THE CONCEPTS OF “DING” AND “ICH” IN IMMANUEL KANT

BY

NUR KARALİ

SUPERVISOR

ASSOCIATE PROF. DR. LALE LEVIN BASUT

INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT

MASTER THESIS

YEDİTEPE UNIVERSITY,

JULY 2022

PLAGIARISM

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Date: June 6, 2022

Name/Surname: Nur Karali

Abstract

This thesis investigates the following questions by considering the Kantian transcendental object, which grounds inner intuition and outer appearances, as the *unknown* but true correlate of those representations belonging to the inner and outer senses. Is the cognition of a transcendental object possible? Is a cognition of my own Self possible? Can a transcendental object be assumed as the matter or a thinking being?

Just like the soul as a transcendental subject, i.e., the *I*, is the transcendental object of the inner sense, the *thing in itself* to which I relate outer appearances as their true correlate is taken as a transcendental object. When our representations, which are related to inner and outer senses, are separated from their object, whatever is remaining is equally *unknown* to us regarding both senses.

Firstly, the synthesis has been detailed. Later, judgments of understanding were analyzed by whether the relation thought in them requires a synthetic function. Then, the successive apprehension of space and its role in ensuring the thinking subject remains identical with itself were treated. In the conclusion part, the difficulties in the question of how outer intuition is possible in a thinking subject when the matter is taken independently of sensibility were discussed.

This thesis treats the possibility of cognition with reference to the *Critique of Pure Reason* and within a certain frame and thus grounds on the *Doctrine of Transcendental Idealism* that acknowledges space and time as neither determinations given for themselves nor the conditions of things in themselves.

Key words: Apperception, inner sense, manifold parts of space, noumenon, outer sense, schema, some third thing, space, successiveness, substance, synthetic a priori, synthetic function, time, the power of judgment, thing in itself, thinking subject, transcendental object

Özet

Bu tez, aşağıdaki soruları, iç görüyü ve dış görünüşleri temellendiren Kantçı transzendental nesneyi, iç ve dış duyulara ait tasarımların *bilinmeyen* ama gerçek bağlılaşığı olarak ele alarak araştırmaktadır. Transzendental bir nesnenin bilgisi olanaklı mıdır? Kendi Benliğimin bir bilgisi olanaklı mıdır? Transzendental bir nesne içerik veya düşünen bir varlık olarak kabul edilebilir mi?

Tıpkı transzendental bir özne olarak ruhun, yani *BEN*'in iç duyunun transzendental nesnesi olması gibi, dış görünüşleri onların gerçek bağlılaşığı olarak ilişkilendirdiğim *kendinde şey* de transzendental bir nesne olarak alınır. İç ve dış duyularla ilişkili tasarımlarımız nesnelerinden ayrıldığında, geriye kalan her iki duyu açısından da bizim için eşit derecede *bilinmezdir*.

İlk olarak sentez konusu detaylandırılmıştır. Daha sonra anlama yetisi yargıları, onlarda düşünülen ilişkinin sentetik bir işlev gerektirip gerektirmiyor olduğu bakımından analiz edilmiştir. Ardından uzayın ardışık ayrımsanışı ve bunun düşünen öznenin kendisiyle özdeş kalmasını sağlamadaki rolü ele alınmıştır. Sonuç bölümünde, içerik duyumsama yetisinden bağımsız olarak ele alındığında düşünen bir öznede dış görünün nasıl olanaklı olduğu sorusundaki zorluklar tartışılmıştır.

Bu tez, bilginin olanağını *Saf Aklın Eleştirisi*'nden hareketle ve belirli bir çerçeve içinde ele almakta ve böylece uzay ve zamanı ne kendileri için verili belirlenimler ne de kendinde şeylerin koşulları olarak kabul eden *Transzendental İdealizm Doktrinine* dayanmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Apperzeption, ardışıklık, dış duyu, düşünen özne, iç duyu, kendinde şey, numen, sentetik a priori, sentetik fonksiyon, şema, transzendental nesne, uzay, uzayın çokkatlı parçaları, töz, üçüncü bir şey, yargı gücü, zaman

Foreword

This thesis deals with the problems of Kant's philosophy on the axis of the concepts of *I* (*Ich*) and *thing in itself* (*Ding*) within a certain frame. I have narrowed down my work to Kant's work of *Critique of Pure Reason* (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*) in order to determine the limits of this frame.

I would like to express my profound gratitude to my husband Oğuz Karali, my dear daughter Nil Karali and my mother Hayriye Çetinmakas. This thesis would not have been possible without their valuable support throughout my work.

I would also like to thank my all tutors, to whom I have attended their classes during my postgraduate education and especially my supervisor Associate Prof. Dr. Lale Levin Basut, who introduced me to Kant and made me interested in Kant's philosophy.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION

When I was first acquainted with Kant's philosophy, what drew my attention most was that the critique took the object in a twofold meaning, either as objects of sensible intuition or transcendental object.

The former is the matter constituting all content of the cognition and given only a posteriori. By being so, it is always connected with a perception according to empirical laws. The latter is a thing in itself that the pure understanding thinks of as an intelligible object through its pure categories without any schema of sensibility. On the other hand, a transcendental object is taken as either a noumenon in the positive sense or a noumenon in the negative sense in *Doctrines* of *Transcendental Realism* and *Transcendental Idealism*.

Despite our categories having validity for only objects of sensible intuition, if we nevertheless assume objects that are given merely to pure thinking in a non-sensible intuition, then it means that we take noumena in a positive sense. This perspective belongs to the *Doctrine of Transcendental Realism*. In this doctrine, thoughts are made into things containing an existence in space and time; accordingly, since the matter inevitably becomes an entirely different and heterogeneous species of substance from the object of inner sense, it seems to cut itself loose utterly from the soul. In such a case, the matter assumed as an object existing outside us and independently of all our sensibility causes insurmountable difficulties in the question of how outer intuition is possible in a thinking subject. Nevertheless, since the valid field of the objects of our senses is bounded with merely our manner of intuition, it cannot be claimed with good ground that no other kind of intuition can be and thereby that no things as objects of this kind of intuition can be. For this reason, even if Kant

leaves room for some other sort of intuition and thereby things as its objects; nonetheless, he considers this realm as illusionary with regard to the objective validity of sensible cognition and treats it in the paralogisms of reason to exhibit how groundless the assertions are concerning that we can be acquainted with the transcendental cause of our outer sense representations.

The latter is taken as a noumenon in a negative sense; correspondingly, it is never a concept of an assumed object but instead a boundary concept which saves the sensibility against falling into traps of the understanding that tries to expand the field of its own intelligible objects beyond the conditions of our sensibility. By being so, it is the entirely undetermined thought of something which should never be separated from sensible data. This something is not the representation of something persisting in the existence and corresponding to the concept of substance; rather, this something is the persistent element that the understanding needs in order to be able to relate the representation of appearances to the object of sensible intuition. Accordingly, in the *Doctrine of Transcendental Idealism,* this transcendental object is no object of cognition in itself; rather, it is the *unknown* persistent element to which I must consider myself in relation to it despite outside me and to which I must ascribe the whole extent of my possible perceptions as their true correlate. For this reason, it cannot be taken as anything but something serving as a correlate of the unity of apperception for unifying the manifold of sensible intuition into the concept of an object.

Metaphysics, insofar as it concerns the possibility of a priori cognition and thus tries to ground a priori laws of the sum total of objects of experience, belongs to the transcendental philosophy. If metaphysics is a field in which reason attempts to go beyond the boundaries of the sensible principles of our faculty of cognizing a priori,

the propaedeutic to the system of pure reason denies all uncertain and contradictory advances in this field. Therefore, the *Critique of Pure Reason* limits our cognition to things taken as objects of sensible intuition, i.e., appearances; thus, everything concerning the transcendental object, which is never taken as matter nor a thinking being but just as an *unknown* ground of those appearances, is out of our possible field of cognition.

The question initiating this thesis is whether a cognition of the *I* (*ICH*) and the thing in itself (*DING*) is possible. This thesis, framed by the *Critique of Pure Reason*, attempts to answer that question by justifying why the transcendental object is outside our possible cognition. This question is thoroughly discussed in the final chapter of the thesis. I left this discussion particularly to the final chapter because of the fact that the principal subjects must have been initially clarified, which I will need while defending that a cognition concerning the *I* and the thing in itself is not possible.

Given that the experience is a synthetic edifice, the synthesis and its connected aspects are the first subjects on which I deliberate. The chapter *On the Synthesis* is generally about the apperception despite the fact that the synthetic unity of apperception has exclusively been examined under a distinct heading belonging to this chapter.

In order to firmly ground why the cognition of the *I* and the thing in itself is impossible, we first need to know how a possible cognition is established and what its necessary conditions are. The unity that an object makes necessary is a concept of the object into which the a posteriori given intuitions ought to be unified in accordance with the synthetic unity of apperception. However, since the transcendental object cannot hold the condition concerning the synthetic unity of apperception, it is

impossible to subsume it under categories and thus cognize it. Accordingly, what I investigated in the chapter *On the Synthesis* deals with how a possible cognition is established and its necessary conditions. The following paragraph concisely summarizes what I examined in this chapter.

The apperception expressing numerically single consciousness is the simple representation of *I*; thus, its unity implies the identity of apperception in all representations. This numerically one consciousness identically accompanies all representations by way of thinking of them; therefore, I get conscious of all thoughts and the representations arising from these thoughts as belonging to identical me as objects of my own thinking. I.e., this accompaniment makes all thinking belong to one identical consciousness. That the *I* accompanies all representations by way of thinking of them means that the consciousness exhibits the same formal unity in all manifold contained in an intuition. This formal unity is the *I think* and is called the formal unity of consciousness. A transcendental synthesis of the *I think* with all manifold given in an intuition is the apperception's synthetic unity in all representations; thus, the synthetic unity of apperception is the transcendental condition of the relation of cognition to its object.

On the synthesis is the chapter in which I give an account of the following questions. Thus, these questions determine the frame of this chapter.

What is the aim of analysis fulfilled in the transcendental sense? What is the form? To what two conditions does the form point in terms of the fundamental cognitive sources of our mind? What are two components that must be contained in a possible cognition? What is the receptivity of sensibility and the spontaneity of understanding? What is the difference between the faculties of sensibility and

understanding in terms of the possibility for which they serve? What does apperception as the consciousness of itself imply? What is the formal unity of consciousness? Through what proposition is the necessary unity of self-consciousness contained in all representations expressed? What is the transcendental condition of accompanying all representations with consciousness? What sort of synthesis of imagination does it necessitate to accompany all representations with consciousness? What is the role of the transcendental synthesis of the imagination in the relation of cognition to its object? What should we understand from the synthetic unity of apperception as the transcendental ground of making all thought belong to one and the same consciousness? What are the conditions of the unity of self-consciousness as original pure rules of synthesis?

When I first started, I believed that displaying that the synthetic unity of apperception was the necessary condition of a possible cognition would be enough to defend the impossibility of the cognition of the transcendental object of the inner sense and outer appearances. For it was pretty evident that the transcendental object as an *unknown* ground of those appearances could not be subsumed under the synthetic unity of apperception. Despite all, the understanding had dared to think of the concepts of the *I* and the thing in itself as related to another concept and yielded some so-called judgments, I should have been able to prove that these cognitions could not have objective validity. To thoroughly prove why judgments in which we think of the concepts of the *I* and thing in itself as related to another concept do not hold objective validity, we should first know which by what right the understanding represents a concept as connected with something that has not ever been thought in this concept. Accordingly, the understanding thinks of the relation of a subject to the predicate in three manners in respect of whether this relation requires a synthetic

function. While the judgments that do not require a synthetic function are always thought a priori, although most judgments requiring a synthetic function are thought a posteriori, some can nevertheless be thought of as a priori. This last judgment manner has a special significance because of being the foremost issue belonging to pure reason and thus transcendental philosophy, and the subhead in which I gave an account of them might be read as a deduction of the category of causality.

The Judgments of Understanding and The Use of Reason is the chapter in which I gave an account of these three manners of judgments. To make this chapter as comprehensible as possible, I gave many examples of the concepts regarding their being judged analytically or synthetically. I hope that these examples concerning being judged of the concepts analytically or synthetically will light our investigation of whether a cognition of the concepts of the *I* and thing in itself is possible. Besides, I have not neglected to investigate the logical use of reason which aims to bring our all conditioned cognitions into a thoroughgoing interconnection by putting the totality of series as regards the conditions in a systematic unity according to a transcendental idea. My purpose in doing this was to display that reason in its logical use concerns giving the highest possible unity of reason to all conditioned cognitions of the understanding but that the transcendental object can never be a member of these series of conditions.

The last obstacle standing in my way in grounding that the cognition of the transcendental object of all inner appearances is impossible was that the *I* itself, which cannot be thought through any determinate predicate, is being taken as a substance. Nevertheless, if the *I* itself had been subsumed under the concept of substance which must always be related to sensible intuitions, a cognition of my own self must have been possible. However, since the frame of my thesis does not allow

me to investigate *The Paralogisms of Pure Reason* under a separate heading alone, I have preferred to investigate substances by taking them as substrata representing time in the manifold parts of space. Through this, I tried to demonstrate the role of the successive apprehension of the manifold parts of space in remaining the thinking subject identical to its own self. For this reason, the contribution of this chapter to the thesis is mediately rather than directly.

During my investigations, I have concluded that the successiveness in the synthesis of the manifold parts of space is the fundamental working principle of our mind which prevents substances representing the unity of time in these parts from being isolated from each other. *Successiveness in the Synthesis of Manifold Parts of Space: The fundamental Working Principle of our Mind ensuring the Thinking Subject remains Identical to its own Self* is the chapter in which I have detailed the issues that enabled me to come to this conclusion. Accordingly, since the substances are the substrata representing the unity of time in the manifold parts of space, substances prevented from being isolated from each other through the successiveness in the synthesis of these parts prevent the time's absolute unity from being disintegrated in the thinking subject; thus, it is ensured that the thinking subject remains identical with itself. Correspondingly, I have believed that the successiveness in the synthesis of the manifold parts of space that ensures the thinking subject remains identical with itself is the fundamental working principle of our mind. Although I have tried to justify this conclusion with the evidence I found in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, I had to expand this chapter in lengthy details that might be found tiring because of the fact that I have not come across a sample study coming to such conclusion before. On this occasion, I attribute some misinterpretation that might be encountered in this chapter to the fact that I have not come across a study

reaching similar results through which I can confirm my conclusion; hereby, I feel the need to add that I look forward to reading a more ameliorated version.

Finally, I have dealt with the chapter *On the Cognition of Transcendental Object as Something that grounds Inner Intuition and Outer Appearances* under two headings in which I tried to answer the questions asked in this thesis. Accordingly, while the former gives an account of why a cognition of my own self is not possible, the latter gives an account of why a cognition of the thing in itself is not possible.

2. ON THE SYNTHESIS

Considering that experience is a synthetic edifice, either as a composition or a connection, the synthesis is undoubtedly one of the most crucial issues in *Critique of Pure Reason*. That is why it is the primary topic on which we should elaborate. "… the synthesis alone is that which properly collects the elements for cognitions and unifies them into a certain content; …, the first thing to which we have to attend if we wish to judge about the first origin of our cognition" (Kant, 1998, p. 211 A78/B103). I think that an elucidation proceeding from simple to complex will ease grasping this synthetic edifice.

We think of appearances. At an initial glance, although this statement seems proper, the following utterance I am about to posit might be more befitting to Critique of Pure Reason. We think of the synthetic unity of the representations combined within one consciousness in accordance with a priori concepts. Although it is a more appropriate statement, it needs, for sure, to be made more understandable because of including tons of details. Therefore, what is thought of is not appearances but the synthetic unity of representations subsumed under a priori rules. Appearances should be considered products concerning the synthetic unity of representations belonging to one consciousness; thus, experience is a synthetic unity as a product arising from manifold synthesizes.

At the very beginning of *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant commences his words with the following statement: "There is no doubt whatever that all our cognition begins with experience; …" (Kant, 1998, p. 136 B1). This statement is essential because of indicating that experience is not an edifice that we should construct over from scratch but an already constructed synthetic unity in hand that needs to be

analyzed to comprehend how it had come about. Since experience is a conditioned cognition implying the determinate relation of given representations to an object, this investigation intends to reveal necessary conditions of a possible cognition. Thus, experience is not something in itself; instead, it is a cognition of the manifold representations, contained in a possible intuition, united in an empirical concept. Accordingly, since experience is nothing but a combination of the manifold representations, our examination should commence with analyzing an empirical concept of the object.

2.1.Analysis

From the analysis, within this context, I understand to resolve an empirical concept, which makes cognition of the object possible, into its elements. Therefore, to resolve any empirical cognition into its elements, we need a rule that will serve us as a principle; because cognition is a representation of appearances under the concept of an object in general. Accordingly, such a rule is an empirical concept that corresponds to an object in the experience because the cognition of anything is that which corresponds to the unity of manifold synthesized according to this rule within the concept of an object. “Thus the concept of body serves as the rule for our cognition of outer appearances by means of the unity of the manifold that is thought through it” (Kant, 1998, p. 232 A106).

What can be resolved into its elements is what has already been synthesized; therefore, the analytic method always presupposes a synthesis already applied. If the whole is to be resolved into its elements, it must have already been established as a unity. Within this context, analysis and synthesis always proceed oppositely with one

another. "...; for where the understanding has not previously combined anything, neither can it dissolve anything, for only **through it** can something has been given to the power of representation as combined" (Kant, 1998, p. 246 B130). While synthesis serves to unify distinct parts according to certain rules, the analysis serves to comprehend what parts it is of made. In other words, the whole made possible by the synthesis is clarified by the analysis through resolved into its parts. Accordingly, while synthesis is an act that makes unity possible, the analysis is a function that is interested in this given synthetic unity.

> The analytic method starts with something conditioned (such as a whole, or a consequence) and provides an analysis of the condition (such as the parts, or the ground). The synthetic method starts from the condition (such as parts, or something that is a ground) and proceeds to the conditioned (or the whole, or the consequence). So, for example, if we start by examining a whole and work out what sort of parts it is made of, we are following the analytic method. If, on the other hand, we start by examining a number of distinct things and work out how they can, and perhaps must, be put together, we are following the synthetic method. (Thorpe, 2015, p. 19)

In the chapter *The Judgments of the Understanding and the Use of Reason,* I have analyzed judgments. However, if I put it aside for a while and try to express what I understand, in the transcendental sense, from analysis, then I say that it is a work of abstraction exercised with the aim of obtaining the pure parts of cognition. For obtaining the pure parts of any cognition, whatever belongs to experience is abstracted, i.e., removed from it away. Hence, the parts that can be removed are called the empirical content of cognition. After that, the remaining will be the pure a priori representations. Accordingly, since our expectation from the analysis is to

obtain the pure parts of cognition native to the human mind, the work of abstraction is terminated when we get there.

In that case, a work of abstraction, which starts from a given whole and lasts until we reach pure elements, is the aim of analysis because all our cognition has already commenced with experience, and our starting point is this. After that, we will try to comprehend how these empirical parts are brought together with the pure ones and how all constitute this unity called experience. Expectation from synthesis is to comprehend the action bringing the manifold representations contained in an intuition given to a concept together in one cognition and thus in one consciousness. "By **synthesis** in the most general sense, however, I understand the action of putting different representations together with each other and comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition" (Kant, 1998, p. 210 A77/B103).

The raw data of sensations in an intuition through the receptivity of sensibility cannot yield any object's cognition insofar as the understanding does not combine them within the concept of object. While gathering these raw data is through synthesis as an effect belonging to the imagination, combining them under the unity of apperception is again through synthesis as a function of the understanding. That these raw data of sensations stand under the formal conditions of space and time is the supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition taught by the *Transcendental Aesthetic*. "The supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition in relation to sensibility was, according to the Transcendental Aesthetic, that all the manifold of sensibility stand under the formal conditions of space and time" (Kant, 1998, p. 248 B136). The original synthetic unity of apperception provides unity of intuition to these raw data. "The supreme principle of all intuition in relation to the understanding

is that all the manifold of intuition stand under conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception" (Kant, 1998, p. 248 B136).

In that case, the possibility of cognition first depends on the raw data of sensation that ought to be given through sensibility. These raw data are the content of cognition or the matter of a concept. However, without the synthesis of apprehension applied to the raw data of sensation, these cannot exhibit a manifold structure that ought to be contained in an intuition. For this reason, the synthesis of apprehension that serves to construct a composition from this raw data makes the manifold of intuition possible. Through the synthesis of apprehension, the raw data of sensations are taken up into empirical consciousness and indeed becomes a manifoldness in an intuition. "… by the **synthesis of apprehension** I understand the composition of the manifold in an empirical intuition, through which perception, i.e., empirical consciousness of it (as appearance), becomes possible" (Kant, 1998, p. 261 B160).

The statement that the raw data of sensation are taken up into consciousness implies that these are brought together under the original synthetic unity of apperception; otherwise, the unity of intuition would not have been possible. Through the unity of intuition, the relation of representations to an object becomes possible. What I mean by the relation of representations to an object is their necessary relation to a possible empirical consciousness. Therefore, the condition of the necessary relation of representations to a possible empirical consciousness is the accompaniment of the *I think* to these representations. In that case, the synthesis of apperception makes this necessary relation possible between the subject and the representations. "Thus all manifold of intuition has a necessary relation to the **I think** in the same subject in which this manifold is to be encountered" (Kant, 1998, p. 246 B132). So, through the synthetic unity of apperception on representations, the raw

data of sensation is represented as belonging to the necessary unity of self-consciousness, i.e., they become my representations exhibiting unity in one consciousness. “A manifold that is contained in an intuition that I call mine is represented as belonging to the **necessary** unity of self-consciousness through the synthesis of the understanding, …” (Kant, 1998, p. 253 B144).

What determines the relation of given representations to an object is to combine the manifold representations in an intuition into the concept of an object insofar as they are subsumed under the unity of apperception, i.e., insofar as the *I think* accompanies them. Accordingly, to unify the manifold representations given in an intuition into the concept of an object is to determine these manifold representations as an object of experience, i.e., as the thing standing in front of me. “The **transcendental unity** of apperception is that unity through which all of the manifold given in an intuition is united in a concept of the object” (Kant, 1998, p. 250 B139). Hereabouts, we stressed that the empirical cognition of an object consists of a specific connection of this raw data coming through sensations with the thinking subject.

Analyzing an empirical intuition aims to reach the pure parts of it by abstracting everything belonging to sensation. That corresponding to sensation is called the physical content or matter encountered in space and time. “**Empirical**, if sensation (which presupposes the actual presence of the object) is contained therein; but **pure** if no sensation is mixed into the representation. One can call the latter the matter of sensible cognition” (Kant, 1998, p. 193 A50/B74). Thus, such empirical components of an object can merely be given a posteriori, and the only thing we have a priori regarding it is the concepts, which have not been determined yet, of the synthesis of possible sensations.

It needs to be remarked on what we should understand from the pure parts before proceeding further. The pure parts express the non-empirical form of either receiving the impressions or cognizing an object by means of these received impressions.

The former is the pure form of intuition that is cognized and determined a priori. It is cognized a priori because it is the pure intuition available a priori in mind. Pure intuitions are space and time. The reason why it is determined a priori is that the corresponding object to the concept can be exhibited a priori in pure intuition by means of imagination. Such is the concept of the triangle.

The latter is the pure concept of the understanding, i.e., the pure form of thinking, and an object is thought in general by means of it. Experience is a conditioned cognition, and the categories are the conditions of this conditioned cognition. Accordingly, the pure concept is the pure part of cognition and indeed the subjective condition of thinking. For this reason, the cognition regarding an object must contain the subjective conditions of thinking. Determining the manifold representations contained in a given intuition as an object of experience is not possible without them. "Thus pure intuition contains merely the form under which something is intuited, and pure concept only the form of thinking of an object in general. Only pure intuitions or concepts alone are possible *a priori*, empirical ones only *a posteriori*" (Kant, 1998, p. 193 A51/B75).

To sum up, there is only one sole subjective condition that is called the form. However, in terms of the fundamental cognitive sources of our mind, the form indicates two different conditions. First is the form, which is the condition of receptivity; by being so, it is the subjective condition of our intuition, i.e., an object

can only be given under these conditions. In the *Transcendental Aesthetic*, the conditions of all intuitions were shown as space and time. Second is the form which is the subjective condition of thinking the objects; by being so, it is the mere form of thinking, and its origin is based on understanding. Thus, while the pure part of intuition is space and time, the pure part of the thinking of an object is the *I think* that is the vehicle of categories which are the conditions of cognizing that object. "This is the concept - or rather, if one prefers, the judgment - **I think**. But one will easily see that this concept is the vehicle of all concepts whatever, and hence also of transcendental concepts, …" (Kant, 1998, p. 411 A341/B399).

All experience covers the pure forms of intuition and the pure form of thinking. Through the former, objects are given. Through the latter, the given representations are made belonging to one consciousness and thus determined as an object of experience. Accordingly, the form implies the subjective condition of intuition and thus the cognition; for this very reason, it is always a priori possible no matter where its transcendental place, whether in the sensibility or the understanding, is.

Kant asks if there might be pure cognitions that are independent of experience and thus of all impressions of the senses. "…, whether there is any such cognition independent of all experience and even of all impressions of the senses" (Kant, 1998, p. 136 B2). As seen from this, the impressions from the senses are the empirical content of cognition and must be removed from it to reach its pure parts.

All experience is ascribed to one single identical subject; for this very reason, the cognition evolves out of one sole source, i.e., necessarily of the *I*. Above, what the possibility of cognition depends on, I had the opportunity to indicate. Accordingly,

the possibility of cognition firstly depends on that the objects are given to us and that secondly, these givens are being thought. However, for the objects to be given to us, we must have a certain cognitive capacity that would make it possible for us to receive the representations concerning these objects. Sensibility, which is the first one of the fundamental sources of our mind, is this certain cognitive capacity and serves for receiving the representations of objects; thus, Kant terms it as receptivity. "The capacity (receptivity) to acquire representations through the way in which we are affected by objects is called sensibility" (Kant, 1998, p. 155 A19/B33). The understanding, which is the second one of the fundamental sources of our mind, serves for being thought of the objects in relation to representations that are those which these were given by means of them. Thus, Kant terms it as the spontaneity of concepts or the spontaneity of cognition. "… the second the faculty for cognizing an object by means of these representations (spontaneity of concepts); …, through the latter it is **thought** in relation to that representation (as a mere determination of the mind)" (Kant, 1998, p. 193 A50/B74). Accordingly, two fundamental cognitive faculties native to our mind, as the sole source always identical with itself, are sensibility and understanding, which all cognition arises from them. "... there are two stems of human cognition, which may perhaps arise from a common but to us unknown root, namely **sensibility** and **understanding**, …" (Kant, 1998, p. 135 A15/B29). That is, so to speak, there are two branches springing from the one identical source, and each refers to distinct faculties of our mind; thus, determining given representations as an object of experience requires a necessary combination of these distinct faculties called sensibility and understanding. Without such a combination of our cognitive faculties, even if we could have some representations, it

would be impossible to relate those representations to a determinate object and thus be conscious of them.

Accordingly, the difference between sensibility and understanding arises in terms of the possibility for which they serve. While sensibility serves the possibility of our receptivity, understanding serves the possibility for thinking of objects. The former contains the pure form of intuition, i.e., the representations of space and time. The latter contains the pure form of thinking, namely the *I think* that makes all concepts possible by being their transcendental vehicle.

Transcendental Aesthetic is the section in which the transcendental ground of our receptivity is taken in hand; thereat, an empirical intuition is analyzed. Since sensibility is the necessary condition of being given the objects to us, such a necessity must have a transcendental ground. Hence, *Transcendental Aesthetic* is the part in which this ground is inquired, and the task undertaken in this section is two-phased. In the first phase, sensibility is handled in an isolated manner by removing everything thought through concepts of understanding concerning an object from its representation. Sensibility is the faculty of intuitions; for this reason, insofar as the sensibility is abstracted by excluding whatever is thought of as regards the object, we acquire the empirical intuition that will be analyzed in the second phase.

Kant defines intuition as that which relates cognition to objects immediately. "In whatever way and through whatever means a cognition may relate to objects, that through which it relates immediately to them, and at which all thought as a means is directed as an end, is intuition" (Kant, 1998, p. 155 A19/B33). Then, he underlines sensation as what makes an intuition an empirical one. "That intuition which is related to the object through sensation is called **empirical**" (Kant, 1998, p. 155

A20/B34). Because the thing corresponding to sensation is that encountered in space and time and consequently containing an existence. Therefore, the intuition, by means of which representations concerning an object are given to us, covers the entire objects of the possible field of experience in general; by being so, it is the essential component relating a priori concepts to the objects of experience.

Accordingly, in the second phase, everything that belongs to sensation is removed from an empirical intuition for reaching the pure part of intuition. After eliminating everything belonging to sensation from an empirical intuition, the pure form of intuition remains as a priori representations, which sensibility contains, and as the transcendental ground of our receptivity. These a priori possible representations are the formal conditions of sensibility; by being so, these themselves must also be an intuition containing no sensation. According to this, the objects of sensible intuition must invariably conform with these sensible conditions. "All appearances therefore necessarily agree with this formal condition of sensibility, because only through it can they appear, i.e., be empirically intuited and given" (Kant, 1998, p. 224 A93/B125). Since space and time are the form of all sensible intuitions, the pure part of intuition is the transcendental ground of the possibility of all objects of sensible intuition. Now that these are pure representations belonging to the subjective constitution of our senses, things can appear to us only under them.

> For since an object can appear to us only by means of such pure forms of sensibility, i.e., be an object of empirical intuition, space and time are thus pure intuitions that contain *a priori* the conditions of the possibility of objects as appearances, and the synthesis in them has objective validity. (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1998, p. 222 A89/B122)

Kant expresses the general problem of transcendental philosophy with the following question. “The real problem of pure reason is now contained in the question: **How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible?**” (Kant, 1998, p. 146 B19). The *Critique of Pure Reason* as the transcendental philosophy is responsible for investigating the components employed in solving this problem because the transcendental philosophy is pure philosophy in which pure reason is interested. Thus, these components come into light as space and time in the *Transcendental Aesthetic*. Space and time are the pure forms, which lie at the root of the human mind, of all intuition. By theirs means, being affected by outer objects and thus receiving the impressions become possible for us.

Consequently, any possible cognition must necessarily embrace two components together, namely intuition and concept, at once. The purpose of the analysis, in the transcendental sense, is first to abstract cognitive faculties, in which these components originate, and then treat these faculties separately to reach the pure part within these components. Accordingly, while the pure part of intuitions is the pure intuition as space and time, the purest and most fundamental part of an object’s cognition is categories; thus, the *I think* is the transcendental ground of the possibility of these categories.

Above, I have attempted to analyze sensibility according to the main lines. We have reached the pure form, in which representations concerning an object can merely be given by means of it after removing the physical content corresponding to sensation from an empirical intuition. We thus found that space and time are pure representations cognized a priori.

2.2.Relation of cognition to its object

The understanding is the birthplace of twelve basic a priori concepts that are the conditions of the possibility of any experience. "A concept that expresses this formal and objective condition of experience universally and sufficiently would be called a pure concept of the understanding" (Kant, 1998, p. 227 A96). These twelve fundamental concepts under the name of categories serve for cognizing objects in terms of their quantity, quality, relation, and modality through a priori principles; because Kant claims that these categories, which ought to be applied to experience in accordance with a priori principles, are the necessary condition of its possibility. By being so, these a priori principles are the rules guiding the application of categories to appearances; thus, this is what makes their functions in the judgments the universal rules of the experience. "… the origin of the *a priori* categories in general was established through their complete coincidence with the universal logical functions of thinking, …" (Kant, 1998, p. 261 B159). For example, the application of the concept of cause to the experience is according to and through the rule 'Everything that happens has its cause'. This application is the necessary condition of the possibility of the experience. For this reason, the justification for applying the concept of cause to experience should be sought in the fact that this application is the necessary condition of the possibility of experience.

So, these twelve basic concepts should be considered as the logical forms for particular concepts of the objects. Considering that the schemata are a priori formal conditions coming from sensibility to the categories, the categories are schemata giving the universal rules of synthesis, namely the rules for the use of understanding, to the concepts through which we determine something as an object of experience. For example, if the concept of what happens had not contained the schema of the

concept of cause, possible intuitions corresponding to this concept could not have been determined as an event. This event determined in accordance with the schema of the concept of cause is the phenomenon of the concept of what happens; i.e., it is a phenomenon that presupposes something which it follows in accordance with a rule.

Consequently, categories should be recognized as the a priori conditions for a possible experience. "The transcendental deduction of all *a priori* concepts therefore has a principle toward which the entire investigation must be directed, namely this: that they must be recognized as *a priori* conditions of the possibility of experiences …" (Kant, 1998, p. 225 A94/B126). Since our cognitions cannot have unity without categories, their objective validity rests on that these are necessary conditions for any cognition of experience.

What does the unity that our cognitions have mean?

The unity our cognitions have is the unity yielding the concept of the object through formal unity of consciousness.

What does the formal unity of consciousness signify, then?

It implies the original and transcendental condition concerning that a numerically one consciousness accompanies all representations by way of thinking them; this numerically one consciousness as the consciousness of itself is the simple representation of the *I*. "Consciousness of itself (apperception) is the simple representation of the I, …" (Kant, 1998, p. 189 B68). Accordingly, the accompaniment way of the *I* to all representations is through thinking of them. That a numerically one consciousness accompanies all representations expresses that the *I* is in a necessary relation to all manifold representations contained in an intuition of an object in a way that unifies them into one representation; because this numerical unity

of consciousness lies at the bottom of all concepts making a cognition of any object possible. Such necessity is called the spontaneity of thinking. That all representations concerning object come into relation with each other in the way making a cognition of that object possible points to this necessity called spontaneity of thinking; because the spontaneity of thinking is an act belonging to this numerical unity of consciousness unifying these representations into one representation, i.e., into the concept of the object. Therefore, the relation of cognition to its object requires that the cognition must necessarily have the formal unity of consciousness that constitutes the concept of object. "…, since insofar as they are to relate to an object our cognitions must also necessarily agree with each other in relation to it, i.e., they must have that unity that constitutes the concept of an object" (Kant, 1998, p. 231 A104/105).

Accordingly, the formal unity of consciousness, making the synthetic unity of manifold representations possible, determines this manifoldness as a concept of the object through the spontaneity of understanding, i.e., thinks their synthetic unity in a concept. So, the concept of the object that is determined in accordance with the formal unity of consciousness serves as a rule in terms of the relation of cognition to its object. "All cognition requires a concept … as far as its form is concerned the latter is always something general, and something that serves as a rule" (Kant, 1998, p. 232 A106). However, if the concept of the object had not been determined in accordance with the formal unity of consciousness, it could not have served as a rule for synthetically unifying the manifold representations given in an intuition into one representation; according to that, the concept of object could not have been a cognition that analytically points out to the representations of extension, impenetrability and shape at once regarding outer appearances.

Extension, impenetrability and shape are the manifold representations that have already been unified into one representation, i.e., that have been thought in the concept of body. In other words, the concept of body is the consciousness of the synthetic unity of the representations of extension, impenetrability and shape. The representation of an object that would be determined under the concept of the body becomes possible first through the accompaniment of the *I* to them by thinking, i.e., through the consciousness of the synthetic unity of these manifold representations. Accordingly, we have the cognition of a body, i.e., of an object as the outer appearance, through the relation of these manifold representations to the unity of consciousness. The relation of these manifold representations to the unity of consciousness refers to a universal necessity regarding their synthetic unity within one and the same consciousness. Consequently, we cognize a body in the experience as an outer appearance through the consciousness of the necessary unity of the synthesis of the corresponding manifoldness. I.e., the cognition of a body is through synthetic unity of the manifold contained in an intuition into one single consciousness and thus one single representation.

If our consciousness had lacked synthetic unity that must lay in the root of all a priori concepts, the manifold representations contained in an intuition could find no basis in which they could have unified in a way exhibiting an objective unity; correspondingly, any possible cognition concerning objects would have never come about in me.

The unity that any object makes necessary is a concept of the object into which the manifold representations contained in an intuition have been unified in accordance with the formal unity of consciousness. Analysis of a concept is to judge about it analytically and aims to clarify it by emerging the manifold representations

that had already been thought in this concept. Accordingly, analytically judging a concept resolves this concept into its sub-representations, which had been brought together according to formal unity of consciousness. This formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of representations indicates an original and transcendental condition. Kant terms such an original condition as transcendental apperception because of the fact that it points out the necessity as regards the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of representations. "Every necessity has a transcendental condition as its ground. … Now this original and transcendental condition is nothing other than the **transcendental apperception**" (Kant, 1998, p. 232 A106/107).

Since the concept of the object contains a transcendental condition concerning the synthesis of the manifold representations given in an intuition, it serves as a universal rule. The necessity concerning that the rule in the synthesis of representations is based on a transcendental ground is termed as 'law' by Kant. "… the representation of a universal condition in accordance with which a certain manifold (of whatever kind) **can** be posited is called a **rule**, and, if it **must** be so posited, a **law**" (Kant, 1998, p. 235 A113). Consequently, if any representation contained in an intuition corresponding to the concept of an object could have been exempt from subsuming under the transcendental unity of apperception, all relation of cognition to that object would entirely have disappeared.

2.3.Synthetic unity of apperception

The numerically one consciousness is no other than the simple representation of the *I*. Kant signifies this numerically one consciousness as the transcendental

apperception because of not only notifying pure and original oneness but also being unchanging. “This pure, original, unchanging consciousness I will now name **transcendental apperception**” (Kant, 1998, p. 232 A107). Accordingly, apperception is a consciousness implying that the thoughts and thus the actions arising from these thoughts are not things in themselves but the objects of our own thoughts.

Unity of apperception implies the identity of apperception in all representations. In other words, it implies that I am conscious that all thoughts and thus all representations resulting from these thoughts belong to identical me as the objects of my own thought. For this reason, transcendental unity of apperception is an analytical unity. Since the *I* accompanies all representations identically by thinking of them, its transcendental unity functions as unifying my thought. The *I think* is an original and thus transcendental action towards unifying my thought concerning the manifold given in an intuition into one representation thus one cognition. Therefore, the unity of *I* in representations manifests itself as the *I think*.

Accordingly, the unity of apperception is the *I think*, and its transcendental function manifests itself in the action of unifying my thought. However, since thinking of representations can merely be through concepts, the *I think* must be the purest and most fundamental form of all concepts serving for the possibility of the cognition; then, it must have been added originally to all representations subsumed under these concepts. The representations can only obtain synthetic unity and be determined as objects of the experience by being brought together within these concepts whose purest form is the *I think*. Now, the *I think* is the action of supplying unity to our thought; however, the thinking is only through the concepts. Then, unifying our thought is toward putting all cognition into a thorough connection as a

demand of reason for completing the unity of the understanding through bringing the universal use of these concepts to the smallest number. “In fact the manifold of rules and the unity of principles is a demand of reason, in order to bring the understanding into thoroughgoing connection with itself, …” (Kant, 1998, p. 391 A305/B362).

Since the *I think* is the most fundamental form of all concepts serving for being thought of objects in general and thus for the possibility of cognition, it is a purely empty thought as just a logical act till provided content; being so, it expresses not my self-cognition but just the form of self-consciousness. “The *consciousness* of myself is logical merely and leads to no object; it is, rather, a mere determination of the subject in accordance with the rule of identity”. (Kant, Opus Postumum, 1993, p. 188 22:82) Accordingly, the form of self-consciousness manifests that I am conscious of my identity with myself, i.e., of the numerical oneness of my own self in all representations. Given that the *I think* is a purely formal condition of thought and expresses a self-consciousness accompanying all representations, it should be already contained in all cognition by being added to all manifold representations given in intuition through a transcendental synthesis. Thus, by the phrase of adding, I mean an a priori synthesis belonging to the imagination; because a manifold contained in intuition is never given in an already combined way. Rather, a transcendental synthesis, which lies in the ground of all cognition as a principle of possible experience, is necessary for the formal unity of the manifold of intuition. For this reason, it deserves to be named transcendental synthesis because of fulfilled a priori by the imagination. By being so, the synthesis of apperception is the transcendental condition of accompanying all representations with consciousness.

> For the formal unity in the synthesis of the manifold of intuition, in which the manifold is not *given* in combination, but *made* by the understanding, is the

> principle of the possibility of empirical representations with consciousness for a system of representations in the unity of experience. (Kant, Opus Postumum, 1993, p. 166 22:448)

A transcendental synthesis adding this purest and most fundamental form, namely the *I think*, to all representations for supplying unity to our thought, might be called the unity of synthesis. Accordingly, a transcendental synthesis is a synthesis subsuming all representations under the representation of unity. Since self-consciousness required by the cognition of objects is supplied by adding the representation *I think* to them, the transcendental unity of consciousness is the form constituting the synthetic unity of the appearances in accordance with concepts. Therefore, the thoroughgoing connection among our perceptions making experience possible cannot be established insofar as the representation of unity is not unexceptionally added to all representations through the transcendental synthesis of imagination.

The representation of unity makes it possible that all manifold given in intuition belongs to one and the same consciousness; i.e., it gives unity to the synthesis of manifold representations in an intuition. Therefore, the *I think* is the purely formal condition of thought and the mere form of the understanding that must be contained in every experience. In other words, pure thinking is the transcendental ground of the original pure concepts of synthesis, and the understanding functions to unify our thought in judgments through the categories. For this reason, when all content of a judgment is abstracted, the mere form of the understanding remains, which is only the logical form for a concept.

However, if the representation of unity was not added to the manifold contained in a possible intuition originally, the apperception could not manifest itself as an analytical unity; according to that, we could not have been conscious of our identity in our own representations. The consciousness is an analytical unity; thus, the analytical unity of consciousness gives rise through awareness of our identity in representations; however, the consciousness of our identical self in representations is based on the fact that these representations are related to one sole subject. "Namely, this thoroughgoing identity of the apperception of a manifold given in intuition contains a synthesis of the representations and is possible only through the consciousness of this synthesis" (Kant, 1998, p. 247 B133). Consequently, the imagination adding the representation of unity to all representations by means of a transcendental synthesis makes the analytical unity of apperception in representations possible, i.e., the self-consciousness exhibits a transcendental unity in all representations.

Thus, the pure and original apperception is the simple representation of the *I* manifesting itself as *I think* in representations. The cognition of objects requires a self-consciousness accompanying all representations by thinking of them, and such an accompaniment might be called its manifestation in the experience. Since the *I* manifests itself merely by thinking, and thoughts belong to the inner sense, we cannot externally intuit the *I.* As long as the *I* manifests itself by thinking of representations, we represent our thinking subject as an object of our inner sense through these representations. Accompaniment of the *I* to representations through thinking of representations is the spontaneity of the understanding; therefore, while manifesting itself in the representations, it spontaneously produces the representation of the *I think*.

Accordingly, since the representation of *I think* notifies the necessary unity of self-consciousness in representations and is the transcendental ground of categories unifying our thought in judgments, it is the original synthetic unity of apperception in representations. Without such a transcendental function of the imagination, I could not have represented my identity in the representations; for this reason, it would not have been possible to combine them within one consciousness, i.e., bring them under categories. Because the representations, which do not belong to the same consciousness, i.e., do not hold identical self, cannot become objects of my experience. In that case, the formal proposition of apperception is the *I think* and implies the necessary unity of the self-consciousness encountered in all cognition. "The **I think** must **be able** to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all, …" (Kant, 1998, p. 246 B132). Hence, the transcendental synthesis of the *I think* with representations is the apperception's synthetic unity in all representations and is called the synthetic unity of apperception. Thus, the accompaniment of this formal proposition to representations presents all thinking belong to one consciousness.

> I call it the **pure apperception**, in order to distinguish it from the empirical one, or also the **original apperception**, since it is that self -consciousness which, because it produces the representation **I think**, which must be able to accompany all others and which in all consciousness is one and the same, cannot be accompanied by any further representation. I also call its unity the **transcendental** unity of self-consciousness in order to designate the possibility of *a priori* cognition from it. For the manifold representations that are given in a certain intuition would not all together be **my** representations if

> they did not all together belong to a self-consciousness; … (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1998, pp. 246-247 B132)

Accordingly, the unity of synthesis refers to the transcendental function of the imagination that adds the purest and most fundamental thought-form to all representations because the *I think* is the purest and most fundamental proposition of apperception. By its means, all manifold contained in intuition is combined in one consciousness, i.e., their synthetic unity is determined as an object by being represented in accordance with categories.

The possibility of categories, i.e., their necessary application on objects, depends on that the *I think* had already accompanied to the manifold given in intuition because their relation to the original apperception is only through the transcendental synthesis of imagination. The representations subsumed under the original apperception become in agreement with the categories, i.e., the conditions of the unity of self-consciousness. If we say that the unity of self-consciousness is the original apperception, then the conditions of the unity of self-consciousness are the categories, i.e., the conditions for thinking the representations in a possible experience. Accordingly, in order for becoming in agreement with the conditions of the unity of self-consciousness, all representations initially must have been synthesized with the *I think*, i.e., subsumed under the original apperception. Categories are the original pure rules of the synthesis, and the representation of the manifold given in intuition in accordance with these rules first requires their agreement with the conditions of the unity of self-consciousness. "Now this is the listing of all original pure concepts of synthesis that the understanding contains in itself *a priori*, and on account of which it is only a pure understanding; …" (Kant, 1998, p. 213 A80/B106). However, the representations that have not been subsumed under the original apperception are not

ready to stand under the universal functions of synthesis. Accordingly, while subsuming representations under the original apperception is a synthesis belonging to the imagination, to apply the original pure rules of synthesis to these representations is a combination belonging merely to the understanding.

> However, the possibility, indeed even the necessity of these categories rests on the relation that the entire sensibility, and with it also all possible appearances, have to the original apperception, in which everything is necessarily in agreement with the conditions of the thoroughgoing unity of self-consciousness, i.e., must stand under universal functions of synthesis, namely of the synthesis in accordance with concepts, … (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1998, pp. 234-235 A111/112)

Insofar as the manifold contained in intuition is in agreement with the conditions of the unity of self-consciousness, it can be combined according to the original pure rules of synthesis and thus determined as an object of the experience. Thus, the original pure rules of synthesis are the necessary conditions of determining an object, i.e., thinking of it in a possible experience. These original pure rules of synthesis are the concepts of understanding, i.e., categories. Thus, since categories contain the grounds of the possibility of determining and accordingly cognizing any object in the experience, their objective validity should be sought in the fact that the experience is alone possible through them. "… concepts of objects in general lie at the ground of all experiential cognition as *a priori* conditions; consequently the objective validity of the categories, as *a priori* concepts, rests on the fact that through them alone is experience possible …" (Kant, 1998, p. 224 A93/B126).

2.4.The synthesis of imagination in all possible combining actions of the understanding

The purely formal condition of thought is the purest and most fundamental form of all concepts. Therefore, the *I think* serve for thinking the objects, in general; thus, it contains the possibility of all cognition because the pure synthesis of apperception is the ground of the possibility of all a priori concepts. The *I think*, which must be synthesized with representations through a transcendental function of the imagination, is the representation of unity contained by all called my representations. Accordingly, it becomes possible that I accompany all my representations with consciousness by way of being added the representation of unity produced by self-consciousness to all manifold given in intuition. "… the **original apperception**, since it is that self-consciousness which, because it produces the representation **I think**, which must be able to accompany all others …" (Kant, 1998, p. 246 B132). The transcendental synthesis of imagination is the pure synthesis of apperception that represents the transcendental unity of my self-consciousness in all my representations.

Nevertheless, since the *I think* itself is a mere form that serves for being thought of the objects in general and accordingly for the possibility of the cognition, synthesizing it with representations does not determine the thought yet as concerning an object. "… although it is itself not yet the consciousness of the **synthesis** of the representations, it still presupposes the possibility of the latter, …" (Kant, 1998, p. 247 B134). Instead, this function of imagination makes representations being in agreement with the conditions of the unity of self-consciousness, i.e., takes them into the scope of the unity of apperception. To the extent the representations had been taken into the scope of the synthetic unity of apperception by means of the

transcendental imagination, it is an operation belonging merely to the understanding that will determine my consciousness concerning the synthesis of these representations.

On this opportunity, I have distinguished the transcendental function of imagination from an action fulfilled only by understanding.

The former synthesizes representations with the *I think* and thus adds to them the representation of unity, i.e., makes them agree with the conditions of the unity of self-consciousness. The *I* is the pure apperception or self-consciousness; the act concerning its spontaneity manifests itself as the *I think*; the sameness of its spontaneous original act encountered within all representations is called the transcendental unity of self-consciousness. By being so, it supplies unity to our thought. Therefore, the accompaniment of the *I* to the representations is only through its manifestation, i.e., the original act of its spontaneity: which is nothing but the representation of unity, namely the *I think*, that must be encountered in all representations. Accordingly, the *I think* expresses the representation of unity produced by self-consciousness or pure apperception. The imagination transcendentally synthesizes this representation of unity with all other representations, i.e., establishes the identity of consciousness in all these representations unexceptionally. For this reason, such a transcendental function of imagination is the pure synthesis of apperception that makes all manifold of intuition agree with conditions of the unity of self-consciousness. At above, I explained this transcendental function as being added the *I think* to all representations.

The latter determines these manifold representations, which are synthesized with the *I think* and consequently become in agreement with conditions of the unity of

self-consciousness. From determining the manifold representations, I understand the cognition of an object in the most general sense; because the possible intuitions corresponding to the concept constitutes a determinate relation to the object by means of being united within this concept; my empirical consciousness concerning this determinate relation is the cognition of this object. Insofar as the manifold given in intuition agrees with the conditions of unity of self-consciousness, the concept of the object is a condition serving for being thought of the rule concerning the synthesis of possible intuitions contained in this concept. Hence, even if adding the purest and most fundamental thought-form to representations enables that I accompany them with consciousness, determining my thought as concerning an object necessitates the empirical consciousness of the synthesis, i.e., the understanding's operation of combining a priori. "Synthetic unity of the manifold of intuitions, as given *a priori*, is thus the ground of the identity of apperception itself, which precedes *a priori* all **my** determinate thinking" (Kant, 1998, p. 248 B134). The understanding regards whether all the manifold of intuition agrees with conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception in order for fulfilling its action that combines the manifold representations of intuition in one consciousness. That is, so to speak, the understanding looks in the first instance if these manifold representations of intuition hold the identity of consciousness because all combination of the manifold representations given in intuition pre-necessitates the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them. "… all unification of representations requires unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them" (Kant, 1998, p. 249 B137).

The transcendental function of imagination, which subsumes the manifold of intuition under the transcendental unity of apperception, is not yet an action that has determined thought as relating to an object of experience. Nevertheless, since it is the

function making possible that the manifold given in an intuition agrees with the conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception and thus is combined in a concept of the object, it is objective. "The **transcendental unity** of apperception is that unity through which all of the manifold given in an intuition is united in a concept of the object. It is called **objective** …" (Kant, 1998, p. 250 B139). For this reason, it should be considered a principle toward combining the manifold of intuition in one consciousness. "The supreme principle of all intuition in relation to the understanding is that all the manifold of intuition stand under conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception" (Kant, 1998, p. 248 B136). By being so, it first makes all of the manifold contained in intuition available to be objectively valid representations, i.e., to be combined in a concept of the object. "The representation of this unity cannot, therefore, arise from the combination; rather, by being added to the representation of the manifold, it first makes the concept of combination possible" (Kant, 1998, p. 246 B131).

Consequently, the act of pure apperception manifests itself in the formal proposition *I think*; nevertheless, since the thinking and cognizing are not the same, it does not refer to the cognition of a determinate object yet. "To **think** of an object and to **cognize** an object are thus not the same" (Kant, 1998, p. 254 B146).

Thus, we have distinguished what it means to be in agreement with the conditions of unity of self-consciousness from being standing under these conditions, i.e., from a synthesis performed in conformity with these conditions. The synthesis of understanding is an action combining manifold representations, which must be in agreement with the conditions of self-consciousness, in one consciousness and determining my thinking by relating the cognition to an object of experience. The representations that are not originally made agreeing with the conditions of the unity

of self-consciousness cannot be combined within categories, i.e., synthesized under them. “The **transcendental unity** of apperception is that unity through which all of the manifold given in an intuition is united in a concept of the object” (Kant, 1998, p. 250 B139). By being so, the former should be regarded as the transcendental condition of the latter. “Every necessity has a transcendental condition as its ground” (Kant, 1998, p. 232 A106). The former is a function of imagination; the latter necessitates an operation of understanding because the combination is not something lying in the objects but an action requiring understanding. “Combination does not lie in the objects, …, but is rather only an operation of the understanding, …” (Kant, 1998, p. 248 B135). The imagination takes all the manifold given in intuition into the scope of the pure act of apperception emerging in the understanding, i.e., synthesizes the formal proposition *I think* with everything given. “The unity of apperception, however, is the transcendental ground of the necessary lawfulness of all appearances in an experience. This very same unity of apperception … is the rule, and the faculty of these rules is the understanding” (Kant, 1998, p. 242 A127). On the other side, the understanding, by means of its spontaneity, represents a priori the combination of the synthetic unity of the manifold representations; consequently, it determines the synthesis of the possible intuitions as an object of cognition under categories.

3. THE JUDGMENTS OF UNDERSTANDING AND THE USE OF REASON

Unlike reason as a faculty never being in immediate relation to an object, the understanding, which makes use of its categories for only asserting judgments, is the faculty dealing with intuitions for bringing them under rules through these categories. Accordingly, since the only object to which reason is in relation is the understanding itself that unifies the manifold into an object through concepts, any empirical use of reason can be spoken of only through the understanding's concepts and thus judgments; briefly, the understanding itself is the only object of the reason's empirical use.

Whether mathematical or philosophical, all concepts making these thoroughly distinct types of cognitions possible must eventually be related to possible intuitions because an object can only be given through them. Correspondingly, we can discourse upon two sorts of a priori concepts according to the intuition they contain. "… the concepts of space and time, as forms of sensibility, and the categories, as concepts of the understanding" (Kant, 1998, p. 220 A85/B118).

The first sort is an a priori concept containing a pure intuition in itself, and the concept of a triangle is an example of it. However, since our main concern is philosophical cognition as discursive use of reason, I will not dwell on this subject any further after providing a brief explanation about an a priori concept containing a pure intuition in itself.

It is possible to cognize a priori what pertains to the object of a concept containing a pure intuition in itself; because a concept to which a pure intuition corresponds can be concretely assessed in this pure intuition and thus without any

help from experience. Thus, a concept that we cognize a priori what pertains to its object is that which we can exhibit the intuition corresponding to it independently of experience and indeed only through the imagination. For this reason, the synthetic judgments about the object of a concept containing a pure intuition in itself will necessarily be apodictic. Such synthetic judgments having apodictic certainty are mathematical cognition. Accordingly, the first principle of the pure understanding, i.e., the axioms of intuition, is a principle concerning the possibility of such apodictic propositions; however, the principle itself is undoubtedly not an axiom.

> Transcendental philosophy does not contain merely the complex of synthetic *a priori* propositions in a complete system, but contains such propositions from concepts, not through the latter's construction; for then it is mathematics. (Kant, Opus Postumum, 1993, p. 184 22:421)

Categories as the second sort are a priori concepts containing the synthesis of possible intuitions, which can be given only a posteriori; because how they can be in an a priori relation to objects depend precisely on it. Since the understanding makes use of its concepts for asserting judgments through them, insofar as these concepts contain a rule regarding the synthesis of sensible intuitions, they become predicates of possible judgments and thus gain objective validity.

> The principle [of this original appearance] does not found metaphysics but transcendental philosophy and leads to a twofold task: (1) How are synthetic *a priori* principles possible from intuitions? (2) How are synthetic *a priori* principles possible from concepts? Thus transcendental philosophy likewise founds mathematics by its use of the latter as instrument. But it does not do so directly, for it would be a contradiction to make directly into a concept that

> which is merely knowledge from the constitution of concepts. (Kant, Opus Postumum, 1993, pp. 185-186 22:77)

3.1.The judgments of understanding

Kant has isolated the human cognitive faculties to examine their possible roles in cognition and thus exhibited all thinking as a threefold structure corresponding to the understanding, the power of judgment and reason; i.e., through concepts, through the composition of two concepts, through derivation of a concept from another by inferences.

> All thinking is threefold: (1) through concepts, and the faculty for this is called understanding. (2) Through composition of two concepts, i.e., through judgments, i.e., the power of judgment. (3) Through derivation of a concept from another by inferences, i.e., reason. (Kant, Lectures on Metaphysics, 1997, p. 257 29:889)

In addition to that, he has distinguished the concepts into three types as respectively the concepts of space and time, the categories of the understanding and the ideas of reason.

> … we have three types of concepts that refer *a priori* to objects, namely, the concepts of space and time as forms of our sensibility (A85), the categories of the understanding (A85), and the ideas of reason (A338), there emerges in rough outline the plan for a *Critique of Pure Reason* in three divisions - transcendental aesthetic, transcendental analytic, and transcendental dialectic. (Kant, Opus Postumum, 1993, p. xxx)

Given that the categories do not ground on sensibility, the critique of Kant aims to reveal our faculties' circumstances to prevent the use of categories from overstepping their objectively valid territory. Accordingly, we have no faculty ever other than the understanding that occupies itself with subsuming intuitions under concepts and thus is responsible for the unity of appearances through its categories; therefore, the objective validity of categories depends on their being applied to the manifold of intuition as the functions of synthetic unity in the judgments.

All judgments are the representations in which the relation of the subject to the predicate is thought. Our mind thinks of this relation as either a priori or a posteriori. These can be itemized in three manners.

> A judgment is the representation of the way that concepts belong to one consciousness universally [,] objectively. If one thinks two representations as they are combined together and together constitute one cognition, this is a judgment. In every judgment, then, there is a certain relation of different representations insofar as they belong to *one* cognition. (Kant, Lectures on Logic, 1992, p. 369 928)

3.1.1. Relations that we can think of as a priori require no synthetic function

I want to give the same example used by Kant. "All bodies are extended" (Kant, 1998, p. 130 A7/B11).

It is a judgment in which I cognize the concept of extension as belonging to the concept of body. However, since the concept of extension is one of the component concepts that have already been thought in the concept of body, the understanding

does not need any synthetic function in order to think of the concept of the body as related to the concept of extension. Given that the judgment ‘All bodies are extended’ is nothing but an explanation of what has actually been contained already in the thought, it does not amplify my cognition regarding the concept of the body. Simply put, that judgment in which the relation of the concept of the body to the concept of extension is thought a priori informs me nothing new, which I had not already known, about the object of the concept of body. Accordingly, since to judge analytically the concept of body is sufficient to cognize a priori its relation to the concept of extension, any proof from experience is needless to confirm that a body is something extended. “Analytic judgments (affirmative ones) are thus those in which the connection of the predicate is thought through identity, …” (Kant, 1998, p. 130 A7/B10). What I already cognized about the object of a concept without the need for any synthetic function of the understanding is asserted by means of analytical judgments.

Then, it should be thoroughly explained what I mean by the synthetic function of the understanding.

Since the understanding can think of the concept of the body only in accordance with the schema of the concept of extension, the extension is a necessary mark native to all objects belonging to the concept of body. Since possible intuitions corresponding to the concept of the body are determined according to the schema of the concept of extension, all objects pertaining to this concept fulfil a priori the condition of the concept of extension. Accordingly, since the extension is a necessary determination pertaining to the objects of the concept of body, the understanding does not need a synthetic function for thinking of the concept of the body as related to the concept of extension. To think of the mere concept of body is identical to thinking of

all objects, subsumed under this concept, as extended. For this reason, to seek for some third thing in an experience with the aim of grounding the a priori thought as to the relation of the concept of the body to the concept of extension is unnecessary. The objective validity of the rule ‘All bodies are extended’ is immediately certain without the need of showing any determined object of the concept of the body as proof.

Let us look at the absurd syllogism below for detailing the analytic judgments a bit more.

All bodies are extended.	This is the rule.
The pen is a body.	This is some third thing as the condition of the rule.
The pen is extended.	This is the cognition determined a priori.

The empirical concept of pen stands under the concept of the body that is also valid for other objects of cognition. Therefore, the pen is the object, determined in the empirical concept of pen, of possible intuitions corresponding to the concept of the body; by being so, in our example, it stands for some third thing sought in an experience. At above, I expressed this as the condition of the rule. Nevertheless, since the phrase ‘the condition of the rule’ expresses the necessity of some third thing for being able to prove objective validity of the rule ‘All bodies are extended’, this phrase might be changed as the unnecessary condition of the rule. To justify such change, we need to look inside the concept of the body; however, we encounter nothing other than an empirical rule of synthesis in the concept of body. What, then, is this rule?

This rule should be such a rule that it should be able to determine the possible intuitions given to this concept as a mere body without the need for any further distinguishing feature. In other words, this rule should be such a rule that it must not be possible to cognize any of the objects pertaining to empirical body concepts as a

body unless the a posteriori given intuitions have been principally synthesized according to it. This general rule thought in the concept of body is identically valid for all empirical body concepts standing under it and thus also their objects determined in the experience. The objects of all empirical body concepts, which would not be cognized as a body without it, become possible by synthesizing the intuitions corresponding to these concepts according to this rule. Accordingly, this rule is the schema of the concept of extension, which is necessarily thought in the concept of body and thus in all outer objects that are determined under this concept.

For this reason, the understanding thinking that the concept of extension belongs to the concept of the body does not seek the testimony of an object determined as a body in the experience to justify the objective validity of its thought.

If we utter it within the context of our example, in order to determine our cognition about that a pen is an extended object, we do not need to go beyond the concept of the body; i.e., it is unnecessary appealing to experience for which some third thing, serving as a mediating cognition, would be looked. It is because this mediating cognition asserts that the pen is a body. However, since the pen is the object, determined in the concept of the pen, of possible intuitions given to the concept of body, it is immediately cognized as extended by means of the rule that is thought a priori in the representation of its concept. For this reason, the judgment ‘The pen is a body’ is not a necessary condition for being able to infer the cognition ‘The pen is extended’ from the rule ‘All bodies are extended’. That is exactly why I had above expressed this as the unnecessary condition of the rule.

Consequently, it is sufficient to analyze the concept of the body to be conscious of the rule that I have already thought of in the concept of the pen to find

the concept of extension in an a priori relation to it. "… I need only to analyze that concept, i.e., become conscious of the manifold that I always think in it, in order to encounter this predicate therein; …" (Kant, 1998, p. 130 A7/B11).

3.1.2. All relations that we can think of only a posteriori always require a synthetic function

The example that we would survey to explain it is as follows:

All scholars are human.

That is a proposition in which I cognize the concept of the human as belonging to the concept of the scholar. I.e., therein, the understanding thinks of the concept of the scholar as related to the concept of human. However, since the concept of the scholar has not contained the concept of human, this relation cannot ever be thought of as a priori but always as only a posteriori by the understanding. A relation that can only be thought of as a posteriori always necessitates a synthetic function of the understanding.

The understanding, which represents the concept of the scholar as connected with something that has not ever been thought in this concept, is responsible for grounding by what right it has amplified my cognition concerning the concept of scholar. Because when I judge the concept of scholar analytically and thus become conscious of what my thought has actually contained, I find that the concept of human never gives rise as one of the component concepts already thought in the concept of scholar. Therefore, 'All scholars are human' is a judgment in which the concept of human is synthetically added to the concept of scholar.

Given that judging analytically the concept of scholar cannot legitimize an addition of the concept of the human to it, the ground of its nevertheless being thought of as related to the concept of human should be sought in judging this concept synthetically. It is because the testimony of some third thing, on which the understanding must depend in order to cognize the concept of human as belonging to the concept of scholar and thus formulate this judgment, can only be attained from judging the concept of scholar synthetically.

Then, what should we understand from judging synthetically about the concept of the scholar?

If we recall the previous example, that was a judgment in which I became conscious of a rule that had already been thought in the concept of the body; there, the understanding had been content with what was already contained in the concept. Therein, formulating that judgment had not necessitated going beyond the concept, namely appealing for the experience, with the aim of attaining the testimony of some third thing.

Therefore, going beyond the concept means to look at experience for singling out an object which would justify the thinking of this concept as nevertheless connected with something that has not ever been thought in this concept. Accordingly, synthetically judging the concept of scholar, i.e., going beyond it and thus going to the intuition given in this concept to assess its object in the experience concretely, is the understanding's synthetic function to cognize what pertains to the object of the concept of scholar.

The rule that this judgment universally asserts is that all scholars are human. I.e., so to speak, in the subtext of this judgment, the understanding reports that the

rule it bases on is the schema of the concept of human in determining possible intuitions given in the concept of scholar. Therefore, this judgment asserts that the manifold in an intuition corresponding to the concept of the scholar has been cognized as determined in accordance with the schema of the concept of human. Nevertheless, if the power of judgment had not distinguished some third thing as an object, subsumed under this rule, of possible intuitions corresponding to the concept of scholar, understanding would not have legitimized by what right it has amplified my cognition concerning the concept of scholar. This third thing is the testimony of an object in the experience on which the understanding must depend in cognizing the concept of human as belonging to the concept of scholar. In other words, this third thing is the object, determined in one of the concepts of scholar, of possible intuitions corresponding to the concept of the scholar. The elaboration of the following sample will make that more comprehensible.

A philosopher is a scholar.

Given that the concept of philosopher stands under the concept of scholar that is also valid for other objects of cognition, the philosopher is the object, determined in the concept of the philosopher, of possible intuitions corresponding to the concept of the scholar. Considering that the possible intuitions corresponding to the concept of the scholar can be determined as a great multitude of different objects of experience, the philosopher is just one of the objects of cognition pertaining to this concept. Herein, a philosopher is some third thing that was procured from experience as the condition for being able to justify this synthetic function of the understanding that connects the concept of the scholar with the concept of human in an a posteriori way. Thus, ‘A philosopher is a scholar’ is a mediating cognition in which the thought regarding the relation of the concept of the philosopher to the concept of the scholar is

asserted in a categorical judgment. Accordingly, since the understanding thinks of the concept of scholar, of which one of the corresponding objects is also a philosopher, as related to the concept of human by depending on this mediating cognition, it formulates a posteriori the synthetic judgment ‘All scholars are human’.

Now, it is evident that I have not already included the predicate of the human in the concept of scholar. Nevertheless, since a philosopher, which comes before me in an experience as some third thing, is the object that I think through the concept of scholar, I do encounter in it with the complete experience of the concept of scholar. “For this *X* is the complete experience of the object that I think through some concept *A*, which constitutes only a part of this experience” (Kant, 1998, p. 131 A8/B11). For this reason, by depending on the predicates I have experienced in a philosopher, i.e., by grounding on the testimony of this third thing, I can synthesize the concept of the scholar with all these predicates that have lied outside of this concept. Namely, I can add all these predicates that have not already been contained in the concept of the scholar to this concept as belonging to it. Because this third thing, i.e., indeed experience itself, is always under my hand to justify my thinking of these concepts as connected with the concept of the scholar. In other words, along with the concept of human, insofar as I think of the concept of the scholar as also related to the other predicates of this same third thing and accordingly formulate my judgments, the experience is always therein for grounding the possibility of such synthesis. For the sole possible ground in legitimizing by what right the understanding amplifies my cognition about the concept of the scholar can be found in the experience.

Consequently, to judge a concept synthetically is to assert synthetic propositions about the concept’s object. When we look inside the concept of scholar, we encounter a rule of synthesis that relates it to something that has not been ever

thought of in this concept. Insofar as the possible intuitions given a posteriori to the concept of scholar have been synthesized according to this rule, the concept becomes as connected with this something, despite which is not ever thought in it. The judgment ‘All scholars are human’ asserts that this rule, which the manifold given in intuition to the concept of the scholar is brought together in accord to it, is the schema of the concept of human. Accordingly, since the philosopher is the object, determined according to the schema of the concept of human, of the manifold in an intuition given to the concept of scholar, the concept of the scholar is in general thought as related to the concept of human.

Therefore, since this rule makes possible the synthesis of the concept of the scholar with something that has not ever been thought in it, it must be an empirical rule of synthesis that concerns merely a posteriori given intuitions. It is because if we take this empirical rule of synthesis away from the concept of scholar and want to judge the concept with whatever remains, our judgments will not be further than an explanation of what has been actually contained in the thought.

Accordingly, the mere way of which understanding asserts synthetic judgments, i.e., amplifies my cognition, about the object of the concept of the scholar is to go from this concept to the intuition that corresponds to it. Nevertheless, since the intuitions that the understanding encounters in this concept are not given a priori but always a posteriori, the understanding can assess an object pertaining to this concept solely in the experience.

If the intuitions corresponding to the concept of scholar could have been given in an a priori way, the real object of this concept could immediately be cognized independently of experience. However, since the object of a concept, which cannot be

constructed in the pure intuition by means of the mere imagination, cannot be intuited a priori, the understanding can cognize what pertains to the object of this concept only in the experience and indeed solely mediately. “Now one concept cannot be synthetically yet immediately combined with another, since for us to be able to go beyond a concept a third, mediating cognition is necessary” (Kant, 1998, p. 640 A732/B760). For this very reason, the experience is the only ground on which the understanding must depend in legitimizing its synthesis of the concept of the scholar with the concept of human.

Accordingly, since the synthetic judgments about the object of the scholar’s concept can only be asserted by assessing this concept as a posteriori, these never hold apodictic certainty. In other words, the cognitions yielded from concepts containing the synthesis of possible intuitions that can be given only a posteriori are neither necessary nor apodictic propositions.

To sum up, the understanding necessarily grounds its synthetic thinking that the concept of the scholar is related to the concept of human on some third thing, which needs to be looked for in an experience through a special practice of the power of judgment. For this reason, the proposition ‘All scholars are human’ is a synthetic judgment that can only be formulated in a posteriori way.

3.1.3. In spite of requiring a synthetic function, some relations can nevertheless be thought of as a priori

At above, I explained synthetic a posteriori judgments. Thereat, the understanding had to refer to some third thing, which must be sought in an experience, for justifying its synthetic function in which it added the judgment’s

predicate to the judgment's subject. It was because the understanding, which represented a concept as connected with something that has not ever been thought in this concept, was being able to legitimize by what right it amplified my cognition only through the experience. Consequently, what made a synthetic judgment a posteriori was the necessity of some third thing which the understanding was able to think of a concept as related to another only by its means. "In every judgment there must be something in the subject that makes the predicate be attributed to it, and this is called the condition" (Kant, 1992, p. 497 764).

Then, the question is if the understanding can ever formulate a judgment, in which the predicate would be synthetically added to the subject, without the necessity of looking around in an experience for some third thing. Although the relation established in such judgments necessitates a synthetic function, the understanding nevertheless represents such synthetic relations on the basis of mere concepts and thus entirely a priori.

The example we will use to elaborate synthetic a priori judgments is the proposition 'Everything that happens has its cause'. This proposition, in which the understanding thinks of a concept, independently of experience, as connected with something that has not ever been contained in this concept, is a synthetic judgment that speaks of something that happens through a predicate of pure a priori thinking.

"Everything that happens has its cause" (Kant, 1998, p. 131 A9/B13).

This proposition, just like the proposition 'All scholars are human', is also synthetic. For, though from no analysis of the concept of what happens can be attained the concept of cause, the understanding nevertheless thinks of the second representation as belonging to the first. However, unlike the proposition 'All scholars

are human', the understanding does not formulate this judgment on the ground of some third thing; i.e., the understanding represents a priori the connection among these concepts without needing any sample from experience. In other words, though in no mark of the concept of what happens is involved the concept of cause, the understanding adds necessarily and thus entirely a priori the second concept to the first concept.

Accordingly, the relation to an object is not immediately present with cognition 'Everything that happens has its cause'. However, since the perception of something that happens is immediately represented as connected with its preceding perception through a predicate of pure a priori thinking, namely the pure concept of causality, the relation of cognition to object, namely the objective validity of cognition, becomes possible. The pure concept of causality is the predicate that the understanding uses a priori while thinking of the concept of what happens. For this reason, the understanding thinks of such connection prior to experience and thus necessarily. By being so, the proposition 'Everything that happens has its cause' in which the relation of cognition to object is asserted in accordance with this universal and necessary law is both synthetic and a priori judgment. So, the rule that this judgment brings universally to the experience is that everything that happens depends necessarily on a cause. This universal necessity makes the judgment 'Everything that happens has its cause' a principle with respect to its possible use.

Thus, since the judgment 'Everything that happens has its cause' speaks of the concept of what happens through the pure concept of causality, it is the rule having true universality and strict necessity as regards the whole experience. From a rule, which holds a true universality and strict necessity owing to being thought from the basis of an a priori concept, I understand a lawful form making an entire experience

possible. Hence, this lawful form making an entire experience possible expresses a universally valid rule in which all empirical laws concerning the synthetic unity of appearances in time can become as related to experience only under it. Therefore, all empirical laws relating to a certain order in temporal relations of the appearances are only the particular determinations of this universally valid rule. "But all empirical laws are only particular determinations of the pure laws of the understanding, under which and in accordance with whose norm they are first possible, and the appearances assume a lawful form, …" (Kant, 1998, pp. 242-243 A128).

Considering that the judgment 'Everything that happens has its cause' is thought from the basis of mere concepts, the synthesis of the concept of what happens with the concept of cause does not necessitate looking for some third thing in a possible experience. Synthetic relations that do not require the mediating function of the power of judgment are the a priori judgments that have not been derived from the experience. Therefore, what makes the judgment 'Everything that happens has its cause' a lawful form holding thoroughgoing validity for the experience is that it had not been yielded from experience but a pure a priori concept and thus prior to experience.

> They are called principles because they are not grounded in turn on others but instead provide the ground for others. They are also called *prima principia* because one cannot subordinate them to any other, and are cognitions such that all others are subordinated to them. (Kant, Lectures on Logic, 1992, p. 382 87)

However, even if the judgment 'Everything that happens has its cause' is a universal cognition holding thoroughgoing validity for the whole experience, it is

different from the mathematical cognition containing synthetic judgments about some space concepts like the concept of triangle. "An intuitive principle is called an *axioma*. … An *axioma*, however, can only be exhibited in intuition" (Kant, 1992, p. 382 87). It is because the judgment 'Everything that happens has its cause' is a philosophical cognition making its way in accordance with concepts and thus termed as discursive one. "Now what makes the difference in the kind of cognizing through reason in mathematics and philosophy? The specific difference rests on this: all philosophy is rational cognition from mere concepts, but mathematics [is] rational cognition from the construction of concepts" (Kant, 1997, p. 300 28:532). The discursive cognition deals with inferring particular judgments from universal cognitions according to possible intuitions given a posteriori to the concepts; however, since the mathematical cognition can a priori construct the object corresponding to its concepts by mere imagination in pure intuition, it asserts universal judgments from the particular cognitions concerning these objects. For this reason, apodictic certainty of discursive cognition is not a certainty that is sort of the mathematical cognition holding. "Discursive principles are therefore something entirely different from intuitive ones, i.e., axioms" (Kant, 1998, p. 640 A733/B761). Given that the apodictic certainty, in fact, can literally be ascribed only to the intuitive ones, the certainty of discursive cognition is limited within the realm of experience; and it indeed is in terms of a posteriori given intuitions that are entirely contingent.

> Transcendental *philosophy* contains the principles of synthetic *a priori* judgments from concepts. That which contains synthetic *a priori* judgments from pure intuitions alone is not philosophy, but pure mathematics. … Mathematics thereby becomes an *instrument* of philosophy, without itself being philosophy; and the principles of this instrumental doctrine belong to

> transcendental philosophy also. The key to this problem lies in the principle of the determination of objects (their intuition) in space and time, which [contain] identically in themselves the existence of their objects in *thoroughgoing determination*. (Kant, Opus Postumum, 1993, p. 188 22:81)

Given that the discursive cognition cannot a priori construct the object corresponding to its concepts in pure intuition and through the mere imagination, the judgment 'Everything that happens has its cause' cannot be immediately certain from these concepts themselves. From the certainty of judgment, I understand its objective validity. Thus, the objective validity of the judgment 'Everything that happens has its cause' is its possible use which makes it belong to the cognition of the objects.

Accordingly, the certainty of the judgment 'Everything that happens has its cause', which speaks of the concept of what happens through the pure concept of causality, cannot be immediately proved from the mere concept itself of cause. In other words, since an intuition corresponding to the concept of what happens cannot be represented a priori by mere means of the imagination, an event that would objectively validate the concept of causality cannot be constructed in the pure intuition independently of experience; for this very reason, the concept of causality cannot be made immediately understandable. Considering that an event that would make the concept of causality understandable is the condition of the objective validity of the principle 'Everything that happens has its cause', it is some third thing that is looked for in an experience and serves as the mediating cognition.

Accordingly, given that this synthetic principle, which precedes experience, cannot be immediately certain from the concept of the cause itself, its possible use that makes it belong to the cognition of the objects is the only way to prove its

objective validity. In that case, the certainty of the principle ‘Everything that happens has its cause’ that cannot be cognized immediately can only be proven mediately by exhibiting the relation of the concept of what happens to possible experience. Because the relation of the concept of what happens to possible experience gives some third thing that is the condition for legitimating what asserted in the proposition ‘Everything that happens has its cause’. In other words, an event corresponding to the concept of cause is only acquired from the relation of the concept of what happens to possible experience. Therefore, explaining how the concept of cause can a priori relate to its object depends on the manifold contained in an intuition given to the concept of what happens insofar as it is represented as belonging to the necessary unity of self-consciousness. Considering that Kant defines the way of explaining how the concept of cause can relate a priori to its object as the deduction of this concept, being added a determination a priori to the concept of something happening cannot be objectively grounded and immediately understandable without deduction. “I therefore call the explanation of the way in which concepts can relate to objects *a priori* their **transcendental deduction**, …” (Kant, 1998, p. 220 A85/B117).

The certainty of the judgment ‘Everything that happens has its cause’ always requires a deduction by going beyond the concept of what happens; in other words, the objective validity of the concept of cause necessitates a proof from something contingent through going to the manifold contained in an intuition given in the concept of what happens. “… we cannot have insight into the possibility of any thing in accordance with the mere categories, but we must always have available an intuition in order for it to display the objective reality of the pure concept of the understanding” (Kant, 1998, p. 334 B288). Therefore, I have to go from the concept of what happens to the empirical intuition corresponding to it to assess this concept in

the experience and to cognize a posteriori how an a priori determination is added to the object of this concept.

On the other hand, the fact that the proposition ‘Everything that happens has a cause’ requires proof referring to as deduction of the concept of cause does not result with that it is not a principle. On the contrary, the secure indication of its being a principle holding necessity and strict universality is its certainty that can be thoroughly proved by means of exhibiting the relation of the concept of what happens to possible experience. The provability of this proposition verifies that it is a principle making a whole experience possible. It is because the experience itself that is the verification ground of this judgment has in the first place become possible through the lawful form given to experience by this very judgment itself.

> Of course the logical clarity of this representation of a rule determining the series of occurrences, as that of a concept of cause, is only possible if we have made use of it in experience, but a consideration of it, as the condition of the synthetic unity of the appearances in time, was nevertheless the ground of experience itself, and therefore preceded it *a priori*. (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1998, p. 309 A196/B241)

Given that two components, such distinct sort as concept and intuition, are necessary for a possible cognition, what makes causality cognizable is an a priori rule of synthesis that determines the possible intuitions given a posteriori to the concept of what happens. “For two components belong to cognition: first, the concept, through which an object is thought at all (the category), and second, the intuition, through which it is given” (Kant, 1998, p. 254 B146). In other words, the deduction of judgment ‘Everything that happens has its cause’ is based on a synthesis of

understanding connecting the concept of what happens with the concept of cause in an a priori way. Accordingly, since this connection implies that my possible perception of something that happens is determined in accordance with an a priori rule, this rule should concern the synthesis of possible intuitions given a posteriori to the concept of what happens and hence be comprised already in this concept.

Now that my possible perception of something that happens is determined according to an a priori rule, this rule must necessarily be contained in everything that happens already. It is because the possible intuitions given a posteriori to the concept of what happens are represented as belonging to the necessary unity of self-consciousness only by means of this rule. "A manifold that is contained in an intuition that I call mine is represented as belonging to the **necessary** unity of self-consciousness through the synthesis of the understanding, and this takes place by means of the category" (Kant, 1998, p. 253 B144). It cannot be an object of my possible perception insofar as anything is not represented in a necessary connection with something preceding according to a rule, which determines the series of occurrences. Hence, insofar as something that happens has been represented as belonging to the necessary unity of self-consciousness and thus become an object of my possible perception, I do a priori cognize that it had been represented in a necessary connection with something preceding. This rule, which determines the series of occurrences, is the lawful form making it a priori possible that this preceding thing has been cognized as the cause of my actual perception that exists at a determinate time. "The schema of actuality is existence at a determinate time" (Kant, 1998, p. 275 A145/B184). For this very reason, the understanding thinks of this lawful form, which concerns the condition of the synthetic unity of appearances in time, in the rule 'Everything that happens has its cause'.

However, the a priori cognition does not concern what the preceding event itself that has determined my available perception is; because I might not encounter anything in the series of occurrences that would provide me with a rule of synthesis and thus correspond to the concept of cause and effect. Instead, my a priori cognition grounds on a pure representation, already present in me, of time intuition indicating the possibility of inferring a priori from the effect to a cause; because the succession of appearances is possible only in the a priori form of inner sense. Consequently, since the transcendental ground of the category of causality, which determines the effect a priori through its cause in appearance, is based on this pure representation, inferring a priori from the effect to a cause becomes possible with a strict universality. I.e., I a priori cognize that everything that happens is because of a cause.

So, the category of causality indicating that my possible perception regarding everything that happens stands under a pure a priori self-consciousness is nothing but a rule of understanding that manifests itself as the representation of a determinate temporal order in everything that happens. Then, this rule is the schema of the concept of cause, and the synthesis of possible intuitions corresponding to the concept of what happens can be represented in a determinate temporal order only by being in accordance with it. "The schema of the cause … is the real upon which, whenever it is posited, something else always follows. It therefore consists in the succession of the manifold insofar as it is subject to a rule" (Kant, 1998, p. 275 A144/B183). According to this rule, the series of preceding perceptions progressing by being connected a priori with one another proceeds by determining my possible perceptions in time regarding what happens. That my possible perception of something that happens proceeds in time by presupposing the preceding perception within itself is a necessary result of its being determined according to an a priori rule; thus, the experience

becomes possible through the law ‘Everything that happens has its cause’ that indicates necessity and strict universality of the connection among objects of my possible perception. It is because the law ‘Everything that happens has its cause’ is the principle of causality, which indicates the unity of the understanding.

To sum up, unless something that happens is determined as an object of my possible perception in accordance with an a priori rule, I cannot represent any event, which ought to presuppose its cause in the previous state, in mere intuition only through my imagination. “Understanding belongs to all experience and its possibility, and the first thing that it does for this is not to make the representation of the objects distinct, but rather to make the representation of an object possible at all” (Kant, 1998, p. 310 A199/B245). So, the concept of cause thought of as connected with something happening does not exhibit itself in mere intuition except a sample event provided from experience. If an event, on which the concept of cause would be applied, could have been constructed in pure intuition; in other words, if an intuition corresponding to the concept of what happens could have been represented by mere means of imagination, we might have ascribed a sort of validity to the concept of cause. Nevertheless, unfortunately, we would not have proved that such sort of validity was objective; because the concept of cause is nothing but a rule of the understanding intended the manifold contained in an a posteriori given intuition for being able to be represented in a determinate temporal order. By being so, such a rule itself cannot be an object of perception but be found in the perception of that which had happened, by manifesting itself in making the temporal order of perceptions that follow one another necessary.

The judgment ‘Everything that happens has its cause’ is a synthetic cognition but nevertheless thought of as a priori, i.e., prior to experience; by being so, its

objective validity, which is never certain from the concepts themselves, always requires a deduction by appealing to the experience. To prove whether a rule, which is thought of prior to experience, has validity in the experience necessitates a possible use that would make this rule belong to the cognition of objects. Thus, this proposition belonging to transcendental philosophy, which contains the principles of synthetic a priori judgments yielded from mere concepts, cannot be directly proven immediately from the concepts alone. "… if we were to allow that synthetic propositions, no matter how evident they might be, could claim unconditional acceptance without any deduction, merely on their own claim, then all critique of the understanding would be lost, …" (Kant, 1998, p. 332 A233/B285). Accordingly, since the concept alone is not enough for a possible cognition, a manifold contained in a sensible intuition is always demanded; otherwise, the understanding cannot determine any cognition in a certain way. Therefore, although the understanding independently of experience thinks that everything that happens has its cause, an event on which the objective validity of such thought would be grounded can only be supplied by the experience. So, a possible intuition corresponding to the concept of cause is nothing but some event that has been determined in the concept of what happens according to an a priori rule of synthesis. However, the possible intuitions corresponding to the concept of what happens are always given a posteriori and thus only provided from experience.

In final words, making causality understandable depends on that the effect is always being represented as synthesized with a cause. It means that the perception of that which had happened determined under the concept of what happens has always been thought of as connected with its preceding perception in accordance with an a priori rule. The understanding always seeks the condition of time determination,

which is termed some third thing and indicates a particular event, in an experience to objectively ground its thought that something that happens must necessarily be connected with a cause. Because the objective validity of a rule thought from the basis on mere concepts depends on some third thing, i.e., an experience that had fulfilled the condition of this a priori rule. “It is always busy poring through the appearances with the aim of finding some sort of rule in them” (Kant, 1998, p. 242 A126). Therefore, attributing the objective validity to the rule ‘Everything that happens has its cause’ requires that the power of judgment looks around in an experience for some third thing that will objectively ground the a priori connection between something happening and its cause. The understanding, which is a faculty of thinking of rules, functions as the faculty of judgment while looking around in an experience for some third thing that has been subsumed under these rules. Accordingly, the necessary connection of something that happens with its cause cannot be immediately certain from the mere concept itself. The law of causality can never be understood concretely insofar as anything is not given for the concept of cause. “For we have seen there that concepts are entirely impossible, and cannot have any significance, where an object is not given either for them themselves or at least for the elements of which they consist, …” (Kant, 1998, p. 272 A139/B178). In other words, unless a manifold contained in an intuition corresponding to the concept of what happens are synthesized in accordance with the schema of the concept of cause, it is impossible to cognize that any event was determined by its cause, i.e., by another event that had happened prior to it. “… the schemata of the concepts of pure understanding are the true and sole conditions for providing them with a relation to objects, …” (Kant, 1998, p. 276 A146/B185).

3.2.The use of reason

As explained above, a synthetic judgment thought a priori cannot ever be immediately certain from the mere concept itself. Rather, such a certainty, which would be the proof of objective validity of a priori judgments, always requires going beyond the concept, i.e., from the concept to the synthesis of the possible intuitions corresponding to this concept. However, since intuitions given to the concept are always a posteriori, I cannot proceed a priori from the synthesis to the intuition corresponding to this concept. For this reason, I always need the condition of time determination, i.e., some third thing standing under the condition of the rule on which I can ground the synthesis by its means.

The only possible way of concretely assessing the concept in the experience and thus cognizing a posteriori what pertains to its object is to go from the concept to the empirical intuition corresponding to this concept. Our unique faculty, which goes from the concept to the empirical intuition corresponding to this concept and enables us to cognize a posteriori what pertains to the object of the concept, i.e., yields empirical cognitions about the concept's object, is the understanding.

However, when it comes to reason, we encounter a faculty not dealing with intuitions at all but only determining the cognition a priori by means of the predicate of the rule. "… it has no immediate reference to them and their intuition, but deals only with the understanding and its judgments, …" (Kant, 1998, p. 391 A306/B363). Now, if we go back to the judgment 'Everything that happens has its cause', it is evident that it is not a rule that can be cognized through reason. For, as often stated, as well as thinking and cognizing are not the same, a possible cognition must necessarily involve two components as concept and intuition, at once. "To **think** of an

object and to **cognize** an object are thus not the same. For two components belong to cognition: first, the concept, …, and second, the intuition, …" (Kant, 1998, p. 254 B146). By being so, cognizing a rule means exhibiting its validity over the objects of experience, i.e., presenting a possible use that would make such rule belong to cognition of objects. Nevertheless, since exhibiting objective validity of this rule, i.e., cognizing this rule, always requires going to the intuition given in the concept, but since the reason is not a faculty dealing by no manner of means with intuitions, this judgment is obviously not a rule that can be cognized through the reason.

Then, what is the judging way of reason in a priori determining cognition through the predicate of the rule?

Reason judges through syllogism. However, since syllogism is just a form of inferring cognition, we take reason into consideration as regards only its logical use here. "Thus every syllogism is a form of derivation of a cognition from a principle" (Kant, 1998, p. 388 A300/B357).

Since rational cognitions are the cognitions of mathematics and philosophy from principles, they are always a priori. "We have said of rational cognitions that they are cognitions from principles <*ex principiis*>, they must thus be *a priori*. There are two cognitions that are *a priori* but which nevertheless have many noteworthy differences: namely *mathematics* and *philosophy*" (Kant, 1997, p. 299 28:532). In that case, the reason in its logical use can be defined as the faculty of a certain logical form of cognizing and indeed a faculty of inferring a priori. "Reason, considered as the faculty of a certain logical form of cognition, is the faculty of inferring, i.e., of judging mediately (through the subsumption of a condition of a possible judgment under the condition of something given)" (Kant, 1998, p. 403 A330/B386).

Accordingly, since reason is not a faculty dealing with intuitions but the judgments of understanding, its logical use in determining cognition a priori consists of syllogizing these judgments one another.

The general pattern of a syllogism appears as follows.

A → B

C → A

C → B

Now, let us put the judgments into this general pattern and track by how reason determines the cognition a priori.

Everything that happens has its cause.

The glass that is broken is something that happens.

The glass that is broken has its cause.

As already told in detail, the judgment ‘Everything that happens has its cause’ is a universal rule of understanding, which has not been formulated through induction but thought of thoroughly a priori. For this very reason, this universal rule of understanding deserves to be termed as a principle having thoroughgoing validity in the experience. As well as this principle that subsumes whole experience under a lawful form, the propositions also derived from experience might serve as the major premise in the logical inferences of reason.

In my opinion, the most complicated part of a syllogism is to make the minor premise understandable by means of which the particular in the universal can only be cognized; that is because this complication profoundly connects with the transcendental deduction of pure concepts of the understanding. Given that reason is not a faculty dealing with intuition, i.e., relating directly to objects, the minor premise that functions as a sort of bridge between reason and experience is, therefore, a judgment of understanding serving as the mediating cognition in all syllogisms.

The glass that is broken is the object, determined in the concept of broken glass, of possible intuitions corresponding to the concept of what happens. However, the understanding functions as the power of judgment while it seeks this object in an experience as some third thing that would serve as mediating cognition in a syllogism. Accordingly, the proposition 'The glass that is broken is something that happens' is a judgment of understanding serving as the mediating cognition, i.e., the minor premise, in this syllogism and indeed presented as some third thing to this syllogism through the power of judgment.

Since reason never relates directly to objects, it does not go to the intuition given in the concept and therefore does not deal with finding some third thing that will serve to itself in determining a priori the cognition through the predicate of the rule. However, the understanding can judge synthetically about the concept of what happens. In other words, the understanding makes it possible to cognize a posteriori the object of the concept of what happens by going beyond the concept of what happens, i.e., going from this concept to the empirical intuition corresponding to it. Accordingly, when the understanding goes to the synthesis of a posteriori given intuitions to the concept of what happens and thus assesses this concept in the experience, it yields the judgment 'The glass that is broken is something that

happens'. So, the proposition 'The glass that is broken is something that happens' is an empirical cognition in which the understanding judges synthetically about the concept of what happens.

The mediating judgment 'The glass that is broken is something that happens', which serves as some third thing, is the condition of determining a priori the cognition 'The glass that is broken has its cause'; thus, it is called the condition of time determination. The objective validity of the rule 'Everything that happens has its cause' cannot be proved unless a cognition, which serves as some third thing, mediates. A mediating cognition serving as some third thing is the object to which the rule 'Everything that happens has its cause' will be applied. Since this synthetic principle thought of as a priori is never cognized immediately from the concept of cause alone, I must always look around in an experience for some third thing, i.e., an object to which will be applied of the concept of cause. This object determined under the concept of what happens is an event whose time will be determined in a possible experience in accordance with the schema of the concept of cause. An object determined under the concept of what happens is some third thing that makes possible the employment of the concept of cause. Kant calls it the deduction of the principle 'Everything that happens has its cause'. "It is the exhibition of the pure concepts of the understanding (and with them of all theoretical cognition *a priori*) as principles of the possibility of experience, …" (Kant, 1998, p. 265 B168).

That is to say, a glass that is broken, on the one hand, is the conclusion of the previous event; on the other hand, it is the event that will be the cause of the subsequent event. In order for this series of connected alterations to be represented in a temporal sequence, some third thing must have been found from a determinate time of the experience as an event to which the rule 'Everything that happens has a cause'

will be applied; because otherwise, the concept of cause remains empty and signifies no mark what it means. The absence of some third thing is that no object is determined for the use of the concept of cause and that time is removed from this concept. This object, whose time will be determined, is some third thing to which the concept of the cause will be applied, as the condition of an event for being able to follow something else according to a rule. The glass that is broken is just a random sample event singled from a determinate time of the connected series of alterations. Accordingly, the glass that is broken is an example of some third thing in which the synthesis of the concept of what happens with the concept of cause originates. Therefore, in an event which precedes this event, there must already lie the condition for the law of causality; thus, this preceding event itself is again some third thing to which the rule 'Everything that happens has a cause' has already been applied.

Accordingly, insofar as the power of judgment can indicate an object determined under the concept of what happens as the event to which the rule ought to be applied, it becomes possible that the concept of cause is employed. In the absence of such an object, since an event to which the rule ought to be applied cannot be constructed by means of mere imagination, the power of judgment cannot find a mediating representation, which would serve as the condition of time determination; i.e., it cannot determine some third thing that ought to stand under the rule 'Everything that happens has its cause'. The representation of such an object indicates some third thing in which the synthesis of the concept of what happens with the concept of cause would come about as actuality; by being so, it is the condition of time determination that should be sought in an experience by means of the power of judgment; namely, it is the event whose existence in time would be determined by being subsumed under the rule 'Everything that happens has its cause'.

> Now to the use of a concept there also belongs a function of the power of judgment, whereby an object is subsumed under it, thus at least the formal condition under which something can be given in intuition. If this condition of the power of judgment (schema) is missing, then all subsumption disappears; for nothing would be given that could be subsumed under the concept. (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1998, p. 345 A247/B304)

Then, what makes the homogeneity possible between the object and the concept that should subsume this object's representation under itself? It is nothing but the formal conditions of sensibility contained in the concept of what happens; because the empirical intuitions corresponding to an event are given to the concept of what happens only under the sensible conditions. It accordingly means that nothing other than the sensible conditions can make it possible that the power of judgment can determine some third thing, i.e., a mediating cognition that ought to stand under the rule. Since the sensible conditions restrict the usage of the concept of what happens into a possible realm of experience, it is called the schema of this concept coming from the sensibility. "… although the schemata of sensibility first realize the categories, yet they likewise also restrict them, i.e., limit them to conditions that lie outside the understanding (namely, in sensibility)" (Kant, 1998, p. 276 A146/B186). Accordingly, the schema of the concept of what happens is indeed a condition of the power of judgment in order for determining some third thing in an experience, to which the rule will be applied. "The schemata are therefore nothing but *a priori* **time-determinations** in accordance with rules, …" (Kant, 1998, p. 276 A145/B184).

Therefore, just like the other notions, the concept of what happens contains the formal conditions of sensibility that restrict the usage of this concept into the possible experience. Since sensibility is the faculty of the conditions making it possible that

concepts subsume the corresponding intuitions under themselves, all sensible concepts are the conditions as regards determining the synthesis of possible intuitions given a posteriori. Therefore, all determinations making it possible that a concept is applied to sensibility are given only under sensible conditions. Since all our cognition as to something that happens requires possible intuitions to which an object can be given only through them, the concept of what happens is the condition of determining the synthesis of a posteriori given intuitions as an object of my possible perception. If the concept of what happens had not contained the formal conditions of sensibility, no object to which the rule would be applied could have been determined as an event at a determinate time. However, a glass that is broken is determined as an object of my possible perception, and thus it corresponds to some existence at a determinate time of the experience. So, 'The glass that is broken is something that happens' is an empirical cognition in which I assert the actuality of something that has happened. "The schema of actuality is existence at a determinate time" (Kant, 1998, p. 275 A145/B184).

Kant underlines that the distinction between what is cognized immediately and what has been inferred escapes from our attention. "… we constantly need inferences and so in the end become wholly accustomed to them, it happens at last that we no longer even take notice of this distinction, …, we take as immediate what we have only inferred" (Kant, 1998, p. 389 A303/B359). For this reason, the judgment 'The glass that is broken has its cause' seems as being cognized immediately. However, to infer the cognition 'The glass that is broken has its cause' from the principle 'Everything that happens has its cause' is not possible without the special practice of the power of judgment that looks around in an experience for some third thing. "A synthetic principle, …, e.g., the proposition that everything that happens has its cause,

can never be immediately certain from mere concepts, because I must always look around for some third thing, namely the condition of time-determination in an experience, …" (Kant, 1998, p. 640 A733/B761). Therefore, a particular cognition that is inferred from a universal cognition always necessitates the condition of time determination in an experience, i.e., a mediating cognition of some third thing on which the rule is to be applied.

Let us assume that our understanding had not functioned as a power of judgment and thus not yielded the mediating cognition of some third thing that ought to be subsumed under a universal rule. It would have meant that the condition of time determination necessary in employing the concept of the cause was lacking. Simply stating, it would have been that time was omitted from the concept of cause, and thus all determinations by means of which the concept of cause could be applied to an object would have indeed been left out of my possible cognition. Such an assumption would have undoubtedly eventuated in the impossibility of experience because of the fact that we could not have objectively cognized that an event has followed another without the mediating cognition of some third thing to which the rule would be applied.

The concept of what happens is thought in an a priori connection with the concept of cause, and the judgment 'Everything that happens has its cause' is the lawful form of this a priori connection's universality in the experience. Nevertheless, the objective validity of such a priori thinking requires appearances of a possible experience in which an event had always found its cause in the previous state. It is because some third thing containing the determinations which the concept of cause can be applied to sensibility only through them can be acquired from nowhere except a possible experience. Consequently, the objective determinations making causality

comprehensible for us cannot be constructed by mere imagination and accordingly supplied to our senses independently of experience.

Now, let me go back to the general pattern of the syllogism along with the judgments into which we place. As told before, Kant cites syllogism as the form of deriving a cognition from a principle; by being so, the syllogism is an a priori way of inferring the cognition and belongs to the logical use of reason. “Thus every syllogism is a form of derivation of a cognition from a principle” (Kant, 1998, p. 388 A300/B357).

A	B	Everything that happens has its cause.
C	A	The glass that is broken is something that happens.
C	B	The glass that is broken has its cause.

In the following, I try to deal with this syllogistic process step-by-step.

‘A’ symbolizes the concept of what happens. By being so, it is the condition for the power of judgment depending on its schema coming from sensibility. The power of judgment is responsible for providing to this syllogism a mediating cognition of an object determined in accordance with the schema of the concept of what happens. Before, I had the opportunity to state this mediating cognition as the condition of time determination, i.e., some third thing that ought to be sought in an experience.

‘B’ symbolizes the concept of the cause. By being so, ‘A’ is thought of in a necessary connection with ‘B’. The phrase necessity implies that the connection of ‘A’ with ‘B’ is thought a priori, i.e., in the basis of mere concepts independently of experience. Therefore, A → B is not an empirical judgment formulated with reference from appearances of the experience, but an a priori rule having necessity and a strict universality thought through the understanding. “In every syllogism I think first a **rule** (the *major*) through the understanding” (Kant, 1998, p. 390 A304/B360). Accordingly, ‘B’ is the necessary predicate of this a priori rule, which subsumes a whole experience under a lawful form. Then, we cognize a priori that the rule ‘Everything that happens has its cause’ predicates a cause to everything that had happened at a determinate time of the experience.

‘C’ is the object corresponding to the concept of what happens, and here it symbolizes a glass that is broken as an event. By being so, C → A is some third thing found in an experience through the power of judgment; i.e., it is an empirical cognition as to an event that had happened at a determinate time of the experience. Accordingly, C → A is the minor premise that is the condition of being able to infer a cognition from a universal rule in this syllogism; thus, the minor premise is a mediating cognition that will serve as a bridge between experience and reason. “Second, I **subsume** a cognition under the condition of the rule (the *minor*) by means of the **power of judgment**” (Kant, 1998, p. 390 A304/B360). Since the glass that is broken is an event that happens at a determinate time of the experience, it indicates the event to which the universal rule ‘Everything that happens has its cause’ would be applied. I.e., it is the event coming before us as the condition of being proved the objective validity of this rule. Therefore, the certainty of this principle can mediately be proven by means of the condition of time determination that ought to be sought in

an experience. Briefly, the objective validity of the principle ‘Everything that happens has its cause’ necessitates a special practice of our power of judgment; thus, such a practice is unique employment being able to subsume an event that had happened at a determinate time under the condition of the rule.

C → B is the a priori determined consequence of this syllogism by means of reason. Here, reason determines a priori the cognition ‘The glass that is broken has its cause’ by means of the predicate of the rule, i.e., the concept of cause. “Finally, I determine my cognition through the predicate of the rule (the *conclusio*), hence *a priori* through **reason**” (Kant, 1998, p. 390 A304/B361).

> The principle of the general judgment, or of the rule, is the *understanding* taken strictly <*stricte*>. The principle of subsumption under this rule is the *power of judgment*, and the *a priori* principle <*principium a priori*> of the rule is *reason*. … I use my understanding in all respects, also in empirical cognitions, and that is the empirical use of the understanding. But we can also have an *a priori* use of the understanding, and this is reason. (Kant, Lectures on Metaphysics, 1997, p. 59 28:242)

Accordingly, the major premise ‘Everything that happens has its cause’ provides nothing but a rule of synthesis as regards the a posteriori given intuitions to the concept of what happens to the reason. Since this synthesis is a synthesis of a posteriori given intuitions, but the reason does not deal with proceeding from concepts to the empirical synthesizes, there is nothing the reason can do with this synthesis. Therefore, reason always needs a minor premise that would mediate for itself to determine an a priori conclusion from the major premise. Even if reason ignores the objective validity of premises contained in its arguments, the objective

validity of conclusions reason determines a priori, namely its inferences, always requires a special practice of the power of judgment which looks around in an experience for some third thing. Therefore, this third thing is the objective condition of conclusions that reason determines a priori through the predicate of the rule. Therefore, the power of judgment is a unique faculty coming before us the time conditions, namely the conditions of time determination, suited to the concept of cause. By being so, we can rightfully say that without the power of judgment that is an intermediate faculty between understanding and reason, the cognition of the particular would not have been possible because of the fact that the concept of cause would remain empty. "… we also have an intermediate faculty between the two, namely for subsuming under a general judgment and under a general rule, and that is the power of judgment" (Kant, 1997, p. 59 28:242).

Consequently, a priori determination through the reason of a judgment that could be cognized only through the understanding from a rule thought through the understanding yields the particular cognitions that are derived from principles through concepts. "I would therefore call a 'cognition from principles' that cognition in which I cognize the particular in the universal through concepts" (Kant, 1998, p. 388 A300/B357).

3.2.1. The final aim in the formal and logical procedure of reason

I. All humans are mortal.
II. Socrates is a human.

III. Socrates is mortal.

As told before, syllogism is just a logical form of thinking in which reason strives to bring an argument to a conclusion by means of two premises, one of which is major and the other is minor. “In every inference of reason we have matter and form. The first consists of the premises {the premises are called the matter of the inference of reason}, the latter of the *consequentia*” (Kant, 1992, p. 504 772). The purpose of syllogisms is not to prove the objective validity of the premises contained in the arguments and thus the conclusions inferred from them because reason leaves all the work in relation to the synthesis of a posteriori given intuitions to the concepts to the understanding. “For pure reason leaves to the understanding everything that relates directly to objects of intuition or rather to their synthesis in imagination” (Kant, 1998, p. 401 A326/B383).

Insofar as the relation of the subject to its predicate is thought of in the complete magnitude of the subject’s domain, a judgment that might function as a major premise in a syllogism is always a universal rule. Therefore, the major premise of syllogisms, maybe not with respect to its origin but in terms of its possible use, is always a principle. The phrase *all* is the determinant used in general logic for expressing this complete magnitude of the subject’s domain. Thus, the subject of the major premise in the following, which is a rule that has been universally thought, gives us the concept that ought to serve as the condition of this argument.

All humans are mortal.

This judgment, which is derived from experience by means of understanding, is the major premise of the argument which reason strives at bringing it to a conclusion. Since the relation of the concept of human to the concept of mortal has been thought of in the complete magnitude of the human concept’s domain, this

judgment is a universal rule. So, the concept that I seek in this judgment is the concept of the human. The concept of human is while the logical condition of the syllogism in bringing this argument to a conclusion on the one hand but on the other hand the sensible condition on which the understanding is based in formulating this conclusion judgment. It is because the understanding can find something that does not lie yet in the concept of human in a possible experience only in accordance with this sensible condition. Therefore, while the latter, namely, to formulate the conclusion judgment, falls upon the understanding, the former, namely, to bring this argument to a conclusion, falls upon the reason.

Now that we made evident that the judgment 'All humans are mortal' is a universal rule, the following proposition is a mediating cognition found from experience through the power of judgment and thus serves as the minor premise of this argument.

Socrates is a human.

This judgment is the minor premise of the argument, which reason strives to conclude. By being so, it is the cognition of the object determined under the formal conditions coming from sensibility to the concept of human. Therefore, it is some third thing found in an experience by means of the power of judgment and subsumed under the rule 'All humans are mortal' by reason. Accordingly, the sensible schema of the concept of human is indeed a condition for the power of judgment because the power of judgment can distinguish in a possible experience whether Socrates is an object pertaining to the concept of human only in accordance with this schema. "In every judgment there must be something in the subject that makes the predicate be attributed to it, and this is called the condition" (Kant, 1992, p. 497 764).

Socrates is mortal.

The judgment ‘Socrates is mortal’ is this argument’s conclusion determined through the predicate of the rule and thus a priori through the reason. Accordingly, the reason bases Socrates to be mortal on the condition of his being a human. However, since reason is not interested in objects of experience, the accurate statement should not take objects into consideration but judgments and be as such. Reason justifies the conclusion ‘Socrates is mortal’ through the premise ‘Socrates is a human’, which itself is in need of justification. Therefore, just as the conclusion ‘Socrates is mortal’ is a conditional cognition, the premise ‘Socrates is a human’, which is the condition of justified this conclusion, is itself a conditional cognition. Consequently, the syllogisms, which provide us with conditional justification, lead to further arguments containing a new bunch of premises that must be justified through the subsequent arguments having another set of diverse premises; and so, it goes as far as it may go as such.

Correspondingly, the following three arguments have been set up as chain syllogisms, and each of them is an inference with two premises and a conclusion. Thus, as far as we may, the chain can be sustained, of course. Each argument is a new syllogism in which the condition of the minor premise that justifies the conclusion of the previous argument is sought. Therefore, just as each minor premise is the conclusion of the ensuing syllogism, each major premise might be made the subject to the different arguments in a way being the conclusion of yet other syllogisms. These ensuing syllogisms in different arguments exhibit just a simple example of being brought the understanding’s conditioned cognitions into interconnection by reason.

All humans are mortal.

Socrates is a human.

Socrates is mortal.

All living beings are human.

Socrates is a living being.

Socrates is human.

Everything that breathes is a living being.

Socrates breathes.

Socrates is a living being.

.
.
.

I feel the necessity to remind once again that reason is not a faculty dealing with the validity or content of the judgments of understanding; because all these analytical actions, which require judging synthetically about concepts by going beyond the concepts, i.e., going to the synthesis of possible intuitions, fall upon the understanding that functions as a power of judgment. Hence, the reason, which does not deal with intuitions but the understanding's judgments and concepts, makes its inferences solely upon cognitions arising from synthetical actions of the understanding.

Accordingly, reason in its logical use is just a faculty of syllogisms. Nonetheless, since its syllogistic processes that end up a conditional judgment supply every time a conditional justification, reason unceasingly desires to maintain this syllogistic process for seeking the condition concerning the condition of this

conditional one. In other words, each time the reason is obliged to justify its syllogism's conclusion with another conditional judgment, a new desire stirs reason to seek for a further ground of this conditional justification and thus leads it to a new argument containing a set of premises. These arguments, which the reason assumes will satisfy its desire to find a bit firmer ground, always consist of a set of premises arising from synthetic actions of the understanding. By being so, reason, which is not interested in intuitions for bringing them under rules and thus proving objective validity of the judgments, deals solely with seeking a firmer justification over its justification in the series of conditions constituted by the understanding through its chain syllogistic processes. Therefore, every seeking is an attempt that targets raising the series of conditions to upper constituted by the understanding with the desire to find a firmer justification. Reason sustains this seeking for every single conditional cognition of the understanding invariably insofar as it has been given. Correspondingly, each attempt to raise the series of conditions to the upper leads us to new syllogistic processes along with new arguments.

Now, reason's ceaseless desire in sustaining the chain syllogistic processes, which consist of the understanding's conditioned judgments, is towards to reach a conclusion that would be justified unconditionally; because reason assumes that the conclusions that are in need of justification by means of a new set of premises will never satisfy its desire. However, such a conclusion, which would be justified unconditionally and thus would satisfy the reason's desire, cannot be something corresponding to that which actually exists. Because something corresponding to that which actually exists is a member of the series of conditions constituted by the understanding; by being so, the reason would be obliged to make it once again the subject of another syllogism containing a new set of premises. In that case, a

conclusion itself that is not in need of justification is nothing but something unconditioned that will not be able to be made the subject to a farther syllogism. Accordingly, such a thing that can be no longer subject to any syllogism is just a transcendental idea motivating reason in sustaining its attempt for seeking unconditional justification.

> In the synthesis of intuition this corresponds to **allness** (*universitas*), or the **totality** of conditions. So the transcendental concept of reason is none other than that of the **totality of conditions** to a given conditioned thing. Now since the **unconditioned** alone makes possible the totality of conditions, and conversely the totality of conditions is always itself unconditioned, a pure concept of reason in general can be explained a through the concept of the unconditioned, insofar as it contains a ground of synthesis for what is conditioned. (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1998, p. 400 A322/B379)

So, it is evident that reason is not interested in finding something actual that may exist unconditionally. It is because a thing, which exists actually but still is unconditional, is something that must, on the one hand, belong to the series of conditions constituted by the understanding but is something that cannot, on the other hand, be the subject to syllogism. By being so, it is thoroughly pointless.

Now, it ought to be evident that any use of this transcendental idea is not concerning to constitute the series of conditions; instead, according to properly this transcendental idea, the members belonging to the series of conditions are made the subject to the syllogisms. Then, what might our reason be aiming in using this transcendental idea on the series of conditions constituted by understanding? If it

needs to be compatible with this heading, the question is as: What is the final aim of reason in its formal and logical procedure?

The final aim of reason in its formal and logical procedure is to bring our conditioned cognitions into a thoroughgoing interconnection by way of putting the totality of series concerning the conditions in a systematic unity according to this transcendental idea.

> If we survey the cognitions of our understanding in their entire range, then we find that what reason quite uniquely prescribes and seeks to bring about concerning it is the **systematic** in cognition, i.e., its interconnection based on one principle. This unity of reason always presupposes an idea, namely that of the form of a whole of cognition, … (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1998, p. 591 A645/B673)

The interconnection between our all conditioned cognitions is the systematic unity that comes about with reference to the form of a whole of cognition. Since the form of a whole of cognition is nothing other than a transcendental idea by means of which the reason sustains the chain syllogistic processes, it deserves to be called the unity of reason. Because, as told above, insofar as the conditioned is given, the chain syllogistic processes incline to sustain until reaching a conclusion that will not be in need of justification and thus subsuming all conditioned cognitions of the understanding under the highest possible unity of reason. The point is not the case whether an unconditionally justified conclusion would actually be reached but the systematic in cognition coming about in the course of reason's unceasing attempts on seeking unconditional justification in the series of conditions.

Accordingly, bringing all conditioned cognitions of the understanding into thorough interconnection is to bring the highest possible unity of reason into them. For this, insofar as the understanding gives the conditioned, reason sustains the chain syllogisms for seeking the condition of the conditioned in the series of conditions with the desire of reaching an unconditionally justified conclusion and thus brings about the interconnection of the understanding's cognitions.

Although it is an idea never being reached actually, to sustain seeking the condition of the conditioned till reaching the unconditioned one that cannot be the matter to a new argument necessitates the presupposition which the series of conditions continues stretching out until the unconditioned. Although this unconditioned is what drives us to go beyond the boundaries of experience, the reason necessarily demands the unconditioned for every conditioned thing with the aim of completing the series of conditions. For this reason, unless it is assumed that the unconditioned itself containing the whole series of conditions has already been given; the chain syllogistic processes that bring about the interconnection of the understanding's cognitions become impossible due to the fact that reason would not sustain to seek the condition of the conditioned. Because the final aim of reason in its formal and logical procedure is to complete the unity of understanding by sustaining the chain syllogistic processes with the desire of reaching a conclusion that is not in need of justification; nonetheless, unless initially being assumed that the unconditioned is given, since the idea motivating this desire would vanish, it becomes impossible to bring out the connection of conditions subordinated one to another, i.e., the systematic unity of the understanding's cognitions.

From this, however, one sees only that systematic unity or the unity of reason of the manifold of the understanding's cognition is a **logical** principle, in

> order, where the understanding alone does not attain to rules, to help it through ideas, simultaneously creating unanimity among its various rules under one principle (the systematic), and thereby interconnection, as far as this can be done. (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1998, p. 593 A648/B676)

Consequently, it is evident from all these that the assumption that the unconditioned is given is a principle of pure reason serving the final aim of its formal and logical procedure.

> Now since this rule is once again exposed to this same attempt of reason, and the condition of its condition thereby has to be sought (by means of a prosyllogism) as far as we may, we see very well that the proper principle of reason in general (in its logical use) is to find the unconditioned for conditioned cognitions of the understanding, with which its unity will be completed. But this logical maxim cannot become a principle of **pure reason** unless we assume that when the conditioned is given, then so is the whole series of conditions subordinated one to the other, which is itself unconditioned, also given (i.e., contained in the object and its connection). (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1998, p. 392 A308/B364)

4. SUCCESSIVENESS IN THE SYNTHESIS OF MANIFOLD PARTS OF SPACE: FUNDAMENTAL WORKING PRINCIPLE OF OUR MIND ENSURING THE THINKING SUBJECT REMAINS IDENTICAL WITH ITS OWN SELF

This chapter seeks to investigate the impact of the successive apprehension of the manifold parts of space on remaining the thinking subject identical to itself. It is intended to contribute to our research as much as possible, albeit indirectly. This chapter firstly examines the synthesis of the manifold parts of space and its links with successiveness in apprehension. Next, it surveys the time perception in connection with substances as the substrata representing the unity of time in the manifold parts of space. Finally, it focuses on the successiveness in the synthesis of the manifold parts of space and how this influences the thinking subject on remaining identical with itself. The following paragraph summarizes the conclusion that I reached after a comprehensive examination. Although the path that I have followed till accomplishing this conclusion may relatively seem overlong, it is owing to my belief in taking the connected points necessarily into consideration.

We apprehend space through the successive synthesis, occurring in time, of its manifold parts. In my opinion, the successive synthesis of the manifold parts of space is the fundamental working principle of our mind making a possible thoroughgoing connection among substances representing the absolute unity of time in these parts. A thoroughgoing connection among substances is based on the successive synthesis of the manifold parts of space. Therefore, successiveness in the synthesis of imagination keeping substances connected, namely preventing them from being isolated from each other, ensures the absolute unity of time in the subject. It is because substances are the lasting and unchanging substrata representing time in the manifold parts of space. "…

space alone persistently determines, while time, however, and thus everything that is in inner sense, constantly flows" (Kant, 1998, p. 335 B291). Since the synthesis of the manifold parts of space occurs in time and thus posits them successively into the inner sense, it prevents substances representing the unity of time in these parts from being isolated from each other by empty spaces; thus, the substances stay in connection with each other. Because of the fact that the substances are the substrata representing the lasting and unchanging unity of time in all representations, the isolated substances one another by empty spaces would cause time's absolute unity to be disintegrated in the subject. The disintegrated unity of time leads the thinking subject to lose its identical self, i.e., the synthetic unity of its consciousness in representations. The empty spaces causing substances to be isolated from each other will split the substratum of empirical time determinations that must remain persisting and unchanging in itself. Correspondingly, the thinking subject could remain no more identical with its own self; that is, the identity of the subject, of which I need to become conscious in every representation, can no longer be preserved. The thinking subject whose identical self is disintegrated cannot represent the unity of its consciousness in the representations; thus, the original apperception cannot exhibit a synthetic unity in representations, that is, the *I think* making all representations belonging one and the same consciousness can no longer accompany to them.

4.1.Apprehension of space or the synthesis of the manifold parts of space

Space is a pure intuition available a priori in my mind. From pure intuition, Kant understands an a priori given form of how one would be affected in the most

general sense; for this reason, it must have been represented a priori as a form of how one would be received intuitions by my mind before I was affected yet. Therefore, many things about space already available in my mind as a pure form of sensible intuition containing nothing empirical can be cognized independently of experience, i.e., even if there would be no object in it. Accordingly, space itself containing nothing empirical is the pure form of intuition and thus cognized a priori.

If space, as the necessary form of intuition, had not been represented in advance, since a form would not be possible by means of which I could have been affected by things, receiving outer intuitions would not have been possible either. Accordingly, it would have been impossible to represent things that appear to us as outer objects. This certain form in which we intuit things is our particular manner of intuiting native to our mind. This certain form of outer sensible intuition makes things representable as outer objects appearing in space, i.e., it provides sensible representations. From this, we can say that space is the transcendental ground of all our outer intuitions, i.e., makes them possible and thus has objective validity, namely reality in terms of all possible outer experience. “Our expositions accordingly teach the **reality** (i.e., objective validity) of space in regard to everything that can come before us externally as an object, … We therefore assert the **empirical reality** of space (with respect to all possible outer experience), …” (Kant, 1998, p. 177 A28/B44).

However, space itself as a pure intuition is not an absolute object that can be perceived alone; this is what was explained as the transcendental ideality of space. According to that, space is nothing if we ignore that it is the condition of the possibility of all experience; thus, it cannot be perceived in itself independent of outer appearances. “We therefore assert … its **transcendental ideality**, i.e., that it is

nothing as soon as we leave out the condition of the possibility of all experience, …" (Kant, 1998, p. 177 A28/B44).

Space is the transcendental ground of the possibility of external relations of outer appearances; by its means, things are determined as extended magnitudes and thus become perceivable. Accordingly, since space is nothing other than a subjective condition when things represented in it are ignored, the spatial relations do not refer to the space itself but allude to the relations of those represented in it. Hence, what makes space perceivable is its form that comes into appearing in these relations.

When it is considered in itself, space is our way of intuiting, i.e., of receiving the intuitions, which ought to correspond to the concept of the object. However, the reality of the concept of the object can only be justified by means of the outer senses; because the outer senses can encounter their corresponding actual objects only in space. Accordingly, the actual objects corresponding to sensation and containing an existence are those what we very ourselves have represented in space and time; because only those, which have been represented in space and time by ourselves, can be actual in perception. So, representations to which the actual objects do not correspond might be called deceptive because of the fact that no representations other than objects corresponding to the senses can be given to us.

Now, it is clear that space itself is just a form, i.e., pure intuition, and for this reason, it cannot be perceived in itself. In that case, space can only become perceivable by means of being apprehended its manifold parts that are represented as extended magnitudes. Space itself is not perceived but may become an empirical representation with which the consciousness accompanies. The faculty of imagination is responsible for the apprehension of the space through its successive synthesis that

takes up its manifold parts into empirical consciousness. Kant calls this successive apprehension the synthesis of apprehension through which the perception of space becomes possible. "… by the **synthesis of apprehension** I understand the composition of the manifold in an empirical intuition, through which perception, i.e., empirical consciousness of it (as appearance), becomes possible" (Kant, 1998, p. 261 B160).

Apprehension of the manifold parts of space takes these parts into consciousness as empirical intuitions that correspond to the concept of the object. The synthesis of apprehension makes possible an empirical consciousness concerning the synthetic unity of these parts, i.e., their composition. The apprehension of such composite is because of the synthesis that takes its parts into consciousness, i.e., makes its perception possible. Space is determined under the concept of magnitude as extensive magnitudes by the understanding, which combines corresponding intuitions, not as a connection but as composition.

The synthesis enabling the apprehension of the manifold parts of space makes the empirical intuitions of these parts into perception, i.e., takes the manifold representations, to which should correspond the concept of the object, into consciousness. An empirical intuition, namely the manifold in the sensibility, is the matter or content from senses for a possible cognition, and it is called empirical data that correspond to the concept of the object. Without representations corresponding to the concept of the object, no content would be available for the use of this concept which is the same as saying that no cognition of the object is possible. "… a manifold of sensibility that lies before it *a priori*, which the transcendental aesthetic has offered to it, in order to provide the pure concepts of the understanding with a matter, without which they would be without any content, …" (Kant, 1998, p. 210 A77/B102).

Consequently, the mere way to apprehend space, which cannot be perceived in itself, is the successive synthesis of its manifold parts. "The apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive. The representations of the parts succeed one another" (Kant, 1998, p. 305 A189/B234).

It is worth remarking as a short note that when I say the parts of space, I mean neither that these parts on their own are simple ones, nor space consists of these simple parts as its components. I instead mean that these parts can merely be possible under a single all-encompassing space idea. Accordingly, since one and the same space is a whole thought of as a single idea in one identical time, it does not consist of simple parts. "… if one speaks of many spaces, one understands by that only parts of one and the same unique space. And these parts cannot as it were precede the single all-encompassing space as its components …" (Kant, 1998, p. 175 A25/B39).

Accordingly, the manifold parts of space imply the empirical intuition given in space, and space is the condition of the possibility of outer intuition corresponding to actual objects, not of the things in themselves. These actual objects, to which outer intuition corresponds, are the synthetic composites that make space perceivable by determining it by means of their boundaries. These synthetic composites can be abstracted from space; in such a case, even if the possibility of giving something persisting in intuition, corresponding to the concept of substance, disappears, it is, nevertheless, that we cannot represent that there is no space. "One can never represent that there is no space, although one can very well think that there are no objects to be encountered in it" (Kant, 1998, p. 175 A24/B39). Consider it this way; if space had consisted of simple parts and we removed all composition of these parts from it, it would require that nothing would have been left behind; that is, we should have been able to represent that there was no space. However, since no part of space can be

given as a simple object in a possible experience, i.e., no possibility to be encounter anything simple given in anywhere of space, it is evident that space is not a whole consisting of simple parts. It is because space is just an idea, i.e., a pure intuition that refers to a subjective condition of how I am to be affected by something outside me. According to that, even if space is determined by means of these synthetic composites, space itself cannot be considered a determination dependent on them. Consequently, space should be considered nothing but a necessary representation that lies a priori at the very root of the possibility of all outer appearances. "Space is a necessary representation, *a priori*, that is the ground of all outer intuitions" (Kant, 1998, p. 175 A24/B38).

Space can be apprehended only through the successive synthesis of its manifold parts, i.e., the successive representations of them in the imagination. Therefore, the perception of space can only become possible by taking up its manifold parts into an empirical consciousness, i.e., placing them successively into one single time in which these parts are synthesized and indeed brought together as a composition. For this reason, the synthesis, concerning the apprehension of its manifold parts, which makes the perception of space possible, occurs in time. "Yet the synthesis of the manifold parts of space, through which we apprehend it, is nevertheless successive, and thus occurs in time and contains a series" (Kant, 1998, p. 462 A412/B439). Accordingly, even if the space itself does not contain time within itself, all manifold parts of space can merely be represented in an empirical consciousness, i.e., exist only in time. Thus, the apprehension of space implies a synthesis that posits its manifold parts into time and accordingly contains a successive series in time; then, so to speak, space is in time.

Insofar as the possible intuitions corresponding to the manifold parts of space are subsumed under the transcendental unity of apperception, the composition of these parts is determined as a body encountered in space and time and containing an existence. In that case, there must be a rule that brings these parts together in one consciousness and determines them at some particular point in time; otherwise, nothing could have been encountered in space and time to which should correspond our outer senses. This rule is the concept of an object, more precisely a body, and serves to bring the successively apprehended parts together in one consciousness and determine as an object of experience at some particular point in time. "Thus the concept of body serves as the rule for our cognition of outer appearances by means of the unity of the manifold that is thought through it" (Kant, 1998, p. 232 A106).

Accordingly, the apprehended parts of space are the homogeneous representations that have been taken up into an empirical consciousness insofar as they stood under the transcendental unity of apperception. The understanding determines these manifold homogeneous representations taken up into the empirical consciousness as an extensive magnitude encountered in space and time by combining them in the concept of an object. The extensive magnitude that is determined in accord with a rule of synthesis is an outer appearance; thus, it corresponds to a synthesis of homogeneous representations under the condition of the concept of the body. The homogeneous parts of space, which are brought together in accordance with this rule of synthesis contained in the concept of the body, have been determined as an object of possible intuitions corresponding to themselves. "That in the appearance which contains the condition of this necessary rule of apprehension is the object" (Kant, 1998, p. 306 A191/B236). Thus, a sum of the homogeneous representations that are successively apprehended are figured according to this rule of

synthesis in one consciousness; namely, the understanding thinks of their combination as an extensive magnitude encountered in space and time. Since the concept of body is one of the concepts of object, it is a representation belonging to the understanding and contains nothing but a rule regarding the synthesis of a posteriori given intuitions. By being so, it is the representation providing the rule of synthesis according to which a sum of homogeneous parts of space is figured in one consciousness.

Now, as explained above, the space itself does not comprise time; nevertheless, owing to a series of syntheses occurring in time, its all manifold parts simultaneously exist in one single time, i.e., an objective representation of spatial relations becomes possible. Thus, this series of synthesis is the condition for the representation of a determinate temporal order because an objective representation of spatial relations is the representation of a determinate temporal order pointing to the simultaneous existence of all manifold parts of space. "The three *modi* of time are **persistence**, **succession**, and **simultaneity**. Hence three rules of all temporal relations of appearances, …" (Kant, 1998, p. 296 A177/B219). Therefore, to represent spatial relations objectively, the manifold parts of space must have successively been posited in time, in which they will be ordered and connected according to rules; because all representations eventually belong to the inner sense, i.e., time. "Wherever our representations may arise, … they nevertheless belong to inner sense, …, as that in which they must all be ordered, connected, and brought into relations" (Kant, 1998, p. 228 A98/99).

In that case, all manifold parts of space exist simultaneously in one single time by means of a synthesis through which these parts are successively apprehended in the imagination; it is because this synthesis of imagination as regards the apprehension of the manifold parts of space always occurs in time. "… the synthesis

of the manifold parts of space, through which we apprehend it, is nevertheless successive, and thus occurs in time and contains a series" (Kant, 1998, p. 462 A412/B439). However, if the synthesis of apprehension had not occurred in time, any physical content that was to be encountered in space and time could not have been possible, i.e., there would have been nothing containing an existence and thus affecting our capacity for representation. Correspondingly, any sensible data making the objective use of concepts possible would not have been provided.

Our all cognition has already commenced with experience, and we ourselves are the observers that have been looking at it not from outside but altogether its inside. So, our endeavour here, so to speak, is not to construct experience from scratch but to reveal the conditions concerning its possibility by making an analysis of the already synthesized representations.

Correspondingly, by the manifold parts of space, I mean the outer sense representations that had been "… ordered, connected and brought into relations" (Kant, 1998, p. 228 A99) already according to rules. Accordingly, these are representations, even if they simultaneously exist in one single time, still apprehended successively by means of the synthesis of imagination that determines inner sense with regard to temporal relations; because this synthesis of the manifold parts of space occurring in time and containing a series takes up these parts into empirical consciousness as extensive magnitudes existing in different parts of the temporal series. Therefore, since apprehension is the synthesis that makes the manifold parts of space belong to the inner sense, neither part of space can be given prior to this synthesis that takes them up into empirical consciousness, i.e., determines inner sense with regard to temporal relations. If it had been given, this would have meant that the manifold parts of space had already existed in me prior to belonging to the inner

sense, i.e., prior to this synthesis that makes them belong to an empirical consciousness; this is exhaustively incoherent. For this reason, since the manifold parts of space cannot be given independently of the synthesis by means of which we apprehend these parts, the perception of space cannot be possible in us in advance of such a synthesis determining inner sense as regards temporal relations.

Like all other non-empirical concepts, the concept of the magnitude should contain a rule concerning the synthesis of possible intuitions given a posteriori; because this rule contains the conditions of which the a priori concepts can relate to the object of the given concept. In other words, if the concept of magnitude will be in relation to an object of the concept of body, the a posteriori given intuitions to the concept of the body must have been synthesized according to this rule. Now that this rule is the schema of the concept of magnitude, the object determined in agreement with the concept of magnitude is an extensive magnitude which is encountered in space and time and contains an existence; by being so, it belongs to the inner sense and indeed its a priori form, namely to time eventually. “Thus the schemata of the concepts of pure understanding are the true and sole conditions for providing them with a relation to objects, …” (Kant, 1998, p. 276 A146/B185). For example, this extensive magnitude encountered in space and time and containing an existence is a pen in which the synthesis of the concept of magnitude with the concept of body originates; then here, this rule comes into existence in the sensible concept of a pen. Accordingly, this rule is the necessity with which our thought concerning the relation of cognition to its object carries; thus, a possible cognition that ought to be made out of the manifold representations contained in an intuition given to the concept of the body will be determined dependently on it.

An extensive magnitude is the representation of a determinate space limited by the boundaries of other extensive magnitudes. The representation of a determinate space is generated by means of the synthesis that apprehends the manifold parts of space successively, i.e., takes up these parts into an empirical consciousness in which their composition would be thought in the concept of a magnitude. Accordingly, this synthesis of manifold parts of space, which generates a determinate space, enables the composition of successive representations of these parts into one consciousness. “I call an extensive magnitude that in which the representation of the parts makes possible the representation of the whole (and therefore necessarily precedes the latter)” (Kant, 1998, p. 287 A162/B203). Therefore, the representation of a determinate space is an object of my possible perception determined by the boundaries of other extensive magnitudes; by being so, it is the consciousness of synthetic unity of these successively apprehended representations in agreement with the rule contained in the concept of magnitude; because, in the most general sense, the understanding unites the manifold parts of space into an object through the concept of the magnitude.

The synthesis of apprehension makes the perception of a determinate space possible by taking up its manifold parts into empirical consciousness, i.e., positing them into inner sense and thus time; therefore, this successive positing of the parts is my perception’s empirical progression in space and thus in time. It is a progression in space because the apprehension of the manifold in the appearance of a body that stands before me is always successive; but, at the same time, it is a progression in time because every apprehended part is indeed an amplification of the determination of inner sense.

> Thus if, e.g., I make the empirical intuition of a house into perception through apprehension of its manifold, my ground is the **necessary unity** of space and of outer sensible intuition in general, and I as it were draw its shape in agreement with this synthetic unity of the manifold in space. (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1998, p. 262 B162)

> All growth of empirical cognitions and every advance in perception is nothing but an amplification of the determination of inner sense, i.e., a progress in time, whatever the objects may be, either appearances or pure intuitions. This progress in time determines everything, and is not itself determined by anything further: i.e., its parts are only in time, and given through the synthesis of it, but they are not given before it. (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1998, p. 315 A210/B255)

Thus, the empirical progress in space points out the simultaneous existence, in which the perceptions of objects follow each other reciprocally. The reciprocal relationship of perceptions is a relation of simultaneity, not cause and effect; while the former points to the temporal order in the outer sense, the latter signifies the temporal order in the inner sense.

The relation of five different pens, which I perceive them existing simultaneously, on the table is the reciprocal relation; thus, since their existence in time is not successive but indifferent to the order of temporal series, none of them belongs to the past time as regards other. Therefore, I can direct my perception to any of them and then keep progressing to the others, and later, my perception can progress again back to the first one. Even if this progress of my perception seems successive; nevertheless, this is nothing but only these pens' temporal order in the outer sense. "It

has only one dimension: different times are not simultaneous, but successive (just as different spaces are not successive, but simultaneous)" (Kant, 1998, p. 162 A31/B47). By being so, the temporal order of representations in the outer sense indicates a simultaneous existence in which their relationship is always reciprocal. That is the empirical progress, in space, of my perception; thus, which of them my perception will start with is indifferent to the temporal order of their existence in the inner sense. Perception of these objects does not follow one after another but each other reciprocally; thus, it is the reciprocal relationship among five pens that I perceive as existing simultaneously. "Things are simultaneous insofar as they exist at one and the same time" (Kant, 1998, p. 317 A211/B258). Now that this synthesis, which successively apprehends the manifold, occurs in time, in which the perceptions of objects follow each other reciprocally, every empirical progress in space always proceeds in time. In other words, since each apprehended part is a manifold taken up into an empirical consciousness, i.e., inner sense, it amplifies inner sense; by being so, it is a progress in time.

On this occasion, I have distinguished the temporal order of representations in the outer sense from the temporal order of representations in the inner sense. The former points to the simultaneous existence of outer representations in which their relationship is reciprocal, and the latter concerns the relation of cause and effect. Kant has made this issue clear in the third principle of pure understanding with the denomination of *Analogies of Experience*. In the following, I want to cite an example given by Kant, in which representations appearing in the inner sense coincide with those appearing in the outer sense with regard to temporal order.

> E.g., there is warmth in a room that not to be encountered in the outside air. I look around for the cause, and find a heated stove. Now this, as the cause, is

> simultaneous with its effect, the warmth of the chamber; thus here there is no succession in time between cause and effect, rather they are simultaneous, yet the law still holds. (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1998, p. 312 A203/B248)

4.2.What does time perception mean?

As told before, space is itself a pure intuition and thus a subjective condition as regards the possibility of the objects of outer intuition of their being given. In the most general sense, what I understand by the objects of outer intuition is the bodies; however, bodies are not the things in themselves but just the appearances we have represented by ourselves.

Furthermore, I briefly mentioned the a priori concepts by dividing them into two regarding the intuition they contain. Accordingly, cognitions yielded from concepts containing a pure intuition are mathematical. The concept of a triangle might be an example of this sort. Mathematic constructs its concepts by exhibiting a priori the intuition corresponding to them through mere imagination; thus, the exhibited intuition is the object of the concept and indeed the concept itself. Accordingly, since this object corresponds to this concept as only the concept's schema, and since the schemata of pure sensible concepts exist merely in thought, this object signifies universal validity for all intuitions subsuming under this concept. "The schema of the triangle can never exist anywhere except in thought, and signifies a rule of the synthesis of the imagination with regard to pure shapes in space" (Kant, 1998, p. 273 A141/B180). It is essential to pay attention that the manifold contained in the concept is the identical manifold that belongs to this concept's schema. "In fact it is not images of objects but schemata that ground our pure sensible concepts" (Kant, 1998,

p. 273 A140/B180). For this reason, when I put the manifold together in pure intuition, I construct not only the concept's individual object but also the concept itself. In other words, since the manifold that I put together in pure intuition belongs to the concept's schema, this individual object represented in mind completely a priori would be a universally valid representation for all possible intuitions standing under this concept. However, unless the necessary use of these concepts containing a pure intuition on objects of experience is displayed, they would remain without objective validity and thus significance.

> Even space and time, as pure as these concepts are from everything empirical and as certain as it is that they are represented in the mind completely *a priori*, would still be without objective validity and without sense and significance if their necessary use on the objects of experience were not shown; … (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1998, p. 282 A156/B195)

Even if cognitions yielded from concepts containing a pure intuition are the principles of mathematics, their application to experience always rests on the principles of pure understanding. "Mathematics has principles of this sort, but their application to experience, thus their objective validity, indeed the possibility of such synthetic *a priori* cognition (its deduction) still always rests on the pure understanding" (Kant, 1998, p. 284 A160/B199). Accordingly, Kant terms his first two principles as mathematical not because of concerning the mathematical principles themselves but their possibility and objective validity. "… I will not count among my principles those of mathematics, but I will include those on which the possibility and objective *a priori* validity of the latter are grounded, … be regarded as the principle of these principles, …" (Kant, 1998, p. 284 A160/B199).

On the other hand, I also mentioned a priori concepts containing the synthesis of possible intuitions, which are given only a posteriori. These ones are, in fact, called notions because their origin is not in a pure image of sensibility like the concept of the triangle but solely in the understanding. "A concept is either an **empirical** or a **pure concept**, and the pure concept, insofar as it has its origin solely in the understanding (not in a pure image of sensibility), is called *notio*" (Kant, 1998, p. 399 A320/B377). Accordingly, categories of understanding as distinct from the pure sensible concepts are notions.

The first six notions are the pure concepts standing under the categories of respectively *Quantity* and *Quality*. The first two principles, respectively *Axioms of Intuition* and *Anticipations of Perception*, are the rules of the objective use concerning the synthesis of possible intuitions contained in these pure concepts. Since the synthesis of possible intuitions contained in the first six pure concepts pertains merely to the intuition of appearances, Kant calls the use of the synthesis contained in them the mathematical, i.e., the composition of the manifold representations that do not necessarily belong to each other. Accordingly, the composition of the representations that do not necessarily belong to each other concerns the intuition of appearances, by being so, is the synthesis of the homogeneous manifold.

The last six notions are the pure concepts standing under the categories of respectively *Relation* and *Modality*. The last two principles, respectively *Analogies of Experience* and *Postulates of Empirical Thinking in general*, are the rules of the objective use concerning the synthesis of possible intuitions contained in these pure concepts. Since the synthesis of possible intuitions contained in the last six pure concepts pertains to the existence of the manifold, Kant calls the objective use of the synthesis contained in them the dynamical. Accordingly, insofar as the manifold

representations given in an intuition belong necessarily to one another, their synthesis in these last six pure concepts express a connection concerning the existence of appearances, i.e., the synthesis of the unhomogeneous.

> In the application of the pure concepts of understanding to possible experience the use of their synthesis is either **mathematical** or **dynamical**: for it pertains partly merely to the **intuition**, partly to the **existence** of an appearance in general. The *a priori* conditions of intuition, however, are necessary throughout in regard to a possible experience, while those of the existence of the objects of a possible empirical intuition are in themselves only contingent. (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1998, p. 284 A160/B199)

Whether concerning the composition of the manifold not belonging necessarily to each other or the connection of the manifold belonging necessarily to one another, all representations pertain eventually to the inner sense and correspondingly exist in one single time. Otherwise, we would not have become aware of the fact that representations that do not belong to the inner sense are our own. By being so, all representations which we are conscious of that these are our own representations exist in one single time and consequently stand under the a priori rules determining their relation to each other.

> All **combination** (*conjunctio*) is either **composition** (*compositio*) or **connection** (*nexus*). The former is the synthesis of a manifold of what **does not necessarily** belong **to each other**, …, and of such a sort is the synthesis of the **homogeneous** … The second combination (*nexus*) is the synthesis of that which is manifold insofar as they **necessarily** belong **to one another**, as e.g., an accident belongs to some substance, or the effect to the cause - thus also as

> represented as **unhomogeneous** but yet as combined *a priori*, which combination, since it is not arbitrary, I call **dynamical**, since it concerns the combination of the **existence** of the manifold … (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1998, pp. 285-286 A162/B201)

Insofar as the synthetic unity of representations belonging necessarily to one another is determined in accordance with a rule concerning the synthesis of possible intuitions contained in the concept of cause, their existence in time is successive, i.e., the relation in their existence exhibits a temporal sequence. Insofar as the synthetic unity of representations belonging necessarily to one another is determined in accordance with a rule concerning the synthesis of possible intuitions contained in the concept of community, their existence in time is simultaneous. The third principle of the pure understanding contains the rules of the objective use of the categories of relation, which determines all appearances as regards their existence in time. "As regards their existence, all appearances stand *a priori* under rules of the determination of their relation to each other in **one** time" (Kant, 1998, p. 295 A176/B218).

Everything in our cognition contains the spatial relations, the alteration of spatial relations and the determinations of this alteration. "… that everything in our cognition that belongs to intuition (…) contains nothing but mere relations, of places in one intuition (extension), alteration of places (motion), and laws in accordance with which this alteration is determined (moving forces)" (Kant, 1998, pp. 188-189 A49/B67). The third principle of the pure understanding, which comprises the rules concerning the objective use of the concepts of substance, causality and community, should be regarded as laws which this alteration is determined in accordance with them.

Now, all existence is in time within which all alterations are only possible in it. However, since time itself is not an object of perception, it is not perceived. So, to perceive time depends on being determined the existence in it; then, however, what is that whose existence would be determined? Whose existence would be determined is something which ought to be represented as permanent in which all alterations in time would merely emerge in it. In that case, since all alterations consisting of the relations of succession and simultaneity are possible only in time, to perceive time necessitates the representation of a persistent thing whose existence would be determined in the relations of succession and simultaneity.

Accordingly, insofar as the alteration of this persistent thing consists only in movement, its existence is determined in the relation of simultaneity of things represented at once in space and thus requires the application of the concept of community; correspondingly, the third analogy gives the rule of the objective use of this concept. Insofar as the alteration of this persistent thing brings about through moving causes or forces, its existence is determined in relation of succession as an object of the relation between effects and cause thus requires the application of the concept of causality; correspondingly, the second analogy supplies us with the rule of the objective use of this concept.

The alterations through moving causes consist of the members of temporal series belonging necessarily to one another, nevertheless none of which is homogeneous with the other. By being so, the connection of the series is only thought dynamically through a priori combination of its members, i.e., under the dynamical law of causality as a synthesis of unhomogeneous members. For instance, even if the concept of what happens is not homogeneous with the concept of cause, the former representation is necessarily thought of as related to the latter representation; thus, the

phrase necessity refers to their a priori connection. Therefore, the connection of members in a temporal series, which necessarily belong to one another, is nothing but the causal relations of appearances that can only be determined in accordance with this dynamical law. "Necessity therefore concerns only the relations of appearances in accordance with the dynamical law of causality, and the possibility grounded upon it of inferring *a priori* from some given existence (a cause) to another existence (the effect)" (Kant, 1998, p. 329 A228/B280). Accordingly, for every alteration in an appearance to produce another and thus for the temporal series to continue, i.e., in order from a given existence to be inferred another, the members of the series must have been connected in accordance with a dynamical law. If the existence of objects in time had not been determined through a synthesis, namely an a priori combination, of the unhomogeneous members of the temporal series, i.e., if the connection of the series had not been thought in accordance with such a dynamical rule, the determination of an event in time would not have been possible at all. "… the determination of the existence of objects in time can only come about through their combination in time in general, hence only through *a priori* connecting concepts" (Kant, 1998, p. 296 A176/B219).

Given that the use of their synthesis concerns the existence of appearance, the condition on which such dynamical use rests and through which synthesis becomes possible is the experience itself. For instance, let us take the synthesis of the concept of what happens with the concept of cause. Some third thing, which the synthesis of the former concept with the latter concept would emerge in it, can be obtained only from experience. Although objects corresponding to the concepts are only sought in the experience by means of which these are given to us, any characteristic concerning their existence is not something that can be encountered in the mere concept itself. "In

the **mere concept** of a thing no characteristic of its existence can be encountered at all" (Kant, 1998, p. 325 A225/B272). For the a priori concepts whose origin is merely in the understanding notifies nothing but a rule regarding the use of synthesis of possible intuitions, which can be given merely a posteriori. Thus, such a rule is the rule of objective use of dynamical laws and thus is the condition of their objective validity. It means that an intuition corresponding to an a priori concept regarding the principles of the dynamical use can merely be derived from experience; for this reason, the principles of the dynamical use cannot be directly proven, i.e., objectively cognized, from the concept alone. For a concept whose synthesis's use pertains in general to the existence of an appearance cannot ever be exhibited a priori in pure intuition; that is, its corresponding empirical intuition cannot be created by mere imagination insofar as the experience has not provided a sample. It is because existence is not something constructible, just like individual objects of pure sensible concepts, but a determination coming about through combination in time and thus through a priori concepts which connect possible perceptions of objects.

From a sample provided by experience, I understand the condition of time determination which must be looked around for in an experience. The faculty which must single out such condition of time determination in an experience is the power of judgment determining whether an event stands under a dynamical rule. "… the power of judgment is the faculty of **subsuming** under rules, i.e., of determining whether something stands under a given rule (*casus datae legis*) or not" (Kant, 1998, p. 268 A132/B171). Therefore, unless the synthesis of possible intuitions was not determined under the concept of what happens, a condition of time determination that ought to be subsumed under a dynamical rule cannot be found from experience. The rule contained in the concept of what happens determines the synthesis of possible

intuitions, given to this concept, as some third thing in the experience. Thus, the power of judgment finds it from experience as the condition of time determination to which the dynamical rule would be applied. I.e., the rule contained in the concept guides the power of judgment in order to distinguish some third thing from experience. “Hence the schema is really only the phenomenon, or the sensible concept of an object, in agreement with the category” (Kant, 1998, p. 276 A146/B186). This third thing, which has been determined in accordance with the schema of the concept of cause, is the phenomenon of the concept of what happens and thus the sample provided by the experience. That is why Kant defines this rule mediating to find the third thing as the schema of the concept. “Now it is clear that there must be a third thing, which must stand in homogeneity with the category on the one hand and the appearance on the other, and makes possible the application of the former to the latter” (Kant, 1998, p. 272 A138/B177). Accordingly, the sample provided by the experience is the object of possible perception, whose existence in time is determined under a dynamical law through being applied the concept of cause to experience.

Thus, experience is possible through a representation concerning the necessary connection of the objects of possible perception by means of a dynamical law. “… the determination of the existence of objects in time can only come about through their combination in time in general, …, experience is thus possible only through a representation of the necessary connection of the perceptions” (Kant, 1998, p. 296 A176/B219). Without this necessary connection of perceptions, i.e., a combination of the members in the temporal series, progress in time as a determination of time is impossible. For this reason, the time in which existence comes out is a dynamical unity determined through the progress of perception. “For this reason every transition

in perception to something that follows in time is a determination of time through the generation of this perception …" (Kant, 1998, pp. 315-316 A210/B255).

Consequently, time itself, in which everything is determined through progress in perception, is a dynamical unity. For that reason, which itself is a dynamical unity, is nothing but an idea and so cannot be considered a concrete field into which the manifold parts of space have been positioned. "This unity of time-determination is through and through dynamical, i.e., time is not regarded as that within which experience immediately determines the position of each existence, …" (Kant, 1998, pp. 319-320 A215/B262).

Accordingly, time itself is a mere intuition as the pure form of all sensible intuitions; therefore, time, which is a necessary representation given a priori, is just a form in accordance with which the relation of representations positing into inner sense can be determined; by being so, the objective validity concerning time which does not pertain to a shape or a position is only in regard to appearances; for this reason, it is not something perceivable in itself.

> If we abstract from our way of internally intuiting ourselves and by means of this intuition also dealing with all outer intuitions in the power of representation, and thus take objects as they may be in themselves, then time is nothing (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1998, p. 181 A34/B51).

So then, time is not something that can be perceived in itself except its being measurable. However, if the time itself cannot be perceived, then what is the thing to be measured? The only thing which can be measured is the magnitude. Duration is what we measure the magnitude of time by means of it because the magnitude of time is measured by duration. So, what then is the thing whose duration is to be measured?

The mere thing, whose duration can be measured, is existence. In that case, time is the lasting, unchanging and sole ground on which the duration of the existence is measured.

However, existence is not something constructible but a mere determination of one and the same thing whose quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature. I.e., existence is the determinations of that which is persistent and thus arises in temporal relations. Alteration of something whose quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature is a combination of its contradictorily opposed determinations. "Alteration is the combination of contradictorily opposed determinations in the existence of one and the same thing" (Kant, 1998, p. 336 B291). Nevertheless, a combination of the opposed determinations of one and the same thing requires a necessary connection with some actual perception because all real connections can merely be exhibited in the experience. "The schema of the cause and of the causality of a thing in general is the real upon which, whenever it is posited, something else always follows" (Kant, 1998, p. 275 A144/B183). Therefore, a combination of the opposed determinations of one and the same thing in connection with an actual perception can be intuited in space as its alterations. "In order to exhibit **alteration** as the intuition corresponding to the concept of **causality**, we must take motion, as alteration in space, as our example, indeed only by that means can we make alterations, …, intuitable" (Kant, 1998, pp. 335-336 B291). For this reason, an intuition corresponding to the concept of causality cannot be exhibited a priori by mere imagination. Instead, we need an intuition in space to give something persistent in intuition because a combination of these opposed determinations can only be represented over this persistent thing. Thus, unless a sample that corresponds to some actual perception is provided from experience, the existence cannot be created out of

naught by means of mere imagination. "… where should one want to seek objects that correspond to the concepts, if not in the experience through which alone objects are given to us?" (Kant, 1998, p. 325 A224/B272). A combination of opposed determinations in the existence of one and the same thing is a synthesis of a posteriori given intuitions determined as an event under the dynamical law of causality.

To summarize, imagination is not capable of creating existence out of naught because existence is not something constructible, unlike the individual objects of pure sensible concepts that can well be exhibited in pure intuition through mere imagination. Instead of that, it is something understandable only through being determined in time. Thus, since existence does not concern intuitions themselves but their temporal relations, it cannot be thought of as anything other than a dynamical determination in time.

In that case, determining existence requires to give something that persists in intuition. Something that persists in intuition is that which persists exists; by being so, it must be something lasting and unchanging on which all temporal relations are grounded. In other words, everything belonging to existence necessitates something that persists in intuition, i.e., a substratum which ought to represent the unity of time in them. Accordingly, the substance is this lasting and unchanging substratum that represents the unity of time in the appearances; for, only over such a persisting substratum, the mind has represented things as belonging to existence and thus made time perceivable for itself. "… the substratum of everything real, i.e., everything that belongs to the existence of things, is **substance**, …" (Kant, 1998, p. 300 A182/B225).

Simultaneity and succession are the empirically determined temporal relations over this unchanging substratum. Therefore, even if simultaneity and succession are

merely represented in time, these temporal relations are not the time itself but just determinations emerging on the lasting and unchanging substratum, i.e., belonging to the existence of substance. For this reason, what is perceived is not the time itself but only these determinations in apprehension. "Only in that which persists, therefore, are temporal relations possible (for simultaneity and succession are the only relations in time), i.e., that which persists is the **substratum** of the empirical representation of time itself, …" (Kant, 1998, p. 300 A183/B226). Accordingly, insofar as the objective validity of the category of substance is exhibited in the experience, i.e., given something that persists in intuition, experience is the sole realm in which all relations of succession and simultaneity can be apprehended as determinations belonging to the existence of substance.

So, determining existence requires that the ground in which things are to exist must be lasting and unchanging, i.e., the substratum itself that represents the unity of time in the appearances must always exist. There is only one experience in which all objects of senses stand in time relations; indeed, the unity of experience in which appearances exist is nothing other than the oneness of substratum representing the unity of time in them. It is evident that time does not subsist for itself; then, the substance ought to be the unchanging substratum that exhibits time's identical unity in all manifold parts of space. Because even if the experience is possible only through the necessary connection of perceptions, we can comprehend the ground of this connection only through the space in which the connection of everything belonging to existence is revealed. It is because the outer intuitions which the objective reality of the pure concepts of relation and indeed all other categories would be verified through them are only supplied by space. In other words, the concepts of cause and community are the pure concepts of relation; thus, all temporal relations in the

existence of appearances are determined in accordance with them. However, the intuition that would be given to these concepts is always an outer intuition concerning the manifold parts of space. Nevertheless, unless there is a substratum that ought to represent the unity of time in these parts, then, in the outer intuition to be given to these concepts, nothing persistent can be encountered, corresponding to the concept of substance.

In that case, there is only one time, just as correspondingly only one experience. The substance is the substratum that represents the oneness of time in the appearances of experience. Therefore, the unity, in one single time, of experience depends on that we give something which persists in intuition and thus whose quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature. "In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature" (Kant, 1998, p. 299 A182/B224).

Time, within which everything constantly flows, is this persistent ground itself and the substratum representing its persistency is substances. "… in this persisting thing all existence and all change in time can only be regarded as a *modus* of the existence of that which lasts and persists" (Kant, 1998, p. 301 A183/B227). Object, which exists in space and thus in a community, corresponds to the concept of substance in intuition. I.e., The persistent thing in the intuition, which corresponds to the concept of substance, is the object existing in space. "All appearances contain that which persists **(substance)** as the object itself, and that which can change as its mere determination, i.e., a way in which the object exists" (Kant, 1998, p. 299 A182/B224). In other words, the substance representing this persistent ground identically in all objects of senses is determined as the object itself in space because the substance is the unchanging substratum of all simultaneous existence in space and thus all change

in time. “According to Kant, every knowable object is extensive, is real, can be considered as a substance, causally interacts with other substances, and contemporaneously stands in a community with other substances that together make up the whole of nature” (Nunez, 2014, p. 643).

Consequently, I tried to explain time perception through the representation of a determinate temporal order that becomes possible only by means of the representation of determinate spatial relations. The representation of determinate spatial relations is the representations of outer sense ordered in space in which existence is determined simultaneously. The representation of a determinate temporal order is determinations of inner sense that we order in time. Thus, the order in space is different from the order in time, just like the succession in space is different from succession in time. Accordingly, since the determination of the inner sense depends on positing the outer sense representations into time, the outer sense representations are the condition to determine the inner sense; i.e., the representation of determinate spatial relations is the condition of the representation of a determinate temporal order.

Positing the manifold parts of space into one single time leads to a dynamical community; more precisely, even if positing the manifold parts of space into time is to take them up into an empirical consciousness, i.e., makes them exist in the subject, their simultaneity requires a reciprocal interaction among substances that represent time in these parts. The substances in reciprocal interaction reciprocally determine their position into time. “… insofar as the objects are to be represented as being connected by existing simultaneously, they must reciprocally determine their position in one time and thereby constitute a whole” (Kant, 1998, p. 319 A214/B261). Because substances only in reciprocal interaction lead up to an aggregate, i.e., a dynamical community in which simultaneous existence is possible.

However, reciprocal interaction among substances representing time in the manifold parts of space depends on whether a connection between them is. If there is no connection between substances, the interaction among them and thus a reciprocal influence from one to another would not be possible.

> Kant's argument seems to be that for two substances, or perhaps the states of two substances, to be recognized as simultaneous we must recognize them as mutually related to one another, and the only way we are able to do this is through the use of some concept and the category of community just is the concept of such mutual relation. (Thorpe, 2015, p. 16)

The successive synthesis of the manifold parts of space, occurring in time and thus containing a series in time, makes this connection between substances possible; this leads us up to presupposing an interaction among substances in the experience, and this interaction insofar as it has been represented in accordance with the category of community is cognized as their simultaneous existence in space. "… this is a reciprocal influence, i.e., a real community (*commercium*) of substances, without which the empirical relation of simultaneity could not obtain in experience" (Kant, 1998, p. 319 A214/B261).

4.3.The role of successiveness in the synthesis of the manifold parts of space

Reciprocal interaction among substances representing time in the manifold parts of space depends on whether they are connected. However, if there is no connection between substances, they are isolated from each other, and thus the interaction among them is impossible. Since the synthesis of the manifold parts of

space, namely the synthesis through which we apprehend space is always successive and occurs in time, the positioning of parts contains a successive and uninterrupted series in time; thus, this successiveness keeps substances connected. Insofar as the substances are kept from being isolated from each other through this successiveness in the synthesis of parts, the causality of substances determining each other reciprocally becomes possible in a community.

Firstly, to distinguish being subordinated to the other as the cause of existence from being coordinated with others as the cause of the spatial determination is required.

In the first case, i.e., in the situation being subordinated to the other as the cause of existence, we concern consequences and grounds as the members of the temporal series. However, since the consequences are not homogeneous with the grounds, i.e., consequences belong necessarily to the grounds, their combination does not exhibit a composition but a connection. "The second combination (*nexus*) is the synthesis of that which is manifold insofar as they **necessarily** belong **to one another**, … - thus also as represented as **unhomogeneous** but yet as combined *a priori*, …" (Kant, 1998, p. 286 A162/B201). For this reason, the connection of members in the temporal series is only thought dynamically, i.e., according to the synthesis of the unhomogeneous manifold. Accordingly, the connection of consequences with grounds does not constitute a whole because the synthesis constituting a whole is nothing but composition as a synthesis of the homogeneous manifold. Therefore, since composition is a synthesis of the manifold representations that do not belong to each other, only a combination of the homogeneous representations constitutes a composite, i.e., makes the representation of an extensive magnitude possible.

Here but, as the unhomogeneous members of the temporal series, the consequences belong necessarily to the grounds. So, consequences are subordinated to grounds in accord with a dynamical connection because the connection of consequences with grounds can be thought by no way other than dynamically. Accordingly, since the grounds are the cause of the existence of consequences subordinated to themselves, these determine one another unilaterally. This unilateral determination implies that, in time, in which the relation of the representations in our inner state is determined, the manifold constitutes a one dimensioned series. That is to say, since time constitutes a series, not an aggregate like space in which progress and regress are the same, the consequences can merely give rise through the passing of the preceding time. For this reason, by means of a synthesis of unhomogeneous as an a priori connection, it has been thought dynamically and independent of experience that a determined order in the sequence of perceptions in apprehension already exists in this connection. If it were not for this, we would have never cognized a priori that everything that happens has to have its cause.

A determined order in the sequence of the perceptions is what I called above as the representation of a determinate temporal order. However, the outer sense is a necessary condition for the possibility of the inner sense; that is, for a determinate temporal order to be represented, the spatial relations must have been determined in an object of possible perception. Because absolute time is not an object of perception in itself but just a constant correlate of appearances existing in three modi of time, i.e., persistence, succession, simultaneity. "The three *modi* of time are **persistence**, **succession**, and **simultaneity**" (Kant, 1998, p. 296 A177/B219).

On the other hand, an object of possible perception requires a synthesis that makes a composition of the manifold parts of space possible. Accordingly, since

composition is a combination of those that must be homogeneous, i.e., a synthesis of homogeneous, it is evident that all parts of space that make such a combination possible are homogeneous. "… the synthesis of a manifold of what **does not necessarily** belong **to each other**, …, and of such a sort is the synthesis of the **homogeneous** …" (Kant, 1998, pp. 285-286 A162/B201). Accordingly, since homogeneous manifold is representations that do not necessarily belong to each other, it is also evident that neither part of space is contained under any other, i.e., neither part is the cause of the existence of another; by being so, each part of space is in coordination with others.

Accordingly, despite the parts that are not subordinated to any other part being the manifold representations that do not belong to each other, these still constitute a whole that becomes possible by being posited all parts successively from one part to another into the inner sense; thus, they fill space with a simultaneous existence. That is to say; all parts are generated by being apprehended successively from one part to another.

In that case, a synthesis that successively generates all parts from one part to another must be a synthesis that determines each part by means of a boundary determined by another part adjoining to this part; it is because neither part of space can alone determine its boundary by itself. By being so, all apprehended parts of space determine each other reciprocally through their boundaries, just like the members existing simultaneously in an aggregate. No part that reciprocally determines each other is the cause of the existence of the other, but the cause of its boundary. So, it means that each part is the condition of the boundary of the succeeding that will be apprehended. It is because none of them is subordinated to

another; instead, all parts are in thoroughgoing coordination with the others in terms of being the cause of their own boundaries' determination.

For that very reason, the existence of the manifold parts of space coordinated with others cannot be represented in a *modus* other than a simultaneous existence. Nevertheless, simultaneity is a modus of existence as temporal relation of the manifold; thus, it requires a concept of understanding and a principle which would be the rule of objective use of this concept with regard to the determination of temporal relation at the existence. Substratum representing the unity of time in manifold parts of space, on which the concept of the community would be applied, is the ground for the relation of simultaneity in which substances stand in a thoroughgoing interaction with one another. Thus, the rule of the objective use of this concept, namely the third analogy, is based on this ground. "All substances, insofar as they are **simultaneous**, stand in thoroughgoing community (i.e., interaction with one another)" (Kant, 1998, p. 316 A211/B256).

So to speak, the simultaneity needs a persisting and unchanging ground in which this modus of existence can come out. Since time is not something perceivable in itself, this unchanging ground that represents time in the manifold parts of space is substance. It is because all temporal relations as a determination in the existence of substances are represented only in time; accordingly, the substance is that which persists in in-tuition given to the concept of community that would determine as simultaneity the temporal relation in existence. I.e., the substratum representing time in all representations is the persisting thing that corresponds to the concept of substance in intuition. "Consequently that which persists, in relation to which alone all temporal relations of appearances can be determined, is substance in the

appearance, i.e., the real in the appearance, which as the substratum of all change always remains the same" (Kant, 1998, p. 300 A182/B225).

Consequently, the substance is the lasting and unchanging ground as the substratum representing the unity of time in all manifold representations given in intuition. Relation of simultaneity in the existence of the manifold parts of space is the reciprocal causality that comes about in the reciprocal relation of substances to each other; because, in a simultaneous existence, each part is the cause of the other part in terms of determining the boundary of the other part by means of its own boundary. The reciprocal causality in the relation of substances to each other expresses that one part, as long as it is posited, is the cause in the reciprocal determination of others; because spaces that do not subordinate to one another do not determine each other unilaterally but reciprocally through the boundaries of the apprehended parts.

Accordingly, the reciprocal boundary determination can only be possible insofar as an interaction among substances, i.e., a reciprocal influence from one to another, is available. "Thus the simultaneity of substances in space cannot be cognized in experience otherwise than under the presupposition of an interaction among them; …" (Kant, 1998, p. 317 A211/B258). Nevertheless, if substances had been isolated from each other, any interaction among them, i.e., a reciprocal influence from one to another, would have been impossible. In such a case, it would not have been possible to presuppose them standing in a thoroughgoing community and thus to determine the relation of simultaneity at existence.

That insofar as one part is posited, all parts of space exist simultaneously by excluding one another requires the presupposition that there is a necessary interaction

among substances in the experience; because, just like the succession of events, the simultaneity of parts are nothing other than mere determinations in the substances' existence. Hence, a composition of one part, insofar as it is posited, with the other reciprocally determined parts according to itself is determined as the coexisting objects of my possible perception through a successive synthesis of the homogeneous. "They cannot be apprehended, therefore, i.e., taken up into empirical consciousness, except through the synthesis of the manifold through which the representations of a determinate space or time are generated, i.e., through the composition of that which is homogeneous …" (Kant, 1998, pp. 286-287 A162/B202).

Accordingly, from the interaction among substances, I understand a community in which they stay in connection by excluding each other. Besides, it is also through this very same connection that something taking place in one substance has a consequence in another. So, since the synthesis, through which the manifold parts of space are apprehended, proceeds successively and correspondingly contains a connected series within time, substances keep staying in connection without being isolated from each other; i.e., the connection among substances, which determines inner sense as regards temporal relations, lasts. For this reason, successiveness in the synthesis of spaces keeps substances representing time in all representations connected, i.e., prevents them from being isolated from each other. Isolated substances among which no connection is available neither enable a reciprocal influence from one to another nor lead that something taking place in one substance has a consequence in another.

However, if the apprehension of parts had not been successive, the synthesis concerning these parts would not have contained a series in time; thus, this would have caused substances, which are the substrata of all empirical time determinations,

from being isolated from each other. If it had been, then, since the substances would have been isolated from each other, their connection would have disappeared. However, there is only one time whose unity must be represented identically in all manifold which is subsumed under the unity of apperception and thus belongs to one and the same consciousness. That is, the time represented in all outer sense representations by means of substances is ever this very same time, and the series of synthesis contained in it concerning the manifold parts of space never interrupts. Time is not intuited in itself but in the objects filling space with a simultaneous existence through this connection. Thus, time unity in all manifold parts of space depends on this connection. So, without such connection, neither a reciprocal influence of substances leading to the representation of determinate spatial relations nor the dynamical connection of substances leading to the representation of a determinate temporal order would be possible. Hence, since a necessary connection of perceptions makes the experience possible, the substances that have identically represented the unity of time in these objects of perception must have been connected. Successiveness in the apprehension that keeps substances connected with each other is a necessary characteristic in the synthesis of the manifold parts of space. Accordingly, the substances excluding each other yet nevertheless standing in connection enables outer sense representations in many ways, i.e., composites, which are the condition of the possibility of things themselves as objects of experience. "… insofar as they stand outside one another and yet in connection, constitute a composite (*compositum reale*), and composites of this sort are possible in many ways. … three dynamical relations, …, inherence, of consequence, and of composition" (Kant, 1998, p. 319 A215/B262).

Consequently, apprehension is the synthesis that positions manifold parts of space successively and thus contains a series in time. The synthesis of apprehension, which adjoins parts one another by determining each part through the boundary that had been determined in the previous one, makes substances, which represent time in these parts and are the substrata of all empirical time determinations, throughout connected. “Substances (in appearance) are the substrata of all time-determinations” (Kant, 1998, p. 303 A188/B231). Through this connection, any sort of dynamic relation becomes determinable as objects of my possible perception.

Now, I want to draw a bit more detailed attention to the role of successiveness in the synthesis of imagination; but priorly, I will try to clarify what I mean by successiveness over a straightforward example from regular number patterns.

Example I: 10000 - 20000 - 30000 - 40000 - ...

Example II: 3 - 6 - 9 - 12 - ...

Example III: 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - ...

Example IV: 0.001 - 0.002 - 0.003 - 0.004 - ...

The numbers progress in increasing by 10000 in the first pattern, 3 in the second, 1 in the third, and 0.001 in the fourth. No matter how narrow or wide the increment range is, there is an infinite quantity of numbers occupied between members of each pattern; and it is evident that neither infinity can be greater or smaller than another. The infinite magnitude between numbers of each pattern is a representation thought of as a straight line summing up the successive positioning figuratively from one point to another, and indeed, it symbolizes our time representation. Thus, such addition from one to another, which determines inner sense successively, progresses by generating the infinitive amount of numbers without

interrupting of sequence and indeed makes an external figurative representation of time possible for us. Therefore, it is impossible to think that we skip any point and leave there empty in any place of this successive sequence, in which homogeneous points are ceaselessly generated and placed one to another. Where we leave empty is not to pass a number without saying it, but means a gap in which no substratum representing the unity of time is. However, since time is an absolute unity, where is left empty in which its unity is not represented disintegrates the time's thoroughness in us. It is because anywhere in which the unity of time is not represented would cause points to be isolated from each other. The unity of time in one and the same consciousness is these points' connection preventing their isolation from one another, and the successive positioning is the fundamental working principle of our mind which ensures their thoroughgoing connection in one consciousness. Hence, any gap that will cause the series to be cut is possible neither between 10000 and 20000 nor 0,001 and 0,002. If it were, it would not have been possible to continue these number patterns and thus obtain the empirical relation of succession from them because of the fact that time could not have been represented as an uninterrupted line stretching to infinity. Accordingly, successiveness is a thoroughgoing adjacency preventing any gap and interruption in the series; by being so, it is the condition for representing the time for ourselves as an absolute unity.

Now, the successiveness in the synthesis of manifold parts of space does not notify a temporal succession but the boundary that makes interaction among substances possible; because even if it posits them outside one another, it nevertheless makes them remain in connection. Accordingly, the boundary is not something in itself independent of parts but the connection consisting of juxtaposing the parts themselves. Therefore, the synthesis of apprehension is a juxtaposition of these parts

in an empirical consciousness; thus, unless these juxtapositioned parts are not taken under a rule, it does not yet point out a temporal relation; by being so, the successiveness in the synthesis is just subjective. “Now in experience, to be sure, perceptions come together only contingently, so that no necessity of their connection is or can become evident in the perceptions themselves, since apprehension is only a juxtaposition of the manifold of empirical intuition, …” (Kant, 1998, p. 296 A176/B219). In other words, although the synthesis of apprehension makes perception possible by taking up manifold parts of space into an empirical consciousness, a rule concerning that the perceptions reciprocally follow each other or progress in a temporal sequence from one to another does not lie in perception. It is because subsuming the objects of possible perception under the rules determining their relations of existence requires a specific action belonging to the understanding because understanding is the faculty of rules.

Therefore, combining perceptions in apprehension by means of the a priori relation concepts, and thus determining the temporal relations in existence, namely the simultaneity of substances or succession of perceptions, is a function belonging to the understanding. Accordingly, perceptions that follow each other reciprocally represent the relation of simultaneity in existence according to the concept of the community. Perceptions proceeding in a certain temporal order from one to another represent the relation of succession according to the concept of causality. The relations of simultaneity and succession can only be determined into an object of possible perception on a persisting substratum. Since substances are thus the unchanging substrata representing the unity of time in appearances, succession and simultaneity of appearances, namely all temporal relations in their existence, can be determined in substances alone. “All appearances are in time, in which, as substratum

(as persistent form of inner intuition), both **simultaneity** as well as **succession** can alone be represented" (Kant, 1998, p. 300 A182/B224).

If the substances representing the absolute unity of time in these parts had not stood in a thoroughgoing connection, the understanding would not have determined these apprehended parts in a way existing in space simultaneously. Insofar as the interaction among substances representing the unity of time in manifold parts of space is possible, the relation of simultaneity among the numerous things filling space is cognized as an object of our possible perception. Cognizing the relation of simultaneity as an object of my possible perception means that the reciprocal sequence of perceptions is objectively represented, i.e., that the space becomes perceivable through its predicates determined in spatial relations of objects of possible perception.

Now, in the earlier paragraph, I said that successiveness in the synthesis of manifold parts of space notifies a boundary that enables the connection among substances representing time in these parts. Besides, the boundary was an adjacently positing of parts that do not allow emptiness between the series of apprehended spaces. Accordingly, the boundary is the adjacency in positioning coordinated parts of space, none of which is the condition of the another's existence. Such juxtapositioning, in which each further added part is the condition of the boundary of the previous, makes sure of the time's absolute unity in the subject on account of preventing substances from being isolated from each other. It is because the lasting and unchanging substrata representing the absolute unity of time in the series of the apprehended spaces are the substances.

Even if I have mentioned in number patterns example, I want to express once more what I mean by the emptiness in order not to cause any misunderstanding. The phrase ‘emptiness’ must not be understood as some sort of intermediate place between the series of apprehended spaces in which no sensible object is at all, for we are concerned with nothing other than the representations. I can best articulate emptiness as nihility in which the unity of time has not been represented; by being so, it remains utterly incomprehensible to us. However, experience is a synthetic unity, and the unity of time expresses an underlying persistence that must always remain identical to itself throughout this synthetic unity. Such an underlying persistence reveals itself in temporal relations of objects of possible perception as mere determinations in the existence of substance. For this reason, any emptiness within which time is not represented will cause the time’s absolute unity in the subject to be disintegrated. That unity of time disintegrates means that the thinking subject loses its identical self, i.e., the synthetic unity of its consciousness in its representations. So to speak, since empty spaces, namely any emptiness between the series of aggregated spaces, will split substratum that must stay persisting and unchanging, the thinking subject cannot remain identical with its own self, too. It is the same as saying that apperception cannot exhibit a synthetic unity in representations.

Accordingly, successiveness in the synthesis of manifold parts of space is the fundamental working principle of our mind which takes the thinking subject under assurance to remain identical to itself. Thus, the time’s empirical unity in the representations is the identical unity of apperception that accompanies them with *I think*.

Now, if we want to judge synthetically about the concept of community, i.e., to ascribe an objective validity to it, we must go to the intuition given in this concept.

That which will guide us in going from the concept of community to the empirical intuition corresponding to it is the schema of the concept of community. The simultaneity of determinations of a substance with those of others is the schema of the concept of community. "The schema of community (reciprocity), or of the reciprocal causality of substances with regard to their accidents, is the simultaneity of the determinations of the one with those of the other, in accordance with a general rule" (Kant, 1998, p. 275 A144/B184). According to its schema, I can go beyond the concept of community and assess it empirically, i.e., judge this concept synthetically. Accordingly, in order to cognize a posteriori what pertains to the object of the concept of community, I need to perceive the simultaneity of substances in a possible experience insofar as they stand in a dynamical community. The simultaneity of substances in a possible experience is the object of the concept of community. "… they must stand in dynamical community (immediately or mediately) if their simultaneity is to be cognized in any possible experience" (Kant, 1998, p. 318 A213/B259). However, to perceive the simultaneity of substances in a possible experience depends firstly on if we give something persistent that corresponds to the concept of substance in outer intuition. The condition of giving something persistent corresponding to the concept of substance in outer intuition is to determine the manifold parts of space persistently in time in which everything constantly flows; thus, the substances are the substrata of determining the manifold parts of space persistently in time. Accordingly, every appearance as outer intuition is an extensive magnitude determined by the synthesis of the manifold parts of space, which occurs in time and contains a series.

The synthesis determining space persistently in time occurs in time and contains a series in which the time itself is generated by being placed homogeneous

points successively without a gap. “Thus number is nothing other than the unity of the synthesis of the manifold of a homogeneous intuition in general, because I generate time itself in the apprehension of the intuition” (Kant, 1998, p. 274 A143/B182). The successive apprehension makes it possible that all parts of space, none of which is subordinated to the other, constitute an aggregate, in which the determinations of a substance exist simultaneous with those of other substances. Accordingly, the substances, which represent the lasting and unchanging unity of time in all manifold parts of space, stand in a community in which they exclude each other, by being so, fill space simultaneously. That is, the temporal relation in their existence is perceived simultaneously.

Disconnection of the substances prevents them from being represented in a dynamic community where they would exclude each other. Therefore, since a reciprocal influence of the substances isolated from each other could not be possible, their temporal relation would not be determined as coexisting objects of possible perception; i.e., it would not have been possible to experience objects existing simultaneously in space.

Consequently, if manifold parts of space had not been posited successively, the substances representing the unity of time in these parts would have been isolated from each other by empty spaces. Hence, any composition concerning the objects of possible perception would not have arisen from these parts, which did not hold the unity of apperception. However, time is absolute unity; therefore, the substances being isolated by empty spaces cause time’s thoroughness to be disintegrated in us. In other words, the isolated substances cause gaps, i.e., empty spaces, in which time is not represented; thus, gaps, in this sense, lead the time’s absolute unity in the subject to be disintegrated. Time’s disintegrated unity causes the thinking subject loses its

identical self, i.e., the synthetic unity of its consciousness in its representations. Empty spaces, i.e., any emptiness between the series of aggregated spaces, are because of the isolated substances. So to speak, empty spaces that do not hold the time's unity will split substratum that must stay persisting and unchanging; so, the thinking subject will not remain identical with its own self. It is the same as saying that apperception cannot exhibit a synthetic unity in representations. For this reason, successiveness in the synthesis of manifold parts of space is the fundamental working principle of our mind preventing substances from being isolated from one another.

5. THE TRANSCENDENTAL OBJECT AS SOMETHING THAT GROUNDS INNER INTUITION AND OUTER APPEARANCES

Here, I treated if a cognition of the transcendental object is possible respectively with regard to my own self and the thing in itself. Given that the issue concerns time in terms of the inner sense and space in terms of the outer appearances, I need to consider space and time once more by paying attention not to fall into repetition with the previous parts.

Space and time are the pure forms of sensible intuition, i.e., things can merely be given to us according to these forms. These formal and pure conditions of sensibility are the conditions of possibility that the concepts of understanding are applied to any object because the objective validity of categories is only in question as regards sensible intuition. Therefore, since categories can be valid in relation to the unity of intuitions given under the formal and pure conditions of sensibility, Kant regards space and time as principles of all synthetic a priori cognitions.

By the form, I understand the mere subjective constitution of our mind, which precedes all our perception of an object and thus makes its cognition possible. Therefore, space and time are the subjective forms that themselves cannot be intuited but given originally and a priori in the representation. Since space and time are not the objects of intuition of the given manifold in appearance, their reality as our mind's subjective constitution is not absolute but empirical. Accordingly, space and time are objectively valid representations only in regard to appearances. Nothing other than objects of sense is given to us; furthermore, intuition is the condition of which space and time can belong to representations of these objects. However, since the formal condition of intuition is space and time, as soon as we disregard these formal

conditions, nothing is given to us; thus, space and time alone signify nothing and never represent things in themselves. Kant calls it the transcendental ideality of space and time. The following citation concerning space is also valid for time.

> We therefore assert the **empirical reality** of space (with respect to all possible outer experience), though to be sure at the same time its **transcendental ideality**, i.e., that it is nothing as soon as we leave out the condition of the possibility of all experience, and take it as something that grounds the things in themselves. (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1998, p. 160 A28/B44)

Accordingly, space and time are the mere conditions of our way of intuiting things and thus depend on the subject. Thus, through them, the receptivity of our sensibility becomes possible, i.e., our sensibility receives representations; that is, objects are 'given to us'. "… as soon as we take away our subjective constitution, the represented object with the properties that sensible intuition attributes to it is nowhere to be encountered, …, for it is just this subjective constitution that determines its form as appearance" (Kant, 1998, p. 186 A44/B62).

Accordingly, space and time alone are not objective representations in themselves but subjective conditions serving for receiving the representations of objects; for this very reason, the mere field in which we can attribute objective validity to them is the experience because the empirical reality of space and time is limited to appearances as representations belonging to the subject. Consequently, the transcendental ideality of space and time means that they are merely subjective representations. "Space itself, however, together with time, and, with both, all appearances, are **not things**, but rather nothing but representations, and they cannot exist at all outside our mind; …" (Kant, 1998, p. 511 A492/B520).

Since space and time are the pure forms of our way of intuiting representations regarding an object, they are a priori given pure intuitions native to the subjective constitution of our senses; according to that, pure intuition, i.e., our form of receiving objects, is the only one given a priori to us. However, what corresponds to sensation, namely what constitutes the reality in appearance, can only be given a posteriori. Hence, the form that we intuit things by its means is not a property that can be attributed to things in themselves. In other words, we cannot assert that things have form in themselves. If it were, we could have cognized things as they are in themselves independently of receptivity of our sensibility. For this reason, what we can cognize is the objects of possible perception, which are accompanied by consciousness and thus made belonging to the inner sense, and these are only objects of sensible intuition whose possibility depends on their relation to our thought. Therefore, we merely cognize things that exist in us depending on our way of representing them. "… as appearances they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us. What may be the case with objects in themselves and abstracted from all this receptivity of our sensibility remains entirely unknown to us" (Kant, 1998, p. 185 A42/B59). Space and time themselves are not entities but a priori forms of objects that have been produced in our mind through the affection of our sensibility and thus necessarily included sensations.

The transcendental ideality of space and time means that insofar as they are not taken as real relations of something, they are not something real in themselves. By being so, space and time, which do not belong to things in themselves, are not objects that can be intuited as something outwardly, i.e., perceived in itself but the pure form of those intuited as outside of us. Therefore, space is not a property of the things in themselves but of appearances; namely, the spatial relations are not a property

belonging to the things in themselves but to the appearances. “By means of outer sense (a property of our mind) we represent to ourselves objects as outside us, and all as in space” (Kant, 1998, p. 157 A22/B37). Hence, space as the pure form of outer sense does not determine the magnitude and shape of the things; contrary, the appearances bounding it as extensive magnitudes having some shape determine space.

Time’s transcendental ideality expresses that it is nothing in itself when it is abstracted from the conditions native to our sensible intuition. It is because time itself, which is nothing but the form of inner sense, is not an object of perception and thus cannot be perceived in itself. “It is only of objective validity in regard to appearances, …; but it is no longer objective if one abstracts from the sensibility of our intuition, thus from that kind of representation …, and speaks of **things in general**” (Kant, 1998, p. 164 A35/B51). All objects of a possible experience intuited in space and time are mere representations, and their existence can be grounded in our thoughts but not in themselves. Therefore, unless something persisting in intuition corresponding to the concept of substance is given, the possibility of inner sense disappears. This something is an intuition in the space and corresponds not to a thing in itself, independent of all subjective conditions, but actual things perceived outside of myself, i.e., outer objects existing in space and time and intuited under sensible conditions. In other words, nothing in the inner sense, whose form is time, persists; hence, its possibility depends on giving something persisting in intuition; because the inner sense only becomes possible during being experienced the constantly flowing of the permanent thing in it. Accordingly, insofar as something persisting in intuition is given, corresponding to that which represents time in the objects of perception, the inner sense becomes possible through the intuition of the alterations of this persistent thing in time.

Since the subjective conditions of our senses have no concern with things in themselves, we cannot intuit them as they are in themselves; thus, things can only appear to us in conformity with the pure forms of sensible intuition. Without our sensible receptivity, things remain utterly *unknown* to us because our sensibility's receptivity contains the conditions of the possibility that things are represented as appearances; therefore, space and time are a priori given pure forms of perceiving things as objects existing in a possible experience. Accordingly, even if space and time as the pure forms of all sensible intuition are two sources of possible cognition, they mean nothing if we treat them alone and thus independently of the subjective constitution of our senses.

In this case, we cannot say that the objects represented in space and time are how also they are as in themselves; because a possible intuition corresponding to objects represented in space and time is merely sensible and can be given only under our sensible conditions. Therefore, objects represented in space and time have no existence in themselves that is available to be grounded by us, or even if it has been, our subjective constitution that is always sensible does not hold the conditions to justify such existence. By being so, the appearances are not the things in themselves, but instead, they are the mere representations existing only in time and thus belonging to the subject's inner determinations. "… space and time, as the necessary conditions of all (outer and inner) experience, are merely subjective conditions of all our intuition, …" (Kant, 1998, p. 171 A49/B66). The sole field in which space and time are considered objectively valid representations is the objects of sensible intuition, i.e., the realm of appearances. Therefore, any objective cognition as regards the things in themselves is not possible. If we are talking about cognition of the manifold representations given in an intuition, this intuition corresponding to such an object is

always sensible, i.e., provided by the conditions of space and time. Space and time neither represent things as they are in themselves nor provide an objective cognition of them; thus, any use beyond empirical representations cannot be objectively valid for them; because not only concepts of space but also concepts of time can objectively be valid insofar as something empirical is presupposed.

Accordingly, space and time as the properties native to our senses are the forms of sensibility; namely, our receptivity is affected according to these forms. If the subjective constitution of our mind had been something bound with things as an objective determination, space and time would have disappeared as soon as all existence of things was taken away. However, space and time are not the objective representation by themselves but just the properties native to our own subject; by being so, they should be considered as nothing other than the conditions of the existence of things. "Time is not something that would subsist for itself or attach to things as an objective determination, and thus remain if one abstracted from all subjective conditions of the intuition of them; …" (Kant, 1998, p. 163 A32/B49).

5.1.Can a cognition of my own self, namely the *I*, be possible?

There are two kinds of senses in us, bringing about the representation of two kinds of objects; according to Kant, we are conscious of two kinds of objects by means of them. Through the former, we intuit objects of outer sense; i.e., I am conscious of things outside me. Through the latter, we intuit the object of inner sense; i.e., I am conscious of my subject and my state.

Space is the form of representations belonging to the outer sense. Considering that the objects of the outer sense are called the body insofar as they are present in

space, the thing in itself might be named the transcendental object of the outer sense. Hence, the bodies as objects of the outer sense are the corporeal beings that are represented outside of us, i.e., in space, and thus correspond to the outer intuition. Shape, magnitude and reciprocal relations are the predicates, which were determined in space, of these corporeal beings. Consequently, the object of the outer sense is the body whose general nature exhibits itself as the alteration in space, i.e., movement.

Time is the form of inner sense; thus, I can intuit myself as a state of inner sense only in time, not in space. "Time is nothing other than the form of inner sense, i.e., of the intuition of our self and our inner state" (Kant, 1998, p. 163 A33/B49). An object which cannot be intuited in space has neither a shape nor a location; for this reason, the object of the inner sense is not material, unlike the corporeal beings of the outer sense intuited in space; by being so, it that cannot be intuited through outer sense might be phrased as the soul by a general designation. In that case, insofar as the soul, whose general nature manifests itself as thinking, is represented as the transcendental object of inner sense, we can call it our thinking subject. Therefore, since the soul whose action is thinking is the transcendental object of the inner sense, I am only conscious of it through the inner sense. "**I**, as thinking, am an object of inner sense, and am called 'soul'" (Kant, 1998, p. 412 A342/B400). However, Kant does not speak of the soul dogmatically as if it is something that has some states like before birth and after death; instead, he deals with determining the limits of human reason for preserving rational cognition from sophistry. To the extent I am conscious that I intuit myself as an object after abstracting everything outer from the object of inner sense, this is the soul Kant has taken into consideration, and in this sense, the *I* describes the soul.

> When I speak of the soul, then I speak of the I in the strict sense <*in sensu stricto*>. We receive the concept of the soul only through *the I*, thus through the inner intuition of inner sense, in that I am conscious of all my thoughts, accordingly that I can speak of myself as a state of inner sense. This object of inner sense, *this subject*, *consciousness* in the strict sense <*in sensu stricto*>, is the soul. (Kant, Lectures on Metaphysics, 1997, p. 78 28:265)

Accordingly, the object of the inner sense is only represented in time that has one dimension; for this reason, it is not possible to think of the soul through the predicates of the outer sense and determine it as a three-dimensional body. E.g., thinking of the soul as an extensive magnitude cannot be justified because of no corresponding outer intuition, for this corresponding outer intuition is some third thing that must be looked for in an experience. However, the experience cannot supply with us this third thing that would ground the synthesis of the concepts of soul and extension; i.e., there is no experience that would justify our thinking of the concept of soul as related to the concept of extension. Accordingly, an intuition provided by the inner sense, whose object is the soul, cannot correspond to the objects of the outer sense, whose principal property is impenetrability and extension; for this very reason, it is not an outer intuition but an inner intuition whose form is mere time.

The outer sense being externally affected by its objects provides us with a manifold of outer intuition; it is because the outer sense stimulates the faculty of intuiting through the presence of the outer objects. Therefore, unless the outer sense is affected by its objects externally, we cannot intuit objects in space, and because of the fact that no outer intuition would be given to us, we are not conscious of them. Now that the outer sense provides us with a manifold of outer intuition by being externally affected by its objects, then it can be justifiably said that what provides an inner

intuition is that the inner sense is affected internally by its object. Considering that our thinking subject is the object of the inner sense, as long as the inner sense has been internally affected by its object, this provides us with a manifold intuition regarding the mind itself or its inner state.

> … if we admit about the latter that we cognize objects by their means only insofar as we are externally affected, then we must also concede that through inner sense we intuit ourselves only as we are internally affected **by our selves**, … (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1998, p. 259 B156).

However, if the inner sense had not internally been affected by its object, I could not have been conscious of the soul because of the fact that no inner intuition would be given to us. Accordingly, being conscious of the soul through inner sense means to represent our thinking subject as an object of inner sense, i.e., intuit ourselves internally.

> The I shows that I have no concept of the soul other than of an object of inner sense. All objects of outer sense are material, and when they are present in space through impenetrability I thereby become aware of the objects of outer sense. But I am conscious of the soul through inner, and not through outer, sense; thus I comprehend that the soul is given to me as an object of inner sense. Further, we see that all actions of the soul, thinking, willing, etc., are not objects of outer sense. (Kant, Lectures on Metaphysics, 1997, p. 83 28:271)

So, representing my soul as an object of inner sense signifies that I am immediately conscious of myself, i.e., I intuit myself a priori as an object of inner sense. "**I**, as thinking, am an object of inner sense, and am called 'soul'" (Kant, 1998,

p. 412 A342/B400). Nevertheless, to intuit something a priori is to intuit something that is not at all given, i.e., has not been determined yet. "To intuit a thing *a priori* means to intuit a thing that is not at all given, and so I can intuit nothing other than the form of sensibility, how I intuit things, which is in me" (Kant, 1997, p. 189 29:831). Hence, intuiting myself a priori is to intuit myself without any determination, i.e., feel myself just exist. "… inner sense, on the contrary, contains the mere **form** of intuition, but without combination of the manifold in it, and thus it does not yet contain any **determinate** intuition at all, …" (Kant, 1998, p. 258 B154).

To intuit myself a priori as an object of inner sense without any determination is that I am immediately conscious of myself; nonetheless, it does not mean that the inner sense contains a determinate intuition that would make the cognition of my own self possible. Cognition of my own self is to cognize myself as I am in myself. However, all possible cognition always necessitates two components concept and intuition. All of our cognition must eventually be related to possible intuitions because an object can be given to us through these alone. Therefore, the cognition of my own self necessitates the concept of *I* and a sensible outer intuition which the object corresponding to this concept can be determined through it. However, since the object corresponding to the concept of *I* is nothing other than the transcendental subject of the inner sense, no judgment concerning the relation of this concept to its object can objectively be valid.

In other words, cognizing myself as I am in myself requires a determinate intuition that ought to correspond to the transcendental object of the inner sense and that ought to be given through the outer sense. However, since to intuit myself does not express more than that I am immediately conscious of myself, any determinate intuition corresponding to my soul cannot be supplied to the inner sense through the

outer sense; that is, no a posteriori intuition corresponds to the soul. Given that the inner sense contains no determinate intuition of my own self, the concept of the *I* is ever destitute of all sensible data which a cognition concerning the transcendental subject of the inner sense would be determined by means of it.

Accordingly, since the inner sense, whose object is nothing but a transcendental subject accompanying all thinking, does not contain any determinate intuition concerning this object, the concept of the *I* yields no objective cognition of my own self; that is, the power of judgment cannot find from experience some third thing in which the composition of the concept of the *I* with another concept can objectively be justified. That what makes a transcendental concept a sensible one and establishes its objective reality is always an outer intuition. In other words, what makes the relation of a transcendental concept to an object possible is a determinate intuition that ought to be given to this concept under the formal conditions of sensibility. However, since the concept of the *I* would ever be destitute of a corresponding outer intuition, it cannot be considered a sensible concept that would make cognition of my own self possible; thus, its objective reality cannot be established. The concepts making the cognition of objects possible are always to which the determinate intuitions given by sensibility correspond themselves; thus, these are the concepts containing the synthesis of possible intuitions that are only given a posteriori.

Since the object of inner sense is nothing but a transcendental subject accompanying all thinking, the concept of the *I* might be considered as the substratum of expressing the consciousness of inner sense, i.e., the consciousness of *I exist*.

> Through this I, or He, or It (the thing), which thinks, nothing further is represented than a transcendental subject of thoughts = *x,* which is recognized only through the thoughts that are its predicates, and about which, in abstraction, we can never have even the least concept; … (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1998, p. 414 A346/B404)

Now, let us strive to make a deduction of the concept of the *I* and test whether we can cognize what pertains to its object. Because it is obvious that I cannot evade the problem by saying that the concept of *I* is an analytic concept implying a logically simple subject and cannot be resolved into anything. But, if we want to judge a priori and synthetically by means of a concept, we need to presuppose that this concept contains the synthesis of possible intuitions given a posteriori and thus holds sensible conditions that make the relation of cognition to its object possible. It is because our purpose is to see whether we can yield synthetic a priori judgments in accordance with the concept of the *I* through an attempt of deduction. However, since an analytical concept is not a concept that contains a synthesis of a posteriori given intuitions, our attempt towards testing whether a cognition of my own self is possible in accordance with the concept of the *I* ends before it begins. Now it is evident that merely the concepts containing the synthesis of possible intuitions allow us to go beyond them, i.e., go to the intuition given in them. For this reason, for now, let us ignore that the concept of the *I* is an analytical concept, and in a case that we judge it synthetically, we find out whether it would yield a cognition of my own self.

The following might also be read as a crosscheck of whether a cognition of my own self is possible in relation to what I told above.

When I try synthetically to judge the concept of the *I* with the aim of establishing its objective reality, I open this concept up and look inside it because its objective reality always depends on an outer intuition, i.e., a synthesis of a posteriori given intuitions. To cognize what pertains to the object of the concept of *I*, I have to go from this concept to the empirical intuition corresponding to it. If I can assess this concept in the experience by going to its corresponding intuition, I can a posteriori cognize what pertains to its object, i.e., the soul. However, since no determinate intuition at all that I must encounter in this concept is given to it, I cannot assess a posteriori to what pertains to its object. In other words, when I go beyond the concept of the *I*, I can find nothing at all which I can ascribe an objective validity to this concept through it. Namely, I can find nothing in the concept of the *I* through which I can justify my thought that the object of this concept is related to anything in the experience. It is because the concept of the *I* can contain no sensible schema making it possible for the power of judgment to find some third thing in the experience. Some third thing is the necessary condition of which if we have aimed to justify the objective validity of any synthetic a priori judgment of the cognition of my own self.

E.g., if I think of the soul as related to the concept of extension and yield the judgment 'The soul is extended', the power of judgment must find some third thing in an experience in order to ground the objective validity of this judgment. However, the soul is not something that is mediately represented by the concept of extension. Accordingly, since an outer intuition in which the soul is intuited as something extended can never be given to the concept of the *I*, any judgment concerning the transcendental object of inner sense can never objectively be justified; that is, an objective cognition of my own self cannot be possible. In other words, since space can never exhibit the soul as something extended or whatever else through the outer

sense, nothing can be a material of the outer intuition that makes it possible to cognize my own self as I am in myself.

> Kant argues that we do not know what minds are in themselves and we do not know what bodies are in themselves, so we have no way of knowing if that which appears to us through **inner sense** as our mind is the same thing as that which appears to us through our **outer sense** as our body. As we have no knowledge of what our mind is in itself and no way of knowing what our body is in itself we have no way of knowing whether they are the same or distinct things. (Thorpe, 2015, p. 154)

If the concept of the *I* had contained a sensible schema, i.e., the sensibility could supply a corresponding sensible intuition to the concept of the *I*, the soul would have been a corporeal being pertaining to the outer sense, i.e., it could have been represented as an outer object in space, which is absurd. Accordingly, the concept of the soul in me as a representation of the inner sense is nothing but a mere consciousness as regards the existence of myself; by being so, it can be cognized by no manner of any determinate way and thus objectively. "… in the synthetic original unity of apperception, I am conscious of myself not as I appear to myself, nor **as** I am in myself, but only **that** I am. This **representation** is a **thinking**, not an **intuiting**" (Kant, 1998, p. 259 B157).

For this reason, henceforward, using it as the concept of the *I* does not seem proper; "… the simple and in content for itself wholly empty representation **I**, of which one cannot even say that it is a concept, …" (Kant, 1998, p. 414 A346/B404) because the term *concept*, which something can only be thought of by its means, is suitable for which are used as predicates for other things.

> If the representation of apperception, the *I*, were a concept through which anything might be thought, it could then be used as a predicate for other things, or contain such predicates in itself. But it is nothing more than a feeling of an existence without the least concept, and is only a representation of that to which all thinking stands in relation (*relatione accidentis*). (Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science, 1997, p. 86 4:334)

Accordingly, using the phrase the transcendental subject of all inner appearances, i.e., the simple representation of the *I*, seems better than using the concept of the *I*. The simple representation of the *I* is the representation of apperception established by the inner sense; thus, it is mere consciousness of myself as far from being the cognition of my own self because of the fact that it can ever contain no determination at all. For this very reason, it implies just a feeling of existence, i.e., simply the *I am*. "Consciousness of itself (apperception) is the simple representation of the I, …" (Kant, 1998, p. 189 B68).

This consciousness, i.e., my consciousness as to I do exist, is a thoroughgoing necessity for a possible experience. It is impossible to intuit a priori any determination pertaining to the empirical consciousness of my existence prior to establishing such consciousness of *I am*. That is to say, no determination of existence can be intuited independently of experience. "For neither absolute nor relative determinations can be intuited prior to the existence of the things to which they pertain, thus be intuited *a priori*" (Kant, 1998, p. 176 A26/B42).

However, as I told above, the sole thing that I can a priori intuit concerning myself is the form of how I intuit myself; nevertheless, it indeed contains no act of

determination yet. The mere inner intuition, which is given under this form through inner sense and contains no determination and thus present in me prior to experience, is an a priori intuition of myself. Accordingly, insofar as the soul has affected the inner sense, a mere feeling of existence stirs in me. I.e., the inner sense affected by the pure act of my thinking subject leads to a self intuition. This pure act of the soul, i.e., the act which originates in the *I*, manifests itself as thinking. Accordingly, the *I think* is the synthetic unity of apperception accompanying all representations by means of the spontaneity of the understanding. So, its spontaneity is why our subject is self-active; for this reason, it would not have been possible to infer that existence was already given without such self intuition resulting from its self-activity.

> The subject itself is passive through the sensible cognitive faculty, and therefore it is said to have receptivity; it is self-active through the higher [faculty], and therefore it has spontaneity. These two faculties are thus differentiated by the manner in which the subject is thereby conditioned. (Kant, Lectures on Metaphysics, 1997, p. 247 29:877)

Accordingly, intuiting myself a priori does not mean that I intuit myself as an appearance; rather, it is to feel of myself that I only do exist. That my thinking subject causes such feeling of existence by affecting inner sense through its spontaneity indicates that the existence as a necessary representation of apperception has already been given.

Intuiting myself a priori is not being intuited of that which is given in a determinate way but pure thinking regarding the consciousness that my existence has already been given. Therefore, pure consciousness is my pure thinking that my existence is given. "The consciousness of myself in the representation **I** is no intuition

at all, but a merely **intellectual** representation of the self-activity of a thinking subject" (Kant, 1998, p. 328 B278). Since pure intuition, which corresponds to such pure thinking, is time as a priori form of how I intuit myself and thus holds no determination yet, it includes no ground by which my existence would be determined by its means. It is because even if time is the form of how I intuit myself, this ground by means of which my existence in time can only be determined is the substances representing time in the objects of perception. In that case, since the time that is the form of how I intuit myself cannot be perceived in itself, determining my existence in time depends on that something persisting in intuition has been given. However, something that persists in intuition corresponds to the concept of substance and thus always necessitates an outer intuition. By being so, all-determining grounds, which can be encountered in me as belonging to the inner sense, of my existence in time are the representations given only through the outer sense.

Consequently, since in the form of how I intuit myself, there is nothing persistent yet that represents time, pure thinking finds no substratum in pure intuition of time in which the inner sense is to be determined by means of it. However, all-determining grounds of my existence are the substances representing time in the objects of possible perception. Since these objects of perception are nothing but representations that are encountered in space and time and contain an existence, they are given only through an outer intuition. Accordingly, I can be conscious of my existence only as being determined in time; however, since all these determining grounds are the substances as the persisting substrata that represent the unchanging unity of time in the objects of perception given only through an outer sense, it is not possible cognizing myself as I am in myself. "… I therefore have **no cognition** of

myself **as I am**, but only as I **appear** to myself. The consciousness of oneself is therefore far from being a cognition of oneself, …" (Kant, 1998, p. 260 B158).

Considering that there is no corresponding intuition to my thinking subject that can be given through outer sense, the soul can neither be intuited as an outer appearance nor its objective cognition possible. Nevertheless, even if the soul cannot be externally intuited, I can intuit myself as an object insofar as it is being represented as an appearance. However, to represent myself as an appearance, I must be conscious of my existence in time as determined; because insofar as it is not determined, it remains a merely intellectual representation of the self-activity of my thinking subject rather than a representation that can be intuited as an appearance. For this reason, the consciousness of my existence in time is determined through a possible relation to the objects of perception that are given by the outer sense and thus contain an existence in space and time. Because unless these objects of perception given by the outer sense are posited into the inner sense, i.e., taken up into an empirical consciousness, towards determining my existence in time, I cannot be aware of them as mine; correspondingly, an inner experience cannot be possible for me. Therefore, the consciousness of my existence determined in time is not the cognition of my own self but just the empirical consciousness of my existence through a possible inner experience. "I am conscious of my existence as determined in time" (Kant, 1998, p. 327 B275). Not only outer but also inner experience can only be possible through the understanding that determines inner sense according to manifold representations given in an outer intuition. Thus, the understanding is our sole faculty that determines inner sense by subsuming the manifold of intuition under the synthetic unity of apperception and thus makes inner experience possible through establishing an empirical consciousness of the manifold representations given through

outer sense. "… the consciousness of my own existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me" (Kant, 1998, p. 327 B276). Accordingly, that I can be conscious of my existence as being determined in time depends on a possible inner experience.

> Yet I am conscious through inner **experience** of **my existence in time** (and consequently also of its determinability in time), and this is more than merely being conscious of my representation; yet it is identical with the **empirical consciousness of my existence**, which is only determinable through a relation to something that, while being bound up with my existence, **is outside me**. (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1998, p. 121 Bxl)

Accordingly, the inner experience becomes possible by positing the outer sense representations into the inner sense and thus into time; this is nothing but an act of time determination which I can empirically be conscious of my existence by its means. By being so, it is evident that the outer sense representations taken up into an empirical consciousness constitute the entire determining substrata of my existence because all time determination depends on whether something which persists in intuition is given, and thus which corresponds to the concept of substance. This positioning of the outer sense representations into the inner sense necessitates a special act of understanding that subsumes everything under the synthetic unity of apperception. Because, through the act of placing into the inner sense, the *I think* accompanies all manifold representations contained in an intuition. By being so, the understanding internally determines sensibility by taking up these manifold representations into an empirical consciousness through the synthesis of apprehension. That is to say; the understanding determines inner sense according to

these manifold representations that were made belonging to one and the same consciousness.

> That which determines the inner sense is the understanding and its original faculty of combining the manifold of intuition, i.e., of bringing it under an apperception (as that on which its very possibility rests). Now since in us humans the understanding is not itself a faculty of intuitions, and even if these were given in sensibility cannot take them up **into itself**, in order as it were to combine the manifold of **its own** intuition, thus its synthesis, considered in itself alone, is nothing other than the unity of the action of which it is conscious as such even without sensibility, but through which it is capable of itself determining sensibility internally with regard to the manifold that may be given to it in accordance with the form of its intuition. (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1998, p. 257 B153)

That the outer sense representations constitute the entire determining substrata of my existence expresses that the inner experience is mediately possible only through the outer experience because, for a determinate consciousness of our self, the consciousness concerning the existence of outer objects is initially necessary. "… the subject must be determined, for which outer objects are absolutely requisite, so that inner experience itself is consequently only mediate and possible only through outer experience" (Kant, 1998, p. 328 B277).

> Consequently it is in the objects of perception, i.e., the appearances, that the substratum must be encountered that represents time in general and in which all change or simultaneity can be perceived in apprehension through the relation of the appearances to it. However, the substratum of everything real,

> i.e., everything that belongs to the existence of things, is **substance**, of which everything that belongs to existence can be thought only as a determination. (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1998, p. 300 A182/B225)

The following can be considered as an additional elucidation for why outer objects are requisite for a determinate consciousness of myself, i.e., being conscious of my existence as determined in time. Accordingly, something persistent by means of which inner sense is to be determined corresponds to that which represents time in the objects of perception; by being so, it can merely be given by the outer sense. This persistent thing that corresponds to that which represents time in the objects of perception is the substance. However, giving something persistent in intuition corresponding to the concept of substance and thus determining inner sense by its means always necessitates a manifold, which can be given merely through the outer sense, and that I would posit into myself as pertaining to my existence.

> Now since for the **cognition** of ourselves, in addition to the action of thinking that brings the manifold of every possible intuition to the unity of apperception, a determinate sort of intuition, through which this manifold is given, is also required, my own existence is not indeed appearance (let alone mere illusion), but the determination of my existence can only occur in correspondence with the form of inner sense, according to the particular way in which the manifold that I combine is given in inner intuition, and I therefore have **no cognition** of myself **as I am**, but only as I **appear** to myself. (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1998, pp. 259-260 B157-158)

Since the *I think* notifying the necessity concerning the formal unity of consciousness, i.e., a consciousness of that my existence is given, expresses nothing

but the unity of thinking, no object is given merely by means of it. However, the subject corresponding to the category of substance can only be determined through an empirical intuition that must have been given to this category. For this reason, the category of substance finds no intuition enabling itself to be applied to the *I* that notifies the unity of consciousness and lies at the root of the categories. Accordingly, the *I* insofar as it is taken as substance cannot be cognized at all. On the other hand, as soon as it is cognized, i.e., the category of substance is applied, it is no longer the cognition of the *I* but just the cognition of an appearance. "… this unity is only the unity of **thinking**, through which no object is given; and thus the category of substance, which always presupposes a given **intuition**, cannot be applied to it, and hence this subject cannot be cognized at all" (Kant, 1998, p. 453 B422).

Consequently, my existence in time can merely be determined sensibly as the existence of an appearance, and when it is determined is entirely far from being a cognition of my own self. "… my existence always remains only sensibly determinable, i.e., determinable as the existence of an appearance" (Kant, 1998, p. 260 B157/158*). Briefly, the cognition of myself does not express more than the cognition of an appearance through the cognition of representations posited into inner sense and thus made belonging to me.

> … even the inner and sensible intuition of our mind (as an object of consciousness), the determination of which through the succession of different states is represented in time, is not the real self as it exists in itself, or the transcendental subject, but only an appearance of this to us unknown being, which was given to sensibility. (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1998, pp. 511-512 A492/B520)

5.2.The thing in itself: The transcendental object as something grounding outer appearances as their non-sensible cause

Above I gave an account of how Kant has considered the soul under a transcendental naming of the *I*. "**I**, as thinking, am an object of inner sense, and am called 'soul'" (Kant, 1998, p. 412 A342/B400). Accordingly, since the outer sense gives nothing persistent in intuition corresponding to the transcendental object of the inner sense that is represented as a transcendental subject of the thoughts, the transcendental object is entirely *unknown* in regard to the inner sense; correspondingly, cognizing myself as I am in myself is also entirely impossible.

> Thus if that concept, by means of the term "substance," is to indicate an object that can be given, and if it is to become a cognition, then it must be grounded on a persisting intuition as the indispensable condition of the objective reality of a concept, namely, that through which alone an object is given. But now we have in inner intuition nothing at all that persists, for the I is only the consciousness of my thinking; … (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1998, p. 448 B412/413)

Now, if the soul is the object of the inner sense, then its existence is admittedly an immediate perception of the inner sense. Since what is immediately perceived is that which is already in me, my own existence is cognized as an object of my immediate perception. Accordingly, that I intuit myself as an object of immediate perception expresses that I am immediately conscious of myself, i.e., that *I exist*.

However, when it comes to the thing in itself as the non-sensible cause of outer appearances, as the phrase already suggests, this thing, whatever it is, is a thing that is something only and exclusively for itself. Accordingly, a thing that is a thing as

something only and exclusively for itself cannot be something that is already in ourselves; by being so, its existence can never immediately be given in perception; i.e., its existence cannot be an object of our immediate perception.

If that whose existence will never be given in immediate perception is nevertheless being mentioned as a thing, then we might denominate this thing as an object of an intuition that is totally unfamiliar to us. Because since the valid field of the objects of our senses is bound up with merely our manner of intuition, it cannot be claimed with good ground that no other kind of intuition can be and thereby that no things as objects of this kind of intuition can be. Then, since the sole possible way of receiving intuitions is our sensibility, this totally unfamiliar intuition, which does not conform to our manner of intuiting, is not sensible but intellectual. Correspondingly, since the objects we can receive are only those given in a sensible intuition, such objects that might be given in an intellectual intuition cannot belong to the sensibility but merely to pure understanding. For this reason, intellectual objects, i.e., things given in a non-sensible intuition merely to the understanding, are the ones whose existence will never be objects of my immediate perception. Accordingly, now that an object of a non-sensible intuition cannot be the object by which it is understood from the representation of matter and corporeal things, it is equally *unknown* to us with regard to our inner and outer senses.

Kant terms such objects, whose concepts are acquainted by no human being, as noumenon to distinguish them from the objects thought in accordance with the unity of categories. For this reason, assuming such objects, which are thought through merely pure understanding without any schema of sensibility, is to expand the field of things in themselves beyond the conditions of our sensibility, i.e., to take noumena in a positive sense. However, when noumena are taken in a positive sense, i.e., thoughts

are made into things, it implies that the matter is accepted as a thing existing outside us and independently of all sensibility. However, all objects of an experience possible for us are nothing but appearances intuited under the formal conditions of sensibility and containing an existence merely in space and time.

> Appearances, to the extent that as objects they are thought in accordance with the unity of the categories, are called *phaenomena*. If, however, I suppose there to be things that are merely objects of the understanding and that, nevertheless, can be given to an intuition, although not to sensible intuition (as *coram intuiti intellectuali*), then such things would be called *noumena* (*intelligibilia*). (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1998, p. 347 A249)

Since the categories are not grounded on sensibility, the understanding might think whatever it likes and even cognize such intellectual beings in a non-sensible intuition. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the understanding can apply its categories to a thing in itself, i.e., that it can positively expand its own field beyond the conditions of our sensibility by making transcendental use of its categories. The transcendental use of categories means that the understanding can determine its pure thinking's beings as objects containing an existence in space and time; for this reason, such use of categories that have no objective validity on things in themselves, which are not objects of our sensible intuition, is not possible.

The *Doctrine of Transcendental Idealism* does not concern intelligible objects thought through pure categories without any schema of sensibility; instead, it concerns the appearances represented as either extended beings or series of alterations and always thought in accordance with the unity of categories. Since the extended beings or series of alterations are nothing but appearances, i.e., objects of my senses

whose representations must always be thought according to the unity of categories, these have outside us and independently of all our sensibility no existence grounded in itself.

Accordingly, when understanding thinks of a thing in itself without positively expanding its own field beyond the conditions of our sensibility, it thinks of it as a transcendental object whose concept is nothing other than a possible thought. This possible thought can be expressed as the concept of *X* because of the fact that it is the entirely undetermined thought of something and the same for all appearances in general. By being so, it serves as only a boundary concept insofar as it limits sensibility to prevent the field of phenomena from expanding to noumena. The boundary concept is a concept which prevents a transcendental object from separating from sensible data and thus determines the undetermined thought of something by relating it to these sensible data. For this reason, a transcendental object is the entirely undetermined thought of something to which I must relate appearances as their true correlate and thereby ascribe the whole extent of my possible perceptions. If this transcendental object is separated from sensible data, there remains nothing serving as a correlate of the unity of apperception for the understanding that must unify the manifold of sensible intuition in the concept of an object; i.e., there remains nothing back which would determine this undetermined thought as the cognition of an object. Hence, the condition for a transcendental object to be thought of as a substance or magnitude, et cetera, is that it should never be separated from sensible data.

Other than that, a transcendental object is nothing for us but something solely and exclusively for itself; by being so, its existence can never be an object of my immediate perception and thus be known anything about it. In that case, something whose existence is not immediately given in perception is a thing in itself that will

never be encountered in my immediate apperception; by being so, it ought to be denominated in all senses as external.

Things encountered in my apperception, i.e., given directly in perception, are not the things in themselves, but those whose manifoldness given in a sensible intuition are combined in one consciousness and thus stand under the conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception. According to that, things whose existence is an object of my immediate perception are not in themselves but representations that stand in conformity with the conditions of the formal unity of consciousness. Things that conform to the unity of categories are representations to which the *I think* accompanies and whose combination in one consciousness is necessary. For this reason, things whose existence is an object of my immediate perception are nothing other than my own representations that ought to stand under conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception.

Then, we can rightfully say that something which is external in all senses and therefore will never be encountered in my apperception is off our possible field of cognition. Correspondingly, Kant claims that the things in themselves would remain utterly *unknown* to us. "What may be the case with objects in themselves and abstracted from all this receptivity of our sensibility remains entirely unknown to us" (Kant, 1998, p. 185 A42/B59). Apparently, that which will remain *unknown* to us is a thing only for itself; by being so, its cognition is not possible because our all cognition is always sensible. The object whose cognition is impossible is that no sensible intuition corresponds to it; thus, a thing to which no sensible intuition corresponds cannot be subsumed under the categories, i.e., the conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception. Therefore, a thing only for itself cannot be thought through categories, i.e., cognized objectively.

Categories are valid only for sensible intuition because the relation of categories to the unity of intuitions in space and time is the condition for their having significance. An a priori concept insofar as it contains the synthesis of possible intuitions given a posteriori is a sensible concept and thus always stands in relation to an object. A sensible concept contains the conditions, which come from sensibility, that provide it with relation to an object. Accordingly, possible relation to an object implies that all of our cognition must be related to sensible intuitions because this object can only be given through them.

In order to cognize a posteriori what pertains to the concept's object, we judge it synthetically by going from this concept to the empirical intuition corresponding to it. In this way, we can concretely assess whether this concept relates to an object and thus signifies anything. If a concept does not contain the condition of sensible intuition, this means that nothing is given that can be subsumed under the concept and that it cannot be applied to any object. For this reason, a concept having no relation to any determinate object is that contains no formal conditions of sensibility. Since such a concept is not sensible but still refers to the unity of thought of a manifold in general, it might be called the concept of *X*.

> Hence the categories require, beyond the pure concept of the understanding, determinations of their application to sensibility in general (schema), and without these are not concepts through which an object can be cognized and distinguished from others, but only so many ways of thinking of an object for possible intuitions … (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1998, p. 344 A245)

Insofar as an a priori concept can determine the synthesis of possible intuitions given a posteriori to the other concept, which is thought as related to this a priori

concept, it is a sensible concept. E.g., the concept of what happens is thought of as related to the concept of cause. It is because the concept of cause is a rule that determines the synthesis of possible intuitions given a posteriori to the concept of what happens. In accordance with this rule, an event always follows another event in a determinate temporal order. An event that follows according to determinate temporal order another event is the object to which the concept of cause is being applied. This object can only be supplied to the concept of the cause through sensible conditions because the possible intuitions corresponding to the concept of what happens are only given a posteriori by sensibility. By being so, an event following another event in a determinate temporal order implies the condition of time-determination in which we can concretely assess the concept of cause and thus cognize a posteriori what pertains to its object. For this reason, if we leave out this condition of time-determination from the concept of cause, the concept will remain empty and have no significance because of losing all determinations through which it can be applied to any object.

Accordingly, the schema, which makes an a priori concept into a sensible one and thus makes it possible to cognize a posteriori what pertains to its object, is the formal and pure condition of concept coming from sensibility. Since the intuitions are the manifold representations containing these formal and pure conditions, the manifold of intuition given to the concept through the sensibility makes it possible that the concept stands in relation to an object. Sensible intuitions, which are immediately related to the object, in the appearance, are the representations given to the concept only a posteriori; because these representations encountered in my apperception and standing under conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception are the objects that contain an existence in space and time, and that can

only be intuited under these conditions. By being so, their existence is an object of my immediate perception. I.e., the representations whose existence is an object of my immediate perception are in which I am conscious of their existence as determined in time. Representations whose existence is the object of my immediate perception are the outer sense representations that I have posited into my inner sense as belonging to my existence; by being so, these make the empirical consciousness of my existence possible.

Objects of my immediate perception should be distinguished from the object that is neither given directly in perception nor stands under the conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception. By this object, I mean, as already stated above, a thing in itself, i.e., an object that might be something only and exclusively for itself. Accordingly, neither property of such an object whose existence cannot directly be given in perception is presented by space and time because space and time are not the conditions of objects insofar as these are taken as the things in themselves. Considering that the possibility of a thing can only be confirmed according to the synthesis of possible intuitions given a posteriori to a concept, we can rightfully say that space and time presenting no property of such object do not involve its existence's conditions. For this reason, such an object, whose condition of existence is not space and time, never corresponds to a sensible concept.

Even if the possibility of such a thing can by no means be proven, and it cannot ever be cognized what a thing it is in itself, nevertheless, it still seems possible to think of an object in itself. "… even if we cannot **cognize** these same objects as things in themselves, we at least must be able to **think** them as things in themselves" (Kant, 1998, p. 115 Bxxvi). The *I think* expresses the formal unity of consciousness in categories that are the formal conditions of experience; thus, despite any sort of object

cannot be determined through it alone yet, it is nevertheless the purest form of thinking, i.e., the purest form of the understanding's use in regard to objects. Since its origin is not grounded on sensibility but an intellectual representation of the self-activity of a thinking subject, the *I think* remains whether intuition is given or not; thus, this act spontaneously extends beyond even the objects of senses. Accordingly, the *I think* accompanies even some object, to which no intuition ever corresponds itself and thus is entirely *unknown* to us. It is evident that this accompaniment all alone is not yet enough to determine any sort of object because determining an object means cognizing it, and for this, a sensible intuition is always necessary through which this object's concept will be able to be determined.

The categories as the formal thought conditions of experience are valid only for sensation as the matter of our senses and thus sensible intuition because the conditions of sensibility characterize categories as concepts of possible empirical use. Thus, they cannot be taken as concepts of things in general; but, even if they had been taken, it might have been their transcendental use; but such use can have neither determinate nor determinable object. It is because a transcendental use does not refer to a possible empirical use implying the action of relating the synthesis of possible intuitions given a posteriori to an object.

Therefore, the *I* maintains its spontaneous act in any case, even independently of sensible conditions, as a mere intellectual representation of the self-activity of a thinking subject. The *I think* that notifies the necessity as regards the formal unity of consciousness and thereby a consciousness concerning that my existence is given is an analytical representation containing nothing but the unity of thinking; by being so, the consciousness of *I exist* persists even if all intuition is taken away from an empirical cognition. Consequently, even if cognizing an object which is exclusively

for itself is not possible, the *I think* containing the consciousness of *I exist* within itself and thus expressing an empirical intuition, which has not been determined yet, nevertheless accompanies it.

Accordingly, if a thing that will never objectively be cognized in itself is nevertheless being able to be thought, then whatever the concept by whose means such thing is thought is, it must concern the formal unity of consciousness.

> Now this concept cannot contain any determinate intuition at all, and therefore concerns nothing but that unity which must be encountered in a manifold of cognition insofar as it stands in relation to an object. This relation, however, is nothing other than the necessary unity of consciousness, … (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1998, p. 233 A109)

However, since no intuition can correspond to the concept of some object in itself, it itself is neither determinate nor, to this extent, determinable. Thus, it is never objectively cognized. Therefore, an object, which is only for its own self and thus not determinate and accordingly never objectively cognized, has been symbolized with *X* by Kant due to pointing to the *unknown*. "It is easy to see that this object must be thought of only as something in general = *X*, since outside of our cognition we have nothing that we could set over against this cognition as corresponding to it" (Kant, 1998, p. 231 A104). Now that the thing in itself has been symbolized with *X* that points to the *unknown*, the concept by means of which this *unknown* is thought can be denoted with the concept of *X*.

Since space and time do not present any characteristics of the thing in itself, i.e., are not the conditions of its existence, nothing is given as that can be subsumed under the concept of *X*. It means that the concept of *X* lacks the formal condition of

subsuming anything under itself, and thus contains no sensible schema. An object thought through a concept that contains no formal condition of subsuming anything under itself is transcendental. Accordingly, a thing in itself that is thought by means of a concept holding no schema is the transcendental object.

When it comes to whether a transcendental object can be cognized, we evidently stated above that it is not possible at all. Now, the following disputable assumptions and their absurd outcomes might serve as a crosscheck of why it is impossible to cognize a transcendental object.

If we had wanted to judge the concept of *X* in order for asserting some synthetical propositions about the transcendental object corresponding to the concept of *X*, we would have had to go beyond this concept. What we look for beyond this concept is the intuition that must have been given to this concept a posteriori and thus provides it a relation to the object; for, the intuition contains the outer sense representations given by space and thus the data by means of which we can assert some synthetical propositions about this object. However, if we could have found any intuition that was given to the concept of *X* under conditions of space and time, we could have concretely assessed it in this intuition and thus cognized a posteriori what pertains to its object. If we could have concretely assessed the concept of *X* in intuition, i.e., displayed what its correspondences were in the experience, it would have meant that the concept of *X* was a sensible concept. If it had been a sensible concept, it would have contained a schema restricting it by pure and formal conditions coming from sensibility. If the concept of *X* had had a schema, it would have contained the formal condition of subsuming any supposed object under itself, i.e., all conditions of its use in the judgments. If the concept of *X* had contained the formal condition of subsuming anything under itself, the power of judgment could

have found from experience some third thing by means of which we could have cognized a posteriori what pertains to its object; that is, the power of judgment could have shown us the transcendental object as determined in time. Nevertheless, if the power of judgment could have shown us the transcendental object as determined in time, it would not have been correct anymore to denominate it as the transcendental object. For an object determined in time can be nothing other than an outer sense representation by which the empirical consciousness of my existence can only be determined through a relation to it. Accordingly, an object determined in time is not a transcendental object but an object of my immediate perception as a representation containing an existence in space and time. By being so, since it has already been taken up into an empirical consciousness, i.e., made belonging to inner sense, it has become an object encountered in my apperception.

Despite all, if we had been insistent that it is the transcendental object, this would have meant that we had admitted all outer appearances as that which could exist independently of our sensibility. Such an admission leads us to a contradiction in which a thing that is independent of space and time is something which is in spite of not directly being able to be given in perception but still encountered somewhere and thus in my apperception. However, the existence of something we intuit in space or time cannot be grounded in itself except in our thoughts; thus, no existence outside our thoughts can be attributed to the things. Therefore, the cognition of a thing in itself whose conditions of existence do not depend on my own subjective constitution is not something understandable and thus justifiable. Those whose conditions of existence depend on me are the manifold representations encountered under my synthetic unity of apperception, i.e., contained in an outer intuition that can be given only a posteriori. That which is brought under the conditions of the original synthetic

unity of apperception is an appearance whose existence has been determined in time. Accordingly, things that we are conscious of their existence as determined in time are not the things in themselves but the appearances. Consequently, even if space and time as forms of sensible intuition are the conditions of the existence of things insofar as they are taken as appearances, they are nevertheless representations belonging to my subjective constitution. Thus, things encountered in my apperception are not things in themselves but the representations standing under them and thus under the unity of consciousness as belonging to the inner sense.

Consequently, the concept of *X* concerns only the formal unity of consciousness, i.e., the logical unity comprised necessarily in every thought; because it merely implies a formal unity that what pertains to an object would be thought by means of it. Since this formal unity is nothing but the *I think* that has already contained the proposition *I exist* within itself, it undoubtedly precedes an object of perception in regard to time. In that case, the concept of *X* is nothing but an undetermined thought that expresses only and solely the formal unity of an empirical intuition that has not been determined yet. "The object to which I relate appearance in general is the transcendental object, i.e., the entirely undetermined thought of something in general" (Kant, 1998, p. 349 A253). Therefore, it cannot supply to the thinking any empirical representation, which would be used as material toward determining the transcendental object. That is, it can provide nothing that can be subsumed under the conditions of the synthetic unity of apperception, i.e., under the category. That means, in the most general sense, that the thinking and cognizing are not the same. "To **think** of an object and to **cognize** an object are thus not the same. For two components belong to cognition: …" (Kant, 1998, p. 254 B146). It is because since the concept of *X* is not a concept restricted by sensible conditions that make it

possible to determine what sort of properties its object holds, it contains no determinate intuition at all in itself that can be regarded as pertaining to its object. On the other hand, as soon as it contains a determinate intuition, it becomes an object's sensible concept, in agreement with the category. For this reason, the outer sense gives neither property in an immediate way that might pertain to the transcendental object. The transcendental object is not intuited as an object of outer sense, and thus what it is in itself remains entirely a mystery to us.

> The **transcendental object** that grounds both outer appearances and inner intuition is neither matter nor a thinking being in itself, but rather an unknown ground of those appearances that supply us with our empirical concepts of the former as well as the latter. (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1998, p. 431 A380)

Now that the concept of *X* containing no sensible condition and thus no determinate intuition implies merely a formal unity that what pertains to an object can be thought by means of it, its object is a transcendental object that is in every sense outside me. Thus, this transcendental object is the transcendental ground of establishing a possible consciousness as regards external things standing in relation to my sensibility. Because since these external things standing in relation to my sensibility are nothing other than the outer sense representations, their transcendental ground must not be another representation encountered already in my apperception but a transcendental object.

> But still all appearances also have a transcendental cause which we do not know, e.g., body is composite, i.e., an appearance. But there must still be a transcendental cause that contains the ground from which this appearance

> arises. This cause is unknown to us; but because it does not belong to the sensible world, it also cannot be determined by other causes in it, consequently it likewise does not stand under the laws of nature or of the sensible world and is thus transcendentally <*transcendentaliter*> free. (Kant, Lectures on Metaphysics, 1997, pp. 217-218 29:861)

Accordingly, since I am immediately conscious that the existence of objects encountered in my apperception is certain, we might infer that the transcendental object grounding my consciousness of their existence is the non-sensible cause of that given directly in perception.

> The non-sensible cause of these representations is entirely unknown to us, and therefore we cannot intuit it as an object; for such an object would have to be represented neither in space nor in time (as mere conditions of our sensible representation), without which conditions we cannot think any intuition. Meanwhile we can call the merely intelligible cause of appearances in general the transcendental object, merely so that we may have something corresponding to sensibility as a receptivity. To this transcendental object we can ascribe the whole extent and connection of our possible perceptions, and say that it is given in itself prior to all experience. (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1998, p. 513 A494/B523)

The non-sensible cause of all outer appearances is the transcendental object corresponding to the concept of *X*; however, the concept of *X* contains no schema restricting its use into formal and pure conditions of sensibility. Hence, the transcendental object, which grounds all conditioned outer appearances as their non-sensible cause, is unconditioned. Accordingly, the transcendental object is the non-

sensible cause of that encountered in my apperception; i.e., it is nothing but the transcendental cause of that given directly in perception. If the transcendental object had been the sensible cause of that given directly in perception, it itself had to have been a conditioned object and thus been given directly in perception. Nevertheless, everything given directly in perception is something conditioned that is related analytically to some condition.

E.g., if the transcendental object had been an outer object given directly in perception, it itself would have been an object of my immediate perception as a conditioned part of space; because of the fact that it had to have presupposed another bounded space as the condition of its boundary. For the objects of my outer perception are nothing but the manifold parts of space that are coordinated with one another; by being so, each manifold, which presupposes the other as its boundary, is a conditioned one in itself. Accordingly, since the transcendental object cannot be related analytically to some condition, it cannot be thought of as an object of outer perception, which has to presuppose another bounded space as the condition of its boundary. In other words, since the concept of *X* is not restricted by sensible conditions towards being thought of transcendental object as an outer object, nothing that can be determined as the condition of the transcendental object is given. It is because everything that we can relate analytically to some condition is something whose synthesis is always conditioned.

The use of understanding is always toward the concepts containing the synthesis of possible intuitions given a posteriori; thus, the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments should always be sought in them. Accordingly, the understanding, which does not do with things in themselves but those whose synthesis is conditioned, cannot determine things as they are in themselves.

Even if we cannot cognize the transcendental object because of the fact that its possibility cannot ever be proven, it is nevertheless being thought of by the pure understanding as a transcendental ground of the sum of appearances. However, when it comes to whether we can frame a concept of such an object through the categories, it is entirely impossible because the categories are only of empirical use but never of transcendental use. I.e., as soon as categories are separated from sensibility, they do not have any use and significance and thus cannot be applied to a transcendental object.

> For the world is a sum of appearances, and so there has to be some transcendental ground for it, i.e., a ground thinkable merely by the pure understanding. If the question is **second** whether this being is substance, of the greatest reality, necessary, etc., then I answer **that this question has no significance at all.** For all the categories through which I attempt to frame a concept of such an object are of none but an empirical use, and they have no sense at all when they are not applied to objects a of possible experience, i.e., to the world of sense. (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1998, pp. 618-619 A696/B724)

As a result, the transcendental object, which is not a thing as sensibly but only for itself exclusively, is one and the same non-sensible cause in all our outer intuitions. For this reason, the transcendental object, which will remain entirely a mystery to us, is the transcendental ground of all outer appearances, whose synthesis always concerns sensible conditions and thus whose cognition is always conditioned.

6. CONCLUSION

I. The investigation of this thesis can be summarized as established on these two subjects:

►The concept of the *I* as the transcendental subject of the inner sense.

►The concept of the thing in itself as the transcendental object of the outer appearances.

II. The path this thesis follows can be summarized in these three steps:

►The exposition of the conditions of a possible cognition.

►The deduction of judgments in which the combination of concepts is thought as either a posteriori or a priori:

► The demonstration of the role of the successive apprehension of the manifold parts of space in keeping the thinking subject to remain identical with its own self.

III. The aim of this thesis can be summarized as justifying why neither a cognition of my own self nor the thing in itself can be possible.

A whole critique adopts the way of grounding the possibility of cognition on the *Doctrine of Transcendental Idealism*, which acknowledges space and time as neither determinations given for themselves nor the conditions of the existence of objects taken as things in themselves. According to this doctrine, all appearances are nothing other than mere representations. On account of the fact that the manner of our intuition is always bound up with the sensible conditions, something actual outside us

is not a thing existing independently of our sensibility but matter, i.e., a species of representations in us.

The outer sense immediately proves the relation of intuition to something actual outside me. The existence of my representations, just like my Self as a thinking being, is based on the testimony of my self-consciousness; thus, I myself, along with all my representations, are immediately perceived. Since we are immediately conscious of both, cognizing the existence of external things, namely matter, is not a doubtful inference from effect to cause. The reality of the outer sense rests on inner experience, which is the condition of its possibility; therefore, the immediate perception of the matter's existence grounds on my Self, who has these representations.

My thinking subject of which I am conscious as determined in time and the extended beings are nothing but my own objects whose representations are related to the inner sense and also outer sense. However, if I separate my representations from the object of these representations, which remains is not the object regarded as the representation of matter and corporeal things but that which might be outside us in the transcendental sense; by being so, it is equally *unknown* to us in regard to the inner and to outer senses.

Both the object of the concept of a thinking being and the object of the concept of an extended being are nothing but appearances; nevertheless, while the former is merely related to the inner sense, the latter is also related to the outer sense. However, despite being united in one subject, the inner and outer senses are most unlike each other, bringing the question of how outer intuition is possible in a thinking subject to the mind. Accordingly, this question does not hold any difficulty

insofar as we have adopted the *Doctrine of Transcendental Idealism*, according to which the matter is nothing but an appearance as a mere representation of mind which corresponds to an *unknown* object. After that, the question only concerns how these two can be conjoined together according to constant laws and connected into one experience. However, if the matter is considered an object in itself as existing outside us and independently of all sensibility, the question of how outer intuition is possible in a thinking subject would contain serious difficulties.

In that case, insofar as the matter is not regarded as a mere representation of our mind, which corresponds to an *unknown* object, the question of how outer intuition is possible in a thinking subject would involve insurmountable difficulties. Because if the matter is not the appearance of an *unknown* cause but the cause outside us, then it means that this question asks whether we can explain the origin of our representations by entirely heterogeneous causes found outside us. However, the critique has nothing to do with such irrelevant questions; instead, it concerns discovering the illusion concerning how understanding has expanded the field of its own intelligible objects beyond the conditions of our sensibility. In keeping with this purpose, the *Doctrine of Transcendental Idealism* teaches that neither bodies nor movement is something outside us but mere representations in us. Correspondingly, once the movement itself has been recognized as a mere representation in us, it is evident that the matter's motion cannot be considered as that which causes our representations.

Accordingly, if the question of how outer intuition is possible in a thinking subject is asking if we can be acquainted anything with the transcendental cause of our outer sense representations, i.e., with the absolute and inner cause of corporeal appearances, it is evidently not possible. If we intend to take side with the *Doctrine of*

Transcendental Idealism that limits all our speculative assertions merely to the field of possible experience, we have to admit that the gap in our knowledge concerning the transcendental cause of our outer sense representations will never be filled. Because an otherwise case will be nothing but a vain struggle with thoughts made into things, about which no human being has any concept, and thus which lead us to the interminable ambiguities and contradictions. Fortunately, the critique pays regard to this question exclusively from the viewpoint of how the representations in the inner sense can be conjoined with the modifications of our outer sensibility according to constant laws of possible experience.

Consequently, according to the *Doctrine of Transcendental Idealism*, it is evident that it is not possible for any human being to find an answer to this question as long as it is asking about the absolute and inner cause of corporeal appearances. Nonetheless, according to this doctrine, we can indicate why this is impossible by exhibiting our necessity of the concept of a transcendental object, i.e., the necessity of ascribing the outer appearances to a transcendental object that is the cause of such species of representations. Because a transcendental object as the true correlate of species of representations is the persistent element to which we must necessarily ascribe the whole extent of our possible perceptions. As soon as we attempt to go beyond the boundary of primary ground concerning the possibility of those appearances, this *unknown* object necessitates us the concept of a transcendental object notwithstanding never possible its acquaintance or sensible concept; yet, whatever this object is, it is undoubtedly not the object regarded as the representation of matter and corporeal things but that which might be outside us in the transcendental sense. Therefore, insofar as we keep siding with the *Doctrine of Transcendental Idealism*, the question of how outer intuition is possible in a thinking

subject needs no longer be associated with the ambiguities and contradictions that will lead us to speculative assertions as follows. The matter seems to cut itself loose utterly from the soul on account of being an entirely different and heterogeneous species of substance from the object of inner sense; therefore, this question cannot be answered unless a mediating being is assumed that will establish a connection between these entirely different and heterogeneous species of substances, i.e., between the object of inner sense and matter.

Accordingly, if the matter is regarded as an object in itself that seems to exist outside us and independently of all sensibility, it means that we make our thoughts into things and concretize these thoughts as if they are representations persisting in existence. Nevertheless, making thoughts into things indicates that we have assumed an object of a non-sensible intuition as something persistent in existence as if such an *unknown* object corresponds to the concept of substance. On the other hand, something that persists in intuition can only be given by an outer sense and thus provided only from space; and that space, along with whatever we ourselves represent in it, is nothing but a mere representation in us; thus, our outer sense can encounter its corresponding actual object merely in space. By being so, that which establishes the objective reality of the concept of substance is not an *unknown* object of a non-sensible intuition, but matter represented in space by ourselves and thus corresponding to this concept.

Taking matter as an object independently of all sensibility and thus making our thoughts into things carries with it some assertions, whose possibility will not ever be established, in answering the question of how outer intuition is possible in a thinking subject. Because assuming the matter as existing independently of sensibility causes matter to be seemed to cut itself loose entirely from the soul; then, the object

of inner sense and matter inevitably become heterogeneous species of substances disjointed entirely from one another. Correspondingly, everything propounded on the question of how outer intuition is possible in a thinking subject cannot get beyond incoherent claims that lead us to the paralogisms of reason.

In the *Doctrine of Transcendental Idealism*, the question of how outer intuition is possible in a thinking subject does not contain the slightest contradiction that will lead us to any ambiguity. Because in this doctrine, the persisting element, on which the inner experience depends and which I must consider myself in relation to it despite being outside me, is not counted in place of the representation of something persisting in the existence; that is, an *unknown* object to which might belong mere thought is not ever concretized on account of the fact that it is independent of all sensibility, i.e., outside me in the transcendental sense. In other words, a noumenon is not assumed, i.e., not taken in a positive sense; eventually, thoughts are not made into things that persist in intuition and correspond to the concept of substance. In the *Doctrine of Transcendental Idealism*, the noumenon is taken only in a negative sense with reference to our necessity for a boundary concept. Our necessity for the concept of a transcendental object, to which I must relate appearance in general and thereby ascribe the whole extent of my possible perceptions, indicates why impossible cognizing the ground on which the reality of outer appearances rests.

This *unknown* object, which makes the concept of a transcendental object necessary for us because of never being able to be cognized in itself, is not an object of sensible intuition that is necessary for our categories to signify anything. Even if the understanding itself, whose categories are not grounded on sensibility, might cognize this *unknown* object in a non-sensible intuition, such an object can be nothing for us other than a ‘boundary concept’ limiting the objective validity of our cognition

with reference to sensibility. Accordingly, since our intuition kind is never intellectual but always sensible, a noumenon is nothing more than the unity of thinking, i.e., the concept of a transcendental object that is never separated from sensible data; Kant calls it its negative use. Therefore, the concept of a transcendental object is the entirely undetermined thought of something in general and, indeed, a 'boundary concept' that should never be separated from sensible data.

However, if it is assumed that we can apply this entirely undetermined thought to a manifold given by a non-sensible intuition and thus determine it, the noumenon has been transmuted into the matter. A noumenon made into the matter is what Kant calls the noumenon in a positive sense and whose possibility will by no means be comprehended. That an *unknown* object becomes a noumenon in the positive sense is that this entirely undetermined thought is made into a thing containing an existence in the experience despite no sensible data, which will determine this thought in the concept of substance. Making an object of intellectual intuition into a matter, i.e., taking it in a positive sense, leads us to the illusion that we can be acquainted with the absolute and inner cause of outer appearances despite being ascribed necessarily to a transcendental object. Because making a mere intellectual object into a substance is nothing but an attempt to fill our ignorance of the transcendental ground concerning the nature of our thinking being and its conjunction with the corporeal world with paralogisms of reason. For, as soon as a noumenon is concretized, i.e., taken in a positive sense, the matter is inevitably regarded as a substance existing in itself and independently of all sensibility. Moreover, it is assumed that the objects of experience are given in themselves and thus exist outside experience. Correspondingly, since the thinking subject and extended beings will unavoidably become wholly heterogeneous

species of substances, there will remain no impediment of sensibility before us in putting them before and after of the time.

In a case where the noumenon is taken not as a concept limiting the objective validity of sensible cognition but as a thing positively expanding the field of the objects of our thinking beyond the conditions of our sensibility, the transcendental idealism gives way to the transcendental realism. In such a case, since even asking the question of how outer intuition is possible in a thinking subject might be thoroughly inconsistent, establishing a relationship between these entirely heterogeneous species of substances might necessitate the presupposition of a mediating being like God. But undoubtedly, a mediating being would cause the question to become more complicated than it has already been. The admission that things exist in reality even after being abstracted from the conditions of their existence in the experience causes the illusion that the noumena, whose concept cannot be acquired by any human being, can be assumed and thus cognized as the inner cause of external appearances.

If from the non-sensible cause of outer appearances, we understand that an object of a non-sensible intuition is concretized and thus that the objects of pure thinking are made into the matter as the absolute and inner cause of outer appearances, it is a mistake. It is because there is certainly not an objectively valid use of our understanding for the merely intelligible objects thought through pure categories without schema of sensibility.

If, by a noumenon, it is meant that the understanding thinks of a thing in itself as a transcendental object without separating it from sensible data and thus without expanding the field of its own intelligible objects beyond the conditions of our sensibility; and correspondingly, if, by this transcendental object, we understand

nothing sensible, and thereby we mean a thing which merely so that we can have something corresponding to our receptivity; then, this transcendental object insofar as it is taken merely intelligible cause, in general, is called the non-sensible cause of outer appearances.

A transcendental object insofar as it is not counted in place of a noumenon in the positive sense - according to Kant - is the concept of *X*, which is the entirely undetermined thought of something and the same for all appearances in general. Namely, the transcendental object is nothing other than the concept of a thing that is to be thought of as a thing in itself; by being so, the transcendental object is never separated from sensible data by means of which this concept of *X* will be determined into a sensible concept of an object. Because a mere representation of thought cannot objectively be determined through the mere thought itself; i.e., the thoughts cannot be made into things containing an existence in space and time. Accordingly, since the category cannot be valid for an object of a non-sensible intuition, the entirely undetermined thought of something in general, i.e., the transcendental object to which I relate appearances as their true correlate, cannot be separated from sensible data. Because the conditions of the unity of apperception acquire objective validity only through these sensible data; in other words, the categories become sensible concepts making the manifold of outer sense possible in a thinking subject. For this reason, this transcendental object, to which I must relate appearance in general and thereby ascribe necessarily the whole extent of my possible perceptions, is the non-sensible cause of outer appearances as a necessary correlate of the unity of apperception.

Kant likens the *Critique of Pure Reason* to a court in which a final decision will be taken about the possibility or impossibility of metaphysics by means of referring to the boundaries of our faculty of cognizing a priori. The court seems an

especially appropriate analogy because of the fact that there, the philosophy gives an account of all errors putting reason into dissension with itself by condemning all assertions that promise to extend human cognition beyond the possible experience. *Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding* is probably the most important chapter in which Kant undertakes an investigation towards determining the understanding's rules and boundaries of its use for justifying this condemnation.

Given that the boundaries of our faculty of cognizing a priori concern objects of sensible intuition and thus exclude the transcendental object, the significance of this thesis arises. Because this thesis gives an account of why neither a cognition of my own self nor of the thing in itself can be possible by displaying that cognizing an object depends on proving its possibility. This thesis attempts to ground why questions concerning the constitution of both the transcendental subject of inner appearances and the non-sensible cause of outer appearances cannot be answered.

In the *Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding* (§ 17), Kant gives the supreme principles of cognizing an object in terms of sensibility and understanding.

> The supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition in relation to sensibility was, according to the Transcendental Aesthetic, that all the manifold of sensibility stand under the formal conditions of space and time. The supreme principle of all intuition in relation to the understanding is that all the manifold of intuition stand under conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception. (Kant, 1998, p. 248 B136)

These supreme principles notify us that an object can only be determined through the combined employment of sensibility with understanding. Thus, if we separate sensibility from understanding, the sensible conditions through which the objective reality of pure concepts is based would be lacking; accordingly, without any conditions of sensibility, no object can be represented through categories that are nothing other than the pure form of thinking. Because of the fact that an object can be given only through possible intuitions alone, all categories, including the concept of substance, must always be related to sensible intuitions that lie entirely outside the field of the understanding.

That leads us to the fact that I cannot cognize the transcendental object by merely thinking of it, no matter how we take this object as either the transcendental subject of inner appearances or the non-sensible cause of outer appearances. Merely the fact that I think an object does not mean that I cognize it. If we consider that an object can be cognized only by determining a given intuition with regard to the unity of consciousness, neither the concept of *I* nor the concept of the thing in itself provides thought with an object for its being cognized. It is because anything through which the concept of a transcendental object can be framed will never be given to neither function of the unity of consciousness of which all thinking consists.

I would like to end my words with a quote from the *Critique of Pure Reason* that summarizes the main argument of my thesis as neither cognition of the transcendental subject of inner appearances nor cognition of the non-sensible cause of outer appearances is possible.

> I, represented through inner sense in time, and objects in space outside me, are indeed specifically a wholly distinct appearances, but they are not thereby

thought of as different things. The **transcendental object** that grounds both outer appearances and inner intuition is neither matter nor a thinking being in itself, but rather an unknown ground of those appearances that supply us with our empirical concepts of the former as well as the latter. (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1998, p. 431 A380)

REFERENCES

Kant, I. (1992). *Lectures on Logic.* (M. J. Young, Ed., & M. J. Young, Trans.) New York, USA: Cambridge University Press.

Kant, I. (1993). *Opus Postumum.* (E. Förster, Ed., E. Förster, & M. Rosen, Trans.) Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Kant, I. (1997). *Lectures on Metaphysics.* (K. Ameriks, S. Naragon, Eds., K. Ameriks, & S. Naragon, Trans.) New York, USA: Cambridge University Press.

Kant, I. (1997). *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science.* (G. Hatfield, Ed., & G. Hatfield, Trans.) New York, USA: Cambridge University Press.

Kant, I. (1998). *Critique of Pure Reason.* (P. Guyer, A. W. Wood, Eds., P. Guyer, & A. W. Wood, Trans.) New York, USA: Cambridge University Press.

Nunez, T. (2014, Dec 20). *http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcjp20.* Retrieved from Tyke Nunez (2014) Definitions of Kant's categories, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 44:5-6, 631-657, DOI: 10.1080/00455091.2014.974469: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2014.974469

Thorpe, L. (2015). *The Kant Dictionary.* London, New York, UK, USA: Bloomsbury Academic.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ameriks, K. (1982). *Kant's Theory of Mind / An Analysis of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason.* New York, United States: Clarendon Press / Oxford.

Andrew, B. (2016, Winter 21). *Kant's View of the Mind and Consciousness of Self.* (E. Zalta , Ed.) Retrieved from The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition): https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/kant-mind/

Aristoteles. (2014). *Fizik.* (S. Babür, Çev.) İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları.

Bennett, J. (1966). *Kant's Analytic.* Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press .

Caygill, H. (1995). *A Kant Dictionary Blackwell Philosopher Dictionaries.* Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Chance, B. (2011, September). Sensibilism, Psychologism, and Kant's Debt to Hume. *Kantian Review, 16*(03), pp. 325-349. Retrieved from http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1369415411000185

Duralı, T. Ş. (2013). *Aklın Anatomisi / Salt Aklın Eleştirisinin Teşhiri.* İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları.

Friedman, M. (2015). *Kant ve Kesin Bilimler.* (S. Şan Öget, Çev.) İstanbul: Alfa Bilim.

Hanna, R. (2000, June 2). The Inner and The Outer: Kant's 'Refutation' Reconstructed. *Ratio (new series) XIII, 0034*(0006), pp. 146-174.

Heimsoeth, H. (2016). *Kant'ın Felsefesi.* (T. Mengüşoğlu, Çev.) Ankara: Doğu Batı Yayınları.

Holzhey, H., & Mudroch, V. (2010). *The A to Z of Kant and Kantianism.* Plymouth: The Scarecrow Press, Inc.

Horstmann, R.-P. (2018). *Kant's Power of Imagination.* (D. Hogan, H. Williams, & A. Wood, Eds.) Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Howell, R. (1992). *Kant's Transcendental Deduction / An Analysis of Main Themes in His Critical Philosophy.* Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Kitcher, P. (1995, Sep.). Revisiting Kant's Epistemology: Skepticism, Apriority, and Psychologism. *Noûs, 29*(3), pp. 285-315. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2215601

Lindsay, A. (1934). *Kant.* London: Greenwood Press.

Newton, A. (2012). Kant on the Logical Origin of Concepts. *European Journal of Philosophy, 23*(3), pp. 456–484. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0378.2012.00545.x

Parsons, C. (2012). *From Kant to Husserl / Selected Essays.* London, England: Harvard University Press.

Pippin, R. (1982). *Kant's Theory of Form / An Essay on the Critique of Pure Reason.* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

Prichard, H. (1909). *Kant's Theory of Knowledge.* Oxford: Oxford At the Clarendon Press .

Proops, I. (2010). Kant's First Paralogism. *Philosophical Review, 119*(4), pp. 449-495. doi:10.1215/00318108-2010-011

Rohlf, M. (2020, Fall 21). *Immanuel Kant.* (N. Edward , Ed.) Retrieved from The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020 Edition): https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/kant/

Smith , N. (1918). *A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'.* London, England: Palgrave-Macmillan.

Valaris, M. (2008, May). Inner Sense, Self-Affection, & Temporal Consciousness in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. *Philosophers' Imprint, 8*(4), pp. 1-18.

Ward, A. (2012). *Starting with Kant.* London, New York: Continuum International Publishing Group.

Wood, A. W. (2009). *Kant.* (A. Kovanlıkaya, Çev.) Ankara: Dost Kitabevi Yayınları.