

**RIGHT-WING POPULISM AND IMMIGRATION POLICIES:
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TURKEY, HUNGARY AND THE US
CASES (2014 - 2020)**

by

Osman Fedai

A Thesis Submitted to the
Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree of

Master of Arts

in

Political Science and International Relations



**KOÇ
ÜNİVERSİTESİ**

July 2023

ABSTRACT

Right-Wing Populism and Immigration Policies: Comparative Analysis of Turkey, Hungary and The US Cases (2014 - 2020)

Osman Fedai

Master of Arts in Political Science and International Relations

July 2023

While the right-wing populist governments across the world are generally examined with a deeper focus on their similarities, such as their strong emphasis on mono-culturalism, conservative nationalism grounded with anti-elite rhetoric, and deeper focus on identity politics within the literature, it's possible to observe significant differences and deviations within the right-wing populism when it comes to the immigration policy agendas. This Master thesis aims to provide a comparative analysis of the immigration policies of three right-wing populist governments, namely the US case during the Trump administration towards the irregular migration of Latin American citizens, the Hungarian case under the leadership of Prime Minister Viktor Orban during the 2015 European migrant crisis and finally the Turkish case towards the Syrian immigrants during Syrian Civil War. Since the election of both President Erdogan in Turkey and Prime Minister Orban in Hungary took place after the presidential elections in the year 2014, the time frame of this thesis would be between the years of 2014 and 2020, which also coincides with the Syrian migrant crisis and the period of President Trump administration in the United States.

Although the US and the Hungarian responses towards the imbalanced immigration problem include similarities within themselves through representing the right-wing populist-nationalist discourse on migration with more 'exclusionary' rhetoric, the Turkish response towards the Syrian immigrants since the start of Syrian Civil War in 2011 towards the migration

problem deviates from these two right-wing populist leaders' approach on the issue of immigration; although several U-turns and inconsistencies within the discourse and implemented policies. After applying both quantitative research methods and qualitative text analysis to the policy speeches of three right-wing populist leaders regarding immigration during the period of 2014-2020, this thesis claims that the US case under President Donald Trump had the most exclusionary and nationalist discourse. President Trump took a tough stance towards immigrants from different ethnic and religious backgrounds, showing no willingness to consider selective humanitarianism. The Hungarian case during the rule of Prime Minister Viktor Orban represented an example of exclusionary populist-nationalist discourse with some elements of selective humanitarianism; on the condition that immigrants were Christians living under the Muslim majority authoritarian countries, as in the case of Hungary's acceptance of Coptic Christian refugees from Egypt. Whereas, the Turkish case during the rule of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan represented an example of 'inclusionary' populist-nationalist discourse towards the immigrants in the country through the acceptance of Syrian immigrants coming from various ethnic and religious backgrounds like Kurdish people, Assyrian people and Yazidis to the country; despite President Erdoğan's 'exclusionary populist' stance in the domestic politics of Turkey through his emphasis on value-based construction of a shared identity and his negative stance towards certain groups in the Turkish society. From these aspects, this thesis argues that it is not always easy to examine the populist approach to immigration within the exclusionary-inclusionary dualism. Depending on their perspectives on their nation's collective history and their foreign policy goals, it is possible to observe that populist leaders may adopt a relatively inclusionary attitude towards international migrants.

This thesis claims that President Erdoğan's right-wing populist nationalist discourse with an 'inclusionary populist' stance towards the Syrian immigrants while 'exclusionary at home' can be attributed to the Turkish claim of 'occupying moral high ground' in line with Turkey's foreign policy perspective based on the strategic autonomy discourse. The Turkish case represented an exceptional case in that depending on the foreign policy goals of the right-wing populist leaders, their perspectives on their nations' place in the world, and the place of their countries in world politics as protectors of the oppressed one; it is possible to observe that right-wing populist leaders can also adopt welcoming stance towards the international migrants through adopting an 'inclusionary populist' discourse; while continuing their 'exclusionary populist discourse in their domestic politics simultaneously. However, this thesis also points out that through instrumentalizing the issue of immigrants as a bargaining tool for achieving certain foreign policy goals, it is also possible to observe several inconsistencies and ambiguities within President Erdoğan's populist inclusionary stance towards immigrants in some cases, despite Turkish government's emphasis on the moral responsibility of hosting refugees.

Keywords: Populism, right-wing populism, immigration policies, international immigrants, inclusionary and exclusionary populism, strategic autonomy

**Sağ Populizm ve Göç Politikaları: Türkiye, Macaristan ve ABD Örneklerinin
Karşılaştırmalı Analizi (2014 – 2020)**

Osman Fedai

Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Yüksek Lisans Programı

ÖZET

Sağ populist hükümetler, mevcut literatürde tek kültürlülüğe olan vurguları, elitizm karşıtı söylemlere temellendirilmiş ve kimlik politikalarına odaklanan muhafazakar milliyetçilikleri gibi benzerliklerine odaklanılarak incelenmiştir. Ancak göç politikaları söz konusu olduğunda sağ populist hükümetlerin içinde önemli farklılıklar gözlemlemek mümkündür. Bu yüksek lisans tezi, üç sağcı populist hükümetin göç politikalarının karşılaştırmalı bir analizini sağlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu üç örnek, ABD Başkanı Donald Trump yönetimi sırasında Latin Amerika vatandaşlarının düzensiz göçüne karşı uygulanan göç politikaları, 2015 yılında Avrupa göçmen krizi sırasında Başbakan Viktor Orban ve partisi Fidesz tarafından uygulanan göç politikaları ve son olarak Başbakan (daha sonra Cumhurbaşkanı) Recep Tayyip Erdoğan döneminde, Suriye İç Savaşı sırasında Türkiye'ye sığınan Suriyeli göçmenlere yönelik Türkiye'nin uyguladığı göç politikalarıdır. Türkiye'de Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan'ın ve Macaristan'da Başbakan Orban'ın seçilmesinden bu yana 2014 yılında yapılan cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimlerinden sonra, bu tezin zaman dilimi, Suriye göçmen krizi ile ABD Başkanı Trump yönetimi dönemine denk gelen 2014-2020 yılları arasında olacaktır.

ABD ve Macaristan'ın bu yıllar arasındaki göçmen sorununa yönelik tepkileri, kendi aralarında 'dışlayıcı' bir sağ populist söylem izlemeleri açısından benzerlikler gösterse de; Türkiye'nin ve sağ populist bir lider olarak Türkiye Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan'ın 2011'de Suriye İç Savaşı'nın başlamasından bu yana Suriyeli göçmenlere yönelik tepkisi bu iki sağcı populist liderin göç meselesine yaklaşımından farklılık göstermektedir. Ancak, Türkiye'nin Suriyeli göçmenlere

yönelik uyguladığı politikalarda birçok U dönüşleri ve tutarsızlıklar da gözlemleyebilmek mümkündür.

Bu yüksek lisans tezinde üç sağ popülist liderin 2014-2020 döneminde göç sorunuyla ilgili politika konuşmaları hem kantitatif araştırma yöntemleri hem de niteliksel metin analizi metodları uygulanarak analiz edilmiştir. Bu araştırma sonucunda ABD Başkanı Donald Trump'ın görevde olduğu süre zarfında, Meksikalı düzensiz göçmenlere yönelik en sert düzeyde dışlayıcı ve milliyetçi bir populist söylem izlediği sonucuna varılmıştır. Macaristan örneğinde de Başbakan Viktor Orban'ın, 2015'teki Avrupa göçmen krizinde sığınmacı ve göçmenlere karşı yine dışlayıcı populist bir söylem izlediği, Mısır'daki Kıptî Hıristiyanların Macaristan'a göçmen olarak kabul edilmesi örneğinde ise ABD Başkanı Donald Trump'tan farklı olarak 'seçici yardımseverlik' ilkesiyle hareket ettiği gözlemlenmiştir. Türkiye örneğinde ise diğer iki sağ populist liderden farklı olarak, Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın, 2011'de başlayan Suriye İç Savaşı sonrası Türkiye'ye sığınan ve Kürt, Süryani gibi farklı etnik ve dinî kökenden gelen göçmenlerin Türkiye'ye kabul edilmesi sürecinde 'kapsayıcı' popülist-milliyetçi söylem izlediği gözlemlenmiştir. Bu 'kapsayıcı populist' tutum, Erdoğan'ın Suriye ile Türkiye arasındaki ortak tarih ve kimliğe vurgu yapan bir söyleme dayanmaktadır ve Erdoğan'ın Türk iç politikasında izlediği 'dışlayıcı populist' tutumdan ayrılmaktadır. Bu açıdan bu yüksek lisans tezi, Bu tez, popülizmin göç meselesine olan yaklaşımını, popülizm araştırmalarında yer alan dışlayıcı popülizm - kapsayıcı popülizm ikilemi içerisinde incelemenin her zaman kolay olmadığını öne sürmektedir. Popülist siyasetçilerin ülkelerinin kolektif tarihine bakış açıları ve ülkelerinin dış politika hedeflerine bağlı olarak, uluslararası göçmenlerin ülkelere kabul edilmelerine yönelik nispeten kapsayıcı bir tutum benimseyebildiklerini gözlemek mümkündür.

Bu yüksek lisans tezi, Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan'ın Suriyeli göçmenlere yönelik 'kapsayıcı popülist', Türkiye iç politikasında ise 'dışlayıcı popülist' bir duruş sergileyen sağ popülist söyleminin, Türkiye'nin dış politikasında göçmen sorununda 'ahlaki üstünlüğü ele geçirme' iddiasına ve Türk dış politikasının stratejik özerklik söylemine atfedilebileceğini öne sürmektedir. Türkiye örneği; sağ popülist liderlerinin dış politika hedeflerine, ülkelerinin dünya siyasetindeki yerine dönük hedeflerine bağlı olarak uluslararası göçmenlerin kabulüne karşı kapsayıcı popülist bir söylem izlerken iç politikada eş zamanlı olarak dışlayıcı popülist bir söylem izlediği bir örnek olması yönüyle istisnai bir örnek teşkil etmektedir. Bununla birlikte, bir ahlaki sorumluluk olarak Suriyeli göçmenlerin ağırlanmasına yönelik Türk hükümetinin vurgusuna rağmen Türkiye Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan'ın, bir dış politika aracı olarak göçmenlerin göçmenlere yönelik kapsayıcı popülist söylemlerinde yer yer tutarsızlıklar belirsizlikler gözlemlemek mümkündür.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Popülizm, sağ popülizm, göç politikaları, uluslararası göçmenler, kapsayıcı ve dışlayıcı popülizm, stratejik özerklik

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It was a long road with several rewarding challenges that intellectually nurtured me while contributing to the ideas presented in this thesis. I am indebted to my thesis advisors Professor Ziya Öniş and Professor Şener Aktürk, who helped me meticulously navigate my ideas and overcome issues emerging at every step of my intellectual development. This thesis would not be possible without their valuable insights. The research methods that I applied represents the improvement I have succeeded with the help of Associate Professor Selim Erdem Aytaç and Professor Ali Çarkoğlu to whom I would like to express my greatest gratitude. I would like to thank the Department of International Relations at Koc University for providing me an excellent academic background which undoubtedly will augment my own future studies.

Besides, I am also thankful to the all administrative staff of Koç University Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities for their help during my master's study. Finally, I am grateful for the generous financial support I have received throughout my master's studies from TÜBİTAK (the Scientific and Technological Research Council).



List of Tables.....	13
List of Figures.....	14
Abbreviations	16
Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION.....	17
1.1 Research Question.....	17
1.2 Research Design & Methodology.....	21
1.3 Structure of the Thesis	29
1.4 Contributions to the Scholarly Literature & Limitations of the Thesis.....	30
Chapter 2: LITERATURE REVIEW ON POPULISM AND IMMIGRATION POLICIES.....	32
2.1 Populism and Nationalism	35
2.2 Inclusionary vs. Exclusionary Forms of Populism	37
2.3 The Right-wing Populism in Turkey and Turkey's Immigration Policies the AKP period... ..	38
2.4 Right-Wing Populism in Hungary	41
2.5 Right-Wing Populism in the United States.....	43
2.6 Literature Review on Host State Policies toward Immigrants	44
Chapter 3: THE US IMMIGRATION POLICIES DURING PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP ADMINISTRATION	46
3.1 Overview of the US Immigration Policies Before the Year 2016	47
3.2 Legislative Changes in the US Immigration Policy during President Donald Trump Administration	51
3.3 Critical Analysis on the Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric Expressed by President Donald Trump.	59
3.4 Conclusion	69
Chapter 4: HUNGARY'S IMMIGRATION POLICIES DURING PRIME MINISTER VIKTOR ORBAN ADMINISTRATION.....	70
4.1 Diverging Policy Stances between Hungary and the EU during the 2015 Migrant Crisis	74

4.2	Domestic Political Context in Hungary	77
4.3	Critical Discourse Analysis on Viktor Orban’s Policy Speeches on Immigration.....	84
4.3.1	Re-defining the Hungary’s Geopolitical Role in Europe	86
4.3.2	‘Civilizationist Rhetoric’ with References to History of Hungary ..	89
4.4	Conclusion	91
Chapter 5: TURKEY’S IMMIGRATION POLICIES DURING THE PRESIDENCY OF PRESIDENT RECEP TAYYIP ERDOGAN.		93
5.1	Overview of Turkey’s Immigration Policies during the Early Years of the Syrian Civil War	93
5.2	Turkey’s Immigration Policies during 2016-2020 Period	102
5.3	The EU-Joint Action Plan and Its Significance for Turkey’s Immigration Policies.....	103
5.4	Critical Analysis on Turkey’s Immigration Policies during 2016-2020 Period	110
5.4.1	Domestic Political Context in Turkey Following the July 2016 Coup Attempt.....	121
5.4.2	The Turkish Political Parties’ Policy Stances on the Issue of Syrian Migrants in Turkey during 2016 – 2020 Period	125
5.5	Turkish Public Opinion Towards the Syrian Immigrants	136
5.6	Conclusion	148
Chapter 6: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR.....		150
6.1	Overview of Turkey’s Relations with Syrian Arab Republic	151
6.2	Turkey’s Political and Military Involvement in the Syrian Conflict...	157
6.3	The EU Foreign Policy During the Syrian Civil War	162
6.4	The ‘Strategic Autonomy’ Discourse in Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkey – EU Relations during 2016 – 2020 period	169
6.5	Conclusion.....	173
Chapter 7: ANALYSIS ON PRESIDENT RECEP TAYYIP ERDOGAN’S DISCOURSE ON SYRIAN IMMIGRANTS IN TURKEY (2014 – 2020).....		176

7.1 Analysis on the Key Themes within President Erdoğan's Policy Speeches on Syrian Syrian Immigrants in Turkey	182
7.1.1 Emphasis on the Turkey's Place in the World Politics	180
7.1.2 The Common Past with the Syrians	182
7.2 Inconsistencies in President Erdoğan's Discourse Toward Syrian Immigrants.	186
7.3 Conclusion.....	189
Chapter 8: CONCLUSION	191
BIBLIOGRAPHY	198
APPENDIX.....	226

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: The Most Similar System Table of Turkey, Hungary and the US Cases	19
Table 2: Comparative Analysis of the Populism in the US, Hungary and Turkey	23
Table 3: Data on the Temporal Change within Turkey, Hungary and the US Immigration Statistics during 2014-2020 Period	24
Table 4: Legislative Changes in the US Immigration Policies during President Donald Trump Administration (2016 – 2020)	53
Table 5: Number of Donald Trump’s Tweets on Immigration (2012-2020)	57
Table 6: Results of Twitter Sentiment Analysis on Donald Trump’s Tweets on Immigration (2012-2020)	57
Table 7: Tweet Samples from Donald Trump’s Tweets on Immigration	59
Table 8: Legislative Changes in Hungary’s Immigration Policies during Prime Minister Viktor Orban Administration during the 2015 Migrant Crisis	75
Table 9: Most Frequently-Used Words in Prime Minister Orban’s Policy Speeches on Immigration	86
Table 10: Comparative Analysis of Turkey’s Syrian Refugee Policies during 2011-2015 and during 2016-2020 Period	118
Table 11: Distribution of the Key Themes Related with Turkey’s Immigration Policy in President Erdoğan’s Selected 200 Policy Speeches	177
Table 12: Distribution of the Key Themes Related with Turkey’s Transborder Operations in Syria in President Erdoğan’s Selected Policy Speeches	179

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: The Most Frequently Used Words in President Donald Trump’s Tweets on Immigration during 2016 – 2019 Period	63
Figure 2: Migrant Apprehensions at U.S – Mexico Border by Fiscal Year (2013-2019)	65
Figure 3: Number of Border Migrant Apprehensions at the US-Mexico border (1960 – 2018 Period)	66
Figure 4: Change in the Number of Visas Issued by the US Department of Homeland Security (2016 – 2019 Period)	67
Figure 5: Percentage of both Clinton and Trump Supporters’ Statements’, Stating Each as ‘very big problem for the US’ (Survey results conducted August 9-16, 2016).....	68
Figure 6: Descriptive Summary of the 2015 Migrant Crisis.....	70
Figure 7: Annual Number of Asylum Applications Received by EU Member States, including Norway and Switzerland during 1985 – 2015 period... ..	76
Figure 8: Number of First-time Asylum Seekers per 100,000 people in the Population of the all EU Member States in 2015.....	70
Figure 9: A Propaganda Billboard Used during the National Consultation (<i>Nemzeti Konzultáció</i>) Survey Series in Hungary... ..	78
Figure 10: Share of the Hungarian and the EU Member State Citizens’ Responses for the Question on the Two Most Important Issues Facing the EU (2014 – 2018).....	80
Figure 11: The Most Important Issues Expressed by the Hungarian Electorate during 2018 Elections in Hungary	81
Figure 12: Main Fears Expressed by Hungarian Voters in the Final Days of the 2018 Elections	81
Figure 13: Propaganda Booklet Distributed during the National Consultation (<i>Nemzeti Konzultáció</i>) Survey Series in 2016... ..	82
Figure 14: Summary of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP)	98
Figure 15: Return Trend of the Irregular Immigrants from Greece to Turkey (April 2016 – March 2018)	106
Figure 16: Nationality of the Immigrants Being Returned from Greece to Turkey (April 2016 – April 2020)	107
Figure 17: Number of Syrians under Temporary Protection in Turkey (2011-2020).....	112
Figure 18: Number of Syrians in Turkey under International Protection,	

Received Residence Permit, and under Temporary Protection (2011 – 2022).....	114
Figure 19: Number of Apprehended Irregular Migrants in Turkey (2005 – 2020).....	115
Figure 20: The Top 15 Turkish Cities by the Number of Registered Syrians and Share of the Total Population.....	117
Figure 21: The Tone and Saliency of the Issue of Syrian Refugees in Party Speeches of the Five Key Turkish Political Parties	129
Figure 22: Temporal Change in the Tone and Saliency of the Issue of Syrian refugees in Party Speeches (2011-2021)	130
Figure 23: The Tone and Saliency of the Issue of Syrian Refugees by Political Party and Year	131
Figure 24: The Frequency of the Proposed Solutions for the Syrian Refugee Crisis by the Five Key Turkish Political Parties	133
Figure 25: Composition of the Turkish Respondents Participating in 'Syrians Barometer 2020' Sample by Cities	137
Figure 26: 'Syrians Barometer 2020' Survey Sample by Regions	138
Figure 27: Demographic and Occupational Characteristics of the Participants in 'Syrians Barometer 2020' Survey	139
Figure 28: The Most Appropriate Expressions to Describe Syrians Expressed by the Survey Respondents (Including Multiple Responses)	140
Figure 29: The Responses For the Question: "To what extent do you agree with the following statements? (%)".....	141
Figure 30: Comparative Analysis of Research Findings on the Social Distance Groups Participating in Syrians Barometer 2017 and Syrians Barometer 2019	142
Figure 31: Demography of the Social Distance Groups Participated in 'Syrians Barometer 2020' Survey (%).....	143
Figure 32: Comparison of the Survey Respondents' Opinions Towards Granting Citizenship to the Syrians (SB-2017, SB-2019 and SB-2020)	145
Figure 33: Comparison of the Turkish Respondents' Opinions Towards the Question "To what extent do you think Syrians in Turkey are culturally similar to us?" (SB-2017, SB-2019 and SB-2020)	146

ABBREVIATIONS

AFAD	Disaster and Emergency Management Authority Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı
AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
ANAP	Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party)
CHP	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party)
DEVA	Demokrasi ve Atılım Partisi (Democracy and Progress Party)
DGMM	DGMM Directorate-General for Migration Management Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü
DP	Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party)
ESSN	Emergency Social Safety Net
FSA	Free Syrian Army (Özgür Suriye Ordusu)
FRIT	The Financial Assistance Program for Refugees in Turkey
GP	Gelecek Partisi (The Future Party in Turkey)
HDP	Halkların Demokratik Partisi (Peoples' Democratic Party)
İYİP	İyi Parti (Good Party)
LFIP	Law on Foreigners and International Protection (Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu)
MHP	Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party)
PDMM	Provincial Directorate for Migration Management (Valilik İl Göç İdaresi Müdürlüğü)
PKK	Partiya Kerkira Kurdiya (Kurdistan Workers Party)
PYD	Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (Democratic Union Party)
PIKTES	Türk Eğitim Sisteminde Çocuklar İçin Kapsayıcı Eğitimin Desteklenmesi Projesi (Promoting Integration of Syrian Kids into the Turkish Education System)
SDF	Syrian Democratic Forces (Suriye Demokratik Güçleri)
SGDD-ASAM	Association for Solidarity with Asylum-Seekers and Migrants Sığınmacılar ve Göçmenlerle Dayanışma Derneği
SIHHAT	Improving the Health Status of the Syrian Population under Temporary Protection and Related Services Provided by Turkish Authorities Geçici Koruma Altındaki Suriyelilerin Sağlık Statüsünün ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarafından Sunulan İlgili Hizmetlerin Geliştirilmesi
SP	Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi)
TPR	Temporary Protection Regime
YPG	Yekineyen Parastina Gel (People's Defense Units)

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research Question

This thesis aims to question under which circumstances can right-wing populist politicians pursue more receptive stance towards the acceptance of international migrants to their societies; by focusing on the US case during President Donald Trump's administration in the US, Hungarian case during the Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's administration and the Turkish case under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan administration. Through analyzing these three cases of the right-wing populist governments' approaches on irregular immigration in the US, Hungary, and Turkey during the 2014-2020 period, this thesis tries to understand Turkey's receptive immigration policy toward the Syrians; within the context of the populist right-wing President Erdoğan's populist-nationalist discourse and the instrumentalization of the issue of immigrants as part of Turkey's foreign policy. In the cases of the US and Hungary, two right-wing populist leaders adopted a highly exclusionary populist discourse towards the immigrants with an anti-immigrant discourse. Whereas in Turkey during the 2014-2020 period, it is possible to observe that the right-wing populist leader President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan pursued a relatively pro-immigrant stance with an 'inclusionary populist' discourse towards immigrants; while pursuing 'exclusionary populist' discourse in the domestic politics of Turkey with his focus on the value-based construction of a shared identity.

This made the Turkish case an exceptional case in that the populist right-wing politicians who tend to adopt 'exclusionary populist' discourse in the domestic politics of their country could take a more 'inclusionary populist' stance towards the acceptance of international immigrants; depending on their foreign policy perspectives on the place of their nations in the world politics and depending on how they interpret their nation's collective history and its place in the world politics.

This thesis argues that President Erdoğan's 'inclusionary-populist' discourse towards accepting immigrants can be explained with the strategic autonomy discourse in the Turkish foreign policy that entered Turkish politics during the later periods of the AKP rule in Turkey. Focusing on Turkey's role in the Western-led hierarchical order, the Turkish government and President Erdoğan perceived the issue of Syrian immigrants as Turkey's moral responsibility to claim a moral high ground. In line with this, Turkey's approach to irregular immigration under President Erdoğan's administration has been relatively accommodating. This was based on the Turkish government's and President Erdoğan's moral claim, perceiving the immigrants as having moral responsibility for Turkey. However, it is also possible to observe significant ambiguities and inconsistencies within President Erdoğan's 'inclusionary discourse' towards the immigrants during the 2014-2020 period, depending on the rising negative public opinion towards Syrians in Turkish society.

After comparing three country cases, this thesis argues that the populist-nationalist discourse on immigration by US President Trump represented the most exclusionary form of populism. The immigration policies during his years in office toward immigrants from different ethnic and religious backgrounds were highly discriminatory, with little room for selective humanitarianism. The Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán's populist-nationalist discourse also represented an exclusionary populism. At the same time, it was possible to observe some examples

of selective humanitarianism towards the immigrants on the condition that these immigrants were Christian, as in Hungary's case of accepting the Coptic Christians from Egypt in 2016, Prime Minister Orban's overall rhetoric was anti-immigrant. In the Turkish case, Turkish President Erdoğan's populist-nationalist discourse on the immigrants, on the other hand represented a version of inclusionary populist nationalist stance through accepting Syrian refugees from multiple backgrounds, like Yazidis and Syrian Kurds. President Erdoğan aimed to justify Turkey's welcoming narrative towards the Syrian migrants fleeing the Syrian Civil War; through highlighting the collective past between the Syrians and Turks, the benevolence in the Turkish society towards the oppressed people, and Turkey's role in the world as an important political actor. This represented a 'populist-nationalist' discourse in that he frequently directed his criticism towards the West due to their lack of concern about the Syrian migrants; whereas championing the Turkish culture being benevolent towards the Syrians.

The example of President Erdoğan in Turkey reveals that depending on how right-wing populist leaders view their country's role in the world, they might have a favorable outlook on migrants whom they consider to be 'culturally similar.' This was important for understanding his relatively welcoming narrative towards the Syrian migrants compared to the other populist right-wing politicians' discourses on the migrants. Unlike the country cases of the US and Hungary, this thesis argues that the pro-migrant stance of Turkish President Erdogan and his party Justice and Development Party (AKP) 's represented the dominant convergence of Turkish foreign policy discourse with Turkey's migration policies; as well as instrumentalization of the immigration policies as a tool for foreign policy goals.

During Prime Minister Orban's administration in Hungary and President Donald Trump's administration in the US, a form of exclusionary populism towards international migrants was

evident. The arrival of migrants was perceived as a threat to the unity of their societies, with an exclusionary populist stance. While there was almost no place for selective humanitarianism towards the immigrants in the US case, it was possible to observe some form of selective humanitarianism towards the Christian immigrants; in the example of Hungary's relocation of the Coptic Christians in Egypt to Hungary in 2015. Nevertheless, the overall discourse towards the immigrants was exclusionary populist towards the immigrants. In the Turkish case, it is possible to observe an inclusionary stance towards Syrian immigrants and refugees by adopting a discourse emphasizing the Turkish nation's Ottoman past and Turkey's rightful place in world politics. From these aspects, The Turkish case represented an exceptional case in which the right-wing populist political discourse might seemingly become more inclusive towards accepting immigrants, depending on the ruling political elites' definition of 'the people.' The Turkish case highlighted how populist right-wing politicians' perspectives on their nation's collective history and its role in world politics affect their stances on certain issues like immigration. It shows us that right-wing populist leaders might adopt a relatively welcoming attitude toward international migrants, depending on whom they see as ethnically and/or culturally similar to "them,"; as well as depending on their foreign policy perspectives.

Contrary to Hungary under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and the US under President Donald Trump as two examples of populist right-wing leaders, the populist right-wing leader President Erdoğan and his party Justice and Development Party (AKP) 's immigration policy in Turkey between 2014 and 2020 was based on the claim of occupying the "moral high ground" through accepting refugees; despite the rising negative opinion towards the Syrians in the country. Both the US President Trump, Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán and Turkish President Erdoğan had their foreign policy perspectives highlighting the 'rightful place' of their nations in the world

politics when their policy speeches are examined. However, the claim of "occupying the moral high ground" was not observable in the case of Hungary under Prime Minister Orban's administration and in the case of the United States under President Trump's administration.

Another pillar of this thesis is built on the claim that President Erdoğan's discourse on the Syrian refugees was mostly based upon solidarity, rather than built upon an universal human rights approach. By defining the Syrians in Turkey as "guests" and "victims, it is possible to state that the AKP actors pursued to frame its response to the Syrian refugee crisis as part of its positive national narrative. However, there were inconsistencies and ambiguities in President Erdoğan's discourse towards Syrians, making it misleading to view his rhetoric on migrants as inclusive.

1.2 Research Design and Methodology

In this thesis, three country cases, namely the US during President Trump administration, Hungary under Prime Minister Orban and Turkey under President Erdogan administration would be examined based on the most similar systems design. These three countries under three separate political leaders include similarities from several aspects, such as the existence of politically nationalist, conservative incumbent government, the presence of the anti-elite, anti-establishment rhetoric in their party programs, the existence of anti-immigrant discourse in the domestic politics, exposure to flow of migrants which fled from their countries for various reasons like wars, political and economic turmoil and securitization of immigration issue in the domestic political agenda. For this reason, most similar systems research design seems to be more proper for the differential analysis of these countries under three right-wing populist governments. Since the election of Turkish President Erdogan and Hungarian Prime Minister Orban were in 2014 after the presidential elections in these countries, the starting year for the time framing of this thesis was

chosen as 2014 and ending year of the time framing was chosen as 2020. It is important to note that while Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey formed the government after November 2015 general elections, 2014 presidential elections in Turkey was chosen as the starting year for the time frame of this thesis.

The countries which share borders with the conflict zones or countries with economic turmoil are generally expected to open their borders, host more refugees fleeing from these countries. For this reason, this thesis would examine not only the refugees which fled from the neighbour countries of Turkey, Hungary and the United States but also the ones who fled from the conflict zones which are distant from these three countries like Libya, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Venezuela etc. Independent from their domestic politics; neighbouring countries of the conflict zones tend to pursue more receptive immigration policies and for this reason, it would be better to take immigrants/refugees which fled from distant conflict zones into account for the analysis.

Table 1: The Most Similar System Table of Turkey, Hungary and the US Cases

	Turkey (2014 - 2020)	Hungary (2014 - 2020)	United States (2014 - 2020)
Existence of Conservative, Right-Wing President/ Prime Minister?	President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, being elected after 2014 the Turkey Presidential elections	Prime Minister Viktor Orban, being elected after the 2014 Hungary parliamentary elections	President Donald Trump, being elected after the 2016 United State Presidential elections
Freedom House Index (2015)	Partly Free (3)	Free (2)	Free (1)
Presence of the Anti-Elite Rhetoric in the Party program? (Based on Global Party Survey 2019, Chapel Hill Survey)	Yes	Yes	Yes
Presence of Populist rhetoric which challenges the legitimacy of established political institutions? (Based on Global Party Survey, 2019)	Yes	Yes	Yes
Exposure to the flow of irregular migrants fleeing from different countries?	Yes	Yes	Yes
Being a country which has been historically exposed to immigrants from its neighbours?	Yes	Yes	Yes

Securitization of the irregular immigration issue within the domestic politics?	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adoption of border security measurements against irregular immigrants?	Yes	Yes	Yes
Suspension of Refugee Resettlement?	No	Yes	Yes
Continuous Implementation of strict immigration policies?	Partially (during 2016-2020 period)	Yes	Yes

The dependent variable of this thesis would be the temporal and differential variation within the immigration policies pursued by the populist right-wing administrations in Turkey, Hungary and the United States during 2014-2020 period. While both Hungary, Turkey and the US both had populist right-wing political leaders during 2014-2020 period and both of these countries have been already exposed to migrant flows from different locations of the world. As can be seen from Table 1, the country cases under three right-wing populist leaders shared certain commonalities like their anti-elite rhetoric, populist discourse challenging the legitimacy of established political institutions, securitization of the issue of immigration.

Table 2 illustrates the exceptional case of Turkey, compared to the US case during the President Donald Trump administration and the Hungarian case during the Prime Minister Viktor Orban administration. While both the US and Hungary cases represented the example of ‘exclusionary populism’ both in the domestic politics and towards the international immigrants, the Turkish case represented an interesting case which necessitate to go beyond the inclusion and exclusion dualism in populism studies. While being ‘exclusionary’ in the domestic politics through emphasizing a shared collective identity with its anti-establishment stance towards the ‘old Turkey’; right-wing populist President Erdoğan’s discourse towards the Syrian immigrants represented the example of ‘inclusionary populism’; highlighting the collective past between the Syrians and Turks, benevolence in the Turkish society as part of Turkey’s foreign policy discourse.

Table 2: Comparative Analysis of the populism in the US, Hungary and Turkey

The US Case during President Trump Administration	• Exclusionary Form of Populism both in the Domestic Politics and toward the immigrants
The Hungarian Case during Prime Minister Orban Administration	• Exclusionary Populist Discourse both in the Domestic Politics and toward the immigrants
The Turkish Case during President Erdoğan Administration	• Exclusionary Populist Discourse in the Domestic Politics; whereas Inclusionary Populist Discourse Towards the Immigrants, with several inconsistencies

Despite many important measurement efforts such as “International Migration Law and Policy Analysis” (IMPALA) Database which compared nine European countries’ immigration policies from 1990s until mid-2000s, it’s important to note that there are still no comprehensive, cross-nationally comparable data on immigration policies. Hence, the dependent variable would be examined based on sub-categories which are parts of the immigration policies in order to provide better clarification.

Table 3: Data on the Temporal Change within Turkey, Hungary and the US Immigration Statistics during 2014-2020 Period

	Turkey (2014 - 2020)	Hungary (2014 - 2020)	United States (2014 - 2020)
Asylum Applications and Rejection rate (including Protection status at first instance) (2014)	114,127 Applications; 11.4% Rejection Rate	175,960 Applications with %83.3 Rejection Rate	121,000 Applications with %51 Rejection Rate
Asylum Applications and Rejection rate (including Protection status at first instance) (as of 2020)	56,427 Applications; %5 Rejection Rate	468 Applications with %91.5 Rejection Rate	61,000 Applications, with %71.6 Rejection (Denial) Rate
Refugee Admissions with “Refugee Status” from 2014 until 2020)*	1,062,000 in 2014; 31,334 in 2020	105 in 2014; 22 in 2020	69,975 in 2014; 11,824 in 2020
Immigrant Visa grants with residence permit (% Change) (Note: Includes family reunion visas, employment visas)	422,000 (2015), 270,000 (2020)	+34% 32,000 (2014); 44,000 (2020)	- 42.8% (559,536 in 2015; 240,526 in 2020)

Source: Migration Policy Institute (MPI) Migration Data Hub. N.d. Refugee Admissions, 1980-2020. November 13, 2020; Pierce, S., & Selee, A. (2017). Immigration under Trump: A review of policy shifts in the year since the election. *Migration Policy Institute*.

Asylum Information Database (AIDA), “National Country Report :Hungary”, November 2015, Asylum Information Database (AIDA), National Country Report :Turkey, December 2015; UNHCR (October 31, 2015) “Turkey External Monthly Update”. Retrieved from <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/44421>.

*Note: Refugee Admissions Ceiling in the US in year 2014 was 70,000; whereas the number decreased to 30,000 in year 2019.

Table 3 above shows the data on temporal change in the immigration policies of Turkey, Hungary, and the US Immigration during the 2014-2020 period. This table gives statistical information about the asylum applications of immigrants and their rejection rates, the number of refugee admissions, and temporal change in the number of immigrant visa grants in Turkey, Hungary, and the United States during the 2014-2020 period, based on the data extracted from their official sources. It is important to note that the immigration policies adopted in the United States include a more comprehensive and detailed framework compared to the immigration policies in Hungary and Turkey. This can be attributed to the higher number of immigrants who want to migrate to the US annually. It is important to note that the immigration policies of Turkey, Hungary, and the United States in 2020 were examined without considering the travel restrictions imposed in these countries in response to the Covid-19 pandemic.

This thesis applied for both quantitative research methods, as in the case of conducting Twitter sentiment analysis with Python software on Donald Trump's tweets on immigration, and conducting qualitative discourse analysis through using Nvivo software. By focusing on policy speeches of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on immigration and by examining the most frequently used terms within Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban's Facebook posts and policy speeches on immigration, this thesis aims to observe what extent these right-wing populist leaders gave place to immigration in their speeches; how their policy speeches give hindsight about their stances on the issue of immigration. Especially for the case of Turkey, this thesis aims to examine the key major themes related to immigration within President Erdoğan's policy speeches during the 2014-2020 period; by selecting 200 policy speeches based on certain criteria and conducting discourse analysis with Nvivo software. In line with this goal, this thesis aims to analyse the key

themes used by President Erdoğan's policy speeches on the immigrant issue for a better understanding of whether there is any change within his discourse towards immigrants, how this change -if it exists- toward immigrants can be explained in relation with the domestic political context in Turkey.

1.3 Structure of the Thesis

After the introductory chapter, the second chapter of this thesis would examine the existing literature on the immigration and populism; by analysing the theoretical debates on the immigration policies in Hungary, Turkey and the United States. After this theoretical section, the third chapter would examine the US Immigration policy during the right-wing populist President Donald Trump administration. The third chapter aims to critically analyse the policy changes in the US immigration policy through focusing the right-wing populist discourse during his election campaigns in the 2016 US presidential elections. The third chapter would also provide quantitative analysis on President Trump's social media posts on the issue of immigration policy by conducting Twitter sentiment analysis with Python software on President Donald Trump's tweets on immigration during 2016-2020 period. The fourth chapter would analyse the right-wing populist discourse of the Prime Minister Viktor Orban and his political party Fidesz in Hungary on the issue of immigration during the 2015 migrant crisis. The fourth chapter also analyzes Orban's policy speeches by adopting computer-based coding techniques by examining the most-frequently used words on the issue of migration through Nvivo software. The fifth chapter of this thesis would focus on immigration policies in Turkey during the 2014-2020 period toward Syrian refugees and immigrants; providing a comparative analysis of Turkey's immigration policies during the early years of the Syrian Civil War. Focusing on the domestic political context following the July 2016 coup attempt and rising negative public opinion in the country, this chapter aims to understand the

factors behind Turkey's shift towards more systematic migration management during 2016-2020. The fifth chapter also provides an empirical analysis of the Turkish political parties' policy stances on the issue of immigration; comparing their policy stances with the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey. The sixth chapter examines the Turkish foreign policy during Syrian Civil War and tries to analyse how the issue of immigration was being instrumentalized as leverage tool in Turkish foreign policy, in line with the concept of strategic autonomy.

The final chapter of this thesis focuses on two parts: The first part provides research findings based on President Erdoğan's policy speeches and the results of the qualitative coding analysis through Nvivo software based on his selected 200 speeches delivered during 2014-2020 period. The second part analyses selected excerpts from his speeches by focusing on references made by President Erdoğan, in line with his 'inclusionary populist discourse' towards the Syrian immigrants.

1.4 Contributions to the Scholarly Literature & Limitations of the Thesis

This thesis aims to provide a theoretical contribution to the existing literature on populism and immigration studies by comparing three right-wing populist governments in Turkey, Hungary, and the United States between 2014 and 2020. This thesis explores how right-wing populist leaders' views on immigration can vary depending on their interpretation of their nation's history, the identity of the immigrants coming to the country, and populist right-wing leaders' foreign policy perspectives. It provides timely and relevant arguments on this topic. This thesis also aims to contribute to the existing literature on populism and immigration studies by providing quantitative and qualitative analysis. In this thesis, the quantitative analysis focuses on President

Donald Trump's tweets about immigration during his years in office by conducting Twitter sentiment analysis with Python software. The qualitative analysis in this thesis was done using Nvivo software to conduct critical discourse analysis on the policy speeches of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

There are also possible limitations of this thesis. It is worth noting that immigration and populism are broad topics that deserve more in-depth analysis. However, this thesis provides only an overview analysis of the immigration policies in Hungary, Turkey, and the United States during the 2014-2020 period, representing a relatively short time. A more in-depth analysis of the US, Hungarian, and Turkish immigration policies and populist discourse on the issue of immigration in these countries can provide a more comprehensive analysis.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW ON POPULISM AND IMMIGRATION POLICIES

In this chapter, the existing literature on right-wing populism and immigration would be examined. Conventional explanations of the politicization of the immigration hold that it is the combined result of two factors: the significant increase of immigration in recent years, which is overstraining the capacities of national states to control their borders and to accommodate and integrate new migrants, on the one hand; and the successful exploitation of these challenges by radical right populist parties. Political parties may have inconsistent positions on immigration due to their ideologies and strategies. This can result in mixed policy packages that involve trade-offs and compromises influenced by the diverse interests within and between parties.

One of the key concepts of populism is without any doubt the notion of the general will (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). Based on this populist paradigm, political leaders aim to speak on the people's behalf (Mudde, 2004), and there should be the supremacy of the general will's claims over the claims of the individuals' wills. Society, according to the populist perspective, is composed of two structures: The so-called corrupted elite, on the one hand, and the supposedly pure people, on the other hand (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017).

In its nature, populism represents a glorification of homogeneity and pureness; while condemning the corrupt elites and the perceived 'outsiders'; based on an imagined, united idea of community. In line with this, populism tends to emphasize the construction of collective identity, emphasizing the unity of a group while demonizing enemies based on the "us–them" distinction. (Wodak, 2013). As several scholars like Canovan (2002), Müller (2016), and Howkins (2003)

claimed in their studies, the existence of "dangerous others" can be in the forms of various things like immigrants, ethnic minority groups, challenges the populist idea 'homogeneous groups'; based on shared commonalities in terms of their values, lifestyles, opinions, and beliefs.

Since there are multiple definitions of populism, several scholars put forward various explanations for understanding populism. Populism can be described as a political communication style, a political approach, and an ideology. (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Moffitt & Tormey, 2014; Pauwels, 2011). Depending on the lack of a universal definition for populism, most researchers agree on the claim that populism represents a 'thin-centered ideology' (Bracciale & Martella, 2017; Krämer, 2017). As Mudde (2004) argued, the concept of populism relies on a dichotomy that appears between two homogeneous groups, namely the 'good' or 'ordinary' people and the 'corrupt' political, economic, or cultural elite. Additionally, different scholars like Hameleers (2018) argue that there might be situations in which the political elites may not constitute the primary "enemy" in populist rhetoric; rather, immigrants, asylum seekers, and ethnic minorities can also be identified as "enemies."

The concept of populism incorporates different ideologies in itself, and the main causes of the emergence of populism can also differ from country to country. Based on the main idea behind it, the popularity of populist parties began to increase, especially when the gap between citizens and political leaders began to increase. At this stage, the success of populist parties tends to fill the gap within their capability, creating a feeling in the citizens that populist parties can appeal better for their demands from politics (Andeweg, 1996, p. 147). These issues can be immigration, economic crisis, ethnic tensions, or other social problems. During times of economic crisis, radical and populist views can become prevalent due to the policies of populist parties that focus on job protection, as noted by Pauwels (2014, p.58). In line with this, citizens tend to vote for the party,

which provides the most suitable solution to resolve a policy issue (Van der Brug, 2004, p. 209). Inglehart and Norris (2016, p.9) also argued that the decline of the economies could be connected to the emergence of populist powers, as their study examines populist parties' policies on the redistribution of wealth from the elite to the citizens. Some scholars analyzed populism in terms of its relationship with different types, such as authoritarian constitutionalism (Walker, 2019), democratic constitutionalism (Blokker, 2019) and deliberative constitutionalism (Chambers, 2019). The key characteristics of the concept of populist constitutionalism were defined by Walker (2019, p.516) in that it represented "a reaction against a certain type of constitutional orthodoxy and as a constitutional practice involving a binary opposition between two homogeneous and antagonistic camps. According to the populist rhetoric, the existing dominant liberal constitutional framework tends to serve the interests of "the corrupt elite" against those of "the people." The "corrupt elite," as Walker (2019) claimed, constituted the ones who are responsible for breaking the direct link between "the will of the people" and the exercise of power.

Most of the studies on populism examined the populist parties in Europe by focusing on their success in adapting to the various requirements of public office while maintaining populist profiles (Zaslove, 2012; Akkerman et al., 2016). According to Mudde & Kaltwasser (2017) and Müller (2016), the populist right-wing parties were successful because they presented themselves as the voice of the "people" against the distant "elites." This can be observable in several European countries like Hungary, wherein the rhetoric of external 'enemies of the public' personified in the figure of George Soros by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. As a populist politician, Orban successfully maintained his popularity by his critique of liberal values, promoting communitarianism and anti-pluralism (Batory, 2016, p. 292). It is also possible to observe similar

rhetoric in Turkey; in the case of President Erdoğan and his party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), with their anti-establishment attitude targeting the secular elites who have been constituting the key political cleavage of Turkey since the Republican era (Öniş, 2015). Several studies focused on the left and right-wing populist parties in Europe; by pointing out that left-wing populists highlight prioritize socioeconomic concerns over cultural ones; right-wing populists tend to prioritize cultural issues with a more pluralist view on society (Rooduijn and Akkerman, 2017, March, 2017). Concerning the "inclusionary" and "exclusionary" varieties of populism, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser's (2013) prominent research puts forward differentiation between the inclusionary form of populism in Latin America and the exclusionary form of populism in the case of Europe. Based on this differentiation, while Latin American populism focused more on the socioeconomic dimension, European populism focused more on the cultural dimension.

2.1 Populism and Nationalism

It is also important to focus on the existing literature on the relationship between nationalism and populism. Several scholars like De Cleen (2017), Stavrakakis et al. (2020), and Brubaker (2020) provided explanations for populism and nationalism as two distinct ways of constructing the 'people.' Brubaker (2020, p. 51) argued that the populist discourse predominantly concerns unequal power distribution and status within an individual polity. In contrast, nationalist discourse has a global frame of reference, delineating a positively valued national community in "a world of distinct nations." The concept of populism includes in itself a moral counter-position of 'the people' vs. 'the elite' (Mudde, 2004), and scholars like Brubaker (2019) and Müller (2016) accentuated that populist discourses are predominantly built upon inherently anti-pluralist embedded with

exclusionary elements which construe diversity as a threat for the social cohesion; perceiving the minorities, migrants, dissidents and opposition parties as "out-groups."

However, scholars like De Cleen and Stavrakakis (2017) claimed in their articles that depending on the kind of nationalist demands through which populism is articulated, some nationalist demands, in the case of right-wing populism, might be related to the discourse of excluding ethnocultural minorities, from the nation. In contrast, other nationalist demands can use populism to focus on protecting national sovereignty from the encroachments of supranational political forces. Scholars studying nationalism, like Brand (2010); Khoury (2016), examined how national identities are created and transformed through compelling narratives telling the citizens who they are but also 'who they were and who they should be.' Populism scholars like Schertzer and Woods (2021) analyzed how populist nationalist actors can create stories highlighting the elite-driven decline; embedded with a nostalgic desire to restore the nation and the US President Donal Trump's election campaign slogan 'Make America Great Again' represents a good example of this form of narrative. Additionally, several scholars stressed the fact that populism; although most of the populist discourses express nationalist demands in various degrees, may not always become exclusionary; as long as it is not associated with the ethnocultural forms of nationalism; as scholars used several terms like "populist nationalism" (Blokker, 2005), "ethno-nationalist populism" (Bonikowski, 2017). Scholars like De Cleen (2017), Katsambekis and Stavrakakis (2017) claimed that in the case of left-wing populist parties in Europe, populism could merge with civic and inclusionary forms of nationalism.

In his article on populism, Brubaker (2017) presents a different perspective. He argues that the national populisms in Northern and Western European countries form a separate group within the

broader European populism. Populism in these countries represents a clash between "self" and "other" in a larger cultural sense, and in this type of populism, Christianity is perceived as a cultural identity. As Brubaker (2017, p.1203) argues; by embracing liberal values; populists in Northern and Western European countries aimed to oppose modern, tolerant Western civilization against the intolerant, oppressive Islamic civilization. It is worth noting that there are scholars who observed a similar discourse for several right-wing populist movements in the Muslim world, like in Pakistan, Indonesia, through framing domestic politics as part of the struggle between devout Muslims and the forces that seek to undermine their sovereignty (Barton et al., 2021; Shakil & Yilmaz, 2021).

2.2 Inclusionary vs. Exclusionary Forms of Populism

The studies within the literature also focused on the dichotomy between civic/inclusionary and ethnic/exclusionary forms of nationalism. The concept of nationalism takes on different forms. Civic/inclusionary nationalism considers the nation as a political community where membership is based on shared political beliefs. On the other hand, ethnic nationalism views the nation as an organic community where membership is built upon shared traits like race, ancestry, and religion.(Bonikowski, 2017, pp. 187–189; Zimmer, 2003). However, several scholars like Nieguth (1999), Zimmer (2003), and Morgül (2022) directed their criticisms towards this dichotomy by claiming that all nationalist projects can blend both voluntarist and organicist visions of the nation and it is difficult to categorize the nationalisms as civic or ethnic.

2.3 Right-wing populism in Turkey and Turkey's Immigration Policies during the AKP period

Several scholars analyzed the roots of right-wing populism in the Turkish context. During the early 2000s, the AKP's conservative democracy was built upon the idea of the Islamist socio-political movements; the founders of the AKP, like Abdullah Gül, represented a moderate discourse of right-wing populism. As Öniş (2012) also argued in his article, the AKP, since its establishment in 2001, could set itself different from previous populist parties in Turkey by not indulging in old-style populist practices' but demonstrating a firm commitment to the reform process, both in the economic and democratization realms during the 2000s. The AKP's objectives resembled those of former Turkish President Turgut Özal during the 1980s to create cohesion between neoliberal privatization, political Islam, and Muslim democracy. Concerning President Erdoğan's populist discourse in the country, several scholars examined this populist discourse as the monopolization of religion in the name of the people's will (Yabancı & Taleski, 2018), a form of uncivil populism by the adaptation of 'civilizationist discourse' (Kaya et al., 2020) and a Muslim nation project, promoting a neo-imperial vision of Turkey as the natural leader of Muslims, particularly in former Ottoman territories (Saraçoğlu & Demirkol, 2015; White, 2014). Yanaşmayan et al. (2019) claimed that thanks to his uninterrupted rule since 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) could capitalize on 'the people vs. Kemalist elite/establishment dichotomy' in the country. Adisönmez & Onursal (2022) claimed that the AKP's populist discourse was based on its emphasis on shared identity with its discourse "one nation, one flag, one homeland, and one state," illustrating its success in mobilizing its supporters with people-centrist, homogeneous imagination. Tokdoğan (2020) claimed that with its neo-Ottomanist vision, the AKP distinguished from the Republican elites by narrating a shared identity in mobilizing Islamist notions in the country. Taşkın (2013) pointed out that the AKP adopted populism as a strategy of

appealing to the Turkish electorate from its inception, in line with its political and ideological lineage. Scholars like Gürsoy (2021) pointed out in his article that AKP's populist discourse distinguished from the classical exclusionary/inclusionary populism in that it defines "the people" versus "the elite" in civilisational terms through combining this with strategies of neo-liberalism, strong party organisation and grassroots mobilisation. Erçetin & Boyraz (2023) claimed in their articles that starting from the early 2010s, the AKP's inclusionary populism with its democratization reforms evolved into an exclusionary form of populism, framing security, and survival-based narratives, especially after the 2015 elections and the July 2016 coup attempt, with a demonizing language towards the opposition in the country. In line with this claim, it is possible to argue that the type of populism pursued by the AKP politicians from its initial years in office until the early 2010s was similar to the inclusionary form of populism as in the case of Latin American countries in terms of initiating specific political reforms for the political inclusion of certain groups in the country like Kurdish people. Although the AKP politicians and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan adopted highly exclusionary populist discourse toward certain groups in Turkish society, like opposition parties, and journalists, the discourse toward Syrian immigrants and refugees resembled the inclusionary form of populism, which can be observable mostly in Latin American countries.

In their survey research which focused on the "demand" side of populism in Turkey, Aytaç & Elçi(2019) pointed out that the dynamics of mass support for populism could be quite different in a case of populism in power than in cases of populism in opposition, as the Turkish case illustrated. According to these authors, the Turkish case showed that populism does not have to be grounded in a deep discontent with the political system, and those having positive views on the economy and political system in Turkey could also possess a populist stance, as long as their preferred party

stays in power and engages in politics on a populist platform (Aytaç & Elçi, 2019, p.106). In line with this claim, it is possible to observe the significant role of elite discourse pursued by the AKP politicians on the strength and prevalence of populism in Turkish society. Finally, scholars like Hadiz and Chrysseogelos (2017) examined the right-wing populism in Turkey through a comparative study of three Muslim-majority societies; Indonesia, Egypt, and Turkey. These scholars claimed that in Muslim majority societies; the combination of post-Cold War era social conflicts and post-9/11 context led to the concept of the 'ummah' (community of believers); as a substitute for the notion of the people united against social orders that are perceived to be inherently exclusionary.

Turkey's immigration policies and the AKP's populist–nationalist discourse on immigration within the context of Syrian refugees and immigrants were evaluated by scholars from various perspectives. As (Aktürk, 2017) examined in his article, states can reinforce nation- building projects by using immigration as an instrument to facilitate the deliberate transformation of the nation. He also claimed in his other article (2018) that Islamic multiculturalism became the more dominant discourse during the AKP's 'Kurdish and Alevi openings'; based on the AKP's affirmation of a supra-ethnic Islamic identity and its rejection of secular Turkish nationalism. In line with these arguments, it is possible to attribute the AKP's pro-immigrant stance towards the Syrian immigrants to its goal of transforming the Turkish nation into an Islamic multicultural community through migration, as can also be observable in President Erdoğan's speeches on Syrian immigrants. Other scholars like Gülmez (2019) argued that the AKP pursued its "host-guest" rhetoric during the Syrian Civil War as part of the party's emphasis on Islamic values, and this policy prevented the establishment of systemic Turkish immigration policy. Scholars like Ihlamur-

Güner (2014) criticized Turkey's immigration policies toward Syrian refugees by claiming that the Turkish government predominantly adopted generosity discourse with a religious stance towards the Syrians; rather than pursuing a human-rights-based approach. Other scholars like Gülmez (2019) argued that the AKP pursued its "host-guest" rhetoric during the Syrian Civil War as part of the party's emphasis on Islamic values. According to various scholars in the literature, Turkey's migration policy during Syrian Civil War was less welcoming to Kurdish, Alawite, and Yazidi refugees compared to Syrian Arab migrants who are of Sunni Muslim background.(Kloos, 2016; Toğral Koca, 2015). In their study, Ilgıt and Memisoglu (2018) analyzed the policy positions of Turkish opposition parties regarding Syrian immigrants, focusing on Turkish political parties' perceptions of Syrians as disadvantaged groups with unequal access to services in Turkey. İçduygu & Şimşek (2016) highlighted in their articles that dealing with refugees in Turkey at present is not a question of halting the influx of refugees but it requires practical measures to provide them with better integration opportunities. Yanaşmayan et al. (2019) claimed in their articles that debates over the Syrian immigrants in Turkey oscillated between the Western European right-wing populist perception of 'threat'; expressed by the opposition parties in Turkey and the pro-Syrian, civilizationist populist discourse of the ruling party; based on its transnational notion of 'ummah.' Finally, Ayhan (2020) examined the instrumentalization of immigrants as a foreign policy tool in Turkish politics, focusing on the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan, expressing Turkey's criticism towards Europe.

2.4 Right-Wing Populism in Hungary

Populism in Central European countries was widespread after the fall of their communist regimes, although their rhetoric was different in every country. Although populism in Hungary did

not involve a distinctive form of populist communication, it served as a model for politicians in Central and Eastern Europe to follow, according to Krekó et al. (2019). Unlike in many Western European countries where right-wing populism emerged in response to socio-economic problems and exposure to immigrants, populism was already a well-established method of political communication in Hungarian politics (Toth et al., 2019). Contrary to this argument, Uitz (2008, p. 37-38) highlighted in his research that populism was not a strong in the country until the 2000s, although some political parties in Hungary incorporated populist elements into their ideology.

Researchers such as Csígó & Merkovity (2016) and Toth et al. (2019), Palonen (2009) study populism in Hungary, focusing on the country's political changes during its EU accession process. These studies highlight that political polarization was the primary characteristic of populism in Hungary, especially after joining the EU. Using effective political language, the Fidesz party could successfully polarize Hungary's political landscape. Scholars like Toth (2020) and Biro-Nagy (2022) examined the right-wing Fidesz party's success in the securitization of certain issues in Hungary, as in the example of the 2015 migrant crisis. For these scholars, the Fidesz party, led by Prime Minister Viktor Orban, was effective in monopolizing the topic of immigration and gaining political support by appealing to the concerns of the Hungarian people.

Csehi (2019) provided a theoretical framework on Hungarian populism in his book, by examining how populist constitutionalism in Hungary constructed political discourses of "the people," "the non-people," and "the elites" and their conflictual relationship throughout the Hungarian history. His book analysed the development of Orban regime in the country during 2010s by examining the discriminatory legalism, the Fidesz party's influence over the Hungarian

party system and cultural policies in Hungary. The book provided an important contribution to the literature on populism in Hungary with its concept of ‘smart populism’; an adaptive ideology where “the people” was re-defined from above through a moral justification which makes opposition to it politically challenging and the will of people was allowed to be expressed only on issues where populist leaders permitted (Csehi, 2019, p. 197). According to his argument, the Fidesz party under the leadership of Prime Minister Orban could turn private matters of culture and identity into morally predetermined public affairs in the country through its culture and social security policies during 2010s.

2.5 Right-wing Populism in the United States

Regarding to the literature on the right-wing populism in the United States, several scholars examined the origins of the right-wing populist ideology in the country in relation with the American Civil War. In their prominent book ‘Right-wing Populism in America: Too Close for Comfort’, Chip Berlet and Matthew Lyons (2000, p.5) claimed that the right wing populism in the United States represented a backlash against social reform, liberation movements and it represented its growth is fueled by the fears of the left-wing movements in the country. Bill Fletcher (2016, p. 303) claimed in his article that right-wing populism in the US draws its elements from white supremacy, xenophobia, states’ rights, conservative Christianity and militarism. Fletcher (2016, p.307) also claimed that globalization in any form runs counter to the nation-state origin myth for right-wing populists in the US and the antipathy towards globalization among the right-wing populists in the US dated back to the creation of the United Nations, and in the US even further back to post-First World War isolationism of the United States. Berlet and Lyons (2020, p.336) also claimed in their book chapter that the first U.S. populist movement was the Reconstruction-era Ku Klux Klan, which was a counterrevolutionary backlash against the overthrow of slavery in the post-Civil War South. The authors also claimed that demonization, conspiracism and scapegoating constituted the main components of the right-wing populism in the

US; targeting certain groups like Asian Americans, black people. According to both authors, the political center of gravity in the United States moved dramatically to the right starting from 1960s and even the Democratic Party began to embrace traditional right-wing positions regarding “welfare reform,” “crime,” “illegal aliens” (Berlet and Lyons, 2021, p.343). Thomas Greven (2016, p.4) claimed in his report that the Republican party in the US for decades more or less embraced tenets of the “us versus them” narrative in an opportunistic way: Richard Nixon’s Southern Strategy successfully exploited the racism of southern whites, Ronald Reagan demonized African-American welfare recipients during his election campaign to win northern suburban voters and George H.W. Bush adopted the same strategy with African-American convicts through appealing to the racist sentiments of white American voters. Berlet and Sunshine (2018) examined the roots of right-wing populism in the US from a different perspective and they claimed that interpretation of the American Constitution which derides federal power regarding environmental regulations and progressive taxation created the core of right-wing decentralization and this led to the creation of “Patriotic Movement” in the country, as a response to the agricultural crisis in the US during the 1980s. The rural communities’ economic problems after the fall in the US agricultural exports during 1980s and their aggressive defense of unrestricted gun rights later evolved into a movement based on anti-immigrant sentiment and anti-refugee activism, according to the authors (Berlet and Sunshine, 2018, p. 499).

2.6 Literature Review on Host State Policies toward Immigrants

Focusing on the existing literature on the state's behavior in hosting refugees and immigrants is also important. Creating more efficient border regimes, stricter asylum procedures, and reducing irregular immigrants or repatriation are all part of foreign policy making. Foreign policy decisions and actions significantly influence migration policies and generate multidirectional forms (Teitelbaum, 1984). Through sending and receiving refugees, countries can use mass migration movements as foreign policy tools for various goals like destabilizing certain

countries, protecting their borders, and obtaining certain political and economic concessions.

In line with the intertwined relation between refugee policies and foreign policy goals, scholars like Hinnebusch (2003) claimed that the status of refugees could serve as a strategic asset for states' struggle against certain rivals, as in the case of Palestinian refugees in and Arab countries' struggle against Israel. The host states can also use the refugees instrumentally in military conflicts to embarrass their adversary nations by allowing refugee flows or using them against an "adversarial neighbouring regime (Teitelbaum, 1984). In his article, which examined the host state policies towards the Syrian refugees by focusing on Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey; Tsourapas (2019) described these three country cases as 'refugee rentier states'; seeking to leverage their position as host states displaced communities in exchange for material gain like humanitarian assistance, loans, debt reliefs. In line with their security concerns, several studies pointed out that the European Union continuously supported the Global South economies for hosting refugees to prevent the diffusion of forced displacement into their territory during the 1970s and 1980s (Huysmans, 2000; Greenhill, 2016). In their research, Altıok & Tosun (2020) analysed Turkey's immigration policy toward Iraqi refugees during the 1991 Iraqi War and Syrian refugees during the Syrian Civil War. Their research argued that in both cases, Turkish foreign policy strategy aimed to establish safe zones for refugees and the end of Turkey's humanitarian open-border regime in 2015 coincided with the U-turn in Turkish foreign policy; the prioritization of security toward the Kurdish groups in Syria. The article highlighted that the attitude of the receiving countries towards the refugee-sending countries as in the Turkish case played crucial role in determining the policies adopted for refugees.

CHAPTER THREE:

THE US IMMIGRATION POLICIES DURING PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP

ADMINISTRATION

In this chapter, the US Immigration policy during the 2014 – 2020 period will be examined. The first part of this chapter will focus on the general overview of US politics within the context of populism and the US Immigration policies before the Presidency of Donald Trump. The second part will examine the policy changes in US migration management during the years of President Trump in office, focusing on the key legislative changes that were important for understanding the US immigration system. The last section of this chapter will focus on the analysis of President Trump's populist, anti-immigrant rhetoric with an examination of his tweet posts through conducting Twitter sentiment analysis. This chapter argues that during his years in office, President Trump made profound changes in the US immigration system, intending to decrease illegal immigration and its nationalist-populist perspective towards immigrants. It is important to examine the changes in the US immigration policy during his years within the context of his exclusionary, anti-immigrant stance.

3.1 Overview of the US Immigration Policies Before the Year 2016

In this section, the origins of anti-immigrant rhetoric expressed by populist right-wing President Donald Trump during his term will be examined; in comparison with the adopted immigration policies during the Trump administration in the US with the other former US presidents. It is important to note that populism in different political forms and expressions was integral to US political history. John Judis (2016) traced the roots of American populism to the establishment of several farmer alliances in Southern states during the 1890s and the emergence of the "People's Party," representing a grassroots organization that included farmers and mostly Southern Americans represented the first populist political movement; playing a major role in national politics by pushing for more democratic demands in the US society. (Judis, 2016, pp. 22-24). The first demands of the American populists during the late 1890s and early 1900s were based on calling for the US government to nationalize certain industries like railroads and reduce the power of business in determining the outcome of the elections in the country. Regarding to the immigration policies in the US, it is worth noting that although the United States has long branded itself as a bastion of democracy, the policy makers in the country were too late to abandon racial discrimination in immigration until 1960s. As Fitzgerald & Cook-Martin (2014) claimed in their prominent book 'Culling the Masses: The democratic origins of racist immigration policy in the Americas', the history of immigration policy in the demonstrated the coexistence of democracy and racism. Based on their comprehensive analysis on the international events affecting racial restrictions and preferences in immigration policy in the region, both authors pointed out that the more democratic a country in the Americas, the more racist its immigration policies; questioning the widely held view that liberal democracy and racism cannot coexist. For the case of the US, Fitzgerald & Cook-Martin (2014, p.139) pointed out that the global ambitions' of the US after

World War II made it slowly but susceptible to thirty years of diplomatic leverage from other countries working in concert to delegitimize racism in its immigration policies until 1960s.

The 1960s were important for understanding right-wing populism in the US, as in the case of George Wallace. As the governor of Alabama from the Democrat Party who also sought the US presidency as a Democrat and American Independent Party candidate, Wallace became one of the key right-wing populist figures in US history with his segregationist discourse against black people until he died in 1998. The Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965 was crucial for the US immigration policies in that this act removed discrimination against non-Western ethnic groups by creating new priority categories based on family relationships and eliminating the race, religion and place of origin criteria. However, this act did not create the legal way for lower-skilled workers to enter the country and illegal immigration continued to become an issue in the US politics.

The end of the Cold War during the early 1990s and the economic prosperity during the years of Bill Clinton brought a wave of optimism in the US, and the good economic situation positively impacted the country's migration policies. Several reforms were introduced to increase skilled migration, as in the case of the Immigration Act of 1990 and the Diversity Visa Program. However, it is important to note that these reforms became ineffective toward the rising number of illegal immigrants in the US crossing the US-Mexico border, increasing from about 3.5 million in 1990 to 5.7 million in 1995 (Campani et al., 2022, p.8). During the 1990s, there was a rise in the number of illegal immigrants, which prompted criticism from Republican politicians. One example was Pat Buchanan, who ran for the Republican presidential nomination in both the 1992 and 1996 elections. He was one of the populist leaders in the US during that decade who made immigration reduction a central part of his campaign.

President George W. Bush promised to adopt a pro-Mexican-immigrants policy and in 2000, he appealed to Hispanic voters by supporting expanded legal immigration and legalization for illegal immigrants (Baxter & Nowrasteh, 2021). However, the 9/11 attacks completely changed the discourse of the US immigration policy, introducing highly restrictive migratory policies in the name of security and the war on terrorism. The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 and the Secure Fence Act of 2006 reaffirmed the government's power to detain immigrants without trial, authorized about 850 miles of fencing along the southwest border, and expanded the size of the Border Patrol (Baxter & Nowrasteh, 2021). The new measurements also increased non-immigrant visa security screening through implementing various programs, such as the Automated Biometric Identification System and the Electronic System for Travel Authorization.

On the other side of immigration, Congress passed the H-1B Visa Reform Act of 2004, which provided 20,000 additional H-1B visas to high-skilled temporary workers with advanced degrees from American universities. In 2006, the Republican-led Senate passed the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act, which, among other things, legalized illegal immigrants and expanded legal immigration. After Obama's victory in the 2008 US elections, Congress reintroduced the "Dream Act" in 2009 to legalize many illegal immigrants who entered the country as children; although it ultimately failed in the Senate after passing the House of Representatives (Baxter and Nowrasteh, 2021, p.20). In 2012, President Obama announced the start of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program (DACA), which granted a two-year work permit and a reprieve from deportation to illegal immigrants who met many of the latest Dream Act requirements (Batalova et al., 2021).

In 2014, President Obama also issued the Immigration Accountability Executive Action, which granted three years of temporary revocable relief and work authorization to illegal immigrants by expanding DACA to cover the parents of US citizens. This order prioritized deportation for "national security threats, serious criminals, and it also aimed to alter administrative procedures to allow visa processing for illegal immigrant spouses of US citizens without their needing to leave the country, help high-skilled workers on H1-B visas to change their jobs easier, as well as reducing barriers to the immigration of foreign-born entrepreneurs. (Bexter and Nowrastesh, 2021, p.21).

3.1 Legislative Changes in the US Immigration Policy during President Donald Trump Administration

After coming to the office, Trump issued multiple executive orders to stop the issuance of visas to immigrants and non-immigrants from several mostly Muslim-majority countries based on the assertion that they would be detrimental to national security. In the first weeks of his presidency, on the 25th of January 2017, President Donald Trump signed an executive order on border security entitled "Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements," which expanded the use of detention of illegal migrants, limited access to asylum, enhanced enforcement along the USA–Mexico border, and set up the construction of a 2000-mile border wall. On 27th of January 2017, President Trump signed another executive order entitled, "Protecting the Nation from Terrorist Attacks by Foreign Nationals," banning people from six Muslim-majority countries from entering the USA (including four countries that had Temporary Protected Status (TPS), namely Somalia, Syria, Yemen, and Sudan). This executive order, also known as the "Muslim Ban," was later struck down by federal judges who said it amounted to religious discrimination against Muslims.

It would be better to examine the US immigration system during President Trump's years in office by focusing key policy changes:

1.) Ending the DACA Framework

In line with promises made on the campaign trail, Trump's first act after coming to the office was ending the Obama-era Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, designed to protect from removal, work authorization to nearly 700,000 unauthorized individuals who were brought to the United States as children. President Trump announced the unwinding of this program in September 2017 and DACA holders were to have no longer their two-year status renewed when it expired, meaning that all participants would lose protection within two years

(Pierce, Bolter and Selee, 2018, p.9).

2.) Ending Humanitarian Programs for Immigrants

The Trump administration made significant reductions to the number of refugees the United States will accept for resettlement. In recognition of the worldwide refugee crisis, the Obama administration increased the refugee admission ceiling from 70,000 in 2013–15 to 85,000 in the fiscal year 2016 and further to 110,000 in fiscal year 2017 (Pierce, Bolter and Selee, 2018; pp.6). Citing security concerns about the program, the Trump administration took steps to suspend the program, attempting to limit for the year 2017 admissions to 50,000 and ultimately, 53,716 refugees were admitted during for the year 2017. For the fiscal year 2018, the US administration lowered the ceiling even further to 45,000 refugees, the lowest level since the current U.S. resettlement program began in 1980. The Trump administration also ended the refugee and ‘parole’ program designated for vulnerable youth in need of protection in Central America. The Central American Minors (CAM) refugee and parole program was created by the Obama administration in response to the surge in unaccompanied Central American minors who arrived at the border starting in 2014. In an effort to deter the child refugees from undertaking the dangerous journey through Mexico to the United States, the program could allow certain parents lawfully present in the United States to request a refugee resettlement interview for their children. The termination of this program ultimately affected the family refugees negatively.

3.) Increasing the Immigration Enforcement

Between his first day in office and the end of fiscal year 2017 (January 20 to September 30, 2017), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) removed 61,000 immigrants from the interior of the country, representing 37% increase from those months in 2016 (Pierce, Bolter and Selee, 2018; pp.3). In 2017, which included slightly less than four months of the Obama administration, ICE arrested 38,000 immigrants with no criminal convictions, a 146% increase over the 15,000 such arrests in the fiscal year 2016. (Pierce, Bolter and Selee, 2018; pp.4) This reflected the new administration's sharp break from the enforcement priorities of President Obama, who, by the end of his administration, focused interior enforcement almost exclusively on criminals.

The Trump administration also pursued the policy to deter Latin American families, which made up more than one-third of all migrants apprehended at the U.S.-Mexico border during the first nine months of 2018. The US government clearly indicated that this policy was intended to use extended family detention as an alternative to family separation, though this too may be limited by capacity constraints. Another move aimed at deterring arrivals at the southwest border, the

administration has taken steps to limit who is considered eligible for asylum and In June 2018, a decision by U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions made it harder for migrants fleeing private crimes—specifically domestic violence and gang violence—to gain asylum in the United States. (Pierce, Bolter and Selee, 2018; pp.3) While this decision applied to all asylum seekers, it can be stated that Central Americans who file for asylum after crossing the U.S.-Mexico border were commonly fleeing these types of violence, rather than the other grounds for asylum request such as political persecution.

4.) Refugee Resettlement System

The Trump administration aimed to completely change every aspect of the U.S. refugee resettlement system by setting lower refugee admissions ceilings, ultimately setting the fiscal year 2021 ceiling at 15,000, just 15 percent of what it had been when Trump took office in 2016 (Bolter et al. 2022; pp. 74). It is possible to claim that the administration admitted the fewest refugees in a year since the resettlement program began in 1980. Additionally, President Donald Trump also changed the allocation strategy for refugee admissions. According to the Migration Policy Institute Report (2022) prepared by Jessica Bolter, Emma Israel and Sarah Pierce, there were more than eleven critical policy changes in the U.S. Refugee Resettlement system during the President Donald Trump administration.

It would be better to focus on the six most critical policy changes in the migration management of the United States:

1.) Refugee Ban (June 26 to October 24, 2017): The Trump administration suspended the travel of refugees into the United States for 120 days, during which the administration reviewed the refugee application and adjudication process. This refugee ban also took the form of “Targetted Refugee

Ban”; from October 24 to December 23, 2017 and the administration stated that it would deprioritize the resettlement applications of refugees coming from 11 countries deemed a “high risk” to national security; namely Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Mali, North Korea, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen (Bolter, Israel and Pierce 2022; pp. 74).

2.) Elimination of Offices Serving Small Numbers of Refugees (December 2017): The State Department reached to the decision that refugee resettlement affiliates, local NGOs, that were expected to serve fewer than 100 refugees in FY 2018 would not be allowed to resettle new refugees (Bolter, Israel and Pierce 2022; pp. 75).

3.) Continuous Reductions in the Refugee Admissions: Through suspending refugee admissions from June 26 to October 24, 2017, the Trump administration also set lower annual refugee ceilings each year, with record low numbers; based on the data from Bolter, Israel & Pierce (2022, p.76-77)’s report:

- For the year 2017: 50,000 ceiling; which was lowered from 110,00 after President Trump took the office, 53,716 actual admissions at the end of the year.
- For the year 2018: 45,000 ceiling, 22,548 actual admissions at the end of the year.
- For the year 2019: 30,000 ceiling, 30,000 actual admissions at the end of the year.
- For the year 2020: 18,000 ceiling, the actual admissions at the end of the year was 11,814.

4.) Closures of Refugee Resettlement Offices: As of May 2020, 134 refugee resettlement organizations which were established for supporting refugees after arrival) were being closed or prohibited by the State Department from resettling any refugees) since the year 2017); leading to approximately 38 % decrease in national resettlement capacity of the United States (Matherna & Carratala, “Rebuilding the U.S. Refugee Program for the 21st Century”, 2020).

5. Policies on the Asylum Seeking: Trump administration implemented various policy changes in the US immigration policies for the asylum seekers; ranging from cutting off access to protection for those seeking safety in the United States to preventing migrants from accessing asylum by forcing them to wait in Mexico. Trump administration also aimed to restrict asylum eligibility based on putting additional criteria through making groups of migrants ineligible if these migrants had not previously applied for and been denied asylum (Bolter, Israel and Pierce 2022; pp. 79). Approximately twenty-four policy changes were put in place in the category of asylum-seeking policies and it would be better to focus on the most significant policy changes that were put into place during the presidency of President Donald Trump.

5.1. Higher Standards for Credible-Fear Interviews: Starting from 2017 until the year 2019, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) made significant policy changes that make the preliminary asylum interview much more difficult for applicants. As Migration Policy Institute Report (2022, p.79) authored by Jessica Bolter, Emma Israel and Sarah Pierce analysed, the USCIS implemented additional changes such as requiring applicants to establish their identity “by a preponderance of the evidence” rather than the prior standard of “with a reasonable degree of certainty”; requiring immigration officers to conduct more detailed analysis on the credibility of the applicant’s claim.

5.2. Metering: Trump administration also increased the limiting of the number of asylum seekers allowed to enter the United States each day at ports of entry along the US-Mexico Southern border which was not frequently implemented in the year 2016. Based on this “metering”, it was not possible for asylum seekers to have knowledge about how long they will need to wait for application and according to the studies of several researchers, approximately

26,000 migrants had to wait on metering lists across the Mexican border cities (Leutert, Arvey, and Ezzell, 2019, “Metering Update”).

5.3.) Asylum Ban: The U.S Justice Department also published an interim final rule on November 9, 2018 that would make any immigrant who is subject to a presidential proclamation barring their entry into the country. In line with this, any immigrant who crossed the US-Mexican border illegally was not eligible for applying for asylum (Bolter, Israel & Pierce, 2022, p. 81).

Overall, it is possible to claim that during his years in office, President Donald J. Trump enacted approximately 470 administrative changes, significantly changing several elements of the U.S. immigration system. According to the Migration Policy Institute Report published in February 2022, Trump administration took the full advantage of the executive branch’s vast authority on immigration and as a result, humanitarian protection mechanisms in the U.S. were severely diminished; the U.S.-Mexico border became more closed off than any time in U.S. history and legal immigration became out of reach for many, with benefits adjudication increasingly tied to enforcement (Pierce, Bolter and Seele, 2022, pp. 145). Table 4 below provides a comprehensive summary on the adopted legislation and policy changes on the U.S. immigration policies during President Trump’s years in office.

Table 4: Legislative Changes in the US Immigration Policies during President Donald Trump administration (2016 – 2020)

Categories of the Immigration Policies	Legislative Changes on the US Immigration Policy adopted during President Donald Trump Administration
i. Travel Bans and Immigrant Suspension	“Executive Order 13768” and “Executive Order 13769” (Suspended the entry of Syrian refugees indefinitely; Blocks entry of people from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, for at least 90 days, regardless of whether or not they hold valid non-diplomatic visas. in 2017.
ii. Border Security	• Legislation for the completion of 738 miles of border wall with Mexico. • Ensure collection of fines from unauthorized immigrants.
iii. Asylum Seeking Policies	• Limits on Asylum for Victims of Private Violence (June 11, 2018) • “Remain in Mexico” Program by Department of Homeland Security; policy allowing the government to release migrants with asylum claims to Mexico to await their asylum hearings in the United States. (December 20, 2018) • Limits on Asylum Based on Family Membership (eliminated the possibility for applicants to qualify for asylum on the grounds of persecution based on one’s family relationship. July 29, 2019) • Humanitarian Asylum Review Process (HARP): HARP is a program whose aim is to quickly remove Mexicans who do not pass their initial asylum screenings. (October 28, 2019) • Changes to Asylum Process and Eligibility for Humanitarian Protection (December 11, 2020) : Codified and expanded the transit-country asylum ban, narrowed the grounds on which applicants may base an asylum claim, made illegal entry a “significantly adverse” factor in asylum adjudications

iv. Legalization	• Tightening of the criteria which allow qualified unauthorized immigrants to leave country and obtain their visas abroad. (May 10th, 2019).
v. Integration	• Department of Housing and Urban Development proposed a rule that could effectively evict immigrant families living in federally subsidized housing, and displace 55,000 children. (May 10, 2019)
vi. Legal Temporary Immigration	• “Vetting Center” introduced arbitrary and inconsistent process to screen immigrants and visitors that is supposed to determine whether an individual possesses “values” that are deemed acceptable for entry. (2018) • Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) revised its National Detention Standards to lower the requirements applied to detention conditions of immigrant detainees, such as reducing the standards regarding health care, access to legal resources, and time outdoors. (January 22, 2020) • The termination of “Temporary Protected Status” for El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nepal, Nicaragua, and Sudan, resulting in the loss of lawful status for hundreds of thousands of people, most of whom have been living in the U.S. for decades and have U.S. citizen children. (May 4, 2018) • Restrictions for research scholars or foreign students on changing status or adjusting to permanent residency without first returning to their home countries.

Source: Pierce, S., & Selee, A. (2017). Immigration under Trump: A review of policy shifts in the year since the election. *Migration Policy Institute*. Retrieved from <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/four-years-change-immigration-trump>.

3.2 Critical Analysis on the Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric Expressed by President Donald Trump

This section will examine the roots of anti-immigrant rhetoric that President Donald Trump frequently expressed during his years in office. It is important to highlight that the anti-immigrant rhetoric expressed by Donald Trump during his electoral campaign was not just a rhetoric exercise. Once elected as President, most of the anti-migrant measures he promised were implemented, as discussed in the previous chapter. It is important to clarify that his views on immigrants, which are both populist and nationalist, cannot be attributed to ‘civilizationist antagonisms.’ This refers to

the idea of a divide between Western Christian culture and Eastern Muslim culture. From President Trump's perspective, there was no difference between the Christian immigrants coming from Christian-majority Latin American countries and the Muslim immigrants coming from Muslim-majority Middle Eastern or Northern African countries. Hence, it is possible to argue that from President Trump's perspective, there was little room for selective humanitarianism, namely, acceptance of certain displaced groups based on their nationality of origin, religion, or culture.

It is possible to argue that the critical stance on immigration pursued by him during his election campaign and afterward contrasts sharply with his neoliberal tendency toward anti-protectionism and open borders. Being a businessman, it is possible to state that he veered away from the neoliberal free market orthodoxy espoused by mainstream Republicans and Democrats since at least the 1980s. At the core of his anti-free trade stance lies an effort to champion a form of civic nationalism captured by the phrase "America first," which he also used as a motto during his election campaign. With his emphasis on cutting foreign spending, strengthening American security, and further building the U.S. military, Trump's "America first" agenda was predominantly a political discourse that prioritized the interests of native-born Americans over other groups, regardless of their ethnicities. In order to alleviate the American workers' problems like stagnant wages, a rising cost of living, a loss of job security, and an erosion of the country's safety nets, Trump promised not only to curb the outsourcing of American jobs but to seal U.S. national borders to cut the cheap labour which would undermine the American citizens.

The key frame behind Donald Trump's anti-immigrant discourse can be linked with the notion that immigrants crossing the Southern border with Mexico pose a threat to the Americans.

He predominantly focused on the issue of immigrants coming from Mexico during his presidential campaign by talking about the potential dangers that Mexican immigrants pose to the United States. In a June 2015 campaign speech, he clearly stated, *“When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best . They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. And some, I assume, are good people”* (Klein and Liptak, 2018). His electoral campaign significantly represented his anti-immigrant position by framing immigrants with pejorative and derogatory terms; referring to them as “animals” and as “undesired groups”.

His social media posts also follow a similar trend. For examining President Trump’s anti-immigrant stance, it is aimed to look at his social media statistics; namely his tweets on the immigration issue data is extracted from the Trump Twitter Archive which recorded every tweet from the @realDonaldTrump handle Trump; including approximately 56,571 tweets in total. The main rationale behind the selection of his social media posts on immigration is that President Trump actively used social media during his electoral campaign, as well as during his years in office. The main reason behind the selection of Twitter sentiment analysis as main method for this research is that Twitter sentiment analysis can identify and extract subjective information from tweets by determining negative, positive or neutral emotions. This can give us hindsight about the tweet account owners’ position on certain issues by detecting the polarity of the text data.

The table below show the distribution of his immigration-related tweets between 2012 and 2020; basedon this thesis’ analysis through conducting Twitter sentiment analysis based on the Twitter Data Archive. It is possible to observe that his migration related tweets are observed in 2018 with the highest number; the year that the US border migrant apprehensions dropped almost to the 1970s levels.

Table 5: Number of Donald Trump's Tweets on the Issue of Immigration (2012-2020)

Year	Number of Immigration Policy-Related Tweets	Immigration Tweets as Percentage of all tweets
2012	5	0.10%
2013	38	0.50%
2014	117	2.00%
2015	211	2.80%
2016	112	2.70%
2017	134	5.10%
2018	416	11.70%
2019	482	6.20%
2020	215	1.80%
Total	1733	3.10%

Table 6: Results of Twitter Sentiment Analysis on Donald Trump's Tweets on Immigration (2012-2020)

Minimum	1 st Quarter	Median	Mean	3 rd Quarter	Maximum
-1.265	-0.184	-0.015	-0.036	0.119	0.878

Table 6 above shows the results of Twitter sentiment analysis on President Donald Trump's tweets on immigration during 2012-2020 period which are obtained from Twitter Data Archive through Python software. It is possible to state that Trump's tweets during 2016-2020 period was

predominantly negative; with the mean value ‘-0.036’; representing a negative sentiment level; with a minimum value ‘-1.265’ and a maximum value ‘0.878’.

Figure 1: The Most Frequently Used Words in President Donald Trump's Tweets on Immigration during 2016 – 2019 Period



As can also be seen from the above Figure 1 based on the Twitter sentiment analysis through Python software, the most frequently used words during President Trump's tweets on immigration from January 2016 – January 2019 period which was gathered after conducting Twitter sentiment analysis; there is an overall emphasis on the security of the country; through frequent usage of the word “border”; referring to the U.S – Mexico border; the word “wall”; denoting the wall project which President Trump aimed to construct throughout the U.S – Mexico border. Table 3 below also shows some the tweets that specifically focused on the immigration.


Table 7: Tweet Samples from Donald Trump's Tweets on Immigration

Year	Excerpts from President Trump's Tweets on Immigration
June 30, 2015	“We MUST have strong borders and stop illegal immigration. Without that we do not have a country. Also, Mexico is killing U.S. on trade. WIN!”
July 11, 2015	“Legal immigrants want border security. It is common sense. We must build a wall! Let's Make America Great Again!”
February 12, 2016	“I will end illegal immigration and protect our borders! We need to MAKE AMERICA SAFE & GREAT AGAIN! #Trump2016”
June 24, 2018	We cannot allow all of these people to invade our Country. When somebody comes in, we must immediately, with no Judges or Court Cases, bring them back from where they came. Our system is a mockery to good immigration policy and Law and Order. Most children come without parents . . .”
November 18, 2018	“The U.S. is ill-prepared for this invasion, and will not stand for it. [Migrants] are causing crime and big problems in Mexico. Go home!”
January 31, 2019	“More troops being sent to the Southern Border to stop the attempted invasion of Illegals, through large Caravans, into our Country.”

For better understanding the US Immigration policy during President Donald Trump, it would be better to analyse certain figures. Figure 1 represents the number of border apprehensions on the US-Mexico border during 2016-2019 period. It is possible to observe significant increase in the number of apprehensions at U.S – Mexico border during 2016 – 2019 period; namely during President Donald Trump’s years in office. Especially the number of the apprehended families showed the highest increase; reaching to 474 thousand in 2019.

Figure 2: Migrant Apprehensions at U.S – Mexico Border by Fiscal Year (2013-2019)

Apprehensions at U.S.-Mexico border, by fiscal year and type




Note: “Family units” refers to the number of people traveling in families.

Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

Source: Gramlich (2020), ‘How border apprehensions, ICE arrests and deportations have changed under Trump’ *Pew Research Center* (Retrieved from <https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2020/03/02/how-border-apprehensions-ice-arrests-and-deportations-have-changed-under-trump/>)

Figure 3: Number of Border Migrant Apprehensions at the US-Mexico border (1960 – 2018 Period)




Source: Isacson (2018). 'The US Government's 2018 Border Data Clearly Shows Why the Trump Administration is on the Wrong Track'. *WOLA: Advocacy for Human Rights in the Americas*.

The Figure 3 also shows that the number of migrants apprehended by Border Patrol at the U.S.-Mexico border in 2018 - 396,579 people; representing the fifth lowest total since 1973; despite the fact that the migrants were less in terms of the migrant arrivals (Isacson, 2018).

Figure 4: Change in the Number of Visas Issued by the US Department of Homeland Security (2016 – 2019 Period)

More people are getting temporary visas, and fewer are getting permanent ones

Number of visas issued by category, most recent data compared with year before President Trump's election



Note: Most recent data is for 2019, before the coronavirus outbreak

Source: US Department of Homeland Security

BBC


Source: Lowther (2020). US Election 2020: Trump's Impact on Immigration-in Seven Charts. *BBC News*. BBC.

Figure 4 shows the percentage changes in the number of visas issued by the US Department of Security significantly decreased in all categories like temporary working visas, permanent residency visas. As Lowther (2020) analysed, the reduction in permanent visas from about 1.2 million in 2016 to about 1 million in 2019 significantly affected the family members of US citizens especially for family reunions.

Figure 5: Percentage of both Clinton and Trump Supporters' Statements', stating each as 'very big problem for the US' (Based on the survey results conducted August 9-16, 2016).

For Trump backers, immigration rivals terrorism among 'very big' problems

% of Clinton/Trump supporters saying each is a 'very big problem' in our country



Note: Based on registered voters.
Source: Survey conducted Aug. 9-16, 2016.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Source: Doherty (2016). '5 facts about Trump supporters' views of immigration.' *Pew Research Center*. (Retrieved from <https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2016/08/25/5-facts-about-trump-supporters-views-of-immigration/>)

Figure 5 shows the percentage of both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump supporters' responses on the biggest problem in the US. It is worth noting compared to Clinton supporters; supporters for Donald Trump expressed the immigration as biggest problem for the US. It can

be argued that Donald Trump's anti-immigrant discourse was also linked with the Democrat party voters' anxieties; perceiving the issue of immigration as threat for the US.

3.3 Conclusion

During his years in the office, the US President Donald Trump adopted a highly restrictive discourse towards the immigrants; in line with his populist rhetoric. During his election campaign in 2016, he also signalled his anti-immigrant stance and his policy promises on solving the issue of irregular immigrant who were fleeing from Latin American countries towards the US. In fact, the supporters for Democrat Party and President Donald Trump also perceived the immigrants coming to the US as the biggest problem for their country and Trump's anti-immigrant stance was significantly linked with the concerns of his electorate during the 2016 elections. During his administration, President Donald Trump adopted an exclusionary form of populist rhetoric towards the immigrants coming to the US from various regions of the world.

It is important to keep in mind that the right-wing populist leader President Trump's anti-immigrant stance was not grounded on religious lines. Regardless of their ethnic or religious backgrounds, immigrants were perceived as threats for the US society and economy, in line with his perspective. His policy stance towards the immigrants coming from various parts of the world was based on highly 'exclusionary' form of populist stance. The US Immigration policy during Donald Trump administration experienced profound changes with several limitations implemented on various categories related with migration management. Being as right-wing populist leader, it is possible to observe that he frequently used discriminatory tone towards the immigrants in his policy speeches and social media posts; as in the example of his tweets. In line with this, it is possible to claim that in the US case during President Donald Trump administration; the classical, exclusionary form of right-wing populism is clearly observable; with its anti-immigrant stance towards international migrants.

CHAPTER FOUR

HUNGARY'S IMMIGRATION POLICIES DURING PRIME MINISTER VIKTOR ORBAN ADMINISTRATION

In this chapter, Hungary's immigration policies during the Prime Minister Viktor Orban administration will be examined by analyzing the country's domestic political context and the government's policy stance towards the 2015 migrant crisis. Then, Prime Minister Viktor Orban's policy speeches between the years of 2014 and 2017 on immigration will be examined by using critical discourse analysis; to understand the factors behind his anti-immigrant stance towards the immigrants. This chapter argues that the case of Hungary within the context of Prime Minister Viktor Orban's policy stance towards the issue of immigrants also represented an 'exclusionary' form of populist-nationalist towards the immigrants. Like the US case, Prime Minister Orban adopted a highly exclusionary populist stance toward certain groups in the domestic politics of Hungary and immigrants coming to the country during the 2015 migrant. Different from the US case under President Trump and his populist-nationalist discourse on immigrants, it is possible to claim that the Hungarian case included a selective form of humanitarianism toward the acceptance of immigrants, depending on the religious identity of immigrants.

Since the end of World War Two, Hungary has been a relatively homogenous country. The largest ethnic minority is the Roma people and in terms of religion, the overwhelming majority of Hungarian population is Catholic Christian. Based on the 2016 micro census data, 98.3% of the population was ethnically Hungarian; whereas the Roma people constitute 3.2%

of the population as being the largest ethnic minority group (Vukovich, 2018). The other ethnic minority groups are Germans (178, 337 people, representing 1.8% of the population) and Romanians (36,506 people, representing 0.4% of the population). According to CIA World Factbook (2021) estimates based on the 2011 Hungarian population census, 37,2% of the population identified themselves as Roman Catholic, 11,6% as Calvinist, 18,2% as Atheist/non-religious, 2,2% as Lutheran, and 30,9% as belonging to other religious groups. Regarding to the legislative changes in the field of migration, policies adopted during 1990s eliminated the geographical restrictions which Hungary applied in the case of the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees, and extended international protection to those asylum seekers and refugees beyond the citizens of European countries.

Before starting to focus on the Fidesz party in Hungary and Prime Minister Viktor Orban's policies on immigration during the 2014-2020 period, it would better to focus on the key aspects of the party program of Fidesz; through shedding light on the terms within its party manifesto.

a) Desire to Conserve

The key ideology of Fidesz party is to conserve the Christian roots of Hungarian people and Fidesz politicians consistently emphasized respecting Christian values as a European nation; rejecting Marxist and other progressive ideologies (Fidesz.hu, 2023). Taking these into account, Fidesz opposed any change in the Hungarian society that would undermine the social values in Hungary.

b) Traditions

Traditions and values constitute the core of the society that passed down from the next generation. One of the important values of conservatism is tradition and it is important to preserve and maintain traditions. Fidesz's claim of Christian origins considers the Roman

Catholicism as indispensable for the European nation (Fidesz.hu, 2023). In line with this, the Fidesz party and its leader Prime Minister Viktor Orban was against the Lgbt community in Hungary; perceiving it as challenge towards the Hungary society.

c) Organic Society

The integrity of the social structure and the existence of social consciousness are both important conservative values, according to the Fidesz party. The party paid great attention to the family as the core unit of the Hungarian society (Fidesz.hu, 2023).

d) Christian Democracy

Fidesz also emphasized unity for countries in the European continent. The European Union, according to Fidesz has also been a Christian democratic project and it is based on the idea that European countries should stay together and conserve their religious roots (Fidesz.hu, 2023).


When Fidesz was elected in Hungary for the first time in the 1998 elections through forming a coalition with Hungarian Democratic Forum and Independent Smallholders' Party, the Fidesz-led government tried to pursue restrictive policies on labor immigration (Hárs, 2009, pp. 17–18, 45–47), initiated pro-birth policies and aimed to offer citizenship to ethnic Hungarians. Since the year 2010, the Fidesz party has been the incumbent party in Hungary under the leadership of Prime Minister Viktor Orban and the Fidesz government since that year, perceived immigration as a security problem and tried to set some obligations for the immigrants who would settle in Hungary like being law-abiding persons with no criminal records, being healthy and able to integrate smoothly into Hungarian society. It can also be argued that Fidesz consistently adopted a right-wing populist political position concerning the issue of immigration in that non-Hungarian citizens living in Hungary should not threaten the public order or the national security of the Republic of Hungary.

Regarding the issue of migration in Hungary, it is possible to state that it became a highly contested issue in 2015, as many European countries were directly affected by the mass immigration of irregular migrants from various regions like the Middle East and North Africa towards Europe. In 2015, the emergence of the Western Balkan route for mass immigration to Europe for irregular immigrants resulted in critical changes in the Hungarian political position towards the issue of immigration. Being an EU member since 2004, the country saw a dramatic increase in the mass movement of irregular immigrants through its borders. Hungary's strategic location in the Schengen Area, as neighboring Austria and Serbia, made the country the first entry point to the Schengen Area in the Northern Balkans and the first continental entry point in South-eastern Europe for irregular immigrants. These factors allowed Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán monopolized the issue with his well-known anti-immigrant stance. As Simonovits (2020, p. 157) examined in her article, the Fidesz-led Hungarian government purposefully refrained from using the words 'asylum seekers' and 'refugees.' Rather than these words, the government used terms like 'illegal migrants' and 'economic migrants' to frame public discourse. Contrary to this, it is possible to argue that certain left-wing political parties, as well as research institutes (e.g., Publicus Research), preferred to use the terms 'asylum seekers' and 'refugees' to describe this heterogeneous group of people in order to frame the public discourse. During a time when the topic of migration dominated, Orbán rejected all forms of immigration by making the topic the central issue in Hungarian politics.

4.1 Diverging Policy Stances between Hungary and the EU during the 2015 Migrant Crisis

Being an EU member in the Schengen area since 2004, Hungary was part of the EU's overall approach to balance and manage migration flows; based on reducing irregular migration. Initially, the EU responded to the migrant crisis by working with neighbouring countries of Syria to provide humanitarian aid distribution. When the number of migrants and refugees attempting to enter the EU reached approximately one million refugees in 2015, Europe's common set of administrative rules on processing asylum seekers' applications for the majority of the member states came under scrutiny, especially some member states like Hungary and Poland. The EU approved the relocation of 120,000 refugees in September 2015 with 22 member states based on a quota system that was criticized by several member states, including Hungary, being a country located at the core of the migrant route. As can be seen from Figure 6 and Figure 7 below, the number of asylum seekers in Europe reached to 1 million 325 thousand people; representing a record number of asylum seekers during 1985-2015 period.

Figure 6: Descriptive Summary of the 2015 Migrant Crisis




Source: The Economist. (August 27, 2015). Looking for a home. *The Economist*.
<https://www.economist.com/europe/2015/08/29/looking-for-a-home>

Figure 7: Annual Number of Asylum Applications Received by EU Member States, including Norway and Switzerland during 1985 – 2015 period

Number of asylum seekers in Europe surges to record 1.3 million in 2015

Annual number of asylum applications received by EU-28 countries, Norway and Switzerland, 1985 to 2015



Note: "Europe" consists of the EU-28, Norway and Switzerland. Asylum seeker definitions varied by European country prior to 2008. Numbers for asylum applications since 2008 are based on first-time applicants and do not include appeals or transfer of applications between countries. See [methodology](#) for more details. Data on asylum applications is missing for some countries in some years. See [Appendix A](#) for list of countries with missing data. All countries that are part of the EU today are included in previous years' data even though several were not part of the European Union in earlier years. Rounded to nearest thousand.

Source: Pew Research Center analysis of Eurostat data, accessed June 22, 2016.

"Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 1.3 Million in 2015"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Figure 9: A propaganda billboard used during the National Consultation (*Nemzeti Konzultáció*) survey series in Hungary



Source: Budapest Business Journal “Government to Address Immigrants on Billboards.” Budapest Business Journal, bbj.hu/politics/government-to-address-immigrants-onbillboards 98686. (Note: The billboard says “If you come to Hungary, you cannot take Hungarians’ jobs.”)

The National Consultation (*Nemzeti Konzultáció*) in Hungary which started as survey series indicated the framework of how the government would present the topic and the primary goal was to link the issue of immigration to terrorism in order to attract the attention of Hungarian public opinion. It is important to note that the anti-immigrant campaign messages during that period were being delivered not only on outdoor posters; but also through radio stations, television channels, online news sites, and in print publications. Before the national quota referendum on October 2, 2016; the Hungarian government sent around 4 million booklets to Hungarians to make the government’s case for why Hungarians should vote “no” in the national referendum. Regarding the result of this referendum; although the overwhelming majority of voters rejected the EU’s migrant quotas, voter turnout was below the 50% (44%),

making the result invalid. As Biro-Nagy (2022, p.411) argued in his article, 98% of those who had submitted valid votes shared the government's view in that they opposed the EU's migrant quota mechanism and the 3.3 million votes agreeing with Fidesz's position concerning the refusal of the EU's migrant quota also meant that Fidesz's communication reached well beyond its base; surpassing the 2.1 million votes in the 2014 national election.

With this quota referendum, Hungarian government called on voters to defend Christian values to stop Hungary from becoming a host for refugees. Although the European Union asked Hungary to accept 1,294 refugees and Hungarian government rejected this as this would bring economic burden on Hungary; Hungarian government spent around 28 million euros on anti-immigrant campaign during the quota referendum (Goździak, 2023). From the quota referendum towards the 2018 national elections in Hungary, Fidesz and Prime Minister Viktor Orban Fidesz continued to pursue the anti-migration rhetoric in public discourse through various means. Fidesz conducted further National Consultations in 2017 through verbally attacking the European Union institutions; initiating the so-called 'Soros Plan,' which the Hungarian government claimed was a plan by the Hungarian-American billionaire George Soros to settle millions of migrants from Africa and the Middle-East in Hungary. As can be seen in Figure 7, billboards were designed and distributed across Hungary; based on conspiracy theories with Hungarian-born American philanthropist George Soros as the mastermind behind the immigration issue. This campaign theme aimed to blur the line between economic migrants and war refugees who fled from the conflict areas like Syria and Iraq towards Europe. According to the Orban narrative, the European Union, George Soros, the NGOs were all dealing with migration-related issues in an attempt to return Hungary to an 'immigrant nation.'

Prime Minister Viktor Orban centred his entire 2018 parliamentary campaign around the issues of the immigration. In one of his electoral campaign speeches, he called at the Hungarian people to make the 'right' decision in the elections in order to deal with the issue of immigration:

"Hungary today faces two possible futures: either there will be a national government, which means that Hungary will not become an immigrant country; or George Soros's people will form a government, and it will be transformed into an immigrant country ... Ultimately in April the choice will have been narrowed down to two options: pro-immigration or anti-immigration candidates' – claimed the prime minister a month before the election, thereby setting the course and tone of communication for the final stretch of the campaign." (Orban, 2018).

It is important to mention another right-wing political party, Jobbik, in Hungarian domestic politics. In 2015, Jobbik, as the FIDESZ's extreme right-wing opposition party, became the second strongest political force in Hungary and the main challenger of the governing party Fidesz after the 2014 national election results resulted in Fidesz's loss of majority in the Hungarian parliament. The issue of immigration became a highly critical political issue that both Fidesz and Jobbik parties aimed to securitize to attract public attention. As Szalai & Göbl (2015) claimed in their articles, migrants were considered an easy target for securitization in 2015 by both parties, and they were seen as a threat to Hungarians that only a strong government could handle the situation.

Disinformation campaigns towards the immigrants were effective in shaping Hungarian public opinion. Since 2015, immigration has become an increasingly important issue for European citizens, in response to the growing influx of migrants taking the sea route from Northern Africa to countries in Southern Europe, such as Greece, before moving on to the Balkan route. Based on the Eurobarometer Survey results conducted in the year 2014-2015 period; although Hungarians were less likely (18%) than the average EU citizens (24%) to

believe that immigration constituted the key issue for the European Union, this changed in one year when the issue of immigration became the key topic in the Hungarian domestic agenda; reaching at 68% of the Hungarians during the fall 2015 period, as Table 10 below shows. During the fall of 2015, the proportion of Hungarian respondents who saw immigration as one of the most important issues was higher than the European average, and that is how it remained in every survey until the 2018 elections.

Figure 10: Share of the Hungarian and the EU Member State Citizens' Responses for the Question on the Two Most Important Issues Facing the EU

	Immigration – Hungary	Immigration – EU28	Terrorism – Hungary	Terrorism – EU28
Fall 2014	18%	24%	7%	11%
Spring 2015	43%	38%	20%	17%
Fall 2015	68%	58%	34%	25%
Spring 2016	67%	48%	47%	39%
Fall 2016	65%	45%	40%	32%
Spring 2017	60%	38%	55%	44%
Fall 2017	58%	39%	45%	38%
Spring 2018	56%	38%	38%	29%

Source: Boros & Laki (2018); “The Hungarian Fear”; Budapest: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung–Policy Solutions”, based on the field work results of the Závecz Research. (Eurobarometer 82–89. Original question: “What do you think are the two most important issues facing the EU at the moment?”)


As Biro-Nagy (2022) also analyzed in his article, Fidesz also put the issue of immigration as the key component of its electoral campaign during 2018 general elections and based on the public opinion survey carried out by Závecz Research in the final week of the election campaign; migration ranked as the fifth most prominent fear in the total electorate (Biro-Nagy 2022, pp. 418; Boros & Laki 2018, pp. 36). The table below also shows that the issue of migration continued to be one of the most frequently expressed concern among the Hungarian public; based on the Boros and Laki (2018)’s field work from the year.

Figure 11: The Most Important Issues Expressed by the Hungarian Electorate during the 2018 Elections in Hungary

	Fear No. 1	Fear No. 2	Fear No. 3	Fear No. 4	Fear No. 5
Total population	Uncertainty/ Instability	Illness	Financial situation	Vulnerability	Migration
Fidesz-KDNP voters	Uncertainty/ Instability	Migration	Financial situation	Illness	Vulnerability
Jobbik-voters	Uncertainty/ Instability	Financial situation	Illness	Migration	Vulnerability
MSZP-voters	Uncertainty/ Instability	Illness	Vulnerability	Financial situation	Runaway world
Undecided voters	Uncertainty/ Instability	Vulnerability	Illness	Migration	Runaway world
Budapest	Migration	Vulnerability	Uncertainty/ Instability	Illness	War
County seat	Uncertainty/ Instability	Financial situation	Illness	Runaway world	Vulnerability
Small city	Uncertainty/ Instability	Illness	Financial situation	Vulnerability	Migration
Village	Uncertainty/ Instability	Migration	Financial situation	Vulnerability	Illness

Source: Biro-Nagy (2022), pp. 419. (Based on Boros and Laki (2018)'s field work research from Závecz Research. Time of data collection was during 28 March to 5 April 2018. Original question: Please select the three most important issues from the list below that you have thought about during the last month and which made you most concerned in thinking about Hungary's future.)

Figure 12: The Main Fears Expressed by Hungarian Voters in the Final Days of the 2018 Election Campaign (Percentage)



Source: Biro-Nagy (2022), pp. 418. (Based on the Boros and Laki (2018)'s field work from Závecz Research. Original question: "Please select the three most important issues that you have thought about during the last month which made you apprehensive/fearful.")

Figure 13: Propaganda Booklet Distributed during the National Consultation (*Nemzeti Konzultáció*) Survey Series in 2016



Source: The Budapest Beacon (September 7, 2016). 'We must stop Brussels! referendum booklet warns Hungarians.' (Source: <https://budapestbeacon.com/we-must-stop-brussels-referendum-booklet-warns-hungarians/>). The booklet says: "The migration of people is jeopardizing Europe's future. Year by year, the number of illegal immigrants is growing in Europe. The Brussels elite argues that new labour is needed in Europe. However, the situation is that there are already 21.4 million unemployed seeking work in Europe, and of those 12.4 million are long-term unemployed.")

Overall, the Hungarian government's anti-immigrant campaign, within the example of National Consultation, aimed to target multiple audiences by focusing on the security and protection of society. Scholars like Melegh (2016) examined the success of Orban in the recombination of different discursive traditions such as the conservative definitions of 'Europeanness,' the exclusionary rhetoric of economic competitiveness of the socialist-liberal government during the 2004 citizenship referendum campaign, securitization narratives and discourses about the 'dangers' of the 'racial' and religious mixing of populations. Many people

in Hungary viewed asylum seekers as a threat to the country's ethnic and racial uniformity and to its 'Christian European civilization.'

It is worth considering whether Prime Minister Orbán's language was discriminatory towards immigrants based on their religious beliefs. In some cases, it is possible to observe examples of selective humanitarianism in Hungary's migration; on the condition that the immigrants were all Christians. One example was the relocation of the Coptic Christians to Hungary from Egypt, wherein they were under persecution; this relocation took place with the Hungarian government's approval in 2015; while the Hungarian government was rejecting the asylum applications of the both Christian and Muslim immigrants from conflict areas like Syria (McLaughlin, 2016). As Goździak (2023, p.27) examined in his research, the Hungarian government established a ministerial office focused on defending Christians in the Middle East. With this office, the Coptic Christians of Egypt were relocated from there to Hungary, and the Hungarian government also gave them temporary protection because they were Christians. This represented an example of selective humanitarianism combined with a populist-nationalist discourse on the issue of immigrants in Hungary. However, it is worth noting that this example also does not change the fact that Orbán's discourse toward immigrants represented a highly exclusionary form of populism, and it can be difficult to use this example to reach to the claim that Orbán's discourse toward Christian immigrants was inclusionary.

4.2 Critical Discourse Analysis on Viktor Orban's Policy Speeches on Immigration

In this section, Hungarian Prime Minister Orban's policy speeches on the issue of migrants would be analyzed through applying for critical discourse analysis. Through employing critical discourse analysis on the speeches of political leaders, it is possible to understand the historical contexts which framed the social structures, certain practices; regarding the discursive representation of public policies (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p.41). Scholars like Aydın-Düzgit (2013) also adopted the critical discourse analysis for understanding the foreign policy perspectives of the European Union leaders.

To examine how Viktor Orban's discourse on immigration, several speeches delivered by Prime Minister Viktor Orban between 2014 and 2017 were analyzed; based on the selection to isolate the discourses where Orban discussed the issue of migration. These speeches were retrieved from the Hungarian government's official homepage, and the speeches chosen were delivered by himself towards the Hungarian audience. It is important to note that differently from the US case in which President Trump's tweets on immigration were examined through applying for Twitter sentiment analysis, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban's policy speeches were chosen for understanding his position on the issue of immigration. The main rationale behind the selection of his policy speeches, rather than his social media posts for this research is that Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban tended to use Twitter and other social media posts less frequently. For this reason, his policy speeches were preferred for examining his position on the issue of immigrants and based on dictionary based automated- coding analysis through Nvivo software, Table 9 shows the most frequently used words in Hungarian Prime Minister Orban's policy speeches on the issue of immigration.

Table 9: Most Frequently Used Words in Prime Minister Orban's Policy Speeches on the
Issue of Immigration

Hungarian: betelepítését, bevándorlást, bevándorlás, bevándorlással, bevándorló, bevándorlók, bevándorlóország, bevándorlóországgá, bevándorláspárti, kvótát, migráció, migránsok, migránsokat, a bevándorlók fenyegetésként, nem regisztrált bevándorlók, Kriminalizmus, tömeges nepmozgalom, betolakodók	English Translation: Colonization, immigration, by or with immigration, immigrants, immigrant country, (turn into) immigrant country, supporter of immigration, quota, matter of immigration, migration, migrants as threat, non-registered immigrants, Criminalism, mass population movement, invaders
--	---

For better analysing the discourse on immigration, 'Critical Discourse Analysis' is being employed; a methodology which has been used in order to deconstruct speech acts of political leaders for understanding the discourse on certain policy questions like migration (Charteris-Black, 2006). Through using this methodology, it is possible to observe two key discursive categories within right-wing populist leader Prime Minister Orban's policy speeches on immigration. These discursive categories are 're-defining the Hungary's geopolitical role Europe' and the 'civilizationist rhetoric'.

In this section, these categories which were observed as part of the critical discourse analysis of Hungarian leader's policy speeches would be examined; through focusing on the specific excerpts from his policy speeches.

4.2.1 Re-defining the Hungary's Geopolitical Role in Europe

It is important to note that during his policy speeches which focused on the issue of migration, Hungarian Prime Minister aimed to construct the Hungary's geopolitical location through dislocating it from Western Europe towards Central and Eastern Europe; also with Russia. In his policy in 2016, he clearly highlighted that countries' geopolitical locations might change through either by force or by free will; through making references to the history of Hungary:

"In world politics, an entire country may also change its location without its borders moving an inch. We, for instance, were occupied by the Soviet Army, and from one minute to the next we were shifted from the West to the East. Later they withdrew, and we found ourselves back in the West again" (Orbán, 28 February 2016)

In line with this perspective, Orban defended that Hungary should shift its geopolitical and ontological "location" back to Central and Eastern Europe, closer to Russia but also away from the European Union. Moving away from the EU was primarily due to economic factors. Orbán believed that investing in Central and Eastern Europe and other regions such as Asia was the key to reviving the European economy. In his policy speeches, he also stated that due to the dependency of the Hungarian economy on the Russian economy concerning Hungary's gas dependency, the interests of Hungary must shift towards Eastern Europe, as can be observable through focusing on the excerpts below:

"Economic growth will be generated in Central Europe, and if it were not for us, if we were not successful, then there would be no economic growth in Europe" (Orban, 8 February 2016).

"Without good economic relations between Russia and Hungary, the Hungarian economy and Hungarian industry will simply be unable to function" (Orban, 17 February 2016).

"The engine room of the global economy is no longer in the West, but in the East – or, rather, the East has caught up with the West. [t]he Chinese are the strongest – so they've launched

another direction of movement, which is called ‘One Belt, One Road’. This is specifically built on mutual acceptance: there is no teacher and no student. The President of China has said that everyone has the right to their own social structure, culture, approach and values” (Orbán, 16 May 2017).

Regarding his perspective on the European Union, it is possible to observe that Prime Minister Orbán also criticized the structure of the European Union, being an international organization based on the transfer of the member states’ sovereignty towards Brussels. Based on this criticism, he linked the migrant flows to the concept of ‘internationalism’ in the European Union and to migration flows; through the EU’s liberal policies. With a language aiming to create fear and concern among the audience, he aimed to attract the attention of the Hungarians to the possible threat coming from the immigrants. As championing the European-Christian values, Orbán criticized the European Union in that the EU was not respecting the national sovereignty of its member states with the ‘Europeanization of the migration policies’ and its emphasis on multiculturalism, referring to the liberal policy stance of the EU towards the acceptance of the immigrants. In his discourses, he criticized the European Union institutions for not taking the negative consequences of the migrant flows for European society and culture into account. As a populist politician, he expressed his discontent towards the EU as acting not on behalf of the will of the Europeans:

“Similarly, a fair number of centres of financial and political power in Brussels also have a vested interest in erasing national structures, and eliminating national identities” (Orbán, 2015).

“It is forbidden to say that in Brussels they are concocting schemes to transport foreigners here as quickly as possible and to settle them here among us. It is forbidden to point out that the purpose of settling people here is to reshape the religious and cultural landscape of Europe, and to reengineer its ethnic foundations — thereby eliminating the last barrier to internationalism: the nation-states. It is forbidden to say that Brussels is now stealthily devouring more and more slices of our national sovereignty and that in Brussels many are now making a plan for a United States of Europe — for which no one has ever given authorization” (Orbán, 15 March 2016).

“Instead, they (EU leaders) say, people (migrants) can freely go to wherever such a life is available. If we allow space for this belief it will destroy Europe, its culture and its economic system” (Orban, 30 September 2016).

“In Brussels, discourse about migration is still a prisoner of political correctness. [t]hey still regard only those who speak in the voice of human rights activists and the European liberal elite as being acceptable” (Orban, 25 May 2017).

4.4.2. ‘Civilizationist Rhetoric’ with References to History of Hungary

When the policy speeches of the Hungarian Prime Minister are examined, it is possible to observe the frequent references to the dichotomy between Western-Christian civilization and Muslim civilization. As a populist politician, Prime Minister Orban blended populist and nationalist discourse during his policy speeches, and he frequently highlighted the differences between Christian-European culture and Eastern-Muslim culture, depicting the latter as incompatible with Christian-European culture.

From Orban's perspective, there should be a differentiation between the 'deserving refugees' who were coming from other EU member countries to find jobs, Christians under persecution in Muslim-majority and the 'false asylum seekers,' the ones coming from other regions of the world like Middle East, North Africa. Hence, it is possible to observe that Prime Minister Orban did not perceive the immigrant flows from the Middle East and North Africa regions toward Europe as caused by economic or political factors. Interestingly, while immigrants and refugees were motivated to migrate to Europe due to political instability in their countries, Prime Minister Orban viewed them as "false asylum-seekers" with a discriminatory strategy. Hence, it is possible to claim that his anti-immigrant stance was built upon 'civilizationist' antagonism through his negative stance towards the Muslim civilization and culture.

In some of his speeches, Orban claimed that refugee flows would cause demographic and ethnic imbalances by arguing that their high fertility rates would distort the 'aging' Europe. Additionally, he attributed any negative thing which would distort the order in society to the immigrants coming from the Middle East, mostly the Muslim ones:

“If somebody takes masses of non-registered immigrants from the Middle East into a country, this also means importing terrorism, criminalism, anti-Semitism and homophobia” (Orban, 25 February 2016).

“In states with traditional Christian-based legal systems, there are Arab families who may comply with the law on the surface, but who in reality live their private lives according to the culture and legal system of their country of origin” (Orban, 30 September 2016).

“And there is another view, held by Central Europe – and, within it, Hungary. Our view is that we must solve our demographic problems by relying on our own resources and mobilizing our own reserves... by renewing ourselves spiritually” (Orban, 25 May 2017).

“We do not want parallel societies, we do not want the restructuring of our population, and we do not want to replace Christian civilization with a different form. Therefore, (..) we are not allowing migrants to flood us” (Orban, 15 April 2017).

It is worth noting that Prime Minister Orban also made references to the common past of the Hungarians in order to appeal to Hungarians' nationalistic feelings and their instinct of resistance during the country's history against several superpowers and also against the mass refugee flows; in line with Hungary's geopolitical location in the middle of Europe. The usage of the myths, important historical events in Hungarian history can be observable in his speeches:

“Whenever Hungary was invaded – whether from the West or the East – what followed was suffering on an unimaginable scale. The story of the suffering of the ethnic Germans in Hungary should remind us that it is one's inalienable right to live where one was born: to live in the culture, the country and the settlement which one considers to be one's home” (Orban, 19 January 2016).

“Today, 168 years after the great Wars of Independence of the European peoples, Europe, our common home is not free!” (Orban, 15 March 2016).

“Today’s enemies of freedom are cut from a different cloth than the royal and imperial rulers of old or those who ran the Soviet system; they use a different set of tools to force us into submission” (Orban, 15 March 2016).

“Today, once again, we must protect the southern borders of Europe. This task falls on those who not only have long histories but also have long memories. For more than a thousand years we Hungarians ... have withstood the storms of history” (Orban, 1 December 2016).

4.3 Conclusion

This chapter argues that Hungary's immigration policy under the administration of Prime Minister Viktor Orban during the 2014-2020 period represented a typical right-wing populist reaction towards the issue of immigration, perceiving the migrants as a threat to Hungarian society. The migration crisis, which affected the European Union, paved the way for a new situation in both Hungarian politics, and this ultimately allowed Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban to treat this issue as a politicized issue from January 2015 until the 2018 elections. Even the short-term exposure to irregular immigrants affected the Hungarian political discourse, and the right-wing populist party Fidesz under the leadership of Prime Minister Viktor Orban constantly politicized the immigration issue leading up to the parliamentary election in 2018. It is important to note that Fidesz and Prime Minister Viktor Orban entrenched the issue of migration as the top concern among its electorate, and from 2014 and 2020, the migration issue kept its high salience. The Orban government managed to shape public opinion on immigration through different tools, and Hungary pursued a highly restrictive immigration policy contrary to the recommendations from the European Union. Overall, it can be argued that the right-wing populist Prime Minister Viktor Orban and their party Fidesz pursued an exclusionary populist position concerning the issue of immigrants.

This position was similar to U.S. President Donald Trump's immigration policies during his tenure.

In domestic politics, Hungarian Prime Minister Orban effectively instrumentalized the issue of immigrants during the 2015 migrant crisis to get popular support from its electorates; through an anti-immigrant campaign, as in the National Consultation survey series example. Through examining the policy speeches of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban on the issue of migration between the years of 2014 and 2017, it is possible to claim that his anti-immigrant policy stance was highly linked with an exclusionary form of populism, perceiving the migrants as threats for the Hungarian society. By doing this, the Hungarian Prime Minister aimed to protect the ethnic homogeneity in the country, as well as the Christian-European culture in the country. During his policy speeches, he frequently highlighted his vision of Hungary, similar to U.S. President Donald Trump's "America First" perspective. Prime Minister Orban instrumentalized the issue of immigration in Hungarian politics in order to get popular support. In its foreign policy, he also instrumentalized the issue of immigration as a tool for challenging the supranational nature of the European system during the migration crisis, advocating a more state-centric policy towards migration through his criticisms of the E.U.

CHAPTER FIVE: TURKEY'S IMMIGRATION POLICIES DURING THE PRESIDENCY OF RECEP TAYYIP ERDOGAN

In this chapter, Turkey's immigration policies during the 2014-2020 period will be examined. The first part of this chapter will focus on Turkey's immigration policies during the early years of the Syrian Civil War, the time period when Turkey initiated its 'open-door' policy, namely focusing on the 2011-2015 period. Since the time frame of this thesis focused on the period between the years 2014 and 2020, the first part of this chapter will provide only a brief overview of Turkey's migration management during the 2011-2015 period. The second part of this section will examine Turkey's immigration policies during the 2016-2020 period; within the context of the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan, activated on November 29th, 2015, in order to understand the shift towards a more systematic approach in the Turkish migration management regime during 2016-2020 period. The third part will examine the legislative changes and regulations which represented a shift towards a more security-focused, stricter migration management regime in Turkey during the same period. The factors behind this shift towards more security-focused migration management will be analysed in line with the domestic political context in Turkey during 2016-2020 period and the Turkish public during the 2016-2020 period by examining the 'Syrians Barometer-2020' survey results; conducted between the years 2017 and 2020.

This chapter argues that from 2014 until 2020, it is possible to observe a shift in Turkey's immigration policies towards the Syrian immigrants; shifting from the initial 'open-door' policy for the Syrian refugees towards a more centralized, securitized migration management emphasizing domestic security. This shift can be attributed to the political situation in Turkey following the July 2016 coup attempt, the rising numbers of irregular migrants coming to Turkey and the negative Turkish public opinion in Turkey during the 2016-

2020 period. Unlike the US case, which represented the highest form of exclusionary populist-nationalist perspective; the Hungarian case represented an exclusionary populist-nationalist perspective with selective humanitarianism; Turkey's immigration policies during the 2014 – 2020 period represented an 'inclusionary' form of populism; in line with Turkey's foreign policy discourse during that period and President Erdoğan's stance on the immigrants. However, it is misleading to claim that this populist-nationalist discourse on immigrants was always inclusionary in Turkey. In his discourses during the course of the Syrian Civil War, President Erdoğan also instrumentalized the immigrants as a bargaining tool, in contrast with his emphasis on hosting immigrants as Turkey's responsibility. In some cases, it is also possible to observe the preferential treatment of certain refugees in Turkey, in line with the ruling AKP party's religious affinity with the Syrian Muslim Arabs.

5.1 The Overview of Turkey's Immigration Policies during the Early Years of Syrian Civil War

Over the course of the decades, it is possible to claim that Turkey evolved into a land of immigration. As Turkey has been increasingly confronted with large-scale immigration, this inevitably led to a number of social, economic, and political implications. The most widely debated issues in this context are the 'management of migration and asylum laws' arriving in the country and the question of how Turkey's state institutions and legal frameworks would handle irregular migration and asylum. Hence, the 'migration management' issue in Turkey moved to the forefront of official concern, partly because Turkey lacked established immigration policies and practices. In the last decade, most official initiatives to manage immigration have occurred in response to external pressures, like the EU example, rather than domestic policy concerns (Kale, 2005; İçduygu, 2007). The EU's Helsinki decisions of December 1999, which declared the candidacy of Turkey for EU membership, and the EU's Brussels decision of December 2004, which announced the start of membership negotiations

with Turkey in 2005, brought forward new questions and concerns in the areas of immigration policies and practices in the country.

From this aspect, migration management in Turkey has been closely parallel with Turkey's relations with the European Union, and it would be better to analyse Turkey's response to the Syrian refugee crisis by focusing on the accession process of Turkey to the European Union. The declaration of Turkey as 'membership candidate' by the EU in December 1999 and the EU's "Accession Partnership Document" in 2001 included policy recommendations for fighting against irregular migration and the civilianization of migration management in Turkey. In line with this, Turkey made significant immigration reforms and enacted a series of laws to be compatible with the Schengen requirements, and these reforms brought fundamental changes in Turkey's policies on issuing work permits to migrants (Kirişci, 2007, p.8; Tolay, 2012, p.40). In 2004, Turkey also aimed to reform its migration regime by adopting the Palermo Protocol, which authorized government agencies' involvement in countering human trafficking. Considering this, Turkey had already initiated its efforts to make a more comprehensive law on migration management before the Syrian Civil War. However, the influx of mass refugees from Syria towards Turkey paved the way for a more comprehensive law on migration management.

Fleeing from Assad's authoritarian regime and the war, Syrians from different ethnoreligious backgrounds started to take refuge in Turkey, and as early as April 2011, after just one month of the protests, Syrian refugees began to arrive at Turkey's Hatay province located at the Turkish-Syrian border. By September 2011, the Turkish government had already announced its 'open-door' policy towards the Syrians fleeing from the Assad regime, and Turkey's national disaster response agency AFAD together with the Turkish Red Crescent, started to build refugee camps across different provinces, hosting Syrians along the Turkish – Syrian border.

In line with these developments, the Turkish government's main assumption concerning the Syrian refugee problem was that the Syrian refugee crisis issue would be a temporary problem. This was based on the Turkish's government miscalculations that the Assad regime would be quickly overthrown, a new Syrian government would be established by the Syrian National Council, which was supported both by the Turkish government and the Western powers, and the Syrian refugees then would return to their countries. However, the nature of the conflict began to change along with the emergence of the Islamic State (ISIS) as a belligerent of the conflict. The humanitarian crisis in the country ultimately affected the number of Syrians fleeing from conflict zones to seek refuge and Turkish authorities stressed the need to create the necessary legal framework for dealing with this refugee crisis.

The Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) entered into force on April 11th, 2013, was important in terms of becoming the first comprehensive legislation on immigrants after establishing the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM). The LFIP was important for Turkey's immigration policy in that it defined various types of international protection as "refugee," "conditional refugee," and, most importantly, "temporary protection," which did not exist in the previous legislation. In line with the 91st article of the LFIP, foreigners who are massively forced to leave their country, who are not able to return to the country which they left, and foreigners who are in need of urgent temporary protection became subject to the provisions of temporary protection regulation. The Article 91 of the LFIP also paved the way for new categorization in terms of access to rights of those who are under international protection. As Üstübcü (2019, p.11) claimed, the temporary protection for Syrian immigrants is legally constructed upon their overwhelming numbers and their immediate need for protection, while all other categories of people claiming international protection from other countries in Turkey are required to prove their need for protection. Another important aspect of the LFIP is that the concept of 'harmonization' has been stated in Turkish law for the first

time, and the 96th article of the LIFP also uses the term "harmonization" in line with the official discourse. This concept paved the way for the efforts on co-harmonization of foreigners and protection applicants with the host community, and the LIFP deliberately uses the term "harmonization" in line with the official discourse rather than "integration", evoking European practices (Ekşi, 2016, p.15; İçduygu&Şimşek, 2016).

The LFIP's approach on the mass migration movements as in the case of Syrians is based on the status of "temporary protection". Concerning the temporary protection, LFIP includes the following principle:

Temporary Protection:


- (1) *Temporary protection may be provided for foreigners who have been forced to leave their country, cannot return to the country that they have left, and have arrived at or crossed the borders of Turkey in a mass influx situation seeking immediate and temporary protection.*
- (2) *The actions to be carried out for the reception of such foreigners into Turkey; their stay in Turkey and rights and obligations; their exit from Turkey; measures to be taken to prevent mass influxes; cooperation and coordination among national and international institutions and organizations; determination of the duties and mandate of the central and provincial institutions and organizations shall be stipulated in a Directive to be issued by the Council of Ministers. (The Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) – Article 91)*

On October 22nd 2014, the Regulation on Temporary Protection (TPR) entered into force and it clearly defined the legal status of Syrians in Turkey:

"The citizens of the Syrian Arab Republic, stateless persons and refugees who have arrived at or crossed our borders coming from Syrian Arab Republic as part of a mass influx or individually for temporary protection purposes due to the events that have taken place in Syrian Arab Republic since 28 April 2011 shall be covered under temporary protection, even if they have filed an application for international protection. Individual applications for international protection shall not be processed during the implementation of temporary protection." (Regulation on Temporary Protection (TPR) – Article 1)

By the end of 2012, Turkish authorities had registered around 170,000 new Syrian refugees; which rose to the number of 400,000 Syrians taking refuge in 2013; one million in year 2014 and 600,000 Syrian refugees in 2015 (UNHCR - Syria Regional Response Inter-Agency Information Sharing Portal; data based on the year 2016). It is possible to claim that Syrians under the TPR have easier access to registration, services and aid than conditional refugees from other non-European countries and asylum seekers waiting for their status to be determined by the DGMM and the UNHCR. Syrians under TPR could choose their city of registration; whereas asylum seekers from other nationalities were required to reside in their city upon registration with authorities and once register in a province, their mobility within the country is also subject to restrictions like other asylum groups. The Article 11 of the Regulation on Temporary Protection (TPR) also states that Turkey preserves the right to terminate the temporary protection regime collectively or individually. Figure 14 below provides a more comprehensive analysis on the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (6548/4.4.2013) and the Temporary Protection Regulation in Turkey.

Figure 14: Summary of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP)



Source: Erdoğan (2021) 'Turkey: Syrians Barometer 2020: A Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion with Syrians in Turkey', p.30.

At this point, it is possible to claim that Syrians, through temporary protection are granted not based on formal rights but rather based on the discourse of generosity of the Turkish public because the temporary protection qualifies Syrians in Turkey not as refugees but as 'guests' with temporary presence. It is worth noting that the legislative regulations in Turkey until 2013 did not allow the Syrians to be defined as "refugees" because they were not from Europe and their arrival in Turkey was a mass influx by nature. For this reason, authorities in Turkey preferred to use the concepts like "Syrians arrived in Turkey to seek asylum" and "Syrian citizens who fled from conflict zones." The "Law on Foreigners and International Protection" (LFIP) distinguished the concepts of legal migration, irregular migration, and international protection. The Syrians who cannot be given

conditional refugee status but requires international protection are given the status of "subsidiary protection," which was defined by the LFIP.

Overall, the LFIP was important for setting the main components of Turkey's asylum system; through combining the existing regulations on asylum and immigration in harmony with Turkey's legislation with the international and EU standards (İçduygu & Aksel, 2013). This law introduced legal safeguards concerning access to the procedures for the determination of refugee status, and in order to enable the accommodation of non-European immigrants in Turkey, the law paved the way for the establishment of the legal basis for the temporary protection regime in Turkey (Ministry of European Union, Progress Report 2013). According to this law, individuals who seek temporary protection status "shall not be punished for entering Turkey irregularly" as long as they are identified by Turkish authorities when they apply to the authorities like Presidency of Migration Management (PMM).

As a response to the geographical limitations which could deprive immigrants of other legal rights and protections, Turkey also introduced the "Temporary Protection Regulation of 2014," which gave a chance easier access to basic rights and services like education healthcare. This regulation also gave the immigrants benefiting from temporary protection to be allowed to reside in provinces determined by the Directorate General (DGMM, "Temporary Protection Regulation," 2014). This regulation was important in that based on Article 48, immigrants under temporary protection would be provided all health services, psychosocial support, rehabilitation, and all other assistance and support to be provided to those with special needs free of charge within the capacity. Additionally, Article 28 of this regulation also states that education activities for foreigners in various forms under this Regulation, like preschool education, language courses, and skills training, should be conducted inside and outside temporary accommodation centres under the control of the Ministry of National Education (Directorate General Migration Management, "Temporary Protection Regulation," 2014). According to UNICEF, the number of Syrian and non-Syrian refugee children enrolled in formal education at the end of March 2019 was 56,701 (UNICEF, "Turkey Humanitarian

Report," January-March 2019). It is important to note that between 2014 and 2020, this regulation constituted the key framework for the protection of Syrian immigrants who fled from the conflict areas of Syria to Turkey and were settled in camps along Turkish cities like Kilis, Hatay, Şanlıurfa near the Turkish-Syrian border. The Temporary Protection Regulation also gave the right to grant temporary protection beneficiaries the possibility of requesting for family reunification with family members outside Turkey. The same regulation also regulated removal and deportation by determining the issues about the management and monitoring of removal centres, accommodation centres, and camps.

In the summer of 2015, the Syrian refugee crisis began to evolve into a humanitarian crisis, forcing the European Union (EU) to seek an unprecedented level of cooperation from Turkey to manage irregular flows. The summit between EU leaders and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in late November 2015 paved the way for closer collaboration on migration and asylum policy and other issues. From the perspective of the European Union, in order to reduce and prevent irregular arrivals in Greece via the Aegean Sea, it was crucial to persuade Turkey to create more permanent solutions for the geographically dispersed refugee population affected by the Syrian Civil War.

Turkey's initial open-door policy towards the Syrian refugees was based on the Turkish expectation that the conflict was to be resolved in a relatively short period of time rather than a prolonged period. However, between the years of 2014 and 2020, the involvement of the international actors to the conflict like Russia and Iran became more visible and it became clear that the conflict would not end in the short run. Hence, Turkey's policy towards Syrian refugees evolved over time going through the initial stage of admission between the years 2013 and 2015; stabilization period towards the end of 2015 and finally integration period starting from 2016. Despite Turkey's initial open door policy towards the all groups fleeing from Syria and

Iraq during the course of Syrian Civil War, it is possible to observe some limitations within the implementation of the open-door policy; in terms of the preferential treatment of some Syrian refugees in Turkey during that time period. As Korkut (2016, p.17) analyzed in his article, some examples were present in understanding the preferential treatment of refugees in Turkey during the early years of the Syrian Civil War. For instance, Turkey's open-door policy towards Kobane Kurds that were supporting living under the regions controlled by the PYD/YPG and supporting the presence of the PYD in Syria constituted direct contrast with the brotherhood narrative of Turkish government and President Erdoğan's welcoming stance towards the Syrians. Similarly, Assyrian refugees also faced discrimination in accessing to the Christian sections of the refugee camps organized by AFAD whose numbers were quite few in Turkey and for this reason, majority of them preferred to live with the Assyrian communities in Turkey; mostly located in the South-eastern regions or the city of Istanbul (Korkut, 2016, p.17). Taking these factors into account, one might also claim that the implementation of Turkey's open door policy towards Syrians during the initial stages of the Syrian Civil War also included certain problems in itself related with preferential treatment of certain refugees coming from different ethnic or religious backgrounds.

5.2.1 Turkey's Immigration Policies during 2016-2020 Period

This section aims to analyse the Turkey's immigration policies during 2016- 2020 period within the context of the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan activated on November 29th, 2015. Then, the domestic political context in Turkey during 2016-2020 period would be examined; through shedding light on the local government- central government relations as important factors for understanding the changing structure of Turkey's migration management. Final part of this chapter would examine the Turkish public opinion in the Turkish society towards the increasing number of Syrians in the country; through analysing the survey results

from the ‘Syrians Barometer 2020’ Survey series, conducted under the guidance of Prof. Murat Erdoğan and supported by UNHCR Turkey.

In comparison with Turkey's migration policies towards the refugees under temporary protection in Turkey, it is possible to claim that there was a shift towards a more centralized structure, with closer attention to national security that can be linked to the political upheaval following July 2016 coup attempt. To better analyse Turkey's migration management during the 2016-2020 period, applying for the Asylum Information Database (AIDA) Country Report on Turkey would be better. This report analysed the policy changes within Turkey's migration management by focusing on various categories like detention, temporary protection, detention of asylum seekers, and international protection. These categories will be examined one by one by focusing on the policy changes during the 2016-2020 period. Firstly, the EU- Turkey Joint Action Plan, which entered into force in 2016, will be examined, as it constituted an important component of Turkey's immigration policies starting from 2016. Then, the regulations adopted during the 2016-2020 period will be examined. In line with this analysis, the final part will focus on the domestic political context in Turkey following July 2016 and the Turkish public opinion on the issue of Syrians during the 2016 – 2020 period.

5.2 The EU-Joint Action Plan and Its Significance for Turkey's Immigration Policies

For better understanding Turkey's immigration policies during 2016-2020 period; it is important to specifically focus on the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan (JAP), the joint statement by the EU and Turkey for cooperation in the management of the migration crisis. On March 2016, the European Council and Turkey reached an agreement aimed at stopping the flow of irregular migration via Turkey to Europe and this plan identified measures to be implemented by the EU and Turkey with the aim of providing support to the Syrians under temporary

protection and their Turkish hosting communities (Bauböck, 2018, Euuropean Commission, 2015). According to the European Commission Report ‘EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan: Implementation Report’; the European Union and Turkey committed to the following terms below within the framework of the plan:

- The EU committed to further support Turkey to strengthen its capacity to combat smuggling, notably by reinforcing the Turkish Coast Guard patrolling and surveillance capacity as well as other relevant Turkish authorities.
- To ensure an efficient use of the funding, the EU institutions and Turkey will proceed with a comprehensive joint needs assessment as a basis for programming. The assessment would allow designing adequate actions to address the basic needs of Syrians under temporary protection and the communities and provinces hosting them, in order to help cope with the inflow of people, notably in terms of infrastructures.
- Turkey would receive 3 billion euros + additional 3 billion euros from the European Union funding mechanism to improve the humanitarian situation faced by the refugees in the country.

In addition to these terms, all new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands will be readmitted by Turkey; for every Syrian being readmitted to Turkey from the Greek islands, Syrian refugees who are in Turkey at the time of the statement will be resettled in the EU; the EU will provide Turkey with 3+3 billion euros under the EU program through the projects focusing on humanitarian assistance, education, migration management, and socio-economic support and for every Syrian returned to Turkey in the scheme, the EU pledged to resettle another in Europe up to around seventy two thousand and in return, the EU made several promises like acceleration of Turkey’s EU membership process and the acceleration of the reforming the Customs Union between the EU and Turkey. (European Commission 2016, “EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan”). In return, Turkey committed to step up cooperation with Bulgarian and Greek authorities to prevent irregular migration across the EU’s land borders,


continue its efforts to facilitate access for Syrians under temporary protection to public services including education, health, employment; step up its cooperation to smoothly readmit irregular migrants who are not in need of international protection and were intercepted coming through Turkey.

In accordance with the commitments indicated on the Joint Action plan EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan: Implementation Report (2016); Turkey introduced the visa obligation for Syrians travelling to Turkey by air or sea from a third country with the goal of reducing onward transit towards the EU; granted permission for Syrians under temporary protection to work in Turkey, as in the case of Temporary Protection Regulation (TPR) Work Permit Regulation adopted in January 2016.

Regarding to the EU's commitments in line with the joint action plan, the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) was launched in 2016 to help the most vulnerable refugees pay for the things they need most; based on the family-based needs. In line with the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan, the EU also created the fund named 'The Financial Assistance Program for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT)' with its total budget of 6 billion euros. However, it is worth highlighting that the money which was committed by the EU to be allocated to Turkey was planned to be sent to Turkey in return for projects; rather than sending directly to the Turkish authorities. A special commission was established for this support program for deciding on the projects to be supported through the NGOs. During 2016-2019 period, several projects like 'PIKTES' Project (Supporting the Integration of Syrian Children into the Turkish Education System), 'SIHHAT' Project (Migrant Health Centers Project), 'KIGEP' (Transition to Registered Employment Program) were initiated thanks to the FRIT funding.


The EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan was successful in terms of the goal of decreasing number of irregular migrants crossing from the Aegean Sea route. At the peak of the crisis in the year 2015, Greece was the asylum seekers' main arrival points in Europe, with more than 861,000 arrivals in Greece and the number dropped to 36,000 the year after the deal was signed, before climbing again to nearly 75,000 in 2019 (Terry 2021). Between the dates of April 4th 2016 and 31 January 2020, Turkey readmitted a total of 2,140 persons from Greece including citizens of Pakistan, Syria, Algeria, Afghanistan, Iraq and 26,135 Syrians had been resettled in the EU under the 1:1 scheme as of March 2020 (UNHCR 2020, "Returns from Greece to Turkey"). The Figure 15 and Figure 16 below show the composition of the overall returned irregular migrants in terms of their nationality and return trend of the irregular immigrants from Greece to Turkey,

Figure 15: Return Trend of the Irregular Immigrants from Greece to Turkey (April 2016 – March 2018)



Source: UNHCR (2020), 'Returns from Greece to Turkey (under EU-Turkey statement)'.

Figure 16: Nationality of the Immigrants Being Returned from Greece to Turkey (April 2016 – April 2020)



Source: UNHCR (2020), 'Returns from Greece to Turkey (under EU-Turkey statement)'.

However, criticisms were levelled at the EU–Turkey Joint Action Plan from both the EU side and the Turkish side. Several scholars and analysts claimed in their studies that Turkey cannot be considered a safe third country, and for this reason, the EU–Turkey Statement has the potential to risk violating the rights of asylum seekers, due to Turkey’s human rights record (Peers&Roman, 2016, Ulusoy&Batjes, 2017). The EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan could not achieve some of its targets. For instance, the promise of one-to-one resettlements took place less than the target number. As Ineli-Ciger & Ulusoy (2018) claimed in their reports, the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement aimed at ending large scale irregular arrivals of migrants and

asylum seekers to the EU by sea, without including supervision or accountability mechanism or any additional safeguards to ensure human rights are respected. Turkish authorities also accused the EU side for repetitive failures to deliver on its promises on the visa-free regime for Turkish citizens. Additionally, the agreement which aimed to improve the relationship between Turkey and the EU through its statement on energising the accession process of Turkey to the union ended up with deteriorating relations between Turkey and the EU.

Another important aspect of the EU-Turkey joint action plan was granting permission for Syrians under temporary protection to work in Turkey, in accordance with Turkey's commitments. The "Regulation Concerning Work Permits of Foreigners Under Temporary Protection", which was prepared based on the 29th Article of "Regulation on Temporary Protection", entered into force on 15 January 2016. According to this legislation, regulations concerning working of Syrians under temporary protection are stated:

- (i) Duration Condition: To have remained in Turkey with the temporary protection status for at least 6 months.
- (ii) Location Condition: Working is only possible in the city where the individual is registered, apart from exceptional cases.
- (iii) Quota: The number of workers under temporary protection cannot be more than 10% of the total number of workers at a business (if the citizens do not apply to a vacancy notice in 4 weeks, the quota can be surpassed)
- (iv) Employer Condition: Application for the work permit must be made by the employer with whom the foreigner under temporary protection will work
- (v) Wage Condition: A wage under the official minimum wage cannot be paid.
- (vi) İŞKUR: Foreigners under temporary protection can participate in the courses and programs organized by İŞKUR.
- (vii) Exception: An exception to the requirement of a work permit can be issued by provincial governorates for those who will work in seasonal agricultural and husbandry workers.

- (viii) Limitation: Syrians cannot apply to jobs and occupations which are exclusively limited for Turkish citizens by law.

5.3 Critical Analysis on Turkey's Immigration Policies during 2016-2020 Period

This section aims to analyse Turkey's migration management structure during the 2016-2020 period in a straightforward way. Firstly, the domestic political context in Turkey during the 2016-2020 period will be examined, through shedding light on the local government-central government relations representing important factors for understanding the changing structure of Turkey's migration management. The final part of this chapter will examine the Turkish public opinion in Turkish society towards the increasing number of Syrians in the country; by analysing the survey results from the 'Syrians Barometer 2020' Survey (Erdoğan, 2019), conducted under the guidance of Prof. Murat Erdoğan and supported by UNHCR Turkey.

In comparison with Turkey's migration management for the Syrian refugees under temporary protection in Turkey during the initial years of the Syrian Civil War, it is possible to observe a shift towards more centralized migration management during 2016-2020 period, with a closer attention to the national security that can be linked to the political upheaval following July 2016 coup attempt. To better analyse Turkey's migration management during the 2016-2020 period, applying for the Asylum Information Database (AIDA) Country Report on Turkey would be important. This report examined the policy changes within Turkey's migration management by focusing on various categories like detention, temporary protection, asylum seekers, and international protection procedures.

These categories would be examined one by one through focusing on the policy changes during 2016-2020 period.

1.) International Protection Procedures:

- a) Registration: As of 2018, the applications for international protection began to be registered by the Provincial Directorate for Migration Management (PDMM) in all 81 provinces; after the takeover of this process by DGMM and the termination of UNHCR's registration activities. As the AIDA Report (2019, p. 15) examined, this created confusions for refugees in terms of the lack of clarity on which "satellite city" was open to applications; problems for refugees to travel to the assigned province without being provided documentation facing risks of arrest and detention.
- b) Quality of the first-instance procedure: In line with the AIDA Report's analysis (2019, p.15) there was increasing lack of uniformity within the decision making at first instance for refugees. As result; the lack of identification of vulnerable groups, the lack of training of migration experts as well as the lack of available interpreters began to be reported during 2016-2020 period.

However, it is important to note that in line with the emergency decrees in Turkey following the July 2016 coup attempt; the derogation from the principle of non-refoulement for reasons such as public order, security and terrorism were being introduced in October 2016 was consolidated by law in February 2018; as it was examined in the Asylum Information Database (AIDA) Country Report on Turkey in 2018.

2.) Detention of asylum seekers:

- a) Increasing Detentions without legal basis: In line with AIDA Report's analysis (2019, p.16), there was overall increase in the Intensified police checks and apprehension of persons found outside their assigned "satellite city"; eventually leading to in removal Centres, even though there was no legal basis in the LFIP for detaining an applicant for

violating residence restrictions. Based on the July 2019 data from Istanbul PDMM, 42,888 irregular migrants were sent to detention centres in several cities; 6,416 unregistered Syrians were sent to temporary accommodation centres, between 12 July 2019 and 15 November 2019 (Istanbul PDMM Statement, 15 November 2019).

- b) Rising Detention Capacity: In 2018, temporary facilities were established in several cities of Iğdır, Osmaniye (Düziçi) and with increasing arrivals through the Iranian border, in April 2018 the DGMM resorted to other facilities for pre-removal detention due to capacity shortage in Erzurum and detained people in 3 sport venues (AIDA 2018, p.15). Detention capacity increased in 2019 with a total of 28 active Removal Centres accommodating 20,000 persons and other facilities were used for pre-removal detention due to capacity shortage including sport venues (AIDA 2019, p.16).

3.) Temporary protection

- a) Voluntary return: As it was being analysed in the AIDA Report (2019, p.18); it is possible to observe rise in the enforced signing of voluntary return forms in during 2018-2019 period; in line with misleading information provided by the Turkish authorities and based on the data from the AIDA Report; 42,888 irregular migrants were sent to detention centres in several cities and 6,416 unregistered Syrians were sent to temporary accommodation centres between July 2019 and November 2019.
- b) Access to services upon return to Turkey: In line with the DGMM Circular of 7 January 2019; persons returning to Turkey as of 1 January 2019 after having signed a “voluntary return document”, especially pregnant women, elderly persons, children, should be allowed to access certain services. However; it is worth noting that as AIDA Report (2019, p.18) highlighted; in with the political situation after the July 2016 coup attempt

and emergency rule in Turkey; several difficulties in getting temporary protection status were observed for reactivating the access to services once people are back in Turkey.

4.) Housing: Another important issue for the displaced people under temporary protection was housing. As AIDA Report (2019, p.18) also examines, it was possible to observe reduction in the numbers of the temporary accommodation centres (TACS) in Turkey during 2016-2020 period. As of February 27th, 2020, the total population of temporary protection beneficiaries registered with Turkish authorities was listed as 3,587,266; of which less than 2% were accommodated in the TACs, whereas 3,523,218 were resident outside the camps (AIDA 2019, p.18). The reduction in the temporary accommodation centres was important because it could lead to poor living conditions for the temporary protection beneficiaries.

Figure 17: Number of Syrians under Temporary Protection in Turkey (2011-2020)


YEAR	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
TOTAL NUMBER OF SYRIANS	14.237	224.655	1.519.286	2.503.549	2.824.441	3.426.786	3.623.192	3.576.370	3.641.370
NET NUMBER OF SYRIANS EACH YEAR	14.237	210.418	1.294.631	984.263	330.892	592.345	196.406	-46.822	65.000
POPULATION OF TURKEY (IN MILLIONS)	73.7	74.7	75.6	76.6	77.7	78.7	80.8	82.0	83.1
SYRIANS AS % OF TURKEY'S POPULATION	0,01	0,3	2,00	3,26	3,63	4,35	4,48	4,36	4,38

Source: DGMM: <https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638> (Access: 20.04.2023)

As can be seen from Figure 17, the total number of Syrians under temporary protection constantly increased; rising from 1,519,286 Syrians in 2014 to 3,641,370 Syrians under temporary protections. As of December 2022, almost 3.6 million Syrians were registered under temporary protection in Turkey and it is possible to claim that only one percent of these people are living in the six official temporary shelter centers or camps, in Adana, Hatay,

Kahramanmaraş, Kilis, and Osmaniye (Erdoğan 2021, p.59-60). The other Syrians are urban refugees scattered throughout the country, mostly in metropolitan cities like Istanbul, Izmir, Bursa and other cities along Turkey's southeast border with Syria, such as Kilis, Antep, Urfa, and Hatay. Approximately 100,000 Syrians received residence permits while around 200,000 have received Turkish citizenship (Directorate General of Migration Management, 2022). Figure 18 shows the temporal change in the numbers of Syrians under international protection, residence permit receivers and under temporary protection during the course of Syrian Civil War. As can be seen based on this data; in line with the adaptation of more stricter migration policies during 2016-2020 period, it is possible to observe some degree of declining trend in the number of the Syrians under international protection, decreasing from 66,167 in the year 2016 to 31,334 in the year 2020. While this declining trend can also be observable in the number of the Syrians under temporary protection during 2018-2019 period; it is difficult to assess the overall effect of the adaptation of stricter migration management regime in Turkey on the number of Syrians under temporary protection and the number of Syrians who received residence permits during 2016-2020 period.

Figure 18: Number of Syrians in Turkey under International Protection, Received Residence Permit, and under Temporary Protection (2011 – 2022)




Source: Presidency of Migration Management (PMM), 2022.

Although it is difficult to find the correct number of the refugees and temporary protection beneficiaries by their ethnic backgrounds, some data gives hindsight. As of 2014, it was being estimated that around 140,000 Syrian Kurds entered into Turkey fleeing from Syria (UNHCR estimates). Regarding to the number of Yazidis in Turkey, it is estimated that around 18,000 to 30,000 Yazidis were took refuge in Turkey; mostly hosted by the Yazidi communities who are Turkish citizens (Korkut 2016, p.15)

According to the UNHCR-Global Trends 2020 Report, there are approximately 6,7 million Syrian asylum seekers living in 126 different countries around the world and based on December 2020, the number of Syrians in Turkey living in Turkey was 3 million 641 thousand people, corresponding to 54,7% of all Syrians who were forced to leave their country (UNHCR Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2020; Erdoğan, 2021, p..25). The Figure 18 below also shows the number of apprehended irregular migrants in Turkey and between the years of 2016 and 2020, it is possible to observe significant increase in the number of irregular apprehended

migrants. The highest number of irregular migrants who were apprehended by the Turkish authorities was in the year 2019, with a record number of 454,662.

Figure 19: Number of Apprehended Irregular Migrants in Turkey (2005 – 2020)



Source: Erdoğan (2021). “Turkey: Syrians Barometer 2020- A Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion with Syrians in Turkey”, 2021; pp. 94.

Figure 19 above also gives hindsight about the temporal change in the number of apprehended irregular migrants in Turkey. More than 1 million 340 thousand irregular migrants, a majority of whom being from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan have been apprehended between 2015 and 2020 and around 70% of these irregular migrants were those who committed border violation, while 30% were Syrians who overstayed their visa or who departed from Turkey; as Erdoğan (2021,p.36) examined in his report based on the DGMM data. Based on Figure 19, it is possible to observe that there was a significant decline in the number of apprehended irregular migrants; declining from 454,662 in 2019 to 122,302 in the year 2020. This sharp decrease can also be linked with the more stricter and intensified migration management policies in Turkey during 2018-2019 period as AIDA Report (2019) provided more detailed analysis.

Figure 20 shows the number of registered Syrians in Turkey in year 2019. Based on this figure, the largest number of Syrians under temporary protection were living in Istanbul, with 494,634 Syrians, constituting 3,28% of the total population. Istanbul is followed by Gaziantep where 452,361 thousand Syrians representing 22,3% share of the population; Hatay with 440,469 Syrian residents with 27,36% share and Şanlıurfa with 424,596 registered Syrians under temporary protection (AIDA 2019, p.9).

Figure 20: The Top 15 Turkish Cities by the Number of Registered Syrians and Share of the Total Population

Province	Registered Syrian refugees	Total population in Province	Share of total
Istanbul	494,634	15,067,724	3.28%
Gaziantep	452,361	2,028,563	22.3%
Hatay	440,469	1,609,856	27.36%
Şanlıurfa	424,596	2,035,809	20.86%
Adana	246,043	2,220,125	11.08%
Mersin	208,425	1,814,468	11.49%
Bursa	175,308	2,994,521	5.85%
Izmir	146,435	4,320,519	3.39%
Kilis	115,113	142,541	80.76%
Konya	113,250	2,205,609	5.13%
Ankara	95,998	5,503,985	1.74%
Kahramanmaraş	92,383	1,144,851	8.07%
Mardin	85,517	829,195	10.55%
Kayseri	75,512	1,389,680	5.43%
Kocaeli	55,003	1,906,391	2.89%

Source: AIDA (2019), ‘ Turkey Country Report’, p.9.

Overall, it is possible to claim that Turkey’s immigration policies towards the Syrian immigrants during 2016-2020 period became much more centralized, systemic and stricter; in comparison with the initial years of the Syrian Civil War. Table 10 below provides a comparative analysis of Turkey’s migration management policies towards the Syrian refugees. In this section, this shift was predominantly examined within the context of the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan but the next section would also analyse other factors like the domestic political context in Turkey following the July 2016 coup attempt and rising negative Turkish public opinion towards the Syrians.

Table 10: Comparative Analysis of Turkey’s Syrian Refugee Policies during 2011-2015 and during 2016-2020 Period

The early years of the Syrian Civil War (2011-2015 Period)	2016– 2020 Period (Starting with the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan
Adoption of the “Open-Door” Policy	Limitations on the Rights of the Refugees and Temporary Protection Beneficiaries, in line with Domestic Political Situations

Viewing the Refugee Crisis as Short-Term Issue; the Adoption of “Temporary Protection Status”	Shift from “Temporary Protection Status” towards Integration-Related Policies
Migration Management through Establishing Camps	Integration-Related Policies, Increase in the Number of Refugees living in Metropolitan Cities
Limited Involvement of International Agencies	Increasing Involvement of International Agencies; through EU-Turkey Deal in 2016
Regulations on the Working Rights of the Refugees; in line with the Temporariness	Adoption of Additional Regulations on the working rights of the Immigrants
Lack of Up-to-date Tools for Access to the Information on the Refugees	More Systematic Approach on the Access to Migration Registration System (e.g., ‘GÖÇ-NET)

As of 2015, The Turkish authorities began to realize that the Syrian refugee crisis was not a temporary issue, unlike their first impressions after the arrival of the first Syrians to Turkey in 2011. This necessitated the implementation of more systematic and wholistic regulations. Secondly; along with the EU-Turkey deal in 2016 and the start of EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan for dealing with the irregular migrants; there was increase in the involvement of international mechanisms as in the case of the ‘EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey’, the responsible mechanism for coordinating a total of €6 billion in support to refugees and host communities in the country. The European Emergency Social Net (ESSN) which was launched in 2016 also aimed to help the most vulnerable refugees pay for the things they need most; based on the family-based needs. Through the EU humanitarian funding and partnership between the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), as well

as with the Turkish Red Crescent Society and Turkish government institutions, refugees living in Turkey could receive humanitarian support through cash assistance programs, managed by the Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations. Finally, it is possible to claim that there was also shift towards a more systematic approach Turkey's migration registration system. Directorate General of Migration Management launched its new migration registration system "GÖÇ-NET" with its database open to the public access including information on residence permits irregular migration and other key issues related to all foreigners in Turkey.

5.4.1 Domestic Political Context in Turkey following the July 2016 Coup Attempt

In this section, it is aimed to shed light on the internal factors behind Turkey's shift towards more centralized migration management regime during 2016-2020 period; with its more focus on domestic security through implementing more stricter immigration policies. This section would firstly examine the domestic politics in Turkey following the July 2016 coup attempt. Then, Turkish political parties' policy stances would be examined to better understand the tensions between the central government and local governments during 2016-2020 period on the implementation of immigration policies, especially governed by the opposition parties. Final part of this section would focus on the Turkish public opinion towards the increasing number of Syrians in the country; through analysing the survey results from the 'Syrians Barometer 2020' survey.

As it was previously stated, Turkey's migration policy towards the immigrants and refugees during 2016-2020 period put more emphasis on Turkey's domestic security. It is possible to observe the adaptation of more restrictive regulations on various areas of the migration management regime like international temporary protection procedures for temporary protection beneficiaries, procedures for asylum seekers in the country. There are several factors which are useful for understanding the shift towards more centralised migration management, emphasizing domestic security due to the political situation in Turkey following the July 2016 coup attempt.

In line with the political upheaval in the country after the July 2016 coup attempt, more than 100,000 civil servants have been purged, nearly 1,500 NGOs were closed including humanitarian civil society associations for their alleged links to the 'FETÖ' terror organization as called by the Turkish government (Anadolu Agency 2017). The emergency rule (*OHAL*) which was introduced just after the coup attempt continued until the year 2018 and the Turkish government introduced more security-based policies which aimed to ensure domestic security in the country; while putting limitations on the activities of civil society organizations, NGOs; including for the ones who had been conducting projects for the immigrants and refugees in Turkey. Starting in mid-2017, Turkish government decided to cancel several authorisation protocols being signed between the NGOs and district or provincial governorates and it also required the NGOs to sign additional protocols with Ministry of Education. These policies ultimately negatively affected the role of the NGOs who had been conducting humanitarian

projects. One example was the Association for Solidarity with Asylum-Seekers and Migrants (SGDD- (*Sığınmacılar ve Göçmenlerle Yardımlaşma Derneği* or known as ‘SGDD-ASAM’). Founded as impartial, independent non-profit organization in Ankara in 1995; SGDD-ASAM continues to conduct projects for assisting asylum seekers, refugees in Turkey for accessing rights and services like access to healthcare, education; as well supporting their psychosocial well-being, social cohesion through collaborating with international NGOs, humanitarian organizations like UNICEF, United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), European Union Facility for Refugees in Turkey (SGDD-ASAM, 2023). After the cancellation of the previous protocols by the Turkish government; SGDD-ASAM which had been running teaching centres in 15 provinces around Turkey also had to suspend its language teaching programs in 2017 and this ultimately affected the all language education programs provided for the Syrians negatively (International Crisis Group, ‘Turkey’s Syrian Refugees: Defusing Metropolitan Tensions’, 2018: p.20).

Following the coup attempt, nearly 25,000 police officers were also removed from office and this ultimately affected Turkey’s migration management in terms of ensuring security among the local population and the Syrian migrants, refugees. According to the International Crisis Group (2018, p.19) Report ‘Turkey’s Syrian Refugees: Defusing Metropolitan Tensions’ which conducted interviews with the local Kurdish population of several neighbourhoods hosting Syrians like Sultangazi district of Istanbul; it was possible to observe more distrust towards the security forces among the local Kurdish population after the coup attempt, due to the police impunity against the Kurdish youth and this frustration sometimes could be channelled through violence against the Syrians of the district. In August 2017, Turkish authorities introduced the system of “neighbourhood guards”; tasked with

patrolling urban areas, monitoring local tensions between the local population and the Syrians for ensuring security; identifying the groups which were vulnerable in the neighbourhoods.

The introduction of this system of neighbourhood guards came just one month after the clashes between the local population and the Syrians in Izmir's Torbalı district in August 2017; led to the escalation into a mob attack against the Syrians by the locals and resulted with the leaving of 500 Syrians from the district ("İzmir'de 'mahalle' kavgası; 30 kişi yaralandı, 500 Suriyeli mahalleyi terk etti!"). In line with the emergency rule in the country, security forces could conduct more intensified checks during that period. In the cases when Syrians were found outside of their assigned cities, they could face detentions in Removal centres. However, there was no legal basis indicated in the LFIP for detaining applicants for the causes like violating their residence restrictions. Hence, it is possible to claim that the adoption of stricter policies with more focus on security and order also affected Turkey's migration management during 2016-2020 period as being directly linked with the political situation in the country after the July 2016 coup attempt.

Following the coup attempt, it is also possible to observe rising tensions between the local governorates, which the opposition parties ran and the ruling party, AKP party, in terms of their diverging migration management towards the Syrians in Turkey. The local governments play crucial role in the implementation of migration policies and there are several studies within the literature which examined the effectiveness of the municipalities in terms of their migration management strategies and their coordination with the central government decisions. Betts & al. (2021)'s research points out that municipalities with mayors from the AKP party in Turkey are more active in compensating for the gaps that state institutions leave in terms of delivering the needs of the forcibly displaced groups. The ideological affinity between the ruling AKP party and the local governors affected the policies adopted by the local

governors towards the Syrians and their collaborations with NGOs which were creating projects for migrants based on religious solidarity. As Danış and Nazlı (2019, p.153) pointed out in their articles, the local governments run by the ruling party AKP were successful in establishing ties with refugees through their contacts with faith-based NGOs. This can be observable especially in the case of Gaziantep Metropolitan Municipality's migration management policy on which several scholars provided a detailed analysis. Özçürümez and İçduygu (2020) examined the case of Gaziantep Metropolitan Municipality and they classified this municipality as 'centralized small world networks' in that the municipality successfully implemented many donor-funded projects in social service delivery for the Syrian population in the city; through its direct network interactions with many international organizations like EU, UNHCR, UNICEF and its connections with faith-based organizations. The International Crisis Group (2018) Report 'Turkey's Syrian Refugees: Defusing Metropolitan Tensions' provides detailed analysis on the tensions between the local governments and the central government through conducting interviews with both Turkish authorities and the Syrians. According to these interviews conducted with several mayors of the municipalities like the Beşiktaş municipality in Istanbul governed by the CHP; there was a common statement expressed by the mayors that state authorities tended to not share any data on the number of refugees living there or on any other refugee-related issues with the municipality (International Crisis Group, 'Turkey's Syrian Refugees: Defusing Metropolitan Tensions', 2018:p.10). This is important for understanding the lack of cooperation between the state authorities and the local governments in terms of the migration management policies during 2016-2020 period.

After the 2019 local elections in Turkey, tensions increased between the local and central governments concerning the migration management towards the Syrians became more visible, especially between the central government and municipalities that the opposition

parties governed. Following the 2019 local elections in Turkey, the ruling party AKP lost the governance of several municipalities to the main opposition party CHP like the Bolu municipality, and metropolitan municipalities like Antalya, Ankara, and most importantly, Istanbul. The local elections in Istanbul resulted in the election of Ekrem Imamoğlu from the main opposition party CHP as the new mayor of Istanbul. As the new mayor, Imamoğlu stated that the Syrians could not be allowed to change the colour of the city of Istanbul 'recklessly' (Al Yafai, 2019), and this represented an important signal for the policy change of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality towards the Syrians living in the city.

The case of the newly-elected mayor of the city of Bolu, Tanju Özcan, can also be given as an example for understanding the position of the municipalities run by the opposition parties towards the Syrians as demonstrated by his negative stance towards the Syrians living in the city. With around 130,000 population, the city of Bolu hosted around 12,000 refugees in 2019, 2,400 of them were Syrians. During his years in his office, he initiated several plans for the refugees and immigrants in the city, which sparked tensions between the Turkish government and the Bolu municipality and criticism in Turkish society. These policies included charging the Syrians with a tenfold water bill on July 2nd, 2021 ('Mayor's plan to charge 'foreigners' 10 times higher water bill sparks debate', 2021), promising to terminate relief programs for Syrians, charging foreigners additional Turkish Liras for marriage ('Turkish mayor plans to charge foreigners thousands of lira for weddings in yet another racist policy' 2021). In July 2019, the municipal council of the Gazipaşa district of Antalya also decided to ban the entry of Syrians to the beaches in Gazipaşa. Although the mayor of Gazipaşa, from the main opposition party CHP, opposed this decision,

the municipal council first accepted the decision. However, later it was rejected after the re-voting ("Gazipaşa'da Suriyeli sığınmacılara yönelik plaj yasağı reddedildi," 2019).

From these aspects, it is possible to observe that following the 2019 local elections in Turkey, the diverging policy stances between the ruling party AKP and the main opposition party CHP became more visible within the context of the diverging opinions between the local governments run by the opposition parties (mostly the main opposition party CHP) and the ruling AKP on the migration management policies towards the Syrian immigrants and refugees. It is important to note the rising negative public opinion in Turkish society towards the Syrians was also one of the key themes during the 2019 local elections, and opposition parties effectively used this issue towards the Turkish government to obtain more support from their electorates.

5.4.2 The Turkish Political Parties' Policy Stances on the Issue of Syrian Migrants in Turkey during 2016 – 2020 Period

In this section, Turkish political parties' policy stances on the Syrian immigrants in the country during 2016-2020 period would be examined. It should be kept in mind that political parties' policy stances on certain issues like the immigration may change in line with their electorates' concerns like competition for jobs and national security. In many countries, populist parties tend to increasingly adopt anti-immigration political stances; perceiving the immigrants as possible threat to their culture. For the case of European populist right-wing parties, immigration has been becoming one of the most significant issue through which these parties can garner the public support (Rooduijn, 2018). In the Turkish case, it can also be said that opposition parties from different ideologies also tended to depict Syrian refugees as security and social threats, an economic burden through their effects on the rising unemployment and finally a source of crime with high potential for committing criminal

offenses (Yanaşmayan et al., 2019, p.44).

Opposition parties in Turkey criticized the Turkish government's reception policy related with the AKP's and President Erdoğan's foreign policy mistakes during the early years of the Syrian conflict. The instrumentalization of the Syrian refugees as bargaining tool against the EU is clearly criticized by the opposition parties and some political parties described the AKP's policies on the management of Syrian refugees as 'sectarian'. For instance, the pro-Kurdish party HDP MPs like HDP Erol Dora accentuated in one of his speeches that the provision of education in the mother tongue is provided to Sunni Arab children in camps but not to the children coming from Kurdish, Assyrian, and Yezidi backgrounds (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (24.03.2015), Session 83). Another example was from the nationalist MHP party which emphasized the unity between the Turkmens in Syria and Turks and the MHP PM Sinan Oğan expressed its criticism towards the Turkish government's differential treatment towards the Syrian Arab refugees that was not extended to Syrian Turkmens waiting at the Turkish-Syria border for crossing to Turkey (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (04.08.2014), Session 128).

From 2015 until the 2018 presidential elections in Turkey, it is possible to observe changes in the main opposition party CHP's policy stance on the Syrian migrants issue. As Yanaşmayan et al. (2019, p.41) analysed in their article; the CHP began to emphasize the equal access of Syrian refugees by improving their access to education; while defending their eventual return. However, opposition parties as in the case of CHP continued to direct their criticisms towards the AKP's overall Syria policy; expressing their concerns about

demographic changes in Turkish society in line with the increasing number of Syrians in the country. During the 2018 general elections, the party's candidate for the presidential elections, Muharrem Ince frequently stated during his election campaign that as long as he was elected as President after the elections, he would not have allowed the Syrians to return Turkey after their short-term visits to Syria for celebrating religious feasts (Yanaşmayan et al., 2019, p.41). Regarding to the newly-founded İyi Party's policy stance on the issue; it is possible to claim that it was predominantly based on utilizing the general discontent towards the Syrian immigrants, emphasizing the 'burden' of the refugees on the Turkish economy. The party promised to embrace non-arrival policies by not accepting new refugees to Turkey.

Overall, opposition parties in the Turkish parliament directed their criticisms on Turkey's Syria policy towards the AKP and President Erdoğan through focusing on various points. The AKP and President Erdoğan's response towards the criticisms from the opposition parties on the issue of the Syrian refugees also varied; emphasizing the 'collective past' between the Turkish and Syrians through the Ottoman Empire and Turkey's moral responsibility to protect the oppressed ones. It is also possible to observe that criticisms from the Turkish government towards specific opposition parties focused on the history of these political parties. For instance, President Erdoğan linked the dissent expressed by the secularist, social-democratic main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) with the party's ideological affinity with the Arab Socialist Baath Party in Syria; which came to the power through 1963 coup d'état in Syria and has been the main governing party since that year under the leadership of Hafez Al-Assad 1971-2000 period) and Bashar Al-Assad (2017-present). In line with this, he perceived the CHP and the Ba'ath Party as both elitist parties against the people's will with their pro-coup mentality. During his several speeches, President Erdoğan

stated that there was an emotional bond between CHP and the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party which took over the government in Syria through a coup d'état in 1963.


For better understanding the Turkish political parties' policy stances towards the issue of Syrian refugees, it would be better to apply for Deniz Sert, Evren Balta and Ezgi Elçi (2022)'s new research 'Political party representation of anti-immigration attitudes: The case of Turkey'. In this research, the authors conducted content analysis of 900 parliamentary group speeches of Turkey's five major parties represented in the parliament; namely Justice and Development Party (AKP), Republican People's Party (CHP), People's Democratic Party HDP, Nationalist Action Party (MHP), and the İyi Party between June 2011 and December 2021.

In terms of the methodology, holistic grading rubric that used by previous studies to measure populism was applied by the authors, through conducting pilot tests based on the rubric. Finally, they distributed the policy speeches to the five coders who entered their into the links based on the rubric; after generating a Qualtrics page for coding to minimize potential errors (Balta et al., 2022, p.24). Additionally, the authors conduct semi-structured interviews with party officials responsible for migration policies; including the other parties like Felicity Party (SP), Workers' Party of Turkey (TİP), Democracy and Progress Party (DEVA), The Future Party (GP) and they asked questions on the other political parties and figures that they use to benchmark their migration policy and their proposals regarding the issue of immigrants (Balta et al., 2022, p.25). This study aimed to measure the saliency of the migration issue in each speech (whether the speech mentioned about refugees or immigration) and the tone of the

speech (whether the speech included anti-immigrant discourse). Based on the research analysis, 219 of total 900 policy speeches of the five main political parties in Turkish parliament mentioned about the issue of migration. The overall saliency of the issue of immigrants and tone of the parties' policy speeches were represented in the Figure 24 and Figure 25.

Based on Figure 21 and Figure 22, it is observable that the issue of Syrian immigrants and its discussion by the political parties did not evolve into a completely anti-immigrant discourse; as the temporal change in the tone of the speeches did not exceed the mean level (0.5). Regarding to the saliency of the Syrian immigrants issue, it is possible to observe the rise in the saliency after the year 2014 and reaching to the peak level in 2015; coinciding with the Syrian refugee crisis. The highest level in the saliency of the Syrian migrants issue was in 2018; which can be related with the 2018 general elections in Turkey and Turkey's military operations in Syria, Operation Olive Branch.


Figure 21: The Tone and Saliency of the Issue of Syrian Refugees in Party Speeches of the Five Key Turkish Political Parties



Source: Balta, Elçi and Sert (2022); 'Political party representation of anti-immigration


attitudes: The case of Turkey', p.14. (Note: The horizontal black line indicates the midpoint of the scale and vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.)

Figure 22: Temporal Change in the Tone and Saliency of the Issue of Syrian refugees in Party Speeches (2011-2021)



Source: Balta, Elçi and Sert (2022); ‘Political party representation of anti-immigration attitudes: The case of Turkey’, p.14.


Figure 23: The Tone and Saliency of the Issue of Syrian refugees by Political Party and Year



Source: Balta, Elçi and Sert (2022); ‘Political party representation of anti-immigration attitudes: The case of Turkey’, p.17. (Note: The horizontal black line indicates the midpoint of the scale and the missing values in the tone indicates that those speeches mentioned Syrian refugees non-evaluatively.)

Figure 23 above shows the temporal change in the tone and saliency of the Syrian immigrants issue by the five key political parties in the Turkish parliament. In line with these results, it is possible to observe that the AKP and HDP took a more positive stance on the Syrian migrants issue as their tone levels below the 0.5 midpoint level. However; the other opposition parties like CHP, MHP and Iyi Party had all tone levels higher than the midpoint had all tone levels higher than the midpoint level; suggesting that they tended to have negative stance on the Syrian migrants issue. Nevertheless, it is difficult to assess the temporal change of the tone level for the MHP because of its alliance with the AKP starting from the 2017 Referendum and during the 2018 Presidential and General elections in Turkey. It is worth noting that the most temporal change is observable in the MHP's political tone on the migrants issue. Although the party's political tone on the issue was the much more negative than other parties; reaching to the highest level above the midpoint level (0.75) in the year 2015; the political tone of the MHP in its policy speeches on the Syrian migrants decreased and evolved into a more positive stance; possibly linked with the alliance between the MHP and AKP started with the 2017 referendum. Finally for the Iyi Party's political tone, it is also possible to observe change in the party political tone's on the issue since its foundation in 2017; evolving towards more neutral stance. Overall, the saliency of the Syrian migrants for these political parties reached to its peak level during 2015–2016 in line with the Syrian refugee crisis and showed a decreasing trend for all parties starting from the year 2020. This can be linked to the changing policy priorities of the parties like economic problems in Turkey.

Figure 24: The Frequency of the Proposed Solutions for the Syrian Refugee crisis by the Five Key Turkish Political Parties



Source: Balta, Elçi and Sert (2022); ‘Political party representation of anti-immigration attitudes: The case of Turkey’, p.17. (Note: Based on the interviewees’ response towards the question “What solution does the speaker propose regarding immigration?”)

Figure 24 gives us hindsight about the political parties' proposals on the Syrian refugee crisis; based on their responses during the semi-structured interviews As Balta, Elçi and Sert (2022, p.20) analysed the respondents' answers in a more detailed way; it is possible to observe various solution proposals expressed by the parties. Based on the interviewees' responses on migration policy proposals of their parties; it can be said that while the AKP and the MHP tended to advocate the voluntary return of refugees in their policy proposals; the İyi Party defended the safe-zone approach if it proves impossible to normalize relations with Assad and establish order in Syria. However, none of the party representatives mentioned about the role of normalizing relations with the Assad regime as a condition for return of the Syrian refugees during interviews, instead focusing more on Turkey's role in Syria as a condition for a partial return.

In conclusion, one of the key points of disagreement among the Turkish political parties concerning Syrian immigrants from the start of the Syrian Civil War until the year 2020 was predominantly Turkish government's policy mistakes in its Syria policy. As several scholars like Karakaya-Polat (2018), Ihlamur-Öner (2014), İçduygu (2015), Özden (2013) argued in their studies, the AKP's discourse on Syrian refugees is predominantly based upon religious solidarity, as well as Turkey's historical responsibility arising from the Ottoman past; rather than a universal human rights approach. While the main ruling party AKP defended its Syria policy in line with the humanitarian approach; the main opposition party CHP and the pro-Kurdish party HDP tended to view this policy as expansionist and sectarian; arguing that the Sunni Muslim Syrians were given priority, whereas the Turkish government outcasted Alawite and Yazidi immigrants. The case of MHP represented distinct case in that its relatively anti-migrant stance towards the Syrian refugees shifted towards a more pro-immigrant stance after the alliance between the MHP and the AKP.

Another important aspect which is important for Turkey's migration management during 2016-2020 period was understanding the dynamics of the relations between the central government and local municipalities in Turkey. It is important to note that Turkey's centralized immigration policy regime before 2016 already gave limited autonomy to the local governments and the Turkish legislations did not clearly specify the responsibilities of municipalities in this field, as well as not indicating the specific funds for local governments for their engagement within the migration management. The Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) charged the public authorities under the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) within the Ministry of Interior at the national and local levels (LFIP 2013). However, it is worth noting that the municipalities were not able to go beyond

the national policy's terms in every issue areas and they could not contribute to policy making by offering suggestions to DGMM in a cooperative framework (LFIP 2013, Article 96). The services of the municipalities to non-Turkish nationals were being justified with Article 13 of the Municipality Law, entitling them to provide aid, services, and information to all those residing within their territories (Law No. 5393, Townsman's Law, 2015).

5.5 Turkish Public Opinion Towards Syrian Immigrants

In this section, Turkish public opinion towards Syrian immigrants will be analysed; based on the data from the Syrians Barometer Survey Series conducted by UNHCR under the guidance of Professor Murat Erdoğan. Syrians Barometer survey is based on the research conducted on large representative samples complemented with focus group discussions. The 'Syrians Barometer' surveys are based on the results obtained from face-to-face interviews conducted across 26 cities in Turkey, with 2,259 Turkish respondents selected by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK) and 6,953 Syrians under temporary protection in 1,414 households across 15 cities; the confidence interval stands at ± 2.06 for Turkish people (Erdoğan, 2021, pp. 258-59). The surveys were conducted between December 15, 2020 - January 12, 2021, and the survey sample was selected with the diversity of sex, age, border cities/metropolitan cities/others, educational attainment, occupation, and ethnic background. Additionally, the survey questionnaires for Turkish citizens were administered in the city centres of 26 cities at the NUTS-2 level, with individuals of 18 years of age or older who have the capacity to answer the questions, and in the selection of individual respondents, simple random sampling was used; the number of surveys to be conducted in each city was determined according to their respective populations (Erdoğan, 2021, p. 85).

Figure 25: Composition of the Turkish Respondents Participating in ‘Syrians Barometer 2020’ Sample by Cities

Cities							
		#	%			#	%
1	İstanbul	358	15,9	14	Trabzon	74	3,3
2	Ankara	133	5,9	15	Kayseri	68	3,0
3	Adana	110	4,9	16	Konya	66	2,9
4	İzmir	109	4,8	17	Van	64	2,8
5	Bursa	103	4,6	18	Mardin	63	2,8
6	Kocaeli	102	4,5	19	Tekirdağ	59	2,6
7	Şanlıurfa	97	4,3	20	Balikesir	58	2,6
8	Manisa	92	4,1	21	Kirikkale	55	2,4
9	Hatay	92	4,1	22	Malatya	49	2,2
10	Antalya	87	3,9	23	Erzurum	45	2,0
11	Samsun	82	3,6	24	Zonguldak	44	1,9
12	Aydin	82	3,6	25	Ağrı	44	1,9
13	Gaziantep	80	3,5	26	Kastamonu	43	1,9
Total						2259	100,0

Source: Erdoğan (2021); “Turkey: Syrians Barometer-2020: A Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion in Turkey”; pp. 89. (Note: The survey sample of ‘Syrian Barometer-2020’ was designed as a representative one on the basis of Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) Level 2 (NUTS-2), which was determined by TUIK.)

Figure 26: ‘Syrians Barometer 2020’ Survey Sample by Regions

Region	Border Cities	Other Cities			
		Metropolitan Cities	Other (non-metropolitan and non-border) Cities		
Cities	Adana	Ankara	Ağrı	Kastamonu	Manisa
	Gaziantep	İstanbul	Antalya	Kayseri	Samsun
	Hatay	İzmir	Aydın	Kırıkkale	Tekirdağ
	Mardin		Balıkesir	Kocaeli	Trabzon
	Şanlıurfa		Bursa	Konya	Van
			Erzurum	Malatya	Zonguldak
Number of Surveys Conducted	442	600	1.217		
Survey Rate %	% 19,6	% 26,5	% 53,9		
	% 19,6	% 80,4			

Source: Erdoğan (2021); “Turkey: Syrians Barometer 2020- A Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion with Syrians in Turkey”, p. 91. (Note: The data collected from the border cities (Adana, Gaziantep, Hatay, Mardin, Şanlıurfa) that have been hosting large number of Syrians is compared with data collected from other cities.)

Figure 27: Demographic and Occupational Characteristics of the Participants in ‘Syrians Barometer 2020’ Survey

	#	%		#	%
Sex			Region		
Female	1116	49,4	Border Cities	442	19,6
Male	1143	50,6	Metropolitan Cities	600	26,5
Age Groups			Other Cities	1217	53,9
18–24	697	30,8	Occupations		
25–34	512	22,7	Private Sector Employee	531	23,5
35–44	494	21,9	Artisans/Tradesmen	405	17,9
45–54	330	14,6	Housewife	366	16,2
55–64	162	7,2	Student	349	15,5
65 and above	64	2,8	Unemployed	189	8,4
Educational Attainment			Retired	117	5,2
Illiterate / Literate but not graduate of any school	53	2,4	Public Sector Employee	113	5,0
Primary school graduate	436	19,3	Self-Employed	110	4,9
Middle-school graduate	346	15,3	Businessperson	57	2,5
High-school or equivalent graduate	938	41,5	Other	10	0,4
University graduate / holder of graduate degree	486	21,5	No Answer	12	0,5

Source: Erdoğan (2021); “Turkey: Syrians Barometer 2020- A Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion with Syrians in Turkey”, p. 90. (Note: The findings from the representative sample of Syrian Barometer- 2020 survey were broken down into various categories based on sex, age group, geographic location, educational attainment.)

Figure 28: The Most Appropriate Expressions to Describe Syrians Expressed by the Survey Respondents (Including Multiple Responses)

		2017		2019		2020	
		#	%	#	%	#	%
1	They are victims who escaped persecution/war	1208	57,8	794	35,0	863	38,2
2	They are burdens on us	899	43,0	896	39,5	755	33,4
3	They are people who did not protect their homeland	-	-	940	41,4	559	24,7
4	They are dangerous people who will cause us a lot of troubles in the future	814	39,0	954	42,0	518	22,9
5	They are guests in our country	424	20,3	495	21,8	512	22,7
6	They are our brothers and sisters with the same religion	433	20,7	446	19,6	366	16,2
7	They are exploited people as cheap labor	298	14,3	308	13,6	290	12,8
8	They are beggars/people who entirely rely on assistance	509	24,4	343	15,1	257	11,4
9	They are different from and strangers to us	376	18,0	448	19,7	206	9,1
10	They are harmless people	306	14,6	158	7,0	165	7,3
11	Other	15	0,7	42	1,8	14	0,6
	No idea/ No response	32	1,5	20	0,9	33	1,5

Source: Erdoğan (2021); “Turkey: Syrians Barometer 2020- A Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion with Syrians in Turkey”, p. 94. (The respondents were given list of 10 concepts and they were asked which concepts best reflect their view of Syrians.)

In order to measure the social distance between the Turkish people and the Syrians, Syrians Barometer-2020 adopts the methodology of “Cluster and Discriminant analyses.” Within this methodology, based on the respondents’ answers to specific questions, which was indicated in Figure 7, the scoring was conducted by assigning “1” to those who said “I agree” and “0” to those who said “I partly agree” and “-1” to those who said “I disagree”; then calculating the average scores for the responses to measure the overall social distance score and finally using the “Cluster analysis” to form 5 groups; whose appropriateness was confirmed with the “Discriminant analysis” based on the 98.5% correlation (Erdoğan, 2021, pp. 113-114). The questions which were asked to the respondents were stated in Figure 33.

Figure 29: The Responses For the Question: “To what extent do you agree with the following statements? (%)”

			I Disagree -	I Partially Agree - / +	I Agree +	No idea/ No response
	It wouldn't disturb me if Syrian children would enroll to the same school as my children	2020	43,7	16,3	37,0	3,0
		2019	52,0	13,2	32,3	2,5
	It wouldn't disturb me to work with a Syrian in the same work place	2020	48,1	17,1	32,4	2,4
		2019	56,3	12,6	28,2	2,9
	It wouldn't disturb me to live with a Syrian in the same building	2020	53,4	17,9	26,5	2,2
		2019	60,4	14,8	23,3	1,5
	It wouldn't disturb me if some Syrian families would settle down in the neighborhood that I live	2020	53,0	18,2	26,3	2,5
		2019	59,4	14,2	24,7	1,7
	I can be friends with a Syrian	2020	54,7	17,8	25,6	1,9
		2019	61,1	15,4	21,8	1,7
	It wouldn't disturb me to settle down in a neighborhood where the majority of residents are Syrian	2020	62,3	14,5	20,9	2,3
		2019	70,5	11,3	16,7	1,5
	I can form a business partnership with a Syrian	2020	72,7	12,1	11,9	3,3
		2019	75,3	10,2	12,1	2,4
	I can form a business partnership with a Syrian	2020	77,4	9,5	10,4	2,7
		2019	81,3	8,5	8,2	2,0
	I would allow my child to get married with a Syrian	2020	78,7	9,4	9,3	2,6
		2019	81,5	8,5	7,6	2,4
	I can get married with a Syrian	2020	84,7	6,1	6,6	2,6
			86,9	6,6	5,0	1,5

Source: Erdoğan (2021); “Turkey: Syrians Barometer 2020- A Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion with Syrians in Turkey”, p. 116. (Note: Syrian Barometer-2017, Syrian Barometer-2019 and Syrian Barometer-2020 were the survey series conducted under the guidance of Prof. Murat Erdoğan and in these three surveys, the same questions which were stated in this figure were asked to the respondents.)

Figure 30: Comparative Analysis of Research Findings on the Social Distance Groups Participating in Syrians Barometer 2017 and Syrians Barometer 2019

	SB-2017			SB-2019			SB-2020		
	#	%	Social Distance Score	#	%	Social Distance Score	#	%	Social Distance Score
Very distant	748	36,1	-0,95	1157	51,0	-0,97	792	35,2	-0,99
Distant	555	26,8	-0,51	347	15,3	-0,55	589	26,2	-0,62
Neither distant, nor close	363	17,5	-0,02	383	16,9	-0,10	428	19,1	-0,11
Close	220	10,6	0,44	244	10,8	0,36	282	12,6	0,38
Very close	186	9,0	0,88	135	6,0	0,87	156	6,9	0,86
General	2072	100,0	-0,36	2266	100,0	-0,51	2247	100,0	-0,42
*Some individuals who didn't provide answers to the social distance questions (17 in SB-2017, 5 in SB- 2019, and 12 in SB-2020) were not included in the social distance groups.									

Source: Erdoğan (2021); "Turkey: Syrians Barometer 2020- A Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion with Syrians in Turkey", 2021: p.116.

Based on the research findings represented in Figure 30, it is possible to observe that Turkish citizens tend to perceive themselves as distant towards the Syrians, as the distance score increased from “-0,36” in the year 2017 to “-0,51” in 2019, whereas decreasing to the score “-0,42” in 2020. Also, the percentage of the respondents who called them ‘very distant’ towards the Syrians constituted 36,1% of all respondents in SB-2017; this increased to 51% of all respondents in SB-2019 and decreased to 35,2% of all respondents in SB-2020. Regarding the respondents who called themselves ‘very close’ in terms of the percentage of all respondents, it is possible to observe a decrease from 9% of all respondents in SB-2017 to 6% of all respondents in SB-2019, while an increase in SB-2020. Overall, it can be claimed that between 2017 and 2019, it is possible to observe a more negative stance towards the Syrians as the percentage of Turkish people who called

themselves ‘distant’ towards Syrians increased. The results show that there is still a tendency among the Turkish people to distance themselves from the Syrians, despite the ruling party AKP’s emphasis on the solidarity between the Syrians and Turkish people.

Figure 31: Demography of the Social Distance Groups Participated in ‘Syrians Barometer 2020’ Survey (%)

	Very distant	Distant	Neither distant, nor close	Close	Very close
Sex					
Female	34,9	26,7	19,8	12,8	5,8
Male	35,6	25,8	18,3	12,3	8,0
Age Groups					
18-24	31,2	27,2	20,6	16,7	4,3
25-34	33,1	26,8	21,8	11,4	6,9
35-44	39,4	24,6	18,1	10,4	7,5
45-54	37,1	26,1	14,9	10,3	11,6
55-64	42,2	24,2	14,9	10,6	8,1
65+	37,1	29,0	19,4	9,7	4,8
Educational Attainment					
Illiterate/ Literate but not graduate of any school	41,5	28,3	9,4	9,4	11,4
Primary school	43,3	24,8	15,5	8,8	7,6
Middle-school	39,3	24,1	17,4	12,5	6,7
High-school or equivalent	32,8	27,3	18,8	14,2	6,9
University/ Graduate degree	29,2	26,7	24,8	13,1	6,2
Region					
Border cities	50,1	21,1	14,7	9,3	4,8
Other cities	31,6	27,5	20,1	13,3	7,5
Metropolitan cities	35,8	27,5	15,0	12,8	8,9
Non-metropolitan cities	29,5	27,5	22,6	13,6	6,8
Occupation					
Private sector employee	37,2	26,5	18,2	11,3	6,8
Artisan/Tradesman	35,7	22,8	17,9	14,2	9,4
Housewife/ girl	41,6	24,0	18,4	8,8	7,2
Student	26,9	28,1	22,3	17,8	4,9
Unemployed	34,0	31,9	18,1	12,8	3,2
Retired	40,9	27,8	12,2	12,2	6,9
Public sector employee	34,5	25,7	19,5	11,5	8,8
Self-employed	31,5	31,5	22,2	9,3	5,5
Businessperson	26,3	21,1	26,3	15,8	10,5
General	35,2	26,2	19,1	12,6	6,9
Note: 12 people were not included in the grouping because they did not answer the social distance questions.					

Source: Erdoğan (2021); “Turkey: Syrians Barometer 2020- A Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion with Syrians in Turkey”, 2021; p.117.

Based on the data of Figure 31 above, showing the demography of the social distance groups of the SB-2020, it is possible to observe that male respondents tend to call themselves 'close' towards the Syrians (20,3% of the male respondents perceived themselves as close or very close in total; in comparison with 18,6% of the male respondents in the same category); whereas the female respondents tend to call themselves as 'distant' towards the Syrians (61,6% of the female respondents perceived themselves as distant and very distant); slightly higher than 61,4% of the male respondents in the same category. Regarding the relationship between the respondents' educational attainments and the respondents' social distance levels towards the Syrians, it is difficult to observe a significant relationship. However, based on the research findings, it can be claimed that as the education attainment level gets lower, the social distance between the Turkish people and Syrians also gets lower

Figure 32: Comparison of the Survey Respondents' Opinions Towards Granting Citizenship to the Syrians (SB-2017, SB-2019 and SB-2020)

		SB-2017*		SB-2019		SB-2019	
		#	%	#	%	#	%
1	None of them should be given citizenship	1584	75,8	1737	76,5	1621	71,8
2	Those who have been living in Turkey for a certain time period should be given citizenship	153	7,3	135	6,0	223	9,9
3	Those who were born in Turkey should be given citizenship	101	4,8	48	2,1	184	8,1
4	Well-educated ones should be given citizenship	124	5,9	114	5,0	180	8,0
5	Those who know/learn Turkish should be given citizenship	47	2,2	9	0,4	106	4,7
6	Turkish-origin ones/Turkomans should be given citizenship	63	3,0	53	2,3	91	4,0
7	Young ones should be given citizenship	11	0,5	-	-	82	3,6
8	Those who got married to a Turkish citizen should be given citizenship	-	-	65	2,9	55	2,4
9	All of them should be given citizenship	84	4,0	35	1,5	19	0,8
	No idea/ No response	61	2,9	75	3,3	45	2,0

Source: Erdoğan (2021); "Turkey: Syrians Barometer 2020- A Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion with Syrians in Turkey", 2021: p.156.

Figure 32 above shows temporal data on the Turkish respondents' opinions towards the cultural similarity between Syrians and Turkish people. It is possible to claim that from 2017 to 2019, there was an increase in the number of respondents who stated that none of the Syrians should be given citizenship. From 2017 to 2019, there was also an overall decrease in the number of respondents who thought that Syrians should receive citizenship; based on certain conditions like being young, well-educated, being born in Turkey, and knowing the Turkish language. From 2019 to 2020, however, it is possible to observe an increase in the number of respondents who stated that Syrians should receive citizenship; without pre-conditions or based on certain conditions.

Figure 33: Comparison of the Turkish Respondents' Opinions Towards the Question "To what extent do you think Syrians in Turkey are culturally similar to us? (SB-2017, SB-2019 and SB-2020)

	2017			2019			2020		
	#	%		#	%		#	%	
Not similar at all	853	40,8	80,2	1147	50,5	81,9	1177	52,1	77,6
Not similar	823	39,4		712	31,4		575	25,5	
Neither similar, nor not similar	185	8,9	8,9	196	8,6	8,6	253	11,2	11,2
Similar	152	7,3	7,8	153	6,7	7,0	192	8,5	8,8
Very similar	10	0,5		7	0,3		7	0,3	
No idea/ No response	66	3,1	3,1	56	2,5	2,5	55	2,4	2,4
Total	2089	100,0		2271	100,0		2259	100,0	

Source: "Turkey: Syrians Barometer 2020- A Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion with Syrians in Turkey", 2021: p.156.

Finally, Figure 33 above shows the share of the respondents who were asked about whether they perceive Syrians as culturally similar to Turkish people or not. Respondents' answer to this survey question show that despite the political discourse pursued by the AKP

politicians and President Erdoğan's frequent references to religious benevolence and common history between Syrians and Turkish people, the Turkish society still put themselves distant towards the Syrians. When asked the question, "To what extent do you think Syrians in Turkey are culturally similar to us?", the combined share of those who replied with "they are not similar at all" and "they are not similar" is 77,6% of the total number of answers. Although the percentage of respondents that expressed a significant cultural difference changed from 2017 to 2020, the lowest figure is still over 75%, manifesting a strong cultural rejection. Overall, those who claimed that Syrians are not culturally similar to Turkish society were 80,2% in 2017, 81,9% in 2019, and 77,6% in SB-2020.

In addition to the expression of the cultural differences between the Syrians and the Turkish people expressed with these survey results, it is also possible to observe discontent towards the ruling party AKP's and President Erdoğan's discourse on Sunni Muslim solidarity towards the Syrians that were mostly composed of Sunni Arabs. Some religious groups, specifically the Alevi representatives living in Istanbul, expressed their concerns about Turkey's policies toward the Syrians. According to the International Crisis Group Report 'Turkey's Syrian Refugees: Defusing Metropolitan Tensions' (2018, p.7), Alevi representatives in Istanbul expressed their complaints during the interviews that the Turkish government had been conducting demographic politics with its emphasis on religious bonds between Turkey's Sunni majority and mostly Sunni refugee population. The increasing anti-immigrant sentiment in Turkey also led to a rise in the number of mobs and attacks against the Syrians and clashes between the local population and the Syrians.

5.6 Conclusion

This section aimed to shed light on Turkey's migration policies during the 2016-2020 period; it is possible to argue that Turkey's migration policy regime towards the Syrians during the 2016-2020 period represents a shift towards more centralized migration management; implementation of policies with more emphasis on Turkey's security and order while restricting the rights of the Syrians in the country. In line with the rising number of Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey and growing negative Turkish public opinion, it is possible to claim that the Turkish authorities had to adopt more holistic migration management during the 2016-2020 period. Turkish government officials, as well as President Erdoğan also began to voice the concept of 'voluntary return' of the Syrians to their home country, both as a response to the rising anti-Syrian sentiment in the Turkish society and economic problems in the country, which became more visible after Turkey's transition to the presidential regime in 2018. Despite Turkish President Erdoğan's announcement on the Turkish government's intention to give Turkish citizenship to educated and skilled Syrian workers, Turkish government officials and President Erdoğan began to voice more the concept of 'voluntary return' of the Syrians to their home country. This can be linked to the Turkish government's response to the rising anti-Syrian sentiment in Turkish society and economic problems in the country.

The political situation after the July 2016 coup attempt and Turkey's internal security concerns were also the main reasons for Turkey's shift towards a more centralized migration management policy towards the Syrians, representing a shift from its open-door policy during the initial years of the Syrian Civil War. The structural constraints to the local government's response towards the Syrians increased during this period due to the July 2016 coup attempt in

Turkey. Tensions between the ruling party AKP and the municipalities run by the opposition parties also increased during the 2016-2020 period, linked with the diverging opinions on the issue of immigrants between the ruling party AKP and the opposition parties in Turkey.



CHAPTER SIX

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR

In this chapter, Turkey's foreign policy during the Syrian Civil War will be examined; by focusing the Turkey-EU relations and diverging policies between the EU and Turkey concerning the Syrian Civil War. This chapter argues that in line with the changing geostrategic equations during the Syrian Civil War and Turkey's foreign policy perspective based on its quest for strategic autonomy had a crucial impact on Turkey's immigration policy towards the Syrians. In line with Turkey's foreign policy perspective based on its 'New Turkey' discourse, portraying itself as important actor in world politics and an important actor in the solution of the humanitarian crisis, the Turkish government and President Erdoğan reacted to the Syrian Civil War as an important part of Turkey's problem.

For this reason, it is crucial to examine Turkish foreign policy during the Syrian Civil War. This period was also important for understanding Turkey's relations with the EU during the Syrian Civil War, as both sides reached a joint cooperation mechanism to deal with the problem of irregular immigration. What makes the EU-Turkey relations important for Turkey's immigration policies is that in line with the deteriorating relations between the EU and Turkey during the 2016 – 2020 period, it is possible to observe the instrumentalization of the issue of immigrants by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan both in the domestic politics and in foreign diplomacy; through using the issue of immigration as leverage tool towards the West, particularly towards the EU in order to highlight Turkey's dissatisfaction with EU's certain policies towards Turkey and in order to achieve certain foreign policy goals, as in the case of Turkey's cross-border military operations.

The first part of this chapter will examine the relations between Turkey and Syrian Arab Republic; by providing a historical overview of bilateral relations and analyzing Turkey's position on the Syrian Civil War since its start in 2011. Then, the EU's position on the Syrian Civil War and the diverging policy priorities of the EU and Turkey will be examined. The final part will focus on Turkish foreign policy during the 2016 – 2020 period, namely the discourse of 'strategic autonomy' in Turkish foreign policy, representing Turkey's foreign policy goals as the leader of the Islamic world; protector of the oppressed ones. The strategic autonomy discourse is important for understanding President Erdoğan's welcoming stance towards the Syrians in that by highlighting Turkey's humanitarian efforts worldwide with a moralist attitude, President Erdoğan aimed to justify his welcoming stance towards the Syrian immigrants. However, he also used the issue of immigrants as a bargaining chip for the EU and Western powers to achieve certain policy goals.

6.1 Overview of Turkey's Relations with Syrian Arab Republic

To better understand Turkish foreign policy during the Syrian Civil War, it is crucial to analyze the history of Turkey's relations with Syrian Arab Republic since the Cold War period. Since the early 2000s, scholars such as Nimet Beriker-Atiyas (2001) have stressed the importance of changing Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. In her article, she argued that Turkish foreign policy has primarily followed a realist approach, which no longer aligns with the new dynamics of an increasingly globalized world following the end of the bipolar era. In line with this, Turkish politicians were aware that Turkey had to pursue its national interests following the shifting international conditions rather than based on static sense oriented in response to specific threats. This necessitated more proactive foreign policy, which aims to establish political, economic and social relations, as these regions are going through a transformation that boosts transnational interdependency.

During the Cold War, Turkey and Syria were part of the alliance blocs, which were rivals. As a member of NATO, Turkey established close relations with Israel in the Middle East region. In contrast, Arab states such as Egypt and Syria allied with the Soviet Union against Israel's influence in the Middle East. During the 1990s, under President Hafez Al-Assad's leadership, Syria adopted external balancing acts against Turkey's foreign policy by signing agreements with Greece and Cyprus. In response to Syria's diplomatic steps, Turkey and Israel concluded the "Military Training and Cooperation Agreement" in February 1996. This agreement included terms for exchanging military information and joint military training, including naval access to the ports of both countries and Israeli air force training flights from Turkish bases over Turkish territory (Martin, 2004, p. 182). This agreement sparked heavy protest from the Syrian side in that Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam described the military partnership as "the greatest threat to the Arabs since 1948" (Bengio & Özcan, 2000, p. 3). Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad countered Turkey's foreign policies by signing cooperation agreements with Greece and Cyprus.

In the 1980s, the PKK, terrorist organization recognized by Turkey, established its headquarters and training camps in the Arab Republic of Syria. This resulted in the PKK issue becoming a major point of contention in the relationship between Syria and Turkey. Although Turkey signed agreements with the Syrian government regarding cooperation against terrorism in 1992 and 1993, these agreements were ineffective in terminating the PKK's activities in Syria (James & Özdamar, 2009). In response to the Syrian government's indirect support to the PKK by allowing them to establish training camps, Turkey suspended all official contact with Syria. Turkey also threatened to use force against Syrian support for the PKK by deploying its troops on its Syrian border in October 1998. According to articles by Altunışık&Tür (2006) and Güneylioglu (2011), the Turkish government also criticized the Clinton administration for being too lenient towards the Syrian government and called for more diplomatic pressure.

With the Adana Agreement signed between the Turkish and Syrian sides on October 20th, 1998, the bilateral relations were restored. With this agreement, the Syrian government recognized the PKK as a terrorist group and agreed to disallow any of its operations by closing its camps. The agreement's most crucial component was Syria's assurance to prevent any actions that could endanger Turkey's security from their territory. Turkey was also given permission to conduct military operations against PKK militants within 5 km of the Turkish-Syrian border. This provision established the legal framework for Turkey's later military actions in Syria, such as Operation Euphrates Shield in 2017 and Operation Olive Branch in 2018 against ISIS. Moreover, this agreement paved the way for resolving the water-related problems concerning the Euphrates River and the issue of Hatay province, which were the main points of contention in bilateral relations. Along with the rapprochement between Turkey and Syria after this agreement, several regular meetings were held by the Joint Security Committee comprised of both Turkish and Syrian military officials from both sides (Altunışık& Tür, 2006: p.238). The Syrian government also supported Turkey's stance against the creation of a Kurdish state in Syria that would threaten Syria's territorial sovereignty.

In 2002, when the Justice and Development Party (AKP) took office and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became Prime Minister, the Turkish government set the goal to strengthen its relationships with neighboring countries, including Syria. The new Turkish government placed special emphasis on building a strong bilateral relationship with Syria. During Prime Minister Erdoğan's visit to Damascus in 2004, Turkey signed a free trade agreement with Syria and this agreement aimed to gradually remove custom taxations and quotas. The agreement positively impacted the trade relations between the two countries. From 2000 to 2008, the trade volume between the two countries increased significantly from \$0.72 billion to \$1.8 billion (Tür, 2010). The Turkish government encouraged its business owners to invest in Syria. From 2005 to 2007,

Syrian officials approved over thirty Turkish investment projects worth more than \$150 million. (Gordon & Taşpınar, 2008, p.58). Furthermore, the Turkish-Syrian Business Council was formed to investigate the potential for enhancing economic ties between the nations. The energy sector became a significant area of cooperation between the two countries. In 2008, a joint company for oil exploration was established, and the Turkish Petroleum International Company (TPIC) began importing and exporting various oil products, including crude oil. (Arı & Pirinççi, 2010, p.10). The Turkish Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEİK), the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association (MUSIAD), and other non-governmental organizations and business associations significantly enhanced the economic cooperation between Turkey and Syria. In April 2009, Turkey and Syria signed a technical military cooperation agreement to collaborate with the national defense industries. On April 27, 2009, the two sides conducted their first joint military exercise (Arı & Pirinççi, 2010, p.11). In September 2009, Turkey and Syria signed an accord of visa liberalization, and both countries agreed to build the "friendship dam" on the Asi River. Considering these developments, the Turkish government was able to transform its complicated relationship with Syrian government into a strategic cooperation.

The previously positive relationship between Turkey and Syria ended in 2011 when the first clashes of the Syrian Civil War broke out on March 18 of that year. At the beginning of the protests and conflicts in the country, Turkey attempted to communicate with the Syrian government and the opposition. In April and August of 2011, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu met with Syrian President Assad and presented suggestions such as ending the state of emergency, granting national identity to the Kurdish people, and avoiding any military involvement in the protests (Bağcı, 2015). To resolve the domestic political crisis, the Turkish administration attempted to persuade President Assad to take necessary actions. However, these efforts were unsuccessful, and in May 2011, members of the Syrian opposition held their first meeting in

Istanbul, represented by the Syrian National Council. In July 2011, the Syrian opposition members already announced the establishment of the 'Free Syrian Army' under the guidance of Turkish Intelligence. Turkey supported the Free Syrian Army (FSA) during the Civil War by allowing them to establish their headquarters in the South-East of Turkey and providing military assistance. Qatar and Saudi Arabia also supported the FSA during this time. In 2012, Turkey also became the head of the 'Friends of Syria Group'; the collective diplomatic body of the countries group, first initiated by French President Nicolas Sarkozy to exert maximum pressure on the Syrian government. On 22 June 2012, Syrian Air Defence shot down a Turkish aircraft F-4 fighter over the territorial waters of Syria. Turkey immediately called NATO to take direct action to protect Turkey's security, stating that the situation in Syria directly affects the security of all NATO member states.

During the first years of the Syrian Civil War, Turkish policy was based on becoming a part of the U.S.-led military coalition which created in September 2014 to fight Daesh. The reason for Turkish policy change to join the fight on the US side was cooperation between the coalition and the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its military wing the Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG). PYD was known as the Syrian branch of the PKK terrorist organization and Turkey was highly concerned with the cooperation between the US-led military coalition and the PYD. From the Turkish side, PYD's control over large parts of the territory in the north of Syria could prompt the PKK in Turkey to start an insurgency against the government after the collapse of the 'solution process' in July 2015. Another concern of the Turkish government was that its open-door policy for Syrians entering Turkey could encourage the separatist ambitions of the Turkish Kurds by boosting the PKK insurgency in Turkey.

Instead of joining the US-led coalition in Syria, Turkey continued to support both Arab and Turkmen anti-Assad opposition groups, which later evolved into the Free Syrian Army (FSA). It is worth noting that the Obama Administration in the US also preferred to ally with the Syrian Democratic Forces, the Kurdish fighters like the YPG/YPJ over allying with Turkey, especially during the Raqqa campaign (November 2016 – October 2017) against the Islamic State (ISIS). This created tensions between Turkey–US relations, and the increasing presence of Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Northern Syria across the Turkish border created the main rationale behind Turkey's cross-border military operations in Syria against the SDF, as in the cases of Operation Olive Branch in 2018 and Operation Peace Spring in 2019.

Turkey's relations with the Assad regime in Syria continued in a hostile environment; especially when the Assad regime used chemical weapons against the Syrian civilians in August 2013 and increased its airstrikes on the Syrian Turkmen opposition groups in 2015. The involvement of Russian Federation as the key ally of the Assad regime in the Syrian conflict in 2015 also affected Turkey's position in the Syrian conflict. The sour tensions between Turkish government and the Assad regime evolved into direct military clashes between the countries in some cases. In February 2020, the Syrian Air Force conducted airstrikes on the Turkish observation posts in Idlib Governorate; resulted in the death of 34 Turkish soldiers as a response to this action; Turkey announced the start of the Operation Spring Shield against the Syrian regime army, which lasted between the dates of March 1st, 2020 and March 5th, 2020. The ceasefire agreement between Turkey and the Russian Federation ended the hostility. However, Operation Spring Shield was important for understanding Turkey's military involvement in Syria as it was the first direct military operation against the Assad regime.

6.2 Turkey's Political and Military Involvement in the Syrian Conflict

In this section; Turkey's foreign policy perspective during the Syrian Civil War would be examined; through shedding light on the changing geostrategic equations in the Middle East region and changing discourse in the Turkish foreign policy concerning the Syrian Civil war. Then, the EU's foreign policy towards the Syrian Civil War would be examined; through focusing on the diverging policy stances between the EU and Turkey during the course of Syrian Civil War. It is important to examine the Turkish foreign policy during the Syrian Civil War for better understanding Turkey's immigration policies during 2014-2020 period. This section would firstly examine the Turkish foreign policy towards the Syrian Civil War through providing historical overview. Then, the EU's policy stance would be examined through shedding light on the diverging policy stances between Turkey and the EU towards the Syrian Civil War. This section argues that despite their common emphasis on the removal of Assad regime in Syria, approaches of Turkey and the EU towards the Syrian Civil War significantly diverged from each other during the course of the conflict.

Before the Arab Spring protests, it can be said that the Turkish security paradigm was built upon the peaceful resolution of the regional conflicts through playing the role of mediator; in line with Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu's 'zero-problem' policy discourse on Turkey's relations with its neighbours. However, the start of the Syrian Civil War in 2011; Turkey's miscalculations about the Syria issue in terms of viewing the conflicts as short-term significantly challenged this 'zero-problem' foreign policy discourse from various aspects; leading to the failure of this 'zero-problem' foreign policy discourse.

As Bülent Aras (2017, p.5) analysed in his report; despite several attempts to increase Turkey's soft power capacity through the establishment of the Turkish Development Agency (TİKA) developmental aid projects over broad geography from the Balkans to Africa; the AKP government during the Foreign Ministry of Ahmet Davutoğlu could not become successful in

establishing its foreign policy ethos among the bureaucratic cadres; due to lack of academic, intelligence networks at capacity building. Additionally, it is also possible to argue that Turkey's relations with certain countries like Egypt under the leadership of General Sisi after the Egyptian coup d'état in 2013 were highly dependent on President Erdoğan's (then Prime Minister) own perspective in terms of his rejection to recognize the Sisi regime as the legitimate government, due to the military coup in the country.

Regarding the Syria issue, the changing geostrategic equations during the conflict also forced Turkey to revise its Syria policy. They paved the way for a shift towards a more protectionist security policy. The Obama administration's diplomatic and military support for the SDF forces, viewing them as the key ally in fighting against the IS, constituted one of the main problems between Turkey and the US relations. Turkey was also concerned with the EU's diplomatic support for the PYD forces in Syria, as examined in the previous section. The increasing presence of Iran and later Russian involvement in the Syrian conflict in 2015 supporting the Assad regime were other key factors that affected Turkey's leadership role in Syria. The sectarian climate in Syria also began to rise; through the clash between Iran-backed Shiite forces and the Sunni Muslim Free Syrian Army supported by Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Hence, the increasing Iranian presence in Syria also affected the relations between Turkey and Iran, leading to Turkey's adaptation of a new policy toward Iran. Additionally, the Greek-Turkish dispute on several issues like the status of the Aegean islands and the depth of the territorial waters between the two countries led to the formation of coalitions against Turkey between Greece and Egypt, Israel.

Focusing on Turkey – Russia relations during the Syrian Civil War is also important. Along with the increasing presence of Russia across the Turkish-Syrian border through establishing its airbase in Latakia, Turkey, Turkish foreign policy on Russia was based on a more cautious stance; while continuing to cooperate in different areas like trade and tourism.

However, Turkey was highly concerned with the Russian airstrikes on Free Syrian Army targets in 2015 in terms of destabilizing the region and triggering a new wave of refugees.

The downing of the Russian jet Su-24 that violated Turkish airspace on November 24, 2015, severed the relations between the two countries. Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu reacted to the incident by defending the action based on Turkey's right to protect its airspace, and he also directed its criticisms toward Russia by stating that Russia should end its airstrikes attacks on the Turkmen opposition forces. Russian side ignored this call from Turkey and continued its airstrikes on the Turkmen opposition groups around Latakia. The resignation of Prime Minister Davutoğlu on May 4th, 2016, from its post led to a government change in Turkey in May 2016; resulted with his replacement with Binali Yıldırım also paved the way for a change in Turkey's foreign policy. Turkey – Russia relations finally became normalized with this government change and the reconciliation process after Turkish President Erdoğan apologized to Russian President Vladimir Putin for downing the Russian air force jet.

Overall, it can be said that by 2015, Turkey found itself in a multi-frontal confrontation in Syria against the regional interests of Iran, the United States, Russia and the EU member states like France, the UK as being part of the US-led military coalition against in Syria. Turkish government stressed the need for foreign policy revision concerning Syria and other neighbouring countries due to the fact that Turkey's ability to dealing with the changing regional dynamics in the Middle East decreased. As Bülent Aras (2017, p.9) also argued in his study, it was a time period when Turkey began to question why its transatlantic security identity being as NATO member failed to confront the unconventional threats coming from Syria. The government change in Turkey with the resignation of Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu in May 2016 also signalled the change in Turkey's foreign policy discourse.

Along with Operation Euphrates Shield against ISIS between August 2016 and March 2017, Turkey also intensified its diplomatic efforts for a diplomatic solution to the conflict. The Russian Federation, Iran, and Turkey agreed to establish a joint operational group. On January 23rd, 2017, the first round of the 'Astana Talks took place, with the official talks between the Syrian opposition delegations. The 'Astana Process aimed to shape the roadmap for the solution of the Syrian crisis and being part of the Astana Process was important for Turkey's foreign policy. On September 14th, 2017; Turkey, Russia, and Iran agreed on the implementation of the de-escalation zone in the Northern governorate of Idlib; an important city located close to the Turkish border and the last bastion of the Free Syrian Army. On September 17th, 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan agreed to create the buffer zones around the Idlib governorate and conduct joint Turkish – Russian military patrols. After considering these factors, it is evident that Turkey began to strengthen its relationship with Russia in 2016 to address its security concerns, which were primarily related to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

After the Trump administration's decision to withdraw American troops from the North-western regions of Syria in 2019, Turkey expressed its concerns and complaints about the presence of the SDF forces, mostly composed of the YPG/PYD-related forces as the Syrian branch of the PKK. The United States and many EU member states like France, Germany; the UK continued to view the Syrian Democratic forces as the key ally for countering terrorism in the country, mostly due to its role during the US-led military intervention in Syria against ISIS. Although the US and Turkey agreed on a deal in August 2019 for the establishment of the Northern Syria buffer zone in order to reduce Turkey's security concerns through joint patrols

and the withdrawal of the SDF checkpoints, Turkey expressed its complaints and dissatisfaction about the implementation of the deal as a response to the continued arming of the YPG forces by the US and President Erdoğan criticized the US administration through stating that the US did not understand Turkey's security concerns.

On September 10th, the Turkish Foreign Minister demanded the extension of the safe zone to 32 kilometres. On October 9th, Turkish President Erdoğan announced the start of the offensive against the SDF forces in Northern Syria with Operation Peace Spring. During the operation, Turkish troops and Turkey-backed Free Syrian Army took control of the Syrian border towns like Tal-Abyad (close to the city of Şanlıurfa in Turkey) and Ras Al-Ayn. On October 22nd, President Erdoğan and Putin met in the Russian city of Sochi, and both sides agreed on the agreement, which paved the way for establishing the Second Syria Buffer Zone, which would be 30 kilometres in depth. Under this agreement, which excludes the US, joint patrols by Russia and Turkey will occur in the buffer zone area. The SDF forces will withdraw from the cities of Manbij, and both sides will continue to stress the significance of the Adana Agreement. Operation Peace Spring and the Sochi Agreements were important for understanding Turkey's foreign policy in Syria and Turkey's close relations with the Russian Federation during the 2016-2020 period. Turkey aimed to overcome its security concerns caused by the presence of the SDF forces within the areas close to the Turkish-Syrian border by cooperating with the Russian Federation, and this was also important for Russia's foreign policy for Syria in that the Assad regime itself had not approved the establishment of any 'safe zone' areas. It is also important to note that Turkey and Turkish President Erdoğan actively used the immigrant's card as a leverage tool towards the US administration. One of the rationale behind Turkey's continuous emphasis on creating safe zones or 'no-fly' zones during the Syrian Civil War was to resettle the refugees within the created buffer zones. However, the United

States, the UK, France, and the Russian Federation did not support creating no-fly zones or buffer zones for the refugees.

6.3 The EU Foreign Policy During the Syrian Civil War

Before the start of the first conflicts in Syria in March 2011, the EU was one of the key economic partners of the Arab Republic of Syria and the EU tended to direct little criticisms towards the human rights violations in the country; with the exceptions to the EU's condemnations of the arrest and sentencing of human rights defenders in July 2010.

When the first clashes of the conflict started in March 2011, the EU authorities expressed their profound concern about the events by strongly condemning the violent repression of the Syrian government, calling on Syrian authorities to refrain from using violence and respecting its international commitments to human rights and fundamental freedoms. The EU authorities also urged the Syrian authorities to meet the legitimate demands of the Syrian people and initiate urgent political and socio-economic reforms. The European Commission officially declared that it would commit to supporting the neighboring countries in their transition to "deep democracy"; including free and fair elections, the rule of law administered by an independent judiciary, and media freedom with free access to information (European Commission, 2011). In line with these principles, the EU's initial reaction to the Syrian conflict was predominantly based on supporting the democratic transition of the Syrian people, similar to its reaction to the Arab Spring protests in Tunisia, Egypt. As Asseem Dandashly (2015) analyzed in his article; during the Arab Spring protests in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya; the EU's foreign policy relied on several instruments for democracy promotion in these countries, and these instruments included providing financial and technical assistance for the democratic opposition, assistance for democratic reforms, diplomatic assistance in the forms of mediation among the conflicting parts.

In 2012, the European Union began to use sanctions as its main foreign policy against the Assad regime, mostly in trade embargoes, freezing assets of the individuals and bodies supporting the Assad regime, the ban on technology transfer. In May 2011, the EU suspended the cooperation agreements with Syria within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Although the EU also imposed an arms embargo on the Syrian regime in 2012, this arms embargo did not become effective as the Syrian regime continued to supply weapons from its supporters like Russia, Iran, Belarus, and North Korea. It is possible to observe differences among the member states. For instance, while Germany pursued a non-interventionist policy towards the Syrian conflict, the UK and France advocated a more active, interventionist foreign policy towards the Syria issue to deal with the possible consequences of the conflict for regional security. From these aspects, the first signs of diverging interests among the EU members concerning the Syrian conflict were already visible during the early years.

Overall, the European Union's response to the crisis in Syria was based on supporting the Syrian opposition groups with the goal of democracy promotion through utilizing its "soft-power" instruments like financial assistance for the democratic opposition and assistance for democratic reforms. It would not be misleading to claim that Turkey and the EU had a common position regarding supporting the democratic opposition in the country during the early years of the Syrian Civil War. The AKP government, led by Prime Minister Erdoğan, and the EU's stance - represented by Germany, the UK, and France - agreed on the goal of toppling the Bashar al-Assad government and establishing a moderate democratic regime. The EU saw the Syrian uprising as a potential opportunity for democratic transitions and removing autocratic leaders in the Middle East. Nevertheless, the EU lacked the means and collective solidarity to

take a more active stance towards the Syria crisis in terms of being unable to put more pressure on the Assad regime.

Turkey and the EU's policy priorities and strategies on the Syrian Civil War began to diverge in 2014. Along with the emergence of the Islamic State (ISIS) as belligerent in the conflict, the EU's policy priorities and the EU's stance towards the regime were revised; by shifting towards a more securitized approach. Although the EU's position concerning the Assad regime's future did not change drastically, the EU began to take the stance that the Assad regime might stay in power during the transition period; as long as the Assad regime fought against ISIS. Even in certain European countries, the idea of replacing the Assad regime became less appealing due to the destabilizing effects it may have on the fight against ISIS. From these aspects, the EU's pressure on the Assad regime weakened, and the EU began to consider no longer the removal of the Assad regime from power as its priority. Rather, the EU prioritized the fight against ISIS, with its concerns that radical groups might fill the power vacuum after the removal of the Assad regime.

Regarding the EU's position towards the Syrian Kurds, the EU's initial approach towards an independent de-facto Kurdish state was mostly skeptical as it could destabilize the region. As Üstünel-Yırcalı (2017) analyzed the policy stances of the EU actors in his policy report by conducting interviews with analysts of state institutions and experts from the NGOs, EU member states like Germany and the United Kingdom did not and would not support the PYD's political project based on creating a separate, de facto PYD administration in its territories; a move which could hamper the relations with Turkey. As Üstünel-Yırcalı (2017) mentioned in her report, the interviewees from the UK stated that there was general sympathy within the public opinion and leftist parties in the UK towards the Syrian Kurds and PYD

forces; as they were viewed as “dedicated to fighting the ISIS; while appearing secular, inclusive and emerged as the most effective actor in the region.”. For the case of France, the research argues that based on the interviewees’ answers, it is possible to observe that France’s policy on Syria shifted from an anti-Assad stance to an Anti-ISIS stance starting in 2014. According to the French interviewees’ responses, the Syrian Kurds’ Rojava project was always praised by the French political parties, and French politicians highlighted that the US-led coalition should have continued to support the Kurdish forces as their effectiveness and their secular nature against the radicalization of the opposition groups (Üstünel-Yırcalı, 2017). It is worth noting that both the interviewees from the UK and France during the research highlighted that while both the UK and France prioritized the constant fighting against ISIS, Turkey’s main priority was the security threats coming from the YPG/PYD forces in Syria. Both countries also became more cautious about the PYD forces in that their close relations with the Assad regime might lead to the alienation of the local Arab population (Üstünel Yırcalı, 2017).

From these aspects, the EU viewed the PYD/YPG forces of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as an important ally for the coalition’s fighting against ISIS, and the EU member states showed reluctance to develop official and open relations. In an attempt to gain legitimacy as an autonomous force in the territories, the SDF and PYD/YPG started to open diplomatic offices in several European capitals. In 2016, the PYD opened representative bureaus in Moscow in February 2016; in Prague, Czech Republic on April 3, in Stockholm, Sweden, on April 17. (Taştekin, 2016).

Turkey's position towards the SDF forces and the PYD/YPG was more neutral during 2013 – 2014, coinciding with the AKP's Solution process with the pro-Kurdish political party HDP to solve the long-lasting Kurdish question. For instance, Salih Muslim as the main leader

of the PYD in Syria, made visits to Ankara on July 26th, 2013, to meet with Turkish officials on Turkey's concerns over the PYD's existence over the Turkish-Syrian border and during his other visit to Ankara on October 5th, 2014; Muslim held talks with the Turkish officials on Turkey's conditions for providing support for the Kurdish fighters' their fighting against the ISIS for the liberation of the Kobane. During these meetings, Turkey expressed its conditions, such as the end of the PYD's collaboration with the Assad regime, avoiding declaring autonomous regions which would threaten Turkey's border security. One could argue that Turkey's approach to the PYD was based on Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoğlu's false assumption that the PYD was also against the Assad regime. The solution process was removed after the July 2015 attacks planned by ISIS on the members of the Youth Wing Socialist Youth Associations Federation (SGDF) at Turkey's border town Suruç, Şanlıurfa province, and after the Ceylanpınar Incident, in which the PKK killed two police officers. Afterward, Turkey began to conduct air strikes on the PKK camps in Northern Iraq and the ISIS positions in Syria near the Turkish-Syrian border.

The EU's diplomatic support for the PYD and the military support for the SDF and YPG forces received severe criticism from the Turkish side. It is possible to argue that one of the factors behind the instrumentalization of the Syrian migrants issue as a leverage tool vis-à-vis the European Union is Turkey's discontent towards the EU in that the Union does not try to understand Turkey's security concerns. Turkish government officials frequently called the PYD/YPG-controlled semi-autonomous and autonomous regions across the Turkey-Syria border 'terror corridors' established by the PKK's Syrian branches. This created the main rationale behind Turkey's cross-border military operations in Syria against the SDF and YPG/PYD forces, as in the examples of Operation Olive Branch (January 20th – March 24th, 2018) and Operation Peace Spring (October 9th – November 25th, 2019). It is important to

note that before both of these military operations, President Erdoğan frequently accused the international community, referring to the EU for not supporting Turkey on the refugee burden. He also reiterated Turkey's intention to resettle around 2-3 million Syrian refugees within the border zone with his threat to implement Turkey's security plans if the US-led coalition in Syria did not commit its promises on conducting joint military patrols.

Since 2013, the Turkish government constantly defended creating a safe zone or no-fly zone in Syria to protect Syrian civilians and resettle the displaced Syrian refugees. Turkey proposed the creation of safe zones or no-fly zones in Syria to protect civilians and refugees. However, the US-led coalition member states and the Obama administration opposed Turkey's proposals. During the Obama administration, the US-led coalition against ISIS and EU and NATO member states such as the UK, France, and Germany did not endorse Turkey's proposal to establish safe zones. The concern was that these areas could potentially lead to renewed conflicts without concrete agreements between the opposing sides of the Syrian conflict.

For its quest for the creation of zones in Syria, Turkey referred to the Fourth Geneva Convention, which included terms on the creation of "safe zones" at safe distances from military operations in order to protect civilians from the effects of war, as well as "demilitarized zones" in which belligerents of the conflict may create should commit to not use these areas for military purposes. In line with this, it can be said that Turkey aimed to create safe areas in Northern Syria through which the resettlement of the Syrian refugees within these safe areas could take place, and the goal of resettlement of the Syrian refugees within these areas also created one of the key factors behind Turkey's cross-border military operations in Syria; with

the cases of Operation Olive Branch in 2018 and Operation Peace Spring in 2019. In his policy speech in 2019, Erdoğan threatened the EU to allow the migrants as long as they opposed Turkey's proposal for creating safe zones through its cross-border military operations:

The safe zone formula ... is the most practical solution for the return of Syrian refugees. The feasibility of this formula depends on Turkey's control of the safe zone and other countries' logistical support to us. If we cannot return the millions of Syrians living on our lands to their homes, the problem will eventually end up at the gates of Europe. ... I'd like to underline that the support to be given to our country regarding the safe zone will also contribute to the national security of European countries by preventing the influx of refugees and terrorist threats. (Erdoğan 2019b)

Throughout the Syrian Civil War, Turkey and the EU disagreed on various issues, such as the EU's changing policies towards the Assad regime, their support for SDF forces in Syria, and differing opinions on establishing safe zones in Syria. These disagreements constituted the main points of contention between Turkey and the EU during the conflict, and these diverging policy priorities were important for understanding Turkey's immigration policies within the context of the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan. Unlike the EU stance, it is possible to claim that Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu (Foreign Minister during the 2011-2013 period) and Turkish President Erdoğan continued the policy of replacing the Assad regime with a popularly elected government, although Russia's involvement in the Syria conflict in 2015 and the increasing power the Assad regime forces towards the Free Syrian Army put this priority into a difficult situation.

6.4 The 'Strategic Autonomy' Discourse in Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkey – EU Relations during 2016 – 2020 Period

This section will examine Turkey's foreign policy following the July 2016 coup attempt. In line with the changing dynamics in Turkish politics following the July 2016 coup attempt, it is possible to observe a shifting towards a more autonomy-seeking foreign policy perspective with more emphasis on the role of Turkey in world politics, allying with the non-Western countries like Russia through balancing its relations with the West.

During its first decade, the AKP pursued a more proactive Turkish foreign policy; based on regional integration through connecting economic and cultural relations, playing the role of mediator in the solution of the conflicts in the Middle East and Balkans and also positioning itself as humanitarian actor through its emphasis on humanitarian diplomacy. Within this foreign policy perspective, the AKP aimed to envision Turkey as key player in global affairs, both reluctant and capable of protecting the oppressed peoples worldwide, especially the Muslims (Morgül, 2022). In contrast with Turkey's former foreign policy perspective during the 2000s, which was mostly based on the isolation from regional conflicts through forming regional alliances, Turkish foreign policymakers during the AKP period viewed Turkey as a proactive regional player responsible for taking on the role of mediator. This was evident in Turkey's mediation efforts between Palestine and Israel in 2006. In line with these arguments, Turkey aimed to increase its economic and political activism in different regions, most importantly in the Middle East region.

The strategic autonomy discourse entered the Turkish foreign policy during the later periods of the AKP rule; especially during the 2016-2020 period. Scholars put forward several explanations for understanding Turkey's growing autonomy-seeking foreign policy perspective. As Öniş & Kutlay (2020) claimed in their article, right-wing populist leaders can frequently regard foreign policy as domestic legitimating device where they can divert public

attention and Turkish foreign policy especially after its transition to presidential regime can be examined within this context. Turkey's quest for strategic autonomy in its foreign policy can also be attributed to the Turkish government's emphasis on transition towards multipolar order from the Western-led hierarchical order. The weakening of existing multilateral institutions like the UN for finding solutions to the long-lasting conflicts, the growing uncertainties in the international system can be considered the main drivers for Turkey's quest to play more autonomous role in regional and international politics, especially following the July 2016 coup attempt. For scholars like Haugom (2019), Turkish foreign policy's strategic autonomy relied on forming adaptable alliances to accomplish specific international objectives.

The period between 2016 and 2020 coincided with the global wave of authoritarian right-wing populist leaders like Viktor Orbán in Hungary, Donald Trump in the US. In line with this international environment, it is also possible to claim that Turkish President Erdogan resembled these leaders with his nationalist, autonomy-seeking foreign policy perspective. President Erdoğan's foreign policy perspective began to highlight that Turkey was advocating a more 'just global order,' with his discourse that the 'world is bigger than five,' referring to the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

Within this context, Turkey aimed to increase its cooperation with major non-western players like Russia. Along with the start of reconciliation process after President Erdoğan's apology to Russian President Putin over the downing of the Russian air force jet near the Turkish – Syria border; the partnership between two countries began to improve continuously in many areas like tourism, defence, energy. As Öniş & Kutlay (2021, p. 1095) examined, Turkey's domestic political economy after Turkey's transition to the presidential regime with 2018 elections also moved towards the authoritarian Russian model with state capitalist features and as populist leaders; both Erdogan and Putin had strong nationalist, in anti-western perspective with their willingness to create a multipolar international order.

Another component of this strategic autonomy perspective on Turkish foreign policy was identity. During 2016 – 2020 period, President Erdogan increased its references to religious symbolism and Muslim identity in Turkey, in line with Turkey's new foreign policy perspective. He continued his welcoming tone towards the Syrians in Turkey, referencing the ansar-muhajir rhetoric during his speeches. With this rhetoric, President Erdoğan and AKP politicians aimed to justify Turkey's positive stance towards the Syrians through emphasizing the religious benevolence in the Turkish society; as well as Turkey's responsibility to protect the oppressed Muslims as part of its foreign policy. It is possible to claim that Turkey's decision to convert Hagia Sophia Museum to the Ayasofya Mosque in July 2020 can also be examined within this context. Changing the museum back to a mosque important for the Muslim world significantly appealed to the strong religious sentiments of conservative people in Turkish society, as the mosque was symbolically important for the conquest of the city of Istanbul from the Byzantine Empire in 1453. Through frequent references to the Islamic benevolence, to the former days of the Ottoman Empire when minorities from various ethnic backgrounds could live peacefully; President Erdoğan aimed to emphasize the Muslim identity of the Turkish people; challenging the secular identity through portraying Turkey's secular identity as distracted from Turkey's role in the world.

Regarding the Turkey – EU relations during 2016 – 2020 period, it is possible to observe that following the coup attempt, bilateral relations turned sour. After the failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016, plotted by the Gulenist cadres in the Turkish military, which were regarded as 'FETO/PDY Terrorist Organization' by the Turkish government, Turkey began to take a more critical tone towards its NATO allies by stating that the NATO supported the coup

attempt in Turkey; in line with the pro-NATO military officers behind the coup attempt. In line with the political upheaval in the country, emergency rule was declared; civil servants, journalists who had alleged ties with the FETO/PDY terrorist organization were removed from their offices; many civil society associations and NGOs were closed. The EU constantly criticized Turkey's policies after the coup attempt; in the cases of the arrest of several journalists and especially the arrest of Osman Kavala, a Turkish businessman, philanthropist and civil society activist constituted the key disputed issue between Turkey – EU relations. The Turkish government arrested Osman Kavala on October 18, 2017, and he was accused of attempting to overthrow the Turkish government and overthrow the Constitutional order. These charges were linked to the Gezi protests in Turkey during May – July 2013 period and the failed coup attempt in Turkey on July 15, 2016. Kavala was acquitted of overthrowing the government on February 18, 2020, and he was detained for attempting the overthrow the constitutional order under Article 309 of the Turkish Criminal Code. During the 2016 – 2020 period, the issue of Osman Kavala continued to constitute one of the key disputes between Turkey and the EU. According to the Turkish viewpoint, the EU is using the situation with Osman Kavala as a way to pressure Turkey on issues such as granting visa-free travel to Turkish citizens and speeding up Turkey's process of becoming an EU member. In return, it is possible to observe that the Turkish President periodically directed his criticism towards the EU by instrumentalizing the issue of immigrants, accusing Brussels of interfering in Turkish domestic politics by instrumentalizing Osman Kavala.

Considering these factors, it can be claimed that during the 2016-2020 period, Turkey already had limited room for cooperation with its European allies and the US. As Aktürk (2017, p.94) also stated, Turkey could not receive the support of its Western allies in its two most important and immediate internal security threats; the PKK's offensive starting in July 2015 and the Gülenist coup attempt in July 2016. Dissatisfaction with the EU's lack of support for

the democratically-elected President after the coup attempt and the EU's perceived tolerance towards the Gulenists in many European countries led to Turkey's protest towards the EU. In line with its strategic autonomy foreign policy discourse during the 2016-2020 period, Turkey expressed its dissatisfaction with its Western allies, specifically the EU. There were already continuous disagreements between Turkey and the EU on certain issues like Turkey's criticism towards the EU on the equal share of the immigrant burden, and following the July 2016 coup attempt, further disputed issues emerged like the case of Osman Kavala, and human rights violations in Turkey. Turkey became further decoupled from its European allies in line with its dissatisfaction with Brussels. In line with its more autonomy-seeking foreign policy, it aimed to emphasize its place in world politics as an important political actor towards the Western-led hierarchical order and portray itself as an important political actor in resolving disputes, including the humanitarian crisis in the case of hosting refugees. Disagreements on several issue areas also impeded the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan, which started as a cooperation between the EU and Turkey on the issue of irregular immigrants. In response to its dissatisfaction with the EU's policy stance on topics that were important for Turkey's security concerns, the Turkish government and the Turkish President frequently used the issue of immigration as a bargaining tool towards the EU.

6.5 Conclusion

This section examined the Turkish foreign policy during the Syrian Civil War through providing a historical overview. This section also examined the EU's policy stance towards the Syrian Civil War; in comparison with Turkey's foreign policy. It can be claimed that Turkey's relations with the Arab Republic of Syria were bitter during the Cold War period for various factors. The most decisive deterioration between the bilateral relations came when the Syria during the rule of President Hafez Al-Assad) began to provide training facilities and bases for

the PKK; as direct threat for Turkey's security. Along with the Adana agreement, bilateral relations were restored and during 2000s, the AKP aimed to normalize its relations with Syrian Arab Republic. In line with the 'zero-problems' discourse in its foreign policy, economic, political and military cooperation between Turkey and Syria increased until the start of the Syrian Civil War in 2011. During the initial period of the Syrian Civil War, Turkey aimed to convince the Syrian government under the rule of President Bashar Al-Assad for implementing democratic reforms in the country. In line with the Syrian government's negative response towards the implementation of democratic reforms in the country, Turkish government recognized the Syrian National Council; as the legitimate representatives of Syria and supported the Free Syrian Army through giving them logistical support and training bases in its own territory. Since 2014; geostrategic equations in Syria also began to change, as a result of the emergence of the Islamic State (ISIS) as belligerent of the conflict and the increasing military presence of the Syrian Defence Forces (SDF) and PYD/YPG; being the Syrian branch of the PKK terrorist organization. Turkey's main concern was that the power vacuum after the withdrawal of the Assad regime troops could potentially lead to the autonomous semi-independent structures controlled by the SDF or PYD/YPG forces. In line with this, Turkey was concerned with the fact that Kurdish regions in Syria controlled by PYD/YPG could also provide the PKK with additional operational basis which would facilitate its cross border attacks to Turkey.

In line with their diverging policy stances during the Syrian Civil War, it is also possible to observe the instrumentalization of migration as a leverage tool by the Turkish government during this period towards the EU to express Turkey's dissatisfaction with the EU's certain policies. The EU-Joint Action Plan, signed between the EU and Turkey, initially aimed to deal with the issue of irregular immigrants based on cooperation. Nevertheless, this joint action plan was frequently used by President Erdoğan as a leverage tool towards the EU to express

Turkey's dissatisfaction with the EU's certain policies. This aspect is important for understanding how diverging policy stances between Turkey and the EU during the Syrian Civil War also led to the instrumentalization of the issue of Syrian migrants by President Erdoğan. In domestic politics, he both made references to his perspective on Turkey's role in world politics; protector of the Muslims and the oppressed ones, and with this discourse, he aimed to justify Turkey's stance on immigrants. In terms of foreign policy, he intended to leverage the issue of immigration to express Turkey's dissatisfaction with the European Union's stance on certain issues. This represented a critical ambiguity in that while he championed Turkey's hosting of the Syrians as part of his vision of Turkey's rightful place in world politics, he also complained about the burden of hosting Syrian immigrants in the country; through instrumentalizing the issue as a bargaining chip in order to achieve certain policy goals.

CHAPTER SEVEN

ANALYSIS ON RECEP TAYYIP ERDOĞAN'S DISCOURSE ON SYRIAN IMMIGRANTS IN TURKEY (2014 – 2020)

This chapter analyzes Turkey's discourse on the issue of immigrants by focusing on the main discourse within President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's policy speeches. For this goal, this thesis utilized a dataset consisting of President Erdoğan's policy speeches from August 2014 to March 2020, which was created by Çağla Lüleci-Sula and İsmail Erkam Sula (2020). This dataset consists of 727 policy speeches of President Erdoğan on various occasions, accessible from the official website of the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey. 200 out of 727 speeches were selected; based on the three criteria and these criteria for the selection of the policy speeches are as follows: the policy speeches as no longer than 1,500 words, policy speeches referring to Turkey's policy stance on the immigration issue through referring to Turkey's migration management, and finally, policy speeches including some of the key concepts like migrant (*göçmen*), refugee (*mülteci*), asylum-seeker (*sığınmacı*), migration policy (*göç politikası*). Differently from Lüleci Sula & Sula's (2020) 's research, this thesis also examined the specific excerpts from President Erdoğan's policy speeches on immigrants in Turkey; in order to provide answers to questions like from which aspects the Turkish president adopted 'populist-nationalist' discourse on the immigrant's issue, what are the key concepts to which he made references during his policy speeches, whether the Turkish president adopted inclusionary or exclusionary rhetoric towards the immigrants. The list of the policy speeches selected from the Lüleci-Sula & Sula (2020) 's dataset based on the three criteria can be found in the Appendix.

52 policy speeches selected based on the three criteria were from the 2014-2016 period and 148 policy speeches were from the 2016-2020 period. This chapter's first part will examine the research findings based on the Nvivo coding analysis to examine the key themes of President Erdoğan's policy speeches on immigrants in Turkey. The other part of this chapter will straightforwardly examine certain excerpts from his policy speeches.

Table 11: Distribution of the Key Themes Related with Turkey's Immigration Policy in President Erdoğan's Selected 200 Policy Speeches

Key Themes Mentioned in Erdoğan's Speeches	Number of References during 2014-2016	Percentages of the Total Speeches (%)	Number of References during 2016-2020	Percentages of the Total Speeches (%)
Burden of migration	79		148	
Unshared burden	47	%59,4	63	%42,5
Turkey's burden	32	%40,6	85	%57,5
Responsibility to host migrants	63		125	
Being Protector of victims	23	%36,5	47	%37,6
Civilizational - religious duty	22	%34,9	32	%25,6
Humanitarian Responsibility	10	%15,8	28	%22,4
No discrimination	8	%12,6	18	%14,4

Through coding the qualitative data using Nvivo software for President Erdoğan's policy speeches, The table above shows the distribution of the key themes on the issue of Turkey's migration policy within President Erdoğan's 200 policy speeches between 2014 and 2020. Based on the coding analysis for understanding the main discourse on Turkey's migration policies using the Nvivo software, this thesis aimed to show how President Erdoğan's policy discourse on Turkey's migration policy changed over time. In line with the findings based on

the qualitative data coding with Nvivo software, there is an overall increase within Erdoğan's discourse on the burden of hosting immigrants in Turkey during his policy speeches, rising from 79 references during the 2014-2016 period of 148 references during 2016-2020 period. The EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan 2016 for dealing with the influx of irregular migrants and the economic problems associated with the decreasing value of the Turkish Lira as a response to the Turkish government's wrong economic policies can be given as factors behind increasing references to the economic burden of hosting immigrants. While 32 references described hosting immigrants as Turkey's burden during the 2014-2016 period (%40,6 of the total), there were 85 references (%57,5 of the total references on the burden of migration) during the 2016-2020 period.

Compared with the 2014-2016 period, it is also possible to observe an overall increase in the use of the 'responsibility to host immigrants' discourse in Turkey. During both the 2014-2016 period and the 2016-2020 period, the theme of 'being the protector of victims' became the main dominant discourse in President Erdoğan's policy speeches, constituting 36,5% of the total number of 63 references during the 2014-2016 period and 37,6% of the total number of 125 references during 2016-2020 period. In both periods, President Erdoğan made references to hosting migrants as a civilizational-religious duty, with 22 references during the 2014-2016 period (34,9% of the total) and with 32 references during the 2016-2020 period (25,6% of the total).

Overall, it is possible to observe the key themes of 'burden of migration' and 'responsibility to host migrants' during President Erdoğan's policy speeches during 2014-2020 period. It is worth noting that the analysis of this research focused on the key themes that were commonly mentioned during 2014-2020 period. During 2016-2020 period, Turkey conducted

several cross-border operations in 2016 like Operation Euphrates Shield against the ISIS in Syria; Operation Olive Branch against the SDF forces in 2018 and Operation Peace Spring in 2019. Hence, it was also possible to observe references in President Erdoğan's policy speeches for stating the main justifications for these cross-border operations. In line with this, our research also examined the frequency of the references concerning the justifications for Turkey's cross-border operations in Syria within President Erdoğan's speeches.

Table 12: Distribution of the Key Themes Related with Turkey's Transborder Operations in Syria in President Erdoğan's Selected Policy Speeches

	Number of References	Percentages of the Total Speeches (%)
Justification for Turkey's transborder operations	123	Total (100%)
<i>The goal of resettling Syrian immigrants</i>	56	45,52%
<i>Turkey's hosting Syrian refugees without any support</i>	32	26,01%
<i>Preventing another refugee flows to Turkey</i>	30	24,39%
<i>Protection of Europe's borders</i>	5	4,06%

In line with Table 12 above, it is possible to observe that four key themes were present concerning the justifications for Turkey's cross-border military operations within President Erdoğan's policy speeches during the 2016-2020 period: 1) Turkey's intention to create safe zones for resettling migrants, 2) Turkey's acts due to lack of burden sharing, 3) preventing another refugee flows to the country and finally 4) Turkey's cross-border operations as also securing Europe's borders. Based on these four key themes, it is possible to observe that references to Turkey's intention to create safe zones for resettling the migrants in Syria constituted the highest share of the total references, with 56 out of 123 references, representing

45,52% share. Turkey's actions in response to the lack of burden sharing constituted the second highest number of references, 32 references out of a total of 123, representing 26,01% share.

7.1 Analysis on the Key Themes within Erdoğan' Policy Speeches on Syrian Immigrants

In this section, President Erdoğan's discourse on the Syrian immigrants starting from the early years of the Syrian Civil War would be examined; through focusing on the discourse within some of his policy speeches, as well as analysing his references to Turkey's collective past; highlighting Turkey's place in the world from his perspective and within the context of his populist-nationalist discourse. As it was previously examined, the AKP's and most importantly President Erdoğan's foreign policy concept portrayed Turkey not only the voice of the Turkish people but also the champion of oppressed ones around the world (Özpek and Tanrıverdi Yaşar, 2018). Within this foreign policy perspective, Turkey aimed to increase its role in the solution of humanitarian crisis across the world through its humanitarian assistance programs.

7.1.1. Emphasis on the Turkey's Place in the World Politics

The first important discourse that can be observable in President Erdoğan's policy speeches on the immigrants was emphasis on the Turkey's place in the world. During the analysis of Hungarian Prime Minister Orban's policy speeches on the immigrants; it was also possible to observe emphasis on the place of Hungary in Hungary as the protector of the European-Christian values against the immigrants coming from the Middle East; based on the exclusionary 'populist-nationalist' discourse. In the Turkish case, however; it is possible to observe another side of the 'populist-nationalist' discourse; emphasizing that Turkey will once again become a major political and economic power which would protect the 'oppressed'; mostly denoting the Muslims. This was reflecting Turkey's quest for becoming emerging

power through its active involvement in the solution of regional and global humanitarian crises. During his almost every speech at the United Nations General Assembly, he highlighted Turkey's role in humanitarian and development assistance; through comparing with the those of developed Western countries:

Turkey is a country that carries out humanitarian and development aid activities around the world. We don't only embrace the refugees who come to our country. Through institutions such as TİKA, AFAD [Disaster and Emergency Management Agency], and Kızılay, we also come to the aid of all downtrodden and oppressed people, no matter where they're in the world. (Erdoğan, 2017b)

Turkey has also shown great success in the area of emergency and humanitarian assistance. With the help of TİKA and our other institutions, our country is holding the hands of the oppressed and needy in Iraq, Yemen, Arakan, Afghanistan, Somalia, and many geographies, especially the victims of the Syrian war. As the most active country helping the Rohingya Muslims who are ignored by the world, we're continuing our activities in the camps on the Bangladesh border. (Erdoğan, 2020)

When Erdoğan's policy speeches reveals that he has often employed an Ottomanist/Islamist imagination of Turkish history to justify his government's position vis-à-vis the conflict in Syria and Syrian refugees. Two interrelated themes about the national past have been particularly salient in his discourse. Firstly, Erdoğan repeatedly emphasized how "our ancestors" built a virtuous civilization that always protected the weak and sheltered the oppressed ones. During his speech delivered at the General Assembly of the Young Businessmen Confederation of Turkey in February 2016, he claimed that throughout its history, Turkish civilization was "a civilization of mercy and compassion":

Our civilization is a civilization of mercy and compassion. Praise be to Allah, the most important feature of our nation is its hospitality, not rejecting those who come to its door. For centuries, these lands have been the symbol of security, peace, tranquility, and solidarity. Throughout history, from Rumelia to the Caucasus, from Spain to the Balkans, those who took refuge in the benevolent heart of Anatolia found faces that greeted them with love, and rich hearts that put an extra spoon on the table for them. We don't have strangers, we have guests.

Our table is blessed with guests. Our nation is showing the same virtue today for its brothers from Syria and Iraq. (Erdoğan, 2016a)

In one of his speeches with 50 ombudspersons from 34 different countries in Ankara on 3 February 2017, Erdoğan made connection between the government's policies toward Syrian refugees and Turkey's centuries-old tradition of protecting the oppressed peoples:

For centuries, these lands have been a safe haven for the oppressed, who have been subjected to persecution, oppression, and violence in their countries. From the Jews fleeing massacre 500 hundred years ago to the Christians and Circassians in Western Europe, all oppressed peoples have found shelter in this country. As I stated before, Turkey is a safe place, a secure home for the oppressed. ... With this understanding, we've protected our neighbors from Syria and Iraq for the past six years; we haven't left them at the mercy of dictators, murderers, and terrorist organizations. (Erdoğan, 2017)

7.1.2 The Common Past with the Syrians

The second salient theme concerning the national past in Erdoğan's discourse on Syrian refugees has been the strength of the historical ties between Turkey and Syria. In speech after speech, Erdoğan stressed that the Turkish and Syrian peoples were not strangers and they were already two nations who lived together during the reign of Ottoman Empire. Through employing Ottomanist historical themes, he aimed to justify both Turkey's active involvement in the Syrian conflict and its relatively welcoming policies toward Syrian refugees.

In his policy speech delivered on February 7th, 2012; Erdoğan said that the Syrians and Turks were brothers, making references to the Ottoman Empire:

Syria is not just another country for us, the Syrian people are not just another people for us. From Cilvegözü [one of Turkey's border crossings with Syria] to Aleppo, Hama, Homs, Damascus, and As-Suwayda, at every step and kilometer, you'll see the traces of our brotherhood, our common history, our common civilization. ... From the Crusades to the [Turkish] War of Independence, we lived together in these lands in brotherhood for 1,000

years. We defended all these lands together. The Syrian people are our brothers. This is a brotherhood written in history with blood. (Erdoğan, 2012)

President Erdoğan not only highlighted the shared Muslim identity between Turkish citizens and the Syrians but also rendered allegiance to the Islamic faith central; in line with his populist-nationalist discourse. The most salient example of this was the *ansar*–*muhajirun* analogy; representing the Turkish government and Turkish society as ‘*ansar*’; while denoting the immigrants as ‘*muhajirun*’; the ones who would be protected. Erdoğan used this analogy in 2013; just after the car bombings in the district of Reyhanlı on May 11, 2013 and he highlighted the importance of religious solidarity toward their Syrian “brothers and sisters”:

Here, I'd like to remind my brothers and sisters in Reyhanlı that this nation has always been ansar to the oppressed in the world. It has always fulfilled its duty toward the oppressed as ansar. It has always been ansar to muhajirun. ... We're proud of you. My brothers, you've opened your arms to our brothers and sisters who migrated here from Syria, around 25 thousands of them. You've welcomed them. Don't ever listen to those who are trying to expel them from here. And know that they're our brothers and sisters. (Erdoğan, 2013)

During his group meetings of AKP in 2014, Erdoğan also aimed to connect the Syrian refugees to the Ottoman heritage and Syrian refugees with these statements:

“We are a generation born upon the heritage left by the Ottoman Empire. [...] At this moment, the number of people coming from Syria to our country comes up to 1 million. Now, will we say let them die in Syria? How can we say that? Do we have such a right? I ask you! (Erdoğan, 2014d)”.

President Erdoğan's references on the *ansar*–*muhajirun* analogy continued after the AKP began to put more emphasis on the Syrian refugees' eventual return to their country. For instance, in April 2018, during his reception another speech after the Operation Olive Branch, he pointed out the *ansar* status of the Syrians:

We're still hosting 4.5 million refugees within our borders, 3.5 millions of whom are Syrians. We aren't upset about this. We don't ask, “Why is it like this?” We say, “O Lord! You've given us the honour of hosting 4.5 million refugees.” We could've been muhajirun, but my Lord has granted us the honour of being ansar. (Erdoğan, 2018a)

Similar to Muslim nationalism in other Muslim-majority countries like Pakistan, Indonesia; President Erdoğan in Turkey, also perceived Turkish politics from a 'civilizationist' perspective; by establishing a connection with more 'benevolent, peaceful Islamic civilization' that was perceived as superior over the Western civilization. It is worth noting that there are significant differences between the 'civilizationist' discourse in the Western European right-wing parties and the 'civilizationist' discourse of the right-wing parties in Muslim-majority countries. As Brubaker (2017) states, right-wing parties in Western European countries tend to perceive Christianity as their secularized cultural entity; rather than the religious doctrine. Samuel Huntington's theory of "the clash of civilizations" influenced the right-wing populist parties in Western Europe to adopt a defensive stance against what they perceived as the threat of Islam to Europe's identity and security. In the Turkish case, within the context of the AKP, the civilizationist discourse represents Turkey's ambitious goals for regional and global influence in world politics. This civilizationist form of populism was different from the 'exclusionary populism' as defined by Mudde and Kaltwasser (2013), and Turkey's civilizationist-populist style manifested itself through using discourses of religious benevolence narratives, contrary to the indifference of the West.

President Erdoğan made frequent references to the Islamic civilization and the Ottoman heritage to justify Turkey's responsibility to protect Syrian refugees. He also highlighted the religious benevolence in his discourse on Syrian refugees. However, it is worth noting that the ansar-muhajirun analogy represented a hierarchical relationship; rather than a relationship between two entities with equal rights. Additionally, in an attempt to balance the rising anti-immigrant sentiment in Turkey, he also inconsistently used the ansar-muhajirun analogy in some of his speeches:

We're ansar [to the Syrians]. ... They took shelter in us, and we took them under our protection. We're Muslims; we have nothing to say to those who haven't had their share of Islam. Mr. Kemal [the CHP leader] said, "I'll send them to Syria"; the other one said, "I'll send them to Syria." As we get the job done [in Syria], we're sending them there anyway. What have we done to 330 thousand Syrians so far? We've sent them to Jarablus. We're sending them to those places where the situation has calmed down, and we'll continue to do so. (Erdoğan, 2019)

By looking at these examples, it can be suggested that Erdoğan's statements about Syrian refugees were strongly linked to his Muslim nationalist vision of Turkey's shared history. As Aktürk (2018) also examined in his article, through its 'opening process' like Kurdish opening, Alevi opening; the AKP aimed to transform the Turkish nation into Islamic multicultural community, although this goal ultimately failed due to the exclusion of the secular segments of society. The AKP and President Erdoğan's discourse on Syrian refugees also reflected this view of society; locating modern Turkey within its Ottoman-Islamic past by glorifying the "Ottoman ancestors" for having established a merciful, multicultural civilization. Through emphasizing the shared past with former Ottoman territories, Erdoğan aimed to justify his government's open-door policy toward Syrian refugees as a historical responsibility. He used the Syrian refugee crisis to promote his conception of Turkish history, which locates modern Turkey firmly within its Ottoman-Islamic past and glorifies Turkey's past for having established a 'civilization of mercy and compassion.'

President Erdoğan not only highlighted the shared Muslim identity between Turkish citizens and the Syrians but also rendered allegiance to the Islamic faith central; in line with his populist-nationalist discourse. The most salient example of has been the *ansar*–*muhajirun* analogy; representing the Turkish government and Turkish society as ‘*ansar*’; while denoting the immigrants as ‘*muhajirun*’; the ones who would be protected. Erdoğan used this analogy in 2013; just after the car bombings in the district of Reyhanlı on May 11, 2013 and he highlighted the importance of religious solidarity toward their Syrian “brothers and sisters”:

Here, I'd like to remind my brothers and sisters in Reyhanlı that this nation has always been ansar to the oppressed in the world. It has always fulfilled its duty toward the oppressed as ansar. It has always been ansar to muhajirun. ... We're proud of you. My brothers, you've opened your arms to our brothers and sisters who migrated here from Syria, around 25 thousands of them. You've welcomed them. Don't ever listen to those who are trying to expel them from here. And know that they're our brothers and sisters. (Erdoğan, 2013)

7.2 Inconsistencies in President Erdoğan's Discourse Toward Syrian Immigrants

Being a right-wing populist leader, Erdoğan's populist discourse in Turkish politics represented a shift from the 'inclusionary populism' towards an 'exclusionary form of populism,' as Erçetin & Boyraz (2023) emphasized in their articles. During its early years, the AKP initiated several democratization processes like the 'Kurdish opening' and adopted more inclusionary populist discourse, with its goal of shaping social relations between different groups in Turkey based on religious belonging and value-based construction of identity. However, following the 2015 election defeat and the end of the 'Peace Process for the solution of the Kurdish question in the country, the AKP and President Erdoğan began to frame security-based narratives; by adopting exclusionary rhetoric towards certain groups in the country like pro-Kurdish political party HDP and Kurdish nationalists, certain opponent groups like

journalists, authors, people with secular lifestyles and certain communities like LGBT community. From these aspects, his discourse in Turkish politics represented a highly exclusionary form of populism, similar to the Hungarian case under Prime Minister Viktor Orban and the US case under President Donald Trump.

As previously stated, President Erdoğan's right-wing populist discourse towards Syrian immigrants represented an inclusionary populist discourse, highlighting the collective past between the two nations. However, it is misleading to claim that his discourse was always inclusionary. His policy speeches contained several inconsistencies regarding immigrants, which can be attributed to the domestic political situation in Turkey and the evolving geostrategic dynamics in Syria. His approach towards Syrian immigrants and refugees was built upon a hierarchical relationship between the two groups, a relationship based on the logic of charity and paternalistic protection rather than equal status. Hence, it is worth noting that Syrian refugees were frequently portrayed by himself as victims rather than as ingroup members with equal status and rights, representing a paternalistic tone:

“We’ve seen and experienced how important the richness of the heart is in attitudes toward refugees fleeing the conflicts in Syria and Iraq for the last six years. ... We’ve given more than 10 billion dollars from the state budget. Why? ... Because we believe that the hand that gives is better than the hand that takes. From 7-year-olds to 70-year-olds, all of Turkey has mobilized on an issue that the whole world turned its back on. We’ve taken care of everyone who came to our door, regardless of their origin and disposition.” (Erdoğan, 2016b)

Despite its welcoming stance towards the Syrians in Turkey, President Erdoğan began to more emphasize on their eventual return to Syria. This took place for the first time in 2013, after the Reyhanlı car bombings in the district of Hatay province and he tried to calm down the negative Turkish public opinion through claiming that Syrians were not to stay in Turkey permanently:

I want you to know this: God willing, the day when Syria achieves peace, the day when the

dictatorship ends in Syria, the day when the will of the people in Syria comes to power, our brothers here will return to their homes. ... Don't worry, these days will pass. God willing, the opposition forces in Syria will take down this dictator as soon as possible. That day is near. (Erdoğan, 2013)

It is obvious that Turkish government's calculations became falsified when the conflicts in Syria escalated into a civil war. In line with this, Turkish government began to express the idea of establishing Syrians into safe-zones. However as it was previously stated, the idea of establishing safe-zones was not supported by the other states involved in the Syrian conflict like the US, Russia, Iran. Turkish President frequently highlighted the idea of establishing safe zone in Syria and highlighted the repatriation of Syrians plan as the main rationale for Turkey's military operations in Syria. By doing this, Turkish President Erdoğan aimed to justify Turkey's cross-border military operations in Syria in line with Turkey's intention of resettling the Syrians within the safe zones created after these operations. In his policy speeches in 2016 and his speech during Operation Olive Branch in 2018, he highlighted the key motivation of this military operations in order to resettle the Syrians:

"Our goal is that we want to declare a safe zone in an area of 4000-5000 square kilometers with a calculation of 95-45 kilometers and resettle our refugee brothers and sisters in this safe zone. We can settle those who want to take asylum to us here, we can resettle our brothers and sisters among those who took refuge in us here in the same way." (Erdoğan, 2019).

"Our operations have two purposes. First, to eliminate the threats against our country. Second, to create a safe, peaceful, and habitable region in Syria for the refugees living in our country. In fact, hundreds of thousands of refugees have returned to the Syrian lands we've made safe. During Operation Euphrates Shield, 160 thousand refugees returned to Jarablus, Bab, and Rai. Now, at least as many will return to Afrin." (Erdoğan, 2018b)

Additionally, in order to express Turkey's dissatisfaction with the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan; President Erdoğan frequently instrumentalized the immigrants as leverage tool;

threatening the Brussels for allowing migrants to go to Europe. This represents a good example of the instrumentalization of the migrants as tactical tool for leveraging in the diplomacy. Here, the statement of Erdoğan is linked to the Turkey's request for burden sharing concerning the refugee issue.

How much did you give for refugees to Turkey, which has spent about 10 billion dollars for these refugees? \$ 455 million. [...] Sorry, but the word of "gullible" is not written on our forehead. Do what should be done. We show patience as much as we do, but then would do what is necessary. Don't think that the planes and the buses are here for nothing. We will do what is necessary (Erdoğan, 2016a).

7.3 Conclusion

In this section, Turkish President Erdoğan's certain policy speeches were being carefully analyzed. It is possible to observe frequent references to Turkey's Ottoman heritage in order to highlight the collective past between the Syrians and Turkish people and the Turkey's 'rightful' place in the world politics. President Erdoğan's discourse towards the Syrians represented an 'inclusionary form of populism' through his 'civilizationist' discourse in that he highlighted Turkey's moral responsibility to host Syrian refugees and immigrants being part of the Islamic civilization and being the heir of the Ottoman Empire which represented a multicultural polity. This civilizationist discourse was also in parallel with Turkey's ambitious goals for its both regional and global influence in the world politics,

The example of President Erdoğan's discourse towards the Syrians represented a case in which the populist nationalist political discourse might become inclusive towards the acceptance of immigrants; depending on the definition of 'the people' by the right-wing populist leaders. While President Erdoğan himself continuing to pursue 'exclusionary' form of populist rhetoric towards certain groups in the Turkish politics like opposition groups, certain minority groups, communities like LGBT; it is possible to observe that his discourse towards

the Syrian immigrants and refugees represented an inclusionary form of populism. However, it is also possible to observe certain inconsistencies within Erdoğan's discourse towards the Syrians. Depending on the context, he did not refrain to use the immigrants as leverage tool in order to achieve certain policy goals. The usage of the ansar-muhajirun analogy to describe Turkey's hospitality towards the Syrians also represented a paternalistic approach towards Syrians in the country.



CHAPTER 8:

CONCLUSION

This thesis examined the immigration policies towards the irregular migrants in the US, Hungary and Turkey during 2014 – 2020 period and the policy stances towards the immigrants pursued by three right-wing populist leaders; namely the US President Donald Trump, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The US case focused on the US immigration towards the irregular immigrants coming from mostly Latin American countries and several other regions of the world towards the US. The Hungarian case focused on the Hungarian immigration policies during the 2015 migrant crisis in Europe. The Turkish case focused on Turkey's immigration policies towards Syrian refugees and immigrants coming to Turkey during the Syrian Civil War, predominantly focusing on the 2014-2020 period.

Through conducting both quantitative analysis as in the example of sentiment analysis in the case of US President Trump's tweets on the issue of immigration and qualitative discourse analysis based on the policy speeches of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. This thesis concluded that US President Trump's populist-nationalist discourse on immigration represented a high form of exclusionary populism, adopting a highly discriminative policy towards immigrants, regardless of their backgrounds. The Hungarian case in the example of Prime Minister Orbán's populist-nationalist discourse represented an exclusionary populism; both in the domestic politics with his emphasis on the protection of Hungarian society and in Hungary's immigration policy; pursuing a highly exclusionary stance toward the immigrants during the 2015 migrant crisis. In the case of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's discourse on Syrian immigrants, his approach represented an inclusionary

populist discourse. However, he frequently used exclusionary populist discourse toward certain groups, such as opposition parties, marginalized groups, and ethnic minorities, in Turkey's domestic politics.

Turkey's initial open-door policy towards the Syrian immigrants starting from the early years of the Syrian Civil War was reliant on the international requirements and several domestic factors; as well as being reliant on the right-wing populist politician President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's discourse toward the Syrian immigrants during 2014- 2020 period. During the initial years of the Syrian Civil War, Turkey's main policy towards immigrants was based on the assumption that the situation of the migrants in Turkey would be temporary. Therefore, Turkey adopted its open-door policy when the first groups of Syrians arrived at the Turkish-Syrian border in March 2011. The Syrian refugee crisis pushed the Turkish government to reassess its international protection legal framework to accelerate pre-existing reform efforts. The authority gap due to the failure of state of Syria, the ongoing violence against the civilians by the Assad regime, the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS) forced the Turkish government to adopt its open-door policy towards Syrian migrants and refugees. Hence, it was difficult for the Turkish government to ignore the humanitarian imperatives of the Syrian crisis. As a response to the humanitarian crisis in Syria and an increasing number of immigrants coming to Turkey, the Turkish government began to take more wholistic, systematic approach in its migration management by adopting new laws and regulations to protect the rights of the people under temporary protection in Turkey. During 2016-2020, Turkey's migration management regime shifted towards more security-focused policies, emphasizing domestic security, especially following the July 2016 coup attempt. It was possible to observe adaptation of more strict immigration policies by limiting the rights of those under temporary protection and asylum seekers. Other factors like the rising negative public opinion towards immigrants in Turkey, Turkish political parties' policy stances on the issue of

immigration, and especially the opposition parties' criticism of the Turkish government's Syria policy were also important for understanding Turkey's migration policies during the 2016-2020 period.

In line with Turkey's strategic autonomy foreign policy perspective based on the emphasis on humanitarian diplomacy, Turkey's role in the Western-led hierarchical order and Turkish President Erdoğan's 'populist-nationalist rhetoric towards the issue of immigrants; President Erdoğan aimed to justify Turkey's welcoming narrative towards the Syrian migrants fleeing from the Syrian Civil War. For this goal, he continuously highlighted the collective past between the Syrians and Turks, the benevolence in the Turkish society and Turkey's role in the world as important political actor. While adopting a highly exclusionary language towards certain groups in the Turkish politics like opposition groups, marginalized communities, ethnic minorities in the Turkish domestic politics, Turkish President used 'inclusionary populist' discourse towards the Syrian immigrants which makes the Turkish case a particular case. The Turkish case shows that depending on the interpretation of right-wing populist leaders' on the nation's collective history, its role in the world politics; right-wing populist leaders may adopt a relatively welcoming attitude towards international migrants; while pursuing 'exclusionary populist' rhetoric in their countries towards certain groups; depending on whom they see as “ethnically and culturally similar to them”. Hence, Turkish case represented a case of populism which necessitates to go beyond the exclusionary-inclusionary dualism in populism studies. It is worth noting that the acceptance of Ukrainian refugees by Hungarian government to Hungary after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 made the Hungarian case exceptional. The right-wing populist leader Orbán softened his anti-immigrant rhetoric by opening up Hungary's borders to Ukrainians fleeing from their country. It is possible to claim that the identity of immigrants and refugees matter for populist leaders, for deciding on which groups deserve to be accepted to their countries or not deserve to be accepted.

In the US case, during President Donald Trump's administration, it is possible to observe a high level of exclusionary populist stance toward the immigrants; regardless of their nationalities and religious backgrounds. In the case of Hungary, under the right-wing populist Prime Minister Viktor Orban, it is possible to observe a complete 'exclusionary' discourse towards the migrants coming from the Middle East and North Africa to Europe and crossing from the Hungarian territory; with some exceptions on the conditions that these migrants were of Christian origins; as in the case of Hungary's acceptance of Coptic Christians living under persecution in Egypt. Whereas the Turkish case represented an exceptional case in that through emphasizing the collective past between the Syrians, making references to Turkey's rightful place in world politics in line with Turkey's foreign policy discourse of strategic autonomy; right-wing populist leader President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan used a 'welcoming,' inclusionary narrative towards the Syrian immigrants and refugees; although it is also possible to observe inconsistencies in his discourse towards the Syrians during the 2014-2020 period.

Hungarian territory; with some exceptions on the conditions that these migrants were of Christian origins; as in the case of Hungary's acceptance of Coptic Christians living under persecution in Egypt. Whereas the Turkish case represented an exceptional case in that through emphasizing the collective past between the Syrians, making references to Turkey's rightful place in world politics in line with Turkey's foreign policy discourse of strategic autonomy; right-wing populist leader President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan used a 'welcoming,' inclusionary narrative towards the Syrian immigrants and refugees; although it is also possible to observe inconsistencies in his discourse towards the Syrians during the 2014-2020 period.

Another important point that this thesis aims to highlight is the instrumentalization of migration flows as political tool. As being not a new phenomenon in the world politics, it is possible to observe that the right-wing populist leaders of the US, Hungary, and Turkey in the example of President Donald Trump, Prime Minister Viktor Orban and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

effectively instrumentalized the issue of irregular immigrants and refugees in domestic politics. US President Trump effectively used 'anti-immigrant' discourse to get popular support by emphasizing the potential negative consequences of accepting immigrants on the American economy and society. The Hungarian Prime Minister instrumentalized the issue of immigrants during the 2015 migrant crisis in Hungarian politics in order to get popular support from its electorates and Hungary's foreign policy; by challenging the European Union's policy stance towards the immigrants as not in the interest of the Europeans with its critique on the supranational character of the European Union within the context of 2015 migrant crisis. In the Turkish case, the right-wing populist leader President Erdoğan also frequently instrumentalized the issue of immigration both in domestic politics with its emphasis on value-based construction of shared identity and in the Turkish foreign policy; as bargaining tool towards the EU and as a way of expressing Turkey's dissatisfaction with the EU's certain policies toward Turkey.

However, it is possible to observe that during the 2016 – 2020 period, there were inconsistencies between the political discourse and the actual implemented policies. Despite Turkey's criticisms directed at Europe on the migration management, many of the security measures put into force during 2016-2020 period following the July 2016 coup attempt like increasing detention centres, rise in the number of deportation without legal basis. The temporary protection (TP) status in Turkey gave working rights to Syrians but it also designated Syrians not as permanent refugees but as temporary guests. This put the Syrians in precarious situation, and the legal rights of Syrians were not recognized at large; despite the AKP's and President Erdoğan's discourse on the protection of the oppressed ones ("*mazlum*"). From these aspects, this thesis also argues that several inconsistencies were present within Turkey's immigration policy during the 2016-2020 period regarding the ambiguities between the discourse and the implemented policies. Although the overall rhetoric of President Erdoğan's discourse on the Syrian migrants was based on emphasizing the brotherhood between the Turkish and Syrian societies, a rising paternalistic tone in his policy speeches on the issue of the protection of immigrants were observable. This thesis also concluded that through analysing several surveys conducted during 2016-2020, Turkish society did not approve of President Erdoğan's inclusionary populist discourse regarding Syrian immigrants. The Turkish people still tended to put a significant social distance between themselves and the Syrians; perceiving them as not as culturally similar to the Turkish people.

There are several limitations within the scope of this thesis. Through focusing on the immigration policies in three country cases - the US, Hungary and Turkey – during the leadership of three right-wing populist leaders, namely the US President Donald Trump, Prime Minister of Hungary Viktor Orban, President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, this thesis aimed to provide a comparative analysis in order to understand under which situations right-wing populist leaders can adopt positive discourse towards the international migrants. However, due to the wide scope of the topics of immigration and migration management; not every aspect of the migration policies could not be examined in detail, through focusing on every implemented policy during 2014 – 2020 period. Further studies can contribute to the existing literature through providing more detailed analysis of the migration management in these three countries. This thesis, however aims to contribute to the existing literature through providing an overview of the migration management in the US, Hungary, and Turkey under the leadership of three right-wing populist leaders. Finally, this thesis aims to answer questions like under which conditions can populist right-wing politicians exclude certain groups but include other groups; how their perspective on their nation's role in the world affects their policy stances towards immigrants.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adisönmez, U. C., & Onursal, R. (2022). “Strong, but Anxious State”: The Fantasmatic Narratives on Ontological Insecurity and Anxiety in Turkey. *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi*, 19(73), 65-79.
- Akkerman, T., de Lange, S. L., & Rooduijn, M. (Eds.). (2016). *Radical right-wing populist parties in Western Europe: Into the mainstream?*. Routledge.
- Aktürk, Ş. (2017). Turkey’s role in the Arab spring and the Syrian conflict. *Turkish policy quarterly*, 15(4), 87-96.
http://turkishpolicy.com/files/articlepdf/turkeys-role-in-the-arab-spring-and-the-syrian-conflict_en_4321.pdf
- Aktürk, S. (2017). Post-imperial democracies and new projects of nationhood in Eurasia: transforming the nation through migration in Russia and Turkey. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 43(7), 1101-1120.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1369183X.2016.1246177?casa_token=-8Db-FAeT1MAAAAA%3AL20DqH31YFGAbYD31INidzxjEOAqn19Q9CJx3smONe3B_G2iOI N1mjALMSFhvHuu79QHNkKYHEOyble
- Aktürk, Ş. (2018) One nation under Allah? Islamic multiculturalism, Muslim nationalism and Turkey’s reforms for Kurds, Alevis, and non-Muslims, *Turkish Studies*, 19:4, 523- 551, DOI: [10.1080/14683849.2018.1434775](https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2018.1434775)
<https://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080%2F14683849.2018.1434775>
- Anadolu Agency. (December 12, 2017). *Altınok İhraç Edilen polis Sayısını Açıkladı..*
<https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/emniyet-genel-muduru-altinok-22-bin-987-teskilat-mensubu-meslekten-ihrac-edildi/1002476>.

Altıok, B. & Tosun, S. (2019): Understanding foreign policy strategies during migration movements: a comparative study of Iraqi and Syrian mass refugee inflows to Turkey, *Turkish Studies*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2019.1709055>

Al Yafai, Faisal. (2019, August 9). Turkey's Secular Opposition Turning on Syrians. *Asia Times*. (Retrieved from <https://asiatimes.com/2019/08/turkeys-secular-opposition-turning-on-syrians/>).

Altunışık, M. B., & Tür, Ö. (2006). From Distant Neighbors to Partners? Changing Syrian-Turkish Relations. *Security Dialogue*, 37(2), 229–248.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010606066172>

Altıok, B. & Tosun, S. (2020). Understanding foreign policy strategies during migration movements: a comparative study of Iraqi and Syrian mass refugee inflows to Turkey, *Turkish Studies*, DOI: 10.1080/14683849.2019.1709055
<https://mirekoc.ku.edu.tr/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Alt%C4%B1ok-Tosun-2019-Understanding-foreign-policy-strategies-during-migration-movements.pdf>

Altmordu, A. (2020). Uncivil populism in power: The case of Erdoğanism. in *Populism in the civil sphere*, ed. J.C. Alexander, P. Kivisto, and G. Sciortino, 74–95. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Andeweg, R. B. (1996). Elite-mass linkages in Europe: legitimacy crisis or party crisis?. In *Elitism, populism, and European politics* (pp. 143-163). Clarendon Press.

Aras, B. (2017). *Turkish foreign policy after July 15*. Istanbul, Turkey: Istanbul Policy Center.

Arı, T. & Pirinççi, F. (2010). Turkey's New Foreign Policy Towards The Middle East And The Perceptions In Syria And Lebanon . *Gazi Akademik Bakış* , 4 (7) , 1-16 . (Retrieved from <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/gav/issue/6524/86496>)

Asylum Information Database (AIDA). (February 2015). *Hungary Country Report*. Retrieved from [https://asylumineurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/report-download_aida -
_hungary_thirdupdate_final_february_2015.pdf](https://asylumineurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/report-download_aida_-_hungary_thirdupdate_final_february_2015.pdf). (accessed 5 March 2023).

Asylum Information Database (AIDA). (December 2015). *Turkey Country Report*. Retrieved from https://asylumineurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/report-download_aida_tr_update.i.pdf. (accessed 5 March 2023).

Asylum Information Database (AIDA). (2019). *Turkey Country Report*. https://asylumineurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/report-download_aida_tr_2019update.pdf (accessed 5 March 2023).

Aydın-Düzgüt, S. (2013). Critical discourse analysis in analyzing European Union foreign policy: Prospects and challenges. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 49(3), 354-367. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836713494999>

Ayhan, K. (2020). Migration as a leverage tool in international relations: Turkey as a case study. *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi*, 17(68), 21-39. <https://doi.org/10.33458/uidergisi.856870>

Aytaç, S. E., & Elçi, E. (2019). Populism in Turkey. *Populism around the world: A comparative perspective*, 89-108. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-96758-5_6

Balta, E., Elçi, E., & Sert, D. (2022). *Political Party Representation of Anti-Immigration Attitudes: The Case of Turkey*. Heinrich Böll Stiftung. <https://tr.boell.org/en/2023/03/03/political-party-representation-anti-immigration-attitudes>

Barna, I., & Koltai, J. (2018). The inner structure and change of attitudes toward migrants between 2002 and 2015 in Hungary based on data from the European Social Survey (ESS). *socio. hu*, 4-23. <http://socio.hu/index.php/so/article/view/674>

Batalova, J., Hanna, M., & Levesque, C. (2021). Frequently requested statistics on immigrants and immigration in the United States. <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frequently-requested-statistics-immigrants-and-immigration-united-states-2020>

Batory, A. (2016). Populists in Government? Hungary's 'System of National Cooperation'.

Democratization 23 (2): 292.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2015.1076214>

Bauböck, R. (2018). Refugee protection and burden-sharing in the European Union. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 56(1), 141-156.

<https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jcms.12638>

Baxter, A., & Nowrasteh, A. (2021). A Brief History of US Immigration Policy from the Colonial Period to the Present Day. *Cato Institute Policy Analysis*, 919. Retrieved from <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep33757.pdf>

Bengio, O. and Özcan, G. (2000). "Changing Relations: Turkish - Israeli - Arab Triangle," *Perceptions*, 5(1): 136-146. 167

<https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/perception/issue/49025/625381>

Beriker, N. (2001). Yeni dünya eski yaklaşımlar. *Foreign Policy (Türkiye Baskısı)*, 46-54. Foreign Policy. <https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/11239/1/FP.pdf>

Berlet, C., & Sunshine, S. (2019). Rural rage: the roots of right-wing populism in the United States. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 46(3), 480-513.

Betts, A., Memişoğlu, F., & Ali, A. (2021). What difference do mayors make? The role of municipal authorities in Turkey and Lebanon's response to Syrian refugees. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 34(1), 491-519. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/feaa011>

Bíró-Nagy, A. (2022). Orbán's political jackpot: migration and the Hungarian electorate. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 48(2), 405-424. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2020.1853905>

Blokker, P. (2005). Populist nationalism, anti-Europeanism, postnationalism, and the East-West distinction. *German Law Journal* 6 (2): 371-389.

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1369183X.2020.1853905>

Blokker, P. (2019). Populism as a constitutional project. *International Journal of*

Constitutional Law, 17(2), 536-553.

<https://academic.oup.com/icon/article/17/2/536/5523745>

Bonikowski, B. (2017). Ethno-nationalist populism and the mobilization of collective resentment. *British Journal of Sociology* 68: S181-213.

<https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1468-4446.12325>

Bracciale, R., & Martella, A. (2017). Define the populist political communication style: the case of Italian political leaders on Twitter. *Information, communication & society*, 20(9), 1310-1329. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2017.1328522>

Brubaker, R. (2017). Between nationalism and civilizationism: The European populist moment in Comparative Perspective. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 40 (8): 1191–1226.

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01419870.2017.1294700>

Brubaker, R. (2020). Populism and nationalism. *Nations and Nationalism* 26 (1): 44–66. <https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12522>

Campani, G., Fabelo Concepción, S., Rodriguez Soler, A., & Sánchez Savín, C. (2022). The rise of Donald Trump right-wing populism in the United States: Middle American Radicalism and anti-immigration discourse. *Societies*, 12(6), 154. Retrieved from <https://www.mdpi.com/2075-4698/12/6/154>

Canovan, M. (2002). Taking politics to the people: Populism as the ideology of democracy. *Democracies and the populist challenge*, 25-44. Retrieved from https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781403920072_2

Central Intelligence Agency. (2021). Hungary. In *The world factbook*. Retrieved from <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/about/archives/2021/countries/hungary/>

Charteris-Black, J. (2006). Britain as a container: immigration metaphors in the 2005 election campaign. *Discourse & Society*, 17(5), 563–581. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0957926506066345>

Chambers, S. (2019). Democracy and constitutional reform: Deliberative versus populist constitutionalism. *Philosophy & Social Criticism*, 45(9-10), 1116-1131.

<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0191453719872294>

Chorbajian, L. (Ed.). (2021). *Power and Inequality: Critical Readings for a New Era*.

Routledge.

Connor, P. (August 20, 2020). *Record 1.3 Million Sought Asylum in Europe in 2015*. Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project.

<https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2016/08/02/number-of-refugees-to-europe-surges-to-record-1-3-million-in-2015/>

Csigó, P., & Merkovity, N. (2016). Hungary: Home of empty populism. In *Populist political communication in Europe* (pp. 299-310). Routledge.

<https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315623016-28/hungary-p%C3%A9ter-csig%C3%B3-norbert-merkovity>

Chu, Tiffany S. (2020). Hosting Your Enemy: Accepting Refugees from a Rival State and Respect for Human Rights. *Journal of Global Security Studies* 5(1):4-24.

<https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogz043>

Constitutional Court of Turkey. (May 30, 2019). Decision 2016/22418. Available in Turkish at: <https://bit.ly/2wHa3Eq>.

Dandashly, A. (2015). The EU response to regime change in the wake of the Arab revolt: differential implementation. *Journal of European Integration*, 37(1), 37-56.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2014.975988>

Danış, D., & Nazlı, D. (2019). A faithful alliance between the civil society and the state: Actors and mechanisms of accommodating Syrian refugees in Istanbul. *International Migration*, 57(2), 143-157.

<https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12495>

De Cleen, Benjamin, 'Populism and Nationalism', in Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser and others (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, Oxford Handbooks (2017; online edn, Oxford

Academic, November 6, 2017), <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198803560.013.18>.

De Cleen, B., & Stavrakakis, Y. (2017). Distinctions and articulations: A discourse theoretical framework for the study of populism and nationalism. *Javnost-The Public*, 24(4), 301-319.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/13183222.2017.1330083>

Devran, Y., and Ö.F. Özcan. (2016). Söylemlerin Dilinden Suriye sorunu. *Marmara İletişim Dergisi* 25: 35–52.

<https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/maruid/issue/23759/253236>

European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE). (3 March 2020). ECRE Statement on the Situation at the Greek Turkish Border. <https://ecre.org/ecre-statement-on-the-situation-at-the-greek-turkish-border/>

Directorate General of Migration Management (January 7, 2019). ‘Circular 2019/1 on Cessation of Status of Syrians due to Voluntary Return’.

Doherty, C. (2016). “5 facts about Trump supporters view of immigration”, Pew Research Center. <https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2016/08/25/5-facts-about-trump-supporters-views-of-immigration/>

Duvar English. (November 14, 2021). *Turkish mayor plans to charge foreigners thousands of liras for weddings in yet another racist policy*. Duvar English.

<https://www.duvarenglish.com/turkish-mayor-plans-to-charge-foreigners-thousands-of-liras-for-weddings-in-yet-another-racist-policy-news-59515>

Erçetin, T., & Boyraz, C. (2023). How to struggle with exclusionary right-wing populism: evidence from Turkey. *Democratization*, 30(1), 78-100.

<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0191453718755207>

Erdoğan, R.T. (2013). Speech at the Reyhanlı Meeting. Hatay, 25 May.

Erdoğan, R.T. (2014). Speech at a Collective Opening Ceremony. Trabzon, 10 October.

Erdoğan, R. T. (2016a). Speech at the TÜGİK General Assembly. Ankara, 11 February.

Erdoğan, R.T. (2016b). Speech at an Iftar Dinner Organized by Birlik Vakf. Istanbul, 11 June.

Erdoğan, R.T. (2017). Address to the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly New York, 19 September.

Erdoğan, R.T. (2018a). Speech at the Meeting with TİKA Coordinators. Ankara, 10 April.

Erdoğan, R.T. (2018b). Speech at the Global Entrepreneurship Congress. Istanbul, 16 April.

Erdoğan, R.T. (2019). Speech at a Campaign Rally in Sancaktepe. Istanbul, 19 June.

Erdoğan, R.T. (2020). Speech at the Closing Ceremony of the International Migration Film Festival. 21 June.

Erdoğan, M. M. (2017). Suriyeliler Barometresi- Yönetici Özeti (Taslak) (Syrian Barometer-Draft) (<https://mmuraterdogan.files.wordpress.com/2016/06/suriyeliler-barometresi-yc3b6neticic3b6zeti.pdf>)

Erdoğan, M. M. (2020). Suriyeliler Barometresi: Suriyelilerle Uyum içinde Yaşamın Çerçevesi, (Turkey: Syrians Barometer-2019: A Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion with Syrians in Turkey) TAGU and UNHCR.

<https://www.unhcr.org/tr/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2020/09/SB2019-ENG-04092020.pdf>

Erdoğan, M. M. (2021). Suriyeliler Barometresi: Suriyelilerle Uyum içinde Yaşamın Çerçevesi, (Turkey: Syrians Barometer-2020: A Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion with Syrians in Turkey) TAGU and UNHCR.

<https://www.unhcr.org/tr/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2022/03/SB-2020-Ingilizce-son.pdf>

European Commission (2015). “EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan”. Retrieved from https://ab.gov.tr/files/AB_Iliskileri/Tur_En_Realitons/15_october_2015_eu_turkey_joint_action_plan.pdf (Accessed 12 March 2023).

EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement (2013). “EU-Turkey agreement on the readmission of persons residing without authorization”, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3A4309179> (Accessed 12 March 2023).

Ferreira, M. J. M. (2018). Memory, Trauma and the Securitization of Migration in Contemporary Hungary. *Political Observer. Revista Portuguesa de Ciência Política*, (9), 45-69. <http://rpcp.pt/index.php/rpcp/article/view/33>

Fitzgerald, D. S., & Cook-Martín, D. (2014). *Culling the masses: The democratic origins of racist immigration policy in the Americas*. Harvard University Press.

FitzGerald, D. S., & Cook-Martín, D. (2014). *Culling the masses: The democratic origins of racist immigration policy in the Americas*. Harvard University Press.

<http://rpcp.pt/index.php/rpcp/article/view/33>

Fletcher Jr, B. (2016). 'Stars and Bars': Understanding Right-Wing Populism in the USA. *Socialist Register*, 52.

Gramlich, J. (2020). 'How border apprehensions, ICE arrests and deportations have changed under Trump' *Pew Research Center*. (Retrieved from <https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2020/03/02/how-border-apprehensions-ice-arrests-and-deportations-have-changed-under-trump/>)

Goździak, E. M. (2023). Contesting Flexible Solidarity: Secular and Religious Support for Refugees in Hungary. In *Debating Religion and Forced Migration Entanglements* (pp. 21-44). Cham: Springer International Publishing.

<https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/61920/978-3-031-23379-1.pdf?sequence=1#page=33>

Green-Pedersen, C., & Otjes, S. (2019). A hot topic? Immigration on the agenda in Western Europe. *Party Politics*, 25(3), 424-434. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068817728211>

Greenhill, K. M. (2016). Open arms behind barred doors: fear, hypocrisy and policy schizophrenia in the European migration crisis. *European Law Journal*, 22(3), 317-332.

<https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/eulj.12179>

Greven, T. (2016). The rise of right-wing populism in Europe and the United States. *A Comparative Perspective. Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Washington DC Office*, 1-8.

Gülmez, R. (2019). The securitization of the Syrian refugee crisis through political party discourses. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 20(3), 887-906.
<https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12134-018-0637-2>

Gümüş, B., & Eroğlu, D. (2015). Partial integration of Syrian‘ escapees’ under the rule of Turkey’s Justice and development party (JDP). *Contemporary Arab Affairs*, 8(4), 469–487.

<https://online.ucpress.edu/caa/article-abstract/8/4/469/26169/Partial-integration-of-Syrian-escapees-under-the>

Güneylioğlu, Murat (2011), “The Changing Nature of Turkish-Syrian Relations: A Globalization Perspective,” *Boğaziçi Journal: Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 147-169. Retrieved from
<http://acikerisim.klu.edu.tr/xmlui/handle/20.500.11857/1369>

Gürsoy, Y. (2021). Moving beyond European and Latin American typologies: The peculiarities of AKP’s populism in Turkey. *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 51 (1): 157–178.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2019.1665196>

Hadiz, V. R., & Chrysosgelos, A. (2017). Populism in world politics: A comparative cross-regional perspective. *International Political Science Review*, 38(4), 399-411.
<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0192512117693908>

Hameleers, M. (2018). A typology of populism: Toward a revised theoretical framework on the sender side and receiver side of communication. *International Journal of Communication*, 12, 20. <https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/7456>

Hárs, Á. (2009) Immigration countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The Case of Hungary. *Idea Working Papers No.12*, May, http://www.idea6fp.uw.edu.pl/pliki/WP12_Hungary.pdf.
<https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/7456>

Hinnebusch, R. (2003). *The international politics of the Middle East*. Manchester University Press. <https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/35008>

House, F. (2015). Freedom House Index Methodology. *Freedom House*.

Hungarian Helsinki Committee. (2015). The Hungarian Helsinki Committee's opinion on the government's amendments to criminal law related to the sealed border'. Retrieved from <https://helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/modification-of-criminal-laws-16092015.pdf>

Huysmans, J. (2000). The European Union and the securitization of migration. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 38(5), 751-777.

<https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-5965.00263>

Hürriyet Daily News. (July 27, 2021). Mayor's plan to charge 'foreigners' 10 times higher water bill sparks debate. *Hürriyet Daily News*. <https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/mayor-controversially-plans-to-charge-foreigners-10-times-higher-water-bill-166622>

İçduygu, A. (2007). EU-ization matters: Changes in immigration and asylum practices in Turkey. In *The Europeanization of national policies and politics of immigration: between autonomy and the European Union* (pp. 201-222). London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230800717_10

İçduygu, Ahmet and Damla B. Aksel (2013). Turkish Migration Policies: A Critical Historical Retrospective. *Perceptions*, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 167-190. Retrieved from <https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/perception/issue/48972/624814>

İçduygu, A., & Şimşek, D. (2016). Syrian refugees in Turkey: Towards integration policies. *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 15(3), 59-69. <http://turkishpolicy.com/article/828/syrian-refugees-in-turkey-towards-integration-policies>

İhlamur-Öner, S. G. (2014). Türkiye'nin Suriyeli mültecilere yönelik politikası. *Ortadoğu Analiz*, 6(61), 42-45. https://www.orsam.org.tr/d_hbanaliz/11sunagulferihlamuroner_61.pdf

İlğıt, A., & Memişoğlu, F. (2017). Contesting Refugees in Turkey: Political Parties & the

Syrian Refugees. *Syrian Communities in Turkey: Today and Tomorrow*, Transnational Press London.

Ineli-Ciger, M., & Ulusoy, O. (2020). Why the EU-Turkey Statement should ever serve as a blueprint. <https://www.asileproject.eu/why-the-eu-turkey-statement-should-never-serve-as-a-blueprint/>

International Crisis Group. (2018). Turkey's Syrian refugees: Defusing metropolitan tensions. *Brussels: Europe & Central Asia Report*, (248). Retrieved from <https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/western-europemediterranean/turkey/248-turkeys-syrian-refugees-defusing-metropolitan-tensions>

Isacson, A. (2018). The US Government's 2018 Border Data Clearly Shows Why the Trump Administration is on the Wrong Track. *WOLA: Advocacy for Human Rights in the Americas*, 11(09). <https://www.wola.org/analysis/us-government-2018-border-data-trump-immigration-asylum-policy/>

Istanbul PDMM (November 15, 2019). *Düzensiz Göç, Kayıtsız Suriyeliler ve Kayıt Dışı İstihdam İle İlgili Basın Açıklaması*. İçişleri Bakanlığı. Available in Turkish at: <https://bit.ly/33LBDwB>.

İzmir'de "mahalle" kavgası; 30 kişi yaralandı, 500 Suriyeli mahalleyi terk etti! (Nisan 8, 2017). *T24*. <https://t24.com.tr/haber/izmirde-mahalle-kavgasi-30-kisi-yaralandi-500-suriyeli-mahalleyi-terk-etti,398094>

Jacobsen, K. (1996). Factors Influencing the Policy Responses of Host Governments to Mass Refugee Influxes. *The International Migration Review*, 30(3), 655–678. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2547631>

Jagers, J., & Walgrave, S. (2007). Populism as political communication style: An empirical study of political parties' discourse in Belgium. *European journal of political research*, 46(3), 319-345. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00690.x>

Jolly, Seth, Ryan Bakker, Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, Jonathan Polk, Jan Rovny, Marco

Steenbergen, and Milada Anna Vachudova. Forthcoming. "Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trend File, 1999-2019." Electoral Studies. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2021.102420>

Judis, J. B. (2016). Rethinking populism. *Dissent*, 63(4), 116-122.

<https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/56/article/633243/summary>

Kale, B. and Erdogan ,M. (2019). The impact of GCR on local governments and Syrian refugees in Turkey. *International Migration* 57(6), 224–242.

<https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12658>

Kaya, A., Robert, M. V., & Tecmen, A. (2020). Populism in Turkey and France: nativism, multiculturalism and Euroskepticism. *Turkish Studies*, 21(3), 361-391.

Kirişci, K. (2007). Turkey: A country of transition from emigration to immigration. *Mediterranean politics*, 12(1), 91-97.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/13629390601136871>

Klein, B., & Liptak, K. (2018). Trump ramps up rhetoric: "Dems want 'illegal immigrants' to infest our country", CNN.

Kloos, S. L. (2016). *Changing approaches to immigration and diversity in the context of the current refugee-influx to Germany and Turkey* (Master's thesis, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü).

Korkut, U. (2016). Pragmatism, moral responsibility or policy change: the Syrian refugee crisis and selective humanitarianism in the Turkish refugee regime. *Comparative Migration Studies*, 4(1), 2. <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s40878-015-0020-9>

<https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s40878-015-0020-9>

Köstem, S. (2021). Russian-Turkish cooperation in Syria: geopolitical alignment with limits. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 34(6), 795-817.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2020.1719040>

Krämer, B. (2017). Populist and non-populist media: Their paradoxical role in the development and diffusion of a right-wing ideology. In *Political Populism* (pp. 405-420).

Krekó, P., B. Hunyadi, and P. Szicherle. (2019). “Anti-Muslim Populism in Hungary: From the Margins to the Mainstream.” <https://policycommons.net/artifacts/4140614/anti-muslim-populism-in-hungary/4949625/>

Kriesi, H., & Pappas, T. S. (2015). *Populism in Europe during crisis: An introduction*.

Krogstad, J. M., Passel, J. S., & Coh, D. (2017). “5 facts about illegal immigration in the U.S.” Retrieved from <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/27/5-facts-about-illegal-immigration-in-the-u-s/>.

Kutlay, M., & Öniş, Z. (2021). Turkish foreign policy in a post-western order: strategic autonomy or new forms of dependence?. *International Affairs*, 97(4), 1085-1104. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iab094>

Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) . (December 6, 2019). Law No 7196 amending several acts, available in Turkish at: <http://bit.ly/2TSm0zU>.

Law No. 5393 Municipality Law. Townsmen’s Law, Article 13 (2015). Available at <https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.5393-20150404.pdf> (accessed 12 March 2023).

Leutert, S., Arvey, S., & Ezzell, E. (2021). Metering update. *Strauss Center for International Security and Law*. Retrieved from <https://www.strausscenter.org/campi-publications/>

Law on FIP (2013). Law on Foreigners and International Protection in Turkey Law No. 6458 (4 April). Available at https://www.unhcr.org/tr/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2017/04/LoFIP_ENG_DGMM_revised-2017.pdf

Lowther, E. (2020). US Election 2020: Trump's Impact on Immigration-in Seven Charts. *BBC News*. *BBC*. <https://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2020-54638643> (Accessed 12 March

2023)

Lüleci-Sula, Ç., & Sula, I. E. (2021). Migration Management in Turkey: Discourse and Practice. *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi*, 18(72), 1-17.

<https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/uidergisi/issue/68191/1000756>

Mathema, S., & Carratala, S. (2020). Rebuilding the US refugee program for the 21st century. *Center for American Progress*.

<https://www.americanprogress.org/article/rebuilding-us-refugee-program-21st-century>.

McLaughlin, D. (2016, September 27). Hungary to help Christians while rejecting Muslim migrants. *The Irish Times*.

<https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/hungary-to-help-christians-while-rejecting-muslim-migrants-1.2807543>

Melegh, A. (2016). Unequal exchanges and the radicalization of demographic nationalism in Hungary. *Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics*, 2(4), 87-108.

<https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=711283>

Mudde, Cas. 2004. "The Populist Zeitgeist." *Government and Opposition* 39 (4): 542–63.

[doi:10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x)

Mudde, Cas. (2017). "Populism: An Ideational Approach." In *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*. Oxford Handbook of Politics, eds. Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina O. Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy. New York NY: Oxford University Press, 27–47.

March, L. (2017). Left and right populism compared: The British case. *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 19 (2): 282–303.

<https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148117701753>

Moffitt, B., & Tormey, S. (2014). Rethinking populism: Politics, mediatisation and political style. *Political studies*, 62(2), 381-397. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12032>

Mudde, C., & Kaltwasser, C. R. (Eds.). (2012). *Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat*

or corrective for democracy?. Cambridge University Press.

Mudde, C., & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2017). *Populism: A very short introduction*. Oxford University Press.

Müller, J. W. (2016). *What Is Populism?* Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Norris, Pippa, 2020, "Global Party Survey, 2019", <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/WMGNTS>

Nowrasteh, A. (2021). President Trump Reduced Legal Immigration. He Did Not Reduce Illegal Immigration. *Cato at Liberty*. Retrieved from <https://www.cato.org/blog/president-trump-reduced-legal-immigration-he-did-not-reduce-illegal-immigration>

Muller, Jan-Werner. 2017. "Populism and Constitutionalism." In the *Oxford Handbook of Populism*. *Oxford Handbook of Politics*, eds. Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina O. Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 590–606.

National Legislative Bodies / National Authorities, *Turkey: Regulation on Work Permits of Foreigners under Temporary Protection*, 11 January 2016, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/582c71464.html>

Nieghuth, T. (1999). Beyond dichotomy: Concepts of the nation and the distribution of membership. *Nations and Nationalism* 5 (2): 155–173. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1354-5078.1999.00155.x>

O'Driscoll, D. (2015). The YPG and the Changing Dynamics of the Fight against IS. Policy Paper No: 24 (126). <https://pureportal.coventry.ac.uk/en/publications/the-ypg-and-the-changing-dynamics-of-the-fight-against-is>

Orbán, V. (2015). Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's presentation at the 26th Bálványos Summer Open University and Student Camp. Website of the Hungarian Government. Retrieved from <https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-presentation-at-the-26th-balvanyos-summer-open-university-and-student-camp>

Orbán, V. (January 19, 2016). Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's speech delivered on the day of remembrance for ethnic Germans rounded up and deported from Hungary. *Website of the*

Hungarian Government. Retrieved from https://2010-2015.miniszterelnok.hu/in_english_article/prime_minister_viktor_orban_s_speech_delivered_on_the_day_of_remembrance_for_ethnic_germans_rounded_up_and_deported_from_hungary

Orbán, V. (February 8, 2016). Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's statement at the joint press conference with Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland Beata Szydło, following their meeting in Budapest. Website of the Hungarian Government. Retrieved from <<https://2015-2022.miniszterelnok.hu/prime-minister-viktor-orbans-statement-at-the-joint-press-conference-with-prime-minister-of-the-republic-of-poland-beata-szydlo-following-their-meeting-in-budapest/>>

Orbán, V. (February 17, 2016). Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's press statement following his talks with President of Russia Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. Website of the Hungarian Government. Retrieved from <https://2010-2015.miniszterelnok.hu/in_english_article/prime_minister_viktor_orban_s_press_statement_following_his_talks_with_president_of_russia_vladimir_vladimirovich_putin>

Orbán, V. (February 25, 2016). Hungary's prime minister says accepting Syrian refugees also means importing terrorism, criminalism anti-Semitism and homophobia. Business Insider. Interview gave to Kai Diekmann. Retrieved from <http://www.businessinsider.com/viktor-orban-interview-refugee-migrant-hungary-2016-2>

Orbán, V. (February 28, 2016). Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's State of the Nation Address. Website of the Hungarian Government. Retrieved from <<https://2015-2022.miniszterelnok.hu/prime-minister-viktor-orbans-state-of-the-nation-address/>> (Accessed 15 April 2023).

Orbán, V. (March 15, 2016). Speech by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. Website of the Hungarian Government. Retrieved from <<https://2015-2022.miniszterelnok.hu/speech-by-prime-minister-viktor-orban-on-15-march/>>

Orbán, V. (September 30, 2016). Provided there are Christians there will be a spiritual up- turn. *Website of the Hungarian Government*. Retrieved from <<http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/provided-there-are-christians- there-will-be-a-spiritual-upturn>>

Orbán, Viktor. (October 4, 2016). The Referendum has achieved its goal. Retrieved from <<http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/news/the-referendum-has-achieved-its-goal>>

Orbán, V. (December 1, 2016). Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's laudation when presenting the Grand Cross of the Hungarian Order of Merit to Prime Minister of Bulgaria Boyko Borissov. *Website of the Hungarian Government*. Retrieved from <<https://2015-2022.miniszterelnok.hu/prime-minister-viktor-orbans-laudation-when-presenting-the-hungarian-order-of-merit-grand-cross-with-chain-and-golden-radiant-star-to-president-of-the-republic-of-bulgaria-rozen-plevneliev/>>

Orbán, V. (December 22, 2016). Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's press conference after the meeting of the European Council. *Website of the Hungarian Government*. Retrieved from <<http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-press-conference-after-the-meeting-of-the-european-council>>

Orbán, V. (March 30, 2017). Speech of Viktor Orbán at the EPP Congress. *Website of the Hungarian Government*. Retrieved from <<http://www.kormany.hu/en/ the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/speech-of-viktor-orban-at- the-epp-congress>>

Orbán, V. (April 15, 2017). Easter interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in Hungarian daily Magyar Idők. *Website of the Hungarian Government*. Retrieved from <<https://2015-2022.miniszterelnok.hu/easter-interview-with-prime-minister-viktor-orban-in-hungarian-daily-magyar-idok/>>

Orbán, V. (March 15, 2017). Viktor Orbán's speech on the anniversary of the 1848 Revolution. *Website of the Hungarian Government*. Retrieved from <<http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/viktor-orban-s-speech- on-the-anniversary-of-the-1848-revolution>> (accessed 10 september, 2017).

Orbán, V. (May 16, 2017). Interview with Viktor Orbán on Magyar Televízió (Hungarian public television) summarizing his recent visit to Beijing. Website of the Hungarian Government. Retrieved from <<https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/interview-with-prime-minister-viktor-orban-on-magyar-televizio-hungarian-public-television-summarising-his-recent-visit-to-beijing>>

Orbán, V. (May 25, 2017). Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's opening speech at the 2nd Budapest World Congress of Families. Website of the Hungarian Government. Retrieved from <https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-opening-speech-at-the-2nd-budapest-world-congress-of-families>

Orbán, V. (March 2, 2018). Hungary will either have a national government, or George Soros's people will form a government. *Website of the Hungarian Government*. Retrieved from <<https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/news/hungary-will-either-have-a-national-government-or-george-soros-s-people-will-form-a-government>>

Öniş, Z. (2012). The triumph of conservative globalism: The political economy of the AKP era. *Turkish Studies*, 13(2), 135-152. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2012.685252>

Öniş, Z. (2015) Monopolising the Centre: The AKP and the Uncertain Path of Turkish Democracy. *The International Spectator* 50 (2): 22–41. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2015.1015335>

Öniş, Z., & Kutlay, M. (2020). The global political economy of right-wing populism: Deconstructing the paradox. *The International Spectator*, 55(2), 108-126. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2020.1731168>

Kutlay, M., & Öniş, Z. (2021). Turkish foreign policy in a post-western order: strategic autonomy or new forms of dependence?. *International Affairs*, 97(4), 1085-1104. <https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/97/4/1085/6314232>

Özçürümez, S. and İçduygu, A. (2020) *Zorunlu göç deneyimi ve toplumsal bütünleşme: kavramlar, modeller ve uygulamalar ile Türkiye*. İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları 631, Araştırma 13.

<https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/2520612>

Özçürümez, S., & Hoxha, J. (2022). Expanding the boundaries of the local: Entrepreneurial municipalism and migration governance in Turkey. *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 1-19.

<https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/new-perspectives-on-turkey/article/expanding-the-boundaries-of-the-local-entrepreneurial-municipalism-and-migration-governance-in-turkey/A03D1EB101774C6521FAF916E2704890>

Özden, S. (2013). *Syrian refugees in Turkey*, Migration Policy Centre, MPC Research Report. Retrieved from Cadmus, EUI Research Repository. <https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/29455>

Özpek, B. B., and Yaşar, N. J. 2018. Populism and Foreign Policy in Turkey under the AKP Rule. *Turkish Studies* 19(2): 198–216.

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14683849.2017.1400912>

Palonen, E. (2009). Political polarisation and populism in contemporary Hungary. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 62(2), 318-334. <https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsn048>

Pauwels, T. (2011). Measuring populism: A quantitative text analysis of party literature in Belgium. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, 21(1), 97-119.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2011.539483>

Peers, S., & Roman, E. (2016). The EU, Turkey and the Refugee Crisis: What could possibly go wrong?. *EU Law Analysis*, 5.

<http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2016/02/the-eu-turkey-and-refugee-crisis-what.html>

Pierce, S., & Selee, A. (2017). Immigration under Trump: A review of policy shifts in the year since the election. *Migration Policy Institute*.

https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/TrumpatOne_FINAL.pdf

Pierce, S., & Selee, A. (2018). US Immigration Policy under Trump: A review of policy shifts in the year since the election. *Migration Policy Institute*.

https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/TrumpatOne_FINAL.pdf

Polat, R. K. (2018). Religious solidarity, historical mission and moral superiority: construction of external and internal 'others' in AKP's discourses on Syrian refugees in Turkey. *Critical Discourse Studies*, 15(5), 500-516. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17405904.2018.1500925>

Reisigl, M., & Ruth Wodak, R. (2001). *Discourse and discrimination: rhetorics of racism and anti-semitism*. London: Routledge.

Rooduijn, M., and T. Akkerman. (2017). Flank attacks: Populism and left-right radicalism in Western Europe. *Party Politics* 23 (3): 193–204. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068815596514>

Rooduijn, M. (2018). What unites the voter bases of populist parties? Comparing the electorates of 15 populist parties. *European Political Science Review*, 10(3), 351-368. doi:10.1017/S1755773917000145

Sacchetti, M. (2017). Deportations from the Interior of the United States are Rising under Trump. *The Washington Post*.

Saraçoğlu, C., Demirkol, Ö. (2015). Nationalism and foreign policy discourse in Turkey under the AKP rule: Geography, history and national identity. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 42 (3): 301–319.

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13530194.2014.947152>

Schertzer, R., & Woods, E. (2021). # Nationalism: The ethno-nationalist populism of Donald Trump's Twitter communication. *Ethnic and racial studies*, 44(7), 1154-1173.

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01419870.2020.1713390>

Schon, Justin and David Leblang (2021). Why Physical Barriers Backfire: How Immigration Enforcement Deters Return and Increases Asylum Applications. *Comparative Political Studies*.

<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/00104140211024282>

Shakil, K., and I. Yilmaz (2021). Religion and populism in the global South: Islamist civilisationism of Pakistan's Imran Khan. *Religions* 12 (9): 777.

<https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/12/9/777>

Shehaj, A., Shin, A. J., & Inglehart, R. (2021). Immigration and right-wing populism: An origin story. *Party Politics*, 27(2), 282-293.

Simonovits, B. (2020). The public perception of the migration crisis from the Hungarian point of view: Evidence from the field. *Geographies of asylum in Europe and the role of European localities*, 155-176.

<https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/23038/1007123.pdf#page=158>

Speeches and Remarks. (January 14th, 2016). PM Orbán: 'Europe's big problem is Brusselsism, the stealthy withdrawal of powers from the nation states. http://abouthungary.hu/speeches-andremarks/Prime_Minister_Viktor_Orb%C3%A1n_interviewed_on_Kossuth_R%C3%A1di%C3%B3_s_180%20Minutes_program/

Speeches and Remarks. (November 13, 2016). Interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the Kossuth Rádió programme 180 minutes. <http://www.miniszterelnok.hu/interview-withprime-minister-viktor-orban-on-the-kossuth-radio-programme-180-minutes-4/>

Stavrakakis, Y., and G. Katsambekis. (2014). Left-wing populism in the European periphery: The case of Syriza. *Journal of Political Ideologies* 19 (2): 119–142.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2014.909266>

Stavrakakis, Y., G. Katsambekis, N. Nikisianis, A. Kioupkiolis, and T. Siomos. (2017). Extreme right-wing populism in Europe: Revisiting a reified association. *Critical Discourse Studies* 14 (4): 420–439. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17405904.2017.1309325>

Sula, İsmail Erkam; Luleci-Sula, Cagla. (2021) "Replication Data for: Migration Management in Turkey: Discourse and Practice", <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/BFDXNI>, Harvard Dataverse, V2, UNF:6:KNyStrWfHhoPyv1FMzvtv1A== [fileUNF]

Szalai, A., & Góbl, G. (2015). Securitizing migration in contemporary Hungary: From discourse to practice. In *CEEISA-ISA 2016 Joint International Conference (Ljubljana, 23 June 2016)*. <https://cens.ceu.edu/sites/cens.ceu.edu/files/attachment/event/573/szalai-goblmigrationpaper.final.pdf>

Taşkın, Y. (2013). Hegemonizing conservative democracy and the problems of democratization in Turkey: Conservatism without democrats? *Turkish Studies*, 14(2), 292–310. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14683849.2013.802905>

Taştekin, F. (2016). Syrian Kurds expand diplomatic network in Europe. *Al Monitor*.

Terry, K. (2021). The EU-Turkey deal, five years on: A frayed and controversial but enduring blueprint. *Migration Policy Institute*, 8.

<https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/eu-turkey-deal-five-years-on>

Toğral Koca, B. (2015). Deconstructing Turkey's 'open door' policy towards refugees from Syria. *Migration Letters* 12 (3): 209–225.

<https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=477053>.

Tokdoğan, N. (2020). Reading politics through emotions: Ontological resentment as the emotional basis of current politics in Turkey. *Nations and Nationalism*, 26(2), 388-406.

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/nana.12546?casa_token=Fat38mOY5T4AA%3A8GCpJeFubLN8XOeOWcKzbrzWG2SQiu_mzgrdXIQDOenMDVYGN-HgnNex0p5rmD1i9MMAPScPJYxEy5njQ

Tolay, J. (2012). Turkey's "critical Europeanization": Evidence from Turkey's immigration policies. *Turkey, migration and the EU: Potentials, challenges and opportunities*, 5, 39-62.

<https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/27633/1/1002372.pdf#page=41>

Tóth, T., Kékesdi-Boldog, D., Bokor, T., & Veczán, Z. (2019). “Protect our homeland!” Populist communication in the 2018 Hungarian election campaign on Facebook. *Central European Journal of Communication*, 12(2 (23)), 169-186.

<https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=856200>

Toth, T. (2020). Target the enemy: explicit and implicit populism in the rhetoric of the Hungarian right. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 28(3), 366-386.

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14782804.2020.1757415>

Tsourapas, G. (2019). The Syrian refugee crisis and foreign policy decision-making in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. *Journal of Global Security Studies*, 4(4), 464-481.

<https://academic.oup.com/jogss/article/4/4/464/5487959?login=true>

TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 83,

24.03.2015.<https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem24/yil4/ham/b11001h.htm>

TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 128, 04.08.2014.

<https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem24/yil4/ham/b12801h.htm>

T.C.Cumhurbaşkanlığı :Konuşmalar.

<https://www.tccb.gov.tr/receptayyiperdogan/konusmalar/> (Accessed 17 April 2023)

T.C.Cumhurbaşkanlığı (22.09.16) ABD’deki Türk STK’larla Bir Araya Geldiği Toplantıda Yaptıkları Konuşma. <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/52398/abddeki-turk-stklarla-bir-araya-geldigi-toplantida-yaptiklari-konusma>

T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı (10.04.18) TİKA Koordinatörlerini Kabulünde Yaptıkları Konuşma. <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/92347/tika-koordinatörlerini-kabulunde-yaptiklari-konusma>

Ulusoy, O., & Battjes, H. (2017). Situation of readmitted migrants and refugees from Greece to Turkey under the EU-Turkey statement. *VU Amsterdam Migration Law Series*, 15.

UNHCR (October 31, 2015) “Turkey External Monthly Update”. Retrieved from <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/44421>.

UNHCR-Syria Regional Response Inter-Agency Information Sharing Portal. *Situation Syria Regional Refugee Response*.

<https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria> (Accessed on 15 March 2023).

UNHCR Turkey (2018). “Operational Update 2018”. <https://www.unhcr.org/tr/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2019/02/UNHCR-Turkey-Operational-Highlights-2018-Final.pdf> (Accessed 15 March 2021).

UNHCR. “Temporary protection in Turkey”, <https://help.unhcr.org/turkey/information-for-syrians/temporary-protection-in-turkey/> (Accessed 20 February 2023).

Returns from Greece to Turkey (under EU-Turkey statement) as of 31 March 2020. (n.d.-b).

UNHCR Operational Data Portal (ODP). “Returns from Greece to Turkey (under EU-Turkey statement) as of 31 March 2020”. <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/75075>. (Accessed 20 February 2023).

UNICEF. (January-June, 2019). Turkey Humanitarian Situation Report. <https://www.unicef.org/turkiye/en/reports/unicef-turkey-humanitarian-situation-reports-2019> (Accessed 20 February 2023).

United States Department of State. (May 10, 2021). ‘Report to Congress on Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2021’. (Accessed 20 February 2023).

Üstübcü, Ayşen. (2019). The impact of externalized migration governance on Turkey: Technocratic migration governance and the production of differentiated legal status. *Comparative Migration Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 46, pp. 1-18.

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s40878-019-0159-x?wt_mc=Internal.Event.1.SEM.ArticleAuthorIncrementalIssue&utm_source=ArticleAuthor

[IncrementalIssue&utm_medium=email&utm_content=AA_en_06082018&ArticleAuthorIncrementalIssue_20191214](#)

Van der Brug, W. (2004). Issue ownership and party choice. *Electoral studies*, 23(2), 209-233.
[https://doi.org/10.1016/S0261-3794\(02\)00061-6](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0261-3794(02)00061-6)

Vukovich, Gabriella (2018). *Mikrocensus 2016 - 12. Nemzetiségi adatok [2016 microcensus - 12. Ethnic data]* (PDF). Hungarian Central Statistical Office (in Hungarian). Budapest. ISBN 978-963-235-542-9.

We must stop Brussels! referendum booklet warns Hungarians. (September 7, 2016). *The Budapest Beacon*. Retrieved from <https://budapestbeacon.com/we-must-stop-brussels-referendum-booklet-warns-hungarians/>.

White, J. (2014). Muslim nationalism and the new Turks. in *Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks*. Princeton University Press.

Wodak, R. (2013). ‘Anything goes!’—The haiderization of Europe. Right-wing populism in Europe: *Politics and discourse*, 23-38. <https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/right-wing-populism-in-europe-politics-and-discourse/ch2-anything-goes-the-haiderization-of-europe.pdf?dl>

Yabanci, B., and D. Taleski. (2018). Co-opting religion: How ruling populists in Turkey and Macedonia sacralise the majority. *Religion, State and Society* 46 (3): 283–304.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2017.1411088>

Yanaşmayan, Z., Üstübici, A., & Kasli, Z. (2019). Under the shadow of civilizationist populist discourses. *New Diversities*, 21(2), 37-51. <https://repub.eur.nl/pub/130094/>

Yilmaz, I., & Shakil, K. (2021). Transnational Islamist Populism between Pakistan and Turkey: The Case of Dirilis—Ertugrul. *European Center for Populism Studies*, 15.

<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/351119029> Transnational Islamist Populism between Pakistan and Turkey The Case of Dirilis -Ertugrul

Yırcalı, A. Ü. (2017). *Europe and the Syrian Conflict: Policies and Perceptions*. Public Policy and Democracy Studies (PODEM) Publications. <http://podem.org.tr/en/researches/europe-and-the-syrian-conflict-policies-and-perceptions/>

Yüncüler, Z. (2019). No Support for Refugees in Bolu. *Inside Turkey*. Retrieved from <https://insideturkey.news/2019/07/19/no-support-for-refugees-in-bolu/>

Zaslove, A. (2012). The populist radical right in government: The structure and agency of success and failure. *Comparative European Politics*, 10(4), 421-448.

<https://doi.org/10.1057/cep.2011.19>

Zimmer, O. (2003). Boundary mechanisms and symbolic resources: towards a process-oriented approach to national identity. *Nations and nationalism*, 9(2), 173-193. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1469-8219.00081>

“EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement” (2013). <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3A4309179> (Accessed on 10 March 2023).

“Temporary Protection Regulation”, (2014),

<https://www.goc.gov.tr/kurumlar/goc.gov.tr/Gecici-Koruma-Yonetmeligi-Ingilizce.pdf>

(Accessed 10 March 2023)

European Union. (2018). “Turkey Progress Report 2018” .

<https://www.ab.gov.tr/siteimages/kapbtblolar/20180417-turkey-report.pdf> (Accessed 12 March 2023).

“Turkey Progress Report 2019”. (2019).

[https://www.ab.gov.tr/siteimages/resimler/20190529-turkey-report\(1\).pdf](https://www.ab.gov.tr/siteimages/resimler/20190529-turkey-report(1).pdf) (Accessed 12 March 2023).

“1st Report EU-Turkey Statement”. (2016). https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/20160420/report_implementation_eu-turkey_agreement_nr_01_en.pdf (Accessed 12 March 2023).



APPENDIX

Table A1: The List of the 200 selected Policy Speeches of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan for the Nvico Coding Analysis

(Note: The whole list of the speeches that used for this thesis are extracted from Lülecı- Sula & Sula (2020)'s dataset including President Erdoğan's speeches. Then, the three selection criterias were applied and 200 selected speeches on the issue of immigration were ranked in chronological order from August 2014 until 2020.)

Codes of the Speeches (Represented also the Dates of the Speeches; DD/MM/YY)	Title of the Speech Delivered by President Erdoğan
190914	TÜSİAD Yüksek İstişare Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
240914	Birleşmiş Milletler 69'uncu Genel Kurulu Genel Görüşmelerinde Yaptıkları Konuşma
280914	Dünya Ekonomik Forumu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
280914.2	Türkiye İhracatçılar Meclisi Türkiye Markası Tanıtım Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
290914	Uluslararası Uyuşturucu Politikaları ve Halk Sağlığı Sempozyumu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
011014	Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin 24'üncü Dönem 5'inci Yasama Yılı Açılışında Yaptıkları Konuşma
071014	İslahiye'de Bulunan Çadırkent'te Yaptıkları Konuşma
101014	Trabzon'da Akşam Yemeğinde Yaptıkları Konuşma
111014	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Üniversitesi Akademik Yılı Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma

131014	Marmara Üniversitesi Akademik Yıl Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma
021114	Esenler Belediyesi'nin Toplu Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma
241114	Uluslararası Kadın Ve Adalet Zirvesinde Yaptıkları Konuşma
201214	Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu'nda (DEİK) Yaptıkları Konuşma
190115	Türkiye Genç İş Adamları Konfederasyonu (TÜGİK) Genel Başkanı kabulünde yaptıkları konuşma
210115	İslam İşbirliği Teşkilatı Parlamento Birliği (İSİPAB) 10. Konferans'ında Yaptıkları Konuşma
300115	Kırşehir Toplu Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma
020215	Adalet Akademisi'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma
060215	Bursa, Toplu Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma
060215.2	'Büyük Roman Ödülü' Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma
100215	“1915; Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun En Uzun Yılı” Sempozyumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma
130215	Meksika Matius Romero Enstitüsünde Yaptıkları Konuşma

180215	AFAD, 22 Lojistik Merkez Toplu Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma
270215	Valiler Toplantısı Münasebetiyle Verilen Yemekte Yaptıkları Konuşma
070315	Gaziantep STK Temsilcilerinin Katıldığı Yemekte Yaptıkları Konuşma
130315	100. Yılında Çanakkale Ruhu ve Gençlik Adlı Özel Programda Yaptıkları Konuşma
140315	14 Mart Tıp Bayramı Dolayısıyla Çanakkale'de Düzenlenen Toplantıda Yaptıkları Konuşma
240315	Türk Kızılay'ı Olağanüstü Genel Kurulu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
010415	Romanya Cumhurbaşkanı Iohannis ile Düzenledikleri Ortak Basın Toplantısı
170415	Hoca Ahmet Yesevi Uluslararası Türk-Kazak Üniversitesi töreninde yaptıkları konuşma
220415	Irak Cumhurbaşkanı Fuad Masum ile Birlikte Ortak Basın Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma
230415	Çanakkale 100. Yıl Barış Zirvesi'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma
160515	8. Uluslararası Öğrenci Buluşması'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
200615	Midyat Geçici Barınma Merkezi'nde İftar Yemeğinde Yaptıkları Konuşma

210615	Türkiye İhracatçılar Meclisi 22. Olağan Genel Kurulu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
260615	Türk Kızılayı'nın Madalya Töreni ve İftar Programı
270615	Birlik Vakfı İftar Programı
120815	8. Muhtarlar Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
160915	3. Uluslararası Ombudsmanlık Sempozyumu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
101015	Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi 25. Dönem 2. Yasama Yılı Açış Konuşması
051015	Belçika Egmont Uluslararası İlişkiler Kraliyet Enstitüsü'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma
201015	BM Çölleşme İle Mücadele 12. Taraflar Konferansı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
261015	13. Muhtarlar Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
041115	14. Muhtarlar Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
161115	G-20 Antalya Liderler Zirvesi Sonunda Basın Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma
191115	7. Atlantik Konseyi Enerji ve Ekonomi Zirvesi'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma
191115.2	İslam İşbirliği Teşkilatı 5. Sağlık Bakanları Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
241115	Öğretmenler Günü Resepsiyonunda Yaptıkları Konuşma

251115	31. İSEDAK Açılış Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma
031215	TÜRK-İŞ 22. Olağan Genel Kurulu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
031215.2	2015 Yılı TÜBİTAK Bilim, Özel ve Teşvik Ödülleri Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma
081215	16. Muhtarlar Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
060116	18. Muhtarlar Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
120116	8. Büyükelçiler Konferansı Vesilesiyle Düzenlenen Yemekte Yaptıkları Konuşma
100216	20. Muhtarlar Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
110216	TÜGİK Genel Kurulu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
170216	İkinci Mülki Amirler Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
200216	'UNESCO Gastronomi Kenti: Gaziantep' Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma
230216	Somali 6. Yüksek Düzeyli Ortaklık Forumu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
240216	21. Muhtarlar Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma
040316	Yeşilay 3. Zümrüdüanka Ödül Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma
070316	HAK-İŞ 5. Uluslararası Kadın Emeği Buluşması'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma

130316	Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Uluslararası İyilik Ödülleri Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma
180316	18 Mart Şehitleri Anma Günü ve Çanakkale Deniz Zaferi'nin 101. Yılı Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma
210316	'5 Bin Köye 5 Bin Orman Eylem Planı' ve 'Türkiye Çınar Yılı 2016' töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma
250316	Bozok Üniversitesi Tarafından Fahri Doktora Tevdii Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma
260316	Dünya Türk Girişimciler Kurultayı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
060416	23. Muhtarlar Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
260416	BM Medeniyetler İttifakı 7. Küresel Forumu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
230516	Dünya İnsani Zirvesi Açılışında Yaptıkları Konuşma
010616	Uganda Makerere Üniversitesi Tarafından Fahri Doktora Tevdii Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma
110616	36. Geleneksel Birlik Vakfı İftar Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma
120616	MÜSİAD Tarafından Düzenlenen İftar Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma
130616	Milletvekilleri ile İftar Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma

160816	Türkiye Barolar Birliği Heyetini Kabulünde Yaptıkları Konuşma
190616	Louisville Ahıska Türkleri Kültür Merkezi'nin İftar Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma
220616	Fatih Sultan Mehmet Vakıf Üniversitesi 2015-2016 Akademik Yılı Mezuniyet Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma
290716	Beştepe Millet Kongre ve Kültür Merkezi Açılışı ile Şehitleri Anma Programı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
160816	Türkiye Barolar Birliği Heyetini Kabulünde Yaptıkları Konuşma
200916	Birleşmiş Milletler 71. Genel Kurulu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
200916.2	Birleşmiş Milletler Mülteciler Zirvesi'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma
220916	ABD'deki Türk STK'larla Bir Araya Geldiği Toplantıda Yaptıkları Konuşma
290916	27. Muhtarlar Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma
011016	Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi 26. Dönem 2. Yasama Yılı Açılışında Yaptıkları Konuşma
171016	Uluslararası İstanbul Hukuk Kongresinde Yaptıkları Konuşma
191016	28. Muhtarlar Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma

091116	MÜSİAD 16. EXPO Fuarı ve 20. Uluslararası İş Forumu Kongresi'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma
141116	Milli Tarım Projesi Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma
211116	NATO Parlamenter Asamblesi Sonbahar Genel Kurul Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma
221116	"Türkiye'nin Yeni Güvenlik Konsepti" Konferansında Yaptıkları Konuşma
251116	KADEM Adalet Ve Kadın Kongresinde Yaptıkları Konuşma
291116	'Küresel Gelecek: İnsan Odaklı Akıllı Ekonomi' Temalı 7. Boğaziçi Zirvesinde Yaptıkları Konuşma
141216	32. Muhtarlar Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma
090117	9. Büyükelçiler Konferansı Vesilesiyle Düzenlenen Yemekte Yaptıkları Konuşma
130217	Bahreyn'de "Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu'da Barışa Yönelik Girişimci Vizyonu" Konulu Konferansında Yaptıkları Konuşma
020317	4. Uluslararası Ombudsmanlık Sempozyumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma
010517	Hindistan Jamia Millia İslamia Üniversitesi'nin Fahri Doktora Takdim Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma
300517	AK Parti Grup Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma

190917	Birleşmiş Milletler 72. Genel Kurulunda Yaptıkları Konuşma
250917	Uluslararası Ombudsmanlık Konferansında Yaptıkları Konuşma
051017	Kanaat Önderleri ve STK Temsilcileri İle Buluşma Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma
181017	40. Muhtarlar Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma
201017	D-8 Zirvesinde Yaptıkları Konuşma
201217	42. Muhtarlar Toplantısı
160118	Ak Parti Grup Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma
300118	AK Parti Grup Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma
080218	45. Muhtarlar Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma
060318	AK Parti Grup Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma
070318	HAK-İŞ Dünya Kadın Günü Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma
130318	İyilik Ödülleri Takdim Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma
150318	‘Liseliler Destanı Yazıyor’ Şiir ve Kompozisyon Yarışması Ödül Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma
190318	Avukatlık Mesleğinden Hâkim ve Savcılığa Geçen 7. Dönem Adaylarının Kura Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma
100418	TİKA Koordinatörlerini Kabulünde Yaptıkları Konuşma

120418	Başkentray Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma
160418	Global Girişimcilik Kongresi'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma
250418	Anayasa Mahkemesi'nin 56. Kuruluş Yıldönümü Yemeğinde Yaptıkları Konuşma
040518	Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın İstanbul Gençlik Festivali Gençler İle Buluşma Programı
080518	AK Parti Grup Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma
130518	Türk-İngiliz Tatlıdil Forumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma
140818	Londra'da, Chatham House'da Yaptıkları Konuşma
240618	AK Parti Genel Merkezinde Yaptıkları Balkon Konuşması
130818	10. Büyükelçiler Konferansı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
190918	Gaziler Günü Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma
240918	TURKEN Vakfı Gala Yemeğinde Yaptıkları Konuşma
240918.2	ABD'de Türk Ve Müslüman Toplumuyla Buluşma Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma
250918	73. Birleşmiş Milletler Genel Kurulunda Yaptıkları Konuşma
011018	TBMM 27. Dönem 2. Yasama Yılı Açış Konuşması
021018	AK Parti Grup Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma

101018	Türkiye-Afrika Ekonomi ve İş Forumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma
161018	Hâkim Ve Cumhuriyet Savcısı Kura Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma
080119	AK Parti Grup Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma
070219	ABD Ticaret Odası ve Amerikan Türk Konseyi Üyelerini Kabulünde Yaptıklar Konuşma
190219	Budapeşte Süreci 6. Bakanlar Konferansı Konuk Bakan ve Heyet Başkanları Onuruna Akşam Yemeğinde Yaptıkları Konuşma
220319	İslam İşbirliği Teşkilatı Acil İcra Komitesi Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma
310319	31 Mart 2019 Yerel Seçimler Sonrası Yaptıkları Balkon Konuşması
190419	Uluslararası “İşin Geleceği: Tehditler Ve Fırsatlar” Konferansında Yaptıkları Konuşma
090519	Reform Eylem Grubu Toplantısı Öncesi Yaptıkları Konuşma
100519	Büyükelçiler ile İftar Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma
160519	İç Güvenlik Birimleri ile İftar Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma
150619	Asya’da İşbirliği ve Güven Artırıcı Önlemler Konferansı 5. Zirvesinde Yaptıkları Konuşma

160619	İhracatın Şampiyonları Ödül Töreni ve Türkiye İhracatçılar Meclisi Olağan Genel Kurulu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
180619	Sultangazi Toplu Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma
190619	Sancaktepe Toplu Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma
200619	Uluslararası Basın Kuruluşları Temsilcileri Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma
250619	AK Parti Grup Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
290619	G-20 Zirvesi Nedeniyle Bulunduğu Osaka'da Düzenlediği Basın Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma
090719	Güneydoğu Avrupa İşbirliği Süreci Zirvesi'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma
100719	Hak-İş 14. Olağan Genel Kurulu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
260719	Genişletilmiş İl Başkanları Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma
030819	İstanbul Süryani Kadim Vakfı Mor Efrem Süryani Kadim Ortodoks Kilisesi Temel Atma Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma
060819	11. Büyükelçiler Konferansında Yaptıkları Konuşma

310819	Harp Okulları Diploma ve Sancak Devir Teslim Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma
010919	Ak Parti Konya İl Başkanlığı Tarafından Düzenlenen Programda Yaptıkları Konuşma
080919	Malatya Toplu Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma
100919	ABD Ticaret Bakanı Wilbur Ross ve Beraberindeki Heyeti Kabulünde Yaptıkları Konuşma
160919	Türkiye-Rusya Federasyonu-İran Üçlü Zirvesi Öncesi Yaptıkları Açıklama
180919	2019-2020 Yükseköğretim Akademik Yılı Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma
230919	Türk-Amerikan Ulusal Yönlendirme Komitesi (TASC) Tarafından Düzenlenen Etkinlikte Yaptıkları Konuşma
240919	Birleşmiş Milletler 74. Genel Kurulu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
240919.2	“Sürdürülebilir Kalkınma Hedeflerinin Hayata Geçirilmesini Etkileyen Mega Eğilimler” Konulu Oturumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma
011019	TBMM 27. Dönem 3. Yasama Yılı Açılış Konuşması
051019	AK Parti 29. İstişare ve Değerlendirme Toplantısı Açılışında Yaptıkları Konuşma

101019	Genişletilmiş İl Başkanları Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma
111019	3. Parlamento Başkanları Konferansı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
131019	Barış Pınarı Harekâtına İlişkin Genel Yayın Yönetmenleri ile Yaptıkları Toplantıdaki Konuşmaları
141019	Azerbaycan'da Gerçekleştirilen Dünya Türk İş Konseyi Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
151019	Türk Konseyi Zirvesi'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma
161019	Ak Parti Grup Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma
181019	Yabancı Medya Temsilcilerini Kabulünde Yaptıkları Konuşma
191019	Kayseri Toplu Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma
211019	TRT World Forum'da Yaptıkları Konuşma
221019	Rusya Devlet Başkanı Sayın Vladimir Putin ile Ortak Basın Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma
241019	105. Dönem Kaymakamlık Kursu Kura Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma
261019	Fenerbahçe Yüksek Divan Kurulu Olağan Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
301019	AK Parti Grup Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma

311019	6. Türk Tıp Dünyası Kurultayı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
051119	AK Parti Grup Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma
081119	Mevlid-İ Nebi Haftası Açılış Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma
101119	10 Kasım Atatürk'ü Anma Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma
141119	ABD Diyanet Merkezi'nde Vatandaşlarımızla Buluşma Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma
181119	2. İstanbul Uluslararası Ombudsmanlık Konferansı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
051219	İngiltere'deki Türk Vatandaşlarına Hitapları
091219	Asya'nın Kalbi İstanbul Süreci Bakanlar Konferansı'nda Yaptığı Konuşma
091219.2	İslam İşbirliği Teşkilatı Sosyal İşler Bakanları Zirvesi'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma
101219	'Her İnsan Bir Dünya' Temalı Programda Yaptıkları Konuşma
171219	Küresel Mülteci Forumu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
020120	Şehir ve Güvenlik Sempozyumu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
060120	Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı Yeni Hizmet Binası'nın Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptığı Konuşma
140120	Ak Parti Grup Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma

310120	Genişletilmiş İl Başkanları Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
120220	AK Parti Kahramanmaraş İl Teşkilatı ile Yemek Programı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
140220	Pakistan Milli Meclisi ve Senatosu'nun Oturumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma
150220	AK Parti İstanbul İl Başkanlığı Yeni Üye Çalışmaları Ödül Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma
270220	Siyaset Akademisi Açılışı Dersi'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma
290220	İstanbul Milletvekilleri Buluşmasında Yaptıkları Konuşma
020320	AK Parti Ankara İl Danışma Meclisi Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
020320.2	TOBB Başkanı Rifat Hisarcıklıoğlu ve Beraberindeki STK Temsilcilerini Kabulünde Yaptıkları Konuşma
040420	AK Parti Grup Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
110320	AK Parti Grup Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
260320	G-20 Zirvesi'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma
200420	Kabine Toplantısının Ardından Yaptıkları Konuşma

