# UNDERSTANDING JIMINTŌ (LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY) FACTIONALISM AS A STRUCTURE OF ELITE CIRCULATION IN JAPANESE POLITICS

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# UNDERSTANDING JIMINTŌ (LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY) FACTIONALISM AS A STRUCTURE OF ELITE CIRCULATION IN JAPANESE POLITICS

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ABSTRACT

Understanding Jimintō (Liberal Democratic Party) Factionalism as a Structure of Elite Circulation in Japanese Politics

The factions of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (Jimintō/LDP) have been subjected to different analyses over the years, each seeking to explain their origins and functions, and to forecast their future. Factions have been studied from cultural and functional-structural viewpoints, and have been characterized as being integral to both the functioning and breakdown of the Japanese political system and the LDP. This study aims to expand the discussion on the factions by moving beyond both these existing viewpoints by using the works of Weber, Michels, Pareto, and Mosca, and by introducing a new model for attributing levels of significance to the circulation of elites. Thus, this study seeks to examine the changing power and influence of the factions as a structure that is integral to the cycle of elite circulation in Japanese politics. While doing so, this study also aims to reexamine the functions and significance of the factions and the Japanese Prime Minister as a factional representative from the viewpoint of elite theories, whilst locating the Japanese case as firmly outside the scope of Japanese exceptionalism as possible by comparing it to the case of Italy's *Democrazia Cristiana* (DC). The findings indicate that the factions of the LDP have functioned as conflicting elite organizations with discernible policy involvements and differentiations. In addition, their powers have shifted in response to the needs of the party and the nation, producing the leadership changes necessary and ensuring that the political elites have been in a state of circulation within the LDP.

# ÖZET

## Understanding Jimintō (Liberal Democratic Party) Factionalism as a Structure of Elite Circulation in Japanese Politics

Liberal Demokrat Parti'nin (LDP) hizipleri ortaya çıkışlarını, işlevlerini ve gelecekteki durumlarını açıklamaya çalışan birçok çalışmaya konu olmuştur. Hizipler kültürel ve işlevsel-yapısal yaklaşımlarla çalışılmış ve hem Japon siyasetinin hem de LDP'nin işlev ve yıkılmasında önemli bir rolleri olduğu öne sürülmüştür. Bu çalışma Weber, Michels, Pareto ve Mosca'nın yaklaşımlarını, elit dolaşımlarının değer analizinin yapılmasını sağlayacak yeni bir model ile birleştirerek, mevcut yaklaşımların ötesinde geçmeyi hedeflemektedir. Bu çalışmanın amacı, hiziplerin değişen güç dengelerini Japon siyasetindeki elit dolaşımını sağlayan bir dinamik olarak ele alıp incelemektir. Bunun yanı sıra, bu çalışmanın bir diğer amacı hiziplerin ve dominant hizbin temsilcisi olarak Japon Başbakanının işlev ve önemini elit teorileri çerçevesinde yeniden ele alırken, bulguları İtalyan *Democrazia Cristiana* (DC) partisiyle kıyaslayarak Japon istisnailiğini de analiz dışında bırakmaktır. Bu çalışmanın bulguları göstermektedir ki, LDP'nin hizipleri yarışma halindeki elit teşkilatları olarak çalışmakta ve gözlemlenebilir derecede siyasi ayrımlara sahiptirler ve siyasi süreçlere katılmaktadırlar. Bununla birlikte, hiziplerin güçleri partinin ve ulusun ihtiyaçlarına göre değişim göstermiş, ihtiyaç duyulan yönetim değişikliklerini yaratmış ve LDP'nin bünyesinde siyasal elitlerin dolaşımını sağlamıştır.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

DC – Democrazia Cristiana

HoR – House of Representative of the National Diet

ILO – International Labor Organization

JSDF – Japan Self-Defense Forces

LDP – Liberal Democratic Party

MoF – Ministry of Finance

PARC – Policy Affairs Research Council

PKO Bill – Peacekeeping Operations Bill

PM – Prime Minister

PMO – Prime Minister's Office

US – United States

USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WWII – World War Two

# CHAPTER 1

# FACTIONS, ELITES, AND THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY

The Liberal Democratic Party (Jimintō/LDP) of Japan has been – and still is – a political powerhouse, both by Japanese and international standards since its inception in 1955. Since then, the LDP has won thirty-eight out of the forty-two elections that it has contested and has had such strong control over Japanese politics that it has been ousted from power only twice in 1993 and 2009 for a total of about six years, only to come back to the political scene stronger than before. Ideologically, the party has occupied the center-to-right spectrum of Japanese politics with the conservative political overtones overshadowing the liberal and democratic aspects but in turn becoming overshadowed itself by the strong pragmatism and adaptability it has shown. The LDP has a vast power base and resource pool for itself that has guaranteed it control over the highest – elected – political posts in Japan; generated ties to the bureaucracy, business, and interest groups which helps facilitate the political processes; and made it near-indispensable for Japanese politics to function. LDP has managed to project an image of itself, both at home and abroad, as being so strong and resourceful that it is seen as a political machine that cannot be beaten and a party that cannot be voted out of power except for brief periods at a time.

Yet, beneath this façade of power and resourcefulness is a party of continuous conflicts and internal divisions that stretch back in history beyond the LDP itself and will carry on into the foreseeable future. On the one hand, these internal divisions and conflict which was highly organized at the intraparty level, threatened the unity and power of the party by introducing political divisions and power struggles into the party. On the other hand, they have functioned as the LDP's basic internal units in

putting the party's and its members' power and resources to work by getting the house in order. The "basic internal units" in question are the factions (派閥 – *habatsu*, both characters meaning faction, lineage, and clique) which have been conspicuous in discussions about the power of the Jimintō and how it is wielded within the party itself, acting both as blessing and curse for the LDP. When the party was formed in 1955, there were six such factions all formed around a particular leader namely, Yoshida Shigeru, Hatoyama Ichirō, Ōno Bamboku, Ogata Taketora, Miki Takeo, and Kishi Nobusuke.[1] Although the numbers have been subject to change and eventual stabilization in the following years, these early factions were the basis of all later factional lineages within the LDP.

Integral to the LDP, factions were analyzed in the existing literature from two distinctive viewpoints. First of these was the cultural approaches, where Nakane Chie's "vertical society" and *oyabun-kobun* (親分-子分, translated as boss-henchman or foster parent-foster child) relationship figure prominently in explaining political factionalism as a reflection of Japanese culture and society on politics.[2] Second was the functional-structural approaches, which is a broad category which I am putting forward here to simplify discussion by bringing together a number of different explanations which focus on either or both political structure and function to explain factionalism in the LDP. Chief here are explanations such as those of J. A. A. Stockwin and Nathaniel B. Thayer that emphasize the Japanese electoral system between 1955 and 1993, and the party presidential elections of the LDP as sources for the existence and powerful positions of factions in politics.[3]

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[1] Reed, *Japan Election Data*, xx. These factional lineages are mapped out in Figure A (Appendix A).
[2] Chie, *Japanese Society*, 50, 59.
[3] Stockwin, *Governing Japan*, 140; Krauss and Pekkanen, *The Rise and Fall of Japan's LDP*, 108; Thayer, *How the Conservatives Rule Japan*, 21, 35.

Such existing conceptualizations have done much to improve our understanding of the LDP's factions through multifaceted analysis, despite eventually running into problems in being unable to explain continued factional divisions and power. These studies have tried to make sense of the origins of factions, situate them within Japan's political landscape, and eventually predict their future after the 1994 electoral reform. Factions have been noted as originating from the middle-sized multiple member electoral districts, and their functions have been described as securing party endorsements, distribution of funds, party posts, and leadership votes when the time comes for the party to elect a new president.[4] Thus, both their functions and their origins were attributed to the political system in which postwar Japan and the Jimintō operated. This explanation turned them into party political machines, power brokerages of the party that took over its day-to-day electoral affairs and concerns and forces that decentralized the party and destabilized its power.

Subsequently, both the Japanese public in general and scholars such as Tomohito Shinoda and Stockwin expected the factions to decline and the party itself to rise in electoral campaigns and for policy-based politics to become more salient from 1993-1994 onwards.[5] Their argument ran that as the old single nontransferable vote in multi-member districts electoral system of the House of Representatives was replaced by elections in single-member electoral districts and proportional representation lists after 1994, the functional-structural basis of factions would also cease to exist, leading to factional decline and the rise of the party and policy-driven elections. Although it must be admitted that factional decline has occurred, with Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō even going to war against them in the 2005

[4] Richardson, *Japanese Democracy*, 60.; Krauss and Pekkanen, *The Rise and Fall of Japan's LDP*, 18; Shinoda, *Leading Japan*, 12; Thayer, *How Conservatives Rule Japan*, 17.
[5] Richardson, *Japanese Democracy*, 83.; Krauss and Pekkanen, *The Rise and Fall of Japan's LDP*, 254; Stockwin, *Governing Japan*, 37, 192; Shinoda, *Leading Japan*, 14-15, 213.

elections and disregarding them in forming his cabinet afterwards, factions have been able to remain in existence and as salient political structures.[6] As recent as in the election of Kishida Fumio – who is a faction leader himself and was seen as the faction man in the election – to LDP party presidency and prime ministry the factions have played important roles in Japanese and LDP politics.[7] Whether this has come about because the existing studies have been overconfident in their pronouncements that the factions are political machines that rely on their structural origins and functional prowess or because the ability of factions to reinvent themselves and remain in existence has been underestimated is one question which should be asked for its own sake. Certainly, the factions have proven themselves to be structures more than what the existing literature has made them out to be and warrant a new approach into understanding their power and place in Japanese politics. In this study, I intend to address this particular conceptual failing in the literature and reevaluate the factions from an analytical framework which has been absent from their discussion: elite theory.

In this study, elite theory will be used as an analytical approach that provides a much broader scope of analysis than the existing approaches do, with its responsiveness and openness to a variety of evidence and sources of information. Furthermore, elite theory allows for the human element to be integrated into the discussion, which is an important factor in discussions of political organization and action. As such, the aim here is to employ elite theory as a means of emancipating the discussion regarding the factions of the LDP from constraints of culture, structure, and function, and instead use an approach that is much more holistic and mindful of the diversity of factors and actors that are involved in politics. In addition, the use of

[6] Jain, "Why LDP factions still matter for Abe".
[7] Sasaki, "Faction politics take back seat in LDP leadership race as general election looms"; Takahara, "The policies and backgrounds of each of the LDP leadership contenders".

elite theories is important as a move away from explanations that are either Japan-centric or normative in their judgement of the LDP's factions and factionalism. Elite theory is an approach that is better suited as a medium that reflects information both without any normative biases and in a way that can be situated in a global context.

Having been the party in power for as long as it has been, Jimintō has become an integral and entrenched part of the Japanese political system and structures, with near constant control over the legislative offices and the channels of communication to all other politically significant groups – such as the bureaucracy, big as well as small and medium businesses, agricultural and fishery populations – in the country. Through its vast and continuous control over the Japanese political landscape the LDP has formed the central pillar of the Japanese ruling class, functioning as the party of the political elites which shape both the day-to-day and long-term policy and politics of Japan. Within the party itself, the factions have become sub-organizations for the Japanese political elites serving to further organize, coordinate, and direct the power and energies of the Japanese political elites. Yet, the existing literature has handled neither the LDP nor its factions from an elite theory approach – save for a few studies on Japanese elites, which do not concern themselves with party or factions directly – rather opting to use cultural and functional-structural approaches. This has led to the situation in which the LDP and its factions have been visualized as cogs in the political machinery, existing as they do and doing their part because the culture or structures from which they emerge and the functions they must undertake necessitates it. These approaches have done much to lay the groundwork for understanding and further analyses of LDP's factions but have fallen short because of their negligence of the elite perspective and its explanatory faculties.

Moving away from such cultural and functional-structural explanations of factions, elite theory can offer a new and fresh look into these structures and the place they occupy in the Japanese political system and allow a reevaluation of their possible future. Moving in that direction, I aim to undertake here a study of the factions of the LDP from an elite theory perspective, especially focusing on what has been termed "the circulation of elites" in the literature. Within the context of the factions, the major question here is how can the changing power and influence of the factions of the LDP be understood in terms of a manifestation of a "circulation of elites" dynamic in Japanese politics. In seeking to answer this question, it is possible to both begin a reimagination of the LDP and its factions from an elite theory perspective and to reevaluate the functions, power, and place of factions in the LDP in particular and Japanese politics in general as elite structures.

In the following discussion, there will be a reconceptualization of the factions of the LDP as differentiated bodies within the Japanese political elite, that vie for control over political power within the institutional structures of the party and the legislative chambers of the National Diet. On one hand, the factions must go under such rethinking as – mentioned above – their treatment in the existing literature does not identify them or the LDP as institutions for the political elites and the discussion must be opened up in this direction. On the other hand, once the factions have been identified as structures of the political elites their power, functions, and position within the Japanese political landscape can be questioned and restated. Furthermore, the position and power of the Prime Minister, who rises to such a post first by being a faction boss and remains as such during his tenure will also come under closer

scrutiny.[8] The Japanese Prime Minister should be reimagined as a faction boss, who is inevitably – in reality or potentially – an elite leader within the LDP, that controls his own clique of contenders for power.

Understood in these terms, both the factions and the Prime Minister become viable subjects for a study on the circulation of elites within the Japanese political elites, as the rise and decline of their powers become observable. This discussion will be confined to a historical timeframe between the years of 1955 and 1993, in order to formulate a broader picture of elite movements in this period when the factions were operating under the original political system which led to their rise and set much of their functions. Through these discussions, I aim to argue towards the viewpoint that the changing power and influence levels between the factions of the LDP can be understood in terms of power changing hands within the broader stratum of Japanese political elites, where the ruling ideas and policies change but the overall ideological direction remains within the conservative or right-wing/right of center camp.

Through such an analysis, which explicitly acknowledges the factions as elite organizations and the Prime Minister as an elite leader, an alternative to the existing cultural and functional-structural analyses can be introduced to the academic literature. An elite theory approach is not based on a narrowly defined and constrained analysis of culture, structure, or function, but rather on a much more holistic approach that draws upon both these factors and others such as the actors involved, their interactions and relative positions, social and political trends, and history. This makes it possible for a much more flexible and holistic understanding of factions and the Prime Minister to emerge, by removing artificial analytical constraints that limit research. Furthermore, the analytical framework of elite theory goes beyond enlarging the

[8] Krauss and Pekkanen, *The Rise and Fall of Japan's LDP*, 100; Thayer, *How Conservatives Rule Japan*, 21; Tsuneo, *Japan's Backroom Politics*, 149.

scope and subject of analysis and also allows for the subjects in question to be placed and conceptualized within a broader analytical space in which the "political" or the "politically significant" are not constrained by culture, function, and organization. The pull of history and society, for example, emerge as two factors in explaining the powers and resources of these groups and actors, which are now considered as a part of the ruling class that is as historical and social a phenomenon as it is a political one.

Particularly in this study, two categories of analytical sources will be used: theoretical and political-historical. The theoretical aspect of the study, rooted in elite theory, will be built upon the works of Max Weber[9], Robert Michels, Vilfredo Pareto, and Gaetano Mosca.[10] Weber's study on types of authority provides a way to separate the study of factions from the cultural and functional-structural analyses by allowing for the internal organizational principles and norms of the LDP's factions to be understood by themselves. While keeping external factors that matter to the existing approaches in mind, the Weberian categories move beyond them in their operations and turn factions into independent subject of analysis to be understood on their own terms. Michels' study on the oligarchic tendency of the party organizations functions in partially similar fashion to Weber's categories by allowing the emergence and functions of LDP's factions to be analyzed and understood on their own terms. Furthermore, Michels' work allows for the logic behind the emergence of factions as elite organizations to be analyzed in the context of party politics, as opposed to a specific "Japanese" context. Pareto and Mosca provide the foundations for the application of both the identification of elite organizations and the circulation of elites an examination of which in the LDP's factions is central to this study. Political-historical sources are those that allow for the particular elite groups and actors to be

[9] Although this sentence refers to elite theory, Max Weber is not explicitly taken to be a scholar in this category. He is included here to mirror the structure of the study.
[10] Michels, *Political Parties;* Pareto, *The Rise and Fall of Elites*; Mosca, *The Ruling Class*.

scrutinized over the course of analysis. These include political and biographical information on Prime Minister, as well as the political history of Japan, the LDP, and the factions. An important primary source here are the Diet speeches of the Prime Ministers, which – as shall be discussed in detail later – act as platforms for competing elite agendas to be set out.

In a related vein, such an analysis also helps to reduce the sense of Japanese exceptionalism which can be found undergirding much of the cultural and functional-structural analyses. In such analyses, the emergence, functions, and powers of the factions and the weakness of the Prime Minister are found to be of such a degree in Japan that they constitute a unique or exceptional case, especially when compared to – as one finds – to the United States or the United Kingdom. Of course, neither factionalism nor weak Prime Ministers are unique to Japan, except for the way in which they have been formed and integrated into the political system.[11] Furthermore, the point of reference being taken in both the case of the US and the UK is quite off the mark when compared with the Japanese case, whose points of reference is better found on continental Europe. Through the application of elite theory whose claims and explanatory power are of a universalistic nature, and the employment of proper points of reference and comparable cases this situation can be remedied.

The specific point of reference which will be employed in this study will be that of the Italian Christian Democracy (*Democrazia Cristiana* – DC), which is comparable to the LDP in a number of respects. Both parties occupied the center-to-right spectrum of politics although the DC was not enjoy the LDP solitary situation of the LDP on the right, formed dominant party systems, included several factions within themselves which competed for control of top party and state posts, and were the

[11] Pempel, *Policy and Politics in Japan*, 8-9.

products of postwar politics and political contexts shaped by US influence.[12] Although both the DC and the LDP fell from power in the nineties, the former fell apart whilst the latter returned to power after a brief two and a half years away from the prime ministry.[13] Thus, the DC and LDP can be seen as having moved in parallel to one another – each being unique but also quite similar – which allows from them to be studied in such comparative perspective.

In effect, Japanese politics and the factions of the LDP can be analyzed from a position that sees them not as an exception but as a particular version of what emerges across the globe under certain conditions such as intraparty elite competition, one party domination, and right-wing consolidation in politics. In the context of this study, this would also translate to a constant mindfulness towards exceptionalism and an active rejection of it where possible, to deliver a sober account of Japan as unique but not exceptional. The key point here is to remain aware that the case of LDP is a particular manifestation of political factionalism – hence unique – which can be observed in parties across the globe – hence not exceptional.

Such an approach forms the third point of value in pursing an elite theory analysis of Japan, in that it allows for the theory itself to be built upon by using the evidence and experience that is to be found in Japan with regards to the ruling class and the circulation of elites. Thus, what emerges from this study becomes new knowledge and information that can add on to and alter both our existing perceptions of Japanese politics and ruling class, and elite theories in general. Here, Japan becomes less of an exception and more of a subject for a case study from which the theory itself can benefit, by adding onto itself the insights to be found in this country and the way in which its ruling class and political structures have been constituted.

[12] Samuels, "Tracking Democracies – Italy and Japan in Historical Perspective", 284.
[13] Samuels, "Tracking Democracies – Italy and Japan in Historical Perspective", 284.

Structure-wise, the following chapters will each build up aspects of the discussion that will take place in this study. Chapters two and three will set the methodology and theoretical foundations of this study in two parts. Chapter two will focus strictly on the question of factionalism through the lens of elite theories, and the analytical framework which emerges in explaining political factions. Here the theories of Max Weber on authority, Robert Michels on oligarchic tendencies in parties will be discussed. Furthermore, chapter two will discuss elite theory and the circulation of elites, working to define them in the narrower scale of factionalism and introduce an analytical metric – drawing also upon prior work in the field - on identifying significance in elite circulation between factions, which will essentially bring the scale of the theory down to an applicable size. Here the works of Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca with respect to elite theory and the circulation of elites will be discussed. Having established the methodology, chapters three and four will be dedicated to a reimagining of the factions of the LDP as elite organizations. Chapter three will focus on understanding the preexisting paradigm, whilst chapter four will engage the subject through and elite theory analysis. In chapter five a discussion of the Prime Minister as an elite leader will be carried out. Bringing the discussion in these two chapters together, chapters six and seven will include a historical analysis of the LDP between the years 1955 and 1993 – divided into the periods between 1995 to 1972, and from 1972 to 1993 – applying the theory and the discussion built up so far onto the historical record. In chapter eight, a comparison of Japan's factional circulation of elites will be put into a comparative context with the Italian case, where factionalism has been comparable throughout the postwar era. Chapter nine will bring the entire discussion together and conclude this study.

# CHAPTER 2

# CIRCULATION OF ELITES AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CIRCULATION MODEL

The main focus of this study are the LDP's factions as elite institutions, and the Prime Minister of Japan as a faction leader and head of the executive, within the focus of elite theory in general and the circulation of elites in particular. By using elite circulation to track power between the factions of the LDP – manifested by their leaders becoming Prime Minister – the ability of the party to survive and the political relevance of the factions as elite organizations can be better understood. This will be done within the timeframe of 1955 to 1994, which marks a period from the establishment of the LDP to the enactment of electoral reform after it had briefly fallen from power for the first time ever. This timeframe is beneficial because it encompasses that period in which the party operated under a relatively stable structural and electoral environment. Thus, analysis can be confined to a period where the pressures that have been understood as leading to factionalism –discussed in detail in the next chapter – remained relatively stable.

However, before applying elite theory to analyze either of these items in the given timeframe, the methodological confines of this study should be set out. The aim here is to reappraise these theories in the context of factionalism and to build upon them. This will be done by reaching down to their cores, adapting them to party factions and factionalism, and introducing ideal type examples to ground the discussion. This will then provide the empirical toolkit, upon which the rest of the study will be built. This toolkit will be comprised of both the works of established voices in political sociology and a novel classification metric aimed at identifying

significance in factional circulation. First, Max Weber's classification of authority and legitimacy will be discussed, with emphasis on how particular forms of authority and legitimacy may be found in factions and influence their workings. Second, Robert Michels' "iron law of oligarchy" will be analyzed with reference to factionalism in parties, as another manifestation of the oligarchic tendency that emerges in parties. Third, elite theory and circulation of elites as set out by Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca will be discussed and restated in the context of party factionalism. Fourth and finally, my own circulation significance model will be set forward, before moving onto the application of the analytical toolkit.

## 2.1 Weberian authority and legitimacy at the faction level

The first component of the theoretical foundations of this study is the classification of authority and legitimacy made by Max Weber. The classification set out by Weber provides an analytical framework into authority and legitimacy that is well-established and applicable in different contexts, without making recourse to context specific analyses. Thus, just as Weberian categories can be applied to the West, they can be applied to Japan and yield an objective analysis that does not legitimize Japanese exceptionalism in order to obtain results. Moreover, the findings can be used comparatively, allowing for the Japanese case to be better understood in a global context. In this sense, using the Weberian categories is another method of countering exceptionalism by deliberately moving the analytical toolkit into a universalistic and objective position. Furthermore, Weber's work can be used in harmony with elite theories, especially in the context of factionalism and the circulation of elites, as they play roles that support one another. Weber can be used together with Michels to describe the organization and internal structures of the factions, whilst Pareto and

Michels provide for their position within the circulation of elites cycle. Furthermore, by allowing for their internal authority and power structures to be identified, Weber's categories allow for factions to be better situated as elite organizations in circulation.[14]

Weber has identified three pure forms of legitimate authority[15], which are the traditional, legal, and charismatic forms of authority. Each pure type of authority has a form of legitimacy that sustains it, and taken together a particular form of authority and legitimacy shapes the socio-political space in which actors operate by controlling power, its possible uses, and obedience. Despite their state-level scale of explanation, Weberian types of authority and legitimacy can also be applied at smaller scales like that of political parties and factions and explain their formation, power dynamics, and continuation. This is due to the nature of Weber's work in which authority and legitimacy is understood as part of an organizational and institutional framework, meaning that they can be used as analytical categories as long as socio-political organizations and institutions are the subjects of analysis. Thus, they are not context bound in the structural sense, which allows their use in different contexts. Furthermore, they allow for the construction of particular faction ideal types to serve as examples in the discussion.

Used here in accompaniment, Matheson builds upon these forms of authority by identifying eight distinct sources of legitimacy at their foundation: convention, contract, conformity with universal principles, sacredness of authority or norms, expertise, approval of the exercise of power that the ruled extend to the rulers, personal relations between the rulers and the ruled, and personal quality of the ruler.[16]

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[14] Weber, *The Essential Weber*.
[15] Authority and domination have been used interchangeably in the literature on and translations of Weber's work. Here, the term authority is used.
[16] Matheson, "Weber and the Classification of Forms of Legitimacy," 200-205.

As I shall discuss below, Matheson finds that combinations of these eight sources of legitimacy can be attributed to the three types of authority which Weber has set forward. This further detailing of Weber's work expands the scope of the analysis by improving the explanatory power of the original categorization. In this way, Matheson's work allows for the discussion over factions in this study to encompass both the forms of authority one might associate them with and the particular forms of legitimacy as well.

### 2.1.1 Legal authority and party factions

First in the analysis of Weberian authority and legitimacy is legal authority. Legal authority rests "on the basis of enactment" and "on a belief in the 'legality' of patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such terms to issue commands".[17] Thus, this is a form of authority that is "by the book", with the "book" in question being the body of legal documents – constitution, laws, ordinances – which dictate the forms and uses of power available to its holders. Furthermore, this is a form of authority in which procedures – of enactment and execution – relating to the creation, modification, and upkeep of the body of legal documents that shape the political system takes special importance. These sources form the metrics by which power is created, distributed, and used, and also by which its legitimacy is judged.

However, these sources should be understood only as the "location" at which legitimacy rests, rather than its explicit source in systems functioning on the basis of legal authority. As Matheson notes, legitimacy under legal authority is formed and sustained on the basis of "convention and the rationality of law", the former resting on

[17] Weber, *The Essential Weber*, 133; Weber, *On Charisma and Institution Building*, 46.

the "legality" of law and the latter on it being "enacted" or "rationally established".[18] As such, legal authority can sustain itself so long as the holders of power can maintain that their actions are legal by convention and that their orders are being put through to others using the rational means of enaction. Moreover, obedience – which depends upon the legitimacy of authority – under legal authority is owed to "the enacted rule, which is therefore decisive for who obeys the rule and to what extent" and the "duty of obeying is graded in a hierarchy".[19] As such, on the one hand, systems of legal authority function as long as the body of legal documents which form the basis of power and authority can be brought to bear upon individuals. The relationship between these documents and those who are ruled has a direct bearing on their actions and the effective use of power by those who exercise authority over society, as it brings authority to bear upon individuals, distributes power, and prescribes its use. Ultimately, this relationship affects both the perceived legitimacy of the system as judged by the ruled and their adherence to the system. On the other hand, it can be seen that legal authority manifests itself in hierarchies of authority, which Weber has identified as being exemplified best as the bureaucracy.[20] There are clearly defined channels through which authority and power travels, and a chain of command which determines the exercise of power and the effectiveness of authority at each level. Furthermore, there is great predictability in the flow of personnel as well.

In the context of party factionalism, legal authority presents a challenge because it appears to be a form of authority with an accompanying socio-political organization that is less that of a faction and more of a ministry in its inner structures and workings. However, an ideal type of a party faction that rests upon legal authority can be constructed. A primary expectation here is that such a faction would be highly

[18] Matheson, "Weber and the Classification of Forms of Legitimacy," 211.
[19] Weber, *The Essential Weber*, 133, 134.
[20] Weber, *The Essential Weber*, 133.

institutionalized, with its own staff, ordinances, and a hierarchy of authority that binds its members and determines their career paths. Such a faction would be quite stable, as internal disputes could be minimized and group loyalties maximized through allegiance to the body of legal documents which constitute the basis of the faction. Furthermore, one can expect factions based on legal authority to have strong collective and institutional memories guiding their actions. On the side of leadership, factions based upon legal authority could either be constraining or free. Constrained leadership would come about if the authority, power, and abilities of the leader is set out in detail and the legality of the leader's action are closely observed, leading to a situation in which the leader is forced to work entirely within the system, lest they risk a loss of legitimacy. Freer leadership would come about if the authority, power, and abilities of the leader is set out in broader terms that allow more leeway, in which case there is less chances to risk losing legitimacy and more for active leadership.

### 2.1.2 Traditional authority and political factions

The second type of Weberian authority to be analyzed is traditional authority. Traditional authority rests "on the belief in the sanctity of orders and powers of rule" and "the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority under them".[21] In effect, systems based upon traditional authority are based upon tradition itself, which is taken as immemorial and inviolable, and is the source of all power and authority in society. Here, tradition becomes the guide that shapes the way in which power can be used and authority exercised in society, which is inevitably in keeping with tradition. In a system of traditional authority, obedience to the ruler stems from "particular

[21] Weber, *The Essential Weber*, 135; Weber, *On Charisma and Institution Building*, 46.

worthiness of his person that is sanctified through tradition".[22] Thus, the leader who relies upon traditional authority is legitimized, as the keeper of tradition and the man ordained by tradition.

Yet, tradition is only a location or a receptacle in which the sources of legitimacy that holds up the system of traditional authority rests. Matheson finds that underneath traditional authority there is the "sanctity of tradition, convention, and the personal relation of power-holder to power-subject" as legitimizing forces.[23] Key here is the sanctity of tradition, where tradition acts as the metric against which the actions of the leader is held up and evaluated, and where the leader must "keep the faith" when it comes to matters that fall under the jurisdiction of tradition to remain legitimate. Tradition is not to be violated because it is held to be inviolable, and to force tradition becomes equal to forcing the legitimacy of authority itself. However, Weber also states that outside of the scope of tradition leaders have freedom of action, where the use of power and authority can be much more flexible and accepting of personal initiative and arbitrariness.[24]

Convention under traditional authority is similar to legality of law under legal authority, in that it describes a source of legitimacy that exists as long as the power and authority held by the leader is thought to be traditional by the ruled.[25] This means that the legitimacy of a given system is sustained, as long as the people believe that it is rooted in tradition and that tradition itself is being kept alive, as compared to being kept intact. The personal relations of the power-holder to the power-subject can be understood in similar terms, in which there must be the loyalty of the ruled towards

[22] Weber, *The Essential Weber*, 135.
[23] Matheson, "Weber and the Classification of Forms of Legitimacy," 207.
[24] Weber, *The Essential Weber*, 135.
[25] Matheson, "Weber and the Classification of Forms of Legitimacy," 207.

the leader under systems of traditional authority.[26] Here, loyalty is not an independent factor but yet another traditionally defined element, as loyalty to the leader is a result of a traditional dynamic of obedience to the leader and loyalty to his actions, as long as they are legitimate.

As an ideal type, a political faction that is built upon the exercise of traditional authority would be shaped by the norms and traditions of the society from which it emerges. In fact, the faction itself may be held as a reflection of tradition itself in politics, both by its very existence and by its integration of traditions and norms that can be found in the society from which it originates. In its functions, the leader and his followers most likely would be clearly demarcated, but group identity, based upon shared traditions, would remain strong and the faction can rally around them. Although codifiable, most operational rules of such a faction can be left unwritten, as much of tradition usually is, and the flow of power and authority in the faction – as well as its inheritance – would be left to the conscientious carrying out of tradition by members. With regards to leadership, the impact of the norms and traditions upon which the faction is built and which have a bearing on the form and functioning of the faction would be the greatest arbiters. These may make leadership based upon traditional authority easy, by promoting group harmony, obedience to the leader, and by providing a set of norms which are easy to keep in order to maintain legitimacy. On the other hand, if tradition promotes an open path for accusations of illegitimacy it can easily throw a faction into chaos by allowing pretenders to rise up or by leaving great leeway for internal dissent, which can delegitimize leaders or make it hard to run a faction by tearing at its unity.

[26] Matheson, "Weber and the Classification of Forms of Legitimacy," 207.

### 2.1.3 Charismatic authority and political factions

Charismatic authority, is the third and final type of Weberian authority under analysis here. Charismatic authority rests upon "devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him".[27] Thus, systems built upon charismatic authority tend to include personality cults dedicated to the leader, as it is the personality of the leader that creates and sustains it, which must be carefully maintained for the sake of authority and legitimacy. The flow of power and the possibilities of its use is nearly unconstrained, as the leader who relies upon charismatic authority is only bound by the strength and extent of his own charisma and rules. The leader can only be compared to himself and his legitimacy will last as long as he can maintain that the qualities which have made him, and the system he has created, retain their superiority in the eyes of his followers.

Legitimizing charismatic authority is the "sanctity or extraordinary quality of persons, groups, or norms, and the extraordinary quality of an individual person", in which the quality of the sacrosanct and the superhuman are combined.[28] The sacrosanct quality of the leadership legitimizes its position as the holder of power and authority, much like the Mandate of Heaven legitimized the Emperor of China, by elevating the leadership to the position of the chosen people and allowing them the claim that they have an inherent right to rule. In turn, this inevitable right is based upon the superior qualities which the leadership claims to have and whose possession and application forms the second part of what legitimizes them, found in the form of the individual leader at the helm. Furthermore, as obedience rest upon the "purely personal, non-everyday qualities" of the leader which compels the people to pledge

[27] Weber, *On Charisma and Institution Building*, 46.
[28] Matheson, "Weber and the Classification of Forms of Legitimacy," 209.

their allegiance in the first place, the person of the leader becomes doubly important.[29] Thus, the ability of the leader to exercise power and to bring his superior qualities to bear down upon the socio-political space becomes paramount in both legitimizing his authority and sustaining his rule. Obedience and legitimacy are equally demanding of the leader, in that he must constantly perform his duty and prove his worth, if he intends to keep his power and authority intact.

Under such conditions, the leadership must first gain the confidence of the ruled, by getting them to believe in their right to rule and then the individual leader at the top must work to prove that these qualities are "as advertised" by creating a new order. Only then can the circuit of legitimacy under charismatic authority becomes complete. The worthiness of a group to rule is of no use, if it cannot produce a leader that will bring his superior qualities to bear upon the socio-political space and reshape it. Then, this leadership group remains as group of pretenders to the throne, with much potential but no action to back it up. On the other side of the coin, a leader who has no following to back him up and no broader leadership group to prove to the people his inherent right to rule through the possession of the ability to rule, cannot exert much power or authority. The lone leader becomes a captain without a crew and no amount of effort will be enough to get his ship to sail, unless he can form a leadership group around himself.

A unique aspect of charismatic authority which should also be taken into account is its "routinization" either through traditionalization, rationalization, or both.[30] Essentially, this process of routinization is the method through which systems built upon charismatic authority sustains itself after the passing of the leader upon which it depends. In this process of routinization, Weber points out three possible

[29] Weber, *The Essential Weber*, 139.
[30] Weber, *On Charisma and Institution Building*, 54.

outcomes: emergence of traditional authority out of charismatic authority; transformation of the close followers of the leader into a "legal or estatist staff"; or reframing of charisma to allow for a successor to be chosen.[31] If traditional authority emerges out of charismatic authority, the charisma of the individual now becomes the charisma of tradition and sustains itself in that form. If a managerial class forms, the leadership group assumes the charisma of the leader onto itself and becomes a hierarchic organization which can then either make use of legal or traditional authority. Finally, if the meaning of charisma undergoes change, then the path to its inheritability also emerges, with the charisma of the founding leader becoming something that can be found in others and recruited to occupy the post of leadership.

As an ideal type, a political faction operating on charismatic authority would be organized in a way that features a division between the leader, the leadership group, and the mass followers. The faction would show strong cohesion and identity, as long as the incumbent leader maintains his charisma and power. In such a faction, power would be concentrated at the hands of the leader, with some also shared to key lieutenants who help keep the order in the faction by forming the leadership group. The leader can be acknowledged as being "charismatic" for having a variety of tools and powers at his disposal, including but not limited to oratory skill, demeanor, connections in the right places, and access to funds, which he can put to use towards the faction itself. A leader that proves inept in using his tools and powers will inevitably lose his followers due to his failure to translate potential authority into reality, which is equal to being unable to prove one's legitimacy through action. Furthermore, the faction might not survive the retirement or death of the leader, if the process of routinization is not carried out.

[31] Weber, *The Essential Weber*, 142.

## 2.2 Political factions and the iron law of oligarchy

Having discussed Weberian categories of authority and legitimacy and how they can be related to the political faction in its formation and sustenance, here I shall discuss how the work of Robert Michels offers complementary insight into what makes and sustains a political faction. Key here is what Michels has describes as the "iron law of oligarchy", as well as the process and factors that lead to the full emergence of this law in political parties. Here, oligarchy is that part of the ruling class that dominates in the political sphere, who occupy the top of the political hierarchy both within the party and in relation to society. What Michels' work offers is an elite theory approach into why an oligarchy emerges in all socio-political forms of organizations, compromised of the leading members of the society or organization in question, who then pursue their own political agendas and power politics as elite leaders atop of elite organization. Thus, the theory lends itself to a discussion on the organization of the elites in society and particularly in political parties, which can be adapted into a context where the iron law of oligarchy takes place under conditions of competition between members of the oligarchy.

The central maxim that leads Michels' work is that "Who says organization, says oligarchy".[32] Michels' view is not that of an equivalency between the two terms, in that organization does not immediately mean oligarchy by virtue of its existence. What exists between the two is an organic relationship, in which "Organization implies the tendency to oligarchy".[33] This relationship is a logical progression from one to the other, which assures that once a socio-political organization emerges it will inevitably spawn an oligarchy of its own. Thus, the emergence of an oligarchy is a process that is tied into the development of the socio-political organization within

[32] Michels, *Political Parties*, 365.
[33] Michels, *Political Parties*, 70.

which it is coming into existence, as it comes to occupy a certain niche in the socio-political space. In the case of a political party, oligarchy emerges as the party seeks to gain power by obtaining the highest offices of power in the land, electioneers, and forges ties to interest groups across the socio-political space. This is the "iron law of oligarchy" which Michels puts forward.

In identifying the steps in which oligarchy arises in a political party, Gilani notes certain developments which must take place. First, ideological rigidity must emerge, triggering the process that leads to the eventual transformation of the party to big-tent status as it competes for an ever-greater share of the vote to stay in power.[34] From this, two aspect of a political party within which an oligarchy has formed can be discerned. First, the party at hand must have eliminated any ideological cleavages within itself, regardless of the method, and can provide a united front with all of its members working beneath a shared political vision. This assures that the oligarchy that is to emerge reflects the needs and values of the organization that they will be leading and that ideological in-fighting – which can tear the party apart – will not emerge later. Second, emergence of an oligarchy will transform the party fundamentally, by diverting much energy to keeping it in power and by causing it to have an expanded base. This leads to the point that the oligarchy in question is not only an elite leadership group but also a self-serving community, which has a prerogative to stay in power.

In between these two events, the party must become self-seeking – as mentioned above – whilst leaders should emerge that can impose their goals on members willing to follow them.[35] As such, the oligarchy emerges once the party assumes a unified ideological front and can turn its energies outwards towards

[34] Gilani, "The Iron Law of Oligarchy: A Dilemma for Political Parties," 110.

[35] Gilani, "The Iron Law of Oligarchy: A Dilemma for Political Parties," 110.

winning votes, ruling the country, and competing with opponents. Michels' view is that in modern parties, as well as in social organizations, there is an inherent need to delegate duties and responsibilities, which forms the basis of oligarchic groupings.[36] Understood as such, the oligarchy can be seen as a managerial leadership group that emerges within the microcosm of the political party and in turn becomes a candidate to rule the country. They emerge because the mass of the electorate and the party organization does not have the time, resources, or skills to engage in politics full time and feel a need to have a class of leaders to take charge. These leaders are distinguished from the members by their "superior knowledge", "control over the formal means of communication", and "skill in the art of politics".[37] The politicians which make up the oligarchy can be found at the top party posts, controlling political resources such as funds and posts, and they have their own networks and connections which become the channels through which policy-making takes place. They are effectively both members of the party elites and the political elites, but it must be noted that the latter should be qualified by the ability to gain access to and remain in power. A group of party elites that have no access to power at a higher – national or state – level does not necessarily qualify as part of the political elites of a given country, as their power and authority is constrained into its own particular space.

Once the oligarchy emerges, the leaders within this group along with their followings, can become independent actors in their own rights.[38] It is at this point that the first instances of factionalism emerge from Michels' work. Whilst the iron law does work to create an oligarchy – who are the party elites – that is ideologically united, it does not prevent the rise of competition between leaders for the top posts

[36] Michels, *Political Parties*, 66.

[37] Gilani, "The Iron Law of Oligarchy: A Dilemma for Political Parties," 110.
[38] Michels, *Political Parties*, 70.

and positions. The oligarchy will remain united and cohesive in its outward appearance, and keep working towards a common ideological goal, but struggles over leadership, access to posts and resources, and clashes of personality between members of the oligarchy can lead to the emergence of competing factions. Thus, the iron law of oligarchy creates an elite class within a political party and allows for differentiation and divergence within this elite class over a number of political and personal differences. Once contenders for top leadership emerge within this elite group and create factions are formed, each with their own power bases, resources, and competing aspirations for power, factional conflict and politics within the party are the next logical step. Of course, particularly strong leaders may suppress this dynamic but it is bound to reemerge once they are out of the political scene and their suppressive existence is removed.

## 2.3 The circulation of elites

Pareto in his "The Rise and Fall of Elites" (Un applicazione di teorie sociologiche), and Mosca in his in his "The Ruling Class" (Elementi di scienza politica) set out the theory on the circulation of elites. Moreover, Mosca's work also offers insight into the emergence of factionalism, which will also be brought into the discussion as well. The importance of Mosca's and Pareto's work on the circulation of elites theory is that it provides the blueprint for how a circulation cycle takes place. The blueprint which emerges here will provide the pattern of historicization and analysis of the case studies in this study, informing the choice of evidence, relevant dynamics, and key developments which will be a part of the analysis of the factions of the LDP.

One aspect of Mosca's work to note before going detailed discussion is his key assumption – or rather belief – that an organized minority will triumph over a

disorganized majority.[39] The emphasis here is not on the numbers either side has but on their level of organization. It is the benefits of organization that brings Mosca to this assumption, such as the ability to coordinate power and resources, and to manifest and impose a united will upon others. The minority becomes a force to be reckoned with and achieves its status as the ruling class because it can achieve levels of organization that makes it easier to wield and exercise power and authority over the ruled, who exist as a disorganized amorphous mass. From this perspective, Mosca's circulation of elites is one of clashing organizations and organizational durability, as the ruling class declines and a challenger class of elites rises from within the governed masses.

In shortly outlining his work, Pareto finds that the circulation of elites is precipitated by a rise of "religious sentiment", followed by the decline of the old elite and the rise of a new elite.[40] Described in this fashion, Pareto's circulation of elites is process where a new creed rises in society and replaces a preexisting one that is in decline. Similarly, Mosca finds that as the "balance of political forces" shifts, a certain capacity becomes more sought after that is different from what the existing ruling class has – which loses its value – and elites can no longer fulfill their roles in the socio-political landscape, leading to changes in the ruling class.[41] As a new organized minority rises up in challenge to an older one, it does so in a socio-political situation which has been fundamentally altered. This new balance point, undermines the power base of the older ruling class and opens up avenues for a new ruling class to emerge in competition. Both Mosca and Pareto identify elite circulation as a semi-permanent event that is dampened when socio-political equilibrium is reached and restarted once this balance is broken.

[39] Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, 53.
[40] Pareto, *The Rise and Fall of Elites*, 40-41.
[41] Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, 65.

An important note for Mosca's formulation is that his emphasis on the balance of forces is when the cycle of elite circulation is started, numerous pre-existing competitors vying to achieve the status of the ruling elite can be found in the socio-political landscape. However, these challengers do not emerge because the changed conditions favor them over the existing ruling class or because they have managed to organize themselves in a manner that can challenge the power and resources of the existing ruling class. These factors are important, since without them the emerging challengers would stay as another group in the socio-political landscape without the motivation or ability to challenge the existing ruling class. Yet, what is important here is the nature of the socio-political landscape in which these groups operate, which is in a constant state of struggle for power and "social forces" are always on the lookout for paths to power.[42] As can be seen, once the socio-political equilibrium is broken, what emerges are not the contenders themselves but the competition itself for the status of ruling class. The challengers are pre-existing actors in the socio-political landscape, with a particular capacity and level of organization, who are integrated into the socio-political system at times of equilibrium but engage in the struggle to achieve ruling class status once the conditions allow it.

Delving further into what marks the beginning of a cycle of elite circulation, Pareto's "religious sentiment" and Mosca's "political formula" and "social forces" need further examination. The religious sentiment which Pareto has in mind, which is not explicitly identified in "The Rise and Fall of Elites", is not an actual article of faith or religion but more a novel cause or rather the shift in "residues" which Pareto stresses. Although numerous, most important here are the residues of combination and preservation, with the former carrying a capacity to take risks and the latter carrying a

[42] Livingston, *Introduction* in *The Ruling Class*, xix.

capacity to provide security.[43] Although not fully antithetical, these two residues – found within the ruling elite – determine how they exercise their power and authority vis-à-vis the class of people which is governed. Zetterberg notes, that in Pareto's terms circulation of elites does not simply entail a change of personnel but also a change between the two residues as well, as one residue becomes dominant over the other.[44] In effect, the shifts in "religious sentiment" is a much more secular event than implied, as the dominant residue of the elites change. This entails changes not only in how power and authority is wielded, but also a change in worldview that has broader impact on the form, actions, and attitude of the ruling elites as a whole.

Further building on Pareto's work, Ashin finds that "The constant succession of one type of elite by another is a result of the fact that each type of elite has certain advantages that, however, cease to meet the needs of governing a society as time passes."[45] As such, the shift in residues can be seen as a result of changes in the socio-political make-up of a given people at a given period of time, that exerts pressures on the ruling elites by removing their capacity to rule forcefully and efficiently. In this context, the rising "religious sentiment" that precipitates the circulation of elites is the emergence of socio-political factors that fundamentally undermine the existing order or open up avenues through which challenges can emerge. This sets off the decline of the existing elite whose dominant residue is no longer fit to keep it alive, and the power and authority it wields falls weaker and inefficient. At the same time, it allows for the rise of a new elite that contains a competing residue which is much more fit with the times, and – although lacking actual power and authority – is on the path to achieving these eventually.

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[43] Zetterberg, *Introduction* to *The Rise and Fall of Elites*, 7. There is little elaboration on what the "residue" itself is in *The Rise and Fall of Elites* except for its categorization. However, "residue" could be understood as a dominant worldview or approach to leadership, which dictates elite actions.
[44] Zetterberg, *Introduction* to *The Rise and Fall of Elites*, 8.
[45] Ashin, "A Change of Elites", 56.

Turning towards Mosca, the political formula is the basis on which the power of the political class is legitimized, "which are in turn based on beliefs or ethical systems which are accepted by those who are ruled".[46] Furthermore, Mosca notes that the consent of the ruled is tied to their degree of belief in the political formula of the ruling class.[47] In the context of the socio-political landscape, the political formula is also the lifeline of the ruling class and performs two functions. On the one hand, the political formula provides for the ruling class the grounds on which justifies its existence and status to the governed. It fulfills a role akin to the foundation myth of a nation but instead of providing a story to unify the people behind a common identity, seeking to legitimize the form and functions of the ruling class. On the other hand, the political formula serves as the connection between the ruling class and the governed or the rest of the socio-political landscape. The strength at which it captures the minds and hearts of the governed class becomes the measure of the power and authority of the ruling class over the governed. When the socio-political equilibrium is broken, the political formula is also broken, as the existing ruling class begins operating under conditions to which it and its political formula is not adapted to. The result is a loss of legitimacy and the opening of the path for accusations of inability to rule, which invites others to challenge the existing ruling class to replace it.

If the political formula is the basis on which a ruling class justifies itself, a social force is "any human activity or prerequisite that has a social significance" around which the ruling class is formed.[48] The social force is the foundation of the "capacity" which any ruling class – and challenger – possesses, that informs its functions as the ruling class. A social force brings individuals together around a common cause and function, which are the foundations of organization, and allows

[46] Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, 70-71; Livingston, *Introduction* in *The Ruling Class*, xvi.
[47] Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, 97.
[48] Livingston, *Introduction* in *The Ruling Class*, xix.

these individuals to exist together as a significant socio-political group. In turn, this group hopes to make use of a disruption in the socio-political equilibrium and make a bid to achieve ruling class status. These groups built around social forces exist in multitudes within the socio-political landscape and Mosca writes that "the state is nothing more than the organization of all social forces that have a political significance".[49] As such, the social forces that are truly politically significant can always be found operating at large, as they are a part of the equilibrium whether as a part of the ruling class or as an outsider to it. Their activity becomes much more intense once the equilibrium which binds their power is disrupted and the cycle for the circulation of elites begins.

Both Pareto and Mosca agree that as a shift in the religious sentiment or the political formula and the social forces takes place, the existing elite goes into decline and loses the ability to remain in power, exert power and influence, and respond to the needs of rule. Going further, Pareto argues that the declining old elites do not fall out of power immediately but enter a period of struggle with the rising new elites in an attempt to keep its hold on power. This is a period in which the existing ruling elites become softer in their outwards attitudes and more rapacious in their actions.[50] This is a result of the ruling elites using measures to keep their power intact, by appealing to the good graces of their challengers and by entrenching their own power by taking as much out of the socio-political landscape as they can. The former is the policy of appearing approachable and kind so as not to be vilified and thrown out violently, whilst the latter is the policy of bearing down on the governed so as to keep control of what sources of power remain.

[49] Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, 158.
[50] Pareto, *The Rise and Fall of Elites*, 59.

On the point of becoming softer, Pareto finds that a declining elite becomes humanitarian in its attitudes, losing the ability to defend its own privileges in the process.[51] As the declining ruling elites lose power, it masks its position by appearing to increase the thoughtfulness it has for the governed and seeks to assure their continued loyalty by an appeal to the humanitarian values and virtues that make up good and moral government. However, this path of action is essentially that of appeasement, deployed by the declining elite to ward off its rising competitor. Zetterberg notes that Pareto recognizes this point as well, and that in his view "such humanitarian sentiments would easily be a platform for rallying the opposition".[52] In effect, the appeal to humanitarian sentiments becomes a sword that cuts both ways for the declining elites. On the one hand, this can come about as the rising elites can position themselves as the better defenders of such values, thus undermining the position of the declining elites. On the other hand, such appeals inevitably entail the declining elites losing ground to the rising elites, as it works to appease them by making sacrifices in the name of such humanitarian sentiments. It is also possible to see that by taking such a path, the existing elites also try to incorporate rising ones to deflect the challenge coming from them.[53] If successful, this could sap the power of the rising elites and rejuvenate the declining elites in one stroke.

On the side of rising rapacious actions, Pareto finds that the softness which overcomes the declining elites is simply a façade adopted at a time of weakness.[54] Thus, the adoption of an appeal to humanitarian sentiments towards the governed and the rising elites, and the appeasement of the rising elites is only the outer shell. Afterall, the declining elite is in such a position not because it wishes so but because

[51] Zetterberg, *Introduction* to *The Rise and Fall of Elites*, 2.
[52] Zetterberg, *Introduction* to *The Rise and Fall of Elites*, 2-3.
[53] Allen, *The Circulation of Financial Elites* in *Handbook of Geographies of Power*, 5.
[54] Pareto, *The Rise and Fall of Elites*, 68.

of the external circumstances bearing down upon it, chipping away at its power and authority. In this situation, the prerogative of the declining elites is to remain in power and as the ruling elite, which directs their actions towards keeping control over what source of power remains available. In fact, Pareto notes that the fraudulent practices of the ruling elites rise as their power wanes.[55] Although the term "fraudulent practice" is not exactly filled in by Pareto here, it can be understood as the rise of corruption or the use of force in the way in which the declining elite protects and makes its remaining power and authority felt by others. A particular fraudulent practice that Allen finds is that declining elites try to rewrite the rules of the game.[56] As the declining elite is set on staying in power, and despite being weaker than before, is in power until the moment comes that it is replaced by the rising elite. Thus, the struggle to stay in power is drawn out and having enough strength to cling to power, the ruling elites in decline can turn to sustaining their power by changing the structures that power them.

As part of the circulation of elites, neither Pareto nor Mosca hold the illusion that the new elites will be superior to the older ones. Pareto contends that the new elites rise feigning to be different than the declining old elites and put forward humanitarian platforms but promptly shed the act once they achieve elite status.[57] Furthermore, Pareto finds that signs of a descending elite can be seen in an ascending elite and that the new elites take on the qualities of the old soon after coming to power.[58] This is not simply ideological cynicism that sees no difference between alternatives in elites, but part of Pareto's observation that the circulation of elites is an

[55] Pareto, *The Rise and Fall of Elites*, 69.
[56] Allen, *The Circulation of Financial Elites* in *Handbook of Geographies of Power*, 3.
[57] Pareto, *The Rise and Fall of Elites*, 36; Zetterberg, *Introduction* to *The Rise and Fall of Elites*, 3.
[58] Pareto, *The Rise and Fall of Elites*, 56; Pareto, *The Rise and Fall of Elites*, 86.

historical constant and that "History is a graveyard of aristocracies".[59] Pareto's work is constructed on the observation that elites constantly succeed one another and that the circulation of elites is not the displacement of one elite by a radically different another but more a passing of the baton between runners who remain essentially identical. Thus, when Pareto talks of a circulation of elites, and how the declining old elites are triumphed over by rising new elites, this is not a matter of celebration or jubilation as a better group has achieve elite status. On the contrary, no group achieves elite status because of their outstanding morality or virtue, and once in power although the people change but the elites continue being elites.

In agreement with Pareto, Mosca observes that once a new elite forms, traces of the old could be found in the new and that the new elite assumes the trappings of the one which it had displaced.[60] Much like Pareto, Mosca is motivated by the assumption that both the old and the new are essentially elites and both the acquisition of ruling class status and the wielding of supreme power and authority has a quality to it that is shared by both. Furthermore, the historical progression is again at play here, and the two elites – one declining and the other rising – are always exerting a certain pull on each other. Whilst the rising elite is generating pressures that works to undermine the declining elite, for its part the declining elite is generating pressures that help shape the rising elite by resisting the challenge to unseat it.

Of course, the declining old elites and the rising new elites are different from one another in a number of aspects: socially, as one is the elite and the other is a contender rising from the governed; in terms of dominant residues; and in terms of cadres. However, both are elites, which have been playing a vicious political game to achieve ruling elite status and are susceptible to the same trappings of power and

[59] Pareto, *The Rise and Fall of Elites*, 36; Pareto, *Mind and Society*, 1430.
[60] Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, 68, 364-365.

authority once they achieve ruling elite status. Furthermore, within the context of historical continuity, no ruling elite emerges in a vacuum. The declining elites inevitably play a role in shaping the rising elites, and may even become role models. What is certain here is that the moment an instance of elite circulation is completed, the new elite swiftly moves to the positions vacated by those that it replaced, and the process of circulation begins anew.

Turning towards how each scholar has understood the circulation of elites as an actual event, the similarities in their thinking continues. Zetterberg, Hartmann, and Allen agree that for Pareto the important type of circulation of elites is less the replacement of one elite group by another and more the recruitment of eligible and promising individuals into the ranks of the elites, and demotion of those who are "unworthy" from elite status.[61] It can be seen that the ideal type of circulation of elites for Pareto is the constant exchange of personnel inside the ruling elite, as opposed to the change of cadres. Mosca points out that the type of elite circulation which he finds to be ideal is the slow and continuous modification and rejuvenation of the ruling class, which can sustain a ruling class for great lengths of time if the balance in transforming without falling apart can be achieved.[62] The ideal type of elite circulation thus becomes the one in which the ruling class, aware of the crisis facing it and its declining ability to deliver on the capacity it possesses, works continuously to keep itself up to date. This process of updating eventually entails the introduction of new social forces into the ruling class and the adjustment of the political formula to accommodate the modifications being made. Furthermore, Mosca emphasizes that this is a process that cannot be reversed easily and continues until a new social

[61] Zetterberg, *Introduction* to *The Rise and Fall of Elites*, 2; Hartmann, *The Sociology of Elites*, 13; Allen, *The Circulation of Financial Elites* in *Handbook of Geographies of Power*, 3.
[62] Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, 462.

balance is reached through the reformation of the ruling class.[63] Thus, much like Pareto's pronouncement that the circulation is a historical constant Mosca also sees the circulation as an inescapable process. As the circulation of elites takes place and the ruling class reconstitutes itself, this is also a process of restoration of the socio-political equilibrium in which power and authority is redistributed and socio-political positions are rearranged.

One important point in this circulation as an actual event that must be noted is that although it is construed as an inevitable occurrence, its disruption – although never completely – is still possible. Hindering the normal process of circulation is tantamount to the declining ruling elite signing their own death warrant, as it turns the socio-political shift that undermines the existing elites into a pressure point waiting to blow up.[64] As such, to stop or significantly block the normal process of circulation – which may happen both due to increased rapaciousness and fraudulent activity or because a kingmaker emerges that handpicks who gets the ruling elite status – can create crises that would later cripple the socio-political system. Aware of this fact, Pareto himself has shown a favorable disposition towards liberal societies for ensuring the optimum operation of the circulation of elites, despite being branded as anti-democratic by some.[65] In sum, the circulation of elites as Pareto has described it is an inescapable socio-political process, which is best carried out under conditions that allow for free circulation of individuals between the ruling elite and the governed. To obstruct this process is to invite much more violent and broad replacements of cadres between the two groups, such as revolutions, which might either restart the normal circulation of elites or replace one form of obstruction with another. Either

[63] Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, 67-68.
[64] Hartmann, *The Sociology of Elites*, 13, 15.
[65] Kolegar, "The Elite and the Ruling Class", 355, 360.

way, the old elite is replaced by another that soon imitates it and the process of circulation begins anew.

On this point of continuation and blockage, Mosca also observes that "democratic" systems constantly replenish the ruling class through recruitment from the lower classes, whilst "aristocratic" systems introduce inheritance and dynasties to the ruling class.[66] In the former case, what emerges is the ideal type of elite circulations which Mosca also shows a preference for and has been introduced above. It is the latter case that produces an exceptional circumstance, although it is based on phenomenon which Mosca notes as being ordinary. Mosca writes that all ruling classes have a tendency to become hereditary.[67] As the ruling class is motivated to keep its position, along with the power and authority it brings, hereditary succession becomes one avenue of ensuring that these privileges are not lost to the original people which have gained them. However, this is also a method by which the circulation of elites is hindered and carried out in an imperfect fashion. As the ruling class turns to replenish itself from within its own ranks, it runs the risk of heightening the impact of a breakdown of the socio-political balance by closing off the avenues through which the ruling class itself can be rejuvenated.

### 2.3.1 Mosca and factionalism

Turning to the question of factionalism, Mosca's key observation is that humans are always in conflict and tend to get into groups for support with united moral, intellectual, and cultural capacities.[68] Thus, factionalism in Mosca's sense is a natural reaction to the default mode of existence within the socio-political landscape, where the struggle to achieve ruling class status is central. Here, constant conflict pushes

[66] Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, 395.
[67] Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, 61.
[68] Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, 163.

individuals who share outlooks and motivations to band together to form factions, whose main aim then is to leverage the collective resources and power in pursuit of their common goals. In this sense, the purpose of factions is to achieve ruling class status and they come into existence in response to a fundamental need to organize so as to achieve the concentration of power and resources necessary to achieve ruling class status.

Furthermore, Mosca also writes that "when social environments are very circumscribed, internal conflicts arise among minute sections of fairly civilized peoples".[69] Thus, factionalism can be seen emerging from highly confined socio-political landscapes where there might be little differentiation, as well as from the broader socio-political landscape in which differentiation between factions might be quite large. However, in the former case, the fact that factions might have only little differentiation between them – confined as they may be to the same ideological space – does not stop them from engaging in the conflict to rise to the status of the ruling class. At the core, all of them may have different capacities and social forces but the end goal remains constant. In fact, each faction has been formed for the purpose of reaching the singular goal of achieving ruling class status.

### 2.3.2 Circulation of elites in political factions

Having discussed the theory of circulation of elites as formulated by Pareto and Mosca, here I will discuss the implications of the theory in the context of political factions. Beginning with the emergence of factions themselves, it can be seen that each faction is an organized minority onto itself, whose aim is to bring together individuals of a certain capacity – or residue – and then direct their collective

[69] Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, 164.

resources and energies to the achievement of ruling class status. Here, achieving ruling class status is equal to achieving party leadership and becoming what can be termed the “ruling faction”. Furthermore, these factions are locked in a constant struggle over achieving ruling class status, which dies down once an instance of the cycle of circulation is completed but picks up again just as soon. The cycle of elite circulation is an inescapable fact of the socio-political landscape and the factions are either biding their time for when it starts anew or making their move to become the ruling faction. In the context of factions within a political party, this can manifest itself as infighting which can break the party by spawning a constant bidding race for the leadership of the party. However, this tendency might also be mediated by the party, or in fact by the factions themselves, becoming a chronic issue that picks up speed only when the conditions for it is ripe. In this form, the factional struggles to capture the party leadership can allow a party to include different capacities that would allow it to better respond to the challenges of rule but introduce intraparty conflict as a cost each time a leadership contest goes underway.

The cycle of elite circulation among factions begins as the faction which constitutes the leadership – the ruling class of its context – within the party at a given time is faced with a crisis that threatens its continued rule. This is the breakdown of the socio-political equilibrium which means that the capacities of the existing ruling faction, and the dominant residue which it possesses, fails to meet the needs of society and cannot perform the functions expected from it. Simultaneously, the ruling faction also experiences a loss of legitimacy as its political formula suffers from the changed conditions that bring about pressures detrimental to its ability to rule. The impact of changing requirements as to which capacity and residue is necessary for the ruling faction to keep its status can be manifested in a variety of events, which are

themselves precipitated by a shift in the socio-political balance. Failed electoral politics or defeat in the elections is one event that can start off a cycle of circulation of elites, as it would undermine the ruling faction by showing it unable to sustain the forces of the party and unable to elevate it to ruling class status in the broader socio-political landscape. Inept leadership that fails to respond to the changing needs, demands, and expectations of society and tarnishes the standing of the party in the socio-political landscape can also trigger a cycle of elite circulation with the ruling faction shown unable to rule. Lastly, a socio-political shift in society might impact the power and resources of party factions – regardless of an actual impact on the ability of the ruling faction to function – which would lead to a cycle of circulation of elites by altering factional balances. The changing of the guard in political parties between different factions whose power and influence are shaped by intraparty politics and public sentiment over periods of time, can also be seen as another instance of such circulation that occurs on more natural terms.

Once the cycle of elite circulation is brought into motion, the declining ruling faction then begins a process by which it seeks to continue its hold on power. To this end, the ruling faction makes an appeal to the good graces of other factions whose prerogative is to unseat it and make a move to the position of the ruling factions themselves. This tendency can be seen manifesting in several actions which the ruling factions may end up following. The ruling faction may attempt to fends off challengers by trading or tendering in favors which had been incurred previously, or by arrangements in which it shares some of its power for recognition of its continued rule. The ruling faction may also seek to enter into a coalition or shuffle its existing coalition by incorporating the rising faction or factions in the party, which can include the use of patronage by the ruling faction. Finally, the ruling faction may enter into

agreements, whereby it can trade its support for succession to a particular faction for its continued support or where it can guarantee its own leave from power in exchange for support until that time comes.

For its part, challenging factions mount attacks that seek to demonize and delegitimize the ruling faction, and prove their own worth, while doing so. This might take the form of appeals that showcase the ineptitude or unpopularity of the ruling faction, contrasted with the preferable capacity and image of the faction in question. There might also be promises of better patronage or fairer intraparty relations. However, once a faction achieves the position of the ruling faction for itself, it is bound to return to a primarily self-seeking position, granted that it has the power or ability to do so after the cycle of elite circulation is completed. Whether the faction has enough power to readily manifest such a tendency or not, the changeover will take place and the conditions for the cycle of elite circulation to begin anew will be set.

Finally, looking into the actual process of circulation in the context of political factions, two tendencies can be identified. On the one hand, there is the ideal form of circulation for both Pareto and Mosca, in which the ruling faction sustains itself by constantly remaking its own membership, recruiting those individuals which will add to its power and dropping those who take away from it. This recruitment can take the form of elements being drawn away from other factions at any time or from the broader socio-political landscape during elections. However, neither of these can be easily accomplished at the level of factions for reasons of their own. Members of other factions will be bound to their organization by virtue of the social force of which they are a part, and would need significant inducements to join another faction whose uniting social force – though in flux – is different. Electoral recruitment is problematic because turnover of incumbents may not be fast enough for the necessary

recruitment to take place or the ruling faction may be unable to push incumbents out for the sake of rejuvenation. On the other hand, this circulation can take the form of entire cades, in the form of factions, replacing one another in occupying the post of the ruling faction. This form of elite circulation is much easier to perform, as factions are already engaged in a struggle to reach the post of the ruling faction and seek to replace one another en masse.

Regardless of the manner in which factional elite circulation takes place within a party, there exists the problem of the cycle becoming blocked for two major reasons. First is the rise of hereditary politicians and political dynasties associated with particular districts and factions, which means that the ruling faction achieves the continuity of a particular capacity or residue. This can prevent the ruling faction from responding to the disruption of the socio-political balance and even create a certain antipathy on part of the public towards the party.[70] Second, is the emergence of a kingmaker faction that would not itself assume the status of the ruling faction but chooses who gets to occupy to post of ruling faction. This can hinder the normal circulation of elites within a party, as the kingmaker would become the de facto enforcer of the circulation of elites and its arbiter.

## 2.4 Circulation significance model[71]

In addition to identifying instances of elite circulation between the factions of the LDP, in this study I am also aiming at assigning significance to different instances of circulation. To that end, in this section, I will be introducing a "circulation significance model" whose aim is to provide a qualitative empirical model to further qualify the instances of elite circulation. Here, I will first be describing the central

[70] On this final point of antipathy, the American reaction to the Clintons and the Bushes can be recalled.
[71] Appendix A contains the relevant figure that summarizes the model.

focus of the model and what I call “ruling leadership” a major metric, which is an aggregate of the independent variables which determine the significance of circulation, used alongside considerations of agenda fulfillment and length of tenure. Second, the discussion will shift to a detailed overview of individual parts of the model and their foundations, along with the larger application of the model. Third and finally, the model itself will be fully introduced, once all of its constituent parts have been clarified and set into place.

On the face of it, the changing fortunes of individual factions within a party, as they constantly rise and fall – with some achieving ruling faction status now and losing it later – can all be classified as instances of elite circulation through political factions in a one-party dominant system. However, in analyzing the case of the LDP, such a conclusion would be misleading as it would fail to account for the differences that occur between the tenures of different ruling factions and Prime Ministers. No two ruling factions and Prime Ministers are the same, and this situation reflects on the way in which their tenures pan out, once they are in power. Thus, what is necessary in a model is both the ability to identify changes in ruling faction but also the ability to identify whether the changes can be considered “significant” which can then be used as the basis for assessing the degree of elite circulation that takes place. The changes in ruling faction should be qualified in the analysis, so as to be able to claim that they do constitute a proper instance of elite circulation within the party. The model proposed here aims to put forward a qualitative empirical model for the circulation of elites at the political faction level, focusing on the change of the “ruling leadership” and other factors. Here, to track the changes brought about by changing ruling factions, the Prime Ministers will be used as key markers, as they are the most visible and politically significant member of the faction which they lead.

### 2.4.1 The ruling leadership

The term "ruling leadership" is an umbrella term, which captures a number of the factors of circulation – the independent variables in the case of the model – which pertains to the two main actors that are the main objects of study: the factions, one of which becomes ruling faction, and the Prime Minister, who is the leader of the ruling faction. It should be noted, however, that for the model it is the latter actor who is much more important to keep track of when looking for factors through which to qualify the change which has taken place as elite circulation. This is because the Prime Minister, who is the head of the executive, the LDP, and the ruling faction, can be identified with his faction as its key representative.

On the one hand, the policy inclinations of the ruling faction are influenced by the leader – as he holds the power to recruit members, and extends his patronage to existing members both in funds and posts – who is in a position to give the faction his desired shape. On the other hand, the policy inclination of the faction has allowed for the leader to emerge, by making it suitable for members with suitable skills and policy inclinations to set themselves apart. As such, following the point made by Thayer, just as it can be argued that the factions created leaders it can also be argued that the leaders have created factions.[72] Furthermore, besides the power to shape and direct the energies of the ruling faction and the party, the tone and agenda of the government is also set by the Prime Minister, which is bound to reflect the policy inclinations of himself and his faction. Thus, the Prime Minister is the peak elite leader within the party at any given time and he can be identified with the ruling faction. In this sense, tracking changes in leadership is a good way of tracking changes in the ruling faction,

[72] Thayer, *How the Conservatives Rule Japan*, 56.

which can then be analyzed through the model in order to qualify the changes and identify them as different instances of elite circulation.

As a term, “ruling leadership” encompasses a number of items, which constitute part of the independent variables that the circulation significance model will be taking into account when classifying factional changes as elite circulation. Here, it is sufficient to briefly describe what each variable is, as they will be discussed in more detail – along with their foundations – in the following section. First is the changing agenda between administrations of individual Prime Ministers, which is one of the major indicators of the policy inclinations and choices of both the Prime Minister and the ruling faction. Second is the differences in the leadership style of each Prime Minister, which plays a part in their ability to effectively wield power in the party and bring their authority to bear upon other factions. Last is the background of the Prime Minister, as well as that of his faction members taken as a whole, as this can also be another way of identifying differences between factions. These three items allow for the model to encompass important changes that take place as ruling factions and Prime Ministers undergo circulation, without becoming bloated with too many details and going all over the place but not to a conclusion. Furthermore, they allow for focus to be shifted to those observable items where differences between ruling factions and Prime Ministers can be identified. In sum, it is the changes in the ruling leadership that forms a major metric by which the circulation of elites within the context of LDP’s factions will be analyzed and qualified.

### 2.4.2 Parts and application of the model

In applying the circulation significance model, case studies of individual administrations between 1955 and 1993 will be conducted, focusing on the ruling

leadership that exists in each period. Thus, during analysis the Prime Minister and the ruling faction will be scrutinized and analyzed on three independent variables – which are agenda, leadership style, and background – in a manner that would allow them to be understood both individually and, in comparison to others. Depending on the outcome of analysis through the circulation significance model, three categories of change in the ruling leadership and other factors will be assigned to each case: "no significant change", semi-significant change" and "significant change". Each category corresponds to a different level of elite circulation, which is "weak circulation of elites, "moderate circulation of elites" and "strong circulation of elites" respectively. In effect, it will be the changes in the ruling leadership that will then inform the model-based analysis on how a given instance of elite circulation is to be identified in terms of its significance.

In analyzing the agenda and key policy focus of the Prime Minister and the ruling faction as an independent variable, the basis of analysis will be set on the classification of issues that Hayao Kenji and Shinoda Tomohito have offered, which will be used in conjunction. On the one side, Hayao identifies three types of issues that the Prime Ministers must deal with as part of their agendas, calling these "obligatory", "continuing" and "discretionary" issues.[73] The first category of obligatory issues are those "systemwide conflicts" which cannot be ignored.[74] Under this category items such as dealing with the Lockheed and Recruit Sandals[75] that emerge to the top of the immediate agenda, or the passage of the budget bills can be placed. These are issues which emerge outside of the power of the Prime Minister and cannot be ignored as they command great importance for either the LDP or the political system in general to function. The second category of continuing issues are

[73] Hayao, *The Japanese Prime Minister and Public Policy*, 21.
[74] Hayao, *The Japanese Prime Minister and Public Policy*, 21.
[75] Lockheed Scandal 1976 and Recruit Scandal 1988 were major bribery scandals that rocked the LDP.

those over which the Prime Minister has limited discretion of non-involvement but whose effects would be difficult to ignore.[76] Here, issues such as electoral or tax reform, or continuing international negotiations may be placed, as these issues have a propensity to be spread across administrations, which must all deal with it. The third and final category of discretionary issues are those issues in which the Prime Minister has "a long-standing interest" and chooses to become involved.[77] These are the issues in which a leader picks up because they have been largely invested in and can command most authority owing to personal expertise. Foreign relations, economics and social policy are such policy areas, in which the leaders make a conscious effort to place, direct, and conclude an item on their agenda. Although Hayao does not make this observation, it can be argued that such discretionary issues may end up as continuing issues, if they remain unsolved under one administration but remain important enough for the next administration to be unable to ignore them. This transformation can also happen in reverse, if a continuing issue is picked up by a Prime Minister as a key item in his agenda and becomes its centerpiece.

On the other side, Shinoda briefly notes four categories of issues which become part of the Prime Ministers' agenda, which can be identified as "coordination", "international consideration", "questions of basic national ideology", and "discretionary" issues.[78] Issues of coordination, international consideration, and basic national ideology can be seen as categories that largely overlaps the categories of obligatory and continuing issues that Hayao identifies, as they require the attention of the Prime Minister and develop independent of his power and influence. It is the category of discretionary issues which overlaps exactly between the two

[76] Hayao, *The Japanese Prime Minister and Public Policy*, 24.
[77] Hayao, *The Japanese Prime Minister and Public Policy*, 25.
[78] Shinoda, *Leading Japan*, xvii.

categorizations, where the Prime Minister has the freedom and the motivation to bring an item of choice onto the agenda.

Looking at these two forms of classifications, a simplified division between "systemic" and "discretionary" issues in the agenda can be reached, and both categories of issues can be analyzed for their own worth. Looking at those agenda items that are systemic, analysis will focus on how succeeding administrations have handled those issues which have been on the agenda for all of them. Systemic issues also include crisis measures and policy items which emerge during the daily course of politics, such as the 1973 oil crisis which Prime Minister Tanaka faced or the 1991 Gulf War which Prime Minister Kaifu had to handle. In the case of "discretionary" agendas, analysis will focus on what the incumbent Prime Minister chooses to make his flagship policy and how he goes about realizing this agenda item. The focus on the flagship policy of a Prime Minister is important, as nearly each LDP Prime Minister has committed to such a policy in seeking to set his tenure apart.[79] This flagship policy tend to be in an area in which the political skill and inclinations of the Prime Minister lies and can be brought into politics to achieve the policy goal that has been set. Thus, the agenda of a Prime Minister can be analyzed as an aspect of the ruling leadership and used to identify circulation significance.

Looking into leadership style as an independent variable, Shinoda's typology of Japanese Prime Minister types will be informative for the model, alongside the style description which emerges from a freer reading of the literature. Shinoda identifies four different types of Prime Ministers in Japan under LDP dominance, which are "the political insider, the grandstander, the kamikaze fighter; and the peace

[79] Richardson, *Japanese Democracy*, 106.

lover".[80] The political insider type of Prime Minister has "abundant internal sources of power" and "enjoys stable support within the ruling party and close ties with the bureaucracy and the opposition parties" which the other types lack such as Satō Eisaku[81] or Takeshita Noboru.[82] The ideal candidate here can be seen as Prime Minister Satō Eisaku, whose tenure is the third longest and second longest uninterrupted for Japanese Prime Ministers, as he was able to manipulate the political machinery with great ability. It can be argued that it was also Prime Minister Satō's power that allowed him to stay in power for as long as he did, and for his faction to remain the ruling faction as well. The grandstander type of Prime Minister is one that would seek support from the public, lacking it from within the party such as Nakasone Yasuhiro.[83] Nakasone Yasuhiro – or the more recent Koizumi Junichiro – was able cash in on his popularity with the public as a source of power, eventually also winning an extra half-term as Prime Minister. The kamikaze fighter type is a type of Prime Minister who would sacrifice both public support and term in office in exchange for support in finalizing an unpopular piece of policy such as Hatoyama Ichirō or Kishi Nobusuke.[84] Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, who traded his time in office for the passage of the 1960 revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty. The peace lover type of Prime Minister is the opposite of a kamikaze fighter, in that he would not be willing to risk his post or risk making enemies for the sake of policy and end up without achievement such as Suzuki Zenkō.[85] Prime Minister Suzuki's tenure began with the end of LDP's civil war – after it had claimed Prime Minister Ōhira Masayoshi's life – and was largely dedicated to not rocking the boat and bringing back to life the

[80] Shinoda, *Leading Japan*, 205.
[81] Names in Japanese will appear in the surname first format.
[82] Shinoda, *Leading Japan*, 205.
[83] Shinoda, *Leading Japan*, 205, 206.
[84] Shinoda, *Leading Japan*, 208-209.
[85] Shinoda, *Leading Japan*, 205, 209.

animosities of the previous decade. This typology will be applied in this study to differentiate between the leadership styles of Prime Ministers, which is an important factor in both how power it wielded by the Prime Minister and in the setting of the agenda. Thus, changing leadership types can be integrated into the analysis as another aspect of the ruling leadership and used in describing the nature of elite circulation.

Finally, background is an important independent variable in identifying changes in the ruling leadership and the type of elite circulation in question. Here, background is both about the personal details of the Prime Minister – especially his status as a specialist as a *zoku* politician, which will be discussed later on, based especially on their pre-political experience – and the ruling faction he leads. It is important to take into consideration the lineage of the faction in question, its size, and the make-up of its membership in terms of *zoku* members, which is a source of difference between factions of the LDP.[86] If not a difference in attitudes, this cleavage between factions can be seen as introducing differences in access to power in the larger socio-political landscape and to the bureaucracy by virtue of differences in political socialization between actors. This piece of background information is revealing for changes in the ruling leadership, because one's affiliation as a *zoku* in a particular field is an open admission of their policy inclinations.

### 2.4.3 Outline of the circulation significance model

The analysis through the circulation significance model begins with analyzing changes in the ruling leadership, as administrations change and one faction of the LDP replaces another in the position of the dominant faction and the leader of said faction becomes Prime Minister. For each case, the three independent variables which

[86] Thayer, *How the Conservatives Rule Japan*, 169-170.

make up the ruling leadership – agenda, leadership style, and background – will be analyzed based on the criteria set out in the previous section. The result emerging here, will then be filtered through three sets of assumptions and expectations which defines the relation between each type of ruling leadership change and degree of elite circulation. These three sets of assumptions and expectations define the "no significant change and weak circulation of elites", "semi-significant change and moderate circulation of elites", and "significant change and strong circulation of elites" relations which are the dependent variables of the model. The end result of analysis through the model will be the identification of the tenures of Prime Ministers with one of the three sets of relations, and the conclusion that their tenure fits into a certain type of circulation of elites.

The main assumption that defines the relation between an instance of no significant change and weak circulation of elites, is that the ruling leadership has stayed relatively unchanged. A number of supporting assumptions and expectations follow from this position. In this type of relation, one assumption as to why the ruling leadership has stayed constant and the circulation of elites has been weak is that succeeding Prime Ministers may have come from the same faction. A ruling faction that has enough power to dominate others and consistently has its leaders serve as Prime Ministers would impede on the circulation of elites. On a similar note, a faction that emerges as a kingmaker – without actually assuming ruling faction status – may impede the process of circulation by picking winners and perpetuating a ruling leadership that would be beneficial to its own goals. Another reason for the emergence of such a relation is that succeeding administrations may seek to or be forced to continue each other's legacies – especially in terms of the agenda and how it is handled – thus removing this aspect of change for the ruling leadership entirely.

Fourth and final reason which might be behind the emergence of a no significant change and weak circulation relation is that the Prime Minister and the ruling faction may be too weak to wield power and authority, failing to initiate an independent agenda or showing a peace lover leadership style. The first expectation from an instance of change in power, where a no significant change and weak circulation relation has emerged is that the resultant agenda is either unfulfilled or it is fulfilled regardless of the ruling faction and the Prime Minister in power. The second expectation is that leadership styles and backgrounds may remain unchanged, or even if they were to change, they may emerge as only marginal to the broader political process, thus having no effect on the analysis. The final expectation is that, Prime Ministers that come to power under such conditions would be likelier to have shorter tenures.

For a semi-significant change and moderate circulation of elites relation, the main assumption is that between two administrations some – but not all and not especially any particular – aspects of the ruling leadership will undergo change. The first supporting assumption here is that succeeding Prime Ministers are likelier to come from different factions. This would mean that an actual change in the ruling faction itself will be taking place, which increases the possibility for the ruling leadership to change. The second supporting assumption is that succeeding administrations may keep certain agenda items, but there will be a change in either the agenda or the way in which holdover items are being handled. Thus, the possibility of a change in the ruling leadership becomes possible as the agenda of the Prime Minister and the ruling class become subject to change. A third and final supporting assumption is that although a kingmaker may again pick who gets the position of ruling faction and which faction leader becomes the Prime Minister, the ruling faction

and the Prime Minister will be able to set the agenda or show his leadership style by virtue of a relatively independent power base. Here, the power of the kingmaker may be bypassed, especially by a grandstander Prime Minister or a Prime Minister that becomes a political insider thus allowing for a change in the ruling leadership to occur. The first expectation from an instance in which a semi-significant change and moderate circulation of elites relation emerges is that the agenda may be partially or fully enacted with the Prime Minister and the ruling faction becoming involved only in certain respects. A second expectation is for the leadership styles and backgrounds to change but these may also remain constant. The final expectation here is that Prime Ministers will be likelier to have longer tenures but may not extend beyond the full limits set by the LDP itself, with turnovers in office relatively stable.

For a significant change and strong circulation of elites relation, the main assumption is that the ruling leadership will be mostly – if not entirely – changed between any two administration. First supporting assumption here is that the succeeding Prime Ministers will come from different factions and the ruling factions will change. Thus, in this relation the central actors that form the ruling leadership change entirely and allow for a different ruling elite to emerge. The second supporting assumption is that Prime Ministers are able to and do set their own agendas, and influence the way in which systemic items are handled. The third and final assumption is that the ruling faction and the Prime Minister has its own power base that allows them the operate independently and reshape the existing components of the ruling leadership with their own. This would mean that a complete circulation has taken place as the ruling leadership has been completely remade, which is much more likely if a political insider type of Prime Minister has come to power. The first expectation from an instance in which a significant change and strong circulation of

elites relation has emerged is for the agenda to be fully or partially enacted, with the Prime Minister and the ruling faction becoming largely involved in the policymaking process. A second assumption is that the leadership styles and background are likely to change entirely. The third and final expectation is that Prime Ministers are likelier to have longer tenures, and that the turnover is office is relatively lower as compared to the other two relations.

# CHAPTER 3

# LDP'S FACTIONS AS POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS

The first step in the analysis focusing on the identification of the fortunes of LDP's factions as circulation of elites is the reconceptualization of factions as differentiated and competing elite groups of their own right. To that end, this chapter is dedicated to understanding the factions and factionalism of the LDP with a strict focus on the conceptualization found in the existing literature with regards to origins, functions, and powers of LDP's factions. Discussion will first focus on the existing cultural and structural-functional the existing approaches, followed by a historical contextualization of factions in Japanese politics, the LDP, and their functions and powers in politics between 1955 and 1993.

The aim here and in the following chapter, is to reconceptualize the factions as groups which have meaningful divisions between them, which would allow for them to be identified as separate and different elite subgroups that are engaged in cycles of elite circulation. Most significant in this regard is to demonstrate that the factions do have certain differentiations in a political sense, such as by providing an extra political label besides that of the party, by fostering a policy or policy position, or by providing the ground for policy discussion to take place among others. If the discussion about LDP's factions can be liberated from the confines of party political and narrow electoral concerns, and be understood as part of a national political framework, their conceptualization as elite organizations can also be rendered more concrete.

## 3.1 Existing views of LDP's factions

One of the two existing approaches to the question of political factions in Japan is the cultural explanation approach. The cultural explanation to factionalism in Japanese politics – and especially the LDP – is largely based on the notion that the faction either originates from or is a manifestation of a leader-follower – or *oyabun-kobun*[87] – relationship which is a staple of Japanese culture and society as put forward by Nakane Chie.[88] Olsen, and as noted the Japanese press, go one step further and define factions as an anachronism, which can be seen either as a holdover from Japan's feudal past or an exceptional quality of its political life – or both – which will exist unless Japanese culture undergoes radical change itself.[89] In this view, political factions exist in Japan because the entire culture and society carries a disposition towards having such bodies of informal organization – based as they are on personalistic and clientelism relations – emerge within any body where the Japanese are organized and in competition. Personal and clientele relations are seen as a cornerstone of Japanese social organizations and networks, with the idea of Japanese exceptionalism being an inescapable corollary of this initial notion. The explanation behind the existence of political factions becomes a sort of a tautology in that by virtue of its Japaneseness an organization will have factions and factions are a mark of Japaneseness in an organization.

Of course, there is an element of truth to this approach in that leader-follower relations have been highly visible and observable in Japanese political history and they inevitably manifest themselves in politics. Furthermore, the original makeup of the LDP's factions in 1955 – which will be discussed in the following section –

[87] Literally meaning foster parent and foster child, implies a boss-subordinate relationship.
[88] Chie, *Japanese Society*, 50, 59; Takeshi, *Japanese Society*, 64-67; Richardson and Flanagan, *Politics in Japan*, 100-102, 182; Baerwald, *Party Politics in Japan*, 17.
[89] Olsen, "Factionalism and Reform in Japan's Liberal Democratic Party", 260, 263; Totten and Kawakami, "The Functions of Factionalism in Japanese Politics", 109.

confirm this position to hold true. Essentially, there is an appeal to traditional authority, in the Weberian sense, being made by the cultural explanation approach. The argument being put forward by Nakane and others is that leaders are legitimized for their fulfilment of traditional *oyabun-kobun* relations and loyalty derives from the legitimacy of the leader in fulfilling his role properly as described in tradition. Certainly, the factions of the LDP did fulfill some aspects of the ideal type for a faction which have been identified earlier. The faction, especially in its earliest forms, with its hierarchical structure and personalistic leadership which appeared to promoted boss-henchman type of relations, emerged as a political structure rooted in traditional Japanese social organizations. Furthermore, most factional operations were not codified – especially norms such as proportionality and seniority that governed party affairs or factional succession – although the factions did develop offices. However, one key difference which such explanations have left out – that is missing from the ideal type – is the existence of a central rallying point and identity for the factions, as factions were consistently denied policy-based divergences that would have given them a central identity. One can also point out that the cultural approach can also be seen as dealing with charismatic authority which is rapidly traditionalized and understood in such terms. This is because a leader, who possesses the qualities and resources to have a loyal following that creates his "charisma" is in effect replicating what is a cultural form, and the personal basis of his rule is quickly overtaken by the traditional since it imitates a form of informal organization that is culturally predefined.

Thus, the cultural explanation tends to approach the question of factionalism in Japanese politics in a reductionist manner by channeling all discussion into a cultural framework, which yields the same answer no matter the approach. This

essentially removes the questionability of the factionalism phenomenon as the answer becomes "Japaneseness" which can neither truly be dissected nor scrutinized in a manner that would allow it to be understood as an objective phenomenon. In this manner, the cultural approach fails to yield a nuanced understanding of factionalism in Japanese politics and by going for an "exceptionalism" argument ignores the point that Japan is not alone in having political factions.

The other existing approach to the question of factions in Japanese politics is the structural-functional approach pursued by Fukui, Thayer, Cox, and Rosenbluth among others, which is much more widely varied than the cultural approach. One strand of the structural-functional approach finds that the LDP has factions because the electoral system in place between 1955 to 1993 – which used multi-member districts with single non-transferable voting – pitted conservatives against one another and necessitated factional backing to win in elections.[90] The driving idea here is that LDP's factions have been the products of this particular electoral system which nurtured intraparty conflicts over a limited amount of conservative votes, where the candidates standing for elections needed resources and expertise beyond what they can field in order to win in the election. The faction thus became the source of help that gave the aspiring newcomer a boost to capture a seat or a hopeful incumbent help in remaining in control of his seat. This path of thinking is not necessarily incorrect, however, given the persistence of factions into the post-1993 era despite electoral reform sweeping away their foundations in 1993 shows its weakness in explanatory power. Another strand of the structural-functional approach is that the party

[90] Fukui, *Party in Power*, 100, 133; Thayer, *How the Conservatives Rule Japan*, 35; Stockwin, *Governing Japan*, 140; Cox et al., "Electoral Reform and the Fate of Factions: The Case of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party", 35.

presidential elections of the LDP sustained the factions.[91] The argument here is that since the contest for the post of party president – who by virtue of LDP's political domination automatically becomes Japan's Prime Minister – is essentially a numbers game, factions are the tools by which the necessary numbers are achieved. This strand of thinking partially borrows from the cultural approach, in that it sees the party presidential elections of the LDP as the medium in which the leader-follower relations that define factions show that they are two-way interactions.

Besides these two major strands, there are two more novel strands of thinking which also belong to the structural-functional approaches. On the one hand is the work of Krauss and Pekkanen, who identify political factionalism in the LDP as a "path-dependent process" and find that the introduction of penalties to those who are not members finalized the institutionalization of factions.[92] First here, the "path-dependent process" approach delivers a conceptualization of factionalism as a series of interconnected processes that is defined within the political structures of Japan, the paths of organizational development they allow in politics, and the paths factions take in their development. Thus, factions emerge out of the way in which political actors negotiate structural constraints and opportunities, which emerge one after the other as if they were a string of "path-dependent" events, each leading – inevitably – to the next. Second, the growth of factional functions and power – as they co-opt of party functions and responsibilities – and their development into exclusive clubs introduces disadvantages to non-members by barring them from accessing the functions which the factions serve. As such, what cements the emergence of the ideal form of political factions – within the context of the LDP – becomes the functions they serve, and the

[91] Thayer, *How the Conservatives Rule Japan*, 21; Krauss and Pekkanen, *The Rise and Fall of Japan's LDP*, 108; Cox and Rosenbluth, "The Electoral Fortunes of Legislative Factions in Japan", 579.
[92] Krauss and Pekkanen, *The Rise and Fall of Japan's LDP*, 12; Krauss and Pekkanen, *The Rise and Fall of Japan's LDP*, 127.

need of LDP Dietmembers and candidates to have access to these functions if they wish to be successful.

On the other hand, Park argues that factions emerge in response to "political uncertainty and information asymmetry" as a survival mechanism in the political arena.[93] In this view, factions become a tool for politicians to better navigate the political landscape and respond to the challenges that it throws out in the way of actors, which here are LDP Dietmembers and candidates. Understood in this way, factions become conceptualized both in terms of the political structures since they emerge in response to them and in terms of the function they serve, which is rendering the political structures accessible to politicians in the first place.

Overall, although the structural-functional approaches have a much broader and nuanced understanding of political factionalism in Japan, they remain fixated on structure and function. This means disregarding the political actors for the most part and making use of what is essentially structural determinism in the emergence and development of political structures. Although the question of political factions in the LDP remains much more open to questioning in the structural-functional approach, the possibilities are again set in stone since the political structures and functions that yield factions remain largely stable in the 1955-1993 period.

Faced with the problems of the cultural and structural-functional approaches to the question of LDP's factions, an elite theory approach based on the circulation of elites allows for a reconceptualization of factions which is more nuanced and reflective. First, an elite theory approach makes use of both cultural and functional-structural argumentation but goes beyond them by recognizing the agency of elites, as individuals and as a ruling class. Thus, it moves beyond the boundaries set by a

[93] Park, "Factional Dynamics in Japan's LDP Since Political Reform", 432.

particular biased focus on culture, structure, or function which the other approaches entail and allow for factions to be understood on a broader scale. This means that a much more nuanced image of political factions can be drawn through such an approach. Second, elite theory approach does away with an argumentation based on exceptionalism which would preclude further analysis in the first place, and turn the phenomenon of political factionalism into an objectively appreciable and comparable phenomenon. As such, the case of Japan – although retaining a unique handling of a universal matter – becomes one that can be located in relation to others. Third, by recognizing political factions as political organizations for the ruling elite, elite theory approach allows for these structures to be understood beyond the narrow context of party political and electoral politics, and as actors of national politics.

### 3.2 LDP's factionalism in history

Beginning with the establishment of the nation's first political parties during the Meiji era (1868-1912), factions have been a staple of Japanese politics with their forms and functions steadily evolving throughout the pre-war Imperial period as Japan's experience with parliamentary politics deepened. The earliest factions had emerged inside the Meiji era Jiyūtō (Liberal Party) and its successors over geographic distinctions.[94] This reflected both the relatively feudal forms of political thinking which permeated Japan at the time and the divisions of the *genrō* who came largely from the Satsuma and Chōshū domains and their allies against the other daimyo.[95] Political goals of different actors remained geographically defined since until then they had not conceived of a singular sovereign Japanese state, about which they should be concerned. Thus, their political goals and factional associations were

[94] Fukui, *Party in Power*, 11.
[95] Jansen, *The Making of Modern Japan*, 419. See the table for the genrō domination of Cabinets between 1885-1912.

shaped by concerns over how Japan's modernization could be best utilized to serve one's own home region. Furthermore, both the goals and factional organizations of the political actors were dictated by the way politics of locality reflected onto national politics, which had – by this time – begun transitioning from the feudal to the modern way in which such relations were constructed within the state.

The first changes in political factionalism happened with the emergence of the more metropolitan Rikken Kaishintō (Constitutional Reform Party) in 1882, whose factions tended to emerge along the pre-politics occupations of its members who were largely drawn from Tokyo.[96] Being a Tokyo-based party prevented the Constitutional Reform Party from fracturing along geographical lines by removing geographical backgrounds from consideration entirely. The emergence of occupational factionalism also reflected a shift towards a type of factionalism which was less constrained by localistic tendencies. With the experience and understanding that politics in this new period had to be concerned with the nation as a whole, factionalism itself could also move beyond such narrower interests. Furthermore, factions could be geared much more towards national politics with the considerations for membership assuming a certain universality, which meant that party members of the same profession from all over Japan could belong to the same faction. However, it would not be until 1922 when a proposed cabinet shuffle threw the Rikken Seiyūkai (Association of Friends of Constitutional Government) into conflict between those in favor and those opposed, that the foundations of truly political factionalism be set.[97] By this point, political parties were firmly established as contenders for political power within the Imperial Diet and political thinking had achieved an empire-wide scope. This – alluding to Mosca's beforementioned point that factionalism can emerge over the most minute

[96] Fukui, *Party in Power*, 15.
[97] Fukui, *Party in Power*, 23.

things in an ideologically united elite – meant that the conditions had ripened for the further development of political factions, which could be recognized as national-level political power players. From 1922 until the time political parties were suppressed and folded into the Imperial Rule Assistance Organization in 1940, factions had undergone further changes, beginning to favor "monetary considerations and personal (or familial) ties" in their makeup and achieving plurality by tapping into the new zaibatsu for funds.[98] By 1940, the factional landscape had assumed the form, with which the keen observer is familiar from the LDP era – which are a part of the following discussion – such as the rise of money politics, the oft-cited leader-follower relations, and a multitude of factions funded by a multitude of benefactors.

When the LDP was founded in 1955 – after Japan's defeat in WWII and its independence in 1952 – the factions that existed within it had largely inherited the prewar legacy on form, themselves being the products of "inter-personal power struggles within a single party, compounded by temperamental and ideological differences" and were built upon "inter-personal relationships, monetary considerations, ideological differences, and so on".[99] Moreover, these factions were groups with strong leadership – with inheritance between the successive leaders of the same faction – and were mostly linked to prewar formations and political relations.[100] The decade after the end of the war provide fertile grounds – especially with the establishment of a national political structure that was modelled after democratic and republican norms – for a resurgence of older political forms and structures, where factionalism reemerged in full power. Older political allegiances were once again worn openly and key political leaders were once again able to become power brokers leading their entourage of followers. Had the conservatives not realized a need for and

[98] Fukui, *Party in Power*, 24, 25-26.
[99] Fukui, *Party in Power*, 53.
[100] Fukui, *Party in Power*, 123; Curtis, *The Japanese Way of Politics*, 81.

sought the power that the unity in numbers brought, single faction-based political formations might have become the defining political structure in post-war Japan as opposed to the united front that the LDP provided.

Despite being successors of pre-war political forms and networks, the factions which had now emerged in the LDP had one key difference from the predecessors, they were – and are – integral to the political process that had emerged with the 1947 Constitution which remade Japanese politics.[101] The factions of the LDP no longer sought to simply occupy political offices and reap the ostensible benefits, but also to wield political power and to act as true brokers of power and mediators of interests. While their pre-war ancestors had only acted as groups of politicians which shared a vision or a goal but lacked the political influence to actually emerge as key actors, LDP's factions came to wield political influence and coordinate much of the political processes of the party and the nation. As such, whilst the LDP carried on the factional tradition on form, its factions broke to mold when it came to function and opened a new political era that saw the factions emerge as key political actors.

However, being united within the LDP did not mean that the factions had achieved an unshakeable harmony and solidarity with one another, although, the party was able to withstand a number of conflicts between the factions. The first line of conflict within the party emerged between the persons of Yoshida Shigeru and Hatoyama Ichirō, also became the basis of an ex-bureaucrat and pure party politician factional conflict in the first two years of the LDP in 1955-56.[102] The two men themselves embodied the conflict itself: Yoshida, a diplomat, came from a bureaucratic background and Hatoyama had pursued a solely political career beginning in the Imperial Diet in the Rikken Seiyūkai. In this sense, the conflict

[101] Thayer, *How the Conservatives Rule Japan*, 20.
[102] Fukui, *Party in Power*, 50; Thayer, *How the Conservatives Rule Japan*, 169-170; Krauss and Pekkanen, *The Rise and Fall of Japan's LDP*, 105-106.

between the two men also mirrored pre-war occupational factional divides that pitted ex-bureaucrats and pure politicians against one another in a bid to secure political posts and power.[103] However, reflecting the newfound centrality of factions to political processes, this divide also went beyond the ex-bureaucrat and pure politician axis and also had policy preferences inform its formation. Both men also became leaders of different schools of thinking with regards to the political and diplomatic situation of Japan, with the Yoshida school favoring the continuation of the status quo and the Hatoyama school favoring revisions, especially on Japan's military status and the Emperor's role, which reflected the political dispositions of the two men.

The Yoshida-Hatoyama divide, continued to be significant until the tenure of Ishibashi Tanzan – ex-financial journalist and public intellectual – between December 1956 and January 1957 and the party presidential elections that marked its beginning and end.[104] This is because in these two elections – of which Watanabe Tsuneo observes the former election as establishing the factions as power players – had introduced crosscutting factional coalitions as the path towards party presidency and prime ministry.[105] The party presidential elections following these two would continue the pattern began here, with candidates for the top political post in the party and the nation coming together with factional allies in coalitions of convenience. By 1969, the ex-bureaucrat and pure politician divide had become obsolete to the point that Thayer would write that although such backgrounds were observable, no factions was purely of one or the other type.[106]

Since then, factional divides have found new means of manifesting themselves, most importantly in the form of factional coalitions which emerged at the time of

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[103] Farnsworth, "Challenges to Factionalism on Japan's Liberal Democratic Party", 501.
[104] Krauss and Pekkanen, *The Rise and Fall of Japan's LDP*, 110.
[105] Watanabe, *Japan's Backroom Politics*, 86; Kohno, "Rational Foundations for the Organization of the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan", 371.
[106] Thayer, "The Election of a Japanese Prime Minister", 484.

party presidential elections. What emerged was the mainstream and anti-mainstream divide, where the factional alliance that won the party presidential election became the mainstream and reaped the benefits and the losers became the anti-mainstream and were largely emasculated in power arrangements.[107] This new axis of factional conflict, by virtue of being centered around the party presidential election and the post of Prime Minister, was also one that was constantly in flux. Members of both groups could have shifted quickly, depending on the political tides, electoral performance of the Prime Minister, or backroom deals between faction leaders, which meant that this divide invited constant political maneuvering and attention on the part of the ruling faction. Furthermore, this division dictated who would be gaining the upper hand in having access to top party and Cabinet posts, and who would be considered first and foremost when political deals were being made. However, this schism has also been observed to decline in due time with the rise of the proportionality norm – which will be discussed later – which caused the mainstream and anti-mainstream distinction to fall out of use by eliminating gross disparities in factional access to power.

Whilst the broader structure of factional politics and divisions were undergoing change under the period of LDP's political domination, so were their leadership as the original generation of leaders passed away in each faction. Factional succession was a messy affair, with factions not surviving the death of a leader being quite common, as key lieutenants – each with a desire to lead and subfactions to support their bids for leadership – took to fighting each other over inheritance.[108] After all, the faction was the key political unit of organization and association within the LDP and to lead one was not just the goal of any ambitious politician. For an ambitious politician, to lead a faction was a necessity to survive and continue rising

[107] Fukui, *Party in Power*, 109; Watanabe, *Japan's Backroom Politics*, 155.
[108] Thayer, *How the Conservatives Rule Japan*, 25; Richardson, *Japanese Democracy*, 53; Rothacher, *The Japanese Power Elite*, 18.

up in the political world. Thus, major and well-established factions often broke apart once the leader left active politics, lost the confidence of his followers, or died. This periodic breakdown and reconstitution of factions constituted a gamble both for the lieutenants and their followers, since the former would essentially be mounting a rebellion whilst the latter would be reevaluating their factional affiliation, which required a long-term and solid commitment.[109] Thus, whilst the would-be faction leader had to consider the risks and benefits involved in mounting a leadership challenge or bolting from the original factions, whereas the followers would have to weigh the risks and benefits of keeping their old commitments or making new ones. The wrong or untimely decision would certainly have ended up ruining political careers, whereas a correct one would have kept the path forward open for politicians.

Despite these periodic conflicts, the factions of the LDP have always rebounded and over time developed the use of "fancy and euphemistic names" which "has the effect of stressing continuity" whilst also implying "that the organization has an associative and club-like character, and de-emphasizes the implication that it is a boss-henchman type of group".[110] These names tended to be used for as long as a particular leader was heading a faction or was kept as leaders changed, and gave the faction an identity of its own, as it could be appealed to by name. Thus, membership in a faction became membership in a community which had a name of its own – which was a name separate from that of the leader – which allowed for generations of politicians to come together as the members of a single group. Furthermore, a faction that survived leadership changes sought to legitimize itself and its name could be used to legitimize it within the party and the political landscape. This could be achieved by either making an appeal to continuity by keeping the old name of the faction intact or

[109] Thayer, *How the Conservatives Rule Japan*, 21.
[110] Stockwin, "Factionalism in Japanese Political Parties", 162.

through a name change where the faction could be given a name that would emphasize its credentials as a political group.

### 3.3 Functions of LDP's factions

In reviewing the existing literature, the factions can be seen fulfilling a certain number of functions, both party political and electoral. These functions can be described as political recruitment and endorsement, solicitation and disbursement of funds, regulation of seniority in post and portfolio allocations, provision of loyalty and votes to faction leaders, and intraparty balancing and communication. These functions in turn both inform the powers of the factions and their place in the Japanese political landscape, which has informed much of the existing literature and the continuous attempts of the LDP at party and electoral reform until 1993.

When each electoral cycle began between 1955 and 1993, the factions scrambled to use the election for their own benefit and derive the benefits of having their own members re-elected and new candidates elected. Elections served as the process by which factions replenished their strength, as they recruited new members to their ranks and to the party.[111] Thus, the elections served as an outlet for both factional conflict as factions competed for endorsements in the party and votes in districts, and factional strength by serving as an avenue that thickened faction ranks and proved the ability of its leader through securing endorsements. In order to use elections to their advantage, factions worked to have their members endorsed as the official candidate of the LDP in a given electoral district, which provided an electoral leverage through the party label and allowed access to insider information on electoral

[111] Thayer, *How the Conservatives Rule Japan*, 39, 47.

cycles.[112] An endorsed candidate could count on the help of the party headquarters and branch offices on funds and election help, however small they might be, and had information flowing to him on the possibility of an election, which under LDP domination has always been called early and strategically. Furthermore, factional recognition turned a candidate into a serious contender in elections and also allowed them access to hands-on assistance in running electoral campaigns, provided by the factions.[113] As the fate of a member was tied into the fate of a faction, there would inevitably be a flow of funds and electioneering expertise from factions to members, and campaign appearances from faction leaders and politically renowned members.

Although the factions sought official party endorsement of their members as candidates, not acquiring it was not an endgame scenario, since factions that failed to get a member endorsed officially turned to providing covert support to those members standing in elections.[114] However, this did mean that factional competition at the localities were be curtailed – though not entirely since the party headquarters lacked the power and the resolve to stop it entirely – which might have created an intense amount of conflict for the party at each election cycle that could have ended up tearing the party apart. In contrast to the situation surrounding official endorsements, one form of factional conflict that went largely unchecked in elections was the mainstream versus anti-mainstream conflict spilling over into election endorsements, which has continued on even when other norms such as proportionality and seniority among factions had been established after the 60s.[115] Moreover, this disparity was of such a level that Shinoda observed that elections could be used for faction building

[112] Shinoda, *Contemporary Japanese Politics*, 31-32; Kohno, *Japan's Postwar Party Politics*, 102-103.
[113] Thayer, *How the Conservatives Rule Japan*, 36-37.
[114] Thayer, *How the Conservatives Rule Japan*, 38; Cox and Rosenbluth, "Factional Competition for the Party Endorsement: The Case of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party", 262.
[115] Cox and Rosenbluth, "Factional Competition for the Party Endorsement: The Case of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party", 262-263, 267.

purposes by incumbent Prime Ministers by stacking the list of endorsees with their own faction members.[116] Thus, the ruling faction and the factional coalition made used their position – which included controlling party endorsees in elections – to give themselves an edge in elections from which the Prime Minister also benefitted by increasing his following and power base within the party.

A second and related function of the LDP's factions was the solicitation of funds from donors and their disbursement to members. These funds were disbursed to faction members for both electoral expenses and for the running of individual political machines – the *kōenkai* – that the Dietmembers all came to depend upon.[117] However, it should be noted that such a division of funds is – to a certain extent – only an illusion. The running of a political machine that serves a single Dietmember is a year-round political endeavor, with expenses incurred both at the constituency in the name of services, presents, and events and at the Dietmembers' Tokyo offices in the name of services and hospitality to visiting voters. Funds disbursed for electoral purposes is – in effect – only a continuation of this type of funding, but it is delivered over a smaller period of time and for the particular purpose of covering campaign expenses. With the expenses of Dietmembers snowballing during much of the period of LDP's dominance, these funds were of such a size and value that they have consistently eclipsed the funds disbursed by the party and were ultimately one indicator of the ability of a faction leader to stay in power and mount a leadership bid.[118] In a situation where the faction made the leader and the leader made the faction, these funds were an important building block for a faction, as they allowed for a leader to get members elected and remain as incumbents, formed part of an

[116] Shinoda, *Leading Japan*, 64-5.
[117] Fukui, *Party in Power*, 130; Thayer, *How the Conservatives Rule Japan*, 30.
[118] Totten and Kawakami, "The Functions of Factionalism in Japanese Politics", 115; Krauss and Pekkanen, *The Rise and Fall of Japan's LDP*, 212; Kohno, *Japan's Postwar Party Politics*, 104; Watanabe, *Japan's Backroom Politics*, 68.

exchange in which the leader gained loyalty for funds, and signaled the standing of the faction leader among the community of donors.

Funds flowed from factions to members in three ways as Thayer observed: faction leaders gave money to followers directly, faction leaders helped members get into funding networks of their own, and – in certain factions – faction members at times helped direct funds to one another.[119] Each of the three embodies a different level of dependency between faction leader and follower, which in turn had both its benefits and perils. The first meant that the leader would be the sole recipient of the loyalty of the faction members, however, his ability to provide funds was judged heavily as part of his performance as a leader. The second meant that although the member in question was getting to the donors through the good graces of the leader, the window was now open to achieve an independent funding base that would allow a potential leader to arise within the faction. The third meant that members could form mutual assistance networks and potential leaders could form networks of their own which would begin dividing the loyalties of the faction, threatening its unity. However, many factions did not welcome or encourage members sharing funds between themselves, because it held the risk of creating subfactions and divided loyalties.

Once a faction had its members elected and kept them well-funded so that they could be reelected in the future, the faction worked to have these members appointed to key party and Cabinet posts. During the period of LDP dominance, Cabinet, party, and parliamentary posts could not be secured by Dietmembers easily without factional backing, because the factions proposed members to these posts and defended their interests vigorously.[120] Factions controlled the entry to key posts since they controlled the loyalties of the Dietmembers themselves and could control their participation in

[119] Thayer, *How the Conservatives Rule Japan*, 30.
[120] Thayer, *How the Conservatives Rule Japan*, 35.

the Cabinet and assignment to top party post. Factions defended the interests of their members appointed to key party or Cabinet posts, as they allowed the faction to have access to power, and because the faction leader could and did improve his fortunes by showing his ability to place men to key positions and to keep them there.

Two intraparty norms determined the appointment of LDP Dietmembers to positions of power within the party and the national executive: the proportionality norm and the seniority norm. The proportionality norm began during the late sixties and early seventies, although Fukui traces it back to Ishibashi Tanzan's tenure which can be seen as an early example.[121] Under proportionality, Cabinet and top party posts were distributed on a factional basis – where party posts further exhibited a separation of powers between factions – with an eye towards rewarding the mainstream and checking the anti-mainstream, and mending the rifts that a party presidential election opens up.[122] In essence, proportionality was a response to the effects of periodic infighting by the factions over the post of party president and Prime Minister, as well as to the constant maneuvering that occurred in between two party presidential elections. Instituted at a time when the LDP needed to provide a united front due to its falling electoral support and diminishing Diet majority, the proportionality norm allowed for all factions to be included in the Cabinet, effectively giving them a role in policymaking and binding them to decisions made there.

The seniority norm was also established in the seventies, as a way of ordering the progression of LDP Dietmembers through the rungs of power in the party and the Diet.[123] This regularization of promotions within the party worked to give faction leaders a stronger grip over its members, by putting the progression of their careers at

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[121] Fukui, *Party in Power*, 129; Hayao, *The Japanese Prime Minister and Public Policy*, 128; Kohno, *Japan's Postwar Party Politics*, 97-99; Richardson, *Japanese Democracy*, 67.
[122] Fukui, *Party in Power*, 129; Curtis, *The Japanese Way of Politics*, 86; Kohno, *Japan's Postwar Party Politics*, 93, 95.
[123] Krauss and Pekkanen, *The Rise and Fall of Japan's LDP*, 113.

the hands of these leaders. On the other hand, the faction members also gained another measure for their loyalty to their faction's leader, with the prospects for career advancement beginning to figure into the perceptions of the strength and political potential of faction leaders. The way in which seniority worked, is that faction leaders made lists of members of appropriate seniority – determined by standing in the faction and by how many elections one had won – and provided them to the incoming Prime Minister as recommendations for Cabinet and party posts, from which the PM made his choice, aiming to balance seniority, ability, and personal taste.[124] Thus, an administration would be shaped based on how an incoming Prime Minister sought to divide the spoils amongst the mainstream factions, placate the anti-mainstream by giving them appropriate concessions, and drew upon the senior yet able members of each faction proposed to him.

Besides these functions that were geared towards satisfying the needs of the faction members, the faction served an ultimate function for its leader. For the leader, the most important function of the faction was that it served as the definitive power base for him to become party president and thus Prime Minister, as no one could achieve either post without a faction backing them up.[125] A faction leader sought to get as many members elected and keep them as incumbents because they formed his power base within the party and the more numerous his power base was the better it was for the faction leader. It can be observed that the faction leaders were in effect building their own constituencies and recruiting their own voters, in the form of the faction and its members. Furthermore, the factions exchanged the loyalty of the members for the services provided by the leader in the form of endorsements, funds,

[124] Thayer, *How the Conservatives Rule Japan*, 191-193; Hayao, *The Japanese Prime Minister and Public Policy*, 128.
[125] Fukui, *Party in Power*, 128; Hayao, *The Japanese Prime Minister and Public Policy*, 106; Krauss and Pekkanen, *The Rise and Fall of Japan's LDP*, 101.

and appointments, which translated into votes at the time of party presidential elections.[126] Thus, the main reason why the provision of each function became a benchmark in evaluating the political performance and future prospects of the faction leader was because they were in effect payments to faction members for their votes and their breakdown meant that the leader in question would be losing loyalty.

However, because a faction by itself was never enough to get a man elected party president, they entered into coalitions to provide the necessary support for a candidate, based on considerations of factional strength or political convenience.[127] On the one hand, this created the mechanisms by which the factions divided into mainstream and anti-mainstream groups, made claims to proportional distribution of party and Cabinet posts, and retained their form and power. On the other hand, as shall be discussed in the next section, this arrangement meant that any faction of sufficient size could become kingmakers.

The final function that factions had a more political implication, as they provided intraparty power balancing which prevented the rise of an intraparty dictatorship which could have become – given LDP's dominance – a national strongman rule. Kōno Ichirō, who was a significant faction boss until his death in 1965, went onto the record in 1963 with his statement that the factions were a check and balance mechanism on the power of the prime ministry.[128] Although his statement should be approached with a certain level of caution, because Kōno himself was a faction boss and was playing the game of factional politics quite vigorously himself, there is a fundamental truth that lies beneath it. As the factions were locked in a

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[126] Richardson, *Japanese Democracy*, 60; Krauss and Pekkanen, *The Rise and Fall of Japan's LDP*, 102; Cox et al., "Electoral Rules, Career Ambitions and Party Structure: Comparing Factions in Japan's Upper and Lower Houses", 116.
[127] Shinoda, *Contemporary Japanese Politics*, 33.
[128] Kōno Ichirō, *The Japan Times*, (19 October 1963), quoted in Farnsworth, "Challenges to Factionalism on Japan's Liberal Democratic Party", 504.

constant conflict for power, they prevented any other from emerging as an absolute power and faction leaders were constantly wary of too much power being concentrated into the hand of one man or one faction.[129] Thus, the factions created an organically emerging mechanism for intraparty power balances, which was fueled by their own conflict and concerns. Furthermore, this partially informed the rise of the proportionality norm, which provided the type of checks on the concentration of power in the prime ministry, the ruling faction, or the ruling coalition.

### 3.4 Powers of LDP's factions

In terms of the powers that the LDP's factions have wielded, especially during the time of the party's dominance, four sources of factional power can be discerned from the existing literature. These four sources of factional power can be described as the size of membership and kingmaker status, control of key posts and portfolios, membership in the factional mainstream, and party structures co-opting faction leaders. As can be seen, some of these sources of power are influenced by the functions fulfilled and services delivered to members whilst others are a product of factional and party politics.

As a faction leader worked to create a power base within the party for himself – which relied on his delivery of endorsements, funds, and appointments – he inevitably created a political machine that wielded power due to its sheer size. During the period of LDP's dominance, any faction which was able to control half the party's House of Representatives contingent – ranging from 140 to 150 Representatives – had the chance to emerge as an absolute majority and dominate the factional number

[129] Olsen, "Factionalism and Reform of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party", 260.

game.[130] A faction that could reach this critical mass would be able to control both the party and national politics, and it would be able to ignore other factions and solidify its position as the ruling faction due to the lack of meaningful challengers. However, no faction was ever able to reach this critical mass although some have been able to come close to it – such as the faction of Prime Ministers Tanaka and Takeshita, controlling 73 Representatives at its height in 1990 – which prevented factional domination and allowed for ruling coalitions to emerge. Because these kingmaker factions had sufficiently large numbers within their ranks, they were highly sought after as allies during and after the party presidential elections, and by not putting up candidates of their own and instead allying others, they became kingmakers.[131] The kingmaker factions, in effect, would be able to control who the next Prime Minister would be and make demands on the incoming administration, since their support was indispensable and could be retracted at any moment. The kingmaker faction would exchange its votes for part of the winnings, having the ruling faction indebted to itself.[132] However, this did not mean that the kingmaker faction had an absolute control over the state of politics under any single administration, since the ruling faction needed to balance against all factions and would seek to rid itself of the kingmaker when possible.

Another important implication of factions achieving critical – but not dominant – mass in terms of membership size was what Bouissou has termed a "dominant duo" – which were effectively kingmaker cartels – such as the Satō-Kishi duo emerging in 1957 and the Tanaka-Ōhira duo emerging after 1972.[133] In such an

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[130] Fukui, *Party in Power*, 134.
[131] Hayao, *The Japanese Prime Minister and Public Policy*, 116; Shinoda, *Contemporary Japanese Politics*, 35; Shinoda, *Leading Japan*, 92.
[132] Hayao, *The Japanese Prime Minister and Public Policy*, 117.
[133] Bouissou, "Party factions and the politics of coalition: Japanese politics under the 'system of 1955'", 584-585.

arrangement, two factions of large size combined their votes in order to support one another or a third candidate and became a kingmaker cartel. The absence of one or both from a coalition would make it hard for an administration to successfully emerge or to remain in power once if it did. However, this arrangement was fragile in itself since it depended upon the wills and agreement of two factional leaders, and once either was removed from the political landscape the kingmaker cartel would collapse.

A second source of power for factions was their control of key party and Cabinet posts, which were filled by faction leaders themselves and members as well. Writing in 1968, Leiserson ranks the importance of Cabinet and party posts as:

> A: Prime Minister;
> B: Finance Minister, party Secretary-General;
> C: Trade and Industry Minister, Agriculture-Forestry Minister, Transportation Minister, Construction Minister, party Executive Board chairman, party Policy Board chairman;
> D: Foreign Minister and Economic Planning Agency chief-when held by a faction leader; Deputy Prime Minister, Cabinet Minister Without Portfolio, party Vice President;
> E: Foreign Minister and Economic Planning Agency chief-when not held by a faction leader; Education Minister, Welfare Minister, Labor Minister, Defence Agency chief, Justice Minister, Postal Minister, Interior Agency chief, 1958-1960, Interior Minister, 1960-present.
> F: Administrative Management Agency chief, Hokkaido Development Agency chief, Science and Technology Agency chief, Prime Minister's Office chief, 1965-present, Interior Agency chief, beginning-1957.[134] (p. 778)

For the most of the period of LDP's domination, this list can be seen holding true and the key posts of the party and the Cabinet keeping these rankings, without any upsets. However, in order to make this list more representative of the broader period of LDP domination – and to correct a misrepresentation in the list – the Foreign Minister can be placed into the B category, which would correct the list to better reflect the importance of this ministry. The post of the Foreign Minister was a highly visible and prestigious post, with many party leaders and later Prime Ministers

[134] Leiserson, "Factions and Coalitions in One-Party Japan: An Interpretation", 778.

going through this post in their careers. It was a post that allowed its occupant to increase his own visibility and popularity both within the party and within the broader Japanese electorate. Furthermore, as the global standing and involvement of Japan grew so did the significance of this post, which was also one where the incumbent minister had the ability to form international contacts, and to form and apply part of his foreign policy vision. Thus, the most important posts here, which are the most significant sources of power for their factional occupants, are those in the A, B, and C categories. These are the most important and powerful posts, either due to their political activity or visibility, or due to their ability to deliver pork to constituents and funds to the factions that occupy them.

The posts of Prime Minister, party Secretary General, and chairmen of the Executive Board and Policy Board (chairmen of the Executive Council and the Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) Deliberation Council) were posts that were important largely for their political activity and visibility they brought. Control of these posts meant control over national policy; party affairs, funds, and endorsements; and party policy with added political visibility in the case of the Prime Minister and the party Secretary General. Furthermore, because these posts occupied key avenues of power both at the party and the national level, the ability of the occupants to enter into networks of power and increase their access to political funding in the long-run. In the case of the ministries found in these categories, the key source of power is their access to political pork and networks, which would yield voted and funds for those factional incumbents able to enter and exploit them in the long-run. The two exceptions to these are the Finance and Foreign Ministers, whose power and significance – in addition to pork and networking – came from their high visibility and political involvement in national affairs. Overall, it can be seen that for a faction

leader or member to occupy any post in the top three categories brought a measure of power to the factions they belonged to by bringing in connections, voter prestige due to pork distribution or political visibility and control of key lanes of political power and policy formulation.

A third source of power for factions came from their membership in the mainstream factional coalition, which partially connects with the first two sources of power as well. On the one hand, membership in the factional coalition meant the supply of votes to the ruling faction – which need not have happened at a kingmaker level – which is a question of numbers. A faction that is in the mainstream had an inside line to the centers of power within the party, as well as a flow of information in both policy and electoral matters. These connections gave a faction in the mainstream the power to influence policymaking, better react to political shifts, and show increased preparedness in elections. Furthermore, having access to the centers of power within the party meant an opportunity for the factions to forge connections with interest groups and potential donors, meaning political returns in the long-run. On the other hand, being a part of the mainstream meant taking part in the distribution of rewards, meaning a higher likelihood of taking key Cabinet and party posts when a new administration was formed, whose importance has been discussed before. Besides these two paths to power, being part of the mainstream also allowed factions to use threats of insubordination or outright revolt and defection from the mainstream coalition to gain concessions from the ruling faction. This can be seen as the third path to power that came from being a part of the factional mainstream, which comes not from a positive application of the affiliation of a faction but rather from its negative application. Given enough members among its ranks, the withdrawal of a faction from the mainstream is as powerful a threat as any to an administration.

The fourth and final source of factional power are the party structures which co-opted factions and faction leaders aiming to keep them cooperative and also gave them a direct say in policy matters. Three such structures can be pinpointed, that allows the factions to have greater bearing on party affairs and policies, namely the PARC Deliberation Council, the LDP's Executive Council and the Leaders' Meeting. The PARC Deliberation Council is the body that vets and approves all decision taken within the structure of the PARC itself, essentially approving or voting down the policy proposals of LDP Dietmembers, and the factions are represented in the Council by having members serve on it.[135] Having representatives on the PARC Deliberation Council gave the factions an access point into the policymaking mechanisms of the party by adding factional approval into the process in which policies moved through the LDP. This also worked to mediate conflicting factional interests over policies which emerged out of the structures of the PARC, by making their approval a condition for the progress of policy initiatives. Furthermore, this gave the factions an active voice in controlling the policies and policy directions of the LDP beginning at the lowest executive level possible, by allowing them to give their input into the policymaking processes of the party.

The Executive Council functions as the highest decision-making body of the party in its daily political and legislative affairs, has at least one representative from each faction and their influence here reflects on party positions on current and continuing issues.[136] Being able to have a seat on the Executive Council of the LDP, the factions were able to influence the day-to-day operations and policy positions of the LDP in an active fashion at the highest executive level, continuing their influence at the PARC Deliberation Council level. Here again, factional conflict is mediated

[135] Fukui, *Party in Power*, 88, 89.
[136] Fukui, *Party in Power*, 89, 91; Thayer, *How the Conservatives Rule Japan*, 254-255.

because the passage of policy proposals and party stances is dependent upon the consent of factions and necessitated their positions to be taken into account.

The Leaders' Meeting, as the name suggests, is the meeting of the top party heads and members nominated by the party president, whose are drawn from the ruling faction and the mainstream coalition.[137] Thus, in a reversal of the situation in the PARC Deliberation Council and the party Executive Council where factional balancing is sought, the Leaders' Meeting sought to bring the power of the mainstream factions to bear on the affairs of the party. Furthermore, the power of the Leaders' Meeting to override the Executive Council and mission to represent the interests of the mainstream by continuing the status quo of power division within the party and keeping party divisions in check reinforced its position as a tool of the mainstream.[138] In effect, the Leaders' Meeting became a tool for the mainstream factions to enforce their own power over the party when necessary by breaking through decisions made elsewhere that did not sit well politically. Furthermore, because it allowed for the mainstream and anti-mainstream division to be continued, the Leaders' Meeting sought to preserve the power balances that undergirded an administration. Overall, whereas the PARC Deliberation Council and party Executive Council allowed all factions to influence LDP policymaking and policy stances at the executive level, the Leaders' Meeting had the opposite effect of allowing only the mainstream factions executive level influence in the policy and politics of the party.

[137] Fukui, *Party in Power*, 93.
[138] Fukui, *Party in Power*, 95.

# CHAPTER 4

# FACTIONS OF THE LDP AS ELITE ORGANIZATIONS

Having discussed the history, functions, and powers of the LDP's factions during the period of 1955 to 1993, this chapter will seek to describe factions as full-fledged organizations for the political elites to differentiate themselves from one another. As the existing literature makes clear, the factions are not described as having much if any impact on policymaking within the LDP. Thus, this section will be running counter to the dominant current which argues that the factions do not have any policy significance and differentiation but are largely personalistic devices for leadership votes and political services. The analysis here aims to move the discussion regarding factions and factionalism in the LDP away from the political exchange approach that is largely available in the existing cultural and functional-structural approaches. These explanations ultimately, pushes factionalism into the position of a national exception and assumes that political relationships and networks in Japan are simply built upon an exchange between leaders and followers, in an environment that is apolitical with regards to policy itself.

The approach employed here, in two parts, tackles the question of LDP's factions first through the evidence available in the existing literature on the policy relevance and involvement of factions and second through the analytical toolkit developed earlier, with particular recourse to Weber and Michels. The aim here is to reconceptualize the factions of the LDP as bodies of elite organization in Japan, which both participate in policymaking within the party and have policy inclinations of their own, and are engaged in competition against one another for the posts of party president and Prime Minister. Once the factions have been reconceptualized in this

way, the path towards their placement into a circulation of elites analysis becomes possible to pursue as they can now be understood as differentiated elite organizations in competition over achieving national power.

## 4.1 Elite factions through the literature

The aim here is to analyze the existing literature – before building on it further through the analytical toolkit – through an eye towards pinpointing the policy connections that are to be found in LDP's factions from an elite theory perspective. The goal is to be able show that the existing literature itself does hold the key to understanding the factions as organizations that do have certain policy related leaning, functions, and differentiation which would allow for them to be understood as competing elite organizations. In order to reach this goal, one part of the analysis undertaken will be geared towards refuting the common perception to be found in the existing literature about the apolitical nature of factions. It will be important to show that these analyses leave gaps in our understanding by overemphasizing certain aspects of Japanese politics, reducing others to insignificance or simplifications, and invite more questions than they answer. Another part will be to demonstrate that the LDP's factions do have policy considerations within and serve policy related functions. These can be subdivided into categories of impact of leaders, political identity in factions, *zoku* in factions, policy discussions in factions, and factional impact on national budgets for analytical expedience.

### 4.1.1 Problems with the existing conceptualization of factions

Although the existing discussion on the subject largely rules out the factions as policy relevant structures, denying the existence of policy platforms and differences between

factions, there are also numerous pieces of evidence contained within that also support the reverse position. Writing on the subject, scholars such as Shinoda, Krauss and Pekkanen, and Stockwin claim that although factions are not built on the basis of ideology or policy, which remains a secondary concern – if it does at all – they do "provide necessary alternatives for the leadership position" as Shinoda writes.[139] They convey the general consensus that the factions of the LDP were geared more towards surviving politically and reaching the highest offices of power and influence in Japan, access to which did not necessitate any policy differentiation or disposition. This approach not only turns the factions into "apolitical" structures but in turn also forces the same categorization onto the prime ministry, because no man is to achieve the position through a policy platform but simply through navigation of the personalized political space of factions.

However, parts of the argumentation in the existing literature invites questions which lead to the questioning of the "apolitical" nature of factions and factional affiliation. How is it possible to claim that factions provided alternatives to one another in party and national leadership, if there were no policy differences between them but only personnel differences? If such differences did not exist, where would the changing platforms and agendas of the LDP originate from? On the point of political recruitment, would this mean that only similar thinking people are recruited or that they are socialized into a certain pattern of thinking? Another question is how could the factions, bulk of whose work is related to the constant and day-to-day political affairs of the LDP could end up remaining apolitical? How can the electoral structure explanation, where broad and personalistic bases of power are key, be a panacea which answers all questions whilst it excludes bulk of factional work and

[139] Shinoda, *Leading Japan*, 11; Krauss and Pekkanen, *The Rise and Fall of Japan's LDP*, 109; Stockwin, "Factionalism in Japanese Political Parties", 169.

functions from consideration? Furthermore, if Japan is to be understood as a sophisticated democracy, what must the analyst make of the implication that the voters are not sophisticated at all and vote for pork and benefits? In comparison, what must be made of the observation that all politics, across the world, essentially involve an exchange of votes for benefits but different parties still come out on top?

An analytical viewpoint which ties every such change to changing conditions nationally and internationally or to political structures would end up arguing that the Japanese politicians have no control over Japan's direction and are simply managing the ship amidst a multiplicity of wild currents. Furthermore, such an approach would have the effect of reducing the goal of Japanese politics to survival both within and without, obscuring the many inputs that define the national and international landscapes of Japan. As can be seen, the existing literature invites a number of questions – some directed at Japan as is and other directed to Japan in comparison with the world – which chips away at the foundations of the claim that factions are apolitical personalized political machines. Moreover, as McCubbins and Thies notes, while it is a commonly accepted fact that the factions do not have policy bases – or that they are of a catch-all or divided basis, mirroring the LDP itself – this has never been put to a vigorous test, despite indicators that intraparty changes and circulation are the sources of policy change under the LDP.[140] Thus, to continue the perception of apolitical factions is to use an analytical point that is oft cited but never truly proven, at the very least not by a vigorous analysis that seeks clarify this particular point. In addition, although this position is backed up by numerous scholars, many are only repeating the point made by earlier by others.

[140] McCubbins and Thies, "As a Matter of Factions: The Budgetary Implications of Shifting Factional Control in Japan's LDP", 295, 299.

### 4.1.2 The leader factor in factional policy affiliation

As previously discussed, as much as the factions made the leaders, the leaders made the factions into what they were, by providing leadership, funding, endorsements, and appointments. Furthermore, the faction leaders were also engaged in recruiting new members to their own factions and to the party, as they labored to get the necessary votes to become party president and Prime Minister. The point of recruitment constitutes the first instance in which the faction leader has the power to and a choice in imparting his political leanings and outlook onto the rest of the faction. As McCubbins and Thies point out, since the faction leader is involved with the recruitment of new members so intimately – as new members cannot be taken in without the blessing of the leader – he has the power to ensure that the person being recruited is of the proper political material.[141] Moreover, even in a condition where the faction member does not join or is let in expressly on grounds of policy or political disposition, policy coherence could be induced after a Dietmember joined a faction.[142] Given that a faction has to be stable enough to be lead and cohesive enough to be relied upon in leadership elections and political dealings, there is a premium placed on recruiting members whose political outlook fits that of the leader in particular and the faction in general. Furthermore, in an arrangement where the leader seeks to obtain and maintain the loyalty of the members of his faction for as long as possible, having people with whom a less contractual relation can be established emerges as another way of gaining their loyalty. A leader that is able to gain a following composed of Dietmembers whose policy preferences and political outlooks

[141] McCubbins and Thies, "As a Matter of Factions: The Budgetary Implications of Shifting Factional Control in Japan's LDP", 318.
[142] McCubbins and Thies, "As a Matter of Factions: The Budgetary Implications of Shifting Factional Control in Japan's LDP", 318.

is bound to find it easier to secure their loyalty, as long as he does not betray the commonly shared ideas and leanings.

Apart from their ability to set the tone of factional policy preferences and political outlook at the time of recruiting members, the leaders also have the ability to impart their own visions to their faction through their daily contacts with members and exercise of leadership over the faction. On the one hand, Thayer has observed that this occurs as each leader imparts a certain "flavor" to their faction which remains at the level of policies rather than at ideologies.[143] In effect, the factions go through differentiation in terms of policy preferences and political outlooks through socialization, which takes place through continued leader-member relations on a daily basis. This differentiation is constrained within the broader conservative ideological outlook of the party, which is ultimately that of the broader political elites, in which the factions operate as organizations for competing groups of elites. Ultimately, what emerges is a faction that has a certain political leaning, which can be easily identified with that of the leader, and can act as a relevant policy actor. However, it should also be noted that at the end of the process of differentiation and socialization, the policy preferences of the leader and the faction he led were nearly indistinguishable from one another, as they shaped and were shaped by each other. To talk about the agenda or policy preferences of the faction in turn became equal to talking about the agenda or policy preferences of the leader – or the Prime Minister – and vice versa.

On the other hand, Bouissou has written that "all faction leaders have some preferred policies. In order to advance these policies, the faction leaders want to build the strongest possible *habatsu*" (emphasis in original).[144] Thus, Bouissou has reconceptualized factional size as a tool with uses beyond party politics and party

[143] Thayer, *How the Conservatives Rule Japan*, 46-47.
[144] Bouissou, "Party factions and the politics of coalition: Japanese politics under the 'system of 1955'", 596.

presidential elections, with an impact on policymaking as directed by the leader which controls the votes and personal energies under his command. However, it is important to note that – even with the reinforcement coming from the fulfilment of a faction's functions to its members – a leader will not necessarily be able to sway his factional followings to his side, if they do not share is political positions. In effect, when the leader seeks to build the strongest faction possible to support the pursuit of his preferred policies, there must be an agreement with his factional following that these policies should at least have some factional consensus behind them. These must be the preferred policies of the faction, as much as that of the leader, if they are to find adequate support from the faction. In this manner, a leader who can impart his policy preferences and political outlook on his faction – which will translate into both loyalty to the leader and to support for his particular choices in policy – can then use the faction as a tool to pursue such policies both when in and out of power.

Of the factions which existed between 1955 and 1993, observations can be made, showing how they have been differentiated from one another on policy matters, based on the personal leanings the leaders and recruitment patterns of the members. It should once again be noted here, these factions have ultimately stayed within the conservative camp and that an analysis of their policy differentiations would not necessarily place them on a left-right scale, which Bouissou notes as lacking scientific evidence to do in any concrete manner.[145] However, other classifications can be made exploring the relative positions of factions to each other within the conservative spectrum that appears as occupying a space from the center to the far-right. These classifications include the pursuit of dovish or hawkish politics; being part of the Yoshida School or the Revisionists; and having an ex-bureaucrat or pure politician

[145] Bouissou, "Party factions and the politics of coalition: Japanese politics under the 'system of 1955'", 584.

leader and makeup, amongst others. In some factions, policy patterns were kept intact between leaders whilst in others priorities shifted in between leaders which – if the leader became party president and Prime Minister – had a chance to influence national politics.

One important factional lineage is the *Kōchikai* (宏池会/Broad Pond Society) faction, whose leadership includes Ikeda Hayato (PM, 1960-1964), Maeo Shigesaburo, Ōhira Masayoshi (PM, 1978-1980), Suzuki Zenkō (PM, 1980-1982), and Miyazawa Kiichi (PM, 1991-1993) – all of whom except for Maeo have become Prime Ministers – was a largely ex-bureaucrat dominated faction that is part of the so-called "conservative mainstream", with a particular focus on financial affairs.[146] The name of the faction was drawn from a Han dynasty Chinese poem by Ma Rong, and was given to the faction by scholar and power broker Yasuoka Masahiro, which also made a wordplay on Ikeda's name as both included the same character 池 meaning pond.[147] Thus, the faction name served to subtly denote its founding leader, which was carried on as the name of the faction persisted, and gave the faction itself an air of distinction as the name was drawn from Chinese poetry and invoked a certain poetic imagery. All leaders of the *Kōchikai* – except Prime Minister Suzuki whose background was in fisheries administration – had once worked as bureaucrats in the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and later also served as Ministers of Finance. The faction enjoyed a bureaucratic certainty in its leadership successions, with conflicts and breakdowns being rare, and had a pool of expertise that it could always rely on, especially in

[146] Thayer, *How the Conservatives Rule Japan*, 46; Thayer, "The Election of a Japanese Prime Minister", 477; Bouissou, "Party factions and the politics of coalition: Japanese politics under the 'system of 1955'", 584; Farnsworth, "Challenges to Factionalism on Japan's Liberal Democratic Party", 504.
[147] Matsumoto. 自民党総裁選 ビジネスにも通ずるエピソード [LDP Presidential Election - Episodes that also leads to business]; Ozawa. なぜか「宏池会」が大流行 左派含め与野党問わず標榜 本家の岸田政調会長は困惑 [Why is the Kochikai so popular].

financial matters. Here, Ikeda's "income-doubling plan" for the sixties was an important manifestation of the factional leanings towards financial policies. Moreover, men like Ikeda and Suzuki had their administrations geared towards the calming of factional and electoral tensions which had erupted before them, with Ōhira being the exception as Suzuki had emerged to the challenge of sedating the conflict his tenure had left behind. Moreover, the *Kōchikai* can be seen as a part of the Yoshida school, since the revision of the postwar order did not emerge as an important policy issue and the status quo – such as close relations with the US and commitment to the Peace Constitution – was kept and economic policy remained the top concern.[148]

A second factional lineage, which was part of the conservative mainstream, was that of Prime Minister Satō Eisaku (PM, 1964-1972), succeeded by Tanaka Kakuei (PM, 1972-1974), Takeshita Noboru (PM, 1987-1989), and Obuchi Keizō (PM, 1998-2000), initially named the *Shūzankai* (周山会/Suō Mountain Group), and changing to *Mokuyōkurabu* (木曜クラブ/Thursday Club) under Tanaka (1972), and to *Keiseikai* (経世会/Economics and Society Group) under Takeshita (1985).[149] Each name reflected the particular sensibilities of the leader. *Shūzankai* made reference to Satō's own roots in feudal Japan as his hometown of Tabuse was located in the Suō province (周防国/Suō no kuni) which used the same character 周, denoting the leader of the faction and his origins as the descendant of Chōshū men who made modern Japan. *Mokuyōkurabu* reused an older name of the Satō faction, allowing Tanaka – whose rise was a contentious affair – to legitimate himself by drawing upon the roots of the faction which he led. *Keiseikai* combined two important political ideas that

[148] Zakowski, "Kōchikai of the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party and Its Evolution After the Cold War", 184-184.
[149] Bouissou, "Party factions and the politics of coalition: Japanese politics under the 'system of 1955'", 584; Farnsworth, "Challenges to Factionalism on Japan's Liberal Democratic Party", 504.

Takeshita pursued, social rebuilding and economic reform – in the form of the tax reform – and placed the new emphases of the faction onto the name itself.

All four men served as Prime Minister, with Obuchi being the exception here as he was in the post after 1993 which effectively puts him beyond the scope of analysis here. Of the other three leaders, Satō was a bureaucrat, Tanaka was a businessman, Takeshita was a teacher before starting their political careers in the LDP and each men had different policy dispositions from one another. Satō won the return of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty in 1971 and normalized relations with Korea in 1965, Tanaka focused on normalization of relations with China in 1972 and the proposed "remodeling of the Japanese archipelago", and Takeshita's accomplishment was the successful passage of Japan's first consumption tax in 1988. Respectively, Satō was a political jack-of-all-trades, Tanaka had ties to the construction industry and brought both political pork and money politics into the mainstream, and Takeshita was a political powerhouse, which reflected in their tenures as well. It is interesting to note that this factional lineage has acted as a powerhouse that has had members whose expertise could stretch to many subjects, which reflected both the political disposition of its founder Satō and mimicked the development of the LDP into a catch-all party. It should also be noted that, all three men were part of the Yoshida School, in that they did not seek to redraw the postwar settlement, although Satō and Tanaka did work to improve its conditions by return of territory and opening relations with China.

The third factional lineage which was a part of the conservative mainstream was the *Tōkakai* (十日会/Ten Days Group) originally headed by the hawkish Kishi Nobusuke (PM, 1957-1960), who was succeeded by Fukuda Takeo (PM, 1976-1978) who renamed the faction to *Seiwakai* (清和会/Seiwa Group), Abe Shintaro, and

Mitsuzuka Hiroshi.[150] The name *Tōkakai* most likely reflected the founding or meeting date of the faction, whereas the name *Seiwakai* – which combined the characters for purity 清 and peace 和 – reflected the Japan-centric nationalism of the faction, gave it the imagery of political cleanliness, and referenced springtime which could have been taken as a nod towards the goal of restoring Japan to its glory after World War II (WWII) that the faction held dear. In this faction, only Kishi and Fukuda were able to become Prime Ministers, as both Abe and Mitsuzuka were unable to achieve this feat, Abe being barred due to the taint of the Recruit Scandal and Mitsuzuka due to LDP's 1993 electoral loss. Moreover, in Abe's case his death ultimately ended what might have been a career crowned with prime ministerial tenure. As stated, Kishi was a foreign policy hawk, a pure politician, and a member of the Revisionists, whose greatest crowning achievement towards the unmaking of the postwar settlement came with the 1960 revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty towards a more equitable position. Fukuda himself was an ex-bureaucrat from the MoF and a foreign policy hawk like Kishi, although tempered by the changing events such as the Japan-China normalization process. Abe was a reporter before joining the LDP and Mitsuzuka was a pure politican who was part of the transportation *zoku* whilst in the LDP. It can be seen that the Satō and Kishi lineages – which had close ties as their leaders were brothers – had one key similarity and one key difference between them. On the one hand, both factions had the tendency to include men whose backgrounds and areas of interest and expertise were diverse, which reflected onto the faction itself. On the other hand, whilst the Satō lineage was a part of the Yoshida School, the Kishi lineage consisted of Revisionists.

[150] Bouissou, "Party factions and the politics of coalition: Japanese politics under the 'system of 1955'", 584.

Another important factional lineage was that of Kōno faction, initially called the *Daiichi Kokusei Kenkyūkai* (First National Policy Study Group) or the *Shunjūkai* (春秋会/Spring and Autumn Society).[151] The *Shunjūkai* originally had a focus on agricultural policy under Kōno Ichiro and later when Nakasone Yasuhiro (PM, 1982-1987) took over as faction leader in 1965 – and its name became *Seisaku Kagaku Kenkyūjo* (政策科学研究所/ Policy Science Institute) – and Nakasone pursued more "hawkish" foreign policy goals.[152] The names reflected the different directions of the faction under its two major leaders. The name *Shunjūkai* drew upon the rice cultivation seasons of Japan, in spring and autumn of the year, and Kōno's connections with agricultural interests. In contrast, the name *Seisaku Kagaku Kenkyūjo* reflected Nakasone's deep involvement with policy matter across the spectrum, and the factions expanding scope as it became involved with more than just agricultural issues. Both Kōno and Nakasone were professional politicians and both came from outside the conservative mainstream, but only Nakasone and his lieutenant Uno Sōsuke (PM, 1989) were able to become Prime Ministers.[153] Both men brought their particular outlooks to bear onto the faction, with Nakasone especially being vocal about pursuing a more active foreign policy and revising the Peace Constitution to allow the remilitarization of Japan during his tenure as Prime Minister. As can be seen, Nakasone particularly was a member of the Revisionist group that sought to revise to postwar political and international situation of Japan by undoing status quo which had emerged during the Occupation.

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[151] Farnsworth, "Challenges to Factionalism on Japan's Liberal Democratic Party", 504.
[152] Thayer, *How the Conservatives Rule Japan*, 46; Bouissou, "Party factions and the politics of coalition: Japanese politics under the 'system of 1955'", 584; Colton, "Japan's Leaders, 1958", 230.
[153] Bouissou, "Party factions and the politics of coalition: Japanese politics under the 'system of 1955'", 584.

Ōno Bamboku led another one of the early LDP factions of considerable importance, called the *Hakuseikai* (白政会/White Politics Group) or the *Bokuseikai* (睦政会/Harmonious Politics Group). On the one hand, these two names called upon the image of clean and peaceful politic, which were political watchwords during Ōno's time in politics, especially during Kishi's turbulent tenure. On the other hand, especially the name *Bokuseikai* made reference to Ōno's name, with which it shared the character 睦, which made the immediate connection between faction and leader. Ōno was a professional politician – whose career went back to the prewar period – and his involvement with politics, especially as a faction leader, stressed personal ties as Kōno has described it.[154] Although Ōno's faction – and his tenure – is not noted for any particular policy dispositions, his personal approach to politics can be seen reflected in the way he managed factions. Being of a prewar make, Ōno's approach to politics was geared towards a more leader-follower type – which can be seen fitting in greatly with the existing cultural explanations for factionalism – and the way he handled his faction reflected his overall political style.

A final important factional lineage which can be discussed is the *Seisaku Kenkyūkai* (政策研究会/Policy Study Group) headed by Miki Takeo (PM, 1974-1976), which came from outside the conservative mainstream and had an interest and engagement in policy and ideological matters from its inception.[155] Nicknamed "Mr. Clean" for his clean political record, Miki constantly called for party reform, which included calling for the dissolution of the factional system and measures against money politics.[156] Furthermore, Miki had been active in policymaking since his entry

[154] Thayer, *How the Conservatives Rule Japan*, 46.
[155] Fukui, *Party in Power*, 115; Bouissou, "Party factions and the politics of coalition: Japanese politics under the 'system of 1955'", 584; Farnsworth, "Challenges to Factionalism on Japan's Liberal Democratic Party", 504.
[156] Johnson, "Japan 1975: Mr. Clean Muddles Through", 31.

to politics in the Imperial Diet as an independent in 1937, being a vocal voice for items such as cleaner, rationalized, and qualified politics in Japan and peaceful relations with the US. This predisposition of Miki in turn informed the functioning of his own faction within the LDP, as a group who also had a similar interest in being active policy actors. This was reflected in the name of the faction *Seisaku Kenkyūkai* as well, which emphasized the policy involvement of the faction. Later, Miki was succeeded by Kōmoto Toshio in 1976, who renamed the faction to *Banchō Seisaku Kenkyūjo* (番町政策研究所/Bancho Policy Research Institute) of which Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki (PM, 1989-1991) was a member. The name change continued the original commitment to policy matters that this faction had from its inception, but also signaled a shift from politics of principle to politics of application, with the word "banchō" (番町) meaning community signifying this expansion.

Overall, it can be seen that the faction leaders had an immediate impact on the way in which their factions operated on a daily basis, became involved in policy issues, could be identified as having policy preferences, and the type of leadership which would potentially succeed them. The process of differentiation took allowed for a diversity of factional lineages to emerge. Some factions had a catch-all nature – similar to that of the LDP – which meant that the successive leaders brought different policy preferences, and the faction was able to handle such changes because it housed men of different leanings who could still be united behind singular goals, as they shared political outlooks. In some factions, leadership lineages could remain much more constant, with shared backgrounds, policy interests, and political outlooks linking succeeding leaders together. Finally, factions could also see a shift between one position and the other, where succession between pure politician leaders of outstanding character pushed the factional policy priorities in a different route.

### 4.1.3 Factions as sources of political identity and solidarity

The recruitment process, in which faction leaders could enforce unity in policy preferences and political outlooks within their respective factions, by virtue of their control over the recruitment, was not a single-sided process dependent solely on the leader. Whilst the faction leaders were able to manage the recruitment process in a way so that they could ensure that members shared their policy and political views, the members could also choose a faction that fit their existing policy predispositions. After all, the process of being recruited – or inducted – into a faction was not simply a process of finding a willing sponsor within the LDP and dedicating one's loyalty in order to collect the benefits which came from it. Joining a faction also meant that the person in question was seeking to – and willing to – wear the faction label that is associated with the faction and its leader, which allowed a given candidate to distinguish themselves from other LDP candidates competing in the same electoral district.[157]

To be associated with different factional groupings, although claimed to be not entirely distinguishable to the voters on the ground, did provide for differentiation of Dietmembers in a significantly visible way that the media and the voters could identify.[158] Once a Dietmember – or candidate – joined a faction, the people that would support a candidate on the ground changed depending on which faction they joined. This meant that the voters could associate a particular LDP Dietmember in their district with a specific set of prominent politicians, their preferred policies, and political records. This kind of information was widely available in the media, since faction leaders and lieutenants tended to be highly visible and influential figures that

[157] Thayer, *How the Conservatives Rule Japan*, 39; Cox et al., "Electoral Rules, Career Ambitions and Party Structure: Comparing Factions in Japan's Upper and Lower Houses", 117; Cox et al., "Electoral Reform and the Fate of Factions: The Case of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party", 35.
[158] McCubbins and Thies, "As a Matter of Factions: The Budgetary Implications of Shifting Factional Control in Japan's LDP", 304.

were on the news regularly, and the voters had access to this information. Thus, to be a member of a faction such as the *Kōchikai* of Ikeda or the *Tōkakai* of Kishi, would associate a Dietmember with being a part of the Yoshida School or the Revisionists. The voters would be able to judge the policy focuses and inclinations of the LDP Dietmember – or candidate – before them on key matters such as economics, diplomacy, and welfare, by making use of their factional credentials.

Furthermore, from interviews with LDP Dietmembers Sakata Michita and Kurogane Yasumi, Thayer also reported that, factions do have political differences amongst themselves with members banding together not simply because of expedience and benefits, but also due to similarities in thinking.[159] Thus, whilst the choice of faction reflected the choice of factional identity that a given a candidate Dietmember sought to have and an incumbent did have, it also brought people of a similar political outlook together. In effect, the faction helped create a shared political identity for its members, at the level of policies with conservatism serving as the broader ideology, which in turn fostered solidarity between them by allowing them to interact and commit to the same cause. A Dietmember that became a part of a faction, in which the members had a commonly shared political outlook and policy dispositions, could ultimately rely on these fellow members to form a united block during policy discussions within the party.

In sum, what can be discerned here is that factional membership entailed two processes that connected to the politicization of factions and members, as factions brought LDP Dietmembers of similar dispositions together within a single organization. The act of joining into an organization which brought Dietmembers together and combined their energies for political and electoral purposes, led to the

[159] Thayer, *How the Conservatives Rule Japan*, 46.

emergence of both factional labels in politics and solidarity between like-minded politicians. The former meant that the Dietmembers were able to show to the voters their political credentials and policy inclinations, by making an appeal to their factional identity. Whilst the latter meant that factions were organizations of politicians that were of a similar make and could act in solidarity when intraparty discussions and conflicts over policy emerged.

### 4.1.4 Factions and the *zoku* connection

Another way in which the factions demonstrated involvement in policy issues was through the existence of *zoku* politicians in their ranks. Called *zoku* (族) or *zoku giin* (族議員) alternatively, the term *zoku* itself means "tribe" and in the context of politics it is used to identify "policy tribes" and politicians who are members of such groups. These *zoku* groups and politicians can be found in a number of different policy areas, such as taxation, construction, education, and defense, and have connections to both the bureaucracy and interest groups in their area. As such, the *zoku* had policy expertise and networks which made them influential actors, and were involved in matters of both policy and pork barrel politics. As *zoku* politicians were policy specialists, with the power, influence, and expertise to dominate policymaking within the LDP, their membership in factions increased the factional involvement in policymaking. Leduc finds that factions supported the emergence of the *zoku* politicians, in a move that would both provide the means of receiving funding from interest groups by providing them with lobbying outlets and create networks with key industrial and social groups by giving them entry points into national policymaking.[160]

[160] Leduc, "The Anatomy of the Welfare-Zoku: The Institutional Complementarity of the Party Commissions and the National Reform Councils in LDP Decision Making", 573.

As such, the emergence of *zoku* politicians within the factional framework of LDP's party politics had two effects on the policy and political involvement of the factions.

On the one hand, factions inevitably became policy actors themselves, as they came to command the energies of *zoku* politicians and responded to requests from interest groups that they had come to forge ties with. A faction could come to forge ties with key sectors of the Japanese economy – where ties to big business were already a given due to their donor status – and boast of ties to agriculture, fisheries, transportation, or healthcare associations. This generated increased political sensitivity on the part of the factions, who needed to look out for these connections and their interests – in a relationship where support within the party and the Diet translated into electoral support – resulting in the factions becoming more conscious of and involved in policymaking. On the other hand, factions could now demonstrate greater knowledge of and control over policymaking within the party, leveraging their control of the *zoku* politicians within their ranks. Since the *zoku* politicians became experts, with ties to both relevant interest groups outside politics and to the bureaucracy – in their given fields, they became key actors who could push a policy to success, bend its direction to their needs, or sink it in the PARC, effectively dropping it from the agenda as in the case of Nakasone's education reform.

However, it should be noted that although the emergence of the *zoku* within factions increased the sensitivity of factions to policymaking, as well as their involvement with it, this did not mean that factions were now organizations that fully specialized in certain policy areas. Although the factions could certainly have become such specialist units in relation to policymaking, this kind an evolutionary change did not emerge. Instead, most factions remained in a form which Prime Minister Tanaka – although particularly in relation to his own faction – had once described as a "general

hospital" because of the existence of experts and fixers in all policy areas within its ranks.[161] Thus, the *zoku* politicians did not cause the faction to shift its focus onto particular political issues, depending on which type of specialist(s) were dominant in the given faction. Instead, their membership in the faction served to elevate the powers of the factions to become more involved and significant actors in policymaking, and allowed faction leaders to leverage their expertise and power as bargaining chips in policymaking.

On a related point, the emergence of *zoku* politicians did not mean that cracks emerged in the policy leaning of a particular faction because there were now specialists within their ranks, who could push policies and goals of their own as opposed to what united all the members. Although such a situation could have emerged, given that a faction with members focusing on different policy areas and possessing different approaches can reasonably be expected to suffer under the diverging pulls exerted by the specialist *zoku* politicians, such a tendency did not emerge. The key force that kept such a tendency down was seniority.

On the one hand, seniority was a key factor in determining the level of policy specialization of Dietmembers, with the two factors correlating to one another.[162] This meant that *zoku* politicians were senior members of the party and the faction, which limited the number of truly powerful *zoku*, and made it likelier that these were faction leaders and lieutenants themselves. In this way, the impact of seniority on the emergence of *zoku* politicians ensured that what emerged from such specialization was not so widespread that it would create a plurality of voices and directions within the faction. Instead, the true specialists of their areas were the men who led and shaped their factions, such as Prime Minister Ikeda who excelled in economics, or

[161] Krauss and Pekkanen, *The Rise and Fall of Japan's LDP*, 115.
[162] Krauss and Pekkanen, *The Rise and Fall of Japan's LDP*, 175.

those men that had a stake in the continued unity of the faction since they intended to inherit it once the existing leader had stepped away from politics. On the other hand, seniority as a party norm effectively punished rebellions from the ranks of factions, by equating factional loyalty with rising up within the party, which ultimately combining with the factional control over distribution of posts discouraged factional disloyalty. This meant that any politician who could call themselves *zoku* still had more pressure to stay loyal to his faction unless they risked their party careers to become lackluster.

Taken together, it can be seen that the emergence of the *zoku* politicians within the factional system and their membership to factions increased the level of policy involvement and relevance of the factions. *Zoku* politicians necessitated factions to become more responsive to policy matters, for the sake of the interest groups which forged connections and provided support, whilst also giving factions leverage in the policymaking process. Furthermore, the *zoku* politicians increased the range of issues with which factions and faction leaders could effectively become involved with, as their expertise and influence could be called upon by the faction.

#### 4.1.5 Factions as policy discussion forums

Moving away from the human aspect of policy involvement in factions, another way in which factions become involved with policymaking can be found in the functional form they took on, as organizations that assembled politicians. By virtue of the role they play in bringing politicians together, as well as their provision of actual meeting places in the form of offices or official meeting and gatherings, factions created the setting for Dietmembers to get together and discuss policy actively and openly, serving as “units of intra-party communication”, although the leader remained the

ultimate decision-maker.[163] Factions combined a degree of privacy – which on a higher level became "backroom politics" – along with a group of people whose policy positions are closely related to one another. Thus, members could discuss policy amongst themselves without turning it into a public debacle and the LDP could reach settlements on policy positions or formulations within itself. This would then make it easier for the party to present a united front to the public and the LDP, having cleared policy discussions within itself beforehand.

Yet, it should be noted that the faction leaders had the power to override any discussions and conclusions emerging from such private discussions among faction members. However, this should not be taken to mean that faction leaders tended to allow such discussion to proceed without question and then brought down their own decisions to bear down despite what the members have come to think. Although such an action would not have been barred, it would have both run counter to the logic of factional leadership – which necessitates constant control over the affairs of a faction – and might have introduced tensions in the faction itself. Thus, a faction leader was likelier to be a part of the discussion, actively participating in and directing it, and in the end casting the decisive vote.

Ultimately, what can be seen is that the factions not only have policy positions of their own and exist as organizations for like-minded politicians to assemble, but that they also facilitate intraparty discussions on policy within the LDP. Although this is a managed discussion, privy and open to the faction members but ultimately under the guidance of the leader, it does foster policy discussions within the LDP and brings the factions closer into policymaking.

[163] Curtis, *The Japanese Way of Politics*, 88; Fukui, *Party in Power*, 136-137.

### 4.1.6 Analysis of factional impact on the national budget

A final demonstration of factional involvement in politics which can be discerned from the existing literature can be found in a study done by McCubbins and Thies, analyzing the impact of factional coalitions in the making of the national budget. The budget is the key piece of legislation that any administration must pass, if it is to be able to get anything accomplished, which makes it an important indicator of policy involvement for any faction to have an influence on its contents. Although party-line voting on the budget is the norm in the Diet, the LDP first reaches a compromise on the budget through intraparty discussions and then pursues solidarity in the Diet vote.[164] Thus, the budget is not a piece of legislation that the ruling faction or the factional coalition formulates and then pushes onto the rest of the party, offering positive incentives and threatening punishment to bring the factions into line. On the contrary, the budget is a piece of legislation that is the product of factional politics and the factions actively participate in its making, which makes Diet voting an easier affair for the administration although incentives and punishments are available to ensure total adherence.

In analyzing the different budgets between 1956 and 1984, McCubbins and Thies reach the conclusion that the inclusion of different factions in the mainstream does have an impact on the content and nature of policy in LDP administrations, which is reflected on the national budget.[165] Their analysis focuses on a list of budget items, which are categorized as "pork", "public goods", and "semi-public goods" and they find that pork items are least affected, followed by semi-public goods and public

[164] McCubbins and Thies, "As a Matter of Factions: The Budgetary Implications of Shifting Factional Control in Japan's LDP", 300.
[165] McCubbins and Thies, "As a Matter of Factions: The Budgetary Implications of Shifting Factional Control in Japan's LDP", 317-318.

goods respectively in increasing degrees.[166] These results are important, in that they show that the impact of the factions on the budget is not a red herring in analysis. An increase largely in spending that would be considered pork and constituency services would not mean that factions have an impact on policy but rather that they seek to maximize the money being channel to their voters to increase their chances at reelection. The fact that these spending items are not heavily affected shows that pork was not a point of haggling when the budget was formulated and that the factional impact on the budget came from other sources. As such, with the bulk of the spending changes happen in items considered to be public or semi-public goods, it can be seen that policy considerations come into play when faction begin their discussions over formulation of the budget. This leads to the point that the factions that are involved with the making of the budget have policy preferences of their own and that they bring these preferences to bear down on the way in which spending is configured for the next fiscal year. In particular, McCubbins and Thies found that the Kishi faction increases spending, Kōno and Miki factions cut spending, and the Ikeda faction does not have a significant impact.[167] Each of these factions can be observed as having an impact in the way that the national budget of Japan is formulated, applying inflationary or deflationary pressures, or choosing to maintain the status quo. Ultimately, what can be seen is that each of these factions have had an impact on the budget, which corresponded to their policy preferences.

In conclusion, what can be seen is that on the one hand, factions do have particular policy preferences and political outlooks, which the leaders impart, the members partake in and find solidarity through, and they allow policy discussions to

[166] McCubbins and Thies, "As a Matter of Factions: The Budgetary Implications of Shifting Factional Control in Japan's LDP", 310-311, 314.
[167] McCubbins and Thies, "As a Matter of Factions: The Budgetary Implications of Shifting Factional Control in Japan's LDP", 315-317.

take place. On the other hand, these policy preferences and political outlooks do not remain on the paper, and have a significant impact on policymaking that goes on within the LDP, one reflection of which is the national budget. Thus, the factions can be seen as politically differentiated groups of LDP Dietmembers, whose preferences in policy and politics are actually translated into differences between administration and how Japan is governed once they are in power as the ruling faction or as part of the ruling coalition.

## 4.2 Elite factions through the analytical toolkit

Having demonstrated that LDP's factions were involved with policy both actively and passively, which translated into factional differentiation, through an analysis of the existing literature, the discussion will now turn towards an elite analysis of factions. The first aim here, is to demonstrate that the factions can be understood as organizations with their own forms of authority and power, which can be understood in universalistic – as opposed to exceptionalist particularistic – terms. The second aim is to demonstrate that the factions, between whom there exist policy differentiation and a competition for power, can be understood as elite organizations.

In addressing the question of understanding the factions as organizations where power and authority can be understood in objective and comparable terms the categories of authority which Weber has put forward form the analytical metric. In analysis, it can be seen that the factions of the LDP showcase a mixture of the three pure types, which can be analyzed separately in comparison to the ideal types which have been proposed earlier. With regards to legal authority, factions of the LDP can be seen satisfying two conditions: high institutionalization and a hierarchy of authority. LDP's factions, especially since the sixties, had become much more

institutionalized and boasted offices, secretaries, routine meetings, and even summer camps that gave the factions a much more tangible form. The faction took on the form of an organization unto itself, although it should be noted that they did not achieve the level of autonomy that the broader party had, but did become easier to identify, reach, and – for the leaders – lead. Alongside institutionalization, the factions also rationalized their internal hierarchies, as the leader-dominated group came to possess a leading clique with the leader, his lieutenants, and rest of the membership being placed in a hierarchy. Moreover, the solidarity norm helped the factions to solidify their internal hierarchies based upon objective criteria such as the number of times elected, which entailed the accumulation political expertise and the networks which would allow higher ranking members to help fulfill the functions of the faction.

In terms of traditional authority, the factions satisfy both aspects of the ideal type put forward here and what Weber had termed the "estate system". On the side of the ideal type proposed here, the factions can be seen fulfilling the conditions of not having codified but traditionally defined rules and the governance of inheritance by tradition. Although the factions were expected by their leaders and members to fulfill certain functions – which have previously been discussed as part of the cultural explanations – these were not codified but were known to all Dietmembers. Furthermore, norms such as proportionality or seniority were not codified, yet all of the LDP's Diet contingent expected these to be followed, and judged both their faction and party leaders for their proper fulfillment of these norms because they constituted part of the LDP's internal traditional authority.

The governance of factional inheritance was another uncodified norm within the party; however, it followed the structures of traditional authority. This happened as the factional succession process devolved into a contest between faction lieutenants,

each seeking to prove their ability to provide the traditionally defined functions of the faction and its leader. On the side of the "estate system", Weber identifies this as a system of traditional authority where the lieutenants of the boss are not indentured servants but men of prominence themselves, whose positions cannot be taken away easily and have a degree of autonomy.[168] The faction closely imitated this, with the faction leader at the top, surrounded by politicians who had their own expertise, connections, and at times sub-factional followings of their own that owed allegiance to the leader. These lieutenants could not be easily displaced by the leader due to the power they had on their own right and could operate with a certain autonomy, investing in the future contingency of their own leadership bid.

Finally, when compared to the ideal type on charismatic authority, the faction can be seen fulfilling a number of conditions. First, the factions had organizational divisions between leaders, leadership groups, and the masses of followers. The leader remained the ultimate wielder and arbiter of power within the faction, not only defining the political identity of the faction but also choosing who to propose for posts and what policy commitments would be made. The lieutenants helped keep the faction in line with the position of the leader and formed the insider group around him that bolstered his rule. Second, the factions tended to exhibit strong cohesion and political identity which were largely sourced from the leader who imparted their own political positions onto the faction and kept them together. Such a leader-centric approach eventually led both to faction being able to swing into line with the policy choices of different leaders and their tendency to collapse when succession crises emerged. Third and finally, the faction members judged their leaders on their ability to turn the promise of their charisma into reality. Leaders such as Ōno Bamboku

168 Weber, *The Essential Weber*, 136-137.

could not have retained their factional followings, had their personalized charismatic leadership had not been met by their ability to provide the functions expected of them as function leaders. As it can be seen, the factions did operate on premises that could be understood in terms that are universal and comparable, with their authority and power explainable through Weberian categories.

Turning towards the second question of understanding factions as elite organizations the works of Michels and Mosca form the analytical metric by which the LDP's factions will be analyzed, as they provide the theoretical foundations for the emergence and formation of factionalism within political parties. Beginning with Michels, the first observation that can be made is that in his terms, factions – by virtue of being organization of politicians, or rather further organizations of politicians within the organization of the political party – are manifestations of the tendency towards oligarchy. Thus, the LDP, which already occupies the central position in the political ruling class of Japan – having had a near complete control on power since 1955 – can be seen as having created sub-organizations into which the political elites have sorted themselves.

Furthermore, the emergence of the factions both fits in with the developments which Gilani has identified in Michels' work which are necessary in order for factions to emerge, that can be found in the case of the LDP's factions. To recall, for an oligarchy to emerge within party organizations, the party has to achieve ideological rigidity, be transformed into a catch-all status, and become self-seeking.[169] On satisfying the conditions for an oligarchy to emerge, it can be found that the LDP satisfies all the conditions that emerges from Mosca's work. First, the party had achieved ideological rigidity with conservatism being the core ideology that brought

[169] Gilani, "The Iron Law of Oligarchy: A Dilemma for Political Parties," 110.

all the politicians into the LDP and united the factions, whose differences occurred at the policy level rather than at the ideological level. Second, the LDP had also become a catch-all party, which came about as it responded to changes in the Japanese electorate and its demands, and the pressures from the international system. This was a development that had the potential of reflecting in the factions as well, for which the Satō lineage is an important example. Third and finally, the LDP had to become self-seeking, which came about as the party – through the factions – worked to secure elections and keep its place in power.

Once the conditions were ripe for an oligarchy to emerge, the oligarchy that emerged had to perform as a managerial or ruling class within the party, with leaders distinguished from the mass of party members with their political power, expertise, and connections, and could then gain personal followings and become independent actors.[170] These developments can be observed in the factions of the LDP, as they developed and became entrenched within the party. First, it can be observed that the factions turned into ruling classes and the faction leaders performed managerial duties within the party, co-opting the functions of the party for themselves. On the former point, whilst a single faction emerged as the ruling faction by having its leader elected as Prime Minister and – hopefully – members placed into key party and Cabinet posts, a factional coalition became a ruling class within the party by forming the factional mainstream. On the latter, the functions of the factions which have been discussed previously each co-opted and took over a function of the party itself, instead empowering the factional leaders as managers of the affairs of the party in securing endorsements, distributing posts, and providing funds to LDP Dietmembers. Second, it can be observed that faction leaders were always distinguishable from the rest of

[170] Gilani, "The Iron Law of Oligarchy: A Dilemma for Political Parties," 110; Michels, *Political Parties*, 70.

their factions, which was even evident in press reports and academic literature on the LDP. Furthermore, they had both superior political expertise and networks, which not only set them apart from the rest of their faction members but also became the foundation upon which they formed and sustained their factions. As such, it can be seen that the factions of the LDP satisfied the conditions that Michels has set forward, which would allow for them to be classified as elite organizations.

Moving onto Mosca, it can be seen that in his conceptualization, factions are organization of elites who are united in their capacities and can emerge in situations where diversification is constrained.[171] On the point of unity, as demonstrated in the previous section, the factions of the LDP bring together politicians of similar policy views and political outlooks. This happens partly as politicians come together with those others with whom they share political views and partly as faction leaders tailor their factional membership to their own policy preferences and political views. Having brought politicians of a similar political make together, the factions then put their combined energies to work, by providing electoral identities, ensuring solidarity in policy affairs, and creating the grounds for policy discussions. On the point of how factions can emerge, it can also be found that the factions of the LDP tend to satisfy the preposition of Mosca that they can still emerge in ideologically circumscribed situations over minute differences. In the case of the LDP's factions, what can be seen is that although the factions all subscribed to the broader conservative ideology and did not move beyond it, cleavages emerged between them based on both personalistic terms and policy terms, with both being equally salient. In sum, the result that emerges is that when the Moschian prerogatives are applied to the factions of the LDP,

[171] Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, 163, 164.

both their functional form and the basis of their emergence satisfies the conditions for them to be identified as elite organizations.

### 4.3 LDP's factions as elite organizations

In conclusion, this chapter has served to demonstrate three important points about the way in which the factions of the LDP are conceptualized. First, it can be firmly stated that the existing cultural and structural-functional explanations of functionalism within the LDP are inadequate due to their reductivism, selective appreciation of political structures, and the sidelining of political actors from consideration. The existence of factions in Japanese politics is not a phenomenon which can be explained solely on the grounds of Japanese culture, the electoral system, or the provision of services through the factions. This is not to say that these existing explanations are not without merit or that they have not added anything valuable to the study of LDP's factions. However, it is clear that although they have been able to explain much of the factions' functions and powers, they have also selectively ignored the scattered evidence that shows how the factions do have a policy aspect to them. These existing approaches have also created a variety of questions, in place of those that they have answered about politics in Japan. Furthermore, they have also rendered the discussion of factionalism in Japan somewhat incomparable to other places, because of a constant recourse to explanations which are particular to Japan and its specific conditions.

The second important conclusion is that, the factions of the LDP can be conceptualized as politically significant organizations, where political differences serve as the basis of differentiation between each faction. Several factors worked to politically differentiate the factions from one another. The process of factional

recruitment and entry constituted the first point in which the factions gained their political coloration, as faction leader recruited politicians who fit their preferred political profile whilst the politicians sought to join faction where they could be together with others with similar political positions. Politicization of the factions continued during its day-to-day operations, as the leaders came into constant contact with the members and furthered their political socialization into that of the faction. Meanwhile, the factions provided their members with political identity, which would differentiate from others in the same electoral district, and provided political solidarity in the form of comrades within the faction. Becoming more actively involved in politics, the factions first fostered policy discussions between members – under the control of the leaders – which brought policy matter closer to the heart of the factions. In addition, the factions acted as policy actors both by virtue of the *zoku* which they controlled – and whose power and expertise became key for intraparty policymaking – and by actively bringing their policy preferences to bear down on legislation, including the politically central national budget. In effect, the factions can be reconceptualized as political organizations that have political differences between one another and are locked in constant competition to achieve power for themselves by occupying the posts of party president and Prime Minister.

The third conclusion that has emerged is that, the factions of the LDP can be conceptualized as elite organizations on the bases set out by Michels and Mosca, with their own objectively identifiable form of authority and power. On the one side, factions can be seen as satisfying the conditions for what is essentially a mixed form of Weberian forms of legitimate authority. As such, factionalism in the context of the LDP – and likely in the broader Japanese context – can be seen as having roots that can be appraised and identified in an objective and comparable fashion, regarding

how authority and power is wielded within them. In addition, it is also possible in this way to bring more attention to the political actors as significant influences within factional politics in the LDP since power and authority can be better understood as being held by these individuals within the system rather than being external to them. On the other side, the factions satisfy the political conditions and processes which Michels and Mosca have identified as the emergence of elites and their follower groups. Thus, it can be found that elite theories able to explain the question of factionalism within the LDP and that the LDP's factions fit in nicely to the framework for an elite theory approach. In effect, the factions can be reconceptualized as more than differentiated political organizations, who are in constant competition to achieve power. They are also elite organizations which are competing to replace one another as the top echelon of the political elite of Japan, through a circulation of elites cycle that takes within the LDP at the faction level.

# CHAPTER 5

# RETHINKING THE JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER AS AN ELITE LEADER

Having reconceptualized the factions as elite organizations engaged in cycles of elite circulations, this chapter will turn towards discussing the position of the Prime Minister as an elite leader and a significant political actor, stemming from his position as the leader of the ruling faction within the LDP. Discussion will first focus on the existing views on the Japanese Prime Ministers, seeking particularly to explain the factors that have been counted as contributing to their weakness as leaders. This will then be followed by a two-part discussion, similar to that regarding the case of factions. The first half will be focused on using the evidence available in the literature that address the ways in which the Prime Minister has been a significant and adequately powerful political figure in Japan, whilst also showing the ways in which the sources of weakness were countered. The second half will be a theoretical discussion on the elite status of the Prime Minister, making use of both the previous discussion on the factions and the analytical toolkit.

The main aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that the Prime Minister of Japan is a significant elite leader, who is representative of his faction both politically and electorally. Here, the Prime Minister is the subject of analysis because he is the most visible and important member of his faction, and will be used as the representative of his faction during the case studies in the later chapters. As such, it is an important goal to demonstrate that the Prime Minister is both an elite leader and that he is not politically weak to the point of being unable to do anything but does have meaningful power and influence within the political system. To take the Prime Minister as a representative of his faction and as a significant political actor without

first proving the validity of these positions, would impair the analytical ability of this study by making it appear that a key part of the analysis is built upon a simple assumption which the literature rejects. In addition, understanding the Prime Ministers as elite leaders who are significantly differentiated, and who wield power and influence in the political landscape of Japan allows for their positions as a part of the cycle of elite circulation to be better identifiable. After all, the elite circulation cycles which take place through the circulation of the ruling factions of the LDP is the mechanism by which the Prime Ministers of Japan also change. Thus, Prime Ministers change in response to the needs of the party and the nation, just as the factions do, which is dictated by the same circulation of elites cycles.

## 5.1 Existing views of the Japanese prime ministers

In much of the existing literature, the Japanese Prime Minister is not seen as a person that is particularly powerful or significant in the political processes of the Japanese state and the LDP.[172] The Prime Minister is seen as occupying a post that is beset on all sides with different actors and forces that limit his power, ability to legislate and lead, and exert influence over the state and political machinery of Japan. This in turn leads to the image that the Japanese political pyramid is without a head or that the Prime Minister is a vestigial element of the Japanese political landscape, as power is by others, policy crafted elsewhere, and the country led from another level. Surveying the analyses which lead to these conclusions, the sources of weakness of the Prime Minister can be found forming three broad categories. These three categories of weaknesses are factional curtailment, party curtailment, and bureaucratic curtailment of the powers of the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister is found to be weakened by

[172] Rothacher, *The Japanese Power Elite*, 24-25; Hayao, *The Japanese Prime Minister and Public Policy*, 4, 6; Masuyama and Nyblade, "Japan: The Prime Minister and the Japanese Diet", 250-251.

one or the other, or by a combination of three types of curtailment. The aim here is to explore the ways in which the Prime Minister of Japan has been conceptualized in the existing literature as a weak political literature, in order to provide the context for the later discussion, whose aim is to provide refutation and advance the argument that the Prime Minister has been a significant political actor.

### 5.1.1 Factional curtailment

The first category of weaknesses that the Prime Ministers have been found suffering from originated from the factions of the LDP and the barriers they created in the way of Prime Ministers both as the chief of the executive and as party president. Concurrent with the history of factionalism in Japanese politics, this phenomenon can also be traced back in time into the pre-war period where much of LDP's roots – both political and factional – can be found. Going back to the Taishō period, where the rise of factions and the equation of party presidency with premiership had caused an increase in factional politics and power, and a decline in the power and prestige of the Prime Minister, as the factions had begun to curtail prime ministerial power.[173] As it can be seen, the emergence of factional interests and competition over acquiring control over the top party – and hopefully national – post brought about weaker Prime Ministers. This derived in part from the concessions that factional politics brought on leaders, in which the leadership race meant incurring political debts which had to be paid and partly from the constant jockeying to keep the factions in line, lest they move to topple the party leader at a moment of weakness. The pre-war pattern was repeated in the LDP, where the Prime Ministers were stronger in the fifties and sixties but were observed as becoming weaker as the factional system became established and party

[173] Fukui, *Party in Power*, 23.

presidency was equated with the prime ministry, which led to a decline of prime ministerial power.[174] Once the older factional cleavages – between Liberal and Democrats, and between ex-bureaucrats and pure politicians – were broken down and a new politics of factional coalition emerged with Ishibashi Tanzan's tenure as Prime Minister, the factional curtailment of Prime Ministers began anew within the LDP.

Factions in the LDP were seen curtailing the powers of Prime Ministers, first through the powers they wielded – whether through their votes or control of key posts – or through factional conflict that emerged as each faction sought to throw off the ruling faction and grab the party presidency for themselves. One way in which the factions were seen curtailing prime ministerial power through the posts they occupied was through the Cabinet seats they occupied. If the Prime Minister sought to pursue a policy that was controversial for the public and the party, factional conflict would emerge, crippling policymaking as the disharmony between factions would translate into disharmony within the Cabinet.[175] As factions had either members or leaders occupying Cabinet posts, factional conflict over policy within the LDP had a direct line to manifest itself as conflict within the Cabinet and stop it in its tracks. This is because, as the Cabinet worked on the basis of collective responsibility and consensus to function, the intrusion of the factions worked to deter controversial and activist politics from emerging.[176] Each Prime Minister knew that to pursue the wrong policy with the wrong amount of vigor would invite a reaction from the party, which was a constant threat towards crippling or even bringing down an administration.

Another way in which the factions could cripple the power of a Prime Minister through the seats they controlled, was through their control of key party posts and membership in party bodies. Discussed previously, the factions had members sit on

[174] Krauss and Pekkanen, *The Rise and Fall of Japan's LDP*, 109.
[175] Fukui, *Party in Power*, 136, 141; Shinoda, *Leading Japan*, 63.
[176] Hayao, *The Japanese Prime Minister and Public Policy*, 38.

bodies such as the PARC Deliberation Council and the party Executive Council – which wielded power over policy and party affairs, respectively – which allowed them to influence the workings of the party and a given administration. On the one hand, opposition in the PARC Deliberation Council could scuttle the attempts of the Prime Minister in having a particular policy recognized by the party and instead push forward alternative policies. On the other hand, opposition in the party Executive Council could block a particular policy line by ruling it out or endorsing an alternative. Furthermore, factions had members in other organizations such as the Supreme Advisors – who act as the *genrō* of the LDP – and the Government-LDP Consultative Council which also constrains the Prime Minister.[177] The former constituted a brain trust of ex-party leaders, some of whom were faction leaders themselves, which brought factional conflicts into this body that sought to advise the Prime Ministers, albeit informally. This group could confer legitimacy onto a policy proposal, by giving their blessing to it as party elders and leaders, or put it through an uphill battle by expressing reservations or opposition. The latter provided a forum for the party to present its interests and demands to the government, essentially forming a bargaining forum for factional interests and the government. Achieving result here could make the running of an administration smoother and failure could cause conflict later on.

Apart from the use of the power brought to them through occupation of key Cabinet and party posts, the factions were able to make the Prime Minister vulnerable by assuring the existence of a continuous stream of competition and challengers within the party.[178] As each faction was ultimately aiming to secure the post of the party president and Prime Minister for itself, factional alliances remained in flux and allegiances shifted rapidly. Thus, the Prime Minister operated in a political field

[177] Richardson, *Japanese Democracy*, 101.
[178] Hayao, *The Japanese Prime Minister and Public Policy*, 125.

where loyalties shifted endlessly and the survival of the administration depended upon the effective management of the factional shifts because a leadership challenge could be mounted at the slightest weakness, failure, or provocation. This constrained the Prime Minister by forcing him to divert much time into factional politics rather than national politics. Moreover, this constrained the Prime Minister by curtailing possible policy choices available because factional preferences and feedback had to be minded.

A second form of factional curtailment was observed coming from the nature of the party presidential elections and the factional bargaining which it entailed. Each incoming Prime Minister incurred debts with the factions that provided the votes for his victory, to be paid in the form of Cabinet and party posts, whose adverse effect on the ability of Prime Ministers to lead was noted by the party itself.[179] In fact, the case of Ishibashi Tanzan shows that the post of Prime Minister is of such a value that a faction leader may end up not getting any other posts in the Cabinet for his faction if the top post is his.[180] This meant that the victorious faction leader, as Prime Minister was unable to freely create his own Cabinet because he was beholden to his allies and needed to distribute rewards. Moreover, as proportionality became an established party norm, he was also aware of the need to give some posts to the anti-mainstream factions. Overall, this meant that where a weak Prime Minister is concerned, his factions would end up with few posts of importance besides the top one available, and where a strong one was in question, he would still find himself constrained in his choices. Thus, the Cabinet not only became an arena for factional conflict but also an arena in which the Prime Minister could find his faction outnumbered and outflanked.

[179] Hayao, *The Japanese Prime Minister and Public Policy*, 126; Shinoda, *Leading Japan*, 62; Fukui, *Party in Power*, 97; Liberal Democratic Party, "Report of the Organization Investigation Commission" quoted in Thayer, *How the Conservatives Rule Japan*, 55.
[180] Leiserson, "Factions and Coalitions in One-Party Japan: An Interpretation", 783.

Furthermore, besides the need to pay for political debts occurred at the time of the leadership contest, there existed the need to keep a firm grasp on current and future bases of power by keeping all factions content, which curtailed the freedom and power of the Prime Minister in Cabinet appointments.[181] As factional allegiances shifted, the Prime Minister was always in a position to find that the key posts given to one-time allies were now occupied by rivals, whereas the older rivals were unwilling to cooperate having been relegated to lesser posts. Thus, the Prime Minister was always playing a gamble in which he risked losing the cooperation of key Cabinet ministers whose allegiances were to other factions and risked alienating his alternative partners by inadvertently snubbing them. This necessitated much energy to be invested into factional politics, leaving little to pursue policy, and constantly introduced threats to the unity of the Cabinet and the administration.

### 5.1.2 Party curtailment

The second category of impediments on prime ministerial power have been identified as coming from the LDP itself, originating from the length of party presidential terms, *zoku* within the party, and the limits placed on the agenda of the Prime Minister. Beginning with the two-year term limit for the LDP party president, this limit was not only observed as a constraint on the powers of the Prime Minister, but was also introduced deliberately to do so in the post-Satō Eisaku period.[182] The term limit for party president being only two years was the factor which was aimed at decreasing the power of the Prime Minister, both by keeping him occupied with party affairs and by giving him little time to act. On the former point, which has been partially alluded to before, a Prime Minister found that – with the factional challengers always waiting in

[181] Kohno, *Japan's Postwar Party Politics*, 110.
[182] Fukui, *Party in Power*, 97; Hayao, *The Japanese Prime Minister and Public Policy*, 127; Bouissou, "Party factions and the politics of coalition: Japanese politics under the 'system of 1955'", 591-593.

the wings – he would have to dedicate much of his time in power to party rather than national politics. As such, in order to stay in power a Prime Minister not only was seen as putting policy matters on the back burner but also as being more responsive to the voices coming from the factions, essentially tailoring his proposals to their taste. On the latter point, even when the Prime Minister did not have to contend with constant challenges – which was a rarity – he had only so much time to get his policy proposals approved by the party and enacted by the Diet. Not knowing whether a second term would be forthcoming and that any project started now may last beyond an administration or be scrapped in the next was seen as another reason why Prime Ministers did not actively pursue favored policies.

On the question of *zoku* within the party curtailing the powers of the Prime Minister, it has been observed that as the PARC and the *zoku* – who represented special interests and had policy expertise – became more central to policymaking they have curtailed prime ministerial powers.[183] As the PARC acted as the mechanism through which the party members engaged in formal policy discussions and the policies of the LDP began to take shape here, the decisions made here began to take on more weight. The PARC could not be ignored by the Prime Minister since this would bring about a revolt from the factions and the backbenchers, which became the source of its power to act as a check on prime ministerial power. Whereas the *zoku* challenged prime ministerial power and policymaking ability, first by virtue of being experts in their given areas and second because they represented the groups which they were connected to and likely beholden to due to their donor or voter status. On the former point, the *zoku* could challenge top-down policymaking initiatives by putting up staunch opposition – acting as experts – and could further mobilize their

[183] Krauss and Pekkanen, *The Rise and Fall of Japan's LDP*, 214-215; Mulgan, "Japan's Political Leadership Deficit", 188-189, 194.

connections in their given policy realms to further block such efforts. On the latter point, as the *zoku* had ties to interest groups – which tended to provide votes or funds – they were sure to defend their interests, effectively bringing lobbying interests into the policymaking process and limiting the field of action for the Prime Minister.

Besides the *zoku* being directly involved, policymaking subgovernments in different areas were seen constraining Prime Ministers by dominating policymaking and by introducing the need to mediate conflicts between subgovernments.[184] On the one hand, the subgovernments – which included the *zoku* along with relevant bureaucrats and non-state actors – brought together experts and interested parties and held great power on policymaking on a given policy issue. Thus, a Prime Minister either had to pursue policies they would support, reach a compromise, or try and by-pass them entirely for independent policymaking initiatives. The last option, for the most part, tended to be out of the question for Prime Ministers and the subgovernments effectively checked independent policymaking on the part of the Prime Ministers. On the other hand, just like different ministries conflicted over policy and jurisdiction, so did subgovernments which was observed to make the Prime Ministers weaker in policymaking because much time had to be wasted on mediating between these groups.

Finally, the Prime Minister was seen as being weakened due to the limited nature of his agenda, which depended upon a number of factors. First, the agenda of Prime Ministers was relatively small due to the normally busy schedule and the need to maintain power within the party, which quickly led to items falling off the agenda.[185] With only two-years at the job, factional politics demanding much attention, and the demands of leading what was then the world's second-largest

[184] Hayao, *The Japanese Prime Minister and Public Policy*, 149.
[185] Hayao, *The Japanese Prime Minister and Public Policy*, 185.

economy and principal US ally in Asia, Japanese Prime Ministers could bring only so many items into the agenda. This was one reason that they were largely labelled as being ineffective or reactive once in office, since their agendas appeared to be constrained by pressures which emerged elsewhere and the Prime Ministers were unable to act freely. Second, Hayao argued that since the LDP dominated Japanese politics, it disincentivized breaks in the agenda between administration and removed the notion of a "unique" agenda between administrations as long as it was in power.[186] The logic here runs that conservative domination of politics meant that the overall political agenda and approach did not need any changes or any "mavericks" to come along and introduce changes in what was already a broad conservative agenda which was inherited between administrations. Thus, each Prime Minister had less power and incentives to alter the conservative agenda and more towards continuing the agenda that been inherited from the preceding administration. Third and finally, the powers of Prime Ministers were seen to be constrained due to the need for public backing coupled with the wide base of the party, which meant that a wide variety of social pressures and demands would crowd an administration.[187] The Prime Minister had to pursue a policy line that would not only go down well with the voters but also not alienate sections of the LDP's electorate. This meant engaging in a balancing act which favored milder and more controlled approach to policymaking, lest there be a negative reaction emerging from the electorate. Moreover, with such a wide electoral base, the party was susceptible to pressures and demands from multiple groups – which could be contradictory as much as complementary – and had to find ways to equally satisfy or disappoint everyone. Ultimately, this did not leave much room for the Prime Minister to be an active policymaker.

[186] Hayao, *The Japanese Prime Minister and Public Policy*, 187.
[187] Krauss, "Selecting Japan's New Prime Minister", 12; Shinoda, *Leading Japan*, 101.

### 5.1.3 Bureaucratic curtailment

The third and final category of breaks on the powers of the Japanese Prime Ministers were observed to be coming from the bureaucracy. Namely, the bureaucracy was seen as dominating the policymaking processes and causing weaknesses in the personal resources available to the Prime Minister through his office. Addressing the question of bureaucratic domination in policymaking, one central conceptualization is the Japan Inc., approach – where Chalmers Johnson is a particularly strong proponent – which finds the bureaucracy towering over the LDP because of their long tradition of rule and being in power, and the membership of ex-bureaucrats to the LDP.[188] In this approach, the *Kōchikai* faction emerges as the tool of the bureaucracy to control the LDP from the inside, whilst the rest of the state machinery applies pressure from the outside. The party and the Prime Minister are thus constrained by bureaucrats on all sides, who gain leverage not only because their power and influence are so pervasive but also because they come from a tradition of ruling over Japan which only makes it easier for them to do so continuing into the future. As such, the bureaucracy is where policy begins and ends, and the Prime Minister is out of the political equation entirely.

Approaching the question on the side of the LDP, it has been observed that the party is dependent on the bureaucracy for drafting legislation because it lacks the human capital, access to materials, and knowledge and expertise of the existing body of relevant legislation.[189] Moreover, because the LDP, Cabinet, and the Prime Minister were reliant on the bureaucracy to formulate bills, implement policy, and interpret existing laws, which also gave them the power to actively thwart thwarting policy ideas or force compromises.[190] Although the party had the PARC and *zoku* had emerged between 1955 and 1993, the former remained an organization for decision-

[188] Hayao, *The Japanese Prime Minister and Public Policy*, 8-9.
[189] Fukui, *Party in Power*, 166; Hayao, *The Japanese Prime Minister and Public Policy*, 143-144.
[190] Shinoda, *Leading Japan*, 93; Krauss, "Selecting Japan's New Prime Minister", 12-13.

making in policy affairs and the latter remained as actors in bargaining for and deciding what the emerging policy would look like. However, it fell on the bureaucracy to take the decision made by the LDP and dressed it up in the form of legislation, which would then be submitted to the Diet. This meant that the final form of the legislation was under bureaucratic control, which gave the bureaucracy a significant amount of power over the party and the Prime Minister, as they could alter policy or drag its formulation as leverage.

On the question of the bureaucracy causing the personal resources of the Prime Minister, the main constraint emerges from the method in which the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) is staffed. Personnel in the PMO – especially the administrative secretaries of the Prime Minister – are bureaucrats who have been loaned from particular ministries, which causes for them to have divided loyalties since their career will continue on in the ministry.[191] In effect, the Prime Minister either has unwilling and wary supporters on his staff – granted that he has enough power independently to sway these bureaucrats – or has people whose main job is to report back to their superiors elsewhere and represent their ministry inside the PMO. This results in the Prime Minister having a personal staff, whose goals and policy visions do not match up with his, and tend to act as a break on his power by not providing him with the support and expertise that might enable him to become active in policymaking. Another constraint emerges from the small size and capabilities of the PMO, where the lack of a personal policy staff and policymaking expertise prevents the Prime Minister from active policymaking.[192] Thus, the Prime Minister not only suffers from bureaucratic presence in his staff, but also from an inability to circumvent the weight being brought down by the bureaucracy by means

[191] Hayao, *The Japanese Prime Minister and Public Policy*, 160; Shinoda, *Leading Japan*, 78.
[192] Hayao, *The Japanese Prime Minister and Public Policy*, 158; Hayao, *The Japanese Prime Minister and Public Policy*, 189.

of a staff of his own. This, in return, leads to the conclusion that the Japanese Prime Minister is a weak figure without a proper staff to enable him to become stronger.

## 5.2 The Japanese prime minister reconceptualized

Having discussed the ways in which the weakness of the Prime Minister has been conceptualized during the period of 1955 to 1993, this section will turn towards a reevaluation of prime ministerial power and position as an elite leader. The main thrust of this section runs counter to much of the existing literature, in arguing that the Japanese Prime Minister is not a helpless political actor thrown about in the wind of factional desires, party restraints, and bureaucratic governance but is a significant and elite representative actor in his own right. As such, the discussion here will be focusing on the Prime Minister – who leads a faction, which is an elite organization itself – with two main aims. The first aim will be to demonstrate that the Japanese Prime Ministers were not weak but rather influential actors in Japanese politics, depending on their intraparty powers, popular support, and ability to use the tools available to them. The second aim will be to demonstrate that the Prime Ministers were the face and voice of the factions which they have led, and thus were leaders of elite groups within the broader political section of the Japanese ruling class.

The approach employed here will repeat the pattern set in the corresponding section of the previous chapter, with a two-part analysis. First half of analysis will be making use of evidence available in the existing literature regarding the resources, powers, and influence of the Prime Minister as an actor in the Japanese political landscape. Second half of the analysis will then build on the discussion by approaching the question of the Prime Ministers as elite leaders based on previous analysis on the factions and the analytical toolkit.

### 5.2.1 The prime minister through the literature

This section will focus on analyzing the existing literature, with an eye towards finding the sources of power and influence available to the Prime Minister, as a significant politician and powerful faction leader. The main goal here is to be able to demonstrate that the Japanese Prime Minister can be conceptualized as a significant political actor and that the existing literature – when put together – does support this position. The discussion here will pursue this goal by demonstrating that the Prime Minister had a significant amount of power and influence at his disposal to be an important political actor and by refuting parts of the existing views by showing how the proposed curtailments of power could be and were circumvented. As such, the analysis found in this chapter can be subdivided into two main categories: the extent of prime ministerial power, and refuting bureaucratic and factional curtailment. It should be noted that refutations for party curtailment are found under other first heading and thus will not be discussed individually.

#### 5.2.1.1 The extent and sources of a prime minister's power

The extent of a Prime Minister's power rested primarily on his ability to tap into his sources of power. These sources were both internal and external to the LDP, but two can be particularly singled out for carrying the most weight. On the one hand, a Prime Minister with a strong faction of his own and with the ability to manage the remaining factions and sway their leaders, had the power to both leverage his faction against others and push controversial agenda items.[193] A Prime Minister who could stand stronger within the party and influence other faction leaders always stood a better chance to wield more power as a political actor, owing to his ability to placate the

[193] Fukui, *Party in Power*, 141; Hayao, *The Japanese Prime Minister and Public Policy*, 130.

factions and suppress possible challengers, and his ability to form a major voting block within the party. Prime Ministers Satō and Tanaka can be seen as such men, whose factional powers and personal abilities to push and pull the remaining factions – coupled with control over factions or factional dyads which emerged as kingmakers – made them stronger leaders. On the other hand, a Prime Minister not only needed to be strong within the party, but also popular with the public if they sought to be truly strong political actors.[194] Public opinion could always be leveraged by Prime Ministers to bolster their positions, since their standing with the people could translate into popularity of their policies and make it harder for factions to challenge them without proper cause. The quintessential example was Prime Minister Nakasone, whose ability to use mass media to his advantage and popularity with the people was helpful enough to both keep him in office and won him an extension term in office.

Although it was optimal for a Prime Minister to be able to rely on both sources of power, they usually tended to have greater access to one source of power more than the other. Prime Minister Satō – Thayer observed – was able to face the factions with power due to both his ability to manipulate factional politics and his own reserve of factional power.[195] However, he lacked public appeal and was eventually pushed out from power because he lacked strong public backing and his factional rivals seized on the opportunity of the Nixon shocks and the opening up the People's Republic of China (from here on China) to remove him from office. On the other hand, Prime Minister Miki was popular with the public but lacked support within the party, especially after the losses of the 1976 election which the factions seized upon to push him out.[196] Yet Prime Minister Nakasone was able to survive in a similar condition where he was weaker within the party, by capitalizing on the public support he

[194] Ono, "Portfolio Allocation as Leadership Strategy: Intraparty Bargaining in Japan", 557.
[195] Thayer, *How the Conservatives Rule Japan*, 122.
[196] Tomita et al., "Prerequisites to Ministerial Careers in Japan, 1885-1980", 254.

received. Thus, it can also be seen that the ability of a Prime Minister to survive and emerge powerful on the political scene was dependent upon his ability to make use of the sources of power available to him. A Prime Minister could have had either source of power figure predominantly in shaping his tenure – and both were equally valuable and effective – as long as the Prime Minister was able to take advantage of them.

What emerges here is that the political system around the Prime Minister does not specifically weaken him. On the contrary, if the chosen Prime Minister is politically capable and able to make use of the opportunities brought before him, he could become the master of the system, whilst the lack of either could make him a puppet since actors of aptitude were always available and waiting within the party. A strong factional backing or a strong public backing – and ideally a combination of the both – were enough to give a Prime Minister the edge in national and factional politics, as long as he was able to make use of them. Furthermore, because such Prime Ministers would be able to ward off factional challengers and act from a position of power, they would be able to secure longer tenures just as Satō and Nakasone were able to do so. The case of revolving door prime ministry thus becomes less a case of Prime Ministers being weak but a case of them being unable to either make use of the power available to them, their inability to generate either form of power, or them losing preexisting bases of power. Moreover, the kingmaker status of the Tanaka faction can also be taken as another factor which has made it harder for Prime Ministers to stay for long in power. As factional strength came to hinge on the goodwill of Tanaka and his faction, it can be seen as a factor making it harder for unpopular Prime Ministers to stay on, unless like Nakasone they had both Tanaka's backing and public popularity. Ultimately, it was the political ability of the

Prime Minister that determined how well he could tap into his factional or popular sources of power which would in turn determine the extent of his power.

#### 5.2.1.2 Overriding bureaucratic and factional curtailment

Having discussed the power and influence of the Prime Minister through its sources, and the extent to which its potential can be realized, the discussion in this section will focus on how the bureaucratic and factional curtailment was overcome by Prime Ministers. With regards to bureaucratic curtailment, earlier discussion has shown that the dominant view tends to see the bureaucracy dominating the LDP and the Prime Minister, acting as the true policymakers and rulers of Japan. Contrasting this view, Pempel argues that – under the period of LDP domination – the bureaucracy and LDP governments were bedfellows, where the bureaucracy cooperated with the LDP's conservative agenda whilst keeping its own agenda secure.[197] One important result of this convergence was that the bureaucracy was not overriding the policymaking powers of the Prime Minister and the LDP – or vice versa – but were rather enabling the agendas of each other in a mutual exchange. Both were equally the hostage of the other, however, the political system and the policymaking processes worked on the basis of the cooperation between the two sides. Another important result of such cooperation was that the politicians and the Prime Minister had a number of avenues of influence and cooperation open to work with the bureaucracy. Deals could be struck for alternating policy support, Diet discussions on bills the bureaucracy valued withheld or sped up, or public support or opposition used to goad the bureaucracy into agreeing to policy proposals coming from the Prime Minister. As such, the Prime Minister could push through bureaucratic resistance or generate cooperation, relying

[197] Pempel, *Creative Conservatism*, 36.

on the symbiotic relation that existed between the sides and his power base within the faction that the led, which gave him the power to legislate.

However, the Prime Minister was not always relying on a cooperative relationship with the bureaucracy when engaged in policymaking and they did not necessarily respect the agenda of the bureaucracy because it was part of an exchange. Hayao observed that the politicians and the Prime Ministers were always active policymaking actors, and that during this process they were often found overriding bureaucrats especially in the MoF.[198] After all, it should not be forgotten that whilst the bureaucracy could claim to have a duty to the nation and the state, the politicians had a claim to a popular mandate and their duty was primarily to the electorate. Thus, where the ministries may propose a certain policy, it would be overridden due to political unpopularity or the MoF would be overridden on its resistance to increased spending. It should be noted here, since certain factions when they were in power or in the ruling factional coalition were more ready to increase spending on public and semi-public agenda items – as discussed previously – and more predisposed to override the MoF. As such, since the LDP and the Prime Minister were prone to having agendas that ran counter to bureaucratic interests and had electoral incentives to act on their own agendas, they often acted to override the bureaucracy and to impose their own agendas, buoyed by their factional support within the LDP.

As Prime Minister Tanaka's handling of the oil shocks in 1973 shows, the Prime Minister could use both types of interaction with the bureaucracy in conjunction to effectively achieve his own agenda goals. The Prime Minister could ignore or mediate the policy preferences of ministries, or initiate an exchange in which where the Prime Minister made support for the bureaucratic agenda conditional

[198] Hayao, *The Japanese Prime Minister and Public Policy*, 13.

on bureaucratic support on his own agenda.[199] The Prime Minister could choose to cooperate with the bureaucracy and smooth out the policymaking and legislative processes by coordinating between all the competing actors and interests involved; to let these processes bog down or break down; or to pick sides. The choice came down to which of these approaches was more politically expedient and efficient for the Prime Minister to pursue, in light of the different prerogatives, responsibilities, and agendas of the LDP administration and the bureaucracy. Allies could be found in all ministries and it was not an easy choice to alienate a ministry by ignoring its policy preferences and picking the side of a rival ministry, the ultimate determining factor for a Prime Minister was to see how he could push his own agenda better. However, the primacy of the Prime Minister showed itself the most when he leveraged his support – and thus the ability to keep the political system moving – in exchange for bureaucratic backing on his agenda.

During policymaking, the Prime Minister – with the help of his staff – further controlled the bureaucracy by initiating policy at the lower levels, which then filtered up to the Cabinet and sub-cabinet level for approval as based on the foundations and directions which reflected what the Prime Minister had set out.[200] Thus, policies that "emerged" from the bureaucracy were not always products of bureaucratic agenda or ingenuity, but of a process that began with the Prime Minister and his ideas, and ended with his approval. The bureaucracy with its manpower, expertise, and resources thus acted as the conduit through which the Prime Minister could formulate policy and have bills drafted, by providing the initial impetus and then by providing continuous inputs.

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[199] Takayasu, "Prime-ministerial Power in Japan: A Re-examination", 177.
[200] Shinoda, *Leading Japan*, 48.

Regarding factional curtailment, the dominant perspective discussed earlier finds that the factions weakened Prime Ministers due to their control over party and Cabinet posts, and the debts owed to them for being a part of the mainstream coalition. Although after the sixties distribution of Cabinet posts was done largely following the proportionality norm, this has not meant that the faction of the Prime Minister has gotten less seats, as the disparity between the mainstream and anti-mainstream factions persisted in the distribution of posts.[201] Thus, whilst the Prime Ministers were much more inclined to present a united party front, and to keep all faction satisfied and under control, this did not stop them from getting themselves and their allies an edge in appointments. Furthermore, it should be noted that proportionality did not emerge because factional balances shifted to an equilibrium but because shrinking Diet majorities necessitated the LDP to band closer together and limit factional conflict at the top. This meant that the factions did not contain prime ministerial power because they were neither the direct creators of the proportionality norm nor did they benefit significantly from it to the detriment of the ruling faction and the mainstream coalition.

Moreover, since the Prime Minister decided how many seats each faction got – with an eye for proportionality and debts incurred – as well as which seats they got, and then who to put there based on the list given to him, he was in a position to determine the influence of each faction in his Cabinet.[202] Although it can be pointed out that the Prime Minister did have a need to reward supporters and keep opponents in check during appointments, ultimately the factions counted on him to distribute the seats and pick his ministers in a way that would help faction leaders save face in front of their factions. Factions might have ended up with fewer but more important seats,

[201] Cox and Rosenbluth, "The Electoral Fortunes of Legislative Factions in Japan", 584.
[202] Thayer, *How the Conservatives Rule Japan*, 195-196.

or with more but less important seats with both situations reflecting not only on the Prime Minister but on the faction leaders. If the members of the faction were to believe that their leader was unable to secure posts of a certain number or weight, the faction would begin showing signs of internal fractions as the incumbent leader would appear weak and unfit to lead. Thus, the Prime Minister not only determined what factions would wield influence within his Cabinet but also shaped the political fortunes of faction leaders, who depended on him to deliver Cabinet appointments. In addition, the Prime Minister could choose to have faction leaders occupy Cabinet posts, aiming to use collective responsibility to bind them to the agenda and to dampen their ability to revolt.[203] Such an appointment would move faction leaders closer to the centers of policy and decision making within the political landscape, which would both increase their influence and the influence of others on them. Responsibility as a Cabinet appointee would mean that they would have to work with the Prime Minister, and be bound to his leadership if a decision had passed, and that they would have to respond to the bureaucracy and interest groups and represent the government in their interactions.

Prime ministerial control over appointments also stretched out to the distribution of top party posts, which were filled by the Prime Minister's own men or allies in the mainstream coalition.[204] Thus, these important sources of intraparty power were never too far away from the control and influence of the Prime Minister. This did not mean that the factions that occupied these posts derived lesser benefits from doing so but that the Prime Minister was not necessarily impacted negatively from not directly controlling these posts. Key here was the post of Secretary General, which Thayer had observed as consistently being from the faction of the Prime

[203] Thayer, *How the Conservatives Rule Japan*, 189-190.
[204] Thayer, *How the Conservatives Rule Japan*, 183.

Minister but has come from a mainstream faction especially after Tanaka, with Ōhira being the only exception.[205] Controlling the post of the Secretary General allowed for a faction to control party endorsements, finances, and daily affairs which was important for a Prime Minister to either control directly or have an ally control it. As the mainstream faction kept its control over the post over the period of LDP's political domination, the Prime Minister was always in a position to wield influence over the central affairs and apparatus of the LDP, dividing the benefits with mainstream allies.

Overall, it can be seen that the Prime Minister was less constrained by both the bureaucracy and the factions than the dominant view has put forward. With the bureaucracy, the Prime Minister could use both positive and negative action to exert power and influence. Cooperation and mutual assistance between the two sides coexisted with the Prime Minister's leveraging of his role as a coordinator of interests to actively shape the relationship between the bureaucracy and the Prime Minister to the latter's advantage. Moreover, the Prime Minister was able to use the bureaucracy to formulate his policy ideas, in a sense outsourcing the process of policymaking by providing the impetus and the direction for the final outcome to a ministry with the manpower, expertise, and resources to fulfill this task. With the factions, the Prime Minister ultimately emerged as a figure whose faction and mainstream allies consistently wielded more power that the anti-mainstream and the Prime Minister had the power to impact other factions significantly. The Prime Minister not only controlled or maintained influence over the top party posts, but he also controlled Cabinet appointments both distributing influence to factions and opening the path to factional discord.

[205] McCubbins and Thies, "As a Matter of Factions: The Budgetary Implications of Shifting Factional Control in Japan's LDP", 301; Thayer, *How the Conservatives Rule Japan*, 272-273; Krauss and Pekkanen, *The Rise and Fall of Japan's LDP*, 212-213.

### 5.2.2 The prime minister through the analytical toolkit

In the previous section, the Japanese Prime Minister has been reconceptualized as a political actor with his own sources of power and ways of sidestepping curtailment by the bureaucracy and the factions – through an analysis of the existing literature. In this section, the discussion will now turn towards an elite analysis of the Prime Minister. In doing so, the aim here is to demonstrate that the Prime Ministers are elite actors, who are representatives of different sections of elites – in the form of factions of the LDP – and that changeovers in administrations, where both the Prime Minister and the ruling faction changes, present instances of elite circulation. The analysis here will be built upon both on elite theory and the previous discussion on identifying the factions as elite organizations, in order to deliver a qualified identification of the Japanese Prime Minister as an elite leader.

Beginning with the work of Michels, which complements the previous discussion on factions as elite organizations, the Prime Minister – who is simultaneously both the head of the LDP and his own faction within it – occupies a position as a leader of the intra-party oligarchy. The leaders emerge from within the party, as the party organization transforms into an oligarchy with its own prerogatives and survival motives, at the head of competing groups of politicians. Once this division of the oligarchy takes place, the leaders then become competitors for greater power and control over party and national leadership. In the case of the LDP, the Prime Minister emerged first as the leader of his faction – which was the central unit of organization of the political elites in the LDP – which was differentiated from other factions and competed with them over party and national leadership. Once a faction leader became Prime Minister, he also became the chief of the intra-party oligarchy of the LDP – which acted as part of a national oligarchy by virtue of its monopoly on

political power – and acted as a major leader of the political elites. This is paralleled in the work of Mosca, – which also ties in with the previous discussion on the factions – as the Prime Minister emerges as an elite leader, first as the leader of a faction which is a narrow section of the broader ruling class and in the case of the LDP is the leader of the political elites within the ruling class.

Turning to Pareto, his description that the decline of the existing ruling elites leads to softer attitudes towards the rising ruling elites finds its reflections on the proportionality norm and how it has been argued as a way in which the Prime Minister has been weakened by the factions. It should be recalled that proportionality did not emerge due to factions becoming more powerful vis-à-vis the Prime Minister but because the LDP was growing weaker in the Diet and needed unity at the Cabinet-level among factions to provide a united front. The proportionality norm and the fact that the mainstream factions still got disproportionately more posts despite abiding by it, fits Pareto's point that a weakened ruling elite will make shows of concessions and understanding to its challengers but not lose its rapaciousness. Thus, the Prime Minister, as the head of the current ruling elite – both nationally and within the party – appears to be in a weaker position only at face value, whilst retaining the same thirst and potential for power and influence.

## 5.3 The Japanese prime minister as an elite leader

To conclude, there are three important conclusions which emerge from the analysis done in this chapter. The first two conclusions are closely tied to one another. First important conclusion is that the existing conceptualizations of the Japanese Prime Minister, which sees the post and its occupants as largely weak or politically inconsequential figures whose powers are curtailed by the bureaucracy, party, and

faction do not tell a complete story. Second, the prime ministry is not a weak and politically inconsequential post, possessing much of the necessary prerequisites for wielding power and influence, but the political ability of the incumbent is a significant factor, which depends on the political finesse and factional leadership of the Prime Minister in great degree. On the one hand, the Prime Minister has a number of power sources at his disposition, from the faction he leads and the public popularity he commands, and the means to overcome the weaknesses pointed out in the existing approaches. The prime ministry carries much political weight and is the only elected post to have such intense conflict associated with its attainment because of its significance. On the other hand, the Prime Minister is a significant political actor, whose ability to make use of his power bases is the true determinant of the power his post wields. As opposed to the existing approaches, which attribute power to other actors largely on the basis of structure and function, the prime ministry derives its powers not from the simple act of existing – which does give it the potential for much power and influence – but from the ability and expertise of its occupant.

The third and final important conclusion is that the Prime Minister, without making use of self-evident claims, can be identified as an elite leader within the Japanese political landscape. The Prime Minister is a twofold elite leader, once for being the leader of a faction which is a sub-organization of elites and once for being the leader of the LDP – and thus the nation as Prime Minister – which is the chief organized body for the political elites in Japan. Furthermore, just as the factions are differentiated and competing bodies – with both attributes being both imparted by the leader and self-sustaining – the Prime Ministers represent a set of differentiated and competing elite leaders. The key implication which this brings about is that the changeover between leaders can be analyzed within a circulation of elites framework,

and yield a sensible result giving more insight into Japanese politics under LDP domination. The leader – who becomes Prime Minister – and his faction constitute a whole which share agendas and policy preferences, and experience the same shifts in power due to the circulation of elites that takes place within the LDP.

# CHAPTER 6[206]

## THE CIRCULATION OF ELITES IN JAPAN THROUGH THE LDP: ERA OF STRONG PARTY, STRONG FACTIONS, STRONG LEADERS

This and the following chapter will focus on bringing together both the methodology that has been set out and the discussion on the factions and the Prime Minister, through case studies of each of the LDP's administrations between 1955 and 1972, and between 1972 and 1993. The main unit of analysis in these case studies will be the Prime Minister, whose position as the key representative of his faction and as a viable analytical metric has been discussed previously. By analyzing the changes between Prime Ministers and their administrations, it will also be possible to analyze the impact of changes between ruling factions, as changes in both are determined by the same circulation of elites cycles within the LDP. These case studies will primarily draw upon the speeches given by the Prime Ministers in the Plenary Sessions of the House of Representatives of the Diet. Especially central here are the opening speeches where the Prime Minister discusses contemporary affairs and sets out the agenda of the administration in a given Diet session. The data provided by the speeches will then be augmented by data on the political history of Japan in each sub-section of this period and data on the personality and administrations of each Prime Minister to create a complete picture of the differences between them. The aim here is to analyze each Prime Minister as a single unit vis-à-vis their immediate predecessors and successors, in a way that is geared towards finding the key markers – which have been set out previously – for the elite circulation models of Mosca and Pareto, and the circulation significance model of this study.

[206] For further reference, refer to tables and figures in Appendices C, D, E, and F. For data on factional strength, note that the tables and figures make use of data for the House of Representatives but the discussion in all case studies take into account the whole Diet contingents of the factions.

In conducting case studies of LDP administrations between 1955 and 1993 through an application of the circulation of elites and circulation significance models, these two chapters will be separated into four main thematic subsections and one final overview subsection. In this chapter the first subsection will focus on the early formative and turbulent years of the LDP between 1955 and 1960, encompassing the administrations of Prime Ministers Hatoyama, Ishibashi, and Kishi. The second subsection will focus on the decade of stability that took place between 1960 and 1972, under the tenures of Prime Ministers Ikeda and Satō. In the next chapter the first subsection will focus on the decade alternatively called the Kaku-Fuku War – from the rivalry between Tanaka Kakuei and Fukuda Takeo – or the revolving prime ministers period which spanned from 1972 to 1982. This period consists of the tenures of Prime Ministers Tanaka, Miki, Fukuda, Ōhira, and Suzuki. The second subsection will focus on the height and collapse of the LDP's domination over postwar politics in Japan, between 1982 and 1993. Prime Ministers Nakasone, Takeshita, Unō, Kaifu, and Miyazawa will be the subject of analysis in this subsection. In the fifth subsection, located in the next chapter, the findings of the case studies will be brought together and discussed.

## 6.1 Early years and turmoil of the LDP – Hatoyama, Ishibashi, and Kishi

In December 1954, Hatoyama Ichirō became the Prime Minister of Japan whilst heading the Democratic Party and was still in power when the LDP was formed on November 15, 1955 and his faction became the ruling faction of the party.[207] However, this was not an easy victory for Hatoyama and from the outset it appeared that his administration would be plagued by challenges coming from old rivals who were now

[207] Yamamuro, "Hatoyama Ichirō: A Tenacious Attachment to the Restoration of Relations with the Soviet Union and Constitutional Revision" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 75, 78

peers within the same party. The key challenger was Ogata Taketora – who was the president of the Liberal Party before the LDP merger – whose challenge was prevented from reaching a serious power struggle only because of his death in January 1956.[208] It was after this point that the position of Hatoyama within the LDP as party president and leader of the ruling faction became stable and that he could continue focusing on his agenda.

Hatoyama, who succeeded Yoshida Shigeru, was welcomed by the Japanese public as an "open and broad-minded" politician who was committed to democratic and parliamentary politics and was known for his use of the radio to "[address] the concerns and issues raised by the public at large".[209] This was a complete change in style from the autocratic and heavy-handed Yoshida, who also lacked any endearing connection to the public and was notoriously distasteful towards the press. Although Hatoyama was well received by the public, there were also those – in minority – that did not respond to the new leadership style Hatoyama brought with the same enthusiasm. One such observer was Tsuji, who wrote that "Hatoyama, is of weak character, compromising, extremely frank, and often so democratic as to speak to the people in 'fireside chats'".[210] However, in both views it was clear that Hatoyama was a politician of a newer, democratic, and accessible type, whose difference from his predecessor was clearly recognizable.

Politically, Hatoyama pursued what can be termed an "agenda of independence" both domestically and internationally. The most important flagship items of his administration were Constitutional revision and normalization of relations with the Soviet Union (here on, USSR), both intimately tied to the question of Japan's

[208] Kohno, Japan's Postwar Party Politics, 89.
[209] Yamamuro, "Hatoyama Ichirō: A Tenacious Attachment to the Restoration of Relations with the Soviet Union and Constitutional Revision" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 71-72, 73, 76.
[210] Tsuji, "The Cabinet, Administrative Organization, and the Bureaucracy", 12

complete independence.[211] The Constitution was a target of change as a remnant of the Occupation which had formulated it and as a shackle on the normalization – and eventual expansion – of Japan's national and military power in the postwar era. The point of military power was of particular interest to Hatoyama, whose position on defense was to pursue power commensurate to national power and character, and to elevate the JSDF into a full-fledged and constitutionally legal military.[212] Furthermore, Hatoyama made it clear in his Diet speeches that the regarded the issue of Constitutional revision and remilitarization not only as a product of but as a tool of completing Japan's independence by allowing the withdrawal of US troops from Japan.[213] Thus, to revise the Constitution and to allow for the remilitarization of Japan were the keys to Japan's complete independence in the postwar period. The theme of independence extended into Hatoyama's foreign policy, being a point of constant emphasis alongside peace.[214] It was in this light that the normalization of relations with the USSR had become a part of Hatoyama's agenda. The opening up of Japan's diplomatic sphere to the Eastern bloc was a way of freeing up Japanese diplomacy from its US focus by taking the initiative to contact the USSR and also a way of giving Japan a multidirectional playing field in foreign policy.

Acting on his agenda, Hatoyama sought to tackle Constitutional revision alongside electoral reform – the latter would bring him enough seats in the Diet to

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[211] Yamamuro, "Hatoyama Ichirō: A Tenacious Attachment to the Restoration of Relations with the Soviet Union and Constitutional Revision" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 74, 79, 81.
[212] Edström, *Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine*, 29; Yamamuro, "Hatoyama Ichirō: A Tenacious Attachment to the Restoration of Relations with the Soviet Union and Constitutional Revision" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 83.
[213] Hatoyama, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (January 22, 1955); Hatoyama, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (April 25, 1955); Hatoyama, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (December 2, 1955); Hatoyama, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (January 30, 1956); Hatoyama, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (November 16, 1956).
[214] Edström, *Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine*, 28.

achieve the former – but his weakness in the Diet forced him to drop both.[215] His failure on these matters, coupled with his old age and ill health, invited challenges to Hatoyama whose time in power appeared to be increasingly limited to his hopeful successors. Under such conditions, Hatoyama turned to the normalization of relations with the USSR – along with the confirmation of his successor – as benchmarks to be satisfied before his resignation, to secure the stability of his administration as it reached its end.[216] As such, the Hatoyama administration came to an end in December 1956, with relations with the USSR having been normalized and Ishibashi Tanzan succeeding Hatoyama as Prime Minister.

In applying the circulation significance model to Prime Minister Hatoyama, it can be seen that a number of major differences existed between him and Prime Minister Yoshida. These differences began with their backgrounds, with Hatoyama a pure politician and Yoshida an ex-bureaucrat, and extended beyond. Looking at the change in ruling leadership, first there has been a change in the ruling faction from the Yoshida to the Hatoyama factions, who hailed from different parties and had different loyalties. Second, Hatoyama's tenure was not constrained by the existence of a kingmaker who would constrain or shape his agenda or tenure in his stead but was wholly his. Third, Hatoyama's agenda was significantly different from that of Yoshida, with the focuses on independence, Constitutional revision, normalization with the USSR, and remilitarization of Japan acting as significant breaks between the two administrations. Fourth, Hatoyama was largely able to handle the party from a position of power, which only became an issue towards the end of his administration

[215] Yamamuro, "Hatoyama Ichirō: A Tenacious Attachment to the Restoration of Relations with the Soviet Union and Constitutional Revision" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 81-82; Smith, *Japan since 1945*, 79-80.
[216] Yamamuro, "Hatoyama Ichirō: A Tenacious Attachment to the Restoration of Relations with the Soviet Union and Constitutional Revision" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 80.

that can be seen as his "lame duck" period. In sum, Hatoyama's tenure constituted an absolute change in the ruling leadership from Yoshida, as Hatoyama was a strong leader with a new agenda, and a new ruling faction. Turning to the other criteria, it can be seen that Hatoyama had a tenure than was of standard length for both the LDP and the postwar Japanese Prime Ministers. However, his ability to achieve his agenda was partial and limited largely to foreign policy. This partial fulfillment of the agenda is responsible for part of his political style, as Hatoyama was not only open and accessible but also a "kamikaze fighter" choosing to hold onto power in exchange for his resignation once USSR normalization was achieved and his succession was settled. This was different from Yoshida who was both more autocratic and acted best as a "political insider" by moving within party and state machinery to achieve his goals. Overall, it can be seen that from Yoshida to Hatoyama what took place was significant change and strong circulation of elites, with the changes and differences between the two administrations being overwhelming.

In December 1956, Ishibashi Tanzan succeeded Hatoyama Ichirō as the president of the LDP and the Prime Minister of Japan. However, Ishibashi's winning margin over his greatest challenger Kishi Nobusuke was very thin – depending on an agreement with fellow challenger Ishii – and his tenure was over as fast as it began due to his health issues in February 1957 due to his ill health.[217] Ishibashi was known by the Japanese public for his reputation of honesty, not being associated with a faction, and for having and pursuing his convictions even in the face of militarists and Occupation officials.[218] Furthermore, before his career in politics Ishibashi had a

[217] Inoki, "Ishibashi Tanzan: A Coherent Liberal Thinker" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 87-88; Watanabe, *Japan's Backroom Politics*, 78, 85.
[218] I. I. M., "*Politics in Japan*", 131; Time Magazine, *"Toward the Rising Sun*".

record as a liberal thinker, economist, and public intellectual.[219] Had he been able to remain in power for a much more significant period of time, Ishibashi might have emerged as a part of the economics *zoku* and made policy in this field his flagship policy. However, the shortness of his tenure not only prevented such a development but it also prevented the formation of any comprehensive agenda with Ishibashi's only policy speech – delivered by Kishi who was Deputy Prime Minister – repeated the Hatoyama line of national power commensurate to Japan's position, proposed self-reliance in economics, and sought to promote economic diplomacy as "flagship" items.[220] However, these were never really acted on and remained more as a set of goals without concrete plans and proposals to back them.

During the two months of his administration, Kishi served as the greatest continuing challenger to his administration and was for all intents and purposes already the driving power in what was shaping up to be a weak administration. It can be argued that Ishibashi's sickness removing him from power – much like in the case of Hatoyama and Ogata – prevented power conflicts between Kishi and Ishibashi from emerging and crippling the administration entirely. However, such a power conflict might not have occurred in the first place as well, since Ishibashi was a Prime Minister without a solid factional backing to call his own and resigned before he could even form his own loyal following within the party.[221] With his backing and power borrowed, not only was Ishibashi weaker towards challenges from the party but changing internal alignments could have hurt him significantly. Furthermore, without a ruling faction to act as his base in the LDP, he lacked the power and resources to stand against Kishi. His resignation came in late January 1957 and Kishi succeeded

[219] Inoki, "Ishibashi Tanzan: A Coherent Liberal Thinker" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 88.
[220] Kishi, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (February 4, 1957).
[221] Inoki, "Ishibashi Tanzan: A Coherent Liberal Thinker" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 89; I. I. M., "*Politics in Japan*", 131.

him in February. Ishibashi's resignation came cleanly and without a bid to stay in power, which Inoki has observed as signaling his commitment to clean and democratic politics.[222]

Seen through the lens of the circulation significance model, Hatoyama and Ishibashi appeared to have offered alternatives to one another. The former did not have a policy inclination which would have qualified his as a *zoku* whilst the latter did, and whilst one had always been a politician the other was an economist, journalist, and public intellectual. Looking into the ruling leadership, although in the first criterion of faction change on can say that there was a change, from a faction to no faction, this is not a properly applicable category due to the lack of Ishibashi's own faction and should be thought of as a tentative change. Ishibashi did not necessarily suffer from a kingmaker; however, his tenure was not long enough for such as observation to be made healthily since a challenge from Ishii may have emerged in addition to that of Kishi. The agenda did not change much between the two administrations, with Ishibashi carrying over Hatoyama's security policy and only proposing economic policies of his own that stuck out as flagship policies. Finally, Ishibashi was a weak leader. Thus, the change in ruling leadership was only partial in between the two administrations, as Ishibashi was a weak leader, without a strong ruling faction and an agenda that was partially his and partially in continuation of Hatoyama. Ishibashi's tenure was much shorter than standard and his agenda was left entirely unfulfilled due to both his inability to act due to sickness and his early resignation. In terms of leadership style, it is not possible to give Ishibashi a classification, due to the lack of observable leadership on his part as Prime Minister. In sum, the changeover from Hatoyama to Ishibashi constituted an instance of no

[222] Inoki, "Ishibashi Tanzan: A Coherent Liberal Thinker" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 95.

significant change and a weak circulation of elites, as there were no observable and impactful changes between the two administrations that emerged during Ishibashi's two months in office.

Kishi Nobusuke succeeded Ishibashi Tanzan in February 1957, becoming LDP president and Prime Minister, and his faction, the *Tōkakai*, became the ruling faction within the party.[223] During his tenure, Kishi set the definitive precedent on how Diet relations should not proceed, and what the LDP and the successive Prime Ministers should avoid if they wanted Diet relations to remain warm.[224] LDP politics and Diet relations saw a definitive turning point with his administration, ending a period where confrontational politics could and would be pursued and starting one where the LDP sought to keep itself to matters that would invite less conflict and consternation from both the public and the opposition. This situation emerged from a mixture of Kishi's background and political style. Being a pre-war bureaucrat and cabinet level politician, Kishi had the ghosts of his past clinging to him, which was coupled with a highly confrontational political style and an arrogant and haughty approach to the public.[225] As such, Kishi appeared to be return to the Yoshida style of politics, with a more autocratic and heavy-handed tint to them. However, Kishi also had the credentials to be recognized as an economics *zoku* due to his prewar work in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, in Manchukuo, and later as Minister of Commerce and Vice Minister of Munitions. However, as will be discussed below, his major policy focus ended up being in foreign policy.

In formulating his agenda, Kishi was much like Hatoyama, in that his was also an agenda that took the issue of creating an independent Japan to heart. Kishi's

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[223] Kitaoka, "Kishi Nobusuke: Frustrated Ambition" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 106.
[224] Kitaoka, "Kishi Nobusuke: Frustrated Ambition" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 117.
[225] Smith, *Japan since 1945*, 80, 81.

agenda focused on a broad range of issues such as constitutional reform, equality in US-Japan relations, an autonomous foreign policy, and deepening relations with Asia.[226] All of these issues, similar to the way that Hatoyama had approached them, were geared towards completing Japan's postwar independence process. However, Kishi's approach to the issue of complete independence had a much larger scope than that of Hatoyama. While Hatoyama sought to restore to Japan what had been lost and focused on doing so by revising the Constitution from a Japanese perspective and by allowing for the remilitarization of Japan, Kishi went beyond by seeking to assert Japan as the leader of Asia thus his emphasis on relations with the continent. However, it is interesting to note that Kishi's foreign policy pronouncements in his Diet speeches avoided the mention of independence and instead focused on peace, security, and prosperity.[227] This is also indicative of the way in which Kishi saw the issue of complete national independence, not as something that stood on its own but as something that fed heavily into the well-being of a nation both domestically and globally. In terms of flagship policies, Kishi's agenda included a number of items such as the laws on teacher evaluations, police duties, national pensions, and minimum wage but it was the revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty that was paramount.[228] For Kishi, who was noted as being more pro-Japanese than anything

[226] Kitaoka, "Kishi Nobusuke: Frustrated Ambition" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 106, 107;
[227] Edström, *Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine*, 37.
[228] Kishi, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (February 27, 1957); Kishi, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (November 1, 1957); Kishi, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (January 29, 1958); Kishi, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (June 17, 1958); Kishi, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (September 30, 1958); Kishi, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (January 27, 1959); Kishi, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (June 25, 1959); Kishi, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (October 28, 1959); Kishi, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (February 1, 1960).

else, his defining flagship policy and political legacy ended up being his quest to place the relations between Japan as the US on as equal a footing as possible.[229]

In working to get his agenda realized, Kishi had an overwhelmingly successful tenure, however, this does not mean that his success came easily and without costs. While Kishi was able to pass laws on moral education and the evaluation of teachers, he was unable to move forward with a police duties law due to public, opposition, and eventually factional pushback.[230] Thus, whilst Kishi was able to strengthen central government control over education, his attempt to enhance the powers of the national police ran into issues due to suspicions and unrest towards a return to the prewar situation of police oppression and control from Tokyo. However, the true test of Kishi's power and his commitment to his agenda came with the revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty. Revision of the treaty was such a controversial issue and Kishi's handling was so confrontational that massive protests erupted around the Diet building in Tokyo. Seeing his power on the possible decline, Kishi entered into a secret agreement with faction leaders Ōno, Kōno, and Satō, promising to them that they would receive the party presidency and the prime ministry in that order, if they helped Kishi to remain in power until after the revised US-Japan Security Treaty was ratified.[231] Just as he promised, Kishi promptly resigned after the treaty was ratified and after the issue had kicked up a massive storm with the political district of Tokyo swamped with mass protests, for which Kishi also took the blame.[232] The flagship policy that made Kishi's administration also became the on that broke it. Once out of

[229] Time Magazine, "Bonus to be Wisely Spent".
[230] Kitaoka, "Kishi Nobusuke: Frustrated Ambition" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 112; Samuels, *Machiavelli's Children*, 232.
[231] Kitaoka, "Kishi Nobusuke: Frustrated Ambition" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 112; Watanebe, *Japan's Backroom Politics*, 90-91.
[232] Kitaoka, "Kishi Nobusuke: Frustrated Ambition" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 97, 113; Edström, *Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine*, 36.

power, Kishi did not honor the agreement he had previously made to arrange his successors and was succeeded by Ikeda Hayato in July 1960.

Compared to his two predecessors Kishi can be seen as a mix between the two. He had the economics credentials of Ishibashi and the prewar political career of Hatoyama; however, he also had his bureaucratic experience that set him apart. In terms of the ruling leadership, Kishi represented a factional change from both of his predecessors, as he headed his own faction, the *Tōkakai*. He did not suffer from the existence of a kingmaker and even the agreement he made to secure his administration by rigging his succession proved to not be a hinderance on his power. His agenda and flagship items, as compared to his predecessors is only thematically in continuation whereas the policies being put forward are unique to Kishi. Finally, Kishi was a strong leader, who was able to manage both the party and the Diet, and his faction did provide a solid base of support for him. Thus, the ruling leadership has been changed completely between Kishi and both of his predecessors, owing to the emergence of a strong leader who headed a new ruling faction, and a fresh new agenda. Kishi's tenure was of a standard length and his agenda fulfillment was near complete, with the significant exception of the police duties law being shelved due to massive pushback. His leadership style was wholly different from that of his only comparable predecessor Hatoyama, with Kishi's style being confrontational and high-handed, appearing almost un-democratic. Kishi would best be categorized as a mix between a political insider and a kamikaze fighter, since he was able to manipulate the factions and to control the party to achieve his goals, and because he had to stake the final survival of his administration on the ratification of the security treaty and the rigging of his succession. Overall, from the duo of Hatoyama and Ishibashi to Kishi, it

can be seen that a significant change and strong circulation of elites has taken place with major changes between these administrations being observed.

## 6.2 The long calm of the Sixties – Ikeda and Satō

Succeeding the turbulent tenure of Kishi was Ikeda Hayato, who became Prime Minister and had his faction, the *Kōchikai*, achieve ruling faction status in July 1960, with the major aim of moving Japan from the political to the economic era.[233] Ikeda's administration set out with the motto of "forbearance and tolerance" and sought to pursue "a low profile" political approach.[234] This was a result of the lessons learnt from Kishi's downfall – who had polarized the political world with his confrontational and heavy-handed political style – which prompted Ikeda to pursue a political style that would not only lower political tensions but also keep him from sharing Kishi's fate. However, this did not come easy to Ikeda who was known to be "a hard man with yen and a free man with his tongue" and was prone to gaffes and blunt remarks that were just as controversial as Kishi's politics.[235] Yet, Ikeda was able to stick to the political style which he had chosen and which he knew both the nation and his administration needed, emerging as a successful Prime Minister in the process. Moreover, Ikeda was helped in this by the natural difference in political style that existed between him and Kishi: one was the man of high politics and confrontation, the other did not invite discord and worked at his task with vigor. Thus, he became a most fitting successor to clean up what was left behind by Kishi.

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[233] Nakamura, "Ikeda Hayato: The Man Who Created the 'Economic Era'" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 119.
[234] Nakamura, "Ikeda Hayato: The Man Who Created the 'Economic Era'" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 127; Time Magazine, "*Hard Man*".
[235] Time Magazine, "*Hard Man*"; Nakamura, "Ikeda Hayato: The Man Who Created the 'Economic Era'" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 122-123.

The flagship items in Ikeda's agenda included the normalization of the nation's political life, basic laws on agriculture and small-and-medium enterprises, ratification of the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention No. 87, and most importantly the National Income-Doubling Plan.[236] Immediately visible here is the overwhelming focus on economic affairs at the expense of more politically charge issues such as security and constitutional revision which had taken a center place during Hatoyama's and Kishi's administrations. Especially with the income-doubling plan, Ikeda shifted the basis of political discussion from ideological concerns to economics which meant that controversial issues were jettisoned in favor of economic policies which were better suited to achieve political calm and reconciliation.[237] Issues of growth and wealth were used to replace issues of security and democracy, allowing Ikeda to sidestep these already seething spots and to shift the focus towards the elevation of the material well-being of the people, which was a much less divisive issue. Furthermore, such a focus on economic issues played into Ikeda's expertise in economics.[238] Ikeda's prewar experience in the MoF gave him the credentials to appear as an economics *zoku*, which he brought to bear down completely to the character of his administration. In his foreign policy statements, Ikeda emphasized peace, prosperity, security, and recognition.[239] These were all in line with Ikeda's

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[236] Ikeda, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (October 21, 1960); Ikeda, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (December 12, 1960); Ikeda, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (January 30, 1961); Ikeda, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (September 28, 1961); Ikeda, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (January 19, 1962); Ikeda, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (August 10, 1962); Ikeda, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (January 23, 1963); Ikeda, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (February 5, 1963); Ikeda, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (October 18, 1963); Ikeda, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (December 10, 1963); Ikeda, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (January 21, 1964).

[237] Nakamura, "Ikeda Hayato: The Man Who Created the 'Economic Era'" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 128; Edström, *Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine*, 46.

[238] Smith, *Japan since 1945*, 97.

[239] Edström, *Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine*, 49.

vision of a growing Japan that would soon come to be an important economic power, which needed global peace and security to sustain itself, prosperity for the availability of markets, and recognition of its newfound position.

In pursuing his agenda, it can be seen that Ikeda has been largely successful with few policies left unsuccessfully pursued. Most importantly, Ikeda did manage to start a decade of calm and stable politics in Japan by moving national politics from an ideological to economic focus and he did achieve his income-doubling goal well ahead of the deadline that was set. However, he was unable to finalize the ratification of the ILO Convention No. 87 and towards the end of his tenure the fallout from his high and rapid growth economics began to be felt. It was the combination of criticism that emerged towards the fallout from his economic policy and his inability to handle intra-party factional affairs – especially his refusal to yield amicably to Satō – which created the challenge against him.[240] This situation was worsened after Ikeda sought and won a third term in 1964, and the factional pushback against Ikeda became too great with Satō cementing his position as the major challenger.[241] Ultimately, it was not factional infighting but declining personal health which did Ikeda in, who resigned in October 1964 and named Satō as his successor.[242]

Ikeda proved to a polar opposite to Kishi in a number of important ways. In terms of backgrounds, although both men shared a background in economics and bureaucracy, and could be considered experts, Ikeda lacked the political experience of Kishi but also the historical baggage that this experience brought. Turning towards the ruling leadership, whilst Kishi headed the *Tōkakai*, Ikeda headed the *Kōchikai* and the two men represented different factional lineages – both beginning with them. Ikeda

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[240] Nakamura, "Ikeda Hayato: The Man Who Created the 'Economic Era'" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 131, 133, 136.
[241] Smith, *Japan since 1945*, 98.
[242] Nakamura, "Ikeda Hayato: The Man Who Created the 'Economic Era'" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 137.

did not suffer from the existence of a kingmaker that would have hurt his administration or crippled its capacity for independent action. The agenda went through a complete change both in spirit and in content, with economics and national reconciliation as the key undercurrents. Finally, as a leader Ikeda was able to act from a position of strength and his power base within the party was able to maintain a strong degree of support for him. As such, it can be observed that between Kishi and Ikeda, the ruling leadership went through a complete change, as the ruling faction once again changed with a strong leader at the helm, and the agenda went through a complete overhaul. Ikeda was able to win for himself a tenure that was longer than the standard and was able fulfill much of the flagship policies in his agenda. Ikeda's political style was a near-complete opposite of Kishi's style, with its emphasis on low-profile, conciliatory, and non-ideological politics. Moreover, Ikeda was a mix between a political insider and a peace lover, owing to his ability to get both the party and the bureaucracy to move along with his economic program and to his commitment to peaceful Diet operations, whilst still pursuing and achieving his agenda. In sum, it can be seen that between Kishi and Ikeda what has taken place was a significant change and a strong circulation of elites, with major political changes taking place.

Satō Eisaku succeeded Ikeda Hayato as party president and Prime Minister during November-December 1964, and his faction, the *Shūzankai*, achieved ruling faction status. Satō's political style was known as the "the politics of waiting", however, this did not imply ineptitude on his part as demonstrated by his ability to rise through the ranks rather quickly during his prewar career in the Ministry of

Transportation.[243] The politics of waiting was characterized by a combination of standing strong against pressure, the desire and ability to maintain order in times of crisis, and able personnel management.[244] Furthermore, Satō was noted to be "reserved and calculating" in a way that would make US President Lyndon B. Johnson jealous, and when the time to act came he was tough and calculated with an eye towards consensus and swift action.[245] As such, Satō handled the issues at hand by taking a cautious and guarded approach, aimed at both exploring all opportunities and gathering as much strength as possible in a low-profile manner. Once the time to act came, he moved openly, quickly, and strongly in pursuit of the policies and objectives for which he had already gathered his resources and formed the consensus to achieve. Moreover, adept manipulation of personnel allowed Satō to both deflect challenges from the party and to utilize the talents of the people around him with great efficiency. Due to his politics of waiting, Satō was not a visionary or a charismatic man when it came to politics but an able problem solver, which was both a blessing and a curse.[246] As it will be seen, Satō was a man of both great achievement when the times allowed for it but quickly fell out once the times passed him by.

In Satō's agenda a number of flagship items can be observed, including the leftover ratification of the ILO Convention No. 87, shift towards stable growth and addressing the fallout from rapid growth, pollution, and most importantly the return of the Ogasawara islands and Okinawa prefecture.[247] Thus, the agenda took over the

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[243] Kōsaka, "Satō Eisaku: The Truth about the 'Politics of Waiting'" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 145.
[244] Kōsaka, "Satō Eisaku: The Truth about the 'Politics of Waiting'" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 146.
[245] Time Magazine, "*The Right Eye of Daruma*".
[246] Kōsaka, "Satō Eisaku: The Truth about the 'Politics of Waiting'" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 152; Edström, *Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine*, 57; Smith, *Japan since 1945*, 98.
[247] Satō, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (November 21, 1964); Satō, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (January 25, 1965); Satō, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (July

economic undercurrent of the Ikeda administration and coupled it with political issues over which the nation could be unified, but stayed clear of controversial politics and ideological struggles. Addressing the fallout from rapid economic growth became a constant preoccupation of Satō, in both its economic and social aspects.[248] Rapid and high economic growth had caused the economy to become unsustainable and unequally developed across Japan, along with a host of other problems such as urban overpopulation and rural depopulation, inflation, problems of fiscal soundness, and traffic safety. In time, an important aspect of this fallout moved into flagship status: pollution. Pollution first entered the agenda in 1967 with the Basic Pollution Measures Law but only in 1970 did it become full-fledged as an issue with the so-called "Pollution Diet".[249] Thus, Satō had to devote a significant amount of time to charting a way through the aftermath of Ikeda's high, rapid, and unchecked economic growth and to respond to the myriad problems that emerged as a result of it. In foreign policy Satō echoed Ikeda, focusing on peace, security, prosperity, and recognition.[250] However, it can be seen that the focus was in shift as Satō did not simply move forward with an economic focus but also made strides towards getting the political

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30, 1965); Satō, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (October 13, 1965); Satō, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (January 28, 1966); Satō, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (July 12, 1966); Satō, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (December 15, 1966); Satō, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (March 14, 1967); Satō, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (July 28, 1967); Satō, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (December 5, 1967); Satō, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (January 27, 1968); Satō, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (August 3, 1968); Satō, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (November 21, 1968); Satō, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (November 21, 1969); Satō, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (December 1, 1969); Satō, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (February 14, 1970); Satō, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (November 25, 1970); Satō, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (January 22, 1971); Satō, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (July 17, 1971); Satō, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (October 19, 1971); Satō, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (January 29, 1972).

[248] Kōsaka, "Satō Eisaku: The Truth about the 'Politics of Waiting'" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 150.

[249] Kōsaka, "Satō Eisaku: The Truth about the 'Politics of Waiting'" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 151-152.

[250] Edström, *Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine*, 60.

weight and significance of Japan recognized by the world. The return of full sovereignty over Okinawa and the unification of the Japanese homeland was a move in this direction, which ended the physical occupation of Japan completely and elevated it further on the global stage.

In achieving his agenda, Satō was a most successful Prime Minister, with his only failure being his inability to fully respond to the fallout from Ikeda's economic growth policy. However, this should not be seen as a major detraction from his track record, given how this was an issue that was impossible for one man to get done during his tenure and was bound to become the collective struggle of a number of successive administrations. The true failing of Satō emerged with the advent of the seventies as the public grew tired of the long administration, the fight to succeed him (the so-called Kaku-Fuku War) caused party disharmony, and the Nixon Shocks demonstrated the incapability of Satō to respond to the changing political realities and the failure of his leadership.[251] The same politics of waiting that gave Satō the power to dominate Japanese politics for as long as he did became his undoing at the moment that it became unable to cope with the changing political currents and its bankruptcy brought about the fall of Satō in July 1972 with Tanaka Kakuei succeeding him.

Ikeda and Satō had both a number of continuities and key differences between them. Satō shared Ikeda's bureaucratic background, although he came from the Ministry of Transportation as opposed to the MoF, which meant that he qualified more as a transportation *zoku* than as an economics *zoku*. In terms of the ruling leadership, from Ikeda to Satō there was change of ruling faction from the *Kōchikai* to the *Shūzankai*, and as with the case between Kishi and Ikeda, the two men headed two distinct factional lineages that began with them. Satō did not suffer from the existence

[251] Kōsaka, "Satō Eisaku: The Truth about the 'Politics of Waiting'" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 162-163.

of a kingmaker and it can even be said that Satō himself, during the time that he was in power and was dominant in Japanese politics, was the kingmaker due to the power and control he enjoyed. The agenda went through expansion and directional change from the Ikeda era, with economics being transformed towards sustainable growth and remedying the fallout from rapid growth, and non-divisive political issues making their entry. Finally, in terms of strength Satō enjoyed a near absolute hold on power and his faction remained a strong power base throughout his tenure. As such, it can be seen that the ruling leadership underwent a great degree of change from Ikeda to Satō, as once more a strong leader replaced another, the ruling faction completely changed, and the agenda was completely refreshed. Satō's tenure was longer than standard – and until that of Abe Shinzō the longest in the prewar period – and he was able to fulfill his agenda completely. The leadership styles of the two were also different in that Satō pursued a wait-and-see style of politics which kept him from proposing new policies but saw him respond to a host of issues at hand successfully, whereas Ikeda was low-profile but actively sought to promote his agenda of economic policies. Furthermore, although both men qualified as political insiders, it can be seen that the power of Ikeda was greater within the economic circles and the bureaucracy, whilst Satō was masterful at party and faction politics, and used his power here to his advantage. Overall, it can be observed that from Ikeda to Satō there were a number of comprehensive political changes which meant that what had taken place was a significant change and strong circulation of elites.

# CHAPTER 7[252]

# THE CIRCULATION OF ELITES IN JAPAN THROUGH THE LDP: ERA OF THE LONG DECLINE

In this chapter, the case studies will be continued, focusing on the period from 1972 to 1993. The first section will focus on the highly charged decade between 1972 and 1982, where the LDP was about to tear itself apart. Analyzed in this section will be the tenures of Prime Ministers Tanaka, Miki, Fukuda, Ōhira, and Suzuki. The second section will focus on the period of stability, scandals, and eventual decline of the LDP, between 1982 and 1993. Analysis in this section will focus on the tenures of Prime Ministers Nakasone, Takeshita, Unō, Kaifu, and Miyazawa. The third section will bring together the findings of the case studies and present a final analysis.

## 7.1 Years of the Kaku-Fuku War – Tanaka, Miki, Fukuda, Ōhira, Suzuki

Tanaka Kakuei became Prime Minister in July 1972 – defeating Fukuda Taeko, his archrival for the next decade – however, as Satō's factional successor, he brought about a continuation of the ruling faction, although it was now named the *Mokuyōkurabu*. The Tanaka administration set out with the motto of "Decision and Implementation" and Tanaka appeared to be a young, active, and self-confident leader.[253] As with how Ikeda was the man to clean up after Kishi, Tanaka appeared to be the man to follow up after Satō and the bankruptcy of his politics of waiting. His political style offered to strongly and swiftly respond to the crises that beset Japan after the Nixon Shocks, making him an appealing successor for Satō who lacked these

[252] For further reference, refer to tables and figures in Appendices C, D, E, and F.
[253] Mikuriya, "Tanaka Kakuei: The High Point of Developmental Politics" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 167-168; Edström, *Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine*, 71.

qualities and lost his position because of it. Time Magazine in the US observed that Tanaka was the "Khrushchev of Japanese politics", that he was "polite but does not mince words" with "frankness [that] verges on the coarse", and that he was a quick study but no intellectual.[254] This set him apart from Satō whose political style was never close to the people or the press, and who kept his politics to himself and preferably in the backrooms of the LDP until the time to act came. Tanaka on the other hand was always active before the public eye and promised to act quickly and decisively where his predecessor had appeared cold and reactive.

Two points of Tanaka's style merit particular focus to better understand his difference from Satō as a politician. First, as the so-called "Japanese Khrushchev" or the better known "Computerized Bulldozer", Tanaka valued policy implementation and delivery of goods to the people as the most important responsibility of the politician, and called for the separation of ideology and policy from early in his career.[255] This was never a visible concern for Satō, whose greatest achievement – the return of Okinawa prefecture – can be seen as the product of high politics, whereas low politics, which was responding to the fallout from rapid economic growth took place as something that could not be avoided and consumed less of Satō's time. On the other hand, Tanaka sought to tackle these issues of low politics head on and brought to these to the center of his agenda, handling economics not as an abstract national manner as Ikeda but as a concrete and personally experienced matter which made significant impacts on peoples' lives.

Second, Tanaka had the ability to dominate in conversation and used information in "flow", always being prepared to respond to requests and questions,

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[254] Time Magazine, "The 'Computerized Bulldozer'".
[255] Mikuriya, "Tanaka Kakuei: The High Point of Developmental Politics" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 171; Nishio, "Kakuei Tanaka: His Political Aim and Achievements under Political Climate of the Times", 23.

having gathered information, studied it, and formulated responses beforehand.[256] This set him apart from Satō, who was the more intellectual of the two but kept the himself and was a secretive leader, using information as a tool to be kept and used sparingly as necessary. On the other hand, Tanaka could go all out with the information which he had, because he valued the practical applications of what he knew and sought the extract the most he could at a constant pace. As such, Tanaka was a factory that ran on information, which was promptly processed and returned to the people in the form of policy proposals and the delivery of the necessary services and resources.

In Tanaka's agenda the two dominant flagship items were the normalization of the relations with China and the ambitious Remodeling of the Japanese Archipelago, with much time also taken up by the need to respond to crises in land use and prices, and the First Oil Shock of 1973.[257] The flagship policies of Tanaka were aimed at remedying the failures of his two predecessors. However, the dual domestic and international crises produced economic repercussions, which hurt Tanaka as they caused an economic slowdown and because they caused him to divert much attention from actually implementing his agenda and vision, towards crisis management and economic stabilization. Reflecting the international situation of uncertainty, Tanaka's foreign policy pronouncements in the Diet put emphasis on peace and security.[258] This was only natural, considering how Tanaka lead the opening of Japan to China, and had to deal with the repercussions of the Yom Kippur War and the subsequent oil crisis. On the one hand, Tanaka had to make constant overtures of peace abroad so that the energy crunch would be over, and relations with China could be normalized

[256] Mikuriya, "Tanaka Kakuei: The High Point of Developmental Politics" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times,* 169-170; Time Magazine, "Bulldozer on the Skids?".
[257] Tanaka, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (October 28, 1972); Tanaka, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (January 27, 1973); Tanaka, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (December 1, 1973); Tanaka, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (January 21, 1974).
[258] Edström, *Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine*, 73.

and expanded. On the other hand, the successful opening up of the Chinese market, the conditions of conflict in the Middle East and the subsequent the energy crisis impacted Japan's security as a trading nation which needed access both to buyers and to resources, all of which were found more outside than inside the country.

In implementing his agenda, Tanaka's success was mixed. Although he was able to normalize relations with China and handle the energy crisis, he was unable to implement his policy to rebuild the Japanese homeland and its infrastructure. Furthermore, his ambitious remodeling proposal caused land values to skyrocket and abuses of land use regulations, which made the economic problems worse. However, this is not to say that Tanaka was a weak leader. On the contrary, Tanaka was able to skillfully navigate the triangle of reality, law, and system in implementing policy, and was able to cultivate – through personal contacts – work with, outsmart, and use bureaucrats to achieve his ends.[259] Thus, Tanaka was an exceptionally strong leader, whose charismatic leadership in the bureaucracy, and his intraparty power stemming from the strength of his faction allowed for him to respond to crises, and formulate and implement policy with exceptional power and speed. Given his power, Tanaka's tenure might have been longer had it not been for his failings and the crises which beset his administration.

Tanaka's failure and eventual ouster from power stemmed from a number of concurrent problems. One major problem was the Oil Shock of 1973, which caused an energy crunch in Japan that slashed economic growth and exacerbated the already existing inflation problem caused by Tanaka's budgets and remodeling policy.[260] The Oil Shock came as a second blow that made an existing problem – of Tanaka's and

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[259] Mikuriya, "Tanaka Kakuei: The High Point of Developmental Politics" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 172, 173; Johnson, "Tanaka Kakuei, Structural Corruption, and the Advent of Machine Politics in Japan", 6.
[260] Smith, *Japan since 1945*, 122-123.

Ikeda's making – worse by hitting the energy lifeline of the Japanese economy. The economy held because Tanaka was able to use to steer Japan through this crisis. However, the cost to Tanaka and his administration was discontent within the party and the populace.

Tanaka's problems were exacerbated by his inability to rise above challengers such as Fukuda and Ōhira – unlike Satō who was paramount – and from the lack of a skilled secretary general at his side.[261] Despite his ability to control the bureaucracy and to weaponize his faction, Tanaka was unable to ward off factional challenges and manage intra-party affairs alongside his duties as the Prime Minister. He had too much responsibility but very little time and energy, which eventually weakened him within the party. However, the end of Tanaka's tenure came due to the money politics he so skillfully pursued, and his resignation came in December 1974 due to a corruption scandal.[262] Corruption would follow Tanaka for the rest of his political life, yet, it would never be enough of an hinderance to keep him away from politics. As soon as he resigned, Tanaka was replaced by Miki Takeo in December 1974 by an embattled LDP.

The tenures of Tanaka and Satō contained a number of similarities and differences. Tanaka had been a businessman before politics, as opposed to Satō who had been a bureaucrat, and he qualified more as a construction *zoku* than as a transportation *zoku*. Looking at the ruling leadership, from there is both change and continuation in the ruling faction. Tanaka's faction the *Mokuyōkurabu* was carved out of Satō's *Shūzankai*, to which Tanaka had belonged as a senior member. As such, in a rare occurrence, the change in factions between Tanaka and Satō was only partial as

[261] Mikuriya, "Tanaka Kakuei: The High Point of Developmental Politics" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 185, 186.
[262] Mikuriya, "Tanaka Kakuei: The High Point of Developmental Politics" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 186; Johnson, "Tanaka Kakuei, Structural Corruption, and the Advent of Machine Politics in Japan", 10-11.

two leaders of the same factional lineage succeeded one another, although under differently constituted factions. Tanaka did not suffer from the existence of a kingmaker, although not being as dominant a character in politics as Satō was, he was able to formulate and push for an agenda that was entirely his and his main hinderance came from crises outside the party and the nation. His agenda did keep the economics and foreign policy duality of Satō; however, economics were elevated to a primary concern whilst his foreign policy was proactive and sought to respond to emerging challenges as opposed to existing national problems. Finally, Tanaka was a strong leader who had strength in both dealing with the bureaucracy and the LDP as well as the leader of a major factional lineage. As such, the change in the ruling leadership from Satō to Tanaka can be identified as being partial, which is the result of one strong leader replacing another with a new agenda but the ruling faction staying the same. Tanaka's tenure was of standard length, however, due to the crises he faced he was able to only partially complete his agenda. In terms of political styles, the two leaders also differed with Tanaka's political style being active and hands-on as opposed to Satō's wait-and-see style. Moreover, Tanaka's style was a mix between the political insider, drawing upon his power in the bureaucracy and the LDP, and the grandstander, owing to his popularity and engagement with the public. In total, as the administration change between Satō and Tanaka took place, there was a semi-significant change and moderate circulation of elites due to the major political changes clouded by factional continuation and Tanaka's inability to realize his agenda.

Miki Taeko became party president and Prime Minister in December 1974, succeeding Tanaka who had to resign in disgrace, and carried his faction, the *Seisaku Kenkyūkai*, to ruling faction status which it carried tenuously due to its small size. Had it not been for the conditions that Tanaka's resignation had left the party in, Miki

would have been considered too idealistic and outspoken on party reform, preventing him from being a serious contender for leadership.[263] However, Miki was hand-picked for the post by the LDP's vice-president Shiina Etsusaburō, who sought to capitalize on his image as a "clean" politician and restricted his freedom to act as a leader.[264] The choice of Miki was based on the hope that his clean image could be used to save the party from the public outrage to Tanaka's corruption scandal. Thus, Miki was handed the prime ministry and the party presidency, because he was an opposite force to Tanaka and kept his distance from Tanaka-style money politics. Miki, who would have even been considered a dark horse for leadership was now the man to lead Japan and the LDP during this time of political crisis and was called upon to settle the post-Tanaka record. Reflecting his political record, Miki's political style was part idealistic and part pragmatic.[265] As will be discussed below, Miki and never let go of the pursuit of cleaner politics and party reform but also knew that he had to contend with the realities of power that constrained him.

Miki's flagship policies focused on cleaner politics through electoral and funding reform with the Lockheed Scandal[266] added on afterwards; a fairer society through antimonopoly law revision and Japanese-style welfare state; and a shift to stable economic growth.[267] Politically, Miki was seeking to respond to the corruption crisis that was rocking the LDP and Japanese politics, as well as to realize his

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[263] Time Magazine, "A Shokku Instead of a Split".
[264] Shinkawa, "Miki Takeo: Politics of Conviction and Public Opinion" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 189; Edström, *Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine*, 80; Smith, *Japan since 1945*, 126; Johnson, "Japan 1975: Mr. Clean Muddles Through", 31.
[265] Shinkawa, "Miki Takeo: Politics of Conviction and Public Opinion" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 196.
[266] A bribery scandal which implicated ex-Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei over the purchase of Lockheed aircraft for military and commercial purposes under the discretion of the government.
[267] Shinkawa, "Miki Takeo: Politics of Conviction and Public Opinion" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 189-190; Miki, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (December 14, 1974); Miki, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (January 24, 1975); Miki, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (September 16, 1975); Miki, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (January 23, 1976); Miki, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (September 24, 1976).

personal ambition of achieving cleaner politics. Economically, he was responding both the fallout from Ikeda's policies and to the energy crisis which ended Japan's high-growth period, and sought to do so by liberalizing Japan's economy domestically and by constructing a Japanese-style welfare state. In his foreign policy, Miki had few focuses appear in his speeches, with security repeated twice, and peace and prosperity once each.[268] This reflects Miki's preoccupation with domestic politics and the conditions of global stagflation which coincided with his tenure, where the security of the country both in terms of defense and access to key resources that were to be imported were under immense stress.

In attempting to implement his policies, Miki had a mixed track record, reflecting the interplay of an idealistic agenda with pragmatic politics. Shinkawa found that Miki's weaknesses stemmed from the small size of his faction, the lack of factional allies, and an inability to capitalize on public support, with his failures owing to the way in which he pursued the antimonopoly revision issue.[269] Added to these were his zeal in pursuing the Lockheed Scandal fully and the fact that he was never a free actor as party president or Prime Minister, owing to how he was chosen for these posts. From the outset, Miki controlled a small faction which weakened him and the factional opposition was too great in comparison. This situation was made worse by the lack of reliable allies, which became even harder to come by as Miki went on to commit to the Lockheed Scandal. Furthermore, Miki had not won his mandate by winning over the party but was brought in, which weakened his ability to act and defy the factions because he lacked the ties necessary to have and wield intra-party power. Whilst Miki might have been able to offset this power disparity by

[268] Edström, *Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine*, 83.
[269] Shinkawa, "Miki Takeo: Politics of Conviction and Public Opinion" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 200-201.

making use of his popularity, he was unable to do so and lost popularity as the public grew cynical the of backroom dealings and were dismayed at the Lockheed investigation becoming bogged down.[270] Thus, although he could have found external sources of strength, his internal weakness and an inability to capitalize on outside sources made Miki a weak Prime Minister.

In trying to get his flagship reform policies passed, Miki faced pushback from the factions, creating the first cracks in his leadership.[271] Miki had to open up to negotiations with the factions on the content of his policies – with the exception of the antimonopoly law revision – and had his policies watered down to suit the needs of the factions. While election and political funding reform was passed in this manner, antimonopoly law failed to pass the Diet entirely, due to the unrest it created with the factions and many of LDP's major donors. Miki's idealism and strong commitment to reform – which had until then kept him from the offices that he now occupied – were now proving to be his undoing in power by alienating the factions and the party's backers. However, it was his strong public commitment to pursuing the Lockheed Scandal in Japan that ended Miki's tenure as Prime Minister.[272] His commitment, along with his decision to not rescue Tanaka from arrest in the Lockheed investigation, sparked a movement within the LDP to replace him with someone more palatable to the factions. The party had had enough of the reform agenda of the clean Miki – which had ultimately proven to be too radical – and in December 1976 Miki tendered his resignation and was succeeded by Fukuda Takeo.

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[270] Time Magazine, "Miki v. the Lords"; Blaker, "Japan 1976: The Year of Lockheed", 82.
[271] Shinkawa, "Miki Takeo: Politics of Conviction and Public Opinion" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 190-191, 192.
[272] Shinkawa, "Miki Takeo: Politics of Conviction and Public Opinion" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 202, 203; Time Magazine, "Miki v. the Lords"; Blaker, "Japan 1976: The Year of Lockheed", 82.

Tanaka and Miki were best characterized as polar opposites. The former had been a businessman before politics whilst the latter had been a pure politician, and while Tanaka could be identified as part of the construction *zoku*, Miki had no such distinction. Looking at the changes in the ruling leadership, there was a change in the ruling faction, as Miki headed the *Seisaku Kenkyūkai*, which was one of the main factional lineages of the LDP. However, Miki suffered from the existence of a kingmaker in the form of Shiina Etsusaburō who had granted Miki his tenure and made Miki a weak appointee. Miki was left without factional ties and alliances to support him, and turning him into a caretaker picked by a Shiina to smooth the tides rocking the LDP. Despite the existence of a kingmaker, Miki was able to formulate an agenda of his own, which differed from Tanaka's in its focuses and direction, with greater emphasis placed on controversial political issues and the content of economic policy radically altered from remodeling to creating a welfare state. Yet, Miki was never a strong leader and his faction was always weak, owing to both the kingmaker Shiina, the isolation and small size of the faction, and Miki's inability use public support. Thus, there was only partial change in the ruling leadership from Tanaka to Miki, because Miki ended up as a lame-duck type of Prime Minister, despite changes in the ruling faction and the agenda. Due to his weakness – although he was able to have a standard-length tenure – Miki was unable to fulfill much of his agenda, with what he achieved tampered with by the factions. In terms of his political style, Miki replaced Tanaka's action-based style with one that sought to combine idealism and pragmatism. Furthermore, whilst Tanaka was a political insider and a grandstander, Miki was only a kamikaze fighter who committed himself and his tenure to pursuing reforms to clean up politics, make economics fairer, and went all in to pursue the Lockheed Scandal. Miki's could have been a grandstander but was unable to use

public support. In sum, it can be seen that there was a semi-significant change and moderate circulation of elites from Tanaka to Miki, due to a number of strong differences between each administration but failures of power and achievement on Miki's end.

Fukuda Takeo became party president and Prime Minister – and his faction, the *Seiwakai* became the ruling faction, after in December 1976 through an agreement with Ōhira Masayoshi, which dictated that Fukuda would serve a single two-year term and would be succeeded by Ōhira, making the latter the kingmaker during Fukuda's tenure.[273] Through this agreement, Fukuda took over at a time when the Japanese economy was struggling and that an economics *zoku* like Fukuda – who came from the MoF – was best equipped to handle. Reflecting this need to deliver progress to the people on the economic front, Fukuda's administration adopted the name of "'Okay, let's get to work cabinet' (saa, hatarakō naikaku)" with the motto of "collaboration and solidarity".[274] Thus, like Ikeda, Fukuda made it the centerpiece of his government to stay out of the more controversial reform issues that pulled apart the Miki administration – as well as the Lockheed Scandal which took a backseat – and to focus on the economy. His government's motto reflected both the weakness of the LDP in the Diet due to electoral losses throughout the seventies, Fukuda's own reliance on Ōhira as a kingmaker, and the need to reduce the impact of Fukuda's own feud with Tanaka to the LDP by prioritizing party harmony.

Character-wise, Fukuda was noted to be intelligent and charming, and had great aptitude in policymaking with a sense of mission not unlike the Meiji era

[273] Makoto, "Fukuda Takeo: Winner in Policy, Loser in Politics" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 224-225.
[274] Makoto, "Fukuda Takeo: Winner in Policy, Loser in Politics" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 207; Edström, *Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine*, 90.

politicians but was harangued by politicking within the party.[275] Thus, although Fukuda was a leader who would quite enthusiastically tackle the problems that Japan faced out of a sense of mission and responsibility, his handling of party affairs where his base of power and host of challengers ultimately resided was weak. This meant that although Fukuda was not as radically different from the mass of LDP Dietmembers as Miki was, he did have the inclination to prioritize his own political goals and commitments over the reactions of the party. However, when combined with Fukuda's position as an economic specialist that preferred stable growth politics, and as a firm believer in economic cycles and the need of flexible responses to them, this proved to be to his advantage.[276] Just as Miki was the man to steer Japan and the LDP from the period of corruption crises as Mr. Clean, Fukuda was the man to pull Japan through a period of global stagflation due to his experience in economics and his committed workstyle. Once again, the LDP had been able to field a leader who was responding to the shortcomings and failures of his predecessor, and tackling the crises of the period, thus prolonging its hold on power.

Reflecting his expertise and Japan's situation, Fukuda's flagship policies were focused on the economic sphere, which included the achievement of stable growth and financial soundness, and revisions in antimonopoly and business relations bills.[277] Fukuda set out to give the Japanese economy a new direction, jettisoning both Ikeda's high-growth policies and the redistributive policies of his two predecessors, and sought to achieve stable growth that would be felt equally across Japan. Furthermore,

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[275] Makoto, "Fukuda Takeo: Winner in Policy, Loser in Politics" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 210, 222.
[276] Makoto, "Fukuda Takeo: Winner in Policy, Loser in Politics" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 210-211.
[277] Fukuda, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (January 31, 1977); Fukuda, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (July 30, 1977); Fukuda, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (October 3, 1977); Fukuda, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (January 21, 1978); Fukuda, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (September 20, 1978).

Fukuda sought to address the economic stress felt by the government budgets which were growing at a rate that could not be sustained by current revenue and would soon become an extreme financial liability. The major exception to the economic focus of the agenda was in foreign policy, where Fukuda had been able to formulate his own doctrine towards Asia, aptly called the Fukuda Doctrine.[278] Directed towards Southeast Asia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Fukuda Doctrine clarified Japan's position towards the region and the organization, and set the framework for future relations. It offered not only a vision of peace and prosperity for the region and its relations with Japan but also gave Japan a path towards building up its power and relations in the region, so as to be able to place itself as the leader of the region. Moreover, although Fukuda was a nationalist of Kishi's brand, his foreign policy speeches tended to emphasize survival and security.[279] This fit the pattern of a leader working to ensure the economic stability of Japan – which depended on outside sources both for resources and consumer markets – and who sought make Japan the Asia's leader.

In achieving his flagship policies, Fukuda's successes in foreign policy outweighed his successes in economic policy. Overall, Fukuda was able get a strong start in pursuing his economic policies and while he did not fail, he did come up short. The task of changing Japan's economic growth pattern was too mammoth a task for him to accomplish in his tenure and stretched far beyond. In fact, the economic problem Fukuda sought to tackle has snowballed with each new decade and economic crisis, remaining as a complicated challenge that every incoming Prime Minister to date has had to respond to. However, in foreign policy he was able to put forward the

[278] Fukuda, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (October 3, 1977).
[279] Makoto, "Fukuda Takeo: Winner in Policy, Loser in Politics" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 217; Edström, *Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine*, 91.

Fukuda Doctrine and to conclude a normalization treaty with China. Yet the demise of his administration did not particularly stem from policy failures or letdowns, since its overall track record was positive in both fronts. Fukuda's tenure ended because he sought to break free from his agreement with fellow faction leader Ōhira Masayoshi, which the latter thought Fukuda had "an ethical obligation" to adhere to, and this move put the two men into a bitter race for leadership.[280] Ōhira challenged Fukuda based on the agreement that they had, which not only made him a kingmaker but also gave him the right to expect and eventually demand that he be given what he was promised, making him a highly visible challenger. Furthermore, Ōhira was able to secure the backing of Tanaka and his *Mokuyōkurabu*, which were bitter enemies of Fukuda. The result was Fukuda's loss to Ōhira in the party presidential elections of 1978 and Ōhira's succession in December 1978.

For the most part, Miki and Fukuda were politicians of different makes and worldviews. Miki was a pure politician that did not qualify as a *zoku* politician, whereas Fukuda was an ex-bureaucrat from the MoF and could be considered as a part of the economics *zoku*. Regarding the changes in the ruling leadership, Miki headed the *Seisaku Kenkyūkai* whilst Fukuda had succeeded Kishi and renamed the faction to *Seiwakai*, and both of the two men led major factional lineages. Fukuda did have a kingmaker in Ōhira; however, he did not necessarily suffer from his interference in the affairs of his administration which still allowed him free action and the ability to form and pursue his own agenda. However, much of his agenda continued on Miki's agenda, with Fukuda dropping clean politics and adding foreign policy as a major item but keeping much of the economic focus intact. As a leader, Fukuda and his faction proved to be of moderate strength, being unable to handle

[280] Makoto, "Fukuda Takeo: Winner in Policy, Loser in Politics" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 226, 230-231.

party affairs with much efficiency and breaking down against the first serious challenge from Ōhira. Overall, the changeover in the ruling leadership from Miki to Fukuda was only partial, given Fukuda's weaknesses and major continuities between the agendas of the two. Due to the manner in which he obtained and lost power, Fukuda's tenure was shorter than standard and his agenda fulfillment was only partial due to his short tenure and the weight of the items on his agenda. Looking at their political styles, whilst Miki had an approach that combined idealism and pragmatism, Fukuda's style was that of hard work and dedication. Moreover, Fukuda was a political insider, who was weaker in intra-party affairs but was stronger in the bureaucratic circles. Overall, from Miki to Fukuda there was a semi-significant change and moderate circulation of elites, caused by the partial change in the ruling leadership and the inability of Fukuda to see his flagship policies to their successful conclusions.

Ōhira Masayoshi became party president and Prime Minister in December 1978, carrying his faction, the *Kōchikai*, to ruling faction status after his victory over Fukuda.[281] Once in power, Ōhira had to contend with Diet power parity and had to seek the cooperation of the opposition centrists and splinter conservatives such as the New Liberal Club, which reflected in his political catchphrase trust and agreement.[282] First, this reflected his weakness in the party, as both Miki and Fukuda whom Ōhira had helped topple were in opposition and the support he got from Tanaka meant that he was now on his side of the fighting within the LDP. Thus, Ōhira needed to emphasize the need for party to unite and mend the bridges between the factions that were vital to its survival. Second, this reflect the weakness of the LDP in the Diet,

[281] Muramatsu, "Ōhira Masayoshi: The One Who Raised the Issue of Deficit Politics" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 242.
[282] Muramatsu, "Ōhira Masayoshi: The One Who Raised the Issue of Deficit Politics" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 242; Edström, *Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine*, 101.

which was due to the constant electoral decline of the party, which meant that outside support – especially with internal divisions so strong – was a necessity.

Nicknamed the Slow(-thinking) Bull, Ōhira was a "deliberate, unassuming bureaucrat" who "sifts his thoughts, acts cautiously and speaks slowly", and had a straightforward style with the ability to get things done.[283] Furthermore, Ōhira – much like Tanaka – believed that it was the responsibility of the politicians to deliver to the people.[284] Thus, Ōhira's political style was a mix of Satō and Tanaka, combining the deliberate and cautious approach of the former with the hands-on and proactive approach of the latter. On the one hand, Ōhira's deliberative style allowed him to better position himself and move towards a possible compromise or cooperation, in order to have his policies passed. On the other hand, his style signaled a return to an understanding of low politics – and particularly economics – as an experienced and real event to be handled with regard to how it affected the people, as opposed to a national-wide abstract matter. This stood in contrast to Fukuda who pursued theory-led economic policy and saw economics as an issue to be solved on its own. Moreover, Ōhira was further set apart from Fukuda by his political style, which made him more open to pursuing imaginative and concrete policies in response to the problems on the domestic front.

Ohira's flagship policies aimed to respond to the social and economic issues facing Japan, and included policies such as the creation of a spiritually oriented society, family-based Japanese-style welfare, the garden city concept, and

[283] Muramatsu, "Ōhira Masayoshi: The One Who Raised the Issue of Deficit Politics" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 244; Time Magazine, "The Bull Wins: A Disciple of Give and Take".
[284] Muramatsu, "Ōhira Masayoshi: The One Who Raised the Issue of Deficit Politics" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 247.

administrative and tax reforms.[285] What was unique in Ōhira's agenda – in a move that went beyond Tanaka – was that the flagship policies not only emphasized the human aspect of low politics but also addressed the social and human aspect of the economic problems of Japan. In this sense, Ōhira was a trailblazer, who broke the mold for flagship policies and the main concerns of an administration by giving social issues and policies greater weight in his agenda. Nearly all of Ōhira's successor had social policies in their agendas, seeking to remedy the problems that plagued Japanese society as a result of modernization, economic growth, and globalization. Ōhira's trailblazing went further. He was also the first Prime Minister to bring the issues of administrative and tax reform to the fore in his agenda, setting a trend which would be tackled by others for over a decade after him. It was Ōhira that turned the tax solution to the government's decaying financial situation into a serious proposal. The only part of Ōhira's agenda that did not include any new developments was in foreign policy, where his constant emphases on prosperity, peace, and security mirrored his domestic agenda.[286] Ōhira's agenda as a whole placed a great deal of emphasis on both material and mental wealth, and the accumulation of a comprehensive type of prosperity that would satisfy the full needs of the people.

In implementing his policies Ōhira had few successes, with three major problems that kept him from major achievements and sapped his political power. The first problem was that while Ōhira's social agenda was groundbreaking, it could not be achieved overnight and had too many parts to be articulated and implemented, which moved it beyond the scope of Ōhira's powers and tenure from the outset. The second problem was that Ōhira was involved in the Tanaka-Fukuda fight, with

[285] Ōhira, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (January 25, 1979); Ōhira, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (September 3, 1979); Ōhira, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (November 27, 1979); Ōhira, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (January 25, 1980).
[286] Edström, *Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine*, 103.

constant factional opposition, which was made worse by his distrust of factional backroom politics due to experience with Fukuda's attempt to renege on his agreement.[287] Thus, factional conflict kept Ōhira occupied and worked against him for much of his time in office, constituting a constant drain of time, energy, and resources. The third and final problem was Ōhira's tax proposal, whose unpopularity with the public led to disastrous results in the October 1979 elections, leading to the movement to oust him.[288] Although the tax proposal was an important step in addressing the issue of government deficits, its unpopularity with the public also made it unpopular with the LDP's Diet contingent and faction leaders, who were alarmed by the public reaction. Despite these problems, Ōhira's Cabinet ultimately fell as the factional conflict caused a no-confidence vote against him to pass, leading him to call elections rather than resign.[289] Ōhira died in office while the campaign period was getting underway in June 1980, and was replaced by Suzuki Zenkō in July 1980.

In terms of their backgrounds, Ōhira and Fukuda were actually men of similar circumstances. Both had been bureaucrats in the MoF before entering politics and qualified as economics *zoku*, which was the center focuses of their agendas. Analyzing changes in the ruling leadership, Fukuda and Ōhira headed the *Seiwakai* and the *Kōchikai*, respectively and led distinct factional lineages. Unlike his predecessor, Ōhira did not suffer from a kingmaker who controlled or constantly challenged his administration, and was not politically constrained due to it. His agenda kept the heavy economics focus that Fukuda's had, however, its direction was

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[287] Muramatsu, "Ōhira Masayoshi: The One Who Raised the Issue of Deficit Politics" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 248; Quo, "Party Politics in Japan: The June 1980 Election", 254-255; Stockwin, *Governing Japan*, 71.
[288] Muramatsu, "Ōhira Masayoshi: The One Who Raised the Issue of Deficit Politics" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 242, 246. Muramatsu, "Ōhira Masayoshi: The One Who Raised the Issue of Deficit Politics" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 248.
[289] Stockwin, *Governing Japan*, 71.

less theoretical and more applied; foreign policy was less salient; and social policy emerged as an important item. Finally, Ōhira was not a particularly strong leader, and his personal and factional power was circumscribed, owing to both the size of the faction and the intra-party tensions which he faced. In combination, this meant that the ruling leadership did undergo change – although Ōhira was weaker as a leader – due to changes in the ruling faction and the agenda. Ōhira's tenure – much like that of Fukuda whom he replaced – was shorter than standard and this was a factor, along with Ōhira's moderate strength, constant occupation with factional infighting, size of agenda commitments, and public pushback, in the lack of any major agenda fulfillment. In terms of their styles, Fukuda's hard work and dedication was replaced by Ōhira's cautious and hand-on approach to politics. However, both men were political insiders, whose greatest strength lay in their bureaucratic connections which were centered around the MoF. In sum, due to continuities in style and the weakness of agenda fulfillment on Ōhira's part, there was a semi-significant change and moderate circulation of elites between Fukuda's and Ōhira's tenures.

Taking Ōhira's place after his death during the campaign period for the 1980 elections was Suzuki Zenkō, who took over the posts of party president and Prime Minister in July 1980 and kept the ruling faction constant as he also led the *Kōchikai*. Suzuki, whose nickname was "the Buddha", emerged as a compromise candidate because he was neutral, well-connected, "regarded as a tough negotiator with a particular knack for settling party disputes", and had served seven terms as chairman of the Executive Council, which gave him the credentials as a "consensus builder and coordinator".[290] With his experience and reputation, Suzuki became the top man in the LDP and in government because the party been experiencing bitter factional conflict

[290] Quo, "Party Politics in Japan: The June 1980 Election", 273; Tanaka, "Suzuki Zenkō: The Politician Sought by Power" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 256, 257 ; Time Magazine, "Unity Candidate: Deals in a Smoke-filled Room"; Shinoda, *Leading Japan*, 127.

for almost a decade. In this period of factional conflict, Ōhira's death had been too high a price for the LDP to be comfortable with and what was needed now was to rebuild factional relations and achieve intra-party harmony. Thus, Suzuki emerged as the LDP's choice precisely because he was the man of harmony and consensus needed to unite the party, mend the wounds of the previous decade, and to stop the factional conflict that threatened to undo the dominance of the party. In this sense, Suzuki was also Ōhira's antidote, as his confrontational attitude towards the factions had brought intraparty conflict to its peak, leading to the passage of a vote of no-confidence and Ōhira's own death.

Coming to power at such a juncture, the Suzuki administration dedicated itself to the "the politics of harmony".[291] This was a statement of Suzuki's mission to unite the party and calm down the political environment, which had become increasingly unstable during the seventies as LDP's power in the Diet declined and factional conflict redirected the energies of the government away from legislating and into party politics. Suzuki was helped in this by the factions' reaction to Ōhira's death and the Ōhira sympathy vote in the 1980 double-elections, which gave him a comfortable position in the Diet. This commitment to harmony and consensus extended to Suzuki's agenda, which did not have a particular leaning of its own and instead pursued the LDP line.[292] Flagship items in Suzuki's agenda included commitments to administrative reform, fiscal consolidation and reform, welfare for an aging Japan, and the creation of a fulfilling society.[293] Here, Suzuki was not simply pursuing the party line but also the Ōhira line, continuing the fiscal and administrative focuses of

[291] Tanaka, "Suzuki Zenkō: The Politician Sought by Power" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 258.
[292] Edström, *Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine*, 111.
[293] Suzuki, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (October 3, 1980); Suzuki, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (January 26, 1981); Suzuki, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (October 3, 1981); Suzuki, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (January 25, 1982).

his agenda and only dropping the controversial tax reform idea and replacing the family-based welfare and garden city concept with welfare for an aging Japan and the creation of a fulfilling society. The makeup of the agenda was also a deliberate move by Suzuki, who dropped controversial issues from consideration, not endangering his mission to have party unity and consensus, and making his job of governing easier by removing any difficult decisions and legislative issues.

In foreign policy too, Suzuki was a man of harmony, emphasizing peace and security in his foreign policy statements.[294] On the one hand, by making frequent recourse to these themes, Suzuki was extending his domestic policy stance outwards, where appeals to peace and security were constant themes and would incite no opposition for being bland or for being too heavy on taking the initiative. On the other hand, Suzuki was also reacting to a world where the Cold War had restarted, along with conflict in the Middle East between Iraq and Iran which had threatened Japanese nationals in these countries. The only controversial diplomatic action by Suzuki was the use of the term "alliance" in a meeting with US President Ronald Reagan.[295] Suzuki faced opposition at home, stemming from a reaction to the word "alliance" in the context that it was used, and his handling of the issue hurt him as well. However, this ended up being just about the only time that his foreign policy invited such disharmony and conflict within the Diet.

In terms of his agenda implementation ability, the focus on harmony and the skills on consensus-building which had raised Suzuki up to his posts became his undoing. By then end of his term, not only had he been unable to get any of his flagship commitments realized, but 52% of Japanese disapproved of Suzuki due to

[294] Edström, *Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine*, 113.
[295] Tanaka, "Suzuki Zenkō: The Politician Sought by Power" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 263-264.

political inaction.[296] Whilst Suzuki was a strong candidate for party unity and political harmony, in his commitment he was far too timid and weak, which led to him becoming a leader without power and achievement. This hurt his chances of remaining in power for a second term because his leadership had become bankrupt and intra-party struggles to succeeded him emerged. However, it was Suzuki himself who chose to leave his posts, when the conflict between Tanaka and Fukuda – which he had attempted to slow down by appointing Kishi as an advisor – reemerged.[297] Thus it was at the moment when his mission became impossible to fulfill that Suzuki chose to step down, rather than to be consumed by the same conflict that shaped the fates of his four predecessors. Through his choice to step down, Suzuki became another – and it would appear, the final – victim of the Tanaka-Fukuda conflict.

As leaders, Ōhira and Suzuki presented a number of continuities with a few differences in-between. In their backgrounds, both men came from different sections of the bureaucracy: Ōhira had worked in the MoF, and Suzuki had been involved with the fisheries administration. Thus, the former could be considered as part of the economics *zoku* whereas the latter could be considered as part of the fisheries *zoku*. Looking at the ruling leadership, the first continuity between the two men was the faction which they belonged to, with both men leaders of the *Kōchikai*. Thus, the ruling faction stayed the same during Suzuki and Ōhira's tenures. Suzuki did not suffer from a kingmaker, although his politics of harmony was a kingmaker in itself and had the same weight and power over Suzuki that a kingmaker would have had. In terms of his agenda, Suzuki's agenda was a close continuation of Ōhira's agenda with slight changes such as the tax proposal being dropped and social policies becoming

[296] Time Magazine, "Bowing Out".
[297] Tanaka, "Suzuki Zenkō: The Politician Sought by Power" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 265, 268-269; Kaushik, "Suzuki Bows Out", 472.

differentiated. The agenda had undergone only marginal and cosmetic changes, and kept the directions set by Ōhira. Finally, although Suzuki's faction of moderate strength, Suzuki himself was a weak and largely ineffective leader owing to his desire to stay away from the problematic aspects of policy making and intraparty struggles. As such, it can be seen that from Ōhira to Suzuki's tenures the ruling leadership remained unchanged, as Suzuki acted as if he was presiding over an extension of Ōhira's term in office. Although Suzuki had a standard-length tenure as Prime Minister, his weakness within the party and indecisive leadership led to a dismal failure in fulfilling his agenda and enacting his flagship policies. The major difference between Ōhira and Suzuki was their political styles, with the cautious and hands-on approach of Ōhira replaced by the harmony and consensus approach of Suzuki. Furthermore, while Ōhira was a political insider, Suzuki was a peace lover who sacrificed all of his power and potential policy gains for the sake of intra-party harmony. In conclusion, the major continuities between Ōhira and Suzuki's tenures led to a situation of no-significant change and weak circulation of elites.

## 7.2 Zenith and decline of the LDP – Nakasone, Takeshita, Uno, Kaifu, Miyazawa

Replacing "the Buddha" Suzuki Zenkō as party president and Prime Minister – and his faction as the ruling faction – in November 1982 was "the weathervane" Nakasone Yasuhiro and his faction, the *Seisaku Kagaku Kenkyūjo*.[298] Nakasone had achieved this odious distinction because he was quick to change sides and secure his political future, and had been a familiar face in a number of party administrations and Cabinets, which included the Suzuki Cabinet as well. Although his political career was derided in this manner, Thayer noted that Nakasone had inadvertently become a weathervane

[298] Fukui, "Japan's Nakasone Government", 380.

due to his desire to demonstrate that he could be a leader to the LDP and to Japan.[299] To do so, Nakasone needed to keep his career secure – biding his time to become party president and Prime Minister – and to keep his political and administrative skills polished and highly visible. Thus, on the one hand, he had to be able to switch allegiances quickly and as necessary, and on the other hand, he needed to take as many posts as he could secure both in the party and the Cabinets. Ultimately, Nakasone was playing a political game with equal benefits and risks to himself, which he came to reap plentily.

Despite his reputation, Nakasone's political style was much firmer and stronger than would be expected. His political style combined "direct speech and vigorous action" along with a "presidential" top-down leadership style, and clever use of charisma, mass media, and public opinion.[300] The difference between Suzuki and Nakasone's political styles mirrored the difference between Satō and Tanaka a decade earlier. After the failure of Suzuki's politic of harmony and consensus, Nakasone's presidential and populist style offered the LDP and the Japanese citizens the strong and dedicated leadership which seemed to be missing from politics in the seventies. In effect, Nakasone emerged as the response to the Suzuki's failures, with an offer of leadership to which the LDP and the people responded positively. Furthermore, Nakasone had become – after Tanaka – the second LDP president and Prime Minister, who consciously and effectively took to the people for support. However, he went beyond Tanaka and became a pioneer in this field, by making full use of mass media and contacts with the people, infusing a degree of populism and accessibility to his administration which had been done last by Hatoyama.

[299] Thayer, "Japan in 1984: The Nakasone Era Continues", 55.
[300] Edström, *Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine*, 119; Smith, *Japan since 1945*, 141.

Politically, Nakasone was a Prime Minister who looked outward from Japan and at Japan's role in the world, and liked dealing with big and abstract ideas.[301] His flagship policies reflected this, with policies such as achieving politics open to the people; creating in Japan "a country of strong culture and welfare"; administrative, education, and tax reforms; switching to a domestic demand driven economy; and the total settlement of postwar politics.[302] Nakasone's flagship items were the combination of a number of policy proposals – some of which, such as tax reform, had been brought up before him – that required amassing and expending of a massive political capital, something which Nakasone had long been gathering. It can be seen that some items on the agenda, especially on reform, economics, and welfare, were more like the continuation of a trend which had been inherited from the previous decade and the late-Prime Minister Ōhira, with the power behind them changed. Social policy was once more a centerpiece of the agenda, alongside issues of reform and economic stabilization, which sought to change the entire structure of the Japanese economy.

Particularly unique here was the focus on ending the "postwar period" of Japanese politics, which reflected Nakasone's own nationalism.[303] In this, Nakasone was continuing the work of Kishi and inviting the conflicts of that period to repeat themselves. Yet, Nakasone was facing a Japan and an opposition much more different than what Kishi had faced, alongside an LDP which had undergone much change, and

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[301] Thayer, "Japan in 1984: The Nakasone Era Continues", 52.
[302] Nakasone, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (December 2, 1982); Nakasone, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (January 24, 1983); Nakasone, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (September 10, 1983); Nakasone, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (February 6, 1984); Nakasone, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (January 25, 1985); Nakasone, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (October 14, 1985); Nakasone, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (January 27, 1986); Nakasone, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (September 12, 1986); Nakasone, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (January 26, 1987); Nakasone, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (July 6, 1987).
[303] Kusano, "Yasuhiro Nakasone: The Appearance of a Presidential Prime Minister" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 267-277.

was able to pursue a number of policies to effectively circumvent the constitutional and legal constraints on Japan's security stance. He was able to successfully transfer arms technology to the US, break the self-imposed 1% of the gross national product barrier on the defense budget, and went so far as to call Japan "an unsinkable aircraft carrier".[304] While all of these sparked opposition reactions, none of it fazed Nakasone, who pushed ahead with this portion of his agenda. He sought to use his strong and decisive leadership to remedy the domestic issues which Japan faced and to fix Japan's international standing, by removing the ties that bound it as much as he could. His foreign policy also mirrored his desire to revise Japan's international standing, focusing on peace, security, prosperity, and most importantly, recognition.[305] For Nakasone, settling the postwar accounts was not simply an issue of revising the Constitution, but also to change Japan and its diplomatic weight in such a way that the country now carried its weight, had power behind its name, and could stand centerstage in world affairs. In effect, Nakasone pushed for a change in attitudes and actions, beyond the legal changes needed to legitimize his goals.

Although Nakasone successfully fulfilled much of his agenda, scoring especially important victories in administrative reform, foreign policy, and the settling of the postwar politics, he suffered from a number of problems that weakened him. The first problem was Nakasone's reliance on Tanaka – due to which his administration had at first been called the "Tanakasone" administration – who was his kingmaker.[306] To his benefit, Nakasone's agenda setting ability was not impaired but the stigma of Tanaka's support hurt him, both with the LDP and the public who did not desire Tanaka's return to power. It should be noted that Nakasone acknowledged

[304] Kusano, "Yasuhiro Nakasone: The Appearance of a Presidential Prime Minister" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 279.
[305] Edström, *Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine*, 122.
[306] Samuels, "Leadership and Political Change in Japan: The Case of the Second Rinchō", 15.

the importance of relations with Tanaka but also worked to set himself apart and to demonstrate his independence as a policymaker.[307] It was Nakasone's luck that this issue solved itself and his power was restored, with Tanaka's incapacitation from a stroke and the breakup of his faction through Takeshita's succession in 1985. From this point on, Nakasone was a free agent and acted without the shadow of Tanaka over him.

Nakasone's second problem was that his political style ran into problems when it faced established interests in fields where Nakasone had chosen to legislate in.[308] This had been the cause for his failures on tax and education reform, as in both cases strong lobbying groups, interested parties such as the bureaucracy, teachers, and big business had their own ideas, and the existing subgovernments and *zoku* networks interfered and sought to implement their own wills over Nakasone's. As such, although Nakasone was a strong leader, this depended very much on his preparedness and ability to handle the vested interests which had been working on an issue before he had chosen to become involved. Furthermore, as with the issue of tax reform, on issues where Nakasone lost public support, he was especially weak and unable to overcome these vested interests.

Nakasone's third weakness came from the interplay of his domestic and foreign policies, as he was prone to causing diplomatic crises as he did with his racial remarks about the US and his visit to the Yasukuni Shrine.[309] In both cases it was Nakasone's nationalism that had been the underlying reason for the crises he faced afterwards. On the one hand, his racial remarks reflected a certain sense of

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[307] Kusano, "Yasuhiro Nakasone: The Appearance of a Presidential Prime Minister" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 278.
[308] Kusano, "Yasuhiro Nakasone: The Appearance of a Presidential Prime Minister" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 293, 294.
[309] Kusano, "Yasuhiro Nakasone: The Appearance of a Presidential Prime Minister" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 285-287.

Nihonjinron that had been built into his nationalism that found the Japanese homogeneity to be a source of superiority, ignoring the racial problems felt elsewhere and the value others placed on diversity. On the other hand, his visit to the Yasukuni Shrine was meant as a move towards restoring national pride, which ignored the sensibilities of Japan's own neighbors and inflamed the old scars of Japanese aggression and imperialism. Although Nakasone was able to survive both crises, he was in hot waters diplomatically and his policy of settling postwar accounts showed its natural limits.

Yet, Nakasone's political power and experience – as well as an undeniable streak of luck – allowed him to pull through these weaknesses and crises, eventually allowing him to serve for an exceptional one-year third term. His weaknesses did not lead to a vacuum of power that allowed others to constantly attack his positions, although his failure on the tax reform issue towards the end of his term inevitably invited intensified factional politics to replace him. However, Nakasone was able to go through a peaceful transition of power – which had become a rarity in the past decade – and was also able to manipulate his succession to keep his would-be rivals and successors in check.[310] Eventually, Nakasone left office naturally at the end of his allowed term limit and was succeeded by Takeshita Noboru – whom he had chosen to endorse – in November 1987.

Suzuki and Nakasone had multiple differences. The former had a background in fisheries and could be identified as a *zoku* of this area, whereas the latter had been a bureaucrat in the Home Ministry briefly, before entering politics and had no qualification to be considered as a *zoku* politician. In analyzing the changes in the ruling leadership, from Suzuki to Nakasone the ruling faction changed from the

[310] Hayao, *The Japanese Prime Minister and Public Policy*, 95

*Kōchikai* to the *Seisaku Kagaku Kenkyūjo*. Heading the latter, Nakasone was the successor of a major factional lineage, which he had inherited from Kōno Ichirō. Regarding the issue of a kingmaker, Nakasone suffered from Tanaka as a kingmaker partially, in the first two years of his five-year administration. Even then, Nakasone freely formulated his own agenda and pursued his goals, but suffered from the negative impact of his ties to Tanaka. His agenda was largely changed and improved over that of Suzuki, with more controversial items such as tax reform coming onto the agenda and the total settlement of postwar politics reintroducing matters of ideology. Finally, Nakasone was a strong leader, although his power was subject to fluctuations in the public support he received. Overall, Nakasone's tenure introduced a number of major changes and set itself apart from its predecessor, resulting in the complete change of the ruling leadership.

The length of Nakasone's tenure was longer than standard – which was unique – but his ability to fulfill his agenda was partial, owing to his inability to brush aside the vested interests which constrained him and lack of public support. In their leadership styles, Suzuki's politics of harmony and consensus was replaced by Nakasone's top-down, presidential, and populist style. Moreover, Nakasone was a political insider and grandstander, combining his power within the LDP and the bureaucracy with use of public support. Overall, from Suzuki to Nakasone major changes took place in the ruling leadership and political styles, with partial yet highly significant agenda achievements, qualifying this as an instance of significant change and strong circulation of elites.

Takeshita Noboru took over the posts of LDP president and Prime Minister in November 1989, carrying his faction – the *Keiseikai* – to ruling faction status, with

Nakasone casting the deciding vote in his favor.[311] However, as he led the strongest faction of the LDP Takeshita's power was formidable and thus Nakasone never became Takeshita's kingmaker. Yet, despite being the most powerful faction leader in the LDP, Takeshita did not use his power in pushing forward with his agenda. Instead, Takeshita's political style was of "patience and adjustment" and he sought to build consensus from bottom up in his political dealings, which focused more onto domestic issues.[312] This was a radical change in style from the outgoing and populist Nakasone, but was also the type of leadership which was needed to complete what Nakasone had failed to do. Takeshita's political style insulated his position from the types of power fluctuations that Nakasone was susceptible to, and gave him the power to work within the LDP and the bureaucracy to build up his power and to strike at the right time to handle policy matters. His style also gave him the ability to tackle some of the outstanding issues that had been left over from the Nakasone administration, such as tax reform, because he was able to move more cautiously, built consensus, and worked mainly within the party.

In terms of his flagship policies, Takeshita's agenda was thematically an extension of Nakasone's and was built upon a formula that was by now quite familiar. Takeshita committed himself to tax reform; hometown creation; creating a Japan that contributes to the world; and interestingly, promised "politics of bold ideas and execution".[313] The first three items respectively covered Takeshita's economic, social, and foreign policy commitments, maintaining the post-Ōhira pattern of diverse

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[311] Smith, *Japan since 1945*, 145.
[312] Kume, "Takeshita Noboru: A Conservative Politician's Melancholy" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 303; Edström, *Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine*, 132; Chua-Eoan et al., "JAPAN, A Back-Room Man Steps Forward: Nakasone taps Takeshita as his successor".
[313] Takeshita, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (November 27, 1987); Takeshita, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (January 25, 1988); Takeshita, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (July 29, 1988); Takeshita, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (February 20, 1989).

flagship policies. Tax reform had been long in the discussion, with Takeshita being last in a line of leaders to pursue this controversial policy in response to the fiscal crisis that the Japanese state was facing. Hometown creation was Takeshita's own way of responding to the social problems that had plagued Japan since Ikeda's high and rapid growth economics. The policy of creating a Japan that contributes to the world built on Nakasone's work, who had elevated the position of Japan in global affairs by being much more proactive where and when possible. His foreign policy also reflected this, continuing the focuses on peace, security, prosperity, and recognition.[314] The emphasis of a Japan that took its place on the world stage had become a continuing theme, which Takeshita aimed to maintain. On the final item, while Takeshita did pursue bold ideas in his flagship policies, his execution was not bold. Most likely, this was Takeshita's way of responding to Nakasone's legacy of carrying controversial items to the agenda and getting his policies implemented by making full use of the powers available to him.

While Takeshita was successful in getting parts of his agenda – in particular tax reform – passed, he was less successful in social policy implementation, like others before him. Ultimately it was the public reaction to his successes and corruption scandals that removed him from power. During his tenure, Takeshita got the controversial tax reform passed and liberalized trade in beef and oranges, which caused public resentment against him, and although he might have survived, the Recruit Scandal dealt a blow which made it virtually impossible for him to recover and bankrupted his political style.[315] The public reaction to the tax and beef and citrus issues could have been foreseen and perhaps managed by Takeshita, since these were

[314] Edström, *Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine*, 134.
[315] Kume, "Takeshita Noboru: A Conservative Politician's Melancholy" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 314-315; Doerner et al., "JAPAN, A Scandal That Will Not Die: Despite loose ethics, the Recruit fiasco may topple Takeshita".

bound to subside with time and because Takeshita's primary electorate was within the LDP – not with the people – which meant that he only needed to get intra-party backing. However, the 1988 Recruit stocks-for-favor scandal brought the taint of corruption onto almost everyone within the high cadres of the LDP and became Takeshita's black mark. It was not only his own involvement that was the problem but also the discrediting of his leadership style, which relied on backroom deals, that prepared Takeshita's end. Unable to hold on, Takeshita resigned in June 1989 and was succeeded by Uno Sōsuke, who was handpicked by Takeshita.

Takeshita was quite different from Nakasone, but the two men also had a number of similarities. Neither Nakasone nor Takeshita had any qualifications that would have qualified them as *zoku*, as both had only had brief periods of prior experience – in the Home Ministry and as a teacher, respectively – before entering politics. Looking at the ruling leadership changes, there was a change in the ruling faction as Nakasone's *Seisaku Kagaku Kenkyūjo* was replaced by Takeshita's *Keiseikai*, which was the continuation of Satō's factional lineage. Takeshita did not have a kingmaker, as he himself was strong enough to occupy that position owing to the size of his faction. However, the change in agendas was only partial, as tax reform inherited and the foreign policy initiative which Takeshita undertook was influenced by Nakasone. Finally, Takeshita was a strong leader who could rely on a strong factional to act as his base of power and support within the party. Thus, although his agenda was only partially changed, Takeshita's strength and the changes in the ruling faction meant that the ruling leadership had changed during his tenure. As the Recruit Scandal forced him out, Takeshita's tenure was shorter than standard and his agenda was only partially fulfilled, which was also affected by his political style and the magnitude of the policies he envisioned. Looking at his political style, Nakasone's

presidential and proactive style was replaced by Takeshita's wait-and-see and consensus building style. In addition, Takeshita was a political insider, whose power emerged in his dealings with the LDP and the bureaucracy, whereas Nakasone was also a grandstander. In sum, although the ruling leadership and political styles did change, because Takeshita was not able to get a majority of his flagship policies implemented, his impact was dulled leading to the change from Nakasone to be one of semi-significant change and moderate circulation of elites.

Uno Sōsuke succeeded Takeshita Noboru in June 1989 and left just as quickly in August 1989.[316] Much like Ishibashi, in these three months Uno was unable to demonstrate any leadership, which prevents any observation or classification as to his political style. Furthermore, Uno was the first Prime Minister to not lead his faction – he came from Nakasone's *Seisaku Kagaku Kenkyūjo* – and was a weak leader form the start.[317] It was Takeshita who pulled the strings, as he had chosen Uno and placed him to the posts of party president and Prime Minister, in a manner reminiscent of Miki's coming to power. Uno was a "jack of all trades" and "a refined and talented man", as well as someone known to have "no money and no followers".[318] On the one hand, this meant that Uno was not a threatening candidate for leadership since he had no personal base of power and could be disposed of when the time came. On the other hand, his lack of involvement in money politics and factional power struggles made him appear palatable to the public as a clean politician, at a time that the LDP was suffering from the worst corruption scandal in its history. His reputation as an intellectual and gentleman were bonuses for the party, as these would have most

[316] Kume, "Uno Sōsuke: A Symbol of the Liberal Democratic Party's Unsoundness" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 317.
[317] Kume, "Uno Sōsuke: A Symbol of the Liberal Democratic Party's Unsoundness" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 320.
[318] Kume, "Uno Sōsuke: A Symbol of the Liberal Democratic Party's Unsoundness" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 319.

likely proved beneficial by granting an air of refinement and morality to the party in the form of its leader.

Uno's flagship policies included restoring political trust and ethics and he called his Cabinet the "Reform Advance Cabinet" which would be dedicated to the idea of slim government and affluent people.[319] Yet Uno was never able to pursue any of these flagship items, as his tenure went by in a flash. Already feeling the pressures of the Recruit Scandal, the consumer tax, and the liberalization of trade in agricultural goods, Uno was toppled when his own geisha scandal broke out.[320] Meant to be the new "Mr. Clean", Uno fell from power when it came to light that his own personal life was tainted. In August 1989, Uno tendered his resignation and was replaced by Kaifu Toshiki.

Looking at Uno and Takeshita, what emerges is a picture full of continuities. Neither had the experience to claim *zoku* status, and while Takeshita only had a brief experience as a teacher, Uno had been in the military at the end of the war and had ended up as a prisoner in Siberia.[321] Looking at the ruling leadership, although the choice of Uno meant a return to Nakasone's *Seisaku Kagaku Kenkyūjo* from Takeshita's *Keiseikai*, this was only a cosmetic change. This is because Uno was not the leader of his faction but a lieutenant, which also makes it questionable as to whether his faction reattained ruling faction status. This problem was exacerbated by Takeshita's kingmaker position, which caused Uno to be a weaker leader than he would have already been. Before Takeshita's kingmaker position had an impact, Uno had enjoyed no solid factional backing of his own and was not a particularly strong politician, which meant that he was and would have been a weak Prime Minister

[319] Uno, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (June 5, 1989).
[320] Kume, "Uno Sōsuke: A Symbol of the Liberal Democratic Party's Unsoundness" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 321.
[321] Kume, "Uno Sōsuke: A Symbol of the Liberal Democratic Party's Unsoundness" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 318.

either way. However, it is interesting to note that Uno's agenda was different from that of Takeshita, which focused on responding to political corruption. As such, a combination of weaknesses and cosmetic changes, along with Takeshita as a kingmaker, meant that the ruling leadership did not change during Uno's tenure. Lengthwise, Uno's tenure was much shorter than standard and his policy fulfillment was non-existent. The shortness of his tenure also meant that his political style cannot be discerned and categorized. Overall, it was Uno's weakness and short time in power that caused for the changeover from Takeshita to be a case of no-significant change and weak circulation of elites.

Kaifu Toshiki replaced Uno Sōsuke in August 1989, and like his predecessor, he was handpicked by the party and the kingmaker Takeshita because he was clean, did not lead a faction and was a member of Kōmoto's *Banchō Seisaku Kenkyūjo*, and due to his youth was not a challenger to other party presidential hopefuls.[322] Thus, Kaifu came to power under the same conditions and assumptions in which Miki and Uno had been brought to power. It was to be his mission to clean up the image of the party and provide the necessary leadership to recover from fallout from the Recruit Scandal. Once in power, Kaifu adopted the slogan of "dialogue and reform" with consensus a key item due to his weak intraparty position.[323] In order to enact his agenda and address the question of political corruption, Kaifu needed to be able to draw upon the power of factions other than his, making it extremely important for him to maintain intra-party consensus.

Kaifu's flagship policies dedicated his administration to political and welfare issues, and later sought to introduce crisis measures. His flagship policies included

[322] Fukui, "Kaifu Toshiki: Fatalistic Weakness" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 323; Smith, *Japan since 1945*, 148-149.
[323] Edström, *Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine*, 141.

restoring confidence in politics; electoral system and funding reforms; creation of a fair and enriched society; Peacekeeping Operations Bill (PKO Bill); and Securities and Exchange Law revision.[324] Thus, Kaifu's key commitments included addressing the problems of corruption and political reform which had emerged after the Recruit Scandal. The party and the factions expected Kaifu to pursue these points while remaining within the limits set by them, through intra-party dialogue and consensus. Reform was to happen – but perhaps having learnt their lessons from Miki's tenure – the factions and party leaders sought to make sure that Kaifu would not act independently. This, as will be discussed, led to Kaifu's ouster. The revision of the Securities and Exchange Law was also an extension of this sensitivity against corruption, and emerged in response to a securities misconduct scandal involving Sumitomo Bank, Mitsui Trust and Securities, and Daiwa Securities.[325] The PKO Bill was the big latecomer into the agenda, formulated as Kaifu's and Japan's response to the Gulf War, and became one of the most contentious and consuming items on Kaifu's agenda. The PKO Bill was also a litmus test on Kaifu's ability to lead. On the one hand, it tested his ability to get a controversial yet crucial bill passed by coordinating between the LDP, bureaucracy, and the people. On the other hand, it tested his commitment to his foreign policy emphases on peace, prosperity, security, and recognition, by giving Japan the challenge to respond to an international crisis as a responsible nation.[326]

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[324] Kaifu, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (October 2, 1989); Kaifu, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (March 2, 1990); Kaifu, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (October 12, 1990); Kaifu, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (January 25, 1991); Kaifu, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (August 5, 1991).
[325] Sterngold, "Four Arrested in Japan, In Stock-Trade Scandal"; Sterngold, "Sumitomo Chief Quits Over Scandal"; Sterngold, "Stock Scandal in Japan Runs Deep"; Yates. "Japan Brokerages Admit Payments".
[326] Edström, *Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine*, 143.

Faced with these tests and beset with weaknesses, Kaifu was unable to enact any of his flagship policies and paid for it with his tenure. Kaifu's failure came from public opposition to his policies, his weakness and ambivalence toward pursuing and implementing his policies, and his lack of factional following.[327] Public opposition to Kaifu's policies, and his weak and indecisive leadership were two problems that mutually reinforced one another. On the one hand, Kaifu's popularity declined because the public was not supportive of the PKO Bill, which appeared to violate the Constitution by sending the JSDF to combat operation abroad. On the other hand, the public thought of him as being under the control of LDP's bosses – and particularly Takeshita – and that he was an indecisive leader meant to be a "lightweight caretaker".[328] The public was well aware that the LDP bosses were hoping to use Kaifu's politically clean image to cleanse themselves and the party, and that real power laid with these people who were determined to keep Kaifu on a short leash lest he took the initiative to legislate like Miki before him. This was compounded by Kaifu's own weakness as a Prime Minister who did not lead his own faction and had to rely on the other factions – and the kingmaker Takeshita – to get his agenda enacted. In line with their concerns, the factions moved against Kaifu when he sought to move forward with electoral reform without their backing and support.[329] The factions saw this as a confrontational move by Kaifu, who was already unpopular due to his bungling of the PKO Bill proceedings.[330] Ultimately, the factions ousted Kaifu, replacing him with Miyazawa Kiichi in November 1991.

When compared to his two predecessor Uno and Takeshita, Kaifu's tenure shows a number of differences and continuities. Looking at his background, Kaifu

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[327] Fukui, "Kaifu Toshiki: Fatalistic Weakness" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times,* 327-329.
[328] Yalowitz and Impoco, "Beginning of the Endgame".
[329] Weeks, "Miyazawa Kiichi: A Prime Minister for the new era in an old-fashioned way", 10.
[330] Pringsheim, "The Political Ordeal of Toshiki Kaifu (1990-1991)", 14.

shared the trait of not having any experience that would qualify him as a *zoku*, however, as opposed to his predecessors who had pre-political careers Kaifu was a pure politician. Looking at the ruling leadership, Kaifu's case replicated that of Uno exactly. Although the ruling faction nominally became the *Banchō Seisaku Kenkyūjo*, which was a part of the Miki lineage, the leader of the faction was Kōmoto Toshio. This made it questionable as to whether the claim that Kaifu's faction became the ruling faction could be made with confidence, since he did not lead the faction to this position. Furthermore, repeating Uno's case, Kaifu suffered from Takeshita's influence as a kingmaker. Although this influence did not extend to Kaifu's ability to set the agenda, it did weaken him by curtailing his ability to pursue his agenda. In addition, Kaifu was a weak leader without a factional backing that was loyal to him specifically, and the faction he belonged to was not powerful enough to act as a solid base of support within the party. Despite these shortcomings, Kaifu was able to formulate an agenda of his own, although his flagship policies were influenced as much by him as by the crises that emerged in Japan and abroad at the time. Overall, Kaifu's weakness and his inability to rise past the kingmaker Takeshita led to a lack of change in the ruling leadership. The length of Kaifu's tenure was standard, yet, his weakness within the party, and indecisive leadership caused him to be unable to achieve any of his flagship policies. In terms of his leadership style, Kaifu appeared to be a return to Suzuki, with consensus building the backbone of his political approach. Moreover, he was a peace lover because as he was unable to get his agenda passed and had an overreliance on keeping the consensus and peace within the party to secure his tenure. In sum, because he ended up becoming a weak and ineffective caretaker leader, the changeover from Takeshita and Uno's tenures to Kaifu's tenure constituted a case in which no significant change and weak circulation of elites occurred.

Miyazawa Kiichi replaced Kaifu Toshiki as party president and Prime Minister in November 1991, bringing his faction, the *Kōchikai*, to ruling faction status. Miyazawa had become the party's likely choice for the post thanks to his experience as a veteran politician.[331] In this, he was helped by the fact that he led his own faction, although, until recently he had a reputation as someone who completely separated his political and private life, and kept aloof from the factional affairs.[332] Thus, with Miyazawa the brief interlude of faction bosses keeping themselves to the backrooms and letting junior politicians become party president and Prime Minister came to an end. Furthermore, the choice of Miyazawa reflected the concerns for able leadership that had been emerging in Japan which needed a leader who would be open and accessible in the world, and the LDP which needed leadership to distance itself from the image of corruption and lowliness domestically. In these matters – although he was tainted by the Recruit Scandal and had made a comeback – Miyazawa was helped by his image as a bright and cosmopolitan politician, although, he was sometimes seen as cold and haughty due to his English skills and derided by his peers.[333] Thus, on the one side, Miyazawa became the man of political skills and social refinement that would carry the party forward through its troubles and rejuvenate its image. On the other hand, he became the leader that would represent a Japan that was more responsible to the world – especially after Kaifu's PKO Bill and Gulf War support fiasco – and his language skills made him a more agile, open, and accessible leader for the world to behold.

Miyazawa's leadership style was to carefully approach an issue to avoid conflict with the interested parties and to "push one's principles" when conflict

[331] Weeks, "Miyazawa Kiichi: A Prime Minister for the new era in an old-fashioned way", 11.
[332] Igarashi, "Miyazawa Kiichi: The Last Leader of the Main Line of Conservatives" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 336.
[333] Pitman, "Raw and Fishy - Japan's Sleazy New PM.", 16; Impoco, "Japan Plays Musical Chairs".

became unavoidable.[334] This was a style that sought to retain harmony and consensus in political and factional affairs, by using a cautious and low-profile approach. However, Miyazawa did not shy away from conflict when it came down to it, and in fact, to commit to pushing one's principles in the face of inevitable conflict held the seed to making these conflicts even worse. This set Miyazawa's political style apart from Kaifu's, whose dependence on the factions had made it impossible for him to go against them and cost him his tenure when he did over electoral reform. Contrary to Kaifu, Miyazawa had more power and will to go against the factions when necessary and to push his agenda, acting from a position of strength.

Miyazawa's agenda continued the concerns that others before him had and he focused on social policy, tackled the foreign policy failures of Kaifu, and reintroduced fiscal policy to the center. His flagship policies included the PKO Bill and the revision of the Disaster Relief Team Dispatch Law to allow for JSDF participation, electoral system and funding reforms; turning Japan into a "lifestyle power"; and fiscal recovery and stimulus.[335] The PKO Bill was inherited from Kaifu and the revision of the disaster relief bill had emerged under Miyazawa as a natural extension of it. Electoral funding and system reform were issues that had emerged in due the Recruit Scandal – which Kaifu had also attempted – whose main aim was to eliminate the structural and systemic corruption, as well as factionalism, by striking at the electoral system which was seen as the structure that spawned them. Miyazawa's social policy was completely his but was rather vague, calling for Japan to become a lifestyle power which was likely an attempt at both improving conditions at home and

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[334] Igarashi, "Miyazawa Kiichi: The Last Leader of the Main Line of Conservatives" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 337.
[335] Miyazawa, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (November 8, 1991); Miyazawa, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (January 24, 1992); Miyazawa, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (October 30, 1992); Miyazawa, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (January 22, 1993); Miyazawa, "国務大臣 [Speech by the Minister of State]" (May 18, 1993).

raising the appeal of a "Japanese dream" abroad. Economic security returned to the flagship items, as the bursting of the bubble economy in 1991 caused the Japanese economy to enter a massive slump, the effects of which are still felt today and are behind policies such as Prime Minister Abe's "Abenomics" and Prime Minister Kishida's "new capitalism". Miyazawa' foreign policy also kept the pace, emphasizing peace, prosperity, and recognition.[336] Important here is the absence of security, reflecting Miyazawa's mindset on Japan's foreign policy priorities in the newly emerging post-Cold War world. The threat to Japan was gone, however, Japan's responsibilities to the world remained and even expanded as the post-Communist countries gained independence with problems and needs of their own.

Miyazawa's record on getting his policies implemented was mixed. His succeeded in getting the PKO Bill and the revision of the Disaster Relief Team Dispatch Law to allow for the JSDF participation passed. These successes altered Japan's security environment, expanded its ability to respond to global problems and to carry its responsibilities, and altered the constitutional order without amending the Constitution. However, in his social and economic policies, as well as in the matter of electoral reform, Miyazawa failed like his predecessors did. This stemmed partially from the breadth and scope of these policies, which made them unimplementable given the time limits on prime ministerial tenures and power limitations. In addition, Miyazawa was weakened because he disliked and could not handle internal party politics.[337] Without a good grasp on intraparty affairs personally, Miyazawa suffered from a lack of information, connections, and power within the LDP and the mechanism of factional politics. This meant that his power was not being augmented

[336] Edström, *Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine*, 153.
[337] Igarashi, "Miyazawa Kiichi: The Last Leader of the Main Line of Conservatives" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 338, 340.

within the party through alliances and consensus building deals, and his own power base was not strong enough individually.

It was a combination of these weaknesses, coupled with factional displeasure about how he moved forward with political reform – much like it had been in Kaifu's case – that led to Miyazawa's downfall in June 1993 when a no-confidence vote motion against him passed the Diet.[338] Miyazawa found himself deserted by the party, in a move that came from factional displeasure and the defection of younger members who chose to rebel against the factional backroom politics which controlled the LDP.[339] The result was both Miyazawa's fall – in a fashion reminiscent of Ōhira – and the loss of LDP's domination and control over Japanese politics for the first time since 1955. Under Miyazawa's leadership, the LDP went into the July 1993 elections and received a resounding defeat, leaving it without a majority in the House of Representatives. While Miyazawa was replaced by Kōno Yōhei as LDP president in July 1993, the seat of the Prime Minister was occupied by Hosokawa Morihiro who headed the Japan New Party (日本新党/Nihonshintō) and the coalition it led.

When compared to Kaifu, Miyazawa showed a number of key differences and continuities. Looking at their personal backgrounds, compared to the pure politician Kaifu who did not qualify as a *zoku*, Miyazawa was an MoF ex-bureaucrat and had the experience that would qualify him as an economics *zoku*. Analyzing the changes in the ruling leadership, it can be seen that while Kaifu was a member of the *Banchō Seisaku Kenkyūjo* faction, Miyazawa was the leader of the *Kōchikai* faction. Thus, with Miyazawa as LDP president and Prime Minister, a major factional once again achieved ruling faction status. Unlike Kaifu, Miyazawa did not suffer from a

[338] Igarashi, "Miyazawa Kiichi: The Last Leader of the Main Line of Conservatives" in *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 339-340.
[339] Smith, *Japan since 1945*, 151.

kingmaker that hurt his position within the party. However, although his faction did provide a solid base of support within the party, Miyazawa's own distance from intraparty affairs weakened him and limited his power. Finally, Miyazawa was not constrained in forming his agenda but he did partially inherit it from Kaifu, owing to his inability to get key policies – which impacted Japan's domestic and foreign affairs – and the pressing need for the LDP and Japan to enact them. In sum, although Miyazawa's position was partially weakened and his agenda had continuations, the overall changes in the balances of power and agenda focuses meant that the ruling leadership had changed. Miyazawa's tenure was shorter than standard and his agenda fulfillment was partial due to his short tenure and weakened intraparty position. Looking at his leadership style, Miyazawa's careful and principled political style came as an improvement over Kaifu's consensus building style, committing Miyazawa to conflict and confrontation if necessary. In addition, while Kaifu was a peace lover, Miyazawa was political insider, with his power as an insider stronger with the bureaucracy than the party. In conclusion, it can be seen that when Miyazawa succeeded Kaifu, he also brought about a number of changes in the centers of power in party leadership and administration, as well as greater policy achievements which qualifies the changeover as one of significant change and strong circulation of elites.

## 7.3 Conclusion – Elites in motion within the LDP

As the preceding discussion has demonstrated, the history of LDP as the dominant party in government has been one in which competing elite groups and leaders have constantly vied for power and periodically replaced one another. One pattern to this circulation is that while the early leaders of the party brought about significant changes and strong circulation of elites, beginning with Tanaka Kakuei and the LDP

civil war which ensued, semi-significant changes and moderate circulation of elites was more common. Another pattern is that the instances of no significant circulation and weak circulation of elites were attributable either to leaders who had very short tenures and thus had limited impacts (Ishibashi and Uno), or to leaders who suffered from a lack of power within the party due to factional infighting (Suzuki) or due to a kingmaker (Kaifu). These patterns reflect the impact of the power balances inside and outside of the LDP, onto the elite circulation that takes place as administrations change. On one side, as the factions reached power parity during the seventies, the instances in which semi-significant change and moderate circulation of elites occurred became more commonplace. Furthermore, as the parity was distorted, and Tanaka and the *Mokuyōkurabu* grew stronger, instances of no-significant change and weak circulation of elites became more common, as the circulation was hindered by intraparty struggles and kingmakers. On the other hand, the declining power of the LDP in the Diet made the Prime Ministers much less secure in their posts and hindered their ability to enact their agendas. As the party weakened in the Diet so did its leaders, with only a strong leader like Nakasone was able to reverse the trend in the Diet. The only exception to this was the case of Miyazawa, whose power was boosted by his differences and improvements over Kaifu.

The most important function of the intraparty circulation of elites was to make sure that the party could adjust to the new demands that emerged in the socio-political landscape. By making sure that different leaders with different political styles and agendas were available and would succeed one another as party president and Prime Minister, the circulation of elites allowed the LDP to survive against the multitude of crises it faced. In a number of cases, it was the failure of one political style that forced the LDP to find a leader of a different style – such as in the cases of Kishi-Ikeda,

Satō-Tanaka, Ōhira-Suzuki, Suzuki-Nakasone, Kaifu-Miyazawa – to better adjust to the problems emerging in the socio-political landscape. In others, the party needed to respond to domestic crises – Ikeda after Kishi, Miki after Tanaka and Lockheed, Uno and Kaifu after Recruit – where the party needed to change its image or approach to politics, to ensure its survival. Furthermore, in nearly all cases the elite circulation was accompanied by changes in the agenda, allowing the LDP to reorient itself, change its policy priorities, and respond to the needs of the electorate as needed.

The only time in which the circulation of elites failed to protect LDP's hold on power was with the election of Miyazawa Kiichi. Although Miyazawa appeared as the person to respond to the leadership vacuum that that had emerged during Kaifu's tenure, he was not the person to address the problems of corruption, factional strife, and the need for political reform. Thus, his loss of power and the subsequent loss of LDP's political dominance was the result of not only the LDP's own weakness and failure, but also the result of the elite circulation cycle breaking down and failing to produce the leader that was needed to keep the party in power. Overall, the circulation of elites within the LDP served to keep the party in power, and in its strength and significance was subject to the shifts in power between the factions and the LDP and other parties.

# CHAPTER 8

# THE LDP AND THE DC IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

In this chapter, the focus of analysis will be on placing the case of LDP's factions as politically differentiated elite organizations into a more universal perspective, through a comparison with the factions of the Italian party *Democrazia Cristiana* (DC). The two have been compared to one another in a number of expansive studies, focusing on their positions as dominant parties, their development and leadership, and their factionalisms.[340] However, the studies on the factionalisms of the two parties approach the case of the LDP largely from the functional-structural theories, which has limited the similarities between the two parties to the issues of elections and patronage which are readily emphasized in the LDP's case. As such, the aim of this chapter is to not only to put LDP factionalism in a global context but also to incorporate the elite theory approach to the comparative studies on the subject, thus expanding the scope of analysis between the LDP and the DC.

Before moving into the comparative study, it is important to get a grasp on why the LDP and DC are good fits for a comparative study. At the time of their establishment and rise – the LDP in 1955 and the DC in 1943 – both parties benefitted from a positive US policy, weak and fragmented labor movements and leftist vote, and strong bases in the rural regions early on, through the Catholic Church for the DC and the agricultural cooperative *Nōkyō* for the LDP.[341] In the postwar period, both parties benefitted from the appearance of US foreign policy which not only allowed for the old fascists to reinvent themselves as democrats, but also supported them as

[340] Pempel, *Uncommon Democracies*; Samuels, *Machiavelli's Children*; Belloni and Beller, *Faction Politics*.
[341] Pempel, "Introduction" in *Uncommon Democracies – The One-Party Dominant Regimes*, ed. T. J. Pempel, 26-27.

legitimate and nationally central political forces that would pursue liberal, free market economics, and anti-communist agendas. Thus, the broad thrusts of domestic, economic, and foreign policy were the same for both parties, which brought them both outside and domestic supporters. Furthermore, both Japan and Italy – and by extension the LDP and the DC – benefitted from US-centric security arrangements in the form of the US-Japan Security Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and economic support through open markets and, for Italy, the Marshall Plan. In effect, both countries shared similar – although not exactly identical as Italy had an official and constitutionally legitimate military whereas Japan did not – diplomatic, trade, and security paradigms throughout the Cold War era.

In terms of their political bases, both parties started out with and had their roots strongest in the rural and agricultural sectors of society, where only their entry points diverged on its secular and religious attributes. Both parties built their initial successes and key power bases onto a system of "patronage, rural voters and business support".[342] For both the LDP and the DC, pork barrel politics and the channeling of funds to constituencies were a primary concern and key way of maintaining the power and appeal of the party. Business support influenced policy decisions and gave both parties their major source of funding for both elections and pork barrel politics. However, neither party stayed dependent only on rural voters and big business, and both the LDP and the DC developed extensive mass bases which worked on a national scale and drew upon a variety of different social and economic groups.[343] Although the power and appeal of both parties fluctuated between different electoral districts, both the LDP and the DC were able to both field candidates on a national scale and have them elected from a wide variety of rural, urban, and metropolitan constituencies.

[342] Samuels, "Tracking Democracies: Italy and Japan in Historical Perspective", 284.
[343] Pempel, "Introduction" in *Uncommon Democracies – The One-Party Dominant Regimes*, ed. T. J. Pempel, 27.

Their ability to appeal to a large proportion of the electorate, combined with their organizational capacity and the weakness of the opposition on the left, turned both the LDP and the DC into dominant parties, the former ruling Japan between 1955 and 1993 and the latter between 1944 and 1994. Their dominant party status allowed for these parties to achieve ideological and policy hegemony.[344] The preferred policies of the LDP and the DC, and the worldviews of the leadership in each party, shaped and guided their respective nations through postwar reconstruction and democratization, and the Cold War. Both parties acted as the medium through which public and political interests reached the bureaucracy, they mediated the power and impact of the opposition, and frequently decided the courses of action available to the opposition. However, this dominance came to an end for both parties after the end of the Cold War, during the years of 1993 and 1994, and while the DC fell apart the LDP was able to make a comeback and return to its old position of dominance.

As it can be seen, both the LDP and the DC mirrored one another with only a few differences between them. Both started out as rural based parties with big business support, and heavy-handed disbursement of funds to constituencies to sustain the power base of the party. Each party also grew beyond these initial configurations and achieved a truly national power base and representational scope, eventually connecting different social and economic groups with the centers of national power and the bureaucracy. Politically, both parties occupied the same center to the right conservative spectrum – although the DC had the neo-fascist and royalists further right while the LDP stood alone – and faced a left that could not challenge their power, which the LDP locked out of power and the DC coopted. Due to the extent of their powers, both parties headed one-party dominant systems and formed ideological and

[344] Pempel, "Introduction" in *Uncommon Democracies – The One-Party Dominant Regimes*, ed. T. J. Pempel, 27.

policy hegemony over entire national socio-political structures. Their hegemony manifested itself in domestic political and diplomatic arrangements of Japan and Italy, both of which were strongly embedded into the Western camp and benefitted from the security and trade arrangements that existed.

Yet, the similarities did not stop with the broad strokes of social and political developments and orientation of the LDP and the DC, and extended into the way that each party was formally organized. As Giovanni Sartori has noted, the LDP and the DC appeared as twins with regards to factionalism.[345] As the following discussion will demonstrate, the similarities between the factionalism of the two parties stretched beyond considerations of power and patronage. Factions in both parties shared similar historical origins, policy orientations, and public identifiability, which becomes highly visible when an elite theory approach is taken, especially on the side of the LDP as in this study.

## 8.1 Parallels between the factions of the LDP and the DC

The first similarities between the factions of the LDP and the DC lies in their historical origins and the manner in which they have become integrated under a single party banner. Just as the LDP itself contained a number of distinct factions – which had prewar roots on form and content – from the time that it was formed, so did the DC. From its formation in 1943, different "*corrente*" (currents, used interchangeably with factions) existed within and competed for control of DC, and the founder of the party Alcide de Gasperi worked to "[integrate] different groups with varying values, aims, and political ideas" into this center-right conservative national party.[346] As can

[345] Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems – A Framework for Analysis*, 80.
[346] Masala, "Born for Government: the Democrazia Cristiana in Italy" in *Christian Democracy in Europe Since 1945 – Volume 2* eds. Michael Geller and Wolfram Kaiser, 88; Leonardi and Wertman, *Italian Christian Democracy – The Politics of Dominance*, 95-96.

be seen, in both the LDP and the DC, factions existed as intra-party organizations which competed against one another. In both cases these factions inherited key aspects of their makeup – such as their form, function, or membership and policy direction – from the prewar period. In addition, both parties for a time appeared to be collections of factions – which seemed to be small parties unto themselves – brought together by the will of certain leaders – such as Alcide de Gasperi and Kishi Nobusuke– and a concern over combining their energies and resources to solidify their position of power. The process of integration was not immediate in either the LDP or the DC, but was achieved satisfactorily and allowed for both parties to become dominant powers until the mid-1990s.

Another similarity between the factions of the two parties, which tied into their origins and formation, concerns the nature of their power bases. In the DC, the factions first emerged as organizations centered on the electoral regions of their leaders and assumed a national character over time.[347] This was only natural, as a politician in the DC needed to be able to secure his own seat and powerbase, before he could move to establish his own following or move up the ranks of the rank which he had entered. A similar process can be seen in the LDP, where the politician with a solid support base in his constituency and a strong *kōenkai*[348] to support him was more likely to launch his own faction or become a leader, as his seat was secure and he could take time to manage others. In both cases, the factions eventually reacted to the realities of pursuing politics within a national party, which enlarged and diversified their membership on the national scale, and made them responsible to a greater number of different political issues and actors. It was no longer enough for an aspiring politician and faction leader to rely solely on support in his own region, and

[347] Leonardi and Wertman, *Italian Christian Democracy – The Politics of Dominance*, 93.
[348] Voter organization in one's constituency, which provides services and connects the voters to politicians, in exchange for continued support and votes for the politician in question.

they had to be able to make an appeal to voters in all constituencies where faction members were elected or hoped to be elected. Furthermore, in the case of the LDP, the party presidential primaries first introduced in 1978 worked to "massify" the factions by driving their struggles to the grassroots levels.[349] Although the *kōenkai* was one way in which the factions had a mass outreach, it was the party presidential primaries that brought the factions of the LDP to the level of their DC counterparts, which had long been massified along the same lines.

A third similarity of factions in the two parties, which resulted from their formation and development, was their emphasis on policy and power. Leonardi and Wertman observe that DC factions have gone from "debating societies" to a structure that makes it impossible to differentiate between concerns over power and policy.[350] Thus, the factions of the DC have evolved to combine concerns over policy with concerns over control of the party and the prime ministry, and they became organizations which were equally involved in both policy affairs and political power struggles. The same situation can be found in the case of the LDP as well, although the coexistence of considerations over power and policy was not a trait acquired later on and existed from the outset. This can be seen as one of the major reasons why much of the existing literature on the LDP and its factions dismisses policy relevancy in favor of power politics, as the line between the two is blurred and the latter is easier to identify. However, in both the LDP and the DC, the factions were involved in policy matters, providing alternatives to one another and spaces for their members to get into discussions over policy, while at the same time working to distribute political patronage and gain control over the party and the post of Prime Minister. The two

[349] Krauss and Pekkanen, *The Rise and Fall of Japan's LDP*, 58, 116; Curtis, *The Japanese Way of Politics*, 104.
[350] Leonardi and Wertman, *Italian Christian Democracy – The Politics of Dominance*, 92.

were never mutually exclusive aspects of factionalism for these parties, but it is through an elite theory approach that their coexistence can be recognized.

Moving beyond similarities in origins and form, the factions of the LDP and the DC resembled each other in the political distinctions they had from others within the same party. The factions of the DC were observed as "[having] ideological orientations and policy positions which make possible reasonably clear distinctions among them".[351] This was similar to the case of the LDP explored earlier in this study, where the factions were demonstrated as having observable policy differentiations between them and provided alternatives to one another, which will be discussed later on. This similarity of the LDP's and DC's factions had three key implications, where the scope of similarities between the factionalisms of the two parties are expanded. First, factions in both parties had preferred policies and policy inclinations, which were known to members of both the faction, the party, and the voters who were knowledgeable about the factional affiliations of politicians. This meant that for both the party and the public there was a degree of predictability in how a faction would act if it became dominant within the party and captured the prime ministry. Furthermore, memberships of the factions in both parties were influenced by their policy dispositions, which impacted the decision to enter a particular faction and the subsequent political socialization which took place. Second, the factions were rendered recognizable to both the voters and the broad variety of social, political, and economic actors which had to work through them to access both the national centers of power and the bureaucracy. In both cases, this facilitated the work of the party as it allowed for the requests being made to be directed towards the proper channels and increased the responding capacity of the party. Furthermore, this allowed for the

[351] Belloni, "Factionalism, the Party System, and Italian Politics" in *Faction Politics: Political Parties and Factionalism in the Comparative Context* eds. Frank P. Belloni and Dennis C. Beller, 86.

factions to be able to make claims on their – publicly known – reputations and policy stances, when they captured control of the party and the prime ministry, and set out to formulate their agendas. Finally, this policy differentiation was one way for the factions in both parties to provide their members with a political identity with which they could identify themselves. This not only gave these politicians a leverage in campaigning and political affairs, as they had a ready-made platform and identity which they could appeal to, but it also improved the understanding of the public about their positions on key issues by identifying them with a faction and a leader.

Analyzing the sources of policy distinctions further a number of similarities between the factions of the LDP and the DC can be found. For the factions of the DC, divisions stemmed from questions such as those of Church and party relations, economic policy, and security policy.[352] Amongst these divisions, it is only the discussion over relations of the party with the Church which sets the DC's factions apart from that of the LDP, as the latter operated in a much more secularized environment. Much like the DC, factions of the LDP – as seen in the preceding discussion – were divided over approaches to economic and foreign policy as well, oscillating between different growth policies, and hawkish and dovish foreign policies. In addition to these divisions, which tended to be the major fault lines within both parties, the factions were able to further differentiate themselves over other important areas of policy, including education, welfare, labor relations, and electoral reform. These divisions affected the functioning of the factions in both parties as later discussion will explore.

A final point of similarity that stemmed from how factions in both parties differentiated themselves came in the form of organizational identities. In the DC,

[352] Masala, "Born for Government: the Democrazia Cristiana in Italy" in *Christian Democracy in Europe Since 1945 – Volume 2* eds. Michael Geller and Wolfram Kaiser, 92, 96.

each faction had “a common identity and common resources”, with major factions showing continuity and faction switching an exceptional occurrence.[353] As previous discussion in this study shows, factions of the LDP followed a similar pattern. In both cases, the factions derived part of their identities by setting up organizations of their own, which was separate from but was embedded into the party structure itself. The faction provided organizational services such as electoral campaign management and resources such as political funds and post distribution to its members. On one side, this brought the members of the faction closer into the identity of the faction, as it created an environment where members had the ability to stand apart as a group from the rest of the party, created a symbiotic relation with the faction, and had all the members attribute their electoral victory to the same sources and resources. On the other side, the factions generated group solidarity and loyalty, as they took over the management of their members’ electoral successes and careers which tied the fortunes of these individual actors to that of the faction and placed a premium on maintaining the faction as a unit. This also worked to improve public understanding of the factions and the differences between them, as factions worked to set themselves apart, solidify their internal relations, and have all members subscribe to a single identity, this was observable from outside.

In addition to organizational autonomy, the factions in both parties further augmented their efforts at setting themselves apart, and forging group identity and solidarity by adopting names for themselves. As discussed earlier, factions of the LDP adopted names for themselves in order to emphasize their organizational character, with some factions changing names alongside leadership changes and some keeping their original name as a sign of continuity. Similarly in the DC, factions had self-

[353] Bettcher, “Factions of Interest in Japan and Italy”, 351.

consciously adopted names chosen for "political and inspirational connotations".[354] While the names of LDP's factions held a mix of euphemistic names and names chosen to imply the involvement of the faction with policy matters, factions of the DC went overwhelmingly for politically charged names. These included names such as *Politica Sociale* and *Centristi* (Social Policy and Centrists) in the early years, *Forze Nuove* and *Centrismo Popolare* (New Forces and Popular Center) in the sixties, and *Iniziativa Poplare* and *Impegno Democratico* (Popular Initiative and Democratic Commitment) emerging later on. Few groups had euphemistic names such as the *Primavera* (Spring), *Vespa* (named after the Vespa Club[355] in Rome), *Dorotei* (named after a convent of Saint Dorothy), or *Morotei* (Friends of Moro, after its leader Aldo Moro). These self-chosen names were a third way which the factions used to differentiate themselves, push forward an identity, and forge solidarity between members. Members could identify themselves with the name of the faction which they were a part of, and both media and the public would have been able to use these names as cues showing the political and policy affiliations of the politician in question. Furthermore, the name added another layer of personal connection to the faction, which now gained a more personal quality through its name, and boosted the sense of belonging. Furthermore, those who met under the same name were better able to recognize themselves and outsiders, which allowed for solidarity between them to take root.

As a result of these multiple methods of generating factional identity being used together, DC factions were recognized in and outside of the parliament, with their names, leaders, and members recognizable by the press and the public.[356] As

[354] Belloni, "Factionalism, the Party System, and Italian Politics" in *Faction Politics: Political Parties and Factionalism in the Comparative Context* eds. Frank P. Belloni and Dennis C. Beller, 93-94.
[355] Not to be mistaken with the contemporary club for enthusiasts of Vespa scooters.
[356] Leonardi and Wertman, *Italian Christian Democracy – The Politics of Dominance*, 93.

discussed previously, despite the claims that the Japanese voters cannot distinguish the factional affiliation of politicians, the factions of the LDP and their memberships were as identifiable as their counterparts in the DC. After all, both parties headed one-party dominant systems and their internal leaderships translated immediately to national leaderships, which the press and the public could easily recognize. As the factions provided extensive services to members, which included the appearance of faction leaders and key lieutenants – who tended to be well-known public figures – there were also opportunities for the faction labels to be made known to the public. Thus, voters were able to distinguish between the different factional choices brought before them and form expectations based on the policy preferences of each faction.

A third and final major area of similarities between the factions of the LDP and the DC existed in the functions they fulfilled, in addition to similarities in their roles in electing the party leadership, the Prime Minister, and in providing patronage and services to their members. On one side, factions in the DC allowed for shifts within the DC to take place including "shifts from one political strategy to another, shifts between ruling élites, generational change within the party, and the servicing of diverse group interests" as they provided a host of diverse policy positions and leaders.[357] The factions of the LDP fulfilled this exact task, which the case studies have demonstrated, with different factions and leaders becoming preferable over others due to the political climate of the period. In both cases, a change in the ruling faction and the key leader at the top occurred in response to the needs of the party to adjust to the new needs of the time and the nature of the problems which plagued each country and party. The LDP and the DC maintained their grip on power for as long as

[357] Tarrow, "Maintaining Hegemony in Italy" in *Uncommon Democracies – The One-Party Dominant Regimes*, ed. T. J. Pempel, 326; Leonardi and Wertman, *Italian Christian Democracy – The Politics of Dominance*, 91, 92; Belloni, "Factionalism, the Party System, and Italian Politics" in *Faction Politics: Political Parties and Factionalism in the Comparative Context* eds. Frank P. Belloni and Dennis C. Beller, 100.

they did, and became hegemonic dominant parties, because they were able offer the necessary responses, alternatives, and new blood from within. In effect, not only did they have a certain intra-party diversity when it came to policy but they also undermined the opposition by showing the flexibility to coopt and undermine their positions. Thus, alternatives for LDP and DC rule was not found outside the party but from within, allowing for each party to become the dominant powers that they were by responding to political needs internally and not alienating the electorate.

On the other side, DC's factions also allowed for the myriad demands of the electorate to be transferred to the political world, both as the elected representative of a wide variety of actors and interests and as the major recipient of lobbying efforts from all of Italy.[358] This situation also developed within the LDP, whose factions not only became the mediators for those actors that sought to access the centers of political power but had members specialize in handling certain interests as *zoku*. As such, both parties became indispensable for the day the day functioning of politics in Japan and Italy, which reflected both sides of their characters as national and socially diverse parties. Under these conditions, the factions not only acted as relays for demands from the electorate but also allowed for the LDP and the DC to respond to interests and demands that were antagonistic to one another – such as big business and small-and-medium enterprises – by giving them different contacts within the party. In addition, this allowed for both parties to further undermine their opposition by coopting their positions through internal divisions and by making sure that alternatives were available within not without.

In sum, through the use of an elite theory approach, the factions of the LDP and the DC can be found as embodying a number of similarities between them,

[358] Belloni, "Factionalism, the Party System, and Italian Politics" in *Faction Politics: Political Parties and Factionalism in the Comparative Context* eds. Frank P. Belloni and Dennis C. Beller, 100, 101.

beyond what has been noted in the existing literature. On the one hand, the factions were engaged in the power struggles both within the LDP and the DC, with control over the party, prime ministry, and cabinet posts on the line. The factions in both parties served as providers of resources, services, solidarity, and identity to their members, which was done in exchange for their loyalty and votes in intra-party power struggles. On the other hand, factions in both parties diverged from one another through their policy dispositions and served further functions based on their differences. Changes in the ruling faction allowed for the party to adjust to the diverse and disparate demands of the electorate and respond to emerging problems by fielding a variety of policies and leaders to pursue them. Furthermore, as factions within both parties represented a variety of interests and had different policy preferences, they allowed for the LDP and DC to develop internal alternatives to themselves which coopted and undermined the opposition parties.

## 8.2 Divergences between the factions of the LDP and the DC

Despite their similarities, the factions of the LDP and the DC also had a number of differences between them, which emerged in how the factions diverged from one another and functioned within the political arena. The first major difference between the factions of the two parties was in terms of their policy divergence. While the factions of the LDP remained firmly within the camp of conservative politics, the factions of the DC placed themselves on a larger ideological spectrum.[359] Two factors had caused for this divergence to emerge. First, from its founding, the LDP occupied the political space that was right of center and did not specifically move to occupy the political center. In comparison, Alcide de Gasperi – the founding leader of the DC and

[359] Bettcher, "Factions of Interest in Japan and Italy", 350.

the *Centristi*, which reflected his emphasis on making DC a party of the center – created a party which represented both the political center and much of the right, with monarchist and fascist parties flanking it on the far right. Thus, although the two parties were situated on largely overlapping ideological spaces, there was a difference in how completely they controlled the far right and the center. Second, while the LDP was born out of conservative politics – which had existed in and dominated Japan before and after WWII – the DC was born out of Christian democracy and Catholic social movements. The Christian political and social movement in Europe – and by extension in Italy – was much more diverse than the conservative movement in Japan, bringing together a center-right political stance and center-left social stance. Thus, the factions of the DC could claim a diversity of ideologies, within the overall identification of Christian democracy.

This difference between the factions of the DC and the LDP in how they were located on an ideological spectrum, significantly impacted the way in which they performed as political actors. Factions of the DC leveraged their ideological differences against other factions and parties, acting as power brokers with the ability to form cross-party coalitions.[360] In contrast, the factions of the LDP only leveraged their positions against one another, in their bids for power and when they were forging their factional coalitions. This resulted in radically different political considerations for the two parties, as the DC was able to and did seek cooperation with other parties in the system to form governments and the distribution of the key political posts was decided between parties, with the factions serving as intermediaries to DC's partners. In contrast, the LDP formed governments on its own

[360] Bettcher, "Factions of Interest in Japan and Italy", 350, 352; Zariski, "Party Factions and Comparative Politics" in *Faction Politics: Political Parties and Factionalism in the Comparative Context* eds. Frank P. Belloni and Dennis C. Beller, 31; Tarrow, "Maintaining Hegemony in Italy" in *Uncommon Democracies – The One-Party Dominant Regimes*, ed. T. J. Pempel, 325-326.

and the distribution of key posts was decided between factions, with faction leaders and lieutenants serving as connections to their intra-party counterparts. As such, the factions of the DC not only undermined and coopted the opposition but they also worked to integrate the opposition – as much as possible – into the power structure of the DC itself. The factions of the LDP, however, did not reach out to the opposition in any significant way and kept to a self-contained political field within the party.

In addition, the factions of the DC could and did go against the party itself in matters of policy – making full use of their ability to connect to the opposition – whereas the factions of the LDP tended to fall in line once a decision was reached by the party.[361] As a result, factional dissent and conflict in the two parties took on different forms, by moving beyond or staying within the confines of the party. In the DC, factions were able and willing to work against the party, if their ideological leanings and political calculus pushed them to do it. Thus, conflicts within the party could be spread across the broader political system, and solved with the involvement of a number of political actors, as the factions reached out to their outsider connections and allies. In contrast, the factions of the LDP kept their conflicts within the party and did not turn internal conflicts into systemic conflicts, keeping other political actors weak and without the ability to become key actors. Moreover, it should be noted that at the point where the internal struggles of the LDP did become systemic in 1993, it was the factions which had bolted and formed their own parties that caused the LDP's internal struggles to take on such a broader shape. Thus, even at this important junction, the opposition itself played a marginal role as compared to the LDP and its offshoots.

[361] Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems – A Framework for Analysis*, 80.

A second major difference between the factions of the LDP and the DC was in how they impacted the inner workings of government. Sartori observed that while the factions of the DC weakened governments by blurring the line between the party in power and the opposition, the factions of the LDP made government more efficient by solidifying the difference with the opposition.[362] The key dynamic which caused this difference was the openness of the factions in each party towards opposition. As the factions of the DC brought the opposition closer to the political center that was dominated by the DC itself, they paved the way for these parties to undergo a process of familiarization. Over time, the opposition parties that the DC worked with became extensions of the party itself, which then weakened the party and the factions, who had inadvertently created their own alternatives and undermined their own positions. This situation did not hurt the LDP, which was able to undermine and coopt the policy positions of the opposition but kept them locked out from power, which drew a strict boundary between the two sides. As such, the LDP weakened only when its own internal and external troubles caused a decline in the public support which it received – or caused massive factional discord – not because the opposition emerged as a viable alternative to it.

What should be noted here is that as the factions of the DC weakened the government by opening up to the opposition, they also weakened themselves by also blurring the lines between themselves and the opposition which they undermined and coopted.[363] This situation developed as a result of opposite forces working at the same time, as the factions coopted and undermined the opposition while at the same time brought them closer to the centers of power occupied by the DC. When the opposition ended up as governing partners of the DC, they in turn established relations with the

[362] Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems – A Framework for Analysis*, 81.
[363] Bettcher, "Factions of Interest in Japan and Italy", 353.

central leadership of the party itself and bypassed the factions which brought them in. Moreover, the factions were weakened as their position as providers of leadership alternatives through policy differences was taken over by a DC which now made use of an opposition that had become a governing partner. Eventually, the weakening of the factions meant the weakening of the DC and its control of the centers of power, leading to the implosion of the party in 1994. The factions of the LDP and the party itself fared much better, since they locked the opposition out from power decidedly, they were able to better maintain the system which kept both the factions and the party strong. Although the party did lose its hold on power due to a breakdown of the factional circulation system, it was able to remain the largest party and eventually make a comeback on the same premises that had allowed it to rule for so long.

The third and final major difference between the factions of the two parties emerged in the issue of personnel affairs. On the one side was the question of faction switching and loyalty to the faction, where within the DC, some leading politicians had the ability to move between factions with great freedom.[364] Such an occurrence was impossible for influential members of the LDP, whose choices at switching factions was constrained by the seniority system that rewarded them for staying within their own faction. To switch factions would have been to forfeit one's seniority or to come into conflict with senior members already in the faction that they were joining, as the field of candidates for key posts would grow and competition increase. Furthermore, influential members of the LDP would most likely have been men who would be leading their own faction or lieutenants who were aspiring to take over from their current leaders, and their focus would be on securing their own future and their factions, rather than to move between factions. On the other side was the question of

[364] Bettcher, "Factions of Interest in Japan and Italy", 350.

solidarity within the faction and obedience to the leader, where within the DC, members of factions could and did revolt against their leaders.[365] Within the LDP, although members could voice dissatisfaction with their leaders and their choices, the common occurrence would have been for the faction leader to declare neutrality and to grant the members of his factions the freedom to choose for themselves. In this way, a leader kept his position as the head of the faction and did not alienate his own following, although he did hurt his standing with other factions who would have benefitted from if a particular leader was able to persuade his faction on casting their votes.

In sum, it can be seen that although the factions and factionalisms of the LDP and the DC closely resembled one another, they also had a number of differences between them, which highlights the different political contexts, systems, and considerations that these parties faced. Politically, DC's factions had a greater ideological diversity and whilst the LDP occupied the right of the political spectrum entirely, the DC left out the far right and included the center. Factions within the LDP kept strictly to themselves and within the party – locking out the opposition – whereas the factions of the DC were active in cooperating with the opposition and brought them closer to the power structure of the DC. In turn, the LDP and its factions were able to keep themselves stronger and could recover from their fall in 1993, whilst the DC kept getting weaker and eventually fell apart in 1994, never to return. Finally, in personnel affairs, the LDP was at the same time much stricter and more flexible, as faction switching was an almost non-existent affair and members' rebellions were thwarted by giving them the freedom to act. However, the DC was freer in both

[365] Bettcher, "Factions of Interest in Japan and Italy", 350.

respects, with some of its more influential members able to switch factions and the members being able to mount rebellions against their leaders.

## 8.3 Twins in factionalism half a world apart

As it can be seen from the preceding discussion, that by bringing the elite theory reappraisal of the LDP's factions into a comparative context with the DC's factions – which resembles it closely – two new insights can be gained. The first new insight that emerges is that the similarities between the LDP and the DC, and their factions, went beyond what was established by the existing comparative literature. The existing literature showed that, these parties resembled one another because they headed one-party dominant democratic systems, their factions engaged in both the distribution of resources, services, and patronage for loyalty, and in power conflict to capture control of the party and the prime ministry. However, through the application of the elite theory reappraisal of the LDP's factions into the mix, it can be seen that the bank of leadership and the policy diversity that the factions brought to the DC could be found within the LDP as well. In both cases, the factions not only shared similar developmental trajectories but also fulfilled the same duties and functions with regards to changes in policy, sustainment of the party, and generating responses to internal and external crises of the party and the nation.

However, it should also be noted that both the LDP and the DC had their fair share of differences, which had to do with how the factions diverged politically, how they functioned within the broader political system, and how they handled personnel affairs. These differences were products of the unique contextual circumstances in which the LDP, the DC, and their factions were formed and operated in. They drew the boundaries around the similarities of the two party and their factions, yet, the

similarities outweighed the differences. Until both parties fell from power in mid-1990s, the factions continued to serve similar purposes by providing leadership and policy alternatives, reorienting the party in time of crisis, supporting their members and collecting their votes, and keeping their respective parties afloat. Moreover, in both cases, it was only when the factional system itself encountered a crippling problem that the party fell from power.

The second new insight is that the form and functions of factions was not an exceptional occurrence for either Japan or Italy, but a unique characteristic of the broad socio-political environment, within which the LDP and the DC were formed and became dominant. In both cases, similar social, political, economic, and foreign forces combined to ensure a specific type of party would emerge on top, and follow similar patterns of growth, governance, and decline. Moreover, within both the LDP and the DC, there existed the same type of political logic, which brought about factional politics, entrusted them with key functions in matters of policy, elections, and party survival, transformed them into organizations of a national scale that were involved in both policy and power politics. These similarities could not be explained satisfactorily by making an appeal to the cultural or the functional-structural theories, whose main focus were to offer a subject-centric point of view, which then presented both the LDP and the DC similar yet fundamentally divergent and exceptional cases. Yet, as it can be seen from the discussion here, although these two parties and their factions had their unique differences, they were overwhelmingly similar.

# CHAPTER 9

# ELITE FACTIONS, PRIME MINISTERS, AND THE LDP

Throughout the course of this study, I have strived to shed light on to the fluctuations of power and influence between LDP's factions – during the period of the party's domination between 1955 and 1993 – and whether these fluctuations could be understood in terms of a series of elite circulation cycles. The argument driving my analysis has been that the power and influence fluctuations of the LDP's factions can be understood within the framework of circulation of elites in the political sphere, with ideological unity and continuity but shifts in policies and governing mindsets. In this direction, analysis itself has focused on the factions and the Prime Minister – as the most important representative of his faction – and reconstructed LDP's administrations between 1995 and 1993 as case studies, through the analytical framework of elite theories.

The analysis itself has differed from the existing literature in three key ways, which has produced the results that emerged from this study. First, the use elite theories in analyzing the factions of the LDP has been a novel attempt, providing an alternative to the cultural and functional-structural analyses which have produced much of the studies on the subject. The resulting analysis has been able to both demonstrate the gaps within these existing analytical frameworks and to respond to the blind spots that had emerged in the existing literature. Furthermore, through the application of elite theory, the discussion on the factions of the LDP has been moved from the constraints of analyses bound strictly by cultural norms, political structures, and political function. The resulting analysis has combined all of these factors and

augmented them with analytically relevant others, such as political actors and their faculty to act, and fluctuations in Japan's socio-political environment.

Second, the discussion here has served to constantly and consciously move the discussion of Japan's factions away from the focus of Nihonjinron exceptionalism. On the one hand, the use of elite theories and the authority types of Weber has served to move this study away from the use of explanations which can only work within the Japanese context, and has increased both the transferability and comparability of the knowledge which has emerged from this study. On the other hand, by comparing the LDP's factions to that of the DC has served to demonstrate that the case of the LDP and its factions – although unique due to their particular contexts – has not been a singularly exceptional experience confined to Japan and only explained by its own culture or political circumstances. This has also served to demonstrate the importance of choosing the right point of reference in comparisons, since most comparisons with Japan end up using the US – where political development has taken a much different path – and where the differences appear too great to be explained without Japan-specific explanations.

Third, the introduction of the circulation significance model has been an important step towards the expansion of elite theories on the point of circulation of elites, by assigning significance to circulation cycles through qualitative empirical analysis. Although circulation itself is can be satisfactorily identified by making use of the key elements within the literature, which were provided by Pareto and Mosca primarily, the significance of the circulation itself had hitherto been a given. Thus, the model introduced here not only calls the significance of circulation into question but it also aims to provide a repeatable and transferable model as the starting point for further studies acting from the same point of view.

There have been a number of important findings through the course of this study, expanding our understanding of the LDP and its factions. First, the existing cultural and structural-functional explanations are inadequate in explaining the nature of factionalism within the LDP. This is due to the reductivism of their approach to factions, their powers and functions, and the nature of politics in Japan; their selective appreciation of political structures which focuses on the factions and their engagement in power politics; and their disregard for political actors and their place within the political landscape of Japan. These problems could be – and in this study, were – remedied by the use of elite theories, whose analytical approach is much more holistic and takes into account multiple factors which not only includes those accounted for by the existing approaches but goes beyond them. Second, the factions of the LDP can be understood as politically significant organizations, with differentiation achieved through divergent policy views held by different factions. Each faction – due to forces acting upon it both from its membership and its leader – had different policy leanings, with differences in approach to economics, foreign policy, and political reform. Moreover, each faction brought their different policy leaning to the fore in their agendas, when they captured the leadership of the party and the prime ministry.

Third, the factions of the LDP can be understood as elite organizations, fulfilling the conditions set forth by Michels and Mosca, forming an intra-party and broad social oligarchy and bringing together like-minded politicians into competing groups under the circumscribed ideological structure of the LDP. Furthermore, the factions had their own forms of authority and power, that can be identified through the categories set out by Weber. As such, it can be seen that the factions can be understood on their own terms and through an analytical framework that is objectively

and universally applicable, not Japan-specific on the point of culture, political structure, or political function.

Fourth, the existing conceptualizations of the Japanese Prime Minister, where the post and its occupants are characterized as weak and politically inconsequential, with the LDP, the bureaucracy, and the factions as the major source of weakness do not reflect reality in a precise fashion. The fifth finding – which is an extension of the fourth – is that the Prime Minister is not an actor who is rendered helpless by other political actors and organizations, but an actor whose power is dependent on the ability of the person occupying the post. On the one hand, this means that the Prime Minister can be the subject of an analysis – as a representative – where the factions are concerned, because he is – usually – the leader of his faction and because he is an actor that occupies an important position in Japanese politics. On the other hand, this demonstrates that the Japanese Prime Minister has structural, systemic, and personal sources of power available to him, but the determining factor is not the existence of these sources of power but the ability of the person the use them. Thus, the ability to realize the potential of the post is important. Sixth, without making recourse to tautological and self-evident statements, it can be shown that the Japanese Prime Minister is an elite leader in his own right. This is derived from in part from the Prime Minister's own position – which doubled as the leader of the LDP – and his intra-party position – in most cases – as the leader of his own faction, whereby he held a number of leadership positions within Japan's political elite.

The seventh finding is that throughout its period in power as the dominant party in Japan, the LDP has experienced a series of internal elite circulation cycles, where factions and leaders competed for power and achieved dominance over others by offering the best alternative to respond to Japan's and LDP's problems at a given

time. Here, two further related sub-findings can be pointed out. One sub-finding is that the strength of the LDP correlated with the strength of the factions, leaders, and the significance of the circulation of elites. Thus, whilst the period from 1955 to 1972 saw strong leaders, strong factions, and strong and significant elite circulations, from 1972 to 1993 – when the LDP was weaker – leaders and factions had become weaker, and the circulation of elites largely moderated in strength and significance, except for Nakasone and Miyazawa. The other sub-finding is that when the circulation of elites was weak and the circulation of no significance, the Prime Minister tended to be weak, did not lead a faction, and had short tenures with limited impacts.

The eight finding has been that the circulation of elites within the LDP has allowed for the party to survive and keep its dominant position. The factions made sure that the party always had a number of different leaders with different political styles and agendas, as well as a variety of different policy stances and approaches, from which the party could choose. Within the context of an elite circulation cycle, this internal diversity and availability of alternatives allowed for the LDP to react to failures in leadership, policy disasters, political scandals, and the rising new demands of the electorate by simply elevating one faction and its leader to the top. The circulation of elites within the LDP functioned as intended until 1993, where the rise of Miyazawa left many of the party's problems – especially in gaining public trust, addressing corruption, and pursuing political reform – out in the open. Thus, the fall of the party from dominance came as its internal elite circulation structure also became unable to fulfill its function properly.

The ninth finding that has a specific and narrow focus compared to the others, provides an interesting contrast to much literature on the subject, is that Tanaka Kakuei does not emerge as a kingmaker when an elite theory analysis is applied.

While the analysis here did demonstrate that Tanaka's personal and factional strength was exceptional – which supports the existing view on him – this is largely confined to his own term as Prime Minister and for a brief period during the early years of Nakasone's tenure, which was ended by Takeshita and Tanaka's declining health. Outside of these periods, not only was Tanaka kept largely outside of the political mainstream by the impact of the Lockheed Scandal and investigation, his faction was not a dominant powerhouse either. It is only towards the end of his own career as a politician and faction leader that Tanaka and his faction achieved such power, but this did not have much of an impact because it was cut short. It was Takeshita – as Tanaka's successor – that enjoyed the powers of a kingmaker, as he commanded a numerically great faction and was a powerful politician himself.

The tenth finding has been that the factions of the LDP and the DC, as well as the parties themselves – were highly similar, across a number of fields that went beyond the recognized involvement in power politics and exchange of patronage for loyalty. Both parties originated as factional collections, and the factions developed along similar paths, fulfilled similar functions as they provided leadership and policy alternatives internally, rejuvenated the party and maintained its dominance, and responded to the demands of the electorate as they emerged. This meant that just as LDP's factions as actors in power politics found their counterparts in the DC, so did LDP's factions as elite actors that is intrinsically and intimately involved in politics find their counterparts in the DC. Related to this point, the eleventh and final finding has been that the faction as a politically relevant elite organization is not an exceptional aspect of either Japanese or Italian politics. Instead, this is the result of a particular similarity in contexts, where both the LDP, the DC, and their factions were founded, developed, and thrived in. Factions and factionalism in both parties followed

largely similar political logics which allowed them to take on function in policy formulation, elections and party survival and a pattern of development which saw them nationalize and combine an interest in power politics with policy affairs.

As a final thought, I would like to point out three areas of further study, which would expand on what has been done here and improve our understanding of the factionalism of the LDP. One area of further study concerns the relationship between the *zoku* and the factions. Although the *zoku* and faction connection has been theoretically discussed as part of this study, there is few solid data to be able to use it as part of the case studies. This remains as an important gap in our understanding of the policy involvement of the factions in a number of ways. To name a few, by analyzing and quantifying the *zoku* within the factions of the LDP, it would be possible to see which policy area each faction leaned towards; how such policy expertise reflected the outside connections of the factions and their electoral bases; and whether or not such expertise was used in a meaningful fashion when a faction emerged as the ruling faction. Furthermore, this would also be a step towards a concrete classification and quantification of the *zoku*, as well as the necessary qualifications for a politician to be considered one.

The second area of further study concerns the study of factional lineages. Although the existing literature allows for us to draw the necessary connections between leaders and factions that have succeeded one another, or have emerged as splinter groups, and stops there. An in-depth analysis of the factions that focuses on their electoral bases, the geographical distribution of their members and the rare instances of faction switching would be an important starting point in expanding our understanding of the factions. Understanding such distinctions would allow for a more nuanced understanding as to why factions have different policy leanings, why

different styles of leadership are more prevalent among the leaders of each faction, and what motivates a politician to make the rare decision to switch factions. Furthermore, a Weberian analysis of the factions, faction leaders, and the types of authority which they best fit could be undertaken to show further differentiations between the factions and their leaders. The study could then be taken to the comparative context again, from this expanded analytical framework. In addition to its value for an elite analysis of the LDP, understanding these factors would also allow for us to look for patterns in Japanese politics based on geography or political dynasties, and to accept or reject them.

The third area of further study concerns the conservative mainstream and non-mainstream division within the LDP, and how this is affected the circulation of elites within the party. Although it is possible to see which factions have become the ruling faction from the data in this study, with its leader as party president and Prime Minister, it is not possible to analyze the factional coalition which emerges around the ruling faction. Entry into this coalition, although not as prestigious as becoming the ruling faction, was still a source of power and influence within the Cabinet and the LDP. Being able to precisely identify the factional coalition which supports the ruling faction would allow for a more nuanced understanding of how power changed hands within the LDP, not for a single faction but for its allies as well. By making it possible to identify which factions – despite their positions inside and outside the conservative mainstream – had access to top party posts during different periods, the broader implications of circulation of elites within the LDP can be analyzed. This would also add another layer onto the analysis that has been done here, by demonstrating the broader ties and network of the ruling faction and the pressures these had on the agenda and intra-party power balances.

APPENDIX A

FACTIONAL LINEAGES OF THE LDP, 1955-1990




*The factional lineages in this table reflect the six main lineages found at the inception of the LDP. Successor factions and those that are found in this study have been named, others left as "factions".

"The ruling faction has been underlined, the Prime Minister's faction has been put in bold. Cases where the two overlap are in bold and underlined. In years of succession, two factions and two Prime Ministers are highlighted.

APPENDIX B

CIRCULATION SIGNIFICANCE MODEL



# APPENDIX C

## CASE STUDY TABLES

| Prime Minister / Ruling Leadership | | Hatoyama Ichirō* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Agenda | Systemic | Cooperation with US and free world; Peace diplomacy and postwar settlements; Return of Japanese POWs; Financial soundness and economic growth; Unemployment and labor relations; Welfare; Education; Agriculture; SMEs; Participation in Asian development | | | | Achievement of "ruling faction" status:<br>- Pre-LDP: December 1954<br>- LDP: November 1955<br>Crisis and delegitimation:<br>- Failure in Constitutional revision<br>- Old age and ill health<br>Challengers arise:<br>- Ogata's first challenge<br>- Ishii, Ishibashi, Kishi<br>Attempt to remain in power:<br>- Promise to resign after normalization of USSR relations<br>- Confirmation of successor<br>Change occurs:<br>- Ishibashi's succession in December 1956<br><br>*Blockage due to*<br>Kingmaker - No<br>Hereditary Politicians - No | Circulation Significance<br>- Change in Ruling Leadership - Yes<br>+ Factional Change - Yes<br>+ Kingmaker - No<br>+ Agenda Change - Yes<br>+ Weakness of Leader/Faction - Strong<br>- Agenda Fulfillment - Partial<br>- Changing Leadership Style - Yes<br>- Length of Tenure - Standard |
| | Crisis | Disaster Response | | | | | |
| | Flagship Items | Open, democratic politics; Japan's full independence and self-reliant reconstruction; Active independent foreing policy; Defense to the extent of national power, withdrawal of US troops; Revision of Occupation era laws and the Constitution; Normalization of relations with USSR; Administrative and tax reforms; Electoral reform | | | | | |
| Leadership Style | | Open, accessible, and democratic / Kamikaze Fighter | | | | | |
| Background | Factional Lineage | Background of Leader | Faction Zoku | Leader as Zoku | | | |
| | Hatoyama Faction | Politician | N/A | No | | | Significant Change and Strong Circulation of Elites |

* Includes two speeches from before the formation of the LDP in 1955, when Hatoyama first became Prime Minister as President of the Democratic Party.

Table C1

| Prime Minister / Ruling Leadership | Ishibashi Tanzan | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Agenda | Systemic | Commitment to democracy; UN-centered peace diplomacy; Cooperation with US and the free world; Postwar settlement and contributing to Asian development; Economic development and trade; Agriculture; SMEs; Welfare; Unemployment; Education; Transportation; Overseas property issue | | | Achievement of "ruling faction" status:<br>- December 1956 (with weak margin)<br>Crisis and delegitimation:<br>- Ill health<br>Challengers arise:<br>- Continiing challenge from Kishi<br>Attempt to remain in power:<br>- None, resigns<br>Change occurs:<br>Kishi's succession in February 1957<br><br>*Blockage due to*<br>Kingmaker - Partial/Ishii<br>Hereditary Politicians - No | Circulation Significance<br>- Change in Ruling Leadership - Partial<br>+ Factional Change - Yes (N/A)<br>+ Kingmaker - No<br>+ Agenda Change - Partial<br>+ Weakness of Leader/Faction - Weak<br>- Agenda Fulfillment - None<br>- Changing Leadership Style - N/A<br>- Length of Tenure - Shorter than standard |
| | Crisis | N/A | | | | |
| | Flagship Items | Material and mental power commesurate to Japan's position and responsibility; Self-reliance; Promoting economic diplomacy | | | | |
| Leadership Style | N/A | | | | | |
| Background | Factional Lineage | Background of Leader | Faction Zoku | Leader as Zoku | | |
| | N/A | Economist, Journalist, Public Intellectual | N/A | Economics | | No Significant Change and Weak Circulation of Elites |

Table C2

| Prime Minister / Ruling Leadership | Kishi Nobusuke | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Agenda | Systemic | Normalization of Diet relation, clean politics; Welfare and prosperity; UN-centered peace diplomacy, disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation; Asian war settlement and development cooperation; Cooperation with US and the free world; Labor-management relations; Stable economic growth; Agriculture; Science and technology; Unemployment; Transportation | | | Achievement of "ruling faction" status:<br>- February 1957<br>Crisis and delegitimation:<br>- Protests over the revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty<br>Challengers arise:<br>- Ikeda, Ishii, Fujiyama, Ōno<br>Attempt to remain in power:<br>- Agreement with Ōno, Kōno, and Satō<br>- Promise of resignation after passage of the revised US-Japan Security Treaty<br>Change occurs:<br>- Ikeda's succession in July 1960<br><br>*Blockage due to*<br>Kingmaker - No<br>Hereditary Politicians - No | Circulation Significance<br>- Change in Ruling Leadership - Yes<br>+ Factional Change - Yes<br>+ Kingmaker - No<br>+ Agenda Change - Yes<br>+ Weakness of Leader/Faction - Strong<br>- Agenda Fulfillment - Partial/Near Complete<br>- Changing Leadership Style - Yes<br>- Length of Tenure - Standard |
| | Crisis | Disaster Response | | | | |
| | Flagship Items | SME Basic Act; Appeal to the youth; Defense capabilities to improve with Japan's power and global position; Minimum Wage Law; National Pension Law; Teacher work performance evaluation law; Police Duties Execition Law; Revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty; Moral education; Basic law on agriculture and forestry | | | | |
| Leadership Style | Confrontational and high-handed / Political Insider-Kamikaze Fighter | | | | | |
| Background | Factional Lineage | Background of Leader | Faction Zoku | Leader as Zoku | | |
| | Kishi Faction Tōkakai | Bureaucrat, Politician | N/A | Economics | | Significant Change and Strong Circulation of Elites |

Table C3

| Prime Minister / Ruling Leadership | Hayato Ikeda | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Agenda | Systemic | UN-centered peaceful diplomacy; Education; Welfare; Primary sector promotion; Environmental cleanliness; Cooperation with the US and free world; SMEs; Expanding relations with Asia; Transportation; Controlling rising consumer prices (inflation); Economic and trade modernization, growth, and liberalization; Social capital and infrastructure; Housing | | | Achievement of "ruling faction" status:<br>- July 1960<br>Crisis and delegitimation:<br>- Ill health<br>- Length of tenure causes intra-party friction<br>- Fallout from economic policy<br>Challengers arise:<br>- Satō, Kōno, Fujiyama<br>Attempt to remain in power:<br>- None, resigns<br>Change occurs:<br>- Satō's succession in November/December 1964<br><br>*Blockage due to*<br>Kingmaker - No<br>Hereditary Politicians - No | Circulation Significance<br>- Change in Ruling Leadership - Yes<br>+ Factional Change - Yes<br>+ Kingmaker - No<br>+ Agenda Change - Yes<br>+ Weakness of Leader/Faction - Strong<br>- Agenda Fulfillment - Partial/Near Complete<br>- Changing Leadership Style - Yes<br>- Length of Tenure - Longer than standard |
| | Crisis | Disaster Response | | | | |
| | Flagship Items | Humble and sincere politics; Normalizing Diet relations; Alleviating social tension; National income-doubling plan; Agricultural Basic Law; Ratification of ILO Convention no. 87; Public Offices Election law revision; Voluntary improvement of SDF according to national power; SME Basic Act; Balanced national development | | | | |
| Leadership Style | Low-profile, conciliatory and non-ideological / Political Insider-Peace Lover | | | | | |
| Background | Factional Lineage | Background of Leader | Faction Zoku | Leader as Zoku | | |
| | Ikeda Faction Kōchikai | Bureaucrat | Economics | Economics | | Significant Change and Strong Circulation of Elites |

Table C4

| Ruling Leadership \ Prime Minister | Satō Eisaku | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Agenda | Systemic | Harmonious national affairs; UN-centric peaceful diplomacy; Cooperation with US and free world; Relations with Asia; Global North-South issue; Inflation; Agriculture; SMEs; Welfare; Education; Housing; Urban overpopulation and industrial overconcentration; Fiscal soundness and public debt; Rice purchase prices; Traffic and aviation safety; Industrial disaster prevention; Science and technology; Economic internationalization and liberalization; Rationalizing administration | | | Achievement of "ruling faction" status:<br>- November/December 1964<br>Crisis and delegitimation:<br>- Public and party weariness of length of tenure<br>- Nixon Shocks<br>- Failure of leadership<br>Challengers arise:<br>- Tanaka, Fukuda, Ōhira, Miki<br>Attempt to remain in power:<br>- None, resigns<br>Change occurs:<br>- Tanaka's succession in July 1972<br><br>*Blockage due to*<br>Kingmaker - No<br>Hereditary Politicians - No | Circulation Significance<br>- Change in Ruling Leadership - Yes<br>+ Factional Change - Yes<br>+ Kingmaker - No<br>+ Agenda Change - Yes<br>+ Weakness of Leader/Faction - Strong<br>- Agenda Fulfillment - Complete<br>- Changing Leadership Style - Yes<br>- Length of Tenure - Longer than standard |
| | Crisis | Disaster Response; Vietnam War; Mass Student Movements and Violence; US-People's Republic of China (China) normalization of relations; Return to Floating Yen; Narita Airport Protests | | | | |
| | Flagship Items | Shift to stable growth economics; Addressing fallout from rapid growth; ILO Convention No. 87; Return of Okinawa and Ogasawara islands, US bases; Arousing new patriotism; Japan-South Korea normalization treaty; Pollution, Basic Law for Environmental Pollution Control and its expansions; Voluntary development of self-defence capabilities in response to Japan's national strength and | | | | |
| Leadership Style | Wait-and-see / Political Insider | | | | | |
| Background | Factional Lineage | Background of Leader | Faction Zoku | Leader as Zoku | | |
| | Satō Faction Shūzankai | Bureaucrat | N/A | Transportation | | Significant Change and Strong Circulation of Elites |

Table C5

| Prime Minister / Ruling Leadership | Tanaka Kakuei | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Agenda | Systemic | Developing US-Japan relations for the Asia-Pacific; Pollution; Overcrowding and depopulation; Inflation; Housing; Public demand for mental satisfaction; Welfare; Agriculture; SMEs; Education; Economic expansion and liberalization; Disarmament; Global North-South issue; Relations with Asia; Relations with US and US bases; Labor shortage; Advancement of women | | | Achievement of "ruling faction" status:<br>- July 1972<br>Crisis and delegitimation:<br>- Corruption scandal (later Lockheed Scandal)<br>- Oil Shock of 1973<br>- Inflationary budgets and land prices<br>Challengers arise:<br>- Fukuda<br>Attempt to remain in power:<br>- None, resigns<br>Change occurs:<br>- Miki's succession in December 1974<br><br>*Blockage due to*<br>Kingmaker - No<br>Hereditary Politicians - No | Circulation Significance<br>- Change in Ruling Leadership - Partial<br>+ Factional Change - Partial<br>+ Kingmaker - No<br>+ Agenda Change - Yes<br>+ Weakness of Leader/Faction - Strong<br>- Agenda Fulfillment - Partial<br>- Changing Leadership Style - Yes<br>- Length of Tenure - Standard |
| | Crisis | Land use and price issues; First Oil Shock | | | | |
| | Flagship Items | Strong and dedicated leadership; Normalization of relations with China; Remodeling of the Japanese archipelago; Prosperity and development to be backed by commesurate - minimum necessary - national power; Establishing a National Land Development Agency; Land development bills | | | | |
| Leadership Style | Active and hands-on / Political Insider-Grandstander | | | | | |
| Background | Factional Lineage | Background of Leader | Faction Zoku | Leader as Zoku | | |
| | Satō Faction<br>Tanaka Faction<br>Mokuyōkurabu | Businessman, Politician | N/A | Construction | | Semi-Significant Change and Moderate Circulation of Elites |

Table C6

| Prime Minister / Ruling Leadership | Miki Takeo | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Agenda | Systemic | Inflation and recession; Fairness in society; Spiritual affluence; Qualitative economic development; US-Japan relations; Improvement of women's status; Agriculture; SMEs; Education; Labor-management relations; Introduction of peaceful nuclear energy to Japan; Moving into stable growth; Global North-South issue | | | Achievement of "ruling faction" status:<br>- December 1974<br>Crisis and delegitimation:<br>- Pursuit of political and economic reform<br>- Pursuit of the Lockheed Scandal<br>- Poor electoral results (minor)<br>Challengers arise:<br>- Fukuda, Ōhira<br>Attempt to remain in power:<br>- None, resigns<br>Change occurs:<br>- Fukuda's succession in December 1976<br><br>*Blockage due to*<br>Kingmaker - Shiina Etsusaburō<br>Hereditary Politicians - No | Circulation Significance<br>- Change in Ruling Leadership - Partial<br>+ Factional Change - Yes<br>+ Kingmaker - Yes<br>+ Agenda Change - Yes<br>+ Weakness of Leader/Faction - Weak<br>- Agenda Fulfillment - Partial<br>- Changing Leadership Style - Yes<br>- Length of Tenure - Standard |
| | Crisis | International economic, foodstuff, and energy crisis; National energy crisis; Disaster Response; MiG25 defection | | | | |
| | Flagship Items | Steering Nippon Maru in harsh waters, interdependent world vision; Electoral and political funding revisions; Clean and honest politics; Normalization treaty with China; Self-defense power, familiarizing the people with the JSDF, "comprehensive security"; Antimonopoly Law amendment; Japanese style welfare; Pursuing the Lockheed Scandal | | | | |
| Leadership Style | Idealism and pragmatism / Kamikaze Fighter | | | | | |
| Background | Factional Lineage | Background of Leader | Faction Zoku | Leader as Zoku | | |
| | Miki Faction Seisaku Kenkyūkai | Politician | N/A | No | | Semi-Significant Change and Moderate Circulation of Elites |

Table C7

| Prime Minister / Ruling Leadership | Fukuda Takeo | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Agenda | Systemic | Inflation and stagnation; Raising development aid globally; Centrality of US relations; Agriculture; Welfare, improved quality of life; SMEs; Local government rationalization; Pollution; Status of women; Education and human capital; Lockheed scandal; Energy problems; Administrative reform; Liberalization of economy and trade | | | Achievement of "ruling faction" status:<br>- December 1976<br>Crisis and delegitimation:<br>- Intra-party struggle due to succession agreement with Ōhira<br>Challengers arise:<br>- Ōhira, Nakasone<br>Attempt to remain in power:<br>- Party presidential elections<br>Change occurs:<br>- Ōhira's succession in December 1978<br><br>*Blockage due to*<br>Kingmaker - Ōhira<br>Hereditary Politicians - No | Circulation Significance<br>- Change in Ruling Leadership - Partial<br>+ Factional Change - Yes<br>+ Kingmaker - Yes (Weak)<br>+ Agenda Change - Partial<br>+ Weakness of Leader/Faction - Moderate<br>- Agenda Fulfillment - Partial<br>- Changing Leadership Style - Yes<br>- Length of Tenure - Shorter than standard |
| | Crisis | North Sea fisheries; JAL Hijacking | | | | |
| | Flagship Items | Stable growth; Nippon Maru rhetoric, interdependent world vision; Cooperation and solidarity society; Antimonopoly revision bill and business relations bill; Normalization treaty with China (concluded); Financial soundness; Fukuda Doctrine and active omnidirectional diplomacy | | | | |
| Leadership Style | Hard work and dedication / Political Insider | | | | | |
| Background | Factional Lineage | Background of Leader | Faction Zoku | Leader as Zoku | | |
| | Kishi Faction<br>Fukuda Faction<br>Seiwakai | Bureaucrat | N/A | Economics | | Semi-significant Change and Moderate Circulation of Elites |

Table C8

| Prime Minister / Ruling Leadership | Ōhira Masayoshi | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Agenda | Systemic | Lockheed scandal and political ethics; Agriculture; Fiscal consolidation and economic stimulus; Cooperation with US and the free world; Aid to Global South; Energy; Education; Inflation; SMEs; Industrial modernization | | | Achievement of "ruling faction" status:<br>- December 1978<br>Crisis and delegitimation:<br>- Consumption tax proposal<br>- Conflict with Fukuda<br>- Confrontational relation with factions<br>- Non-confidence motion passes<br>Challengers arise:<br>- Continuing challenge from Fukuda; Miki<br>Attempt to remain in power:<br>- Refuses resignation, calls general election<br>Change occurs:<br>- Suzuki's succession in July 1980, following Ōhira's death in June 1980<br><br>*Blockage due to*<br>Kingmaker - No<br>Hereditary Politicians - No | Circulation Significance<br>- Change in Ruling Leadership - Yes<br>+ Factional Change - Yes<br>+ Kingmaker - No<br>+ Agenda Change - Yes<br>+ Weakness of Leader/Faction - Moderate<br>- Agenda Fulfillment - None/Partial<br>- Changing Leadership Style - Partial<br>- Length of Tenure - Shorter than standard |
| | Crisis | Soviet invasion of Afghanistan | | | | |
| | Flagship Items | Culturally/spiritually oriented society; Japanese-style welfare based on the family; Garden city concept; Global interdependence and pluralism; Administrative and tax reform; Comprehensive security with high-quality modest self-defense | | | | |
| Leadership Style | Cautious and hands-on / Political Insider | | | | | |
| Background | Factional Lineage | Background of Leader | Faction Zoku | Leader as Zoku | | |
| | Ikeda Faction<br>Ōhira Faction<br>Kōchikai | Bureaucrat | Economics | Economics | | Semi-significant change and Moderate Circulation of Elites |

Table C9

| Prime Minister / Ruling Leadership | Suzuki Zenkō | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Agenda | Systemic | Political ethics; Energy; Expanding US and free world relations; Cooperation with ASEAN in Cambodia; Stable growth; Agriculture; SMEs; Employment; Domestic demand stimulus; Aid to Global South; Science and technology; Health of the youth; Reform of House of Councillors voting districts | | | Achievement of "ruling faction" status:<br>- July 1980<br>Crisis and delegitimation:<br>- Lack of leadership<br>- Re-emergence of the Tanaka-Fukuda War<br>Challengers arise:<br>- Nakasone, Kōmoto, Abe, Nakagawa<br>Attempt to remain in power:<br>- None, does not pursue reelection<br>Change occurs:<br>- Nakasone's succession in November 1982<br><br>*Blockage due to*<br>Kingmaker - No<br>Hereditary Politicians - No<br>*Continuation of the Tanaka-Fukuda War | Circulation Significance<br>- Change in Ruling Leadership - No<br>+ Factional Change - No<br>+ Kingmaker - No<br>+ Agenda Change - No<br>+ Weakness of Leader/Faction - Weak<br>- Agenda Fulfillment - None<br>- Changing Leadership Style - Yes<br>- Length of Tenure - Standard |
| | Crisis | Agricultural problems; safety of Japanese after beginning of Iraq-Iran War; Disaster Response | | | | |
| | Flagship Items | Fiscal consolidation and reform; Administrative reform; Welfare in aging Japan, Fulfilling society; Comprehensive security, modest and high-quality defenses | | | | |
| Leadership Style | Harmony and consensus / Peace Lover | | | | | |
| Background | Factional Lineage | Background of Leader | Faction Zoku | Leader as Zoku | | |
| | Ōhira Faction<br>Suzuki Faction<br>Kōchikai | Fisheries | Economics | Fisheries | | No Significant Change and Weak Circulation of Elites |

Table C10

| Prime Minister / Ruling Leadership | Nakasone Yasuhiro | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Agenda | Systemic | Relations with US and the free world; Peaceful diplomacy in an interdependent world; Japan's role in Asian prosperity and cooperation with developing countries globally; Sustainable, stable, and qualitative economic growth; Disarmement; Political ethics and public trust; Inflation; Employment; Economic liberalization and internationalization; Improve status of women; Correcting Diet seat imbalance; Cancer and AIDS; Land price issue | | | Achievement of "ruling faction" status:<br>November 1982<br>Crisis and delegitimation:<br>- End of extended term<br>- Negative public reaction to tax proposal<br>Challengers arise:<br>- Abe, Takeshita, Miyazawa<br>Attempt to remain in power:<br>- None, peaceful transition<br>Change occurs:<br>- Takeshita's succession in November 1987<br><br>*Blockage due to*<br>Kingmaker - Tanaka (until 1985)<br>Hereditary Politicians - No | Circulation Significance<br>- Change in Ruling Leadership - Yes<br>+ Factional Change - Yes<br>+ Kingmaker - Partial<br>+ Agenda Change - Yes<br>+ Weakness of Leader/Faction - Strong<br>- Agenda Fulfillment - Partial<br>- Changing Leadership Style - Yes<br>- Length of Tenure - Longer than standard |
| | Crisis | Korean Airlines 007 shot down; Disaster Response; crash of JAL 123 | | | | |
| | Flagship Items | Easy to understand politics, politics that speaks to the people; Japan, a country of strong culture and welfare; Administrative reform; Education reform; Tax reform; Fiscal consolidation; Develop high-quality defense capabilities to the extent necessary for self-defense, Comprehensive security; Weapons technology exchange with the US; Switch to domestic demand driven economy; Total settlement of postwar politics | | | | |
| Leadership Style | Top-down, presidential, and populist / Political Insider-Grandstander | | | | | |
| Background | Factional Lineage | Background of Leader | Faction Zoku | Leader as Zoku | | |
| | Kōno Faction<br>Nakasone Faction<br>Seisaku Kagaku Kenkyūjo | Bureaucrat, Politician | N/A | No | | Significant Change and Strong Circulation of Elites |

Table C11

| Prime Minister / Ruling Leadership | Takeshita Noboru | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Agenda | Systemic | Clean politics and efficient administration; US-Japan relations; SMEs; Agriculture; Promotion of global free trade; Switch to domestic demand driven economy; Welfare in an aging society; Education; Administrative reform; Land price issue; Greater US base burden sharing; Public health; Expansion of development aid; Responding to global warming and global crime | | | Achievement of "ruling faction" status:<br>- November 1987<br>Crisis and delegitimation:<br>- Consumption tax<br>- Trade liberalizaiton<br>- Recruit Scandal<br>Challengers arise:<br>- None, Recruit Scandal disqualifies challengers<br>Attempt to remain in power:<br>- None, resigns<br>Change occurs:<br>- Uno's succession in June 1989<br><br>*Blockage due to*<br>Kingmaker - No<br>Hereditary Politicians - No | Circulation Significance<br>- Change in Ruling Leadership - Yes<br>+ Factional Change -Yes<br>+ Kingmaker - No<br>+ Agenda Change - Partial<br>+ Weakness of Leader/Faction - Strong<br>- Agenda Fulfillment - Partial<br>- Changing Leadership Style - Yes<br>- Length of Tenure - Shorter than standard |
| | Crisis | Recruit Scandal | | | | |
| | Flagship Items | Hometown creation; Politics of bold ideas and execution; Japan that contributes to the world; Tax reform; Liberalizaiton of trade in beef and oranges; Development of necessary defense capabilities | | | | |
| Leadership Style | Wait-and-see and consensus building / Political Insider | | | | | |
| Background | Factional Lineage | Background of Leader | Faction Zoku | Leader as Zoku | | |
| | Tanaka Faction<br>Takeshita Faction<br>Keiseikai | Teacher, Politician | N/A | No | | Semi-significant Change and Moderate Circulation of Elites |

Table C12

| Prime Minister / Ruling Leadership | Uno Sōsuke | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Agenda | Systemic | Peace diplomacy; Continued development aid; Switching to sustainable domestic demand-led economic growth; Global environmental problems; Welfare; Agriculture; Education; International cultural exchange | | | Achievement of "ruling faction" status:<br>- nominally June 1989, questionable due to Uno not being faction leader and shortness of tenure<br>Crisis and delegitimation:<br>- Recruit Scandal<br>- Consumption tax<br>- Geisha Scandal<br>Challengers arise:<br>- None, Recuit Scandal disqualifies challengers<br>Attempt to remain in power:<br>- None, resigns<br>Change occurs:<br>- Kaifu's succesion in August 1989<br><br>*Blockage due to*<br>Kingmaker - Takeshita<br>Hereditary Politicians - No | Circulation Significance<br>- Change in Ruling Leadership - No<br>+ Factional Change - Yes<br>+ Kingmaker - Yes<br>+ Agenda Change - Yes<br>+ Weakness of Leader/Faction - Weak<br>- Agenda Fulfillment - None<br>- Changing Leadership Style - N/A<br>- Length of Tenure - Shorter than standard |
| | Crisis | Recruit Scandal; Geisha Scandal | | | | |
| | Flagship Items | Restoring political trust and ethics; Exclusive and modest defense capabilities; Basic Act for Land; Reform Advance Cabinet (slim government and affluent people) | | | | |
| Leadership Style | N/A | | | | | |
| Background | Factional Lineage | Background of Leader | Faction Zoku | Leader as Zoku | | |
| | Nakasone Faction Seisaku Kagaku Kenkyūjo | Soldier, Politician | N/A | No | | No Significant Change and Weak Circulation of Elites |

Table C13

| Prime Minister / Ruling Leadership | Kaifu Toshiki | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Agenda | Systemic | Agriculture; Peace diplomacy; International cultural exchange; Land price issue; Global warming and global narcotics crises; US relations; Expansion of development aid; Welfare; Education; International Cooperation Initiative; SMEs; Science and technology; Tax revision; Energy; Public debt | | | Achievement of "ruling faction" status:<br>- nominally August 1989, questionable due to Kaifu not being faction leader<br>Crisis and delegitimation:<br>- Lack and failure of leadership<br>- Intra-party frictions due to electoral reform proposal<br>Challengers arise:<br>- Miyazawa, Watanabe, Mitsuzuka<br>Attempt to remain in power:<br>- None, resigns<br>Change occurs:<br>- Miyazawa's succession in November 1991<br><br>*Blockage due to*<br>Kingmaker - Takeshita<br>Hereditary Politicians - No | Circulation Significance<br>- Change in Ruling Leadership - No<br>+ Factional Change - Yes<br>+ Kingmaker - Yes<br>+ Agenda Change - Yes<br>+ Weakness of Leader/Faction - Weak<br>- Agenda Fulfillment - None<br>- Changing Leadership Style - Yes<br>- Length of Tenure - Standard |
| | Crisis | Gulf War; Disaster Response; Securities Misconduct Scandal | | | | |
| | Flagship Items | Restoring confidence in politics; Political reform for policy-centered elections; Fair and enriched society; Politics of dialogue and reform; Electoral system and political funding reforms; Develop modest defense capabilities, exclusive defense; Basic Act for Land; Peacekeeping Operations Bill; Securities and Exchange Law revision | | | | |
| Leadership Style | Consensus-building / Peace Lover | | | | | |
| Background | Factional Lineage | Background of Leader | Faction Zoku | Leader as Zoku | | |
| | Miki Faction<br>Kōmoto Faction<br>Banchō Seisaku Kenkyūjo | Politician | N/A | No | | No Significant Change and Weak Circulation of Elites |

Table C14

| Prime Minister / Ruling Leadership | Miyazawa Kiichi | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Agenda | Systemic | Fair society; Relations with the US; Stopping weapons and WMD proliferation; Global climate change and global crime; Enhancing social capital; Political ethics; Promoting free multilateral trade; Sustainable growth; Ensuring human safety; Expanding development aid; AIDS; Overcrowding; Transportation; Agriculture; SMEs; Energy; Education; Environmental protection | | | Achievement of "ruling faction" status:<br>- November 1991<br>Crisis and delegitimation:<br>- Intra-party frictions due to electoral reform proposal<br>- Weakness in factional politics<br>- Bursting of the bubble economy<br>- Non-confidence motion passes<br>Challengers arise:<br>- Kōno, Watanabe<br>- Defection of younger LDP Dietmembers<br>Attempt to remain in power:<br>- Calls for general election<br>Change occurs:<br>- End of LDP hegemony, Hosokawa coalition succeeds in August 1993, following elections in July 1993<br>- LDP leadership passes to Kōno in July 1993 | Circulation Significance<br>- Change in Ruling Leadership - Yes<br>+ Factional Change - Yes<br>+ Kingmaker - No<br>+ Agenda Change - Partial<br>+ Weakness of Leader/Faction - Moderate<br>- Agenda Fulfillment - Partial<br>- Changing Leadership Style - Yes<br>- Length of Tenure - Shorter than standrd |
| | Crisis | Disaster Response; Collapse of the Bubble Economy | | | | |
| | Flagship Items | Peacekeeping Operations Bill; Disaster Relief Team Dispatch Law amendment to allow JSDF participation; Exclusive defense with modest capabilities; Political reforms on funding and election system; Japan as a lifestyle power; Fiscal recovery and economic stimulus | | | | |
| Leadership Style | Careful and principled / Political Insider | | | | | |
| Background | Factional Lineage | Background of Leader | Faction Zoku | Leader as Zoku | *Blockage due to*<br>Kingmaker - No<br>Hereditary Politicians - No | Significant Change and Strong Circulation of Elites |
| | Suzuki Faction<br>Miyazawa Faction<br>Kōchikai | Bureaucrat | Economics | Economics | | |

Table C15

# APPENDIX D

## LIST OF PRIME MINISTERS OF JAPAN, 1945-1993

| Prime Ministers of Japan (1945-1993) | | |
|---|---|---|
| Name of Prime Minister | Time in Power as Prime Minister | |
| | Factional Membership | Pre-politics Career, Time When Elected, and Party When Elected |
| *Japan declares surrender on August 15, 1945,officially signed on September 2, 1945* | | |
| Higashikuni Naruhiko | 17 August 1945 - 9 October 1945 | |
| | N/A | Prince, General (No Political Party, Unelected) |
| Shidehara Kijurō | 9 October 1945 - 22 May 1946 | |
| | N/A | Baron, Foreign Ministry Diplomat, un-elected - served in the House of Peers (later headed the Japan Progressive Party) |
| Yoshida Shigeru | 22 May 1946 - 24 May 1947 | |
| | Yoshida Faction | Foreign Ministry Diplomat, served in the House of Peers (1945-1947), first elected in 1947 (House of Representatives - Liberal Party) |
| Katayama Tetsu | 24 May 1947 - 10 March 1948 | |
| | N/A | Attorney, first elected in 1930 (Social Democratic Party; leader of the Japan Socialist Party when Prime Minister) |
| Ashida Hitoshi | 10 March 1948 - 15 October 1948 | |
| | N/A | Foreign Ministry Diplomat, first elected in 1932 (Rikken Seiyūkai; leader of the Democratic Party when Prime Minister) |
| Yoshida Shigeru | 15 October 1948 - 10 December 1954 | |
| | Yoshida Faction | Foreign Ministry Diplomat, served in the House of Peers (1945-1947), first elected in 1947 (House of Representatives - Liberal Party) |
| *Period of LDP dominance begins during Hatoyama's term* | | |
| Hatoyama Ichirō | 10 December 1954 - 15 November 1955 (Democratic Party) | |
| | Hatoyama Faction | Politician, first elected in 1915 (Rikken Seiyūkai; later headed both the Democratic and Liberal Democratic parties as Prime Minister) |
| Ishibashi Tanzan | 23 December 1956 - 25 February 1957 | |
| | N/A | Economist, Journalist, first elected in 1947 (Liberal Party) |
| Kishi Nobusuke | 25 February 1957 - 19 July 1960 | |
| | Kishi Faction - Tōkakai | Ministry of Commerce and Industry Bureaucrat and Politician, first elected in 1953 (Liberal Party) |
| Ikeda Hayato | 19 July 1960 - 9 November 1964 | |
| | Ikeda Faction - Kōchikai | Ministry of Finance Bureaucrat, first elected in 1949 (Liberal Party) |
| Satō Eisaku | 9 November 1964 - 7 July 1972 | |
| | Satō Faction - Shūzankai | Ministry of Transportation Bureaucrat, first elected in 1949 (Liberal Party) |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Tanaka Kakuei | 7 July 1972 - 9 December 1974 | |
| | Satō Faction/Tanaka Faction - Mokuyōkurabu | Businessman, first elected in 1947 (Democratic Party) |
| Miki Takeo | 9 December 1974 - 24 December 1976 | |
| | Miki Faction - Seisaku Kenkyūkai | Politician, first elected in 1937 (independent) |
| Fukuda Takeo | 24 December 1976 - 7 December 1978 | |
| | Kishi Faction/Fukuda Faction - Seiwakai | Ministry of Finance Bureaucrat, first elected in 1952 (independent) |
| Ōhira Masayoshi | 7 December 1978 - 12 June 1980 | |
| | Ikeda Faction/Ōhira Faction - Kōchikai | Ministry of Finance Bureaucrat, first elected in 1952 (Liberal Party) |
| Suzuki Zenkō | 17 July 1980 - 27 November 1982 | |
| | Ōhira Faction/Suzuki Faction - Kōchikai | Fisheries Administration Bureaucrat, first elected in 1947 (Japan Socialist Party) |
| Nakasone Yasuhiro | 27 November 1982 - 6 November 1987 | |
| | Kōno Faction/Nakasone Faction - Seisaku Kagaku Kenkyūjo | Home Ministry Bureaucrat and Politician, first elected in 1947 (Democratic Party) |
| Takeshita Noboru | 6 November 1987 - 3 June 1989 | |
| | Tanaka Faction/Takeshita Faction - Keiseikai | Teacher and Politician, first elected in 1951 (local politics) - 1958 ( National Diet; Liberal Democratic Party) |
| Uno Sōsuke | 3 June 1989 - 10 August 1989 | |
| | Nakasone Faction - Seisaku Kagaku Kenkyūjo | Pre-War Soldier and Politician, first elected in 1960 (Liberal Democratic Party) |
| Kaifu Toshiki | 10 August 1989 - 5 November 1991 | |
| | Miki Faction/Kōmoto Faction - Banchō Seisaku Kenkyūjo | Politician, first elected in 1960 (Liberal Democratic Party) |
| Miyazawa Kiichi | 5 November 1991 - 9 August 1993 | |
| | Suzuki Faction/Miyazawa Faction - Kōchikai | Ministry of Finance Bureaucrat, first elected in 1953 (House of Councillors) - 1967 (House of Representatives; Liberal Democratic Party) |
| *LDP falls from power, End of Thirty-eight years of dominance* | | |

# APPENDIX E

## TABLES ON THE STRENGTHS OF LDP'S FACTIONS

Table E1

| Electoral Strength of the LDP and the Factions (based on the General Election results for the House of Representatives [HoR]) | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 15 November 1955 (pre-election) | LDP holds 298/299 seats (out of 467) | | | | | | | Total (α) | Prime Minister at the Time of Election |
| 22 May 1958 | LDP holds 289 seats (out of 467) | Satō Faction - Shūzankai | **Kishi Faction - Tōkakai** | Ikeda Faction - Kōchikai | Miki Faction - Seisaku Kenkyūkai | Kōno Faction - Shunjūkai | Smaller Faction(s) and Unaffiliateds | 297 | Kishi Nobusuke |
| | | 41 | 54 | 41 | 35 | 38 | 88 | | |
| 20 November 1960 | LDP holds 300 seats (out of 467) | Satō Faction - Shūzankai | Kishi Faction - Tōkakai | **Ikeda Faction - Kōchikai** | Miki Faction - Seisaku Kenkyūkai | Kōno Faction - Shunjūkai | Smaller Faction(s) and Unaffiliateds | 301 | Ikeda Hayato |
| | | 51 | 41 | 52 | 28 | 33 | 96 | | |
| 21 November 1963 | LDP holds 283 seats (out of 486) | Satō Faction - Shūzankai | Kishi Faction - Tōkakai | **Ikeda Faction - Kōchikai** | Miki Faction - Seisaku Kenkyūkai | Kōno Faction - Shunjūkai | Smaller Faction(s) and Unaffiliateds | 296 | Ikeda Hayato |
| | | 48 | 19 | 46 | 37 | 45 | 101 | | |
| 29 January 1967* | LDP holds 277 seats (out of 486) | **Satō Faction - Shūzankai** | Fukuda Faction - Seiwakai | Maeo Faction - Kōchikai | Miki Faction - Seisaku Kenkyūkai | Nakasone Faction - Seisaku Kagaku Kenkyūjo | Smaller Faction(s) and Unaffiliateds | 286 (March 1967) / 274 (1968) | Eisaku Satō |
| | | 57 (March 1967) / 50 (1968) | 23 (March 1967) / 27 (1968) | 42 (March 1967) / 43 (1968) | 36 (March 1967) / 36 (1968) | 24 (March 1967) / 24 (1968) | 104 (March 1967) / 94 (1968) | | |
| 27 December 1969 | LDP holds 288 seats (out of 486) | **Satō Faction - Shūzankai** | Fukuda Faction - Seiwakai | Maeo Faction - Kōchikai | Miki Faction - Seisaku Kenkyūkai | Nakasone Faction - Seisaku Kagaku Kenkyūjo | Smaller Faction(s) and Unaffiliateds | 300 | Eisaku Satō |
| | | 58 | 40 | 44 | 41 | 34 | 83 | | |
| 10 December 1972* | LDP holds 271 seats (out of 491) | **Tanaka Faction - Mokuyōkurabu** | Fukuda Faction - Seiwakai | Ōhira Faction - Kōchikai | Miki Faction - Seisaku Kenkyūkai | Nakasone Faction - Seisaku Kagaku Kenkyūjo | Smaller Faction(s) and Unaffiliateds | 279 | Tanaka Kakuei |
| | | 47 | 56 | 42 | 37/38 | 36/38 | 61/58 | | |
| 5 December 1976 | LDP holds 249 seats (out of 511) | Tanaka Faction - Mokuyōkurabu | Fukuda Faction - Seiwakai | Ōhira Faction - Kōchikai | **Miki/Kōmoto Faction - Seisaku Kenkyūkai** | Nakasone Faction - Seisaku Kagaku Kenkyūjo | Smaller Faction(s) and Unaffiliateds | 265 | Miki Takeo |
| | | 46 | 55 | 40 | 33 | 41 | 50 | | |

Table E1 (Continued)

| | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 October 1979 | LDP holds 248 seats (out of 511) | Tanaka Faction - Mokuyōkurabu | Fukuda Faction - Seiwakai | **Ōhira Faction - Kōchikai** | Kōmoto Faction - Banchō Seisaku Kenkyūjo | Nakasone Faction - Seisaku Kagaku Kenkyūjo | Smaller Faction(s) and Unaffiliateds | 261 | Ōhira Masayoshi |
| | | 58 | 50 | 48 | 28 | 41 | 36 | | |
| 22 June 1980 | LDP holds 284 seats (out of 511) | Tanaka Faction - Mokuyōkurabu | Fukuda Faction - Seiwakai | **Suzuki Faction - Kōchikai** | Kōmoto Faction - Banchō Seisaku Kenkyūjo | Nakasone Faction - Seisaku Kagaku Kenkyūjo | Smaller Faction(s) and Unaffiliateds | 292 | Ōhira Masayoshi (dies during campaign) |
| | | 62 | 49 | 57 | 31 | 45 | 48 | | |
| 18 December 1983 | LDP holds 250 seats (out of 511) | Tanaka Faction - Mokuyōkurabu | Fukuda Faction - Seiwakai | Suzuki Faction - Kōchikai | Kōmoto Faction - Banchō Seisaku Kenkyūjo | **Nakasone Faction - Seisaku Kagaku Kenkyūjo** | Smaller Faction(s) and Unaffiliateds | 259 | Nakasone Yasuhiro |
| | | 63 | 44 | 50 | 28 | 47 | 27 | | |
| 6 July 1986* | LDP holds 300 seats (out of 512) | Takeshita Faction - Keiseikai | Abe Faction - Seiwakai | Suzuki Faction - Kōchikai | Kōmoto Faction - Banchō Seisaku Kenkyūjo | **Nakasone Faction - Seisaku Kagaku Kenkyūjo** | Smaller Faction(s) and Unaffiliateds | 302 | Nakasone Yasuhiro |
| | | 72 | 59 | 61 | 25 | 62 | 23 | | |
| 18 February 1990 | LDP holds 275 seats (out of 512) | Takeshita Faction - Keiseikai | Abe Faction - Seiwakai | Miyazawa Faction - Kōchikai | **Kōmoto Faction - Banchō Seisaku Kenkyūjo** | Watanabe Faction - Seisaku Kagaku Kenkyūjo | Smaller Faction(s) and Unaffiliateds | 285 | Kaifu Toshiki |
| | | 73 | 62 | 60 | 27 | 50 | 13 | | |
| 18 July 1993 | LDP holds 223 seats (out of 511)<br>LDP falls from power, falling short of a majority | | | | | | | | |

Thayer, "The Election of a Japanese Prime Minister", 480; Tomita et. ai., "Prerequisites to Ministerial Careers in Japan, 1885-1980", 254; Nakamura, "Party Politics in Japan", 31; Thayer, *How the Conservatives Rule Japan*, 17; Fukui, "Japan: Factionalism in a Dominant-Party System" in *Faction Politics: Political Parties and Factionalism in the Comparative Context* eds. Frank P. Belloni and Dennis C. Beller, 31; Reed, *Japan Election Data*.

(α) The electoral result numbers and the sum of factional powers may not add up exactly, due to the entry of independents into the LDP and the factions after the elections, by-election results, resignations, and deaths which are counted here, in addition to the seats the LDP has won at the time of the election.

* The numbers for these periods are drawn from the existing literature and reflect mid-term powers of the factions.

Faction names bold and underlined denote the "ruling faction" during an election, which the Prime Minister leads or is a member of.

Table E2

| Changes in the House of Representatives Contingents of LDP's Factions | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Factional Lineage / Election Date | Satō - Tanaka - Takeshita Lineage | Kishi - Fukuda - Abe Lineage | Ikeda - Maeo - Ōhira - Suzuki - Miyazawa Lineage | Miki - Kōmoto Lineage | Kōno - Nakasone Lineage | Smaller Faction(s) and Unaffiliateds |
| 22 May 1958 | 41 | 54 | 41 | 35 | 38 | 88 |
| 20 November 1960 | 51 | 41 | 52 | 28 | 33 | 96 |
| 21 November 1963 | 48 | 19 | 46 | 37 | 45 | 101 |
| March 1967 | 57 | 23 | 42 | 36 | 24 | 104 |
| 1968 | 50 | 27 | 43 | 36 | 24 | 94 |
| 27 December 1969 | 58 | 40 | 44 | 41 | 34 | 83 |
| 10 December 1972 | 47 | 56 | 42 | 37 | 36 | 61 |
| 5 December 1976 | 46 | 55 | 40 | 33 | 41 | 50 |
| 7 October 1979 | 58 | 50 | 48 | 28 | 41 | 36 |
| 22 June 1980 | 62 | 49 | 57 | 31 | 45 | 48 |
| 18 December 1983 | 63 | 44 | 50 | 28 | 47 | 27 |
| 6 July 1986 | 72 | 59 | 61 | 25 | 62 | 23 |
| 18 February 1990 | 73 | 62 | 60 | 27 | 50 | 13 |

APPENDIX F

CHARTS ON THE STRENGTHS OF LDP'S FACTIONS




Figure F1




Figure F2




Figure F3




Figure F4




Figure F5




Figure F6




Figure F7




Figure F8




Figure F9




Figure F10




Figure F11




Figure F12


Strength of Factions as a Percentage of LDP's Diet Membership, 18 February 1990
13, 5%
50, 17%
73, 26%
27, 9%
62, 22%
60, 21%
Takeshita Faction - Keiseikai
Abe Faction - Seiwakai
Miyazawa Faction - Kōchikai
Kōmoto Faction - Banchō Seisaku Kenkyūjo
Watanabe Faction - Seisaku Kagaku Kenkyūjo
Smaller Faction(s) and Unaffiliateds

Figure F13


Power and Membership of Factions in the HoR, from 1958 to 1993
Membership
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
22 May 1958
20 November 1960
21 November 1963
March 1967
1968
27 December 1969
10 December 1972
5 December 1976
7 October 1979
22 June 1980
18 December 1983
6 July 1986
18 February 1990
Elections/Data Collection Times
Satō - Tanaka - Takeshita Lineage
Miki - Kōmoto Lineage
Kishi - Fukuda - Abe Lineage
Kōno - Nakasone Lineage
Ikeda - Maeo - Ōhira - Suzuki - Miyazawa Lineage
Smaller Faction(s) and Unaffiliateds

Figure F14

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