THE IMPACT OF FATIN RUSTU ZORLU ON TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AND CYPRUS ISSUE BETWEEN 1955-1960

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BY

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Signature : 

ABSTRACT

Following the end of World War II, Turkey has placed an emphasis on the necessity to adopt the multi-party system for westernization and democratization purposes, which it was unable to achieve twice. Following the establishment of the Democratic Party (DP) in 1946 and starting political life and coming to the power alone in 1950, especially the Turkish foreign policy had a great importance in a period when the Cold War was felt intensely. Marking a remarkable impact on the recent history, the foreign policy of Democrat Party was shaped by the influence of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, and Turkey had a proactive foreign policy upon he became the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Fatin Rüştü Zorlu applied policies to establish the regional peace such as "Bandung Conference" and "Baghdad Pact" in its foreign policy activities and increased the diplomatic power of Turkey in international platforms. The greatest contribution of Turkish foreign policy to the international relations under the influence of Fatih Rüştü Zorlu is that he was the politician to initiate the "détente" between two Cold War Bloc with "versatile foreign policy approach." Zorlu has the biggest impact for adopting the Cyprus issue as a national cause, particularly between 1955 and 1960. Zorlu spent the majority of his time to solve the Cyprus issue with amicable means between 1958 and1959 and showed a great resistance against the "Enosis" activities of the Greeks thanks to his personal diplomatic capability and statesmanship. Today, Cyprus issue is one of the most important subjects of Turkish foreign policy and one of the national causes. Therefore, to have a better understanding of the Cyprus issue and take a concrete step for a solution, we have to take a close look at the foreign policy led by Fatih Rüştü Zorlu and examine the Cyprus issue in that perspective.

Keywords: Fatih Rüştü Zorlu, Cyprus, Turkish Foreign Policy, Turkey, Greece, USA, Russia

ÖZET

İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın sona ermesinin ardından Türkiye batılılaşma ve demokratikleşme adına daha önce iki kez başarısız olduğu çok partili hayata geçişin gerekliliği üzerinde durmuştur. 1946 yılında Demokrat Parti'nin (DP) kurulması ile siyasi hayatına başlaması ve 1950'de tek başına iktidara gelmesinin ardından bilhassa Türk dış politikası Soğuk Savaşın en yoğun hissedilmeye başladığı dönem içerisinde büyük önem arz etmektedir. Yakın tarihin bir dönemine damga vuran Demokrat Parti'nin dış politikası, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu etkisiyle şekillenerek, Türk Dış İşleri Bakanı olması ile Türkiye proaktif bir dış politika sahibi olduğu görülmektedir. Fatin Rüştü Zorlu'nun dış politika çalışmalarında "Bandung Konferansı" ve "Bağdat Paktı" gibi bölgesel barışı tesis etmek uygulanan politikalar, Türkiye'nin uluslararası platformlarda diplomatik gücünü arttırmıştır. Fatin Rüştü Zorlu etkisindeki Türk dış politikasının uluslararası ilişkilere en büyük katkısı, "çok yönü dış politika anlayışı" ile iki Soğuk Savaş bloku arasında "yumuşamayı" (detant) başlatacak siyasetçi olduğu söylenebilir. Bilhassa 1955-1960 yılları arasında Kıbrıs meselesinin milli bir dava olarak benimsenmesinde Zorlu'nun büyük katkısı bulunmaktadır. Zorlu, 1958-1959 yılları arasında mesaisinin büyük bir kısmını Kıbrıs meselesinin barışçıl yollarda çözülmesi yönünde harcamış, kendisinin kişisel diplomatik kabiliyeti ve devlet adamlığı sayesinde Yunanlıların "Enosis" faaliyetlerine karşı büyük direnç göstermiştir. Bugün Kıbrıs meselesi Türk dış politikasının önemli konularından ve milli davalarından biridir. Dolayısıyla Kıbrıs sorunun iyi anlaşılabilmesi ve çözüm yolunda somut adımlar atılabilmesi için Fatin Rüştü dönemi dış politikası ve bu perspektifte Kıbrıs meselesinin yakından incelenmesi gerekmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, Kıbrıs, Türk Dış Politikası, Türkiye, Yunanistan, ABD, Rusya

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INTRODUCTION

Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, one of the important diplomats and politicians brought up in Turkey, was the son-in-law of Tevfik Rüştü Aras, who was one of the first Foreign Ministers of Turkish Republic. Aras was also one of the immediate persons of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and was trusted by Adnan Menderes. So, he left his duty of ambassadorship in 1954, got into parliament upon invitation by Menderes and was appointed as State Minister and Deputy Prime Minister in Menderes Government formed in 1954. When Fatin Rüştü Zorlu became Foreign Minister in 1957, Turkish foreign policy gained a versatile and active structure. As Mahmut Dikerdem, one of the doyen ambassadors of Turkey, mentioned in his memoirs, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu began shining like a star in Turkish political life as of 1953. Despite the fact that he was neither a member of parliament nor a minister in 1953, he was much more authorized than a minister and exercised his power over economic policy (Dikerdem, 1989, pp. 113-114).

Being aware of the geopolitical importance of Cyprus Island for Turkey in particular, Zorlu strained every nerve for the recovery of island and ensured Turkey to be the third guarantor state of the to-be-founded state of Cyprus along with Greece and United Kingdom. The necessity of having a versatile foreign policy for Turkey was one of the important arguments that Zorlu had defended in the course of his foreign ministry. By virtue of this opinion he believed that it was necessary for Turkey to improve its versatile foreign policy line not only via relationships with the USA but also with the Soviet Union. Indeed, beginning from 1957, Turkey drifted towards military coup of May 27, 1960 due to adverse developments both in domestic

and foreign policies and increased tension as a result of political and economic experiences.

Fatin Rüştü Zorlu was harshly criticized especially by the Great Britain due to his foreign policy strategies and implementations. British Ambassador James Bowker filed a report to his government on June 8, 1955 and commented that Americans and English have done with Deputy Prime Minister, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, and that he was narrow-minded. Bowker further emphasized that it would be better to discharge Zorlu from office and replace him with someone, whom Americans would get along with, and that they were prepared to sacrifice Zorlu. The failure of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu's negotiations in the USA and his going back to Turkey with 30 million dollars instead of 300 million dollars that Turkey needed was also followed closely by the UK (Batur, 1989).

Particularly from the early years of Democrat Party (DP) period, foreign policy of the country gave weight to the security of the country as a natural consequence of international political conjuncture in those days. In this context DP worked really very hard to make Turkey to be involved in NATO alliance as soon as they came into power, and Turkey became a member of NATO during the early years of their power (Yavuzalp, 1991, p. 70). Undoubtedly, the esteem felt for the alliance of Turkey and the USA undergoing from the early years of DP reign had continued during the period of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu's Foreign Ministry. Turkey and the USA gave up their traditional policies of isolation and not joining to alliances after World War Two and established an alliance where the concept of security had precedence over. It was obvious that Zorlu recognized Turkey's need for foreign aid to develop its economy and strengthen its defence on the way to Westernization. In substance, stability of Turkish-American alliance was dependent on the continuation of Soviet

threat against West Block and Turkey. Hence, in the period when Soviet threat was softened, Zorlu considered that Turkey had been pursuing a policy independent of its alliance with the USA (Uslu, 2016, p. 23).

NATO had been established to play an important role in achieving two long-range aspirations of American policy. One of these long-range aspirations of the USA was to establish its hegemony on the capitalist world, and the other was to prevent expansion of Communism. In this context, NATO's political and military objectives are to mobilize all political, economic, moral and military powers and resources of North America and Western and Southern Europe, and equip Western Europe with a network of war bases and make this region the most modern arsenal (Fahri, 1966, p. 68).

The relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union, on the other hand, progressed contrariwise of Turkish-American relations. Beyond any doubt, the greatest reason for this was that Turkey had been continuously bringing the Soviet threat forward to obtain American aid. Following its membership to NATO, Turkey moved on under the umbrella of the West and began considering the Soviet Union as a communist danger. On the other hand, after the death of Stalin in 1953, the Soviet Union attempted to soften its relations with Turkey in the light of "de-Stalinization" policies. But, Turkey did not trust the sincerity of Soviets (Albayrak, 2004, p. 466). After Turkey became a member of NATO, Americans were allowed to set up bases in Turkish territory, and this development drew Soviets' reaction, so Turkey began growing away from Soviets in 1956, and this policy continued until the end of 1958 (Albayrak, 2004, p. 467). The reason was Turkey's ongoing unilateral foreign policy understanding under the guidance of the USA. Even though some changes took place in Turkey's foreign policy understanding when Fatin Rüştü Zorlu was appointed as

Foreign Minister in 1957, it was impossible to achieve results in the short term. Towards the end of 1959, economic convergence was observed between Turkey and the Soviet Union. Not being able to obtain the aid it expected from the USA and intending to establish a versatile policy, Turkey was in an endeavor to tend towards the Soviet Union.

The most critical point for Americans in their relations with Turkey was to preserve their national interests in the Near and the Middle East geographies. In this context, Washington administration recognized the military junta, who took over the administration in the country three days later. The most important issue for the USA was the sustainability of Turkey's loyalty to NATO and CENTO and preservation of regional interests. Following the military coup on May 27, Eisenhower sent a message to the leader of the new administration, Cemal Gürsel, and after stating that the determination of Turkish government to maintain their ties with NATO and CENTO was a source of satisfaction for him, assured him that American government would sustain their relations with Turkey to fit the purpose of friendship and cooperation (Cumhuriyet, 1960).

According to historian Feroz Ahmad, Turkey has tried to implement foreign policy objectives determined by Washington and London resolutely and without any complaint during the 1950s (Ahmad, 1977, p. 395). Moreover, according to Hungarian author Ferenc A. Vali, who had been a spy for Hungary in Turkey during World War Two and sentenced to prison between the years of 1951 and 1956 for this reason, Turkey fell into the arms of the USA and became completely dependent on America by way of bilateral agreements (Vali, 1971, pp. 36-38). According to the leader of Workers' Party of Turkey, Mehmet Ali Aybar, the bilateral agreements signed with America since 1947 made Turkey a satellite state. The

American missions settled in Turkey had been interfering with all affairs of Turkey on the basis of their authority to supervise the aids (Çetiner, 1964). According to the opinions of some, economic aid provided to Turkey by America had been utilized mostly by the pro-American economic elite, multi-national corporations and American companies in Turkey. While America was providing economic aid to Turkey, its aim was to strengthen a small elite group governing the country as they wished. It was one of America's goals to support multinational corporations which played a major role in determining the direction of the Turkish economy. While the USA was making Turkey economically dependent, they also used the economic aid they provided to Turkey as a means of oppression to procure acceptance of some of their requests. It would be wrong to say that DP had pursued or forced to pursue the Western policies unconditionally between 1950 and 1960. According to Metin Toker, one of the famous journalists of Turkey and Ismet Inonu's son-in-law, the most important reason why Turkey could not pursue the policy they wished on Cyprus issue was that Turkey could not oppose the pressures of the USA, whom they were economically dependent on (Toker, 1964).

In history, Cyprus Island was controlled by Venetians and used as a base for pirate ships which became a threat to southern coasts of the Ottoman Empire and routes of maritime trade. Eventually, it was conquered by Sultan Selim II in 1571 and incorporated into Ottoman territories (Uzunçarşılı, 1988, p. 9). The island of Cyprus, which has been under the auspices of Ottomans for about 307 years, was officially claimed by THE UK on May 25, 1878 in order to mitigate the heavy articles of Treaty of San Stefano, which were in detriment of the Ottomans, and to protect the Ottoman territory against the threat of Russian expansionism (Koç, 2009, p. 78).

According to the alliance treaty signed between the Ottoman Empire and the UK on June 4, 1878, Great Britain's (GB) aim was to control trade routes by attaining a base in the Eastern Mediterranean on one hand and spread over the Middle East in the short term by claiming rights on the Eastern Anatolia region where the influence of Russians and the French was increasing every passing day. With this treaty signed between the two countries, the island of Cyprus was left to British administration together with the Muslim Turkish population living there. Upon involvement of Ottoman Empire into World War One along with Germany, the UK declared on November 5, 1914 that they unilaterally annexed the island.

Even though Turkey won the War of Independence, during the process of Treaty of Lausanne, where the borders of the new Turkish state were to be determined, the Cyprus issue was also put on the agenda upon request of the UK, and Articles 16, 20 and 21 related to Cyprus were signed along with the other articles of the Treaty of Lausanne. Thus, the Republic of Turkey gave up its sovereignty rights over Cyprus and transferred these rights to the UK (İsmail, 1998, p. 42). Then, the Greek Cypriots took the advantage of Cyprus Island controlled by the UK and began to initiate "Enosis"[1], that is annexation of the island. As a result of these efforts, the Turkish people of the island began to be organized against the activities of "Enosis" with the influence of their ties to Turkey. The Greek Cypriots continued these efforts intensely during and after the World War Two. In fact, the UK could not completely shut its ears to Enosis claims of Greeks on the island. London was aware that they could not stay in Egypt for a long time due to gradually increasing Arabic nationalism in those days, so their presence on Cyprus was very important in order for them to sustain their military presence in Eastern Mediterranean. Eventually, the UK adopted

[1] *Enosis* is a Greek word meaning "union". As a political discourse, it is included in literature to describe the union of Cyprus with Greece. This phrase was first used for Crete.

an intermediary formula and announced that they would make political and economic reforms on Cyprus, on October 23, 1946 (Oran, 2005, p. 597).

Therewith, the Greek Cypriot Church, which had been defending "Enosis" for hundreds of years, announced that they would have a plebiscite on January 15, 1950. On December 12, 1949, Turkish Cypriots organized a comprehensive rally in Nicosia with the participation of 15,000 people, to show their opposition to "Enosis" to the world (Halkın Sesi, 1949). Carrying on their Enosis activities, the Greek Cypriots had a plebiscite, a referendum on January 15, 1950 with the support of the communist party, AKEL and the church. In the referendum, 96% of Greek Cypriots said "yes" to Enosis. "Enosis" activities on the island were intensified after the election of Makarios as archbishop. With the increase of Makarios' activities particularly in Greece after 1950, the Greek government felt the public pressure with regard to Enosis, but as they had determined to be a member of the Western alliance was compatible with their national interest, they also did not want their relationships with the THE UK and Turkey to worsen. Until the end of 1954, Greece's main objective was to solve the Cyprus issue via negotiations with Britain.

When the calendars showed 1950, it was seen that Turkey's interest on Cyprus issue had increased. An incident in Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) had a great contribution to this development. Cevdet Kerim İncedayı, one of the influential members of parliament from CHP (Republican People's Party - RPP), took the floor outside the agenda and went up to the rostrum by holding two small bottles containing soil of Cyprus and blood of a Turkish Cypriot separately. In his speech he commented that Cyprus island was about to be annexed by Greeks and Turks are facing the danger of extinction. This speech evoked the awareness of Turkey. Then, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Necmeddin Sadak went up to the rostrum

and made the following speech and delivered government's opinion: *"Venerable friends, there is no issue as Cyprus issue. Because Cyprus is under British domination and administration. We know that the UK has no intention and tendency at all to transfer this island to another State. We have firm conviction in this respect. No movement on Cyprus cannot and will not change this situation "* (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 1950).

Democrat Party (DP) came to power alone after 1950 elections in Turkey and formed the government by itself for 10 years. During the period of the Second Menderes Government formed after 1954 elections, "Cyprus Issue" became the most important matter in Turkish foreign policy and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu was one the most important people who ensured this (Bayar, 2016).

Turkish Foreign Policy under the influence of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu between the years of 1955-1960 and particularly Cyprus issue were of great importance. It is known that Zorlu mostly worked on Cyprus issue, especially between the years of 1958-1959. As opposed to the previous Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fuat Köprülü, who said *"There is no issue as Cyprus issue,"* Zorlu always considered Cyprus issue as a national problem and issue. By successfully defending the issue on international platforms, he made it possible for Turkish soldiers to set foot on the island for the first time and later on, he paved the way for Cyprus Peace Operation and independence of Northern Cyprus by virtue of the agreements signed. Cyprus has always been a national issue both in Zorlu's foreign policy and in Turkey's long-term politics. When Celal Bayar was imprisoned in Kayseri Prison after the Military Coup on May 27, he commented that the result obtained on Cyprus issue was the personal success of Zorlu, and he considered Zorlu the future prime minister.

These comments are also the proof of how important of an actor Zorlu was for Turkish political life (Günver, 1985, p. 156).

Fatin Rüştü Zorlu strengthened Turkey's hand in international relations in his foreign policy activities with regard to steps taken towards the preservation of regional peace such as "Bandung Conference" and "The Baghdad Pact" and in direction of national interests by putting these steps on Turkey's foreign policy agenda.

In the study, primarily important documents of the period have been reached in the archives of the Presidency and Prime Ministry of Turkish Republic and then the archive of TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) Presidency. Later on the minutes of TBMM have been reviewed and official Foreign Relations of US (FRUS) documents have been reached via the USA Office of Historian. National and international magazines and newspapers have been examined and studies have been conducted with regard to Turkish Foreign Policy of the time and impact of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu. The sources of Harvard University and Yeditepe University Libraries have made great contributions to the thesis as well. Later on, the books involving memoirs of famous political actors of the period have been examined, and journalists, academicians and politicians who witnessed the period have been interviewed. Especially during the interviews with Second President of KKTC, Mr. Mehmet Ali Talat and with Third President of KKTC, Mr. Derviş Eroğlu, important views have been obtained regarding the importance of Cyprus within the context of Turkey's national interests.

I also made significant interviews with the daughter of the third President of Turkish Republic Celal Bayar Mrs. Nilüfer Bayar Gürsoy, the former

chairman of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) Mr. Hüsamettin Cindoruk, the founding President of ISTEK Foundation and Yeditepe University Mr. Bedrettin Dalan, the former Turkey's representative of United Nations (UN) retired diplomat Mr. Üner Kırdar, journalist Mr. Hulusi Turgut, researcher and writer Mr. Mehmet Arif Demirer, journalist Mr. Altan Öymen, retired ambassador Mr. Onur Öymen, academician Mr. Prof. Dr. Ata Atun, the head consulate of TRNC (KKTC) Mr. Fahri Yönlüer, journalist Mrs. Nur Batur and the former foreign minister of TRNC Mr. Taner Ergin.

In the first section of the study, Turkish Foreign Policy Following World War Two is dwelled on in order to better understand the period. Later on the election of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu from Democrat Party (DP) as a member of parliament and his influence on Turkish Foreign Policy, crises, conferences and the preferences of Turkish Foreign Policy under these circumstances are assessed. Then Cyprus issue, which has immemorial importance in Zorlu's understanding of foreign policy, geopolitical importance of the island, the phases that the island went through and became an international problem and Turkey's Cyprus Policy are chronologically discussed. Towards the end of the study, the process heading towards the May 27 Military Coup, Zorlu's status in perspective of the USA and USSR and status of Cyprus in process of May 27 are examined.

Being one of the greatest national cases of Turkey, Cyprus issue is still a serious one where insolubility is the solution. Fatin Rüştü Zorlu ensured Cyprus to be one of the priorities of Turkish Foreign Policy again and pursued a powerful policy against "Enosis" activities of Greeks especially after he was appointed as Foreign Minister in 1957. Without any doubt, Zorlu's personal diplomatic skills and his statesmanship had a great impact on the diplomacy being followed. Cyprus is still of

vital importance for the Turkish Republic in terms of national interests and benefiting from the policy of partition of the island that was always regarded as a remedy by Fatin Rüştü Zorlu during two-state solution debates is of great importance.

1. WAR PERIOD

The international order which had not escaped the devastating effects of the First World War, should have paved a way to another great world war. This led to a rapid collapse of countries in economic, political and social spheres. However, the recovery process took a very long time. During that process, the interest of the states directly affected the affairs among other countries. The aim of this chapter is to analyse the main perspectives of Turkish foreign policy after World War II.

1.1. Turkish Foreign Policy in Polarization Process after the World War Two

The International order had witnessed great changes after World War Two with regard to both Europe and the system. Being divided as “Democracies” and “Fascists” in itself after World War One in the West and the USSR, and the USA's becoming competitors of Europe caused Europe to lose its specialty as the dominant power. Thus, Europe is boiled down to a world sub-system (Oran, 2005, p. 480). One of the biggest problems of Turkey during World War Two was the “loneliness” it had throughout the war. Turkey was among the winning states of the war, and when it declared war to axis states at the last minute of the war, it gained the right to be a full member of the United Nations (UN) in San Francisco Conference held on April 25,

1945. Even though Turkey was one of the founding members of the UN during the years after the war, its political loneliness continued. In the meantime, "balance of forces" was being re-established, and Turkey directed its foreign policy in order to protect its territorial integrity against pressures by Soviets before this balance threatens its national security. In this context, it joined some alliances and became one of their founding members.

Turkey's institutional ties with the West which were established only after World War II have much shorter life span when compared to its history in the West. In order to understand and to properly locate Turkey's place in the West, it is first necessary to comprehend the emergence and the evolution of the Western security structure in the immediate aftermath of World War II within which Turkey had a significant role to play for almost half a century. The role that Turkey assumed within the Western institutional frameworks was mainly an outcome of the entry of the United States into the picture (Kibaroğlu & Kibaroğlu, 2009, p. 43). It became a tangible reason for the pressure on and uneasiness of Turkey by the Soviet Union. Attitude and actions of Moscow Administration during the war revealed that they would have some requests from Turkey after the war. Indeed, the Soviet Government sent a diplomatic note to Turkey on March 19, 1945 and notified that they were not willing to renew the "Turkish-Soviet Friendship and Nonaggression Pact" dated December 17, 1925. Following this development, there were significant reactions against the Soviet Union in Turkey. During the Potsdam Conference held on July 17 - August 2, 1945, a clear Soviet threat was felt on Turkey. This threat manifested itself when Soviets requested to set up a base in the straits and the regions of Kars and Ardahan to be handed over to them. They requested the Montreux Convention to be

reformulated to allow Soviet merchant vessels and battleships to freely pass through the straits all the time (Uçarol, 1985, p. 545).

Another important issue revealed in Potsdam Conference was the behavior of the USA against the Soviet Union's claim of land from Turkey. In relation to the claims of Soviets from Turkey, Washington administration suggested that this issue be a concern of Turkey and the Soviet Union and that it had to be resolved between these two states. The USA believed that they would sustain their cooperation with Soviets that they had established during World War Two, but the developments in later years carried the issue to another dimension (Gönlübol & Ülman, 1969, p. 211). Even though the USA had suggested that the request of the Soviet Union to change the Turkish-Soviet borderline in its favor be a matter of interest to these two states, revised its opinion regarding the straits and engaged with the territorial integrity of Turkey. When Soviet expansion and pressure began to pose a danger in 1946, particularly in the Middle East as indicated before, the USA made significant changes in its foreign policy that they have pursued till that time.[2]

There is no doubt that the most important manifestation of a change in the USA's foreign policy was the transfer of the corpse of Turkish Ambassador Münir Ertegün after his death in Washington to Turkey by one of the biggest battleships of American Navy, Missouri. Anchorage of Missouri in Bosphorus on April 5, 1946 was perceived as an assurance provided by the USA to Turkey against continuing Soviet pressure. the USA President Truman made a speech when the battleship arrived in Istanbul on April 5 and commented that American foreign policy would have a new direction and the situation in the Middle East was still critical (Uçarol, 1985, p. 548).

[2]Following the World War Two, Turkey was faced with two main economic problems. The first one was difficulties emerged due to the normalized (reduced) prices of export goods prices of which were increased during the war and second one was its efforts to improve its industry and create new fields of development while keeping its army combat ready.

The USA also gave a message that the status of Turkish straits would not be changed without its own consent (Erhan, 2005, p. 525). Yet another significance of this development is that it was the first support provided to Turkey by the USA (Ünal, 1994). In the first note given by the USA which shows that Turkey was not alone against the USSR, the USA rejected control of the states which had forces in the Black Sea on the straits and stated that only the control of Turkey was appropriate. They also emphasized that any attack on the straits against Turkey would be considered a reason for action by the UN Security Council (Harris, 1972, p. 22). Together with the Truman Doctrine to be announced later, this support gained a global and official status (Öke & Mütercimler, 2000).

The universal danger caused by communism encouraged the USA to take responsibility for the protection of global structure of international politics and the order of freedom. It appears that the Soviet Union was striving to spread in three directions in 1946; the Middle East petroleum, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean via Iran, The Straits via Turkey and the Eastern Mediterranean via the Aegean Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean and Greece (Armaoğlu, 2009, p. 537). These regions which Soviets were interested in were involved in national interests of Great Britain. But, due to the great damage that the UK suffered in World War Two, the UK did not have the sufficient power to stand against the USSR and they believed that only the USA would oppose the Russian imperialism. In this regard the UK sent a memorandum to Washington government regarding Turkey and Greece and notified the USA that independence of these two countries had vital importance in the context of defending the Western world.

Each year when the US budget is being discussed in Congress, one of the most controversial items is the appropriation for foreign aid. The foreign Aid Program consists of three major parts. Firstly, military aid, which consists of material for defence. Secondly, defence support which is dollar aid given to our allies maintaining their own defence forces. The maintenance of these forces causes a strain on the local economy. Last one is technical assistance which for some years was called the "Point Four Program". This part of the program receives the smallest portion of foreign aid (Brookner & Heilman, 1960, p. 33).

The US President Truman sent a message to the US Congress on March 12, 1947, demanding authorization to provide a military aid amounting USD 400 million to Turkey and Greece (Schleslng, 1973). Truman emphasized in his message that sustainment of Turkey's territorial integrity was of utmost importance for the preservation of the structure in the Middle East. (Armaoğlu, 2009, p. 532). On March 12, 1947, the Truman Doctrine was announced and the US Congress adopted the "Greek-Turkish Aid Act". It was decided to grant USD 100 million to Turkey and USD 300 million to Greece. The basis of Truman Doctrine was the heavy communism and Soviet threat in the USA. Therefore, down from 1947, struggle against communism underlay the American foreign policy. In this context, Truman Doctrine was an important starting point of Turkey's quest for security and the multi-party system initiated in 1946 as the "outpost" of the modern Western world was also ensured (Erhan, 2005, p. 532). After the announcement of Truman Doctrine, Prime Minister Recep Peker made a statement to journalists and said that they appreciated Great Britain's approach to lay some of the burdens of aid on the USA and commented that the aid of the USA to Turkey was not only for the sake of national security and empowerment of Turkey but also to serve the global peace. This might

also be interpreted that the Washington administration would have recognized that the road to security in Atlantic pass through Turkey and Greece.

Truman Doctrine was one of the important steps taken by the American government in this period to ensure pursuing its foreign policy based on directing international issues and provide the solution as they wished. In the message he sent to the congress in January 1949, Truman had determined four matters to be considered in American foreign policy. The first one was to suggest forcing the UN organization to work in compliance with the interests of the American government. The second point was to fill the gaps in various regions and countries and obtain preponderance in these parts. And finally increasing military cooperation and establishing military-political blocs (Fahri, 1966, p. 66). American administrators used a common language as war theoreticians and made the following statement:

> *"Aids to be made to foreign governments might ensure their economic and political security but actually, they should be considered as investments made for the security of America. In order to increase this security of America, we must request foreign states to make efforts to increase their military power"* (Reitzel, 1956, p. 131).

Truman proclaimed his doctrine as "the policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures" (Truman, 1947, p. 178). Inevitably, criticism of the objective of defending democracy appeared at both ends of the intellectual spectrum (Kissenger, 1994, p. 453). While Truman Doctrine was grounding on military aid to Turkey and Greece due to Soviet threat in this process, general situation in Europe was extremely bad, both socially and economically. Due to the heavy devastation caused by the war, social extremism and explosion were boosting. As economic resources became scarce, Soviets carried communist party's applications into practice in this fertile environment. As George McGhee, the ex-ambassador of the USA in Turkey

mentioned in his memoirs, George Marshall, American Foreign Minister made a speech in Foreign Relations Commission of US Congress on March 15, 1947. The main theme of this speech was to prevent the danger of communism throughout Europe and set Europe on fire. He emphasized in his speech that the situation is more critical than a year ago, Soviets have challenged Truman Doctrine for the first time after the adoption of law no. 75 and communists seized the power on May 31, 1947. In this context situation in the Eastern European countries had been worsening and these states were forced to be attached to each other by alliance pacts. He also underlined that other nations in Europe would face with the same danger of being withdrawn to the orbit of communism (McGhee, 1992, p. 96).

For this reason, the USA tried to find another formula to provide aid to Europe, and this formula was announced by the US Foreign Minister George Marshall in the speech he made at Harvard University on June 5, 1947 (Department of State Bulletin, 1947, pp. 1159-1560). According to this, European countries should establish an economic cooperation between them before anything else and make up their shortages themselves. Following this cooperation program, US aid would have stepped in for remaining shortages (Kissenger, 1994, p. 453).

Considering that Turkey was not in a tight spot economically, American administrators tried to direct the military aid to Turkey for two purposes. The first purpose was to equip Turkish army with modern weapons, train the army on how to use these weapons and increase Turkey's defence capacity; and the second one was to lessen military expenses which were almost half of the Turkish budget and a heavy burden for the Turkish economy. But the military aid didn't have a comforting impact on the Turkish economy. Even though no price was paid for the military

articles coming from the USA, a significant amount of budget had to be allocated to military expenses for maintenance of these materials. On the other hand, as dependence on the USA to procure spare parts was gradually increasing, USD shortage arose. US experts emphasized that Marshall Plan was not prepared to finance a national economic development but to invigorate the economy that collapsed because of the war and stated that Turkey did not suffer from the war and was in a position to contribute to Europe's development with its under and above ground richness. Therefore, they did not see fit to provide economic aid to Turkey within the scope of Marshall Aid. In response, Turkey directly contacted with Washington administration and emphasized that Turkey was geopolitically very important, and this geographical location led to financial difficulties. Therefore, internal and external assistance was required for development. Considering this situation, US administration took notice of Turkey's critical status and decided to involve Turkey within the scope of Marshall Plan on July 4, 1948 (Gönlübol & Ülman, 1969, p. 234).

Turkey transited to multi-party system in 1946, following the establishment of Democrat Party (DP). Even though they had determined their purpose in party bylaw as making Turkey a free, independent, democratic, powerful and creditable country in the light of and in accordance with Atatürk's principles and reforms and upgrading the country to a level better than the level of modern countries, DP could not present a new understanding in foreign policy. DP adopted to base its foreign policy on legal equity of nations, political, economic and cultural cooperation between nations, collective trust and good neighbor relations. In addition, it was believed that a peaceful and clear foreign policy which would achieve the unity of nations aim would be most appropriate and realistic way to follow the interests of the country (DP Program ve Tüzüğü, 1946). One of the most important practices of DP

during the first months of their power was membership application to NATO, which was a milestone for Turkish Foreign Policy. The emergence of NATO had mostly favourable implications for Turkey in the political, economic and military domains throughout most of the post-World War II period. Yet, each of these institutions had separate, and at times parallel, life cycle in its relations with Turkey, experiencing a number of difficulties as well as attaining a certain degree of harmony. However, the net effect has been to forege Turkey's place in the West especially by means of its NATO membership (Kibaroğlu & Kibaroğlu, 2009, p. 47).

DP's membership application was rejected after 45 days. Right after this, Korean War erupted and Turkey was one of the first few countries to respond the call issued by the UN to the whole world. Thus engaging with Korean War became Turkey's best card for NATO membership (Şen, 2010, pp. 109-110). A Turkish brigade consisting 4500 soldiers engaged with Korean War which broke out on June 25, 1950. Being the third biggest force after American and South Korean troops, Turkish soldiers won the appreciation of Western world due to their success throughout the war. Turkey's joining to Korean War contributed a great deal to the establishment of warm relations between the two states (Amerika'da Onbir Gün, 1967, pp. 10-16). Despite opposition from some Western states, the USA leaned towards Turkey's membership to NATO by thinking that Turkey would strengthen NATO's southern flank. So Turkey became a member of NATO in February 1950. According to Stearns, who was one of the important people stationed in American Embassy in Turkey, the high probability of a Soviet attack on Turkey during Korean crisis played an important role in Turkey's acceptance as a NATO member by Western leaders. The probability of a Soviet attack on Turkey during Korean War was so high that a plan

was prepared to take the USA citizens in Turkey out of the country (Stearns, 1992, pp. 74-75).

Turkey's membership to NATO provided great benefits to the member countries of the pact but especially to the USA. One of these benefits was that the south-eastern flank of NATO would be protected against enemy forces and Soviet expansionism would be limited by Turkey's membership. Moreover, Soviets' penetration into the Middle East would be prevented, and so petroleum resources would be protected (Lacey, 1991, pp. 316-317). The USA Chief of Staff made a speech at Foreign Relations Commission of US Congress on January 15, 1952 and commented that by possessing Dardanelles and Bosphorus, Turkey was controlling and defending the waterline from the Black Sea to Mediterranean, Suez Canal and Egypt and also controlling the highways extending from North to strategically important oil wells in the Middle East (McGhee, 1990, pp. 88-89). The military-strategic role that the US had in mind for Turkey and Greece as the new members of NATO was to use their territories both as natural barriers between the Soviet Union and the oil rich Middle East and the Eastern Mediterrenean regions, and as forward defence bases against possible Soviet offensives on the Western European members of alliances (Kibaroğlu & Kibaroğlu, 2009, p. 48).

Turkey's NATO membership would be manifestation of the westward foreign policy it pursued. Turkey ensured its national security especially against the Soviet threat under NATO's umbrella. Another important feature of Turkey's membership would be the continuation of military and economic aid by the USA. The biggest advantage of NATO membership from DP's point of view was the great prestige gained by the government in terms of domestic policy. Beginning to pursue a

parallel policy with the West contributed a great deal to the status of the country. In this context, Turkey headed towards establishing regional pacts under the USA's control to strengthen the defence of the West. The first attempt of the USA to establish a regional alliance in the Middle East was drawing Turkey and Egypt together in the years of 1951 and 1952. However, the relations between Turkey and Arab countries were rather tense in those days due to Israel-Palestine issue. It was because Turkey was supporting Arab countries at first by assuming that Israel would take sides with Soviets, but when the USA and Israel got closer in 1949, Turkey changed its position. For this reason, the possibility of Turkey-Egypt alliance had completely died out and the cooperation agreement signed with Pakistan in 1954 became the second attempt to establish a regional alliance. This was followed by the The Baghdad Pact signed in February 1955 under observation of the USA (Zürcher, 2005, pp. 342-343).

2. FATİN RÜŞTÜ ZORLU IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY, CRISES, CONFERENCES AND PREFERENCES

The process that started in international affairs with The Baghdad Pact and continued up to the 1958 military coup in Iraq has been influential due to economic and political agreements and on the domestic policies of the countries. Therefore, in this chapter is going to explain how Fatin Rüştü Zorlu affected Turkish foreign policy.

2.1. The Baghdad Pact

The Middle East gained an important position in international relations after World War Two due to its geographical location and strategic importance and petroleum reserves in the region. In this context, the Middle Eastern geography

became economically, politically and militarily sensitive area after the great war. Following World War Two, the establishment of State of Israel in 1948 was one of the major factors affecting political developments in the Middle East. Arab-Israel wars, which began in 1945, played a determining role in relations of Arab countries among themselves and with other countries. The Arab States located in the Middle East came directly under the domination or mandate of Great Britain, France or Italy towards the end of 19th and at the beginning of 20th centuries. Hence, these countries were predicated nationalism on and fought against colonialist states to protect their independence after they earned it. Especially the support given to Israel by the West during its foundation instigated the hatred of Arab states in the Middle East against the West (Al, 2014, pp. 142-143). In order to strengthen the solidarity between them, they developed the idea of "Great Arab State". The leader of this ideology was Gamel Abdel Nasser, who brought down the Kingdom of Egypt on July 23, 1952. By nationalizing Suez Canal in 1956, Nasser completely burned the bridges with the UK and France. This situation in the Middle East led the great powers to pursue policies to dominate the region or increase their effectiveness after World War Two. For the Arab world, The Baghdad Pact would be regarded as a power struggle between Andel Nasser and Iraqi leader Nuri al-Said, who had close relations with the UK and strove to establish Arab League. 1947-1948 Palestine War made Nasser believe that Arab countries should unite. This idea was put into practice in 1945 with Arab league and with Arab Collective Security Pact in 1950. Egypt believed that it would play an active role in Arab Collective Security Pact, Arab League and Arab World. Nasser considered that Egypt should be in the center of three powers such as Arab, African and Muslim worlds due to the realities of history and geography (Badeu & Gunther,

1959, pp. 62-63). He believed that only Egypt would play an active role in the Arab world.

When Eisenhower became the President of the USA on January 20, 1954, the first issue he dealt with was the Middle East. After being a NATO member in 1952, Turkey shifted the center of its foreign policy to the Middle Eastern geography, and in time, Turkey's policy became parallel to the regional policy of the USA. According to observations of Dulles, US Secretary of State, on the Middle East, Arabs were not willing to be members of any Western defence organization. In this context, a "Northern Wall Project" composed of Non-Arab countries was being elaborated (Armaoğlu, 1995, p. 222). This project aimed to involve Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq and Syria. Therefore, the Baghdad Pact was inspired by "North Wall Project.

George McGhee, who was commissioned as US Ambassador to Turkey for long years, comments in his memoirs that unlike European forces, Turkey never showed any indication that it wanted to look out for its own interests in the Middle East. Turkey had withdrawn from the region after World War One and had nothing to do with the territories outside its borders. McGhee argued that Turkey would play an important role in the development of the Middle East Command as a neighbor with strong the Middle Eastern ties. Being the only important military force in the region, Turkey offered a basis for security to the other Middle Eastern countries in the post-war period. In addition, joining NATO and having an increased military power provided an additional possibility of prestige to Turkey (McGhee, 1992, pp. 208-209).

The most significant challenge that arose when Turkey's NATO membership was in question was defending the Middle East. As is known, the UK

objected Turkey's NATO membership till the last minute as it wanted to involve Turkey in defence order of the Middle East. But, with breaking out of Korean War, it appeared that the USA had tried to persuade Great Britain. Turkey was accepted to NATO only after it gave a promise to play an active role in defending the Middle East in the future. The first impact of Korean War was Turkey's entry to NATO, and the other one was that it made the USA closely interested in the security of Balkans and the Middle East as it concerned that the Soviet Union would use force in other geographies as they had already attempted to attack the Far East (Gönlübol & Ülman, 1969, p. 269). It was recognized that it was time to plan a defence pact in the Middle East.

Turkey began working on accomplishing a defence pact in the Middle East as of summer 1954. The main source behind this move was US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. The Korean War had encouraged Dulles to take more sever measures against the danger of communism. In this context Dulles wanted to unite the Middle East countries in an alliance system and visited all the Middle East countries in May 1953. But, since the Suez crisis between the UK and Egypt had not been solved yet and the hostility between Arab countries and Israel continued, he could not grease the skids to establish a defence system in the Middle East (Armaoğlu, 2009, p. 634). Commenting that "This issue of a Defence Organization in the Middle East is not a short-term possibility but rather an issue to consider in future," he postponed this idea of a defence pact. Dulles visited Turkey on May 25-27, 1953 and Turkey gave a memorandum to US Secretary of State on this matter. When it was understood that Turkey was willing to the leadership of the Middle East Defence Pact, it was time to determine the countries which would join this pact. Dulles wanted to prevent their alliances, the UK and France to be perceived as colonial powers in the region due to

their attitude. Dulles recognized that it would be very difficult for the countries in the region to join a defence pact to be established against the Soviet danger before Arab-Israel conflict and Suez issue are solved (Sever, 1997, pp. 107-108). In negotiations made in Ankara, Dulles wanted to know how Turkey would solve the problem of the defence of the Middle East against the Soviet threat. According to İsmail Soysal, Prime Minister Menderes approached the subject in the following way:

> *"The Suez Canal base is not a problem of Egypt and the UK only. For example, this is also a vital matter for Turkey. The UK should remain as the guardian of this outpost, which is a key point for a free world. Keeping its 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean is the proof of the importance that the USA gave to the region. In this case, it would not be right for Egypt to present the canal base issue as only its own problem of independence. Turkey's acceptance of establishing some joint bases in the country to use together with the USA would be an example for Egypt. Turkey is an important country with its determination to take stand against an attack and due to its social and political stability besides its strategic position and being a bridge between the East and the West. Without Turkey, defence of the Middle East would be theoretical. It was time to abandon the scenario of defending the Middle East region with Arabs. A new initiative is needed to defend the Middle East. The backbone of this should be Turkey"* (Soysal, 1955 Bağdat Paktı, 1991, p. 183).

The meeting where the draft of a new "the Middle East Defence Pact" was prepared was held on July 12, 1954 in Ankara under the title of "Conference of the Middle East Chiefs of Mission". The main purpose of the conference was to help Turkey determine its Middle East policy. The meeting was attended by Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Fuat Köprülü, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, Jeddah Ambassador Kemal Aziz Payman, Baghdad Ambassador Fikret Şefik Özdoğancı, Beirut Ambassador Rıfkı Rüştü Zorlu, Amman Ambassador Kadri Rizan, Damascus Charge d'Affaires İsmail Soysal and Cairo Charge d'Affaires Mahmut Dikerdem (Mütercimler & Öke, 2004, pp. 167-168). It is possible to say that this meeting was an important step in establishing a defence organization in the region as well as showing the increasing interest of Turkey in the Middle East. Fatin Rüştü Zorlu described The Baghdad Pact as *"An important development for the constitution of a circle of security and peace for around Turkey"* (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, pp. 807-808) . According to

Zorlu's the Middle East policy, first of all, Egypt should be involved in the Middle East Military Pact planned by the USA if Arabs are to be involved because it could not be expected for other Arab countries to join a pact to which Egypt, the leader of Arab nationalism, was not involved.

The idea of Iraq and Turkey to establish a defence organization in the Middle East was reacted by Arab states, Egypt being in the first place because Nasser had increased his activities to establish the Arab Block under his own leadership. In fact, after discussions of Egypt with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, establishment of an "Islamic Congress" in September to keep the balance between the East and the West had been discussed (Armaoğlu, 20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, 2009, p. 635). The agreement between Turkey and Pakistan was signed on April 2, 1954 in Karachi between Pakistani Foreign Minister Mohammad Zarifullah Khan and Turkish ambassador Selahattin Refet Arel. After being approved by Turkish and Pakistan parliaments, this agreement entered into force on June 12, 1954 (Gönlübol & Ülman, 1969, p. 272). Thus, after the signing of the Karachi Agreement, the first step in the Middle East security system was taken. While France opposed the idea of forming a regional pact, the Soviet Union reported that the Turkish-Pakistani agreement was directly related to its own security and warned Turkey that Turkey would be responsible for the consequences (Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, 1971, p. 493). But, despite the warnings, Turkey tried to ensure Iraq to take part in Turkish-Pakistani agreement. Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Said visited İstanbul towards the end of September 1954 and had a talk with Prime Minister Adnan Menderes.

The two statesmen agreed that Turkey and Iraq should cooperate with their neighbors for their own security and tried to involve Egypt in security grouping in the region. They also decided to contact with Syria, Iran and Pakistan. Nuri al-Said

and Menderes met and had talks in Baghdad between January 6 and 12, 1955. As a result of these talks, an official declaration was issued stating that Turkey and Iraq had reached an agreement to sign a pact in the shortest time possible to expand their relationship with regard to security and stability of the Middle East region. The Prime Minister Menderes stated that their main objective was not signing a bilateral agreement but establishing a multilateral cooperation (Gallman, 1964, p. 35). Menderes visited Damascus and Beirut in January. While Syria refused to be involved in this pact to be established, Lebanon and Egypt hesitated to join the pact as a result of Syria's rejection (Armaoğlu, 2009, p. 636).

Under the circumstance, Turkey and Iraq signed the The Baghdad Pact on February 24, 1955 (Ayın Tarihi, 1955, pp. 185-188). According to the 8-article pact, which would be required to be renewed every 5 years and stipulates cooperation in security and defence, the two states should not interfere with their domestic affairs and settle possible disputes peacefully. The Pact would also be open to members of Arab League and to any state which was actively interested in the security of the region and definitely recognized by the parties (Soysal, 1965, pp. 436-439). After a short while, Great Britain, Pakistan and Iran also took part in The Baghdad Pact, which was signed between Turkey and Iraq. Thus, The Baghdad Pact became a regional organisation. Turkey's being involved in such an organization was due to its special relations with the West and playing an active role in the concept of the northern zone as requested by the USA. Turkey was aiming to obtain the military and economic support of the West by joining this organization (Marlowe, 2012, p. 84). The Baghdad Pact was considered one of the elements of the policy of Western Bloc to surround the Soviet Union and its alliances under the conditions of Cold War. The Pact would be an additional defence cooperation to NATO. The goal of The Baghdad

Pact was creating a defence circle against the Soviet Union and China. That Pact also constituted the part of the said surrounding circle which extends from Arabian Peninsula to Pakistan (Öymen, 2013).

The most basic impact of The Baghdad Pact on Turkish Foreign Policy was bringing Turkey against the Arab world. Arab countries immediately began to make propaganda against The Baghdad Pact and Turkey, and this caused Turkey to move away from the Arab world. For them, Turkey became a part of the imperialist world now. Turkey, on the other hand, commented that the communist danger also exists for Arab countries except Iraq and the impact of Soviets was expanding towards the region (Uslu, 2016, p. 101). On the other hand, the Soviet threat was a more tangible reality for Turkey. This was because Turkey and Soviets had a very long common frontier, and Turkey had been subjected to pressure of Soviets on Straits and Eastern Anatolia after World War Two. Turkey aimed at an economic and military cooperation with the West instead of being in conflict. Turkish administration was well aware of the fact that it should establish good relations with the West and had to be a part of the Western world. Egypt sustained its foreign policy as a "non-aligned country" under Nasser's presidency. In addition, it gave importance to being in good relations with the Soviet Union. Egypt and other countries affected by them like Syria rejected to join this pact which they considered the extension of the Western block and applied pressure on those who wanted to join (Öymen, 2013, p. 104).

The sixth meeting of the Ministerial Council of the The Baghdad Pact was significant for the region’s future and Turkey’s role on that geography. Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and Secretary General to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Melih Esenbel were the visiting committee

of that meeting. The head of the Turkish delegation to the Economic Committee Semih Günver stated at the conclusion of the meeting that the three Muslim members of the Pact had decided to raise the standard of living in their countries with the assistance of Britain and the US. He stressed the following matters which had been settled by the Committee (Turkish News, 1959):

1- The establishment of a common technical assistance fund to supply technical equipment to member countries and to exchange experts and trainees,
2- The signing of a veterinary agreement between the three Muslim members,
3- The Application of a reduced tariff for press telegrams between the three countries,
4- The undertaking by Great Britain to supply technical aid amounting to 850.000 Pound.

The committee issued at the conclusion of the Economic Committee's meeting said that several projects to improve telecommunications links between Turkey, Iran and the United Kingdom had been studied. The Committee had approved the construction of a railway along the Persian Gulf to link Karachi and Basra, Karachi and Kirman and a rail link between Turkey and Iran. It also agreed on the steps taken to standardize the agricultural products of the three countries; to facilitate co-operation in customs procedure; and to promote tourism. The committee also stated that the question of setting up a common market between Turkey, Iran and Pakistan had been discussed and that these countries would submit their reports before April 30th.

Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu made a speech on February 28, 1959 during budget discussions in the assembly and assessed Turkey's Middle East policy as a policy which would prevent the infiltration of international communism to this region just for the sake of its own security. Later on, Zorlu mentioned the importance of The Baghdad Pact in this context and emphasized that The Baghdad Pact was a collective security pact established to prevent the expansion of communism to this region. He added that the Middle East was one of the areas that the stagnant Eastern Bloc in Europe wanted to use in order to surround the Western Bloc. If The Baghdad Pact was not established, communism would be more successful in its activities (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 1959, p. 1342).

Turkey's position in The Baghdad Pact did not contribute to defence force of West in the Middle East as its troops were already within the structure of NATO. Turkey was accepted to NATO because it made the promise to take part in the defence of the Middle East due to Great Britain's insistence. The Soviet Union's dissatisfaction with The Baghdad Pact was obvious from the long speeches of Marshall Burganin and Khrushchev about this pact in Supreme Soviet Council on December 1955 following their Asian travel. The two Soviet leaders announced that they came to an agreement with India, Burmese and Afghanistan during their visits to these countries on the principle of "living together in peace". Bulganin talked about The Baghdad Pact at his speech and briefly said the following: *"the USA, the UK and France played the major role in the establishment of SEATO. It is also a very well-known fact that first violin was played by UK during the military grouping in Baghdad. "* On the other hand, Khrushchev referred to Turkey's role in the establishment of the pact and continued as follows: "*When authority belonged to Atatürk and İnönü in Turkey, we had very good relations with these states. But then, a*

shadow had been cast upon these relations. We cannot claim that it only stems from Turkey's mistake. We have also made some statements which have cast a shadow on these relations. But then, we have taken a step back and tried to establish friendly relations with this state. Unfortunately, Turkish statesmen did not respond to this in the same way" (Gönlübol & Ülman, 1969, pp. 189-190).

Like other strategic steps taken against the Soviet Union, the big boss of the The Baghdad Pact project was the USA again. During Eisenhower's Presidency, the American policy pursued by US Secretary of State John F. Dulles was to use The Baghdad Pact as a tool to weaken the East Bloc (Öymen, 2013, p. 100). According to Zorlu, the weakest spot in Turkey's defence is south and southeast directions both geophysically and geopolitically. He stated that Turkey was able to establish The Baghdad Pact with the help of its great allies, the USA and Great Britain. Consequently, it became possible for the States which took responsibility around the world also to take responsibility for Iran, Turkey and Pakistan (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 1958, s. 831) .According to Zorlu, Turkey was facing filtration actions of communism. The primary objective of Turkish Foreign Policy was to prevent the spread of communism. For this reason, Turkey's support to the USA and the UK, who stepped into action to protect the governments that communism tries to overthrow was extremely important (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 1958, s. 832) .

According to memoirs of Retired Ambassador Mahmut Dikerdem, Dikerdem and Zorlu visited Tunisia to participate the celebrations of the first anniversary of Tunisia's winning its independence in the early 1957. When assessing the Cold War policy of America, Zorlu dogmatized that CIA had organized the revolt which occurred in Hungary a couple of months ago. Another important matter was the statement made by Ambassador Dikerdem during a reception in Tunisia regarding

Turkey's role in the Middle East; *"Turkey is the most powerful state in this region. Being aware of that, Turkey should not run after Arab countries but stand still as solid as a "cathedral" and wait for Arabs to gather around itself. "* When Dikerdem quoted this statement to Zorlu, he said; *"The man was telling the truth, but I wonder if his government agree with him? Aren't they those who motivated us for the Baghdad Pact?"* (Dikerdem, 1989, pp. 119-120).

As of March 1955, Egypt and Syria on one hand and Egypt and Saudi Arabia on the other decided to sign military pacts. Egypt and Syria signed a defence agreement on October 20, 1955, while Egypt and Saudi Arabia signed a similar agreement on October 27, 1955. On April 21, 1956, Egypt-Saudi Arabia-Yemen Defence Agreement was signed. Thus, a new block emerged in response to the Baghdad Pact. Such a disintegration was for the benefit of the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union penetrated to the Middle East. Even though the Baghdad Pact was established against the Soviet danger, its consequence was just the opposite because Egypt had been purchasing weapons from the Soviet Union as of 1955 against the Israeli danger. Syria, on the other hand, established more rapport with the Soviet Union than Egypt and pulled USSR in the Middle East further. Thus, it was seen that the struggle between the East and the West was further intensified in the Middle East (Armaoğlu, 20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, 2009, p. 638). The Baghdad Pact not only caused Turkey to grow away from the Soviet Union but also worsened its relations with Arab states except Iraq. Egypt was uncomfortable with the unity in the Arab world to come apart and its leadership to be shaken, but it was also anxious about Great Britain's attempt to sustain its effectiveness in the region.

According to the USA National Intelligence Forecast Report dated December 14, 1956, the USA's loyalty and devotion to the Baghdad Pact depended on

its policies in the Middle East geography in near future. The aim of Washington administration was actively and directly preventing Soviet expansionism in the Middle East geography and hindering Nasser and other groups from posing an obstacle for the policies of the West in the region. On the other hand, the USA's participation in the pact bears some responsibilities and dangers. The member countries of the pact consider the USA's participation economic, political, military and especially political support which has privileged requests in return. Nasser would sustain to influence Syria and Jordan and threaten the existence of the West in Iraq and Lebanon with the support of Soviets. Later in the report, it was stated that the United Kingdom would lose its potential military force integrated to Western defence system of The Baghdad Pact due to its notoriety and be destitute of the USA's absolute support. Perhaps most importantly, the member countries and particularly Iraq would face with the pressure of Egypt and Soviets since the USA is not a member of the pact. It is stated in the report that the member countries would not be able to stand the pressure of Soviets and Egypt for a long time provided that the USA would not be a member and the pact would not be long-lasting. Additionally, it was stated that the Baghdad Pact without the USA would hinder the Soviet-the USA conflict in the Middle East to enter a detente process and the tension of the relation with Soviets might also affect the relations with India and impartial countries in South-eastern Asia (FRUS, 1956). US Secretary of State of the time, John Foster Dulles wrote a letter to English Consul General Roger Makins and emphasized that it was impossible for the USA to be a member of the Baghdad Pact till the tension between Arabs and Israel in the Middle East was defused and manifested definitive behaviour of Washington administration by stating that the USA will support the Baghdad Pact from the outside (FRUS, 1955). Even though the USA was not

involved in the pact, it established a military connection later and participated in the committee meetings of the pact. But the USA was not involved in this entity in 1955 maybe as they refrained from Egypt's reaction or due to the efforts of the Israeli lobby, and this weakened this pact to a great extent (McGhee, 1992, p. 262). As the press attaché of the period, Mr. Altemur Kılıç had quoted, Hand-son Baldwin from New York Times stated that the Baghdad Pact was a weak entity and in order for it to be strengthened, America should officially and fully join the pact and provide significant military, economic and psychological support (Kılıç, Altemur, T.C Cumhurbaşkanlığı Arşivi).

President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and Secretary of Foreign Ministry Melih Esenbel met in Paris on December 18, 1957 before the meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council to discuss the developments in the Middle East (Cumhuriyet Ansiklopedisi 1941-1960, p. 330). The main item on the agenda of the meeting was the assertion that President of Egypt, Abdel Nasser is moving away from USSR. While the US President was asserting that Egypt was trying to cut loose from the Soviet Union, Prime Minister Menderes opposed this opinion and claimed that Abdel Nasser was trying to secure his position. According to Zorlu, on the other hand, the criterion in this issue should be Jordan. Nasser should give up his interest in Jordan. In case either Egypt or Syria attacked Jordan, Eisenhower Doctrine would be put into operation (FRUS, 1957, p. 747). Prime Minister Menderes was trying to obtain economic aid from the USA in those days, but during the meeting, Eisenhower did not provide any guarantee to strengthen The Baghdad Pact (The New York Times, 2017).

On January 26, 1958, that was before the Fourth Council Meeting of the Baghdad Pact, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin

Rüştü Zorlu and Secretary of Foreign Ministry Melih Esenbel from Turkey and Secretary of State J. F. Dulles, Ambassador Warren and Deputy Secretary of State Rountree, who was responsible for the affairs in Near East, South Asia and Africa got together for a series of early negotiations. In the meeting, the agenda of which was the issues in the Middle East, Rountree wanted to learn the opinions of Turkish authorities about the recent rapprochement of Arab countries. Menderes commented that the USSR would have influence on Egypt and Syria and this development disturbed Turkey. Zorlu tried to break the ice by giving positive replies to the questions posed to him. In response, Rountree said that they would determine their position in accordance with the process in the forthcoming days (FRUS , 1958). Rountree placed a great importance on the relations between the USA and Turkey. President of the Republic of Turkey, Celal Bayar asked Rountree his personal opinion with regard to military and economic aid to Turkey. Rountree considered Turkey an important ally of the USA and no other nation, country or government in the world gave such a strong reaction against the USSR danger. However, he also reminded that he was not an expert at economic and military issues. According to him, the problems between Turkey and the USA would be settled within the framework of cooperation based on mutual trust. Giving an interview to a radio in Italy, Prime Minister Menderes stated that the USA should join the the Baghdad Pact and Italy is also aware of the positive impression created by Eisenhower Doctrine in Turkey. He also emphasized that it was impossible to establish peace in the Middle East as long as the hostility between Arabs and Jews continued (Cumhuriyet, 1957).

The Fourth Council Meeting of the Baghdad Pact was held in Ankara between the dates of January 27-30, 1958. It was observed that meetings were pretty beneficial, and the Pact was structured for peace, freedom and independence in the

region (The New York Times, 1958). It was also emphasized that regional conflicts serve the USSR imperialism. It was underlined that the problems in theMediterranean, the Middle East and the South Asia should be resolved according to the principles of the UN (The New York Times, 1958). After the council meetings, Adnan Menderes, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and Melih Esenbel met G. C. McGhee, Admiral A. W. Radford and Ambassador Warren to discuss the issues in the Middle East on March 2, 1959. Menderes commented that Turkey's role in Iran's participation in the pact was important and if Iran left the pact, this would erode Turkey's position. He also said that if Iran fell under the influence of the USSR, Turkey might be vulnerable to possible threats from Iran, Iraq and Syria. While the great pressure of the USA continued over Shah of Iran, it could only be overcome with the support of the USA (FRUS, 1959, pp. 791-792).

It is observed that relations had been successfully managed during the early years of the Baghdad Pact. After the meeting held in Turkey on July 17, 1958, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu answered the questions related to the Pact in the following way (Akşam, 1958); *"The Baghdad Pact became stronger with regards to three states. The Baghdad Pact treaty is determined to tighten the existing solidarity still more among the states. The pact will survive. "* Zorlu answered the question whether the USA would join the pact or not by saying *"As you know, participation of the USA to the Baghdad Pact is always in question. This depends on the decision of America. However, as we always said and US Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles explained in the last Ankara meeting, the USA is actually involved in the Pact"*. This statement of Zorlu pointed out that the Baghdad Pact would serve regional security and peace and be a bloc against communism in the long term. Moreover, the USA's involvement in the Baghdad Pact actually, if not officially, is the power of the Pact behind the curtain

and makes Turkey undertake an important mission in the struggle against the Soviet Union.

There were important developments in the Middle East geography in 1958. First, Egypt and Syria, and then Iraq and Jordan were united and a coup was staged in Iraq. The coup of July 14, 1958 caused the problem whether Iraq would stay in the Baghdad Pact or not. But, the other member states except Iraq made a decision and declared that Pact would continue without Iraq. Following this development, the USA declared that it would proceed by a common action with the countries which have undersigned this decision and prestige of the Pact was preserved. After the agreement in the field of security, economic cooperation between the member countries was increased. In addition, a decision was made about the establishment of a nuclear center in Iran. As the new Iraqi government established relations with the Soviet Union, China and East European countries, the other members of the pact decided on October 23, 1958 to move the headquarters of the council to Ankara (Al, 2008).

Fatin Rüştü Zorlu explained this development regarding the Baghdad Pact in his speech in Budget Commission on January 8, 1959 as follows:

"Determination of the member states of the Baghdad Pact is not shaken at all after the events regarding Iraq. Mr. John Foster Dulles, US Secretary of State stated on behalf of President Eisenhower that the wish of the USA to sign bilateral agreements with the members of the Baghdad Pact pursuant to Article 1 of the pact is increased. Thus America decided to support the Baghdad Pact more due to the Iraqi events and this is certainly a source of power for the pact" (Cumhuriyet, 1959).

Speaking at a parliamentary meeting on February 22, 1959, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu made extensive explanations on foreign policy and touched upon the relations with the Middle Eastern countries one-by-one made an assessment with regard to the Baghdad Pact. He stated that the objective of the pact was preventing the danger of

communism to penetrate into this geography (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, pp. 1342-1343).

Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu gave an interview to English newspaper, "Daily Express" regarding the situation in Iraq and made the following statement (Cumhuriyet, 1959): *"We too believe in the declaration of General Kasım that he wants to live in harmony with their neighbors and aims to keep his country free and independent of any block. We wish him success in his politics. We also know that he is under great pressure. Despite this, we hope that he will find the opportunity to implement his policy."* Zorlu also continued his speech with concern that some Arab countries were prone to show Iraq under the domination of communism and said, *"All Arab countries are vulnerable to such a danger. The best way to prevent communism from infiltrating should be to combine their efforts against the danger, avoid accusing each other and side against each other. To my opinion, it is not enough for a country to be seemingly anti-communist. The main point is whether a country follows an expansionist policy and is a direct or indirect ally of Soviet bloc which pursues such an expansionist policy or not. Otherwise, just believing in anti-communist thoughts does not mean much."* For Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, regional alliances had been of great importance for permanent peace. It was obvious that he believed the member countries should agree on their common national interests in order not to cause gaps between the alliances to be established.

The Baghdad Pact signed in 1955 was a new implementation of the idea of "regional blocks" which didn't produce the expected result with the countries located in the southwest of the Soviet Union. Although this pact could not reach its intended objective, it was longer lasting than the Baghdad Pact. After the revolution

and regime change that took place in Iraq in 1958, Iraq left the pact. The remaining four states continued their cooperation under the name of CENTO.

The overthrown regime in Baghdad was not based on solid foundations. Wendell Wilkie, who was also the candidate for the presidency against Roosevelt in 1940 US presidential election mentions his observations from his visit to Baghdad in his work titled "One World" in 1940's and states that a revolution was expected in Iraq (Wilkie, 1943). According to Şevket Süreya Aydemir, the Baghdad Pact had a romantic place in the minds of Menderes and Zorlu. This pact was announced when Menderes and Zorlu were prepared for a visit to Egypt, and there was a chance of putting the relations between Egypt and Turkey, which had not been improved since the Egyptian revolution in 1952 back on track. Instead of establishing realistic relations with Egypt, suddenly announcing the establishment of the Baghdad Pact was irrelevant (Aydemir, 2013, p. 272). After all, the Baghdad Pact was announced at an unexpected time when Menderes and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu got closer to Egypt, the strongest and populist state in the Middle East, even just before their visit to Egypt. Therefore, the announcement of the Baghdad Pact led to ceasing of attempts to get closer to the populist state in the Middle East, Egypt.

Turkey's involvement in the Baghdad Pact Project encouraged by the West along with Great Britain, deepened the policy difference between Turkey and the Middle Eastern countries even more. So, even though the Baghdad Pact was an attempt of Menderes government to increase Turkey's influence on the Middle East, at the end it caused Turkey to move away from the Middle Eastern countries. The greatest reason was that the other Arab countries did not join the alliance due to Egypt's impact, and they were considering this another trick of English imperialism and blamed Turkey for taking a part in it. Later, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu confessed to Prime

Minister Adnan Menderes that this was a mistake, and while this development strengthened the anti-western camp in the region, it also caused Turkey to become further isolated in the region (Acar, 1959, pp. 62-63). Whether its name was Northern Wall, the Middle East Command or the Baghdad Pact, Turkey generally acted as an "engine power" in defence projects of the Middle East due to its geographical location and cultural structure.

2.2. Bandung Conference

After World War Two, many Asian and African countries colonized by the European states fought for their independence and earned it. But, due to their inexperience in international relations and their loneliness, it was observed that they had the potential to be easily dominated and controlled by powerful states. Therefore, these countries, which gained their independence, needed cooperation among themselves. The Soviet Union had supported these countries in their fights for independence and aimed to increase its prestige in their eyes. But these states did not want to be a part of either Western or Eastern Bloc and believed that they would defend their independence, solve their problems and provide the balance between those two blocs by uniting as a third power (Çelik, 1959, p. 174).

The idea of organizing outside the United Nations was first suggested after 1954. The idea of a big conference was first suggested by Indonesian Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo, and a conference was held for this purpose on April 28, 1954 in Ceylon's capital, Colombo with the participation of Burma, Ceylon, India, Pakistan and Indonesia (Merih, 2006, p. 155). Even though this conference was held to review the situation in Indochina, organizing a broader conference of Asian-African states was also discussed. Following this development, the same five states,

which were later referred to as "Colombo Five", held a meeting in December 1954 in Bogor and decided to organize such a conference in Bandung, in 1955 (Gönlübol & Ülman, 1969, p. 291).

They tried to invite as many states as possible to the conference, and eventually Bandung Conference was held with the participation of all the invited states except Central African Federation. The following states did participate the conference: Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gold Coast, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, Pakistan, Iran, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Siam, Sudan, Syria, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Yemen, Peoples Republic of China and Turkey. The Greek Cypriot leader Makarios, former Mufti of Jerusalem, a black Member of Parliament from New York, Enoch Powell and a spokesman of African National Congress participated the conference as informal observers (Gönlübol & Ülman, 1969, p. 292). The countries called "Colombo Five" became polarized, and while Pakistan and Ceylon appeared as western-oriented the other three countries, namely India, Burma and Indonesia adopted the policy of neutrality. Later, influenced by Indian Prime Minister Nehru, Laos and Cambodia aligned themselves with neutrals. Following this, most of the participating states adopted the policy of "nonalignment" (Gönlübol, 2000, p. 73). The Conference began with the speech of Indonesian President Sthe UKarno on April 18, 1955 and continued until 24, 1955. It was clear from the conference that the Asian-African states did not have any other objective except for gaining importance in the world.

All the participating states took a resolution to support the fight of colonized peoples, requested a peaceful solution to the problem of Algeria and condemned the racist policies in South Africa. One of the most important articles of

conference declaration was the wish for nuclear armament to be banned. In the "Declaration on Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation" of Conference it was recommended "to respect the fundamental human rights, the purposes and principles of the charter of the UN, Organization, territorial integrity of all nations and to settle all international disputes by peaceful means". (Devrimler ve Karşıdevrimler Ansiklopedisi, 1975, s. 427)

The Asian-African states which were organized for the first time as a result of Bandung Conference had mostly adopted the policy of independence as mentioned earlier. The principles shaped were expanded in the conferences held afterwards. The understanding developed in Bandung accelerated the national liberation movements in Asia and Africa and directed the foreign policies of the countries which attained one of the fundamental principles of the conference, the freedom of "independent foreign policy" (Devrimler ve Karşıdevrimler Ansiklopedisi, 1975). One of the significant consequences of Bandung Conference is Yugoslavia being the only state to join the "non-aligned bloc" other than Asian and African states. Hence the leaders of this bloc both inside and outside of the UN were Indian Prime Minister Nehru, Egypt President Nasser, Indonesia President Sthe UKarno, Ghana President Nkrumah and Yugoslavian President Tito in turn (Gönlübol, 2000, p. 73).

A delegation headed by the State Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Fatin Rüştü represented Turkey in Bandung Conference. At the session of the conference on April 21, 1955, Zorlu particularly laid emphasis on communist danger and condemned the non-alliance policy. Zorlu gave the example of Czechoslovakia's aftermath to the consequences of non-alliance politics and by saying that "it was drifted to a wrong way due to its good intentions" and warned the participants of the conference about "the dangers to arise from such a politics". Zorlu went on his speech

as follows: *"Freedom, independence and peace are not blessings gained without exerting any effort but ideals, realization of which lays serious responsibilities on each and every one of us. Not comprehending these truths and hoping to ensure security by a weak resistance and shutting eyes to danger is a behavior which not only endangers those who act this way but also the whole community".* Zorlu asserted that the motive behind the establishment of alliances such as NATO, Balkan Pact, Turkish-Pakistan and Turkish-Iran Pacts and Southeast Asia Defence Treaty was the danger of transgression. Fatin Rüştü Zorlu added that Turkey believes in the necessity of colonialism and racism, which are the remains of old imperialism to be completely erased from the world (Gönlübol & Ülman, 1969, p. 293).

Nehru made a very sharp speech in response, which made a tremendous impact and emphasized that NATO protected colonialism, both blocs were wrong and their policies would lead to war (Sönmezoğlu, 2000, pp. 130-131). Nehru claimed that Fatin Rüştü Zorlu showed only one side of the coin, and if the other side is seen, there would be strong objections against NATO. Nehru commented in his speech that India was against all kinds of force grouping whether it was communist or anti-communist, both parties made mistakes and polarization between the blocs would lead to war (Gönlübol & Ülman, 1969, p. 273).

During the meeting, the Turkish delegation headed by Zorlu defended NATO and Western Bloc in general and opposed to all states objecting all kinds of blocs and forming blocs and adopting neutrality as their foreign policy principle. Turkey was seen as the West's voice, and this was looked askance at. Zorlu later openly stated that he went to Bandung to speak for the West and upon the persistence of the West. As a matter of fact, Zorlu made a speech during discussions of 1956 Foreign Ministry budget in TBMM and said the following:

> *"Our task is clear. We will first defend our own policy and opinions and then we will defend them together with our friends. We went to Bandung at the last minute. Our allies wanted us to participate the conference, they said "please go!" They said "it will be so bad if you don't go"* (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 1956, p. 737).

Ambassador Zeki Kuneralp cited in his book, "Just a Diplomat" that 25 countries were invited to Bandung Conference, and one of them was Turkey. He also emphasized that Asia and Africa continents proved their existence, separate from Europe and America but equal to them for the first time in its history. He cited that Turkey was represented by the Deputy Prime Minister of the time and Turkey's Permanent Representative to NATO, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and he involved Zeki Kuneralp in the conference delegation, and Turkey owed the gaining obtained in Bandung to Zorlu (Kuneralp, 1981).

Turkey's participation in Bandung Conference under the leadership of Zorlu and the attitude he assumed against the policy of neutralism was assessed in a different way. While Turkey was blamed for missing the chance to be the leader of non-aligned countries on one hand, the opinion that its prestige was increased in the eyes of the countries of free world due to its neutrality policy was being defended on the other (Bağcı, 2014, p. 59). A stance against all kinds of neutrality was observed in foreign policy understanding of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu. It is seen that Zorlu, who represented Turkey at the conference, had adopted the opinion of a common defence against the communist expansionism in the world.

It could be said that Fatin Rüştü Zorlu acted according to Turkey's international position and the current circumstances during Bandung Conference. No doubt the main reason for this attitude was the western-oriented policy that Turkey was pursuing at the time. When the indispensable position of the USA in Turkey's western-oriented policy is taken into consideration, Turkey did not want the

establishment of a neutral organization in a region which Washington administration regards vital for their national interests. the USA's biggest concern was the possibility of Soviet filtration to the region. Fatin Rüştü Zorlu pointed out the danger of communism in line with the foreign policy of the USA throughout the conference and cited the drawbacks of neutrality against this danger. Zorlu emphasized in his speech at the conference that acts of violence and invasion should come to an end and colonialism and race discrimination, which are the remains of old imperialism should be erased from the world (Zafer, 1955). Zorlu further emphasized in his speech at the conference that the lesson to be taken from the tensions in the world is that those who believe in freedom and independence should cooperate to avoid invasion and provide peace and security. Zorlu believed that primarily the Asians should end the violence in their own region. Wiping out colonialism and racism was one of the most important arguments defended by Turkish delegation at the conference. This is one of the open manifestations of Zorlu's understanding of universal peace.

One of the important figures in Bandung Conference was the Prime Minister of Communist China, Chou en-Lai. China was one of the mightiest countries of the world in those days. Korea gained its military reputation, had strong relations with the Soviet Union and developed a good dialogue with India. It is understood that Turkey did not know Communist China well in those days. Turkey fought against Communist China during Korean War. Nehru also pursued a supportive policy regarding China to which the Soviet Union came close. Consequently, while it was expected that Prime Minister of Communist China, Chou en-Lai would remain distant from Turkey, he was friendly with Zorlu. Even though they do not have any political relations with Turkey, the Chinese always showed concern and consideration for Turkey after the Bandung Conference. Another important figure who participated in the meetings with

Zorlu at the Bandung Conference was the Permanent Representative to the UN and Washington and London Ambassador Turgut Menemencioğlu. According to Menemencioğlu, the Bandung conference was a historic event. Actually Zorlu had a great role in the obtainment of this result (Günver, 1985). It was seen that Fatin Rüştü Zorlu did not act in parallel with his own opinions during the Bandung Conference but as a requirement of the international tension caused by World War Two, he became an ally of the West against the danger of the Soviet Union. Zorlu emphasized in the conference that all kinds of imperialism should be preserved, but he never went beyond the state policy.

2.3.Common Market

For Europe, which had survived the two great wars with great economic, political and social devastation, it was of great importance to provide economic, political and social stability again. In this context, European countries got united in order not to allow another great war and established European Economic Community (EEC) in accordance with a project to establish a historical, political and economic togetherness which in time converted into the European Union (EU) in a more extensive manner. Therefore, the primary objective was to achieve economic unity. As it is known, this initiative first began as the “European Coal and Steel Community” and in the following years its name changed into EU as a result of agreements and consensuses in between a new base was set for a new structuring in Europe's economic policy. In short, this resolution led to the establishment of the organization, the official name of which was "European Economic Community". However, this community was also known unofficially as "The Six", "Internal Six", "Little Europe" or "Common Market". As of the establishment day of its

establishment, the importance of this organization gradually increased every passing day (Goodman, 1969).

One of the most important reasons for the establishment of Common Market was to locate Europe in a place it deserved within the international community. All the member nations were conscious of the fact that Europe was becoming narrow due to expansionism of Soviets and economic superiority of the USA. The 1956 Suez Crisis showed how narrow the manoeuvring area of European states became. The aim was ensuring the unity of Europe at the least and establishing a new Europe which was not under the guidance the USA and the Soviet Union (Gönlübol, 1965, p. 77).

Representatives of France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg came together on March 25, 1957 in Italy and established the European Common Market by signing the Treaty of Rome. These countries with a population of 160 million in total aimed their cooperation to develop in a short time and free movement of persons, goods and currencies between the members of Common Market. So, the customs tariffs that the six member countries applied to each other were cancelled (Devrim, 1995, s. 256). This agreement allows every European State to become a member of the community. Another important economic association of the period was the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Turkey did not have a clear idea regarding which organization it would be a member of but upon membership application of Greece to European Common Market on July 15, 1959, Turkey also made a membership application to this organization on July 31, 1959 (Ülger, 2003, p. 101). DP determined its economic understanding as positioning itself in line with the free market economy and benefiting from foreign aids as of the first year it came into power. In the first part of the DP's program, both liberalism and

democracy were regarded among the general principles of the party in terms of freedoms and economic system. Supporting private entrepreneurship was regarded as one of the tasks of etatism at the heart of economic policy specified in party program (Takım, 2012, p. 164).

The economic growth maintained in 1954 via foreign aids went wrong afterwards due to interruption in foreign credits and Turkey became questing new opportunities. In this period, the experts of the World Bank gave Turkey prescriptions for development stating that Turkey should not make a comprehensive development plan and focus on agriculture and raw material production. Moreover, etatism should be liquidated, all fields should be opened to private enterprise, legislation which prevents foreign capital should be amended, foreign capital should be brought in, and growth rate should be kept high (Güven, 1998, p. 120). However, Turkey had a problem with the World Bank regarding the necessary credit to construct Seyhan Dam and when Turkey could not obtain it, the relationship went bad. In addition, sufficient foreign investment could not be provided, and credits obtained from the USA and OECD countries were not enough for Turkish economy. As a matter of fact, this situation led Turkey to new quests after 1954. At the same time, the Common Market initiatives which commenced in Europe continued with attempts of Germany and France.

It is seen that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu was a political actor who followed these developments closely and tried to provide the biggest benefits for Turkey in foreign policy and economy. Thereby Zorlu regarded the entry of Turkey to the Common Market as one of the most important goals of his foreign policy approach. The financial structure of Turkey, which started to deteriorate as of 1954, necessitated new investors and new resources. Turkey was

making almost all of its exports to European countries in this period and was aware that staying outside the Common Market would mean a serious loss of market and loss of new shares for the country. Fatin Rüştü Zorlu aimed to make Turkey be involved in the Common Market, preserve this market, enter into new markets and make foreign investors rapidly enter Turkey by taking advantage of financial aid facilities from European Common Development Fund. As of 1957, Zorlu attended to all the Common Market meetings held by OECD and established a special commission at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by taking consent of President Celal Bayar and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. Then, Turkey applied to the commission in Brussels to be accepted to the Common Market. Zorlu's effort to carry Turkey to the same line with Europe and his diplomatic efforts in this direction made this idea be adopted by Turkish public in a very short time (Gaytancıoğlu, 2009).

As a result of the disruption of the economic structure after 1954, new opportunities for cooperation with Germany were sought. Fatin Rüştü Zorlu trusted Germany the most for Turkey's Common Market membership. This was because Germany was the fastest developing country in Europe and one of the most important actors of the "Common Market" idea. It is also seen that US President Eisenhower was the one to establish the dialogue between Turkey and Germany. Zorlu had a talk with Eisenhower and told him that Federal Germany was willing to supply aid to Turkey and asked him to talk with German Prime Minister Adanauer on this issue (Akalın, 2000, p. 104). German Economy Minister Dr. Ludwing Erhardt visited Turkey on August 15, 1959 and conducted negotiations regarding the development of Turkish economy. By stating that Turkey was a very attractive country for investor countries, Minister Erhardt made great promises to German investors and underlined that they would support Turkey's entry into the "Common Market" (Cumhuriyet,

1959). Pursuant to the agreement signed between Turkey and Federal Germany in April 1960, he promised a credit amounting to 147 million German Marks and exports amounting to 63 million German Marks (Horay, 2007, p. 103).

Zorlu became aware of how important the phase of Turkey's acceptance to the Common Market as of Turkey's date of application, 1959, due to its economic structure. In order for Turkey to strengthen its gradually weakening financial structure, it was necessary to be involved in this formation. Zorlu believed that being involved in the Common Market had both economic and political issues. The most important political issue was Greece. Any formation in which Greece was involved but not Turkey was assessed to the detriment of Turkey in relations with the West. During this period, sensitivity was shown in international order with regard to equal treatment to Turkey and Greece. In fact, accepting Turkey and Greece as NATO members on the same day was one of the most concrete examples of this. Zorlu insisted on equality of status in relation to the Common Market. The opinion for this political requirement absolutely to be taken into consideration within the framework of the Common Market was defended. This requirement of equality of status was being accepted as a data within the framework of Western Europe. Subsequently, this principle was abandoned, and the West clarified that Greece should always be treated preferentially (Günver, 1985, pp. 100-101). In fact, Zorlu sensed the danger in advance and defended that the political dimension should also be taken into consideration because if Greece entered the Common Market alone and established good relations with Western Europe countries, Greeks would harm Turkey.

The fact that Zorlu was always cautious of Greece in foreign policy caused some criticisms, and Zorlu responded them as follows: *"Both history and destiny sentenced us to live together with Greeks. As this is the case, we should not*

overlook Greece in our relations and integration with West. We are like two horses harnessed to the same carriage in this respect. We have to go to the same direction" (Gökmen, 1999, p. 78). Fatin Rüştü Zorlu was rather different than others in this process, and instead of thinking like everybody else and saying *"We should do whatever Greece does"*, he believed that Greece should be observed and followed closely as a bordering neighbor and a country considered important by the West. In this period, the economic policy of Turkey constituted a significant requirement in terms of membership to the "Common Market". As this decision was taken immediately after Greece's application was generally assessed by public opinion as a decision taken for not falling behind Greece due to political reasons.

For Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu the "Common Market" had a priority in Turkey's foreign policy. He believed that it was a necessity to preserve national interests of Turkey and increase the welfare of the nation. As a result of the studies conducted, preparations were made with regard to membership of Turkey in the first meeting of EEC Council of Ministers in 1960 (Hürriyet, 1960). Turkey's involvement in the Common Market was one of the most aspired objectives of foreign policy implemented by Zorlu, but the Military Coup of May 27 did not allow this process to continue democratically. While Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and Minister of Labor and Finance Hasan Polatkan were being taken to İmralı Island by an assault boat to be executed, Zorlu would not hesitate to say how important Common Market membership for Turkey was in terms of its national interests (Demirer, 2016).

2.4. Suez Crisis

The Suez Canal is one the critical regions providing strategic importance to the Middle East. As the canal was being used petroleum transfer in particular, it was a very important transfer route to carry transport petroleum to the Western market. Expansion of oil fields after World War Two and as the Western industry was using the Middle East oil to a great extent, the economic importance of the Suez Canal increased (Sander, 2016, p.145). The most important developments which led to Suez crisis were the continuation of convergence between Egypt and the Soviet Union, and the conflict arose from Aswan Dam project. Aswan Dam had a great importance for Egypt's economy. This dam would make it possible to use new lands for agriculture by irrigation, and limitless electricity would be produced. The amount of irrigated land would be increased by 30%, and Egypt would have a balanced and healthy economy (Fisher & Ochsenwald , 1990, pp. 698-699). A serious crisis arose on July 26, 1956 in Egypt when Nasser administration nationalized the Suez Canal Company, and this crisis led to some important consequences for DP government's policies with regard to the region. One of the reasons was financing the construction of the Suez Canal. But, Nasser's primary objective was getting even with English and French owners of the company controlling the canal. During the crisis, Ankara Government supported the UK and France, who owned the Canal Company. In this context, it was observed that the criticisms on the assertion that Turkey was pursuing a policy on behalf of the West are increased. At the end of the operation commenced by France and the UK against Nasser, Nasser was not defeated and as the invasion ended upon the USA's suggestion, Nasser came out of the crisis with a political victory, even if he was militarily defeated.

The most arduous issue that brings Egypt and West against each other was the financing of Aswan Dam, and it was also very important due to its consequences. the USA and the UK regarded financial aid to this dam as a convenient way to sustain good relations with Egypt and offered some aid. However, Prime Minister Nasser delayed his reply to Westerlies either to obtain the aid with more suitable conditions or to wait for the possible offers of the Soviet Union. In addition, Nasser established diplomatic relations with China in May 1956 and the West was not happy with it.

When the owners of the Suez Canal Company, the UK and France could not obtain a result from political and economic pressure, they applied armed intervention via Israel and later on, the UK and France also attacked this country (Arı, 1999, p. 70). The countries which benefited from the Suez Crisis most were Nasser's Egypt, the Soviet Union because of its support to the Arab world and the USA, which became the only dominant western power after discharge of France and the UK from the region. However, President Eisenhower announced with the doctrine named after him in 1957 that he would apply to military intervention in case of any development he deemed against his national interests upon increased influence of the Soviet Union in the region as of 1956 and it was becoming a danger for anti-Western regimes in the region especially through Nasser (Arı, 2004, pp. 276-277).

The Suez Crisis led to significant difficulties on Turkey's Middle East policy. Great Britain’s membership to the Baghdad Pact along with Turkey put Turkey in a tight spot as the UK was at war with Egypt. It was seen that Turkey pursued a western-oriented attitude during the Suez crisis. Turkey was one of the few states along with the USA and the UK, which condemned Nasser's nationalization decision from the beginning of the crisis. The USA became very influential in the

Middle East geography as a result of Eisenhower Doctrine. The USA's support to the Baghdad Pact right from the beginning was the clear manifestation of its interest in the Middle East. After the Suez Crisis, it was seen that the Soviet Union's prestige was increased in the region. In this context, Syria became the dominance struggle area of these two great actors.

2.5. Eisenhower Doctrine and Turkey

Eisenhower Doctrine emerged as a result of Arab-Israel War in 1956 (Armaoğlu, 1989, pp. 115-117). During the war which broke out when Israel, the UK and France attacked Egypt, Soviets had threatened these countries and made threatening announcements that they would send military troops to the Middle East. Thereupon the USA pressurized Israel, the UK, and France and finalized the war (Armaoğlu, 1991, p. 240). There were some new developments in the Middle East policy of the USA after the Suez Crisis in 1956. Hostilities caused by the Suez Crisis and the following ceasefire made the USA snap the UK and France harshly and after hindering the attack of these two states to Egypt, it reviewed its Eastern policy again. Upon threats of the Soviet Union, the USA and the UK changed their opinions on the Middle East. The USA was not happy with this new situation in the Middle East following the Suez Crisis. Besides, Egypt had cancelled Suez Treaty dated October 19, 1954, which was the only legal bond binding Egypt and Suez during the crisis of 1956 and severed all of its ties with the West (Armaoğlu, 2009, p. 608). When the West lost such a great prestige in the Middle East, it created a huge gap in the geography, and the Soviet Union began to fill this gap. Soviets sought a pretext to send troops to the Middle East. One of the main reasons for the Soviet Union to be involved in the Middle East geography was dominating the Suez Canal and oil sources of the West in the Middle East, keeping the region under their political

control and delivering a major blow to the West. The Eisenhower Doctrine was prepared to achieve certain things that was inevitable to do. The American Congress and American people were aware of the seriousness of the Soviet threat in the Middle East and to put their weight behind the President in his future efforts to hinder Soviet domination over the geography (Campbell, 1957).

There were no economic reasons for the attempt of the Soviet Union to penetrate the Middle East. This is because only 1% of the sea traffic in the Suez Canal belonged to Soviet vessels. the Soviet Union did not need the Middle East oil because it was a petroleum exporting country. Hence their reason to penetrate the Middle East was merely political. Soviets aimed to dominate the region politically by controlling the Suez Canal and oil reserves of the West in the Middle East, stroke a major blow to the West and even completely throw them out from the region (Armaoğlu, 1991, p. 240).

US President Eisenhower regarded this situation in the Middle East extremely critical and dangerous and asked Congress to adopt a resolution with regard to "Eisenhower Doctrine". He called a meeting of US Congress on January 3,1957 to announce the outline of the new the Middle East policy (Cumhuriyet, 1957). He sent a private message to Congress on January 5, 1957 and requested authorization to be granted to government to cooperate with and assist to increase the economic power of the Middle East countries in order to help them to defend their independence. He made the following three requests (Gönlübol & Ülman, 1969, p. 308):

1- The US government should be authorized to prepare military aid and cooperation programs for the Middle East and cooperate with all countries or communities of countries which would request such aid.

2- Military aid programs of the USA should involve using American armed forces if required in order to preserve the territorial integrity and political independence of the states asking for help to resist an openly armed assault of any country under the control of international communism.
3- The government should be authorized to decide how to allocate the economic and military aid for the Middle East amounting USD 200 million in the years of 1958 and 1959 within the scope of Mutual Security Act.

Eisenhower continued his speech by saying "Russia should not need to fear from America either in the Middle East or in any other region, unless they are the ones who attack first". US President further commented that, "Russian administrators have been trying to dominate the Middle East since Czarism," and that the main goal of communism was to invade the whole world. The President requested authority to use US Armed Forces to protect the territorial integrity and political independence of any Middle Eastern country threatened with armed assault by communism. He also requested to spare a special aid amounting to USD 400 million to spend in a period of two years as economic aid to the Middle East. Eisenhower also appealed for the implementation of a special military aid program for the Middle East. The President explained that the new Middle East policy was directed against any communist invasion (Cumhuriyet, 1957). Ömer Sami Coşar from Cumhuriyet Newspaper wrote an article about "Eisenhower Doctrine" and emphasized that the doctrine had announced the previous assurance provided to the Baghdad Pact members by Washington to the world much more crisply and officially this time (Coşar, 1957). On the other hand, the Soviet Union reacted against the Eisenhower Doctrine. The house organ of the Russian government, Izvestia, warned the USA not to interfere in the

Middle East. It was also declared that the Soviet Union will announce its plans for the Middle East region against this doctrine of Eisenhower (Cumhuriyet, 1957).

Eisenhower Doctrine and particularly the part related with the use of American troops in the Middle East caused severe controversies in US Congress. Nevertheless, House of Representatives and Congress accepted "Eisenhower Doctrine" and granted the authorities requested by President on January 30, 1957 and March 5, 1957 respectively. US Secretary of State Dulles welcomed the doctrine pleasantly and said; *"Now, it is not possible to act in a way to endanger peace in the region"* (Cumhuriyet, 1957).

Eisenhower Doctrine was an important American foreign policy for two reasons. Firstly, it expanded the engagement area of America with the Middle East. Via this doctrine, all the Middle East geography entered the sphere of influence of the USA, and the USA assumed full responsibility for the protection of all countries in the region against communism by using US troops. Secondly, America stepped into action to fill the gaps created in the Middle East by the discharge of the UK and France. the USA and the Soviet Union came face to face in the Middle East for the first time (Armaoğlu, 2009, p. 610). As a consequence of this doctrine, the British leadership in the Middle East had been erased, and the USA had a voice in this geography by entering into a clear obligation to the member states of the Baghdad Pact. American Doctrine was an expression of this philosophy. This philosophy was based on the fact that the Common East would be safe against communism, and it came with the territory of the common interests of American people and the Middle Eastern states (Armaoğlu, 1991, p. 249).

Fatin Rüştü Zorlu welcomed the announcement of Eisenhower Doctrine pleasantly. In the context of its consequences, the USA's need to Turkey increased, for its possible operations in the region and American bases in Turkey gained importance. Thus, İncirlik Base set up in 1954 was improved. In addition, US military aid resumed, and Turkey entered a period of political tension with Arab countries and USSR as they did not support the Doctrine (Merih, 2006, p. 187). The meaning of this new US Doctrine for Adnan Menders was expansion of military and economic aid commenced via the announcement of Truman Doctrine in 1947 to the other Middle Eastern countries along with Turkey through the USA. The economic crisis in Turkey at that time led Prime Minister Menderes to seek for new solutions and in this context, he hoped to overcome the financial crisis and sustain his political stability (Bağcı, 2014, p. 85). Prime Minister Menderes expressed in a press conference that he believed the Eisenhower Doctrine could establish political stability in the Middle East, and the opposition also supported Eisenhower Doctrine. Turkish press generally approached to the doctrine with such expressions as *"We record that this Doctrine is as clear and simple as the Monroe Doctrine. What this principle seeks is that the Middle East belongs to the Middle Eastern people The doctrine guarantees the military power of the USA and what it promises is the economic guarantee to the Middle East through extensive financial aid tools. History will decide whether Eisenhower Doctrine is healthy or not. Whether or not this decision is healthy will be seen within the frame of position and importance it provided by America under this doctrine"* (Ahmad, 1977, p. 86).

Prime Minister of Turkish Republic, Adnan Menderes, made a statement to M.B.S. Radio in the USA and replied a question regarding Turkey's approach to Eisenhower Doctrine by saying that only the countries which seemed lost

from the perspective of the free world would welcome the doctrine in the Near East. The states which were involved in the Baghdad Pact and believed in the principle of common security would only welcome this doctrine with absolute satisfaction. Menderes continued his speech and commented that Eisenhower Doctrine should be regarded as an initiative similar to the peerless efforts of the USA to help the world that faced with numerous dangers and disasters after World War Two reach safety. This doctrine could be assessed as a bold move to prevent any attempt of invasion (Başvekil Adnan Menderes'in Amerika M.B.S Radyolarıyla Neşredilen Beyenatı, 1957, p. 18).

When George Sokolsky mentioned the importance of the doctrine in his speech which appeared in US ABC media he stated that Turkey would be one of the two great focal points in the Middle East and a very important one indeed. According to him, the most important reason was that Turkey was the outpost of the West and a powerful member of NATO, which also knows how to fight. David Michol from Chicago Daily News noted in three important posts that Turkey advanced much more than the rest of the Middle East countries within the last 35 years and expressed the reasons for its economic ambition and the role of its resistance against the Soviet Union in its economic development (Türkiye ve Türkiye ile İlgili Meseleler Hakkında Onbeş Günlük Basın Raporu, 1957).

Eisenhower Doctrine was criticized as much as it was supported by the state. Western European countries supported the doctrine, while Eastern European countries criticized it harshly. On the other hand, Arab countries approached the doctrine positively. But, as mentioned earlier, the greatest support on Turkey's side was given by Fatin Rüştü Zorlu. Zorlu commented that the destiny of the Middle East was not loneliness, and this could not be allowed, and implementation of this plan would bring

peace and stability to the region. In a commentary in Jerusalem Post Newspaper which reflects the official opinions of Israel, it was stated that statements made by Eisenhower would lead to the isolation of the USA in the Middle East (Los Angles Times, 1957).

Prime Minister of the the Baghdad Pact members, Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan had a meeting in Ankara on January 19-20, 1957. Prime Minister Menderes' Deputy Foreign Minister of the time, Ethem Menderes commented that the Baghdad Pact was the most solid treaty for peace in the Middle East. In the doctrine submitted by US President Eisenhower to Congress in 1957, it was stated that military and economic aid should be granted to the Middle Eastern countries, which were in need of US aid to resist the communism threat.

Prime Minister Adnan Menderes gave an interview to the Turkey correspondent of "Associated Press" in Turkey, Web Mackinley on February 6, 1957 and emphasized that the US should be cautious when determining the countries to receive aid within the scope of this doctrine. The country which served to peace should be preferred. The most important issue was that Eisenhower Doctrine would stabilize the Middle East in every respect, and this had a great importance for the world peace. When he was asked what Turkey's role would be in doctrine, Menderes replied that Turkey would be an important factor for the success of this doctrine that gave particular importance to security and peace (Kılçık, 1992, p. 170). Menderes stated at the press conference on February 7, 1957 that no action of NATO and the USA in the Middle East should be successful without Turkey and the Baghdad Pact was the only reliable organization in the region (Kılçık, 1992, pp. 181-182). When giving interviews to the foreign press, Adnan Menderes generally underlined the

approach of Turkish government towards Eisenhower Doctrine and their expectations from it and emphasized Turkey's importance as a regional power.

The Soviet Union was not idle against the USA's Eisenhower Doctrine towards the Middle East and made a new offer to the USA regarding the Middle East. The Soviets requested not to send weaponry to the Middle East mutually, dismantle military bases and withdraw all foreign troops in this territory. The first reaction of the USA and the UK was considering this an open propaganda of Moscow (Cumhuriyet, 1957). Upon increased Soviet influence in the region after Suez Crisis, Eisenhower Doctrine became a current issue in 1957, and the first positive reactions other than exterritorial countries like the UK and France from countries in the region were given by Turkey and Lebanon. Then Pakistan, Iraq and Greece followed them. In return, the harshest reactions were received from Syria and Egypt in the region and the Soviet Union (Arı, 2004, p. 316). From the viewpoint of the USA, Eisenhower Doctrine did not come up with the expected outcome. The Soviet Union, Egypt and Syria regarded the doctrine as a direct interference in the internal affairs of the Middle Eastern countries and interpreted it as an action against Nasser and Arab nationalism. One of the most important outcomes of Eisenhower Doctrine is, without any doubt, its being a step for acceleration of the Cold War. In addition to this, this doctrine increased the possibility of a US intervention in the region and the USA requested air bases from its allies in the region to actualize this (Sander, 2001, pp. 307-308).

For Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, the USA was the most important domino for his active policy. The strong solidarity between the USA and Turkey which was never seen until that time led to worsening of America-Arab and the USA-USSR relations in those years of crisis. This is because the USA achieved its objective to be a protective power in the Middle East upon announcement of Eisenhower Doctrine in

the Turkish Foreign Policy understanding of Turkey under the influence of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu. By this means, Zorlu applied to the USA to break Soviet influence in the region and used one of the classic methods of Ottoman diplomacy and offered to the "balancing factor" in order to prevent Russian expansionism.

2.6. Syrian Crisis

Attack of the UK and France to Egypt during 1956 Arab-Israel War stimulated anti-Westernism in all Arab world. In such a conjuncture, Syrian administration began drifting to left as of 1957. Actually, Syria sided against the West following the establishment of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 and began getting closer to USSR against the pact it considered as a cat's paw of Western imperialism. It was for sure that Western hostility of Egypt's nationalist leader, Abdel Nasser contributed to this to a great extent. But, Syria's rapid falling under the influence of Soviets caused serious concerns in Turkey. The process of Syria's falling under the influence of the Soviet Union was led by Defence Minister Khalid al-Azm, who was a powerful figure in Syria and a communism sympathizer (Armaoğlu, 2009). Khalid al-Azm visited Moscow with a delegation in July 1957 and made a number of agreements. After the announcement of this agreement Syrian Crisis broke out, and it became obvious that Syria fell under USSR's control with these agreements. Ultimately appointment of Colonel Afif El-Bızri, who was a member of French Communist Party in his youth, as Syrian Chief of Staff caused great excitement in Syria's neighbors, Turkey, Iraq and Jordan (Armaoğlu, Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri, 1991, p. 249). President Eisenhower expressed his reaction to these developments as follows; *"If Syria came to terms with just the radical Arab nationalism and Nasser partisanship, this is one thing, but if they plan to be entirely communist, this might require an opposing action"* (Sever, 1997, p. 185).

Syrian Crisis broke out in 1957, and this was the first serious incident when Turkey directly confronted an anti-Western Arab country after the establishment of the Baghdad Pact. When Syria blamed Turkey and the USA for interfering in its internal affairs, Turkey deployed its troops at the Syrian border. The issue became a global crisis in a short time, which concerns NATO, Warsaw Treaty Organization and United Nations. Thus conflict of "the East and the West" reached the Middle East. The major concern was Syria's becoming a "satellite state" to be used by the Soviet Union in each and every way. So, it was thought that Syria became a gradually growing danger for Turkey. Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu stated that Syria procured more than it could utilize in line with its capacity in December 1956 from Soviets, and this development seriously concerned Turkey. Turkey was feeling that it was surrounded by communist danger not only in the north but also in the south (Uslu, 2016, pp. 109-110).

The USA sent Loy Henderson, Deputy Secretary of State and the Middle East expert to Syria's neighbors in August 1957 to acknowledge what was happening. When Henderson came to Turkey on August 27, King Faisal of Iraq and King Hussein of Jordan were also in Turkey. The meeting of these two kings, President Bayar and Prime Minister Menderes strengthened the assertion of the countries on Nasser's side that the West aimed to overthrow the regime in Syria. After going back to his country, Henderson prepared a report and stated that the situation was vital, and all neighbors of Syria were concerned that Soviets might use Suez Crisis as an excuse and overthrow their own regimes (Merih, 2006, pp. 188-189).

On the other hand, the USA was concerned that Syria would fall under the influence of Soviets. The major concern of the USA was a possible Russian coup in Syria as a result of Syria's falling under the influence of USSR as days passed. It

was asserted in summer 1957 that Turkey was deploying troops on Syrian border. Syria and Egypt accused Turkey and the USA of planning an armed operation against Syria and trying to replace Baas regime with another government that they supported. These developments caused great excitement in Syria's neighbors, Turkey, Iraq and Jordan along with Israel and Lebanon. Israel's Prime Minister Ben Gurion said that US President was one of the most dangerous events that Ben Gurion would be facing with (Eisenhower, 1965, p. 200). Actually, Soviet Russia stated in the message they sent that Syria's becoming a base of international communism was the first instance that Soviets got to set foot in the Middle Eastern country with this agreement against free world for a long time. Thus, many military and civil Soviet experts had the chance to be in Syria.

Towards the end of September 1957 Syria and the Soviet Union alleged that Turkey had deployed its troops on its southern borders to pressure the Damascus government. Turkey and the USA definitely denied these assertions and described these attempts as deceptions fabricated to mask the Soviet weapons sent to Syria within the last two years and works performed to turn this country into a Soviet satellite. Prime Minister Adnan Menderes made a statement on September 24, 1957 with regard to the current situation in Syria and why he was concerned about the developments in this country. His statement was as follows:

"It is impossible to presume the current situation in Syria as a reasonable armament. This is simply the implementation of the objective of turning the country into an armory to be used by heads when needed. As for Turkey, we are a country surrounded by dangers in the eyes of future possibilities and developments. As we have a long border with Syria, it prompts us to be extremely vigilant for our national security within the context of latest developments. Turkey must closely follow the development of events. " (Gönlübol & Ülman, 1969, pp. 312-313)

The tension between Turkey and Syria caused some incidents on the border on October 8, 1957. Then, Syria sent a diplomatic protest note to Turkey and made a complaint to Secretary General of the UN. The note included the following points; recent provocative activities of Turks along the northern borders of Syria, unjust concentration of Turkish troops throughout Syrian border, violation of Syrian airspace by Turkish Air Force. Statements of Turkish government with regard to Syria were also mentioned in the note, and it was alleged that this was interfering in Syria's internal affairs. Turkey replied to this note and stated that the assertions in the message sent to Secretary General of the UN were irrelevant. In addition, all accusations of violation of peace and security attributed to Turkey were denied in the note, and it was stated that the measures taken on southern borders were directed towards the objective of defence (Gönlübol & Ülman, 1969, p. 314).

Turkey wanted to warn Syria by organizing military maneuvers near the Syrian border. But, 1957 was a year when Arab nationalism was peaked and if Turkey had attempted an intervention to Syria, both countries in the region and the Soviet Union would have confronted Turkey. Even if the USA stood by Turkey, this situation would move the USA away from its regional allies and strengthen Nasser (Pearson, 2007, p. 49). The Soviet Union Prime Minister Bulganin conveyed his concern regarding Turkey's concentration of military forces on Syrian border and weaponry shipment of the USA to Turkey in the message he sent to Prime Minister Adnan Menderes on September 10, 1957. So, the Soviet Union supported Syria, while applying pressure on Turkey. The Soviet Prime Minister Bulganin commented that the USA was planning a military operation against Syria and gave a special role to Turkey in this regard. He also asserted that he saw the reports regarding weaponry shipment of the USA to Turkey to be used in this assault and underlined that a

military operation in this region would easily turn into a large scale war. Also, harshly warning Turkey, Bulganin commented that in case of such a war in the Middle East, Turkey would also get harmed and weaken provided that it took part in this war. Turkey responded that these harsh and threatening discourses of Bulganin aimed to frighten and alarm Turkey, while it made Syria dependent on itself. On the other hand, Syrian Foreign Minister Salah ad-Din al-Bitar stated that Turkey assured him with respect to not attacking Syria, and Turkey notified Syria about military exercises it conducted within its boundaries every year (Milliyet, 1957). On August 6, 1957 it was announced that USSR and Syria had signed a technical assistance agreement. Under this agreement USSR was to construct ports, highways, railways and 6 airports and finance irrigation and energy projects in Syria (Aktaş, 2006, p. 113).

Then, the Soviet Union continued to support Syria while intensively pressuring Turkey. Khrushchev commented in an interview with James Newton of The New York Times on October 9, 1957 that *"If war breaks out, we are closer to Turkey but you are not. When guns start to fire, the rockets will fly and then it will be too late to think. "* (The New York Times, 1957). US Secretary of State replied this statement of Khrushchev with a declaration on October 11, 1957. In this declaration it was also stated that despite the distance in between, the USA would not undervalue the responsibilities it assumed for Turkey in NATO (Armaoğlu, 2009, p. 617). The USA's supportive attitude towards Turkey in defiance of the threats of the Soviet Union attempered the Soviets. In addition, Saudi Arabia tried to be a mediator between Syria and Turkey and soothe Syria. When Jordan also assumed a soft attitude towards Syria, the crisis was resolved in October 1957. Another important factor for the crisis to disappear was the decision of Syria and Egypt taken on September 14, 1957 to establish a unity under the name of "The United Arab Republic" being valid

from February 1, 1958. Even though Nasser was reluctant to adopt this idea for a long time, the possibility of a communist administration in summer 1957 made Nasser agree with this idea. Nasser wanted to prevent Egypt to be left open for communism by taking Syria under his protection (Armaoğlu, 2009, p. 618). Considering Syria's being united with Egypt less risky for itself than its being connected with the Soviet Union, Turkey announced on March 11, 1958 that it recognized the "United Arab Republic". The USA also responded positively to this union by considering that it would prevent a possible coup in Syria (Tuncer, 2013, p. 133).

Fatin Rüştü Zorlu expressed his opinion before the establishment of United Arab Republic that *"Strengthening the relations between the Middle Eastern countries would not give any harm to us if it would protect the Middle East from the infiltration attempts of the Soviet Union to the region and particularly, if it would prevent Syria to come under the influence of Soviets"* (Gilead, 1959, p. 366). This important statement shows one of Zorlu's foreign policy priorities in relation to the Middle East in this period hindering Soviet influence in the region. He openly comments that if it was the "United Arab Republic" that could provide it, Turkey would stand behind it. Zorlu perceived the developments in Syria as a threat for NATO's eastern wing to be surrounded. When Arab states did not put a strain on Syria, Turkey decided to act alone against Syria. But, this attitude of Turkey militated in favor of the Soviet Union, and Syria became connected to the Soviet Union more. Moscow has threatened that if an attack against Syria occurred, it would not be confined to the region (Robins, 1991, p. 26).

When the Syrian crisis was assessed in general sense, it was obvious that this crisis was the manifestation of dominance and authority struggle commenced between the two blocs after the years of 1945-1947 and accelerated later on. This had

happened during the Syrian crisis between two blocs as it happened in other parts of the world. Wanting to benefit from Syria's internal state, the Soviet Union had chosen this country as a suitable base to expand its power and authority to all the Middle East but Westerners posed an obstacle for danger and expansion of communism. There is no doubt that Turkey was the one feeling the communist danger most closely in the Western bloc. One of the biggest reasons for this was that Turkey had a very long borderline with Syria and that a possible communist order would threaten Turkey's security first. Hence, Turkish Foreign Policy under the influence of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu perceived every policy that the Soviets pursued in Syria against itself. Another important consequence of the 1957 Syrian Crisis was the Israeli issue which became a source of concern for Arabs while the USA was trying to stop the expansion of communism in the Middle East (Gibson, 1967, p. 97).

In brief, Syria had begun to get closer to the Soviet Union as of 1957, and it was intensively armed due to its military relationship with this country. As Turkey regarded this situation in Syria as a threat to its own security, it had a crisis with Syria which would continue until the end of 1957 and lead to a conflict. Overreaction shown by Turkey to Syria's relations with the Soviets brought Turkey to the verge of a conflict with Syria and USSR (Arı, 2004, p. 316). US policy in summer 1957 created the impression that it was secretly trying to overthrow the Syrian government. The most concrete example of this was the visits of US Deputy Secretary of State, Loy Henderson, to İstanbul and Beirut, because he had a reputation as a "coup plotter" and supported Shah of Iran in 1953. Secondly, the USA began to grant arms aid to neighboring Arab countries of Syria and particularly to Jordan. Thirdly, sea patrol troops of 6th Fleet were frequently seen in offshore Syria. All of these incidents gave an impression of an outside intervention to Syria. Moreover, the USA

applied the Eisenhower Doctrine and announced that Syria was under the control of communists and created a danger for its neighbors. Syrian crisis was calmed down only after the majority of the Middle Eastern countries declared that they did not see Syria as a threat (Sander, 2001, p. 309).

2.7. July 1958 Military Coup in Iraq

The UK had lost its role as the order-setter in the Middle East it gained following the World War One after the Suez Crisis, and the USA began directly penetrating the region as the new order-setter via Eisenhower Doctrine announced on January 5, 1957. The coup made on July 14, 1958 under the leadership of General Qasim led to radical changes in the Middle East policy of DP. On the other hand, Egypt's leader Abdel Nasser pleasantly welcomed the revolution in Iraq and immediately recognized the revolutionary government (Milliyet, 1958). Faisal II, Prime Minister Nuri Pasha al-Said and King Naibi Abdullah were killed in the bloody revolution occurred on the same day with the Baghdad Pact meeting held in İstanbul, and this had stunned the DP administration, Menderes and Bayar being in the first place, as there were also rumors regarding a military coup in Turkey. DP government abstained from recognizing Qasim administration for a while. Being annoyed due to the military coup in Iraq, Turkish government seriously considered the option of a military intervention. Bayar and Menderes approved this suggestion of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu. But, considering that such an intervention would interlock the Iraqi people with the new regime caused the new Iraqi government to get closer with Egypt and USSR and induce USSR's intervention. The USA and the UK warned Turkey to remain calm against the events in Iraq. The famous literary figure Peyami Safa assessed these events after the coup in Iraq in his newspaper column and expressed the following opinions:

"Provoking the colonized and semi-colonized countries under the sway of Western states and especially of the UK and France, encouraging them for rebellion and put them under its influence is one of the unchanged policies that the Soviet Union have been pursuing since Lenin. The Soviet Union managed to create a man like the English puppet Nuri Said in Egypt. The Arab independence and Arab Unity baits set out on Russian fish-lure and in Nasser's skilled and hands, cut Syria and Saudi Arabia free from Western hegemony and put them under Soviet hegemony and now it was Jordan's, Lebanon's and Iraq's time. After its attempts in Lebanon and Jordan which came to nothing, it was as if successful in Iraq. Egypt and Russia are happy. Nasser immediately recognized the new government and took them into his community. The Soviet Union requested the replacement of the Iraqi delegate in the UN with the delegate of today's government" (Safa, 1958).

Being one of Turkey's famous literary writers, Peyami Safa especially contributed to a better comprehension of Zorlu's foreign policy moves by public opinion via his articles in Milliyet newspaper. He also shined out as an author reading and analysing world conjuncture in a period when the Cold War gathered pace. Peyami Safa had another important specialty. Even though he was a pro-RPP, he also felt close to Democrat Party due to their anti-communist approaches.

Afterwards, a declaration was broadcasted from Radio Cairo at the night of Jul 15, and it was announced that Iraq was withdrawn from the Baghdad Pact and all previous agreements were cancelled. In addition, it was stated by Cairo that Yugoslavia would protest the landing of troops by America to Lebanon in the presence of Westerners and declare that this would lead to World War Three. East Germany Government sent a congratulatory telegram to Baghdad and expressed their appreciation (Milliyet, 1958). According to İzzet Sedes, Iraq revolution did not come out of the blue but uncloaking the deep-rooted hatred based on domination of a class. The Military Coup in Iraq was the result of the hatred felt for Prince Abdullah, Nuri Said and the UK in their person rather than the hatred for King Faisal. Sedes had conducted some research and made some interviews in Iraq for a long time before the revolution and his general opinion was that the majority of Iraqi people were greatly

in favor of Egypt's Arab nationalist leader Nasser, who became a hero for Iraq. Therefore, what brought Iraq to its feet with a bloody coup d'etat was Arab nationalism. Iraq was not a state and nation to establish an intimacy with the UK and Turkey anymore (Sedes, 1958).

Iraq's new leader Qasim stated after the coup that the coup was not against the West and both parties would sustain their cooperation with the West for their own interests. In addition, the Soviet Union, with long-cut off diplomatic relations when again, on the other hand, with the United Arab Republic on July 19, 1958 mutual defence agreement was signed (Sönmezoğlu, 2000, p. 360). Iraq had been pursuing a different policy than the Arab countries as of the commencement of Cold War, and it was the only Arab state among the members of the Baghdad Pact and the military coup staged under the leadership of General Qasim on July 14 not only overthrew the monarchy but also led to important changes in regional policies. The Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu held a press conference on July 17, 1958 and stated that a new Iraqi government would beside the point for them. The most important consequence of Iraqi coup in terms of international politics was that the Baghdad Pact was replaced with Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). The new administration in Iraq initially showed attention for not breaking up with the Western countries to prevent any foreign intervention and did not withdraw from the Baghdad Pact. Then, the meeting to discuss the latest developments in the Middle East was held on July 28-29, 1958 in London with the participation of foreign ministers of all the Baghdad Pact members except Iraq and US Secretary of State. At the end of the meeting, it was declared that the Baghdad Pact would be needed more than ever and the USA was invited to join the pact. But, the USA rejected this invitation and preferred to develop its relations with member countries. At the meeting in London it

was also agreed upon the common attitude towards the new regime in Iraq. In this direction Turkish Government announced on July 31, 1958 that they recognized the new Iraq Republic and would pursue a policy based on friendship with this regime (Geçikli, 2016, p. 360).

After losing its confidence in the region after Iraq Coup, the USA strove for not leaving the region under the influence of USSR. In this context, the USA signed mutual agreements with member countries within the scope of Eisenhower Doctrine (Armaoğlu, 1991, p. 258). Agreements signed with the USA contained six articles. These articles were; 1) in case of a possible assault on a member country, the USA will help it upon his request, 2) the USA will sustain its aids uninterruptedly, 3) the aids will be used in compliance with its aim, 4) cooperation will be established with other countries, 5) this agreement shall not affect the existing commitments, and 6) Agreement's entry into force (Gürün, 1983, p. 361). In this way the USA planned to stop aggressive Abdel Nasser, reduce the influence of the Soviets in the region and strengthen the economic and social structure of the region. Turkey's expectation from this agreement was not political but economic.

After changing the name of the Baghdad Pact into CENTO on August 21, 1959, the new organization held its first meeting on October 7-9, 1959 in Washington. Participants of the meeting, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and the UK declared that the organization would be named as such due to its central location between NATO and SEATO.

It is seen that the Military Coup of Iraq in 1958 also had an impact on Cyprus issue. The attacks of Greek Cypriots continued until the end of 1958. When the incidents did not calm down, Turkey sent a note to the UK and notified that

Turkey would land its troops on the island if military measures of the UK remain insufficient. Upon this note, the UK sent troops of 193th Bombardier Regiment to Cyprus by taking the military coup in Iraq into consideration and declared a curfew on the island (Ulus, 1958). The fact that the General Qasim administration, which came to power as the result of the Iraqi Military Coup, virtually ended the Baghdad Pact and began to pursue a policy against the British seems to have influenced the UK in pursuing a more moderate policy towards Turkey regarding Cyprus issue.

3. CYPRUS AND ZORLU

Cyprus question had a significant impact on Turkish foreign policy during Fatin Rüştü Zorlu's foreign ministry period. In this chapter, the Cyprus issue that has an important place in Turkish foreign policy is going to be analysed from the beginning of that question until the foundation of independent Cyprus Republic.

3.1. Geopolitical Importance of Cyprus

Cyprus is a very old issue. It all started with the Morea riots. It was obvious that Cyprus had to be controlled by Turkey after being occupied to ensure the security of Anatolia as it was only 40 miles away from the Turkish coast. And when Turkey annexed the island, the majority of the population was Catholics and Levantines. There was an insignificant number of Orthodox. The Ottoman conquest in the 16th century led to a Turkish migration to the island along with Orthodox pressure and politics via Fener Patriarchy because the Ottoman Empire's policy at that time was taking sides with Fener and Orthodox against Catholic Christians and Christians from other sects. This situation caused the revolt of Greek Cypriots when Ottoman Empire was in a vulnerable state. At that time, the Ottomans were defeated. It was in

need of Great Britain's help against Russia. In order to provide this aid, the UK virtually assumed the administration of the island with an agreement under which the rights of dominance and sovereignty would be of Ottoman Empire (Fersoy, 1979). In 1878, Turkey transferred the administration of Cyprus, which it administered for 307 years and regarded as a part of its homeland to Great Britain. However, Turkey did not give up its sovereignty rights over the island until 1923. Turkey left the island to the English pursuant to Article 21 of Lausanne Treaty in 1923 (Treaty of Peace with Turkey and Other Instruments, 1923). As it was a small island, Cyprus was generally controlled by the dominant power in the region. Therefore, the sovereignty of Cyprus changed hands many times during the course of history. Nancy Crawshaw, who made important geopolitical assessments on Cyprus Island, regards the island as a piece of land which had been bought, sold and transferred from one country to another (Crawshaw, 1978).

The importance of Cyprus Island for Turkey comes from the collateral Turkish people who share the same culture and use the same language living on the island in the first place. Turkey did not accept the Turkish people on an island which was only 40 sea miles away from its borders to suffer and expose to violations of human rights. The ultimate goal of Turkey with regard to the island was ensuring a peaceful, free and secure life for Turkish people and make Cyprus an island of peace in the region. In this context, Cyprus is important for Turkey in terms of proving its commitment to its international responsibilities and undertakings. In addition, being located on a strategic and key location in East Mediterranean makes Cyprus a critical land for the security of Turkey's southern coasts. The only way out for Turkey, which is surrounded by the islands left to Greece in the Aegean Sea is on the south. Cyprus Island is located right across these coasts. If Cyprus falls into the hands of an enemy

force, one of the important veins of life of Turkey will be cut. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey was very well aware of this fact. When he was watching the military exercises on the southern coast on one occasion, he gathered his staff and asked them a question: "Let's assume that Turkey is occupied again and Turkish forces are resisting only in this region. What are our supply routes and amenities?" Then putting his hand on Cyprus on the map, Atatürk said, *"Gentlemen, our supply routes are completely obstructed as long as Cyprus is possessed by enemies. Pay attention to Cyprus. This island is very important to us"* (İsmail, 1998, p. 49). As Cyprus is only 40 sea miles away from Anamur, it means that Turkey would never stay silent in face of Enosis danger.

As Cyprus increasingly featured in the great game of the Cold War, the US also took a keen interest in the island, specifically regarding defence of the Eastern Mediterranean (Sutton, 2017, p. 122). The memorandum titled "The Future of Cyprus" by famous English politician, Lord Curzon is worthy of attention in terms of the geopolitical and strategic importance of the island. Being the English Foreign Minister of the period, Curzon determined the frame of his Cyprus policy in Paris Peace Conference on January, 1919 (Satan, p. 10). Explaining his opinions on the war in his memorandum, Curzon states that the situation in Cyprus is not the same as the situation before the war. The UK should stop acting in a spirit of generosity and take every step with caution. Curzon briefly makes some historically significant statements in terms of the history of Cyprus issue in his memorandum and says that the UK should be ready for the pressure to be applied by Greek press and politicians for Cyprus to be left to Greece during the discussions of the destiny of Greek islands. He also emphasizes that Cyprus has a totally different system in terms of geography and in its long history it was dominated by Egypt, Persia, Assyria, Rome, Great Britain,

Venezia, Genoese and Turkey and the only Mediterranean state which never dominated the island was Greece. Curzon claims that there are 220 thousand Greek Cypriots and 60 thousand Muslims who speak Romaic on Cyprus. According to Lord Curzon, Cyprus has the key position in the competition in the Eastern Mediterranean due to its location (The Future of Cyprus, Memorandum By Lord Curzon, 1999). Lord Curzon's opinions show that only a powerful force would give its all to protect the island as proven by the history of Cyprus Island, but in any case, the fate of the island was always connected with Anatolia. Leaving Cyprus to Greece would be attractive to countries which are more powerful than Greece.

The island of Cyprus always had a great geopolitical importance from the ancient times to the present due to its geographical location (Özveren, 2012). The English in insufficiently defended Cyprus felt uneasy about the Germans' occupying Greece during World War Two, landing troops on Crete and threatening Egypt over North Africa (Sönmezoğlu, 2000, p. 68). It is understood from the discussions made in English War Cabinet with regard to the issue and reports prepared that Secretary of State Anthony Eden offered an agreement to Greek government on exile to assign the island to them after the war to eliminate the possibility of the island being occupied by Germans and to be assigned to Greece and thus receive support of Greek people. But, when the German danger for the island went away towards the end of 1941, this offer of Eden was not supported by the War Cabinet (Xydis, 1966). Even though peace in the region was disturbed due to Arab-Israel wars after World War Two and economic life was significantly damaged, this was a process during which the strategic importance of Cyprus Island was defined. Particularly when the UK recognized that it would lose Egypt, the importance of Cyprus increased still more. The geographical location of the island would make it possible to penetrate the

abundant oil fields in the Middle East, which had vital importance for showing the continuation of “Pax-Britannica” (Cohen, 2007). Cyprus Island is a strategic target involved in domination theories and in a location to control numerous geographical centers. In summary, the strategic importance of Cyprus can be expressed as follows (Yurdakul, 2002, p. 6):

1- It has a command of transportation routes to oil fields in the Middle East geography.
2- It controls the axis from the Middle East to Africa.
3- It is in a location to control the sea routes beginning from the Suez Canal and reaches to Indian and Pacific Oceans.
4- According to air supremacy theory, it is a strategic platform to direct the air force to any direction. With this feature, it can be regarded as an "aircraft carrier".
5- The power which possesses Cyprus would have respect in the Middle Eastern countries.

The importance of an island with such a strategic importance for Turkey can be summarized as below (Yurdakul, 2002, p. 5):

1- Cyprus ensures Turkey's geographical security from the South. Therefore, the occupation of the island by enemies would create a threat to Turkey's national interests.
2- Having the capacity to be an air or sea base, it enables the occupiers to affect depths of Turkey.

3- Since the island is in a location to control Turkey's trade routes to the Middle Eastern and North African countries, it has the potential to facilitate trade over these routes.

Great Britain’s transferring its role in the Middle East and East Mediterranean to the USA during the Cold War had changed the balance in these regions. This development was a precursor of a new era for Cyprus. Even though Cyprus gained its independence in 1960, its importance for Western alliance remained intact during the Cold War. The strategic importance of the island was determined in terms of its role against the Soviet threat in accordance with the new international and regional political conditions. On the other hand, Cyprus was deemed to have vital importance in order to obtain intelligence to nullify the plans of the Soviet Union to penetrate the Middle East and expand there (Dimitrakis, 2009).

Cyprus had a significant and special place for Fatin Rüştü Zorlu’s foreign policies. According to Zorlu, Cyprus was of vital importance to Turkey. There were two factors, one geographic and one human that dictate Turkey’s concern for Cyprus. Cyprus controlled the southern approaches of Turkey. It was lying astride the main and vital line of communication that Turkey had with the free world. Zorlu pointed out that the Second World War proved that in time of crisis the Aegean Sea became unnavigable, submarines and aircraft rendered it completely useless even for the riparian nations. Turkey had to depend on its southern access into the Mediterranean for supplies from Turkey’s allies in the free world. In that manner, Cyprus was like a cork to a bottle in that area. Turkey was required to make certain that it would never be used to disrupt Turkey’s line of communications. Significantly,

Turkey could not allow even a remote possibility of its use as a base of action against Turkey. Turkey's northern frontiers both by land and sea were blocked by the Communist world both by land and by the sea; consequently, Turkey's first instinct of self-preservation dictated the necessity for keeping its own interests.

3.2. DP's Cyprus Policy and Cyprus' Becoming an International Issue

Turkey's Cyprus Question depended on the principles of "status-quo" and "balance of power" that had been harmonized with Turkish foreign policy principles between the years of 1923-1954 (Işıksal, 2015, p. 300).

Cyprus became an important issue in Turkey's agenda as of early 1950's and in time, it continued to be one of the issues engrossing Turkish Foreign Policy during DP period. According to the 3rd President of TRNC, Mr. Derviş Eroğlu, Cyprus became a national case for Turkey during the years of 1955-1956. Prior to this date, when Dr. Fazıl Küçük visited Ankara, the authorities said, *"We don't have an issue called Cyprus"* (Eroğlu, 2017). It is seen that DP had made some changes in its Cyprus policies within this period. While at early 1950's *the policy would be summarized as*" Cyprus issue is the internal affair of the UK and it is none of our business", converted into an irredentist policy as of 1954 *which was stated with the slogan of* "Cyprus is Turkish. This time the official Cyprus policy was changed one more time in 1956 and *"partition"* policy was adopted. As of 1959, the policy of "independent Cyprus" had been pursued due to the changes in foreign conjuncture. In a way, administrators of DP formed their approaches towards Cyprus issue in line with Great Britain's approaches. Great Britain's Cyprus policy was shaped in accordance with the altered situation in the Middle East, and this had directly affected the Cyprus policies defended by Turkey (Özcan, 2015). Turkey headed towards

further strengthening and expanding the security it obtained by joining NATO in the period of 1952-1954. In the meantime, Greece had applied to the UK and officially requested the island but in spite of this development, Turkey gave importance to establish the Balkan Alliance with Greece. As a consequence, Turkey remained passive at the beginning of Cyprus issue and lost ground. Turkey-Greece relations gathered pace as of 1950's, and both countries became allies within NATO in 1952 and within the Baghdad Pact in 1953. However, these relations became tense as of 1954. In this period, the issue that Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, who had a great influence on Turkish Foreign Policy, made a great effort to resolve was Cyprus. Additionally, Cyprus and Aegean issues have been main factors affecting Turkish Foreign Policy. Cyprus Island was temporarily turned over to English administration in 1878, but its sovereign right still belonged to the Ottoman Empire, and this situation continued till World War One.

Upon lease of Cyprus Island to the UK by the Ottoman Empire in 1878, the balance on the island was deranged to the detriment of Turkish Cypriots. When Ottomans engaged with the war on October 29, 1914 the UK took advantage of it and declared that it annexed Cyprus Island to the empire territories on November 5, 1914 (Oberling, 1982, p. 29). Great Britain's unilateral annexation of the island lasted till 1923, and it was only accepted by Turkey with Treaty of Lausanne. Thus began the British rule on Cyprus. The English established a colonial administration on the island and while treating Greek Cypriots as first-class citizens, they regarded Turkish Cypriots as second-class citizens. In this context, many Turks who had enough of the pressures and deceits of Greek Cypriots and English had to migrate to Turkey and other countries. This order continued until 1960 and after this date, new developments were experienced in the status of Cyprus Island. In the meantime, when Greece

requested of annexation, that is to say “Enosis”, of the island to Greece by activities and efforts of Greeks and Greek Cypriots created the Cyprus conflict and issue between The Turk and Greek Cypriots on the island and between Turkey and Greece (Uçarol, Siyasi Tarih, 1985). The legal and political base that the intensified Enosis campaign within the years following the World War Two was the unofficial plebiscite held by the Church on January 15, 1950 and the principle of “determination of one's own identity” on which this attempt was based.

The main articles of the Cyprus strategy determined by Athens and Cyprus Orthodox Church as a result of Makarios’ persistent policy in 1950 can be listed as follows;

1- Objecting all constitutional attempts and recommendations that would lead to independence of the island,
2- If needed, making extensive efforts in foreign countries and international platforms for Enosis,
3- In pursuit of this objective and in cooperation with relevant organizations in Greece, making necessary preparations for an armed struggle on the island and establishing youth organizations,
4- Applying to the UN for recognition of the right of “determination of one's own identity” to actualize Enosis.

The Cyprus issue came to the forefront previously as an internal issue of Ottoman Empire and Great Britain. Therefore, the Cyprus conflict would be connected to the establishment and activities of local Orthodox Church, which aroused the nationalistic movement on the island. In this context, it could be regarded as an issue manifested with the Morea riot in 1821. Settlement of the English on the

island in 1878 would be interpreted as a new process for the Greek Cypriots to achieve their objective. Kition Bishop, Makarios III made a speech in the welcoming ceremony held for the arriving English governor on July 22, 1878 and his words about the future of the island proves this as in the following; *"We have absolute confidence that Great Britain will facilitate the connection of Cyprus with the Homeland Greece that it has natural ties with as in the Ionian Islands"* (Uçarol, 1985, p. 559). As it is seen, the idea of connecting Cyprus to Greece, that's to say the ideal of Enosis was prevalent among the Greek Cypriots in 1878. After this date, the Greek Cypriots made many attempts and rebelled to achieve their goal. They were engaged with Cyprus issue more and more after the World War Two. But, these attempts had remained as internal problems until the official application of Greece to the UK in 1951 for Cyprus to be turned over to them. During World War II, the Turkish Prime Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu attended a meeting with Anthony Eden in Cyprus to discuss the ongoing war. Turkish Cypriots welcomed and cheered the Turkish Prime Minister. Furthermore, during World War II the community also made donations to the Turkish army (Makovsky & Sayarı, 2000, pp. 88-89).

The close association of Turkish Cypriots with Turkey was uninterrupted throughout the twentieth century. Throughout British rule, Greek nationalism intensified in Cyprus, propagated mostly by the teachers sent from Greece and Greek Orthodox clergy who were ardent supporters of "Enosis" (Smith, 1993).

While Makarios III was taking his religious education in Athens and Boston by name of Michael Mouskos, he determined modern and political methods to frame Enosis. In this sense, for example, he benefited from the independence movements of the colonies. The new approaches he adopted and the campaign he launched in direction of this goal aroused a great deal of interest among the Greek Cypriots in

Cyprus and communities which were struggling against colonialist countries for their independence (Gazioğlu, 1998, p. 1). In this process, terrorizing and intimidation movements by Greek Cypriots were intensified. Their aim was turning the Cyprus issue into an international case and push their requests on English government by influencing the English public opinion. On the other hand, they also aimed to prevent Turks to be involved within the English security forces and then make Turkish community to leave the island as it happened in Crete Island by dismaying them (Uçarol, 1985, p. 562). Turkey's being a side of Cyprus issue began in 1955. Following this interest in Cyprus, it is seen that Turkish government began changing their policies they adopted till that time. It is seen that the Cyprus conflict between Turkey and Greece was hotted up.

Cyprus issue was discussed in the General Assembly of the United Nations for the first time upon the complaint by Greece on August 16, 1954 and became an international issue. In the first application by Greece, it was requested that the people of Cyprus Island should be allowed to determine their own destiny. The UN addressed the issue in 1954 but rejected to take a resolution. In reality, this attempt of Greece was simply requesting the authority to be granted to Greek Cypriots to annex Cyprus to Greece. When this matter became very clear, Turkey took a clear action with regard to the Cyprus issue. The interest aroused by Makarios III and his leadership ability established him as the invariable leader of Greek Cypriot Community in a short time at home and abroad. When taking up the position as Archbishop, Makarios took the “Oath of Enosis” and emphasized that the Cypriot public shall reject and constitutional motion or compromise (Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt, An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece, 1978, p. 50). Makarios took the following oath with regard to “Enosis” he vowed for annexation of Cyprus to

Greece when he took the chair of Archbishop on October 20, 1950: *"I make a vow to work for actualization of our national freedom and never give up the policy to connect Cyprus with Greece"*

During the prime ministry period of Plastires and Venizelos in Greece, in the years of 1950 and 1951, they avoided having a direct conflict with the British and significantly shake the friendship with Turkey. But, when Marshall Papagos became the Greek Prime Minister in November 1952, these cautious behaviors changed a great deal. During the first 3 to 4 years following 1950, Makarios conducted an intensive policy campaign both at home and abroad. He forced Greek government both on Cyprus and in Greece for a national struggle with regard to Enosis and challenged the UK by organizing public demonstrations. Makarios pursued a policy objecting all sorts of constitutional and self-governmental administration of the English, and he did not participate in any constitutional works as he believed that these attempts would deactivate the will and effort to be annexed to Greece in time. In this direction, Makarios sent the results of the 1950 plebiscite to the United Nations and other world organizations along with governments of some certain states and tried to draw the attention of the public that granting this right to "Cypriots" was unlawful. "Autonomy" was an opinion suggested by the English colonial administration after World War Two under the impact of the winds blowing in favour of independence all around the world and increasing aversion and reactions of Turkish and Greek Cypriots against colonial administration According to this view, British sovereignty on Cyprus will continue and the symbol of this sovereignty would be the Governor. There would be an Advisory Council or a Legislature under the chairmanship of the Governor to which Turkish and Greek Cypriots would participate in their proportion to total population. One of the most important issues in this respect

is that all plans presented were not accepted by Greek Cypriots because they did not fully envisage Enosis. The Greek Cypriot leadership rejected the autonomy proposals as it would gradually lead to independence and by establishing EOKA, initiated armed attacks to actualize Enosis. The only solution for the Greek Cypriots was Enosis (İsmail, 1998, p. 48).

From 1947 to 1951, Turkey made efforts to base its foreign policy on America's alliance. Between 1947 and 1951 and even as of 1945, there was a common fate for Turkey and Greece. Both states have faced with Soviet threat as of the end of the war. When NATO was established on April 4, 1959 and the USA underlay this alliance, both Turkey and Greece applied for membership of the alliance and applications of both states were accepted in 1951. Turkey's participation in NATO alliance created dynamism in its foreign policy. Therefore, the primary concern of Turkey between 1945 and 1951 was to seek security factors against the powers that were deemed as threats to national security. From 1952 to 1954 Turkey directed its efforts to further expand and strengthen this security. These issues were one of the main reasons for the indifference of Turkish governments to Cyprus issue (Armaoğlu, 1963, p. 3). As of February 1950, Turkish public opinion turned its attention to May 14, 1950 elections. When the election process is examined, it is seen that nobody mentioned the Cyprus issue in any election speech during the election campaign. Democrat Party was reluctant to address this issue. As of 1951, Greece had supported the activities of the Greek Cypriots by constantly provoking this issue from the beginning of Cyprus issue, and even though Turkey was aware of it, it was abstained from pressing the issue. Turkish Foreign Minister of the period, Fuat Köprülü made a speech in the Turkish Grand National Assembly and stated that the emergence of Cyprus issue was untimely and that Turkey was interested in the Cyprus issue.

Besides, that he made a statement to Turkish press on April 22, 1951 and when explaining that the geopolitical importance of Cyprus for Turkey was rooted in the existence of Turkish population on the island and Turkey's close attention to the island due to its historic ties with Cyprus, he made the following comments:

*"Turkey does not see any reason why the island's present legal status needs to be changed. But if such a change would be made due to a problem, it is not possible for Turkey to accept and allow a solution that would be contrary to its national interests" (*Hürriyet, 1955).

Editorial writer of Vatan Newspaper, Ahmet Emin Yalman said that although it was announced that the British administration on the island was developing in favor of the people and Greece asserted that they did not have any intentions for the annexation of the island and asked the following question in his column; "If this is the case, why the Cyprus issue is on the agenda?" and replied the question as follows:

"Obviously we are confronted with a red Muscovy arson. In the eye of Muscovite, which is getting prepared to land on the Mediterranean, the presence of an English administration on Cyprus and taking advantage of the island as a security base of the democratic world by the participation of Americans is a thorn. In order to remove the Anglo-Saxons from there, they make their agents among the Greek Cypriots to commit arson. They are hiding behind an intense and expansive nationalism. Turkish, British and Greek governments should put their heads together and absolutely defeat each and every Muscovite attempt to create a Cyprus issue. It is necessary to deem every movement which would recede Turkish-Greek cooperation as an assault on the vital interests of both nations" (Yalman, 1950).

When Turkey and Greece were accepted as members of NATO in early 1952, Makarios attempted to use this resolution for his Enosis propaganda. Makarios sent a telegram to Greek Foreign Minister at the NATO meeting in Lisbon and expressed that Cyprus would be a secure base only when the national objectives were achieved and the people of Cyprus would support NATO plans in this conjuncture (Cyprus Mail, 1952). Later on, with the establishment of underground organizations and terrorist groups called EOKA, Makarios tried to benefit from these organizations to a large extent. At the second anniversary of 1950 plebiscite Makarios made a

speech at Panagia Fanaromeni Church and after commenting that armed actions would be taken to achieve Enosis and invited Greek Cypriot youth to be in the front line for this struggle. According to the speech obtained from the British archives, the following points are remarkable;

1- 1950 Plebiscite is a true indication of Enosis desire of the Greek Cypriots and is an important milestone in the history of the struggle for Enosis.
2- At negotiations in the UN, the signatures for Plebiscite will be evidence that supports the Cypriots' right.
3- Our youth, who have completed organizing throughout the island, have created a new force for the realization of the Pan-Cypriot and Pan-Helen Enosis wishes.

Being strengthened gradually, Makarios began challenging the colonial administration and demanded the acceptance of the results of 1950 plebiscite from the governor of the island. By stating that Greek Cypriots, who constituted 80.2% of the people of the island, would use their right to determine their own destiny many times in the history and by doing so, manifested their will to have an organic connection with motherland Greece, Makarios commented that 95.7% of the Greek Cypriots voted for unity with Greece in the plebiscite on January 15, 1950 and the English rejected the will of Greek Cypriots, despite this result (Gazioğlu, 1998, p. 8):

In fact, there are some main reasons that irritate the incidents on Cyprus and play a role in the emergence of Cyprus issue. Some of them belonged to the period before the World War Two, and they directly stemmed from the policies pursued by the English on Cyprus. These reasons can be listed as follows;

1- The economic structure of the island was weak and the UK did not make any investments for its economic development because unlike other British colonies, Cyprus was not economically but militarily important for the UK.
2- When the UK had taken over Cyprus from Turkey via Lausanne Treaty, they declared the island as a colony in 1925. Consequently, they applied an iron-handed administration on the island and avoided granting the right of local autonomy.

Looking back at the developments as of 1952, the admission of Turkey and Greece to NATO at the same time brought heat to the relations of the two countries and the governments of the two states became closer to each other in terms of their policies. This rapprochement inaugurated the series of developments which led to the establishment of a Balkan Alliance between Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia in 1954 (Armaoğlu, 1963, p. 34). As Turkish-Greek relations suddenly developed as of early 1954, Turkish government kept away from Cyprus issue as far as possible. This situation of Greece had an impact on Turkish Youth. In general, Turkish youth became considerably threatening.

Archbishop Makarios began making some visits in order to lobby in the General Assembly of the UN and obtaining support from the USA towards the end of 1952. Lasky from the English delegation in the UN expressed his opinion in a letter he sent to Ministry of Foreign Affairs on January 3, 1953 as follows: "This visit of the Archbishop did not inspire interest. Archbishop did not have any influence here. There is no certain sign for the formation of a pressure group on the Cyprus issue yet." (Gazioğlu, 1998, p. 14) It is seen that DP and RPP were in agreement of a

common policy with regard to the Cyprus issue. Being adopted as a national case, the Cyprus issue shows that government and opposition came to the common grounds. Therefore, the evaluations of the Secretary General of RPP, Kasım Gülek, on Cyprus issue at the open-air meeting held in Anamur in October 1953 became more of an issue:

> *"Turkey is interested in Cyprus. This interest is worth laying emphasis on in many respects. There are our English friends in Cyprus now. Turkish-English friendship constitutes one of the foundations of our foreign policy today. We're also friends with the Greeks and we'll stay so. We want the current status quo on Cyprus to be protected. If any change is to be made in this situation, Turkey is one of the primary parties to have a say in the issue. If there is to be a change in status quo, this would only be in favor of Turkey. We undertake to deal with this matter as a duty at the nearest point of our motherland to Cyprus. The Cypriots living in Turkey and our Turkish siblings on Cyprus should know that Turkey is interested in the future of Cyprus. And Turkey will lead every change in relation with Cyprus"* (Vatan, 1953).

The attitude of the English on Cyprus issue was acutely determined in the first half of 1950's as follows. The UK shall not accept any proposal of Greece with regard to Cyprus in foreseeable future. The Government of Her Majesty the Queen shall not foresee any change in the island's sovereignty due to strategic reasons. As a NATO member, the UK does not want any attempt by Greece in this critical period which would agitate or weaken the alliance. According to Great Britain, US Administration supports Great Britain's attitude regarding Cyprus issue. In this period, the Government of Her Majesty the Queen never considered sharing the English sovereignty on Cyprus with another state even if it is a friend or ally or granting rights to locals to associate them with sovereignty due to the strategic importance of Cyprus with regard to the protection of English interests (Gürel, 1984).

One of the significant developments in the Middle East in 1954 was the decision of the UK to withdraw from Suez Canal and begin to transfer its bases located here to Cyprus as of early 1954 (Armaoğlu, 1963, p. 46). This development disturbed Greece. Because Cyprus gained a strategic importance in East

Mediterranean for the UK after withdrawing from Suez. Thus, Great Britain's leaving Cyprus will not be easy and it was a great blow for Greek Cypriots longing for "Enosis". By comparing Cyprus issue with the previous Macedonia issue, editorial writer of Vatan Newspaper, Ahmet Emin Yalman expressed the following opinions in his column:

> *"Cyprus is 44 miles away from the Anatolian coast. Today we are faced with disordered conditions, Turkish enmity, Greek provocations, rooted communism and cooperation of church with communism there. We cannot accept to be a mere spectator to these developments for our own security and stability of the region. If THE UK will remain to stay on Cyprus, it should pursue an honest policy and act accordingly for the sake of regional stability. If it plans to leave the island, they should put the cards on the table and a reasonable solution which would satisfy those concerned in maximum should be sought. Today's indecision is harmful to everyone in all respects. Only the ones behind the iron curtain would benefit from it"* (Yalman, 1954).

The Greek governments had been not interested in Cyprus that much until 1951. The reason for this was the country's internal affairs. But in the meantime, it is seen that aid-to-Cyprus committees were being established in Greece. General Grivas stood out as one of the organizers of these aid organizations. Close relations of Greek governments got started with Plastiras government in 1951 and especially with Papagos government in 1952. Being a supporter of "Enosis", Papagos declared his ideas even before being elected as the Prime Minister. After the Papagos government was formed, the Greek Foreign Minister Stefanopulos made a speech in Greek Parliament in May 1953 and declared that Greece would never give up the Cyprus case. Following this speech, Turkish National Student Federation declared on June 2, 1953 that they regarded the Cyprus issue as the national case of Turkish Youth (Gürün, 1983, pp. 383-384).

There were new developments in the status of both Greece and Turkey as of March 1954. Greece applied pressure to the UK to discuss the Cyprus issue, but the UK definitely rejected this request. Greek government and the public reacted to this

attitude harshly, and Greek government began making mention of taking this issue to the UN. Consequently, Turkish people did not remain unresponsive. During the discussions in House of Commons on March 15, a member of parliament asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the latest status of Cyprus issue. In reply to this question, Foreign Minister Eden said that Greece had unofficially applied to the UK in this respect and requested bilateral negotiations, but English government did not accept any negotiation on this issue. (Hürriyet, 1954) As it is understood from these words of British Prime Minister Eden, Greece did not officially apply to the UK, yet. In spite of this, Greek Prime Minister Papagos made a declaration in Athens on March 23 and said that Greek government decided to take the issue of annexation of Cyprus to Greece to the UN meeting in September 1954 (Vatan, 1954). After reviewing the declaration of Prime Minister Papagos regarding Turkish-Greek relations, Altemur Kılıç from Vatan newspaper wrote the following in his column:

> *"Until recently we have believed that Makarios, enemies of Turks and communists were exacerbating the Cyprus issue. But we regretfully understand that Papagos government also doesn't prevent the actions of these groups and even, they make attempts in the presence of English government. A Greek Prime Minister should have stated his opinion on Cyprus issue in the first place while going through the Turkish-Greek relations. Unless it is done, his declaration will remain lacking. This much is certain that the Turkish nation will never consider Cyprus as an issue between Greece and Great Britain. Above all, an initiative by any Greek government on Cyprus issue will prevent the expansion of cooperation between Turkey and Greece"* (Kılıç, 1954).

The delegation headed by Turkish Cypriot politician Faiz Kaymak visited London in mid-September 1954 and by making a declaration presented the opinions of Turkish Cypriots with regard to the latest developments. The opinions expressed in this declaration were briefly as follows (Gazioğlu, 1998, pp. 29-30):

1- Turkish Cypriots are against Enosis. They will make every effort to prevent its actualization.

2- When studies regarding the new constitution begin, every effort will be made to secure the rights of Turkish Cypriots.
3- We will work hard to announce our opinions to Turkey, the UK and the USA.
4- Cyprus must continue to remain under British administration. This is the only way to protect the rights of minorities and peace in the Middle East.
5- Turks are happy with the developments and development movements under British administration. the UK protects the balance between the two communities and provides order and security on the island. If Cyprus will be given to Greece, security will disappear.
6- 60% of the Greek Cypriots are communists. Communist movement is very well organized on the island. Communists have been supporting Enosis movement since 1952 upon directive of Russia.
7- If Enosis becomes real, there will be financial destruction and racist and social disorder on the island. Consequently, even an ideological civil war might break out as in Greece. Enosis might be a stepping stone for Communist Bloc to achieve its provocative goals. In this case the destiny of Turkish will be the same with the destiny of Turks on Crete, Dodecanese Islands and in Western Thrace.
8- Turkish Cypriots support the constitution proposed by English government announced in English Parliament on July 28, 1954.

English Deputy Minister of Colonies Hopkinson commented that Greece had requested the island to be handed over to them and asked for negotiations with the UK when he answered the questions asked about Cyprus issue in the House of Commons on April 28, 1954. However, he said that there was no change in Great Britain's decision and attitude. Hopkinson also referred to Köprülü's declaration of

April 1 and stated that Turkey did not want the Cyprus issue to come up and was not in favor of a change of status on the island. (Hürriyet, 1954)

As a result of the voting in General Committee on September 23, 1954, the Cyprus issue was put on the agenda of the General Assembly of the UN. When Greece set aside Turkish-Greek friendship and took the issue to the UN, this drew a great reaction in Turkey, and consequently the behavior of Turkish youth became severe and by collaborating Turkish media, they began to get organized. On the other hand, RPP Secretary General Kasım Gülek stated that *"If the status of Cyprus is to be changed, this can only be done on condition that the island is granted to Turkey."* Zafer newspaper handled the issue by reflecting the government's opinion. Even though Greece did officially apply to the UN, the newspaper did not want to blame Greek government. Mümtaz Faik Fenik of Zafer newspaper wrote an article on August 24, 1954 and claimed that the Cyprus issue was actually added to the agenda by communists, and that Greek government was deceived. He also found the UK guilty of allowing communism to spread on an island under their control and continued as follows:

> *"Keeping the peace in this region of Mediterranean will not allow any change in status quo of Cyprus in this sensitive state of the world. Turkey carefully follows the provoked incidents closely both in terms of the situation of Turks here and not allowing a communist post located only 50-60 kilometers away from its coast to expand its activities. The problems to occur on Cyprus under today's status quo will surely be further limited. We will see that the UN will take note of all these points and decide not to intervene* in Great Britain's *internal affairs. Such a decision will be in favor of both peace and Greece"* (Fenik, 1954).

Mumtaz Faik Fenik's following statements in his editorial on September 15 is rather important:

> *"All of us are strictly interested in the future of our cognates living on Cyprus for sure. If ultimately this island changes hands that is to say if status quo in the region is disturbed, it will affect both the defence system of peace front which involves Turkey and free states and Mediterranean strategy. It is certain that if such a matter is brought forward, it will surely be of interest to the policy of free states and defence system of NATO"* (Fenik, 1954).

During the 9th term meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations Greek Prime Minister Marshall Papagos sent a letter to the General Secretary of the UN on August 16, 1954 and requested that *"the issue of protecting the right of Cyprus people should be put on the agenda of General Assembly pursuant to the principle of equality of law and the right of self-determination of their destiny by people under the protection of the UN*" (T.C Cumhurbaşkanlığı Celal Bayar Arşivi). Greece applied on August 16 to the UN and reflected the Cyprus issue and requested application of the right of nations to determine its own destiny on Cyprus. Selvyn Lloyd, the British delegate to the UN argued that British administration should remain on Cyprus within the historical perspective. He stated that the issue was not a matter of independence or self-determination of one's destiny; there were two ethnic communities on Cyprus, and in case of the actualization of Enosis, the Cypriots would not obtain the right to determine their destiny, and all previous discussions and claims were based on the annexation of the island to Greece (Gazioğlu, 1998, p. 34).

He underlay that the Cyprus issue concerned the security of the Middle East and Mediterranean in the first place in his interview to Forum Magazine dated September 15, 1954 and mentioned these important points:

> *"The UN organization has been established to constitute peace and security among nations. I wonder to what legal grounds our friend and neighbor Greece had based this issue when applying to UN Would the desire of Greek Cypriots to unite with Greece be a good enough reason for annexation? If such a reason is sufficient, then where should the political borders of Turkey pass? ("*Forum, 1954, p. 6)

According to Ahmet the Sukru Esmer, the foreign policy writer of Halkçı newspaper and a political historian, the aim of taking Cyprus issue to the UN was interpreted as follows:

"In general, it can be said that the possibility of the result to be to the detriment of Greece is very high. Greece also knows that but their aim is to reflect Cyprus issue to the world via UN. It is already successful in this respect. Greeks think that this issue will definitely bore THE UK one day and the English will desert the island. It is seen that Greeks pursue a long term policy. It would not be judged as the Greeks are defeated by considering that they did not get a resolution in their favor from UN. Greece's plans for Cyprus are long-termed" (Esmer, 1954).

The Cyprus issue began to be discussed in General Assembly of the UN in the afternoon of September 24, 1954. This discussion was about whether the issue should be put on the agenda of General Assembly or not. English head delegate Selvwyn Lloyd took the floor first and commented that UN will not deal with this issue by saying the following (T.C Cumhurbaşkanlığı Celal Bayar Arşivi):

1- Cyprus Island is geographically a part of Anatolia, and there is a Muslim-Turkish population of 100 thousand living on the island. Cyprus Island never belonged to Greece throughout the history, and its sovereignty was assigned to the UK with the consent of Turks via the Treaty of Lausanne. The request of Greece before the UN is simply requesting the handover of this sovereignty, and this actually means interfering in internal affairs of a nation in defiance of Article 2 of the UN Agreement, and the UN does not have any right to do so. In addition, Greece also accepted English sovereignty on Cyprus by signing the Treaty of Lausanne.
2- Cyprus was promised to Greece in 1915 but Greece did not take part in the war, so this promise became invalid.
3- Venizelos said, "There is no such issue as Cyprus issue between the UK and Greece," in 1931.
4- While advocating the right of people to self-determine their own future, Greece actually does not want the Cyprus island to be granted its independence but to annex this island.

5- If the UN deals with this issue, this will only result in the increase of the uneasiness on Cyprus.

The head of Turkish delegation to the UN, Selim Sarper, made a long speech at the committee and underlined that Turkey was adopting Great Britain's thesis, so it would not be politically rational to create a topic called Cyprus issue and this was Great Britain's internal affair. At the beginning of his speech, Sarper described the emergence of Cyprus issue as an artificial event as it was created right at the time when the friendship of three related states, Great Britain, Turkey and Greece was about to support the establishment of an ideological and spiritual effectiveness between the people of these countries (Özkan, 2015, p. 551). Later on, Sarper analysed geographical and economic state, history and people of Cyprus in detail and emphasized that it was a part of Anatolia due to its distance to Turkey, climate and geological characteristics. He also added that the island was under Turkish administration for 307 years, but it was never ruled by Greece (Gazioğlu, 1998, p. 36). Furthermore, Selim Sarper evaluated the Greek doctrine of Enosis with the German “Anschluss” accused Greece of pursuing the same irredentist policy as Nazi-Germany. Ironically, in arguing for annexation on the grounds of geographical proximity, Sarper thought nothing using the German term “hinterland”, a favourite catchword of Nazi leaders championing German expansionism. According to Sarper the Cyprus Island was not economically self-sufficient, in the past when it was part of the Turkish motherland, it was able to sustain its population by becoming the hinterland of Anatolia and engaging in economic cooperation with it (Özkan, 2015, p. 551).

Nicosia-born Turkish politician Prof. Dr. Ahmet Şükrü Esmer warned Turkish government for Cyprus issue was put on the agenda of the UN and commented that

even though Turkey was related to Turkey, its name was being mentioned neither in the initial discussions at the UN and in the world media. He reminded that Turkey would confront with a fait accompli some day or other unless it clearly expressed its own opinion and wrote in his column as follows:

> *"Cyprus issue is within the limit of the national authority. Legally* Great Britain*'s status is strong. But if Turkey is only trusting the rights of the UK to prevent annexation of Cyprus to Greece, it would fall into a trap. Such an action is not solid in two respects: 1-* Great Britain *'s rights are colonial rights which are gradually becoming disreputable in terms of international relations. 2- The UK may decide by herself to abandon Cyprus one day"* (Esmer, 1954).

Great Britain's head delegate to the UN, Selwyn Lloyd made a speech and said that putting the Cyprus issue on the agenda would mean interfering in Great Britain's internal affairs. Then he continued: *"This is not an issue of self-determination and independence in the accepted manner. Cyprus is an island where two ethnic groups, namely Turks and Rums live together. Is there anybody who thinks that the people of Cyprus will be granted the chance and opportunity to determine their own future if Enosis becomes a reality? Almost all allegations in the past were talking about annexation to Greece."* Stating that the British control on the island should continue due to strategic reasons, Lloyd replied the proposal of Greeks to allow the UK to establish bases on Cyprus and emphasized that the lease terms would end one day regardless of their length, and Greek government would also be replaced one day (Gazioğlu, 1998, pp. 38-39). Prof. Dr. Nihat Erim wrote out in his column in Halkçı newspaper and proposed an interesting system not only for Cyprus issue but also for all Aegean islands. He commented that it would be right for Turkey to warn Greece and notify that Turkey would have a new perspective on the issue if Greece continued its agitations around Cyprus. Then he led up to Aegean islands and by saying that these islands were geographically parts of Anatolia and proposed the following formula with regard to all islands:

*"It would be right to jointly administer all islands located up to 50 miles away from Turkish coasts. For example an English-Turkish-Greek administration on Cyprus would satisfy everybody. Our Greek friends should calmly think about it. 100 thousand Turks on Cyprus cannot be left to the mood of semi-communist agitators. Turkey has the physical and spiritual power to protect the Turks living there. The best thing to do for Greece is to adopt the deep and foreseeing approach that Great Venizelos had late in his life. Venizelos proved that he was really an intelligent and foresighted person to openly wish to establish a federation between Turkey and Greece. Establishment of a Turkish-Greek joint and exemplary administration on Aegean and Mediterranean islands will be a step taken towards that great ideal" (*Erim, 1954).

It is possible to sum up the outline of Turkish government public opinion behaviors in 1954 as follows. First of all, there was no change in the official behavior of Turkish government till the discussions about Cyprus issue in the UN commenced in September. Turkish government canalized its efforts to the establishment of the triple Balkan alliance during the first eight months of the year and was attentive not to do anything which would weaken Turkish-Greek relationship. Consequently, they did not concern themselves with Cyprus issue. Great Britain's declaration announcing that they would definitely not abandon Cyprus in spite of the pressures of Greece played an important role in this attitude of Ankara government. In addition, official application of Greece to the UN in August led the reaction of Turkish public opinion to intensify. When the General Assembly of UN decided on December 17, 1954 not to discuss this issue, it aroused a great joy in Turkey. Even though Turkish Government believed that Cyprus issue was dropped, public opinion thought that it would cease (Armaoğlu, 1963, p. 96).

As of 1955, it is Turkey's being a party in Cyprus issue which was seen as a conflict only between the UK and Greece till that year. This happened at the London Conference held upon Great Britain's invitation towards the end of August. In this regard, the London Conference was a milestone in the history of Cyprus issue. Beginning with the London Conference, this period was very painful for the Turkish government and public and 6-7 September Events erupted. When Greece had applied

to the UN for Cyprus in August 1954, there were important changes in Great Britain's status in the Middle East. The negotiations that had been going on between the UK and Egypt since 1945 on Great Britain's abandoning Suez came to an end and the UK abandoned Suez under the agreement signed with Egypt. Naturally, this increased the importance of Cyprus for Great Britain. On the other hand, Turkey went into action to establish a Middle Eastern alliance as if it wanted to take Great Britain's place. On February 24, 1955 Turkey was only able to sign the the Baghdad Pact with Iraq (Ayın Tarihi, 1955, p. 185-187). When Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia sided against this pact, Turkey tried to expand the pact with the participation of new members. The first country to participate in the pact was the UK, and so the two states which were parties to the Cyprus issue formed a common front within the Baghdad Pact. Greece was not happy with this development. It seemed that the UK wanted to be present again in the Middle East via the Baghdad Pact after abandoning the region with Suez Treaty. It would be regarded as a mistake for Turkey to admit the UK to the pact.

While Turkey's external relations faced with this kind of problems resulting from the alliance systems that it established, the Turkish government was not engaged with Cyprus issue that much. The most important statement within the first six months of 1955 was made by Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü during the budget talks in TGNA (TBMM) on February 27:

> *"You know that Cyprus issue has been brought to the UN as a new event this year. Even though we have acted with utmost care for not disturbing our friendship and alliances in this issue which is a particular concern to our country, we have also shown our close interest in it"* (Ayın Tarihi, 1955, p. 115).

Turkish public was not even in favor of a change of status quo on Cyprus and requested the island to be taken from the UK and turned over to Turkey. What Turkey wanted was turning over the island to Turkey when the UK withdrew. In the

meantime, general elections were held in the UK on May 26, 1955, and Eden became Prime Minister, and Harold Macmillan was appointed as Foreign Minister. Great Britain's new Prime Minister Eden avoided making a reassurance on Cyprus issue due to Turkey's importance. Eden believed that it was impossible to protect the interests of NATO and the UK in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East without the support of Turkey. Therefore, he believed that it was necessary to discuss the proposals of a new constitution and autonomy with Turkey as well as with Greece, and no steps should be taken towards a status quo change on the island without Turkey's consent. Prime Minister stated that policy adopted by Turkish government underwent tough processes up until that date, and they always gave importance to Turkish-Greek friendship. He emphasized that they cared for Turkish-Greek friendship with regard to Cyprus issue and acted accordingly (Ayın Tarihi, 1955, s. 171).

As of July 1955, Cyprus issue was beginning to enter a new period. The UK sent notes to Turkish and Greek governments on July 30 and invited them to a conference in London at an early date to discuss political issues related to Eastern Mediterranean including Cyprus. As being officially invited to this conference by the UK officially meant that the UK accepted Turkey as a side of this issue. This invitation caused a great joy in Turkey while it caused a disappointment in Greece. Turkish government gave up being inactive about Cyprus issue and started dealing with the issue. The reasons for this change in Turkey can be summarized as follows:

1- Holding a tripartite conference showed Great Britain's wish to solve the problem. Under this circumstance Turkish government was obliged to make a decision and implement it.

2- The invitation of Ankara government to London irritated both Greek government and Greek public. The invitation of Turkey to the conference had stunned Greece. It became impossible for Turkey to assume a soft attitude anymore.
3- The London conference was welcomed with great excitement by Turkish public. Turkish people saw that the solution of the issue is now very close.

The USA knew that the main issue would be Cyprus at the tripartite conference and announced that it would support this initiative. The statement made by the press office of US Secretariat of State was as follows:

"We consider this proposal of the UK as a step taken in the right direction for a solution to a difficult problem. The Cyprus problem is closely related to the interests of our three allies and closest friends, Great Britain, Greece and Turkey. For this reason, we welcome this initiative to resolve disagreements with direct and constructive debates" (Bil, 1976).

Along with the announcement of the London Conference, the rumors began to circulate that Britain intended to give autonomy to the island. As a result, possible types of autonomy also began to be considered. For example, Şükrü Kaya from Hürriyet newspaper wrote these in his column:

"It is pointless to expect a solution to please all parties in the tripartite negotiations in London. But in view of the possibility of a change in status quo, we should evaluate this invitation by the UK in the most appropriate way due to Turkey's rights on the island and necessity of protecting lives and security of Turkish" (Kaya, 1955).

Ahmet Şükrü Esmer from Ulus Newspaper wrote this:

"Turkey had negatively approached to Cyprus issue until now and stated that status quo should not change. But what if the UK changes status quo? Then what? There is no specific Turkish argument yet. It is strange that this kind of an argument came from the English instead of Turks. There was an article written by Douglas Armstrong in Daily Telegraph newspaper on July 12. This person says; "The best thing that the English would do under these circumstances is cancelling the unilateral annexation of the English dated 1914 and going back to the state before 1914. As long as Russia keeps Batum, Kars and Ardahan, the UK would stay on Cyprus by lease. Since Russia abandoned these places, then the UK should give Cyprus back to Turkey" (Esmer, 1955).

Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın stated in his article in Ulus newspaper that we should not be indifferent to the future of Turkish Cypriots and alleged that Cyprus should be a defence center of the Western world under the common sway of NATO members. His article went on as follows: *"Then both Greek and Turkish Cypriots would live comfortably by having equal rights of autonomy and independence in their internal affairs"* (Yalçın, 1955). All in all, the decision of the UK to hold a tripartite conference on Cyprus issue gave the impression to Turkish press that the UK decided to change the status of Cyprus due to pressures of Greece, and they all believed that Turkey should put an opposing argument on the table. Thus, some solutions were offered to the Turkish government to inspire them. Turkish public welcomed the London Conference with great excitement. Turkey was now in a position to reject any resolution which would be against its interests. One day after the announcement of the conference, a piece of news appeared in Cumhuriyet newspaper. In this news, it was said that Turkey should now officially present what it wanted and what it did not with regard to Cyprus in its capacity of the intervening party (Cumhuriyet, 1955).

One day before the London Conference, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes hosted a lunch for the press in Liman Restaurant on August 24, 1955. The strong wording used by the prime minister at this meeting was the precursor of the firmer stand that Turkey will take. (T.C Cumhurbaşkanlığı Celal Bayar Arşivi) In his speech, Menderes opposed the right to determine their own destiny, and he claimed that the Cyprus issue was now perceived as a security problem of Turkey. He later continued his words: *"It should be clear to everybody that most of the Turkish coasts are surrounded by other states' means of observation and threat. A Cyprus site seems secure today. In this respect, Cyprus is the continuation of Anatolia and it is one of*

the main points of its security. For this reason, if Cyprus is to change hands, it will need to be decided on the basis of much more important facts and justifications, not on ethnic basis and it will have to be returned to Turkey." Actually, the views that Zorlu defended during London Conference were consistent with the views that Menderes expressed in the Liman Restaurant. During the conference, Zorlu based his views on geopolitical assessments and talked about the impossibility of applying the right of nations to self-determine their destiny on Cyprus (Özcan, 2015, pp. 118-119).

As Cyprus Conference approached, "Cyprus is Turkish Society" continued to open branches in this atmosphere in various parts of the country only within the last week of August. In addition, 3000 members of the State Railways Wagon Workshop Workers' Union in Istanbul decided to donate their bread rations they received every Saturday to Cyprus was Turkish Society. Again 200 workers of a factory in İstanbul donated their daily wages on August 30 to this society (Hürriyet, 1955). In response to Greece's efforts to make the issue an international problem, the UK attempted to make Turkey a side of the issue. Great Britain's policy aimed to show the world public that the incidents on Cyprus were not a simple problem of decolonization by creating the impression of a complex international problem. In addition, the UK assumed that they would use Turkish nationalism as a balancing factor against the Hellenistic nationalism scaling up on Cyprus. The first attempt of the UK in this direction was inviting Turkey along with Greece to the London Conference to be held on August 25, 1955. DP administration was to see this invitation as a green light by the UK to make Turkey have a voice on Cyprus policy. The diplomatic means that Turkey pursued during the conference held in London between the dates of August 25 - September 7, 1955 to discuss the issues related with Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean would be assessed as Turkish government made progress with regard

to Cyprus issue. In the meeting held upon Great Britain's invitation and with participation of Turkish and Greek governments Zorlu represented Turkey and declared that the island should be returned to Turkey if the status quo on the island would not be preserved and proposed the solution of self-government in the long term (Press Attache's Office , 1956, p. 58). Zorlu emphasized importance of the island during the talks and stated that Cyprus was left to the UK with the Treaty of Lausanne and if there was a change in this status, this treaty should be reconsidered (Press Attache's Office , 1956, p. 52).

According to Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, the Greek claim for "Enosis" was self-explanatory. Enosis means "Union", the union of Cyprus with Greece. In other means, the annexation of Cyprus to Greece. The Greeks started by demanding the annexation of the island to Greece. However, when this claim did not make and headway, they shifted to self-determination. This was not a shift in policy, it was merely a change in tactics. They insisted that self-determination should apply only to the Greeks on island, naturally hoping that this would lead to annexation. In point of fact, if self-determination were truly the aim of Greece, Turkey could wish for nothing better. Zorlu stressed on that Greeks and Turks had been living separately for centuries. If self-determination was to prevail, it would have to apply to the Turks as well as to the Greeks, and the problem would be resolved. The Greeks said that there were so many Greek islands around the Turkish shoreline that the addition of Cyprus to Greece would not affect the security of Turkey. According to that issue, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu pointed out that there were many former Turkish islands in Greek hands, and many of these were within Turkey's territorial waters. If Turkey pursued that Greek contention to its logical conclusion, Turkey had to accept that this argumentation called for the return of these islands to Turkey and not for the annexation of additional Turkish

islands to Greece. Furthermore, Cyprus commanded the approaches to the southern underbelly of Turkey, the only direction from which contact could be maintained by Turkey with her allies in the event of a crisis. The addition of Cyprus to the other islands held by Greece would complete the virtual encirclement of Turkey. Zorlu stressed on another occasion that no country should have been accepted to place her entire security at the mercy of any one country, no matter how great a friend and ally the latter may be (KKTC Cumhurbaşkanlığı Milli Arşivi, 1958).

3.3. The London Conference and 6/7 September Riots

When Greece took Cyprus issue to the UN in 1954, a delegation headed by one of the leaders of Turkish Cypriots, Faiz Kaymak, held official talks in Turkey and Great Britain. President Celal Bayar advised the delegation during their visit "to request for the English to stay on the island" (Gürkut & Soyalp, 2017, p. 43). When it was 1955, the terrorist movement carried on together by Church Rum Society and Communist Party on Cyprus began gathering pace. Weapons used in this terrorist movement were sent by Greece, and these terrorist actions were taken against the British. The aim of these actions was intimidating the English and making them apply some scams to actualize the objectives of Greeks and Greek Cypriots. But, Ankara government was aware that these terrorist actions would be directed to Turkish Cypriots one day in order to intimidate them, too. In this context the fact that Turkey would not be a mere spectator to these terrorist actions which created a threat to the safety of life and property of the Turks was conveyed to Great Britain, Greece and world public while it was also requested the status quo on Cyprus to be preserved. Greece's aim was increasing the pressure on the UK by setting the Greek Cypriot Orthodox Church, Greek Cypriots and communists in motion. They assumed that they would persuade the UK to come to table with Greece by pursuing the policy of

continuous bloodshed (Esenbel, 1993, p. 24). While the events had been progressing in this manner on Cyprus, the UK decided to hold a conference in London within the first half of 1955 and invited Turkey and Greece to this conference.

British Prime Minister Eden was in favor of openly announcing the fact that Turks would never allow the annexation of Cyprus to Greece. Eden showed that the aim of English government to hold the London Conference proved that the Cyprus issue was not a problem of colonialism, and the future of the island would only be determined by reconciliation of these three countries as there was a serious difference of opinion between Turkey and Greece, the other two states closely related to Cyprus. First of all, this fact should have been revealed.

The "Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus" held upon Great Britain's invitation on June 20, 1955 commenced in Lancaster House in London on August 29, 1955 and ended with a joint declaration on September 7, 1955. Turkey's view presented at the conference had three main points (Armaoğlu, 1963, p. 141):

1- Unlike the claims of Greece, Turkey has a first degree interest on Cyprus.
2- Status quo of Cyprus should not be modified.
3- If this status quo should be modified, then the island should be returned to Turkey.

Prior to the conference, Adnan Menderes appointed Fatin Rüştü Zorlu as Acting Foreign Minister and Fuad Köprülü as Minister of State and Deputy Prime Minister on July 28, 1955. In this context, Zorlu attended the conference with broad authorities and led Turkish delegation. Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, the head of Turkish delegation at the conference, made statements to press prior to the conference and

confirmed the points expressed by Prime Minister. Foreign Minister Zorlu made a statement to press at the London Airport on August 26, 1955 and after reflecting the appreciation that Turkey felt for the conference and said the following:

> *"Turkish Government requests to be satisfied on Cyprus issue. Turkey is loyal to its conventional obligations and international agreements that it signed as always. But if the agreements are to be changed, Turkey considers itself as the main party in interest in this respect"* (Zafer, 1955).

As the Tripartite Conference in London commenced on August 29, 1955, Turkish press started significant campaigns supporting Turkish argument. Falih Rıfkı Atay pointed out that the Greek imperialism will set its sight on Anatolia after Cyprus and said, *"It would be a treason not to deal with the issue of islands giving of which to Turkey's enemies as a base tomorrow is the greatest danger to us"* (Atay, 1955). Yeni İstanbul newspaper commented that Greece had destroyed the system established by the Treaty of Lausanne by putting Cyprus issue forward and Cyprus was directly a part of Turkey from now on (Haskan, 1955).

It appears that the view of a complete national unity was prevailing. Opposition declared that they agree with the government, particularly in terms of foreign policy. With regard to Cyprus issue İsmet İnönü said; *"We support the measures to be taken by the government with regard to Cyprus. It is our duty to show the world that the air of our internal politics is filled with Cyprus."* And Osman Bölükbaşı said; *"We gladly welcomed the energetic declaration of government. Our internal policy controversies would never shadow our sensibility with regard to national issues."* And finally, Turkish Peasants Party declared that; *"We are in agreement with the government with regard to Cyprus issue."* (Vatan, 1955).

Mahmut Dikerdem wrote the following in his book titled Revolution Years in the Middle East:

> *"Menderes appointed Zorlu, who he made to be elected as a member of the parliament in 1954 elections and then made State Minister deal with Cyprus issue in all its aspects. As soon as he laid his hands on Cyprus issue, Zorlu established a commission in Foreign Ministry. Commission was tasked with examining the Cyprus issue in various aspects and determining Turkey's view and government's attitude. Zorlu presented two main principles as follows:*
>
> 1- *Proving that we are as eligible as Greece on Cyprus via documents and declare this to the world public.*

2- *Helping out Turkish Cypriots in every required way and increase their endurance to pressure till the issue is resolved"* (Demirer, 2009).

In addition to stating the direct importance of Cyprus Island for Turkey's defence, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu said *"In so much that, it is impossible to imagine maintenance of Turkey's defence and power during a war without taking account of Cyprus. I am sure that the representatives of the two allied states will welcome these words with ease and complete consensus"* (Demirer, 2009, p. 174).

Turkey was the key country for sustainment of Great Britain's interests in the Middle East. Turkey was in favor of the continuation of status quo on the island. Turkish Government was not annoyed with Great Britain's, its ally in NATO and the Baghdad Pact, sovereignty on the island. The only thing that Turkey would not accept was the annexation of Cyprus to Greece. Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes made a statement on August 24, 1955 and said that merely ethical factors would not be a determinant of the future of Cyprus but geographical, economic, political and historical facts should also be taken into consideration. Prime Minister Adnan Menderes had a meeting with the delegation to attend the London Conference and by stating that Cyprus had a very important location in terms of Turkey's security, the issue did not merely have ethnical origins, and Cyprus was a part of Anatolia, he told them to consider political, economic and international peace in the first place rather than the ethnical structure of the island. Menderes also requested from the Turkish delegation not to accept modification of existing status quo under no circumstances. Thus, he explained Turkey's general view on Cyprus issue (Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisi: 200 Yıllık Süreç, 1999, p. 536).

English Foreign Minister Harold Macmillan took the floor first at the opening of the conference. The British Foreign Minister briefly made the following speech; This conference was not a formal conference, and it was held to explore how to remove the difference of opinion on Cyprus between the three countries which were closely united with each other with the ties of alliance. He also emphasized the conditions that the UK undertook pursuant to Ottoman-English alliance on Cyprus dated 1878 were still on in 1955. He stated that the defence of Eastern Mediterranean was assigned to the UK within the scope of NATO strategy, and that this strategy was based on Cyprus in the first place (Esenbel, 1993, pp. 28-29).

At the opening of the conference Fatin Rüştü Zorlu also made a speech and by wanting to set the Cyprus issue on legal grounds, he continued as follows:

> *"Pursuant to Article 16 of the Treaty of Lausanne the Turkish State accepted not to claim any right on territories separated from Ottomans. But articles 30 and 31 of the Treaty of Lausanne gave a special status to Cyprus Island differently from Article 16. Pursuant to Article 30, Turkey transferred its right to the sovereignty of Cyprus only* to Great Britain. *In Article 31, the peoples living on the island are granted the right to chose either Turkish or English nationality within two years following the signature of the treaty. When minutes of the Treaty of Lausanne are examined, it is seen that these provisions were not accidentally included in treaty but added after long lasting discussions. Turkey's interest on Cyprus Island has historic, geographical, ethnical and strategic reasons. The island had been administered by Turks for almost 400 years but never was under Greek administration. Cyprus is only 40 miles away from the coast of Anatolia but a thousand miles away from Greece. Cyprus has a great importance for Turkey in terms of security. For all these reasons if the new Turkish state who had fought against Greece for its independence intends to give up its sovereignty right on Cyprus, Cyprus Island should be returned to its owner. Because like modern Law of Nations didn't grant right of absolute disposition on pieces of land to states. THE UK shall not transfer a land that it took over from Turkey to Greece. So then, Greece is not even a state party for Turkey with regard to Cyprus issue"* (Ayın Tarihi, p. 262).

Zorlu's scolding gave a shock to Greek representatives who did not think that Turkey would not break off its relation with Greece because of Cyprus. While the London Conference was interrupted due to 6-7 September events, Turkey presented its approach, which would be summarized as either the English administration on the island should continue or island should be returned to Turkey. In addition, an impression was formed that a crisis might arise between the two members of NATO if

the self-determination principle was accepted, and this would damage the integrity of the alliance (Özcan, 2015, p. 119):

Greek Foreign Minister Stefanopoulos dwelled on self-determination[3] right during London Conference. He also emphasized that Greece would be grateful and thankful to THE UK if they grant this right to Cyprus. In addition, he stated that Great Britain's military bases on the island would become stronger, and they would also have a military base in Greece. Minister Stefanopulos' speech in the conference might be summarized as follows (T.C Cumhurbaşkanlığı Celal Bayar Arşivi):

1- The people of Cyprus should be granted the right to determine their own destiny.
2- If this right is granted the UK will continue to have bases on Cyprus and have the chance to have a base in Greece.
3- The Turkish minority on Cyprus will be granted autonomous rights in social issues like religion, education and economy and Greece also will accept a special regime in terms of nationality and military service if Turkey requests so.
4- It is not acceptable to regard Cyprus issue as an internal affair of Great Britain.

Fatin Rüştü Zorlu had a private meeting with English Foreign Minister MacMillan and told him that the UK would always find Turkey by its side as long as its role defined in Lausanne continued, but if it began to pursue another policy based on annexationist desires, Turkey and the UK would definitely break up. Zorlu made another proposal to Prime Minister Menderes in case the London Conference

[3] Right of self-determination is referred in law as the right of peoples to determine their international status without being exposed to any external pressure or interference.

collapses. In summary, Zorlu said that the conference could collapse, and even though this would not cause any danger for Turkey, a medium-term way out might be sought considering the dangerous conditions all around the world and not harming the harmony and strength of the peaceful front of which Turkey is a part. In order to achieve this goal, the status quo should be preserved, Cyprus issue should be discussed again within a period of 5 to 10 years, and the parties should negotiate for not being in any activity till that time. But Menderes did not lean towards this proposal:

> *"We didn't propose this conference. If it comes to an end, we will not be harmed. A temporary way out might be considered for not affecting NATO's image negatively. This would be done for the sake of appearance. What is important for us is the preservation of status quo and if this status quo should be changed, preserving the fundamental principle of returning Cyprus to Turkey. If a moratorium for 5 to 10 years and preservation of status quo within this time is proposed today and if it is accepted, this would harm the strength of our main attitude and might keep the hope of Greeks to own the island in the future alive"* (Esenbel, 1993, p. 36).

The English government made an official statement at the end of London Conference which commenced on August 29, 1955 to discuss the Cyprus issue and declared that they had no intention to withdraw from Cyprus. The UK also notified Greece to give up supporting Enosis. The UK also proposed to Greece and Turkey to establish a tripartite command on the island. During those days, Cyprus Mufti Mehmet Dana said that the Greek Cypriots were preparing to share the properties of Turks. He also declared that Turkish Cypriots had established an organization named "Volkan" (Volcano) with the intent of resisting the assaults of Greek Cypriots. Besides that, Turkey sent a note to the UK on August 24, 1955 to ensure the security of life of Turkish Cypriots. In this memorandum, it was requested from the UK to take coercive measures against terrorists from the Cypriot Governorate. Finally Prime Minister Menderes would say that *"Cyprus is the continuation of Anatolia."*

Zorlu, who made the last speech of the first part of the conference on behalf of Turkey declared that they were not against the principle of "self-determination" and demanded that the implementation of this principle should be prevented from being a factor of injustice, unrest and insecurity. Pursuant thereto, only Turkey and the UK could designate the future of Cyprus. Because the agreement on 1878 was signed between the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain. Fatin Rüştü Zorlu stated that in case the existing circumstances changed and autonomy was established on Cyprus, status quo of Cyprus should be preserved and if it was not, Cyprus should be left to Turkey and if not, Turkey would get into a scrape in terms of defence. Turkey did not want to accept the existence of a problem called the Cyprus issue. Because if such an issue was accepted, then the entire Lausanne system should be changed. Thus, Turkey would make rightful requests, and this would not be good for Greece (Ayın Tarihi, 1955, pp. 166-167). Continuing his speech, Zorlu said Cyprus Island was essential for Turkey, even because of strategic reasons and said: *"Cyprus Island should be militarily administered by Turkey or a country as close to it as Turkey . In the event of a war, Turkey's defensive power can only be supported via western and southern ports on the Mediterranean Sea. If the dominant force on the island would also dominate the islands in the west, Turkey will be virtually surrounded. No country can bind its entire security to a single state, no matter how friendly and allied it is"* (Ayın Tarihi, 1955, p. 168). *"The ultimate Turkish view is that the status quo must be preserved on Cyprus. This is to say, the UK should not withdraw from the island. If this status quo will be destroyed, then the island should be returned to Turkey"* (Ayın Tarihi, 1955, p. 170). Zorlu also argued that the future of Cyprus should be determined by Turkey and the UK and continued as follows; *"Trying to present the Cyprus issue to the world as a matter of self-determination is groundless. This is the*

security and balance issue for free world (Cumhuriyet, 1955). The view of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu concerning the independence of Cyrus was independence could never be given to a territory. Independence, as a modern concept, could only be given to a people or to a nation. Since there were two distinct people in Cyprus, if one of these people received independence, it would be necessary to give independence to the other, as well. On the other hand, it was equally necessary to take into account the wishes and aspirations of the two communities in the island (KKTC Cumhurbaşkanlığı Milli Arşivi, 1958).

It is seen that the Turkish argument presented in the London Conference was supported by the entire Turkish public. The President of Cyprus is Turkish Society, Hikmet Bil, stated that the Turkish argument presented in London was the expression of the Turkish nation's view in his statement made on September 2, 1955 (Hürriyet, 1955). Şükrü Kaya from Hürriyet newspaper wrote that the UK would not be able to stay on Malta and Gibraltar if it withdrew from Cyprus and if this was the case, Turkey would be obliged to ensure its rights and sovereignty on Cyprus in order to do its share of task it had taken via Atlantic and the Baghdad Pacts (Kaya, Türkiye'nin Davası, 1955). Ahmet Şükrü Esmer from Ulus Newspaper advocated that all islands including Cyprus should be returned to *Turkey and Turkey's motto from then on should be* :"Islands and Anatolia are an entirety" (Esmer, Adalar ve Anadolu Bir Bütündür, 1955). Vakit newspaper commented that in case the Lausanne status quo was distorted, then the legal status of the island would be the same as before, and this would lead Turkey to have new requests to be negotiated with regard to Dodecanese Islands and Western Thrace along with the Rums (Greeks) in Istanbul (Us, 1955).

Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu held a press conference with Turkish journalists in London on September 2, 1955 and made the following statement with regard to the said Turkish view:

> *In order for a conference to be successful, it does not have to end with consensus. Because there are two right owners in this conference like the UK and Turkey and a country which had needlessly showed up like Greece. Turkish-Greek friendship is based on a special border balance in Lausanne. Desiring to go beyond these borders means embracing the "great ideal" and heading for imperialism. It is impossible to capitulate to Greece with regard to Cyprus issue."* (Zafer, 1955).

At the same press conference, Zorlu said the following regarding the intimidation activities on Cyprus:

> *"In our opinion, the most important case to put emphasis on Cyprus today is unfortunately the activities of terrorists who act with the encouragement of a man of God. As government and nation, Turkey definitely keeps track of this situation with great sensitiveness. Because there is not a nation but two communities there. And Turkish wanted the English to have the island unless it was annexed to Turkey"* (Zafer, 1955).

Fatin Rüştü Zorlu stated that Turkey received the result it desired in the conference because there were two right owners in this conference, namely the UK and Turkey and a country which showed up with an unjust request, namely Greece (Tercüman, 1955). Zorlu made a long speech in the conference and commentated on how and why we had to give away Cyprus in 1878, after a Turkish administration of 308 years and under which circumstances we transferred the island to the UK and continued: *"Pursuant to these judgments, it is obvious that the destiny of the island is only interest to the UK and Turkey. In the presence of these clear judgments, it is impossible to regard Cyprus as an island the future of which should be determined. Such a claim is doomed to be an attempt to demand the revision of Lausanne. The future of Cyprus can only be determined between Turkey and Great Britain. Because during the Treaty of Lausanne the only related parties to Cyprus were Turkey and*

Great Britain. Because one of them was the state which transfers its sovereignty right and the other was the one which took it over. No other state was involved."

He insistently emphasized during the conference that if the status quo of Cyprus had to be changed, the island should be returned to its absolute owner, Turkey:

> *"As long as English sovereignty continues on Cyprus, there is no problem for us under the agreements. But if a change in the status of Cyprus Island comes into question one way or another, Turkey will consider itself as the first degree party on this issue. Because since Turkey's waiver and generosity regarding Cyprus was only for the benefit of THE UK and valid for only under specific circumstances, Turkey will demand to revert back in case of an attempt to change this status. Because the importance of Cyprus for Turkey doesn't base only one reason. It is based on the requirements of history, geography, economy and military strategy. It is a necessity for Turkey by nature as Turkey has the right to reinforce its right to exist and security which is a divine right of every state"* (Gazioğlu, 1998, p. 95).

Zorlu also emphasized that Cyprus had remained attached to Anatolia throughout its long history, Ottomans conquered Cyprus as a dominant country in and around Anatolia and the existing population on the island could not be regarded as a criterion for determining its future.

The second part of the London Conference commenced on September 6. English Foreign Minister MacMillan told in his speech that the three countries came to an agreement regarding the friendship and cooperation among themselves and enhancing the welfare of Cyprus together. According to Macmillan, there were two main problems in the determination of the future of Cyprus. The first one was proposing and implementing a new constitution which protected acceptable guarantees and assurances necessitated by the international status and benefits of related communities. This new constitution should also enable the people of Cyprus to achieve a full autonomy. The second was the international status of Cyprus in the

future. Macmillan's proposal for autonomy of Cyprus at the Conference can be summarized as follows (Gazioğlu, 1998, p. 100):

1- The purpose of these recommendations is to enable the democratic development on Cyprus run its course.
2- The English government is considering to propose a new and liberal constitution which would provide the broadest autonomy to Cyprus and also meet the strategic requirements.
3- This Constitution stipulates a majority-based parliament in which Turkish community would have a relative share.
4- Within the scope of assurances, some of the ministries will be reserved for Turkish community to the extent of a proportion.
5- A special tripartite committee composed of the representatives of Turkish, Greek and English governments will be assigned to examine these constitutional proposals on behalf of the conference.

Due to the differences of opinion between three sides of Cyprus issue regarding the future of the island during the conference, it was impossible to reach a compromise. Upon the failure to solve the Cyprus issue, it was thought not to allow preventing the establishment of an internal autonomous administration on the island. Fatin Rüştü Zorlu found MacMillan's proposals objectionable for two reasons Firstly, a great degree of separation came into existence due to provocations and incidents on the island. Autonomy can only be implemented in communities having good relations and getting along with each other. For this reason, the implementation of declared autonomy proposals could not be implemented on Cyprus for now. Secondly, as long as Greek Cypriots gave up the idea of annexation, autonomous government would encourage the Enosis fans more and provide the grounds for their related activities.

Due to the rights they granted to Turkey for the administration of the island, Greece also notified that they would not accept these proposals. Also, Archbishop Makarios declared that they would not accept any proposal of autonomy under any circumstances on September 9, 1955 before Greece gave any answer (Cyprus Mail, 1955).

Milliyet Newspaper approached the guidelines of Turkish argument in London in terms of defence of Turkey and the Middle East:

> *"Turkish argument defended by Zorlu in London is a masterpiece. The asserted evidences are indisputably clear and satisfactory and the content of the argument is completely objective. Now the UK cannot accept that Greece also has a right to speak with regard to Cyprus issue without revoking one or more of our great rights. Even if it accepts this, the right to speak cannot violate the boundaries of defence conditions in the Middle East, territorial integrity of Turkey and Turkey's rights of security"* (Milliyet, 1955).

Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın from Yeni Ulus Newspaper approached the Turkish argument in terms of the Soviet threat and underlined that Cyprus issue should not be considered separate from Bolshevist activities (Yalçın, 1955). Vakit newspaper considered it important to base Turkish argument in London on the Treaty of Lausanne. Asım Us wrote in his column:

> *"Fatin Rüştü Zorlu made a perfect defence. Turkish argument was that if the status quo based on the provisions of Treaty of Lausanne is disrupted, then the legal status of the island reverts back and Turkey will definitely make new requests. Dodecanese Islands and Western Thrace being in the first place, the Greeks in Istanbul would be discussed in conference"* (Us, 1955).

"Cyprus is Turkish Society" is one of the institutions which was pleased with the Turkish argument on Cyprus issue. Chairman of the society, Hikmet Bil, expressed his happiness on his statement he made on September 2 as follows: *"Turkish argument is the expression of the opinions and ideas of our nation and*

society by our statesmen. We are filled with great joy. The truth is at the point that our rightfulness will be accepted one day" (Hürriyet, 1955).

The proposals presented at the meeting were rejected by both Turkey and Greece due to different reasons. (The Economist, 1955) After all the English declared to the world that Turkey, which they saw as one of their solid allies at that time, was a side in this controversy and tried to point out that this issue would only be resolved with a resolution of the General Assembly of the UN. The issue had not been a simple colonial problem. Great Britain's mediation was needed to prevent the disagreement between Turkey and Greece to become a conflict as these two countries are sides of the issue but not come to terms due to their attitudes and arguments with regard to the issue. The concrete meaning of these rumors with respect to Cyprus was the necessity of English presence on the island. The only thing that went wrong in the scenario of the UK and particularly of Prime Minister Eden was that the USA was not yet sufficiently persuaded about Turkey's position with regard to the Cyprus issue (Sönmezoğlu, 2000, p. 72).

3.3.1. Consequences of the London Conference

The London Conference held with the participation of Great Britain, Greece and Turkey revealed the fact that Turkey is a first-degree related state with the Cyprus issue and status of the island could not be altered without its consent. Moreover, it was definitely emphasized that it was impossible to implement unilateral self-determination as requested by Greek Cypriots and Greeks and actualize Enosis in this way. Who would determine the future administration and status of Cyprus was also determined. The conference also revealed the deep differences of opinion between Turkey and Greece with regard to the Cyprus issue and reinforced the view that it was out of the question to think that the UK would negotiate and finalize this issue by

discussing it only with Greece. Perhaps one of the most important consequences of the conference was creating the possibility of the world to know (Turkey's) valid grounds, concerns and views with regard to Cyprus. Indeed, it provided the basis to publish articles involving Turkish views in English and US media. For example, Daily Express newspaper gave wide coverage to Zorlu's speech and Turkish opinions and emphasized the view that Cyprus should be returned to Turkey if the UK withdrew from the island. The article continued as follows:

> *"Both geography and history support Turkish argument on this subject. Cyprus is only 40 miles away from Turkey but 400 miles from Greece and actually this island was never owned by Greece. When making unreasonable requests concerning the island, Greece should understand very well that Great Britain is on Cyprus and determined to stay there" (*Daily Express, 1955).

The London Conference ended without providing any reconciliation and consensus between three related parties regarding Cyprus. The only common point revealed in the conference was Turkey's insistence on Great Britain's not withdrawing from the island, particularly requesting to change the island's legal status and Great Britain's adoption of this part of Turkish view. Moreover, the UK and Turkey were separated from each other due to autonomy issue. While the UK wanted to implement the autonomy by disregarding self-determination claims of Greece, Turkey requested to receive an affirmative guarantee from Greece that it abandoned its claims of annexation and independence of Cyprus. Greece had been persistent on self-determination since the very beginning and its views were different than views of the UK and Turkey. Under these circumstances, it was impossible to find a way to make all three parties come to a mutual agreement. Consequently, the UK intended to prepare a constitution of autonomy for Cyprus late in 1955 without considering Turkey and Greece. Although the London Conference was not a complete success, Turkey got the best of the conference by procuring acceptance of its being a side of

Cyprus issue in the first place. Greece had automatically accepted this fact by sitting face to face with Turkey. Without any doubt, Great Britain's invitation of Turkey to the conference played an important role in Turkey's gaining, but Great Britain's wish to see Turkey as a party in the conference also provided significant added value to itself because the UK was alone against Greece, but by involving Turkey in the issue, it gained a balance weight. Hereby Great Britain's maneuverability against Greece was further increased (Armaoğlu, 1963, pp. 154-155). Another important benefit that Turkey obtained as a result of the London Conference clearly showed to Greece that it was a first degree party with regard to the Cyprus issue and the future of the island. Just like Fatin Rüştü Zorlu had expressed, Greece interpreted Turkish governments' indifference to Cyprus issue and acting slowly till that time as a total indifference. Turkey also corrected this misunderstanding.

British Foreign Minister Harold Macmillan underlined that Turkey and Greece should accept the new arrangement regarding Cyprus in order for it to be successful after the London Conference, but the only point that Greek Foreign Minister Stefanapulos put emphasis on was making Turks waive from all of their rights obtained in Lausanne. MacMillan stated that this approach of Greek Foreign Minister was not accurate because Greeks never had any right on Cyprus. The result of the London Conference was a disappointment. MacMillan emphasized that whoever held the Cyprus Island, it would control the Iskenderun Port and the back gate of Turkey (Esenbel, 1993, p. 42).

Not being able to reach an agreement in the London Conference was not considered a failure by the Head of Turkish Delegation, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu. Zorlu said in his statement to Turkish journalists on September 3, 1955 in London that the conference was successful because all three parties had the chance to express their

views. He also underlined that there was no obligation to compromise in order for a conference to be successful. In the evening of the day when the conference was closed, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu made a statement to a Greek reporter on September 7, 1955 and harshly criticized Greece's attitude by saying : *"It is Greece who had sabotaged its friendships without considering the disastrous consequences this would lead to. In order for us to be recovered from this gridlock, the first attempt should be made by Greece. Turkey had acted with the worry of preserving the common security in the Cyprus Conference and contributed to important consequences in terms of this case. The UK was saved from hesitation and began fulfilling its obligations. Greece had acknowledged that the door it was trying to force was closed and pertness is not a valid attitude."*

Then, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu posed two important questions to English Foreign Minister MacMillan. The first question of Zorlu was; "Does English Government intend to protect the sovereignty right granted them on Cyprus Island with the Treaty of Lausanne in the future?" In reply to this question, MacMillan said that the situation of the UK was really simple, and they accepted Cyprus in 1878 for safe-keeping to meet some strategic and political conditions of the world. He also declared in his statement on August 30, 1957 that Great Britain's sovereignty on Cyprus was beyond any dispute. He also stated that the UK should keep the island in order to fulfill its obligations in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Zorlu's second question was whether the UK would accept the principle of "self-determination" which would mean annexation of the island to another state in the future provided that English government decided to preserve its sovereignty on the island or not. In response, MacMillan stated that it was not possible for the UK to implement the principle of self-determination everywhere, and there were many places where this principle was

not implemented due to geographical, legal, strategic and historical reasons. Zorlu then listed the following important points reflecting the view of Turkish government on the proposal of English government with regard to Cyprus issue (T.C Cumhurbaşkanlığı Celal Bayar Arşivi):

1- First of all, Greece should give up the principle of self-determination on Cyprus.
2- The implementation of "self-government" can be considered only after the complete elimination of current uneasiness between two communities on the island. In the case this right is to be implemented, then both communities should have the same rights.
3- Any change in the status quo on the island which was determined by the Treaty of Lausanne requires the Treaty of Lausanne to be fully reviewed. If there is a change in the status of Cyprus, this is possible only by returning Cyprus to its former owner, namely Turkey.

While negotiations continued in the London Conference, the explosion in the garden of Turkish Consulate in Thessaloniki and Atatürk's house right next to it was damaged was in the news in Ekspres Newspaper. It was followed by pillaging towards Greek minority in Ankara, İstanbul and İzmir. Thousands of young people organized demonstrations by carrying posters of Atatürk and began protesting Greece by shouting the slogan of "Cyprus is Turkish". But, these demonstrations went beyond protest march on September 6 and 7 and converted into pillaging of the properties of Greek minority in Ankara, İstanbul and İzmir. When the pillaging in Turkey was heard in London, Greek delegation aborted the negotiations and went back to their country. Consequently, the success of Turkish Delegation and especially of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu in London was overshadowed by the riots on September 6-7

(Cumhuriyet, 1955). Fatin Rüştü Zorlu regarded the Cyprus issue as a national one both in his speeches during budget discussions in GNAT and in his negotiations with Great Britain. While he underlined the view that Cyprus issue was only of interest to Turkey and Great Britain, he also referred to the following declaration of British Foreign Minister MacMillan; *"We have over this island from Turkey in certain circumstances. These circumstances are still valid and we will stay here as long as they continue to exist."* Zorlu emphasized that in case the UK abandoned the island, it would be owned by Turkey. Zorlu added that Greece did not act in good faith during the conference, and Greeks aggressively pursued their intention to annex the island. He emphasized that if Greece became the third state in this issue, then it would definitely confront with Turkey (TBMM, 1955, p. 739).

The London Conference seems to have caused a complete Greek opposition in Turkish public. The fact that Turkish government had been in a harsh attitude since August 24, 1955 led to the emergence of the feelings and opinions of Turkish people in its entirety.

3.3.2. 6-7 September Events and Their Impact on Cyprus Issue

While Turkey, the Turkish government and Turkish public had a success in the London Conference within the context of their argument, the events that occurred on the night of September 6th created a bitter and unpleasant process for Turkey in the history of Cyprus issue. The events caused both a financial devastation to Turkey and moral damage in the international platform. There were numerous opinions and claims with regard to 6-7 September events. In particular, the generally accepted opinion was that a restrained movement commenced with nationalistic feelings, and it was converted into pillage and destruction as a result of the agitation of communists (Armaoğlu, 1963, p. 155). But, it was not possible to clarify these events to the full.

In substance, the 6-7 September events were the result of agitations and provocations of Greece and Greek Cypriots and terrorist actions towards Turkish Cypriots on the island for so long. Besides that, continuous publications of Greek press against Turkey caused a great build-up in Turkish public. It would be right to base the 6-7 September events on Cyprus issue (Sakin & Dokuyan, 2013, p. 270). The attacks turned into wrecking and destroying actions in a short time, especially against the buildings, shops, offices and churches of Greeks (Rums) in Beyoğlu district in İstanbul. The events commenced when it was heard in Turkey that the house where Atatürk was born and Turkish Consulate in Thessaloniki were bombed, and Turkish youth staged protests. But, the rumour that Greek Cypriots would kill Turks on Cyprus on August 28, 1955 and the historic speech made by the Prime Minister to harshly criticize Rum-Greek relation on August 24, 1955 increased the excitement in Turkey and caused anger sensitivity (Gazioğlu, 1998, p. 103).

One of the important attention-grabbing points was the second edition of Istanbul Ekspres Newspaper with the headline of "House of our father is bombed" distributed two hours prior to the bombing. Even though its daily circulation was 20.000, 290 thousand newspapers were printed on September 6th. As a consequence of this news, Cyprus is Turkish Society decided to organize a protest meeting in Taksim. Then, the people gathered in Taksim Square full of excitement and by shouting "Cyprus is Turkish and will remain Turkish" began damaging the properties of Rums (Yaşın, 1997, p. 826).

Following the involvement of Turkey on Cyprus issue, Turkish public took a close interest in Cyprus issue. Undoubtedly the greatest reason for this was the

existence of the plan to annex Cyprus to Greece after the UK leaves the island. (Apulhan, 2007, p. 121) It is seen that the speeches made in meetings organized in various places to evoke national feelings had a great impact on the sensitivity of Turkish people on the Cyprus issue. As of the first day of the London Conference, the tension and feeling of hostility, especially in Istanbul increased. The meeting organized in London by London Branch of Cyprus is Turkish Society on September 4, 1955 was a vital point in this development. This meeting attended by 5 thousand Turks in the same city while the conference was in session supported by the public to a great extent. Istanbul Trade Unions Association sent a telegram on September 2, 1955 to Cyprus is Turkish Society in London and declared that 180 thousand workers in Istanbul were at their order (Hürriyet, 1955). Turkish Federation of Workers' Trade Unions Turkey sent the following telegram to London: *"Cyprus is Turkish. Peace at home, peace in the world is our national maxim. But, the world also must not forget that Cyprus is Turkish. We take an oath with you: Cyprus is Turkish and will remain Turkish."* (Hürriyet, 1955).

According to the news covered in Hürriyet Newspaper dated September 4, 1955 telegrams were sent to Cyprus is Turkish Society in London from all over Turkey. These senders of telegrams include the presidents of Istanbul Iron and Hardware Workers' Union, Turkish National Students Federation, Hereke Fabric Factory Workers' Union and presidents of approximately 150 Cyprus is Turkish Society branches (Hürriyet, 1955). In addition to this, the President of Cyprus is Turkish Society sent a telegram with the following words; *"We are shouting one last time before the whole world that we are together in our case forever."* According to a news cowered in Hürriyet on September 6, 1955, Cyprus is Turkish Society had opened 42 new branches all over the country as of the first day of the London

Conference and a total number of its branches was increased to 135. Prime Minister Adnan Menderes was also closely interested in the activities of the society. Prime Minister Menderes picked up the President of the Society, Hikmet Bil, with his official car on September 5, 1955 when he was returning from the opening ceremony of Istanbul Courthouse and got information about the activities of the society (Hürriyet, 1955).

Turkish Cypriot Delegation headed by Dr. Fazıl Küçük, who was in the UK for the London Conference attended the big and enthusiastic meeting held by the London branch of Cyprus is Turkish Society in the capital of the UK upon Hikmet Bil's attempts on September 4th, 2 days before the 6-7 September events. The meeting attended by thousands of Turkish Cypriots aroused interest with the slogan shouted: *"Cyprus is Turkish and will remain Turkish!"* Such a big and enthusiastic meeting in favor of Turkish argument on Cyprus was organized in London for the first time, and it aroused the interest of English public and media (Gazioğlu, 1998, p. 103). On the other hand, many incidents occurred between Turks and Greeks in İstanbul on September 5th. For example, when a club on Heybeliada distributed flyers in Romaic, the youth became provoked, and the owner of the club had a serious quarrel with the youth. Moreover, when a Greek in Teşvikiye had erased the Cyprus map drawn on a wall and the wording "Cyprus is Turkish", it caused a tension. In response, the youth hanged a plate on the wall of Fener Greek Patriarchate, which was under police protection as of the beginning day of the London Conference, on which it was inscribed "Cyprus is Turkish" (Hürriyet, 1955). According to diplomat Melih Esenbel's memoirs, Menderes and President Bayar were to go back to Ankara by train at night on September 6, 1955. Before the departure of the train, Bayar and Menderes were greeting people at the back of their carriage. Just then, Istanbul Governor

Fahrettin Kerim Gökay arrived in a flash and informed them that there was an urgent phone call from London. Esenbel took the phone first. Zorlu was on the phone, and he told him one more time to perform a moratorium for 5 years and asked for the prime minister's approval. The Prime Minister took the phone and annoyedly said: "*What are you saying, Mr. Zorlu? The nation is on the alert, I cannot accept moratorium and so forth, Istanbul is on fire. Finish your job there and come back here*" (Esenbel, 1993, p. 39).

The phone call between Menderes and Zorlu shows that Zorlu was not aware of the 6-7 September events, and the Prime Minister was so sad and angry due to the devastation caused by the demonstrations in Istanbul. Athens Ambassador Settar İksel, who was with Zorlu during the London Conference, expressed his view on 6-7 September events as follows:

> *"Zorlu was informed about 6-7 September events on his phone call 6-with the Prime Minister. When he hang up the phone, he told me that Menderes was so angry and asked us immediately come to Turkey. Menderes had interrupted him and said: "What are you saying Mr. Fatin? I cannot hold back the people here." When Zorlu found out about 6-7 September events, he was totally shocked. Like any sane person, he accepted those events with sorrow and also felt anxious that the results he obtained in London would fall into danger due to these events"* (Demirer, 2001):

When the terrorist actions of Greek Cypriots against Turks scaled up Dr. Fazıl Küçük, who was representing Turkish Cypriots, assigned the security of the Turks on the island to Turkey. When the news regarding the torture put on the Turks by Greek Cypriots on Cyprus spread, public demonstrations were held all around Turkey, including the eastern regions. People's request in this demonstration was the division of Cyprus into two and freeing Turks from the oppression of Greek Cypriots (Gülen, 2005). According to court records, a total of 5 thousand 317 places including 4 thousand 214 homes, 1004 workplaces, 73 churches, 1 synagogue, 2 monasteries and many factories, hotels and pubs were damaged. The calculated material damage was

approximately 54 million US Dollars (Demirer, 2001). According to the investigation made by Nevzat Karagil, an executive of Cyprus in Turkish Society, 3 people died and 30 people were injured during the 2-day events. 8538 immovable properties, 3884 of which belonged to Rums and 1 synagogue, 8 holy springs of Orthodox Greeks and 2 monasteries were totally destroyed. Karagil stated that the Cyprus is Turkish Society in İstanbul decided to organize a public meeting in Taksim Square on September 6th to protest the bombing in Thessaloniki and immediately printed tens of thousand leaflets and distributed them. He then made a statement as follows:

> *"The house in Thessaloniki where Atatürk was born has a special place in every Turk's heart and this house is Turkish territory. The bomb attack made against this house was an attack on the integrity of Turkish homeland and was the last straw. The claim of Greek authorities that this attack was not made by Greeks proves that Greeks were personally involved in this incident. If Greeks don't pull themselves together, they will find our hatred and might before them but this time our reaction will overshadow 1922. Greek imperialists seem to forget how they were thrown into the sea in September 1922. Now they directed their assaults to the house in Thessaloniki where our precious Father was born. Close your ranks! Repeat our national oath: Cyprus is Turkish and will remain Turkish. Those who break this oath shall pay a heavy price for it"* (Yaşın, 1997).

The Turkish delegation in London found out about the events at night on September 6th, but they continued their negotiations. When they get together in Lanchester House in the morning of September 7th, Zorlu asked English Foreign Minister MacMillan what the aftermath of Cyprus would be. In reply Macmillan said; "English Government doesn't want to give up its sovereignty right on the island. The government considers the principle of self-determination is not a universal principle to implement everywhere and there are many places where this principle is not implemented due to geographical, legal, strategic and historical reasons." Head of the delegation Zorlu said that they came to agree on the idea of internal sovereignty underlined by the English government and proposed to establish a tripartite committee between the parties to determine this. Then, Zorlu requested the status of Cyprus to be respected pursuant to international status and in case of a change, the island to be

returned to Turkey (Albayrak, 2004, p. 432). Taking the floor one more time, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu said the following in the London Conference, which had expressed the great disappointment of Turkey due to September 6-7 events:

> *"I have to express with a deep sorrow that while we are seeking for a peaceful solution to Cyprus issue here, the house where Great Atatürk, founder of Turkish Republic was born was attacked with a bomb. This is a serious agitation and Turkish delegation doesn't consider the conference will do nobody any good under these circumstances"* (Dikerdem, 1990, p. 133).

6-7 September events also caused serious concerns within NATO and particularly in America. US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles sent a message to Prime Minister Menderes and reminded that the USA had been providing aid to Turkey and Greece since 1947 so that they would continue their existence as part of the free world and enable them to develop socially and economically. He emphasized that these two countries located in such a sensitive geography would establish a barrier to contribute to the free world by developing their mutual friendship under favor of these aids. Thereby, he solicited the two countries to show great care to eliminate their disputes and not to damage their relationship (Armaoğlu, 1963, pp. 167-168). Prime Minister Adnan Menderes replied Dulles on September 20, 1955 and commented that Turkey attached great importance to the friendship of Greece and asserted that 6-7 September events were caused by "secret communist organization and leftist elements" (Gazioğlu, 1998, p. 111).

In his book titled "Cyprus Issue and Its Lowdown", president of Cyprus is Turkish Society Hikmet Bil claimed that the reason behind 6-7 September events was the bombing of Atatürk's house in Thessaloniki and Turkish government had a finger in this incident. Mr. Derviş Eroğlu expressed that 6-7 September events was a plot but he did not presume that the events were organized by DP government (Eroğlu, 2017). Prime Minister Menderes wrote to the head of the delegation in London, Zorlu, that

Greeks had confused their chairs at the beginning of the conference and said, "We have to be strong." Later on, the Prime Minister cited that he received a cipher telegram from Zorlu in which he complained of being helpless and requested to announce that they could not hold Turkish public back. In response he asked Zorlu to be more active. Bil claimed in his book that 6-7 September events were devised in a meeting in Florya Mansion and attendees of the meeting were top government officials like President Bayar, Prime Minister Menderes and Interior Minister Namık Gedik (Bil, 1976). According to Mehmet Arif Demirer, Namik Gedik was at the dinner given to the foreigners attending International Criminal Police Congress at Park Hotel that evening (Demirer, 2009, p. 211). According to Hikmet Bil Bayar, Menderes and Namık Gedik laid this plot in Florya at night on September 5, 1955; the London Conference should either be a success for Turkey or sabotaged. By the fact that it was requested from Zorlu, who was in London that day, to be more active, three high-level officials of the time had planned to bomb the garden of Atatürk's house to put Athens on the spot at first, then there should be intimidating tense protests in İstanbul and windows of a couple of stores owned by Rums should be broken and made necessary arrangements. Continuing his assertions Bil said that Menderes and Bayar were having lunch together on September 6th and they were informed by phone about the bombing in Atatürk's house in Thessaloniki. Menderes immediately notified the radios of İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir to cover the news. It would not be wrong to say that these statements in Hikmet Bil's book aimed to damage Turkey's prestige and reputation on both national and international platforms. Hikmet Bil had a conversation with Prime Minister Menderes in his official car without any witnesses. On the other hand, he said that Greeks were bemused. Also Zorlu said in a cipher telegram that he was helpless. However, it is seen that the

Turkish delegation was in good shape at this phase in the London Conference. According to investigations made by Mehmet Arif Demirer, Bayar gave a dinner in Adana boat on September 5, 1955, and Namık Gedik gave a dinner to the delegations attending International Criminal Police Congress at Park Hotel. Prime Minister Menderes and his friends from the assembly had a dinner in Florya and then he showed them the new Maslak road under construction at midnight (Demirer, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu Gerçeği, 2009, p. 213). The events of September 6-7 appear to have important consequences in two respects. The first is that Turkey initiated its Cyprus policy that would be implemented in the following periods. Mr. Bedrettin Dalan has the opinion that the information regarding the 6-7 September events were organized by Zorlu do not reflect the reality. According to Mr. Dalan, 6-7 September events are a Gladio operation (Dalan, 2017).

Mr. Hüsamettin Cindoruk stated that there was a lawsuit in which Cyprus is Turkish Society was put on trial in Martial Law Court and he was commissioned as a lawyer in this lawsuit. Cindoruk believes that 6-7 September events were not a plot. Besides, it is a total negligence to prevent such a rebellion with police commissioned in police stations (Cindoruk, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, 2016).

Hüseyin Yalçın from Ulus Newspaper argued that the reason of 6-7 September events was obvious. Even though Turkey attached importance to Turkish-Greek friendship and alliance, Greece did not get the message and by being deceived by some parties who wanted to destroy Turkish-Greek friendship and Balkan Alliance, it provoked Turkey. He wrote the following in his article: *"This mentality and negligence have dynamited the foundation of Turkish-Greek friendship. It was impossible for the bombing in Thessaloniki to create a violent reaction in Turkey.*

Everything depends on tranquillity, decency and understanding of Athens" (Yalçın, 1955).

Another journalist from Ulus Newspaper, Bülent Ecevit, was regarding the events as a plan of communists but considering the events from a different angle, he wrote this:

> *"It is impossible to regard these simultaneous demonstrations held in İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir and which were ejusdem generis particularly in various neighbourhoods in İzmir and İstanbul as spontaneous and disconnected movements. Manifestations of the demonstrations in various places give the impression that these are intentional, planned, well-organized and interrelated movements. As a matter of fact, if the latest demonstrations in İstanbul and İzmir are really planned and executed by communists, it would be regarded as evidence of the chance that communists found for their broad underground activities in our countries"* (Ecevit, 1955).

Milliyet Newspaper regarded not only 6/7 September events but also breaking-up the Turkish-Greek relations, provocation of Cyprus issue and the bombing in Thessaloniki are doings of communists and commented as follows:

> *"The Communists have used the national excitement created by Cyprus issue as an explosive in their gun, they have directed the barrel of which to individual ownership, capital and places of worship. They are the ones who fuelled, organized and executed the excitement and movements which are tightly connected to each other on Cyprus, Athens, Thessaloniki and İstanbul. They acted by the orders of one center and according to a plan"* (Milliyet, 1955).

As Greece and Turkey grew away from each other due to the events in both countries and consequently not being able to conduct common NATO military drills forced the USA to apply to both countries. US Secretary of State Dulles sent a message to Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, the content of which was announced on September 21, 1955. In his message Dulles first referred to solidarity in North Atlantic Treaty Organization, communist expansion and the aids provided to Turkey and Greece to prevent this expansion and then asked the parties not to break up their relations. In reply to Dulles, Prime Minister Menderes blamed the secret communist organization and leftist elements for 6/7 September events and stated in his speech in

GNAT on September 12th that necessary measures were taken to punish the guilty and cooperate with Greece. He also said; *"Implementing the joint security idea and sincerely believing in its advanced and favorable work, NATO and in peaceful and humanitarian policy that NATO pursues, Turkish government never intends to leave this path that it has been faithfully following up until today despite everything. In this respect, Turkey gave its assurance that it is working to fulfill its share not to harm the Turkish-Greek friendship via its efforts and the measures* it had been taken (Bilge, 1969).

Istanbul Express Newspaper, which was owned by intelligence officer, Mithat Perin, was the first newspaper to cover the news of the bombing of Atatürk's house and Gökşin Sipahioğlu, the executive editor of the said newspaper expressed that the events were organized by the intelligence agency, National Security Service (MEH/MAH). Sabri Yirmibeşoğlu, who became the head of Special Warfare Department later, explained to journalist Fatih Güllapoğlu in 1991 that 6-7 September events were organized by Special Warfare Department as follows; *"Then examine 6-7 September events. It was the work of Special Warfare Department and a magnificent one. It achieved its goal. "* (TBMM, 2012, p. 119).

3.4. Partition Struggle of Turkey

When it came to 1956, the UK had adopted the "partition" argument for the first time. The English wanted Turks to defend the partition argument against Enosis. Thus, the partition argument became an official view in Turkey after 1956. By taking the advantage of partition argument of Great Britain, Turkish Cypriots organized almost 50 demonstrations with the slogan of "either partition or dead" on Cyprus and Turkey from 1956 till the end of 1958 (Gürkut & Soyalp, 2017, pp. 47-48). According

to Daily Telegraph, that was the one of the most effective newspaper at that period indicated that the UK was seeing “partition” plan as a most possible to provide peace on Cyprus (Telegraph, 1955).

It was an article published in Forum Magazine suggesting the idea of "partition" with regard to Cyprus issue in the first instance. The author of this unsigned article stated that it was impossible to give the island either to Greece or to Turkey as a whole and suggested that tripartite joint administration be the most reasonable way. The author also mentioned that English sovereignty would be better for the security of Turkey but if this situation continued, the UK would not be able to stay on the island. In this article it was also emphasized that the best solution would be "partition" of the island between Turkey and Greece (Forum, 1955, pp. 6-8). In December 1956 Turkish Government adopted the "partition" argument, but it also got in a jam in this respect. Because Turkey struggled to preserve the status quo on Cyprus Island since 1954, argued against even the possibility of a change in this status quo and used this view as a trump by insisting that Turkey should be returned to Turkey in case of a change in status quo. Turkey's strategy with regard to Cyprus from its national security point of view was the continuation of English sovereignty on the island. But, Turkey renounced this view and began defending a change in status quo. However, Turkey also requested some part of the island to come into its possession. It caused difficulties for Turkey to procure the acceptance of a change in its policy and at the same time try to possess some part of the island.

Turkey initially remained aloof from the idea of partition but leaned towards this view after the statements made by the UK on December 19, 1955. Prime Minister Menderes announced the partition argument in the speech he made in GNAT on December 28th and stated that partition was the new policy of the government. The

opposition leader İnönü also supported this argument. After this date, Turkish public adopted the partition argument and the slogan of "either partition or dead" replaced the old one, "either Cyprus or dead". While the UK was preparing a constitutional draft and the parties were discussing partition, Greece was pursuing a policy to internationalize the issue. In the news covered in Daily Telegraph Newspaper it is stated that there was strong evidence showing that the idea of "partition" seems to be regarded as a solution to Cyprus issue. According to the article, there are three solution-oriented possibilities. First one is recognition of self-determination after administrative autonomy within NATO under international guarantees. Secondly, granting independence after administrative independence. And the third is partition. It was emphasized that partition had more chance than other possibilities (Daily Telegraph, 1955).

Towards the finalization of Radcliffe Constitution, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes asked for help on Cyprus issue from Prof. Nihat Erim, who was an expert on the constitution. Nihat Erim accepted this request in November 1956 and prioritized what the Prime Minister should do during his first discussion with Menderes as follows (Erim, 1975, p. 15):

1- Let the British stay in Cyprus.

2- If they withdraw, the island should return to us.

3- If this does not happen, the island should be partitioned.

4- Autonomy.

5- What we really do not want is resigning the island to Greece.

Then Nihat Erim submitted his first report regarding Cyprus to the government on November 24, 1956 and expressed the following views (Erim, 1956):

1- Defending the idea of letting the UK have Cyprus as it will not arouse sympathy in the UN. Besides it will not be right to allow the English stay on the island while at the same time Turkey is making geographical, historic and strategic rights on the island. Therefore, if we are to defend English sovereignty on Cyprus, we have to object granting autonomy to the people of the island.
2- Our government has been defending the argument that Cyprus should be handed over to us from the very beginning. The reasons put forward for this are reasonable.
3- If Cyprus Greece is given to Greece, the argument that the political and strategic balance constituted by Treaty of Lausanne will be completely broken down to our country's detriment is very strong with regard to political requirements.
4- It was appropriate for Prime Minister Menderes to convey these views to English Ambassador on June 28th and state that all bilateral issues should be required to discuss with Greece since this balance established in Lausanne is going to break down. It was also very appropriate to prominently announce this to Americans and notify them that Western Thrace, Patriarchate, Rums in İstanbul and some islands in Aegean would also be addressed if this happens.
5- There is no possibility to close this issue with autonomy. Therefore, it is necessary to have a medial solution by way of reconciliation. And this the partition of the island.

6- The legal and humanitarian principle to support the idea of partition is autonomy. One of the political reasons to support the argument of partition is the necessity of the presence of a powerful state on the island for the sake of the security of Turkey, NATO and the Baghdad Pact. Turkey should take part in the protection measures required for the security of Turkey and the Near East in the territory to be given to Greek Cypriots. Greece would not demand the same right in Turkish territory because the distance of the island to Anatolia is 45 miles, while it is 600 miles to Piraeus.

According to Nihat Erim, it is impossible to overcome the obstacle of return of Cyprus to Turkey through the UN under the circumstances in those days as Greek Cypriots are in majority on Cyprus. Along with this, the other obstacle is "self-determination". In short Turkey's demand regarding the return of Cyprus to Turkey is based on political reasons but not on legal ones, and thus the decision would be ensured with a political result but not with a legal one. Turkey should defend its claim up to the end. It should be declared that the people will benefit from equal rights regardless of their religion, language and race if Cyprus is given to Turkey. Proposals of implementation of Enosis on Cyprus by Greece and return of the island to Turkey are definitely two different proposals. The most reasonable solution for Erim is partition of the island (Erim, 1956).

The idea of partition of the island was first mentioned in 1956, in private statements, comments in the press and in the speeches made in GNAT and English Parliament. The partition argument was first adopted by Greece, and it was discussed between the Greek Foreign Minister Averof and Turkey's Ambassador in Athens,

Settar İksel on October 6, 1956. He discussed the issue of "partition" with Turkey's Ambassador in Athens on October 6, 1956 and when Turkish Acting Foreign Minister Menderes brought up this subject at the meeting with his Greek counterpart during NATO meeting, Averof's reply was interpreted by İksel as "he was talking about partition without thinking deeply" (Gazioğlu, 1998, p. 220). While working on autonomous government system for Cyprus, Turkish government realized that it would lead to Enosis. Thus, they adopted the view of partition and initiated diplomatic contacts.

The first person to raise the partition issue in GNAT was Hikmet Baydur, the member of parliament from Manisa. Baydur uttered the following: *"Greeks will demand something at every opportunity and at this rate, one day will come and Cyprus will unite with Greece. Therefore, Turkish government should steer another course. My proposal is this: As India and Pakistan separated from each other, the part of Cyprus which is close to Turkish coasts should be ours and the other part should be given to Greeks"* (Cumhuriyet, 1956).

Even though Turkish press and public had been hesitant about partition argument at the beginning, it is seen that the public also accepted this idea as of January 1957. Forum Magazine, which suggested the idea of partition in the first instance published an article on its issue dated January 1, 1957 and announced that they were very pleased with the acceptance of partition argument by the government. The article continued as follows: *"If partition argument had been properly brought up during the London Conference, it would have been possible for us to attract more attention and gain more prestige with regard to the rights of Turkish Cypriots in the*

world and we would have gained time in long and tough discussions related to the actualization of partition" (Forum, 1957, pp. 3-4).

Prime Minister Adnan Menderes had a meeting with Turkish Cypriot leaders, Fazıl Küçük and Faiz Kaymak and established a delegation composed of professors of the constitution to determine Turkey's proposals against the constitutional draft prepared by Great Britain. Later on, Menderes, Dr. Fazıl Küçük and Faiz Kaymak got together and after this meeting, Küçük and Kaymak declared that they supported Cyprus policy of Turkey completely. Küçük and Kaymak, who had the implicit trust of 120 thousand Turks living on Cyprus, stated that it would be a mistake for Turkish government and Turkish Cypriots to favor the constitutional draft prepared by English Lord Radcliffe (Cumhuriyet, 1957). The opposition in Athens expressed that the Cyprus issue was not managed well. They were convinced that Greek government would not oppose to partition too much and ultimately would consent to a tripartite discussion. The announcement of Turkish view on Cyprus by Prime Minister Menderes and Radcliffe project declared by the UK created a great deal of confusion and uneasiness in Greek political circles. Greek press was disacknowledging the idea of partition but not formally siding against the idea. When Turkey declared its views regarding Cyprus issue, the USA suggested that Turkish, English and Greek governments reach an agreement to solve the Cyprus issue and this suggestion left Greece speechless (Cumhuriyet, 1957).

Although Turkey asserted that the UN had no authority to examine Cyprus issue till 1957, it defended tripartite negotiations in the UN and forced Greece to accept partition after accepting status quo alteration and adopting partition argument. the USA was defending the idea to solve the issue out of the UN with regards to procedures. But, Zorlu considered having a meeting with US Secretary of State,

Dulles necessary to find out the exact intention of the USA. At the meeting Dulles said; *"the USA exerts everywhere to prevent the communist attack. If there is a danger of communism in the world, it's very important for other countries rather than the USA. When it comes to Greece, if it cannot be properly satisfied with regard to Cyprus issue, the government in Athens might be overthrown and communists might come into power. This is our main concern."* In reply to Dulles, Zorlu said: *"First of all it would not be right to put Turkey, the UK and Greece in the same pot. When compared to Greece, Turkey may claim more rights regarding this issue. In fact Greece has no rights with regard to Cyprus. While Greece is arming the Greek Cypriots and provoking them to rebel, Turkey did nothing to direct its cognates on the island to do the same thing. In plain terms, Greece is in the position of the attacker. Turkey and the UK are using their right of self-defence. The assertion of Greece that communism would rule the country in case of a failure on Cyprus issue is nothing else but mere blackmail. It is the church and government who create Cyprus issue. If we approach this issue from the viewpoint of a communist danger as stated by the USA, we don't consider that a failure on Cyprus would direct Greece to communism. It is simply unlikely. So then it is necessary to implement partition suggested by English government at the end of December 1956 as immediate as possible, pursuant to the declaration of acceptance* by Turkey" (Esenbel, 1993, pp. 72-73).

The first compromise of Turkey and the UK regarding Cyprus issue created reactions in some circles. According to some circles, if Cyprus participated, then the English bases on the island would be left in Turkish side or the bases would be transferred to this region. Turkey received this proposal favourably and would try to keep 3 English bases on Turkish territory if possible at the time of participation (Cumhuriyet, 1957). 1957 was a period of time during which Turkey really exerted

itself in many fronts to defend its argument on Cyprus. For example, the UK intended to give the priority to autonomy negotiations with Makarios. In this context, the statement made by the Undersecretary of English Foreign Ministry, David Ormsby, on April 9, 1957 revealed Great Britain's negative attitude in terms of Turkey. According to Ormsby; the UK would not negotiate with any foreign country with regard to the internal administration of Cyprus. (Esenbel, 1993, p. 76) This statement showed that the UK was apt to make one-to-one negotiations with Makarios and did not expect the contribution of Turkey and Greece. In response Zorlu made the following statement:

> *"Turkey will not accept the autonomy project designed for Cyprus from now on. The experiences prove that it is not allowable to believe in the sincerity of this project. The only acceptable solution is mediation of NATO. Turkey will not recognize any other solution except this. If the UK disregards Turkey's proposal with respect to the mediation of NATO and reaches a decision by negotiating with Makarios and somebody he chooses among Turkish Cypriots, Turkey will oppose this and declare to the world that this will not bind Turkey under any circumstances"* (Esenbel, 1993, p. 77).

Prime Minister Adnan Menderes addressed to 60 thousand people in Bursa and stated that the international communism was trying to exploit the Cyprus issue and Turkey's defending the "partition" policy on Cyprus was a sacrifice made for the sake of world peace and the UK gave the assurance for this. Menderes believed that in case of partition, Cyprus would not be a threat for Turkey anymore and Cypriots would have the honor of living under the Turkish flag (Milliyet, 1955).

Upon Turkey's persistence on "partition", the UK tried to involve the USA in the issue and looked for a way to detain Greece, Makarios and Turkey. As of March 25, 1957 the USA was involved in Cyprus issue. The USA argued that the parties of the issue should forget their resentments in the past and swiftly negotiate the issue among themselves. In order to pursue a positive solution, English government and Cypriots should negotiate autonomy. In his capacity as the leader of Greek Cypriots,

Archbishop Makarios should absolutely be involved in these negotiations. It is seen that the negotiation of Cyprus issue at the General Assembly of the UN was not sufficiently covered in the American press as it was overshadowed by Israel-Egypt crisis. Prior to negotiations an editorial was published in Washington Times newspaper explaining the situation. In this article it was stated that the real enemy was the Soviet Union, and it was more important to prevent Russian plans than who would have control over Cyprus. Constantine Brown from Washington Evening Star newspaper mentioned in his article that the "realist" Turkish leaders tried to convey the issue NATO Council rather than the UN and after commenting on Turkey's plan to partition the island into two, mentioned Turkey's concern regarding the island to turn into a communist base if it was annexed by Greece. Ansel Talbert from another important media organ, New York Herald Tribune stated in his column that the Cyprus issue was not a simple struggle for "freedom colonialism" but had many important economic, strategic and political aspects. He then added that the interests of Turkey on Cyprus could not be denied because Turkey was the castle of the free world in the Middle East and the true friend of the USA. The article in The New York Times titled "NATO and Cyprus" suggested these solutions (T.C Cumhurbaşkanlığı Celal Bayar Arşivi, 1957):

1- Europeanisation of Cyprus, in other words joint-administration by NATO and the European Union.
2- Greek sovereignty which gives various guarantees to Turkish minority who accept Cyprus to be a demilitarized island for Greeks and accepts customs union between Cyprus and Turkey and Great Britain.
3- Autonomy to Cyprus within or outside of British community.

Although Turkey was supporting the preservation of status quo on Cyprus at the beginning, it announced that this situation changed due to the experiences and Turkey would not insist on the preservation of status quo (Yirmibeşoğlu, 1999, p. 171). Great Britain, on the other hand, set Archbishop Makarios free on March 28, 1957 via foreign policy manoeuvres and initiated a new diversion in its Cyprus policy and initiated a period of bargaining with Makarios. Naturally, Turkey was extremely uncomfortable with these developments. Then, on April 17th, Makarios was welcomed as a guest statesman on Cyprus and then the government protested Athens. Making a statement in Yeşilköy on April 20th, English Foreign Minister Bureau stated that Cyprus was a national issue for Greece, but the same thing cannot be said for Turks and since Makarios represented the majority on the island, Archbishop was an important figure. In this context, another important event was welcoming of Archbishop Makarios by New York Mayor Harriman on April 22nd like an official president. Turkish public condemned this event fiercely.

One of the leaders of Greek Cypriots, Glafkos Klerides, who knows Cyprus issue by heart and wrote a 4-volume work on it, claims that the idea of partition was suggested by the British. He claims that the English really aspire to the partition of Cyprus but not for believing this would be a solution but as they consider this a tactic to ensure the continuation of English sovereignty on the island (Clerides, 1989, p. 39). According to Klerides, the UK did not want to leave Cyprus in 1956 and 1957 for two reasons. Firstly, they were removed from Suez region a short time ago, and they only had Cyprus in Eastern Mediterranean. It moved all of its military to Cyprus from Suez and by setting up bases here, utilized the island as the center of its the Middle East quarters. The British Government considered that they would ensure the security of their bases on Cyprus only if they remained as a sovereign power here. Nasser's

situation in the Middle East and its relations with Greece and Archbishop Makarios also supported the idea of the UK to presserve its sovereignty on the island. The second reason was thinking their influence in the Middle East would continue if they sovereignty on the island sustains. It is possible for the UK to lose its influence in Eastern Mediterranean in case of Enosis or partition (Gazioğlu, 1998, p. 227). If Cyprus was annexed by Greece, it would also be possible for Greece to have control over southern coasts of Turkey, including Mersin and İskenderun ports which were the most important exportation points in south-eastern Turkey. Moreover, this would enable Greece to play an important role in the Middle East politics as a whole after a secured annexation of the island and obtainment of the two English bases on Cyprus. On the other hand, the UK aimed to keep its two bases on Cyprus which it considered its two last fortresses of its unlimited sovereignty in the region once in order to have something to say in the Middle East politics and with regard to the future of the Suez Canal, which was only 200 miles south. The UK aspired to keep Cyprus dependent on itself as is. This is because it wanted to guarantee the security of its bases on the island. Turkey wanted to prevent annexation of Cyprus to Greece in any case. Because such an annexation would result in surrounding of Turkey by sea and lead to new territorial demands by Greece (Karpat, 2012, p. 226).

The editor of Vatan newspaper, Ahmet Emin Yalman stated that Cyprus was our first line of defence against Greek imperialism and ambitions of Moscow and supported partition as follows:

> *"For the sake of mutual assistance in the free world, the maximum self-abnegation we can envisage is partition of the island. This would enable us to have a bridgehead there for our own security and 120 thousand cognates of us continue to live tranquilly in Turkish territory on Cyprus"* (Yalman, 1957).

Adnan Menderes attended in budget commission discussions in GNAT and tried to explain the reasons for accepting "partition" argument and how the island would be partitioned by government as follows:

> *"We constitute 18% of the population on the island but they have the majority with 82%. We don't mean to say that partition of the island should be based on these proportions. This would only be Greece's argument. In our view, goods and properties of the people on the island should form the basis. We split up the island into two. As long as we have a land to guard Turkish homeland there and our flag flies on it. Turkish forces would be able to control cross-border events there. There is no rule saying all Turks should definitely move to our part of the island. We can also consider the population exchange arbitrary" (*Ayın Tarihi, 1957, p. 133).

This statement of Prime Minister Menderes proved that the prior objective of Turkey in partition was setting foot of Turkish troops on the island. In order for the landed territory to be as wide as possible, he argued that the basis for partition should be land ownership but not population ratio.

Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, the designer of Menderes government's Foreign Policy carefully observed Great Britain's Cyprus policy and approach and considered to cooperate for Cyprus issue. A reason for this policy was the closeness of Turkey to the incidents in the region to prevent Soviet expansion in the Middle East due to Great Britain's membership to the Baghdad Pact. Therefore, Turkey's closeness to the UK was a necessity in terms of its national interests. Prime Minister Menderes made five requests to Nihat Erim on November 16, 1956 (Bağcı, 2014, p. 119): The English should stay on the island.

1- If they withdraw, the island should be given to us.

2- If this does not happen, the island should be partitioned.

3- Autonomy.

4- What we really do not want is the island's being given to Greece.

Turkish Government's own argument on one hand and its campaign on terrorism on the other had characterized its other official statements. Wanting to strengthen its New York delegation for discussions at the UN, Turkey sent Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, Nihat Erim and Secretary General of Foreign Ministry, Muharrem Birgi to New York. This delegation held a press conference in New York on February 7, 1957 with the participation of the representatives of important newspapers such as The New York Times and New York Herald Tribune. At this press conference Fatin Rüştü Zorlu announced the points that Turkey would defend at the UN as follows:

> *"We believe the best solution for Cyprus issue would be rejection of Greek claims by the UN. Although Turkey prefers the continuation of existing state on Cyprus, we also accept the partition of the island provided that the Turkish community will be granted a satisfactory status. In case of a plebiscite, this would be conducted in Turkish and Greek regions separately. Because it is always necessary to bear Turkey's security in mind. Cyprus is only 40 miles away from its motherland. Hence the island should be administered by a state which would protect it"* (Ayın Tarihi, 1957, pp. 78-79).

These words of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu was against the previous Cyprus policy adopted by Turkey. First declaring that Turkey "prefers" preservation of current status of the island and then stating that Cyprus should be administered by a state which can protect it seems as reviving the old Turkish view. Then Zorlu commented on supporting the previous argument: *"In terms of existing agreements and treaties, we consider that Cyprus only Turkey and Great Britain. If the UK withdraws from the island, Turkey will request the return of the rights it waived pursuant to the Treaty of Lausanne. In case of a claim by Greece, this would disturb the balance of treaty"* (Armaoğlu, 1963, p. 312)

Fatin Rüştü Zorlu worked very hard to make US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles accept Turkish argument. In respect thereof Nihat Erim quoted this conversation between Dulles and Zorlu on February 8, 1957 in his memoirs as

follows: "*Dulles said 'We don't want to give a hard time to Greek government' to Zorlu. 'Because if the government is overthrown, the next government in Greece would be communist government'.* Zorlu rejected Dulles' words and said '*This is an ongoing blackmail of Greeks and unfortunately, you believe in it.* In reply Dulles said: *' This is not because of a suggestion that Greeks made to me. I acquired this information via my own intelligence.* Upon this Zorlu said, *' Then your intelligence is also wrong. If this government is overthrown, no communist government will be in power in Greece'* . At the end of this conversation, which became rather harsh from time to time Mr. Dulles said, *'What do you want then*?' In reply Zorlu said, *'The resolution of the United Nations Assembly, should state by some formula that we are also a party on Cyprus Issue'.* In response Mr. Dulles said, '*Let me talk with the British and seek for a solution then'* . This is important because till then the UN Assembly had not determined that Turkey was also an interested party on Cyprus issue yet. In fact, when we mention the Turkish argument, those who were spoken to were looking at us as if saying 'What Turkey has to do with this even if they don't directly say that to our face. This is why the year of 1957, the meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations and the resolution to be adopted are very important for us in this respect (Erim, 1975, p. 66).

As it is understood, although maintaining the status quo is a view adopted by Zorlu, his statement would be assessed as a tactic employed in the UN as the speeches of Selim Serper in the first commission rather than a change of view. Prime Minister Adnan Menderes accused Athens in this respect and declared that almost an intimidation policy was initiated on the island due to arms and people sent to Cyprus by Greece and this was an international scandal (Cumhuriyet, 1957).

Fatin Rüştü Zorlu gave an interview to MBS radios on February 15, 1957. At the end of his speech involving many issues with regard to Turkish foreign policy, some questions about Cyprus were posed to Zorlu. In response to them, Zorlu said the following: *"Today the most important issue on the island is stopping terrorism and propaganda publications on the island which make it impossible to live there in peace and tranquility, make the two communities to live together in peace difficult each passing day and are encouraged and managed from abroad"* (Ayın Tarihi, 1957, p. 357).

Fatin Rüştü Zorlu made another speech at a banquet thrown in honor of Turkish delegation in Lotus Club in New York on February 15th where there was also a crowd of American journalists and expressed the following view about the new Turkish argument: *"Turkey has accepted the partition of Cyprus in order to end the problems on the island. This view is based on ending terrorism on the island, protection of 120 thousand Turks there and the security of Turkey" (*Ayın Tarihi, 1957, p. 343).

On February 18, 1957 Cyprus Issue was discussed at the UN and Turkish, British and Greek delegates expressed their views and requests with regard to the issue. Although the views of Turkish and British delegates were appreciated, Greek Foreign Minister's speech was found weak and his strategy was considered faulty (Cumhuriyet, 1957). Turkish delegate Selim Sarper took the floor at the resolution meeting of the United Nations on Cyprus issue and laid emphasis on the following five articles; 1- Turkey's interest on Cyprus is inevitable. 2- The people of Cyprus consists two communities and any resolution in reference to them will adhere to equal rights. 3- UN has rejected ENOSIS, 4- Terrorism will not be for the benefit of

negotiations 5- Turkey, Greece, and the UK will renew their negotiations. The full text of the accepted Indian proposal: *"The General Assembly, having considered the question of Cyprus, believing that the solution to this problem requires an atmosphere of peace and freedom of expression, expresses the earnest desire that a peaceful, democratic and just solution will be found in accord with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the hope that negotiations will be resumed and continued to this end"* (Cumhuriyet, 1957).

Two resolution copies were submitted to Political Commission by Greece and the UK when the Cyprus discussions were opened in the UN. According to proposal by Greece, General Assembly of the UN should review the question of Cyprus, accept that people of Cyprus have the right of "self-determination" in compliance with the principles of Constitution of the UN and the order on Cyprus is disturbed and thus, enable the people of Cyprus to determine their own self-determination right (T.C Cumhurbaşkanlığı Celal Bayar Arşivi, 1957, p. 29). On the other hand, the UK refers to the condition of states should get along with each other and states that despite numerous applications of United Kingdom government, regular broadcasting of special programs to Cyprus by Athens radio encourages revolutionary and terrorist actions. And Greek government demands full measures to be taken from Greece to stop support to and encouragement of terrorism on Cyprus (Milliyet, 1957).

While the Cyprus issue was being discussed at political committee of the General Assembly of the UN, Greek Foreign Minister Averof took the floor and requested Cyprus not to be a military gathering camp and claimed that this was a very inappropriate situation for the modern world. Averof continued his speech by saying; "Annexation of Cyprus to Greece will be legitimate indulgence of the people of Cyprus. However, it is also possible to establish a completely sovereign state here.

Such a free and independent state would stay autonomous at least for five years before voting for whether they will unite with Greece or not (T.C Cumhurbaşkanlığı Celal Bayar Arşivi, 1957, p. 32).

Greek delegate continued to his speech and said that the UK was taking advantage of Cyprus to fulfill its strategic needs and keep hold of this island to control vitally important oil transmission sources. The main points that Averof put emphasis on were the existence of a complete colonialism issue on Cyprus. Greece did not want to annex this island having Greek character for 3000 years. But claims of other states as if there were such a thing and complicated issues along with Arab claims on Eastern Mediterranean would lead to numerous new problems.

Turkey's geographical views seem to support Great Britain's colonialism goals and dangerous in this respect because the UK came up with the claim of geographical closeness to dominate many foreign nations. No international treaty would prevent the implementation of "self-determination" principle on Cyprus. Turkey recognized Great Britain's control on the island with Treaty of Lausanne. Since Turkey did not give anything in relation to Cyprus with this treaty, now it had no right to request anything basing on this treaty. Greek Government never sent weapons to patriotic Cypriots. On the contrary, Greek Government took measures to prevent delivery or weapons. The Greek government was involved in national movement on Cyprus only in terms of politics (T.C Cumhurbaşkanlığı Celal Bayar Arşivi, 1957, p. 33).

The English state deputy Allan Noble took the floor to convey Great Britain's view on Cyprus issue at UN Political Commission reminded the role his country played in Greece's gaining its independence and the role of English forces to help Greece getting rid of invasion during World War Two and stated that the only point of

dispute between Turkey and Greece, the two member countries of NATO and European Council, was Enosis and Greece broke up these relations because of its ambition and drained the defence of independent world dangerously in South Eastern Europe. Moreover, he stated that the UN could not give some part of a country's territory to another one, and therefore Greece was using phrases for the UN to ensure acceptance and by doing so, trying to mask its campaign in favor of Enosis (T.C Cumhurbaşkanlığı Celal Bayar Arşivi, 1957, p. 36).

In brief, according to Allan Noble, "Enosis" movement was organized and financially supported by Greece. This policy was sustained to the detriment of the welfare of the people of Cyprus and the good relations between Greek and Turkish communities on the island, between Greece and the UK and between Greece and Turkey. According to Noble, the political commission should end the activities of Greece on Cyprus Island.

Then Turkey's head delegate to the UN, Selim Sarper, took the floor and explained the interests caused the rise and working-up of Cyprus issue and how this issue damaged the interests of the three allied states in time. Sarper commented that Greeks were openly mentioning "Enosis" primarily but then embraced the principle of self-determination to win world public over their case and themselves more but in reality, they did not change their annexation aim, explained geographical state of the island, history of the issue, legal, strategic and ethnical aspects and said partition of population was not this way, there were currently 300 thousand Cyprus descent Turks in Turkey, 42% of the land in Cyprus and 28 million sterling worth of foundation land belongs to Turks (T.C Cumhurbaşkanlığı Celal Bayar Arşivi, 1957, p. 38).

According to Hasan Ali Yücel from Cumhuriyet Newspaper, the UN approved Turkey's right to speak when determining the destiny of Cyprus. It is extremely proper for the English to regard Cyprus issue as "security of Eastern Mediterranean". The Near East and Syrian events involved in them, developments in North Africa and Egypt and of the Soviet Union would benefit from possible disputes in this region. Furthermore, Yücel believes that Greeks want to reduce their economic troubles on Dodecanese Islands by receiving Cyprus. The spokesman of English delegation said the following at UN commission; "It is proved by the majority of representatives in political commission that terrorism on Cyprus had been supported by Greece. This should be ended immediately. " (Yücel, 1957).

According to presidential documents of Turkish Republic an article was published in Economist magazine on May 4, 1957 in which it was stated that Turks were better conciliators than Greeks with regard to Cyprus issue as they accepted the partition of Cyprus instead of status quo or Turkish sovereignty. Cyprus was continuation of Anatolia which was separated from the motherland only by 40 miles and Turks could not stand Greek sovereignty on Cyprus (T.C Cumhurbaşkanlığı Celal Bayar Arşivi).

Fatin Rüştü Zorlu was in the USA to attend the discussions on Cyprus issue at UN and by making a speech at Council on Foreign Relations during his official visits, he underlined the importance of Cyprus case for Turkey. In this context American public comprehended the Turkish argument via official interview of Turkish delegation with newspapers, radios and their explanations in similar meetings. According to Ansell Talbert from Herald Tribune newspaper, he emphasized the importance of Cyprus for the world and by saying that the claims of Greece were groundless, he pointed out that Turkey's rights over the island were vitally important

not only for Turkey but for the Middle East as a whole (T.C Cumhurbaşkanlığı Celal Bayar Arşivi, 1957, pp. 43-44).

In an article of Dr. Ernest Jack, a Political Sciences Professor from Columbia University and expert on the Middle East published in The New York Times newspaper, it was stated that the idea of "partition" suggested by Turkey was the best solution for Cyprus issue. Being a close friend of Atatürk, the founder of Turkish Republic, Jackh advised to deal with Cyprus issue within the frame of Turkish-Greek friendship and reminding that Atatürk left Western Trachea to Greece in the cause of this friendship, he suggested that the Cyprus issue only be solved by "partition" (Milliyet, 1957).

The opposition journal Akis criticized the Turkish foreign minister, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, for having forsaken the strategy of partition, which, with its slogan 'partition or death', had called on Turkish people to give their lives to seize a portion of the island: 'As one would expect, this 'unprecedented' tactic of the Democrat Party produced a backlash. 100 thousand Cypriot

Turks could not abandon the notion of the partition that they had embraced – or had been made to embrace – since they were not tactical masters like Zorlu' (Özkan, Making Cyprus a National Cause in Turkey's Foreign Policy, 1948-1965, 2015, s. 548). A statement made by Turkish Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu on July 5th, 1958, reiterated Turkey's conviction that the final acceptable solution to the Cyprus problem was partition. Zorlu also warned that the situation was such that an immediate solution should be found and he said it was indispensable to hold a conference between the powers concerned within a few days. It was important to point out that the Greek Foreign Ministry requested Turkey to substantiate the statement that the idea of partition for Cyprus was first put forward by Greece and the

Greek Foreign Minister Averof denied that he was the originator of the proposal. The Turkish Ambassador to Bonn, Settar İksel, who was Turkish Ambassador in Athens, when Averof mentioned the idea, confirmed that the Greek Foreign Minister had first broached the idea to him (Turkish News, Incomporating "News from Turkey", 1958). In addition, the Times of May 1st, 1958 asserted in an editorial that partition was first suggested by Greece (The Times, 1958).

Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu made a statement on August 11, 1958 and underlined the peace and tranquility would be established on the island only by "partition" and stated that the government should sustain its rights and interests on Cyprus Island within the context of the developments in the Middle East (T.C Başvekalet Basın-Yayın ve Turizm Umum Müdürlüğü Kıbrıs Haberler Bürosu, 1958). Another proof of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu's self-abnegation by insisting that Cyprus issue should be resolved only by partition in spite of all sorts of pressure was the telegram sent by US Ankara Embassy to Washington which said Zorlu felt that NAC was not proper forum for discussion of disputes between NATO allies, saying: *"Today, it is Cyprus, tomorrow it may be Iceland and Great Britain. If I had been Foreign Minister when 'three Wise Men' policy propounded, I would have fought it bitterly"* (FRUS, 1958).

Another important speech of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu was made in the course of address to the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) on September 24th, 1958. Zorlu indicated that Cyprus question was of particular concern to Turkey because that non-self-governing territory lay in the immediate proximity of the Turkish mainland and because part of its population was Turkish. Plans for the

annexation of Cyprus to Greece had been put forward sometimes under the name of "Enosis", at other times as "self-determination", and occasionally as "independence". As a matter of fact, there was an independent Greece, and there existed the territory of Cyprus on which there were two national communities. Part of the population of Cyprus was composed of Greeks whose leaders desire union with Greece. The other part of the population was composed of Turks who wished to join Turkey and who would not agree to being placed under Greek rule. For all these reasons, independence was not a workable solution for Cyprus question. The slogan of independence had been advanced occasionally by Greek extremist elements as a means of achieving the annexation of the entire territory of Cyprus, including the Turkish Cypriots to Greece (KKTC Cumhurbaşkanlığı Milli Arşivi, 1958).

3.4.1. Radcliffe Constitution Proposal

When British Government took hold of the evidence proving Makarios' relation with EOKA and his arms smuggling into Cyprus, he was sent into exile to Seychelles Islands in March 1956. After Makarios, EOKA assumed the leadership of Greek Cypriots on the island. Lord Radcliffe was commissioned as "Constitution expert" on Cyprus by English Prime Minister Eden in July 1956. As a result of Radcliffe's constitutional proposals published in December 1956, it was accepted to spare a quota of 6 for Turks and 6 for the governor in 36-member legislature, so that the Greek Cypriots had the majority. The autonomy of Cyprus was exclusive of foreign affairs, defence and security. It was found suitable for the governor to be authorized in the fields of defence and public security and stated that Cyprus might be used as a base by the UK to fulfill its international responsibilities (Tuncer, pp. 168-169). Lennox Boyd, English Minister of Colonies made a speech at House of Commons on December 19, 1956 and said the following: *"To my knowledge, our*

trump against the UK should be the Baghdad Pact. Actually, this pact is seemingly a very important pact. That is to say, it is merely a ring in our, NATO's circle against Russia, Slav forces. But it is such a ring that was unfortunately put around the neck of Turkish people in full force" (Zafer, 1956).

The most important feature of Radcliffe's proposal was also giving autonomy to Turks in the fields left to the administration of Cypriots. It was accepted to leave quotes of 6 to Turks and governor separately and let Greek Cypriots have the majority; it was proposed the governor to be authorized in defence, public security and foreign relations. In order for the UK to fulfill its international obligations, provisions were inserted to enable the UK to use the island as a base when required (Fırat, 2005, p. 604). Makarios rejected to examine this draft in exile and Greece declared that this draft was far from being a solution as it was written out to enable the continuation of colonial administration. In response to this, Turkish Government declared that Radcliffe proposal would be discussed and positively welcomed the explanation of the Minister of Colonies with respect to the partition of the island. The main reason behind Turkey's positive approach to Radcliffe draft was the change in its Cyprus policy. Ankara Government formed a second policy for Cyprus and began defending the "partition" argument. Thereupon Prime Minister Menderes stated in his speech at GNAT that Radcliffe report provided autonomy to Cyprus and Turkey does not fully accept this administration. He also explained that he invited the leaders of Turkish community on Cyprus for negotiations and they would inculcate the English government after these negotiations (Bilge, 1969, p. 352).

After Turkish government had determined its views and proposals regarding Radcliffe draft, settlement of the issue was left to tripartite negotiations of Turkey,

Greece and Great Britain. Greece never acceded to tripartite negotiations and continued its terrorist activities on the island.

3.5.Establishment and Role of Turkish Resistance Organization

On Cyprus Island administered by the English till the foundation of Cyprus Republic on August 16, 1960, EOKA based terrorist activities commenced after April 1, 1955 made the life on the island unbearable, led to the death of innocent people and migration of thousands of Cypriots from the island. British Ambassador Selwyn Lloyd made a speech at the first meeting of the General Assembly of the UN on September 24, 1954 and remarked that Cyprus had never been possessed by Greece throughout its history, there were 100 thousand Turks living on Cyprus aside from Greek Cypriots, Turks did not support Greek Cypriots in the matter of self-determination and under these circumstances, no country's borders would remain unchanged and uneasiness would grow on Cyprus (Serter, 1975, p. 69). Turkey's representative Selim Sarper said in his speech that Greece was pursuing its annexation policy and stated that Cyprus had never been possessed by Greece throughout its history with regard to historical, geographical and economic aspects (Bayülken, 1983, p. 6).

EOKA was established to silence the Greek Cypriots, who were not devoted to Enosis by violence, ensured English government to apply pressure to drive a wedge between the two communities on Cyprus, put the English into trouble before the world public by keeping Cyprus on the agenda and undermine the administration on Cyprus and the UK but in time, it became a nightmare for all people living on the island (Halkın Sesi, 1997). Another important development was experienced on

August 28, 1954. Archbishop Spiridon gathered Grivas and his men in Kifisa district in Athens and ensured Enosis (Foley, 1964, p. 45).

As of 1957, Cyprus issue became an international problem and in order to reach an agreement, negotiations between Turkey-Greece-the UK got started and the issue was put on the agenda of the meetings at the UN. It might be said that Turkish Government began to pursue a Cyprus policy which would satisfy Turkish people at last. But, Priest Makarios did not give up his "Enosis" aim and increased his actions via National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA). The resolution of UN negotiations in December 1957 dated February 26, 1957 remained in force and directed the UK to increase its efforts to seek for a solution for Cyprus via diplomatic negotiations. For the first time since 1955 Turkish government set free its control on the public and tried to receive the support of the public to actualize "partition" in Cyprus issue (Hatzivassiliou, 2012). Turkey and THE UK negotiated on Cyprus during the meeting of The Baghdad Pact Council held between January 28 and 30, 1958. On the purpose of supporting these negotiations, big demonstrations were organized on January 28th in Nicosia, Larnaka, Limassol and Famagusta where Turkish Cypriots intensified. The greatest one of these demonstrations was held in Nicosia but English security forces drove their vehicles over protesters including women and children and killed 8 and injured 70. This bloody action of the English administration on Cyprus against Turks was taken at the same time when English statesmen were in Turkey before the meeting of the Baghdad Pact and it caused a furious unrest and reaction to spread over Cyprus.

Daily Telegraph newspaper made reference to the statement of State Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu on Cyprus and cited Zorlu's words. According to the news in the newspaper Zorlu stated that the only solution for Cyprus was partition and Turkey

regarded this as maximum abnegation. In the article it was also mentioned that Turkey had more rights than Greeks over the island. Geoffrey Wakeford from Daily Mail wrote an article and claimed that Cyprus was in a new atmosphere in this period and although the situation was not bright, the future of the island would be saved if these conditions sustained (T.C Cumhurbaşkanlığı Celal Bayar Arşivi).

The first reaction against these events on Cyprus came from Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. Menderes made a statement to Anatolian News Agency on January 28, 1958 and expressed the grief he felt for the devastating loss of Turkish Cypriots but at the time of Turkish-English negotiations it would be to prevent the events from becoming violent and protection of rights and interests of Turkish community were urged upon with utmost caution and sensitivity, Turkish-English relations were still friendly as they had always been and there was no need for concern with regard to ongoing negotiations (Zafer, 1959). The influence of Daniş Karabelen, president of Special Warfare Department at the time was rather big during the establishment phase of Turkish Resistance Organization. Karabelen instructed İsmail Tansu, one of the founders of TMT and started a new project against rapidly growing activities of EOKA. In this context, the Greek Cypriots launched an oppression operation against English and Turks on January 27-28, 1958 and when Turks became martyred, it was decided to establish Turkish Resistance Organization. Being the president of Special Warfare Department, Daniş Karabelen was involved in the activities of TRO. Karabelen convinced Fatin Rüştü Zorlu to establish TMT in relation with Cyprus issue (Eroğlu, 2017).

The first secret operation field of Special Warfare Department established upon NATO's instructions to fight against communist expansionism was Cyprus, the starting point of 6-7 September events. It is seen that Special Warfare Department had

organized the civil components until 3 months before the events on the island (Kılıç, 2007, p. 92). One of the points to be considered is that the officers and petty officers belonging to this department brought to bear the special warfare techniques on the island. On the other side, Greece's secret army called "Sheepskin" began organizing among the Greek Cypriots on Cyprus. NATO had established both the Special Warfare Department and Sheepskin with similar objectives but these two organizations came to a point of conflict when George Grivas, one of the important figures of Greece's secret army, visited Cyprus in 1955 to establish an underground organization and he had established National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA).

The officers of Special Warfare Department secretly began to move to the island to fight against EOKA. In the meantime, Turkish Cypriots established various organizations such as "Black Gang", "September 9" and "Volcano". But these organizations did not have the power to fight against EOKA. In this context Turkish Cypriots requested arms and military support for Turkey to withstand EOKA. As a result of these requests, Adnan Menderes decided for the establishment of a secret organization at the beginning of 1958, in order to establish a Turkish state at some part of Cyprus. Establishment of a secret organization by the state was not easy. Fatin Rüştü Zorlu had a great role in the establishment of the organization due to his sensitivity regarding Cyprus issue and the importance he attached to it.

Cyprus had a different place in Fatin Rüştü Zorlu's political life. In particular, a great progress was made during the years of 1958-1959 and armed conflicts took place between Turkish and Greek Cypriots on the island. Prime Minister Menderes assured Turkish Cypriots on January 2, 1958 and (Akşam, 1958) Turkish-English discussions on Cyprus commenced in Ankara on January 4, 1958. Great Britain's

Ankara Ambassador Sir James Bowker Brown came to Ankara and stated that they considered recognizing the right of independence on the island. In response to this statement, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu said: *"Cyprus is our national matter. You can't make such a decision."* He got very tough with the ambassador (Cumhuriyet, 1958). Upon Zorlu's reply, the UK suspended this plan for a while. Then, Adnan Menderes and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu had a talk with Dr. Fazıl Küçük, the President of Cyprus is Turkish Society (Zafer, 1958). Upon English Prime Minister MacMillan's visit to Cyprus, Zorlu declared that no decision should be made with regard to Cyprus without the involvement of the UK in the issue. So, English Ambassador Sir James Bowker assured Zorlu on January 10th on behalf of his government (Zafer, 1958). The meeting of the Baghdad Pact was held in Ankara on January 24, 1958 and English Foreign Minister Sewyn Lloyd arrived in Ankara for the meeting. In the meantime, US Secretary of State Dulles came to Ankara on January 30th. Turkey took this opportunity to explain its views on Cyprus issue assertively to his American and English addresses. The British side was defending an autonomous structure on Cyprus Island but Turkey was persistent on the partition of the island. Towards the end of negotiations, the promise to allow Turks to have a base on the island after partition was considered as a new alternative solution. The UK requested a new conference to discuss the matter of a Turkish base on the island (Eltetetik, 2009, p. 77).

Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu had a long and important talk with English Ambassador Sir James Bowker. After the meeting, the main topic of which was the Cyprus issue Dr. Fazıl Küçük, the leader of "Cyprus is Turkish Party" (Kıbrıs Türktür Partisi) visited the Federation of Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT). The same day he also had a meeting with Zorlu and talked about Cyprus and TMT (Milliyet, 1958).

In this process it seems that the British had adopted the independence formula in order to fulfill the requests of Greek Cypriots. Whereas Turkey requested this base to have two functions. Thus, the security of Turkish community would be provided and it would be the guarantee of Turkey's connection with the island. EOKA declared war on Cyprus, on April 2, 1958. Wishing to provide the independence of Cyprus, the English continued to work on their new plan. When the UK announced its plan on May 20th, Zorlu rejected this plan on behalf of Turkey on May 24th and summoned English Ambassador to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He said *"The only solution is partition of the island. The question of the base should naturally be considered together with partition. It is not possible to separate them from each other. Turkey always supports a tripartite conference to solve this problem"* (Cumhuriyet, 1958).

Fatin Rüştü Zorlu consulted with Chief of Staff, Full General Rüştü Erdelhun, whether a powerful organization should be established or not to enable the Turks on Cyprus Island not to be exposed to injustice and crimes against humanity and to resist Colonel Grivas' EOKA. Thereupon a secret meeting was held at General Staff with the participation of force commanders and it was decided to impose this duty to Special Warfare Department (Kılıç, 2007, p. 93). Cyprus Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT) was established in 1958 by Tactical Mobilization Group, where Colonel İsmail Tansu served under the leadership of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu. İsmail Tansu pointed out in his memoirs that Zorlu's assistance in the establishment of this organization was nonignorable.

Menderes Government was hesitant during the establishment phase of TMT. Ismail Tansu asked the reason to Zorlu after a while and also cheered up when he received the information regarding the landing of 20 tons of weapons and ammunition to Cyprus the night before last. Then, Zorlu replied him and said it was because he

cared for the friendship of Turkey and Greece for being allies within NATO and they tried to solve the Cyprus issue in peaceful ways via diplomatic negotiations. He also stated that the geography would be protected in conjunction with Greece within NATO against the danger of Russia's going down to Mediterranean. And then Zorlu mentioned the personal friendship between Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis and Turkish Prime Minister Menderes and Karamanlis was trusting Menderes and therefore he was worried that Menderes would assist the establishment of an armed organization on Cyprus and initiate armed conflicts because he thought that these conflicts would negatively affect the negotiations on Cyprus. And finally, Prime Minister Menderes began sharing the same opinion with Zorlu as to not trusting the Greeks and approved the establishment of TMT (Tansu, 2001, p. 31).

The main objective of Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT) was increasing the number of its members to 5000 trained and armed persons in the first step and as soon as possible. Under normal conditions TMT's task was providing the security of Turkish Cypriots and supporting Turkish government's Cyprus policy. In response to the operation of EOKA to actualize Enosis on Cyprus, TMT would come up from the underground and rapidly counterattack, try to have a command of the situation by denying the defence of Greek Cypriots defence all around the island. In case of such a situation, if Turkey performed military intervention to the island and Turkish armed forces began to invade the Island, TMT would use this opportunity to operate in all regions of the island, guide Turkish armed forces and seize control on all over the island in order to destroy Enosis dream of Greek Cypriots and Greeks and annex the island to motherland (Tansu, 2001, p. 33).

İsmail Tansu initiated the establishment works of TMT and prepared a detailed project. The project was based on American military directives used in the

establishment of Special Warfare Department and involved determination of other staff, secret quarters to be formed and other information. The leadership of the organization was assigned to Lieutenant Colonel Rıza Vuruşkan, Operations Branch Manager of Special Warfare Department. Only the special warfare experts stationed on the island were not included in TMT. Both the Chief of General Staff and President of Special Warfare Department had some tasks. Special warfare officers sent from Turkey had been assigned to some mask duties but later on, fake id's and passports were prepared for them. These fake passports were prepared under favor of Namık Gedik, the Interior Minister (Kılıç, 2007, pp. 96-97).

Minister of National Defence, Ethem Menderes, was engaged in supplying weapons and ammunition to this illegal organization established by the state. Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu had a great role in the supply of arms, types and amounts of which were requested by the organization and Prime Minister Menderes. According to İsmail Tansu, founder of the organization, the state was so generous to supply arms to the organization. The arms were stored at Special Warfare Department and while they were shipped to the island, secret acceptance was established on Cyprus. An important problem during this process was how the communication would be established between TMT on Cyprus and Special Warfare Department in Ankara. In order to establish this communication, radios supplied by the USA for Turkey to establish communication with NATO in case of a Soviet invasion were used. The place that these radios supplied by Americans were hidden was Şile in İstanbul. By order of İsmail Tansu, Logistics Unit Manager of Special Warfare Department, some of these radios buried underground were taken out and secretly sent to the island. Their empty boxes were filled with cheese and they were buried again so that the Americans would not realize this operation during inspections (Kılıç, 2007, p. 98).

Upon emergence of EOKA terrorist organization and severe attacks to Turks all over the island directed Turkish youth to get organized among them. The steps towards the organizations were taken in this way. Beginning from April 1, 1955 EOKA leader Grivas turned Cyprus into bloodshed by blasting bombs in Nicosia, Famagusta, Lernaka and Limassol, office of the governor, undersecretariat and English quarters being in the first place (Alasya, 1964, p. 148). Upon receipt of required permissions, Major İsmail Tansu and Major General Daniş Karabelen made the necessary arrangements and invited the two important leaders of Turkish community on Cyprus, Dr. Fazıl Küçük and Rauf Denktaş, to Ankara via Foreign Ministry. They made their first meeting on the organization to be established in Cyprus and how to organize the cooperation in June 1958 (Tansu, 1996, p. 6).

Prime Minister Adnan Menderes approved the organization of TMT on Cyprus in April 1958 and assured that the government would use every means available. As is known, Prime Minister Menderes was initially against the establishment of TMT but when the Cyprus issue progressed as Foreign Minister Zorlu stated earlier, he permitted establishment and armament of the organization. The ground of Menderes' hesitation at first was involvement of Turkey and Greece as two allies within NATO to prevent expansionism of the Russians towards Mediterranean. For this reason, he thought that the relations should be maintained well. The personal friendship between Menderes and Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis at that time was one of the most important reasons for the necessity of resolving the matter in peaceful ways (Tansu, 2001, p. 76). Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis followed an apparently friendly but insidious and hypocritical policy towards Menderes. While he was supporting EOKA, he also adopted an attitude as if he had wanted to reach an agreement with Turkey regarding Cyprus (Tansu, 2001, p.

77). In order to provide the financial support needed by TMT, Fatin Rüştü gave the instruction to meet it from the discretionary fund. Expenditures were made by the Cyprus Turkish Cultural Association, headquartered in Ankara but being hesitant at the beginning, Foreign Affairs bureaucracy delayed the payments. Upon Zorlu's using his influence on the matter, the needed money was transferred to Cyprus Turkish Association. It can be said that Zorlu had this contribution to the establishment and activities of Turkish Resistance Organization. Zorlu did not hesitate to use the means of Special Warfare Department to make Cyprus a national case and fight against EOKA and took a great risk by keeping this secret.

3.6. January 27-28, 1958 Events

It is seen that the events were gradually escalating on Cyprus as of the beginning of 1958 and provocations against Turks were going on. When it was seen that the word "EOKA" was inscribed in capital letters on the wall of Nicosia Turkish High School on January 24th, made Turkish people greatly indignant. Then the people poured into the streets and started to walk by shouting "Down with EOKA", "Long Live Turkey" and "Partition" (Hürriyet, 1958). During this period of high tension, sad events took place between the Turkish Community on Cyprus and English Colonial Administration on January 27-28, 1958, and it is seen that these events were important for the future of Turkish Cypriots. This national struggle is named as "27-28 January Resistance" (Akkurt, 2000, p. 37). In the memoirs of President Rauf Denktaş, the founder of TRNC, this period, that is the date of January 1958 is described as an opportunity to introduce us to the people and announce "live like a Turk" to the world for the first time (Denktaş, 2000, p. 132).

It is seen in this period that the UK was trying to determine the future of the island. Would the Cyprus Island be annexed to Greece as Greek Cypriots wished or would it be "partitioned" as Turks, who were trying to prove that they are not a minority? The UK was considering neither Enosis nor partition. At the end of 1957, the United Kingdom prepared a new plan for Cyprus based on autonomy (Kızılyürek, 2015, p. 12). This means that the British had never adopted the argument of partition. Being aware of this, Turkish leadership had tried to prove the existence of Turkish Cypriots on the island that they could not live together due to Enosis dream of Greek Cypriots and partition was necessary.

When it was recognized that the English broke their promise of partition, Turkish Cypriot leadership put all organizations of Turkish Cypriots in action and through the newspapers, conveyed their request of partition to Governor Sir Hugh Foot. 27-28 January events which commenced with the fabricated news announcing that the English had accepted partition and led to the death of seven were the first resistance of Turkish Cypriots to the English. According to Kemal Tanrısevdi, one of the founders of TMT, TMT had organized 27-28 January events. The purpose of the organization was announcing the case of Turkish Cypriots to colonial administration and the world and showing how they laid claim to the issue and giving a message (Cahit, 1997).

Even though it was expressing partition argument till late 1957, when the UK suddenly began defending autonomy argument, TMT organized 27-28 January events to prove that they could not live together with Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots would not accept any solution other than partition (Gürkut & Soyalp, 2017, p. 88).

3.7.London-Zurich Treaties

Commenced with the great contribution of Greece, the Cyprus crisis deeply affected Turkish-Greek relations deeply due to increased terrorism and shaken NATO's south wing. Upon recommendations of the UN and NATO, negotiations ceased in 1955 began again for the matter to be discussed between Turkey, Greece and the UK to find a solution. After Turkish and Greek representatives reached an agreement with regard to fundamental principles of the future constitution and independence of Cyprus in Zurich between the dates of 5-11 February 1959, the Treaty of London which confirms the Treaty of Zurich was signed on February 19, 1959 with participation of English, Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot representatives in London.

According to the Treaties of Zurich and London, the state would base on common authority and responsibility of both communities. The State of Cyprus and its Constitution were under guarantee of Turkey, the UK and Greece (Kıbrıs Türk Kültür Derneği Genel Merkezi, 1983, p. 20). With this treaty, international qualification of the fundamental articles of Republic of Cyprus' constitution and the parties agreed to recognize and secure the independence of the Republic of Cyprus which was established and regulated pursuant to this constitution.

With Treaties of Zurich and London both Turkey's rights on the island and rights of Turkish Cypriots were secured. The newly established Republic of Cyprus would not unite with any state. This is not only stipulated in written treaties but also in the constitution of Cyprus State. Moreover, the future of Cyprus was secured by a provision of the treaty signed between Republic of Cyprus and Turkey, Greece and the UK which entitled these three states to interfere severally or jointly in case of any

violation of the constitution. Another important matter was the provision stating that the State of Cyprus would not engage in any political activity against Turkey. The treaties also included provisions which stipulated that the State of Cyprus would not be a member of pacts and political institutions of which Turkey and Greece were members (Rosenbaum, 1970). The term "minority" was not used for Turkish Cypriots in treaties. Turkish Cypriots constituted an independent entity with different race, religion, culture, mores and legislative-executive and juridical powers from the Greek Cypriot community. It was also resolved that sovereignty rights of the UK on Cyprus would be transferred to the State of Cyprus with a declaration signed in London. According to this, the UK transferred the regions except for Agratur and Dikelya under certain conditions (Eden, 1960).

Greece brought Cyprus issue to the UN again towards the end of 1958. But, the General Assembly advised the conflict to be resolved between the parties on December 5, 1958. Thereupon Greece accepted to negotiate the issue. While Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers were in Paris for NATO meeting, they had a talk about Cyprus issue on December 18, 1958. At NATO meetings where Turkey Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and Greek Foreign Minister Averof attended, they believed to have gradually narrowed the gap between the Greek Project to give the island independence and the Turkish Project to partition it between the two ethnic groups (Averoff, 1986). Considering that their ultimate desire was the union of predominantly Greek Cyprus with Greece, the Greeks regarded as a concession their willingness to accept independence for the island. They maintain that the Cypriots were entitled to determine their political future themselves. Turks treated the plan for independence as a subterfuge that would lead to union with Greece sooner or later.

Such a union was unacceptable, they said, partly because the rights of the Turkish minority would be threatened but more significantly because the island had a vitally strategic importance to Turkey since it covered its southern coasts. As long as Cyprus was British, Turks said that they were not pressing their claims to the island which were based on centuries of Turkish rule. The British protected both the rights of the minority and Turkey's strategic interest, the Turks said, but if Britain was to leave, the least they could expect was partition (The New York Times, 1959). Then it was decided the two states would have a meeting in Zurich (Uçarol, 1985, p. 565). The negotiations between Menderes and Karamanlis started in Zurich on February 5, 1959 with the participation of Foreign Ministers of the two countries and finalized with initialization of the treatment on February 11th. The common memorandum announced on February 11th stated that a compromise was reached after long negotiations (Zafer, 1959). It was declared in the memorandum with great pleasure that both prime ministers wanted to implement the tight cooperation and constructive friendship determined by two great statesmen, Atatürk and Venizelos and this positive issue would immediately produce results. Actually, it was an unrealistic view to expect immediate results from the settlement of Cyprus issue with regard to all relations between two countries. After all, a new status was decided upon with the Treaty of Zurich made between Turkey and Greece. Turkey was satisfied with the provisions of the Treaty of Zurich and by disclaiming "partition" argument, accepted the independence argument for Cyprus.

Ministers of Foreign Affairs of went to London from Zurich on February 11, 1959. Turkish Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu made a statement at the airport and said the Treaty of Zurich was concluded with a good agreement and the signed agreement was in favor of all three parties and of Cyprus thereof. Greek Foreign

Minister Averof stated that the Cyprus issue was settled (Zafer, 1959). On his way back to Ankara from Zurich on February 14th, Prime Minister told Anatolian Agency his satisfaction with this treaty and assessed that the result reached in terms of the future of Turkish-Greek relations as an agreement made with respect to mutual rights for both countries (Zafer, 1959).

Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers informed British Foreign Minister about the Treaty of Zurich and the parties decided to hold a conference in London with the participation of three states along with leaders of Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities. In this context, the London Conference was convened with the participation of the prime ministers of Turkey, the UK and Greece and leaders of both communities. But, a national disaster occurred for Turkey during the period between discussions regarding the results of Zurich Conference and right before the London Conference. The plane carrying the Turkish delegation headed by Prime Minister Adnan Menderes to London crashed on February 17, 1959 near London Airport and 14 members of Turkish delegation lost their lives (T.C Cumhurbaşkanlığı Celal Bayar Arşivi, 1957).

At the end of the negotiations at the London Conference, by the Treaty of Zurich forming a basis, all agreements that constituted the independent Republic of Cyprus was signed on February 19, 1959. The treaty named Treaty of London involves these four articles (Bilge, 1969, pp. 394-395):

1- An establishment agreement with respect to transfer of English sovereignty on Cyprus to Republic of Cyprus,
2- Guarantee agreement which secures independence, territorial integrity and constitutional order of Cyprus,
3- Military alliance agreement to be signed between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus,

4- Fundamental articles of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus.

The basis of the agreement reached with Greece is that the State of Cyprus shall be a sovereign republic with a presidential regime having a president and vice-president who work together by protecting sovereign existences of Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities with equal rights and under equal conditions. The way of solution to Cyprus conflict with these treaties tried to associate rights and interest of the three related countries and the two communities. Neither the request of Greece and Greek Cypriots to annex the island to Greece, nor the request of the partition of Turkey and Turkish Cypriots were accepted. It was envisaged to establish a kind of independent federal republic based on partnership of the two communities which would cooperate with Turkey and Greece.

According to these treaties, Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities in the Republic of Cyprus would execute the works of their own interest via Communal Chambers and common works through the executive rate based on the presidential system. The President would be Greek and the vice-president would be Turkish and there would be a council of ministers composed of ten ministers, three of whom would be Turkish. In addition, the House of Representatives would involve fifty members and thirty percent of them would be Turkish. A Constitutional Court and Combined Courts would be established for law suits between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Turkey, the UK and Greece would guarantee the sustainability of constitutional order in the Republic of Cyprus. Besides defence of the island would be assumed by a joint force to be established within the frame of Military Alliance Agreement with these three states. The island would never unite with any other

country and would never be partitioned. Another important point was Great Britain's right to maintain its bases on the island and its sovereignty on them. On the other hand, Turkey would have a force of 650 and Greece would have a force of 950 soldiers at the joint quarters to be established on Cyprus pursuant to alliance agreement. Each guarantor state would be entitled to jointly interfere to protect the constitutional order on Cyprus under the guarantee agreement and if this was not possible, each state would be entitled to interfere by itself (Uçarol, 1985, p. 566).

The states which were parties to Cyprus issue which was regarded as a threat to international peace got together in Zurich and London in 1959 and 1960 respectively and signed a treaty under which they agreed on the island to be an independent state instead of being under sovereignty of either one the state parties or partitioned or annexed to another state. Provisions of the Treaties of Zurich and London were accepted by the Republic of Cyprus established by the treaties and embodied with warranty agreement. The Treaty of Guarantee of which Great Britain, Turkey, Greece and the Republic of Cyprus were parties had secured the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus as a result of the consensus. Within the scope of Article 2 specifying the guarantee issues it was prohibited for the Republic of Cyprus to establish political and economic union with any other state or union of the Republic of Cyprus with any other state or partition of the island (Arsava, 1996). The US President Eisenhower made an important statement about that agreement (Eisenhower, 1959, p. 208):

> "The conclusion of an agreement on the substance of a Cyprus settlement by Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom, and the representatives of the Cypriot people is indeed a splendid achievement. A high order of statesmanship and resolution was needed to construct the basis for an equitable solution of this grave problem. I want you to know how much I admire your efforts and those of your Foreign Minister, Mr. Zorlu, in the important negotiations which preceded the agreement. The solution owes its impetus to Turkish-Greek understanding and cooperation. It will surely strengthen the NATO alliance and indeed the entire Free World."

Foreign Minister Bakanı Fatin Rüştü Zorlu made a statement on February 23rd and said the Treaties of Zurich and London were positive agreements for both parties and stated that a new way of independence was opened for Cyprus now. He also commented that two communities were getting closer and moving towards a union via cooperation and instead of making mischief between Turkey and Greece, this development would strengthen the rapport and relations between two countries each passing day (Zafer, 1959).

Editor-in-chief of Vatan newspaper, Ahmet Emin Yalman wrote an editorial during Zorlu-Averof negotiations in Paris in January 1959 and commented that free world expects "benevolence and sagacity" from Turkey and Greece, in order to close the gap opened in its security system and added that in order for two nations to successfully pass this exam, they need to have a meeting at the level of Prime Ministers (Yalman, 1959). He also demanded a system of equality to be established on Cyprus instead of a minority-majority system for a Turkish-Greek agreement and even if the system of proportional representation was adopted, Turkish Cypriots should have been granted the right to veto resolutions to their detriment (Yalman, 1959). In another article by Yalman on Zurich negotiations, he underlined that the agreement was facilitated between two countries when Greece gave up Enosis and Turkey gave up the argument of "partition" that it was using as a shield (Yalman, 1959).

Turkey's Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu conferred on January 3, 1959 with Greek ambassador in the two countries' rapprochement on the Cyprus issue. First, it was necessary to find some way describing the conference without mentioning Greece's demand for the Turks' fear would endanger the Turkish Cypriot minority or the Turks' advocacy of partition which the Greeks would not tolerate. One report said the Greek and Turkish governments were getting ready to discuss a republican regime for Cyprus similar to the system in Lebanon. Lebanese political tradition required that the President be a Christian and the Prime Minister be Muslim. In Cyprus, under this concept, a Greek would be chosen President in recognition of the four-to-one majority of the ethnic Greek population while the Prime Minister would be a Turk. Ankara government would not confirm any of this speculation. The official position still was that Turkey supports Great Britain's seven year partner

membership plan. In Cyprus but without Greek acceptance, and still looked to the partition of the island as a permanent solution (Walz, 1959)**.**

One of those who welcomed the solution of Cyprus issue pleasantly was Nadir Nadi, the editor-in-chief of Cumhuriyet Newspaper. Not regarding either Enosis or partition as a solution, Nadir Nadi welcomed the new formula and wrote; *"If Treaty of Cyprus will be regarded as a phase, this should be a phase in the happy development of Turkish-Greek friendship and world peace"* (Nadi, 1959). In another article, Nadir Nadi stated that the successful execution of this treaty primarily depended on the goodwill of both parties, but as Greeks were insistent on Enosis, Turkey came up with the partition argument Nadi wrote that when Greeks left Enosis Turkey also waived from the partition (Nadi, 1959).

Editor-in-chief of Ulsu newspaper, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu also welcomed the Treaty of Zurich. Karaosmanoğlu wrote, *"Even though this reconciliation might be regarded somewhat of a disappointment for Turkish Cypriots, Turkish public and government as we have given up the* partition argument which government made a national goal, we are now pursuing a more realistic approach" (Karaosmanoğlu, 1959).

All in all, Turkish media and public accepted the Treaties of Zurich and London. One of the biggest reasons for this was that Turkish public got tired of the long lasting complicated process and the dangerous phase that Turkish-Greek relations were in. During this period the hope emerged from the resolution of Cyprus issue was the recovery of Turkish-Greek relations.

The reaction of the USA to the Republic of Cyprus established as a result of the Treaties of Zurich and London was important. The USA followed a rather passive

policy with regard to Cyprus issue in 1950's. One of the reasons of this policy might be the sovereignty of the English on the island (Bölükbaşı, 1988, p. 37). In the eyes of the USA Cyprus Island had a strategic importance and the continuity of English dominance on the island was the biggest obstacle for enemy forces. The main concern of Americans was to prevent the breakdown of relations between three important members of NATO, namely Greece, Turkey and the UK due to Cyprus issue. Thus, the south wing of NATO and in general, its internal integrity and solidarity would be averted. The ultimate opinion of the USA with regard the Cyprus issue was solving this problem with an agreement between three member states of NATO. But, Washington administration was objecting the "internationalization" of the issue by discussing it before international organizations like the UN. Because in such a case there would be some reservation with regard to enabling the Soviet Union to damage the solidarity of Western solidarity. In this context the USA made a great effort to prevent Greece from conveying the issue to international platforms (Coufoudakis, p. 105).

Solution of the issue by the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus via the Treaties of Zurich and London had satisfied the USA because a problem threatening the cooperation of three NATO member countries went away and by virtue of the strength of western alliance, Cyprus issue was resolved. US President Eisenhower openly praised the Treaties of Zurich and London and regarded the process as an "awesome success". The main objectives of Americans after the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus were as follows (Uslu, pp. 36-37):

1- Political stability should be provided on Cyprus and Cyprus should join to Great Britain, Greece and Turkey to create a strong entrenchment against communism,

2- Cyprus should be developed economically, have a free market economy and libertarian democratic institutions and be encouraged to pursue western-oriented policies.
3- the USA should be able to benefit from the communication and intelligence amenities on Cyprus without being subject to limitation.
4- The UK should continue to dominate its bases on the island and these bases should be open to using of western countries.

By virtue of the Treaties of Zurich and London, relations between independent Cyprus and Turkey-Greece and the UK were established. One of these treaties, the Treaty of Guarantee was an inseparable part of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus and Cyprus undertook to protect the constitutional order of the Republic of Cyprus down to the last detail. The Treaties of Zurich and London signed on February 19, 1959 were discussed at GNAT on February 28, 1959. Consequences of the Treaties of Zurich and London should have been deemed as a success. One of the biggest reasons for thinking so, diplomatic steps were taken by Turkey for Cyprus Island from the beginning day of the problem till the date of signature of the treaty should be appraised. Cyprus, dominated by the UK in 1954, was removed from the British administration, Greece's entry was blocked and the Turkish military set foot on the island. The Greek Cypriot leader Makarios claimed that Zurich and London Treaties were signed under fait accompli but later he stated that these treaties made the island come closer to Enosis. In other words, these treaties were a step taken towards Enosis (Eroğlu, 2017).

Journalist Kemal Bağlum mentioned in his memoirs that Zorlu summoned him before Zurich negotiations. Zorlu wanted him to witness the talk he would make with Greek Ambassador George Pezmazoğlu that day. Bağlum secretly followed the talk

from the other room. Zorlu achieved great success at the meeting and made Pezmazoğlu sign the document he prepared on Cyprus without the knowledge of Greece. Zorlu obtained a promise from Bağlum for not writing about this conversation. With the rightful pride of success he achieved at the meeting, he said to Bağlum after the interview; *"We had a big time success. It is already clear that Zurich Conference will proceed just like we wanted. If I can manage to have a troop on Cyprus, believe me, Cyprus will be ours"* (Bağlum, 1991, pp. 91-94). If Turkey was able to claim rights on Cyprus today, this was the result of the diplomatic success of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu at the Treaties of Zurich and London. Zorlu made Turkish Cypriots equal to Greek Cypriots in every respect and put across two important articles (Gülen A. , 1998, p. 9):

1- The article that enables us to have military existence on the island is
2- the one which enables any one of three countries to interfere by itself in case of the violation of constitutional order on the island and if three guarantor states cannot reach an agreement between themselves.

According to investigative writer Mehmet Arif Demirer, Cyprus issue was resolved in this period by virtue of Turkish Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and Greek Foreign Minister Averof. It seems that these two ministers wanted to mature the issue without proclaiming to the UK and the USA. At the NATO conference in Paris on December 16, 1959, Zorlu and Averof informed the British about their agreement on Cyprus issue and the British were pleased with it. This was Zorlu's most successful event (Demirer, 2016). Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu made an important speech related to Cyprus during the Ministry of Foreign Affairs budget

talks in GNAT. In his speech he underlined that the Zurich and London Treaties led to good results and by protecting the rights of both communities and providing the security of Turkey, enabled Turkey and Greece to build their friendship on a strong foundation again. Zorlu also stated that the economy of Turkish people on the island would improve due to these treaties (Türk Sesi, 1960).

Treaties of Zurich and London which enabled Cyprus to gain its independence and the new constitution of Cyprus established the Republic of Cyprus on equal rights of Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities. The concepts of "minority" and "majority" disappeared, "Enosis" and "partition" were disposed of and it was assumed that a joint administration was established on the island with the agreement reached by two parties. As a result, the rights that Turkish Cypriots gained with these treaties are as follows (Kıbrıs Türk Cemaati Milli Arşivi, 1963):

1- The status of two separate communities was recognized and so, the danger of Greek Cypriots to completely dominate the island under self-determination argument and regard Turks as minority in the future was removed,
2- Institutions required by the establishment of separate communities would be organized. These are;
    a- Establishment of separate assemblies,
    b- Separate voting right on some issues in the House of Representatives
    c- 70% -30% administrative ratio, 60% -40% ratio in the army
    d- Veto rights of President and his/her deputy in some issues
    e- Management of separate municipalities
    f- Turkish and Romaic being official languages

g- Equal rights of President and his/her deputy

The Republic of Cyprus was established on August 16, 1960. Makarios, who was appointed as President on that day made a public speech and expressed the pleasure he had from the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus as an independent state. He commented that a new page was turned in terms of improvement of democratic institutions and implementation of the principles of international freedoms. Ultimately, Makarios disabled all articles in favor of Turks and violated the treaties.

A state having a republican regime was established on Cyprus but a nation was not brought into existence. By its nature, a "unified" but "separate" republic was created. It was a republic with separate municipalities, separate schools, separate communities and assemblies and separate languages. In this way, it was aimed to preserve the Turkish and Greek identities. Turkish and Greek armies landed the island in compliance with the alliance treaty. The Treaty of Guarantee prevented the island from uniting with or being annexed to another country. But actually, neither Greek Cypriots gave up the idea of Enosis, nor Turks gave up the partition. Even though EOKA surrendered some of its arms, it did not break up. Likewise, TMT acted the same way because the majority did not believe how this republic would survive. Greek Cypriots were disturbed for having equal rights with Turks whom they regarded as minority and this would be a mandatory partnership for Turks, who were attached to partition argument for dear life (Gürkut & Soyalp, 2017, p. 158). According to İsmail Tansu, who was one of the founders of TMT, the national policy of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu from Menderes cabinet was partition of the island and

annexation to Turkey. When the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus came into question, İsmail Tansu talked to Menderes and said, *"We don't trust in Greek Cypriots and they don't trust in Greeks.*" In response Menderes told him that he did not trust in them, either, and this was why Turkey had to change its partition argument (Tansu, 2001, p. 225).

The treaties signed during the establishment of independent State of Cyprus had been brought to GNAT for approval. RPP leader İsmet İnönü took the floor and said he was in favor of "partition" and he had always supported this argument but even though the Treaties of Zurich and London did not mean partition, he understood the latest developments. Even so he said that he would give negative vote not because the state to be established on Cyprus was independent and partition was not achieved but as the Treaty of Guarantee did not enable Turkey to interfere by itself when necessary. According to İnönü, Treaties of Zurich and London banned Enosis and partition. But it should not have been forgotten that Greeks were shouting Enosis a short while ago and while the gate of partition was closed, the gate of Enosis was open. Makarios would attack the Turks due to the majority of Greek Cypriot on the island. If Turks interfered alone, they could not achieve any results. Therefore, the English should take sides with Turks. İnönü stated that he would use a negative vote in the assembly due to these reasons (Öymen, 2017).

In response Fatin Rüştü Zorlu took the floor to respond on behalf of the government and said İnönü was right and Makarios would bring up Enosis to the agenda before long. Moreover, he underlined that Turkish side should always be cautious because the treaty was closed to partition but open to Enosis. And finally,

Zorlu stated that if the treaty entitled Turkey to interfere together with Great Britain, Greek Cypriots would have broken up the treaty and Turkey would not do anything by itself without the consent of the English. Then, Enosis would be actualized. He said this was why Turkey had included the right to interfere by itself in case the UK did not take action (Cılızoğlu, 2007, pp. 337-338).

With these treaties, for the first time since the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey actively participated in the administration of the island again (Halkın Sesi, 1958). It would not be wrong to consider the Treaties of Zurich and London as a milestone in the history of Cyprus due to its consequences.

4. FATİN RÜŞTÜ ZORLU TOWARDS THE END

The change in politics applied by Fatin Rüştü Zorlu before the military coup of May 27th, 1960 had a great influence of that period. The most effective politics was implemented in that term. In that context, foreign policy implementations of Zorlu are going to be evaluated depends on USA and USSR perspectives.

4.1. May 27, 1960 Military Coup

On the night of May 20th, six days before the coup, an officer came to Fatin Rüştü Zorlu's house and stayed there for five hours. After this long meeting, her daughter Sevim asked him the reason of the nervousness in his countenance and Zorlu told her that the officers should not meddle in politics. Then Zorlu immediately met with Prime Minister Menderes and told him a conspiracy was about to take place in the country and asked Menderes to make the Defence Minister in order for this

conspiracy to be overcome. He said this was the only way to prevent the military. He also advised Menderes not to leave Ankara for a few days and cancel his Eskişehir program. But, Menderes did not pay any regard to Zorlu's advices (Kırdar, 2016).

At 04:36 am on the morning of May 27, 1960 Ankara radio broadcasted an announcement and informed the country that the army had seized the power. Colonel Alparslan Turkes read the following notice: *"Due to the crisis our democracy is in and the recent incidents, Turkish Armed Forces took over the administration today in order to prevent the fight between brothers "* Then he continued: *"Fair and free elections shall be made as soon as possible and administration of the country shall be handed over to the winner of elections regardless of their side"* President Celal Bayar was detained in Çankaya Palace and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes detained in Kütahya, where he went from Eskişehir after receiving the news regarding the military coup. (Devrim, 1995, s. 327). Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu was sleeping at his home at the time of the military coup and he was wakened by a phone call to be informed about the incident. Zorlu followed the developments from his home and after being informed that Menderes, Bayar and other cabinet members have been taken to War College, he called the Central Command and told them his whereabouts (Fersoy, 1979, p. 77).

The revolutions took place in countries like Iraq, Korea, Lebanon and Cuba after 1958 had closely affected the military coup in Turkey and the following revolutionary period. Journalist Metin Toker expressed the following statements about how RPP used the revolution in Iraq to corner DP: *"DP Parliamentary Group gathered a couple days in a row. During these meetings President Bayar came to the*

assembly. They complained about the publications of RPP's organs with regard to Iraqi revolution." Toker said in his article that Bayar blamed RPP for encouraging the army to do the same thing by pointing out the incidents in Iraq. *"To be honest, they were not totally unjust. The Said Nuri regime in Iraq was a model of our Menderes model and DP members also knew that people were thinking the same way. DP members got nervous for this reason and all of them took extraordinary security measures. The opposition felt it and they were gloating over from hitting their nerve"* (Toker, 1966, pp. 104-105). The event which had a great doping effect on May 27, 1960 coup was the revolution took place in Korea towards the end of April, 1960. The Western German newspaper "Bad Godersberg" published an article about the impact of this revolution on the military coup in Turkey. *"The rebellion in South Korea seems to be the spark of the rebellion against Menderes"* (Kocabaş, 2012, p. 463).

When Turkey joined NATO, it did not only allocate more resources for the army but also the character of the army was significantly changed. New technologies and warfare methods were introduced to officers and they became more cosmopolitan by ideologically replacing limited regional patriotism with anti-communism approach initiated by the Cold War. They were sent to other NATO countries for training, the lifestyle of which were more different than theirs. They gained a new world perspective and craved for making a reform in Turkey (Ahmad, 2008, p. 142). The military junta which planned the May 27 military coup had overthrown an elected government by violence and trickery with the help of this psychological support.

When Turkish Armed Forces landed on Cyprus on July 20, 1974 for peace, Turkish government declared to the world that Turkey interfered with the situation on

the island in its capacity of a guarantor state pursuant to and by its authorities specified in the Treaties of Zurich and London signed in 1959 (Turgut, 1988, p. 153). The interview made with ex-president of GNAT, Mr. Hüsamettin Cindoruk, revealed the importance of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu's impact on Turkish Foreign Policy. According to Cindoruk, Zorlu was one of the smartest, wisest and quality diplomats and Foreign Ministers served in Turkey. Mr. Cindoruk stated that he followed him with admiration when he was attending the Yassıada Court as a young lawyer and Zorlu had defended himself without a pen and paper in his hand, by improvisation (Cindoruk, 2016).

4.2. Zorlu in Pendulum of the USA and USSR

There were two important developments in Turkey's foreign relations during the period before May 27. One of them was convergence initiatives with the Soviet Union and the other was moving to the last phase to join European Economic Community. It is necessary to assess the convergence period with the Soviet Union. In 1959, Turkish administrators began thinking positively with regard to relations with USSR. The statement made by Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu to Cumhuriyet newspaper on February 8, 1959 (Cumhuriyet, 1959) and Celal Bayar said in his opening speech at GNA on November 1, 1959 that some disheartening events had occurred within previous year in terms of actualization of peace and stability, these events had generally brought international communism into the open in various regions and along with them and the policy pursued by Soviet Russia to create contentment by providing personal contacts is gradually improving in broader sense. He underlined that these movements led to optimism hopes even a little in democracies complaining from distrust and longing for a real peace. Bayar emphasized that Turkey welcomed all initiatives towards the goal of mending fences

between the West and the East with approval and appreciation (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 1959, p. 10).

Turkish Foreign Policy executed by Fatin Rüştü Zorlu showed maximum effort, particularly in solving the Cyprus issue within the scope of Turkey's national interests. But it was observed that the intensity of tension and conflict in the community increased after 1957, due to the limitations in foreign aids to Turkey and financial crisis. Especially the occurrence of 6-7 September events during Zorlu's negotiations on Cyprus in London had weakened the position of Turkish delegation. Just the same, Zorlu and Menderes were claimed to be responsible for the 6-7 September events. The Western world had never wanted Turkey to make big industrial investments and forced Turkey to remain as an agricultural country. Journalist and member of parliament from DP Mithat Perin cited in his memoirs as follows:

"Menderes visited Germany to ask for economic aid. Turkey has to take its industrialization much further as immediate as possible. But Germany did not edge in. Actually, the West was not allowing heavy industry in Turkey. During the negotiations Zorlu slammed his fist on the table and left. Germany was not drawing into plants like iron and steel factories and refineries. Turkey already behaved warily from time to time and had these plants built by the Soviets by getting off the tyranny of West. At the time the Germans had a tradition. They were organizing boat trips for their guests on Rhine River. While we are sitting on the deck with Menderes, Erhard came to us and asked: 'Why are you this insistent on the heavy industry?' Menderes replied him; "Do you still want us to buy your terra-cotta as cement?" Turkey went beyond this." Erhard; 'Let us not issue a credit to you. Let us make you an advance payment: Develop agriculture in Turkey, engage in intensive agriculture and become the grain, fruit and vegetable warehouse of Europe.' Mr. Adnan suddenly said; 'We don't want anything from you"' (Perin, 1995).

According to Hüsamettin Cindoruk, it was the reality that Democrat Party had followed a more independent policy during the years of 1959-1960. This policy of DP scared the USA. According to Cindoruk, the experienced diplomat Selim Sarper had tried to be the balance between the parties. In addition, when the new cabinet was formed after May 27 military coup, Fahri Korutürk was appointed as Foreign Minister. But three days later, the coup plotters replaced Fahri Korutürk with Selim

Sarper. Cindoruk said this happened because of the official talks mad with the Westerners. Thus, Turkey remained devoted to NATO and CENTO (Cindoruk, 2016).

According to Kemal Bağlum, one of the famous journalists of the period, Foreign Minister Zorlu visited Washington towards the end of 1959 to request an aid amounting to 20 million dollars from the USA. When Zorlu was telling about the attitude of the USA towards Turkey to Bağlum, he said Turkey's biggest mistake was unconditionally depending on America and such a policy would not go on forever. Zorlu predicted that Turkey would not obtain anything by depending on the USA and on the contrary, it would not satisfy the USA under any circumstance and would deprive itself. According to Zorlu's understanding of foreign policy, Third World countries and the Soviet Union along with Turkey, NATO and the USA should pursue a new policy in line with Turkey's national interest. Upon Zorlu's persistence, Menderes agreed on cooperating with the Soviet Union in the field of economy and establishing relations with India which was regarded as the leader of Third World countries. Zorlu did everything to ensure Prime Minister Menderes' visit to Moscow and predicted that Menderes would visit Moscow as late as mid-1960's (Bağlum, 1991).

Kemal Bağlum referred to Fatin Rüştü Zorlu's persistence on Menderes' Moscow visit as follows; *"I know these attempts disturb especially the USA…"* (Mütercimler & Öke, 2004, p. 428). Orhan Erkanlı, one of the important figures of May 27, stated that no foreigners were involved in any military operation but some circles which continuously brought this up wore out the army by implying that the army was cooperating with the external powers (Erkanlı, 1987, s. 221-222). Whereas when one looks at the officers who performed the military coup of May 27, the issue becomes clearer. The officers were sent to the USA for training after World War Two.

Their training had an impact on their worldview. In the memoirs of Talat Aydemir, who was involved in secret coup plotting organizations in the army before May 27 and in coup attempts on February 22, 1962 and May 21, 1963 was a sign before and after of American training. *"All staff officers at the general staff had their academy education in the old system. They couldn't get rid of the pressure put by War Academies. Because that school was such a place where you wouldn't defend the ideas you believe in. Most importantly, they were remaining weak beside the staff officers trained in the new system. Because newly trained staff officers have been raised in accordance with American doctrines. Currently Turkish army was being assigned for the armies of NATO countries. New American doctrines have replaced the old German doctrines"* (Aydemir, 1968, pp. 23-24). US President of the time, Eisenhower prepared a secret report on February 2, 1960. It was stated in this report that Prime Minister Adnan Menderes was planning an official visit with USSR Secretary General Khrushchev and it was needed for Fatin Rüştü Zorlu to notify this official visit to NATO in the context of security (Eisenhower, 1960).

Another important development was President Truman's request of authority from US Congress to drill and train two outstanding personnel, one Turkish and one Greek (Ulus, 1947). During the following process, most of the officers who were active in May 27 coup had received this training. When Law on Foreign Aid dated 1962 was being discussed during the second session of the 87th meeting of Foreign Relations Committee of US Senate, US Defence Minister Mc Namara touched on considerably important issues; *"Next year 18000 foreigners will receive education in American military schools. Each of these persons will witness how our democracy works, learn our governmental traditions and philosophy. When they go back to their countries, each of them will implement this"* (Baldwin, 1966, p. 142). Another

important expression came from Adnan Selekler, a parliament member from DP. According to Selekler, after the military coup of May 27 Fatin Rüştü Zorlu was kept under custody at Military College. When he was asked, *"What would the gentleman America say about military intervention?"* his reply was rather meaningful; *"America prefers military regimes." Americans get on well with officers"* (Selekler, 1994). As Zorlu's statement suggests, it was seen that the USA had developed and was still using foreign policy means to interfere with and influence internal affairs of other countries. It might be said that Zorlu was aware of the influence of the USA, especially on NATO officers who were trained in the USA.

At the end of December 1959, Minister of Health Dr. Lütfi Kırdar visited the Soviet Union with a delegation. In his statement upon returning to Turkey Kırdar said; *"From now on our relationship with Russia will develop. Soviet Health Minister will visit our country in the spring"* (Kırdar, 2016). As Mehmet Arif Demirer conveyed, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu had persuaded Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes to pursue policies to soften the relations with the Soviet Union. Later, Menderes and Zorlu requested from the Health Minister of the time, Lütfü Kırdar, to visit the Soviet Union with regard to the health sector. He stated that it was very important not to draw the reaction of the allies, and then Turkey had carried out negotiations with the Soviet Union on "Cooperation on Animal Health" because there was always the possibility of communist slander on Turkey. There would not be a communist animal after all (Demirer, 2016).

According to Ercüment Yavuzalp, private secretary of Adnan Menderes at the time, a new idea was shaped in this respect with regard to his visit to the Soviet Union in August 1960. Moreover, Yavuzalp had expressions in the manner of Zorlu's intention to have a new trial with the Soviets (Yavuzalp, 1991). According to Semih

Günver's opinion on the matter, Turkish authorities informed the USA about the USSR visit and the USA seemingly approved this visit. US Ankara Ambassador sent a letter to Zorlu and notified that they did not object his visit to Moscow. But also an information was received that CIA would take action and try to prevent this visit. In fact, the USA was not pleased with Menderes' Moscow visit at all. A country which had been acting along with the USA since 1947 wanted to act on its own for the first time (Günver, 1985).

Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu replied to the question by the reporter of "US News and World Report" magazine about the Soviet Union's attempt to improve its relations with Turkey as follows: *"We will be extremely pleased to see a change in the principles of politics followed by the Russians. But unfortunately I can not see such a change for today. It is necessary to have some factors which would persuade the Westerners that there is a change in Soviet politics "* In reply to the question of "Does the Soviet Union make friendly gestures towards Turkey?", referring to the general policy of the Soviets Zorlu said: *"Their general policy is relevant to all countries and there is no exception."* With this, he wanted to state that the relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union depended on the general policy of the Soviet Union (Gönlübol & Ülman, 1969, p. 432). Besides that, Zorlu also visited the USA in September 1959 and made speeches about Turkey's foreign policy at the General Assembly of the UN and some American universities. In these speeches he emphasized that the international tension was not removed yet and put his wish in this respect into words. Zorlu also stated that Turkey was one of the neighbors of the Soviets and therefore it should be regarded reasonable its being one of the countries which desired the establishment of peace between the Soviet and its allies the most (Gönlübol & Ülman, 1969, p. 444).

An article series titled "CIA-Central Intelligence Agency of the USA" written by Kamil Bülent was published in Ulus newspaper for 101 days as of November 10, 1961. In the 29th chapter of this article the following view was included; *"CIA serves a goal of countering the sedition of international communism. Given this goal, the first question that comes to mind is this: "If CIA's activities lead to some dangerous consequences and these consequences require immediate action to rapidly crush communism, would the agency remain neutral?"* In chapter 32 of the article, the answer to this question is revealed: *"The marks on the world map on the wall of CIA President's office in Langley, Washington and on the map on the wall of GPU head's office in Moscow share similarities in some respects. In these maps, the Middle East and Central America are framed with red lines. "* (Yetkin, 2011, p. 74). In chapters 30-31 of the article the author wrote out the following by quoting from the book titled "The Inside Story of CIA":*CIA had been informed about the wiggling in Turkish army due to Menderes' tyrannous administration well in advance and informed Washington. In the telegrams sent to Washington one week prior to revolution it was stated that the government coup would be made soon. The only thing CIA was wrong was in respect of General Gürsel. CIA was assuming that Commander of the Land Forces, Cemal Gürsel, was not into politics but the general claimed responsibility for the leadership of revolution. Menderes was so extravagant in terms of building factories and dams. Contacting the preparers of revolution, CIA was notifying Washington to a day about the situation. The fact that CIA was informed about the revolution in advance caused the enemies of CIA think that the agency had an active role in the revolution "* (Yetkin, 2011, s. 75).

At the time of the May 27, 1960 military coup, Turkey's relations with the outside world were of great importance. One of the most important figures of DP, Member of Parliament Rıfkı Salim Burçak stated that Turkey's pro-American policy during this period was a national policy. Because it would mean to surrender to the Soviets in the contrary case. While the Soviet threat was of great importance for Turkey's NATO membership, the pressure of the Soviets on Turkey became more visible after Turkey's membership (Burçak, 1988, s. 29).

A statement made in Ankara and Moscow on April 11, 1960 was one of the most remarkable developments and had a great impact on diplomatic circles. It was announced to the public that Prime Minister Adnan Menderes would officially visit Moscow on July 12, 1960, in return Nikita Khrushchev would visit Turkey (Hürriyet, 1960). As a matter of fact, the mutual visits to restore the relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union were announced to the public with declarations simultaneously made in the capitals of both countries on April 9, 1960. USSR deputies had announced that Prime Minister Menderes would definitely visit Moscow upon special invitation by the Head of the Delegation. This development was covered by Cumhuriyet newspaper and attracted the attention of the world. In the news, attitudes of Moscow and Washington were also touched upon and stated that Moscow regarded these visits as *"an important step towards world peace,"* while Washington commented on these visits as *"the USA hopes these visits would soothe tension in the Middle East"* (Cumhuriyet, 1960).

Prof. Dr. Oral Sander attributes Menderes' visit to Moscow to the economic crisis in the country; *"Due to the new mood of Turkish-American relations and the impact of economic difficulties, the Prime Minister of Turkey planned to visit Moscow especially for aid"* (Sander, 2016). The historian Feroz Ahmad attributes Menderes'

visit to economic expectations and by pointing out the danger of it, he states that Eisenhower administration had refused to give money to Menderes in October 1959 and so, Menderes decided to visit the Soviet Union in July of the following year. According to Ahmad, this was extremely interesting because Menderes had warned the Americans when he was in the USA that they should not take notice of the detente initiatives of the Soviets and not trust to such an enemy (Ahmad, 2015, p. 167).

Historian Mete Tuncay thought that Menderes' Moscow visit was based on the economy and an attitude against the May 27th movement. Tuncay did not sufficiently emphasize Menderes's attempt to establish relations with the Soviets to solve Turkey's economic difficulties. He attributed the silence of the USA against May 27 military coup (Tuncay, 1997, s. 187).

At that time, the main reservation of the leader of RPP, İsmet İnönü, was not improving relations with the Soviet Union, but the approach of Menderes-Zorlu couple. Metin Toker expresses İnönü's concerns as follows:

> *"Zorlu was not afraid of external borrowing. As a matter of fact, he was the one who encouraged Menderes most for external borrowing. Zorlu believed that the West needed us. In order to have us by their side, the West would approve to wipe off all of our debts if needed. When İsmet Pasha heard that Menderes sent the Minister of Health to Moscow, he said "Adnan and Fatin are playing a dangerous game"* (Toker, 1993, s. 277).

It is a matter of debate whether the May 27 military coup and the removal of the DP from power served the national interests of the USA or not. First of all, by virtue of the coup, restoration of Turkey's relationship with the Soviet Union was postponed. Naturally Turkey's entering a period of detente with the Soviet Union before the USA as an ally of NATO concerned Washington. Secondly, the attempt of Menderes and Zorlu to obtain aid from the Soviet Union outside the USA was hindered. And thirdly, the USA was aware that neither military coup nor DP's getting

close with Russia would turn Turkey to neither Egypt nor Lebanon. In CIA's report prepared after May 27, it was stated that National Unity Committee was not like the Free Officers of Nasser (FRUS 1958-1960, s. 859). After May 27 the USA sent the message stating "We are loyal to the allies and our commitments." This message points out that Americans had already known that the coup plotters would not change Turkey's national policy in advance (Mütercimler & Öke, 2004, p. 431).

4.3. Cyprus Spiral

While the foundation of the new Republic was being laid in Cyprus, May 27, 1960 military coup came true, DP government was overthrown and its effects reached to Cyprus. Full General Cemal Gürsel first became the head of National Unity Committee composed of 38 coup plotting officers and then announced as the President and the Prime Minister. While loyalty messages were sent to him on one hand, how the coup would reflect on Cyprus and TMT was being discussed on the other. One of the lawsuits leading to the execution of Prime Minister Menderes was the discretionary fund case by which he was blamed for transferring money to TMT, as he gave a hand to the establishment of TMT and becoming an armed organization (Haber Revizyon Gazetesi, 2013, p. 29). After May 27, 1960 military coup, the republic was founded on Cyprus and the problem was solved for Turkey. Turkey dealt with its internal problems and had no such problem as "Cyprus". In this context, the presence of the TMT becomes a controversial topic (Talat, 2017). According to Aydın Samioğlu, another important founder of TMT, continuation of TMT became a current issue after May 27. Treaties of London and Zurich were signed. It was decided to make Cyprus an independent state and not a colony. These treaties were approved by the constituent assembly of May 27 revolution. Upon arrival of Turkish Regiment to Cyprus pursuant to these treaties, a group of officers within National Unity

Committee, who did not accept the presence of TMT requested the organization to be dissolved. At this phase, all supplies and training were ceased (Cahit, 1996).

When Rauf Denktaş, the Founding President of TRNC talks about the morning of May 27, he tells that Rıza Vuruşkan visited him on the morning of the coup and told him that May 27 coup should be immediately supported. But as they know that Dr. Fazıl Küçük was a close friend of Menderes, they were aware that it would be difficult to convince him. Rıza Vuruşkan told him that there was no other way and they might have a conflict with the new administration otherwise. Dr. Küçük was extremely shocked when he heard the coup. At the end Rauf Denktaş and his team sent a support message to Cemal Gürsel. But, the most concerning issue was the death sentences of Menderes and Zorlu given in Yassıada proceedings because according to Denktaş, the execution of these two important leaders was a reason of mourning because those who solved Cyprus issue, sign Treaty of Zurich and bring Turkish soldiers after a long time were Zorlu and Menderes (Batur, 2006, p. 194). Zorlu, who had challenged the world in Cyprus issue, made no compromise on his stance when he was going up the gallows. While they were being taken to İmralı Island by boat, Celal Bayar turned to Zorlu as if nothing had happened and said; *"Mr. Fatin, would you please tell us your objective of European Union?"* And Zorlu, mentioned the place and importance of Turkey in the European Union as advices to future generations, as if he was not going to be executed after minutes.

It would be said that those who made May 27 revolution did not want to deal with the Cyprus issue. They assumed that the problem was solved upon the announcement of the Republic of Cyprus. All of them were in agreement that there

was no need for an underground organization like TMT on the island anymore. Yassıada proceedings and execution of Menderes, Zorlu and Polatkan and the overall crisis in the country caused a decrease in Turkey's interest in Cyprus. The interesting point within May 27 process was the retirement of Daniş Karabelen, the President of Special Warfare Department established and financed by the USA (Eroğlu, 2017). One of the most important reasons of this retirement might be the view of coup plotting officers with regard to Special Warfare Department during the period when Cyprus issue had gained importance. They used to see this department as a private organization of Zorlu and Menderes (Talat, 2017).

CONCLUSION

It can be said that Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, who gave his name to a period of Turkish Foreign Policy, was a statesman who made a self-sacrifice for and great contribution to procure acceptance of his country in line with its national interests and became Turkey’s voice in international platforms. In this context, Zorlu continues being remembered by many politicians, diplomats and statesmen with his bold policies and significant foreign policy moves. According to Kamran İnan, one of the prominent figures in Turkish political life, Turkish Foreign Policy is divided into two as periods of Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic. İnan says that the imperial period has a magnificent past in spite of some significant mistakes and unpleasant incidents taking place during the period of downfall. During this period the state was always seen and shown as great. Dispersion of Ottoman Empire and the announcement of the republic by Mustafa Kemal and his friends are regarded as a principal international event. The reforms initiated in this period evoked admiration all around the world, the country

had a say in the world due to its new foreign policy and important issues such as Hatay and Straits were solved in this period. It states that Turkish Foreign Policy entered a passive period after Atatürk, and Turkey turned its back on Turkish world in this period. İnan also states that Turkish Foreign Policy moved in line with national interests, especially after DP came into power in 1950 and with Fatin Rüştü Zorlu's dominance on foreign policy (İnan, 1991).

It is seen that Fatin Rüştü Zorlu gave six years of his life to Turkish politics. This period should be divided into two: the first period is the time elapsed from 1954 to 1957, when he was elected as a member of the parliament and appointed as Foreign Minister. He also acted as Deputy Prime Minister and State Minister in this period. During this period, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu was one of the most important policy makers with regard to issues such as First London Conference, The Baghdad Pact, Bandung Conference, Turkey-the Middle East, Turkey-the Soviet Union and Turkey-the USA relations. The second period begins with Zorlu's appointment as Foreign Minister after 1957 elections and upon resignation of Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü. During this period, it is seen that Turkish External Affairs controlled by Zorlu spent most of their time on Cyprus issue. It can be said that peace and versatile foreign policy underlay the foreign policy understanding of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu. But, the effects of realistic approach are also seen in Fatin Zorlu's diplomacy understanding. Even though Zorlu acted as the spokesman of the USA seen as pro-American at Bandung Conference in 1955, which corresponded to his first years on duty, he recognized that it was wrong, and he acted with the consciouness that every country should act in accordance with its own national interests. He also became aware that no permanent

friendships or hostilities in international relations were possible and successfully implemented the principle of the validity of permanent interests only.

During the period when Fatin Rüştü Zorlu visited the USA towards the end of 1959 to request an additional credit amounting to 20 million dollars, he told the journalist Kemal Bağlum that the biggest mistake of Turkey was to unconditionally act as the USA wanted, and that this would not gain any favour to Turkey. But, when Turkey could express its opinion on an issue that it was right on an international platform in spite of the USA, Turkey's respectability would increase and could be a prestigious country in the eyes of other states. Thereupon, Zorlu convinced Prime Minister Menderes to officially visit Moscow and bore in mind how annoyed the USA would be for this (Bağlum, 1991, p. 229). Turkish foreign policy philosophy under the influence of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu was shaped within the context of tight relations with the West. After that, the main objective for Turkey was to become a member to all political, military and economic organizations established under the leadership of West. But, especially after 1959, he suggested that Turkey establish good relations also with the USSR and determine a versatile and active foreign policy approach. By doing so, he provided an insight into Turkey's current foreign policy. When a journalist asked Fatin Rüştü Zorlu what the reflections of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes' visit to the Soviet Union would be in July, he replied that all parties had responded positively to this visit and Turkey showed that it stood by the allies in terms of providing detente, security and justice between the parties. Turkey's aim was to improve its relations with its neighbour Soviet Russia and contribute to the establishment of peace between two blocs (Bozkurt, 1960).

It can be said that Cyprus issue had a special place in Turkish foreign policy under the influence of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu. The domestic and foreign sources examined and interviews made with politicians who witnessed the period revealed that the solution-oriented attempts and diplomatic negotiation methods of Zorlu with regard to Cyprus issue and his acquisitions established the ground for Cyprus policies implemented by Turkey in future and strengthened Turkey's status. Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu considered that Cyprus Island has a great importance for defence and security of Turkey. Western ports in Turkey were open to a potential enemy assault and in case of a war, Turkey would be supplied via its southern ports. Therefore, loss of Cyprus would mean a complete surrounding of Turkey. Cyprus issue could only be discussed between the UK and Turkey, as Turkey gave the island to the UK in 1878. Because pursuant to the Treaty of Lausanne, future of Cyprus could be determined by Turkey and Great Britain, as they were parties to the issue under this treaty. One of the most important points that Zorlu opposed with regard to this issue was the implementation of self-determination principle on Cyprus by condoning the truths and ignorance of Lausanne.

It is seen that Zorlu's being charged with organizing 6-7 September events during Yassıada proceedings and being sentenced for this reason had no real legal basis. Because Zorlu almost attacked Greek Foreign Minister at London Conference on the morning of September 6th and shouted, *"How dare you do not protect Atatürk's house? Because of you, the UK declared a state of emergency on Cyprus."* And, Greek Minister apologized and promised that the guilty would be found immediately. As a matter of fact, if 6-7 September events had never occurred, it would have been mentioned in the final declaration of London Conference that Greece should not be

considered a party of Cyprus issue. In addition, according to Adnan Menderes' son, Aydın Menderes, it is extremely wrong to call these events 6-7 September events because the events were put to an end at midnight on September 6th by the declaration of martial law. So, there was no indignation on September 7th at all (Demirer, 2016).

When the developments in Turkish Foreign Policy are considered, it is seen that Fatin Rüştü Zorlu influenced not only Cyprus issue but also Turkish foreign policy in general. One of the issues that might support this view is Turkey's application process to "Common Market". When Turkey applied to Common Market in 1959, it was seen that this new organization was extremely weak and fragile. So, the establishment of European Union seemed to be a dream. But, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu predicted that Common Market would bring economic and political stability and peace to the European continent in the long run and did his best to make Turkey proceed in this direction. When he was taken to İmralı Island by an assault boat to be executed after being sentenced to death in Yassıada proceedings, he had a talk with Celal Bayar, who was also sentenced to death but whose death penalty was abolished later on. Zorlu told Bayar that Common Market membership of Turkey was a huge national interest. This incident also shows the importance of statesman capacity of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu.

The greatest victory that Fatin Rüştü Zorlu gained with his personal diplomatic negotiation skills were Treaties of Zurich and London, which were the most important treaties after Lausanne and Montreux. These treaties lie at the bottom of Turkey's rights on Cyprus. Zorlu made Turkish troops land on the island and ensured Turkey's

security in the Eastern Mediterranean. Today, the importance of Cyprus Island is more vital for Turkey today than before. It could be stated that Fatin Rüştü Zorlu's Cyprus policy is still valid to provide an insight for a solution to Cyprus issue for Turkey today. As a matter of fact, Founding President of TRNC, Rauf Denktaş, told to Hüsamettin Cindoruk, former President of GNAT that his greatest regret was not erecting his statue on Cyprus before the death of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu (Cindoruk, 2017).

One of the greatest contributions of Turkish Foreign Policy under the influence of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu to international relations at the time was implementing policies to enable the initiation of a detente period between two blocks of Cold War. Attending to the Summit Conference of NATO in Paris on May 20, 1960, Zorlu stated that Turkey was ready to do everything to initiate detente with respect to NATO's views, as Turkey was a member of the treaty. Quite so, the statement of Secretary General of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev as did not want to go back to the bad old days of Cold War shows that Soviet Bloc also wanted a detente (Bozkurt, 1960). But, it can be stated that military coup of May 27 delayed the commencement of a detente period initiated by Fatin Rüştü Zorlu to slow down Cold War even a bit. The plotters of the military coup of May 27 and members of the Yassıada Court of Justice knew that Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, who was sentenced to death and executed, was a statesman who secured Turkish presence on Cyprus Island. Zorlu had established Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT) on Cyprus against terrorist activities of EOKA by using all of his initiatives. But, after the Military Coup of May 27, 1960, the arms records of which were deleted from the records of Turkish Armed Forces and stored in some warehouses hit the headlines of daily newspapers after the coup (Esin, 2005).

Being appreciated by the foreign media and regarded as the most capable Foreign Minister of Turkey, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu was accepted as the responsible statesman of Turkish side in Treaty of Cyprus. The adopted view with regard to his being hanged after the Military Coup of May 27th is that he was sacrificed for the request of those who said *"a revolution should be stamped with blood"* (The Sunday Times, 1961). In another piece of news covered by The Times newspaper about Zorlu, it was stated that his success in the settlement of Cyprus dispute for Turkey's benefit would be always remembered as a great service and whatever Zorlu's mistakes were, his diplomatic ability, intelligence and knowledge of foreign affairs preceded his defects. It was also emphasized that the treaty signed in 1959 was Zorlu's work to a great extent (The Times, 1961).

Fatin Rüştü Zorlu's state policy was to level up Turkish Foreign Policy and Economic Policy to be sufficient for its national defence and national interests and improve the standard of living of Turkish nation. Today, the argument defended by Turkey and TRNC for the island enables the two communities to live together in peace and by establishing good neighbor relations as two different states. So, it is the continuation of "green line" policy. Zorlu's Cyprus policy mainly involved partition of the island, in other words, the establishment of two separate states on the island. It is a known fact that Turkey does not confront Zorlu's addresses today, but it is seen that it is different in terms of conjuncture. The partition policy which was regarded by Zorlu, who procured acceptance of Turks are not in minority on the island and their partnership to the island, as the most reasonable solution on Cyprus today that Turkey would implement at the negotiation table in spite of the total rejection of Turkish troops on the island by Greek Cypriots.

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APPENDICIES

Appendix A

"Backgrounders on Turkey"

PROFILES

FATIN RUSTU ZORLU

Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Turkish Republic

A well-known figure on the international scene, Fatin Rustu Zorlu has come to be recognized as one of the free world's foremost exponents of collective defense and economic cohesion.

As Chief Delegate, Ambassador, Minister of State, Deputy Premier, and, since November 25, 1957, as Foreign Minister, career diplomat Zorlu has been a familiar personality at almost every major international conference of the past decade.

A graduate of the Galatasaray Lycee in Istanbul, Mr. Zorlu holds LL.B. degrees from the Law School of the University of Geneva and from the School of Political Science in Paris.

Mr. Zorlu entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1932 and was successively Secretary to the Turkish Delegation to the Disarmament Conference (1934), Legal Adviser to the Turkish Delegation to the Montreux Conference (1936), Adviser to the Turkish Delegation to the League of Nations in Geneva (1938).

Appointed First Secretary to the Turkish Embassy in Paris in 1939, he later became Counsellor of Embassy in Moscow (1942), Charge d'Affaires in Kuybyshev USSR (1942), and Consul-General in Beirut (1943).

Appointed Director-General of the Department of Economy and Commerce at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Ankara (1946), he served as Chief of the Turkish Delegation to the Economic Commission for Europe (1947-49), Chairman of the Turkish Delegation to the Conference on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in Havana (1948), Deputy Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Marshall Aid Program, and Chief of the Turkish Delegation assigned to conclude trade agreements with different countries (1949).

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Promoted Minister Plenipotentiary in 1950, he was a member of the Turkish Delegation assigned to conclude the loan agreement with the World Bank in Washington, D. C. (1950), Chairman of the Turkish Delegation to the GATT Conference in England (1951), and member of the Turkish Delegation to the NATO Conference in Lisbon (1952).

In 1952 he was appointed Ambassador and Turkish Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Council in Paris.

Elected to the Grand National Assembly from the Constituency of Canakkale on May 2, 1954, Mr. Zorlu entered the Cabinet as Minister of State and Deputy Prime Minister on May 17, 1954; and became Minister of State and Acting Foreign Minister on July 29, 1955. He headed the Turkish Delegation to the Bandung Conference in 1955.

Resigning from the Cabinet on November 29, 1955, he re-entered it as Minister of State for Press Affairs on July 28, 1957. On November 25, 1957 he became Minister of Foreign Affairs in the fifth Cabinet formed by Premier Adnan Menderes.

He took part in the NATO Summit Conference in Paris in December, 1957, and accompanied Premier Menderes on State visits to Japan, South Korea, and Nationalist China in April, 1958.

Mr. Zorlu was born in Istanbul in 1950, is married and has one daughter.

* * * *

Appendix B



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Florya, 29 Temmuz 1955

CUMHURBAŞKANLIĞI
CELAL BAYAR ARŞİVİ
Yer No : 3/6-29
Desimal No :
Dosya No :
Fihrist No : 3172

Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi
Reisliğine

Devlet Vekili Fuat Köprülü'nün Devlet Vekili ve Başvekil Yardımcılığına ve Devlet Vekili Fatin Rüştü Zorlu'nun Devlet Vekili ve Hariciye Vekâleti Vekilliğine nakillerinin Başvekilin teklifi üzerine muvafık görülmüş olduğunu saygı ile arzederim.

Reisicumhur

Appendix C

APPENDIX 1

CONFERENCE ON CYPRUS

Documents signed and initialled at Lancaster House on 19 February 1959

I

MEMORANDUM SETTING OUT THE AGREED FOUNDATION FOR THE FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF CYPRUS

The Prime Minister of the United-Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Greece and the Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic.

Taking note of the Declaration by the Representative of the Greek-Cypriot Community and the Representative of the Turkish-Cypriot Community that they accept the documents annexed to this Memorandum as the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus.

Hereby adopt, on behalf of their respective Governments, the documents annexed to this Memorandum and listed below, as the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus.

On behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	On behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Greece	On behalf of the Government of the Turkish Republic
HAROLD MACMILLAN	C. KARAMANLIS	A. MENDERES

London,
February 19, 1959.

List of Documents Annexed

A. Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus.
B. Treaty of Guarantee between the Republic of Cyprus and Greece, the United Kingdom, and Turkey.
C. Treaty of Alliance between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey.
D. Declaration made by the Government of the United Kingdom on 17 February 1959.
E. Additional Article to be inserted in the Treaty of Guarantee.
F. Declaration made by the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers on 17 February 1959.
G. Declaration made by the Representative of the Greek Cypriot community on 19 February 1959.

H. Declaration made by the Representative of the Turkish Cypriot community on 19 February 1959.
I. Agreed Measures to prepare for the new arrangements in Cyprus.

II

ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE DOCUMENTS AGREED IN THE FRENCH TEXTS AND INITIALLED BY THE GREEK AND TURKISH PRIME MINISTERS AT ZURICH ON FEBRUARY 11, 1959.

(*a*)

BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

1. The State of Cyprus shall be a Republic with a presidential regime, the President being Greek and the Vice-President Turkish elected by universal suffrage by the Greek and Turkish communities of the Island respectively.

2. The official languages of the Republic of Cyprus shall be Greek and Turkish. Legislative and administrative instruments and documents shall be drawn up and promulgated in the two official languages.

3. The Republic of Cyprus shall have its own flag of neutral design and colour, chosen jointly by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic.

Authorities and communities shall have the right to fly the Greek and Turkish flags on holidays at the same time as the flag of Cyprus.

The Greek and Turkish communities shall have the right to celebrate Greek and Turkish national holidays.

4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected for a period of 5 years.

In the event of absence, impediment or vacancy of their posts, the President and the Vice-President shall be replaced by the President and the Vice-President of the House of Representatives respectively.

In the event of a vacancy in either post, the election of new incumbents shall take place within a period of not more than 45 days.

The President and the Vice-President shall be invested by the House of Representatives, before which they shall take an oath of loyalty and respect for the Constitution. For this purpose, the House of Representatives shall meet within 24 hours after its constitution.

5. Executive authority shall be vested in the President and the Vice-President. For this purpose they shall have a Council of Ministers composed of seven Greek Ministers and three Turkish Ministers. The Ministers shall be designated respectively by the President and the Vice-President who shall appoint them by an instrument signed by them both.

The Ministers may be chosen from outside the House of Representatives.

Decisions of the Council of Ministers shall be taken by an absolute majority.

Decisions so taken shall be promulgated immediately by the President and the Vice-President by publication in the official gazette.

However, the President and the Vice-President shall have the right of final veto and the right to return the decision of the Council of Ministers under the same conditions as those laid down for laws and decisions of the House of Representatives.

6. Legislative authority shall be vested in a House of Representatives elected for a

period of 5 years by universal suffrage of each community separately in the proportion of 70 per cent for the Greek community and 30 per cent for the Turkish community, this proportion being fixed independently of statistical data. (NB. The number of Representatives shall be fixed by mutual agreement between the communities.)

The House of Representatives shall exercise authority in all matters other than those expressly reserved to the Communal Chambers. In the event of a conflict of authority, such conflict shall be decided by the Supreme Constitutional Court which shall be composed of one Greek, one Turk, and one neutral, appointed jointly by the President and the Vice-President. The neutral judge shall be president of the Court.

7. Laws and decisions of the House of Representatives shall be adopted by a simple majority of the members present. They shall be promulgated within 15 days if neither the President nor the Vice-President returns them for reconsideration as provided in Point 9 below.

The Constitutional Law, with the exception of its basic articles, may be modified by a majority comprising two-thirds of the Greek members and two-thirds of the Turkish members of the House of Representatives.

Any modification of the electoral law and the adoption of any law relating to the municipalities and of any law imposing duties or taxes shall require a simple majority of the Greek and Turkish members of the House of Representatives taking part in the vote and considered separately.

On the adoption of the budget, the President and the Vice-President may exercise their right to return it to the House of Representatives, if in their judgement any question of discrimination arises. If the House maintains its decisions, the President and the Vice-President shall have the right of appeal to the Supreme Constitutional Court.

8. The President and the Vice-President, separately and conjointly, shall have the right of final veto on any law or decision concerning foreign affairs, except the participation of the Republic of Cyprus in international organizations and pacts of alliance in which Greece and Turkey both participate or concerning defence and security as defined in Annex I.

9. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall have, separately and conjointly, the right to return all laws and decisions, which may be returned to the House of Representatives within a period of not more than 15 days for reconsideration.

The House of Representatives shall pronounce within 15 days on any matter so returned. If the House of Representatives maintains its decisions, the President and the Vice-President shall promulgate the law or decision in question within the time-limits fixed for the promulgation of laws and decisions.

Laws and decisions, which are considered by the President or the Vice-President to discriminate against either of the two communities, shall be submitted to the Supreme Constitutional Court which may annul or confirm the law or decision, or return it to the House of Representatives for reconsideration, in whole or in part. The law or decision shall not become effective until the Supreme Constitutional Court or, where it has been returned the House of Representatives has taken a decision on it.

10. Each community shall have its Communal Chamber composed of a number of representatives which it shall itself determine.

The Communal Chambers shall have the right to impose taxes and levies on members of their community to provide for their needs and for the needs of bodies and institutions under their supervision.

The Communal Chambers shall exercise authority in all religious, educational, cultural and teaching questions, and questions of personal status. They shall exercise authority in questions where the interests and institutions are of a purely communal nature, such as sporting and charitable foundations, bodies and associations, producers' and consumers, co-operatives and credit establishments, created for the purpose of promoting the welfare of one of the communities. (NB. It is understood that the provisions of the present paragraph cannot be interpreted in such a way as to prevent the creation of mixed and communal institutions where the inhabitants desire them.)

These producers' and consumers' co-operatives and credit establishments, which shall be administered under the laws of the Republic, shall be subject to the supervision of the Communal Chambers. The Communal Chambers shall also exercise authority in matters initiated by municipalities which are composed of one community only. These municipalities, to which the laws of the Republic shall apply, shall be supervised in their functions by the Communal Chambers.

Where the central administration is obliged to take over the supervision of the institutions, establishments, or municipalities mentioned in the two preceding paragraphs by virtue of legislation in force, this supervision shall be exercised by officials belonging to the same community as the institution, establishment, or municipality in question.

11. The Civil Service shall be composed as to 70 per cent of Greeks and as to 30 per cent of Turks.

It is understood that this quantitative division will be applied as far as practicable in all grades of the Civil Service.

In regions or localities where one of the two communities is in a majority approaching 100 per cent, the organs of the local administration shall be composed solely of officials belonging to that community.

12. The deputies of the Attorney-General of the Republic, the Inspector-General, the Treasurer and the Governor of the Issuing Bank may not belong to the same community as their principals. The holders of these posts shall be appointed by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic acting in agreement.

13. The heads and deputy heads of the Armed Forces, the Gendarmerie and the Police shall be appointed by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic acting in agreement. One of these heads shall be Turkish and where the head belongs to one of the communities, the deputy head shall belong to the other.

14. Compulsory military service may only be instituted with the agreement of the President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus.

Cyprus shall have an army of 2,000 men, of whom 60 per cent shall be Greek and 40 per cent Turkish.

The security forces (gendarmerie and police) shall have a complement of 2,000 men, which may be reduced or increased with the agreement of both the President and the Vice-President. The security forces shall be composed as to 70 per cent of Greeks and as to 30 per cent of Turks. However, for an initial period this percentage may be raised to a maximum of 40 per cent of Turks (and consequently reduced to 60 per cent of Greeks) in order not to discharge those Turks now serving in the police, apart from the auxiliary police.

15. Forces, which are stationed in parts of the territory of the Republic inhabited, in a proportion approaching 100 per cent, by members of a single community, shall belong to that community.

16. A High Court of Justice shall be established, which shall consist of two Greeks, one Turk and one neutral, nominated jointly by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic.

The President of the Court shall be the neutral judge, who shall have two votes.

This Court shall constitute the highest organ of the judicature (appointments, promotions of judges, etc.).

17. Civil disputes, where the plaintiff and the defendant belong to the same community, shall be tried by a tribunal composed of judges belonging to that community. If the plaintiff and defendant belong to different communities, the composition of the tribunal shall be mixed and shall be determined by the High Court of Justice.

Tribunals dealing with civil disputes relating to questions of personal status and to religious matters, which are reserved to the competence of the Communal Chambers under Point 10, shall be composed solely of judges belonging to the community concerned. The composition and status of these tribunals shall be determined according to the law drawn up by the Communal Chamber and they shall apply the law drawn up by the Communal Chamber.

In criminal cases, the tribunal shall consist of judges belonging to the same community as the accused. If the injured party belongs to another community, the composition of the tribunal shall be mixed and shall be determined by the High Court of Justice.

18. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall each have the right to exercise the prerogative of mercy to persons from their respective communities who are condemned to death. In cases where the plaintiffs and the convicted persons are members of different communities the prerogative of mercy shall be exercised by agreement between the President and the Vice-President. In the event of disagreement the vote for clemency shall prevail. When mercy is accorded the death penalty shall be commuted to life imprisonment.

19. In the event of agricultural reform, lands shall be redistributed only to persons who are members of the same community as the expropriated owners.

Expropriations by the State or the Municipalities shall only be carried out on payment of a just and equitable indemnity fixed, in disputed cases, by the tribunals. An appeal to the tribunals shall have the effect of suspending action.

Expropriated property shall only be used for the purpose for which the expropriation was made. Otherwise the property shall be restored to the owners.

20. Separate municipalities shall be created in the five largest towns of Cyprus by the Turkish inhabitants of these towns. However:

(*a*) In each of the towns a co-ordinating body shall be set up which shall supervise work which needs to be carried out jointly and shall concern itself with matters which require a degree of co-operation. These bodies shall each be composed of two members chosen by the Greek municipalities, two members chosen by the Turkish municipalities and a President chosen by agreement between the two municipalities.

(*b*) The President and the Vice-President shall examine within 4 years the question whether or not this separation of municipalities in the five largest towns shall continue.

With regard to the localities, special arrangements shall be made for the constitution of municipal bodies, following, as far as possible, the rule of proportional representation for the two communities.

21. A Treaty guaranteeing the independence, territorial integrity and constitution of the new State of Cyprus shall be concluded between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, the United Kingdom, and Turkey. A Treaty of military alliance shall also be concluded between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey.

These two instruments shall have constitutional force. (This last paragraph shall be inserted in the Constitution as a basic article.)

22. It shall be recognized that the total or partial union of Cyprus with any other State, or a separatist independence for Cyprus (i.e. the partition of Cyprus into two independent States), shall be excluded.

23. The Republic of Cyprus shall accord most-favoured-nation treatment to Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey for all agreements whatever their nature.

This provision shall not apply to the Treaties between the Republic of Cyprus and the United Kingdom concerning the bases and military facilities accorded to the United Kingdom.

24. The Greek and Turkish Governments shall have the right to subsidise institutions for education, culture, athletics, and charity belonging to their respective communities.

Equally, where either community considers that it has not the necessary number of schoolmasters, professors, or priests for the working of its institutions, the Greek and Turkish Governments may provide them to the extent strictly necessary to meet their needs.

25. One of the following Ministries—the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, or the Ministry of Finance—shall be entrusted to a Turk. If the President and the Vice-President agree they may replace this system by a system of rotation.

26. The new State which is to come into being with the signature of the Treaties shall be established as quickly as possible and within a period of not more than 3 months from the signature of the Treaties.

27. All the above Points shall be considered to be basic articles of the Constitution of Cyprus.

E. A.-T. F. R. Z.

S. L.

† A. M. F. K.

Annex I A

The defence questions subject to veto under Point 8 of the Basic Structure are as follows:

(*a*) Composition and size of the armed forces and credits for them.
(*b*) Appointments and promotions.
(*c*) Imports of warlike stores and of all kinds of explosives.
(*d*) Granting of bases and other facilities to allied countries.

The security questions subject to veto are as follows:

(*a*) Appointments and promotions.
(*b*) Allocation and stationing of forces.
(*c*) Emergency measures and martial law.
(*d*) Police laws.

It is provided that the right of veto shall cover all emergency measures or decisions, but not those which concern the normal functioning of the police and gendarmerie.

(*b*)

TREATY OF GUARANTEE

The Republic of Cyprus of the one part, and Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey of the other part:

I. Considering that the recognition and maintenance of the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, as established and regulated by the basic articles of its Constitution, are in their common interest;

II. Desiring to co-operate to ensure that the provisions of the aforesaid Constitution shall be respected;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution.

It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. With this intent it prohibits all activity tending to promote directly or indirectly either union or partition of the Island.

ARTICLE 2

Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey, taking note of the undertakings by the Republic of Cyprus embodied in Article 1, recognise and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the provisions of the basic articles of its Constitution.

They likewise undertake to prohibit, as far as lies within their power, all activity having the object of promoting directly or indirectly either the union of the Republic of Cyprus with any other State, or the partition of the Island.

ARTICLE 3

In the event of any breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, the United Kingdom, and Turkey undertake to consult together, with a view to making representations, or taking the necessary steps to ensure observance of those provisions.

In so far as common or concerted action may prove impossible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs established by the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 4

The present Treaty shall enter into force on signature.

The High Contracting Parties undertake to register the present Treaty at the earliest possible date with the Secretariat of the United Nations, in accordance with the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter.[1]

E. A.-T. F. R. Z.

S. L.

† A. M. F. K.

[1] 'Treaty Series No. 67 (1946)', Cmd. 7015, p. 21.

(*c*)

TREATY OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, GREECE AND TURKEY

1. The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey shall co-operate for their common defence and undertake by this Treaty to consult together on the problems raised by this defence.

2. The High Contracting Parties undertake to resist any attack or aggression, direct or indirect, directed against the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.

3. In the spirit of this alliance and in order to fulfil the above purpose a tripartite Headquarters shall be established on the territory of the Republic of Cyprus.

4. Greece shall take part in the Headquarters mentioned in the preceding article with a contingent of 950 officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers and Turkey with a contingent of 650 officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus, acting in agreement, may ask the Greek and Turkish Governments to increase or reduce the Greek and Turkish contingents.

5. The Greek and Turkish officers mentioned above shall be responsible for the training of the Army of the Republic of Cyprus.

6. The command of the tripartite Headquarters shall be assumed in rotation and for a period of one year each by a Cypriot, Greek and Turkish General Officer, who shall be nominated by the Governments of Greece and Turkey and by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus.

E. A.-T. F. R. Z.

S. L.

† A. M. F. K.

III

DECLARATION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, having examined the documents concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, comprising the Basic Structure for the Republic of Cyprus, the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance, drawn up and approved by the Heads of the Governments of Greece and Turkey in Zurich on February 11, 1959, and taking into account the consultations in London, from February 11 to 16, 1959, between the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom Declare:

A. That, subject to the acceptance of their requirements as set out in Section B below, they accept the documents approved by the Heads of the Governments of Greece and Turkey as the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus.

B. That, with the exception of two areas at

(*a*) Akrotiri—Episkopi—Paramali, and

(*b*) Dhekelia—Pergamos—Ayios Nikolaos—Xylophagou, which will be retained under full British sovereignty, they are willing to transfer sovereignty over the

Island of Cyprus to the Republic of Cyprus subject to the following conditions:

(1) that such rights are secured to the United Kingdom Government as are necessary to enable the two areas as aforesaid to be used effectively as military bases, including among others those rights indicated in the Annex attached, and that satisfactory guarantees are given by Greece, Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus for the integrity of the areas retained under British sovereignty and the use and enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights referred to above;

(2) that provision shall be made by agreement for:

(i) the protection of the fundamental human rights of the various communities in Cyprus;

(ii) the protection of the interests of the members of the public services in Cyprus;

(iii) determining the nationality of persons affected by the settlement;

(iv) the assumption by the Republic of Cyprus of the appropriate obligations of the present Government of Cyprus, including the settlement of claims.

C. That the Government of the United Kingdom welcome the draft Treaty of Alliance between the Republic of Cyprus, the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey and will co-operate with the Parties thereto in the common defence of Cyprus.

D. That the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus shall come into force and the formal signature of the necessary instruments by the parties concerned shall take place at the earliest practicable date and on that date sovereignty will be transferred to the Republic of Cyprus.

SELWYN LLOYD

ALAN LENNOX-BOYD

E. A.-T.
† A. M.
F. R. Z.
F. K.

Annex

The following rights will be necessary in connexion with the areas to be retained under British sovereignty:

(*a*) to continue to use, without restriction or interference, the existing small sites containing military and other installations and to exercise complete control within these sites, including the right to guard and defend them and to exclude from them all persons not authorised by the United Kingdom Government;

(*b*) to use roads, ports and other facilities freely for the movement of personnel and stores of all kinds to and from and between the above-mentioned areas and sites;

(*c*) to continue to have the use of specified port facilities at Famagusta;

(*d*) to use public services (such as water, telephone, telegraph, electric power, etc.);

(*e*) to use from time to time certain localities; which would be specified, for troop training;

(*f*) to use the airfield at Nicosia, together with any necessary buildings and facilities on or connected with the airfield to whatever extent is considered necessary by the British authorities for the operation of British military aircraft in peace and war, including the exercise of any necessary operational control of air traffic;

(*g*) to overfly the territory of the Republic of Cyprus without restriction;

(*h*) to exercise jurisdiction over British forces to an extent comparable with that provided in Article VII of the Agreement regarding the Status of Forces of Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty,[2] in respect of certain offences committed within the territory of the Republic of Cyprus;

(*i*) to employ freely in the areas and sites labour from other parts of Cyprus;

(*j*) to obtain, after consultation with the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, the use of such additional small sites and such additional rights as the United Kingdom may, from time to time, consider technically necessary for the efficient use of its base areas and installations in Cyprus.

IV

Additional Article to be Inserted in the Treaty of Guarantee

The Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus undertake to respect the integrity of the areas to be retained under the sovereignty of the United Kingdom upon the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights to be secured to the United Kingdom by the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the declaration by the Government of the United Kingdom.

S. L. E. A.-T. F. R. Z.

† A. M. F. K.

V

Declaration made by Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers on February 17, 1959

The Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, having considered the declaration made by the Government of the United Kingdom on February 17, 1959, accept that declaration, together with the document approved by the Heads of the Greek and Turkish Governments in Zurich on February 11, 1959, as providing the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus.

E. AVEROFF-TOSSIZZA

FATIN R. ZORLU

S. L.

†A. M. F. K.

[2] 'Treaty Series No. 3 (1955),' Cmd. 9363.

VI

Declaration made by the Representative of the Greek-Cypriot Community on February 19, 1959

Archbishop Makarios, representing the Greek Cypriot Community, having examined the document concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus drawn up and approved by the Heads of the Governments of Greece and Turkey in Zurich on February 11, 1959, and the declarations made by the Government of the United Kingdom, and by the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey on February 17, 1959, declares that he accepts the documents and declarations as the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus.

† ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS

S. L. E. A.-T. F. R. Z.
F. K.

VII

Declaration made by the Representative of the Turkish-Cypriot Community on February 19, 1959

Dr. Kutchuk, representing the Turkish Cypriot Community, having examined the documents concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus drawn up and approved by the Heads of the Governments of Greece and Turkey in Zurich on February 11, 1959, and the declarations made by the Government of the United Kingdom, and by the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey on February 17, 1959, declares that he accepts the documents and declarations as the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus.

F. KUTCHUK

S. L. E. A.-T. F. R. Z.
† A. M.

VIII

Agreed Measures to Prepare for the New Arrangements in Cyprus

1. All parties to the Conference firmly endorse the aim of bringing the constitution (including the elections of President, Vice-President, and the three Assemblies) and the Treaties into full effect as soon as practicable and in any case not later than twelve months from to-day's date (the 19th of February, 1959). Measures leading to the transfer of sovereignty in Cyprus will begin at once.

2. The first of these measures will be the immediate establishment of:

(*a*) a Joint Commission in Cyprus with the duty of completing a draft constitution for the independent Republic of Cyprus, incorporating the basic structure agreed at the Zurich Conference. This Commission shall be composed of one representative each

of the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot community and one representative nominated by the Government of Greece and one representative nominated by the Government of Turkey, together with a legal adviser nominated by the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, and shall in its work have regard to and shall scrupulously observe the points contained in the documents of the Zurich Conference and shall fulfil its task in accordance with the principles there laid down;

(*b*) a Transitional Committee in Cyprus, with responsibility for drawing up plans for adapting and reorganising the Governmental machinery in Cyprus in preparation for the transfer of authority to the independent Republic of Cyprus. This Committee shall be composed of the Governor of Cyprus, the leading representative of the Greek community and the leading representative of the Turkish community and other Greek and Turkish Cypriots nominated by the Governor after consultation with the two leading representatives in such a way as not to conflict with paragraph 5 of the Basic Structure;

(*c*) a Joint Committee in London composed of a representative of each of the Governments of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, and one representative each of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, with the duty of preparing the final treaties giving effect to the conclusions of the London Conference. This Committee will prepare drafts for submission to Governments covering *inter alia* matters arising from the retention of areas in Cyprus under British sovereignty, the provision to the United Kingdom Government of certain ancillary rights and facilities in the independent Republic of Cyprus, questions of nationality, the treatment of the liabilities of the present Government of Cyprus, and the financial and economic problems arising from the creation of an independent Republic of Cyprus.

3. The Governor will, after consultation with the two leading representatives, invite individual members of the Transitional Committee to assume special responsibilities for particular departments and functions of Government. This process will be started as soon as possible and will be progressively extended.

4. The headquarters mentioned in Article 4 of the Treaty of Alliance between the Republic of Cyprus, the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey will be established three months after the completion of the work of the Commission referred to in paragraph 2 (*a*) above and will be composed of a restricted number of officers who will immediately undertake the training of the armed forces of the Republic of Cyprus. The Greek and Turkish contingents will enter the territory of the Republic of Cyprus on the date when the sovereignty will be transferred to the Republic.

S. L. E. A.-T. F. R. Z.

Appendix D

Interview 1: The Founder of ISTEK Foundation and Honorary President of Yeditepe University, Politician Bedrettin Dalan

Interview 2: The former Permanent Representative of Turkey in UN and son of DP's Minister of Health Dr. Lütfi Kırdar, retired Ambassador Dr. Üner Kırdar

Interview 3: Former Speaker of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Politician Hüsamettin Cindoruk

Interview 4: Daughter of the Third President of Turkey Celal Bayar, Politician Dr. Nilüfer Bayar Gürsoy

Interview 5: The Second President of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Mehmet Ali Talat

Interview 6: The Third President of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Derviş Eroğlu

Interview 7: The Founder of Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT), former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Taner Ergin

Interview 8: Consul General of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus of Istanbul, Fahri Yönlüer

Interview 9: Journalist & Politician Altan Öymen

Interview 10: The Founder of Democrats Club & Writer Mehmet Arif Demirer

Interview 11: Retired Ambassador, Politician Dr. Onur Öymen

Interview 12: Journalist & Writer Hulusi Turgut

Interview 13: The Chief Advisor of Third President of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Prof. Dr. Ata Atun.

Interview 14: Journalist & Writer Nur Batur