BEGUM CEREN CANPOLAT TURKISH AND EUROPEAN REPRESENTATIONS OF THE SYRIAN REFUGEES Bilkent University 2017

TURKISH AND EUROPEAN REPRESENTATIONS OF THE SYRIAN REFUGEES: POLITICAL LEVERAGE VS. HUMANITARIAN IDEALS

A Master's Thesis

by
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Ankara

December 2017

To my mother,

Esin T. Canpolat

TURKISH AND EUROPEAN REPRESENTATIONS OF THE SYRIAN REFUGEES: POLITICAL LEVERAGE VS. HUMANITARIAN IDEALS

The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

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December 2017

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ABSTRACT

TURKISH AND EUROPEAN REPRESENTATIONS OF THE SYRIAN REFUGEES: POLITICAL LEVERAGE VS. HUMANITARIAN IDEALS

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The internal unrest that broke out in 2011 in Syria has caused the biggest refugee influx Europe has seen since the Second World War. Turkey, as Syria's neighbour country, hosts the largest number of Syrian refugees. Due to its geographical position, Turkey plays an important role in shaping European refugee policy. Similarly, Turkey has largely been affected by the negotiations with the EU and by European policies on Syrian refugees. This dissertation attempts to analyze the question of how the Turkish and EU authorities have represented the influx of Syrian refugees and how these representations or constructed perceptions of 'the problem' impacted on their bilateral relations and foreign policies. In order to achieve this goal, the approach of "What is the problem represented to be?" (WPR) has been used as an analytical tool to scrutinize Turkish and European foreign policy

representations and investigate their bilateral relations in accordance with Syrian refugee crisis policies. The methods of the research were a combined effort of literature review, an analysis of official policy documents attained through governmental websites, and a web-based analysis of Turkish and European newspapers. The research has found that despite each actor's/government's representation of the problem as a humanitarian issue, each party tends to prioritize its self-interests and neglect the root causes of the problem in the policy making process.

Keywords: European Union, Foreign Policy, Syrian Refugee Crisis, Turkey, WPR Approach

ÖZET

TÜRKİYE VE AVRUPA'NIN SURİYELİ MÜLTECİLERİ YANSITMASI:
İNSANİ İDEALLERE KARŞI SİYASİ KOZ

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Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Suriye'de 2011'de başlayan iç huzursuzluk Avrupa'nın İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan bu yana şimdiye kadar gördüğü en büyük mülteci akınına yol açtı. Suriye'nin komşusu olarak Türkiye en fazla mülteciyi barındırır durumdadır. Coğrafik konumundan dolayı Türkiye, Avrupa'nın mülteci politikasının şekillendirilmesinde önemli bir rol oynamaktadır. Benzer şekilde Türkiye, Avrupa Birliği ile yaptığı Suriyeli mültecilerle ilgili görüşmelerinden ve Avrupa politikalarından büyük bir ölçüde etkilenmektedir. Bu tez Türk ve Avrupa Birliği otoritelerinin Suriyeli mülteci akınını nasıl yansıttığı ve bu sorun yansımasının veya oluşturulmuş sorun algısının, iki taraf arasındaki karşılıklı ilişkilerini ve dış politikalarını nasıl etkilediği sorularını analiz etmeye yöneliktir. Bu amaçla, "What is the problem represented to be?"

(WPR) (Türkçe: Yansıtılan sorun nedir?) yaklaşımı Türk ve Avrupa Dış Politikası bağlamında, karşılıklı ilişkiler ve Suriyeli Mülteci Krizi politikaları da göz önüne alınarak dikkatle incelenmiştir. Araştırma yöntemleri literatür taraması, devlete bağlı internet sayfalarınca elde edilen resmi dış politika dokümanlarının incelenmesi, Türk ve Avrupa gazetelerinin internetten alınan makalelerinin incelenmesi yönündedir. Bu çalışma sonucu olarak göstermektedir ki her bir aktörün/devletin probleme yaklaşımı hümanist gözükse de, her bir taraf kendi çıkarlarını öncelik olarak koymakta ve sorunun ana kaynağını politika oluştururken göz ardı etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, Dış Politika, Suriyeli Mülteci Krizi, Türkiye, WPR Yaklaşımı

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFAD	Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetim Başkanlığı (in Turkish), Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency
AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (in Turkish, JDP in English)
CEAS	Common European Asylum System
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CHE	Council of Higher Education
CoE	Council of Europe
DAESH	al Dawlah al-Islameyah fi Iraq wal-Sham (in Arabic) Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (in English)
EASO	European Asylum Support Office
EC	European Commission
ECFR	European Council on Foreign Relations
EEAS	European External Action Service
EP	European Parliament
ERIS	European Regional International Society
EU	European Union
FAZ	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
GAMM	Global Approach to Migration and Mobility
IO	International Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IPA	Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance

IS	Islamic State
ISSG	International Syria Support Group
JDP	Justice and Development Party
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
Q&A	Question and Answer
TOKİ	Toplu Konut İdaresi Başkanlığı (Public Housing Development Administration in Enlgish)
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WPR	What is the Problem Represented to be?

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Statement of Research Problem

The civil war in Syria has caused one of the biggest refugee influxes since the Second World War[1]. Turkey, as the largest host country for Syrians escaping the war, has played an important role in shaping the foreign policy dynamics in the region. Syrian asylum seekers have become a challenge both for European Union (EU) and Turkey. Consequently the outbreak of Syrian refugee crisis has significantly influenced the subsequent relations between Turkey and EU. The ongoing Syrian civil war increases the number of Syrians crossing Turkish borders and this holds an important share of foreign policy concerns both for Turkish and European policy makers. According to the data, the Syrian refugee flow towards the neighboring countries began in the early April 2011. Same year in June the military siege of Jisr al-Shughour in the northwestern part of the Syria triggered a major flow of people into Turkey. Towards the end of 2011, Turkey had already spent up to $15 million in order to set up six camps for thousands of refugees. As UN High

[1] According to the report published by International Committee of the Red Cross at the end of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995 the number of the refugees and internally displaced person was more than 3 million in total. (https://www.icrc.org/ara/assets/files/other/781_806_young.pdf - RICR Septembre IRRC September 2001 Vol. 83 No 843) . In 2015 and the first months of 2016, while the conflict is still ongoing, almost 1.2 million refugees and migrants reached European shores according to UNHCR data (http://www.unhcr.org/europe-emergency.html) 4.8 million registered Syrian refugees are far from their home and the number of internally displaced persons has now reached 6.3 million (http://www.unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html).

Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres indicated, "[w]ith an average 6,000 people a day fleeing conflict in Syria by summer 2013", such a high number of refugee flight was not experienced since the Rwandan Genocide in 1994 (MPC, 2013). However, the conflict escalated. In September 2013 Germany agreed to resettle 5,000 Syrian refugees to stay for two years (UNHCR). In November 2013, when Bulgaria built fences on Turkish border, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Guterres urged European countries to open their borders for the refugees, who are the first victims of civil war.[2] Only in 2014 UK announced through its foreign office that it will take Syrian refugees. In July 2014 EU Home Affairs Minister Cecillia Malmström stated Syria's neighbors accepted over 3 million refugees, while Europe only 100,000.[3] In April 2015, during the EU summit in Brussels it was stated that majority of the migrants who manage to reach Italy would be deported, and the European Council also decided that only 5,000 resettlement places would be offered to refugees under the emergency summit crisis package (MPC, 2015). By June 2015, in Global Trends Report UNHCR informs that the number of the displaced people in the world hits the historical maximum of 59.5 million, more than ever (UNHCR, 2017). Seeing that the world is living in an era where one in 122 humans on earth is either a refugee, an internally displaced person, or an asylum seeker (UNHCR, 2017), migration and refugee policies become a crucial part of foreign policy.

Therefore, using crisis as some kind of leverage towards each other, Turkish and the European policy makers caused changes in each other's foreign policy implemented towards each other. However most of the existing literature (Alessandri, 2010; Lecha, 2012; Davutoğlu, 2012; Kardaş, 2012; Verheugen, 2012)

[2] See; euronews.com, 2013
[3] See; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0dFVmfBZcoY . By WochitGeneralNews

only provides a one sided analysis of the actor's foreign policy-making process. They approach the issue either from the Turkish or European side. There is a need for systematically investigating the already existing Turkey- EU literature (Lavanex & Uçarer, 2004; Diez et al., 2004; Rumelili, 2004; Aydın &Açıkmeşe, 2007; Keyman &Aydın-Düzgit, 2013; Yaka, 2016) together with the relatively new Syrian refugee influx literature (Lavanex, 2001; Fargues &Fandrich, 2012; Carrera et al., 2015). This study aims to provide a double sided analysis, instead of a one-way analytical approach. In order to achieve that an analytical model called 'what's the problem represented to be' (Bacchi, 2009) will be used to demonstrate how foreign policy processes have developed in accordance with the ways in which Turkish and European actors have represented/reformulated the Syrian refugee problem, and the relevant policy actions to solve it.

1.2. Objectives and Significance of the Study

This research is aimed at examining on how susceptible decision making process is to both internal and external factors in the context of political dynamics between Turkey and the EU. How do Turkish and European policy makers construct the refugee 'problem'[4] and represent the policy for that specific problem? While both Turkish and European policy makers are making their foreign policy concerning the Syrian refugee crisis, they are affecting and been affected by this foreign policy making processes. The Syrian refugee crisis affected and changed the Turkey-EU

[4] 'Problem' here refers to Syrian crisis with Bacchi's understanding of problem; "policies 'claim' to 'fix' things; hence, by their nature they assume the existence of a 'problem' that needs 'fixing'"

relations from an already troubled status (e.i. the accession process) to a more intelligible relation, and this research targets to investigate the relation causing this shift in Turkey-EU relation. In other words this research addresses both representations of Syrian refugee conflict and Turkey-EU relations with the involvement of the Europe after 2013 (MPC, 2013). In the light of these issues, the main research question is formulated in the following way:

How have the Turkish and EU authorities represented the influx of Syrian refugees and how have these representations or constructed perceptions of 'the problem' impacted on their bilateral relations and foreign policies?

While addressing this question, the focus will remain on the processes of foreign policies' problematization regarding the Syrian conflict. More specifically, it will be on how the Syrian refugee crisis has impacted the perspectives of both Turkish and European foreign policy actors. This alteration in perspectives will also reflect on the problematization of refugees as a policy matter. Because the problematization of the Syrian refugee influx has been embedded to the relations between EU and Turkey, the problematization process should be investigated bilaterally.

1.3. Literature Review

This thesis is an attempt to provide a bilateral evaluation of the Syrian refugee conflict by investigating the specifics of the Turkey- EU relations including the representation of Syrian refugees by the Turkish and European authorities and the influence of these representations on the parties formulation of the relevant

policy approaches. The relevant literature contains a wide range of studies conducted on the impact of the EU on the conflicts close to its border, as it includes Turkey's relations with its entourage and its foreign policy with regard to the EU. Foreign policy, as a field of study, is an important area of engagement in world politics due to its potential to link academic debates with contemporary international relations dynamics (Smith, Hadfield & Dunne, 2012).

The existing studies on the policy formation processes in Turkey and the EU appear to approach the issues encountered in the course of relations between the two either from the European side and omit Turkey's reflection on the EU policies regarding non-member states (Sofos, 2001; Knil & Lehmkuhl, 2002; Diez et al., 2005), or look at it from the Turkish perspective and exclude the effects of the EU policies on domestic processes in Turkey (Baban & Keyman, 2008; Rumelili, 2011). In addition to these narrowly articulated analytical approaches, a third deficiency exists in the emerging literature on Turkey - EU relations after the Syrian civil war (Kardaş, 2012; Verheugen, 2012; Lecha, 2012; Davutoğlu, 2012). Consequently, the literature can be categorized into three main sections. The first group of the literature represents the EU influence over Turkey and can be examined by dividing it mainly into three subsections; namely, its effects on Turkish foreign policy, implications for Turkey's internal political structures and effects on its identity. In order to do it properly, this part of the literature will also include a brief examination of the Europeanization literature where relevant. The second section of the literature review will be focusing on the Turkish perspective on the EU and its accession process. Finally the third section of the literature will be focusing on the analysis of the

Turkey-EU relations following the outbreak of the Syrian crisis; specifically the merging of the Syrian conflict into the EU-Turkey relations.

In the first section of the literature review, EU influence over its neighbors and non-member states, such as Turkey, will be analyzed in three subsections; (1) influence over countries' foreign affairs, (2) influence over domestic affairs, and (3) normative power over countries' identity. Firstly, among various studies regarding the EU's influence over non-member states closer to its border, scholars appear to agree on the idea that the EU has a transformative power not only over its members but also over non-member states. For instance Lavanex and Uçarer (2004) draw attention to the EU's use of asylum and immigration policies as means to assert its power outside of its border. Even though the term 'Europeanization' mainly refers to the effects of the EU integration process on a state level among its member states (Knill & Lehmkuhl, 2002), it also refers to the broader impact of the EU policies beyond its borders which is framed as the "external dimensions of Europeanization" (Lavanex & Uçarer, 2004: 419). One of the most prominent ways to analyze the EU's impact is through theoretical categorization by Diez, Stetter and Albert (2004). Their formulation evolves around the power typology by Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (2005), and asserts that there are four paths of EU impact (Diez et al., 15). These four categories are (1) compulsory impact, (2) enabling impact, (3) connective impact, and (4) constructive impact (Ibid.). This formulation is being echoed in many other works. For instance, Rumelili (2004) uses this framework to analyze the EU impact on the Greek-Turkish conflict.

The term Europeanization is often used in the context of the introduction or transfer of policies and practices from the EU to member as well as candidate states.

In his 1994 work, Ladrech (1994) defined it as “an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making” (70). Similarly, Borzel (1999: 564) conceptualized Europeanization as “a process by which domestic policy areas become increasingly subject to European policy-making”. Aydın and Açıkmeşe (2007) interpret Europeanization “as a new framework for analyzing the EU dynamics” (264) and apply it to the examination of Turkish foreign policy. They outline three types of foreign policy conditionality, which have been employed by the EU on Turkey. The first type of conditionality is through the acquis concerning common foreign and security policy (CFSP) which currently holds NATO responsible for the territorial security of Europe, which Turkey also takes part in. The second type is via a set of political criteria which aims to eliminate non-compliance with the Copenhagen criteria while mediations, also which is one of the core conditions for candidacy (Aydın & Açıkmeşe, 2007: 268). Thus, both external dimensions of Europeanization and conditionality approaches appear to provide a coherent explanation for EU policies’ influence on Turkey’s foreign policy, as a non-member country. In addition to these approaches, more specifically, Diez, Agnantopoulos, and Kaliber (2005) analyze the Europeanization effect on Turkey’s domestic transformation with reference to “policy-Europeanization, political Europeanization, societal Europeanization and discursive Europeanization” (4). Similarly, Spyros Sofos (2001) assesses Turkey-EU relations and Turkey’s interactions with the EU and comes to the conclusion that Turkey either reconciles with EU recommendations or opposes them (257). Thus, a broad conceptualization of the Europeanization and its integrative power upon foreign

affairs has been the main reference point for many researchers in their study of EU-Turkey relations.

In this second section, a narrower perspective to the EU's influence over domestic issues in specific to Turkish domestic policy will be reviewed briefly. Even before the Arab Spring there was an ambiguity about Turkey's Europeanization process. Bölükbaşı and his colleagues (2010) claim that there is an inclination towards taking Europeanization for domestic change occurred with the impulse of membership conditionality. However there are more impulses to Turkey's Europeanization process than just membership conditionality. Turkish authorities within a European framework aim to achieve better infrastructure for its own citizens such as standardization in transportation systems. Although a significant share of the concept Europeanization is based upon influence of cost-benefit analysis over domestic transformation based on the acquis, it also includes a deeper and broader cultural perspective (Kaliber, 2012: 229).

At this point the third type of influence comes in; the normative impact, which is another perspective towards Europeanization through identity building. Some scholars, such as Çamyar and Tagma (2010: 375) and Eralp (2009) discuss the normative, transformative power of Europe as a means to Westernize Turkey. Those normative powers are also referred to as democratization, secularization, and proliferation of liberalism and human rights (Müftüler-Baç, 2003; Tocci, 2003). Yet one should keep in mind that none of the identities is ever fixed or predetermined, both Turkey's and EU's identities are thus subject to change. For instance, Kirişçi (2006) demonstrates the shift in Turkish policy makers' behavior in relation to EU as being from Hobbesian to Kantian. In other words, a European norm, once has been

received as a positive social contract by Turkish citizens, can now be looked upon more suspiciously. For that reason even though EU had once normative impact on Turkey, it is certainly not permanent and slowly fading away. Although Europeanization literature provides an extensive perspective on EU countries effect on Turkish government, I do not expect it to be relevant and applicable for this study. Now that the EU's impact upon Turkey is covered, the second section of the literature review can be introduced, which is Turkey's perspective on EU.

Second group of the literature covers the works regarding the Turkish perspective on the EU and its accession process. Turkey's first involvement with European integration dates back to 1963 when the Ankara Agreement was signed. Yet the customs union between Turkey and the EU only entered into force in 1996. However in 1987 Turkey applied to join European Economic Community, and became eligible to join the EU in 1997[5] and in 1999 Turkey was granted the candidate status at the Helsinki summit. Since then 16 chapters were opened though one being temporarily closed[6] yet Turkey still remains as a candidate country. Eventually this never ending candidacy status fueled despair among Turkish actors, which caused a change in perception and subjective understandings of Turkish decision-makers. To understand clearly how subjectiveness can change perceptions, Baban and Keyman (2008) indicate that Turkey's membership would transform the EU into a multicultural cosmopolitan rather than Turkey's Westernization.

Another offered identity approach is: "the Turk has been and continues to serve as a key 'Other' in the definition of European identity" (Neumann and Welsh

[5] European Commission's web site retrieved in December 2016. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/turkey_en

[6] Republic of Turkey Ministry for EU Affairs. *History of Turkey- EU Relations* http://www.ab.gov.tr/111_en.html. Retrieved in 07.06.2017.

1991)(Rumelili, 2011). Turkey may not be a member of the EU however it has been a crucial partner of European politics due to its memberships to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the Council of Europe (CoE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Thus, as Rumelili also points out (2011: 236), Turkish authorities take active part in all afore mentioned institutions of the European regional international society (ERIS) except the EU. Throughout time this discourse of non-acceptance within the accession process created a pattern for both Turkish and European side. They started to redefine their relations and assess each other's action based on that pattern.

Thirdly and finally, with the outbreak of the Arab Spring, studies regarding the Turkey - EU relations started to take different directions, especially with the Syrian refugee crisis. While the ruling party, JDP (Justice and Development Party, AKP in Turkish) has become more suspicious towards European policies (Davutoğlu 2012), Turkish policy makers have also revised its foreign policy priorities with respect to its neighbors, more precisely towards Syria; "Turkey has evolved from a status-quo power to a more assertive and interventionist actor" (Lecha, 2012: 2). This changing foreign policy orientation has been characterized by the formulation of new principles, concepts under Davutoğlu era. Lecha (2012) highlights the significance of the words and in his text review some of the concepts that are commonly used in both the political discourse and the academic debates of Turkish policy planners, such as strategic depth, emerging power, foreign policy agency, multidimensional foreign policy, autonomy, multilateralism, rhythmic diplomacy, EU bid, strategic dialogue, zero problems with neighbors, soft power and so on.

Thirdly, and finally, literature about Turkey's stand in the Syrian crisis mostly concentrated around the argument that "the conflict in Syria – has forced Turkey's diplomacy to revise not only its priorities but also its conceptual architecture" (Lecha, 2011: 1). For example, Altunışık and Tür in 2008, before Syrian conflict, wrote about how Turkey and Syria came to be partners from being distant neighbors. Coalition shifts can clearly be observed in the academic discourses, as the political transformation that has been brought by this turmoil in the Middle East and Africa may bring Turkey and Europe closer. Verheugen (2012), a German politician, for instance, draws attention to the shared values between the two parties, such as shared neighborhood or common strategy for stability and economic development, which may increase the potential for the cooperation. Similarly, Lecha (2011) discusses the prospect of a "joint strategy" between Turkey and the EU in the follow up;

> Rather than creating new institutional mechanisms, which could be perceived by Turkey as the materialization of a "privileged partnership," that is, a consolation prize for the EU's rejection of Turkey's full membership, EU actors (particularly the External Action Service) could approach Turkey not as an ordinary candidate country but as a quasi-member state, which in many respects, Turkey already is since its entry into the EU Custom Union. (34)

Likewise, although Kardaş (2012) acknowledges some difficulties such as enforcement of regime change, by "facilitating a coalition at the regional-global nexus" (1), Turkey has an important responsibility for the region. When it comes to the terms of this partnership between Turkey and the EU, there has been some ambiguity over the international community's expectations from Turkey. "Turkey is expected in some [western] circles to lead international efforts to end the actions perpetrated by the Baath regime" (Kardaş, 2012). So it seems so that Turkey is an important regional actor that can play a key role in the region. However what kind of

role and on what ground this role is shaped varies among each actor's perspective, actor meaning foreign policy makers of each side. First each side has a different point of view for the kind of role Turkey should play. For instance should Turkish policy makers solely facilitate the negotiations on global level or coerce a coalition to forge a military intervention? Secondly on what ground this role is given to Turkey? Is it because Turkey is geographically close to the conflict or because it is a respected authority, who has the power to convince other regional countries? Due to the shared border, Turkish politicians' fear from Syrian civil war spillover and turn into a wider regional conflict reflects on its foreign policy behavior in many different ways.

After 2011, because of the spillover effect of the Syrian war, Turkey's position and prestige in the region has seriously been affected, which led Walker (2012) to come up with two scenarios. First scenario is "Limited Intervention through a Buffer Zone plus Covert Assistance to the Free Syrian Army" and second scenario is "Internationally Sanctioned and Supported Military Intervention" (Walker, 2012: 5). Distinctively Kınıklıoğlu (2011) argues that there is a "new Turkey" emerging and "[t]his new Turkey is not content with a fragile, unfair and unequal relationship with Europe" (68). Hence one of Turkey's foreign policy impulses is then to re-establish the terms of its relations with its Western neighbors and in a similar vein to attain new regional positions. Following the same "new Turkish foreign policy" trend, Alessandri (2010) opposes the prevailing argument that Turkish policy makers' recent endeavor in the Middle East shows that policy makers are losing interest towards the West. Until stability is reached in the Middle East, Syrian conflict will remain as a groundbreaking aspect of the foreign policy in

both Turkey and EU. To be able to adjust the changes they both need to diversify their foreign policy and balance between resources and expectations. It is also important to pay attention to what has been normalized and notice what has been disregarded by the common practices and preferences, which is Lecha (2012) suggests through analyzing political discourse.

The above mentioned literature showed us that Turkey-EU relations have been examined through a variety of lenses, however this research omits to reveal what is really hidden under the policy and disregard a part of the conflict to make their point. Clearly they successfully demonstrate that Turkey, as a sovereign state and EU candidate, and EU, as a regional actor, cannot generate foreign policy in full autonomy from each other. However there is a clear lack of literature that combines the multiple perspectives on the ways in which they influence each other. Therefore this research aims to contribute to the literature by analyzing multiple perspectives in line with each other's action - reaction process for both Turkish and EU authorities in their foreign policy preferences towards Syrian conflict. This bilateral study is an attempt to investigate whether the actors (i.e. Turkish and EU policy makers) are self-interested or committed to the identities they constructed.

1.4. Methodology

This research will use qualitative discourse analysis of official statements, media sources and various policy documents to demonstrate the pattern of foreign policy of the EU and Turkish policy makers regarding Syrian refugees. This analysis centers on both the Turkish and the European problematization process through

analyzing the problem representations rather than the 'problems' as they are the ones that foreign policies based on. Foreign policy can be described as a way governments express their preferences molded through time and traditions (Bacchi, 2009). In this context, referring to time, the historical foreign policy practices that a country has had, and by traditions, the lessons gained from those experiences and used as foreign policy tool repeatedly so it becomes a tradition are been intended. Policy makers who are a part of their social environment inevitably shape their ideas and perceptions with influence of their historical background and traditions. Therefore, in order to have an analytical examination of the policy I will conduct a textual analysis of the policy documents and speeches that may help to see some of the major impulses behind the policy-making process. I will be borrowing Carol Bacchi's approach to investigate the meanings lying under policies and what has been disregarded during the making of the policy in question. Since this topic can be analyzed from each entity's experience from the past till today, for the sake of precision, this study will be interpreting their foreign policies for one of the current major dilemmas in the international realm; the Syrian refugee flow. 'What's the problem represented to be?' approach by Bacchi provides a helpful framework to shed light on how Turkish and European policy makers have understood and represented the problem, referred to as the "Syrian refugee crisis". Actor's "[c]haracterization of the 'problem" becomes the starting point to be able to understand how an issue is being understood (Bacchi, 2009: xi).

Bacchi's policy analysis tool is structured on six interrelated questions;

1. What's the 'problem' (e.g. of 'problem gamblers', 'drug use/abuse', domestic violence, global warming, health inequalities, terrorism, etc.) represented to be in a specific policy?

2. What presuppositions or assumptions underlie this representation of the 'problem'?
3. How has this representation of the 'problem' come about?
4. What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the silences? Can the 'problem' be thought about differently?
5. What effects are produced by this representation of the 'problem'?
6. How/where has this representation of the 'problem' been produced, disseminated and defended? How could it be questioned, disrupted and replaced? (Bacchi, 2009: 2)

Using this framework as an analytical tool, this study aims to (1) inquire the complexities of the policies proposed by Turkey and the EU, (2) highlight the presuppositions or assumptions that actors have had during the problematization of the issue for foreign policy making process, and (3) identify what has been included / disregarded and how the EU and Turkey have framed and reframed their foreign policies towards Syrians. This research will analyze the foreign policies of the EU and Turkey since 2011 when the Syrian civil war broke out. This analysis will highlight the problem representations by specifying the perceptions of policy-makers. As Hudson (2005: 1) makes the point by stating "[u]nderstanding how humans perceive and react to the world around them is central to the inquiry of social scientists". This methodology will help us look into the specific aspects of the problematization process regarding Syrian refugees in both the Turkish and European policy-making contexts. As Bacchi reminds us every policy goes through a particular problematization process. At the end of this problematization process, when policy-makers come to agree on the problem, they generate the policy to solve the described problem. Hence, foreign policies can be analyzed as a discursive reenactment of what is to be presented as the problem(s).

1.5. Thesis Structure

Having outlined the objectives and scope of this introduction chapter, the theoretical framework used in this thesis will be elaborated on in the following chapter. It provides discussion of the realist, the constructivist, and the post-structural approaches to the analysis of foreign policy. Including the reasons why, 'what's the problem represented to be?' approach by Carol Bacchi will also be provided in the examination of the problematization and the accompanying policy-making processes. In the third chapter, through a political discourse analysis Turkish policy makers' way of representing the problem and how it has constructed its foreign policy accordingly will be explored. In the fourth chapter, the ways in which the EU constructs its 'self' image and represents the problem of the Syrian refugees for policy making processes will be investigated. Major impacts of the problem representation on its foreign policy towards the issue will be provided. Finally, chapter 5 consist of concluding remarks by summarizing the findings and recapping the key arguments discussed in the thesis. In addition to that, it will also include a summarized bilateral interpretation of the Turkey - EU relations with respect to their foreign policies towards an externally rooted problem is presented, reference to both the represented problems and each side's devised policy.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Foreign policies, writes Hansen, "rely upon representations of identity, but it is also through the formulation of foreign policy that identities are produced and reproduced" (Hansen, 2006: 1). Following Hansen it can be said that foreign policy is a discursive practice, which combines subjective ideas, such as the answer to the question 'who we are', with more material element of the policy. And this formation of subjective and material elements are reciprocal, subjective ideas have effect on the practice as much as practice have on the subjective. Since the perception and practice are so interrelated with each other, it is incommensurable to study one without the other. In addition to this ensemble of ideal and material, policy discourse, by its nature, is social. As policy makers shape the discourse to legitimize their understanding of events and their opinions towards the issue, they promote their representations officially and publicly not only towards their opponents but also towards the citizens. For this chapter, it will be appropriate to present a brief theoretical account of foreign policy analysis continued with why 'what's the problem represented to be?' is being chosen as a policy analysis tool. First part will concern the development of foreign policy theories in IR. Second part will introduce the link that post-structuralists establish with the real world. Finally the third part will present the liaison between the theory and methodology.

2.1. Foreign Policy Theories

When looked at from the perspective of Realism, actions of states including foreign policy are determined either by human nature or the structure of the international system. A majority of the IR texts, such as those produced by Carr, Niebuhr, Angell, Morgenthau, Herz, Wolfers, and Waltz around the positivist school of thought in IR around the 1950's and 60's. Related to that, foreign policy was inspected within the framework of agent-structure relations. When it has come to 70's, with Waltz's (1979) work on theory, classical positivist epistemology was challenged. After that point, the focus of IR texts deviated from classical to more abstract and historical. These types of shifts were also parallel in foreign policy analysis. A theoretical divergence in International Relations texts can also reflect in foreign policy analysis. International relations, as commonly defined, is a discipline that studies relations between actors, either governmental or nongovernmental. In addition to that, it also examines more broadly global interactions processes. Foreign policy is a subfield of this discipline. Although policy actors and their impulses during policy making have been an area of interest to historians for very long time, foreign policy analysis, as a sub-field, met international relations discipline in late 1950's; with Snyder and his colleagues 1954, with James Rosenau in 1964, with Harold and Margaret Sprout in 1956. Together with R.C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and B. Sapin have introducing *Decision Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics* (1954), they all have drawn attention on decision-making process as part of the explanation for foreign policy outcomes (53). Further on Harold and Margaret Sprout in *Man-Milieu Relationship Hypothesis in the Context*

of International Politics (1956) put emphasis on 'psycho-milieu' of individuals, which entails examination of psychological and social contexts. Thirdly Rosenau in *Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy* (1966) developed actor specific theory and also "... encouraged scholars to systematically and scientifically tease out cross-nationally applicable generalizations about nation-state behavior" (Hudson, 2008: 16). Hence Rosenau encouraged middle-range theory, which will bridge the gap between abstract principles and complex reality. Subsequently Valery M. Hudson considers these studies as the three core paradigmatic works of the "first generation" of foreign policy analysis. Clearly there is a need for middle-range theories in order not to be limited within specific theoretical boundaries and also to be able to go beyond the individual with the individual.

The second generation of classical foreign policy analysis, although it builds upon the first, has moved towards framing the aspects of the decision-making process. Among a large number of scholars, there are several perspectives that prevail. Those are small-group decision making, organizational process and bureaucratic politics, comparative foreign policy, psychological influences on foreign policy decision making, and societal milieu (Hudson, 2008: 19). Each of them takes a different aspect of foreign policy to its center and develops around it. In order to have a better understanding, one should also be able to make connection between international relations theories and foreign policies of states. The common understanding about theories is that they are climbing up on the ladder of abstraction and sets the organizing principle to cope with the massive amount of information, while trying to understand and explain foreign policy outcomes. However one thing is generally disregarded; the fact that they are not solely organizing the data, while

doing so they also imply specific policy options based on their core assumptions. As Trine Flockhart (2008) also argues "'the world is of our making'(Onuf, 1989) conviction challenges the realist view and liberal perspective in many ways but also in foreign policy analysis" (79). Among the second generation FP analysts, those who work on psychological and societal milieu of foreign policy decision making draws attention to the impact of role perceptions and images in foreign policy. Kal Holsti (1970) elaborates on 'national role conception' and aims to disclose the way a state views itself and its place in the international system. While Holsti's work is directed to investigate elite perceptions, Hudson argues that "perception of national role is also influenced by societal character, a product of the nation's socialization process" (2008: 25). Social characteristics of a nation influence the members' perceptions of the society and create a social pattern in making sense of the events around then. Considering national role as a social construction, I argue that policy behaviors are influenced by both of them; elite and societal perception. In studying the role of societal groups on foreign policy, Hudson categorizes the work by Kaarbo (1993), Skidmore and Hudson (1993), and Van Belle (1993) as the "second wave" (2008: 25). Although this "second wave" studied the effect of perceptions on policies, they were based on a single level of analysis. Only after the Cold War that multilevel foreign policy analysis started to emerge in the academic IR debates. Since there is not a single trigger or cause of the foreign policy action, it makes perfect sense to study it on multiple levels. For instance, with the presence of domestic concerns such as elections, politicians tend to behave differently towards other countries. As Laura Neack asserts, "It is [...] impossible to truly isolate one level from the other levels […] Not only is it analytically impossible to isolate one

level from another, it would also be foolhardy to make pronouncements or policy decisions using but a single-level analysis in an era of globalization" (Neack, 2008: 12). Therefore a study of foreign policy decision making on a single level is certainly neither sufficient nor possible. A combination of multiple levels will have the potential to provide a better understanding of the situation or issue in question.

2.2. Poststructuralism and Foreign Policy

On one hand, the basis of the post-structuralist assumption and its connection to discourse analysis is that it does not rely on the so-called 'objective' facts but it occurs through policy discourses and practices. On the other hand, post-structuralists, different from the other critical thought, can also share the same concerns with traditional realism like power and state sovereignty.

According to Lene Hansen, "foreign policies are dependent upon particular representations of the countries, places, and people that such policies are assisting or deterring, as well as on representations of the national or institutional Self that undertakes these policies" (2006: 95). It is therefore that objectivity or the accuracy of what being told does not matter. Instead what really matters is what kind of norms and values are tried to be created through the language. Language, Walker describes it "a medium of both communication and mystification" (Walker 1986: 495). It is through language that people generate meaning. By means of this function of the language that discourse analysis made its way to foreign policy analysis. The earliest examples of discourse analysis in the discipline of IR were provided by post-structuralists, such as Ashley (1987), Der Derian (1987), Walker (1987), and Shapiro

(1988), who were also inspired by eminent scholars as Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida.

Later in the 90's and 2000's, spread through the important contribution made to current events, such as ethics and the politics of humanitarian intervention (Campbell, 1998), European integration and identity formation (Neuman, 1999; Hansen and Waever, 2003), and the war on terror (Walker, 2006). In other words, post-structuralism appears to find its place among the current events more easily compared to constructivism (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 219). With the means of this solid link that post-structuralists establish with the real events, it constitutes a connection between discourse analysis and foreign policy analysis. This being noted, it is also important to remind that discourse analysis is not just a methodology but also an influential approach to foreign policy, just as language and identity are not the same (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 199)

There are three main realist traits that post-structuralists take into consideration and built upon; groupism, egoism, and power-centrism (Hansen, 2006: 96). To begin with the groupism, just like realism, post-structuralists also put states at the center of the research scope and asserts that state sovereignty draw the line for inside-outside dichotomy (Walker, 1993). This inside-outside distinction provides necessary foundations for people to answer the question of "who we are?" (Walker, 1990: 12) or what makes the difference between us and them, which are also the bases for their identities? This may seem similar with the realist assumption of humans gather in groups and bound them with a social contract for survival. However what differ post-structuralists from realists is the realization of the reproduction process of inside-outside distinction throughout time. While the realist

assumption takes this distinction as granted, post-structuralists take it as a social construction which is still reproducing itself in discourses. While the realists hold the inside-outside distinction because they claim that it reflects and describes how the world is, post-structuralists hold on to inside-outside distinction because through referring to each other they create a dichotomy, which enforces each other's existence. As in the foreign policy "[t]he construction of the 'foreign' is made possible by practices that also constitute the 'domestic'" (Campbell, 1998: 62). So that the orderly inside and the chaotic outside outset each other's existence, such as good and bad. This argument is reflected in the French philosopher Derrida's work. According to him language is a kind of semiotic structure in which words become meaningful as long as they have antonyms. So "the outside is known as the radical opposite of the inside and, vice versa, the inside is only meaningful because it is the antitheses of the outside" (Hansen, 2006: 98). Therefore, until post-structuralists draw attention to this dichotomy, all theories and researches about the foreign policy and domestic policy kept using this distinction, thus kept reproducing it.

Apart from the inside-outside assumption, there are two more core realist assumptions that post-structuralists both draw upon and challenge; egoism and power. To proceed with egoism, realists believe that egoism is rooted deep in human nature, which reflects on political and social behavior, ends up with humans acting on their self-interests. Nevertheless, though post-structuralists also agree that politics including foreign policy being driven by self-interests, they claim that interests are the outcome of discursive processes that are expressed through language. "National interests… are social constructions that emerge out of a ubiquitous and unavoidable process of representation"(Weldes, 1999: 15). In other words, rather than being

passive bystanders whose interests are automatically determined by certain supposedly fixed or innate factors and concerns, "states are actively involved in the construction of their own national interests through processes of interpretation and representation" (Sahin, 2014: 6). Since post-structuralists are more concerned with the public texts and discourses, whether humans are rational or irrational, or egoistic or altruistic does not really matter, because these are also dichotomies that shape our thinking. Post-structuralists try to bring out what remains outside of these dichotomies and challenge their power, which is called deconstruction.

Foreign policy, as Hansen puts it, "plays a central role in producing not just the boundary between inside and outside, but the 'we' who enact foreign policy" (2006: 99). Construction of the 'we' accumulates into an identity pattern. An open-ended transformative process guided by the changes in power relation fluctuation brought about. Looking from the post-positivists lenses, it is possible to realize that the distinction between a good *self* and radically different *other* embedded within foreign policy discourse which creates identity dynamics. So if self-interests should be mentioned, the fact that it is shaped by the identity dynamics, which is also shaped by discourse cannot be overlooked. As Hansen describes it, "identities are invoked as the precondition for foreign policy decisions and implementations, for example by the claim that 'we are going to war against Taliban to protect the liberal values that define who we are'" (2006: 99). This reference to identity in the foreign policy action shows us that how identity reconstructs itself in every foreign policy action. Therefore as Judith Butler says identity is "constituted by the very 'expression' that are said to be its result of it" (1990: 25). Consequently each time we claim that we are acting in a certain way because this is our identity/who we are

than we perform the discourse. Hence it could be stated that identity is 'performative' according to post-structuralists. At this point we can distinguish constructivists from post-structuralists because this particular understanding of identity also puts post-structuralists in a different position from constructivists. According to constructivists, identities underlie actors' interests and are shaped by "their shared knowledge" that refers to "any belief an actor takes to be true" (Wendt, 1999: 140-1). In rationalist theories actors are held as if their interests and identities are autogenous (Reus-Smit, 2005: 192). It is rather the case, according to constructivists, that "identities are constituted by the institutional norms, values and ideas of the social environment in which they act" (Reus-Smit, 2005: 199). Identities, in other words, are socially constructed through knowledgeable practices. This, Wendt suggests, includes actors' knowledge about "anarchy", which according to Realists, is characterized by a self-help situation that determines state behavior, and makes identity formation irrelevant. For post-structuralists, on the other hand, identities are "performatively" constituted through representational differentiation in discourses (Campbell, 1998). This means that identities are not "stable" entities. Rather they need to be "stabilized" through drawing borders or distinguishing a "self" from an "other", an "inside" from an "out-side", and "domestic" from "foreign" when such distinctions become blurred (Campbell, 1998: 8, 69-72). Thus this particular approach to identity draws the line between post-structuralist perspective to identity, and liberal and constructivist perspective to identity, due to owing to taking identity as a variable independent from discourse. To come back to the self-interest assumption, as explained above, our interests are defined by who we are, and sooner or later this is what makes us egoists or altruists. On that Hopf claims

that identities are the basis of interests that tells us “who we are” (1998) that defines what our intentions are. Therefore we should not limit our thinking within the dichotomy of egoist-altruist, rather we should move outside of it when we think of foreign policy.

Lastly the third realist assumption that post-structuralists took and built upon is ‘power’. Power, according to realists, is a key element of politics. Barnett and Duvall (2005:50) define power as ‘productive power’ which is totally different from the realist way of defining power; ‘compulsory power’. According to realists, power is being able to use material resources in order to achieve one’s interests even it is opposing with other’s interests. Notwithstanding, post-structuralists define power as “the constitution of all social subjects with various social powers through system of knowledge and discursive practices of broad and general social scope” (Barnett & Duvall, 2005: 55). At this point, the difference between realists and post-structuralists rely on its scope. For post-structuralists, power is embedded within the language as discourse constitutes actors, identities, subjects and objects. Since the discourse is always present, it can be applied to every state, not only great powers. From a post-positivist perspective, one can easily include the marginalized ones into study of power, such as stateless people. Hence post-positivist perspective encaptures all the important aspects of the event, while the realist perspective omits to dwell upon.

2.3. Bridging Theory with Methodology

This thesis will provide an analysis of official discourses from a poststructuralist perspective of foreign policy. Taking post-structuralism as the theoretical foundation, through a study of foreign discourse we can proceed to a more in-depth study, including the details we tend to overlook. Approaching foreign policy as a discursive practice may help bridge the theoretical and analytical fields. Taking language as a key social tool that generates meaning , discourse used in foreign policy connects actors' logic with their action/performance. Since actors justify their foreign policy they also imply why these policies needed or plausible. "Foreign policy discourses must, more specifically, provide representations of the 'problem' that policies are aimed at solving" (Shapiro, 1988 cited in Hansen, 2006: 101). Those representations on which foreign policy is based can belong to heads of state or groups of representatives. By the means of such an analysis, it is possible to map out the situation at hand and actors' standing according to issue. "We need, more specifically, to identify those 'key representations' (Hansen, 2006), or 'nodal points' (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985), that structure debates on a foreign policy issue" (Hansen, 2006: 102). This is what this thesis aims to do; finding out the 'key representations' (Hansen, 2006) which lead foreign policy debates and construct the framework. Hansen (2006: 102) uses the example of Bosnian War (1992-1995). She points out two key representations; one as the 'Balkan' War and second one as a 'genocide'. In each representation, foreign policy choices change accordingly because each representation targets different aspects. Thus they have different aims. In short, using discourse analysis in foreign policy enables us to reveal both major discursive structures and more covered variations among perspectives.

Now that the target of the analysis is introduced, now it is suitable to move onto the scope of the analysis. “Discourse analysts study official foreign policies, but may also broaden the scope to include political parties not in government, the media, NGOs, and other who engage in foreign policy debates” (Hansen 2006: 103). Following Hansen, incorporating non-official texts can provide a solid understanding of key discourses’ commonalities and discrepancies. In addition to that, bringing non-official documents in connection with the official one can also eliminate the inconsistency and diplomatic language barrier. Because sometimes official texts may not be explicit about the meanings and intentions they incorporate. In such situations providing additional documents by other agencies, such as the media, will provide a clearer understanding of implicit meanings for the representation of the problem that policy targets.

Taking representations and scope of the discourse analysis into account, one can easily err and take it as a static field. However foreign policy, as any policy, should be examined within its dynamic process. Policy changes over time, as the subject matter deviates from its first time occurrence in the international realm till the policy makers consider it has been ‘handled’. In order to address these changes and shifts, analysis should combine any type of change in discourse and their implications for society. As Hansen summarizes; “Discourse analysis makes an assumption that foreign policies rely upon representations and that such representations are articulated in language, and this leads to concern with the public texts” (2006: 106). Hence based on these assumptions in the case of the representation shifts, it will reflect on language, thus reflect on public text. At such

circumstances studying texts within a range of time will also include and reveal the shifts in the representations.

2.3.1. Research Design

As there is unlimited ways to ask the questions and formulate the research, one should build the research around a variety of questions. According to Hansen someone who wants to study foreign policy using post-structuralist discourse analysis these are the central choices that one should make;

> ...whether one should study official foreign policy discourse or expand the scope to include the political opposition, the media, and the marginal discourses; whether one should examine the foreign policy discourse of one Self or multiple Selves; whether one should select one particular moment or a longer historical development; whether one should study one event or issue or a multiplicity; and finally, which material should be selected as the foundation for and object of analysis. (2006: 65)

The following section will clarify the choices that are being made in designing this research. Hansen (2006) in the above mentioned quote poses 5 central questions for a post-structuralist research design; (1) *intertextual models* whether official or wider, (2) *number of selves* whether one or multiple, (3) *temporal perspective* whether one moment or historical development, (4) *number of events* whether one or multiple, and (5) *selection of textual material* (2006: 65-82). Following paragraphs will answer each of these questions for this research.

First part is about the *intertextual models*. As texts are socially constructed, they all are in some way related but also peculiar. Each text has its own specific contribution to the discourse of the self, which makes all of them unique.

Yet, at the bottom line they all are produced in the same environment, in which they make references to previous ones. This process is called *intertexuality* by Julia Kristeva (1980). Understanding this process, Hansen argues that "the meaning of a text is thus never fully given by the text itself but is always a product of other readings and interpretations" (2006: 49). For that reason defining the scope of the selected texts is very important. Hansen starting from the official documents and moving towards a wider range of sources, propose three models for designing intertextuality of the analysis (Table 1). The first model concerns the official foreign policy texts and their intertextual links. The second one is elaborating on the analysis by adding the media debates, oppositional political parties and corporate groups' contribution to the discourse. And the third model goes even further and adds elements from popular culture. Due to time constraints, precision and rigor, this research will be structured around the model 2, including official discourses, intertextual links between them, and the media and oppositional parties / groups debates.

Table 1: Hansen's three models for designing intertextuality of the analysis (Hansen, 2006: 57)

	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3A*	*Model 3B*
Analytical focus	Official discourse: Heads of states Governments Senior civil servants High ranked military Heads of international institutions Official statements by international institutions	Wider foreign policy debate: Political opposition The media Corporate institutions	Cultural representations: Popular culture High culture	Marginal political discourses: Social movements Illegal associations Academics NGOs
Object of analysis	Official texts Direct and secondary intertextual links Supportive texts Critical texts	Political texts Parliamentary debates Speeches, statements Media texts Editorials Field reporting Opinion—debate Corporate institutions Public campaigns Recurring intertextual links	Film, fiction, television, computer games, photography, comics, music, poetry, painting, architecture, travel writing, autobiography	Marginal newspapers, websites, books, pamphlets Academic analysis
Goal of analysis	The stabilization of official discourse through intertextual links The response of official discourse to critical discourses	The hegemony of official discourse The likely transformation of official discourse The internal stability of media discourses	Sedimentation or reproduction of identities in cultural representations	Resistance in non-democratic regimes Dissent in cases of models 1 and 2 hegemony Academic debates

Second question that I will address is about the *choice of Selves*. This dimension of the research design deals with "how many states, nations, or other foreign policy subjects one wishes to examine" (Hansen, 2006: 67). This dimension can be inspected under two categories. First one can choose a single self and examine it thoroughly, such as Campbell (1992) on American security policy or Neumann (1996) on Russian European policies. Second category is the selection of multiple selves. The latter category is more suitable for this research because the aim

of this thesis is to analyze Turkey - EU relations through their foreign policies, and such target requires the involvement of at least two selves; one from Turkey and second from the EU. Since one of the questions that this thesis aim to respond is how these two selves respond to one single event, which is the Syrian crisis, selection of two foreign policy subjects and not more will also make the analysis more concise. Thus the selection of the selves is important and determent by the nature of the events, which will be covered in the fourth dimension; *number of events*.

Third dimension of the research design is the *temporal perspective*. "Foreign policy can be studied as it addresses events either at one particular moment or through a longer historical analysis" (Hansen, 2006: 69). Temporal perspectives of the discourse analysis is categorized under three sub-dimensions; (1) one moment, such as a war or moment of conflict, (2) multiple comparative moments, (3) and historical development. For this research, although it scrutinizes the discourse and foreign policy subjects' reaction after one single moment, which is the outbreak of the Syrian crisis, the research also incorporates the reactions towards subsequent events. For that reason it is safe to say that temporal perspective of this study is multiple comparative moments. Since foreign policy is a dynamic process and the purpose of this study is to reveal policies' effects both on Turkey and the EU, it is important not to overlook any follow up event caused by discourse.

Turning from the temporal perspective to the fourth dimension, the *number of events*, is largely defined by the notion of the 'event' itself. Among the various discourse analysis it can be observed that there is either one or multiple. In addition to this distinction Hansen divides the multiple events category into two; one multiple events related by issue and the second is multiple events related by time (Hansen,

2006: 72). However research topic for this thesis would not fit in any category if we assumed that one event as a single incident. Nevertheless Hansen argues that "events will often be studied through analysis of 'events within events'; the Western debate on Bosnia for instance is defined as one event for the purpose of building a research design, but the analysis of this event will itself trace the discursive construction of events such as Srebrenica" (Hansen, 2006: 71). Similarly the discourse between Turkish and the EU authorities based on their foreign policies towards Syrian refugees can be categorized under one major event, which will inevitably include subsequent events, such as chemical attacks and IS threat.

Finally the fifth and the last question, which is actually not a part of the four-strand research design that Hansen proposes (Figure 1), is about textual selection. Textual data selection process will start with the official data from Turkey and the EU; official speeches, press statements, and parliamentary debates and go beyond with media interpretations. According to Hansen there are two criteria to filter and choose the texts to analyze; temporal location of the text, and overall commonality of the material (Hansen, 2006: 74). By temporal location she means the time in which the text is been created. Hansen separates it into two; time of study and historical material. Although the study mainly constituted by the text within the time of study historical material will help to trace back the genealogy of the dominant representation (Hansen, 2006: 74). In the case of this thesis' research topic one of the parties involved is a country while the other one is an organization, therefore the official documents to analyze the discourse will vary and the selected documents will be explained in detail in both of the chapters; one for Turkey (chapter 3) and one for the EU (chapter 4).

On one hand the first figure below (Figure 1) summarizes the four points of the suggested research design for discourse analysis by Lene Hansen, which I have briefly discussed above. On the other hand, following figure (Figure 2) is the implementation of this research design to this thesis. Thus this thesis will evolve around this research design taking Bacchi's WPR approach as a research tool to analyze the mutual responses of Turkish and European actors regarding Syrian refugees. Subsequent section will elaborate on WPR approach.



Figure 1; Four major points of the suggested research design for discourse analysis by Lene Hansen (Hansen, 2006: 72)



Figure 2; Implementation of Hansen's research design for this thesis

2.3.2. Analytical Framework

'What's the problem represented to be?' (WPR) approach claim to analyze the problematization process of policy making, nevertheless the word problem, in this approach, is not used to depict the policy content as a collection of troubling conditions, although it should also be kept in mind that governments would not function without problematizing its own terrain (Osborne, 1997). Since every policy has a target to meet or a condition to be fixed, this approach concerns more with the problematization process than results of the so-called 'problem'. For the sake of clarity, the definition of policy used in this thesis is as follows; "The term policy is generally associated with a program, a course of action" (Bacchi, 2009). The term itself carries an understanding of the issue is not always explicit, it is rather

embedded within the representation of the problem. With the means of WPR approach it will be possible to reveal this implicit representations and understandings. “The goal is to probe the premises that underpin particular problem representations” (Bacchi, 2009: xiv). By this, Bacchi means that the goal is not to assess the policy or its efficiency but to analyze the meanings and particular perceptions of the situation. Bacchi’s approach provides a perspective that can evoke critical thinking in Foucauldian sense. “A critique does not consist in saying that things aren’t good the way they are. It consists in seeing on what type of assumptions, of familiar notions, of established, unexamined ways of thinking the accepted practices are based” (Foucault, 1994: 456). To be more specific this thesis will look upon problematization process of the policies than the policies itself or their outcomes.

In the table below (Table 2) the extended version of the WPR’s questions are shown. These questions will function as tools throughout the thesis. Analyzing the foreign policy discourse to find answers to these questions will reveal the problematic part in problematization process.

Table 2: Carol Bacchi's expanded version of the WPR approach's questions (Bacchi, 2009: 48)

What's the problem represented to be?
An approach to policy analysis

1. What's the problem (e.g. of 'problem gamblers', 'drug use/abuse', domestic violence, global warming, health inequalities, terrorism, etc.) represented to be in a specific policy? See what the policy proposes and 'read off' the implied 'problem' from this proposal.
2. What presuppositions or assumptions underlie this representation of the 'problem'? This question involves a form of Foucauldian *archaeology*, identifying underlying conceptual logics and political rationalities in specific policies. Identify key concepts, binaries, and categories. Think beyond national and/or cultural boundaries to address this question.
3. How has this representation of the 'problem' come about? This question involves a form of Foucauldian *genealogy*, focusing on the practices and processes that led to the dominance of this problem representation (or of these problem representations).
4. What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the silences? Can the 'problem' be thought about differently? Cross-cultural comparisons and comparisons of problem representations over time (see Question 3) will be useful here, alongside the discourse analysis conducted in Question 2..
5. What effects are produced by this representation of the problem? Consider three kinds of effects: discursive effects; subjectification effects; lived effects. Include effects due to dividing practices. The following sub-questions will assist here: What is likely to change with this representation of the 'problem'? What is likely to stay the same? Who is likely to benefit from this representation of the 'problem? Who is likely to be harmed? How does the attribution of responsibility for the 'problem' affect those so targeted and the perceptions of the rest of the community about who is to 'blame'?
6. How/where is this representation of the 'problem' produced, disseminated and defended? How could it be questioned, disrupted and replaced? Consider past and current challenges to this representation of the 'problem'. Consider the discursive resources available for re-problematisation.

Apply this list of questions to your own problem representations. This stage of the analysis requires a form of reflexivity, which involves subjecting the grounding assumptions in one's own problem representations to critical scrutiny.

To sum up, until now, "... the conventional understanding of foreign policy depended on a particular representation of history in which the rise of state is understood…" (Campbell, 1998: 61) and how these representations bring us to the formation of a specific type of identity and social organization. Yet there is a

multitude of ways in which a society is constructed and shaped. Actors are constantly involved in this process and foreign policy is only one of the means that are used. In other words "[f]oreign policy is one part of a multifaceted process of inscription that disciplines by framing man in the spatial and temporal organization of the inside and outside, self and other; i.e., in 'the state' "(Campbell, 1998: 62). Thus this research aims to uncover the connection between actors' perception of 'self' and their preferences in foreign policy. As a representation, with the increase on the hosting country emphasis in the discourse, Turkish policy makers aim to transform the 'us' in the 'us' and 'them' relation. This representation intents to transform Turkey from a country who demands help to a country who provides help for its region. So this paper will approach to both the EU's and Turkey's foreign policy decisions from how they position themselves in 'self' and 'other' relation. Their self and other concepts affect the way they perceive the situation, which will be called the problem. And their problem representation determines their policies. Thus when there is a change or an attempt of change either in the 'self' or 'other' concepts, then policy will be reflecting this change. Henceforth this research aims to discover each parties 'us' and 'them' representations. Examining Turkey's and the EU's representations will provide a wider picture of the issue.

To conclude, using post-structuralist discourse analysis to investigate foreign policy, representational differentiations in discourses will be analyzed, which makes it possible to understand the identities constructed by these differentiations, and to discover the discourse that is used to draw the line between "self" and "other". Hence within the framework of WPR approach, in this research, there are two selves in interaction (Turkey and the EU) within multiple comparative moments, one major

event at concern (Syrian refugee crisis), and application of wider intertextual political debate (official and media with political opposition).

CHAPTER 3

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY FROM 2011 TO 2015

This chapter provides in depth discussion of Turkish foreign policy discourses regarding Syrian refugees. Through a set of questions formulated by the WPR approach (as detailed in chapters 1&2), the perceptions of the foreign policy makers, their representation of the Syrian crisis, and their representation of Turkey - EU relations will be revealed. To explore these issues, public texts were analyzed. These texts can be divided under two categories, which are official and nonofficial. As the name stands for itself official documents are reports and summaries on policies implemented and on the current situation at hand, published by Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These annual reports incorporate the description of the bilateral relations between Turkish authorities and other countries' policy makers, and also Turkish authorities' stand towards NGOs, and IOs. In addition to official texts, nonofficial texts composed of published articles from two of the most circulated newspapers. These two newspapers were selected regarding their diverse perspectives and their political and ideological stance, which impact on their use of particular language and discoursive practices. One of them is *Yeni Şafak,*with average circulation of 112,000.[7] Yeni Şafak perceives the event in line with the government as they are known to have closer relations with the ruling party

[7] See http://gazetetirajlari.com/category/haftalik-tirajlar/

members. Due to these relations journalists tend to frame their representations in favor of the ruling party. On the other side *Sözcü* has an average circulation of 265,500.[8] Sözcü represents the opposition's opinions, so that they prefer to frame events in a degrading way against ruling party. Other potential papers that are either close to government (such as Sabah, Star or Takvim) or with a left inclination (such as Cumhuriyet or Birgün) did not have proper archives or significant circulations. Keeping these in mind it is also important to understand that in Turkey "not only AKP's rise to the power fortified the declining trend of media criticism in Turkey since the neoliberalization of the economy in the early 1980s but also that there are additional ongoing pressures from the public and the market on its freedom of press" (Yavcan & Ongur, 2016: 2438). Hence, the overall decrease in the level and the variety of criticisms and the increase in self-censorship should be taken into consideration. In sum the texts that have been used in this section are; annual action and budget reports from Ministry of Foreign Affairs between years 2011 and 2015, and two of the most readed and also subjective newspapers' articles from the beginning of the 2011 till the end of 2015 by Sözcü and Yeni Şafak. The dates were chosen as such for both precision and that they are marking critical points. 2011 was the year that internal unrest in Syria was unfolded and the refugee influxes have started. Furthermore 2015 is the date of the agreement and announcement of the Joint Action Plan.

3.1. Overview of Turkish Foreign Policy Discourse

[8] See http://gazetetirajlari.com/category/haftalik-tirajlar/

This section of the research will provide a synopsis of the Turkish representation of the Syrian crisis and Turkey - EU relations based on the crisis discourse, by the means of both official and printed press. To have a better understanding of the represented problem and 'problem space'[9], the data will be examined in detail. WPR approach has provided a number of questions which were implemented on the textual data gathered. For the sake of responding to the questions properly, but first both official and non-official data will be introduced.

3.1.1. Official Documents

To begin with, the data from 2011 till the end of 2015 concentrate around some dominant themes. Following the collective data, Turkish Foreign policy documents frequently refer to four 'common themes' in addressing Syrian refugee crisis. These four themes are; humanitarianism, internationalism, proactivism, and Assad being the essence of the problem. This classification of the themes will help to understand how the government defines the situation between selected years. The depiction of the situation, mainly evolves around the humanitarianism theme, yet interdependence at the international level, and Turkish policy makers' proactive approach to the problems that Assad regime being problematic are equally important as humanitarianism in discourse. The following sections will examine the official documents more closely.

First common theme, humanitarianism, is the most frequently used one. Ministry of Foreign Affairs defines its primary parameters towards Syria as helping

[9] A concept from WPR approach by Bacchi, meaning the spectrum of the policy problem since one problem can be related to another.

to maintain territorial integrity of Syria, cease the bloodshed in the country, and satisfying public's legitimate demands of democratic reform and transition period (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012). These general parameters set the foundations of a liberal argument, such as humanitarianism. In the very same report the first refugee group from Syria mentioned to be above 8.000. The paragraph in which incoming Syrians have been mentioned, ministry choose to use the word 'guests' for Syrians and stated that it's Turkey's humanitarian duty to keep its borders open for anyone who seeks shelter and escaped from the hard conditions in their countries. The word 'guest' here serves as an indirect reference to how welcoming Turkish government is. In addition to that the document also make it clear that Syrians are welcomed and can stay in Turkey, in camps provided by the Turkish government as long as they want to. This way of presenting the policy within the frames of humanitarian act strengthens Turkish policy makers' hand on every level, towards non-governmental organizations, towards international organizations and on its bilateral relations. Another way that Turkish authorities represent their humanitarian argument is as constructive intentions for Syria, in cooperation with the international community:

> In the face of such tragedy, our country on one hand provides necessary help to bind up wounds of those who escaped the regime brutality, and on the other hand endures its efforts and collaboration with international community to cease the crisis in a peaceful manner as soon as possible. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013: 66)

Above given quote from the action report for 2012 summarizes Turkish politicians' foreign policy towards Syria, but most importantly it echoes some of the keywords of humanitarian discourse. These keywords are tragedy, brutality and wounds of Syrians. With these words government fortifies its leverage. Yet the same report also highlight the economic side of the "humanitarian aid" in amount of $400 million

from 2012's budget and the updated number of Syrians in Turkish camps above 135.000 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013). Turkish authorities emphasize on these expenditures as "conscientious and humanitarian responsibility ['vicdani ve insani sorumluluğumuz' in Turkish] to help our Syrian brothers" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013). Furthermore, the following year the number of "Syrian guests" in camps is recorded to be above 200 thousand, apart from 400 thousand living all around the Turkey on their own resources. The report claims that Turkey is hosting 1.6 million Syrians within its territory, and has spent over $4.5 billion for Syrian guests (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014). In 2015 final numbers have raised to above 2.6 million Syrians hosted within Turkey and the sum of expenditures regarding the Syrians is above $10 billion, while the sum of the bilateral and multilateral provided supports are only $455 million (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015: 80). Reframing expenditures in this way, Turkish policy makers emphasize their humanitarian image by implying that Turkey cares more about the people than its budget. In this vein each year Turkish authorities represents the recent numbers on the amount of people it host and amount of money it has spent. Moreover Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu introduces the new numbers by saying; "I would like to give more detail on humanitarian side of the conflict" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016: 79). Drawing attention to the majority of the displaced Syrians living within Turkish boundaries and to the amount spent to provide solid proofs for politicians to promote the humanitarian argument. All reports repeatedly asserted that Turkey's doors are always "open" to Syrians on the other side of the border that can be interpreted as Turkey's humanitarian ideals. At

the same time this open door emphasis is to invoke Europe's closed door policies, which bring us to the next common theme interdependence on international level.

Secondly, the following common theme is internationalism. This section draws attention on the way the problem is described. The concept of internationalism used to identify the problem. Turkish policy-makers prefer to present the problem as global or international. For instance, in the annual report on the actions took place in 2012, Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserts that the crisis situation in Syria has obliged Turkish policy makers to take responsibility for the region and face great challenges (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013). This statement implies that the weight of the Syrian crisis is upon Turkey's shoulder, whereas it could have been divided between the actors in the region and international organizations. The solution for crisis that has been presented within these reports is that Syrians must form an efficient and inclusive opposition to ease the transition period. To attain this suggested solution emphasis made on UN Security Council's accountability, that they must be aware of their responsibilities and duties for an efficient and sustainable solution. By saying that Turkish policy makers claim to carry out all their responsibilities and take active role in international society, policy makers direct the attention on international society. This statement implies that whether international society carries out all its responsibilities is doubtful. Similarly, right after giving the numbers of Syrians living within Turkey and the amount Turkish government spend for refugees, reports specify that financial burdens over Turkey's shoulder keep increasing however international community fall behind on supporting Turkish government with regard to Turkish authorities' expectations. To be more specific, the financial aid allocated by the international society until the end of 2014 is $265 million while Turkey's total

expenditure is $4.5 billion. Although there is repeated accentuation on Turkey's humanitarian and conscientious intentions and the burden it carries for the world by allocating such a big amount, it seems that these are not the only intentions. It is clear that spending these resources provide Turkish authorities leverage over UN, NATO and EU. Turkey, for instance, hosted the 2nd Ministerial Meeting of Syria Bordering Countries, which was first organized by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees on 4 September 2013. Hosting international meetings can be seen as an important indicator of soft power. The main aim of these meetings is to develop strategies on burden-sharing between international community and countries hosting Syrians. Representatives from Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Egypt have participated. Being host to such a meeting brings prestige to Turkey.

In pursuit of the suggested solution, Turkish gvernment has added a new ally in 2015 among its international cooperators along with the UN and NATO; International Syria Support Group (ISSG). For the first time UN Security Council issued a resolution for the crisis situation in Syria to plan a political solution (UNSC Resoltion/2254, 2015). UNSC, in this resolution, proposed an agenda for negotiations between the Assad regime and the oppositions. Although it did not yield the results aimed for, Turkish policy makers publicize this attempt as a good effort from Turkey to solve the crisis situation in Syria and in establishing peace negotiations. Turkish authorities have also takes pride in as in recognizing the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces since 2012 to assert that Turkish government actively interacts with international partners (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012/13/14).

Thirdly, all the reports provided by the ministry of foreign affairs contain notes on the meeting took place in 9th August 2011 between the president Assad and Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu. According to these reports, in the meeting, Turkish policy makers have stated its expectations from Syrian government of stopping violence, immediate cease of the operations towards civilians, withdrawal of the army, and the implementation of the reform process as soon as possible (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012). Furthermore in each year's report Turkish Ministry has emphasized that long before conflicts has started, Turkish authorities foresee the possible danger and warned Assad to make necessary reforms that society demand, so that the transition period would be smooth. However according to these reports Assad ignored Turkish authorities' warnings and now he does use every mean, including chemical weapons, to oppress his public who only demand their basic rights (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013/14/16). These documents deliberately include a "we told you so" type of statement. More specifically the report articulates that long before the crisis in Syria began, Turkish policy makers had foreseen the change that Middle East was going through and that it could also spread to Syria. Therefore, Turkish government warned the Syrian government and called for its adoption of necessary reforms to ease the transition period before anything bad would have happened (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013). But reportedly Assad did not pay attention to the warnings of Turkey's Minister of Foreign Affairs which brings us to the next commonly used theme.

Fourth and the last matter that Turkish policy makers build their representation of the policy around is that the person who is to blame for all this humanitarian crisis is Assad. As mentioned above, Turkish Ministry blames Syrian

administration for not taking the necessary steps, although they warned them. From this point on arguments become less humanitarian and more defensive. The reports declare that after two pilots and five civilians, including women and children, were killed as a result of the attacks from Syria to the Turkish soil, the Turkish armed forces was granted permission from the national assembly to deploy military forces for one year in foreign countries in order to exercise its right to self-defense. Followed by a proclamation saying that this is not a declaration of war but an action taken with the purpose of defense, showing that if attacks on Turkish citizens would continue then Turkish government would not hesitate to defend itself. After the Foreign Ministers Meeting took place in 21st of November 2012 by NATO, the document adds that Germany, Netherlands and the US were willing to support Turkey's defense by air forces. In addition to that due to increased casualties in 2013, this permission was extended for one more year. Reports underline that the Assad regime is responsible for casualties caused by chemical weapons and other violent acts from Syrian border legitimize Turkey's exportation of military. Moreover while Syrians demanding democracy, human rights and freedom, the regime, which has de facto lost its legitimacy, keeps using illegitimate and violent ways to oppress the public, which attributes more meaning for the use of force. In year 2014, along with the key parameters between Turkey and Syria repeating itself, the word Daesh has been used first time in an annual report by Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Daesh is described as an extension of the Assad regime that threatens international peace and security. Therefore, after 2014 the fight against the regime has evolved into a more complicated situation that also involves Daesh. At this point the use of the acronym Daesh instead of Isis reflects the preferences of the Turkish

government.[10] These kinds of word preferences are thoughtfully chosen by Turkish government to transform the government's definition of the 'self' as a savior in the region.

All in all, Turkish policy makers proudly present its policies between 2011 and 2015, from its negotiations efforts to build peace to its expenditures on camps, from exporting military to cooperating on every level. The words and expressions being chosen to represent and defend them will indicate the assumptions lying under (Q2), what is left unproblematic (Q4), and also the effects that they have produced (Q5). Yet before moving on to the answers of the questions, the following section will introduce the data gathered through media.

3.1.2. Wider Political Debate through Media

In the previous section the official discourse is reviewed and how the official data has represented the foreign policy towards Syrian refugees is analyzed. This section will reveal how the two opposite sides in media has covered it. In order to do that, two newspapers among mostly readed ones are chosen; *Sözcü* and *Yeni Şafak*. As mentioned earlier these two newspapers were selected based on their political stances. The main objective of choosing these two outlets is to comprehend both poles of the public opinion and uncover how they represent the 'problem'. Yeni Şafak which is the one that operates with the intention of maintaining government interests presents their representations that are similar to those in the official

[10] This use of acronym first started with French President François Hollande referring to Isis / Isil as Daesh in December 2015. Then, UK Prime Minister David Cameron also announced that his government would be joining France in calling the group "Daesh" rather than "Isil" due to its negative connotations. Considering Turkish government's sensitivity towards the use of Islam and terrorism together, Turkish government aims to disassociate the two by using Daesh instead of Isis.

documents. Nevertheless the opposition media provides alternative perspectives to the problem representations. Alternative here refers to Sözcü as it is one of the widely read media sources for supporters of the opposition. As it is commonly expected from opposition media, it can be anticipated that Sözcü proclaims what the government avoids disclosing, and brings counterarguments to what the officials put forward. As the underlying assumption will differ in each of the representations provided by the two media sources I will be discussing them in categories based on their content and separately for both media data from the beginning of the Syrian crisis till the end of 2015. First I will be analyzing Sözcü's articles based on their content, then I will proceed with Yeni Şafak's articles.

In the previous section the discourse used by the Turkish government is reflected and how the policy is being represented is evaluated. In the following section the same for the two media sources will be done. Assessment of how this policy being represented by the two opposite media sources will enable us to assess the policy itself. In the previous section (3.1.1.), I have covered that the government repeatedly highlight the element of humanitarian act, which is publicized as every powerful state's duty. The assumption lying behind this idea that Turkish government wants to be seen as one of the major powers in Middle East including, being a soft power. Otherwise, an alternative assessment for the policy is that Turkish government use "Syrian guests" (Mehmet, 2011) as leverage against international community more so towards the EU. The meaning of asking which representation truly reflects the agenda behind the policy and the problem it targets to solve. Namely is the open door policy aims to solve humanitarian crisis in Syria or

increasing Turkey's credibility and improve its reputation towards international community?

3.1.2.1. Sözcü's Perspective

Since the previous section has outlined the major aspects of the government's representations, as the opposition's representations, Sözcü's perspective during the Syrian conflict is clarified in this section. This section is based on nearly 200 news articles published by Sözcü, reached, which aims to reveal the discourse by incorporate some parts from those articles. These articles were reached via a key word search in the newspaper's website archives between the years 2011 and 2015. To begin with the first years of the crisis the newspaper have published an article on a speech given by Assad in an Syrian channel, and the headline starts with "Assad called Turkish authorities ignorant" ("Bazı Türk Yetkililer", 2012) for even thinking of a buffer zone for refugees would be possible. This is a type of news that would certainly not be reported in Yeni Şafak, likewise publishing a headline "Turkey is our hangman" ("Türkiye Bizim Celladımız", 2012) (a quote from UN Permanent Delegate of Syria). At this point it should be reminded that this analysis is not to determine which news is speculative and which one is accurate, it is rather to draw attention what words two sides prefer to use and what news they prefer to publish and not to publish. For example in matter of opening doors to Syrians, Yeni Şafak has reported 'Turkey is helping the needed ones' and Sözcü has reported as Turkish authorities offering shelter to Syrian terrorists ("Türkiye Bizim Celladımız", 2012). Sözcü's rigid criticisms and comments keep its pace throughout the five years, which been scrutinize. It is possible to categorize them in four groups. This study classifies them based on their content because in this way the problem or issue will be easy to

differentiate and analyze them more properly by each content group. After going through the data gathered from the beginning of the 2011 till the end of 2015, there are four major groups of subjects that help to categorize the news. To be clearer 4 group of subject for Sözcü's article would be (1) inefficiency of the Turkish foreign policy, (2) unsuccessful Turkish politicians, (3) foreign media, and (4) Europe. More detailed explanations about the subjects will be made throughout the analysis.

First subject matter is; insufficiency of the policy. News categorized under this section will be the ones that criticize the policy directly. One of the major arguments against the open door policy is Turkish government being economically vulnerable to help Syrians while having budget deficit itself. With Sözcü's own words Turkey is spending a "fortune" ("Suriyeli Mülteciler İçin", 2012) while having foreign debts and deficits. According to Sözcü this is also why politicians keep asking for more funds. Sözcü claims that Turkish policy makers cannot adequately provide aids to refugee camps because they do not have the necessary resources and therefore looking for outside help (ibid.). Repeated notifications on Turkey's resources are coming to its end. The policy is even being called "Justice and Development Party's (JDP) bankruptcy policy" ('AKP'nin İflas Politikası' in Turkish) ("AKP'nin İflas Politikası", 2015). According to the opposition, 'humanitarian aid' only serves as a pretext for JDP's failed *open door to Syrians* policy. While criticizing too much money being spent on Syria policy, the opposition proposes some alternative ways to the JDP administration. For example Sözcü pointed out that this money could have been spent for creating scholarship for student, funding for food expenses for the retired, income for unemployed, and subsidies for craftsmen and farmers ("Tayyip Suriyeli Mülteciler",2013). In another

article, the emphasis is placed on certain rights and privileges given to Syrians and Turkish citizens denied of, such as the statement from the Council of Higher Education (CHE/ Turkish acronym YÖK) on the availability of university education opportunities for Syrians. In addition to YÖK's reportedly 'unsound' decision, Sözcü has also reported that JDP's authorities are making too much sacrifice for Syrians, which causes neglecting of Turkish citizens. Let alone high expenditures, Syrian refugees are depicted as cause of trouble in the everyday life of Turkish citizens. They said to carry health problems to Turkey, such as "measles and h1n1 swine flu virus" ("Suriye'den Gelen Tehlike", 2013). The opposition has published headlines on how ungrateful Syrians are, even though soo much sacrifices done for them and that even some of them living in luxury houses built by the country's Housing Development Administration (TOKİ). Similarly, the JDP's decision to grant work permit to Syrian refugees is strongly criticized and considered to be a careless act, knowing that there are 3 million unemployed citizens in Turkey already. Regarding the policy, the opposition's leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu have said that; "I will not allow Turkey to become EU's concentration camp and neither will accept Turkey bargaining with the EU on Syrian refugees" ("Avrupa Birliği Liderleri", 2015). This statement clearly demonstrates that opposition argues that Turkish policy makers are using Syrians as leverage to bargain with the EU. To summarize, according to Sözcü this policy is something that Turkish policy makers cannot handle not only because of its infrastructural problems and economic limitations but also the inappropriateness of using Syrians as a source of bargaining. In addition to this, trying to implement this policy, from their perspective, is and will be decrementing the interests of Turkish citizens whose problems are neglected by the government.

The second group of subject matter that some of the articles fall into is 'unsuccessful politicians'. Among these articles one can easily find multiple ways to condemn the politicians. One of them is denouncing them for being inadequate. This criticism is based on politicians' speeches. Politicians, who suggest that the refugee crisis is a global crisis and everyone should be involved in solving it, is interpreted as the JDP's inadequacy for not being able to handle it by themselves and they are calling for outside help as a needy government. Nonetheless the same call for help from international society is interpreted differently in Yeni Şafak; as the JDP authorities are moral guides to international community and calling them out to do the right thing heroically. To come back to Sözcü, there is a head title saying "Erdoğan gone too far" ("Erdoğan Fazla İleri", 2012) implying that, he does not know where to stop and his policy towards Syrians are simply unbalanced and wrong.

Another argument made by Sözcü is that Sözcü held Erdoğan responsible for 51 civilian casualties in an explosion in southern town of Reyhanlı, near the border with Syria in May 2013 ("51 Kişinin Sorumlusu", 2013). The opposition claimed that Erdoğan let the terrorists in and let them walk freely in Turkey, which made the attacks inevitable. News regarding JDP's intelligence agencies poorly doing its duty and leaks information, and because of irresponsible action of the politicians there is no such thing as border left between Syria and Turkey. According to Sözcü, Erdoğan is no different than Assad ("51 Kişinin Sorumlusu", 2013). Furthermore a specific critique made to Erdoğan's personality traits is that he is making an attitude to international community, especially to the EU, for not helping them, and living Turkish government alone in this battle ("Erdoğan'dan Bahçeli'ye Cevap",2015).

While criticizing Erdoğan's expostulation they depict him as a needy politician who wants to be approved by more powerful states. Nevertheless Erdoğan is not the only politician who is criticized, Ahmet Davutoğlu is another one. The newspaper blamed him for selling hopes to Syrians in one of his speeches ("Suriyelilere Umut Dağıttı", 2015). In every report being published by foreign organizations, whether EU progress report or the Annual Report of Human Rights Watch (HRW), Sözcü prefers to report solely the negatives, such as the comments on the Gezi Protests and police brutality, while Yeni Şafak solely prefers to mention the part where they thank Turkish policy makers for what they have done for Syrians.

Third group of articles concentrate on foreign media. Sözcü, when it comes to condemning JDP, instead of taking the hit, it selects foreign journals that already published a harsh critique and publish them in Turkish. In other words the third group of articles is the ones that Sözcü acquired from foreign journals (such as Deutsche Welle, Times, Frankfurter Allgemeiner Zeitung) and report them to Turkish readers. They are mostly about Erdoğan or Turkey and give the impression of no one say any good thing about Turkey. Simply it reports back how bad of a reputation Turkish government and politicians have outside of its borders. For instance it has reported that the German newspaper FAZ claimed Isis militants easily entering Turkey and use Turkey as bridge to Europe ("Alman FAZ Gazetesinden", 2015). Moreover Financial Times alleged that "Merkel preferred to meet with Erdoğan because she did not want to visit the 'Ak Saray' " (Referred to as White Palace, it is the newly built presidential palace despite strong criticisms from the opposition) ("FT: Merkel Ak", 2015). Same journal has also published a headline saying "EU yields to Erdoğan" ("Avrupa Birliği Erdoğan'a", 2015) which are the

words of former EU Ambassador to Turkey Marc Pierini. He follows as “Erdoğan plays with us”. The concept of yielding to someone or someone playing with another implies an improper situation caused by one side cornering the other. In these articles Erdoğan is depicted as a leader with all the traits of a dictator, making the Turkish people yield to him and forcing his way through. On another journal, The Economist, Erdoğan is described as an ‘indispensable ally’ for Europe and Europe needs Turkey. To sum up what Sözcü brings from foreign outlets is that Turkish policy makers hold a good leverage and uses it against Europe, which makes him a leader who challenges peace.

Forth and the final group of articles published by Sözcü is about Europe, more specifically Turkey - EU relations from opposition’s perspective. Sözcü particularly highlights some parts of Erdoğan’s speeches; “EU needs Turkey”, “Refugee problem is a global problem that needs to be dealt globally”, “I am asking you Europe, where is your conscience?”(“Soruyorum Sana Ey”, 2014) These are the parts that Sözcü wanted to draw attention to along with the repeated notation that Turkish government exceeded 2 million while Europe in general accepted relatively low numbers of refugees. These news are followed by the news of the Head of EU Commission Jean-Claude Juncker's resolution on distributing refugees among European countries, which was rigorously refused by some. However EU Commissioner reminded that; if refugees would not be distributed among EU then Schengen will collapse (“Mülteciler Paylaşılmazsa Schengen”, 2015). Denmark offered financial support to Turkish authorities in return of keeping refugees within its border. German government offered to set up a camp in Turkey. And UK only settled with acknowledging their responsibilities towards Syrian refugees. At the EU

Interior Ministers Meeting on 14th of September 2015 ministers have agreed upon the suspension of the free movement agreement. According to Sözcü, EU getting cold feet and building walls are signs for the severity of the situation, which serves as another way to argue that Turkish policy makers are not aware of the burden they shoulder.

From Merkel's visit to Turkey, Sözcü promotes the pessimistic parts while Yeni Şafak promotes the optimistic sections of the same speech. For instance Sözcü reported that Merkel said; "Erdoğan knew that I am and always been against Turkey's EU membership" ("Merkel: Erdoğan da", 2015). In the meantime from the same speech Yeni Şafak reported that Merkel said; "EU needs Turkey" ("Beğenmediği Türkiye'ye Mahkum!", 2015). At this point priority that each of the journals putting forward and choosing what discourse to be distributed becomes more evident. For the same differentiation between what to report and what not to report we can give a similar example with EU Progress Report for Turkey. On one hand Sözcü reports that Turkish government has received crucial warnings on topics like democracy, freedom for journalists, rule of law, and fundamental rights ("AB'den Türkiye'ye kritik", 2015). On the other had Yeni Şafak reports that Europe thanks Turkish government for its cooperation and for taking care of Syrian refugees. After these news Martin Schulz's words, as head of the European Parliament, make the headlines; "Turkey takes better care of the Syrian refugees than most of the EU countries"("Martin Schulz: Türkiye", 2015). From that point on Turkey is considered as a key country in solving Syrian crisis, for which EU decided to grant € 3 billion aid for Syrian refugees. Since with this rapprochement Turkey - EU relations speeded up the negotiation and accession process, the leader of the

Italian Northern League (Lega Nord) Matteo Salvini reacted to the EU summit by saying; "If Turkey enters EU, we are out" ("İtalyan Aşırı Sağcı", 2015). Then the next news is on Turkish authorities proposing to take back all the refugees who fled to Europe through Turkey in return of the approval of the visa-free travel for Turkish citizens. Taken from Sözcü's point of view it can be said that hosting so many refugees turn out to be Turkey's advantage in its dialogue with Europe.

3.1.2.2. Yeni Şafak's Perspective

Similarly in Yeni Şafak it is possible to categorize more than 500 articles in four categories based on their subject matter. This classification enables us to be more specific about the subject being represented. The subject matters, which are being used to analyze Yeni Şafak's articles, are as follows; (1)humanitarian responsibilities argument, (2)appreciations received on the international level, (3)inefficiency of the international community, and (4) bargaining with Europe. The subjects which are mentioned above will be elaborated in the following paragraphs.

The first, and may be the most important, subject matter that almost all of the Yeni Şafak's articles incorporate, either explicitly or implicitly, is the 'humanitarian responsibilities' argument. The word 'vicdan', meaning conscience in Turkish, is very frequently used regarding Syrian refugees. So for the discourse being used by JDP administration and their supporters, it is one of the linchpins of the discourse. Another important keyword for this discourse is 'insani' which means humanitarian in Turkish. So both conscience and humanitarian responsibilities are the main tools of discourse that government, hence their supporter, want to spread. Yeni Şafak, as JDP supporter, will also be promoting this rhetoric. Multiple references to Syrian

refugee crisis being a global problem is being made. The news keep reminding that this is a global problem and needs to be dealt globally for the sake of global morals and conscience (Kucur, 2012). Davutoğlu saying and Yeni Şafak quoting that; "Turkey cannot be a mere spectator for what is happening in Syria" ("Davutoğlu: Bize Dokunan", 2014) and "We opened the borders for innocent children" ("Sınırı Masum Çocuklar", 2015) are proofs that Turkish government is carrying out its humanitarian responsibilities. Earlier I have mentioned that Sözcü and the opposition arguing that Turkish government is taking too much of a responsibility than it can carry, and Yeni Şafak's response to that criticism is that Turkey getting stronger and stronger each day. Adding to that Davutoğlu has said "Our ambitions will increase with our increasing power" ("Davutoğlu: Gücümüz Arttıkça", 2012). According to Davutoğlu Turkey has gathered its strength while Europe was going through an economic crisis ("Avrupa Krizdeyken Türkiye", 2014). Yeni Şafak is also reporting that how good of a job Turkish government does on hosting Syrians. For instance it is being published that Turkey is breaking records on amount of help it provides ("Türkiye'den Büyük Rekor", 2013). The image of Turkey shifting from a demanding and needy country to a giving and supportive country is being promoted. Besides the rhetoric of Syrians being 'guests' instead of being refugees is also explained from a humanitarian point of view. These explanations are also followed by the good services that Turkish government offers to Syrians, such as a group of lawyers who provide services to refugees against human smugglers. Government in every criticism from the opposition is hiding behind the humanitarian argument. Case in point when opposition's leader Kılıçdaroğlu said "hosting 1.5 million Syrians is a betrayal for Turkey", Davutoğlu as prime minister responded that

“Those words are betrayal for humanity” (“O Sözler İnsanlığa”, 2014). Yeni Şafak highlights that Turkish government shoulders the heaviest burden and that Europe should take a lesson from Turkey (“İbret Olsun Diye”, 2015). Through commenting on refugee crisis being a humanitarian crisis, they condemn Europe’s ‘fortress’ policy which they implement to keep refugees out. Turkish officials note that Europe should be ashamed because this is a shame for humanity. Another way that Yeni Şafak is spreading ‘conscience’ rhetoric is first they stage how bad and dramatic the conditions for Syrians are, and supporting this argument with photos that will arouse pity. And then they display Erdoğan as a confident and decisive leader, who scares those who stands against him and raise admiration among those who stands with him (“Erdoğan Emin Ve”, 2014). After this point on, after depicting Erdoğan as a great and humanist leader the next category of the news is the appreciation of the Erdoğan and Turkish government from other countries.

The second category of the subject matters under which some of the articles are categorized is appreciations on international level. Most of the earliest praises towards Turkish policy makers’ generosity is from UN at the beginning of the crisis. After a UN summit both Sözcü and Yeni Şafak has reported the summit as news however while Yeni Şafak’s article is obviously positive and even encouraging saying that UN is willing and ready to support Turkey’s refugee policy, Sözcü is discrediting Davutoğlu saying that in the summit he talked by himself and no one has listened (“Kendi Konuştu Kendi”, 2012). This difference shows how each of them exaggerates the situation to make their points. Another optimistic praise comes from Iranian foreign minister Ali Ekber Salihi who have said that; “It is in Turks blood to help the needed ones” (“Salihi: Bu Türklerin”, 2012). While boosting the image of

Turkey, Yeni Şafak also publishes comments from the US implying that US administration is in agreement with Turkish authorities on its foreign policy and thinks that Turkish government is doing a great job and should be supported in its struggle. Later on the following years of the crisis, Europe is also started to sweet-talk Turkish policy makers. Denmark's chairperson of parliament Mogens Lykketoft reported saying "we cannot make it up to Turkey" ("Lykketoft: Türkiye'nin Hakkı", 2014) to show their gratitude. Likewise German defense minister Leyen thanked Turkey for its support on refugee crisis, which made the headlines 'Germany Thanked Turkey' ("Almanya Teşekkür Etti", 2014). These are followed by multinational organizations like Amnesty International and UNHCR. Amnesty International pointed out and Yeni Şafak chose to publish that Turkish government's sensitivity towards Syrians is admirable and that Turkish authorities should not be left alone in this fight. Meanwhile UNHCR in its 2014 report stated that Turkey is hosting the highest number of refugees in the world, which gives proof to the 'heaviest burden on Turkey's shoulder' argument by the Turkish government. Similarly European Parliament's Dutch reporter Kati Piri revealed that it is a shame that EU discusses numbers like 20 thousands while Turkish government has accepted 2 million refugees. These were followed by Merkel praising Turkish authorities' refugee policy and Mogherini delivering "we should be aware of the 2 million that Turkey is hosting" ("AB: "Türkiye'deki Göçmenlerin", 2015). The purpose of the publishing these news is very similar to the purpose of Sözcü for publishing critics from foreign media, discursively create an image for public readers about how others think of Turkey. Nevertheless Sözcü and Yeni Şafak vary on the

image they wanted to create and chose to present. While Sözcü is circulating a negative one Yeni Şafak aims at creating a positive image.

The third group of articles published by Yeni Şafak is gathered under the inefficiency of the international community's approach. This fraction of the articles is published to show how too little and too late Europe and other Western countries are doing, while how much Turkish government has already provided. According to Yeni Şafak the opposition, like Sözcü, tries to make the public believe that Turkish government is weak and insignificant to other big powers. Yeni Şafak argues that there is a continuous manipulation of perceptions on the Syrian crisis by the opposition. They claim that most of the people try to understand the situation in Syria from videos, photos or published articles, and politicians, media members and the public's opinion depends very much on the information source they choose. This difference in perceptions, letting the political dimension a side even in a humanitarian emergency, does not even become an agenda for 22 months since the crisis broke out. The irony in Yeni Şafak's critique is that they are also part of this process of agenda setting and perception management. They have their own biased perceptions that they advocate, and highlighting the humanitarian side of the issue can be considered just one of them. For instance, the UN and AFAD jointly called for humanitarian help and this was published in Yeni Şafak. That article has the implications that Turkish government is doing everything within its capacity using the resources in its possession while the world ignores the situation. In most of the news articles, Turkey is described as a key actor helping determine the fate of the people in the region. Therefore, every decision that Turkish policy makers are making is very crucial. The EU commissioner urged Europe to act in 2013 ("AB

Komiseri'nden Suriye", 2013), however it took a few years for them to act. Yeni Şafak draws the attention to the number of the refugees that Turkey hosts and compares it with the number of refugees that Europe is hosting and willing to take in. Turkey's numbers overpassing Europe's excessively, makes Europe more selfish and even fascist in the eyes of Yeni Şafak readers. Yeni Şafak made use of some of Europe's bad humanitarian records in its history, and used it in favor of Turkey. The news on the hostile treatment facing refugees in Europe made the headlines. Racist comments and attacks in Germany and all around Europe are published. There is even an article saying that instead of accepting refugees Germany deported 10 thousand refugees ("Almanya 10 Bin", 2014). Any silence in the EU's reaction is regarded as the EU neglect of the refugee crisis at its border which is a disgrace for humanity. Away from its border, Europe being silent for the massacre in Syria is also described as a shame for humanity. At this point, Yeni Şafak publishes an article with the headline "Shame on you Europe" ("Başınızı Utançla Öne", 2014). This article signifies that Europe does nothing but prefers watching the war in Syria, and does not even want to give one tenth of the help that Turkish government has already given, and notes that while Europe is applying a 'fortress' strategy, Turkish policy makers pursue an 'open door' policy. These assertions were made in 2014 after an EU meeting in which 18 EU countries including the UK and Italy preferred to remain silent on the issue. Germany, for example, with already a bad reputation becomes a frequent subject in the news relating to racist attacks on refugees. The EU loses its credibility throughout this process of blaming and condemning. Greeks took advantage of the situation and Greek defense minister Panos Kammenos threatened Germany with releasing refugees to Berlin ("Yunan Bakan'dan Almanya'ya", 2015).

These were the indications of a declining solidarity within Europe. After the EU decided to distribute the refugees among EU countries, the quota discussion began among EU countries, which was another sign of the EU's own internal disagreement. A British journalist calling refugees 'cockroaches', Estonia and Latvia opposing the decision on the distributed settlement of refugees, Slovakia and Czech Republic refusing to accept any Muslim refugees are some of the issues found their place in the news titles. As Sözcü brought voices outside of Turkey to criticize the government policies, Yeni Şafak also brought voices from outside to criticise Europe's policies. For instance Palermo's Mayor Leoluca Orlando remarks that "we are witnessing genocide on Italy's shore because of Europe's selfishness" found emphasis in Yeni Şafak ("Denizde Göçmen Soykırımı", 2015). On the same day, Yeni Şafak also reported that the EU took the decision to deport 20 thousand refugees, let alone hosting them. Yeni Şafak used the words deadly and ridiculous to describe the EU's refugee policy. After the sunken ship at the borders of Italy, the JDP held Europe responsible for the deaths. Yeni Şafak quoted Erdoğan saying that "It is not only the refugees who have been drowned in the Mediterranean Sea, but also the humanity" ("Avrupa Bu Vebale", 2015). To sum up, the image of Europe is depicted as a group of countries that are selfish, ignorant, and chose to build walls instead of opening borders, and escape from assuming its share of the humanitarian responsibilities.

The fourth subject matter, after displaying inefficiency of the EU, is bargaining with Europe. Most of the criticism on EU's passive attitude started towards the end of 2013, mostly on 2014. The deals that EU countries try to make with Turkish government is mostly used by Yeni Şafak to show that Turkish

government is in charge and if an EU country want less refugees without appearing selfish and reckless then they should negotiate with Turkish policy makers. This makes the situation to Turkish government's advantage, which is an opportunity to be used to enhance the relation between Turkey and the EU. After 2014 offers from European countries started to appear in the news. Merkel is reported having said "we want to open the chapters n.23 and n.24" ("Fasıllar Açılsın", 2014). Martin Henriksen from Denmark offered financial aid in return to refugees ("Danimarka'dan Türkiye'ye İlginç", 2014). Germany declared that they want to increase the financial support. Previously progress reports on Turkey have never been reported as optimistic as in 2014. For European countries, according to Yeni Şafak, it becomes more preferable to give money than accepting refugees. To make that happen "EU needs Turkey" ("Beğenmediği Türkiye'ye Mahkum", 2015), as Merkel said. Turkish government gains more leverage towards EU authorities and this is interpreted as Turkey taking its strength from refugees. Lastly at the end of 2015, vice prime minister Kurtulmuş said that; "global refugee crisis is a bigger threat than 3rd World War" ("Dünya Savaşından Daha", 2015). Because the bigger it becomes, the bigger gets the power it leverages to Turkish policy makers.

As a conclusion the data gathered from media, both Sözcü and Yeni Şafak, providing use the representations of the refugee crisis from the two dominant perspectives. This provided detailed knowledge is the input of the WPR approach. On one hand, Sözcü has used a different language to promote the arguments on inefficiency of the Turkish foreign policy, unsuccessful Turkish politicians, critics from foreign media, and relations with Europe. On the other hand Yeni Şafak had used another set of words to support government's humanitarian responsibility

argument, reflect praises from International society, reproach to other countries and organizations, and to promote the leverage gained from Syrians towards Europe. In the following section using both official and non-official data I will be examining how the problem represented, what seem to be the causes of the conflict via WPR approach.

3.2. Application of WPR Approach to the Data

This section will respond to each of the WPR approach's questions using the official data represented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and two adverse media sources, Sözcü and Yeni Şafak. Before going through questions, it will be useful to remember the questions once again;

> 1. What's the 'problem' (e.g. of 'problem gamblers', 'drug use/abuse', domestic violence, global warming, health inequalities, terrorism, etc.) represented to be in a specific policy?
> 2. What presuppositions or assumptions underlie this representation of the 'problem'?
> 3. How has this representation of the 'problem' come about?
> 4. What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the silences? Can the 'problem' be thought about differently?
> 5. What effects are produced by this representation of the 'problem'?
> 6. How/where has this representation of the 'problem' be produced, disseminated and defended? How could it be questioned, disrupted and replaced? (Bacchi, 2009).

Each question has specific purposes to assess the policy devised to deal with the Syrian refugee crisis, including revealing the assumptions behind the policy, how it is being formed in the first place, what is left outside of it, and what are the effects it produces.

Based on the main points in official policy documents (see 3.1.1.) and news articles (see 3.1.2.) that were mentioned earlier, major points that dominates Turkish

discourse on Syrian refugees are obtained. Following section will use these major points of discourse that Turkish policy makers use to depict the situation in Syria, to assess the target and efficiency of the policy.

Earlier (see 3.1.2.), it has been mentioned that there are two different ways that media represents the problem; while one analyzing in favor of the government, the other one criticize the government policy. As it is in the nature of the policy to solve problems, each of the problem representations requires different types of policy proposals. However there is only one being applied currently, which is the 'open door policy for Syrians'.

The first question to start with is; "What is the problem represented to be?"(Bacchi, 2009: 48). Through first question it will be helpful to understand how this policy statement reads off. What is the problem represented within the policy? The 'problem' targeted with the policy is clearly the cruel treatments and the violence Syrian citizens face during the crisis and have to run from. "Remember that in a WPR analysis our objective is not to expose the declared commitment […] as empty rhetoric, […] , but to uncover the assumptions and presuppositions (Q2) that allow such a declaration to be made" (Bacchi, 2009: 159). Hence the first question helps to clarify the target policy for analysis, nevertheless following questions, starting with the second question, they will help to uncover the hidden assumptions and intentions. The policy that Turkish policy makers are applying towards Syrians at their borders is the "open door" policy. "Our country, as it is since the beginning of the conflict, will continue to provide services in reach of its resources and keep its door open to help our Syrian brothers" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012/13/14/16). This is the statement that is repeating itself since the beginning of the crisis by every

high ranked official (Ahmet Davutoğlu, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan). However foreign policies usually are not this simple, in entails other small policies on related areas. For instance open door policy brings about the deployment of the military, an increase in the budget expenditures and negotiations on multiple levels with other countries and organizations. They will also be included in the following questions. Thus the ‘problem’ which this policy set aims to solve is the increasing number of refugees crossing the Turkish border rather than the civil war that led many Syrians to flee their homes.

Second question is; “What presuppositions or assumptions underlie this representation of the 'problem'?” (Bacchi, 2009: 48). If there is a ‘problem’ that compels one to propose a solution then there are some assumptions, inevitably, that one must make. For instance, a policy is proposed to enhance foreign relations through increasing interactions with another country, then it should be assumed that there is a lack of interaction with that country. Keeping this logic in mind, the next step is to analyze the Turkish foreign policy which prescribes opening boundaries as a solution to the crisis situation in Syria. To begin with the causes of the ‘problem’, it is the violent acts of the Syrian government. Especially the official documents clearly point Assad as responsible for all of the displaced persons’ agony. As the policy involves providing a shelter and protection for Syrians accordingly we must assume that there is a lack of protection for Syrians. This assumption can be followed by another one which infers that they cannot protect themselves and need a higher authority committed to protecting them as they can no more rely on their government, which brings the illegitimacy of the government to the forefront of the assumptions. What is hidden within this deep-seated is *socia unconscious* (Bacchi,

2009: 1-53). Turkish policy makers, through reflecting on the humanitarian side of the conflict, prefer to draw attention to its soft power and its diplomatic efforts with the international community. The documents make constant attribution to Turkish authorities' efforts on all levels; including one to one meetings with leaders, multinational and international organizations. Turkish policy makers certainly are proud of the aid that has provided for Syrians, however also seems to aim for a benefit from the expenses it made. Another assumption lying beneath the policy is that Turkish policy makers assume that the Syrian refugee problem is a short-term problem and therefore the policy is actually promoting short-term solutions. In the beginning of the problem, Turkish politicians failed to foresee that the refugees would keep coming and this wave would last this long. By opening the doors, Turkish government tried to present itself as a leading country in the region in an attempt to transform its concept of the 'self'. Yet the problem has lasted longer than foreseen; thus the policy has become unfit with the situation as it only provides short-term solutions.

The third question is; "How has this representation of the 'problem' come about?" (Bacchi, 2009: 48). This question focuses on the practices and processes that lead to the dominance of the aforementioned representation of the problem. How did these assumptions and presuppositions emerge in the first place? Historical traces rise to the surface with this question. Why Turkish policy makers preferred to apply an open door policy while some European countries' first reaction was closing their doors? A reporter from the British newspaper Independent stated that the "Turkish government is concerned with the recurrence of the refugee inflow happened with Iraqi Kurds in 1991 after the Gulf War" ("Türkiye Suriye'de Tampon", 2011). We

should remind ourselves that all the countries do not act in the same way, and certainly there is no single rational choice for every situation. Countries with their past, culture, and customs differentiate themselves from other countries. When the government did not know what to do and shut the door, the influx of Iraqi Kurds left a mark on Turkey's history. A second historical trace is the Arab Spring. Turkish policy makers considering the problem as a short-term problem are based on the countries that have been going through Arab Spring before. Based on the historical pattern of these uprisings Turkish policy makers assumed that the uprising in Syria will also cool off in a short period of time. Thus, based on these assumptions and presuppositions, the policy again reflects Turkish authorities' intention to change its 'self' image to a more soft and sympathetic one. It has been brought to our days through history books, movies, media, and by word of mouth that Turkey has a reputation of being an Eastern country while the developed countries considered Western. As it is in deep-seated *socia unconscious* it requires an extra effort to change it. This unconscious ambition to change a deep seated reputation makes the overly repeated emphasis on humanitarian argument and Turkish government's inclusionary hospitality. At this point the 'humanitarian and conscientious responsibility' argument is to justify how civilized Turkish government are. Additionally it also shows Turkey's increasing self-confidence and its intention of being an ambitious and powerful actor in its region.

The fourth question is; "What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the silences? Can the 'problem' be thought about differently?" (Bacchi, 2009: 48). Hosting Syrians does not surely help with the crisis situation in Syria. Basic rights violations by the Assad regime, civil uprising, rise of

divided non-state actors, and great power rivalry (the USA, Russia and Iran) are some of the other explanations for the ‘problem’. Nevertheless Turkish policy makers fail to address these causes. Furthermore the binaries the government uses left some of the points untouched, as they do not fall under any of the two sides. For example Turkish authorities try to give an impartial stand between the sides battling in Syria; however they also say that they will stand by Syrian Turkmens and against Assad regime. Within this dichotomy Turkish authorities hinder their objective stand if it wants to protect Syrian Turkmens as a priority, or they fail to help the Syrian Turkmens if they want to keep their neutral stand. Hence there is a ‘silence’ left unproblematized within the policy. Another dichotomy occurs between the national and international. Throughout the research, it has been observed that Turkish policy makers attempt to fit every party involved with the conflict within ‘self’ or ‘other’ boxes, yet there are many grey areas that policy makers fail to apprehend. Assad’s human rights violation and external interference in the conflict have created multiple divisions. External intrusions into the battling parties in Syria have created a protracted conflict and thus extended the civil war, which Turkish policy makers appear to have unproblematized.

The fifth question is; “What effects are produced by this representation of the 'problem'? ” (Bacchi, 2009: 48). Due to its nature, every policy targets some part of the society and therefore some part of a social group is more likely to be affected than some others. Through this question, the effects created by the policy and how these effects vary on different social groups are investigated. The essence of the question also poses the following questions; “what is likely to change with this representation of the ‘problem’? What is likely to stay the same? Who is likely to

benefit from this representation of the ‘problem’? Who is likely to be harmed?”(Bacchi, 2009: 48). These effects are analyzed under three headings; discursive effects, subjectification effects, and lived effects. Discursive effect of this ‘problem’ representation is imposing limits on what can be done. For instance when the problem is Syrians coming to Turkey then the things that can be thought or done to solve the problem are limited. Nevertheless if the ‘problem’ is to be handled as Syrians leaving their homes then things that can be done or said will be more efficient. The second effect is subjectification, which asserts that policies create different group of subjects. Subjects relate themselves within the positions constructed by the discourse. Turkish discourse creates a role model / a hero, multiple villains/ subversives, and a victim/ an escapee. The way that roles were given in Turkish government’s representation, does not leave any choice to those claim to have humanistic ethics, since the representation clearly separates between the people helping the victims and people questioning the policy. One of the articles even argues it openly that people who stands with Erdoğan are protected, and those who stand against him should fear. Au contraire in the opposition’s ‘problem’ representation, subjectification is done differently. One of the subject groups is the Syrians, whether in need or self-sufficient, while the other group is neglected citizens of Turkey. Yet the policy makers, as they position themselves within a more heroic, strong man, they seem to enjoy the praises. At this point the separation is made between a chauvinist person preserving national interests before anything, and globally moral and altruistic for the greater good. Officials have blamed Europe by not taking power of doing the morally right thing. Anyone being exposed to the policy has an effect on forming these subjectification groups. Based on who we think

we are affect our position towards the situation and with repeated practice of these positioning groups were formed. Based on these positioning the situation of the displaced persons within Syria stay the same, and the situation of those who manages to arrive to a safe place is more of a policy tool than the previous ones. Hence the subjectification of the policy makers affects the policy. The third effect is lived effects which draws attention to the more material effects, such as high cost of settlement/rent and unemployment. These are the policies which have direct impact on the everyday life of the citizens. As the groups coming through the borders are not homogenized, varying from the richest to the poorest, a possibility to exploit the vulnerabilities occur. Some of the examples of the effects experienced from this situation can be observed in the increase in housing rents in Gaziantep and unregulated settlements. Again this diversification among Syrian refugees creates vulnerability also in employment. For instance, for those who are in more need of financial support create groups of cheap labor force. So now those who have been called 'temporary' and 'guests' are now providing cheap workforce. Hence the 'problem' representation at this points creates uneven impacts on different subjectified groups, which ends up with vulnerabilities being exploited. Another lived effect of the refugee policy can be traced within Turkey's relations with EU. Although the next chapter will investigate the EU policy in more detail, it will be useful to acknowledge here using refugee leverage when bargaining with the EU has affected Turkey's relation with the EU remarkably.

The sixth and the last question is; "How/where has this representation of the 'problem' be produced, disseminated and defended? How could it be questioned, disrupted and replaced?" (Bacchi, 2009: 48). Here on replying this question, it will

be efficient to remind here the answer to the third question. Third question was about practices and processes which are the means of creating a representation. These practices consist of spreading the discourse through history books, movies, media, and by word of mouth. Repeated usage of a concept, the more it is being used, makes the concept more common hence more 'true'. How the discourse is spreaded is a long and effortful process, but the way it is generated is only by a simple thought or action. Based on these findings I came to understand that the way to re-problematizing goes again through discourse. By this, I mean that the instruments used to reshape the discourse between the speakers and the audience is again the discourse itself. Simply by paying attention to the words being chosen and being aware of the presupposition lying behind the words we can generate policies that will actually solve the 'problem'. Once a simple thought is being learned it cannot be unlearned. Through generating and disseminating the practice of the alternative discourse it is possible to replace the dominant one, as this is how the dominant presentation came about. Even in some cases, the critics they themselves reproduce the discourse as they are embedded within, yet being aware of this already a first step to the transformation. As the critics regenerate the same discourse, change requires alternative ways to look at the same problem but from a different point of view. So the action preferred would be channel politicians/ actors' attention to what is uncovered and even to what they are avoiding. Then through the appropriate use of multimedia and other tools, another presentation will be created.

Following table (Table 3) will summarize the major points that dominate Turkish discourse based on attained representations through data.

Table 3: Comparison of the key findings between official and non-official Turkish data

	Problem Representation	**Underlying Assumptions**	**Emergence of Representation (practices and processes)**	**Unproblematic aspect**	**Effects of representation**	**Production, dissemination and defense of representation**
Official documents	Humanitarian emergency, Internationalism, Proactivism, Assad as the root cause of the problem	Short-term problem, Lack of protection for Syrians, Unreliable government	Iraqi Kurds inflow, Arap Spring pattern, Eastern & Western 'selfs'	Basic rights violation in Syria, Civil uprising, External intrusions	Subjectification; hero, villains, and victim / internally displaced, refugees Protracted conflict,	Going back to reproblematization of the crisis / what is uncovered.
The media						
Pro-government; Yeni Şafak	Humanitarian responsibilities, Inefficiency of the international community	(parallel with official data)	(parallel with official data)		Bargaining with Europe, Appreciations on International level	
Opposition; Sözcü	Ineffective foreign policy, Incapability of the politicians	Global problem	Foreign Media		Subjectification; Syrians, Turks Unemployment, High settlement costs	

CHAPTER 4

SYRIAN REFUGEES AND THE BELATED EU INTEREST

In the previous chapter Turkish perspective towards Syrian refugees has been analyzed. In this chapter the EU involvement in the issue and how the foreign policies between Turkey and EU have been affected when an outside development or factor has been included in their relations will be discussed. In this case, the outside factor was the Syrian conflict. Hence, this chapter investigates the relations between Turkey and the EU based on the EU's representation of the civil war in Syria in terms of a "refugee crisis". In order to understand the link between the EU and the problem framed as "crisis", it is necessary to have a chronological insight into the course of developments in the region. This enables us to see at what point and why the EU began to show policy interest and how it has acted in response to the unfolding events. Therefore, before going into details of the European foreign policy, following part will outline some of the events in their chronological order. Having outlined the unfolding of the developments regarding the Syrian conflict, its internationalization and European foreign policy, the chapter provides a detailed overview of the official discourse and media representations. It concludes with the analysis of the European representations of Syrian refugees using Bacchi's approach.

4.1. Review of the Events

In April 2011 Syrian refugee influx started with approximately 5000 refugees fleeing to Lebanon. In June the same year, first major flow into Turkey occurred. From that point on the numbers of refugees crossing Syria neighboring countries (Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey) have increased exponentially. In November Turkish government announced that they had spent almost $15 million to set up six camps. Moreover by the end of the 2011 Turkish officials already become persistent on the 'guest' rhetoric instead of 'refugee'.

In April 2012, approximately a year later from the outbreak of the crisis, a group of refugees of Kurdish origin headed to Iraq. Two days later the highest ever recorded number of refugees crossing border in one day was documented as above 2,500 across the Turkish borders. At the beginning of July 200,000 more fled from Syria with a majority over Turkey due to the intensive attacks in Aleppo. Towards the end of July UNHCR decided to become more involved by opening a camp in Jordan. By September the highest number of refugees crossing a border in a day has risen to 11,000 people in a 24 hour period.

In January 2013, UNICEF launched #childrenofsyria to raise awareness and to remind that a huge portion of the refugees are children in need of education. In July, the UN recorded that the Syrian refugee flow is the largest refugee flow since Rwandan Genocide with a total of 2 million. Despite this data and even higher numbers publicly certified in EU documents in 2013 on the refugee influx, the EU does not seem to have realized the significance of the situation. Only in September Germany declared that they consented to host 5,000 Syrian refugees only for two

years. In October, with the UNHCR's encouragement some more EU countries promised to accept some small numbers of Syrians by the end of 2014 (Table 4)

Table 4: Table of the EU countries, with the numbers of Syrian refugees they have promised to accept by the end of 2014. (source: UNHCR)

Country	Pledge (Persons)
Australia	500 resettlement
Austria	500 humanitarian admission
Canada	200 resettlement 1,100 private sponsorship
Finland	500 resettlement
France	500 humanitarian admission
Germany	5,000 humanitarian admission
Hungary	10 resettlement
Ireland	90 resettlement
Luxembourg	60 resettlement
Moldova	50 resettlement
Netherlands	250 resettlement
Norway	1,000 resettlement
Spain	30 resettlement
Sweden	400 resettlement
Switzerland	50 resettlement
USA	open-ended number on resettlement
TOTAL	**10,240 plus an additional number to the USA**

Having more than 2 million of refugees in mind and seeing that these are the most developed and richest countries, the numbers like 50, 30 or 10 look hideously low. Moving on with the flow of events, in November a German NGO claimed that Greek special-operation forces is conducting an operation on land and sea at the Turkish border to hold off the Syrian refugees. A few days later Bulgaria started to build a 30 km border fence at the Turkish border while UN High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres endorsed European countries to keep their borders open. At the end of 2013, in December 16, UN declared its estimations that by the 2014 nearly three-quarters of the Syria's population will need humanitarian help (MPC).

In 2014, UK's Foreign Office tweeted an announcement from Home Secretary saying that they will provide emergency sanctuary to vulnerable Syrian refugees. By February 1800 refugees in Lebanon were facing death due to malnutrition. In mid-2014, Cecilia Malström, EU Home Affairs Minister, argued that "Syria's neighbors have accepted over 3 million refugees, while Europe only 100,000" (https://youtu.be/0dFVmfBZcoY). In August 11, Isis as one of the biggest non-state actors in Syria took control of the oil and gas fields. In September, Isis attacks on Kurdish villages along the Syria - Turkey border have caused refugee influx, which multiplied the numbers of those who fled to Turkey. Records show more than 130,000 Syrians in late-September. In December UN initiative of providing food aid is suspended due to lack of funds, because donors could not meet their commitments. With this unfortunate, UN draws attention to the forthcoming humanitarian crisis due to increasing gap between need and resources. UN has stressed that "[they] seeks $16.4 billion to give response to the humanitarian crisis of 2015" (MPC, 2015,December 8).

When we came to the year 2015, Europe started to make its real concerns and aims clearer. In April 23, EU summits in Brussels after migrant tragedies in the Mediterranean. "A confidential draft summit statement stipulates that the majority of migrants who manage to reach Italy will be deported as irregular migrants under a more agile scheme coordinated with the European agency for border control Frontex" (MPC, 2015,April 23). In addition to that, European Council established that the number of resettlement places to be offered to refugees based on the emergency summit crisis package, which will be limited to 5,000. A month later, with the collapse of pro-regime forces in Palmyra, Isis took over the control of 50%

of Syria. In June 18, UN signifies that the world have reached the historical maximum with 59.5 million displaced people worldwide. One of the biggest shares in this amount belongs to Syria. In 13th of July, Hungarian Government started to build a border fence of 150 meter long and 4 meter high, in order to repel migrants at the Serbian border. With the initiation of the construction of the border fence, Hungary confronted a refugee rush. In one day 2,093 asylum seekers crossed Hungarian border, this is the doubled number of the past recent weeks. Finally in 26th August, Germany has become the first European country to open its borders to Syrian asylum seekers. Germany exhibited a positive attitude unlike Europe has done until then. According to the 1990 protocol, asylum seekers must seek asylum in the first European country they encounter, also known as the Dublin Regulation. However Germany suspended this protocol and is willing to take Syrian asylum seekers no matter which European country they have set a foot before. Furthermore Germany encouraged other countries to do so too. On September European Commission presented a proposal for the relocation of the refugees across EU member states. In order to protect Italy, Greece and Hungary, which are the EU countries that have faced with refugee influx the most, the President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker introduced a proposal to redistribute some part of the refugees. In this scheme 120,000 people are anticipated to be relocated based on criteria, which expects France, Germany and Spain to host around 60% of this 120,000 people. It is ironic that on one hand the EU encouraging countries to open their borders to refugees and on the other hand some countries are building walls. After the border fence that Hungarian government was building was completed, government authorities have announced that those who try to break through the fence

will be penalized with jail, and those who will claim asylum at the Serbian border will turned back automatically. By doing so the path that goes into Western Europe will be blocked and two decades of European open borders policy will be ended. Two weeks later Russia strikes for the first time directly to Syria, more precisely to Islamic State with aircrafts. In 4th November, the resettlement scheme promised by EU has started. In addition to that, towards the end of 2015 Turkish and the EU authorities agreed on a Joint Action Plan. These were some of the important events between the years 2011 and 2015. Certainly these events are not the only ones happened on the refugee crisis, but they are the major pieces of the puzzle. Apart from that it displays the exact point where the EU is involved, which is the end of 2014.

Of course, these events are not exclusively the important ones, yet they can be considered as the major milestones in building Turkey-EU relations on Syrian refugee subject. As you can see above Turkish government started, actually compelled, to host the Syrian refugees at its border and allocated resources for them at a very early stage of refugee crisis due to its proximity to Syria. Yet Europe only has started to recognize the issue towards 2014 and begun act on it in 2015. Therefore to understand the 'problem' representation of the policy formed in 2015 both official and non-official documents will be evaluated along the year of 2015.

4.2. An Overview of the EU Foreign Policy

To have a better understanding of EU's foreign policy discourse, it will be useful to have a brief discussion of how the EU works in relation to the management of externally rooted matters and what types of policy instruments it

uses. In doing so, the institutional and the public documents also could be pointed out, which generate the foreign policy discourse. In 1993 EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was established by the Treaty of European Union. Some of its initial objectives were maintaining peace, fortifying international security, promoting international cooperation, expand and strengthen democracy, rule of law, and uphold human rights and fundamental freedoms. In 1999, European Council established the function of the High Representative for the CFSP. Later on, in October 2007, Lisbon Treaty was signed to reform institutional provisions. With its entry into force in January 2009 external services become more concrete since the treaty has provided legal personnel, and naturally an institutional incarnation to the Union. The treaty has also created new CFSP actors, such as High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who also serves as Vice-President of the Commission. In addition to these, Lisbon Treaty has also initiated European External Action Service (EEAS). When we turn our faces to EU bodies European Commission is the unit that works in cooperation with CFSP. European Commission is composed of 28 Commissioners, one from each EU country, and those commissioners first priority is European interests. Commissioners' first objective is to preserve the integrity of Europe, which they can only do by leaving their national identities a side and adopting a European one. In addition to that European Parliament composed of directly elected 751 members and possess the legislative power that neither Commission nor Council does. It is the first institution of the EU. However EU Council consists of ministers from each country, which makes the Council more of a combination of separate national voices. In other words each minister, who came there to represent its country will inevitably reflect and argue

their national interests. So the European Council does not act on their European identity, but their national background. Therefore the documents of the Council will not be included. Nevertheless, European Council and European Parliament share the legislative power, adding that the Parliament's goal is to contribute to the European identity. European Parliament consists of members directly elected by citizens and it executes the legislative function of EU together with the Council. Hence the Parliament's documents will present legislative body's representation from a European point of view, not from a national one. In addition to that EU's executive body European Commission's documents, as it will play a crucial role in disseminating the discourse, will also take part in the research. As common foreign policies should be made for European unity, this research will be focusing on European Parliament's data for legislations, and European Commission's official documents on representing and practicing the policies onto public. It will be appropriate to analyze both European Parliament and European Commission's press releases, memos, fact sheets, and speeches. As the Commission and the Parliament are responsible for making and executing the legislation and budget proposals, it will be appropriate to analyze their documents to obtain the whole picture of the European representation.

As earlier in this chapter the timeline of the events demonstrated that the EU's territorial involvement to Syrian refugee crisis was in 2015, official documents will be analyzed throughout 2015. Although the EU is physically involved with the crisis in 2015, indications of how the EU defines the problem and the solution, and also the indications of the EU's verbal involvement has started in 2013. Hence the documents of 2013 and 2014 will also be briefly included into the analysis.

4.3. EU Official Documents Regarding Foreign Policy on Refugee Crisis

Even though the EU has started to be territorially involved with the crisis in 2015, it has started its first verbal actions in 2013. Thus this section will be analyzing the data from 2013 till the end of 2015. However this section will be categorized under 5 main sub-discourses on the subject. First part will be reflecting the EU's perspective on its roll regarding the Syrian conflict as an exclusive actor. Second section will be reflect the EU's representation on Turkey's role concerning the crisis. Third section will demonstrate the fluctuations in the EU - Turkey relations on the course of the conflict. Fourth segment of the discourse will be on the Joint Action Plan , where European and Turkish policy makers agreed on a €3 billion deal. And last but not least, the pragmatism, which comes after the Joint Action Plan.

4.3.1. EU's role in the crisis

The European Union has started to be involved with the crisis situation in Syria with allocating a special section in its budget devoted to humanitarian aids, also called as Humanitarian Aid Budget. From that budget a small share was assigned for humanitarian crisis in Middle East. For instance, in June 2013 the EU provided support to Jordan to cope with Syrian refugee crisis. According to the related press release Jordan and Lebanon, but mostly Jordan, has taken the "lion's share of Syria refugee" (European Commission, Press Release Database, 2013, June 3). With this allocated financial supports to Jordan and Lebanon, the EU aims to help with the economic and political challenges that arise with refugee influx, and also to complement the EU humanitarian actions, by providing medical services to camps. However this humanitarian aid is also send to some countries in Asia of Africa who

are in need of financial support. So this refugee crisis, from the EU's perspective is regional problem concerning Jordan and Lebanon for that time being not Europe.

Similarly the EU has represented its role in Syrian refugee crisis solely financial and humanitarian. According to EU's 2013 data, European Commission is aware of the crucial humanitarian crisis going on in the world. Therefore it allocates "almost 28% of its annual humanitarian aid budget which exceed €1billion" (European Commission, Press Release Database, 2013, June 20) to support refugees and internally displaced people all around the world. The target of their humanitarian help is to meet the most urgent needs of refugees, protect and support them during their displacement and increasing their self-reliance and reduce their dependency. Taking all humanitarian crises over the world, Syrian refugees' share is even smaller than the half of 28% percent. Commission claims to channeling its supports through organizations like UNHCR, the International Organizations for Migration, the Red Cross, Red Crescent and also through some non-governmental organizations. They claim to obtain durable solutions through these aids. In one of the memos published by European Commission all documented EU responses to Syrian refugee crisis are declared to be through their founding organizations. This shows us that how remote the EU actually are even though they claim to be involved. Thus these donations are like social responsibility projects that they get away by donating money.

In 2014, the dramatic situation of Syria and Syrian people again seem to be acknowledged by the EU as in 2013. Although welcoming and hosting Syrian refugees are described as an overwhelming test, and in the documents the responsibility is assigned to Syria's neighboring countries. Violence and everyday deaths are causes of the problem, and the EU asserts that sustainable solution to the

problem should be a political one that will promote stability to the region. Apart from that all related documents repeatedly emphasize that the EU has been the largest donor for this crisis with the €2 billion provided for the crisis (European Commission, Press Release Database, 2014, January). According to the Commissioner Füle, "Lebanon and Jordan are facing immense challenges as a result of the crisis and massive refugee influx" (European Commission, Press Release Database, 2014, January). Although Turkey was one of the neighboring countries who face huge challenges due to the crisis, Turkey's role is not recognized as a major one but more of a side help. So this shows that the EU does not consider Turkey as a part of EU's Syria policies or better said financial help received. Putting the acknowledgement of Turkish efforts a side, the EU does not even prefers to be involved directly within the process of finding a solution to the crisis, despite his claims of being biggest donor. "The assistance will be channeled through the European Commission's humanitarian partners: UN agencies, the Red Cross / Red Crescent family and international non-governmental organisations" (ibid.) as it was in 2013. Providing support for others to deal with the situation is a sign that they do not see themselves responsible but those who aids being sent are responsible for dealing with the situation, and the EU as a soft power who sets 'an example' for the rest of the world on account of donating money is a noble gesture. Only towards the end of 2014 that the EU realizes Turkey's crucial role in holding spill-over effect of refugee influx, when the biggest number ever recorded crossed Turkey's border within a day. The Commissioner represented its gratitude to Turkish officials for keeping its border open. The EU, in September 2014, declares that "EU steps up assistance" (European Commission, Press Release Database, 2014, September 23) in

a press release. This declaration is the first one until then that the EU promises to be involved de facto with the crisis. Again in this press release the EU disclosed its commitment to support the governments and host communities of Syria's neighbors so that they can deal with the situation effectively (ibid.). This 'stepping up' rhetoric also demonstrated that this newly provided founding is the first specific move that the EU took towards Syrian crisis. Before that what the EU was doing was just allocating some share of its humanitarian aids budget to its 'humanitarian partners'. At the end of 2014 Commissioner Stylianides has said; "Let me express my deep appreciation for the immense efforts by Turkey and its people, who have shown their huge capacity for solidarity with the people of Syria in their greatest time of need" (EC, Press Release Database, 2014, December 9). As a consequence 2014 can be seen as the year where the EU starts to understand the severity and the proximity of the crisis, and realized the need for extra efforts to deal with it. So even though it has been 4 years since the refugee crisis has burst out, the EU does not even allocated a separate budget for such a big humanitarian crisis. The reason for that is Europe still considered the crisis as a distant problem from its territory. Another proof that the EU is not being personally involved with the problem is that the financial aid and humanitarian aid is channeled through organizations.

While analyzing the 2013's and 2014's data, it becomes obvious that the EU represents its role in Syria and its relation with Turkey separately. Yet, in 2015's data, the EU has started to merge them in a one policy. As the president of the European Parliament Schulz pointed out "for the benefit of refugees we need to cooperate with Turkey" (European Parliament, News, 2016, March 7). The reason for this is that EU has stopped looking at these two policies separately, and also the

number of illegal border-crossing to Italy, Greece and Cyprus has increased. Hence the EU is being obliged to be territorially involved with the crisis. Now the crisis is not solely on Syria and its neighbors' territory but also Europe's territory. So the EU's problem representation has started to change from a crisis happening far away to a crisis concerning Europe's internal integrity. In January 2015, European Commission published a fact sheet on smuggling of migrants. The fact sheet reports that large part of the illegally smuggled migrants comes from Syria and Eritrea followed by Afghanistan, Mali, and Kosovo (EC, Press Release Database, 2015, January). Furthermore there are two main routes that smugglers mostly use; (1) Central Mediterranean, which goes from Libya and Egypt to south of Italy and Malta, and (2) Eastern Mediterranean Route, which goes by sea from Turkey to Italy, Greece or Cyprus' shores. The fact sheet also reports that the number of illegal border-crossing in 2014 increased of 155% compared to 2013. The EU's response to these illegal activities are providing technical and operational assistance via Frontex to Italy, implementing new law enforcements in Member States, reinforcements of cooperation among intelligence agencies, as well as offering new resettlements and assistance to refugees in third-countries (EC, Press Release Database, 2015, January 13). Here we can see the reason behind the EU aids. Although the EU claims and promotes the 'stepping up humanitarian assistance' policy as the driven force behind these aids, it is subjected to question. Is it really the humanitarian purposes as it is being promoted or self-interests to protect its external borders? To clarify, when looked at the subjects and the objects within the policy, it is observed that humanitarian purposes are not as clear as the aim of keeping the refugees outside of Europe. The real target of the EU's actions is clearly its external borders.

Meanwhile the European Parliament emphasizes the obstacles that Europe's internal dynamics are faced with the increasing number of refugees. "The real divide revealed by today's migration challenges to the EU is between "pros", who want to use the EU to solve these challenges, and "antis", who want to use them to dissolve the EU" (European Parliament, News, 2015, October 27). Refugee crisis bought most of the member countries to their edges, which has shaken the EU to its foundation. Most of the countries asked themselves whether refugee crisis needs a European or national response. According to a survey published by European Parliament, "nearly two thirds of Europeans think decisions on migration should be taken at EU level rather than nationally" (European Parliament, News, 2016, February 3). Thus refugee crisis has become a case where member states started to question European identity and solidarity.

The EU since 1999 was working to create a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) and several legislatives were set to establish some common minimum standards for asylum seekers until 2005 (EC, Press Release Database, 2015, March 4). Although CEAS was conceived by 2005, in 2011 and 2013 some rules are added. The dates of added rules are noteworthy as 2011 is the outbreak of the crisis and 2013 is the date that EU started to be affected by it. Those recently added rules introduced new instruments for asylum system. One of the newly added tools for asylum system is, for instance, 'relocation'. Relocation tool aims to rotate recognized refugees from overburdened member states for those states' protection and further solidarity among members. Another example for an instrument that the Common European Asylum System uses is 'resettlement'. Resettlement is claimed to be a tool that operates on external dimension by offering refugees a safer way to

reach EU. A second example for the tools that operates on external dimension is 'Regional Development and Protection Programmes'. These programmes are also a core part of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) along with resettlement. Hence the EU enhanced its strategy to 'cope' with the refugee problem, not 'solve'. Hence, it is safe to say that once refugees started to come in it is not a regional problem apart from Europe anymore.

So at this point the EU has started to deploy its migration policies instead of foreign humanitarian help because the definition of the policy has changed. Apart from CEAS, an effective return and readmission policy, via Frontex that manages cooperation on operational level at EU's external borders, also holds an essential part of the EU's migration policy. In a Q&A on how the European Commission helps refugees, emphasis is made on donations pledged in the case of Syrian refugees (EC, Press Release Database, 2015, June 19). When the subject has come to the offering asylum in the EU, the first concrete action mentioned only in the midst of 2015 is to conduct search and rescue activities in the Mediterranean after the tragic events. However the same report also mentions that a new proposal is being presented for the new European Agenda on Migration that will temporarily relocate 40.000 people in Italy and Greece including 20.000 refugee's resettlement among member states. The president of the European Parliament Schulz called upon all the member states to welcome the refugees and also invoked them to "immediately mobilise billions of euros for Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey" (EP, 2015, September 21). This proposal could be considered as the first formal action made to host a small part of Syrian refugees. In a speech given by Dimitris Avramopoulos, Migration and Home Affairs Commissioner, European response to migration issue is presented as "showing

solidarity and sharing responsibility" (EC, Press Release Database, 2015, August 14). In his speech Avramopoulos points out the increasing number of refugees within Europe (Greece, Italy, Hungary…) and announces some of the conclusions from the emergency meeting. These conclusions are as follows; increase in the funding, civil protection mechanism, hotspot approach, effective plan for relocation, redoubling efforts to cooperate with Turkey, and Frontex joint-operation Poseidon (ibid.). To this point, attention should be paid to the word 'redoubling', but before going into the details of it let me elaborate on this Turkey clause. On this clause he reveals that he will be visiting Turkey and also that he counts on the support of his colleagues, namely High Representative Mogherini and the Commissioner Hahn for making efforts to cooperate with Turkish government. So now what does he mean by 'redoubling'? The word itself implies that the relations were once doubled and now, with the prefix 're-', it needs to be gone again or the previous attempts of cooperation was not enough. Hence the role that Turkey holds for providing a solution in the eyes of the EU authorities is getting more crucial. Commissioner also puts emphasis on the severity of the challenges caused by migration and that none of the member states can effectively address these challenges alone. "I hope together we, Member States, Institutions, Agencies, International Organisations, Third Countries, can prove we are equal to this challenge" (EC, Press Release Database, 2015, August 14) said Commissioner. After this statement, which also includes third countries, in an announcement made in September Turkey's role became a little clearer. This announcement entails some proposals by President Juncker in response to some urgent needs, such as an extra €100 million more for emergency assistance to mostly affected members, additional €600 million for Frontex, €200 million more

for World Food Programme, and more funds to stabilize the EU's closest neighborhood, including additional €1 billion for Turkey for refugee related actions (EC, Press Release Database, 2015, September 24). In the document produced as outcome of the emergency summit meeting, one can deduct that the main aim for taking all those precautions is to protect EU's external borders and those who resides within, even with the policy change towards Turkey. And with Turkey becoming a part of the problem, this brings us to the next group of sub-discourse; Turkey's role on the crisis.

4.3.2. EU's perspective on Turkey's role in the crisis

Štefan Füle, European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy has given a speech in June 2013 at the Conference of Ministry for EU Affairs in İstanbul. In his speech he first argues that he is optimistic about the Turkish citizens travelling Europe without visas and also about opening new chapters for Turkey to see the EU as 'a benchmark for reforms' (EC, Press Release Database, 2013, June 13). In the following sections of his speech, he admits that joint approach on foreign policy is the key to make both sides stronger, as he gives the example of goals on promoting political solution to stop the bloodshed in Syria. This statement followed by the EU's "great admiration and gratitude for the generosity of the Turkish people, for Tukey's highly professional handling of thousands upon thousands of Syrian refugees sheltered on [its] territory" (ibid.). He claims that Turkey's role in finding political solution to the crisis is a key one; therefore the EU will support Turkish government to deal with the situation. In this speech and in many more inferences on 'Turkey's responsibility', 'EU support', and 'closer cooperation' indicates the EU's own role representations, as discussed above. Since

they are admiring from afar and supporting those fighting with the situation, they do not consider themselves as one of the leading roles in solving the crisis, but more of a sidekick or understudy. These representations can be interpreted as EU was not holding the Syrian refugee crisis as a problem for itself, but for Turkey and Syria's neighboring countries as it is a 'local' one, until it hits Europe. These role representations stayed solid in both 2013 and 2014. As the EU does not want to damage its soft power image, it goes on encouraging Syria's neighboring countries to host the refugees. Even though these admirational and supportive comments, EU official documents contain also lots of criticism to Turkey within the years 2013 and 2014. Most of 2013's criticisms are on Gezi Park protests, fundamental rights and freedom, and freedom of speech. As a solution to Turkey's aforementioned problems, the EU argues that through 're-energising' the accession process Europe can inspire Turkish policy makers to raise their standards. Hence all the comments on accession process gives the impression that it is simply a tool for Europe to provide a platform to promote European values and principles, not enlarging and adding a new member. The goal is still to help Turkish authorities and solve the conflict away from Europe.

After the emergence of the unrest in South-Eastern part of Turkey at the Syrian border, the Commission has stressed that they were ready to provide further financial assistance to support Turkish government in their response to the Syrian refugee crisis (EC, Press Release Database, 2014). Towards the end of 2014, Commission has published a press release on the assessment made for Turkey in visa dialogue (ibid.). According to this document Turkish government has made progress in Turkish passport and civil registry system, in reforms adopted in the field of

migration and international protection, in border cooperation with the EU member states and Frontex, and in making initiatives taken to reform anti-terror legislation (ibid.). Nonetheless a longer list is also published as Turkey's remaining necessary steps within the requirements of the visa roadmap. The list shortly consists of requirements on; document security, migration management, border management, public order and security, fundamental rights, and prevention of discrimination and facilitate social inclusion (ibid.). All these show that the EU starts to feel a step closer to the refugee problem, yet still not close enough to concern Europe. Being able to monitor is enough for now. To sum up, in 2014 Turkey is referred as a key strategic partner and Turkey - EU relations gained important milestones to new opportunities. Turkish government once again received praises from the EU on its efforts on hosting over 1.5 million Syrian refugees on its territory and received also promises from Commission on additional package of financial support for that matter.

Throughout the year, repeated references made to emphasize that the EU is founding main migration-related activities in Western Balkans and Turkey. For the specific case of Turkey, the funds are done from the budget of Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance's (IPA's) budget. Nevertheless as the document in October 2015 states, instead of spending the given amount for the criteria of the accession period, the bulk of the given assistance was allocated to the management of the land and sea, fight against the source of illegal migrants, to the international protection system, and to support the anti-trafficking of human beings (EC, Press Release Database, 2015, October 6). In other words the EU wants Turkey to facilitate its planned military operations in Mediterranean. According to Schulz's announcement

first part of this operation is gathering intelligence and setting up the structure, and the second part is arresting traffickers and disabling smuggler's' vessel as the EU's External Action Service (EP, News, 2015, September 23). To this extent, though the funds allocated to Turkey described to be a support for Turkey's development in accession process, their main underlying purpose is to make Turkish government to hold the refugees. As one can see by comparing the issues described to be dealt for accession in 2013 and 2014 are completely different from the issues the EU allocates funds for in 2015. Hence in the eyes of the EU officials, Turkey becomes a country that the EU can profit on the refugee subject, while it used to be a country that the EU keeps rejecting. This points out to the next subject; Turkey - EU relations.

4.3.3. Turkey - EU Relations

The EU through enhancing its engagement with Turkey, aims to stay as a 'benchmark' for Turkish government, especially on the matters that have been highly criticized, such as particular democracy to reach all segments of society, and respect for fundamental freedoms including freedom of expression and assembly. In other words Turkey's accession process is not an accession process for an actual candidacy, but a development process solely to remain as a benchmark for Turkey to reform itself according to EU values (EC, Press Release Database, 2013, October 16). Same year, later in November, the 're-energising the accession process has made again an appearance with a new chapter's opening. Chapter 22, Regional Policy and Cooperation of Structural Instrument, was opened after three and a half years long unproductive accession period. Turkey is being mentioned as an important partner with repeated reminders of the EU being Turkey's benchmark, ideal point to reach. Apart from that the EU also occasionally congratulates Turkish

government on some progresses it has made. For instance fourth judicial reform package adopted in April, the peace process as a solution to Kurdish issue, or progress in women's human rights constitute some examples of the progresses that the EU felicitated.

As to another example of the EU financial support to Turkey's development, in 2013 the EU announced that they will provide "more than € 236 million to support Turkey's reform efforts in key areas such as judiciary and fundamental rights, migration and border management, energy, environment and climate change, social development, as well as agriculture and rural development" after showing appreciations in a press released by European Commission (EC, Press Release Database, 2013, November 22). Štefan Füle declared that he expects further reforms that will contribute to the progress, and hoping that Turkey- EU relations will continue with the momentum it has gained. Towards the end of 2013, this 'new momentum' clearly made Turkey - EU bounds got stronger than before and the EU started to be more open towards Turkey. This indicates either a policy change or change in the EU's the perspective towards Turkey. On the assumption that the EU policy makers changed their perspective and now perceives Turkey as an equal ally, as opposed to seeing themselves superior to Turkey, it would eventually cause an immediate major shift in European dynamics. For instance with the EU's changed perspective towards Turkey, after EU Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia Malmström has signed the Readmission Agreement, and announced that it would not take long to progress on the Visa Liberalisation dialogue. However Visa Liberalisation dialogue could not surpass being an empty promise.

As an alternative to the option that the EU has changed its perspective, it might be preparing an alternative policy to keep Turkey outside of the Union but still pleased. As words have immense power on ideas and vice versa, some combinations of the words can imply more than their meanings. In this case the set of words, which are frequently used by the EU in relation with Turkey are 'setting the benchmark', 'support for reform', 're-energising'... to say something is getting better you must assume that was bad before. As these words asserts a sudden change, before being enhanced, the words suggests that Turkey - EU relations being in a bad condition. Yet, when to criticize, the EU still criticize the same issues and even the fact that Turkey is not making much progress. So what makes the EU to wanting to please Turkey? The major cause to this policy change is the chance in Turkey's role in the region.

In 2014, the language used to criticize Turkey or giving 'feedback' on its actions became a little softer. What is meant by softer is a noticeable increase in the use of some phrases such as 'close ally' to describe Turkey, or 'fruitful and beneficial' to describe the relations until 2014 (EC, Press Release Database, 2014, January 21). The notion of 'renewed momentum' by itself implies a change in the dynamics, as explained above. While before 'renewed momentum', the EU was criticizing Turkey's lack of independence in judicial power, the rule of law, and fundamental principles of democracy; after the 'renewed momentum', President of the European Commission José Manuel Durão Barroso has announced that they come to an understanding on these issues in his meeting with that time's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (ibid.). With the launched visa liberalisation dialogue in December 2013, Turkish government was given 1 year time to

implement the necessary reforms for visa liberation to be granted, which is to be prolonged later. At the beginning of the 2014 the President offered gratitude on Turkish government's constructive approach on energy relationships. In March 2014, Štefan Füle gave a speech in European Parliament plenary debate on Turkey's progress report. In his speech he lists four major aspects which make Turkey "a special country for European Union" (EC, Press Release Database, 2014, March 11). These four aspects are (1) dialogue and cooperation on foreign policy, (2) trade relations, (3) cooperation on mobility and migration, and (4) dialogue on energy issues. Towards the end of his speech he urged the Council to provide a roadmap for opening benchmarks for Chapter 23 by saying that this is what Turkish government asked for and that they can take Turkish policy makers' word to engage in a more constructive dialogue for crucial issues (ibid.). These sentences imply that there are some benefits that the EU is getting out of its relation with Turkey that they would not want to push Turkey off; instead they want to keep Turkey satisfied. In every speech, memo, or press release the EU prefers first to presents its appreciation on the achievements done and then introduce their criticisms, which can also be considered as a sign for EU's intention to soften the relations. The achievements referred under 'renewed momentum' are the opening of chapter 22, launching visa liberalisation dialogue in return to signing readmission agreement, reviews done on Custom Union for trade relations, successful cooperation on energy, and cooperation on foreign policy (EC, Press Release Database, 2014, April 10). After these positive inferences, EU continues with its remark on Turkey's negative points. While doing so EU describes itself as "Turkey's true friends who speaks true words" (ibid.). The target of those true words is misconduct of the investigations on corruption regarding

police officers, ban on social media, restraint freedom of expression etc. Nevertheless the Commission define itself in bold words as “strong promoter” of Turkey’s EU integration process. Therefore the positive dialogue and cooperation should continue, especially for the working group on Chapter 23. The advice that EU is giving to Turkey is to ‘re-engage in reforms’. In October 2014, key finding on 2014’s progress report is being published. The report covers the progress made by Turkish government and a number of concerns for the EU. As earlier mentioned, progress includes 3rd and 4th judicial reform packages’ adoption and implementation, readmission agreement’s signature and entry into force, and visa liberation dialogue. Other issues, such as Turkey’s alignment with *acquis* (EU legislation) and Turkey’s efforts on newly opened chapters noted as ‘continued’. In these progress reports, EU’s most frequently used set of words are ‘provide roadmap for reforms’ and ‘be a benchmark for Turkey’, which imply a kind of ranking among countries, by its nature one needs to be better or smarter than the other to provide a roadmap.

Nevertheless Turkish government has not received praises only for its ability to host vulnerable Syrians in 2014. The Commission, which finds Turkey’s renewed ‘EU strategy’ encouraging, endorses Turkish policy makers on further reforms, to enhance their potential at all levels. What is called ‘EU strategy’ in aforementioned document is an initiative of Minister Bozkır that re-affirms that European Convention for Human Rights and the EU *acquis* will serve as a reference point for reforms. The EU wishes to be remaining as ‘a crucial anchor’ (EC, Press Release Database, 2014, November 11) for reform process. As a consequence of this

enhanced relations, in October 2015 Turkish and EU policy makers agreed to act on a joint action plan. This action plan is composed of 2 parts;

> Part I: Supporting the Syrians under temporary protection and their Turkish hosting communities.
> Part II: Strengthening cooperation to prevent irregular migration. (European Commission, Press Release Database, 2015, October 15)

Each part specifies clause-by-clause what the two parties intend to do. According to the document international community faces "an unprecedented crisis" which requires solidarity and efficiency. Following that headline, the report starts with following sentences; "Challenges are common and responses needed to be coordinated" (ibid.). Are those challenges common now? Weren't they common in 2012 or 2013? The represented aspiration of the action plan is to "supplement Turkey's efforts in managing the situation of massive influx of people in need of temporary protection" (ibid.). In this one and the ones that come afterwards, it draws attention that the EU refers to Syrians in Turkey as 'temporary protection seeker' instead of 'refugee'. Here the observations show that the EU authorities comply with Turkish policy makers' choice of words (discourse) for this matter.

4.3.4. The Joint Action Plan

The importance of reinforcing the dialogue at all levels becomes once again an important issue. The Joint Action Plan also aims subsequently strengthening the cooperation and the "spirit of burden sharing" (EC, Press Release Database, 2015, October 15), so that this spirit of cooperation will be carried into other contexts, such as Visa Liberalisation Dialogue. Up to this point there has not been any related document that the EU declaring the number of Syrians in Turkey or the amount spent by Turkish government from its own resources. The information that is chosen not to

be reported is also important to depict the representation preferred. Thusly this can be interpreted as the EU policy makers' unwillingness to give credit to Turkish government on its refugee response. Nonetheless, in 2015 they appear to have changed their mind. Only after Joint Action Plan that the EU makes remarks on the 2.2 million people and €7 billion that Turkish government has spent up until October 2015. For the first part of the action plan the EU expressed its intentions to mobilize "substantial and concrete new funds outside the IPA funds" (EC, Press Release Database, 2015, October 15); to support relevant humanitarian organization apart from bilateral relations between Turkey and the EU, to ensure an efficient use of the funding through a 'comprehensive joint needs assessment' in terms of infrastructures, to continue its assistance to weakening the push factors forcing people to move to Turkey, and to support already existing Member States and the EU resettlement programmes. What Turkish policy makers describe as their intentions for the first part are; to continue and also enhance the effective implementation of the law on foreigners, to ensure the registration of migrants and build a stronger migration management system, to continue its efforts to provide better services to those under temporary protection, and to take care of vulnerable people. These were the actions planned for the first part of the action plan, to support the Syrians under temporary protection and their Turkish hosting communities.

The second part of the action plan is concerned with strengthening cooperation to prevent irregular migration. On this matter both sides again expressed their own intentions. The EU side firstly intends to better inform the Syrians in Turkey about the risks they take by choosing irregular departures and also about the possibilities available for them to enter the EU in an orderly manner. Secondly the

EU intends to support Turkish Coast Guard patrolling and surveillance to increase Turkey's capacity to fight against migrant smuggling. Thirdly it plans to organize joint return operations between the EU member states and Turkey for illegally entered migrants. Fourthly the EU wishes to support the implementation of the framework for "Silk Routes' Partnership for Migration" again to prevent irregular migration and smuggling. Fifth intention is about enhancing the capacity of both Frontex liaison officers and Turkish liaison officers through an officer exchange. Sixth and the final EU intention is to increase the "financial assistance offered to support Turkey in meeting the requirement of the Visa Liberalisation Dialogue", which is one of the key actions for Turkey (EC, Press Release Database, 2015, October 15). Thus, as it is clearly seen here, the actions the EU intends to take in regard of the second part of joint action plan, solely aim to make every necessary action to stop Syrians coming to Europe and send back those who managed to came.

After evaluating the actions and intentions the EU announced, the second part will be going over Turkey's intentions for strengthening cooperation to prevent irregular migration (Part II). Firstly, the Turkish side intends to reinforce the capacity of the Turkish Coast Guard by upgrading its surveillance equipment, intensify the frequency of patrolling activity, and by cooperating with the EU member states, especially with Bulgarian and Greek authorities to prevent irregular migration through common borders. Second intention is to collaborate to facilitate the readmission process of irregular migrants coming from Turkish territory based on the bilaterally agreed readmission provisions. Thirdly Turkey ensures to complete asylum procedures, which has been assessed positively. Fourthly Turkey established its intention to pursue the progressive alignment for Turkish visa policy, which will

also be in line with Visa Roadmap requirements indicated by the EU policy makers. This will also help Turkey to take measures against the countries which are source of illegal migration for Turkey. Fifth intention is to fight against the network of migrant smuggling, mainly by reinforcing the operational cooperation between Turkish law enforcement authorities and their European counterparts and EU agencies. Sixth intention, as in the fifth one, is about increasing the cooperation between Turkish and European policy makers; however this time it is through exchanging information between EU member states' immigration liaison officers in Turkey and the Turkish officers, in order to fight fraudulent travel documents and false migrant identities. Seventh action that Turkish government intends to make is to intensify cooperation with Frontex. Eighth and the final one is to deploy a liaison officer to Europol. These 8 intentions were the main points on Turkey's actions in Turkey - EU Joint Action Plan. Here the observations shows that Turkey's actions also serves the EU, maybe even more than they serve for Turkey.

Hence it seems that Turkish government is under the influence of the EU policy makers, and its actions also aim to prevent refugees crossing to Europe, just like the EU's actions, but in return for funds and the possibility of visa liberalisation. The timing of the action plan, the language used in indicating intentions and the actions themselves display that the underlying purpose is not to help Syrians or Turkish government but to make sure that the EU stay safe within its external borders.

4.3.5. After the Joint Action Plan

Newly after Joint Action Plan is endorsed, "member states have expressed their willingness to increase cooperation with Turkish government and to step up

their political and financial engagement to the country" (EC, Press Release Database, 2015, October 16). However, Turkish government, although being the biggest ally for the EU's refugee policy, is not the only channel that the EU policy makers deal with the Syrian refugees. Approximately 10 days later a meeting was set on the subject of Western Balkans Migration Route. Leaders from Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia have met in Brussels (EC, Press Release Database, 2015, October 25). They have also agreed that no one country can cope with the challenges created by refugee crisis by its own national resources, therefore they settled to develop a collective approach, as it is being said in Joint Action Plan. In this meeting leaders agreed on 17-point plan of action on multiple subjects, being; permanent exchange of information, limiting secondary movements, supporting refugees and providing shelter and rest, collective management of the migration flows, border management, tackling smuggling and trafficking, informing refugees and migrants on the rights and obligations, and monitoring. Although this plan has been agreed by all member states EP President Martin Schulz utters his deep concerns on the possibility of failure to keep their promises; "if governments consider national egoism more important than common solutions, it will be to the detriment of both refugees and European cohesion" (EP, News, 2015, October 27). This plan is just another one for the EU to keep the refugees out, while trying to keep the union tight. To come back to the subject Turkey - EU cooperation, in 24th of November 2015 the EU declared that a €3 billion will be provided within the framework of Joint Action Plan to meet the needs of Syrian refugees in Turkey.

Along with the €3 billion, the EU announced that it will set up a refugee facility for Turkey.

> In dealing with the refugee crisis, it is absolutely clear that the European Union needs to step up its cooperation with Turkey and Turkey with European Union. We both need to work together and to implement the Joint Action Plan which will bring order into migratory flows and help to stem irregular migration. Within this framework, the setting up of a Turkey Refugee Facility translates our intentions into concrete actions. This money [€3 billion] is about providing support to further improve daily lives and socio-economic conditions of Syrians seeking refuge in Turkey. (European Commission, Press Release Database, 2015, November 24)

This quote is from the European Commission First-Vice President Frans Timmermans' speech. This quote is substantial on drawing attention on a few things. To begin with the first sentence, the focus point seems to be the needs of the EU and needs of Turkey or mutuality of needs. Yet what do they need precisely? Food? Shelter? Money? The answer of this question inquires the intent behind the problem representation because policies derivative force comes from the needs which vary for each country. We can notice that although the problem supposed to be the refugee crisis and the aim supposed to cease the violence causing people to flee their homes and provide food and shelter, both the problem and the aim represented differently for each side, Turkey and the EU (Q4). Hence the focus of the policies seems to be out of balance for both parties. The emphasis of the policies should be made Syrians' needs, not Turkey's or the EU's. The way that Europe tries to save its territory from Syrian refugees as if they are some kind of 'burden' or 'terrorists' and forgets that they are actually the victims of a global crisis are the major indications that EU policies are out of its focus. Same goes for Turkey, Turkish policy makers negotiate because they pursue their own national interest. There could have been more projects

to raise awareness, and more worldwide humanitarian conscious, because “with no end to the war in sight, millions of Syrians have become refugees and are in dire need of assistance” (EP, News, 2015, November 17).

In earlier sections through Turkish official and non-official data (chapter 3), the indication that Turkish government is using this situation as a leverage has been covered. Furthermore there are also indications of this argument among EU official data. Right after the announcement of Joint Action Plan and €3 billion, in 29th of November EU 28 Heads of State, European Council President Donald Tusk, Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu report a joint statement. The content of this statement is composed of the opening of Chapter 17 (economic and monetary policies), preparations for the opening of other chapters, further steps on visa-liberalisation, implementation of readmission agreements, and the Joint Action Plan, which are the main goals of Turkish government’s EU policy. The summit is reported as “Summit meeting re-energises EU - Turkey relations” (EC, Press Release Database, 2015, November 29). Through negotiations between Turkey and EU, Turkish government manages to use its leverage to its favor. This summit has aimed to conceive the enormous potential of Turkey - EU relations political dialogue on all levels should be reinforced according to the officials.

On the 15th of December 2015 European Commission presents recommendations for a voluntary humanitarian admission scheme with Turkey for refugees from Syria. This action seems to be the only one until now that is not involved with money. Jean-Claude Juncker had said that; “We are recommending that our Member States offer temporary protection to vulnerable people fleeing violent conflict in Syria, in line with their individual capacities” (EC, Press Release

Database, 2015, December 15). The aim of this scheme is to spread a fair share of Turkey's responsibility for the protection of Syrian refugees. Nonetheless, at the very same day, European Commission has announced that the Commission is adopting substantial new measures and setting a common approach to manage Europe's external borders and preserve the security within Schengen area of free movement. Thus the EU tries to look supportive towards Syrians in need, yet it also never let its guard down at its borders. At the end of 2015, European Council has declared that "progress was made last night on the management of the refugee crisis, in particular on the protection of the EU's external borders" (EC, Press Release Database, 2015, December 18). Based on this sentence one can deduct that what is and always been 'particular' for Europe is the protection of the external borders.

As a consequence, the EU's foreign policy is largely affected by the refugee crisis, especially its policies towards Western Balkans and Turkey came to the forefront of their foreign agenda. The EU is dealing with refugees from multiple sources, not only Syrians which requires precautions on multiple levels. With the crisis at the EU borders, EU's foreign policies towards Western Balkans have shifted, mostly with Serbia and Macedonia.

> The refugee crisis also affected relations with Turkey and prompted the EU to step up its engagement and take a more pragmatic approach towards Ankara in order to buy its cooperation. The EU agreed to "re-energise" the accession process with Turkey while softening its emphasis on human rights and the rule of law, even as the situation in the country deteriorated. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) won a solid majority in the November elections. (ECFR, 2016)

According to ECFR, although the situation within Turkey got worse, such as the collapse of the Kurdish peace process, Turkey's shooting down a Russian plane, and

human rights violations, the EU will still adopt a positive approach in Turkey - EU relations, because it wants to 'buy' Turkish cooperation.

In entering 2016, this document summarizes the major challenges that the EU could possibly be facing based on the challenges it has faced recently;

> As in 2015, wider Europe will continue to be the central testing ground for EU foreign policy. From armed conflict in the Donbas to economic reform in Kyiv, from Russian pressure on Eastern Partnership countries to stalling reform in the Western Balkans and a new dependence on Turkey, events in the region will test Europe's cohesion, its commitment to its values, and its ability to multitask. (ECFR, 2016)

This scorecard on 2015 clearly reflects the overall attitude of the EU towards its close neighbours. The scorecard criticize the EU for lowering its threshold for more firm policies, and called out for Europe to find more effective policies to deal with these challenges. Hence, 'new dependence on Turkey', being one of the challenges the EU will try to overcome and break this dependence, will induce EU to keep 're-energising' and 'burden sharing' with Turkey.

4.4. Wider Political Debate through Media

After analyzing EU's official data, in the following section journal articles from BBC and The Sun will be analyzed. The reason for choosing BBC and The Sun is very parallel with the reasons of picking Sözcü and Yeni Şafak in Chapter 3; the dominant representations from different points of view. On one hand, Peter Sissons, one of the main news presenters at BBC between the years 1989 and 2009, said that "[a]t the core of the BBC, in its very DNA, is a way of thinking that is firmly of the Left" (Sissons, 2011). Some others have criticized BBC for being neo-liberal and unionist. On the other hand, The Sun can be classified under one of

the most right-wing and biased of Europe, mainly from UK's perspective. Hence these two news sources will provide two different mind-sets that dominate Europe. Other potential papers that would represents pro-EU and opposition's perspective did not have proper archives or high circulation numbers as the BBC and The Sun. The articles were gathered through Google News Scrapper based on a keyword search. The keywords used to reach the related articles were "Syrian refugees", "humanitarian aid", and "EU Turkey policy". The number of results for BBC is 100 for each of keywords, and for The Sun in the order of appearance: 100, 42, and 100. Nevertheless, with the Google News Scrapper, quantity is not always equal to quality. Irrelevant articles may somehow overlap with the keywords used and appear in the list of articles. Thus, to purify the outcome of the keyword search I have handpicked the articles that are relevant.

Throughout the research three major sub-subjects have stand out that these news articles can be categorized under. For both media sources, in order to inspect it more closely, the articles of both journals are divided into these three sub-sections based on the subject they tackle. First sub-field is the EU's **internal dynamics** which are quite affected by the crisis. Secondly, **Turkey - EU relations** also constitute a major part of the data, which should be scrutinized separately. Last but not least, third sub-field consist of perspectives on **evaluating Europe on a humanitarian crisis**. Establishing three major sub-fields of the overall media data, firstly BBC articles will be inspected and their representations on the Syrian refugee crisis and Turkey - EU relations will be projected regarding the three major issues. Then this section will be followed by giving details on the articles published by The Sun and reflecting their perspective on the refugee crisis subject and Turkey - EU relations.

4.4.1. BBC's Representation

In this chapter, all BBC articles will be broken down into three sub-sections. First of those subsections is on the EU's internal dynamics. It is necessary to single out the ones on the EU's internal dynamics; because with the refugee crisis a turbulence has occurred between member states which has caused an increase among the voices between countries. For instance this causes BBC to give the headlines such as "Mediterranean migrants: EU split over quota plan" ("Mediterranean migrants: EU", 2015). With the rapidly increasing refugee numbers that Europe is encountering at its border towards the end of 2014 and 2015, internal ministers have raised their voices. According to BBC the key dates on the migrant crisis are as follows;

- 13 July: Hungary starts building razor-wire fence on border with Serbia
- 25 Aug: Germany says all Syrian refugees can apply for asylum there, regardless of which EU country they first entered
- 2 Sept: Image of body of three-year-old Syrian Aylan Kurdi, washed ashore in Turkey, moves public opinion worldwide
- 12 Sept: Record 4,330 migrants cross into Hungary
- 13 Sept: In a switch of policy, Germany introduces border controls with Austria - other EU nations later impose their own controls
- 15 Sept: Hungary enforces tough laws on migrants crossing its border fence, prompting thousands to turn to Croatian route
- 18 Sept: Croatia transports migrants over its border into Hungary, which ships them on to Austria
- 19 Sept: Thousands cross into Austria, which prepares to send many on to Germany ("Migrant Crisis: 17", 2015)

Till the midst of 2015, EU ministers failed to reach a consensus over refugee issues, which damaged Europe's solidarity. Thereof Mr. Avramopoulos, after interior ministers' talks in Luxembourg have said that "it's time we looked beyond national interests and avoided the lowest common denominator, the bargaining and

finger-pointing" ("Mediterranean migrants: EU", 2015). The fact that voluntary approach on being involved with refugee crisis did not work, European Commission felt the need to impose the quota system on 28 member states. BBC underlines the fact that, although the crisis is large scaled, the EU could have manage it easily if they can be organized. The main criticism under this assertion is to remark disorganized and inconsiderate manner of EU response. There is five obstacles, according to BBC, that causes the EU to struggle on reaching a consensus. First obstacle is EU's core principle, free movement principle being on rocks. UK's Home Secretary Theresa May used the word 'broken' to describe EU migration system. BBC justifies EU's bad migration system saying that this is the first time since Second World War that the EU facing such huge exodus (Laurence, 2015 Sept.9), therefore the EU might need time to adapt. Second obstacle hindering consensus is the disputes between member states over barriers and razor-wire fences. This is followed by the third obstacle, which are disagreements on quota plan. Fourth topic causes controversy among member states is conflict zones. Each member is being affected by different conflict zones - Centre Mediterranean, West Mediterranean, and Western Balkans - in varied degrees, therefore their priorities change on the measure to be taken at the borders. That leads to the fifth obstacle; national interests, which is the strongest obstacle to overcome. Summing up, all the dispute motives are caused by the fact that refugee crisis creating various pressures from country to country.

They lose time and effort on accusing each other. For instance UK's Prime Minister David Cameron argued that accepting Syrians from camps surrounding Syria would set an example for providing safe route to Europe, so that migrants are repelled from making the journey through Mediterranean Sea in a boat ("Migrant

Crisis: UK's", 2015). A week later David Cameron, again, called out EU countries to follow UK's lead on refugee crisis and funding the refugee camps around Syria. Towards the end of September EU interior ministers have finally approved quota plan after months long discussions. Even though countries such as Romania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary have voted against the mandatory quota, the plan is being accepted by the majority. Expecting that all the EU countries share a similar culture and common norms, the proposal should have been accepted with an unanimous decision.

Another vicious side of the relocation system based on quota plan is, although seem to be represented as a solution for refugee crisis, it certainly not helping anyone additively to those already manage to settle in Europe. The 120,000 people mentioned in the quota proposal are composed of 15,600 people from Italy, 50,400 from Greece, and 54,000 from Hungary. So even though it seems to be a good deed for Syrians, it is actually for Italy, Greece, and Hungary. The only logical option would be to accept an additional 120,000 people outside of Europe; nonetheless this was not even a subject. Relocation of those in Europe was by itself controversial enough for member state to negotiate. BBC's Europe editor, Katya Adler, has written that "what progress - if any - did EU leaders make at their summit in Brussels? [...] That depends on what you believe the true aims were of the official host, European Council President Donald Tusk, and the de facto shepherdess of the meeting, German Chancellor Angela Merkel" (Adler, 2015). Aims of the meeting according to Adler are certainly not humanitarian. Furthermore she argues that "nothing can be achieved while EU prime ministers and heads of state exchange insults, threats and unilaterally slam national borders shut" (Adler, 2015). She

sarcastically comments , though the debates were heated, the leaders did agreed on number of things, such as fight against smugglers, getting faster on asylum claims so that failed ones can be deported faster, providing integrity of external borders, 'throwing' more funds to camps in Syria's neighbouring countries to decrease the need to come to Europe. Based on the points EU leaders easily agreed on we can deduct the true aims Adler was mentioning earlier. These sincere aims of EU leaders are getting rid of the refugees and making sure that they or any other do not come back. She likewise criticise Europe for applying 'fortress Europe' policy and "courting the Turkish government and persuading it to clamp down on migrants heading for Europe [which] is likely to be complicated and costly". She describes Turkey as a country who desperately entreats to enter the Union, although being repeatedly rejected. That is why Turkish government would use this leverage over the EU policy makers.

Leaving the relations with Turkey to the second sub-section, this part continues with Europe's internal dynamics. Merkel has many times called out for unity. She was drawing attention on the fact that no matter they try to isolate themselves at the price of leaving people to suffer at the borders; there is no escape from the consequences of a humanitarian crisis ("Migrant Crisis: Hollande", 2015). While Merkel and Cameron was making calls for opening the doors, Australian former prime minister Tony Abbott advised Europe to follow Australia's footsteps and close their borders to migrants. Likewise French Prime Minister Manuel Valls blamed Germany for increasing number of refugee influx, with his words; "It was not France that said 'come'!" ("Migrant Crisis: France", 2015). He laid emphasis on France's reluctance to accommodate anyone further. With all the disagreements EU

leaders has among each other, they still manage to agree on one thing; control over EU's external border. According to BBC the refugee crisis is giving an impetus to European countries for enhancing their integration, which makes 'EU border security' Europe's "new mantra" (Laurence, 2015). To sum up, even though internal dynamics were going through a rough patch, all EU leaders can unite under the cause of protecting their external borders from the victims of war, if not under the cause of helping them.

Second group of articles is gathered under the sub-field of Turkey - EU relations on the refugee crisis. Based on the all data, one can derive that BBC is not a very big fan of Turkey - EU cooperation. For instance BBC's Europe editor reports its analysis on migration talks between Erdoğan and EU in a concerned manner. With her own words "the Turkish president cultivates an authoritarian strongman image and he needs to keep that up ahead of tight elections in Turkey. He won't come to Brussels to be pushed around" ("Turkey's Erdoğan to", 2015). This statement includes multiple subjectifications. First it unconsciously assumes that Turkish president will be pushed around if he comes to Brussels. Secondly, the statement asserts that Turkish president has too much pride and prejudice which holds him from going to Brussels as a sign of weakness. BBC also quoted from Erdoğan's speech saying that Turkey had taught Europe and the world a "lesson on humanity" via being a host for 2 million Syrians ("Turkey's Erdoğan to", 2015). When the EU was preparing to offer more money for the camps in Turkey, BBC noted that European Commission Chief Juncker 'hailed' Turkey for being host to 2.2 million Syrian refugees and added that "it is clear that we need Turkey. [Therefore] The Commission will come to its aid" ("Migrant Crisis: EU", 2015). The EU

admitting they need Turkey becomes a sub-title in the article. Another major criticism made towards Turkey is through German Chancellor Merkel. Merkel has asserted that for ‘a fair distribution of efforts’, Europe should not expect Turkey to tighten its border because Turkey is already spending a considerable amount of effort to host the refugees. Therefore in the name of ‘burden sharing’ Europe should secure its external borders. BBC also describe Merkel’s visit as a gift for Erdoğan, for him to boost his votes two weeks before the elections. More precisely words being used are “she showered Turkey with promises … It’s realpolitik in the original German sense of the word” (Lowen, 2015). Followed by the statement that “Europe is courting Mr. Erdoğan quite simply because the EU needs Turkey now perhaps more than ever” (Lowen, 2015). What the EU is aiming for Turkey is to make it a ‘privileged partner’ not a member. Later on, when Turkey and the EU bargaining on Joint Action Plan and on limiting refugee flow to Europe, BBC’s Istanbul correspondent Mark Lowen said that there was reluctance among some EU members to “bow too deeply to Turkey” when there are serious concerns about its government's respect for democracy and the rule of law (“Migrant Crisis: Turkey”, 2015). Yet with both sides compliance Joint Action Plan was settled in November. Nevertheless, not much later on December, Amnesty International’s report on December was already delivering negative feedback. According to report Europe is pressuring Turkish government, by giving it the role of being Europe’s gatekeeper, which generates undesirable outcomes. The report suggests that Turkish government started to ‘force’ hundreds of refugees to transportation, which is a human rights violation that Europe is overlooking. Finally, at the end of 2015, BBC highlights the statistics of International Organisation for Migration (IOM). This map (Figure 3)

shows the number of refugees who have crossed European borders from different routes in 2015, in total being 1 million. The majority of the 1 million, as shown in the map, goes from Turkey through Greece, which supports the argument that Turkey is an important partner in this deal.



Figure 3: The map that shows the number of refugees who have crossed European border in 2015 with their routes (Source: BBC, 22Dec.2015)

Before moving on to the third field of BBC articles it is important to draw attention to another keyword that BBC also dwell upon; migrant. After a certain point on, off-and-on, BBC has started to add a terminological note at the end of its articles. This note on terminology is to clarify the use of the word 'migrant' in BBC's articles. The note points out that BBC uses the term to "refer to all people on the move who have yet to complete the legal process of claiming asylum" ("Migrant Crisis: Why", 2015). Hence above mentioned numbers does not signify the numbers of refugees accepted, but the refugees who have applied, almost half of which will be rejected.

Third subsection of the BBC articles evaluates Europe on a humanitarian crisis. This section includes comments from both outside and inside of Europe on its response and its ability to deal with the crisis situation. This means that this section will consist of what BBC thinks of the EU is doing wrong or right, and how it should be done. For instance, as for BBC, Europe should "treat refugees as a development issue" (Betts, 2015). The real challenge for Europe, according to BBC, "is not how we [the EU] stop people coming to Europe; it is how we create innovative and sustainable global models of refugee assistance" (Betts, 2015), so that they won't need to come to Europe. This view supports that aids, in order to be sustainable, should make refugees self-reliable by granting them work permits and providing them a limited amount of Europe's freedom of movement. Hence it should be seen as a development issue aiming to create innovative and sustainable global models of refugee assistance. In the first quarter of the 2015, BBC noted that, International Powers have failed the victims of Syrian Conflict. A spokesman for the UN chief, Stephane Dujarric has told to BBC that the powerful nations put their own interest ahead of the necessary actions to end the war. Mr. Dujarric said that "[w]e have found a lack of political will to move forward in a united fashion to stop the fighting" ("Syrian Crisis: UN", 2015). Another article from the first quarter of 2015, points out that how Syrians feel abandoned as the end of the war is nowhere in sight. BBC used following depiction to describe the severity of the crisis; "imagine that almost all of the eight million people living in London had seen their homes destroyed by constant bombardment and fighting" (Sinjab, 2015). There is an underlying purpose to describe the number in this way. Most of the people do not realize the enormity of the 8 million when it is simply said with numbers. In order to materialize an abstract

number usage of a city's population is a very common practice, however why exactly London? Because people tend to sympathize more with the people living close to them or even in their city, therefore usage of the London city is subconsciously asking the reader; would you act the same if it were London?

In addition to sympathizing with displaced people, BBC also underlines the lack of support for those who are fighting in Syria. BBC argues that almost all opposition powers are being ignored or abandoned. The main opposition group is Syria's National Coalition, which once received funding from the West. With the withdrawal of the funds Syria's National Coalition is said to be left alone and "now relies on Turkey's help, along with some donation from Qatar for its humanitarian work" (Sinjab, 2015). Nagham Ghadri, vice-president of the National Coalition said in Istanbul that "the world has left us to fight the battle on the ground with no support" (Sinjab, 2015). BBC by reflecting these perspectives, asserting that the world is ignoring the real cause of problem, which emerges with Bashar al-Assad, along with that there will be consequences for the whole world if they do not act quickly. In September BBC evaluated the EU response to influx, concluding that the EU's existing procedures being inadequate to deal with the increasing number of refugees. Since the Second World War, which includes Balkan Wars of the 1990's, Europe hasn't faced with the increasing number of refugee influx. This is also why the asylum system is not designed for such a crisis. BBC, under the subtitle of "Tackling migration at source", reports about the plans of "destroy[ing] the people smugglers' boats" (Laurence, 2015). Hence this implies that when Europe talks about the solving the migration problem from its source, they mean preventing refugees from travelling to Europe. Looking from this point of view the problem is

not the cruel conditions causing Syrians to flee their country; but it is them coming to Europe. Although ending the war in Syria is also noted further on, it is described as a target far from being achievable. Thus the problem is Syrian refugees coming to Europe and solution is to stop them.

According to International Organisation for Migration (IOM) between January 1st and August 28th in 2015, 322,914 migrants entered the EU from Mediterranean routes (Figure 4), and 2,432 have died along the way. 209,457 of the arrived ones are in Greece, 111,197 of them are in Italy, and 2,166 arrived in Spain (Laurence, 2015). Despite these are official numbers, saying that they 'arrived' does not mean that they have been granted asylum. EU countries deport almost half of the asylum seekers. For instance in 2014 among all asylum claims only 45% were successful. BBC points out that the number of refugees EU countries are being ask to host is simply 0.11% of the EU population, while in Lebanon the refugees are representing 25% of the population ("Migrant Crisis: EU's", 2015). These types of comparisons are to show how little EU does for Syrians, while it has the resources to do more.



Figure 4: Key migration routes (Laurence, 2015)

BBC's Middle East editor Jeremy Bowen, in one of his articles claims that "some Western politicians, and journalists, are taking proper notice for the first time [in 2015] of a refugee crisis that has been a huge concern for Syria's neighbours since the war started [in 2011]. The difference now is that refugees, in big and increasing numbers, are trying to get to the richest countries in Europe" (Bowen, 2015). This is giving another proof to support the argument that the EU is not concerned with Syria but with its own territory and interests.

As earlier mentioned the EU is refusing almost the half of the asylum applications (Table 4), but "who does the EU send back" (Laurence, 2015)? BBC in

this article questions EU's asylum and readmission procedures whether it has a pattern or not. The article points out that the EU has been negotiating many readmission agreements with a number of countries. These agreements facilitate send backs of the migrant for EU border agency, Frontex. European Asylum Support Office (EASO) announced that applications from Syria, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and Somalia had a failure rate close to 50%.



Figure 5: Origin of people applying for asylum in the EU (Laurence, 2015)

Similarly to these recurrent comments and critics on EU's refugee response, another common critique is towards 'burden sharing'. As reported by BBC, 'burden sharing has become a 'buzzword', which supposed to imply that all countries need to do their share to solve this crisis, yet it mostly fails in the practice. BBC, compared to The Sun, shows the humanitarian side of the conflict more dramatically through refugee interview inside the camps revealing how desperate they are (Doucet, 2015). UN's Refugee Agency, Antonio Guterres' words evolved to be a mantra; "there is no humanitarian solution for this tragic humanitarian crisis" (Doucet, 2015). The purpose of these words was to emphasize that a political

solution is a must; nonetheless it has discouraged EU countries for searching for it. Knowing that EU is not balanced in its internal dynamics and adding the desperate approach to Syria on top, it would not be a surprise that the EU is failing the refugee test. UNHCR in every opportunity urges the EU to set up 'massive' refugee resettlement program to cope with the situation ("Migrant Crisis: EU", 2015). However critics do not only come from outside the EU but also from inside. UK's senior judges and lawyers argued that "the offer to accept 20,000 refugees over five years is not enough", moreover one retired judge even claimed that UK could handle 75,000 people a year. UK, as one of the richest countries in the world, does not pull up to its reputation. To sum up, as a group of richest and normative powers, Europe is failing its humanity test after everything Europe have seen through its history.

4.4.2. The Sun's Representation

Likewise BBC, data generated from The Sun's article will also be splitted to three groups; (1) Europe's internal dynamics, (2) Turkey - EU relations, and (3) evaluation of EU's response to the crisis. To begin with the internal dynamics, The Sun does not hold the argument that EU's internal discussion hinders EU efficiency in responding humanitarian crisis. The Sun prefers to mirror some of the EU leaders' arguments that they support. The Sun, as a British media tool contributes this research from a very partial point of view, which was not the case with BBC even though it is also UK sourced media channel. The Sun also criticizes BBC, for instance the project called "flee Syrian refugee game" (Sales & Payne, 2015). This game is based on the real-life stories of the refugees, which aims to show the choices that thousands of Syrian families face every day. Yet according to The Sun, "in the midst of probably the bloodiest Syrian crisis this century, the decision of the BBC to

transform the human suffering of literally millions into a children's game beggars belief" (Sales & Payne, 2015). They have been criticized for being insensitive. The Sun also sees Europe being fragmented as BBC did, nevertheless the causes of the fragmentation varies. While BBC held EU regulations and European politicians responsible, The Sun holds refugees responsible for the EU collapse. Considering border controls between France and Germany, Hungarian police using tear gas and water cannon at refugees, refugees started to protest the EU. Moreover The Sun described the situation as "the chaos deepened the migration crisis threatening to tear the European Union apart" (Hawkes, 2015). Another headline in The Sun reports that "[m]igrants laying siege to Budapest" (Parker, 2015). The big waves of refugees coming in Hungary affected the EU's internal dynamics largely. Hungarian authorities demanding order from the EU, while refugees are pouring in Hungary thinking once they entered Schengen area they can travel freely within. Yet EU regulations state that a refugee must stay in the first country they stepped in first. Hungarian authorities pointing this crisis as a European one, demands this regulation to be changed. On the other hand British politicians arguing that UK can't protect its borders while in the EU, which does not mean UK will not help the refugees. According to The Sun "UK always provided safety to people fleeing violence and extremism. Once it was the Nazis. Today, it is Islamic State" (Parker, 2015, September 2). Approximately 13,000 people pushed away from Croatia, Hungary and Slovenia towards Austria, and they mostly prefer to head towards Germany (Figure 5), which is said to waking old fears in central Europe as it shows resemblance with the cause of WWII. Due to this internal unrest European countries received warnings from European Commission president Juncker. Division within

the EU deepened at showdown talks to relocate 120,000 asylum seekers. The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania objected the relocation scheme but were over-ruled. Juncker called the EU for solidarity and said; “Closing borders is not a solution. If you have survived bombing and a rubber boat in the Mediterranean, a fence will not stop you” (Davidson, 2015). Yet these countries kept arguing that enforcing a plan on a country is not solidarity but compulsion. Thus we can observe the changes in the ‘us’ notion of the EU.

Figure 6: Migrant route from Turkey to Germany (Source: BBC, 9Sept.2015)

The Sun, while reporting EU’s internal fluctuation, it also draws attention on EU’s normative power identity. Sweden considered as one of the most welcoming countries for refugees, after the increase in the numbers of bridge crossing refugees

from Denmark and Germany, Sweden's public opinion shifted its perspective. "There is rising anti-immigration sentiment in a nation that prides itself on being a humanitarian superpower" (Hawkes, 2015). Far-right Sweden Democrats became the nation's most popular party. Nevertheless Sweden is not the only country. Overall in Europe far-right parties are in rise. Blaming refugees as the cause of the EU's fragmentation, The Sun points in the direction of helping the Middle East by increasing the foreign aid not the numbers of asylum seekers.

When it comes to the second group of articles, compared to BBC, The Sun includes less Turkish politicians' statements and prefers to use more rigid words on Turkey subject. The Sun mainly avoids direct relations with Turkey when the subject is migrant crisis that Europe is facing. The Sun omits the burden sharing and the meetings made for Syrian refugees between European and Turkish policy makers. Turkey's geopolitical position made Turkey an essential partner for Europe, yet there is no recognition of that from The Sun unlike BBC. The EU wants Turkey to accept to be a 'hotspot' for the EU and Turkey expects either the removal of visa requirements for Turkish citizens or commitment to take more refugees from camps. While BBC avoided to criticize Turkey, The Sun does not hold it back. According to The Sun tens of thousands of "refugees invade Greek island" with the boats "supplied by the Turkish mafia" (Clliford, 2015). In this framing of the situation the inside outside distinction is revealed through representations. First refugees are described as invaders and by definition invaders take something away that once belonged to the locals. The homes, families, jobs and even life of these fleeing Syrians have been taken from them, yet this representation fail to see that. Secondly the responsible for this is the lack of rule of law in Turkey. According to The Sun,

“there are three million more in Turkey waiting to cross” (Clliford, 2015), which makes Turkey a source for refugee danger. So according to The Sun Turkey is the place responsible of incoming refugees for Europe.

Another representation of Turkey can be found under these headlines; “Will Isis ruin your Mediterranean holiday?” (“Will Isis ruin”, 2015). This article is introduced as The Sun’s guide for ‘trouble-free trip’ for summer holiday. Nonetheless it is actually a representation of Mediterranean countries from the Sun’s perspective. The article evaluates Turkey, Egypt, Greece, Tunisia and Italy on the basis of whether they are safe to travel or not. In addition to this list of countries there is another list including Syria, Iraq, Libya and most of the Lebanon, which are described as no-go zones. When it comes to Turkey’s representation by The Sun, Turkey is said to be “generally safe but not advised” for travel, due to the risk of IS attacks spreading towards Turkey. It can be deduced from this representation that according to The Sun the border between Turkey and Syria is an easy one to cross. It is almost like there is no border in between so that along with the refugees dangerous IS attackers use Turkey as a step towards Europe. This is what Turkey symbolizes for The Sun, a stepping stone for any Syrian towards Europe.

In this third and the final segment of The Sun’s articles, The Sun’s view on the EU response to the crisis will be evaluated. Compared to BBC’s evaluation of the EU response which was calling out for more solidarity in Europe, The Sun is more individualistic on refugee policy. Because, according to The Sun, the EU hinders the progress that one country can make on its own, if it was not paying any taxes to the EU. For instance according to The Sun, “Brits scrimp as membership of the EU leaves us shackled to an economic corps” (Hannah, 2015). Apart from the economic

burden that the EU creates on its members, The Sun also criticizes the common EU policy by reflecting the perspective of some British politicians. According to them "the EU has made a catastrophic error" ("It's life & death", 2015) by classifying an asylum seeker anyone that sets foot onto EU territory. The Sun draws attention to one refugee from Iraq saying that "we fled wars and violence and did not expect such brutality and inhumane treatment in Europe" (Hawkes, 2015, September) in order to show EU's inefficiency in handling situation. The Sun calls out for Cameron and states that "... summer is over. Now deal with the biggest crisis facing Europe since World War II" ("Its life & death", 2015). It is clear that The Sun does not appreciate UK refugee policy as BBC does. Furthermore The Sun points out Syria's exodus as a worldwide problem. Headlines such as "Blood, fear and panic; migrant chaos engulfs Europe" (Reilly & Cooke, 2015) and "On the front line at World War III" (Phillips, 2015) demonstrate that it is actually more of a global problem than a European one.

It was the picture of a three-year-old facedown at the sea that displayed the fact that Europe was ignoring thousands of refugees dying in their journey for a safe shelter. Europe is dwelling between sympathy for refugees and fear from the consequences of offering sanctuary to so many. Some politicians argue that stopping tragedies is through stopping the boats, which is why the EU needs to control its borders from offshore without letting them in. Fortress mentality that dominates Europe does not really show the empathy and compassion for Syrians. This is why "Budapest has become the focus of the EU's failure to deal with the biggest movement of refugees in Europe since WWII" (Parker, 2015). Thus it can be

conclude that Europe is torn because EU states are divided between doing the ethical thing and pursuing their own interests.

The refugee crisis is not a recent phenomenon, yet it is new to Europe and the West (Figure 7). The Sun asserts that the drama has erupted with the 4,000 refugees arriving to Greece from Turkey in 2015 (Reilly & Cooke, 2015). Heroic act of Europeans helping refugees on Greek costs, a refugee baby being delivered in a filthy subway next to a main international terminal in Hungary, or 5 men pretend to be Syrian and under 18 raping a girl at a homecare are all new for the West, which are the type of news that they were ignoring in Syria neighboring countries (Sullivan, 2015).



Figure 7: Syrians registered in Syria neighboring countries along with the EU countries with the number of Syrian asylum applications (Retrieved from: BBC, Harding, 2015)

When it comes to solving this refugee problem The Sun reports a survey done in UK. According to the questionnaire, the majority of the participants answer the question "would you support or oppose Britain playing a greater military role in bringing an end to the war in Syria?" by choosing "support" with 52% (Figure 8) (Woodhouse, 2015). So this shows that the majority of the public opinion prefer an extending bombing campaigns against IS in Syria. Another common understanding this survey establishes that David Cameron's handling of the European refugee crisis was a failre.



Figure 8: Results of the questionnaire done in UK regarding the public opinion on military intervention in Syria to end the war (Retrieved from: The Sun, Woodhouse, 2015)

To conclude, even though both BBC and The Sun seem to agree on the fact that the EU failed to respond refugee crisis, they appoint different causes for the

failure. While BBC argues that the EU response is insufficient and needs to be expanded, The Sun holds the EU, Turkey and the refugees are responsible for the unrest in Europe and argues that it is not a problem that Europe can tackle alone, that is why powerful countries such as the US and UK should give more rigid responses, like an airstrike. The major difference between BBC and The Sun is that BBC tries to hold Europe together on responding migration influxes, while The Sun argues that countries like UK will respond better if they were not paying any taxes to EU. When it comes to their representation of Turkey, while BBC sees Turkey as some kind of an ambivalent partner, The Sun sees it more as a source of problem. However they both agree on the fact that the EU does not want further more refugees but prefer sending out financial aid instead.

4.5. Application of WPR Approach to the Data

In this section, the outcome of the above analyzed data from official documents and media articles will be used. Based on the emphasized concept in discourse, which were highlighted both in official documents (4.2.) and media articles (4.3.), this section will answer the questions of WPR approach. As the data entails different perspectives, some of the answers to the questions will be incorporating different representations.

The policy that is to be analyzed through the questions is EU's policy on refugee crisis. Yet when looked through the data, especially in 2015, the policy becomes inseparable from the EU's foreign policy towards Turkey. For that reason this part of the analysis will be for both the EU's 're-energising' Turkey relations and the EU's refugee policy. Each of these policies, as it was also the case in Turkish

‘open-door’ policy, incorporate multiple sub-policies which are the parts of the whole set of foreign policy. For instance, the EU’s re-energised Turkish policy includes; reviving accession by opening new chapters and starting discussions on visa liberalisation, financial supports for Turkey’s reform efforts, ‘redoubling’ cooperation efforts, funds to support Turkey’s response to refugee crisis, and ‘burden-sharing’. This set of policies’ ‘problem’ representation and the assumptions lying behind are intersecting with the EU’s refugee policy.

The EU’s policy set for refugee crisis response composed of deportation, readmission, building border fences, relocation of refugees across Europe, allocation of funds to organizations, technical and operational assistance by Frontex, law enforcement within member states, cooperation between intelligence agencies, and resettlement in third-countries. So what is the ‘problem’ that all these policies are aiming to solve?

First question, as mentioned before, is; “What is the problem represented to be?”(Bacchi, 2009: 48). The ‘problem’ that this set of policies aiming to solve is ‘refugee crisis’. A follow up question would be; when did refugees turn into a crisis for Europe? The answer to this question is not the same with the question; when did Syrians started to flee their country? The reason for that is it took four years to refugee influxes reach Europe. So EU policies change correspondingly with that shift in refugee influxes. In other words, Syrian refugees arriving in Europe are represented as a “crisis”. Rather than treating the civil war in the country fought since 2011, its much later felt symptom is presented as the problem. In this way of framing the Syrian conflict as a refugee crisis, refugees rather than the civil war itself are presented as if they caused a crisis. Within Turkey - EU relations the problem is

represented separately from EU refugee response although they are very much related. The EU argues that ‘re-energising’ the accession process will inspire Turkey to enhance its attitude on fundamental rights and the freedom of speech, which the EU represents as the ‘problem’ in Turkey relations. So the ‘problem’ targeted to be solved with EU’s Turkey related policies seem to be the inefficiency of Turkish government as a democratic state. This is also the reason of the repetitive usage of the concept of ‘setting benchmarks for Turkey. Yet the keywords such as ‘new momentum’ or ‘re-energising’ imply a sudden change or an awakening compared to the policy being applied before. If this sudden change in the discourse and also in the attitudes occurred at the end of 2014, then what has caused this change? Seeing that Turkey has stayed the same, no government changes or any big reforms, what has made Turkey so appealing to the EU; again parallel to the shift in the refugee influxes towards Europe. The EU aims at the benefits that it can get out of its Turkey relations on the matters of migration, trade, energy, and foreign policy. On that account the EU define itself, in its relation with Turkey, as a ‘strong promoter’ of Turkey’s EU integration process.

Furthermore, on to EU refugee policy, observations show that implicitly represented ‘problem’ is EU’s inability to deal with the crisis in the first place. This conclusion is driven from the frequent reminders that this is a common problem and hence requires joint response. In addition to that, refugees are repeatedly defined as ‘burden’ under the ‘burden sharing’ policy of the the EU. The reasons of the EU failure varies from person to person, like some politicians criticized the EU’s migration system as ‘broken’, or some others represent the refugee problem as a bigger problem than the EU can handle. Still and all some others (like BBC) criticize

EU's selfish intentions saying that even though it has the resources to cope with the situation, it chooses to ignore it. This critic also explains the timing of the EU problematization. The case of Syrian refugees is known to be a humanitarian crisis since 2011, however only in 2015 EU represents it as a problem. In Europe recognition of it as 'common' challenges and expression of the need for 'solidarity' only show itself in 2015, when actually the EU needs support to handle it. Now what are the assumptions these 'problem' representations are reproducing?

Second question is; "What presuppositions or assumptions underlie this representation of the 'problem'?" (Bacchi, 2009: 48). Although different representations agree on the fact that the number of worldwide displaced people has reached its historical maximum, the assumptions uphold the problematization varies. To begin with the delay in the EU considering refugees as its own problem, the EU must have assumed that the unrest in Syria would not last long so that the number of displaced person will not keep increasing. As it was also the case in Turkish presuppositions that behind this assumption another presupposition lies, which is the pattern observed in the previous Arab Springs. Secondly, for EU's Turkey policy, the assumption behind the EU portraying itself as a benchmark for reforms is based on the EU holding itself as the norm or the ideal. In other words it sets the standards that other countries should try to reach. While the EU calls its standards as 'benchmarks', Turkish politicians call them simply 'reference points'. As a normative power, the EU holds the chapters and other criteria for accessions as a platform to spread European values. Even deeper presupposition is that the more a country appears to be similar to the EU then it becomes an ally. People tend to fear the unknown, so if Turkey resembles more to Europe and adopts its values, then

Turkey becomes less dangerous. From a different point of view the more Turkey complies with EU requirements more controllable Turkey becomes for the EU. This being the assumptions for the problematization of 're-energize' policy, another assumption lying behind EU's wish for a joint action plan comes from the old, liberal win-win understanding (Q3), which makes the assumption everyone wins if they cooperate. Concerning the EU response to refugee crisis, there are numerous adjectives that Europe has called Turkey, such as important / ambivalent / indispensable partner, close ally, special country for Europe, or true friend. Some of these words like 'ambivalent' or 'indispensable' imply that the EU is not making this partnership willingly. The presupposition underlies in 'indispensable' asserts that EU would have preferred it to be dispensable. These diverse adjectives have created the dependency understanding. So now the EU is dependent on Turkey in its response to refugee crisis. Another assumption lies under the visa liberation is that if the EU keeps Turkey pleased, then Turkey will be more willing to cooperate on EU terms, in other words a way to 'bribe' Turkey. So the next question goes one step deeper. Another assumption made by the EU that if there is an unrest in a country, civilians will flee towards the neighboring countries, not any further. So according to EU's presupposition the refugee influxes should have stopped at Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. Europe could not foresee that migration waves will spread so wide and turn into a humanitarian crisis. Hence the EU has underestimated the situation in many ways as long as it can and then, regarding Turkey, the EU presumed that Turkey will take the burden of the EU's shoulder in return for money. As Yavçan (2013) states, "[…] immigration attitudes and EU attitudes regarding integration and enlargement actually stems from a specific fear of Muslim or other culturally alien immigrants".

This fear is not only the cause of Turkey's everlasting accession process, but now it is also the cause of the temporary rapprochement between Turkey and the EU. Yavçan (2013) has demonstrated that strong attitudes towards Turkish immigrants are threatening Turkey's potential EU membership. Yet not the same strong attitudes caused by the same fear of 'other', is the driven force behind the re-energised Turkey-EU relations with one difference; in this case the 'other' that Europe is worried in not Turkish immigrants but Syrian immigrants.

Third question is; "How has this representation of the 'problem' come about?" (Bacchi, 2009: 48). In other words, what practices have caused aforementioned assumptions? To begin with the argument of the EU being a benchmark for Turkey, the argument was earlier that the assumption in this case is EU holding itself as a normative power above Turkey. That is why European norms and values are the ones to be adapted. After all what are the processes and practices created these norms and values? As we all know that the EU can be considered as a very recent organisation, however before that, due to country's proximity and intertwine relations, a common sets of understanding, a common understanding of 'us', have been set through time for the Europeans. On top of that with the establishment of the EU many concepts and notions through frequent practices become norms. To legitimize the organisation the EU were compelled to spread their norms, which member countries complied with the assumption that those norms are the right ones for a civilized and developed country. They spread through making 'European' events, creating 'European' standards to be implemented within everyday life, and from there on it spreads through a process of repeated practices and campaigning/advertising. Apart from European values, Europe's historical traces are also to be seen in form of joint action

plan. Every time when a problem has risen among European territory, they deal with it by uniting the forces, either under the League of Nations or the European Union. But EU's history is also full of selfishness causing destruction. This attitude seems to be also a pattern as some of the EU Member States shut off their borders, while EU officials encourage to open them. Although being united in desperate time seem to be a pattern that Europeans are proud of, disperse also seem to be a pattern when it does not suits one of them. Another practice that is being discovered through analyzing EU official data is the practice of allocation of funds. The EU while allocating funds has shown its real intentions unaware of doing it. Until 2015 the EU was spending from an already existing budget either 'humanitarian aid' or 'pre-accession assistance' which was not requiring any extra efforts for Syrian case. But once the EU started to see it as its own problem it prepares a new scheme and a separate fund, which means that before 2015 the EU was just trying to look like as if they are trying to solve the 'problem'. This is the consequence of the assumption that refugee crisis is a Middle Eastern problem, not European, therefore it was not a concern until the number increases. This can be considered as one of the things that the EU failed to problematize, which brings us to the next question.

Fourth question is; "What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the silences? Can the 'problem' be thought about differently?" (Bacchi, 2009: 48). The commonly established and unexamined ways of dealing with refugee crisis are basically composed of setting up camps and allocating funds and aids. Yet this understanding fails to offer a sustainable solution. What is going to be next for the refugees is being left unproblematized. The fact that these refugees are people and they rightfully demand more than a tent and a bread,

needs also be incorporated within the policy. Otherwise it can cause even deeper damages harder to heal. Through a subjectification towards Syrians (which will be elaborated on the next question), the EU is dehumanizing and labelling them as ‘burden’, terrorist sympathizers or even terrorists, consequently creates a tragedy at European land and sea borders. Another unproblematized aspect is that Syrian refugee crisis being also a European problem, because the EU intents containment of refugees outside of its border. Subsequently, the EU failed to recognize the problem earlier than 2015, which has caused a quicker escalation at EU external borders. It took years for the EU to realize that as long as the civil war in Syria lasts, the refugee influx will never stop. Hence the EU failed to problematize the real cause of the problem as civil war in Syria, not the human smugglers. Besides these unproblematized issues in EU’s refugee policy, there is also one unproblematized issue in EU Turkey relations. In year 2015 Turkey’s adaptation to acquis lost its relevance. The reforms that the EU was holding necessary before are left unproblematized, which I think is ironic as they are calling the policy ‘re-energising’ the accession process. From this observation it could be concluded that the EU has changed its priorities, therefore they can advance in visa liberalisation dialogues while Turkey cooperates on the refugee issues.

Fifth question is; “What effects are produced by this representation of the 'problem'? ” (Bacchi, 2009: 48). This question aims at drawing attention on the different social groups that the policy creates or targets by affecting them in an unbalanced way. This question also aims to uncover what can be changed through policy and what is likely to stay the same. As an overall evaluation it can be said that with EU’s refugee policy, increase in the number of people demanding asylum is

likely to stay the same, as it does not target to reduce the need for asylum. EU refugee policy only attempts to relocate, resettle or distribute the number. Yet Syrians, either on EU borders or offshore, keep applying for asylum in the EU. How much of them the EU can handle or accept is likely to change. The effects of the policy can be analyzed under three categories according to WPR approach; discursive effects, subjectification effects, and lived effects. To begin with the discursive effects, first of all recalling one of the earliest emergency meetings that the EU held on refugees will be discussed. This emergency summit concludes with a decision that approves deportation of the irregular migrants with an agile scheme in coordination with Europe's border agency Frontex. The discourse that this summit created has limited to think the other ways. For instance displaying the deportation of the migrants needs to be done with an 'agile' scheme demonstrates that the EU prioritizes keeping them out more than helping them. Similarly the EU asserts that humanitarian funds, before action plan, aim to help with economic and political challenges that arise with the refugee influx. However the terms of the Joint Action Plan clearly demonstrate that the money is not to help Turkey but to convince Turkey to take some action to stop refugees crossing EU border. This intention once it is set, followed the EU for the rest of the policy actions. The effects and the outcome of this wrong representation stretched away to refugees being labelled as 'burden' or 'terrorists', which leads the way to the second type of effect; subjectification. Again in the earlier stages of EU's realization of the problem, before any resettlement scheme was agreed, UK announced that they will accept some refugees from camps. Yet the wording used was as such; "the most vulnerable Syrian refugees". Since the EU cannot accept all the applications, it had to categorize the

applicants somehow to be able to choose among. From this point on Syrian refugees were faced with multiple subjectifications; the most vulnerable, least vulnerable, irregular, regular. This is called “dividing practices”(1982: 208) by Foucault. For example by verbally encouraging the desired behaviour among the refugees the countries create different subject groups. They encourage regular ones to decrease the undesired behaviour, which is irregularly entering the EU. Thus by announcing that the EU will accept refugees from camps, the EU intended to encourage migrants to stay in the camps and to use the legal ways to apply instead of smuggling. Nevertheless this is not the only subjectification effect of European discourse; it also creates separate subject groups between ‘European’ and ‘non-European’ in its policy towards Turkey. With the generation and proliferation of European values once again two subject groups were formed among the countries responding to refugee crisis. Between European and non-European certain behaviours become expected and they cannot step out of their expected behaviour. For instance in the representation of the problem as a collective one, the EU does not distribute the ‘burden’ equally among partners. Turkey with its non-European identity is expected to put in its territorial and human resources, while European partners expected to contribute with financial resources. The last subjectification to mention is between ‘willing coalition’ and ‘unwilling coalition’ among EU member states. This subjectification has occurred during the discussions of the relocation scheme. The Commission was divided into two; the ones who agree on quota plan like Germany, and the ones who oppose it like Romania, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. This division again causes different expectations in their behavior towards the problem. For instance the willing coalition is expected to behave more welcoming

towards the refugees, while unwilling coalition is expected to behave more hostile. In addition to that this subjectification leads the way for dissolution of the EU. Overall these subjectifications places social groups within a mould through discourse and narrow their range of motion. Finally the third effect is the lived effects. One of the lived effects is to be observed in EU's relation with Turkey. Turkey was called many things, nevertheless the largest part of them assign a key role to Turkey, which causes an interdependent relation between two sides. Joint Action Plan has also a similar effect in Turkey - EU relations. Some even claimed that this plan has changed Turkey's welcoming attitude towards Syrians. Based on BBC's assertion Turkey, under the EU Action Plan pressure, has transported some refugees back which leave traces in their lives. Another lived effect occurs as the outcome of EU relocating and resettling scheme. EU's general attitude towards refugees composed of detaining them while applications are processed, rejecting them based on readmission agreements, relocation them, and resettling them. These actions have material effects on two different sides. It disturbs the lives of refugees; meanwhile it causes relief on Italy, Greece and Hungary's shoulder. Last but not least, the lived effect of 'burden' discourse make refugees feel unwanted and demonstrate unwillingness of the European countries to host them, these two effects are the leading causes for protest happened in Europe by refugees. After considering all the effects, the true aim of the policy reveals itself. It becomes obvious that the EU is not after helping the refugees, but protecting its external borders and keeping refugees out.

The final and sixth question is; "How/where has this representation of the 'problem' be produced, disseminated and defended? How could it be questioned,

disrupted and replaced?" (Bacchi, 2009: 48). This question is very much linked with the third one. Because in order to understand how a representation of a 'problem' produced, disseminated or replaced; the practices and processes that has brought it should be understand first. First of all, it will be beneficial to briefly remind the practices and processes that were discussed in the third question. It has been said that Europe established and adopted through frequent practice new sets of rules and codes of conduct to unify all European countries under one general practice. During that new concepts and notions were created and spreaded some of the tools there are being used in spreading the discourse are news, public speeches, Q&A's done by the EU bodies, official EU announcement and so on. Yet to be more specific the name of the funds under which the policy budget gathered, the words used to name the schemes, these are the names that are most frequently repeated when to talk on the subject, and thus make themselves a place in the commonly used discourse. Apart from these any news, electronic or printed, either pro or contra asylum policy, will do the job, because the most important part of a producing a discourse is to reach many ears as possible, does not matter how. For instance The Sun campaigning a bid to help refugee kids after Aylan Kurdi's tragic death was one of the times that the discourse repeated itself, and has drawn many people's attention on refugees in need (Wells, Pisa & Harvey, 2015). So now, to the question six, what is to be done to generate or replace a common representation of the problem? First of all whichever practice is chosen, it should be able to reach big numbers, therefore unification and collaboration among multiple groups is the key. For instance the EU has many side projects to promote European identity, and to fortify European integration. A similar practice could be done to raise awareness to the refugee situation all over the Europe.

Creating new symbols like the three-year-old Aylan Kurdi moving the public opinion worldwide can also be one of the ways to reach masses. At this point the biggest role is on media and politicians, because they have a wider range that they can transmit their words. They should be aware of the limitations that the effects of an unquestioned way of thinking bring to the discourse, and best way to do it is to question.

Following table (Table 5) will summarize the major points that dominate European discourse regarding Syrian refugee 'problem' based on attained representations through data.

Table 5: Comparison of the findings between official and non-official European data

	Problem Representation	**Underlying Assumptions**	**Emergence of Representation (practices and processes)**	**Unproblematic aspect**	**Effects of representation**	**Production, dissemination and defense of representation**
Official documents	Syrian refugee "crisis" EU as an exclusive actor, A far regional problem, Internal turbulence	Geographical distance, Pragmatism, Short-term assumption based on Arab Spring, European values, Fear of the 'other'	Humanitarian aids/funds, Setting benchmarks for Turkey, Creating norms and values, Liberal win-win tradition	Basic rights violation in Syria, Future of the Syrians in foreign countries, Civil uprising, External intrusions	Readmission & relocation of people, Turkey became an ally, Unwillingness to host	Going back to reproblematization of the crisis / what is uncovered. Rename & reframe & creating symbols
The media						
Pro-EU; The BBC	Global problem, Burden sharing, Need for solidarity	(parallel with official data)	(parallel with official data)		Split up of the EU, JAP effect on Turkey	
Opposition; The Sun	EU's failiure on humanitarian crisis	Problem requires joint response, EU's selfishness	'Bribing' Turkey to cooperate		EU is divided, Subjectification: civilized, not civilized/ European, non-European	

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

In retrospect, Turkey - EU relations have been more of an unbalanced relation. Since Turkey's first application for membership, EU member states were reluctant to accept Turkey. Throughout the whole process since 90's in every session Turkey being voted negatively and every statement related to Turkey included some sort of unwillingness. For this period of time EU's unwillingness has created a pattern in its relation with Turkey. Over time Turkey and the EU distance themselves from each other. Nevertheless with the outbreak of the refugee crisis, this pattern is been broken. For both Turkey and the EU, different attitude is been observed between two actors. For Europe - and by this I mean not the outbreak of the real crisis in 2011, but 2011's spillover effect at EU borders at the end of 2014 - this pattern in EU behavior started to show some changes. Similarly around the same time Turkey's foreign policy attitude towards EU has changed. This research emphasized the importance of an external factor, such as refugee crisis, on two parties' foreign policies in their bilateral relations, and the way it can affect how they perceive each other. Both parties have socially deeply seated self-images that affect the way they comprehend other actors and situations. Thus actor's representations and behaviors thereby their policies are affected by it. Nevertheless this relation is double sided that actors first act and then create the representations to justify their actions, and those representations find themselves a place in countries constructed

images. This research was an application of these relations in Turkey - EU relations in case of Syrian refugees using WPR approach.

This research had two main aims; first to assess both Turkish and European representations of their foreign policies towards refugee crisis, and second to investigate refugee crisis effects on Turkey - EU relations. To begin with Turkish representations, the research shows that Turkey prefers to highlight its open door policy from the humanitarian framework so that it can provide a bargain power or leverage with the EU. The effects of this preference of Turkey is to be seen in the language used, such as 'Turkey's guests'. Turkey's representation of the problem in foreign policy documents evolve around four 'common themes'; humanitarianism, internationalism, proactivism, and Assad being the essence of the problem. Similarly in Yeni Şafak it is possible to categorize more than 500 articles in four categories based on their subject matter. These subject matters are as follows; humanitarian responsibilities argument, appreciations on international level, inefficiency of international community, and bargaining with Europe. However Sözcü generates a different picture for Turkey. According to Sözcü's article Turkey's representation would be categorized under these categories; inefficiency of the Turkish foreign policy, unsuccessful Turkish politicians who ignore their citizens, foreign media who keeps providing negative image, and Europe, who uses Turkey for its benefits. The image created by Turkish officials and Yeni şafak is a caring and protective image for Turkey, which emphasizes the humanitarian side of the conflict. Yet the opposition, represented by Sözcü, draws an image completely opposite of the former one including incompetent politicians and ineffective policies.

Subsequently the EU's representation of the crisis situation changes from being regional problems far away from Europe, to a common problem that even EU need the support of other countries to deal with it. Parallel to this change in the definition of the problem, EU's definition for Turkey's role on the refugee problem on its borders also changes. The change in the discourse showed that the language used towards Turkey has changed positively. The EU used less criticism and more positive attitude to enhance its relations with Turkey, use its territory and human resources to set their own camps. The EU aims to stop the refugee influx with cooperating Turkey, may be even decrease the number of refugees already in the EU by sending half of the asylum applicants back to Turkish camps. This is how EU and Turkey agreed on a €3 billion deal called the Joint Action Plan. The European media agrees on the fact that the European response to refugee crisis is inadequate. However, while BBC intends to keep the EU together, The Sun argues that European countries can respond more efficient on their own. With the refugees piling up on the Hungarian side of the EU external border, common foreign policies of EU becomes less appealing and national response, or closing borders with fences in case of Hungary, became more appealing. The Sun holds refugees responsible for dissolving European internal dynamics, and BBC holds the EU and member countries responsible for being selfish and causing a divide between 'pros' and 'cons' in common foreign policy. Yet no matter what the cause is, the EU has failed to respond the biggest humanitarian crisis it has seen since the Second World War.

Table 6: Comparison of the representations between Turkey and the EU

	Problem Representation	**Underlying Assumptions**	**Emergence of Representation (practices and processes)**	**Unproblematic aspect**	**Effects of representation**	**Production, dissemination and defense of representation**
The EU	Syrian refugee "crisis" EU as an exclusive actor, A far regional problem, Internal turbulence	Geographical distance, Pragmatism, Short-term assumption based on Arab Spring, European values, Fear of the 'other'	Humanitarian aids/funds, Setting benchmarks for Turkey, Creating norms and values, Liberal win-win tradition	Basic rights violation in Syria, Future of the Syrians in foreign countries, Civil uprising, External intrusions	Readmission & relocation of people, Turkey became an ally, Unwillingness to host	Going back to reproblematization of the crisis / what is uncovered. Rename & reframe & creating symbols
Turkey	Humanitarian emergency, Internationalism, Proactivism, Assad as the root cause of the problem	Short-term problem, Lack of protection for Syrians, Unreliable government	Iraqi Kurds inflow, Arap Spring pattern, Eastern & Western 'selfs'		Subjectification; hero, villains, and victim / internally displaced, refugees Protracted conflict,	

As shown in the table 6, both Turkey and the EU have the same unproblematized aspect which is caused by the same reason: self-interests. They both neglect the root causes of the conflict in order to obtain more from each other. In this process Syrian refugees become a subject to bargain or a political leverage. The EU rely on the deal it has made to protect its outside borders and Europe's integrity, while Turkey rely on the fear Syrian refugees create on the EU to have the upper hand on the negotiation table with the EU. Hence, these wrongly problematized policies leading the way for an even bigger humanitarian crisis, if it has not already did. The wording of the 'Syrian refugee crisis' by itself reflects how wrong the problematization is done. It gives the impression that Syrian refugees are the ones

who cause the crisis, while they are actually the victims. Murat Erdoğan (2017) has a suggestion to this representation problem. He suggests that instead of calling it 'Syrian refugee crisis', it can be referred as "international protection crisis" (Erdoğan, 2017: 20) as it is a global problem that requires international attention on Syrians need of protection. Thus, with this type of changes in discourse can only lead the policy makers to the right policies that will solve the real 'problem'.

In conclusion, although both actors are representing their policies within a humanitarian framework, the discourse has shown that they are actually trying to pursue their own particular interests and are unable to address the real source of the problem that caused this humanitarian tragedy. This bilateral study has shown that the actors (i.e. Turkish and EU policy makers) are tending to value more their national interests than the constructed identities. In other words, on the construction process of foreign policy main assumptions lying under the problem representation are based on national interests and selfishness. In an attempt to attain their preferred outcomes, both Turkey and the EU have put on a different attitude towards each other, and as a result their relation seems to affected positively. Nevertheless it is not a sustainable change because their policies do not problematize the causes of crisis. Considering the result of this study, the suggestion could be reframing the foreign policy problem, because a spot-on representation of the problem can lead to the particular policy that can actually solve the problem. To be able to do that both Turkey and the EU should leave their prejudices and self-interests a side, and focus on a solution that can help the peoples of the region.

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