



T.C.

ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

**DIASPORAS AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE TURKISH DIASPORA IN
GERMANY AND ARMENIAN DIASPORA IN FRANCE**

MASTER'S THESIS

ALPEREN USTA

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

ANKARA, 2022

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
DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this Master thesis has been prepared in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct at every stage. All data and documents are obtained in the framework of academic and ethical rules. All materials that have been utilized are fully cited and referenced in the thesis; otherwise I approve all legal responsibility.

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To my beloved mother, father and brother...

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ABSTRACT

Diasporas and International Politics: A Comparative Study of the Turkish Diaspora in Germany and Armenian Diaspora in France

As they defy the conventional meaning of state, ‘diaspora politics’ receive growing attention from policy makers around the world. Diasporas appear as the supporter of multicultural foreign policies along with carrying out lobbying activities. They are, sometimes, acting as mediators or bridge that can support developing relations between their homeland and host land while they can also be reason of relationship breakdown. This thesis examines the multidimensional and complicated relationship between diasporas and international politics. It focuses on a comparison of two cases: Turkish diaspora in Germany and the Armenian diaspora in France. It discusses efficacy and diplomatic power of the Turkish diaspora in Germany in comparison to Armenian diaspora in France as two examples of how diasporas affect international politics and how international politics affect diasporas. More than 6 million people of Turkish descent live in Europe. They have increasing impact on not only Germany’s foreign policy but also European policy. However, despite the Turkish diaspora’s high potential for political influence, they are not as effective actor as Armenian diaspora due to several reasons including but not limited to: their divided organizational structure, limited interest in European politics, and the current global conjuncture, the political and legal system of Germany and deficiency of formation of diaspora consciousness. Furthermore, the different extent of political opportunities in France and Germany for diasporic organizations, and harmony of interests and aims between French and Armenians invigorate the efficacy and diplomatic power of the Armenian diaspora in France. The thesis utilizes quantitative data including content analysis of news, reports and interviews, existing statistics, surveys and reviews of the findings in the previous researches.

Keywords: Comparative Politics, Diaspora, Diplomacy, Turkish Diaspora, Armenian Diaspora

ÖZET

Diasporalar ve Uluslararası Politika: Almanya'daki Türk Diasporasının ve Fransa'daki Ermeni Diasporasının Karşılaştırmalı Çalışması

Devletin geleneksel anlamına meydan okuyan ‘Diaspora Politikaları’, dünya çapında politika belirleyiciler tarafından gittikçe artan bir şekilde ilgi görmektedir. Diasporalar lobi faaliyetleri yürütmek ile birlikte çok kültürlü dış politikalarının savunucusu rolündedirler. Bazen anavatanları ile ev sahibi ülke arasındaki ilişkilerin gelişmesi için arabulucu veya köprü görevi görmektedirler, bazen de bu ilişkinin bozulmasının nedeni olabilmektedirler. Bu tez, diasporalar ile uluslararası siyaset arasındaki çok boyutlu ve karmaşık ilişkiyi incelemektedir. Ayrıca, bu tezde Almanya’daki Türk diasporası ile Fransa’daki Ermeni diasporasının karşılaştırılmasına odaklanılmaktadır. Almanya’daki Türk diasporasının etkinliğini ve diplomatik gücünü Fransa’daki Ermeni diasporasına kıyaslanması aracılığıyla diasporaların uluslararası siyaseti nasıl etkilediği ve uluslararası siyasetin diasporaları nasıl etkilediği iki örnek ile tartışılmaktadır. Avrupa’da 6 milyondan fazla Türk kökenli insan yaşamaktadır. Sadece Almanya’nın dış politikasında değil, aynı zamanda Avrupa politikasında da artan bir etkiye sahiptirler. Fakat, Türk diasporasının siyasi etki bakımından yüksek potansiyeline rağmen bölünmüş örgütsel yapıları, Avrupa siyasetine sınırlı ilgileri, mevcut küresel konjonktür, Almanya’nın siyasi ve hukuki sistemi ve diaspora bilincinin Türk toplumunda olmaması gibi nedenlerden dolayı Ermeni diasporası kadar etkin bir aktör değiller. Buna ek olarak, diaspora örgütleri için Fransa ve Almanya’daki farklı boyutlarda var olan siyasi fırsatlar ile Fransız ve Ermeniler arasındaki çıkar ve hedeflerin uyumu, Fransa’daki Ermeni diasporasının etkinliğini ve diplomatik gücünü kuvvetlendirmektedir. Bu tez, haberlerin, raporların ve röportajların (videolar ve ikincil veriler) içerik analizini, mevcut istatistikleri, anketleri ve önceki araştırmalardaki bulguların incelemelerini içeren nicel verileri kullanmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Karşılaştırmalı Siyaset, Diaspora, Diplomasi, Türk Diasporası, Ermeni Diasporası

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

IOM	: International Organization for Migration
IR	: International Relations
EU	: European Union
NGO	: Non-Governmental Organization
IMF	: International Monetary Fund
YTB	: Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities
TİKA	: Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency
DİB	: Directorate for Religious Affairs
ILO	: International Labor Office
MPs	: Member of Parliament
ANCA	: Armenian National Committee of America
AAA	: Armenian Assembly of America
CCAF	: Coordinating Council of Armenian Organizations of France

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1. INTRODUCTION

Diasporas as defiers of its conventional boundaries, as transnational transporters of cultures, and as manifestations of de-territorialized communities have significant roles in international politics because of their passive and active roles influencing the world affairs in numerous ways and different extents. They, sometimes, act as mediators or bridge that can support developing relations between their homeland and host land while they can also be reason of relationship breakdown. Moreover, they are embedded in networks that provide them connection with simultaneously to two or more 'nation states'. Thus, they have transnational connections as both a local and a global actor in the international system. Due to the globalizing world, the interconnected structure of the world system and technological developments, the importance of diasporas have increased which makes them substantial actors of the international politics. International politics has critical role to comprehend the structuring, organizing and the political activities of diasporas along with the other disciplines such as sociology and political science. This complicated and multidimensional correlation between the international politics and diasporas recently attract the attention of policymakers, leaders, governmental and non-governmental organizations, think tanks, academy, and civil institutions. Therefore, through electoral rules, constitutional provisions, regulations, allowing dual citizenship, and legal guarantees, states started to give the specific roles to their diasporas such as being 'representatives' of their ethnic homeland and a group that has responsibilities to their homeland. In addition to states, the international organizations such as World Bank and International Organization for Migration (IOM) have been promoting and supporting diasporas as significant actors and partners for global development particularly global economic growth by the reason of substantial amounts of global remittances mainly provided by migrants and diasporas (Adamson 2016).

The international system has transformed local and societies through its substantial penetration into their political and social practices, while local and societies have transformed the global system at one and the same time. Diasporic communities as both parts of local and global actors have a significant and peculiar impact on this transformation. As discussed in detail in the methodology chapter, they are local because the diaspora doesn't just come to mean of the geographical spread of a considerable number of people. A diaspora also contains the identity, culture, memory and home which are produced via translocation (Chiang 2010). Although diasporas' social features are permeable due to intentionally or unintentionally orientating to host land society and globalization process, diasporas have strived to maintain their locality together with identity, cultural and social characteristics by numerous ways in their host land which has different cultural, social even political codes. For these reasons, diasporas are defined by Khachig Tölölyan as "paradoxical combination of localism and transnationalism" (Tölölyan 2012).

In the mean time, diasporas are global actors because of their transnational connections that ensure them the opportunity to be simultaneously in more than one society and more than one 'nation-state'. In some cases, these de-territorialized and transnational structures of diasporic communities are seen as an opportunity and a partner to promote the national interests of migrant sending countries by their policymakers. Therefore, they are formed as a foreign policy tool by the way of delegating them some foreign policy missions as in Georgian case. Also migrant-sending countries support their diasporas through the giving them some political rights to promote 'long-distance nationalism' which is important to expand political influence beyond its territorial boundary as in Greek-Cypriot case. Contrary to these kinds of cases, they are sometimes perceived as a threat by ruling elites of migrant-sending countries because their transnational connections and de-territorialized structure of diasporas make it harder for them to be politically controlled. In this context, it should be unsurprising that the cooperation or conflict between diasporas and their respective homelands is being academically discussed more in the discipline of international relations in recent years.

While the structure and activities of diasporas make them a natural part of international politics, their position in the transnational sphere enables them to play an active role in international politics. As the most known active role of diasporas, they

conduct lobbying activities in mainly liberal host lands because of their political system, and support multicultural foreign policies. As their active roles are examined in the third chapter, through these lobby activities, especially in liberal societies, they might aim to promote their own communal interest or interest of their homeland. On the other hand, overzealous diaspora activists can distort the interests of the people or societies they claim to lobby for, as it is observed in the case of the 1998 attacks on ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. Depending on the economic and political capacity of diasporas, they have the potential to directly affect the decision-making process of their country of origin and host land country, as well as intergovernmental organizations such as the European Union.

Diasporas may play quite important role and in most cases controversial role in conflicts and political crisis in their respective country of origin because they may become an obstacle to conflict resolution and peacebuilding process of conflicts by the way of recruitment of new militants, funding and providing arms for continuation of violent activities which can be on behalf of its homeland government or detrimental of the interest of its homeland. Although the literature is prone to focus on problematic aspect of the linkages between diasporic communities and conflict owing to diaspora's roles at the transnationalisation or internationalization of conflicts and internal issues, the diasporic communities may come into prominence as potential agents that may make significant contributions to peacebuilding process and conflict transformation in their respective homelands. As the positive aspect of diasporas in the conflict resolution is exemplified in the third chapter through the Ethiopia and Somalia cases, the combination of their familiarity with their country of origins and experiences gained in the countries of residence makes them mediator and useful facilitator for the peacebuilding process.

The systematic transformations in international politics after the Cold War period have increased the importance of the civil society in politics. As a result of these transformations, the diplomacy has adapted these changes through the developing civil society-based politics. In this respect, diasporas of the states have become rewarding natural partners and foreign policy tools for image/prestige management which is inseparable part of the state power in the existing international system as both realists and constructivist have argued. The increasing importance of public diplomacy has brought the increasing institutionalization of diasporic communities promoted by the migrant-sending countries such as Turkey, China and India. On the other hand, that institutionalization of

diasporic communities enables institutional cooperation between diasporas and their country of residence. To illustrate, French government had supported institutions established by Arab immigrants in France to enhance France's image in the Arab World (Safran 2004). Owing to diasporas' roles in public diplomacy aiming to directly communicate with foreign publics, diasporas which are 'outside the state but inside the people' can make contribution to image/prestige of their country of origin as well as of host land country. Therefore, throughout the study, programs and aims of diasporic institutions established by diaspora such as the Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU), and institutions established in recent years by migrant-sending countries to engage with diasporas such as Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) are examined to discuss to what extent the public diplomacy is important on the success of the diaspora's efforts.

The reason for the existence of diasporas can cause them to be instrumentalized in foreign policy issues. To illustrate this instrumentalisation and passive role of diasporas, while Russia has developed its diaspora politics, it has applied soft power tools by giving passport to Russian population in near abroad (twenty-five million Russians stayed out of the current territory of Russian Federation together with the collapse of the Soviet Union) as well as has applied hard power methods including annexation of territories where Russian diaspora reside. On the other hand, by the conceptualization of Russian diaspora by Moscow, Russian diaspora in near abroad has been instrumentalized to legitimate Moscow's intervention and engagement in the internal and external affairs of ex-Soviet republics without considering the opinion of Russian population who found themselves out of territory of Russian Federation (Değirmen 2008). As it is discussed shortly in introductory chapter and more detail in the third chapter, diasporas have various passive and active roles in the international politics, and these roles make them significant actors and partners for the states, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, and civil society. However, although there are many diasporic entities across the world, a number of them come to the forefront because of their considerable direct and indirect effects on the affairs at global, national and local level.

In the last part of third chapter, reasons why some diasporas come into prominence in international politics while others do not are analyzed through the discussing of factors affecting the success of diaspora's efforts and diplomatic power of diasporas. This part

along with the fourth chapter, for this reason, provides a basis for fifth chapter comparing of the Turkish diaspora in Germany and Armenian diaspora in France. In this thesis, these factors are divided into two categories: Internal Factors and External Factors. Internal factors are used to define factors which have naturally emerged that cannot be controlled or have been created/self-created by members of the diasporic community as a result of social interaction between each other, and social interaction with host land society for a length of time. However, it is erroneous to argue that internal factors are completely independent from external factors because the structure of diasporic community as discussed before harbors some traces from cultural, political and social codes of their country of origin. On the other hand, external factors, in the study, are used to define factors which are generally constituted by out of diasporic community. Thus, diasporas, in most cases, might little influence on those factors which are difficult to be controlled by the community itself. To make this categorization more comprehensible, the political system of the country where a member of diasporic community resides can be given as an instance of external factor, and how identified diasporas themselves can be given as an example of internal factor.

This thesis places a particular importance on international conjuncture belonging to external factors because it aims to emphasize the substantiality of this factor on the success of the diaspora's efforts and the diplomatic power of diasporas. On the other hand, although there are few studies which intentionally or unintentionally research on the influence of international conjuncture on the diaspora's activities in political sphere, there is no other study examining the impact of the international conjuncture on the diplomatic power of diasporas which directly influence the success rate of diasporas. For instance, Thomas de Waal puts emphasis on the politicization of the term of 'genocide' by the Armenian diaspora, and how international conjuncture influence the result of Armenian diaspora's efforts for recognition of the events of 1915 as 'genocide'(de Waal 2015). In addition, Anton Weiss-Wendt discusses how the term of genocide converted from a legal concept into a political discourse used in propaganda battles between the United States and the Soviet Union. He argues that Cold War period was a proper time to bring up the events of 1915 to the agenda of Armenian diaspora and to take positive results from Armenian diaspora's efforts for politicization of the events of 1915 in the Soviet Union (Weiss-Wendt 2018b). However, international conjuncture is indirectly examined within the limit of the events of 1915 in these studies. A limited number of other studies in the literature regarding the factors affecting the success of the diaspora's efforts do not discuss this

factor. In this context, international conjuncture is developed by this study as a factor through the analyzing of different cases in the last part of third chapter and fifth chapter. The term of international conjuncture is applied in the thesis to define the combination of “different forces, events, and structures at particular times”(Paulmann 2013).

To be supposed a diasporic community as influential and successful actor in the international system, the diplomatic power of the diasporas needed to be discussed through the examining of the factors affecting the diplomatic power of the diasporic community, because the diplomatic power affected by the various factors is the one of the main determinants of the level of efficacy and the success of the diasporas in international politics. Shortly, factors discussed in the study influence positively or negatively the diplomatic power of diasporas, and diplomatic power substantially determines the level of efficacy and the success of the diasporas in international politics. Therefore, throughout the study, these factors are discussed by examples from the literature and current issues to provide a systematic explanation the main problem of this thesis.

In the fourth chapter, the historical background of the Turkish community in Germany and Armenian community in France is analyzed to comprehend diasporisation process of these communities in time. Along with this process, the construction of a common narrative for the reasons of existence in the diaspora is an important factor for the motivation of diasporas to act in unison. The lack of a common narrative that has not been constructed in the diasporisation process of the Turkish community makes it difficult for the diaspora to take a common stance on issues that concern them. In addition, history of these communities in the diaspora paves to way for researchers useful basis to analyze background of bilateral relations between diasporas and host land society. For instance, this thesis draws on the Ottoman Archives to discuss historically constructed relations between French society and Armenians living in France. The documents from Ottoman Archives are also of critical importance to understand how the level of instrumentalisation of the Armenian community in France is related to the international conjuncture. For these reasons but not limited to, after the fourth chapter begins with the general information about the specified cases (under the separate topics), the historical background of the formation of main cases of this study is examined. The aforementioned cases are examined from the Ottoman period to the present day.

In order to discuss the differences between the Turkish diaspora in Germany and the Armenian diaspora in France in terms of success, diplomatic power and effectiveness, which is the main research problem of the study, the social, political and economic structures of the cases are analyzed after the examining of historical background in addition to the factors mentioned in the third chapter. To avoid repetition, the factors discussed in the third chapter are largely not applied to the cases in the fourth chapter. However, the time factor, which has an indisputable importance on the success of diasporas as the factor of international conjuncture, is discussed again in this section since the examination of the diasporisation process of the cases is essential and facilitating to comprehend the time factor. The time period when the first generation of the migrants arrived to a new host land is critical for the organizing, structuring, and position of diasporas in the country where they reside. As Tölölyan discusses, “those communities of the dispersed who develop varieties of association that endure at least into their third generation” (Tölölyan 2012). Dispersion is a first step to their acceptable persistence in the form of consolidated along with being the common feature of diasporas. The process that starts with dispersion generally continues with a continual transformation in social, political and economic terms in communities of immigrant origin. For this reason, the time factor developed by this thesis as a factor affecting the diplomatic power of the diaspora is discussed in various chapters throughout the study and is applied on specified cases of the study.

In the fifth chapter, the international conjuncture and time factor developed by this thesis, together with the factors previously discussed and implemented in the literature, are applied to provide systematic explanation for the differences in terms of efficacy, diplomatic power, and the success rate between the Turkish diaspora in Germany and Armenian diaspora in France. The comparison of the cases of the study also presents a potential answer to why some of the diasporic communities are referred as influential, diplomatically powerful and ‘successful’ examples of the diasporic community in terms of international politics, why others not. On the other hand, fifth chapter shows that factors discussed and intentionally or unintentionally applied to limited cases are insufficient to explicate the differences in terms of efficacy, diplomatic power, and the success rate between the Turkish diaspora in Germany and Armenian diaspora in France. The literature does not grow in enough maturity to explain why some diasporas have shined out as a significant actors in the international scene why others have not. There are limited studies

in the literature which focuses on a certain part of the reasons of stated problem above. For instance, the Yossi Shain and Abaron Barth (2003) examine some of these factors which present a partial explanation for the problem of the thesis through the cases of Jewish diaspora and Armenian diaspora. Some other studies indirectly seek an answer to a certain part of the problem such as possible effects of the diaspora policies of homeland countries to the success of the diaspora's efforts (Adamson 2016; Aydın 2014). The role and impact of the political participation of diasporas and political system of the host land countries on the diaspora's activities are also analyzed to see how these factors are responsible for the efficacy and success of the specified cases in international politics. Although all of these studies are very useful and valuable to find out a systematic explanation to major problem of the study, they do not directly pay attention to subject of this thesis itself. For this reason, they are insufficient to discuss and analyze the problems of this study at full length.

On the other hand, the affairs at global, national and local level have important direct and indirect effects on the diaspora's structuring, organizing and the success of its efforts. This complicated and multidimensional correlation between the international politics and diasporas have crucial roles to understand why some of the diasporic communities are referred as influential actors and 'successful' examples of the diasporic community in the In this context, through the comparison of the Turkish diaspora in Germany and Armenian diaspora in France, this study provides a potential explanation to why some of diasporas are more influential and successful than others in terms of international politics. On the other hand, the literature regarding the correlation between international politics and diasporas is inclined to focus on the limited scope and unidirectional side of this correlation. Thus, most studies place emphasis on the diasporas' influence on the foreign policy of their respective homeland and host land, and on global affairs. However, international politics has also a critical role in structuring, organizing and the political activities of diasporas. This study discusses and illustrates how the international politics along with other disciplines such as political science and sociology transform and shape the diaspora's structuring, organizing, and the political activities which determine the role and place of diasporas in the international politics. Lastly, there is no other study that examines and compares the Turkish diaspora in Germany and Armenian diaspora in France in such detail in terms of their differentiating extent of roles and influences in international politics. Moreover, comparison of the cases is rarely applied by researchers in diaspora

studies and studies regarding its correlation with international politics. In this sense, the thesis reaches out to significant contributions to the literature.

This thesis focuses on the Turkish diaspora in Germany and Armenian diaspora in France by the analysis and implementation of the factors affecting the diplomatic power of diasporas; thus the efficacy and the success of diaspora's efforts. In the introductory chapter, descriptive information regarding the thesis subject, and the features and scope of the research problem are clearly presented. In addition, the contributions of this thesis to the literature, and aims and hypothesis of the thesis are specified. In the second chapter, it explains the methodological framework of the study. Thereafter, the term of diaspora is conceptualized, and the conceptual and theoretical dimension of the correlation between the diasporas and international politics are examined. In the third chapter, active and passive, constructive and destructive roles of diasporas are analyzed to understand how diasporas influence affairs at global, national and local level. Over and above this, factors affecting the success of diaspora's efforts, efficacy and the diplomatic power of diasporas are discussed for the preparation to give systematic explanation to main research problem of the thesis. These factors are divided into two categories as internal factors and external factors. Although the factor of international conjuncture is the part of external factors, it is separately analyzed to illustrate how substantial this factor on the diaspora's activities, and on the possibility to take positive response from their activities in both political and social sphere. In the fourth chapter, the historical background of the Turkish community in Germany and Armenian community in France is analyzed to comprehend diasporasation process of these communities in time. After the examining of historical background, the social, political and economic structures of the cases are discussed in addition to the factors mentioned in the third chapter. In the fifth chapter, the international conjuncture and time factor developed by this thesis, together with the factors previously discussed and implemented in the literature, are applied to provide systematic explanation for the differences in terms of efficacy, diplomatic power, and the success rate between the Turkish diaspora in Germany and Armenian diaspora in France. By comparison of the cases, it is determined to what extent the preparations made throughout the study yielded results in the fifth chapter. Finally, in the conclusion, it discusses a short summary of the thesis, and the extent to which the aim of the thesis has been achieved. The contributions of the thesis to the literature are discussed. In the light of the findings, the recommendations for the further researches regarding the subject of this thesis are brought in.

The thesis essentially aims to explain the reasons for why the Turkish diaspora in Germany is not as influential, diplomatically powerful, and successful diasporic community as the Armenian diaspora in France with regards to international politics. Through the comparative study of specified cases, it intends to illustrate the crucial roles of complicated and multidimensional correlation between the international politics and diasporas to comprehend why some of the diasporic communities are influential actors, diplomatically powerful and ‘successful’ examples of the diasporic community in terms of international politics, why others not. In addition, investigating and comparing these cases of this study aims to provide a viewpoint regarding the multidimensional correlation between international politics and diasporas, instead of the unidirectional side of this correlation. In addition to these, as discussed before, the literature does not grow in enough maturity to explain why some diasporas have come to the forefront as influential actors in the international scene; why others have not. The thesis aims to fill, or at least minimize, this gap in the literature.

Most studies do not sufficiently attach importance to the category of the diasporas majorly identified with the time period when first generation of the migrants arrived to new host land, overlapping at least harmony of the interests and aims between diasporas and the host land state, and international conjuncture to discuss why some diasporas receive more positive reactions than others as a result of their efforts in respect to the international politics. Hence, this study also aims to illustrate the substantiality and necessity of these factors on the success of the diaspora’s efforts which make them more effective or ineffective examples of a diasporic community in point of international politics. Lastly, mainstream IR theories widely incline to combine these two concepts: State and national identity. However, diaspora studies have shown that national identity is embedded not only within the limited territorially defined state entity but also transnational state politics and practices. Therefore, by analyzing role of diasporic practices and politics, the changing of the relationship between ‘national identity’ and ‘state’ can be better examined and observed in this study.

As stated previously, this study constitutively hypothesizes that the Turkish diaspora in Germany is not as influential, diplomatically powerful, and successful as the Armenian diaspora in France with regards to international politics. In addition, the study argues that international conjuncture, which has substantial influence on the overlapping, at least

harmony, of the interests and aims between the diasporas and host land state, is the most significant determinant on the success of the diaspora's efforts in terms of international politics. In this context, this study aims to reveal the substantiality of the realist perspective to explain a certain part of the diaspora's activities and consequences of their efforts in both social and political spheres. Lastly, there is a multidimensional correlation between the international politics and diasporas because of the direct and indirect effect on the organizing, structuring and the activities of diasporas, contrary to what most studies concentrated unidirectional side of this correlation.



2. METHODOLOGY

This study deploys the comparison of the cases to analyze the efficacy, diplomatic power and the success of the Turkish diaspora in Germany and Armenian diaspora in France in terms of international politics. In this study, this method is applied to understand and explain how features/factors within the context influence the success of the diaspora's efforts and policy initiatives with regards to international politics. Through the comparison of the specified cases, this study aims to find out the reasons why there is pointedly dissimilarity among cases in respect to success of the diaspora's efforts, efficacy and diplomatic power.

The study utilizes quantitative data including content analysis of news, reports and interviews, existing statistics, surveys and reviews of the findings of the previous studies. As part of the literature review, academic journals, books, reports and working papers are utilized. The data used in this study is open-data that everyone can access them by internet. In the study, both primary and secondary data are obtained from private and public resources. This study is an explanatory research which aims to comprehend cause effect relationship. Finally, as a common feature of studies in the social sciences, the readings in the study inevitably include some traces of the subjectivity of the researcher.

2.1 Research Design

2.1.1 Temporal Domain

This study focuses on the Turkish diaspora in Germany and the Armenian diaspora in France. In addition to cases of the study, throughout the article, the several illustrative examples, drawn from ethnic diasporas instead of religious or cultural diasporas, are utilized. To better understand and discuss the dissimilarity among cases in respect to success of the diaspora's efforts, efficacy and diplomatic power, the historical process of the diasporisation of cases are required to examine. For this reason, the period from 1960s to today is mainly investigated. However, to comprehend the root of Armenian community

in France, the late 19th century and early 20th century are also examined mainly in the light of the Ottoman archives.

2.1.2 Independent and Dependent Variables

Dependent Variables:

- The efficacy, diplomatic power and the success of the Turkish diaspora in Germany with regard to international politics
- The efficacy, diplomatic power and the success of the Armenian diaspora in France with regard to international politics
- The role and place of diasporas in the international politics

Independent Variables:

- The category of the diasporas majorly identified with the time period when first generation of the migrants arrived to new host land
 - The level of political participation and interest of the diasporas to homeland and host land politics and global affairs
 - How do the members of diasporas identify themselves in where they reside?
 - Individual activists and leaders of the diasporic community
 - To what extent are the members of diasporas unified in terms of political stance regarding the issues related with the diasporas, their homeland and global affairs or divided into different political or civil organizations that compete with each other and follow different agendas?
 - The political and legal system of the country where diasporas reside
 - The overlapping at least harmony of the interests and aims between diasporas and the host land state
 - The relationship between diaspora's country of origin and host land state
 - Homeland's diaspora policy (this independent variable is applicable for the Turkish diaspora in Germany)
 - International Conjuncture
 - The occupational and educational status of diasporas

2.1.3 Main Topic and Research Questions

Although around 2.8 million of Turkish origin lives in Germany, they are less influential and weaker in terms of diplomatic power, than the 300,000-650,000 Armenians living in France. There are several factors affecting the success of the diaspora's efforts and possibility to receive positive results from their political activities. These factors can be divided into two categories as internal and external factors. Based on specified cases, the factors affecting the diplomatic power and the success of diasporas, some of which are examined in the literature, and some of these factors developed by this study in the light of findings can be examined and analyzed in depth. This hypothesis will be investigated through the answering the following questions below:

- To what extent the Turkish diaspora in Germany is an influential, diplomatically powerful and successful diasporic community in comparison with the Armenian diaspora in France with regards to international politics?
- Why are some diasporic communities referred as influential actors and 'successful' examples of the diasporic community in the international politics, why others not?
- What are the factors that have positive or negative influences on the efficacy and success of diasporas?
 - a) What are the internal factors that have positive or negative influences on the efficacy and success of diasporas?
 - b) What are the external factors that have positive or negative influences on the diplomatic power of diasporic organizations?
- What is the role and influence of the international conjuncture on the efficacy and success of the diaspora's efforts in the context of international politics?

2.2 Conceptualization

What are diasporas, and which groups can be referred to as diaspora? Those questions have been discussing for years, especially last three decades among the scholars in diaspora studies and those questions have not been answered yet as a result of heavily discussion. The diaspora is an 'essentially contested concept'. This debate in the literature on diasporas about what diasporas' limits and meaning, has implicitly based on the extent

of whether they are ‘natural’ entities or they are socially constructed. According to Fiona B. Adamson, “this debate in many ways mirrors the essentialist-constructivist debate in studies of nationalism, a debate that also implicitly informs the treatment of collective identities in IR”(Adamson 2013).

In the approach of essentialists, diasporas are transnational ethnic groups defined by a common identity and interested in a real or imagined country of origin. Although diaspora as a term is often applied to define some religious groups, it mainly defines transnational ethnic groups. This literature is utilizing a more expansive definition of diaspora that is discussed in the following subheadings of the study.

On the other hand, ‘constructivist approach to diasporas’ that is labeled by Adamson, diasporas are a group which are socially and politically constructed. Therefore, this literature has been closely associated with cultural studies. According to ‘constructivists’, diasporas are not pre-political or natural entities that emerged by migration or boundary crossing process, instead they are constructed or mobilized which is facilitated by the technological developments in the global communication and transportation sector. Therefore, they can be categorized as de-territorialized social, cultural or political community. ‘Constructivists’ treat diasporas as transnationally-organized “imagined communities” (Adamson 2013) that was developed by Benedict Anderson (2006).

In the following chapter, this debate of what diasporas are which seems so challenging to compromise among scholars is discussed in more detailed. In addition, the evolvement of the diaspora concept and variant categorization of features for community to be referred as diasporic are important part of the next chapter. However, this study does not categorize the group of scholars as ‘essentialist’ or ‘constructivist’ as Adamson inspiringly did in his study because some studies of ‘essentialist’ and ‘constructivist’ scholars are implicitly or explicitly utilized from both two approaches that makes it harder to categorize them whether they are ‘essentialist’ or ‘constructivist’. ¹

¹ For instance, **Robin Cohen’s** (1996) “Diasporas and the Nation-State: From Victims to Challengers” and William Safran’s (2004) “Deconstructing and Comparing Diasporas” have some traces of ‘essentialist’ and ‘constructivist’ approaches.

2.2.1 The Concept of Diaspora: Definitions and Literature

Like other terms which are so much in social sciences, although, there is no consensus among scholars about the meaning of term diaspora which has rooted history; it is generally used to depict geographical spread and spatial relations of their identity, culture and social interaction which are accompanying this spread (Sağlam 2020). The term Diaspora was used among philosophers and Hellenist writers in the 5th century BCE. At that time, the connotation was negative which derives from an ancient Greek word “Dispersion”, “to scatter, spread, disperse, and be separated”(Yaldız 2019). This ancient Greek word is approximately 2500 years old. Therefore, the term of diaspora is accepted as an ancient word. According to Khachig Tölölyan (1996), Jews were forced by the king of Babylon for exile in 6th century BCE, and they had to live from their homeland. The diaspora as a term was used to imply these Jews who lost their homeland and were exposed to violence. On the other hand, Yaldız who applies the argument of Braziel and Mannur cites that the term was first used to describe Jewish communities who were living in exile (outside Palestinian) circa 3rd century BCE (Yaldız 2019).

The traumatic experience and wish for returning to homeland had been common features of the term of diaspora. Diaspora as a term emerged to define Jewish communities and this term had been defining Jewish, Armenians and African communities. However, the meaning of Diaspora enlarged a lot and its meaning became ordinary. Also, it lost its instrumentalism. Brubaker emphasized on that the term has proliferated, and its meaning has been stretched to different agendas such as intellectual, cultural and political. Brubaker referred to his critique of the quick growth of diaspora studies as ‘The “diaspora” diaspora’. He indicated that during the 1970s, the term of diaspora and its cognates appeared as keywords only once or twice a year in dissertation abstracts, while it appeared in the late 1980s about thirteen times. On the other hand, its cognates appeared around 130 times in 2001. The ‘diaspora’ as a term reached a million Google hits and the large majority of them are not academic. Therefore, Brubaker warned of the rapid scattering of the term into many disciplinary discourses because this situation is diluting the meaning of diaspora (Brubaker 2005).

In twentieth century, the meaning of the term evaluated and expanded in the literature. From the first decade of twentieth century onwards, the distinct processes shaped the evaluation of the term of ‘Diaspora’ (Dufoix 2015):

- 1- Secularization, which means the usage was extended to nonreligious meanings
- 2- Trivialization, which means the extending of the spectrum of relevant cases

The term had a very limited meaning to define the exile of the Jews from their historical homeland and their spread through several regions. At the same time, it had implied the oppression and moral derogatory (Safran 1991). It has been not very useful for social scientist to signify the categorization of several groups which had some similar features with the Jews. For this reason, diaspora as an academic notion had been imported from the religious meanings/realm into the sphere of social sciences. Some scholars such as Jewish Russian historian Simon Dubnow played a critical role in this process. Diaspora as a term entered the Encyclopedia of Social Sciences in 1931 by the contribution of Simon Dubnow. He ensures a vision that the term goes beyond the case to include Armenian and Greek societies. A few years later, American sociologist Robert E. Park who relied on Dubnow's studies extended the scope of 'Diaspora' by way of applying it to Asians. In the 1950s, Chinese and Indians were demonstrated as 'other formed diasporas' by British anthropologist Maurice Freedman (Dufoix 2015).

The widespread of usage of diaspora created semantic discussion among researchers. Every researcher started to define his/her diaspora by including several groups (enlarging the boundary of diasporic community) or taking out some groups (shrinking the boundary of diasporic community). However, some scholars such as William Safran categorized some common features of the term which were accepted widely. He centered the point of 'leaving from motherland traumatically' as a common feature of diasporas together with six main features (Safran 1991):

1. The members of group or their ancestors have been dispersed to more than one country/regions or "peripheral".
2. They form a memory and entire of myths about their original homeland and past.
3. The group members argue that they are not full recognized by their host society and therefore feel partially alienated.
4. The dream to return their true and ideal ancestral homeland when the times come.
5. They believe that they should collectively strive and wish for maintenance or restoration of their original homeland.
6. They have group consciousness and solidarity.

According to Safran's notes (1991), diaspora described "different categories of people such as expatriates, expellees, political refugees, alien residents, immigrants and ethnic and racial minorities"(Safran 1991). Also, the term was implemented for a wide array of different people such as Cubans and Mexicans in the United States, Turkish in Germany, Indians and Armenians in different countries and Maghrebis living in France, Corsicans in Marseilles and even French-speaking Belgians living in communal enclaves in Wallonia by Safran and some scholars such as Walker Connor, although they are not appropriate to refer as diasporic organizations in terms of "ideal type" of Jewish diaspora. On the other hand, according to Robin Cohen (1996), the meaning of the term diluted, changed and expanded. The first criticism of Cohen was about this definition and list. He argued that according to the definition of Safran, the Germans, the Irish, the Russians, the Italians, Ukrainians, or the Kurds should be included in this list. Moreover, he also argued Safran's expression 'diaspora X in country Y'. For Cohen, it is necessary that all diasporas should scatter all lands like biblical Jews, but at least they should disperse more than one land. He rejected that stranded ethnic minority is a diaspora. Safran's classification excluded several diaspora groups. Although he was influenced by Jewish and Armenians, today, they are also not appropriate to form a diaspora group in point of the Safran's first definition.

The purposes, motivations and soul of diaspora groups are dynamic that can change in time. For instance, in the Safran's work (1991), Turkish community in Germany were assumed as a community that has highly developed diaspora consciousness based on a result of an opinion poll. According to this poll, 53% of the Turkish in Germany hoped to return to Turkey within the next few years, while only 5% were planning to remain in Germany permanently. By this result, he argued that it was the attitude that represented the internalization of the "myth of return to the homeland". Yet, today, this definition can't be applicable for most of the diaspora groups like the Turkish diaspora in Europe. Especially the feature of "the dream to return homeland when the times come" is problematic among other features because a survey conducted by the polling firm DATA4U from November 2019 to January 2020 and published in a joint report of Center for American Progress and Foundation for European Progressive Studies (2020) illustrates that great majority of the Turkish diaspora (primarily 72% of the respondents primarily identify themselves as a Turk and only 6% of the respondents identify themselves primarily as Kurds) in Germany, Netherlands, France and Austria intends to stay in Europe. For instance, while 68% of the

Turkish diaspora intends to stay in Germany while 24.4% of the Turkish diaspora are intended to go back to Turkey. Therefore, as purposes, motivations and soul of diaspora groups are dynamic, the term of diaspora has evolved and changed in time.

Nonetheless, the contribution of William Safran to the literature of diaspora is quite valuable and substantial. Some scholars accepted some part of Safran's features and reformed it (William Safran also later reformed). To illustrate, Cohen accepted three of his features, amend two and add four more (Cohen 1996):

1. The diaspora group should disperse from a real homeland, often traumatically, to more than one foreign region.
2. In the alternative, they should be expanded from a homeland to seek out a work, in chase of commerce or to further colonial purposes.
3. They should form a memory and entire of myths about their motherland, past and, achievements.
4. An idealization of the homeland and collective commitment to its continuation, restitution, security and wealthy.
5. The development of a return movement which gains collective approbation.
6. Among the group members, there should be strong ethnic group consciousness that based on common history and fate sustained over a long time.
7. There should be a problematic relationship with host land society, at least a lack of acceptance.
8. Group members should have a sentiment of empathy and cooperation with co-ethnic diaspora members in other countries.
9. There should be the possibility of a distinctive yet creative and enriching life in host countries with a tolerance for pluralism.

Cohen calls this list "quite consciously one of 'common features', to indicate that no one diaspora will manifest all features"(Cohen 1996). His list extended the frame of Safran's definition about which groups can be accepted as diasporic groups. He also included the communities which don't have traumatic experience and leave voluntarily from their homeland to the category of diasporic community. Beyond any doubt, his definition led to modern diaspora approach. Diaspora started to be used for groups which left their homeland due to economic, cultural and various reasons in the contemporary diaspora approach (Sağlam 2020).

After the long discussion about which features are necessary for a group to be accepted as a diaspora, Brubaker formed a new category and offered three main topics (Brubaker 2005):

1. Dispersion: Although this is the most widely accepted feature of ‘diaspora’, it is not universally accepted. Dispersion includes forced or traumatic dispersion, more broadly crosses state borders.
2. Homeland Orientation: It means orientation to a real or imagined ‘homeland’ as an authoritative source of value, identity and loyalty.
3. Boundary-Maintenance: The third constitutive criterion is about forming a boundary in host land society by preservation of distinctive identity.

According to (Brubaker 2005), the one of the most important feature is protecting and sustaining the ties with homeland which can be officially recognized as a state or potential state. Also, Brubaker emphasized the importance of the time and features and social boundaries are transferred from the generation to another generation. The similar characterization of common feature of the term was applied by William Safran. As mentioned above, Safran’s first definition in 1991 was criticized by some scholars such as Robin Cohen. He looked like be influenced from these criticisms because he redefined the most common features of the diaspora term. In this Safran’s study, Safran argued that members of the diaspora have ideational, emotional or cultural connection with homeland on the outside of host land. This motherland can be different from motherland belonged to your ancestor. It can be a place where you grew up in, outside of host land. Such as, the motherland of American-Armenian can be Lebanon instead of Armenia. Moreover, diasporas don’t need to be ethnic. It can be ideological and religious too (Safran 2015). But I will use the term of ‘diaspora’ based on ethnicity in my thesis. Otherwise, the term can include the different religious groups which can be accepted as diaspora group based on Safran’s argument that dissolves the definition of diaspora recognized by widely. When we take into consideration the fragmented religious structure (there are several religious orders that member of Turkish diaspora have adopted) of Turkish Diaspora and Armenian diaspora, it would create ambiguity about which groups can be classified as Turkish Diaspora/Armenian diaspora or “religious diaspora”. Besides, Safran’s argument about ideological or religious groups can be recognized as diaspora is still discussing among scholars.

On the other hand, diasporas are not solely formed as a result of dispersion, common national ancestry or any kind of simple link. According to Manuel Orozco, four significant factors are necessary to recognize a group as diasporic entity. Those are:

1. The degree of community, and particularly elite and activist, consciousness about the need or disposition for correlation with the homeland,
 2. The homeland's senses of emigrants,
 3. The social welfare policies by governments in the homeland, and
 4. The existence of relationships between source and destination countries
- (Orozco 2007).

According to Khachig Tölölyan, “a collection of transnational immigrants becomes diasporic community when its members develop some familial, cultural and social distance from their homeland or nation”(Tölölyan 2012). However, it doesn't mean that they don't care about kinship and affiliation. Instead, they continue to care deeply regarding on grounds of kinship and cognate by certain chosen affiliations. Contemporary transnational studies show that the homeland is reached easily by mobile phones, internet connection, video and airplane, and this transnational social space is “the space is the space in which the new immigrants still feel most at home, and they project this characteristic of recent forms of dispersion onto diasporas”(Tölölyan 2012). He/she is diasporic because he/she adapts a set of collective decisions to maintain to remain bi-or multi local as well as caring others in diaspora which he/she shares same ethnic origin. At the same time, he/she gives the importance to well-being of the homeland of his/her ancestors in some manner.

Another important feature of diaspora is “long-distance nationalism” which was brought in by Benedict Anderson (2006) to the literature. Diasporas were figured as groups which are long-distance nationalists have connection with political, economical, and social cases of homeland, but they don't need to bear the consequences of these cases and behavior fecklessly. In this respect, it has negative meaning. However, according to Nina Glick Schiller, “long-distance nationalism” has not only negative meanings but also positive. In her article, she defined actions of long-distance nationalists as: “Actions taken by long-distance nationalists on behalf of assumed motherland may include voting, demonstrating, lobbying, contributing money, creating works of art, fighting, killing and dying”(Nina Glick Schiller 2005). Nowadays, Armenian and Jews Diaspora can be shown as example of where “long-distance nationalism” is widespread among members. At the

same, these Diasporas are accepted as most integrated diaspora groups to their host lands. Again, Turkish Diaspora has also similar features to Armenian and Jewish Diaspora in point of prevalence of “long-distance nationalism” among members, although there are lasting integration problems compared with Armenian and Jewish Diaspora.

Diasporic experience inclines to focus on collective memory that mainly attributes to forced dispersion, childhood or cultural identity. Simply, this experience is different from the sole experience of individuals because it is common experience. That commonality and community feeling can be maintaining by communication, journey that frames some practices which produce new cultural knowledge, economical exchange and cultural connections exceed the national borders or in some cases by new migration of their cognates (Chiang 2010).

The meaning of the term of diaspora is cleared of from the classic traumatic elements which had been accepted as one of the main features of diasporas. However, there are still some scholars who insists on the reason of migration from homeland should be traumatic as one of the presuppositions to assume a group as diaspora. For example, Michel Bruneau suggested that dispersion under pressure (e.g. abject poverty, catastrophe, calamity, famine,) should be criteria to assume a group as a diasporic. The structure of diasporic community is shaped by several waves of migration. Yet the reason for immigration shouldn't be in response to a call for labor. Moreover, diaspora communities were organized before they had a nation state (homeland). For example, Armenians formed a diaspora before the establishment of Armenia as a nation state. However, Turkish immigrants had already a nation state before the migration to Europe. For this reason, Bruneau asserted by the influence of Riva Kastoryano that Turkish migrants are a transnational community instead of diaspora. “The transnational community essentially moves people who are going to ‘sell’ their labor and send part of their wages back to their community of origin in the form of remittances”(Bruneau 2010). This argument can be valid for the first generation of Turkish migrants. However, according to the World Bank's migration and remittances data (2021), annual remittances inflows to Turkey regularly have decreased because the economical, political and life condition of Turkish migrants have enhanced along with the new generations.

Additively, the differentiating experiences, features and living condition from one generation to another are not peculiar to Turkish Diaspora. In the past, diasporas were

seen as ‘victims’. Contrary to the past, at present, members of Armenian, Chinese and Indian Diaspora that had different ‘traumatic’ reason for migration, are prosperous and ‘expellee’ Jews gained comfort and high positions in their host lands (Safran 2015). Even, diasporas which have multicultural identity are presented as ‘national hero’ in diaspora congress. They are amounted that community, which is appreciated due to their contribution to transnational relations and homeland’s interest. Therefore, diaspora now evokes more positive meanings (Sağlam 2020) contrary to Bruneau’s argument based on traumatic meanings. As Safran argued (2015), both poverty and pressure can’t immortalize. Shortly, pressure as a reason for migration is not an indispensable presupposition to assume a group as diaspora. Rainer Bauböck asserted (2010) that the first criterion of traumatic dispersal is insufficient to identify diasporic communities. Moreover, Robin Cohen remarked some similar common features with Safran, in his book “Global Diasporas: An introduction”(2008). He accepted that generally diasporas leave their homeland by traumatic ways and dispersed to two or more foreign regions. However, additionally or alternatively, diasporas disperse from their homeland to find job, for commerce or other colonial desire. On the basis, Cohen identified five types of diaspora:

1. Victim Diasporas such as Jewish, African, Armenian Diasporas
2. Labor Diasporas such as Indian and ‘Turkish Diasporas’
3. Trade Diasporas such as Chinese and Lebanese Diasporas
4. Imperial Diasporas such as the British and French Diasporas
5. Cultural Diasporas such as Caribbean Diaspora

The economic push and pull factors such as with ongoing West–East and North–South inequalities, although the truss span has been narrowing between especially West and East, the form of labor markets and economy in the United States and other western countries which have advanced industry, and the generating new economic areas and opportunities for emigration after the collapse of communism have affected international migration flow. More importantly, increasing international migration flow have accelerated the ‘diasporization’ of the different communities in the world. The Cohen’s category of ‘labor diasporas’ met this ‘diasporization’ process. Along with economic factors, the technological developments on the movement and communication that enables migrants to communicate and reach remote countries and easily contact with their country of origin have facilitated ‘diasporization’ of population. This process provides the new opportunities

for the diasporic communities to maintain with their either symbolic or a migration sending country that causes the new formation of identity which takes on a transnational dimension (Adamson and Demetriou 2007).

While, a couple of scholars think that Turkish migrants are transnational community instead of diaspora. Vast majority of the scholars including Robin Cohen who is one of the prominent figures in the field of diaspora studies recognized that Turkish communities in Europe formed diaspora. In the globalization process, the international flowing of the products and capitals brought on new type of communities that have the characteristic of diaspora structuring. Those communities created national and regional identities that challenged globalization by the answer of indigenization. This process makes the dialectic between globalization and indigenization more complicated (Chiang 2010). Hence, Turkish diaspora should be taken into consideration from this context. As it is discussed above, Turkish community like many others generally has been referred as diasporic community (Labor diasporas) due to expanding the meaning of diaspora accordingly to existing condition of the era. The evolution of Turkish community will be widely examined and discussed in the chapter of the Turkish diaspora.

There is no commonly accepted definition of what diaspora is. There are several definitions that have some differences and similarities to each other for the concept. Therefore, a researcher should explain well what he/she means by the term of diaspora and remarked the limitation of his/her study. The term of diaspora in this thesis is influenced by Cohen's definition in *Global Diasporas: An Introduction*, Brubaker's main three categories, the concept of Anderson's "long-distance nationalism", conceptualization of diaspora by Safran (2004) and Bauböck's argument regarding the relation between the process of formation of a diasporic community, and political opportunities in host land and homeland. Although various illustrative examples are applied in the study, Turkish diaspora and the Armenian diaspora who identified themselves with ethnic or diasporic identity instead of religious identity such as Muslim diaspora or Alawite diaspora are main exemplary cases.

2.2.2 Conceptual and Theoretical Dimension of the Correlation between International Politics and Diasporas

Diasporas are withstanding against traditional state institutions of citizenship and loyalty, conventional meaning of state. They are embedded in networks that provide them connection with simultaneously to two or more 'nation states'. By the technological developments, especially in transportation and communication, in the every field, various places have become effectively a single community. Therefore, migrants have developed peculiar public identities which are formed in relation with more than one 'nation-state'. Moreover, they are characterized by a situation of being simultaneously in more than one society (Adamson and Demetriou 2007).

“They are not sojourners because they settle and become incorporated in the economy and political institutions, localities, and patterns of daily life of the country in which they reside. However, at the very same time, they are engaged elsewhere in the sense that they maintain connections, build institutions, conduct transactions, and influence local and national events in the countries from which they emigrated.”(Adamson and Demetriou 2007; N. G. Schiller, Basch, and Blanc 1995)

They are therefore described as the "paradigmatic other of the nation-state, as challengers of its traditional boundaries, as transnational transporters of cultures, and as manifestations of de-territorialized communities” (Shain and Barth 2003). “Deterritorialization is a term that is applied not only to transnational corporations and money markets, but also it is applied to ethnic groups, sectarian movements, and political formations (Adamson and Demetriou 2007)”.

While diasporas have increasingly received public and policymakers attention for last two decades, due to diasporas' peculiar public identities, the word of 'diasporophobia' has emerged in some cases which defines the fear of not just the foreignness of immigrants but also of their ongoing strong ties with abroad or their homelands. This word was derived from xenophobia that reflected in the immigration discussions and literature (Vertovec 2006). The word of 'diasporophobia' can be observed in some host land societies but also in migrant-sending countries since diasporas can lead to political headaches by their politically critical opinions and actions to the detriment of migrant-sending countries such as China, Turkey. In this sense, de-territorialized structure of diasporas are making harder

to politically control the diasporas which are still citizen (including dual citizens) of their homeland, for migrant-sending countries. Therefore, deterritorialization of the population that becomes later diasporic community has both positive and negative meanings from the perspective of IR discipline, which is exemplified by the case of the Turkish diaspora in Germany in the following chapters.

The concept of diaspora has been nurtured and institutionalized by non-state political entrepreneurs and particularly state elites in many migration-sending countries. Developing countries have realized the importance of their overseas nationals' political and economical potential, and they have been increasingly interested in them for particularly past two decades. To any doubt, this process has transformed and developed the institutional link between a state and its diaspora, and it has brought on the changing in both the discourses and practices that define membership and belonging in the state. National identity is still significant and linked with a specific territory or state, while the practices, strategies and politics that have been linked to identity and a specific territory or a state are themselves transnational and de-territorialized (Adamson and Demetriou 2007). In addition to state elites' contribution to deterritorialization of their overseas nationals, those nationals also de-territorialized themselves by their own practices and strategies in their host land. In this sense, diasporic communities have challenged the classical meaning of 'nation-states' and structural relation between state and nation.

Mainstream theory in international relations still inclines to combine the two concepts: state and national identity. However, diaspora studies have illustrated that national identity is embedded not only in the state entity defined territorially but also transnational state politics and practices, as I discussed above. At the same time, there are differences between nation state and diaspora in point of organizational and spatial logic. While nation states mainly consist of territorialized institutional structures, diasporas consist of largely de-territorialized networks (Adamson and Demetriou 2007). This transformation, to any doubt, has been made easier by developing communication and transportation technologies.

For mainstream realist and constructivist scholars, states are still defined and conceptualized, which is monolith territories embedded with unitary social identities. In the mainstream constructivists, there has been reluctance to deconstruct the state into its various components (Adamson and Demetriou 2007):

“States are modeled as bearers of discrete, homogenous identities that are then projected onto a socially thin anarchic system. This model of states as possessing territorially defined unitary identities, however, fails to capture the complexity and diversity of identities that inhabit the larger social world within which states are embedded”(Adamson and Demetriou 2007).

IR scholars and theoretical enterprise have been striving to reorient themselves to deal with increasing in global heterogeneity and diversity. According to Yosef Lapid (1996), changing world system showed the IR’s inability to involve the accelerated and coinciding “dynamics of integration and disintegration at both sub- and supra-state levels” because of state-centrism that hinges to homogenous and unitary terms instead of multicultural and plural. Although postmodernist and critical approaches to the discipline of IR have contributed to deconstruct the state into various components and practices, the number of studies from a postmodernist perspective to IR that engages conceptually with diasporas, the process of deterritorialization, transnational identity and migrants are very limited as it is same for studies in IR which examine the politics occurred within transnational space (Adamson and Demetriou 2007).

The concept of diaspora and diasporas’ practices have a satisfied potential for IR studies to reorient them into the increasing in global heterogeneity and diversity due to their transnational practices and ‘constructed’ de-territorialized structure. Additively, by the analyzing role of diasporic practices and politics, the changing of the relation between ‘national identity’ and ‘state’ can be better understood. Moreover, the concept of diaspora can be imported to a mainstream constructivist approach to theorize de-territorialized or transnational identity networks. Although there is a growing literature in IR that examine the transnational networks, transnational relations and non-state actors, those studies mainly focus on liberal and norm-based sides of those networks and relations, and transnational actors’ penetration to states’ politics as units. Therefore, the concept of diaspora offers an empirically grounded research field to comprehend the relations between the nature of transnational identity and territorially defined system of states (Adamson and Demetriou 2007). Lastly, diasporic practices and politics can be good source to analyze changing in the spatio-political configuration of identities in the international system.²

² For more analysis about diaspora as a useful analytical category in IR, **Fiona B. Adamson and Madeleine Demetriou’s** impressive and seminal study “ Remapping the Boundaries of ‘State’ and ‘National Identity’: Incorporating Diasporas in IR Theorizing” can be viewed.

In this study, diasporas' transnational practices, 'constructed' de-territorialized structure and, their challenge against traditional state institutions of citizenship and loyalty, conventional meaning of state will be exemplified by several cases but mainly Turkish diaspora and Armenian diaspora in the following chapters.

On the other hand, there are very limited studies regarding diasporas activities in international affairs in terms of theoretical space. In this regard, Yossi Shain's and Aharon Barth's study (2003) titled as "Diasporas and International Relations Theory" is quite valuable, although diasporas activities were only analyzed from the perspective of constructivism and liberalism.

According to Shain and Barth, constructivist and liberalist perspectives share common theoretical space to understand diasporic activities. While constructivism emphasizes on identity, liberalism focuses on domestic politics. On the one hand, constructivists argue that interests are determined by social interaction. On the other hand, liberal approach argues that state's preferences are "identity-based" that is one of the most important features of diasporic communities (Shain and Barth 2003). In terms of concern for states' preferences, both constructivism and liberalism share the same approach. Both theories perceive states as embedded in a larger social context and acknowledgement of the non-state actors on states' preferences. For this reason, diasporas as communities are mainly identity-motivated, as a part of a larger international society, communities which are using their influence on homelands mainly through domestic politics and as 'non-state' actors in the global system seem to be logical basis for the integration of diasporas into IR theory.

Constructivism views the state as a social actor, unlike the traditional meaning rational approaches. States are seeking identity expression and governed by the 'logic of appropriateness' along with governed by the 'logic of consequences' as rational actors (Shain and Barth 2003). The identity of a state means its preferences and sequential actions. The approach of a state to other state bases on "the identity it attributes to them while they are reproducing its own identity by their daily social practice" (Hopf 1998). Therefore, interests are mainly the product of identity along with variable influenced. In this sense, neorealism and constructivism share some similar concerns with the definition of state interests and role of structure in international politics (Hopf 1998). Thus, to understand the international behavior and foreign policies of any state, one need to analyze

beyond the interests, emphasize on identity the way that is shaped. Identity is regularly molded by relations between actors, internal processes and internal characteristics of the actors. As diasporas are outside the state but inside the people give importance to national identity, and even, sometimes, this importance can be higher than those inside the state. Thus, diasporic communities are striving to shape national identity to comply with their interests by sustaining their nourished self-image, which is generally more important than material interests. Diasporas as other actors can influence foreign policy decision-making process for their international images that can be positively or negatively influenced by the governments or other actors. In this sense, constructivism can help us to examine the diasporic international activities based on identity (Shain and Barth 2003). To illustrate, Armenian diaspora discussed in detail in the following chapters, have constructed their identity on the ground of “Armenian Genocide” claim. Armenian diaspora perceives any normalization process between Turkey and Armenia as a threat to their constructed identity. Therefore, the ongoing tension between Armenian diaspora and Republic of Armenia as it happened under the presidency of Levon Ter Petrosyan, regarding Turkey-Armenia relation can be interpreted from the perspective of constructivist approach, although it is insufficient to comprehend the case. Moreover, Jewish diasporas in some cases showed their reaction against Israel’s policy toward Palestinians due to their international image that have been constructed for years.

Liberalism challenges the conventional assumptions that states are primary actors in the international relations with a unitary structure. Instead of this conventional assumption, according to liberalist approach, the primary actors in international relations are individuals and private groups that strive to promote different interests. For this reason, the state is not an independent actor, but rather “a representative of the transient coalition that has captured it”(Shain and Barth 2003). The relations between state and society are the central subject of politics. This society consists of individual human agents with autonomous interests and identities, organizations, private groups, and arrangements to advance on behalf of their social and political interests. Those actors are substantial on the decision-making process of foreign policies of a country (Moravcsik 1992).

According to liberal theory, the level of effect of domestic actors on the foreign policy is related with the how relations are between political institutions of the state and its social organizations means society. In this sense, a ‘weak’ state signifies a state which is

permeable to social organizations' influence on its decision-making process, such as the United States. As Shain and Barth discussed (2003), diasporas can be viewed as one of many domestic interest groups. 'They are outside the state, but inside the people.' However, their transnational and de-territorialized structure should be taken care of while we are analyzing them as one of the domestic interest groups. Any doubt, the diasporic activities expand the meaning of the important term 'domestic'. Diasporas as interest groups may use their economic power to advance their interests because generally the members of diasporic community are richer than their homeland citizens. Armenian diaspora and Nigerian diaspora can be shown as good examples that exert their financial resources on behalf of their interest and disputatiously their homeland, particularly for Armenian case. In addition to financial resources, they are directly and indirectly influencing the political parties of their homeland through donations, civil society projects, supporting political campaigns and political contributions to parties and candidates which they support because when they are supporting a party or candidate (Shain and Barth 2003), they are also selecting their preference in terms of international politics. In some cases such as Turkish diaspora and Croatian diaspora, diasporas have also significant political power in their homeland by right to vote while Croatian Diaspora are represented in Croatian Parliament, Turkish Diaspora not. They draw on their diplomatic power through lobbying activities and political environment in their host land, and they are behaving as political pressure groups that might change foreign policy outcomes in some cases. With regard to their diplomatic power and electoral realm, diasporas are different from the conventional interests groups.

Diasporas are interest groups that have an influence on the domestic political decision-making process of their homeland based on their identity, as I discussed in Armenian case. However, it is only one side of the roles of diasporic activities because they have also impact on the decision-making process of their host land's foreign policies by different ways such as creating a good international image of their identity and nation which are quite important in terms of public diplomacy and lobbying activities. I argue that despite constructivism and liberalism offer useful theoretical ground to examine the diasporic activities as Shain and Barth analyzed in detailed (2003), they are insufficient to comprehend the theoretical background of their activities since diasporic activities are not independent of the external factors such as international conjuncture that can restrict the activities of some diasporic communities or form an appropriate ground for their activities.

The chance of a diasporic community to receive positive reaction and support from hostland is strictly bond to correlation between hostland's and diaspora's interests and goals, which are influenced by directly or indirectly international conjuncture. If there is an overlapping between the interests, the possibility of the diaspora's lobbying activities and actions' receiving positive reactions is clearly high. For instance, realpolitik and parameters of France's foreign policy are coherent with Armenian diaspora's goals. Beyond any doubt, it makes it easier for the Armenian diaspora to conduct lobby activities. However, this situation might change in the future due to possible changing of drive of France foreign politics or interest of the Armenian diaspora in France.

On the other hand, although realism and neorealism argue the international system dominated by states, some realist theorists have attempted to analyze diasporas' role and place in international politics by the utilizing a realist analytic framework (Karanou 2015). The homeland states try to organize and affect activities of diasporas whose are coming from same origin, to promote homeland's national interests. In some cases, homeland states are willing to cooperate with other diasporic communities to promote its own interests. Therefore, to analyze the diasporic activities by the theoretical dimension, realist approach offers also useful theoretical ground to examine the diasporas' activities although those theories, like realism, that I discussed in this chapter mainly assume the state as a unitary actor (M. Aydın 2004). On the other hand, most of their activities can be analyzed by combination of different approaches, such as liberalism-constructivism and realism-constructivism. For instance, while they are conducting lobby activities as an internal actor, their lobby activities, in some cases, are shaped by identity which has been constructed by social interaction. Shortly, it is really challenging to explain diasporas activities by only one theory in general because of concurrence of different motivations, factors and codes.

In this chapter, firstly It discussed the conceptual dimension of diaspora which is withstanding against traditional state institutions of citizenship and loyalty, conventional meaning of state, from the perspective of international relations. Moreover, diasporas' de-territorialized structure offer an empirically useful grounded research field to comprehend the relations between the nature of transnational identity and territorially defined system of states. As this study has done in this chapter, by the analyzing the role of diasporic practices and politics, the changing relationship between 'national identity' and 'state' can

be better understood. In addition to conceptual dimension, theoretical ground of diasporic activities to understand their place in IR theories and analyzing their activities via liberal, constructivist and realist approaches are inclusively examined, and it argued that diasporic activities can be properly analyzed by the combination of different theories instead of one theory.

2.3 Operationalization

In order to understand and examine to what extent the Turkish diaspora in Germany is an influential and successful diasporic community in comparison with the Armenian diaspora in France with regards to international politics, this study deploys various measures which are also applied by the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, OECD/DAC and partly IFRC. The evaluation criteria applied in this study utilizes from IOB, IFRC and OECD/DAC evaluation criteria:³⁴

- **Efficiency:** It measures how inputs (funds, people, material, and time) and the way they are applied are converted to direct results. It is directly related to cost-efficiency.
- **Effectiveness:** It measures to what extent to which the direct results of output contribute to the sustainable achievement of policy objectives (outcome)
- **Impact:** It is defined differently by the different institutions. In this study, the definition of IFRC evaluation criteria is grounded on, “Impact examines the positive and negative changes from an intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.”
- **Relevance or Coherence:** It is defined by the OECD/DAC as “the extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries’ requirements, country/community needs, global priorities and partners’ and donors’ policies.”

³ **Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs** (2009) Evaluation policy and The efficacy, diplomatic power and the success of the Turkish diaspora in Germany with regard to international politicsThe efficacy, diplomatic power and the success of the Armenian diaspora in France with regard to international politicsfor Evaluations, 17-21.

⁴ **Planning and Evaluation Department (PED) IFRC Secretariat** (2011) IFRC Framework for Evaluation, 4-7.

- Sustainability: It is an aspect of effectiveness. To recognize an activity as an effective, the effect it has achieved should last.
- Policy Consistency: It emphasizes the absence of inherent contradictions between different policy areas.

To exemplify the evaluation criteria of this study, the recognition of the tragic events of 1915 as ‘genocide’ by the parliaments and governments of the 33 countries and European Parliament through the resolution on a political solution to the Armenian question on 18 June 1987, is an example of successful and effective diaspora’s political activity that have achieved the expected results and largely satisfied the members of the community. On the contrary, although the Armenian diaspora in France bear down on French government along with the deputies from majority party (LREM) in all respects, France’s verbally support to Armenia did not result satisfying (to the Armenian diaspora) active support to Armenia during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. Consequentially, the French realpolitik outweighed due to growing economic importance of Azerbaijan recently. In the light of remarked evaluation above, it is the example of unsuccessful and ineffective diaspora’s political activity that has not achieved the expected results. However, findings shared in this study show that the Armenian diaspora has largely achieved its set goals by the reasons of the factors examined widely in the study. For this reason, the Armenian diaspora is majorly referred as one of the most influential diasporic communities in the world.

3. THE CORRELATION BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND DIASPORAS

The cultural, economical and social dependency between the nations, societies and the states in the globalizing world system makes the relations between global and local more complicated. The examination of the globalization and its effects on the international system should be started with the analyzing and discussing of the globalization at local level, since local dependencies are the inseparable part of the global and international system. Therefore, while the international system has transformed to local and societies, local and societies are transforming the global system at the same time. In this context, diasporic communities as a both part of local and global actor have substantial and peculiar impact on this transformation. They are local because the diaspora doesn't just come to mean of the geographical spread of a considerable amount of people. The diaspora also contains the identity, culture, memory and home which are produced via translocation (Chiang 2010). They have strived to maintain their locality together with identity, cultural and social characteristics by numerous ways in their host land which has different cultural, social even political codes, although their social features are permeable due to intentionally or unintentionally orientating to host land society and globalization process. From the different perspective, diaspora communities are "paradoxical combination of localism and transnationalism" what it means that, the strong aspiration to achieve strong economic and social success in host land, eagerness to sacrifice for the community and the homeland (Tölölyan 2012).

On the other hand, diasporas are global actor since they have bad or good relation with their imagined or real homeland. Moreover, they have transnational connections, including their cognates in different host lands. Through their active and passive, constructive and destructive roles, diasporic communities have played significant role in the international scene and international behavior in many cases such as Irish, Jews, Palestinians and Tamils. Therewithal, they have been affected by the global system in political, social, cultural, identity and organizational dimensions.

As diasporic communities are both local and global actor due to the reasons discussed above, the complicated and multidimensional correlation between international politics and diasporas can be understood and analyzed by the examination of internal (including local) and external (including global) factors that have impact on diplomatic power and the success of any diasporic community along with conceptual and theoretical dimension of the relation. Therefore, firstly, this study discusses the conceptual and theoretical dimension of the relation then internal and external factors affecting the success of the diaspora's efforts to comprehend the multidimensional correlation between international politics and diasporas. However, international conjuncture is discussed separately from internal and external factors since it should be placed it a particular importance due to its indisputable importance on the diaspora's activities in both political and social spheres.

3.1 The Role and Place of Diasporas in International Politics

Contemporary studies show that diasporas have influenced "world affairs in numerous ways which can be classified as passive and active, constructive and destructive" (Shain and Barth 2003) since ancient times by differentiating ways and methods. For this reason, diasporas have a unique role and place in international politics. The increasing attention of the policymakers, leaders, governmental and non-governmental organizations, think tanks, academy, and civil institutions to diaspora politics have proved the importance of diasporas in both domestic and external politics of the states as well as international system.

Diasporas play a passive and active role in international politics. While they actively influence the homeland foreign policies, they are also influencing host land foreign policies. But, of course, the extent of influence of diasporas is changing from one diasporic communities to another due to several factors such as political system and political opportunities of their homeland, overlapping or a harmony between host land's and diaspora's interests and aims, the international conjecture. Moreover, as this study discusses in the previous sections, the diasporas are reached out by their ethnic homeland or non-state actors in their ethnic homeland to encourage them for investment, political support, and using the ethnic population as a source of influence in the state which they

live (King and Melvin 1999/2000). Through electoral rules, constitutional provisions, regulations, allowing dual citizenship, and legal guarantees, the states may give the specific roles, such as being 'representatives' of their ethnic homeland and a group that has responsibilities to their homeland, to their co-ethnic populations in the abroad which can be seen in Armenian case. The kin state may advocate the rights of their diaspora in international forums, conferences, and organizations to ensure their political and cultural rights in their host lands. In this manner, the states has an important role in defining a particular group as a diaspora which is crucial and widespread in particularly newly independent or established states (King and Melvin 1999/2000). In return, the homeland state may expect from their 'diaspora' (even if it is not appropriate for definition of diaspora concept) the loyalty to value, interests, and internal/external political aims of their ethnic homeland. However, this external incentives and demand for loyalty can be perceived and interpreted as a threat to interests, meaning of citizenship, internal/external political aims and values of where diaspora resides. In this case, withal, diasporas might be useful tool and leverage for the far right parties to expand their political ground in the state which they reside. For instance, in Germany, there is widespread concern about Turkish diaspora because the members of Turkish diaspora are perceived by some part of German society, politicians and media outlets as a community that is 'outwardly controlled penetration' by their homeland and directed by Ankara. More seriously, German politicians as media and society are often affected by the controversial expressions indicated for Turkish diaspora in Germany such as 'fifth column' or 'Trojan horse' (Aydın 2014).

Diasporas are, in some cases, perceived as a foreign policy tool and delegate foreign policy mission to them. To illustrate, Georgia aims to develop its relations with its diaspora as stated in Georgia's Foreign Policy Strategy, "It is a task of Georgian diplomacy to mobilize and organize Georgian diasporas to support the goals of Georgia's agenda, including Georgia's active outreach in their respective states and attracting foreign investment to Georgia"(Shaffer 2010). Likewise, although there has been political competition between Armenia and its diaspora, Armenian governments have been taking care of preserving strong ties and cooperation with major Armenian diaspora communities particularly in the United States and France to promote Armenia's foreign policy interest and agenda in these states. Moreover, overseas Greek-Cypriot communities identity was

restructured and rearticulated within the larger context by the Greek-Cypriot state, and current technology.

The state has managed to create a state-based version of 'long distance nationalism' which is supported by 'long-distance citizenship' for the 'de-territorialized' member of the overseas Greek-Cypriot community. By this way, Greek-Cypriot state aimed to expand their political influence beyond its territorial boundary, and engaging with its diaspora particularly in the UK to conduct lobby activities for Cypriot interests. This case is also a good example of a partial decoupling of the 'fit' between a state's territory and its 'national identity'(Adamson and Demetriou 2007).

Diasporas also conduct lobby activities in liberal host lands and support multicultural foreign policies. By these lobby activities, especially in liberal societies, they might aim to promote their own communal interest or interest of their homeland. They often organized interest groups in order to realize their political and economical aims by influencing the foreign policy of their homeland vis-à-vis their host lands. In the United States which is best exemplified, the various ethnic lobbies have significant effect on America foreign policy that has been argued whether diasporas lobby activities promote American national interest or not. Some scholars such as Samuel Huntington, Tony Smith argue that narrow policy agenda of diasporic communities "promote the interests of people and entities outside the United States," and flaw the nations' "common good." On the other hand, others view that ethnic lobbies and their transnational relations are not a threat for the U.S. foreign policy, national interest and security. According to this view, diasporas' lobby ethnic lobby activities are part of American pluralism or as counterweight to traditional political elites (Shain and Barth 2003). Although, the lobby activities are well described and analyzed in the context of the United States, there are salient examples of lobby activities in Europe. For instance, Armenian diaspora in France or the Greek Cypriots in the UK have used their political to influence government positions on the events of 1915 and Turkey's relations with the EU and Cyprus. Those lobby activities illustrate that large and influential political capital of diasporas to influence the host land governments can be very rewarding and fruitful to realize diasporas' aims at behalf of their interests (Østergaard-Nielsen 2006). However, in order to understand why some diasporas' lobby activities receive positive responses and results others not, it is necessary to find out

whether interests and aims of a diasporic community overlap with the interests and foreign policy agenda of its host land or not.

In some instances, overzealous diaspora activists distorted the interests of the people or societies they claimed to lobby for, even those people or populations were stuck in a difficult situation due to diasporas' lobby activities. To illustrate, in the case of 1998 attacks on ethnic Chinese in Indonesia and then during the Asian financial crisis, a global Chinese diaspora led by members of Chinese diaspora in the United States, mobilized to lobby for interest of their 'ethnic kin' in Indonesia. However, their 'ethnic kin' Chinese people resisted those efforts, and they brought forward that they are feeling themselves as an Indonesian rather than part of a diaspora. Similarly, Armenian communities in Turkey or Iraqis, as many of them did in the 2003 invasion, may resist the political activities of overzealous diaspora members in Europe and in North America. Therefore, a gap between the political demands put forward by the leader of diasporic community and preferences of those diaspora argue to represent may sometimes emerge, as it happened in the case of Chinese diaspora (Adamson 2016).

Diaspora activities can be incompatible to the host land's foreign policy agenda and long term interests. For instance, one of the main purposes of the U.S. foreign policy in the South Caucasus has been restructured the existing security architecture in the region and economic integration of the South Caucasus on behalf of the U.S. national interest and purposes through different ways such as programs that aim to integration of democracy, economy and security development. Until now, non-regional powers in efforts for an influential role in the South Caucasus have been unable to provide sufficient assistance to guarantee secure economic development and sustainable political atmosphere in the region. The lack of integration to a large extent is also risky and harmful for the U.S. long term economic and military strategic interests in Central Euro-Asia which is a region that is connected by the Caucasus (Kotanjian 2004). In this sense, American policymakers could intensify their engagement with global Armenian diaspora to enhance its effectiveness in the South Caucasus, which offers good case to analyze by realist interest based approach. However, current disputes between Armenian National Committee of America and Republic of Armenia shows that normalization process with Turkey and Azerbaijan has been not acceptable situation for the many members of Armenian diaspora in the United States. Whereas, those normalization process might be good start for the economic

integration of the region, sustainable peace and development in the region. Moreover, it offers a great chance for Armenia which is land-locked to get rid of political and economical loneliness in the South Caucasus that has been hurting fragile Armenian economy from the very beginning of the establishment. On the other hand, the U.S. and the EU as well as Russia remarked their fully support the normalization process between Turkey and Armenia, and the appointment of Special Envoys for this purpose⁵⁶. Beyond any doubt, regional stability, economic integration and development are on behalf of regional countries as well as non-regional powers such as the United States. In this respect, Armenian diasporas' activities mainly led by ANCA seem as detrimental and incompatible to their host lands' interests and political aims in the South Caucasus. When we take into consideration official statements of ANCA⁷ and its sharing in its social media accounts regarding Turkey-Armenia normalization process, the gap between ANCA's political purposes and interests of the U.S. in the region can be easily observed.

Diasporas can be active actors in the decision-making process of foreign policy of their homeland as they can be in the decision-making process of their host lands' foreign policies. Diasporas have economic and political power, as well as strong transnational ties that can directly influence the foreign policies of their homelands. For instance, Nigerian diaspora is the second major source of foreign exchange for Nigeria that has been struggling with foreign exchange crisis, with \$16.8bn in 2020⁸. Therefore, Nigerian diaspora's contribution to fragile Nigerian economy provides to diaspora having an important position in the Nigeria political system. Diasporas also use direct influence by political proxies in their homeland, such as Armenian or Taiwanese parties. In addition to

⁵ **European External Action Service (EEAS)**, Turkey/Armenia: Statement by the Spokesperson on the normalisation process, <https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/109673/turkeyarmenia-statement-spokesperson-normalisation-process_en>, Accessed: 14.01.2022

⁶ **SecBlinken**. (2021, December 15). We welcome and strongly support statements by Turkish Foreign Minister MevlutCavusoglu and MFAofArmenia on appointing Special Envoys to discuss the process of normalization. (Tweet) <<https://twitter.com/SecBlinken/status/1470999830470311941>>

⁷ **Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA)**, ANCA Chairman Urges Biden Administration Reset of U.S. Policy on Armenia & Artsakh, <<https://anca.org/press-release/anca-chairman-urges-biden-administration-reset-of-u-s-policy-on-armenia-artsakh/>> , Accessed: 15.12.2021

⁸ **The Punch Newspaper**, Nigeria Diaspora remittances declined by 27.7% to \$16.8bn – World Bank, <<https://punchng.com/nigeria-diaspora-remittances-declined-by-27-7-to-16-8bn-wbank/>> , Accessed: 14.01.2022

influence by political proxies, in many cases, diaspora community has voting right although, they don't live in their country of origin. For instance, according to Decree 952 of Turkish Supreme Election Council, the number of registered voter in overseas was 3,044,837 which are equal to slightly more than 5% of the total registered voter in the last presidential election in Turkey in 2018⁹. Through the right to vote, diaspora can have potential to indirect influence on the direction of foreign policy of their homeland. Turkish communities in overseas showed their support to internal and external policies of the Recep Tayyip Erdogan who has been President of the Republic of Turkey by vote for him in the last presidential election. He took around 60% of the total votes from the overseas voters. Above all, diasporas may attain economical leverage at home, whether through investments in national projects or through political contributions during election campaigns. To illustrate, election races in Israel, political contributions provided by its diaspora have significantly influenced on the electoral results (Shain and Barth 2003).

In Hungarian case which has some similarities with Turkish diaspora politics, The Orbán government has introduced the structured policy to enhance its engagement with Hungarian diaspora and revised its kin-state politics (Herner-Kovács 2014). Together with the changing of law in 2011, more than 1.1 million ethnic Hungarians (most of them live in surrounding countries) obtained dual citizenship. On the other hand, Slovakia changed its law in 2012 to hamper its citizens from having dual citizenship in reply to Orbán's law change. In 2018 general elections, while Fidesz party received 47.3% of the total vote within Hungary, it received 96.2% among the Hungarian diaspora which are accounted 4% of overall votes. Through this support, most of the Hungarian diaspora who has the right to vote showed its support and consolidated Orbán's power in Hungary. More importantly, Hungarian diaspora has been instrumentalized by Victor Orbán to attract the support of Hungarians within the country and ignite the nostalgia for Greater Hungary (Hutt 2022). In this sense, Hungarian diaspora has a passive role along with active role through dual citizenship and the right to vote. For this reason, Hungarian case is substantial to analyze both diasporas' active and passive roles in international politics.

On the other hand, diasporas might view the homeland's foreign policy as a one of the factors which affects the interest of a specific community. Those interests can be

⁹ **Supreme Election Council**, Decree No:952, published on 4 July 2018, Accessed: 20.03.2022

material or existential, as in the Armenian diaspora case. Diasporic communities generally attach importance to homeland's foreign policy due to its relation with the security, image, standing, and self-perception in the country where they reside. Therefore, diasporic activists may try to change or shape the homeland's both internal and external policies to harmonize it with their communal interests. For instance, Jewish-American society in the United States urged Israel to tear off its tie with the Apartheid government in South Africa (Shain and Barth 2003).

Diasporas may play quite important role and in most cases controversial role in conflicts and political crisis in their homeland through becoming an obstacle to conflict resolution and peacebuilding, recruits, funding, or arms for violent activities which can be on behalf of its homeland government or detrimental of the interest of its homeland. Diasporic communities and individual diasporans may initiate and support intrastate conflicts and violence in their origin of country for their self-interests. Those supports can be political or financial to relevant rebellious or criminal groups in their homeland. Moreover, by lobbying activities and creating pressure groups, diasporic communities can have influence on the host land governments' perspectives (Sheffer 2013). In many cases, diasporas organized demonstrations, meetings, activities and organizations in their host lands to influence the public opinion as well as civil society regarding the issue what they lobby and fight for. On the other hand, one of the main purposes of political activities in diaspora is creating international awareness, and raising pressure for political reform or change in the homeland through providing alternative sources of information in some cases. For instance, in the case of civil war in Algeria, accessing the information sources was quite limited and suppressed. In this example, diaspora played significant role by organizing conferences, demonstrations and marches in host land to inform and raise the awareness regarding what was happening in Algeria. Therefore, diaspora can be an alternative unofficial source of information dependent on personnel networks, travel and cell phone conversations (Horst 2007). However, It is worthy to be noted down that those kinds of demonstrations and actions can be useful in democratic countries where civil society and public opinion are significant actor on the decision-making process because, otherwise, the indirect efficiency of diasporas on the decision-making process remains very limited.

A classic example of the diaspora's activities on the conflict is Irish diaspora in the United States together with other well documented examples. Irish diaspora financially supported to Irish Republican Army (IRA) activities during the Northern Ireland conflict which is also known the Troubles. On the other hand, Tamil diaspora had provided substantial economic resources which had been used for prolongation both the armed struggle for a separate Tamil state and Tamil refugee communities in the different countries. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) which had dominated Northern Part of Sri Lanka while Sri Lankan government dominated Southern part of the country, was largely financed by Tamil diaspora, though there is some disagreement whether these sources are collected voluntarily or through coercion (Horst 2007). The LTTE had been the major representative of the Tamil and is most influential community in terms of political and social influence due to its establishment of a far reaching network in different European countries and North American countries such as, Canada, Switzerland, Germany and, Great Britain. However, there are various organizations which had approached differently to establishment of a Tamil state and prolongation of the armed conflict such as Tamil Information Centre (TIC) in London to University Lecturers for Human Rights which had criticized the activities of the LTTE (Zunzer 2004). The LTTE like Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) was recognized as a terrorist organization by the EU and the US.¹⁰¹¹

In the Ethiopian Civil War, which was ended by formation of the Eritrean State, Eritrean diapora played a significant role. The relationship between Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) which had contended for the independent Eritrea had been very strong that go back to 1960s. Eritrean diaspora and Eritrean refugees in Tripoli got involved in the civil war through financial contributions and collecting money that would be sending to an EPLF-based bank. This collecting money sent to EPLF was used to buy weapons medicine, books and such for the fighters in Eritrea. In addition to financial contribution, EPLF successfully established a network of NGOs named as the Eritrean Relief Association targeted to host country civil society and NGOs for contribution. Moreover, diasporas' has been significant economical sources for clan militias that have collected money, raised funds, in some cases through coercion, from clan members living in different country which has been observed in Darfur region of Sudan. During the war in

¹⁰ **U.S. Department of State, Foreign Terrorist Organizations**, < <https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/>>, Accessed: 15.03.2022

¹¹ **The Council of the European Union**, Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/154, Accessed: 17.03.2022

Kosovo, the Kosovo-Albanians who live abroad and some of them have formed diaspora structuring, were important political and economical sources of the Kosovo Liberation Army had been founded in the early 1990s (Horst 2007). Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) is another example of contribution of diasporic community to conflict and terrorist activities. PKK, which concentrates armed structuring in Syria, Iraq and Iran, begun the staff and to be organized in the European countries such as Germany, Sweden. In Germany, PKK focuses on the activities that aim to find financial, political and militant sources to maintain its struggle against Republic of Turkey. There are almost 1 million Kurdish origin people in Germany which seems good sources for PKK and its terrorist activities in Turkey (Keskin 2019) although there are different approaches that oppose the PKK and its successor organizations such as KOMKAR . Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) was a legal entity in Germany until it was banned in 1993 (as well as in the EU and the US) due to its terrorist attacks and violence activities in German cities (Adamson and Demetriou 2007). PKK have been one of the reasons of tension between the Turkey-Germany relations, and Germany's dealing to PKK has been mainly shaped by issue of internal security, developments in the Middle East, and relations with Turkey (Keskin 2019). This case is also significant to understand how an internal issue internationalizes through diasporas both Turkish and Kurdish diaspora, and become the issue of host states that has to deal with it. To give another instance, the Eritrean diaspora is strongly divided into the two sides: government loyalists and various opposition groups. The background of the tension between the sides can be traced back to the struggle to obtain independence from Ethiopia, achieved in 1993. This old political competition and rivalries have been transmitted through diasporas to different countries and reemerge in new context in there (Adamson 2016). For this reason, the competition and rivalry become the one of the subjects of the countries' political agenda where Eritrean diaspora reside.

According to Center for Defense Information (CDI) in the United States cited in Sheffer's study (2013), twelve organizations (some of them were discussed above) which are applying violence activities as well as terrorism¹² have proven links to diasporic entities which have ethno-national-religious codes in their structure and motivations. These

¹² It is worthy of notice that while some of those organizations listed above are recognized as a terrorist organizations by the EU, the United States and some non-western states, some states don't recognize them as a terrorist organization. For instance, HAMAS is in the list of foreign terrorist organization of the EU, the U.S. Japan, Canada, and Israel. On the other hand, many countries such as Iran, Malaysia, Qatar and Pakistan don't have same view to HAMAS' activities.

are: Palestinian Hamas; the Islamic Jihad and Fatah-Tanzim; the Lebanese Hizbullah; the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and Islamic Group (al-Gama'a al Islamiyya; IG); the Irish Republican Army (IRA) (which has dissolved and no longer carries out armed activities but Real Irish Republican Army mainly composed of former IRA members is still on the list); the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA); the Indian Barbar Khalsa International (BKI); the Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (now forcibly dissolved); the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK); and Al Qaeda (which is connected to, and cooperates with, various ethno national diasporic entities). The international financial support for Hamas which has been declared as a terrorist organization by several countries exceeds \$100 million per year although mainly the United States and the EU have tried to prevent this financial support. Moreover, annual resources provided by Tamil diaspora for the LTTE activities were estimated at around \$50 million (Sheffer 2013).

In general, geographically concentrated stateless diasporas such as Tamil diaspora are more apt to engage in conflict with their countries of origin and their host lands than diasporas referred as historical diasporas which formed in ancient times, modern diasporas formed in the modern times, or incipient diasporas which are currently organizing. They are may be more demanding and aggressive to achieve their aims compared with other types of diasporas (Sheffer 2013). However, it doesn't mean that all member of stateless diasporas are conflict generator because the member of historical and modern diasporas sometimes become the main political and economical source of the one party of the conflict as it is discussed with the examples in the previous pages.

The literature mainly focuses on problematic aspect of the linkages between diasporas-conflict correlation, and migrants are depicted as paving the way for the transnationalisation or internationalization of conflicts and internal issues through engaging in them from a long distance. According to Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), "many internal armed conflicts continue to be internationalized: of the 48 intrastate conflicts in 2017, and external states made military contribution to at least one of the sides in 19 of these conflicts which equal 40% of the intrastate conflicts" (Dupuy and Rustad 2018). As (Figure 1) illustrates, the highest number of armed conflicts belongs to type of internationalized conflicts that reached its peak point in 2016. Beyond any doubt, diasporas have played significant role on internationalization of the intrastate conflicts as I discussed above together with the technological developments particularly in the field of

communication and transportation. After the 9/11 the attention to the role of diasporas heightened due to domestic and international security concerns and both policymakers and literature highlight the dark side of diaspora politics. For instance, in the LSE yearbook on global civil society of 2003, diasporas were entitled as ‘regressive globalisers’, that depicted diasporas as a part of the problem instead being part of the solution (Østergaard-Nielsen 2006). Particularly, diasporas of the countries that have experienced political tumults, civil wars, upheavals and dictatorships or those problems are still in there have negative outlook in terms of conflict management in their country of origin. Due to the examples of Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Eritrea the diaspora from the regions of Horn of Africa is mainly externally correlated with the conflict in a negative meaning. However, it is very narrow and limited approach which only focus on the negative side of the diasporas’ roles on the intrastate conflicts that have been internationalized.




Figure 1. Number of armed conflicts by type of conflict, 1946-2017¹³

Number of authors and researchers such as Eva Østergaard Nielsen (2006) and Giulia Sinatti (2010) started to challenge with this assumption by researching and focusing the possible positive roles of diasporas in the peacebuilding process, although there are limited researches and theorization on the positive influence and engagement of diaspora in peace process. Diasporas and exile groups may make great contribution and reinforce local

¹³ Taken from: **Dupuy, Kendra& Rustad, Siri Aas** (2018) Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946–2017, Conflict Trends 05, pp. 2.

processes of democratization as well as post-conflict reconstruction in their country of origin (Østergaard-Nielsen 2006). Diasporas which reside in the Europe or the United States are not just transfer their economy by remittances to their homeland, they are also transferring their knowledge, skills, mixed culture and political views which have been substantially influenced by Western political perspective and educational system. Therefore, well-organized and interconnected diasporic entities have a potential to accelerate and reinforce the local processes of democratization of their country of origin.


In terms of peacebuilding, the diasporic communities may come into prominence as potential critical agents that can make significant contributions to peacebuilding process and conflict transformation in their respective homelands. This approach attributes the assumption and notion that the diasporic entities have better familiarity with their homelands, and they can combine this familiarity with the experiences gained in the countries of residence. This combination makes them potential facilitator that may have more chance to become better contributor for resolution compared to other external players such as development agencies. In intrastate conflict take places in their country of origin, diasporas can engage with peacebuilding through direct political participation such as national-level peace conferences and electoral processes, which happened in the Ethiopia case in 2005. In addition to direct political participation, diasporas can engage with their homeland through civil society organizations at local, national and international levels. Diaspora groups took part in the development and humanitarian activities mainly based on education and health as well as relief activities in some cases. For instance, in Somalia, these development and humanitarian activities helped to transformation of the conflict and the sectors which had suffered from the ongoing conflicts. Likewise, the diaspora played significant roles which had facilitated the reconciliation efforts at the local level in the example of Somalia. The diaspora supported the conciliation between clashing clans through service delivered in various locations which are strategic for parties, and brought together those clans and rival communities for interaction, sports as well as meetings for elders. The positive role of diasporas on the peacebuilding process can be observed in Somalia case as well as El Salvador case, and they show us diasporic entities have a potential to reduce the tension between conflict parties by facilitation the constructive dialogue to discuss the issue, positively contributing economic developments in the respective country of origin, transferring of their knowledge and necessary skills which are

vital for the post-conflict building process of the country, and having role as simultaneous bridge-builders (Sinatti 2010).

Thus far, this study has been mentioned and discussed regarding the importance of the remittances sent by diasporas for the economy of their country of origin and post conflict building if there had been an intrastate or interstate conflicts in their respective homelands. However, diasporas' possible contribution for global economic growth is as important as their contribution to national economies. The growing importance of the diaspora politics are not just realized by the policymakers at local and national level. The diaspora politics have been considered important by the international organizations that mainly aim to global development.

The successful examples of the diaspora engagement of Israel, India and China which have been attracting diasporic investment and lobbying support through different methods such as dual or special citizenship status, and promoting direct investment opportunities are followed lead and involved in parallel attempts by NGOs, the World Bank and the IMF (Tölölyan 2012). According to the World Bank's migration and remittances data (2021), annual global remittances amounted to around \$700 billion in 2020 as (Graph 1) illustrates below and in some countries such as Tajikistan, remittance inflows constitute the around 30% of gross domestic product. Due to substantial amounts of global remittances mainly provided by migrants and diasporas, the international organizations such as World Bank and International Organization for Migration have been promoting and supporting diasporas as significant actors and partners for global development particularly global economic growth, as India, Mexico (3x1 Program) and another countries develop politics to encourage diasporas for remittances to apply them to fund national development projects (Adamson 2016).

Graph 1. Migrant remittance inflows (US\$ million)¹⁴




According to The World Bank Data, \$700 billion total migrant remittance inflows in 2020 mainly composed of migrant remittance inflows to low and middle income countries, which is around \$540 billion (77% of total amount). When we take into consideration the economical security of the low and middle income countries, those remittances play very critical role (Graph 2). As Mehmet Levent Yılmaz (2020) mentioned and quoted from Thomas Homer-Dixon's "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict" and Barry Buzan's "Is International Security Possible?" in his study, economical security is the one of the dimension of the security at both state and individual level. The economic problems in any country, particularly low and middle income countries, may lead and encourage to political uprisings, illegal activities such as drug traffic, influx of immigrants and regional instability. In a globalized economic system, those problems can easily become the issue of international security as well as national security of the countries. In this sense, diasporas have made economic contribution to their country of origin through remittances, investments and supporting the national development projects, and they may significant partner to struggle against global poverty and 'failed states' that perceived as a threat to the international system. However, their economic contribution to their mainly low income homelands is not sufficient to solve the economic dimension of the problems. Although, the remittance inflows constitute the around 35% of gross

¹⁴ **The World Bank**, 'Migration and Remittances Data- Annual Remittances Data (updated as of May 2021)', <<https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data>>, Accessed: 19.03.2022

domestic product in Somalia (World Bank 2021), the similar economic problems have continued for many years. But they are still substantial for the economic security of Somalia, as the World Bank and the IMF are conscious of it.

Graph 2. Migrant remittance inflows to low and middle income countries (US\$ million)¹⁵



In the discipline of IR, the systematic transformations have occurred which increased the importance of the civil society. In a consequence of these transformations, the diplomacy has adapted this process through the developing civil society-based politics that is known as public diplomacy in the literature. The policymakers also started to deal with this part of the diplomacy, which is different from the conventional way of diplomacy. The public relations have gained prominence in the international scene. In this respect, diasporas of the states have become substantial partners and tools for image/prestige management which is inseparable part of the state power in the existing international system, as both realists and constructivist have argued. To illustrate, Turkey have geared up its engagement with Turkish diaspora as well as related communities, particularly since AKP came to power in 2002. Turkey established Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) in 2010 to coordinate the activities for Turkish community in abroad and related communities. On the other hand, Yunus Emre Foundation that aims to promote Turkey, Turkish language, its history and art was founded in 2007 (Ekşi 2018). The same diaspora politics have been also applied by several countries such as China and India for years to create a good image or to fix deteriorated image and prestige in the international

¹⁵ **The World Bank**, 'Migration and Remittances Data- Annual Remittances Data (updated as of May 2021)', <<https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data>>, Accessed: 19.03.2022

society because image and prestige management is quite critical for any country to take more fruitful and rewarding results from its public diplomacy which may create or expand the sphere of influence as it can be observed in Turkey case through its institutions such as YTB and TIKA. Another instance of diasporas' role in the public diplomacy is that institutions belong to Arab immigrants in France had been supported by French government to enhance France's image in the Arab world (Safran 2004). Herewith, diasporic entities' transnational and de-territorialized structure makes them important actor that have efficacious potential, for the public diplomacy that aims to communicate directly with foreign publics.

As discussed in the very beginning of this chapter, diasporas play a passive and active roles in the international politics. To illustrate the passive roles, together with the collapse of the Soviet Union, twenty-five million Russians stayed out of the current territory of Russian Federation. Whether Russian communities which found themselves of their homeland form a diasporic entity, Russia drew on the diaspora politics during the process of making definition of nation and reconceptualised the Russian people living in "near abroad" as Russian diaspora. Along with re-conceptualization of Russian community, Moscow charged and identified itself as a protector of the rights of Russian diaspora in ex- Soviet republics, as we can easily observe this mentality in the case of Russian invasion of Ukraine. By the conceptualization of Russian diaspora by Moscow, Russian diaspora in near abroad has been instrumentalized to legitimate Moscow's intervention and engagement in the internal and external affairs of ex-Soviet republics (Değirmen 2008). Putin's Russia, particularly, have intrumentalized its diaspora with the intent of increasing its sphere of influence and reimperializing the post Soviet states. That diaspora politics are also appropriate with the Russian intellectuals who desire to re-establish a Russian Empire as in history.

While Russia has been developing its diaspora politics, it is applying soft power tools, giving passport to Russian population in near abroad as well as hard power methods including annexation of territories where Russian diaspora reside. Although Russia used the Russian community in near abroad before Putin as a pretext to meddle internal and external affairs of newly independents states, together with Putin, Kremlin's pretextual use of its diaspora has seriously increased to serve as a tool to revise territorial boundaries. However, it would be mistake to strive the correct analysis of Russian diaspora politics

without examining Russia-West relations because when Russian relations with the West deteriorated, its diaspora politics and the pretextual use of its compatriots serve to expand its sphere of influence which is connected with the concept of “Russian World” and evolution of geopolitical thinking (Değirmen Dysart 2021). As we have witnessed the instrumentalization of diaspora in the cases of Russian invasion of Crimea, Donbass Region as well as all territory of Ukraine, it can be insignificant whether diasporic entity demands intervention or support from their homeland (but one of the biggest issue in Ukraine-Russia case is that Russia argues that Ukraine territory is its historical land and Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians are coming from same descendants of Kievan Rus)¹⁶¹⁷. Their presence can be sufficient to become an instrument of foreign policy of their homeland.

The policies of the Russian Federation toward ex-Soviet republics are not only circumstance that a diasporic community play a passive role. In some cases diasporas cannot control their status as perceived as members and kin of their remote homeland, and thus become the part of homeland’s international affairs which may not be important whether the diaspora want to be or not. The terror attack related with the conflict in Lebanon, allegedly committed by the Hizbullah with Iranian backing, against the Jews in Argentina in 1994 is another example of passive role of diasporas in international politics (Shain and Barth 2003).

In sum, diasporas have various passive and active roles in the international politics which make them significant actor in the changing, transforming and globalizing world although it received wound due to Covid-19 Pandemic and Russian invasion of Ukraine in recent years. Accordingly, policymakers, international organizations such as World Bank and the UN, think tanks, scholars, and civil institutions have intensified their studies on the diaspora politics, and positive aspects of the diasporas regarding the conflict resolution and

¹⁶ According to the 5.000 word-article, entitled “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” written by Russian President Vladimir Putin published on July 2021, ‘true sovereignty of Ukraine is only possible in partnership with Russia’. Putin described in his article how ‘Russians and Ukrainians are one people- a single whole’. The article also noted that ‘Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians were all descendants of Ancient Rus, which was the largest state in Europe’. For full version of article: <<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181>>

¹⁷ See also **Peter Dickinson**’s analysis “Putin’s new Ukraine essay reveals imperial ambitions”, published on 15 July 2021, <<https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putins-new-ukraine-essay-reflects-imperial-ambitions/>>

the global development along with the negative aspects of the diasporas about particularly intrastate conflicts through economic and political contributions. However, every diasporic community is not the same in terms of diplomatic power and the success of a diaspora's efforts to influence homeland and host land government policies as well as global affairs due to various internal and external factors. In the following part, this study separately discusses those internal and external factors, as well as international conjuncture with the several instances.

3.2 Factors Affecting the Success of Diaspora's Efforts

In the last chapter, this study discussed and analyzed the role and place of diasporas in international politics. Although there are many diasporic entities across the world, a number of them come to the forefront due to both internal and external factors. These factors can be divided into two categories: Internal Factors and External Factors. In this thesis, internal factors mean that factors which have naturally emerged that cannot be controlled or have been created/self-created by members of the diasporic community as a result of social interaction between each other, and social interaction with host land society for a length of time. Shortly, the internal factors are linked by diasporic community itself such as individual leaders and activists that have potential to greater influence and produces better results for diasporas. However, it is erroneous to argue that internal factors are completely independent from the external factors because the structure of diasporic community harbors some traces from cultural, political and social codes of their country of origin. Along with the technological developments, the communication, connection and interaction with their kin have become much easier that have led to new transnational social sphere. It is substantial whether diasporic community internalizes these interactions or not in their diasporic structuring. For this reason, it is good to take into consideration the correlation between internal and external factors.

On the other hand, external factors, in this study, mean that factors which are generally constituted by out of diasporic community. Thus, diasporas, in most cases, might little influence on those factors which are difficult to be controlled by the community itself. To illustrate, political system and opportunities can make diasporas more effective and successful or weak and ineffective on the contrary. In this subheading, those factors are

discussed with various instances, and are deepened through the cases of the Turkish diaspora and Armenian diaspora in the following parts of the study.

3.2.1 Internal Factors

As this study discusses in the first chapter titled as “The Historically Evolvement of the Concept”, there are some requirements and conditions to assume a group as a diasporic community. Although the discussions regarding the common features of diasporas have been abiding among the scholars, dispersion have been accepted as a common feature which is also compatible with the terminological meaning of diaspora from ancient times. However, dispersion is a first step to their acceptable persistence in the form of consolidated, along with being the common feature of diasporas. For instance, Tölölyan calls “those communities of the dispersed who develop varieties of association that endure at least into their third generation” (Tölölyan 2012). On the other hand, Samim Akgönül (2021) remarked the similar prerequisite to accept a group as a diaspora in an online conference.¹⁸ As the generations pass in the host country, changes are easily observed in the structure of the immigrant society. More importantly, social, political and economical differences between the generations have emerged because the priorities, aims and the depth of the social interaction with the host society have diversified and transformed. Compared with the first generation, identity and belonging issues have become more critical in the following generations, which have grown up in the host land instead of their country of origin. Therefore, among the group members, strong ethnic group consciousness that based on common history and fate sustained over a long time have increasingly emerged in reply to identity and belonging issues in host land. This transformation in the community brings along cooperation and organizing among the members as well as with the homeland society. In addition, the new generations are more demanding, active in social sphere and integrated to political, economical and social system although there can be huge differences in terms of extent of this integration. One of the main reasons is that they were born and grew up in the host land distinctly from ancestors, and they are part of the host land in every sense despite identity and outsiderdom issues. Moreover, immigrants don’t remain an ice bar and a perspective. Over the years, their ideas on how to live and

¹⁸ “Banu Dalaman Moderatörlüğünde Topkapı Talks'un Bu Haftaki Konuğu Prof. Dr. Samim Akgönül! – 3 May 2021”. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5yiHCLcy-P8> , Accessed: 18.02.2022

perspectives in a new place have changed, sometimes very radically, such as the Irish diaspora in Canada (Berns-McGown 2007). For these reasons, the time period when the first generation of the migrants arrived to new host land is critical for the organizing, structuring and position of diasporas in the country where they have resided.

Diasporic structuring and organizing need time to become more effective, demanding and well-organized. Moreover, a community needs time to convert into the diasporic entity which is differentiating from immigrant society in this manner. However, it is substantial to bear in mind that every immigrant society don't transform into the diaspora due to the distinctive features of diasporas. To illustrate, the importance of the time on the diasporas' structuring and organizing, the strong cooperation, organizing and efficiency of the Armenian diaspora in France as well as emerging Armenian intellectuals took almost more than 40 years (1920s-1960s) to take shape as Armenians in France (particularly first and second generations) prioritized their economical, social and political integration to the system of France. The communication and cooperation among the members developed during the 1960s due to the proper international conjecture such as Armenian uprisings in Yerevan, and enhanced intellectual, political, social and economical basis of Armenian diaspora in France to become more active in France's internal and external politics (Çakıllıkoyak 2005). When we take into consideration the long history of the Armenian community in France, the Armenian diaspora have already formed sophisticated, extensive and inter-connected diasporic entity that affects the success of their efforts from the perspective of international politics. The Irish diaspora and Jewish diaspora in the United States, which are one of the most successful and effective diasporas, can be other instances of diasporic entity that have been formed for a long time. On the other hand, although third generation of the Turkish diaspora in Germany is more demanding, active in the public sphere and integrated to German political, social and economic system compared with first generation (Kaya and Kentel 2008)(Demirağ and Kakışım 2018), they are not effective as much as the Armenian diaspora. Until the late 1980s and 90s, Turkish community was perceived as guest workers (*gastarbeiter*) which will return to Turkey when the proper time comes. Yet, it was understood that Turkish community is the permanent residents of Germany which have been organizing and acting up in the social sphere. However, the Turkish diaspora is a type of incipient diaspora that have transformed from *gastarbeiter* to the diaspora in the near future. For this reason, organizing problems, lack political consciousness and awareness of being member of a diasporic community are standing out

that are directly related with their success rate of diaspora's efforts. In short, I argue that it is substantial whether a diasporic community belongs to 'category' of historical diasporas which formed in ancient times, or modern diasporas formed in the modern times, or incipient diasporas¹⁹ which are currently organizing, on the success of diasporas' efforts from the perspective of international politics.

The second significant internal factor is the political culture of the diasporic community. According to Gabriel Almond (1956), a pattern of orientations to political actions explicitly or implicitly constitutes a political culture, which was presented as a new term for public opinion. On the other hand, many scholars argue that political culture has some causative influence on the political behavior. Political culture, which was conceptualized in terms of norms, values, beliefs and symbols, significantly affects or even determines the political behavior at the sub-national level which means political culture of a class, interest group or any other sub-societal collectivities (Kim 1964). The developing of the political culture of a society is acutely related with the social environment which is the critical social sphere where a member of a society discusses political institutions, issues and circumstances. More importantly, the developing of political culture has significant impact on the political participation of the society, which may make them indispensable part of the political system. Thus, political culture is the one of the main determinant of the participation of diasporas to their homeland and particularly to host land politics. However, socio-economic (gender, educational level, professional status etc.), psychological conditions (the feeling of political efficiency, the feeling of citizenship, the feeling of alienation from the society) and legal system of the host land country²⁰ have influenced the diasporas' political behavior (Sakman 2015) as well as political culture that has mutual interaction with those factors. It is thorny for diaspora's efforts to pan out without political activism and consciousness that is mainly molded by political culture, from the perspective of international politics.

¹⁹ According to **Gabriel Sheffer** (2003), "We have seen that some currently existing diasporas arose in antiquity or during the Middle Ages and despite enormous hardships have survived until today – those are the historical diasporas. The diasporas that arose much later, from the seventeenth century onward, many of which resulted from the great waves of migration that took place from the middle of the nineteenth century to World War II – those are the modern diasporas. Finally, all other diasporas either have been formed recently (i.e. since World War II) or are still in various stages of evolution – those are the incipient diasporas" (Sheffer 2003).

²⁰ It is widely discussed in the next chapter titled as "External Factor" because it is mainly imposed by the external political actors although diasporas may have indirect weak influence on the legal system of the country where they reside, in the most of the cases.


The third internal factor that has impact on the efficacy, diplomatic power and the success of the diaspora's efforts in terms of international politics is how diasporas identify themselves in the host land. The acknowledgement of fully any diasporic identity which strongly attributes to the homeland with regards to national and moral authority have confined the behavior and political sphere of influence of diasporas, particularly last generations, in the country where they reside in.²¹ Therefore, it is quite widespread in the last generations (3rd , 4th generations etc.) that they have many identities along with ethnodiasporic identity such as the usual gender, class, sexual orientation (Tölölyan 2012). To illustrate the importance of how diaspora identify itself on the success of diaspora's efforts from the perspective of international politics, according to survey conducted by the polling firm DATA4U from November 2019 to January 2020, the Turkish diaspora in Europe gives very high importance on their Turkish identity as well as their religion while younger respondents place less emphasis on Turkish identity and religion (Figure 2). Moreover, the great majority of respondents of the survey in Germany see themselves primarily as Turkish with a very high percentage which is 77.2%. Another study published by Hacı Halil Uslucan and Martina Sauer (2020) showed that Turkish diaspora in Germany is more interested in Turkish politics instead of German politics. The joint studies of Ayhan Kaya and Ferhat Kentel(2005, 2008) illustrate the similar data with Martina Sauer's study regarding the comparison of the interest of the Turkish diaspora in Germany to homeland and host land politics. There is a very strong correlation between how diasporas identify themselves and level of intense of interest to homeland politics, which is stronger than interest to host land politics. This situation together with several factors such as increasing islamphobia in Europe stirs up to prejudice against the loyalty of Turkish diaspora to Germany which particularly emerges when a Turkish origin wants to go into German politics (Sakman 2015) or lobbying parliaments which leaves them in a tight spot although, the number of Turkish/Kurdish origin member of parliament has been quite slowly increasing in Bundestag.²²

²¹ According to **Tölölyan** (2012): "a collection of transnational migrants becomes a diaspora when its members develop some familial, cultural and social distance from their nation yet continue to care deeply about it not just on grounds of kinship and filiation, but by commitment to certain chosen affiliations"(Tölölyan 2012).

²² For more information regarding tough process of going into the German politics of a Turkish origin politician, Cem Özdemir, who have been Minister of Food and Agriculture in the Scholz cabinet, Özdemir's book (1999) "*Ben Almanyalıyım: Alman Parlamentosu'ndaki İlk Türk Asıllı Milletvekili*" is recommended to read.

The diaspora strongly values its Turkish identity

On a scale of 1 to 10, how important are the following to you?



Note: Average of scores by country on a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 being "not important at all" and 10 being "very important."

Figure 2. How do the respondents identify themselves in where they reside?²³

The fourth internal factor is diaspora's ability to influence the decision-making process and political actions of host land government with regard to conflicts that can be applied for foreign affairs. The ability is based on how diasporic community is skillful at lobby activities in the parliament as well as administration (Sheffer 2013). Moreover, diasporas' ability to use and utilize sophisticated media and communication networks is crucial to influence public opinions and launch public campaigns on behalf of their communal interests or their respective homeland's aims and benefits. For instance, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) in the United States is often recognized as a successful model of effective lobby group which has been followed as a model by different lobby groups such as the United States India Political Action Committee, and American Mexican Public Affairs Committee (Adamson 2016).

The fifth internal factor is individual activists and leaders of the diasporic community. The capable and venturous activists and leaders have potential to produce more fruitful and better results for diasporas or their country of origin, provided that they

²³ Taken from: **Center for American Progress/Foundation for European Progressive Studies/Fondation Jean-Jaurès/Foundation Max van der Stoep** telephone survey of the Turkish diaspora in Germany, Austria, France, and the Netherlands; conducted November 2019 to January 2020 by the polling firm DATA4U. For more information, see the methodology in Max Hoffman, Alan Makovsky, and Michael Werz, "The Turkish Diaspora in Europe: Integration, Migration, and Politics" (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2020), available at <https://www.americanprogress.org/?p=491951>.

don't contradict the significant organizations of diasporas, for their continuation and performance. Their success is as much as dependent to their friends and, well-known supporters of the host land government and leading officials, their influence depends on their personalities and modes of operation (Sheffer 2013). To exemplify, Patrick Devedjian who was Armenian-origin French politician from the Union for a Popular Movement Party, which was close adviser of Nicolas Sarkozy as well as Minister under the Prime Minister in charge of the Implementation of the Recovery Plan, had produced more and better results for Armenian diasporas in France due to its modes of operation, strong connection with leading officials in the host land and identification of himself as French²⁴ although he had strived for interest of Armenia and Armenian community in France. He was the prominent figure among the Armenians in France that struggle on to recognition of the events of 1915 as "genocide" by France, and France recognized the events of 1915 as "genocide" in 2001. Moreover, Devedjian proposed an amendment to a proposed bill penalizing denial of the "Armenian Genocide" on 9 October 2006.²⁵²⁶ Apart from the historically constructed relations between Armenians and French, Patrick Devedjian can be shown as an effective and "successful" activist/leader who didn't contradict with significant Armenian organizations in France. But also, it is a good example of how an activist or leader of diasporic community can be influential on the interest of their community and homeland through its connection with leading officials and its position in the government. Beyond any doubt, the success of the activists and leaders of the diasporic community is also clinging to how the relation has been constructed between diasporas and host land society.

Last but not least, it is significant whether the members of diasporas are unified or divided into different political or civil organizations that compete with each other and follow different agendas. It is certainly obvious that diasporas are not unified actors which comprise various different cultural, political, social and religious codes and backgrounds as

²⁴ In an interview with **Banu Avar**(2006), Patrick Devedjian identified himself as a French citizen thus as a French. For full of interview: "Fransa ve Ermeni Soykırımı | Banu AVAR'la Sınırlar Arasında S2B7 25 December 2006". < <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uOeYml6BP4>>, Accessed: 22.01.2022

²⁵ **The Armenian Mirror-Spectator**, Former French Minister Patrick Devedjian Dies of COVID-19,<<https://mirrorspectator.com/2020/04/02/former-french-minister-patrick-devedjian-dies-of-covid-19/>>, Accessed: 22.01.2022

²⁶ He was also known as an advocate of Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) terrorist group established in 1975. ASALA aimed to urge Turkey to recognize the "genocide", pay reparations, and support the establishment of an Armenian state through terrorist activities.

it can be observed in the Hungarian diaspora. However, the extent of this diversification plays significant role on the success of diaspora's efforts in terms of international politics, particularly during the political, social and diplomatic crisis between host land policymakers and diasporas, or between their homeland and host land. In some cases, the structure of diasporic community internalizes the political fragmentation or situation in their respective homeland which caused the transnationalization of the fragmentation or spilling over the political issue into the member of diasporic community, as it happens in the violent activities discussed in the previous chapters (Adamson 2019). The existing of the common narrative which can be based on traumatic reason of the first immigration (which provides motivation and idea for the community but also junctor factor for people from every walk of life), and following a common goal are critical for the structure of diasporas which make them more effective and successful at both international scene and host land politics. On the other hand, according to Østergaard-Nielsen (2006), political plurality can be beneficial since it provides different political networks with different ideas regarding the possible solutions for the conflict in their country of origin. It can be applicable for the conflict resolution. However, in terms of diplomatic power, it seems that political plurality likely has negative impact. To illustrate, Turkish diaspora in Europe cannot act in unison in most of the political, social and diplomatic crisis due to their politically and socially fragmented structure which reflects the polarized structure of the Turkish society in Turkey. As Tunahan Kuzu, who has been member of the House of Representative of the Netherlands since 2012 and controversial political figure in the Netherlands, remarked in a interview with Tolga Sakman (2015), Turkish Civil Society Organizations in the Netherlands (which is also similar in Germany) have completely different visions and agendas. He said: "If you research on the 10 Turkish Civil Society Organizations and ask them their visions, you would encounter with 10 different visions". He also emphasized on the dividedness of the Turkish diaspora due to their political, denominational and congregational discrepancy. But also, fellow- townsmanship has played important role in the relations between members of the Turkish diaspora in their everyday life. This dividedness negatively influences when they are intend to act in unison on behalf of their communal interest as well as for sake of Turkey.

In this chapter, six main internal factors are discussed with the various examples. As remarked in the beginning of the chapter, those factors have strong relations with external factors, and it would be erroneous to argue that internal factors are completely independent

from the external factors. However, those internal factors are constitutively related with the diasporic community itself. There are also some factors that cannot be interpreted through the excluding internal or external factors such as overlapping interest between the diasporas and host land, which is examined in the following subheading titled as “External Factors” together with other external factors.

3.2.2 External Factors

There are some factors which are generally constituted by out of diasporic community, although they may have little impact on them in most of the cases. Those factors which are unremarkably interconnected with each other can be at local (rarely), national and international level such as international conjuncture.

The political and legal system of the countries varies from each other in the widest sense. The legal system regulates the structure of political opportunity for the migrants, which is one of the reasons why integration level of the migrants shows an alteration in different cases. The preservation of the diasporic identity is tightly related with the political institutions, ideologies, and policies of the hostland. As mentioned, diasporic identity and diaspora’s efforts for their communal interest and homeland’s favour have better atmosphere in democratic countries than in authoritarian ones because citizens can define their cultural and social spheres which is part of personal freedom as long as such behaviour doesn’t harm to host land and offend host land’s democratic values. Yet, there are some differences among democracies. According to William Safran (2004), we may categorize the countries in terms of their receptivity to immigrants: ‘Welcoming’ Countries and ‘Selective’ Countries, which can be subdivided into the subtypes.

The first subtype of ‘welcoming’ countries is culturally pluralistic countries that accept immigrants and encourage them to become members of political community, thus provide a fertile ground for political participation of diasporas, but permit immigrant to maintain their cultural particularities. Canada and the United Kingdom can be shown this kind of countries.²⁷ Another subtype of ‘welcoming’ countries is culturally monolithic

²⁷ In the United Kingdom, however, the perception against lobby activities is not so friendly compared with the perception in the United States (Laçiner and Bal 2002).

countries which embrace immigrant and encourage them to become members of political community as so Canada, but expose them cultural melting pot. France and the United States, which have generous admission not based on *jus soli* can be shown as examples for culturally pluralistic countries.

On the other hand, ‘selective’ countries can be similarly subdivided into subtypes. The first subtype of ‘selective’ countries is culturally pluralistic countries which encourage immigrants to become members of the political community, and tolerate, differently from ‘welcoming’ countries, the continuation of the cultural particularities. Israel is the example of this kind of countries. Another subtype of ‘selective’ countries is culturally monolithic countries, which distinguish permanent returnees and guest workers. In this kind of countries, going into politics is very difficult, if not impossible. Germany, which has highly selective admission based on kinship (*jus sanguinis*)²⁸²⁹ is a very good instance of selective and culturally monolithic countries.

William Safran’s categorization is applicable to comprehend why some diaspora organizations are more successful and effective from the point of view of international politics because diasporas in ‘welcoming countries’, feel themselves as a part of political system of their host land with a different extent, than in ‘selective countries’. It makes them politically capable to take better results for their community or sometimes respective homeland interest as in the United States. For instance, exclusive citizenship and migrant incorporation countries make diasporas more interested in their homeland politics and organizations instead of host land political orientations. To illustrate, Turkish and Kurdish diaspora in Germany difficultly find an institutionalized platform for dialog with policymakers of where they reside on the contrary to the Netherlands which is multicultural inclusive country (Third-country citizens can vote in local elections)

²⁸ Together with the change on nationality law came into force in 2000 (Section 10, para. 1 of the Nationality Act), Germany adapted more inclusive and democratic citizenship perception. For more information official article is recommended to examine: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, “Naturalization in Germany”, <<https://www.bamf.de/EN/Themen/Integration/ZugewanderteTeilnehmende/Einbuengerung/einbuengerung.html?nn=285728>>, Accessed: 11.04.2022

²⁹ Although the change on nationality law made the citizenship more inclusive, the number of the immigrant-origin candidates is very low due to several reasons such as lack of integration politics and perception of political parties against immigrant-origin candidates as Gökay Sofuoğlu who has been president of the Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland (Turkish Society in Germany) observed. (retrieved from <https://www.dw.com/tr/türkiye-kökenliler-kimi-seçiyor-ve-türkiye-kökenli-kaç-aday-var/a-59249514> 10.04.2022)

(Østergaard-Nielsen 2009). When we also take into consideration the highly selective admission based on kinship, Turkish and Kurdish diaspora don't sufficiently feel as a part of political system of Germany. For this reason, the general run of those diasporas are more willing to engage with political issues and agenda of Turkey.

As it is discussed in the previous chapter, strengthening homeland political orientations and organizations among Turkish and Kurdish diaspora in Germany make difficulties when they intend to go into politics and lobbying parliament. Moreover, there is an explicit (sometimes implicit) oppression of homeland political agendas and engagement within the context of migrant political participation in Germany. Therefore, successful Turkish candidates try to keep its engagement with homeland political issues or an affiliation, which has relation with particular homeland political party or association, at a distance. But also the relation of Turkish origin candidates with homeland political agendas leaves them in a tight spot at the relation with member of Turkish diaspora due to politically fragmented diasporic structure which is very difficult to avoid for Turkish origin politicians (Østergaard-Nielsen 2009). Under these circumstances, the execution of successful and effective diaspora's efforts for particularly interest of homeland is very compelling. Shorty, if political system (legal system in the widest sense) doesn't provide sufficient political opportunity for diasporas, the success rate of diaspora's efforts remains relatively limited from the view of international politics.³⁰

The second external factor, which is strongly interconnected with internal factors, is the harmony between the host land's and diaspora's interests and goals. The influence and success of the diaspora's efforts strictly depend on whether diaspora's aims and interests do not contradict and challenge to accepted host land interests and basics. In the cases which there is an overlapping or, at least a close harmony, between the host land's and diaspora's goals and interests, the chances of diaspora receiving positive reaction from the host land government is considerable higher than cases which diaspora's efforts contradict, at least lack of harmony with, the basic and host land interests (Sheffer 2013). Therefore,

³⁰ On the other hand, in the Netherlands and Denmark which are 'welcoming' countries, Turkish and Kurdish associations are urged to focus on migrant political issues instead of politics of Turkey through the significant public funding for migrant associations as long as they are not interested in their homeland politics. It is also applied by Sweden. In those countries, diasporas don't want to lose funding opportunities which urge them keep their relations with homeland politics at bay (Østergaard-Nielsen 2009). In this respect, they are more integrated and motivated to their host land politics that provide them to become more demanding for their communal interest.

the interests, which have played significant role at defining which are good and which are bad diasporic organizations and communities, should be examined to comprehend why some diaspora's efforts receive positive and supportive feedbacks while others do not (Østergaard-Nielsen 2006).

In the case of Armenian diaspora in France, overlapping between the host land's and diaspora's interests and goals can be clearly observed. The one of the main goals of the Armenian diaspora in France through lobby activities and propaganda methods is preventing or deteriorating any good and rewarding relations between Turkey and France. On the contrary, by same methods, Armenian diaspora makes an effort to develop the relations between France and Armenia (Akgönül 2002). From the point of view of the Armenian diaspora, the strong and sustainable Armenia-France relationship is for the good of the Armenian diaspora's interests, as is a problematic and slender Turkey-France relation. In addition to French foreign policy toward Turkey, as France hosts the biggest Armenian diaspora in Europe, the Armenian diaspora has always strive to influence over the French foreign policy to the regional issues in the South Caucasus (Mustafayev 2021). Moreover, Armenian diaspora aims to influence France's position against Turkey's membership in the EU as well as institutional foreign policy of the EU to the detriment of Turkey under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). On the other hand, power struggle between France and Turkey in the several regions has been increasing, especially in recent years. Scrambling with Turkey over the Eastern Mediterranean, Libya and South Caucasus has enhanced the possibility of success of Armenian diaspora's effort to influence France's foreign policy on behalf of Armenia and to the detriment of Turkey's interest. Moreover, Turkey's support for Azerbaijan is another important motivation behind the support of France to side with Armenia on the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and other regional issues. Therefore, the position of France against Turkey and challenging issues between Azerbaijan and Armenia can't be explained merely intensive lobbying activities of Armenian Diaspora (Mustafayev 2021). To give another example, the Jewish residents, which has remained very limited number, in Egypt had been prevented to contact with Israel, and it led them to be stuck in a difficult situation to retain their diasporic identity (Safran 2004). In this situation, it is clearly inconvenient to maintain relations with homeland as well as lobby activities for communal and homeland's interests. As examined through the examples, the harmony between the host land's and diaspora's interests and goals is one of the main determinants of the success of diaspora's

efforts, and inseparable part of academic explanation of why some diaspora's efforts receive positive and supportive reactions while others do not.

The third external factor is the relationship between diaspora's host land and homeland. It is fundamentally related with the harmony between the host land's and diaspora's interests and goals. However, some diasporic organizations' accepted interests and goals can be different from their homeland interests and goals. For instance, Ahmed Chalabi, who was an Iraqi politician, founder of the Iraqi National Congress opposition group in the United States and important figure among the neoconservatives of the U.S. government, claimed himself as a representative of diaspora interests. He played a substantial role in the process of paving the way for the 2003 invasion of Iraq through the different methods including feeding intelligence to the United States and the United Kingdom that was later realized that it could be false. However, the conditions were ripe for the cooperation between the U.S. government and supporters of Ahmed Chalabi in the diaspora due to similar goals and interests. He helped legitimize the toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime by claiming to represent the political will of the Iraqi community in diaspora (Adamson 2016). The problematic and hostile relations between the United States and Iraq under the Saddam Hussein's regime provided a basis for possible cooperation between Ahmed Chalabi and the U.S. government. Thus, Ahmed Chalabi and some part of the Iraqi community in diaspora could lobby in a proper atmosphere and received positive reactions from the U.S. because of the same intention against Saddam Hussein's regime. On the other hand, the problematic homeland-host land relations may restrict the political and social sphere of the diaspora, as in Jew's case in Egypt as well as in Moscow during the Soviet period, particularly after 1948 (Safran 2004).

To give another instance, during the late nineteenth century, the Great Britain and France were in a power struggle on the Ottoman Empire territories (to encourage and support the rights for ethnic minority groups in the Ottoman Empire is part of this struggle), particularly in the Middle East, although they fought together during the First World War. This wrest can be clearly observed in the Ottoman State Archives. For instance, the comparatively better the Ottoman Empire and France relations at that time had partially restricted the activities of Armenian community in France. George Buisson who was a French trade union leader and Resistance activist, gave a conference at *Société de Geographic* in 1995, and he argued that 'Armenian issue' and 'massacre' were

fabricated by the United Kingdom for their respective interests. He warned Paris society that was exposed to propaganda of Armenian society, to be aware of reality.³¹ Moreover, some Armenians who were deported by the Ottoman Empire due to their anarchic activities, such as attack to Ottoman Bank in 1896, were detained by the France authorities when they arrived to Marseilles Port and some of them were also deported by French government to the North and South America as a result of diplomatic negotiation between the Ottoman-French governments³². There are more historical documents which showed the cooperation between the Ottoman Empire and France against Armenian anarchists and their activities in France (this cooperation was very rare in the following centuries). In this circumstance together with the lack of Armenian organizations in France at that time, Armenian community in France could not find a proper, at least sufficient, basis to conduct comparatively successful lobby activities. However, while France did not want to endanger somehow rewarding relations with the Ottoman Empire, France maintained its political and economic support for Armenian community in the Ottoman Empire and escalated the 'Armenian issue' as a 'religious protector of Eastern societies'³³. But it was limited compared with the direct support of France to Armenian communities throughout the twentieth century. Shortly, the homeland-host land relations have significant effect on the success of diaspora's efforts in terms of international politics. As discussed, while problematic diplomatic relations between homeland and host land positively influence some diaspora's efforts as in case of Ahmed Chalabi, they can also restrict some of the diaspora's activism even if this diasporic organization comes from same ethnic origin. This argument can be also applicable for the cases where the relations between homeland and host land are quite rooted and sustainable. For this reason, the correlation between harmony of the interests and goals, and the relation between homeland and host land (shortly the correlation between second external factor and third external factor) is critical to understand and analyze the reasons behind of the successful or failing diaspora activities.

³¹ **The Ottoman Archives of the Prime Minister's Office, hereafter "the Ottoman archives"** (BOA. HR. SYS. 2748/73, 2838/7)

³² BOA. HR. SYS. 2802-4, 2749/25

³³ BOA. Y. A. HUS. 362/8

Another external factor is homeland's diaspora policy. As discussed throughout this study, the importance of diasporas have been realized by policymakers and international organizations such as World Bank. They become the significant global actor in the globalizing world. Together with the new technologies particularly rising of global media and communications, diasporas have obtained critical power which allows them influence to political events of homeland, host land as well as non-state actors. Moreover, diasporic networks that connect populations from the different states have attracted to all political actors and those networks can be used to transfer of resources, skill, knowledge, and influence. For those reasons, homeland governments intensify diaspora engagement policies that may positively or negatively impact the success of diaspora's efforts. On the other hand, there are also stateless diasporas across the world. Their relations with real or imagined "homeland" are different from diasporas in terms of homeland's diaspora politics because they might be deprived of diaspora politics at state level (homeland). Therefore, through discussing the fourth external factor, the effect of homeland politics on the success of diasporas which have a state is analyzed.

The homeland diaspora policy can be the consequence of the foreign policy agenda and aims of the country of diaspora's origin. For instance, Turkey's diaspora policy has been reflecting the active foreign policy agenda which aims to intensify relations to Muslims in the Balkans, the Caucasus and to Turkic peoples (Aydın 2014). These aims can be also found in the official website of Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB). YTB remarks "to coordinate the activities for Turks living abroad, related (sister) communities and Türkiye Scholarship Program, and develop the services and activities carried out in these fields" as a main institutional task.³⁴³⁵ The Hungarian diaspora policy, similarly with the case of Turkey, reflects the foreign policy agenda of Victor Orbán's government as discussed before. While this homeland's diaspora

³⁴ **Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB)**, Institution, <<https://www.ytb.gov.tr/en/corporate/institution>>, (Accessed: 10.04.2022)

³⁵ For instance, Ahmet Davutoğlu who is a Turkish academic, politician and former diplomat who served as the 26th Prime Minister of Turkey redefined the Turkish diaspora which consists of the population that emigrated from Turkey (he said from our land) in a conference. According to Davutoğlu's very extensive definition, Armenians, Jews, Greeks, 'El Turcos' in Latin America and even Arabs in Argentina are part of the Turkish diaspora.

(Retrieved from <https://www.cnnturk.com/2012/guncel/07/07/el.turco.acilimi/668029.0/index.html> 12.04.2022)

engagement can give a purpose, political and economic support, and motivation to their diasporas, it can also restrict the diaspora's efforts because it is highly possible that this engagement is perceived as an interference to the political life of other nations. To illustrate, Turkey's diaspora engagement policies were viewed by Germany as interference to their internal political life. Particularly, after the July 2016 military coup attempt in Turkey, a German court decided to put restrictions on who wanted to speak remotely against to crowds at public demonstrations and a video-link connection of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at a political rally in Germany (Adamson 2016). Slovakia's altering its law in 2012 to hamper its citizens from holding dual citizenship in reply to Orbán's law change can be another example of reaction of host land government which might negatively influence the results of diaspora's effort. Furthermore, if homeland diaspora policy that goes hand in hand with homeland's foreign policy orientation is not in harmony with the host land interests and goals, homeland diaspora policy may beget additional pressure by host land government on diaspora's efforts, particularly diasporic organizations which have strongly engagement with homeland politics. At the same time, homeland diaspora politics may intentionally or unintentionally carry the conflict, political issues and social problems in homeland to diaspora's host land. It may lead to division among the member of diasporic community that affects the diaspora's efforts negatively. For those reasons, homeland diaspora politics is significant factor that facilitates to understand the reasons of effective and ineffective diaspora's efforts.

3.2.3 International Conjuncture

International conjuncture is also part of the external factors because it is generally constituted by out of diasporic community. Thus, diasporas, in most cases, might little influence on the international conjuncture which is difficult to be controlled by the community itself. However, international conjuncture as a last external factor in this study is discussed separately from other external factors by the reason of its critical importance on the success of diaspora's efforts.

The international conditions play a crucial role on the states' internal and external relations. During the Cold War, the ideological drives were important part of decision-making process of the countries because of the competition between the United States and

Soviet Union. On the other hands, together with the ending Cold War, the world system have undergone a change which also have transformed both internal and external politics of the states. While, those transformations bring some states, groups and diasporas into the forefront, they play down some states, groups and diasporas. Therefore, diasporas as a global actor are directly and considerably influenced from international conjuncture. For instance, throughout the Cold War period, the term of genocide converted from a legal concept into a political discourse used in propaganda battles between the United States and the Soviet Union. Nearly eighty countries were accused of genocide (Weiss-Wendt 2018a). For this reason, Cold War period was proper time to bring up the events of 1915 to the agenda of Armenian diaspora, which directly aimed to protect Armenian identity in diaspora and restrict Turkey's interests in simple terms. Throughout the Cold War period, Turkey had a special role due to its geostrategic importance and unique location, which was closed to the Soviet Union and bridge between west and east. Turkey, as a significant and powerful NATO ally, enjoyed its geostrategic importance to weaken the Armenian diaspora's lobby activities and influence, particularly in the United States, France and the Soviet Union. To illustrate, during the 1960s, Armenian diaspora increased its activities in the Soviet Union. The idea of building a 'genocide' memorial was proposed by John Kirakosyan for the first time ever and this suggestion was sent as an open letter to Central Committee of the Communist Party of Armenia in 1963. It was followed by demanding a series of events and proposals. However, Soviet-Turkish relations were in a period of normalization with the incentive of deteriorating relations between Turkey and the United States due to Cyprus issue at that time. It was perceived as a big opportunity for the Soviet Union to gain over Turkey. From all reasons above, the secretary of the Communist Party of Armenia warned the Armenian proponents that none of these proposals should jeopardize the normalization of Soviet-Turkish relations. The upsurge of nationalism in Armenia was much related with the improvement in Soviet-Turkish relations (Weiss-Wendt 2018b). For this reason, improvement in Soviet-Turkish relations, which had been largely shaped and influenced by the international conjuncture, was one of the most significant determinants on the success of Armenian diaspora's efforts thereat.

Another example that shows the role of the international conjuncture on the consequences of diaspora's efforts is activities of the Armenian diaspora in the United States during the Cold War period. The position of the U.S. on the Armenian 'genocide' issue and the Armenian diaspora's efforts were very similar with the Soviet Union. In

1951, the United States government lawyers submitted advice on the Genocide Convention to the International Court of Justice, which argued that the events of 1915 were an instance of 'genocide'. Thirty years later, in a proclamation on the Holocaust, the President of the U.S. Ronald Reagan remarked "the genocide of the Armenians before it, and the genocide of the Cambodians which followed it". However, the assassination of Kemal Arikan, who was the Turkish consul general to the United States, by two Armenian terrorists in Los Angeles changed the thinking of Ronald Reagan together with the other political circumstances. The death of a diplomat of the powerful and close NATO ally enraged and embarrassed the president (de Waal 2015). According to his foreign policy agenda, there were three priorities: the Soviet Union, Israel, and terrorism. Therefore, Turkey was a very critical ally for the interests of the United States because the U.S. had been utilized and maintained a military air base and communication facilities in Turkey which provided important advantage to CIA for its activities in both the Soviet Union and the Middle East. More importantly, while Turkey was on the United States side, Armenians, on the contrary, were not. On the other hand, Turkey has been the second-largest military power in the NATO (Weiss-Wendt 2018b). From all reasons above, seven months after the assassination of Arikan, Ronald Reagan altered its position on the tragic events of 1915. The State Department's official bulletin published a special issue regarding the terrorism, and there was a piece in this issue titled "Armenian Terrorism: A Profile." According to a note at the end of the article,

"Because the historical record of the 1915 events in Asia Minor is ambiguous, the Department of State does not endorse allegations that the Turkish government committed genocide against the Armenian people. Armenian terrorists use this allegation to justify in part their continuing attacks on Turkish diplomats and installations."(de Waal 2015)

Although the bulletin ended up publishing as a result of Armenian complaints, a new position against the tragic events of 1915 had been drawn by the executive body of the United States. The term of 'Armenian genocide' was declared unlawful in the United States. As the Department of State remarked, the historical record of the tragic events of 1915 was regarded as ambiguous. For many Americans, the phrase of 'Armenian genocide' now reminds not a story of human suffering, but a way and method for congressional bargaining and lobbying. As Thomas de Wall remarked in his study, the tragic events of 1915 turns into "You vote for the farm bill, and I'll back you on the

genocide resolution” (de Waal 2015). However, at the last statements of the U.S. President Joe Biden on Armenian Remembrance Day, Biden defined the tragic events of 1915 as ‘genocide’.³⁶ The deteriorating relations among the NATO ‘allies’ paved the way for this kind of definition which pleased the Armenian diaspora. As it can be comprehended from the instances discussed above, there is very strong correlation between the international conjuncture, harmony of the interests and goals, and the success of the diaspora’s efforts.

A recent instance of how international conjecture affects the diaspora’s efforts is the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It sparks off reaction across the world but the joint reaction of West, particularly, is rather strong which might significantly bring to a standstill of Russian economy in the long term. The Russian government attaches importance to diaspora engagement, like many other governments in the world, through the Russkiy Mir (Russian World) Foundation, which also aims to reconnect the Russian community abroad with their respective homeland. Russkiy Mir, however, also acts as an institution which tries to justify Russian invasion of Ukraine by reproducing the Kremlin’s victim narrative, together with its cultural and social programs.³⁷ While Russian diaspora are negatively feeling the impact of the sanctions, particularly wealthy Russians, they are also exposed to ‘Russophobia’. Though, some members of the Russian diaspora in Europe and the United States support the war in Ukraine, many do not publicly support Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, those including the Congress of Russian Americans that seems like nonparty in the war and concern regarding the “prejudices and retaliations”, which do not defend Russia’s war are also negatively influenced from politics of Putin’s government (Satzewich 2022). For instance, some Russians in Germany, which has the largest Russian diaspora in the European Union, organized a demonstration ‘against Russophobia’. One demonstrator who has both Russian and German citizenship said "My life is hell," and he added “My aim was only to protest against the daily aggression suffered by Russians in Germany.” Germany is home to around 1.2 million Russians and 325,000 Ukrainians that has been increasing. According to official reports of German police, since Russia invaded

³⁶ The statement of President Joe Biden on 24 April 2021 started with this sentence: “Each year on this day, we remember the lives of all those who died in the Ottoman-era Armenian Genocide and recommit ourselves to preventing such an atrocity from ever again occurring.” (retrieved from <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/24/statement-by-president-joe-biden-on-armenian-remembrance-day/> 14.04.2022)

³⁷ **France 24**, Pro-Russian vehicle convoys spark outrage in Germany, < <https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220410-pro-russian-vehicle-convoys-spark-outrage-in-germany>>, Accessed:14.04.2022

Ukraine in February, 383 anti-Russian and 181 anti-Ukrainian crimes have been occurred.³⁸³⁹ These reports show that interstate conflict is also moved to host lands through diasporas. When we take into considerations the all those issues, the consequences of the Russian diaspora's efforts (most especially organizations that have strong engagement with Russia and Putin's government) in the Western countries has been greatly affected together with their daily life. However, the Russian diaspora in Baltic countries are not receptive to Russian penetration as it has not acknowledged the concept called 'Russkiy Mir' that is promoted by the Kremlin, and its policies based on hard power. They have been not perceived and viewed as the 'Trojan Horse' in their host land because they have formed an individualized and situational conception of their identity (Coolican 2021). For this reason, the efforts and activities of the Russian diaspora in the Baltic State is unlikely to encounter with the same reaction as in Western Europe. Nonetheless, further studies are required to more deeply analyze how Russian invasion of Ukraine have influenced the activities of the Russian diaspora in the Western Europe compared with the Russian diaspora in the Baltic States.

In summary, under the title of "the Correlation between the International Politics and Diasporas", various passive and active roles of diasporas in the international politics, which make them significant global actor in the changing, transforming and globalizing world, are discussed in detail by various cases. While problematic aspects of the linkages between diasporas and conflict are comprehensively exemplified, the positive aspects of the diasporas, which have been neglected in the literature, on the conflict resolution and post conflict building are emphasized. Lastly, the factors are discussed to commentate the reasons of why some diasporas are more effective and successful in terms of international politics, others are not. Those factors divided into internal and external factors, and international conjuncture (which is actually part of the external factors). Through this categorization, it is aimed to demonstrate separately, relationally, their positive/negative influences on the diaspora's efforts from the point of international politics.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ **Mail Online**, Thousands of Russian demonstrators take to streets across Germany after claiming they have been 'victims of daily aggression' in wake of Ukraine invasion, < <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10704921/WAR-UKRAINE-Pro-Putin-protesters-demonstrate-Germany.html>>, Accessed: 14.04.2022

4. THE TURKISH DIASPORA AND THE ARMENIAN DIASPORA

In this chapter, firstly, the historical background of the formation of the specified cases of the thesis is examined to comprehend and compare the diasporisation process of these cases, because this process provides substantial clues for the differentiating level of efficacy and success rate of the Turkish diaspora in Germany and Armenian diaspora in France. Afterwards, the implementation of the factors affecting success of the Turkish diaspora and Armenian diaspora's efforts from the perspective of international politics through the findings in the literature is discussed in detail. On the other hand, in this chapter along with following chapter, the substantiality of the factors of time and international conjuncture developed by this thesis through the examination of the studies from different disciplines can be better understood, because these cases provide useful ground to analyze how these two factors are critical on the diaspora's activities in political and social spheres.

4.1 Turkish Diaspora

The most common mistake about usage of "Turkish diaspora" in the literature is ambiguity regarding what is meant by "Turkish diaspora". Many researchers are using this term without analyzing the community whether suitable to refer it as diasporic or not. Even, some researchers in the literature use the term of "Turkish diaspora" that includes the Kurdish people who have Turkish citizenship. It is both impediments to develop fruitful diaspora politics and to research correctly. It is really hard to give an answer to this basic question: Who forms the Turkish diaspora? The term is used differently in academia, legal regulations, press, diplomacy and bureaucracy. The term of the Turkish diaspora has been used by various policymakers, particularly Turkish researchers, press and various think tanks to define: Citizens, fellow descendants, related communities, fellow communities, international students, Ottoman residues, all Muslims (Ummah). The extensive usage of this term makes the Turkish diaspora less functional. One of the main reasons of changing and dilatational scope of the Turkish diaspora is to use this term as a

tool when Turkish governments assumed useful in foreign policy. The context of the term is changing together with changing foreign and domestic policy agendas. This ambiguity influences the capacity of organizational movement of Turkish diaspora in Europe. It is clear that the term of Turkish diaspora should be defined and remarked its limitations by conceptual discussions and its meaning shouldn't be changed by the changing foreign policy of the Turkey. For example, Yıldız offers two different definitions, "Each of which is based on either a legal ground (Turkish citizenship) or a cultural ground (Turkish language) in accordance with Turkey's own historical and social dynamics." (Yıldız 2019) On the other hand, in the recent Turkish literature regarding the Turkish diaspora, there is a tendency to define Turkish community in previous Ottoman territories such as Western Balkans and South Caucasus, who maintained to close contact with relatives in Turkey, remained as minority and safeguarded their identity and culture, as the Turkish diaspora. This tendency bases upon reasonable grounds because Hungarian community, found themselves living in newly independent, neighboring countries after the First World War, is recognized as the Hungarian diaspora and the Russian diaspora which is applied to define twenty-five million Russians stayed out of the current territory of Russian Federation. Turkish community has very common features with these communities. But I argue that further studies are required to analyze those types of communities to understand whether they are suitable to be referred to as 'diaspora' or not. Mehmet Köse (2021) who was the President of the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities refers to those Turkish communities, stayed out of the current border of Turkey and maintained its relation with Turkey, as 'Autochthonous Turkish diaspora'. However, in this study, the term of "Turkish diaspora" will be used to define Turkish origin (ethnic based) people whether citizen of Republic of Turkey or not, living abroad, recognize Turkey as homeland and in solidarity with Turkey, having cooperation with the Turkish communities in other countries, maintaining their ties with Turkey and having a boundary in host land society by preservation of distinctive identity. Therefore, it focuses on the Turkish diaspora, which have been mainly formed as results of post-1950 migrations.

According to Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Turkey, "The total population of Turks living abroad exceeds 6.7 million and around 5.7 million of them live in Western European countries. Together with the 3 million Turkish citizens having returned to Turkey for good, a large-scale migration phenomenon that concerns a

population of approximately 10 million emerges.”⁴⁰ According to different studies based on Germany’s Federal Office for Statistics, around 2.8 million people with Turkish roots were living in Germany in 2020^{41,42}. It constitutes 3.4% of the overall population of 83.2 million in 2020. In numerical terms, Turkish origin people represent the biggest group among the 11.4 million foreign nationals in Germany.⁴³ On the other hand, according to Turkish MFA, around 780,000 Turks live in France and 360,000 of them have dual citizenship⁴⁴, more than 250,000 Turks live in Belgium.⁴⁵ Although most of the Turks live in Western European countries, the number of Turks living different foreign countries is at a certain level. For instance, according to conservative estimates of Turkish Coalition of America, there are approximately 350,000 Americans of Turkish descent living across the United States.⁴⁶ If we accept the total population of Turks living in Europe as 5.7 million, it means that the number of Turks living in Europe is higher than separate population of the eleven EU member states as Eurostat’s , the statistical office of the European Union, data shows (Graph 3).

⁴⁰**Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey**, Turkish Citizens Living Abroad, <<https://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-expatriate-turkish-citizens.en.mfa>>, Accessed: 15.04.2022

⁴¹ **Deutsche Welle**, Almanya'da 2,8 milyon Türkiye kökenli yaşıyor, <<https://www.dw.com/tr/almanya-da-28-milyon-turkiye-kokenli-ya-siyor/a-54385723>> Accessed:15.04.2022

⁴² **Türkmen, Gülay** (2019) Reset Dialogues on Civilizations, “But you don’t look Turkish!”: The Changing Face of Turkish Immigration to Germany, <<https://www.resetdoc.org/story/dont-look-turkish-changing-face-turkish-immigration-germany/>>, Accessed:15.04.2022


⁴³ **European Commission**, Germany’s Population: Demographic Situation, Languages and Religions, <https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/national-policies/eurydice/content/population-demographic-situation-languages-and-religions-31_en>, Accessed:15.04.2022

⁴⁴ **Turkish Embassy in Paris (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Paris Büyükelçiliği)**, Büyükelçinin Mesajı, <<http://paris.be.mfa.gov.tr/Mission/Message>>, Accessed: 15.04.2022

⁴⁵ **Turkish Embassy in Brussels (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Brüksel Büyükelçiliği)**, Büyükelçinin Mesajı,<<http://brussels.emb.mfa.gov.tr/Mission/Message>>, Accessed: 15.04.2022

⁴⁶ **Turkish Coalition of America**, The Turkish American Community, < <https://www.tc-america.org/community/the-turkish-americancommunity-463.htm#:~:text=According%20to%20conservative%20estimates%2C%20there,New%20Jersey%20and%20in%20California>>, Accessed: 15.04.2022

Graph 3. Population in the EU Member States on 1 January 2020



4.1.2 Historical Background of the Formation of the Turkish Diaspora

The migration process of the Turkish/Muslim people that have continued until today began in the 19th century in the Ottoman Empire with a fairly insignificant number. The destination, which is differently from post-1950 Turkish immigrants, to migrate was the American continents in Ottoman era. According to Kemal Karpat's study (1985) the total number of Ottoman emigrants to the American continents in the period from 1860 to 1914 was around 1,200,000. Most emigrations (Arabic speakers) from the Ottoman Empire to American continent were from Syria and Mount Lebanon which was 600,000 because of famine/poverty, and inter-sectarian conflicts in the region at that time and about 150,000 were Muslims of all areas. On the other hand, 450,000 people emigrated from Albania, Macedonia, Thrace, and Western Anatolia (Karpat 1985). The immigration from the Anatolia remained relatively limited (Baycar 2016). Interestingly, the ratio of return home was very widespread and high among the Muslims of all regions and Syrians. One-third of the emigrants from the Ottoman Empire returned to their homeland (Karpat 1985). The rest of them played significant role in the formation process of some diasporic communities in American continents. They lost their relations with the Ottoman Empire and later Republic of Turkey, and they formed diaspora organizations in their new host lands. For instance, the origin of the Armenian diaspora and Greek diaspora in the United States and Western countries coincides with those times.

The number of Turkish emigrants was very low compared to the other ethnic and cultural groups. According to records of the American immigration authorities, 22,085 of the emigrants were registered as Turkish in the period from 1900 to 1925 and most of them resided in industrial cities such as New York and Chicago. While the Armenian and Greek nations migrated from today's Turkish borders and previous Ottoman territories begun to establish relatively successful communities in their new host land, Turkish migrants could not form sustainable organizations and community. This failure can be explained by the structure of Turkish migrants, lack of communal institutions and intention to return home after saving enough money to buy land or establish business at that time. Most of the Turkish migrants were single people because they immigrated to new host lands without their families. When we combine these factors with the low population of Turkish migrants, it can be better comprehended why they did not establish a strong community in the Americas. Although, there was not a strong Turkish community in the Americas, pioneering Turkish diaspora institutions were established at that time through the efforts of some members of the community and their descendants. For instance, The Turkish Welfare Association (Osmanlı/Türk Teavün Cemiyeti), Protecting Children (Himaye-i Etfal), Red Crescent (Kızılay), and the Turkish Cultural Union (Türk Hars Birliği) were established at that time. Moreover, they supported the Turkish Liberation War by the raising substantial amount of money and transferred them to Turkey. On the other hand, migration to Europe during the late Ottoman Empire, did not lead to formation of strong Turkish communities because they were mainly trainees or university students. However, the contribution of Turkish migrants to Germany's industry started much earlier than bilateral agreement with Germany in 1961. In the early 20th century, the population of Turkish community reached to 12,000 and most of them worked in significant industry 'giants' such as Bosch and Mercedes (Köse 2021).

Together with the ending of the Second World War, western countries exposed to huge population losses, and it created demand for labor power. In this context, western countries (particularly Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark, Austria and Sweden) loosened its restrictive migration policies and started to sign bilateral agreements with the different countries. Although the movement of migration through the exchange of population occurred in the very beginning years of Republic of Turkey, the first migration in modern manner, begun in the 1960s and continued intensively until 1980s (Erdoğan 2015). Through the Labor Recruitment Agreements with Federal Republic of Germany in

1961, Austria in 1964, the Netherlands in 1964, Belgium in 1964, France in 1965, Sweden in 1967, and Australia in 1967, Turkey became a significant migrant sending state and around 800,000 workers were sent to Europe until 1974 by way of Employment Agency of Turkey (İİBK) (Sağlam 2020). Until the Labor Recruitment Agreement with West Germany (30 October 1961), Turkish people unlike the Greeks, Germans, Italians, British, Chinese, or Indians had not immigrated at large-scale to any countries in modern times (İçduygu 2012). Those agreements resulted with bilateral agreements regarding social security between migrant sending country and receiving country. Turkey adapted developmentalist migration politics in the period from the 1960s to 1980s, and it incited and organized its citizens to immigrate to Western countries on the purpose of both foreign currency inflow and providing skilled labor (Erdoğan 2015). Together with the First Five-year Development Plan (1962-1967), Turkey emphasized the importance of Turkish labor force in the Western countries and depicted the ‘export of surplus labor power’ as an important component of development policy due to their potential contribution to reduction in the unemployment rate and prospective flows of remittances (İçduygu 2012).

From the 1960s until 1980s, Ankara governments like the German government assumed that ‘guest workers’ would return to Turkey with their new skills, knowledge and qualifications when the time comes. For this reason, Turkey’s policies against its citizens in Western Europe based upon protection of the identity, preserving and strengthening the links of migrant workers to their homeland and consolidating their loyalty to Turkey. The main purpose was the prevention of assimilation of citizens living abroad and alienation from ‘Turkish culture’. The late 1970s bear witness to significant changes in the perception of ‘guest workers’ from Turkey, which recognized later by German politicians. It was understood that the ‘guest workers’, which were supposed to return to Turkey when the time comes, would permanently remain in their host land with their family (Aydın 2014). Although some Western European countries such as Germany restricted even stopped the migration of workers in the 1970s due to economic crisis across the world, Turkish population continued to grow through family reunification, unofficial migration and asylum seekers. Moreover, newborn children to Turkish families caused the growing population of the Turkish community. For instance, only in Germany, 195,000 children were born among the years of 1961-1976 (Köse 2021). Therefore, those indicators were precursor of permanence of ‘guest workers’ in their new host land.

In the late 1970s, the focus of the Turkish government about Turkish migrant workers changed from economic to political matters. Turkey realized that the continuing residence in European countries of Turkish migrants could be more advantageous to Turkey than their return. When we take into consideration their contribution to Turkish gross national product, this politics can be better understood. While remittance inflows to Turkey in 2020 constituted the around 0.1% of gross domestic product, it contributed more than 2.1% in 1980.⁴⁷ In the 1990s, remittances from Turkish migrants were equal to more than one third of the trade deficit. Moreover, emigration helped to reduction in unemployment and underemployment, although it is very hard to quantify its effects on the unemployment and underemployment (İçduygu 2012). Together with the 1982 Constitution, protection of the interest of Turkish citizens in the abroad acquired legal status. Furthermore, the representing new law about permission to Turkish nationals to obtain dual nationality in 1982 showed the changing perspective of Turkish politicians to Turkish migrants. The first aim of Turkey with new ‘diaspora policy’ was mobilizing the Turkish migrants in case of any issue such as radical left-wing groups and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) which has been directly related to national interest and security (Aydın 2014). As discussed before, migration of politicized Kurdish migrants (different from Kurdish ‘guest workers’) in the 1980s contributed to structuring and staffing of PKK in Western Europe (Bayraklı, Yalçın, and Yeşiltaş 2019). Hence, while Ankara maintained its struggle with PKK in Turkey, it also started to focus on PKK’s structuring and organizations established newly in Western Europe. Though the PKK and some of its successor organizations such as Teyrbazen Azadiya Kurdistan (Kurdistan Freedom Falcons) were recognized by the EU and Western countries as terrorist organizations, they have been always one of the main challenging and problematic issues between Turkey-European countries relations.

Secondly, Turkish government introduced some practices for representation of its interest in where Turkish migrant reside. Thus, Turkey aimed to promote its national interest in Western countries by influencing the politics of those countries (Aydın 2014). While Turkey’s Constitution of 1982 was a critical turning point on the Turkey’s engagement with citizens living abroad, later it became ‘diaspora politics’, it created, which still exists, the definition of ‘desirable citizen in abroad’. According to this

⁴⁷ **The World Bank**, ‘Migration and Remittances Data-Annual Remittances Data (updated as of May 2021)’, <<https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data>>, Accessed: 17.04.2022

definition, those groups described as ‘anarchist and terrorist’ were excluded from engagement of Republic of Turkey with its citizens in abroad because they posed a problem to Turkey’s interests and national security as mentioned reasons above (Bayraktar Aksel 2017). In 1986, Turkey provided opportunity for external voting of its citizens 2-3 weeks before the election in customs of foreign countries. In addition to external voting opportunity, Turkish-language teachers were sent to European countries and religious organizing was provided under the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Sağlam 2020). Since 1980s, Turkey have also aimed to collect disorganized Turkish associations, which are respecting Turkey’s values and integrity, in abroad under the umbrella organizations as Ismail Cem who was former Foreign Minister of Turkey remarked as a response to parliamentary question (Bayraktar Aksel 2017).

Until mid-1985s, Turkey had adapted developmentalist approach to their citizens in abroad. However, it began the change together with the new Turkish foreign policy agenda that instrumentalize the Turkish communities in Western countries as a foreign policy element. To illustrate, despite positive developments between Turkey and the EU, the European Commission boxed out Turkey from the enlargement process in ‘Agenda 2000’ which aimed to reinforce the enlargement process to take in ten countries of central and Eastern Europe, and Cyprus, it disclosed on the 16th July 1997.⁴⁸ After the Luxembourg European Council of 12-13 December 1997, EU emphasized to create a special procedure to review the developments made with Turkey. However, Turkey was not included in enlargement process. In reply to the Summit’s decision about the commencing of accession negotiations, Turkey immediately suspended its political relations with the EU in 1997.⁴⁹ Helmut Kohl who served as Chancellor of Germany from 1982 to 1998 played important role in the decision-making process of the European Union. For this reason, Mesut Yılmaz who was the Prime Minister of Turkey during that time warned Turkish origin migrants which have German citizenship regarding German Federal elections were held in Germany on 27 September 1998, and he implied that Turkish origin migrants should vote against Helmut Kohl and his party due to his significant influence on the Decisions of Luxembourg European Council in 1997. It cannot be accurately known whether this

⁴⁸ **EUR-Lex**, Agenda 2000: for a stronger and wider Union, < <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3AI60001>>, Accessed:17.04.2022

⁴⁹ **Economic Development Foundation (IKV)**, 1963-1999 From Partnership to Candidacy, < https://www.ikv.org.tr/ikv.asp?ust_id=36&id=445>, Accessed: 17.04.2022

warning was effective on the political preferences of Turkish origin migrants who have German citizenship in the German Federal elections. However, Mesut Yılmaz's efforts for directing of Turkish origin electors in the Federal elections illustrated the turning point on the instrumentalization process of Turkish community living abroad (Erdoğan 2015) and we witnessed the same kind of efforts to affect the result of elections of Western countries from the Turkish politicians in the following years.

With the era of Turgut Özal(1983-1993), Turkey begun to depart from traditionally passive and one dimensional foreign policy and implement more active and multidimensional foreign policy. This process accelerated with the AKP government. After Ahmet Davutoğlu took office in May 2009, “strategic depth” and “no problems with neighbor states” became the key concepts of Turkish multidimensional foreign policy. The concept of ‘strategic depth’ developed by Davutoğlu was based on four principles: “Emphasizing the multiple identities of Turkey, proactivity and multidimensionality essential guidelines of foreign policy towards the states of the Near and Middle East, Africa and Asia, presence in solving conflicts, which is to be expressed in the role of Turkey as a mediator between parties to conflict, to attach importance to civil society and the business community in the foreign policy agenda” (Y. Aydın 2014). In addition, export-oriented economic policy was adopted through the new parameters which make the Turkish diaspora important economical partner due to its transnational connections and sphere. Together with the new orientation of Turkish foreign policy, Turkey needs to keep pace with the many developed and developing countries in terms of the diaspora engagement because, as discussed widely, the growing importance of diasporas have been realized by policy-makers, NGOs and international organizations such as World Bank (differently from other states, the United States have been developed diaspora politics for a long time).⁵⁰ For these reasons, Turkey have restructured the responsible offices and established new institutions to expand its engagement with the Turkish communities living abroad.

In line with the new orientation in Turkish foreign policy, Turkey increased its activities in Balkans, Africa and Asia by the Turkish Cooperation and Coordinating Agency (TIKA). To strengthen and expand the domain of TIKA, its budget has

⁵⁰ For instance, India in 2005, Poland (*Karta Polska*) in 2007, Ethiopia in 2002 and Mexico in 2009 proposed new laws/programs/implementations regarding their diasporas on the purpose of developing diaspora engagement (Foreign Economic Relations Board-DEİK and World Turkish Business Council-DTİK 2011).

significantly increased and its scope of activities was extended (Y. Aydın 2014). Moreover, Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) was established on 6 April 2010, which aims to “coordinate the activities for Turks living abroad, related (sister) communities and Türkiye Scholarship Program, and develop the services and activities carried out in these fields”.⁵¹ Supporting diaspora policy was seemed as part of public diplomacy to expand sphere of influence. Kemal Yurtnaç (2012) who was former president of YTB emphasized increasing importance of the “soft power”, that has been significant part of the new Turkish foreign policy orientation, in SAM Papers: The ensuing process of globalization facilitated countries in their efforts to establish closer ties with their citizens and kin communities. “Today many countries work to strengthen their public diplomacy efforts, or “soft power,” and expand their sphere of influence through their diasporas. Progressively, Turkey also went through a similar process” More importantly, first time, the term of was used to define people who originated in Turkey and has been adopted in official terminology (Y. Aydın 2014).

Since 1944, Turkish Language Association has published the Great Turkish Dictionary (Büyük Türkçe Sözlük). However, any edition until 1988 did not include the term of diaspora or similar word. In the Eighth edition published in 1988, a Turkish word ‘*kopuntu*’ described as ‘broken bit’ appeared. The term of diaspora was defined for the first time in the First Volume of the Ninth edition published in 1998 and it was described as ‘fragment’, ‘*kopuntu*’ in Turkish original (Yaldız 2019). In progress of time, the term was used in a wider meaning in the following editions. For instance, the term of diaspora is included in the official website of Turkish Language Association in three different definitions:⁵²

1. A place where member of a nation or belief live as a minority
2. A branch of any nation, fragment (*kopuntu* in Turkish original)
3. Branches of Jewish people who left their homeland and started to settle in foreign countries, fragment (*kopuntu* in Turkish original)

⁵¹ **Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB)**, Institution, <<https://www.ytb.gov.tr/en/corporate/institution>>, (Accessed: 18.04.2022)

⁵² **Turkish Language Association (TDK)**, Güncel Türkçe Sözlük,< <https://sozluk.gov.tr/>>, Accessed: 18.04.2022

As remarked, the term of diaspora is very new in the Turkish literature and Turkish Dictionary. On the other hand, this word has been generally used in Turkey to define Armenian community living abroad. Due to the genocide allegations that have been promoted by Armenian diaspora, it has negative perception among the Turkish society. “In addition to negative perception bolstered up the Armenian diaspora, pejorative connotations influenced by terms like ghetto, minority, alien and fragment have beefed up this negative perception” (Yaldız 2019). Turkish policy-makers such as President Recep Tayyip Erdogan also used the term of diaspora as a synonym with the meaning of the “separated, parted” and it lends wings to negative connotations regarding the meaning of the diaspora in Turkey (Yaldız 2019). Nonetheless, the term of diaspora has become widespread in Turkish academy, governmental organizations, and statements of the Turkish politicians, think tanks and NGOs responsively growing importance of diasporas in the international politics. However, it is good to remark that the term of diaspora and boundaries of the Turkish diaspora are mainly shaped by discourses of government officials, though Turkish academy has been carrying on some studies on the conception.

In recent years, Turkey has been giving weight to cultural diplomacy as a part of new orientation in Turkish foreign policy. While many rooted and newly established government agencies such as TİKA, YTB and the Directorate for Religious Affairs (DİB) play a critical role, especially in Central Asia, the Balkans, and recently also Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) through the promotion of Turkey through cultural diplomacy to influence foreigners, they promote a positive image of the Turkey’s culture and history by improving social, cultural and economic relationship with Turkish diaspora reached around 5.7 million in Europe. For this reason, Turkey carries out activities that promote Turkish culture and history to direct both foreigners and Turkish communities living abroad. Turkish scholarships, such as *Türkiye Bilimsel ve Teknolojik Araştırma Kurumu (TÜBİTAK)* and Türkiye Scholarships organized by YTB, for foreigners, sister communities and Turkish communities are, for instance, significant tool for cultural diplomacy which aims to improve mutual understanding. Likewise, Turkish universities organize conferences, congresses and exchange programs for the cultural diplomacy (Donelli 2019).

As discussed, there has been increasing concern and efforts regarding diaspora politics and the term of diaspora in Turkey and Turkish literature in recent years. However,

Turkish diaspora politics and discussions regarding the concept were concentrated comparatively at a late time. When we take into consideration that Turkish diaspora is a type of incipient diaspora which have transformed from gastarbeiter to the diaspora in the near future, this late concern can be comprehensible. On the other hand, the Turkish diaspora has been mainly formed and directed by Turkey and its diaspora politics instead of organizing itself as the Armenian diaspora in the United States or France. The language based on conservative social values which Turkish government frequently used in its diaspora politics, reinforces existing cultural fragmentation within the Turkish diaspora in Western countries and it limits the attempts of the Turkish government to control and intervene them (Y. Aydın 2014). More importantly, along with Western criticism regarding direction of democracy in Turkey, Turkish diaspora politics enclosed with conservative social values are, sometimes, perceived as a threat to existing order in where the Turkish diaspora resides in. Furthermore, Turkey's more active and engaged diaspora politics have given acceleration to the structuring and organizing of the Turkish diaspora. However, until now, Turkey has encountered many negative reactions on account of the fact that it is an intervention to domestic policy. To illustrate, five big diplomatic crises with European countries occurred in 2017 due to Turkey's engagement with its diaspora. In 2017, Bulgaria blamed to Turkey for intruding into the Bulgarian General Elections by Turkish origin community As a result of this diplomatic crisis, Bulgaria swiftly recalled Bulgarian Ambassador to Turkey. In addition to Bulgarian case, according to Article 28 of the Commission Report on Turkey adopted by the European Parliament on July 6, 2017, EU blamed to Turkish government to mobilize Turkish Diaspora in EU Member States for its own interest (Yaldız 2019). Within this context, externally structuring and organizing of the Turkish diaspora have been differently interpreted by the host lands, and mostly those interpretations contain negative and prejudiced approaches against Turkey's diaspora politics.

4.1.3 Turkish Diaspora in Germany and Examining the Factors Affecting Success of the Turkish Diaspora's Efforts

The emigration (partly collective) of Turkish people to Germany date backs to the last century of the Ottoman Empire. Those emigrants generally went to Germany on the purpose of taking education and training through the scholarships provided by the Ottoman

Empire. Though executives of the Ottoman Empire planned to send 10,000 young people with the intention of improvement of industrialization in the last years of the long-lived Empire, this plan could be partially realized due to the First World War broke out 1914. Nonetheless, the population of Turkish community reached to 12,000 and most of them worked in significant industries such as Bosch and Mercedes in the early 20th century. However, it did not result in strong Turkish communities and organizations in Germany as other European countries (Köse 2021).

As a result of Hitler's rise to power in Germany in 1933, many German of Jewish descent, left-wing and liberal academics and engineers applied to Turkey for asylum to escape from oppression of the Hitler's regime. Turkey accepted asylum requests of many those German people. They played significant role in the industrialization process, reorganization of universities and foundation of companies in Turkey. During the Cold War period, the bilateral commercial, economic and cultural relations between Turkey and the Germany was further developed and intensified.⁵³ Together with the signing of the Labor Recruitment Agreement between Turkey and Germany in 1961, emigration and immigrants have become significant part of the bilateral relations and it has influenced the political and economical relations both in positive and negative manner.⁵⁴ In the period from 1961 to 1974, nearly 800,000 workers went to Europe through the Turkish Employment Service (TES) and 649,000 of those workers went to Germany which was equivalent to 81% of total. In the first years of the migratory movements from Turkey to Europe, female participation was very lower which had increased over time. For instance, only nine percent of the emigrants from Turkey to Germany were females in 1962. However, proportion of female participation had reached to more than a quarter of all emigrants in 1974 due to the voluntary and imposed demands of potential women migrants

⁵³ **Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey**, Relations between Türkiye and the Federal Republic of Germany, < <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-federal-republic-of-germany.en.mfa>>, Accessed:19.04.2022

⁵⁴ West Germany and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) signed labour recruitment agreements with many countries to struggle with a shortage of labor in Germany, particularly West Germany. As it is remarked in the official website of Virtual Migrations Museum which is a special project of the Documentation Center and Museum of Migration in Germany (DOMiD): "In 1955, West Germany signed the first labour recruitment agreement with Italy; followed by recruitment agreements with Spain (1960), Greece (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), South Korea (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968). The German Democratic Republic (GDR) entered similar labour recruitment agreements with Vietnam, Cuba, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Poland, Hungary, Yemen and Angola." (retrieved from <<https://virtuelles-migrationsmuseum.org/en/Glossar/labour-recruitment-agreement/>>,Accessed: 20.04.2022)

and family reunification (İçduygu 2012) which was most common method to emigrate from Turkey to Germany after restriction on emigration of workers in 1970s(German government allowed family unifications after the removal of the two-year limitation In 1964). This method has been also applied by the other migrant groups in Europe. When the Eurostat data collected in 2008 is analyzed, it can be easily observed that main common reason of women for emigration and duration of residence in the some European countries including Germany were family reasons differently from men (Albertinelli et al. 2011).

The number of the emigrants from Turkey to Germany reached 1 780 000 in 1991 (Demirağ and Kakışım 2018), although Germany and some European host lands proposed the ‘Return Acts and Bonuses’ to encourage return migration to Turkey 1980s. To illustrate, 310 000 migrants from Turkey returned from Germany in the period of 1983-1985 which had decreased in the following years. During the first half of the 1990s, annually 40 000-45 000 migrants returned to Turkey from Germany which was around annually 100 000 together with migrants from the Netherlands (İçduygu 2012). These data shows that emigration from Turkey to Germany was the second widest mass migration after the emigration from Mexico to the United States in the modern times (Demirağ and Kakışım 2018). The population of the Turkish origin migrants has been increasing over the years that reached to around 2.8 million in 2020, according to different studies based on Germany’s Federal Office for Statistics.⁵⁵ On the other hand, according to the Central Register of Aliens (Ausländerzentralregister – AZR), Turkish origin migrants represents the biggest group with 12.8% of Germany’s foreign population which was around 11.4 million in 2020.⁵⁶ In this respect, Turkish origin migrants have become significant part of political, economical and social life of Germany, though it had been supposed to return their homeland when the time comes. However, as Max Frisch who was Swiss dramatist and novelist said: “Man hat Arbeitskräfte gerufen, und es kamen Menschen”, “Workers have been called, and people came” (Kırmızı 2015).

The demographic aspects, education and occupational position and structural features of the Turkish origin migrants in Germany play essential role to discuss and analyze the


⁵⁵ **Deutsche Welle**, Almanya'da 2,8 milyon Türkiye kökenli yaşıyor, <<https://www.dw.com/tr/almanyada-28-milyon-türkiye-kökenli-yaşıyor/a-54385723>> Accessed:20.04.2022

⁵⁶ **European Commission**, Germany’s Population: Demographic Situation, Languages and Religions, <https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/national-policies/eurydice/content/population-demographic-situation-languages-and-religions-31_en>, Accessed:20.04.2022

structuring and organizing of the Turkish diaspora. For this reason, they are examined through the different studies, survey and analysis. On the other hand, this study argues that they have substantial impact on the success of the diaspora's efforts in terms of international politics. Moreover, they provide a critical basis for further chapters, which will discuss the implementation of the factors (internal and external) affecting the diplomatic power and the consequences of the diaspora's efforts. However, it is crucial to take into consideration that most of the studies and surveys assume that all the emigrants from Turkey to Germany are Turks, although some of them identify themselves as a Kurd or Yezidi. For this reason, this study cites them how the authors of studies and implementer of the surveys refer in their surveys/studies.

According to a survey conducted by the State Planning Organization in West Germany, the first arrivers of emigrants from Turkey in early 1960s were better educated compared with the later arrivers. While 49% of first arrivers of emigrants were primary school graduate, 13% were middle school graduate, and 15% had graduated from vocational schools. It was rather related with whether emigrants came from urban or rural areas. For instance, 83% of the first arrivers were coming from urban areas where offered better opportunities for education. However, this proportion had changed rapidly in the second half of the 1960s, which are reflected in data and surveys regarding the educational background of the emigrants from Turkey to Germany. In the second half of the 1960s, the emigrants for recruitment mainly consisted of workers came from rural areas (Kaya and Kentel 2005; Türkmen 2019). Although the 73% of first generation of the Turkish migrants were primary school graduate due to their rural background, there are significant improvements from one generation to the next generation with regards to educational and occupational status in their host land. This improvement can be observed in the survey conducted by Kaya and Kentel (2005) during late 2003 and early 2004 (Graph 4). However, the educational status of Turkish migrants was still lower compared with Germans due to several reasons such as the German educational system.

Graph 4. Educational status of Turkish migrants in Germany and France⁵⁷



It is significant to take into consideration the year when survey conducted because the both educational status of the new generations have risen, and they have better utilized from the educational opportunities Europe provides. As a survey conducted by the polling firm DATA4U from November 2019 to January 2020 illustrates, migrants from Turkey were generally pleased with the educational opportunities offered in Europe. The survey illustrates that among the four significant European countries, Germany had the lowest level in terms of the pleasure of Turkish migrants with the educational opportunity (Figure 3) which is another indicator of problematical structure of the Germany's educational system that does not provide opportunity for the students for upward mobility among, particularly foreign origin, students.

Turkish residents value the educational opportunities Europe provides

To what extent do you agree with or identify with the following statements?

	TOTAL	Germany	Austria	France	Netherlands
I/my children receive(d) a good education in schools in [Austria/France/Germany/Netherlands].	8.05	7.84	8.18	8.11	8.31
Ethnic Turks have a fair opportunity to attend university in [Austria/France/Germany/Netherlands].	7.91	7.68	8.10	7.95	8.22
Public schools here in [Austria/France/Germany/Netherlands] are better than those in Turkey.	7.50	7.36	7.65	7.45	7.75
I am satisfied with the degree of access to Turkish-language and Islamic education in [Austria/France/Germany/Netherlands].	6.34	6.43	6.29	5.93	6.48
I would prefer that my children grow up and be educated in Turkey.	4.68	4.89	5.16	4.04	4.45
I prefer/would prefer an Islamic school for my children in [Austria/France/Germany/Netherlands].	4.05	4.68	4.83	2.47	3.57

Note: Average of scores by country on a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 being "not at all" and 10 being "very much."

Figure 3. Satisfaction rate regarding the educational opportunities Europe provides⁵⁸


⁵⁷ Taken from: Kaya, Ayhan/ Kentel, Ferhat (2005) Euro-Turks: A Bridge or a Breach between Turkey and the European Union. The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), pp. 30.

However, there have been still huge educational gap between the Turkish students and German students. While, the nearly a quarter of Turkish students in Germany go to the *Hauptschule* which is the lowest track of education, only 13% of all German students go to the same school. On the other hand, only 6% of Turkish students latter attend the Gymnasium which is most advantageous school-type whereas a quarter of the German students do (Fassmann and İçduygu 2013). As Türkmen (2019) remarked and cited in her study, data from the German Socio-Economic Panel covering a period from 1985 to 2014, illustrates that full time employed migrants from Turkey between the ages 25 and 64 had lower level of education than their German counterparts. This difference is not peculiar to migrants from Turkey; it can be clearly observed in the migrants from different countries. According to study of Statistik Austria conducted in 2012 and cited by Heinz Fassmann's and Ahmet İçduygu's in their valuable study, the highest education of the Turkish migrants was substantially primary school with 72,6% whereas 23,5% of Austria births were primary school graduate, and most of Turkish migrants were blue collar worker with 77,3% in Austria (Fassmann and İçduygu 2013). As discussed, it is obvious that there are improvements among Turkish migrants in Germany from one generation to the next in terms of level of education, which might make them more effective actors in Germany. It is also a good example of why the time when the first generation immigrated to new host land is critical for the organizing, structuring and position of diasporas in the country where they reside because the educational status of the members of diaspora is substantial on the diaspora's position and political capacity in their host land as well as their efficiency in the international politics. For this reason, the Turkish diaspora which can be referred as the incipient diaspora since it is still in various stages of evolution shows positive graphic in terms of level of education, this upward graphic might positively influence the structuring and organizing of its diasporic community in the following years. However, the prevalence of low level of education among the members compared with Germans and other diasporic groups from mainly ex-Yugoslavia still seems to negative and problematic effect on the success of the Turkish diaspora's efforts in Germany.

⁵⁸ Taken from: **Center for American Progress/Foundation for European Progressive Studies/Fondation Jean-Jaurès/Foundation Max van der Stoep** telephone survey of the Turkish diaspora in Germany, Austria, France, and the Netherlands; conducted November 2019 to January 2020 by the polling firm DATA4U. For more information, see the methodology in Max Hoffman, Alan Makovsky, and Michael Werz, "The Turkish Diaspora in Europe: Integration, Migration, and Politics" (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2020), available at <https://www.americanprogress.org/?p=491951>.

In addition to educational status, occupational status and economic conditions of the diaspora are crucial to analyze and discuss the success of the diaspora's efforts in terms of international politics. For instance, one of the main sources of high-capacity at the influencing the global affairs of the Jewish diaspora is based on its occupational status and economic conditions. Therefore, it is necessary to examine those aspects of the Turkish diaspora in Germany. However, it is obvious that there are few studies and surveys (mainly conducted in the 1990s and 2000s) which quantify the occupational status and economic conditions of the Turkish diaspora in Germany. According to Antoine Pécoud's study (2002), while unemployment rate for Turkish origin migrants was 22,7% in Germany, unemployment rate for Germans was 10,5% which was more than twice higher in 1998. One of the main problems was low level of education among Turkish origin migrants. On the other hand, similar unemployment rate of Turkish origin migrants was observed in the survey conducted by Kaya and Kentel (2005) during late 2003 and early 2004. While the unemployment rate of Turkish migrants was 22% as illustrated in (Graph 5), it was 11% among Germans. Interestingly, unemployment rate of Turkish migrants in France was 7-8% which was almost three times lower than Turkish migrants in Germany as well as Turkish migrants in Belgium which was 24% (Kaya and Kentel 2008).

Graph 5. Occupational status of Turkish migrants in Germany and France⁵⁹



According to a report prepared by Carola Burkert and Anette Haas (2014) include reference data gathered by Migration Policy Institute (MPI) and International Labor Office (LLO) staff, migrants in Germany had worse employment rates than natives. For instance,

⁵⁹ Taken from: **Kaya, Ayhan/ Kentel, Ferhat** (2005) *Euro-Turks: A Bridge or a Breach between Turkey and the European Union*. The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), pp. 29.

in 2013, while the unemployment rate of foreign nationals were 13,9%, it was 6,0% among Germans. It meant unemployment rate among the foreign nationals was more than twice among Germans in 2013. It can be deduced from those data that there has been disequilibrium and employment gap between the foreign nationals and natives. Therefore, employment gap between Turkish migrants and natives can be generalizable for other foreign nationals. However, there is no current study which compares the unemployment rate of the each foreign national in Germany. The underlying reason of this employment gap is migrant's lack of education. Most jobs in Germany's highly regularized economic system are required to have *Ausbildung* which is a specific professional training. In addition, there are some studies regarding the discrimination on Turkish migrants in several forms such as giving worse jobs in the factory, applying different implementation to their non-German employees, giving them temporary contract. Moreover, such studies illustrate that Turkish migrants encounter difficulties to find a good job in Germany (Pécoud 2002). In addition to discrimination, German employers emphasis and pay attention to formal qualification in employment procedure, and it makes entering middle-skilled jobs hard accessible for migrants (Burkert and Haas 2014). On the other hand, Turkish migrants benefit from interethnic friendships. A study published in an issue of International Migration indicates that having German friends accelerates the process of finding a job by 46%. Particularly this shortening due to ethnic networks comes to the forefront in the first generation of Turkish migrants (Lancee and Hartung 2012). More importantly, it is a significant indicator how important the integration is on the transition to employment.

By the reasons of lack of education, discrimination in several forms and the heavy emphasis German employers place on formal qualification, the members of the Turkish diaspora are pushed into self-employment. According to data published by Zentrum für Türkeistudien in 1999 and cited in Pécoud's study (2002), there were around 51 000 self-employed Turks in Germany, and they employed 185 000 persons. Those sectors intensively have comprised of restaurants, snack-bars and cafes, travel agencies, transport firms, clothes and music shops, grocery stores, translation services, and import/export activities. Another study considering the Turkish diaspora in Europe remarks that there are around 40 000 Turkish-owned businesses, employing about 120 000 (Küçükcan 2021).

Similarly with the level of education and employment rate, the average income of Turkish origin households is less than for non-Turkish migrants and German households. According to report published by Germany's statistics agency, Destatis, in cooperation with several German think tanks and cited by Soeren Kern (2016) while the average income of ethnic Turkish households is €1 242 per month, it is €1 730 for German households, and €1,486 for non-Turkish migrants. The same report argues that 36% of ethnic Turks are living below the poverty line, compared to a quarter of migrants (25%) from the Balkans and southwestern Europe. In other respects, 5% of Turkish migrants earn more than 150% of the average of German. Another study focused on wage discrimination in Germany between Turkish migrants and German natives (Collected from around 11 000 private households in the period from 1984 to 2014 in Federal Republic of Germany and Eastern Germany from 1990 to 2014) illustrates that the average monthly income for Turkish migrants (fulltime employed individuals between the ages of 25-65 with a wage greater than 500 Euros) is €2 368 (Figure 4) which is just around €1 000 lower than the average monthly income for Germans which is €3 402 (Figure 5). The average age difference between Turks and Germans stands out in this study. While the average age of German workers is 43 years old, the average age of Turkish workers in Germany is 36 years old. The potential reason of this difference is that younger Turkish migrants are more populous in the German labor markets compared with older Turkish migrants (Ray 2017). It can also be related with distribution of the age for the Turkish diaspora in Germany and for German natives.

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
In wage	937	7.68786	0.391458	6.309918	9.472705
wage	937	2368.215	1128.798	550	13000
age	937	36.13447	7.445604	25	62
Turkish	937	1	0	1	1
other	937	0	0	0	0

Figure 4. Summary Statistics for Wage for Turks in Germany⁶⁰

⁶⁰ Taken from: **Ray, Annie** (2017) 'Wage Discrimination in Germany Between Turkish Immigrants and German Natives: An Empirical Analysis of Labor Market Outcomes of Turkish Immigrants', *Issues in Political Economy*, Vol.26, No. 2, pp. 273-274.

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
ln wage	78909	7.971403	0.536978	6.216606	11.52986
wage	78909	3402.069	2639.388	501	101708
age	78909	43.59442	9.78004	25	65
Turkish	78909	0	0	0	0
other	78909	0	0	0	0

Figure 5. Summary Statistics for Wage for Germans⁶¹

According to survey conducted by Kaya and Kentel (2005), 52% of Turkish migrants in Germany were reported as being in the lower middle class and below, and it was 41% among the Turkish migrants in France. Another study conducted by same authors illustrates that the average monthly income 21 % of Turkish migrants in Germany earned less than €1,000 per month while it was 15% among Turkish migrants in France and 9% among Turkish migrants in Belgium (Kaya and Kentel 2008). Germany has a relatively low share of unskilled jobs compared with other EU countries. However, the percent of foreign-born workers in these positions was two times more (22% vs. 10%) than native-born workers (Burkert and Haas 2014).


Shortly, occupational status and economic conditions of the diaspora are significant factors on the success of the diaspora's efforts because the communities which have substantial economic power and high level occupational status can be more effective and prospering at influencing the public opinion and host land policymakers in democratic countries. When considered from this point of view, although the Turkish diaspora has economical potential in Germany, it is not economic power that might significantly affect the public opinion and host land policymakers. It is required to remark that occupational status and economic conditions of the Turkish diaspora in Germany have been going better with the new generations, which are more integrated to host land society in every sense. However, as Bülent Kırmızı's survey (2015) which was asked to 150 Turks in Germany also illustrates like many other studies, the majority of the member of Turkish diaspora are worker (64%) and high school graduate (75%). The high rate of high school graduate is another indicator that there has been upward graphic in terms of educational status of the Turkish diaspora.

⁶¹ Ibid.

As discussed, educational status, occupational status and economic conditions of the diaspora are important to analyze and comprehend the structuring and organizing as well as effectiveness of diasporas. However, it is impossible for diasporas to become effective and successful actors in homeland, host land and global affairs without political participation, and interest to host land politics as Küçükcan remarked in his study (2021). For this reason, those factors are required to be discussed for the Turkish diaspora in Germany.

There are many studies regarding the political interest (political participation in the widest sense) of the Turkish diaspora in Europe, and all of them illustrate that diaspora Turks are more interested in Turkish politics than German politics. According to joint study of Hacı Halil Uslucan and Martina Sauer (2020), the interest in Turkish politics among the diaspora Turks was all times higher than the interest in German politics. Last findings showed that, more than one third of the Turkish diaspora affirmed a strong interest in Turkish politics; it was one fifth in German politics. Moreover, almost half of the diaspora Turks had little interest in German politics; it was just under one third in Turkish politics (Graph 6). However, together with the rising of legal participation, higher citizenship rights and higher level of education, the political interest for German politics has been increasing (Uslucan and Sauer 2020).

Graph 6. Comparison of the interest in politics in Germany and in Turkey⁶²



⁶² **Uslucan, H. Halil and Sauer, Martina** (2020) 'Political Participation and Party Preferences among Immigrants of Turkish Origin in Germany', *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Vol. 17, No. 68, pp. 120.

The studies of Ayhan Kaya and Ferhat Kentel(2005, 2008) illustrate the similar data with the joint study of Uslançan and Sauer regarding the comparison of the interest of the Turkish diaspora in Germany to homeland and host land politics. Another survey (2020) conducted by the polling firm DATA4U from November 2019 to January 2020, indicates that political participation of diaspora Turks to German politics remained very low which was 3.12 (Average of scores by country on a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 being "not at all" and 10 being "very much."). Similarly, few respondents feel politically represented in Germany. It can be one of the reasons why the interest in Turkish politics among the diaspora Turks is all times higher than the interest in German politics. Another potential reason is that a large quantify of the diaspora Turks were pessimist about the future of Germany, as it can be observed in the joint study of Kaya and Kentel (2005). Nonetheless, current studies draw a more optimistic table. For instance, according to Kırmızı's study (2015), while 89% of the Turkish respondents said that "Germany gives me confidence", 84% said "I am happy with my job and income in Germany". On the other hand, only 37% of Turkish respondents responded as 'Germany's political issues concern me'. One of the main reasons of this interesting result is how diaspora Turks identify themselves in Germany. As discussed in the chapter titled 'Internal Factors', Turkish diaspora in Europe gives very high importance on their Turkish identity as well as their religion, while younger respondents place less emphasis on Turkish identity and religion. Moreover, the big majority of respondents of the survey conducted by DATA4U see themselves primarily as Turkish, with a very high percentage (Figure 2). Another reason is that almost half of the diaspora Turks feel as a second class citizen in Germany. To illustrate, according to a survey published in 2012 cited in Kern's study(2016), while 51% of the Turkish respondents said "as an ethnic Turk, I feel like a second class citizen" and 54% of respondents said "regardless of how hard I try, I am not accepted as a member of German society".

Although political participation of diaspora Turks to German politics remains very low, the number of Turkish origin or origins comes from Turkey has been slowly increasing. For instance, as a result of 2017 Bundestag Election, 14 Turkish/Turkey origin candidates were elected as MP of Bundestag, although it was 11 in the 2013 Federal Elections (Figure 6). There are also Turkish origin ministers in different provinces. Moreover, Aydan Özoğuz served as Minister of State to the Federal Chancellor and Federal Government Commissioner for Migrants, Refugees and Integration from 2013

until 2018. In addition, 18 candidates of Turkish/Turkey descent were elected as lawmakers in the last German Federal Elections held on 26 September 2021. More importantly, since December 2021, Turkish origin Cem Özdemir has been the Minister of Food and Agriculture in the Scholz cabinet, and he is the first government minister of Turkish origin in Germany's history.⁶³ In addition to Cem Özdemir, Ates Gürpınar was elected to Bundestag in the 2021 German Federal Election, and he has been serving as one of six deputy leaders of The Left (Die Linke) since 2021.⁶⁴ Derya Türk-Nachbaur, Macit Karaahmetoğlu, Gülistan Yüksel, Hakan Demir, Aydan Özoğuz, Mahmut Özdemir, Cansel Kızıltepe, Nezahat Baradari, Metin Hakverdi, were elected as Social Democratic Party (SPD) lawmaker. Melis Sekmen, Cem Özdemir, Ekin Deligöz, Canan Bayram, Filiz Polat were elected from the Green Party. Ateş Gürpınar, Sevim Dağdelen and Gökay Akbulut were elected as MPs from the German Left Party (Die Linke) and Serap Güler was elected as MP from Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU).⁶⁵

Lawmakers of Turkish Descent	SPD	CDU/CSU	Linke	Bündnis 90/Grüne	FDP	Total
1994-1998	1			1		2
1998-2002	1			2		3
2002-2005	1			2(-1) ⁶⁶		2
2005-2009	1			1	3	5
2009-2013	1			2	1	4
2013-2017	5	1	2	3		11
2017-2021	6		3	5		14
2021-	9	1	3	5		18

Figure 6. Lawmakers of Turkish Descent in German Federal Parliament Bundestag⁶⁷

Around 100 candidates with Turkish/Turkey origin ran for office in the 2021 German Federal Election, and 18 of them have been elected as MPs in Bundestag. Although the population of Turkish origin in Germany constitutes 3.4% of the overall population (83.2

⁶³ **Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture**, Federal Minister of Food and Agriculture-Cem Özdemir, < https://www.bmel.de/EN/ministry/minister/minister_node.html >, Accessed: 24.04.2022

⁶⁴ **Deutscher Bundestag**, Ates Gürpınar, Die Linke, <https://www.bundestag.de/abgeordnete/biografien/G/guerpinar_ates-860516>, Accessed: 24.04.2022

⁶⁵ **Deutscher Bundestag**, Members, < <https://www.bundestag.de/en/members>>, Accessed: 24.04.2022

⁶⁶ Cem Özdemir resigned as spokesman for domestic affairs and as a member of the Bundestag in 2002.

⁶⁷ **Deutscher Bundestag**, Members, < <https://www.bundestag.de/en/members>>, Accessed: 24.04.2022

million in 2020) and biggest group among the 11.4 million foreign nationals, they represent 2,44% in German Bundestag after the last Federal Election. On the other hand, 24 candidates (18 of them from Turkey as remarked) with Balkan roots were elected as lawmakers in the German federal parliament Bundestag.⁶⁸ According to findings of a study of the Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration (SVR) shared by DW in 2021, 54.4% of the Turkish/Turkey origin electors went to the polls in the 2017 Federal Election, whereas 85% of the natives voted, and it was 65% among migrant-origin electors.⁶⁹ The joint study of Uslancan and Sauer (2020) illustrates through a survey conducted on January 2018 that preference for the next parliamentary election of voting eligible Turkish origin in Germany showed a tendency to SPD (44%). On the other hand, 12% of eligible Turkish origin preferred to CDU/CSU, 13% Linke, 9% Bündnis 90/Grüne, 4% FDP and 18% other parties. While party preferences of diaspora Turks origin in Germany is more left wing oriented parties, their party preferences in Turkey, on the contrary, is more conservative-religious oriented parties.

The general political profile of Turkish/Turkey origin lawmakers challenges Turkey's foreign, diaspora and domestic policy as well as the more engaged and active Turkish diaspora policy. Moreover, adverseness to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan government has been dominant approach among the Turkish/Turkey origin lawmakers in the German Bundestag. For instance, during a debate in the Bundestag, Sevim Dagdelen from German Left Party (Die Linke) raised the flag of YPG that is PKK's Syrian branch, which was forbidden after the decision taken by the German government in March, together with many other symbols used by the terrorist group and former German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel criticized lawmaker Sevim Dagdelen.⁷⁰ Moreover, Cem Özdemir was awarded Armenia's Mkhitar Gosh Medal for being the author of a resolution that passed in 2016 in the German parliament recognizing the events of 1915 as 'genocide' and

⁶⁸**Balkan Insight**, German Parliament Gets 24 New MPs with Balkan Roots, <<https://balkaninsight.com/2021/09/27/german-parliament-gets-24-new-mps-with-balkan-roots/>>, Accessed: 24.04.2022

⁶⁹**Deutsche Welle**, Türkiye Kökenlilerin Yüzde 54'ü Oy Kullandı, <https://www.dw.com/tr/türkiyeli-göçmenlerin-yüzde-54ü-sandık-başına-gitti/a-56818491>>, Accessed: 24.04.2022

⁷⁰**Anadolu Agency**, German government defends ban on PKK symbols, <<https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/german-government-defends-ban-on-pkk-symbols/973473>>, Accessed: 25.04.2022, For the video of the debate please watch: <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aWK-abl2Evk>>

condemning Germany's role in the events of 1915.⁷¹ In an interview with Ateş Gürpınar from the German Left Party (Die Linke) and one of six deputy leaders of his party since 2018 said that “YPG fought against so-called Islamic State and save life of many people. I don't approve the crimination of the YPG”. In another interview of the *Cumhuriyet* newspaper with Filiz Polat from Alliance 90/The Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen), she approved her contradiction to official visit of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to Germany in 2017. In addition, she said that “*Die Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion e.V. (DİTİB)* should be financially and structurally independent from the Presidency of Religious Affairs of Turkey although *DİTİB* has been doing valuable works and helping Muslims in Germany through providing aid”.⁷² Considering that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan received approximately 60% of the total votes from the eligible citizens living abroad and 64.78% from the voters living in Germany in the last presidential elections,⁷³ the political position of the Turkish/Turkish origin lawmakers in the Bundestag against the current government of Turkey does not appear to be consistent with the vast majority of the diaspora Turks' political preferences. Within this context, it is debatable that to what extent 18 Turkish/Turkish origin lawmakers represent the ‘agreed interests’ of the Turkish diaspora in the German federal parliament, and to what extent their existence in the Bundestag influence the success of the Turkish diaspora.

According to data published by Ministry of Labor and Social Security of Turkey and cited in Aksel's study (2017), Turkish/Turkey origin migrants in Germany as the biggest foreign national group have established 5 300 associations. While 3 700 of 5 300 established associations have religious, political and cultural themes and agenda; 400 associations for supporting purposes, 1 200 associations for different groups such as employers. On the other hand, most of these associations are interested in Turkish politics and this engagement restricts their activities in the host land. More importantly, the dividedness of the Turkish diaspora due to their political, denominational and congregational discrepancy can be also observed in visions of associations established by

⁷¹**Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA)**, German Lawmaker Cem Özdemir Awarded Armenia's Mkhitar Gosh Medal, < <https://anca.org/german-lawmaker-cem-ozdemir-awarded-armenias-mkhitar-gosh-medal/>>, Accessed:25.04.2022

⁷²**Cumhuriyet**, Bundestag'a seçilen üç Türk kökenli Alman vekili tanıyalım, <<https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/dunya/bundestaga-secilen-uc-turk-kokenli-alman-vekili-taniyalim-1877166>>, Accessed: 25.04.2022

⁷³ **Supreme Election Council**, Decree No:952, published on 4 July 2018, Accessed: 25.04.2022

Turkey/Turkish origin migrants in Germany. Moreover, as Kaya and Kentel discussed, the incentive of Turkish government to increase political participation of the Turkish diaspora caused the ideological contents and competition among the members of the diaspora including groups which identified themselves differently from being Turkish (Kaya and Kentel 2005). Beyond any doubt, this dividedness of the Turkish diaspora hinders them to act in unison in every issue in Germany. Thus, it directly impairs their capacity and the success of their efforts in terms of international politics.

4.2 Armenian Diaspora

The sources for emergence of the Armenian diaspora are based on induced or forced models of the diaspora origins which have been universally recognized as emigration models as widely discussed in the first chapter. The reasons of emigration for the Armenians have played significant role in their structuring and organizing, as well as identity formation. In this sense, it can be classified into two factors that urged to Armenians to emigrate from their homeland: Negative factors (invasion and conquest, deportation, relocation and resettlement, religious persecution and lasting political instability) and economical/political factors (commerce, educational activities, political opportunities and searching for refuge). Throughout the centuries, Armenians individually and collectively emigrate across the world and, this long and lasting process have shaped the Armenian diaspora (Baibourtian 2009). The continuous wave of individual and mass departure is one of the main reasons of considerably preservation of Armenian identity in diaspora so that they are universally acknowledged as successful and effective diasporic community (Karagül 2003).

According to estimation of the Office of the High Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs established on June 11, 2019, by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, around 7 million Armenians scatter to more than 100 countries around the world. While 2.5-3 million Armenians live in Russia, currently, 1.6 million Armenians live in the United States. On the other hand, an estimated 650 000 Armenians live in France. About 120 000 Armenians reside in Lebanon today, which had been around 250 000-300 000 members until the mid-1970s. More than 200 000 Armenian origin people currently live in Georgia, (400 000, according to unofficial data). In addition to those most populated

countries, thousands of Armenians live across the world.⁷⁴ It is obvious that the exact size of the Armenian population in the 2000s is not clear, as it can be observed in the literature regarding the Armenian diaspora. For instance, according to “Diaspora-Homeland Issue Paper” draft by Arak-29 Foundation in 2003 and cited by Tatoul Manaseryan’s working paper in 2004, in Russia, 2 250 000 Armenians live, 1 400 000 in the United States, 450 000 in France, 234 000 in Lebanon and 264 000 in Argentina (Figure 7). In this working paper, 81 countries listed as where Armenians live and in some of those listed countries such as Vietnam and Philippines, only 8 Armenians reside. Another estimate (Figure 8) shared by Robin Cohen in 2008 presented that there are 7 580 000 Armenians in the world. 1 109 000 of them in Russia, 945 000 in Canada and the United States, 273 000 in France, 202 000 in Iran, 260 000 in Lebanon, 115 000 in Turkey, 132 000 in Argentina, 264 000 in Georgia and around 200 000 in Syria (Cohen 2008).

Country	Population	Country	Population
Russia	2,250,000	Russia	1,109,000
U.S. and Canada	1,480,000	U.S. and Canada	945,000
France	450,000	France	273,000
Lebanon	234,000	Lebanon	260,000
Syria	150,000	Syria	200,000
Argentina	132,000	Argentina	264,000
Iran	80,000	Iran	202,000

Figure 7 and Figure 8. Distribution of the Armenian diaspora by country⁷⁵⁷⁶

⁷⁴ **Office of the High Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs**, Armenian Diaspora Communities, <<http://diaspora.gov.am/en/diasporas>>, Accessed: 27.04.2022

⁷⁵ **Manaseryan, Tatoul** (2004) ‘Diaspora the Comparative Advantage for Armenia’ Armenian International Policy Research Group, No.04/14, pp. 3-4. (Figure 7)

⁷⁶ **Cohen, Robin** (2008) Global Diasporas, First Edition, New York, Routledge, pp. 52. (Figure 8)

4.2.1 Historical Background of the Formation of the Armenian Diaspora

The process of formation of Armenian Diaspora is based on 11th century which was period that mass emigration from the homeland occurred as a result of fall of Armenia's Bagratid capital Ani to Byzantium in 1045, and later Ani was taken by Seljuks in 1064. In the 13th century, Mongol invasions caused a mass emigration among the Armenians as caused to emigration of Kayı tribe, and Armenians scattered to Southern Russia, Crimea, Poland and other regions of the Eastern Europe. In the following centuries, geopolitical struggles between the rival states, large scale deportations, political instabilities, and commercial reasons entailed the lasting emigration of the Armenians throughout the centuries (Baibourtian 2009). By 17th century, Armenians started to form community in different countries and regions such as France and North America as well as Lebanon For instance, an Armenian merchant opened the first café in Paris in this century.⁷⁷ Since the beginning of the 17th century, Armenians community has begun to come into existence in America through the emigrations from the different regions of the world (Karagül 2003). However, the number of Armenians was quite limited and their community was not structured in American continents and Europe. Particularly, as a result of missionary activities of American missionaries in the territories of the Ottoman Empire facilitated movement of Armenians for emigration to North America.⁷⁸ Any doubt, new flow of emigration nourishes the Armenian identity and culture in the diaspora together with the authority of Armenian Apostolic Church which is national church of Armenian people.

Throughout the 19th century and last years of the Ottoman Empire, many Armenians along with communities from different nations immigrated to particularly American continents. According to Kemal Karpat's study (1985) the total number of Ottoman emigrants to the American continents in the period from 1860 to 1914 was around 1 200 000. Although the rate of return home was high among the Muslims of all regions and Syrians, this rate was not high among Armenian emigrants compared with Muslims. The rest of emigrants who decided to stay in new host land played significant role in the formation process of some diasporic communities in American continents. They lost their

⁷⁷ **Office of the High Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs, France,** <<http://diaspora.gov.am/en/pages/37/france>>, Accessed: 29.04.2022

⁷⁸ **Office of the High Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs, United States of America,** <<http://diaspora.gov.am/en/pages/3/usa>>, Accessed:29.04.2022

relations with the Ottoman Empire and later Republic of Turkey, and they formed diaspora organizations in their new host lands. For instance, the origin of the Armenian diaspora and Greek diaspora in the United States and Western countries coincides with those times. To illustrate, the first Armenian unions were founded in the late 1870s in Worcester, and New York, Providence, and Armenian political parties such as, Armenian Revolutionary Federation, Hunchakian could organize activities in the United States, though around 500 Armenians lived in the U.S. at that time and the number of Armenians in the U.S. reached to 1,500 in the late 1880s.⁷⁹

As remarked, the Armenian diaspora originated in the eleventh century, however its identity was particularly defined by the events of 1915 (after resettlement and relocation). Most of the Armenians after relocation and resettlement settled first in the Middle East, particularly Syria and Lebanon, and later in Western Europe and the United States. Few Armenians from Armenia and Karabakh emigrated at that time (Koinova 2011). After the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, former Armenian inhabitants did not return to their homes, few of them had gone to Soviet Armenian Republic.⁸⁰ For this reason, during the inter-war years, the concept of the homeland was very disputatious issue among the Armenian diaspora (Laycock 2012). However, division regarding the concepts of the homeland can be observed in the some current fieldwork in the Armenian community because “there are different Armenians in the community, they all represent very different places”. The memory of real places and family stories are still alive and passed on from one generation to another generation. More importantly, those stories and memories pertain to various cities which are not part of Republic of Armenia such as Adana, Istanbul, Vakifli, Diyarbakir, Tehran, Isfahan and Urmia (Harutyunyan 2012).

Although the Soviet Armenia was the very small part of where Armenians resided before the First World War, it was portrayed as a homeland/fatherland by the Soviet Union, diaspora organizations and repatriates when they resettle in Soviet Armenia (*hairenik* in Armenian). During the process of authentication of homeland (Soviet Armenia), Soviet policymakers applied extensive propaganda campaign by reason of enhancing the justification of territorial demand from the Republic of Turkey in the midst

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ From the point of view of Armenians, they were unable to return their homeland (Laycock 2012).

of 1940s. Soviet authorities requested Kars and Ardahan regions from Turkey to the Soviet Union in 1945 and demanded in a formal way in 1946. This demand was supported and echoed by the leader of the Armenian Apostolic Church in 1945. Although many Armenians perceived this demand as a sign that the Soviet Union helped them to rebuild their homeland, it was directly related with Soviet interests and the strained relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union in the early stages of the Cold War (Laycock 2012). Nonetheless, in 1946-1948, around 100,000 Armenians arrived in Soviet Armenia and the population of the Republic increased by around 10% (Darieva 2018). In this sense, the authentication of homeland (Soviet Armenia) harbors significant traces from the international conjuncture of the Cold War period as in formation process of Armenian identity in diaspora.

As the generations pass in the host country, the structuring and organizing of diasporic communities has undergone the changes. First generations, mostly, challenge with the adaption of the new host country due to cultural, lingual and economical differences. In the first years of the emigration, they don't become organized to indicate their social, political and economical demands as a 'resident' of the host land. Initially, they devote their times to deal with individual basic needs, particularly economical, to live in a different country and, cultural and lingual differences. However, new generations start to be born in new host land and become the part of host land society in every sense, such as receiving education in host land educational establishments. They are more demanding and active in the public sphere of host land, as discussed widely in previous chapters. Thus, they are intentionally or unintentionally more exposed to assimilation and exclusionist politics (in some cases) of the host land governments. At this juncture, identity of the diaspora comes to the forefront for organizing and preservation of the cultural, religious and identity values. To illustrate, the Armenian diaspora in France as well as emerging Armenian intellectuals took almost more than 40 years to take shape as modern-day Armenians in France. Until 1960s, Armenians had focused on individual and collective economic development in France, and integration to French society and its political, economical, social and juridical system (Çakıllıkoyak 2005). Together with the emerging of Armenian intellectuals in diaspora who can make Armenians' demand heard in the host land, the formation or reconfiguration of the Armenian identity which based on common reason for being in diaspora was required for continuation of the community because of the especially new Armenian generations which were born, and grown up in host land. The

tragic events of 1915 were acknowledged as reason for being in diaspora and became fundamental part of the identity of the Armenian diaspora which comparatively united and strengthened them as a community by the help of institutionalization and Armenian Apostolic Church, although there were significant political, social and cultural differences among the members of the community.

Throughout the Cold War period, the term of genocide converted from a legal concept into a political discourse used in propaganda battles between the United States and the Soviet Union, and nearly eighty countries were accused of genocide (Weiss-Wendt 2018a). Therefore, Cold War period was the proper time to bring up the tragic events of 1915 to the agenda of Armenian diaspora to draw on for reconfiguration and preservation of the Armenian identity in the diaspora (de Waal 2015). In addition to international conjuncture, Armenian uprisings in Yerevan presented favorable ground for the Armenian diaspora. Moreover, the concept of ‘Armenian Genocide’ helped to activate a new political movement for the Armenian diaspora. For these reasons remarked above, Armenian diaspora increased its activities in their host lands as Armenians in the Soviet Armenia and other parts of the Soviet Union. For instance, the idea of building a ‘genocide’ memorial was proposed by John Kirakosyan for the first time ever and this suggestion was sent as an open letter to Central Committee of the Communist Party of Armenia in 1963. It was followed by demanding a series of events and proposals. Not coincidentally, the first academic works, in both Armenian and Russian, regarding the resettlement and relocation started appearing in 1963. It was directly relevant with the conditions of the Cold War period and bilateral relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union (Weiss-Wendt 2018b). On the other hand, the Armenian diaspora increased its pressure and lobby activities in their host lands to raise awareness in the international community and to put pressure to Turkey in every respect. For example, in 1965, Uruguay became the first country in the world to officially recognize the tragic events of 1915 as ‘genocide’ then it were followed by many countries.⁸¹ Shortly, external factors such as international conjuncture of Cold War and internal factors such as need for preservation of the Armenian identity in the diaspora made the concept of ‘the Armenian Genocide’ as an indivisible part of the Armenian diaspora.

⁸¹ **Office of the High Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs, Uruguay,** <<http://diaspora.gov.am/en/pages/10/Uruguay>>, Accessed: 30.04.2022

Since 1950s, the many French-Armenians who went to the Soviet Armenia returned to France together with Armenians from Eastern Europe and Palestine. Those new waves of emigrations underwent to changes on the ethnic appearance of the Armenian community in France (Akgönül 2002). In the 1970s, many Armenians emigrated from Lebanon and Iran to Western Europe and North America in consequence of conflicts in the Middle East and Iranian Revolution in 1979 (Çelik 2017). As a result, the appearance of Armenian communities in diaspora which mainly composed of Armenians who emigrated after the relocation and resettlement changed and became diversified (Akgönül 2002).

The Karabakh Issue and 1988 Earthquake mobilized the Armenian diaspora in the late 1980s (Çelik 2017). Firstly, Armenian delegations increased their lobby activities for the transfer of Karabakh to Armenia under color of linguistic self-determination in 1987-1988. On 20 February 1988, the Deputies of Soviet of the People in Karabakh balloted with a vast majority for cession of Karabakh to Armenia, and mass Armenian demonstrations followed the vote. Consequently, the Karabakh conflict escalated between Armenians and Azerbaijani Turks. In response to Karabakh conflict, traditional diaspora political parties⁸² which had been rivals for a long time published a joint declaration on the issue in October 1988. Although they affirmed their support to Armenians in Armenia and Karabakh, they were opposed to any Armenian uprisings and demonstrations that could jerk the USSR's legitimacy in the region. It was good testimony regarding the unawareness of socio-economic situation in the South Caucasus, as well as in the USSR. Along with the Karabakh conflict, the 1988 Earthquake in northern region of the Soviet Armenia revived the 'Armenianness' of the Armenian diaspora. Through the humanitarian aid to Armenia and calling of the three traditional diaspora political parties, the Armenians acted in unison and left aside the divisions among the member of the Armenian community in the diaspora. Political parties, Armenian Church, AGBU and both Prelacy and Diocese supported the campaigns to support Armenia. However, after the Armenia's independence in 1991, the struggle between the Ter Petrosyan's "New Thinking" which can be referred as pragmatist and realist political approach, and "National Ideology" which focuses on the "Armenian Cause"(Hay Dat) and the recognition of 'the Armenian Genocide' as a top priority came into prominence (Tuncel 2014). This struggle has shaped the relations between the Armenian diaspora and Armenia, as well as Armenia's foreign policy.

⁸² Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaksutyun (ARF), Armenian Democratic Liberal Party (ADLP) and Social Democratic Hunchakian Party (SDHP)

According to Gerard J. Libaridian who was the president's chief advisor and first deputy minister of foreign affairs, there are two different world views in Armenian political thinking:

“The first group consists of the pragmatists, people who want to use the opportunity of statehood to return Armenia and Armenians to the fold of humanity as “normal” people. The second group believes statehood should be used as a vehicle to achieve a “higher” purpose, quality, mission, or program”. (Libaridian 1999)⁸³

Levon Ter Petrosyan is the prominent representative of the first worldview while Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan (Karabakh Clan) are the representatives of the second worldview, in other words “National Ideology”. The presidential election in 1991 was resulted in the victory of Levon Ter Petrosyan and defeat of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF). In the following times of his presidency, he declared the war against ARF which was significant message to the Armenian diaspora (Tuncel 2014) and many Dashnak activists (they have been powerful in the diaspora) were arrested and expelled. He followed a realist-pragmatist politics which aimed to democratic state, free market economy and peaceful relations with all neighbors. He attached the importance to normalizing the relations with Turkey as a geopolitical necessity to break the dependence on Russia and landlocked isolation. Therefore, Ter Petrosyan was harshly criticized and confronted by the representatives of the Armenian diaspora (DerGhougassian 2014). During his term, the relations between the Armenian government and the Armenian diaspora were rocky and unsustainable. While the Armenian diaspora places the ‘genocide’ to its center of the diaspora’s identity and organizational agenda, it was less important for the Armenians in Armenia. For instance, he responded the rhetorical question like that: “Let's say that all states and the United Nations were to recognize that they slaughtered us; what then?” He basically focused on the political democracy and independence from Russia (Shain and Barth 2003). In addition, Ter Petrosyan was not willing to burn his bridges with the diaspora, instead, he supported the bilateral economic relations with the Armenian diaspora without diaspora’s interference into the politics of Armenia. Another dispute occurred between the diaspora and the Armenian government regarding the constitution. While Armenian government argued the civic approaches to constitution,

⁸³ Taken from: **DerGhougassian K.** (2014). Genocide and Identity (Geo)Politics. *Genocide Studies International*, 8: 198.

anti-ANM and the Armenian diaspora supported ethnicist/racist approaches to constitution. On the other hand, Ter Petrosyan opposed to dual citizenship because he argued that this legislation can entail the perception against the Armenian diaspora as a fifth column in the country of residence (Tuncel 2014). Briefly, the agreed interests and priorities of the diaspora and the Republic of Armenia drifted apart during the Ter Petrosyan's presidential term.

The second phase of the Armenia-diaspora relations after the independency started with the resignation of Ter Petrosyan as a result of domestic and diaspora opposition in 1998 after the controversial 1996 election. The Armenian diaspora played a very important role in the resignation of the president. By the reason of collapsed Armenia's economy since the independence, Armenia has been highly dependence on its diaspora which make the diaspora as a crucial actor in the decision-making process of Armenia. Any doubt, this situation changed the balance of power between the diaspora and Armenia that went in diaspora's favor (Shain and Barth 2003). The 1998 presidential election was the both victory of Robert Kocharyan, and victory of "National Ideology" against the "New Thinking". As expected, Robert Kocharyan emphasized the "Armenian Cause", Karabakh issue as a one of the founders of Karabakh Clan together with Serzh Sargsyan, and the relationship between Armenia and the Armenian diaspora. He acknowledged the power of the Armenian diaspora in defining national goals of Armenia and put emphasis on the wrestle for internationally recognition of the tragic events of 1915 as 'genocide'. On 22-23 September 1999, more than 1200 Armenians from around 70 countries gathered for the first Armenia-Diaspora Conference, and it was followed by 2002, 2006, 2011, 2014 and 2017 Armenia-Diaspora Conferences held in Yerevan. Kocharyan aimed to restrict Turkey in the international arena through the bringing the genocide issue into the forefront along with the dense campaign of the Armenian diaspora (Tuncel 2014). One of the main purposes of Kocharyan's politics was force to Turkey to open the land borders of Turkey's own accord. In this sense, bringing the genocide issue to the international arena by the diaspora and Kocharyan attributed different motivations because the Armenian diaspora's stance to Turkey-Armenia relations was generally uncompromising. In addition, the genocide issue is the main component of constructed Armenian identity in the diaspora, as widely discussed before.

1995 Constitution of the Republic of Armenia placed the relationship between Armenia and the Armenian diaspora principally to cultural sphere. Through the Article 11 of 2005 Constitution, a more inclusive Armenia-diaspora relation is provided, and it is intact with the new governments.⁸⁴ Since the approval of the Republic of Armenia National Strategy (hereafter NSS) in 2007, the Armenian diaspora have become the significant part of the Armenia's national goals and interests. According to 5.21 Article of the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia published in July 2020: "Among the most important components of Armenia's national security policy is the further development of relations and cooperation between Armenia and its Diaspora to a new pinnacle....." And it is followed by "Armenia-Diaspora relations aim to create a Pan-Armenian format, based on a participatory principle, for resolving pan-national issues and priorities....." In the same document, it is remarked in 5.22 Article that "The primary goal of Armenia-Diaspora relations is protecting Armenian interests, as well as ensuring progress through collective action." Moreover, the document through the Article 5.24 emphasized on the threat of the assimilation diasporan Armenians. The assimilation is portrayed as a part of national security.⁸⁵

The ideological and political stance of Kocharyan continued with another *Karabakhtis* Serzh Sargsyan who served as the third President of Armenia from 2008 to 2018. By the decree, Sargsyan established the Ministry of Diaspora of the Republic of Armenia on 1 October 2008 which was converted to Office of the High Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia in 2019.⁸⁶ On 20 August 2009, the "Concept on the Development of Armenia-Diaspora Partnership was

⁸⁴ According to amended article 11: "Historical and cultural monuments and other cultural values are under the care and protection of the state. Within the framework of the principles and norms of the international law the Republic of Armenia shall contribute to fostering relations with the Armenian Diaspora, protecting the Armenian historical and cultural values located in other countries, advancing the Armenian education and culture." (Tuncel 2014) (Retrieved from the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia 30.04.2022)

⁸⁵ **The Government of the Republic of Armenia**, National Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia: A Resilient Armenia in a Changing World, published in July 2020, Accessed 30.04.2022

⁸⁶ According to official website of **the Office of the High Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs**, the Office focuses on the following 9 directions: **1-** Encouraging state-centered identity formation in the Diaspora, **2-** Cultivating strong Diaspora ties with the homeland through partnerships, programs and events, **3-** Supporting youth leadership and community organizing in the Diaspora, **4-** Consolidating and involving Pan-Armenian organizations in Armenia's development, **5-** Bringing Armenian professional potential to bear on building and strengthening institutions in Armenia, **6-** Promoting repatriation and ensuring a smooth integration process for repatriates, **7-** Assisting Diaspora investors and philanthropists with their projects in Armenia, **8-** Mapping the Diaspora's professional potential, **9-** Keeping the Diaspora informed regarding current events in Armenia and in Diaspora communities. (Retrieved from <<https://www.gov.am/en/diaspora-affairs/>>, Accessed 30.04.2022)

approved by the Armenian government. Through the Concept, it was aimed to prevention of assimilation of the Armenian diaspora, recognition of the ‘genocide’ and reconfiguration of the Armenia-diaspora relations. Shortly, after Robert Kocharyan came into power in 1998, the legalization process of the Armenia-diaspora relationship gained momentum, and it gathered speed by Serzh Sargsyan (Tuncel 2014). However, it is obvious that same momentum is not observed in the Nikol Pashinyan-diaspora relationship because he is held accountable for the defeat of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, he closed down the Ministry of Diaspora, and he is widely criticized and accused by the reason of normalizing relations with Turkey by the Armenian diaspora. For instance, the Chairman of Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) published a statement which criticized talks regarding the normalization process between Turkey and Armenia, and Pashinyan government in indirect way.⁸⁷ Moreover, On December, 11 2020, the Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU) also issued a statement calling on Pashinyan to resign.⁸⁸ Most of the diaspora Armenians, particularly Armenians in France and the United States, have showed their supports to opponents of Pashinyan government (Kılıç 2021). Nonetheless, the Armenia-diaspora relationship has kept in a certain degree.

The institutionalization of the Armenian diaspora goes a long way back, as shortly remarked in the beginning of the chapter. For instance, the Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU) was established in Cairo in 1906, and it is “the world’s largest non-profit organization devoted to upholding the Armenian heritage through educational, cultural and humanitarian programs.” Four years later, the Armenian Relief Society Red Cross (Hereafter ARF) founded. On the other hand, political parties established in the Ottoman Empire in the last quarter of the 19th century started to be organized in the diaspora after 1921. For instance, Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaksutyun (ARF), Armenian Democratic Liberal Party (ADLP) and Social Democratic Hunchakian Party (SDHP) were organized in diaspora in the 1920s. Moreover, there are many Armenian ecclesiastics associations adhered to Armenian Apostolic Church, Catholic Church and Protestant Episcopal Church in the diaspora. Also, the Armenian diaspora places emphasize on

⁸⁷ **Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA)**, ANCA Chairman Urges Biden Administration Reset of U.S. Policy on Armenia & Artsakh, <<https://anca.org/press-release/anca-chairman-urges-biden-administration-reset-of-u-s-policy-on-armenia-artsakh/>> , Accessed: 01.05.2022

⁸⁸ **Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU)**, AGBU Statement on Transition Government, <<https://agbu.org/news-item/agbu-statement-on-transition-government/?fbclid=IwAR3zLT-JLCXzGMRqUlhPavpb6qXufVH54GKG4T-rX7QOaGQuz7nMR572ToA>>, Accessed: 01.05.2022

communication tools to mold public opinion, to provide awareness regarding the ‘Armenianness’ and current issues in the diaspora, and to organize. For instance, Asbarez Newspaper which began the publication in 1908 in Fresno as a weekly, The Armenian Weekly which is an English-language newspaper belonging to the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), Hayern Aysor which is news platform of the Diaspora Department of the "Center of Public Relations and Information" of the Office of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and Massis Weekly which is an official publication of the Social Democratic Hunchakian Party of the Western Region of the United States of America are significant platforms of the diaspora Armenians and Armenians in the diaspora are using very effectively to host land countries’ communication tools. On the other hand, through the universities, publications, research centers and institutes, education and culture activities have an important place on the success of the Armenian diaspora’s efforts. For instance, only the United States and Canada, there are more than twenty Armenian Research Centers aims to conduct scientific research, publish issues, and organize scientific organizations regarding the ‘Armenian Genocide’. However, it can be easily observed that these Research Centers often try to impose on hostility to Turkey and Turkish society in the host land society and academy (Karagül 2003).

The Armenian diaspora are very prospering at lobby activities, which is widely acknowledged that the Armenian lobby is one of the most effective formation among the other diasporas. By way of lobby, aims of the Armenian diaspora are informing society of where they reside regarding Armenian and Armenians, supplying economical and humanitarian aid to Armenia⁸⁹, molding public opinion on behalf of Armenians in the Karabakh issue, applying pressure and implementing sanctions to Turkey and Azerbaijan and recognition of the tragic events of 1915 as ‘genocide’ by the countries and international organizations (Karagül 2003). According to Şenol Kantarcı’s study cited in Master Thesis of Fatih Aydoğan(2018) regarding the Armenian lobby organizations, the member of the Armenian lobby operating in the U.S. are around 1 250. Those organizations gathered under the umbrella organization named as the Armenian Assembly of America (AAA) in 1972. Around 7 000 people are estimated to work under this

⁸⁹ According to joint study of Victoria Minoian and Lev Freinkman, from 1991 to 2006, fourteen large Diaspora organizations have mobilized about US\$900 million in assistance to Armenia and significant part of this funding was provided by non-Armenian origin. The one of the main channels of diaspora aid is Pan-Armenian Fund Hayastan which is the government-sponsored (Minoian and Freinkman 2006).

umbrella organization with the towering budget. In addition to the AAA, as remarked in the previous chapters, ANCA established in 1918 is the most effective and structured lobbying organization of the Armenian diaspora. When we take into consideration that up to the present, parliaments and governments of the 33 countries and European Parliament through the resolution on a political solution to the Armenian question on 18 June 1987⁹⁰ have recognized the tragic events of 1915 as ‘genocide’, the Armenian lobby activities comparatively attains its aim. On the other hand, they are good at mobilization of the funding, which is provided considerably by non-Armenian origin. According to Cohen (2008), from the 1991 to 2008, about 1 billion US\$ was subsidized to Armenia by the help of the Armenian lobby. In this sense, their lobby activities play a significant and active role in Armenia’s economic development. By the reason of Armenian lobby activities in the United States, Armenia always received more attention in the United States Congress among the five Caspian nations (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), according to the congressional records from 1985 to 2001. In short, the Armenian diaspora have been conducting very effective and successful lobby activities and, it makes them a substantial global actor in terms of international politics.

Lastly, the examining of the prominent and most effective of the diaspora organizations is critical to understand the general political stance of the Armenian diaspora. For instance, the Armenian Assembly of America (AAA) as an umbrella organization has an uncompromising stance on Turkey, Azerbaijan and Karabakh issue in every sense. It doesn’t hesitate to illustrate its full support to any political and economical actions which are detriment of Turkey. For instance, AAA have been conducting intensive lobby activities to prevent F-16 sale to Turkey⁹¹, even if Turkey’s (as a second-largest military power in NATO) fortification is compatible with the interests of the U.S. and European countries due to Russian increasing threat to the world political order. In every platform, AAA always accuses to Turkey due to its deteriorating democracy level⁹²

⁹⁰ For the full text of the EP Resolution:

<https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/european_parliament_resolution_on_a_political_solution_to_the_armenian_question_18_june_1987-en-91fbffca-0721-49d5-9e53-f95393d470b2.html>

⁹¹ **Armenian Assembly of America (AAA)**, Members of Congress Sign Bipartisan Letter Opposing F-16 Sale to Turkey, < <https://www.armenian-assembly.org/post/members-of-congress-sign-bipartisan-letter-opposing-f-16-sale-to-turkey>>, Accessed: 02.05.2022

⁹² **Armenian Assembly of America (AAA)**, Assembly Statement on One-Year Anniversary of Artsakh War Agreement,< <https://www.armenian-assembly.org/post/assembly-statement-on-one-year-anniversary-of-artsakh-war-agreement>>, Accessed: 02.05.2022

because it argues that AAA is the part of Western society. However, although Turkey (Turkish drone Bayraktar TB2 wins general approval in the international community by reason of its role in the Russia-Ukraine war) is acknowledged as a crucial partner in the struggling with Russia which threatens the Western democratic values as in Cold War, AAA continues to strive for tottering to Turkey instead of Russia. Thus, it is also contradictory to interests of the European countries. Similarly, ANCA have been intensely conducting lobby activities against Turkey and Azerbaijan. Almost all the statements and social media shares are regarding ‘genocide’ issue, Turkey and Azerbaijan. Moreover, ANCA completely opposes to any normalization process with Turkey and Azerbaijan without ‘justice’ as discussed before.⁹³⁹⁴ Its irreconcilable and irrational stance are endangering the interests of Armenians reside in the Republic of Armenia because of its incapacity to comprehend socio-economic and political situation in the South Caucasus as Tuncel (2014) points out for traditional diaspora political parties in his study. To receive more positive results from its lobby activities, ANCA cooperates with other diaspora organizations which are also against to Turkey such as Hellenic Leaders belonging to the Greek diaspora.⁹⁵ For instance the Armenian diaspora and Greek diaspora rallied against Turkish origin Mehmet Oz who plans to go into politics in the United States.⁹⁶ Even ANCA shared this tag in Twitter: #MakeIstanbulConstantinopleAgain.⁹⁷ On 1 April 2022, ANCA started to campaign named #Turxit which aims to keep down the U.S. to kick Turkey out of NATO⁹⁸ though Turkey is a second-largest military power in NATO. To gain insight about the stance of the Armenian diaspora in France, it would be useful to

⁹³ **Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA)**, ANCA Chairman Urges Biden Administration Reset of U.S. Policy on Armenia & Artsakh, <<https://anca.org/press-release/anca-chairman-urges-biden-administration-reset-of-u-s-policy-on-armenia-artsakh/>> , Accessed: 02.05.2022

⁹⁴ **ANCA_DC** (2021, December 14). Normalizing Turkish-Armenian relations without justice is just normalizing genocide. (Tweet) < https://twitter.com/ANCA_DC/status/1470796203097001987>

⁹⁵ **ANCA_DC** (2022, March 29). Dear @CivCenter: Please consider joining this diverse coalition's call for an end to US military aid to oil-rich (openly violent) #Azerbaijan. (Tweet) <https://twitter.com/ANCA_DC/status/1508843130883293186>

⁹⁶ **ANCA_DC** (2022, April 27). "With both #Greek-American and #Armenian-American leaders rallying against @DrOz, this shows Oz could be a serious liability for the Republican Party in the general election". (Tweet) < https://twitter.com/ANCA_DC/status/1519064556907212805>

⁹⁷ **ANCA_DC** (2019, June 4). #MakeIstanbulConstantinopleAgain. (Tweet) <https://twitter.com/ANCA_DC/status/1136010111598641153>

⁹⁸ **ANCA_DC** (2022, April 1). #Turxit | Kick Turkey out of @NATO- #WorstAllyEver. (Tweet) <https://twitter.com/ANCA_DC/status/1509946298002292740>

examine the Coordinating Council of Armenian Organizations of France (CCAF) which comprises considerable part of about 500 community-based organizations and branches in France. For instance, Ara Toranian (as a witness in the case) who is Co-Chair of the CCAF and editor of *Nouvelles d'Arménie* showed his support to Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA)⁹⁹ terrorist group during the process of a lawsuit of Mardiros Jankodjian who assassinated Turkish diplomat Mehmet Yergüz in Switzerland. It was just one of the 20 terrorist actions carried out by the ASALA in Switzerland (Perinçek 2018). Moreover, at a meeting with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in 2021 in Armenia, Toranian specified that CCAF takes step to promote Armenia's interests in France.¹⁰⁰ However, as widely discussed before, similar approach of Turkish community-based organizations in Germany causes these organizations to be perceived as 'fifth column' or 'Trojan horse' in Germany. As it is understood by the examples from the three of the most effective Armenian diaspora organizations, the general political stance of the Armenian diaspora (particularly in the U.S.) to Turkey, Azerbaijan and Karabakh issue is more uncompromising and stiffer than the Armenian government and the majority of Armenians in Armenia.

4.2.2 Armenian Diaspora in France and Examining the Factors Affecting Success of the Armenian Diaspora's Efforts

The existence of Armenians dates back to early Middle Ages according to some Armenian inscriptions. In the 17th century, an Armenian merchant Haroutiun opened the first café in France.¹⁰¹ Moreover, it is writing that in the oldest Armenian manuscript, kept in Matenadaran, copied in France and dated 1707, "Paris capital of France and Armenia".¹⁰² In the nineteenth century, Armenians in France composed of mostly a few

⁹⁹ For more information about ASALA please visit to: **Britannica**, Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia <<https://www.britannica.com/topic/Armenian-Secret-Army-for-the-Liberation-of-Armenia>>

¹⁰⁰ **The Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia**, Press Releases: Nikol Pashinyan receives Ara Toranian, < <https://www.primeminister.am/en/press-release/item/2021/07/09/Nikol-Pashinyan-Ara-Toranyan/>>, Accessed: 02.05.2022

¹⁰¹ **Office of the High Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs**, France, <<http://diaspora.gov.am/en/pages/37/france>>, Accessed: 03.05.2022

¹⁰² **Yegavian, Tigran** (2021) EVN Report, French-Armenian Relations: Past and Present, <<https://evnreport.com/politics/french-armenian-relations-past-and-present/#>>, Accessed: 03.05.2022

thousand poor students, merchants and entrepreneurs. Initially, Armenians in France conducted their social, economical and political activities in Paris, Marseille and Lyon. Particularly Marseille occupies an important place in the Armenian diaspora because as said by Pascal Chamassian who is an Armenian origin politician whose grandparents came from Anatolia “Marseille is the cradle of our diaspora”.¹⁰³

First collective activities of Armenian community were laid the base by Mighirditch Portokalian who escaped from Ottoman Empire due to risk for detention because of his activities in Van (Sarinay 2002). According to Ottoman archives, in 1885, he started to publish a newspaper in Armenian language called as L’Armenia and this newspaper was forbidden in the Ottoman Empire. L’Armenia was effectively and successfully used to explain Armenian’s aims to get support from Western countries during the late 19th century and first quarter of 20th century.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, another newspaper named as Armenie started to be published in Paris in the same century.¹⁰⁵ Armenian students had strived to mold public opinion through the pressure to French newspapers to publish news regarding ‘atrocities’ of Ottoman Turks against Armenians.¹⁰⁶ Particularly, after the Treaty of Berlin which had been signed by Russia and Turkey in 1878, Armenians increased its propaganda activities by the way of being organized in Europe and America. The one of the main purpose of Armenian communities is realizing the reforms which were promised as a result of Treaty by the support of Western Powers. At the same time, Armenian community in France which composed of some Armenian students, businessmen and people who escaped from the Ottoman Empire made a petition to Goblet who was Foreign Affairs Minister of France regarding ‘abusing’ Ottoman government in 1888¹⁰⁷ (Sarinay 2002).

Before the 1914, Armenians started to form a community and institutionalized as discussed. However, there were only 4 000 Armenians in France at that time and most of

¹⁰³ **Cogan, Killian** (2019) Eurasianet, In France’s second city, a vibrant outpost of Armenian culture, <<https://eurasianet.org/in-frances-second-city-a-vibrant-outpost-of-armenian-culture>>, Accessed:03.05.2022

¹⁰⁴ **The Ottoman Archives of the Prime Minister’s Office**, hereafter “the Ottoman archives”, (BOA. HR. SYS. 2748/26)

¹⁰⁵ BOA. HR. SYS. 2749/110

¹⁰⁶ BOA. HR. SYS. 2749/31

¹⁰⁷ BOA. HR. SYS. 2748/6

them were students, merchants and entrepreneurs. Therefore, the number of Armenians in the 1910s was quite limited compared with today's Armenian population in France which is around 300 000-650 000. The massive emigration of Armenians (many of Armenians in France are based on those emigration waves) to France with relocation, and accelerated this process with the withdrawal of French forces from Adana where many Armenians had lived and signature of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. From 1925 to 1938, around 63 000 Armenians immigrated from Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, Soviet Armenia and Greece to France. The selection of France as a destination to emigrate could be related to existence of the small but rooted Armenian community which was mainly dealing with the trade in France, and French hegemony in Lebanon and Syria (Akgönül 2002). From 1946 to 1948, around 100 000 Armenians from Western countries arrived in Soviet Armenia as a reply to invitation from the Soviet authorities on the purpose of paving the way for territory demand from Turkey. However, a large number of French repatriates, experienced disappointment, and they never felt 'at home' although Stalin's brutal term passed away with his death in 1953. For instance, during the official visit of French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau to Yerevan, he was greeted by a crowd comprised of French repatriates, and they remarked their request to go to France which was acknowledged as their homeland (Laycock 2012). As a result, since 1950s, the many Armenians who went to the Soviet Armenia returned to France. These returns underwent to changes on the ethnic appearance of the Armenian community in France. In addition to French repatriates, in the 1970s, many Armenians immigrated from Lebanon, Iran and Turkey to France by reasons of conflicts in the Middle East and Iranian Revolution in 1979, military coup in Turkey in 1980 and family reunification. As a result, the appearance of Armenian communities in diaspora which mainly composed of Armenians who emigrated after the relocation and resettlement changed and became diversified. Along with the 1988 Earthquake and the Armenia's independence in 1991, the new waves of the Armenian emigration to France carried out and accelerated again (Akgönül 2002). These lasting emigrations from the different regions and countries lead to diaspora Armenians having a mosaic appearance in terms of culture, religious belief, political standing and way of life in France. For instance, Armenian community in France largely comprises Armenians (as an example of 'Victim Diaspora') who emigrated from the Middle East. Therefore, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, new emigrations, the nature of the Armenian diaspora comprised of 'old' members has undergone (Torosyan and Vardanyan 2019). However, although the members of the Armenian diaspora in France and political parties have ideological differences, they can act

in unison in the fields of preservation of the Armenian identity in the diaspora and striving for the “Armenian Cause” (*Hay Dat*). According to different studies, today 300 000-650 000 Armenians live in France.

The member of the Armenian community in France composes of different cultural, social and religious codes due to their region where they came from as remarked above. Those differences make them (particularly young generations) more fragile against to assimilation, which is the main concern of the prominent figures of the Armenian community in France. To take measure to prevent assimilation, the Armenian community in France have institutionalized, formed and developed tools to make propaganda, and established many associations. However, it is required to remember that institutionalization of the Armenian diaspora in France is not a new process. For instance, one of the first Armenian structures, the Armenian Church of Paris, was constructed between 1902 and 1904. However, together with the new waves of emigrations, this process has accelerated. The measures taken to struggle with assimilation have been applied to mold the public opinion, to make propaganda activities and lobbying (Akgönül 2002). According to the data given by the Office of the High Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs of Republic of Armenia, “there are about 500 community-based organizations and branches in France and some of which are part of the Coordination Council of Armenian Organizations of France (CCAF), which was established in 2001. In 2016, Armenians in France established Hayassa Federation in Paris, which includes more than 35 organizations and has branches in Marseille and Lyon. Moreover, there are around 70 Armenian schools in France; seven of them are day schools, as well as many Armenian cultural houses, media, churches and libraries.”¹⁰⁸ Another old-time institution is the Tebrotsassere School, relocated from Istanbul to Marseilles in 1918. The budget of this school provides by tuition, private donations and French government assistance.¹⁰⁹ On the other hand, the first everyday Armenians school named “The French-Armenian Kevork Arabian School” opened in

¹⁰⁸ **Office of the High Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs, France,** <<http://diaspora.gov.am/en/pages/37/france>>, Accessed: 03.05.2022

¹⁰⁹ **Zenian, David** (1995) The Armenians of France, <<https://agbu.org/news-item/the-armenians-of-france/>>, Accessed: 04.05.2022

Valence, France in 2020 through the large-scale project led by the French-Armenian Cultural Center of Valence (CCAV).¹¹⁰

Armenians in France have well integrated to French society over years. According to Akgönül's study (2002), while a few Armenians in France are speaking in Armenian in their everyday life. Although there is increasing number of Armenian schools in France, the registered students to these schools are limited. More importantly, 5,000-20,000 Armenian origin French adhere to 'Armenianness'. For this reason, there is also large number of Armenian origin French (they define like that themselves) which are intentionally or unintentionally 'assimilated'.¹¹¹ According to study of the Language Policy Division of the Council of Europe (2009), some 40% of the young people in the Diaspora do not speak the Armenian language. On the other hand, it is obvious that the Armenian diaspora have maintained their intensive and effective lobby activities through the different institutions. However, it is very hard to give a certain data (as data can be given in Turkish diaspora in Germany and France) regarding the educational and occupational status of the today's Armenian diaspora in France because Armenian community has existed for a long while in France. They have been already 'natural' part of the French society. For this reason, while most of the migration studies focus on Turkish immigrants (relatively low level of education), South East Asian immigrants, Maghreb, Portuguese and some immigrants from European countries¹¹²¹¹³, it is challenging to find a study focused on educational and occupational status of Armenians in France. However, it is known that early Armenians mainly composed of farmers, laborers and craftsmen. Moreover, most of them were uneducated and few of them could speak French as Aram Shehigian who was

¹¹⁰ **Zartonk Media**, New Armenian school in Valence, France, welcomes its first students, <<https://zartonkmedia.com/2020/09/08/new-armenian-school-in-valence-france-welcomes-its-first-students/>>, Accessed: 04.05.2022

¹¹¹ As stated previously, a large number of French repatriates acknowledged France as their homeland instead of Soviet Armenia. Therefore, most of them have returned to France.

¹¹² To illustrate, please glance to **Mathieu Ichou's** study (2018) translated by Oliver Waine: "The Educational Fortunes of Children of Immigrants in France", Metropolitics, < <https://metropolitics.org/The-Educational-Fortunes-of-Children-of-Immigrants-in-France.html>> Accessed: 04.05.2022

¹¹³ Although Armenian origin children are not part of this study, it is a very comprehensive working paper regarding the educational status of the children of immigrants (second generation) in France: **Kirszbaum, Thomas/ Brinbaum, Yaël/ Simon, Patrick with the collobaration of Gezer, Esin**, (2009) 'The Children of Immigrants in France: The Emergence of a Second Generation', UNICEF Special Series on Children in Immigrant Families in Affluent Societies, No:13

retired pharmacist and the ‘unofficial historian’ remarked.¹¹⁴ On the other hand, according to John Reid (1840) who was English editor, the professions of Armenians in Anatolia were grain merchant, jewelry, medicine, bakery, architecture, masonry, money changer, carpentry, banker etc. in 19th century. It can be observed that although some professions of Armenians were added and some of them disappeared over the years, there had been the continuation in terms of professions of Armenians in Anatolia during the Ottoman Empire era. In this manner, Seyran Aktaş’s study based on Ottoman cadastral record books regarding Armenians in Anatolia in 16th century is valuable that proves Armenians worked 100 variety of working fields (Seyran 2020). However, craftsmanship and chandlery came into prominence in these Ottoman cadastral record books as John Reid observed during his travel to Ottoman Empire (Turkey) in 19th century. When we take into consideration that most of the early Armenians in France emigrated from Anatolia (directly or indirectly), it is highly possible that they majorly retained their professions in France.

The working areas of today’s Armenians as a citizen and mostly well integrated to France, however, might show similarity with professions of other French citizens in the ordinary course of things. As remarked, it had better to keep in mind that there is no certain data about the today’s educational and occupational status of the Armenians in France. However, it is obvious that new generations are better integrated to French system in every sense and most of them adopt the French identity along with their Armenian identity. For example, according to a pilot survey held in Boston, Cairo, Pasadena and Marseille conducted by Armenian Institute (Armenian Diaspora Survey) in 2018, only 19% of the respondents from third generation identified as “Armenian”, while 39% identified as “Armenian-French”(or Armenian-American/Egyptian) and 35% identified as “French of Armenian origin” (or American/Egyptian) (Sahakian 2019). Therefore, new generations have not experienced hardships, discrimination and hostility as early Armenians in France were exposed. Simon Mahdessian who was a retired tailor and came to France in 1927 and Aram Shehigian narrated their first years in France as traumatic days. According to Mahdessian, Armenians were referred to as “dirty foreigners” in the late 1920s.¹¹⁵ Shortly, it can be expected that educational and occupational status of the Armenian community in France are considerably similar with natives and better than other, comparatively, newer

¹¹⁴ **Zenian, David** (1995) The Armenians of France, <<https://agbu.org/news-item/the-armenians-of-france/>>, Accessed: 04.05.2022

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

migrant origin communities in France. Any doubt, their longstanding entity in France have played significant role on present situation.

As political participation of the Turkish diaspora in Germany discussed, it is also required to examine the political participation of the Armenian diaspora in France to analyze and comprehend the structuring and organizing as well as effectiveness of the diaspora because it is impossible for diasporic communities to become effective and successful actors in homeland, host land and global affairs without political participation, and interest to host land politics. For this reason, the Armenian diaspora's political participation, methods applied for lobbying and forming public opinion, and interests to host land politics as well as to global affairs are discussed through the existing but limited data regarding the Armenian diaspora in France.

Begin with, through the political participation, lobbying and forming public opinions, the Armenian diaspora in France addresses the Armenians in France, French people and France. The one of the main goals of the Armenian diaspora in France by lobby activities political participation and propaganda methods is preventing or deteriorating any good and rewarding Turkey-France relationship. In this respect, the 'genocide' issue is often applied as a tool to force Turkey in the international scene and to make worse Turkey's relations with other countries, including France. On the contrary, by same methods, Armenian diaspora makes an effort to develop the relations between France and Armenia. In addition, the Armenian diaspora aims to influence France's position against Turkey's membership in the EU as well as institutional foreign policy of the EU to the detriment of Turkey under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). On the other hand, politics, lobbying and propaganda are useful methods to struggle with the assimilation of the Armenians (particularly young generation) as well as promotion of the 'Armenianness' in the diaspora. As pointed out, the public opinion is one of the main concerns of the Armenian diaspora that aims to form through political participation, institutionalization, actively using communication tools and establishing educational and cultural associations. In short, the Armenian diaspora in France aims to address Armenian community in France, French public opinion and French state (Akgönül 2002).

According to different data, ethnic Armenian population in France is estimated as 300 000-650 000 which constitutes around 0.4%-1% of the total population of France which is 67.8 million in 2022. On the other hand, four ethnic Armenians were elected to

the French National Assembly as a result of the 2017 French Legislative Election. It means that ethnic Armenians in the French National Assembly constitutes 0.69% of the 577 seats. All four Members of Parliament are elected from the President Emmanuel Macron's La République en Marche (LREM). The Coordination Council of Armenian Organization in France (CCAF) officially stated its support to Macron against Marine Le Pen of the French National Front (FN) party in the 2017 Presidential election.¹¹⁶ Though there is no certain data regarding the political preferences of the Armenian diaspora in French politics, CCAF's political stance is significant to deduce political preferences of the community. As a part of majority political party in the Assembly, the Armenian origin deputies from LREM gain the upper hand for Armenian community to influence decision-making process of the French government on behalf of Armenians and Armenia. Moreover, Armenian origin political in France Georges Képénékian was served as Mayor of Lyon from 2017 to 2018 as a member of France's Socialist Party.¹¹⁷ Most prominent political figure of the French politician of Armenian origin was Patrick Devedjian who was Minister under the Prime Minister in charge of the Implementation of the Recovery Plan and lawmaker of the Union for a Popular Movement as well as close adviser of Nicolas Sarkozy (who argued that if Ankara wants to gain EU membership, firstly it must acknowledge the 'genocide'). He played a significant role in the process of passing the law of the Senate of the French Republic which recognizes the 'Armenian Genocide' on January 29, 2001. On 9 October 2006, he also came up with an amendment to a proposed bill to penalize the denial of the 'Armenian Genocide'.¹¹⁸ Another significant French politician of Armenian origin was Édouard Balladur who served as Prime Minister of France under François Mitterland from 1993 to 1995. It was well known that he supported to give special statute to Turkey before the full membership to the European Union. He said "If Turkey satisfies with this special statute and give up from full membership, anyone in Europe will not make a complaint

¹¹⁶**The Armenian Weekly**, Four Armenians Elected to French Parliament, <<https://armenianweekly.com/2017/06/19/four-armenians-elected-to-french-parliament/>>, Accessed: 06.05.2022

¹¹⁷ **Agos**, Lyon'a Ermeni Belediye Başkanı, <<https://www.agos.com.tr/tr/yazi/18960/lyona-ermeni-belediye-baskani>>, Accessed: 06.05.2022

¹¹⁸ **The Armenian Mirror-Spectator**, Former French Minister Patrick Devedjian Dies of COVID-19, <<https://mirrorspectator.com/2020/04/02/former-french-minister-patrick-devedjian-dies-of-covid-19/>> published on 2 April 2020, Accessed: 06.05.2022

about it”.¹¹⁹ He was a vigorous advocate of the bill penalizing denial of the ‘Armenian Genocide’ along with Armenian origin singer Charles Aznavour and Serge Tchuruk who is a French businessman of Armenian origin. On the other hand, two prominent French newspapers, Le Monde and Le Figaro, opposed this law (Crampton 2006).

It is crucial that all of remarked Armenian origin politicians, Danielle Cazarian, Nadia Essayan, Guillaume Kasbarian, Jacques Marilossian, Georges Képénékian, Patrick Devedjian, Édouard Balladur and Jean Pierre Asvazadourian who is French diplomat of Armenian descent, have shared same view on the concerns regarding the Armenian diaspora in France, Armenia and Armenians. More importantly, although there are some ideological differences among them, they can act in unison on the issues involving interests of the Armenians in the diaspora as well as relation with their homeland in every sense. Beyond any doubt, this united political stance make them politically powerful and effective actor in the decision-making process of France and global affairs. However, it is crucial to not forget that overlapping or a harmony between hostland’s and diaspora’s interests and aims are indispensable part of the success of the Armenian diaspora’s efforts in France. In other respects, there is a strong support from non-Armenian origin French politicians to the ‘Armenian Cause’ (Hay Dat) and agreed interests of the Armenian diaspora in France. During the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict in 2020, French lawmakers from LREM, such as Anne-Laurence Petel, urged to more active support for the Armenians and some of them were signed a resolution to call the French government to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent state. There is also intense support from French politicians from other parties in the National Assembly for the aims that the Armenian diaspora is struggling to achieve, such as internationally recognition of the 1915 Events as ‘genocide’. To illustrate, Valérie Boyer from the Republicans has been an ardent supporter of the penalizing denial of the ‘Armenian Genocide’. She stated, “How indeed to fight against genocide without also fighting against negationism?”¹²⁰ There are many other French politicians who are struggling for interests and aims of the Armenian diaspora in the both political and public sphere.

¹¹⁹ **Directorate for EU Affairs- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey**, 2003-11-06 Fransa'nin Eski Başbakanı Balladur - Türkiye'ye Özel Statü, <<https://www.ab.gov.tr/p.php?e=28081>>, Accessed: 06.05.2022

¹²⁰ **First Channel News**, How indeed to fight against genocide without also fighting against negationism: Valérie Boyer, <<https://www.1lurer.am/en/2021/04/24/How-indeed-to-fight-against-genocide-without-also-fighting-against-negationism-Val%C3%A9rie-Boyer/461963>>, Accessed: 06.05.2022

The Armenian origin people are rather active in the public sphere in France as they are in political sphere. World-famous singer Charles Aznavour, poet and political activist Missak Manouchian who took part in the French resistance during the Nazi occupation of France in the Second World War, Louise Aslanian who was writer, novelist, poet and significant figure in the French resistance, painter Jean Jansem, film actress Alice Sapritch, composer Michel Legrand, Napoléon Bullukian who was substantial businessman and rewarded by the Legion of Honour, and many others are some examples of famous French of Armenian origin. Along with political activism, their entity in the French public sphere have positively penetrated the public opinion regarding the Armenians, Armenia and what Armenians fight for, although it is not clear whether public opinion is taken shape through impartial and unprejudiced knowledge about the issues cared by the Armenian diaspora such as tragic events of 1915. The Aznavour Foundation (La Fondation Aznavour) can be given as a successful example of association, which was founded by world-famous Charles Aznavour and his son Nicolas Aznavour. Through this association, educational, cultural and social projects have been conducted for Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Armenians since 1988 Armenian earthquake. One of the substantial partners of the Foundation is the Crisis and Support Centre of the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs. The Aznavour Foundation has played an important role to gain sympathy for the Armenians in French society and to promote Armenia and Armenian culture in the French-speaking world (Akgönül 2002). The promotion of Armenia and Armenian culture in the French-speaking world is determined as a one of the missions of the Foundation.¹²¹ Briefly stated, the activism in the public sphere is as substantial as political activism to receive better results from the diaspora's efforts in the host land, and the Armenian diaspora in France have set a good and successful example for this argument.

In the fourth chapter, the historical background of the Turkish community in Germany and Armenian community in France is analyzed to comprehend diasporasation process of these communities in time. Afterwards, the social, political and economic structures of the cases are analyzed after the examining of historical background in addition to the factors mentioned in the third chapter.

¹²¹ **Aznavour Foundation,** Vision&Mission, <<https://en.aznavourfoundation.org/details-growing+the+legacy+sharing+the+values-45.html>>, Accessed: 07.05.2022

5. DISCUSSION: A COMPARISON OF THE TURKISH DIASPORA IN GERMANY AND THE ARMENIAN DIASPORA IN FRANCE

Until the 6th Chapter in this study, the internal and external factors affecting the success of the diaspora's efforts have been discussed through various examples from different cases, including the Turkish diaspora in Germany and Armenian diaspora in France. On the other hand, the historical background of the 'diasporasation' of the Turkish community and Armenian community were examined in the previous chapters to pave the way for comparison of the Turkish diaspora in Germany and Armenian diaspora in France in terms of international politics because historical evolution of the migrant origin communities have substantial impact on the process of structuring, organizing and institutionalization of the diasporas. As stated previously, those processes have considerable influence on the success of the diaspora's efforts. In this chapter, analyzed and discussed factors are applied to compare of the specified cases. Through this comparison, it is aimed to find out why the Turkish diaspora in Germany is not effective as much as Armenian diaspora in France in terms of diplomatic power despite its potential.

Initially, as widely discussed in the chapter of 'Internal Factors', the time when the first generation emigrated to new host land is critical for the organizing, structuring and position of diasporas in the country where they have resided because the 'diasporasation' of the migrant origin community takes up time which changes from case to another case. More importantly, the time is essential for the migrant origin communities to become more effective, integrated, demanding and well-organized. The existence of the first generation of the migrants in the political and public sphere of the host land is quite limited and invertebrate in comparison with the following generations because of the increasing level of integration and changing priorities, as various studies illustrate (Demirağ and Kakışım 2018; Kaya and Kentel 2005; Sahakian 2019). For this reason, it is required to compare specified cases in this respect. The emigration (partly collective) of Turkish people to Germany date backs to the last century of the Ottoman Empire. However, the number of those emigrants was very low, and it did not result in the formation of the community due

to several reasons. The mass emigration from Turkey to Germany started with the signing of the Labor Recruitment Agreement between Turkey and Germany in 1961. Therefore, the year of 1961 can be the starting point of the formation of Turkish community in Germany. As stated previously, the Turkish diaspora is a type of incipient diaspora¹²² that have transformed from *gastarbeiter* to the diaspora in the near future. Moreover, the institutionalization process of the Turkish diaspora almost begun in the 2010s, although some institutions were established in the 1980s. Beyond any doubt, this situation brings along organizing problems, lack of political consciousness and awareness of being member of a diasporic community which are standing out that are directly related with their success rate of diaspora's efforts. However, it is, of course, not only reason behind of those problems. On the other hand, third generation of the Turkish diaspora in Germany is more demanding, active in the public sphere and integrated to German political, social and economic system compared with first generation (Demirağ and Kakişım 2018; Kaya and Kentel 2008) which might make them more effective community in the decision-making process of Germany in the following years but not today. When we take into consideration that the strong cooperation, organizing and efficiency of the Armenian diaspora in France as well as formation of Armenian intellectuals (a few Armenian intellectuals existed before 1960s) took almost more than 40 years (from 1920s to 1960s) to take shape as Armenians today in France, it seems premature for the Turkish community as a community that struggle with integration problems, to anticipate the same efficiency in the political and public sphere of Germany, but it doesn't mean that it must take a long time to become more active in the host land in every sense.

On the contrary, the existence of the Armenian community in France dates back to 19th century and the communal organizations existed in France before the relocation and resettlement in 1915. However, the communal emigrations to France intensified after the relocation and resettlement, withdrawal of French forces from Adana and signature of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. The early Armenians in France experienced discrimination,

¹²² According to **Gabriel Sheffer** (2003), "We have seen that some currently existing diasporas arose in antiquity or during the Middle Ages and despite enormous hardships have survived until today – those are the historical diasporas. The diasporas that arose much later, from the seventeenth century onward, many of which resulted from the great waves of migration that took place from the middle of the nineteenth century to World War II – those are the modern diasporas. Finally, all other diasporas either have been formed recently (i.e. since World War II) or are still in various stages of evolution – those are the incipient diasporas." (Sheffer 2003)

hardships and hostility, as Simon Mahdessian and Aram Shehigian narrated. Both of them remembered those days as traumatic days and Mahdessien added that Armenians were referred to as “dirty foreigners” in the late 1920s.¹²³ Therefore, to come to these days, Armenians as a migrant origin community in France had to pass over some challenges, and today they are not perceived as migrant in the most of the current studies focused on the migrants in France. Shortly, when we take into consideration the long history of the entity of Armenian community as a type of modern diaspora formed in the modern times in France, the Armenian diaspora have already formed a sophisticated, extensive and interconnected diasporic entity for a long time that affects the success of their efforts from the perspective of international politics. On the other hand, the Turkish diaspora as a type of incipient diaspora have recently institutionalization, organizing and structuring in Germany. While the Armenian diaspora in France have already overcome the most common difficulties such as integration that many of the migrants (especially first generations) generally encounter, the Turkish diaspora have recently strived to come through those difficulties, and new generations are more successful at tackling with them. This difference is positively reflected to the success of the Armenian diaspora’s efforts in France, whereas it is negatively reflected to the success of the Turkish diaspora’s efforts in Germany in terms of international politics.

The political participation and interest of the diasporic community to global affairs and host land politics is one of the most significant determining factors affecting the efficiency of diasporas in both domestic and international politics. Without political activism, it is rather difficult for the diasporas to grew up as a notable actor in the host land politics as well as global or regional issues because politics is fundament method for lobbying on behalf of interest of the diasporas and their respective homeland. Hence, it is critical to comprehend the reasons of politically ineffectiveness of the Turkish diaspora in Germany’s foreign and domestic politics, whereas the Armenian diaspora in France politically forceful on the decision-making process of France. Firstly, there is a prosperous literature about the political participation and preferences of the Turkish diaspora in Germany, and all of these studies illustrate that diaspora Turks are more interested in Turkish politics than German politics. According to joint study of Uslucan and Sauer

¹²³ **Zenian, David** (1995) The Armenians of France, <<https://agbu.org/news-item/the-armenians-of-france/>>, Accessed: 05.05.2022

(2020), the interest in Turkish politics among the Turkish diaspora was all times higher than the interest in German politics. Last findings showed that, more than one third of the Turkish diaspora remarked a strong interest in Turkish politics, whereas it was one fifth in German politics. Moreover, almost half of the diaspora Turks had inconsiderable interest in German politics; it was just under one third in Turkish politics. Together with the rising of legal participation, higher level of education and higher citizenship rights the political interest for German politics has been increasing (Uslucan and Sauer 2020).

On the other side, there is no certain data regarding what extent Armenians are interested in French politics. Yet, it is obvious that Armenians have been hunkering down to penetrate French politics for their communal interests, Armenian population around the world, Armenia as well as “Armenian Cause” (Hay Dat). Although the Armenian origin population in France equivalent to less than one percent of the total population, the influential Armenian figures in French politics stands out in relief such as French politician of Armenian origin Édouard Balladur who served as Prime Minister of France under François Mitterland from 1993 to 1995, and Patrick Devedjian who served as Minister under the Prime Minister in charge of the Implementation of the Recovery Plan and politician of the Union for a Popular Movement as well as close adviser of Nicolas Sarkozy. Moreover, before the 2022 French presidential election, two candidates, Éric Zemmour and Valérie Pécresse,¹²⁴¹²⁵ visited to Armenia because French elites have given the special place to the Armenian diaspora in their political calculations which is disproportionate to its size (300 000-650 000). Beside the politically weighty structure of the Armenian diaspora, Armenian Christians living other countries have symbolic importance for the conservative Catholic right in France (Cutler 2022). The symbolic importance of the Armenians outside France has strengthened the Armenian diaspora’s hand in the French politics due to their political clout in the Armenian world. Herewith indifference of the Turkish diaspora in German politics and its strong interest in homeland politics makes them politically powerless and insufficient actor, while the Armenian diaspora in France enjoys fully their political clout due to symbolic importance, its political

¹²⁴ **Eurasianet**, French far-right figure seeks votes in Armenia, <<https://eurasianet.org/french-far-right-figure-seeks-votes-in-armenia>>, Accessed: 08.05.2022

¹²⁵ **Le Figaro**, Valérie Pécresse en Arménie pour afficher son soutien aux chrétiens d'Orient, <<https://www.lefigaro.fr/elections/presidentielles/valerie-pecresse-en-armenie-pour-afficher-son-soutien-aux-chretiens-d-orient-20211221>>, Accessed: 08.05.2022

activism and connections. More to the point, the strong relation and interest in Turkish politics puts a question mark in the minds of German society, media and politicians. However, it is required to highlight that the Armenian diaspora in France is solicitous about the Armenian politics without hesitation due to codes of their constructed identity in the diaspora as discussed previously. In contrast to the Turkish diaspora case, they do not meet any prejudice and negative reaction (such as be named as ‘Trojan Horse’ or ‘Fifth Column’) from French society, media and politicians. This different perception can originate from the historically constructed Armenian-French interest and cultural based relations, increasing Islamophobia in Europe, and Turkey’s more engaged and active diaspora policy which particularly contain conservative discourses.

Another factor affecting the success of diaspora’s efforts in terms of international politics is how the members of the diasporic community identify themselves in the host land. As stated previously, the acknowledgement of fully any diasporic identity which strongly attributes to the homeland with regards to national and moral authority have confined the behavior and political sphere of influence of diasporas, particularly last generations, in the country where they reside in (Tölölyan 2012). In some cases, the identity issue of the diasporas brings along loyalty issue which begets the query regarding the level of integration to their host land. For instance, the Turkish diaspora in Germany gives very high importance on their Turkish identity as well as their religion, while younger respondents place less emphasis on Turkish identity and religion. Moreover, Turkish respondents of the survey conducted by the polling firm DATA4U from November 2019 to January 2020 see themselves primarily as Turkish with a very high percentage which is 77.2% in Germany. This identification brings about strengthening homeland political orientations and organizations among the diaspora Turks in Germany, and it makes difficult when they intend to go into politics and lobbying parliament. Therefore, successful Turkish candidates try to keep its engagement with homeland political issues or an affiliation, which has relation with particular homeland political party or association, at a distance. But also the relation of Turkish descent candidates with homeland political agendas leaves them in a tight spot at the relation with members of the Turkish diaspora by the reason of politically fragmented diasporic structure which is very difficult to avoid for Turkish origin politicians (Østergaard-Nielsen 2009). Under these circumstances, the receiving positive results from their efforts for particularly interest of homeland are very compelling in Germany.

On the contrary, a great majority of the third generation of the Armenian community in France adopt and prioritized the French identity along with their Armenian identity. For example, according to a pilot survey held in Boston, Cairo, Pasadena and Marseille conducted by Armenian Institute (Armenian Diaspora Survey) in 2018, only 19% of the respondents from third generation identified as “Armenian”, while 39% identified as “Armenian-French”(or Armenian-American/Egyptian) and 35% identified as “French of Armenian origin” (or American/Egyptian) (Sahakian 2019). The emphasis on the French identity have made contribution when a member of the Armenian diaspora wants to go into politics, lobbying parliament and molding public opinion in France. Moreover, the structuring and organizing of the Turkish diaspora in Germany has been formed mainly by Turkey as an ‘external actor’ from the point of Germany, while the Armenian diaspora significantly took shape by the Armenian community itself and before the establishment of the Republic of Armenia. The ‘interference’ of Turkey to form a diaspora and to make Turkish community a leverage and tool for domestic policy are perceived as the intervention to German domestic policy, and it leads to additional conflicts in Turkish-German relations (Adamson 2016; Y. Aydin 2014). It reveals both loyalty issue and biased perception against the diaspora Turks. The asymmetrical relationship between Turkey and the Turkish diaspora can be other reasons of this perception, which leaves them in a difficult situation because it is likely that actions taken by the Turkish diaspora on behalf of Turkish community in Germany and Turkey are perceived by Germany as actions directed by Turkish government to influence German politics. However, in Armenian case, the direction of the asymmetrical Armenia-diaspora relationship is in favor of the Armenian diaspora. It facilitates the Armenian diaspora’s engagement with the issues relevant to the Armenian diaspora, Armenia and Armenians and provides an advantage to take better results from their efforts in contrast to Turkish case.

The political representation of the both Turkish diaspora in German Federal Parliament and Armenian diaspora in French National Assembly are slightly different in proportion to their size. While 18 Turkish/Turkey origin (among 100 candidates) were elected as lawmakers in the German federal parliament Bundestag in the last federal elections, Turkish/Turkey origin lawmakers represent 2.44% in German Bundestag. On the other hand, the population of the Turkish/Turkey origin in Germany constitutes 3.4% of the overall population, and it means that Turkish/Turkey origin people are underrepresented in the German Bundestag. In the Armenian case, while 4 ethnic

Armenians were elected to French National Assembly as lawmakers in the 2017 French Legislative Election, the ethnic Armenians in the French National Assembly constitutes 0.69% of the 577 seats. Besides, the population of Armenian origin in France is equivalent to less than one percent of the total population. In this regard, the Armenian origin people in France are nearly represented in the French National Assembly in proportion to its size. However, main differences among the cases originate from to what extent kin lawmakers represent the political stance of their community on host land and homeland politics, and communal interest instead of proportion of the political representation. In the Armenian case, it stands out that although there are some ideological differences among the Armenian origin lawmakers as well as members of the Armenian community, they can act in unison on the issues involving interests of the Armenians in the diaspora as well as relation with their homeland in every sense as discussed previously. It is obvious that the influential figures in political domain such as Édouard Balladur and Patrick Devedjian, and in public sphere such as Charles Aznavour have displayed united political stance, and it makes them politically powerful and effective actor in the decision-making process of France and global affairs. More importantly, they have been struggling for the same goals determined by the Armenian diaspora in France as a part of the community. The solidarity among the members of the community beyond the political and cultural differences reverberates in the both political and public sphere.

Unlike the Armenian case, the general political profile of Turkish/Turkey origin lawmakers do not represent the vast majority of the diaspora Turks' political preferences because adverseness to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan government, Turkey's foreign, diaspora and domestic policy as well as the more engaged and active Turkish diaspora policy have been dominant approach among the Turkish/Turkey origin lawmakers in the German Bundestag. Considering that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan received approximately 60% of the total votes from the eligible citizens living abroad and 64.78% from the voters living in Germany in the last presidential elections,¹²⁶ the discrepancy between the general political stance of the Turkish/Turkey origin lawmakers and political stance of the great majority of the Turkish diaspora frankly reveals. For this reason, it is required to discuss that to what extent 18 Turkish/Turkish origin lawmakers represent the 'agreed interests' of the Turkish diaspora in the Bundestag, and most importantly for this study to what extent their existence in the Bundestag influence the success of the Turkish diaspora. The differentiating point of views

¹²⁶ **Supreme Election Council**, Decree No:952, published on 4 July 2018, Accessed: 09.05.2022

between Turkey and Germany on the issue of EU accession of Turkey, Turkish human rights and democracy record, the Kurdish issue, the Armenian issue, the Cyprus conflict and regional issues (these subjects take an important place for homeland political lobbying of European-based Turks(Østergaard-Nielsen 2009)) are restricting the scope of political activities of the Turkish diaspora in the both national and local level politics. Thus, presenting an opinion coherent with the Turkey's position about those issues contains political risk in the election race. For instance, Osman Elmancı, Ayhan Tonca and Erdinç Saçan were let take out from the candidate list for 2006 General Elections in the Netherlands by their party because they did not accept the Armenian claims regarding the tragic events of 1915 (Sakman 2015). In an interview, Bilkay Öney who was Ministry of Integration in Baden-Württemberg and politician from Bündnis 90/Die Grünen remarked referring to Armenian Genocide claims "As a German deputy, I don't have a chance for disclamation because they tripped up to me before entering the politics".¹²⁷ Therefore, the discrepancy between the Turkish/Turkey origin deputies and the great majority of the Turkish diaspora in terms of political stance and relations with Turkey arises from the reason discussed above, and it negatively influences the success of the Turkish diaspora's efforts in Germany.

In the Turkish case, the divided structure of the Turkish community by the reasons of their political, denominational and congregational discrepancy can be clearly observed in the visions and agendas of the Turkish Civil Society Organizations which is around 5300 in Germany. Most of these associations are interested in Turkish politics and this engagement restricts their efforts in both political and public sphere. On the other hand, the polarized structure of the Turkish society in Turkey is brought in to Germany through the strong interest of the Turkish Organizations in homeland politics, and incentive of the Turkish government to ratchet up the political participation of the Turkish diaspora(Kaya and Kentel 2005). This dividedness of the Turkish diaspora hinders them to take joint action against every issue involving the Turkish community in Germany, Turkey and Turks. Thus, it directly impairs their capacity and the success of their efforts in terms of international politics. Similarly with the Turkish case, ideological differences stands out among the Armenian political parties (ARF, ADLP and SDHP) in the diaspora and organizations such as AGBU and CCAF. However, they can get on the same page

¹²⁷Banu Avar(2006), Banu Avar'la Sınırlar Arasında - Almanya - 10.10.2006, <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xwetd8wH3S0&t=193s>>, Accessed: 09.05.2022

regarding the critical issues and determined aims such as preservation of the Armenian identity in the diaspora which is provision against the assimilation, and struggling for internationally recognition of the tragic events of 1915 as ‘genocide’ (Akgönül 2002). This common action to accomplish the objective make them motivated and influential actor in the international politics. Moreover, the common narrative based on traumatic days and ‘genocide’ acts as glue for the Armenians in the diaspora. It is quite hard to mention such strong glue in the Turkish diaspora, although there is a narrative regarding the difficulties that first generation encountered in Germany.

The political and legal system of Germany and France are different from each other, although both countries are democratic. The difference in the political and legal system is affecting the success of the diaspora’s efforts, political participation of the migrant origin communities and political interest to country where they reside and their country of origin. The William Safran’s (2004) categorization of the democratic countries in terms of their receptivity to immigrants are very useful to analyze how the political and legal system of the host land countries of the specified cases affect their political activities. According to Safran’s categorization, France is ‘culturally monolithic welcoming country’ which embrace immigrant and stir up them to become the part of political community as so Canada, but expose them cultural melting pot. As widely examined, one of the prioritized issues of the Armenian diaspora in France is preservation of the Armenian identity and their identity’s most important part, Armenian culture. However, on the flip side, going to politics in France for migrant origins is relatively easier in France by comparison to Germany. However, this convenience shows an alteration for different ethnic groups in France as Umut Özkırımlı and Ayhan Kaya (2009) discussed in the incipit of the Turkish translation of the Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany written by Roger Brubaker. France and the United States have generous admission not based on *jus soli*. On the other hand, Germany is categorized by Safran as culturally monolithic selective country which distinguish permanent returnees and guest workers. In Germany, going into politics is very difficult, if not impossible because Germany has highly selective admission based on kinship (*jus sanguinis*) despite the change on nationality law in 2000. For this reason, the Armenian diaspora in France feel themselves as a part of political system of their host land which make them politically capable to take better results for their community or sometimes respective homeland interest as in the United States while exclusive citizenship and migrant incorporation system of Germany make the Turkish

diaspora more interested in their homeland politics and organizations instead of host land political orientations. In addition, the Turkish diaspora and Kurdish diaspora in Germany slog on to find an institutionalized platform for dialog with policy-makers (Østergaard-Nielsen 2009). Therefore, the difference in the political and legal system between Germany and France penetrates the success of the specified cases' efforts and possibility to take positive response to their political activities.

The educational and occupational status, and economic conditions of the diasporas are among the determinant factors on the diplomatic power of the diasporas as in Jewish diaspora in the United States. While, there is sufficient data regarding the educational and occupational status, and economic conditions of the Turkish diaspora in Germany to make an inference, there is no certain numbers for the Armenian diaspora in France. These three factors are strongly interconnected and the educational status of the diasporas has the biggest impact on other two factors. For this reason, it will be correct with starting with the educational status. According to joint study of Fassman and İçduygu (2013), 73% of first generation of the Turkish migrants was primary school graduate due to their rural background. On the other hand, according to data from the German Socio-Economic Panel covering a period from 1985 to 2014, full time employed migrants from Turkey between the ages 25 and 64 had lower level of education than their German counterpart. All studies illustrate that there are significant improvements from one generation to the next generation with regards to educational and occupational status in their host land, as it can be made an inference by joint study of Kaya and Kentel (2005). This improvement is also reflected to occupational and economic status. However, the unemployment rate and average income of ethnic Turkish households are still rather less than German natives. The unemployment rate for Turkish origin migrants was two times more than Germans, according to different studies published different times (Kaya and Kentel 2005; Pécoud 2002). The similar difference between the Turkish origins and Germans stands out in the average monthly income. While the average income of ethnic Turkish households is €1 242 per month, it is €1 730 for German households and €1,486 for non-Turkish migrants. The same report argues that 36% of ethnic Turks are living below the poverty line (Kern 2016). Another study illustrate that monthly income (€2 368) for Turkish origins is €1 000 lower than the average monthly income for Germans (Ray 2017). Therefore, existing data prove that the Turkish diaspora is far away from being an economic power in Germany despite its potential, and it seriously influences the diplomatic and bargaining power of the

Turkish diaspora in Germany. In the Armenian case, there is no certain data about these factors, but it is highly possible that educational and occupational status, economic conditions of the Armenian diaspora as a well integrated to France shows similarity with the natives. However, further studies are necessary to deduce since migration studies focused on migrations in France does not contain the Armenians diaspora as a case.

The bilateral relationship between diaspora's homeland and host land is the one of the most substantial factor on the success of the diaspora's efforts. As stated previously, the bilateral relationship is to a great extent shaped by the international conjuncture. For this reason, these two factors are ideally applied to specified cases of this study. In Turkish case, Turkey has a very special political, economical, social and cultural relationship with Germany as in history. Although there were some peaks and trough throughout the history, such as Helmut Kohl's contribution to decisions of the European Council meeting in Luxembourg in 1997 which did not contain Turkey in the enlargement process, the relationship was kept at a certain level. However, the bilateral Turkey-Germany relationship have been deteriorating since 2011 by the reasons of different positions to global and regional issues such as the Arab Spring and the eastern Mediterranean crisis between Turkey, Greece and the EU. In addition to regional conflicts, the differentiating foreign policy and point of views between Turkey and Germany on the issue of EU accession of Turkey, Turkish human rights and democracy record, the Kurdish issue, the Armenian issue, the Cyprus conflict and approach to PKK's Syrian branch YPG have tensed up the relations. Moreover, the compelling crises that undermined bilateral relations occurred recently. The recognition of the tragic events of 1915 as 'genocide' by the German Federal Parliament in 2016, the reading of a poet which contains invectives against the President Recep Tayyip Erdogan by Jan Böhmermann who was the presenter of Neo Magazin Royale, the racist activities and attacks of the neo-Nazi groups against the ethnic Turks in Germany, the raids from German police to imams of the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs, the detention of the deputies from People's Democratic Party (HDP) in Turkey, the decision of the German court to put restrictions on who wanted to speak remotely against to crowds at public demonstrations and a video-link connection of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at a political rally in Germany, and disallowance to Turkish ministers for giving a speech in Turkey meetings in Germany for Turkish constitutional referendum in 2017 can be shown as some of these crises. The last example is also very important for this study to how the Turkish diaspora have been

instrumentalized by the Turkish government for the domestic policy (Ermağan and Gümüş 2019). Shortly, along with the instrumentalization of the Turkish diaspora, deteriorating bilateral relations partially affected by the international conjuncture have revealed negative and biased approaches to the Turkish diaspora in German politics and public sphere. As Hüseyin Bağcı remarked and cited by İsmail Ermağan and Burak Gümüş (2019), “since 1949, there has never been such a negative period towards Turkey among the German public and intellectuals.” More importantly, the inharmoniousness of the interest, political agenda and aims between Turkey-Germany and Turkey-EU due to various reasons sorted above confine the activities of the Turkish diaspora in both political and public sphere because it is perceived as representatives of Turkish state instead of the part of Germany. Thus, the members of the Turkish diaspora have become a part of clash of interests between their homeland and host land.

The influence and success of the diaspora’s efforts strictly depend on whether diaspora’s aims and interests do not contradict and challenge to accepted host land interests and basics. As it is clearly come out in the Turkish case, the contradiction and challenge to accepted host land interests and basics negatively influence the success of the diaspora’s efforts in terms of international politics because of the highly engaged structure of the Turkish diaspora to Turkish politics. On the contrary, the overlapping interest and aims between the Armenians and French state have leaped out throughout the history. Since 18th century, France has intervened to domestic policy of the Ottoman Empire under color of protection of Christians living in the Ottoman Empire. For this reason, the Armenian community had become a part of the Eastern Question and it was instrumentalized by France to increase its clout on the Ottoman Empire (Sarıay 2002). On the other hand, this intervention was also compatible with the increasing demand (incited by Western powers) of the Armenian community for independence. After the First World War, French forces which mainly composed of Armenians wore France uniform had occupied Dörtyol located in Hatay, Adana and Pozantı under the command of French officers from 1918 to the Ankara Agreement signed in 1921.¹²⁸ This occupation resulted in the abandonment of the Armenians of Cilicia by French forces as a result of the Agreement. The power struggle for Cilician Plain between France and the Great Britain stand out at that time. France utilized from Armenians on behalf of its own interests to enhance its authority in the region,

¹²⁸ **The Ottoman Archives of the Prime Minister’s Office, hereafter “the Ottoman archives”** (BOA. BEO. 340957, BOA. HR. SYS. 2555-2/77, BOA. BEO. 341163, BOA. HR. SYS. 2543-1/13-16, BOA. HR. SYS. 2543-5/28, BOA. HR. SYS. 2555-2/23)

although this cooperation seemed as based on common interest because France pledged an independent state to the Armenians in ‘Armenian historical land’, Cilician Plain, which was strategically and economically crucial for French forces (Hatipoğlu 2002). Any doubt, it enabled to unconstrained political ground for the growing Armenian community in France. This historical interest and cultural based relationship have lifted effectiveness recently in consequence of the escalating power struggle between France and Turkey in the several regions. Scrambling with Turkey over the Eastern Mediterranean, Libya, Africa and South Caucasus has enhanced the possibility of success of Armenian diaspora’s effort to influence France’s foreign policy on behalf of Armenia and to the detriment of Turkey’s interest because there is an explicit harmony of interests and aims between the Armenian diaspora and France.¹²⁹ Moreover, along with aggravated Turkey-EU relations, growing anti-Turkish discourses, public opinion and approach in Europe have been embittered by the Armenian and Greek diaspora, and existing international conjuncture and anti-Turkish sentiment in Europe has presented these diasporas proper political grounds for their activities. However, although France verbally showed its support to Armenia in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, this support did not result in active support to Armenia. As in the abandonment of the Armenians of Cilicia by French forces in 1921, the French realpolitik outweighed due to growing economical importance of Azerbaijan recently (Yegavian 2021).

The international conjuncture is the key factor on the success of the diaspora’s efforts because the harmony of the interest is generally shaped through the international conjuncture, as Turkey’s critical importance during the Cold War narrowed down the political activities of the Armenian diaspora. While Arab countries were at war with Israel, how can the Jewish community in Egypt organize and carry out lobbying activities in a significant Arab country, Egypt? In this situation, the contradiction and challenge to (or such perception by the host land) accepted host land interests and basics due to the international conjuncture or bilateral homeland-host land relations make it difficult for the migrant origin communities to be organized, structured, and conduct political activities. On the contrary, the overlapping, at least harmony, of the interests due to the international conjuncture or bilateral homeland-host land relations increases the radius of the diaspora’s

¹²⁹ The ongoing war in Ukraine strengthened Turkey’s position on the regional level, and Turkey-France relations have normalized for almost two years. However, it is early to make an inference to what extent changing international conjuncture will influence the Armenian diaspora’s possibility of receiving positive results from its efforts.

actions and the diaspora's efforts give better results in such situations. All the factors sorted throughout this study have the importance in various forms, but the fundamental factor is overlapping, at least harmony, of the interests which are substantially molded by the international conjuncture between diasporas and host land state, if not so the other factors considerably lose their significance on the structuring and organizing of diasporas as well as success of the diasporas' efforts.

In conclusion, the international conjuncture have given the opportunity to the Armenian diaspora in France and the Armenian diaspora plays their cards well by the reasons of their rooted diasporic organizations, sturdy structuring, using public relations tools productively, historically interest and cultural based Armenians-French relationship, majorly common political stance against the issues involving their community, Armenia and Armenians, strong political and social activism, individual activists and leaders of the community and asymmetrical Armenia-diaspora relationship in favor of the Armenian diaspora. On the other hand, the wind of the international conjuncture does not blow on behalf of the Turkish diaspora in Germany. Even if it blows, it does not seem so possible that the Turkish diaspora puts to good use this opportunity despite its potential due to weak diasporic organizations which have been recently activated, lack of political interest in German politics, strong engagement with the homeland politics at both individual and institutional level, highly polarized and divided structure of the community, low level but increasing participation to political and social sphere of Germany, disharmony on the political stance between the Turkish/Turkey origin lawmakers in Bundestag and the Turkish diaspora/Turkey, Turkish diaspora policy, bilateral Turkey-Germany relationship (if this conjuncture does not ameliorate it), educational and occupational status of the Turkish origins, average economic conditions of the diaspora and lack of the consciousness regarding being a member of a diasporic community.

6. CONCLUSION

The concept of diaspora, which has been discussed for especially last three decades among the scholars, is a controversial concept like many other concepts in social sciences. What are diasporas, and which groups can be referred to as diaspora? Those questions have not been answered yet as a result of heavily discussion in the literature. This debate in the literature on diasporas about what diasporas' limits and meaning, has implicitly based on the extent of whether they are 'natural' entities or they are socially constructed. Within this context, this debate largely reflects the essentialist-constructivist debate in nationalism studies, and also implicitly opens the floodgates for the treatment of collective identities in the discipline of international relations (Adamson 2013).

In the approach of essentialists, diasporas are transnational ethnic groups defined by a common identity, and interested in a real or imagined country of origin. In this respect, diasporas mainly represent transnational ethnic groups, instead of using this concept to define some religious groups as discussed in detail in the second chapter. On the other hand, according to 'constructivist approach', diasporas are bunched entities, which are socially and politically constructed in time. In other words, diasporas are not pre-political or natural entities that emerged by migration or boundary crossing process, instead they are constructed or mobilized which is facilitated by the technological developments in the global communication and transportation sectors. Therefore, diasporas are often discussed as de-territorialized social, cultural or political community in the literature. The issue of what the meaning and limits of the concept of diaspora, which has been carrying over for more than 30 years in the literature, are mostly and implicitly takes place on the basis of this essentialist-constructivist debate.

The importance of diasporas in international politics has been attracting the attention of policymakers, governmental and non-governmental organizations, civil society, think tanks and academy, although increasingly widespread use of the concept of diaspora has undermined the conceptualization of the diaspora. Beyond any doubt, the secularization of the concept of diaspora, which means the usage was extended to nonreligious meanings, brings along the extending of the spectrum of relevant cases, so trivialization of the

concept. However, that secularization process of the concept has paved the way for new theoretical discussions, and diasporas have evolved a more substantial component of international politics. On the other hand, de-territorialized and transnational structure of diasporic communities, which provide them opportunity to be simultaneously in more than one society and more than one 'nation-state', are seen as an opportunity and a partner to promote the national interests of migrant sending countries by their policymakers. Moreover, political, social and economic activities of diasporas in transnational sphere make them significant collaborator for the international organizations such as World Bank and International Organization for Migration (IOM). The international organizations have promoted and supported diasporic communities as significant actors and partners for global development, particularly global economic growth due to substantial amounts of global remittances mainly provided by migrants and diasporas.

Contrary to cases discussed above, activities of diasporas are not always welcomed by both host land and in the migrant-sending countries by the reasons of their structure. In this sense, de-territorialized and transnational structure of diasporas are making harder to politically control the diasporas, which have still responsibilities to their respective homeland as a citizen (including members of community who hold dual citizenship), for migrant-sending countries. Therefore, de-territorialized structure and transnational activities of diasporas has both positive and negative meanings from the perspective of the discipline of international relations, which is also exemplified through the main cases of this thesis. Along with their structure, their position and activities in the transnational sphere enable them to play an active role in international politics. As literature mainly discusses, they conduct lobbying activities in mainly liberal host lands because of their political system, and support multicultural foreign policies. Through the lobbying works, they might aim to promote their own communal interest or interest of their country of origin. As it can be observed in the case of Iraqi politician Ahmed Chalabi, in some cases, some members of a diasporic community might strive to promote the interests of country where they reside as they expect a positive response from the ruling elites of host land. This case is also significant to argue that overzealous diaspora activists can distort the interests of the people or societies they claim to lobby for, because many members of the Iraqi community, including Iraqi people living in Iraq, did not support Ahmed Chalabi, and his policies. Within this context, it is controversial to what extent Ahmed Chalabi represented the interests and aims of the Iraqi community. As one of the most known

active role of diasporas, which is directly related to lobbying, they have a potential to directly affect the decision-making process of their country of origin and host land country, as well as intergovernmental organizations such as the European Union.

Diasporas may play significant roles in conflicts and political crises in their homeland because of their transnational connections, better economic situations compared to their co-ethnics living in homeland, and political relations with various governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. However, their role might have a positive or negative meaning related with the type of their engagement with issues. As in Ethiopia case, both meanings can be clearly observed because of the violence activities of Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) supported by the Eritrean diaspora which had fought for the independence of Eritrea from Ethiopia, and economic and political support of Ethiopian diaspora to Ethiopia after the destructive civil war. On the other hand, the systematic transformations in international politics after the Cold War period have attributed new roles to diasporic communities as they have been perceived as partner for public diplomacy of both host land and homeland. Although, the United States realized the substantiality of diasporas in terms of public diplomacy long ago, there has been increasing attention to diasporas in the international politics for the past decade. Within this context, Turkey's diaspora policy, which has been part of the active foreign policy agenda, has reflected the grip of roles of diasporas in terms of public diplomacy.

The existence of diaspora communities in another country or in more than one country loads them with passive roles. The reason for the existence of diasporas can cause them to be instrumentalized in foreign policy issues by policymaker of their country of origin. As discussed in the third chapter, by the conceptualization of Russian diaspora by Moscow, Russian diaspora in near abroad has been instrumentalized to legitimate Moscow's intervention and engagement in the internal and external affairs of ex-Soviet republics. Although Russian government have grounded on its diaspora policies to consent and desire of the Russian diaspora, it is disputable issue that whether the Russian diaspora living in ex-Soviet republics supports to intervention/this kind of engagement. However, this issue needs depth academic analysis, which goes beyond the main subject of this thesis.

Nonetheless, the passive and active roles of diasporas discussed throughout the study do not mean that all diaspora communities are equally prominent in the international arena.

Their efficacy and the success rate, which are largely molded by the diplomatic power of diasporas are determinants for why some diasporas come into prominence in international politics while others do not. This thesis illustrates that there are various factors affecting the diplomatic power of diasporas, this power greatly influences the possibility to take positive result from diasporas' efforts and their efficacy. These factors can be divided into two categories as internal factors and external factors. In the thesis, categorization of internal factors are applied to define factors which have naturally emerged that cannot be controlled or have been created/self-created by members of the diasporic community as a result of social interaction between each other, and social interaction with host land society for a length of time. On the other hand, external factors are applied to define factors which are generally constituted by out of diasporic community.

The time factor is developed by this thesis as an internal factor, which has substantial influence on the diplomatic power of diasporas. Primarily, it is determinant for whether a diasporic community belongs to 'category' of historical diasporas formed in ancient times, or modern diasporas formed in the modern times, or incipient diasporas which are currently organizing, on the success of diasporas' efforts from the perspective of international politics, because diasporic structuring and organizing need time to become more effective, demanding and well-organized. The Irish diaspora and Jewish diaspora in the United States, which are one of the most successful and effective diasporas, are very useful instances for diasporic entity that have been formed for a long time. The second internal factor discussed in the study is political culture. Along with the socio-economic and psychological conditions (the feeling of political efficiency), the feeling of citizenship, and legal system of the host land country, the political culture is the determinant of level of political participation of diasporas to their homeland and particularly to host land politics. The third internal factor is how diasporas identify themselves in the host land. As this thesis illustrates through the different data, there is a correlation between how members of a diasporic community identify themselves and the level of these members' interest in host land politics, which is one of the most useful ways to influence decision-making process of host land politics on behalf of communal interests or interests of their country of origin. On the other hand, this factor has huge potential to influence the perception of a host society to members of a diasporic community, as it is clearly observed in the Turkish case. The fifth internal factor is individual activists and leaders of the diasporic community. The capable and venturous activists and leaders can produce more fruitful and rewarding results for

diasporas or their homeland, provided that they don't conflict with the significant organizations of diasporas, for their continuation, performance and upward mobility. Last but not least, it is significant whether the members of diasporas are unified or divided into different political or civil organizations that compete with each other and follow different agendas.

In addition to six internal factors discussed in the third chapter, there are various external factors affecting the diplomatic power of diasporas, so efficacy and the success rate. The first external factor, which is generally constituted by out of diasporic community, is the political and legal system of the country where they reside that regulates the structure of political opportunities for the migrants. Within this context, William Safran's categorization (2004) is useful and applicable to compare the political system of France and Germany, which are host lands of the specified cases of the thesis, in terms of receptivity. The second external factor, which is strongly interconnected with internal factors, is to what extent harmony is between the interests and aims of host land and diaspora. The possibility to take positive consequences from the diasporas' activities in political and social spheres, and the success of the diaspora's efforts strictly depend on whether diaspora's aims and interests do not contradict and challenge to accepted interests and basics of the country where diasporas reside. The third external factor is the relationship between diaspora's host land and homeland. The type and level of this relationship can expand or narrow the sphere of diasporas' influence on the host land politics. This factor as many other factors affecting the diplomatic power of diasporas is largely penetrated by the international conjuncture, which is applied to define the combination of "different forces, events, and structures at particular times"(Paulmann 2013). The increasing importance of diaspora communities due to technological developments and transformations in the global political system has caused the migrant-sending countries to develop policy strategies for their diasporas. This engagement is generally part or consequence of the foreign policy agenda and aims of the country of diaspora's origin. The establishment of the YTB by the Turkish government and Turkey's intense relations with Muslims in the Balkans and in the Caucasus, and strong engagement with Turkic peoples can be examined in this context.

The international conjuncture, which is part of external factors, is the most important factor among the all factors discussed in the thesis. All of the factors sorted throughout this

study have the importance in various forms, but the fundamental factor is overlapping, at least harmony, of the interests, which are substantially molded by the international conjuncture between diasporas and host land state, if not so the other factors considerably lose their significance on the structuring and organizing of diasporas as well as success of the diasporas' efforts. This thesis illustrates that studies examining the relationship between diasporas and international politics without considering the international conjuncture are lacking to a large extent. To illustrate, the Jewish residents, which has remained in very limited numbers, in Egypt had been precluded from the contact with Israel and to be organized in Egypt, and it led them to be stuck in a difficult situation to retain their diasporic identity (Safran 2004). In this situation, the answer to this question is very clear: While Arab countries were at war with Israel, how could the Jewish community in Egypt organize and carry out lobbying activities in a significant Arab country, Egypt? The comparative analysis of diasporas belonging to the same ethnic group but forming a diaspora community in different host lands, such as the comparison of the Armenian diaspora in the U.S. and Armenian diaspora in Russia, will contribute greatly to the literature in this regard. In addition, liberal and constructivist optics, any doubt, provide a notable sight for diaspora activities. However, it is clear that they are insufficient to explain the differences between diasporic communities with regards to their proportion of effects on international politics. Moreover, the international conjuncture provides a very useful and suitable theoretical basis for the realist approach to give a systematic explanation for diaspora activities in both political and social sphere, which is not applied much in the literature to explain diaspora activities.

The comparison of the Turkish diaspora in Germany and the Armenian diaspora in France, which are the main cases of the thesis, offers a potential answer to why some diaspora groups shine out in international politics, why others do not. Although the Turkish diaspora in Germany has potential in terms of being a significant actor in international relations, the Turkish diaspora is not a diplomatically powerful and efficient community, which is disproportionate to their size in Germany. On the other hand, although the Armenian community in France is a small community in terms of population, which is estimated around 300 000-650 000, the Armenian diaspora in France is diplomatically powerful and efficient, and is referred to as a 'successful' example of diasporic community. The explanation of this difference, which is the main research problem of the thesis, has been provided through the examining of the international conjuncture and time

factor developed by this thesis, together with the factors previously discussed and implemented in the literature.

The structuring and organizing of the Turkish diaspora in Europe has been newly formed, and mainly formed by Turkey as an ‘external actor’. On the other hand, the term of the diaspora is very new in the Turkish literature and Turkish Dictionary. Although there has been expanding interest to the term of diaspora and the Turkish diaspora in Turkish academy, the meaning and the scope of the term and Turkish diaspora are drawn by discourses of government officials. For this reason, the term is often politicized by the policy-makers, which cause the deviation of the academic meaning of the term and boundaries of the Turkish diaspora. In the meantime, Turkey’s more active and engaged diaspora politics have facilitated movement to the structuring and organizing of the Turkish diaspora in Europe.

Although the emigration (partly collective) of Turkish people to Germany date backs to the last century of the Ottoman Empire, it did not cause the establishment of strong Turkish community in Germany. Together with the signing of the Labor Recruitment Agreement between Turkey and Germany in 1961, the number of the migrants from Turkey has been increasing over the years, and it reaches to around 2.8 million that constitutes the biggest group among the foreign nationals with 12.8% of Germany’s foreign population (11.4 million). On the other hand, it can be obviously observed through different studies that there are improvements among Turkish migrants in Germany from one generation to the next in respect to level of education. However, the prevalence of low level of education among the members compared with Germans and other diasporic groups from mainly ex-Yugoslavia still stands out in relief. Due to the several reasons such as lack of education and discrimination against migrant-origin people, the unemployment rate for migrants from Turkey has been higher, generally two times more, than unemployment rate for German workers. Similarly with level of education and employment rate, the average income of ethnic Turkish households is less than for non-Turkish migrants and German households, according to Germany’s statistics agency and Annie Ray’s study (2017). In addition, all studies regarding political participation of the Turkish diaspora in Germany illustrate that diaspora Turks are more interested in Turkish politics than German politics as a result of lack of integration, Germany’s insufficient and weak integration politics, diaspora’s intense emphasis on Turkish identity, and Turkish diaspora politics. However,

though political participation of diaspora Turks to German politics remains very low, the number of Turkish/Turkey origin has been slowly increasing over the years. In the last German Federal Elections held on 26 September 2021, 18 candidates of Turkish/Turkey descent were elected as lawmakers, whereas it was 14 in the 2017 Federal Elections and 11 in the 2013 Federal Elections. On the other hand, adverseness to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan government has been dominant political stance among the Turkish/Turkey origin lawmakers in the German Bundestag, on the contrary the vast majority of the Turkish diaspora's political preferences in Turkish politics. Lastly, although there are many associations established by Turkish/Turkey origins in Germany, they are not effective and powerful by the reasons of the dividedness of the Turkish diaspora (similarly with the politically polarized atmosphere of Turkey) in terms of goals, agenda and interests. As discussed, the Turkish diaspora does not put to good use of its political and economical potential as the biggest foreign group in Germany.

Armenians as a nation considered to be one of the most scattered nations in the world have a long mass emigration history. Although the existence of Armenians in France dates back to the early Middle Ages according to some Armenian inscriptions, the formation of a community accelerated with the relocation and resettlement in 1915, withdrawal of French forces from Adana where many Armenians had lived, and signature of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. The formation of the Armenian diaspora dates back to earlier times than when Armenians have a state. For this reason, their structuring and organizing have taken form to a great extent the independent from the Republic of Armenia. On the other hand, institutionalization and organizing of the Armenian community in France started before the relocation and resettlement. The lasting emigration to France from different part of the world continued with the returning of French repatriates, emigration from Lebanon, Iran and Turkey in 1970s-1980s. Along with the 1988 Earthquake and the Armenia's independence in 1991, many Armenians who wanted to leave from newly established Republic of Armenia preferred to immigrate to widespread destination for the Armenians, France. As a result of lasting emigrations from the different regions and countries leads to diaspora Armenians having a mosaic appearance in terms of culture, religious belief, political standing and way of life in France and the population of the Armenian origin reaches to 300 000-650 000 according to different studies.

The mosaic appearance of the Armenian diaspora in France makes them, particularly young generations, fragile against the assimilation in France. To take measure to prevent assimilation, the Armenian community in France have institutionalized, formed and developed tools to make propaganda, and established many associations. Although there is no certain data regarding the educational and occupational status of the Armenians, it is estimated that the Armenians as a highly integrated to France have showed similarities with natives in terms of level of education, occupational and economic status. Another prominent feature of the Armenian diaspora in France is its high level of political participation and interest in French politics. Despite the small population of the Armenian community, important political figures have risen to prominence in French politics, such as Patrick Devedjian and former Prime Minister Édouard Balladur. Besides that, the Armenian diaspora have been active and efficient in the French public sphere as it has been in political sphere. The famous Armenian figures in France such as Charles Aznavour are added value for the forming public opinion, propaganda and lobbying activities on behalf of the Armenian diaspora, Armenians and Armenia. More importantly, the Armenian diaspora can largely take joint actions against the issues involving the community, Armenians and Armenia, although there are salient ideological differences among the members of the community.

Both the factors discussed and implemented in the third and fourth chapters, and in depth analysis of the historical background, provide a systematic answer to the main research problem of the study. According to the comparison made in the light of the findings, the underlying reason of why the Turkish diaspora in Germany is diplomatically weaker, less effective and less successful than the Armenian diaspora in France can be explained by the combination of various factors. The international conjuncture, determining the level of harmony of interests and aims between diasporas and host land is the most important component of these factors. As remarked in the last chapter, the international conjuncture have given the opportunity to the Armenian diaspora in France and the Armenian diaspora puts to good use it because of their rooted diasporic organizations, sturdy structuring, using public relations tools productively, historically interest and cultural based Armenians-French relationship, majorly common political stance against the issues involving their community, Armenia and Armenians, strong political and social activism, individual activists and leaders of the community and asymmetrical Armenia-diaspora relationship in favor of the Armenian diaspora.

Contrary to the Armenian case, the wind of the international conjuncture does not blow on behalf of the Turkish diaspora in Germany. As so in the history, the current situation may change in favor of Turkey over time. However, in the current climate, differentiating foreign policy and point of views between Turkey and Germany on the issue of EU accession of Turkey, Turkish human rights and democracy record, the Kurdish issue, the Armenian issue, the Cyprus conflict and approach to PKK's Syrian branch YPG, many other compelling crises that undermined bilateral relations and Turkey-EU relations have tensed up the relations, and have left the Turkish diaspora in Germany in a tight spot. Even if international conjuncture blows on behalf of the Turkish diaspora in Germany, it does not seem so possible that the Turkish diaspora puts to good use this opportunity despite its potential due to weak diasporic organizations, which have been recently activated, lack of political interest in German politics, strong engagement with the homeland politics at both individual and institutional level, highly polarized and divided structure of the community, low level but increasing participation to political and social sphere of Germany, disharmony on the political stance between the Turkish/Turkey origin lawmakers in Bundestag and the Turkish diaspora/Turkey, Turkish diaspora policy, bilateral Turkey-Germany relationship, educational and occupational status of the Turkish origins, average economic conditions of the diaspora and lack of the consciousness regarding being a member of a diasporic community.

This study discusses and illustrates how the international politics along with other disciplines, such as political science and sociology, transform and mold the diaspora's structuring, organizing, and the political activities, which determine the role and place of diasporas in the international politics. In this sense, contrary to what most studies concentrated unidirectional aspect of this relationship, this thesis focuses on the multidimensional correlation between the international politics and diasporas. In addition, factors discussed and intentionally or unintentionally applied to limited cases in the existing literature are insufficient to explicate the differences between the Turkish diaspora in Germany and Armenian diaspora in France with regards to their proportion of effects on international politics, and diplomatic power. Therefore, the literature does not grow in enough maturity to explain why some diasporas have come to the forefront as effective actors in the international scene, why others have not. Through the analysis and implementation of various factors expanded by this study, the comparison of the chosen cases of the thesis brings in a possible explanation to this research question, which can be

also applied for the different cases. Furthermore, diaspora activities are generally tried to be explained directly or indirectly through liberal and constructivist approaches. Beyond any doubt, these approaches ensure a notable sight for diaspora activities. However, they are unable to explain the main research problem of this thesis. Therefore, by way of examination of the international conjuncture molding the degree of harmony of interests among parties, the thesis provides a very useful and suitable theoretical basis for the realist approach to give a systematic explanation for diaspora activities in both political and social sphere. Lastly, there is no other study that examines and compares the Turkish diaspora in Germany and Armenian diaspora in France in such detail in terms of their differentiating extent of roles and influences in international politics. The comparison of the cases is rarely applied by researchers in diaspora studies and studies regarding its correlation with international politics. For these reasons, the thesis reaches out to make significant contributions to the literature and to contribute further studies in this field that presents extensive research area.

6.1 Results and Recommendations

Regarding the analysis of the factors affecting the efficacy, diplomatic power and success of diasporas, that have been implemented to the Turkish diaspora in Germany and Armenian diaspora in France, this study illustrates the reasons of that although the Turkish diaspora in Germany has a potential, it is not as influential, successful and diplomatically powerful as the Armenian diaspora in France. The international conjuncture which has direct influence on the diaspora's political activities at local, national and international level plays crucial and most critical role on the explanation of underlying reasons of differences among the specified cases with regards to international politics, because the harmony of the interests and aims between diasporas and the country where they reside is largely shaped by the international conjuncture as it is exemplified in the study. In this context, all the factors sorted throughout this study have the importance effect on the diaspora's efficacy, diplomatic power and success in various forms, but the fundamental factor is overlapping, at least harmony, of the interests between diasporas and host land state, if not so the other factors considerably lose their significance on the success of the diasporas' efforts. Through a comparative study, this thesis reveals the substantiality of the

realist perspective to explain a certain part of the diaspora's activities and their consequences in both social and political sphere.

Through the implementation of the factors affecting the efficacy, diplomatic power and success of diasporas in terms of international politics to the cases of this study, the hypothesis of this study is discussed and proven to a large extent. On the other hand, explanation and examination of the multidimensional correlation between the international politics and diasporas illustrate to what extent of these factors are determinant of the political activities of diasporas which make them significant part of the international politics. No doubt, diaspora studies presents considerable field of inquiry for the IR researchers as in the discipline of the political science and sociology.

The lack of the conceptual discussion regarding the Turkish diaspora stands out in the Turkish academy. The academically examining and discussion of the boundary of the Turkish diaspora is required to be examined without political prejudice. On the other hand, there is a need for studies on whether the ethnic Turks living in the lands that the Ottoman Empire lost after the Balkan Wars and the First World War can be referred as the Turkish diaspora. In this context, it seems quite useful to choose the Russian diaspora as a comparative case to investigate the ethnic Turks living in previous Ottoman territories.

Although some realist theorists have attempted to analyze diasporas' role and place in international politics, the number of the study regarding the examination of the diaspora's activities rather limited. As discussed in this study, the realist perspective presents a useful ground to investigate diasporas political activities and the success rate of their efforts in terms international politics. Therefore, further researches based on the realist approach will come in useful for the diaspora studies and diasporas' correlation with the international politics.

The comparison of the cases method has not been adequately deployed to diasporas, whereas the comparative case studies are useful to understand and explain how features/factors within the context influence the structuring, organizing, activities and success of diasporas. The fact that the same factor influences different cases in different extents and forms necessitates this research method in the analysis of diaspora activities. Therefore, it can be rewarding to deploy this method to diasporas for the literature.

This research has mainly worked on the secondary data and documents obtained from reliable public and private sources; nonetheless, fieldwork and new surveys could provide substantial current data regarding diasporic communities. In addition, the further surveys and fieldworks to collect certain data about the educational and occupational status as well as average economic conditions of the Armenian diaspora in France are required to for a better comparative study because these factors have notable influence on the success of the diaspora's efforts.

Lastly, this thesis works on the data and documents written in English. In addition to these data and documents, it utilizes from sources written in Turkish. In this sense, future researches on sources written in German and French can further deepen the studies regarding the main problem of this thesis.

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