

EXPLORING THE RELIGIOSITY EFFECT ON
NATIONALIST AND GLOBALIST ATTITUDES IN
TÜRKİYE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE WORLD VALUES
SURVEY DATA

Şuheda ŞEN

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A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO ABDULLAH GÜL UNIVERSITY
SOCIAL SCIENCES INSTITUTE
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE

By
Şuheda ŞEN
December, 2024
Kayseri, Türkiye

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SCIENTIFIC ETHICS COMPLIANCE

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M.A. thesis titled “Exploring the Religiosity Effect on Nationalist and Globalist Attitudes in Türkiye: A Study Using World Values Survey Data” has been prepared in accordance with the Graduate Thesis Preparation Guidelines of the Abdullah Gül University, Social Sciences Institute.

Prepared By
Şuheda ŞEN
Signature

Advisor
Asst. Prof. Murat İNAN
Signature

Head of the Data Science Program at Abdullah Gül University,
Social Sciences Institute

Assoc. Prof. Umut TÜRK
Signature

ACCEPTANCE AND APPROVAL

M.A. thesis titled “Exploring the Religiosity Effect on Nationalist and Globalist Attitudes in Türkiye: A Study Using World Values Survey Data” and prepared by Şuheda Şen has been accepted by the jury in the Data Science Graduate Program at Abdullah Gül University, Social Sciences Institute.

..... /12/2024

(Thesis Defense Exam Date)

JURY:

Advisor : Asst. Prof. Murat İNAN

Member: Assoc. Prof. Mehmet İnanç ÖZEKMEKÇİ

Member: Asst. Prof. Mehmet Celil ÇELEBİ

APPROVAL:

The acceptance of this M.A. thesis has been approved by the decision of the Abdullah Gül University, Social Sciences Institute, Management Board dated /.... / and numbered

..... / /

(Date)

Assoc. Prof. Umut Türk

Name Surname : Şuheda ŞEN

Program : Data Science (Master of Arts)

Advisor : Asst. Prof. Murat İNAN

Thesis Title : Exploring the Religiosity Effect on Nationalist and Globalist Attitudes in Türkiye: A Study Using World Values Survey Data

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the complex relationships across religiosity, nationalist and globalist attitudes in Türkiye. The study provided a unique conceptual foundation for Türkiye by examining whether religiosity supports nationalist and globalist attitudes. This study analyzes how religion affects nationalism and globalization through the variables of attendance to religious services, national pride, and support for the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN). Using the Turkish leg of World Values Survey (WVS) data, and a series of generalized ordered logistic (gologit) regression models, this study aims to provide empirical findings revealing relationships between these variables. Understanding the associations between these variables provides crucial insights into the question what determines participants' sense of national identity and belonging to global institutions. The findings presented that religiosity interacts positively with national pride, and negatively with sonfidence with the EU.

Keywords: Nationalism, Globalization, Religiosity, Political Sociology, Turkish Politics

Ad Soyad : Şuheda ŞEN

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ÖZET

Bu çalışma, Türkiye'ye odaklanarak din, milliyetçilik ve küreselleşme arasındaki karmaşık ilişkileri incelemektedir. Çalışma, dindarlığın milliyetçi ve küreselci tutumları destekleyip desteklemediğini inceleyerek Türkiye için benzersiz bir kavramsal temel sağlamıştır. Bu çalışma, dinin milliyetçiliği ve küreselleşmeyi nasıl etkilediğini, küreselleşme aktörleri olarak kabul edilen dini hizmetlere katılım, milli gurur ve Avrupa Birliği (AB) ve Birleşmiş Milletler'e (BM) destek değişkenleri aracılığıyla analiz etmektedir. Dünya Değerler Araştırması'nın (WVS) Türkiye ayağı verilerini ve bir dizi genelleştirilmiş sıralı lojistik (gologit) regresyon modelini kullanarak bu çalışma, bu değişkenler arasındaki ilişkileri ortaya koyan ampirik bulgular sağlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu üçü arasındaki ilişkiyi anlamak, bireylerin aidiyet, kimlik ve dünya görüşü duygusunu nasıl oluşturdukları konusunda önemli içgörüler sağlar. Bulgular, dindarlığın milli gururla olumlu, AB'ye güvenle olumsuz etkileşime girdiğini ortaya koymuştur.

Anahtar kelimeler: Milliyetçilik, Küreselleşme, Dindarlık, Siyaset Sosyolojisi, Türk Siyaseti

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AK Parti

Justice and Development Party

Gologit

Generalized Ordered Logistic Regression

MHP

National Action Party

The EU

The European Union

The UN

The United Nations

WVS

World Values Survey

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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

Changes in today's world have a dizzying speed. Technological advancements change the way we understand the world and the politics. The world is becoming more globalized by means of transportation and communication technologies. On the other hand, religiosity and nationalism still continue to shape people's identities and values. On one hand, people are becoming more aware of other identities, more tolerant towards them as they get to know the others, yet, identity politics is on the rise, especially right-wing movements are getting even more powerful all over the world as a response to immigration and globalism. While globalization dissolves economic, cultural, and social boundaries, people who see erased boundaries as a threat to their identity and values embrace nationalism even more strongly. Besides, religion continues to exert its impact, leaving deep imprints on people from the past to the present. The direction of religiosity's influence in today's society will be investigated in this study in terms of the effects on nationalism and support for globalization.

This study intends to investigate to what extent religiosity supports nationalist and globalist attitudes. The relationship between religiosity and nationalism is examined through variables measuring attendance to religious services and national pride. The globalism was quantified using questionnaire items gauging the embracement of the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) identities.

Religiosity is reflected in individuals in different ways. According to Grock and Stark (1965), when it comes to the reflection of religiosity in an individual, five dimensions should come to mind: experiential, ritualistic, ideological, intellectual, and consequential. The experiential dimension refers to people's relationship with religion being shaped by their individual experiences, while the ritualistic dimension includes the individual's worship and prayer, such as fasting. The ideological dimension refers to the expectation that religion requires a person to have certain beliefs or doctrines. According to the Intellectual dimension of religiosity, a religious person is expected to be conscious and knowledgeable about the basic teachings, doctrines and sacred texts of his/her religion. The Consequential dimension of religiosity refers to how people's

religious beliefs and commitment appear in their daily life and behavior. (Grock & Stark, 1965). These five dimensions offer different perspectives in understanding the reflections of religiosity in individuals, while also showing how religious identity is shaped at the individual and social level. At this point, when the relationship between the concepts of religiosity and social belonging is examined, their intersection with dynamics that form social identity is striking.

Nationalism, attributed to national identity and sovereignty, plays a pivotal role in creating modern nation-states and its relation with religion changes according to the communities. The source of nationalism is debated on many different grounds. The concept of nationalism dates back to the French Revolution. Over the years, numerous alternative definitions of nationalism have appeared in the literature. Yet, most scholars ignored the religious effect on nationalism and mostly accepted nationalism as a product of economic development and modernization. (Gellner (1981), Anderson (1983), Hobsbawm (1992)). Data from previous studies suggest that religiosity generally supports nationalism. A few cases of the opposite results reveal that this created the necessity of this research for Türkiye. As evidenced by the literature's discussion of the relationship between religiosity and nationalism, my interest in this part of the study began to pique.

The establishment of modern nation-states is one of the fundamental principles of the modernization ideology adopted during the transition to the Republic of Türkiye. (Akman, 2004). It is used by the Turkish state for the creation of nation-state identity. Nevertheless, following decades, Turkish nationalism, which progressed along secular lines in the Post-Republican period, began to progress under the influence of religion after the 1950s (Aytürk, 2014). However, the relationship between religion and nationalism remains unclear. We can state that this is because the concepts of religion and nationality support each other in the Turkish concept. For example, when the National Action Party (MHP) is examined, it is seen that the party has founded its ideology on a religion-based nationalism. Even this particular example underlines the importance of demonstrating how much this complicated connection between religiosity and nationalism has evolved in Türkiye. The complex relationship between

religion and nationalism has also led to nationalist discourses changing in response to globalization and European integration (Bilgin, 2005). As a result, Turkish nationalism, which was built on secularism and Western values during the modernization process, was reshaped over time under the influence of religious elements; this change also led to the evolution of nationalist discourses against dynamics such as globalization and European integration. Furthermore, the relationship between religion and globalization is uncertain in terms of how it take evolve in the future, given the dynamics and complex nature of both phenomena.

Globalization is a process that aims for economic, cultural and potentially political integration. Improving inter-state relations has been considered as a strategy to bring states closer together by removing economic obstacles and increasing their economic gains and end wars eventually. Nevertheless, this process has the potential to lead to many cultural and social changes. It was argued that globalization was driven by the idea of creating a single culture, and within this framework, nationalist movements decreased their effectiveness. Therefore, globalization caused the emergence of sub-identities. From another perspective, it has promoted "shared common values", acting with the idea that a single global family can be created. Hence, how the relationship between religion and globalization take shape in the future remains uncertain due to the dynamic and complex nature of both phenomena.

Globalization has enhanced its impact with the EU membership process in Türkiye. International organizations and companies have increased their importance and become influential actors in economic, political, and social areas. In this context, Türkiye has made economic and social reforms while integrating into international markets through customs union agreements with the EU. Türkiye signed the Customs Union Agreement, one of the integration steps, in 1995 and implemented many reforms for cultural and social integration (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate for EU Affairs, 2024). This situation strengthens the impact of globalization in Türkiye. Featherstone (1990) touched upon the complexity of global cultural flows and the processes by which these flows create cultural homogeneity and disorder. In this context, he stated that with globalization, previously isolated

homogeneous cultures have been connected to each other and these processes have resulted in the creation of more complex identities and identity-strengthening reactions (Featherstone, 1990). Thus, with globalization, local identities have been strengthened, preventing the formation of an upper identity (Soysal Karlıova, 2018). In this context, Türkiye's integration with the EU constitutes an important example for understanding how globalization interacts with nationalism and how nationalism evolves in the modern world.

When looking at the relationship between religion and globalization in Türkiye, we must go back to the beginning of the ruling period of the Justice and Development Party (AK Parti), which employed religious notions in its discourses. When AK Parti came to power, they implemented policies that would increase Türkiye's integration into the EU and the global economy. From this point of view, we may argue that religion, particularly in Türkiye, has become a promoter of globalization. Yet, this view requires empirical evidence.

This study also addresses globalization in terms of the interaction between the UN and Türkiye. The UN has undertaken the task of peace and security in the globalization process and acts as a global regulator in these matters. Türkiye was one of the founding members of the UN, which was established in 1945 after World War II. However, the obstacles in the decision-making processes due to the inadequacy of the UN in intervening in international crises and the presence of countries with veto power have made the UN interpreted as harming national interests. Nevertheless, it is argued that the UN has the potential to create an international order that meets the needs of the global society by overcoming the interest-oriented approaches of states (Delbruck, 1997). At this point, since the EU and the UN play the role of globalization actors, the relationship between religiosity and globalization will be measured through these concepts in the study.

Departing from this perspective, the Turkish demographic structure has become a microcosm that can be examined in terms of the relationship between these three

dynamic concepts. This research will assist us in understanding the complex relationship between religiosity, attitudes associated with nationalism and globalisation in Türkiye. Another important aspect of this thesis is that it sheds light on contemporary politics. Understanding the dynamic relationships between globalization, nationalism, and religion might be foresight, as it would allow decision makers in Türkiye to make more conscious and effective decisions regarding its domestic and foreign policy. Hereby, this study is also significant in terms of exposing the religion-nationalism and religion-globalization link, which can be used to guide policymakers.

Quantitative methods of inquiry were used in this research. Data from the WVS were employed to investigate links between religious support for nationalism and globalization. Descriptive statistics, generalized ordered logistic regression (gologit), and data visualization approaches were used to identify trends and patterns.

While examining the relationship between religiosity and nationalism and globalization, the effect of control values such as income level, gender, education level and age on this relationship is analyzed in the context of Türkiye. According to the modernist approach, nationalism is a product of modernization and has been shaped by modernization processes such as industrialization, education, urbanization and secularization (Smith, 1996). Modernists argue that concepts such as nation and nationalism are structures that did not exist before the modern era, but emerged as a result of modernization processes (Özkirimli, 2017).

In this context, the study evaluates the understanding of nationalism of individuals in Türkiye and their interactions with globalization within the scope of modernization theory. It aims to test the theses of modernists that associate nationalism with the modernization process by examining how factors such as income, gender, education, and age affect the relationship between nationalism and globalization. Therefore, this research not only reveals the dynamics between religiosity and

nationalism and religiosity and globalization but also provides an opportunity to evaluate the validity of modernization theory in the Turkish context.

With all this, this study has two limitations. The first of these is its scope limitation regarding being focused on Türkiye. In this context, only Türkiye's data was taken in the data analysis, and inferences were made for Türkiye. Another limitation is that the questions in this study were prepared according to the questions in the WVS dataset. This enabled the data and the flexibility of this study to be prepared according to the data set. In this study, analysis was carried out while being aware of these limitations.

This thesis study is divided into five chapters. The literature on modernization theory, nationalism and globalization are reviewed thoroughly in the second chapter, and the evolution of these notions, their modifications from the past to the present, and today's relational dynamics are discussed. This literature review serves as the theoretical foundation for the research and gives the context required to address the study's main issues. The third section has extensively detailed the dataset's selection, substance, and analysis methodologies. The results from the data analysis are presented in the fourth section and findings discussed in detail in the final section, along with an explanation of how these findings connect to the key hypothesis of the study. The study ended by reviewing the results, discussions, and suggestions for future research.

CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW

This section reviewed the literature on modernization, nationalism, globalization, and religiosity. Based on the discussions made so far, the studies presented and revealed in this section are divided into three main sections: modernization theory, nationalism and globalization. Classical modernization theory offers a valuable framework for comprehending the processes of transition from traditional to contemporary society. Literature on nationalism is divided into three parts: (1) nation and nationalism, (2) religion, and (3) quantitative analyses related to nationalism and religion. This part examines studies on nation, nationalism and perspectives on nationalism and religion. Moreover, it reviews literature related to Turkish nationalism and its relation to religion. In the final part, findings of the extant quantitative research examining nationalism-religion are presented to understand religious support and nationalism's relation to age, income, gender, and education. The third part is divided into three sections: globalization, the European Union and the United Nations, and quantitative analysis related to globalization and religion. As the first part of globalization, definitions and historical background of globalization and its association to religiosity have been reviewed. The relationship between religiosity and globalist attitudes is then examined in the EU and the UN context.

2.1 Classical Modernization Theory

When we examine the origins of the classical modernization theory, we can see that it was rise as a response of American political elites and intellectuals to the international environment in the post-World War II era. During this time, Third World nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America gained more influence in politics as a result of the Cold War and the fall of European colonial Powers (Tipps, 1973). This prompted American academics and researchers to study social transformation, political stability, and economic development in these areas outside of Europe or their own nations. Given this, modernization theory has developed into a paradigm that aims to describe how societies change from traditional to contemporary structures. It is strongly associated with a number of social, political, and economic concepts.

The approach to nationalism that considers nationalism together with modernization processes or as a product of modernization is called "modernist" (Smith, 1996). This approach is centered around the idea that nations and nationalism are structures specific to the modern age. Accordingly, nationalism should be evaluated together with the basic parameters of modernization: industrialization, the formation of centralized state structures, urbanization and secularization processes (Yahşi, 2017). In this context, modernization theory needs to be addressed in terms of historical understanding of nationalism.

A prominent student of the classical modernization theory, Seymour Martin Lipset, linked modernization to the ideas of democracy, legitimacy, and economic growth. He claimed that only under the particular circumstances of capitalist industrialization could contemporary democratization take place (Lipset, 1959). In his research, Lipset came to the conclusion that democracy and economic development—including urbanization, industrialization, and education—are intimately associated. In this regard, Lipset's opinions on the interrelationship between modernization and democracy demonstrate that both economic growth and societal structural change are critical to democracy's ability to function. Nonetheless, Lipset's thesis highlights that for democratization to be viable, these elements must continuously evolve in addition to arguing that capitalist industrial development strengthens democracy.

Lipset's conclusions about the connection between democracy and economic development are similar to Lerner's viewpoint on long-term modernization and growth. According to Daniel Lerner only a civilization that can eventually achieve "self-sustained growth" can be considered as developed (Lerner, 1968). Modernization is a long and complex process which has implications in many walks of life, including economic, social, juridical and political changes. According to Lerner urbanization, literacy, and media engagement are the three fundamental phases of modernization. As the majority of the society moves from the traditional mode of production to the industrial one, the social and economic relationship become more complex and interdependent. People from different ethnic and social backgrounds meet in large

metropolitcs to work and live their lives. They make more personal contact with “others” which increases their tolerance to out-groups. More people have access to education, which enables them to make better judgments and makes them more participatory in politics. Higher education, participation to politics, and access to mass media give people a global perspective and enable them to monitor changes on a national and international scale. In the end, these procedures increase people's support for democratic institutions and engage in economic activities which are modernization's primary objectives (Shah, 2011) (Lipset, 1959) (Lerner, 1968).

Max Weber, Talcott Parsons and Samuel Huntington reverse the causal arrow and argue that sub-structural elements determine economy (Parsons, 1937; Huntington, 1993). Huntington contends that political stability actually spurs economic development, and asserts that political stability and advancement will be followed by economic growth in this way (Çırakoğlu & Sayın). Therefore, according to him, the construction of a strong and orderly political system is important before economic development (Huntington, 1993).

Huntington argues that modernization is a transformative process that encompasses social, cultural, and political changes in addition to economic expansion. Social mobility, urbanization, industrialization, literacy, and media consumption are all interrelated. He offers a crucial foundation for comprehending these aspects of modernization because of his heavy focus on the political system. He claims that modernization is a long-term, homogenizing, progressive, cultural, and methodical process (Huntington, 1993).

Departing from Huntington’s perspective, Inglehart and Welzel contribute to the discussion of modernization by arguing that social and cultural shifts brought about by modernity make democratization more feasible. It is not linear and fixed, though. In other words, there is no set path for every nation to follow when it comes to the transition to democracy; social circumstances, cultural norms, and historical context can all have an impact (Inglehart & Welzel, 2009).

To set themselves apart from early modernization interpretations, Inglehart and Welzel assert that religious and ethnic traditions are still very much alive and that modernization and religion are not mutually exclusive. Additionally, they claim that while religious beliefs, deference to authority, and patriotism are valued in traditional communities, these traits will change as societies become more modern and logical (Inglehart & Welzel, 2009). In this context, the process of modernization brings about both social and personal changes in people's values; while religion and traditional norms change as the social structure evolves, this change can occasionally result in social unrest or cultural conflicts. Gaining an understanding of these dynamics' function in the modernization process, particularly in the Turkish context, might help one see societal change processes from a wider angle.

Türkiye was one of the earliest countries to experience modernization in its region. The roots of modernization date back to the Reform and Tanzimat Edicts carried out in the Ottoman Empire. (Zürcher, 1995). Modernization initiatives started to support the establishment of a nation state during the Republican era (Göl, 2005). A number of political, social, and educational reforms that included Western values took the place of the traditional with the Republic's declaration. The foundation of modernization efforts during this era was the secularization of education, the acceptance of the laic concept, and the reduction of the power of religious organizations (Zürcher, 1995). Under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's direction, these reforms sought to change Turkish society's social, cultural, and economic composition in a way that was compatible with the West. With a number of reforms ranging from official holidays to legal and political institutions, from dress and outfit restrictions to units of measurement, from cultural activity areas to art practices, they expedited the modernization process (Kılınç, 2016). Thus, it is crucial to analyze how religion, nationalism, and globalization interacted during Türkiye's modernization process in order to comprehend current social and cultural dynamics as well as to get a historical perspective. These dynamics point to a complicated structure that requires analysis using both empirical data and a theoretical framework.

2.2 Nation

Theorists of nationalism and nation can be divided into three categories: primordialists or perennialists, modernists, and ethno-symbolists (Pushkareva & Agaltsova, 2021; Qazi et al., 2023). Primordialists argue that nations existed before the modern world and are rooted in biological states. They suggest that the origins of ethnic identities and nations are ancient and unchangeable. Geert Hofstede and Edward Shils reflect the primordial perspective, concentrating on identical “givens” such as “kinship, continuity, tradition, belief, language, and tribe.” (Gusfield, 1996). On the other hand, modernists state the nation concept belongs to the last centuries, and its emergence is a product of industrialization, the modern state, bureaucracy, secularism, and capitalism (Smith, 1996). The reason for this is that there were no social and economic conditions that would allow nationalism to emerge in the early ages (Özkirimli, 2017). Gellner, Anderson, and Hobsbawm are among the prominent modernist theorists. Lastly, ethno-symbolists argues that ethnicity, symbols, values, and myths are essential components of any nation. They judge modernists for neglecting these components (Smith, 1996). They also criticize primordialists for their inadequacy to provide answers regarding the origin, change, and extinction of particular ethnic groups (Smith, 1996). Ethno-symbolists essentially identify the historical significance of ethnic identities like primordialists. However, they are also accepted that these identities have been reshaped in the contemporary period as modernists. Consequently, they contend that ethnic identities have historical origins and the capacity to evolve and progress. Anthony D. Smith is among the recognized ethno-symbolists.

Ernest Renan is credited with presenting the earliest definition of the concept of a nation in literature. According to Renan:

“A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things that, in truth, are but one constitute this soul, this spiritual principle. One is in the past, the other in the present. One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is present

consent, the desire to live together, the will to perpetuate the value of the heritage that one has received in an undivided form."(Aguirresarobe, 2023, p. 4).

Renan attributed the rise of nationalism to the French Revolution (Moxnes, 2017). He also argued that it consists of a spiritual essence composed of two key elements: collective memories of the past and a collective determination to coexist in the present (Aguirresarobe, 2023).

The first component is the past-based component. This involves having a significant collective memory legacy in which individuals within the nation share a similar past, cultural values, and shared experiences. The second component in the present is the desire to live together and maintain the value of the inheritance received. This expresses the unity of the nation's members in the determination to preserve the heritage of the past and to carry it into the future. However, Aguirresarobe (2023) claims that Renan's definition is insufficiently broad and satisfactory for communities with a rich history and culture. He also argued that Renan failed to create a conceptual certainty (Aguirresarobe, 2023). This resulted in a lack of certainty regarding spiritual and cultural existence components. While Renan concentrates on a nation's spiritual and historical elements, Gellner stresses its contemporary features by linking nationalism to economic and social advancement.

Ernest Gellner, a liberal sociologist and one of the leading scholar in the study of nationalism, describes the nation as perception and culture (Rieffer, 2003). As he states, in order to form a nation, two individuals must have a shared culture. Then, he defines culture as behavior, association, symbols, and thought systems. Thereafter, these two people need to acknowledge each other as belonging to the same nation (Gellner, 1983). He also argues that the nation is a distinguishing feature of modernity, ensuring state construction (Kelly, 2015).

In his book Nations and Nationalism, Gellner claims that the development of nations was strongly connected to the necessities of industrial societies. These societies

need advanced homogeneity and standardized culture (Gellner, 1983). For Gellner, this demonstrates that industrial societies' structural necessities and functioning are based on shared language and cultural norms. Gellner asserts that individual homogenization through education and communication is important to the continuity of economic and social functioning in these societies (Gellner, 1983). Furthermore, he notes that the educational system and communication methods are essential to this process, ensuring the interchangeability of persons throughout society.

Anthony D. Smith is a leading sociologist and theorist in nationalism and national identity studies. Smith defines a nation as a group of people who share specific characteristics. From his perspective, nation is

“...as a named human population occupying an historic territory and sharing common myths and memories, a mass public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all members (Smith, 2000, p. 796).

Smith defines the nation as a geographical concept and a community bound together by a shared history, culture, economy, and legal system. Smith's approach assists us in understanding how these elements interact in the construction of nations and how national identity arises from these interactions. Smith reviews modernist approaches that argue that nations are invented or completely new structures in the modern period and rejects the typical portrayal of modern and traditional concepts as being in opposition to each other. Smith stresses that the secularism, rationalism and bureaucracy of modernity are inextricably linked to earlier components such as tradition, religion and ethnicity. Therefore, he points out the fallacy of making a sharp distinction between tradition and modernity. Smith implies that both concepts can coexist. Smith also expresses that the foundation of ethnic identity is myths and memories about a group's origins (Smith, 1991). In this context, Smith argues that modern nations formed when ethnic communities with historical and cultural continuity obtained a political identity and structure in the modern age (Smith, 1991, 2000).

Unlike Smith, Eric Hobsbawm takes a modernist approach, seeing nations as manufactured institutions of the contemporary period, formed primarily by industrialization and political demands. Hobsbawm contends that nations are not natural or eternal formations but rather social and political structures that evolved in the modern era (Hobsbawm, 1992). As Hobsbawm states, the nation is an entity commonly “invented” for specific objectives in the modern period, particularly during industrialization. He claims that nation and nationalism reflect the attempts of rulers and politicians to regain legitimacy on the basis of national principles during a time when conventional legitimacy sources declined following the French Revolution (Hobsbawm, 1992). Therefore, for Hobsbawm, nations are imaginary groups based on “invented traditions” with a shared identity. These traditions are intentionally manufactured or rewritten to give the appearance of historical continuity.

Benedict Anderson defines nations as "imagined communities," drawing on the modernist approach but emphasizing perception and identity. Nationalism, as Anderson explores, refers to an idea of “imagined communities” where nations are viewed as manufactured structures instead of natural or objective realities (Pushkareva & Agaltsova, 2021). In his book “Imagined Communities: The Origins and Spread of Nationalism,” Anderson suggests that nations are products of the modern age and that nationalism enables individuals to define themselves as members of an imagined community (Anderson, 2006). For Anderson, this means that members of a nation see themselves as part of a community, even if they do not meet each other directly.

Rogers Brubaker advocates not treating national identities as a logical consequence of an existing ethnic identity and not conceptualizing the nation as a real group. Instead, he suggests treating “national identities as a practical category, an institutionalized form, and a contingent event” (Ginderachter & Fox, 2019). Brubaker also sees these concepts as products of their social and political components in analyzing nation and ethnicity. He focuses on the social construction and reshaping of national identity and ethnic personality (Brubaker, 2009).

To sum up, investigated literature provides various conceptualizations of nationalism and its association with modernity. Renan focuses on a shared past and common will, whereas Gellner connects nationalism to modernity and industry. Smith combines tradition and modernity, emphasizing mythology and cultural continuity. Hobsbawm and Anderson see nations as created entities, emphasizing "invented traditions" and "imagined communities," accordingly. Brubaker criticizes essentialist viewpoints, portraying national identity as socially dependent. Together, these ideas depict nations as dynamic creations shaped by historical, cultural, and political influences. The following section investigates the relationship between nationalism and religion, tracing their reciprocal influence across time.

2.2.1 Nationalism and Religion

Different forms of nationalism have been discussed and explained in various ways in the literature. Louis Snyder separated nationalism into four periods: "Aggressive nationalism" (1900–1945), "distributive nationalism" (1871–1900), "integrative nationalism" (1815–1871), and "contemporary nationalism" (after 1945) (Ertan, 2018).

Furthermore, in his work *Theories of Nationalism*, Özkırmılı divided nationalism into the 18th-19th centuries when nationalism was born, the first period when nationalism became the subject of academic studies (1918-1945), the period when nationalism debates developed (1945-1990) and the period when nationalism debates reached new dimensions (after 1990) (Özkırmılı, 2017). Özkırmılı states that the first period of nationalism is based on the German romantic movement. In the period of 1918-1945, it is indicated that nationalism began to progress systematically, but it is also stated that its roots were not questioned. In this period, there were also those who explained nationalism from a functionalist perspective and stated that nationalism facilitated the transition from traditional to modern. In this direction, modernization theories developed in this process focusing on the functionality of

nationalism. Another approach in this period was nation-building. This understanding of establishing a nation was linked to social and demographic processes and associated with concepts such as literacy and technology. Gellner, Hobsbawm, Anderson, who made explanations under the influence of modernization, were influential in this period. In addition, scholars such as Smith, who were ethno-symbolists, contributed to the literature on nationalism in this period. In the period from 1990 to the present, it was mentioned that nationalism was handled within a narrow framework and interacted with other disciplines (race, identity, migration) (Özirimli, 2017).

Along with its historical development, types of nationalism have also emerged. According to Smith, nationalism is divided into 3: Sovereignty Nationalism, Pre-Independence Nationalism and Post-Independence Nationalism. The first of these, Sovereign Nationalism, is the nationalism of states that have been independent for a long time and is divided into 2. These are Protection Nationalism and Renewal Nationalism. Protection Nationalism includes the preservation of the superiority of the dominant group in societies where different ethnic groups exist. Renewal Nationalism is the type where socially and politically divided but culturally homogeneous groups come together for modernization and economic development. An example of this is Türkiye during the Atatürk era. On the other hand, Pre-Independence Nationalism is divided into Colonial Nationalism, Ethnic Nationalism and Mixed Nationalism. In Colonial Nationalism, movements with political goals based on the colonial framework are addressed. In Ethnic Nationalism, the preservation of cultural identity is the main focus. Smith stated that religion is an element that determines group identity in ethnic nationalism types. Ethnic Nationalism types are divided into Separatist, Irredentism and Pan Movements. Separatist Nationalism includes movements that separate a culturally homogeneous group. Irredentism is a movement aimed at unifying members of a nation in other regions. Pan Movements involve the gathering of culturally different groups under a single state. The last type of Pre-Independence Nationalism is Mixed Nationalism. This nationalism is also based on the colonial framework. However, they are movements directed by a specific strategic ethnic group. Finally, there is Post-Independence Nationalism. This type of nationalism is divided into 3 which are Integration Nationalism, Protection Nationalism and Expansionary Nationalism. Integration Nationalism includes efforts

to bring society together in the newly independent country. Protection Nationalism, on the other hand, acts with the goal of being politically and economically self-sufficient. Expansionary Nationalism is the type in which newly independent states make movements that include ethnic or other ties and demands for surrounding lands (Smith, 1996).

In this context, understanding nationalism's function in forming new societies in this setting requires an understanding of its development and how it interacts with other social elements like religion and modernization. Nationalism is strongly tied to the modern era's significant developments, including industrialization, print capitalism, literacy, urbanization, and social transformations (Göl, 2005). Many theorists have discussed the relationship between nationalism and religion. While some see religion as a unifying element for nationalism, some have stated that nationalism substitutes religion, and some have argued that religion diversifies ethnic identity (Kökce, 2021).

As stated by Kedourie, the idea of nationalism arose among German romantic intellectuals in the nineteenth century (A. D. Smith, 2000). Kedourie explains nationalism as the notion that humanity is naturally split into nations with distinctive characteristics and that national self-rule is the only valid form of government. National unity is attained through these distinctive features. To put it briefly, Kedourie argues that from this perspective, nationalism defines individuals as part of a national community and emphasizes the sovereignty and rights of this community (Aguirresarobe, 2023).

From Hayes's perspective, nationalism means "...a proud and boastful habit of mind about one's own nation, accompanied by a supercilious or hostile attitude toward other nations." (Koçak, 2022, p. 43). For Hayes, nationalism triggers a deep and moving emotion, and this emotion has religious qualities. Nationalism includes belief in an external power, feelings of admiration and respect, and ceremonial rituals around the flag like other religions (Brubaker, 2012). Hayes is among the nationalism theorists

who do not neglect this relationship by emphasizing the similarity between nationalism and religion and states that nationalism can replace religion (Hayes, 1960). So, while Kedourie's definition of nationalism concentrates on the features that bind people together under a common national identity, Hayes emphasizes the emotional and ritualistic aspects of that togetherness.

While defining nation and nationalism, Gellner emphasizes the effect of industrialization and states that modern nationalism is related to the emergence of industrial states. According to him, nationalism progresses around the development of economics and a common language (Gellner, 1981). Gellner says that nationalism is not "the awakening of nations to self-consciousness". He argues that they are invented where they are rather 'where they do not exist' (Anderson, 2006; Aguirresarobe, 2023). Therefore, nations and national identities do not naturally exist for Gellner. Nationalism creates these identities and gives meanings.

Furthermore, Gellner defines his nationalism theory as

"...a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones, and, in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state—a contingency already excluded by the principle in its general formulation—should not separate the power-holders from the rest." (Gellner, 1983, p. 1).

According to Gellner, ethnic groups within a state and the powers that govern it should not be incompatible. In other words, the political borders of the state should coincide with the ethnic borders. This view emphasizes ethnic unity as the basis of national identity and political legitimacy. He argues modern states seek cultural and ethnic unity to ensure social integrity and maintain political legitimacy.

For Gellner, modern societies encourage the secularization of religion. In general, the relationship between religion and nationalism has been neglected in his works (Rieffer, 2003). Gellner, who accepts the emergence of nationalism as

industrialization, does not focus on religious nationalism but on the economic effect. In short, Gellner sees nationalism as a result of modernization and states it has become secular (Gorski & Türkmen-Dervişoğlu, 2013). However, he also noted that some religions - such as Islam - are compatible with nationalism (Brubaker, 2013).

Eric Hobsbawm acknowledges Gellner's definitions in his definition of nationalism (Hobsbawm, 1992). Hobsbawm proposes a similar explanation for the growth of nationalism in Europe to modernization theory: 'Nations exist as a function of or in the context of a particular stage of technological and economic development' (Rieffer, 2003). Hobsbawm indicates that nationalism often emerges as an "invention" and a product of modernization (Hobsbawm, 1992). Additionally, he states that nationalism did not come from nations, but nations came from nationalism (Hobsbawm, 1992). Hobsbawm remarks that nationalism often emerges as a secular ideology. Even though there are similarities between Gellner's and Hobsbawm's definition, Gellner's perspective claims that nationalism is an outcome of modernization and prioritizes economic progress. Hobsbawm, on the other hand, assesses nationalism in terms of "invented traditions" and contends that political elites consciously shape these identities. With this argument, Hobsbawm suggests that some forms of nationalism can also include religious elements and symbols. Therefore, Hobsbawm argues that religion has paradoxically served as a cement for modern nationalism (Kökce, 2021).

Like Hobsbawm, Anderson is another theorists linking nationalism to the process of modernization. However, while Hobsbawm argues that nationalism is deliberately created through the concept of 'invented traditions', Anderson emphasizes its economic foundations and modern communication technologies. Anderson emphasizes the significance of "print capitalism" in forming nationalism (Anderson, 2006). The communication technologies have enabled people to feel connected to large masses who speak the same language and consume the same cultural products. According to him, the development of print technology and capitalism has enabled this. In this context, the nation is seen as an imagined community that shares a particular cultural identity and a common sense of history rather than a geographical

or ethnic community. Anderson, like Gellner, disregards the link between religion and nationalism and instead concentrates on economics (Rieffer, 2003). Nonetheless, Anderson believes that nationalism may replace religion (Kökce, 2021).

Smith's view, unlike Gellner and Anderson, attaches more importance to ethnic and cultural roots. Smith defines nationalism as "... 'an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining the autonomy, unity, and identity of a nation. Nationalism is an ideology of the nation, not the state'" (Smith, 2004, p. 198). In his definition, Smith emphasizes that nationalism is not a state but a nation ideology. In addition, Smith sees nationalism as a solely modern phenomenon and accepts that modernization encourages the formation of nation-states. However, he states this process is also linked to ethnic and cultural roots.

Smith states nationalism-religion relation as:

"... Formal parity is achieved, as the new nation, displaying its symbolic and ritual credentials, is 'recognized' and thereby becomes a member of the 'diplomatic' comity of nations. In this new international order, traditional religion continues to play a vital, if sometimes unseen, role. But more importantly, in its national manifestations, a new kind of intra-historical religion with its novel liturgies, symbols, and rituals provides the bond and inspiration for the citizens of the constituent national states that make up the contemporary international community" (Smith, 2000, p. 814).

Smith suggests that after the international community recognizes nations, a new type of historical religion shaped by national identity, in addition to traditional religion, takes on a function that brings citizens together and motivates them.

Smith states that religion and language are the most common shared cultural elements (Smith, 1993). He suggests that religion is one of the essential aspects and was among those who argued religion's effect on nationalism in his early period of

nationalism studies. In his “Ethnic Myths and Ethnic Revivals” work, he emphasized that ethnic identity is expressed through certain symbols, and these symbols can not alternate. According to Smith, some symbols have more significant and intricate meanings than others. In particular, language, religion, and traditions are essential forms of exclusion, commitment, and expression (Smith, 1984). However, he ignored the relationship between religion and nationalism in his later works (Rieffer, 2003).

Brubaker interprets nationalization as a process and nationality as a variable rather than viewing nations as distinct entities (Jayet, 2019). Rather than considering nations as static constructions, Brubaker sees them as practices people develop and debate in specific contexts. Additionally, Brubaker investigates the nation's cultural and political features like A. D. Smith (Jayet, 2019). Moreover, unlike most nationalist theorists, Brubaker acknowledges the link between religion and nationalism. Brubaker has recognized four major theoretical approaches (Brubaker, 2012). The first is to consider religion and nationalism to be identical phenomena. In this approach, nationalism can substitute for religious claims. The second approach is to explain nationalism through religion. Religion can adjust to the nationalist process. For instance, Anderson explains print-capitalism by talking about translating the Bible into different languages in his work. The third one considers religion an element of nationalism. Religion can be seen as part of nationalism. While explaining this, he gave the example of Jewish nationalism, where the nation consists of a single religion. The final one considers religion as a variation of nationalism in which religious sensations contribute to nationalistic ideals. Brubaker gave Northern Ireland as an example of this approach. He stated that religion was a critical dividing mark defining the parties to the conflict, but there was no clear religious nationalist conflict (Brubaker, 2012). In brief, Brubaker's analysis underscores the complicated connections between religion and nationalism, suggesting that the two constructs interact, influence each other, and contribute to forming identities and political ideologies.

Greenfeld claimed that contrary to common assumptions, modernity is the product of nationalism. Greenfeld's approach questions the widespread belief that

modernization and nationalism are directly linked and argues that nationalism defines modernity. This approach argues that each nationalism acquires its own unique characteristics resulting from identity crises in the modernization process (Göl, 2005). Greenfeld sees nationalism primarily as constructing identities and secondarily as a political movement (Kyselova & Kironka, 2024).

Greenfeld's study also looks into the connection between nationalism and religion, arguing that it is context-dependent and may differ among contexts (Çıtak Aytürk, 2018). Greenfeld argues that nationalism, rather than replacing religion, emerged during the Reformation when religious commitments were most intense (Kökce, 2021). She rejects the notion that secularization evolved to replace religion. Greenfeld also argues that religion played an important role in the initiation of nationalism, but is eventually subject to nationalism's tolerance (Santiago, 2015).

In the “Religion and Nationalism: Understanding the Consequences of a Complex Relationship” study, Rieffer suggested that their relation is divided into three groups: religious nationalism, instrumental pious nationalism, and secular or anti-religious nationalism (Rieffer, 2003). Rieffer states that the emergence of religious nationalism can be due to the homogeneity of the land in which one lives, the land being considered sacred, the perception of threat by another faith, being surrounded by other religious beliefs, and the liberation movement. Secondly, she explains the situations in which religion supports nationalism. She states that in these cases, religion provides legitimacy to political leaders. Finally, Rieffer mentions secular nationalists. She explains that secular nationalists either ignore religion or reject certain religious traditions. Rieffer includes nationalism in Türkiye after 1920 in this category (Rieffer, 2003).

Up to this point, it has been determined that the relationship between religion and nationalism is quite complex and multifaceted. While Hobsbawm and Smith evaluate religion as a complementary element to nationalism, Anderson suggests that nationalism can replace religion. Based on the studies of Brubaker, Greenfeld and

Rieffer, this relationship is shaped according to different contexts. While nationalism replaces religion in some cases, religious elements play a decisive role in the construction of nationalism in other cases. These theories show that nationalism is not only a process of constructing an ethnic or cultural identity, but also a social phenomenon intertwined with religious and cultural values. In the next section, the relationship between nationalism and religion is examined for Türkiye.

2.2.2 Nationalism and Religion in Türkiye

This section explains the process of nationalism in Türkiye. According to Göl (2005), the foundations of Turkish nationalism, which has been attempted to be established since the foundation of the Republic of Türkiye, can be explained within the framework of modernist theory (Göl, 2005). Modernists state that there are three reasons for the reality behind nationalism: identity losses caused by the erosion of tradition; the need for modernization and industrialization; and the development of communication and printing capitalism. Starting from this point, Göl explained Türkiye's early nationalism with modernist theory as follows:

“I claim that modernist theory provides a better explanatory framework for the understanding of Turkish nationalism for the following three reasons: the need to belong to a separate Turkish nation was the result of the erosion of the traditional Ottoman identity; the emergence of Turkish nationalism coincided with the need for modernisation in the Ottoman Empire; and a separate Turkish national consciousness gradually developed in parallel with the use of print capitalism as part of modernisation policies.” (Göl, 2005, p. 124).

According to Alakel (2011), the first period of Turkish Nationalism was influenced by the French Revolution and developed along the lines of Ernest Renan. Alakel supported this idea by stating that abstract, moral and spiritual elements were adopted rather than material elements in national identity. He stated that Turkishness was defined as a political citizenship and that Turkish-speaking Muslims were the

ethnic center. According to his statement, the New Turkish history included “Central Asian roots, Anatolian past and pre-Islamic history” (Alakel, 2011).

Following these theoretical frameworks, it is important to look at the roots of nationalism in the Ottoman Empire and modern Türkiye. The Ottoman Empire governed its people with a form of government called the Millet System (nation system) before nationalist ideas were united based on race. The “millet” system is an essential concept in the administrative structure of the Ottoman Empire. Millet refers to confessional communities in the Ottoman Empire. In the system, there were Greek, Orthodox, Jewish, Armenian, and Syrian Orthodox Millets alongside the Muslim Millet, and it continued to be implemented in the Ottoman Empire until the nationalist movements began (Kaya, 2013). However, nationalist ideologies evolved in the nineteenth century, transforming the Ottoman Empire's multinational structure and paving the path for independence movements.

Nationalism impacted the Ottoman Empire, which comprised many distinct nations, and caused it to lose territory. Greeks, Serbians, Bulgarians, and other nations joined independence movements near the end of the nineteenth century as nationalist ideas expanded throughout Ottoman Empire. Although the idea of Ottomanism was renounced to keep these nations together in the period near the demise of the Ottoman Empire, these nations declared independence when the Ottoman Empire collapsed. These separation movements paved the way for the Turks living in the Ottoman Empire to question their national identity and develop a new understanding of nationalism.

During the collapse of the Ottoman, the search for national identity increased alongside the idea of Ottomanism, and Turkism also began to show itself. Two leading theorists of Turkism, Yusuf Akçura and Ziya Gökalp, associate the emergence of Turkish nationalism with the changes in the Turkish modernization process (Çalen, 2019). Ziya Gökalp investigated the idea of nationalism according to modern readings and adapted it to Turkish society. According to Gökalp, nationalism first emerged

among non-Muslim people, then among Albanians and Arabs, and finally among Turks (Çalen, 2019).

Gökalp believes that three causes underpin nationalism: Turkification, Islamization, and modernization (Gökalp, 1918). He asserts that language is the foundation for all activities, including religion, morality, law, and politics, and that Turkish should be employed in both written and spoken forms. Furthermore, Gökalp believes that the establishment of a Turkish-Islamic culture, as well as the existence of a purpose from the nation's past, are required to foster Turkish nationalism. Gökalp based the concept of the nation not only on factors such as race, geography, and political affiliation but also on culture; the nation should be based on a common language, religion, morality, and art (Turner, 1977).

Yusuf Akçura examines the concept of nation and defines it as a race, a language, and a tradition (Aksoy & Can, 2018). According to Akçura, the study of intellectual movements in Europe shows that language and historical studies played an essential role in the emergence of nationalism. Nationalism, previously associated with race, began to have a political and cultural meaning in the nineteenth century. He states that language is the basis of nationality, so people who speak the same language belong to the same nationality. Furthermore, Akçura points out that religions can maintain their political and social importance by integrating with and supporting nations. He evaluates religion as a tool for strengthening national feelings. He believes the Islamic religion can be essential in forming the Turkish nation (Uçar & Akkuş, 2018). Both Gökalp and Akçura highlighted the importance of language and culture in defining the fundamental parts of Turkish nationalism; however, Akçura's political and historical underpinnings diverged from Gökalp's approach, which focused on culture and social structure.

While two crucial figures who defined Turkish nationalism saw religion as a supporter in their definitions of nationalism, Türkiye's nationalism followed a secular line in the Republic's early years. Modern Türkiye's secular tendencies were first and

strongly determined by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Republic of Türkiye, in the 1920s (Haynes, 2010). To implement these secularization reforms, Atatürk focused on language, history and cultural identity, aiming to limit the influence of religion on national identity.

Efforts towards secularization were supported by language reforms and changes in the understanding of history. Güneş Dil Teorisi was put forward, arguing that Turkish was one of the oldest Turkish languages. The Turkish language was purified of foreign words and aimed at using pure Turkish. Moreover, the Arabic alphabet, which is the alphabet of Islam, was abandoned, and the Latin alphabet was adopted. In addition, by focusing on Turkish history's past, the Central Asian roots were examined, and the aim was to show that the traditions and customs regarding Turkish history predate the acceptance of Islam (Alakel, 2011). In this context, Turkism was established on a secular basis at the beginning of the Republic period, based on a common language and history.

In addition, theorists such as Akçura, who supported Atatürk's Kemalist revolutions, left Pan-Turan discourses in order to prevent nationalism based on the Turan ideal from evolving into an irredentist direction during this period, and the Turkish Hearths (Türk Ocakları) were closed down in this process. This allowed for the implementation of a nationalist understanding based on modernization and economic development, rather than expansionist nationalism in Türkiye. In addition, while the Turkish nation-building was carried out with the republic, it was carried out on the basis of a Turkish-speaking ethnic center rather than a racial center (Demir, 2023).

Atatürk's secular reforms were the driving force behind Türkiye's modernization and secularization. Atatürk saw traditions and Islam as solid examples of backwardness. He advocated for national progress by incorporating European cultural ideals and political institutions into Turkish culture (Haynes, 2010).

While Atatürk's reforms created the groundwork for secular nationalism, the political parties that emerged in the following decades developed this notion of nationalism from various perspectives. The shift to a multi-party system was accomplished in the 1950s. Furthermore, migration to large cities started in the 1950s as Türkiye moved to a macro economy, allowing the periphery to participate in politics (Dönmez, 2010). Therefore, situations such as the transition to a multi-party system in the 1950s, the reopening of the Turkish Hearths, and the Cyprus Problem brought about radical changes in the 1960s and 1970s (Demir, 2023). In the processes following the Republic's foundation, there were parties established on nationalist discourses. One of these was the Republican Peasant Nation Party, which was founded in 1958 by the unification of the Republican Nation Party and the Turkish Village Party, and later changed its name to the National Action Party (MHP) and has been a party that has been actively involved in nationalist politics to this day. Alparslan Türkeş, who would guide the party with his ideas in later periods, defined Turkish nationalism in two factors: people and land. Türkeş, who touched upon the material and spiritual dimensions of nationalism, emphasized common national goals for the nation and development in art, literature, and the social sphere (Alpdoğan, 2022).

Academic circles have also followed the transformation in political parties, and this process has revealed the change and diversification of the understanding of nationalism in Türkiye. Keyman and Kanci (2011) stated that while modern Türkiye is still in the formation process, the process has been shaped by ruptures. They noted that the first rupture was the transition to the Parliamentary System in 1946 and that the second rupture occurred after the 1980s with globalization. The third rupture occurred in the 2000s, and the European transformation process started with the candidate status for EU membership in 1999. The development of modern Türkiye began in 1923 and became more complex with democratization in the 1950s, globalization in the 1980s, and Europeanization in the 2000s (Keyman & Kanci, 2011). In addition, Keyman and Kanci (2011) analyzed educational books in their study. They stated that the foundations of nationalism in Türkiye are based on land, culture, ideals, history, and the flag (Keyman & Kanci, 2011).

Following these ruptures, different forms of nationalism and their political effects were shaped by globalization and the Kurdish issue, especially after the 1980s. The Kurdish issue in particular is an important element that reshapes nationalism in Türkiye. For Turan (2011), the rise of nationalism in the 1980s was rooted in globalization. According to him, globalization has not encouraged nationalism paradoxically, and he stated that the post-Cold War period caused the rise of nationalism in countries. It is emphasized that the Kurdish issue has revived nationalism by creating concerns such as the threat of division of the homeland. It has caused the reinterpretation of Turkish nationalism due to the idea that foreign sources support the separatist Kurdish movements (E. Turan, 2011).

The growth of nationalism in the 1980s was accompanied by ideological initiatives like the Turkish-Islamic synthesis. This synthesis emerged in response to the rise of communist movements in Türkiye, and it included both national and religious ideals. The Turkish-Islamic synthesis, which emerged with the Aydınlar Ocağı (Intellectuals' Hearth) in the 1970s, is an understanding of Islam that includes nationalism (Çağlar & Uluçakar, 2017). The Turkish-Islamic synthesis emerged based on culture against Türkiye's increasingly influential leftist movement. Such a process was born to "defend Turkish morality and traditions against movements that are destructive of national values" (Duman, 2014). This practical synthesis blended Turkish identity and culture with Islam and presented a worldview emphasizing nationalist and religious values. According to Çağlar and Uluçakar (2017), the Turkish-Islamic synthesis does not intend to integrate Islam into the concept of nationalism as commonly assumed. For them, the Turkish-Islamic synthesis combines the notions of Turk and Kurd in the furnace of Islam.

Although the Turkish-Islamic synthesis and the Milli Görüş (National Vision) are based on similar ideological roots, they both interpret nationalism in different ways. The Milli Görüş movement, which emerged in similar periods, began with the National Order Party. The National Vision movement, which criticizes Western modernization, makes a nationalist interpretation by focusing on Islam. Rather than ethnic nationalism, it is united on the basis of Islam and instead of the ummah, it takes

Anatolia as its basis (Arpacı, 2020). While the Milli Görüş aimed to establish an Islamic society and state order, the Turkish-Islamic synthesis aimed to strengthen the existing state structure with these values by blending more national and religious values.

AK Parti, which evolved from this ideological base, has reshaped the relationship between nationalism and religion, particularly as a continuation of the Milli Görüş's legacy. Some state that it positions its values in a way that is close to Turgut Özal's, that is, that it follows the path of Turgut Özal, and Parti continues its global and economic relations, especially on a neoliberal line (Şen, 2015). However, the AK Parti was founded in 2001 by the reformist part of the Milli Görüş movement and abandoned the regressive Islamic view of democracy and human rights and accelerated the democratization process in Türkiye and its adaptation to the EU (Yılmaz & Bashirov, 2018). This was made possible by the support it garnered from a wide range of people who had not previously supported Islamist parties.

During the Republican period, the top-down modernization program implemented by the central government alienated the peripheral masses. According to Şerif Mardin, during the Republican period, the relations between the center and the periphery remained mostly the same (Mardin, 1973). This continuity has been further fragmented by both parties' strong suspicion of one another. Until the AK Parti took power, marginalized ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups were routinely excluded from administration. This exclusion caused these groups to adopt an oppositional stance against the central government and its modernization reforms (Aytaç & Çarkoğlu, 2019). The AK Parti established a strategy to bring peripheral groups that were excluded during the Republican period to the center, and it accomplished this by integrating ethnic and religious values.

Şen (2015) stated that the AK Parti gave place to nationalism and pursued a nationalism that was far from the deep-rooted Atatürk nationalism and ethnicity-based MHP nationalism. The AK Parti, which incorporated "one flag, one nation, one state,

one homeland" motto in its discourses, also touches upon ethnic and religious majorities (Şen, 2015). The Parti has adopted a new program that includes "Islamism, nationalism, and populism" (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2021). The concept of "national will" used in its discourses is again a result of the populist approach. It has been interpreted that the AK Parti is trying to create a hegemonic empty signifier above values (a concept that everyone can interpret in their own way) by using the concept of "national will". With this approach, the AK Parti tried to gain the support of the broad masses by highlighting Islamic values and nationalist sentiments.

The AK Parti, which has been in a religion-centered position while implementing neoliberal values during its time in power, has conveyed its transformation away from the initial "MHP nationalism" with a discourse based on the "continuity of the state" put forward by the "AK Parti and MHP" alliance within the framework of the presidential system. The AK Parti, used the discourse that making quick decisions would bring stability and advance the economy, has exhibited a populist public benefit (A. Turan, 2022). In addition, the AK Parti turned to the EU, implemented reforms and prioritized economic development in the early periods of its rule. However, as a result of not receiving the support it expected in the later periods of its rule, the nationalist tone was increased after 2015, emphasizing "survival", "domestic" and "national" (A. Turan, 2022).

As a result, Turkish nationalism has progressed from the multinational framework of the Ottoman Empire to the Republic's secularization, and now to an understanding centered on religion, nationalism, and populism. While secular nationalism was boosted by Atatürk's reforms, it varied after the 1980's due to issues such as globalization, the Kurdish issue, and the Turkish-Islamic synthesis. The AK Parti has pushed excluded groups to the forefront by combining religion and nationalism with a populist discourse and redefining nationalism.

The next section examines the data analyses conducted on the relationship between nationalism and religion.

2.2.3 Empirical Findings on the Relationship Between Nationalism and Religion

Up to now, many scholars have examined the relationship between nationalism and religion. The literature reveals the complexity of this relationship. In the rest of this section, studies examining the relationship between religion and nationalism through data analysis are examined. However the number of studies examining the relationship between religion and nationalism quantitatively is insufficient. This showed the necessity of such a study, especially in Türkiye where the relationship is even more complex. In addition to the relationship between nationalism and religion, the effects of income, age, gender, education on nationalist support are also examined in the data analysis.

Voicu (2012) examined the relationship between nationalism and religion in his study *Effect of Nationalism on Religiosity in 30 European Countries*. Religion was taken as a dependent variable and its relationship with nationalism interpreted according to WVS dataset. The findings show that the effect of nationalism on religiosity varies depending on the context. According to the results, the effect of nationalism on religious beliefs is particularly strong in countries with high religious density (Voicu, 2012).

In a 2002 study, Duriez et al. investigated the relationships between religiosity, values, and political attitudes. Findings were provided regarding the relationship between religion and nationalism (Duriez et al., 2002). The study found that nationalism was positively correlated with frequency of church attendance. According to the study, nationalism is not directly linked to religious beliefs and practices, but it is associated with certain religious behaviors, such as church attendance. This suggests that church attendance by nationalist people may be a social or cultural habit rather than the depth of their religious beliefs (Duriez et al., 2002).

Fox's study to measure the impact of religion on conflicts showed that the religious nationalism had no significant impact on ethnic conflicts during the period 1945-1979, but had an increasing impact on ethnic violence from the early 1980s onwards (Fox, 2004). The hypothesis that nationalism is a phenomenon that can replace religion is contradicted by this research. In conclusion, this study shows that nationalism, especially in the form of separatism, is the primary cause of ethnic conflicts and that religion plays a role as a factor that exacerbates these conflicts (Fox, 2004).

Dadlani (2018) examined the strong and significant relationships between nationalism and various economic, cultural and political factors. Accordingly, he found that nationalism has positive relationship with factors such as religion, age and political interest, and negative relationship with factors such as education, trust and trade openness. Thus, nationalism increases as religiosity and age increase while education decreases (Dadlani, 2018).

In Türkiye, Sarıgil (2010) investigated the effects of religious belief and socio-economic factors on Kurdish ethno-nationalism through data analysis. In this direction, he found a negative relationship between Kurdish ethno-nationalism and religiosity. Moreover, he found a negative association between income/education and Kurdish ethno-nationalism. In other words, as education and income increase, Kurdish ethno-nationalism decreases. Lastly, no significant relationship was found between Kurdish nationalism and age (Sarıgil, 2010).

On the other hand, Ekmekci re-tested Sarıgil's study and determined that a religiosity affects Kurdish respondents' tendency towards ethnic nationalism, especially by shaping their political ideology. According to this research, religion is negatively associated with Kurdish nationalism. It was concluded that more religious Kurds in Türkiye are less likely to adopt a leftist ideology and support Kurdish ethnic nationalism. He also showed that Sarıgil's relationship with income and education

status is not correct and that factors such as age and income do not have a significant effect on Kurdish nationalism (Ekmekci, 2011).

In 2003, the relationship between ethnic nationalism and liberalism in Croatia was examined with various social and economic variables. According to the data analysis conducted by Massey et al., revealed a strong positive correlation between religiosity and ethnic nationalism. However, education level showed a weak negative correlation with ethnic nationalism. Men over the age of 30 were observed to support ethnic nationalism more than women. In addition, groups such as blue-collar workers, farmers, and retirees were noted to support ethnic nationalism (Massey et al., 2003).

The study by Tafoya et al. (2022) presented the result that men have a greater sense of national pride. It was stated that people with high levels of nationalist notions are older, have lower income levels, attend religious rituals more often, and have lower levels of education (Tafoya et al., 2022).

In the study conducted on the national pride of Filipino youth, the national pride of the youth in technological, economic-social security and artistic activities were tested empirically. According to analysis performed by Castillo et al., the national pride levels between the genders show statistically significant differences in the areas of sports, economy and social security and environment. Men have higher pride levels in sports than women, while women have higher pride levels in the economy, social security, and the environment than men. In addition, in the same study, Muslims had the highest pride levels in arts and literature and sports, while individuals with no religious affiliation showed the lowest pride levels. In addition, the study indicated that the level of education has an impact on national pride, and as the level of education increases, the level of national pride decreases (Castillo et al., 2016).

In an empirical analysis for 22 countries by Coenders and Scheepers (2003), it was found that the level of education has a direct effect on nationalism. According to the analysis results, it was observed that as the level of education increases, chauvinism

(extreme nationalism) and ethnic exclusionism generally decrease. In addition, it was concluded that while education affects nationalism more in countries with long-standing democratic traditions, this effect weakens in newly established or interrupted democracies. Again, the same study it was concluded that younger people are less nationalist, indicating a positive relationship between nationalist attitudes and age. In addition, although not as significant as education level, a negative relationship was observed between chauvinism and income, while a positive relationship was observed between patriotism and income. Finally, according to the study, men are more likely to be chauvinist and patriotist than women, while they were observed to be less exclusionary towards immigrants. In addition, other studies on nationalism and education level, such as Bollen & Medrano (1998) and T. W. Smith (2006), also stated that there is a negative relationship between nationalism and education (Bollen & Medrano, 1998) (T. W. Smith, 2006).

2.3 Globalization

This part includes presents of the concept of globalization in the literature. According to scholars who conducts research on globalization, and its multidimensional reflections in Türkiye are explained. In the following part, the literature on the role of the EU and the UN in globalization is examined. The dimension that provides religious support to the concept of globalization is discussed and the effects of globalization, which occurs economically, on social and political dimensions are also investigated. In the last section, findings of quantitative studies on the relationship between religiosity and globalization are presented. In this context, the different dimensions of the concept of globalization, its historical development, and various approaches in the literature will be presented.

Globalization is a complex and difficult concept to define. It has social, political and economic dimensions. While economists and sociologists began to define the concept of globalization in the 1960's, historians did so in the 1990's (Steger et al., 2023). Globalization has accelerated as the Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of planned economies in the Eastern Europe

(Osakede et al., 2024). The term refers to the emergence of international social norms, spread of Western culture, free trade and liberal economic systems and democratic political systems (Osakede et al., 2024). The content and historical background of the concept have been interpreted in different ways. The literature extensively discusses several periods of globalization throughout history (Williamson, 2002, Papanikos, 2024).

There are various views in the literature on the history of globalization. One of these views argues that globalization has existed since the beginning of history and has accelerated since the 1970s. Another view suggests that globalization has progressed with the development of capitalism and has gained momentum in recent years. A third view evaluates globalization as a rather newer phenomenon that has just emerged recently in relation to the disintegration of post-industrial society and the capitalist system (Bilgili, 2021).

Williamson (2002) examined globalization in four different periods (epochs) and stated that two of these periods were pro-global and two were anti-global. The first wave was Mercantilist Restriction (1492-1820). Williamson defined this period as a period in which global integration was prevented despite the significant impact of discoveries on trade and migration. The second wave was The First Global Century (1820-1913). Although liberalization policies played a role in this period, some protectionist measures emerged. The third wave was Beating an Autarkic Retreat (1913-1950). During this period, trade barriers rose again, which significantly regressed global integration. The fourth period was The Second Global Century (1950-2002). During this period, globalization gained momentum again (Williamson, 2002). Papanikos added two more periods to this approach: Hyperglobalization (2002-2008) and Deglobalization (2008-2022) (Papanikos, 2024).

Regarding to the support for globalisation, there are three primary schools of thought: hyperglobizers, skeptics, and transformationalists (Magu, 2015). While hyperglobalists argue that globalization has created a large and uniform cultural,

economic and political change all over the world, skeptics state that the effects of globalization are exaggerated and in fact nation-states are still very powerful. Skeptics also suggest that the impact of globalization are limited and unequal. Lastly, transformationalists argue that globalization is neither completely transformative nor limited; this process affects the world in a complex and multifaceted way. They argue that globalization creates new identities and forms of belonging. These identities have local and global characteristics (glocalization) and are independent of geography (Magu, 2015). Following these theoretical approaches, it is necessary to touch upon how the concept of globalization is addressed by different disciplines, as well as its economic-based explanations.

Building upon such theoretical foundations, the cultural component of globalization investigates how local and global connections influence communities and identities. There are two basic approaches to the cultural dimension of globalization: Americanization and Homogenization and the Relationship Between Global and Local Cultures. The Americanization and homogenization approach argues that globalization creates American influence and similarity at the cultural level. In contrast, the Relationship Between Global and Local Cultures approach examines how global and local cultures interact and includes concepts such as homogenization, hybridization, and differentiation (Yaman, 2019). In another explanation, cultural globalization is discussed in three different ways. First, in the approach called "global difference", Ritzer argues that cultures are not greatly affected by globalization. Second, with the "global overlap" view, he argues that cultural change has increased under the influence of globalization and cultures are becoming more similar to each other. Third, with the term "cultural hybridization", he suggests that local cultures can be suppressed by stronger external cultures. Here, it is argued that internal structure and external influence come together to form a unique cultural heritage (Yaman, 2019).

Theoretical approaches to globalization indicate that globalization is not only an economic phenomenon, but also has many social, political, technological and cultural dimensions. In this context, the relationship between globalization and its other dimensions and its multidimensional explanations in the literature should also be

evaluated. Among the concepts that globalization interacts with are politics Giddens (1998), Fischer (2003), Wallerstein (2005), Held (1997), culture (Katumo et al. (2023), Magu (2015), Held (1997), technology (Giddens (1998), Fischer (2003), Held (1997), migration (Ertekin & Dural (2011), social life (Thomlinson (2006), Held (1997), media (Ishchuk & Ishchuk (2023). Globalization is considered as a broad concept, not only with its economic but also social, cultural and technological dimensions.

According to Giddens, globalization is not just an economic phenomenon. To understand globalization, it is necessary to examine the nature of government, the change in culture and communication, and everything that changes in our lives as a result of the communication system. Giddens defines globalization not as a result of events that occurred in the modern period but as a phenomenon that emerged with the spread of modernity in the world. According to him, globalization cannot be limited to the financial sphere and requires the reconstruction of institutions in the world we live in. In addition, according to Giddens, when we say globalization, we should think of a large remote system that affects our lives. The process of establishing connections between various social settings or geographical locations worldwide is referred to as globalization (Giddens, 1990). Giddens' emphasis on globalization as a multi-dimensional process that affects every aspect of our lives reveals how comprehensive and complex this issue is. He also stated that globalization is not only an economic process but also a political, technological and cultural one (Giddens, 1998). Following Giddens' multidimensional perspective on globalization, Held's conceptualization is notable for its emphasis on the spatial dimensions of the process.

According to Held, globalization is not a new phenomenon, but it has recently become more intense and comprehensive. For him, globalization is:

"... best understood as a spatial phenomenon, lying on a continuum with 'the local' at one end and 'the global' at the other. It denotes a shift in the spatial form of human organization and activity to transcontinental or interregional patterns of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power." (Held, 1997, p. 253).

Held argues here that globalization represents the expansion of human activities and organizations from the local scale to the global scale and a spatial change in this process. In addition, Held stated that globalization is not a single phenomenon or a linear process but rather a multidimensional phenomenon with activities and interactions in various areas such as economic, political, technological, military, legal, cultural, and environmental. According to him, globalization increases the interdependence of states and societies; therefore, developments at the global level affect the policies of states and the lives of societies more (Held, 1997). Following Held's treatment of the globalization process as a spatial transformation, Scholte's comments focusing on conceptual differences have an important place in the literature.

Scholte points out that the concept of globalization is often confused with internationalization, liberalization, universalization, and Westernization. According to him, globalization is not just a matter of increasing international interactions, removing trade barriers, or spreading Western values. According to Scholte, globalization

“...involves the spread of transplanetary and supraterritorial connections between people, reducing barriers to transworld contacts and creating a shift in the nature of social space” (Scholte, 2002, p. 13-14).

With this explanation, Scholte removes globality from space in the social sense and sees the world as a whole. According to Scholte, global is not opposed to local; it complements each other. Globalization does not mean a decrease in cultural homogeneity and is not universal because it does not affect everyone for Scholte. In addition, according to him, globalization is the re-spatialization of social life and the acquisition of supraterritorial characteristics of social geography (Scholte, 2002). Scholte's emphasis on conceptual distinctions adds to the diversity of perspectives about globalization's complex structure. In this context, Wallerstein's explanations of the economic character of globalization are notable.

Although Wallerstein stated that globalization is not only an economic process but also includes political and social dimensions, his explanations were generally based on economics. According to Wallerstein, globalization dates back many centuries to the emergence of capitalism. Wallerstein stated that globalization emerged from the 1980s, replacing the previous "developmentalism" paradigm. With the failure of developmentalism, globalization encouraged free market economies and aimed to increase trade and capital flows across national borders. Wallerstein defines globalization as a system in which developing countries encourage their markets to open up to developed countries within the framework of neoliberal policies while the same developed countries keep their own markets closed (Wallerstein, 2005).

Following Wallerstein's economically based explanations of the historical evolution of globalization, Fischer's perspectives on the economic and non-economic components of this process can be assessed. According to Fischer, globalization has emerged due to the increasing interdependence of countries and their citizens. He explains that economic globalization is the process of increasing economic interdependence between countries, which manifests itself in the increase of trade in goods and services, international financial flows, and labor movements (Fischer, 2003). Fischer emphasized that globalization is not only an economic phenomenon. According to him, technological and political changes that direct economic globalization also lead to non-economic consequences to a large extent. As can be understood from here, Fischer states that globalization triggers many changes, even if they are on an economic basis, and he stated that these aspects are at least as crucial as the economic (Fischer, 2003).

Following Thomlinson's ideas on the consequences of globalization on social changes and cultural ties, Katumo, Muinde, and Waswa's assessments in the context of cultural integration and Westernization are significant contributions. Katumo, Muinde and Waswa emphasized the impact of globalization on culture. They mentioned that a common language emerged based on globalization and stated that it increased cultural integration. According to them, contrary to what Scholte (2002) stated, globalization has caused the spread of Westernization. This has caused a clash

of traditions and has caused the decline of traditional practices. As a result, according to them, globalization has a two-pronged effect on culture: while it diversifies cultures, it causes the disappearance of traditions (Katumo et al., 2023).

While exploring the implications of the cultural component, such as Westernization and the loss of traditions, Ishchuk's explanations of the function of mass media in this process are critical in comprehending the relationship between globalization, media, and communication. Ishchuk (2023) states that while globalization transforms the fields of technology and economy, its social and political effects largely depend on the ability of mass media to provide successful intercultural communication (Ishchuk & Ishchuk, 2023). Magu (2015) also argues that the impact of globalization goes beyond socio-economic and political discourse and affects cultures. According to him, globalization reshapes human relations by increasing social, economic, cultural and technological connections worldwide. Although it is claimed that Westernization or Americanization as a result of globalization has an impact on foreign cultures and changes these cultures, he states that cultures act selectively in this process and only adopt elements that suit their own needs. Therefore, he argues that the basic characteristics of cultures are preserved. According to him, globalization provides enriching experiences for individuals, allowing them to interact with this process in a personal way (Magu, 2015).

Following Magu's research of individual and social links in cultural impacts, Qazi et al. (2023) assessment of globalization's paradoxical economic and cultural consequences contextualizes the issue. Qazi et al. (2023) state that the globalization process manifests itself in a contradictory way in the economic and socio-cultural fields. In other words, with globalization, economic and cultural processes become centralized and more interconnected, while these centralization tendencies can also lead to fragmentation and differentiation. According to them, globalization is also intertwined with modernization processes. Still, they state that this modernization can also cause the reemergence of economic, social and cultural phenomena that were thought to be in the past (Qazi et al., 2023).

The impact of globalization on nation-state building and nationalism has also been examined in the literature. The aspect of globalization that supports or reduces the impact of nationalism and nation-states is also complex. According to Sastrapratedja (2000), while globalization promotes cultural similarity, on the one hand, it also enables the revival and preservation of local cultures. This means that globalization creates both a unified global culture and increases the importance of local and national identities. In addition, the increasing dependency on the global level and the impact of international regulations with globalization can be supportive as it can reduce the autonomy of states but also provide opportunities for nation-states to defend their interests and ensure their security through international cooperation (Sastrapratedja, 2000). Smith, an essential theorist for nationalism, states that globalization did not negatively affect nationalism. According to him, we are still far from creating a cultural global culture (Smith, 1990). Rodrik, on the other hand, argues that globalization creates social and political tensions, making the concept of the nation-state challenging and problematic (Balci, 2006).

It is stated that globalization is a phenomenon in which economic, cultural, social and political processes are rapidly connected and interacted with each other worldwide. The complex effects of globalization on individuals and societies vary across geographies and contexts. In this context, strategically located countries such as Türkiye have experienced the economic, cultural and political effects of globalization intensely. (Kıvılcım, 2013). Türkiye, as it was separated from the protectionist economic structure and joined the free market economy with a series of reforms after 1980, has increased its connection with the world market (Bayar, 2006). Globalization, which has an increasing effect on the economy, has also had cultural, security, social life, environmental and demographic effects on Türkiye. Türkiye is one of the countries which was the most affected by globalization in every field due to its geographical location. The rate of being affected similarly in terms of culture is quite high (Yaman, 2019). While Türkiye has had the opportunity to announce its traditional culture to different cultures under the influence of globalization, it has also been subject to changes and transformations in its own culture (Bayar, 2006).

The political dimension of globalization has been reflected in Türkiye in terms of universal values such as democratization, rule of law, and human rights (Kıvılcım, 2013). These concepts have become widespread in Türkiye due to a series of harmonization activities, especially in the EU harmonization processes.

2.3.1 The EU – The UN and Globalization

Globalization refers to a period in which economic, political and social networks are intensified worldwide. In this process, international organizations such as the EU and the UN have played a critical role when we look at from the perspective of Türkiye. While the EU stands out as both an actor and regulator in the economic and commercial dimensions of globalization, the UN acts as a platform that encourages multilateral cooperation in solving global problems and determines international norms. The EU has become a strong player in the global economy through the common market, single currency, and regional integration and it tries to mitigate the social and environmental effects of globalization through trade policies and regulations. The UN, on the other hand, strengthens cooperation at the global level in line with fundamental goals such as maintaining peace and security, promoting human rights and ensuring sustainable development, and lays the foundations for an order based on multilateral diplomacy.

The establishment of a Common Market within the EU was a step that accelerated the EU's integration with the globalization process. The Single European Act, signed in 1986, aimed to liberalize trade and economic activities within Europe and make the EU more competitive in global markets. This process led to the disregard of social harmony and welfare state principles with the spread of neoliberal policies. The Common Market, particularly strengthened by the Maastricht Treaty, has aligned the EU with the dynamics of the global economy by ensuring the free movement of goods, services, people and capital. However, this alignment has imposed restrictions on the social policies of the member states and has led to economic alignment at the expense of reducing social expenditures. Thus, the Common Market has functioned as a tool of integration in the globalization process of Europe, contributing to the reduction of state intervention within the EU, the shrinkage of the public sector and

the strengthening of the free market economy. These developments show that the EU has become a part of globalization rather than an alternative to it (Şeren Güler, 2011).

The EU's integration into economic globalization has not only been limited to the common market and trade liberalization processes, but has also attracted attention with the strategies it has developed to adapt to changing global dynamics. Milošević (2022) explained the changing strategies of the EU regarding its impact on globalization with its trade dimension. The EU first tried to regulate global capitalism with multilateral rules with its "managed globalization" strategy. Since 2006, it has encouraged preferential trade agreements and liberalized trade with its "Global Europe" strategy. In 2010, it adopted the "Trade, Growth and World Affairs" strategy within the framework of the Europe 2020 strategy and aimed for sustainable and inclusive growth. The "Trade, Growth and Development" strategy strengthened relations with developing countries in 2012. In 2015, the "Trade for All" strategy proposed effective and value-based trade policies. The "Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy" strategy, published in 2021, aimed to ensure that the EU plays an independent and influential role in global trade (Milošević, 2022). These strategies show that the EU aims to remain a global actor.

Beyond its economic and trade strategies towards the globalization process, the EU takes a more holistic approach by focusing on cultural and environmental dimensions. While the EU's integration into the globalisation process is primarily driven by economic and trade strategies, the organisation's efforts also include cultural and environmental dimensions, reflecting a comprehensive approach to managing globalisation's challenges and opportunities. In addition to its economic strategies, the EU uses five main mechanisms to manage globalization: expanding policy scope, exercising regulatory influence, empowering international institutions, enlarging the territorial sphere of EU influence, and redistributing the costs of globalization (Nergiz, 2014). However, while directing globalization, it faces three problems: economic globalization, cultural dimension and the need to protect global security in terms of climate change and sustainable sources of energy. Economic globalization gives EU companies access to new markets and financial resources, but also has negative effects

such as job losses and wage pressures. In addition, the European Commission has developed a new cultural agenda to address the challenges of globalization. This agenda aims to promote cultural diversity, intercultural dialogue, and creativity, increase the access of cultural products to global markets, and protect cultural heritage. It also aims to support international cultural cooperation and achieve these goals through the EU's cultural programs (Nergiz, 2014). The EU also plays a significant role in international politics for environmental and sustainability issues that have become a global problem.

Beside its economic dimension, globalization has also had a significant impact on the spread of democracy, human rights, culture, and the environmental movements, worldwide. Uçak (2006) discussed how Europe established a hegemony over the world under the discourse of peace, freedom, and democracy and exploited other societies under the name of globalization. While Featherstone (1990) states that globalization promotes cultural diversity and richness, Hall (1997) argues that American culture is dominant worldwide. Robertson (1992) defines globalization as “both the compression of the world and the creation of a single, unified sociocultural space” and argues that globalization will produce a global culture. McLuhan (2001) also developed the concept of the "global village." However, According to Smith (2004), the idea of a global culture will not be realized in the near future, but cultural mixing and interaction of national cultures may lead to the formation of larger cultural regions in the long term.

Reversing the direction of the arrow operation from globalization to democratization, Özkan (2005) mentions globalization as an outcome of that democratization. He states that democratization came in series with the democratization of technology, finance, and information. As a result of globalization, democratization and human rights have started to be effective internationally (Özkan, 2005).

In this context, the globalization process has resulted in the transfer of political power from national governments to international organizations, with entities such as the UN, the EU, and NATO playing prominent roles (Şeren Güler, 2011). Local and regional governments, which cooperate with hegemonic states, multinational corporations and international institutions that shape the world, have become compelling actors in global politics by working together in political administration. In addition, international participation and practical tools are necessary for solving global social problems. The globalization process has not eased social problems (Büyükbaş & Ören, 2005). In this regard, international cooperation and specific social policies are extremely important for spreading global welfare and solving social problems (Büyükbaş & Ören, 2005).

According to Delbruck (1997), the UN is crucial in bringing the idea of worldwide public interest to life to address the issues facing the globe as it becomes more interconnected. In order to increase the legitimacy of decision-making processes, he added, the UN promotes the participation of non-state players (NGOs, multinational businesses, and international organizations) in global governance processes. He contends that by overcoming states' interest-driven strategies, the UN has the ability to establish an international order that satisfies the requirements of the whole community (Delbruck, 1997).

For Ruggie (2003), the UN system produces innovative responses to the challenges of globalization. Contrary to traditional media understanding, the UN has developed creative solutions to the challenges of globalization. These innovative solutions have not been realized because of the constraints of the UN's constitutional structure but by overcoming these constraints. However, Ruggie stated that these innovative approaches will not replace the traditional inter-state order but will only exist with it. While the UN continues the old inter-state order on the one hand, it tries to create a more inclusive and fluid global public sphere on the other (Ruggie, 2003).

2.3.2 Globalization and Religion

Questions concerning the compatibility of values and ideologies have been raised by the extraordinary levels of interactions between many cultures, religions, and political systems brought about by the advent of globalization. This has led to a great deal of attention being paid to issues such as "Is democracy compatible with Islam?" and "Is globalization intensifying a 'Clash of Civilizations' between Islam and the West?" This section will examine the relationship between globalization and Islamic religion while raising the question of whether globalization creates a convergent movement or widens the gap between cultural and ideological divides. By posing the aforementioned important concerns, this essay will address the topic from the viewpoints of religion, identity, and globalization.

According to Berger, global culture, no matter what is related to the modernization process, originates from the West (Berger, 2003). In other words, he sees global culture as a product of Western modernization. However, he does not consider this global culture as irreversible. He emphasizes the complexity of the relationship between globalization and culture and states that religion is also a part of this.

Another aspect of Berger's discussion on the relationship between religious movements and modernity is how different religions interact during the globalization process. In explaining the interaction between globalization and religion, Berger mentions two major interactions: Popular Protestantism and Revival Islam. He states that Islam had more difficulty in embracing modernity than Protestantism. However, he also emphasizes that there were efforts to develop an alternative modernity in the Islamic world that was compatible with modernity. He gave Indonesia as an example of this effort. Berger also states that religious movements around the world were globalizing by transcending their traditional boundaries, but each of them handled their relationship with modernity differently (Berger, 2003).

Furthermore, Kurth states that the role of religion in the globalization process can be considered from three different perspectives: modernist, post-modernist, and pre-modernist (Kurth, 2009). First, modernists predict that secularization will transform all religions into the same secular and rational philosophy. According to this perspective, secularization will spread to society, starting with the educated elite, and religious communities will be marginalized. According to the majority of modernists, religious conflicts are temporary and unimportant and will be eventually eliminated by globalization and secularization processes. Modernists often see religious revivals as a response to the Enlightenment and modernism, but these revivals often emerge in response to the failures of secular ideologies. Post-modernists reject traditional religions while also rejecting Enlightenment and modernist values. This view focuses on individual expression, and traditional religions have been replaced by more superficial, Americanized Eastern religions and nature cults. According to pre-modernists, many modern secular ideologies have failed, and religious communities have often provided effective opposition to these failures. They argue that secularization has occurred in different religions uniquely, and that globalization will not create a uniform worldview. According to this perspective, religious beliefs and communities are the main elements that have the capacity to counter the failures of secular ideologies (Kurth, 2009). Moreover, for Kurth, the US supports globalization and secularization and promotes free trade through international financial institutions in this process. As a result, he states that the great religious traditions, especially the revived Islam and neo-Confucianism, have resisted (Kurth, 2009).

Kurth's theoretical techniques allow us to delve deeper into Lehmann's explanation of how religious movements adapt to or reject globalization. According to Lehmann, religious movements in the globalization process have determined boundaries between their followers and their social environment, while also emphasizing transnational homogeneity (Lehmann, 2002). This is particularly true of political Islam, evangelical and charismatic churches, sects and trends derived from the Protestant tradition, and diasporic cultures such as ultra-Orthodox Judaism (Lehmann, 2002). These movements form transnational communities and affiliation networks, transcending broad political, linguistic, and geographic boundaries. According to him, these religious movements benefit from globalization and use this

situation to strengthen their borders and carry out transformation campaigns. For him, neo-fundamentalist movements reinterpret Islamic traditions and pursue the ideal of a global ummah. Lehmann also states that religion responds to globalization in various ways, leading to identity and cultural wars in some societies. He states that religion itself is not the direct cause of these problems, but that it is a multifaceted concept and that a simple understanding of causality will be insufficient to explain this situation (Lehmann, 2002).

Following Lehmann's explanations, one can turn to Beyer's perspectives on religious groups' reflections in the context of cultural and economic globalization. Beyer draws attention to phenomena such as the international political system, the increasing influence of global communication networks and mass media, the global spread of iconic mass consumer products (Coca-Cola and McDonald's, etc.), and popular culture trends (such as rap music, Chinese food, and etc.) (Beyer, 2007). According to Beyer, religion functions as a significant element that structures cultural differences in the global world. Beyer also emphasizes the efforts of immigrants to preserve their religious and cultural identities, as well as to establish religious institutions in new places and assume cultural and social functions. This has led to the differentiation of religious institutions, the emergence of new religious forms, and the evolution of existing religions. This process has occurred in different ways in local contexts, with some traditions accepting these concepts while others rejecting them. As a result, it is stated that as part of the modern globalization process, certain religions have become institutionalized within a global system, and this system has developed in parallel with other global systems such as the capitalist economy and nation-states (Beyer, 2007).

In addition to Beyer's ideas, one may evaluate the effects of economic globalization on religious movements in Türkiye using Akti's insights. The increasing consumer culture with globalization has had reflections on religious life starting from the economic basis. In this direction, Akti (2008) states that the religious effects of globalization have affected the marketability of religious traditions, the provision of services in areas such as education and health by religious groups, and the

strengthening of the structures of religious groups by global technologies. The transformation experienced by Islamist movements in Türkiye since the 1980s is considered as a result of liberal policies and media influence. He mentions that Islamist leaders are influenced by Western consumer culture and that they spread this culture in their own circles. According to Akti, some religious groups in Türkiye are blending Western cultural and technological elements with local cultural values. According to Akti, some religious groups in Türkiye are blending Western cultural and technological elements with local cultural values. While consumer culture weakens the traditional values of Islam, religious groups are introducing themselves to a wider audience with new hybrid structures (Akti, 2008).

2.3.3 Empirical Findings on the Relationship Between Globalization and Religion

In the last part of this section, empirical findings in the literature on the relationship between globalization and religion are presented. In the study including 38 countries, Torgler analyzed trust in the UN. The study showed that demographic and socioeconomic factors such as age, gender, education, income and religiosity affect trust in the UN differently. According to the study, trust in the UN increases as the level of education increases, but trust decreases with age. In the study where different models were tested, a positive relationship was observed between church attendance and trust in the UN in one model, while no significant relationship was observed in the other models. Although the studies conducted on income level differed according to the model, it was observed that the being from the upper class has a negative significant effect on trust in the UN. In addition, it was emphasized in the study that while economic and political globalization had strong positive effects, social globalization did not have the same effect. In other words, it was observed that while economic and political integration increased trust, this is not true for social globalization (Torgler, 2008).

Kim (2012) showed in his research on trust in the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and Multinational Corporations that individual characteristics and

identity perceptions shape individuals' trust in global institutions. It has been shown that demographic factors such as age, gender, and education generally have a significant negative effect on institutional trust. It has been observed that institutional trust decreases as age increases and that there is less institutional trust in men relative to women. In addition, trust decreases as education increases. Moreover, it has been observed that identity-based factors such as ethnic pride and religiosity generally have an positive effect on trust in global institutions (H. Kim, 2012).

The study conducted by Grötsch and Schnabel presents the results of multi-level models that analyze the factors affecting the trust of individuals in the European Community in 20 European countries in 1990 and 2000. The study found that women were less trusting of the European Community than men were, based on data from 1990 and 2000. Women still have lower levels of trust, even though this gap has closed, according to the most recent survey data. The study also found a positive and significant correlation between trust in institutions and the level of education. The effect of religious affiliation on trust in the European Community was negative and slightly significant in 1990 but no statistically significant relationship was found in 2000 (Grötsch & Schnabel, 2012).

Brosius et al. (2019) conducted a study for 18 countries in the EU and examined how government satisfaction, pro-immigration attitudes and other demographic factors affect trust in the European Parliament. The demographic factors in the study include age, gender and level of education. In this direction, it was observed that trust in the European Parliament decreased as age increased, while women's trust in the European Parliament was observed to be positively significant. In the same study, trust in the European Parliament was found to be positively associated with income level and the level of education (Brosius et al., 2019).

CHAPTER 3 - DATASET AND METHOD

This section introduces the dataset, research design, and the limitations of methodology used in this research. This section also helps to create a systematic approach of the research, which provides a comprehensive understanding of the interaction of religiosity with nationalist and globalist attitudes., Quantitative methods of inquiry are employed to understand their relationship.

In this part, the research design and dataset are introduced first. The WVS data for Türkiye was used in our analyses. The WVS gathers data by asking respondents questions and allows the carrying out of data analyses for social science researchers. The WVS is the most reliable and the only data source that is applicable for this research. Thus, the WVS dataset was examined to show the relations between religion, nationalism, and globalization. It has seven waves, which were accomplished in 1981-1983 (1), 1990-1992 (2), 1994-1998 (3), 2000-2004 (4), 2005-2008 (5), 2010-2014 (6), and 2017-2022 (7). However, data for Türkiye is only available in the 3rd, 5th, and 6th waves. After the deletion of missing cases, 3,557 respondents were left in the final dataset. All analyses were conducted using STATA, version 15.1.

After introducing the dataset, the techniques used for analyses are introduced below. In this research, descriptive research techniques and inferential research techniques were implemented to investigate relationships between variables. Descriptive research techniques provide a statistical understanding of the data. It shows variables' mean values, frequencies, standard deviations, etc. Moreover, inferential research techniques refer to correlation scores, hypotheses tests, and regression analyses.

The following parts will present the dependent, independent, and control variables.

3.1. Dependent Variables

The WVS items investigating respondents level of nationalist and globalist attitudes were employed while constructing the two dependent variables of this research.

Three dependent variables, one for nationalist and two for globalist attitudes were constructed. The questionnaire item that was recruited to gauge nationalist attitudes reads as follows: “How proud are you to be of nationality of this country?”. The “missing”, “don’t know”, “no answer” and “not applicable” responses were deleted, and the remaining answers were recoded into four categories: “none at all proud (4)”, “not very proud (3)”, “quite proud (2)”, and “very proud (1)”.

This research quantifies globalist attitudes with the questionnaire item gauging respondents’ confidence in the EU and the UN. The battery-type question that was employed reads: “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them? Is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? (Confidence: The European Union)” and “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them? Is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? (Confidence: United Nations)”. “Not asked”, “no answer”, and “don’t know” categories were dropped and answers were reverse-coded into four categories as “none at all (4)”, “not very much (3)”, “quite a lot (2)”, “a great deal (1)” for both questions.

3.2 Independent Variables and Controls

Independent and control variables were used owing to their availability and face validity. Attendance to religious services was recruited as the key independent variable. In addition, age, income, education, period effect, and gender were used as controls.

The religiosity question reads: “Apart from weddings, funerals, and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days?”. “missing”, “don’t know”, “not applicable” and “no answer” values were dropped, and the answers to this question were recoded into seven categories as “practically never (1)”, “less often (2)”, “once a year (3)”, “only on special days (4)”, “once a month (5)”, “once a week (6)”, and “more than once a week(7)”.

Age, income, education, period effect, and gender were employed as classical control variables. The “missing” and “no answer” values for all the variables were deleted. Moreover, income data includes the ten interval categories as “lower step (1)”, “second step (2)”, “third step (3)”, fourth step (4)”, “fifth step (5)”, “sixth step (6)”, “seventh step (7)”, “eighth step (8)”, “ninth step (9)”, and “tenth step (10)”. The education variable were composed of eight intervals: “inadequately completed elementary education (1)”, “completed compulsory education (2)”, “incomplete secondary education-technical (3)”, “completed secondary education-technical (4)”, “incomplete secondary education-university (5)”, “completed secondary education-university (6)”, “some university without a degree (7)”, “university with degree (8)”. Three waves of WVS (3rd, 5th, and 6th) were employed as period effects and recoded as 1 (1994), 2 (2005), and 3 (2010). Finally, gender is recoded as “male (0)”, and “female (1)”.

When we analyze the descriptive statistics of the dataset, we observe that the “quite a lot” categories are the most chosen answer for both globalization dependent variables with 30.82% for the EU and 30.87% for the UN. On the other side, a high level of pride demonstrates itself in the nationalism variable. The “a great deal proud” answer was selected by 79.23% of the respondents. Besides, it can be seen from the table that globalization determinants have more equally distributed answers than nationalism determinants.

Our “religious service attendance” variable’s “practically never” category is the most selected option (29.13%) among the answers. When we go into control variables, we should understand their effect on the dataset. As for gender, despite a close distribution between respondents' genders, men took 53.72% of them which is consistent with the Turkish Statistical Institution (TUIK)’s 2023 data, where men represent 50.1% of the population ((TUIK), 2024). In addition, the ones who completed their compulsory elementary education appear as 34.44% within the education control variable. Therewithal, people with the tenth-step income level are the least represented segment within the dataset. The mean value of the age variable is 36.50 in the dataset. Our last control variable period effect shows almost identical responses given to the survey waves.

Selection and cleansing of the dataset and analyses showing the dataset structure have been presented thus far. The following part shows the methods used to analyze the dataset and their step-by-step validation.

3.3 Method

In the subsequent part, I will explain the regression model chosen according to the dataset’s structure. Firstly, I have to identify the structure of our dependent variables. There are two types of classification of variables in statistic analysis: linear and categorical variables. Linear variables, including continuous and discrete data, are analyzed by linear regression models such as simple linear, polynomial, multiple linear, etc. Alternatively, categorical variables that contain nominal and ordinal data are well-suited for logistic or probit regression model analysis. When we investigate our dependent variables, we see that they have categories such as “none at all”, “not very much”, “quite a lot” and “a great deal”. Therefore, our focus is now on choosing whether the logistic or the probit regression model is more suitable for our categorical dependent variables.

Afterward, I investigate the dependent variables' distribution to decide on the appropriate regression model. The dataset's distribution leads us to the regression model we must select for analysis. The error term is assumed to be normally distributed in ordered probit regression, while in ordered logistic regression, it is assumed to be logistically distributed (Greenway & Makus, 2014). Therefore, after we run the "qnorm residual" command, we clarify that the dataset does not have normal distributions. With this clarification, we assign the appropriate regression model, which is the logistic regression model.

After selecting the appropriate regression model, we determine the correct logistic regression classification. It has 4 types of classification: binary logistic, multinomial logistic, ordered logistic, and generalized logistic. In binary logistic analysis, dependent variables have categories such as 0-1 / successful-unsuccessful. Binary logistic regression is not convenient for our dependent variables due to having 4 different categories. Moreover, multinomial logistic regression is a regression that tests unordered variables having more than 2 categories (Molla & Moges, 2022). Because of our dataset's nature, multinomial logistic regression is also unsuitable for running our data. In light of this information, we conclude that binary logistic and multinomial logistic regressions are not suitable for our dataset. In situations where the dataset is the ordinal scale, we have to choose ordered logistic or generalized ordered logistic regressions. Therefore, we start with ordered logistic regression to understand whether it is proper for our dataset.

Tests are made to prove the compatibility and reliability of the created ordered logistic regression models. With this goal in mind, the multicollinearity test, which predicts correlation levels between the predictors, is performed as a first step. If there are high linear relations among them, this will cause the analysis to be unreliable. Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is employed to demonstrate the result of multicollinearity.

Table 3.3.1 Multicollinearity Results

Variables	VIF	SQRT VIF	Tolerance	R-Squared
Religiosity	1.30	1.14	0.77	0.24
Income	1.28	1.13	0.78	0.22
Education	1.40	1.18	0.72	0.28
Age	1.14	1.07	0.88	0.12
Gender	1.27	1.13	0.79	0.22
Period Effect	1.09	1.04	0.92	0.08

Notes: 1) Data: World Values Survey, rounds: 1994/2005/2010.

2) Number of observations: 3,557

VIF is an indicator that measures how much multicollinearity increases the variance of the coefficient estimates in a regression model. (Senaviratna & A. Cooray, 2019) Multicollinearity occurs when independent variables are highly correlated, leading to instability in coefficient estimates. Generally, a VIF value greater than 10 is considered a sign of multicollinearity. However, in models such as logistic regression, a VIF value greater than 2.5 can be a sign of a problem (Senaviratna & A. Cooray, 2019). When we examine our dataset's VIF values from the table, we deduce that our predictors are between low levels, which means our dataset does not have multicollinearity problems.

Having presented the VIF results, this paper now shows the datasets' specification errors. The “link test”, which demonstrates the specification problems of the models, is applied to understand better whether our regression model is stated correctly or not.

Table 3.3.2 Link Test Results

Models	Confidence: the EU		Confidence: the UN		Nationality pride	
	Coef	P> z	Coef	P> z	Coef	P> z
_hat	.975	0.000	1.018	0.000	-0.580	0.077
_hatsq	-.038	0.585	0.032	0.461	0.044	0.000

Notes: 1) Data: World Values Survey, rounds: 1994/2005/2010.

2) Number of observations: 3,557

If the model is correctly specified, the coefficient **_hat** should be significant ($P>|z| < 0.05$) and should generally be close to 1. This indicates that the model has generally good predictive performance. It is seen that the models established with the variables Confidence in the EU and UN have good predictive performance. As for the variable Nationality pride, the coefficient is quite close to the limit of significance but has a negative sign instead of a positive one. This suggests that there may be problems with the predictions.

Additionally, the **_hatsq** coefficient should be insignificant ($P>|z| > 0.05$) if the model is appropriately defined. A nonlinear link or a missing variable in the model could be indicated by a significant **_hatsq** coefficient. Similarly, a nonlinear link is seen in the nationality pride model, even though confidence in the EU and UN models is appropriately provided.

Moving on to the last pretests of the datasets, a parallel line assumption test is conducted to determine the accuracy of the models. It tests and anticipates the same influence on the categories of dependent variables as it does on the categories of independent variables. The Brant test is used to determine whether there is a violation of the parallel line assumption (Williams, 2007). If the p-value is less than 0.05, the

parallel line assumption is violated. The obtained results shown below indicate the violation of the parallel line assumption.

Table 3.3.3 Brant Test Results

	Confidence: the EU			Confidence: the UN			Proud Nationalism		
	chi2	p>chi2	df	chi2	p>chi2	df	chi2	p>chi2	df
All	51.07	0.000	14	92.19	0.000	14	52.14	0.000	14
Religious service attendance	0.43	0.807	2	7.83	0.020	2	15.35	0.000	2
Income	2.20	0.333	2	4.34	0.114	2	10.61	0.005	2
Education	3.53	0.171	2	0.53	0.769	2	7.85	0.020	2
Age	3.32	0.190	2	0.49	0.783	2	6.69	0.035	2
Gender	2.34	0.311	2	4.83	0.089	2	12.31	0.002	2
Period effect									
1	8.90	0.012	2	25.34	0.000	2	4.68	0.096	2
2	17.60	0.000	2	46.25	0.000	2	8.51	0.014	2

Notes: 1) Data: World Values Survey, rounds: 1994/2005/2010.

2) Number of observations: 3,557

The specification and the parallel line assumption tests revealed that the ordered logistic regression model does not sufficiently explain our dataset. Therefore, generalized ordered logistic regression (gologit) (Williams, 2016), which loosens the

parallel line assumption when its necessary, is pinpointed as proper regression analysis.

The following chapters present and discuss the regression analysis results and contributions to future research.



CHAPTER 4 - FINDINGS

This section presents the results of the data analysis undertaken to investigate the effect of religiosity on nationalist and globalist attitudes. In this way, correlation and regression analyses are presented.

4.1 Findings

This part begins with presenting a correlation matrix of all the variables employed in the model which is, followed by regression analysis results. Correlation analysis can determine the degree to which variables are interconnected. The table below illustrates the correlation scores for variable pairs.

Table 4.1.1 Correlation Analysis Results

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1)Confidence the EU									
2)Confidence the UN	0.72***								
3)Proud of Nationalism	0.00	0.04*							
4)Religious y	-0.08***	-0.06***	0.21***						
5)Gender	-0.06***	-0.08***	-0.03	0.43***					
6)Education	-0.02	-0.03	-0.18***	-0.15***	0.10***				
7)Income	0.08***	0.08***	-0.07***	-0.16***	-0.02	0.38**			
8)Age	0.02	0.04*	0.13***	0.16***	0.06***	-0.31***	-0.07***		
9)Period effect	-0.07***	-0.00	0.06***	-0.00	-0.03	0.15***	0.27***	0.05***	

Notes: 1) Data: World Values Survey, rounds: 1994/2005/2010.

*2) Significance levels: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.*

3) Number of observations: 3,557

It can be seen from the data in the Table above that there are significant relationships between confidence in the EU and the UN, religious service attendance, gender, education, income, and the period effect. The table shows a statistically significant ($p\text{-value}<0.000$) association between the EU and UN variables. This means that as confidence in the EU increases, so does confidence in the United Nations. Furthermore, there are strong positive associations with confidence, including the EU and income ($p<0.000$). However, there is a substantial negative association with the period effect ($p<0.000$), gender ($p<0.001$) and religious service attendance ($p<0.000$).

Furthermore, confidence in the UN is associated with nationality pride, gender ($p<0.000$), religiosity ($p<0.000$), age ($p=0.02$), and income ($p<0.000$). A negative correlation was found between religion, and gender with the UN. The table also illustrates that as income rises and as people get older, confidence the UN increases. Moreover, there is also a positive correlation between confidence in the UN and national pride.

Shifting the focus to our last dependent variable: "nationality pride", we see a strong significant correlations between the independent and control variables. There are strong negative correlation between education ($p<0.000$), and income ($p<0.000$) with the nationality pride. Nonetheless, religiosity ($p<0.000$), age ($p<0.000$) and period effect ($p<0.000$) have positive association with the nationality pride.

Till now, we have demonstrated the correlation scores and significance levels of variables. Now, we delve into our regression models. In this context, we give the results of the regression analysis of our dependent variables, which are nationality pride, Confidence the EU, and Confidence the UN.

4.1.1 Religiosity and Nationalist Attitudes in Türkiye

This part discusses the findings of a regression analysis that examine the relationship between religiosity and nationalist attitudes. The purpose of this analysis is to expose direct influences of religion on nationalism in Türkiye.



Table 4.1.1.1 Generalized Ordered Logistic Regression Results (Dependent Variable: national pride)

Category 4 (not at all proud) versus categories 3 (not very much), 2 (quite a lot), 1 (a great deal).

National Pride		Coef.	Std. Err.	Z
Not very proud				
Religiosity		-0.4489***	0.0789	-5.68
Income		0.1080	0.0701	-1.54
Education		-0.1325	0.0918	1.44
Age		0.0533***	0.0179	-2.98
Gender (Ref: male)		1.7263***	0.3783	-4.56
Period effect (ref: 1994)				
	2005	0.6797	0.4537	-1.50
	2010	0.2773	0.3950	-0.70
Constant		0.5777***	0.7296	-0.79
Quite proud				
Religiosity		0.2806***	0.0344	-8.16
Income		0.0813*	0.0376	-2.16
Education		-0.2175***	0.0421	5.17
Age		0.0204***	0.0076	-2.70
Gender		0.7903***	0.1709	-4.62
Period effect				
	2005	0.6028***	0.1996	-3.02
	2010	0.7521***	0.1960	-3.84
Constant		1.1732***	0.4033	-2.91
Very proud				
Religiosity		0.2037***	0.0181	-11.23
Income		-0.0203	0.0207	0.98
Education		-0.1387***	0.0222	6.24
Age		0.0156***	0.0036	-4.32
Gender		0.4467***	0.0965	-4.63
Period effect				
	2005	0.3759***	0.1106	-3.40
	2010	0.3269***	0.1049	-3.12
Constant		0.2510	0.2207	-1.14
Pseudo R²			0.0808	
Number of observations			3,557	

Notes: 1) Data: World Values Survey, rounds: 1994/2005/2010.

2) Significance levels: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

The results obtained from the generalized ordered logistic regression model, the effects of various socio-economic factors on the national pride (nationality pride) variable were examined. In this model, the 4th category of the dependent variable, “not

at all proud”, was taken as the reference category, and comparisons were made with the other three categories 1(very proud), 2 (quite proud), 3 (not very proud).

From the table above we can see that as the frequency of religious attendance increases, the national pride levels of individuals increase. The independent variable has statistically significant in all categories and positive effects in 2 categories. The coefficient for religiosity in the "very proud" group is 0.2037 ($p<0.000$), implying that religiosity has a positive effect on national pride. This impact is replicated in the other categories: the religiosity coefficient in the "quite proud" category is 0.2806 ($p<0.000$), whereas in the "not very proud" category it is 0.4489 ($p<0.000$). These data suggest that as people's religiosity increases, so does their likelihood of having higher level of national pride.

The income variable has a multifaceted impact on national pride. It is seen that the relationship between income and nationalism varies according to the categories. There is a statistically significant different only between the reference category and “quite proud” category that as income increases, nationalism also increases from not at all to quiet proud. Although the education variable does not show a significant effect in every category, it shows a significant effect in the "quite proud" and "very proud" categories, indicating that nationalism decreases as education increases between the reference category and these categories. When we examine the relationship between the age and national pride, it is observed that their relationship is significant. In this sense, it has been noted that people's sense of national pride rises with older age. There is a significant gender effect between the reference category and all other categories when we look at the relationship between gender and national pride. Results show that women typically exhibit higher levels of national pride than men. Lastly, a significant time effect was found across all categories of national pride. It has been noted that Türkiye's attitude of national pride has grown over time linearly.

These findings suggest that the national pride levels of individuals in Türkiye are significantly affected by demographic and socio-economic factors. More frankly,

national pride in Türkiye rises with increasing age and religiosity. Furthermore, it has been noted that Turkish women tend to be more proud of their nationality than men. There is a negative association between national pride and education level, meaning that national pride decreases for increasing levels of education.

4.1.2 Religiosity and Globalist (the EU and the UN) Attitudes in Türkiye

In this part, regression analyses predicting confidence in the EU and the UN will be presented to examine the relationship between religiosity and globalist attitudes in Türkiye. In this context, to what extent confidence in these two institutions in Türkiye interacts with individuals' levels of religiosity is analyzed.

4.1.2.1 Regression Analysis Model Predicting Confidence for the EU

In this part, results of a Generalized Ordered Logistic Regression examining the relationship between religiosity and confidence for EU are presented.

Table 4.1.2.1.1 Generalized Ordered Logistic Regression Model Predicting Confidence for the EU

Category 4 (none at all) versus categories 3 (not very much), 2 (quite a lot), 1 (a great deal).

Confidence the EU		Coef.	Std. Err.	z
Not very much				
Religiosity		-0.0433***	0.0158	2.73
Income		0.0566***	0.0188	-3.02
Education		-0.0002	0.0195	0.01
Age		0.0013	0.0030	-0.42
Gender (ref: male)		0.1563	0.0848	-1.84
Period effect (ref: 1994)				
	1	-1.006***	0.0934	10.77
	2	-0.1730	0.0996	1.74
Constant		1.0655***	0.1996	-5.34
Quite a lot				
Religiosity		-0.0472***	0.0145	3.25
Income		0.0309	0.0174	-1.78
Education		-0.0405*	0.0181	2.24
Age		0.0030	0.0027	-1.11
Gender		0.0326	0.0781	-0.42
Period effect				
	1	-1.1179***	0.0916	12.21
	2	-0.5090***	0.0851	5.98
Constant		0.2397	0.1832	-1.31
A great deal				
Religiosity		-0.0326	0.0234	1.39
Income		0.0352	0.0275	-1.28
Education		-0.0576*	0.0294	1.96
Age		0.0080	0.0041	-1.92
Gender		0.1599	0.1250	-1.28
Period effect				
	1	-0.7488***	0.1552	4.82
	2	-0.3154**	0.1314	2.40
Constant		-2.0442***	0.2882	7.09
Pseudo R²			0.0131	
Number of observations			3,557	

Notes: 1) Data: World Values Survey, rounds: 1994/2005/2010.

*2) Significance levels: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.*

In this model, the 4th category, “none at all” was taken as reference, and comparisons were made with the other three categories 1 (a great deal), 2 (quite a lot), 3 (not very much).

The relationship between the independent variable religiosity and confidence EU varies across categories. The religiosity variable has a negative coefficient in the categories “not very much” and “quite a lot”, which is statistically significant ($p=0.006$ and $p=0.001$, respectively). This finding demonstrates that respondents with higher levels of income are more likely to report “not very much” confidence in the EU relative to reporting “none at all” confidence. It has been observed that there is a negative relationship between education and trust in the EU; accordingly, as the level of education increases, trust in the EU decreases. However, this relationship is not statistically significant for the 'not very much' category.

The findings indicate that generally a person's trust in the EU is likely to decline as his education level increases. Examining the results of the gender and age variables reveals that neither gender nor age has a statistically significant association with confidence in the EU. Lastly, it is found that relative to 1994, in both 2005 and 2010 rounds confidence in the EU is significantly lower in general.

4.1.2.2 Regression Analysis Model Predicting Confidence for the UN

In this part, the results of a Generalized Ordered Logistic Regression analysis conducted to predict the level of confidence in the UN. The analysis aims to measure the effect of religiosity on confidence in the UN.



Table 4.1.2.2.1 Generalized Ordered Logistic Regression Model Predicting Confidence for the UN

Category 4 (none at all) versus categories 3 (not very much), 2 (quite a lot), 1 (a great deal).

Confidence the UN	Coef.	Std. Err.	z
Not very much			
Religiosity	-0.0251	0.0153	1.64
Income	0.0574***	0.0182	-3.15
Education	-0.0103	0.0192	0.54
Age	0.0034	0.0030	-1.15
Gender (ref: male)	0.3130***	0.0827	-3.78
Period effect (ref: 1994)			
2005	-0.4860***	0.0898	5.41
2010	0.2349**	0.0957	-2.45
Constant	-0.4960**	0.1926	-2.58
Quite a lot			
Religiosity	-0.0186	0.0146	1.28
Income	0.0266	0.0173	-1.54
Education	-0.0225	0.0179	1.25
Age	0.0037	0.0027	-1.38
Gender	0.1843**	0.0779	-2.37
Period effect			
2005	-0.8696***	0.0901	9.58
2010	-0.3210***	0.0851	3.77
Constant	-0.2253	0.1820	1.24
A great deal			
Religiosity	-0.0484	0.0258	-1.88
Income	0.0251	0.0293	-0.85
Education	-0.0484	0.0308	1.57
Age	0.0067	0.0044	-1.53
Gender	0.3954***	0.1350	-2.93
Period effect			
2005	-0.8241***	0.1702	4.84
2010	-0.1241	0.1381	0.90
Constant	-2.670***	0.3162	8.44
Pseudo R²		0.0146	
Number of observations		3,557	

Notes: 1) Data: World Values Survey, rounds: 1994/2005/2010.

*2) Significance levels: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.*

Religiosity, income, education and age are not statistically significantly associated with confidence in the UN. Yet, relative to men, women in general are more likely to report higher levels of confidence in the UN ($p=0.003$ $p=0.018$ and $p<0.000$ for the “a great deal”, “quite a lot” and “not very much” categories, respectively). Relative to 1994, in both 2005 and 2010 rounds, Turkish respondents confidence in the UN is significantly less in general. Lastly, higher levels of income is associated with “not very much” confidence relative to “none at all” confidence in the EU.



CHAPTER 5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This section discusses the findings of the study and links them to previous studies in the literature. It will emphasize the theoretical and practical significance of the findings and their implications and show avenues for future research. In addition, the research hypothesis, limitations, and contribution of the study to future studies will be discussed in light of the results.

In Türkiye, where the impact of globalization was felt intensely in the post-1980 period, it has been observed that religiosity has come to the forefront in politics as a concept supporting nationalism. In this regard, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, which developed around the Aydınlar Ocağı in the 1970's, was shaped as a nationalist interpretation of Islam (Çağlar & Uluçakar, 2017). By fusing Turkish identity and culture with Islam, this synthesis has produced a new worldview that elevates nationalist and religious values. This new ideology has also made it possible for religion to serve as a unifying and guiding force by joining forces with nationalism in opposition to the internal ideological changes brought about by globalization and the external dynamics. In this way, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis offers a valuable framework for comprehending the ways in which local identities are impacted by globalization processes.

The interplay of this relationship with modernity are equally remarkable when we look at the role of religiosity in the processes of nationalism and globalization in a larger perspective. When analyzing the relationship between modernity and religion, Berger (2003) highlighted that every religious movement has a unique interpretation of modernity and creates unique dynamics between the two ideas. This approach also provides an important basis for understanding the relationship between religion and globalization and nationalism. As Giddens points out in his work *The Consequences of Modernity*, globalization strengthens local national identities (Giddens, 1990). As in the case of Türkiye, it is observed that globalization processes strengthen local identities and religious sensitivities, and direct communities towards their ethnic roots

and local values rather than a global culture. Therefore, this study evaluated how effective religious beliefs are on nationalist and globalist attitudes in Türkiye.

When nationalism and religiosity are examined theoretically in the literature, many different theoretical foundations and explanations are seen. In the extant studies carried out on the relationship between religion and nationalism, it is seen that there is a positive association between attendance to religious services and nationalist attitudes. In this direction, several research attempts such as Voicu (2012), Duriez et al. (2002), Fox (2004), Massey et al. (2003), Tafoya et al. (2022) have shown this relationship. The results confirmed our hypothesis. Previously, a negative association was found between education and nationalist attitudes, (Massey et al. 2003; Tafoya *et al.* 2022; Castillo *et al.* 2016; Dadlani 2018). The results of this study also support their findings. Additionally, the relationship between income and nationalism was found to be negatively associated (See also, Tafoya *et al.*, 2022; Sarıgil, 2010). Tafoya et al. (2022) stated that men are more prone to be nationalist than women. Contrarily, our findings showed that female respondents in Türkiye are more likely to be proud of their nation than males.

When it comes to the relationship between religiosity and globalist attitudes, Akti (2008), investigated the effects of globalization and consumer culture, during the transformation of Islamist movements in Türkiye since the 1980s. While Torgler (2008), and Brosius et al. (2019) indicated a positive relationship between religiosity and confidence in global institutions, Grötsch & Schnabel (2012), H. Kim (2012) found a negative relationship between religiosity and trust in institutions. As seen, some mixed findings exist in the literature. Yet, in Türkiye, higher levels of attendance to religious services has been found to be negatively associated with confidence in the EU, but the association between religiosity and confidence in the UN does not seem to be statistically significant.

Regression analysis on confidence in the EU includes results for many different control variables. Accordingly, high-income respondents trust in the EU and in the UN

more than their low-income counterparts. This supports Brosius et al.'s (2019) EP trust and income relationship. In addition, a negative relationship was observed between education level and confidence in the EU. Although this result shows an opposite relationship with the results of Grötsch & Schnabel (2012), Brosius (2019), and Torgler (2008), it supports the study of H. Kim (2012). It was revealed that age and gender did not have a significant effect on confidence in the EU. Moreover, there is a significant period effect which indicates a decreasing trend of confidence in the EU over time. This finding reveals that the perception of the EU in Türkiye has changed over time and that other socio-economic and political factors, rather than demographic ones, are more decisive on confidence.

The factors influencing confidence in the UN have been thoroughly researched in the literature. Torgler's (2008) research, particularly on the trust in the UN, found a significant association between religiosity and trust in the UN. Nonetheless, we found an insignificant association between the two. Torgler (2008) discovered a negative effect for upper-class wealth while stating that there is a positive relationship between education and trust in the UN. In our study, it has been discovered that income has a positive and significant effect on confidence in the UN. Moreover, Torgler (2008) observed a negative relationship between age and trust in the UN. However, in our research, it was found that education and age have significant effect on confidence in the UN for Türkiye. It has been seen that gender has a significant effect on confidence in the UN, and that women trust in the UN more than men in Türkiye. This finding also contradicts Torgler's results.

The results of the study reflect some aspects of modernization theory and can be used to understand the modernization effects on nationalist and globalist attitudes. The classical modernization theory proposes that the processes of economic development and social change create certain transformations in the values of individuals. In accordance with this perspective, the observation of a negative relationship between education and both nationalist and globalist attitudes taps to a modernization account. It is known that education makes individuals less dependent on traditional authority and bonding social ties, as well as increases their ability to think critically and generate

new bridging ties. Thus, it is an expected result that educated individuals are more likely to be more trusting and confident with the intergovernmental and supranational actors of the international order, such as the UN and the EU. In addition, Inglehart & Welzel (2009) in their research concluded that in the aftermath of WWII, self-expression values will emerge with the emergence of young generations that were born and spent their formative years in affluent socioeconomic and physical conditions and take survival values granted and seek for higher levels of needs. These individuals grow with post-materialist values and as the number of post-materialist individuals grow in the society, self-expression values flourish more strongly. Our findings support that Türkiye has been going through a similar process recently. The fact that older individuals adhere to more traditional values and tend to be more nationalist than younger ones is consistent with these theoretical expectations. As a result, the validity of modernization theory and Inglehart & Welzel's predictions about value transformation are supported in our research.

Furthermore, the study fills gaps the literature by providing a novel theoretical and practical perspective. The results show that religious tendencies in Türkiye affect perceptions of the globalization process in general and global institutions in particular significantly. This supports a perspective that globalization process is highly dependent to local identities and religious sensitivities. In this context, the study contributes to a better understanding of Türkiye's unique position in the globalization process and the role of religion in this process, thus making an important contribution to the literature on the relationship between religiosity and globalization.

The findings also revealed that individuals' attitudes towards nationalism and globalization is strongly effected by demographic and periodic factors. This provides a valuable basis for future research, emphasizing the need for more in-depth studies especially in terms of interaction effects. This study supports the validity of modernization theory and Inglehart & Welzel's value transformation predictions in understanding the effects of education, income and age factors on nationalist and globalist attitudes. The transition to secular-rational values with increasing education and income levels and the tendency of younger individuals to dissociate to traditional

values reflect the effects of social transformation processes on individual values. Yet, we do not know how would period or age effects differ across different ethnic and religious backgrounds and different education as well as occupational social class categories. It would be interesting to read from the data how would modernization processes of these sub-groups continue.

Another important dimension of the study is that it sheds light on current policies. Thanks to this data analysis, policymakers will be able to see underlying dynamics of more nationalism and globalist attitudes in Türkiye clearly which would allow them to make more conscious and effective domestic and foreign policy decisions.

Finally, using larger and more diverse datasets coming from other other countries in future research could increase the generalizability of the analyses and provide a more detailed picture of how these relationships play out across different socioeconomic contexts. In particular, examining the effects of religiosity on nationalism and globalization across different cultural and geographical contexts could provide valuable insights into understanding how religiosity effects nation-building and globalization processes especially in the new democracies.

6 APPENDIX

6.1 Appendix 1: Descriptive Statistics

6.1.1 Descriptive Statistics (Part 1 of 3)

Variables	Groups	Freq (n)	Percent (%)
Confidence: The European Union	None at all	1,071	30.06
	Not very much	1,033	28.99
	Quite a lot	1,098	30.82
	A great deal	361	10.13
	Total	3,557	100.00
Confidence: The United Nations	None at all	1,117	31.35
	Not very much	1,027	28.82
	Quite a lot	1,100	30.87
	A great deal	319	8.95
	Total	3,557	100.00
How proud of nationality	None at all proud	40	1.12
	Not very much proud	134	3.76
	Quite a lot proud	566	15.89
	A great deal proud	2,823	79.23
	Total	3,557	100.00
How often do you attend religious services	Practically never	1,038	29.13
	Less often	137	3.85
	Once a year	164	4.60
	Only on special days	810	22.73
	Once a month	105	2.95
	Once a weak	747	20.97
	More than once a week	562	15.77
	Total	3,557	100.00

6.1.2 Descriptive Statistics (Part 2 of 3 – Continued from Page 84)

Variables	Groups	Freq (n)	Percent (%)
Gender	Male	1,914	53.72
	Female	1,649	46.28
	Total	3,557	100.00
Education	Inadequately completed elementary education	170	4.77
	Completed (compulsory) elementary education	1,227	34.44
	Incomplete secondary school: technical/	201	5.64
	Complete secondary school: technical/vo	223	6.26
	Incomplete secondary: university-preparation	416	11.68
	Complete secondary: university-preparation	734	20.60
	Some universities without degree/Higher education	95	2.67
	University with degree/Higher education	497	13.95
	Total	3,557	100.00

6.1.3 Descriptive Statistics (Part 3 of 3 – Continued from Page 85)

Variables	Groups	Freq (n)	Percent (%)
Income	Lower step	267	7.49
	Second step	554	15.55
	Third step	515	14.45
	Fourth step	534	14.99
	Fifth step	400	11.23
	Sixth step	404	11.34
	Seventh step	325	9.12
	Eight step	308	8.64
	Ninth step	169	4.74
	Tenth step	87	2.44
	Total	3,557	100.00
Age (mean: 36.50)	Total	3,557	
Period Effect	1994	1,233	34.61
	2005	1,047	29.39
	2010	1,283	36.01
	Total	3,557	100.00

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