced that one of the most prominent ambitions of the inspectorate was for the People's Houses to have modern buildings, and in this context the construction of 28 People's Houses in the East began.[58]

57 *Güneydoğu Birinci Genel Müfettişlik Bölgesi*," Bayındırlık", 315-385. Apart from the eight provinces within the First General Inspectorate, Elazığ and Ağrı also remained within this inspectorate for a while, and after a while, the former was connected to the Fourth General Inspectorate and the latter to the Third General Inspectorate.

58 Accordingly, it is stated that a "modern and comfortable" People's House building was built in Diyarbakır with an expenditure of 140 thousand liras, that exceptional buildings were being constructed in Van and Bitlis with an expenditure of 50 thousand liras, and that a beautiful and modern building was built in Mardin. In Muş and Bulanık, the People's Houses also have regular buildings, a beautiful People's House building was constructed in Siverek and Erciş with an expenditure of 20 thousand liras, and buildings were under construction in Erciş, Ergani, Lice, Çermik, Savur and Ahlat. In Urfa and Siirt, buildings belonging to the government were given to the People's Houses, while in Birecik, Cizre and Derik, a beautiful building belonging to the municipality was allocated to the People's Houses. The Silvan People's House building is being repaired and efforts are made to ensure that the other People's Houses in the region have proper buildings. Ibid, 135.



Figure 3.1 Public works and building works of the First General Inspectorate, 1938. SOURCE: *Güneydoğu Birinci Genel Müfettişlik Bölgesi*, 312.

While the People's House in Diyarbakır, the central province of the First General Inspectorate, was among the first 14 People's Houses opened in Van province in 1932, Diyarbakır's "special" location created an inclination to relatively support both the architectural and other activities of the People's House, financially and otherwise. Diyarbakır, where the 1925 Sheikh Said Rebellion culminated and was violently suppressed, was seen as the main potential site of Kurdish nationalist uprisings, with its 70 percent Kurdish-speaking population, along with other cities in the region. However, İsmet İnönü, during his 1935 trip to the Orient, stated that Diyarbakır was suitable to be made a "strong center of Turkishness"[59], while the publications of the General

59 Saygı Öztürk, *İsmet Paşa'nın Kürt Raporu*, Doğan Kitap, (İstanbul:2008) 20-21.

Inspectorate argued that "the places in Diyarbakır are essentially Turkish and Diyarbakır should be a great cultural center of Turkishness".[60] In this trajectory, the aforementioned connection, which intensified in the 1930s, to make space modern, public and national by transcending traditional forms was reproduced in the central city of the region. As was the case in Ankara, in Diyarbakır too, the city moved its center, and embarked on new construction activity. The city center began to move from the multi-ethnic and multi-religious Suriçi of the Ottoman period, with its narrow streets, to an empty plain with wide boulevards and national public buildings in modern form.[61] During this period, public buildings such as the mansion occupied by the First General Inspectorate, the commander's mansion, the station building, The Office of Monopolies (İnhisarlar Ofisi) and The Directorate of the Public Works (Nafia Müdürlüğü) high schools, primary schools, and army houses were constructed.

In the 1940s, it was announced that urban development plans were being implemented for the cities of Diyarbakır, Urfa and Van, to provide them with wide boulevards and modern buildings, and that planning would also be carried out in the provinces. In provincial centers such as Elazığ, Diyarbakır, Mardin, Erzurum and Kars in the Third General Inspectorate region, it was accepted that the buildings of the People's Houses came close to the criteria of the "ideal People's House building" in terms of architecture. In this sense, it is possible to say that state administrators thought that these buildings presented an architectural representation similar to those of Ankara, Mersin, and Izmir, even though they were seen as lacking in terms of splendor, aesthetics, and equipment. Diyarbakır People's House, one of the first People's Houses established in 1932, first operated in the building of the Turkish Hearth, which it would later continue to use as an annex, and in 1934 in a twelve-

60 "Founded by Turks, from its smallest stone to its biggest bastion, Diyarbakir is a great cultural center of the East and the sacred home of Turkishness today as it was yesterday." *Güneydoğu Birinci Genel Müfettişlik Bölgesi*, 192.

61 For the Suriçi history, see Şeyhmus Diken*, Sırrını Surların Fısıldayan Şehir: Diyarbakır,* 8th ed., (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2013).

room building with a large hall rented from the Armenian Mendilciyan family[62] before moving to its new building in 1937.[63] The building, constructed in Dağkapı Square, the new center of the city in accordance with the urban planning of the period, was considered by the People's House administrators as "a high example of modern art and the great temple[64] of the Southeast with all its comforts" at a time when Kemalism was glorified with a sanctity and symbolism that was expected to replace Turkish Hearths, religion, and the mosque.[65] Furthermore, it was

62 Özer, "Türk Modernleşmesinde Halkevleri ve Diyarbakır Örneği", 384.

63 The project of the building, which was completed in three years, was designed by Arif Hikmet, a professor at the Academy of Fine Arts. For the construction of the building, 80 thousand liras from private accounting, 60 thousand liras from the RPP headquarters and 15 thousand liras from donations were collected. The reinforced concrete building, which is said to represent a brilliant symbol of modern architecture, has an "enormous hall" for 1,500 people, a large stage, ten study rooms and a large hall. *Cumhuriyetin 15. Yılında Diyarbakır*, Diyarbakır Halkevi Yayını, 1938. 99. In 1937, 23.5 percent of the People's House budget, which was close to 1 million liras, was allocated to the construction of People's Houses. "Dahiliye Vekili ve CHP Genel Sekreteri Şükrü Kaya'nın Halkevleri'nin 6'ıncı Yıldönümü olan 20 Şubat 1938'de Ankara Halkevi'nde Verdiği Nutuk", *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Genel Sekreterliği*, (Ankara: 1938).

64 Neşe Gürallar, "Mabet: Türk Ocakları Genel Merkezi'nden Halkevleri'ne", In *Ankara Resim ve Heykel Müzesi,* ed. Zeynep Yasa-Yaman, (Ankara: T.C. Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 2012) 29-34.

65 Usman Eti, "Halkevimiz Sekiz Yaşında", *Karacadağ*, no: 25, (1940), 14-15. Diyarbakır MPs Kazım Sevüktekin, Zülfü Tigrel, Rüştü Begit, Veli Necdet Süngütay and Zeki Mesut Alsan, in their reports sent to the RPP General Secretariat in 1940, said the following about the new building of the Diyarbakır People's House: "The Diyarbakır People's House can be considered one of the largest and best of the existing People's Houses not only in this province but also in Turkey, both in terms of its large and excellent building and its equipment and furnishings." The deputies add that the People's Houses in the districts do not have their own and adequate buildings. "Diyarbakır İlinde Bulunan Halkevleri'nin Teftiş Raporları." CCA. 490 01/996.850.1, (10.08.1945). According to Dalkılıç and Halifeoğlu, the building bears the characteristics of modern architecture with its unadorned facades, corner windows and round windows. In addition to its grand hall and stage, spaces were designed to meet the needs of sports, public classrooms, courses, libraries and publications, museums and exhibitions. The building, which today can only be seen in photographs, was also used as the City Cinema and the Men's Art Institute (in the 1949s). Later sold, the building was also used as Yenişehir Movie Theater for a period and was demolished in 1991. See. Dalkılıç and Halifeoğlu,

announced that apart from this building in Dağkapı, the twelve-room, two-hall building was used as a library on the ground floor, and four rooms on the upper floor were used as apartments for party inspectors.[66]



Figure 3.2 The construction of Diyarbakır People's House, the other public buildings, Dağkapı Square. SOURCE: M. Şefik Korkusuz, ed., *Bir Zamanlar Diyarbekir, Zamanlar, Mekânlar, İnsanlar,* (Erenköy: Personal Publication, 1999), 58.

"Cumhuriyet Dönemi Mimarlığı, Erken Cumhuriyet Döneminde Diyarbakır'da Kamu Binaları, 1923-1950 dönemi", 2011. For features and photographs of other public buildings in Diyarbakır, see Dalkılıç and Halifeoğlu.

66 *Cumhuriyetin 15. Yılında Diyarbakır*, 99-100.




Figure 3.3 Diyarbakir People's House, completed in 1937. SOURCE: http://www.mimarlikdergisi.com/index.cfm?sayfa=mimarlik&DergiSayi=372&ecID=2615

However, a short time later, it was argued that the consecrated building was not built in accordance with the building criteria of the People's Houses, where functionality was expected to be at the forefront, on the grounds that despite its large hall, there were not enough rooms to cover the branch activities.[67] In addition to the importance of its symbolic and

67 The discourse of the Diyarbakır People's House building as a bright temple representing the revolution is made effective through poems. A poem that participated in the Karacadağ poetry competition in the 1930s, where propagandistic/agitative poems were expected, included the following lines:

functional presence as a site of economic investment and employment, the primary demands of regional MPs, local government officials and other members of the People's Houses from the RPP General Secretariat were for the construction of a building for the People's Houses, the payment of building rents, and the furnishings inside the building, while Diyarbakır People's House's demand was for a new building where the existing building was not sufficient. In 1941, upon the request of İsmet İnönü, who was visiting Diyarbakır, the People's House allocated fifty thousand liras from its own budget for a new and larger building in cooperation with the General Inspectorate, but this was not sufficient. However, in a period when it was said that it would not be possible to construct a new building without the major contribution of the RPP General Secretariat, the correspondence between the General Inspectorate and the People's House administrators with the General Secretariat regarding land appropriation, project design and materials continued until the closing of the People's Houses.[68] For example, in 1946, the RPP General Secretariat reported that with one hundred thousand liras and the amount to be obtained from the sale of the existing

"Hey, friend, this tall building you see
May your head always bow before it
It will find you a cure for your troubles
Every friend you know is there
It is a national temple to us,
There one is free from all troubles,
As relief descends on our hearts,
Dark ideas find light.
Hearts beat with the love of revolution,
There is one idea, one faith, one desire,
The poor and the rich are all together,
No classes: The same voice rises there
Hey, friend, this tall building you see
May your head always bow before it
It will find you a cure for your troubles
Every friend you know is there"
M. Erk Halkçıoğlu, "Halkevi", *Karacadağ*, vol. 2, no.13, 20 February 1939, 22.

68 For example see CCA.490.01/1700.911.1; CCA.490.100.1697.899.1, (10.03.1947); CCA.490.100/1699.909, (26.01.1948).

building, "it was decided to construct a building that would rise as a monument worthy of the party and its noble causes". The First General Inspector Avni Doğan also states, "Since we aim to turn the People's Houses into temples, we are obliged to ensure the financial status of these organizations and secure their future with various sources of income."[69] The implication that this sum would not be sufficient and that other resources should be provided for the construction of a “temple”, if it was seen as such, was in fact a "whining" by the local to the center, a softened form of complaint in the parlance of the time.

During these years, the Diyarbakır People's House continued to make use of its new building, which had the largest auditorium in the region, as a performance and meeting hall, and sold it to the Dilan family, who operated it as the City Cinema in exchange for rent. The Municipality, the Directorate of Public Works and the last building belonging to the Special Provincial Administration also made use of the new building, and after purchase of the last building, the People's House activities continued there until 1951. Although the decision was made for the long hoped for new building to be constructed and included in the program, it was designed to be a dignified building, and the resources required for its construction could not be obtained from the central and local budgets, due to the arduous process of negotiating with private landowners to find land, and the issues of expropriation, and as the culmination of a process involving conflicts, rivalries, tensions and compromises along the central-local line. With the establishment of the RPP offices in 1944, it is quite apparent that the plan to build the new building, in which the RPP provincial administrative board was also involved, was seen as a development investment, and that local actors wanted to raise funds for the province and create political and socio-economic capital for the RPP in both land and construction efforts.[70] Due to the special importance

69 İsmail Özer, “Türk Modernleşmesinde Halkevleri ve Diyarbakır Örneği”, 406.

70 According to Devres's reference to the 1944 fiscal year, 2.5 million lire were allocated for construction in the first, second, and third inspectorates. The total budget for construction in the first inspectorate, the first area of focus for this study, was 750,000 liras, of which more than half was designated for the construction of official housing.

attached by the republican administrators to the East and the Kurds, by making Diyarbakır the center of the First Inspectorate within the framework of its policy towards the East and the Kurds, and the accelerated development activities in this context, the Diyarbakır People's House second building was not constructed, but there was a large demonstration and meeting hall constructed.

One of the People's House buildings that began to be constructed in the First Inspectorate in the late 1930s was in Mardin, which also made use of the Turkish Hearth building that had previously been appropriated. The Mardin People's House building, which became operational in 1938, was described as "a magnificent and beautiful work", similar to the Diyarbakır People's House building.[71] The reinforced concrete building housed a large performance and conference hall, four assembly halls and various study rooms, and the hall and some of the other rooms had heating.[72] However, we learn from the "People's Wishes Regarding the People's Houses" section of the 1941 election office reports of Mardin MPs Seyfi Düzgören and Rıza Erten that problems had begun in the building in the previous three years.[73] According to this, since the building was inclined against the mountain at the back and was not insulated when it was first constructed, the walls of the three facades were damp up to the ceiling, and started to pose a danger. The General Secretariat of the RPP had to send the required 1,800 liras for the isolation work to be carried out before winter.[74]

On the other hand, the People's Houses in the districts of Lice, Çermik, Hani, Eğil, Silvan and Ergani had advantages over many other districts, but were not as "lucky" as Diyarbakır. In the First General Inspectorate publication of 1939, it is stated that in Lice and Ergani districts "a modern building is being constructed with a plan to meet local needs", while in

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Murat S. Devres, "The Turkish Mission Civilisatrice? Governance of Dersim as an Internal Colony (1927-1952)", 269.

71 CHP Mardin Halkevi Yayını, *Mardin* , (İstanbul: Resimli Ay, 1938).

72 Ibid.

73 "Mardin İlinin Teftiş ve Çalışma Raporlarının Genel Sekreterliğe Sunulduğu", CCA, 490.01/688.339.1. (20.04.1950).

74 Ibid.

Silvan, where the People's House was opened in 1934, it is stated that the building was being substantially repaired due to deficiencies.[75] However, according to "in-state" reports and petitions in the archives, deficiencies and unmet needs were constantly on the agenda in Diyarbakır's districts, both in newly constructed and under construction buildings, as well as those converted from other buildings. For instance, in his 1941 inspection report on the Lice People's House, Münir Soykam, the RPP party inspector and Elazığ Regional Inspector, writes that the existing People's House was operating in the basement of the municipality, and that this had a negative impact on its activities.[76] The construction of the Lice People's House, opened in 1937, which the Inspectorate announced in 1939, was still unfinished, with construction at a standstill and some of the walls cracking and collapsing.[77]

In these years, when photography became important as something that could be interpreted as a way of showing the state's presence there, and the favoring of the People's House and the people to the center, and also as a means of seeing the state's concern from the provinces, Soykam's reports, which also contained a lot of anthropological data, are particularly interesting in this respect. He also included in his report the photographs he had taken as evidence of solving problems in the places he visited. The party inspector photographed Lice, the people who came to make representation to the state, and the current state of the construction of the People's House, including its cracked wall:

75 *Güneydoğu Birinci Genel Müfettişlik Bölgesi,* 435.

76 CCA. 490 01/996.850.1, (10.08.1945).

77 Ibid.




Figure 3.4 Lice People's House under construction; its cracked wall, people coming to the People's House to "have a chat" with the state inspector, images from Lice. SOURCE: CCA. 490 01/996.850.1, (10.08.1945).

As mentioned under the first heading, in the case of the Lice People's House building, the inability to procure resources from either the local or the central budget with the necessary project and planning, along with inaccuracies in accounting records, problems with the transportation of

the necessary materials, and the spread of the construction process over years (including incorrect engineering practices). This phenomena were reflected as common problematic patterns in the construction and repair work of People's Houses in the region.[78] We see that an architect was required for the deficiencies of the Hani People's Room building, but the province had not yet sent one, and the land could not be registered because this required the payment of 70 liras. While the Ergani People's House stood out with its reinforced concrete, larger structure, and big garden, it was one of the other buildings that took a long time to be constructed, because the floor was not levelled, and the plastering was not completed, while the building of the Bismil People's House was also not sufficient.[79]

Tension was caused by the fact that the center took the position that it could not act beyond projecting and directing the construction, even though it had decided that it was to do so, and that the General Inspector, in the case of Avni Doğan, realized this and informed the party center to take action for a practical solution rather than a mere decision. Moreover, the RPP members insistently attributed responsibility to the center, while the center did not take any real action for more than ten years. On the other hand, while the party center was in this position, even in the receptive Diyarbakır city center, donations were made in insignificant amounts, and there was no participation of the "people" in the construction. It can be argued that this was different after the

78 Soykam wrote the following: "The concrete of the cinema room has also cracked and tilted...The expenses incurred so far for this building could not be determined because the accounts were entered in the municipal ledger, they had 4,980 liras of construction money in their hands, they needed to plan the construction, make the calculations, and then give it to a contractor, they asked the inspector general's office to get an architect or engineer involved, but they had important work on their hands and could not be engaged in this work before the twentieth of June. Since the construction season is very short in these regions, it is very necessary to obtain an independent architect or engineer from the Ministry of Public Works for the construction and repair of Ergani, Çermik, Lice, Hani and other People's Houses. (In the meantime, the leaking floors of Elazığ People's House need to be repaired urgently)". CCA. 490 01/996.850.1, (10.08.1945).

79 Ibid.

establishment of the RPP offices, creating a mobility around party supporters. However, up to this point, it is important to note that in the construction of the People's House building, the issues of land, material and project procurement, especially the budget, were areas of state influence and direction, which were plagued with significant problems of administrative relations, capacity, access and control that the central and local state confronted or negotiated about. In addition to the spatial symbolic effect of the state, which included religious influence, as in the case of the Diyarbakır People's House, the image, visibility and presence of the state can be seen in the material sense, as well as in the dynamics of the everyday and the local, which undermine the image of the powerful state, and in the concrete encounters with the state regarding powerlessness, control, capacity, functioning and interventions in the local area, as well as forms of mutual inclusion and exclusion within the power structure.

The province of Elazığ, the seat of the Fourth General Inspectorate, occupied a special position as a central province in extending to Dersim, where military operations were planned, and as a center of distinctive civilizing and colonial spatial planning and investment, marked by security objectives.[80] This process can be considered one of the most typical examples of the violent establishment of spatial modernization. Elazığ whose city center was moved from Harput, where Armenians were active, to a modernised city center Ma'mûretül-Azîz during the reign of Sultan Abdulaziz (then Elaziz), whose city center was considered the

80 For a study and discussion on this subject, see Devres, "The Turkish Mission Civilisatrice? Governance of Dersim as an Internal Colony (1927-1952)". According to the politician and journalist Naşit H. Uluğ, civilizing and liberating movements, in addition to military action, "must be based on big cities, civilized facilities and cultural centers, which will play a great role in terms of health and means. Elazığ is connected to the railroad; since reconstruction will be based on iron, cement and constructive people, this place will also be the base of this blessed movement." Uluğ "In order to bring Dersim to its senses, it is necessary to build roads first and foremost." Naşit Hakkı Uluğ, *Tunceli Medeniyete Açılıyor,* 180. For transportation and zoning practices aimed at civilization and discipline in Tunceli in this period, see also Tan's Tunceli Supplement.

gateway to the east of the Euphrates.[81] "Republican Elazığ" where the Turkish-speaking population was the largest among the twelve provinces was a militarily and culturally strategic province where place names were Turkified under the leadership of the People's House, and which was produced as a "center of Turkishness" by establishing Turkish immigrant villages within the scope of internal colonization.[82] Modern and national city building and public works in Elazığ were one of the main objective of the rulers. The Elazığ People's House, the earliest modern building in the region to be constructed and rapidly completed, opened in 1934 in the Culture Quarter (Kültür Mahallesi), on the south side of Republican Square (Cumhuriyet Mahallesi). With its location and architecture, the Elazığ People's House building is considered to be the first appropriate, ideal and magnificent People's House building reflecting classical modernism in the region and across the country.[83]

81 About the anthropological history of the dual town Harput/Mezre's place-making, then its ruinisation and also metamorphosis into "Republican Elazığ" from 1830s to 1930s see Ali Sipahi, "At Arm's Length: Historical Ethnography of Proximity in Harput", (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2015).

82 For the many muhajir villages in Elazig that were built with modern structures, see. *Cumurluk devrinde Elaziz, İl ve İlçelerde Kültürel Bayındırlık İşleri*, (İstanbul: Resimli Ay, 1935); *Cumhuriyetin XV. Yılında Elaziz Vilayeti*, (Ankara: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, 1938).

83 It is a building that is also praised in the 1934 Annual Report of the People's Houses: "The vigilant and valuable young people of the country in Elâziz have built a really modern People's House in full masonry at a cost of (50811) liras". *Halkevleri'nin 1934 Senesi Faaliyet Raporları Hülasaları*, Ulus Basımevi, (Ankara 1935), 132. RPP Secretary General Mahmut Şevket Esendal said the following about the Elazığ People's House: "In my opinion, it is more useful and convenient than the Adana People's House, which we built by spending a lot of money, and its exterior is more beautiful." "CHP Genel Sekreteri Memduh Şevket Esendal'ın Doğu İllerine Yaptığı Gezinin Raporu", CCA.490. 01/571.2274.1, (14.06.1945).




Figure 3.5. Elazığ Culture Neighbourhood (Kültür Mahallesi): Republic Area, Halkevi building and Halkevi band. SOURCE: *Cumurluk Devirinde Elaziz, İl ve İlçelerde Kültürel Bayındırlık İşleri*.

The building had many areas of use, such as a performance hall, library, meeting hall, indoor gymnasium, work corners for branch departments, performance locker room, music room, billiard room, guest house, relaxation hall, dining hall and bathroom, as well as furniture and fittings. In its garden, there was a children's playground and the "People's House Culture Park", which met the city's need for a park. The People's House building, which was said to amaze those who saw how it was built, won

the admiration of visitors from outside the city.[84] However, official correspondence and reports emphasize that the 400-seat performance hall of the Elazığ People's House was insufficient, that the maintenance and repair of the building was beyond local capabilities, that there was not a sufficient budget allocated locally, and that it was difficult to manage in terms of physical space.[85] Despite the vast size of its space, the lack of proper maintenance and repair rendered the building unusable, and this was one of the reasons for the lack of activity and "vitality" at the desired level. Other reasons include the fact that the governors chose the staff for the People's House from the civil servant class and their frequent changes prevented a stable administration, leading to a gradual decrease in public participation.[86] In 1945, Diyarbakır MP Osman Ocak commented in the same manner about the Elazığ People's House, adding that although the People's House building in the Harput district of the old city center had an "excellent" appearance, there was no activity inside.[87] The Balıbey People's Room is of a similar nature.[88]

84 *Altan/Elaziz,* Issue. 1, 1935, 1. Naşit Uluğ writes the following: "The stadium, the People's House, the Girls' Institute and the park at the mouth of Malatya Street in the west are the heirlooms of former governor Tevfik Gür to Elazığ...The People's House is one of the most beautiful buildings in the east. Built of stone, the building has large halls and an excellent book room. In front of this building, Atatürk's bronze statue standing in his military uniform honors Elazığ. The park next to the People's House meets all the needs of the city...The girls' institute built behind the People's House is a very valuable home of the Republic in Elazığ." Naşit Hakkı Uluğ, *Tunceli Medeniyete Açılıyor*, 207.

85 In a 1939 report by Fethi Altay, Elazığ MP, he states that "the Elazığ People's House building is fully comfortable and even has more outbuildings than needed", but he adds that this state of affairs "invites difficulties in its repair and administration". “Elazığ Bölgesi Teftiş Raporunun CHP Genel Sekreterliği'ne Sunulduğu.” CCA..490.01/645.136.1, (08.11.1939).

86 Ibid.

87 Ocak says the following about Harput: "However, there is almost no one in the town, which has now become a district. Since most of the estimated 2,000 inhabitants reside in the gardens, there is no staff to carry out the work of the People's House and to do useful work. For this reason, the People's House is completely vacant". “Elazığ İlinde Bulunan Halkevleri’nin Teftiş Raporları”, CCA.490.01/997.852.1, (10.08.1945).

88 Ocak reports that the building of the Balıbey district People's Room was also neat, suitable for gathering and working, but that its work was stagnant due to the lack of a

The problematic of the People's House building and the balance of activities, which party and state administrators complained about, is a common pattern in all the People's Houses in the East. In the 1930s, it was as important for the buildings to be constructed with ideal architecture, if possible, as it was for the buildings to be ideal and convenient, and for the administrators and members of the People's Houses to be idealistic, and suitable in other ways. Therefore, the People's House buildings, which were established as state and nation "actors", were intended to embody national aspirations, by reflecting the rational modernist architectural and spatial ideals that were dominant in those years. Despite the construction of such a People's House building, due to the symbolic and material importance of Elazığ, the activities of the House and the lack of public interest seem to be related to a technical rationality on the lines of "if the building is appropriate, there should be activity and appreciation/interest". In the case of the People's House in Erzurum, the center of the Third General Inspectorate, which was considered ideal "even if it was a toy in the hands of some one or the other", "lack of activity and weakness in administration" were found despite the nature of the building, thus the balance between building and activity was found to be defective.[89] Inspired by Ferguson, it is possible

clerk to carry out cultural affairs and the need for a battery for the radio, whereas when the radio was working, even women would come to the People's Room. Ibid.

89 The large building of the Third Inspectorate, which was constructed in Erzurum, where the RPP party office had its headquarters, was far from the city, its construction was not in accordance with science, it went into debt, the contractor "did not do solid work" and its construction "became a toy in the hands of this and that" due to allegations of corruption. "Erzurum Halkevi Binasının Proje ve İnşa Masrafları" CCA.490.10/1491.83.1. "Erzurum Halkevi Binası İnşaatına Ait Proje ve Mukavemet Hesapları", CCA..490.10/1709.948, (25.08.1941), (17.09.1946). "Erzurum Halkevi Kalorifer ve Elektrik Tesisatına Ait Proje ve Keşifler", CCA.490.10/1708.944, (19.08.1938). In his 1940 inspection report, Dr. Vehbi Demir, the RPP's Erzurum District Inspector and Ordu MP, wrote, "The building of the People's House is very good, meeting all needs," and then, in a similar manner to the Elazığ People's House, stated that "the People's House does not operate as desired and in all respects, because the last meeting was held two years ago, the officials and teachers in the province do not show enough interest in the People's House, and a determined chairman and administrative board are

to determine that we are facing the production of a *state effect*, perception and knowledge in which the state works like an "anti-political machine", concealing the problematics of direct political, social and cultural origin, and reducing them to the idea that the problem can be solved by building, engineering, and administrators with ambitions.[90] On the other hand, as we will see in the representative examples below, the fact that the main reason for the People's House's lack of activities requiring a large and appropriate space and equipment was the lack of suitable buildings or the complete lack of buildings, led to the reaction of the center, which thought that this was an excuse, plus the reactionary responses of the local community.

3.2.1 *People's Houses Under Construction, Without Buildings and Not Suitable to Function*

Within the scope of the representation of the visibility and spatial design of "state power" in the East in the 1930s, the People's Houses in Elazığ, Diyarbakır, Van and Mardin are reflected as *national sanctuaries*, where buildings that were found to be *magnificent*, *beautiful* and *convenient* became unsuitable in the 1940s due to reasons such as being inadequate for the needs, being too big for the needs, or being built incorrectly. Attempts to rectify these can be identified as protracted and slow in progress. On the other hand, the buildings in other provincial Houses and Rooms, where new buildings were not (could not) be constructed, were characterized as unfit, in need of repair, full of deficiencies or dilapidated places that did not meet the criteria of a modern People's House building. This phenomenon makes it much clearer that the state's image of omnipotence was not as idealized as thought, in view of the actual

needed to make the People's House active." "Erzurum Teftiş Raporlarının Birinci Büro'ya Gönderildiği", CCA.490.01/271.1081.1, (10.12.1943).

90 Ferguson, James. *The Anti-Politics Machine: Development, Depolitization, and Burocratic Power in Lesotho,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1990.

processes and realities of the encounters, and this seems to have led to a greater involvement of local complicated dynamics and interactions.

In contrast to Elazığ, which had a large and well-organized People's House building, the People's House in Bingöl, like most of the other People's Houses in the same inspectorate, which saw the transformation of Çapakçur town into a province, was one of the provincial People's Houses that could not afford a new building, and this was the case from its establishment until its closure. So much so that the People's House, founded in February 1936, could only become operational in June due to the lack of a building.[91] According to a petition written by the governor of Bingöl in 1937, the main reason why the activities of the People's House were not carried out sufficiently was the lack of a building. As a matter of fact, there was attempt for the People's House to survive by paying rent on a small hall built in the style of a coffeehouse by the municipality. However, "a gathering place like the People's House for the large mass of civil servants in Bingöl and providing a social benefit to its neighborhood is, above all, a natural necessity of life".[92] In 1941, the House moved into a larger building owned by the municipality[93] but they constantly reported that its inappropriateness was the cause of the House's inactivity, and that the construction of a new building was necessary. In 1943, RPP Consultant Architect Sabri Oran showed his disapproval for constructing a building, by reporting that the hotel and

91 "Bingöl Halkevi'nin Çalışma Raporları", CCA.490.01/ 982.807.1 (02.11.1936).

92 "Kığı Halkevi Binasına Yangın Söndürme Aleti Alınması, Bingöl Halkevi Binasının Sigortalanması", CCA.490.01/1670.815.1. (04.06.1947).

93 Soykam says the following about this: "The building used to be a small café in the bazaar. The municipality started to build a hotel and the ground floor was reserved for the house. This is a hall large enough to accommodate 200 people (the hall has a high part where a stage can be built). On this floor, there are three rooms, a hall, a bathroom, and craftsmen who have not yet completed the internal parts. I told them that it is necessary to open a door on the side of the stage and to add equipment on the sides to open the curtains. If these are done, it will be sufficient for the need. This building belongs to the municipality and is rented for 30 a month." "Bingöl İlinde Bulunan Halkevleri'nin Teftiş Raporları", CCA.490.01/ 994.844.3 (06.12.1943).

casino in Bingöl had been purchased for 20 thousand liras instead.[94] In 1948, according to the petition of A. Bayram, the head of Bingöl People's House, although a construction had been added to the purchased building, the severity of the winter that year caused the building to fall into ruins, and the People's House was left flooded, with all its plaster and top tiles crumbling and partially falling off due to the excessive snow. The aid sent to neighboring provinces should also be given to them, otherwise there was no other option but to close down the People's House, which "did not have enough money to buy a broom".[95] After this, it appears that the Secretariat and the RPP provincial organization sent funds for repairs. Although there is no documentation on whether repairs were made, we find that a People's House employee, who worked as a janitor and teamaker, wrote a petition stating that the People's House had no money, and that he could not take care of his family because he had not been paid for months.[96] These years are reflected as a phase in which the People's Houses in the region declined or faced closure due to budgetary and building problems.

94 "Bingöl Halkevi'nde Şube Kollarına Ait Yazışmalar", CCA.490.01/971.755.2, (16.02.1942).

95 Ahmet Bayram, the head of the People's House, said that the chairs and tables that had been in use for years were completely broken and the covers had become unusable, and that due to budget cuts they did not receive any funds from local institutions that year, only 250 liras from the RPP General Secretariat. Complaining that they "didn't even have enough money to buy a broom", Bayram said that in this situation there was no other option but to close down the People's House, and asked the General Secretariat to seriously consider this. "Bingöl'deki Halkevleri ve Halkodaları'nın Genel İhtiyaçlarına Yardım Olarak Gönderilen Tahsisat", CCA.490.01/1477.32.1 (24.02.1951). Similarly, Rıfat Yüksel, Civil Registry Director and the head of the Solhan district People's Room, wrote a petition stating that the People's Room building was "still being ruined in drops of water and is taking the form of collapse" due to snow and rainwater, and asked for funds for repairs. Stating that a trunk was brought from the bazaar and the books were placed in it and the trunk was moved to the population administration due to the waterlogged condition of the chamber, Yüksel wrote that "the desired purpose of the room cannot be achieved in this misery".

96 CCA.490.01/1670.813.1

On the other hand, People's House president Bayram's implication that Elazığ and Tunceli, within the same inspectorate as Bingöl, received “more state aid" is a reaction to the unequal distribution of the financial support provided by the Secretariat, even though it was "not obligatory", and exemplifies the reaction of the administrators of the People's House, which became localized to a certain extent after 1945, and their demand for equal civilization and development from the state within the region. Once the lack of a building was overcome, the "stagnation" in the activities of the People's House, which was attributed to monetary constraints due to the lack of support from the local budget and the lack of donations, was communicated to the headquarters, the General Inspectorate and RPP offices, and a solution was expected from them in a vicious cyclical process of negotiations and tensions.

The Urfa People's House is an example of a pattern of the People's Houses where the "building problem" persisted until its closure, and where the construction of a new building, as if a metaphor for the process of the establishment of the state, spread over years and ended before it even began. On the one hand, it is also an example of post-1940 attempts to construct buildings with centralized planning, as in the case of the Diyarbakır People's House. In addition, the construction process of the building more visibly reflects the different practices, perceptions, conflicts and negotiations along central/local lines. In 1937, Party Inspector Gündüz reported that the Urfa People's House was operating in an old building that did not qualify as a People's House building, and that "a building worthy of this important Turkish city of the south should be built" and that building allocations should be made in the budgets of the Special Administration and the municipality as soon as possible.[97] Similarly, Soykam reiterated in 1940 that the building, which had once been a school, then a movie theater, and then allocated to the People's House, had an unorganized structure that was not sufficient for activities, and therefore a modern new building should be built.[98] In 1946, the foundations of a new building, which was to be used jointly by the RPP

97 CCA. 490. 01/996.850.1.

98 “Urfa İlinde Bulunan Halkevleri’nin Teftiş Raporları”, CCA.490.01/ 1004.875.1.

and the People's Houses under the supervision of a consultant architect, were set to be laid in response to the repeated demands of central and local state officials for years. However, according to correspondence that lasted until 1949, only 25 thousand liras out of the 100 thousand liras promised for the construction was sent, and since no funds could be found locally, only the foundations were laid and only the hall was built. The issue did not end there, as the construction of the building did not start, so the municipality wanted to expropriate the building land belonging to the private accounting department, which the RPP had barely acquired in a central part of the city. While there were great debates about this, there were also discussions about how to share out the precious stones obtained by demolishing the old buildings on the land. As a result, the DP government decided to halt construction completely in 1950, and the building land was expropriated by the governorship and the municipality. The contractor for the People's House building, as was common, continued to demand that the center reimburse him for the wages he had not received up to that point.[99]

Through the example of the Urfa People's House building, which is roughly described here, it can be observed that the construction of People's Houses in the East was a struggle for land, project, budget, material procurement and sharing between local party and state institutions, and that the RPP's inability to establish absolute control led to the construction of the building taking years to begin, and eventually failing to materialize. During the DP period, even after the expropriation of the land, which meant the de facto completion of the construction of the People's House, and its removal from the lists of RPP property, the process of struggle and conflict between the central and local lines regarding the property acquisition of the RPP and the People's Houses was observed. Moreover, it can be observed that, as is more common in a multi-layered field such as building construction, the slowness in the snail-like functioning of the bureaucratic process in all People's Houses, and especially in the districts and villages, and the communication process between the center and the local, where telegram or petition

99 "Urfa Halkevi Binası İnşaatı", CCA.490.01/1793.1269.1, (13.08.1951).

traffic was disrupted due to postal problems, and yet those at the local level continued to insist on the construction of the building. It is also possible to observe how the center tried to keep the local building processes under its control, while the local state, RPP and People's House administrators struggled and negotiated to turn the situation in their favor.[100] This case represents the RPP's efforts to acquire deeded property in the name of the party through the ubiquitous People's House, but with the impact of the multiparty era, there was added the inability of state administrators to make decisions in the direction they wanted, and the conflicts and struggles of all actors to use the situation in their favor, intertwined with local specific dynamics, regarding who would own the property and land.

With a ruined, dilapidated People's House and 7 People's Houses in need of repair, Hakkâri, in the city with the lowest number of People's Houses in the region, was not a place where serious attempts were made by "members of the party-state who wanted to escape from the deprived region as soon as possible, to have a modern Houses' building. It operated in "an adobe building with a roof, two rooms and a living room, best suited for local conditions".[101] By 1941, Party Inspector Aytuna stated that "the wish of the people of Hakkâri is for a new building, be it mudbrick or stone, suitable for work and meetings", a request in line with the acceptance of local styles in the architecture of the People's Houses of this period. However, in the poorest and most poverty-stricken province of the country, where the informal economy based on smuggling across the borders of the nation-state was dominant, it was not possible to use the local budget, which was the main preference of the RPP General Secretariat.[102] Moreover, according to Party Inspector Aytuna, the People's House could not overcome the "People's Room atmosphere"

100 Ibid.

101 "Hakkâri İlinde Bulunan Halkevlerinin Teftiş Raporları", CCA.490.01/998.856.1.

102 For the phenomenon of smuggling across nation-state borders in Kurdish provinces, see Kudret Çobanlı, "Bir Tehlikeli Mekân' Olarak Sınırlar, Cumhuriyet'in Kurucu Kadroları Gözünden Doğu ve Güneydoğu Sınırları", *Toplumsal Tarih*, no.286, (October 2017), 70-80.

due to the lack of public participation and the indifferent and inappropriate attitudes of state officials. Because the mistreatment of the people by the gendarmerie organization, which was "in the business of making money", alienated the people from the state, and because of the influences stemming from the economic relations with the Kurds in Iraq and Iran, the people of Hakkari, who were Kurdish and all of whom spoke Kurdish, "had lost their qualities to be good citizens" and had nothing to do with the People's House.[103] In such a political, social and cultural environment, he says that although a new building to represent the state and the party would not be built, he concluded that a good renovation of the building and the provision of furnishings would be "sufficient for the time being" for Hakkâri, which the state has difficulty reaching due to transportation and communication difficulties.[104]

103 As mentioned in the second chapter, in these years, when the uncontrolled tyrannical behavior and acts of violence of the gendarmerie and army forces in the Kurdish provinces were reflected more in the reports, Inspector Aytuna writes:" In the province of Hakkâri today, there is a corrupt gendarmerie organization that is in dire need of supervision. From the commander to the private, every one of them is in pursuit of making money, and their ill-treatment of the people to achieve this goal alienates the people against the government. Although the people appear to be calm and obedient, they are under the pressure of the gendarmerie on the one hand, and under the influence of their relatives in Iraq on the other, and through various and illegitimate ways and means, their qualities of being good citizens have been corrupted. Along with all these events, the shortage of food and the poverty and misery of the people in the region make the situation even more grave." "Hakkâri İlinde Bulunan Halkevlerinin Teftiş Raporları." CCA.490.01/998.856.1.

104 Ibid.




Figure 3.6 The appearance and features of the Hakkâri People's House and the landscape of Hakkâri in 1941. SOURCE: "Hakkâri İlinde Bulunan Halkevlerinin Teftiş Raporları." CCA.490.01/998.856.1.[105]

These statements show how citizens in Hakkâri "handled" members of the state and bent the power, regulations and practices of the state to

105 Photographed by RPP Party Inspector Hasip Aytuna. Aytuna, who inspected and visited many People's Houses in the region, seems to have been much more interested in the engineering and repair of the buildings of the People's Houses than other party inspectors, as Münir Soykam also shows to a certain extent. His detailed descriptions of them and his detailed suggestions and enthousiam for renovations are remarkable.

themselves through border production and the smuggling economy, and how secret forms of consensus on this issue influenced the ownership and adoption of the People's House. It is also consistent with the RPP's consideration of whether a People's House or a People's Room was active or not as a criterion for providing central support for the construction of new buildings. As such, in 1942, RPP Secretary General Esendal stated that he "did not consider the condition of the People's Houses in Kurdish-populated towns and villages to be good"; however, even requests for the addition of rooms, as in the case of the People's House in the Bulanık district of Muş, were not meaningful due to the "unpopularity" of the existing People's Houses, and that making Turkish and Turkishness dominant in these areas would make the People's Houses meaningful.[106] As a matter of fact, as these views gained ground, literacy courses and schooling began to be prioritized in the Halkevleri as well. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the construction of People's Houses buildings was not prioritized, especially in the "non-Turkified" rural areas of the Kurdish provinces, which were found to be in a "weak position" in terms of building construction and appropriate and modern building stock.

On the other hand, it is also possible to get the impression that public participation in the People's Houses was not expected in Hakkâri[107], a province where almost the entire population spoke Kurdish even in 1939, and which was recorded in statistics as the province with the lowest rate of Turkish-speaking population in Turkey. Rather, it shows the prototype of a People's House that organized official ceremonies, and the fact that it was a place that would more or less ensure the visibility and presence of the state, a place that could be frequented and gathered in by civil servants, seems to have been deemed sufficient by the state authorities, where the assimilation and inclusion of the Kurdish population was

106 "CHP Genel Sekreteri Memduh Şevket Esendal'ın Doğu İllerine Yaptığı Gezinin Raporu", CCA. 490. 01/571.2274.1, (14.06.1945).

107 The other provinces with the lowest rates of speaking Turkish were Siirt and Mardin. Şükrü Aslan, Sibel Yardımcı, Murat Arpacı, Öykü Gürpınar, *Türkiye'nin Etnik Coğrafyası, 1927-1965 Ana Dil Haritaları*, (İstanbul: Mimar Sinan Güzel Sanatlar Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2015), 226.

discussed in terms of both intention and state capacity. Also, the space occupied by the People's House, as an acceptable institution, seems to have been given importance not to give way to "illegitimate" culture, publicness and spatiality. In this process, it can be said that in the province where the military regime was openly practiced and the people were harassed, the recipients responded to this institutional practice of the state not with directly open resistance, but with an attitude that can be considered as passive resistance involving non-participation and indifference.[108] However, on the other hand, the cultural and linguistic enactment represented by the People's Houses also involved inequality and exclusion on the basis of not benefiting from the advantages of capital acquisition, even if these were limited, such as modernization, citizenship and participation, and not being able to develop their own different cultural, political, symbolic and social capitals. The isolation and punishment of existing spatial/cultural spaces can be read as another aspect of this process. On the other hand, in Hakkâri, where it was reported in 1941 that the inhabitants were "peaceful and happy and satisfied with the government", the removal of İsmet İnönü's bust by DP supporters after the 1946 elections manifested itself as an open protest.[109]

The People's House building in Siirt, near Hakkâri, was one of the best and most spacious buildings in the province in the early years of its takeover from the Turkish Hearth, but it was constructed in a local style with a watery plaster material called "cas", a more typical example of the increasingly dilapidated People's House buildings. Party Inspector Aytuna wrote about it in 1942: "The People's House building, which is located on one of the most beautiful and high hills of Siird, makes a very good impression on people with its beautiful view from afar, but when

108 In this context, on the fact that smuggling involved an informal practice of resistance for Kurds in socio-economic and cultural terms, see Adnan Çelik, "Challenging State Borders: Smuggling as Kurdish infra-politics during 'the years of silence", In *Kurds in Turkey, Ethnographies of Heterogeneous Experiences*, ed. Lucie Drechselova and Adnan Çelik, (Maryland: Lexington Books, 2019), 159-184.

109 "Hakkâri'de İnönü Büstünün Sökülerek Atıldığı", CCA, 490.01/460.1888.4.

you get closer to it, it immediately turns this good impression into sadness with its visible ruin."[110] In particular, the dampness and heating problems that arose in the winter, and the correspondence regarding the repair or replacement of the building, which was "almost in danger of collapse and was in all respects neglected and unsanitary", continued from its opening in 1934 until its closure in 1951.[111] In 1947, the president of the Siirt People's House sent a petition to the RPP General Secretariat stating that "pigeon infestation had begun due to the collapses in the building, so cleaning was not possible, and the fixtures and books in the bookstore were rotting". In addition, he stated that the People's House officials could not be held responsible for this situation and asked the RPP General Secretariat to intervene as soon as possible.[112] In 1951, when the DP was in power, the RPP General Secretariat reiterated more clearly that the financial situation was not adequate even for the repair of the Siirt People's House and that local resources should be used.[113]

Siirt had only two People's Houses in the provincial center and Şırnak district, while the 19 People's Houses in the remaining districts and some villages were described with similar characteristics. These People's Rooms were shown as typical examples of the local buildings that were commonplace, especially in the First Inspectorate Region, which state administrators described as "dilapidated, neglected and full of deficiencies". These buildings, which were generally modified from houses or shops rented from the municipality and the Public Accounts

110 CCA, 490.01.1006.883.1. The building with 6 rooms and a meeting room for 350 people had tennis and volleyball courts and a small garden next to the building. “Siirt İlinde Bulunan Halkevlerinin Teftiş Raporları”, 490.01/1002.871.2, (04.11.1945).

111 “Siirt Halkevi Binasının Tadil ve Tamiratı”, CCA.490.01/1781.1219, (08.06.1951). In a letter to the General Secretariat, Zeki Ülke, one of the heads of the People's House, states that "the People's House is trying to fulfill its duty as best it can to spread Turkish culture and heritage in the province, where the majority of the people do not speak Turkish, but the building's dangerous condition cannot be repaired and cannot be heated in winter, and therefore family meetings cannot be held."

112 Ibid.


113 Ibid.

Office, were "earthen sheds" with earthen wooden roofs where snow and rainwater constantly dripped onto the ground. According to the reports, these buildings with old and broken doors and windows were generally damp, unpainted and consequently "unhealthy". In 1940, Party Spokesperson Kemal Güngör said of one of these buildings, the Şirvan People's House, that "there was no specific (average) building for the Şirvan People's Room, a house was rented on the day the room was opened and the signboard of the People's Room was put up, but after a while, this building was allocated for other purposes and the signboard was removed."[114] Assistance was provided from the center for the construction of the building, but the construction was not started due to the "shortage of craftsmen".[115] Two years later, Inspector Aytuna added that the Şirvan People's Room was "still functioning as an ordinary room in a house belonging to the Private Accounting Department; moreover, its furnishings were poor and lacking, and no furniture had been purchased for the room since his inspection a year ago". However, like many other party inspectors, Aytuna, due to the lack of a more suitable building, gave a "note" to the Şirvan Community Room as "suitable for work for the time being" - as noted in the following photographic document.[116]

114 "Siirt İlinde Bulunan Halkevlerinin Teftiş Raporları", CCA.490.01/1002.871.2 (04.11.1945).

115 The General Secretariat sent 300 liras for the construction of the Şirvan People's Room, and the municipality allocated a plot of land for the construction, but the construction of the building could not be started due to the fact that the master builder went for military service. Kemal Güngör also states that 14.50 liras of this money, which was kept by the municipality, was given by the municipality in exchange for his promissory note, since the same master was working for the municipality at the time, and that he was told that it would be returned when construction began. Here, while referring to the confusion about the master's promissory notes, we see a phenomenon of local engagement and experience that influenced the construction of the People's House building. Ibid.

116 Ibid. The Pervari People's Room was an old house with three rooms and an earthen roof belonging to the municipality. The monthly rent was 12 liras and, as was the case in many places, there was a debt to the municipality, because the rent had not been paid for three years. There was no other building in the town that was suitable for a People's Room, as all government offices were in dilapidated buildings. In addition, as an


DEVLET ARŞİVLERİ GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ
CÜMHURİYET HALK PARTİSİ
Siirt BÖLGESİ
MÜFETTİŞLİĞİ
SAYI:

Siirt Vilâyeti:

Şirvan Halkodası:

Bina, eskidir. Hususî idarenindir. Üstü demdir.
2 odası vardır: Biri-toplantı ve okuma odası;
diğeri- İdare odası olarak kullanılmaktadır.
Şimdilik, çalışmalara müsaittir.

160

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Figure 3.7 Siirt Şirvan People's Room building, from Party Inspector Hasip Aytuna's report, 1942. SOURCE: "Siirt İlinde Bulunan Halkevlerinin Teftiş Raporları", CCA.490.01/1002.871.2, (04.11.1945).

example of the sharing of the People's House or People's Room with other state institutions, which was seen in many places, he relates that one room of the Pervari People's Room had to be used as an examination room, even though it was an unhealthy building: "In one of the two rooms on the second corridor of the building, which belongs to the Municipality, the government physician has established himself. This room has an earthen floor. The ceiling is covered with mould. Dust and garbage fall through it at every moment. It does not have the qualities of a doctor's surgery." "Siirt İlinde Bulunan Halkevlerinin Teftiş Raporları", CCA.490.01/1002.871.2, (04.11.1945).

Although Aytuna emphasized the need for a new building, he insisted that this building should at least be repaired, since there was no other alternative. The public halls in Beşiri, Eruh and Garzan, which were also used for other purposes due to the lack of buildings in the Siirt districts, had similar characteristics, and Inspector Aytuna prepared detailed repair and maintenance instructions for them as well.[117] Only in Şırnak was a new People's House building constructed using cut stone, which was "immaculate, spacious and the most beautiful building in the town"; however, since the material for the roof could not be procured, it was covered with an earthen roof in the local way, and unfortunately it remained on the title deed of the municipality.[118]

In another important province, Muş, the Muş People's House building was transferred from the Special Accounting Department to the RPP, and the party inspectors stated that "it is possible to use the existing building for the time being with some additions and repairs until a modern building is constructed".[119] After the Varto-Hınıs earthquake in 1946, which killed 839 people in Varto, a town in Muş, the building of the People's House was badly damaged and in danger of collapsing. Hüsnü Özer, the president of the People's House during 1947 and 1948, insisted that the building was rented and that the owner wanted to close the People's House in its current location so that repairs could be carried out, since there was no other building that could be used. The district governor asked the Ministry of Public Works to grant a share from the earthquake budget allocated to the district for the People's House if necessary. However, the applications were fruitless and Özer wrote in a letter dated 29 February 1948, that the telegrams sent by the youth of Varto to the general secretariat of the RPP requesting the construction of

117 Ibid.

118 Ibid. According to Aytuna, the building was "sturdy, durable and even beautiful". The timbers of the interior and exterior doors and windows were made of walnut. However, zinc or tiles could not be procured for the roof, and it was built with an earthen roof. Ibid.

119 "Şark vilayetlerindeki Halkevleri Hakkında Kemal Güngör ve Ahmet Adnan Saygın'ın Raporları." CCA. 490.01/1006.882.1, (09.10.1943).

a building had not been answered, and that this situation created a coldness among them toward the People's House. He uses insistent language not found in other letters, demanding his rights and equal treatment, demanding that the money needed for the construction of the People's House be sent immediately and that books and fixtures be provided, as was done for other People's Houses.[120]

It is noteworthy that the Varto People's House, whose activities were praised by the district governor, received no response to the request for a mud-brick building suitable for local conditions. However, after 1940, due to architectural and engineering problems, regulations were drawn up for the construction of many buildings within certain standards and under the direct control of the center in every sense. However, as mentioned above, it is seen that the promises regarding the construction of new buildings, which were proudly displayed by the general inspectorates in the 1930s, were left unfulfilled, and the criteria for a suitable People's House building, which had been more "meticulous" in previous years, were abandoned, especially compared with the People's Rooms. It is also noteworthy that it was deemed sufficient for them to be "specific", especially in provinces and towns where the Kurdish population was even more dense. Considering that a wide range of issues such as the construction of new buildings, such as obtaining land, designing a project, finding professionals to construct such buildings,

120 "Muş Varto'daki Parti ve Halkevlerine ait gayrimenkuller", 490.01/1768.1173.1, 1950. Özer writes the following: "While the vivid scenes and results of the party activity are evident, it is obvious that the absence of the People's House building, which is the sole appurtenance of the party, and the suspension of its activity will have consequences for other party interests. The fact that the neighborhood is a disaster area and the people are poor is not enough not only to build a People's House building with local aid, but even to buy a book and employ a janitor. In the present situation, it is possible to build a People's House that will meet the needs of our district for a minimum of 15 thousand and a maximum of 20 thousand liras... In order to save the organization of our People's House, which is an organ of the RPP, which emerged from the bosom of the Turkish nation and occupies an honorable place in Turkish history, from the weakness that is expected to fall in the future due to the lack of a building, I respectfully request you to enlighten us on the situation of our People's House in this situation and the action to be taken in this regard." Ibid.

supplying materials, finding a vehicle in the area where no roads had been built and transporting them, could not be solved in the short term, so that repairs and renovations became the main solution, but even this could not be carried out.[121] In addition to the RPP's shift of focus away from the People's Houses mentioned above, the military's use of the People's House buildings on a local level and the military's desire for complete domination over state offices, and of course Fevzi Çakmak's "prudence" in allowing investment in the Kurdish regions beyond military motives, should be taken into account, as will be seen below, although the military archives are not available (Ch. I).

On the other hand, we observe that the discourse that emerged in internal state reports in the 1930s that "Kurds lived under earthen roofs while immigrants lived in more modern buildings" evolved into the acceptance of the use of locally built earthen roofs in People's Rooms after they were renovated. It would be incomplete to say that this phenomenon is only related to the view, which became noticeable in the RPP in the 1940s, that "the important thing in People's Houses is the work, not the building, and local architecture is acceptable". Indeed, work was seen as almost non-existent and it was deemed sufficient for the state and the People's House, which did not prioritize socio-economic and cultural investments as in the case of Siirt, where military control was prioritized. Its ties with the state were very weak, such as the situation in Hakkâri, so that to find an adequate roof over its head or even a piece of property, if any, to show its existence became the exception rather than the rule.

121 In the case of Varto, the head of the People's House wrote in detail that the land, the contractor who built the government mansion, and the plan were ready, that materials would be provided cheaply, and stated that all that was needed was the budget, but his assurance that the conditions for the construction of the aforementioned building had been met was not enough. “Muş Varto’daki Parti ve Halkevlerine ait gayrimenkuller”, 490.01/1768.1173.1, 1950.

§ 3.3 The State Property, Whose Property Is It? Confiscation and Occupation in People's House Buildings

3.3.1 *Confiscated Churches and Mosques Versus People's Houses*

In the phase when the People's Houses were symbolized vis-à-vis mosques as temples and places of worship[122] as seen in many other places in the country, a common pattern is that most of the People's Houses in the Eastern/Kurdish provinces, where they were located, were converted from confiscated church buildings and mosques, which had the status of "abandoned properties" left by the Armenians who were deported and underwent genocide, into the People's Houses that were experiencing a "building shortage".[123] This phenomenon can be read as the nation-state's "ethnic cleansing" of the Armenian, Assyrian and Yezidi populations in the Kurdish provinces during the war, as part of demographic engineering, the policy of subjecting the population to ethnic homogeneity, and the complex progressive overlap of the secularist policy toward Islamic institutions and practices with the practices of space and property.[124]

The allocation of churches and other properties that had been designated as abandoned property to the People's Houses and other state institutions as private property, was a legacy of the Turkish Hearths, whose properties were transferred to the People's Houses.[125] Before the construction of a building that would later be transformed into a People's

122 This phenomenon is common in many parts of Turkey. The People's House in the Turgutlu district of Manisa is one of them. Rıfat Damla, who played a role in performances in the People's House, reports that in 1932, the Armenian church behind the old municipality building was used as a theater building. See. Ali Şentürk "Kasaba" (Anılar, Fotoğraflar, Belgeler)" *Halkevleri*, no.60, (http://www.turgutluyanki.com/halkevleri-sayi-60/13151/).

123 For the process and practices of confiscation of Armenian and Greek properties see Nevzat Onaran, *Cumhuriyet'te Ermeni ve Rum Mallarının Türkleştirilmesi (1920-1930)*: *Emval-ı Metrukenin Tasfiyesi-II,* (İstanbul: Evrensel Basım Yayın, 2013).

124 Kezer, "Desmantling the Landscapes of Islam", *Building Modern Turkey, State, Space, and Ideology in the Early Republic,* 81-112.

125 Karaer, *Türk Ocakları (1912-1931)*, 24-5.

House, called "a monumental temple", in 1924, the Ankara Turkish Hearth was housed in a building that had been acquired from an abandoned property. Subsequently, 78 buildings, including buildings in Elazığ, Maraş and Kars, were allocated to the Hearths with the approval of the GNAT.[126]

These buildings would be transferred to the jurisdiction of the People's Houses and the RPP. The People's House in Diyarbakır's Silvan district both used and rented out an old church, in addition to another building. In his 1937 inspection report, party inspector and Ankara MP Aka Gündüz stated that the two-sided Silvan People's House was a separate building with two rooms, a hall on one side and a church on the other, and that the church could be transformed into a good place with renovations. However, Gündüz referred to the fact that the administrators of the People's House acted arbitrarily by not making more necessary renovations to the building by "building an unnecessary concrete pool which could have been built in the future, from last year's budget".[127] According to Inspector Soykam in 1941, the church adjacent to the Silvan People's House was sold to the People's House for fifty liras by the special accounting office, and the People's House rented it to the Monopoly Administration (*Inhisar/Tekel İdaresi*) at 414 liras per year. The title deed of the church had not yet been obtained, because 60 liras were required for the transfer and fee tax, and the documents were still in process.[128]

126 Karaer, *Türk Ocakları* (1912-1931).

127 CCA. 490. 01/996.850.1. Gündüz continued such as: "Other than that, they spent time gossiping. The degree of work is zero." In his report, Gündüz added that none of the inventory, allocation and decision books were in order, and that the library had not been sorted out. Ibid.

128 Ibid.



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Figure 3.8 Confiscated church by Silvan People's House (at center right), the main building of the House, the administrative board of the People's House, the exterior of the district and the *people*. SOURCE: "Diyarbakır İlinde Bulunan Halkevlerinin Teftiş Raporları". CCA. 490. 01/996.850.1.

Soykam writes under the photo of the church building that was appropriated to the People's House above, "the rent is based on the land, it is possible to add a wooden floor inside and the rent can be increased one-fold", pointing out that the People's House could ask for more rent by enlarging the area. This shows that churches in Gaziantep were not

treated as historical artifacts, as they in fact were, but were occupied and altered.[129]

The People's House building in the Sarıkamış district of the Kars province, which was not among the twelve provinces but was administered by the third General Inspectorate and had a Kurdish population and various ethnic and linguistic communities, also occupied a Tsarist Church, which was built during the Russian occupation at the end of the 19th century and was also an "abandoned property". This building presented a controversy, involving a multi-layered conflict within the dynamics of multi-party life, including the use of the building for the military, as a mosque and a granary.[130] In a two-page letter sent to the RPP General Secretariat in 1948, RPP Sarıkamış District Administrative Board Chairman Hüseyin Altay wrote that the church building was used by the military before it became a People's House, then it was converted into a mosque, and after a while it was deemed unsuitable for a mosque and turned into a barley and salt warehouse.[131] In 1935-1936, the building, which had been allocated to the Special Administration (*Hususi İdare*), was repaired by the Special Administration and the municipality, its furnishings were provided by the municipality, and it was opened as a People's House.

129 Ibid. A typical example of a People's House building replaced the function of a large Catholic church building is the People's House in Gaziantep, located in Southeastern Anatolia, not within the First General Inspectorate. As mentioned earlier, this was commonplace and permitted in the regulations regarding the People's Houses for a People's House and the RPP organization to be located in the same building or outbuilding. It was reported that the church's altar was desanctified with cloths and plywood and transformed into a movie theater and a concert hall, that the U shaped body of the church was transformed into the most modern movie theater in the city despite all its shortcomings, and that the priest's apartment was allocated for the meeting hall of the People's House and the party and the committees of the People's House, but that it had to be modified from being a church. “Gaziantep bölgesi teftiş raporlarının bürolara sunulduğu”, CCA.490.01/ 654.178.1 (10.02.1945)

130 “Kars’ın Merkez ve İlçelerindeki Parti ve Halkevi Binaları, Parti Malları.” CCA.490.01/1739.1063. 1, (15.09.1950).

131 Ibid.

By 1948, it was reported that the church had been confiscated by the municipality and registered as a mosque in the title deed, and the People's House was asked to vacate the building, leaving the question of who the building belonged to unresolved.[132] When the conflict over the ownership of the building escalated and turned into a conflict between the People's House and the mosque, with DP members advocating that the building be given over as a mosque, the "center of government" intervened. With the decision of the Council of Ministers, the aforementioned building was purchased by the Foundations Administration, with a payment of 3,000 liras to the Special Administration and the Municipality, and was put back into the use of the People's House. Subsequently, a mosque was rebuilt in Sarıkamış by the Foundations Administration and a judge and chief clerk were appointed, and the case was closed. A new process began in which the building, which had a hall for 500 people and 4 rooms, was "transformed from a church with various dismantling and repairs" and two of its rooms were used as an agricultural warehouse by the State Agricultural Produce Office upon the request of the district governor. This gradually resulted in the use of the entire building as a warehouse. The Office, which occupied the building, did not pay the rent, and was again evicted by the Special Administration and the municipality, this time renting out the hall as a movie theater. Thus, the People's House was deprived of its big stage, where it had held major performances and conferences. Altay, the RPP district chairman, demanded that this valuable building, normally valued at 100,000 liras, be purchased by the party for the paltry sum of 3,000 liras and reused by the People's Houses.

The document does not provide information on whether or not the large and majestic-looking church, now used as the Kazım Karabekir Mosque, was given back to the People's Houses. However, up to this point, in this example, we see that large church buildings, which fit the ideal of a large People's House building of the period, but whose ownership was disputed and conflicted, were easily appropriated and converted into People's Houses, but the responsibility was taken away from this

132 Ibid.

institution due to its inability to acquire property and assets. In addition, the building problem of state institutions, and the local struggles that crystallized around this issue, became more complex after 1945, when the policies of the People's Houses and Party properties came up for discussion. In both macro and micro terms, Sarıkamış represents a case where the struggle between members of the state over the appropriation of the church, the mosque and the issue of secularism, and the linking of this conflict between the mosque and the People's House to the inter-party political struggle crystallized over property and space.

However, as Yüksel discovered, the use of Armenian and Assyrian churches as mosques, not only by the state, but also by Kurdish religious authorities and people who faced state obstacles, overlapped with multi-actor processes aimed at eradicating non-Muslim heritage and existence.[133] In this context, especially during World War II, mosques, including ones used as People's Houses, were also occupied by military units in order to find space for the increasing number of military personnel and equipment.[134] In Siirt, in 1950, the gendarmerie regiment was asked to vacate the mosques[135] used by them, and in 1949, the RPP

133 Sheikh Muhammad Taha objected to imparting Islamic knowledge to regular Kurds in Kurdish, citing the fact that when he moved to the village of Bulank/Muş, the locals prayed in an old church, which he subsequently razed and replaced with a large mosque. Ayşe Gül Altınay, Fethiye Çetin, *Torunlar* (İstanbul: Metis, 2009), 116, cited by Metin Yüksel, "Dengbêj, Mullah, Intelligentsia: The Survival and Revival of the Kurdish-Kurmanji Language in the Middle East, 1925-1960", 204. Another exemple of conversion of a church to a mosque is in a district of Kağızman/Kars. Ibid, 205.

134 A. Kıvanç Esen, "Tek Parti Dönemi Cami Kapatma/Satma Uygulamaları", *Tarih ve Toplum Yeni Yaklaşımlar*, no: 13, (Autumn 2011): 91-158.

135 The use of state institution buildings by military units, especially during World War II, was commonplace, and had a legal basis. However, it can be observed that they also used mosques in Siirt after the war in 1950. Upon a petition sent to the Prime Ministry by the headman of Siirt's Ulus neighborhood, requesting the evacuation of the Münkedir and Cumhuriyet mosques, the Ministry of the Interior wrote a letter to the Prime Ministry. The Ministry informed the Prime Ministry that this was resorted to due to the lack of buildings in the region, that the construction of new buildings for the troops had begun and that the mosques would be evacuated once the construction was completed. "Siirt'te 8. Seyyar Jandarma Alayı tarafından kullanılmakta olan Münkedir ve Cumhuriyet Camilerinin Tahliye edilmesi" CCA.490.01/30.01/66.414.7 (01.09.1950).

organization worked in a madrasa and masjid (small mosque/prayer room) in Gaziantep.[136] This was a complicated process, in which the RPP started to show a more moderate attitude toward religious institutions and practices in order to dismiss the DP's arguments, but the usage of mosques continued.

A room of the village mosque was reportedly allocated for the Andiri[137] People's Room in the former Armenian Turkmen village in Elazığ's Ağın district, which was later renamed Akpınar. In 1947, the head of the People's Room wrote that the mosque room resembled a cell that was not suitable for the needs and desires of the village, but that the villagers could not afford to construct a new building for the People's Room, because they had already built the village school, which was a more urgent need for the village, and for these reasons they asked for help from the Party.[138]

As seen in the case of Sarıkamış, People's Houses and People's Rooms were affiliated to the RPP, and as organizations without legal standing, they were not able to acquire property and assets. Despite the single-party rule, the process of acquiring the deeds of the building from the RPP was not a systematic one. Therefore, in the eastern provinces, where RPP offices were absent or weak for a long period of time, this process proved to be even more difficult. Since the People's House building was not in the title deeds of the institution itself, it could not be purchased on behalf of the party, since there were no RPP offices for many years, and when there were offices, it was a common situation[139] that it was "occupied" and "used for different purposes" by other state institutions

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On the use of mosque buildings during the war years, see A. Kıvanç Esen, "Tek Parti Dönemi Cami Kapatma/Satma Uygulamaları".

136 "Gaziantep parti ve Halkevi binalarının lağım ve su yollarının tamiri, poliklinik inşaatına yardım, halkevi binası olarak kullanılmak üzere bina satin alınması, partiye ait bina satışı" CCA, 490.01/ 1712.959, (29.06.1949)

137 See https://nisanyanmap.com/?y=&t=Ağın&u=1&ua=0.

138 "Elazığ ilindeki halkevleri ile bazı kurumların CHP Genel Sekreterliği'nden kitap ve piyes talebi." 490.01/ 920.583.3, (21.06.1947).

139 *Halkevleri Teşkilat, İdare ve Mesai Talimatnamesi*, 1932, 4; *CHP Halkodaları Talimatnamesi*, 2.

and actors, especially military institutions, due to economic reasons, or because it was rented.[140]

3.3.2 *Cultural Assimilation or Military Needs: People's House Occupation by the Army*

It was ironic that the buildings of the People's Houses and People's Rooms, which had the mission of assimilation with the goal of cultural security, on the grounds of the scarcity of state-owned buildings and the scarcity of suitable buildings, were occupied or co-occupied by military units in the Eastern provinces, governed by a state of emergency regime. In 1950, Şırnak People's House was occupied by the Gendarmerie Mobile Battalion, and their work was terminated.[141] In response, the RPP General Secretariat wrote to the Minister of the Interior Emin Erişirgil that the gendarmerie battalion had been occupying the Şırnak People's House for 18 months, and that despite repeated appeals by the People's House officials, the building had not been evacuated. The General Secretariat asked that "the building be returned to its premises as soon as possible so that it can perform the service expected of it, which serves the party's cultural cause".[142] On the other hand, the occupation of

140 Normally, the occupancy or sharing of the People's Houses for other uses was prohibited, although not directly, by use of the edict "The halls of the People's Houses are only open for the gatherings of national associations" in all the instructions of the People's Houses, and by the clause stating that these associations "must not be in opposition to the principles of the party or belong to other political parties". See *Halkevleri Teşkilat, İdare ve Mesai Talimatnamesi*, Ankara: 1932, s.4; *CHP Halkodaları Talimatnamesi*, Ankara: 1940, s.2. In correspondence regarding the occupation practices, the RPP General Secretariat reiterated this article, and also responded that these practices were "contrary to the goals of the People's Houses".

141 "Siirt Halkevi'nin Faaliyetleriyle İlgili Şikayet ve İstekler", CCA.490.01/843.332.1, (04.08.1950).

142 The use of state institution buildings by military units, especially during World War II, was a common practice with a legal basis. However, it was observed that they also used mosques in Siirt after the war in 1950. Upon a petition sent to the Prime Ministry by the headman of Siirt's Ulus neighborhood, requesting the evacuation of the Münkedir and Cumhuriyet mosques, the Ministry of the Interior wrote a letter to the Prime Ministry. The Ministry informed the Prime Ministry that this was due to the lack of buildings in

buildings owned by the RPP's local offices was also a common occurrence. In 1943, Kemal Güngör, the inspector of the People's Houses, reported that the "party-owned" Van People's House, the construction of which was completed in 1940, was once again occupied by military units despite the fulfillment of the construction specifications, forcing the People's House to move into a new and unsuitable building.[143]

The 1937 Tunceli Law[144] reestablished Tunceli as a city with a high number of People's Houses and People's Rooms, in parallel with its neighboring and administrative center Elazığ, where public work and construction work were given importance in the cultural sense, in order to create a "civilized and national area".[145] In particular, unlike the provinces within the First General Inspectorate, in some of the larger towns in these districts, a town was built in the way that an urban People's House should be built.[146] In Tunceli, where the occupation of People's Houses by military units was prominent, RPP Provincial

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the region, that the construction of new buildings for the troops had begun and that the mosques would be evacuated once the construction was completed. "Siirt'te 8. Seyyar Jandarma Alayı tarafından kullanılmakta olan Münkedir ve Cumhuriyet Camilerinin Tahliye edilmesi". On the use of mosque buildings during the war years, see. A. Kıvanç Esen, "Tek Parti Dönemi Cami Kapatma/Satma Uygulamaları", 124-129.

143 "Şark Vilayetlerindeki Halkevleri Hakkında Kemal Güngör ve Ahmet Adnan Saygın'ın Raporları", CCA. 490.01/1006.882.1, (09.10.1943).

144 İsmail Beşikçi, who has conducted research on the Tunceli Law, argues that the administrative arrangement made by this law was an important stage in the military campaign that resulted in mass killings in Dersim in 1937 and 1938. He also establishes a relationship between this process and the practices of Turkification and civilization that would become more and more visible. See. İsmail Beşikçi, *Tunceli Kanunu (1935) ve Dersim Jenosidi*, (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1990).

145 On this subject see *Cumurluk devrinde Elaziz, İl ve İlçelerde Kültürel Bayındırlık İşleri*, 1935; Uluğ, ibid.; *Tan'ın Tunceli ilavesi*, 1 August 1937.

146 Necmeddin Sahir Sılan, who served as Tunceli and Bingöl MP, emphasized in his report to the RPP in 1943 that some of the People's Houses and People's Rooms in the province, such as the Pertek People's Center and Ovacık People's Room, were in a "clean structure and sufficient for the needs" and that their number should be increased. Necmeddin Sahir Sılan, "Tunceli Vilâyeti Genel Durumu Üzerine İncelemeler (1943)", In *"Doğu Sorunu' Necmeddin Sahir Sılan Raporları (1939-1953)*, Pervan and Akekmekçi, ed., 340-343.

Chairman Ali Aras wrote a petition in 1948 stating that many People's Houses in almost every part of the province were occupied by police stations, that they did not have title deeds and that most of them were on the verge of collapse.[147] Accordingly, the RPP General Secretariat asked Ağrı Deputy Müştak Aktan to investigate the situation on the spot and report which People's Houses were occupied by police stations and whether the use of these buildings by police stations "constituted an absolute necessity". Aktan reported that the Hakis and İres People's Rooms in Nazımiye district had been used as gendarmerie stations for a year and a half, the Puh People's Room in the central district had been used as a police station for a year, and the Tüllek and Türüşmek People's Rooms in the central district had been "occupied" by the District Directorates (Nahiye Müdürlüğü) for two years. Aktan also stated that the buildings, especially those used as police stations, had suffered serious damage due to misuse. Aktan stated that "the occupation of the People's Rooms in this backward and deprived region caused the distress of the people who could not benefit from the activities of the People's Rooms" and demanded that "even though the military units occupied these buildings due to the lack of other buildings, this situation and especially the destruction of the buildings were harmful for the Party's considerations and goals and that measures should be taken as soon as possible".[148] Following this report, the General Secretariat submitted a list of People's Rooms occupied by police stations to the Ministry of the Interior and requested that "the possibility of evacuating the buildings should be investigated". In this example, it is noteworthy that the General Secretariat gave importance to the issue of occupation and wanted these buildings to be evacuated, but used more moderate language in the form of negotiations with the Ministry of the Interior, while Party Inspectors and local People's House administrators took a more definite stance regarding the immediate evacuation of the buildings. In this period, there may be a connection between the fear that allowing Dersim exiles from

147 "Tunceli İlindeki Halkodalarının Durumu Hakkında Tamim", CCA.490.01/8.42.65, (19.03.1949).

148 Ibid.

other provinces to return to their hometowns would create a public order problem, and the fact that these occupations were carried out.

The case of the Doğubeyazıt People's House in the province of Ağrı, which was first occupied as a military gathering place by the Division Command in 1942, and then used as a "guesthouse" in the room belonging to the municipality which it had just moved to, is an example of local administrators compromising on this issue, while the central actors took a stricter stance.[149] After being evacuated from its building, Doğubeyazıt People's House was placed in a small room in the municipality, and it was decided to allocate the hall in its old building from time to time for its general meetings. Thus, the military and the People's House started to use the same building. On the other hand, by order of the district governor, a corner of the small room was allocated to an officer who had recently arrived in the district and could not find a place to stay.[150] Party inspector Hasip Aytuna described this situation as "deplorable" for the People's Houses, describing in detail the "disorganized and filthy use of the room, which had been turned into a guest room, by the civil servants". While pointing to the district governor, who was also the head of the People's House, as the cause of the allocation of the old building to the division, he said that the division had the power to build a new military quarters building with the means at its disposal, and emphasized that this occupation was an arbitrary act of the state actors there.[151] The head of the People's House, the district governor, wrote in a letter of defense to the General Secretariat that the building allocated to the People's House had been rented to the military division the year before, after the People's House had not been active, that

149 "Ağrı İlinde Bulunan Halkevlerinin Teftiş Raporları", CCA.490.01/994.842.2, (16.02.1943).

150 Article 63 of the 1940 People's Houses Administration and Organization by-laws states that not even a single room of the People's Houses can be used for accommodation: "Great care must be taken to ensure that the People's House never becomes a mere guesthouse, even with a single room. *CHP Halkevleri İdare ve Teşkilat Talimatnamesi*, (Ankara: 1940), 15.

151 "Ağrı İlinde Bulunan Halkevlerinin Teftiş Raporları", CCA.490.01/994.842.2 (16.02.1943).

it was not possible to vacate the building since the lease agreement had not expired, and that they would try to allocate the building to the People's House again after one year.

The district governor stated that during Party Inspector Aytuna's inspection, the representative of the trade office who had come to the district was temporarily hosted at the People's House, because there was no hotel in the district. He also asks that "such shortcomings in this new organization in the district be excused".[152] The RPP General Secretariat, on the other hand, wrote to the Deputy Minister of National Defense General Ali Rıza Artunkal, Party Inspector Aytuna and Nazif Ergin, the Third General Inspector to whom Doğubeyazıt was affiliated, requesting that "the People's House, which was first occupied by the military and then turned into the district governor's guesthouse, be taken care of and made operational". In its letter to the Minister of National Defense Artunkal, the RPP General Secretariat states that the occupation of the building by the command caused the People's House's needs to be suppressed in the first place and continues as follows: "The fact that military needs are met at the expense of the People's Houses weakens the thoughts and initiatives about these institutions, which we are trying to give the value of a public school. We hope that these cultural institutions, whose existence we witness that you are closely interested in, will also be patronized by your Commanders in the places where they are located.".[153]

In his letter to the Head of the People's House, he states that while they were trying to end this occupation, they were "saddened to learn that it was rented out by the People's House itself".[154] Party Inspector Aytuna wrote a separate letter to the Deputy Ministry of Internal Affairs, stating that there were widespread complaints from local actors about

152 Ibid.

153 Ibid.

154 Ibid. In Article 59 of the 1940 People's Houses Administration and Organization by-laws, it was written more explicitly than in previous years' instructions that Public Houses could not be rented out. *CHP Halkevleri İdare ve Teşkilat Talimatnamesi*, 1940, 14.

the district governor, whom he held responsible for this situation, and that the people of the district and civil servants called the district governor a "puppet" of the division commander, and that all administrative affairs in the district were in fact carried out by this general.[155]

This incident points to a conflict in the relationship between the military and the local authority that shows the military's general power in the region, as can be seen in the example of the People's House building, as well as the district governor's disregard of the People's House by placing it under the jurisdiction of the RPP General Secretariat. It is also important in terms of showing how it was perceived by the officers and the "people of the district", whose identity was not given in detail, and how this was reflected by the Party Inspector.[156] The fact that the events were attributed to the special relationship between the general and the district governor, rather than between institutions, and that the subordination of the district governor to the division commander due to his "obscure" personality was a view shared by both local and central actors is an example of the fact that the events were perceived and conveyed as originating from various people and individuals, beyond the power and power relations between institutions. Nevertheless, in these provinces, where intense security practices were observed and as can be seen in the documents, the institutional actors related to security were almost "privileged", the criticism of the military institutional practices by the civil servants and the Party Inspector, and the complaints of local

155 Ibid.

156 In 1940, Burhan Teker, the deputy general inspector, disapproved of the Ağrı Governorate's proposal to appoint Hüseyin Gökçe, a retired provincial cavalry regiment commander, as the head of the Ağrı People's House. Teker states that it would be less beneficial for the People's House in Ağrı, where he had previously served as governor, to be administered by such an autocratic authority and that this duty should be entrusted to the governor. This can be considered as an example of state actors envisioning a more "civilian" administration at the People's House in order to "warm the people to the state" and trying to draw a boundary with the military administration that started to become visible in the 1940s. "Ağrı ili kaza ve nahiyelerindeki halkevleri başkanlarına mahsus sicil cetvelleri". CCA. 490.01/932.624.1 (20.12.1950).

state actors and other bodies about the erosion of the district governor's authority in favor of the division commander, reveal that the conflicts between state institutions extended to the members of the military, and were also realized through interaction with the social sphere.

In these occupations, which are observed to have been carried out due to the even more extraordinary conditions of the war years, the military acted with the authority to confiscate all the buildings in this process in which the center stepped in, regarding the People's Houses being seen as the first place to occupy. In the meantime, the district governor, in cooperation with the military, confiscated the buildings and used them as guesthouses. The prioritization of these needs for the existence of the People's House can be seen as related to the fact that the assimilation and visibility purpose of the People's House, which was already not very viable, was found to be dysfunctional.

3.3.3 *State Occupation of People's Houses: Conversion into Warehouses, Civil Servants' Houses and Schools*

There are many cases such as the occupation of the Bulanık People's House by the Courthouse, which led to the suspension of the activities of the People's House, even temporarily, as in Elazığ, where the People's Rooms, which were located in school buildings in the villages, were actually closed down by being removed from usage in the building.[157] In addition, during the Second World War, it was determined that the state saw the People's House buildings as the first place to be used as granaries, and the People's Houses in Muş emerged as representative in this respect. Party Inspector Feyzi Kalfagil reports that, in 1944, the

157 During his inspection of the People's Room in the village of Kovancılar in 1942, Soykam, the Elazığ Regional Inspector, states that he first settled in a room in the school building used as the People's Room, but later this room was joined to the school by a door being opened, and that although the People's Room was said to be active, it had actually disappeared as the chairs were sent to the village headman's house and the stove was removed. Although it was said that the villagers would contribute to the construction of a new People's Room building, Soykam states that without the contribution of the 4th General Inspectorate and the center, this "'didn't seem likely'" to happen. Ibid.

performance hall of the Bulanık district People's House was filled with wheat belonging to the Directorate of Grain Board and closed down.[158] Kalfagil said that he "regretted" that the provincial governor did not do so, even though the Muş Governor's Office had said that the People's House would be evacuated, and that the rent for the building was not paid to the People's House.[159] In 1942, the Malazgirt People's Room was also used as a 350-batch wheat warehouse in its two existing rooms.[160] Although Party Inspector Aytuna requested that the building, which already had an old earthen roof with two rooms and a living room, be vacated as soon as possible; this request was not accepted in the short term by "the district governor with corrupt and senseless actions".[161] The People's House in the Tutak district of Ağrı is an example of successive occupations and displacement, first by the municipality and then by the primary school, and then by being evicted from the place where it was moved to, part of it being used as a warehouse in the second place to which it was moved.[162] Aytuna complained that the People's House, which was opened in 1939 and was supposed to develop, had already become "very backward" since its establishment, and that it had not even had an independent room for a year.[163] On the other hand, the events

158 "Muş İlinde Bulunan Halkevlerinin Teftiş Raporları", CCA.490.01/1001.868.1 (1947).

159 Kalfagil wrote the following on this subject: "The two-story Bulanık People's House consists of a room and two 'coffee stoves' on the right side of a corridor leading to the upper floor, a reading room on the left, and a performance hall on the lower floor. Since October 1943, this hall of the house has been filled with wheat belonging to the grain board and closed, the matter was submitted to your office, the wheat was ordered to be removed in response, and although the Muş province wrote to your office that "it has started to be evacuated" (annex: 1), I saw with regret that about 15-20 tons of wheat remained in its place as it was". Ibid.

160 Ibid.

161 Ibid.

162 "Ağrı İlinde Bulunan Halkevlerinin Teftiş Raporları", CCA.490.01/994.842.2 (16.02.1943).

163 Ibid. In the same report, it is stated that the Eleşkirt People's House used the hall of a building with 4 rooms and a hall together with the municipality and the district governor's office, and that when the new government building was built, these two institutions said that they would move out and leave all of their old buildings to the

related to the Tutak People's House continued. One year later, in a petition dated April 3, 1943, Cevat Şahin, the Chief Clerk of the Court, reported that the room belonging to the People's House in the municipality was closed by the district governor Sadi Süer, and that the radio, books and other materials were all distributed in various places.[164] This case, too, reflects the complex interactions at the daily and local level, woven with layered conflicts over which institution would conduct the ceremonies in which there were complaints against the former head of the People's House, who made no objections to the district governor's actions because he feared his authority, and the order of the General Inspectorate was invalidated. The issue of the "misuse" of the People's Room in the Kurtalan district of Siirt, which was registered in the deeds of the RPP office, also reflects an area of conflict arising from the fact that the heads of the People's Room were DP members with the advent of the multi-party system.[165]

Due to the shortage of hotels and housing for civil servants, which was widespread throughout the country but more intense in the Eastern provinces, the People's Houses were also used for both temporary and permanent accommodation. In the People's House regulations, state administrators were encouraged to use the People's Houses for work and lodging, during both inspection trips and visits.[166] The administrator in

People's House. One room of the Ağrı People's House building was rented out to the Turkish Aviation Association. The General Secretariat directed that this room be vacated and allocated to the needs of the "House" since it was causing a shortage of space for the People's House.

164 Ibid.

165 In 1950, the building was 'unnecessarily' given to the use of a sewing course by the head of the People's House, who was the district's director of public records. Party inspector Aytuna claims that T. Atakav, the head of the Halkevi and a civil servant, was not a "party member" but an opponent of the "party" and prevented the evacuation of the People's Room and thus prevented it from functioning. “Siirt Halkevi Binasının Tadil ve Tamiratı”. CCA.490.01/1781.1219, (08.06.1951).

166 Article 63 of the 1940 Halkevleri İdare ve Teşkilat Talimatnamesi states that "Those who come to engage in the affairs of the C.H.P. and the People's Houses ex officio may sleep in a room of the People's Houses". *CHP Halkevleri İdare ve Teşkilat Talimatnamesi* 1940, 15.

question could work and stay in the "private residence" or guest house that could be seen in the provincial People's Houses.[167] In small People's Houses, the use of a suitable room was allowed during actual processes. People's Houses were often the first place which state and RPP officials, especially from Ankara, would visit. The People's Houses functioned as a kind of provincial home of the state, which held a ceremonial reception in its building and garden to welcome the person or persons.[168] This was followed by a banquet at the People's House, where both the local bureaucracy and the public came together, and meetings where the wishes and complaints of the public could be heard. As for the People's Houses in the East, except for the newly constructed buildings in the big provinces, there was not much room in the form of a guesthouse in the People's Houses and People's Rooms. RPP Secretary General Mahmut Şevket Esendal's first visit was usually to the People's Houses, where he complained about the welcome, accommodation and food, pointing to the lack of an ideal "state house".[169]

167 Provincial People's Houses might have a "private residence" (guesthouse) consisting of a hall, room and bathroom reserved for guests. Among the People's Houses in the East, those in large provinces such as Elazığ and Diyarbakır also had a guest house. See Gürallar Yeşilkaya, *Halkevleri, İdeoloji ve Mimarlık*, 162.

168 "CHP Genel Sekreteri Memduh Şevket Esendal'ın Doğu İllerine Yaptığı Gezinin Raporu." CCA.490.01/571.2274.1, (14.06.1945).

169 Esendal's first stop on his Eastern tour in 1942, which included Elazığ, Tunceli, Muş, Bitlis, Bingöl, Siirt, Diyarbakır, Mardin, Urfa, Gaziantep, Maraş and Malatya, was the People's Houses. There he was welcomed by the predominantly local bureaucracy and a dinner was given in his honor. The People's Houses also intended for meetings with the public. However, he says that he did not meet anyone from the public in Bingöl and that he himself 'could not imagine anyone from the public being present in such a small place and therefore did not invite anyone', and he also continuously refers to the fact that a significant part of the people of the region did not speak Turkish and therefore could not communicate in his report. Throughout his trip, Esendal complained that he had to stay in the houses of the local administrators because there were no rooms to stay in the People's Houses he visited, let alone the People's Rooms, and no hotels in the city apart from in Urfa, where he could stay in return for money, and he said, "You are eating the food of the men you will ask to be replaced tomorrow and the next day". Esendal emphasized that this situation prevented the inspectors from conducting objective and healthy inspections, and said that because of the difficulty of

It became a common practice for civil servants to use one room, or even if it was only one room, the whole room or a corner of the room, for long-term accommodation, in violation of the rules of the People's Houses and People's Rooms in the East, on the grounds that the civil servants' houses were not sufficient, and that there were no suitable houses or hotels to rent. Enver Ferah, Şırnak's government physician, also wrote a complaint to the General Secretariat about a civil servant who was allowed to move into the People's House because he could not find a house in the district, but was forced to evacuate by the head of the People's House after a while. Ferah states that until he moved into the People's House, no newspapers or magazines were allowed in the building, and that he had turned the People's House, which had "only been used for gambling", into the most beautiful People's House in the Siirt district, thus increasing the interest of the public.[170] According to the petition, Ferah was virtually thrown out of the House because "the walnut armchairs, chairs and other furniture of the House were broken, some of them were burned and the rest were used in the municipality's clubhouse, and he hinted to the head of the People's House, who was the district Registrar, that this was wrong". However, the real reason was that the head of the People's House was uncomfortable with his activities. Ferah asks the RPP General Secretariat to allow him to continue his activities by staying at the People's House, in which he "almost acted as a guard since it was far from the city", and he also asked for the situation to be investigated on the spot by headquarters. The General Secretariat, on the other hand, wrote to the Şırnak People's House, stating that turning the People's Houses into guesthouses, even temporarily, was "contrary to the regulations" and that they were "pleased" with the evacuation decision. He asked the People's House to collect the fixtures

transportation, they sometimes traveled on mule-back to places where they had no place to stay, so they finished their work as soon as possible and left. He also said that, similar to Iran and Afghanistan, he did not approve of the welcoming ceremonies and banquets for state officials. CCA.490.01/571.2274.1, (14.06.1945).

170 "Siirt İlinde Bulunan Halkevlerinin Teftiş Raporları", CCA, 490.01/1002.871.2, (04.11.1945).

"if they were found here and there and to put the People's House on the path of service expected of it".[171]

In this example, with the misuse of the buildings and belongings of the People's Houses, it can once again be clearly observed that the space of the People's Houses was a crystallized space that affected and was affected by the conflicts between local state actors. Furthermore, the process of the General Secretariat spatially supervising a local state institution could be observed by reminders of the functioning, order and structure of the People's Houses, praising the "right work" done, directing the "wrong work" to be corrected, and sending the message that it would monitor developments. This was a process of regulating the functioning of both the People's Houses and other institutions, monitoring and controlling both the practices of civil servants involving power conflicts and the local political, social and cultural sphere. The administrators and users of the People's Houses, in this case, had perceptions of the space and its belongings that conflicted with each other and with the rules and regulations of the general secretariat, and committed various violations and produced responses such as "reversing" them. On the other hand, they tried to negotiate the whole process under the arbitration and supervision of the center, as the government physician Ferah did.

The People's Room in Beşiri, a subprovince of Siirt, was also identified as a representative example of use for accommodation and tea houses. Party Inspector Güngör wrote that the Beşiri People's Room, which he inspected in 1943, had turned into a "disheveled and dirty corner of an inn" that accepted guests for money, and that its garden looked like a tea house where passers-by drank tea.[172] In such an environment, it was also

171 Ibid.

172 "Unfortunately, I found the Beşiri Public Room, which is a busy district center on the Diyarbakır-Bitlis road, in a very shabby condition. The Room building, which did not even have a signboard, was like a coffee house when we saw it, and some nights it was like a corner of an inn that even accepted guests for a fee. Books and notebooks were negligently left in one part of the building and the books in a broken cabinet were covered in dust and dirt. In the main hall part of the building, there was nothing but two or three local cots called thrones. Around the pool in front of the building, passers-by

impossible to read official newspapers and magazines and engage in "state conversations" with "villagers, most of whom did not speak Turkish anyway", which was recommended as a minimum requirement for activities in People's Rooms.[173] In Beşiri, where there were few civil servants other than soldiers, it was suggested that the townspeople reproduced the space of the People's Room according to their own needs and perceptions, and that by violating the rules of the People's House, they were in fact somehow constructing a strategy of *appropriation of the subaltern subjectivity* outside the elite. On the other hand, it is clear that the difficulty of transportation to rural areas and the widespread use of Kurdish as the language of communication made it difficult for state and Party administrators to control. Besides, a communication process on this scale enabled the establishment of an official information network about this People's Room and the town, making the representation of the modern state felt, reminding of the rules of spatiality and, in fact, making it readable and observable in terms of modern political rationality. Moreover, it should also be seen as a finding that while this new spatiality was being performed, in the process of this encounter with the People's House spatiality, they transformed the determined framework and created a modern way of being according to their own spatial needs and memories. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the short and long-term experiences, effects and interactions of the state-society encounter in this process, in the spatial context, were in no way imaginary, but existed precisely in this way.

were sitting and drinking tea. Since the head of the Room and most of the members of the administrative committee were in the villages for office work, we found a registrar and a fellow officer from the administrative committee of the Room and talked to them about the improvement of the situation and contacted the district governor and other intellectuals and asked them to improve this situation with their close attention". "Şark Vilayetlerindeki Halkevleri Hakkında Kemal Güngör ve Ahmet Adnan Saygın'ın Raporları." CCA. 490.01/1006.882.1, (09.10.1943).

173 Ibid.

3.3.4 *People's House Fixtures: Missing, Dilapidated, Unshared*

Another fundamental issue in the People's Houses in the Eastern/Kurdish provinces, which was also seen in other provinces but was said to have reached its peak in the former, was the lack of fixtures, technical equipment and tools, as mentioned above in many examples. This was the case even in the central province of Diyarbakır. In a letter, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu writes that in the Diyarbakır People's House he visited in the 1940s, " there was not a soul around", that he could not even find paper, pens or envelopes to write letters, and that the books and newspapers did not seem to have been touched.[174]

First of all, the petitions, which constituted a significant number of archival documents, frequently stated that "no activities could be carried out" at the People's House and People's Room due to the lack of furniture. These petitions included requests for furniture and technical equipment such as typewriters, radios, and film projectors, as well as in-kind and in-cash requests for items such as chairs, tables, bookcases, and carpets, which were "difficult to procure on site". The People's Houses were required to use modern and western style furnishings in their interiors, but the discourse of compliance with "certain conditions" did not seem to work in favor of the use of locally used furnishings. Especially in places where there was no wood, and carpentry was not available, the inability to acquire these items created a problem. In this context, objects as the inanimate actors of the state and the modernization project at the local level, the practices related to them, and their multifaceted effects turned into a field of cultural, social, and political interactions, negotiation, power and capital struggles.

174 "I'm writing these lines to you in a bare room of the People's House, in which there is no soul around. I bought this lined paper and the envelope which is black inside from the grocery store downstairs a little while ago. In this cultural center, it is not even possible to find pens and paper, let alone books. In the center of the large room I mentioned, there is a large table on which a number of old newspapers and magazines from Istanbul and Ankara are sitting, untouched, wearing out and fading by themselves. May God grant us all patience and peace, amen." Yakup Kadir Karaosmanoğlu, (*Ankara*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994), 92.

The belongings were also the subject of a very visible struggle for distribution, which was compounded by power struggles between state officials. Because, especially in the last years of the People's Houses, there were many complaints and grievances about the state and party administrators illegally confiscating the fixtures, destroying, losing and not keeping proper records. After 1945, when the existence of the People's Houses under the RPP began to be discussed, and the number of People's Houses reached hundreds, and the number of People's Rooms reached 4,000, the issue of the property of the unincorporated People's Houses became more complicated and, as can be said for other issues, this already complicated issue became more visible with the increase in inspections.

In this period, there were more complaints about pro-Democrat Party local administrators interfering with the buildings and belongings of the People's Houses, while the attitudes of RPP provincial presidents and local administrators were also the subject of complaints. In 1947, in Elazığ, where more support and interest in state practices were reflected, the head of the People's House reported that the RPP Elazığ Provincial Chairman had given the glass covering from the large tables in the People's House to the courthouse without permission.[175] There was a power struggle between the head of the People's House and the RPP Provincial Chairman over who would run the People's House, and the party chairman showed that he did not recognize the authority of the head of the People's House. While the permission of the General Secretariat should have been obtained, this was not done, and the RPP provincial chairman himself overruled the authority of the RPP General Secretariat by giving the People's House fixtures to another state institution. This example illustrates the placement of fixtures and fittings, which were an important part of the People's House spatiality, by local institutional actors through a strategy of "appropriation", bypassing the head of the People's House and party headquarters, and exemplifying the conflict between the RPP and the local members of the People's House for power and capital, in a case where fixtures played a role.

175 "Elazığ Halkevi'nin Faaliyetleri", CCA.490.01/ 832.287.2. (14.01.1941).

The People's Houses in Tunceli, and especially the People's Rooms in the villages were observed to have a shortage of furniture and fittings such as tables, chairs, bookcases and covers. In the Hozat district People's House, it was found that the furniture and fixtures were missing. The Party Inspector reported that 16 hornbeam wood chairs and 3 walnut chairs were missing, and that 34 liras 30 kurus, the cost of these chairs, should be collected from Avni Duru, the district governor of the period, who was deemed responsible for this. Besides, the radio of this People's House had disappeared, and upon the complaint of the officials, it was found that the same district governor had purloined the radio, as was the case in many other places. In a petition written in 1947, H. Özyol, the head of the People's Room in the Rabat village of Pülümür, stated that a "room" had been built with the help of the villagers, but that the provision of materials such as tables, chairs and stoves was "beyond the means of the villagers, who were already suffering and miserable themselves". He asked for 250 liras for these needs.[176] The General Secretariat, on the other hand, sent 100 liras of aid in October, but, as they repeatedly wrote in their reply, they requested that "the needs of the People's Houses and People's Rooms, which numbered nearly 5,000, be met in the local communities."[177]

In Tunceli Pülümür, one of the two provinces that did not have a RPP office until 1944, along with Bingöl's Kiğı district, it was complained that the RPP office in Tunceli held back 500 liras from the People's House, and the RPP district chairman wrote in 1949 that the People's House was closed in the winter because firewood could not even be bought, among many other needs, and that it needed help from the center.[178] In his petition written in 1948, H. Mutlu, the chairman of the People's Room in Göbürge village in Pülümür, stated that the People's Room, which he had been running in poverty for years "with the contribution of himself and the villagers", did not have a chair, a table, a lighting device or even a

176 "Tunceli'deki Halkevleri ve Halkodaları'nın Genel İhtiyaçlarına Yardım Olarak Gönderilen Tahsisat", CCA.490.01/1530.226.1 (28.03.1951).

177 Ibid.

178 Ibid.

building worthy of a People's Room. The People's Room had only a name, and as such, it did not exist.[179]

As in other cases, this petition more directly demonstrates that the internal equipment of the People's Houses and People's Rooms, which were required to be in line with modern conditions, was as important as the financial resources required for the activities and participation in the activities. On the one hand, the "confiscation" of the belongings is a case that questions the control and power of the party-state over the People's Houses and local party and state institutions, while on the other hand, it reflects the local conflicts arising from the local authorities' confiscation of the belongings of the People's Houses, and the division of these belongings among the civil servants, bending the intra-state sphere of power to themselves, as they considered state property "owned by the state". On the other hand, the material and symbolic effects of ownership of such modern objects spread through the struggle for sharing. When we think in line with Bruno Latour's analysis that not only people but also objects and nature are actors in the social network, the "object-like" entities such as buildings, construction materials, furnishings, furniture, technological devices, music and sports equipment, as well as the nature and geography that affect buildings and objects, take on different meanings.[180] In the case of the People's Houses, we can say that in their role as the "local representatives" of the state and modernization, they took a role in the reproduction of the state and its east, as effective entities in a field of conflict and distribution within local dynamics.

The organization of fixtures, books and materials, as well as the cleanliness and maintenance of the buildings in general, became one of the most important themes of administrative regulations, inspection reports and other local reports and correspondence regarding the People's Houses. In the absence of the means to construct a building, it was an important criterion that the building converted into a People's House, even if it was old, should be "clean, well-maintained and adequate

179 Ibid.

180 Bruno Latour, *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

to the needs". Rather than an orderly building with expensive installations and interior furnishings, it was stated that "a beautifully plastered and whitewashed People's House built of stone in a small village can sometimes be more advanced in terms of cleanliness than the People's Houses in big cities and towns", thus emphasizing cleanliness over appearance, which is in line with the view of the 1940s when contents, not form, was more important in the People's Houses.

In fact, it can be said that the People's Houses were positioned by the Republican rulers as a symbol of modern spatial maintenance, cleanliness, and hygiene. With the increase in the number of People's Rooms, the General Secretariat of the RPP published a *Manual for the Cleaning and Maintenance of People's Houses and People's Rooms* in 1944.[181] The Manual emphasized that since "cleanliness is a prerequisite of civilized life and the beginning of everything" and "the Turkish nation has been a clean nation throughout its history", People's Houses and People's Rooms should "set an example of cleanliness and care with their clean, refreshing and pleasing appearance and condition".[182] It described in great detail how and with what methods and cleaning products cleaning and maintenance should be carried out on a daily, weekly, monthly and yearly basis.[183]

181 *CHP Halkevleri ve Halkodaları Temizlik ve Bakım Kılavuzu* (Ankara: 1944), 5.

182 Ibid., 1-16.

183 “Daily, weekly, seasonal and yearly under the title "Where Cleaning Starts and Goes" “cleaning and disinfecting, polishing, whitewashing, including any repairs and maintenance of the following three sections. It is requested to be done in detail in such a way: 1) Building, walls, doors, windows, floors, footways, washbasins, baths and showers; 2) Furniture, carpets, mirrors, wicker furniture, metal objects, mats, runner carpets, waste paper baskets, trash bins; 3) Working tools for the committees, piano and various musical instruments, blackboard, sewing machines, accessories and decor items, books, museum objects." Ibid., 7. "The interior and exterior whitewashing of buildings should never be neglected as they deteriorate and as the need arises. Lime, which is ubiquitous and cheap, is a convenient and effective cleaning agent that we can always make use of easily...There are ways to make use of things like kaolin, vim, limestone, soda, even clay, ash, sand, quicklime in places where soap is not available." Ibid., 5-6.

In this study, it was found that especially in the Party Inspectorate reports, People's Houses and especially People's Rooms in the East, especially in provinces without RPP offices, were described as "inns," "shabby," "unkempt and disorganized," "poorly maintained," "dirty and filthy," and "covered in dust and dirt," which became even more visible when they were used "for other purposes." This was even written about the Diyarbakır People's House. It also goes hand in hand with the general discourse with orientalist implications, which explicitly or implicitly states that Kurds live in unsanitary and uncivilized conditions under earthen roofs, without mentioning whether they have the necessary water or materials, and that this is due to their given backwardness.[184] The People's House and Room administrators were also criticized for not paying attention to the cleanliness, maintenance and hygiene of their buildings, which was a necessity of modern and advanced life, and even those in the provinces were "not attentive". Siirt People's Houses were criticized in detail in this regard.[185] Based on the information provided by Aytuna, the RPP General Secretariat wrote to the Siirt People's House warning that the building of the People's House and all its fixtures and

184 "Cizre was dirty, the shops were like caves" *Mardin Halkevi Broşürü*, (C.H.P. Mardin Halkevi Yayınlarından, 1938).

185 After his inspection in 1942, Hasip Aytuna summarizes his "criticisms" under the following headings: "The Siirt People's House building was not kept sufficiently clean; although the way the building was constructed may have played a role in this, the general cleanliness of the building was not given as much attention as it should have been; the locks of the main doors, which had been broken since last year, were still not repaired, and at night these doors were closed by pushing chairs up against them; some household items were not kept well; sports clothes were kept dirty and scattered; the toilet room was smelly and cleanliness was not taken care of; It was observed that the film projection room was covered in dust and dirt; the motor boiler was cracked by leaving water in it in winter; the balls of the ping-pong table, whose legs were broken, were not replaced with new ones; no care was given to the procurement of some items and furnishings necessary for the People's House; the music equipment of the marching band and musical instruments such as violins and mandolins were not well kept; the grand piano had been left open for many years and had deteriorated to the point of being out of tune by being left in the hands of people coming and going. " "Siirt İlinde Bulunan Halkevlerinin Teftiş Raporları", CCA.490.01/1002.871.2

musical instruments should be kept clean and well maintained, and that they should be "handled with utmost care".[186] The fact that the members and users of the People's House did not follow the rules of cleaning, maintenance, and repair of the building and belongings can be read as a local attitude that had material reasons such as indifference, ignorance, and non-compliance with the regulations of the state, and insufficient help from the center in this regard, as well as being related to everyday habituses. The aforementioned attitudes toward both buildings and objects seem to be related to the fact that after 1945, the party-state began to cease to be representative, and the formation of the opposition party and the authority of the RPP began to break down due to global influences.

§ 3.4 Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I focused on how People's Houses's buildings, modern architectural symbols of the Republic, existed in the East as a field of discourse and practice parallel to macro and micro power relations on the local-central axis, based on the first-hand data. I addressed the question of why the state wanted to establish the "ideal architecture" of Halkevleri for the representation and representation of the East and the Kurdish population, and how this was performed and transformed in actual processes. I interpreted the forms of participation and interpretation of local state actors and other "ordinary" spatial actors. I analyzed the spaces of interaction, intervention, power and power struggle, negotiation and resistance in the spaces encountered. The modern and national architecture reproduce visibility, surveillance, controlling and legitimated architectural effects of the state with the aim of the production of a Republican East. Meanwhile, in the practice of how these effects existed and reproduced in the encountering process is also defines the state formation. In the exercising process containing always lacks and failure of the planning, building, and owning of the Halkevi's

186 Ibid.

buildings and the furniture of them were always problematic. They reflect both the local conflict and accommodation axis of state officers and the ordinary people in the local-center axis. For that reason, the process of the architecture and building or appropriating another building in the local as old churches produce always both spatial state effects and experience of the state reformed and reproduced in daily encountering process containing asymmetric interpretation of power and their responses.

In the architecture and construction of the Houses and Rooms, I have shown that even ideal practices contain failures and shortcomings, but that these realities are always productive and generate new beginnings, solutions and strategies to combat failures. In this way, I have argued that the central and local state tries to concentrate its power directly or indirectly in the East, thus reproducing and provincialize the state in the Kurdish regions. On the other hand, the discourse of the Kurdish East as inherently deficient is always accompanied by the issue of failures in the construction of Halkevi spaces. At the same time, intra-state competition and conflict over space ultimately legitimizes the discourse of strong state rule and control. Local actors, including civil servants, are always playing with the limits of state power and authority and trying to appropriate them. Therefore, failures due to infrastructural problems, conflicts between Halkevleri actors and local actors reflect how the state is constructed through complex phenomena, and re-produce the sophisticated and nonhomogenious existence and non-autonomous state from space, society and culture in the Kurdish East.

4

Everyday Re-Production of the *Halkevi* as a Public and Socialization Space in the Kurdish East: Regulation, Practice and Responses

The single-party state envisioned the People's Houses as an acceptable and absolute public space for adults only, as an alternative to associations that were closed down or had to dissolve themselves, as well as traditional spaces. In this framework, it would not be wrong to say that the People's Houses aimed to shape and control the individual's daily social and cultural life on a modern and national axis, from the rules of society and etiquette to the limits of activities and ways of spending time, by making centralized arrangements that would shape the conditions and dynamics. With these, it can be said that while it was envisaged to create social and cultural habituses deemed acceptable in the People's House, an alternative and "acceptable" public "home" or spatiality was envisioned that excluded all daily gathering and socialization spaces such as mosques, coffee houses, village rooms, agha rooms and dîwan.

In this context, the existential goals of the People's Houses were set as "*socialization under the shadow of the state*" through the "gathering of

local officials, intellectuals and the public"[1] at public gatherings such as official ceremonies, fairs, conferences, balls, performances (theater), cinemas and concerts.[2] In line with Kemalist populism, the People's House space was defined as "a place of gathering and work open to all citizens, registered or unregistered with the RPP, without discrimination".[3] At the People's House meetings, it was stated that no special seats would be reserved for anyone, referring to the fact that no privileges would be granted to anyone, but special seats were reserved for central and local state administrators, who were the distinguished members of the regime.[4] Thus, in fact, it was emphasized that no one was

1 Hasan Rıza Soyak, a bureaucrat and politician who was also the Secretary of the Presidency at the time, states the following in his memoirs: "... People's Houses will be run by devoted and idealistic intellectuals, old and young. They were to be places where all citizens with their girls, women and men would work and have fun together, hand in hand, in a sincere atmosphere, and where the new and advanced life of Turkish society would take root and mature. At the same time, the youth would be saved from coffee houses, cafés and idleness." Hasan Rıza Soyak, *Atatürk'ten Hatıralar,* (İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2005), 457-458.

2 In 1945, with an amendment to the Administrative and Organizational Regulations of the People's Houses, due to budgetary constraints, all branches were allowed to organize paid bazaars, balls, excursions, concerts, performances and sports shows, and to show films. It was allowed to charge money to students attending certain courses, to distribute magazines and books published by the People's Houses free of charge, to sell them for money other than the portion to be determined, and to rent out the halls of the People's Houses for certain days to show movies. CHP, 1*946 yılında Halkevleri ve Halkodaları,* (Ankara: 1947), 4.

3 *Halkevleri Teşkilat, İdare ve Mesai Talimatnamesi*, 1932, 5. In 1940, the People's Houses were more explicitly prioritized for civil servants and intellectuals, stating that they were "the common property and the means for the common upbringing of all civil servants and the intellectual class of the country, of all elements that want to progress". *CHP Halkevleri İdare ve Teşkilat Talimatnamesi,* 1940, 1. Thus, with a spatial arrangement in line with the contradictions within Kemalist populism, the People's Houses were positioned as a public space that was not based on a hierarchy of class, social status, education, knowledge, and skills, although it was an institution led by local intellectuals, artists, civil servants and professionals.

4 *CHP Halkevleri Öğreneği,* 1935, 7. According to the rule, "Only as a sign of respect for the great national president Atatürk and the authority of the state, seats shall be prepared for the president of the Republic, the president of the Parliament, the prime minister,

privileged under the umbrella of the People's Houses except for these people and the distinguished ones whose limits of worthiness varied.[5] Because the People's Houses are "People's Houses" that should encourage all kinds of participation of "citizens who can grow up to make the nation into a mass", including time spent at home.[6]

According to Tanyeli, who says that the Early Republic envisioned the individual who would become a member of the nation in the process of modernization, publicity and the relationship with the new city, primarily the station, the park and the People's House, the latter, as a new public space for adults, which especially cared about its active use by young people and women, loosened the traditional order of human relations by defining it as open to both genders and not creating age seniority among adults.[7] In addition, the voluntary nature of attending and taking part in its activities made the People's House the first comprehensive application of modernity in Turkey, which understood

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and, where they have duties, for the provincial governor, district governor, sub-district governor and the highest commander of the district. After these principles are strictly adhered to, the boards of directors of the People's Houses have the right to establish procedures for regulating the entrance to and exit from the meetings and the seating in the hall according to their location, and to ensure peace and order". Ibid., 7-8.

5 Ibid., 7.

6 According to the communiqué dated February 29, 1932 sent from the RPP's General Secretariat to the organizations of the political parties, "Citizens (Scholars, Editors, Teachers, Civil Servants, Doctors, Lawyers, Artists, Members of the Fine Arts Fraternity, Men of Science, Sportsmen, Young Athletes, those who know the state of the country and its needs, and all other elements of intellectuals...and so on) who will increase and strengthen the work of the People's Houses should be encouraged with appropriate and gentle explanations in terms of the service that the People's Houses will render to the country". He then added, "The following point should not be misunderstood: All citizens, regardless of their education and level of knowledge, are equally valuable sons and daughters of the country in the eyes of the People's Houses. The People's Houses should try to gather them all under its roof. The People's House is truly "the house of the people". *Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası Kâtibiumumiliğinin Fırka Teşkilatına Umumî Tebligatından Halkevlerini Alâkadar eden Kısım, Ağustos 1931'den Kânunuevvel 1932 nihayetine kadar,* (Ankara: Hakimiyet-i Milliye Matbaası, 1933), 22.

7 Uğur Tanyeli, "Mekânlar, Projeler, Anlamları", in, *Üç Kuşak Cumhuriyet,* ed. Uğur Tanyeli, (İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1998), 102.

public space as a neutral stage designed for the autonomous actions of individuals.[8] However, with the loosening of age and gender criteria for adults and voluntary participation, it can be seen that this approach was not in line with all the facts. In this new and hegemonic public space, there was a phenomenon of the inclusion of subjects and qualities that were deemed acceptable according to the new order and discipline, shaped by place, context, and actors. It seems closer to historical facts to say that there were prohibited or invisibilized qualities of individuals or groups that were not considered acceptable and were excluded in both legal and actual processes, through intersections with the social and cultural sphere. They were the subject of conflict, struggle and negotiation, and boundaries were constantly produced in this regard. For example, although the Republic and Kemalism emphasized the importance of modern public visibility, the fact that women, who were burdened with the main responsibility for housework and childcare, were forbidden to bring their young children to the People's House[9] even though the age limit was less strict over time was a factor that fundamentally affected women's participation, which was shaped by

8 Ibid., 101-108.

9 In 1940, the presence of children as participants or spectators at the meetings of the People's Houses was permitted to a certain extent although generally restricted. In the 1940 Public Houses Administration and Organization Regulations, age limits were set: "Children under the age of 12 are prohibited from attending the meetings of the People's Houses at night. During the daytime, it is permitted for children over the age of six to attend educational movies and performances. Students in primary, secondary and high school education may not attend the balls, tea parties and dances organized by the People's Houses, nor may young people of the age corresponding to these levels of education. However, in engagement and wedding ceremonies, guests of the families organizing these ceremonies may attend the ceremony regardless of age." *CHP Halkevleri İdare ve Teşkilat Talimatn*amesi, Ankara: 1940. s.13. Since students attending high school would be considered of legal age only after graduating from high school, only then could they become members of the People's Houses. On the other hand, 'within the scope of their instructions and under the supervision of teachers, they may give lectures, performances and concerts in the People's Houses; they may make use of the gymnasiums and sports fields of the People's Houses'. Ibid., 12-13.

class and cultural variables.[10] Additionally, it seems more accurate to say first-hand that the new norms of dress or social morality regarding women's public visibility, which were formed according to localities, were intended to prevent women's participation in particular and to exclude de facto and de jure linguistic, religious, class and bodily representations and practices that were not deemed acceptable in general. Another example is that with the mandatory requirement to know and speak Turkish, it is an important problematic how they would be able to socialize in the Halkevi without speaking and understanding the language of the activities in most Kurdish and Arabic-speaking areas where Turkish was only spoken to a minimum degree.

Within this framework, the People's House, the "state-society and citizen meeting space", was one of the main actors in the national ceremonies led by state officials and a special place was allocated for them. The celebrations and balls[11] held at the People's House after the national ceremonies[12], as well as the commemorations and communal events of its branches, aimed to increase the participation of the recipients through publicity and socialization that brought together ceremony and entertainment under the shadow of the state. The balls organized in the larger provinces, often accompanied by western dances and music, were more typical of the elitism inherent in the existing populism, as they could be attended especially by high-level

10 Arzu Öztürkmen, *Türkiye'de Folklor ve Milliyetçilik,* 76; Elif Ekin Akşit "Halk Eğitiminin Başarısı ve Başarısızlığı, *Türk Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi*, vol. 6, no.12, (2008), 371-398.

11 Balls, which meant "night entertainment with dancing and special/official dress", were organized especially for the non-Muslim population and Westerners in the late Ottoman period, while in the Republican period, the balls, which started for the first time in Izmir in 1925, became symbolic as one of the model practices of the modernization and nationalization project, especially during the Atatürk period, when Western dress, music, dance and local dances could come together. See Cemre Arı et al., "Cumhuriyet Baloları", *Kebikeç* 38, (2014): 307-315.

12 Ideally, especially the larger People's Houses were to be designed to have separate ceremony halls called gazinos or a "People's House family and intimate conversation hall". C.H.P. Halkevleri ve Halkodaları, "Halkevi Binalarının Planlaştırılması", 20.

administrators and members of the upper economic class.[13] Again, only RPP and People's House members were allowed to hold their engagement and wedding ceremonies at the People's Houses, while certain games such as chess, dominoes, checkers and billiards were allowed.[14]

In order to produce civilization, secularization and nationalization in the space of the People's House, in integration with the everyday social and cultural sphere, these gatherings were defined as "healthy family meetings" that envisaged clean family fun, and a certain sterile atmosphere.[15] This form of gathering pointed to a clean, orderly, peaceful socializing environment that would prevent chaotic and harmful socializations, where all kinds of "bad habits" were excluded, as would be expected in the "home" of the modern Turkish family. As part of a stance between being modest but close to the western and secular, the use of local alcoholic beverages, with the exception of raki and cognac, was permitted at balls, engagements and weddings. Alcoholic drinks were completely forbidden in People's Rooms, and it is possible that it was

13 Taner Timur argues that the increasing number of balls in Ankara in the 1930s reflects "society life" rather than populism, including the emerging bourgeoisie within a Westernized clan. According to Timur, while this "elegant clan" was flourishing during the construction of Ankara, during World War II and the years that followed, this flourishing would spread across the country, class division would sharpen, and populism would become merely a slogan that the rulers could use for ideological purposes. Taner Timur, *Türk Devrimi ve Sonrası*, 285.

14 The 1940 People's Houses Administration and Organization Bylaw states that "Chess, dominoes, checkers and billiards can be played in the People's Houses. Space is provided for indoor tennis and indoor gymnastics. No other games are allowed". *CHP Halkevleri İdare ve Teşkilat Talimatnames*i, 14.

15 Prime Minister İnönü stated the following in 1935: "People's Houses are not political institutions. They are social and cultural institutions. Therefore, all the enlightened sons and daughters of the country should enjoy being present at these meetings, and they should consider serving the People's House as a duty to the country. Everyone, whether a civil servant or a self-employed person, should consider it an aesthetic thing for himself to be present in the People's House like the cleanest family gathering." 1935, 3rd anniversary of the People's Houses.

thought that doing otherwise would provoke a negative social reaction in small towns.[16]

In the Kurdish-inhabited provinces, as the main mission of the People's Houses, it was equally valid that the intention to establish an omnipotent and absolute public space that would spread Turkishness and civilized culture, as well as make the visibility and goals of the state a part of everyday life, and to meet the cultural and social needs of officials and the public, which should be acceptable and legitimate. How this intention and ideal were shaped by different subject and group positions, and shifting historical dynamics, under the influence of everyday and local dynamics and power dynamics in interaction with actual processes will be examined in more detail below.

§ 4.1 People's House or State House? Official Ceremonies and *Clean Family Meetings*

The national celebrations, ceremonies and commemorations that marked the years between 1923 and 1950 were intended to create a political socialization around a "national cause" and to produce a new national, social and individual memory, identity and state images and practices by repeating them every year.[17] In addition to the Republic Day, National Sovereignty and Children's Day, Youth and Sports Day, Victory Day, Language Day, Lausanne Day and the Republic Day, in which the People's Houses played a leading role as organizers, many other ceremonies were organized, such as the celebration of the anniversary of the founding of the People's Houses on February 19, which was glorified

16 A connection was established between clean family gatherings and the use of alcoholic beverages in the By-law for the People's Rooms. Under the heading of the main expectations from the People's Rooms, it was stated: "To be a clean meeting and conversation place (Tea, coffee, lemonade, buttermilk, etc. are allowed. All kinds of alcoholic beverages are prohibited)". *CHP Halkodaları Talimatnamesi,* 1940, 4.

17 For national celebrations in the era as instruments of political socialization, legitimacy and mobilization in Turkey, see Hale Yılmaz, *Becoming Turkish: Nationalist Reforms and Cultural Negotiations in Early Republican Turkey,* 179-207; Zeynep Kezer, *Building Modern Turkey, State, Space, and Ideology in the Early Republic,* 231.

as "a day of cultural movement for the country", as well as ceremonies such as flag planting in villages. These festivals and celebrations, which took place at very frequent intervals, included propaganda aimed at appealing to the strong feelings of enthusiasm and excitement of the participants, where the modern development of the state and the country and the institutional and subjective authority of state officials at the local level were symbolized, and forms of citizen development were displayed through verbal and physical performances.[18] National holiday celebrations and ceremonies, which were intended to replace the temporality and spatiality occupied by religious and ethnic/local festivals and celebrations with the nation-state, reflecting the spirit of the dominant totalitarian regimes of the period, were the main state and People's House practices that were given special importance in Kurdish localities, where concerns about the establishment and approval of state authority were at their peak.

Hale Yılmaz argues that the single-party period was a time that was met with less conflict and resistance by the society, and when more social participation was displayed. However, she points out that there were gendered and class boundaries, such as inequality-based differences between cities and villages in terms of the capacity to celebrate, and local reactions to the presence of women in traditional dress in some places.[19] In the Kurdish provinces, as in Siirt in 1942, and as is often the case in this research, she includes testimony that the participation, interest and enthusiasm of local receivers in the celebration of the Republic Day was low. She also draws attention to linguistic, cultural and political differences and variables, with memorial findings about children singing songs and chanting slogans in Kurdish and this being tolerated by state officials in Ağrı Patnos, one of the provinces in the region where 90 percent and in some places 99 percent of primary school children did not

18 For People's House anniversary celebration and national celebrations, see Arzu Öztürkmen, "Celebrating National Holidays in Turkey: History and Memory," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 25 (September 2001): 47–75.

19 Yılmaz, *Becoming Turkish, Nationalist Reforms and Cultural Negotiations in Early Republican Turkey,* 203-7

attend school.[20] Party inspector Aytuna also writes that even in 1942, in the Garzan district of Siirt, "the celebrations of national holidays remained mere ceremonies, the meaning and nature of which the people still did not grasp, and almost every time the people had to be brought to these ceremonies by gendarmes".[21] In the state of emergency zone, a despotic use of coercion was normalized, to prevent Kurdish local residents from attending ceremonies, even though there was no legal obligation to do so. According to the inspector, the main reason for the reluctance of the mostly Kurdish local population in the backward and deprived region to participate in ceremonies was that they did not speak Turkish and "lacked a national spirit". This deprivation was not remedied due to the lack of merit in both public and social affairs by "civil servants with weak morals and character, lacking culture, most of whom denigrated the civil servants who weren't locals" and used the People's Room as a village coffee house where they met each other.[22]

This multi-layered narrative exemplifies the process by which the Kurdish community in Garzan reproduced the legitimacy of the state by existing in the symbolic performance space of state power, thereby constructing and imposing a new subjectivity of obedient citizens. The

20 Ibid. Hamza Mızrak, a teacher and president of the Patnos People's Room, stated that even in 1951, "In this backward neighborhood, which had witnessed the movements of the reactionaries, the spirit and meaning of the Republican revolution had not yet been established and the revolutionary movements were met with hesitation; not only those who were literate, but even those who knew the language (meaning Turkish) were too few to be counted. The people still call themselves Kurds and consider themselves separate from the Turkish community, and this is the subject of foreign propaganda." Therefore, he says that the issue is not the existence of a people's room that needs central help, but "the necessity of national existence and national unity in a wide circle". He sees the non-adoption of the regime here and the fact that Kurdishness and the Kurdish language is an area of resistance as a cultural security problem, and if the People's Room is to be produced as a space against this, the "elders" in Ankara should help. "Ağrı'daki halkevleri ve halkodalarının genel ihtiyaçlarına harcanmak üzere gönderilen tahsisat". CCA.490.01/1469.6.1, (25.07.1951).

21 "Siirt İlinde Bulunan Halkevleri'nin Teftiş Raporları" CCA. 490.01/1002.871.2, (04.11.1945).

22 Ibid.

production of the image or *fantasy*[23] of the state in public life through interaction with society, through official holidays and celebrations, was desirable in the East, as it was more visible in the western provinces.[24] The aforementioned image and discourse of the East and Kurds as non-Turkish-speaking and "devoid of national spirit" justified the orientalist, colonialist state and intellectual despotism, legitimizing the state's concentration of power through gendarmerie force if necessary. Moreover, by making local state officials the "scapegoats" for the lack of spread of forced assimilation and civilizational practices, the local practitioners and recipients were blamed. In these ways, the questioning of what state practices represented and rejected in the case of existing ceremonies was excluded from the aforementioned positivist ratio.[25]

23 For an ethnography on the dynamics of the social re-production of state fantasy in Turkey in the 1990s, see Yael Navaro-Yashin, *Faces of the State, Secularism and Public Life in Turkey,* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).

24 While the Tenth Anniversary of the Republic was being celebrated "without incident and with enthusiasm" in Ankara, where the People's House played a central role, and across the country, the claim that Çomuzade Kamil did not stand up when the anthem of the Republic was being sung in an entertainment venue and a fight broke out represents a case where a state practice merges with personal conflicts. According to Erdem Çanak, Mr. Kamil filed a lawsuit claiming that he had been insulted and attacked by the head of the RPP executive committee and district chairmen, which set the agenda in the province. In the courtroom, as the conflicting testimonies of the defendant, plaintiff and witnesses come to light, Çomuzade Kamil claims that there was no such thing as the anthem being sung, and that the defendants attacked him because they had a grudge over a matter of credit and debt. The defendant RPP members, on the other hand, claimed that they had only asked the plaintiff, who "did not respect the national sentiment", to stand up during the anthem, and that the people around them who heard the argument had attacked Çomuzade Kamil and that they had protected him. The case ended with three days of detention and equal fines for both parties, while the press in İçel reportedly covered the case favorably to the RPP. Erdem Çanak, "İçel'de Cumhuriyet'in Onuncu Yıl Kutlamaları ve Kutlamalar Sırasında Yaşanan Müessif Bir Hadise: Çomuzade Davası", *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi: AAM Derg.*, 34, no.1, (2018), 97.

25 Ibid. As in Şırnak, the nomadic and tribal lower-class peasants who had refused to enlist in the army, who maintained informal economic practices, and who were not civilized by failing to settle down and become sedentary, were condemned to their own political economy, cultural and social sphere, even though they complained about their

On the other hand, especially during the ceremonies in which the cities were decorated with flags, RPP symbols, inscriptions, lights and ornaments, the fact that the local population did not even choose to stand still or turn to watch the state performances in the ceremonial area is an act that can be read as indifference or resistance to the celebration events at the People's House. The fact that the state rulers perceived the reactions as a covert political protest stemming from the aforementioned deprivations and ignorance, and made use of force reveals not only the strength of the state, but also the weakness, fragility and deep anxiety of the state officials regarding the inability to generate consent to their sovereignty and authority. On the other hand, a discourse was constructed that rationalized that the state should engage in more *temsil* and *temdin,* in order to overcome deprivation.[26]

landlords. Aytuna implies that despite these conditions, the village elders, who were still "distant and cold" with the modern state and its legitimized spheres, behaved with a cynicism of gratitude toward the state as well as their landlords. Aytuna finds it incomprehensible that in the East, especially in the countryside, the transcendent authority that could liberate them from these primitive bonds was the Republican government. “Siirt İlinde Bulunan Halkevleri’nin Teftiş Raporları” CCA. 490.01/1002.871.2, (04.11.1945).

26 In Hakkari, a province on the frontier that had just broken with Iraqi Kurds and had been the scene of forms of resistance to state authority, the celebration program in which the district governor in Yüksekova district notified civil servants in 1941 of the "celebration of the 18th anniversary of the Republic" again envisaged a military parade. All the civil servants were to be dressed in national costumes with the swords and rifles of the military battalions and the gendarmerie, and about a hundred villagers were asked to bring their horses to join the parade. The district governor wrote in the program that the military and civilian bureaucracy in the town, military battalions, schoolchildren, village headmen, artisans and craftsmen, and the villagers to be hosted were invited, and that a selection would be made as to who would be invited to the dinner. There are no documents on how the program was carried out, but as far as we know, it appears that a populist ceremonial program and discipline was integrated with local dynamics to produce an image and practice of the state. In addition, in this context, the state dignitary's request that people attend with their best clothes and weapons in order to encourage public participation, represents a willingness to include the local population in exchange for obedience, to prove that there were cooperative groups, and to demonstrate that the state was producing approval among the villagers, even in the province where the People's Room and formal Turkish education were weak.

The ceremonies and celebrations at the People's Houses, on the other hand, can be said to have portrayed a more "civilian" portrait of political socialization, dominated by "more intimate" new artistic practices and forms of entertainment that changed the official atmosphere. In accordance with the rule that the opening of a newly established People's House should be held on or around February 19, the anniversary of the opening of the People's Houses, the Siirt People's House was opened on February 2, 1934, despite a heavy snowstorm, with an opening ceremony "attended by the governor, the general commander and the public".[27] According to the daytime program of the ceremony reported by the president of the People's House, it ended with the singing of the National Anthem, the pledge of allegiance, poetry recited by middle school students, a moment of silence for the great veteran Atatürk, and the distribution of sweets. In the evening program of that day, it is implied that after the anthem and poems were recited, there was an atmosphere of fun and relaxation with musical entertainment by traditional Turkish and Western musicians, and a performance of the Independence play by primary school teachers.[28]

"Hakkari'de 1938-1941 Yılları Arasında Yapılan Cumhuriyet Bayramı Kutlamaları". CCA.490.01/1144.15.2.

27 "Siirt Halkevi'nin Faaliyetleriyle İlgili Şikayet ve İstekler". 490.01/843.332, (04.08.1950).


28 Ibid.



Figure 4.1 Opening ceremony of the Siirt People's House where the military and bureaucracy was predominant. SOURCE: "Siirt Halkevi'nin Faaliyetleriyle İlgili Şikayet ve İstekler". 490.01/843.332.1.

Hani, one of Diyarbakır's sub-districts, sent photographs of the ceremonial arch and ceremonial events for Republic Day in 1941 to the General Secretariat of the RPP.[29]

29 CCA.490.01/1143.11.02



Fon No: 490 1 0 0 - Kutu No: 1143 - Dosya No: 11 - Sıra No: 2

Figure 4.2 The ceremonial arch, which was set up for a Republic Day celebration in Hani. SOURCE: CCA 490.01/1143.11.02.



Fon No: 490 1 0 0 - Kutu No: 1143 - Dosya No: 11 - Sıra No: 2

Figure 4.3 A primary school student reciting a poem during the Republic Day ceremony in front of the People's Room in Hani. SOURCE: CCA 490.01/1143.11.02.

In the inspection report on Hani sent the same year, it is stated that the people of Hani "suffered for their ignorance" by participating in the Sheikh Said Rebellion and therefore "were a bit timid and spooked" toward the state. Here, the use of violence by the state was again normalized, and a connection was established between the "ignorance and backwardness" of "the people of Hani, 98 percent of whom were illiterate, most of whom spoke the Zaza language", mentioning the fact that they did not speak Turkish, spoke Zaza and could not read or write, and it was implied that this was the reason for their participation in the rebellion.[30]

In the photograph above, the inscription ""Long Live Those who Love the Revolution" hanging over an empty and deserted street, with the implication that there may have been people who did not like the Revolution among the people of Hani, who were "timid" toward the state, and the message "those who do not love it do not deserve to live", can be said to show that the environment of fear and threats continued in these places where "gendarmerie beatings" were not lacking. The link established in the article between survival and "loving the Revolution" can be considered as an example of a discourse of domination, an indicator of spreading regime and state influence over the society. In the same report, the fact that people other than civil servants, who wanted to follow the developments related to World War II, showed an interest in the People's Houses and People's Rooms, wherever there was a radio, was also valid for the Hani People's Room.[31] The Director of Hani Sub-district writes that those who had previously come to the People's Room

30 "Diyarbakır'daki Halkevi ve Halkodalarının Radyo, Akümülatör ve Hoparlör Tesisatı Gibi İhtiyaçlarıyla İlgili Yaptıkları Yazışmalar." 490.01/1228.85.1. (15.05.1950).

31 Ibid. The spatiality of ceremonies and celebrations in the People's Houses was a stage where a new national history and memory was shaped by commemorating figures such as Ziya Gökalp, Namık Kemal, Mimar Sinan, and Abdulhak Hamit, who were considered pioneers in politics, culture and art in the Republican era, and by encouraging participation by softening the official atmosphere with performances. İsmail Özer, "Türk Modernleşmesinde Halkevleri ve Diyarbakır Örneği", 473-474.

only to have fun, thanks to the radio, "did not want to leave the People's Room even if they were kicked out", and therefore the help of the RPP General Secretariat was essential for the purchase of the radio handset, which was not available. Throughout the 1940s, there are successive reports that with the spread of the radio, a new public and social spatiality emerged in the People's Rooms, including Kurdish-speaking people who were especially curious about the developments related to the war, and that the radio, which did not require literacy, was the best means of representing Turkishness.[32] As seen in other settlements in Diyarbakır province, the RPP General Secretariat was flooded with letters of request and complaint regarding the delivery of radios "as an urgent need", the repair of broken radios and requests for radio components, as well as the confiscation of equipment such as radios and gramophones by local authorities and state and People's House administrators. On the other hand, over time, areas of tension and a "war of the airwaves" would emerge in relation to the trans-border space created by the radio, which was intended to be spread in the region as the main means of assimilation into Turkishness, and the listening to broadcasts in Kurdish and other languages, which were considered to threaten national security, among Kurds.[33]

Planned as a "center of Turkishness", where the military and civilian bureaucratic class and the more prominent gentry were concentrated, the People's House in Diyarbakır, with the largest hall in the region, became a center for RPP meetings with institutions such as the Red Crescent and the Turkish Aeronautical Association, and a center for

32 On the development of radio in the early Republican period and its relationship with politics, Uygur Kocabaşoğlu, *Şirket Telsizinden Devlet Radyosuna: TRT Öncesi Dönemde Radyonun Tarihsel Gelişimi ve Türk Siyasal Hayatındaki Yeri,* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilimler Fakültesi Yayınevi, 1980) and for an analytic study about the effects of radio broadcasting which produce a Turkish Occidentalist identity, see Ahıska, *Radyonun Sihirli Kapısı*.

33 For the Kurdish radio broadcasting in Ex-Soviet Armenia in the era, see Kamran Elend, *Kimliği Terennüm Etmek, Erivan Radyosu Kürtçe Yayını,* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2021), see also Zeri İnanç, *Di Radyoya Erivanê de Dengê Kurdî*, (İstanbul: İsmail Beşikçi Yayınları, 2017).

celebrations, ceremonies and activities after celebrations that would begin to fade with the switch to a multi-party system. In this context, the "granting of the right to vote for women" also became an occasion for ceremonial celebration, and the newspapers reported that on 13 February, 1934, a large concert followed by a conference on the subject was held, and that more than 500 "ladies from Diyarbakır" thanked Mustafa Kemal by chanting "long live Gazi Halaskar (The Savior Veteran)".[34]

On the other hand, especially in the early years of the 1940s, when it was thought that "public order was restored" in Tunceli, official reports and the press emphasized that "the people were grateful to the state for getting rid of the landlords" and had a "warm" relationship with state institutions and the active People's Houses. The Pertek People's House, which President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk visited during his 1937 trip to the region, was one of the People's Houses most admired by state officials. The head of the People's House reported to the General Secretariat of the RPP that at the opening ceremony of the Pertek People's House on 21 February, 1937, where the Fourth General Inspector's address was read, anthems were played, poetry was recited, the People's House plaque was hung and performances were given; the municipal hall, which had a capacity of two hundred people, was "packed to capacity with four hundred people, men and women" two hours before the opening.[35] It is noteworthy that in the photographs taken in the same year and in celebration of Language Day on September 24, which can be seen in the photograph below, there are a number of school-age children in addition to men, reminding us of the allegations that the statistics and reports of the People's House reflect exaggerated figures regarding the participation of women, peasants and workers, in addition to civil

34 "Diyarbekir Kadını Halkevinde Kadına Hak ve Mevki Veren Gazi'yi Alkışladı" Anadolu, 14.2.1934 cited by Özer, "Türk Modernleşmesinde Halkevleri ve Diyarbakır Örneği", 520.

35 "Tunceli İlindeki Halkevleri ve Halkodalarının Açılış Merasimleri", CCA.490.01/962.724.1 (26.01.1948).

servants, local administrators and elites in cooperation with the state. (Ch I).



Fon No: 490 1 0 0 - Kutu No: 962 - Dosya No: 724 - Sıra No: 1

Figure 4.4 Pertek People's House Language Holiday – 1937. SOURCE: "Tunceli İlindeki Halkevleri ve Halkodalarının Açılış Merasimleri", CCA 490.01/ 962.724.1 (26.01.1948).

The "clean family meetings" (temiz aile toplantıları) held within and outside the scope of the ceremonies aimed to educate the intellectuals, civil servants and the public in the East as in the Houses in the rest of the country, which was deprived of this, with civilizing habituses on how to spend their leisure time and entertain themselves. By questioning the extent to which these regulations were spatialized in the People's Houses, it is seen that, as in Ağrı, daily life and public gatherings were monitored and controlled. Party Inspector Aytuna, during his inspection of the Ağrı People's House in 1942, reported that the number of members of the People's House was low, and that the People's House could not be an effective public space because "many of the youth and intellectuals in the city did not visit the People's House; they lived a disorganized and

even gloomy coffee house life".[36] Aytuna argues that this could be prevented not by allowing games in the People's Houses, but by organizing "clean family meetings" to be attended by some "female friends" who he sees participating in sports trips, and by "increasing the interest of women in the city". Thus, in the People's Houses, domestic and decent family meetings attended by women who did not indulge in bad habits such as gambling were considered as the main battleground for the "sterilization" of social life within the modern order.[37] As seen in the Tutak People's House, in most of the People's Houses, collective activities, which were intended to be manifested as "family gatherings", such as balls, performances, conferences, etc., did not go beyond meetings such as the Republic Anniversary day and night, commemoration days, and New Year's Eve.[38] These words show the limits of participation in the "People's House" as in many small settlements in the Ist General Inspectorate, where the Kurdish population made up two-thirds. This is also true for the Elazığ People's House, which was mentioned as not being attended by enough "members of the public" despite the availability of its building. A detailed invitation to a more "sterile", family-oriented and acceptable "public house" was extended to the residents of Elazığ in 1941 in a flyer titled "The People's House is your home".[39] Party Inspectors also made suggestions in this direction in the places they visited. For example, after Münir Soykam's inspection of the Hozat People's House in 1941, he directly addressed men and gently invited them and their wives to plan

36 "Ağrı İlinde Bulunan Halkevleri'nin Teftiş Raporları". CCA.490.01/994.842.2 (16.02.1943).

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 "This house, which belongs to you as much as your homes, is open for you at all times and every night", heated with central heating, plenty of light and clean halls are waiting for you. There is radio, tea and coffee in the living room. There are billiards, dominoes, aznif (a game like dominoes), chess, checkers. It is possible to listen to the news from the agency, which has become a necessity today. The air is clean, the coffee and tea are cheap (3 kuruş) and the games are free." "Elazığ ilinde bulunan halkevlerinin teftiş raporları". CCA, 490.01/ 997.852.1, (10.08.1945)

their private and public time within the space of the People's House, with different promises based on gender.[40]

The Urfa People's House, 33 of its nearly one thousand members being women, heard praise for the modern "family meetings" it was said to organize every week on Sunday evenings, which were mostly attended by civil servant women, wives of civil servants, and wives of the city elite.[41]



Figure 4.5 One of the Family Nights at Urfa People's House, 1935-1936. SOURCE: *Urfa Halkevi'nin Bir yıllık İş Sayımı-23-2-1935/23-2-1936*, (İstanbul Hüsnutabiat Matbaası, 1936).

40 The sentences in Soykam's invitation are as follows: "To the public and officials: The People's House is your home. Our elders have entrusted this hearth of ideals to the intellectuals and elements of the country who want to progress. The house is always open. Newspapers and useful books are at your disposal. You can listen to world news and very useful conferences on the radio. There is a playground and a park in front of the house. Your dear wife and your beloved child will find fresh air and a good neighborhood here. I present this letter to you as an invitation with all my respect and wish you to make our house always pleasant. "Tunceli İlinde Bulunan Halkevlerinin Teftiş Raporları", CCA. 490.01/1003. 874.1, (19.02.1943).

41 *Urfa Halkevi'nin Bir yıllık İş Sayımı-23-2-1935/23-2-1936*, (İstanbul Hüsnutabiat Matbaası, 1936), 16. For the ceremonies and commemorations organized by the Urfa People's House between 1934-1951, see Yüksel Yıldırım, *Urfa Halkevi (1934-1951*), (İstanbul: Nobel Bilimsel Eserler, 2016), 129-138.

In the 1930s, when the People's House administration were anxious to perform in line with the regime's expectations and were in a race in this direction, there was an effort to show through the press and broadcasting that Kemalist revolutions were embraced by the public, without being met with resistance through the activities of the People's Houses. Again, in Urfa, the fact that "women who did not know what theater was, with their children in their arms and their chador (full body covering)" went to watch the theater plays staged by the drama branch, which worked effectively in the People's House, was published in Urfa newspapers as proof that the wind of revolution was blowing in Urfa, and that the people were adapting to the reforms without resistance.[42]

§ 4.2 The Chador *Versus* the Coat: Struggles and Negotiations on Clothing in the People's Houses in the East

It can be said that within the *millet system* in the Ottoman Empire, the symbolic order of the colors of clothing to clarify religious and gender-class distinctions, the symbolic order[43], of who could wear a sword and ride a horse, and the "positivist civilization and belief in progress" with change to westernization in the 19th century were most concretely demonstrated by modern clothing.[44] While these processes were woven with tensions between new legal regulations and those who opposed them, it can be argued that they were felt less strongly in places where the interaction with modernization, urbanization and capitalism was

42 Yüksel Yıldırım, *Urfa Halkevi (1934-1951*), 36.

43 Rıfa'at Ali Abou-El-Haj, *Modern Devletin Doğası, 16. Yüzyıldan 18. Yüzyıla Osmanlı İmparatorluğu,* trans. Oktay Özel, Canay Şahin, (Ankara: İmge Yayınları, 2000), 91.

44 According to Hanioğlu, "The overlap between "alafranga" and "progress" was linked to "progress", "modernization", and fulfilling the "necessities of science" in a field ranging from manners and etiquette to clothing and attire, and the way of dressing, which was identified with these concepts instead of *temeddün* (civilization) in classical Ottoman thought, became a necessary condition of civilization and elitism within the new civilization project". Şükrü Hanioğlu, "Geçmişten Günümüze Örtünme, Çağdaşlık ve Medenîleşme Projesi" in *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Zihniyet, Siyaset ve Tarih*, (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 2006), 55.

more unevenly distributed. Ultimately, these regulations offered an interpretation that allowed for relatively more heterogeneity in the "authentic" dress codes of different ethnic and religious groups, with various boundaries. However, in the republican period, women mostly abandoned the chador and veil in favor of a more symbolic western style of dressing, and men wore trousers instead of shalwar – pijama-like trousers - and trilby hats in accordance with the Hat Law, presenting a picture in which the attitude in actual practice was left to the discretion of local administrations, the legal basis of which was not clearly defined centrally.[45] While this field involved a much more homogenizing intention, in line with the attempt at production of a monolithic nation and citizenry; on the other hand, social reactions appertaining to it emerged as one of the main areas of struggle and negotiation with the state.[46] In the Kurdish provinces, the ban on the chador and veil for women, rather than men's clothing, and the requirement for women to wear a coat and uncover their heads in public spaces instead, emerged as an important theme in the branch activities of the People's Houses, affecting the process of being seen in public, and participation in society, inside and outside work. In the documents analyzed, while the reasons for this were cited as the backwardness and religiosity of the region, and the fact that men did not allow their wives to dress in this way[47], it was observed that an attitude and use of language was generally established

45 Hale Yılmaz, *Becoming Turkish: Nationalist Reforms and Cultural Negotiations in Early Republican Turkey.*

46 For the politics and social history of clothing in the early republican period, see Yılmaz and Adak. On the bans on the chador and veil, its different state and local implementations, and its social reception and interpretation, see Yılmaz 2013 and Adak, "Kemalism in The Periphery: Anti-Veiling Campaigns and State-Society Relations in 1930s Turkey".

47 During his visit to Bitlis, RPP Secretary General Esendal pointed to the difficulties of moving women from place to place in the city with its scattered neighborhoods, especially during the winter months when their husbands did not let them out even during the day, and said that "the Bitlis People's House, whose roof was already collapsing and in need of repair, could not be a center of attraction". "CHP Genel Sekreteri Memduh Şevket Esendal'ın Doğu İllerine Yaptığı Gezinin Raporu." CCA.490.01/571.2274.1, (14.06.1945).

that did not include the transmission of women's views on this issue. In addition to the fact that women did not participate in the "clean family meetings" at the People's House due to their widespread lack of knowledge of Turkish, which was more commonly mentioned for the Ist General Inspectorate Region, cultural forms such as clothing that were incompatible with secularism were also influential.[48]

In Mardin's Cizre district, Altan reports that it was forbidden for the People's House to be open to the public, and that a small number of civil servants and women from the city's gentry who wore headscarves and coats went to the People's House with their husbands. In Altan's oral history study, it is reported that in the district where the majority of women wore the chador, headmen went from house to house trying to persuade the people of the district to attend the "clean family meetings", while some civil servants bribed the administrators of the People's House and did not take their wives to these meetings.[49] The last example shows that, on the one hand, the obligation to go with the bribing spouses was perceived as a sanction, and on the other hand, state officials themselves used an illegal method by using bribery, and the People's House administrators who received bribes accepted this and negotiated the practice mandated by the People's House. It appeared as a social strategy in which men came to the forefront as the main actors, involving turning the aims and practices of the state in their favor, and it refutes the thesis that the state was strong, monolithic, corruption-proof, and autonomously established, rather than through social interaction. It can also be argued that instead of defining the one-party state as weak and failed by default, the dress codes served to establish a normalizing effect

48 On this issue, see again Yılmaz, 2013 and Adak, 2015.

49 Bilal Altan, "Halkevleri Sürecinde Cizre Halkevi Örneği", (MA Thesis, Dicle University, 2012), 63. Altan quotes Sabri Gümüş, a retired tradesman who lived through the period, as saying, "When the Cizre People's House was established, the officials of the People's House asked those who participated in the activities to come with their spouses. Although not everyone was told this, especially the notables, the rich and the civil servants were encouraged to do so. Sometimes those who were required to go to the People's House with their spouses due to their position would bribe officials in order not to take their spouses to the events." Ibid.

in the Eastern and Kurdish provinces as well. It is also possible to argue that the state was reproduced within local dynamics in a way that involved corrupt negotiations, which perhaps enabled these individuals to remain within the state sphere. On the other hand, the experiences of men who insisted on wearing religious and local dress not allowing women to go out, or the contention that women did not want to go out, indicate that institutional practices aimed at increasing women's public visibility turned into a phenomenon to the detriment of those women who did not dress legally or legitimately.[50]



Figure 4.6 Cizre Cumhuriyet Avenue, 1938. SOURCE: *Güneydoğu Birinci Genel Müfettişlik Bölgesi*, 222.

The obligation for women to wear a coat instead of a chador in order to participate in modern public life, and the demand for its actualization in

50 Abdulkerim Özervarlı, a retired imam interviewed by Altan, had the following to say on this subject: "The Cizre People's House had activities that were not in line with our usual values and religious sensitivities. We especially found it strange that men would attend balls and dances at the People's House with their wives with their heads uncovered and wearing coats. The chador, which almost all women in Cizre wore, was forbidden to be worn when going to the People's House. So much so that my father did not allow my mother to go out for 13 years." Ibid. 63.

the People's Houses, transformed the coat into an important symbol for secular practices and sanctions in Cizre, as it did throughout the country.[51] In a Kurdish *kilam* (Kurdish epic songs sung slowly and generally without instruments) called "Kemal bavê meye" (Kemal is our father), which is also known in Cizre, the duality of coat and chador is featured.[52] It is ironic that the song, allegedly sung by Kurds sentenced to death in order to be pardoned, was sung in Kurdish, a forbidden language, but was full of praise for Mustafa Kemal and the reforms and practices of the state, including the modernization of men's clothing.[53] While in Cizre, it is said that Seîd Ağayê Cizîrî, a dengbêj (the singer who sings kilam) from Cizre who went into exile because of the Kurdish nationalist kilams he sang during the Sheikh Said Rebellion, composed this song to negotiate forgiveness by the state.[54] The song emphasizes the coat as a symbol of civilization, and the chador as a misdemeanor. The lyrics are as follows: "*Kemal ve İsmet'tir, wer lê lê lê; Kemal ve İsmet'tir, wer lo lo; Dünya medeniyettir, de lo lo; çarşaf kabahattir, wer lê lê lê, adet mantodur, de lo lo*".[55]

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51 Former Cizre MP Şerafettin Elçi, who was interviewed by Bilal Altan as a witness to the last period of the Cizre People's House, said that "there was a small group of people who wanted to be close to the state and who cut their wives' hair fashionably, dressed them in coats and took them to balls at the People's Houses". Ibid., 66-7.

52 Cited by Bilal Altan, "Halkevleri Sürecinde Cizre Halkevi Örneği", 67.

53 Another song found by Yüksel has a contents that embraces and praises the wearing of modern hats and Mustafa Kemal at the same time: "Kemal is our father; The hat is on our heads; Kemal passed away; The young [men] got into trouble, Kemmal Kemmal e, werî lê lê (Kemmal Kemmal e, werî lo lo; Kemmal bavê me ye, Şewqe li serê me ye; Kemmal çû rehmetê; Xort ketin zehmetê", Yüksel, Dengbêj, Mullah, Intelligentsia: The Survival and Revival of the Kurdish-Kurmanji Language in the Middle East, 1925-1960", 90-91.

54 Salihê Kevirbirî, *Bir Çığlığın Yüzyılı: Karapetê Xaço* (İstanbul: Sî Yayınları, 2002), cited by Yüksel, 91.

55 Kemal û İsmete wer lê lê lê,
Kemal û İsmet e wer lo lo,
Dinya medeniyet e de lo lo,
Çarix qebahate wer lê lê lê,
Manto bi adet e de lo lo,

In the aforementioned official and memory sources, it does not seem possible to find the voices of women themselves in the Eastern/Kurdish provinces, regarding the boundaries created by clothing. However, reading between the lines of oral, written and visual sources, it can be seen that in the cities and large towns, the wives of civil servants, or women who were themselves civil servants, or rather a small number of women from the gentry, were the protagonists and potential changemakers in the People's Houses, wearing clothes that symbolized secularism, westernization and modernity. Just as some men in Cizre went to watch the events in the garden of the People's House without entering the building because they were curious[56], in our telephone interview Altan said that he had not interviewed women, but that he had been told that women watched the movie screenings in the garden of the People's House from the roofs of their houses.[57] "Watching with curiosity" as the prominent theme here, like the state watching the society, observing the state and modern art practices that could be watched even without knowing Turkish, which presuppose assimilation and civilization, tells us that the members of society Öztürkmen talks about watched the Halkevi from afar and created a legitimate effect, even if they did not participate.[58]

In the end, the conflictual patterns of women going to the People's House, which crystallized much more prominently on the axis of women's bodies and clothing, the production of different types of coping, resistance, struggle and negotiation strategies such as bribery, women not going out or not being allowed to go out, remote monitoring, adaptation and cooperation at the local level, can be seen as components of the complex relations between Kurds and the state, in terms of assimilation and civilization practices, as well as the development of the state.On the other hand, for women, being able to attend family meetings,

Here, "wer lê lê lê lê" refers to women, while "wer lo lo lo" and "de lo lo lo" are interjections for men in Kurdish songs (kilams). Altan, 67.

56 Altan, 63

57 Interview with Bilal Altan, 20 April 2016.

58 Öztürkmen *Türkiye'de Folklor ve Milliyetçilik.*

conditional on wearing these clothes, suggests that modern dress, which presupposes equality between the sexes, may have had a negative impact on women's public participation. Moreover, women's refusal to wear these clothes and attend the meetings of the People's Houses, with or without their husbands' permission, can be interpreted as different voices and strategies, such as showing indifference or resistance to the People's Houses, which may also have served to reproduce the patriarchal order. However, even if there was a case of not giving up clothes with traditional and religious motifs, the fact that coats and other modern clothes were beyond the purchasing power of especially the lower class villagers, the lack of a widespread market for them, and the lack of the habit of wearing them, can be discussed as other factors. To sum up, through these examples, it can be seen that a line of struggle and negotiation was established between the state and the menfolk, regarding women's bodies and their public participation.

In Diyarbakır, where intellectuals opposed the wearing of the chador, veil, shalwar, and pushi (Kurdish traditional scarf) in the city, the Women's Association, founded in 1935 within the People's House, and chaired by Behiye Baturay, emerged as a distinctive example that advocated the social reproduction of state and western secularism by women. It is reported that this association held twenty large meetings at the People's House, and that Baturay and Çubukçu, the head of the People's House, gave conferences in order to encourage Diyarbakır women not to wear the chador and veil in public life, and to encourage their socialization. Çubukçu, the head of the People's House, informed the General Secretariat of the RPP that more than two thousand women from Diyarbakır had participated in these events, so that there was not a single woman in Diyarbakır wearing a veil or chador, and that the association was now working on a handicraft exhibition. The General Secretariat, on the other hand, informed the RPP General Secretariat that the association's efforts to accustom women to modern life were appropriate, but that according to the party program it was forbidden to establish an association for the purpose of "disseminating gender ideas"

and called for its closure.[59] This shows that in 1935, when authoritarian practices reached their peak, the party-state did not allow urban women in Diyarbakır to organize within the People's House, even if they were defenders of the regime.

Women's participation in the People's House, which was framed by gender-based and religious, linguistic, ethnic, and class boundaries, decreased from the provincial centers to the districts and villages, with an average enrollment of less than 2 percent, and mostly consisted of participation in branch committees in literary and artistic branches, with no more than a few people involved, most of whom were teachers or wives of civil servants. As for the wives of civil servants and middle- and upper-class Turkish-speaking women, their participation tended to be in the poor relief activities of the social aid branches of the People's Houses, and in tailoring and sewing courses, and some literacy courses.[60] In the Village Women's Mobile Courses that began in the 1940s, the fact that women did not speak Turkish was a de facto barrier to their actual participation in these courses, creating a boundary that rendered them invisible and reinforced inequality.[61]

On the other hand, the 1946 RPP complaint signed by Mehmet O. and Mehmet Akcan, who claimed to be from the local and traditional people of Bozova district of Urfa, drew attention as one of the complaints of people outside these groups.[62] In his letter containing the complaint, he reports that although in the Bozova People's Room, which was supposed to "spread Turkish culture to civilized Turkish people" but was almost like a coffee house, people were notified by signs that no one should enter the room wearing traditional clothes such as "fur, aba, mısilli" (traditional

59 "Diyarbakır İli ve Kazalarındaki Halkevleri'nin Çalışma Raporları". CCA. 490.01/984.814.2 (30.07.1936).

60 For an example, see photographs of the Tunceli People's House CCA. 490.01/1078.1122.2. For a discussion on women's visibility in People's Houses and Village Institutes based on domestic and gendered division of labor, see. Elif Ekin Akşit "Halk Eğitiminin Başarısı ve Başarısızlığı", 392-395.

61 Metin Yüksel, "Training Kurdish Men and Women in Turkey: Mobile Village Courses in the 'Eastern Provinces".

62 CCA.490.01/844.340.2.

men's clothes), everyone entered the room from time to time wearing these clothes that "represented backwardness". Here, by "everyone" he means men. This incident indicates that men entered the People's House in violation of the existing dress code, and that the People's House administration allowed or failed to prevent this, as in the previous example of women wearing chadors. With this violation, the men from Urfa took a position of both turning the rule upside down, and negotiating with and contributing to the development of the People's House.[63]

§ 4.3 People's Houses *Versus* Other Public and Socialisation Spaces: Overlap, Competition and Conflict

In the process of the state's management of imagined everyday publicness, and forms of socialization in the early Republican period, and the dissemination of its disciplinary power and control, the rivalry and overlapping relations of the coffee house, café, Village Room, Agha and Mukhtar Room, City Clubs, and also mosques and madrasas with the People's Houses, emerges as one of the main themes. There is a lack of analytical studies, including studies on the Kurds, on the daily actual practice and experiences of these spatialities, and their connection to the People's Houses and the process of state formation.[64] However, with the

63 For a recent work based on historical ethnography, showing that the secularisation experience of the early Republic cannot be understood in terms of an irreconcilable contradiction between "Kemalist power" and "pious popular sectors", and the detailing popular strategies of everyday resistance to secularist reforms and practices, see İlbey C.N. Özdemirci, *Fötr Şapkalı Şıh, Cumhuriyet Sekülerleşmesi ve Taşra*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2022).

64 For an analytical and comprehensive historical study on this issue, see in particular Serdar Öztürk, *Cumhuriyet Türkiyesinde Kahvehane ve İktidar (1930-1945),* (İstanbul: Kırmızı Yayınları, 2005) and for the complicated relations between Halkevi and coffeehouses, see Lamprou, *Nation-Building in Modern Turkey, 'The People's Houses', The State and The Citizen,* 125-131.There are more studies on such public and social spaces in the late Ottoman period. For an example see Cengiz Kırlı, "The Struggle over Space:

opening of the state archives, it has become clear that there were multiple interactions and reproductions between these spaces and the People's Houses, one of the focuses of this study, including power conflict, competition, overlap and reconciliation, both physically and in terms of political, social and cultural spatiality. These spaces, which envisaged different socializations, produced complex responses that varied according to daily and local dynamics and subjective attitudes, such as challenging the institutional norms and practices of the People's Houses, turning them upside down, and turning them in their favor, or supporting them. The People's Houses and state actors, on the other hand, do not seem to have taken a homogeneous stance, and have positioned themselves differently, depending on the context, either by cooperating with the contradictory practices of these spatialities, or by prohibiting them or using them to their advantage.[65] While more urbanized forms of these spaces were rare in the twelve provinces, complex experiences emerged that paralleled and differed from the country as a whole in their "intersection of the spatial, the social and the historical", and in the distance and interactions between the ideal and the real.[66]

As detailed in Öztürk's studies, it is an important area of dispute that citizens across the country spent their free time outside of work in "dirty and smoky" coffee houses and in the City Club[67], which was the place of state administrators and elites in the global sense, in accordance with the logic of the clubbing mentality instead of the People's Houses, which directly or indirectly prevented participation in the People's Houses.[68] Although there were discourses and practices to reconcile the People's House with places such as coffee houses, cafés, and the City Club, some intellectuals of the period argued that it was a "social crime" for civil servants to go to coffee houses, and that going to the People's House

Coffeehouses in Ottoman İstanbul, 1780-1845 (PhD diss. New York State University, 2000).

65 For more on the topic see Öztürk 2005 and Lamprou 2015.

66 See Lebevre, *Production of Space,* 11-12.

67 Serdar Öztürk, "Bir Kurumun Tarihsel ve Sosyolojik İncelemesi: Şehir Kulüpleri (1923-1950)", *Galatasaray Üniversitesi İletişim Dergisi*, no.4, (June 2006), 97.

68 Ibid.; Öztürk, *Cumhuriyet Türkiyesinde Kahvehane ve İktidar (1930-1945).*

instead was an obligation and a social duty.[69] Policies were introduced to keep the coffee houses under control through regulations and practices that changed over time, while legitimizing the "light and bright" People's Houses.[70] Practices regarding coffee houses varied according to the context, such as bans on games, which accelerated after 1935, their conversion to reading rooms, closure, the loosening of restrictions after 1945, and the lifting of the game ban in 1948. The practices that were intended to make them an extension of the People's Houses were those within the scope of "public enlightenment and guidance", such as teaching reading and writing with the new alphabet in coffee houses, reading newspapers and books aloud, giving lectures through loudspeakers, playing the gramophone and hanging up the newspaper, Yurt.[71]

In the 1940s, City Clubs were banned and restricted, and some were even closed down, following complaints that gambling and the use of alcoholic beverages were undermining the local image of the state.[72] In these years when we are witnessing social reactions becoming visible, it would be a complex process involving the daily interventions, struggles and negotiations of state administrators and other local actors, shaped by their class and cultural habitus, capital and power. It can be argued that the forms of undermining and asymmetrically producing the state's power of control, in which state representatives themselves played a role, and which were not in line with the normative framework of the state and the People's House, became an important component of the

69 Öztürk, *Cumhuriyet Türkiyesinde Kahvehane ve İktidar (1930-1945),* 224.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid.

72 The City Clubs, which started to be established in the early 1930s and were accessible to the ruling bureaucratic/intellectual and local upper class with membership and dues paid, were designed as socialization spaces intended to replace the Ottoman-era club-café, coffee (house and tavern-style spaces. Also called "Memurin Kulübü" (Civil Servants Club), these venues were designed to "contribute to the scientific and social development of the country". They were places where "bad habits" such as gambling and drinking had no place. See Serdar Öztürk, “Bir Kurumun Tarihsel ve Sosyolojik İncelemesi: Şehir Kulüpleri (1923-1950).”

development of the state and the East. During the transition to a multi-party system, a more dynamic process took place in which, depending on the loosening or increase of the bans, the coffee houses and Clubs were criticized more openly, and complaints against them increased. Similarly, complaints about the transformation of People's Houses into other types of venues and the violations committed against them also increased.

As Öztürk reports, in 1945, when the struggles between the RPP government and the City Clubs became more evident, there was a complaint made to the Urfa RPP Provincial Administrative Board. In Urfa, within the remit of the First General Inspectorate, it was stated that the behavior of the patrons of the Club constituted a bad example to the public, but that they were immune from government prosecution because they were bureaucrats, and that the governorship was indifferent to this situation.[73] Some parents in Urfa also complained that the Club was a bad example for young people, and as a result, it was closed down despite the resistance of the local bureaucracy.[74] Another example found in the archives involves a case in which the City Club, which was intended to set a good example, sabotaged and subverted the aims and practices of the People's House, by using the space of the People's House. In 1943, the Gaziantep City Club was using the hall of the Gaziantep People's House, which, as mentioned earlier, had appropriated the church building. Kemal Güngör, the Inspector of the People's Houses, reacted against the permission given by the governor, himself a member of the club. Güngör states that, although the People's House sometimes held meetings there, the fact that it was used as the City Club, where only a small number of civil servants who could pay their dues could enter, created an image of the People's House as elitist. Güngör emphasizes that this was contrary to the goals of the People's Houses, which sought to "unite all citizens without class distinction" and that it had a negative impact on the "middle class people and intellectuals" who were supposed

73 Serdar Öztürk, “Bir Kurumun Tarihsel ve Sosyolojik İncelemesi: Şehir Kulüpleri (1923-1950)”, 108-9.

74 Ibid.

to carry out activities in the People's Houses.[75] Under the multi-party system, the Clubs, like other spaces, became places where the RPP and DP conflict crystallized. The People's Room on the island of Bozcaada, was taken over by the City Club and "non-members are not allowed to enter" was placed on a sign over the door, as an example of this.[76]

In the provinces with a Kurdish population density, the City Clubs were more common in the cities of the Eastern provinces, while the number of coffee houses was lower than in other provinces, as were the People's Houses and People's Rooms.[77] However, very close interactions between the existing ones and the People's Houses can be detected. As became more noticeable with the spread of the People's Houses after 1940, due to the shortage of buildings suitable for coffee houses, the lack of income and inactivity, it was frequently complained about and reported by officials and local purchasers that the People's Houses were partially or wholly used as coffee houses. In 1944, Muvaffaf Uyanık, the Education Counselor of the First General Inspectorate, complained about the lack of suitable and spacious buildings in the Yüksekova district of Hakkâri, and the fact that the People's Room building, which consisted of

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid., 111.

77 According to Öztürk's data based on the 1945 Village Statistics, the rate of People's Rooms in villages in Bingöl, Muş, Bitlis, Van, Hakkâri, Siirt, Diyarbakır, Mardin and Urfa, the Sixth Agricultural Region, was 1.1 percent, while this rate was 0.8 percent for village coffee houses and 5.9 percent for Village Rooms. In Erzurum, Erzincan, Kars, Ağrı, Çoruh, the Fifth Agricultural Region, where the number of coffee houses was higher, the proportion of People's Rooms was 6.4 percent, while the proportion of village coffee houses was 3.7 percent, and the proportion of Village Rooms was 20.4 percent. In the Eighth Agricultural Region, consisting of Tunceli, Elazığ, Malatya, Amasya, Tokat, Sivas, the proportion of village coffee houses was 1.8 percent, while the proportion of People's Rooms was 5.2 percent, and the proportion of Village Chambers was 14.7 percent. Looking at the villages in Western and Central Anatolia, in the Marmara region, the proportion of village coffee houses was 52.2 percent, village rooms 81 percent and People's Rooms 14 percent. In the provinces of the Aegean region, the percentages were 31.3 percent for coffee houses, 73.2 percent for Village Rooms, and 17.2 percent for People's Rooms. Öztürk, *Cumhuriyet Türkiyesinde Kahvehane ve İktidar (1930-1945),* 281.

a hall, "the only place to sit in the town", had become a coffee house over time due to its inactivity.[78] In the Sixth Agricultural Region, including Hakkâri, the proportion of both People's Rooms and coffee houses was around 1 percent[79] and instead of producing activities within the discipline of the People's Room, the coffee house swallowed up the space of the People's Room and its function of socializing and passing the time was preferred. It is ironic that despite the People's House and People's Room's mission to "save the people and youth from the coffee house corners", the administrators themselves rented out the People's Rooms as coffee houses, and members of the public and civil servants used the coffee house more than the People's Room. This shows that the subjects in Yüksekova transformed the public space of the People's Room according to their own needs, and in their own favor, and sabotaged its functioning.[80] Yaylak (Bozova), one of the Urfa districts, is one of the examples of the "transformation of the People's Room into a coffee house" in 1942. The party inspector reported with regret that "the only hall of the People's Room" had been rented out to a coffee house by the Room's administrators, which resulted in both the closure of the meeting place and the tenant starting to run backgammon games there.[81]

In addition to the competitive relationship between these spaces, both in terms of the mutual occupation and sharing of physical space and the daily socialization and passing of time that they represented and produced, there were overlaps and compromises, with the transfer of People's House activities to the coffee houses. The Mardin People's House established relations with tradesmen's associations and "asked the members of the association to speak Turkish in their private lives, and

78 "Hakkari İlinde Bulunan Halkevleri'nin Teftiş Raporları", 490.01/998.856.1.

79 Serdar Öztürk, 2005, 281.

80 Inspector Uyanık wrote the following on this subject: "The People's Room building is a large hall on the second floor in a central part of the town center. It is a bright coffee house with a view. I have been there several times because it is the only place to sit in the district, and with the sounds of backgammon and tea sets going back and forth, the People's Room cannot be called anything other than a coffeehouse." "Hakkari İlinde Bulunan Halkevleri'nin Teftiş Raporları", CCA, 490.01/998.856.1

81 "Urfa İlinde Bulunan Halkevlerinin Teftiş Raporları". CCA. 490.01/1004.875.1.

civil servants and intellectuals, especially teachers, were sent to coffeehouses to give speeches on the importance of Turkish and cultural issues".[82] The People's House in Erzincan also announced that it was reproducing daily news bulletins and distributing them to coffee houses and village headmen.[83]

As mentioned above, as in other provinces, the coffee houses in the East, especially in the city and district centers, were often portrayed as "scapegoats" for the lack of participation in the People's Houses due to the daily life and culture they produced, and an image was presented as if they came to life to the extent that they "stole customers" from each other.[84] In Kars, where the proportion of coffee houses was relatively higher, the elitist attitude of the People's House meant that it could not attract the public, and the coffee houses continued to be full.[85] In Diyarbakır, the abolition of the ban on games in coffee houses in 1948 led to a decline in attendance at the Diyarbakır People's House, and therefore there were calls for the ban to be reinstated.[86] While party inspectors' and civil servants' complaints about coffee houses were prominent, the

82 Mardin Halkevi, *Mardin Halkevi Broşürü*, (Mardin Halkevi: 1935), 27.

83 *Halkevleri'nin 1935 Senesi Faaliyet Raporları Hülasası*, (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1936), 49.

84 "Ağrı İlinde Bulunan Halkevleri'nin Teftiş Raporları", CCA.490.01/994.842.2 (16.02.1943).

85 "Halkevi Müsamerelerinde Davetiye Usulü Kaldırılamaz mı?", *Kars*, (6 February 1940).

86 Reşit İskenderoğlu, Head of the People's House, writes: "While in the past years our People's House has enjoyed a level of public interest and popularity that would be difficult for any People's House, this year, unfortunately, it seems to be a bit stagnant in this respect. As a result of observation and examination, it has been understood that the recent governmental permission to play card games in coffeehouses has caused people to flock to coffeehouses. Some citizens even expressed this. Also, those who attend the People's Houses this year prefer playing cards (and consequently gambling) in coffeehouses to attending the courses. Leaving the social and health hazards caused by these card games to the investigation of the relevant authorities, I consider it a social act that must be prevented in terms of the work of the People's Houses. This observation of mine has been submitted to the General Secretariat and the encouragement of many of my fellow People's House members has been instrumental in attempting to remove card games from the coffeehouses as before." "Diyarbakır Halkevi Temsil Şubelerinin Faaliyetleri." CCA. 490.01/1022.934.1, (13.08.1948).

letter containing a complaint from the Bozova district of Urfa stated that the Bozova People's Room, which was supposed to "spread Turkish culture to the civilized Turkish people", was instead offering the playing of games such as backgammon and dominoes and that "the money belonging to the People's Room was spent on this business that had become a coffeehouse."[87] In fact, the violation of the rules on gambling and playing "educational games" such as chess and checkers in the People's House by officials and other local groups is an important theme of the complaints. As mentioned earlier, as in the complaint made by the government doctor from Şırnak[88] a letter of complaint dated 1949 about Erzincan People's House, which was rented out as a coffeehouse and turned into a gambling den, is the subject of this complaint.[89] In his reply to the General Secretariat in response to the complaint, the head of the People's House stated that he had previously requested that bridge, a card game, be allowed to be played at the People's House, but that the Secretariat had forbidden it. Stating that this had caused discontent in the community, the president admitted that bridge was occasionally played in the People's House, which was "always attended by the upper classes", implying that this increased attendance at the People's House.[90] He negotiated with the RPP General Secretariat to at least allow bridge. The Secretariat reiterated that this was strictly forbidden, and asked for the lease agreement with the coffee house to be rescinded.

On the other hand, according to Öztürk, the villages in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia Regions were land-dependent and mountainous, transportation to cities and districts was difficult, and communication, including for relations with the state, was provided through the aghas. For these reasons, the number of both coffee houses and Village Rooms, which were opened in accordance with the Village Law, where "state

87 CCA.490.01/844.340.2.

88 "Siirt Halkevi'nin Faaliyetleriyle İlgili Şikayet ve İstekler", CCA 490/01.843.332.1, (04.08.1950).

89 "Erzincan Halkevi'nin Faaliyetleriyle İlgili İstek ve Şikayetler", CCA 490.01/833.289.1, (08.01.1951)

90 Ibid.

affairs were mostly discussed", was low.[91] However, in the East and in the twelve provinces, Agha Rooms and/or Mukhtar Rooms, Village Room and Dîwanxane appeared as informal village rooms that were not part of the formal procedures.[92] For this reason, they are not included in official statistics. Generally run by village leaders, tribal or clan leaders who also held the office of mukhtar, and privileged by the religious elites, these Rooms emerge as public spaces where community members according to ethnicity, state, class, religion, language, gender and generation were to be found. In Kurdish villages, where the number of schooling opportunities and People's Rooms was minimal, they were the main spaces of political and cultural socialization at the intersection of the traditional and the modern.

As in the Village Rooms, these rooms were characterized by a hierarchical seating arrangement and rules of communication, in which transmission from generation to generation was prioritized, religious elites such as the agha, sheikh and melle (mullah, imam) were privileged, and young people sat near the door. These rooms in relation to the political and social dominance of the institutions of agha, mullah and sheikhdom.[93] In these Rooms, the order of relations with the state and other units, and all kinds of issues in the village were negotiated according to power dynamics and changing contexts.[94] The rooms were frequented by *dengbêjs* and *stranbêjs* (singers), *çîrokbêjs* (storytellers) and traditional performers who sang songs without instruments, the

91 Under the administrative and financial supervision of the village elders such as aghas and mukhtars, the Village Rooms, where village affairs were discussed, where chat and entertainment nights were held and oral culture was maintained, and which provided transmission and socialization from generation to generation, were sometimes considered like coffee houses by the intellectuals of the period, and the People's Room was asked to fill its place. Öztürk, *Cumhuriyet Türkiyesinde Kahvehane ve İktidar (1930-1945),* 286.

92 Ibid.

93 Ibid., 292-295.

94 For the characteristics of the Rooms and Diwanxane in Kurdish villages, their place in everyday socialization, see also Van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan,* 105-108.

bearers of the Kurdish oral tradition. The Rooms were also a place of accommodation for guests such as *feqî* (imams) who came to the village from distant Kurdish settlements to collect fitre (alms for the poor). My mother Belqîza Ayman told me that in the early 1950s, when her father, a member of the RPP, became a mukhtar in the village Mewreg (Dolaylı) after defeating Dewrêş Agha, who had been exploiting and oppressing the villagers with the state's knowledge and consent, he built the Mukhtar's Room next door to his house in opposition to the *Oda Sor* (Red Room), which was an confiscated house from Armenian villagers who migrated from Mewreg due to the war by Derwêş family. Ayman emphasizes that this room created a vibrant and influential ethnic, religious and cultural space, dominated by the Kurdish language, rivaling the *Oda Sor*, with similar qualities to the Agha Room, Guest Room or Village Room (*Odayê Gund*), and in communication with neighboring and distant Kurdish localities. It was also a place of pilgrimage where the collectors of the animal tax, qermuç, meaning whip, and other state officials who inspected the village were welcomed with feasts and conversations with the villagers..[95] This experience shows that the spatiality of the room in the village played a multiple role in the interaction of Kurdish villagers and administrators in both horizontal village organization and the state's process of inclusion, administrative and financial control, which took form according to location, context and actors.

Van Bruinessen, on the other hand, emphasizes that even in the 1970s, a time of mechanization in agriculture, land organization, urban migration, urbanization, Turkish language-oriented modernization, changes in the village hierarchy, intensive assimilation practices, and increased communication technologies, the Agha Room produced a very lively publicness.[96] Therefore, in the early Republican years, when the Kurdish village was relatively distant or left out of the penetration of assimilation, civilization and development practices, different village

95 Interview with Belqîza Ayman, 15 February 2023.

96 Van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan.* 105-108.

rooms named Agha Room, Mukhtar Room, Diwanxane, Guest Room, or Village Room deserve detailed research. In this context, it is possible to say that the public sphere is a phenomenon in which practices of control and design are shaped by various subjectivity positions, power struggles and historical contexts. From this perspective, it can be argued that the analysis of these spaces as the product of static agnatic patriarchal and tribal life, as a hierarchical and allegiance-based space, should not be seen as the end point. It is also evident that more detailed analyses are needed that go beyond the boundaries of this study, including of the ways in which these spaces were contested and how they interacted with state institutional actors and the practices of the People's Rooms.

4.3.1 *Alcohol and Quarrels in the Halkevi Space*

It is observed that the use of alcoholic beverages throughout the country was mostly subjected to bans and restrictions during and after World War II. In the People's Houses, on the other hand, the use of local spirits other than raki and cognac was permitted, only during balls, weddings and engagements, but this was in fact violated in daily practice. In this context, incidents such as "outbursts of anger", "fights with beatings" and "expulsion from the People's House", which were linked to the use of alcohol and drunkenness in the People's Houses in the East, were identified as the cause and consequence of local power conflicts over the use of the space. In Bingöl in 1943, alcoholic beverages were not allowed during celebrations of the 20th anniversary of the Republic. İhsan Altay, the head of the People's House, wrote that "since the family gatherings under the name of ball in the Bingöl neighborhood had only recently begun, they had to be very careful not to have alcoholic beverages, especially considering that the people were of the Shafi sect and were extremely hostile to alcohol".[97] However, according to Altay's letter to the RPP General Secretariat months, after the ball, the judge of the courthouse and the prosecutor defending public rights, who came to the

97 "Bingöl'de 1937-1948 yılları arasında yapılan Cumhuriyet Bayramı kutlamaları". CCA. 490.01/1142.6.2, (03.11.1948).

ball drunk, threw handfuls of chickpeas at the guests and made outrageous remarks. In response to "this ugly and disgraceful incident, which lowered the honor and reputation of the House and caused rumors against the People's House," the governor canceled the ball. In addition, the head of the People's House complained to the Secretariat that while they could request prosecution against the members of the police force, there was nothing that could be done about the judge İsmail Ünlü due to his position, and that the judge, who was actually responsible for the events, should be prosecuted, even though he did not write that explicitly.[98] Writing on behalf of the Secretariat, Münir Hüsrev Göle, a member of parliament from Erzurum, asked the Elazığ Regional Inspector to investigate the incident, clearly angry about it.[99]

In this incident, we see a common example of a fight within the "state house", as state officials sabotaged the ball, one of the symbols of the republic, in violation of this practice, and members of the security forces continued to do so. The fact that the judge was not prosecuted was one of the many complaints about the lack of consequences for the arbitrary actions of high-level state administrators, and there is an emphasis on the negative local perception of this. However, in provinces without RPP offices, it seems more accurate to say that these complaints only became conspicuous in the multiparty period.

A significant number of denunciation letters regarding the People's Houses and People's Rooms in districts of Malatya reflected these incidents.[100] These letters to the RPP General Secretariat, which were characterized as "denunciation letters", could be anonymous; some of them also included allegations that the name of the writer was fake. However, it is important to point out that there was a local conflict underlying these denunciations, that it was related to the regulations of the center, and that it was expressed through the use of the People's House spatiality. In an unsigned letter dated June 6, 1947 regarding the Arapkir People's House in the Arapkir district of Malatya, it was reported

98 Ibid.

99 Ibid.

100 See “Malatya Halkevinin Faaliyetleri”, CCA.490.01/840.321.1, (16.12.1950).

that the Arapkir People's House had not carried out any activities up to that point, and that although it was closed every day, private meetings were organized on official days, where raki was drunk and poker was played.[101] It is also claimed that theater actresses called "theater girls" came to the district and entertained them at the People's House. The letter also stated that the necessary investigation to verify this information could be made by the district governor's office, the Security Police and any other official in the district. Although the RPP General Secretariat wrote to RPP Malatya Regional Inspector Hüsamettin Tugaç, asking him to investigate this situation, there is no further documentation on how this process was conducted.[102]

One incident that took place at the Ağrı People's House in 1938 is another example in which different perceptions and daily practices and habits within local networks of relations regarding the openness of the People's House to the public, especially in the evenings, clashed with the intended use, and the legal status of the People's House and its employees was problematized.[103] In his letter of complaint to the General Secretariat of the RPP, Muharrem Karaca, the secretary of the People's House in Ağrı, who claimed to be the victim of the incident, described in detail the incident that began on December 27, 1938, when he was beaten up by "non-local" civil servants Ö. Saydam from Trabzon and M. Kurşun from Sürmene, who came to the People's House in the evening in a drunken state and wanted to drink there. Afterwards, he was dismissed by the governor "despite being victimized", and the officers who attacked him were not taken to court.[104] No other documents were found except that

101 Ibid.

102 Ibid.

103 "Ağrı İli ve Kazalarındaki Halkevlerinin Faaliyetleri İle İhtiyaçları Hakkında İstek ve Şikayetler", CCA.490.01/733.2.2 (06.04.1943).

104 Karaca wrote the following: "In the face of this situation, I have completely lost myself, and although I belong to a great family in the country, the General Prosecutor, who has trampled on the honor of this family and disregarded the honor of my civil service and the honorable roof of our People's Houses, which is a home of prosperity and the prosperity of our nation, leaves it to your conscience to what extent my rights have been lost due to the illegitimate treatment and my honor has been lowered to the level of a

the RPP General Secretariat sent a copy of Karaca's "complaint against his dismissal" to the People's House and the Governorship of Ağrı, and asked them to reconsider it.

Although we have no further information about the details of this incident, this letter is representative of how complex positions and processes were, such as the non-official status of the People's House staff and the legal process in the court case; the local relations between the members of the People's House and the officers. Also, it reflects the perception and appropriation of the People's House as a place to drink alcohol as a space for spending free time and socializing; the use of violence; and the perception and interpretation of complex positions and processes such as being a member of the People's House or not, being from a prominent local family or being from another region.

Another complaint sent in 1941 from Mardin's Cizre district, which is noteworthy for the fact that it was claimed to be from shopkeepers, is related to the issue of expulsion and exclusion from the People's House, again in connection with the issue of drunkenness, and also includes complaints about the relationship of the district governor, the head of the People's House, with the citizens.[105] Hasan Yıldırım, a photographer, and Kadir Sabuncu, a tailor, sent a telegram to the RPP General Secretariat complaining that the head of the People's House, district governor Tevfik Yener, had refused them admission to the People's House and expelled them. Yıldırım and Sabuncu asked the Secretariat to send an inspector to investigate and evaluate the incident as soon as possible. Three days later, Yıldırım and Sabuncu sent another telegram, this time stating that Yener had pressured and scolded them and that they were "waiting for justice to be carried out". The First General Inspectorate Organization, in which Cizre was included, stated that as a result of their investigation into the complaint, it was understood that these people were not allowed in because they had gone to the People's House in the middle of the night

janitor or even a garbage man. I would like to add that I am now in a victimized situation, and if you have use of your high command, I will appeal to the hearts of us Turks about this matter, and I kiss your hands with deep respect." Ibid.

105 CCA.490.01/841.325.2.

drunk, and wanted to sit there. In another telegram signed Çelebi Öztürk following this correspondence, it was stated that the men were expelled from the People's House by the district governor and that the district governor was restricting individual freedoms in Cizre. "There is no personal freedom in Cizre. We are being expelled from our People's House by District Governor Tevfik Yener. I wish our rights to be protected and the necessary action to be taken against the district governor." The complaint fulminates about the authoritarian attitude of the district governor, who was also the head of the People's House, and points out that this was also experienced through exclusion from the spatiality of the People's House.[106]

4.3.2 *Intersections and Tensions of Religion and the State: The Case of the Prayer in Ergani Halkevi*

On another matter, using the People's House in Ergani because it offered a place to pray, turning it inside out, was also reflected in a complaint to the center. This resulted in correspondence, and seems to tell of the relationship, bureaucratization, and mutual lack of understanding between religion and the state, in the stages in the production of sovereign and disciplinary power, secularism and civilization.

I have already mentioned that within the Kemalist discourse, the People's House was defined as a "temple" or modern "house of worship" that was divorced from religious practices and attributed a secular status. It was analyzed above that in practice, being an alternative to mosques and churches was also symbolized through the architectural field, and mosque and church buildings were transformed into People's Houses. While the People's Houses and the spatiality they represent were intended to replace mosques, it was also intended that the people of the mosque would spend more time in the People's Houses. Religious rituals in mosques, which could be propaganda centers against the regime, the contents of sermons, and the use of Turkish instead of Arabic were

106 Ibid.

controlled, and at the same time, mosques were used for military needs like the People's Houses, and their number was reduced by half.[107]

The local and everyday aspects and social reflections of the reforms and practices of Kemalist secularism brought from the top may be seen in a different light. According to the approaches parallel to this study, the ideology and social imaginations of the Kemalist cadres shaped the policies implemented in the context of secularism, but could not completely determine these policies and their implementation.[108] The regime's limitations in terms of state capacity and the need to refer to its Muslim identity in the path of nation-building, plus the need to achieve a certain compromise with existing religious and traditional institutions were influential in this. Moreover, rather than a systematic project of secularism that followed a certain model, it seems more accurate to talk about a project that was shaped in the process and shaped in an interaction with social and cultural dynamics in local and daily life, that involved unequal power relations.[109] The case of the use of the People's House as a prayer hall by both state actors and other social groups in the Ergani district of Diyarbakır can also be evaluated in accordance with this analysis. This example is meant to make apparent how the People's House could be appropriated and transformed into a reproduced space within local dynamics, and the network of conflicts that this created. In addition, it suggests a connection between the reduction in the number of mosques, and the insufficient mosque space in Ergani.

According to a petition dated November 1, 1943, sent by the First General Inspector Avni Doğan to the General Secretariat of the RPP, the Ergani People's House Presidency informed them that the district governor of Ergani had opened an investigation on the pretext of the last Ramadan Feast Prayers held in the hall of the People's House. According to the petition, an investigation conducted by the Inspectorate in Ergani revealed that Eid prayers had been held in the hall of the People's House,

107 A. Kıvanç Esen, "Tek Parti Dönemi Cami Kapatma/Satma Uygulamaları", 2011, 91-158.

108 Sevgi Adak, "Kemalist Laikliğin Oluşum Sürecinde Ramazanlar (1923-1938), *Tarih ve Toplum Yeni Yaklaşımlar,* no. 11, (Autumn 2010), 86.

109 Ibid.

since the mosque's space was insufficient, and that the current district governor, like the previous district governors, was aware of this issue.Therefore, the information that the district governor recently started this investigation due to his bad relationship with the People's House administrator seemed to be correct. In the rest of the petition, Doğan stated that he had written to the Diyarbakır Governor's Office to terminate the investigation "since no incident requiring legal proceedings had occurred", and "not to allow prayers to be offered in the hall of the People's House under any form or pretext". In addition, the Head of the People's House was also instructed accordingly. Kırklareli MP Nafi Atuf Kansu, on behalf of the General Secretariat of the RPP, wrote to the Ergani People's House Directorate, stating that it had been learned that Eid prayers were held in the hall of the People's House, but reminding them that "no attempt or movement outside of the principles outlined in their instructions would be allowed in the People's Houses, which are our national cultural institutions", he gave one of the responses aimed at establishing state *effect and image*.[110] However, in practice, it is observed that no disciplinary investigation or criminal sanctions were imposed on the Ergani People's House, and the incident was closed in this way.

In the actual process, this document shows to what extent local state actors such as the district governor of Ergani were influenced by local dynamics, and allowed the "misuse" of the People's House, and to what limits, as crystallized in this case, this emerged as a result of interpersonal power struggle, and how the General Inspectorate and central RPP administrators *handled* it. Contrary to the approach that dominates critical approaches to the period, state administrators explain that they responded to the form of social appropriation and violation in the form of using the People's House as a prayer hall by "not making a big deal out of it" on the one hand, and as an intermediate means of sternly reminding people of the ban, whose legitimacy was established on the basis of secular nationalism, on the other. In the literature, it is a dominant determination that social actors, who are accepted as the

110 Ibid.

sources of the alleged failure of the People's Houses in the East, were indifferent and distant from the People's Houses, because they did not speak Turkish, and that only civil servants were observed to participate. It is also argued that the People's Houses were alien to the cultural and social life of the people, and that it was not possible to satisfy all of these factors due to oppressive spatial design and capacity problems. In this study, it is also seen that there is a grain of truth in these statements. However, in this case, it is observed that actors other than civil servants were involved in the formation of the House, not only through statements spread through spoken language, but also through religious expression, practices and forms of socialization that produced a new spatiality. These actors also collaborated with local administrators, positioning themselves somewhere between being involved in this process and being controlled centrally. Therefore, the hypothesis that the process of People's House and state formation was not homogenous, but constituted by multidimensional central and local state influences and interactions in encounters in everyday and local practice is also confirmed.

Since the document including this incident was removed from the archives in the spring of 2015, when I was doing research. It could only be obtained from Senem Aslan who conducted archive research in 2006 and 2007. Through other research, it has been determined that some of the documents on the People's Houses in the East, which were found to be in the Republican Archives, including mostly petitions and complaints, were made available in the Archive for a while and then removed. I assume that they may have been removed from the archives as part of an attempt on behalf of the state for the national and secular state to establish the image of an autonomous, coherent and harmonious structure. On a similar theme, although there are documents reflecting a local conflict over the fact that the deeds of the church used by the People's House in Sarıkamış, which was analyzed above, actually belonged to a mosque, the small number of like documents suggests that similar documents may have been removed from the archives. Thus, although the case of the prayer at the Ergani People's House seems to be

a singular example, since more and more data has emerged in recent years on the relationship of daily religious practices and religious spatiality with the state during the single-party period, and the forms of struggle and negotiation regarding this, it is possible to consider this case as a representative, albeit singular, event.

On the other hand, another case of the interaction between a mosque and a People's House, or between Islamic practices and secularism, is also illustrative. Although it might like to be coded as the acceptable and only public space, it is reported that every evening in Cizre, dozens of people would gather in dozens of rooms for religious and mystical conversations in the banned Kurdish language, where Ahmed Al Jazari's Divan was discussed. There are testimonies that the heads of the Cizre People's House, Ferman Sönmez and Cahit Özkan, as well as the leaders of the People's House and the state, participated in these practices, prayed in congregation, but did not openly show it. This demonstrates that the administrators of the People's House, who both spoke Kurdish and maintained their religious-oriented gathering habitus, did not adopt a homogeneous positioning, but established their symbolic capital in the locality by adopting a dual and ambiguous attitude. In addition, it shows once again that public spaces were also established in homes, which were officiallycoded as private spaces.[111]

This process has become an important component of the formation of the state and the East, in which representatives of the state could play a role, in ways that were not in line with the normative framework of the state and the People's House, in ways that undermined the state's power of control and that it was formed asymmetrically. The transition to the multi-party system was a more dynamic process, in which the bans were loosened and coffee houses and City Clubs were more openly criticized, and complaints against them increased. Similarly, complaints about the transformation of the People's Houses into other venues and the violations committed against them also increased.

111 Altan, Bilal, “Halkevleri Sürecinde Cizre Halkevi Örneği”, 65.

§ 4.4 Concluding Remarks

In the Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, the spatiality of the People's Houses in the Eastern/Kurdish provinces, provinces that show very strikingly that they were formed in relation to space, society, culture beyond their autonomy is analyzed. By looking at the spatial structure and practices of the People's Houses in the East in terms of physical, social and cultural aspects, as well as their transformations and the reproduction processes in the spaces of encounter, a new picture is conjured up in terms of the history of relational, complicated and non-lineer People's Houses and the state formation process in the *East*.

In Chapter 3, the process of the People's House civilization and the Turkification of the East, the processes of the construction of the buildings of the People's Houses and the People's Rooms, as well as the representation of their buildings that produced the spatializing effect of the state, and the practices of converting existing buildings into Houses and Rooms buildings, and their occupation by other state buildings were important themes. In this field of encounter, competition and conflicts between local state institutions regarding the use of People's House property and buildings, corruption, local architectural practices, the reproduction of architectural culture, the use of fixtures, and processes of conflict, reconciliation, struggle and reproduction, derived from local networks of relations, were found to have taken place. I observed that the process of establishing physical space was one of the main channels of communication, negotiation and conflict between central and local actors within the administrative functioning process. For example, People's House buildings being turned into military barracks, police stations, municipalities, schools, and warehouses by the state administrators after the cessation of activities of the People's House, or becoming coffee houses and country clubs, which the People's House hoped to become an alternative to, were found to produce important lines of tension and negotiation related to macro-political dynamics.

These lines were found to be related to the dichotomy of inclusion and exclusion within the framework of Kurdish policy, populism and

secularism. All these examples show that the homogeneous and given strength of the state cannot be normative, and that the fact that the internal affairs of the state produce results contrary to its ideals is a component of state formation. Meanwhile, local struggles and interventions, the appropriation of the cultural heritage of the "other", as in the case of churches, and the internal tensions of the state in the acquisition of property, were related to their discourse, and were not realized from the top down through power dynamics.

Through some representative examples, it was seen that the failure of the Eastern provinces to transform "enormous, full of deficiencies or in ruins" buildings into an ideal and civilized space was not only attributed to the state's financial and administrative weaknesses, but the discourse of the East's own "deficiency, deprivation and backwardness" was brought into play. As this field produced the general state discourse, it was also found that especially after 1940, reactions were visible from within the state to the state's lack of interest in the East, and its coding of the East as a field of "failure" and "lacking" in the example of the People's Houses. In the context of the desired representation, I determined that the state and the People's Houses could not be evaluated on the axis of a definite success or failure in terms of the People's House buildings in the Eastern provinces, the "ideal" building type in accordance with modern and national dimensions, and the related organization and its functioning. It is possible to say that this again has a productive side that crystallizes the process of state formation at the local level. Thus, both the visibility and representation of the state in the physical space, and the equipping of the People's Houses with a mechanism of control and surveillance like a panopticon, are based on a discourse based on failure and the legitimization of the sustainability of this mechanism to overcome this failure. Therefore, failure emerged as an important dynamic of this process, and one of the fundamental components of state formation. Moreover, it was determined that the discourse of failure created a dynamic more as an "internal discourse" of the state. For example, in order for the People's House buildings and spatial use to be "successful" rather than "unsuccessful", they were periodically

monitored and inspected, especially by Party Inspectors. Thus, in order to make this state space established in the East successful in the name of Turkification and modernization, the space, spatial cultures, local administrators and other groupings were monitored, inspected, made readable, and also legitimized and illegitimized in a “rational” functioning, while producing boundaries on what kind of a line of negotiation could be produced through them. Also these boundaries are reshaped by the local actors interventions in a ongoing process.

During the research, the local architectural culture of the buildings, the perceptions and interpretations of the state and People's House administrators on this issue, and the practices of transforming them also emerged as a theme. Local architectural forms and habits, goods and objects, as well as climate and geography, which also affected transportation and communication, were evaluated as prominent actors interacting with state practices. The fact that cement was not the main construction material, especially in villages and then in districts, and that modern furniture was not used for interior decoration, and again that these were already scarce products, created an economic and cultural tension on the center-local line for the People's Rooms and the local society. Local requests to the RPP General Secretariat for funds for the construction and repair of a new building, and for the purchase of furniture or materials that the People's House was required to have, were accompanied by the statement that if this was not provided, the People's House would become inoperable and would have to close down. I observed that these demands increased during the multi-party period when RPP offices were established and evoked a kind of "language of bargaining and blackmail". Thus, it is seen that the timid, frightened and distant citizen profile, which was intended to be included in the new ethos from the more open authoritarian regime, was only changing for the elites who wanted to benefit from the state space due to the legitimization of spatial demands.

In Chapter 4, the People's Houses, which were designed as a public space for communication and socialization between the state and society, as well as between citizens, were examined in the complexity of their

daily public and socialization framework and practices, through a methodology that considers the regulations on this subject. In the process of publicness and socialization envisaged in the People's Houses, the effects of physical and symbolic violence experienced during the official ceremonies as the main practice of the securitarian and colonial-oriented state were discussed. Some cases of how the boundaries of the People's House, from dress codes to gender boundaries, were dealt with reveal that the People's House and state administrators and local social actors also violated the rules, and shaped the physical space of the People's House according to their own needs for socialization and public space. In this respect, the relationship between the coffee house and the City Club was analyzed in relation to other spaces of socialization, such as the Agha, Mukhtar, Village Room and mosque a space for Kurdish language and Kurdish ethnic relations, as well as for contact with the state. Backgammon, card games, and even gambling were practiced, so that they almost became like the coffee houses that the People's House was intended to replace, or even rented out directly to actual coffee houses, and how this produced experiences of conflict and compromise; conflicts linked to drinking and drunkenness, resulting in expulsion from the People's House and beatings up; experiences such as its use as a masjid; the intervention of the social and intra-state space and its negotiation process were observed. It has been concluded that the spatiality of the People's House was produced with the conflicting perceptions of the state's own members, forms of relations that include reconciliation and inversion with the existing rules, and practices of social and public spatialities that are also contradictory. It has once again been seen that different categories, such as gender, class and ethnicity are not marginal but constitutive components in this process.

I demonstrate that the processes of organizing and creating discipline in daily life and habits on the spatial plane did not spread in a simple top-down line and were not produced in the dualism of a strong state and a passive or resistant society. Also the process of spatial control is intersectional with different spatial, social and cultural perceptions and habits in the locality; with the reproductions of everyday publicness; and

with the complex positionings of conflict, compromise, indifference or various forms of resistance that cut across these spaces. Assuming that the administration of the People's House and local social sectors allowed or failed to prevent this violation, it is a simple consequence that the one-party state - as seen in other examples of violations - was associated with a systematic, extremely repressive and consistent control in local practice. This process became an important component of the formation of the state and the East, in which representatives of the state themselves could play a role, in ways that were not in line with the normative framework of the state and the People's House, in ways that undermined the state's power of control, and asymmetrically produced it. The transition to multi-party life was a more dynamic process, in which bans were relaxed and, for example, coffee houses and City Clubs were more openly criticized and complaints against them increased.

Similarly, complaints about the transformation of People's Houses into other venues and the violations committed against them also increased. As we have seen in the case of Cizre, ethnic and religious social subjects produced their own spaces in their homes and in the public spheres they produced, and as we have seen in the case of the Ergani People's House, those who opposed these bans turned to producing their own spaces by transferring their religious worship to the People's House itself. In the context of the state-society relationship, these practices have been found to include appropriating the People's House or producing counter spaces and counter practices, as well as methods such as bribing male officials and notables who did not want their wives to attend the meetings in the People's House due to the obligation to wear a coat instead of a chador, to negotiate with the state to resolve this process and to bend and twist the state’s rules. In the meantime, it can also be interpreted that they recognized its power of control and continued to be within the state sphere through negotiation and struggle. The phenomenon of men entering the People's Houses in their local attire and the inability to prevent this is an example of the state "turning a blind eye". Due to the limitations of the study and the data, it is theoretically possible to speculate that these individuals had complex attitudes that

included both violating and establishing in their own favor, participating by recognizing its legitimacy or vice versa.

Therefore, in line with the theoretical line on which this study is based, it has been shown that the image and effects of the state is a phenomenon that was constantly produced and established through interactions involving both control and negotiation in all actual processes. In the same way, it has been seen that both state members and Kurdish and other subjects do not produce monolithic answers, just as every period or cross-section is not homogeneous, neither do they produce homogeneous and static answers. It has been seen that there were different spatial acts of control, resisting violence with tactics and strategies to cope with it, and turning it from resistance to their own favor.

5

"How Can Kurds Speak?"*:* Linguistic Assimilation and People's Houses in the *East*

"If a person who does not speak Turkish claim to be a member of the Turkish culture and society, it would not be right to believe him/her."

– Mustafa Kemal Atatürk

Dinya bu hikumet Kurmancî rabu[1]

– Musa Anter, Hatıralarım

In this chapter, I analyze how answers to the question "How can Kurds speak?" made the Halkevleri a missionary institution representing the cultural/linguistic aspect of the state's discourse and practices towards

1 "The world became the government and Kurdish/Kurdishness disappeared".

the Kurdish population in eastern Turkey, and how the receptors responded to these answers between 1932 and 1951. I seek to analyze this problematic alongside the linguistic politics of the *Kemalist* state in the 1930s and 1940s. As mentioned, the state's rulers' motto was "solving of the issue of Kurdishness in a Turkified Kurdish-speaking population as long as it is civilizing; civilizing them as long as they are Turkified." This politics signified the eradication of the Kurdish language, which was the second most spoken language in the country. Likewise, this policy forced the Kurds to adopt the official language, otherwise they could not speak and communicate, and they could not benefit from their citizenship rights and could not be active in the fields of education, economy or bureaucracy. On the other hand, the Kurdish language being banned, they were prevented from producing their own linguistic universe, and the webs of meaning that encompass the whole of life. The ultimate goal of the state rulers was to ensure that the Kurds and all those who did not speak Turkish, not only learn Turkish, which they called "the state language", but also adopt it as their mother tongue. As I noted above, in order to construct a new East, freed from the connotations of Kurdishness, as well as heterogeneous religious and linguistic adherents, the People's Houses were charged with organizing a wide range of activities to achieve identical and spatial homogeneity through a comprehensive assimilation plan. They were thus a leading institution that directly and indirectly forced adults to speak only in Turkish. This way, it aimed to provide them with a new identity, based on a change of self, oriented toward Turkishness.

The comprehensive historical process and the experience covering its everyday aspects that reflected the characters of state formation in the East in a way that went beyond binary oppositions captured in either the success or the failure of state and society, have not been examined until now. The broader question investigated this chapter is as follows: how and by which methods were linguistic assimilationist practices implemented in the "Kurdish East" by the People's Houses as a missionary institution, to turkify the region by the linguicide of "other" languages and through linguistic assimilation? How were the state's

areas of tension regarding Kurdish politics and the implementation processes of the Houses' practices shaped in relation to place, time and actors and in everyday, micro, and local contexts? What are the effects of these practices? And, what were the complicated responses of perceptors and speakers of other languages?

As was pointed out earlier, scholars interested in the linguistic changes and linguistic assimilation of the people in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, in general, and Kurds, in particular, have tended more to delve into discourses and practices of the state with a specific attention to the People's Houses, without going into their social and cultural effects and responses in the localities. Moreover, the state and the People's Houses have been viewed by such binary oppositions as strong/weak, successful/failed, and monolithic/non-monolithic. With the exception of various notable studies undertaken in recent years, the actors that were subjected to linguistic assimilation generally tend to be depicted through a bipolar perspective; that is, they are viewed to be totally resistant or else as obedient objects of linguistic assimilation.[2]

This assessment stemmed from the coercive character of the state-led reforms in linguistic areas where the consent of the community was not so visible. Therefore, analyses can be concluded by simply stating that these are attempts at cultural domination of society, or attempts at acculturation. Indeed, the level of imposition of Turkish, which is constructed as one of the main constitutive criteria of the national identity on speakers of other languages has just meant more violence. However, this reality does not mean that it is useless to conduct research

2 The works by Aslan, Lamprou and Türköz are exceptions embedding the societal grifted reactions to the linguistic reforms and practices in Republican era. See Senem Aslan, "Citizen, Speaks Turkish!, A Nation in the Making", *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 13 (2007): 245-72; Alexandros Lamprou, "Nationalist Mobilisation and State-Society Relations: The People's Houses' Campaign for Turkish İzmir", *Middle Eastern Studies,* 49, no. 5 (2013): 824–839, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2013.811653; Meltem F. Türköz, "The Social Life of The State's Fantasy: Memories and the Documents on Turkey's 1934's Surname's Law" (PhD dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 2004); Türköz, "Surname Narratives and State-Society Boundary: Memories of Turkey's Family Name Law of 1934", *Middle Eastern Studies* 43, No. 6 (November 2007): 893-908.

into the everyday experiences of these oppressive processes. On the contrary, this dissertation argues that there is a lack of analysis on this matter, and containing the Houses' linguistic assimilation, reaching the degree of even *linguicide* to turkify people, their effects or side effects.[3] There is a gap in the exploration and interpretation of the reactions of historical subjects to the techniques of violence of the People's Houses and the state in general, as well as horizontal and vertical power relations, within the locality and in the everyday situation. This may help one understand the ways in which the state has both produced and eradicated Kurdishness, by aiming to create a new "Republican East".

Citizens' reactions to the linguistic practices of the Halkevi, which represent the local implementation and interpretation of state policy, may go beyond binary oppositions into realms such as challenge, avoidance, resistance, or accordingly acceptance or accommodation. It is possible to imagine that people challenged, reacted to and negotiated these reforms culturally and politically on the everyday level in different times and space.[4] Furthermore, even failures of the state toward assimilation might have asymmetrical effects and results or they might be perceived, interpreted and subverted differently by social and cultural agents.

In what follows, I first discuss the research findings into the everyday indoctrination practices of the People's Houses, with a specific focus on teaching Turkish and making it the mother-tongue of the locals. In this context, one can see a reproduction of the domination of the Turkish language alongside the efforts of the People's Houses actors oriented at the denial, invisibility, and extermination of Kurdish and other languages. As a *cultural/linguistic capital*, Turkish was taught with more sophisticated techniques besides the straightforward violence that aimed to change their memory, mind, habitus and life-style. Hence, not

3 Amir Hassanpour, *Nationalism and Language in Kurdistan*, 1918-1985, (San Francisco: Mellen Research University Press, 1992).

4 For the everyday cultural negotiation of Kemalist cultural/linguistic reforms and practices, see Hale Yılmaz, *Becoming Turkish, Nationalist Reforms and Cultural Negotiations in Early Republican Turkey, 1923-1945.*

only the interpretation of state officials, members and executives of Houses regarding institutional practices and cultural techniques, but also the receivers' responses, need to be unveiled. In this context, I also attempt to reinterpret the "silences" and "voices" collected from the different official and non-official sources. I aim to analyze them by way of the non-linear and complex positions of both the actors and power relations. I want to pose questions such as: how and what are the discourses, practices, experiences, and effects of the assimilation of Kurds and non-Turkish speakers in the *East*? In what ways did the People's Houses spread linguistic assimilation into daily processes? What were the different interpretations and proposals of the state cadres regarding assimilation and its effects? What were the specific practices through different social groups and individuals in the localities? What were the responses and reactions of local people in the context of state-culture and state-society relations? Which types of challenges and negotiations took place? How can we evaluate the results from the point of view of the arguments of the failure or success of the Houses? What is the meaning and effect of failure or success as seen through the cultural assimilation process in the East?

It can be argued that the process of cultural/linguistic assimilation was not simply a "top-down" process of state governance, when one adopts non-autonomous, non-monolithic and relational attitudes, the interconnected character of state formation's tension, and manners which compromise or conflict with the cultural and social space. Hence, the cultural/linguistic assimilation had already been performed by the officials in different and complex forms throughout the power techniques and networks in the central and local axis. The people's explicit and implicit responses and their consequences also include the complicated matrixes, either culturally or politically.

§ 5.1 The Single-Party State's Linguistic Practices

James Scott argues that the 20th century witnessed the emergence of a "high modernist" state, that attempted a wholesale transformation of their societies according to new disciplinary logics. If one accepts that the state is formed of images, representations, cultural discourse and practices, and their effects on the historical process, as Scott suggests the cultural sphere becomes the scene of these types of state government techniques. From imposing surnames to standardizing language, "high modernist" states have sought "huge, utopian changes in people's work habits, living patterns, moral conduct, and worldview." Indeed, this goal implies the modern transformation of the cultural life of a society. The main motivation of this statecraft is to render society "legible" and "to arrange the population in ways that simplified the classic state functions of taxation, conscription, and prevention of rebellion."[5] On the other hand, considering culture as a relational variable of state formation, one can assume that language being a cultural phenomenon, it should be admitted as constructing or reproducing, or constructed and reproduced entity. As to the case of Turkey, the hegemonic elites defended the idea of a "high modernist" state and society, hence a monist national regime and society. The ambition of state-led radical changes in cultural life thus appears most clearly in the linguistic area.

It should be noted that these "new" politics and radicalisms had their origins in the late Ottoman period. The 19th-century Ottoman state elites, inspired by nationalist ideas, announced Ottoman Turkish as the official language. Especially in response to nationalist movements in the Balkans, some Ottoman-Turkish nationalists advocated the purification of the Turkish language and linguistic nationalism. A multi-cultural and multi-lingual empire was viewed as a danger from the point of view of nationalist ideologies, as it came to mean more territorial losses, especially after the Balkan Wars. Besides, the Ottoman Empire is estimated by some scholars to have had colonial practices as well as its

5 James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 5.

civilising practices on the peripheries, and is also considered to have been a semi-colonial country seeking to cope with this situation.[6]

During this period, not understanding state documents such as legislation documents or the public announcements made in Ottoman Turkish by the ordinary Turkish speakers was another problem between the state and the people.[7] Inspiring the populism discourse the "people's language" was seen as more acceptable than the "the language of the palace". Thus, the Turkish language was always seized upon by the Turkish nationalists for the Young Turks in the Second Constitutional Period, as well as in the Single-Party Era, as the language was an evidence of Turkishness in an Empire where the population was ethnically mixed.[8] Besides, language was seen as the most effective way to induce ethnic change, and the inclusion of the other Ottoman Muslim ethnicities. Hence, inspiring pioneering figures like Gökalp and Köprülü, linguistic nationalism became one of the predominant currents in this period.[9]

6 According to Reşat Kasaba, even before this period, in provinces such as Eastern Rumelia, the government insisted on teaching Turkish to Muslim ethnicities, even in formal education, and tried to prevent them from going to schools opened by "foreigners", which could undermine Ottoman sovereignity. Reşat Kasaba, "Göç ve Devlet: Bir İmparatorluk Cumhuriyet Karşılaştırması", *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e, Problemler, Araştırmalar, Tartışmalar*: 1. Uluslararası Tarih Kongresi, 24-26 Mayıs 1993, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998), 340; Yusuf Ziya Öksüz, *Türkçe'nin Sadeleşme Tarihi: Genç Kalemler ve Yeni Lisan Hareketi*, (Ankara: 1995). For the roots of linguistic nationalism in the Ottoman era, see David Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism 1876-1908*, (London: 1977), 56-78. For the early Republican era, see Agâh Sırrı Levend, *Türk Dilinde Gelişme ve Sadeleşme Evreleri*, (Ankara: 1972); Geoffrey Lewis, *Turkish Language Reform*, *A Catastrophic Success,* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press: 1999); Lewis, *Trajik Başarı*, *Türk Dil Reformu*, (İstanbul: Çeviribilim Yayınları, 2015).

7 Geoffrey Lewis, *Trajik Başarı, Türk Dil Reformu,* 30-43.

8 M. Berk Balçık, "Milliyetçilik ve Dil Politikaları", *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce,* vol. 4, *Milliyetçilik,* İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003, 777-787.

9 Ziya Gökalp and Fuat Köprülü are important political and intelectual figures of linguistic Turkish nationalism. Gökalp wrote a poem titled "Language" (*Lisan*) thinking that Turkish nationalism and setting up Turkishness is a more eligible and realistic "solution" for the "salvation" of the whole Muslim population in an Ottoman context as well: "The language of Turkishness is one / His religion is one / His homeland is one / But they are all separated / If not, his language is one / Turan has one hand / And he

Nevertheless, under the independent or semi-autonomous Kurdish rule in the Ottoman Empire, Kurdish was supported and reproduced. Ottoman Turkish was hegemonic and found more room in formal education. However, there were some cases where Kurdish was officially recognized. For instance, in response to a request made from Muş in 1913, the Ministry of Domestic Affairs said that a Kurdish translator would be provided in a court case. Kurdish was also used in publications. The violent rejection of Kurdish as a language, in addition to outlawing and criminalizing its use in public places, publications and education, emanated from the fact that the Turkish linguistic nationalist republican elites feared that the continued existence of Kurdish would pave the way for Kurdish nation-building.

The governors and policy-makers during the period of single-party rule were successors of the Young Turks. Thus, they developed linguistic nationalism that imagined that all Turkish citizens could have a homogenous national identity based on an official language which would be expected to become the mother-tongue of its citizens. Abandoning Ottoman-Turkish also meant a break from the Ottoman past, which included the legitimacy of the heterogeneous political and cultural identities and languages. They aimed for a radical change of identity of not only of those with Turkish ethnic descent but also all Muslim citizens, who were considered to be proper candidates for Turkishness compared to non-Muslims.

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has only one language / He who says "There is another language" / He has another ambition (Türklüğün lisanı bir/Dini bir vatanı bir/Fakat hepsi ayrılır/Olmazsa lisanı bir/ Turan'ın bir eli var /Ve yalnız bir dili var /"Başka dil var" diyenin/Başka bir emeli var)." Faruk K. Timurtaş, *Dil Davası ve Ziya Gökalp*, (İstanbul: Fakülteler Matbaası, 1965), 30. It is ironic that some researchers and political figures argue that Gökalp studied for modernizing the Kurdish language by Kurdish nationalist intellectuals Hanili Salih bey and Xelil Xeyalî at the beginning of the 20th century. For the sources about these issues, see Cemil Paşa (Zinar Silopi), *Doza Kurdistan*, (Ankara: Özge, 1991), 29 and Malmisanij, *Yirminci Yüzyılın Başında Diyarbekir'de Kürt Ulusçuluğu,* (1900-1920), (İstanbul: Vate Yay., 2010), 28-37, cited by Fuat Dündar, "Kürt Sorunu Ekseninden Bir Ziya Gökalp Biyografisi", *Kürt Tarihi ve Siyasetinden Portreler,* eds. Yalçın Çakmak and Tuncay Şur, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2018), 143-157.

Meanwhile, similar to the Republican citizenship found in Western Europe, the Turkish republican citizenship, too, viewed Turkishness to be the supra-identity that would be "inclusive" of other ethnic identities. In this sense, it aspired to be culturally rather than ethnically nationalist. However, inspired by "cultural populism" and secular "Western civilization", republican political and cultural elites tensely negotiated western cultural elements. However, if the extent to which popular culture *(hars)* would be synthesized into the new national culture was constantly negotiated, there would be a greater consensus on the definition and language of this folk culture. This means an exclusivist and assimilationist approach to all ethnicities, including even Turkish ethnicity itself.[10] Üstel argues that in the course of the political transition from the empire to nation-state, Turkish citizenship and nationalism possesses the dual characteristics of territorial nationalist and cultural assimilationist.[11] In the official discourse, a formulation that combines essentialist-culturalist and linguistic nationalism with civil-assimilationist citizenship is gradually becoming dominant.[12] The emphasis on Turkishness possessing the two sides occupied a central position in the program of the Republican Public Party (RPP) in the 1930s. Indeed, a condition to become a member of the RPP was to adopt "Turkish culture", and the Turkish language as your mother tongue, according to the party program of 1927 and 1931. This situation closed the doors to all the citizens whose mother tongue was not Turkish, or

10 A considerable number of scholars such as Şener Aktürk claim that the state produced a language and culture in the circle of Western civilisation being new and foreign for all ethnic groups including "pure Turk" Turkomans, and demanded they be assimilated into this new Turkish language and culture. Şener Aktürk, "Karşılaştırmalı Siyasetin Zaviyesinden Türk Kimliğinin Geçmişi, Bugünü ve Geleceği", *Türkiye Günlüğü* 114, (Spring 2013): 40.

11 Füsun Üstel, "Türk Milliyetçiliği ya da Vatandaşlığın Kültürel Boyutu", *Türkiye'nin Kürt Sorunu,* 29-32.

12 "According to the conceptions of the Party and the new state, every citizen living in the Republic of Turkey speaking the Turkish language, growing with the Turkish culture and embracing the Turkish 'ideal' no matter what religion and origin they belong to is Turkish… " *On Beşinci Yıl Kitabı,* 10.

were not able to speak Turkish or did not adopt the supposed Turkish culture. Thereby, to be a Turkish citizen was not enough for the membership, for political participation as a member of the single party.[13]

The Turkification project aimed, above all, to replace the Turkish language with religion as the basis of commonality among those whose mother tongue was not Turkish, and who did not ethnically or nationally identify themselves as Turkish.[14] Large-scale linguistic engineering policies during the 1920s and especially 1930s included the prohibition and invisibilization of other languages in both public and private spaces. Various practices of linguistic engineering were as follows: change of the script from Arabic to Latin; the closure of madrasas where Kurdish was the main medium of instruction; Turkifying first names, surnames and place names;[15] Turkish translation of prayers; purifying Turkish of foreign vocabulary and grammar; and collecting words that were used in everyday speech and old Turkish texts to create a new Turkish vocabulary.[16] For Zürcher, the linguistic planning policy of nationalist Turkey was "the most coercive measure". As for Lewis, Turkish language reform was successful but because of the brutality was also *tragic,* even

13 Mesut Yeğen, *Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu,* 95.

14 Fuat Dündar, Measuring Assimilation: 'Mother Tongue' Question in Turkish Censuses and Nationalist Policy, *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 41 (4), (October 2014), 1-21.

15 Uğur Ümit Üngör, *The Making of Modern Turkey, Nation and State in Eastern Anatolia, 1913-1950,* 243.

16 Senem Aslan, "Everyday Forms of State Power and the Kurds in the Early Turkish Republic", 75-93. Aslan claims that, "the new Turkish language implied a radical rupture from the Ottoman past, which state elites associated with backwardness and ignorance. They considered the pluralistic character of the Ottoman Empire to be the main reason for its dissolution and perceived the spread of a common language as indispensable for political and cultural unity. As Şükrü Kaya, the minister of the interior, stated: "The biggest responsibility of a government is to assimilate all who live within its boundaries into its own community. While many people did not assimilate (in the past), the Ottomans suffered from that." Elsewhere he explained that assimilation should produce "a country which would speak one single language, think and feel alike." Ibid., 79.

for Turkish speakers. For French philosopher Derrida, language reform means in fact “Coup de lettres” (a coup d’etat against the language).[17]

Meanwhile, creating a simple alphabet and a simplified Turkish was one of the main objectives of this revolutionary change in the process of development of the civilized nation, to solve the question of the very low literacy rates among the *peopl*e.[18] On the other hand, it should be said that the expression “Language Revolution” or “Language Reform” is adopted or challenged by different political actors and societal groups,

17 Erik Jan Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye’nin Tarihi,* 2nd ed. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996), 273. Geoffrey Lewis, *Turkish Language Reform,* A Catastrophic Success. The letter reform, one of the most radical steps in modernizing Turkey, also attracted the attention of French philosopher Jacques Derrida. In a letter written during a visit to Istanbul, the French philosopher Derrida, who was also interested in the philosophy of language, called the transliteration in Turkey a "coup de lettres", a jarring break with the language and meaning of the past. Derrida, *Yaşamı Yeniden Düşünürken, Cogito*, no. 47/48, (Automn 2006): 9-15. E. Szurek and B. Caymaz also argue that the political, cultural and social impact of this radical practice in Turkey has been enormous compared to other countries. Emmanuel Szurek and Birol Caymaz, “La Révolution au Pied de la Lettre. L’invention de L’alphabet Turc”, *European Journal of Turkish Studies,* no. 6, URL : http://www.ejts.org/document1363.html.

18 In 1927, the literacy rate was 4% for women, 13% for men and 8.16% for the general population. It was recorded that 5-6% of this was composed of people who knew the old script and the rest of the population was composed of non-Muslims and people who knew other languages. The literacy rate was 30% in urban areas and 6% in villages. President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the most enthusiastic pioneer of the radical reform especially concerning language and history for a new national identity, and educated developed country having the same alphabet with western countries, and a modern language considered these aspects also for the cultural and political homogenization of the citizens. As a matter of fact, Mustafa Kemal expressed his satisfaction in 1929 by stating that the National Schools, the most important public education institution until the opening of the People's Houses, "served to enlighten hundreds of thousands of citizens, both men and women, outside of normal education, and that the Turkish letters had been fully implemented in the public life of the country" and that "the first difficulties in the transition to Turkish letters were easily overcome thanks to the nation's strength of ideals and its love for civilization". *Ayın Tarihi* 21, no.68, november 1929, 23-28. For ideas and special efforts of Atatürk see Lewis, 2006.

and a radical break from the *past*, it became one of the most persisting and long-discussed subjects in the period under question.[19]

§ 5.2 The State, People's Houses and Kurdish Linguicide: Political and Juridicial Attempts

Following World War I, the Kurdish-speaking population were dispersed in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and the former Soviet Union. They spoke the dialects of Kurmancî, Soranî and Zazakî/Dimilî. Belonging to the southwestern group of the Iranian languages, Kurdish is not close to the Turkic languages.[20] In Turkey, Kurds spoke Kurmanci and then Zazakî. The deputy of Muş Hacı Ahmet Hamdi's speech signals that it was officially stated that in the early 1920s, "92 percent of the inhabitants of Kurdistan do not speak Turkish."[21][22]

The prohibition and elimination of Kurdish, the language of the second largest ethnic group in Turkey after Turkish, was the main goal of the language engineering project agreed upon by state administrators. Like the colonizers in Africa, the Turkish nation-state's rulers seemed to target the colonization of the minds of non-Turkish speakers, especially of Kurdish Eastern ones through the imposition of their languages and

19 Hale Yılmaz, *Becoming Turkish, Nationalist Reforms and Cultural Negotiations in Early Republican Turkey.*

20 Van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh and State; The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan,* 22-23. Kurdish speakers especially including Kurmanci and Sorani ones can more or less understand each other. Ibid.

21 Kurdistan here seems to correspond here, more or less, to the twelve provinces analyzed in this dissertation. Statement by Hacı Ahmet Hamdi, MP for Muş, TBMM ZC, I/6-30.11.1336 (1920), 156-157, cited by Nevzat Onaran, *Ermeniler, Rumlar, Türkler, Türk Nüfus Mühendisliği (1914-1940),* (İstanbul: Kor Kitap, 2017), 25.

22 It is a misconception that the last census in 1985 asked a question on mother tongue. The question asked was "the language spoken in the household", which is recorded in the official statistics as the mother tongue. In fact, this can be considered as a statistical technique of the state in order not to count people who speak Kurdish as their mother tongue, but later assimilate it, and speak Turkish in the household. See Dündar "Measuring Assimilation: 'Mother Tongue' Question in Turkish Censuses and Nationalist Policy", 1-21.

the extermination of local languages.[23] As Hassanpour and Skutnabb-Kangas describe, Turkey's state policy toward the Kurdish language implied virtually a linguistic and cultural war and genocide.[24] They are closely involved in Kurdish language policies, and have called such a policy *linguicide*.

State elites considered unacceptable another effective language spoken mainly by Kurds who lived in a region having problems of incorporation and manifesting some types of uprisings and resistance, in a country where the level of literacy was dramatically low at 8 percent, even in 1935. It is noted that by the late 1950s, the countrywide rate of literacy had reached 33.6 percent. This rate was 3 percent among the Kurds.[25] This was because the policies and strategies of the Kemalist ruling elites, due to the "resolution of this problem" "in theory", were

23 African author and academic Ngugi wa Thiong'o states that 'for colonisers, economic and political control can never be complete or effective without mental control and the domination of people's language by the languages of the colonising nations was crucial to the domination of the mental universe of the colonised'. Ngugi wa Thiong'o, *Decolonising Mind, The Politics of Language in African Literature*, (England: James Currey Ltd, 1997), 16.

24 Amir Hassanpour, *Nationalism and Language in Kurdistan*; Kürdistan'da Milliyetçilik ve Dil, (İstanbul: Avesta Yayınevi, 2005); Tove Skutnabb-Kangas, "Kurds in Turkey and in (Iraqi) Kurdistan: A Comparison of Kurdish Educational Language Policy in Two Situations of Occupation", *Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal* 3, no. 1, (2008), 43-73.

25 See Metin Heper, *The State and the Kurds in Turkey, The Question of Assimilation,* (New York: Palgrave, Mac Millan, 2007), 110. The rate in 1935 dropped to much lower rates in the 12 provinces at the center of this study, when literacy in Arabic letters and Ottoman Turkish was banned, and Kurdish and Arabic were banned. Low literacy rates were also observed in the eastern settlements where Turkish was dominant. Although 52.9% of the population of Iğdır, which had been part of the pre-Republican province of Revan, then Bayazıt and then Kars in 1934, spoke Turkish, its literacy rate in 1927 was 1.4%, far below the average for Turkey. Only 17 women were recorded as knowing how to read and write in the town with a population of more than 25 thousand. On the other hand, besides Kurdish and Turkish, one person reported speaking Circassian and 13 people reported speaking other languages. TCBGUM, 1935 General Population Census, (Ankara: 1937), 382, akt. Hidayet Kara ve Sami Yuca, "Cumhuriyet'in İlk Nüfus Sayımına Göre Iğdır'ın Demografik Yapısı", *History Studies* 2/3, (2010), 194, 196-7, 189-200,

based on compulsory Turkishness.[26] *The Law for the Maintenance of Order* was passed soon after the 1925 Sheikh Said Rebellion was crushed. In force till 1929, this law gave extraordinary powers to the government. It was also the beginning of the single-party period.[27] The first reflections of the exclusion of Kurdish identity were seen. For instance, the removal of all references to the name of Kurdistan from official materials and the Turkification of the names of Kurdish place names, restrictions on the use of Turkish in courts, and the prohibition of Kurdish.

There is a crucial argument that the single-party state's rulers who adopted such discriminatory regulations, did not exactly act in conformity with the conditions of the Lausanne Peace Treaty (1924). Contrary to the obligations of the Lausanne Treaty, especially in the 1930s, at a time period when ultra-nationalism and fascism were the rising trend all over the world, Kurdish-speaking citizens were punished and no adequate facilities were offered to non-Turkish speaking people in courts.[28] The Plan for the Reform in the East implied concrete prohibition and punishment against the Kurdish language in official departments, schools, the bazaar, etc.[29] As Zürcher claims that after the

26 Ahmet Yıldız, *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene: Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Seküler Sınırları (1919-1938),* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), 246.

27 Mesut Yeğen, *Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu*, 217. According to Yeğen, in fact, the republican state was engaged in the exclusion of Kurdish national identity by means of assimilation, compulsory settlements, and so on: "While the Turkish state was engaged in the practice of excluding Kurdish national identity, the Turkish state's discourse maintained that the state was actually engaged in repressing political reactionaries, smuggling or tribal resistance". Ibid.

28 Article 39 of the Lausanne Peace Treaty, being not implemented through statism, is as follows; "No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind or at public meetings. Notwithstanding the existence of the official language, adequate facilities shall be given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral use of their own language before the Courts", see https://www.mfa.gov.tr/lausanne-peace-treaty-part-i_-political-clauses.en.mfa.

29 Article 17 of the plan was such that: "In the regions located west of the Euphrates, where our Kurdish citizens live, the Kurdish language should be absolutely prohibited" and the 14th article of the plan is: ""Anyone originally Turkish, but who started to be defeated by Kurdishness in the provinces of Malatya, Elaziz, Diyarbekir, Bitlis, Van, Muş, Urfa,

Ağrı Revolt (1927-1930), the single-party state's officials studiously neglected Kurdish ethnic identity, officially and publicly.[30] Since the Ağrı Rebellions (1927-30), led by the *Xoybun* organization which opposed the Republic's public order, cultural policy, centralization and practices with Kurdish nationalist motifs and demands for autonomy, created a dramatic break in the construction of the state and the East, as did the Sheikh Said Rebellion. The governor of Bitlis said to Ihsan Nuri's mother-in-law, a Kurdish military actor who had served in the Ottoman Army but later became a dissident, by refusing to accept the practices of the republic, the commander of the Ararat Rebellion: "Madam, what has your son-in-law done? Even though we are all educated people here, we cannot manage ourselves properly in the conditions we live in. How are these illiterate, ignorant Kurds living in the mountains to govern themselves?"[31] In this example, a local state administrator claims, from an orientalist perspective, that the illiterate and "mountain ignorant" cannot be subjects of autonomous or independent administration/governance. This carries a political rationality parallel to the central line represented by the Chief of General Staff Fevzi Çakmak, who opposed schooling. Illiterate but Turkish-speaking peasants, on the other hand, as would become evident in the 1930s, were considered more "acceptable", somewhere between orientalism and glorification, as they were considered capable of producing a national culture because they possessed their own folk heritage and language.

Ergani, Hozat, Erciş, Adilcevaz, Ahlat, Palu, Çarsancak, Çemişgezek, Ovacık, Hısnımansur, Behinsi, Arga, Hekimhan, Birecik, Çermik, those who use languages other than Turkish in government and municipal offices and other facilities and organizations, schools, bazaars and markets in provincial and district centers shall be punished with the crime of opposing and resisting the orders of the government and municipality". Mehmet Bayrak, *Kürdoloji Belgeleri II,* (Ankara: Özge Yayınları, 2004), 24.

30 Eric Jan Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi,* 250-51.

31 Kumru Toktamış, "Bazı Kadınlar İçin Savaş Hiç Bitmez, Yaşar Hanım'ın Anıları", *Kürt Tarihi,* no. 37, (July, August, September 2019), 15. See also Sedat Ulugana and Kumru Toktamış, *Ağrı İsyanı'nda İstanbullu Bir Kadın: Yaşar Hanım'ın Anıları*, (Ankara: Dipnot Yayınları, 2023).

In that process, The Sun-Language Theory and Turkish History Thesis, claiming Turkish language and civilization as the sources of all the languages and civilizations in the world, were being institutionalized. They were attempting to justify the necessity of enforcing the uniqueness and the dominance of the Turkish language and civilization, as it possessed roots extending to Middle Asia, the homeland of Turkish ethnicity.[32] The Turkification program spread over the public and personal regime, within private laws including daily language, education, industrial and commercial life.[33] The campaign of "Citizen, speak Turkish" targeted non-Turkish speakers in the country, and it involved the use of violence.[34] The local government implemented pecuniary punishment on the citizens who spoke the non-Turkish language in public areas.[35]

32 Etienne Copeaux, *Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk-İslam Sentezine, İ*stanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998; İsmail Beşikçi, *Türk Tarih Tezi "Güneş-Dil Teorisi" ve Kürt Sorunu*, (İstanbul: İsmail Beşikçi Vakfı, 2013).

33 See, Murat Koraltürk, "İşgücünün Türkleştirilmesi ve Türkçe Zorunluluğu", in *Erken Cumhuriyet Döneminde Ekonominin Türkleştirilmesi*, ed. Murat Koraltürk, (İstanbul: İleitişim Yayınları, 2011), 265-75; Ahmet Yıldız, Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene: Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Seküler Sınırları (1919-1938), 272-3. One of the most important examples of Turkification of the economy is the transfer of non-Muslim capital to overcome the economic crisis during the Second World War, the Wealth Tax (Varlık Vergisi Kanunu, 11 November 1942). For detailed information, see Ayhan Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları,* (İstanbul İletişim Yayınları: 2010).

34 Balçık, "Milliyetçilik ve Dil Politikaları". 783.

35 Hikmet Kıvılcımlı, one of the most important intellectuals and politicians who took part in the communist movement during this period, reports that in 1933, after the Language Revolution, a special correspondent "made a pass" at Lazness by saying that the only difference between the Laz people beyond Giresun and the Turks was their language: "The only difference between the essentially brave (don't let the French hear!...), naturally intelligent, talented, patriotic, hospitable Laz people and the Turks is that they have a special language". Here, the "high virtues" of the Laz are emphasized to the extent that they are similar to the Turks, while, similar to the approach to Kurdish, the Laz language is presented as a minor difference and is considered worthless. Kıvılcımlı reports that in Hatay's Dörtyol, the district governor's office, under an arbitrary decree, announced that those who spoke a language other than Turkish in public places could be subjected to severe investigations and harsh punishments. Hikmet Kıvılcımlı, *Yedek Güç Milliyet (Doğu)*, (İstanbul: Sosyal İnsan Yayınevi, 2009), 36.

Kemalist intellectual elites use racist scientific productions such as these theories Sun Language Theory and Turkish History Thesis to legitimize their attempts to ban and destroy the folk languages of other ethnic groups. According to these theses, which claim that the languages and cultures of Kurds and other non-Turkish ethnicities are based on Turkishness, the source of all languages and civilizations, Kurdish is already an extension of Turkish. Since it has been scientifically proven that the source of civilization is Turkishness, Kurds should recall their forgotten Turkish language and assimilate in the name of civilization. Since it has been scientifically proven that the source of civilization is Turkishness, Kurds should recall their forgotten Turkish language and assimilate in the name of civilization. Üngör notes that after the elimination of the Kurdish elites from the East, the Kemalists also saw also the remaining Kurdish population of peasants, nomads, and city-dwellers as 'raw material' for the Turkish nation.[36] Vali also signals that Kemalist state actors, and the Pehlevi regime in Iran legitimized the processes of territorial centralization based on violence, asserting the principle of the legal-political sovereignty of the people written in their constitutions.[37] He states that, similar to the Sheikh Said Rebellion, the Simko Rebellion, launched by the Kurds in Iran, who resisted the policy of territorial centralization, was defined as tribal, primitive and anti-modern, and in both countries, the ethnic difference of the Kurds was seen as a phenomenon that disrupted national sovereignty and territorial integrity. In this context, the suppression of the Kurdish language and culture, and the denial of Kurdish ethnic identity, were integral to the discursive strategies of national identity, and asserted the monism and indivisibility of sovereignty. Vali analyzes how the Kurdish language was the first target in this process, the position of the Kurdish language and the exclusion of Kurdish civil society and public space in this context:

36 Uğur Ümit Üngör, "Geographies of Nationalism and Violence: Rethinking Young Turk 'Social Engineering'", *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, Thematic Issue, no. 7, (2008), Demographic Engineering - part I, URL : http://www.ejts.org/document2583.html.

37 Abbas Vali, "Milliyetçilik ve Kürt Tarih Yazımı", *Kürt Tarihi, Kimliği ve Siyaseti, Kuramsal Bir Yaklaşım,* trans. İbrahim Bingöl, (İstanbul: Avesta Yayınları, 2013), 13-45.

> "Kurdish was no longer the language of the different, it was the language of the other, that is, of hostility and opposition. This immediately called into question the identity of the sovereign and the legitimacy of the new order. The suppression of Kurdish identity is intrinsic to the self-definition of these nation-states, whose histories were not prioritized by capitalist entrepreneurs or liberal political culture. In Turkey and Iran, the suppression of the Kurdish language meant the exclusion of Kurds from the sphere of writing. This was symptomatic of the immediate disappearance of civil society in Kurdistan. This eradication of civil society meant that Kurds could not express their subjectivity and identity in the public sphere without violence."[38]

Based on this analysis, as the facts presented so far in this study show, the cultural and military security political spheres attempted to produce a field of relations, discourse and practice that would reinforce each other. Thus, Kurdish ethnicity started to be gradually seen as producing "future Turks"[39], an anonymous and memoryless mass that would metamorphose easily through a sustained process of forced

38 Ibid., 38. In 1939, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, the Turkish Minister of Justice uttered the following sentence, which with a symbolic significance reflecting the racist feelings and thoughts about the Kurds among the state officials: "As your deputy, I can explain my true feelings without any hesitation: This country has one and only one master and that is the Turk. Those who are not pure Turks have only one right in this country, and that is to be servants and slaves." (Milliyet, September 6, 1930). While such a political environment existed in Turkey, Vali states the situation in Iraq was quite different: "The political authority that replaced the Ottoman administration was foreign. The legal recognition of the ethnic and cultural diversity of the indigenous peoples, at least in the tribal territories, was essential for the perpetuation of the colonial identity of the British ruler and the adaptation of the power structure to indirect rule, especially in Kurdistan. In this way, the recognition of Arab (Sunni) political supremacy by the Mandate did not preclude a commitment to Kurdish administrative and cultural autonomy... In practice, however, the outcome of such a commitment depended on the balance of forces in Iraq and the region." Ibid., 38-39.

39 See, Mesut Yeğen, *Müstakbel Türk'ten Sözde Vatandaşa, Cumhuriyet ve Kürtler,* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014).

assimilation.[40] The Ministry of Education was to hold children in its powerful assimilationist embrace, and the People's House would gear up Turkish identity and Kemalist ideology to the popular audience. At their establishment, inspectors from Diyarbakır province reported that people spoke Kurdish, Zaza, and Arabic in their homes, in the bazaar, in the coffee house, and even in the People's House, and solicited their superiors for measures that would "eradicate the deplorable influence of these cultures and render our national culture and mother tongue dominant'"[41]

As Üngör indicates, the aim of imposing the national culture by forced assimilation was a troublesome issue for the state's staff in Eastern localities, because of the existence of other dominant languages and culture, especially in the Kurdish population. Republican rulers were searching continuously to impose this dominance, either through physical extermination, deportation, or cultural assimilation. The Settlement Laws even in the CUP period, in 1916, 1926, and especially in 1934, directly aimed at the resettlement of the non-Turk population due to Turkification of the population via cultural/linguistic assimilation.[42] They were always in search of new methods, techniques and solutions to reach the state's actual goals. Besides, as mentioned above, it is difficult to say that there was no harmony especially between the senior proponents of statism over the exigence of assimilative modernization or the formal education of Kurdish speakers. However, as already mentioned, the People's Houses being at the service of a "Language Revolution" or "Language Case" *(Dil Davası)* in the East, they were considered by statists as one of the most effective state actors, even more so than primary education.

Reşit Galip, one of the founding leaders of the People's Houses, said, "Among the elements of culture that compose the national self, shape and strengthen the national spirit (without denigrating the importance of

40 Üngör, "Geographies of Nationalism and Violence: Rethinking Young Turk 'Social Engineering'".

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

others), Language, Literature and History undoubtedly come first."[43] In the annual report of the People's Houses for the year 1932-35, it was stated that "the People's Houses were at the disposal of the language cause" and that "trying to sort out and enrich the language of the world's richest language, the language of a nation with the most ancient civilization and the greatest cultures, was one of the most satisfying tasks in terms of both knowledge and ideals". The Turkish Language Association (TLA), which was responsible for researching and compiling vocabulary, asked for "vocabulary slips" compiled from the local Turkish of the peasants, especially the "bearers of pure Turkishness". This was also planned in coordination with other branches and activities of the TDK and the People's Houses. Within the scope of folklore studies, the compilation of *mani* (poems), *hoyrat* (ballads) or proverbs was also included, as a contribution to the new Turkish language.[44]

In the East, especially in Diyarbakır, "village tours" were organized in a few places such as Çermik, Bismil[45] and Elazığ, where Turkish-speaking Turcoman communities live, in search of original Turkish words and

43 *Halkevleri 1932-1935 senesinde, 103 Halkevi'nde Nasıl Çalıştı*, 17. While the name of the branch of the People's Houses that carried out language-related activities was the Language-Literature and History Branch until 1940, the CHP General Secretariat narrowed its scope "due to the breadth of the branch's field of work and the fact that each branch contained detailed subjects of study, and with the aim of focusing on each of them in depth". While language and literature were kept together, history was included in the branch formerly known as Museum and Exhibition, and the name of this branch was changed to History and Museum. See. *C.H.F Halkevleri Talimatnamesi,* (Ankara, Hakimiyeti Milliye Matbaası, 1932).

44 Ibid. 17-20.

45 The Diyarbakır People's House came to the forefront with its studies on Turkish folklore. The results of these studies were published in the Karacadağ magazine, completely ignoring other languages and folklore, and spreading the narrative that Turkish was dominant in Diyarbakır and the region. Lawyer and researcher Şevket Beysanoğlu, on the other hand, has done a lot of folkloric compilation, emphasizing the profitability of this field, for which a significant budget was allocated. Şevket Beysanoğlu, "Anılarımda Diyarbakır Halkevi". Whether these include translations from Kurdish and other languages deserves a separate study. However, the translation of Kurdish songs is a more significant finding. Üngör, *The Making of Modern Turkey, Nation and State in Eastern Anatolia,* 1913-1950.

folkloric elements. In the Kurdish provinces, where the peasant population was concentrated, when the "language of the people" was Kurdish, of course Kurdish was not collected and folklore studies were not carried out, and those that were carried out were included within the scope of appropriation into Turkish. Those who spoke "Mountain Turkish", i.e. Kurdish, which had lost its Turkish essence, were also told that they should return to their own language, Turkish. The main task of all branches, not only the Language and Literature Branch of the People's Houses and the branches of the People's Classrooms, was to raise awareness of Turkish, which had now become compulsory, through their activities, to make it the dominant and legitimate language, to raise awareness of the Turkish population in the East on this issue, to produce it as the main legitimate source, and to teach literacy and Turkish as much as possible.[46] However, since teaching Turkish and literacy at the same time to those who did not know Turkish was a very difficult and financially costly task, it would be seen that it was mostly implemented in the city centers and some towns, except for a few villages close to the cities in the first few years.

Therefore, just like the prioritization of establishing centers of Turkishness, the primary mission of the People's Houses was to make Turkish dominant, and to teach Turkish and literacy to the Turkish-speaking adult population and the illiterate. The "sensitivity" of the People's Houses as carriers of linguistic assimilation was also reflected in the *Directive for the Inspection of the People's Houses and Rooms in the Unorganized Provinces* which regulated the inspection issues specific to the 12 provinces. As might be expected, the most important question the party inspectors were asked to answer was "whether Turkish language teaching courses were given particular importance".[47] In the *RPP*

46 In 1937, Kadri Kemal Kop explained the main purpose of the People's Houses' work on language as follows: "To make the relationship between the Turks in Turkey and those who speak languages other than Turkish stronger and to bring them to the social, cultural and civilized level of the great mass of people who speak Turkish as their mother tongue." *Diyarbekir*, (4 May 1937).

47 *CHP Teşkilatı Kurulmamış Vilayetlerdeki Halkevleri ve Odaları Teftiş Talimatnamesi*, (Ankara: Zerbamat, 1940). In parallel with the country-wide audits, the directive also

Inspection Directive, which was intended to inspect the People's Houses in 51 other provinces, minorities whose mother tongue was not Turkish were referred to as "groups whose mother tongue should be Turkish" and members of the state were asked to take measures to make Turkish the mother tongue.[48] As a result, in the "Kurdish-populated East", from 1924 onwards, education and publications in Kurdish were banned, and public speech in Kurdish was prohibited and punished. In dealing with Kurdish and other languages, which were seen as producing different political, socio-economic, cultural and ethnic unities, codes, meanings, beliefs and lifeworlds, demographic engineering practices such as dispersing the Kurdish population among the Turkish-speaking population and creating a buffer between Turks and Kurds were among the main techniques.[49]

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covered the administrative functioning of the People's House, its budget, the conditions of its buildings and fixtures, and whether or not the records were kept properly. More general audit issues, such as whether activities were organized according to the "level and needs" of the local population, and the level of public participation, were questioned. However, due to possible or actual incidents in these provinces, banned books and theater repertoire, as well as whether or not plays were being performed, were also mentioned, again with an emphasis on "security" concerns. Ibid., 10.

48 *CHP Teftiş Talimatnamesi* states that: "To examine the social conditions of the minorities within the regions and the intellectual movements among them and to report their thoughts to the General Administrative Board in order to make them beneficial to our nation, and to think of the necessary and practical measures to realize this goal in the groups within their regions whose mother tongue should be Turkish and to write these to the General Administrative Board". *CHP Teftiş Talimatnamesi,* (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi 1939/1943), 6. The 1939 "RPP Directive for People's Houses", which was prepared for the special supervision system for the People's Houses established in 1939, stated that "People's Houses shall not keep any books other than those written in Turkish letters and that lists of the names and authors of existing books shall be sent to the General Secretariat of the Party at the end of each year." Ibid. The aim was to extend the supervision of both the alphabet in which books were written and the names of books and authors to the villages. *CHP Halkodaları Talimatnamesi*, (Ankara: 1940).

49 For a study on how the resettlement laws against Kurds were implemented by state actors, and their intended and unintended effects and consequences, enriched with ethnographic data, see Uğur Ümit Üngör, *The Making of Modern Turkey, Nation and State in Eastern Anatolia,* 1913-1950.

This thesis is particularly concerned with the different and parallel practices of linguistic assimilation in the People's Houses in interaction with daily and local dynamics, and the prominent themes and patterns of how these practices were perceived and experienced. At a time when speaking Kurdish in the public sphere was met with various forms of violence and punishment, practices were identified under the leadership of the People's Houses, such as the rewarding of learning/speaking Turkish alongside the punishments and sanctions, not only in the public but also in the "private" and self-identity spheres. In the late 1940s, with the RPP's transition to inclusionary assimilation practices such as increased schooling, Turkish literacy courses for adults in the villages became noticeable in the *Halk Dershaneleri* (People's Classrooms) under the umbrella of the People's Houses, which were the continuation of the *Millet Mektepleri* (National Schools). Prior to this, the relationship with the villages was more limited to the centralized ones. The phenomenon of literacy is reflected in the documents as a phenomenon that did not receive the expected attention due to infrastructural problems such as administrative and financial capacity, transportation, and the social indifference to education caused not only by being Kurdish but also by being a peasant, and was practiced more effectively among Turkish speakers. In these contexts, it is noteworthy that the People's Houses, as the main actor of assimilation through "indoctrination and training", began to develop various techniques of power and discipline in everyday and micro levels in *the work of temsil/assimilation.*

§ 5.3 Everyday Linguistic Assimilation by *Carrot and Stick Technique* and People's Houses

Similar to the punishment/reward method commonly used pedagogically in education *to discipline* students, the carrot and stick, which entered political terminology with its typical use by the British in colonial India, can be seen at first glance to have been applied prominently in linguistic assimilation through discipline and

indoctrination in this period.[50] With these two methods used together, in the period in the focus of this thesis, Kurds and speakers of other languages, which represent a world away from the new and acceptable national language Turkish, seem to have been offered a combination of prohibition and punishment to silence and suppress Kurdish and other languages, and rewards of certain citizenship rights and forms of capital and freedom from punishments, only by adopting the "language of the state". In a process where physical and symbolic violence coexist, it has been found that historical subjects confronting subalternization produce interactive, symmetrical and asymmetrical methods and tactics such as cooperation, resistance, and negotiation to deal with power and power relations, the dynamism and accumulation of the everyday and the local, as well as their subjective positions. Within the framework of the above questions, this section will start from the memorial narratives that are not directly included in official documents in the Kurdish-inhabited state of emergency provinces, where the security forces, which mostly implemented the "stick policy", and the "carrot policy", in which People's Houses and local administrations played a leading role, were in operation together, and would lead to the practices of the People's Houses. I believe

50 According to an explanation the "carrot and stick" approach is: "An idiom that refers to a policy of offering a combination of reward and punishment to induce good behavior. It is named in reference to a cart driver dangling a carrot in front of a mule and holding a stick behind it. The mule would move towards the carrot because it wants the reward of food, while also moving away from the stick behind it, since it does not want the punishment of pain, thus drawing the cart. Even the Britishers used this policy to deal with the emergence of Extremists during the "Swadeshi Movement". The Britisher realized that the moderates could be useful as an alternative to the militant nationalists who were growing in popularity. So, the British followed a policy of carrot and stick. The policy involved repressing the extremists, making promises to the moderates for reforming institutions if they were to separate from the extremists and then once the extremists were repressed the moderates could be ignored. This strategy was successful and led to a split as both the moderates and extremists fell into the trap. The Surat split of Congress in 1907 suggests that the policy of carrot and stick had brought rich dividends to the British Govt. in India." https://www.quora.com/What-is-carrot-and-stick-policy. In the German language, the concept of carrot and stick is expressed as "sweet bread and whip" (zuckerbrot und peıtsche).

that this would establish a complementary historical context for the practices of the party-state institution Halkevi, and especially the ways in which they were received and the reactions to them.

5.3.1 *Punishment against Language Versus Social Strategies to Turn it to an Advantage in the East*

Journalist-writer Musa Anter, a prominent figure of Kurdish nationalism, who was killed in Diyarbakır in 1992 in a political assassination that was recorded as a "unsolved" murder, wrote eloquently about his encounters with Turkish and linguistic assimilation and his responses to it in his memoirs.[51] Estimating that he was born in 1917 or 1918, Anter writes that the establishment of the new Turkish state was perceived in the village of Zivinge in Mardin's Nusaybin district as the sweeping or disapperance of Kurdish language. As is prominent in many memorial narratives of this period, Anter also remembers the encounter with the state as a modern, centralized and national state, with its gendarmerie, tax-collectors and other officials, which generally aimed to "take" rather than "give", through practices of exploitation, oppression and persecution. Anter emphasizes the fact that his own village, on the other hand, although they were ready to give the officials what they wanted (taxes, soldiers, etc.), they were "ravaged" by the "language issue", caused by not speaking Turkish. Here, the harshness of the Turkish-mediated cultural and political boundaries between state representatives and Kurdish villagers emerged as the primary issue. His head of clan mother, who also officially governed their tribe and the village, began to think that to have a Turkish-speaking person who could act as an intermediary was a vital issue to overcome the "language issue" that prevented "dialogue with the state" and produced inequality.[52] Anter explains that not knowing Turkish created a distance that was difficult to bridge for both

51 Musa Anter, *Hatıralarım*, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Aram Yayınları, 2011), 26.

52 Anter states that: "We were willing to give them anything they asked for and this was the custom, we thought this was the government. But this language issue was making us miserable. My mother was especially devastated. She wanted me to go to school and learn Turkish just to understand what the gendarmerie wanted..." Ibid., 26.

members of the state and the local population, and that those who spoke Kurdish were by default labeled as "language deficient" and therefore subjected to violence, and that knowing Kurdish was "found incomplete, defective and problematic."

I have already mentioned that the state defined cultural politics and the establishment of its cultural and symbolic power in everyday and local contexts as a constitutive space for the state to penetrate and produce itself. As mentioned in the introduction, according to the French sociologist and philosopher Pierre Bourdieu, in modern societies, not only ecenomy, but also culture is a source of domination, in which intellectuals are in the key role as specialists of cultural production and creators of symbolic power.[53] Anter's mother wanted her son, whose future representation as the son of a feudal leader would be important, to learn Turkish, and how to read and write, in order to increase his political, economic, social, cultural and symbolic capital, which signified fame and appeal. Since there was no school in the village, she enrolled Anter as a guest student in a primary school in the district of Mardin, formerly known as Kercews, now renamed Gercüş. This school was one of the few schools which only the children of tribal chieftains and other elite families from the villages could attend. After attending school for a year, Anter returned to the village. He wrote the following about his one-year experience: "I came to the village when the schools were closed. I had learned words like 'bread, water, wood, come and go, what's your name'. I also knew 'rooster, chicken, turkey, egg' because they were in our alphabet. My mother was on top of the world. That summer we had no trouble with the gendarmes who came to the village and we were not beaten. Anyway, our problem was not about giving them things, but not understanding what they wanted."[54]

53 Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of Theory of Practice,* 159-197.

54 Anter's emphasis on the fact that they did not resist state officials in giving them what they wanted was an effort to show that although they were compliant citizens who did not have problems with the economic sanctions of the state, the discrimination and violence they experienced simply because they did not speak Turkish produced unequal cultural citizenship. In other experiences, the fact that poor and landless villagers refused to pay the animal tax to the collectors accompanied by gendarmes, and felt the

An example of this desire to increase one's political, cultural and symbolic capital by feeling the obligation to learn Turkish and literacy, and to have boys learn it, due to the "lack of contact with the state" took place in Dersim. Haydar Kaya, who spent his childhood in a village in Dersim in the 1940s, said that his father, the village clerk who acted as an interpreter and mediator between the local headmen and state officials, was the only person in the village who could speak Turkish, and that this was only possible because his grandfather had pushed for the conditions in the village where there was no school. He said that his grandfather wanted his two sons to learn Turkish because it was a legal obligation, so he traveled by mule to the distant town of Tercan and brought back someone who knew how to read and write and said, "Educate my children!". Kaya continues as follows: "One year that man sent the children to school. The next year the man said he couldn't come and asked my grandfather to send the children to him. My grandfather sent my father and uncle to Tercan. My father learned both the new and old script. My uncle only learned the new script... My father was the only Turkish speaker in the village at that time." [55]

Musa Anter, on the other hand, says that state representatives considered the fact that the villagers, who had never been to school and whose contact with the Turkish language and the state was very limited, should speak Turkish as if it was a natural and given characteristic that they had been born with, and that they were punished with beatings just because their mother tongue was Kurdish. Moreover, the dominant discourse and practices of Kurdish being dangerous and harmful destroyed the legitimacy of the Kurdish language, and legitimized the use

need to hide their animals shows that this issue was not an area of compromise and that class position was important at this point. As a matter of fact, Belqîza Ayman reported that her father, who was the headman and rather wealthy, paid the tax, but other villagers informed her father about the situation and hid their animals in places other than the barn beyond the collectors' control. Interview with Ayman January 2016. It should be added that this was a tactic practiced by peasants all over the country in the history of Ottoman Turkey.

55 Ibid., 27. Şükrü Aslan and Şükran Lılek Yılmaz, *Hafızanın Dili 1940'lı Yılların Çocukları Dersim'i Anlatıyor*, (İstanbul: Dersim Yayınları, 2017), 27-28.

of violence by state officials. In fact, this was also related to the discourse produced in the People's House magazines that the origins of Kurds are Turkish and that they became Turkic after they came to Anatolia and Mesopotamia by mixing with other peoples. While there was a perception in the state that "how come they don't speak Turkish even though they are essentially Turks", there were also those who thought the opposite. In the 1940s, Cevad Dursunoğlu's report emphasized that insisting on the Kurds' Turkishness was not a meaningful endeavor, and that urgent and permanent "assimilation measures" should be taken with the recognition that they were a different ethnicity. First General Inspector Avni Doğan was emphasizing the wrongness of the state not teaching Kurdish citizens Turkish, but punishing them when they could not speak Turkish.[56]

Spivak says that the inability to enjoy civic rights such as education is one of the most striking stages of subalternization.[57] Hence, the policy, which appears as a search for reconciliation and harmony with the state and the official a deeper perspective as a process in which the national language was national identity, can be read in imposed by not defining cultural rights on the basis of equality and diversity, and those who did not know it were treated unequally, suppressed and turned into *subaltern citizens.* In fact, Anter and upper middle class Kurdish citizens, such as elite or civil servant families as Kaya's family, who sought to increase their

56 Belma Akçura, *Devletin Kürt Filmi, 1925-2011 Kürt Raporları*, 3rd edition, (İstanbul: Postiga Yayınları, 2014), 145. Advocating moderate and inclusive assimilation instead of military security techniques, Doğan also criticizes in 1943 the military displays of strength that frightened the people of Diyarbakır and led them to be influenced by the Kurdish movements: "The placing of machine guns on the roofs of Diyarbakır, a city which has produced outstanding values for Turkishness for centuries and which is one of our strongest cultural centres, on the occasion of the arrival of the Minister of Interior as a so-called security measure, was not only ridiculous but also hurtful to the people. In this period, the activities of foreign Kurdish movement and staff centers increased a lot. They tried to poison our Eastern provinces through various propaganda ways. Bedirhan, Celadet, Ali and Alişanzades expanded their fields of activity to Paris, Switzerland and Russia". Ibid.

57 Spivak, *Yapısöküm, Postkolonyalizm, Madunluk*, trans. Soner Torlak, (İstanbul: Zoomkitap, 2016).

capital and power by learning Turkish and receiving a formal education, responded to this subalternization with an effort to turn articulation with the state to their advantage. In fact, the legal framework and daily practices seem to have produced a parallel view with the policy of forcing Kurds to become Turkified and integrated into the state, by surrounding them spatially and demographically with the Turkish population to be resettled, or in the western provinces where they were resettled. In the region, the prohibition and physical and symbolic violence and punishments to make Turkish dominant in state affairs and daily life, and other cultural techniques to be seen in the People's Houses, seem to have been aimed at compelling the Kurdish-speaking population to exercise their social, political, economic and cultural citizenship rights to speak Turkish. As a result, many subjects like Anter imply a quest to cope with the politics of punishment, which included physical violence and symbolic violence on the axis of speaking Turkish and being Turkish, by increasing their symbolic/linguistic capital. Because, as Scott points out, the case of Anter can be read as a desire to cope with the domination of the new Turkish, which was only called a "state language" through its mediation in the practice of the state, to somehow become stronger as a form of resistance against it by trying to eliminate the justification for punishment, and one step further, to gain the capacity to penetrate the state sphere and negotiate with the power emanating from there.[58]

On the other hand, just as in the early 1930s, in the west of the country, the "Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş!" (Speak Turkish, Citizen!) campaigns backed the imposition of penalties by local governments for speaking languages other than Turkish[59], in Izmir there were attacks

58 See James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts*, (Yale University Press, 1992).

59 Cumhuriyet newspaper reported that in 1936, the municipality of the Gönen district of Balıkesir, which was home to a large number of immigrants from Rumelia, announced that it would punish those who spoke a language other than Turkish in public spaces and that the people of the district were very pleased with this decision: "Speaking any language other than Turkish in Gönen is forbidden by the decision of the Gönen municipality. It has been announced to the people that those who speak foreign languages such as Circassian, Georgian, Arnavud, Pomak will be punished. Those who

against non-Muslim minorities, led by some civic-minded citizens who demonstrated the relationship between the state and the formation of society, as a racist reaction to the strength of their various capitals.[60] While the international reaction to this process reduced the impact of the campaign by easing tensions in the West, people in the Kurdish-inhabited areas were subjected to a regime of violence under a state of emergency and punitive measures, including fines for speaking Kurdish and Arabic. It was in 1925 that the The Plan for the Reform in the East officially proposed the punishment.[61] Furthermore, a document titled "On the Prohibition of Speaking Kurdish and Arabic in the Eastern provinces", which was not found in the Prime Ministry Archives in Turkey but was discovered by researcher Yüksel in the Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reveals that in 1934, those who spoke Kurdish and Arabic in Mardin and Diyarbakır were sentenced to fines and imprisonment.[62] In the same year, a document titled "Nationalist Impulse in Turkey", written by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that it was forbidden to speak Kurdish in the East, and this was announced through town-criers, and those who did not comply with this decision would be fined 50 Turkish liras.

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speak foreign languages in the bazaar, in the market and in the coffee houses will speak Turkish from now on as a result of this decision of Gönen Municipality. The people of Gönen are very pleased with this decision." "Gönen'de Herkes Türkçe Konuşacak", *Cumhuriyet,* 21.05.1936, 6.

60 Alexandros Lamprou, "Nationalist Mobilization and State–Society Relations: The People's Houses' Campaign for Turkish in Izmir, June–July 1934", *Middle Eastern Studies,* 49:5, 824-839.

61 The 14th article of the plan implied that "In the following provinces and districts which are originally Turkish, but beginning to succumb to Kurdishness: Malatya, Elaziz, Diyarbekir, Bitlis, Van, Muş, Urfa, Ergani, Hozat, Erciş, Adilcevaz, Ahlat, Palu, Çarsancak, Çemişgezek, Ovacık, Hısnımansur, Behinsi, Arga, Hekimhan, Birecik, Çermik, those who use languages other than Turkish in government and municipal offices and other facilities and organizations, schools, bazaars and markets in provincial and town centers shall be punished with the crime of opposing and resisting the government and municipality". Mehmet Bayrak, *Kürdoloji Belgeleri II*, 24.

62 Metin Yüksel, "Hayatta Kalma ve Diriliş: Kürtçe'nin Yakın Tarihine Bir Bakış", *Kürt Tarihi*, no. 1, (June-July 2012), 19-20.

These documents, in turn, are an official testimony and confirmation of the oral testimonies.[63] Anter tells anecdotes about how villagers coming to Mardin with their donkeyloads of firewood to sell in the bazaar or market were subjected to unimaginable and humiliating punishment for speaking Kurdish, "a language other than Turkish". Accordingly, the gendarmerie, who were watching the villagers, started to fine them as soon as they used the Kurdish word "ço" (to lead a donkey); the villagers tried to defend themselves by speaking Kurdish, but the gendarmerie started to calculate the fine for each word they used. The poor peasant would be fined more than the value of the wood.[64]

Ex-Parliamentarian of Diyarbakır Tark Ziya Ekinci has a similar recollection regarding the prohibition of Kurdish in a different locale and in ordinary life:

63 "Recently, around 20 residents of Mardin were sentenced to a fine of 50 Turkish paper liras and 3 days in prison for "speaking Arabic and Kurdish". Similar charges have been filed against various nationals in Diyarbakır." Ibid. Yüksel also reports that in the early 1930s, it was possible to rent a house for 10 liras in Istanbul and that the salary of an assistant at the School of Political Sciences in 1938 was 35 liras. İbid.

64 Ibid. 29. "The villagers used to take wood to Mardin to sell. They transported it by donkey. They would sell the firewood for about 50-60 kuruş. If the donkey and the saddle were in good condition, they could sell it for 5-6 lira. To make the donkey go while riding it, Kurds say 'ço'. Poor Kurds who didn't know Turkish and who didn't know anything about this would say 'ço,' and the gendarmes would stop them and beat them up for speaking Kurdish. When the Kurd -speaking Kurdish- tried to defend himself against this, they would prosecute him and charge him with a crime. Something like this happened to one of my mother's relatives. His donkey and firewood were confiscated and sold (to pay the fine). He received 5 Turkish lira for them, but his fine was 12 lira. So, he was jailed for two days and beaten up. Three and a half months later when the tax collectors came to our village, they wanted him to pay the remaining seven lira outstanding on the fine and said that if he didn't pay, they would seize his house and belongings. Of course, the gendarmes came along with the tax collectors. My uncle was able to pay the fine by selling a few of his sheep. This incident didn't just happen to my uncle, it was commonplace. If there was a documentary archive of crimes in Mardin you would find a great many of this sort of disgraceful document (Anter 1991: 29). cited by Nicole F. Watts "Re-Considering State-Society Dynamics in Turkey's Kurdish Southeast", *European Journal of Turkish Studies, State-Society Relations in the Southeast,* no. 10, (2009), 3.

> "Kurdish speaking was banned. Peasants were coming to our district (Diyarbakır-Lice) to buy some of their agricultural products. If they speak a word in Kurdish they must pay 5 kuruş. One load of wood was already 5 kuruş. I learnt a bit of Turkish in the school. When they come, my father called me and said 'My son go and help them in Turkish' (Oğlum git onlara Türkçe yardım et). Every morning they knocked at our door and called me to help them for the bargain and sales of their goods [65]

As in the case of Anter, the struggle of the villagers and Ekinci's father to quash or cope with the fine, a fine that also affected the economy of the villagers and townspeople, appears as an assimilation experience that

65 Cited by Cuma Çiçek, "Bireysel Haklar Kürtçeyi Kurtarmaya Yeter mi? Bireysel Haklar, Kolektif Haklar ve Dil Kaybı", *Birikim*, no. 253, (May 2010), 16. Galip Güz, a native Turkish speaker who spent his childhood in Diyarbakır's Çermik district in the 1940s, also sheds light on the period through his encounters with the Kurdish-speaking villagers who came to sell their produce at the market. He comes from a family that graduated from the Railroad Vocational High School in Ankara and worked as an administrator in the Turkish Republic Railways, which at the time was considered Turkish and was a channel open to the Turkish-speaking population to become civil servants. Güz recounted his childhood encounters within linguistic boundaries with villagers who did not speak Turkish and did not need to because Kurdish was the dominant market language: "Since my father passed away when I was 3 years old, I started to take responsibility for the shopping of the house from an early age. Since I didn't speak Kurdish, that is, Zazakî, I couldn't talk to the villagers who brought village products to the market. They didn't speak Turkish either. We used to communicate with them by gesturing, with one or two words they knew, or if there was someone in town who spoke Kurdish at the time, he would help them. I have never seen them being fined for not speaking Turkish." Güz, who was born in Diyarbakır's Çermik to a Turkmen mother and a Syrian immigrant father who spoke Arabic, evaluates Çermik differently from other districts with its significant Turkmen population in its center, while emphasizing that there are no Kurds in the center of Çermik, that Kurds lived in the villages, and that they settled in Çermik later. Güz's discourse establishes a dichotomy between Kurds from the villages and Turks from the city, and he conflates Kurdishness, being from the villages and not knowing Turkish in the same category. He also made it felt that he did not identify the existence of the Zaza villagers of Çermik with the Turkish Çermik, even if they came from a few kilometers away, and the policy of the period was to render Kurdishness invisible. Interview with Galip Güz on 5 October 2017, Istanbul.

means recognizing the legitimacy of Turkish while trying to "turn the situation in its favor" as a subaltern strategy. In the case of the Ekinci experience, we can speak of a complex, context-dependent situation in which both the state was imposing Turkish, and the villagers being able to feel they were profiting, empowered or successful. However, it seems difficult to say that this always worked. Indeed, for these villagers, who had no language capital and communicated through an interpreter, paying 5 kuruş per word in the 1930s, when a sheep was sold for 50 kuruş, must have been a very heavy burden in terms of economic capital. In fact, Canip Yıldırım reports that as this practice was stepped up by the police officers in Diyarbakır, the villagers could no longer cope with these practices and fines and were unable to come to the city.[66] The state administrators of the period complained about the fact that the Kurdish language monopolized the market language even in the 1940s, and that the capital was not Turkified, this picture becomes even clearer.[67]

It was possible to learn Turkish through the courses at the People's Houses, which would become more widespread in the 1940s, through formal educational institutions where mostly boys from more elite families could attend, as in the case of Anter, and also commonly during their period of military service. In the perception of the time, since the dominance of Kurdish was undisputed in some provinces, Turkish seemed to be seen as the "language of the state" that had to be learned. In other words, the emphasis was not on living with that language and the world it offered, but on learning and using it functionally. As a matter of fact, as in the case of Anter and Ekinci, Kaya and Güz, for the children of civil servants, knowing, learning and speaking Turkish, with its linguistic and educational implications, was seen as increasing cultural capital, providing status and prestige that increased symbolic capital, and

66 Mustafa Akyol, *Kürt Sorununu Yeniden Düşünmek, Yanlış Giden Neydi? Bundan Sonra Nereye?* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık, 2006), 122, cited by Eslîxan Yıldırım, *Di Sedsala 20'an de Kurdîstan û Sînor,* vol. 1-2, (İstanbul: Weşanên Azad, 2013), 359.

67 For example, see. "CHP Genel Sekreteri Memduh Şevket Esendal'ın Doğu İllerine Yaptığı Gezinin Raporu." CCA.490.01/571.2274.1, (14.06.1945).

increasing political capital in the form of working in state affairs or carrying out the state's affairs for the people.

At this point, it might be good to relate a memory about the history of Kurdish and Turkish that touches me on a personal level. Born in 1917, my grandfather Abdi Alınak was from a prominent family of the Milli clan, inheriting the memory of his relatives on his mother's side, who had served as administrators before migrating to Kars from Tsarist Russia. In line with the practice prioritized by the state rulers for young Kurdish men to learn Turkish during their long military service, which lasted four years at the time, he learned to read and write in one night due to his unique "linguistic talent" and improved his Turkish, of which he knew very little. Alınak, who would come to be known as Abdi Çavuş (Sergeant Abdi), was given the title of sergeant by the state to teach Turkish literacy and to be one of the loyal intermediaries in contact with the state. He was precisely the kind of person who cared about negotiating with the ideals of the Republic and the law of citizenship. Alınak who had been called with his father's name as Avdoyê Hado (the son of Hado) by that time is called also Abdi Çavuş. So much so, he succeeded in becoming a headman by raising the alarm against the arbitrary practices of a family in the village in a case concerning populist opposition and citizenship rights. His representation before local state institutions and his initiative in handling the village's affairs such as land and education were combined with his prestigious and pioneering position in the RPP Kars organization. My grandfather's taking care to speak Turkish well, and his interest in reading and writing were also directed toward religious books and Arabic. He had taken Kurdish and Arabic lessons in one of the madrassas in secret for a while in his youth. I remember his interest in performing Kurdish music and speaking Kurdish more privately as a "home language." He used to criticize in Turkish the actions of my grandmother Emine, who, unlike him, never spoke Turkish and was not interested in learning it, because her husband and children took care of the affairs of the Turkish world in the period when Kurdish was still dominant, being incompatible with the "civilized world." He also refrained from publicly displaying his religious practices. While he

continued to wear fedora hats and "western" clothes throughout his political life, even though he no longer wore them after he became a Hajji (pilgrim) in his last years, he gave the impression that he had a separate official and private life with his daily habits that deferred to his secular lifestyle.

It was as if my grandfather had chosen the motto of "becoming civilized or modernized by becoming Turkish" or vice versa, "becoming Turkish by becoming civilized" in order to benefit from the rights of citizenship, to make himself, his family and his tribe profitable, advantageous and prestigious in all aspects of state affairs, and to use the opportunities of education, professional training and entry into the modern and capitalist world. As a religious person from the Shafi sect of Sunnism, he had adopted secularism centered on the Hanafi sect, and thus entered the common sphere of identity that the state deemed legitimate. His pride in speaking Turkish and even his acceptance of Turkification was influenced by the comfort of doing so in exchange for becoming a citizen. Like many members of the local elite, he seemed to be saying "I am negotiating this situation". He thought that by shaking the feudal tyrannical order in the village with the rights and means brought about by these citizenship rights, he was able to stand up against this family who had been elected village headman and were DP members thanks to the RPP. As a person who spoke Kurdish to its fullest extent, and loved to relish his communication skills, my grandfather realized the "damage" caused by the "dumbing down" experienced by the villagers who did not speak Turkish in many public and governmental spheres with the ban on Kurdish. He learned Turkish in a short time, and instead of being "outclassed", he made use of it, for many years he would control the sphere of power to deal with the state and modernization, to bargain, to survive, to gain power. Beyond being an interpreter between the state and the villagers, he would convey the demands of the villagers and transfer the state's or the party's response and power to the village, and then he would lose it when he got old.[68]

68 Interview with Belqîza Ayman, January 2016 and my memory and experiences.

In such subjectivizations, the relationship between the Kurds and the state is characterized by the different consequences and effects of a form of cultural violence against the subjects of the state's requirement to speak the state language as a condition of benefitting from Turkish citizenship, in order for the prevailing ethos to penetrate the region where Kurds live and make them subjects of the new state. In the previous cases, we also find that in addition to forcing them to speak Turkish, the state also tried to ban the speaking of Kurdish or, as in the case of Çermik, to render it illegitimate and invalid in daily life. Another phenomenon that emerges here is that state officials seem to have had an expectation that the peasant population should know and speak Turkish by birth and by default. As such, especially in the villages, the number of primary schools and People's Rooms that would teach Turkish, forcibly or not, was very small and this would only be realized to a certain extent in the years to come. Therefore, according to these accounts, even though the impossibility of the villagers speaking Turkish was known by the soldiers and other officials, it is seen that a disciplinary form of power called "oppression and persecution" was applied with both physical and symbolic violence as a practice of representation.

On the other hand, Ekinci draws attention to the social and political effects of the establishment of district governorships, directors of financial affairs, population and land registry offices at the local level during the centralization process that accelerated after the Ottoman sultan Mahmut II, and the emergence of a third layer of power, that shared the authority of the local lords and aghas in the case of Lice. Ekinci says the following on this subject: "These were a group of literate masters who also used state power when necessary. They mostly worked as tax collectors, clerks, bailiffs, guards and in other secondary state jobs. The master clan was a secondary layer that could easily exploit the Kurdish peasants who spoke no language other than Kurdish. Uneducated Kurdish peasants were also in need of masters. Among them were judges of Armenian origin."[69]

69 Tarık Ziya Ekinci, "Tarihsel, Sosyolojik ve Siyasi Yönleriyle Lice Beyleri", *Kürt Tarihi*, no. 43, (January, February, March 2021), 48.

5.3.2 *Sanctional Indoctrination (Telkini Müeyyide) in the People's Houses' "War" with Arabic and Kurdish in Mardin*

It is seen that the central and local administrators of the People's Houses envisioned a spatiality of the People's Houses extending to the homes, in order to assimilate and civilize for an effective *temsil*, not only using disciplinary power techniques but also with even more disciplinary power techniques. The administrators of the Mardin People's House, who were also state administrators, were found to be the ones most determined to implement the aim of the People's Houses and the state administrators to intervene in the "domestic sphere" and turn "state language" into "home language". It is important to note that the Mardin People's House, along with the Diyarbakır People's House, had the profile of a People's House that made it its primary occupation to make Turkish dominant and to spread linguistic assimilation into everyday life. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the discourse and practices of the Mardin People's House were directly in line with the articles in the Turkification circular sent by Minister of the Interior Şükrü Kaya to the governorships in January 1930, which directly states that assimilation techniques should be applied according to the dynamics of the province in order for Turkish to enter homes and become the mother tongue.[70]

In this context, the Mardin People's House first announced that it was launching a campaign to "fight" Arabic, which it saw as another "foreign language" after Kurdish, and "the Mardin language", the language of the city center, which had been formed through significant interactions with languages in the region. The head of the Mardin People's House wrote that the Language, History and Literature Branch was "fighting against foreign languages, which is a special case in the center, and believing that Turkish culture can only spread through Turkish language, it has determined this task as an important task that it will accomplish first and foremost." With this belief, the Mardin People's House made "spreading the Turkish language" the first important task in the work programs of

70 Mehmet Bayrak, "Şükrü Kaya ve Gizli Türkleştirme Genelgesi", *Kürt Tarihi,* (April, May 2013), 45-46.

all branches, and for this reason "called on all the People's Committees and Municipality to help, and worked tirelessly on this task".[71]

The linguistic and social engineering intention here was in line with the discourse that can be summarized as "war against Kurdish and other languages and their extermination", which appeared in the statements of the General Inspectorates and in many official reports and regulations during these years. This battle to sweep away the “Mardin language” involved a determination to radically change the heterogeneous cultural and social codes and networks of meaning symbolized by it in every sphere. Sabri Aykal, the mebus (MP) of Mardin, called the hybrid language unique to Mardin "weird" and said that it was composed of Kurdish, Arabic and some Turkish, and similarly emphasized that "it was necessary to at least reduce to a minimum the "bad habits" of even local officials who spoke this language even though everyone knew Turkish".[72] To this end, Aykal explained, the People's House made great efforts to ensure that Turkish was spoken in both public and private spaces, first mobilizing all civil servants to show unity in this regard. Then, he said, tradesmen's associations were contacted and informed that they should speak Turkish in their private lives, and the public was enlightened in the field of language and culture by means of a nightly meeting in coffee houses with teachers and intellectuals, who were composed of the youth of the country. In addition, delegations going to the districts on inspection trips contacted the district governors "to show their cooperation in the fight for this language issue", while the Turkish Language Dissemination Society (*Türk Dilini Yayma Cemiyeti*) perhaps the only association in the

71 CCA, 490.01/989. 830.2, (December 1936).

72 "I considered the language issue important. Although most of the people and the city speak Turkish, they use a mixed language of Kurdish, Arabic and some Turkish. Even in government offices, local officials speak this way. It is necessary to at least minimize these bad habits." CCA, 490.01/688.337.1, (23 November 1935). Sabri Aykal, the head of the Language, Literature and History Committee and Mardin's Inspector of Primary Education in 1935, also boasted that he had waged a major "war" in Mardin in 1935 to eradicate the "invasion of foreign languages", especially in the city center, and especially the tendency toward Arabic. CHP Mardin Halkevi, *Mardin, Cumhuriyetten Önce ve Sonra, Halkevi Broşürü 5* (İstanbul: Resimli Ay Matbaası, 1938).

Eastern provinces, began to be established in district and town centers such as Nusaybin, Savur, Midyat, Derik, Ayınkaf, and in villages with large schools. In 1935, the Society reported that "young Turkish fighters" had taught Turkish literacy to about 7,000 citizens.[73] Teachers and "young people" working in this society were called "warriors", and citizens who were taught Turkish were called "citizens being worked on".[74]



Figure 5.1 Mardin People's House Language and Literature Committee members with peasants, 1938.[75] SOURCE: *Mardin Halkevi Broşürü*, 1938, 101.

73 Behçet Kemal Çağlar, *103 Halkevi Geçen Yıllarda Nasıl Çalıştı*, 20.

74 CCA, 490.01/989.830.2, (7 January 1936). Considering that the People's Houses have been "exposed" from time to time by the RPP General Secretariat and in "internal correspondence" with regard to the "exaggerated" statistics, this substantial increase is not without suspicion (Chapter 2).

75 "This committee made valuable efforts to spread the mother tongue in the desert villages and to help the villagers to acquire their own language. During each trip, the radio was taken along with the committee, concerts and lectures were given to the villagers, scientific advances were explained in clear language, the band that joined the committee taught the national anthems, many conferences were held and useful

Table 5.1 The number of "citizens fighting for the spread of the Turkish language" (Kullanılan Savaşçı) and "the citizen being worked on" (Üstünde Uğraşılan Vatandaş) at Mardin People's House, 1935:

Dates (1935)	"Used Warriors'	"The citizen being worked on"
February	31	215
March	33	340
April	39	586
May	39	603
June	43	596
July	41	503
August	41	496
September	59	510
October	63	678
Total	389	4486

SOURCE: CCA., 490.01/989.830.2.

By 1939, the *Society for the Propagation of the Turkish Language* had taught Turkish to approximately twenty thousand people through its courses that extended to villages across the province, and claimed to have given ninety-four conferences.[76] On the other hand, Aykal states that "as we come across people in every village who know Turkish, who are trying to learn Turkish, and as the propaganda of the people teaches them that they are the real Turkish generation around the real situations, their eagerness also shows itself clearly". With this, he emphasizes that care was taken not only to teach Turkish, but also to spread the prevailing discourse of teaching the people that they were Turks through propaganda. Despite this ideal that teachers should be the pioneers of teaching Turkish and literacy to the non-Turkish-speaking adult

discussions were held", CHP Mardin Halkevi, *Cumhuriyetten Önce ve Sonra, Mardin Halkevi Broşürü*, 92.

76 Ibid., 92.

population, due to the dramatically lower number of teachers compared to the national averages, the "temsil work" is left to the creative methods and solutions pioneered by the People's House in the East and Mardin in particular.[77] Within the scope of the local state authorities' "war against foreign languages", the method of sanctional indoctrination (indoctrination through sanctions) was introduced into daily life and homes, as a method to ensure the speaking of Turkish. Because, even if Turkish was taught, a significant segment of Mardin's population still had the "ingrained habit of negative resistance", of speaking "other languages" in daily life on the street and especially at home, and this habit must be eliminated.[78] In order for Turkish to become the "home

77 One researcher points out that the Mardin People's House and especially the "natural members of the People's Houses, the teachers, who shouldered the language work" collaborated with and shared the heavy workload of the province's administrators, civil servants, state institutions, tradesmen's associations, and actors reaching out to coffee houses. According to 1935-1936 data, there were 23 primary schools and one secondary school in Mardin province. There were 59 teachers and 2,212 students in primary schools and 13 teachers and 277 students in secondary schools. Hıdır Dilek, "Mardin Halkevi ve Faaliyetleri", (PhD diss İstanbul Üniversitesi, 2003), 52. According to a parliamentary report I obtained during my archival research, by 1940, there were 5 primary schools and 1,500 students attending them in the center of Mardin. As an important piece of information, it is written that there were 25 primary schools in the 900-odd villages of Mardin with its 10 districts and 10 sub-districts. Considering that there was usually one teacher in each of these schools, we can observe the extent to which Turkish language learning and Turkish education, and thus assimilation, was promoted. When we look at the budget issue, with the knowledge that the costs of education were met locally in those years, it is stated in the deputy's report that 100 thousand of the 240 thousand provincial revenues of that year were "allocated to education, but the need for education could not be met". On the other hand, in 1940, the secondary school graduated 50-60 students and, as Musa Anter points out, very few of them went to provinces with high schools to follow high school classes, while the rest - who probably represent the male population - were busy with their families' trade and art businesses. Some of them were employed as civil servants in Diyarbakır or Mardin. CCA 490.01/688.337.1, (9 November 1941).

78 *C.H.F. Mardin Halkevi Broşürü*, 18. The writings of Tan newspaper reporter Mümtaz Faik Fenik provided examples of the Mardin language, which some members of the state and parties in Mardin could not place as a specific language by calling it "hybrid, weird". Fenik, who spent three months in Mardin as a "participant observer" to report on

language" and, in fact, increasingly the mother tongue, sanctional indoctrination involving "tiny punishments" began to take effect. Here, the triangulation point regarding the mission of the People's Houses was that "...the citizen should not be forced, his/her self-respect should not be offended, and he/she should not be subjected to violence and humiliation" in line with the carrot-and-stick policy against social and cultural resistance to learning Turkish. Because "the citizen is a Turk, he does not want the deficiencies in his core self and in the dough of his core self to be openly exposed to his face."[79] Uras, the head of the Mardin People's House and mayor of Mardin, emphasizes that in order for the removal of the habit of speaking in other languages, which is the main task to be tackled, to be effective through "indoctrination" instead of phisical violence and oppression, "there must be a sanction that will not be too heavy for the pure Turkish Mardinite". In other words, in the process of encouraging people who were Turkish in essence to speak Turkish, "the scale should not be missed". Therefore, the way was found to soften the assimilation within the family through domestication, and to spread state control to the family and gain effectiveness. Uras shared these ideas with the "authorized authorities and the municipality" and

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smuggling, which was the economic engine of the region bordering Syria, heard that in the language spoken in the city, a person playing backgammon in a café would say "La tü kariş" to intervene from outside and "Kappatül bab" to close the door. Fenik calls the spoken language a mixture of Arabic and Turkish and adds that "no matter what anyone says, Mardin is a Turkish city". *Tan*, 19 January 1937, 2, cited by Pelin Helvacı, "İstanbul'dan Mardin'e Bakmak: Gazeteci Mümtaz Faik Fenik'in Mardin Gözlemleri ve İtirazlar", *Uluslararası Medeniyet Konferansı Tam Metin Kitabı*, (December 2017), 8. The local newspaper *Ulus Sesi*, which claimed that there was a "successful assimilation" in the city, reacted harshly to Fenik, who wrote that Mardin was "less Turkified, less civilized and surrounded by smuggling", and it is reported that they had a fierce argument over this issue. Pelin Helvacı, İbid.

79 The rest of the sentence is as follows: "Because this deficiency is not the fault of the individual, it is entirely due to the past, to the past's thoughtlessness, mismanagement, negligence and short-sightedness. In the case of an individual's private defects, the community and society can act harshly and hurtfully. But when this defect is instilled in the individual against his will, it is the duty of the community to remove this defect by respecting the dignity and morality of the individual." *C.H.F. Mardin Halkevi Broşürü*, 19.

the municipal council unanimously decided to play a game to ensure that Turkish was spoken at homes. He told the municipal council that Mardin is "the father of the Beldi family and his fellow citizens are members of the family" and proposes an "educational game" within the Mardinite family "under the directive of the father". Here, a house/household that submits to a masculine command is taken as a given and Turkish is made the "language of the home"; in other words, the way to break the resistance of the household not to speak Turkish in obedience to the father's will was put into effect. Thus, Turkification was desired through the cooperation of the state and masculine/patriarchal power.

As for the game, family members would receive small fines if they said a word starting with the letter suggested by the head of the family. Uras, who created the game, describes it as follows: "The head of the family proposes: whoever speaks a word that starts with the letter -C- will be fined ten coins. The game starts and those who start with the letter -C- are fined, but there comes a time when there are no more words starting with the letter -C- and the game ends." Uras suggested that the same sanctional indoctrination should also apply in public spaces: "Whichever Mardinite speaks a language other than Turkish without absolute necessity, he should be fined a small penalty, say 10 kuruş or 25 kuruş". According to the People's House publication, this game was "played with pleasure and joy in Mardin, fellow citizens would try to catch each other (speaking another language) and foreign languages were not heard".[80] In

80 Ibid. 22. In Mardin, the members of the People's House proudly proclaimed that the progressivist and positivist thinking and the practices based on "indoctrination and upbringing" had yielded results, and that "the task of advancing on the path of the ideal that Atatürk gave to the young generation for the Turkish social revolution" would surely reach its goal. *C.H.F. Mardin Halkevi Broşürü*, 21. By 1938, the People's House had opened 12 courses throughout the province each year and 20,000 people had attended these courses, so that "four Republican years had been enough to break with three hundred years of habit". It was added that the activities of the Language, History and Literature Committee of the People's House on language did not end there; civil servants and tradesmen were gathered together from time to time to take the lead on this issue, intellectuals were sent to coffee houses at night to hold discussions with the public on language and culture, and 49 conferences were held in the center and 94 in the sub-center. In this regard, as in every movement, it was teachers who played the biggest role

this way, the public, influenced by the threat of punishment for speaking the Mardin language and other languages, were asked to control themselves and each other, to censor others through self-censorship. Assimilation was supposed to encompass the "private sphere" and therefore envisioned a radical transformation, such as changing all family codes, the private, individual, intellectual, and spiritual world, and establishing a new subjectivity. As long as this did not happen, "the process of homogenizing cultural characteristics, especially linguistic differences, which hinder and complicate the process of making society 'readable' in order to ensure 'social control' in the formation process of the state" was embodied in a daily People's House practice that insisted on Turkish being the "home language" in the East and in the case of Mardin, that is, "assimilation at home". Spreading state effects (the identification and totalization effect)[81] which envisaged the production of individuals and the public with the same identity in the formation of the state, could be the key to establishing not only the civilized Turkish individual, but also a new national individual, a loyal citizen who fulfilled the dictates of the state. In order to prevent subjects from speaking the Mardin language, Arabic, Kurdish or Aramaic languages, and producing a different memory, code, meaning, emotion and identification that interacted with all spheres, the state authorities *made them enemies and diversified the techniques to fight this bad habit*. Preventing the production of this habitus in everyday public and private life and ignoring it was seen as the most effective way to implement this. The "breaking of the resistance" to speaking in these languages and the return of Turkish as the mother tongue, Turkification, means the destruction of the mother tongue and the re-establishment of subjectivities, the transition to a new form of identification and existence, and becoming an acceptable national subject or citizen of the new state.

in this movement. In addition, while the *temsil* work of the People's House in Mardin continued in this way, examples are listed that refer to the ongoing civilizational efforts in many areas such as roads, government buildings, toilets, and small industry. Mardin, Cumhuriyetten Önce ve Sonra, Halkevi Broşürü, 92.

81 M.R. Trouillot "The Anthropology of the State in the Age of Globalisation", 38-125.

There is also the assumption that the state's choice to penetrate through this method failed to break the resistance of "other languages". In these years, it was reported that the people of central Mardin had learned Turkish to a significant extent, but in the cultural sphere, they continued to conduct their daily lives and symbolic and mental worlds with the codes of the language they already used.[82] Therefore, considering that there cannot be a "successful" assimilation as long as Turkish did not become the "home language", this fact of failure seems to have turned into a legitimate motivation that initiated and sustained new techniques of power with the accumulation of knowledge about it. Furthermore, the above examples suggest that individuals responded to this difficult process with participation or non-participation, which involved negotiation within boundaries and relations of power and violence.

5.3.3 *Penalty for Refusal to Perform the Work of the One Who Speaks Kurdish in State Affairs*

A different area of discussion and practice in terms of *punishment or sanction* was that of making Kurdish unspoken in state offices. Take the case of Hakkâri, which was considered "the most deprived and the furthest behind" as regards speaking Turkish. According to the head of the People's House, the people in Hakkâri, who did not know their "own language", spoke one that was "a mixture of several mixed languages that did not really have the characteristics of a language and did not make any sense".[83] In a letter to the RPP General Secretariat dated February 19,

82 CCA, 490.01/989.830.2, (7 January 1936).

83 In 1939, İhsan Kazancıoğlu, the head of the Hakkâri People's House, reported the "language situation" in Hakkâri to the RPP General Secretariat as follows: "Eighty percent of the people in the center of Hakkâri today do not speak Turkish. Those who do are those who mingle with those who have come here to fulfill their civic duty. Since the people have not come into closer contact with their own language, they cannot save themselves from using a linguistic mixture that does not make any sense in their contacts with each other outside. Especially in the villages, only a few people know a little Turkish. They are nothing but pure-hearted citizens performing their military service. The above-mentioned current situation of our Turkish brothers and sisters is a

1939, Kazancıoğlu, the head of the Hakkâri People's House, described the inability of citizens to carry out daily affairs of state as a "deplorable" situation, as seen in many different reports, and he emphasized that "Hakkâri is in dire need of a Language and Alphabet Reform":

> "The phonetics of the neighborhood in terms of language is nothing but a mixture of several different languages. The neighborhood is in dire need of a Language Revolution and with it a Letter/Script Revolution. It is regrettably noteworthy that almost every day, people who visit official institutions to follow up their business, in the face of their Turkish brothers and sisters who are Civil Servants[84], use their fellow countrymen who speak a little bit of Turkish to make their point. Courts, in particular, are always and every day a prisoner of a difficult situation. The translation of the above mentioned phenomenon into completely different phonetics leads to the fact that many times the work to be done goes in the opposite direction. Our unshakable feelings of fraternity, which our racial nobility has endowed us with, have been captured by a foreign phonetics, and many times and for a long time, the feelings of belonging to another community have shown the desire to live on crumbs and in a harmless way."[85]

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natural consequence of the culture that has not been developed in the neighborhood. (...) Considering these disastrous ratios, our People's House tries to manifest the attachment to the native language in the neighborhood with the most fundamental feelings. In order to bring the people face to face with their own language at all times, it organizes conferences on various subjects and in a way that they can understand. (...) In this respect, it was imperative that the people of Hakkâri, who are, in general, pure Turks and who reflect the racial nobility and sublime qualities of Turkishness in their physiognomy with their actions and movements, be equipped as soon as possible with the revolutionary and cultural qualities acquired by the greatest asset, Turkishness." CCA, 490.01/785.817.3.

84 The capitalization of the word such as "Civil Servant" symbolizes the fact that civil servants were seen as the dominant class.

85 CCA, 490.01/785.817.3.

Two years later, on 26 September, 1941, Kâzım Atakul, the district governor of Yüksekova, stated in the district public hall that the people of Yüksekova "have fought and must fight to remove the corrupt Kurdish language[86] from their houses, homes and languages and to replace it with the language of their ancestors, the language of the original nation to which they belong."[87] In this context, referring to the civil servants in the district, he drew attention to their "bad habit" of continuing to speak Kurdish with the public and explained the reason for this as follows: "We continue to speak Kurdish with those who do not speak Turkish and with those who know little Turkish, either because of the ease of understanding them or because of bad habits." This situation was described as the "indifference to the original language" of citizens who were originally Turkish but used Kurdish: "we can express without hesitation our own language and our great nationality, this is an insult, if we know this, we will give up the blunder of meeting and speaking in Kurdish."[88] The sanction and punishment here is shown as applicable to officials speaking Kurdish in public encounters. It also includes insulting and humiliating references to the occupation, and annihilation of the sphere of language and culture from an orientalist perspective, such as "the call for everyone to eliminate the corrupt Kurdish language from their homes, homes and tongues, and to give up the bad habit of speaking the Kurdish language". In this speech, it is also possible to say that a social Darwinist and positivist view, xenophobia and hate speech are produced in the face of "the Turkish language spoken by a nation that has taught culture and civilization".

On the other hand, Atakul proposed a more "moderate" system of punishment, similar to the "indoctrination" in Mardin:

86 The Kurdish language or the initials of Kurdish are often written in small letters in official reports. This is part of a policy of belittling and devaluing the Kurdish language. Occasionally Turkish and Turk also start with a lower case letter, but this is not very common.

87 CCA, 490.01/1168/101.3, (29 September. 1941).

88 Ibid.

> "Language cannot be dealt with by laws and legal sanctions; moreover, these procedures are inappropriate for a Turk and cannot be applied. In the Turkish administration, there is no pressure, threat or punishment in the republican principle. Therefore, in the matter of language, we must work and fight together to love and respect each other more and to know and speak the language, which is the only means of understanding of the great community to which we belong.. *In the bazaar, in the market, in the shop, in the apartment, wherever he is, we must not answer anyone who speaks Kurdish, we must not do business with him, we must force him to learn and speak our common language.* I am absolutely sure that all of us will participate in this common and important task and language war and that you will share this task and war. If there are those who believe that this is not so and that it is not necessary, the only answer to them is this: they are not Turks, they do not exist among us in our honorable and blissful society. Friends: with this speech, I have started a war for Turkish speech and practice in the neighborhood."[89]

A parallel example of the condemnation and vilification of not speaking Turkish, which had become a "bad habit", with the implication that Kurdish is not a language but a harmful addiction that must be eliminated, was seen in Mardin. He wrote that in the name of fighting "foreign languages", the Turkish Language Propagation Societies there "denigrated and ridiculed not knowing and learning one's mother tongue" in the eyes of the public.[90] The "ridiculing" of not knowing Turkish, speaking Kurdish or not speaking "proper Turkish" has been remembered as a strategy of establishing power among Kurdish-speaking individuals as a kind of "borrowed self-orientalism or self-colonialism" in the pendulum of the inclusion by Turkifying and also structural and practical segregation.[91]

89 CCA, 490.01/1168.101.3, (29 September 1941).

90 CCA, 490.01/841.325.2.

91 According to one such example, a fight broke out between a security guard at a government office and a Kurdish-speaking citizen, and the citizen grabbed the guard by

A form of *indoctrination* is a method of political, social and symbolic violence based not on fining people who speak Kurdish, but on not speaking to them, not responding to them, not doing business with them, shaming and ridiculing them. In a city where most people did not speak Kurdish, where there was limited formal education or Turkish courses, this form of daily punishment, which was developed with the aim of "decimating the Kurdish language", involved cornering them by denying them the state services that are their right as citizens. In addition, not opening Turkish or literacy courses but forcing people to speak Kurdish is another form of violence, which is a contradiction in itself. While the People's Houses practiced these techniques of government, which were shaped by state actors and local responses, the fact that central planning was not effectively disseminated at the local level brings to mind Minister of Economy Celal Bayar's statement in these very years, in 1936, that "there was no coherent decision as to whether or not Kurds would be allowed to read", and the contradictions and debates on the subject (Ch. 2).[92] On the other hand, in many official documents such as The Plan for the Reform in the East and the Turkification Circular, we are talking about the years when decisions were made not to recruit civil servants from the

the collar and shook him: "bırak yakamdan yırtıldın? /Let go of my collar" the guard said, and the citizen responded: "Kurban olduğum Türkçenden/How great is your Turkish." As opposed to the official's flawed speech while trying to speak the state language Turkish, even though he was a state official, there was also the misuse of Turkish by the citizen who wanted to gain the upper hand by making a mockery of his Turkish. Both were engaged in a power struggle over the dominant language imposed on them. The narrators of these and similar ironic examples had the motive of displaying political opposition by ridiculing both narrators and emphasizing the tragicomic consequences of assimilation. I observed that they find it ridiculous to speak Turkish in this way and show that they actually care about speaking it well and correctly. In the example Anter mentioned above of the gendarmerie following the villager and fining him for calling his donkey "ço", a similar ridicule is made of the gendarmerie, while the villager continuing to speak Kurdish despite being fined is also ridiculed by Anter. Of course, it can also be said that the "tyranny" of state institutionalization is undermined in the eyes of both the villager and the state official along the lines of "the state has nothing to do but chase a peasant with a donkey for speaking Kurdish."

92 Celal Bayar, *Şark Raporu.* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2006).

local Kurdish population, those who continued to speak Kurdish with the citizens, thus leading to the production of local worlds of meaning and forms of relations. In my opinion, this has turned into an issue that will be finally decided in the years to come, when assimilation to Turkish speech and Turkishness will increase, to the extent that the "loyalty of civil servants to the state and its process of national subject production" increases.

In 1942, Party Inspector Aytuna described the people of Yüksekova as "people who do not speak Turkish and say they are Turks" and stated that "no case of direct opposition to the government and the regime was encountered, and it was repeated at every opportunity that the people were very satisfied with the government and the policies pursued, and it was observed that they prayed to the nation, the state and the national chief".[93] Therefore, there is an implication that the "loyal people" who say they are Turks can fulfill the criteria of being a national subject and Turkish citizen if they learn Turkish. In those years, the issue of citizens of Kurdish ethnicity in the region telling state officials that they were also Turks is a case with a lot of connotations that should be emphasized. We can say that this was a visible reaction in the process of establishing a citizenship relationship with the state, in the process of performing state affairs and benefiting from state services in many areas that are more visible on the everyday level, such as the courthouse, finance, gendarmerie, land registry, cadastre (land registration) and education. In fact, the state was also engaged in a macro negotiation and bargaining with the Kurds in Hakkâri regarding the acceptance of the sovereignty of Turkishness, which was considered acceptable and legitimate only as a symbol of loyalty to the state and the citizenship it defined: "If you learn and speak Turkish, I will do your job for you". In the East, where rebellion, resistance and objections to not being part of the centralizing, modernizing circle of Turkishness have been experienced with great losses and damage, it was the state actors who held the upper hand in this bargaining. On the other hand, in a country with decades of war losses, culminating in World War I, it was clearly imposed that refusing

93 CCA, 490.01/998.856.1, (3 December 1942).

to accept being Turkish would be detrimental in the face of growing trends such as economic, social and political survival, survival of families and tribes, literacy, vocationalization of the curriculum and education. There was the promise of the state to acquire new capital, which could be called Turkishness capital to be acquired through Turkish, which had become the signifier and producer of Turkishness. However, in daily relations between the bureaucracy and individuals, it could be found that it did not go so smoothly, that knowing Turkish was insufficient to be accepted as Turkish, and that the process involved unequal and inconsistent practices subject to power matrices.[94]

5.3.4 *Carrot Policy: Turkish Competition and Reward*

Hilmi Uran and Dr. Hikmet Fırat, who served as RPP Diyarbakır Party Inspector, Minister of the Interior and Secretary General of the RPP, stated that after the DP's landslide victory in the 1950 elections in the Southeastern Anatolia region and Diyarbakır, "The mood in Diyarbakır has always been inclined towards the opposition and has always given room for it throughout history, and has actually shown various and repeated acts of rebellion."[95] There is an acknowledgement here that

94 See, Tuba Akekmekçi and Muazzez Pervan, eds., *Doğu Anadolu ve Cumhuriyet Bürokrasisi*, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2011).

95 "1950 seçimlerini RPP'nin Diyarbakır'da kaybettiği", CCA, 490.01/365.1537.1, (22.05.1950). A representative example that "deserves" the state's distrust was the situation in the Beşiri district of Siirt, as reported in 1941 by Aytuna, one of the most "hardworking" party inspectors in the region: "...the people of the district are composed of elements such as Arabs and Kurds who do not consider themselves Turks. These people have no close and firm connection not only with Turkishness but also with Islam. Their morals and characters are corrupt and mixed. They are capable of doing all kinds of evil. They cannot be trusted and relied upon in any national affairs". The people of Beşiri district, described as "a sleeping snake", are said to be obedient to the state due to their fear of the government's power of force, otherwise, "God forbid, in the event of any weakness in the government's power", they might attempt to riot and cause unrest. Thus, the continuation of the security regime is justified. On the other hand, Aytuna argues that tribal chieftains who approached the government "for the benefit of their tribes" and "for their own interests alone" appeared to be "quiet and loyal to the government", whereas in fact they were involved in robbery and smuggling, and that

even at an advanced stage of the young republic, when the People's Houses were to be closed a year later, the state was unable to change the "perennial dissident" and rebellious identity of Diyarbakır, historically the regional center of state institutional practices. On the other hand, the RPP executives who wrote the report continued to formulate an accusatory and dominationist politics that securitized this oppositional attitude by pointing out that the real culprit of this situation was Diyarbakır, which had never obeyed state authority. However, a lot of work went into transforming Diyarbakır into a "center of Turkishness" that would transcend its "rebellious and oppositional character" and exert both symbolic and real influence.

It was asked to be the representative of making Turkish the sole language in the province, where official statistics indicate that the rate of speaking Turkish was 30 percent. In his inaugural speech in 1932, Şükrü Sökmensüer, the Director of Public Security of the First General Inspectorate, who was the main actor in establishing the East and the "Eastern Turkish subject" with a "detachment-style administration", as the president of the People's House, which was positioned in the cultural sphere of this work, defended the imposition of various penalties and pressure on those who did not speak Turkish but spoke "foreign languages" with a proposal in line with his position.[96] Sokmensüer considered it was appropriate for an ancient Turkish sultan to impose the death penalty on those who did not speak Turkish in regions where Turks had settled after migrating from Central Asia, at a time when Turks were

their exile to Anatolia could have prevented these incidents. CCA, 490.01/1002/871.2, (2,3,4 July 1941). A year earlier, in his report in the same file, Aytuna had said of Beşiri, "Although originally Turkish, the locals speak Arabic and Kurdish, and most of them do not speak Turkish." Aytuna described the language spoken in the places he inspected under the heading "The language of the people". In 1941, he wrote the following for Şırnak: "For Şırnak, the language of the district center and the entire district is Kurdish. There are very few people who speak Turkish here. It is necessary to use interpreters in government offices. The people are not inclined to learn Turkish and send their children to school." Ibid.

96 *Diyarbekir,* (22.2.1932).

beginning to assimilate and speak less Turkish.[97] With this point of view, it is possible to assume that the head of the People's House who was the director of the Public Security Directorate gave his approval to the prohibitions and punishments including physical violence against speakers of the Kurdish language, economic punishments, the introduction of Kurdish and other languages into a universe of surveillance and sanctions from public life to homes, and the inability to benefit from formal education and civil servant positions for those who spoke in their mother tongue. In the aforementioned speech, Sökmensüer calls for the Language and Literature Branch of the Diyarbakır People's Houses, together with the Peasantry Branch, to fight against the "foreign languages" spoken mostly by the people living in the villages through cultural means.[98]

Three years later, in 1935, the method of rewarding, rather than punishing, would be used to make Turkish dominant, spread and teach it. In villages near Diyarbakır, the new language "pure Turkish", produced under the leadership of the Turkish Language Association, was encouraged to be spoken through competitions and prizes.[99] In this

97 Sökmensüer states the following: "...At a time when the Turk was on the verge of losing his identity in the face of foreign languages and his brothers and sisters were estranged from each other with different languages, it is understood that a great ruler such as Karamanoğlu Mehmet Bey was compelled to write a great decree that from now on, only the Turkish language would be spoken in the court, in the dervish lodge, in the convent, and that those who spoke any other language would be hanged. However, the Turkish language and country were so shaken by foreign languages and emotions that this warning was not enough to awaken them for another eight centuries. Turks who were moving away from their language were also moving away from their history. The last century had begun to make the Turk unrecognizable." “Halkevi’nin Açılma Merasimi Nasıl Yapıldı?” *Diyarbekir*, 22.2.1932.

98 Sökmensüer states: "The work of the members of this branch: On the one hand, to read the writings of the world's scholars who have searched for and written about the existence of the whole nation, and on the other hand, to find and reveal the language that is still living in its own environment, especially in the people, and to explain it to our nation through writing and language."Ibid.

99 Ibid. Not only in the Eastern provinces, People's Houses across the country also used to organize competitions to increase participation. In this way, it is possible to observe that in the eyes of the RPP General Secretariat and Ülkü magazine, they tried to be one of the

context, it was reported that the People's House organized Öztürkçe (pure Turkish) and Yurdbilgisi (Civics) competitions in the villages "with the aim of correcting the language and dialect of the villagers of Diyarbekir and teaching them knowledge of the country", and that 130 villagers were taught pure Turkish and 150 villagers with a proper dialect were taught civics.[100] In the competitions said to be held at the end of May every year, it was stated that "the first place winners would receive four oxen, the second place winners would receive two oxen, the third place winners would receive one ox, and the others would receive cash bonuses ranging from twenty liras to five liras "according to their qualifications".[101]

According to a report by Cahit Çubukçu, the head of the Diyarbakır People's House, on the last Friday of May 1935, 100 villagers, including 10 women, participated in a competition held in front of a committee of villagers from the villages of Diyarbakır's central district, and a woman named Fatma from the village of Zimmiğik won first place.[102] The first prize was fifty liras, the second prize was twenty-five liras, and the others received bonuses from ten liras to three liras according to their qualifications." The fact that a female citizen from a village, whose name had not yet been translated into Turkish, won the "language competition" is an important finding, especially in the 1930s, when "mute Eastern women" were not directly involved as People's House administrators and participants.[103] Considering that Turkish-speaking muhajirs – migrants -

"most successful" People's Houses of that year. The aforementioned competition in the Diyarbakır People's House was one of the events that resonated.

100 *Diyarbekir'e Bir Bakış: Cumhuriyet'in Büyük Eserlerinden Olan Tren Diyarbekir'e Yeni Bir Hayat Getirdi,* (Diyarbekir: Diyarbekir Basımevi, 1935), 7.

101 Ibid.

102 "Diyarbakır İli Ve Kazalarındaki Halkevleri'nin Çalışma Raporları", CCA, 490.01/984.814.2, (15 December 1935).

103 In addition to Turkish and pure Turkish, the term "language competition" is used more frequently in the documents. It is possible to mention that there is an acceptance that the term "language" directly connotes the new Turkish language in terms of meeting the qualification of Turkish as a language. Languages other than these, such as Kurdish, Arabic, etc., were not recognized as languages and this can be observed in the discourse. Another point is that non-Turkish languages, which were generally not mentioned in

were settled in villages such as Kadıköy, which was established for Turkish immigrants around Diyarbakır, as well as other villages, it is highly probable that Fatma's mother tongue was Turkish. The fact that she was involved in a state-supervised public activity involving competition with men, and that she knew Turkish in those years, indicates that she had attended primary school if her mother tongue was Kurdish or another language. In this process of assimilation, making herself a competitor shows the intertwining of Fatma's encounter with the state with the cultural sphere in terms of visibility in the public sphere, modernization and secularization. The limited data available to us provides a straightforward interpretation that she was in harmony, and this limitation is not necessarily the truth but the best assumption was can make on this data.

It should also be noted that the Peasantry Branch of the Diyarbakır People's House was engaged not only in peasant activities such as the "agricultural production techniques or economic development" of peasants like Fatma, but also in "working especially on the language of the peasants" as was common in other Eastern provinces. For example, in Ağrı, in the file titled "Requests and complaints about the activities and needs of the People's Houses in the province of Ağrı and its districts", in which the Third General Inspector reported that the judge in Ağrı kept the People's House locked up, and that its committees were not working properly, the decisions on the Peasantry Branch in 1943 within the scope of linguistic assimilation included. While the Ağrı Youth Club had complained a year earlier that the People's House was "headless, orphaned and neglected", the "works" it decided to carry out to instill Turkish and Turkishness should be considered in terms of spreading the image of a state institution and state effect.[104] The aim of the Peasantry Branch was "to take measures to help the spread and rooting of the

newspapers and journals such as People's House magazines, or were mentioned with negative references, were frequently mentioned as languages that needed to be eliminated in internal state correspondence.

104 "Ağrı İli ve Kazalarındaki Halkevlerinin Faaliyetleri ile İhtiyaçları Hakkında İstek ve Şikayetler". CCA, 490.01/733.2.2 (06.04.1943).

Turkish language among the people of Ağrı, who, due to geographical and historical reasons, pronounce the language called 'Kurdish' with a vocabulary that is mostly Turkish". The work decided to be done was: a) To go to the villages of the people of the mountain villages of the region who are racially Turkish, i.e. those who have little contact with the cities and towns, and who have forgotten their mother tongue and speak a language other than Turkish, and to explain to them that they are originally Turkish (by calling their headmen to the center from time to time in the form of a conference) and to advise and ensure that they speak in Turkish, b) Visiting appropriate villages at least twice a month to convince the villagers that their mother tongue is Turkish and that they are Turks in a way that they can understand and based on historical evidence, c) Performing performances (theater) d), Establishing reading rooms, d) Opening a follow-up office for illiterate villagers, e) Teaching the scientific way of cultivating the land, f) To guide them in cheesemaking, yogurt making, and beekeeping.[105] While there are no details of how the people who did not speak Turkish would have understood what was being said, the findings of this thesis suggest that at such events and during inspections by state administrators, they sometimes spoke to Kurdish villagers through interpreters, and complained that this communicative distance made it difficult to adapt to state practices. At this point, it should be added that an important criticism in the literature is that even in the case of trips to Turkish-speaking villages in the province of Ankara, these were generally conducted with top-down elitist, missionary or colonial sentiments, rather than effective communication.[106] The darkening of the color of this view in the impressions of Kurdish villages is shown in the evaluations of the Kurdish language in this section, within the themes of the other sections.

105 Ibid.

106 For a critical historical analysis of the village excursions of the Kemalist elites having nationalizing and civilising Turkish peasants in the west of Turkey see A. Lamprou, "Between Central State and Local Society. The People's Houses Institution and the Domestication of Reform in Turkey (1932 - 1951)", 251-281.

It was stated that the Republican administrators and intellectuals attributed the "cultural essence" of the Turkish nation to the peasants, who constituted 80 percent of the population in the whole country, and considered village Turkish as the essence of the national language and made use of it. In eight villages in Diyarbakır's Devegeçidi sub-district, another competition was organized to assign citizens with "proper dialect" as "teachers for villagers with improper dialect". Therefore, there is no mention here of collecting examples or compiling the language of the villagers of Devegeçidi, but the aim was to "correct their broken Turkish".[107] In addition, the fact that the villagers who spoke Turkish taught Turkish to those who did not is an interesting example of the production technique of assimilation at the micro and everyday level. As would become more prominent in the 1940s, the term "broken dialect" was sometimes used for the Kurdish language called *Dağ Türkçesi* (Mountain Turkish), but it is not entirely clear whether the "broken dialect" referred to is Kurdish or a dialect or dialect of Turkish, including the Turkish of Balkan immigrants.

Pierre Bourdieu emphasizes the fact that the linguistic habitus, which refers to the accents and intonations of the spoken language, is an entity that directly affects all forms of capital, and in this regard, he emphasizes the disadvantages that those who do not speak Parisian French actually face, as he himself speaks French with an accent and in a dialect. Linguistic capital, on the other hand, refers to the possession of the world of discourse, code and meaning in certain fields.[108] It can be said that a norm was established that the peasant population here, who spoke Turkish well, had a Turkish language habitus, was a candidate to acquire the new Turkish language capital that produced a common discourse network, and that the other sections of society, who were also pioneers in the activities of the People's Houses, would be excluded if they were not a party to this process, as the grouping to be allied and cooperated

108 See Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991).

with. In fact, this is in line with the intention to create "centers of Turkishness" such as Diyarbakır, Van, Ahlat, Bismil, Erciş, Erzincan, where the Turkish population lived for many years or had recently settled (Chapter 2).

On the other hand, in the 1935 general activity report of the People's Houses published by the General Secretariat of the RPP, the Turkish language teaching activities of the Diyarbekir and Mardin People's Houses were praised for being very useful and especially *practical*.[109] Thus, it was pointed out that teaching Turkish could not be accomplished without "going into the field", as the People's Houses aimed to do.[110] In addition to the annual language competition, Çubukçu, the head of the Diyarbekir People's House, stated that "forty-two villagers in the villages of Giyiktepe, Ekinciyan and Cimikan, who knew Turkish, had been identified for the purpose of experimentation, and they had been assigned as teachers to fifty-five villagers who did not speak any Turkish, and at the end of six months they would be tested and the best Turkish learner and teacher would be given four oxen as gifts." If the competition "yielded a good result, it would be extended to all the villages of Diyarbekir." Çubukçu also reported that the language competition had a very good effect on the villagers, increasing their interest in Turkish, and that it would be held again that year on the last Sunday of May. In 1939, the Language and Literature Committee organized the "annual civics and

109 *Halkevleri, 1932-1935 senesinde, 103 Halkevi'nde Nasıl Çalıştı,* 20. According to the People's Houses' general activity report for the years 1932-35, in a village in Diyarbekir, 42 Turkish-speaking villagers and 55 non-Turkish-speaking villagers were appointed as teachers by the People's Houses' youth. At the end of the year, the best Turkish teacher and the best learner would be selected, and four oxen would be awarded to him/her. The Mardin People's House, on the other hand, "established institutions for the dissemination of the Turkish language in six provinces, mobilized fifty vigilant young people for this cause, and set out to teach 700 citizens how to read and write Turkish." Ibid.

110 In addition to these two People's Houses, "Mersin, Adana and Siirt People's Houses also resorted to measures that could yield good results in this regard. The Gaziantep People's House trained 120 students in the pure Turkish language course and published the lessons given in these courses in book form and distributed them to citizens who needed to attend the course but could not find the opportunity to do so." Ibid.

Turkish competition" on June 2, "in the presence" of Diyarbakır governor Dr. Mithat Altıok. Participants were tested on the aforementioned subjects and prizes, including cattle and sheep, were distributed.[111] In the same year, the Language and Literature Committee announced that it had organized some 50 lectures, including some on language, which were broadcast over loudspeakers in the city of Diyarbakır, "some of which were mixed with concerts by the music branch" to make them more listenable.[112]

There is no detailed information on the contents of these "language competitions". It can be seen that the appointment of Turkish-speaking villagers as teachers to teach Turkish to Kurdish-speaking people had an aspect that reproduced the superiority of Turkish and Turkishness. The rewarding of those who were successful in the competitions related to the *Yurd Bilgisi* (Civics) course, in which a Turkish and national imaginary was produced, which also had an aspect that legitimized the relegation of speaking Kurdish to a "penal sphere" outside of rewards, as seen in current practices. In accordance with the *carrot and stick policy*, accepting the Turkish language and moving toward the reward contained the message of getting rid of the stick. This can be considered as indirect symbolic violence. Furthermore, through these competitions, the norm

111 "In the (exams of the) competition, Reşit Kaya from the village of Mermer, who won in Turkish, was awarded an ox, Abdullah Askar was awarded a cow, Ahmet Avşara from the village of Telalo, who won in civics, was awarded an ox, Hasan from Kadıköy was awarded a bullock, Hamit Çelebi from Telalo was awarded a ram, and Yusuf Ordu was awarded a sheep. Fourteen other successful winners received prizes such as pens and notebooks." "Bu Ay İçinde Olup Bitenler; Türkçe ve yurtbilgisi Müsabakası", *Karacadağ,* no 17, 20 June 1939, 23.

112 In the *Karacadağ* magazine in 1939, there is the following information about the branch in question: "Chairman: High school philosophy teacher Kâzım Baykal, Members: High school history and geography teacher Şeref Kişmir, Literature teacher Süheyl Beken, Retired head teacher Süleyman Savcı. Activities: Gave about 50 speeches, some of which were distributed to various parts of the city by loudspeaker alone, some of which were distributed to the people gathered in our house and also to the city by loudspeaker. Some of them were mixed with the concerts of the music department. Conducted research on the richness of the Turkish language and also gave speeches on the language." "Halkevimizin Bir Yıllık Çalışması", *Karacadağ,* no.13, 20 February 1939, 3.

was produced that those who learned and spoke Turkish would be included by the state by increasing their symbolic and economic capital and gaining an advantageous position, while those who did not do so would not be able to benefit from these advantages and inclusive citizenship. These adult-oriented practices, which were determined by reservations about "providing formal education to Kurds", can be considered as *maternal colonialism*[113] practices that include "positive language and methods" to include Kurds by assimilating them, as noted earlier.

Within the scope of "public education" led by the People's Houses, and depending on the initiatives of the local People's Houses and state actors, this seems to have come to the forefront in important centers such as Diyarbakır and Mardin, which were "invaded by obscure languages" despite being eternally Turkish. As a matter of fact, there is no documentation in the archives that these competitions were repeated in the following years. It is doubtful to what extent this practice of competition and rewarding in villages close to the center, where Turkish was also spoken, would work in the Kurdish-speaking villages, because it is not evident from the documents that the need and desire to learn Turkish in the region of the First General Inspectorate during these years was a common demand, especially in villages outside the urban centers. It is also easy to get the impression that this was both an insurmountable problem for the state and a matter of preference. Moreover, according to Kıvılcımlı, it was done because it was feared that the Kurdish peasants, who were subjugated and put under the sovereignty of the aghas and lords, would learn Turkish and acquire a nationalist consciousness, unlike in other colonies. Otherwise, he says, "those who are more or less engaged in sociology and politics will not buy it" when it is expressed under the heading of "budget shortage".[114] However, Ferro similarly emphasizes that in Algerian France, neither was Arabic-language

113 See Zeynep Türkyılmaz, "Maternal Colonialism and Turkish Woman's Burden in Dersim: Educating the 'Mountain Flowers' of Dersim", *Journal of Women's History*, 28 (3), (January 2016): 162-186.

114 Kıvılcımlı, *Yedek Güç Milliyet (Doğu)*, (İstanbul: Sosyal İnsan Yayınevi, 2009), 151-152.

education permitted nor was French language education an area of investment open to all.[115] According to Kıvılcımlı, the issue could not be a matter of budget, since the Bolshevik Revolution had created the resources to open schools for the small Turkish and Kurdish minorities in the newly established small region of Armenia. The issue was the fear that Kurdishness would turn into a nationality issue and lead to separatism, and to prevent the possibility of their awakening if they were educated by providing education in their own language and even in Turkish education. Those responsible for this were the aghas, who did not want the population, more than 80 percent of whom are peasants, working and acting under the command or control of the aghas in the region, to have contact with the state, where they would exercise their citizenship rights in education, justice, taxation and many other matters, and thus individualize and break away from their sovereignty, and move into the aegis of the state administrators, who turned a blind eye to their sovereignty in order to control the population. Because, says Kıvılcımlı:

> "Do not masses of people living as subjects of aghas submit to a foreign national oppression more easily than people united in the organization of a nation? The marabah (farmer) recognizes the "owner " who is called agha. For this reason, he even considers it natural for a Kurdish agha to have an owner called a Turkish bey. The fact that his own owner is Turkish or Kurdish is an afterthought for a serf. Who would not shear such a lamb?"[116]

However, he says that despite these systems of oppression, despite psychologies more disastrous than a straw for a drowning man to clutch at, there is a "tendency towards separatism" in Kurdistan, and that "it is this fear, not the budget or so and so, that makes Kemalism hesitate to spread its own culture there". In fact, he says, in a secret meeting of the First General Inspectorate, which included the eight provinces with the

115 M. Ferro, *Sömürgecilik Tarihi, Fetihlerden Bağımsızlık Hareketlerine Kadar, 13.-20. Yüzyıl* 231-235.

116 H. Kıvılcımlı, *Yedek Güç Milliyet (Doğu*), 153.

largest Kurdish populations, mostly in the Southeastern Anatolia region, Kemalist officials unanimously concluded: "Shall we educate the Kurds and create a new Albanian problem for ourselves!..."[117] This is why Kıvılcımlı says: "While one or two new high schools are opened in every district of Istanbul, it closes the secondary schools and teachers' colleges in Kurdistan one by one, and does not hesitate to impose all the games of its budgetary existence on the Eastern provinces. High schools cannot cross the border from Silvan to the East."[118] These lines, written by Kıvılcımlı from Elazığ prison in the early 1930s, would evolve with the changing dynamics in the 1940s, when schooling and public classrooms offering literacy courses would become a better assimilation and security policy.

Also there were examples such as Anter, Yıldırım, Ekinci and Alınak, who were sent to study in the cities in the 1930s from middle or upper class, tribal leader or civil servant families, and those who went to cities and towns to study in secondary and high schools, because there was no primary school in their villages, where they also took an interest in the activities of the People's House, such as music and sports, and negotiated assimilation. Later on, as in the military view that Kıvılcımlı drew attention to, some of these people became part of the generation of educated Kurds who became "enlightened" and integrated with modernity to oppose the assimilation and the state's Kurdish policy.[119]

In addition, after 1935, there were local movements for Kurds to learn Turkish and literacy. Rather than the production of a new generation through formal education, "public education" comes to the fore. Considered one of the "hardest-working" branches in the region, the Language and Literature branch of the Diyarbakır People's House practiced the encouragement of learning and speaking Turkish through contests, competitions and prizes in nearby villages with accessible Turkish-speakers. However, in the city center, where the number of civil

117 Ibid., 153

118 Ibid.

119 Tarık Ziya Ekinci, *Lice'den Diyarbekir'e Anılarım,* ed. Derviş Aydın Akkoç, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları), 2013.

servants was high due to its position as an administrative center, and where a "broken", in other words, a hybrid Turkish language influenced by Kurdish was still dominant, conferences were organized with intellectuals and bureaucrats from Ankara. In 1941, a competition organized through Karacadağ to encourage "intellectual youth" to use Turkish well and efficiently, and to be published there, was held for "mature writings for the people and the country, and original writings concerning the history of Diyarbakır", a method of competition and rewarding that was widely used in many People's Houses.[120] In 1943, a "competition for reciting beautiful poetry" was organized among high school students.[121] In these years, the People's Houses' mission of modernization "through indoctrination and upbringing of the people" through the distribution of prizes, such as play and short story contests with monetary prizes for the winners' works, such as the publication of their works or the nomination of their works as candidates to be performed as plays, was promoted. By encouraging the use of the new Turkish language, the dissemination of modern literature, and works that propagated the one-party state and the People's Houses, the Diyarbakır People's House, which occupied a central position in the region, propagated the principles of Kemalism that coincided with its mission of assimilation and civilization.

The examples such as the "Turkish competitions" in which individuals' performances were put forward and measured, which were prominent in the People's Houses in the East, were of course also a result of the People's Houses' general understanding of the concept of competitive education. These experiences, which coincided with the end of the 1930s, were related to the desire to prove the success of teaching and learning Turkish, and to gain recognition. The 1940 annual report by Zeki Ülke, the head of the People's House in Siirt province, which begins with the sentence "Our house is accomplishing the task it has taken upon itself in the dissemination of Turkish culture and heritage...", states that those who learn to speak Turkish are "preferably given the right to speak

120 "Okuyucularımıza", *Karacadağ*, vol.4, June 1941, 41.

121 "Güzel Şiir Okuma Müsabakası", *Karacadağ*, no. 6, June 1943, 774.

over the loudspeaker of the People's House and to recite poems, national anthems and songs", and defines speaking Turkish as a right and a kind of reward.[122] Similarly, propagandistic assimilation techniques were practiced in schools through loudspeaker broadcasts. Again, in Siirt, it was reported that students were made to sing "national poems and anthems" over loudspeakers every day "to ensure that Turkish is spoken as the only language".[123]

As emphasized in this thesis, state officials, through the People's Houses, saw learning and speaking Turkish as a right granted to citizens to accept Turkishness within the framework of assimilation, in other words, "the dissemination of Turkish culture and heritage", as expressed by the head of the People's Houses, Ülke. In Siirt, Mardin, Diyarbakır and many other eastern provinces, there was a discourse that it was a blessing for Kurdish and Arab citizens, especially those who were learning Turkish, to vocalize/demonstrate/perform in the public sphere, in the space of the People's Houses.

One of the rewarding practices was that the RPP General Secretariat provided more in-kind or cash aid to People's Houses with "good work", depending on whether they were in need or not. In fact, while Diyarbakır and Elazığ were the headquarters of the inspectorates and had high provincial budgets, the fact that they were seen as active - which began to decline in the 1940s - led to high amounts of central aid and interest,

122 CCA, 490.0. 1781/1219.66, (14 May 1940). When the RPP General Secretariat requested the Siirt People's House's six-month activity report (it was a common practice not to send the reports on time), the head of the People's House listed its "achievements" as follows: "...The swelling of the files of the People's House in this regard can make us all proud. For example: a-To teach and spread the Turkish language in the neighborhood, the People's House opened various classrooms. (It also worked hand in hand with the Education Department in this regard.), b-Numerous lectures were given on Turkishness, loyalty to the Republic of Turkey and national unity. In addition to this, every day, publications are made over the loudspeaker for the same purpose and goal, c-Those who learn to speak Turkish are given the preferential right to speak over the loudspeaker of the public house and to recite poems, national anthems and songs. d-Primary and secondary school students sing national poems and anthems over the loudspeaker every day in accordance with a method."Ibid.

123 CCA, 490.01/1002.871.2, (2/3/4 July 1941).

in many other places inactivity seems to have prevented budgetary and other aid. The head of the Siirt People's House, like the heads of all the regional People's Houses, asked for a share of these donations, saying, "You will appreciate that in these places that speak languages other than our language and are influenced by other cultures and heritages, money is needed as much as personal energy". Thus, he sarcastically emphasized that assimilation involved not only moral but also material costs, and that the budget of the People's House in a non-Turkish speaking place like Siirt was small.[124]

In this section, where we see examples of the production of power relations in the social sphere together with state powers, speaking Kurdish was coded as "bad" not only in the legal sense but also in the moral sense and seen as a "ridiculous" situation, and as in Mardin, there was an attempt to punish and ridicule each other in the family and on the street and ultimately to make it an everyday language. On the other hand, the cases of oaths and pledges to speak Turkish and for the signing of contracts emerge as reproductions of the state and assimilation in the field of *capillary power relations,* in interaction with religious and moral social attitudes.

§ 5.4 Technique to Prove/Exert Linguistic Assimilation: Taking Oaths and Signing Contracts

In 1935, Aziz Uras, the head of the Mardin People's House, proudly reported that schoolchildren *swore an oath* to their teachers that they would not speak any language other than Turkish with their parents, in

124 "(...) In these places, which speak languages other than our own and are under the influence of other cultures and heritages, you can well appreciate the need for money as well as personal energy. However, you can be sure that this money is not needed for luxurious and arbitrary expenses, but for the rooting of the ideal of country and nationality here " CCA, 490.01/1487.65.1. In these letters of request, just as in the requests for buildings and equipment and other issues, there is a kind of bargaining language with the subtext that "their selfless work in a backward and difficult place like the East must be supported financially, otherwise the realization of their national ideals will not be possible".

order to show how "tangible" the linguistic assimilation activities led by the *Society for the Dissemination of the Turkish Language* (Türk Dilini Yayma Derneği). Uras states that:

> "At home, one of these children tells his mother in Turkish that he is going to sleep and that his bed should be made, but his mother, not understanding, asks the child to say what he wants in Arabic, but he refuses. The mother persists, the child insists and the child agrees to sleep without a bed in order not to say it in Arabic. Another child stops eating in this way, and there are some minor complaints. But the issue is clear. Turkish children are determined to acquire their mother tongue, they want to overcome their bad habits. In desperation, they are forced to prefer Turkish, which they know half and half, to other languages and they learn it."[125]

Here, it is argued that the stubbornness of the child who is made to swear not to speak any language other than Turkish at home is directed against the parents' "ingrained habit of negative resistance" (ingrained habit that leads to negative resistance) to speaking "other languages".[126] After stating that hundreds of similar examples, large and small, could be listed, it is stated that "it is this unwavering determination of the Turkish child that has brought the mother tongue into the home".[127] The penalty for not communicating with the family of the child if they do not speak Turkish, and the criminalization for not speaking Turkish show the merging of symbolic practices of violence with micro spheres of power

125 *C.H.F. Mardin Halkevi Broşürü*, 18.

126 The choice made by their children to increase their capital and power in all areas, linguistic, symbolic, cultural, of learning Turkish, not preferring Kurdish or other languages at home, and the fact that this was generally forbidden by the father, seems to operate as a form of micro-power in general. For a fictional narrative inspired by experiences on this subject, see Miraz Rusipî, "Asimilasyon Masalı" , *gazeteduvar.com*, (25 January 2009),https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/forum/2019/01/25/asimilasyon masali/?fbclid=IwAR1hGbPFiZRG8mf_QLfO5dtaAg8ISCov0YBuFxSQdA59rXlOjeUHmb WmRp0

127 *C.H.F. Mardin Halkevi Broşürü*, 93.

such as the family. As can be seen here, with the assumption that the Eastern subjects' origins are Turkish and their mother tongue is Turkish, there is already the claim that "their mixed language is the result of bad governance" and that it is a "bad daily habit" that can be changed. The goal was to make their true language, Turkish, the language of the home and gradually "return to Turkish", the mother of all languages. Even if Turkish was learned, the fact that it was not the language of the home and street on a daily basis would contradict the goal of deep-rooted assimilation. In realizing this goal, the People's House was involved in a campaign with the motif "Vatandaş Türkçe konuş!" (Speak Turkish, Citizen!), celebrating the perseverance of schoolchildren, and again using the reward method. At Mardin Gazipaşa Primary School, for the past two years, students who spoke no language other than Turkish had been wearing specially made badges on their chests during a ceremony.[128] By 1940, children who attended classes to learn how to speak Turkish and read and write were given "gifts such as gold pens and watches that would serve as incentives for those who showed high achievement".[129] Another *oath-taking* event in Mardin took place on 26 September during Language Day, which, like other official holidays and ceremonies, was celebrated under the leadership of the People's Houses. In Sabri Aykal's lecture, "In response to an exciting sentence addressed to the public, a young man from the public proposed that everyone take an oath to never speak in a foreign language again unless there was a definite necessity, and he did so." Uras, the President of the People's House, proudly described this in his annual report for 1934 and 1935. [130]

Bingöl (Çapakçur) MP Feridun Fikri's example of taking an oath to speak Turkish, mentioned in the report of the election office (1941), stands out as a unique example. In Bingöl which stands out with a Kurdish-speaking rate of over 90 percent (Ch 2), Fikri reports that a

128 "Şehrimizde Kültür Hareketleri", *Ulus Sesi*, 21 March 1935, 2.

129 CCA, 490.01/688.337.1, (5 March 1940).

130 CCA, 490.01/989.830.2, (7 January 1936).

group of citizens speaking Zazakî[131], a dialect of Kurdish, signed an agreement at a conference titled "War and World Affairs" at the People's House, stating that they had learned that they were Turkish by descent, and that they would speak Turkish in their homes and in all public places:

> "At the conference organized in series on the outlines of Turkish history and the connection of Bingöl, when the orator proved that the people of the province were originally descendants of Turks, the listeners, who were very excited and appreciative of the conference and whose mother tongue was Zazakî, signed a document, promising that they would speak our own Turkish language, which they had long considered foreign, in their homes, in coffee houses, on the streets, in other words, everywhere, and that when they came across people speaking in another language, they would invite them to speak Turkish."[132]

With this signature, 20 people consisting of the "notables" of the city such as merchants and headmen and middle/upper class people seem to have rejected Zazakî, and in fact signed a kind of "Turkishness contract" with the state, to be included in the national identity and citizenship through speaking Turkish. Thanks to the conference that is said to have been instrumental in the signing, a contract with the state has been signed in which the official discourse of Turkishness produced in the relationship between knowledge and power "comes to fruition" in practice, nationalization in which the state language, Turkish, is the main driver, as well as proof of recognition of state authority. No specific

131 In official documents, Zazakî is sometimes classified as a dialect of Kurdish, sometimes as a separate language, and more and more often as Mountain Turkish. This *indecisiveness*, crystallized mostly in the state's "internal discourse", is also related to the *undecidability* of whether Kurds should be included under the banner of Turkishness. However, even though Kurdish was considered a completely different language, it evolved into a more explicit discourse in the 1940s, when their Turkification was a security necessity due to the increase in nationalist uprisings among the surrounding Kurds, and the impact of the war.

132 "Bingöl Halkevi'nde Verilen Konferanslar", CCA, 490.01/1008.889.2, (23 March 1943).

research has been conducted on why this group felt the need to sign such a document. However, it seems that, because they spoke Zazakî, they did not feel secure in a position that did not "trust" the state by default, and they wanted to show that they were culturally/linguistically included, or wanted to be included in the field of discourse and practice of the Halkevi and the state. In fact, they may have wanted to declare this with a contract that has no legal equivalent, and to become the "appropriate ones of the people" (See Chapter 2).[133] In Bingöl, which has a memory of physical violence and symbolic violence, having experienced the atmosphere of the Sheikh Said Rebellion and Dersim massacres, and considering that this violence continued throughout the region, the coerciveness of the environment in which this decision was shaped within the historical context should be taken into account.

133 Feridun Fikri, MP for Bingöl, mentions this in his election office report (1941): "The governor has organized a new People's House administrative committee. They are composed of civil servants and the appropriate members of the public." CCA, 490.01/994.844.3, (6 December 1943).




Figure 5.2 The landscape of Çapakçur/Bingöl, People's House; people coming to the People's House to "chat" with the inspector, the administraory board of the House, primary school and government house (from top to bottom) SOURCE: "Bingöl İlinde Bulunan Halkevleri'nin Teftiş Raporları", CCA, 490.01/ 994.844.3.

On the other hand, this signed document, in which they promised to speak Turkish, included the acknowledgment that the people of Bingöl spoke Zazakî in their daily spaces, which the state officials were trying to

make illegitimate, unscientific, ahistorical, invisible, and therefore exterminated.[134] For the elite group of intellectuals, academics and politicians, the idea that Kurds were a Turkic tribe originating from Central Asia, and that Kurdish, which had become confused over time and ceased to be a language, was of Turkish origin, would become a state-sponsored scientific endeavor, especially in the 1960s. The proud reporting of this document by the Bingöl MP points to an effort to establish a local indicator and a space of social legitimacy that the Kurdish language, which was seen as the biggest area of resistance, was beginning to break down, and therefore the identity, world of meaning, social, cultural and economic networks woven by it would disintegrate.

§ 5.5 Debates and Tensions about *Failure* and *Success* of Linguistic Assimilation and Linguicide

In 1950, in the 18th year after the founding of the People's Houses, the Urfa MPs reported with regret that in Urfa, as in Hakkâri, Diyarbakır, Mardin, Bingöl and Siirt[135], Kurdish, and later Arabic, was the dominant language, and that Kurdish continued to be spoken even in villages with a Turkish population. To be more convincing, they gave detailed figures, and complained about this lack of assimilation, which was not seen even in the colonies:

"There are 1,232 Kurdish villages, 374 Arab, 78 Turkish, 11 Yazidi, 24 Zaza villages in Urfa. Urfa 30 thousand, 12 thousand Turkish. Siverek

134 Münir Soykam, in his 1941 inspection report on the "language and education situation" of the town, also states that the "home language" is Zazakî, a dialect of Kurdish: "All men in the town speak Turkish, but few are literate. Fifty percent of the women can speak Turkish, the (family) language they speak at home is the (Zaza) dialect. there is a primary school with (5) grades in the center. (70) girls (110) boys are studying in this school. The people are very inclined to educate their children. There are primary schools in five villages connected to the center. (56) girls (132) boys are studying in these schools". CCA, 490.01/994.844.3, (6 December 1943).

135 See for example; "People in Siirt speak Arabic as their mother tongue. Kurdish is also spoken in the center. No one speaks Turkish except for those who come to the region from outside for very different purposes." CCA, 490.01/1002.871.2.

16,800, 2 thousand of them are Turks. Birecik 12 thousand, 7 thousand of them are Turks. The Turkish element is one in 16. Kurdish is also spoken in the Turkish villages. Even in the colonies, states teach their own languages and do not hesitate to make any sacrifice for their *temsil*. However, the province of Urfa is not a colony, but a part of the homeland. It is in the national struggle. Turkish can be read and written. The Kurdish population should be thinned out, but Kurdish citizens should be harmed as little as possible."[136]

The MPs who indirectly criticized the central state authorities by saying that Urfa was "not valued as much as a colony" were trying to prove with quantitative evidence that assimilation was denied to Urfa. This was a reaction to the *effect* of the state officials, symbolized by Çakmak, who had been Chief of General Staff for many years and who was defended by Kıvılcımlı above, that cultural assimilation investments in education were not accelerated due to "the fear that the educated Kurds might be more dangerous" and that the East in fact consisted of a region of "deprivation". This reaction is in line with the louder voices of local and central administrators and politicians during the multi-party period, who argued that the East was being left behind culturally through effective assimilation (Ch 2).

However, according to the Urfa MPs, Urfa had proved its identity in the national struggle, and therefore had already earned the right to Turkish literacy and assimilation and, in fact, the capital of Turkishness with the prices it had paid. It is clear that the republican state's solutions to this undesirable demographic problem, which implies the "failure in itself" or "deficiency or imperfection" of Urfa, and the fact that Urfa, which was predominantly Kurdish and then Arab in the cultural sphere, started the process of nationalization in a kind of "defeated" situation due to this structure: Turkish literacy, and, as was the main method of the period, a less violent approach to the Kurdish population, i.e. "thinning it out by inflicting as little damage as possible".[137] As mentioned earlier, this is in line with the views among members of the state, particularly on the

136 CCA, 490.01/717.451.2, 20 September 1950.

137 Ibid.

lack of excessive use of violence in security practices and the People's Houses' role in carrying out the work of *telkin ve terbiyeyle temsil ve temdin* (assimilation and civilizing through indoctrination and upbringing). In the case of Urfa, the fact that it was said to have failed because this policy was not actually practiced, and that in this sense it was even worse than the colonies, reflected the debate within the state officialdom that assimilation had failed, even as far back as 1950.

Sociologist and historian İsmail Beşikçi, who was imprisoned for years for calling Kurds an ethnic and national group in his field research on Kurdish tribes and ethnicity in the 1960s, does not advocate linguistic assimilation like the Urfa deputies, but similar to them, he says that Kurds do not even have colonial status. According to Beşikçi, one cannot even speak of a typical colonial practice, since the colonized Kurds and Kurdistan were not even given an explicit and official colonial status. He claims that in the colonies, even if the use of the local language is not ensured, at least the existence of a different language is accepted, while Kurdish and Kurdish identity is in a lower position because it is denied and assimilation was not practiced effectively, because the people under the sovereignty of aghas and beys were exploited by the state and by them and protected from assimilation in a closed way removed from capitalist networks.

According to Ercan Çağlayan, "although the Muş People's House, which was active for nearly twenty years with the main aim of raising individuals with national and secular characteristics by spreading the Turkish language in the region and thus realizing social transformation, wanted to teach the Turkish language and incorporate it into the Kemalist system through its social, political, sporting, cultural and economic activities," it could not go beyond influencing the officials and notables in the city center as much as desired.[138] Çağlayan explains the reasons for this as the heavy rural population in Muş, where traditional life continued, and that there was a low rate of schooling and literacy, and the public retained a distance from the authoritarian secular state and

138 Ercan Çağlayan, "Cumhuriyet Taşrasından Bir Kesit: Muş (1925-1938)", *Dicle Universitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, no.16, (April 2016): 255-268.

the People's Houses.[139] Hasip Aytuna's 1940 report, which paints a more "optimistic" picture of linguistic assimilation in Muş, takes a more statist view, claiming that although Kurdish was dominant in the villages, Turkish was spreading rapidly from year to year, from the centers to the villages, due to schools, markets, economic relations and the people's contact with state institutions. Aytuna would add that the "admirable" activities of the People's Houses in this regard had entered a productive phase.[140]

As is common, the official report on Siirt also complained about the speaking of "other languages": "People speak Arabic as their mother tongue. Kurdish is also spoken in the center. No one speaks Turkish except those who come to the region from outside for very different purposes. There is no discernible desire to learn our language among the people living in these beautiful places of great historical and political importance within the borders of our national homeland, neither in the provincial center nor in the towns."[141] The mentioned reluctance, especially in the early years, was attributed to reasons such as the people's excessive religiosity, their low level of culture, being composed of peasants living a tribal life, and their distance from their mother tongue, Turkish, and it was said that there was a "perceptible" resistance in Siirt against participating in the activities of the People's House and learning Turkish.[142]

In the internal correspondence of the state, we generally come across journalists, intellectuals and academics who support the current state politics looking for responsibility in the state's local infrastructural problems. However, it is also an important argument for them to attribute the "savagery", biological and mental backwardness of the "East" to its "deficiencies in itself", even to the point of not realizing that it can find life through Turkishness. In this sense, the East was ghettoized as having an "inherent backwardness and deprivation" that would continue in the

139 Ibid.

140 CCA, 490.01/1001.868.1.

141 CCA, 490.01/1002.871.2.

142 CCA,490.01/961.720.1.

following years with its geographical difficulties, where direct physical extermination and expulsion was permissible. So much so that within this network of discourse of failure in itself, in my opinion, in the 1920s and 1930s, the burden of not being civilized and Turkified was also placed on the "Eastern" subjects, especially the Kurds, who chose a tribal and primitive life.

The criticism of cultural policy at both the national and regional level, ranging from the inappropriateness of the state bureaucracy to the lack of investment in the administrative and financial spheres, was actually more pronounced in the early 1940s, during World War II. Although cultural development and progress were prioritized, this was generally not achieved, and therefore the East could not be assimilated and integrated into the West. It is significant that 20 years later, the republic had failed to force linguistic and cultural assimilation not only on the Kurds but also on Muslim minorities such as Pomaks, Circassians and Laz people. The single-party RPP was criticized for not working effectively in this regard and suggested that the People's Houses should work more effectively and intensively on assimilation in the field. In this regard, the detailed report of RPP Secretary General Esendal is a representative example. Esendal's most important point was that Turkish was not sufficiently prevalent as the only language, but rather he complained about the effectiveness and density of the Kurdish population and the difficult hegemony of Kurdish.[143] Therefore, it can be seen that the specific linguistic assimilation techniques of the Diyarbakır and Mardin People's Houses, which were especially appreciated in the examples given above, were not widespread and sustainable. On the other hand, it should be noted that the election reports of political/bureaucratic actors from the center, especially local administrators of the People's Houses and members of parliament, were intended to examine the "exaggerated" reports of their own actions, in order to gain appreciation for them, and therefore, their reporting focused on finding deficiencies and proposing solutions. However, it was also thought that such reports would be more

143 "CHP Genel Sekreteri Memduh Şevket Esendal'ın Doğu İllerine Yaptığı Gezinin Raporu." CCA..490.01/571.2274.1, (14.06.1945).

objective and reflect the "truth" because they were written by outsiders, even from different constituencies, who were not seeking "political rent" or "subservience" due to their higher position. Based on this position, Esendal very emphatically asked the question of how to communicate with a people who did not speak Turkish, and how to ensure their participation. The presence of Kurdish and Arabic in the southeastern part of the country was so striking that Esendal went so far as to argue in his report for the mass expulsion of Kurds from the country, a kind of cultural genocide. But such methods were no longer realistic, the remedy was *temsil* led by the People's Houses.[144]

Another person who prepared a more specific report on the assimilation of minorities during this period was Cevat Dursunoğlu, who had been a high-level bureaucrat in the field of education, and after 1942 a member of parliament and central director of the RPP. In 1944, he asked the General Secretariat of the RPP to distribute the Muslim minorities in the country and to assimilate them into the circle of Turkishness as soon as possible, by assimilating adults through People's Houses, and children through formal education, in line with the current official policy of not making enough progress in assimilation, and he emphasized the more effective work of the RPP cadres. In this report, which is felt to have been written with the insecurity of the war years as a backdrop, with foreign intervention and survival concerns, he again emphasized the danger of incorporating non-Muslims into Turkishness, and emphasized that a separate axis of *tedip and tenkil* (discipline and banishment) of the Kurds would again take place, that the Kurds to be educated and the villages where schools would be opened would be carefully selected, and that a cultural policy that included the extension of very effective assimilation to formal education would be emphasized.[145] The RPP, whose support among ordinary peasants had declined due to its taxation and austerity

144 Ibid.

145 See Mehmet Pınar, "Cevat Dursunoğlu'nun Azınlık ve Millet tanımlamalarıyla ilgili Raporu", *Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi/The Journal of Social Institute,* no. 45, (Autumn 2019), 357-374.

policies during the World War II years, was criticized internally for its lack of success in assimilation, and a new beginning was sought.

In addition to interpretations that the state failed at the end of the day, these policies also read it as an effective process that ignored Kurdish and other languages in the East and resulted in the destruction of their dominance. Ekinci, one of the witnesses of the period, states that the coercive assimilation policy, which started with the closure of Kurdish madrassas, the prevention of reading and writing in Kurdish and the prohibition of speaking Kurdish, was first implemented by martial law commanders and the General Inspectorate administration, which had extraordinary powers established for assimilation purposes.[146] Ekinci also says that even though the General Inspectorates were abolished in 1952, the forced assimilation and denial of the Kurds' existence continued.[147] Altemur Kılıç, on the other hand, complained that the Kurdish movement was paradoxically restarted by young people from the East, such as Musa Anter, Faik Bucak, and Tarık Ziya Ekinci, who studied in the boarding schools, and were expected to be recruits loyal to the state like graduates of the Tribal Schools, under the influence of the DP's

146 Fuat Uçar, "Demokrat Parti Döneminde Kürt Sorunu: Gelişimi ve Etkileri", 175-200

147 Ibid., According to Uçar, the French Ambassador in Ankara presented the opposite picture in a telegram dated March 13, 1952. Reporting that the people were not under the pressure of a colonial or semi-colonial regime and that no discriminatory regime was applied against the Kurds, the Ambassador added the following to the secret report dated June 9, 1952: "The regions in the East are filled with Kurds. These people have regained a majority in nine cities, namely Ağrı, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Hakkâri, Muş, Siirt, Tunceli and Van. All the efforts made by the Kemalists for 25 years to spread the Turkish language in these regions have been in vain. DP government faced a very dangerous situation in these regions because of the significant number of Kurdish votes. Two years ago, Hasan Oral, a member of parliament who was involved in arms smuggling, sided with the Democrats when he was exposed as a smuggler. Thus, the Kurds united in the Democrat Party in line with their own interests. The Kurds started to support the Democrats in order to extract as many concessions as possible. As a result, the government had created a very important problem that could not be resolved. In parallel to this situation, the Turks living in the East took up arms to ensure their own security in the event of a weakening of the government." Ibid., 188.

mistakes.[148] This result can be seen as the unintended consequence of assimilation, and thus as side effects in state formation that were predicted to be successful but turned out to be a failure.[149] These examples again show the asymmetrical and dialectical production of the success and failure of the state, in terms of assimilation of subjects, interpreted according to the period.

An important issue is the researchers' findings and analysis that Kurdish was struggling to "survive" academically, culturally and socially in Turkey due to assimilation practices and the politics of linguistic genocide, even if the state authorities found them unsuccessful.[150] In fact, during this period, the Kurdish language, which had been rendered more invisible in Turkey and Iran, found support only paradoxically in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon to a limited but effective extent, and in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics thanks to the "small nationalities" policy. There, the fact that tens of thousands of people found support in the Kurdish press, broadcasting and education, and that the Kurdish language has been rebuilt, and resurrected scientifically, literarily and socially through this means, is a realm of politics and experience in contrast to neighboring Turkey.[151]

After the Sheikh Said Rebellion, state violence such as massacres, village burnings, resettlement, and the departure of rebels, sympathizers, other exiles and immigrants to the Kurdish binxet (under the border), the Kurdish-majority northeast of Syria, especially Jazira, which was divided after World War I, a cultural resistance area based on Kurdish nationalism began to form straddling the border line. There were counterparts, such as the modernized literary and folkloric production of Kurdish in the Latin alphabet, which took parallel steps with Turkish

148 Altemur Kılıç, *Büyük Kürdistan Küçük Türkiye*, (Ankara: Akasya Kitap 2007), 166, cited by Fuat Uçar, "Demokrat Parti Döneminde Kürt Sorunu: Gelişimi ve Etkileri", 189.

149 For a study focusing on this theme see, Mezher Yüksel, "Unintended Consequence of Modernisation in Turkey: Nationalist Reactions from Its Periphery" (PhD diss. Middle East Technical University, 2007).

150 Metin Yüksel, "Hayatta Kalma ve Diriliş: Kürtçe'nin Yakın Tarihine Bir Bakış", 16-23.

151 Ibid. 21.

state nationalism.[152] The pioneers of this were Celadet Bedirxan, from one of the old Kurdish princely families, who had been fighting the state since the Ottoman Empire for a share of power and sovereignty, centralization and identity rights, as well as other Kurdish nationalist politicians and literary intellectuals such as Osman Sebri and Cegerxwin. In response to the Kemalist state rulers' conception and formation of an East under the hegemony of the Turkish national identity, an effort to prove that the Kurds are an ethnic and linguistic unit through cultural nationalism came to the fore on international platforms as a response to states that denied this, although they did not have the same power reserves. It can be said that they, too, strived for the production of an alternative "East" dominated by Kurdish culture, centered on the survival of the Kurdish language.[153] At the transborder and transnational level, this process, which we can call the survival and resurrection of the Kurdish language on the premise of cultural nationalism and ethnic rights, can be read as an attempt to reverse the process as a reaction to the attempted assimilation of the Kurdish population, which was considered a failure. In this sense, it can be read as a response to the state and the People's Houses in Turkey, albeit with unequal forces.

It is also argued that during this period assimilation was not successful in areas with strong Sunni Islamic sentiments.[154] The reason for this is the inability to reconcile with secular religious practices, both institutionally and ideologically, and practically. The fact that Kurdish texts continued to be taught and the spoken language remained Kurdish in the old educational institutions, the madrasas, which were banned but sometimes allowed due to the influence of local networks, should also be added. Therefore, the existence of the *madrassa* phenomenon and the "*melle*", or religious people who graduated from there, is a counter or

152 Jordi Tejel Gorgas, "The Shared Political Production of 'the East' as a 'Resistant' Territory and Cultural Sphere in the Kemalist Era, 1923-1938", *European Journal of Turkish Studies, 10, (2009) State-Society Relations in the Southeast,* URL : http://ejts.revues.org/4064;

153 Ibid., 10.

154 See for example Van Bruinessen, *Kürdistan Üzerine Yazılar,* 10th ed. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2019).

alternative/different cultural space that contributed to the "survival" and "resurrection" of the Kurdish language and the life worlds it embodies, as is the effect of musical products based on traditional Kurdish lyrics song by *dengbêjs and stranbêjs*.[155] Music, theater[156], productions of the strong oral art tradition within social networks, especially in villages where assimilation was felt less, weddings and local ceremonies dominated by folk dances and Kurdish music were areas where Kurdish was still found. While the introduction of radio and cinema into everyday life created a significant transformation, the engagement with Turkish productions, as well as the new space created by Kurdish radio in the 1950s, would also offer colliding and intertwining experiences. Hence the Kurdish language's greatest resistance dynamic is the Kurdish ethnicity's strong linguistic habitus and memory, which are not closed units of course, but are embedded in strong and self-transforming tribal and kinship relations.

§ 5.6 Concluding Remarks

This section focuses on the discourses and practices of the People's Houses, the main missionary institution for ending the hegemony of the Kurdish language in every field and making Turkish dominant, which also meant the People's Houses and state institutions taking the Kurdish language out of the clutches of the settled Turks in the East, where the state tested its success the most. To put it bluntly, beyond the dichotomy of success-failure, strength-powerlessness, the techniques through

155 For a historical study and discussion on this issue, see Metin Yüksel, "Dengbêj, Mullah, Intelligentsia: The Survival and Revival of the Kurdish-Kurmanji Language in the Middle East, 1925-1960". See also Wendelmoet Hamelink, *The Sung Home. Narrative, Morality, and The Kurdish Nation,* (Leiden: Brill 2016); W. Hamelink and Hanifi Barış, "Borders and the State as Seen the Eyes of Kurdish Singer-Poets, *Kurdish Studies* 2, no.2, (2014): 35-60.

156 For a short, but analytical history of Kurdish theather in all Kurdish populated countries see Mari R. Rostami, "A History of Kurdish Theatre", in *The Cambridge History of The Kurds*, eds., Cengiz Güneş, Hamit Bozarslan, Veli Yadırgı (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 729-751.

which these were applied and interpreted on a daily and local level, and the complex ways in which subjects relate to and cope with them have been examined from both top-down and bottom-up, and evaluated in their complexity. Here, it is seen that the debate and discourses on making *temsil* effective as a security practice in the 1930s, in relation to the process of establishing security/public order, materialized in the field in different ways depending on the city, village, ethnic and class units. At this point, the sophisticated practices of power techniques of the modern state at the local level have been disclosed and discussed. It is seen that these have significant effects and produce the success of declaring different proposals and forms as illegitimate, criminal, bad, ridiculous, dangerous with the spirit of war and conquest in the entire linguistic and cultural field, and it has been found that there is a plane of struggle and negotiation regarding the formation of an East through Kurdish, together with the counter fields. It is possible to say that a state formation has emerged that is woven with discourses and practices and responses that include tensions about the nationalization and secularization of the linguistic and cultural sphere through the cultural techniques mentioned above, and the control, readability and surveillance of it.

Here, in addition to the state and the People's Houses' view that the people did not speak Turkish, the language of civilization, as a given failure and deficiency of the East, there is also the constant production of discourse and practice within state officials, as a field of state failure, powerlessness and incapacity. Without being satisfied with the result of the state's inability to spread the Turkish language far beyond what was intended, it was also realized in this section that how these processes of failure were experienced in daily encounters produced different results when they were read together with the micro and macro, long and short-term state effects and side effects. In other words, while the failure fed a legitimization not only for the state but also for assimilation, due to the fact that the East was a problem area, the state's new strategies in the East were in question. Kurdish was rendered as illegitimate, bad, "weird", ridiculous, criminal, and a homogeneous language and identity discourse tried to dominate it. In the meantime, those who were the recipients of

this process were also able to make these stories of success and failure more complex through various and differing interpretations articulations. I think the success or failure of the state during this encounter should be seen in terms of its ever-productive and intricate micro and macro, political, social and cultural effects. Even though the state seems to have failed because the target language was not spoken, the fact that it has not focused on this in a fully determined manner weakens the argument that it has failed. Instead, with all its discourses and practices, strategies and technical productions, it created effects through this with all its discourses and practices, strategies and technical attempts regarding the prohibition, punishment, denial and eventual annihilation of other languages with a social Darwinist attitude, and it was in these processes and in this way that it was trying to create its own East, in a way that encompassed different tendencies within it. At the point where it seemed to fail, it also managed to give itself the appearance of autonomy through state influences such as identification and assimilation based on the state language. Whether the issue of success is an issue that contains asymmetrical elements that do not need to proceed along certain lines for the receivers, and what can happen beyond binary oppositions were the specific problematics of this section.

Of course, a preventive attitude toward the education of the Kurds, and the socio-economic de-development of the East and Kurds is as a form of internal colonization tendency of the state agents. It is perceptible in the preference for prioritizing and budgeting for security practices, and in cultural investments and practices that do not give a sense of mobilization. However, it seems inconvenient to say at the outset that this is a very consistent and non-negotiable issue. The ruptures that became apparent in the 1940s would lead to a debate on the state's prioritization of the East in education, and assimilation would begin to be prioritized over the fear that the Kurds would be enlightened and exposed to nationalist ideas. This was influenced by the predominance of the view that the influence of Kurdish nationalism would be more dangerous, as long as Kurds remained Kurds, such as the example of the appointment of local appropriators to the administration of the People's

House, and the assimilationist development policy that was also visible in the DP.

This chapter also provides important examples of the modern state's practices of diffusion, through technologies of the self at the micro level, intervening deeply in everyday life with techniques of power, especially in places with a majority Kurdish population such as Diyarbakır and Mardin in the 1930s. It was also shown how the state-society and state-culture relationship is multilayered, and how it is realized through the interplay of phenomena such as domination and submission, resistance or silence, participation or non-participation, and the ways in which the process of linguistic assimilation may or may not have transcended these phenomena. In this way, an attempt has been made to contribute to the literature in order to understand in a more sophisticated way how the process of state formation in the East took place precisely through the actions, practices and experiences in this period.

Hence, just as in space, state actors and receptors have various strategies (appropriation, indifference, contract, oath, violation, bargaining, blackmail) with a capacity of struggle and negotiation social and cultural ordinary actors during the diffusion of the spatialization effect created by the state in the fields and processes of encounter, so too in the more exclusionary linguistic field. Of course, it is unthinkable that the state's practices of dealing with the Kurdish language and its dominance under the name of "war" with the Kurdish language are perceived coldly and clinically. The state acted through complex biopolitical and disciplinary and surveillance techniques, such as oath-taking, anthem singing, punishment and reward techniques And there needs to be rational evaluation of the application of technologies of the self by making Turkish compulsory and transforming Kurdish and other languages into both the public sphere and, as mentioned in People's Houses, the home language and gradually the mother tongue. However, evaluating these practices, which are components of the process of the state's local formation with changes in form and tone according to local and daily contexts, at the point of success and failure and ending the discussion, considering this as the final point, turns out to be an

incomplete historical analysis. When the results of such experiments were not effective, it can be said that they were sources of legitimacy for the state to constantly establish new beginnings and strategies to produce even more effective techniques in the "underdeveloped or left backward and deprived of Turkish" East, as was the case in the 1940s. In addition, these practices provide an understanding of the techniques by which the modern state is produced in areas of encounter.

This assimilation, likewise coded as silent or resistant, has been a perspective that makes it visible for Kurdish subjects under the domination of violence to produce different interpretations of assimilation, in which they try to exist within the dynamics of power and violence. This dissimilation or various challenges as *reappropriation indifference*, *resistance, counter responses, in-betweens* and *transcendences* produce voices.[157] In fact, as a more general argument, I discussed whether it is possible to see that modernization has side effects or unexpected consequences that the state did not intend as well as intended, within this photograph of the authoritarian, repressive/punitive state. For this, I tried to show that it depends not only on intentions, projects and discourses, but also on practices, their subjective, social and culturally complex effects and consequences, and their dependence on the mores of the period itself. On the other hand, the Halkevi, in perspective with the repressive power practices of other state institutions based on the denial and punishment of the Kurdish language, engaged in cultural productions in micro, local and everyday contexts. They tried to prove that the cosmopolitan identities of the "old", and especially the Kurds and other different ethnic and linguistic belongings and identities, do not reflect reality and are illegitimate.

157 According to H. Bhabba, instead of defining the subaltern in terms of forms of resistance with a negative consciousness like Ranajit Guha or in extreme cases like the impossibility of being a subject like Spivak, it is more appropriate to define the subaltern in an 'in-betweenness' that imitates and inverts the language, culture and thought patterns of the colonizer and shows this through forms of resistance such as humor. Homi Bhabba, *Location of Culture*, 86.

Thus, the denial of languages, cultural and artistic products was legitimized through the exclusion of the structurally mentioned elements and the creation of a new reality, a new rationality and causality through the produced definitions of what there could be inside. As Yeğen emphasizes, the effect of these discourses seems to have been to cover up the ethno-political existence of the Kurds, since the invisibility and neglect of Kurdish, and the denigration of Kurdish as a language has the potential to make it a sub-category or antecedent of ethnic group nationhood.[158] With this policy of rejection, the state tried to ensure that their ethnic and cultural rights were not mentioned. While the reports, discourses and modern techniques of power aimed to produce a new East, they also produced and constructed the state. They negotiated assimilation with the state in the social and subjective sphere within certain boundaries and power baggage, through reactions such as approval, indifference, silence, participation, self-optimization and implicit rejection, which vary according to class and gender differences, and where women are not visible. After all, we see that the subjects are not passive in this process within macro and micro dynamics, but relational parties to the formation of the state, nation and citizenship, from taking an oath to non-participation in a way that is interwoven with forms of violence and power.

Thus, the performance of the state and the People's Houses in the dichotomies of success and strength and failure and weakness, in the field of linguistic assimilation also turns into concepts that need to be read contextually and interpretatively in this process. This can also valid for the subjects. As showed that in Kurdish cultural sphere both modern written productions that transcend the borders of nation-states and productions in the field of traditional oral culture have been important areas of response to these state discourses and techniques for the revival and production of Kurdish language and Kurdish ethnic and national identity.

158 For this discussion, see Yeğen, *Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu.*

Tos um up, it is the hegemonic argument that the People's Houses and the state "failed", especially in linguistic assimilation - that the state failed in its aim to weaken and destroy Kurdish and to replace it with Turkish as the "home language". However, in this period, the delegitimization, invisibilization and banning of Kurdish, the state and its sovereignty are seen to have in fact ensured its visibility and legibility. Also, the fact that "Turkishness" became a compulsory and attractive status by turning into a condition for the enjoyment of citizenship rights, modernization and articulation with capitalism, is a phenomenon that can be entered in the "success" column. The receivers, on the other hand, developed different attitudes such as "turning this situation in their favor", "rejecting" or "adapting" to it. This shows the contextualization of success and failure and its relevance to subjective experiences. Prohibitive, "otherizing" and exterminatory discourses and practices regarding Kurdish and other cultural forms of the Kurdish ethnicity were effective. However, it can be argued that the linguistic nationalism of the state and Turkish nationalism has led to the strengthening of Kurdish nationalist arguments through linguistic rights and linguistic nationalism, and that Kurds who learn Turkish and receive Turkish education produce also challenging complex subjectivities that reinterpret modernity with new forms of capital. In this process, it can be said that for Kurdish subjectivities, modernization has turned into a normative field of practices and ideologies with different interpretations.[159]

159 Cemil Gündoğan, "Geleneğin Değersizleşmesi: Kürt Hareketinin 1970'lerde Gelenekselle İlişkisi Üzerine", in *Türkiye Siyasetinde Kürtler, Direniş, Hak Arayışı, Katılım*, eds. Büşra Ersanlı, Günay Göksu Özdoğan, Nesrin Uçarlar, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2016), 93-150.

6

Conclusion

Time makes us forget everything and creates new ignorance out of all knowledge. Something that is known to almost everyone becomes unknown to almost everyone. Incidents that took place in front of the eyes of many men become the subject of a novel when there are no more witnesses. (...) Those who know say it, those who don't know say it. The one whose voice is stronger is heard. Reputations dissipate and names blend into each other. (...)

– Şinasi Hisar, "Fahim Bey ve Biz" (Mr. Fahim and Us)[1]

This dissertation actually started out with the intention of uncovering and re-analyzing a topic that has remained "unknown", due to the fact that the final and definitive causality and conclusions put forward in

1 Cited by A. Ömer Türkeş, "Aşka, Zamana ve Unutulanlara Adanmıştır" Virgül, no. 71, (March 2004).

the literature create a veiling effect, with a different conceptual, historiographical and empirical perspective to contribute. My aim was to examine the process and experience of the non-autonomous state's daily re-penetration and re-production of its sovereignty and authority in an East which has been overwhelmingly inhabited for centuries by Kurds, and to look at all this through the medium of the People's Houses, and the social, cultural and spatial responses beyond the simplicity of binary oppositions and fixities.

The existant distinguishing characteristics of these provinces were a decentralized and special administrative system of Kurdish mirs (princes), demolished by the Ottoman state powers during the 19th century, as well as horizontal and vertical conflicts, negotiations, and consensus, across new judicial and administrative practices, which had political, economic, cultural, spatial, and social effects. This may have been true for many other provinces or regions in the empire, which had been dealt with separately by the authorities, but the case of Kurdistan, or Vilayat-ı Şarkiyye was different: it was now positioned within a nation-state, having such a difficult political and historical background.

Hence, "should the repressive nation-state be analyzed as omnipotent, homogeneous, autonomous and strong/powerless or successful/failed and completely closed to negotiation? Should the region and its residents be coded as uniform and manageable, or only conflictual and resistant, as the founding of the nation-state changed the nature of this relationship and ruled with intense violence and as a 'state of exception'?" Because in an official, nationalist and descriptive historiography, as well as in a critical and analytical one, the fixation on situating historical facts and subjects within these binaries parallels the institutional practice of constructing an autonomous, unitary, and monolithic state. In these processes, the establishment of the People's Houses was prioritized over the branches of the Republican People's Party (RPP) as the most important ideological as well as institutional representative of the party-state regime in the Kurdish dominated provinces. Because of that, the People's Houses emerged as a vitally

important medium for understanding everyday state formation and production, in interaction with political and cultural practices.

I have tried to transcend taking part in the discussion of the People's House, by not focusing primarily on the strong versus weak, "failed" versus "successful" nationalist and colonial motivated state, and its assimilative and civilizatory discourses, practices and their effects. In addition, not only the images, discourses and representations of the modern nation-state, which are prioritized in the literature, but also the actual practices that cut across them have been explored in this work, and placed within the intersections of everyday, local and micro contexts and power dynamics.

Hence the major research problematic of the dissertation is described as: "how to portray a state formation and East formation process in the case of the People's Houses in the Kurdish dominated provinces, and to go beyond the autonomous, homogeneous, strong/succesful or failed/weak state, and totally resistant or silent and obedient society?" Contributing to a significant gap in the literature, I aimed to reveal how the ethos of the Houses was diffused along the center/local line and in interaction with social, cultural/linguistic and spatial encounters, on everyday and micro grounds. Informed by both comprehensive empirical findings, and theoretical considerations, this study argues that both the People's Houses and the East in itself were re-produced through these local and everyday institutional and at the same time complicated practices and interactions. Employing the recent trend of dismantling "macro" processes, I argue that the state and the East did not establish each other all at once and in uniform historical processes, but through power relations, institutional and social interventions, impositions, and the struggle, conflict, and negotiation of their boundaries.

In this context, in the second chapter, I have presented various findings about the ways in which the People's Houses were established in the twelve Kurdish provinces, in the context of ideological, political, institutional and administrative continuities and ruptures. I claim that in the political contexts within the institutional/administrative private security regime of the People's Houses, by focusing on the processes of

discursive, political, and administrative control and supervision, participation and representation, and everyday and local materialization, the boundaries of "exclusion and inclusion" of the Kurds are continuously produced and re-produced on the center-local line. This chapter is the first time in this dissertation that this central-local line has been discussed in such detail, and it is found to have led to a process of administrative and political inclusion or exclusion through the People's Houses. I have attempted to show that the politics of ambiguous segregation and exclusion on the one hand, and the politics of selective inclusion and containment, or the politics of "leaving at the threshold and not being able to make decisions" on the other, transformed into strategies of governmentality and power in interaction with local and central tensions and struggles that would be effective in the "long term". Moreover, it has been confirmed that phenomena such as the People's Houses, and the "failed" and unqualified attitudes of the state actors, conflicts and struggles, which are seen in the literature as "deviations" from the autonomous and ideal state formation, are complex but were in fact integral elements in the process of dynamic and relational state formation.

In Chapters Two and Three, by focusing on the twelve provinces inhabited predominantly by Kurds, another important gap in the literature is addressed: by analyzing the spatial structure and practices of the People's Houses in terms of their physical, social and cultural aspects, their transformation into spaces of encounter and their reproduction processes, a new picture is drawn in terms of the history of the People's Houses in the East, and the history of the state's construction of the East.

In the third chapter, in addition to the architectural representational effect of the People's House buildings, I observed the visibility of the state with its *panopticon* effect, the observation and surveillance of the territory, and the expansion of the bureaucratic state along the central-local line. Moreover, I demonstrate the social, political, cultural and economic effects of the public works, the changes in modern and state perceptions and practices of physical space, and the negotiations and the

tensions with the locals. I argue that the process of establishing physical space was one of the main channels of communication, negotiation and conflict between the central and local actors. Likewise, I find out that there were processes of conflict, reconciliation, struggle and reproduction originating from the competition and conflicts between state institutions, regarding the use of the People's House properties and buildings, along with other complications such as corruption, local architectural practices, the reproduction of an architectural culture, the use of fixtures and fittings, and local relationship networks.

In this context, I discovered that the buildings of the People's Houses were transformed into military barracks, police stations, municipal buidings, schools and warehouses by the local state administrators, even though this had the effect of delaying or even ending the activities of the People's Houses. These examples have once again demonstrated that the homogeneous and given power of the state cannot be normative, and that the functioning and practices of the state, producing results contrary to its ideals, and the tensions between its organs, are actually a component of state formation. Meanwhile, local struggles and interventions were related to discourses of appropriation of the cultural heritage of the "other", as in the case of churches, in addition to internal state tensions over property ownership, and were not top-down actions through power dynamics. All of this involved a complexity of interaction with state space at the local level, seeking approval, contributing to or undermining the recognition of state legitimacy and norm-making.

Chapter 4 sheds light on the People's Houses as a public space for communication and socialization between the state and society, as well as between citizens. This chapter thus finds that the performance of official ceremonies as the basic practice of the securitarian state was one of the most emphasized practices, and that this was the space where citizen participation and visibility were most openly demanded, through the use of physical and symbolic violence. Examples and cases of how the boundaries of the People's House were handled, from dress codes to gender boundaries, reveals that the People's Houses, the state administrators, and local social actors also violated the rules, and shaped

the physical space of the People's Houses according to their own needs for socialization and public space. I conclude that the spatiality of the People's Houses was produced by the contradictory perceptions of the members of the state, by forms of relations involving compromise and reversal of the existing rules, and by contradictory practices of social and public spatiality. It is once again seen that different categories such as gender, class and ethnicity are not marginal, but constitutive components in this process.

The findings on the production of the public and socialization space of the People's House indicate that the processes of organizing and disciplining everyday life and habits on the spatial plane did not spread in a simple top-down line, nor were they produced in the dichotomy of a strong state and a passive or resistant society. Moreover, the process of spatial control interacted with the different spatial, social and cultural perceptions and habits of local receptors; with the reproductions of everyday 'publicness'; and with the complex positioning of conflict, compromise, indifference or various forms of resistance that cut across these spaces.

Likewise, I observe in the fourth chapter that neither representatives of the state, nor Kurdish and other subjects, produce entirely monolithic responses, and that each period or cross-section is not homogeneous. If we accept that non-participation is an attitude that resists violence, through tactics and strategies, the different spatial responses of ordinary Kurdish citizens are clearly delineated in this chapter: from not participating in ostensibly acceptable socialization and publicity, as well as not being able to participate because they did not speak Turkish or dressed "inappropriately" - or because they were women - and extending to such practices as remote monitoring, violation or favoritism. As a result, the spatiality of the People's Houses in the Kurdish provinces has been analyzed in relation to the state. It is also hoped for even more contributions to be made to bridging the current gaps in the literature, with new studies, in such a way that spatial, social, and cultural reactions will become more visible.

Chapter 5 turns to the linguistic practices of the state and the People's Houses in the Kurdish-populated provinces. I have found that, in the 1920s and 1930s, the focus was more on preventing the kurdification of the Turks in the region, and their detachment from the Kurdish language, while the assimilation of the Kurds was envisaged to be carried out in a contradictory pendulum based on the duality of the prohibition and destruction of the Kurdish language, rather than through the effective teaching of Turkish. In the mid-1930s, there appeared a more prominent view that the Kurdish language and the strength of Kurdish ethnic and, to a considerable extent, national identity fed into Kurdish nationalism. State administrators discussed a clearer agenda of shifting from the priority of dominating the Turkish population to an effective forced assimilation of the Kurds, who were kept in a kind of isolation through the use of exceptional state violence, both in physical and symbolic forms.

In this process, if it was said that, "When the state was being established, it was establishing the East", which had a broad consensus, the members of the state and the People's Houses were referring to what this vision of the East lacked: all exclusionary references such as being outside civilization, a history, a civilized language, music, spatial life, traditions, and way of life, were all negated, and war was declared on them. The East, and the Kurds within it, had formerly been described as rude and incidental, speaking an uncivilized language of unknown origin. In order to overcome this, a field of legitimacy has been established that there is a need to establish an East reborn, dominated by Turkishness and fully Turkish. Only a common mind and memory, governers supposed, would make the East generally comprehensible, and satisfy both the "urgency to be governed" and the need for representation in the sense of assimilation, as well as the need for political and cultural representation.

However, the linguistic nationalism of the state and Turkish nationalism has also led to the strengthening of Kurdish ethnicist and nationalist arguments through linguistic rights and linguistic nationalism, and the view that Kurds who learn Turkish and receive a Turkish education produce complex subjectivities that reinterpret

modernity with new forms of capital. In this process, it can be said that, for Kurdish subjectivities, modernization has turned into a normative field of practices and ideologies with different interpretations. This is since we see that people tend to negotiate assimilation with the state within certain limits, and bring to the table the baggage of power in the social and subjective sphere, with reactions such as approval, indifference, silence, participation, self-affirmation and implicit rejection, which vary according to class and gender differences.

To conclude, the contributions of this dissertation can be summarized in three broad points. First, this dissertation is the first comprehensive study of the People's Houses from a distinctive historiographical, conceptual and methodological perspective, in the twelve Kurdish-dominated provinces, where RPP organizations were not re-established until 1944, and the territory was governed by a state of exception, by showing notworthy differences with other provinces. Also, it scrutinizes for the first time, using a comprehensive first-hand approach, written, visual and verbal datas on the People's Houses in the twelve Eastern/Kurdish provinces.

The second substantial contribution of this study is to provide answers to the question of how the People's Houses, charged with the mission of assimilation and civilization, imagined and attempted to control space, culture and society in the East, and what kind of modern state governmental techniques it produced in complicated local and everyday contexts. In addition, the effects of and responses to these techniques have been analyzed both horizontally and vertically. I analyzed the attitudes of members of the state, also including conflicts and contradictions, and the cooperative and non-cooperative, or complex responses of the receivers as resourses allow.

Third, this dissertation elaborates on the state as an entity, space and practice that operates with the reality of human beings and natural surroundings, rather than as an abstract, transcendental, autonomous and self-substantiated, and fixed institutional entity. As I demonstrate, once established, the state is by no means immune from struggles, interpretations and power relations, and it exists with their images,

practices and their effects, in an ongoing, non-homogeneous process. Lastly, this study aims to prove that the People's Houses and the *East* were shaped and produced by multiple challenging interactions and power relations in spaces of encounter.

Finally, a few remarks need to be made regarding the future projections for this study. Based on extensive archival research and limited memory sources, this dissertation touches on the discourses, practices, and products of branches of the arts, such as the theater, cinema, and music, as well as folklore, and the impacts and reception of the widespread use of radio after 1940. However, I have not been able to include the People's House sports activities. I plan to work further on these themes and some other ones, based on hundreds of pages of first-hand data, not all of which can be included in this thesis, by making further comparisons with locations outside the Kurdish dominated provinces. I plan also to turn this dissertation into a book, by addressing its shortcomings, and adding a comprehensive appendix of unpublished first-hand documents which I have collected.

An important finding of this study is that the People's Houses and other institutional and non-institutional practices of the period are not a closed history, but rather deserve further research and analysis. Because this dissertation aims to contribute to an important gap in the literature by presenting a picture of the totality of the twelve provinces through common patterns, it is beyond the limits of this study to analyze the provinces individually in more depth. With a similar perspective to this study, it is clear that in-depth historical ethnographic research concerning individualized Kurdish localities including the social, cultural spatial dynamic of everyday state formation process revealing and stressing more on the everyday historical actors' complex experiences. Such a work requiring a multivocal pool of sources and more comparisons with the different localities in Turkey and particularly Kurdish dominated ones in the Middle East, would constitute very important contributions.

As stated in the introduction to the study, since on-site field research was not possible, interviews with primary and secondary witnesses of

the period were limited. I have tried to interpret social voices through a critical, polyphonic, and cross-referential reading of archival sources, together with limited press scanning and interviews, other memory sources and my own experience, memory, and observations, based on the *critical intimacy* method. Although this interpretation has filled an important gap in the study of the twelve provinces, it has once again shown the necessity of more local ethnographic research, again beyond the limits of this present study. Clearly, the limited but effective use of oral history interviews has shown that there is a need to further increase the data and findings on the experiences of the social actors. Although the witnesses of the period are mostly no longer alive, the narratives of the generation which followed them, about the period which preceded them, and their own productive period, has gained importance. Accepting that there was no homogeneous state, interviews with state officials or their relatives active in the period concerned, will also contribute to the literature. In mainstream history, where Kurdish-speaking women and peasants are almost always rendered invisible, the importance of conducting research into the People's Houses and other state institutions, and the cultural practices of the state and local residents, has once again been noted.


On the other hand, comparative studies can also reveal how public education, other cultural modernization, and assimilation-oriented practices, on a more local and daily basis, including more the ordinary people's experiences were implemented in the bordering Kurdish regions, where Kurds lived densely in neighboring nation-states. In addition, the social and cultural history of the five Village Institutes and other formal educational institutions, especially the primary schools located in the East, is another area waiting to be studied.

In this study, limited use of local and national press coverage was possible. Due to the fact that the archival research was more extensive than I expected, insufficient research time, and the fact that newspapers, journals and magazines were scattered around in libraries in different cities, and that not all issues could not be accessed, constituted a major obstacle. During the field research, I observed that the local press in the

twelve provinces generally conveyed formal news and information about the People's Houses and other state actors, and social, cultural, and spatial processes. This fact was accompanied by a homogenous and non-confrontational image, due to the impression conveyed by the authoritarian party-state, and the special security regime specific to the twelve provinces. Besides, I observed that this kind of information was mostly contained in archival documents and Halkevi journals. Nevertheless, I foresee that a detailed local and national press survey following this study may reveal different data. In particular, it is possible to analyze the periodical press appearing after 1945, when the restrictions on the press were relaxed. In this period, I have found that a more dynamic state-society, state-culture and state-space relationship, as well as forms of political, social, cultural and economic relations involving local tensions and compromises were more visible in the press.

In conclusion, while reaching important conclusions with comprehensive findings and analyses within certain limits, this study has contributed to the literature on the political, cultural, social and spatial history of the early republican period, with a special focus on Kurdish studies. It has also opened important windows, by contributing to fields such as state formation, state anthropology, nationalism, postcolonial studies, spatial, cultural, gender and memory studies, and peasantry literature. By pinpointing the gaps in knowledge, this dissertation has further demonstrated the need for further research in this area by identifying gaps in sophisticated analytical knowledge based on the novel primary source research.

Appendix A Documents from Presidential Republican Archives (CCA)



T. C.
NAFIA VEKÂLETİ
Yapı İşleri Umum Müdürlüğü
Ş. .....
Sayı : .....

-2-

..../..../ 193
Özü .....

İlişiği

T. C. BAŞBAKANLIK CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ

	Müfredat Lira	Krş.	İcmal Lira	Krş.
Nakli Yekun	280 000		280 000	
İkinci Umumi Müfettişliğe aid işler:				
Umumi Müfettişlik Evi	28 000		28 000	
Üçüncü Umumi Müfettişliğe aid işler:				
Umumi Müfettişlik Dairesi	108 000			
Komutanlık Dairesi	125 000			
Jandarma Müfettişlik Dairesi	65 000			
Posta,Telegraf ve T. Dairesi	45 000			
Halkevi	65 000			
İlk Mekteb	45 000			
Şehir Oteli	40 000			
Umumi Müfettişlik evi	25 000			
Komutanlık evi	20 000			
Müstahkem mevki komutanlık evi	20 000			
II çift memur apartömanları	55 000			
Yol ve meydanların inşasiyle sair masraflara	107 000		720 000	
Dördüncü Umumi Müfettişliğe aid işler:				
Plür Hükümet konağı	20 691	50		
Plür Kışlası	29 268	82		
Plümür Kışlası	28 728	02	78 688	36
olmak üzere cem'an yekûn	1106 688	36	1 106 688	36

lira olarak tesbit olunmuştur.

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Fon No: 30 10 0 0 - Kutu No: 68 - Dosya No: 452 - Sıra No: 4

T. C.
BAŞBAKANLIK
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ

ve tahrikât yapmış bulunanları ailelerile birlikte garba nakil ve iskân etmek ,

d)Göçebe halinde yaşayan aşiretleri yerleştirip toprağa bağlamak ,

e) Halk evlerinde okuma odaları açmak , öğretici filim ve temsil işlerini temin etmek ,

f) Kazalarda doktor , ebe ve sağlık teşkilâtı bulundurmak , seyyar sağlık ekipleri kurmak ve Nahiye Müdürlerile Ziraat ve Baytar Memurlarına hayvan yem bedeli vermek ,

g) Yerli ve Kürtleşmiş olanlardan küçük memur tayin olunmaması , Adliye Başkâtiblerinin intihabında fevkalâde dikkatli bulunulması , küçük memur maaşlarının artırılması , şarka gönderilecek memurlara birer derece terfi hakkı veya tazminat verilmesi , memur evleri yaptırılması , lise ve orta mekteb bulunmıyan yerlerdeki memur çocuklarının Maarif Vekâleti hesabına leylî mekteblerde okutturulması , memur ailelerinin tedavilerine ve yol masraflarına yardım edilmesi , tahsildarlık , muhtarlık , hancılık gibi işlerde Türkleri ve Türkçe bilenleri ve Türküm diyenleri kullanmak , Türkçe şarkı ve türküleri öğretmek ırkî hüviyet ve benliklerini iade etmek muvafık görülmüştür .

Jandarma

Saha vüs'ati ve şark mıntakasının istisnaî vaziyeti itibarile mevcudunun kırk iki bine çıkarılması , karakol , subay, silâh , teçhizat , telefon ve iaşe cihetlerinden kuvvetlendirilmeğe muhtaç bulunduğu , 1/3 nisbetinde gedikli efradla takviye edilmesi , jandarma efradının mektebden yetiştirilmesi te'min olununcaya kadar :

a) Ordudan iyi efrad ayrılması ,

b) Kazalardaki emniyet işlerinin polise verilmesi , kazalarda polis teşkilâtı vücuda getirilmesi , polis teşkilât kanununun çıkarılması ,

c) Vergi tahsilâtı , şahid celbi , adlî tebligat ve ilk

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
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DEVLET ARŞİVLERİ GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ

...ti Teşkilâtı Bulunmayan Vilâyetler

Ağrı
Bitlis
Bingöl — Kiğı ilçesinde teşkilât vardır.
Diyarbekir
Elâzız
Hakkâri
Mardin
Muş
Siirt
Tunceli — Pulümür ilçesinde teşkilât vardır .
Urfa
Van

Fon No: 490 1 0 0 - Kutu No: 284 - Dosya No: 1139 - Sıra No: 3



A Gurupu : A.R.Erem — Çoruh				B Gurupu — Şevket Erdoğan — Gümüşane			
Bölgesi	Bölge dahil Vilâyetler		Mülettişi	Bölgesi	Bölge dahil Vilâyetler		Mülettişi
1 Kırklareli	Edirne	Kırklareli T. Dağ		1 Niğde	Kayseri	Niğde	
2 Kocaeli	Kocaeli	Bolu		2 Kırşehir	Yozgat	Kırşehir	
3 Bilecik	Bursa	Bilecik		Ankara	Çankırı	Ankara	
4 Balıkesir	Çanakkale	Balıkesir		Sinop	Sinop	Samsun	
5 İzmir				Amasya	Çorum	Amasya	
6 Kütahya	Manisa	Kütahya		6 Sivas	Tokat	Sivas	
7 Afyon	Eskişehir	Afyon		İçel		Seyhan	
8 Aydın	Muğla	Aydın		G.Antep		Hatay	
9 Denizli	Burdur	Denizli		9 Maraş		Malatya	Maraş
10 Isparta	Antalya	Isparta		10 Giresun	Trabzon	Giresun	Ordu
11 Konya				11 Çoruh	Rize	Çoruh	
12 Kastamonu	Kastamonu	Zonguldak		12 Erzurum	Kars	Erzurum	
				13 Erzincan	Gümüşane	Erzincan	

Fon No: 490 1 0 0 - Kutu No: 284 - Dosya No: 1141 - Sıra No: 2

Devlet Arşivler Genel Müdürlüğü
Cumhuriyet Arşivi

Birinci Umumî Müfettişlik Bölgesi dahilindeki Parti teşkilatı olmayan vilayetlerde Hususı idare ve Belediyelerin Halkevleri ve Odalarına yaptıkları yardımı gösterir cetveldir.

Vilâyet dahilindeki Halkevleri :	Hususî idare yardımı Lira	Kr.	Belediye yardımı Lira	Kr.
Diyarbakır Vilâyeti				
Diyarbakır	6000	-	1500	-
Silvan	500	-	200	-
Ergani	500	-	400	-
Çermik	500	-	100	-
Lice	500	-	500	-
Vilâyet dahilindeki Halkodaları :				
Bismil	300	-	100	-
Eğil	300	-	150	-
Kulp	300	-	100	-
Hani	300	-	500	-
Van vilâyeti :				
Vilâyet dahilindeki Halkevleri :				
Van	7500	-	1000	-
Erciş	1000	-	400	-
Bitlis vilâyeti :				
Vilâyet dahilindeki Halkevleri :				
Bitlis	1500	-	1000	-
Ahlat	150	-	350	-
Adilcevaz	100	-	300	-
Vilâyet dahilindeki Halkodaları :				
Hizan	150	-	140	-
Mardin vilâyeti :				
Vilâyet dahilindeki Halkevleri :				
Mardin	7000	-	600	-
Cizre	300	-	800	-
Derik	300	-	200	-
Gercüş	300	-	60	-
Midyat (estâk)	300	-	250	-
Nusaybin	300	-	100	-
Savur	300	-	100	-
Vilâyet dahilindeki Halkodaları :				
Kızıltepe	200	-	50	-
Midyat				Bütçeleri alınmamıştır. alındığında ilâve ayrıca sunulacaktır.
Urfa vilâyeti :				
Vilâyet dahilindeki Halkevleri :				
Urfa	3500	-	2500	-
Birecik	500	-	2000	-
Siverek	500	-	800	-
Sürüç	300	-	100	-
Viranşehir	300	-	150	-
Vilâyet dahilindeki Halkodaları :				
Yaylak	650	-	25	-
Halfeti	350	-	00	-
Hakkâri vilayeti :				
Vilâyet dahilindeki Halkevleri:				
Hakkâri (Çölemerik)	500	-	30	-
Vilâyet dahilindeki Halkodaları :				
Yüksekova	100	-	175	-

Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü

Fon No: 490 1 0 0 - Kutu No: 1489 - Dosya No: 75 - Sıra No: 1

CÜMHURİYET HALK PARTİSİ
GENEL SEKRETERLİĞİ

DEVLET ARŞİVLERİ GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ

Dosya: 48639

Birinci umumi müfettişin bölgesinde Diyarıbakır vilâyeti dahilindeki parti mallarının kaydını muhtevi ikinci yoklama cetvelleri (ikinci)tetkik listesidir .

1 - a : Diyarıbakır Halkevi binası yerinin istimlâki için Belediyece mahkemeye müracaat edileceği ve bunun neticesinde mezkûr binanın parti adına tapuya bağlanacağı anlaşılmıştır . Bu takdirde Belediyece mahkemeye müracaat tarihile mahkeme safahatının bildirilmesi,


b : 18/7/940 tarih ve 12/25905 sayılı yazımıza bağlı tetkik listesinde bu bina sigorta parası hakkında istenilen malumatın da verilmesi,

2 - a : Yukarda sözü geçen tetkik listesinde Silvandaki parti malı ve tapularınızda bulunan Halkevi binasının ölçü mıktarı hakkında malumat ve sigorta ettirilerek sonucunun bildirilmesi istenilmişti. Bu husus meskut bırakılmıştır . Derhal Sigorta ettirilerek sigorta parasile yıllık prim miktarının bildirilmesi ,

b : Silvanda intifa hakkı partimize raci olan kilise binasının 164 lira ferağ harcının tedarik edilememiş olması sebebile ancak 941 senesinde Parti adına tapuya bağlanabileceği bildirilmekte ise de bu harç bedelinin mahalli kaynaklardan temini mümkün olup olmadığı mevzubahs edilmemiştir . Bu hususunda tetkik ve iş'arı ve binnetice bu binanın bir an evvel Partimiz adına tapuya bağlanmasının tahtı temine alınması .

3 - a : Çermik Halkevi inşaatı durumu, Bina tapusu almağa müsait bir hale gelüp gelmediğinin tetkikile müsait ise buradaki arsa tapusunun celbile usulen iptal ettirilerek alınacak bina tapusunun durum cetvelile beraber gönderilmesi .

4 - Birinci maddede sözü geçen tetkik listesinde de dahil olduğu veçhile Diyarıbakır vilâyeti dahilinde bu mallardan başka parti malı bulunup bulunmadığının da açık olarak bildirilmesi lazımdır .



DEVLET ... GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ

CÜMHURİYET HALK PARTİSİ
GENEL SEKRETERLİĞİ

5
68885

Büro IV B.Şefliğine

5/XII/941 T.ve 68885 sayılı yazınız cevabıdır:
Diyarbakır Mebusu Cahit Çubukcunun intihap dairesine ait verdiği raporda:

(Parti teşkilâtı bulunmıyan yerlerdeki Halkevleri yerli azasına komita ve Halkevi başkanlıklarına seçim imkânı verilmesi rica ediliyor).

Bu mevzu etrafında Halkevleri teşkilât,idare ve çalışma talimatnamesinin 16 cı maddesinin B fıkrasına yapılan ek tamim(Ancak parti teşkilâtı henüz yapılmamış yerlerde Halkevi reisile komita reislerinden gayrı Halkevi azaları komita azası olabilir) vaziyeti temin etmiş ise de bu ek tamim mebuslara gönderilmemiştir.


Bu tamim 6/I/941 T.ve 5/1981 numara ile teşkilâta gönderilmiştir.

Buna göre muvafık cevabın verilmesini rica eder, saygılar sunarım.

B.V.Şefi
Giresun Mebusu
N.Kanaı

42

Fon No: 490 1 0 0 - Kutu No: 996 - Dosya No: 850 - Sıra No: 1



C.H.P.
BİTLİS VİLÂYETİ
GENEL SEKRETERLİĞİ

Bitlis
20/I/945

C.H.P .genel sekreterliği
yüksek katına

Ankara

3571

DEVLET ARŞİVLERİ GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ
22184
2 Şubat 1945


Vilayet C.H.P partisi 20/IO/944 de kurulmuştur .Kaza iti
-barile partımıza bağlı bulunan ,halk evi ve halk odalarının talimatname
-sine tevfikan bütçe ve hesap işlerine partımızce bakılmakta isede ,kaza
-larda parti teşkilatı henüz yapılememiş olduğundan ,yapılinceye kadar -
bu kaza ve nahiyelerdeki halk evi ve halk odalarının bütçeleri vilayet -
idare heyetincemi ,yoksa eskisi gibi umumi müfettişlik makamıncetatkık v
tasdık odilecegi kesdirilemamıştır . Ne suretle muamele yapılacagının --
emir buyrulmağını rica eder sonsuz tazimlarımı sunarım .

C.H.P reisi
Arif Özdemir

Reisi dalayısiyle 5 nci Bşk
Sunulur. 16.2.1945

2

Fon No: 490 1 0 0 - Kutu No: 284 - Dosya No: 1139 - Sıra No: 3




C. H. P. 14.06.1945

Not : Sayın Ecevit'in Genel Sekreterliği zamanında 1944 senesinde Şark Vilayetlerini gezisi raporu

14.6.945

Bu rapor Başkâtip tarafından dosyaya konmuş üçer nüsha ter. Başka rapor verilmedi. 14.6.1945



DEVLET ARŞİVLERİ GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ

(84)

Elazığ'da , Vilâyet merkezinin okur yazarlarından dört beş kişi , topluca gelerek Parti kurumu istediler , Urfada da halk ile yapılan bir konuşma toplantısında emeklilerden olduğu anlaşılan bir kimse bu dilekte bulundu .Orada bulunanlardan başka hiç kimse bu emekliye yardım etmediler . Bu yardım etmeyiş bana öyle geldi ki Partiye karşı kayıtsızlıktan yahut Parti teşkilâtının faydasız olduğuna inanıştan değil Parti teşkilâtının açılacağını ummadıklarından ileri gelmiştir .

Başka Vilâyetlerimizde de eğer biraz umutları olsaydı, bizden Parti kurmamızı isteyecek, hiç olmazsa politika isteklileri bulunurdu sanırım.

Bu umutsuzluğun neden ileri geldiğine gelince : bu , ilkin hükûmetimizin oralardaki idare ve emniyet tutumundan , sonra da Vilâyetleri halkının her hangi bir teşekkülü yaşatmıya yetirliği olmadığını sezmiş olmalarından ileri gelmiş olsa gerektir .

Parti teşkilâtını taşımıya elverişli olmayışı Vilâyetlerden kazalara ve nahiye ve köylere doğru indikçe, okuyup yazmak bilenlerin azlığı değil ya , türkçe dilini bilir insanların bulunamamasından ileri gelmiş olsa gerektir .

Bu bakımdan bu Vilâyetlerimiz yalnız görünüşte değil gerçek olarak da ülkemiz üstünde bir yama olarak durmaktadır .

Doğu Vilâyetlerimiz merkezlerinde ev dilleri Türkçe olanlar vardır . Ancak çevreleri türkçe bilmediği için bu Vilâyetlerin pazar dilleri kürtçe yahut arapçadır .

Kazaları doğru türk dili konuşanlar azalır . Ev dilleri türkçe değildir . Nahiye ve köylerde türkçe hiç kalmaz . Çok kaza merkezlerimizde bir ilk okul bile yoktur .

Bu büyük yurt parçası üzerinde Türk kolonisi olan Vilâyet merkezleri ile Ahlat, Ercis Bismil gibi kazalarımız pek azdır .

İş böyle olunca Parti kurumundan önce birer kültür kurumu olan Halkevleri açmak

84

DEVLET ARŞİVLERİ GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ

Uşak-15-6-35

C. H. P. Genel Katipliğine

17. Haziran 1935
23.8.3


Göndermekligimi emir buyurdugunuz şark halk evleri teftiş alanını gösterir kurokiyi ilişik olarak sundum, buna göre işe Urfadan başlayarak Elazizde bitirecegim.
Dört gün sonra işime başlamak üzere Urfaya hareket edecegim ,Urfaya Vardığım gün emrinize göre telegrafla malumat aez ederim.
Sonsuz saygılarımı sunarım

Dosyasına
20, VI, 1935

49

Fon No: 490 1 0 0 - Kutu No: 1005 - Dosya No: 880 - Sıra No: 3

DEVLET ARŞİVLERİ GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ



Şark mıntıkası teftiş alanını gösteren kurokidir.

1-Urfa
2-Mardin
3-Diyarbekir
4-Diyarbekir-Silvan
5-Siirt
6-Bitlis
7-Van
8-Karaköse-bayazıt
9-Muş
10-Diyarbekir -yolmla- Elaziz

DEVLET ARŞİVLERİ GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ ARŞİVİ

1935

Diyarbekir Halkevinin I-I-935 tarihinden I5&-I2-935 tarihine kadar olan bir yıllık çalışma raporudu .

I-- Dil ,Tarih veEdebiyat şuğbesi bir yıllık düzgün ve özlü çalışmasile çok müsbet neticeler elde etmiş olan bu şuğbemiz, Diyarbekir folkloruna ait bir kitap çıkartmış, Diyarbekir tarihini yazdırtarak, basdırtmak için matbaaya vermiş ve Demir yolunun açılma töreninde (Diyarbekire bir bakış) adlı bir büroşür basdırarak konuklara dağıtmış, sentaks anketi üzerinde araşdırmalarda bulunmak üzere,Diyarbekirin Türkmenlerle meskun Bismil, Darlu, Seyithasan, Şükürlu köylerine öğretmenlerden müteşekkel bir heyet göndererek, elli sentaks fişi hazırlayarak Dil tetkik cemiyetine göndermiş, yirmi konferansla, ulusal bayramlarda elli kadar söylev verdirmiştir . Bundan başka, Bu şubemiz köycüler şubesile birlikte, iki yıldan beri yapıldığı gibi, Türkçe bilmeyen köylülerimize Türkçe öğretmek ve Türkçe bilenlerinde yurdbilgilerini artırmak maksadile Diyarbekire bağlı sekiz nahiye köylerinde(Öz Türkçe) ile(Yurdbilgisi) müsabakaları açmıştır . Mayısın son cuma günü, bir heyet önünde yapılan bu müsabaka imtihanında onu kadın olmak üzere I00 köylü dahil olmuş,birinciliği Zimmiğik köyünden Fatma namında bir kadın kazanmıştır . Birinciye elli lira,ikinciye yirmi beş lira ve diğerlerinede ehliyetlerine göre on liradan üç liraya kadar ikramiyeler verilmiştir .
Köylülerimiz arasında çok iyi bir etki bırakan ve Türkçeye karşı ilgilerini artıran bu dil müsabakamızı bu yıl gene mayıs ayının son pazar günü yapacağız . Müsabakaya ait programlar köylülere şimdiden dağıtılmıştır .
Bu Şubemize bağlı olarak, birde Halkevinde (Kadınlar dernegi) açılmıştır . Bu dernekDiyarbekir kadınlarının çarşaf ve peçeden çıkmaları ve soysal hayata atılmaları için çok önemli bir surette çalışmış, Halkevinde yirmi büyük toplantı yaparak,Halkevi başkanı C . Çubukçu ile dernek başkanı Behiye Baturay tarafından konferanslar verilmiştir . Bu toplantılara iki binden fazla Diyarbekirli kadın iştirak etmiştir . Bu Dernegin özlü ve insanlı çalışması sayesinde bu gün Diyarbekirde bir tek çarşaf ve peçeli kadın kalmamış

9

Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü

Fon No: 490 1 0 0 - Kutu No: 984 - Dosya No: 814 - Sıra No: 2

CÜMHURİYET HALK PARTİSİ
Diyarbakır BÖLGESİ
MÜFETTİŞLİĞİ
SAYI: I69

DEVLET ARŞİVLERİ GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ

C.H.P. ARŞİVİ
20. IV 1950
169
Ekl

Diyarbakır
I6/4/950

C.H.P.Genel Sekreterliğine
Ankara

Diyarbakır haleti ruhiyesi ötedenberi muhalefete daima meyyal ve tarih bo
yunca buna yer vermiş filen muhtelif ve mütaaddit isyan hareketlerini gös
termiştir. son siyasi partilerin faaliyetlerinin serbestliginden istifa
de eden karşı parti namı altında ötedenberi koyu ırkçı olup açıkca iftira
emellerini güdenlerle beraber geniş arazi sahipleri olup iskân durumu iti
barile kısmen arazileri I5I5 sayılı kanun hükümlerince ellerinden alınara
göçmenlere verilenler ve bu halden ürken ve çekinen geniş arazi sahipleri
ve bu şekilde beyler ve agalar, dünkü idarenin zaruri kıldığı halden ötü
garbe nakledilen ve bu gün son iskân kanunun tadil hükümlerinden istifad
ederek yerlerine gelenler ve bu mıntakada geniş nüfuz sahibi olan Seyhler
ve bilhassa son şeyh Sait isyanini idare eden Şeyh Şemsettinin oğlu Şeyh
Heybetüllah D.P. Diyarbakır adayı gösterilerek irticai hareketlere yol a
mak teşebbüsü hissolunmaktadır. bundan başka muhtelif harekât ve isyanla
rda fiili hareketlerinden dolayı hükûmet kuvvetlerile müsademe sonunda öl
dürülenlerin çocuklarile kötü hareketleri muhakemeten sabit olarak asıl
mış bulunanların çocukları karşı parti adile bu gün birleşmiş durumda
intikam, iftirak ve irtica ruhlarile meşbu olarak gece gündüz köy köy dol
şmaktadırlar .
şu çetin mukavemet karşısında mümkün olan her tedbir ve mesaiden geri ka
lınmadığı tabii ve zaruridir.
köylerde yapılan propaganda babalarımızın haksız ölümlerinin hesabini so
rma günüdür, bizi yerimizden yurdumuzdan eden ve garbe süren bu hükûmete
itimat etmiyicegiz, din elden gitmiştir bu gün bu C.H. partisi ve onun hü
kûmeti ezani muhammediyi de okutmiyor okuyanları hapsediyor(arapça ezani
kasdediyorlar) din elden gitti D.P. nin kitabi kur,ani kerimdir kur,ana
inanlar bu partiye reylerini versinler dinsiz olanlar ve gavur olmak isti
yenler C.H.partisine rey vereceklerdir diya propaganda yapılmakta ve bu
propaganda içten içe saydığım ve sıraladığım zümrenin adamları vasıtasile
gizli gizli yapılmaktadır. Şeyh Heybetüllahın müritleri ve Sofileri kend
nüfuz mıntakası olan Bismil, Silvan, Kulp ve Licede bu telkinatı gizli giz
i yapmakta ve muhakkak ve mutlak tesirini cahil köylü üzerinde bırakmakta
dır . Şeyh Heybetüllahın evinde icap eden duruma ve zarurete istinaden ar
aştırma yapılmıştır bu araştırmada I2 mürit, kaçak muhtelif eşya 700 altı
n ve 4000 banknot elde edilerek tutulan evrakle adliyeye teslim edilmiş
isede mahkeme tatili muhakemeye karar vererek serbest bırakılmıştır bu ev
rak adliye vekâleti yolile bozulmasına geçilmiştir. Şeyh Heybetüllahın re
fikası bayan Müşerref zabıtayı tahkir ettiginden mahkemeye verilmiştir.
Eğil kazasında bir tahsilat yüzünden D.P. mensupları tahsildarı döğmüşle
r ve işe karışan bir jandarma erinide döğmüşlerdir bunlar mahkemeye veril
miş mahkeme suçu sabit görerek 6 gün hapis cezası vererek tecil etmiştir
bu hal karşısında şımaran D.P. başkanı zabıtayı tahkir etmiştir tabii od
mahkemeye verilerek gayri mevkuf muhakemesi devam etmektedir takip ediyo
yum alınacak sonucu bildiririm. Kulp kazasında Şeyh Heybetüllahın mutlak
tesiri olan köylerde yakınlarda bu gibi arizelerin zühuri beklenmektedir
emniyet ve asayişin temini bakımından gerekli bütün tedbirler alınmış bu
lunmaktadır bu tedbirlere rağmen bu gibi arize ve hadiselere her gün int
zar zaruridir. Şeyh Heybetüllahın huzurunda yakalanmış olupta dini telkin
atın şeyh tarafından yapılmakta olduğunu söyliyen Salahiddin adındaki ad
m bu vakadan 3 gün sonra iki kurşunla öldürülmek üzere vurulmuştur yarali
hastanededir adliye el koymuştur fail yakalanmıştır. yaralı ile temasta
yım daha ileri bilgi alacagıma kanidim.
şu durumla seçim mücadelesi namı altında bir rejim mukavemetile karşı ka
şıya bulunduğumuzu arz ederken bu işlerle oğraşmak için imanlı çeşitli ad
amlar çalıştırmaktayım çok paraya ihtiyaç vardır gösterilen ve gönderilm
ş olan paraların bu işlere kifayetsizliğini takdir edersiniz ona göre ba
na para yardımınızı ehemmiyetle rica ve arz ederim.

müfettiş
Dr. H. Fırat

Fon No: 490 1 0 0 - Kutu No: 365 - Dosya No: 1537 - Sıra No: 1

DEVLET ARŞİVLERİ GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ

mülâhaza etmekteyiz. Urfa valisinin suretî maksusada toplad[a] malumata göre ilk vaziyeti aşağıda gösterildiği şekildedir.

Yeri	Kürt köyü	Arap köyü	Zaza köyü	Türk köyü	Yezidi köyü
Urfa Mer.kazası	201	132	78	3	-
Siverek "	250	6	-	-	-
Hilvan "	138	-	-	-	-
Sürüç "	165	-	-	-	-
Birecik "	137	6	-	18	-
Bozova "	148	-	-	3	-
Harran "	25	184	-	-	-
Viranşehir"	168	46	-	-	11
Yekûn.	1232	374	24	78	11

Urfa merkez kazasının nüfusu : 30.000 olup 12.000 i Türktür.
Siverek " : 16.800 " 2.000 "
Birecik " : 12.000 " 7.000 "

Yukarıda gösterdiğimiz rakamlar diger bazı hudut vilâyetlerimizde olduğu gibi Urfa vilâyetinde de, Türk unsurunun diger unsurların ancak on altıda bir nisbetinde olduğunu belirtmektedir. Fakat bu cetvelin göstermediği çok mühim bir nokta varsa o da, güzel Türk dilimizin Kürt vatandaşlarımızın yaşadıkları köylerde bilinmemesi ve bu yerlerde Türkçe yerine Kürtçe konuşulmasıdır. Bugünkü durum devam ettikce Kürt vatandaşlarımızı istediğimiz gibi millî davaya kazanmak imkânını elde etmek mümkün olamıyacaktır. Kürt vatandaşlarımızı umumiyet itibarile sağlam, gayyur, verdiği sözü tutar insanlar olarak bulmuştur. Ancak büyük bir ekseriyetin Türk dilini bilmemesi bu çoğunluk için büyük bir eksik teşkil ettiği gibi bu hal Türk camiası arasında hayret uyandırıcı bir manzara arzetmektedir. Müstemlekelerde bile hakim devletler kendi dillerini öğretmek ve bu vasıta ile idareleri altında yaşıyan milletleri temsil için hiç bir fedakârlıktan çekinmemektedirler. Halbuki Urfa Vilâyeti bir müstemleke değil, Türk Devletinin aziz bir parçasıdır. Vatan meseleleri bahis mevzuu olduğu zaman hiç bir fedakârlığı esirgemeyen ve memleket uğruna seve seve kanlarını akıtmasını bilen ve bunu tarihi misallerle isbat etmiş bulunan Urfa vilâyetinde yaşıyan bütün halkın ve köylünün alınacak isabetli tedbirlerle Türk dilile konuşmalarını, Türkçe okuyup yazmayı öğrenmelerini ve millî davaya dört el ile sarılmalarını sağladığımız gün temsil yolunda çok esaslı adımlar atmış olacağımıza kani bulunmaktayız. Bu mevzuda bir çok sözler söylenilmiş bir çok

İmzalandıktan sonra mühürlenecek.

DEVLET ARŞİVLERİ GENEL ... CUMHURİYET ...

No. - 2

Gürt Halkevi (1. 1. 935 Tarihinden 16. 12. 935 tarihine kadar)

Toplantıların erğeleri						Sayısı	Gelenlerin sayısı	
Halkevi Yönetim Kurulu						32	112	
Şubeler	Komite Toplantıları: Toplantı Sayısı	Komite Toplantıları: Gelenlerin Sayısı	Şubeler Toplantıları: Toplantı Sayısı	Şubeler Toplantıları: Gelenlerin Sayısı				
Dil, Tarih, Edebiyat	12	34	2	140				
Ar	14	42	4	155				
Gösterit	17	48	30	600				
Spor	15	49	2	212				
Soysal yardım								
Halk dersleri ve kurslar								
Kitapsaray ve yagın								
Köycülük								
Müze ve Sergi								
Yekün	57	173	38	157				
Yanlız - I: Gösterit								
Yanlız - I: Konser						76	480	öğretim için Banka-Kredi çalışıyor
Yanlız - I: Sinema						32	6400	
Yanlız - I: Konferans						4	1600	üçü söylendi
Birlikte verilen temsil, Konferans, konser, sinema, oyun v. s. - II						10	5900	altı Halkevi tiyatrolar tarafından
						2		biri komşu Halkevi tiyatrosu
Sergiler - III: Resim								
Sergiler - III: Yerli Mallar								
Sergiler - III: v. s.								
Kongreler - III								
Balo						2	500	935 Yılbaşı ve Cumhuriyet Bayramında kapalı
Şölen						12	2500	10 temmuz 2 si cumaya tesadüf etmesi dolayısile
Nişan, nikâh törenleri						1	250	Belediye Reisliğine seçilmesi
Çaylı danslar						2	140	
Spor: Dersler (Halkevinde İskrim, Boks, Beden terbiyesi) dersleri veriliyorsa						4	120	
Spor: Geziler (Toplu, Yaya, Atlı yürüyüşler, Kayak, Av gezileri) v. s.						3	140	
Dersler - IV						110	2100	Türk müziği öğretimi olumlu sonuçlu
Köy gezileri						5	195	
Bayramlar - V						5	15000	Bütün eski ve yeni törenler
VI							5[illegible]	
GENEL YEKÜN								

I — Bunlardan her hangi biri Halkevi örgütü dışında bir örgütçe verilmişse, sayısı ve gelenlerin sayısı yazılmakla beraber karşılarına (şu kadarı Halkevi örgütleri tarafından değildir) diye işaret verilmeli.

II — Bazan meselâ bir konferansla birlikte konser veya temsil yapılabilir; Bu, bir toplantı sayılmahdır.

III — Karşısına ne kongreleri olduğu yazılmalıdır.
- Dil dersleri, müzik dersleri. kurslar bunun içindedir.
- Cumuriyet bayramı, Halkevleri açılma töreni, Dil bayramı, Kurtuluş bayramı v. s.
- cetvelde gösterilmiyen bir toplantı olursa burada izah edilmelidir.

Gürt Halkevi Başkanı

Mürşt Aykim

DEVLET ARŞİVLERİ GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ

CÜMHURİYET HALK PARTİSİ
GENEL SEKRETERLİĞİ

Siirt Milletvekillerinin müşterek raporundan :

SURET

Büro V.i ilgilendiren dilekler

Siirt İli:

Halkevleri ve Halk odaları... Siirt Halkevi bütçesinin darlığına ve binasının kışın toplanmağa müsait bulunmamasına rağmen iyi çalışmakta; Türkçe okuyup yazma, müzik ve temsil çalışmaları muhitine faydalı olmaktadır .

Eruh,Beşiri ve Kurtalan halkodalarının bütçeleri 150-200 lira arasında bulunduğu ve bazı memurlara toplanma yeri olmaktan başka çalışmaları bulunmadığı öğrenilmiş ve öntümüzdeki yılda okuyup yazma kursları açmak ve sihhat ve ziraat işlerine dair konuşmalar yapmak suretiyle faydalı olabilecekleri izah edilmiştir .

Vilâyet halkının ekseriyetinin Türkçe bilmediklerini ve nüfus yazımında kendilerini kürt veya arap diye yazdırmış olduklarını ve ilk okullara devam eden kız çocuklarının çok az olduğunu geçen sene ek raporumda arzetmiştim. İlk öğretim işinin esastan halli ve Halkevleriyle Halkodalarının okuyup yazma kurslarını çoğaltmaları suretiyle uzun sayılmıyacak bir zaman sonra dilimizi öğrenmiyenlerin pek çok azalacağını ümit edebiliriz .

Açıldı 26 Nisan 1946

10

Fon No: 490 1 0 0 - Kutu No: 1002 - Dosya No: 871 - Sıra No: 2

CÜMHURİYET HALK PARTİSİ
Bitlis BÖLGESİ
MÜFETTİŞLİĞİ
SAYI: 15

DEVLET ARŞİVLERİ GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ

D. N e t i c e :

Uzun seneler ihmal edilmiş ve hâlâ,her hususta bakım ve itinaya muhtaç kalmış vaziyette olan Hakkâri vilâyeti;bir müstemleke manzarası arzetmektedir. Hattâ burada çalışan büyük-küçük memurlar da böyle bir zihniyet taşımaktadırlar.

Yerli halka gelince,bunların bir kısmı;tarla ve hayvan bakımı işlerinden memnun görünmekte,her toprak ve hayvan mahsulünün fazla değerlenmiş olması yüzünden,şimdiyekadar görülmemiş tarzda zengin olmuşlardır.Fakat,topraksız ve sürüsüz;hattâ tek hayvan sahibi olmayan bir kısım halk ta vardırki,bunlar;ağaları yanında âdetâ yalnız bir boğaz tokluğuna çalışmakta ve çoluk çocuklarıyla birlikte,son derece sefalet ve ıztırap çekmektedirler.

Bu hal,yalnız köylerde değil,merkezde de kısmen böyledir.

Bu fakir halk,bu vilâyette yapacak ve geçim teminine yardım edecek başka bir iş te bulamamaktadır.Bu şartlar içinde yaşayan vilâyet halkı ve memurlardan ruhan sonderece bedbinleşmiş bir haldedirler.

Bu halin,Halkevi çalışmalarına sirayet etmemesi imkânsızdır.İşte bu sirayet neticesidirki,Halkevi;sanki yalnız İdare Hey'eti ile 3-5 memurun evi imiş gibi bir manzara arzetmekte;Ev çatısı altında yapılabilecek her türlü hareketler ve çalışmalar;yalnız bu 5-10 arkadaşa mahsus imiş gibi bir vaziyet hâsıl olmaktadır.

Valinin Halkevine uğramaması,Halkevi çalışmalarına ehemmiyet ve Ev İdare Hey'etine değer vermemesi de memurların,Halkevinden uzak kalmalarına sebep olmuş;Halkevinde faal vazifeler almalarına engel teşkil eylemiştir.

Diğer taraftan Halkevi;çalışkan,gayretli,feragatlı ve bilhassa cemiyetçi ruh taşıyan heyecanlı bir reise ve faal İdare Hey'etine malik olmamak yüzünden de sönük kalmış;neticede,halk ve memurlar,Halkevine,istenildiği gibi bağlanamamışlardır.

Hep bu sebepler yüzünden ve Ev âzası arasında-muhtelif şubelerde canla-başla ve feragatla çalışacak-tecrübeli ve daha evvel başka Halkevlerimizde çalışmış eleman da bulunmadığı için,burada Halkevi,bir türlü inkişaf edememiş ve normal çalışma devresine girememiştir.

Evin,geçen bir senelik çalışmalarında,bu hali görmek mümkün değildir.Onun içindir ki,Hakkâri Halkevinin bir senelik çalışmalarını,ancak zayıf derece ile değerlendirmek ve Hakkâri Halkevinin,hâlen bir Halkodası halinde kaldığına işaret eylemek lâzımgelmektedir.

Keyfiyeti,derin saygılarımla yüksek huzurunuza arzederim.

C.H.P. Bitlis Bölgesi Müfettişi
Tokat Mebusu (Hasip A.Aytuna)

Fon No: 490 1 0 0 - Kutu No: 998 - Dosya No: 856 - Sıra No: 1

zî masraflar için benimle görüşerek para almasını rica ederim.

I2-:Saat 20 den sonra kaza halkodası salonu bütün memurin,halka aileli toplantı için kaymakam ve eşi adına açık bulunacak ve bu toplantı çaylı ve muhtelif eylenceli bir ziyafet halinde gice yarısından sonraya kadar devam edecektir. bütün subay,memur ve kasabalı arkadaşlarımın bu toplantıya beraberlerinde aileli bulunduğu halde icabetlerini dilerim.

I3-:Birinci teşrin perşenbe günü öğleden evvel saat I0 da askerî mahfelsalonunda hudut taburu eratına askerlik şubesi jandarma birliği eratına mahsusu olmak üzere okullu çocukların temsil kolu ikinci bir müsamere vereceklerdir.aynı günün gicesi saat I9 dan itibaren önce verilen iki müsamere kasabalı ve bütün memurin aileleriyle birlikte teşrifleri suretiyle tekrar edilecektir.

I4-:Emniyet komseri bu pruğramı başından sonuna kadar dikkatla okuyacak,bayram günleri ve giceleri jandarmadan yardımcı devriyeler alarak umumî intizamı her suretle temine ve pruğramın hüsnü tatbiki imkânlarına çalışacaktır.

I5(-:Pruğram memuriyet makamına ve adına verilen her arkadaş için bir vazife tahmili ve hizmet tevdi'i olduğu kadar aynı zamanda yazılı husussat hakkında davetiye yerinedir.

I6-:Bu bayrama oramar nahiyesi(50)ve bajirge nahiyesi I5 ve kasaba merkez köylerinden dahi 45 atlı ve yaya vatandaş iştirak edeceğinden bunların geçen sene olduğu gibi kasabadaki evlere taksimen müsafir edilmelerini ve ağırlanmalarını belediye reisinden ,belediye üyelerinden ve kazanın tüccar,esnaf ve muteberanından müsafir perverliğinden beklerim. Köylülerimizin kasabaya bezenmiş,süslenmiş kamalı ve tüfekli millî kiyafetleriyle geleceklerdir.Merkezi nahiye köylerinden davet edilecek-lerin listesinin jandarma komutanı ayrıca benden isteyecek ve bu listeye göre gerekli tebliğatı 27 akşamına kadar yaptırmış bulunacaktır.

Kaymakam
Kâzım ATAKUL

Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü

Fon No: 490 1 0 0 - Kutu No: 1144 - Dosya No: 15 - Sıra No: 2

DEVLET ARŞİVLERİ GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ

CUMHURİYET HALK PARTİSİ
Balıkesir BÖLGESİ
MÜFETTİŞLİĞİ
SAYI: .....

M u ğ Vilâyeti:



V e r t o Halkevi:

Bina,husuşî şahsa aittir.Eskidir.Bir salon-toplantı odası ile 2 küçük odadan ibarettir.Bunların biri; İdare,ötekisi-kütüphane ve ambar odasıdır.
Şimdilik,çalışmalara müsaittir.

243

Fon No: 490 1 0 0 - Kutu No: 1001 - Dosya No: 868 - Sıra No: 1

C.H.P.
VARTO
Belediye Başkanlığı
Sayı
81

Varto - Muş 11
9/IV/948

Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü
Cumhuriyet Arşivi

25/III/1948

C . H . P . Genel Sekreterliğine
Ankara

C.H.P. GENEL SEKRETERLİĞİ
T. -9. 4. 1948 | EKİ
No. 80705

İlcemizde bir halkevi binasının yapılması çok zaruri olduğunu müteaddit yazılarımızla arzettiğimiz halde, bu hususta henüz ümit verici kesin bir sonuç alınamamıştır .

Elimizdeki bina bir gözden ibarettir ve şahsa aittir. 946 depreminde zedelenmiş , bu yüzden sahibi binasını tamir etmek için halkevinin tahliyesini ısrarla istemektedir .

Bu hal karşısında binayı tahliye ederek sahibine teslim etmek mecburiyetindeyiz. İlcemiz deprem bölgesi olduğuna göre kira ile tutulacak ev de yoktur. Halk ve gençlerimiz önümüzdeki inşaat mevsiminde bir halkevi binasının yapılması için Genel sekreterliğe derdimizin anlatılmasını , bu hususdaki ihtiyaçların teminini sağlamak bakımından ardısıra kesilmeyen haklı müracaatları başkanlığımıza yapmaktadırlar .

İlcemizde geniş bir inşaat bloku vardır. (Belediye, tekel; hükümet konağı) herşey hazır, müteahhitler hazır, malzeme ucuza maledilmektedir. Halkevimize yakından alaka gösteren ilcemiz kaymakamı Rebî Başol maliyeden ucuz fiyatla ve hatta parasız arsa teminini esirgemeyeceğini vaid etmektedir. Halen Ankarada bulunan ve aşağıda adresi yazılı olan hükümetçe tanınmış ve itimada şayan Varto hükümet konağı müteahhidi Ahmet Gündeş'le temasa geçilerek orta vasatta bir halkevi binasının ihalesinin orada yapılarak gelirken halkevimizin plân ve anlaşma yazılarınxxx da beraberc e getireceğini yüzde yüz ümitle beklemekteyiz .

İlc emizin tepesine inen menhus deprem yumruğu yetmiyormuş gibi genel merkezin de bizi böyle bir köşede bırakmasına yaptığımız müracaatları sonuçsuz ve cevapsız bırakmasına bir türlü akıl erdiremiyoruz . Parti faaliyetlerinin canlı sahneleri ve sonuçları meydanda iken partinin yegâne yardımcısı olan halkevi binasının yokluğuna ve faaliyetinin durdurulmasının diğer parti menfaatına ne gibi sonuçlar doğuracağının aşikârdır .

Muhitin felâket bölgesi olması ve halkın fakir olması mahalli yardım yapılarak bir halkevi binasını inşa etmek değil, bir kitap almak ve bir odacı dahi istihdam etmeye imkân vermemektedir .
Asgari 15 bin, azami 20 bin liraya ilcemiz ihtiyacını karşılayacak mükemmel bir halkevi binası bugünkü durum karşısında yapma imkânı vardır.
İleride orta vasatta bir bina inşaat olmadığından ancak iki misline sağlanılabilir .

2486

15

Fon No: 490 1 0 0 - Kutu No: 1768 - Dosya No: 1173 - Sıra No: 1

DEVLET ARŞİVLERİ GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ

CUMHURİYET HALK PARTİSİ
GENEL SEKRETERLİĞİ

SURET

Dahiliye Vekilliği ile ilgili dilekler

Doğubayazıt Kaymakamının umumî sevk ve idare kabiliyeti hakkında öğrendiklerimi kaydeylemek lüzumunu duymaktayım. Şöyleki:

1) Bu zatın,genç ve tecrübesiz olmaktan ziyade dirayetsiz ve idare kabiliyetinden mahrum bulunduğu için, Kazada; tamamen silik ve sönük bir memur vaziyetinde kaldığı;

2) Şeklen Kaymakamlık yaptığı halde, bütün işlerin Tümen Komutanı General tarafından tertip ve tanzim ile sevk ve idare edildiği; hatta, Kaymakamın, her hangi bir iş hakkında -en basitlerinde dahi- karar vermeden önce; Generalin fikir ve muvafakatini almağa lüzum gördüğü ve, bu suretle; Kazada:

3) Kaymakamlıkla Kumandanlığın, Generalde toplandığı ve Kaymakamın, artık bir memur vaziyetine düştüğü öğrenilmiştir.

4) Bu hususdaki fikrine müracaat olunan Ağrı Valisi; Kaymakamı müdafaa etmek istemişse de, kendisine saydığım bazı misaller ve vaziyetler karşısında, kanaatıma tasdiklemek zaruretinde kalmıştır.

5) Ağrı'da, bu Kaymakamın Kazasındaki idare acizini yakından bilen bazı memurlar ona "kukla Kaymakam" demektedirler.

Aslı gibidir. 8 Kasım 1942

13

Fon No: 490 1 0 0 - Kutu No: 994 - Dosya No: 842 - Sıra No: 2

Sayın General Ali Rıza Artunkal
Milli Savunma Vekili
Ankara

DEVLET ARŞİVLERİ GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ

1— C.H.P. Bitlis Bölgesi müfettişi Hasip Argunalın Doğubeyazıt halkevi hakkında verdiği 17.XI-1942 tarih ve 121 sayılı teftiş raporundan yüksek vekilliğimizle ilgili kısmın suretini ~~ilişik~~ sunulmuştur.

2— Binanın Komutanlıkça işgal edilmiş olması, ilk planda halkevinin sönmesini ~~mucip~~ intaç etmişti. Askerî ihtiyaçların halkevleri zararına karşılanması, hiçbir «halk mektebi» değeri vermeye çalıştığımız bu müesseseler hakkındaki düşünce ve teşebbüsleri zayıflatmaktadır. Varlıklarıyle yakından ilgilendiğimizi isbat olduğundan bu kültür kurumlarının bulundukları yerlerdeki Komutanlarımızca da himaye edilmelerini emir ve arzederiz.

Emrinize yüksek tasvibleriniz arzedilmek üzere sayın ~~ilişik~~ sunmaları rica olunur.

Müdafaa-i Milliye S. Teftiş Kurulu

20

Fon No: 490 1 0 0 - Kutu No: 994 - Dosya No: 842 - Sıra No: 2

DEVLET ARŞİVLERİ GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ

Sayin Elazığlılar :

Halkevi; sizin eviniz ...

Yuvalarınız Kalar sizin ve size ait olan bu ev, sizler için her zaman ve her gece açık.

Kalörüferle ısıtılmış, bol ışıklı, temiz salonlar sizi bekliyor...

Ev salonlarında radyo var, çay, kahve var. Blardo, Domine, aznif, satranç, dama oyunları var.

Bu gün bir ihtiyaç halini almış olan ajans haberlerini orada dinlemek mümkün. orada hava temiz, kahve, çay ucuz (3 kuruş) , oyunlar parasızdır.

Her mesleke yarar, her isteğe cevap verir, bol kitap, her nevi gazete, mecmua sizleri bekliyor. orada samimiyet ve kardeşlik hakim.

Kazanç darlığından dolayı eyi giyinememiş, geçim kısalığı yüzünden kendine bakamamış olmak bir kusur değil, Günün türkiyesi bir aile ocağıdır. Türk milleti de top yekûn o ocağın ailesi .

Aile fertleri nasıl biri birinden çekinmez ve biribirini hoş görürse Türk milletini teşkil eden kardeşler arasında da biribirinden çekinme olamaz. Bizde sınıf yok. çiftçi ile memur , tüccarla işçi memleketin ayni derecede çocuklarıdır.

HALKEVİ yalnız münevverlerin değil, aynı zamanda çiftçinin, işçinin, hanımalın ve tüccarındır da ...

EVİMİZ hepinizi bekliyor. hepiniz gelin. çekinmeden, irkilmeden gelin tanışalım , kardeşçe görüşelim ve eğlenelim. hepimiz biriz ve bir yolda yörüyoruz

Her gece herkese açık olan evimizin büyük salonu her ayın ikinci ve dördüncü cumartesi akşamları aileli toplantıya, üçüncü cumartesi akşamları da gençlik toplantısına açılacaktır. Bu toplantılarda yine samimiyet ve karşılıklı hurmet duyguları hakim.

Bu gecelerde Halkevli kardeşleriniz sizlere saz, musiki dinleteceklerdir, halk havaları çalacaklar, Halk oyunları oynanacak, tombala çekilecek, eğlenilecek, gülünecek ...

Bu toplantılara girmek için bir para ödemeye ihtiyaç yok. Büfenin çaynıdan kahvesinden, pastasından, meyvesinden isteyenler yer içer.

Hiç para harcamadan bir gece eğlenilebilir, yalınız aileli toplantılara; eşle, ana ve kız kardeşle, akraba bayanı ve arkadaş ailelerile gelmek kaydi var. gençlik gecesi için böyle bir kayıt yoktur .

HALKEVİnin sizin için yaptığı hizmetlerden bunlar; yalınız bir kısmı. evimiz bütün arzularınızı yerine getirmek, müşküllerinizi halletmek, derdinize dava olmak istiyor. bildirirseniz isteklerinizi yapacak ve müşküllerinizi halledecek arkadaşlarımız var .

Haftanın her çarşamba günü evimiz salonunda konferanslar veriliyor. Uzun ve mühim emeklerle hazırlanan bu konferanslar çok faydalı ve değerlidir. İnkılâp Türkiyesinin ana prensibini hepimiz biliyoruz: Millet arasında okumayan ve öğrenmemiş hiç bir kimseyi bırakmamak .

HALKEVimizin çalışma esası da şu yoldadır: Herkes bildiğini bilmeyen kardeşine öğretecek ve yine herkes bilmediğini bilen kardeşinden öğrenecek. Ata zözümüzde vardır: bilmemek değil öğrenmemek ayıp. kurslarımız okuyup yazma öğretiyor, keman, piyano öğretiyor. isteyen oldukça daha bir çok şeyler öğretmek azminde. yeterki rağber görelim ve sizin bu rağbetinizden kudret alalım.

Dedim ya; Halkevi bütün milletin evi, bütün millet için, milletin yükselmesi için yine milletin uğraştığı sıcak bir yuva ... Buyurun, yuvanıza, evinize buyurun .....

Halkevi

Fon No: 490 1 0 0 - Kutu No: 997 - Dosya No: 852 - Sıra No: 1

DEVLET ARŞİVLERİ GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ

C. H. P
Andırı Halkodası
Başk.

10-II-947

C. H. P. Genel Sekreterliğine

1553

VIII

C. H. P. Genel Sekreterliği Ankara
T. N. 62853 18 Şubat 947

18 II emr

1-24.II-944 tarihinde Köyümüzde açılan Halkodası için Caminin bir odası tahsis edilmişti. Her bakımdan arzu ve ihtiyaca uygun olmıyan bu hücre, içinde bulunduğumuz şartlar, ve halkodasından daha elzemdan köy okulu ve müştemmiminin inşası da köylüyü sarstığından yukarda açıklanan odamızın inşası geri bırakılmıştı.

Halkodasını kendine bu gün için zarurî bir ihtiyaç bilen Halkımızın aynı fikir ve aynı çatı altında toplanmak ve halkodamızı faal bir hale getirmek için yeni bir bina inşasına düşündük. Bunun için gereken bazı ihtiyaçlar köyden temin edildi. Yakında inşasına başlanacaktır. Halkodasını kendisine bir ihtiyaç bilen köylümüzde fazla mutazarrır etmemek için partimizin bu hususta büyük yardımlarını beklerken bağlılığımızın ifadesi olan derin saygılarımızı sunarız

2- Odamızın açılışından beri gelmekte olan gazetelerimiz bir kaç aydan beri gelmemektedir. Gazete mecmua ve bazı kitap ihtiyacının gönderilmesi hususunda delaletlerinizi saygılarımızla arz ederiz

C. H. P.
Andırı köyü Halkodası
Başkanı Sıtkı Karaman.

18.II.1947

MA. 2476

CÜMHURİYET HALK PARTİSİ
Tunçeli BÖLGESİ
MÜFETTİŞLİĞİ
SAYI: 4

21/X/948
Pertek

697

C. H. P. GENEL SEKRETERLİĞİ
27 10 948
No. 88482

C.H.P

Genel sekreterliğine
Ankara

6/X/948 gün ve I5I04 sayılı emirleri karşılığı dır .

I - Nzımiyyenin Hakis(digr adıderova) , İres halkodaları bir buçuk seneden beri işgal edilerek J; karakolu olarak kullanılmaktadır.

2 - Tunçeli merkezine bağlı Pah Halkodası binası bir senedenberi- J.karağolunun , Türüşmek , Tüllek halk odaları binalarıda İki-- seneden beri Nahiye müdürlerinin işgallerında bulunmakdadır .

3 - karağol ve bucak müdürleri için hükumetçe bina yapma teşebbüs leri olmamağla beraber , bilhassa karağol olarak kullanılan bina lar tahribata oğramaktadır .

4 - çok geri ve mahrumiyyetli bu bölge halk odalarının işğalı , bu odalarda birleşip halkin kitap ve gazete okumasına , okuma ye yazma kurslarına ve sair suretle faydalanmalrına engel olduğu- cihetle bölge halkının teessürünü mucip olmuştur.

mütaleaa :

adları yazılı halk odaları binalarının bulunduğu köyler de filhakika Karağol ve nahiye müdürünün daire olarak ikamet edebilecekleri başka bina mevcut olmadığından , mülak bir zaruretle - binaların işğal edilmiş olduğu muhakkak isede : bu halin devamı Parti mülahaze ve gayeleri bakımından zararlı olduğugörüşünde bulun duğumu , gereken tedbirin (bilhasse binaların tahripden vikayesi) alınmasını Üstün saygılarımla arz eder ellerinizden öperim .

27.X.1948

27 Ekim 1948


Ağrı Milletvekili
Müştak Aktan

28 Ekim 1948

B.VII. şefliğine saygıyla sunulur.
28 Ekim 1948
B.T.B. Şefi

490 | 01 | | 8 | 42 | 65

Fon No: 490 1 0 0 - Kutu No: 8 - Dosya No: 42 - Sıra No: 65



HALKEVİ BAŞKANLIĞI

SAYI
109

5/II/1943

Gizli ve zata mahsustur

C. H. P. Genel Sekreterliği
T. 12225 Teşrin 1943
N. 02001 Ek:

C.H.P Genel sekreterliğine
Ankara

Cümhuriyetin XXnci yıl dönümü kutlama programına Halkevi salonunda 29/IO/I943 günü akşamı bir Balo verilmesi konulmuş ve bu hususta lazım gelen tertibatta alınmıştı.Bingöl muhitinde Balo namı altındaki bu gibi aile toplantıları henuz pek yeni olarak başladığından çok titiz davranmak bilhassa alkollü içkileri velev Cümhuriyet bayramı şerefine yılda bir defaya mahsus olarak tertip edilen baloda dahi bulundurmamak zaruretinde idik.Elimizde mevcut talimatnameler Halkevine ait salon ve bahçelerde alkollü içkilerin bulunmasını menettiği gibi muhit halkının Şafii mezhebinden bulunması hasebiyle içkiye karşı ileri derecedeki düşmanlıklarını da nazarı itibara alarak daha çok titiz davranmak zaruretinde idik.

Balo gecesi aldığımız bütün bu tedbirlere rağmen vukua gelen hadiseler yüz kızartıcı mahiyet almıştır.Bu hadiseyi teessürlerimle arzetmek mecburiyetindeyim:

Adliyemizin burada yegane mümessilleri olan C.M.umumisi Mitat Gafurla Hakim İsmail Ünlü balo salonunda sarhoş olarak toplantıya iştirak etti,salonda laubali hareketleriyle..Kendilerini diğer misafirlerimiz üzerinde sovuk tesirler bıraktığımız esnada Hakim İsmail Ünlü etraflarında hazırlanan büfede izaz ettiği taplarda bulunmak ve avuç avuç Leblebi atmak suretiyle davetlilere ağır hizahet ve vekarını bozdu.Bu arzu edilmedik vaziyetlerden sonra toplantımızın neşesizlik ve bir sinir gerginliği hakim oldu.Cümhuriyet bayramını sona neşeğlenmek istiyen misafirlerimize kötü hadiselerin yakınlaşmakta olduğu kanaati geldi,bir az sonra Emniyet memurları arasında çıkan kavga üzerine Valimiz Baloyu tatil etmek zaruretinde kaldı.

Yukarda kısaca hülasa ettiğimiz iki hadise Evimizin şeref ve itibarını düşürmekten başka bir netice vermemiştir.Muhitte bu güne kadar kendisine iyi bir mevki teminine muvaffak olan evimiz bu çirkin hadiselerin üzerine muhitte evimiz hakkında hiç arzu etmediğimiz dedi koduların yapılmakta oluşundan teessür duymaktayız.Kendi aralarında hadise çıkaran emniyet memurları hakkında takibatta bulunulması Vilayet makamından rica edilmiştir,Vilayet makamınca Hakim İsmail Ünlü hakkında yapılacak bir muamele bulunmadığından hakikati olduğu gibi yüksek makamınıza arzetmeyi muvafık buldum.Sonsuz saygılarımızın kabulü..


Halkevi Başkanı
İhsan Altay

Görülmüştür.
Dosyasına


Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü

Fon No: 490 1 0 0 - Kutu No: 1142 - Dosya No: 6 - Sıra No: 2

Appendix B Documents from Periodicals and Brochures



Dispersion of the People's Houses and Rooms across Turkey in 1948



Millî Mimarî meselesi

Bir muharririmiz Mimar Muallim Sedat Hakkı Eldem ile (Millî Mimarî) davamız hakkında aşağıdaki görüşmeyi yapmıştır:

Konuşmanın mevzuunu iki esas teşkil etmektedir:

1 — Modern Türk Mimarîsi hakkında düşünceler, 2 — Millî karakteri ifade eden mimarî üslûbumuzun ana vasıflarının nelerden ibaret olduğu.

S. — Bugün gibi, yapı tekniğinin dünyanın her yerine kolaylıkla ve süratle yayılabileceği bir devirde, memleketlerin kendilerine mahsus yapı karakteri stillerini ve yapı stillerini muhafaza etmeleri kabil ve doğru mudur?

Yahut yapı teknik ve stilleri enternasyonal değil midir, ve olmamalı mıdır? Bugün aynı gratte-ciel'ler New York, Madrid ve Honkong'da yapılmıyor mu? Le Corbusier stilindeki «kübik» villalar dünyanın malı olmamış mıdır? Beton arme ve demir tekniği her yerde bir değil midir?

C. — Söylediklerinize ayrı ayrı alınırsa doğrudur, fakat toplu olarak yapı stilinin enternasyonal olduğunu isbat için kâfi değildir. Filhakika bugünkü mimaride enternasyonal addedilecek binalar ve bina unsurları varsa da, her millete teşmil edilebilecek enternasyonal bir mimarî meydana gelmemiştir. Bugün muhtelif memleketlerde yapı sahaları kendi karakterlerini muhafaza etmektedirler, yalnız yapı sanayiinin bazı kısımları hakikaten enternasyonal olmağa yüz tutmuştur. Bunlar bilhassa betonarme ve demir iskelet tarzı inşaatı ve dahili tesisat sahalarıdır.

Bundan masada mimarî tarzlarına bir takım moda cereyanları vardır ki, bütün dünyaya sathî bir şekilde yayılmıştır. Vertikalizm, horizontalizm, rasyonalizm, fonksiyonalizm, sinamizm gibi. Bu cereyanlar da yakından tetkik edilecek olursa, beynelmilel, addedilemez, çünkü esas itibariyle her zaman küçük bir zümrenin mahsulü olmuş ve bütün dünya tarafından iyi kötü taklit edilmiştir.

S. — O halde yapı sahasında bir varlık gösteren milletler ayrı ayrı üslûplara sahip midirler?

C. — Bugün, muhtelif millet veya memleketlerin yapı stilleri eskisine nisbeten birbirinden fazla farklı değildir. Çünkü eskiden milletler arasındaki temas ve münasebetler bugünküne nazaran daha az ve müskül idi. Bugün ise gerek nakliyat vasıtalarının inkişaf etmiş olması, gerekse san'at hakkındaki neşriyatın memleketten memlekete intişarı, üslûplar arasındaki büyük tezatların azalmasına, ve muayyen fikir ve cereyanların yayılmasına sebep olmuştur. Meselâ bir Alman veya Amerikan mimarî mecmuasının, dünyanın her tarafında meslekle alâkası olanlar ve olmayanlar tarafından okunması, fikrin yalnız yayılmasına değil, icabında bu fikirlerin yapı hususunda daha geri kalmış memleketlerin zevkine tesir ve hakim geldiği görülebilir. Fakat benliğini muhafaza etmiş milletler, yapı sahasında da kendilerine mahsus karakteristikleri taşıyan, bir üslûba mâlikdirler. Almanyadaki modern mimarî, İtalyadakinden, Fransadakinden farklıdır. Şimal memleketleri birbirine yakın ve benzer bir tarzda yapı yaparlar. İtalya, modern tarzı mimarîyi yapı fenninde ön safhalarda yürümüş olan Almanyadan öğrenmiş ise de, bugün kendi zevk ve memleketine uygun bir şekil bulmuş ve o istikamette yürümeğe başlamıştır. İtalyanın kendi memleketinde gördüğü klâsik misaller bu yolun istikameti üzerine çok tesir etmiştir. Almanya yeni rejime kadar kendi karakteristiklerini fonksyonalizmde görmüş ise de, yeni rejimin verdiği yeni idealler tesiriyle klâsik bir tradisyonalizme girmiştir. Skandinavyalılar ise ananeleri ile irtibatlarını hiç kesmemişler, yeni yapı fennini, kendi ideallerine yalnız bir yardımcı olarak telâkki etmişlerdir. Bundan görülüyor ki, bugünkü mimaride, enternasyonalizmden ziyade, nasyonalizme doğru bir cereyan vardır. Muhtelif milletler yeni yapı zihniyet ve unsurlarını hep kabul etmiş ve tatbik etmekte iseler de, fikir ve ideal hususunda, kendi benliklerini gösterebilecek, ve benliklerinin inkişafına mâniolmayacak yolar aramaktadır. Bu yolları ananeye rucu veya yeni bir ideale inanç, veya her ikisinin mezci olarak telâkki ediyorlar.

S. — Bizim memleketteki vaziyet nesidir? Yeni bir Türk mimarisi doğmuş mudur? Karakteristikleri var midir?

C. — Henüz yeni ve memleketimize mahsus bir yapı stili ve kültürü vardır denemez. Fakat şurada burada yapılan bazı binalarımızda, yeni ve millî stilin tohumları atılmıştır denebilir.

S. — Yeni Türkiye yeni bir şehir kurmuş, ve yeni bir çok büyük binalar yapmıştır. Ankara büyük ve medenî bir şehir olmuştur. Bu büyük imar faaliyeti neticesinde yerli bir üslûb elan doğmamış mıdır? En iyi ecnebi mimarlara yaptırılan binalarımızın bu yolda bir faydası olmamış mıdır?

C. — Türkiyede inkilâptaneri bir kaç yüz milyon kıymetinde mimarî eserler meydana getirilmiştir. Başlangıçta, en elzem ihtiyaçları en kısa bir zamanda temin etmek lâzım gelmiş olduğundan, fazla araştırmalarla vakit kaybetmeden yapı yapmak mecburiyeti vardı. O devirlerde ise tekemmül etmiş ve yeni Türkiyenin yeni ihtiyaçlarını karşılayacak ve tatmin edecek yapı teknisiyenleri ve mimarları azdı. Bu sebepten dolayı, yerli elemanlarla yapılan muhtelif tecrubelerden sonra Hü-

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Bu Ay içinde Evimizde Olup Bitenler

Halkevi Polinikliği

Evimiz sosyal yardım komitesi memleketin sıhhî ihtiyaçlarını göz önüne alarak 15 Hazirandan itibaren şehrin merkezi noktasında bir dispanser açmıştır. Dispanser şimdilik on mütehassıs doktor tarafından idare edilmektedir. Fakir ve yoksul yurdtaşlar için büyük bir noksanlığı karşılayan dispanser her gün saat 10 — 11 ve 16 — 17 de olmak üzere sabah ve akşam hastalara açık bulundurulmaktadır.

Mahkûmlara Okuma Yazma Kursu

Halkevimiz Halk dershaneleri ve kurslar komitesi tarafından Diyarbakır hapishanesindeki mahkûmlara okuma yazma öğretmek için bir kurs açılmıştır.

Kursa 200 den fazla mahpus devam etmektedir. Ayrıca bunların kalem, defter, kâğit gibi ihtiyaçları da temin edilmiş ve sıra masa gibi diğer Gereçlerde Halkevimiz tarafından hazırlanmıştır.

Türkçe ve yurtbilgisi Müsabakası

Evimiz köycülük kolu tarafından her yıl tertip edilen köylüler arasındaki yurt bilgisi ve türkçe müsabakası bu yıl da 2 haziran 939 tarihinde yapılmıştır. Sayın Valimiz Dr. Mithat Altıokun huzurile yapılan bu müsabakaya ait imtihanlarda türkçeden muvaffak olan mermer köylü Reşit Kayaya bir öküz, Abdullah askara bir inek, yurt bilgisinden kazanan telalo köylü Ahmet Avşara bir öküz, Kadı köylü Hasana bir tosun, Telalo köylü Hamit çelebiye bir koç, yusuf Orduya bir koyun mükâfat verilmiştir. Diğer muvaffak olan on dört kişiye kalem defter gibi mükâfatlar tevzi edilmiştir.

Çiçek Sergisi

Diyarbakırda salon ve bahçe çiçekçiliğini teşvik maksadile Evimiz müze ve sergi kolu tarafından 11 Haziran 939 da bir çiçek sergisi açılmıştır. Üç gün devam eden bu sergiye şehirn maruf çiçekçileri iştirak etmiş ve 7900 kişi sergimizi gezmiştir.

Konser

Evimiz Ar koluuun muntazaman tertip ettiği konserlerden yeni çalışma yılının ilk konseri 12 Haziran 939 pazartesi günü verilmiştir. Konseri 1159 yurdtaş dinlemiştir.

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Karacadağ, no. 13, 20 February 1939



Ar Komitesi

Bir yıl içinde görülen işlerin özü

Sayı	Ne olduğu	Gelenler
28	Konferans	5368
9	Konser	1601
16	Gösterit	7783
3	Balo	460
23	Aile gecesi	1442
1	Şölen	40
4	Konğra	1661
5	Nişan nikâh	1300
1	Sergi	1200
13	Konserli konferans	5500
2	Köy gezisi	
7	Bayram töreni	27600
115		52955
	Dersler	
69	Musikî dersi	
184	H. Dersleri	
23	Fransızca dersleri	

Evimizin çalışan kayıtlı üyeleri

Komiteler	Bayan	Bay	Yekûn
Dil, Tarih, edebiyat	4	176	180
Ar	11	163	174
Gösterit	6	91	97
Spor		152	152
Sosyal yardım	10	130	140
Halk deshaneleri, kurslar		61	61
Kitapsaray ve yayın	2	50	52
Köycülük		142	142
	33	965	998

BELEDİYE KÜTÜPHANESİ No.

Urfa Halkevi'nin Bir Yıllık İş Sayımı (23/2/1935-23/2/1936), İstanbul: Hüsnütabiat Matbaası, 1936



Sayı 463 (ULUS SESİ) 29 Ağustos 1936 Sayfa: 9

Partimizin Mardindeki kültür örğüdü Halkevi

Partimizin Mardinde bir kültür örğüdü olan Halk evi 933 Şubatında açılmıştır. Partice tasdik edilmiş özel bir program altında dil, edebiyat, tarih, ar, gösterit, spor, kitabsaray ve yayın köycülerden mürekkeb altı şubesile özlü olarak çalışır. Her şubenin kendi çalışma-

Halkevi Başkanımız Atıfı Uras

ların çerçiveleyen ayrı bir programla halk kalkınmasına yani Kemalizm devriminin ülkümüne emin adımlarla yürümektedir.

Mardin halkevi kuruluşu günündenberi memleket için kıymetli bir varlık olmuş çok ilgili ve sempati toplamıştır.

Münevver gençlik ve öğretmenler tarafından yönetgelenen partinin bu kültür kurulu dikkat nazarlarını kendisine çekecek bir surette mütesanit; duyğulu; şuurlu bir topluluk arzetmektedir.

Her gün daha fazla artan alâka ile bu günkü üyelerinin sayısı 426 yı bulmuştur. Mesailerinin daha verimli olabilmesi için yer ve kuruğun münasebetsizliğine rağmen istatistiklerine göre verim ve randıman yüksektir. Değerli Ilbayımız Fehmi Yuralın kıymetli teşebbüsleri neticesi olarak gelecek sene kurağ sıkıntısı da bitmiş olacak ve Halkevi de büyük, rahat, geniş ve her türlü çalışmaya elverişli bir binaya taşınmış bulunacak ve bu suretle Halkevimiz daha pek çok verimli olacaktır.

Her şube çalışmalarına âid ihsal rakamlara bakılacak olursa Halkevimizin artan bir hızla ülküye doğru ilerlediği kıvanç ve gururla görülmektedir. Bunun için münevver gençliğe ve öğretmenlere şükran borcumuzu sunmağı bir ödev bilirir.

Mardin

Özel İdaresinin 2 yıl 5 aylık çalışma PLANÇOSU

Büyük bir sevinçle ulu cümhuriyet bayramımızı kutlulayan hemşerilerimizin vermiş oldukları paralarla cümhuriyet hükümetimizin ilmir özel idare bütçesile yaptığı işleri hemşerilerimize bildirmeği bir borç sanırım.

934 Yılı özel idare bütçesi

934 Yılı özel idare bütçesi varidatı 228332 lira 60 kuruştur. Bundan tahsil olunan 183900 lira ile aşağıda yazılı işler yapılmıştır. 80193 lira villâyetin yol, 60153 lira Kültür 6779 lira Tarım, 13509 lira Sağlık ve hayır işlerine 20128 lira da batak-lık kurutmasına, köy sandığına, Halkevine, Spor ve saire gibi memleketin öne-

– Sonu 11 inci sayfede –

li işlerine harcanmıştır.

935 Yılı

Bütçelerin bakiki rakamlara dayanarak yapılmasından ötürü 934 yılına nazaran 935 yılında; varidat 48238 lira artmak suretile 276570 liraya çıkarılmıştır. Bu yıl içinde de 176874 lira tahsil olunmuştur. Bundan 102761 lirası memleketin bayındırlık 64637 lirası Kültür, 6852 lirası Tarım, 16238 lira Sağlık ve hayır işlerine, 25199 lira Halkevi, Çocuk esirgeme kurumu, Spor ve Memleket hütüphanesi, Telefon ve saire gibi ilimizin önemli işlerine harcanmıştır.

936 Yılı

936 Yılı umum varidat yekunu 228757 liradır. Bu yıl bütçesile 93256 lira yol işlerine ayrılarak şehir dahilindeki parke kaldırım inşası ve Midyat, Savur yolu arasındaki iki menfez inşası isteklilerine ihale edilmiş ve işe başlanmıştır. 62034 lirada kültür işlerine tefrik edilerek Tohup, Kendirip, Tınat, Tiyan, Silobi, Hisar

Sonu 11 inci sayfede

Urayımızın

SON BİR YILLIK ÇALIŞMASI

Yıkılan Osmanlı imparatorluğunun yerine nasıl enerji dolu şerefli ve kudretli yeni bir Cumhuriyet Türkiyesi kaim olmuşsa; eski, bilgisiz, tembel, ihmalci ve kudretsiz belediyeler yerine Türkiyenin her yerinde yeni şehir ve belediyecilik dokterinelerine sahib yapıcı, imar edici asrî belediyeler kaim olmağa başlamıştır.

Mardinin eski belediyesinin halını bilenlerle bugün daha kıt imkânlarla çalışan belediyesini mukayese ettiklerî vakıt vazih olarak görecekleri şey mukayese kabul etmeyecek büyük bir farktır. Cehalet, tembellik, ihmal ve kudretsizliğin yerlerini bilgiye, harekete, tayekkuz ve aksiamele ve nihayet

[Sonu 11 inci sayfede

Cumurluk devrinde yeni bir hayata kavuşan ilçelerimizden güzel Midyattan bir görünüş



Ulus Sesi, August 1936

Ulus Sesi, September 1936



ALTAN

ELAZIĞ HALKEVİ TARAFINDAN HER AYIN 23 SİNDE ÇIKARILIR

SAYI: 39 - 40 - 41 - 42 Haziran, Temmuz, Ağustos, Eylûl YIL: 3

İçindekiler:

Gazete muhbiri nasıl olmalıdır?	Ömer Kemal AĞAR
Kuru ziraat	Tevfik Dündar
Harput tarihine bir bakış	Necip ERDEM
Elâzığda milli âdetler	B. Turgut OKAYGÜN
İnönü şiirlerine	Cemile AYTAÇ
Yeni zamanlarda hükûmet	Ömer Kemal AĞAR
Harput manileri	* * *
Hava hücumlarından şahsi korunma	Sabri AKIN
Gençler duyunuz ve duydurunuz	Yaşar KARAYALÇIN
Gençler Partimizin müsabakasına giriniz!	* * *
Köy ve ziraatı ilgilendiren ata sözleri	* * *
Sivas muallimleri Elâzığda	* * *
Atatürk diyor ki:	* * *
Orduyu takdir	* * *
Biz nasıl hallediyoruz?	Falih Rıfkı ATAY
Dersim medeniyete açılıyor	Naşit ULUĞ
Doğu manevralarının hususiyeti	* * *
40,000 kişilik bir geçit resmi	* * *
Halkevleri Cümhuriyetin eseridir	* * *
Sana hayranım	Hüsameddin IŞIN
Harput tarihi ve tarihi âbideleri	Nureddin Ardıç
Harput şairleri	* * *
Krom ve Türkiye kromları	Ömer Kemal AĞAR
Vesaire	* * *
Nazımiye tetkik seyahati notları	Necip Erdem — Hayreddin Özdal
Öğretmenin aşkı (roman)	* * *

ÜLKÜ BASIMEVİ
İSTANBUL — 1938

Dersim Medeniyete Açılıyor

Yaza: Naşit ULUĞ

Dersimden döndüğümü öğrenen birçok münevver insanlar, bana:

— Dersim meselesi artık kökünden halledildi, değil mi? diye soruyorlar. Bu zevatın çoğu kendi ihtisas şubelerine hayatlarını vakfeden, fakat, Dersim hakkında kâfi bir fikir sahibi olmıyan vatandaşlardır. Onların bu sualleri, Cümhuriyetin Dersim işini nasıl bir dâva olarak elinde tuttuğunu ve bu yaz Tunceli'nde yapılan askerî harekâtın mahiyet ve maksadının ne olduğunu bilmediklerini gösteriyordu. Bu bakımdan Türk inkılâbının çalışma sahalarında bir şereflisini teşkil eden «Tunceli'nin medeniyete açılışı» işini en geniş ölçüde milletimize bildirmeyi lüzumlu ve faydalı buluyoruz. «ULUS», önümüzdeki hafta içinde bu çalışmalara geniş bir sayı tahsis edecek ve bunda Tunceli'nde âşiret rejimi altında inliyen binlerce Türkün ağa, reis ve seyitlerin elinden nasıl kurtarıldığını ve haydutluk hayatının nasıl tasfiye edildiğini, Dersim'de hürriyetin ve insanlık haklarının tessüsü devrinin nasıl açıldığını anlatacaktır.

— Dersim meselesi artık kökünden halledildi mi?

Sualinin cevabı, müsbet olarak daha şimdiden verilebilir. Evet, Dersim işi; bir temdin dâvası, bir imar dâvası, Dirsim'de yaşıyan ve haydutlar elinde esir kalmış olan on binlerin Cümhuriyet vatandaşlığı şerefi ve haklarına kavuşturulması dâvası olarak takip edildiği zamandanberi, hal yoluna girmiş demektir.

Üzerinde ciddî ve vatanperverane bir ısrarla durulan, haydutların ve tabiatin çıkarttığı birçok güçlüklere rağmen sarsılmadan takip edilen ve edilecek olan imar ve temdin programı; bize şimdiden meselenin kökünden hal yoluna girmiş olduğunu vadedebilir.

Dersim'in medeniyete açılışı, Kemalist inkılâbın başardığı eserlerin büyüklerindendir; neslimize şeref verecek ölçüde büyük bir hamledir.

Dersim'in karanlıklar içinden geçen dününden, teşebbüs, hareket ve emek dolu bugününden ve bol ışıklı yarınından bahsetmeden önce, büyük bir hâz ve heyecanla bir vazife yapmak isterim:

Üçüncü ordunun büyük manevrasının Tunceli'nde geçen safhasında bulundum. Bu yıl manevra sırası Cümhuriyetin üçüncü ordusunda idi. Ordu üç kolurdu ve iki süvari tümeninden mürekep otuzla kırk bin kişi arasındaki büyük kuvvetiyle üç safhalı manevra yapmak vazifesini almıştı.

Birinci safha, Tunceli'nde geçecekti; buraya Kağızman, Karaköse, Trabzon, Urfa ve Gaziantep gibi uzak yerlerden kara yürüyüşleri yaparak kıt'alarımız toplanmıya başladılar. Bu uzun yürüyüşler gelişigüzel zamanlar içinde değil, manevranın programına uygun olarak tesbit edilmiş uzun ve çetin mukavemet yürüyüşleriydi. Ordu, manevra yerine gelmeden önce yürüyüş kabiliyeti bakımından büyük bir imtihan verdi. Manevranın birinci safhasında birlikler üç yüz ile altı yüz kilometre arasında yürüyüş yapmışlardı; bunlar yaya ve atlı kıt'alardı ve bu kıt'aların erlerini teşkil eden vatan çocukları hepsi Cümhuriyet devrinde büyümüş, iyi beslenmiş, iyi bakılmış neslindendiler; «Türk gibi kuvvetli» sözü yabancıların diline mal olmuştur.

Bu yiğit varlık; Pümlür'ün bir kısım şimalini, Çemişgezek ve Pertek kazalarının bir kısım cenup bölgelerini ayırırsak geride kalan bütün Tunceli'ni tarama emrini almışlardı.

Tunceli, hartamızın içinde avuç içi kadar bir yerdir. Fakat tabiat bu avuç içi kadar yerde sayısız tepeler, dereler, uçurumlar, mağaralar, çalılıklar, meşelikler, sarp ve yalçın sıra dağlar yaratmış ve Dersim'in dağlı zihniyeti bu tabiata yaslanarak bugüne kadar yaşamıştır.

Cümhuriyet ordusu, uzun yürüyüşünden sonra içine girdiği Dersim'in bu çeşitli ârızasının her köşesinden pusu ve baskın tehlikesiyle karşılaşıyordu. Bütün bu tehlikeleri tecrübeli tedbirleri ile önliyen ve askerin bir damla kanını bile kıskanan bir sevk ve idare altında, ordumuz, Dersim'i taradı ve aldığı vazifeyi en müsait im-

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