T.C.
ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

FUNDAMENTALS OF AUTHORITY AND LEGITIMACY IN THE 16TH CENTURY OTTOMAN SIYASETNAMAS

MASTER THESIS

Tahir YILDIZ

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

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THESIS ACCEPTANCE APPROVAL PAGE

The thesis prepared by Tahir YILDIZ titled “Fundamentals of Authority and Legitimacy in The 16th Century Ottoman Siyasetnamas” has been accepted by the jury members as a thesis at Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Institute of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science and PublicAdministration

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I certify that this thesis fulfills all the requirements to be deemed a doctoral thesis at Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Institute of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science and PublicAdministration.

Director of the Institute of Social Science. Assoc. Professor Dr. Seyfullah Yıldırım

DECLARATION

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Tarık YILDIZ

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ÖZET

On Altıncı Asır Osmanlı Siyasetnamelerinde Otorite ve Meşruiyetin Temelleri

Kanuni Sultan Süleyman dönemi, Osmanlıların altı asra uzanan "hanedan egemenliğini" patrimonyal sistem içerisinde zirveye taşıdıkları dönem olarak bilinir ve çözülme dönemi müelliflerince ideal dönem olarak tanımlanır. Bu çalışma Osmanlı iktidarı açısından oldukça karmaşık ilişkileri ve gelişmeleri barındıran Kanuni döneminde, iktidarın hangi meşruiyet kanalları ile kendisini hem dünyevi hem de dini açıdan "meşru" olarak takdim ettiği ve kamusal imajını nasıl şekillendirdiği üzerine odaklanmaktadır. Çalışmanın temel amacı Kanuni Sultan Süleyman döneminde iktidarın başvurduğu meşruiyet yollarını aydınlatabilmektir. Söz konusu meşruiyet kaynakları, Osmanlı devlet aklının nasıl işlediğini, Osmanlıların "çifte hakimiyete" eriştiklerine, bu dönemde kendilerini hem dünyevi hem de dini bir otorite olarak nasıl sunduklarına ve Osmanlı siyasal zihniyetinde hangi dini, ideolojik ve kültürel kaynakların ağır bastığına dair ipuçları sağlamaktadır. Çalışmanın kapsamı Süleyman dönemi ile sınırlı olup, bu döneme dair çalışmalardan azami derecede istifade edilmiş ve bu çalışmalar eşliğinde Osmanlı'da meşruiyetin dinamiklerini saptamaya yönelik olarak Amâsi'nin *Tuhfetü'l-Ümera ve Minhatü'l-Vüzera* adlı eseri, Kınalızade'nin *Ahlak-ı Alai*'si, İbn-i Firuz'un *Gurretü'l-Beyzâ* adlı eseri, Lütfi Paşa'nın *Asafname*'si, Taşköprizade'nin *Risale fî Beyâni Esrâri'l-Hilafeti'l-İnsaniyye ve's-Saltanati'l-Ma'neviyye* adlı eseri gibi bu dönemde kaleme alınan siyasetnameler incelenmiştir. Bu döneme dair Halil İnalcık, Norman Itzkowitz, A. D. Alderson, Cornell Fleischer, Colin Imber, Gülru Necipoğlu ve Suraiya Faroqhi gibi tarihçilerin analizleri, yaklaşımları ve yürüttükleri çalışmalar; dönemde egemen olan sosyo-kültürel ortamı, siyasi zihniyeti ve koşulları zihnimizde yeniden tahayyül etmeye ve bu doğrultuda çalışmamızı şekillendirmeye yaradı. Üstelik sundukları farklı yaklaşımlar ve ele aldıkları farklı konular meşruiyet problemini daha iyi anlamamız için olanak sağladı.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kanuni Sultan Süleyman, iktidar, meşruiyet, rıza, çifte hâkimiyet.

ABSTRACT

Fundamentals of Authority and Legitimacy in the 16th Century Ottoman Siyasetnamas

The period of Kanuni is known as the period in which the Ottomans carried dynastic rule to the top within the patrimonial system, and the dissolution period authors define this period as the ideal period. This study focuses on how the government presented itself as “legitimate” in terms of both worldly and religious aspects and how it shaped its public image in the period of Kanuni, which contained highly complex relations and developments in terms of the Ottoman power. The main purpose of the study is to enlighten the ways of legitimacy applied by the power in the period of Suleiman the Magnificent. The sources of legitimacy in question give a clue to how the Ottoman raison d'etat operated, how the Ottomans presented themselves as both an worldly and religious authority in this period when they reached "double sovereignty," and what religious, ideological, and cultural resources predominated in the Ottoman political mentality and what's the operational motivations of the power. The scope of the study is limited to the Süleiman period, and the studies related to this period have been benefited to the maximum. In addition, in order to determine the dynamics of legitimacy in the Ottoman Empire siyasatnames which belong to this era, such as Amâsi's work titled Tuhfetü'l-Ümera ve Minhatü'l-Vüzera, Kınalızade's work named Ahlak-ı Ali, İbn-i Firuz's work named Gurretü'l-Beyza, Lütfi Pasha's work titled Asafname, Taşköprizade's work titled Risale fî Beyâni esrâri'l-hilafeti'l-insaniyye ve's-saltanati'l-ma'neviyye, were examined. The analyzes, approaches, and works of historians such as Halil İnalcık, Norman Itzkowitz, A. D. Alderson, Cornell Fleischer, Colin Imber, Gülru Necipoğlu, and Suraiya Faroqhi regarding this period depicted the socio-cultural environment and political mentality that dominated this period, shaped our work accordingly. Moreover, the different approaches they presented and the different issues they dealt with provided us with a better understanding of the legitimacy problem.

Keywords: Suleiman the Magnificent, power, legitimacy, consent, double sovereignty.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

The period of Suleiman the Magnificent is known as the period in which the Ottomans carried dynastic rule to the top within the patrimonial system, and the dissolution period authors define this period as the ideal period. Compared to other Ottoman sultans, the fact that Suleiman was the most famous Ottoman sultan in the world and in whom the magnificence of the Ottoman and contemporary fears mixed with admiration for the Ottoman was embodied attracted academic attention here. That is why academic studies on Suleiman, the golden period of Suleiman, and the key figures of this period continue at full speed. The intense interest of historians in the period of Suleiman is not incomprehensible. As a matter of fact, the Suleyman period is the period when the Ottoman state structuring and the spread of power reached the highest level on the path of centralization. During this period, the Ottoman bureaucracy took shape and constitutionalism came to the fore, at the cost of adapting to the conditions of the early modern period, as Cornell Fleischer rightly put it; as Kaya Şahin stated, the Ottomans began to share the early modern state experience like the contemporary empires in Europe [such as the state's gaining control of religion]; as stated by Abdurrahman Atçıl, the ulema was reproduced in a learned hierarchy and attained professional awareness; as Colin Imber showed in his successful work on Sheikh-ul-Islam Ebussuud Efendi, the ulama began to function as a "state apparatus" in presenting the power with Islamic patterns; for the first time after the Abbasids, a non-Arab dynasty that was not the Qurayshi presented itself as the Caliph and the functions of the caliphate became visible in the Ottoman Empire; Ottoman power presented channels of legitimacy on a multi-way platform; the doctrine of justice based on the fixation of the Ottoman social elements and the welfare of the citizen was put into practice. This period was on the eve of the dissolution era in the classic phrase and was the time when the first example of a new type of power behavior such as the withdrawal from behind the scenes emerged. Although the period of Suleiman the Magnificent can be read as part of a longing for the past, it was the period when the patrimonial power [or in the language of Kâtip Çelebi, "sahib-i seyf", that is “the sword owner”] reached its capacity to control and fix the elements.

This study focuses on what channels of legitimacy the government presents itself as "legitimate" in terms of both worldly and religious aspects, and how it shapes its public image in a period involving such complex relationships and developments. The main purpose of the study is to enlighten the ways of legitimacy applied by the power in the period of Suleiman the Magnificent. The sources of legitimacy in question give a clue to how the Ottoman raison d'état operated, how the Ottomans presented themselves as both an earthly and religious authority in this period when they reached "double domination," and what religious, ideological, and cultural resources predominated in the Ottoman political mentality and what's the operational motivations of the power.

Method

In this study, the interpretivist history method developed by Collingwood was used. In this approach, history does not just reflect the process of events, in fact, history has an inner side that includes the thought process. Indeed, the historian's primary aim should be to illuminate the inner side in question. This basic idea of Collingwood is followed by a categorization that divides human actions into "observable physical actions" and "thought processes". (Sager & Rosser, 2015) In his work "The Idea of History" (1946), Collingwood defends the view that the knowledge of the past can be reached to the extent that the historian abstracts himself from the intellectual and value judgments of the period he is in and identifies with the thought atmosphere of the "historical actor". (Yapıcı & Yapıcı) The relations of power, legitimacy and consent in the Kanuni period were studied with the interpretivist history method developed by Collingwood, and the study was carried out on the axis of "thought processes". In this process, it was tried to avoid generalizations, judgments and comparisons that would cause anachronism, and historical events and facts were tried to be examined under periodic conditions. In this qualitative study, first-hand and second-hand reference sources containing information about the religious, political and social structure of the Kanuni period were scanned, especially in order to determine the type of relationship between power and society within the scope of legitimacy. Accessed historical sources and modern studies were classified. Then, in the analysis phase, the nature and content of the sources were analyzed, the sources were examined, and the reliability of the collected data, both as individual works and as a part of a whole, was tested and a synthesis was made.

The scope of the study is limited to the Suleiman period, and the studies related to this period have been benefited to the maximum. In addition, in order to determine the dynamics of legitimacy in the Ottoman Empire siyasatnames which belong to this era, such as Abd al-Salam b. Şükr-Allâh Amâsi's work titled Tuhfetü'l-Ümera ve Minhatü'l-Vüzera, Kınalızade's work named Ahlak-ı Ali, İbn-i Firuz's work named Gurretü'l-Beyza, Lütfi Pasha's work titled Asafname, Taşköprizade's work titled Risale fî Beyâni esrâri'l-hilafeti'l- insaniyye ve's-saltanati'l-ma'neviyye, were examined. The analyzes, approaches and works of historians such as Halil İnalcık, Norman Itzkowitz, A. D. Alderson, Cornell Fleischer, Colin Imber, Gülru Necipoğlu and Suraiya Faroqhi regarding this period depicted the socio- cultural environment and political mentality that dominated this period and shaped our work accordingly. Moreover, the different approaches they presented and the different issues they dealt with provided us with a better understanding of the legitimacy problem.

In line with these studies, this study, which was carried out to determine the sources of the legitimacy and authority of the rulers during the period of Suleiman the Magnificent, is divided into three main sections. In the first chapter, the innovations brought to the Ottoman political ground by the three important events, namely the conquest of Istanbul, the Battle of Çaldıran and Battle of Ridaniye, experienced by the Ottoman Empire before the period of Suleiman, are discussed. This triple experience has a special place in the period of Suleiman the Magnificent, as the gains of these developments for the Ottoman Empire [For example, the title of the supreme ghazi sultan, the institution of the caliphate and the guardianship of Sunnism] were most literally operated and used during the period of Suleiman the Magnificent. The second chapter that follows is devoted to the foundations that underpin the worldly authority of Suleiman the Magnificent and the dynasty. The sources that serve to present Suleiman the Magnificent and the dynasty as a legitimate ruler in a patrimonial power system and on a universal scale have been examined. The worldly dimension of the public image, idealized by the power and intended to portray itself, emerges in this section. In the third chapter, the bases of the caliphate claim put forward by the rule of Suleiman the Magnificent, in which worldly and religious authority united for the first time after the caliph Al-Ma'mun, are discussed. Here, the privileges and achievements that made the Ottomans stand out as a caliphate state compared to other Muslim countries were examined.

1. IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS BEFORE SULEIMAN THE MAGNIFICENT

Important political elements entered the Ottoman political environment with the second half of the fifteenth century. The most important of these are "the supreme ghazi sultanate", the guardianship of holy cities", “the khilafat al-kubra", the " guardianship of Sunnism", “messianic ruler” and" "Lord of the Auspicious Conjunction”. All these are the constituent elements of “double sovereignty”, which is the characteristic of the sovereignty in the period of Suleiman the Magnificent. Now the discussions are not based on the domination of the sultan within the country, but on the transfer of the sultan's sovereignty to the universal field. The talented intellectual staff that could provide this was reached, the ulama were hierarchically articulated to the state staff, and the Ottomans made a reputation in the Islamic world as the supreme “ghazi” sultans. For the Ottomans, the understanding of a unique and indivisible universal empire became the biggest target, and the sharing of the country among the dynasty members, which was seen in the old Turkish state practices, was abandoned. The understanding of the "one and indivisible" empire of the Romans [which passed from Sassanids to Romans (Cumont, 1929, p. 125-131) passed to the Ottoman Empire. For example, Cem Sultan suggested sharing the country, a practice existing in the Old Turkish tradition, and Bayezid objected by saying “Arûs-i saltanat taksim kabul etmez” and refused to meet with Cem Sultan. (Alderson, 1956, p. 6-7) There are narratives that such an intention was also present in Fateh. Ultimately, however, the principle of "unity of the state" and "indivisibility of sovereignty" remained vitally important in Ottoman thought. This was later adapted to a universal state. Pax Ottomana is a universal imperial ideal based on Ottoman identity. (Ortaylı, 2003, p. 13) Schweigger explains this most clearly. According to him, there should be only one ruler in the world for Turks, just as there is a sun in the sky. (Ortaylı, 2020, p. 79) There were three important developments that reinforced the understanding of the world empire that the Ottomans set their targets for: Conquest of Istanbul [1453], Çaldıran Victory [1514] Ridaniye War [1517]. The gains of these wars were best operated in the sixteenth century. In this respect, all three wars increased the importance of two issues for the Ottomans: The Caliphate and Lord of the Auspicious Conjunction. While the Caliphate emphasizes the spiritual dimension of the sovereignty, the Lord of the Auspicious Conjunction is based on worldly sovereignty, and a new regime emerges with the holding of the two in one hand: "double sovereignty".

1.1. Conquest of Istanbul: 1453

One of the benefits of the conquest of Istanbul to the Conqueror was the "claim for the Roman throne". Now, for the young conqueror of Istanbul, besides the Middle East Islamic civilization, Byzantium also stood as a source of political culture. As a result, the conquest of Istanbul contributed to the understanding of Ottoman domination in two ways. The first is the "Roman throne" on which the Conqueror sits, the other is the "supreme Ghazi" title, which carries his reputation to the other end of the world and bestowed the prestige of the "supreme Sunni ruler" to the Ottoman sultans. The Conqueror's conquest of the "polis" [when the word "polis" is used specifically, it refers to Istanbul] in 1453 was an important step on the way to the empire. In this context, the main sources fed by The Conqueror, who built the genuine imperial tradition, belonged to the Islamic and Byzantine traditions. Now the Conqueror, the sultan in the Islamic tradition, a large khan according to the understanding of Central Asia, and the Caesar of the Romans were sitting on the throne of Istanbul. Now the Conqueror was sitting on the throne of Istanbul as a Muslim sultan, a great khan according to the understanding of Central Asia, and the Caesar of the Romans. (Kunt, 2013, p. 21) While the Ottomans described him as the greatest Muslim ruler after the Hulefa-i Raşidin, the Conqueror saw himself as a religious warrior who fought on behalf of Muslims. (İnalcık, 2002, pp. 85-86) Moreover, with the legal basis provided by the Roman throne on which the Conqueror sat, he was now the legal ruler and guardian of the Eastern Roman lands [as well as the only, since the royal Greeks were ruled out]. (İnalcık, 2002, p.47) According to Georgios Trapezuntios, the person who took the "polis" was the emperor of the Romans. In this understanding, the emperor of the Romans is equal to the world emperor. (Babinger, 1978, p. 249) An author presented him as the emperor of the Romans and regarded keeping Istanbul in hand and dominating this city the justification of this reality. Thoughts that there should be one empire and one ruler were spreading in full swing in the world. Just like in Dante's dreams. (Turan, 2019, p. 289) In this approach, Istanbul was functioning as the center of a world empire. For this purpose, Gennadios was appointed as the Greek Orthodox patriarch in 1454, and the Armenian patriarch and chief rabbi were brought to Istanbul. (İnalcık, 2002, p. 86) For the Turks, Istanbul is the representation of the "Kızıl Elma", that is, world sovereignty, and is the milestone of the capture of Rome, the genuine "Kızıl Elma". (Şahin, 2010, pp. 348-350) These comments are owned by Sufi Ahmed Bican. It can be guessed that such a view was shared in an intellectual environment. That is to say, the conquest of Istanbul was heralded by the hadiths of the Prophet [phub],

and Istanbul became an important target and a holy place [balda-i tayyiba] for Muslims to dominate the world. Secondly, this ideal merged with the “Kızıl Elma” concept of the Turks, who had already kept the case of jihad alive for centuries, and as a result, it was seen as an important turning point in the realization of “world domination”. Koca Hüseyin, one of the Turkish historians, reveals such intertwining in his own statements: I hope that the city of Istanbul, called Kızıl Elma, will be owned by Muslims and the name of Kaiser will be erased from the world. (Turan, 2019, p. 267) The attempt to spread the sovereign was further consolidated by decentralizing the local principalities. Ultimately, the Conqueror consolidated his sovereignty in these lands in two ways, both as the shadow of God, who provided the justice in which non-Muslim subjects took refuge, and as the legal heir of Rome. However, the succession of the Roman throne is the weakest source of legitimacy. As İnalcık emphasized, the Conqueror was primarily a “ghazi Islamic sultan”, and his power was unlimited. (İnalcık, 2002, p. 51) He described himself as “Sultanu'l Berreyn” [ruler of two continents] and he knew very well that the people of one of the two lands were Muslim. Thus, the transformation and sublimation process, which accelerated with Murad I and Bayezid I, (Lindner, 1983, p. 51) from an accessible chief to an inaccessible sultan, reached an irreversible point. After the reign of Murad II, just in this period when the empire was truly established and the Ottomans regained the self-confidence lost since the Timur incident, the devices of the Conqueror to spread his sovereignty at an absolute level were working.

The conquest of Istanbul granted the Conqueror a reputation that no one in the Islamic world can compete with. Istanbul became an indispensable part of the rule of the Conqueror not only as a great imperial center but also as an "ideal" engraved in the consciousness of the ummah. As Turan said, the conquest of Istanbul in the name of protecting and promoting Islam opened the door to the Conqueror the title of caliph. The Ottoman sultans are now exalted enough to conquer big cities in the name of Islam and protect the people of the Holy cities. The return of the emperors who were sent letters also reinforces this impression. (Atçıl, 2018, p. 55) All these developments are the harbingers of the “caliphate” coming to the Ottoman Empire. Because during this period, “Gaza” registered the superiority of the Ottoman ruler over other Islamic rulers. These elements were used in the theoretical phase of combating Uzun Hasan, a strong opponent. Moreover, the sovereignty put forward over the principalities is also based on the “supreme ghazi qualification.” (İnalcık, 2002, p. 53) “Gaza” was the most important of legitimacy theories, and it was none other than Ahmadi

who formulated it. (Imber, 2014, p. 139)[1] The most important aspect of the image built by Ottoman popular historiography was the spirit of "ghazi". (Imber, 2014, pp. 142-143) The conquest of Istanbul is not only the harbinger of "caliphate" but also of "world domination". Such a success reinforced the belief that the Ottoman sultan was affirmed and supported by God. (Turan, 2019, pp. 285-286) The "fetihnameler" highlighted the divine support behind the Ottoman sultans who succeeded in expanding the borders of Islamic lands. (Faroqhi, 2009, p. 9)

In addition to all these, the rumors that the Doomsday would break with the conquest of Istanbul inspired various messianic and Mahdi movements before the end of the century. Conquest of Istanbul and apocalyptic discourses were present in narratives, especially in a fused state. For example, Ahmed Bican reaffirmed apocalyptic fears and hopes. Mehmed II was an apocalyptic warrior who carrying cosmic responsibility with messianic qualities, moreover, he aspired to the second "Kızıl Elma", Rome. (Şahin, 2010) George of Trebizond was presenting the Conqueror as the last Roman emperor, which was nourished by almost the same apocalyptic tradition. For, apocalyptic discourses are not just a phenomenon shared by Muslims. Christians and Jews shared the same thing. Judaism had a serious impact on apocalyptic discourses. Undoubtedly, this intellectual environment made serious contributions to the imperial ideology that took shape in the sixteenth century.

1.2. Rise of the Safavids and Chaldiran Battle: 1514

Ottoman financial regulations point to the process of creating an acceptable and satisfied society. According to Lindner, the Ottoman dream is about establishing a secure and stable administration. (Lindner, 1983, p. 109) This political action also involved the transformation of protruding elements into a predictable form.) For example, tribal chiefs were de facto rulers for nomads, symbolizing independence and mobility, and the administration did not find empire within the empire very acceptable over time. (Lindner, 1983, pp. 54-55) The steps taken towards centralization - audit, regular tax, etc. - were also in conflict with nomadic law. This conflict peaked towards the end of the sixteenth century. (Öz, Kanun-ı Kadimin Peşinde, 2019a, p. 46) On the other hand, in terms of religious belief, the nomads were heterodox elements. With their creed adorned with shamanic teachings and

[1] Ahmadi is a famous divan poet who grew up in Anatolia in the 14th century and made a great contribution to the development of Turkish poetry. He was one of the first poets to present frontier chiefs [uç beyleri], who were raiders, as veterans who served a religious purpose in various works such as Iskendername.

their “Turkmen” fathers whom they likened to shamans; they were quite suitable for transforming the unrest in which socio-economic variables lay into a religious rebellion. Around 1500, the heterodox Turkmen masses under the leadership of İsmail Safevi of Ardebil raised the flag of rebellion, although, as Linder points out, the main motive behind the Safavids’ attracting nomads is not religion, but the establishment of the Safavid administrative organization on the tribe. (Lindner, 1983, p. 110)

Ismail Safavid's ambitions regarding Anatolia made the Ottoman Empire compulsory for a fierce war with the Safavids. Here, we can argue that the dimension of the claim to sovereignty that concerns us continues in two categories. First, it is the question of who the real Lord of the Auspicious Conjunction is after Timur since both rival states were established within the Turkish administrative legacy. Second, it is the question of who is worthy of the [legitimate] rulership of the Muslims [the ruler was used to cover both the caliphate and the imam]. Accordingly, the claim of sovereignty of the Safavid shah involved both a religious and a political dimension. (Faroqhi, 2014, p. 107) According to Itzkowitz, the Safavids inherited the tradition of the Timurids’ [expansionist] sovereignty in Central Anatolia and Iran’s view of the divine kingdom. (Itzkowitz, 1980, p. 32) There was a place where such opposing claims could be tested in Turkish culture: the battlefield. We mentioned that victory in the war is understood as “divine confirmation”. The 1514 Battle of Chaldiran was the opportunity to confront two different claims. The battle resulted in Selim's brilliant and absolute victory. After the Battle of Chaldiran, Hodja Isfehani described Yavuz as “mahdi-i ahirzaman” [ie apocalyptic leader] and “kudret-i ilahi” [confirmed by God]. (Emecen, Osmanlı klasik çağında hilafet ve saltanat, 2020, p. 39) Mahdi and apocalyptic rhetoric and other political, religious-ideological ideas that prevailed in Eurasia enabled Selim to be built with images such as the ruler of the End Times, the apocalyptic leader, and the Mahdi. (Çıpa, 2017, p. 131) Historiography with reconstructive imaginations has a large share in this. But this does not mean that the image of Selim was completely built up later. For worried subjects like Ali Khalifa, Selim was indeed the expected Mahdi and the savior sultan. (Çıpa, 2017, p. 178)

In fact, Selim and Selimnames are useful materials for the period of Suleiman the Magnificent. For such a brilliant victory had a symbolic side: the victory of Sunnism. For this reason, the Ottomans came to the fore as Sunni leaders, indisputably. Therefore, Suleiman kept the memory of this victory alive, if Busbecq is right, with the mosaic representing Chaldiran engraved on the door of one of his mansions. (Dalle, 2013, p. 120)

Thus, after Selim, Ottoman politics revolved around concepts such as messianism, universal sovereignty, caliphate and absolutism during an intense religious and cultural rivalry with the Safavids. (Fleischer, 1992, pp. 160-164)

1.3. Battle of Ridaniye: 1517

When Selim marched on the Mamluks, he declared that he had come to protect the Islamic world as a savior of the Arabs. (İnalcık, 2002, p. 56) Besides, the Mamluks were not strong enough to protect the interests of Islam against the Portuguese. (Itzkowitz, 1980, p. 33) Moreover, as if this was not enough, according to the Ottomans, Mamluks was cooperating with the infidels. (Akça & İnce, 2015, p. 44) The abolition of an administration that could not protect the holy places against the Portuguese and such an attempt to unite the ummah was considered a religiously legitimate act. (Emecen, 2018, p. 25) The new "manea" owner, that is, the deterrent power that ensured the security of "Daru'l-Islam" was the Ottomans. The Ottomans obtained the only legal basis for the conquest of Muslim countries such as the Mamluks and Anatolian principalities with the "gaza". Ibn Kemal presents the legitimate religious basis of this work as follows: "Zira anlar gazilerin ayağı bağı idi. Ol şehbâzların ferağ-ı billâhi 'gazâya ikbâllerine mani' olub her yakadan üzerlerine mündefi' olurlardı" (Kemalpaşazade, 1970, pp. 25-26) On the other hand, the conquest of the Mamluks was a reaction to the expansionist Shia movement to become the "greatest Sunni ruler". (Hamilton, 1962)

An issue that preserves its complexity, such as the transition of the Caliphate to the Ottomans, will not be discussed here. However, the conquest of Egypt had two main benefits for the Ottoman Empire: first, the servitude of Mecca and Medina, and the second, the acceptance of the Ottomans in the Islamic world as the new "manea", that is, a protective power state. "Hadimü'l-Haremeyn", that is, the servitude of the sacred places, is a more important achievement than the caliphate. İnalcık describes the accession of the holy cities to the Ottoman Empire as the beginning of an era. According to Itzkowitz, with the conquest of Mecca and Medina, the Ottoman sultan was now the strongest Muslim ruler of the Islamic world and thus took over the responsibility of protecting the Islamic world from the invaders. (Itzkowitz, 1980, p. 33) The Ottomans were also aware of this privilege. According to Hodja Sadeddin's report, Yavuz said during the soldiers started to feel homesick during the Egypt expedition: I waited to be a servant of the holy places. Now my wish has come true, we will

serve the fatherland. (Turan, 2019, p. 301) Selim did not say that I waited for the caliphate, but instead said that I waited to become a servant of the Holy Places. Lutfi Pasha, on the other hand, mentions that Suleiman is "hadimü'l-Harameyni'ş-Şerifeyn" among the praises he gave for Suleiman. In fact, this eulogy index also refers to the foundations of legitimacy. In the introduction of the Asafname, Suleiman is mentioned as "Nasır-ı ‘ibâdillah” and “hami-yi bilâdi'llah”, “al-gazi fi sebilillâh, "" hadimü'l-Harameyni'ş- Şerifeyn". (Lutfi Pasha, nr 2634/2, p. 21a) All these are definitions emphasizing that Suleiman is "the assistant of the Muslims, the protector of the Islamic World, the veteran and the servant of the holy places", respectively, and are the infrastructure elements that base the sixteenth century understanding of caliphate and produce “consent”.

In line with the narratives, we recognize that the Ottoman elite understood the prestige of servitude to the holy cities outweighed other elements. In Mecca, the name of the ruler to be recited in the Cuma‘ khutbah was a competitive field in the eyes of the Muslims who came from all over. It is known that Alparslan's name was read in “khutbah” in Mecca, after Caliph Kaim. (Barthold, 2012, p. 57) According to Barthold, with the thirteenth century, who would rule Mecca and Medina and who would send the cover of the Kaaba was a matter of great importance for the rulers of Islam. (Barthold, 2012, p. 67) Like the Fatimids, the Shia states have also assumed that the de facto sovereignty belongs to the person whose name is mentioned in the Khutba in Haremeyn. For this, they have been to add Hejaz to their sovereignty. (Avcı, 2019, p. 157) Timur attached great importance to his relations with Mecca. His son Shahruh was also trying to get the approval of the Egyptian sultan to send gifts and a cover for the Kaaba to Mecca. (Barthold, 2012, p. 86) The brilliant victory of the 1517 Ridaniye War offered this privilege to the Ottomans. The Ottoman Empire was no longer a border state, but an Islamic caliphate, "the protector of the Islamic world". With the servitude of the two holy cities, the Ottomans were "the rulers of the rulers". (Barthold, 2012, p. 109) Selim sent the Kaaba cover, and all the pilgrims did not hesitate to pray to Selim. (Barthold, 2012, p. 111) Selim was now the leader of the Muslims. When Yavuz said to Tomanbay, "I am the caliph of God on earth", he immediately stated that he was worthy of serving the Holy cities more than him. (İbn-i İyas, 2016, p. 117) [However, what is meant is the caliphate, not the classical Islamic caliphate, it is the “halifetullah or zıllullah” which has been the property of almost all rulers. [However, what is meant is the caliphate, not the classical Islamic caliphate, the common title used by almost all rulers, “the shadow of God and the deputy of God”] The important aspect of this narration of Ibn Iyas is that Selim

referred to the servitude of the holy cities as a phenomenon of privilege and election, if such a thing happened. Secondly, the “responsibility to protect” that was placed on the shoulders of the Ottomans brought the legitimacy of the caliphate, which became more institutionalized in the later period. Manea, the power that can provide security, was sufficient religious argument for the legitimacy of power in the post-Mongolian period. Because the third option to choose the imam in Amasi’s work is as follows: “imamete layık kimesne şevket ve cünûdla hıttâ-i İslam üzerine kahr u galebe eyleyüp halife olıcak hilafet mun‘akid olup ita‘ati vacip olur.” (Amâsî, pp. 17-18)

Confusion and disorder were common in the period when the Ottomans acquired the caliphate, and there are two elements that threaten the unity and security of the Islamic world: the Safavids and the Portuguese. First, the Safavid propaganda was enough to mobilize some elements that were already very inclined to action in Anatolia, and the simultaneous spread of Shia propaganda worried the Sunni world. Second, the Portuguese are a major threat to the Arab world [or Daru’l-Islam] in the South. These worries will bestow the legitimacy of an alternative leadership [caliphate] to the Ottomans. For, in chaotic times, the ulama emphasized power rather than qualification, and after the eleventh century "power and might" became the most sought-after criteria. (Şen, 2019) For example, scholars such as al-Ghazali, Ibn Taymiyya, and al-Juvayni carefully emphasized the phenomenon of "power" both because of security concerns and for the sake of the applicability of the law. (Şen, 2019, pp. 11-12) These conditions made it possible for the Ottomans to function as de facto caliph, ignoring a binding criterion such as the Qurayshism. The Ottomans, who had "Manea" or protective power, had no alternative in protecting the Islamic world. According to Lutfi Pasha, the Ottoman Empire was the only power to revive the caliphate duty thanks to its state power. Lutfi Pasha does not see the Qurayshism as the basis of the caliphate in line with these teachings, according to him, Suleiman the Magnificent is a true caliph. (Emecen, 2020, p. 55) Ibn Firuz, on the other hand, generalizes this view and says, “It is not necessary for the imam to be from Hashim. This is the view of Ahl as-Sunnah”. (İbn-i Firûz, 1629, p. 9a) Because the conditions of the caliphate have matured for the Ottomans.

As a result, three important developments, the conquest of Istanbul, the rise of the Safavids and the victory of Ridaniye, respectively, provided some prerequisites for the Suleiman period, when double sovereignty was established. First, with the conquest of Istanbul, three things were included in the political discourse of the Ottomans: the greatest veteran sultan, one of the pillars of the caliphate discourse that will reach maturity in the

sixteenth century, the image of the Roman emperor and the messianic ruler. All three evoke world domination. Because the conquest of Istanbul was an important step on the way to the world empire where “Ilay-ı Kelimetullah” and “Kızıl Elma” were merged. The image of the last Roman emperor and the messianic ruler was matured under the guidance of apocalyptic discourses intertwined with the conquest of Istanbul. Indeed, periodic conditions built social expectations in this direction. Second, the absolute victory over the Safavids in 1514 fed the image of the Ottoman sultan as a Sunni ruler. This established a new pillar of the Ottoman caliphate as the “greatest Sunni ruler” as well as the “great ghazi sultan”. Finally, the 1517 victory in Ridaniye brought the privilege of servitude of the Holy places and the responsibility of protecting the Muslims to the Ottomans, which were the most important means of legitimacy. This latter demonstrated that the Ottomans had “manea”, and in the view shared by post-Mongol caliphate theorists, it is both a primary and a sufficient condition for the caliphate. This view was a temporary deviation from the original caliphate theory in a chaotic time, with the concern of the security of the Islamic world and the fragmentation of unity. The rise of the heterodox Safavids and the Portuguese danger that appeared in the south brought the problem of "unity" and "security" to the agenda again. In this theoretical framework, there is no substantial justification other than the Qurayshism problem that would void the Ottoman caliphate. Moreover, the Ottomans were able to ignore this argument with strong bases such as “security” and “gaza”. In the light of all these developments, the ways for Suleiman to establish double sovereignty as both the caliph and the world emperor were opened. Beside a loaded treasure, Selim also left many prestigious titles. “Servant of the Holy Places” is the most important of these titles. Now that the conditions had matured, scholars like Ibn Firuz had expectations from Suleiman: “hilafet-ü şehriyari vü saltanat u tec-dari”. (İbn-i Firûz, 1629, p. 3a) According to Ibn Firuz, Suleiman was “mü'essis-i erkânü'l hilâfetü'l- Osmâniyye” and established a double sovereignty.

2. THE BASICS OF SULEIMAN THE MAGNIFICENT'S WORLDLY SOVEREIGNTY

The conditions for the double sovereignty regime to appear on the Ottoman political plane were ripe. We discussed this process in the previous section. The political responsibility that now belongs to Suleiman and the elite class [alim-bürokrat] around him is to make the most of these opportunities. Every political discourse and operational initiatives displayed in this direction constitute the main subject of this study. The focus of this chapter is to show what kind of devices the power used to dominate "double sovereignty" during the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent. In this way, the foundations and tools of legitimacy will be examined in the Suleiman period. First, the multiple pillars of the "worldly side" [It is not called secular because, according to Lewis, the Islamic sultanate also has religious foundations, at least in theory (Lewis, 1991)] of the theory of "double sovereignty" will be discussed.

2.1. The Method of Selecting the Sultan and His Claim of Right

In the first three centuries of the Ottoman dynasty, including the sixteenth century, there was no succession theory like "ekberiyet". Whereas according to Alderson, in the Islamic world, it was not the vertical lineage that passed from father to son, but "ekberi" lineage was common. Osman's dismissal of Dündar at the point of successor to Ertuğrul Bey was the first sign that the next sultan would take the throne with a vertical lineage [Amud-i Nesep]. In the first three centuries, when the strongest of the princes ascended to the throne and the throne was seen as an open to all competition, "practice of fratricide" also won its permissibility. This method indeed served the talented person to ascend to the throne. This was a necessary process for the country to be run by the most capable person. (Kunt, 2013, p. 28) At least such a thought was shared by the ruling elite. (Alderson, 1956, pp. 4-7) Appointment of the khan according to ancient Turkish beliefs shows the will of God, and since putting an unchangeable dynastic law on "election" or opposing "legal rulers" would be to oppose the will of God, there was no custom and law in this regard. Such a belief is evident in the advice Suleiman gave to his son Bayezid. Suleiman advised his son Bayezid to leave everything to Allah. Because it is His will that organizes the kingdoms. The result of the fight for the throne has been accepted as a divine command in this context. (İnalcık, 2002, p. 89) Those who ascended to the throne without political struggle, like Suleiman, had

to somehow “test their fortune” and prove his military capability. Thus, it is understood that the root of the divine claim to which the Ottomans frequently applied is embedded in the ancient Turkish tradition.

Against the possible danger, two serious measures had been taken. The first is the sending of the powerful prince to the province close to Istanbul, and the second is the practice of “practice of fratricide”. The legitimization of the practice of fratricide by the ulama even in the periods when the shari'ah was the strongest can only be due to the identification of maslahat-ı ‘umma [public interest] with the existence of the state [it can be called the dynasty]. At this point, great "loyalty" to the dynasty was skillfully achieved. Indeed, as Alderson reports, loyalty to the Ottoman lineage has never diminished throughout the dynastic history. (Alderson, 1956, p. 8)

If the successor person was elected from the dynasty, it was referred to the people who would be elected. Although the mass representing the people is janissaries, palace faction and shopkeepers. This is where democracy and despotism intertwine. The democratic spirit came to light with the understanding of "choosing a chief" inherited from the old Turkish tradition and Islamic "allegiance” and reaching a compromise with the hereditary aspect of the system. (Alderson, 1956, pp. 8-9) Moreover, at the end of the sixteenth century, at such a level as to raise doubts about the existence of “Oriental Despotism”; It is known that the people, guild organizations, and paramilitary groups act collectively and achieve certain political goals. (Faroqhi, 1995, p. 2) One of these political goals is the case of "dethroning". Dethroning was another democratic act in the Ottoman political system, according to Alderson. This was what distinguished the Ottoman sultans from their European counterparts of the time, and compared to their absolutist regime, the Ottoman sultans displayed a "more limited" and "softer" rule. (Alderson, 1956, p. 59) According to Linda Darling, dethronement was understood as "constructive action", not destructive. The challenge is not the administrative system itself, but a temporary phenomenon of lack of justice. Therefore, the pursuit of justice might require replacing one ruler with another. Precisely here, as Darling points out, the image of the "just king" misled by his advisers has been repeatedly used by both the rulers and the people who strive to use softer critical language. (Darling, 1996, pp. 291-292) But with this tactic, the sultans were not always able to get away with it. But this tactic did not always work as expected. Twelve of the thirty-six sultans were deposed. For some, it cost his life. However, an interesting aspect of the dethronement cases is that anyone outside the dynasty was never considered a candidate for

the throne. The first factor affecting this thought should be the understanding of “kut”. The main contribution of the steppe tradition to the understanding of Ottoman sovereignty, one of the three sources shaping the Turkish understanding of politics and society, was as follows: According to this tradition, sovereignty was the privileged quality of a single family that God chose [or might be the more accurate word he appointed] to claim power. The Turks were so devoted to the blood ties of the Ottoman dynasty that no other family was ever seen as an alternative to the throne. However, according to Busbecq, the concept of "nobility" had no equivalent in the Ottoman Empire in general. It did not mean anything "beyond personal virtue" among the Turks. The Ottoman dynasty remained the only exception to this. Busbecq also expresses this opinion. (Busbecq, 2019, p. 24) Moreover, some established practices such as the killing of members of the dynasty with a beam, show that the idea that the Ottoman dynasty was blessed is alive in the minds. Cuveynî reports that the belief that the Khan lineage came from a princess who married a wolf from the sky existed in the Mongols. (Cuveynî, 2013, pp. 101-104) A similar thought was shared by the Turks as well. The khans were believed to come from a princess conceived by a light descending from heaven, and this kind of "blessing" was the appearance of the will of God. Thus, the belief in the holiness of the dynasty that existed in the Turks seems to have been revived with the effect of the Mongol invasion. There was a claim of “right” adopted by the Ottomans with the holiness. The Ottomans were appropriating the right to rule with their lineage based on Oghuz Kağan [so-called]. For example, such a claim of “right” can be caught in Ibn Iyas’s narrative. While Selim proudly stated that he was descended from twenty sultans, Tumanbay, whose ancestors were mamluks, was deprived of such hereditary virtue. (İbn-i İyas, 2016, p. 117) In fact, Dante set up a similar claim for Italians, descendants of the Romans. "Right" in the thought of Dante, who was a supporter of a universal monarchy and attributed it to the descendants of the Romans [Italians]; It was what fit God's will. Dante justifies this on the grounds of the nobility of the Romans from Aeneas, the miraculous achievements of the Romans, their serving the "common good", and so on. (Alighieri, 1904, pp. 76-84) The Turks built a similar claim on the grounds that they were descendants of Oghuz Kağan, the dynasty received blessings, that they provided order and justice in the world, and with the help of dreams and mythological narratives, underlining that Turkish sovereignty was subjected to “right” and “divine approval”; and that the way of sovereignty is closed to different dynasties. In fact, such a claim was inherited from the old Turkish states to the Ottoman Empire. As a matter of fact, the Byzantine ambassador Priskos states that the Huns believed that Atilla came from a divine origin and perceived the world as their own. (Rásonyi, 1942,

pp. 34-35) Tardu Khan's description of himself as the owner of seven climates and seven races in the world against the Romans shows that claim to world sovereignty has always preserved its vitality among the Turks. (Chavannes, 1900, p. 246)

However, the dynasty remaining in power for 622 years without an alternative cannot be explained solely by the doctrine of “kut”. There was a more important legitimacy base than the concept of Kut, which was the dynasty's ability to identify itself with the interests of Islam. Busbecq, who visited the Ottoman Empire in the second half of the sixteenth century, names the Ottoman dynasty as the only pillar of Islam. (Busbecq, 2019, p. 92) There is no argument to negate that this view was widely shared at that time. Since persuading the subject and generating “consent” is a highly complex process, we need to use justification mechanisms, actions, images, rhetoric and "sovereign" to understand how Muslims and non-Muslims equate the interests of the dynasty with their own interests and perceive it as part of the divine politics. It is necessary to look at how sovereign power is reflected in different interest groups and social elements. Such legitimation techniques ultimately placed the rule of Al-i Osman's immutability. Underlying this success is the capacity to combine different legitimacy grounds. (Emecen, 2018, p. 39)

2.2. Ottoman Genealogy

After the Bayezid I, whom Western sources described as the first emperor, there was an important struggle between the Ottomans and the Timurids. Timur's claim to rule over the ancient Mongolian lands in Anatolia continued in the Shahruh period. The Ottomans attempted to create a “genealogic tree” against Shahruh's possible claim. A genealogy was invented based on the Central Asian Turkish khans and the legendary ruler Oghuz Kağan. In fact, this breakthrough was aimed at creating a new claim to sovereignty. These teachings were reinforced during the period of Murad II. According to İnalcık, this was the meeting point of “khanate” and “sultanate”. (İnalcık, 2002, p. 85) According to Köprülü, the formation of such a paradoxical romanticism in this period in which the old Turkish aristocracy was replaced by “devşirme” [royal servants] and an absolutist monarchy [sultanism] was strengthened is a concession made to the dissatisfied Turkish masses. The Kayı stamp struck on the coins is a result of this trend. (Köprülü, 2019, p. 248) Indeed, the "noble lineage" was still important to win the support of the nomads. But in this process, behind the "genealogy writing", there are also different sources of motivation such as

producing antitheses against other Turkish dynasties, and a vivid Turkish consciousness can be mentioned in the Ottomans. (Öz, 2019b, p. 57)

While the supremacy of the caliphate and sharia weakened with the Mongols, the understanding of “yasa” and “kut” was revived. Although over time the "khans", descended from Genghis, tried to present themselves as Muslim sultans, new rulers of Turkish origin also had to adopt the Mongolian political heritage. Moreover, the descendants of Oğuz, Cengiz and Timur had important benefits. The Ottomans emerged in this kind of political and ideological atmosphere created by the Mongol invasion. (Atçıl, 2018, pp. 17-20) For example, while Karamanoğulları claimed to be descended from Afşar-Oğuz for prestige, Ottomans were declaring that they came from Kayı-Oğuz clan. In this way, the Ottomans specialized in genealogy by the time of Murad II. The peculiarity of this period includes the process of the Ottomans' opposition to the "inheritance" rights of the Timurids. As a matter of fact, the Ottomans first responded with the phenomenon of "divine election" against the "claim of the Timurids". Secondly, they created a unique right to rule with the method of basing their genealogy on Oghuz Khan and Genghis Khan. In Tarih-i Al-i Osman, written by Matrakçı Nasuh in the sixteenth century, the Ottomans were shown to be descendants of Oghuz Khan and Al-i Selçuk, so they had the right to inheritance in Anatolia. By relying on Oghuz Khan, they did not only gain sovereignty over Turks. According to the book, Oguz Khan was the warrior prophet Zulkarneyn mentioned in the Qur'an, and he was descended from the son of Noah, Yafes. Thus Turks found an Islamic basis for their geneology. Also, according to the work, Oghuz Khan was a world emperor and ruled all countries from China to Europe, from Yemen to Russia. “Vaktâ ki Oğuz Hân Çin ve Hıtā’ya ve Gūr ve Gazne ve Hindistân ve Frengistân’a ve Deylem ve Bâbil’e ve Rûm ve Rus’a ve Şâm ve Hicâz ve Yemen’e ve Habeş ve Nûbe’ye ve Berber’e müstevlî oldı” (Matrakçı Nasuh, 2019, p. 72) After a world emperor like Oghuz Han, the sovereignty was left to Gün Khan, one of his six sons. Gün Han was from Bozok branch and could claim superiority over Üçok, to whom the Seljuks were based on genealogy. Bozok represented the left, and in the old Turkish belief, the left is superior to the right. This was the same with the Ottomans. Fresne-Canaye noticed this in his 1573 Istanbul trip. (Fresne-Canaye, 2009, p. 81) The Ottomans, on the other hand, were descended from Gün Khan's son Kayı Khan. Kayı, on the other hand, is the name who will take the throne after Gün Khan. All this points to a fictional historiographical process. But what is essential for this work is the authenticity and ability of the Ottomans to establish their legitimacy. The writing date of this work coincides with the period when Kanuni's

image of the world emperor was thoroughly reinforced. Suleiman the Magnificent was the common heir of Oghuz Khan, Zulkarneyn and Al-i Seljuk, and just like his ancestors, he was put in "adl ü dad ve ta'mîr-i bilâd" [providing justice and ordering the world], which is the main reason for world rule. (Nasuh, 2019, p. 334)

2.3. Just Ruler Image

Justice, prosperity and peace have been the primary source of legitimacy for a ruler, regardless of his religion or race. Among the factors that spread the Ottoman influence on the Balkans, the peasants who were struggling under feudal burdens became aware of the more moderate and fair tax and religious tolerance associated with Islam. The peasants had a guardian who defined the "raison d'etre" of the state with the welfare and well-being of the people. According to Itzkowitz even this attitude is a transformation that, had great effects. (Itzkowitz, 1980, pp. 17-18) The peasants in question changed their masters by crossing the other side, and lived in peace and security, even if they had to pay an extra tax. (Kunt, 2013, pp. 10-11) As a matter of fact, the basic principle idealized in the Ottoman Empire was that the subjects lived in peace. (Emecen, 2018, p. 9) In this direction, the Ottoman dream is aimed at establishing a safe and stable administration. (Lindner, 1983, p. 54) According to Ibn-i Firuz, what is expected from the caliph is both the implementation of the Shari'ah and to keep its people live in a safe and peaceful environment. (İbn-i Firûz, 1629, p. 48a)

At this point, the Sasanian example is shown as a prototype in politics. For example, according to Amasi, the Sassanids ruled for a long time because their people were happy, and they built their country. (Amâsî, p. 185) Since the Mesopotamian civilizations, the most important execution and legitimacy source of the "sovereign" was justice. (İnalcık, 2002, p. 131) Therefore, in this tradition, "justice" and "good governance" are common concepts and were not directly related to the religion of the ruler. The understanding of Ottoman administration also adopted and always preserved this ruling principle. According to İnalcık, justice in the Ottoman understanding of the state meant the protection of subjects against the ruling class and against illegal taxation. (İnalcık, 2002, p. 98) The justice of the sultan stood between the "free peasant" and state officials. (İslamoğlu-İnan, 2010, pp. 24, 80, 94-95) In the later stages, this attitude was preserved with "adaletnames" and "law decrees". The peasants, on the other hand, were well aware of this kind of patronage with the ruler and

were able to reference the “adaletnames” skillfully to defend their rights. (Faroqhi, 1995, p. 21) The image of "just ruler" has always maintained its position within the theme of the sultanate. According to Suraiya Faroqhi, the image of a just ruler was an alternative political form of strengthening the sultans' own legitimacy even when the “ghazi” prestige could no longer be enjoyed. (Faroqhi, 2009, pp. 13-14) In this context, the sultan's existence was in the public interest, and his existence is a preventive parameter between the persecution of corrupt ruling class or informal elements and its subjects. In this context, one can speak of an inseparable link between justice and power, and this also shows that the sovereign's power is limited. (İnalcık, 1993, p. 71) The Timar system, which was the main mechanism of the Ottoman organization, was built on these basic values. Although this system was originally Iranian, it was Islamized by the Great Seljuks. (Itzkowitz, 1980, pp. 47-49) The phenomenon of central government and the justice function of the sultan differentiated this system from the classical feudal system on the one hand and structured the legitimacy of the sultan's sovereignty on the "image of the righteous sultan" on the other hand. As stated by Itzkowitz, one of the main responsibilities of the sovereign in the Islamic period, as in the Near East state understanding, is to ensure the existence of a smoothly functioning justice mechanism throughout the country. In the Ottoman Empire, the "Tower of Justice" reflects the traditional image of the sultan in this direction. The sultan mostly appeared as the "protector of the peasant" and in this way the "provider of justice" among the "timarli-peasant" duo, which was based on the principle of mutual benefit, and the sultan's door was always open to the complaints of the peasants. Faroqhi showed that in the sixteenth century, Ottoman subjects protected their interests with the power to complain to the Court. (Faroqhi, 1995, p. 10) Writing a petition is proof that the Ottoman people could object to government affairs from within the system, as Darling has shown. This right includes the capacity to shape politics. Most of the petitions submitted were considered and often ended up against the interest of the state. According to Darling, this shows that the need for legitimacy overrides the need for money. (Darling, 1996, pp. 281-282) The existence of the court was also devoted to this basic function. The vizier on behalf of the Sultan and the kadıaskers in sharia issues made efforts to fulfill this duty. These courts, which were directly based on the legislative power of the ruler and derive their legitimacy from this, were the special places where the will of the ruler was manifested in absolutist regimes. According to İnalcık’s accurate determination, the “divan-i mezalims” were the bestowing manifestation of justice and sovereignty that spilled over from the pastoral power to the people. (İnalcık, 2015, p. 28)

2.4. Law Consciousness and Image of Law-Conscious Ruler

Narratives that convey Zengi and Baybars' sensitivities about equality before the law and their capacity to internalize these teachings are common. The same image was created for Yavuz Sultan Selim. Sultan Selim is portrayed as a law-conscious ruler. (Çıpa, 2017, p. 195) In the Ottomans, "kanun" was a phenomenon to be respected as a symbol of justice and accepted [or tested] laws. (Fleischer C. H., 1986, p. 192) Lutfi Pasha, trying to instill the awareness of the law to his colleagues, insisted that the basic principle of the Ottoman state was the rule of law. (Uğur, 1980) According to him, this consciousness is present in Selim with excess. According to Lutfi Pasha, Selim was not only a ruler who obeyed the law and had a legal awareness, moreover, Selim was a good legislator. (Çıpa, 2017, pp. 196-198)

There is a common concern of scholars and bureaucrats of this period, which is "compliance with the law." In fact, this thought was settled in the old Turkish thought. As a matter of fact, Turkish khanates were regarded as equal to the people before the law. (Bilkan, 2018, p. 321) There is a reference to this in Yusuf Has Hacib. (Hacib, 2016) It can be said that the understanding of "justice" in Kutadgu Bilig differs from the Indo-Iranian thought in which the authority is placed above the law. In Kutadgu Bilig, justice is the derivative of the law, not the ruler's sovereignty. Justice, which is the correct and impartial application of the "törü", is not the gift of the ruler. (İnalcık, 2015, p. 30) According to the old Turkish traditions, the ruler would be a khagan with a kind of social contract. Kagans derived from Açina and created for government business (Hassan, 2017, p. 81) they had to feed, dress and reproduce the people. The ruler had to rule the people in accordance with "tore" and justice. (Genç, 2002, p. 59) The thing called justice could only arise in this way. Because, in the Turkish tradition, "justice" is the impartial application of the law. If it was a known fact that justice was the basic element that provided the legitimacy of the ruler in Ottoman political thought; It should be known that justice should be applied without favoring any religious and ethnic group. A "dynastic law" that embraces these qualities and through which justice is transferred to all elements; It was embodied in Suleiman, which the Ottomans called "Kanuni" instead of "magnificent" like the Westerners. (Kunt, 2013, pp. 27-28) The Suleiman's "law" was also the provider of justice for non-Muslim elements who were not liable to sharia, and this was where one of the pillars of legitimacy lay. The dynastic law was more than the orders of a particular ruler. This was the sum of the orders and bound the ruler who was the successor. In his sixteenth century Ali Ekber states how even, the Chinese emperor obeyed the law, (Atçıl, 2018, p. 92) thus, he presented the image of the ruler who

respected the law to the Ottoman sultan in an idealized way. Just as Montesquieu, whose target was French absolutism, used Oriental Despotism as a tool of criticism in a way that indirectly touched the ruler, Ali Ekber was also using the Far East as a tool of positive criticism.

Until the sixteenth century, the law, whose origin is Central Asia, has a consistent source, which is the power of the sultan. (Lindner, 1983, p. 52) However, with the sixteenth century, a religious legitimacy was sought for the law. Siyasat al-Shariyya debate is a product of this concern. In this context, the specific nature of the law of the Suleiman period was that the customary laws were controlled and explained around the Sharia. (Emecen, 2018, p. 343) Until this period, even though the Ottoman sultans were Sunni themselves, they did not feel the need to express their political initiatives in Sunni lines. The passage of the Caliphate to the Ottomans, the Ottomans being the sole patron of the Western Islamic world and Sunni Muslims, the struggle against the Shiites and above all seeing themselves as the ruler of the Holy cities made this identity clear. The prominence of Hanafi law as official law, and efforts to reconcile sharia and customary law are all parts of this development. (Atçıl, 2018, pp. 128-131) Scholars-bureaucrats were not only officials who turned the wheel of the administration but were a part of the administrative mechanism that was effective in shaping the law, shaped the Ottoman political ideology, produced legitimacy and participated in the administration.[2] However, in classical Islamic political theory, the legislature belongs to the ulama, not to the power. Therefore, sharia was the law of the people rather than a law of power. The Ottomans made an effort to give the ruler aggravated judicial power and then the legislative power by moving the discussion of Siyasat al-Shariyya to Istanbul and even deviating it from its foundation. While the area allocated to politics was rather narrow at first, it has expanded further over time. (Köksal, 2016, p. 79) Nevertheless, even with its broadest definition, a limit was placed on politics and legislation, and in this context, Ottoman rulers were never positioned above the law like absolutist monarchs in Europe. (Köksal, 2016, p. 145) Regardless of the outcome, in fact, the purpose behind the discussions on Siyasat al-Shariyya was to define the boundaries of the political field according to fiqh. (Köksal, 2016, pp. 19-33) There was a class that stood behind this and

[2] However, it should be known that people like Ibn Kemal and Ebussuud are not just puppets by the ruling elite. A tendency to restrict the government can also be detected in their legal actions. Moreover, their main motivation was not only to generate legitimacy for the administration but also to serve Islamic law as law-conscious scholars. See Abdurrahman Atçıl, "The Safavid threat and juristic authority in the Ottoman Empire during the 16th century", International Journal of Middle East Studies, 49 (2017), 295–314.

included scholars such as Ali Cemali and Kınalızade. According to these scholars, sharia determined the limits of legitimate rule. According to another name, Taşköprizade, sharia both determines the basic principles of politics and directs politics, but the opposite is not possible. According to these scholars, sharia determined the limits of legitimate rule. According to another name, Taşköprizade, sharia both determines the basic principles of politics and directs politics, but the opposite is not possible. (Arıcı, 2016, p. 95) The power of the government in terms of legislation and judiciary as designed in Islamic law was limited to appointing a judge. In the Ottomans, the kadı, priest, and rabbi got their legal authority only from the authority of the sultan. (Imber, 1997, p. 6) Therefore, in Hanafi theory, appointing a legitimate ruler is important because the judges take their jurisdiction power from the sultan. Apart from this, the ruler has no authority in terms of the content and expression of the law. Because Islamic law is a social law rather than a power law. The concept of caliph in Hanafi's political theories has no influence or involvement in the structure and formulation of law. Imam is de facto ruler and military commander in Hanafi theory. (Imber, 1997, p. 65) In fact, the prevalent post-Mongolian approach, that the owner of "protective power" was deemed legitimate ruler was disturbing for the Ottoman patrimonial regime. Therefore, according to Imber, in the sixteenth century, thanks to Ebussuud, a detailed theory of legitimacy that feeds the claim of universal sovereignty was provided. Initially, the "gaza" and "conquest" made the Ottomans the legitimate rulers of these lands that could not be conquered by others. (Imber, 1997, p. 73) The arrangement of the main owner of lands and property as the ruler must have also contributed to this.

Constitutional anxiety is also the product of the search for an answer to "changing conditions" and the obligation to comply with it in the early modern period. (Fleischer, 1986, pp. 199-200) But by exaggerating the role and style of the "past". Precisely in this period, historians drew the image of a "law-abiding" sultan as an ideal typology, with the concern of constitutionality and the doctrine of the rule of law, which is in both Islam and Turkish custom, without emphasizing the religious or customary nature of the law.

2.5. Fixing the Elements: The Greco-Iranian Justice Doctrine

Classical works bearing Iranian thought such as Kelilah and Dimna, Kabusname, and Siyasetname, (Köprülü, 2018, pp. 168-170) which entered the borders of the Ottoman Empire in the very early period, report the strict protection of class distinctions [or anasır-ı

erbaa] that originated from the Sasanids as a method of protection from chaos and deems it as necessary for power's continuity. Justice [or keeping elements in place] is essential for the existence of the dynasty and the stability of the government, as suggested by the doctrine of "Circle of Justice", which summarizes the political, moral and social thought of the Ottoman class, or at least the ruling elite mentality molded in the Iranian-Islamic tradition. This teaching can be traced back to the royal laws of the Sumerians and Babylonians, who thought that divine grace, military power, efficiency and justice were inextricably linked. Justice is the preservation of the established social hierarchy, which is accepted as the natural order of the universe. This idea, based on keeping everyone in place and preventing social mobility, has settled in the Ottoman state philosophy. (Darling, 1996, pp. 283-285) Only in this way can the social order be balanced. For example, according to Akhisari, one of the reasons for the deterioration of the order is the deportation of citizens, tradesmen and townspeople to the borders. (Akhisari, p. 22) Lutfi Pasha experiences the same uneasiness and, like Akhisari, perceives the mobility as a threat to the order. These authors also define this order that they try to protect as "balance" and they are in favor of the reflection of the balance existing in the universe to the world by the hand of the ruler. According to Taşköprizade, it is none other than the "sultan" who gives the balance to the social order. (Taşköprizade, p. 22b) That's why Solakzade says that the Ottoman state found its balance in the just period of Suleiman. (Solakzade, 1880, pp. 4-5) While the origin of the doctrine of circle of justice, which is the first of the principles of balancing, is the Perso-Indian political thought, the other; Social stratification as four elements is the Ancient Greek heritage. It should be known that these two sources shaped Ottoman thought as much as the Islamic tradition. In fact, the group that built such a syncretic philosophy of the state and society, and the "Middle East state manners" specific to the Ottoman Empire, is the rulers from the Seljuk centers, Iran and Egypt. This carrier group transferred the Perso-Indian political thought to the Ottoman Empire by fusing it with the Turkish-Mongolian state tradition that became widespread in the ninth and thirteenth centuries. (İnalcık, 2002, p. 97) Thus, the two main sources that formed the Ottoman administrative manners were "Perso-Islam and Turco-Mongolian tradition. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that in the syncretic state manners that are conveyed, Islam outweighs others. (Rosenthal, 1958) However, it should not be overlooked that other elements of the syncretic structure have undermined many Islamic characteristics. As a result, social egalitarianism[3] in the Islamic understanding gave

[3] According to Cabiri, in the first Islamic society, there was no political domain, and the military- people and the ulama-ruling class defined the same thing. (el-Cabiri, 2018) Spoils were distributed equally to everyone,

way to hierarchical social stratification. As it is known from the Companions, that there is no land aristocracy and the understanding of society based on mobility has left its place to the stratified fixed society understanding idealized by the Perso-Greek conception of justice. The doctrine of justice based on the understanding of "keeping the elements in their place", wtih the famous theorist of this doctrine, the followers of Nasiruddin Tusi, a profound scholar in Ancient Greek and Iranian thought, and the "balanced" form of social structuring in which four elements remained in place dominated the Ottoman intellectual thought. According to Kınalızade, who was one of the leading names carrying this effect in the sixteenth century of the Ottoman Empire, a "balanced" and "just" society can only be reached with the harmony of four elements. (Arıcı, 2016, p. 104) In this social structuring, there is no place for anyone other than the four elements. According to Avicenna, the legislator should eliminate the lazy ones outside the elements. (Arıcı, 2016, p. 107) Akhisari also shares the same view. According to him, philosophers said, "Unemployed people are unprofitable and they should be killed." (Akhisari, p. vr 20) According to Kinalizade, these are people who have gone astray from justice. (Kınalızade, 2010, p. 111) Since justice is "keeping the elements in their place", injustice consists of upsetting this balance. In fact, this theory and system of elements of Tusi reflects the influence of the urban elite environment based on the agricultural society. (Itzkowitz, 1980, p. 39) From this point of view, it can be immediately understood that these theories are non-Islamic in origin. For Islam was born within a mobility-based trade society rather than a fixed agrarian society and had egalitarian elements rather than hierarchical social order. For this reason, Imam Shafi states that the highest of the profession departments is trade. However, it can be understood that the ulema held agriculture superior in later periods, (Kınalızade, 2010, p. 20) especially in the "patrimonial" regime based on the land regime. For example, according to Akhisari, the profession of the people of agriculture, which is the third layer of the asnaf-ı arbaa, is better than the professions after science and “gaza”. (Akhisari, p. 18) This idea of justice, based on the agricultural society, was indispensable for the Ottomans who evolved towards the

especially during the time of the first caliph Abu Bakr, every individual benefited from all kinds of opportunities equally, and legal equality was the cornerstone of the regime. There could be no talk of a family or a group with special privileges in this society. Electing the administration was a right belonging to the society, thanks to the council principle based on the right of each individual to choose. Islam, on the other hand, was born in a commercial society, as Ülgener stated, and emphasized "mobility" rather than a fixed hierarchy established from the very beginning with motivational sources such as jihad and science demand. Therefore, first century scholars state that trade is the most honorable profession after science. However, the Middle Eastern state tradition was based on the fixed and hierarchically aligned four-element theory, and they perceived keeping the elements in place and preventing mobility as a form of justice. Towards the seventeenth century, the authors of the period tended to explain the systemic problems observed in the Ottoman Empire with the inability seen in this type of justice, that is, in fixing the elements.

empire. According to Tursun Bey, the witness and theorist of this process, justice had two wings, the first of which is the order, that is the balance between people, and the second is to be in a profession and position appropriate to everyone's abilities, reflecting the Socratic justice. (Öz, 2019a, p. 57) According to him, harmony is important in the life of the community and every individual should preserve his assigned place according to his abilities. (Emecen, 2018, p. 387) The same thought was shared by Kinalizade. (Kınalızade, 2010, p. 177) In this thought, the order can be achieved by everyone doing what is expected of them. Such an understanding of order was the common sharing of the Middle Ages, and according to Christian Ruby, the understanding of order is based on the understanding of the Ancient Greek justice, which is dependent on harmony and hierarchy instead of equality, and a place and a role is allocated to everyone. (Ruby, 2012, p. 19) Within these teachings, the Ottomans imposed a duty on everyone in the Ottoman social order divided into the askeri, that is, the privileged class and reaya, and tried to ensure social harmony. It is up to the sultan to keep the elements in harmony with the justice apparatus. The ability to realize this kind of social harmony measures the competence of sovereignty on its own, because the nizam [ie order] inspired by the harmony of social elements is the spread of patrimonial power in the words of Şerif Mardin. (Mardin, 1995, p. 209) At this point, the military class, which holds the monopoly of legitimate policy making and protects this right to death, expects the citizens to pay taxes and affirm the privileged position of the elite class. (Faroqhi, 1995, p. 13) These expectations are for the smooth functioning of the social structuring and keeping the askeri-reaya difference alive. These expectations are clearly expressed in the works of Lutfi Pasha, one of the statesmen of the sixteenth century. According to him, the difference and privilege between the military and the reaya class should be protected in all dimensions, even in the dress. (Öz, 2019b) There is an expression in Asafaneme that "re'ayadan olub ata ve dededen sipahi-zade itmeden kaçınmak gerek". (Lutfi Pasha, p. 26a), and "bir yerün re'ayası zulümden kaçub, bir ahir yere gelse, ol yerin hakimi anı eski yerine göndermek gerektür," [and if the citizens of a place flee from persecution and come to another place, the governor of that place must send them to their previous settlement.] (Lutfi Pasha, p. 29a) "ve ra'iyete çok yüz virmemek gerekdür. Malı çok olursa kimesneye ta'arruz itmemek gerek emma libasda ve esvabda ve atda ve emlakda sipahi gibi tezyin ittirmemek gerekdür." (Lutfi Pasha, p. 29a) It cannot be said that the ruling elite is very moderate towards the reaya to which they exist thanks to their surplus products. As a matter of fact, the Ottoman political class perceived the subjects as poor and needy people and thought that they should stay that

way. The frequently used “reaya fukarası” reflects this understanding. This kind of discourse also emphasized their protective qualities. (Faroqhi, 2014, p. 106)

The Ottomans believed that social welfare and order could only be achieved through the proper functioning of the "anasır-ı erbaa" theory of the social elements and the "justice" based on fixing the social elements. Therefore, regression period scholars explained the systemic degenerations and "Ottoman decline" by the dysfunction of these two doctrines. (Öz, 2019a, p. 16) For example, according to Akhisari, who mentions the four-class theory, each class should do its own job for the order of the state and sultanate affairs, (Akhisari, p. 21) and those other than four classes must be annexed to one of the four classes by force. (Akhisari, p. 20) Only in this way can the order be reached, and public affairs become in order. Actually, Akhisari was arguing that he would renew the state and social order that struggled against the effects of early modernization with “Perso-Greek” elements and that he would renew the rules of the order [ie nizam-ı alem]. (Akhisari, pp. 10-11) Those who complained the most about the deterioration of the state order were also complaining about the deterioration of the social order. According to them, the blurring of the dual division of “askeri and reaya” and the displacement of the elements were the main factors of the collapse. For this reason, Mustafa Ali reacted excitedly to the movements that took place towards the end of the sixteenth century. (Mustafa Ali, pp. 42b-43b) Indeed, keeping the elements in place also requires a managerial skill. It is possible that according to them, the rulers of the period lacked this ability. This in itself is a problem of legitimacy. On the other hand, Suleiman the Magnificent, as the ideal emperor of the classical age, withdrew the tax exemptions of many people who entered the military class irregularly, and acted respectfully towards the basic principles of the transition from citizenship to military service. (İnalcık, 2002, p. 102) All of these were gathered in a single concept in summary, in the "order of the world" [ie nizam-ı alem] whose inventor was uncertain as Berkes stated. (Berkes, 2012, p. 30) However, recent findings show otherwise. Sam White mapped an empire's ecology in the sixteenth century that was incapacitated by population pressure, wars, and natural disasters. It revealed the relationship between climate fluctuations due to the little ice age and the Celali rebellions that defied the order. This represents a break from the typical regression paradigm. (White, 2011) However, it was not possible for the thinkers of the regression period to realize that this transformation, which they sensed, was an ecological and universal phenomenon rather than a social phenomenon. While people like Akhisari said, "I observed corruption in the order of the world" (Akhisari, p. 5), they attempted to

explain the systemic disorder with the theories of "anasır-ı erbaa" and "circle of justice", and these two represent a necessity for power and are also related to legitimacy.

2.6. The Past as a Tool of Legitimacy

The past served the function of benchmarking, criticizing and legitimizing for the Ottomans, especially during the periods when "regressive" discourses were intense. Towards the end of the sixteenth century, observable systemic failures, war defeats and unfavorable reasons such as income not meeting the expenses caused the scholars of the period to direct the view of the past. "Kanuni" was portrayed as an ideal ruler, and the age of Kanuni as a period of "prosperity and peace". Thus, a way to criticize the sultans who could not be criticized openly was discovered, which is to give examples from history. If it were not so, the same method would not have been used by Lütfi Pasha, who often refers to the Selim period to criticize the period of Kanuni. The frequency of using this style of the past in time enabled the Ottoman to idealize the past. The other way around is not just a tool of criticism.

It also reveals some fear of innovation. For example, the Ottomans had the understanding that the violation of the “qanun-i kadim”, a set of rules whose benefits were tested, would lead to death. (Öz, 2019a, p. 112) Lütfi Pasha fears that time will change the laws and methods of the Al-i Osman. (Lutfi Pasha, p. 22a) According to Za‘ifî, the laws that are left behind by padishahs should remain in their previous state. (Za’ifî, p. 164a) The expression "it has always been" had a binding effect on the Ottomans. In this case, according to Faroqhi, being "contradictory to the past" meant that one's position and legitimacy would be weakened relative to the other. (Faroqhi, 1995, p. 18) Referencing the past could give legitimacy to an action. For "tested" is enough argument to commit the action in question. However, there were also those who were aware of the changing of times, and criticized dependence on the past and traditionalism. In the seventeenth century, the author of the Kitâbu Masâlih opposes this understanding by saying "it is not useful to say that it happened before, the conditions of the time are changing". (Yücel, 1988, pp. 46-47) In fact, Turks' attachment to the past is not just a political problem. According to Busbecq's observation, Turks had beliefs that the breakdown of customs would bring evil. (Busbecq, 2019, p. 146) According to Lybyer, the Ottomans' devotion to tradition, the doctrine that a job should always be done the same way after it is done, is a legacy of the stubborn conservative Tatars. (Lybyer, 1913, pp. 18-19)

2.7. Historiography and Public Image

The phenomenon of the past cannot be considered apart from historiography. The state apparatus or officials representing this apparatus provided cultural production with the writing of history and literature and directed this production with the "patronage" system. Towards the end of the fifteenth century historiography matured thoroughly. During this period, the public image of the sultans was drawn as follows: A popular hero, devout and “ghazi” sultan. Ahmedi, the fundamental theorist of the Gaza ideology, reinforced the image of the Gazi sultan. Over time, these narratives were reformulated within the scientific tradition by the more professional mass, scholar-bureaucrats. Colin Imber, who traces the legitimacy theories of the Ottoman historiography in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, describes this development as follows: The warrior king and the devout conqueror, the caliphate institution that ensures the right to inheritance and universal sovereignty. (Woodhead, 2014, pp. 119-120) At the end of this process, not only the justifications for the rule of the Ottoman dynasty were presented, but an ideology that supported the right to universal rule was established. Serving such a clear and simple purpose, this ideology was essentially complex. The main reason for this was the political and social differences of the Ottoman Empire. The need to address the political needs of a particular group at a given time created this complexity. But after all, a state that dominated such different elements had a simple expectation: loyalty to the Ottoman dynasty. The discourses and ideological clustering were based on the Turkish Muslim tradition, (Imber, 2014, p. 138) although the methods remain Perso-Greek. While historiography created a public image for the sultans in this way, in the 1550s a “shahname” author had embarked on the business of presenting Kanuni as the universal ruler with an imperial elegance. Since such an effort, it served to create an image that Ebussuud was trying to establish in the field of law, through literature.

2.8. Lord of the Auspicious Conjunction and Müeyyed Min Indillah

Like many discoursive elements, Lord of the Auspicious Conjunction is a legacy to Suleiman the Magnificent from the reign of Selim. Unfortunately, much attention has not been given to Selim's serious role in the formation of the political, religious and cultural scene of the sixteenth century. (Şahin, 2013, pp. 27-28) However, as Erdem Çıpa reports, Selim played a serious role in the formation of the religious, social-political and cultural agenda of the sixteenth century. For example, political theology, which included the image

of the supreme Sunni ruler and universal sovereignty during the Selim period, played a leading role in the completion of the construction of an imperial state. (Çıpa, 2017, p. 5) In the company of this reality, according to Celalzade and Mustafa Ali, Selim is a Lord of the Auspicious Conjunction and "a person approved and supported by Allah. The Lord of the Auspicious Conjunction means the victorious, the lucky one, and it has three signs: to continue his lineage for ten generations, to be a conqueror by hand, never to lose in his life. (Emecen, 2020, pp. 161-162) Selim had all these qualities, and, like Timur, he was a true Lord of the Auspicious Conjunction. In this respect, Selim is a role-model for the period of Suleiman, since the Ottoman conqueror and sahipkıran was fully represented in his self. This is most clear in the Persian preface to the Niğbolu Kanunnamesi. Here, Selim was defining himself as " Confirmed by Allah ", "caliphate" and " Lord of the Auspicious Conjunction". Confirmed by Allah emphasized the direct support of Allah and invincibility here. (Fleischer C., 1992, pp. 162-163) The same discourse was produced for Suleiman. Because the invincibility and imperial splendor of the empire during the reign of Suleiman was a sign that God appointed the Ottoman sultan as the caliph on earth. (Imber, 1997, p. 106) In addition, Suleiman was born at the beginning of the tenth century in Hijri and according to Celalzade, when the Quran was opened for the choice of name, the verse of "İnnehü min Süleyman" came out, and he was the tenth sultan in the Ottoman genealogy [if you pay attention, there are ten “şerefe” in Süleymaniye Mosque.] These facts nurtured the belief that Suleiman was confirmed by God. Prophet Suleiman is known for his lofty grandeur and mighty kingdom. Apparently, the resemblance to the Prophet Solomon will not remain only in the name. Indeed, the image of Suleiman was built in this direction from many sources, religious and secular. The desire for global governance was reflected in legal symbols, using seven flags pointing to seven climates and four-tailed horse symbols pointing to the four corners of the world. (Necipoğlu, 2005, p. 27) The expectations from Suleiman, who already reached the confirmation of Allah with the qualities we have mentioned above, were also high at this rate.

First, the issue of "Confirmation of Allah" included the legend of the “Kızıl Elma” and a sacred duty embedded in the Turkish ruling tradition with the understanding of world domination. Although the Islamic aspects of this belief were "caliphate" and "tajdeed", it also carried elements such as "Pacta Ottomana" and "world empire" embedded in the understanding of Turkish sovereignty. The Ottomans combined both Islamic and Turkish ideals within the body of "Sultan Suleiman Han, the ruler of the world". Suleiman's

sovereignty went beyond the borders of the caliphate, in fact it was based on the ideal of a Turkish conqueror. The fact that Suleiman did not recognize the German ruler as an emperor and the phrase " Suleiman is the only real ruler in the world as the only God who owns the world" spilled out from Ibrahim Pasha's language (Turan, 2019, pp. 311-317) shows that the notion of world domination has been internalized by Kanuni. Moreover, this notion was an important component of the Ottoman administrative ideology. The introduction of a law code handled under the leadership of İbrahim Pasha was the first official document expressing a new "political theology" in response to the ideological pursuits in early modern Eurasia and was building Suleiman here as an ideal sultan and caliph. (Şahin, 2013, pp. 56-57) Ibrahim informed a Venetian ambassador that Suleiman would establish the reign of a single religion by taking Rome. (Fleischer C. H., 2007, p. 57) In this context, Rome was the Turkish “Kızıl Elma”. Celalzade, like his contemporaries, reinforced the claims of the Ottomans to establish "the kingdom of the Mahdi" and establish a universal sovereignty.

Who is the real world emperor is one of the main questions of the sixteenth century. In this period, the Ottoman Empire, whose influence and sovereignty overflowed the borders ofits own country; there is not even one international political problem that does not concern Ottomans. (İnalcık, 2002, p. 59) If we define power as the capacity to shape someone else's action, "sahipkıranlık" is achieved by the holding of power with no alternative around the world. At this level, there was an alternative formation to "real sahipkıran", that is to say Kanuni, in Europe. As Karl V shouldered this burden, he was well aware that he could not benefit from the Ottomans' indulgence. With his effort to unite both worldly power and spiritual power, Karl V’s use of the crown of the Holy Roman Empire was a turning point for his relationship with Kanuni to be further strained. (Şahin, 2013, pp. 81-81) Who was both the ruler of the world and the real Roman emperor associated with it came to the fore again. The Ottomans produced antitheses to this challenge in every field, and while struggling with Karl V on the one hand, they used unhappy elements that were harmed by Karl on the other. At this point, the Ottomans became the shelter for kings like François, who was persecuted by Karl V. As Lord of the Auspicious Conjunction and king of kings, the gate of the Kanuni became a haven not only for subjects but also for kings. For whatever reason, the Ottomans did not remain silent to the socio-religious movements in Europe. After all, according to Luther, the Ottoman Empire was a punishment from God on the Christian people, reminiscent of Atilla. [Busbecq adds Timurleng to these names. (Busbecq, 2019, p. 248)] As Suraiya Faroqhi points out, in fact, this thought provides legitimacy for the

Ottoman intervention. Since the divine punishment also included the confirmation of Allah, the Ottoman conquests were perceived a part of God's way of arranging affairs [sunnatullah]. This thought legitimized the success of the Ottomans in this respect, and the Ottoman progress was perceived as a destiny of God by both themselves and their opponents. (Faroqhi, 2009, p. 10)

As a result, when the perception of a nation endowed by God to rule the whole world combined with the hadiths that refer to the Turks as "Jundullah" [the army of God], the Turkish world domination concept and "ilay-ı kelimetullah" became the same and Kanuni became the symbolic name for this teaching.

2.9. Spiritual Dimension of Sahipkiran: Mujaddid

The discourse of “Sahipkıran” in the Ottoman Empire was expanded to include "mujaddidism". In essence, “Sahipkıran” included both religious and political leadership. This title, which was used by Timur for the first time, became very popular in the sixteenth century and was developed by further strengthening the spiritual channel. Mujaddid is a description peculiar to scholars that essentially includes the meaning of "religious renewal". However, the emphasis on mujaddid was strengthened with Selim. Selim's "religious leadership" was also supported by the "religious reviving mujaddid hadith". (Lufi Pasha, h1341, p. 4a) Indeed, he was the most victorious Sunni ruler who defended Sunnism against the Shiites. (Çıpa, 2017, p. 10) According to Lütfi Pasha, Selim revived the religion of Islam in the ninth century just as befits a mujaddid. (Lufi Pasha, h1341, pp. 11-12) The role model of Lutfi Pasha at this point was İdris-i Bitlisi. He described Bayezid II as the mujaddid of the ninth century. (Genç V. , 2016, p. 445) According to İdris-i Bitlisi, Bayezid was a mujaddid who started to protect Islam and a savior guardian who banished all strife. Nevertheless, the theoretical scheme of mujaddidism, rather than being a part of the literary series, started in the period of Selim. This achievement, namely the attribution of mujaddidism to the sultans, exposed itself mostly after Selim and became an integral part of the Ottoman political discourse. The birth of Suleiman the Magnificent at the beginning of the tenth century was interpreted as mujaddid, supported by the hadith that a mujaddid would be born at the beginning of each century. (Turan, 2019, p. 311)

Kanuni was the mujaddid-sahipkiran, who, Mawlana Isa described a universal ruler who would initiate the rule of one true religion, as many people actually use. (Fleischer C. ,

1992, p. 165) The same expressions were reflected in the language of poetry, as a matter of fact, Yahya of Taşlıcalı said the following about Kanuni: “Ol ki sâhib-kıran ‘alemdir/ Her kerâmât ile mükerremdir.” The “keramat” is an emphasis on his spiritual side, namely mujaddid. In addition to this political, poetic and ideological use, there are also attempts to build "mujaddidism" on the legal grounds. The fact that Kanuni rebuilt the tomb of Abu Hanifa (Turan, 2019, p. 326) shows that this aspect of mujadidism, which has a fiqh content by its nature, is not ignored. Moreover, according to the Sunni caliphate theory, the caliph was supposed to be a mujaddid. Nevertheless, although this usage can be read as a supply to the fiqh demand, the political content of the emphasis on mujaddidism here, in coordination with “sahipkiran”, is more pronounced.

In addition, the prestige of mujaddidism in the "scientific world" must have inspired the use of this concept with a political context. For, mujaddid is a scholar appointed by God to revive religion in every century. It carries the confirmation of God and the religious legitimacy. With a strong centralization, the sultan tried to bring this prestige in the hands of the ulema to his power. In some formulations, the dynasty itself was described as "mujaddid", expressing an existential imperative for the ummah. However, according to Lutfi Pasha, the greatest mujaddid of the mujaddid dynasty, Al-i Osman, is definitely Selim. Because Selim revived the religion of Islam and sunnah. (Atik, 2017, p. 153) On the one hand, the action undertaken [consciously or unconsciously] served to destroy the possibility that a possible contradictory mujaddid could exist. Still, the Ottoman Empire would not remain indifferent to a tajdeed movement, which, in practice, though not in theory, depicted an early example of pan-Islamism that could occur even in the periphery. Abu Manneh has emphasized this strikingly. (Abu-Manneh, 2013)

2.10. Accompanied by Apocalyptic Discourses

Sahipkıran was the most useful title for the Ottoman claim of universal sovereignty in the apocalyptic air that exists in Eurasia. (Şahin, 2013, pp. 59-61) Hijri ninth century [m. 1494-5] was the period when apocalyptic discourses increased their prevalence. Successive disasters in places such as Edirne and Bursa reinforced this understanding. In the sixteenth century, besides the plague, venereal diseases struck Istanbul (Dalle, 2013, p. 110) and continued to feed apocalyptic rhetoric. As stated before, the conquest of Istanbul was understood as a harbinger of apocalypse, and the people psychologically became sensitive

to the appearance of a messianic leader. Under these circumstances, Messianic and Mahdist movements gained visibility. Shah Ismail's and his successors 'claim to being “Mahdi” and their capacity to attract nomadic elements were the driving force behind the Ottomans' presenting their rulers in apocalyptic form. With his absolute victory over the Safavids and Mamluks, Yavuz announced to the world that divine confirmation belonged to him, but the influence of the Safavids in Anatolia was a serious obstacle to the global empire. Mahdi movements such as Baba Zünnun in 1526 and Kalenderoğlu in 1926-7 did not hesitate to disturb the Ottoman Empire. (Atçıl, 2018, p. 123)

Suleiman the Magnificent, the best representation of the Ottoman domination, appeared as an “eschatological” ruler as an axillary to these movements. In the Ottoman Empire, the belief that he was the expected person [Mahdi] who would conquer the whole world in the name of Islam increased. Accompanied by legal apocalyptic rhetoric, he was perceived as a leader, a mujaddid and a mahdi who concluded the understanding of “devlet-i ebed-müddet”. The idea that Suleiman is the righteous ruler who will rule the world was adopted in the intellectual thought of the Hijri Xth century, with the idea that doomsday is approaching among the groups that are fed by apocalyptic perceptions. (Emecen, 2020, p. 90) Kanuni did not hesitate to use titles such as "mahdi", "kudret-i ilahi", Sahib-i zaman”, “kutb”, and “sahib-kıran” referring to divine support. (Atçıl, 2018, p. 121) The first step towards Hungary is characterized as the first stage towards the ideal of universal sovereignty. (Şahin, 2013, p. 37) The famous golden helmet similar to the papal crown should also be read in this context. This helmet is symbolically associated with Alexander the Great. This helmet was displayed during the 1532 Vienna War, in parades and at the embassy reception. (Necipoğlu, 2005, p. 28) In fact, this whole process was not unique to the Ottomans. The Ottomans, Safavids and Mughals, as states with military-agricultural governance forms of the gunpowder age, had a common religious-ideological paradigm inspired by Islam and were familiar with the theory of world domination, millennium and mahdist thought. Azfar Moin reported that the Mughals and Safavids were connected to each other through a common management style based on Sufism and millennialism. (Moin, 2012) These empires also shared the same imperial destiny as their Western contemporaries. They were no strangers to bureaucratization, the regulation of laws, and the problems arising from regional enlargement. (Çıpa, 2017, pp. 13-14) All these similarities show that sixteenth-century contemporary empires faced the same problems. The Ottomans, on the other hand, responded to such common problems with the image of "The Lawgiver as Messiah" to the

millennial, apocalyptic discourses. However, as the Kanuni got older and lost his warrior role, the image of the "The Lawgiver as Messiah" weakened. What remains is a palpable and dignified image: the "guardian of Sunni Islam". (Faroqhi, 2009, p. 59) According to Ibn-i Firuz, he was “imam-ı cumhur-ı enam ve hümam-ı ehl-i İslam bir padişah-ı şeriat-perver”. (İbn-i Firûz, 1629, p. 3a)

2.11. Dream as a Place of Divine Covenant

As Roy Mottahedeh argued, the dream can be considered as a sovereignty contract between God and the ruler. (Mottahedeh, 1980, pp. 69-79) Such a function of the dream attributed to Osman can also be mentioned. In the dream, a tree emerging from the heart of Osman and surrounding the whole world was interpreted by Sheikh Edebalı as “kut” according to the narrative. According to the interpretation of the dream, Allah granted the sultanate to Osman and his descendants. At this point, Sheikh Edebali's good news to Osman and his daughter engagement with him were indicative of two things. The first is good news for the divine election of the Ottoman dynasty, and the second is the blessing of the dynasty on the occasion of Edebalı, who was also a sayyid. (Imber, 2014, pp. 148-149) In fact, a similar dream of Osman was seen by Mahmud of Gazneli and Toksurmus, father of Tuğrul, before. This usage shows that the Ottomans did not abstain from consuming traditional and local resources.

Murad III's dreams are also noteworthy. In these dreams, Murad was envisioned as Kutb'ul-Aktab and a "proxy" person who sat on the throne with divine appreciation. Murad must have imagined himself as the expected Mahdi. (Felek, 2012, pp. 256-262) This is an indication that Murad, too, was not indifferent to the millenniumist discourses established in Eurasia. (Çıpa, 2017, p. 247) At the same time, the Ottoman ideal type of ruler was expressed through these stories. Murad, who abandoned the Gazi typology, reflected his own image and personal representation in this way. Murad represented the portrait of a sovereign chosen by God through dreams. He was the one who would restore Islam and unite the Muslim world under his rule. In this way, which he applied to increase his political and spiritual influence, the sultan presented himself as the Lord of the Auspicious Conjunction and Shadow of God, (Felek, 2012) as the only Ottoman sultan pictured with the Holy Qur’an in his hand. (Felek Ö. , 2010) From here, we see that the idea that sovereignty is a gift of God, and a given right were cultivated intensely until the end of the sixteenth century.

2.12. Sultanic Generosity

Each new Muslim-Turkish dynasty continued the "old foundation order" in a way that would not hurt the people of madrasahs and dervish lodges, who made their living through religious foundations and had great influence over the people. While the justice of pastoral rulers was manifested as a gift in the courts of “mezalim”, their generosity was manifested through foundations [waqfs]. In almost every political book, these two qualities of the ruler, justice and generosity, have been the subject of and not only protecting the oppressed from the oppressors, but also giving the poor and enlivening the lower strata are inculcated to the ruler. Mustafa Ali often emphasizes this issue, according to him, the ideal ruler should protect the poor with his generosity. (Mustafa Ali, p. 25b) The public image of the ruler, as part of imperial propaganda, could only be positively shaped by broad generosity for a society in which there was essentially conspicuous consumption. Efforts in this direction show that the Ottomans were aware that they could not keep their regime alive solely with the hard power. Good administration should include fairness and generosity. At this point, foundations and charities were of functional importance. As Faroqhi pointed out, foundations were the most important institutions in which the piety and generosity of the sultan was demonstrated. In addition to foundations, rulers also ordered state officials, libraries and madrasas. (Faroqhi, 2009, p. 12) However, among these institutions, “foundations” had a more privileged place than others. Family foundations' capacity to save and protect private property from a diffuse patrimonial network, and the ulama's reliance on foundations to provide their own subsistence made "foundations" a tool of consent. This concern has also infiltrated siyasatnames. For example, according to Lütfi Pasha, “emvâl-i halk bî-vech dâhil-i mâl-i padişâh-i olmak fenâ-yı devlete dâldur”. (Lutfi Pasha, nr 2634/2, p. 23a) and ve “abes yere vüzera veyahud saîr rical-i Devlet-‘Aliyyeyi müsâdere ittirmekten gayet ihtiraz gerektür”. (Lutfi Pasha, nr 2634/2, p. 23b) Zaifi also has the same concern, according to him, “felek-şevket ‘ali-himmet padişahlar dahi fukara-yı ra’iyyet ve zü’efa-yı ehl-i kana‘at emvâline iltifat buyurmazlar.” (Za’ifî, p. 161b) In fact, these highlights reflect the problem of finding ways to protect the individual and the property of the individual from the state, which derives from the fiqhist understanding because each is of madrasah origin. Foundations, which are under the strict protection of the fuqaha, also satisfied this search. Fatih faced the discontent of the dervishes, ulama and powerful families when he handled the foundations, which are normally under the strict protection of the fuqaha and Islamic law, in the direction of centralization and being the sole patron, as Baybars did. (Atçıl, 2018,

p. 67) The confiscation of devoted properties was an intervention in the "family foundations", which was the only way to be protected from Ottoman patrimonialism, and the discontented elements mentioned above faced the loss of their capacity to protect "private property". However, not everything developed in the direction that Fatih wanted. Knowing that he would not be able to hold on to a strong opposition formed after the Conqueror, and his throne was shaking against Cem, Bayezid II stepped back and accepted the return of the confiscated properties. (Itzkowitz, 1980, pp. 29-30) It was the environmental reaction that pushed Bayezid to this, and this reaction underlined that "sharia" could not be violated so easily. Because of this feature, Ibn Kemal praised Bayezid as someone who revived sharia and established justice. (Kemal, 1991, pp. 3-4) Moreover, a clear violation of Sharia during this period could have caused the throne to be lost. This was the primary thing that fundamentally limited the power of the sultans. (Lybyer, 1913, pp. 26-27) This transfer underlines that the foundations under the direction of sharia and jurists are a means of production of consent and are integrated with maslahat-ı sharia [because one of the five goals of Sharia is to protect the property of the individual]. However, foundations were a solidarity mechanism that permeates the fabric of the society where the wealthier shared their food regularly with the weak. (Singer, 2002, p. 168) As it operates in the logic of "division" in Turkish tradition, this practice ensured the legitimacy of the upper class on the one hand, and on the other hand, brought the classes closer together. This convergence is also an opportunity to re-learn the place and position of the elements, to reproduce sociality and to reinforce social contract. For, according to Turkish customs, the ruler would be a “kaghan” with a kind of contract. Created for government business, kağanlar had to feed, clothe and reproduce the people. (Hassan, 2017, p. 81) Moreover, even more importantly, philanthropy was very developed in the Muslim community. Considering that most of the foundation owners are disconnected from the state mechanism, it is known that the motivation behind this work cannot be reduced to a political function. For, in an anonymous travel book, a European traveler stated with astonishment that there is no other nation in the world as fond of philanthropy as the Turks. (Aybet, 2018, p. 355) Baudier, who admires the philanthropy of the Turks, states that the Christian world should learn this from Turks. (Aybet, 2018, p. 343). It is because of this nature of Turkish society that beggars were rare. (Aybet, 2018, p. 344). Moreover, the tradition of helping out was very common. All these show that generosity is the primary religious phenomenon in which individual religiosity is manifested in Turkish society. Major public projects and palace foundations have a political function in this context. For example, palace foundations had an important role in integrating local elements

into the system. As Amy Singer put it, “foundations” functioned as a means of monitoring. (Singer, 2002, pp. 169-170) Therefore, in this period when the influence of the political center began to seep into the lives of the people through techniques such as ceremonies, architectural projects and laws, (Şahin, 2013, pp. 5-6) foundations also had this kind of functionality. The participation of palace women in this process is also high. Amy Singer shows how Hürrem, a courtier woman, took care of the foundations, which were an instrument of Ottoman imprint on cities, after the Mamluk women, Tumshuk. Accordingly, it is clear that foundations serve many things such as creating a charitable and just image, gaining legitimacy, and improving social welfare. (Singer, 2002) Suleiman, on the other hand, did not hesitate to spend his considerable fortune on charity and major architectural projects in the sixteenth century. According to Woodhead, he was the first sultan to be widely known to Western European palaces and peoples, perhaps thanks to these qualities as well as his invincible identity. That is why he deserved the nickname “the Magnificent”, which belongs to a Renaissance period.

2.13. Display Area of Splendor and Means of Consent: Festivals and Ceremonies

Rather than an inaccessible ruler hidden “behind the scenes” in the public sphere, the image of a ruler exhibiting all his glory in court celebrations and hunting with various virtues is more in demand because of his admiration and fear. At this point, the public sphere could not be ignored for the state, which was becoming objectified by detaching itself from both the absolute ruler. The Ottomans were well aware of this and resorted to many ways to display the "sultan's" glory. First, a predatory sultanic iconography is indispensable to the Ottomans, as the political cultural legacy that the Ottomans inherited included it. As Faroqhi reported, this image was exhibited on metal objects in many parts of Ancient Iran and the Near East. (Faroqhi, 2009, pp. 19-20) A unique "hunter king" motif adopted by the Islamic sultans must have played a role in consolidating the image of a powerful sultan in the public sphere. Based on the narratives of Michael Herber, who had the opportunity to watch Murad III's hunting ceremony in 1588, Faroqhi states that the intention of hunting was to display the magnificence, power and wealth of the sultan rather than the killing of an animal. For example, the silks and graceful harness horses that stood out at the hunting ceremony impressed Herber. (Faroqhi, 2009, p. 88) Second, the sultan's possession of wild and exotic animals was another way of consolidating the sultan’s sovereignty before the subjects. With the exhibition of exotic animals, the sultan declared that he even ruled wild animals.

Sixteenth century Istanbul witnessed chained lion parades. The submission of the wildest animals and their display in a discipline aroused respect in the public with fear. According to Faroqhi, caged lions were an important symbol of the Ottoman sultans in this atmosphere. (Faroqhi, 2009, pp. 27-28)

There are also elephants in the category of animals exhibited in the sixteenth century. The display of elephants is a challenge to the Baburs, famous for their elephants, in terms of access to exotic animals and domination. (Faroqhi, 2009, pp. 100-101) Thirdly, ceremonial processions such as "Friday processions" and "circumcision ceremonies" are important events where the "glory" of the sultan is displayed. These kinds of parades have been the subject of much depiction by Western writers. Almosnino during the time of Selim II and Lubenau during the time of Murad III depicted "parades". (Faroqhi, 2009, p. 57) Weddings, festivities, and ceremonies were a means of expressing the greatness of dynasties and ruling elites in the early modern world. Establishing a link between political ideas such as justice, reform, and world domination that resonated in early modern Europe and new political symbolisms around the rulers, the determination of Edward Munir can also be adapted for the Ottoman Empire. Establishing a link between political ideas such as justice, reform, and world domination that resonated in early modern Europe and new political symbolisms around the rulers, the determination of Edward Munir (Muir, 2005, p. 9) can also be adapted for the Ottoman Empire. (Şahin, 2013, pp. 51-52) The festivities were places of communication and reconciliation for those who ruled and managed. Ceremonial events in the Ottoman Empire in the 1530s were venues where patronage and loyalty were reformed and produced, showing the performative and symbolic aspects of power. (Şahin, 2018) In fact, the festivities were used as a means of domination on the eve of the birth of the modern state. Similar things can be said of the Safavids. Babak Rahimi revealed how the Moharram ceremonies turned into a political and public sphere by being distorted from their original purpose over time. (Rahimi, 2012) Depicting the circumcision ceremonies of princes, Nabi declares that the people fill the festival squares. In this ceremony, viziers and other statesmen present precious gifts to princes. (Aybet, 2018, p. 385) It was clear that the dynasty was restoring "hierarchical structuring" and sovereignty in the eyes of both the ruling class and the people through the princes. The seating arrangement at the festivities was insistently engraving into the "minds of the citizens of the city" the magnificence and inaccessible position of the sultan, who was positioned at the top of the social hierarchy. (Faroqhi, 2009,

p. 76) Thus, the seating plan at public festivities was the plane where the social and political hierarchy was exposed and "emphasized" or "confirmed" by the public once again.

Among the ways of displaying splendor and legitimacy, the event in which a ruler to ascend to the throne “first appears first to the public" is also important. This event was crowned with effective and large parades. The Sultan wore a sword from the hands of the scholars of the age in Eyüp Sultan. On this occasion, it was confirmed by the scholars that the Ottoman rule of "shawqah" and "manea", which were the legitimacy rule of the post-Mongolian law and express the sociological balance of power (Şen, 2019, p. 90). At the same time, the ulema was delivering the will of the ummah to the sultan. Indeed, the need to affirm the legitimacy of rulers by religious leaders is a common need for every absolutist tradition. Indeed, as Russell reported, the sovereignty of kings in Europe was legalized by a religious ceremony. In this way, it would be authorized in the public sphere through religion which is a universal legitimation tool. (Russell, 2002, pp. 72-73) For Turks, this experience is very old. According to the narratives, the wise religious leader of the ancient Turks, Irkıl Hodja advised Oghuz Kağan, (Ebu’l Gazi, 2011, p. 68) and he heralded the Oghuz Khan that God gave him the sovereignty of the world. (Turan, 2019, p. 98) Dede Korkut, who fits both the shaman of the ancient times and the image of the saints in the Islamic world, heralded that the world domination would pass to the Kayı tribe, which is the Oghuz tribe. (Turan, 2019, p. 101) Moreover, the Ottoman historiographer mentions that Hacı Bektash Wali crowned Osman with takbirs. Sarı Saltuk prayed for the descendants of Osman to be from the sultans. (Ebu'l-Hayr-i Rūmi, 1988, pp. 182-186) Thus, the blessing of the Ottoman lineage based on divine selection was realized by the hands of the most respected religious leaders of the period. Repeatedly, this is how the process of granting the "right" of sovereignty to Al-i Osman begins.

Another element that functions as instrumental in the display of grandeur is "architecture". Mustafa Ali emphasized the importance of "public construction" in clarifying the status of rulers. (Faroqhi, 2009, p. 67) According to him, the sovereign “‘Amâyir-i dârü’ş-şifâ yapmağa himmetleri ve kitâbet-hâne ve medâris-i ‘ulyâ ta’mîrine sarf-ı dikkatleri ve bi’l-cümle hayrât u müberrat inşâsına iltifat ü rağbetleri olmalıdır.” (Mustafa Ali, p. 39a) The continuation of the construction of the Selimiye Mosque even at a time when the state was financially troubled in the 1570s shows that the Ottoman sultan was well aware of the linear relationship between architectural projects and legitimacy. This kind of massive construction was a mirror of the empire's central power and grandeur. The same can be said

about the selatin mosques, which reflect the power and splendor of the government. Even the order of a “complex”, which depicts the name of Prince Mehmet as if he were a sultan, explains how the power or the will to power is reflected in the architectural project. The notion that construction projects symbolized power and piety was shared by Muslim and non-Muslim elements. (Faroqhi, 2009, pp. 83-85) Thus, the government used public buildings as a means of reflecting their grandeur, equipped with symbolic contents. Süleymaniye Mosque, which Suleiman longed to end (Busbecq, 2019), is a monument of victory against the Shiites. (Necipoğlu-Kafadar, 1985) This masterpiece was, in fact, the supreme expression of Ottoman Sunnism (Şahin, 2013, pp. 144-145) and reflected the willingness of sultans to reflect Sunnism’s triumph on building projects.

This splendor reflected in public buildings was noticed by a new age European, Schweigger. (Ortaylı, 1984) However, in the first twenty years of the rule of Kanuni, such large construction projects are not encountered. (Dalle, 2013, p. 112) For, in this period, his uninterrupted war victories gave him a strong public image. Indeed, all of Suleiman's great conquests took place in the first twenty years of his rule. (Imber, 1997, p. 4) However, as Darling stated, when the end of the great conquests came, the administration, which assumed the existence of a “stable” country, came to the fore as legitimacy elements such as law-making and security. (Darling, 1996, pp. 294-295) At this point, taxation and justice are two devices in which legitimacy is tested for the people, and the Ottoman rulers maintained their top position in the social category with the correct use, reconciliation and integrated success of these two. (Darling, 1996, pp. 305-306)

There is a common space where public constructions still stand in splendor: Istanbul. Istanbul was a place with no alternative in showing the grandeur of the Ottoman empire and the public face of the dynasty. However, as determined by Robert Mantran correctly, the source of such magnificence lies in the transfer of the "surplus value" of other regions to Istanbul. (Mantran, 1995) Here, thanks to this wealth flowing from the provinces to the center [surplus values flowing into the center], the sultans embarked on the architectural project that registered their power. It was the Conqueror who properly initiated this initiative and wanted to decorate Istanbul with all the qualities of an imperial capital. Before long, as Itzkowitz stated, Istanbul had a breathtaking urban landscape in the world. (Itzkowitz, 1980, p. 3) This new policy has been strengthened by transferring various professional groups to Istanbul. This example was repeated in the time of Selim and Suleiman. Such an application, which continued the ancient tradition, was also fed by the Ottoman tax mentality. However,

this situation is a deviation from the Islamic tax logic to the Iranian tax logic. In a work attributed to Caliph Ali, it is stated that the tax can only be collected as a result of the service. (Çâvîş, 2017) But now the only thing that falls on the sultan in the contract between the sultan and the people was to provide justice. (İslamoğlu-İnan, 2010) In this way, Anatolia's surplus values flowed seamlessly to Istanbul and empire projects.

2.14. Guardian of the Merchants

The Ottomans gave the necessary priority to "trade routes" in their conquest policies. Galata in Istanbul had become an international export and import port, although the role of minorities was dominant here. After the conquest, Mehmed II gave capitulations to the Genoese and then Italian merchants and renewed the convenience given to merchant colonies before the conquest. (Mantran, 1995, pp. 70-73) But the part that interests us is not how the Ottomans carried out trade policy, but the fact that the Ottoman justice mechanism, [injustice is understood here as illegal negative actions committed by officials against the people (Mumcu, 2007)] which was carried out between the peasants and the state, had an aspect that also looked at the merchants. It is known that in many instances, the sultans did their best to compensate the losses incurred by the merchants. For example, they put considerable pressure on Venice Signoria for some merchant losses. (Faroqhi, 2009, pp. 28-29) For the Ottomans, trade, beyond tax earnings, was the ground on which the image of a "just ruler" was displayed all over the world, as the majority of those who carried out this profession were minorities and foreigners. According to Faroqhi, the title of "sultan-ı âlempenah" [the ruler who protects the world] used by the sultans envisaged security for the merchants, and the "alempenah", the refuge of merchants, oppressed and asylum seekers, was part of the superior image of the sultan. (Faroqhi, 2009, pp. 22-25) Moreover, as Faroqhi pointed out, for example, while the murder incident is usually a matter for the victim’s family to decide, the punishment of crimes such as pirates and robbery were perceived as committed crime directly against the authority of the ruler. (Faroqhi, 2009, pp. 116-117) This is a privileged right for the sultans, and Dede Cöngi has carefully grounded this right religiously. (Dede Cöngi) Crimes such as piracy and robbery are acts that damage the sultan's universal fair image, and it is not tolerable for someone who has absorbed the notion of world domination, such as the Ottoman sultan.

We can assume that in this period, in which the understanding of Ancient Greece was adopted, capitulations consisted of a role distribution in a way befitting a "true sahipkıran". Ahidnames can also be read in this context. For example, in the sixteenth century, when Ottoman power increased, the Ottomans granted many ahidnames [unilateral concessions] to Venetians and Western Europeans. (Faroqhi, 2009, p. 125) However, a world ruler could issue capitulations and ahidnames as a manifestation of his grace. The Ottoman sultans must have displayed both their justice and their magnificence here, both as the "just ruler", the merchant's refuge, and the "sahipkıran" who responded to demands and distributed roles. As a plus, they kept Khidr and St. George alive in their actions.

2.15. The Sovereign's Corrupt Men

Generally, the subject had a positive impression of the nature of power. As La Boétie states, the people sometimes blamed the ministers, not the king, and generally had a good view of the nature of power. (Ruby, 2012, p. 23) Suraiya Faroqhi emphasizes this reality with an example from the Ottoman Empire. According to her, sultans maintain a rhetorical distance from their corrupt men. This is an important form of legitimation. According to her statements, it is as if the “ehl-i örf”, who are cruel "by nature", are in betrayal of Allah's trust to the sultan. In this context, oppression and “ehl-i örf” are two related phenomena. (Faroqhi, 1995, p. 22) What comes between this latter and the people is the image of a sultan "in love with justice". (Ladurie, 1977, p. 855) This image was combined with a different variant of legitimation: the "image of the king," whose good intentions were abused by his advisers. But no one can claim that with this action, the sultan completely relied on the "interest of the people" and offended the ruling elite. On the contrary, the sultan's function here is two-dimensional. On the one hand, he strengthened his role as the “protector of the subjects”, on the other hand, his patronage extended to the treasury. Alongside the first, "protection of the treasury" appeared as part of the official ideology. (Faroqhi, 1995, p. 37) After all, "raison d’état" could only be displayed through [and thanks to] the ruler's servants.

In this direction, the goodwill of the people regarding the nature of power and the justice of the ruler between the people and “ehl-i örf” had been a source of legitimacy. The monarch, with his "good nature", acted as a protective father to his subjects from a tyrannical mass [albeit his own slaves].

3. THE SPIRITUAL ARM OF DOUBLE SOVEREIGNTY: THE CALIPHATE

Much more than a full treasure was inherited from Yavuz Sultan Selim to Suleiman the Magnificent. There is also a line of titles filled in among them. Servant of holy places, supreme sunni ruler and protector of Darul-Islam; These three were Selim's greatest contributions to the world of thought of the sixteenth century. Although Selim did not present himself as a true caliph [caliph al-kubra], he laid the groundwork for Suleiman's caliphate. Only with these qualities could the Ottomans overcome the problem of Qurayshism, consensus and allegiance.

3.1. Gaza

Gaza is the most basic argument used in Ottoman legitimacy and functioned in three directions. First, a religious obligation was fulfilled by gaza. Second, “gaza” provided divine right for the sultans over the conquered lands. The person who formulated the latter is Neşri. Thirdly, “gaza” has been the mainstay of the fatwas during the Ottoman expansion into Muslim lands. (Imber, 2014, pp. 144-145) Gaza provided fame and prestige in the Islamic world for the Ottoman rulers, who were local lords in the early periods. This prestige also explains why Timur left the Balkan lands to the Osmanoğulları. Apart from the Ottomans, other veterans who took up the same job also benefited from the same prestige. The fact that they were fed from the same channel of legitimacy allowed the formation of a vassalage or alliance relationship between the veterans and the dynasty rather than a master and servant relationship. (Çıpa, 2017, p. 107) Therefore, in this period when the patrimonial relationship in the center and the periphery had not matured yet, the dynasty's withdrawal from the war would have brought about the loss of legitimacy. As if this were not enough, titles such as "sultan-ı iklim-i rum" could be undermined. However, the Ottomans, with their ingenious process of integration and elimination, eventually became the sole representative of the Muslims in the Gaza. Towards the sixteenth century, during the reign of Bayezid II, in the work called Kutbname about the Mytilene campaign, by Firdevsi; The words Turkish, Muslim and Ottoman were now used synonymously. (Rumî, 1980) The same is true for Tursun Bey’s “Tarih-i Ebu'l Feth”.

The first function of gaza, namely "fulfilling the religious obligation", has an important place in reinforcing the rhetoric of the sixteenth century caliphate. In classical caliphate theories, the fuqaha defined "jihad" as an obligation on the caliph. In this case, the caliph had fulfilled his duty of jihad, which was fard al-kifaya for the ummah, and freed the ummah from this religious responsibility. In this context, the Ottomans masterfully built the image of "ghazi sultan" in the Islamic world, especially thanks to the fetihnames, and successfully carried the "gaza" flag. While Fatih was going to a business division with the Mamluk sultan just a century ago, he described himself as a great “ghazi”, and expected the Mamluk sultan to protect the “path of pilgrimage”. (İnalcık, 2002, pp. 85-86) Thus, they monopolized the “gaza” and went to a division of labor with the Mamluks, the center of the caliphate. In fact, this declaration showed its own competence in an issue in which the center of the caliphate fell short, and on this occasion, was stealing a role from the caliphate.

The Ottomans displayed the Prophet's [phub] banner in the parades to keep alive the "image of gazi" that had already formed for them. (Faroqhi, 2009, p. 77) Thus, in West Asia, where legitimacy is predominantly based on religion, they referred to spiritual values with some symbols and aimed to keep this alive in the public conscience. Especially after the Eastern campaign, the population balance changed in favor of the Muslims (Kunt, 2013, pp. 23-24), directed the search for legitimacy primarily to Islamic sources. Moreover, as an inevitable result of this expedition, the administrative, bureaucratic and religious structure of the Ottomans was surrounded by the traditional Islamic politics approach in the Arab provinces and with careful adaptation techniques, it resulted in laying the foundations of sustainable Ottoman administration. (Çıpa, 2017, p. 8)

In the light of these developments, when the Ottomans rapidly took shape as an Islamic state that emerged as a "protector" and "leader" in the Islamic world, "gaza" was carefully underlined as one of the requirements of the caliphate, and "gaza" was personalized in the person of Kanuni. Jihad, which expresses a social obligation and is the “raison d'etre” of the administration, was personalized by Ebussuud, and referred to Suleiman the Magnificent as the person who brought territory of Daru'l-Harb to Daru'l-Islam. (Imber, 1997, p. 77) In addition, "gaza" had a great role for a government dedicated to ensuring the "sovereignty of one religion" under the influence of apocalyptic discourses. Even the Hungarian expedition was enough to make many scholars and bureaucrats dream of the Mahdi's kingdom. The fact that Suleiman the Magnificent used this tool, “gaza”, even in his old age, when his prestige was shaken, reminds us that "gaza" is an indispensable duty for a caliph. This thought is also

dominant after Kanuni. Mustafa Ali, even during the reign of Murad III, who was not actually a veteran-sultan, put special emphasis on “jihad and gaza”. (Mustafa Ali, pp. 155a-156b.)

3.2. Hadimu’l-Haremeyn

Historians are unanimous that the greatest reward of the Egyptian Expedition was “serving the holy places”. For example, historians such as İnalcık, Itzkowitz and Emecen give more importance to the joining of Mecca and Medina to the Ottoman Empire rather than the discussion of the transition of the caliphate to the Ottoman Empire. Because, as Barthold reports, Mecca and Medina were so important among Sunnis and Shiites that the rulers who did not dominate these cities did not dare to call themselves “amir of the Muslims” and “caliphs” even if they did not approve of the rights of the Abbasids. He called him the son of the caliph. For example, even the Andalusian Umayyads called themselves "son of the caliph". (Barthold, 2012, p. 50)

The annexation of Mecca and Medina to the Ottomans and the "serving of the holy places" was a unique achievement for the Ottomans. This is the greatest contribution of the Selim period to the sixteenth century “caliphate thought”. When the Ottomans reformulated the “hilafet-i kübra”, the only basis of legitimacy was "serving the holy places". (Emecen, 2020, p. 39) Selim, who was aware of this privilege at first, registered himself as "hadimu'l-haremeyn" in official documents. It is known that the sultans after Selim showed the necessary care to this task. For example, even at a time when the expenses of the navy and the supply of the army imposed a heavy burden on the state after the defeat of Lepanto, the restoration of the holy buildings in Mecca and Medina did not cease. From this we can deduce the importance that the Ottomans gave to Mecca and Medina. (Mantran, 1995, p. 103).

The Ottomans built the caliphate understanding of the Kanuni period on this gain. They were now the servants of Mecca and Medina and the guardians of Dar al-Islam. "Caliph" was also used in the de facto sense after Sultan Selim, both with the Hadimu'l Haremeyn and the leadership of most of the Sunni Islamic geography. According to Lütfi Pasha, who tried to formulate a theory of caliphate for Kanuni, Kanuni was the caliph to be obeyed because he ruled most of Daru'l-Islam. (Emecen, 2020, p. 57) In any case, the doctrine of the “hilafet-i kübra” included that there could be only one caliph on behalf of the

ummah, and this usage was not based on the Qureshi lineage like the Abbasids, but on the servitude of the holy places. Spreading justice on earth [adl-u dad], gaza, protecting holy places formed the theoretical basis of the Ottoman caliphate. (Emecen, 2018, p. 16) Undoubtedly, the most useful of these components is "hadimü'l-haremeyn". Even in the eighteenth century, definitions of the caliphate were based on this privilege. For example, according to Ragıp Pasha, the Ottoman sultan was a caliph, since the holy lands were under Ottoman rule. (Ragıb Paşa, 2003, p. 115) This style of caliphate had two important benefits for Suleiman the Magnificent: making maximum use of the powers (such as intervening in Islamic legislation as a mujtahid) conferred on a true caliph and legitimizing his claims to rule the worldly and otherworldly realms.

3.3. Siyasat al-Nafisa

According to Sufis, “siyasat al-nafisa” is a spiritual process that an ideal ruler should complete. This process has some calculable returns. First, this process, which aims at spiritual purification and spiritual maturation, activates moral consciousness in the ruler. In fact, in a political area where the balance of power is deteriorated in favor of the center and the intermediary institutions do not function as expected, the "conscience" activated as a result of spiritual purification is the most important element to balance the ruler. Because the behavior of a ruler who is moralized by Islamic moral values can be predicted and his rule can be limited by moral rules. At this point, politics written under the influence of Sufism often emphasize "conscience", which establishes an internal balance mechanism, and "the hereafter, which is a place of reckoning." Tusi, who is an important name for the sixteenth century Ottoman thought, defines the “conscience” as a pure soul, and according to him, conscience cannot be thought of independently from the purification process of the soul. (Gafarov, 2018) While conscience is the expression of moral consciousness, it also carries the "trust" phenomenonIslam's definition of the world as a way and the world as a passenger reminds the ruler that he is not the real owner of power, but that he is a trustee. All these norms are the most effective form that can set a barrier between the will of power and oppression. Thus, moralist books often emphasize politics of self-purification, which is the process of “siyasat al-nafisa”, and according to them, the level of comprehension of the heart and the capacity of man to understand the truth develop through this process. With this development, the sun of justice first appears in the insides of the kings and rulers and rulers with a mature mind, recognize the secret of the universe and reach justice.” (Amâsî, p. 185)

All these are preliminary preparations for the practice of spreading justice, because, according to Taşköprüzade, an ideal ruler should spread the light of justice and benevolence to the world "without discriminating people". (Taşköprizade, p. 28b)

The works that will be considered a handbook on this process for the sultans were written by Zaifi and Taşköprüzade. In many places in these works, guidance is offered for the sultans in the spiritual purification process. The sultan, like other servants, should bow his head and pray in the presence of Allah at night. (Za'ifî, p. 161b) According to Amasi, sultans should not neglect their daily dhikrs. (Amâsî, pp. 208-209) With such an effort, the soul is satisfied, (İbn-i Firûz, 1629, p. 61a) that is, it attains the degree of friendship of God.

Secondly, "the siyasat al-nafisa" enable the growth of a just, moral and pious "caliph" personality envisaged by the caliphate. For, the "caliph" must be righteous and pious. (İbn-i Firûz, 1629, p. 8b) The Ottoman sultan, who successfully completed the period of "siyasat al-nafisa", is a person worthy of the "hilafet-i kübra" with his moral and religious qualities. According to Kınalızade, a caliph with "divine confirmation" should not only regulate the affairs of countries, but also perfect people's spirituality. (Kınalızade, 2010, p. 109) Because with the caliphate, the servants become closer to Allah. (İbn-i Firûz, 1629, p. 45a) After all, only such a person can follow the path of Hulefa-i Raşidin. This view became popular at that time, simultaneously with the Ottoman use of the caliphate. For example, according to Taşköprüzade, the head of state should follow the path of Hulefa-i Raşidin and should pay attention to asceticism and simplicity. Taşköprizade's work "Risâle fî Beyâni Esrâri'l-Hilâfeti'l-İnsâniyye ve's-Saltanati'l-Ma'neviyye" is full of references to the period of Hulefa-i Raşidin. The specific feature of this work is that it carries Iranian-Ancient Greek elements to a minimum. Many works written during the Kanuni period present the example of "Hulefa-i Raşidin" to the sultan in this way. Indeed, Suleiman "evâhır-ı 'ömrinde istimâ'-ı çeng ü rebâbdan bi'l-külliye ictinab idüp, libas-ı hariri dahi terk etmişti." (Necipoğlu, 2005, pp. 27-28)

According to Taşköprizade, Adam was the first person to have religious and worldly authority. He would not contaminate his sensual desires with his worldly authority. However, according to him, most of the rulers use their office as a tool for the satisfaction of their desires. (Taşköprizade, p. 23a) According to Taşköprizade, the caliph, who has religious and world authority, should live as a true ascetic, just like Yusuf. As a matter of fact, in order not to forget the poor in the land of Egypt, he never ate to the fullest, and did

not even take barley bread. (Taşköprizade, p. 23b) According to Mustafa Ali, the "ruler" should avoid waste and gold embroidery. (Mustafa Ali, pp. 102a-102b) Kanuni was actually responding to such dervish expectations. By nature, he was a simple and contented sultan. Which, according to Busbecq, was typical Turkish virtue. (Dalle, 2013, p. 174) In fact, this teaching was also supported by moral philosophy. The “state of consciousness" seen in Tursun Bey is "phrones", which comes from Aristotelian philosophy, that is, the state of being restrained and sane. The same can be seen in Yusuf Has Hacip. Thus, Kanuni, as a 'simplicity-loving', 'measured', 'sane' and strict follower of worship, both satisfied these expectations and gave life to the identity of a caliph in the real sense. All these are the image of Suleiman that dominated that period. Because those who criticize him could not find anything to criticize except being weak in front of his wife and acting irresponsibly in Mustafa's death. Besides, they were connecting it to Hürrem's magic potions. (Dalle, 2013, p. 130)

There is one more detail that needs to be taken into account regarding the issue of siyasat al-nafs. Since this process is a mystical purification process, the person who completes this process is also the person who has attained welayat. The claim of “welayat” is a convenient discourse to carry the sovereignty to the inner dimension. We know how thought of Qutb, which is revealed by the statements of a Turkmen father who goes so far as to challenge Fatih in the legends, provides a theoretical basis for possible objections. As İnalcık points out, heterodox sheikhs bearing the title of "kutbu'l-aktab" used to argue that events in this world were under their control, as in the esoteric dimension, with the claim of welayat. (İnalcık, 2002) This was clearly a rebellion against the dynasty's monopoly of "policy" making. At this point, the sultans generally avoided the sheikhs and dervishes and tried to integrate them into the system with soft or hard policies. (İnalcık, 2002, p. 143) Because some of the sheikhs are willing to protect the rights of the villagers who are groaning under excessive taxation by openly challenging the authorities. (Faroqhi, 1995, p. 52) On the other hand, there was the "warrior dervish ethos" accompanying them. In some menakibnames, there are many narratives such as "slaying the wicked" and "punishing the oppressor". (Faroqhi, 1995, pp. 55-56) Some Bektashi narratives included the punitive abilities of the sheikhs such as "turning water into blood" and "bringing disaster to the people". (Ocak, 2015, pp. 259-260) However, the Ottomans also had a share in the “welayat” at least as much as these sheikhs. As a matter of fact, Firdevsi Rumi had the following to say

about Bayezid II: *"Kutbu'l-aktâbı kılam sana beyan /Tâ bilesin kimdürür kutbı 'ayân".* (Rumî, 1980, p. 29)

As a result, the Ottomans, like the Abbasid caliphs, did not neglect to appear pious and devout in the public sphere, despite their reliance on worldly politics. They were surrounded by jurists and ulama. Sultans never missed their Friday prayers, punished those who neglected their prayers and did not fast, distributed thousands of sacrificial animals on Eid al-Adha, and often gave alms to dervishes. (İnalcık, 2002, p. 143) According to Mustafa Ali, Murad III loved "awliyas" very much, despite his many weaknesses. Thanks to these, Murad III supported his caliphate with the Sufi understanding of caliphate, that is, the Rabbani caliphate. (Emecen, 2020, p. 67) The influence of the Akbari caliphate understanding, which includes epistemological competence, and the classical caliphate theory, which argues that the imam should be a scholar, can be perceived on this teaching. Mustafa Ali praises Murad's knowledge of religion by saying "kamil-i efazıl-ı me'alim nişandur."

3.4. Implementation of Sharia

According to Islamic political theory, what is expected from the "state", which is considered subordinate to religion and provides instrumental service at the point of service to religion, is the implementation of Sharia. Caliphate according to Ibn Firuz "dünya vü dinde riyâset-i 'ammeden 'ibâret ve devlet ü âyinde asalet-i tâmmeden kinayetdür" and what is expected from caliphate that "idamet-i âyin-i din-i müstebinde ve him'ayet-i havza-i İslam ve ri'ayet-i havme-i enam". (İbn-i Firûz, 1629, p. 3b) The expectation of the sheikh al-Islam and the ulema class, who used the religious authority of Kanuni, who was the caliph-sultan, on his behalf, was the implementation of the sharia and the execution of justice. Only in this way would the conditions for the caliphate be ripe. According to the classical theory of the caliphate, the caliph's primary job is to "protect religion" [hirasat al-din] and ensure its continuation. [iqamat al-din]. (Haldun, 365) An ahkam al-sultani, written in the sixteenth century, summarizes the legitimacy dynamics of this period and bases the legitimacy of the sovereign as two wings; the first is to obey the Islamic rules, and the second is to protect the rules of Islam. Justice, on the other hand, is to follow the sharia in the form of rule of law. (Kavak, 2012) Similarly, Lutfi Pasha built the legitimacy of the Ottoman caliphate on "applying the Sharia" and fulfilling "justice". These qualities sought in the caliph are more important than the lineage for some post-Mongolian scholars. For example, role model

scholars for Ottoman thought, such as Taftazani, placed more emphasis on merit, carrying out functions that would work "in the interest of Islam" rather than lineage. (Taftazani, 1998, p. 245)

According to Ebussuud, the "sovereign" could only be legitimate by applying and protecting the sharia. When this expression is read backwards, the judgment that the existence of the Shari'a depends only on the existence of a sovereign emerges. Supporting this judgment, according to Ebussuud, the dominance of the sharia is impossible without the sovereignty of the Kanuni. In that case, "Suleiman" is equal to “the interest of the Shari'a”. As a result of this process, especially during the Ebussuud period, according to Colin Imber, Sharia and Ottoman rule became concepts that could be used interchangeably. (Imber, 2014, pp. 150-151) By sanctifying the secular Ottoman public law. To this end, in the second half of Suleiman’s rule, the Ottomans focused their legitimacy more on "sharia" and "law".

It was during this time period that the Ottomans began to seek a sharia basis for the law. After Selim's brilliant Eastern Expedition, with the conquest of the Arab lands, the ideological and religious identity of the Ottomans became firmly Sunni. (Çıpa, 2017, p. 10) The transfer of the Egyptian and Syrian school and the understanding of Mamluk style domination to the Ottomans, the debates on the “siyasat al-shariyya” and “caliphate” paved the way for the further Islamization of the state and social structure. Religion and sharia came to the fore even more, and with Ebussuud's intense work, the image of Suleiman the Magnificent as "the defender of Sunni Islam" within the framework of his imperial and spiritual sovereignty claim was reinforced. (Imber, 1997, p. 5) Suyuti states that the same developments took place in Egypt. As a matter of fact, after the transfer of the caliphate from Baghdad to Egypt, Egypt became a center of science where Islamic law and sunnah were practiced and Islamic sciences progressed. (Suyuti, 1967) The same is true for Istanbul. The translation of the work "Ed-Dürretü'l-Garrâ fî Nesâyihi'l-Mülûk ve'l-Vüzerâ", which was written in Egypt during this period and contains the classical theory of caliphate, by both Amasi and Ibn Firuz shows this effect. According to Metin Kunt, the fact that the institution of Shaykh al-Islam was a "respectable" and "effective" institution during the Kanuni period is an indicator of Islamization.

Ebussuud did not base the Ottoman caliphate on applying and protecting the sharia alone. In fact, he included the "interpretation" capacity, which was the monopoly of the fuqaha, into this work. Kınalızade also presents the capacity of “ijtihad” to the “caliph”, as

he reports, “bu kudrete ulemâ-yı müte’ahhirîn ictihâd dirler ki halîfe-i ber-hakk olan kimesnede şartdır” (Kınalızâde, 2007, pp. 414-415) Ebussuud, based on the will of the Caliph, reconciled the laws with the shari'ah, in fact, he brought many views that the tradition did not share into effect under the guise of sharia. For example, he adopted the understanding that the sultan was the main owner of arable land, (Imber, 1997, pp. 115-138) however, this attempt serves nothing but legitimizing patrimonialism through Islamic rules. Although it conflicts with the basic structure of Islamic political thought. Among all these, the most interesting aspect of Ebussuud theory is that he shows Kanuni, whom he defines as the caliph, as the source of legislation. Thus began the monopolization of fiqh, which is the law of the people, in the hands of the government. Samy Ayoub showed how much the late Hanafi jurists gave value and authority to Ottoman edicts and laws, showing that the balance had shifted against fiqh. State authority intervened in late Hanafi legislation to settle legal disputes. (Ayoub, 2016) This type of Caesaropapism remained ideologically alive in the Ottoman state for a long time. (Birdal, 2011, p. 66) It is also in conflict with the classical understanding of caliphate and law. For, unlike the Catholic church, the caliphate in Islam has never become a law-making institution. The caliphs gave orders only in financial and administrative matters. The community of jurists, who shaped the theological and legal teachings in Islam, functioned independently of the authority of the sultan and the caliph. In the light of this reality, as Mehmet Sinan Birdal emphasized, it is necessary to look for Ottoman caesaropapism in the distinctive features of the Ottoman Empire, not Islam. (Birdal, 2011, pp. 69-70)

3.5. Safety of Pilgrims

By acquiring the privilege of “hadimü'l-haremeyn”, the Ottomans took on a responsibility: the safety of the pilgrims. Selim, as being “hadimü'l-haremeyn”, also undertook the security of the pilgrims. From this date on, the security of the pilgrimage routes was under the responsibility of the Ottomans. In this period, the pilgrimage itself was a means of legitimacy for the Ottoman sultans, who described himself as the caliph, because there has always been a close relationship between the institution of the Caliphate and the phenomenon of Hajj. For example, as long as the Umayyads and Abbasids were in power, they considered the protection of pilgrims both a duty and a right. In some cases, the caliph could have declared that the Hajj could not be performed for a year, which was attempted in 1047-8 due to the famine in the Hejaz. However, failure to properly fulfill the obligation of

Hajj could undermine the legitimacy of the Caliph and his prestige. Therefore, with the sixteenth century, this responsibility remained serious for the Ottoman sultans.

The rise of the Safavids in the sixteenth century interrupted the scientific-cultural communication and pilgrimage between Central-Asian and Ottoman lands. Hamid Algar and Dina Le Gall emphatically revealed the multiple consequences of this case. The presence of the Safavids was an obstacle to both cultural communication and the pilgrimage route. Pilgrims who could not use the Iranian route had to cross the Caspian Sea from the north and use the road to the Crimean ports. It was under these conditions that the "Özbekler Tekkesi" emerged as the place where Central Asian pilgrims were hosted, and in the light of these developments, the importance of Istanbul increased not only spatially but also spiritually. Istanbul appeared directly as the "only place" that patronized the Central Asian pilgrims. In this way, Ottoman sovereignty extended to the East side of "Daru'l-Islam" with the practice of "protecting the pilgrims". In this direction, in the second half of the sixteenth century, the Ottoman sultans and their advisers never ceased to pay special attention to dervishes and scholars from Central Asia. (Faroqhi, 1994, p. 144) Istanbul was already a spiritual place because it was the center of the pre-Ottoman ecumenical patriarchate (Dalle, 2013, p. 108) and as a city that had already been the capital of universal spiritual rule, it has now become the center of the Islamic caliphate.

Before long, there was another development that brought the Ottomans and Uzbeks closer together. In the middle of the century, Russian Tsar Ivan IV occupied the only alternative pilgrimage and trade route of Central Asians against Safevids. In the face of this situation, the Central Asian Khanates asked for help from the Ottomans. (İnalcık, 2002, pp. 63-64) According to Barthold, the duty of protecting Islam and the ummah was not limited to the rulers' own lands. (Barthold, 2012, p. 84) The Ottomans organized expeditions to India and the Volga to keep the pilgrimage routes open. (İnalcık, 2002, pp. 86-87) Thus, for the second time, the Ottoman Empire was accepted as the "only actor" that could secure the Hajj route for Central Asians. After all, that was the only thing worthy of a real caliph. In an inscription dated 1538, Kanuni said, "By the grace of God, I am at the head of the nation of Muhammad [phubAll the conditions were ripe to say this. The Ottomans, who were allies of the Turkestan Sunnis against Shiite Iran in the sixteenth century, were for them the caliph of Allah and the Prophet, although they were previously seen as the "Rum Kayser". (Barthold, 2012, p. 152) In the process of placing this in minds, Süleyman has a special position. Ibn

Firuz defines Suleiman as “mü’essis-i erkânü’l hilâfetü’l-Osmâniyye”. (İbn-i Firûz, 1629, p. 2a)

The duty of the Ottomans to "protect the pilgrims" was not limited to Central Asia. As a matter of fact, in a document dated 1552, an order was given to the governor of Damascus to protect the pilgrimage caravan from the Bedouins. (Aybet, 2018, p. 402) In the 1570s, Selim II acted against Christian pirates who threatened the "safety of pilgrims" in the Mediterranean and conquered Cyprus. The prestige of a Muslim ruler really depended to some extent on the buildings that would ensure the welfare of the pilgrims. Apparently, in the sixteenth century, the "safety of pilgrims" was an important apparatus that produced consent. In any case, the state mind knew how to use these apparatuses properly. Only in this way the dynamics of “concrete power” [which is very important in directing the action of others] and “consent”, one of the basic pillars of power, could work. Social approval was also accessible with this ability of the state mind.

In addition to ensuring the safety of the pilgrims, the "pilgrimage site" is an important place for the "caliph" to provide legitimacy and display magnificence. Accordingly, the Ottoman caliphs consolidated their legitimacy by repairing public buildings in Mecca and Medina, and this was their privilege and right. Personal piety certainly plays a big part in such construction projects. However, in the end, this action provided a political gain, confirming and consolidating the legitimacy of the Ottoman caliphs. In addition, the buildings built in the holy places were designed according to some symbolic elements, for example, four madrasahs were built by Suleiman the Magnificent near the Masjid al-Haram. This was undoubtedly done to represent the four Sunni sects. Moreover, the newly built minarets had two sharafas, as in Selatin mosques. However, since ancient times, these minarets had a single sharafa. Moreover, Kanuni added one more to six minarets, increasing it to seven. It is debated whether the number seven was adopted by the climate doctrine or because of the mystical value of the number seven. II. Selim also decided to build a domed gallery while he was in the sultanate. This decision was taken during the Cyprus War and the project was expected to be completed soon. (Faroqhi, 1994, pp. 100-103)

The ceremonies during the restorations made a special contribution to the legitimacy of the sultan. (Faroqhi, 1994, pp. 117-120) This opportunity, as Faroqhi emphasizes, was indispensable for making the sultan's presence visible, especially with the women of the court, which had serious symbolic connotations, and for displaying the sultan's magnificence

and wealth. (Faroqhi, 1994, p. 203) The Polish Simeon wrote how the ceremony of taking the covering of the Kaaba was greeted with love by the people. (Aybet, 2018, p. 403) In addition, new public buildings and constructions served to provide the legitimacy of the new by bringing them to comparison with the old. (Faroqhi, 1994, p. 106) The Ottomans were very meticulous in monopolizing this process and kept the donations of states in demand for pilgrimage under strict control and control. After all, Hajj was a place where all Muslim elements met, and the presence of a single caliph should have been visible in this place. As a result, the large amount of irreversible investments and expenditures made for Hajj; As Faroqhi states, it reflects the fact that the adjective "Hadimü'l-Haremeyn" is much more than rhetoric. (Faroqhi, 1994, pp. 7-10)

3.6. The Dynasty Equals the "Maslahat al-'Umma"

Although the term "Sultan" was positioned against the "religious leader", it was widely used for each person holding worldly power, and the legitimacy of the "sultan" was consolidated over time to the extent that it served the caliphate or the ummah. When the Shiite Buyids stole worldly power from the Abbasids, the "sultanship" of the Seljuks, which appeared on the horizon as a savior, was the most sought-after thing. The primary thing that the Islamic Ummah expected from the power at that time was to provide "security" and "protect unity". All this can only be guaranteed under the shadow of a victory sovereign. The rise of the Seljuks took place in this atmosphere as a supply to the rising demands. With this rise, the Seljuks did not refrain from appropriating the "shahanshah" that came with the Buyids and the "Roman Caesar" that came with the conquest of Asia Minor. (Barthold, 2012, p. 58) The unhesitating consumption of these titles by the Seljuks is closely related to the conditions of the time. Eventually, they became known on earth as the shadow of Allah. Most of the political works written in this period reinforced this perception theoretically. This reference is to their justice and even their power to provide justice. The sultan aspired to the most important function of the caliph, in fact justice, which was the sole guarantee of the caliph's existence. Apparently, the "worldly power" was ready from yesterday to rip everything out from the "caliph", which represents the spiritual power. For example, while Ravendi emphasized that the main work of the caliphs was religious worship, (Ravendi, 1999) assigned a very limited role to the caliph. The remaining large area, including the right to make free politics, was thus left to the "sultan". Thus, the caliph actually lost the function of "justice" and the title of "zillullah" built on this function, its capacity to provide "security"

and to protect Islam. For example, while Saladin was making efforts for Jerusalem, the caliph did nothing but watch from afar.

When the worldly one shifted from the double sovereignty of the caliphs to the Turks, elements such as “allegiance, social contract, election, consensus” were already emptied by the Umayyads and Abbasids. The view that sovereignty was a family property was well established with these regimes. In such a political structure, the Turks gained legitimacy by solving the security problem like Muaviye’s property. It is known that Muawiya's coming to power was also based on political and military struggle. With the prestige of stopping the Mongols in Ayncalut, protecting the Dar al-Islam and the caliphate, the protection of the two holy cities, and the security of the Pilgrimage routes, the Mamluks appeared on the map of such a fragmented ummah as a “manea” power. The Mamluk style of domination is quite meaningful for Anatolian Beys even in the early 14-15 centuries. (Atçıl, 2018, pp. 20-21) These sultans struggled to get the title of “sultanu’r-rum” from the caliph.

Theoretically, although the real owner of the countries where the name of the Abbasid caliph was read in Friday prayers was considered the caliph, the rulers used this right on his behalf. (Avcı, 2019, p. 149) In the fourteenth century, the sultans of India came to the conclusion that no sultan could be “legitimate” without the approval of the Abbasid caliph. (Barthold, 2012, p. 79) But in practice, only the spiritual sovereignty of the caliph can be spoken of. It is to the extent permitted by the earthly sovereign. The Ottomans, after the Abbasids, became the only state in the sixteenth century that could combine both types of sovereignty. Expert scholar and bureaucrats with professional consciousness employed the gains of the Selim period by creating a theory of caliphate during Suleiman period. Thus, for the first time in centuries, Suleiman was presented as the caliph who held “worldly and religious power” at the same time. The contribution of scholars-bureaucrats to this process is significant. As a matter of fact, they were the only element that could control and limit the absolute ruler with their capacity to interpret the sharia, (Emecen, 2018, p. 391) they were also without alternative in terms of presenting the sultan with spiritual motifs. The ulema were aware of this, so Akhisari, one of the sixteenth-century scholars, advises that the sultan should rely on the ulema. Because there is no treason in this class. (Akhisari, pp. 153-155) There is a saying in Amasi that summarizes the influence of scholars over rulers: “While kings dominate people, scholars have influence over kings.” (Amâsî, p. 143) There is also a tendency among the ulama to underline their own importance. After all, this process wouldn't work without them.

By the time of Kanuni period, unlike all times, the integration of the ulama was completed and the logic of the state was instilled in this group. The ulema positioned themselves exclusively in service to the dynasty and relied on sultanic generosity for their subsistence. Zaifi, one of the scholars of the Kanuni period, describes the sultan's door as “mahal-su'ud-ı ekabir-ü ulema” and describes himself as a fly-size in the face of the sultan's magnificence. (Za’ifî, p. 161a) However, in a work written in Egypt a few centuries ago, the example of Abu Hazm, who rejected the gold sent by Süleyman bin Abdulmalik, is emphasized. (Amâsî, p. 152) In fact, this action was inspired by the desire to escape from an expansionist patrimonialism and the love of autonomy. This mentality transformation seen in the ulama was a one-hundred-and-eighty-degree deviation from the classical “ulama” understanding and thinking. The role of Akbari School in the new positive attitude of the ulama regarding the “nature of power” can also be mentioned. The flexibility that the Akbari school offered to the perception of Ottoman jurisprudence and politics in terms of reason and exploration, and the emphasis on destiny embedded in the understanding of “ayan-ı sabite” that could be used regarding the divine election and immutability of the dynasty, were the things sought for the dynasty. This type of "destiny" phenomenon also appears in Ibn Firuz. According to this understanding, if the servants obey Allah, the sultans will be a mercy for them, and if they rebel against Allah, the sultans will be a trouble for them. (İbn-i Firûz, 1629, p. 16a) In such a belief, the sultans are God's punishing instrument, and this reveals the transcendent aspect of the sultans' actions.

In the Turkish tradition, the understanding of the divine origin of the sultanate, namely kut, could be kept alive in the thought of Akbari School. Against the individualistic character of fiqh, the statist and socialist structure of the Turkish tradition could be provided with this school, which strengthened the theory of sultanate, and with this school, the sultan and the dynasty could be given transcendence. Thus, while the “caliph” was accepted as the one who held "worldly and religious" power, on the other hand, the “divine chosenness” of the caliph was emphasized with its characteristic of incorporating divine names. This theoretical approach was prepared more professionally than the fact that the sultan was the shadow of Allah due to the distribution of justice, had a strong theoretical background, and its subjects were handled in detail and skillfully. Moreover, Akbari School has a special history for the Ottoman Empire. The first professors such as Davud-u Kayseri and Molla Fenari were from the Akbari school.

The processing of the chosen dynasty logic in the Ottoman Empire without any problems is also related to the Iranian basin where the ulama were fed. Some studies have revealed that in the sixteenth century, Ottoman scholars mostly preferred Iran for education. While this number is 26 for Iran, it is 12 for Egypt. (Lekesiz, 1989) Thus, we can state that the primary source of influence on Ottoman thought is the Iranian basin. It is quite natural for the scholars, who were fed from this region, where the Sassanid and Abbasid dynastic logic was alive, to carry the Iranian-Islamic management tradition to the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, the Ottomans united not only Iran but also many basins. Seljuk Turks, Persian and Arab Muslims, Central Asian Turks, Byzantine Greeks and many more... In fact, this line can be carried to China via Tatarstan, and to Babylon and Egypt via Parthians and Romans. The masterful processing of these traditions was made possible by involving people from all sides and races in a common effort. Therefore, Ottomans were able to continue his life for more than six centuries with the capacity to use such discursive and social phenomena rather than sword tyranny. (Lybyer, 1913, pp. 3-5) In any case, empires have to manage their multi-ethnic structures with soft and hard power elements for their own survival, integrate local authorities that pose obstacles with the vertical hierarchy of the empire, (Birdal, 2011, p. 27) and the flexibility of the institutions is an important factor for the survival of empires. (Barkey, 2008, pp. 9-27) The Ottomans knew how to use all the experiences from the past with the "dynastic ideology", which is an upper identity. With flexible policies, they masterfully managed the elements of hard and soft power. The evolution of the Ottoman Empire from a small principality to a world empire, which is one of the most extraordinary events in history, is also due to its ability to use these resources skillfully. The lands and institutions of the two great empires of the Middle Ages, the Muslim-Arab empire and the Eastern Roman empire, were a fertile phenomenon for the Ottomans. In this way, as a Mediterranean empire, they became sharecroppers with an accumulated cultural heritage in Western Asia and Southern Europe. Thus, the Ottoman people, as Lybyer said, were both Eastern and Western in terms of culture and administration. (Lybyer, 1913, pp. 7-8) However, on this multi-ethnic administrative structure, the "dynastic ideology" had to appear as the upper identity. The existence of the dynasty was associated with the benefit of Islam for Muslims and with "justice" for non-Muslims. Even in the nineteenth century, Ahmed Cevdet described the dynasty as renewing the power of the Islamic nation. (Neumann, 2005, p. 122) The foundation of this idea, which dates to the middle of the nineteenth century, was laid in the sixteenth century. For, Suleiman was the protector of the Sunni world against the divisive and expansionist danger of Safavid propaganda. Suleiman

the Magnificent had the dome repaired Abu Hanifa's tomb and his stay in Baghdad for a certain period of time indicated the clear superiority of Ottoman Sunnism over Safavid Shiism. (Şahin, 2013, pp. 97-98) Suleiman the Magnificent had saved this city, which was the ancient capital of the Sunni Abbasid caliphs, from the hands of the disrespectful Shiite Safavids and presented himself as the caliph of the Islamic world. (Necipoğlu, 2005, pp. 27-28) In this case, Suleiman was understood as an acceptable caliph, a miraculous saint, and a messianic ruler, while the dynasty was understood as a family of mujaddids, caliphs and landlords, as the protective fortress of Islam, and the existence of the dynasty became synonymous with public interest and the benefit of Islam. If the dynasty falls, it is only to the detriment of Islam, because if the dynasty falls, Islam falls. According to Busbecq's testimony, the dynasty was the sole pillar of the religion of Islam and remained so.

CONCLUSION

The results of three important wars towards the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent, with their different gains, paved the way for the legitimacy claims adopted in the Suleiman the Magnificent period. The first of these is the conquest of Istanbul, which is a turning point not only in Ottoman history but also in world history. With the conquest of Istanbul, the Ottoman sultans resurrected the “jihad”, which was considered one of the most important functions of the caliph, with the image of a “ghazi” ruler and attained a wide reputation in the Islamic world. Istanbul has been an important destination for Muslims since the first era of Islam, an important step on the way to “ilay-ı kelimetullah”. The taking of Istanbul activated the conscience of the Ummah and the desire for unity. On the other hand, apocalyptic discourses and the image of the messianic [or mahdi] ruler who will rule the whole world, which had been intertwined with Istanbul since the Abbasids, were revived. The rise of the Safavids, who built their political claims on millenarian and mahdist rhetoric on their own and were imagined as a sign of the end times in Ottoman historiography, and the successful victory of Yavuz Sultan Selim against such a movement presented the title of “the highest Sunni ruler” to the Ottomans in a full heart. The Rıdaniye Victory, which came right after this and this time won against a Sunni state, granted the Ottomans the most important privileges of the caliphate, such as "serving the holy places" and "protecting the pilgrims and the Islamic world", which formed the basis of the caliphate discourses of the Kanuni period. Although Yavuz’s important role in shaping the thinking style of the sixteenth century has been ignored in the academic community, except for a few competent research, Yavuz's brilliant career formed the fabric of the claims of universal sovereignty and caliphate in the Kanuni period. In the light of all these developments, the ways for Suleiman the Magnificent to establish double sovereignty on earth as both the caliph and the world emperor were opened. Yavuz left many prestigious titles to Kanuni as well as a loaded treasury. Servant of the holy places is the most important of these titles. Now that the conditions had matured, scholars like Ibn Firuz had some expectations from Suleiman: to carry out the caliphate and the reign. (İbn-i Firûz, 1629, p. 3a) According to Ibn Firuz, Suleiman had established the Ottoman caliphate and achieved double sovereignty.

Suleiman was the first Ottoman emperor to truly present himself as the caliph. However, it was not so easy to overcome an important problem such as Qureshi in this period when the legacy of traditional science centers such as Egypt and Syria flowed to Istanbul.

The ulema and scholar-bureaucrats integrated in a learned hierarchy were capable of providing such legitimacy, and indeed they adorned the Ottoman caliphate system with the kingdom of the Mahdi and placed Kanuni in the middle of this image. There are worldly and spiritual foundations of legitimacy that feed such an imageFirst of all, it was God's will that the sultan sit on the throne in line with the understanding of "kut" from the old Turkish belief and "baht" from the Iranian source in the Ottoman Empire, and to put a dynastic law to determine the person who would ascend to the throne was understood as countering this desire. The outcome of the struggle for the throne was understood as the will of God, and the triumph of a ruler was cemented by the belief that God was affirmed. He ascended the throne without a legal struggle and had to test his luck on the battlefield. He was a "blessed" and "fortunate" person whose unmatched victories were confirmed by God in the first twenty years of his rule. Secondly, he based his right to rule on the notion of "hereditary tutelage" prevalent in the post-Mongol period. With a strong and competent historiography, he was imagined as the legitimate heir of Kanuni Oğuz Kağan, Cengiz and Ali Selçuk. For example, in Matrakçı Nasuh, the transfer of countries under Oğuz Kağan's rule, from China to Greeks, from Russia to Yemen, was instilled in the minds that Kanuni, as a world emperor, was the sole owner of all these countries through hereditary tutelage. Like his legal ancestor, Oğuz Kağan, he would first ensure justice and order in the world by taking these countries. Therefore, Kanuni's first march on Belgrade was understood and appreciated as the first step towards world empire. Over time, the invincibility of Suleiman the Magnificent, his birth at the beginning of the tenth century of the Hijri, the appearance of the verse “innehu min Süleyman” when the Quran was opened for the name, firmly established the understanding that he was a possessor and expected messianic ruler who had attained Allah's confirmation. Thirdly, justice and order of the world was the most basic source of legitimacy for sovereignty. In the Ottoman understanding of administration, justice was understood as the ruler's protection of the people from the oppression of the oppressors [or ehl-i örf]. In the agreement between the ruler and his people, the ruler would rule his people in justice, and the people would fulfill a duty that was obligatory to him, namely obedience to the ruler. The subjects’ informal familiarity with the Adaletnames and their ability to reference them, and the frequency of their use of petitions showing that the Ottoman people could object to systemic failures from within, showed that the agreement in question was always alive between the rulers and the subjects. Here, Kanuni was an unrivaled ruler with his lawmaking and justice dispensing in Ottoman political thought, where justice was also understood as respecting the law. “The Magnificent,” a Renaissance-era nickname, indicates how he was

admired not only within the country but also abroad. So, no one else could come to mind who could establish justice and order on earth. Fourthly, Kanuni was understood as a balancing and measured ruler who brought the balance in the realm to social life, which was committed over a long period of time. The Ottomans, who emerged on a ground where Ancient Greek and Perso-Indian thought merged, inherited the “four elements theory” and the “circle of justice” understanding from ancient civilizations. The four-element theory, including the keeping of things in their place and the Socratic justice assigning a role to each element, predicted a stable and settled social order. The balanced performance of the four elements would have ensured the balance, the order and the viability of the power. Suleiman was a competent sultan who preserved the order of the elements, especially by the authors of the decline period, with the classical expression. As the ideal emperor of the classical age, Suleiman took back the tax exemptions of many people who entered the military class illegally and respected the basic principles of the transition from reaya to military. (İnalcık, 2002, p. 102) Fifth, Suleiman; was a balanced, fair, measured and “generous” sultan. The foundations, the most important instrument in which the sultan’s generosity was manifested, were supervisory institutions that both produced consent and spread patrimonial power and even re-teach the roles of social layers [because foundations served people of all classes]. But above all, the image of the sultan as “the patron of the weak among his people” was important to the nomads and other classes, where a “re-distributionist” logic was still alive. This way of fulfilling the social responsibility towards the poor, which exists in Islam, also allowed the portrait of a pious sultan. Especially in an environment where the ulama and Sufis are the people who benefit most from the foundations. At the same time, the government's respect for foundations and not violating the law of foundations also ensured the consent of an important mass who could protect their private property against patrimonial power, especially thanks to family foundations. Sixth, in this period, the government used festivities and ceremonies as areas to reinforce sovereignty and legitimacy. In these events, where people from all classes are present, the sultan was displayed as a hunter with unlimited magnificence and wealth, a “cihangir” who dominates even exotic animals. All these were ways of declaring the worldly power of the ruler "legitimate" both within the Ottoman borders and throughout the world. In this way, it was explained on which legitimacy foundations of the “worldly power”, a pillar of double domination, were built during the Kanuni period.

While the worldly foundations of power were built during the Kanuni period, the foundations of the caliphate were laid in an intertwined state. For the first time in the history of Islam, a non-Qurayshi ruler asserted himself as the true caliph. With this claim, the Ottoman caliphate continued its legitimacy through different channels. The first pillar of the “hilafet-i kübra” was gaza. Fiqh scholars, who built the theory of caliphate long before the Ottoman Empire, assigned jihad as a religious duty on the caliph. The caliph had to both protect Dar al-Islam and wage jihad. However, there was no other Islamic state capable of gaza in the basin where the Ottomans emerged. As early as the time of the Conqueror, the Ottomans presented themselves as a strong alternative to the Mamluks, both as strong “ghazis” and benefactors. After 1517, there were no longer alternative. The personalization of gaza by Ebussuud and the effort to mention Kanuni, not society, as the real executor of this duty (Imber, 1997, p. 77) shows how important the ghaza is for a real caliph. The second pillar of the caliphate, and perhaps the most important, was the "serving of the holy places". Even with this qualification alone, Kanuni was the caliph to be obeyed according to Lutfi Pasha. (Emecen, 2020, p. 57) It is known that the two holy places were a place of competition for all Islamic rulers. The meticulousness of the Mamluks before and after the Ottomans in protecting this privilege shows that this privilege was understood by them as the most solid foundation of consent and legitimacy in the Islamic world. In this context, the Ottomans established their caliphate not on the Qurayshi lineage, but on the “hadimu'l-haremeyn". By the eighteenth century, according to Ragıp Pasha, the Ottoman sultan was a caliph, since the holy lands were under Ottoman rule. (Ragıb Paşa, 2003, p. 115) Third, the safety of pilgrims as well as the servitude of the holy places became a question of legitimacy. The Ottomans functioned as the "caliphate state" protecting the pilgrimage routes in both the Mediterranean and Central Asia. The rich fortunes and gifts transferred to the holy places during the pilgrimage, the services provided to the pilgrims, and the reciting of the name of the Ottoman sultan as the caliph in the sermon during the Hajj pilgrimage were the main motives behind the recognition of the Ottoman ruler as a caliph by Muslims from all over the world. Fourth, applying the sharia and respecting it were another pillar of the caliphate. This quality was the primary thing that the ulama expected from power in the post-Mongol period, and to this extent, legitimacy was granted to power by the ulema, understood as the ruler “ahlu’l-hal ve’l akd”. Ebussuud, on the other hand, did not only portray Suleiman the Magnificent as the executor of the Shari'a, moreover, he bestowed upon him the "interpretation" gifted to mujtahid rulers such as Great Caliphs. Kanuni was both the patron and interpreter of Shari'a. It cannot be regarded as a coincidence that all these remind the great caliphs. Finally, the

Ottomans did not stay with the sultans alone, but presented the dynasty to the public in a way that identifies with the interests of Islam. The viability of the dynasty became synonymous with Islam. Because the Ottoman dynasty was a caliphate, a dynasty of mujaddids and mujtahids, and offered a versatile service to Islam. At that time, it undertook the "security of Dar al-Islam, the service of the holy places, the protection of the pilgrims, the guardian of the Sharia". The image created at this point gave rise to the belief that the possible threat to the dynasty was directly to Islam. Even Busbecq expressed the same thought in his own words during his five-year journey. At least we understand that this belief was established at that time. Thus, it becomes more understandable why an alternative to the Ottoman dynasty was not considered, and that even in the nineteenth century, Ahmed Cevdet mentioned the dynasty among the factors that gave strength to Islam.

Thus, in the period of Kanuni, the power laid the foundations of both worldly and spiritual legitimacy with its competent scholar-bureaucrat staff. While doing this, it masterfully crafted every source filtered from the past, was able to overcome the controversial issue of "Qurayshism" and built a unique The Lord of the Auspicious Conjunction-caliph model. Ottomans' capacity to manage and use soft power elements rather than hard power elements; Its ability to reconcile different intellectual apparatuses, the interests of power and social expectations on one ground made it viable until the first quarter of the twentieth century. Moreover, all this transfer indicates that the sources that the Ottomans fed were of different types such as Turco-Mongol, Perso-Islamic, Greek, and emphasizes the specific syncretic structure of the Ottoman Empire. With all these qualities, the Ottoman Empire is a traditionalist state that embraced the legacy of past civilizations.

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