IBN HALDUN UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

MASTER THESIS

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BEING, TRUTH, AND ART IN THE THOUGHT OF HEIDEGGER

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ASSIST. PROF. MUHAMMET İKBAL BAKIR

İSTANBUL, 2021

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by

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A thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy

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APPROVAL PAGE

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Phılosophy.

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I hereby declare that all information in this document has bee obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical concuct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

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ÖZ

HEIDEGGER DÜŞÜNCESİNDE VARLIK, HAKİKAT VE SANAT İLİŞKİSİ

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Bu tezde Heidegger düşüncesinde Varlık, hakikat ve sanat ilişkisi ele alınmıştır. Her ne kadar bir sistem filozofu olarak değerlendirilmese ve çalışmaları sistematik bir bütünlük arz etmese de Heidegger düşüncesi bir devamlılık perspektifi içinde değerlendirilmiştir. Bu çerçevede Heidegger'in, Varlığın zamanın boyutları içerisinde sadece "şimdi"den hareketle ve mevcudiyet (*presentia*) anlamında yorumlanmasına itiraz etme sebeplerine ve buna ilaveten Varlık anlayışını farklılaştıran unsurlara yer verilmiştir. Daha sonra *aletheia* olarak aslî hakikat fenomeninden zaman içerisinde uyuşum (*adaequatio*) fikrine geçişin nasıl gerçekleştiği tahlil edilmiştir. Heidegger'in hakikat anlayışı incelendikten sonra Heidegger'in sanat anlayışı çerçevesinde, sanatın hakikatin vuku bulmasında aslî bir mecra olarak değerlendirilmesinin ne anlama geldiği sorgulanmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Hakikat, Sanat, Sanat Eseri, Varlık

ABSTRACT

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IN THE THOUGHT OF HEIDEGGER

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In this thesis, the relationship between Being, truth and art in Heidegger's thought is discussed. Although he is not regarded as a system philosopher and his work does not present a systematic unity, Heidegger's thought has been evaluated in a continuity perspective. In this framework, the reasons for Heidegger to object to the interpretation of Being within the dimensions of time based only on "now" and in terms of presence (*presentia*) are examined. In addition, the elements that differentiate Heidegger's understanding of Being from the traditional understanding of Being have been analyzed. Later, it was analyzed how the transition from the fundamental phenomenon of truth (*aletheia*) to the idea of agreement (*adaequatio*) over time took place. After Heidegger's understanding of truth was examined, within the framework of Heidegger's understanding of art, it was questioned what it means to evaluate art as an essential medium in the happening of truth.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Art, Being, Truth, Work of Art

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

What subject is Heidegger's philosophy about? The common and known answer to this question has been "Being". According to this view, the question regarding the meaning of Being is the fundamental question that guided Heidegger's thought.[1] On the other hand, when we look at Heidegger's field of work as a whole, we see many different topics: analysis of everyday life, modern thought and representative theory, modern technology and its world of meaning, the origin of art and artwork, etc. Otto Pöggeler states that Heidegger is walking on the narrow path of a problem unique to him. In other words, there is the question regarding the meaning of Being at the basis of all these different issues.[2] So is it really so? What are the bases of the understanding that deals with Heidegger's thought in a continuum and the perspectives that deal with the deviation or break? Evaluating this is important in understanding how Heidegger's way of thinking has transformed. Why did a philosopher who thinks about the meaning of Being spend time on subjects such as art and technology later in his life? This question contains important implications for both the course of Heidegger's thought and the foundations of the relationship between Being, truth and art in Heidegger's thought.

As can be seen from the above lines, one of the characteristic aspects of Heidegger's thought is that it does not systematically present a unity. Articles, conference texts and letters on different subjects have an important place in his works. These are products of continuous self-transcendence and have a fragmentary character. For this reason,

[1] Thomas Sheehan, *Making Sense of Heidegger A Paradigm Shift*, (London: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2015), 3.
[2] Otto Pöggeler, B. Allemann, *Heidegger Üzerine İki Yazı*, trans. Doğan Özlem (Ankara: Gündoğan Yayınları, 1994), s. 12.

any attempt to establish a clear understanding of the basic theses of Heidegger's thought seems doomed to fail. Heidegger's thought is not suitable for summarizing and classification. This is due to the fragmentary nature of Heidegger's works, as well as the scattered and different dates of their publications. Even *Being and Time*, which is considered to be his only major and systematic work, has a fragmentary nature as it is presented as the first part of a book. Another characteristic of Heidegger's thought is that he constantly goes beyond the limits drawn to him. Heidegger's philosophy cannot be reduced to a philosophy of existence, metaphysical criticism, metaphysical innovativeness, Aristotle's interpretation, or any other subject he studied. This is one of the main difficulties of studying Heidegger's philosophy.[3]

In this context, this thesis attempts to explain the relationship between Being, truth and art in Heidegger's thought. We benefit mostly from *Being and Time* along with some other works of Heidegger, namely *The Origin of the Work of Art, On the Essence of Truth, Plato's Doctrine of Truth, Letter on Humanism, Nietzsche, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays ve What is Called Thinking? Being and Time* has been used as the main reference source for each part of our thesis, particularly the parts of Being and truth, as it contains important data on the foundations, concepts, and method of Heidegger's thought. In the fourth part, where Heidegger's views on art were examined, the route of *The Origin of the Work of Art* was followed.

Heidegger begins by putting a judgment on the first chapter of *Being and Time*. According to him, the question of Being has been forgotten today. However, this question is not just any question. So this question cannot be ignored and cannot be made as if it did not exist at all.[4] Based on these determinations, Heidegger wants to ask the question regarding the meaning of Being. To do this, he goes back and makes a evaluation of the history of philosophy. Because he thinks that the prejudices in front of the question of Being should be eliminated. In this direction, Heidegger returns to the Antiquity and begins his investigation from there. Because the prejudices in question are based on Antiquity ontology according to Heidegger. The transformation

[3] Pöggeler, Allemann, *Heidegger Üzerine İki Yazı*, 14-16.
[4] Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 21.

of the approach in Presocratic thought that centered the Being itself, especially in Plato and Aristotle after Socrates, stands out as the point where Heidegger's criticism intensifies. Heidegger objects to the interpretation of Being within the dimensions of time only from the "now" and in terms of presence (*presentia*). According to him, the theoretical view that tries to make sense of Being contains problems. Because the understanding indirectly inherent in the concept of *theoria* is also the idea of presence.[5] This objection Heidegger directs to the entire Western metaphysical tradition. He also analyzes the roots of the humanistic attitude through the views of these two names. The place of human being and the relation of human being to Being in Heidegger's thought is also different from that of the metaphysical tradition in question. According to him, human being cannot control the Being and reduce it to a fixed reserve. Rather, human being is under the control of Being. This difference forms the line between Heidegger and the history of humanistic thought that forgot the question of the meaning of Being. This differentiation also plays an important role in Heidegger's analysis of truth, art, artist and work of art. Contrary to theoretical perspective, the starting point in Heidegger's thinking is our everyday-experience-in-the-world. In this context, in the second part where we try to examine Heidegger's view of Being, we discussed the prejudices before the question of Being, the formal structure of this question, ontic and ontological priority. While doing this, we have included the analysis of the views of thinkers such as Parmenides, Heraclitus, Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel on the subject of Being, which is one of the most fundamental topics in the history of philosophy, from the perspective of Heidegger. In this direction, we tried to examine the foundations of the question of "What is Being" within the framework of its relationship with truth and art.

Heidegger states that Being coexists with truth. Also, according to Heidegger, if there is truth, Being exists.[6] The Western tradition of thought has forgotten the meaning of Being and also the truth that belongs to the foundation of Being. In other words, Heidegger thinks that the meaning of Being and truth is obscured by the Western tradition itself and especially by various reality theories. Since truth depends on the

[5] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 98.
[6] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 272.

idea of Being, Heidegger argues that the meaning of truth, like Being, is not clarified.[7] Accordingly, Heidegger takes the question of "what is truth" with a similar approach to the question of "what is Being". First of all, he examines the traditional concept of truth and its ontological foundations. Heidegger's question on this subject is this: How did traditional theory come to the idea of agreement, based on the fundamental phenomenon of truth? Heidegger regards the understanding that characterizes the truth as "correspondence", "adaequatio", "homoiosis" as too general and empty. But he also thinks that this characterization carries a rightfulness. For this reason, while searching for the answer to the question in question, he analyzes a line extending from Heraclius to Nietzsche. Unlike the traditional understanding of truth, Heidegger explains the truth in terms of the concept of *aletheia*. How the idea of truth as the disclosedness of Being (*aletheia*) is transformed into correctness of perception and agreement is, for Heidegger, the pivot of the problem. In the third part, where we examine the understanding of truth in Heidegger's thought, we examined this transformation and the factors that make Heidegger's perspective different. In this direction, we tried to explain the truth within the framework of its relationship with Being and art. In doing so, we have also evaluated critical comments on the foundations on which Heidegger's interpretation of truth is based.

Heidegger says that particular beings are disclosed in their Being in a work of art. Heidegger explains this situation as the happening of truth. Art is, for Heidegger, the domain of truth. This relation established between "happening of truth at work", "the Being of entities", "particular entities" and "the work of art" requires handling the relationship between Being, truth and art as a whole. This perspective of Heidegger does not seem to be explained by traditional art theories. Because, in traditional art theories, the subject of art is about beautiful, beauty and pleasure. However, Heidegger rejects the traditional conception of truth and states that art deals with truth, not beauty. According to Heidegger, art cannot be understood by reducing it to beauty. He states that what is beautiful in fine arts is not art, on the contrary, art creates beauty.[8] In *The Origin of the Work of Art*, Heidegger evaluates art in a different position than

[7] Vladislav Suvák. "The Essence of Truth (aletheia) and the Western Tradition in the Thought of Heidegger and Patocka," in *Thinking Fundamentals*, ed. David Shikiar (Vienna: IWM Junior Visiting Fellows Conferences 9: 2000), 4.
[8] Barbara Bolt, *Heidegger Reframed*, (New York: I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2011), 43.

approaches that consider it as a description, representation, or imitation. Heidegger also rejects the notion that the work of art is primarily a thing and that aesthetic value is later added to it through a subjective point of view.[9] Instead of all these traditional views, Heidegger proposes the concept of strife to understand art. In Heidegger's thought, conflict arises as a situation created by the work of art. What does conflict mean? What distinguishes the work of art in which the conflict takes place from the thing and the equipment? More importantly, is art still an essential and necessary medium for the realization of the truth for people? Does art still have any significance in terms of our historical existence? In the fourth chapter, where we tried to understand Heidegger's understanding of art, we sought answers to these questions. In addition, in this section, we have evaluated the criticism of Heidegger's position based on Van Gogh's painting as relevant to our subject. In particular, we tried to examine Heidegger's technology interpretation, which is within the framework of the relationship between Being, truth and art, within the framework of our subject.

[9] Michael Inwood, *Heidegger: A Very Short Introduction*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 116.

CHAPTER II

BEING IN THE THOUGHT OF HEIDEGGER

2.1. Introduction

"Being" is an important conception in the the history of pihilosophy and also plays key role Heidegger's philosophy. "Question of Being" is at the fundemantal issue of his philosophy. This question is the starting point of Heidegger's whole way of thinking.[10] More moderately, the common answer to the question of what is Heidegger's philosophy about has been **Being** (das Sein) since Otto Pöggeler and William J. Richardson formed the main course of Heidegger's thought in the early 1960s. Generally speaking, it would not be wrong to make these determinations regarding the place the title of Being occupies in Heidegger's thought. However, it can be said that these determinations are incomplete. Because the question to be addressed is what Heidegger understands from Being. So we can say that the basic question of Heidegger's early and late thinking is the question of the meaning of Being.[11]

Inquirying the meaning of Being is not the same as inquirying Being. Because, through scientific research, the question of the meaning of Being cannot be answered. This inquiry is not based on object experience. So it is not an ontic investigation. It is also not based on an external perspective. In most general terms, this investigation is a phenomenological investigation and is based on phenomenological experience. Because in Heidegger's thought Being is always the Being of an **entity** (das Seiende). By doing so, Heidegger rejects the distinction between Being and entity in classical ontology. Studying the question of Being in this state means making an entity

[10] Frank Schalow, Alfred Denker, *Historical Dictionary of Heidegger's Philosophy*, (Plymouth: The Scarecrow Press, 2010), 66.
[11] Thomas Sheehan, *Making Sense of Heidegger A Paradigm Shift*, (London: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2015), 3.

transparent within its own Being. The question in *Being and Time* is asked considering the Being of human beings.[12]

As pointed out above, the question of the meaning of Being is one of the most rooted questions of the Western philosophical tradition. In this sense, the question of Being cannot be seen as a new question that has arisen today. Heidegger makes the opening of *Being and Time* with an excerpt from Plato's *Sophist* dialogue to point out the foundations of the question of Being. Just before this passage, the Eleatic Stranger asks Theaetetus and Theodorus what they understand by the expression of being. What is to be understood from this question? In the passage in question, we see a short being interpretation of the Eleatic Stranger. Eleatic Stranger tells Theaetetus and Theodorus that you obviously know exactly what you mean when you use the expression being. Eleatic Stranger states that they knew this once, but now they are hesitant about it.[13] For this point, where the Eleatic Stranger leaves the word, we can say that this is Heidegger's departure point. Heidegger, like him, asks the question of the meaning of Being for "today": Has an answer been found today to the question of what is essentially meant by the expression Being? Heidegger's answer to this question is clear: "Not at all". Therefore, according to Hedeigger, the question of the meaning of Being must be asked again. Heidegger points out another point. Today, there is not even an awareness of not understanding the expression Being. When considered from this point of view, it can be thought that the question in question is a new and today's question. For this reason, Heidegger thinks that the first thing to do is to revive the understanding of the question of Being. Basically, Heidegger's goal is to take the question of the meaning of Being concretely and develop it and interpret time as the horizon of any understanding of Being.[14]

Heidegger expresses that time in Being and Time must be scrutinized from temporality. This scrutinisation must be done in terms of Dasein as the only entity that

[12] H. Bülent Gözkan, "Kant'tan Heidegger'e Varlığın Anlamı Meselesi," *cogito*, no. 64, (Güz 2010): 136-137; Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 50.
[13] Plato, "Sophist", *Plato Complete Works*, ed. John M. Cooper (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 264-265, [243e2], [244a4–8].
[14] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 19.

can reflect on the meaning of Being. The ontological assignment regarding the meaning of the question of Being must include the temporality of Being. Temporal determination refers to the originated from character of Being. Heidegger also states that understanding Being is through time, as well as existing. Because if Being can be grasped from time, not only entities but Being itself can be made visible. Accordingly, natural processes and historical events, or non-temporal and supra-temporal are also temporal. The answer to the question of the meaning of Being is that there is no fixed proposition framed because Being can only be grasped in terms of time.[15]

Heidegger sees only the study of the question of Being as a task, while interpreting the question of the meaning of Being in a concrete way and interpreting time as the horizon of any understanding of Being. He states that his aim is not to present a complete ontotology. What it is trying to do is to reveal the meaning of Being and the horizon necessary for the interpretation of Being. For Heidegger, what should not be done is to interpret the meaning of Being.[16] Heidegger explains what this means by giving an example of a situation where we are facing the tree. While we are standing in front of a tree, the tree is standing in front of us. This is a situation where we present ourselves mutually. Both the tree and we are face to face and exist. Well, who here actually presented himself to the others? And where does this face-to-face encounter occur? Is the tree in the lawn or is it in our minds? More generally, is the earth in our consciousness, or are we standing on earth? Heidegger argues that a simple truth is judged in all these questions. According to him, this confrontation has nothing to do with the thoughts inside our heads. The fact that everyone is standing in front of a tree is judged scientifically. However, according to Heidegger, first of all and finally, the existence of this tree must be accepted and dropped in its place. Heidegger says that thought never drops that tree where it stands. That is, what exists in its own Being cannot be understood in the subject-object relationship. It cannot be determined by the cognitive effort of the human being and within the scope of the possibilities of epistemology to know. Its possibility to be understood is directly related to how it uncovered itself. In his text *On the Essence of Truth*, Heidegger refers to this situation as “to let entities be”. To let entities be means, according to him, that one engages to

[15] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 38-40.
[16] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 38.

the entity and its openness. At this point, context is also important. The context in which the entity reveals itself as a whole appears as *physis*, that is, nature. Heidegger's view that the meaning of Being should not be interpreted can be understood in this context.[17]

According to Heidegger, understanding is not a cognitive faculty imposed on Being from outside. Understanding is also not knowing the world through thinking. However, the concrete experience of **Being-in-the-world** (In-der-Welt-sein) can open the way for us to understand.[18] The exact opposite of this understanding is expressed by Heidegger as follows: "When we merely stare at something, our just-having-it-before-us lies before us *as a failure to understand it any more*."[19] We will examine Heidegger's criticism of this externalist understanding attitude, which manifests itself in Cartesian thought, as much as our subject requires while dealing with his thought on Being.

It was stated that Heidegger's goal was to take the question of the meaning of Being in a concrete way and develop it and to interpret time as the horizon of any understanding of Being. The emphasis on Being comprehensible only in terms of time has taken on a more central role after *Being and Time*. In his *Letter on Humanism*, Heidegger speaks of a "**turning**" (Kehre) from "being and time" to "time and being".[20] The question regarding the meaning of Being in *Being and Time* has been asked by taking into account Dasein. According to Pöggeler, the discourse of returning from "being and time" to "time and being" can be considered as a warning that shifts the emphasis to the other pole in the "Dasein-Being" relationship. Pöggeler says that this turning also includes the demand to think on the history of Being. Thinking that has forgotten the question of Being must now return to itself. Why is we turned away from Being and how can we turn our faces back to Being? It is possible to turn to Being

[17] Martin Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking?*, trans. J. Glenngray (New York: Harper&Row Publishers, 1968), 41-44; Martin Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," trans. John Sallis, *Pathmarks*, ed. William McNeil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 144-145.
[18] Barbara Bolt, *Heidegger Reframed*, (New York: I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2011), 23.
[19] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 190.
[20] Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," in *Basic Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964)*, ed. David Farrell Krell (London: Routledge Classics, 1993), 231.

with such a turn towards history. So, can this turn be considered for Heidegger as a radical transformation, rupture, or abandonment of position in *Being and Time*? Or could there be a classification like before turning or after for Heidegger? Pöggeler states that this turn has been instrumentalized in the creation of a new portrait of Heidegger, with largely arbitrary interpretations. According to him, this "turning" in Heidegger's way of thinking cannot be regarded as a radical deviation. It would also be misleading to classify Heidegger's work as early and late periods, based on some contrasts or connections in his views expressed before or after that date by determining a date chronologically. Pöggeler states that each of Heideggeri's work should be seen as an effort to determine the object of his thought. His work can be viewed as pathmarks of this effort.[21]

When we look at Heidegger's field of work, we see many different topics: analysis of everyday life, modern thought and representative theory, modern technology, art and *The Origin of the Work of Art*, etc. At the basis of all of these issues lies the question of relationship to the meaning of Being. Heidegger's thought revolves entirely around this question. In the words of Otto Pöggeler, "Heidegger walks on the narrow path of a question that is unique to him."[22] Therefore, for Heidegger, researching art, *The Origin of the Work of Art*, the position of the artist is not beyond the question of the meaning of Being. So art does not correspond to an autonomous, isolated area of human experience. His research on art is also part of this question. Heidegger continues to think resolutely on the basis of the question of Being. Art is in direct relation with Being and truth in that it shows how Beings of entities emerge through the work of art.[23] But this does not mean that Heidegger was the thinker of a single thought. In his thinking the question of the meaning of Being can be seen as an inclusive axis.[24]

[21] Pöggeler, Allemann, *Heidegger Üzerine İki Yazı*, 28-33; For an analysis of the periodization of Heidegger thought, see also, Erdal Yılmaz, *Varlık ve Zaman'ı Anlamak*, (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2020), 19-28.
[22] Pöggeler, Allemann, *Heidegger Üzerine İki Yazı*, s. 12.
[23] Daniel E. Palmer, "Heidegger and The Ontological Significance of The Work of Art", *British Journal of Aesthetics* 38, no. 4 (October 1998): 397.
[24] Pöggeler, Allemann, *Heidegger Üzerine İki Yazı*, 15.

Looking at the course of Heidegger's thought after *Being and Time*, there were also those who disagreed with the Pöggeler's view. A diagnosis of deviation in Heidegger's thought manifests itself in these views. In the same direction, it is claimed that Heidegger moved away from the essence of *Being and Time*. There is a differentiation at this point. Commentators such as King and Langan argue that the project *Being and Time* remained of primary interest to Heidegger, but some shortcomings in the book's method prompted him to look at the subject from other angles. Names like Richardson, Versenyi, Waelhans, Heinemann and Löwith do not agree with this view. The emphasis in the second view marks a break. In Heidegger's comments after *Being and Time*, it is argued that he intentionally did not adhere to his work in question. In other words, it continues to be discussed whether the project put forward in *Being and Time* is continued by Heidegger later. According to Robert Solomon, from *Being and Time* to recent studies, there is enough ground to think that there is no project continuity in Heidegger's philosophy. Because Heidegger's approach to the problem of Being has undergone serious changes. But Solomon argues that in all of Heidegger's work his main problem is continuity.[25]

In the light of all these evaluations, we will first examine Heidegger's interpretation of Being in order to reveal Heidegger's relationship to truth and art. While doing this research, we will try to trace the following question posed by Heidegger: What does it mean for truth to occur in art? Is art still an essential and essential medium for people in relation to the truth? Can it be mentioned that art still has an importance in our historical existence?

2.2. The Questions of Being and the Prejudices

Heidegger begins by putting a judgment on the first chapter of *Being and Time*. According to him, the question of Being has been forgotten today. However, this question is not just any question. So this question cannot be ignored and made as if it did not exist at all. This question that feeds Plato's and Aristotle's research has gone

[25] Robert C. Solomon, *Akılcılıktan Varoluşçuluğa*, trans. Reha Kurdaşlı, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2020), 361.

silent. Heidegger states that the idea of Being put forward by these two names comes by transformation up to Hegel's logic. But piecemeal and initial gains have been trivialized. In addition, Heidegger draws attention to one more point. A dogma arose on the grounds provided by the Greeks' interpretation of Being. As a result, it was deemed unnecessary to ask questions about the meaning of Being. In addition, it was supported not to ask this question. In this context, Heidegger recalls the once established judgment of Being: Being is the most universal and empty concept. Because of this determination, attempts to define the concept of Being have been insufficient. In other words, Being resists attempts to define. Being is perceived as the most universal and therefore unidentifiable concept. As such, it does not need to be described, says Heidegger. Because everyone uses this concept constantly. Everyone always understands what they mean by this concept. In the Ancient Age, the question of Being, which made thinkers uneasy due to their secrecy and made them think, has become so clear that it is now understood by everyone. For this reason, asking questions about the Being is considered as a methodical error.[26] We will review biases regarding the understanding of Being again below.

The fact that Western thought, whose classical form is "metaphysical", has forgotten the question of the meaning of Being, has led to what understanding? According to the Heidegger interpretation of Pöggeler, in a context in which Being is forgotten, nothing has been researched other than a set of principles that aim to grasp the entity and dominate it. These researches aimed to make all of the entities available to human beings. In other words, a human-centered structure has shaped the Western thought tradition. The human-centered approach is not limited to philosophy. A similar structure is encountered in Christianity. In Christianity, even God is considered only as the authority to provide spiritual salvation to human. As in Kant's doctrine of postulates, God's position in thought is to open space for human will. In Sartre's thought, existentialism, truth and meaning are designed by human. In Heidegger's thought, the place of human and the relation of human to Being is completely different from this line. According to him, human cannot control Being. Rather, human is within

[26] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 21.

the jurisdiction of Being. This difference marks the boundary between Heidegger and the history of humanistic thought that forgot the question of the meaning of Being.[27]

This differentiation also plays an important role in Heidegger's analysis of art, artist and work of art. Heidegger is in a position to reject approaches that center the artist as a founding subject. According to Heidegger, both the artist is *The Origin of the Work of Art* and the work of art is the origin of the artist. One of them is not superior to the other. The existence condition of both artist and work of art is Art.[28] Heidegger maintains his position, which is different from the humanist metaphysical tradition, in the field of art as well. In this direction, he criticizes the forms of reading that reduce art to aesthetic experience or representative perspective. To put it briefly, the thought that forms the axis in these criticisms is the idea that the Being cannot be surrounded and taken under domination. But the descriptive, representative thinking does just that. In the Presocratic period, the human being seen as an entity among the entities does not exist anymore. Instead, a new type of human has emerged, which takes the entity under its rule. The manifestations of the idea of representation in art also bear these problems.[29] Aesthetics is likewise like an obstacle to the road to Being. According to Heidegger, aesthetics reduces the function of art to the experience of pleasure. However, art has an essential and necessary role to understand Being. Aesthetics prevent art from this role. Heidegger points to another perspective rather than aesthetics or experience of pleasure. This is the strife between **world** (Welt) and earth.[30] We will see the implications of these concepts on Being and art in the following pages. As can be understood, the problems caused by forgetting the question of the meaning of Being raises a very large area of discussion. We will deal with these issues, which we touched on in terms of their relation to Heidegger's understanding of Being, in more detail in the third chapter.

[27] Pöggeler, Allemann, *Heidegger Üzerine İki Yazı*, 26.
[28] Martin Heidegger, "The Origin Of The Work Of Art," in *Basic Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964)*, ed. David Farrell Krell (London: Routledge Classics, 1993), 140.

[29] Bolt, *Heidegger Reframed*, 58.
[30] Bolt, *Heidegger Reframed*, 43.

Before Heidegger asks the question of the meaning of Being, he points out that there are some prejudices in front of this question. These prejudices are based on Antiquity ontology, according to Heidegger. The way to make an adequate evaluation of this ontology is to examine the question of the meaning of Being. But first of all, Heidegger states that these prejudices must first be posed in order to raise the necessity to re-ask the question of the meaning of Being. Three prejudices are listed regarding this issue:[31]

First Bias: 'Being' is the 'most universal' concept:

The source of the first prejudice about Being in the history of philosophy is Aristotle. He maintains that "An understanding of Being is already included in conceiving anything which one apprehends as an **entity** (Seiende)". But the universality of Being is not the same thing as universality of the genus. The universality of Being transcends all the other universalities of genus-specific. Being in its sense of medieval ontology is accepted as a trancendent. Heidegger points out Aristotle's position at this point as follows:

> In medieval ontology 'Being' is designated as a 'transcendens'. Aristotle himself knew the unity of this transcendental 'universal' as a unity of analogy in contrast to the multiplicity of the highest generic concepts applicable to things.[32]

Heidegger points out the importance of this conception of Aristotle. According to Heidegger, although Aristotle was based on the way Plato formulated his ontological question, he grounded that question on a new basis. However, Heidegger thinks that Aristotle failed to illuminate the darkness of categorial interconnections. According to Heidegger, this issue has not been elucidated within the medieval ontology. Hegel has designated Being "indeterminate immediate" and based it on all other categorical explanations in his "logic". Heidegger therefore thinks that Hegel remained within the standpoint of ancient ontology. In addition, at this point Heidegger makes a comparison on Aristotle and Hegel. According to Heidegger, Aristotle expressed the unity of Being despite the multitude of categories of things, but Hegel did not. After making these explanations, Heidegger makes the following inference: That Being is seen as the most universal concept does not mean that it is a clear and understandable

[31] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 22.
[32] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 22. Aristotle, "Metaphysics," in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 67, [1016b31-1017a2].

concept that requires no further explanation. On the contrary, the concept of Being is the darkest of all concepts.[33]

Based on the analysis of this first prejudice, it can be evaluated by Heidegger that Aristotle's researches on Being, which were collected under the title of *Metaphysics*, were ignored or not found sufficient. However, Heidegger is in dialogue with Aristotle at every stage of the process in which he explores the question of the meaning of Being. He also puts forward a radical reckoning with traditional ontology. This leads Heidegger to a persistent way of thinking about Aristotle's legacy. While the first reference to Heidegger's question of Being is the question in Plato's *Sophist* dialogue above, the second is the question in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*:

> And indeed the question which, both now and of old, has always been raised, and always been the subject of doubt, viz. what being is, is just the question, what is substance? For it is this that some assert to be one, others more than one, and that some assert to be limited in number, others unlimited. And so we also must consider chiefly and primarily and almost exclusively what that is which is in this sense.[34]

Aristotle also stated that the word Being is used in different meanings in *Metaphysics*.[35]

At this point, Heidegger points to the concept of *ousia*, which will be translated into Latin by the word *substantia*. According to him, the meanings of Being are organized around this concept. So, similar to Aristotle, Heidegger also accepts the multiplicity of meaning regarding Being on the one hand. But, on the other hand, he tries to research it, affirming the possibility of a central meaning of Being. Heidegger's reference to Aristotle, while examining the initial prejudice before the question of the meaning of Being, points to a fundamental objection against it: Heidegger objects to Aristotle's interpretation of Being within the dimensions of time only from the "now" and in terms of **presence** (presentia). Heidegger directs this objection to the entire metaphysical tradition, including Hegel, as noted above. As a result, the establishment of Being as the most universal concept has strengthened the way to abandon and cover up the question of the meaning of Being.[36]

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[33] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 22-23.
[34] Aristotle, "Metaphysics," in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 89-90, [1028b3-1028b8].
[35] Aristotle, "Metaphysics," 42-43, [1003a22-1003a32], [1003a33-1003b18], [1003b19-1003b22], [1003b23-1004a9].
[36] Umut Öksüzan, "Heidegger Düşüncesinde Varlığın Anlamı Sorusu", *Özne Dergisi*, no. 16, (Bahar 2012): 40-41.

Second Bias: The concept of 'Being' is indefinable.

The reason the concept of Being is seen as unidentifiable is because of its highest universality. According to Heidegger, Being is not an entity. It is not possible for the Being to gain a determination with reference to the entities. Being, by definition, can neither be derived from concepts higher than itself, nor can it be explained by reference to lower concepts than itself. This situation does not prevent the question of the meaning of Being from being the subject of research. According to Heidegger, the only inference that can be made from this situation is that Being is nothing like entity. In this case, it is out of the question to apply the definition in traditional logic based on the ancient ontology to Being. That is, the determination of justified entities within certain boundaries does not reveal an openness regarding Being. It is no excuse for Heidegger that Being is seen as unidentifiable. This situation does not exempt us from asking the question about the meaning of Being, for him, on the contrary, it requires asking this question.[37]

Third Bias: 'Being' is of all concepts the one that is selfevident.

Human beings use the concept of Being for making cognizes anything or making an statement anything. Besides we use towards relation to ourselves this concept. So, without another thing, being considered to be understood of Being. Heidegger claims that expressions such as "The sky is blue", "I am happy" can be understood by everyone, but in fact this understandability actually prevents these expressions from being understood clearly. Every contact with Being contains an *apriori* being-sight. Heidegger thinks that the question of Being is necessary because people already live in an understanding of Being and are still veiled in the dark.[38]

As Mulhall notes that Heidegger's claim which pilosophical tradition has forgotten the question of Being does not mean question of the Being of entities totaly neglected. In fact, Heidegger thinks that past thinkers who question entities and the Being of entities have moved away from the axis of the problem. That is, they have presumed that they know what the phrase 'the Being of entities' which itself dubious. Put it differently,

[37] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 23.
[38] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 23.

the meaning of Being have been failed to see by them clearly. They caused into a multitude of problems by forgetting and by closing off that question.[39] For Heidegger, as we mentioned in the introduction, to think of the meaning of Being ensure not only can be talked art's and work of art's basis but also basis of all diciplinaries and basically all ontologies.[40] This issue is expressed by Heidegger that:

> The question of Being aims therefore at ascertaining the *a priori* conditions not only for the possibility of the sciences which examine entities as entities of such and such a type, and, in so doing, already operate with an understanding of Being, but also for the possibility of those ontologies themselves which are prior to the ontical sciences and which provide their foundations. *Basically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has at its disposal, remains blind and perverted from its ownmost aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task*.[41]

Due to the fact that this judgments, as above mentioned, the question of Being whose answer deficit and which itself in darkness again must be asked. In order to ask the question of Being, the structure of this question must be formulated.[42]

2.3. The Formal Structure of the Question of Being

Progressing by asking questions while thinking about the meaning of Being has an important place in Heidegger's methodology. He persistently asks new questions rather than giving answers certainly. According to Heidegger, it is necessary that the meaning of Being was formulated again by purifying from mistake commentary. For this reason, Heidegger tries to determine structure of the question of Being. What are the elements of this question and reason why this question's distinctive character and very special? Formulating the question about the meaning of Being and discussing it's structural items is a must for him. Put another way, if it is a fundamental question must be made transparent and must be formulated and every question has a formal structure.

At this point, however, a new question arises. Why didn't Heidegger ask the basic questions of traditional ontology: "what is there? Are there forms and universals or

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[39] Stephen Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, (Newyork: Routlege, 2005), 7
[40] Heidegger expresses the understanding of Being as a pre-ontological or ontological understanding in a broad sense that has not yet been brought into a concept. See: Martin Heidegger, "On the Essence of Ground," trans. William McNeill, *Pathmarks*, ed. William McNeil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 104.
[41] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 31.
[42] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 23-24.

only particulars? Does God exist? Is there such a thing as substance or are there only properties? Is the mind physical? Do we have free will?" In contrast to general acceptance, according to Heidegger these questions related to about entities, not about Being. The above mentioned questions of traditional ontology is classified as "ontic" not "ontological" in Heideggerian perspective. Besides Heidegger indicates that these questions are among the reasons for being forgotten of the basic question of Being. The question of Being is the fundamental question of metaphysics for him and the question does not interest things what is there and why is there. For Heidegger question is what it "is" the Being in a basic manner.[43] So how should this question be asked?

To ask question indicates a questing which has certain elements for Heidegger. In Heidegger's words, these elements can be sorted that:

> Any inquiry, as an inquiry about something, has *that which is asked about* [sein *Gefragtes*].
>
> What is asked about, an inquiry has *that which is interrogated* [ein *Befragtes*].
>
> In what is asked about there lies also *that which is to be found out by the asking* [das *Erfragte*]; this is what is really intended: with this the inquiry reaches its goal.[44]

In the Being-related question, the asked about is Being and the one which was interrogated is *Dasein*. The thing which wants to be found by inquiry is the meaning of Being. Namely, a question also contains the thing which was wanted to be found by inquiry. The purpose of theoretical questions is to be able to determine and conceptualise what be asked. This position to bring us again to the question itself because the asked about lies in the question itself. Every question needs guidance by the thing which wants to be found by inquiry.

Heidegger, on the one hand, says "meaning of Being must already be available to us in some way", on the other hand he says we don't know the answer when it is asked "What is Being?" Furthermore, Heidegger expresses as a fact that the existence of a

[43] Heidegger, "On the Essence of Ground," 105-106; Taylor Carman, "The Question of Being", *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger's Being and Time*, ed. Mark A. Wrathall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 84.
[44] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 24.

vague average understanding of Being.[45] At this point, Mulhall argues that Heidegger implies the question of Being was sabotaged by a not-yet-analysed conception. Thus, our prior understanding of Being must be determined and be neutralized. In order for this to be done, our previous understanding of Being must be carefully revealed. Besides, it is necessary to avoid to be contacted with our prior understanding of Being.[46] How can it possible this? According to Heidegger, in order to can be interpreted the understanding of Being which is the only possible way is to improve the concept of Being.[47]

Heidegger points out that Being cannot be understood by telling a story. In other words, the Being of entities should not be explained with reference to other entities. This judgment is very important in terms of understanding Heidegger's position. Heidegger wants to avoid seeking a fixed and unchangeable essence to explain Being. However, traces of a search for a fixed and unchangeable essence can always be seen in the Western thought tradition. To give an example, for German idealism the fixed and unchangeable essence was the spirit. Essences are grounded in the thought of the spirit, and the spirit is conceived as being that is historically advanced, transcends time, and will eventually be in itself. In other words, German idealism wanted to fill the inside of static Greek thought with dynamism. But German idealism also appears in a position similar to that of Greek essentialism.[48] Can Heidegger, as a thinker re-asking the question of the meaning of Being, have fallen into an essentialist position by asking the fundamental question of metaphysics in crisis? Pöggeler states that Scholastic thinkers tend to say "yes" to this question. According to them, Heidegger is a philosopher of Being, and by substantiating Being he tries to revive the metaphysical tradition that has almost disappeared with New Age philosophy. However, according to Pöggeler, Heidegger's question is not actually a question directly asked to Being. His question is about the *world* as the field of appearance of entities.[49] This question does not refer to a search for essence but to a world in which Being opens itself up in different ways. That is, although Heidegger seems to be speaking about Being, he is

[45] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 25.
[46] Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, 13.
[47] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 25.
[48] Pöggeler, Allemann, *Heidegger Üzerine İki Yazı*, 37.
[49] Pöggeler, Allemann, *Heidegger Üzerine İki Yazı*, 34-35.

actually reckoning with attempts to essentialize Being. We can consider this attitude as a reckoning with metaphysics.[50] According to Heidegger, Being must be seen as itself without being subjected to deterioration. For this, first the access routes to the Being must be revealed. This goal, according to him, demands a new terminology and methodology from us. It becomes important to understand the priority of the Being problem on this ground.[51]

2.4. The Ontological Priority of the Question of Being

The question of Being is a genuine question and it requires a series of fundamental studies. This question is not only an examination on universals on which its generally a speculation topic. According to Heidegger, the question of Being is the most basic and the most concrete question among all questions. At this point, Heidegger attempts to show the ontological priority of this question must be shown.

Being, for Heidegger, is always the Being of an entity. All entities are classified according to subjects such as history, nature, space, life, Dasein, language and so on. These scientific research areas are thematized as objects of study. Determining the boundaries and first fixing is important for scientific research. But Heidegger thinks that these determinations for the sciences are made sketchy and naive. For this reason, these sciences must be revealed and separated from each other through a purification.[52]

For Heidegger, Being can only be understood within its ontological priority. That is, Being is not understood in the light of theory and hypothesis which are consisted propositions. Also, sciences like mathematics, theology, natural sciences or human sciences can not give the meaning of Being. These disciplines can give a conceptual explanation about Being and examine Being only as an object of knowledge.

[50] Pöggeler, Allemann, *Heidegger Üzerine İki Yazı*, 27-30.
[51] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 26.
[52] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 29.

There are some basic concepts in all disciplines. These concepts serve as a guide in the first place. Basic concepts are specifications that show the boundaries of disciplines. In addition, basic concepts guide the area underlying the subjects of the disciplines. Therefore, proofs of basic concepts must be shown authentically, as every science posits certain ontologies. Likewise, every ontology presupposes a specific ontology, whose name is fundamental-ontology. Fundamental-ontology interprets and clarifies entities according to the basic structure of their Being. If the meaning of Being is not clarified, the ontology falls into a meaning-crisis even if it has a solid structure. Thus, according to Heidegger, the question of Being has an ontological priority.[53]

2.5. The Ontical Priority of the Question of Being

Dasein provides an ontical basis for Heidegger's understanding of Being. At this point the question "What is Dasein?" becomes important because Dasein is one of the most important concepts in Heidegger's philosophy. It seems quite difficult to give a clear definition of Dasein. According to Daniel O. Dahlstrom, "Dasein is 'the good German translation' of *existentia*, the traditional Latin term for whatever is on-hand or present."[54] The concept uses to mean "human existence" within everyday German usage. But Heidegger gives a new philosophical meaning and uses the concept of Dasein in a different way than it traditionally had. In order to understand the place of the concept in Heidegger's thought, it is first necessary to examine it etymologically. The conception consists of two words: The first syllable of the concept Dasein (*da*) has meanings such as "there" and "here", "then", "since". The second syllable is "sein" which is mean "to be". Two-word together creates the concept of Dasein which means "to be there, present, available, to exist".[55]

"To be-here" implies space-occupying entities and objects. However, according to Heidegger, Dasein is not a tangible entity.[56] So, we cannot reduce Dasein to a concrete

[53] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 25. Kaan Öktem, *Varlık ve Zaman Bir Okuma Rehberi*, (İstanbul: Alfa, 2019), s. 92.
[54] Daniel O. Dahlstrom, *The Heidegger Dictionary*, (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 35.
[55] Michael Inwood, *A Heidegger Dictionary*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 42.
[56] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 36.

being that only occupies space. Besides, "Dasein" is expressed that a term that is purely an expression of Being by Heidegger.[57]

Dasein is expressed by Heidegger that: "Ontically, of course, Dasein is not only close to us-even that which is closest: we are it, each of us, we ourselves. In spite of this, or rather for just this reason, it is ontologically that which is farthest."[58] These statements by Heidegger about Dasein give us a clue about Dasein's sphere of existence. Dasein has to understand its Being from the world in which it lives. The meaning of being cannot be understood without Dasein. Hence, in *Being and Time*, Dasein differs from all other entities. Because Dasein has a matter of its own existence and the challenge and meaning of Being. According to Heidegger, only Dasein can ask the question of the meaning of Being. [59]

Ontic and ontological concepts occupy an important place in *Being and Time*. Heidegger uses the concept of ontic to express entities. The entities surround us. Dasein is also an entities within entities. On the other hand, it refers to the concept of ontological in studies directly related to Being itself. Ontic entities are the anchor points of Dasein's ontological Being. At this point, we arrive at another important concept of Heidegger, the concept of the world mentioned above. Because Dasein always tends to understand its existence from the world.[60]

Why Heidegger uses the concept of Dasein is an important question. According to Stephen Mulhall, although Dasein refers to human existence in everyday German usage, it refers to a different type of Being than the human being. The concept of Dasein is not one of the concepts used in the history of philosophy in the sense of "human being". Heidegger thinks that the concepts such as "subjectivity", "consciousness", "spirit" or "soul" used in ancient times would mean taking a biased position in the issue of Being. According to Mulhall, the concept of Dasein is far from

[57] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 33.
[58] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 36.
[59] Schalow, Denker, *Historical Dictionary of Heidegger's Philosophy*, 71.
[60] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 36, Heidegger, "On the Essence of Ground," 105-106.

erroneous interpretations as it is a *tabula rasa*, and for Heidegger this is important for the soundness of his research. Heidegger uses Dasein as an ontological tool /concept in a new meaning.[61]

Dasein does not carry the ontological meanings attributed to human historically since Plato. Also, the conceptualization of Dasein does not carry the meanings implied by the subject-object dualism. In other words, subject and object are not equivalent concepts with Dasein and the world.[62] In Heidegger's thought, Dasein is a starting point for not only the question of Being but also all sciences. According to Heidegger, science can ultimately be considered a human behavior pattern. For this reason, science as something that exists has a common basis with the human. This common basis is Dasein. Scientific research is just one of Dasein's ways of expressing itself. Therefore, the question of Being has a nature that goes beyond scientific research fields. That is, the question of Being can not be limited to scientific research. For this reason, sciences and scientific research must be based on the question of Being.[63]

According to Heidegger, Dasein should be examined before the question of Being. Because the question of Being cannot be considered separately from Dasein. Dasein is not any entity. Entities other than Dasein cannot think about Being. Objects, for example, exist but are not alive. Living species, such as animals and plants, lack consciousness, will and choice. There may be situations such as survival and reproduction for entities other than Dasein. But thinking about own Being and thinking about other entities is Dasein's defining feature. Therefore, Dasein cannot be explained and understood in terms that explain other entities. Dasein cannot be fixed within a certain biological category. So Dasein is not homo sapiens. The concept of Dasein does not directly refer to human. Dasein can only be understood by existing.[64] For this reason, the essence of Dasein is existence. In other words, Dasein can understand itself

[61] Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, 14.
[62] H. Bülent Gözkan, "Kant'tan Heidegger'e Varlığın Anlamı Meselesi," 138.
[63] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 33.
[64] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 33, 39; The concept of Dasein in *Being and Time* holds an important place against the philosophy of the subject. But then, by Heidegger, this concept itself is also considered a subjective departure point. About the issue, see also, Zeynep Direk, *Çağdaş Kıta Felsefesi* (Ankara: Fol Kitap, 2021), 81, 88; Zeynep Kot Tan, *Heidegger Sarkacı – Metafor Kavramının Arkeolojisi* (İstanbul: Ketebe Yayınları, 2020), 87-89.

from its own existence.[65] In relation to this situation, according to Heidegger, Dasein has three priorities compared to all other entities:

First Priority: Dasein has an ontic property because the question of Being can only be asked by Dasein as an entities. In addition, this entity is determined by the existence within its own Being.

Second Priority: Dasein has the possibility of understanding Being. Dasein also has the ability to understand entities other than Dasein. For this reason, Dasein has an ontological feature.

Third Priority: Dasein is an ontic-ontological precondition as the basis for all ontologies. In this sense, Dasein has priority as a possibility of existence for all other ontologies.[66]

According to Heidegger, the fundamental ontology from which all other ontologies can derive can be understood thanks to these three priorities of Dasein. Dasein is the core of fundamental ontology, and Dasein's ontic and ontological structure are not mutually exclusive. In Heidegger's words "Dasein, as its ontically constitutive state, has a pre-ontological being."[67]

In short, the question concerning the meaning of Being is only possible with Dasein.[68] Dasein is the first entity to be questioned. This situation implies that: Like a work of art, entities outside of Dasein can only be understood on Dasein's ontic-ontological context. Because work of art is also an entity among the entities. Heidegger, who examines Being in its relation with entities, also explains his thoughts on art by examining *The Origin of the Work of Art*. So Heidegger is not interested in asking theoretical questions such as "What is Being" or "What is Art" that ignore the reality

[65] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 345; For an interpretation on the meaning of understanding the essence of Dasein as existence in Heidegger's thought against the understanding that determines Being as presence, see also, Emmanuel Mounier, *Existentialist Philosophies An Introduction*, (London: Rockliff, 1948), 29.
[66] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 34.
[67] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 39.
[68] Carman, *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger's Being and Time*, 84.

basis of this relationality. In other words, the basis of questioning the Being of all entities including the work of art is based on such an ontic-ontological basis.[69]

According to Heidegger, ontology is only possible as phenomenology. Phenomenology is, in its most general definition, a science of phenomena.[70] Phenomenon means showing itself in itself.[71] In other words, phenomenology examines the Being of entities and its modifications. Heidegger states that this showing itself does not mean appearing. In this sense, Being of entities is not something behind what does not appear. In other words, there is no essentially any other existence behind the phenomena in phenomenology. But Heidegger mentions that phenomena may be hidden. The phenomena can be undiscovered or **buried over** (verschüttet). The concept of covered-up-ness is, according to Heidegger, the opposite concept of phenomenology. Phenomenology is needed because phenomena are often not given to us as they are.[72] In other words, Dasein should be accessed as it shows itself in itself and as it shows itself from itself.

Dasein relates to Being by understanding itself within its own Being. Heidegger says that Dasein exists.[73] In this respect, the way to analyze Dasein is phenomenology. According to Heidegger, the possibility of this is to examine Dasein's itself approximately and mostly as it shows, that is, within its average *everydayness*. Hence Heidegger questions the meaning of Being, and the method he uses for this is the phenomenology of Dasein's **everydayness in-world** (In-der-Welt). According to Heidegger, Dasein, whose phenomenology will be made, is within the truth. [74]

Phenomenology, which seeks to reveal the things themselves, aims to reveal the constant thing, *eidos* or Being in the change of phenomena. Accordingly, the phenomenological method's aim to reveal the Being distinguishes it from being just a

[69] Metin Bal, " Martin Heidegger'in sanat anlayışında varlık, sanat yapıtı ve insan arasındaki ilişki" (PhD diss., Ankara Üniversitesi, 2008), 18.
[70] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 50.
[71] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 51.
[72] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 60.
[73] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 78.
[74] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 263.

description activity. This approach can be called an ontological phenomenology. Well, if consciousness does not see entities as certain entities by its own analysis and does not show it in its *eidos* or Being, how is it possible for the Being to come to light? It is here that Heidegger's phenomenological method differs from transcendental phenomenology. His phenomenological attitude is characterized by his grasp of the transcendental Ego as existence. So this Ego is not just a way of seeing or a thought. This Ego is a human being. Even though this Ego devotes itself to developing a pure theory, it is in an active praxis with entities, it has relationships with other people. It is mortal, it has conscience, fears and anxieties. It is finite, it is in time, and it lives in a historical position. So it is in a *certain* world. All these express the characteristics of Dasein and these features have an important place in *Being and Time* philosophically. For Heidegger, the transcendental Ego is not something that transcends concrete existence or constitutes it. But the opposite is true. Concrete existence has a determining function. In fact, Heidegger criticizes the initiation of human's attempt to understand themselves from a *theoria* and transcendental Ego since the Greeks. This approach also explains why Heidegger began to think from the work of art and its material structure while examining the ontological roots of art.[75]

We have stated earlier that Heidegger objects to the interpretation of Being as presence. According to him, the understanding indirectly inherent in the concept of *theoria* is the idea of presence. Whereas, according to Heidegger, entities can show themselves to Dasein in three different ways: **ready-to-hand** (zuhanden); **present-at-hand** (vorhanden) and Dasein. According to Heidegger, the understanding of presence in the history of philosophy is a kind of understanding of present-at-hand. However, the more fundamental way of being in Heidegger's thought is readiness-to-hand. Heidegger states that a theoretical view of things cannot understand readiness-to-hand. Heidegger does not ignore the preoccupation with entities because he thinks that things cannot be viewed as mere things.[76] This situation points to the limits of Heidegger's

[75] Pöggeler, Allemann, *Heidegger Üzerine İki Yazı*, 20-21; For a comparative analysis of Husserl's phenomenology with Heidegger's phenomenology, see also, Kasım Küçükalp, "Heidegger ve Fenomenoloji," *Kutadgubilig*, no. 30 (2016): 364-366.

[76] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 98; On the theory-practical relationship in Heidegger's philosophy; see also, Özkan Gözel, "Çevre-Dünya'dan Dünyaya: Heidegger'in 'Dünyası'na Bir Giriş", *Kutadgubilig Felsefe-Bilim Araştırmaları*, no. 39, 139-140; Özkan Gözel, "Heidegger'in Kartezyen Dünya Ontolojisine Yönelik Eleştirisi," *FLSF (Felsefe ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi)*, no. 28, s. 12, 15.

phenomenological method. According to Heidegger, entities have a meaning. The entities are not isolated from the context in which they are located. Context is the world. Entities gain a meaning by their relationship with other entities in the world. These relationships between entities are different from each other. Being in this sense is the world and the possibility on this context.[77]

[77] Michael Lewis-Tanja Staehler, "Martin Heidegger" trans. Mehmet Dermihan in *Fenomenoloji*, (Ankara: Fol Kitap, 2019), 113-116.

CHAPTER III

TRUTH IN THE THOUGHT OF HEIDEGGER

3.1. Introduction

The relationship between truth and Being has been the subject of philosophy from ancient times. We can start the history on this topic with Parmenides. Parmenides is the first name to discover the Being of entities. Parmenides identified the perceptive understanding of Being with Being. According to Aristotle, the philosophers before him were guided by the things themselves. This situation forced philosophers to ask new questions. In this regard, Parmenides made a study of what shows itself in itself. Aristotle also expressed this guidance as a compulsion of truth. For Aristotle, these researches meant philosophy "on the truth" or "within the scope of the truth". Here we arrive at Aristotle's definition of philosophy. For him, philosophy is the science on truth. According to Aristotle, philosophy is also a science that examines the entities as entities, in other words, based on its Being.[78]

After referring to Parmenides' and Aristotle's analysis of Being in the context we pointed out above, Heidegger asks the following questions: What does research about truth and "science of the truth" mean? What does the statement of truth signify? What ontic-ontological relationship does truth have with Dasein? Is it possible to show the reasons for the relationship between truth and Being? According to Heidegger, these questions cannot be avoided since Being is together with truth.[79] Thus, the Western tradition has forgotten the meaning of Being and also the truth that belongs to the foundation of Being. So Heidegger thinks that the meaning of Being and truth is obscured by the Western tradition itself, and especially by various reality theories.

[78] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 256.
[79] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 256.

Because truth depends on the idea of Being, the meaning of truth, like Being, has not been clarified.[80]

In Heidegger's thought, a link is established between the forgetting of the question of the meaning of Being and the degeneration of traditional philosophy's approach to art. Art's connection with Being has been severed, and as a result, its relation to the truth has not been understood. In traditional philosophy, truth has been considered as true knowledge, knowledge appropriate to its object or knowledge of the Absolute or beauty. However, Heidegger rejects the traditional conception of truth and states that art deals with truth, not beautiful and beauty. According to Heidegger, art cannot be understood by being reduced to beauty. He states that what is beautiful in fine arts is not art, on the contrary, art creates beauty.[81] Heidegger studies the work of art as something that reveals the Being of entities. The truth of the entites is evaluated as the opening up of the Being of entities. While the truth of the entities set itself into the work of art, art set itself into the truth.[82] In order to examine how this happens, the phenomenon of truth should be limited and the issues it contains should be determined. In order to do this, we will first consider how the traditional concept of truth emerged.

3.2. The Traditional Conception of Truth, and its Ontological Foundations

According to Heidegger, the traditional understanding of truth and the first definition of truth are based on three theses:

First Thesis: The place of truth is assertion (judgment).

Second Thesis: The essence of truth lies in the agreement of assertion with its object.

Third Thesis: Aristotle, the father of logic, determined that the primary place of truth is the assertion. It also paved the way for the definition of "truth" to be established as "agreement".[83]

[80] Suvák, "The Essence of Truth (aletheia)," 4.
[81] Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," 162.
[82] Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," 165.
[83] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 257.

After listing these three theses in *Being and Time*, Heidegger attributes a founding importance to Aristotle on the traditional concept of truth. According to Heidegger, Aristotle's expression "*pathemata tes psykhes ton pragmaton homoiomata*" caused the essence of truth to be formulated as *adaequatio intellectus et rei*. That is, the experiences of the soul (ie *noemata* or representations) are likening to things. Heidegger argues that this definition was not actually put forward to clearly define the essence of truth. However, this definition has been decisive in the definition of truth.[84]

It is useful to examine Heidegger's interpretations in *Plato's Doctrine of Truth*, as it provides important clues about Heidegger's understanding of truth and includes some clear analyzes on the roots of the concept of traditional truth. In this text, Heidegger makes a new reading of the allegory of the cave in Plato's *The Republic*, starting from his own position. According to Heidegger, Plato's claim is clear: Plato gives an example of the essence of education with the allegory of the cave, that is, he concentrates on making the essence of *paideia* visible and known. According to him, Plato states that *paideia* does not mean to pour information into the soul that is not ready, as if it were poured into an empty container. Because education captures the soul of humans, directs them to Being, and harmonizes humans to education. The allegory of the cave aims to illustrate this process by illustrating it.[85] But more fundamentally Heidegger thinks that this allegory is intended to mark Plato's doctrine of truth. In making this assessment, Heidegger first proposes a point of view: According to him, a thinker's doctrine is based more on what he does not say than what he says.[86] But it is necessary to analyze what has been said to find what is not said. For this reason, he deals with the allegory of the cave in four stages: In the first stage, people are inside the cave, bound in chains. At this stage, no one thinks that there might be something hidden. In the second stage, the removal of the chains is described. People are still in the cave, but they also have a certain freedom. Because now they can turn in all directions. In other words, they get closer to the entity. In the third stage we see real freedom. One person was taken outside the cave. Each stage is

[84] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 257; On the predicted agreement between language, thought, and Being in Aristotelian logic, see also: Kasım Küçükalp, Ahmet Cevizci, *Batı Düşüncesi – Felsefi Temeller* (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2017), 71, 186.
[85] Martin Heidegger, "Plato's Doctrine of Truth," trans. Thomas Sheehan, *Pathmarks*, ed. William McNeil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 167.
[86] Heidegger, "Plato's Doctrine of Truth", 155.

a step towards what is not hidden. **Unhiddenness** (Unverborgenheit) in the third stage refers to the most obvious situation in all stages. This emphasis on unhiddenness is very important. Because education can only be carried out on the basis of unhiddenness. In Heidegger's words, the essence of education is based on the essence of truth. In the fourth stage, there is a return to the cave. The struggle between what comes from outside the cave and what is inside the cave is told. Like the other three stages of the allegory, this stage is related to *aletheia*. According to Heidegger, the reason why allegory is based on the image of a cave is *aletheia*. The main issue in allegory is the transitions between scenes. These transitions form the key points of direct exit to the sun from where the sun is illuminated. What determines the essence of thinking here is the *idea*, that is, the light itself.[87] He resolves this essence based on Plato's passages:

> then one may draw the conclusion -gathered together (from the highest idea itself)- that obviously for all people this [idea of the good] is the original source [*Ur-sache*] both of all that is right (in their comportment) and of all that is beautiful [517 c].
>
> that anyone who is concerned to act with prudential insight, either in personal matters or in public affairs, must have this in view (namely, the idea that, insofar as it is the enabling of the essence of idea, is called the good). [517 c4/5].
>
> she herself is mistress in that she bestows unhiddenness (on what shows itself) and at the same time imparts apprehension (of what is unhidden). [517 c4].[88]

On the basis of this, Heidegger argues that the allegory of the cave does not deal with *aletheia*, but contains Plato's doctrine of truth. Because, according to him, the basis of allegory is the process in which *idea* gains dominance over *aletheia*. *Idea* is the primary resource for Plato that everyone should consider. Moreover, it is the owner who bestows unhiddenness and insight. At this point Heidegger makes the following comment: *Aletheia* is now under the yoke of *idea*. According to Heidegger, the expression of the *idea* as the host of unhiddenness and insight points to another unspoken thing: In this case, the essence of the truth has to give up its essential feature of unhiddenness and shift towards the essence of the *idea*.[89]

[87] Heidegger, "Plato's Doctrine of Truth," 168-175.
[88] Heidegger, "Plato's Doctrine of Truth," 175-176.
[89] Heidegger, "Plato's Doctrine of Truth," 176.

Heidegger points out that if, as Plato said, there is an idea to be seen in all that exists, always and everywhere, the whole effort must be to make this seeing possible. The correct vision is what is needed in this situation. He also evaluates the transition processes in the allegory of the cave as an expression of the vision becoming more correct. Seeing and knowing finally looks at the highest *idea* and adapts to it. The superiority of the *idea* over *aletheia* causes a transformation in the essence of truth, and as a result, truth becomes the correctness of understanding and explanation (*orthotes*). According to Heidegger, the position of truth also undergoes a change with this transformation. Truth as unhiddenness is a fundamental feature of entities. However, truth now becomes the determinant of human behavior as the correctness of the vision.[90]

Heidegger states that there is an inevitable ambiguity in Plato's doctrine. Because what is meant is the thought of correctness of the vision even though the *aletheia* is being discussed. Heidegger expresses that we encounter an ambiguity similar to Aristotle. In the closing chapter of Chapter 9 of *Metaphysics*, Aristotle speaks of unhiddenness as the main feature of the entities that dominate everything.[91] Heidegger points to another thesis of Aristotle: "In fact, the false and the true are not in things (themselves) . . . but in the intellect."[92] This thesis points to the judgment and expression of the mind as the place of truth, falsehood, and the difference between the two. The reference to this determination of the essence of truth is not *aletheia*. We see that the understanding of correctness of thinking replaces *aletheia*. Based on this analysis of the views of Heidegger, Plato and Aristotle, he points to a fundamental shift in perception of the essence of truth. Since Plato and Aristotle, considering *aletheia* as truth, in other words, considering the essence of truth as both the correctness of representation and expression has become the norm for Western thought. According to Heidegger, we can take the view of Thomas Aquinas as a continuation of the same line. For Aquinas, the place of truth is the mind. Truth can only be encountered in the mind. At this point, then, truth is *homoiosis* (*adaequatio*), not *aletheia*. Heidegger states that at the beginning of the modern period, Descartes exacerbated this view. According to

[90] Heidegger, "Plato's Doctrine of Truth," 176-177.
[91] Heidegger, "Plato's Doctrine of Truth", 178.
[92] Heidegger, "Plato's Doctrine of Truth", 178. Aristotle, "Metaphysics," 88, [1027b17-1028a8].

Descartes, the only place of truth and falsehood is the mind.[93] In terms of being a critical threshold, attention is also drawn to Kant's position in *Being and Time*.

In the *Critique of Pure Mind*, Kant expresses it as follows:

> The old and famous question with which the logicians were to be driven into a corner and brought to such a pass that they must either fall into a corner and brought to such a pass that they must either fall into a miserable circle or else confess their ignorance, hence the vanity of their entire art, is this: What is truth? The nominal definiton of truth, namely that it is the agreement of cognition with its object, is here granted and presupposed, but one demands to know what is the general and certain criterion of the truth of any cognition.[94]

In the continuation of these statements, Kant makes the determination that cognition is false if it is not in agreement with the object to which it is attributed.[95] Kant also states that truth and illusion are in judgment about the object, not the object.[96] Referring to these theses of Kant, Heidegger emphasizes that Kant's adherence to the traditional concept of truth has been overlooked.[97]

Heidegger states that at a time when the modern age was beginning to complete itself, Nietzsche appeared as a representative of the traditional understanding of truth. Nietzsche explains the truth as follows: "Truth is the kind of error without which a certain species of life could not live. The value for life is ultimately decisive."[98] Heidegger says that treating truth as an error indicates that its essence is seen by Nietzsche as a thought. According to Heidegger, determining truth as incorrectness of thinking is compatible with accepting truth as correctness of assertion. According to him, throughout this tradition, a truth in the sense of correctness of the gaze and the direction of the gaze has been sought. Heidegger states that the point of departure of metaphysics in Plato can also be seen as the beginning of humanism since the correctness of thinking puts people at a central place among entities. Since Plato, the

[93] Heidegger, "Plato's Doctrine of Truth," 178-179.
[94] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 197, [A 58].
[95] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 197, [B 83].
[96] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 384, [B 350].
[97] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 258.
[98] Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, trans. Walter Kaufmann, (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), 272, [number 493].

change in the essence of truth has followed the historical change of metaphysics. So according to Heidegger, Plato's doctrine of truth is not in the past, it is in the present.[99]

Heidegger's evaluations based on *Plato's Doctrine of Truth* also point to the foundations of his understanding of art. According to him, although there were intense artistic activities before Plato and Aristotle, there is not yet a theory of art. There is no need to put forward a theory of art. Because theory puts something into a representative conceptualization process. The basic concepts that determine the limits of all future research were formed in the period of Plato and Aristotle, and philosophy was organized as a whole during this period.[100] However, in the Presocratic period, the attitude of the Greeks was to openness and to be exposed to what stood before them. Heidegger considers this attitude as an attitude of being ready for the potential of revealing the truth of Being. Within the framework of such an understanding of Being, art appears with the concept of *techne* as a knowing or disclosing, not as a production in the sense we understand today.[101] It can be thought with this point that Heidegger spoke from a position other than the approaches that treat the artist as a founding and genius subject to the work of art. In addition, this understanding of Being of the Greeks means that according to Heidegger they saw an inseparable link between ethics and art. The replacement of the ethical understanding of art with the aesthetic understanding of art is considered by Heidegger as the death of great art. Heidegger points to a form of relation in aesthetics other than the concept of *techne*. In aesthetic thought, the work of art is positioned as an object in front of a subject. There is a relationship in which the subject-object relationship is determinative in aesthetic understanding.[102] According to Heidegger, the death of great art and this transformation in the positioning of art started with Plato. In the process that eliminates the conceptualization of ethical art and leads to the death of great art, Heidegger points out two issues: The first is Plato's conceptualization of real beings as *eidos* (ideas). The second is the conceptualization of matter as transforming it into a form.[103] Heidegger also states that the ideas in Plato's thought determine the conception of

[99] Heidegger, "Plato's Doctrine of Truth," 179-180.
[100] Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche, Vol. 1: The Will to Power as Art, Vol. 2: The Eternal Recurrance of the Same*, trans. David Farell Krell (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1991), 80.
[101] Young, *Heidegger's Philosophy of Art*, 18.
[102] Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, 78.
[103] Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, 80.

beauty. In Plato's thought, it was previously mentioned that real entities are *ideas* and that entities are real at the rate in which they share *ideas*. Heidegger states that in Plato's thought, the really beautiful are also positioned as *ideas*. According to him, this understanding replaced the understanding that sees the beauty of the Greek thought as the truth. Over time, the similarity to the *ideas* disappeared and the resemblance to the superficial appearance remained. In this case, only an imitation can be mentioned in art. Art can now be a flawed copy of the *ideas* that model our concept of beauty. As a result of this justification, the painters are sent to exile in *The Republic*. However, Heidegger says that beauty is "the existence of truth in the work and as work".[104] This area, which we have pointed out regarding the relationship between the process that reaches the understanding of truth as agreement with Heidegger's view of art, will be examined in more detail in the fourth chapter.

According to Heidegger, the understanding that characterizes the truth as agreement, *adaequatio*, *homoiosis* is very general and empty. But there is also some truth to this characterization. In order to understand this, it should be understood what kind of relationship lies on the basis of agreement.[105] According to Heidegger, the agreement of one thing to another has the formal character of one thing's relation to another. Every agreement is a relationship. Truth is also a relationship. But the same cannot be said for the opposite. In other words, not all relationships are agreements. For example, a sign points to indicated. The indicate is a relation, but it does not imply the agreement of the sign with the indicated. Heidegger's example for this case is the relationship between the numbers 6 and the numbers 16-10. The question "how much" makes an agreement visible. However, equality is only one of the ways of agreement. Heidegger states that the properties of relational elements are important for elucidating a truth relation.[106]

The key question here is: How can *intellectus* and *res* agree? If the real and rational are not equal, but similar to each other, does this provide an agreement? According to the general belief, knowledge is to give a subject "as it is". However, agreement has

[104] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 206. Bolt, *Heidegger Reframed*, 128-130.
[105] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 258.
[106] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 258.

the character "**just as**" (So–Wie) in Heidegger's words. Heidegger states that it is insufficient to make assumptions to understand what basis the truth relationship is based on.[107] Heidegger states that it is knowledge that is true according to the general belief. But knowledge means making a judgment. According to Heidegger, two things have to be distinguished when it comes to judgment:

1) Judgment as a real psychic process

2) Judged as ideal content

Heidegger states that the latter has been judged to be "truth". The real psychic process either present-at-hand or is not. Based on this, Heiddegger states that what is in the relationship of agreement is the ideal content of judgment. In other words, the relationship of agreement is about a relationship between the ideal judgment content and the real thing about which judgment is made.[108]

What is the relationship between ideal entities and real and present-at-hand entities? Heidegger thinks this relationship should be asked. In fact, the subject comes to the question of what is subsisting. In other words, the epistemological issue arises again in terms of the subject-object relationship.[109]

Reality is an important subject of discussion in modern Western philosophy. The question is whether there is a realm of material objects outside and independent of a human subject, and if so, how to prove it.[110] According to Heidegger, attempts such as believing in the reality of the external world, proving this reality or assuming this reality are meaningless. Because he expresses that these attempts assume a wordless subject. This subject is a subject who is unsure of his own world and wants to provide himself with the guarantee of the world. For Heidegger, the problem is not whether the outside world is real or not. The problem is not how the outside world exists. The problem is that the external world is first epistemologically buried in nothingness and

[107] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 258.
[108] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 259.
[109] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 259.
[110] Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, 94-95.

then trying to prove its existence through proofs.[111] The expectation for evidence was born out of a misunderstanding of Dasein's relationship to its world. This false expectation arises from misinterpreting Dasein's Being and the Being of the world.[112] The relation of agreement, which is indicated by the traditional concept of truth, cannot be considered independent of this problem. According to Heidegger, various epistemological directions have not been mistaken because they are epistemology. The neglected issue is Dasein's existential analytics. This cannot be achieved by making some phenomenological corrections to the analytical concepts of subject and consciousness.[113]

According to Mulhall, Dasein cannot know if the world exists. Knowledge, doubt, belief, denial are Dasein's ways of dealing with phenomena in the world. In this sense, the world is not an object of knowledge. Because the world is not a single entity or a set of entities. Entities appear in the world and are based on an ontological set of relationships. The world is in this sense a field or a horizon. This approach distinguishes itself from the Cartesian approach, which sees the world as a large object or collection of objects, leading to epistemological skepticism.[114]

Dasein is the possibility of understanding entities within their own Being and revealing them in their current state. If there is Dasein, there is Being. It is here that separates the Heideggerian understanding of truth from the traditional understanding of truth. Because, in traditional understanding, truth depends on the agreement of what is said with reality, as stated above. In this understanding, according to Mulhall, the existence or disappearance of human beings does not change anything. Of course, if there are creatures capable of speaking, the truth can be spoken in the world. But, the conditions of utterance and truthfulness are completely different from each other. Unlike Mulhall, Suvak expresses that the subject determines the truth in the relationship between *subjectum* and *objectum* in Cartesian thought. That is, truth cannot be talked about without the subject's proposition. As a natural consequence of this, in the modern

[111] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 250.
[112] Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, 95.
[113] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 250.
[114] Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, 96-97.

period, the concept of truth has been handled as an epistemological issue. However, this point of view is not correct from the Heideggerian perspective because it contains a certain understanding of truth on the basis of the problem of knowledge.[115] For this reason, the situation is different in Heidegger's thought. If truth is a matter of agreement between judgment and reality, truth cannot be independent of Dasein. Dasein's existence is a condition for the existence of truth.[116] That it does not mean that truth is determined by Dasein. In other words, Heidegger's approach to the concept of truth cannot be considered separate from Dasein's fundamental ontology. The fact that his examination of truth in *Being and Time* comes after Dasein analysis also shows this. The essence of truth is investigated from the perspective of Dasein's Being. The question of truth is also associated with the examination of the question of Being independently from dogmatic assumptions. This question can only be asked by Dasein. Because unlike other entities, only Dasein can reflect on the meaning of Being and its own Being.[117] While researching the primordial phenomenon of truth, we will again examine the relationship between Dasein and truth.

Heidegger gives an example of an assertion expressed by a person with his back to the wall. This person expresses the assertion of "the picture on the wall is hanging askew". According to Heidegger, the correctness of this assertion does not depend on a mental representation of the picture. The accuracy of the assertion depends on whether the assertion is in agreement with the picture itself. The proof of this can only be obtained by turning the person and looking at the wall. According to Heidegger, the assertion is the Being that toward the thing itself. Here, what is proven through perception is that the entity in question exists exactly as itself. A second question arises here: What ensures confirming the assertion? Heidegger states that it is not agreement that provides confirmation. It is not the agreement of the contents of consciousness among themselves that provides confirmation. Only **Being-uncovered** (Entdeckt-sein) is

[115] Suvák, "The Essence of Truth (aletheia)," 4; For an analysis on the meaning of seeing truth as an epistemologically based issue, see also, Kasım Küçükalp, *Varlık Problemi Bağlamında Düşünmenin İmkanı*, (İstanbul: İlem Yayınları, 2014), 10-14.
[116] Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, 98-99
[117] Suvák, "The Essence of Truth (aletheia)," 6.

what is to be confirmed. In other words, confirming is possible by showing the entity itself as itself. The manifestation of the entity as it is also the basis for confirming.[118]

Heidegger states that to say that an assertion is true means the entity is uncovered in itself. In other words, assertion shows the entity in its own **uncoveredness** (Entdecktheit). The function of assertion is to make visible (*apophansis*) what is uncovered. The Being-true of assertion should be understood as Being-uncovering. As a result, truth is not the agreement between knowing and object in the sense that one entity is likened to another.

3.3. The Primordial Phenomenon of Truth

Heidegger draws attention to one point in starting his analysis of the primordial phenomenon of truth: The purpose of the definition of truth that he is trying to make is not an effort to throw tradition away. Heidegger argues that tradition should essentially be appropriated to ourselves.[119] For this, it is necessary to examine the course of traditional theory. How did traditional theory come to the idea of agreement, based on the phenomenon of primordial truth? After making an analysis on this question, it is time to point out the roots of his understanding of truth.

According to Heidegger, "Being-true (truth) means Being-uncovering." This definition is not an arbitrary definition for him. This definition does not mean that tradition is abandoned to nullity. This definition, which seems arbitrary at first sight, was, according to him, originally perceived and pre-phenomenologically distinguished in the oldest tradition of ancient philosophy.[120] Heidegger explains this awareness with a concept analysis as follows:

> If a *logos* as *apophansis* is to be true, its Being-true is aletheuein in the manner of apophainesthai, -of taking entities out of their hiddenness and letting them be seen in their unhiddenness (their uncoveredness). The *aletheia* which Aristotle equates with *pragma* and *phainomena* in the passages cited above, signifies the 'things

[118] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 260-261.
[119] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 262.
[120] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 262.

> themselves'; it signifies what shows itself-entities in the 'how' of their uncoveredness.[121]

Before examining Heidegger's analysis, it is useful to examine the *logos*, which is an important part of this conceptual analysis. One of the difficulties in interpreting the concept is that logos is widely used and does not have a precise meaning. Another difficulty is when the logos started to be used in a unique sense. At this point, we see Heraclitus, in which the word logos played a major role for the first time. Herakletios often used the *logos* in common usage. However, there is also a special and technical approach that focuses on *logos*. This approach is related to the meaning of proportion in the common use of logos. In Heraclitus thought, logos are the underlying organizing principle of the universe.[122] The fragment that Heidegger subjected to analysis is as follows:

> But of this account, which holds forever, people forever prove uncomprehending, both before they have heard it and when once they have heard it. For, although all things happen in accordance with this account, they are like people *without* experience when they experience words and deeds such as I set forth, distinguishing (as I do) each thing according to (its) real constitution, ie, pointing out how it *is*. The rest of mankind, however, fail to be aware of what they do after they wake up just as they forget what they do while asleep.[123]

Heidegger draws attention to the above-mentioned use of the phenomenon of truth in this fragment of Heraclitus, one of the earliest philosophical doctrines that explicitly mention *logos*. According to him, in this fragment, the phenomenon of truth emerges as uncoveredness. Heidegger thinks this is not a coincidence. In this fragment, those who are aware of *logos* and those who are not aware of *logos* are positioned at opposite points. Heidegger points to the aforementioned meaning of *logos*. According to this meaning, *logos* is *phrazon hokos ekhei*. In other words, logos is the thing that expresses how the entity behaves, that is, the general arrangement principle. For those who do not understand, what they do is hidden (*lanthanei*). Those who remain in hiddenness, i.e. those that are hidden, are *epilanthanontai*, that is, the forgotten ones. In other words, they are those who have fallen into hiddenness again. Heidegger concludes here: Unhiddenness belongs to *a-letheia*. The translation of this concept as truth has veiled the spontaneous understandability inherent in the concept.[124]

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[121] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 262.
[122] F. E. Peters, *Greek Philosophical Terms-A Historical Lexicon*, (New York: New York University Press, 1967), 110-111.
[123] Heraclitus, *Fragments*, trans. T. M. Robinson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 10-11, [Fragment 1, Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 7.132].
[124] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 262.

So *aletheia* contains a meaning that the modern concept of truth erases. Heidegger states that the first ancient thinkers (Heidegger calls Parmenides and Heraclitus not as a philosopher but as thinkers) saw Being as what made the disclosure of entities possible. Heidegger also refers to Parmenides as a source for what he says in this context. The goddess of truth, who guides Parmenides, confronts him in two different ways: On the one hand, there is uncovering, on the other hand there is hiding.[125] In this approach, we see that Being is equated with truth in the original sense. **Disclosedness** (Erschlossenheit) is the essence of truth. As a result, *aletheia* still means unhiddenness, similar to what it was originally in Greek thought for Heidegger. On this basis, we can say that in Heidegger's thought the concept of *aletheia* implies a strife of unhiddenness and hiding. This strife can be considered together with the strife of the world and the earth in the work of art. However, the thoughts of Heraclitus and Parmenides pointed out above have undergone a transformation. Heidegger even argues that these names were not only misunderstood by Plato, but increasingly deformed and misrepresented.[126] Heidegger sees this as a turning point and the real starting point of Western metaphysics. According to him, the reason why the thought of focusing on Being as *un-concealment* disappeared is Socrates' polemic method with sophists and the rise of the Platonic dialectic. As stated earlier, Heidegger analyzes this issue in *Plato's Doctrine of Truth* with reference to the allegory of the cave in Book VII of *The Republic*. According to him, the *idea* of Platonic truth has an important role in establishing the correctness of perception. The idea of Presocratic truth as the "disclosedness of Being" (*aletheia*) has been transformed into meaning, along with the Platonic idea of truth, into the "correctness of perception". Because Being in Plato are *ideas* that occupy a superior position. As such, the truth cannot be understood as the unhidennes of Being. Truth is now understood as the correct perspective of a superior Being. In other words, truth is the agreement between *idea* and thought.[127] This situation can also be considered as the domination of truth by *ideas*. Another conclusion that can be deduced from these evaluations based on Plato's doctrine of

[125] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 265.
[126] Jean Beaufret, *Dialogue with Heidegger*, trans. Mark Sinclair (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 24.
[127] Heidegger, "Plato's Doctrine of Truth," 182-182; On the necessity for the object in Plato's thought to be of the same character as the knowledge of the object, see also: Küçükalp, Cevizci, *Batı Düşüncesi*, 63.

truth is the following: Heidegger sees Plato as the founder of subjectivist dualism long before Descartes.[128]

The next stop of Heidegger's interpretation of the truth we have examined above is Dasein. But before we move on to the analysis of the truth-Dasein relationship, we need to dwell on an important criticism of Heidegger. One of the strongest criticisms of Heidegger's understanding of the concept of truth as *a-letheia* was brought by Heidegger's student Paul Friedländer. In fact, Heidegger draws attention to one point when analyzing the concept from the definition of truth he gave: It is not just the explanation of a word. He also expresses that while doing concept analysis, one should not fall into an uninhibited word mysticism. According to Heidegger, the main job of philosophy is to save Dasein's words from the incomprehensibility. Because words are reduced to incomprehensibility due to their ordinary understanding.[129] But the criticisms he received suggest that when analyzing Heidegger's concept of *aletheia* we should also consider the possibility that he might have fallen into some kind of word mysticism. Friedländer's critique is a philological critique he developed in the context of his writings on Plato. Friedländer basically objects to Heidegger's etymological analysis and the meaning he ascribes to the Greek term *aletheia*. According to Friedländer, Heidegger's etymological interpretation has no basis in Greek literature. Therefore, he critizes Heidegger's conceptualization of *aletheia* as un-hiddenness. According to Friedländer, *aletheia* also means correctness of perception.[130] Friedländer gives examples to support his argument. It also shows that the words *atrekeia* and *akribeia*, which share the same semantic form as *aletheia*, mean "accuracy", "correctness" or "truth". *Aletheia* has no single meaning.[131] In other words, this concept cannot be evaluated by reducing it to a single meaning. In conclusion, Friedländer argues that the Greek concept of truth does not change from the unhiddenness of Being to the correctness of perception.[132] Basically, Heidegger claims that understanding the concept of *aletheia* as correctness of perception is based

[128] Oğuz Haşlakoğlu, *Platon Düşüncesinde Tekhne-Sanat ve Felsefenin Ortak Kökeni Üzerine Bir İnceleme*, (Ankara: Sentez Yayıncılık, 2016), 176.
[129] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 262.
[130] Paul Friedlander, *Plato: An Introduction*, trans. Hans Meyerhoff (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), 229.
[131] Friedlander, *Plato*, 222.
[132] Friedlander, *Plato*, 229.

on a misinterpretation of Greek thought. But later, in his conference entitled *The End of Philosophy*, Heidegger acknowledges that at first, it was experienced as the correctness of representations and statements. But Heidegger thinks that this does not completely falsify his position. This historical fact does not mean that the *aletheia* as correctness is ontologically before unconcealment. The concept of unconcealment represents the most fundamental pre-ontological phenomenon for Heidegger.[133]

Heidegger points out that truth, Being, and Dasein are related. Dasein is able to understand Being through disclosedness. He can create his understanding of Being only in this way. Being and truth exist equally and essentially. According to Heidegger, if there is truth, Being exists. The existence condition of truth is Dasein. So if Dasein exists, there is truth.[134] Being-true as Being-uncovering is Dasein's way of Being, which is the condition of existence of truth. It is the truth itself that makes uncovering possible. The existential-ontological foundations of uncovering itself constitute the basis that makes visible the essential phenomenon of truth. For Dasein, uncovering is a way of Being-in-the-world. Uncoveredness exists with and through Dasein. Hence, the way to reach the ultimate phenomenon of truth is Dasein's disclosedness. Heidegger states that Dasein exists in truth.[135] He analyzes this ontological statement in four items:

1. **"To Dasein's state of Being, disclosedness (*Erschlossenheit*) in general essentially belongs."**

Disclosedness is an ontological term for Dasein to be understood in **Being-in-itself** (An-sich-sein). Dasein is not locked inside itself, with its structure open to Being. This fundamental opening of its existence is Dasein's possibility of Being. Thanks to this openness, Dasein can come across with its own self or anything.[136] Disclosedness is included in the whole structure-of-Being that is marked by the phenomenon of **care** (sorge). To care belongs to both Being-in-the-world and **Being alongside** (Sein-bei) **entities within-the-world** (innerweltlich). The Being of Dasein and the disclosedness

[133] Suvák, "The Essence of Truth (aletheia)," 10-12. Friedlander, *Plato*, 221-229.
[134] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 272.
[135] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 263.
[136] Schalow, Denker, *Historical Dictionary of Heidegger's Philosophy*, 96.

of Dasein are equally essential to the disclosedness of the within-the-world.[137] We can think of this equally essential situation with Heidegger's interpretation of the status of the subject. The central problem about the ontology of the scientific mind is the status of the subject. Heidegger states that this situation points to a problem for ontotheological conceptions of substance since Palton and Aristotle. In the modern period, this problem becomes completely clear with Descartes' dualist metaphysics of mind and matter. For Descartes, the world is a mechanistic field of material objects.[138] However, there is no privileged status of the subject in Heidegger. Being alongside entities within-the-world is an explanatory concept of Dasein's status. This ground will also constitute the context in Heidegger's positioning of the artist. For Heidegger speaks of a position outside of any interpretation where the artist is positioned as a kind of genius or founding subject, apart from the work of art. We will discuss this issue in the fourth chapter.

2. "To Dasein's state of Being belongs *thrownness* (Geworfenheit); indeed it is constitutive for Dasein's disclosedness."

Heidegger points to disclosedness as a concept that establishes thrownness. As a result of its thrownness, Dasein is in a certain world. In other words, Dasein is not an external subject that interprets what is happening from a position other than the existing ones. Dasein is in a certain environment of existing entities. In this sense, facticity belongs to disclosedness.[139] Thrownness also points to the facticity of Dasein, and it also belongs to Dasein. Thrownness does not indicate a finished or settled state of reality. Dasein is turbulent in a state of thrownness and exists factually. This also indicates being thrown into the **projection** (entwurf). Thrownness and projection are basically related.[140] Dasein is not the basis of its own existence. Instead, it has been irrevocably thrown into the world.[141] This is also related to its tendency to distinguish Dasein from

[137] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 264.
[138] David West, *An Introduction to Continental Philosophy*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), 98; For an analysis of the understanding of truth revealed by the mechanistic universe conception in Descartes' thought, see also, Küçükalp, Cevizci, *Batı Düşüncesi*, 141.
[139] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 264.
[140] Schalow, Denker, *Historical Dictionary of Heidegger's Philosophy*, 271-272.
[141] Dahlstrom, *The Heidegger Dictionary*, 212.

other entities. This feature is Dasein's own Being and its tendency to think about Being. Thrownness has made this the fate of Dasein in a sense.

It was stated above that Dasein did not determine the truth and that Dasein exists in a certain world. Another point to be expressed is that at the center of Heidegger's thought is not the individual subject, but the Being itself. This determination points to Heidegger's critique of Western metaphysics. According to Heidegger, the Western metaphysical tradition has positioned Being as a kind of objective Being. It is a serious mistake to determine the Being in this way and to separate the subject from the Being absolutely. Heidegger's return to Presocratic thought, where a sharp distinction has not yet been made between subject and object, is related to the Being's self-centered approach. For this reason, Enlightenment rationality, which ruthlessly tends to control nature, is not a reference for Heidegger. Heidegger has an understanding that leads to Being, turning his face towards the world, the source of primary meanings. The context of thrownness into the world is that Dasein is "there", that is, it is in the world. What is certain for Dasein, whose status towards the past and future is uncertain, is that he will die. It is the Being that establishes Dasein's relationship with nature and other entities. In this framework, the world is not positioned outside of Dasein. For Dasein, the world is not an object that he watches and tries to understand. Existence can be explained as a dialogue of the world with Dasein being thrown into the world.[142]

Therefore, it is not possible for Dasein to grasp the world objectively as a natural result of being among other human beings and entities in the world and being thrown into the world. This understanding is in contradiction with the scientific world view, which sees human, nature and every existing thing as an object of study. Heidegger's concepts of thrownness and Being-in-the-world also refer to the problems of the idea that the world can be known or represented by mental effort. Heidegger makes the world questioned along with these concepts, such as thinking about the world or knowing it through its representation in our minds. In other words, he makes the problems of Cartesian thought more clear by his phenomenological method. Heidegger thinks that the skeptical view towards Being is meaningless. According to him, Dasein

[142] Terry Eagleton, *Literary Theory*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), p. 55.

is never alone with his thoughts. There is an unbreakable bond between Dasein and the Being-in-the-world state. The way to understand the world is not to look at it objectively. For what defines existence cannot be reduced to thought. The conception of Being must also encompass Dasein's relationship to all entities and human beings. Only in this way can one enter the path of understanding Being and truth.[143]

3. "To Dasein's state of Being belongs *projection*-disclosive Being towards its potentiality-for-Being."

For Dasein, there are ways to understand itself. Dasein can understand itself from the world, from others, or from its potentiality-for-Being. That is, it can be disclosed on its own based on its potentiality-for-Being. The truth of Being is Dasein's ultimate disclosedness based on and with reference to its potentiality-for-Being.[144] In this context, projection appears as the existential structure of understanding. The character of understanding as projection coexists with Being-in-the-world and Dasein's disclosedness. Projection points to an area for the possibilities for Dasein to exist. But projecting does not refer to a pre-thought plan.[145]

Projection does not refer to a pre-thought plan because the subsistence ground of the essence of truth is the freedom of Dasein. It is Dasein that discloses freedom. Moreover, according to Heidegger, the fact that the essence of truth is Dasein as the ground of subsistence does not mean to subordinate the truth to human caprice. Besides, Heidegger presents freedom as the essence of truth itself. For him, the essence of truth reveals itself as freedom. This reveals the central importance of Dasein analysis in the Heideggerian understanding of truth. Heidegger expresses freedom as "as letting entities be". This expression does not indicate a situation of indifference. On the contrary, there is a situation of engage on the open and its openness.[146]

[143] Bolt, *Heidegger Reframed*, 3-4.
[144] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 264.
[145] Schalow, Denker, *Historical Dictionary of Heidegger's Philosophy*, 235-236.
[146] Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth", 143-145.

Freedom understood as to let entities be has a direct relation to the essence of truth. This freedom completes the essence of truth in the revealing of the entities. In other words, according to Heidegger, truth can be understood on the basis of this understanding of freedom, which is included in the projection. Truth cannot be reduced to a subject's correct proposition about the object that is valid elsewhere without ground and context. The relation of Dasein as a Being-in-the-world with truth as the basis of freedom's subsistence makes it historical. This is a feature unique to Dasein only. For example, *physis*, which is the context in which the existing entity discloses itself as a whole, that is, nature does not have a history.[147]

4. "To Dasein's state of Being belongs *falling*".

Dasein has been lost. Heidegger states that this happens primarily and mostly in Dasein's own world. Dasein's tendency to think about Being and entities in its lostness points to a ground on the concept of projection. Falling forms the basis for understanding by moving from as a projection upon possibilities of Being. [148] Falling appears in this context as an existential mode of Being-in-the-world. Dasein in **everdayness** (Alltäglichkeit) does not exist in an individualized manner. Dasein exists in a state that has fallen into the world and a ground to **be absorbed** (aufgehen).[149] This fall is not after something. In other words, there is no assumption of a previous state similar to that of the fall of original sin. In this fall, the world can be considered as part of Dasein's projection. Dasein falls into the world from itself. Dasein is in motion and threatened by alienation, temptation, and trap.[150] Dasein is absorbed on the groundlessness of his daily life. The absorption of Dasein in the **they** (Man) refers to an area of existence dominated by publicly interpreted. Those that are uncovered and disclosed in this area are in hidden and disguised mode. Among those that cause this are **idle talk** (Gerede), curiosity, and ambiguity. As a result of this absorption, Dasein moves away from its authenticity. This divergence is inherent in Dasein's thrownness and facticity. However, it is expressed by Heidegger that Being towards entities is not extinguished but uprooted. One point is highlighted here: Entities are not completely

[147] Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth", 145-146.
[148] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 265.
[149] Schalow, Denker, *Historical Dictionary of Heidegger's Philosophy*, 111-112.
[150] Dahlstrom, *The Heidegger Dictionary*, 72-73.

hidden. It is stated that entities are on the one hand uncovered and on the other hand disguised. Heidegger points to the **mode of semblance** (schein, illusion) as the cause of this situation. With the effect of the mode of semblance, those previously discovered (uncovered) may again fall into hidden and disguised. Because it is stated by Heidegger that Dasein is essentially falling. Another consequence of this is that Dasein exists in untruth in terms of state of Being. Both this situation and falling refer to an ontological situation. In addition, hidden and disguised are considered by Heidegger to be included in the facticity of Dasein. This assessment occupies an important place in the relationship between Dasein and truth in Heidegger's thought. The proposition Dasein exists in truth is equally essential as the proposition which is its direct opposite. That is, Dasein exists both in truth and in untruth. Dasein is disclosed as well as closed off. The same is true for entities within-the-world. Those who have the potential to encounter within the world are also in hidden and disguised when they are uncovered by Dasein.[151]

Uncovering is not a one-off action for Dasein. That is, entities within-the-world, once discovered, may not remain in a state of Being discovered forever. Heidegger states that Dasein has to constantly look out for what has been discovered before against semblance and disguised. In line with this, uncovering itself never takes place on a complete hidden ground. Because entities are visible in one way or another. This means that entities are already uncovered in a certain way. But at the same time, they are disguised. In this context, truth as uncoveredness is, according to Heidegger, something that is seized by force primarily from existing ones. In other words, it is stated that entities are stolen from hiddenness. From this coercive capture, Heidegger sees a reinforcing link between the Greeks' use of a negative word (*a-letheia*) about the essence of truth. On the basis of this bond, Dasein always exists in truth and untruth. This determination in truth and untruth is based on Dasein's entity constitution expressed as thrown projection. Thrown projection also brings out the structure of care of Dasein.[152] This situation should be considered together with the strife between world and earth, which we will examine in the fouth chapter.

[151] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 264-265.
[152] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 265. Heidegger, "Plato's Doctrine of Truth," 171.

The starting point in Heidegger's thinking is our everyday experience-in-the-world. But at this point we see the reason for Heidegger's concern: In this experience Dasein can forget the question of the meaning of Being because of its idle talk in everyday life. Since falling is a part of Dasein's existence, it is not a mistake that must be overcome. The danger is that Dasein will be absorbed into the-they by idle talk. Moreover, the everyday activities and practices of people do not constitute the fundamental question for Heidegger. The important issue for him is what they uncover or hidden about the Being of human beings and entities. Ultimately, the fundamental question in this context is whether Dasein in falling will be an authentic Dasein.[153]

To sum up, what has been derived from the existential-ontological interpretation of the phenomenon of truth can be grouped into two items. First, Dasein's disclosedness is essentially truth. The uncoveredness of entities within-the-world is considered to be included in Dasein's disclosedness. Second, as stated above, Dasein exists equally in truth and untruth.[154] However, the following emphasis of Heidegger is important in terms of showing the relationship of Dasein with Being and truth: Disclosedness establishes Dasein and as a result Dasein exists in truth. Disclosure is Dasein's type of Being. If there is Dasein, one can speak of truth. The condition of uncovering of existing entities is the Being of Dasein. Truths are truth as long as Dasein existence. If there is no Dasein, there can be no talk of Newton's laws, no contradiction proposition, in short, no truth. Disclosedness, uncovering, and uncoveredness can exist if Dasein is present. This determination of truths does not detract from the Being-true of truths. Heidegger cites Newton's laws to explain this situation. According to Heidegger, the discovery of Newton's laws made these laws true. That is, we cannot talk about the truth of Newton's laws before they are discovered. Heidegger points out that it should not be concluded that these laws are wrong before discovering. It cannot be said that it is true or false for Newton's laws before Newton. It cannot be said that those uncovered by discovery disappear before they are discovered. What can be said is that the laws are true, thanks to Newton. With the discovery of these laws, access to entities

[153] Bolt, *Heidegger Reframed*, 37-39.
[154] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 265.

was opened for Dasein. With the discovery of entities through laws, entities become visible the way they were before. This uncover is the kind of Being of truth.[155]

[155] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 269.

CHAPTER IV

ART IN THE THOUGHT OF HEIDEGGER

4.1. Introduction

For those who read Heidegger's thought by dividing it into "early period" and "late period", *The Origin of the Work of Art* marks the approximately beginning of Heidegger's late period thought. This date is the mid 1930s. The work in question was published in 1950, but the basis of the study is the lessons Heidegger gave in 1935.[156] With this study, an indirect continuity relationship between *Being and Time* can be mentioned, even if not directly. *Being and Time*, as we examined in the first three chapters, includes the first analyzes of the understanding of Being and truth, which is also important for the study of *The Origin of the Work of Art*, and conceptual analyzes that are important for Heidegger's understanding of art. *The Origin of the Work of Art* deals with the essentially neglected subject of art in *Being and Time*, and this work also includes some important innovations in Heiddegger's thought. As we will examine in the following pages, the introduction of the concept of the earth is one of the fundamental changes noteworthy.[157]

In *The Origin of the Work of Art*, Heidegger evaluates art in a different position than approaches that consider it as a description, representation, imitation. Heidegger rejects the notion that art is concerned only with beauty and pleasure, or that the work of art is primarily something and that aesthetic value is added to it later through a subjective point of view.[158] Heidegger also avoids the easy answer that the origin of the work of art is only the artist itself. Heidegger's position is closer to saying that the artwork is the source of the artist's existence and life.[159] Moreover, it is art that reveals to us what a thing actually is, and the Being of entities.[160] Art creates a world of its

[156] Michael Inwood, *Heidegger: A Very Short Introduction*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 116.
[157] Lewis-Staehler, "Martin Heidegger," 145.
[158] Inwood, *Heidegger*, 116.
[159] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 140.
[160] Inwood, *Heidegger*, 116.

own. According to Heidegger, the questions about **origin** (der Ursprung) point to the relationship between the basis of art and truth as *aletheia* or concealment. Because Heidegger explains art as setting-itself-into-work of truth. In other words, art means becoming and happening of truth. Work of art reveal the Being of entities and within this framework they show their origin in a special way.[161] In other words, the work of art constitutes a new way to bring to light the Being of entities without a malfunction.[162]

At the beginning of *The Origin of the Work of Art*, Heidegger says that word "origin" is used to mean where, what, and how something happened. In other words, he wants to think about the source of the Being of art. Because the origin of something points to its source. In this sense, the question of *The Origin of the Work of Art* also points to the origin of its essence. At this point, Heidegger states that the known and widespread view is the activity of the artist that reveals the work. In addition, he asks what constitutes the artist and replies "work" in response. So the source of the artist is the work. Heidegger emphasizes that there cannot be one without the other, the two elements are not interchangeable. There is a third element that gives the artist and the work its name: Art. Art is of decisive importance for the artist and the work both within themselves and in terms of their relations with each other. The work is the origin of the artist, and the artist is the origin of the work. Heidegger expresses this as a necessity, and likewise art is a necessity for artist and work.[163]

As will be remembered, Heidegger criticized the attempt to first epistemologically sink into nothingness and then prove its existence by means of proofs. He describes this situation as "the scandal of philosophy" in *Being and Time*.[164] From a similar perspective, Heidegger does not attempt to clarify whether or how art exists. For him, art lies in the work of art and is more than a "collective notion". Heidegger says that what a work is can only be understood from the essence of art. He expresses that in order to find the essence of art, it is necessary to search for the actual work. Because

[161] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 196-197.
[162] Lewis-Staehler, "Martin Heidegger," 147.
[163] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 143.
[164] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 249.

the addresses of the questions of what and how art is will be the work. Heidegger lists some errors: Comparison of works of art cannot explain what art is. The essence of art cannot be understood by bringing together the features of existing works. According to him, the essence of art can be derived from inferences from higher concepts. Inferences have a predetermined direction. For this reason, they offer us things that we can grasp what a work of art is. Heidegger admits from the outset that the situation we are trying to explain here can be seen as a cycle. He does not avoid this, even says that a cycle must be established. For him, this is neither a remedy nor a deficiency. This is a path for him and also the ability is to stay on that path. From art to work or all kinds of steps are included in this cycle.[165]

Heidegger says that in order to find the essence of art, it is necessary to search for the real work. In this case, it becomes important what Heidegger understands from the work. Heidegger said that everybody knows what Being is from the everyday use of Being in *Being and Time*. When talking about the work of art, Heidegger makes an introduction similar to what he did in the analysis of Being in question and says that the work of art is known to everyone. Artifacts are everywhere similar to things. Artifacts of architecture and painting are seen in public places, churches and houses. Artworks are exhibited in exhibitions and museums. Artifacts are moved from one place to another, like coal or tree stumps. Similarly, Beethoven quartets are stored like potatoes in publishing houses, or Hölderlin's poems can be found in a soldier's bag with cleaning items. Heidegger enumerates these examples to draw attention to the thingly character of the works of art and thus prepares the ground for investigating the self-evident thingly element in the work of art.[166] The work of art aims at something else that is different from the thingly elements that constitute it. This situation may show the inquiry of the self-evident thingly element in the work of art misleadingly in the first place. Because it is something else that forms the work of art. Heidegger states that a work of art is something made, but that what has been made is different from any pure thing. Heidegger, who said that true art can only be seen in a work of art,

[165] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 144.
[166] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 145.

aims to discover the work of art in its entirety. For this, it first examines the thingly element of the work.[167]

4.2. Thing and Work

Heidegger asks the question, in terms of truth, what is the thing. Because he thinks that we need to know the thingness of the thing. The thingly character of the thing must be revealed. According to Heidegger, for this purpose, it is necessary to examine the framework to which all entities belong known as things.[168]

Rather than answering the question of what the thing is, Heidegger prefers to order what is known as the thing first. It is a stone thing standing in the road. Or a fountain standing in the corner is something. Other things that count are: Jug, clouds in the sky, thorns in the field, leaves, hawk in the forest, aircraft and broadcast vehicles. Heidegger further points out that even those that do not really exist are called things. Such invisible things, that is, things-in-itself, according to Kant, constitute the whole of the world. God himself is such a thing. In short, things-in-itself, things that appear, all entities that exist are something in the language of philosophy. The last things are death and judgment. Artworks are also things in this sense, in proportion to their connection with the entity. Heidegger states that the concept of the thing that emerges with such a sequence is not enough to make the difference between mode of being of a thing and mode of being of a work. Heidegger continues his description of things in reverse, this time. What are the things that are hesitant to be described as the thing? For example, it states that people avoid classifying God as something. The farmer in the field, the fireman in the cauldron, the teacher in the school, that is, human beings, were avoided to call things. The deer, insects, and horses in the forest are not named things either. According to general acceptance, hammer, shoe, ax and clock are all things. Heidegger points out a distinction here: shoes and so on things are not mere things. “Mere things” refers to things that are inanimate in nature and that we use.[169]

[167] Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” 146.
[168] Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” 146.
[169] Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” 146-147.

Heidegger states that the limitation of the thingness of things is an obligation. This is necessary first of all to be sure of conventional knowledge about the thing. For this reason, Heidegger brought the word to mere things, after even the highest and last things were listed as thing. "Mere things" are simply "pure things." This also points to the pejorative meaning of the thing. As can be seen from the examples listed above, mere things are things other than those that are used. The important question at this point is: What determines the thingly character of these things? It is important to identify the source of the thingness of things. The point that characterizes the thing must be revealed. Here is the way to reveal the feature that makes the work of art as something "another".[170]

Heidegger argued that the established interpretations of thingness of the thing that dominated the history of Western thought can be reduced to three. By doing this, Heidegger tends to deconstruct the understanding of the thing in the Western tradition of thought, or in other words, in Western metaphysics.[171] In this way, the relations between the work and the thing can be revealed. First thing understanding is as follows:

1) **"The thing is a substance (*to hypokheimenon*) in which the properties are assembled."**

Heidegger cites a piece of granite to illustrate this interpretation. Granite is hard, heavy, large, huge, formless, raw and colored. Similar inferences can be made by looking at the granite piece. Heidegger points out that it is also possible to acquire knowledge of this personally. All these properties are listed as properties that fit the stone. But these are the properties that a thing has. Heidegger points out that a thing is not the sum of the properties that a thing has. Properties gather around the thing. In this case, core of things is mentioned. The Greeks called this essence the *hypokeimenon* and they were based on this essence of things.[172]

[170] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 147-148.
[171] Erdal Yıldız, *Sanattan Hakikate: Heidegger, Van Gogh, Schapiro, Derrida*, (İstanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 2017), 60.
[172] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 148.

Heidegger emphasizes that this nomenclature of the Greeks is not accidental. The experience of the Greeks underlies the naming of the core of things as *hypokeimenon*. But, according to Heidegger, the transfer of this word to Roman-Latin thought obscured the experience of the Greeks. This transference also points to the process of understanding the Being of the entities as presence. The determinations in this transmission process established the main interpretation of thingness of the thing, according to Heidegger. This is what determines the interpretation of the Being of entities in the Western philosophical tradition. Heidegger sees the starting point of this process as the transference of the word *hypokeimenon* to Roman-Latin thought. In Heidegger's words, "Hypokeimenon becomes subjectum; hypostasis becomes substantia; symbebekos becomes accidens." Heidegger says that the process of translating ancient Greek concepts into Latin is not a problem-free process as it seems. It is not just a word that is translated in this process. There is also a transfer of experience. So the Greek experience is translated into another language. In other words, Roman thought translates Greek words without meeting their original experience. This situation points to the starting point of the baselessness of Western thought according to Heidegger.[173]

The translation of the word *hypokeimenon* as *subjectum* determined the view to Being and indirectly to the thing. *Subjectum* has self-consciousness. Being is in a position where it is determined according to *subjectum*. It is the setup of the *subjectum* that reveals the distinction between the knowing subject and the known object. The positioning of the subject separately from the thing makes the subject the substance of things and the world.[174] If the *subjectum* is in a position where the Being is determined according to itself, it is the determinant of the thingness. In this case, subjectivity becomes objectivity if a generalization is required. Heidegger examines how this occurs in language from the structure of the proposition and what this proposition corresponds to as follows:

> A simple propositional statement consists of the subject, which is the Latin translation, hence already a reinterpretation, of *hypokeimenon,* and the predicate, in which the

[173] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 149.
[174] Martin Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, trans. William Lovitt (New York & London: Garland Publishing, 1977), 68. Martin Heidegger, "Modern Science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics," in *Basic Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964)*, ed. David Farrell Krell (London: Routledge Classics, 1993), 301-305.

> thing's traits are stated of it. Who would have the temerity to assail these simple fundamental relations between thing and statement, between sentence structure and thing-structure? Nevertheless, we must ask: Is the structure of a simple propositional statement (the combination of subject and predicate) the mirror image of the structure of the thing (of the union of substance with accidents)? Or could it be that even the structure of the thing as thus envisaged is a projection of the framework of the sentence?
>
> What could be more obvious than that man transposes his propositional way of understanding things into the structure of the thing itself? Yet this view, seemingly critical yet actually rash and ill-considered, would have to explain first how such a transposition of propositional structure into the thing is supposed to be possible without the thing having already become visible. The question as to which comes first and functions as the standard, proposition-structure or thing-structure, remains to this hour undecided. It even remains doubtful whether in this form the question is at all decidable.[175]

In this passage, Heidegger explains the transformation in the translation process pointed out above by emphasizing the "proposition-structure" and "thing-structure". Because the mirroring of the propositional statement to the structure of the thing and its determination will reveal different meanings. The difference between these two situations points to the difference between the state of being open to Being in the Greek thought and the humanistic attitude that emerged afterwards. As we discussed in the second chapter, Heidegger drew attention to Plato and his theory of *ideas* as the starting point of this humanistic attitude. In the same direction, we see the subject-predicate relationship as a continuation of the *hypokeimenon* - *subjectum* relationship. Heidegger thought that this sentence structure does not set the standard of thing structure, does not simply reflect it. According to him, sentence structure and thing structure emerged from a common source.[176] This source is the area where Being and the entity are in relation.[177] Heidegger states that the interpretation of the thing as the bearer of his own properties is not as natural as one might think. In fact, according to him, the natural and the unnatural have been replaced here. Habit makes the unnatural look natural. In other words, it is not possible to reach the thingness of the thing, the essential structure of the thing, with the object interpretation as the carrier of its own properties.[178]

[175] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 149-150.
[176] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 150.
[177] Yıldız, *Sanattan Hakikate*, 70.
[178] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 150.

The understanding of the thing as the carrier of its own properties does not apply only to mere thing. Heidegger states that this understanding also applies to any entity. The separation of thingly beings from non-thingly beings cannot be accomplished by this interpretation, according to Heidegger. The concept of the thing must include the thingness of the thing, its being in itself, its presence within itself. Heidegger states that the thingness of the thing is oppressed by the *ratio*, which has long been positioned as the authority of thought. According to him, this situation is the reason why the thingness of the thing is forgotten. In any case, mind was decisive. This understanding, which determines the essence of the thing, does not include what is in itself. On the contrary, this understanding tries to dominate the thing.[179]

We see the manifestations of the understanding that tries to dominate the thing, especially in modern period rationalism. Descartes' approach that focuses on the *cogito*, in other words, the thinking subject is based on this understanding. The transformation of *logos* into *ratio* paved the way to examine everything on the basis of subject-object duality. Now the subject is decisive and everything is evaluated with reference to it.[180] Heidegger points out that Descates' approach was inherited from Medieval Scholastic thought and led him to neglect Being. Because the thought of Being, which is revealed by looking at a certain part of the entity, has dominated Descartes' access paths to the within-the-world. However, according to Heidegger, we cannot base neither the things of the world nor the precise understanding of the *subjectum*.[181] Because we cannot explain things with value-predicates that we load into it later.[182] In this way, through *ratio*, it is out of the question to explain the thingness of the thing.

Heidegger states that things must be left free for their thingness to show directly. For this, the founding priority given to *ratio* should be left aside. As it can be understood, this is considered as a destruction that occurred in the process of transferring the above-mentioned Greek experience to Roman-Latin thought. As in the example of the tree

[179] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 150.
[180] Yıldız, *Sanattan Hakikate*, 70-71; For an analysis of the subject's decisive position in relation to Being and truth, see also, Küçükalp, Cevizci, *Batı Düşüncesi*, 186.
[181] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 134.
[182] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 132.

we cited in the second chapter, Heidegger wants to examine the thing as it is, with all its reality. For this, "apprehending and talking" about what comes between us and the thing must be eliminated. Heidegger says that this may be the possibility of reaching the undistorted state of the thing.[183]

2) "The thing is the *aistheton*, that which is perceptible by sensations in the senses belonging to sensibility."

This interpretation evaluates the thing as the unity of the given through the senses. According to Heidegger, the adoption of this sum as a whole or as a form will not have an effect on the basic quality of the concept of thing. Besides, all intermediaries between things and us must be removed. Only in this way can the thingness of the thing be revealed. Heidegger says that this interpretation will also be inadequate while searching for the thingness of the thing. He explains the reason for this as follows:

> We never really first perceive a throng of sensations, e.g., tones and noises, in the appearance of things—as this thing-concept alleges; rather we hear the storm whistling in the chimney, we hear the three-motored plane, we hear the Mercedes in immediate distinction from the Volkswagen. Much closer to us than all sensations are the things themselves. We hear the door shut in the house and never hear acoustical sensations or even mere sounds. In order to hear a bare sound we have to listen away from things, divert our ear from them, i.e., listen abstractly.[184]

This thing-concept aims to bring things as close to ourselves as possible. However, this is not the case for the thing as long as we carry what we perceive through our senses to it. Because what is perceived is not the thing but the sound of the thing. In order to reveal the thingness of the thing we have to get away from our sensations. According to Heidegger, we are far from things in the interpretation of the first thing, and in the interpretation of this thing we are too close to things. He thinks that it is necessary to get rid of the excess of both interpretations. The thingness of the thing is lost in both interpretations. The thing must remain in a state of self-containment.[185]

3) "The thing is formed matter."

Heidegger sees this interpretation of the thing as an interpretation that will allow him to answer the question of the thingly element in the work of art. Because matter

[183] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 151.
[184] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 151-152.
[185] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art,"152.

provides the thingly element in the work of art. It is matter that forms the basis for the artist to do and shape things. Heidegger explains this view as follows:

> That which gives things their constancy and pith but is also at the same time the source of their particular mode of sensuous pressure—colored, resonant, hard, massive—is the matter in things.- In this analysis of the thing as matter (*hyle*), form (*morphe*) is already coposited. What is constant in a thing, its consistency, lies in the fact that m atter stands together with a form. The thing is formed matter. This interpretation appeals to the immediate view with which the thing solicits us by its outward appearance (*eidos*). In this synthesis of matter and form a thing-concept has finally been found which applies equally to things of nature and to utensils.[186]

According to this view, elements such as color, sound, and hardness are considered as matter, and the rest as the form of that thing. The question is whether this view can explain the thingness of thing in mere things, tools, and works of art. As stated in the introduction, he says that compared to the other two comments, this interpretation brings us to a point where we can discuss thingness in the work of art. However, Heidegger also does not rely on this interpretation, which sees the thing as formed matter.[187]

Heidegger first states that matter and form are a conceptual scheme used for art theory and aesthetics. However, according to him, this distinction could not be adequately grounded. In addition, the said pair of concepts is initially outside of the field of art theory and aesthetics. Matter and form can be seen as concepts that anyone can use for anything. Besides he states that this distinction can impose on us the distinctions in disciplines such as theory of knowledge, logic that include specific problems such as subject-object, logical and non-logical. As such, the concept couple in question is far from explaining the "thingness of the thing." The important question for Heidegger here is where does the material-form structure originate. In other words, does the material-form structure stem from the thingness character of the thing or from the workly character of the work of art.[188]

Heidegger examines the matter-form structure in terms of usefulness at this point and he gives an example of granite block as matter. For the granite block, the form indicates

[186] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art,"152.
[187] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art,"152.
[188] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art,"153.

the place of its material parts in the space. However, the jug, ax or shoe is also a substance that stands in a form. Unlike the first, it is the form that determines the arrangement of matter in them. Even form refers to the properties of matter, such as the hardness of the ax, the waterproofness of the test, the strength of the shoe. According to Heidegger, such usefulness cannot be added to the aforementioned entities afterwards. Usefulness is not something that stands somewhere as an end.[189] In the words of Heidegger, "Usefulness is the basic feature from which this being regards us, that is, flashes at us and thereby is present and thus is this being." Heidegger states that both the formative act and the choice of material and the power of the structure put therein from matter and form are based on such usefulness. The entitiy based on usefulness is the product of a process of making and has been produced as a piece of equipment for something. Matter and form are the determination of the entitity. As such, they occupy a place in nature of equipment. According to Heidegger, matter and form can in no case be the original determination for thingness of mere thing.[190]

According to Heidegger, the three modes of defining thingness have come to this day by intertwining. In Heidegger's words "Thus it comes about that prevailing thing-concepts obstruct the way toward the thingly character of the thing as well as toward the equipmental character of equipment, and all the more toward the workly character of the work."[191] By analyzing his interpretations of things, Heidegger does two things at once: both the analysis of the key concepts that need to be later recognized, and the preparation of the path to the work of art. Heidegger puts particular emphasis on the third interpretation because the third interpretation is the most dominant interpretation in the Western tradition. From this interpretation, Heidegger positions the equipment in his analysis somewhere between the pure thing and the work of art. In this way, he says, it is possible to explain things and works, even all entities. However, it also draws attention to one thing: The thing and the work should not be considered as sub-types

[189] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art,"153.
[190] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art,"154.
[191] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art,"156-157.

of equipment.[192] Accordingly, a research on equipment can help to distinguish the artwork from it. Heidegger goes through a study by Vincent van Gogh for this.[193]

Heidegger chooses a common equipment: "a pair of peasant shoes" (In the following pages, we will mention the discussion caused by this expression "a pair" used by Heidegger). The question is what is extra in van Gogh's painting? Everyone knows why a shoe can normally be made and what it can be used for. But Heidegger thinks that it is not possible to learn equipmental being of the equipment in truth by imagining a pair of shoes or simply looking at the picture. It also does not provide location information regarding van Gogh's official shoes. Heidegger brings the word to what is visible by listing what is not visible in the equipment from the picture:

> From the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes the toilsome tread of the worker stares forth. In the stiffly rugged heaviness of the shoes there is the accumulated tenacity of her slow trudge through the far-spreading and ever-uniform furrows of the field swept by a raw wind. On the leather lie the dampness and richness of the soil. Under the soles stretches the loneliness of the field-path as evening falls. In the shoes vibrates the silent call of the earth, its quiet gift of the ripening grain and its unexplained self-refusal in the fallow desolation of the wintry field. This equipment is pervaded by uncomplaining worry as to the certainty of bread, the wordless joy of having once more withstood want, the trembling before the impending childbed and shivering at the surrounding menace of death. This equipment belongs to the *earth*, and it is protected in the *world* of the peasant woman. From out of this protected belonging the equipment itself rises to its resting-within-itself.[194]

With this description, Heidegger points to the world between equipment and the living world. The shoes reveal a whole world of life of a peasant woman. In this passage, Heidegger uses two important concepts that will become more important in the rest of his work: world and earth. In this description of Heidegger, the equipment is ontologically associated with the earth. It has been associated with the world in a cultural way. These two concepts will be examined in detail in the relevant section as they are the basic concepts of the "Work and Truth" section.

[192] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art,"155, 158.
[193] Patricia Altenbernd Johnson, *Heidegger Üzerine*, çev. Adnan Esenyel, (Ankara: Sentez Yayıncılık, 2013), 81.
[194] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 159-160.

The equipmental being of the equipment, according to Heidegger, lies in its usefulness. The usefulness is in the essential being of the equipment. According to Heidegger, usefulness provides reliability to the world and the earth.[195] In other words, the fact that something is made by a human and that something can be used does not constitute the equipmental being of the equipment. The equipment must be reliable. In this way, the woman becomes conscious of her world. The reliability of the shoe is the guarantee of both the safety of the world of women and its belonging to the earth.[196]

The equipment is used, consumed and provides a service. This process creates a state of habit. The habit of using the equipment enables the tool to reveal a unique style of existence. As the equipment gets older and loses its usefulness, its benefit becomes more visible. According to the evaluations so far, we can see what equipment in truth is, in the example of shoes. In his own words, "The equipmental quality of equipment was discovered." It is neither a description of the shoes that actually existed nor a report on the manufacturing processes of shoes that allows this discovery. The discovery is not due to the observation of how shoes are used. Heidegger says that we were able to make this discovery by confronting ourselves with van Gogh's painting. Because, according to him, when we are near the work, we are somewhere other than where we are. In a sense, Heidegger points to the world of the work. But the question of thing's thingly character and, in the context of the work of art, the workly character of the work remains unclear.[197]

Heidegger states that it is van Gogh's picture that disclosure to us what shoes are in truth. Heidegger explains what is in the artwork as follows:

> Van Gogh's painting is the disclosure of what the equipment, the pair of peasant shoes, is in truth. This being emerges into the unconcealment of its Being. The Greeks called the unconcealment of beings *aletheia*. We say "truth" and think little enough in using this word. If there occurs in the work a disclosure of a particular being, disclosing what and how it is, then there is here an occurring, a happening of truth at work.
>
> In the work of art the truth of beings has set itself to work. "To set" means here "to bring to stand." Some particular being, a pair of peasant shoes, comes in the work

[195] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 160.
[196] Johnson, *Heidegger Üzerine*, 81-82.
[197] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 161.

> to stand in the light of its Being. The Being of beings comes into the steadiness of its shining.[198]

This correlation established between a happening of truth at work and the Being of entities, particular entities and the work of art is very determinant in terms of Heidegger's position. Because, according to Heidegger, this relationship established between art and truth is new. In other words, the subject of art in traditional art theories has been beautiful and beauty. For this reason, the arts that give these kinds of works are called fine arts, unlike the industrial arts that produce equipment. As stated earlier, Heidegger points out that what is beautiful in fine arts is not art, that art is about the beauty and produces the beautiful. In addition, the classification of beauty and truth according to the traditional distinction has also been made under different headings. Beauty is considered to belong to aesthetics and truth to logic.[199]

Is there a connection between the thought that evaluates art as an imitation or depiction of reality and art is truth setting itself to work? In the third part, we examined the process leading to understanding truth as agreement. In the words of Heidegger, "Agreement with what is has long been taken to be the essence of truth." Aristotle's equivalent of this conception of truth is the concept of *homoiosis*, while its counterpart in the Middle Ages is *adaequatio*. However, Heidegger's answer to the question in question is clearly no. In other words, painting cannot be considered as a copy and cannot be seen as a product of artistic production. Therefore, Heidegger does not deal with art on a mimetic basis. For him, art is the reproduction of things' general essence, not the reproduction of some particular entity.[200]

Heidegger wanted to show the difference between his own thinking and understanding of art as description and imitation. For this, he chooses C. F. Meyer's poem titled "Fountain of Rome" as an example. He also chooses the ancient Greek temple as an example in the next section. Because the temple is not representational.[201] Heidegger did not think that the *idea* of a temple can be described in an architectural work.

[198] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 161-162
[199] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 162.
[200] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 162.
[201] Inwood, *Heidegger*, 118.

According to him, if the temple is a work, truth is set to work in such a work. In the same vein, Heidegger wants to show the baselessness of the relationship established between the work of art and reality through *mimesis*, based on the poem he quotes.[202] The poem is as follows:

> **Roman Fountain**
> The jet ascends and falling fills
> The marble basin circling round; This, veiling itself over, spills
> Into a second basin's ground.
> The second in such plenty lives,
> Its bubbling flood a third invests,
> And each at once receives and gives
> And streams and rests.[203]

Heidegger also cites Hölderlin's poem "The Rhine" and states that the idea of copying between the actual and the work of art fails when it comes to poetry. He thinks of Meyer's poetry as a good example of the fact that his artwork does not copy reality. Because, according to Heidegger, made in this poem is not a literary presentation of a real fountain. Nor is there any transfer of the general essence of a true Roman fountain. Heidegger repeats his thesis in this context: "Yet truth is set into the work."[204]

Heidegger states that he seeks the actuality of the work of art. Its purpose is to find art on this basis. The closest actuality to the work of art manifests itself as the thingly substructure. Traditional thing-concepts, on the other hand, are insufficient to explain what thingly substructure is. In fact, according to Heidegger, these comments are comments that empty the essence of the thing. Heidegger thinks that the concept of what is dominant in Western thought, that is, thing as formed matter, can be understood not from the substance of the thing but from the essence of equipment.[205]

In the interpretation of entities there is a demand for priority of the equipmental entity. This situation signals the question of the question of equipment to be asked again. But Heidegger thinks that for this, current interpretations should be set aside. Heidegger states that it is the work of art that can tell us what the equipment is. In the work of art,

[202] Yıldız, *Sanattan Hakikate*, 96.
[203] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 163.
[204] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 163.
[205] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 163.

disclosure of the particular entity in its Being takes place. Heidegger explains this as the happening of truth.[206]

In addition to the notion that dominant thing-concepts are insufficient, Heidegger draws attention to one more point: It would be misleading to look for the reality of the work in its hihgly substructure. Because the thighly substructure does not belong to the work. If it is accepted as belonging to the work, a superstructure should also be mentioned in order to include the artistic. Heidegger states that the work of art is not a piece of equipment loaded with aesthetic value.[207]

Based on his analysis so far, Heidegger states that the question regarding the work of art was shaken. Rather, it is an inquiry about the thing and its equipment. Heidegger sees this as a problem of aesthetics. Because seeing the work of art as a premise carries the traces of the traditional interpretation of all entities, according to Heidegger. In the second chapter of our thesis, we saw the basics of Heidegger's method. While thinking about the Being of the entities, we discussed prejudices and traditional interpretations, and addressed the priority of the question of the meaning of Being. For Heidegger, researching the origin of the work of art is not outside the question of the meaning of Being. In his opinion, art does not correspond to an autonomous, isolated area of human experience. His research on art is also part of the problem in question. Art is in direct relation with Being and truth in terms of showing how Beings of entities emerge through the work of art. At this point, Heidegger states that his priority is to think about the Being of entities. The question about the workly in the work, equipmental in equipment and thingly in the thing structure can be seen as its expansions. For this, Heidegger states that he moves towards the removal of current pseudo-concepts and the barriers to our understanding.[208] Heidegger states the following in this context:

> The thingly feature in the work should not be denied; but if it belongs admittedly to the work-being of the work, it must be conceived by way of the work's workly nature. If this is so, then the road toward the determination of the thingly reality of the work leads not from thing to work but from work to thing.

[206] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 163-164.
[207] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 164.
[208] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 164.

> The artwork opens up in its own way the Being of beings. This opening up, i.e., this revealing, i.e., the truth of beings, happens in the work. In the artwork, the truth of beings has set itself to work. Art is truth setting itself to work.[209]

After making the necessary preparation regarding the position of the work of art on the basis of Being, the issue that gains importance is the relationship between art and truth. In addition, what needs to be examined are the questions of what is the truth itself that discloses itself in the work of art, and the truth of entities how is it set itself to work.[210] The reason for this is, as shown above, according to Heidegger, the reality of the work of art is not that it is a thing, but a fact of truth. We will discuss this in the next section.

4.3. The Work and Truth

According to Heidegger, the origin of the work of art is art. In this case, the question of what is art becomes important. This question does not imply a conceptual and abstract point of departure for Heidegger. According to him, art is in the work of art. Therefore, what is sought is the actuality of the work. In the first part of this chapter, we saw the first phase of this quest. The work of art has a thingly character. However, trying to manifest the thingly character of the work with common thing-concepts will not produce a result. According to Heidegger, these comments we examined in the previous section are far from explaining the thingly character of the work. The question of the thingly substructure of the work, on the one hand, put the work under pressure, on the other hand, it blocked the path to the work-being of the work. Heidegger states that the discovery of thingness in the work is possible by illuminating the pure self-subsistence of the work.[211]

The question that needs to be answered in order to shed light on the pure self-subsistence of the work is the question of where the artwork belongs. Heidegger states that the work belongs to the space opened through it. This determination of the area to which the work of art belongs can be considered as a preliminary preparation for the relationship between the work of art and reality. Heidegger claimed that the truth

[209] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 165.
[210] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 165.
[211] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 167.

happens in the work and referred to van Gogh's painting to explain this happening. Now Heigger tends to explain the question of what truth is and how it happens with a non-representational example.[212] This example is a Greek temple conceived in its physical and social context, in the reality of the period it served people.[213] Heidegger describes the temple as follows:

> A building, a Greek temple, portrays nothing. It simply stands there in the middle of the rock-cleft valley. The building encloses the figure of the god, and in this concealment lets it stand out into the holy precinct through the open portico. By means of the temple, the god is present in the temple. This presence of the god is in itself the extension and delimitation of the precinct as a holy precinct. The temple and its precinct, however, do not fade away into the indefinite. It is the temple-work that first fits together and at the same time gathers around itself the unity of those paths and relations in which birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline acquire the shape of destiny for human being. The all-governing expanse of this open relational context is the world of this historical people. Only from and in this expanse does the nation first return to itself for the fulfillment of its vocation.
>
> Standing there, the building rests on the rocky ground. This resting of the work draws up out of the rock the obscurity of that rock's bulky yet spontaneous support. Standing there, the building holds its ground against the storm raging above it and so first makes the storm itself manifest in its violence. The luster and gleam of the stone, though itself apparently glowing only by the grace of the sun, first brings to radiance the light of the day, the breadth of the sky, the darkness of the night. The temple's firm towering makes visible the invisible space of air. The steadfastness of the work contrasts with the surge of the surf, and its own repose brings out the raging of the sea. Tree and grass, eagle and bull, snake and cricket first enter into their distinctive shapes and thus come to appear as what they are. The Greeks early called this emerging and rising in itself and in all things *physis*. It illuminates also that on which and in which man bases his dwelling. We call this ground the *earth*. What this word says is not to be associated with the idea of a mass of matter deposited somewhere, or with the merely astronomical idea of a planet. Earth is that whence the arising brings back and shelters everything that arises as such. In the things that arise, earth occurs essentially as the sheltering agent.[214]

In these lines where Heidegger describes the temple, we encounter two important concepts: world and earth. The temple both builds a world and advances an earth. These concepts also point to the context of the relationship between the work of art and truth. At this point it is necessary to think about what Heidegger meant when using the concepts of world and earth.

[212] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 167.
[213] Johnson, *Heidegger Üzerine*, 83.
[214] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 167-168.

4.3.1. World

According to Heidegger, the work of art sets up a world. The narration of the Greek temple can be seen as an example of how the world was established. The sum of entities does not give us the world.[215] It refers to the pre-theoretical context of meaning that has already been given to Dasein. In this sense, the world refers to the general horizon of the context of references, including the hermeneutical state of Dasein. This horizon includes Dasein's use of equipment, everyday life, tradition, language, and anything that makes sense for the human being.[216] The context of Heidegger's critique of the understanding of Being as presence comes to light here again. According to him, the world is not an object that stands in front of us, which we watch. It is not a representational concept that adds to things. In the words of Heidegger, "The world worlds, and is more fully in being than the tangible and perceptible realm in which we believe ourselves to be at home."[217] According to Johnson, Heidegger's definition of the world in this way aims to emphasize that the world does not have a static and separate structure from us.[218]

According to Heidegger, where we make decisions, adopt or abandon them, and ask questions about, the world becomes world. Heidegger draws attention to a distinction at this point. For example, he says stone is without world. It also counts plants and animals among those who do not have the world. Because they belong to an environment with which they are connected. But the peasant woman has a world.[219] In this distinction, the concept of the world points to human responsibility, the possibility of experience possible for Dasein. It has been stated before that Dasein's disclosedness is the truth. The concept of the world is a reality of disclosedness.[220]

As a result, we see that the concept of the world used in *Being and Time* is reused in *The Origin of the Work of Art*. In this study, the world is the side of a strife with the

[215] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 170.
[216] Schalow, Denker, *Historical Dictionary of Heidegger's Philosophy*, 308.
[217] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 170.
[218] Johnson, *Heidegger Üzerine*, 84.
[219] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 170.
[220] Johnson, *Heidegger Üzerine*, 84-85.

earth and has an important position in understanding the relationship between art and truth. The other concept that will make it understandable that the strife in question and truth reveals itself in the work of art is the earth.

4.3.2. Earth

Heidegger draws attention to the historicity of Dasein at the end of *Being and Time*. Because Dasein is open to influence. It is shaped by the society and tradition in which it lives. In the second part, we emphasized the expressions of Heidegger's return from Being and time to time and Being in terms of our topic. The question of Dasein's historicity becomes more important for Heidegger in the relationship between art and truth.[221] Heidegger's tendency to think historically of Being brings about important changes in his thinking. In this context, one of the most notable changes is Heidegger's beginning to use the concept of the earth. The concept of earth is a concept that allows the concept of the world and the historicity of Being to be understood. At the same time, this concept is a new category that Heidegger uses to understand nature. Heidegger explains this concept as follows:

> That into which the work sets itself back and which it causes to come forth in this setting back of itself we called the earth. Earth is that which comes forth and shelters. Earth, irreducibly spontaneous, is effortless and untiring. Upon the earth and in it, historical man grounds his dwelling in the world. In setting up a world, the work sets forth the earth. This setting forth must be thought here in the strict sense of the word. The work moves the earth itself into the open region of a world and keeps it there. *The work lets the earth be an earth*.[222]

As will be remembered, Heidegger objected to the interpretation of Being as existence and stated that beings manifest themselves to Dasein in three different ways: ready-to-hand; present-at-hand and Dasein. The reason for Heidegger to make this distinction was that he saw the conception of Being in the history of philosophy as a kind of present-at-hand understanding. In the above passage, Heidegger reconstructs the relationship between the work of art and the earth in this context. By doing this, Heidegger takes a different position with the concept of the earth than the

[221] Johnson, *Heidegger Üzerine*, 84.
[222] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 171-172.

interpretations of presence, which reduce nature to a fund for human productive activity.

The manifestation of an entity in the ready-to-hand mode has a meaning for de-materializing matter.[223] This mode of understanding with eyes and hands is different from a conventional understanding of knowledge since Descartes. In other words, it is not fed by a representative paradigm based on the subject-object duality. There is a care relationship in handling. In this relationship, the world is not an object of knowledge for Dasein. The work of art refers to a special way of understanding the human being in relation to equipments and materials within the framework of the mode of understanding with eyes and hands.[224] The concept of earth forms the basis of this way of understanding.

Heidegger's judgment of "The work lets the earth be an earth", in addition to the work of art setting up a world, points to the grounds on which materials are used. For example, the temple is a structure made of stones. At this point, there is a two-tier situation. A world is created using stones. At the same time, the stones used in the construction of the temple are brought to the clarity of the world. The temple is made of stone, but its Being is not based on explanations about the stone. The temple is the place of religious experience. As a structure, the temple is not a place where the value of stones is analyzed for people. There people experience the presence or absence of god.[225] In other words, this is what the temple manifests. In this sense, the work of art is a part of the world on the one hand, and manifests on the earth on the other. It announces the fact that the work of art is manifested while carrying out its function. However, an entity manifesting in the mode of ready-to-hand manifests without announcing itself. As long as it carries out its function, it makes itself almost invisible. (For example, we can think of the shoes of the peasant woman.) The work of art shows itself, according to Heidegger, and does so consistently without any malfunction. In this way, the aspects of the world that remain hidden from us are revealed. That is, the

[223] Lewis-Staehler, "Martin Heidegger," 148.
[224] Bolt, *Heidegger Reframed*, 89-90; For an analysis of the relationship between subject-object duality and objectification of Being, see also, Küçükalp, Cevizci, *Batı Düşüncesi*, 157.
[225] Johnson, *Heidegger Üzerine*, 85.

work of art reveals the Being of entitites. Also, the earth is manifested in the work of art. A link emerges in this context. The work of art connects the world and the earth.[226] In Heidegger's words "They belong together, however, in the unity of work-being."[227]

4.3.3. The Relationship Between the World and the Earth as a Strife

Heidegger's art perspective cannot be explained by conventional art theories. Because, as stated at the beginning of this chapter, the subject of art in traditional art theories is about beautiful, beauty and pleasure. Heidegger thought that art cannot be understood within the framework of the concept of aesthetics. Because, he thinks that aesthetics inhibit art's questioning of the thingness of thing. Thus, Heidegger does not think of art as an experience related to aesthetics, beautiful, beauty and pleasure. Instead, he proposes the concept of strife. In Heidegger's thought, strife arises as a situation created by the work of art. Strife is happening between the world and the earth.[228]

According to Heidegger, the world and the earth are different from each other. But this difference does not mean that they are separate from each other. World and earth are in mutual relationship.[229] It is a manifestation of this relationship that the set up of the world and the set forth of the earth are two important features in the work-being of the work. At this point, "what" this relationship reveals and "how" it reveals gains importance.[230] Heidegger explains the relationship between the world and the earth as follows:

> The world is the self-opening openness of the broad paths of the simple and essential decisions in the destiny of a historical people. The earth is the spontaneous forthcoming of that which is continually self-secluding and to that extent sheltering and concealing. World and earth are essentially different from one another and yet are never separated. The world grounds itself on the earth, and earth juts through world. Yet the relation between world and earth does not wither away into the empty unity of opposites unconcerned with one another. The world, in resting upon the earth, strives to surmount it. As self-opening it

[226] Lewis-Staehler, "Martin Heidegger," 148-149.
[227] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 173.
[228] Bolt, *Heidegger Reframed*, 43.
[229] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 174.
[230] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 173.

> cannot endure anything closed. The earth, however, as sheltering and concealing, tends always to draw the world into itself and keep it there.[231]

According to Heidegger, the world and the earth are in opposition. Heidegger refers to this state of contrast as strife.[232] It is the work of art that initiates the strife to set up a world and set forth the earth. In contrast to the clarity and openness of the world, the shelter and conceal of the earth feed the strife. Strife does not imply a separation. Heidegger does not think that the strife has to end. On the contrary, the work of art is accomplished so that the strife remains as strife. The set up of the world and set forth of the earth by the work not only initiate the strife, but also perpetuates the strife. According to Heidegger, it is this strife that creates the work-being of the work. Truth happen in the work-being of the work and in this strife between the world and the earth.[233]

In the third chapter, we examined Heidegger's understanding of truth in the axis of the concept of *aletheia*. Heidegger again refers to the concept of *aletheia* when he thinks about how truth happens as a result of the strife between world and earth. However, he specifically states that what he seeks here is not the truth of essence but the essence of truth. According to him, in this stuation there is also a state of interweaving. In this context, Heidegger defines truth as the essence of the true. He states that he means the concept of *aletheia*. Heidegger expresses this concept with the word unconcealment. As it will be remembered, Heidegger argued that, in the Western thought tradition, truth interpretations were not enough to explain the concept of *aletheia* as unconcealment, and even that the Greek understanding of truth was transformed and distorted in the process. According to Heidegger, derivative essence of truth has taken the place of truth expressed by the concept of *aletheia* as unconcealment. However, uncocealment determined in the Greek experience the essencing of everything present.[234] This understanding of truth, on which Heidegger's own thought is based, also implies a tense relationship between unconcealment and concealment.[235] In contrast to the clarity and openness of the world, the shelter and conceal of the earth

[231] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 174.
[232] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 174.
[233] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 175.
[234] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 176.
[235] Johnson, *Heidegger Üzerine*, 86.

take us to the place where the truth reveals itself with a similar tension. Heidegger considers the strife between clearing and concealing to reveal the truth in parallel with the relationship between the world and the earth.[236] According to Heidegger, truth is in the work-being of the work. In the strife of the world and the earth in the work, the truth of the entities as a whole is unconcealed.[237] So the truth is at work in the work. Hence, Heidegger says that truth happens in the stance of the Greek temple there. The temple does not represent anything. What the temple does with its stance there is an unconcealment. The entities are brought into unconcealment in the temple as a whole. Entities are brought to unconcealment and preserved there. In the same context, we can consider van Gogh's painting. According to Heidegger, the shoes in the picture are not an exact depiction of a pair of shoes that actually exist. The equipmental being of the shoes beings has been brought into unconcealment. In other words, neither the poem describing the Greek temple nor the Roman fountain nor the picture showing the shoes explain certain entities. The work of art brings the entities into unconcealment as a whole. Heidegger refers to this situation as the enlightenment of self-concealing Being.[238]

Heidegger wanted to show that the work of art cannot be explained by interpretations of the traditional thing, first by evaluating the thingness of thing and then the work-being of the work. At the end of these evaluations, Heidegger states that the work's visible work-being does not say anything about the thingly structure of the work.[239] He is in a position that equates setting-into-a-work of truth to the essence of art.[240] Another question arises here: What is the position of the artist in this process? At this point, Heidegger's Dasein analysis is decisive. We have seen that human beings are not central to this analysis. In the same direction, when it comes to the art, the position of the artist is not of central and founding importance. Heidegger describes the position of the artist as follows:

[236] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 180.
[237] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 180.
[238] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 181.
[239] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 181.
[240] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 182.

> It is precisely in great art—and only such art is under consideration here—that the artist remains inconsequential as compared with the work, almost like a passageway that destroys itself in the creative process for the work to emerge.[241]

Heidegger states that in order to access the work, it must be abstracted from things other than itself. According to him, the work should stand alone. This attitude can be evaluated as a result of Heidegger seeing art, not artist, in the origin of art. Heidegger sees art as the origin of not only the work of art but also the artist.[242] This stands out as an important issue that determines Heidegger's position in the art-artist relationship and distinguishes it from others. At this point, it is important how to understand the word "destroy" that Heidegger uses when explaining the artist's position. The artist's destroying himself indicates a limit in terms of determining the artist's responsibility. The main issue is art itself. In this case, the position of the artist compared to the position of art is not of central and founding importance.[243] As it will be remembered, Heidegger attached importance to the experience of being open to Being, based on the concept of *aletheia*, and criticized the established truth interpretations in the Western thought tradition based on this concept. Similarly, the situation of the artist in the face of art demands such openness. According to Heidegger, the artist must allow the nature of the artwork. In other words, the artist should not try to dominate the nature of the work of art. The artist should be fully open to art and what it will bring.[244]

After the above evaluations regarding the position of the artist, there is a point that needs to be stated: In spite of all these analyzes, the work of art is ultimately something created. For this, it needs a medium. This "medium" is also the artist. As such, the thingly element enters the work of art. Heidegger states that we will be faced with new questions here. What does this creation mean and how does it belong to the work? To what extent does createdness belong to the work and to what extent is it decisive in the work?[245] Heidegger points out the concept of truth in response to these questions: "The pertinence of createdness to the work can be elucidated only by way of a more fundamental clarification of the essence of truth. The question of truth and its essence

[241] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 166.
[242] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 165.
[243] Bolt, *Heidegger Reframed*, 107.
[244] Bolt, *Heidegger Reframed*, 110.
[245] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 181-182.

returns again."[246] For Heidegger, who defines the essence of art as setting-into-a-work of truth, the subject again comes to the truth, its happen in the work and its relationship with art.

4.4. Truth and Art

Heidegger repeats some judgments in more than one place in his work on *The Origin of the Work of Art* and presents his new judgments in relation to them. The judgment that art is the origin of the work of art and the artist is one of them. In Heidegger's words, "origin is the provenance of the essence in which the Being of a being essentially unfolds." Another of these judgments is that the essence of art can be understood in actual work. What determines the actuality of the work is that the truth is at work in the work and that the truth happens. Heidegger expresses this happening as the strife of the world and the earth.[247]

The happen in the work of art depends on the existence of an actual work. Therefore, according to Heidegger, the question about the thingly feature of the work should be asked again in the context of truth and art. Heidegger associates this situation with the creation of the work of art by the artist. The creation of the work by an artist constitutes the workly character of the work. The work's createdness can be understood from the creation process of the work. Understanding this is also important to the question regarding the origin of the work of art. Heidegger points to the activity of the artist at this stage to reflect on both the creation of the work and the origin of the work of art. In other words, there is a movement from the work to the essence of the creative process.[248]

4.4.1. Relationship between Creation and Truth

Heidegger states that the essence of the creative process cannot be thought of as simply bringing forth. Because the making of equipment is also creation. The important

[246] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 182.
[247] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 182.
[248] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 183.

question here is: How can bringing forth as creation be separated from bringing forth in the mode of making? Heidegger points out that creating a work also requires craftsmanship, and that great artists attach great importance to mastery. Because of this, Heidegger states that the Greeks refer to the word *techne* to describe craft and art, and to the word *technites* to refer to the craftsman and artist. In the same direction, a link is established between the essence of creative work and its craft aspect. Heidegger states that the linguistic usage of the Greeks is thought-provoking. But he still finds these determinations insufficient and superficial.[249]

The question of "what is *techne*" gains importance in this context. According to Heidegger, *techne* does not mean craft, art, technique as it is understood today, or a kind of practical performance. *Techne* is considered by Heidegger as a mode of knowledge. To know is here broadly associated with seeing in the sense of comprehending what is present. As such, it requires us to return to the concept of *aletheia*. In the previous chapters, we focused on the place of *aletheia* in Heidegger's truth thought. In this context, however, Heidegger draws attention to the relation of this concept to knowledge and the way it is perceived in the Greeks. In the Greeks, the basis for the essence of knowing is the *aletheia* in terms of the revealing of entities.[250] Heidegger says that this is what determines all kinds of comportments towards the entities. So *techne* means the knowledge experienced in the world of the Greeks. It is possible to remove what is present in *techne* from concealment to unconcealment. Based on these analyzes, Heidegger states that *techne* is not an action of making.[251]

We have stated above that there is a movement from the work to the essence of the creative process. But after Heidegger stated that *techne* is not an action of making, it creates a new cycle, as in the art-artist-art work relationship. Heidegger states that the essence of creation is determined by the essence of the work. In other words, Heidegger places all his research on the work-being of the work both in front of and

[249] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 183-184.
[250] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 184.
[251] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 184.

on the axis of his research on the creation of the work.[252] Heidegger establishes the relationship between work-being of the work and truth as follows:

> Earth juts through the world and world grounds itself on the earth only so far as truth happens as the primal strife between clearing and concealing. But how does this happen? We answer: it happens in a few essential ways. One of these ways in which truth happens is the work-being of the work.[253]

As a result of the contrast relationship between the world and the earth, the strife between clearing and concealing arises. The work, according to Heidegger, points to a **rift** (Riss) between the world and the earth with its existence. Because it brings together earthly substances and forms a stable form. In this sense, the concept of rift used by Heidegger can be related to the created ground of the work of art. The work of art standing on this ground is loaded with a tension brought about by the strife and at the same time becomes visible thanks to it. The visibility of the work of art includes tension and has a striking nature. However, an equipment becomes invisible within the usefulness it provides.[254] It is creation that creates strife and tension as a natural consequence of strife.[255] Heidegger explains creation as a way of becoming and happening as follows: "… to create is to let something emerge as a thing that has been brought forth. The work's becoming a work is a way in which truth becomes and happens. It all rests in the essence of truth."[256]

Heidegger elsewhere states that in the essence of truth there is an impulse toward the work. He evaluates this situation as the possibility of truth and expresses the following regarding the relationship between creation and truth:

> The establishing of truth in the work is the bringing forth of a being such as never was before and will never come to be again. The bringing forth places this being in the open region in such a way that what is to be brought forth first clears the openness of the open region into which it comes forth. Where this bringing forth expressly brings the openness of beings, or truth, that which is brought forth is a work. Creation is such a bringing forth.[257]

In the process of this work, we focused on how the truth establishes itself in the work. But what kind of truth is mentioned? In other words, does the truth appear in the work

[252] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 185.
[253] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 180.
[254] Inwood, *Heidegger*, 121.
[255] Johnson, *Heidegger Üzerine*, 181.
[256] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 185.
[257] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 187.

of art in a pure form? No. For Heidegger, truth never presents itself purely. Each era has its own historical reality. Heidegger points to a truth within historical context.[258] For this reason, those within the scope of unconcealment and untruth are not considered separate from the truth.[259] The work of art brings the tension between truth and untruth in its historical context.[260] So Heidegger doesn't think of art in terms of social isolation. Because according to him, art is considered as a resource in essence. Art is a special way truth comes into existence and is historicized.[261] Art is an area in which Being of entities comes to light. This is because art happens in the middle of entities, not within a theoretical and abstract field.[262]

4.4.2. Preservation of Work of Art

Heidegger does not only focus on the work and the artist on the issue of the creation of the work of art. Because, according to him, a work needs not only the creator but also those who preserve it. Moreover, Heidegger suggests preserving the work as the condition for the work of art to be work. Thanks to this protection, the work is found as actual in its createdness.[263] Heidegger does not understand preservation of work in the simple sense. In other words, its issue is not the physical protection of the work from external threats. Heidegger states that if it cannot find the preservers of a work in which truth happens, we cannot say that it is unprotected. According to him, a work is under protection even if it is left forgotten. In Heidegger's words, "preserving the work means standing within the openness of beings that happens in the work."[264] In this sense, preservation refers to a meaning in which the work of art can stand in itself. In this context, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger gives examples of antiques and household items kept in museums. Why are these equipments historical and why are they preserved in this way? Moreover, they are not yet something completely from the past. According to Heidegger, an equipment can be a historical object because it is historical.[265] In other words, preserving something in museums does not show us their

[258] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 186. Johnson, *Heidegger Üzerine*, 88.
[259] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 185.
[260] Johnson, *Heidegger Üzerine*, 88.
[261] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 202.
[262] Bolt, *Heidegger Reframed*, 52.
[263] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 191.
[264] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 191.
[265] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 432.

historicity and does not base their historicity. The relationship established with the historical can only be possible through a genuine relationship that Dasein, a historical entity, will establish with them. Preservation of works of art in museums is far from giving their historicity in a meaningful way. The preservation of the work of art may be possible with the historicity of the meanings of the works of art remaining in the work of art.[266] Heidegger states that where this is not the case, the art trade will be mentioned. Carefully moving the work from one place to another, preserving it in one place does not provide access to the work-being of the work. He expresses that what will reveal the real truth of the work is the place where the work is preserved in reality.[267]

Heidegger points again to the work of art as a means of preserving the work. The work can only be preserved thanks to the work itself.[268] Heidegger expresses the continuity of this protection as a knowledge.[269] This knowledge manifests itself in the awareness of the preserve of the work. At this point, Heidegger gives the example of preserving an artwork as something that corresponds only to artistic enjoyment. In such a case, it is not possible to preserve the work of art as a work.[270] Willingness' to openness has a decisive importance in the preservation of the work. Just as the artist should stay away from dominating the work and make itself open to the work, the preserver should also be like this. In Heidegger's thought, both the creation and preserving of the work of art emerges as a process of unconcealment.[271] The fact that art, in Heidegger's thought, is the origin of both the artist and the work of art can be understood in relation to this subject. The artist and other parties of the preserve process become visible as those who allow the work to maintain its essence. Truth should be left to be in the work. In this way, the strife pointed out before becomes externalized in the work.[272]

[266] Yıldız, *Sanattan Hakikate*, 182.
[267] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 193.
[268] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 193.
[269] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 192.
[270] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 193.
[271] Bolt, *Heidegger Reframed*, 109.
[272] Yıldız, *Sanattan Hakikate*, 185-186.

The work offers a new world to its preservers. It does this by removing its preservers from the banality of the world in which they live. This creates a situation where the usual actions, values and perspectives are interrupted.[273] We can consider this situation in relation to the concept of everdayness in *Being and Time*. Art exists as a possibility of truth for human beings in everdayness, such as idle talk, curiosity, ambiguity, fallenness, and being thrown away from Dasein's possibilities of Being itself. According to Heidegger, art reveals truth. In other words, art is considered as a constitutive preservation and has a historical structure.[274]

4.5. More than An Example: On van Gogh's Painting

So far, we have tried to understand Heidegger's view of art. While putting forward his thesis, Heidegger makes some comments on the life world of a peasant woman based on a painting he says belongs to van Gogh. Accordingly, Heidegger claimed that truth happens in the work and referred to the picture in question to explain this happening. However, when Heidegger was making this inquiry, he did not give clear information about which painting van Gogh was speaking from. At this point, we will discuss an important critique of Heidegger's views expressed in *The Origin of the Work of Art*. Meyer Schapiro, one of the prominent art historians and critics of his time, reveals his criticisms of Heidegger in two different articles. The first of these articles is the article titled "The Still Life as a Personal Object-A Note on Heidegger and van Gogh" published in 1968, and the second one is the article "A Further Notes on Heidegger and van Gogh" published in 1994. In terms of forming the basis of the second article, it is necessary to focus on the theses of the first article dated 1968.

Schapiro is concerned with certain material determinations of van Gogh's painting rather than the context and structure of Heidegger's ideas in *The Origin of the Work of Art* in the triangle of being-truth-art. As an art historian and critic, Schapiro poses a question as to which work is spoken of. This point is where the argument begins for him. He directs his request to Heidegger in a letter. As Schapiro quoted from

[273] Inwood, *Heidegger*, 122.
[274] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 202.

Heidegger's letter, Heidegger states that the painting he refers to in his work is a van Gogh painting he saw in Amsterdam in March 1930.[275] Upon this answer, Schapiro traces what image the painting could be (see Figure 1) and states that the image in question could be the following image cataloged by de la Faille at number 255:

Figure 4.1. F255 - A Pair of Shoes[276]

Schapiro states that in the exhibition mentioned by Heidegger, another painting of van Gogh depicting three pairs of shoes was exhibited (see Figure 2). The sole of one of these shoes is visible. According to Schapiro, it is possible that this painting also inspired certain parts of Heidegger's analysis.[277]

[275] Meyer Schapiro, "The Still Life as a Personal Object¬-A Note on Heidegger and van Gogh" in *The Reach of Mind*, ed. M. L. Simmel (New York: Springer Science+Business Media, 1968), 205.
[276] "Pair of Shoes, A", van Gogh Gallery, accessed May 1, 2021, https://fineartamerica.com/featured/a-pair-of-shoes-vincent-van-gogh.html.
[277] Schapiro, "The Still Life as a Personal Object," 205.

Figure 4.2. F332 - Three Pairs of Shoes[278]

Schapiro says that van Gogh painted such shoes many times. Heidegger is also aware of this, according to him. But Schapiro expresses that Heidegger did not reveal the picture in his mind as if these pictures were interchangeable. Schapiro sifted the eight different shoe paintings van Gogh made at different times, taking into account Heidegger's analysis of his work and the information in the letter he wrote to him. In doing so, his most fundamental criticism is that these shoes do not say anything about a peasant woman's relationship with nature and her work. Because these shoes are pictures of the artist's own shoes, according to Schapiro's research.[279] To support this view, Schapiro refers to a passage in the memoirs of Gaugin, van Gogh's colleague and friend. This passage reveals the personal history behind an old pair of shoes that van Gogh kept in his room and their transfer to the canvas.[280] When Schapiro researches which picture Heidegger is talking about, he actually wants to point out the context and reality of that picture.

Based on Schapiro's criticism, we can ask the following question: Is there a difference between whether the van Gogh painting Heidegger refers to in his work is "it" or "this"? At this point, Heidegger's answer to Schapiro is important in terms of talking about the differences in the perspectives of the two names:

[278] "Three Pairs of Shoes", van Gogh Gallery, accessed May 1, 2021, https://www.vangoghgallery.com/catalog/Painting/616/Three-Pairs-of-Shoes.html.
[279] Schapiro, "The Still Life as a Personal Object," 205.
[280] Schapiro, "The Still Life as a Personal Object," 208.

> The art-work told us what shoes are in truth. It would be the worst self-deception if we were to think that our description, as a subjective action, first imagined everything thus and then projected it into the painting. If anything is questionable here, it is rather that we experienced too little in contact with the work and that we expressed the experience too crudely and too literally. But above all, the work does not, as might first appear, serve merely for a better visualization of what a piece of equipment is. Rather, the equipmental being of equipment first arrives at its explicit appearance through and only in the work. What happens here? What is at work in the work? Van Gogh's painting is the disclosure of what the equipment, the pair of peasants' shoes, is in truth[281]

In this passage quoted from Heidegger's letter, we see a general summary of his view of art. In doing so, Heidegger points out the limits of his position. As will be remembered, Heidegger positioned art as the origin of the artist and the work of art. In other words, he was not looking at the work of art as the result of a creative activity in which the artist was the founding subject. He was also not explaining the work of art in a representative perspective. For this, Heidegger later tended to explain the question of what truth is and how it happens, with an example that cannot be explained as representational, with the example of a Greek temple. Therefore, it is clear that Heidegger did not see the shoes in van Gogh's paintings as a direct representation of any shoe in nature. In addition to all this, it is also important that Heidegger later added a note to the public edition of his works, saying that the exact location of these shoes and who they belong to cannot be known.[282] Heidegger does not seem to be interested in who the shoes belong to or what shoes they are pictured looking at. In addition, Heidegger expresses the loading of the interpretations into the picture with a subjective act, as seen in the passage, as a bad self-deception. Schapiro's criticism is expressed precisely from this point. According to Schapiro, what Heidegger did is exactly an act of self-deception. Schapiro believes that Heidegger made the painting say what the painting itself did not say by making comments based on his own world of life. In other words, Heidegger made it say what he dreamed of.[283] Schapiro states that he could not find anything unimagined in Heidegger's descriptions. Schapiro says that Heidegger's mistake is not simply to choose the wrong picture for analysis. So if Heidegger actually preferred the painting of a peasant woman's shoes, he would still make an important mistake. According to Schapiro, this mistake is that the artist's presence in the work of art is ignored. Schapiro also says that neither the uniqueness

[281] Schapiro, "The Still Life as a Personal Object," 205-206.
[282] Meyer Schapiro, "A Further Notes on Heidegger and van Gogh" in *Furter NotesTheory of Philsosphy of Art: Style, Artist, and Society*, (New York: George Braziller, 1994), p. 150.
[283] Schapiro, "The Still Life as a Personal Object," 206.

of the work of art nor the artist's presence in the work of art can be ignored.[284] To say that Heidegger ignores the uniqueness of the work of art and the artist's position in front of the work of art would be an extreme interpretation. But Heidegger thinks that modern subjectivism misinterprets the creativity of the subject.[285] In other words, this perspective, which opens autonomous space for the artist in a founding and genius position against the work of art, is rejected by Heidegger. It is clear that Schapiro and Heidegger are at separate points at this point. Schapiro continues the same thesis in his second article, written in 1994, and states that Heidegger ignores what the shoes he studied meant to his artist.[286] This criticism is at the center of both of Schapiro's articles. According to him, what makes the problem of belonging so important is that the question of who and where the work belongs directly affects the understanding of the work of art. The focus of Schapiro's criticism on the story of the shoes in the work evokes the function of the modern subject in the work of art. Schapiro appears to speak from within the modern subjectivism that Heidegger criticizes. However, Schapiro's criticism almost does not have anything to do with Heidegger's comments on the position of the artist and the relationship between art and truth, which we have pointed out above. We can say that the question of who owns the shoes is not a question for Heidegger.[287] While Heidegger refers to van Gogh's painting as a concrete example of what truth is and how it happens, Schapiro deals directly with the painting itself.[288]

Derrida joins the discussion of shoes in van Gogh's painting from a different position than both Heidegger and Schapiro. In Schapiro's criticism of Heidegger, the context of the debate was the question of who owned a pair of shoes. Derrida brings a conceptual perspective to the discussion in question. The "pair" in the phrase "a pair of shoes" points to the context of Derrida's question. Derrida asks what a "pair" means and what makes two separate shoes a pair of shoes. Derrida thinks at this point that

[284] Schapiro, "The Still Life as a Personal Object," 206-207.
[285] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 200.
[286] Schapiro, "A Further Notes," 147.
[287] Mo-Li Yeh, Po Hsien Lin, "Beyond Claims of Truth", *Journal of Arts and Humanities* 3, no. 1 (January 2014): 99.
[288] Hagi Kenaan, "What Philosophy Owes A Work of Art: Rethinking the Debate between Heidegger and Schapiro," *Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy* 8, no. 3 (2004): 589.

there is a correspondence between Heidegger and Schapiro.[289] Because when Heidegger looks at the picture, he sees a pair of peasant shoes. Schapiro researches who this pair of shoes actually belongs to. However, Derrida sees it as a problem that these two names started to think by accepting the existence of a pair of shoes in the picture in question.[290] Because Derrida believes that a philosophical inquiry should be conducted with a questioning attitude without prejudices. Therefore, it can be said that Derrida criticized both Heidegger and Schapiro for making the mistake of making van Gogh's painting say things that the painting itself did not say.[291] Derrida points out that there is another correspondence between the two names. According to him, both names assume a subject when they look at van Gogh's painting and establish a relationship of belonging. The assumption of a subject who owns the shoes also determines the content of the conversation about the essence and truth of the shoes in the picture. However, Derrida considers it a dogma to assume that shoes belong to a real subject, feet, and body.[292] In addition, he includes in his own research what constitutes a relationship of belonging between a shoe and its owner.[293] Another point that Derrida's analysis points out is this: What can be produced from the work of art as something produced? So is it the question of attributing certain ideas produced to van Gogh? Is it possible to interpret what the two names did as an effort to verify their references to the painting, based on their own worlds? Did Heidegger, the thinker of the Black Forest and the chalet, and Schapiro, a city man, incorporate dogmatic representations in their arguments? If so, the signatures of both Heidegger and Schapiro are now attached to the picture in question.[294]

The place Derrida is involved in the debate can be seen as a natural consequence of his philosophy. Because Derrida thinks that philosophy is shaped by a dominant logocentrism. Also, according to him, philosophy is threatened by what they neglect

[289] Jacques Derrida, "Restitutions of the truth in pointing [pointure]" in *Of Grammatology*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 259.
[290] Derrida, "Restitutions of the truth in pointing [pointure]," 261.
[291] Yıldız, *Sanattan Hakikate*, 275.
[292] Derrida, "Restitutions of the truth in pointing [pointure]," 313-314.
[293] Derrida, "Restitutions of the truth in pointing [pointure]," 266.
[294] Igor Guatelli, "Injunctions, Disjunctions, Remnants: The Reverse of Unity," *World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences* 15, no. 1, (2021): 76-77.

to think. For this reason, in Derrida's thought, deconstruction is considered as the way to overcome these problems.[295] Therefore, Derrida's asking what the pair means and what constitutes the relation of belonging is an application of the method of deconstruction on painting. Derrida also thinks that philological, etymological, semantic and intellectual relations are important for speaking a tool. According to him, every equipment has a social-cultural context. According to him, one of the common mistakes of Heidegger and Schapiro is that they try to interpret the shoe as an equipment without considering this context.[296] Derrida expresses his position towards Heidegger and Schapiro as follows:

> I did not say, like Heidegger, they are peasant shoes, but against him: nothing proves that they are peasant shoes (Schapiro's only incontestable proposition, in my view); and I did not say, like Schapiro, they are the shoes of a city dweller and even of Van Gogh, but against him: nothing proves or can prove that "they are the shoes of the artist, by that time a man of the town and city." Each time you read "they are clearly . . . ," "this is clearly . . .," "are evidently . . .," it does not signify that it is clear or evident, very much the contrary, but that it is necessary to deny the intrinsic obscurity of the thing, its essential crypt, and that it's necessary to make us believe that it is clear quite simply because the proof will always be lacking.[297]

In these lines, not only are the shoes considered "pairs" and "peasant shoes", but also the way van Gogh's painting was interpreted by Schapiro is criticized. As a result of his research, Schapiro claimed that the van Gogh painting that Heidegger interpreted was clearly the picture number 255 cataloged by la Faille. But Derrida asks why this claim is "clear". Because according to him, nothing has been said about this subject.[298] In addition to the common mistakes that the two names fall on, Derrida's another opinion is that Schapiro basically misunderstood Heidegger. According to him, Schapiro made a mistake about the primary function of Heidegger's reference to the painting in question. When Schapiro tries to return the shoes to their owner, he speaks as if the shoes in the painting should imitate, represent and reproduce the real shoes. However, Heidegger, as stated before, analyzes art in a position other than these three approaches. Derrida therefore points out that the truth debate in Heidegger's picture analysis is not about the shoes, the wearer, the person who made that painting. According to him, these issues are secondary in Heidegger's analysis. In addition,

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[295] Kasım Küçükalp, *Jacques Derrida – Felsefenin Dekonstrüksiyonu*, (İstanbul: Ketebe Yayınları: 2020), 13-14; See also, Lisa D. Campolo, "Derrida and Heidegger: The Critique of Technology and the Call to Care," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 53, no. 3 (September 1985): 433.
[296] Yıldız, *Sanattan Hakikate*, 281-282.
[297] Derrida, "Restitutions of the truth in pointing [pointure]," 364.
[298] Derrida, "Restitutions of the truth in pointing [pointure]," 364.

Derrida points out that the truth, which Heidegger tries to explain with reference to painting, cannot be understood by reducing it to a subject-object relationship.[299] Heidegger basically discusses how truth happens in a work of art.

The point where the debate has come takes us back to Heidegger's understanding of the truth. As will be remembered, Heidegger gave the example of the judgment of a person with his back turned to the wall. This person was assertioned that "the picture on the wall is crooked." Heidegger stated that the correctness of this judgment does not depend on a mental representation of the picture, but on the confirmation of the picture itself. As we have stated before, according to Heidegger, truth is not the agreement between knowing and object. [300] The following question may be asked here: Does looking back at the picture on the wall give us the opportunity to confirm our assertions? Can we be sure of our knowledge of the picture in this way? We may also ask: Can we be sure that there is a picture there? From Heidegger's perspective, we can say that Dasein cannot be sure whether the world exists. So this is also true for anything in the world. Information, doubt or belief in a relationship established with an entity refers to a relationship form for human beings. Knowing is, in Heidegger's words, "a mode of Being of Dasein as Being-in-the-world". According to him, there is no authority that can decide whether there is a problem of knowledge or not. In Heidegger's thought, "knowing is grounded beforehand in a Being-already-alongside-the-world, which is essentially constitutive for Dasein's Being".[301] Therefore, Heidegger does not speak of a problem of knowledge at this point. For Heidegger, the world is not an object of knowledge. The world is not a set of entities either. For Heidegger, the world is a field or a horizon. This horizon is based on an ontological body of relations in which entities emerge. If there is no world, one cannot talk about relationships within the world. In other words, this also means: The world cannot be analyzed with the conceptualizations created by the relations within the world.[302] This brings us to the discussion, which Heidegger points out as "the main scandal of philosophy", which we pointed out in the second chapter. Unlike Kant, Heidegger does not think that the scandal of philosophy is the inability to find evidence of the existence

[299] Derrida, "Restitutions of the truth in pointing [pointure]," 312.
[300] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 260-261.
[301] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 88.
[302] Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, 96-97.

of objects outside of us without any doubt.[303] According to Heidegger, this expectation of evidence is the result of an ontologically inadequate approach:

> The 'scandal ofphilosophy' is not that this proof has yet to be given, but that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again. Such expectations, aims, and demands arise from an ontologically inadequate way of starting with something of such a character that independently of it and 'outside' ofit a 'world' is to be proved as present-at-hand. It is not that the proofs are inadequate, but that the kind of Being of the entity which does the proving and makes requests for proofs has not been made definite enough.[304]

Based on this passage, we can express Heidegger's effort as an effort to determine the kind of Being of the entity. This effort includes not only Heidegger's analysis of Being, but also his views on the work of art. In this context, we can go back to the painting on the wall mentioned above or the painting of van Gogh. Knowing is seen by Heidegger as a mode of Being of Dasein as Being-in-the-world and one of the forms of relationship with entities does it allow us to discuss Heidegger's position as a problem of knowledge? Answering "yes" to this question will be insufficient to answer the question. Heidegger is not speaking from a position that first problematizes the existence of shoes as an external reality and then traces their reality. For this reason, it does not seem reasonable to see Schapiro's "corrections" of van Gogh's painting as comments that falsify Heidegger's analysis. In the framework of Heidegger's thought, attempts in this direction can be seen as modes of Being of Dasein. The questions Derrida asks about the meaning of the word "pair", the nature of the relationship of "belonging" and the possibility of producing something new from something that has been produced draws the issue into a field of discussion regarding the universals. We will be content with asking a question first and then pointing out Heidegger's position on the singularity. Can Heidegger's descriptions based on van Gogh's painting be seen as a kind of truth imposition? This issue is directly related to the place of history and singularity after *Kehre* in Heidegger's thought. Heidegger's interpretation of history is based on the view that the meaning of Being is forgotten, the singularity and our experience of the singularity are destroyed. For Heidegger, we can say that the work of art offers an opportunity for experience of singularity.[305]

[303] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 247-249.
[304] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 249.
[305] Lewis-Staehler, "Martin Heidegger," 145.

4.6. Technology and Art

While art and technology were neglected in *Being and Time*, it later came to the fore as the main topics in Heidegger's thought.[306] Technology is in a position in Heidegger's thought that has a connection with all three issues in relation to Being, truth and art. In order to understand this position, one must first understand the place of technology in Heidegger's thought. At this point, the concept of *techne* is of central importance. As it will be remembered, Heidegger stated that the Greeks used the word *techne* to denote craft and art, and *technites* to denote craftsman and artist.[307] For the Greeks, *techne* is a type of *poiesis*.[308] *Poiesis*, which means production, is a way of bringing things into visibility, that is, revealing.[309] The form of revealing in question has changed over time. The understanding of nature has also changed. In this direction, especially after the Industrial Revolution, the meaning of the concept of *techne* has turned into a technology form.[310]

Heidegger thinks that technology should not be seen as something neutral. The view of technology as neutral is blinding people to the essence of technology. Therefore, the possibility of explaining the transformation in question disappears. In order to explain this changing, Heidegger first turns to determining what is understood by technology. Heidegger points out that technology is a means with an end and a human activity. In Latin, the state of technology as a means is expressed as *instrumentum*.[311] Heidegger asks the question of what is the instrumental itself. This question leads him to the idea that wherever there are ends and means there is causality.[312] Heidegger takes the following route here: He enumerates the theory of four causes (*causa materialis*, *causa formalis*, *causa finalis*, *causa efficiens*) and discusses why there are exactly four causes. More fundamentally, according to Heidegger, *causa efficiens* forms the basis of all causation. At this point, he discusses the position of the

[306] Hans Ruin, "Technology," in *The Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger*, ed. Francois Raffoul, Eric S. Nelson (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 353-354.
[307] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 183-184.
[308] Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, 13.
[309] Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, 50. Plato, "Symposium", *Plato Complete Works*, ed. John M. Cooper (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 488, [205 c].
[310] Lewis-Staehler, "Martin Heidegger," 146.
[311] Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, 4-5.
[312] Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, 6.

silversmith by giving an example of a silver vessel. Heidegger states that silversmith cannot be viewed as a *causa efficiens*.[313] According to him, there is a common responsibility of four reasons in the silver vessel. Heidegger explains this situation as follows:

> The four ways of being responsible bring something into appearance. They let it come forth into presencing [An-wesen]. They set it free to that place and so start it on its way, namely, into its complete arrival. The principal characteristic of being responsible is this starting something on its way into arrival. It is in the sense of such a starting something on its way into arrival that being responsible is an occasioning or an inducing to go forward [Ver-an-lassen]. On the basis of a look at what the Greeks experienced in being re sponsible, in aitia, we now give this verb "to occasion" a more inclusive meaning, so that it now is the name for the essence of causality thought as the Greeks thought it. The common and narrower meaning of "occasion" in contrast is nothing more than striking against and releasing, and means a kind of secondary cause within the whole of causality.[314]

Here, Heidegger wants to reveal the difference of *causa efficiens* from the way it is understood today. Heidegger states that in *Being and Time*, proximally given I and subject thought cannot be accepted as the starting point. Heidegger's approach in this passage points to the foundations of this idea.[315] Heidegger's aim is to point out the unity of these four reasons in bringing something to appearance. In other words, the silversmith is not an effector or a maker. It plays its part of the responsibility / indebtedness in preparing and presenting the vessel. Also, according to Heidegger, the Greeks understood all four reasons as indebted to the truth.[316] Heidegger describes *poisesis* as a bringing-forth with reference to Plato, while explaining the four reasons bringing something to appearance. In this way, something that does not exist is made present. Here, it is pointed out that the concept of *physis* is also *poiesis* in the highest sense. Bringing-forth is the unconcealment of something. The Greek equivalent of this revealing is the *aletheia*. Heidegger states that the essence of technique is in every way related to revealing. Because, according to him, technology is not just a means but a way of revealing. As a result, the essence of technology is happening in the realm of revealing. In other words, it occurs in the realm of truth.[317]

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[313] Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, 7-8.
[314] Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, 9-10.
[315] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 72; For an analysis of the relationship between subject-centered thinking and the objectification of being by fixing it under the destructive dominance of technology, see also, Küçükalp, Cevizci, *Batı Düşüncesi*, 188-189.
[316] William Lovitt, "A Gespräch with Heidegger on technology," in *Man and World* 6, no. 1 (February 1973): 46-47.
[317] Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, 10-12.

Heidegger's analysis of technology so far can only be understood on the basis provided by his idea of Being and truth. Heidegger uses the concept of **enframing** (Gestell) to explain the above-mentioned transformation on this basis. According to him, enframing is the essence of technology.[318] This concept refers to the homogenization of entities in a process. The wealth of entities is thus fixed, molded and exploited unlimitedly.[319] In this way, many worlds dissolve into one world.[320] Enframing obscures revealing in the sense of *poiesis*. Therefore, as unconcealment, it covers the place where the truth occurs. This is why Heidegger calls enframing the greatest danger.[321] The transformation of the *techne* concept has also transformed the relationship established with nature. *Techne*, which works with nature, has taken the form of a technology that works against nature with this transformation process. After taking this form, there is a situation of imposing order on nature. Technology obliges nature to offer it all its riches.[322] In other words, it is a form of challenging revealment that points to the essence of technology.[323]

The transformation in the relationship established with nature has also changed the meaning of benefiting from nature. The demand for storage and continuity stands out as the distinctive feature of modern technology.[324] Nature must provide energy constantly, and the way to provide this is to create a surplus that can be stored. In this understanding, nature is seen as a source of energy. The earth is seen as completely consumable for technology. Nature is understood as a **fund** (Bestand).[325] In the modern period, traces of Descartean subjectivity and voluntarism can be seen on the basis of the idea of nature as a fund.[326] On the other hand, the natural result of the said storage and continuity demand is mass production. Heidegger points at this point to the Platonic idea of essence. According to him, this essence is related to the metaphysical approach that underlies mass production in technology. This essence inspired the

[318] Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, 25.
[319] Lewis-Staehler, "Martin Heidegger," 157-158.
[320] Lewis-Staehler, "Martin Heidegger," 165
[321] Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, 27-28.
[322] Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, 15-16.
[323] Lovitt, "A Gespräch with Heidegger on technology," 51.
[324] Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, 14.
[325] Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, 16-17.
[326] Lovitt, "A Gespräch with Heidegger on technology," 50.

reproduction of a template by machines.[327] Mass production should also be understood as the loss of singularity.[328] The loss of singularity leads to metaphysical attempts at domination. For this, Heidegger's phenomenological method can be understood as a means of observing the meaning of the singularity. Phenomenology has an ethical duty for Heidegger and points to the importance of experiences of singularity.[329] However, understanding nature and entities as fund and approaching them in a dominating and destructive way means that human beings are also dominated. Therefore, this situation eliminates the possibility of human experience. That being so paves the way for the human being to be organized as a fund.[330]

The emergence of history in Heidegger's thought after *Kehre* requires attention to how Being reveals itself at different times. Each era has its own historical reality. According to Heidegger, the current historical revelation of Being points to the essence of technology.[331] This historical reality is directly related to the forgetting of the question regarding the meaning of Being. However, technology hides its historical character. It does not allow it to be considered on itself. Technology has a structure that denies the fact that it is an ongoing historical process. In this way it imposes itself and its assumption of truth.[332] In other words, human beings are challenged in this process. Its purpose is to ensure that it challenges the natural powers.[333] Heidegger says that this is also a **call** (ein ruf). The essence of technology makes a call, and human responds in a certain way.[334] But in giving this answer, human is not completely free since he is not out of history. According to Heidegger, at this point, human responsibility can be seen as listening and hearing in order to find the right answer, not to obey.[335]

[327] 156; Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, 20.
[328] Lewis-Staehler, "Martin Heidegger," 155
[329] Lewis-Staehler, "Martin Heidegger," 170.
[330] Lovitt, "A Gespräch with Heidegger on technology," 53.
[331] 155; Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, 27.
[332] Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, 28.
[333] Lovitt, "A Gespräch with Heidegger on technology," 51.
[334] Lewis-Staehler, "Martin Heidegger," 156.
[335] Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, 25.

The effort to find the correct answer raises the question of what will provide the change against technological hegemony. Heidegger points at this point to one of the forms of equipment, the work of art. Art is not as insensitive to the earth as technology.[336] On the contrary, the poietic work of art in which truth happens reveals nature. The work of art also describes the Being of entities in the mode of ready to hand without any malfunction.[337] According to Heidegger, art is a versatile revealing. Art allows truth to holding-sway and safekeeping. Moreover, it has nothing to do with the artistic derivative, aesthetic enjoyment, and the cultural activity sector. Art belongs to *poiesis*, and *poiesis* is production that revealing entities.[338] According to Heidegger, a work of art changes our usual relationship with the world and the earth. It stops the common ways of seeing, knowing, and doing, and paves the way to surrender to the truth that happens in the work of art.[339] In this sense, the work of art is considered by Heidegger as an opportunity to get rid of the hegemony of technology as another type of poietic activity.[340]

[336] Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, 34-35.
[337] Lewis-Staehler, "Martin Heidegger," 146-147.
[338] Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, p. 34.
[339] Lovitt, "A Gespräch with Heidegger on technology," 58-59.
[340] Lewis-Staehler, "Martin Heidegger," 146, 166.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

When we look at Heidegger's field of work as a whole, we see many different topics: analysis of everyday life, modern thought and representative theory, modern technology and its world of meaning, the origin of art and artwork, etc. What is the perspective that underpins this broad field of interest? This question should be regarded as a asked question for understanding, not for limiting and classifying Heidegger's thought. Because Heidegger's philosophy presents a structure that opposes classification, summarization, and reduction. Heidegger, as a method, presents a portrait of a philosopher who is not looking for clear answers but constantly advancing by asking new questions. We are talking about a methodology that analyzes past answers rather than looking for answers and tries to avoid asking wrong questions. In this context, it is possible to say that every subject that falls within Heidegger's field of interest basically rests on the foundations of his investigation of the meaning of Being. In fact, from *Being and Time* to his most recent work, there is enough ground to think that there is no project continuity in Heidegger's philosophy. Because Heidegger's approach to the problem of Being has undergone serious changes. However, as a result of our work, we found that there are stronger grounds for us to think that Heidegger's main problem in all his work is continuous.[341]

Heidegger avoided seeking a fixed and enduring essence to explain Being. However, traces of a constant and permanent search for essence can always be seen in the Western thought tradition. Heidegger objects to the interpretation of Being in the dimensions of time only from the "now" and in terms of presence. According to him, the theoretical view of Being is problematic. Because the understanding that is indirectly inherent in the concept of *theoria* is also the idea of presence.[342] In response, Heidegger states that it is imperative to ask the question of Being, which he thinks has

[341] Solomon, *Akılcılıktan Varoluşçuluğa*, 361.
[342] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 98.

been forgotten. In addressing and developing the question of the meaning of Being concretely and interpreting time as the horizon of any conception of Being, Heidegger sees only the study of the question of Being as a task. He expresses that its purpose is not to present a complete onotology. What it is trying to do is to reveal the meaning of Being and the horizon necessary for the interpretation of Being.[343] In this framework, according to Heidegger, entities have a meaning. Entities are not isolated from the context in which they are. The context is the world. Entities gain meaning by their relationship with other entities in the world. These relationships between entities set them apart. In this direction, Being stands out in Heidegger's philosophy as the possibility in the world in this context.[344] That being so does not constitute a clear answer to the meaning of the question of Being and its relation to truth and art. The foundations of the possibility in question formed the subject of the second chapter, where we dealt with Heidegger's view of Being.

According to Heidegger, Being cannot be considered separate from truth, and likewise, truth cannot be considered separate from Being. In Heidegger's philosophy, truth is the existence condition of Being. The Western tradition of thought has forgotten not only the meaning of Being, but also truth. The Western tradition itself and especially the various reality theories have covered up the meaning of Being and truth. Traditional theory has moved from the fundamental phenomenon of truth, but over time has come to the idea of agreement. However, Heidegger regards the understanding that characterizes the truth as "correspondence", "adaequatio", "homoiosis" as very general and empty. Heidegger explains the truth in movement in the concept of *aletheia*. How the idea of truth as disclosedness of Being (*aletheia*) is transformed into correctness of perception and agreement constitutes the axis of the problem for Heidegger. According to Heidegger, Parmenides initially discovered the existence of Being. He has done a study of the thing that manifests itself in itself. But later in Plato truth was under to yoke of *ideas*.[345] The theory of *ideas* is accepted by Heidegger as the starting point of the humanistic perspective and the understanding of agreement in Western thought.[346] Heidegger's refers to Aristotle's that judgment: "In

[343] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 38.
[344] Lewis- Staehler, "Martin Heidegger", 113-116.
[345] Heidegger, "Plato's Doctrine of Truth," 176.
[346] Heidegger, "Plato's Doctrine of Truth," 182-182.

fact, the false and the true are not in things (themselves) . . . but in the intellect."[347] According to Heidegger, this judgment reinforced the idea of agreement. In other words, the truth has become established as true knowledge, knowledge appropriate to its object, knowledge of the Absolute or beauty.[348] Since Plato and Aristotle, it has become the norm for Western thought to consider *aletheia* as an agreement, in other words, to consider the essence of truth as the agreement of both representation and expression. In the third part, we examined how this understanding manifested in Tomas Aquinas, Descartes, Kant and Nietzsche. Of course, the basis of this investigation is Heidegger's understanding of truth as unconcealment. But how consistent is this understanding? At this point, we have also included a criticism of Heidegger's philological basis of his understanding of truth based on the concept of *aletheia*.

In Heidegger's philosophy, a link is established between the forgetting of the question of the meaning of Being and the degeneration of traditional philosophy's approach to art. Art's connection with Being has been severed, and as a result, its relation to the truth has not been understood. In traditional philosophy, truth has been considered as true knowledge, knowledge appropriate to its object, knowledge of the Absolute or beauty. However, Heidegger rejects the traditional conception of truth and states that art deals with truth, not beauty. According to Heidegger, art cannot be understood by reducing it to beauty. He states that what is beautiful in fine arts is not art, on the contrary, art creates beauty.[349] Heidegger studies the work of art as something that reveals the Being of entities. The truth of the entites is evaluated as the opening up of the Being of entities. While the truth of the entities set itself into the work of art, art set itself into the truth.[350] In other words, Heidegger evaluates art in a different position than approaches that consider it as a description, representation, imitation. Heidegger proposes the concept of strife to understand art instead of traditional views. In Heidegger's thought, conflict arises as a situation created by the work of art. Conflict is happening between world and earth. The work of art accomplish so that the conflict remains conflict. Conflict separates the work of art, in which truth happens, from the

[347] Heidegger, "Plato's Doctrine of Truth", 178. Aristotle, "Metaphysics," 88, [1027b17-1028a8].
[348] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 257.
[349] Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," 162.
[350] Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," 165.

pure thing and the equipment. More importantly, it is possible to say that the work of art still has an importance in terms of our historical existence in Heidegger's thought. Art is still considered as an essential and necessary medium for the realization of the truth, and more cautiously speaking, as an opportunity.

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