NON-TRADITIONAL DONORS AND GEOPOLITICS OF FOREIGN AID: CHINA, TURKEY AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES IN AFRICA

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NON-TRADITIONAL DONORS AND GEOPOLITICS OF FOREIGN AID: CHINA, TURKEY AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES IN AFRICA

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ABSTRACT

NON-TRADITIONAL DONORS AND GEOPOLITICS OF FOREIGN AID: CHINA, TURKEY AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES IN AFRICA

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The rise of non-traditional (non-DAC) donors is one of the most significant debates concerning the international development agenda. In my research, I examine why non-traditional donors provide foreign aid. Based on their economic and political interests, this dissertation investigates how power relations influence China, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates' foreign aid behavior. Using descriptive and inferential quantitative methods, I follow a three-step empirical quest to to elucidate non-traditional donors' foreign aid behavior. First, this research shows that non-traditional donors adjust their foreign aid flows in response to the existence of DAC donors in their country. Second, I investigate how non-traditional donors respond to political and economic Western conditionalities. Finally, I explore whether non-traditional donors behave differently from traditional donors. My findings indicate that non-DAC donors adjust foreign aid flows in response to competitive recipient environments. On the other hand, I find that China, Turkiye, and the UAE do not similarly respond to traditional donors' political and economic conditionalities. Lastly, this research suggests that non-DAC donors and DAC are not different in terms of prioritizing recipient needs. This dissertation contributes to the literature by revealing how non-traditional donors react to Western political and economic conditionalities, as well as demonstrating how traditional and non-traditional donors behave similarly with regard to their political and economic interests. My empirical inquiry reinforces the interest-based and systemic understanding of donor behavior.

ÖZET

GELENEKSEL OLMAYAN DIŞ YARDIM BAĞIŞÇILARI VE DIŞ YARDIMLARIN JEOPOLİĞI: AFRIKA NEZDINDE ÇIN, TÜRKIYE VE BIRLEŞIK ARAP EMIRLIKLERI

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Anahtar Kelimeler: Geleneksel olmayan dış yardım bağışçıları, dış yardım, jeopolitika, şartlılık politikaları, Afrika

Uluslarası Kalkınma gündeminin en önemli konularından biri geleneksel olmayan yardım bağışçılarının yükselişidir. Bu çalışma geleneksel olmayan dış yardım bağışçılarının neden dış yardım verdiğini araştırır. Güç ilişkilerinin Çin, Türkiye ve BAE'nin dış yardım davranışını ekonomik ve siyasi çıkarlar temelinde belirlediğini sorgular. Betimleyici ve çıkarımsal sayısal yöntemler kullanarak, DAC üyesi olmayan bağışçıların yardım davranışını anlamak için üç adımlı bir tetkik hattı takip eder. İlk olarak, bu tez DAC üyesi olmayan devletlerin dış yardımlarını DAC üyesi ülkelerin yardımlarına göre nasıl ayarladığını gösterir. İkincisi, geleneksel olmayan donorlerin DAC ülkelerinin şartlılık politikalarına nasıl cevap verdiğini araştırır. Üçüncüsü, geleneksel olmayan dış yardım bağışçılarının DAC üyesi devletlerden farklı olup olmadığını sorgular. OECD-DAC üyesi olmayan devletler dış yardımlarını rekabetçi ülkelere yönlendirmektedir. Fakat, Çin, Türkiye ve BAE batılı ülkelerin politik ve ekonomik temelli şartlılık politikalarına aynı şekilde tepki vermemektedir. Son olarak, bu araştırma DAC ve DAC-olmayan ülkelerin alıcı devletlerin ihtiyaçlarını gözetmeme konusunda benzer olduklarını göstermektedir. Bu çalışma geleneksel olmayan donorlerin batılı ülkelerin yardımlarına ve şartlılık politikalarına tepkisini ölçmesi açısından, ayrıca geneleksel ve geleneksel olmayan donorlerin benzer davranış gösterdiklerini açıklamasıyla literatüre katkı yapmaktadır. Araştırmam sistemik düzeyden hareket eden çıkar temelli yaklaşımı güçlendirmektedir.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATONS

ADFD Abu Dhabi Fund for Development

AKP Justice and Development Party

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

CIDCA China International Development Cooperation Agency

DAC Development Assistance Committee

EU European Union

FCDO Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office

FOCAC Forum on China-Africa Cooperation

GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GCC Gulf Cooperation Council

HST Hegemonic Stability Theory

IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

IMF International Monetary Fund

LDCs Least Developed Countries

MB The Muslim Brotherhood

MDGs Millenium Development Goals

MENA Middle East and North Africa

NTD Non-Traditional Donors

ODA Official Development Assistance

OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

OOF Other Official Flows

OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

PRC People's Republic of China

ROC Republic of China

SDGs Sustainable Development Goals

TIKA Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency

UAE United Arab Emirates

USAID United States Agency for International Development

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WB World Bank

WITS World Integrated Trade Solutions

WTO World Trade Organization

1. INTRODUCTION

Why do non-traditional donors provide foreign assistance? Non-traditional donors (NTDs) are getting more attention in international politics NTD have become an integral part of the foreign aid literature, as their aid modality, logic, and way of providing foreign aid create a diverse global foreign aid landscape. Within this multifaceted foreign aid landscape, China , Turkiye, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are the three significant donors, and their foreign aid behavior is a trending topic to analyze the possible challenges of global foreign aid architecture. The literature on traditional donors' foreign aid behavior dominated the scholarship for a long time; however, there is still a significant gap of comparative analysis of non-traditional donors. Investigating these three donors' foreign aid motivations entails a comprehensive theoretical and empirical analysis. This dissertation adopts a systemic and interest-based understanding of international development and hypothesizes that non-traditional donors' foreign aid behavior is shaped by international and geopolitical dynamics and donors provide foreign aid for their own economic and political interests.

Using descriptive and inferential statistics, I scrutinize regional distribution of China, Turkiye, and the UAE's foreign aid flows. Firstly, I use descriptive statistics to detect general trends in the global foreign aid landscape to show the increasing importance of non-traditional donors vis-à-vis traditional donors. Second, this dissertation maps three non-traditional donors' foreign aid behavior across recipients, regions, income groups, and ethnoreligious groups. This descriptive part shows that some regions and countries are prioritized, and Africa emerges as a significant region for all three donors. After detecting general trends and priorities in three different donors' aid flows, I analyze the determinants of their foreign aid flows for all regions to detect more robust regional variations. The second, empirical part of the dissertation employs different regression models to test the main thesis and sub-hypotheses generated from the main one. These empirical sections adopt three different alternative modalities to test the main thesis, namely,

that the foreign aid behavior of donors is influenced by geopolitical issues. This dissertation first investigates whether the foreign aid behavior of a rival donor in a country – for example, reducing or increasing aid to that country – affects the foreign aid behavior of NTDs. Then, I look into how three NTDs respond to the OECD-DAC bilateral and multilateral conditionalities for different regions. I also investigate how NTDs challenge each other, as they do not act similarly toward traditional donors. This point is significant because it shows that NTDs are not a block within themselves, and each one of them has different geopolitical agendas. Not all NTDs have responded to Western donors similarly; instead, a variation is more likely as these donors are all from different geopolitical settings. Lastly, I show to what extent non-traditional donors are different from traditional donors. A comparative analysis of three significant donors will provide extensive information on why non-traditional donors provide foreign aid.

I use an analytical demarcation line between traditional and non-traditional donors. If a country is a member of the OECD-DAC, then I label such countries as "traditional donors". Otherwise, all other countries are non-traditional donors. Indeed, there are different groupings among non-DAC or non-traditional donors (Manning 2006). First, some countries are members of the OECD, and they are outside of the DAC. Turkiye, Mexico, and Korea are examples of such countries (Manning 2006). Also, there are OPEC members that are not members of the OECD and OECD-DAC. For instance, the UAE is the most significant example of OPEC and GCC-driven foreign aid actor. Moreover, we have other donor groups which are not the members of OECD and DAC such as China and India. However, I label all non-DAC donors as non-traditional donors. This is the analytical demarcation line I am using throughout the dissertation. However, I do not suggest that traditional and non-traditional donors are like blocks that follow a strong policy pattern. Instead, I use this distinction as an analytical tool. Traditional DAC donors were created during the height of the Cold War, and they directly reflected the Cold War concerns. It continues to act as an agenda-setting forum constituting mostly Western donors. For instance, it offers an eligibility criterion for recipient countries, by which other DAC members follow this guideline. Non-DAC or non-traditional donors do not have to follow any suggestions of DAC, even if some countries have good relations with the OECD. However, this analytical demarcation line does not offer that traditional and non-traditional donors are blocks, having a similar policy pattern. Traditional and non-traditional donors' interests might diverge from each other. On the other hand each group has a variation within themselves, as will be analyzed throughout the thesis.

I link three non-DAC donors' foreign aid behavior with the existing literature, by which we can formulate possible hypotheses and questions regarding new trends in their foreign aid behavior. Based on the theory and literature, we can divide foreign aid scholarship into three different epochs. The first period is dominated by the Cold War security concerns, by which states used foreign aid as an instrument to satisfy their security and political needs. Traditional donors used foreign aid as an instrument to fight communism globally (Kragelund 2011). The second period intersected with the globalization process after the 1980s and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. This phase offered conditionalities, multilateral arrangements, and increasing selectivity for recipient growth and good governance (Dollar and Levin 2006). The third period concentrates zero poverty, aid effectiveness, and Millennium and Sustainable Development Goals (MDGs and SDGs. However, the last phase has a significant issue that generates a puzzle. While bilateral and multilateral aid initiative focus on aid effectiveness, zero poverty, and conditionality, the rise of non-traditional donors create a competitive donor environment in which donors pursue their political and economic interests. This dissertation concentrates on the third period where a diverse donor landscape is becoming one of the salient issues in the global development infrastructure.

Theoretically, there are two different strands in the foreign aid scholarship: the first strand deals with modeling donor motivations such as interest-based and need-based theorizations. The second tradition in the literature deals with the levels of analysis, focusing on state-level and system-level approaches (Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998). The second strand in the literature investigates the importance of systemic or state-level constraints on states' aid behavior. For instance, system-level approaches investigate changing landscape of distribution of capabilities, which in turn affect donor behavior (Waltz 1979). State-level approaches mostly deal with the effect of domestic institutions, party-system, partisan alignments, religion, and leader survival on donors' foreign aid behavior. Recently, as a part of foreign-domestic linkage literature, state-level theorizing is becoming a trend. Indeed, most of the literature -related to motivation and levels of analysis- concerns traditional donors. There is still a puzzle regarding the main motivations of non-traditional donors based on these two different theoretical frameworks. Moreover, there is a lack of systematic analysis of non-DAC donors to determine where their foreign aid behavior falls in this literature. I contribute to the existing literature by carrying out an in-depth analysis, and locating China, Turkiye, and the UAE within this literature. Therefore, mapping three NTDs' foreign aid behavior – based on the two strands in the literature – is a novel attempt. This endeavor also challenges state-level theories or foreign-domestic linkage literature.

Empirically, this dissertation answers the question of "why non-DAC donors provide foreign aid" by offering a systemic and interest-based explanation. I suggest that economic and political factors are the main determinants of NTDs' foreign aid behavior. Donors respond to what other foreign aid donors do (Trumbull and Wall 1994). I initially investigate how non-traditional donors respond to Western donors' development assistance. Do they adjust their foreign aid flows to the Western foreign aid flows? If so, what are the determinants of such an adjustment? For instance, NTDs might respond to the OECD-DAC conditionalities by increasing or decreasing their foreign aid flows. Moreover, I carry out all empirical operations by looking into regional variations. These regional variations provide the core of the geopolitical debate in this dissertation. To sum up, this dissertation scrutinizes how the geopolitics of foreign aid is affected by NTDs' political contestation.

Non-DAC donors in the OECD-Creditor Reporting System (CRS) database are Turkiye, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Qatar, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lithuania, Taiwan, and Thailand. China does not report its concessional foreign aid flows to the OECD. Moreover, many of these donors, ¬including Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, are not new donors. China, Russia, and many of them have been significant aid donors (Kragelund 2008). Actually, they are not new donors. On the other hand, a novel fact is that they are becoming more prominent and visible in public discourse and aid scholarship. (Dreher, Fuchs, and Nunnenkamp 2013). Another novel fact within the scope of this dissertation is NTDs' way of responding to geopolitical changes in different regions around the globe. There are important, new, and uncovered dimensions of NTDs' differentiation that scholars need to focus on. In other words, China, Turkiye, and the UAE show a divergence due to the different dimensions of their political and economic interests. The geopolitics and proliferation of foreign aid donors pose substantial dimensions to aid scholarship in two critical ways. Their salient existence might be a response to DAC donors' existence in different regions; they can affect the main pillars of multilateral and bilateral DAC-generated conditionalities, and NTDs' foreign aid behavior is more likely to be influenced by geopolitical power contestation. In this sense, foreign aid policy harmonization generated by the UN, EU, and OECD-DAC bodies might be ineffective due to the interest-based attitude of non-traditional donors.

My dissertation's analytical and empirical framework begins with how non-traditional donors respond to DAC countries. However, these responses vary across different donors. I detect that China, Turkiye, and the UAE manifest a variation regarding their response to Western DAC-generated conditionalities. However, non-traditional donors also challenge each other, related to diverging political and

economic interests. From another perspective, I investigate the global and regional power dynamics that shape non-DAC donors' foreign aid behavior, not only related to their response to Western power, but also because they might adjust their foreign aid allocation to the existence of other non-traditional donors. Their foreign aid behavior might be a manifestation of the struggle among each other too. After showing variation among non-DAC donors, I also show that traditional donors and non-traditional donors are not different in terms of alleviating recipient-need or pursuing their economic and political interests. The existing literature also shows that traditional and non-traditional donors are not that different in terms of pursuing their economic and political interests (Dreher, Fuchs, and Nunnenkamp 2013). In this manner, this dissertation does not build on a Manichean dichotomy between traditional and non-traditional donors, which is one of the shortcomings of the existing literature. I contribute to the existing literature by articulating the non-Manichean character of traditional and non-traditional donors. I add the top seven DAC donors into our quantitative analysis to show whether non-traditional donors' foreign aid behavior is different from traditional donors. My research is the first comprehensive research that focuses on the variations among traditional and non-traditional donors. To illustrate, while Western conditionalities are a significant determinant of China's grant-based flows to Africa, the same is not valid for Turkiye and the UAE. Also, while the literature on the UAE's foreign aid flows is scarce, this study assesses the UAE's foreign aid behavior in detail, by which we overcome this scarcity. Furthermore, the literature on Turkiye's foreign aid behavior is mostly related to ideational factors including religion and ideational elements of its NGO activism. Indeed, I directly put Turkiye's foreign aid behavior into the context of geopolitical power struggles. All these separate and comparative analyses make this research the first endeavor that employs such a vast research agenda.

Africa is the main regional focus of this dissertation, the region where traditional and non-traditional donors might encounter. Donors often try to find ways to influence African governments via foreign aid (Whitfield 2009). As the former colonial and Western states and rising donors confront each other and desire to take economic and political policy concessions from the recipient, this confrontation is a practical example of how traditional and non-traditional donors interact. Therefore, Africa has become a new hub of geopolitical competition stemming from the different interests of traditional and non-traditional donors. Many African countries have been aid-dependent, so they need financial contributions to run the state and services . While African countries have many donor alternatives apart from Western donors, NTDs' rising economic power provides them to create a playing ground for their interests. China's massive need for natural resources and new markets make

Africa an appropriate target (Power, Mohan, and Tan-Mullins 2012). While China carries out extensive infrastructure projects and provides concessional loans and grants, Turkiye and the UAE mainly deal with project-based official development assistance and build new trade partnerships and high-level political engagements. Each donor's prioritizing of Africa depends on different commercial and political issues. Africa is also one of the main destinations of OECD-DAC countries. Past colonial ties, relations with the Bretton Woods institutions, and growing domestic populations increase Africa's strategic positioning in international policies. The region also encounters political and economic conditionalities from Western donors, which compels African countries to find new alternative sources of funding. For instance, after an African country faces a foreign aid conditionality from Western donors, I predict China or other non-traditional donors increase their foreign aid to suspended countries. Taking advantage of conditionalities is an example of the interest that power dynamics shape. NTDs' response creates a broader playing field for the recipients, specifically when it comes to vulnerable African countries. Such vulnerable countries are also a field of contestation between non-traditional donors. To illustrate, as regional antagonists, Turkiye and the UAE are more likely to deal with each other and respond to their foreign aid and humanitarian diplomacy.

In the second chapter, I theoretically explain why donors provide foreign aid by appealing to the existing literature. In each historical epoch after 1945, the literature focused on different dimensions of foreign aid behavior. The first phase of foreign aid literature concerned the Cold War and alliances, which were the side-effects of great power rivalry. The second period was related to the 80s and 90s' conditionality, selectivity, and governance mechanism, which intersect with the collapse of the USSR. The third period mostly deals with effectiveness, multilateral poverty eradication, and the rise of non-DAC donors. Initially, I give a theoretical summary of the existing literature on traditional and non-traditional aid donors' behavior. Theoretically, the first theoretical strand explains how systemic and state-level approaches shaped initial foreign aid scholarship (Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998). First, system-level approaches explain foreign aid behavior through distribution and balance of power. If the international structure creates a self-help system, then foreign aid policies will be a useful tool to influence recipients. Foreign aid scholarship on the Cold War reflects such a system-level explanation, showing how military and economic interests shape donor behavior. The existing balance of power shaped donor behavior, as Western countries targeted to prevent Soviet influence (Boschini and Olofsgård 2007). Second, state-level theories are mostly part of foreign-domestic linkage theories, underlining how domestic factors shape foreign policies. Donors' ethnic and religious orientations, party politics, democratic in-

stitutions, and other unit-level characteristics might be significant components of donor behavior. Turkiye's changing domestic political trends might be an example of foreign-domestic linkage theorization (Kavakli 2018). State-level explanations in the foreign aid literature are generally the projection of the foreign-domestic linkage narrative in international relations (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007). The second theoretical strand is related to donor motivation: do donors provide foreign aid for their own interests, or do they build on recipient-need? Therefore, I offer a two-dimensional theoretical matrix here. In other words, I can explain a donor's foreign aid behavior through four different policy modalities: systemic/interest-based, systemic/need-based, state-level/interest-based, and state-level/need-based. At the end of the third chapter, I provide our theoretical construct, explaining donor behavior from the system level-interest base nexus. Therefore, the second chapter focuses on the political and economic dynamics of foreign aid behavior. Economic and political interests are significant to model donor behavior. However, this literature is mostly related to traditional donors. The second chapter maps non-traditional donors' behavior according to the existing modalities in the foreign aid literature, which is also a theoretical contribution to the literature. Theoretically, this dissertation also contributes to the literature by showing the primacy of geopolitics regarding the political economy of NTDs' foreign aid flows.

The third chapter articulates the main hypothesis and offers an empirical strategy generated from our theoretical framework. This chapter also includes many sub-hypotheses to detect the determinants of NTDs' foreign aid behavior. I analyzed commercial, political, and cultural determinants of foreign aid behavior by operationalizing these sub-hypotheses. This chapter is the empirical locus of my dissertation.

The fourth chapter provides extensive information on the power and aid nexus, focusing on the emergence of traditional donors. The Second World War, the formation of OECD-DAC, and American supremacy as the beginning of official development aid (ODA). In this sense, the third chapter demonstrates how the advent of Western foreign aid is strictly attached to geopolitical challenges. US and Western support for some authoritarian regimes and alliances with strategic countries illustrate such geopolitically-driven thinking. However, these interest-based and geopolitical concerns transformed/changed after the Cold War. The second chapter also portrays new bilateral and multilateral foreign aid policy after the 80s as a necessary step for economic globalization. As the main geopolitical rival collapsed, global trade and investments became a top issue in the global political economy, and multilateral and bilateral aid became more interested in economic and political selectivity (Dollar and Levin 2006). These conditionalities and the selective process might be

related to good governance, poverty, solid fiscal and macroeconomic reform, WTO membership, and many other issues related to globalization. However, this new orientation does not rule out the interest-based attitude of Western bilateral and multilateral donors because the absence of a rival donor or geopolitical rival empowered Western countries' global outreach. The third chapter shows how new dynamics of the distribution of capabilities after the Cold War alter the international development infrastructure. Conditionality for open trade, sound fiscal and macroeconomic policy, and other political conditionalities also serve for the well-functioning of the new global economic order, which clustered around Bretton Woods institutions. Therefore, the rise of conditionality is also a consequence of changing international geopolitical relations. This chapter also introduces the contemporary phase of DAC-generated foreign aid policy, which is dominated by Millennium and Sustainable Development Goals (MDGs and SDGs), the Paris Declaration, and aid effectiveness. Within this period, I introduce one significant foreign aid modality, namely budget support. Budget support emerges as one of the essential aid types after the Paris Declaration, and this chapter introduces the main dynamics involved. Budget support brings budget suspensions – one of the most significant modes of conditionality. These suspensions deprive recipient governments of getting a substantial amount of money, which is vital for aid-dependent African countries. In this phase, non-traditional donors emerge as alternative and unconditional sources of funding, which challenges the multilateral and bilateral aid policies of Western governments.

The fourth section of the dissertation also articulates the new dynamics of foreign aid behavior since many countries emerge as powerful actors in the global arena, including China, Turkiye, and the United Arab Emirates. This chapter provides a broad descriptive statistics, articulating geographical, income group, sectoral, and recipient diversification of three NTDs' foreign aid flows. This part defines the concept of non-traditional donors and illustrates the initial perception of the literature during the 2000s. The chapter articulates NTDs increasing donor visibility in the context of changing power relations after the 2000s. Their emergence as non-traditional donors also challenges the DAC-generated bilateral and multilateral foreign aid of traditional Western donors. This issue becomes more interesting as/since/because many African and the least developed countries LDCs have alternative financing options due to the enhancing interactions with emerging powers (Hernandez 2017; Manning 2006). Therefore, the rise of non-traditional donors and powerful investment opportunities can weaken the effect of Western conditionalities. In this sense, China, Turkiye, and the UAE cases might be helpful to capture NTDs donor responses against DAC members' bilateral aid flows and aid suspension.

The fifth section of the dissertation is the main empirical chapter, offering testable hypotheses derived from the theory-building above. After providing descriptive statistics for China, Turkiye, and the UAE's foreign aid behavior, this chapter also includes an inferential analysis by measuring how NTDs react to the Western donors' aid policies. Empirical chapters firstly explain three non-traditional donors' foreign aid behavior. Using quantitative tools, the chapter explains the three NTDs' contemporary foreign aid behavior. First, I look into how and to what extent non-traditional donors respond to the existence of traditional donors. In other words, do they adjust their foreign aid allocation to traditional donors' existence? After explaining this point, I measure whether and to what extent non-traditional donors react to the Western conditionalities. This part uses one specific foreign aid conditionality, namely DAC-generated budget suspensions. I aim to determine how non-traditional donors behave after aid suspension. Since many bilateral and multilateral donors provide a great deal of budget support (BS) to the governments, this chapter also explains the role of budget support and suspension as the primary political official assistance type. Because budget support directly goes to the recipients' budget, it is more likely to allow recipient governments to use this in their interests (Molenaers et al. 2015). In this sense, budget aid suspensions are a useful variable to determine how non-traditional donors react to such conditionalities. Doing so, I analyze how China, Turkiye, and the UAE increase or decrease their foreign aid response to Western conditionalities. This part also gives an empirical understanding of foreign aid's geopolitics; namely, I explain why Africa is significant to take policy concessions from NTDs. Because I also put other regions, this chapter sets Africa apart from them.

After looking into variations among non-traditional donors, the fifth chapter also provides extensive information about the geopolitics of foreign aid, building on the power contestation between Turkiye and the UAE before and after the Arab Spring. The previous chapter models NTDs' foreign aid behavior as a response to the traditional donors and their aid suspensions. However, in Africa, we also see a struggle among different donors. Therefore, this section also analyzes the foreign aid behavior of non-traditional aid donors in terms of their geopolitical rivalry with each other. Each donor has separate commercial, economic and strategic interests. Especially after the Arab Spring, the foreign aid behavior of Turkiye and the UAE has become competitive in many respects. Therefore, this section considers the effects of these challenging arenas' influence on their foreign aid behavior. Because NTDs are not a homogeneous bloc, they also have conflicts with each other. Their geopolitical interests also determine the destinations of foreign aid because of their power contestation with each other. This issue becomes more salient as the power

contestation between Turkiye and the UAE became apparent in their foreign aid allocations. This chapter analyzes how this contestation affects their foreign aid behavior, mainly focusing on their aid to Egypt and Somalia. These cases are the two most visible cases, offering a sound understanding of how NTDs' foreign aid behavior is related to their geopolitical power contestations.

The last empirical quest in this section is the comparison of non-traditional donors with traditional donors. I answered whether traditional donors are different from non-DAC donors. Our sample composes of the top seven DAC donors including the United States, Japan, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Netherlands, and Sweden. These countries are also leading export partners for the developing world among the DAC group of states. Therefore, their encounter creates a useful opportunity to check if their foreign aid behavior is different from non-traditional donors. This dissertation hypothesizes that there is not a Manichean dichotomy between traditional and non-traditional donors, so this sub-section provides extensive information to test this thesis.

As a result, this dissertation provides extensive information about non-traditional donors' foreign aid behavior. It deals with the possible challenges of non-DAC donors for Western donors and OECD-DAC donors. First, I investigate how non-traditional donors react to Western aid allocations. Second, my research focus on how they respond to Western conditionalities. Third, I look into how non-traditional donors respond to each other's foreign aid flows. Fourth, I compare non-traditional donors with traditional donors to demonstrate that they are not as different, as scholars expected. These are the main empirical contributions to the literature. However, theoretically, I locate and interpret these findings via a systemic and interest-based outlook, which falls into the boundary of systemic realism. I theoretically and empirically contribute to the literature, not only via explaining their foreign aid behavior empirically, but these empirical findings strengthen the systemic and interest-based understanding.

However, I must also add in the last chapter that foreign aid behavior does not have to be confrontational. The fact that there is an ongoing struggle among donors does not mean that they do not make efforts for foreign aid cooperation. To illustrate, the OECD initiated a dialogue between Arab and Gulf donors and Development Assistance Committee. Non-traditional donors' data transparency and their multilateral initiative for global development goals are significant elements of aid effectiveness and policy harmonization. Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are significant donors. Broader donor coordination and multilateral arrangement might foster new collaborations in the field of foreign aid, which increase its importance

as global inequalities are on the rise. Therefore, the last part of this dissertation also provides initial implications for the development cooperation of non-traditional donors in the foreseeable future.

2. THEORY AND LITERATURE

A significant theoretical strand on foreign aid is related to theorizing donor intentions or motivations. Do donors provide foreign aid for their self-interest, or do they focus on recipient-need? The literature on foreign aid builds on two different theoretical frameworks. The first strand in the literature focuses on two distinct donor motivations: interest-based and need-based approaches (Maizels and Nissanke 1984; McKinlay and Little 1977). Literature on traditional donors can be analyzed through three epochs. The first distinctive period is the Cold War, and bipolarity created an international environment in which alliances and security partnerships were the top prior issues. In such a setting, foreign aid was a significant factor to alleviate the side effects of the Cold War. The second epoch was a response to the changing international environment, where selectivity, conditionality, and the end of the Cold War shaped donor behavior (Dollar and Levin 2006). The third period has been related to aid effectiveness, Millennium and Sustainable Development Goals, and the rise of non-traditional donors. The third period also dealt with the reasons for aid ineffectiveness. Blaming Western donors' foreign aid policies, and their ignorance of local characteristics, sociology, and politics are targeted by scholars (Easterly 2003). In each phase, donor motivation is shaped by different factors. During the first period, survival and security instincts were more important than other factors. The second epoch dealt with global neoliberal transformation, conditionalities, and the rise of multilateral arrangements in the field of foreign aid. This dissertation depicts and concentrates on the third phase. However, the third phase poses a research puzzle: while global endeavor for aid effectiveness is becoming more salient in the global foreign aid infrastructure, the rise of non-traditional donors challenges the existing foreign aid landscape in many ways. I offer the idea that this challenge is shaped by systemic factors and states act through their political and economic interests. Moreover, these political and economic interests diverge, since each non-traditional donor has different political and economic agenda. I arrange this theoretical and literature part, mostly focusing on the third phase. In the following part, I not only scrutinize the challenges of the third phase but also analyze the theoretical and

empirical infrastructure of the literature concerning the first and second phases.

There is extensive literature to answer whether donors provide foreign aid as a response to their economic or political interests, or whether they provide foreign aid for developmental considerations (McKinlay and Little 1977). For instance, USA's political goals -driven by the Cold War- are decisive for its foreign aid allocation. However, the second strand in the literature focuses on different levels of analysis. System-level and state-level explanations are the significant pillars of the second strand (Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998). In this sense, almost all research in foreign aid scholarship can be mapped using two distinct theoretical frameworks. If we suggest that foreign aid behavior is shaped by the characteristics of the international system, in other words, if we offer that the distribution of capabilities, balance of power, or alliance formation in the international system is significant, then this would be a pure form of a systemic understanding of foreign aid. On the other hand, if we focus on how domestic-level variables such as regime type or control of corruption affect foreign aid allocation, then this research agenda will act through a state-level theorization. If a donor supports a recipient for its democracy and quality of governance, then the recipient's state or unit-level characteristics become more important than its system-level characteristics.

The theoretical approaches above build on international relations theories. Both levels of analysis and donor motivation are parts of a broader theoretical debate. Therefore, we link both strands in the aid literature with the theoretical progress in international relations. For instance, system-level approaches focus on international settings shaped by anarchy and the distribution of capabilities. The systemic approach focuses on the interactions of nation-states, regardless of what is happening in the black box of the nation-states (Ikenberry et al. 1988). Interest-based approaches with a systemic analysis focus on how anarchy and distribution of capabilities direct nation-states behavior (Waltz 1979). The self-help system of the international environment forces states to pursue their economic and military interests. Alliance formation and threat perception is a continuation of this tradition (Walt 1985). For instance, as the Cold War's concerns faded away, the war on terror became a significant explanatory factor of US foreign aid behavior (Fleck and Kilby 2010). Systemic theories for neorealist thinking focus on how international-level changes affect state behavior. Alliances, security goals, military partnerships, and economic alignments are substantial parts of such a theoretical research agenda. Foreign aid literature during the Cold War debated how systemic factors shape donors' foreign aid behavior (Boschini and Olofsgård 2007; Lai 2003). Indeed, systemic theories do not have to be related to neorealism only.

Post-1980 aid literature also is affected by another systemic attitude, namely neoliberal institutionalism which created a different framework in the foreign aid scholarship by focusing on recipients' economic growth, conditionalities, and multilateralism. Many neoliberal institutionalists adopt premises of realism, including the rational character of state behavior and constraints of the international system (Baldwin 1993). However, these premises do not rule out the importance and robustness of international interactions and regimes that guide state behavior. International regimes are significant components of institutionalism, which are the principles and rules that states follow (Krasner 1983). From the perspective of foreign aid scholarship, we do not classify OECD-DAC as a foreign aid regime. However, the OECD-DAC has the power of setting donor agenda, focusing on transparency, monitoring, and a sound dialogue among its members and non-members. The Millennium and Sustainable Development Goals (MDGs) and (SDGs) are also consequences of multilateral dialogue and engagement, in which multilateral institutions played a significant role. Cold War concerns are alleviated during the 1980s, and states' foreign aid priorities also changed (Ball and Johnson 1996). These systemic changes created a robust groundwork for different theoretical frameworks.

Neoliberal institutionalism also is a systemic theory, and they regard the international system as an analytical tool to show the constraints on state behavior (Keohane 1984). However, institutions and regimes –generated during the Pax Americana – can maintain their existence, which might have the power to influence state behavior. Institutions might be information providers for other countries and monitor other countries' behavior (Axelrod and Keohane 1985). This systemic framework is also valid for foreign aid scholarships. The OECD and other institutions are useful examples of affecting state behavior in the international realm. Development Assistance Committee monitors member states' behavior and transparency and coordinates developmental goals during state forums. These attributes are within the scope of Keohane's quest for institutionalism. Cooperation among self-interested rational actors is possible via institutions because they decrease uncertainty and provide information. The OECD-DAC has done a lot for transparency, and each DAC members and even non-DAC participant countries (i.e UAE) report their foreign aid data via Creditor Reporting System (CRS). This is one example of how institutions play a significant role in determining donors' behavior, reporting, and dialogue. This issue became salient since China does not report its concessional financial flows to any multilateral entity. This is interesting because the PRC became a part of many multilateral arrangements such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), however, its foreign financial flows are still

unrevealed except for some open-source data extraction initiatives such as AidData. System-level approaches can be both interest-based or need-based. If we believe that institutions –formed as a consequence of a specific type of balance of power– have a level of autonomy from its constituting members, then these institutions can have their own agenda and economic interests. IMF and World Bank are the two notable institutions that their development agenda can be interpreted through need-based and interest-based lenses. If one believes that World Bank and IMF only reflect the dominant powers' geopolitical policy choices, then this view operationalizes system-level premises with an interest-based attitude. However, many organizational structures changed after the Cold War. Their organizational mechanisms and voting patterns to elect directors changed during and after the Cold War. During this period, these institutions insisted on governance-oriented (economic and political) conditionalities, when compared to the Cold War. These conditionalities targeted the economic well-being and governance mechanism of recipient countries. If we propose that foreign aid behavior is shaped by post-1980 institutional trends targeting recipient-need, we are acting from the system level with a need-based outlook.

From a different point of view, if we explain donors' foreign aid behavior with the change of the intra-state actors, the cultural characteristics of the state, the relations between the parties or the type of regime, we are acting from the unit or state-level. For instance, structural-institutional and normative dimensions of democratic peace theory are part of state-level theories (Russett 1994). However, we deal with state-level explanations from the foreign aid literature. World Bank and many other international institutions adopted poverty alleviation as one of the primary policies of international development landscape; however, there has always been significant divergences among donor countries. If this differentiation is explained by societal and domestic political structures, then we explain donors' foreign aid behavior at the state level (Lundsgaarde 2012). The difference between state-level and system-level approaches determines the causal direction. This strand of theorizing is most visible in domestic determinants of international relations (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2012) and politics, or the left-right political stance, which is more likely to influence governments' foreign aid behavior. For instance, Tingley (2010) asserts that conservative political segments decrease foreign aid flows as a share of donor GDP, and Thérien and Noel (2000) asserts that if a political party aims to redistribute wealth in its domestic politics, then they are more likely to be proponents of providing foreign aid. Leftist governments set the examples of such a foreign aid rationale. However, Greene and Licht (2018) suggest that conservative parties also have incentives to provide foreign aid. Regardless of political party position, internationally

oriented right and left political parties can be the proponents of foreign aid. From a more societal perspective, For some scholars, foreign aid flows are correlated with corruption if political tension among competitive societal actors (ethnic minorities) are intense (Svensson 2000). In this sense, aid infectiveness is explained by recipients' domestic-level characteristics. The same logic is visible in Knack (2001), who explains that aid can foster poor governance performance because of its influence on institutional domestic incapacity. These are all state-level theories, which are parts of foreign-domestic linkage theories. In other words, these state-level theories do not approach states as if they are closed upon themselves like a blackbox; instead, what's going on within the state is a crucial point of their theoretical framework. On the other hand, system-level theories build causality from the systemic variables including distribution of capabilities. As we will see below, we link non-traditional foreign aid donors with this literature. For instance, there are studies explaining Turkiye's foreign aid behavior based on its religious orientation (Kavakli 2018; Zengin and Korkmaz 2019). Religious political parties and ethno-religious orientation of the leading parties might influence foreign aid behavior. This is an example of state-level theories.

Constructivism, another significant international relations theory, was used extensively to explain international relations. Neorealism or neoliberalism takes interests as given; however, there are ideational factors defining state interests. Alexander Wendt's theory of constructivism is also a system-level theory. Instead of relying on exogenous agency, the intersubjective process is significant to constitute the international system. According to Wendt (1999) anarchy is created by an intersubjective process, by which actor/agents gain identities. Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian perceptions of anarchy correspond to different degrees of identity formation. Being an enemy, a rival or a friend depends on the anarchic culture that actors constitute (Wendt 1999). Face-to-face interactions, a social-learning process, and identity formations are the practical ground for making identities a part of the international system (Adler, Barnett, and Smith 1998). Constructivism also is significant for searching how international regimes affect state behavior. Ruggie (1982) suggests that a powerful country might be a significant step for creating international regimes, and such regimes taught states to focus on and bargain on common interests. Their normative framework still exists even if their hegemonic power decline. Regarding such an institutionalist and constructivist framework, OECD's definition of ODA – searching for the harmonization of states' foreign aid policies, dialogue with Arab donors, and affecting donors' transparency – are consequences of OECD's foreign aid initiative after 1969. Such policies are still robust and much more effective with the existence of UN and OECD-generated development goals. Changing power relations

did not weaken DAC's agenda-setting power. However, we cannot call OECD-DAC a part of regimes.

Lumsdaine and Risse-Kappen (1993) is a leading scholar criticizing neorealism from the perspective of constructivism. Donors' moral vision is an important component of modern foreign aid practices, as official development assistance is directed to the neediest countries more (Lumsdaine and Risse-Kappen 1993). Morality affects international development perspectives because domestic concerns of justice are carried to the international level, and also international regimes lead to a normative framework by which helping needy countries becomes a moral attitude (Lumsdaine and Risse-Kappen 1993). Such works show how ideational factors affect and shape donor behavior. However, constructivism's research agenda on foreign aid is limited.

Governance mechanisms are the illustrations of such an identity formation process. Recently, there is not a Cold War that the OECD legitimized itself as the economic projection of NATO. Because it was the Cold War that made OECD legitimize itself as the economic projection of NATO, conditions have changed, and the such legitimization is no longer valid. OECD still exists and its Development Assistance Committee (DAC) brings donors together, behaves as an international forum, sometimes dictates rules, and helps non-DAC members to join the OECD's policy framework. Being a member of DAC or OECD is also related to having an identity that its policy process entails. The historical projection of constructivism on foreign aid scholarship is mostly related to international organizations, including security communities, economic partnerships, and strategic alliances. However, this dissertation does not deal with identity formation or any other ideational factors.

Table 2.1 A Theoretical Framework in the Foreign Aid Literature

	System-Level	**State-Level**
Interest-Based	Geopolitics, Balancing, Bandwagoning, International Trade Alignments	Political Party Competition, Elections, Domestic Political Debates
Need-Based	International Policy Harmonization for Poverty Eradication	Aid-Governance Nexus, Recipients' Economic and Political Performance to get foreign aid

The first table above shows the main topics that system and state-level theories focus on. In this work, -although we use unit-level variables- we don't focus on the theoretical and empirical implications of state-level variables. In other words, we

do not generate our thesis from linkage theories. However, we need to mention that state-level theories or foreign-domestic linkage strands are also gaining more visibility in the foreign aid scholarship. For instance, party-politics or political party alignments might be a significant factor explaining foreign aid (Thérien and Noel 2000). Moreover, Meernik, Krueger, and Poe (1998) asserts that the end of the Cold War alleviated donors' security-driven attitude, and provided more playing ground for state-level factors such as the democratic character of donors. These are all a part of the domestic-foreign linkage theory. Therefore, diving into linkage theories entails strong empirical research on legislatures, governmental decision-making for aid provisions, intra-political differences between political parties, leader-vision, and any other domestic variable. Also, the democratic character of the recipients is a significant factor in aid allocation in the literature. For instance, if a country performs better towards democratic governance, then the EU might allocate foreign aid to such countries more (Gafuri 2022). However, some authors suggested that aid does not improve a recipient's democratic performance (Knack 2004). State-level theories in foreign aid are parts of foreign-domestic linkage literature in international relations, which focus on domestic audience costs, regime type, and domestic institutions (Fearon 1994; Putnam 1988). To sum up, all these empirical researches maintain that domestic-level characteristics (democracy, rule of law, or any other unit-level attributes) are important elements of donors' foreign aid allocation. State-level variables might be either related to donors' or recipients' domestic political structure.

Below, I provide the main implications of the theoretical framework. For instance, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union (USSR) are extensively debated in the literature as seen in the following chapter. The Cold War was a systemic topic, implying a change in the distribution of capabilities, alliances, and many other events. For instance, the cold war also affected Turkiye's foreign aid behavior. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkiye established its foreign aid organization and started to provide a significant amount of foreign assistance to the Balkans and Central Asian states, which are from USSR republics. The fall of the Warsaw Pact also intersected with the policy harmonization in the international institutions and organizations such as the EU and UN. Multilateral cooperation increased and states adopted new global development agenda. However, this period did not occur smoothly, as each state has its foreign aid agenda.

Another important systemic change is the Arab Spring. This is a systemic change, which has regional and global implications. The established status quo in the Middle East has been destroyed by popular movements and civil wars, and Islamic and democratic movements have gained power. Many of these movements were related

Table 2.2 General Topics in Each Theoretical Unit

	System-Level	**State-Level**
Interest-Based	USSR, The Arab Spring, Taiwan Recognition (China), The Qatar Blockade (UAE), Turkiye's Africa Opening	Political Parties' aid debate in the donors' legislatives during the elections, providing aid or cutting aid as an election propaganda.
Need-Based	UN-Generated MDGs and SDGs, Formation of EU AID Initiative, Democracy Support, The Paris	Democracy support for underdeveloped and developing countries, based on their democracy and governance score, conditionalities

to the Muslim Brotherhood, and this situation greatly disturbed some status quo states such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE but provided more influence to Turkiye. Thus, alliances have changed, each overthrown government has made alliances with different actors. For instance, Saudi Arabia and the UAE's support for the coup-government in Egypt was a consequence of such concerns (Stuster 2013). The foreign aid policy of states such as Turkiye and UAE has been shaped accordingly. Therefore, we have many instances of how systemic changes affect the foreign aid behavior of traditional and non-traditional donors. Another system-level explanation for foreign is related to international institutions' agenda-setting power over the years. OECD and UN-generated foreign aid policies and standardization of aid sectors, volumes, and principles are the consequences of such a multilateral agenda-setting power. MDGs and SDGs are the illustrations of such a policy harmonization, which are targeting the alleviation of poverty, and higher standards of health and education. Therefore, systemic analysis has two faces: the first argument concerns state interests and changes in the international system. The second one is related to the institutional power of multilateral bodies, which are driven by Millennium and Sustainable Development Goals (MDGs and SDGs).

2.1 Interest and Need-Based Approaches: Traditional Donors

The question of "Why do non-traditional donors provide foreign aid?" is strictly related to another question. "What are the determinants of foreign aid?". The literature on foreign aid scholarship branches out two different strands. First, interest-based or donor-oriented approaches suggest that donors provide foreign aid for their foreign policy concerns regarding economics, military and political interests. They might either support the countries where they have good relations or where they want to establish economic and political ties (McKinley and Little 1979). Almost all the relevant variables- such as international trade, the UN-voting similarity, economic growth, democracy, and corruption- are coming from this division in the literature. In this part, I first explain the interest-based and need-based theories, and then explicate the missing elements in the literature, offering the dissertation's main thesis to explain the determinants of foreign aid.

I divide the interest-based literature into two components: Geopolitical and economic. In other words, as we will see below in the foreign aid literature, the concept of interest can be examined under two different frameworks. The chronology of all these approaches -explaining foreign aid- can be examined from the Cold War to the present. For example, we see that geopolitical concerns became significant too much due to the Soviet threat during the Cold War period. Specifically, Cold War is a useful case to follow the interest-based attitude of traditional donors (Boschini and Olofsgård 2007). A natural consequence of this tendency was the geopolitical tendency that motivated the United States to support authoritarian regimes (Huntington 2006).

The second strand of the foreign aid literature focuses on recipient-need models. Such explanations include some normative elements, proposing that donors should provide foreign aid for the recipients' well-being (Sachs 2005). One part of need-based theories includes critical works. Another strand of the recipient-based model reflects an increasing emphasis on institutions, conditionality, and effectiveness. As the Soviet Union collapsed and Western countries and multilateral organizations focused on aid effectiveness and conditionality. In other words, needs are also defined over open trade, good governance, and economic development. Sometimes, recipients were blamed for aid ineffectiveness and the absence of good governance (Svensson 2000).

2.1.1 Interest-Based Approaches

2.1.1.1 Geopolitical interests

The first interest-based strand in the foreign aid literature is based on the geopolitics-aid nexus, which scrutinized Cold War politics. In this part, I articulate the main dynamics of geopolitics-aid nexus by appealing to the literature. The initial analysis of Western foreign aid is strictly related to the research analyzing the US and other Western powers' foreign aid initiative during the Cold War. Therefore, these works are in line with some neorealist scholars and follow the footprints of their systemic realist premises. One of the hypotheses produced from this theoretical framework is that the USA will give more support to the states that are close to it. We can presume that if the distribution of capabilities changes or if there is a systemic change in the international order, then foreign support policies might change. For instance, Boschini and Olofsgård (2007) investigated the US foreign aid behavior during and after the Cold War, and they found that Western ODA is positively associated with the military expenditures of the Warsaw Pact countries during the Cold War. However, they don't find such a tendency after the Cold War. Meernik, Krueger, and Poe (1998) also suggested that security-driven systemic inclinations of the Cold War inclinations weakened after the Cold War. As the national-survival priorities change during and after the Cold War, it is somehow corroborated that the overall foreign aid behavior of the Western countries also transformed. However, the decreasing importance of the aid-geopolitics nexus -regarding the Warsaw Pact- does not mean that the geopolitical logic of state behavior weakens after the Cold War. According to Lai (2003)'s research, the security perspective did not weaken after the Cold War, but its focus -regarding official development aid- had shifted. This shift is crucial due to its explanatory power for new dynamics of security threats. If the distribution of power changes and the Soviet Union collapses, then what is the new threat to the US geopolitical interests? If there is such a threat, then do we see the footprints of a balancing act against new threats? Lai (2003) articulates that rogue states -after the Cold War- became the focus of US national interests, and its foreign aid behavior was shaped against the rogue states . Countries that are more proximate to a rogue state, then such proximate countries get more US aid . The US still used foreign aid as a foreign policy tool, not related to Cold War concerns anymore, but related to new security threats. This was a useful example of testing hypotheses generated from neorealist theory. Fleck and Kilby (2010) also suggest that with the US launching the war against terrorism, United States aid to needy countries decreased, but the volume of foreign aid was mostly used as an instrument in this war against terrorism.

Based on the Cold War, we can have other implications for empirical inquiry. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2016) model the foreign aid behavior of the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. They find that if the United States is the only actor giving aid to the recipient country, then the aid recipient state grants too many policy concessions to the dominant donor state . On the other hand, they also find that when the Soviet Union provides foreign aid to a country, then the United States provides more foreign aid and gets fewer policy concessions from the recipients. This tendency of the Cold War might explain how donor competition works. From this point, we can also use Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2016)'s model to test if a similar trend exists between traditional and non-traditional donors. Therefore, 'fighting communism' might not be insufficient to capture recent tendencies in foreign aid. Instead -regardless of ideological outlook- we might seek systemic power contestation.

International institutions also become a part of the interest-based literature. Kuziemko and Werker (2006) find that being a UNSC member is positively associated with more US ODA and UN-foreign aid. Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele (2008) find that the United States uses foreign aid -general budget support and grants- to recipients' who have more voting similarities with the United States. Institutions such as World Bank and IMF also affect voting patterns in the UNGA meetings. Moreover, Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland (2009) find that countries with temporary UNSC members receive more foreign aid from World Bank. Switzerland, which gives foreign aid to Central Asian countries in order to be a board member of the World Bank. Switzerland can indeed use foreign assistance as a tool to be in governance mechanisms (Vreeland 2011). These findings are part of the interest-based literature, with an emphasis on system-level outlook, namely political alignments in the multilateral institutions have been an integral part of the interest-based literature. Recently, a non-traditional donor China also uses its foreign aid to influence a multilateral institution and demonstrates its dominance by providing a high amount of foreign aid to ASEAN's Chair countries (Lim and Kim 2022). From a systemic and interest-based perspective, powerful countries affect multilateral lending. Also, multilateral institutions reflect powerful countries' interests, which might be corroboration of neorealist interpretations of international institutions, as Mearsheimer (1994) predicted. In this regard, system-level theories with an interest-based outlook reflect mostly neorealism's assumptions.

Cold War policies are only some parts of the interest-based literature. The colonial past and political alliances are also influential factors during the Cold war period. As Alesina and Dollar (2000) argue, countries with a colonial past and strong political alliance with donors receive more foreign aid. They also find that more democratic

countries get more foreign aid from donors. However, the latter finding is significant because the debate on democracy is one of the most significant factors after the Cold War. However, they find such a tendency among Western donors during the Cold War. Dunning (2004) also find that there is a positive link between foreign aid and democracy in Africa after the Cold War. That is, the end of the Cold War caused different tendencies in the motivation to give aid. In particular, the conditionality policies -regarding democracy, good governance, and macroeconomic stability- of donor countries are an important example of this. These changing geopolitical environment encouraged donors to take action towards governance mechanism, selectivity and conditionalities.

2.1.1.2 Economy/Trade interests

Geopolitical interests represent only one dimension of foreign aid behavior as a part of interest-based theorizing. Commercial interests occupy a significant part of the literature. For example, DAC members may prioritize their commercial or export interests when they give foreign aid. Hoeffler and Outram (2011) find that most Western donors provide foreign aid for their self-interest in trade, and this research covers the time between 1980 and 2004. Also, a donor can give a lot of development aid to a country, it will give that country the power to export from donor countries. Wagner (2003) finds that foreign aid increases the amount of bilateral trade between donor and recipients. Moreover, foreign aid-trade nexus between specific donors and recipients can lead to a familiarity with donors' exported goods. This engagement results in purchasing more goods from foreign aid provider countries.

Aid-trade nexus sometimes create competition among Western donors. For example, recipients who are important for export markets have strategic importance. Barthel et al. (2014) find that top donors provide foreign aid in trade-related aid sectors, where other donors do so. for export markets is also an obstacle to more harmonized foreign aid policies of Western donors. While we expect that OECD-DAC donors might cooperate to provide more foreign aid to economically and geographically disadvantaged countries, competition in export markets leads to fragmentation within the DAC group of states. Fuchs, Nunnenkamp, and Öhler (2015) suggest that countries do not coordinate or harmonize their foreign aid policies because their trade interests are divergent

The relationship of commercial interests with foreign aid can sometimes create a distinction between Western donors. For example, Switzerland, Austria, Ireland and Nordic countries give foreign aid relatively more independently from trade relations,

while France, Japan, Italy, and America display a more self-interested attitude in their trade-aid relationship (Berthélemy 2006). Indeed, divergent export interests might explain the lack of coordination among donors (Fuchs, Nunnenkamp, and Öhler 2015).

2.1.2 Recipient-Need

Need-based literature either normatively suggests that aid should be given for recipient-need or articulate the conditions how foreign aid might foster recipients' economic growth. The aid-development problem came into the academic agenda extensively after the 1980s, the period that the Cold War tensions decreased. The main question here is to determine how the welfare of the recipient countries will increase. At this point, foreign aid came into the agenda as a development problem arising from the needs of the recipient countries. Most of the aid-effectiveness literature is also related to need-based literature, which also concerns the increasing institutionalism during the 80s. In this sense, I will analyze the need-based literature with these developments. The initial analysis of the aid-growth nexus was pessimistic and aid does not bring growth regarding human development and investments (Boone 1996). The following literature suggested different implications. First of all, we should underline that -with the end of the Cold War- it became crucial to investigate the conditions leading to an increase in the welfare of the recipient countries. For instance, Bearce and Tirone (2010) suggest that aid fosters economic growth only after the 1990s, the era when Cold War tensions decreased, and donors more effectively targeted the economic reform in the recipient countries. However, if donors prioritize their strategic goals, then foreign aid becomes ineffective.

Why has Africa not developed despite receiving so much foreign aid? There is no clear answer to this question, but we should not pass without mentioning William Easterly. The western world started very serious aid programs under the banner of "Zero poverty" in Africa and tried to implement aid projects from the top to down. But the main problem was that the Western world believed that it could end poverty with a simple top-down foreign aid policy without going deep into local conditions, relations, and social and political conflicts (Easterly 2006). Aid ineffectiveness was a consequence of grand promises, and negligence of planners. However, different aid modalities including budget support, and the promise of Millennium and Sustainable Development Goals still did not overcome acute poverty in the region. An African contribution to the foreign aid literature asserts that foreign aid is problematic itself. Foreign aid makes recipient governments accountable to donors rather than to their

people, so the goal is to fulfill donors' wishes, but Africa's underlying systemic problems do not change (Moyo 2009). Somehow, foreign aid contributes to systematic aid dependence because of the deadlock of the donor-recipient relationship.

Asking if Africa needed a Marshall plan came to the fore in this post-Soviet period. However, the literature has shifted from an economy-dominated ground to a political-driven explanation. The factors hindering the economic development that Africa needs are political rather than economic (Collier and Dollar 2000). When we attribute the ineffectiveness of foreign aid to political reasons, we also argue that the source of the primary problems is the recipient countries. The works -that followed such a political mindset- began to analyze the impact of foreign aid on recipients' economic growth, received by the recipient countries on development, taking into account the political and administrative developments of the recipient countries. Knack (2001) suggested that recipients' aid dependency on foreign aid can undermine good governance mechanisms since recipient governments' strive for aid to maintain their power overwhelms any other recipient-need concerns. Therefore, there should be an effective policy to promote recipients' domestic-level governance mechanisms. Also, Collier and Dollar (2002) suggest that good fiscal rules and good governance such as anti-corruption policies support the economic development of African countries. from political and administrative institutions, cross-country differences are also significant to explain negative growth rates in Africa.

Berthélemy and Tichit (2004), for the years between the 1980s and 1999, find that total aid flows have a declining pace, the impact of colonial history started to lose its power, donors provide more foreign aid with good policy environments. Good economic policies attract more foreign aid flows, and being a democracy attract more foreign aid for specific donors. In fact, the issue of democracy came to the fore in the field of foreign aid after the 90s. In the literature after the 80s and 90s, by which the governance-foreign aid relationship came to the fore, naturally, scholars investigated if foreign aid is effective to increase the quality of government. Knack (2001) argued that aid-dependency or higher levels of aid are associated with more corruption, less accountability, and worse institutionalization.

Burnside and Dollar (2000) underline that countries with better quality governance tools are more prosperous when they receive foreign aid. However, Easterly (2003) find no evidence for such a finding, based on new in-depth data covering 1973 and 1990. Starting from here, we witness a broader concern for improving economic conditions, which is a part of the recipient-need debate in the literature. We see the importance of good governance mechanisms in terms of the foreign aid-economic needs nexus. In this sense, development, foreign aid and recipient governance become a

significant point of aid effectiveness during the 2000s. The rise of non-traditional donors occur in the midst of this governance-related precautions.

It is also significant to underline that need-based approaches with a systemic understanding mostly overlap with liberal institutionalism. Institutions -the main actors of multilateral lending- play an important role in allocating foreign aid. This allocation is not only related to foreign aid volumes but also these institutions have the power to set donor agendas. The Millennium and Sustainable development Goals are the consequences of dialogue between OECD, UN and many other bilateral donors. Multilateral institutions are influential in terms of setting some standards and goals, and they also target effective foreign aid to contribute to recipient development. The main apparatus for foreign aid effectiveness is economic and political conditionalizes, as used by World Bank, IMF, and European Union. Therefore, the need-based approach also intersects with liberal institutionalism.

In the foreign aid literature, the foreign aid behavior of Western donors has been frequently analyzed on both an interest-based and a need-based basis. Some of these interest-based perspectives are either system-level or state-level. On the other hand, need-based approaches can also be related to system-level or domestic-level considerations. Almost all this literature is related to traditional DAC donors. However, there is still a gap regarding systemic analysis of non-traditional donors. For example, although the Chinese foreign aid literature has developed, there is still a need for studies that comparatively analyze the motivation and foreign aid of different non-DAC countries. For this, it is necessary to first establish different hypotheses to compare non-traditional donors and their differences. Below, I first explain the literature on non-traditional donors, then analyze how power relations triggered interest-based foreign aid policies for Western donors. After this, I articulate and investigate how changing power relations lead to diverse foreign aid policies for non-traditional donors. Below, I provide a variable matrix generated from the literature.

2.2 Theory and Literature: Non-Traditional Donors

Non-traditional donors are not novel in foreign aid literature. Non-OECD donors enjoyed Western foreign aid for a long time; however, they have become significant global donors. India, China, Turkiye, Brazil, and the UAE provide a large amount of foreign to the developing world (Dreher, Fuchs, and Nunnenkamp 2013). For instance, the aid behavior of Arab donors found a place for itself mostly after the

Table 2.3 A Variable Matrix for Each Theoretical Unit

	System-Level	**State-Level**
Interest-Based	International Trade, UN Voting Similarity, Political Alliances, Cultural Affinity, Rival Donor Existence	Political Party Polarization (Donors), Partisanship, Electoral Campaigns
Need-Based	International Regime Dynamics, Conditionalities for Economic Growth	Democracy Score, The Rule of Law, Population, GDP Per Capita, Infant Mortality Rate

1990s, albeit a little, since the 1990s. Today, unlike in the past, much larger literature emerges with the changes in the international arena. Here, it is significant that I do not use the concept of new donors, because non-traditional donors are not a novel phenomenon in the literature (Woods 2008) I use an analytical demarcation line, as proposed by other scholars (Kragelund 2008). This analytical demarcation line is related to donors' membership in OECD-DAC, which is Western countries' main multilateral dialogue and policy body. In this sense, scholars used "emerging" donors to make an analytical demarcation line between established (traditional) and non-traditional donors (Woods 2008).

It is also significant to underline that this division has some political motivations. Most of the DAC members are also NATO members. In this sense, the birth and institutional configuration of DAC is related to the initial power dynamics of the Cold War. Even if the former geopolitical rivalries ended by the fall of the Warsaw Pact, OECD-DAC is still a useful policy harmonizing body, as it set the standards of Official Development Assistance. In this section, we will first introduce this literature on general non-traditional donors, and right after that, we will evaluate this literature within the mainstream foreign aid research, and show the missing elements in this literature. As mentioned, above non-traditional donors are non-DAC donors, which is our main analytical comparison. Non-DAC donors and non-traditional donors will be used interchangeably.

There are two strands in the scholarship of non-traditional donors. One significant strand focuses on possible adverse effects of NTDs' aid due to NTDs' interest-based and predatory inclinations. This part of the debate also focuses on NTDs' negative impact on domestic politics. The second strand evaluates positive elements in NTDs' aid in supporting recipients' economic growth and needs.

Literature also includes a significant endeavor to overcome the data scarcity of non-traditional donors. For a long time, NTDs' aid data were underreported, and there have been initiatives to solve the data problem. Chinese aid data was collected from open sources and now the data problem seems to be overcome by different data collection processes (Dreher et al. 2018; Kitano and Harada 2016). However, the UAE and Turkiye report their foreign flows to the OECD. Specifically, data scarcity of non-traditional donors regarding foreign aid has been one of the most critical obstacles to capturing a general picture of China's foreign aid policy. In this work, we will AidData's Global Chinese Development Finance Dataset (Custer et al. 2021). Regarding Turkiye and the UAE, we don't have a data scarcity problem because both report to the OECD. Therefore, this dissertation uses the OECD data for Turkiye and the UAE.

Non-traditional donors' visibility in the literature increased after the 2000s. The former head of the development assistance committee (DAC), Manning (2006) suggested that there are three significant issues regarding new donors as NTDs increase their global ODA allocation: First, the recipients can get NTDs' aid in a way that undermines their macroeconomic stability regarding debt trap, wasting their aid as un-earned income, and non-DAC donors' economic and political non-conditionality would make it harder for the recipients to adjust their policies following the Western institutions (Manning 2006). Most of Manning's predictions came true. To illustrate, World Bank offered fewer conditionalities if a recipient country has a high level of aid engagement with China (Hernandez 2017). Manning (2006) also underlines the importance of dialogue between DAC and non-DAC donors, based on development goals and poverty alleviation. Kragelund (2008) is another significant predecessor of the existing research. He gives a conceptualization of non-DAC donors and shows the importance of economic gains related to China and India's foreign aid behavior.

There are three different lines in evaluating NTDs' foreign aid behavior. First, some part of the literature focuses on the effect of NTDs on the recipients' domestic political and economic configuration. The second strand of literature tries to capture the effect of NTDs on the existing foreign aid infrastructure of Western donors. The third is dealing with reporting the underreported data of non-traditional donors such as China and Qatar. Such scholars and research institutions find a way to measure NTDs' foreign aid volumes (Dreher et al. 2018; Kitano and Harada 2016). However, the UAE and Turkiye report their foreign flows to the OECD. Specifically, data scarcity of China's foreign aid has been one of the most important obstacles to capturing a general picture of China's foreign aid policy. However, the third strand in the literature overcomes data scarcity.

The initial understanding of non-traditional donors was pessimistic. The predecessors of such a pessimism debated the issue through Western lenses. For instance, Naim (2007) labeled new donors' foreign aid as rouge aid, implying that donors like China or Saudi Arabia are detrimental to traditional Western foreign aid due to its interest-based, non-democratic and nontransparent character. The recent developments also corroborated the predictions of previous works.

However, we need to keep in mind that this dissertation does not rely on a Manichean dichotomy between Western and non-Western donors. As indicated above, Western multilateral and bilateral foreign aid flows do not exempt from interest-based attitude. Indeed, their emphasis on conditionality made little sense for good governance and macroeconomic performance. From the beginning of the OECD, we have seen that power dynamics are so influential for traditional donors' foreign aid policies (Morgenthau 1962). Moreover, aid fragmentation is not only prevalent among traditional donors, non-OECD DAC donors are also divided among each other in terms of their geopolitical, economic, and political priorities (Knack and Rahman 2007). Indeed, non-traditional donors manifest diverse inclinations and competition regarding dealing with OECD-DAC donors and other non-traditional donors.

2.2.1 China

China's foreign aid behavior has historically been the result of very significant systemic factors. For example, in the early periods of the People's Republic of China, it was important for China to support the communist and Maoist movements in Africa to build alliances with national liberation movements (Taylor 2007). This also provided China leverage regarding the balance of power. It provided room for maneuver not only against the Western world but also against the Soviet Union. China adopted an anti-hegemonic foreign policy in Africa and other parts of the World. During the 60s and 70s, not only the US but also the Soviet Union was a competitor of the Chinese state (Taylor 2007). Therefore, initial foreign aid support was a part of this anti-Soviet and anti-hegemonic attitude. Besides, his survival instinct and one-China policy were fundamental. In this respect, we can explain early Chinese foreign aid with its political interests. However, this trend changed after the 2000s. As China emerged as a trade power, its foreign aid flows became much more related to its commercial interests. Brautigam (2011*b*) suggests that China's financial support does not fit into the definition of OECD's ODA standard, as its financial flows compose of commerce-oriented concessional loans with a small grant element. Indeed, I need to underline that this change is also systemic, namely, it

is related to China's position in the distribution of capabilities. As China becomes a trade power, China expanded its power in world politics, its foreign policy vision changed accordingly.

There are two strands of China's foreign aid behavior in the literature. The first strand is pessimistic about China's foreign aid in terms of its undermining character of DAC-generated foreign aid policies, and multilateral organizations' lending/loan policies (Naim 2007; Woods 2008). On the other hand, the second trend in the literature states that the claims of the first strand might not be empirically corroborated because they think that these opinions should be supported by empirical research. For instance, Bräutigam and Zhang (2013) suggested that some of the pessimism generated by the early literature on China include myths, and they tried to eliminate fiction from realities. The following part will scrutinize these two strands in the literature, and detect the missing elements.

China's foreign aid initiative has always been a part of its foreign policy goals. After the establishment of the People's Republic of China, it started to support other socialist countries and later African countries after 1955(Taylor 2007). During that period PRC's struggle with ROC, and PRC's geopolitical competition with the USSR were significant elements of its foreign aid allocation. Kragelund (2008) articulates that although Taiwan's recognition and Soviet Challenge were significant geopolitical issues that shaped China's early foreign aid behavior, such issues are not relevant anymore. However, One-China policy is still a dominant factor in determining its foreign aid allocations during the Covid-19 shock (Telias and Urdinez 2022). This is a robust continuity of its foreign aid policy.

Recently, China's need for raw materials, export markets, and its growing economic and political influence is the new aspects of its foreign aid policy. Therefore, today, China's foreign aid literature consists of a more interest-based perspective regarding its economic gains from the recipients. The literature includes questions of "Is the Chinese state's foreign aid more directed towards its commercial interests? Or does the Chinese state serve the economic needs of the receiving countries?" In fact, today's literature has been the subject of many studies seeking answers to these questions. Bräutigam (2000) suggests that Chinese foreign aid is intertwined with financial instruments such as export loans and concessional loans. In this sense, it is necessary to completely distinguish the Chinese foreign aid from the foreign aid of the OECD-DAC countries. "Aid with Chinese characteristics" would be the correct term to describe China's foreign aid. For instance, if China provides a concessional loan to Angola for a hospital building, most of the raw materials, steel, cement, or any other stuff come from China (Tan-Mullins, Mohan, and Power 2010). This is

also an example of tied aid.

New trends in China's aid operation concern the commercial logic of its foreign policy. For instance, Russia is the largest recipient of China's foreign aid, and most of this support consists of concessional loans for oil companies and additional grants as labeled ODA-like flows (Allen-Ebrahimian 2017). Apart from its commercial logic, debt diplomacy is a significant part of the story. Manning (2006) suggests that China's financial flows create a debt problem for the recipients and harm their macroeconomic stability. Green (2019) offers that China leads to debt diplomacy by which it becomes a dominant economic actor in Africa and other regions. However, the debt trap is not an accurate description of China's loan-based financial flows to Africa or any other region, because debt relief and rescheduling are also another significant part of China's financial flows. Acker, Bräutigam, and Huang (2020) suggests that China canceled 3.4 billion US Dollars and rescheduled 15 billion of debt in Africa. Therefore, such cancellations become de-facto grants for Africa. In this sense, the discourse of the "debt trap" is somehow part of demonizing China's foreign aid. are also some African voices that praise China's existence in Africa, suggesting that infrastructure projects and the commercial vision of China will contribute to Africa (Moyo 2009). Indeed, Huang and Ren (2012) assert that China's aid flows can develop African countries, and might serve them via need-based considerations, regardless of any political or economic conditionality. Following the literature, this dissertation refrains from using a Manichean discourse to label China's financial flows, as empirical findings do not support such a demarcation line between China and other donors.

Table 2.4 Economic and Political Dynamics of China's Foreign Aid

Characteristics of China's Foreign Aid	
Economic/Commercial	Political
-Variation in grant and loan-based flows	-Taiwan's Recognition
-Debt trap and financial dependency	-Creating new military domination in Africa
-Commercial Loans	High level FOCAC meetings and signaling alliances
-Export-Oriented Flows	-Decreasing flows to UNSC members
-Chinese worker colonies	-Pressing leaders for more commercial and political concessions
-Establishing new trade routes	

Although there are many negative comments against China in the existing literature, the number of studies that approach such studies cautiously increased with

the release of the Chinese data. For example, Dreher and Fuchs (2011) point out that although China's foreign aid might be politically motivated, this situation is not different from that of Western donors. Moreover, Chinese foreign aid is not economically related to the natural resources, the wealth of the recipient countries, or the weakness of their institutional governance mechanisms. Moreover, when we look at the studies on whether the Chinese state's aid motivation is interest or need-oriented, it shows that China's financial flows are positively related to the economic development of the recipient countries in the short run and that China's foreign aid does not undermine the aid effectiveness of Western donors (Dreher et al. 2021).

For need-based concerns, governance indicators such as democracy and corruption has also been a part of the debate. Some scholars defended the idea that China's existence as a foreign aid donor would undermine democracy and control of corruption (Brazys, Elkink, and Kelly 2017; Isaksson and Kotsadam 2018; Kersting and Kilby 2014). Actually, there is still not robust empirical findings showing that China supports authoritarian governments and fuels corruption (Bader 2015; Blair and Roessler 2018). My dissertation also targets to analyze the relation between good governance indicators and non-traditional foreign aid flows. I also add Turkiye, the UAE alongside with China to see the variation among non-traditional donors.

China's debt cancellation, restructuring, and contribution to economic growth are actually important to show its focus on the urgent needs of recipient countries. In other words, it is possible to see both interest-oriented and need-oriented behaviors of China's foreign flows. Lastly, some scholars focus on many systemic aspects of China's foreign aid flows. In this regard, the Taiwan issue, trade alliances, and any military issue becomes a significant part of China's aid debate. Henderson and Reilly (2003) interpret China's foreign aid flows to Oceania target the competition with the United States and Taiwan, taking advantage of Western conditionalities. From a different angle, these aid activities might be an example of soft-balancing, as China did not respond to the systemic changes militarily but used its economic and diplomatic power to establish new alliances (Lanteigne 2012). However, there is still a gap in the literature on one significant issue. How will China's foreign aid behavior change if OECD-DAC member states or Western multilateral institutions impose sanctions on recipient states? Up to this point, the literature focuses on the historical milestones of China's foreign and its main determinants; however, China's reaction to OECD-DAC countries' bilateral/multilateral aid and aid suspensions is still unknown. This issue is important because we can follow the footprints of geopolitical competition between China and OECD-DAC donors by looking at how the Chinese respond to Western donors.

2.2.2 Turkiye

Two very important systemic factors historically determined Turkiye's foreign aid behavior. One of them is the fall of the Warsaw Pact in 1991. The disintegration of the USSR is the first systemic event that Turkiye saw as a chance to penetrate Central Asian Turkic countries. Therefore, foreign aid policy at that time was a part of broader changes in the international system. The establishment of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) coincided with these geopolitical changes. During that period, political and economic interests shaped Turkiye's foreign initial foreign aid policy (Fidan and Nurdun 2008).

The second systemic event is the Arab Spring. Turkiye has politically supported mass movements and tried to consolidate its influence over new regimes in North Africa and the Middle East (Altunişik 2014). At the same time, it provided significant foreign aid to countries where the regional status quo was hit, especially Egypt and Syria. A very important part of Turkiye's foreign aid still goes to Syria. In these regional conflicts, Turkiye clashed with countries such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, which did not support the mass movements in any way and saw them as a threat to themselves. It is still possible to trace the effects of this process today. Therefore, Turkiye's foreign aid policy is a reflection of its general foreign policy goals, during and after the Arab Spring.

Turkiye is a member of NATO and the OECD, and these characteristics set Turkiye apart from other non-traditional donors such as China and the UAE. However, it does not mean that Turkiye harmonizes its foreign aid in line with the Western foreign aid initiatives. Although Turkiye is a member of the OECD, it is not a DAC member. Therefore, Turkiye does not have to bind itself to all the responsibilities of being a DAC member. However, Turkiye has become more aligned with the OECD standards as it reports its foreign aid data to the OECD, and Turkiye also diversifies its foreign aid across different regions and countries. These two factors are significant and also a sign of policy harmonization.

Domestic-foreign linkage perspectives in the literature occupy a significant place in the literature, focusing on ideological variation among different governments. In this sense, the ruling party, namely Justice and Development Party (AKP) reflects ideological-religious changes in Turkiye's foreign disbursements, and Muslim countries became more visible in Turkiye's foreign aid landscape (Kavakli 2018). Some other domestic-driven accounts also suggest that ethnic, religious, and historical ties are key factors in understanding Turkiye's foreign aid behavior under the rule of the conservative AKP (Zengin and Korkmaz 2019). From a different perspective,

some scholars analyzed Islamic humanitarian organizations as a significant factor in determining Turkiye's humanitarian diplomacy (Çelik and İşeri 2016). Turkiye has many non-governmental organizations as a part of its foreign aid policy (Çelik and İşeri 2016). Its humanitarian diplomacy also favors NGOs' activism globally (İpek and Biltekin 2013). However, these NGOs have close ties with the government, and also they have the power to set the agenda of the government, meaning that the relationship between the state and NGOs is not dyadic; instead, they reinforce each other (Turhan and Bahçecik 2021).

The existing literature on Turkiye's foreign aid behavior mainly focuses on domestic-driven explanations. However, we propose that Turkiye's foreign aid behavior is also a consequence of systemic changes in the region. We can see that the establishment of Turkiye's centralized foreign aid initiative, namely the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) came after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. After Central Asian Turkic countries and Balkan countries became sovereign actors, Turkiye unleashed its support for these Central Asian and Balkan countries. Turkic countries were the primary recipients' of Turkish foreign aid after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in 1991; Muslim-Turkic and Balkan countries also became significant recipients of Turkish foreign assistance (Ozkan 2016). However, sub-Saharan countries increased their visibility in Turkiye's foreign aid infrastructure (Ozkan 2016). The literature on Turkiye's foreign aid to sub-Saharan Africa has been increasing specifically after its Africa opening in 2011.

This dissertation also reinforces the findings that -as we saw in the collapse of the Soviet Union- the second systemic change that shaped Turkiye's foreign aid policy was the Arab Spring (Altunişik 2014). As former dynasties and authoritarian regimes collapsed, Turkiye used the opportunity to influence emerging governments in the region and increased its foreign to these regimes. Indeed, Turkiye's strategy to support post-Arab Spring regimes failed; however, this case shows how geopolitical changes and power struggle shape donor behavior. Although Turkiye's foreign aid policy is very regular and consistent regarding its foreign aid flows to its historical-political influence, sharp changes in its foreign policy are also discernible. Sometimes external changes such as Arab Spring affects Turkiye's aid behavior(Altunişik 2014).

These two are missing points in Turkiye's foreign aid literature. The first one -even if there are some remarks in the literature- is related to describing systemic factors that shape Turkiye's foreign aid flows. The second one concerns how Turkiye adjusts its foreign flows in response to regional rivals. These two points are significant to capture how Turkiye shapes its foreign aid policy, based on its geopolitical interests. These are the main missing point in Turkiye's foreign aid literature.

2.2.3 United Arab Emirates

The literature on UAE aid is scarce, and there are very few studies that show the determinants of UAE aid. In this part, I provide a literature on the UAE's foreign aid and detect missing points that this dissertation articulates. I also give a short historical account of the UAE aid, then explain how power politics determine the new inclinations in its foreign aid policies.

The UAE's foreign aid is not a novel political phenomenon; instead, it has a history beginning in the 1970s. However, it is essential that the UAE's early foreign aid policy was a part of broader geopolitical conditions in the MENA, associated with OPEC's success during the 1970s. The UAE's initial foreign aid policy was a product of Arab countries' cooperation, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar. Also, the UAE's geopolitical concerns regarding the OPEC crises and Israel were discernible. Today, these historical geopolitical concerns are not valid anymore. The UAE does not politically antagonize Israel, and there is significant divergence among Arab donors in terms of their attitude to the geopolitical changes in the region. Qatar blockage and the Arap Spring are examples showing not only political divergences but also its spillovers on their foreign aid policies.

Table 2.5 Economic and Political Dynamics of the UAE's Foreign Aid

Characteristics of the UAE's Foreign Aid	
Economic/Commercial	Political
-OPEC Cooperation during the 1970s -Wealth Fund and Foreign Direct Investments -Energy Exports -Export-Oriented Flows	-Gulf Cooperation against Israel during the 1970s -Power Contestation in MENA and Africa The Arab Spring -Aid as a tool for gaining support from the recipients.

The initial analysis of Arab countries' foreign aid shows that the leading providers were Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Arab countries such as Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Somalia, Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, and the Yemen Arab Republic were the primary recipients of Arab countries' foreign aid between 1973 and 1989 (Van den Boogaerde 1991).

The UAE's net disbursements had been higher than the OECD-DAC standard as a share of its GNP. To illustrate, in 1973, the UAE allocated 12 percent of its GNP as foreign aid, which is a great amount when compared to traditional donors(Van den Boogaerde 1991). Historically, among non-traditional donors, Arab countries were

always among top countries as share of their Gross National Income (Nielson, Powers, and Tierney 2009; Shushan and Marcoux 2011). However, the UAE decreased its foreign aid as oil prices went down at the end of the 1970s (Van den Boogaerde 1991). Therefore, geopolitical factors and external price shocks also determined the UAE's foreign aid capabilities. Some scholars claimed that Arab aid prioritized recipients' economic needs in this landscape, estimating Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries' foreign aid flows (Al-Humaidi 1984). Indeed, statistical analysis demonstrated that Arab countries' foreign aid was strongly associated with ethnoreligious ties compared to other factors . In the following part, I explore also and check how UAE's current foreign aid behavior and humanitarian diplomacy are similar to or different from its historical orientations. Saudi Arabia and the UAE initiated their foreign aid programs to collaborate in the Gulf Cooperation Council during the 1970s (Al-Mezaini 2017). At that time, the UAE's religious and cultural inclinations were visible in its foreign aid policies(Villanger 2007). Amid the Palestinian conflict and OPEC crises, Islamic tendencies and rising Arab nationalism were the loci of GCC's collaboration (Al-Mezaini 2017). It can be said that ideational factors played a significant role in the early history of the UAE's foreign aid. However, this tendency started to change as the UAE became a global donor.

However, these historical inclinations changed dramatically. UAE tried to change its vision that dominated by Arab and Islamic cooperation, and this was a result of changing global and regional dynamics (Ulrichsen 2016). First, the Arab countries have not cooperated recently as we see in history. The Arab Spring played a significant role in intensifying conflicts within the Arab World (Bianco and Stansfield 2018). Second, their economies are much more persistent regarding exogenous economic shocks. Third, changing geopolitical dynamics bring the UAE and other Gulf countries to the point that they can no longer antagonize Israel and Western World. Such inclinations were sharply visible during and after the Arab Spring; the event shook the MENA as status quo powers such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia felt threatened by these changes.

The UAE's ideational and geopolitical orientation changed during the 2000s. The UAE's recent foreign aid behavior oscillates between global and regional factors. Globally, specifically, the UAE began to re-calibrate itself to the new dynamics of international development. In 2016, it announced a ten-year plan for international development. Emphasizing Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), women's protection, and global peace were the underlined topics, and it increased its foreign substantially during the 2000s. Today, the UAE's foreign aid is diversified across many regions and recipients. Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD) is the leading foreign aid initiative in the UAE since 1974, and it still protects its place

in the country's foreign aid mission. In addition to ADFD, many non-governmental organizations support the UAE's foreign aid initiatives, such as UAE red crescent.

Apart from global developments in the UAE's foreign aid behavior, acute regional crises affect its foreign aid behavior. Recently, the UAE responded to regional crises including Libya, Syria, Somalia, and other conflict-affected settings. The Arab Spring was the main regional challenge for the UAE's existential concerns. This dissertation proposes that the missing element is the geopolitical context of the UAE aid. As the Arab Spring erupted, the status quo in the MENA collapsed, and each state tried to orient itself to the emerging regimes. The Arab Spring has an immense effect on the UAE's foreign aid policy and humanitarian diplomacy regarding its foreign aid volume and strategy. While Turkiye supported popular movements during the Arab Spring, the UAE felt threatened as these popular movements showed a close relationship with Qatar and Turkiye. The existing literature explains the UAE's foreign aid history to some extent; however, contemporary inclinations of the UAE's international development policy are still unexplored. In the following empirical parts, first I explicate the main determinants of the UAE's foreign aid, showing how it responds to Western conditionalities. Then, I show how geopolitical competition between Turkiye and the UAE determined their foreign aid allocation for specific geostrategic countries. Below, I provide a list of geopolitical and economic issues that shape China, Turkiye and the UAE's foreign aid behavior.

2.3 Dissertation's Contribution to the Literature

My dissertation contributes to the literature both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically and empirically, there are still significant gaps in the literature on non-traditional donors' main motivations. I follow the footprints of interest and need-based literature and investigate how donor competition shapes their foreign aid behavior. The existing literature still has weaknesses regarding demonstrating donor competition. In other words, we still do not empirically corroborate that there is competition between traditional and non-traditional donors. Secondly, we still don't have enough sources to predict competition among non-traditional donors. Although I use DAC and non-DAC classification as an analytical and conceptual tool to deal with the categorization of non-traditional donors, I suggest the idea that competition also occurs between non-traditional donors. Thirdly, I contribute to the literature by showing there is not a substantial difference between major traditional and non-traditional donors in terms of serving recipient needs. Consequently, my

Table 2.6 A Comparison of Three Non-Traditional Donors' Foreign Aid Behavior

Country List		
China	Turkiye	The UAE
-China's struggle against the Soviet Union, and supporting liberation movements	-A direct response to the geopolitical changes after the Cold War (Balkans and Central Asia) (Fidan and Nurdun 2008).	-A part of coalition durng the 1970s against Israel. ((Neumayer 2003; Van den Boogaerde 1991; Villanger 2007).
-Change the distribution of power in the international system during 2000s.	-Interventionist actor during the Arab Spring, and its subsequent foreign aid policy (Aydın-Düzgit 2020).	-OPEC Cooperation
-Competition with Taiwan ((Brautigam 2011*b*; Dreher et al. 2018)	-Interventionist actor during the Arab Spring, and its subsequent foreign aid policy (Aydın-Düzgit 2020).	-Fragmentation in the Gulf after the Arab Spring, looking for suppoer against Qatar
-Trade Power, Investment-Aid Nexus (Power, Mohan, and Tan-Mullins 2012).	-Military and security interventions in Africa (Somalia, Libya)	-Military and Security Interventions in Africa (Somalia, Mali, Libya
-Uyghur Problem: Miltiary Aid and Deportations	-Development cooperation as a visible trend: Volume, geographical diversification ((Cihangir-Tetik and Müftüler-Baç 2018)	-Started to use direct budget support for Sudan, Mali, which makes around 1 Billion Dollars.

contribution has three different angles and each of them uncovers the missing points in the literature.

Empirically, I demonstrate how non-traditional donors respond to the existence of Western donors, and show whether there is a variation among non-traditional donors to react against Western conditionalities. Kilama (2016) suggests that traditional donors follow their economic and political interests, and the rise of China as an alternative donor affects the foreign aid behavior of traditional donors. Moreover, Trumbull and Wall (1994) suggest that donor responds to each other behavior. In this work, I look into how and to what extent non-traditional donors react against traditional donors' foreign aid behavior and conditionalities. Since geopolitical competition does not take place only between traditional and non-traditional donors, non-traditional donors are not a block of countries encountering Western powers. Therefore, I also inquire whether non-traditional donors adjust their foreign aid behavior to the existence of other non-traditional donors, explaining divergent interests

affect their foreign aid allocations. Moreover, my research investigates whether there is a variation among traditional and non-traditional donors. This extensive empirical inquiry makes my work one of the most comprehensive analyses of non-traditional donors. However, many of my findings are striking and novel in the literature, extracting a great deal of knowledge using quantitative methods. However, these findings build on a theoretical basis, by which we generated our testable thesis and sub-hypotheses. I employ a system-level interest-based theorizing, which falls into the boundaries of neorealism. I mainly hypothesize that non-traditional donors' foreign aid behavior mainly shaped by power relations, using their foreign aid mechanism for their own economic and political interests. Therefore, my dissertation strengthens system-level interest-based literature.

The literature is based on interest and need-based arguments, there is still a space regarding NTDs' aid behavior in response to geopolitical trends. The question "Why do NTDs provide foreign aid?" needs to be elaborated via interest-based and need-based explanations. This dissertation answers this question by appealing to donor competition in a geopolitical setting. The existing works are still insufficient to show how donors respond to each other's aid movements. For example, it is often claimed that the Chinese state has undermined Western donors' conditional aid policies Naim (2007). But many of these works do not offer a robust empirical insight. We explain NTDs' foreign aid behavior in response to both DAC donors' existence and their conditionalities.

Second, we focus on the systemic level when explaining donor competition and collaboration, which entails strong empirical research on regional variation. Without a comprehensive regional variation, how can we know that non-traditional donors prioritize specific locations for economic and political interests? Interest-based attitude at the systemic level implies that alliances, distribution of capabilities, and anarchy are significant determinants of donor competition. Throughout this dissertation, we use the concept of power as part of the relational power approach, meaning to what extent a country can alter other actors' behavior (Baldwin 2013). Within the scope of foreign aid scholarship, we can adjust this relational power approach to many concrete instances. For instance, China has the power to change recipients' attitudes towards Taiwan's recognition by using its foreign aid flows (grants and concessional loans)(Brautigam 2011*b*). This is an instance of relational power theory. Instead of measuring China's military, economic and domestic resources, we just look into to what extent China or any non-traditional donors influence other countries. Therefore, when I use "power struggle" or "power contestation", it should be understood in relative and relational and relative terms. The same logic is also valid for Turkiye and the UAE, by taking policy concessions from Somalia and other countries, where

they are leading actors. However, we should note that the relational power approach is a part of a grand debate in social sciences, not only in political science or international relations. Therefore, we limit the concept of power as Waltz underlined. Power is related to the distribution of capabilities, which might be economic and military (Waltz 1979). Therefore, this dissertation amends relational power theory with systemic offerings within the scope of neorealism.

My contribution to the literature is also related to regional analysis. Although this dissertation mainly focuses on Africa, our empirical research covers all the regions, which provides a great comparative strength to test our hypotheses for different regions. There is still no substantial work on the regional analysis of how China, Turkiye, and the UAE respond to the Western foreign aid and aid suspensions. Actually, many of them were opinions. In the empirical sections, we first explore how China, Turkiye, and the UAE have responded to the conditionality policies of Western states regionally.

The literature on China's foreign aid behavior concerns aid-development nexus, its financial flows, and data-driven problems, but there is not any systemic work focusing on how China responds to foreign aid behavior of traditional donors. Second, this study assesses the UAE's foreign aid behavior in detail, by which we contribute scarce literature. Third, the literature on Turkiye's foreign aid behavior is mostly related to ideational factors including religion and ideational elements of its NGO activism. However, we directly put Turkiye's foreign aid behavior into the context of geopolitical power struggles. Lastly, we provide a comparative understanding of China, Turkiye, and the UAE's foreign aid behavior. This is also the first endeavor that employs such a vast research agenda.

Donors respond to the existence of other donors (Trumbull and Wall 1994). One modality of donor competition is related to export. For example, if export competition is high among donors, they are less coordinating their foreign aid (Fuchs, Nunnenkamp, and Öhler 2015). Moreover, herding or donor concentration is another aspect of donor competition. Recipients' economic and political potential can lead to more donor concentration. However, the economic sphere of donor contestation occurs not only among traditional donors, instead, but the emergence among non-traditional donors also occupies a significant place in Africa and other regions. This trend creates a contestation in Africa, where aid-dependency is prevalent. African countries also have a great experience to deal with multiple donors. They have been aware of donor contestation for more policy concessions from African governments and try to maximize their benefit as much as they can. Therefore, new donors have a useful chance to maximize unearned revenue from different donors. Hernandez

(2017) shows how World Bank decreases foreign aid conditionalities if China has a high level of economic and aid engagement with African countries.

Africa has always been a contestation field of different donors. The anti-communist environment of the Cold War, 1990s democracy promotion, and MDG-oriented development support are all external pressures in Africa (Horning 2008). However, recently, the main external dynamic -regarding foreign aid- is the emergence of a new donor landscape. In this work, I specifically show how new donors create a more competitive donor environment.

For example, when DAC countries cut aid to an aid recipient in Africa, does the Chinese government increase or decrease its grant-weighted aid in the next year for sanctioned countries? This is important because while Western states want to align the recipient countries by appealing to their conditionality policies, on the other hand, NTDs' aid may undermine these conditionalities. In this sense, NTDs become an alternative and secure option for the recipient governments. For example, after Europe suspends aid to a specific country, the Chinese state might build a port with a huge grant-included loan. In Africa, many countries may not resist such concessional financing, especially countries with high macroeconomic instability. At this point, the geopolitics of foreign aid comes into play. The answer to the question of why a significant part of foreign aid projects goes to Africa may be here because it is very natural to direct aid to countries where you can make more concessions.

On the other hand. States such as China, Turkiye, and the UAE may not respond to the conditionality policies of the West in the same way. This is because China has much larger resources than Turkiye and the UAE. What is valid for China may not be valid for Turkiye and UAE. Indeed, the geopolitics of foreign aid works differently for the UAE and Turkiye, as these states go into contestation regionally, especially after the Arab Spring. Moreover, their foreign aid policies were also affected by this trend. We can assume that Turkiye and the UAE are giving more aid to Muslim states, but the main point may not be religion or cultural proximity. Instead some Muslim recipients such as Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia and Somalia have become a new hub of power contestation across different regional players including Turkiye and the UAE. Therefore, as a new contribution to the literature, I suggest the idea that cultural proximity might a useful tool to empower geopolitical interests.

As a result, this dissertation explains the geopolitics of foreign aid through research that has not been done before. I hypothesize that geopolitical interests shape non-traditional donors' foreign aid behavior. Therefore, our research targets a systemic level with an interest-based outlook. This is the part that we contribute to the literature. We explain the foreign aid behavior of NTDs by appealing to other

donors' existence and behavior in a recipient country. Firstly, this research shows how NTDs' respond to bilateral and multilateral Western foreign aid and its conditionalities. On the other hand, this study also shows how NTDs respond to rival donors' existence in the recipients. Moreover, I highlight that there is not a substantial variation between traditional and non-traditional donors in terms of targeting recipient-need. We fill this gap in the literature, based on these points.

Our main concentration is at the system-level, namely, we locate NTDs' foreign aid behavior in the system-level literature, which generally analyzes foreign aid through geopolitics, balancing, and the political economy of international trade. However, in the empirical part, we also use some variables -generated from state-level literature- such as democracy and governance score, and religion as control variables. There are no main independent variables, but they are control variables showing if our main findings change., our main variables are taken from the interest-based system level strand in the foreign aid scholarship. But such variables are used to capture the tension between interest-based and need-based motivations of donor countries, not for dwelling on domestic politics.

Our main indicator for aid is official development assistance (ODA). We adopt the OECD standard of ODA definition. ODA flows are provided by bilateral and multilateral donors, including grants and concessional loans. Each income group has a different percent of grant element vis a vis concessional loans . Turkiye and the UAE regularly report their ODA flows to the OECD-creditor reporting system. Indeed, they are not part of the OECD-DAC. However, China does not report to the OECD as a non-traditional donor. We take all China's aid data from AidData's Chinese Global Finance Dataset (Custer et al. 2021).

3. HYPOTHESIS AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY

3.1 Hypotheses

Our main thesis is that international/system level factors shape non-traditional donors foreign aid behavior, and they provide foreign aid for their own economic and political interests. However, to measure political and economic factors, empirical chapters need to employ different sub-hypotheses regarding economic and political interests. In the following part, I provide these sub-hypotheses.

H1. Non-traditional donors provide more foreign aid if DAC donors provide more.

H2. Non-traditional donors provide more foreign aid in response to other non-traditional donors' existence.

If there is a dominant donor in any recipient environment, then such donors get more policy concession from the recipient. In such a setting, policy concessions become less costly for donors because there is no alternative source of funding for the recipients. On the other hand, if the number of donors is high, and there is not any dominant donor in a recipient environment, policy concessions become more costly because recipients have alternative funding choices (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2016). A competitive donor environment compels rival donors to provide more foreign aid. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2016) tested this for the Cold War time for the United States and the Soviets. Recently, the rise of non-traditional donors has been debated throughout the literature, and the competition between traditional and non-traditional donors can lead to the same trend. This is what I hypothesize to visualize donor competition. China, Turkiye, and the UAE are significant non-traditional donors, encountering traditional donors in many regions, specifically Africa. If we propose that geopolitical competition shapes donor behavior, then there should be an empirical case for this. Therefore, I propose that donor adjust their foreign aid

behavior to other donors if there is a political or economic competition between them. To visualize this tendency, I used seven DAC donors' foreign aid flows, including United States, Germany, Japan, France, United Kingdom, Sweden and Netherlands. This provides a more direct measure of donor competition, since these countries are also export powers in Africa and other countries.

However, this is not only related to competition between traditional and non-traditional donors, I also apply the same hypothesis to the competition among non-DAC donors. To illustrate, Turkiye expands its global and regional outreach via foreign aid, and its commercial and political interests might play a significant role in achieving certain foreign policy goals. Indeed, this policy might encounter other donors such as the United Arab Emirates, a regional antagonist after the Arab Spring. In other words, both Turkiye and the UAE use their foreign aid flows to take some policy concessions from Somalia. Protecting political and economic partnerships, and trade/security concerns in the Horn of Africa were the main donor concerns. Moreover, such geopolitical indicators might change for different regions. Therefore, rival donors might adjust their foreign to the existence of other donors.

H3. Non-traditional donors provide more foreign aid if DAC donors impose conditionalities.

Non-traditional donors challenge the existing development policy, either taking advantage of traditional donors' political conditionalities or increasing their development aid volume where the traditional donors are dominant. The former measures how non-traditional donors respond to the bilateral and multilateral budget suspensions. Multilateral suspensions, including the EU and World Bank sanctions, are also a matter of how non-traditional donors act against and replace traditional donors. This thesis measures China, Turkiye, and the UAE's response to the Western donors' foreign aid. While budget support becomes a significant aid modality as a consequence of the Paris Declaration, it brings budget suspensions as an important type of conditionality. I use the "Budget Suspension" variable to measure and follow to what extent NTDs respond to aid conditionalities. I code "1" if the OECD-DAC countries suspend their budget support for a given year, and "0" if there is no suspension. African countries are the main subjects for budget suspension since their political and economic corruption is often targeted by Western donors. In such an environment, non-traditional donors might be useful options for recipients. In this way, the non-DAC donor can take the advantage of Western conditionalities. Budget suspension data is recorded by Molenaers, Gagiano, and Smets (2016), which includes recipients, years, and modalities of suspensions. For instance, bilateral and multilateral DAC donors might target a recipient and cut the budget support for

political reasons such as violating free and fair elections and gender oppression. On the other hand, sanctions might be related to macroeconomic indicators such as not paying debts to IMF. However, this topic becomes more interesting when Hernandez (2017) suggests that World Bank offers fewer conditionalities for countries that have more aid engagement with China. For this hypothesis, I test how non-DAC countries respond to DAC countries' conditionalities.

H4. Non-traditional donors provide more foreign aid to their export partners.

Export partnership and foreign aid are essential issues since donors challenge each other for their own commercial interests. Exports constitute a significant portion of such donor competition. When it comes to traditional donors, the biggest foreign aid donors compete with each other for export markets (Barthel et al. 2014). Fuchs, Nunnenkamp, and Öhler (2015) suggest that donors do not coordinate regarding foreign aid flows because trade interests prevent donors from cooperation. However, the economic struggle between traditional and non-traditional donors is also an important issue to understand the trade-aid nexus (Kilama 2016). Turkiye is increasing its exports to the developing world. The UAE is a notable oil exporter and an investor country, playing a significant role around the globe. China is a trade power, and its engagement with the developing world expands through concessional loans, financial flows, and huge infrastructure projects. For all non-traditional and traditional donors, foreign aid might generate and ignite more exports to the recipient countries. All three non-traditional donors have their interests to use foreign aid as a source of inducing trade partnerships.

H5. Non-traditional donors provide less foreign aid if the recipients have a more trade engagement with traditional donors.

On the other hand, non-traditional donors also compete with each other. Export markets sometimes are sources of divergences and fragmentation. All three non-traditional donors have their trade interests, not only against traditional donors, but also they might respond to each other. Since they look for export markets, they are most likely to be trade partners with countries where they might sell more than other actors sell. Therefore, exclusionary export markets might be a reality in new geo-economic arena.

H6. Non-traditional donors provide more foreign aid to politically aligned countries.

This dissertation is important to test Walt's theory of foreign aid (Walt 1985). Based on Walt's balance of threat theory, we expect that China should give more

foreign aid to the countries where it already has some policy concessions. In other words, foreign aid may not create new alliances, but it can reinforce the existing political partnerships. For China, Taiwan's recognition is a vital signal of having good relations with the recipient. This is a specific case for China's political survival concerns. From another perspective, one of the essential indicators of political alignment is the UN Voting Similarity. Wang (1999) finds that US provides more foreign aid to the recipients that have high voting similarity with the US. If these UN issues are significant for the US' interests, then recipients with more UN-Voting similarity with the US receive more foreign aid. We can apply this findings to different cases of non-traditional donors. If a country has a high level of voting similarity with China, Turkiye, or the UAE, then it means we should expect that these donors more likely give foreign aid to like-minded and friendly countries. Indeed, this dissertation checks how non-traditional donors provide foreign aid if recipients have political engagement with Western donors. Even if recipients' UN voting similarity with China might be negligible, we should investigate whether recipients' voting similarity with the US is a significant factor for NTDs. This is significant because it can model the geopolitics of foreign aid, based on the political alignments in the UN.

H7. Religious and cultural affinity is a significant element of non-traditional donors' foreign aid behavior.

Alesina and Dollar (2000) find no significant relationship between religion and foreign aid. However, this dissertation investigates whether non-traditional donors provide foreign aid for any religious factors. Each donor has a different cultural-religious perspective shaping their foreign aid behavior. This issue becomes salient for Turkiye and the UAE, since their main recipients are Muslim, and they manifest a regional rivalry related to Muslim countries. Kavakli (2018) and Zengin and Korkmaz (2019) find that religion is a significant factor in Turkiye's foreign aid flows. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the establishment of TIKA, Turkiye provided an extensive amount of foreign aid to Turkic peoples in central Asia and Muslim countries in the Balkans. Indeed, an Islamization of its foreign aid operations is also visible. Therefore, cultural affinity is a useful thesis to measure. Religion issue is also significant for China, as it has a problem with its own Muslim ethnicity, namely Uyghurs (Shichor 2005). Islamic radicalism is prevalent among Uyghurs who live outside of China. The existence of China's radical Islamists abroad might shape China's motivation to provide foreign aid. Arab countries have been the most generous donors globally in terms of their allocated aid share as a percent of gross national income. However, religious proximity and OPEC cooperation shaped their foreign aid behavior under the leadership of Saudi Arabia between

1974 and 1994 (Villanger 2007). The UAE attached itself to the needs of Arab cooperation, based on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). One of the most significant geopolitical conflicts was related to the escalation between Israel and Palestine. The Gulf cooperation and the UAE directed their foreign aid flows against Israel, the main antagonist of Arab cooperation at that time (Van den Boogaerde 1991). The Arab Spring triggered survival instinct among Gulf countries since many authoritarian regimes in the MENA faced popular movements, which are mostly related to Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Muslim majority regimes became a theatre of power politics among Turkiye, the UAE, and Iran since they tried to increase their leverage in newly established governments. Therefore, the effect of religion on three non-traditional donors is political, instead of cultural. This dissertation shows how donors use religion as a political tool.

H8. The existence of a rival donor moderates the effect of religion, when the geopolitical struggle is intense.

It is also significant that not only the amount of foreign aid correlates with the existence of a rival donor in the recipient country, but religious factors might also become less critical when geopolitical competition plays a decisive role. To explore this possible factor, we utilize a regression analysis for before-and-after trends regarding the Arab Spring, and two different cases in assessing different motivations for Turkish foreign aid to Muslim countries. Our case studies demonstrate how geopolitical interests have priority over religious affinity, even when Turkiye provides a substantial amount of foreign aid to Muslim countries generally. Although ethnic-religious similarity is an essential component of Turkish aid allocation, Muslim-majority recipients who have a high-level aid engagement with a rival donor end up getting less Turkish ODA. This thesis does not claim that Turkiye's foreign aid engagement with Muslim countries has declined; instead, it points out the need that one has to check the presence of rival donors in Muslim countries. That is because Turkiye's foreign aid distribution is impacted by its competition with rival donors such UAE, attesting to the critical role played by geopolitics, rather than religious affinity.

H9. Non-Traditional donors provide more foreign aid to countries with acute poverty.

This hypothesis targets to test recipient-need thesis. For instance, Martorano, Metzger, and Sanfilippo (2020) finds that China's foreign aid flows have a positive association with lower infant mortality rate and higher education quality. Yuan (2020) suggests that China can help to improve recipients' human development index. In this work, I test these hypotheses by using infant mortality rate and GDP Per Capita.

H10. Non-Traditional donors provide more foreign aid to authoritarian or corrupted governments.

The issue of democracy and foreign aid is one of the most controversial topics in the literature. However, I focus on the part of NTDs' influence on good governance indicators, which are within the scope of my dissertation. For example, findings about China are also controversial, and a discussion is going on about China's stance towards autocratic regimes. Actually, there are no credible empirical indicators of China's support for authoritarian governments (Bader 2015).In addition, there is no sound empirical evidence that China's aid helps to decrease citizens' trust in democracy (Blair and Roessler 2018). There are also studies suggesting that Chinese aid can harm democracies, and some research suggests that China's aid can increase local corruption(Brazys, Elkink, and Kelly 2017; Kersting and Kilby 2014). In this respect, it is important to test this whole situation. but one of the main contributions we make here is that we include Turkiye, the UAE and China into the equation together.

3.2 Empirical Strategy

In the following chapters, we adopt a three-step empirical strategy. In the next chapter, we show how power politics and systemic factors during the Cold War shaped countries" and multilateral institutions' foreign aid behavior. This point is significant because traditional donors are the consequence of systemic factors during the Cold War. This part mainly includes descriptive statistics and historical milestones of global foreign aid initiatives. Secondly, we provide a description of China, Turkiye's, and the UAE's foreign aid flows, again based on descriptive statistics. Thirdly, we use inferential statistics to show how donors respond to the other donors' existence in the recipient countries. Inferential statistics is the main locus of our research to test our hypotheses. We use four different regression frameworks to test our main and sub-hypotheses. First, I separately measure each country's foreign aid flows based on the existence of rival donors. Second, I use a regression model with a new budget suspension variable, as an extension of the first model. Then, I use a similar model, measuring how non-traditional donors respond to other non-traditional donors' foreign aid and trade volumes. Lastly, I add different models to measure the variation between traditional and non-traditional donors. All these models target to measure how economic and political interests shape donor

behavior, concerning the existence of other donors. In this way, I reach a confident theoretical level that explains donor behavior through a system-level interest-based outlook.

The theoretical framework of this dissertation has a significant influence on its methodology. Our theoretical matrix defines significant elements of our methodological approach. Our methodology also defines how we test our hypotheses generated from our theoretical framework. For instance, we clearly distinguish system-level and system-level variables, following our theoretical construct. I use both descriptive and inferential statistics to test our hypotheses and to test our main hypotheses. Descriptive statistics provide general trends in time, including data visualizations, and do not deal with statistical correlations or associations between different variables. For instance, non-traditional donors' total aid flows by year, NTDs' aid share in their gross national product, their top aid recipients, income-group diversification, and regional distribution of foreign aid are all constituting significant elements of descriptive statistics. We also visualize how dominant powers' foreign aid flows as a share of GNI are related to their economic power vis a vis other countries. This is just a snapshot of what is existing in time, and how power relations shape a country's economic commitment as a donor. The next chapters manifest an extensive use of descriptive statistics. However, the description provides general tendencies, and they do not aim to gather information to answer our main research question. I employ regression analysis to capture what determines the foreign aid behavior of non-traditional donors. My main regression model is a pooled time series regression. In the online appendix, I provide the same models with year-fixed effects. All the variables are coming from what the literature and our theoretical framework suggest. Below, I provide system-level and state-level variables.

As mentioned above, I adopt a system-level and interest-based approach, hypothesizing that rival donors' existence is a significant factor in NTDs' aid allocation. Second, NTDs try to take the advantage of Western conditionalities. Third, not all NTDs' respond to rival donors and Western conditionalities in the same way. All these hypotheses entail system-level variables to analyze. However, we also add state-level variables to control systemic tendencies. Most of these variables are suggested by the existing literature. Initially, we employ separate empirical sections for each donor to detect general tendencies and determinants of their foreign aid. Then, we bring each three donors together for comparison with the same variables. Lastly, we focus on Turkiye's and the UAE's regional power struggle with each other. Our main dependent variable is the log of donors' foreign aid flows. Research design and data are provided in the data section in the empirical part.

4. THE GEOPOLITICS OF TRADITIONAL AND NON-TRADITIONAL DONORS

As summarized from the literature above, traditional and non-traditional donors seek for their geopolitical and economic interests. However, we need to depict how states used foreign aid in response to systemic changes. When we follow the footprints of such behavior, it will be easier for us to understand historical demarcation lines between traditional and non-traditional donors. Moreover, we show how geopolitical interests shape foreign aid policies.

4.1 What Makes OECD-DAC Donors Traditional?

This dissertation only uses the standard of Official Development Assistance (ODA), as developed by OECD-DAC. We define financial flows as ODA, if it is concessional, given by an official agency that intends to contribute to recipient development[1]. Military and other modalities of foreign aid do not account for development assistance. However, the standard definition of ODA is adopted in 1969, the time that Cold War concerns were salient. Therefore, this definition and standardization have a history [2].

This part aims to explain the theories above by appealing to the historical development of official development assistance provided by Western OECD-DAC donors, and their multilateral organizations. By so doing, I show how geopolitical setting shapes foreign aid policies. Initially, the formation of the OECD-Development Assistance Committee is a consequence of post-World War developments (Lairson and Skidmore 2016). In other words, global power dynamics played an essential role in

[1] "Official Development Assistance." 2021. OECD. April 2021. https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/What-is-ODA.pdf.

[2] China's foreign aid flows do not exactly follow OECD Standards. However, AidData makes an approximation to apply OECD definiton of ODA to China's foreign aid flows (Custer et al. 2021)

determining foreign aid policy. These power dynamics are related to distribution of capabilities of rising and declining powers. A rising great power is a state that begins to accelerate its military and economic capabilities visibly to other great powers (Gilpin 1988). While the War ruined Europe, The United States had become the most potent state globally regarding its military and economic capabilities.

The United States took the responsibility for reconstructing the European countries, which was one of the main problems during the post-World War period (Lairson and Skidmore 2016). Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine are well-known strategic aid examples, meaning states used foreign assistance to balance rival states' expansion during the Cold War (Lairson and Skidmore 2016). This massive aid package, money, services, and goods were consequences of the Mutual Security Act (1951), one of the pioneering steps protecting the US's national interest during the initial stage of the Cold War (Gilpin 1988). This act aimed to help the US allied countries to prevent the USSR's influence. In this sense, the strategic rationale of foreign aid was apparent. In 1961, a new Foreign Assistance Act separated economic and military aid programs. The act also gave way to establishing the United States Assistance for International Development (USAID). Simultaneously, in 1961 some of the OECD member countries established a multilateral initiative, namely the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) (Gilpin 1988). The standardization and policy harmonization were essential objectives of the DAC. The OECD-DAC committee's institutionalization is also a reflection of NATO, which provided security for the Western Hemisphere against the USSR expansion.

The early history of official development assistance was a manifestation of post-War strategic cooperation between OECD countries. These post-War alliances and configurations follow some realist accounts in two different ways. First, security challenges and the survival of the European states were the main problems after 1945 (Winham 2005). In this new post-War bipolar world, each dominant actor supported their allied countries. The United States not only economically supported its allied countries but also prevented the main rival from mobilizing its power (Leffler 1988). In this sense, foreign aid is a tool for alliance formation; Walt (1985) suggests that recipients' threat perception is a significant aspect of political and military alignments. Moreover, he also underlines those donors do not mainly use foreign to create new alliances, but they provide foreign aid to strengthen alliances. They provide more foreign aid to allied counties to guarantee more leverage and policy concessions . Within such a challenging setting, the bipolar world forced Western donors to behave in a certain way, and the global dominant actor namely the United States created a solid ground to realize its strategic goal.

Systemic realism is a useful theoretical tool to articulate trends during the Cold War[3] In this sense, domestic ideational factors or other state-level predicates become less significant than the dictates of the international system. For instance, Western donors -especially the US- supported many authoritarian countries in the developing world, Latin America and Africa not to lose ground to the Soviet Union. The primacy of geopolitics often leads to support for authoritarian regimes in Africa (Dunning 2004). Regarding the distribution of capabilities and security challenges, the bipolar post-War power configuration forced states to allocate their foreign aid not to lose ground to their rival. In this sense, strengthening alliances was the primary concern, and foreign aid policies after 1945 were a kind of application of systemic realist theories. Foreign policy was criticized for supporting an authoritarian government during the Cold War. To illustrate, the US provided a substantial amount of foreign aid to one of the most corrupted leaders in the African continent during the Cold War, namely Mobutu Sese Seko, the leader of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Arnold 2017).

For some scholars, the US should support the countries to prevent rapid economic growth and class mobilization because it might end up losing such states to the arms of the Soviet Union (Huntington 2006). In that sense, it is better to look for a degree or power of government than the government's shape or regime type. Realist thinkers' criticism opposed the norm-based inclinations that existed in the US political community. During the Cold War years, stripped from ideational and societal state-level factors, the US foreign aid to the developing world prioritized national interests.

During the Cold War, there are also some significant events and geopolitical crises reflecting power struggles among different actors. The Israel-Arab conflict was an essential event, that shaped the foreign aid policies of the OPEC countries. Figure 4.3 shows that non-DAC donors provided a great deal of foreign aid globally between 1970 and 1980. During that time, the main non-DAC donors were OPEC countries, including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar. After the 1970s, they allocated a vast amount of ODA to strengthen anti-Israeli block(Van den Boogaerde 1991). Although the Israel-Arab conflict has some cultural elements; however, there was a power struggle between Arab countries and Israel, which lead to major wars such as Yom Kippur. Between 1973 and 1983, OPEC countries' ODA flows were more than USA global ODA levels, and the amount of OPEC ODA was very close to non-USA bilateral DAC ODA. The net amount of OPEC aid was around 166

[3]In this dissertation, I use "Systemic Realism" to distinguish it from classical realism. While systemic analysis suggests that anarchy and distribution of capabilities are two major factors regarding international stability, classical realist analysis focus more states' inherent nature or instinct to maximize their power.

billion US dollars (OECD-Statistics). Figure 4.3 clearly shows this trend, showing that acute political crises might lead to sharp changes in bilateral foreign aid allocation. Therefore, bipolarity and great power politics were not the only determinants of foreign aid policies. Other countries also used foreign aid as leverage during the acute political crisis.

However, foreign aid policies in a bipolar world do not explain all developments regarding foreign aid. In this sense, the hegemonic stability theory (HST) offers a more explanatory foreign aid initiative analysis after World War II. If there had not been a powerful actor in the Western Hemisphere, would Europe have been reconstructed as we had after the War? Hegemonic stability theory is the instance of such systemic approaches that we can use to answer this question (Gilpin 1981; Kindleberger et al. 1986; Krasner 1976; Modelski 1987; Organski 1968). For instance, HST suggests a powerful state international system is stable if there is a hegemon actor (Milner 1998), who might convince or compel other countries to have a more open trade system; in turn, this hegemon state pays for the public goods for other states (Sørensen, Jackson, and Møller 2022). Moreover, a hegemon has an economic and market superiority, a comparative productive advantage compared to other states (Keohane 1984). In this sense, low tariffs are also an essential indicator to channel its products to other countries. Although HST is a theory that explains mostly trade openness and international stability, we can also use the theory to explain other issue areas. For instance, public goods such as the security of trade routes, infrastructure projects in developing countries, or concessional loans might also be a subject matter of HST (Kindleberger et al. 1986).

Regarding foreign aid, the US provided public goods, including foreign aid to Europe, for reconstruction in the Marshall Plan's scope. Bretton Woods institutions (IBRD, IMF, and GATT are also reflections of such a dominant position in the international system (Sørensen, Jackson, and Møller 2022). Development assistance and subsidies contributed to the post-war transformation of Europe. At the beginning of DAC formation, the US provided 60 percent of total ODA in the OECD (Lairson and Skidmore 2016). Such examples are also an indicator showing how the US power took the responsibility of creating a new international order. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 shows how US GDP and ODA share follow parallel trends. During the last 60 years, the US' GDP as a share of global GDP steadily decreased, and its ODA as a share of global ODA also decreased. In other words, its decline as a hegemon economic power has spillovers its aid power in the global landscape. While other countries increase their GDP, they also provide more foreign aid so US' influence as an aid actor decreases. However, not only other actors' existence in the aid market but also multilateral institutions also gained a substantial presence in the foreign aid

market.

Although HST explains why the United States and allied countries created new institutions such as GATT, OECD-DAC, World Bank, and IMF, it does not explain such institutions' existence and endurance after the 1980s. The United States had been the most powerful actor in military and economic capabilities. However, its relative capabilities declined after Japan, Germany and other countries increased their economic presence globally. During the 1980s, the United States adopted protectionist policies with a vast budget deficit (Gilpin 1988). Indeed, its power to regularize the world economic order declined. Actually, this decline is also following the rise of Japan and the emergence of the European Union.

Figure 4.1 Global Share of US ODA and GDP



Figure 4.2 Global Share of Japan ODA and GDP



During the 1970s and after 1980, aid effectiveness had become a pivotal point for DAC. This was also the time when IR scholars think about complex interdependence and institutions in the international system (Keohane 1984). These scholars looked at systemic factors of cooperation and conflict, while they differ from realists regarding institutions' relative significance. They insisted that institutions endure even if the hegemon's power declined and some non-military issue areas such as trade, navigation, and environment, namely the focal points of cooperation among states (Keohane 1984). One of the non-military issues of a new global order was official development assistance.

The decline of US economic power, the increase in aid from global institutions, and the collapse of the Soviet Union almost coincided with each other. Therefore, in an atmosphere where there was no systemic threat in the 1980s and early 2000s, multilateral institutions strengthened and the importance of conditional and institutional aid for economic needs increased. These needs and conditions have been defined over democracy, macroeconomic stability, trade openness, and many other factors. In the following part, we summarize these trends, then we analyze how these trends may change with the rise of non-traditional donors, which most likely change the global foreign aid landscape.

4.2 Collapse of the Warsaw Pact, New Power Dynamics and Foreign Aid

During the 1990s, foreign aid effectiveness was a primary issue in the literature because foreign had become much more related to the recipients' orientation toward global trade and investment integration. In this global landscape, predicted positive outcomes for recipient governments did not take place, then this ineffectiveness led scholars to think about recipients' domestic and political conditions, preventing economic growth. Burnside and Dollar (2000) find that foreign aid became more effective if the recipient has good fiscal, monetary, and macroeconomic policies. This was one of the essential differences between post-Cold War foreign aid scholarship. In other words, while Cold War development policy oriented itself to alliances, and security, post-Cold war development policy became much more related to the open-trade policies, balance of payments, macroeconomic stability, domestic institutions, and political conditionalities. The head of the World Bank, Wolfensohn, underlined that they would reward nations with open trade and sustainable macroeconomic indicators. On the other hand, Bretton Woods institutions still played a significant role in foreign aid allocation, specifically becoming a cornerstone for globalization during the 80s. It should also be noted that World Bank becomes more selective in terms of good governance (Dollar and Levin 2006). In that sense, foreign aid becomes less significant for Cold War alliances but becomes more important for the alleviation of side-effects of rapid globalization (i.e., Washington Consensus). In that sense, we expect that both international institutions and the recipient states should conform themselves to the rules of the new global aid policy. Not only economic terms but also political conditionalities become an essential component of foreign aid allocation.

During that period, systemic changes also created a more diversified donor-recipient environment. For instance, after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, post-Soviet countries also benefited from development assistance. Turkiye established its foreign aid institution after the collapse of the Soviet Union to support post-Soviet Central Asian and Balkan countries (Ozkan 2013). This is an example of donor and recipient diversification which gives us a picture very different from the Cold War's bipolar inclinations. Turkiye illustrates how systemic factors (i.e, the fall of the Warsaw Pact) globally direct foreign aid policies. New power dynamics bring newcomers into the foreign aid market.

Figure 4.3 General Trends in ODA Flows (US Billion Dollars)



Unlike the Cold War's geostrategic concerns, the literature during the 1980s and 1990s underscored multilateral lending, aid conditionalities, and effectiveness . International institutions and DAC countries imposed foreign aid conditionalities and increased selectivity before and after the Cold War (Dollar and Levin 2006). Economic development, macroeconomic stability, and governance had become more salient factors for multilateral lending. This is the reason why aid effectiveness had become one of the primary issues for development. The point is no more related to ally with the Western countries to balance and undermine the Warsaw pact, but conditionality and selectivity imposed specific regulations that the recipients become the subjects of an open global world economy. Figure 4.3 shows that multilateral ODA flows gradually increase its visibility in global donor landscape between 1960 and 2017. While bilateral flows manifest fluctuations over time, multilateral ODA allocation protects its pace between 1960 and 2017.

Figure 4.4 Global Share of World Bank ODA



The Post-Cold War issue not only created a ground for new donors, it also created a new vision for the multilateral institutions. With the strengthening position of the EU, the World Bank, and the IMF as foreign aid donors, these institutions joined the foreign aid market, and multilateral lending became a significant issue. As institutions gained more power, they applied foreign aid conditionalities to force the recipients to adopt macroeconomic policies for open trade and good governance. Selectivity or conditionality were the main pillars of new-emerging multilateral foreign aid policy. Figure 4.4 shows that World Bank share of global ODA steadily increased during the 1980s and 90s, the period where globalization of trade and production became one of the most salient issues across the world. However, as seen in the Figure 4.3, multilateral allocation did not lose its importance over time because new multilateral players such as the EU emerges as a big foreign aid player. EU also uses conditionalities and selectivity based on macroeconomic and political factors (Molenaers 2012; Molenaers et al. 2015). Consequently, the "traditional" character of Western donors depends on Cold War's aid policies, and the subsequent increase of multilateralism, conditionality, and selectivity in foreign aid policies. The debate on international regimes and post-hegemonic institutional settings creates an optimistic understanding of international institutions and their agenda-setting power (Keohane 1984; Ruggie 1982).

People from the Bretton Woods institutions always emphasize the apolitical character of IMF lending and its conditionalities (Thacker 1999). However, we will see that all these developments also have a globalized interest-based approach, and this globalization process of multilateral arrangements are also related to some geopolitical concerns. Namely, increasing selectivity, conditionality, and commercial dynamics of foreign aid do not rule out the importance of state power. Instead, foreign aid during the 90s has a strategic component. For instance, Western donors sometimes use multilateral organizations to satisfy their global economic and political goals. For instance, if a country is a temporary member of the United Nations Security Council, it gets more foreign aid to the United States and United Nations (Kuziemko and Werker 2006).

World Bank's primary focus is development, and it has a particular branch for development affairs called International Development Association (IDA). In this sense, World Bank is mostly dealing with the recipient country's economic development, which sets it apart from the IMF. On the other hand, it is often debated that Bretton Woods institutions serve the political interests of powerful Western countries. Some findings in the literature also support the idea that political interests play a significant role in the allocation of World Bank loans. In addition to the IMF, the World Bank also allocated large amounts of structural adjustment loans, based on privatization and international trade. To be more specific, World Bank also allocated some loans to solve the macroeconomic problems of the recipient countries. However, if a recipient country has more political proximity with the US, then World Bank does not insist on some conditionalities regarding macroeconomic stability and performance (Kilby 2009). Moreover, the World Bank's executive affairs are also problematic for aid effectiveness because the executive board's election process depends on many members' votes. Countries sometimes do not play fair to be elected to these executive boards. For example, countries might use foreign aid as a tool to influence Bretton Woods institutions. Vreeland (2011) reveals that Switzerland directed its foreign aid to Turkic and Central Asian countries in order to get itself elected to the World Bank's director of governors. Indeed, the countries that received the most aid from Switzerland are also the group of countries that elected Switzerland to the board of directors. By this way, some donors can use foreign aid as a tool for vote-buying in multilateral institutions.

Multilateral institutions might fail to trigger and enforce reform in the recipient countries due to member countries' intervention. There is a political logic in IMF lending and other multilateral organizations. The ineffectiveness of IMF programs might come from recipients' engagement with the US and colonial legacy (Stone 2004). IMF is also a significant factor for the developing world, and its loan flows

are also related to borrowers' geopolitical importance, composed of military power, natural resources, land area, and nuclear power (Reynaud and Vauday 2009). If a country is aligned with the US, then it receives more support from the IMF (Thacker 1999). Also, members of the United Nations Security Council receive much more World Bank projects (Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009). In this sense, power relations are still playing a significant role in multilateral aid allocation. Strikingly, therefore, improvements in multilateral lending, conditionality, and selectivity are impeded by the political interventions of donor countries. Therefore, the aid ineffectiveness is related to systemic factors, instead of domestic problems of the recipients.

4.3 Traditional Donors and Contemporary Aid Modalities: Characteristics of Foreign aid: Western Budget Support and Suspensions

The previous chapter focuses on how power relations might shape foreign aid behavior, which is also visible in multilateral donors' aid and loan behavior. However, we also need to explain recent tendencies in traditional donors' foreign aid behavior. This part reveals one of the most prominent foreign aid tools of Western donors, namely budget support and suspensions. Before explaining how non-traditional donors react against Western donors, it is vital to describe conditionalities that multilateral and bilateral donors use. The first part of the chapter describes budget support and its political character, then we explain bilateral and multilateral donors' budget support politics across the world.

There are two significant components of recent foreign aid policies. The first one is Millenium Development Goals (MDGs)[4], adopted by the UN. OECD-DAC does not directly suggest political conditionalities, but it played a significant role in the UN's agenda-setting power on MDGs, one of the essential components of external assistance. States are expected to orient themselves to the MDGs. These goals are related to poverty reduction, AIDS, child mortality, and education. Bilateral donors and significant institutions such as World Bank, IMF, and the European Union are also actors that try to promote MDGs and SDGs. Although development goals have been a significant for a more harmonized foreign aid discourse, we do not label the OECD-DAC, the EU, or any multilateral organizations as the carrier of the international aid regime because it would be an exaggeration to locate the concept of foreign aid in the international regimes literature. The literature includes many different

[4]Sustainable Development Goals replaced MDGs

definitions of international regimes. However, international relations regimes can be defined as international regimes as rules and norms that affect state behavior; such rules can constrain state behavior and can lead them to act in a certain way Puchala and Hopkins (1982). Rather than using the concept of international regimes, it is better to use policy harmonization among traditional donors and its problems with the new global dynamics of non-traditional donors. Indeed, it is not the case that all member states strictly comply with the DAC recommendations; instead, each state has discretion over its own bilateral foreign aid allocation. French government might prioritize its colonies, or the UK might look for its authentic engagement while allocating its foreign aid flows to the developing countries.

The second significant element of recent foreign aid policy harmonization is the OECD-initiated Paris Declaration, which targeted to decrease donor fragmentation among DAC and other donor countries. Paris Declaration is a vital step to understanding how non-traditional donors respond to the Western ODA and its conditionalities. The Paris Declaration offered the main pillars of recent foreign aid policies. First, the policy recommendation of the Paris Declaration is the idea that recipient governments should take more responsibility for implementation aid projects. Also, donors should provide aid to recipients in line with recipients' own policy priorities. For instance, recipients might choose their aid sectors resulting by their own policy priorities. Third, donors should coordinate their aid behavior, meaning that donors should refrain from duplication of their projects. For instance, if they want to improve Uganda's health services, they should allocate resources to the recipient government by coordinating their aid. Fourth, the declaration says that donor should report their aid transparently. These elements are the main pillars of today's foreign aid policy harmonization.

The new era of the Paris declaration also leads to more direct funding from donors to governments. Foreign aid has two main modalities. The first one is project-aid, which gives great power to the donor to allocate resources in a recipient country (Clist, Isopi, and Morrissey 2012). It can build a hospital and select target groups that will benefit. On the other hand, budget support provides extensive control for the recipient governments. By so doing, donor countries save material resources, as budget support does not entail a vast amount of mobilization of resources (Hammond 2006). Project-based aid is also dependent on the sources, companies, and material arrangements from donor countries, which is an indicator of tied aid. For example, suppose that Norway wants to build a hospital project in Mozambique. Sometimes most of the raw materials or materials used in this aid come from Norwegian companies. In other words, it is possible to say that foreign aid might be an export-generating character for the donor country (Wagner 2003). However, if

the recipient countries had bought the raw materials and other supplies in other countries instead of buying them from Norway, they would not only have made the inputs cheaper but also would have had some money they could freely spend on other needs. Actually, Paris Declaration was an import to step to overcome such side effects of tied aid. After the Declaration bilateral and multilateral donors begin to increase their budget support for the recipients, as budget support provides more autonomy and control for funds for the recipients. This is a significant aspect of understanding the new provision of the Paris declaration. The politics of budget support builds on the decisions made at the Paris Declaration. In other words, budget support is regarded as the most useful policy option to satisfy the Paris Declaration (Molenaers 2012).

Figure 4.5 Total Amount of Bilateral and Multilateral Budget Support



Figure 4.5 shows that budget support today accounts for a significant portion of all global foreign aid. However, we need to underline that budget support has a political character for two important reasons. First, budget support directly goes to the government budget. Second, it is also political because initial findings show that budget support is also used for trade liberalization in certain countries such as Tunisia, Ghana, and Uganda. During the 1980s and 1990s, in this international trade regime above, the literature shows that donors provide foreign aid to countries

with an economic interest (Langan 2015). Previous research shows that countries that export their goods also provide more foreign aid to their export destination (Wagner 2003). In the history of liberalization, international institutions such as World Bank and IMF took great responsibility to convince other states to liberalize their economies. Therefore, trade liberalization goes hand-in-hand with multilateral lending. Specifically, World Bank and IMF give too much importance to macroeconomic stability, and their foreign support is conditional on economic and political issues. However, it is interesting that a similar path is visible in the case of budget support. Therefore, it directly contributes to the government budget without any "economic" expectation regarding trade liberalization. This is one significant demarcation line between previous budget support practices and recent modern budget support modality. The Paris Declaration and Sustainable Development Goals do not offer any political or economic conditionality such as decreasing tariff levels. However, we need to keep in mind that budget support is also a political type of aid due to its direct effect on the recipient country's budget. However, some initial findings show that the EU also uses budget support for more trade liberalization, which makes budget support a foreign policy tool.

4.4 Africa, Politics of Budget Support and Suspensions: The European Union, Bilateral DAC flows and Conditionalities

Classifying certain types of aid and conditionalities is significant to understanding how NTDs react against such conditionalities. There are many official development assistance modalities such as project-based aid, grants, and concessional loans. In turn, each institution and state have certain types of economic and political conditionalities. However, we need to articulate a distinct type of conditionality that non-traditional may have the interest to respond them. I propose one type of foreign support and conditionality for a more parsimonious operationalization of DAC-generated sanctions. Namely, the bilateral and multilateral budget suspension is our primary type of conditionality to measure how non-traditional donors respond to them. In this section, I introduce why I use budget support and suspensions to visualize donor competition . For instance, if an actor imposes a budget suspension due to recipient governments' human rights violations, then budget support is one of the most significant foreign support modalities today. We aim to capture how China, Turkiye, and the UAE respond to such "more" harmonized foreign aid support and conditionalities.

Africa has been a significant region for both DAC and non-DAC foreign aid. We can follow the footprints of a geopolitical struggle between traditional and non-traditional donors (Kornegay and Landsberg 2009). Geopolitical interests can explain non-traditional donors' attention to the African region (Kragelund 2011). This geopolitical competition that occurs in Africa includes many aid-dependent countries. If a country does not carry out fundamental public services without a significant amount of foreign aid, then these recipients are aid-dependent (Goldsmith 2001). It is also important to underline that many African countries are not only aid-dependent but also suffer limited statehood. In other words, many African governments do not have absolute territorial sovereignty in different regions of their country. Instead, there are de-facto states that challenge the central governments. In this sense, ethnic and religious conflicts are part of the African countries. This issue will be important within the scope of my dissertation because donor competition also occurs in such a political setting. However, these points are not valid for North Africa, where economic and political trends are different from sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, North African countries are not aid-dependent.

Figure 4.6 Africa's Share in Global ODA Flows



African region experienced different stages of donor pressure such as an anti-communist donor environment before 1989, democracy and governance conditional-

ities after the 1990s, and MDGs during the 2000s. They were all donor-generated external policies (Horning 2008). Aid-dependency, governance, and external debt are still important problems for Africa. Africa has its own structural problems, and foreign aid is less likely to solve domestic development problems. For instance, Brautiam and Knack (2004) find that foreign aid flows are negatively associated with poor governance performance and lower levels of tax collection. Aid-dependency is a social and political condition the government cannot carry out basic public services without having foreign aid flows (Bräutigam and Knack 2004). If foreign aid occupies a very large place in a country's gross national income, then we can have an idea about the level of aid dependency. However, recently Africa, there emerge a much more important problem. Africa has been a significant region where donors face and contest each other. This donor contestation provides African countries a playing field to attract more aid. Recently, new donor players posed a significant challenge for the Western aid initiative.

In Africa, there are three main Western donor groups . The first group is DAC countries which provide the bulk of foreign aid to Africa. The second group is World Bank and IMF, which operates in Africa for a long time. The third group is the European Union, and the international development agenda became more salient as the EU joined the market and set its agenda to support African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries (Carbone 2017*a*). The EU harmonized its foreign aid policies by appealing to MDGs, which the UN adopted in 2001. Recent EU aid is also strictly related to the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which are continuing the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Most of the actors in Africa uses budget support a significant aid modality, including bilateral and multilateral donors. European Union is the actor using this modality extensively, specifically during the 2000s[5].

Today, all budget support from bilateral and multilateral donors targets Sustainable development goals. EU's budget support has 17 SDGs to contribute. The EU allocated 5.2 billion for Budget Support in 2020. Sub-Saharan Africa received more than 2 billion US Dollars, which makes up 40 percent of all EU Budget Support. Moreover, Africa receives the bulk of the World Bank's total budget support, which makes more than 60 percent in 2020. We aggregate DAC countries' budget support for Africa, making around 20 percent of its all-total budget support. But at this point, we should be careful that these total figures can be misleading because many

[5]On the other hand, the EU Budget Support has differentiation for different country classes. SDG contracts, Sector Reform Performance Contract (SRPC), and State and Resilience Building Contract (SRBC) are the three different kinds of budget support that the EU provides . SRBC is a relatively new phenomenon in the EU's foreign aid support that directly targets conflict-affected settings. There are thirthy-four contracts in the scope of SRBC. Nevertheless, it is better to keep in mind that EU Budget Support has differentiation within itself, not a unique modality.

countries such as the USA use the World Bank as a tool for budget support.

It is significant to underline that budget support comes with budget suspension. Even if budget support is not -de jure- conditional on certain political and economic indicators, governments cut their budget support for the recipient, if the recipient misuse budget support (Molenaers, Gagiano, and Smets 2016). There are 238 multilateral and bilateral budget suspensions between 2000 and 2014 (Molenaers, Gagiano, and Smets 2016). 199 of all budget suspensions belong to African countries, and 39 of them targeted Latin American countries. We can underline that Africa and Latin America are the main regions of budget suspensions. The EU and World Bank suspended 34 and 26 budget support flows, which makes a quarter of all global budget suspensions. United Kingdom (35), Sweden (21), Germany (24) and the Netherlands (22) are the leading countries that imposed suspensions. Indeed, there are 14 DAC countries using budget suspensions. Because the United States does not use extensively budget support as an aid modality, we don't have any suspension imposed by the US. There are 47 countries subjected to suspensions by DAC donors and multilateral institutions. For political reasons, Uganda (40), Mozambique (27), Tanzania(22), Nicaragua(20), and Malawi(13) are the main sanctioned recipients. African countries are the primary laboratory of budget suspensions. In the economic realm, Nicaragua(9), Malawi(8), Uganda(8), Ghana(5), Tanzania(3), Mozambique(3), Chad(3) are the main targeted countries.

Figure 4.7 Political and Economic Budget Suspensions



It is also important that budget suspension is macroeconomic or political. 89 of all suspensions are related to corruption, and 72 of them targeted democracy/human rights. For instance, if the recipient country has a poor governance performance, then the EU suspends budget support for these countries. Fraudulent municipal elections lead to a budget suspension in Nicaragua. In 2010, Uganda's corruption and democracy-related violations lead to massive pressure from budget support providers. 10 foreign aid donors suspended their foreign aid to Uganda this year. Political instabilities in Madagascar and Rwanda's military campaign against the Democratic Republic of Congo also end up in a budget suspension (Molenaers, Gagiano, and Smets 2016). These are political types of budget suspensions. Moreover, 39 of all budget suspensions have macroeconomic reasons. For instance, the United Kingdom suspended budget support for Uganda in 2014 because of excessive defense spending used from budget support. Also, countries impose aid sanctions on recipients who are off-track with IMF reforms. This is an example of a macroeconomic reason to suspend budget support. We have a good deal of illustration that the EU, World Bank, and other donors use budget suspension as a tool for punishing the recipients.

The EU suspended its budget support to African countries 34 times between 2000-2014. The political suspension (corruption and human rights/democracy) are main breach category . The reasons for 29 of the total 34 EU sanctions are political. These sanctions target a country's political leadership on issues of corruption and democracy. This reality becomes much more important that most of the DAC countries are EU members. Bilateral suspensions of the EU members and multilateral suspensions of the EU are strongly associated with each other.

World Bank and IMF are also significant actors in budget support and suspensions. IMF is not a budget support provider, but a significant actor to set the agenda of recipient countries regarding structural reforms. These reforms can be related to macroeconomic stability and any other economic indicators. World Bank and many other countries' budget suspensions followed IMF's decisions regarding recipients' macroeconomic stability. The content of 44 suspensions is directly related to the IMF and its violated regulations, and most of them concern macroeconomic reasons. Moreover, 55 of all suspensions were directly linked to the World Bank policies. For instance, Ivory Coast - 2010- arrested IMF and World Bank have power over bilateral budget suspensions. Some donors explain their suspensions by appealing to these institutions' decisions. Therefore, although there is no de-jure necessity, Western bilateral donors closely follow World Bank and the IMF's footprints while suspending budget support.

Moreover, we can suggest that World Bank, IMF, and the EU are the main budget support policy harmonizers, and they emerge as the most influential normative powers. The normative element in the budget support is visible. However, we cannot say that these budget support policies are fully harmonized. In other words, we don't have a de jure budget suspension regime. There are not any de jure rules of budget suspension at the international level. Therefore, we don't exaggerate the harmonized character of budget support and suspensions. First, the EU still suffers aid and policy fragmentation, coming from its member states (Carbone 2017*b*). For instance, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark suspended their budget support for Uganda in 2014 because of the government of Uganda's discriminatory policies towards homosexuals. Indeed, other countries and multilateral institutions did not follow the same attitude. This is just a minor example that shows budget suspensions are not coordinated. But such levels of policy heterogeneity do not underline the real power of institutions and institutional interests. From another perspective, the United Kingdom is more interested in economic suspension related to recipients' macroeconomic stability. Some of these suspensions are related to IMF or World Bank guidelines. Other countries are relatively more interested in political conditionalities. In any sense, we can group such DAC-generated suspension as the most

significant and political way of punishing the recipients. Policy fragmentation does not undermine the role of multilateral's agenda setting.

If a recipient country is deprived of unearned foreign income to maintain its functions, how would it compensate for this unexpected loss of money? At this point, non-traditional donors might be a useful alternative. In 2010, the government of Uganda committed large-scale corruption, and many donors suspended budget support. After this year, China increased its grant-based foreign aid flow from 4 million to 100 million USD. This considerable increase was also followed by the rise of loan-based flows . This alternative is one of the most striking examples of how a foreign aid donor emerges as an alternative funder for African countries. Media reports also follow the same trend. In 2018, the President of Tanzania claimed that Tanzania prefers to get aid from China as it offers no conditionalities . However, new donors' existence and increasing multipolarity in world politics become a salient issue that traditional donors face. China's and other non-traditional donors' rise in Africa is part of the systemic change in the international arena. Therefore, all these debates on China's foreign aid are the consequences of systemic transformation in world politics.

4.5 Non-Traditional Donors: Global and Regional Trends of China, Turkiye and the UAE's Foreign Aid Flows

In this part, I explain the emergence of non-traditional donors and summarize their global and regional approaches. This section is a preliminary part, including descriptive statistics. This is necessary to understand what's going on in the international foreign aid landscape. Figure 4.8[6] shows that these three non-traditional donors diversified their foreign aid recipients across years. We see that Turkiye increased its foreign aid recipients after 2005, and this trend reached its peak in 2013 and 2014. The UAE gradually increased foreign aid recipients, and it is the top country in 2020, regarding the number of recipients. China also steadily increased the number of recipients between 2000 and 2017. Therefore, these non-DAC donors are increasing their recipient diversification globally.

[6]China's ODA data includes only the years between 2000 and 2017

Figure 4.8 The Number of ODA Recipients: China, Turkiye and the UAE



Figure A.2 in the Appendix reflects the main recipients of China, Turkiye, and the UAE's ODA flows. Egypt, Yemen, and Jordan are the UAE's top recipients, while Syria, Kyrgyzstan, and Afghanistan are Turkiye's primary aid recipients between 2000 and 2020. These recipients show the main priorities of donor countries. UAE's support for Egypt and Yemen is resulting from the conflict during and after the Arab Spring. For Turkiye, Muslim and Turkic countries, namely cultural proximity played a significant role in its foreign aid allocation. However, this dissertation suggests that such cultural tendencies started to change. Geopolitical concerns started to dominate other factors. Moreover, Iraq, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and Congo are the top recipients of Chinese aid. China's foreign aid flows are less geographically concentrated when compared to Turkiye and the UAE.

Figure 4.14 below also demonstrates that these non-DAC donors are significant exporters for the African region. China, Turkiye, and the UAE have special cooperation with African Union. For instance, FOCAC and African Union-Turkiye partnerships are significant formal cooperation entities, reflecting non-traditional donors' political and economic engagement with African countries. Therefore being an emerging donor also intersects with their export-oriented attitude. Export competition is also a part of the foreign aid debate. In the following sections, I will

analyze how economic and political interests shape non-DAC donors' foreign aid behavior.

4.5.1 China: Trends and Regional Differentiation

Kragelund (2008) summarizes three phases of China's foreign aid: The first stage is its one-China policy against Taiwan's recognition. The second phase was related to its competition with the Soviet Union, and China supported movements that the Soviet Union did not help. Finally, the third phase concerns China's economic, and commercial interests globally. I dwell on the last phase in this dissertation; however, the first two stages are essential to understanding China's aid today. The first phase reflects China's attitude against 'hegemonism' in Africa. The Soviet Union was the main competitor in Africa (Taylor 2009). Therefore, a rapprochement with the US was a part of this anti-hegemonic foreign policy.

China has a long history of foreign aid. Foreign assistance has some principles that still seem to conduct China's foreign aid policy today. China's foreign aid policies are not a new issue: it manifested its eight foreign aid principles in 1963 by China's Premier Zhou En-lai. These principles were formulated after En-Lai visited African countries, including Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Mali, Guinea, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somalia, in 1963. It is not a coincidence that these principles also reflect the post-colonial atmosphere of China's African and Asian foreign policy (Huang and Ren 2012; Olimat 2014). This historical reality manifests that ideological elements played a significant role in China's foreign policy during the Cold War. However, as the Warsaw Pact collapsed and China became a significant economic and political player globally, its logic of giving foreign aid also changed. Rather than ideological affinities, trade, energy, and resource diplomacy became the cornerstones of new Chinese activism. Figure 4.14 shows that its exports to African region increased dramatically after 2000s. On the other hand, its insistence on One-China-Policy also protected its importance regarding its foreign aid disbursements.

As many people accuse China of being not committed to rule-based international order, the initial analysis of China's foreign aid was explained as a detrimental political phenomenon for the recipients (Alden 2007). China takes advantage of Western conditionalities by offering a large number of concessional loans, export credits, and official development assistance (Tull 2006). Deborah Brautigam (2011) suggested that China's foreign aid flows are not like Western donors' official development assistance due to its large amount of loan-based support . Loan-based assistance is also another debate on China's financial flows. Loan debts have a very important

point. China both provides loans or concessional loans and also cancels some of these debts. In other words, some of the development loans automatically turn into foreign aid in "grant" status, if China cancels any debt. However, this situation is also problematic for Western financing countries and institutions because the Chinese state does not make this borrowing and debt forgiveness following the West and leading lending institutions such as World Bank and IMF. For instance, such institutions often impose sanctions if the recipients' macroeconomic and political reforms are poor. However, China's lending and debt forgiveness create a puzzle for the effectiveness of Western donors. In other words, both borrowing and forgiving debt actually pose a problem.

For a long time, China did not have a central foreign aid institution like most Western and non-Western donors have. China provided foreign aid through its various commercial enterprises, mostly under the supervision of the Ministry of Commerce (Reilly and Na 2007). Therefore, China's loan-based, commercially-oriented foreign aid flows reflect the logic of China's post-2000 aid policies. Recently, they have established their own central foreign aid agency, namely China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA).

In terms of loan-based OOF volume, Russia, Venezuela and Angola have been the most top recipients of China's loan-based OOF between 2000 and 2017. Russia received a total of 125 billion US dollars of Chinese OOF in these years[7]. Some of these support are low-interest loans given to Russian oil companies and aim to direct Russian oil to the Chinese market. In this sense, the trade-aid relationship can be clearly seen in Russia. For example, African, Asian, or Latin American countries are becoming more and more financially dependent on Chinese financial flows. According to IMF reports, public debt to China doubled from 2013-2016, moreover, some countries such as Sri Lanka had to give the use of ports to the Chinese government for 99 years (Green 2019). Moreover, the Chinese state gave Venezuela a 63 billion dollars loan between 2007 and 2014, on the condition that oil is paid in return. In fact, this means that most of Venezuela's oil goes to China (Balding 2017).

China provides an opportunity for many African countries to get money without any important strings. For instance, Angola halted a lending process with IMF because of IMF's strong monitoring capabilities and getting a loan from China (Woods 2008). This is a useful example showing how borrowing countries have more financial options. Grant projects occupy a large place in China's financial flows. However, several projects do not reflect volumes. Figure 4.10 shows that loan volumes are

[7] AidData's Global Chinese Development Finance Dataset, Version 2.0: (Custer et al. 2021)

much higher than grants between 2000 and 2017. Indeed, loan volumes manifest an increasing trend when compared to grants. While grant-based aid was around 3 billion dollars in 2017, the total amount of loans was 57 billion dollars. However, we should not underestimate the role of grants in China's foreign financial flows because 3 billion US dollars is a large number of funds as a foreign aid volume. Moreover, some loan support is ODA-like, namely, they are concessional in character and under the market interest rates. In 2017, ODA-like flows (concessional loans and grants) are around 7 billion dollars[8], which is almost equal to Japan's ODA flows for the same year. From these statistics, we can estimate that China is very close to Japan's foreign aid volumes. Therefore, we should not only appeal to grants while explaining China's foreign aid flows.

Figure 4.9 Flow Class of China's Foreign Aid



[8]Estimated from (Custer et al. 2021)

Figure 4.10 Types of China's Foreign Aid



The grant element in China's foreign aid is low. The grant element is one of the most critical parts of the ODA definition. If the grant element is less than 25 percent, we cannot call this flow class ODA. This definition is a DAC standard. However, a combination of concessional loans and grants provides a useful approximation toward the DAC-standard definition. On the other hand, it is hard to detect grant elements' percentages via the data collected from open sources. That is why Dreher et al. (2018) call these "ODA-like" flows, "which consist of all grants, technical assistance and scholarships, loans with large grant elements, and debt relief, under the condition that these projects are provided with development intent." OOF-like[9] foreign support is mostly trade-oriented and not related to any grants. Therefore, we use ODA-like flows to label China's concessional flows and grants. China's grant-oriented foreign assistance mostly goes to Asian and African countries as seen in Figure 4.11. These two regions receive the bulk of China's grant-based financial flows.

China's international partnerships and China-dominated international organizations such as ASEAN are also significant to determine China's foreign aid behavior. For instance, Lim and Kim (2022) find that China gives more foreign aid to ASEAN

[9] I use ODA and ODA-like interchangeably throughtout the dissertation.

chair countries, indicating that it uses such international platforms to enhance its political goals. ASEAN countries are Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Such an organizational dominance might be a demonstration of China's power over Far East Asia. However, there are other modalities of exerting political power with foreign aid flows. Such a tendency is also visible in Africa's case.

Figure 4.11 Regional Differentiation of China's Foreign Aid



The economic dependence of African countries on China also leads to substantial political and military issues. For example, Djibouti is home to one of the largest US military bases in Africa. At the same time, it borrows a large amount from China, in return the Chinese state wants to obtain more military concessions. This is how China opened a military base in Djibouti in 2016 (Pham, Bello, and Barry 2018). Bolivia, Ghana, Pakistan, Cambodia, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Liberia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Afghanistan, Zambia, and Mali are the top recipients of China's military support in terms of the number of interactions. Pakistan has always been one of the top recipients of China's foreign aid flows both economically and militarily. Apart from China's geopolitical and commercial interests, there are also some claims that China uses foreign aid to take policy concessions from the recipients, by providing foreign aid (Keating 2009). Uyghur problem is a part of this

story, and it is alleged that China provided a huge amount of foreign investment and aid to Cambodia, in response to the deportation of 20 Uyghurs to China .

Although this dissertation does not focus on China's foreign aid on the recipients' domestic political configuration, it is also significant to mention that China's foreign aid policies influence the domestic perception of the recipients' citizens. As formulated by Joseph Nye, foreign aid is also a soft power tool that targets certain economic outcomes without using coercive methods (Nye Jr 2008). Also, via soft power practices, a state does not need to force other countries to do something for the donor. As China's economic influence increase in African countries, it disregards concerns for the environment and poor labor conditions. While some domestic groups become more wealthy from China's investments, ordinary people become more vulnerable as domestic groups, and foreign investors extract resources from the country (Mydans 2009). Moreover, many reports claim that friction between locals and many Chinese workers is becoming a salient issue (Suri 2020). As of 2014, Algeria (71.542), Angola (50.231), Congo (14.483), Ethiopia (14.078), Equatorial Guinea (12.550), Sudan (9.808), Nigeria (8.677), and many other African countries hosted a large number of Chinese workers (Dollar, 2016 p. 74). In the political realm, some political parties use anti-China sentiments during the election campaign. As China invests in African countries, this occurs at the expense of the environment and poor working conditions (Alden 2017). Foreign aid behavior of non-traditional donors might prioritize its economic or political power; on the other hand, such a foreign support policy's success is questionable regarding debt crises, local-Chinese encounters, and debates on Chinese colonialism.

China's interest-based approach actually questions its unconditional aid character. China does not have de jure political and economic conditionalities. However, the existing practice tells vice versa. Another critical determinant of China's foreign aid is its desire for recognition and reputation. China's challenge with Taiwan is at the center of its policy for recognition. Although China officially adopts the eight principles above, Taipei's competition for international recognition substantially affected its foreign aid policy. Today, the only country that did not get any Chinese foreign aid is Swaziland because of its insistence on Taiwan's recognition (Brautigam 2011*b*). Indeed, China does not have any political conditionalities regarding human rights, but it has one type of political conditionality. For instance, China canceled the debt of the countries that have been loyal to the one-China policy (Brautigam 2011*b*). African countries also played their cards regarding the competition between Tapei and Beijing. Taiwan provided foreign aid to the countries that officially recognize Tapei as "real China." Some states such as Senegal, Sao Tome and Principe shifted China's recognition more than one time (Taylor 2009). Gambia and Sao

Tome and Principe received high amount of foreign aid from Taiwan, when they gave up recognizing PRC (Taylor 2009). During the 2000s, Senegal, Gambia and Sao Tome and Principe recognized PRC as China, and later received huge aid packages from PRC. For instance, Sao Tome and Principe refused to recognize Taiwan diplomatically, then it received aid from China for the first time in the ODA-like category, worth 30 million dollars in the following year[10]. There are many examples from Africa, showing how China uses foreign aid and investments to take policy concessions from recipients. In this sense, China has political conditionalities. The Taiwan issue is the main factor in China's political conditionalities. Burkina Faso, Chad, Gambia, Liberia, and Senegal are other countries that switched sides at least two times. China adjusts its foreign aid flows and investments based on recipients' Taiwan recognition. As seen in different cases, Taiwan's recognition is a tool for some African countries to take funds from both sides.

Second, China has not had a centralized policy coordination agency, as seen in many traditional donors (i.e., USAID, FCDO, TIKA). Bilateral trade contracts were one of the main determinants of ODA-like development aid and OOF-like loans. There have been many different foreign aid providers in China, and actors who are responsible for signing trade contracts, also the agents who determine aid provision in these contracts. Therefore, the foreign aid policy in China was decentralized and fragmented across different institutions and state branches (Hameiri and Jones 2016). Before 2019, there have been many funding agencies within the Chinese state. Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, All-China Women's Federation, Bank of Shangai, Beijing Municipal Government, and hundreds of agencies actually funded foreign aid flows, including both grant and loan-based support. Today, China encounters much more complex economic and military issues when compared to the past. Thus, it establishes new institutions to manage the existing complexity. Each domestic economic institution in China has its interest in the Belt and Road Inıtaitive (BRI). Allocation of grants and loans are scattered among these domestic institutions. Therefore, foreign aid allocation was decentralized among different actors. However, this dispersed institutional framework created an ineffective foreign aid initiative because domestic and financial institutions might have different interests (Cheng 2019). China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) was established in 2017, which means foreign aid allocation is not decided by the commercial, cultural, or any other bodies of the state structure anymore. China can differentiate its grant-based and ODA-like concessional flows from its commercial flows, and CIDCA is an opportunity to harmonize its aid behavior by decreasing the number of domestic providers (Cheng 2019).

[10]Calculated from AidData's Chinese Financial Flows Dataset (Custer et al. 2021)

We have some qualitative and quantitative works on how China's existence increases or decreases the bargaining power of Western powers. China is a strong competitor of Western powers' infrastructure projects (Swedlund 2017). Financially, for instance, despite IMF's reservations, the Democratic Republic of Congo received enormous financial flows (aid and loans) from China (Swedlund 2017). The existing trends in China's foreign financial flows (grants and loans) also corroborate some of Mearsheimer's (2014) predictions about China's rise. Mearsheimer (2014) suggested that China -firstly- will desire to be a hegemon within its own region. When we looked at China's loan and grant-based foreign financial flows, we see that Asia (without MENA has been the main recipient region. China primarily and commercially encounters Japan, South Korea, and other Western allies in the region. This endeavor is a reflection of competition. On the other hand, we also look for global competition between Japan and China ODA. As seen in Figure 4.12, China and Japan's ODA are positively associated globally, meaning that countries with higher levels of Japan's ODA are getting more aid from China in the following year. However, this is just a simple association between China and Japan's ODA flows. We handle this association in detail in the following parts.

Figure 4.12 Association Between China nad Japan's ODA Flows



However, the literature above does not provide any information about how China

systematically responds to Western conditionalities. However, the literature provides useful information about possible determinants of China's foreign aid including trade, Taiwan recognition, or any indicator measuring recipient need. These are the main variables we need to take into account. In the empirical part, I also employ the variables that the current scholarship offers; however, one significant variable, namely Western conditionalities, is the dissertation's primary focus on testing how China and other donors respond to them.

4.5.2 Turkiye: Trends and Regional Differentiation

Turkiye's foreign aid flows were affected by two major events. The first one is related to the Collapse of the Soviet Union. The second geopolitical turn was a consequence of the Arab Spring. The former provided Turkiye a chance to reach Central Asian countries, a significant region that cultural proximity with Turkic countries played a significant role. The Arab Spring changed Turkiye's ODA allocations unprecedently. After the Arab Spring, North Africa and Syria became the maiin destinations of Turkiye's ODA. Figure A.4 in the Appendix shows that how MENA countries created a skewness in Turkiye's foreign aid flows.

Figure 4.13[11] shows that African countries received the bulk of Turkish official development assistance after the Arab Spring. After the fall of Morsi in 2012, Turkiye significantly decreased its foreign aid to the same region. This fluctuation resulted from North African political dynamics. South and Central Asia is still the leading region, receiving the biggest portion of Turkiye's ODA. Africa and North Africa are the regions where sudden increases or decreases are most visible. This is the first ODA fluctuation during the 2000s. However, the Syrian Civil War diverted a high amount of ODA to the region again. This is resulting from the geopolitical crises in the region, mostly related to the Arab Spring. As seen in Figure A.4 in the appendix, you will realize that MENA countries receive a huge amount of money from Turkiye, and Syria is the main reason for such a skewness.

When we look at Turkiye's foreign aid sectors, it is discernible that the grant element of Turkiye's foreign is high when compared to its loan-based support. Turkiye's humanitarian aid, technical assistance, and social aid are the main components of Turkiye's foreign support (Cihangir-Tetik and Müftüler-Baç 2021). A bulk of Turkiye's foreign aid is classified as ODA because of its high grant element. Because Turkiye reports to the OECD, I do not have an empirical hardship in finding

[11] Estimations with Syria is in Figure A.4, Appendix.

Turkiye's ODA amounts. Turkiye's humanitarian concerns play a substantial role in its foreign aid allocation (Cihangir-Tetik and Müftüler-Baç 2021). This trend became more visible after the humanitarian crisis in Syria. Based on the OECD Statistics, I found that more than 90 percent of Turkiye's total ODA was in the scope of humanitarian sector. However, most of this aid is directed to Syria, which creates a regional skewness in Turkiye's ODA allocations. Figure A.4, in the Appendix shows how Middle-East absorb most of Turkiye's aid flows. In general, top 10 recipients of Turkiye receive more than 90 percent of its total ODA flows.

One remarkable similarity is a non-traditional donor, China, Turkiye, and the UAE, channel their foreign aid by their agencies bilaterally and contribute less foreign aid to the multilateral organizations than DAC countries do. They are more likely to make their bilateral foreign visible in the international realm. Although it satisfies the primary dictates of the DAC, Turkiye does not want to be a member of the DAC because of its desire to be independent in its foreign aid affairs (Cihangir-Tetik and Müftüler-Baç 2018). Turkiye wants its foreign aid to be more visible. Nevertheless, China's non-traditional character is much higher than Turkiye's because it has a higher level of political and economic linkage with the West.

Figure 4.13 Regional Distribution of Turkiye's ODA (w/o Syria)



This dissertation suggests that Africa is a new hub for great power politics and a playing ground for non-traditional donors. This geostrategic significance is related to changing power politics regionally and globally. Africa has become a hub of energy and raw material source for China. Turkiye and the UAE also strengthen ties with African countries, establish new military bases, and build economic ties. Population projections show that Africa will be one of the most populated regions in the World.

Turkiye has a long history with North Africa; however, this is not valid for the South of Sahara (Ozkan 2010). Colonial ties, religious similarity, geopolitical concerns, and geographical proximity lead to a closer relationship between Turkiye and North Africa than sub-Saharan countries. Turkiye -when compared to China- initiated its diplomacy-economy nexus after China. Turkiye has organized high-level summits since 2008, which are the components of the Africa-Turkiye Partnership , which is a formal cooperation between African countries and Turkiye. This is a significant step for Turkiye because this formal cooperation is one of the ten international cooperation agreements between Africa and other countries. Korea, India, China, EU, and Japan are other significant formal partnerships that Africa Union signed[12]. Therefore, Turkiye's interests in Africa are not trivial but formalized through international formal partnerships. The last summit between Turkiye and African countries was carried out in 2021, which emphasizes economic and political cooperation. Recently, Turkiye is a significant export and humanitarian in Africa.

[12]The list of partnerships between the African Union and other countries: https://au.int/en/partnerships

Figure 4.14 Exports to Africa: China, Turkiye, UAE and Top Seven DAC Exporters



Today, Turkiye concerns sub-Saharan Africa unprecedentedly regarding its foreign aid disbursements and commercial enterprises. Figure 4.14 shows that Turkiye steadily increases its exports to Africa region. In 2019, Turkiye's exports to Africa was 16.6 billion US dollars[13]. Although MENA, Asia, and Europe are the leading export destinations for Turkiye, it is interesting that Turkiye's export share for Africa increased from 3 percent to 6 percent between 2000 and 2019. This is interesting because other regions' trade shares remained stable; however, Africa's share coupled within 19 years. Africa's export share is still lower, but it continues to increase. However, these economic and commercial interests have become more affiliated with Turkiye's political influence recently (Ozkan 2013). Although Turkiye is not as economically powerful as China, it has increased its market power and Turkiye become a competitive country in Africa. For instance, Turkiye builds a railway in Tanzania, worth 1.9 billion US dollars, funded by a private Turkish construction company. This is just an example of Turkiye's increasing influence on the continent.

[13]Trade data is taken from Global WITS: https://wits.worldbank.org/

4.5.3 UAE: Trends and Regional Differentiation

The UAE is one of the most benevolent foreign aid donors as a share of GNI. However, the UAE's foreign aid allocations was affected by many systemic and regional events. The two regional events, namely the Israeli-Arab conflict during the 1970s and the Arab Spring in 2011 were the main geopolitical turns in the history of the UAE's foreign aid flows. We should note that the UAE changed its foreign policy priorities after 1990s, and detached itself from traditional Arab and Islamic cooperation (Ulrichsen 2016). The developed new ways of soft and hard power, established deeper relations with the US, and used aviation and finance sectors to create a new image of itself (Ulrichsen 2016).

Regarding foreign aid volumes, the UAE allocates the highest GDP share as official development assistance (ODA) without Syria. The UAE's top recipients are Yemen, Serbia, West Bank and Gaza Strip, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, Syrian Arab Republic, Iraq, Maldives, and Egypt. The most recent data shows that the UAE provides more aid to Islamic countries; yet, the UAE's foreign aid flows become regionally diversified, as European countries became the second-largest group of recipients after 2018, and other regions also had an increase in their share of total ODA from the UAE. Apart from foreign aid volumes, Figure 4.8 shows that the UAE gradually increased the number of its foreign aid recipients. In 2020, the UAE allocated its foreign aid flows to 121 countries globally, which is more than Turkiye's recipients.

Figure 4.15 Regional Distribution of the UAE's ODA



As seen in Figure 4.15, the UAE increased its foreign aid after 2013, which coincided with the rise of post-Arab Spring regimes in North Africa. Most of its ODA during that time channeled to post-Morsi regime in Egypt. At this point, Turkiye cut its ODA for Egypt. In this sense, Turkiye and the UAE manifest antogonistic inclinations in their response to the acute political crises in the MENA. UAE's post-Arab Spring support to Egypt was security-driven, and it reflected the UAE's political and economic concerns (Young 2017). This is clearly demonstrated in Figure A.5 in the Appendix, which shows the interconnection between UAE's rise as a foreign aid donor and the MENA conflicts after 2010. This trend is interesting because being a Muslim country has been a significant factor of providing foreign aid for both Arab donors and the UAE (Al-Mezaini 2017; Neumayer 2003; Van den Boogaerde 1991; Villanger 2007). However, the Egyptian case AND its ambitious foreign aid policy does not corroborate GCC's classical religion-driven foreign aid behavior during the 1970s. Political and economic dimension of statecraft is becoming more visible in the UAE's foreign aid architecture. Actually UAE's security-driven foreign policy is visible, and divergences within the GCC are indicators of changing geopolitical landscape in the Arab cooperation (Ulrichsen 2017). Moreover, regional differentiation of the UAE's forein aid flows has been visible recently. To illustrate, Europe is also a significant recipient region of the UAE Aid, and this is mostly coming from

not Albania and Kosovo. Instead, Serbia has become the largest recipient of UAE Aid in Europe. In 2019, it received $205 million budget support, a direct support for the Serbian government. ın 2017, the UAE directed more than billion US dollars to Serbia. In this sense, being a Muslim country might not seem as significant as the literature proposes, as some countries like Serbia attracts a large amount of investments from the UAE (Bartlett et al. 2017).This is also a corroboration of the existing trends, implying that the UAE has changed its foreign policy directions after 1990s (Ulrichsen 2016).

UAE's primary aid sectors have been Humanitarian and emergency response reflecting its foreign aid policy priorities. Security-driven interests have been a significant factor in the UAE's foreign aid allocation in these sectors (Gökalp 2020). However, different from Turkiye, it begins to provide general budget support for specific countries. Indeed, the amount of this budget support is much higher when compared to its traditional project-based aid. The UAE allocated more than 925 million US dollars for Sudan, and the aid was budget support directly channeled to the Sudanese government. Budget support made up a share of 50 percent of UAE's total ODA flows in 2020. Strikingly, some conflict-affected settings such as Mali, Eritrea, and Sudan were the main recipients of UAE budget support. Mali suffers from Islamic radicalism, and the Sahel region struggles against terror with the support of other countries including France and the UAE. Mali is also a significant recipient of UAE's budget support, which was $256 million in 2019[14]. Military aid is also a component of UAE's support for such conflict-affected environments (Ardemagni 2020). Some countries like the Maldives also a recipient of UAE's budget support in 2020, a country that joined the Suadi-Emirati coalition against Qatar. Some countries such central Somalian government rejected to join the anti-Qatar coalition, and the UAE closed one of its free-care hospitals in Mogadishu (Al-Jazeera 2018*b*). The UAE offered to reopen the hospital in response to Somalia's support for its Yemen campaign(Fenton-Harvey, Jonathan 2020). These examples show that how non-traditional donors such as the UEA uses its foreign aid to leverage its security-driven interests.

I underline the importance of budget support because it makes a huge amount of money directed to conflict-affected settings reflecting UAE's interests in the recipient countries. China and the UAE can use this tool as leverage on recipients, however, Turkiye does not have such a powerful instrument due to its economic turmoil. Certain strategic aid-dependent countries might guarantee more policy concessions for the benefit of donors. Sudan, Mali, Eritrea, and the Maldives are notable examples

[14] All estimates is from the OECD-Statistics

of such interest-based attitudes, revealing that budget support is a more political type of aid.

Table 4.1 Characteristics of China, Turkey and the UAE's Foreign Aid Flows

Country List			
	China	Turkiye	The UAE
Main Priorities	Geopolitics, Investment	Exports, Geopolitics	Geopolitics, Investments
OECD Membership	No	Yes	No
Dominant Flow	Loan-Based	Grant-Based	Grant-Based
Main Type	OOF-like	ODA	ODA
Main Modality	Concessional Loans	Humanitarian	Budget Support
Multilateral Lending	Minor	Minor	Minor
Data Transparency		OECD	OECD
Central Agency	CIDCA	TIKA	ADFD

5. QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH DESIGN AND REGRESSION RESULTS

In these sections, I summarize the mail regression model and data. First, I provide advantages and disadvantages my model, then I represent data and sources.

5.1 Main Model

I estimate different regression models to analyze different alternative hypotheses. I use cross-sectional time-series OLS models to test the hypotheses below. Our dependent variable is the log of China, Turkiye and the Emirates' net official development flows. Following the convention, all the models include a lagged dependent variable to deal with serial correlation. Indeed, I add robust standard errors clustered around sample units. Therefore, I take all the precautions to deal with hetereskasdicity and autocorrelation problems. All the continuous/time variant independent and control variables are lagged and logged to deal with the endogeneity problem. Here, I do not offer causal claims but focus on variation across years.

The first regression table investigates the determinants of three non-traditional donors' foreign aid, focusing on the existence of high-level traditional donors. However, I carry out separate regression for each donor because I provide a regional analysis of their foreign aid behavior.

The second model provides information about how non-traditional donors respond to Western conditionalities, namely budget suspensions. I coded a budget suspension as "Political Suspensions" if the DAC targeted the recipient countries' leadership and government for "human rights" or "corruption" reasons. We also coded "economic suspension" if DAC countries or bilateral states targeted the recipient country's leadership for economic reasons (macroeconomic). The same empirical section includes how non-traditional respond to each other's foreign aid engagement with the recip-

ients. In this sense, I add each donor's foreign aid flows as a lagged independent variable. Moreover, the models include three non-traditional donors' lagged exports. After explaining variations, the dissertation focuses on another empirical dimension of variation among donors.

The third empirical section focuses on how Turkiye and the UAE challenge each other via foreign aid policies. Models in this section include an interaction term of religion and aid variable. This interaction term provides substantial information about how Turkiye or the UAE respond to each other's existence, based on the religious affiliation of the recipients.

The fourth empirical model investigates whether non-traditional donors are different from traditional donors. Our findings might be interest-driven; however, non-traditional donors might follow the trends that exist in traditional donors. Therefore, I need to analyze if there is a pattern between DAC and non-DAC donors. In this sense, I add Japan, the US, Germany, France, the UK, Netherlands and Sweden's foreign aid flows as a dependent variable, then compared their foreign aid flows to China, Turkiye, and the UAE. Below, I provide a prototype of the models.

Main Model: $\text{Donor ODA}_t = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{RivalDonorODA}_{t-1} + \beta_2 + \text{PoliticalVariables}_t + \beta_3 \text{EconomicVariables}_{t-1} + \beta_4 \text{CulturalVariables}_{t-1} + \beta_5 \text{Controls}_{t-1} + \epsilon$

5.2 Data

The absence of sound data made analysis much harder for experts and scholars (Bräutigam 2011*a*). Therefore, it is necessary to dwell on reliable data to analyze China's aid in foreign aid behavior accurately. Dreher et al. (2018) and Morgan and Zheng (2019) provide the most recent data with a specific focus on foreign aid. The authors classify China's ODA from other Chinese financial inflows (concessional loans, grants). This is a significant attempt to classify China's foreign aid volumes following the OECD standards. First, they find out that if the grant element increases, then recipients' policy concessions increase. Second, China's non-concessional loans are highly associated with economic interests. In this dissertation, I used both China's grant-based ODA flows and loan-based other official flows to see whether the determinants of China's financial flows change.

China's Foreign Assistance Flows: China's foreign aid flows to Africa are measured by a new data set provided by AidData, a research lab at William and Mary. This data is useful for many aspects because it classifies China's foreign aid by appealing

to OECD standards. We have ODA-like assistance, grants, and loans for different hypothesis testing.

Turkiye, UAE, France, Japan, US, UK, Sweden, Netherlands, and Germany's ODA Flows are taken from the OECD Statistics (DAC2a). As non-traditional donors, the United Arab Emirates and Turkiye provide their ODA flows to all countries. Although we can find statistics of such non-DAC donors, China does not give any of its foreign aid flows.

UN-Voting Similarity Data is taken from Voeten, Strezhnev, and Bailey (2009). This dataset is used by foreign aid scholarship to measure policy concessions. Voting patterns in the UNGA show the similarity of these patterns for different states. In this sense, I measure the voting similarity between China and different African countries.

Multilateral and Bilateral Budget Suspension Dataset: I coded our data from this dataset below. I coded "I" if DAC countries impose a budget suspension for specific targeted country, and coded "0" otherwise. I use Molenaers, Gagiano, and Smets (2016) data set, which shows global multilateral and bilateral foreign aid suspensions. This variable is useful to show how China and other countries respond to such suspensions.

Religion data is taken from (Maoz and Henderson 2013)'s World Religion Dataset. We coded Muslim as "1" if a country has a Muslim population over 50 percent, and "0" if not. However, I also used Muslim population as a percent of population to capture a more delicate association of religious proximity.

All trade data is taken from WITS/World Bank. These variables also lagged and logged, as I use a pooled-time-series regression model. Affected From Disasters: I take disaster data from EM-DAT International Disaster Database. I used a log of affected people from disasters to measure the intensity of the disasters. For instance, if many people died or were injured, and lost their homes, then it means this disaster harmed people a lot. This is a useful variable to measure the acute needs of the recipients. Non-traditional donors might enforce their global donor image by providing an extensive amount of foreign aid to affected countries.

I use "control of corruption" and "rule of law" to measure if NTD's' foreign support looks for such domestic-level institutional variables. We use OECD-World Bank's good governance indicators, which include control of corruption, the rule of law, and violence. I used V-Dem Institute's Democracy Index, and particularly Electoral Democracy Index. Since it indicates polyarchy, it demonstrates whether traditional and non-traditional donors prioritizes recipient governance. Non-traditional donors

existence might empower authoritarian governments, and can undermine good governance.

I took recipient-need indicators from World Bank. These indicators are GDP Per Capita, and Infant mortality rate per 1000 people, and the number of people affected by disasters. Infant mortality rate and disasters measure the acute need for foreign support, while GDP Per Capita measures more long-term inclinations between recipients' economic needs and foreign aid. Infant mortality rate, GDP Per Capita, and the number of people affected by disasters are mostly used in the literature as an indicator of recipient needs (Dreher et al. 2018; Kavakli 2018; Knack 2001).

I used the log of population taken from the World Bank. However, it is debatable that population size can reflect both recipient-need and it also signals donor interests. Population size often implies need. However, it is also a sign of state power and a matter of geopolitical priority (Maizels and Nissanke 1984). In this dissertation, I take population as an interest-based indicator.

5.3 Regression Results

5.3.1 Country-Based Results

5.3.1.1 China

Our first thesis is confirmed within our models above. China adjusts its foreign aid flows to the existence of the rival donor. For instance, the first and second columns in the regression table show that China provides more foreign aid to the recipients whereas top seven DAC donors also provide more foreign aid. In other words, there is a positive association between China's grant-based concessional flows and DAC ODA. If top seven DAC total countries' ODA flows target a recipient located in a given year, then China increases its ODA-like flows in the following year for the same locations. But, this finding is valid for concessional flows including ODA-like support and grants. Such flows are not commercially oriented, meaning that China may not desire any return for its grant-based flows. However, a high association with DAC ODA may reflect a herding effect. China may either want to take more policy concessions from the recipient or it thinks to fill the donor space if there happens an aid cut against the recipient country. But the most important point here is that China's commercially oriented external financial flows are different from grant-based flows. As seen the third and fourth columns in Table 5.1, loan-based

financial flows (OOF-like and loans) do not follow the trends in ODA-like flows. If DAC countries provide more foreign in a given year, then China does not increase or decrease its loan-based OOFs in the following years. The herding effect is valid for China's grant-based flows. Therefore, I follow Dreher et al. (2018) caution about the distinction between different types of financial flows in terms of evaluating China's foreign aid behavior. While investigating China's financial flows, it is always better to look into the modalities of financial flows.

Table 5.1 Regression Output for Different Aid Modalities

	(1) China Grant	(2) China ODA	(3) China Loan	(4) China OOF
L.China Grant	0.301***			
	(9.04)			
L.Imports from China(log)	0.261**	0.240**	0.732***	0.646***
	(2.47)	(2.47)	(5.26)	(4.72)
L.Top Seven DAC ODA(log)	0.394***	0.456***	0.142	0.00880
	(6.56)	(7.32)	(1.51)	(0.11)
L.Top Seven DAC Exports(log)	-0.190**	-0.231***	-0.134**	-0.120**
	(-2.44)	(-3.35)	(-2.10)	(-1.99)
Taiwan Recognition	-6.717***	-6.930***	-2.288***	-1.802***
	(-12.52)	(-11.87)	(-3.88)	(-3.09)
Muslim Majority	-1.089***	-1.027**	-1.959***	-1.412***
	(-2.68)	(-2.47)	(-3.80)	(-2.92)
L.Control of Corruption	-1.277***	-1.247***	-0.866**	-1.352***
	(-3.80)	(-3.50)	(-2.17)	(-3.63)
L.GDP Per Capita(log)	0.0942	0.122	-0.0455	-0.0185
	(1.26)	(1.57)	(-0.44)	(-0.18)
L.Infant Mortality	0.0251***	0.0333***	0.00598	-0.0105
	(2.80)	(3.39)	(0.48)	(-0.89)
L.Natural Resources	-0.218**	-0.176*	0.116	0.0342
	(-2.43)	(-1.95)	(1.03)	(0.31)
L.Population(log)	-0.720***	-0.724***	-0.130	0.0671
	(-4.03)	(-3.99)	(-0.50)	(0.30)
L.Affected from Disasters	0.0566*	0.0524	0.0230	0.0661*
	(1.72)	(1.49)	(0.56)	(1.95)
L.China ODA		0.347***		
		(10.34)		
L.China Loan			0.345***	
			(11.76)	
L.China OOF				0.390***
				(12.17)
constant	13.32***	13.48***	-1.898	-3.668*
	(6.51)	(6.42)	(-0.82)	(-1.71)
r2	0.366	0.450	0.268	0.315
N_clust	155	155	155	155
N	2397	2397	2397	2397

t statistics in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

As seen in Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 below, lagged dependent variable shows that China's previous foreign aid allocation is strong predictor of following foreign aid flows. This is an important point. I add lagged dependent variable to deal with serial and auto correlation. However, it inflates variance a lot. Therefore, I added models without lagged dependent variable as seen in Table A.11 in the Appendix. In our case, I provided some other models without lagged DV to show how lagged DV affects variance. Table A.11 in the Appendix addresses this issue.

Our first hypothesis is corroborated at the global level. However, regional analysis of China's foreign aid flows is significant to capture the existing trends. For instance, columns 1-4 in Table 5.2 demonstrates that recipients with higher DAC engagement receive more foreign aid from China, based on Africa, Asia, Europe, and Middle East estimations. In other words, countries with higher DAC engagement received more foreign aid from China vis-a-vis other African countries. Therefore, in these four regions, China prioritizes providing more foreign aid to DAC-engaged countries. But, this finding is not corroborated for Americas and Oceania. Indeed, we find strong evidence that China provides more grant-based aid to DAC's main recipients. However, this is not valid for China's OOF; China's loan-based commercial flows are not related to the existence of top DAC donors in a recipient environment. I do not this here because regional trends also show this tendency.

One of our political variables, namely the UN-Voting agreement with the US is not associated with China's ODA flows, as seen in Table A.1 in the Appendix. However, this finding is not statistically significant. This is valid for regional analysis too. Figure A.2 and A.3 shows that UN voting similarity with the United States is not a determinant of China's grant or loan-based oda flows. However, when check same models with UNGA voting similarity with China, then the output changes. Table A.13 in the appendix shows that shows that countries with higher voting similarity with China receive more foreign aid from China. This finding is interesting to our first finding. While higher DAC ODA flows imply higher Chinese ODA in the future, internationally like-minded countries with China get more foreign aid. This is also a different corroboration of Dreher et al. (2018), who suggests that China's grant is positively associated with countries' voting similarity with China. However, we find that UN voting similarity with China is a significant variable for both grant and loan-based flows. This discrepancy might result from different time-periods. Therefore, both rival donors' UN Voting Similarity and China's UN Voting Similarity is a useful measures to capture how China orients its foreign aid flows to such political variables.

Table 5.2 Regression Output for Regional Analysis of China's ODA

	(1) Africa	(2) Asia	(3) Middle East	(4) Europe	(5) Americas	(6) Oceania
L.China ODA	0.168***	0.328***	0.131**	0.146*	0.308***	0.294***
	(3.61)	(5.18)	(2.31)	(2.10)	(3.82)	(3.81)
L.Imports from China(log)	0.0337	0.650*	1.172*	-0.0522	0.787***	0.289
	(0.20)	(2.03)	(2.03)	(-0.23)	(3.08)	(1.66)
L.Top Seven DAC ODA(log)	0.635***	0.616***	0.355**	0.426***	0.285	-0.0674
	(4.27)	(4.43)	(2.59)	(3.15)	(1.66)	(-0.80)
L.Top Seven DAC Exports(log)	-0.308***	-0.758***	0.123	-0.0859	-1.788***	-0.0746
	(-3.39)	(-3.48)	(1.54)	(-0.39)	(-2.88)	(-1.60)
Taiwan Recognition	-9.056***	0	0	-7.867***	-4.646***	-10.19***
	(-10.43)	(.)	(.)	(-3.98)	(-3.17)	(-7.75)
Muslim Majority	-2.273***	1.182	3.633*	-1.290	0	0
	(-3.29)	(1.31)	(2.05)	(-1.11)	(.)	(.)
L.Control of Corruption	-1.510**	-1.989**	-0.454	-5.995***	-0.640	0.333
	(-2.20)	(-2.64)	(-0.38)	(-4.83)	(-0.68)	(0.66)
L.GDP Per Capita(log)	0.0619	0.388**	0.0518	0.0191	0.0679	-0.0897
	(0.50)	(2.26)	(0.27)	(0.08)	(0.36)	(-0.57)
L.Infant Mortality	-0.00352	-0.0137	0.225**	-0.255*	-0.0375	0.0105
	(-0.21)	(-0.38)	(2.78)	(-1.98)	(-0.91)	(0.35)
L.Natural Resources	-0.371*	-0.598***	-0.901***	-0.932*	0.0226	0.256
	(-1.82)	(-2.86)	(-3.28)	(-1.90)	(0.09)	(0.67)
L.Population(log)	-0.357	-0.497	-1.402	0.0816	-0.240	-0.0716
	(-1.19)	(-1.24)	(-1.59)	(0.29)	(-0.49)	(-0.09)
L.Affected from Disasters	0.0959*	0.0363	0.0676	0.0911	-0.00546	0.0226
	(1.79)	(0.45)	(0.54)	(1.53)	(-0.06)	(0.46)
constant	16.63***	12.17**	2.782	8.197	30.76***	9.115
	(4.66)	(2.32)	(0.49)	(1.42)	(3.52)	(1.20)
r2	0.327	0.500	0.476	0.321	0.356	0.825
N_clust	55	29	14	12	33	12
N	834	462	212	187	526	176

t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Rival donors' ODA existence might demonstrate a competition of establishing good relations with the recipients, while UNGA voting shows more entrenched partnerships. This is a significant finding because it shows the political logic of concessional and non-concessional flows. While grant-based flows do not have an economic return for China, loan-based flows are directly related to China's commercial interest-based logic. China's OOF-like and ODA-like flows are not related to a country's US alliance in the UNGA. However, regional analysis in the A.14 shows that we do not have a particular findings across regions regarding the significance of UNGA voting. Therefore, China does not have a regional outlook vis a vis its UNGA voting similarity.

Another important variable is Taiwan recognition. Taiwan recognition is extremely important for both ODA-like and loan-based financial flows. For example, as can be seen from the first and third columns in Table 5.1, if a country recognizes Taiwan, it *almost* cannot receive any aid from China. However, after stopping recognizing Taiwan, China increases its foreign aid and loans to these countries. This finding

is following what other scholars suggested ((Brautigam 2011*b*; Dreher et al. 2018; Taylor 2007, 2009). For instance, in Latin America, Costa Rica switched its side from ROC to PRC in 2006. After this year, the country started to receive both grant and loan-based foreign flows from China[1]. There are many examples of how China responds to Taiwan's recognition. This is also a systemic finding. The political competition between Taiwan and China shape each other's China's aid behavior. This is also a find that corroborates geopolitical interests. However, there is an important point about Taiwan's recognition, also a contribution to the literature. Even though China's OOF is negatively associated with Taiwan recognition, the relationship is not as strong when we compared it to grant-based ODA flows. When it comes to commercial interests, Taiwan's recognition might not play an important role in China's financial flows. Table 5.2 and 5.3 demonstrates this tendency. On a regional scale, China's ODA flows are strongly negatively associated with Taiwan's recognition. However, this is not valid for China's OOF at the regional scale. Table 5.3 shows that if any country recognizes Taiwan in the Americas, then China provides less loan-based funding for these countries in the Americas. However, this does not correct for other regions. For instance, if an African country recognizes Taiwan, it does not mean that China provides less or more foreign aid to this country vis-a-vis its African counterparts in the region. Therefore, although Taiwan's recognition is a strong indicator of China's global financial flows, the magnitude of the relationship might change across different types of financial flows, based on the flow types.

Another variable that reveals China's interest in development aid is its exports. China is a trade power. Therefore, it is likely to give more aid to states with which it trades more. We corroborate the fourth hypothesis, finding a positive relationship between China's ODA-like and OOF-like financial flows and its exports. However, ODA-like flows and loan-based OOF-like flows do not follow the same regional trend. Globally, the relationship between China's commercial flows and imports from China are stronger when compared to grant-based flows. Table 5.1 demonstrates this variation between grant-based and loan-based flows.

We also need to employ regional analysis to capture the variation. For grant-based ODA-like flows, countries in the Americas with higher levels of export partnership, receive more foreign aid from China vis a vis other countries in their region. This is also corroborated for Asia and Africa at a 90 percent confidence interval. In other words, if a country in Asia does not have a high-level export engagement with China, then these countries do not get as much foreign aid from China when compared to other Asian countries.

[1] My own estimations from (Custer et al. 2021)

On the other hand, on the global scale, there is a strong relationship between imports from China and its commercial OOF. Regional analysis for Africa and Asia shows that there is a strong positive link between China's exports to a country and its OOF. In this sense, the Americas do not show a strong positive relationship between China's OOF-like flow and China's exports to the Americas. However, African countries that have higher imports from China receive more loan-based official flows when compared to other African countries that have lower levels of imports from China.

Therefore, we can corroborate that the trade-loan nexus work for China on the global scale because export credits also contribute to bilateral trade flows. As recipients receive more financial flows, they become more capable of exporting from other countries, and the biggest global exporter is China. This interest-based logic is valid for our global estimation.

Moreover, China's financial flows are mostly project-based rather than providing direct cash support. The projects -which China funds with credits- might be tied to China's exports. Therefore, the loan support-export nexus is most visible in Asian and African countries, in line with global tendencies as seen in Table 5.1. Moreover, there is a strong negative relation between the top seven DAC countries' trade flows and China's ODA-like flows as seen Table 5.1. If a recipient country has a high-level trade partnership with top seven DAC donors, then these recipients get less foreign aid from China in the following year. This finding is valid for both ODA and OOF flows. Regionally, African, Asian, European, and Americas countries show this strong negative relationship. Therefore, in these places, higher trade engagement with top DAC exporters is negatively associated with imports from China in the following year, when compared to other countries within their regions. It is striking that while China provides more foreign aid to places where DAC donors also provide foreign aid, Table 5.2 shows that China provides more grant-based foreign aid to places where recipients have lower export engagement with China. In this sense, we can corroborate that China not only provides more foreign aid to its export partners but also provide more grant-based foreign aid to places that are not Western powers' export partners. This is the commercial logic that we can follow clearly. Regionally, this is valid for grant-based flows, but we cannot follow the same finding for OOF-like loan-based flows on a regional basis. China's OOF does not regard top DAC exports as a significant factor. It does not deal with the existence of other exports in a recipient country to initiate infrastructure projects.

The relationship between China's foreign aid flows and corruption is also an important topic. Naim (2007) claims that the unconditional character of emerging donors

Table 5.3 Regression Output for Regional Analysis of China's OOF

	(1) Africa	(2) Asia	(3) Middle East	(4) Europe	(5) Americas	(6) Oceania
L.China OOF	0.254***	0.354***	0.339***	0.329***	0.326***	0.138
	(5.48)	(5.49)	(3.54)	(3.66)	(4.41)	(0.88)
L.Imports from China(log)	0.853***	0.929***	0.0987	-0.0919	0.448	0.514
	(3.36)	(2.81)	(0.30)	(-0.26)	(1.39)	(1.55)
L.Top Seven DAC ODA(log)	0.226	-0.00793	0.136	0.149	-0.428***	-0.109
	(1.29)	(-0.04)	(0.70)	(1.10)	(-2.75)	(-1.12)
L.Top Seven DAC Exports(log)	-0.0281	-0.531*	-0.157	0.0305	-0.186	0.00828
	(-0.25)	(-1.73)	(-0.93)	(0.23)	(-0.36)	(0.16)
Taiwan Recognition	-0.411	0	0	1.091	-2.140**	2.192
	(-0.50)	(.)	(.)	(1.19)	(-2.04)	(1.71)
Muslim Majority	-2.539***	0.280	-0.391	0.384	0	0
	(-3.43)	(0.25)	(-0.20)	(0.32)	(.)	(.)
L.Control of Corruption	-1.779**	-1.813**	1.121	-3.351*	-0.272	-2.162
	(-2.35)	(-2.05)	(0.96)	(-1.90)	(-0.35)	(-1.63)
L.GDP Per Capita(log)	-0.156	0.464*	0.0919	-0.576	-0.282**	0.249
	(-0.81)	(2.02)	(0.37)	(-1.25)	(-2.15)	(0.87)
L.Infant Mortality	-0.00996	-0.00823	-0.00458	-0.580**	-0.0674	-0.0624
	(-0.44)	(-0.18)	(-0.08)	(-3.09)	(-1.61)	(-1.43)
L.Natural Resources	-0.345	0.529*	0.133	-1.156*	0.115	-1.962***
	(-1.25)	(1.76)	(0.69)	(-1.81)	(0.51)	(-3.22)
L.Population(log)	0.156	0.132	0.637	1.935***	0.819**	3.401**
	(0.35)	(0.32)	(0.77)	(3.11)	(2.05)	(2.91)
L.Affected from Disasters	0.0316	0.109	0.192**	0.172	0.0132	0.00373
	(0.55)	(1.62)	(2.21)	(1.24)	(0.18)	(0.04)
constant	-6.391	-9.404*	-9.530	-12.58	-3.810	-39.36**
	(-1.50)	(-1.74)	(-0.94)	(-1.44)	(-0.66)	(-2.98)
r2	0.254	0.417	0.226	0.371	0.325	0.326
N_clust	55	29	14	12	33	12
N	834	462	212	187	526	176

t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

is detrimental to recipients' governance mechanism. The first column in Table 5.1 shows that China's ODA flows are negatively associated with control of corruption, meaning that more corrupted recipients attract more China's grant-based financial flows. The same finding is also valid for China's OOF financial flows. This finding does not propose a causal link between China's financial flows and local corruption. However, there is striking research on this finding. Isaksson and Kotsadam (2018) suggest that local corruption is a more prevalent phenomenon in geographically proximate places to Chinese projects. Interestingly, they find that this is not valid for World Bank projects. Such works provide in-depth information about the corruption-aid nexus for China's aid projects. Regionally, more corrupted African, Asian, and European countries receive more grant-based flows when compared to other countries in their regions.

To understand the governance-aid relationship, we also need to look at the association between democracy and China's ODA flows. On the global scale, we do not have any association between democracy score and China's grant-based flows.

The same finding is valid for OOF. On the other hand, I suggest controversial outcomes on a regional basis. For instance, Asian and European countries with lower democracy scores receive more Chinese ODA when compared to other states within their own regions. Strikingly, African countries with higher democracy scores receive more foreign aid from China. Indeed, these findings on the regional and global levels do not suggest a strong causal association between democracy and foreign aid. Therefore, I follow previous findings in the literature (Bader 2015; Blair and Roessler 2018)

To measure, China's economic interests, we also use recipient revenues from natural resources. If recipient countries have abundant natural resources, then China is more likely to provide more aid to such countries. This is because China needs plenty of raw materials and natural resources from other countries. Interestingly, China's ODA is negatively associated with recipients' natural resources, as seen in Table 5.1. However, there is not such a negative association between China's OOF and natural resources. In this sense, China's grant-based and loan-based flows show a variation again. However, some case studies show that China uses foreign aid to access natural resource-rich countries (Reilly 2013). Therefore, our findings might change in different cases. For instance, Asian countries with greater natural resource extraction receive more loan-based flows from China, when compared other countries in the region. Russia -a natural resource rich country- receives a great deal of OOF from China, which also an empirical cases corroborating our hypothesis.

To measure China's and other donors' recipient-need orientation, we used infant mortality rate, GDP Per Capita, and the number of people affected by disasters. I find that the infant mortality rate is positively associated with China's grant-based ODA-like flows, as seen in the the first and second columns of Table 5.1. This is important because the infant mortality rate is a significant indicator of recipients' acute needs (Kavakli 2018). However, this finding is not valid for loan-based or OOF-like flows. It means that a country's acute need is not associated with China's commercial flows. Another indicator for recipient need, namely GDP Per Capita is not associated with China's grant-based or loan-based flows. Moreover, China's grants are positively correlated with number of people affected from disasters. China's OOF also is positively associated with disasters at the 90 percent confidence interval. However, I couldn't find any attitude towards disasters on the regional basis. To sum up, we couldn't find that China provides foreign aid for recipient-need for classical poverty indicators such as GDP Per Capita. However, it responds to acute recipient needs in terms of infant mortality rate and the number of people affected by disasters to some extent. Therefore, we can suggest that there is a slight positive

association between recipient-need and China's foreign aid in terms of acute needs.

5.3.1.2 Turkiye

As seen in the table below Turkiye's ODA in a year is highly associated with its ODA flows in the following year, meaning that Turkiye is a regular donor. In this sense, I corroborate some of previous findigs as indicated in Zengin and Korkmaz (2019). This point is important. While a lagged variable overcome many issues related to serial correlation, it might inflate variance or R2.In our case, I provided some other models without lagged dependent variable to show how it affects variance. Table A.11 in the Appendix addresses this issue.

Top seven DAC donors' ODA flows also have a positive association with Turkiye's ODA flows. If a recipient receives a high level of top seven DAC ODA in a year, then Turkiye provides more foreign aid in the following year. This finding is the strongest on the global basis. Indeed, regional analysis shows significant trends. This finding is valid for Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and the Americas. Within these regions, countries with a higher level of DAC engagement receive more foreign aid from Turkiye in the following year, when compared to other countries in their regions. Europe and Oceania do not corroborate such a finding. This is a sign of herding, and a corroboration of our first hypothesis. Donor concentration taking policy concessions less likely because recipient countries have many alternative options. A donor needs to provide more to influence these recipients.

Moreover, I also find that the association between Turkiye's ODA and UN Voting Similarity with the US is positive, meaning that Turkiye provides more foreign to US-friendly countries vis a vis other countries. Regional analysis also shows some strong indicator on this finding. Table A.4. in the Appendix shows that US friendly countries in Africa and Americas get more foreign aid from Turkiye, when compared to other countries in these regions. In other words, if an African recipient country has a high-level voting similarity with the US, then these countries receive more foreign aid from Turkiye in the following year within the African region. This finding is significant for systemic alignments; however, we cannot establish a causality here. Moreover, we cannot corroborate that there is a systemic alignment with the USA in terms of targeted recipients. However, I can certainly suggest and underline that Turkiye does not manifest an anti-US sentiment in its foreign aid allocations. African region is an arena of contestation for different traditional and non-traditional donors. Turkiye is an important exporter in Africa and it is most likely that Turkiye faces China and other donors. Therefore, Turkiye -as a member

Table 5.4 Regression Output for Regional Analysis of Turkiye's ODA

	(1) Global	(2) Africa	(3) Asia	(4) Middle East	(5) Europe	(6) Americas	(7) Oceania
L.Turkiye ODA(log)	0.749***	0.603***	0.765***	0.657***	0.639***	0.487***	0.226*
	(38.98)	(18.81)	(19.03)	(9.34)	(12.56)	(6.14)	(2.04)
L.Imports from Turkiye(log)	0.0697***	0.104***	0.0859***	-0.0177	0.165	0.104***	0.0178
	(5.58)	(3.24)	(2.85)	(-0.21)	(1.35)	(2.77)	(1.38)
L.Top Seven DAC ODA(log)	0.0774***	0.0715**	0.112***	0.140**	0.101*	0.0260	0.0287
	(7.77)	(2.30)	(4.80)	(2.95)	(1.82)	(1.28)	(1.24)
L.Top Seven DAC Exports(log)	-0.0433***	-0.0633**	0.0216	-0.0265	0.00672	-0.112	-0.0000267
	(-3.83)	(-2.20)	(1.11)	(-0.96)	(0.13)	(-1.66)	(-0.00)
Muslim Majority	0.396***	0.382***	0.401***	0.422	0.203	0	0
	(5.89)	(4.25)	(2.97)	(1.68)	(1.30)	(.)	(.)
L.Control of Corruption	-0.187***	-0.250***	-0.0889	-0.0995	-0.625*	-0.0258	-0.196
	(-4.32)	(-2.86)	(-1.08)	(-0.73)	(-2.08)	(-0.39)	(-1.62)
L.GDP Per Capita(log)	0.00754	0.0279	-0.00683	0.0184	-0.0301	0.0167	0.0154
	(0.73)	(1.40)	(-0.26)	(0.71)	(-0.45)	(1.04)	(0.52)
L.Infant Mortality	-0.00383***	-0.0104***	0.00319	-0.00693	0.0363	-0.00601	0.000564
	(-3.03)	(-4.27)	(0.85)	(-0.61)	(1.42)	(-1.14)	(0.11)
L.Natural Resources	-0.0330**	0.0597*	-0.0197	-0.0697	0.261***	-0.0462**	0.0227
	(-2.27)	(1.90)	(-0.78)	(-1.49)	(4.24)	(-2.09)	(1.31)
L.Population(log)	0.0183	0.0388	-0.0682	0.144	-0.414***	0.145**	-0.0576
	(0.81)	(0.72)	(-1.06)	(1.02)	(-3.84)	(2.43)	(-1.27)
L.Affected from Disasters	-0.00675	0.00648	-0.0183	0.0275	-0.0105	-0.00643	0.000159
	(-1.45)	(0.78)	(-1.48)	(1.36)	(-0.54)	(-0.62)	(0.01)
constant	-0.0541	-0.594	-0.156	-1.455	3.704***	-0.581	0.565
	(-0.25)	(-1.19)	(-0.27)	(-1.04)	(4.36)	(-0.99)	(1.40)
r2	0.806	0.654	0.875	0.898	0.865	0.418	0.0996
N_clust	155	55	30	14	11	33	12
N	2832	991	567	248	204	619	203

t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

of the OECD and NATO- might align itself with Western-oriented countries, and UN Voting Similarity with the US might be a manifestation of this. I also add the UN Voting with China and find that the coefficient is negative and statistically significant, as seen in the second column of Table A.15. It becomes more interesting as the relationship between Turkiye providing more ODA to US aligned countries, and less foreign to China-friendly countries on the global scale.

Interestingly, control of corruption is negatively associated with Turkiye's ODA. We do not suggest that Turkiye's foreign aid leads to corruption, but Turkiye provides more foreign aid to more corrupt countries. This finding does not mean that non-traditional donors lead to the survival of corrupted regimes. Indeed, I will add leading traditional donors to detect whether there is a variation between traditional and non-traditional donors. Such a comparison will give an understanding that there might not be a Manichean dichotomy between traditional and non-traditional donors, regarding donor interests. Table 5.4 shows that African countries with higher levels of corruption get more foreign aid from Turkiye when compared to other African countries. Therefore, based on the global and African estimations, Turkiye disregards governance indicators, which is highly debated in NTDs' literature. Indeed, I control for democracy score using the V-Dem electoral index, which is a good indicator to capture the democracy-aid nexus. Table A.4 in the Appendix

demonstrates that Turkiye's foreign aid has a negative association with democracy at the 90 percent confidence interval. Finally, I do not offer the idea that Turkiye's aid leads to more corruption, but it is obvious that Turkiye does not have a selective policy towards good governance indicators.

When compared to China, Turkiye's export-oriented foreign aid policy is more visible. Turkiye's ODA follows its trade interests. In other words, Turkiye's export partners receive more foreign aid when compared to other countries. This shows that there might be an economic logic behind its foreign aid flows. The first, second, third, and sixth columns in Table 5.4 demonstrates this tendency. In Africa, Asia, and the Americas, countries with high-level export partnerships with Turkiye receive more foreign aid, when compared to other countries that have low-level imports from Turkiye. Within these regions, Turkiye favors its export partners, as a reward mechanism.

It is striking that the top seven DAC donors' export partners receive less foreign aid from Turkiye. In other words, if a recipient country extensively imports from the top seven DAC donors, then Turkiye allocates less foreign for these countries. Interestingly, this finding follows what I find in China's case. Turkiye not only supports its export partners but is less likely to support countries that have a high-level export partnership with top DAC donors. Therefore, a commercial logic is visible in Turkiye's foreign aid flows. However, regionally, Africa also shows such a trend. African countries with higher export engagement with the top seven exporter DAC countries, receive less foreign aid from Turkiye in the next year. We can assume that global and regionally (Africa), Turkiye tries to open new spaces of trade, and its foreign aid targets the places where there is a low trade engagement with the West. However, I check this finding not only vis a vis top Western exports, but also next chapters put China's trade flows in the models. Non-traditional donors' foreign might also target some empty spaces where other non-traditional donors have low-level export partnerships.

Interestingly, Turkiye does not provide foreign aid for any recipient-need indicator. Infant mortality rate, GDP Per Capita, and the number of people affected by disasters manifest no relationship with Turkiye's ODA. Turkiye's humanitarian response is visible during the last ten years. However, this aid is highly skewed to specific countries, including Syria, Somalia, and other countries in the region. Therefore, such a skewness hurts Turkiye's image as a humanitarian actor. Such geopolitical factors divert Turkiye's aid flows from the global to the regional level. We do not corroborate the idea that Turkiye prioritizes recipient needs.

Turkiye's religios and cultural orientation is essential to analyze its relation with geopolitical factors. Muslim-majority countries have been the main recipient of Turkish ODA under the Justice and Development Party's rule (Kavakli 2018). Muslim majority variable is one of the strongest determinants of Turkiye's ODA flows. As seen in Table 5.4, I find that religious affinity -for Africa and Asia- corroborates the literature and suggests that cultural proximity is an important element of Turkish ODA. Globally, Muslim countries receive more foreign aid from Turkiye. A religious tendency is obvious in Turkiye's foreign aid allocation. However, it is interesting that I could not corroborate religious orientation for European countries. I expected that Muslim majority countries in Europe might receive more foreign aid from Turkiye vis-a-vis other countries in the region. However, this does not ring true. For instance, while Turkiye traditionally provides foreign aid to European Muslim states, our regression output doesn't support that Muslim-majority countries in Europe receive more Turkish ODA, as seen in Table 5.4. On the other hand, a cultural-religious factor is visible at the global level. Indeed, I should note that some countries such as Kosovo are excluded from the sample because the software omits such countries with many missing variables[2]. As Kosovo is somehow a de-facto state, international institutions and organization do not provide records for such countries.

5.3.1.3 The UAE

UAE is also a regular donor, meaning that its previous foreign aid flows to determine its aid flows in the following year. UAE's ODA is also positively associated with DAC's top donors' aid locations. Interestingly, all three non-traditional donors' foreign aid behavior is positively associated with the DAC ODA flows. In other words, if DAC donors provide more foreign aid for a specific location, then UAE also provides more foreign aid in the following year. Indeed, the regional analysis reflects this trend, as countries in Asia, Middle-East, and Americas with higher DAC engagement receive more foreign aid from the UAE when compared to other countries in these regions.

Religious orientation is also visible in the UAE's foreign aid flows. Both Turkiye and the UAE share a similar tendency regarding global foreign aid flows to the Muslim world. Also, UAE's Muslim coefficient is stronger than Turkiye's. This finding is valid for both the global and regional scales. Muslim countries in Africa, Asia, and

[2]Historical data of international trade, World Bank Data such as Control of Corruption, GDP Per Capita, and Infant Mortality Rate)

Table 5.5 Regression Output for Regional Analysis of UAE's ODA

	(1) Global	(2) Africa	(3) Asia	(4) Middle East	(5) Europe	(6) Americas	(7) Oceania
L.UAE ODA(log)	0.670***	0.630***	0.567***	0.479***	0.632***	0.577***	0.384***
	(24.88)	(18.15)	(10.84)	(4.41)	(5.92)	(6.53)	(3.82)
L.Imports from UAE(log)	0.0463***	0.0367	0.175***	-0.0582	-0.0401	0.122***	0.0866**
	(3.38)	(1.26)	(4.27)	(-1.10)	(-1.09)	(4.57)	(2.87)
L.Top Seven DAC ODA(log)	0.0800***	0.0356	0.0997***	0.316***	0.0630	0.0577**	0.00559
	(5.68)	(0.68)	(4.34)	(4.60)	(1.53)	(2.72)	(0.15)
L.Top Seven DAC Exports(log)	-0.0290**	-0.0170	-0.0162	-0.00186	0.00999	-0.0804	-0.0241
	(-2.11)	(-0.65)	(-0.57)	(-0.12)	(0.32)	(-0.97)	(-0.79)
Muslim Majority	0.603***	0.701***	0.592***	0.468	0.907*	0	0
	(5.17)	(4.16)	(2.81)	(0.57)	(2.14)	(.)	(.)
L.Control of Corruption	-0.0414	-0.117	0.0545	0.291	-0.111	-0.208*	0.381**
	(-0.72)	(-0.90)	(0.61)	(0.88)	(-0.32)	(-1.94)	(2.42)
L.GDP Per Capita(log)	-0.0115	-0.0297	0.0556**	-0.167**	0.199*	0.0290	0.102**
	(-0.72)	(-0.83)	(2.26)	(-2.58)	(1.94)	(1.16)	(2.68)
L.Infant Mortality	0.00202	-0.00300	0.0157**	0.0488**	-0.0300	-0.0210***	-0.00157
	(1.17)	(-0.85)	(2.71)	(2.56)	(-0.58)	(-5.47)	(-0.27)
L.Natural Resources	-0.0865***	-0.0734	-0.0349	-0.00528	-0.0416	-0.142***	-0.0389
	(-3.86)	(-1.41)	(-0.78)	(-0.10)	(-0.24)	(-4.12)	(-0.63)
L.Population(log)	0.0611*	0.201**	-0.0641	-0.0443	0.0547	0.0344	-0.0122
	(1.83)	(2.47)	(-0.88)	(-0.38)	(0.39)	(0.51)	(-0.07)
L.Affected from Disasters	-0.00815	-0.00450	0.0264**	-0.0487	-0.0262	-0.000717	-0.00258
	(-0.97)	(-0.29)	(2.25)	(-1.20)	(-0.86)	(-0.08)	(-0.09)
constant	-0.310	-1.770*	-1.614**	2.381	-2.321	0.946	0.0106
	(-0.95)	(-1.84)	(-2.15)	(1.09)	(-1.29)	(0.97)	(0.01)
r2	0.635	0.566	0.627	0.797	0.579	0.431	0.199
N_clust	155	55	30	13	12	33	12
N	2811	988	566	229	222	601	205

t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Europe receive more foreign aid from the UAE when compared to other countries in these regions. This becomes more interesting since some non-Muslim antagonists like Serbia receives more foreign aid from the UAE during the last couple of years. However, I find that European Muslim countries receive more foreign aid from the UAE at a 90 percent confidence level.

On the other hand, we cannot be certain that UAE provides foreign aid to the Muslim world for religious reasons. Especially, after the Arab Spring, Turkiye, Iran and Gulf countries challenged each other to strengthen political ties and create like-minded regimes in the MENA. These geopolitical struggles occurred in Muslim geography in the Middle East and North Africa. Therefore, we need to isolate and distinguish geopolitical factors from religious tendencies. Isolating geopolitical factors from other variables are at the core of this dissertation. We need to go deeper with this regard and try to find a way to look into variation during the 2000s. The next section will focus on this finding in detail, and I will challenge the idea that Turkiye and the UAE provide foreign aid for religious issues.

It is also significant that the UAE provides more foreign aid to its export partners. UAE is an oil exporter and trade power in the MENA as an important member of OPEC. Table 5.5 shows that China countries in Asia, Americas and Oceani with

higher imports from the UAE receive more foreign aid vis-a-vis other countries in these regions. This is also interesting that China, Turkiye and the UAE manifest a trade-aid nexus. However, it is interesting that the UAE does not have strong and negative association with the top seven DAC members' exports on the regional basis, when compared to Turkiye and China. The UAE does not provide less or more foreign aid to DAC's export partners in Africa, Asia, Middle East, Europe, Americas and Oceania. This set the UAE apart from Turkiye and China as non-traditional donors. However, I do not offer a causal suggestion here. This finding might be contingent upon many other factors. Indeed, it is better to underline that non-traditional differ in terms of their reaction to DAC states' export partners. Another useful finding is that countries with higher-natural resources receive less foreign aid from the UAE. Natural-resource-rich countries do not need the UAE's oil exports, and their revenues from oil might make them wealthier than other recipients.

It is also important to underline that UAE's foreign aid flows are associated with some recipient-need indicators. This also sets the UAE apart from China and Turkiye. For instance, in Asia and the Middle East, countries with higher infant mortality rates receive more foreign aid from the UAE, when compared to other countries in these regions. In Asia, countries affected by disasters receive more foreign aid from the UAE. However, there is not such a strong association on the global and regional scale. Therefore, these findings do not offer a strong need-based argument here. However, I should underscore that UAE's tendencies are a little bit different from what I find in Turkiye and China cases. Therefore, religious orientation, export partnership, and the US are the most important indicators of UAE's foreign aid flows. In this sense, UAE's recipient-need indicators are similar to Turkiye's ODA trends. The UAE is also different from China and the UAE regarding its attitude towards control of corruption. I do not find a negative association between UAE ODA and control of corruption. Moreover, I find that Ocenian countries with higher control of corruption scores receive more foreign aid from the UAE. Moreover, the UAE provides more foreign aid if a country has a higher democracy score in Asia. This finding also put the UAE aside, even though I do not corroborate this tendency at the global level. I don't suggest that the UAE has a selectivity towards good governance indicators, but this difference is significant. This variation between non-traditional donors prevents of from classifying non-traditional donors as a block within themselves.

Up to that point, we summarized the first regressions of China, Turkiye, and the UAE's foreign aid flows. Indeed, I also checked each region within itself, which is a novel inquiry in the literature. Global and regional orientations might differ for each non-traditional donor. Which factors are the most important for each region

within themselves? To answer this question, I provided separate regression tables for each region. In the following section, I provide a great deal of information about how non-traditional donors respond to Western conditionalities.

5.3.2 Non-DAC Donors' Response to DAC Budget Suspensions

Table 5.6 shows a comparative analysis of three NTDs' foreign aid flows. These models do not include political and economic budget suspensions. I created these models because our budget suspension models cover only the years between 2000 and 2014, as seen in Table 5.7. Molenaers, Gagiano, and Smets (2016) dataset only include the years between 2000 and 2014 Therefore, our estimations have a limited time scale. On the other hand, Table 5.6 manifests the trends among three non-traditional donors. In Table 5.7, I add political and economic budget suspensions to see whether Table 5.6's coefficients and significance change.

The regression Table 5.7 captures how three non-traditional donors respond to DAC-generated budget suspensions. These three non-DAC donors increase their global visibility around the world. For a long time, it is debated if China replaces Western countries as foreign aid donors. Since much aid-dependent countries need alternative funding resources, China and other non-traditional donors might be a useful alternative to maintain recipients' economies. The regression table below demonstrates such tendencies. We used DAC-generated Western budget suspensions to see if these three non-traditional donors respond to Western conditionalities. As usual, if a country faces a budget suspension, then this recipient will look for other options. Indeed, many African countries are aid-dependent, and they need a substantial amount of money to run the state. Budget support is a very important type of aid that serves to fulfill governments' budgetary problems. Therefore, DAC countries, and some multilateral organizations such as the WB and the European Union use budget suspension to support their recipients. However, budget support has a conditional character, and donor uses it as a punishment mechanism.

The first two models in Table 5.7 table show the determinants of China's global ODA-like flows, and official flows to Africa, respectively. When I look into determinants of China's global financial flows, the first model above shows that China's exports, DAC's existence in the recipient country, and infant mortality rate are positively associated with China's grant-based ODA flows. These findings serve for both need-based and interest-based understandings. On the other hand, Taiwan's recognition, being a Muslim country, control of corruption, and top seven DAC members' exports are negatively associated with China's grant-based financial

Table 5.6 Regression Output for China, Turkiye and the UAE's ODA Flows

	(1) China	(2) Turkiye	(3) UAE	(4) Turkiye Africa	(5) UAE Africa	(6) China Africa
L.China ODA	0.345***	0.00160	-0.0101*	0.00121	-0.0238***	0.171***
	(9.93)	(0.47)	(-1.96)	(0.21)	(-2.82)	(3.63)
L.Turkiye ODA(log)	0.225**	0.734***	0.0688***	0.578***	0.130***	0.222
	(2.19)	(34.48)	(3.05)	(16.50)	(3.52)	(1.31)
L.UAE ODA(log)	0.0795	0.0111	0.650***	0.0223	0.620***	-0.000821
	(1.04)	(0.89)	(22.51)	(0.95)	(17.82)	(-0.01)
L.Imports from Turkiye(log)	-0.104	0.0749***	0.00603	0.0517	0.0492	-0.319*
	(-1.01)	(5.14)	(0.36)	(1.54)	(1.16)	(-1.77)
L.Imports from UAE(log)	0.0361	0.0137	0.0396***	0.00650	0.0112	-0.0227
	(0.46)	(1.28)	(2.73)	(0.25)	(0.33)	(-0.23)
L.Imports from China(log)	0.231**	-0.0357*	0.0319	0.0678	-0.0306	0.266
	(2.09)	(-1.82)	(1.21)	(1.61)	(-0.47)	(1.02)
L.UN China	3.775**	-0.522**	0.124	-0.963	0.888	1.287
	(2.42)	(-2.43)	(0.45)	(-1.47)	(0.75)	(0.24)
L.Top Seven DAC Exports(log)	-0.220***	-0.0393***	-0.0308**	-0.0605*	-0.0201	-0.284***
	(-2.92)	(-4.16)	(-2.09)	(-1.93)	(-0.79)	(-3.72)
L.Top Seven DAC ODA(log)	0.369***	0.0730***	0.0713***	0.0712**	0.0278	0.584***
	(5.05)	(6.62)	(4.87)	(2.24)	(0.55)	(3.59)
Taiwan Recognition	-6.828***	-0.181**	-0.0736	-0.117	-0.312	-9.007***
	(-10.88)	(-2.35)	(-0.65)	(-0.74)	(-1.57)	(-9.19)
Muslim Majority	-1.580***	0.378***	0.496***	0.476***	0.440**	-2.148**
	(-3.14)	(5.33)	(4.24)	(4.43)	(2.62)	(-2.58)
L.Control of Corruption	-1.150***	-0.194***	0.0124	-0.233**	-0.0502	-1.405**
	(-2.86)	(-4.46)	(0.19)	(-2.67)	(-0.40)	(-2.02)
L.GDP Per Capita(log)	0.0909	0.0106	-0.0157	0.0310	-0.0407	0.0664
	(1.16)	(1.05)	(-0.95)	(1.47)	(-1.17)	(0.48)
L.Infant Mortality	0.0334***	-0.00417***	0.00571***	-0.0101***	0.00194	-0.00579
	(3.24)	(-3.06)	(2.82)	(-3.83)	(0.49)	(-0.33)
L.Natural Resources	-0.265***	-0.0243	-0.0798***	0.0821***	-0.109**	-0.360*
	(-2.84)	(-1.53)	(-3.74)	(2.75)	(-2.05)	(-1.85)
L.Population(log)	-0.631***	0.0156	0.0254	-0.000414	0.167*	-0.292
	(-3.37)	(0.63)	(0.65)	(-0.01)	(1.81)	(-0.93)
L.Affected from Disasters	0.0499	-0.00432	-0.00327	0.00620	-0.00312	0.0845
	(1.41)	(-0.93)	(-0.38)	(0.75)	(-0.19)	(1.58)
constant	10.52***	0.605**	-0.283	0.228	-1.519	14.55*
	(4.90)	(2.03)	(-0.62)	(0.29)	(-0.97)	(1.97)
r2	0.459	0.803	0.631	0.651	0.577	0.329
N_clust	151	151	151	55	55	55
N	2291	2722	2722	979	979	821

t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

flows. These findings make us think that political and economic determinants of China's ODA flows are significant elements. Indeed, there is a substantial question: How does China respond to Western conditionalities? For instance, Uganda is one of the most suffered countries regarding political and economic budget suspensions. If Uganda was deprived of alternative sources of funding, then how it will carry out basic public services? How will it pay for officers' salaries? This is the point that non-traditional donors come into play. The first and fourth models show that China responds to Western political and economic aid suspensions. If a country's budget support is suspended by a DAC country in a year, ten China increases its foreign aid flows in the following year. However, in sub-Saharan Africa, it is striking that if DAC countries impose a budget suspension, then China increases its foreign aid flows in the following year. This finding is interesting because other regions do not

manifest such a tendency. This is a significant finding showing China might take the advantage of Western conditionalities. However, China's OOF is not associated with any political and economic budget suspensions. In other words, if DAC countries impose budget suspensions against any country, then China does not adjust its OOF to Western conditionalities. This is also signficant that commercially-oriented financial flows do not follow the footprints of grant-based flows. I show this finding in the third and fourth columns of Table A.8 in the Appendix. ODA-like flows and grants targets DAC countries aid suspensions, but its loan-based flows do not follow this. Grant-based types become a tool for China to react against Western conditionalities.

Table 5.7 Budget Support Suspension and NTDs' Response (2000-2014)

	(1) China	(2) Turkiye	(3) UAE	(4) China Africa	(5) Turkiye Africa	(6) UAE Africa
L.Turkiye ODA(log)	0.100	0.775***	0.0604**	0.00173	0.663***	0.137**
	(0.91)	(38.55)	(2.37)	(0.01)	(17.67)	(2.42)
L.UAE ODA(log)	0.0855	0.0277*	0.659***	0.0993	0.0212	0.607***
	(0.94)	(1.93)	(18.92)	(0.81)	(0.91)	(13.65)
L.China ODA	0.317***	0.00987**	0.00344	0.140***	0.0206**	-0.0226*
	(8.76)	(2.43)	(0.57)	(3.04)	(2.64)	(-1.87)
Political Suspension	1.544**	0.0133	0.0419	1.608**	0.129	0.0524
	(1.99)	(0.09)	(0.32)	(2.17)	(0.74)	(0.29)
Economic Suspension	1.362*	0.257	0.307	1.413	0.149	0.497*
	(1.66)	(1.18)	(1.46)	(1.39)	(0.60)	(1.99)
L.Imports from Turkiye(log)	-0.139	0.0680***	0.0148	-0.293	0.0583	0.0765
	(-1.28)	(4.16)	(0.89)	(-1.61)	(1.62)	(1.43)
L.Imports from UAE(log)	0.0794	0.0116	0.0217	-0.0627	-0.00835	-0.00604
	(1.02)	(1.14)	(1.47)	(-0.61)	(-0.38)	(-0.18)
L.Imports from China(log)	0.264**	-0.0270	-0.00320	0.308	0.0504	-0.0206
	(2.15)	(-1.47)	(-0.12)	(1.22)	(1.33)	(-0.30)
L.Top Seven DAC ODA(log)	0.372***	0.0508***	0.0518***	0.815***	0.0264	0.0144
	(4.69)	(4.66)	(3.34)	(4.17)	(0.87)	(0.27)
L.Top Seven DAC Exports(log)	-0.206***	-0.0381***	-0.0236**	-0.246***	-0.0441*	-0.0283
	(-2.91)	(-3.61)	(-2.24)	(-4.00)	(-2.00)	(-1.33)
Taiwan Recognition	-6.896***	-0.0429	-0.0360	-9.231***	0.207	-0.201
	(-10.29)	(-0.48)	(-0.29)	(-9.77)	(1.31)	(-0.76)
Muslim Majority	-1.512***	0.283***	0.701***	-2.154**	0.391***	0.507**
	(-2.71)	(4.07)	(4.87)	(-2.58)	(4.06)	(2.54)
L.Control of Corruption	-1.345***	-0.203***	0.0853	-2.087***	-0.201**	0.0679
	(-3.22)	(-4.56)	(1.38)	(-2.87)	(-2.31)	(0.42)
L.GDP Per Capita(log)	0.0963	0.00670	-0.0198	-0.0527	0.0200	-0.0314
	(1.10)	(0.60)	(-1.29)	(-0.41)	(0.96)	(-0.98)
L.Infant Mortality	0.0338***	-0.00556***	0.00553**	-0.0116	-0.0107***	0.00308
	(3.07)	(-4.41)	(2.51)	(-0.70)	(-4.04)	(0.71)
L.Natural Resources	-0.151	-0.0297*	-0.0763***	-0.255	0.0699**	-0.0883
	(-1.44)	(-1.93)	(-3.22)	(-1.29)	(2.51)	(-1.31)
L.Population(log)	-0.747***	0.0276	0.0925**	-0.792**	0.0414	0.176
	(-3.55)	(1.05)	(2.15)	(-2.23)	(0.94)	(1.66)
L.Affected from Disasters	0.0535	-0.0109**	-0.00890	0.112*	-0.00516	0.00153
	(1.34)	(-2.01)	(-0.89)	(1.76)	(-0.58)	(0.07)
constant	14.20***	0.138	-0.832*	20.97***	-0.925*	-1.120
	(5.91)	(0.50)	(-1.92)	(4.99)	(-1.75)	(-0.96)
r2	0.426	0.821	0.663	0.345	0.716	0.567
N_clust	153	153	153	55	55	55
N	1884	1884	1884	668	668	668

t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

This finding corroborates dissertations' third hypothesis, showing that if the DAC

countries impose a budget suspension, then China increases its foreign aid levels. However, it is important to underline that this finding is not valid for Turkiye and the UAE. Therefore, I show a variation among non-traditional donors regarding their response to Western budget suspensions. Although the UAE has its own sovereign wealth funds, it does not show such a tendency as we have in the China's case. UAE and Turkiye do not have a foreign policy and intention to replace Western donors.

Although conditionality is often associated with aid ineffectiveness, this finding shows that the DAC countries' budget suspensions are challenged by China's external support. It is not only because China's foreign support has no political conditionality, but also because its unconditional character also might undermine DAC conditionality. This finding is following Hernandez (2017)'s finding on the relationship between World Bank conditionality and China's foreign aid. World Bank offers less conditionality if China has more foreign aid engagement with the recipients. In our case, after a year from budget suspension, China increases its foreign aid flows to sub-Saharan African countries. Future implications of this finding are challenging for DAC, individual members, and the EU's global development policy; recipient countries can easily take the advantage of foreign aid competitively between different rival donors.

5.3.3 Non-DAC Donors' Response to Other non-DAC donors: The Case of Turkiye and the UAE

This section uncovers the geopolitical competition between Turkiye and the United Arab Emirates. The UAE has been a part of the status quo in the MENA region under the leadership of Saudi Arabia. The main idea of this section is to show that non-traditional donors also challenge each other and foreign aid flows play a significant role in the geopolitical struggle. On the other hand, these two Muslim countries always provide more foreign aid for Muslim majority countries, as seen in the previous chapter. However, in this section, I take religious and cultural proximity as a significant tool of geopolitical struggle. I begin with a regression analysis and extend my analysis to the cases of Somalia and Egypt. In this part, we need to three distinct hypotheses: namely H2, H7 and H8. We should analyze if non-traditional donors adjust their foreign aid flows to rival donors' existence. Then, I focus on whether religion is a significant factor globally and regionally. In our case, I describe Turkey and the UAE as rival donors for the reasons I suggest below. Indeed, even if religion and rival donors' existence is positively associated with Turkey's foreign aid flows, muslim countries with higher engagement with rival

donor might receive less foreign aid from Turkey.

Table 5.8 Turkiye's Response to Cultural Proximity (2000-2019)

	(1) Global)	(2) Africa	(3) Subsaharan	(4) Europe	(5) Middle-East	(6) Asia
L.Turkey ODA(log)	0.756***	0.590***	0.578***	0.635***	0.653***	0.811***
	(36.89)	(18.09)	(15.59)	(12.72)	(7.95)	(23.97)
Muslim Majority	0.376***	0.672***	0.584***	0.412	0.547	0.493**
	(3.56)	(4.70)	(3.81)	(1.38)	(1.40)	(2.15)
L.UAE ODA(log)	0.0251*	0.0699***	0.0625***	0.0193	0.0387*	0.00436
	(1.75)	(3.78)	(3.26)	(0.97)	(1.93)	(0.12)
Muslim Majority × L.UAE ODA(log)	-0.0116	-0.0812**	-0.00983	-0.0584		-0.00816
	(-0.56)	(-2.40)	(-0.29)	(-1.48)	(.)	(-0.19)
L.DAC ODA(log)	0.0742***	0.141***	0.103***	0.0946	0.127*	0.0341**
	(5.48)	(3.34)	(2.87)	(1.69)	(2.02)	(2.13)
L.Imports from Turkey(log)	0.0723***	0.0865***	0.0873***	0.179	-0.0628	0.0436
	(4.82)	(2.95)	(2.91)	(1.49)	(-0.85)	(1.64)
L.Natural Resources	-0.0351**	0.0729**	0.101**	0.251***	-0.0450	0.0179
	(-2.08)	(2.09)	(2.59)	(3.45)	(-0.89)	(0.64)
L.GDP Per Capita(log)	0.00532	0.00554	-0.000397	-0.0308	0.0281	-0.0145
	(0.50)	(0.25)	(-0.02)	(-0.47)	(0.92)	(-0.57)
L.Infant Mortality	-0.00295**	-0.0104***	-0.0140***	0.0424	-0.0142	0.00203
	(-2.34)	(-3.99)	(-4.26)	(1.23)	(-1.13)	(0.50)
L.Control of Corruption	-0.191***	-0.303***	-0.226*	-0.492	-0.137	-0.0717
	(-3.47)	(-2.76)	(-1.84)	(-0.90)	(-1.00)	(-0.76)
L.Electoral Democracy	-0.178	-0.0614	-0.278	-0.382	0.418	0.254
	(-1.33)	(-0.25)	(-0.99)	(-0.37)	(1.06)	(0.77)
L.Population(log)	-0.0142	-0.0603	-0.000444	-0.392***	0.229*	-0.00930
	(-0.63)	(-1.08)	(-0.01)	(-3.93)	(1.83)	(-0.18)
constant	-0.367	-0.584	-0.904*	3.532***	-3.071**	-0.0979
	(-1.32)	(-1.16)	(-1.77)	(4.75)	(-2.21)	(-0.16)
r2	0.800	0.656	0.674	0.865	0.901	0.864
N_clust	138	55	50	11	14	29
N	2535	991	896	204	248	548

t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Our regression output shows a significant variation in Turkey and the UAE's foreign aid flows. Regarding Turkey's UAE challenge, I find a positive association between Turkey and the UAE's ODA on a regional basis. Our second and third regression models show in Table 5.8 that African and Sub-Saharan countries with higher aid engagement with the UAE receive more foreign aid from Turkey when compared to other countries within these regions. This is also valid for Subsaharan Africa as seen in Table 5.8. African and sub-Saharan countries with higher levels of UAE ODA receive more Turkish ODA within their region. If we exclude North Africa from the sample, a robust association between UAE and Turkish ODA exists in sub-Saharan Africa where we find a positive association between Turkish and the UAE's ODA. As a result, we can claim that our first thesis is substantiated by our empirical data for these regions. However, our estimations for regional analysis do not reveal a similar trend. Therefore, we need to investigate African region a little bit more. This result might be related to the fact that both the UAE and Turkey provide higher levels of foreign aid to Muslim countries in these regions. However, even if we add Muslim percent and majority variable to the models, Africa and subsaharan

Africa still shows robust relationship between Turkey and the UAE ODA. When we include the "Muslim" variable, the association between Turkey and the UAE ODA still holds positive. Moreover, while we tested for multicollinearity, we were not able to find multicollinearity for a comparison of Turkish and UAE ODA.

Figure 5.1 Interaction of Religion and UAE ODA



There is a clear pattern among countries with majority Muslim populations that Turkey is giving more foreign aid globally and regionally. This finding holds true for Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia. The findings presented in this section corroborate those presented in the previous sections. The UAE's main aid destinations and African Muslim countries receive more Turkey's aid as seen in the second model. Does Turkey provide more foreign aid to Muslim countries with a higher level of UAE engagement? Limits of religious proximity must be captured by this question. A culturally proximate recipient faces this limit when there is a rival donor. In Table 5.8, the second model takes into account the presence of UAE ODA and the Muslim percent together. There is a need to examine whether Turkey provides more official development assistance (ODA) to the Muslim countries with which the UAE has a high level of engagement in terms of aid. In all models, lagged DV indicates that Turkey's ODA over the last year is a strong predictor of its ODA over the following year, as is seen in all models that use lagged DV. According to Table 5.8,

Muslim countries received more foreign aid from Turkey in Africa than non-Muslim countries. There is also evidence that Turkey provides more foreign aid to UAE's ODA recipients than to any other country. At the same time, it is striking that our interaction term of UAE ODA and Muslim -where we are primarily focusing our efforts - is negatively and strongly correlated with Turkey's ODA, at a 95 percent confidence level, which is statistically significant. As a result of my research, I aim to demonstrate that Turkey's attitude towards culturally proximate countries might be related to the existence of a rival donor, in this case, the UAE.

However, as presented in Table A.20, post-Arab Spring trends change substantially when compared to previous years. This is clearly visible in Africa, since Muslim majority countries with higher UAE engagement receive more foreign aid from Turkey after the Arab Spring. Although the same interaction is not valid for pre-Arab Spring period. After the Arab Spring, relations between the UAE and Turkey have become antogonistic. The fall of Morsi and increasing presence of the MB created a panic in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Therefore, Egypt and many other North African countries have become an arena of contestation between Turkey and leading Gulf countries, including the UAE and Saudi Arabia. It is interesting that Europe also shows such a tendency for Muslim countries, based on the fourth column in Table A.20 in the Appendix. After the Arab Spring, Europe also manifests such an inclination. In other words, Muslim majority countries with higher levels of UAE engagement receive less foreign aid from Turkey, which is valid for 95 percent confidence level for Africa and Europe. I do not corroborate the same finding for other regions.

Figure 5.1 illustrates the difference between pre-and post-Arab spring trends in the African region. Based on the third and fourth columns in Table A.20, parallel trends have ended for Muslim and non-Muslim countries, and slopes have significantly changed. In spite of this, we should be mindful of the fact that the post-Arab Spring trend does not indicate that Turkish foreign aid is given more to non-Muslim countries than it is to Muslim countries. Hence, this paper identifies the interaction between the binary religion variable and UAE ODA, because it will reveal that when regional contestation is acute in the region, Turkey's ODA for Muslim countries is conditioned by the presence of the rival donor in the recipient country. It is also an interesting case for the Middle East; however, it is to be expected that all the countries in this region -except for Israel - are Muslim, which makes it extremely hard to predict the effect of receiving aid from them. Therefore, we will not be relying on the estimations that are derived from the Middle East.

Table 5.9 UAE's Response to Cultural Proximity (2000-2019)

	(1) Global	(2) Africa	(3) Subsaharan	(4) Europe	(5) Middle East	(6) Asia
L.UAE ODA(log)	0.666***	0.610***	0.605***	0.635***	0.538***	0.576***
	(22.78)	(16.84)	(13.64)	(5.99)	(3.91)	(10.97)
Muslim Majority	0.519***	0.775***	1.013***	0.450	0.295	0.140
	(3.46)	(3.38)	(3.99)	(0.61)	(0.27)	(0.37)
L.Turkey ODA(log)	0.0788***	0.147***	0.140***	0.0300	0.0614	0.0905*
	(2.84)	(3.07)	(2.80)	(0.31)	(1.03)	(2.02)
Muslim Majority × L.Turkey ODA(log)	0.00607	-0.0478	-0.0838	0.0855	0	0.0365
	(0.17)	(-0.73)	(-1.25)	(0.84)	(.)	(0.49)
L.DAC ODA(log)	0.0525***	0.0168	-0.00762	0.0220	0.194*	0.0384
	(3.32)	(0.35)	(-0.16)	(0.30)	(1.79)	(1.34)
L.Imports from UAE(log)	0.0391**	0.0147	0.0100	-0.0293	-0.0713	0.112***
	(2.60)	(0.55)	(0.38)	(-0.76)	(-1.14)	(3.33)
L.Natural Resources	-0.0661***	-0.0862*	-0.0290	-0.0887	-0.0462	-0.0374
	(-2.70)	(-1.85)	(-0.60)	(-0.54)	(-0.92)	(-0.78)
L.GDP Per Capita(log)	-0.0138	-0.0438	-0.0498	0.197	-0.159*	0.0431
	(-0.85)	(-1.47)	(-1.52)	(1.63)	(-1.97)	(1.41)
L.Infant Mortality	0.00511***	0.000317	-0.00396	-0.0205	0.0504**	0.0173***
	(2.84)	(0.09)	(-1.02)	(-0.46)	(2.91)	(3.05)
L.Control of Corruption	0.0454	0.0324	0.0352	0.00650	0.0421	0.0254
	(0.63)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.01)	(0.16)	(0.21)
L.Electoral Democracy	0.0112	-0.371	-0.469	-0.291	-1.097	0.452
	(0.06)	(-0.86)	(-1.03)	(-0.21)	(-1.07)	(1.36)
L.Population(log)	0.0752***	0.164**	0.172**	0.160	-0.0805	0.0908*
	(3.20)	(2.08)	(2.34)	(1.07)	(-0.87)	(2.03)
constant	-1.174***	-1.040	-0.867	-3.419	3.839	-3.391***
	(-3.09)	(-1.25)	(-1.09)	(-1.62)	(1.49)	(-4.44)
r2	0.639	0.573	0.562	0.575	0.785	0.612
N_clust	138	55	50	12	13	29
N	2530	988	893	222	229	547

t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

As is shown in Table 5.9, there is statistical significance at the global level for both the Muslim majority and Turkish ODA variables. The second and third models in Table 5.9 show a significant association between Turkey's ODA and religion variables. The ODA of Turkey and the Muslim majority variables are significant in Africa and Subsaharan countries. UAE aid increases if Turkey provides more foreign aid to a random African country. Foreign aid from the UAE does not tend to be higher for Muslim-majority countries with more Turkey humanitarian engagement. Although the coefficient of the interaction term is not significant, there seems to be a significant association between the Muslim majority and Turkish ODA in Africa and Subsaharan Africa. In the following sections, based on Egypt and Somalia, I conduct an in-depth analysis of African countries.

While identifying a broad trend for Turkey and the UAE in Africa, we also attempted to evaluate how regional power dynamics might impact Turkey and the UAE's regional development plans in light of the unique circumstances of the receiving country. We use Egypt from North Africa and Somalia from South Africa as our primary case studies to achieve this. The former demonstrates how Turkey and the UAE pursue conflicting goals, while the latter demonstrates how Turkey and the

UAE support various regions inside the same nation, highlighting how drastically different their material interests are.

In the next part, we look at how Turkey and the UAE compete with one another for foreign aid in Somalia and Egypt. Additionally, we support our second hypothesis with these two examples. With its 1998 Africa "Opening," Turkey launched its new African initiaitve. But as seen in Figure 4.15, the UAE's involvement in overseas aid also rose from 2011. It is important to observe that both the UAE and Turkey increased their foreign assistance involvement with Africa after 2011. It is also clear that Turkey and the United Arab Emirates are vying for influence in Muslim nations at the same time. The following portion of this section will analyze how Turkey and the UAE used foreign aid to address geopolitical competition between each other.

The UAE and Turkey have undertaken approaches in Egypt that are noticeably different from one another since they were vying for the same political result. They appear to have similar preferences when it comes to Somalia receiving international recognition. Despite this, Somalia's sub-state developments reveal a startling pattern, with the UAE giving Somaliland the majority of its aid. Our data shows that, when there is geopolitical contestation, Turkey and the UAE frequently give ODA to various parties within a nation. From this point, we can say that the OECD's reporting might be inadequate to show sub-stata entities.

5.3.3.1 Egypt

Egypt is one of the most powerful and prominent nations in North Africa, with a population of 106 million. Due to its close geographic and political closeness to Israel and other Arab nations, it serves as a bridge between them. Being a country that experiences widespread turmoil, it has also experienced a rise in important conflicts between its different political groups as well as a rise in public dissatisfaction. The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and elite secularists are two of these significant divisions. During the Arab upheavals in 2011, Tunisia and Egypt saw significant levels of public mobilization, particularly when the MB spearheaded huge mobilizations. Turkey was able to expand its influence in these nations as a result of this rebellion. Turkey finally backed Mohammed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood after originally being reluctant to participate in the Arab upheavals. Turkey considerably expanded its ODA flows to Egypt in 2012 after Morsi was elected president as a show of solidarity. Following the military takeover that toppled Morsi in 2013, the Turkish government drastically cut back on its help to Egypt. Due to loan repayments following Morsi's overthrow, Turkish ODA for Egypt became negative during

President Sisi's first year in office. Turkey firmly opposes Egypt's military coup. On the other side, the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood in several nations has come under strong criticism from the UAE and Saudi Arabia (Diwan 2017). The UAE provided significant foreign aid to Egypt as part of its backing for the new administration led by President Sisi. Turkey and the UAE responded to Egypt's political upheavals in a strongly aggressive manner on the humanitarian front.

Figure 5.2 Turkiye and UAE's ODA to Egypt



Therefore, one should be cautious when reading Turkish motives for providing help to other nations as a sign of its support for Muslim nations. Egypt, a Muslim nation, did not get a lot of Turkish help before the Muslim Brotherhood took control. In the years before the revolution, the UAE gave ODA to Egypt. Indeed, the UAE generously donated to Egypt after Morsi was overthrown and the Muslim Brotherhood was forced from office. The Egyptian regime shift was a winner-take-all scenario for Turkey. Similarly, despite Egypt being a Muslim nation, the UAE did not gain anything from the Morsi administration. ODA from Turkey and the United Arab Emirates varies independently of Muslim characteristics and is consistent with the contention of regional power struggle.

5.3.3.2 Somalia

Compared to their power contests in Egypt, Turkish and UAE ODA to Somalia shows a different pattern. Despite substantial ODA from Turkey and the UAE, their support for Somalia exhibited parallel trends. Turkey and the UAE's assistance to Somalia manifest similar donor behavior, and invest in the country. Such trends can be seen in Figure 5.3. The UAE continued to provide ODA to Somalia even when their bilateral relations were strained by the Qatar crisis. The OECD, however, does not differentiate between ODA to Somalia and ODA to Somaliland in its reporting for Somalia. This is due to the fact that the OECD database incorporate only sovereign territories as recipients.

Figure 5.3 Turkiye and UAE's ODA to Somalia



The poor state capacity of Somalia, which accounts for Turkish and UAE ODA contributions, is a significant distinction between Somalia and Egypt. Due of Somalia's limited statehood, the central authority is unable to properly manage all of its provinces. In instance, Somaliland, a de facto state that lacks international recognition but enjoys a high level of internal sovereignty, longs for more independence from Somalia. In order to secure diplomatic recognition against Somalia, Somaliland has received support from a number of ODA donors. The UAE thinks more favorably of

Somaliland than Turkey does. In addition, Somalia is a nation that depends heavily on outside financial assistance to exist.

As a result, DAC and non-DAC donors compete fiercely in Somalia. Some of the donors who require political compromises in exchange for their material contributions include the Turkish government, China, and the governments of the Gulf nations. For instance, in response for Somalia's backing of the one-China policy, China backs the country's territorial integrity. Turkey also constructed a military installation in Mogadishu in addition to deploying soft power strategies there (Akpınar 2017). This mindset of self-interest may have sprung from geopolitical concerns. Due to its small status and reliance on foreign assistance, Somalia is particularly susceptible in its bilateral and international ties. Figure 5.3 illustrates the parallel trajectories that Turkey's and the UAE's ODA to Somalia are pursuing. Regarding Turkey's involvement in Somalia, during the country's civil war in the 1990s, the Turkish government backed the Somali government. Turkey maintains diplomatic presence in Somaliland through a general consul, demonstrating its support for both Somalia and Somaliland. Between Somalia and Somaliland, Turkey serves as a mediator (Akpınar 2013). Despite this, Turkey continues to see Somaliland as a sub-state entity and refuses to acknowledge it as a separate state.

The Turkish government provides foreign assistance to both Somalia and Somaliland, mediates disputes between rival groups, and acts as a check on other parties trying to exert influence in Somalia, such as the UAE. Thus, in order to prevent the central government from becoming concerned about Somaliland, Turkish ODA primarily benefits the central government. Despite this, the UAE has a different stance on Somalia than Turkey does. Turkey and the UAE show this variety in Somalia in addition to their rivalry for regional influence. Before the 2017 Qatar Crisis, Somalia's ties with the UAE were harmonious(International Crisis Group 2018). The UAE gave both Somalia and Somaliland foreign aid in exchange for political concessions. The UAE proposed to construct a hospital in Mogadishu during the Yemeni Civil War in an effort to win Somalia's assistance(Fenton-Harvey, Jonathan 2020). Even if the Somali government turned down the offer, it is nevertheless an instance of receiving foreign assistance in exchange for making a political compromise. Additionally, in order to control vital ports, the UAE invests more in Putland and Somaliland.

While the Somalian government had some reservations towards the UAE, Somaliland was more welcoming to the UAE, which also supported Somaliland's sovereignty claims. The most important policy concession for the UAE in Somaliland turned out to be the naval military bases. Somalian government appealed to the UN Security

Council to stop the UAE's construction of these military bases in Somaliland and tried to prevent the UAE's engagement in Somaliland, claiming its initiative for military bases violates the Federal State of Somalia's authority(Al-Jazeera 2018*a*). In response, Somaliland joined other African countries in its support of the UAE against Qatar. These are clear policy differences between Turkey and UAE in terms of their involvement in Somalia and Somaliland, and their engagement with different parties, highlighting their power contestation and regional rivalry. Despite their power struggles, Turkey and the UAE may choose to give Somalia suitable foreign aid based in part on the limited sovereignty of Somalia. According to OECD statistics and information provided to the OECD, assistance flows to Somaliland may also be considered aid to Somalia. This accounting may explain the significant degree of resemblance between the ODA to Somalia provided by the UAE and Turkey. Although the ODA from the UAE and Turkey is directed to various parts of the nation, it is nevertheless regarded as aid to Somalia without distinction between Somaliland and the Somalian government.

This is an empirical difficulty since sub-state aid statistics are not included in official reports. The whole Somalian area is referred to as Somaliland, and assistance is given to it, as is clear from ADFD's 2019 Annual Report. Although I am unable to locate any proof of the precise amount of ODA given to the government-controlled regions in Somalia, it appears that the UAE backed Somaliland. This critical accounting issue is brought up by states or areas with limited statehood. Despite being distributed to various parties within Somalia, the UAE and Turkey's assistance to that country is included in OECD reports as aid to Somalia.

Our case studies demonstrate the involvement of both parties in Egypt and Somalia despite the notable contrasts between Turkish and UAE activity in these countries. First of all, both nations have a Muslim religion, as do both of their benefactors. The limitations of ideational-based ODA have been shown in our qualitative investigation, hence generalizing religious-based components to accounting for Turkish ODA is inaccurate. While ideational affinity may influence how aid is distributed, geopolitical considerations continue to dominate, as seen by Egypt and Somalia/Somaliland. While Turkish and the UAE's worldwide and regional outreach in their ODA disbursements is influenced by religious concerns, this outreach nonetheless takes place in a geopolitical context. Because of this, a competing donor, specifically a geopolitical adversary, is a crucial element in the explanation of donor behavior. As observed in Somalia and Somaliland, this geopolitical competition drives competing donors to boost their ODA contributions in an effort to get additional policy concessions. The priority of geopolitical and material interests are the primary drivers of their ODA allocations in both Egypt and Somalia.

5.3.4 An Analysis of DAC and non-DAC Donors

In this section, I scrutinize differences among DAC donors in terms of their attitude toward recipient needs. The United States, UK, Japan, Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, France, and the European Union are significant DAC donors. I investigated their foreign aid flows separately. Do they also respond to the existence of non-traditional donors? To test this, I added three top non-traditional donors, composed of China, Turkey, and the UAE's ODA flows. It is striking that if any recipients get foreign aid from three non-traditional donors, then DAC countries provide more foreign aid in the following year. This is another example of the herding effect, from the perspective of traditional donors.

Table 5.10 Variation among Top DAC Donors (2000-2019)

	(1) EU	(2) France	(3) Germany	(4) USA	(5) UK	(6) Japan	(7) Sweden	(8) Netherlands
L.Three non-DAC ODA(log)	0.110***	0.0788***	0.0724***	0.0725***	0.0893***	0.0692***	0.0641***	0.0569***
	(6.30)	(5.32)	(4.53)	(3.96)	(6.77)	(4.41)	(4.22)	(4.22)
L.Three Non-DAC Export(log)	-0.498***	-0.361***	-0.157*	-0.150	-0.110	-0.0423	-0.253***	-0.232***
	(-4.90)	(-4.34)	(-1.86)	(-1.59)	(-1.31)	(-0.53)	(-3.20)	(-2.73)
Muslim Majority	0.331	0.200	0.434	-0.362	0.122	-0.475	0.0205	0.398
	(0.84)	(0.54)	(1.05)	(-0.91)	(0.30)	(-1.36)	(0.06)	(1.04)
L.UN China	5.437	5.778***	1.441	2.298	1.792	4.621***	-1.428	0.810
	(1.49)	(2.61)	(0.48)	(0.86)	(0.88)	(3.10)	(-0.45)	(0.34)
L.Control of Corruption	-1.635***	-1.267***	-0.839***	-1.441***	-0.314	-0.435	-0.638**	-0.174
	(-4.76)	(-4.29)	(-2.77)	(-4.80)	(-1.05)	(-1.44)	(-2.19)	(-0.58)
L.Electoral Democracy	3.489***	2.321***	2.243**	2.081**	0.471	0.169	0.382	1.569*
	(3.66)	(2.76)	(2.50)	(2.47)	(0.59)	(0.19)	(0.55)	(1.69)
L.GDP Per Capita(log)	-0.0727	0.0847	-0.0903	-0.120*	-0.140**	-0.0161	-0.114*	-0.0728
	(-1.13)	(1.38)	(-1.31)	(-1.69)	(-2.25)	(-0.23)	(-1.73)	(-1.04)
L.Infant Mortality	0.0112	0.0150*	0.00716	0.0223***	0.0186**	0.0179**	0.0181**	0.0150*
	(1.58)	(1.94)	(0.91)	(2.91)	(2.11)	(2.32)	(2.39)	(1.87)
L.Natural Resources	-0.158	-0.0280	-0.0198	-0.121	-0.208**	-0.180**	-0.190**	-0.0672
	(-1.37)	(-0.32)	(-0.19)	(-1.07)	(-2.31)	(-2.11)	(-2.30)	(-0.66)
L.Population(log)	0.735***	0.182	1.154***	0.755***	1.054***	0.521***	0.951***	1.023***
	(4.74)	(1.31)	(8.03)	(4.95)	(7.57)	(3.23)	(7.93)	(6.75)
L.Affected from Disasters	0.0644***	0.0282	0.0159	0.0678***	0.0394**	0.0769***	0.0629***	0.0236
	(3.39)	(1.57)	(0.92)	(3.85)	(2.26)	(3.86)	(3.92)	(1.19)
L.Imports from France(log)		0.570***						
		(5.14)						
L.Imports from Germany(log)			-0.138					
			(-1.17)					
L.Imports from USA(log)				-0.0898				
				(-1.29)				
L.Imports from UK(log)					-0.132			
					(-1.23)			
L.Imports from Japan(log)						-0.349***		
						(-3.77)		
L.Imports from Sweden(log)							0.0197	
							(0.25)	
L.Imports from Nether.(log)								-0.0933
								(-1.13)
constant	-2.283	-9.949***	-10.17***	-5.856**	-9.463***	-0.823	-5.869*	-7.078***
	(-0.66)	(-3.95)	(-3.25)	(-2.09)	(-4.16)	(-0.35)	(-1.91)	(-2.80)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
r2	0.484	0.351	0.460	0.493	0.451	0.305	0.472	0.403
N_clust	136	136	136	136	136	136	136	135
N	2492	2492	2492	2492	2492	2492	2492	2473

t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Good governance indicators such as control of corruption and democracy are also controversial. I find that the EU, France, Germany, the USA, and Sweden provide

more foreign aid to corrupt countries. This is actually what I find for the cases of China and Turkiye. Indeed, there is not any non-traditional donor that has a positive association with control of corruption. Good governance indicators are components of the recipient-need argument since Western countries believe that good governance increases recipient development (Burnside and Dollar 2000).

It is striking that the EU, France, USA, and Germany provide more foreign aid to democratic recipients. However, this does not ring true for other Western donors. On the other hand, more concrete recipient-need indicators, GDP Per Capita, and infant mortality rate manifest some divergences from non-traditional donors. The USA, UK, Japan, and Sweden provide more foreign aid flows to the recipients with a higher level of child mortality rate. However, the EU, Germany, France, and Netherlands do not show such a recipient need attitude. Another significant need indicator is GDP Per Capita. Only United Kingdom prioritizes low-income countries, namely the UK provides more foreign aid to countries with lower levels of GDP Per Capita. But, this is not corroborated by other countries. Regarding infant mortality and GDP Per Capita, the United Kingdom and the USA are the top countries that prioritize recipient needs.

Trade interests are significant to capture the economic orientation of donor behavior. I find that France has a strong positive association between exports and its foreign aid flows. However, this does not ring true for other countries. In this section, I showed traditional donors' variation among themselves in terms of recipient needs. Findings on control of corruption, democracy, and the recipient need to reflect the idea that some traditional donors are not different from non-traditional donors.

Table A.9 in the Appendix shows that lagged dependent variables are strongly and positively associated with traditional donors' foreign aid behavior in the following year. I added this model to the Appendix to show what changes after I add lagged DVs. However, the existence of lagged DV did not change our output. To sum up, I can conclude that there is a variation among traditional donors regarding their export-oriented aid, prioritization of recipient-need, or governance indicators. Therefore, we should not exaggerate the differences between traditional and non-traditional donors.

6. CONCLUSION

In this dissertation, we examined the foreign aid behavior of China, Turkiye, and the UAE from the perspective of system-level characteristics. The main hypothesis is that the foreign aid behavior of the three donors is shaped by the competitive geopolitical setting. I followed the footprints of competition between traditional and non-traditional donors by looking into their political and economic interests. In other words, rival donors' existence in a country and the policies of donors in those countries determine the foreign aid behavior of emerging donors.

Political interests are significant point that is shaped by system-level factors. All three non-traditional donors try to establish partnerships with African countries. In this sense, it is most likely for non-traditional donors to take the advantage of any political conditions that African countries face. For instance, I find that China, Turkey, and the UAE give more aid to countries to which the top seven DAC donors have given large amounts of aid. Therefore, this is a common point among non-traditional donors, showing that non-traditional and traditional donors' foreign aid destinations are similar. Donor concentration implies competitiveness across different recipient environments. While this trend is more visible in China and Turkey's case, the UAE manifests a softer stance regarding aid to competitive environments. we corroborate that if there is a donor concentration ina recipient environment, then non-traditional donors provide more foreign aid to such countries.

China has the strongest position regarding its political interests. For instance, Taiwan recognition is still a substantial issue for China during the 2000s. If a country establishes diplomatic relations with Taiwan, then this recipient does not receive foreign aid from China. However, this is not as strong as in China's loan-based commercial flows. Therefore, grant-based logic is different from investment and loan-based rationality. When it comes to economic interests, the Taiwan issue loses its importance to some extent. However, I should note that Taiwan's recognition is still a significant issue for commercially oriented flows; however, it is not as strong as grant-based flows. On the other hand, China provides more grant-based flows to

recipients who have a higher UNGA voting similarity with China, based on Table A.13 in the appendix.

Our second concern is to investigate how non-traditional donors respond to DAC-generated political and economic conditionalities. Western countries' aid suspensions are crucial in terms of governance, social needs, and fiscal stability of the recipients. Countries dependent on foreign aid recently faced a dilemma: How will they find alternative financial flows if Western-DAC countries suspend their aid? Many African countries are aid-dependent, meaning that they cannot run their states without substantial amounts of foreign aid. Emerging donors are useful options for recipients in such a social and economic setting. Additionally, I tested whether non-traditional donors provide more foreign aid to suspended recipients. Those who suffer from Western political and economic conditions may receive more foreign aid from non-traditional donors. I find that if a recipient country faced a politically driven budget suspension or sanction from DAC countries, then China increases its ODA-like flow in the following year. These ODA-like flows have a generous grant element, and this might be an example that China might replace or challenge DAC countries in Africa. Although we were able to confirm these hypotheses for China, we could not confirm them for UAE and Turkiye. The most important reason for this is that the UAE and Turkiye do not have the power to pose a threat to the conditionality policies of the DAC countries globally, besides, Turkiye is an OECD member and the UAE is an OECD-DAC participant. Both Turkiye and the UAE have deep ties with Western countries and their institutions. Therefore, both Turkey and the UAE do not have interests to challenge Western foreign aid policies, aiming to replace them. In this sense, China, Turkey, and the UAE show a variation among each other. Therefore, my dissertation distinguishes each non-traditional donor from the other, which is another contribution to the literature.

For China, political and economic challenge is global; however, this is not valid for Turkey and the UAE. These two minor foreign aid donors have politicized regional foreign aid policies. Indeed, I suggested that their foreign aid behavior is strongly affected by surrounding regional crises, including Arab Spring and diverging political interests. I detected that they both provide more foreign aid to Muslim countries. However, this religious orientation is political, instead of targeting religious proximity. On the other hand, I find that they provide more foreign to the places where other donors allocate more foreign aid. Strikingly, Turkey provides less foreign aid to Muslim-majority countries with high foreign aid engagement with the UAE. This finding is valid for the African region and Europe, where Turkey and the UAE politically and economically invest more during the 2000s. Africa is a new hub of donor

competition between regional players, as articulated in the cases of Somalia and Egypt. In this sense, I visualized how foreign aid flows are shaped by the political crisis in the region, based on the cases of Turkey and the UAE. Consequently, I demonstrate that, unlike China, Turkey and the UAE do not respond negatively to DAC-generated conditions; nevertheless, their desire for regional dominance impacts their political economy of development aid. This demonstrates the limitations of cultural and religious justifications, as Turkey's case exemplified.

The export-oriented aid behavior of non-traditional donors is another arena of investigation. Each donor is actually a competitive commercial actor in trade-related matters, which is especially evident in Africa's case. In terms of trade, I discover that Turkiye's international aid flows are export-focused. Turkey provides greater assistance to African nations who have strong export partnership with Turkey. In the region, it offers more foreign goods to locations where it has export partnerships. The same conclusion holds true for China and the UAE's worldwide ODA flows. However, African countries with trade partnership with the UAE and China does not receive more foreign aid vis-a-vis other African countries. However, China's loan-based and commercially oriented other official flows have a strong positive relation to its exports on the global and regional levels. China prioritizes its export partners in specific regions and provides more foreign aid such as African and Asian countries. In other words, China's export partners in Africa and Asia receive much more loan-based foreign aid when compared to other African and Asian countries. This is a striking point showing how China prioritizes its economic interests in the African region. Therefore, my dissertation also makes a distinction between China's loan-based and grant-based financial flows, which is crucial to predict determinants of China's foreign aid flows (Dreher et al. 2018).

This finding has regional implications. Africa emerges as a contested region, where non-traditional and traditional donors encounter. Turkiye's export-aid nexus is visible, as a result of its Africa opening, and Africa is a growing market for Turkiye's trade flows. China -as an export power- has the power to replace leading Western exporter countries. However, I also find that Turkiye and China's foreign aid flows are strongly negatively associated with the top seven DAC exporter countries, meaning that their foreign aid flows are more likely to target the places where the top seven OECD exporters have fewer trade engagements. Regionally, Africa is the most prominent region of such an inclination. Within Africa, countries with less trade engagement with the West receive more foreign aid from Turkiye and China. However, the UAE's foreign aid flows do not have a negative or positive association with the top seven OECD exporters in Africa. There is not any global or regional variation of export destination concerning its foreign aid flows. This difference be-

tween the UAE and the other two non-traditional donors is important, showing that although they are export powers, is also significant for non-traditional donors. To sum up, China and Turkey's political and trade behavior are similar to each other when compared to the UAE.

However, Turkey and the UAE are not objectively global actors like China uses foreign financial flows to fund huge infrastructure projects, and their relations with the West are not as loose as China's. Although it is a fact that Turkiye and UAE do not compete with traditional donors globally, this does not mean that their foreign aid behavior is independent of power relations. The foreign aid behavior of both countries has been influenced by certain systemic or regional factors. While the collapse of the Soviet Union is a very important factor determining the foreign aid behavior for Turkiye, the Arab Spring is the second important geopolitical change that affects the foreign aid behavior regionally. The same thing with the Arab Spring applies to UAE. While regional and political solidarity against Israel within the framework of OPEC was an important component of UAE's foreign aid, today, on the contrary, the new regimes established after the Arab Spring constitute an important component of UAE's foreign aid behavior. Therefore, the regional power struggle, that is, the drive to be influential on neighboring regimes, has guided both Turkiye's and UAE's foreign aid behavior.

This dissertation deals with foreign aid behavior from a systemic level. Therefore, it states that competition between states is more important than the state level or domestic power relations. However, their response to such power relations might be different, as we see in their foreign aid policies. While the rivalry between Turkiye and the UAE can be explained by both political and cultural variables. China's foreign aid behavior results from economic and political issues such as trade, policy concessions for investment, and Taiwan recognition. It should be noted that the foreign aid behavior of each non-traditional aid donor is different. Although these differences are important, the main point that unites these differences is that the competition of these donors with rival donors is effective in determining foreign aid behavior. Therefore, systemic factors, ie regional or global distribution of power, and rival donors' existence are the most important factors of foreign aid. From a different aspect, the connection between China's economic and political interests in Africa or other regions is also a part of systemic theories because its loan and grant-based financial flows aim to increase its influence in the region. In this sense, this dissertation is a part of the literature that explains helping behavior at the systemic level. Although state-level explanations find more and more place in the foreign aid literature today, this dissertation argues that the systemic level is more effective in determining foreign aid behavior.

In addition, our findings explain the foreign aid behavior of non-traditional donors as interest-based. That is, an attitude towards the needs of the recipient states is not evident. In this sense, my dissertation becomes a part of interest-based literature. Although this is the case, I also used different variables to control for government-level and needs-based studies. But we have seen that these variables are not statistically significant. I find that three non-traditional donors do not regard recipient needs, which are measured by GDP Per Capita and infant mortality rate. Moreover, I measured their reaction to governance indicators such as control of corruption and democracy. However, I compared their attitude towards such state-level factors with traditional donors' attitudes. I find that traditional donors show a significant variation among each other regarding recipient-need and governance indicators. Japan, the US, UK, Germany, France, Sweden, and Netherlands's foreign aid behavior vary significantly, and it is hard to capture robust similarities among each other. In this sense, it is wrong to suggest that traditional and non-traditional bilateral flows are strongly different from each other.

My research contributes to the literature in many different aspects. First, I measure how three different non-traditional donors respond to foreign aid from DAC member states and multilateral organizations. This is the first comparative and comprehensive study that investigates patterns of NTDs' foreign aid behavior. Our contribution detects the variation between three different donors and concentrates on the cause. Therefore, it determines that non-traditional donors may not be in a systemic struggle against the West and that their foreign aid behavior may be a competition among themselves. Also, I suggest that economic and political factors vary substantially and it creates sound divergences among non-traditional donors. Moreover, I contribute to the UAE's aid literature, as my work is the first statistical analysis of the UAE's foreign aid. Our last contribution is that the deep distinction between traditional donors and non-traditional donors is unfounded, with the global or regional ambitions of its ever-increasing multipolarity. Therefore, one of the most important points we should pay attention to is that when talking about geopolitical struggle and investigating the effects of this struggle on foreign aid behavior is not creating a sharp distinction between West and East. This finding of the dissertation contributes to the literature. Just as traditional donors are not a whole among themselves, similarly, non-traditional donors are not a whole among themselves.

On the other hand, dialogue between traditional and non-traditional donors is significant. Systemic reasons that force each donor to behave in their political and economic interests create dangers, but this does not preclude cooperation among donors on important development concerns. Rather, new challenges bring their ways of cooperation. China signals that it might harmonize its foreign aid policy

with OECD standards. In 2016, the European Commission wanted to establish a trilateral institutional body among the EU, China, and African countries for the regulation of foreign aid (Stahl 2017). Although the future of these cooperative endeavors is unknown, the international community will continue to prioritize the need for multilateral and bilateral development cooperation. In this regard, this study highlights the significance of geopolitical factors regarding traditional and non-traditional donor behavior, yet collaboration is always a possibility. While I detect the challenges of a more harmonized foreign aid policy, I also suggest that cooperation is possible in the following years.

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APPENDIX A

Additional Models and Figures

This appendix includes alternatives figures and regression models, complements the main regressions models in the dissertation manuscript. When we add UN Voting Similarity data Kosovo and West Bank/Gaza are excluded from the sample. This affects our estimations. Therefore, we add UN Voting with US to this appendix to detect whether our results change or not.

Figure A.1 Exports to Africa: China, Turkiye, UAE and Top Seven DAC Exporters



Figure A.2 Main Recipients

	UAE		Turkey		China ODA
Egypt	13936.64	Syrian	34769.36	Iraq	8152
Yemen	6671.75	Kyrgyzstan	788.19	Ethiopia	6568
Jordan	2755.81	Afghanistan	756.02	Indonesia	4425
Morocco	2386.86	Somalia	624.8	Congo	4239
WB.Gaza	2197.39	Egypt	612.67	Pakistan	4178
Serbia	2132.62	Pakistan	487.04	Sri Lanka	4174
Sudan	1906.78	Kazakhstan	468.86	Cuba	3352
Afghanistan	1614.44	WB.Gaza	392.92	Bangladesh	2947
Pakistan	1116.45	Iraq	316.57	Myanmar	2721
Lebanon	1029.02	Bosnia	297.83	Sudan	2567
Oman	963.48	Azerbaijan	259.72	Uzbekistan	2240
Iraq	820.06	Albania	198.55	Ghana	2210
Syria	586.27	Tunisia	192.62	Cambodia	2196
Eritrea	342.88	Sudan	168.24	Zambia	2100
Mali	322.39	N.Macedonia	134.67	Kenya	2034

Figure A.3 China Regional (MENA Included)



Figure A.4 Turkiye Regional (MENA Included)



Figure A.5 UAE Regional (MENA Included)



Table A.1 Regression Output for Different Aid Modalities with UN Voting with USA

	(1) China Grant	(2) China ODA	(3) China Loan	(4) China OOF
L.China Grant	0.289***			
	(8.16)			
L.Imports from China(log)	0.310**	0.323**	0.708***	0.665***
	(2.10)	(2.43)	(4.86)	(4.36)
L.Top Seven DAC ODA(log)	0.448***	0.522***	0.212**	0.0981
	(6.34)	(7.38)	(2.03)	(1.04)
L.Top Seven DAC Exports(log)	-0.315**	-0.370***	-0.204*	-0.172
	(-2.05)	(-3.03)	(-1.79)	(-1.59)
Taiwan Recognition	-6.613***	-6.989***	-2.882***	-2.643***
	(-10.72)	(-10.46)	(-4.85)	(-4.18)
Muslim Majority	-1.164***	-1.114**	-2.056***	-1.613***
	(-2.69)	(-2.48)	(-3.52)	(-2.81)
L.UN Voting with the US	0.0562	-0.609	-1.719	-0.884
	(0.05)	(-0.50)	(-1.21)	(-0.70)
L.Electoral Democracy	-1.144	-1.383	0.0700	-0.908
	(-1.13)	(-1.25)	(0.06)	(-0.76)
L.Control of Corruption	-1.301***	-1.139***	-0.806*	-1.222***
	(-3.18)	(-2.64)	(-1.97)	(-3.06)
L.GDP Per Capita(log)	0.114	0.140*	-0.0135	0.0133
	(1.45)	(1.70)	(-0.13)	(0.13)
L.Infant Mortality	0.0213**	0.0298***	-0.00399	-0.0178
	(2.14)	(2.75)	(-0.31)	(-1.37)
L.Natural Resources	-0.264***	-0.241**	0.290**	0.175
	(-2.65)	(-2.41)	(2.08)	(1.33)
L.Population(log)	-0.666***	-0.678***	0.198	0.239
	(-3.17)	(-3.17)	(0.75)	(0.96)
L.Affected from Disasters	0.0463	0.0443	-0.00867	0.0543
	(1.31)	(1.18)	(-0.20)	(1.50)
L.China ODA		0.329***		
		(9.13)		
L.China Loan			0.331***	
			(11.51)	
L.China OOF				0.369***
				(10.98)
constant	14.49***	15.06***	-6.370**	-6.448**
	(5.07)	(5.06)	(-2.23)	(-2.12)
r2	0.354	0.434	0.272	0.313
N_clust	136	136	136	136
N	2101	2101	2101	2101

t statistics in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.2 Regression Output for China's ODA with UN Voting with USA and Electoral Democracy Index

	(1) Africa	(2) Asia	(3) Middle East	(4) Europe	(5) Americas	(6) Oceania
L.China ODA	0.162***	0.317***	0.103	0.128*	0.305***	-0.155**
	(3.05)	(4.92)	(1.49)	(2.06)	(3.98)	(-4.75)
L.Imports from China(log)	-0.0530	0.668*	0.0800	-0.0942	1.019***	1.079***
	(-0.35)	(2.02)	(0.12)	(-0.25)	(3.01)	(6.92)
L.Top Seven DAC ODA(log)	0.577***	0.663***	0.158	0.383**	0.395	0.0648
	(3.86)	(3.96)	(1.35)	(2.34)	(1.23)	(0.93)
L.Top Seven DAC Exports(log)	-0.343***	-0.793***	0.0148	-0.0876	-1.915**	0.712
	(-4.08)	(-3.68)	(0.23)	(-0.33)	(-2.71)	(1.12)
Taiwan Recognition	-9.014***	0	0	-8.939***	-2.953	-13.23***
	(-11.11)	(.)	(.)	(-4.07)	(-1.43)	(-6.93)
Muslim Majority	-2.263***	1.015	12.81*	-1.208	0	0
	(-3.34)	(1.11)	(1.84)	(-0.92)	(.)	(.)
L.UN Voting with the US	1.297	-0.663	3.394	5.073*	1.989	-0.557
	(0.65)	(-0.16)	(0.62)	(1.93)	(0.66)	(-0.10)
L.Control of Corruption	-2.265***	-1.868**	0.618	-3.908**	0.159	-3.972**
	(-3.42)	(-2.47)	(0.42)	(-2.65)	(0.12)	(-4.94)
L.Electoral Democracy	3.956**	-2.964*	6.345	-9.970**	-0.269	-0.437
	(2.06)	(-1.81)	(1.16)	(-3.15)	(-0.08)	(-0.18)
L.GDP Per Capita(log)	0.0367	0.401**	-0.184	0.0591	-0.0422	-1.647**
	(0.31)	(2.31)	(-1.00)	(0.12)	(-0.22)	(-3.82)
L.Infant Mortality	-0.0132	-0.0180	0.180**	-0.209	-0.0203	0.227**
	(-0.76)	(-0.48)	(2.71)	(-1.30)	(-0.43)	(4.26)
L.Natural Resources	-0.309	-0.717***	-1.269***	-1.027	0.614	-1.699**
	(-1.52)	(-3.21)	(-5.86)	(-1.58)	(1.30)	(-4.57)
L.Population(log)	-0.200	-0.380	0.722	0.137	-0.303	-3.425***
	(-0.64)	(-0.89)	(0.62)	(0.24)	(-0.54)	(-10.84)
L.Affected from Disasters	0.0825	0.0389	0.0432	0.110	-0.0370	-0.0382
	(1.59)	(0.45)	(0.32)	(1.53)	(-0.35)	(-1.45)
constant	14.45***	12.37*	-16.87	11.28	27.42**	59.70**
	(3.75)	(1.97)	(-1.06)	(1.07)	(2.31)	(5.32)
r2	0.330	0.476	0.559	0.350	0.314	0.883
N_clust	55	28	13	11	25	4
N	826	446	196	171	398	64

t statistics in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.3 Regression Output for China's OOF with UN Voting with USA and Electoral Democracy Index

	(1) Africa	(2) Asia	(3) Middle East	(4) Europe	(5) Americas	(6) Oceania
L.China OOF	0.251***	0.347***	0.330***	0.105	0.288***	-0.279**
	(5.40)	(5.52)	(3.45)	(1.59)	(3.62)	(-3.24)
L.Imports from China(log)	0.847***	0.910**	-0.190	0.0929	1.280*	0.789
	(3.30)	(2.74)	(-0.44)	(0.71)	(2.06)	(0.78)
L.Top Seven DAC ODA(log)	0.219	0.00655	0.0663	0.0762	-0.713**	-0.132**
	(1.27)	(0.03)	(0.34)	(0.95)	(-2.58)	(-3.32)
L.Top Seven DAC Exports(log)	-0.0164	-0.583*	-0.196	0.0811*	-0.970	1.879
	(-0.15)	(-1.87)	(-1.02)	(1.82)	(-1.21)	(1.43)
Taiwan Recognition	-0.303	0	0	-0.938*	-2.564	13.43**
	(-0.36)	(.)	(.)	(-1.88)	(-1.39)	(4.83)
Muslim Majority	-2.520***	0.291	2.945	0.699**	0	0
	(-3.29)	(0.24)	(0.70)	(2.50)	(.)	(.)
L.Control of Corruption	-1.920**	-1.469	1.755	1.683	-0.817	-8.531
	(-2.33)	(-1.69)	(1.20)	(1.52)	(-0.81)	(-1.44)
L.Electoral Democracy	0.426	-4.355*	4.327	-25.02***	1.974	-0.714
	(0.20)	(-1.77)	(0.93)	(-7.30)	(0.64)	(-0.07)
L.UN Voting with the US	1.915	0.871	-0.486	3.580	2.157	4.170
	(0.73)	(0.21)	(-0.14)	(1.11)	(0.72)	(0.26)
L.GDP Per Capita(log)	-0.192	0.494**	0.00633	-0.814**	-0.307**	1.926
	(-0.98)	(2.24)	(0.03)	(-3.09)	(-2.12)	(0.68)
L.Infant Mortality	-0.00847	-0.0141	-0.0221	-0.402**	-0.0374	-0.0767
	(-0.37)	(-0.30)	(-0.41)	(-2.99)	(-0.65)	(-0.61)
L.Natural Resources	-0.343	0.445	0.0758	-0.844	0.424	-5.363**
	(-1.21)	(1.56)	(0.27)	(-1.56)	(0.95)	(-3.88)
L.Population(log)	0.139	0.278	1.339	1.618***	0.926	6.628
	(0.32)	(0.65)	(1.25)	(3.28)	(1.60)	(1.86)
L.Affected from Disasters	0.0312	0.131*	0.218**	0.111	0.0393	-0.0650
	(0.54)	(1.98)	(2.28)	(0.93)	(0.43)	(-0.43)
constant	-6.647	-8.987	-17.71	3.445	-2.853	-116.4
	(-1.60)	(-1.47)	(-1.30)	(0.53)	(-0.30)	(-1.56)
r2	0.253	0.420	0.225	0.506	0.320	0.464
N_clust	55	28	13	11	25	4
N	826	446	196	171	398	64

t statistics in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.4 Regression Output for Turkiye Regional Analysis with UN Voting with USA and Electoral Democracy

	(1) Global	(2) Africa	(3) Asia	(4) Middle East	(5) Europe	(6) Americas	(7) Oceania
L.Turkiye ODA(log)	0.734***	0.592***	0.758***	0.581***	0.687***	0.386***	0.322
	(34.40)	(18.15)	(19.38)	(6.45)	(23.18)	(3.80)	(2.29)
L.Imports from Turkiye(log)	0.0840***	0.104***	0.0826**	0.0864	0.124	0.248***	0.0314
	(5.17)	(3.27)	(2.53)	(1.01)	(1.20)	(4.68)	(0.84)
L.Top Seven DAC ODA(log)	0.0981***	0.0743**	0.110***	0.169***	0.0705	0.101***	0.0884**
	(8.29)	(2.44)	(4.58)	(3.18)	(1.58)	(3.79)	(3.37)
L.Top Seven DAC Exports(log)	-0.0565***	-0.0643**	0.0290	-0.0172	0.0349	-0.131*	0.0753
	(-2.63)	(-2.21)	(1.26)	(-1.41)	(0.93)	(-2.03)	(0.34)
Muslim Majority	0.392***	0.428***	0.441***	-0.0618	0.239	0	0
	(5.85)	(4.48)	(2.83)	(-0.13)	(1.39)	(.)	(.)
L.Control of Corruption	-0.157***	-0.273***	-0.113	-0.165	-0.520	0.162*	-0.359
	(-3.03)	(-2.73)	(-1.25)	(-0.97)	(-0.93)	(1.86)	(-1.19)
L.Electoral Democracy	-0.244*	0.0138	0.338	0.630	-0.367	-1.051***	-2.075
	(-1.82)	(0.05)	(0.94)	(1.04)	(-0.33)	(-4.46)	(-2.15)
L.UN Voting with the US	0.702***	1.119***	0.0482	-1.027	-0.256	0.793**	0.0533
	(3.98)	(4.37)	(0.18)	(-1.58)	(-0.45)	(2.40)	(0.05)
L.GDP Per Capita(log)	0.0152	0.0251	-0.0127	0.0381	-0.0299	0.0227*	0.125
	(1.44)	(1.24)	(-0.47)	(1.28)	(-0.49)	(1.87)	(0.71)
L.Infant Mortality	-0.00419***	-0.0108***	0.00303	-0.00879	0.0502	-0.00281	0.0170
	(-2.79)	(-3.94)	(0.80)	(-0.91)	(1.44)	(-0.57)	(0.80)
L.Natural Resources	-0.0176	0.0619*	-0.00486	-0.00409	0.265***	0.0252	0.121
	(-1.06)	(1.86)	(-0.19)	(-0.12)	(3.54)	(0.64)	(1.30)
L.Population(log)	0.00672	0.0328	-0.0780	0.0563	-0.407**	0.0813	-0.510
	(0.25)	(0.60)	(-1.16)	(0.44)	(-2.88)	(1.64)	(-1.62)
L.Affected from Disasters	-0.00479	0.00734	-0.0187	0.0244	-0.0254	-0.0123	0.0231
	(-0.95)	(0.89)	(-1.39)	(1.14)	(-1.70)	(-0.88)	(0.90)
constant	-0.197	-0.799	-0.220	-1.660	3.851***	-1.160*	3.835
	(-0.63)	(-1.64)	(-0.33)	(-1.04)	(3.79)	(-1.92)	(1.32)
r2	0.800	0.653	0.869	0.896	0.891	0.461	0.368
N_clust	136	55	29	13	10	25	4
N	2490	983	548	230	185	469	75

t statistics in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.5 Regression Output for Different Aid Modalities with UN Voting with USA and Electoral Democracy Index (UAE)

	(1) Global	(2) Africa	(3) Asia	(4) Middle East	(5) Europe	(6) Americas	(7) Oceania
L.UAE ODA(log)	0.662***	0.632***	0.550***	0.477***	0.495***	0.532***	0.507**
	(23.32)	(18.65)	(11.20)	(4.35)	(3.93)	(5.30)	(3.79)
L.Imports from UAE(log)	0.0590***	0.0411	0.185***	-0.0828	0.0112	0.127***	0.131*
	(3.63)	(1.42)	(4.86)	(-0.68)	(0.29)	(3.96)	(2.41)
L.Top Seven DAC ODA(log)	0.0943***	0.0441	0.0972***	0.332***	0.0339	0.0624**	0.151***
	(5.15)	(0.84)	(4.74)	(4.16)	(0.90)	(2.39)	(6.57)
L.Top Seven DAC Exports(log)	-0.0165	-0.0125	-0.00293	0.00560	0.0373	-0.0599	-0.254
	(-1.16)	(-0.48)	(-0.10)	(0.21)	(1.24)	(-0.57)	(-0.73)
Muslim Majority	0.595***	0.696***	0.545**	0.479	1.471**	0	0
	(5.02)	(4.27)	(2.48)	(0.23)	(3.10)	(.)	(.)
L.Control of Corruption	-0.00229	-0.0446	-0.0381	0.127	-0.344	-0.127	0.473
	(-0.03)	(-0.30)	(-0.37)	(0.36)	(-0.88)	(-0.99)	(1.50)
L.Electoral Democracy	0.0417	-0.419	0.822***	-1.597	1.476	-0.302	-3.302
	(0.22)	(-0.94)	(3.37)	(-1.26)	(1.09)	(-0.98)	(-2.17)
L.UN Voting with the US	0.0986	0.645	-2.037***	1.181	-1.536	1.018	-4.801**
	(0.31)	(1.28)	(-3.08)	(0.84)	(-1.06)	(1.47)	(-4.15)
L.GDP Per Capita(log)	-0.00789	-0.0308	0.0456*	-0.150**	-0.00789	0.0330	1.014**
	(-0.49)	(-0.84)	(2.01)	(-2.41)	(-0.11)	(1.30)	(3.80)
L.Infant Mortality	0.00244	-0.00276	0.0149**	0.0488**	0.0139	-0.0182***	-0.0164
	(1.30)	(-0.78)	(2.52)	(2.54)	(0.37)	(-3.30)	(-0.85)
L.Natural Resources	-0.0465**	-0.0786	-0.0388	-0.0120	0.215	-0.107*	0.307
	(-2.23)	(-1.57)	(-0.78)	(-0.22)	(1.50)	(-2.02)	(1.26)
L.Population(log)	0.0524	0.176**	-0.0775	-0.130	-0.231	0.0552	0.486
	(1.43)	(2.10)	(-1.04)	(-0.77)	(-1.46)	(0.65)	(1.42)
L.Affected from Disasters	-0.00482	-0.00304	0.0225*	-0.0521	-0.0114	0.00352	-0.0212
	(-0.55)	(-0.19)	(2.00)	(-1.17)	(-0.38)	(0.36)	(-0.69)
constant	-1.008**	-1.512	-1.220	3.709	1.785	-0.294	-11.49*
	(-2.09)	(-1.56)	(-1.44)	(1.03)	(0.87)	(-0.23)	(-2.36)
r2	0.629	0.569	0.622	0.767	0.571	0.435	0.544
N_clust	136	55	29	12	11	25	4
N	2485	980	547	211	203	469	75

t statistics in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.6 Regression Output for China, Turkiye and the UAE's ODA Flows with UN Voting with USA and Electoral Democracy Index

	(1) China ODA	(2) Turkiye ODA(log)	(3) UAE ODA(log)	(4) China ODA	(5) Turkiye ODA(log)	(6) UAE ODA(log)
L.Turkiye ODA(log)	0.174	0.750***	0.0491**	0.207	0.633***	0.142***
	(1.58)	(35.48)	(2.00)	(1.17)	(17.87)	(3.56)
L.UAE ODA(log)	0.0594	0.0119	0.660***	0.0302	0.0178	0.620***
	(0.73)	(0.75)	(21.34)	(0.27)	(0.64)	(16.74)
L.China ODA	0.326***	0.00808**	-0.00168	0.159***	0.0211***	-0.0204
	(9.11)	(2.03)	(-0.27)	(3.02)	(3.05)	(-1.62)
L.Imports from Turkiye(log)	-0.0956	0.0734***	0.00416	-0.305*	0.0445	0.0598
	(-0.69)	(4.68)	(0.20)	(-1.85)	(1.54)	(1.40)
L.Imports from UAE(log)	0.0488	0.0219*	0.0486***	0.0482	0.000222	0.00432
	(0.50)	(1.91)	(2.68)	(0.49)	(0.01)	(0.12)
L.Imports from China(log)	0.302**	-0.0358	0.00343	0.0996	0.0573	-0.0245
	(2.22)	(-1.61)	(0.11)	(0.41)	(1.35)	(-0.38)
L.Top Seven DAC ODA(log)	0.446***	0.0791***	0.0879***	0.521***	0.0462	0.0403
	(5.34)	(6.65)	(4.31)	(3.15)	(1.62)	(0.76)
L.Top Seven DAC Exports(log)	-0.353***	-0.0485***	-0.0120	-0.319***	-0.0528**	-0.0130
	(-2.86)	(-2.72)	(-0.86)	(-4.64)	(-2.02)	(-0.49)
Taiwan Recognition	-6.809***	-0.123	-0.102	-9.102***	0.130	-0.200
	(-9.17)	(-1.35)	(-0.77)	(-10.73)	(0.83)	(-0.91)
Muslim Majority	-1.470***	0.313***	0.597***	-2.279***	0.453***	0.444**
	(-2.73)	(4.39)	(4.47)	(-2.88)	(4.80)	(2.48)
L.Control of Corruption	-1.063**	-0.166***	0.0806	-2.166***	-0.184**	0.0654
	(-2.21)	(-3.32)	(1.10)	(-3.13)	(-2.18)	(0.38)
L.Electoral Democracy	-0.778	-0.150	-0.142	4.264**	-0.186	-0.617
	(-0.62)	(-0.97)	(-0.67)	(2.09)	(-0.59)	(-1.24)
L.UN Voting with the US	-1.037	0.908***	0.471	0.379	1.464***	0.598
	(-0.80)	(5.29)	(1.55)	(0.19)	(5.26)	(1.09)
L.GDP Per Capita(log)	0.122	0.0171	-0.00984	0.0290	0.0323	-0.0401
	(1.45)	(1.62)	(-0.60)	(0.23)	(1.58)	(-1.23)
L.Infant Mortality	0.0317***	-0.00491***	0.00526**	-0.0131	-0.00955***	0.00240
	(2.77)	(-3.41)	(2.28)	(-0.74)	(-3.72)	(0.62)
L.Natural Resources	-0.249**	-0.0143	-0.0601***	-0.287	0.0802***	-0.112*
	(-2.49)	(-0.88)	(-2.80)	(-1.48)	(3.02)	(-1.92)
L.Population(log)	-0.615***	0.0197	0.0512	-0.154	-0.00379	0.133
	(-2.71)	(0.67)	(1.04)	(-0.47)	(-0.07)	(1.29)
L.Affected from Disasters	0.0465	-0.00384	-0.00574	0.0697	0.00826	-0.000859
	(1.23)	(-0.72)	(-0.58)	(1.36)	(1.07)	(-0.05)
constant	14.86***	-0.237	-1.100*	14.18***	-0.906*	-0.443
	(5.02)	(-0.70)	(-1.88)	(3.49)	(-1.94)	(-0.38)
r2	0.432	0.811	0.649	0.336	0.684	0.581
N_clust	134	134	134	55	55	55
N	2060	2060	2060	821	821	821

t statistics in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.7 Budget Support Suspension and China's Aid Modalities with Electoral Democracy and UN Voting with the US

	(1) China ODA	(2) Turkiye ODA(log)	(3) UAE ODA(log)	(4) China ODA	(5) Turkiye ODA(log)	(6) UAE ODA(log)
L.Turkiye ODA(log)	0.110	0.773***	0.0515*	0.0260	0.653***	0.140**
	(0.94)	(36.05)	(1.86)	(0.12)	(17.83)	(2.55)
L.UAE ODA(log)	0.0862	0.0183	0.652***	0.123	0.0234	0.615***
	(0.90)	(1.25)	(18.77)	(1.04)	(1.00)	(14.34)
L.China ODA	0.298***	0.00999**	-0.000364	0.135**	0.0216***	-0.0265**
	(7.59)	(2.29)	(-0.05)	(2.62)	(2.75)	(-2.12)
Political Suspensions	1.541*	0.00748	0.0224	1.583**	0.147	0.0617
	(1.91)	(0.05)	(0.17)	(2.08)	(0.83)	(0.35)
Economic Suspensions	1.467*	0.256	0.309	1.265	0.140	0.505*
	(1.83)	(1.17)	(1.49)	(1.22)	(0.56)	(2.00)
L.Imports from Turkiye(log)	-0.0838	0.0684***	0.0111	-0.315*	0.0609*	0.0741
	(-0.58)	(3.50)	(0.53)	(-1.74)	(1.71)	(1.39)
L.Imports from UAE(log)	0.0221	0.0184	0.0358**	0.0175	-0.00972	-0.00224
	(0.22)	(1.63)	(2.03)	(0.16)	(-0.44)	(-0.06)
L.Imports from China(log)	0.320**	-0.0267	-0.00305	0.196	0.0441	-0.00983
	(2.12)	(-1.14)	(-0.09)	(0.76)	(1.07)	(-0.13)
L.Top Seven DAC ODA(log)	0.390***	0.0662***	0.0749***	0.723***	0.0282	0.0261
	(4.26)	(5.30)	(3.65)	(3.49)	(0.89)	(0.48)
L.Top Seven DAC Exports(log)	-0.371***	-0.0513**	-0.0152	-0.274***	-0.0447**	-0.0233
	(-3.06)	(-2.54)	(-1.13)	(-4.60)	(-2.03)	(-1.02)
Taiwan Recognition	-6.844***	-0.0727	-0.109	-9.104***	0.204	-0.228
	(-8.58)	(-0.72)	(-0.75)	(-10.77)	(1.25)	(-0.81)
Muslim Majority	-1.524**	0.298***	0.669***	-2.365***	0.437***	0.450**
	(-2.59)	(4.22)	(4.45)	(-2.79)	(4.37)	(2.32)
L.Control of Corruption	-1.305**	-0.186***	0.132*	-2.765***	-0.210**	0.126
	(-2.56)	(-3.45)	(1.73)	(-3.78)	(-2.09)	(0.66)
L.Electoral Democracy	-0.710	-0.0436	-0.125	4.018*	-0.0202	-0.326
	(-0.54)	(-0.29)	(-0.56)	(1.97)	(-0.07)	(-0.57)
L.UN Voting with the US	-3.027*	0.457**	0.0978	-0.892	0.961***	0.0519
	(-1.96)	(2.52)	(0.32)	(-0.36)	(3.23)	(0.09)
L.GDP Per Capita(log)	0.111	0.0131	-0.0125	-0.0847	0.0177	-0.0333
	(1.19)	(1.19)	(-0.76)	(-0.65)	(0.83)	(-1.02)
L.Infant Mortality	0.0303**	-0.00619***	0.00543**	-0.0188	-0.0113***	0.00391
	(2.48)	(-4.36)	(2.15)	(-1.06)	(-4.01)	(0.91)
L.Natural Resources	-0.241**	-0.0151	-0.0533**	-0.184	0.0740**	-0.0944
	(-2.24)	(-0.90)	(-2.20)	(-0.94)	(2.55)	(-1.41)
L.Population(log)	-0.650***	0.0324	0.0772	-0.628	0.0416	0.132
	(-2.67)	(1.04)	(1.44)	(-1.66)	(0.90)	(1.19)
L.Affected from Disasters	0.0464	-0.0113*	-0.00625	0.0936	-0.00520	0.00290
	(1.11)	(-1.95)	(-0.58)	(1.49)	(-0.59)	(0.13)
constant	16.71***	-0.137	-1.164*	19.15***	-1.113**	-0.569
	(5.15)	(-0.38)	(-1.89)	(4.18)	(-2.09)	(-0.46)
r2	0.414	0.826	0.648	0.346	0.715	0.572
N_clust	134	134	134	55	55	55
N	1668	1668	1668	660	660	660

t statistics in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.8 Budget Support Suspension and China's Aid Modalities

	(1) China ODA	(2) China ODA	(3) China OOF	(4) China OOF
L.Turkiye ODA(log)	0.100	0.00173	0.291**	0.195
	(0.91)	(0.01)	(2.50)	(0.65)
L.UAE ODA(log)	0.0855	0.0993	0.00106	-0.0493
	(0.94)	(0.81)	(0.01)	(-0.40)
L.China ODA	0.317***	0.140***		
	(8.76)	(3.04)		
Political Suspensions	1.544**	1.608**	-0.802	-1.073
	(1.99)	(2.17)	(-0.92)	(-0.97)
Economic Suspensions	1.362*	1.413	-0.183	0.146
	(1.66)	(1.39)	(-0.15)	(0.10)
L.Imports from Turkiye(log)	-0.139	-0.293	-0.153	-0.250
	(-1.28)	(-1.61)	(-1.40)	(-1.05)
L.Imports from UAE(log)	0.0794	-0.0627	-0.0671	-0.0659
	(1.02)	(-0.61)	(-0.80)	(-0.30)
L.Imports from China(log)	0.264**	0.308	0.788***	0.928***
	(2.15)	(1.22)	(4.59)	(2.99)
L.Top Seven DAC ODA(log)	0.372***	0.815***	-0.104	0.235
	(4.69)	(4.17)	(-1.11)	(1.34)
L.Top Seven DAC Exports(log)	-0.206***	-0.246***	-0.145**	-0.0431
	(-2.91)	(-4.00)	(-2.58)	(-0.38)
Taiwan Recognition	-6.896***	-9.231***	-1.973***	-0.850
	(-10.29)	(-9.77)	(-3.33)	(-0.94)
Muslim Majority	-1.512***	-2.154**	-1.859***	-2.327***
	(-2.71)	(-2.58)	(-3.16)	(-3.06)
L.Control of Corruption	-1.345***	-2.087***	-1.299***	-2.040**
	(-3.22)	(-2.87)	(-3.18)	(-2.24)
L.GDP Per Capita(log)	0.0963	-0.0527	-0.00753	-0.280
	(1.10)	(-0.41)	(-0.07)	(-1.39)
L.Infant Mortality	0.0338***	-0.0116	-0.00223	-0.0213
	(3.07)	(-0.70)	(-0.18)	(-0.77)
L.Natural Resources	-0.151	-0.255	0.142	-0.0920
	(-1.44)	(-1.29)	(1.28)	(-0.43)
L.Population(log)	-0.747***	-0.792**	0.181	0.220
	(-3.55)	(-2.23)	(0.73)	(0.47)
L.Affected from Disasters	0.0535	0.112*	0.0873**	0.0813
	(1.34)	(1.76)	(2.10)	(1.15)
L.China OOF			0.333***	0.208***
			(9.00)	(3.74)
constant	14.20***	20.97***	-5.126**	-5.102
	(5.91)	(4.99)	(-2.09)	(-1.12)
r2	0.426	0.345	0.304	0.251
N_clust	153	55	153	55
N	1884	668	1884	668

t statistics in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.9 Variation among Top DAC Donors (2000-2019) with Lagged Variable

	(1) EU	(2) France	(3) Germany	(4) USA	(5) UK	(6) Japan	(7) Sweden	(8) Netherlands
L.EU ODA(log)	0.827***							
	(23.83)							
L.Three non-DAC ODA(log)	0.0168***	0.0153***	0.00842**	0.00303	0.0195***	0.0135***	0.00129	0.00148
	(3.99)	(3.33)	(2.53)	(1.23)	(4.69)	(2.70)	(0.55)	(0.48)
L.Three Non-DAC Export(log)	-0.0748***	-0.0646***	-0.0322*	-0.00227	0.00994	0.0153	-0.0140	-0.0753***
	(-3.82)	(-3.51)	(-1.95)	(-0.19)	(0.47)	(0.72)	(-1.15)	(-3.63)
Muslim Majority	0.0325	0.0712	0.125	-0.0725	0.0519	-0.218**	0.0600	0.162**
	(0.44)	(0.78)	(1.55)	(-1.34)	(0.57)	(-2.14)	(1.41)	(2.20)
L.unchn	0.625	1.050*	0.244	0.415	-0.135	0.845**	-0.254	0.0221
	(1.08)	(1.92)	(0.47)	(1.63)	(-0.32)	(2.09)	(-0.93)	(0.05)
L.Control of Corruption	-0.362***	-0.332***	-0.207***	-0.187***	-0.110	-0.159*	-0.0994***	0.0249
	(-3.91)	(-3.82)	(-2.96)	(-3.63)	(-1.53)	(-1.76)	(-2.64)	(0.44)
L.Electoral Democracy	0.383*	0.471**	0.408**	0.243**	-0.0632	-0.112	-0.0492	0.116
	(1.97)	(2.12)	(2.06)	(2.01)	(-0.34)	(-0.43)	(-0.64)	(0.69)
L.GDP Per Capita(log)	-0.0156	0.0305*	-0.0240*	-0.0121	-0.0338**	0.000634	-0.00995	-0.00875
	(-1.33)	(1.92)	(-1.70)	(-1.52)	(-2.23)	(0.03)	(-1.30)	(-0.65)
L.Infant Mortality	0.00195	0.00223	0.00123	0.00189*	0.00263	0.00740***	0.00213**	0.00361**
	(1.34)	(1.17)	(0.70)	(1.95)	(1.18)	(2.95)	(2.03)	(2.01)
L.Natural Resources	-0.0213	-0.0219	-0.0125	-0.0144	-0.0363	-0.0644**	-0.0237**	-0.0314
	(-1.03)	(-0.90)	(-0.57)	(-1.09)	(-1.50)	(-2.32)	(-2.39)	(-1.38)
L.Population(log)	0.130***	0.0843**	0.252***	0.0952***	0.227***	0.122**	0.0934***	0.252***
	(3.44)	(2.22)	(5.71)	(4.11)	(5.33)	(2.43)	(4.40)	(5.67)
L.Affected from Disasters	0.0116	0.00334	-0.00236	0.00512	0.00909	0.0207**	-0.0000630	-0.0103
	(1.46)	(0.46)	(-0.37)	(1.15)	(1.28)	(2.36)	(-0.01)	(-1.33)
L.France ODA(log)		0.766***						
		(22.43)						
L.Imports from France(log)		0.0966***						
		(2.95)						
L.Germany ODA(log)			0.814***					
			(30.58)					
L.Imports from Germany(log)			-0.0272					
			(-1.19)					
L.USA ODA (log)				0.894***				
				(56.16)				
L.Imports from USA(log)				-0.0264**				
				(-2.38)				
L.UK ODA(log)					0.775***			
					(30.30)			
L.Imports from UK(log)					-0.0545**			
					(-2.07)			
L.Japan ODA(log)						0.731***		
						(27.95)		
L.Imports from Japan(log)						-0.110***		
						(-3.35)		
L.Sweden ODA(log)							0.913***	
							(79.82)	
L.Imports from Sweden(log)							-0.00380	
							(-0.30)	
L.Nether. ODA(log)								0.834***
								(43.12)
L.Imports from Nether.(log)								-0.0306*
								(-1.72)
constant	-0.0534	-2.270***	-2.141***	-0.688**	-1.513***	0.156	-0.479	-1.586***
	(-0.08)	(-3.30)	(-3.34)	(-2.09)	(-2.65)	(0.22)	(-1.48)	(-3.28)
r2	0.828	0.717	0.815	0.904	0.773	0.673	0.905	0.806
N_clust	136	136	136	136	136	136	136	135
N	2492	2492	2492	2492	2492	2492	2492	2473

t statistics in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.10 Variance inflation factors for Table 5.10

	(1) Sweden	(2) France	(3) Germany	(4) UK	(5) USA	(6) Japan	(7) Netherlands	(8) EU
L.Imports from Sweden(log)	3.532599							
L.Three non-DAC ODA(log)	1.376794	1.366373	1.374826	1.378842	1.467336	1.402344	1.38101	
L.Three Non-DAC Export(log)	2.997895	3.073008	2.939344	3.1276	2.922936	3.26421	2.770027	
Muslim Majority	1.263716	1.32405	1.29435	1.28009	1.27055	1.280071	1.290422	
L.unchn	1.661373	1.677877	1.755024	1.663174	1.621699	1.634175	1.6694	
L.Control of Corruption	1.977121	1.926905	1.903509	2.046295	1.826161	2.003499	1.875658	
L.Electoral Democracy	1.534466	1.537307	1.535442	1.537974	1.564418	1.536649	1.544075	
L.GDP Per Capita(log)	1.043805	1.093705	1.043801	1.044235	1.049035	1.044981	1.057574	
L.Infant Mortality	2.136556	1.92103	2.308582	1.98802	2.014293	2.125142	1.950614	
L.Natural Resources	1.452884	1.444038	1.441861	1.442292	1.442111	1.442243	1.440971	
L.Population(log)	3.77749	3.245841	4.126435	3.388557	3.00804	3.336358	3.058228	
L.Affected from Disasters	1.560932	1.588398	1.605476	1.58704	1.538433	1.533759	1.591741	
L.Imports from France(log)		2.744236						
L.Imports from Germany(log)			3.985021					
L.Imports from UK(log)				3.09999				
L.Imports from USA(log)					2.380373			
L.Imports from Japan(log)						3.513959		
L.Imports from Nether.(log)							2.133658	
Observations	2492	2492	2492	2492	2492	2492	2473	2492

Table A.11 Regression Output for China, Turkiye and the UAE without Lagged DV Variables. An extension of Table 5.6

	(1) China	(2) Turkiye	(3) UAE	(4) Turkiye Africa)	(5) UAE Africa)	(6) China Africa
L.Turkiye ODA(log)	0.190		0.162***		0.274***	0.0210
	(1.29)		(2.85)		(2.91)	(0.10)
L.UAE ODA(log)	0.0945	0.0814**		0.0666*		-0.0189
	(0.89)	(2.36)		(1.84)		(-0.15)
L.Imports from Turkiye(log)	-0.196	0.302***	0.0554	0.156**	0.176	-0.204
	(-1.32)	(5.76)	(1.22)	(2.63)	(1.61)	(-1.06)
L.Imports from UAE(log)	0.0934	-0.00776	0.0851**	0.0207	0.0792	-0.0504
	(0.88)	(-0.24)	(2.27)	(0.58)	(0.97)	(-0.44)
L.Imports from China(log)	0.286	-0.248***	-0.0299	-0.120	-0.150	0.0478
	(1.63)	(-2.95)	(-0.37)	(-1.53)	(-0.94)	(0.14)
L.Top Seven DAC ODA(log)	0.597***	0.234***	0.186***	0.110*	0.116	0.682***
	(6.17)	(7.16)	(5.06)	(1.81)	(0.94)	(3.44)
L.Top Seven DAC Exports(log)	-0.269***	-0.105***	-0.0704***	-0.106***	-0.0547	-0.349***
	(-2.99)	(-3.58)	(-2.65)	(-3.99)	(-1.17)	(-3.71)
Taiwan Recognition	-10.41***	-0.626**	-0.0836	-0.405*	-0.393	-11.08***
	(-15.02)	(-2.48)	(-0.31)	(-1.78)	(-0.88)	(-10.40)
Muslim Majority	-2.006***	1.339***	1.802***	1.027***	1.294***	-2.365***
	(-2.73)	(5.63)	(5.07)	(4.94)	(2.82)	(-2.68)
L.Control of Corruption	-1.703***	-0.701***	0.152	-0.328*	-0.111	-1.542*
	(-2.86)	(-4.52)	(0.94)	(-1.83)	(-0.36)	(-1.77)
L.GDP Per Capita(log)	0.140	0.0276	-0.0671	-0.00815	-0.0997	-0.0127
	(1.15)	(0.70)	(-1.52)	(-0.19)	(-1.29)	(-0.08)
L.Infant Mortality	0.0566***	-0.0199***	0.0105*	-0.0112**	-0.000843	0.00151
	(3.72)	(-4.56)	(1.97)	(-2.15)	(-0.08)	(0.07)
L.Natural Resources	-0.292**	-0.102*	-0.226***	0.0912*	-0.254*	-0.497**
	(-2.01)	(-1.83)	(-3.76)	(1.84)	(-1.77)	(-2.05)
L.Population(log)	-0.944***	0.107	0.176	0.217*	0.384	-0.137
	(-3.02)	(1.11)	(1.52)	(1.86)	(1.53)	(-0.32)
L.Affected from Disasters	0.0738*	-0.0124	-0.00225	0.00603	0.00297	0.105*
	(1.71)	(-1.35)	(-0.12)	(0.57)	(0.10)	(1.89)
L.China ODA		0.0162**	0.0116	0.0107	-0.0107	
		(2.04)	(1.14)	(1.53)	(-0.64)	
constant	17.45***	-0.326	-1.207	-2.873***	-2.456	17.92***
	(5.67)	(-0.36)	(-1.08)	(-3.09)	(-0.83)	(3.96)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
r2	0.388	0.610	0.403	0.628	0.336	0.347
N_clust	153	153	153	55	55	55
N	2332	2768	2768	987	987	829

t statistics in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.12 Regression Output for China, Turkiye and the UAE with DAC ODA. An extension of Table 5.6

	(1) China	(2) Turkiye	(3) UAE	(4) Turkiye	(5) UAE	(6) China
L.China ODA	0.342***	0.000494	-0.00895*	-0.000965	-0.0211**	0.163***
	(10.18)	(0.15)	(-1.81)	(-0.18)	(-2.51)	(3.42)
L.Turkiye ODA(log)	0.189*	0.741***	0.0701***	0.579***	0.122***	0.220
	(1.93)	(36.20)	(3.26)	(17.03)	(3.44)	(1.39)
L.UAE ODA(log)	0.0456	0.0145	0.655***	0.0244	0.613***	0.0130
	(0.58)	(1.13)	(22.80)	(1.10)	(17.16)	(0.11)
L.Imports from Turkiye(log)	-0.118	0.0834***	0.0145	0.0504	0.0543	-0.308*
	(-1.16)	(5.47)	(0.82)	(1.38)	(1.33)	(-1.82)
L.Imports from UAE(log)	0.117	0.0132	0.0402***	0.00931	0.00443	-0.0277
	(1.59)	(1.36)	(3.04)	(0.34)	(0.13)	(-0.30)
L.Imports from China(log)	0.197*	-0.0500**	0.00773	0.0764*	-0.0307	0.257
	(1.76)	(-2.59)	(0.28)	(1.79)	(-0.50)	(1.05)
L.DAC ODA(log)	0.381***	0.0669***	0.0701***	0.118**	0.0181	0.504**
	(4.85)	(5.03)	(4.29)	(2.58)	(0.39)	(2.35)
L.Top Seven DAC Exports(log)	-0.155**	-0.0324***	-0.0227*	-0.0565*	-0.0216	-0.278***
	(-2.28)	(-3.73)	(-1.75)	(-1.80)	(-0.87)	(-3.81)
Taiwan Recognition	-7.067***	-0.230***	-0.119	-0.100	-0.289	-9.068***
	(-11.13)	(-3.20)	(-1.16)	(-0.65)	(-1.49)	(-9.80)
Muslim Majority	-1.433***	0.359***	0.526***	0.430***	0.504***	-2.300***
	(-2.84)	(4.91)	(4.19)	(4.17)	(2.87)	(-3.03)
L.Control of Corruption	-0.987**	-0.179***	0.0364	-0.250***	-0.0508	-1.311*
	(-2.44)	(-3.98)	(0.56)	(-2.77)	(-0.41)	(-1.96)
L.GDP Per Capita(log)	0.116	0.0126	-0.0127	0.0339	-0.0410	0.0401
	(1.43)	(1.24)	(-0.76)	(1.64)	(-1.26)	(0.31)
L.Infant Mortality	0.0349***	-0.00473***	0.00495**	-0.0104***	0.00183	-0.00506
	(3.41)	(-3.75)	(2.52)	(-4.03)	(0.48)	(-0.30)
L.Natural Resources	-0.167*	-0.0316**	-0.0867***	0.0790**	-0.110**	-0.366*
	(-1.69)	(-2.03)	(-3.95)	(2.60)	(-2.09)	(-1.82)
L.Population(log)	-0.548***	0.0506**	0.0776**	-0.0333	0.195**	-0.160
	(-2.86)	(2.07)	(2.00)	(-0.57)	(2.10)	(-0.48)
L.Affected from Disasters	0.0612*	-0.00413	-0.00614	0.00442	-0.00214	0.0878*
	(1.76)	(-0.90)	(-0.72)	(0.54)	(-0.13)	(1.69)
constant	10.11***	-0.350	-0.902**	-0.753	-1.050	14.63***
	(4.75)	(-1.55)	(-2.42)	(-1.45)	(-1.02)	(3.93)
r2	0.449	0.805	0.642	0.657	0.575	0.330
N_clust	153	153	153	55	55	55
N	2332	2768	2768	987	987	829

t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.13 Regression Output for China's ODA and OOF Flows with UN Voting with China

	(1) China Grant	(2) China ODA	(3) China Loan	(4) China OOF
L.China Grant	0.303***			
	(8.92)			
L.Imports from China(log)	0.238**	0.224**	0.740***	0.651***
	(2.21)	(2.25)	(4.97)	(4.48)
L.Top Seven DAC ODA(log)	0.379***	0.440***	0.121	-0.0126
	(6.34)	(7.03)	(1.28)	(-0.15)
L.Top Seven DAC Exports(log)	-0.201**	-0.246***	-0.141*	-0.125*
	(-2.41)	(-3.28)	(-1.95)	(-1.86)
Taiwan Recognition	-6.731***	-6.904***	-2.344***	-1.824***
	(-12.47)	(-11.61)	(-3.82)	(-3.04)
Muslim Majority	-1.133***	-1.047**	-2.140***	-1.527***
	(-2.77)	(-2.49)	(-3.97)	(-3.01)
L.unchn	2.916**	3.532**	4.630**	3.627**
	(2.32)	(2.53)	(2.43)	(2.04)
L.Control of Corruption	-1.354***	-1.325***	-1.009**	-1.453***
	(-3.94)	(-3.67)	(-2.46)	(-3.86)
L.GDP Per Capita(log)	0.0828	0.106	-0.0610	-0.0344
	(1.11)	(1.35)	(-0.58)	(-0.33)
L.Infant Mortality	0.0235**	0.0299***	0.00370	-0.0113
	(2.56)	(3.00)	(0.28)	(-0.89)
L.Natural Resources	-0.293***	-0.266***	0.0359	-0.0306
	(-3.25)	(-2.94)	(0.28)	(-0.26)
L.Population(log)	-0.663***	-0.661***	-0.111	0.0891
	(-3.81)	(-3.72)	(-0.41)	(0.38)
L.Affected from Disasters	0.0479	0.0444	0.0173	0.0604*
	(1.46)	(1.27)	(0.42)	(1.78)
L.China ODA		0.350***		
		(10.00)		
L.China Loan			0.337***	
			(11.30)	
L.China OOF				0.387***
				(12.00)
constant	11.16***	10.85***	-5.217*	-6.340**
	(5.31)	(5.24)	(-1.92)	(-2.42)
r2	0.374	0.459	0.269	0.316
N_clust	153	153	153	153
N	2356	2356	2356	2356

t statistics in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.14 Regression Output for China's ODA and OOF Flows with UN Voting with China-Regional

	(1) Africa	(2) Asia	(3) Middle East	(4) Europe	(5) Americas	(6) Oceania
L.China ODA	0.173***	0.328***	0.113*	0.162*	0.306***	0.293***
	(3.62)	(5.18)	(1.82)	(2.13)	(3.75)	(3.83)
L.Imports from China(log)	0.0509	0.652*	0.213	0.00134	0.785***	0.338
	(0.28)	(2.04)	(0.33)	(0.00)	(3.08)	(1.75)
L.Top Seven DAC ODA(log)	0.624***	0.617***	0.226*	0.411**	0.301*	-0.0569
	(4.22)	(4.29)	(2.05)	(2.38)	(1.80)	(-0.70)
L.Top Seven DAC Exports(log)	-0.305***	-0.758***	0.0606	-0.103	-1.764***	-0.0725
	(-3.27)	(-3.49)	(0.90)	(-0.45)	(-2.93)	(-1.52)
Taiwan Recognition	-8.878***	0	0	-7.521***	-4.595***	-10.37***
	(-9.84)	(.)	(.)	(-3.34)	(-3.15)	(-7.17)
Muslim Majority	-2.237***	1.188	11.84**	-0.954	0	0
	(-3.03)	(1.30)	(2.29)	(-0.73)	(.)	(.)
L.Control of Corruption	-1.489**	-1.988**	-0.0538	-5.853***	-0.677	0.255
	(-2.18)	(-2.62)	(-0.05)	(-3.96)	(-0.71)	(0.46)
L.GDP Per Capita(log)	0.0622	0.389**	-0.122	-0.0345	0.0808	-0.125
	(0.47)	(2.27)	(-0.73)	(-0.07)	(0.42)	(-0.68)
L.Infant Mortality	-0.00388	-0.0134	0.196**	-0.228	-0.0401	0.00986
	(-0.23)	(-0.36)	(2.85)	(-1.46)	(-0.95)	(0.34)
L.unchn	-1.220	-0.250	-9.277	3.928	4.791	-1.078
	(-0.24)	(-0.03)	(-1.35)	(0.79)	(0.85)	(-0.80)
L.Natural Resources	-0.369*	-0.597**	-1.288***	-0.919	-0.00833	0.398
	(-1.81)	(-2.70)	(-6.54)	(-1.50)	(-0.03)	(0.81)
L.Population(log)	-0.351	-0.501	0.106	-0.0739	-0.243	-0.263
	(-1.16)	(-1.29)	(0.10)	(-0.15)	(-0.51)	(-0.29)
L.Affected from Disasters	0.0963*	0.0365	0.0361	0.0861	-0.00255	0.0147
	(1.78)	(0.46)	(0.29)	(1.31)	(-0.03)	(0.33)
constant	17.37**	12.38*	0.408	7.561	26.06***	11.61
	(2.45)	(1.76)	(0.05)	(0.78)	(3.00)	(1.19)
r2	0.324	0.500	0.554	0.330	0.357	0.825
N_clust	55	29	13	11	33	12
N	826	462	196	171	526	175

t statistics in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.15 Regression Output for China, Turkiye and the UAE's ODA Flows with UN Voting with China

	(1) China ODA	(2) Turkiye ODA(log)	(3) UAE ODA(log)	(4) Turkiye ODA(log)	(5) UAE ODA(log)	(6) China ODA
L.China ODA	0.345***	0.00160	-0.0101*	0.00121	-0.0238***	0.171***
	(9.93)	(0.47)	(-1.96)	(0.21)	(-2.82)	(3.63)
L.Turkiye ODA(log)	0.225**	0.734***	0.0688***	0.578***	0.130***	0.222
	(2.19)	(34.48)	(3.05)	(16.50)	(3.52)	(1.31)
L.UAE ODA(log)	0.0795	0.0111	0.650***	0.0223	0.620***	-0.000821
	(1.04)	(0.89)	(22.51)	(0.95)	(17.82)	(-0.01)
L.Imports from Turkiye(log)	-0.104	0.0749***	0.00603	0.0517	0.0492	-0.319*
	(-1.01)	(5.14)	(0.36)	(1.54)	(1.16)	(-1.77)
L.Imports from UAE(log)	0.0361	0.0137	0.0396***	0.00650	0.0112	-0.0227
	(0.46)	(1.28)	(2.73)	(0.25)	(0.33)	(-0.23)
L.Imports from China(log)	0.231**	-0.0357*	0.0319	0.0678	-0.0306	0.266
	(2.09)	(-1.82)	(1.21)	(1.61)	(-0.47)	(1.02)
L.unchn	3.775**	-0.522**	0.124	-0.963	0.888	1.287
	(2.42)	(-2.43)	(0.45)	(-1.47)	(0.75)	(0.24)
L.Top Seven DAC Exports(log)	-0.220***	-0.0393***	-0.0308**	-0.0605*	-0.0201	-0.284***
	(-2.92)	(-4.16)	(-2.09)	(-1.93)	(-0.79)	(-3.72)
L.Top Seven DAC ODA(log)	0.369***	0.0730***	0.0713***	0.0712**	0.0278	0.584***
	(5.05)	(6.62)	(4.87)	(2.24)	(0.55)	(3.59)
Taiwan Recognition	-6.828***	-0.181**	-0.0736	-0.117	-0.312	-9.007***
	(-10.88)	(-2.35)	(-0.65)	(-0.74)	(-1.57)	(-9.19)
Muslim Majority	-1.580***	0.378***	0.496***	0.476***	0.440**	-2.148**
	(-3.14)	(5.33)	(4.24)	(4.43)	(2.62)	(-2.58)
L.Control of Corruption	-1.150***	-0.194***	0.0124	-0.233**	-0.0502	-1.405**
	(-2.86)	(-4.46)	(0.19)	(-2.67)	(-0.40)	(-2.02)
L.GDP Per Capita(log)	0.0909	0.0106	-0.0157	0.0310	-0.0407	0.0664
	(1.16)	(1.05)	(-0.95)	(1.47)	(-1.17)	(0.48)
L.Infant Mortality	0.0334***	-0.00417***	0.00571***	-0.0101***	0.00194	-0.00579
	(3.24)	(-3.06)	(2.82)	(-3.83)	(0.49)	(-0.33)
L.Natural Resources	-0.265***	-0.0243	-0.0798***	0.0821***	-0.109**	-0.360*
	(-2.84)	(-1.53)	(-3.74)	(2.75)	(-2.05)	(-1.85)
L.Population(log)	-0.631***	0.0156	0.0254	-0.000414	0.167*	-0.292
	(-3.37)	(0.63)	(0.65)	(-0.01)	(1.81)	(-0.93)
L.Affected from Disasters	0.0499	-0.00432	-0.00327	0.00620	-0.00312	0.0845
	(1.41)	(-0.93)	(-0.38)	(0.75)	(-0.19)	(1.58)
constant	10.52***	0.605**	-0.283	0.228	-1.519	14.55*
	(4.90)	(2.03)	(-0.62)	(0.29)	(-0.97)	(1.97)
r2	0.459	0.803	0.631	0.651	0.577	0.329
N_clust	151	151	151	55	55	55
N	2291	2722	2722	979	979	821

t statistics in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.16 A Comparison of Turkiye and the UAE

	(1) Turkiye ODA(log)	(2) UAE ODA(log)
L.Turkiye ODA(log)	0.607***	0.133***
	(18.37)	(2.85)
L.UAE ODA(log)	0.0537***	0.603***
	(3.00)	(15.98)
Muslim Majority=1	0.530***	0.505**
	(3.86)	(2.63)
Muslim Majority=1 × L.UAE ODA(log)	-0.0607*	
	(-2.00)	
L.Imports from Turkiye(log)	0.0930***	0.0628
	(2.69)	(1.57)
L.Top Seven DAC ODA(log)	-0.000690	0.0333
	(-0.02)	(0.49)
L.unchn	-1.134*	0.546
	(-1.83)	(0.46)
L.Top Seven DAC Exports(log)	-0.0517*	-0.00864
	(-1.78)	(-0.34)
L.Imports from UAE(log)	0.0258	0.00279
	(0.88)	(0.09)
L.Electoral Democracy	-0.287	-0.693*
	(-1.23)	(-1.76)
L.DAC ODA(log)	0.114**	0.0258
	(2.16)	(0.51)
L.GDP Per Capita(log)	0.0324*	-0.0384
	(1.79)	(-1.12)
L.Infant Mortality	-0.00840***	0.000563
	(-3.30)	(0.15)
L.Natural Resources	0.100***	-0.129**
	(3.19)	(-2.36)
L.Population(log)	-0.0199	0.109
	(-0.38)	(1.10)
L.Affected from Disasters	0.00395	-0.00487
	(0.48)	(-0.31)
Muslim Majority=1 × L.Turkiye ODA(log)		-0.0160
		(-0.30)
constant	0.278	-0.973
	(0.38)	(-0.64)
r2	0.659	0.567
N_clust	55	55
N	1024	1024

t statistics in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.17 Regression Output for Turkiye's UAE Challange Before and After Arab Spring with Interaction Term

	(1) Global	(2) Global After	(3) Africa	(4) Africa After	(5) Subsaharan	(6) Subsaharan After	(7) Europe	(8) Europe After	(9) MENA	(10) MENA After	(11) Asia	(12) Asia After
L.Turkiye ODA(log)	0.780***	0.695***	0.597***	0.432***	0.590***	0.403***	0.482***	0.652***	0.567***	0.502***	0.760***	0.681***
	(31.86)	(22.26)	(13.02)	(7.67)	(11.28)	(6.42)	(5.84)	(8.52)	(10.10)	(6.23)	(15.23)	(10.63)
L.UAE ODA(log)	0.0456**	-0.000250	0.0902***	0.0652**	0.0973***	0.0701**	0.00722	-0.0229	0.0469	-0.0878	-0.0000296	-0.0826**
	(2.25)	(-0.01)	(3.65)	(2.30)	(4.13)	(2.45)	(0.13)	(-1.54)	(1.20)	(-1.32)	(-0.00)	(-2.39)
Muslim Majority=1	0.304***	0.497***	0.434***	1.028***	0.399**	0.654**	-0.615	0.419***	2.761*	0.134	0.344	0.356**
	(2.72)	(3.71)	(3.05)	(3.45)	(2.44)	(2.21)	(-0.90)	(3.98)	(2.05)	(0.15)	(1.35)	(2.17)
Muslim Majority=1 × L.UAE ODA(log)	-0.0198	-0.000236	-0.0813**	-0.0913*	-0.0814	0.00508	0.157	-0.0114	0	0	0.0250	0.0663*
	(-0.76)	(-0.01)	(-2.36)	(-1.75)	(-1.46)	(0.10)	(1.20)	(-0.34)	(.)	(.)	(0.68)	(1.86)
L.Natural Resources	-0.0544***	-0.0151	0.0408	0.0510	0.0242	0.0476	0.351*	0.265**	-0.0602	0.0762	-0.0227	0.0104
	(-3.48)	(-0.85)	(1.48)	(0.93)	(0.68)	(0.81)	(1.93)	(2.81)	(-1.74)	(1.28)	(-0.66)	(0.39)
L.Top Seven DAC ODA(log)	0.0415***	0.112***	-0.0102	0.132*	0.00867	0.118	0.0789	0.152*	0.0468**	0.312***	0.108***	0.172***
	(3.53)	(8.14)	(-0.30)	(1.86)	(0.17)	(1.65)	(1.37)	(2.10)	(2.16)	(6.63)	(4.60)	(4.73)
L.Top Seven DAC Exports(log)	-0.0244***	-0.0344***	-0.0501***	-0.0954***	-0.0597***	-0.0991***	-0.0470	0.0820	-0.346***	-0.0217	-0.0234	0.00560
	(-3.11)	(-3.60)	(-2.76)	(-2.81)	(-2.76)	(-2.78)	(-0.98)	(0.64)	(-3.13)	(-0.97)	(-0.91)	(0.18)
L.gdpper	5.53e-09	-1.74e-09	-3.20e-08	4.72e-08	2.31e-09	3.64e-08	-0.000000691	0.000000493*	2.47e-08***	-2.40e-10	-7.76e-09	-8.11e-09
	(1.30)	(-0.85)	(-1.01)	(0.60)	(0.06)	(0.47)	(-0.81)	(1.85)	(4.03)	(-0.04)	(-0.78)	(-1.38)
L.Imports from Turkiye(log)	0.0634***	0.0894***	0.136***	0.0808	0.114***	0.0755	0.0733	0.452*	0.651***	-0.265	0.0635**	0.123***
	(3.75)	(5.18)	(4.40)	(1.60)	(3.74)	(1.40)	(0.42)	(2.23)	(3.05)	(-1.46)	(2.33)	(3.47)
L.Imports from UAE(log)	0.00806	-0.00793	0.00700	0.0364	0.00636	0.0421	0.171	-0.129***	-0.134	-0.0724	0.0755**	0.0385
	(0.73)	(-0.67)	(0.31)	(0.85)	(0.28)	(0.89)	(1.69)	(-3.96)	(-1.44)	(-1.48)	(2.08)	(1.56)
L.Control of Corruption	-0.206***	-0.0838*	-0.0294	-0.145	-0.0193	-0.122	-1.159**	-0.890*	-0.356*	-0.193	-0.169	-0.0282
	(-4.16)	(-1.66)	(-0.32)	(-1.12)	(-0.22)	(-0.86)	(-2.47)	(-2.17)	(-1.83)	(-1.46)	(-1.65)	(-0.29)
L.Affected from Disasters	-0.0120*	-0.00222	0.00932	-0.000550	0.0138	0.000337	0.0174	-0.0123	0.0146	0.00161	-0.0285*	-0.00304
	(-1.68)	(-0.36)	(0.85)	(-0.05)	(1.03)	(0.03)	(0.47)	(-1.04)	(0.55)	(0.06)	(-1.77)	(-0.21)
L.Population(log)	0.0134	-0.00754	0.00163	0.0784	0.00475	0.103	-0.544*	-0.704**	-0.249	0.136	-0.0679	-0.117*
	(0.49)	(-0.27)	(0.03)	(0.87)	(0.08)	(0.97)	(-1.89)	(-2.53)	(-1.25)	(0.82)	(-0.92)	(-1.94)
constant	-0.0679	-0.181	-0.216	-0.919	-0.0271	-0.994	6.752*	3.472***	2.566	2.173	0.328	-0.262
	(-0.24)	(-0.72)	(-0.45)	(-0.98)	(-0.04)	(-0.87)	(2.11)	(3.57)	(1.44)	(1.51)	(0.31)	(-0.37)
r2	0.793	0.815	0.629	0.529	0.606	0.560	0.787	0.962	0.806	0.830	0.867	0.909
N_clust	155	158	52	55	47	50	11	11	18	17	31	31
N	1481	1383	510	477	460	432	105	98	174	150	307	278

t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.18 Regression Output for Turkiye's UAE Challange before and after the Arab Spring

	(1) Global	(2) Global After	(3) Africa	(4) Africa After	(5) Subsaharan	(6) Subsaharan After	(7) Europe	(8) Europe After	(9) MENA	(10) MENA After	(11) Asia	(12) Asia After
L.Turkiye	0.782***	0.694***	0.602***	0.441***	0.592***	0.406***	0.457***	0.627***	0.605***	0.496***	0.760***	0.700***
	(32.45)	(22.25)	(12.64)	(7.62)	(10.91)	(6.43)	(4.94)	(9.20)	(11.56)	(6.06)	(15.21)	(10.91)
L.UAE ODA(log)	0.0307*	0.00133	0.0440**	0.0130	0.0684***	0.0728***	0.0510*	-0.0224*	0.0208	-0.0786	0.0160	-0.0377
	(1.90)	(0.08)	(2.04)	(0.37)	(2.86)	(2.83)	(1.84)	(-2.12)	(0.67)	(-1.14)	(0.55)	(-1.43)
Muslim Majority	0.268***	0.496***	0.237**	0.713***	0.191**	0.669***	-0.0316	0.482**	1.965	0.182	0.386**	0.493***
	(3.23)	(5.22)	(2.41)	(4.01)	(2.06)	(3.24)	(-0.15)	(3.07)	(1.53)	(0.23)	(2.27)	(4.61)
L.Natural Resources	-0.0539***	-0.0148	0.0343	0.0664	0.0176	0.0554	0.361*	0.240**	-0.0753*	0.0887	-0.0236	0.00515
	(-3.50)	(-0.84)	(1.11)	(1.26)	(0.52)	(0.91)	(2.04)	(2.73)	(-2.04)	(1.45)	(-0.82)	(0.20)
L.Top Seven DAC ODA(log)	0.0403***	0.112***	-0.00859	0.136*	0.0172	0.121*	0.0993	0.192**	0.0349	0.313***	0.109***	0.160***
	(3.48)	(8.14)	(-0.28)	(1.88)	(0.39)	(1.68)	(1.48)	(3.08)	(1.71)	(6.53)	(4.85)	(4.44)
L.Top Seven DAC Exports(log)	-0.0237***	-0.0353***	-0.0462**	-0.0951**	-0.0544***	-0.0982**	-0.0529	0.138	-0.493***	-0.0218	-0.0282	-0.0161
	(-2.94)	(-3.68)	(-2.36)	(-2.58)	(-2.72)	(-2.51)	(-0.95)	(1.05)	(-3.80)	(-1.06)	(-1.02)	(-0.49)
L.GDP Per Capita(log)	0.000483	0.0116	0.00834	0.00534	0.0245	0.000879	-0.166*	0.102**	0.0959**	0.0263	-0.00463	0.00260
	(0.04)	(0.94)	(0.48)	(0.18)	(1.33)	(0.03)	(-1.85)	(2.77)	(2.29)	(0.54)	(-0.15)	(0.12)
L.Imports from Turkiye(log)	0.0620***	0.0898***	0.131***	0.0707	0.110***	0.0810	0.159	0.347*	0.532**	-0.298*	0.0629**	0.124***
	(3.78)	(5.16)	(4.14)	(1.30)	(3.66)	(1.50)	(0.75)	(1.86)	(2.71)	(-1.98)	(2.07)	(3.16)
L.Imports from UAE(log)	0.0106	-0.00957	0.0136	0.0556	0.0104	0.0440	0.172*	-0.129***	-0.0524	-0.0810*	0.0813**	0.0469*
	(1.03)	(-0.82)	(0.55)	(1.22)	(0.43)	(0.96)	(1.94)	(-4.08)	(-0.62)	(-1.95)	(2.45)	(1.99)
L.Control of Corruption	-0.206***	-0.0834	-0.0228	-0.134	-0.0176	-0.149	-1.203**	-0.742*	-0.0616	-0.188	-0.169	-0.00715
	(-4.18)	(-1.62)	(-0.26)	(-1.00)	(-0.22)	(-1.03)	(-2.66)	(-1.89)	(-0.20)	(-1.52)	(-1.68)	(-0.07)
L.Affected from Disasters	-0.0113	-0.00248	0.00982	0.00186	0.0129	0.000164	0.0157	-0.0157	0.0161	-0.000547	-0.0294*	-0.00166
	(-1.58)	(-0.41)	(0.90)	(0.17)	(0.98)	(0.01)	(0.42)	(-1.53)	(0.58)	(-0.02)	(-1.72)	(-0.11)
L.Population(log)	0.0167	-0.0105	0.00234	0.0582	-0.000499	0.0854	-0.575*	-0.697**	0.0127	0.127	-0.0728	-0.119*
	(0.63)	(-0.38)	(0.05)	(0.58)	(-0.01)	(0.75)	(-2.07)	(-2.54)	(0.07)	(0.77)	(-0.90)	(-1.88)
constant	-0.123	-0.246	-0.320	-0.785	-0.306	-0.910	7.841**	2.580**	1.903	2.472	0.468	0.0124
	(-0.45)	(-1.00)	(-0.74)	(-0.83)	(-0.61)	(-0.81)	(2.85)	(2.37)	(0.83)	(1.41)	(0.48)	(0.02)
r2	0.793	0.815	0.625	0.525	0.605	0.560	0.788	0.963	0.800	0.830	0.866	0.908
N_clust	155	158	52	55	47	50	11	11	18	17	31	31
N	1481	1383	510	477	460	432	105	98	174	150	307	278

t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.19 Turkiye's UAE Challange w/o Interaction Term

	(1) Global	(2) Africa	(3) Subsaharan	(4) Europe	(5) MENA	(6) Asia	(7) Americas
L.Turkiye	0.755***	0.621***	0.624***	0.646***	0.631***	0.753***	0.481***
	(38.30)	(19.40)	(19.17)	(11.80)	(11.63)	(17.51)	(6.43)
L.UAE ODA(log)	0.0137	0.0240	0.0622***	0.00217	-0.0162	-0.0159	0.0329
	(1.13)	(1.14)	(3.80)	(0.11)	(-0.53)	(-0.74)	(0.77)
Muslim Majority	0.345***	0.293***	0.263***	0.241	1.603*	0.436***	0
	(5.01)	(3.37)	(2.86)	(1.25)	(2.09)	(3.30)	(.)
L.Natural Resources	-0.0370***	0.0344	0.0277	0.202*	-0.0391	-0.0112	-0.0342
	(-2.70)	(1.65)	(1.44)	(2.13)	(-0.93)	(-0.51)	(-1.21)
L.Top Seven DAC ODA(log)	0.0690***	0.0566*	0.0614*	0.0889	0.130***	0.119***	0.0316
	(7.30)	(1.90)	(1.82)	(1.37)	(4.47)	(5.51)	(1.49)
L.Top Seven DAC Exports(log)	-0.0281***	-0.0492	-0.0450	-0.00637	-0.0291	-0.0149	-0.0114
	(-4.35)	(-1.63)	(-1.52)	(-0.12)	(-0.82)	(-0.75)	(-1.22)
L.GDP Per Capita(log)	0.00527	0.0109	0.0131	0.00509	0.0451	-0.00531	0.0121
	(0.52)	(0.62)	(0.80)	(0.06)	(1.42)	(-0.23)	(0.70)
L.Imports from Turkiye(log)	0.0727***	0.117***	0.108***	0.0585	0.144	0.0733***	0.0577**
	(5.42)	(3.48)	(3.30)	(0.39)	(1.31)	(2.82)	(2.05)
L.Imports from UAE(log)	0.00505	0.0362	0.0274	0.0475	-0.0933*	0.0520**	0.0266
	(0.60)	(1.64)	(1.30)	(0.65)	(-1.97)	(2.48)	(1.29)
L.Control of Corruption	-0.148***	-0.101	-0.0924	-0.864**	-0.344**	-0.104	0.0102
	(-3.81)	(-1.29)	(-1.21)	(-2.84)	(-2.18)	(-1.35)	(0.17)
L.Affected from Disasters	-0.00698	0.00324	0.00146	-0.00631	0.0129	-0.0154	-0.00620
	(-1.51)	(0.40)	(0.17)	(-0.32)	(0.69)	(-1.27)	(-0.59)
L.Population(log)	0.00135	-0.0162	-0.0125	-0.391**	-0.0854	-0.0723	0.0714*
	(0.06)	(-0.32)	(-0.23)	(-2.98)	(-0.81)	(-1.46)	(1.99)
constant	-0.167	-0.494	-0.553	4.689***	-0.258	0.168	-1.332***
	(-0.83)	(-1.10)	(-1.05)	(5.90)	(-0.25)	(0.28)	(-3.86)
r2	0.808	0.647	0.664	0.865	0.802	0.882	0.441
N_clust	159	55	50	11	18	31	36
N	2864	987	892	203	324	585	643

t statistics in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.20 Turkiye's UAE Challange with Interaction Term Before and After the Arab Spring

	(1) Turkey ODA(log)	(2) Turkey ODA(log)	(3) Turkey ODA(log)	(4) Turkey ODA(log)	(5) Turkey ODA(log)	(6) Turkey ODA(log)	(7) Turkey ODA(log)	(8) Turkey ODA(log)	(9) Turkey ODA(log)	(10) Turkey ODA(log)
L.Turkey ODA(log)	0.545***	0.427***	0.538***	0.406***	0.457***	0.623***	0.596***	0.512***	0.785***	0.797***
	(10.21)	(7.64)	(9.30)	(6.01)	(6.42)	(11.64)	(5.37)	(3.26)	(17.61)	(17.06)
Muslim Majority=0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Muslim Majority=1	0.510***	1.214***	0.605***	0.884**	-0.732	0.553***	1.699***	-0.688	0.596*	0.442**
	(3.73)	(4.38)	(3.49)	(2.61)	(-0.85)	(3.35)	(3.26)	(-1.12)	(1.78)	(2.09)
L.UAE ODA(log)	0.0933***	0.0689**	0.0821**	0.0699**	-0.0186	0.0185	0.00815	0.0281	0.0665	-0.0252
	(3.35)	(2.51)	(2.68)	(2.57)	(-0.36)	(0.91)	(0.23)	(1.14)	(1.23)	(-0.58)
Muslim Majority=0 × L.UAE ODA(log)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Muslim Majority=1 × L.UAE ODA(log)	-0.0733*	-0.111**	-0.0529	-0.0155	0.151	-0.0991***	0	0	-0.0395	0.0229
	(-1.85)	(-2.28)	(-0.92)	(-0.27)	(0.85)	(-4.70)	(.)	(.)	(-0.71)	(0.45)
L.DAC ODA(log)	0.0568**	0.254***	0.0553	0.191**	0.154*	0.214***	0.141	0.260**	0.0397*	0.0485**
	(2.12)	(3.25)	(1.54)	(2.50)	(2.04)	(3.20)	(1.68)	(2.66)	(1.79)	(2.06)
L.Imports from Turkey(log)	0.0786**	0.0743*	0.0788**	0.0754	0.365*	0.221	-0.0544	-0.143	0.0531	0.0443
	(2.47)	(1.79)	(2.56)	(1.66)	(1.99)	(1.55)	(-0.74)	(-1.08)	(1.17)	(1.42)
L.Natural Resources	0.0698**	0.0429	0.0992***	0.0504	0.378**	0.320***	-0.0326	0.0143	-0.0162	0.0504
	(2.41)	(0.64)	(2.82)	(0.71)	(3.13)	(4.52)	(-0.53)	(0.26)	(-0.33)	(1.37)
L.GDP Per Capita(log)	-0.0117	-0.0105	-0.0125	-0.0185	-0.156	0.0327	0.0328	0.0340	-0.00838	-0.0222
	(-0.47)	(-0.31)	(-0.47)	(-0.57)	(-1.05)	(0.95)	(0.68)	(0.80)	(-0.24)	(-1.04)
L.Infant Mortality	-0.00953***	-0.00143	-0.0134***	-0.00303	0.0553	0.0531	-0.0361**	0.00274	0.00149	-0.00635
	(-2.98)	(-0.32)	(-3.24)	(-0.59)	(1.31)	(1.45)	(-2.35)	(0.19)	(0.24)	(-1.34)
L.Control of Corruption	-0.298*	-0.172	-0.248	-0.139	-0.500	-0.263	-0.313	-0.0177	-0.195	-0.0181
	(-2.00)	(-1.14)	(-1.50)	(-0.85)	(-0.54)	(-0.60)	(-1.44)	(-0.11)	(-1.52)	(-0.14)
L.Electoral Democracy	0.0116	-0.647	-0.237	-0.645	-0.359	1.003	1.879**	-0.803	0.101	0.467
	(0.03)	(-1.39)	(-0.61)	(-1.31)	(-0.20)	(1.00)	(2.22)	(-1.07)	(0.21)	(1.59)
L.Population(log)	-0.0184	-0.0643	0.0152	0.00809	-0.486**	-0.598***	0.370**	0.0576	-0.0698	0.0372
	(-0.43)	(-0.65)	(0.30)	(0.07)	(-2.85)	(-3.54)	(2.39)	(0.39)	(-0.83)	(0.99)
constant	-0.407	-0.584	-0.692	-0.924	3.685*	3.549***	-6.354**	1.368	0.873	-0.885*
	(-0.93)	(-0.64)	(-1.59)	(-0.91)	(2.02)	(3.74)	(-2.60)	(0.85)	(0.86)	(-1.78)
r2	0.602	0.541	0.576	0.561	0.771	0.963	0.852	0.959	0.836	0.886
N_clust	52	55	47	50	11	11	14	13	29	29
N	462	477	417	432	94	99	121	114	259	260

t statistics in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01