

**THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY  
BAHCESEHIR UNIVERSITY**

**THE IMPACTS OF THE ECONOMIC AND  
SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF RIO DE JANEIRO  
ON DRUG TRAFFICKING AND SOLUTIONS**

**Master's Thesis**

**SENA BELKAYALI**

**ISTANBUL, 2016**



**THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY**

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**THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCE**

**MASTER OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS**

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**Supervisor: PROF. DR. NILUFER NARLI**

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MASTER OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS**

**Name of the thesis: The Impacts of the Economic and Social Structure of  
Rio de Janeiro on drug Trafficking and Solutions**

**Name/Last Name of the Student: Sena Belkayalı**

**Date of the Defense of Thesis: January 5, 2016**

**The thesis has been approved by the Graduate School of Social Science.**

**Title, Name and LAST NAME  
Graduate School Director  
Signature**

**I certify that this thesis meets all the requirements as a thesis for the degree  
of Master of Arts.**

**Title, Name and LAST NAME  
Program Coordinator  
Signature**

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and we find it fully adequate in  
scope, quality and content, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

**Examining Committee Members**

**Signature**

**Thesis Supervisor  
Prof. Dr. Nilüfer NARLI**

-----

**Thesis Co-supervisor  
Prof. Dr. Sabri SAYARI**

-----

**Member  
Asist. Prof. Mine ÖZAŞÇILAR**

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **THE IMPACTS OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF RIO DE JANEIRO ON DRUG TRAFFICKING AND SOLUTION'S**

Sena Belkayalı

Master Program of Global Affairs

Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Nilüfer Narlı

January 2016, 125 Pages

Urbanization in Brazil has undergone significant economic and social changes since the proclamation of the independence of the country in 1822. It can be observed as a result of the changes emerging in the same period, due to reasons like population growth, increasing unemployment rate, and practice of slave trade until 1888. Rapid urbanization, unbalanced income distribution, usage of illegal drugs and drug trafficking has occurred as the most important facts and issues in the history of Latin American countries. The statistical data shows that there is an economic and social instability in Brazil, notably in large cities such as Rio de Janeiro. When the social and economic structure formed within Brazil's historical development is examined, it can be observed that the efforts made throughout the country for the purpose of reducing or eliminating drug trafficking in Brazil did not have positive outcomes. In fact, even though Brazil has undergone a considerable economic development, the number of individuals who use drugs, as well as the individuals who are incarcerated due to drug related problems, is on the rise. This is largely related to the economic and social inequality, as well as the particular subculture that exist in the favelas, the notorious ghettos in the largest cities in Brazil. The reduction or elimination of this problem constitutes great importance with regard to the country's economic and social stability. The fact that the banning methods and techniques the country have implemented up to now have not been effective on this stabilization creates the need to look for solutions by setting forth the basic rules of this issue and the evaluation of the problem once again, further considering the liberalization alternative, which is one of the solutions. Drug issue as a major problem of modern societies is analyzed via casual effects such as the income distribution, poverty, unemployment and crime dimensions. In addition to

those obvious motivators, subcultures are crucial in determining the individuals' behavior. In the study, it's criticized for being one of the main sources of the high level of crime rates.

***Keywords:*** *Rio de Janeiro, drug usage, drug trafficking, economic and social stability, solutions, and liberalization.*



## ÖZET

### RİO DE JANEİRO'DAKİ EKONOMİK VE SOSYAL YAPININ UYUŞTURUCU KULLANIMI VE UYUŞTURUCU TRAFİĞİ ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİLERİ VE ÇÖZÜM YOLLARI

Sena Belkayalı

Küresel İlişkiler Yüksek Lisans Programı

Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Nilüfer Narlı

Ocak 2016, 125 Sayfa

Brezilya'da şehirleşme yapısı, 1822 yılında ülkede bağımsızlığın ilanından günümüze kadar ekonomik ve sosyal yönden önemli değişikliklere uğramıştır. Aynı dönemde nüfus artışı, işsizlik oranının yükselmesi, 1888 tarihine kadar köle ticaretinin yapılması, hızlı şehirleşme, dengesiz gelir dağılımı ve ortaya çıkan yoksulluk gibi nedenlerle suç unsuru olan yasa dışı uyuşturucu kullanımı ve uyuşturucu trafiğinin ön plana çıktığı görülmektedir. Brezilya'da, Rio de Janeiro gibi, başta büyük şehirlerde olmak üzere ekonomik ve sosyal yönden istikrarsızlık yaşandığı, istatistiki verilerden anlaşılmaktadır. Brezilya'da tarihsel gelişim içerisinde yaşanan sosyal ve ekonomik yapı incelendiğinde görülüyor ki; Brezilya'da uyuşturucu trafiğinin azaltılması veya ortadan kaldırılması konusunda ülke genelinde yapılan çalışmalardan olumlu bir sonuç alınamamıştır. Aslında Brezilya dikkate değer bir ekonomik kalkınma gerçekleştirmiş olsa da uyuşturucu kullananların ve uyuşturucuya bağlı nedenlerle tutuklu bulunanların sayısı artış göstermektedir. Bu, büyük oranda ekonomik ve sosyal eşitsizlik, aynı zamanda da Brezilya'nın en büyük şehirlerinde görülen kötü şöhretli yoksul kenar mahallelerdeki alt kültür ile ilgili bir durumdur. Bu sorunun azaltılması veya yok edilmesi ülkenin ekonomik ve sosyal istikrarı açısından büyük önem taşımaktadır. Bu istikrarın sağlanabilmesi için bugüne kadar ülkenin uyguladığı yasaklama önlemlerinin etkin olamaması, meselenin, ancak temel kuralların tekrar ortaya konarak çözüm

yollarının araştırılması ile sorunun tekrar değerlendirilmesi ihtiyacını doğurmaktadır ki bu çözümlerden biri de serbestleştirme alternatifinin dikkate alınmasıdır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** *Rio de Janeiro, uyuşturucu kullanımı, uyuşturucu trafiği, ekonomik ve sosyal istikrar, serbestleştirme.*





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## ABBREVIATIONS

AIDS	: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
CONAD	: National Council on Drug Policies
DEGASE	: Departamento Geral de Ações Sócio Educativas
EMCDDA	: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction
EMCDDA	: The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction
EUROPOL	: European Union's law enforcement agency
GDP	: Gross Domestic Product
HEMP	: Help End Marijuana Prohibition
IBGE	: Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics
ICANS	: Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nova Scotia
INCB	: International Narcotics Control Board
INTERPOL	: International Police Organization
LSD	: Lysergic Asit Dietilamidi
MDMA	: National Institute on Drug Abuse
MS	: Municipal Health office
NCASA	: Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse
NGO	: Non-Governmental Organizations
ONDCP	: Office of National Drug Control Policy
OSAC	: The Overseas Security Advisory Council
SAMHSA	: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration
SENAD	: National Secretary on Drug Policy
SISNAD	: National System of Public Policies on Drugs
SIM	: SIM data / Data of the Ministry of Health
SVS	: Secretariat of Health Surveillance
THC	: Tetrahydrocannabinol
UN	: United Nations Organization
UNDP	: United Nations Development Program
UNODC	: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UPP	: Pacifying Police Unit - Unidade de Policia Pacificadora
US	: United States
WHO	: World Health Organization

## **1. INTRODUCTION**

The relation between economic and social instability and drug trafficking has always been an issue, which disturbs societies. It is one of the reasons of economic instability, as unearned income causes an unfair income distribution within society. This contradicts the principle of social peace. As is known, social peace is the state of social life away from internal conflict.

It is possible to trace back the illegal drug supply and illegal selling of these drugs that are supplied in Rio de Janeiro to the slave trade that started on the year 1558 and ended on the date 13 May 1888 within the historical development of Brazil, besides the fact that overpopulation, climate, people with low income and their settlement in areas which are geographically difficult to reach (like favelas) are facilitating drug trafficking while obstructing prosecution and control.

Brazil has the largest economy of Latin America. However, Brazil also remains as one of the most unequal countries in the world. This creates susceptible areas that lack basic infrastructure, public goods, or an effective presence of the state because of intense and fast urbanization. This urban divide characterizes the Brazilian cities. Important changes affecting the structure and the types of operation of organized crime groups have taken place in Brazil's illicit drug market in the past decades. These changes reflect the growth of global drug markets and the importance of drug utilization in Brazil. Brazil has recently become a key destination for cocaine. The growth of the country's urban population and the rise in wealth and disposable income appear to be the principal causes of the increasing drug use and it also leads to a major drug trafficking milestone.

It is seen through the sources that drug trafficking is practiced intensely in Rio de Janeiro. At this point the following questions arise: Since the drug use and drug trafficking is practiced illegally in Rio, does this illegal activity has an impact on the economic and social stability? If it has, what are the dimensions of it? What could be the solutions to it? The reason of this study is to look for answers to these questions.



The reason to choose this subject is to observe the problems that emerge due to the social and economic aspects of drug trafficking, thus handling the subject from this dimension.

Consequently, upon through our hypothesis, since the Economic and Social structure of Rio de Janeiro brings illegal drug trafficking to the forefront, the study will be about the elimination or ways of reduction of this problem, which is detrimental to Rio de Janeiro.

### **1.1. AIM OF THE STUDY**

The aim of this study is to investigate the socio-economic and structural reasons associated with the drug trafficking problems in Rio de Janeiro and discuss the options for a solution such as prohibition or liberalization of drug use. In addition, this research will aim to show that a coercive law enforcement of drug laws is ineffective in the struggle to successfully tackle the problem of drug use and trafficking.

The research is focused on two major questions.

2. What are the main socio-economic reasons that explain the high level of illegal drug use in Rio de Janeiro?
3. What are the effective ways of preventing illicit drug trafficking and usage?  
Could liberalization of drug use be the effective way to reduce drug trafficking?

Drug trade and drug use are driven by specific social-economic factors. Drug use can be in particular connected to several personal factors, which are driven by the social environment. First of all, individuals engage in drug use because they interpret the practice of drug use as a form of rebellion to the existing social norms. Other individuals use drugs as a form of escape from the dire conditions of their social surroundings. A third group of individuals uses drugs in order to cope with their personal problems, which are also largely affected by their social surroundings. The factor for drug use that is strictly connected to the social relations is the one in which individuals are driven into drug use in order to become a part of a certain social group. This factor could be titled as conformism. It might also be understood as a form of peer-pressure especially when adolescent drug users are in question.

It is also assumed that the extent of drug use also reflects the gradual changes which have occurred in the social structure in the last couple of decades, in which the global capitalist system has gone through a series of economic and social crises. As a country, which represents one of the largest actors in the global economy, Brazil has also been the subject of these changes. These changes are the overall reduction of the cohesiveness of the communities and the family - understood as the most basic social institution. Other changes also include the increased levels of unemployment, as well as the increased notions of alienation since a large number of drug users tend to be the members of marginalized communities as is the case of Brazil, where the individuals who live in the slums of the largest cities such as Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo are the ones who are most involved both in the drug trade and in drug use. Furthermore, when the socio-economic structure of Rio de Janeiro is examined we see the subcultural concentration. There is inequality of income distribution between individuals. The quality of life, education and income distribution of the Brazilian society reveal its cultural differences. This structure that reveals cultural differences leads people to illegal actions causing the concentration of drug uses and drug trafficking, emergence of violence and criminals within the society, thus breaking the social peace. This is the reason why the author of this thesis has selected the question of the relationship between the socio economic factors and the drug use and trade as the main research question.

Basically, the aim of the study is to reveal the reasons and results of drug trafficking. It is also closely related to the sociological factors that Brazilian people have been experiencing due to the recent economic developments. However, being the most basic brick of drug dealing, addiction can't be denied as the biggest reason behind drug traffic. The most basic and most common motivator of drug dealers to provide cash is to maintain their habits. For that reason, when the mass drug trafficking is the case, motivators of addicts can't be ignored as a brick stone. It is a must to understand the components of the addiction process, and the legal and philosophical status of drug abuse.

## **1.2. HYPOTHESIS**


In the research in social sciences, a dependent variable represents a variable whose values are reliant on the value of other variables with which it is related to, while independent variables are the ones which are used in order to predict the value of the depended variable with the use of a functional relationship (Kundu, 2009, p.12). In other words, even though in some researches these two types of variables tend to be indistinguishable, the dependent variable is the one that the researcher tends to elaborate, while the independent is the one that represents the hypothesized explanation (Baile, 1994, p.47). There is a cause and effect relationship between the independent and the dependent variable, that is, a change in the independent variable causes some type of an equivalent change in the dependent variable (McQueen & Knusse, 2002, p.47).

For the purpose of this research, the dependent variable is; drug trafficking.

On the other hand, the independent variables that affect drug trafficking are the following factors:

- Income inequality rate,
- Poverty rate,
- Crime rate,
- Unemployment rate.

*Figure 1.1 - Dependent and Independent Variables*



The analysis will focus on the ways in which income inequality, poverty, level of crime and unemployment contribute to the occurrence of drug use and drug trade among the citizens of Rio de Janeiro in Brazil. The results from the research conducted so far in other countries suggest that poverty significantly effects the increase of the number of drug users, and that drug related crime, such as production of illegal drugs is mostly affected by unemployment, income inequality and illiteracy (Niazi, Zaman, & Ikram, 2009, p.100). Furthermore, evidence from previous research has shown that income inequality has been positively correlated with many social and health problems, including violence, short life expectancy, psychological health problems, low school performance, and, most importantly, drug use (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010). Drug use and crime have also been positively related in previous research. For example, the already available statistics show that 80% of the prison population in the United States is represented by individuals who are abusers of alcohol or illegal drugs and 50% of the prisoners are clinical drug addicts, while 60% of the persons who are arrested for a criminal act have been under the influence of illegal drugs during the arrest (Malbrough,

2014, pp.17-18). In addition, research has also shown that there is a positive correlation between unemployment and drug use. The National Survey on Drug Use and Health, which was conducted in 2012, has shown that 1 in 6 of the unemployed U.S. citizens were alcohol or illegal drugs addicts, which was twice the rate in the case of employed citizens (Kurt, 2013).

Drawing from the above stated statistics, the main hypothesis of this thesis is that the factors such as high levels of income inequality, poverty, crime and unemployment are positively correlated to the higher levels of drug use and drug trafficking among the population of Rio de Janeiro.

In Brazil, drug trafficking has occurred and increased because of individuals' socio-economic problems. Geographically economic and social divisions in the states gave people the feeling of indignation and anger. This psychological condition triggered people to earn more. Drug trafficking is seen the best option for Brazilians. Most of the crime rates are related to drug trafficking.

It is hypothesized that the specific socio-economic structure of Rio de Janeiro, which produced marginalized communities in the form of favelas, is closely related to the high levels of drug related crime and drug use.

### **1.3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND**

It is assumed that the problems in economic and social structures may be effective on the drug traffic, which is run illegally in Rio de Janeiro. The main purpose for beginning with this assumption is to determine the problems at their root and look for their solutions there as well. Unemployment, inequality and poverty are primary economic problems related to low levels of economic development. It is presumed that unemployment, inequality and poverty steer individuals into violence. The illegal drug traffic run in a widespread manner today is aimed at a certain economic gain.

Table 1.1 - Brazil Demographics Profile 2014 (Indexmundi, 2015)

Age structure	0-14 years: 23.8% (male 24,534,129/female 23,606,332) 15-24 years: 16.5% (male 16,993,708/female 16,521,057) 25-54 years: 43.7% (male 43,910,790/female 44,674,915) 55-64 years: 8.4% (male 8,067,022/female 9,036,519) 65 years and over: 7.6% (male 6,507,069/female 8,805,247) (2014 est.)
Median age	Total: 30.7 years male: 29.9 years female: 31.5 years (2014 est.)
Urbanization	Urban population: 84.6% of total population (2011) rate of urbanization: 1.15% annual rate of change (2010-15 est.)
Major cities - population	Sao Paulo 19.924 million; Rio de Janeiro 11.96 million; Belo Horizonte 5.487 million; Porto Alegre 3.933 million; Recife 3.733 million; BRASILIA (capital) 3.813 million (2011)
Sex ratio	at birth: 1.05 male(s)/female 0-14 years: 1.04 male(s)/female 15-24 years: 1.03 male(s)/female 25-54 years: 0.98 male(s)/female 55-64 years: 0.97 male(s)/female 65 years and over: 0.74 male(s)/female total population: 0.98 male(s)/female (2014 est.)
Infant mortality rate	Total: 19.21 deaths/1,000 live births male: 22.47 deaths/1,000 live births female: 15.78 deaths/1,000 live births (2014 est.)
Life expectancy at birth	Total population: 73.28 years male: 69.73 years female: 77 years (2014 est.)
Total fertility rate	1.79 children born/woman (2014 est.)
SHIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate	NA
HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS	NA
HIV/AIDS - deaths	NA

Literacy	Definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 90.4% male: 90.1% female: 90.7% (2010 est.)
Child labor - children ages 5-14	Total number: 959,942 percentage: 3 % note: data represents children ages 5-13 (2009 est.)
Education expenditures	5.8% of GDP (2010)
Maternal mortality rate	56 deaths/100,000 live births (2010)
Children under the age of 5 years underweight	2.2% (2007)
Health expenditures	8.9% of GDP (2011)
Unemployment Rate	7,9% (as of October 2015)
Poverty rate	21.4% (as of October 2015. With a 13% of extreme poverty rate)

It can be seen in table 1.1, depicting a brief summary of Brazil's Demographic Conditions that as a developing country, it faces many major problems.

*Table 1.2 - Demographic structure of Brazil (Cepalstat, 2015).*

Total population (thousands)	207,750(000)	(000)	2015-2020
Annual population growth rate	0.8 %	%	2015-2020
Urban	1.1%	%	2015-2020

Rural	-0.3 %	%	2015-2020
Fertility rate	13.90/00	0/00	2015-2020
Mortality rate	6.20/00	0/00	2015-2020
Migration rate	0.00/00	0/00	2015-2020
Life expectancy	76 years	years	2015-2020
Women	79 years	years	2015-2020
Men	72 years	years	2015-2020

Brazil has a population of 207,750,000 citizens and an annual population growth of 0.8 percent (Cepalstat, 2015). The median age of the population is 30.7 years old, while the largest age group on Brazil is the one aged between 25 and 54, constituting the 43.7 percent of the overall population, followed by the population age group below 14 years of age, constituting the 23.8 percent of the overall population (Indexmundi, 2015). Most of the population growth is occurring in the urban areas of the country (Indexmundi, 2015). The largest percent of the population of Brazil lives in urban areas which are home to the 84.6 percent of the total population of Brazil.

*Table 1.3 - Employment rate in Brazil (World Bank, 2015)*

Unemployment rate	7.9	%	(2015)
Urban population employed in low productivity sectors of the labor market	37.7	%	(2013)
Women	41.2	%	(2013)



Men	34.9	%	(2013)
Structure of total urban employed population, by category of employment			(2013)
Employers	3.8	%	(2013)
Employees	62.3	%	(2013)
Self employed	25.0	%	(2013)
Domestic service	6.7	%	(2013)
Annual real average wages (Average annual index (2000=100))	108		(2014)

The unemployment rate of the country was 7.9 percent in October, 2015, while the largest part of the Brazilian workforce (37.7 percent) represents urban population employed in low productivity sectors of the labor market (Cepalstat, 2015). As a result of severe unemployment, poverty becomes inevitable. Along with such a low rate of unemployment, middle classes are experiencing the chronic unemployment.

*Table 1.4 - Poverty rates Brazil (World Bank & Cepalstat, 2015)*

Poverty rate	21.4	%	(2013)
Urban	15.7	%	(2013)
Rural	31.1	%	(2013)
Extreme poverty rate	13	%	(2013)
Urban	4.5	%	(2013)

Rural	13.6	%	(2013)
Gini coefficient	0.55	-	(2013)
Population without own individual income			(2013)
Women	28.3	%	(2013)
Men	16.7	%	(2013)
Social public expenditure as percentage of GDP	26.6	%	(2009)

The poverty rate in Brazil in 2013 was 21.4 percent, the extreme poverty rate was 13%, while the Gini index was 0.55 (Cepalstat, 2015). With such unemployment rates which lead to poverty and extreme poverty, it is not wrong to claim there are some crucial problems with economic indicators in Brazil. Poverty can be a serious reason for the massive drug abuse. Recent statistics show that Brazil is the second biggest cocaine user in the world. They use the 18,6% of the cocaine in flow.

It is easy to say that drug use and poverty are largely interconnected. Massive drug abuse leads the addicts to become a drug dealer in order to provide drug. On one hand, the problematic use of drugs can lead to poverty since the individual will not be able to function properly in society and can lead to the individual losing all his or her assets. On the other hand, poverty can also be the root cause of the drug use, since in the case that there are no prospects for the individual in the society for his or her personal growth, the individual can turn to problematic drug use as a form of escapism from the dire social circumstances. A large percentage of the drug users turn to drug dealing in order to support their harmful habits. As a criminal activity, drug dealing is also related to violence per se. This is the manner in which poverty, drug use, drug trafficking and

violence are interconnected. The study of one of these issues should also include the other related aspects mentioned above. It can be assumed that a common drug user can be considered as a potential drug dealer. This study aims to analyze the social impacts of drug trafficking and reasons behind it.

*Table 1.5 - Annual prevalence of drug use in Brazil as a percentage of the population aged 15-64 in 2012 (Rogers 2012).*

Drug type	Prevalence of drug use in Brazil as a percentage of the population aged 15-64
Cannabis	3.4
Ecstasy	0.5
Amphetamines	.0.7
Opiates	/
Cocaine	0.9

In the period between 2005 and 2012, the number of inmates in Brazilian prisons dramatically increased. For example, the number of inmates held for drug related crimes increased by 100 000 in the same period (Ministry of Justice, n.d.). Cannabis is the most widely used illegal drug in Brazil with a prevalence of 3.4, followed by cocaine with prevalence 0.9 and amphetamines with 0.7 (Rogers, 2012).

The annual return of illicit drug trafficking is estimated to be around 300 – 500 billion USD. It is important to note that illicit drug trafficking takes place the second line after weapon industry. There is no tax income from illegal drug trafficking in Brazil. Illegal drug use and drug trafficking bring along health problems, tragedies, social distresses, loss of time and money. Countries confronted with this subject opt for liberalization options to cope with this issue.

The starting point of this subject is that the economic and social structure formed in Rio de Janeiro during the course of history has left negative impacts on some sections of the society and as a result of this illegal drug use and drug trafficking, has been causing

crime. For these reasons, we must first examine the economical aspect of why and how criminal drug trafficking emerged. It has been observed that this illegal act is detrimental to the society and the people involved have high criminal potential for various economic and social reasons.

For this study to achieve a healthy solution, the opinion is that the determination of the main causes of the disposition of these people involved is going to take us to the conclusion faster. In the first section of our study, to find answers to our questions we tried to emphasize the economic theories primarily. For example, Miller's (1958) *Theory of focal concerns* explains the criminality of people with low-income by stating that the culture of the low-income class causes crime, due to the reason that their standards and focal concerns violate some legal norms derived from the interests of the middle class. According to Miller (1958), these focal concerns of the low-income class are restlessness, toughness, shrewdness, excitement, and predestinarianism, being self-ordained. Shrewdness signifies eluding others, gaining money by deceiving them; excitement signifies danger, risk, change, being active; predestinarianism signifies believing in luck and fortune; being self-ordained signifies not accepting any limitations. The individual has to adopt these features to be able to identify with his surroundings, be accepted by it, to have a status and prestige. On the other hand, criminal activity is impossible to avoid when adopting these features.

The second part of our study revolves around the analysis of social theories. Sociologists indicate that within a social system, society consists of sub-groups. In some sub-groups within the main society we observe cultural differences. These different cultures originating in certain professions and social categories are named as "subcultures" within the main culture (Stolley 2005, p.49). In short, subculture can be defined as meanings, values and behavior types pertaining to a certain group in society. The degree of difference and integration between subculture and main culture causes a normative isolation and solidarity in the subculture. The existence of a subculture falling into place with values different than the main culture is at times explosive and harmful to the whole culture and at times may be tolerated by it.

*Table 1.6 - Crime and Safety Index for Country 2015: America (Numbeo, 2015a)*

Rank	Country	Crime Index	Safety Index
1	Venezuela	85.19	14.81
2	Honduras	80.07	19.93
3	El Salvador	72.32	27.68
4	Trinidad And Tobago	72.28	27.72
5	Brazil	70.23	29.77
6	Jamaica	67.40	32.60
7	Puerto Rico	67.28	32.72
8	Dominican Republic	66.37	33.63
9	Guatemala	66.16	33.84
10	Argentina	63.54	36.46
11	Peru	63.07	36.93
12	Colombia	59.89	40.11
13	Bolivia	59.41	40.59
14	Costa Rica	58.47	41.53
15	Mexico	53.03	46.97
16	Uruguay	50.61	49.39
17	Ecuador	50.35	49.65
18	United States	49.79	50.21
19	Panama	47.78	52.22
20	Chile	43.46	56.54
21	Canada	38.73	61.27
22	Nicaragua	33.63	66.37

With a Crime index of 70.23 and a safety index of 29.77, Brazil is placed fifth on the list of American countries according to the level of crime rate and safeness (Numbeo, 2015a). In addition, the city of Rio de Janeiro has a very high level of crime with a Crime Index of 90.49 which has been increasing in the last three years (Numbeo, 2015b).

The theories that attribute reasons of crime to subculture assert that to be a member of a certain subculture individual is directed towards certain purposes and these may be against the law, and constitute a crime. The criminal gang constituting subculture is separated into 3 groups.<sup>1</sup>

1. In well-organized, integrated societies gangs function virtually as training places for adults' organized criminal activities. Profitability comes first in activities and violence is not observed much. This is called criminal subculture.
2. In these groups drug inclination starts by time and activities are held to gain money for acquiring drugs.
3. As for disintegrated societies, there are not any well-organized structures such as these and there is a weak social control on the young. The gang subculture in these types of societies shows extreme behaviors. Here the first purpose is to get "respect." Behaviors of violence and slashing are used for this purpose.

Whereas, structural theories claim that the structure of society and differences between classes create crime. Cohen examined the gang subculture as well, and defined these as gainless, negative and treacherous. In regards to the groups of gang subculture, the drug gangs in Brazil could not fit the any of the categories exclusively. In fact since they are well organized and shows extreme behaviors they would represent a combination of the first and the third category.

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<sup>1</sup> Turkish Military Academy, n.d. Criminal gangs. [online], <http://www.kho.edu.tr> [accessed 5 May 2015].

*Table 1.7 - Number of Detained for Drug Trafficking (2005 – 2012) Regarding the Total Prison Population (Ministry of Justice, n.d)*

Year	Total Inmates	Inmates/ Trafficking	Percentage Inmates/Trafficking
2005	361.402	32.880	9.10%
2006	383.480	47.472	12.38%
2007	422.590	65.494	15.50%
2008	451.219	77.371	17.50%
2009	473.626	91.037	19.22%
2010	496.251	106.491	21.46%
2011	514.582	125.744	24.43%
2012	548.003	133.946	26.00%

In the period between 2005 and 2012, the number of inmates in Brazilian prisons dramatically increased. For example, the number of inmates held for drug related crimes increased by 100 000 in the same period (Ministry of Justice, n.d.).

In addition to all those information, there are many perspectives about the reasons of high crime rates in societies and the major motivators of group crime phenomenon. It is a must to mention Merton's (1938) strain theory and Hagan and Petersen's (1995) approach to the group crime phenomenon while talking about social tendency to crime. On the other hand, despite the low correlation, the cogent study of Blau and Blau (1982) should be mentioned also. Blau and Blau claimed that, there is a negative correlation

between economic gain (income) and death rates. It is logical to tie up high death rates due to low Medicare, low life standards etc. and high death rates in societies. But also, it cannot reveal the whole story. Low income and lack of a middle class is only a spark to flame the social disorganization.

The main case for the Brazilian society is that high drug use rates and high crime rates can be considered as mutual. One variable can also be considered as the reason or result of each other. Drug trafficking in Brazil is a pure and solid part of a bigger crime organization. To broaden the case wider, the social disorganization theory claims that, there is a correlation between the crime rate and the neighborhood or ecological environment of the criminals. The term “ecological” refers to the economic environment or the inner circle of individuals. Basically, an environment with high rates of crime can motivate an individual to commit a crime.

Social disorganization theory is considered as the main theory for this study. It is used to explain the back stage of what happens in Brazil. High drug abuse rates can be assumed as a main factor to become a drug dealer.

#### **1.4. METHODOLOGY**

Due to the limited resources in terms of the means of researching the problem that includes fieldwork, as well as due to the geographical distance of the actual location that the study refers to, the main research method for this study is secondary data. This type of research method revolves around the analysis of the already present data that was collected by researchers in prior studies of similar or related research problems. The purpose of the analysis of secondary data is to follow a research interest that is different from the ones in the already conducted studies in the form of a new research question or a different view of the already posed research question.

According to Burton (2000), secondary data is used in two main ways. The first way is using it as a substitute for primary research, while the second one is to use it as only one component of the research strategy. This study uses the former approach. The data, which is usually used in the analysis of secondary data, derives from wide-ranging activities, including studies that were conducted by academics, governmental and non-



governmental organizations, commercial groups, public authorities and all of the organizations that are involved in recording events and processes for different purposes (Heaton 2004, p.3). The most elementary use of secondary data analysis is to use only one dataset in order to replicate the previous researchers' results or to use the existing data in order to refer to another set of issues (Burton 2000, p. 348). In this study, the author will use the existing data to address the issue formulated in the research question.

Since the research question involves the impact of very broad aspects of social life, namely, the economy and social welfare, which include many different and complex indicators such as the rates of unemployment, inequality, crime and poverty, the analysis will include a broad sample of documents that reflect both on the current economic and social situation in Brazil. It will also involve the analysis of historical issues that contributed to the current state of Brazil's economy and society, which, in effect, constructed the economic and social conditions in one of the biggest cities in the country, namely Rio de Janeiro. As drug use and trafficking represent illicit activities, data from the past and current crime rates will also be taken into consideration in the analysis. In order to meet the aims of this research, data was gathered from credible institutions such as the Brazilian observatory drug information center (OBID), National System of Policies on Drugs (SISNAD), Brazilian Ministry of Justice, Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, United Nations Office of Drug and Crime, Brazilian Drug report of Brazilian institutional security cabinet national secretariat for policies on drugs. Results from existing studies on the issue and statistics of related institutions were collected and used in the analysis in order to give a more precise perspective on the relationship between the economic and social circumstances and the illicit drug use and drug trade in Rio de Janeiro. In this regard, historical and statistical data relating to the socio economic developments of the infamous ghettos, the so-called favelas, which are highly connected to organized crime and especially drug trafficking are also part the secondary analysis. Other data includes information regarding drug use and prevalence of lifetime use of drugs on a national level in Brazil, as well as data about the use of drugs by elementary and secondary school students on a local level in Rio de Janeiro. Furthermore, data deriving from countries, which have taken a different approach in tackling the problem of drug use and drug trafficking, mainly the decriminalization and legalization of drug use are also analyzed, in order to find the

correct suggestions about the possible solutions to this issue on a local level in Rio de Janeiro. In addition, the study also includes crime rates related to the issue in Rio de Janeiro and another Brazilian city Sao Paulo. In order to present the current legal developments regarding the issue, the data found in legal documents related to drug reforms on a national level in Brazil are also taken into consideration and analyzed in the study. The aggregated data from different sources is critically assessed by the author with the intent of revealing patterns that reveal the correlation between economic and social difficulties and drug use and trafficking. Since the secondary data that was gathered by the author is both quantitative and qualitative, rather than using a software for analysis, the author will conduct a critical analysis in order to make a relationship between the level of economic and social development and drug trafficking and reach a conclusion from the collected data.

It is important to mention that this project also includes a theoretical analysis of different approaches in tackling the issue of drug use and trafficking. These two approaches employed in different countries are the prohibition and the liberalization of drug use and trade.

## **2. LITERATURE REVIEW**

Drug use is a result of several complex social and psychological factors. According to Jiloha (2009), there are several factors that drive individuals into drug use. These factors are parental influence, family structure, peer influence, role models, advertising and promotion, socio-economic factors, availability, and knowledge attitudes and beliefs. Regarding socio-economic factors, it has been observed that higher drug abuse rates are related to people who belong to lower income groups; that is, the low income individuals have higher chances of becoming drug users in comparison to the middle class individuals (Jiloha 2009, p.169). Researchers have found that there is a negative correlation between earning a higher income and the demand for all types of drugs, but at the same time, that the demand for cannabis has become more normal in recent periods (Taylor n.d., p.124) In addition, it was also revealed that the higher level of education is negatively correlated to the demand of illegal drugs (Taylor n.d., p.124).

Researchers have observed that the structural changes that occurred in the business of drug trafficking in Latin America since 2006 have contributed to a dramatic change in the escalation of violence, which is especially observed in the increasing murder rates. Factors that have contributed to this situation are the increased flow of drug trade between the U.S. and Brazil, the availability of firearms which has become larger in the last decade, as well as the fact that the reduced supply of Colombian cocaine has increased the profits and invented new actors into the drug trade in general (Robles, Calderón & Magaloni 2013, p.29). In Brazil, the illegal drug trade has also been going through structural changes in terms of profile, structure, as well as the ways of operating used by the criminal organizations. It is believed that these changes represent consequences from the evolution of the global drug trade as well as the significant increase of drug use within the country. One of the reasons for this is found in Brazil's geographical position – the fact that it is surrounded by countries that represent major producers of cocaine, which are Peru, Colombia and Bolivia, has made Brazil a transit country for the trafficking of cocaine to Western Europe through the use of the

connections to Central and West Africa<sup>2</sup>. In fact, half of the cocaine that was confiscated by the Brazilian authorities came from Bolivia, Peru and Colombia<sup>3</sup>. In this regard, the consumption of cocaine and crack has been on the rise in the last ten years in Brazil. Even though the use of cocaine in North America has been declining, the yearly prevalence of cocaine use among university students in Brazil has remained 3 percent.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, the use of cocaine in Brazil is four times higher than the world average.<sup>5</sup> However, the roots of the cause for the drug use and trafficking in Brazil go a lot further back into the history of the country. In order to trace the deeper origins, the next section of the literature review will be focused on the historical events that shaped Brazil and which still influence the current economic and political circumstances of this South American country.

## **2.1. BRIEF HISTORY OF BRAZIL**

The history of Brazil starts at the point when it was discovered in 1500 by the Portuguese diplomat Pedro Alvares Cabral.<sup>6</sup> The recorded history of Brazil started after the arrival of the Portuguese into the land (Burns 1993, p.9). Then the colonial era of Brazil started and continued for more than three centuries. In 1822 Brazil became an independent country<sup>7</sup>. The Republic was established in a peaceful revolution led by Marshal Manuel Deodoro da Fonseca in 1889.<sup>8</sup> He was also the first president of Brazil. In 1914 Brazil was recognized by all the countries in the world<sup>9</sup>.

Brazil passed through a variety of stages as a Republic. The early republic was formally democratic, then from 1930 until 1945 it experienced a dictatorship under Getulio

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<sup>2</sup> Miraglia, Paula. (n.d.) Drugs and Drug Trafficking in Brazil: Trends and Policies. Foreign policy at Brookings (p.3) <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Research/Files/Papers/2015/04/global-drug-policy/Miraglia--Brazil-final.pdf?la=en> [accessed 14 August 2015].

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid

<sup>5</sup> Ibid

<sup>6</sup> A brief history of Brazil, The New York Times n.d. [www.nytimes.com](http://www.nytimes.com) [accessed on 19 May 2015]

<sup>7</sup> CIA, n.d. Country comparison: Population. The World Factbook, [online], <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html> [accessed 29 July 2015].

<sup>8</sup> The Washington Post, n.d. Country guide: Brazil. The Washington Post, [online], <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/countries/brazil.html> [accessed 1 June 2015].

<sup>9</sup> Encyclopedia.com, n.d. Brazil, cities of the world. [online], <http://www.encyclopedia.com/> [accessed 1 May 2015].


Vargas, and in 1946 Brazil returned to the democratic form of government. In 1964 military took over the Brazilian government and continued the ultimate political power (Robock 1977, p. 13). Dictatorship ruled in Brazil from 1964 to 1985.<sup>10</sup>

After the country gained independence, in spite of numerous local and bloody wars waged in Brazil, one of the major events was abolition of slavery in 1888 (Cardozo 1961, p. 241). Primarily in September 1885 slaves over 60 were freed and then on May 13<sup>th</sup>, 1888 Brazilian Monarchy signed the Golden Law to end the slavery (Klein and Luna 2009, p.309). Most of the slaves were in the Minas Gerais - the second most populous state, Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro, Bahia (the fourth populous state) and Maranhao in Brazil. Brazil had a slavery system for nearly more than 300 years (Martin 1921). At first sight it is very sensible to give freedom to these slaves but it was a sharp turn and thousands of former slaves were left without jobs and resources and they went to the inner backlands of the Northeast (Perlman2010, p.24). Figure 2.1 shows the migration from Europe and Africa to Latin America in two different historical periods.

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<sup>10</sup> The Economist, 2014. Brazil's dictatorship: The final reckoning. The Economist, [online], <http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21636059-investigation-human-rights-abuses-names-culprits-far-too-late-final-reckoning> [accessed 5 June 2015]

Figure 2.1 - Latin America migration map (1701-1870)



Source: Lombardi and Lombardi (2011)

Brazil primarily fascinated temporary traders. They were exchanging European goods with the Indians for Brazil wood and it was used as dye in Europe. The name of the country also derived from the brazilwood tree that used to produce a deep red dye.<sup>11</sup> Portuguese then decided to settle down here permanently and the symmetrical relation changed. The wealth of the colony was established on goods, primarily sugar in the

<sup>11</sup> CIA, n.d. South America: Brazil. The World Factbook, [online], <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/br.html> [accessed 14 June 2015].

seventeenth century, gold in the eighteenth century and coffee in the beginning of the nineteenth century.<sup>12</sup>

Today, Brazil has a huge land area and a large population (Sachs, Wilhelm, & Pinheiro 1999, p.55). It is the fifth largest country of the world. Improvement of living standards and streamlining of economic change has been one of the most important issues with regard to the size of the country. The size of a country also increases the chances that a country will have a wide variety of natural resources within its borders in reasonably large quantities, but it also appears to be both advantageous and disadvantageous with regard to development. It expands the problem of internal communication and transportation and contributes to a great social and political diversity (Stefan 1997, pp.5-6).

*Figure 2.2 - Regions of Brazil*




*Source: Burns (1993)*

<sup>12</sup> KPMG 2008, p.13, [https://www.kpmg.de/docs/Folder\\_Market\\_Entry\\_ing-Final](https://www.kpmg.de/docs/Folder_Market_Entry_ing-Final) [accessed on 10 March 2015].

Until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, people were overwhelmingly illiterate in Brazil and it represented a less dynamic society in the region firstly with regards to the quality of life and the human capital of its population (Luna & Klein 2015, p.3).

The next two tables show Brazil's incredible population growth in the period of the last century and a half. In 1850, Brazil had a population of only 7 million citizens, and it was less populated than Mexico. In 1900, the population increased for 10 million and it became the most populated country in Latin America. In 2004, the population of Brazil reached almost 205 million citizens.


*Figure 2.3 - Population of Latin American Countries in 1850*



*Source: Luna and Klein (n.d. p.3)*


*Figure 2.4 - Population of Latin American Countries in 1900*





Source: Luna and Klein (n.d., p. 4)

Figure 2.5 - Population of Latin American Countries in 2014



Source: Central Intelligence Agency<sup>13</sup> & IBGE<sup>14</sup>

## 2.2. SOCIAL INEQUALITY AND CRIME RATES IN BRAZIL

Sharp social inequality and high poverty rate became one of the most important problems of Brazil. In the last decade, population in the slum areas increased nearly

<sup>13</sup> CIA (2014) [online] <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html> [accessed on 29 July 2015]

<sup>14</sup> IBGE (2015) [online] <http://www.ibge.gov.br/apps/populacao/projecao/> [accessed on 29 July 2015]

three times more than the overall average of population growth. While the general population growth rate is 0.74% per year, in slums the growth rate is 2.4% (Iannicelli 2009, p. 80).

*Table 2.1 - The most unequal countries in the world*

Country	Gini Index	Bottom 10% share (%)	Top 10 % Share (%)
South Africa	65.0	1.1	53.8
Namibia	61.3	1.5	51.8
Botswana	60.5	1.1	49.6
Zambia	57.5	1.5	47.4
Honduras	57.4	0.8	45.7
Central African Republic	56.3	1.2	46.1
Lesotho	54.2	1.0	41.0
Columbia	53.5	1.1	42.0
Brazil	52.7	1.0	41.7
Guatemala	52.4	1.3	41.8


*Source: Business Insider 2014<sup>15</sup>*

Brazil represents one of the most unequal countries in the world. It has been rated by the Business Insider as the 9<sup>th</sup> most unequal country in the world in 2014. The Gini Index for 2014 was 52.1, which places it between Colombia and Guatemala on list of the most unequal countries in the world. However, it has to be noted that the income distribution has been improved in comparison to 2005, when the Gini index of Brazil was more than 56 (Brzinski, 2012, p.50). As shown in Figure 2.6, the differences between individuals' earnings and households per capita incomes, as well as the percentage of the population living below the poverty line has been decreasing in the last 15 years. Nevertheless, the

<sup>15</sup> Kiersz, A. (2014). Here Are The Most Unequal Countries In The World [online] <http://www.businessinsider.com/gini-index-income-inequality-world-map-2014-11#ixzz3jNL8nbKyh> [accessed on 28 August 2015]


rate of violence, crime and illegal drug trafficking related crime have been rising for the past four decades in Brazil, despite progressive improvement in the country's social and economic conditions. Violence is mostly recognized as a multi-causal occurrence, linked to the social and economic situation.<sup>16</sup>

Figure 2.6 - Economic inequality in Brazil from 1990 to 2014



Source: Chart book of income inequality<sup>17</sup>

Figure 2.7 - The growth of prison population in Brazil 2000-12



Source: International Center for Prison Studies (n.d.)<sup>18</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Portal Brazil (2014) [online] <http://www.ibge.gov.br/apps/populacao/projecao>, [accessed on 10 April 2015]

<sup>17</sup> Chartbook of income inequality (2014). Economic inequality in Brazil [online] <http://www.chartbookofeconomicinequality.com/inequality-by-country/brazil/> [accessed on 28 April 2015]

Besides the growth of population of the country in general, Brazil experienced a serious boom in terms of the number of its prison population. The prison population of Brazil has been on the rise in the period of the last decade and a half. As shown in Figure 2.7, only in the period between 2000 and 2012 the prison population in Brazil doubled and reached almost 550 000 in 2012. If these trends continue with the existing rate, in the future Brazil is going to have to deal with an even larger number of prisoners which stresses out the need to take active measures in preventing this massive increase of prisoners. As it will be discussed later in the paper, reforms related to drug laws could significantly contribute to minimizing such a threat. As an effect of the rise of the rate of drug related crimes, the number of the prisoners incarcerated for drug related crimes has been on the rise in the period of the last seven years. The below table represents the number of detained persons for drug trafficking for the period between 2005 and 2012 regarding the total prison population. As shown in the table, the number of inmates whose crime was related to drug trafficking increased for about 100 000 individuals in the period between 2005 and 2012.

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<sup>18</sup> International Center for Prison Studies (n.d.). World Prison Brief [online]  
<http://www.prisonstudies.org/country/brazil> [accessed on 28 April 2015]

*Table 2.2 - Number of Detained for Drug Trafficking (2005 – 2012) Regarding the Total Prison Population*

Year	Total Inmates	Inmates/ Trafficking	Percentage Inmates/Trafficking
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2006	383.480	47.472	12.38%
2007	422.590	65.494	15.50%
2008	451.219	77.371	17.50%
2009	473.626	91.037	19.22%
2010	496.251	106.491	21.46%
2011	514.582	125.744	24.43%
2012	548.003	133.946	26.00%

*Source: Ministry of Justice, Brazil*

The data about the deaths caused by the use of both legal and illegal drugs and over-consumption of alcohol show that alcoholism is the most common reason of natural deaths in Brazil in 2005. The second most occurring cause of death related to both legal and illegal drugs is tobacco.

Table 2.3 - Ranking of drugs as primary cause of death in Brazil

Drug Type
1. Cocaine
2. Cannabis
3. Solvents and inhalants
4. Tranquilizers and sedatives
5. Opioids
6. Amphetamine type stimulants
7. Hallucinogens

Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime<sup>19</sup>

Table 2.4 - Annual prevalence of drug use in Brazil as a percentage of the population aged 15-64 in 2012


Drug type	Prevalence of drug use in Brazil as a percentage of the population aged 15-64
Cannabis	3.4
Ecstasy	0.5
Amphetamines	.0.7
Opiates	/
Cocaine	0.9

Source: Rogers (2012)<sup>20</sup>

<sup>19</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2011) [online] [www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/WDR2012/Drug-related\\_Mortality\\_2012.xls](http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/WDR2012/Drug-related_Mortality_2012.xls) [accessed on 29 August 2015]

<sup>20</sup> Rogers, S. (2012). Drugs use map of the world [online] <http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/interactive/2012/jul/02/drug-use-map-world> [accessed on 28 April 2015]

Table 2.5 - Violent death rates (per 100 thousand). Total population. 1980/2012. Transporte – Transport / Suicídios – Suicides / Homicídios – Murder



Source: SIM/ SVS/MS 2014 (as cited in Waiselfisz 2014)

As indicated in the above figure, homicides represent the number one cause of violent deaths in Brazil. In addition, the rates of such cases have been increasing in the last decade and a half. Homicides showed strong growth since the beginning of series, in 1980, when the rate was 11.7 homicides per 100 000 inhabitants to the year 2003, when the rate reached 28.9 with a gradient of 4% annual growth. As of 2003, resulting from disarmament campaigns and specific policies in some Units Large demographic weight Federation, homicide rates tended to fall until 2007, climbing the resume point of violence<sup>21</sup>.

### 2.2.1. Crime

The correlation between crime and inequality has been subjected for a protracted time within the literature. Similar versions of our proposal have appeared in some sociological theories. Merton's (1938) strain theory and Hagan and Petersen (1995) argue that the frustration felt by the lower income people once perceiving the prosperity of others, conjointly referred to as "relative privation", might justify the impact

<sup>21</sup> Waiselfisz, J.J., 2014. Os jovens do Brasil. Mapa da Violência, [online], [http://www.mapadaviolencia.org.br/pdf2014/Mapa2014\\_JovensBrasil.pdf](http://www.mapadaviolencia.org.br/pdf2014/Mapa2014_JovensBrasil.pdf) [accessed 12 July 2015].

differences have on criminalism. Some studies conjointly entails, in an exceedingly specific sense, that economic condition may be an issue that influences criminalism. The argument here is that the social disorganization generated by economic condition reduces the informal management mechanisms acting upon the individual, leading to a rise in criminalism (Hagan and Petersen, 1995). Kennedy et al (1998) hypothesized that the impact of the growing gap between the rich and poor individuals is mediated through an undermining of social cohesion, or social capital. This can be conjointly associated with the social disorganization theory, which argues that crime happens once the social mechanisms supporting society, sort of a community's ability to control its members, are weakened. The cogent study of Blau and Blau (1982) found a robust relationship between financial gain difference and putting to death rate. An undeniable result of the Blaus' study implies that the income level has a crucial effect on death rate. It can be explained that a high rate of natural deaths can be caused by low living standards, drug abuse and lack of basic needs. On the other hand, killing in actions can be pointed to a result of crime activities. Daly, Wilson and Vasdev (2001) conjointly support the proposition that the degree of how much the resources are unevenly distributed may be a stronger determinant of the levels of fatal violence in trendy nation states than is the average level of living standards and public welfare.

The economic literature on crime suggests that class differences will generate criminalism. Regarding how the differences cause crime from an economic perspective, there's an enormous literature of theories mentioning the precise economic mechanisms governing class differences and crime. Firstly, based mostly on the earliest works of Becker (1968) and Paul Ehrlich (1973), people will allot time between market and unlawful activities by examination of the expected income from these alternatives. Differences create crime by inserting low-income people who have low returns within the market next to high-income people. This proximity contributes to a frustration feeling, or the "envy effect", already mentioned before, changing into a crucial determinant considering criminalism. This concept appeared in an exceedingly aphoristic economic framework in Easterlin's seminal in 1980. During this study, Easterlin (1980) tries to clarify why individuals within the U.S., Japan, continental Europe or UK haven't become happier, in despite of the robust economic process. One potential reason for this, in line with a significant finding from happiness surveys, is



that satisfaction/ happiness depends on some “status ranking”; that is, it is not solely absolutely the economic well-being that matters, however conjointly its relative position in the society.

Thirdly, one similar theory is based on the thought that individuals have a targeted consumption, and by that, difference exerts a positive impact on criminalism. It would be too simple to state that this targeted consumption tends to succeed in those levels of satisfaction experienced by richer people. It's going to be argued here that the targeted consumption arises from close contact with the segments for whom the distribution of wealth is advantageous, or further, it might be valid to state that mass communication establishes standards that would be thought of references. Bearing this in mind, the person derives discontentedness from the distinction between the amount of targeted consumption and the level of consumption that can be achieved with his/her financial gain in reality. Discontentedness reduces utility, by leading the person interpret his/her financial gain as being “lower”, therefore reducing the discounted worth of her/his utility. It's honest to assume that a rise within the targeted financial gain makes the individual demand the next remuneration to participate within the market. Thus, there should be an immediate relation between financial gain difference and criminalism. A high level of difference implies a high level of discontentedness and, as it is going to be shown, there's conjointly a relation between discontentedness and the needed financial gain to remain out of criminalism. Considering the stance taken here, economic condition by itself isn't thought of an immediate issue resulting in criminalism, however solely an indirect one. The analysis should then specialize in poorer individuals' perception of their relative deprivation once they encounter with segments of higher financial gain.

Finally, we will realize a lot of specific economic channels through which social differences lead to criminalism if one assumes that unlawful activities also rely on economic processes. Firstly, the class differences manifest themselves through capital market imperfections since the poor are devoid of the economic resources to investment. Secondly, the differences influence the balance of power within the social group in such a way that pressures the government to increase the financial gain distribution which, in turn, slows down the economic process. Finally, there's an ancient

argument that the difference contributes to deviated behavior and non-compliance to social norms, so reducing the safety of norms and property rights which, in their flip, discourages investment and economic process [Persson and Tabellini, (1998), Bénabou, (1996), Aghion and Howitt, (1998)].

We simply highlighted the channels through which social differences cause crime, however the question is whether criminalism generates social difference as well. There are a minimum of four arguments to clarify the channels through which violence generates financial gain inequality: a) Violent areas are less attractive to new investments, and violent areas can gradually become poor and composed areas that are receiving investments can gradually become very rich; b) the foremost competent individuals would prefer living in the composed areas. As such, the higher educated people (for example) would teach in safer places, and therefore the youngsters living in violent areas don't receive a competently academic education. That is, the youngsters of violent areas receive a lower educational quality than children who live in non-violent areas. In the long-term, this distinction within the skills, originated by violence, can generate financial gain inequality; c) the foremost competent people would prefer to live in non-violent areas. Drawing from the idea that social interaction (or networks) is very important for the future of the youngsters, it's the case that youngsters living in non-violent places have a more robust environment for their development than the youngsters living in violent places. Again, the distinction within the skills of the youngsters, generated by violence, can imply a financial gain difference in the future; and d) a personal can receive a lower wage, simply because she/ he lives in an exceedingly violent place. As an example, 2 people with a similar human capital working at the same job, can receive totally different wages, simply because they live in places with totally different levels of violence. The leader might not grasp the talents of every individual, thus attributing everyone the characteristics of the region of origin. As such the distinction within the wages can generate financial gain difference, however the wage differential was originated by violence. We have a tendency to use during this study the Gini constant [Kelly (2000), Fajnzylber (2002)] as the indication of financial gain difference.

*Table 2.6 - The most unequal countries in the world (Business Insider 2014)*

Country	Gini Index	Botton 10% share (%)	Top 10 % Share (%)
South Africa	65.0	1.1	53.8
Namibia	61.3	1.5	51.8
Botswana	60.5	1.1	49.6
Zambia	57.5	1.5	47.4
Honduras	57.4	0.8	45.7
Central African Republic	56.3	1.2	46.1
Lesotho	54.2	1.0	41.0
Columbia	53.5	1.1	42.0
Brazil	52.7	1.0	41.7
Guatemala	52.4	1.3	41.8

*Brazil is also one of the ten most unequal countries in the world (Kiersz, 2014).*

### **2.3. CRIMINALIZATION**

What, exactly, is deviance? Therefore, what's the link between deviance and crime? As Duke of Edinburgh Hudson has seen, some acts, like wearing garments of the alternative sex, is considered deviant in bound places, outlawed in some places, and utterly acceptable elsewhere. William Graham Sumner, who is a famous social scientist, explained that “deviance may be a violation of established expression, cultural, or social norms, whether or not folkways, mores, or statute law” (1906). It is as minor as nose-picking publically or as major as committing a murder. Though the word “deviance” features a negative connotation in everyday language, sociologists acknowledge that

deviance isn't essentially dangerous (Schoepflin 2011). In fact, from a structural-functionalist perspective, one among the positive contributions of deviance is that it fosters social modification. As an example, throughout the U.S. civil rights movement, Rosa Parks profaned social norms once she refused to maneuver to the “black section” of the bus, and therefore the capital of Arkansas abolished the segregation.

As norms vary across culture and time, it is sensible that notions of deviance is modified conjointly. Fifty years ago, public colleges within the US had strict dress codes that, among alternative stipulations, prohibited girls from dressing sweat pants in classes. Today, it's socially acceptable for ladies to wear pants, however less acceptable for men to wear skirts. In time of war, acts typically thought to be virtuously condemnable, like taking the life of another, may very well be rewarded. Whether or not an act is deviant or not depends on a society's response to that act.

The question of what the deviant behavior is can't be replied in an easy manner. Whether or not an act is tagged deviant or not depends on several factors, together with location, audience, and therefore the individual committing the act (Becker 1963).

### **2.3.1. Social Control**

When someone violates a social norm, what happens? A driver caught driving above the speed limit will receive a ticket. A student who wears a robe to the class gets a warning from the teachers. An adult belching loudly is avoided. All societies follow a group action, and regulation and social control of norms. The underlying goal of group action is to keep up the social order, as practices and behaviors on which a society's members base their daily lives. Think about social order as an employee guideline and group action as a manager. Once an employee violates a work guideline, the manager steps in to enforce the principles.

Sociologists conjointly classify sanctions as formal or informal. Though stealing, a sort of social deviance, could also be illegal, there are not any laws dictating the correct sanction for picking one's nose. That doesn't mean picking your nose publically won't be punished; instead, you may encounter informal sanctions. Informal sanctions emerge in face-to-face social interactions. As an example, wearing flip-flops to an opera or

swearing loudly at a church might draw unfavorable appearance or maybe verbal reprimands, whereas behavior that's seen as positive – like serving to an old man carry grocery baggage across the road – might receive positive informal reactions, like a smile or pat at the back.

The means of implementing rules are called sanctions. Sanctions can be positive as well as negative. Positive sanctions are rewards given for compliance to norms. A promotion at work may be a positive sanction for an exhausting work. Negative sanctions are punishments for the violation of the norms. Loosing one's job may be a penalization for stealing. Each variety of sanction plays a role in a group action.

Violence, savagery, and organized crime related to drug trade are basic issues in Latin America today. What are the significant patterns that have described the development of illegal drug trafficking and organized crime (organized criminal systems or networks) in the Americas in the course of the last quarter of a century? What have been the foremost changes or adjustments – financial, political, and structural- that has occurred inside of the area's incomprehensible illicit medication economy amid the first decade of the twenty-first century? This paper distinguishes eight key patterns or examples that exemplify the progressing change of the medication exchange and the organized criminal gatherings it has brought forth as of mid-2011. They are: 1) The expanding globalization of medication utilization; 2) The constrained or "halfway triumphs" and unintended outcomes of the U.S.- driven 'war on medications,' particularly in the Andes; 3) The expansion of zones of medication development and of medication sneaking courses all through the side of the equator (purported "balloon impacts"); 4) The scattering and fracture of organized criminal gatherings or systems inside of nations and crosswise over sub-areas ("cockroach impacts"); 5) The disappointment of political change and state-building endeavors (de-institutionalization impacts); 6) The deficiencies or disappointments of U.S. local medication and crime control arrangements (request control disappointments); 7) The incapability of territorial and universal medication control strategies (administrative disappointments); and 8) The development in backing for mischief decrease and decriminalization, authorization strategy choices (legitimization debate).

Formal sanctions, on the opposite hand, are ways in which to formally acknowledge and enforce norm violations. If a student violates her college's code of conduct, as an example, she may be expelled. Somebody who speaks unsuitably to the boss can be fired. Somebody who commits against the law could be arrested. On the positive aspect, a soldier who saves a life might receive a positive commendation.

The table below shows the link between differing types of sanctions.

*Table 2.7 - Informal/Formal Sanctions*

	<b>Informal</b>	<b>Formal</b>
<b>Positive</b>	An expression of thanks	A promotion at work
<b>Negative</b>	An angry comment	A parking fine

Formal and informal sanctions could also be positive or negative. Informal sanctions arise in social interactions, whereas formal sanctions formally enforce norms.

Why does deviance occur? Does it have an effect on a society? Since the first days of social science, students have developed theories making an attempt to clarify what deviance and crime mean to society.


### **2.3.2. Social disorganization theory**

Developed by the researchers at the University of Chicago within the Twenties and Thirties, social disorganization theory asserts that crime is possibly to occur in communities with weak social ties and therefore the absence of group action. An individual who grows up in a very poor neighborhood with high rates of drug use, violence, adolescent delinquency, and disadvantaged parenting is more possible to become a criminal than an individual from a rich neighborhood with an honest establishment and families who are concerned absolutely within the community.

Social disorganization theory points to broad social factors for the reasons behind deviance. Someone isn't born a criminal, however becomes one over time, typically

supported by factors in his or her social setting. Analysis into social disorganization theory will greatly influence public policy. For example, studies have found that kids from underprivileged communities who attend educational institution programs that teach basic social skills are considerably less prone to get involved in criminal activity.

States determine the structure or the sort of organized crime that can work and prosper inside of a given national domain. Criminal associations, interestingly, don't determine the kind of state, despite the fact that they unquestionably can hinder or repress political change endeavors at all levels of a political framework. Vote based industrialized countries – from the United States to Europe to Japan – display wide varieties in the sorts of organized crime they create and/or endure. The United States, for instance, has dispensed with the Italian mafia show and seen it supplanted by divided and generally scattered household criminal associations, numerous partnered with settler groups. Europe is portrayed by a comparable development of organized crime gatherings partnered with outsider populaces. Japan, interestingly, has existed together with the Yakuza, a more corporate-style criminal system. In China, state free enterprise exists together with the Chinese triads and other criminal associations. In Russia, the Putin government, subordinated and consolidated different components of the Russian mafia as para-state organizations. (Bagley, 2004, s. 260-300)



### 2.3.3. Crime and socio-economic class

While crime is usually related to the deprived, crimes committed by the rich and powerful stay under-punished and costly among societies. The Federal Bureau of

Investigation reported that victims of felony, larceny, and motorized vehicle stealing has caused a loss of a total of \$15.3 billion dollars in 2009 (FBI 2010). Once Bernie Madoff was in remission in 2008, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission reported that the calculable losses of his money in Ponzi scheme fraud were near \$50 billion (SEC 2009).

This imbalance supported category power is additionally found inside American legal code. Within the 1980s, the utilization of crack hard drug (cocaine in its purest form) quickly became an endemic sweeping the country's poorest urban communities. Its pricier counterpart, cocaine, was related to upmarket users and was a drug of alternative for the rich. The legal implications of being caught by authorities with crack versus hard drug were completely different. In 1986, the federal law mandated that being caught in possession of fifty grams of crack was punishable by a 10-year jail sentence. The same jail sentence for hard drug possession, however, needed possession of 5,000 grams. In different words, the sentencing inequality was one to a hundred (New dynasty Times Editorial employees 2011). This difference within the severity of social control for crack versus hard drug paralleled the unequal classes of individual users. A conflict theorizer would note that those in society who hold the resources also are those who build the laws regarding crime. They create laws for their own benefit, whereas the ineffectual categories who lack the resources to create such choices suffer the results. The crack-cocaine social control inequality remained effective till 2010, when President Obama signed the honest Sentencing Act that shrunk the inequality to one to eighteen (The Sentencing Project 2010).

#### **2.3.4. Symbolic Interactionism**

Symbolic interactionism could be a theoretical approach, which explains how societies and/or social segments develop a self-reflection on their behaviors as deviant or standard. Labeling theory, differential association, social disorganization theory, and management theory fall inside the realm of symbolic interactionism.

Sometimes, in additional extreme cases, primary deviance will morph into secondary deviance. Secondary deviance happens once a person's self-concept and behavior begin to alter, once his or her actions are labeled as deviant by members of a society.



Although all people violate norms from time to time, few individuals would think about themselves as deviant. Those that do, however, have typically been labeled “deviant” by the society and have gradually started to believe it themselves. Labeling theory examines the ascribing of a deviant behavior to a different person by members of a society. Thus, what is considered as deviant is set not such a lot by the behaviors themselves or the ones who commit them, however by the reactions of others to those behaviors. As a result, what is considered as deviant changes over time and may vary considerably across cultures.

Sociologist Lemert dilated on the ideas of the labeling theory, distinguishing two styles of deviance that have an effect on identity formation. Primary deviance could be a violation of norms that doesn't end in any semi-permanent effects on the individual's self-image or interactions with others. Rushing could be a deviant act, however receiving a ticket typically doesn't lead others to read you as a foul person, nor will it alter your own self-concept. People who are involved in primary deviance still maintain a sense of happiness in society and are still possible to adjust to norms in the future.

The person could begin to require on and fulfill the role of a “deviant” as an act of rebellion against the society that has labeled that individual intrinsically. For instance, think about a high school student who typically gets into fights. The student is punished often by the teachers, and shortly enough, he is labeled as a “troublemaker.” As a result, the student starts acting out even more, breaking a lot of rules; he has adopted the “troublemaker” label and embraced this deviant identity. Secondary deviance functions as such. Some individuals see themselves primarily as doctors, artists, or grandfathers. Others see themselves as beggars, convicts, or addicts.

### **2.3.5. Types of Crimes**

Not all crimes are given equal weight. Society typically socializes its members to look at some crimes as more severe than others. For instance, the majority would think that murdering somebody is much worse than stealing a wallet and would expect a slayer to be punished more severely than a burglar. In the Yankee society, crimes are classified into 2 according to their severity. Violent crimes (also called “crimes against a person”) involves the utilization of force or threat of force. Rape, murder, and holdup make up

this class. Nonviolent crimes involve the destruction or stealing of property, however don't use force or the threat of force. Owing to this, they're conjointly generally known as "property crimes." Larceny, car theft, and deviltry are all kinds of nonviolent crimes. If you use a pry to get into an automotive, you're committing a nonviolent crime; if you mug somebody with the pry, you're committing a violent crime.

When we consider crime, we regularly visualize street crime, or offenses committed by standard individuals against people or organizations, typically publically areas. A typically unnoted class is company crime, or crime committed by clerical employees in business surroundings. Peculation, trading, and fraud are all kinds of company crimes. Although these styles of offenses seldom receive constant quantity of media coverage as street crimes, they will be way more damaging. Economic recession results due to the money loss triggered by the company crime.

An often-debated third sort of crime is law-breaking. These are known as victimless, since the wrongdoer isn't expressly harming another person. Battery or stealing clearly have a victim; on the other hand the laws like drinking a brew at age twenty or marketing a sexual act that doesn't end in injury to anyone apart from the individual who engages in them are less critical. While some claim acts like these are victimless, others argue that they really do hurt the society. Whoredom could foster abuse toward women by their clients or pimps. Drug use could increase the chance of employee absences. Such debates highlight how the deviant and criminal nature of actions develops through the current give-and-take.

#### **2.3.6. Hate Crimes**

On the evening of October 3, 2010, a 17-year-old boy from a borough was kidnapped by a gaggle of young men from his neighborhood and brought to an abandoned house. Once being overwhelmed, the boy admitted he was gay. His attackers taken over his partner and beat him likewise. Each victim were intoxicated, sodomized, and compelled to burn each other with cigarettes. Once questioned by the police, the instigator of the crime explained that the victims were gay and "looked like [they] likeable it" (Wilson and Baker 2010).

Attacks against a person's race, religion, or different characteristics are called hate crimes. Hate crimes within the US evolved from the time of early European settlers and their violence toward Native Americans. Such crimes weren't investigated till the first decade, once the Ku Klux Klan began to draw national attention for its activities against blacks and different groups. The term "hate crime," however, didn't become official till the 1980s (Federal Bureau of Investigations 2011).

An average of 195,000 Americans fall victim to hate crimes annually, however fewer than 5 percent report the crime (FBI 2010). The bulk of hate crimes are racially actuated, however several are based on non secular (especially anti-Semitic) prejudice (FBI 2010). Since the incidents like the murder of Matthew Shepard in Wyoming in 1998 and the tragic suicide of Rutgers college boy Tyler Clementi in 2010, there has been a growing awareness of hate crimes against sexual orientation.

#### **2.4. CRIME RATES OF SAO PAULO AND RIO DE JANEIRO**

Crime and violence became further prevailing in Brazil since their marked increase in the 1980s, primarily in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, and in the 1990s in alternative large cities like Belo Horizonte. Though town of São Paulo has witnessed a sharp reduction in killing rates in recent years (Goertzel and Khan 2009), violent crimes, particularly property crimes, still have extraordinarily high levels. Not only the media, but also the official statistics have incontestably put forward that criminality has risen significantly in large cities in recent years. Whereas within the us in the 1970s and 1980s, the general public pointed out crime as one of the foremost severe social issues. In Brazil a survey conducted by the Confederação Nacional dos Transportes in 2010 showed that nearly 23 % of the Brazilians cited urban violence as the major social drawback to be tackled, followed by the matter of drugs (21.2 percent) and unemployment (19 percent) (CNT/SENSUS, 2010). Recent analyses have confirmed the increase of victims in urban centers (Beato, Peixoto, and Andrade 2004).

This reality is obvious with the observation that almost all people lock their homes, have made high walls and built up all of the methods of home security. Today, within the giant urban centers, the house has become the most effective model of a fort that one will imagine (Paixão 1991; Caldeira 2000). This generalized concern has created several

Brazilians prisoners in their own homes, leading to social behaviors of suspicion and isolation (Silva and Beato Filho 2013).

In Brazilian society, increasing crime has conjointly fostered the demand by civil society for a defined peace policy. This Brazilian example is not new; alternative countries have confronted similar drawbacks. Once adopted, primarily in less developed countries, such public policies haven't been guided by systematic studies on crime, neither have adequate follow-ups on the enforced policies have occurred. The US and England are exceptions. There, scholars are discussing the origins of crime for a protracted time, and also anti-crime policies that have been adopted are based on criminological theories and criminal analyses.

In contemporary criminology, a crucial tradition of studies has shown the existence of geographic patterns of crime. The prevalence of crimes and further concentration of criminals and victims follow patterns that manifest themselves otherwise in space and time (Beato 2012; Bursik and Webb 1982; Brantingham and Brantingham 1981; Sherman, Gartin, and Buerguer 1989). The proof of the spatial-temporal distribution of urban crime has driven research not solely to prove the existence of those patterns, but basically to recognize the processes that produce them. Thus, the controversy on the development of crime has emanated from approaches that emphasize physical or psychological aspects, like genetic abnormalities or personal predispositions, to structural levels of clarification. These studies determine bound properties of community structures as determinants of patterns of crime distribution that successively characterize some places or neighborhoods as violent and dangerous.

Ecological studies are among those trying to associate the structural characteristics of neighborhoods with the prevalence of crimes. The concentration of a particular economic status, urban segregation, and residential instability are, consistent with these studies, elements that are ecologically targeted and powerfully correlated to the development of crime.

One of the foremost ecological approaches in social sciences to the study of crime and delinquency originates from the analysis of the Chicago School, specifically in the works of Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay (1942). They investigated the link

between the social system of neighborhoods (or communities) and also the methods of growth of enormous cities. Above all, these scholars inquired why high rates of delinquency had persisted in bound areas for several years, independent of the changes within the composition of the population. Consistent with their theory, crime appeared in communities characterized by social disorganization and was perpetuated through a method of cultural transmission whereby the traditions were passed from generation to generation.

Shaw and McKay affirmed that three structural factors — low socio-economic standing, ethnic non-uniformity, and residential mobility — disrupt a community's social structure that successively explain the special variations in crime rates and delinquency. Therefore, the community, treated as a tiny low space within the interior of the urban area, became the unit of research for the environmental social scientists aspiring to explore the causes of crime in large cities.

From the 1950s till the 1980s, social disorganization theory was the target of considerable criticism, leading to its abandonment as a viable clarification for empirical studies of crime. These criticisms were targeted on the utility and capability of the macro-level interpretation, the assumed stability within the standards of urban land use, and also the measure of social disorganization as a construct independent of that construct's outcome (Veysey and Messner 1999).

However, social disorganization theory has received attention from researchers in recent decades with the advance of computer-based applied mathematics techniques, new methodologies and theoretical approaches. Around the end of the 1980s, Robert J. Sampson and W. Byron Groves followed the principles and logic of the first theory of Shaw and McKay while developing their work regarding the ecology of crime to construct a theoretical clarification of crime at the community level. Sampson and Groves (1989) tested the mediating impact of what they called as the “intervening dimensions of social disorganization” in relevance to the structural characteristics of the community, or “exogenous sources of social disorganization” and crime rates. For Sampson and Groves, the structural characteristics of a community, like urbanization and the degree of family disruption, have a negative effect on the capability of the community to impose informal and formal controls on its members and outsiders. This

inability to exert group action is reflected as direct indicators of social disorganization, and the lack of relationship networks, involvement in organizations, and also the management of adolescent peer teams. A decline in the mechanisms of group action and, consequently, an increase in social disorganization lead to high crime rates. Social disorganization, in this case, emphasizes the shortcomings of “a community structure to understand common values of its residents and to stay the effective social control” (Sampson and Groves 1989, 777). This ends up in weakened social bonds, poor control, and restricted institutional capability to access external resources (Berry and Kasarda 1977). Since then, many studies have pursued to check the instructive power of the idea of social disorganization in varied urban contexts. For Bursik and Grasmick (1993), the area people or neighborhood ought to be understood as an exclusive relative system created with family and friends further as formal and informal associative ties shaped through the socialization method prevalent within the neighborhood. In this regard, variations within the ability of neighborhoods to manage and to control themselves make a case for the differential rates of criminal behavior and victimization among different neighborhoods.

Revealing that the main deficiency of the first model of social disorganization theory is its failure to consider the role of the general public sphere of local management, Bursik and Grasmick propose a general theory in which, lower levels of crime and violence are argued to stem from larger effectiveness of a community to barter with external agencies, like the police or town officials. It is these inter-institutional connections that are successively capable of maximizing choices taken internally by the local residents (Bursick and Grasmick 1993; Sampson 2012).

Along this same line of reasoning, Sampson and his colleagues developed a brand new theoretical approach in which local group action depends on the amount of the ability of “collective efficacy” to resolve the community issues (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997). The essential premise of this idea is that social and structural characteristics of neighborhoods make a case for variations in crime rates that ought not to be attributed solely to the communal demographic characteristics of the residents. Indeed, the lowest crime rates would be the results of neighborhood environments in which the residents share common values and occasionally act together to regulate local activities. Higher

levels of informal group action of the neighborhood are exercised if there is larger social cohesion and trust among its residents, that is, further collective efficacy. Thus, collective efficacy may be a resource existing among communities in different levels, and it is activated at the crucial and specific moment of group action.

Furthermore, it is vital to notice that collective efficacy is indeed a way to build up individual properties. The theoretical orientation of the concept is based on the idea that shared expectations for action is probably activated to perform specific tasks in conditions of mutual trust and social cohesion. Within a community context, where the principles are unclear and external resources capable of supporting the community are lacking, the likelihood of finding individuals susceptible to intervene is the lowest. Thus, this might result in the emergence of what Elliott and colleagues (1996) called “illegitimate chance structures and dysfunctional lifestyles” or in other words, the street university for “alternative activity strategies” (Cohen and Machaleck 1988), with low capability for exercising effective collective local management.

The Federative Republic of Brazil consists of 1 Federal District and 26 states.<sup>22</sup> Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro represent the two largest cities in the country. The largest city in Brazil is Sao Paulo according to the Brazilian Geography and Statistics Institution (IBGE).<sup>23</sup> According to the 2014 official census, the city's population is 11.895.893.<sup>24</sup> However, it is estimated to be between 15-22 million with the suburbs included.<sup>25</sup> The statistics of the same institution states that the population of Rio de Janeiro is 6,453,682, which gives Rio the status of the second largest city of Brazil.

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23 IBGE, n.d. <http://www.ibge.gov.br> [accessed 20 July 2015]

24 IBGE, 2014. São Paulo. *IBGE*, [online], <http://cidades.ibge.gov.br/xtras/perfil.php?lang=&codmun=355030&search=sao-paulo|sao-paulo> [accessed 25 July 2015].

25 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Sao Paulo Başkonsolosluğu, n.d. <http://saopaulo.bk.mfa.gov.tr/> [accessed 25 July 2015].

Figure 2.8 - Population of Sao Paulo - Population of Sao Paulo



Estimated Population 2014 <sup>(1)</sup>	11.895.893
Population 2010	11.253.503
Area of the territorial unit	1.521,110

Figure 2.9 - Population of Rio de Janeiro - Population of Rio de Janeiro



Estimated Population 2014 <sup>(1)</sup>	6.453.682
Population 2010	6.320.446
Area of the territorial unit	1.197,463

Source: IBGE (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics)<sup>26</sup>

26 IBGE, 2014. Rio de Janeiro. IBGE, [online], <http://cidades.ibge.gov.br/xtras/perfil.php?lang=&codmun=330455&search=rio-de-janeiro|rio-de-janeiro> [accessed 25 July 2015].



Table 2.8 - Rio de Janeiro - Rio de Janeiro – Poverty and Inequality - 2003

Rio de Janeiro - Map of Poverty and Inequality - 2003 /	
Incidence of Poverty 23	85;%
Lower limit Poverty Incidence: 17	69;%
Upper limit Poverty Incidence, 30	01;%
Subjective incidence of poverty; 10	71;%
Lower limit of the incidence of Subjective Poverty 9	34;%
Upper limit Incidence of Subjective Poverty 12	08;%
Gini index: 0	48;
Lower limit of the Gini Index; 0	46;
Upper limit of the Gini Index; 0	50;

Source : <http://cidades.ibge.gov.br><sup>27</sup>

Table 2.9 - Sao Paulo – Poverty and Inequality - 2003


Sao Paulo - Map of Poverty and Inequality - 2003	
Incidence of Poverty 28	09;%
Lower limit Poverty Incidence: 26	16;%
Upper limit Poverty Incidence, 30	02;%
Subjective incidence of poverty; 10	60;%
Lower limit of the incidence of Subjective Poverty 10	08;%
Upper limit Incidence of Subjective Poverty 11	13;%
Gini index: 0	45;
Lower limit of the Gini Index; 0	43;
Upper limit of the Gini Index; 0	46;

Source: <http://cidades.ibge.gov.br><sup>28</sup>

27 IBGE, 2014. Cidades. *IBGE*, [online], <http://cidades.ibge.gov.br/> [accessed 25 July 2015].

28 Ibid

Figure 2.10 - Poverty reduction in Rio de Janeiro



Source: Smith 2013<sup>29</sup>

The rate of poverty in Rio de Janeiro as well as in Brazil has gone through a significant decrease in the period between 1993 and 2011. In 1993, nearly 34 % of the population in Rio de Janeiro lived below the poverty threshold, living with less than \$140 per month. In 2011, this proportion of the population has dropped nearly to 15%.

According to the European Commission's country strategy paper, Brazil has a well-developed and politically stabilized democracy and an institutional system. BHowever, there are still some problems regarding the governance of human rights individuals'

29 Smith, D. A (2013) Rio de Janeiro: a City in Transformation [online] <http://citygeographics.org/2013/11/04/rio-de-janeiro-a-city-in-transformation/> [accessed 27 August 2015].

security issues. One of the challenges that is stated here is violence, specifically serious in big cities and more often related with illegal drug trafficking and social exclusion.<sup>30</sup>

Sao Paulo is one of the principal industrial and finance centers of Brazil. The city attracted many immigrants from poorer areas. The population of the city increased gradually and this has caused irregular growth and social division.<sup>31</sup> São Paulo is challenged by the harmful impacts of illegal drug trafficking.<sup>32</sup> According to a UNESCO research, drug dealers are responsible for an increase in violence within the drug market. The research results show that between 12% and 15% of homicides are directly related to trafficking.<sup>33</sup>

From the beginning of the republic to 1960, Rio de Janeiro has changed in both economic and social terms. Since 1920, the city has started to become an important business center with a population of more than one million people. The population grew to nearly two million people in 1940. The state could no longer control the growth of high-rise buildings and big buildings replaced houses and small buildings.<sup>34</sup> The poorest segments of the population were pushed to live outside the city center. The politicians were forced to invest in the interior part of the country, which eventually led to the establishment of Brasilia, the city that replaced Rio as the nationwide capital in 1960.<sup>35</sup>

Meanwhile Rio continued to be an important center of political affairs, art, music, and literature, and commerce. Especially the Copacabana and Ipanema were among the most desirable destinations of the world. This created plentiful of opportunities for the city in comparison to other cities and places in the country. Rio continued to grow, while more Brazilians without work or education continued to migrate into the city. Because of this irregular growth, they built large slum neighborhoods that contributed to the grave social problems that continue to affect the city to this day. Rio continues to

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30 European Commission, 2007. Brazil: Country strategy paper. *EEAS*, [online], [http://eeas.europa.eu/brazil/csp/07\\_13\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/brazil/csp/07_13_en.pdf) [accessed 22 July 2015].

31 UNESCO, n.d. <http://www.unesco.org>, [accessed on 7 July 2015]

32 OSAC, n.d. <https://www.osac.gov> [accessed 10 July 2015]


33 <http://www.unesco.org>, [accessed on 9 July 2015]

34 Questia, n.d. [www.questia.com](http://www.questia.com) [accessed 9 July 2015].

35 Encyclopedia.com, n.d. Brazil, cities of the world. [online], <http://www.encyclopedia.com/> [accessed 1 May 2015].

face increasingly serious urban challenges because of criminality, overpopulation, and pollution.

Figure 2.11 - Violent Crimes in Rio de Janeiro



Source: Rio de Janeiro Department of Public Safety

Table 2.10 - Evolution of the Gini Index According to the Federation unit's from 1985 to 2006

Federal Units	Evolution of the Gini Index		
	1985	1995	2006
Rio de Janeiro	0,815	0,79	0,798
Sao Paulo	0,77	0,758	0,804

Source: IBGE

In general, Brazil has a high level of income inequality according to the Gini index. This is reflected in Rio de Janeiro as well as Sao Paulo, which also has a high level of income inequality. While Rio de Janeiro has witnessed a slight decrease in poverty in the period between 1985 and 2006, has Sao Paulo also witnessed a slight decrease in the same period. Nevertheless, the levels of income inequality remain high in both cities.

The picture becomes more clear when Gini index of monthly income distribution for all type of jobs for the people who are 15 years old and over in the period between 2011 and 2012 is taken into consideration as shown in Table 2.2.4.

*Table 2.11 - Gini Index from 2011 to 2012*

Cities	Gini index of Monthly income distribution all type of jobs for the people who are 15 years old and over		
	Gini index is a measurement of the income distribution of a country's residents. Numbers, which ranges between 0 and 1 and is based on residents' net income, helps define the gap between the rich and the poor. 0 represents perfect equality, 1 represents perfect inequality. <sup>36</sup>		
	Total	Men	Women
Rio de Janeiro	0,485	0,484	0,469
Sao Paulo	0,468	0,466	0,446

Source: <ftp://ftp.ibge.gov.br>

*Table 2.12 - Population of Subnormal Areas in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro*

Metropolitan Region	Population of Subnormal areas (slums and others)	Proportion in the total Population
Sao Paulo	2.162,368	11%
Rio de Janeiro	1.702.073	14.4%

Source: <http://exame.abril.com.br><sup>37</sup>

As displayed in above table the percentage of the population who lives in slums represents more than one tenth of the population in both cities.

<sup>36</sup> Investopedia, 2015. <http://www.investopedia.com/> [accessed 25 July 2015].

<sup>37</sup> Moreira, D., 2011. São Paulo é metrópole com mais moradores de favelas do Brasil, segundo o IBGE. Exame, [online], <http://exame.abril.com.br/brasil/noticias/sao-paulo-e-metropole-com-mais-moradores-de-favelas-do-brasil-segundo-o-ibge> [accessed 25 July 2015]. Hala yanlışlıkla pazar yazmışım, pazartesi 14'e kadar demek istemişti.

More than a fifth of the population of Rio de Janeiro, 22.03% of the 6,323,037 inhabitants, live in favelas. In 2010, there were 763 favelas. With 1,393,314 inhabitants living in favelas, Rio de Janeiro was on the top of the list of Brazilian cities, which has the highest number of people living in favelas. For comparison, the city of Sao Paulo has 1,280,400 inhabitants living in favelas.

## **2.5. THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF THE FAVELAS AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON DRUG USE AND TRAFFICKING**

The first slums, known as favelas, were built by military veterans in 1898. They build their own wooden houses on the hillside. It was just an urban housing for people until 1940 (Gay2005, p.17). The differentiation, diversification and the gap between rich and poor structure of the country pushed the weak ones to the peripheries of the society. Under these circumstances, people created their shelters, which were called favela in Brazil. This was the place where former slaves with no land and no work resided. Many former black slaves moved to favelas over the years. Most of them were illegal settlements and generally the favelas were built close to the factories or on the hills (McCann2008, p.54). The “divided city” approach argues that since the mid-1980s, favelas, as a result of varied and complex forms of state policy failure, have emerged as “feudal” fortresses of criminal dominance set apart from the rest of the city (Arias 2006). Deficiency and disproportion always have been among the most serious problems that societies suffer. The impacts of irregular growth led to poor inhabitants being pushed away from the city and to live in the far environs, thereby increasing interest in favelas.

The many housing projects, which had been built during the height of the industrial development, were unable to engross the flow of immigrants who arrived in search of formal employment and associated benefits. Large numbers of undocumented families were left with few services and little hope.

People living in Rio’s favelas and the Brazilian privileged class had no relationship with one another. For the urban elite, the favelas is a risk to their developing or modernizing missions. Politicians however used the favelas to get votes during elections.

According to a data published in December 2011 by the IBGE (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics) in 2010, about 6.9 percent of the people lived in favelas in Brazil. While the population of the favelas within the population of Rio had a share of 7.24% in the year 1950, it has reached a ratio of 18.66% between the years 1990-2000 . When the statistics in the charter observed, one can understand that the favela population appears within the Rio population with an increasing ratio by years. The population of Rio was 2,337,451 in 1950. The population of Rio reached 5,857,879 between the years 1990-2000. The population growth rate between the two periods is 150.6%. The favela population in Rio was 169,305 in the year 1950. The favela population reached 1,092,958 between the years 1990-2000. The population growth rate between the two periods is 545.55%. When these rates are taken into consideration, the population of Rio increased by 150.6% between 1950 and the 1990-2000 period, while the population of the FAVELAS increased by 545.55% in the same period. These rates show us that the favela population in Rio, which is one of the largest cities of Brazil, has increased at an enormously high rate.

Clearly, along with the city's population growth rate, the population living in the favelas has increased substantially. It is possible to see from these charts and rates that rapid urbanization carries along very important social and economic problems. Approximately 20% of Rio's population has been living at favelas.<sup>38</sup> When looking at this complex history, it is clear that the Brazilian state and the powerful members of the society have sought ways to exploit the labor of mainly non-white, poor people while at the same time, devoting relatively few resources to their social wellbeing or even, for that matter, their policing. This has resulted in the development of an extensive system of irregular and informal housing that includes favelas.

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38 *Favelas of Brazil: The boundary between wealth and poverty.* 2013. <http://www.bubblews.com/news/816593-favelas-of-brazil-the-boundary-between-wealth-and-poverty> [accessed on 15 March 2015]

Table 2.13 - Favela Grow Faster than City of Rio

TABLE 2.4 Favelas Grow Faster than City of Rio

Year	Population of favelas (a)	Total population of Rio (b)	a/b (%)	Favela growth rate by decade (%)	Rio growth rate by decade (%)
1950	169,305	2,337,451	7.24	-	-
1950-60	337,412	3,307,163	10.20	99.3	41.5
1960-70	563,970	4,251,918	13.26	67.1	28.6
1970-80	628,170	5,093,232	12.33	11.4	19.8
1980-90	882,483	5,480,778	16.10	40.5	7.6
1990-2000	1,092,958	5,857,879	18.66	23.9	6.9

From 2000-2005 favelas grew six times more than nonfavelas.

Source: IBGE (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics), 2000, IPP (2008-09)

Source: IBGE 2000

Table 2. Error! No sequence specified. - Favela growth rates in Rio from 1950 to 2000

Source: IBGE (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics), 2000

There is a close relationship between the favelas and the illegal drug market. Favelas are known especially as a center of hiding places for drug traffickers and they are also the centers, where they conduct their drug operations. The geographical location of the favelas, which are located on hillsides that are very steep, makes them perfect places for hiding drugs and illegal arms (Arias 2009, p.32).

Favelas often have witnessed clashes between police and drug gangs. The traffickers' relations with politicians and favelas' residents and their hierarchical status are very unclear (Arias 2006). Traffickers may possess relatively high status among some favela residents, but other favela residents may view traffickers as a problem and see them as having a lower status. The drug trades in the favelas are dominated by mostly young and poor non-white individuals who are the public faces of the criminal gangs located in them. According to Arias (2006), the gangs have their own specific organizational structure, which is highly dependent on the current political and economic dynamics. On the top of the organizational structure are the so-called "*chefe de seguraca*" who represent security chiefs, accountants, as well as managers of the sales of cocaine and marihuana. The lower levels of the gang are comprised of the dealers themselves, the so-called soldiers, carriers, who transport the drugs to the drug users which are located outside the favelas, while the lowest level of the gang is comprised of the so-called



lookouts who are mostly children as young as ten (Arias 2006, p.32). Leadership fights between criminal organizations in the favelas often leads to long-term conflicts. To reduce the criminal organization in the favelas, governments try to provide different alternatives to solve the problem, but none of them has worked effectively.<sup>39</sup>

Brazilian government still fights with criminal groups and try to find alternative solutions to clean them. One of them is the Pacifying Police Unit (UPP). These units work to finish the criminal groups that are in and around favelas. It is first started in Santa Marta favela and continued with the others. It has to be noted that in Rio de Janeiro, the rate of both homicides and robberies significantly decreased since 2009 with an average drop of 15% in the period from the middle of 2009 to the middle of 2011. The decrease of homicides on the average from 10% to 25 % and for robberies from 10% to 20 % was associated with the increased presence of the Pacifying Police Unit program.<sup>40</sup> Furthermore, in the period between 2008 until the middle of 2011, the Pacifying Police Unit program was related to 15% growth of the prices in the formal property markets in Rio de Janeiro, which was also related to the effect of the program in the crime reduction in the city.<sup>41</sup>

*Figure 2.12 - Slum Areas in Rio de Janeiro / Favela (2013)*

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39 Ashcroft, P., 2014. History of Rio de Janeiro's military police part 4: Pacifying police units. *Rioonwatch*, [online], <http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=14728> [accessed 25 March 2015].

40 Journalist resource (2013). Crime, house prices and inequality: Examining Rio de Janeiro's favelas [online] <http://journalistsresource.org/studies/international/development/crime-house-prices-inequality-upps-rio-favelas> [accessed on 28 April 2015]

41 *ibid*




*Source: Veríssimo, A. A. (2013)<sup>42</sup>*

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42 Veríssimo, A. A. (2013). Four Decades of Urbanization of Slums in Rio de Janeiro [online] <https://lsecities.net/media/objects/articles/four-decades-of-urbanization-of-slums-in-rio-de-janeiro/en-gb/> [accessed on 28 April 2015]

Figure 2.13 - Slum Areas in Sao Paulo / Favelas (2010)



Source: Sertich (2010)<sup>43</sup>

### 2.5.1. Crime and Violence in Urban Areas

The cities, in their classical conception, were created exactly for the protection of its inhabitants who found there an area for shelter and liberty outside the provincial feudalism. The evolution of the concept of citizenship, economic rationality, a universalistic legislation, and new ways of association among people emerged as the

43 Sertich, Adriana Navarro (2010). Brief Overview of SP's Urbanization [online]. <http://favelissues.com/2010/03/01/brief-overview-of-sps-urbanization/> [Accessed on 28 August 2015]

cities went on to develop (Weber, 1978. Durkheim, 1978). Yet, the current development of metropolitans is linked to crime and angst, which limit the freedom of its citizens and erode their sense of safety (Davis, 1998).

Some authors believe that the cities are not accountable for the crimes that occur in them, being solely a stage for the social relations – which should rather be held responsible for violence (Freitag, 2002). This argument fails to grasp the whole picture by neglecting not only the multiple ways in which these relations occur within the urban context, but also the environmental influences on different forms of violence. The urban configuration is the central aspect of the social disorganization of communities and places (Shaw e McKay, 1942), of the structure of opportunities for offenses to occur (Cohen e Felson, 1979), and of the formal and informal housing market as an encouraging force for many varieties of violent crime and in self-acting capability (Bottoms and Wiles, 1997).

Examining the combination of crime rates in geographic areas has aimed to elucidate the variation in violent crime rates among many cities, metropolitan areas, states or countries (Bailey, 1984; Blau and Blau, 1982; Land et al., 1990; Schuerman and Solomon, 1986. Fajnzylber, Lederman e Loayza. 1998). Results have shown that variables like the degree of economic difference, population structure, comprising total population, demographic density and rates of unemployment are considerably associated with and correlated to homicides.

Contrary to these considerably combined approaches, new spatial-analysis techniques and computers that can analyze large data have enabled the understanding of facts associated with urban area, a development that facilitates the pursuit of explanations in urban areas with a level of details inconceivable before. Reminding the Chicago School tradition, a considerable number of recent studies are trying to grasp the context dynamics of urban communities so as to understand crime and violence. Hence, communities and social and time dynamics became the main target of these studies (Sampson, 2002. Abott, 1997). Going back to the the Chicago School tradition is caused to a great extent by the ecological concentration of socio-economic resources and by the mechanisms of geographical segregation and crime concentration.

The crime-cause ecologic model attempts to understand violence's many-sided nature and to diagnose factors that influence behavior and thus, increase the chances for a person to be a criminal or a victim of violence. Ecologic analysis of crime distribution in urban centers raises theoretical and practical questions. In practice, there's the question why some neighborhoods and locations of a city have high crime rates. It is often the explosion of crime in urban centers that is talked about. However, to call it implosion would be more accurate, as both the criminals and the victims belong to the same part of the city. A time-honored interpretation of this development is to credit to drug traffic (Zaluar, 1984; 1997. Beato et al, 2001).

Indeed, many varieties of association between predatory crime and drugs were studied in the literature. They are rather common topics, like the affinity between drug use and an inclination to commit crime, ways of dependency financing, manners to deal with extra-legal conflicts and also the demand for costly weapons for such aims (Johnson et al., 1990).

Theoretically, the literature discussing the hypothesis of social disorganization links this larger incidence to socio-economic characteristics of the communities, cities, boroughs and neighborhoods (Shaw and McKay, 1942. Park e Burgess, 1924. Bursik, 1986) or to "collective efficiency" in managing the behavior of their inhabitants (Sampson, 1997). In fact, this cause and effect mechanism is not direct, yet caused by the reality that areas with higher relative and absolute privation are adaptable to higher mobility and demographic diversity, weakening accustomed bonds of group control and, so increasing the crime rates. However, empirical studies show places in a city with high crime rates not solely as a result of the characteristics of their populations. There is another factor associated with environmental characteristics, which may favor this incidence of criminal activities. The impact of boroughs and neighborhoods exceeds the established characteristics associated with poverty concentration and focuses on aspects like institutional mechanisms as well as the interaction processes among people. Social bonds, trust, institutional resources, disorder and routine activities are highlighted as dimensions that elucidate the concentration of violence and crime (Sampson et al, 2002).

As a result of this highlight and as an antithesis to approaches that deal solely with individual or social-group characteristics, analysis methods were developed to manage the geographical distribution of crimes and contexts of opportunities for criminal actions. These are the characteristics of community and urban areas in which crimes occur that should be examined. Attention is drawn to the fact that some communities are still troubled with high crime rates, despite substantive changes in the social and cultural characteristics of their residents (Reiss, 1986). The significance of socio-economic background factors is not being denied as components that may make people inclined to crime. Yet, they refer to only one component characterizing the context of criminal activity. The others are related to the convenience of targets for criminal action, the absence of management and vigilance mechanisms in addition to institutional and interactive mechanisms (Cohen and Felson, 1979). The dominant strategy has privileged socio-demographic analysis as well as the social characteristics of groups of people in the cities, with special attention to the poverty concentration (Wilson, 1987). The comparison of communities of diverse strata will provide leads and hints on mechanisms and resources to regulate geographic areas and locations. Romantic exercises regarding “civic culture” or “social capital” are of very little importance, unless conditions are rendered clear through which the social cohesion of communities is effectively converted into management of the place where their residents live (Sampson, 2002). Paradoxically, this cohesion is not constantly translated into management mechanisms and resource mobilization in favor of the community (Wilson, 1987). Poor communities are able to develop interaction mechanisms within the neighborhood that do not essentially translate into collective efficiency (Zilli, 2004. Silva, 2004).

Transitions from tyrant administrations to more open and majority rule types of administrations in Latin America, as in the cases of Russia and Eastern Europe, are especially hazardous, in the light of the fact that the old, tyrant institutional controls that are usually dropped or cleared away can not be effortlessly or immediately supplanted by new, equitable types of control in any development in the short term. Mexico is currently encountering such a transition. The old organizations – police, courts, jails, intelligence offices, gatherings, and decisions – no more function. Without a doubt, they are clearly degenerate and broken. In time, couple of new institutional elements were

built to supplant them. Additionally, endeavors for change can be, and frequently have been, hindered or crashed completely by institutional corruption and criminal roughness reaches to utmost or undermines state power and the principles of law. There absolutely were huge institutional changes proposed or in progress in Mexico towards the end of the Felipe Calderón's 2006-2012 term, yet there is little question that such changes have not come sufficiently quick nor have they been adequately comprehensive to restrict drug trafficking, criminal associations and related brutality and corruption in Mexico. Such perceptions do not constitute contentions against democratization. Maybe, they highlight challenges and obstacles on the way to democratization that are every now and then neglected or disregarded through and through. Popularity based scholars have just recently started to genuinely look at the issues challenging majority rule transitions that stem from organized and settled criminal systems. In the nations of Latin America and the Caribbeans, such disregard of institutional change might well jeopardize both political soundness and majority rule government itself. Instead of fair union, the result of disregarding organized crime and its destructive impacts might well be institutional rotting or popularity based de-organization. Nations rising up out of such dominant inner clashes are essentially more powerless in this transition, albeit such clashes are by all account not the only source of institutional frailty.

## **2.6. DRUG TRAFFICKING**

In general, Latin America has higher rates of crime when compared to other regions in the world. According to the most recent report issued by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Latin America records around 100,000 homicides per year. Latin America is the only region in the world where homicides increased between 2000 and 2010.<sup>44</sup> The large part of this violence and criminality can be linked to arms and drug trafficking operations by criminal groups. According to Bureau of Justice and Statistics, in Brazil in the 1990's, homicide rates were higher than in the United States, Canada, Italy, Japan, Australia, Portugal, Britain, Australia and Germany. It is


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44 United Nations, 2013. The international drug control conventions. *UNODC*, [online], [http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND/Int\\_Drug\\_Control\\_Conventions/Ebook/The\\_International\\_Drug\\_Control\\_Conventions\\_E.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND/Int_Drug_Control_Conventions/Ebook/The_International_Drug_Control_Conventions_E.pdf) [accessed 5 May 2015].

considered that huge increase in serious crime is related to law enforcements and it is also linked to drug trafficking.<sup>45</sup>

The use and trafficking of cocaine has become very prominent in South America, especially in Brazil because of its geographical location and its large population living in urban areas.<sup>46</sup> In the mid-1980s, drug trading looked as if it was a powerful force in Rio when Andean cocaine started to flow into Rio as part of an intensification of trafficking routes to Europe and North America. The large and complex favelas and corrupt policing of these areas made them perfect places for storing cocaine in preparation for transport and shipment. Over time, a local retail market has developed and the poor drug dealers of favelas became the public faces of narcotics trade.

Figure 2.14 - Cocaine seizures in selected South American Countries



Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2012).

In the period between 2000 and 2010, there has been a large increase of cocaine seizures by the authorities in the South American countries. In 2013, the Brazilian federal polices reported that a total of 256.4 tons of drugs have been seized. More precisely, cocaine accounted for 35.7 tones, cannabis accounted for 220.7 tones, while the policed also seized a total of 80.1 million Brazilian coins of property of drug traffickers. In

45 Bureau of Justice Statistics, <http://gb1.ojp.usdoj.gov/> [accessed on 5 April 2015]

46 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2014, p. xxi. World Drug Report 2014. New York: UNODC.



Figure 3.1 it can be observed that Brazil is at the top of the countries that have seized large quantities of cocaine.<sup>47</sup> It is believed that this increase is an indicator of the increased demand for cocaine, which is possibly export driven and is used to supply to the European drug market as well as to Brazil's domestic market as a compensation for the decrease of the cocaine production located in Columbia, which may have affected the change in the patterns of trafficking cocaine.<sup>48</sup>

Even though Brazil accepted a new drug law proposed to make a clear and definitive distinction between drug users and dealers in 2006, there is a prejudiced culture in the justice system, combined with great judicial discretion given to the authorities that lead to the classification of crimes as trafficking and resulting in increased imprisonment of addicts. So today, Brazil has the world's fourth largest imprisoned population. This shows the need for alternatives in dealing with violence and crime, particularly when related to drug use.

Drug trafficking and arms trafficking are linked in Brazil. The Brazilian non-governmental organization Viva Rio conducted a national mapping and found that 50% of the weapons circulating in Brazil today are illegal. According to the estimates of Viva Comunidade, there are between 7.6 million and 10.7 million illegal firearms in circulation in Brazil (Miraglia 2014). An illegal market operated by heavily armed actors such as the Comandos in areas, where state presence is weak, lies at the heart of urban violence in Rio de Janeiro. As a result, a combination of local conflicts among drug trafficking organizations, an often violent response from the police, and the emergence of other criminal groups competing for drug trafficking space is experienced in these societies.

On the level of the city of Rio de Janeiro, it is believed that Rio has become a “divided city” where drug traffickers in favelas operate outside well-organized democratic political life. In the last decade, drug traffickers who lived in favelas have confronted

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47 Red Hot Web Deal (2014). Brazil 2013 anti-drug record high drug forfeiture of hundreds of millions of property <http://redhotwebdeal.com/?p=85> [accessed on 28 April 2015]

48 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2012, p. 40. World Drug Report 2012 References to Brazil. New York, NY: UNODC.

governmental offices, bombed public transportations, and effectively ordered extensive business closings. Some of the academic institutions and press have declared in response that parallel “powers”, “authorities”, or “states” have emerged in the city’s favelas (Arias 2006, p.293). A systematic comparative analysis of favela-level political communications suggests that drug traffickers have not only qualitatively changed client list relations in favelas, but have also developed complex and flexible networks to enable them and their partners to occupy other political spaces. Networks with state officials and civic leaders, criminals' applicable state power and social capital make their continuing criminal activities possible.

Research indicates that drug trafficking came into being in Rio when some favela populations began to trade cocaine in the 1980s.<sup>49</sup> Drug trafficking has become a common routine over the years.

*Table 2.14 - Prevalence of lifetime use of psychoactive substances, by student age group in 2010*

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<sup>49</sup> Drug Traffic, n.d. <http://soulbrasileiro.com/main/rio-de-jenario/social-problems/drug-traffic-and-gangs/drug-traffic-and-gangs/> [accessed on 15 March 2015]

Psychotropic Substance	Lifetime use (%)				
	Total	Up to 18	18-24 years old	25-34 years old	35+ years old
<b>Alcohol</b>	86.2	79.2	89.3	82.4	83.3
<b>Tobacco Products</b>	46.7	26.7	45.5	47.4	54.6
<b>Use of Illicit Drugs</b>	48.7	22.8	45.7	51.9	59.8
<b>Marijuana/Hashish/Skank</b>	26.1	5.9	26.9	29	21.1
<b>Inhalants and Solvents</b>	20.4	5.6	21.6	20.5	17.5
<b>Cocaine (Powder)</b>	7.7	0.7	5.3	10.5	13.9
<b>Merla</b>	0.8	0	0.4	1.8	0.5
<b>Crack</b>	1.2	0	0.3	2.9	2.4
<b>Hallucinogens</b>	7.6	2.7	7.9	9.6	3.6
<b>Ketamine®</b>	0.8	0.6	1	0.5	0.4
<b>Ayahuasca Tea</b>	1.4	0.1	0.9	2.7	1.5
<b>Ecstasy</b>	7.5	0.9	7.5	11.2	1.8
<b>Anabolic Steroids</b>	3.8	5.3	1.9	7.2	5.4
<b>Tranquilizers and Anxiolytics</b>	12.4	4.5	8.9	14.9	23.9
<b>Sedatives or Barbiturates</b>	1.7	0.5	1.1	1.1	5.5
<b>Opiate Analgesics</b>	5.5	1.2	4.6	6.4	8.5
<b>Codeine-Based Syrups</b>	2.7	1.3	2.3	3.9	2.6
<b>Anticholinergics</b>	1.2	0.1	0.8	1.6	2.2
<b>Heroin</b>	0.2	1.3	0.1	0.5	0
<b>Amphetamines</b>	13.8	5.9	10	17.9	23.6
<b>Synthetic Drugs</b>	2.2	0	2.1	3.3	0.9

Source: SENAD (2010)<sup>50</sup>

Table 2.15 - Percentage of Drug Use

Percentage of Drug usage in Brazil 2002			
DRUGS	Use in lifetime	Yearly use	Monthly use
	%	%	%
Any Drugs*	19.4	4.6	2.5
Cannabis	6.9	1	0.6

50 National Secretariat for Drug Policies (SENAD), 2010. First nationwide survey on the use of alcohol, tobacco and other drugs among college students in the 27 Brazilian State Capitals. Brasília: SENAD, [online], [http://www.obid.senad.gov.br/portais/OBID/biblioteca/documentos/Dados\\_Estatisticos/Estudan-tes/328380.pdf](http://www.obid.senad.gov.br/portais/OBID/biblioteca/documentos/Dados_Estatisticos/Estudan-tes/328380.pdf).

Cocaine	2.3	0.4	0.2
Crack	0.4	0.1	0
Heroin	0.1	0	0
Hallucinogen	0.6	0	0
Solvents	5.8	0.8	0.2
Opiatic	1.4	0.6	0.2
Benzodiazepinic	3.3	1.3	0.8
Stimulants	1.5	0.3	0.1
Barbituric	0.5	0.1	0.1
Alcohol	68.7	49.8	35.3
Tobacco	41.1	20.1	19.8

*\*Except Tobacco & alcohol.*

*Source: Michel Misse and Joanna D. Vargas, Drug Use and Trafficking in Rio de Janeiro, p. 96.*


*Source: Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (2009, p.16)*

*Table 2.16 - Prevalence of lifetime use of drugs, by gender, among respondents in the 108 cities with more than 200,000 inhabitants in Brazil (in %)*

Drug / Gender	2001			2005		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Marijuana	10.6	3.4	6.9	14.3	5.1	8.8
Solvents	8.1	3.6	5.8	10.3	3.3	6.1
Benzodiazepines	2.2	4.3	3.3	3.4	6.9	5.6
Orexigenics	3.2	5.3	4.3	2.5	5.1	4.1
Cocaine	3.7	0.9	2.3	5.4	1.2	2.9
Syrups (codeine)	1.5	2.4	2.0	1.7	1.9	1.9
Stimulants	0.8	2.2	1.5	1.1	4.5	3.2
Barbiturates	0.3	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.8	0.7
Steroids	0.6	0.1	0.3	2.1	0.1	0.9
Opiates	1.1	1.6	1.4	0.9	1.6	1.3
Anticholinergics	1.1	1.0	1.1	0.9	0.3	0.5
Hallucinogens	0.9	0.4	0.6	1.8	0.6	1.1
Crack	0.7	0.2	0.4	1.5	0.2	0.7
Merla	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.6	0.0	0.2
Heroin	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.1

Source: Source: SENAD/CEBRID/ Second Household Survey on the Use of Psychotropic Drugs in Brazil, 2005<sup>51</sup>.


Figure 2.15 - Student Elementary And Secondary School Students Who Use Illicit Drugs in Municipal and State of Rio de Janeiro, 2004 (except alcohol and tobacco)



51 Duarte, P.C.A.V., Stempliuk, V.A., & Barroso, L.P., 2009. Brazilian drug report. Brazil: National Secretariat for Policies on Drugs. OBID, [online], [http://www.obid.senad.gov.br/portais/OBID/biblioteca/documentos/Publicacoes/Sem\\_logo/329774.pdf](http://www.obid.senad.gov.br/portais/OBID/biblioteca/documentos/Publicacoes/Sem_logo/329774.pdf) [accessed 10 August 2015].

Source: Fifth National Survey on the consumption of psychotropic drugs among elementary school students and middle public school system in the 27 capitals XX<sup>52</sup>: Means data not informed by the students.

Figure 2.16 - 3,522 Student Of Elementary and Secondary School Students Who Use Illicit Drugs in Municipal And State of Sao Paulo, 2004 (except alcohol and tobacco)



Source: Fifth National Survey on the consumption of psychotropic drugs among elementary school students and middle public school system in the 27 capitals<sup>53</sup> XX: Means data not informed by the students.

A survey of adolescents in institutions for youth offenders conducted in 1999 in Rio de Janeiro showed that 90% had used drugs at some point in their lives, about 60% in the last six months and 31% in the last month. The most often used drug was marijuana (77%), while crack was stated as 10%.<sup>54</sup>

Figure 2.17 - 9th grade Elementary School Students who use illegal drugs, According to Federal District, 2009


<sup>52</sup> OBID, 2004.

[http://www.obid.senad.gov.br/portais/OBID/biblioteca/documentos/Dados\\_Estatisticos/Estudantes/V\\_Levantamento/Regioes/Regiao\\_Sudeste/327545.pdf](http://www.obid.senad.gov.br/portais/OBID/biblioteca/documentos/Dados_Estatisticos/Estudantes/V_Levantamento/Regioes/Regiao_Sudeste/327545.pdf) [accessed 8 August 2015].

<sup>53</sup> OBID, 2004.

[http://www.obid.senad.gov.br/portais/OBID/biblioteca/documentos/Dados\\_Estatisticos/Estudantes/V\\_Levantamento/Regioes/Regiao\\_Sudeste/327546.pdf](http://www.obid.senad.gov.br/portais/OBID/biblioteca/documentos/Dados_Estatisticos/Estudantes/V_Levantamento/Regioes/Regiao_Sudeste/327546.pdf) [accessed 8 August 2015].

<sup>54</sup> DEGASE, 1999. O uso de drogas e a Prevalência de Doenças Sexualmente Transmissíveis/HIV/Aids entre os adolescentes internados, in Predictive model for cocaine use in prisons in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, deCarvalho,M.L.[online],[http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?pid=S0034-9102005000500019&script=sci\\_arttext&tlng=en#back3](http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?pid=S0034-9102005000500019&script=sci_arttext&tlng=en#back3) [accessed 1 May 2015].




Source: IBGE, Directorate of Research, Coordination for Population and Social Indicators, National Health Survey of the School in 2009<sup>55</sup>

According to police records, drug traffic has been increasing and recently, drug dealers have confronted government offices, blown-up buses, and effectively ordered widespread business closings.

Another study by the Ministry of Finance of the State of Rio de Janeiro in December 2008 expected that the drug trade in Rio (marijuana, cocaine, and crack) generates between R\$ 316 and R\$ 633 million each year, but revenues are approximately R\$130 million. This is very dangerous, because trafficking income has also supported other criminal activities, such as guns and weapons trade.


Figure 2.18 - - Civilian Deaths by the Police in Alleged Confrontations and Officers Killed While on Duty in Rio

<sup>55</sup> IBGE, 2009. Pesquisa nacional de saúde do escolar 2009. IBGE, [online], <http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/populacao/pense/comentarios.pdf> [accessed 8 August 2015]



Source: Michel Misse and Joanna D. Vargas, *Drug Use and Trafficking in Rio de Janeiro*

Figure 2.19 - 2005, Use of Alcohol, Tobacco and Other Psychotropic Drugs in Brazil



Source: Brazilian National Secretariat for Policies on Drugs<sup>56</sup>

56 Duarte, P.C.A.V., Stempluk, V.A., & Barroso, L.P., 2009. Brazilian drug report. Brazil: National Secretariat for Policies on Drugs. *OBID*, [online],



Organizations with governmental patronage changed in Rio de Janeiro because of illicit networks. At present, there is a mixed dual patronage in favelas. The government and the drug traders act as patrons to the favela inhabitants while drug traders at the same time work to increase support for themselves from the activities of officials in the favela. While political figures want to build connection to the favelas, drug traders, however, do not function as political brokers. Governmental agents search and negotiate relations with officials. Drug dealers' stand aside of this relation and let the dealers establish a clientelist method that they effectively secure. Lawbreakers must control the role of the government in favelas. Traffickers cannot allow strong personal relations among officials and inhabitants. This part of the provisions has to support relationships to community leaders to get access to other resources. These local leaders also help drug traders to get control of non-profit organizations and mediate conflicts within the inhabitants.

To have an idea about Rio, the government must realize the ways that criminals, local leaders and government administrators establish networks among themselves. Networks and linkages help to be organized for different functions. Actors who have varied skills can contribute to ongoing criminal activity. At the same time, as is established by the participation of lawyers and society residents, network connections assist traffickers to establish trust for actions they participate in.

Connections among favelas and officials are a direct give and take among patrons, consumers and dealers (wished-for in lettering on clientelism). Convicts, as a consequence of their place in the polity, have struggles interacting directly with officials, outside business leaders and law enforcement. This fact also shows that traffickers use similar kinds of mediation to contract with the government representatives, business owners and irregularly with the police.

This mediation reveals some of the restrictions of a neo-clientelist. Neo-clientelism briefly underlines the many cross-class political interactions. It is set of unequal, reciprocal, non-institutional, face to face exchange relations (Stokes 1995, p.55; Scott & Kerkvliet 1977, pp. 442–443) Drug dealers themselves are not brokers in a

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[http://www.obid.senad.gov.br/portais/OBID/biblioteca/documentos/Publicacoes/Sem\\_logo/329774.pdf](http://www.obid.senad.gov.br/portais/OBID/biblioteca/documentos/Publicacoes/Sem_logo/329774.pdf)  
[accessed 10 August 2015].

hierarchical clientelist affiliation among officials and favela inhabitants. Traffickers need to function over more complex networks, because unlike other elements of society, they cannot work directly with state agents. In all three issues, real negotiations with government and outsiders are carried out by civic leaders and other respected residents. As a consequence of their situation, as was displayed in Tubarao, Residents' Association chiefs may not even get in touch with traffickers about their negotiations, and dealers, presumably through other mediators, may make deals with other politicians (Arias 2006 p.429). However, in Vigário, where the network had weakened, dealers had much less capability to follow their political aims.

Drug dealers came to an agreement to make sure that there were no additional officials come into a favela during an election. Only the politicians who paid for the building of a dance floor could come and meet the public and get votes. The politicians went along with the agreement partly for the reason that they thought that the drug dealer had ensured their access. This demonstrates that as drug dealers do not work closely with resident chiefs, it is hard for the chiefs to assure monopoly access for any politician to the community. The drug traffickers may establish other ties with other politicians that can create diversion in the favelas about which politician to support.

Drug dealers work with communication networks to establish legitimacy in the societies in which they operate since they sit on the border between government and civic society. The other works have demonstrated that drug dealers made important efforts to provide support among the residents they live and work with. In exchange, public chiefs get resources and some flexibility in commuting with the drug dealers.

They have a restricted monopoly on the means of forcefulness in favelas but they do not have at their disposal a great legitimacy-building gadget and they face a government that, in part, builds its legitimacy by contrasting their actions. As a result, drug dealers have to work via localized communications of belief and exchange to establish the support needed for the government.

A final aspect of illicit communications is to avoid inhabitants of favelas from allying themselves with other traffickers or

with the law enforcement agencies. Indication from all societies proposes the complicity of Rio de Janeiro's Policia Militar in drug trafficking at the favelas.<sup>57</sup> Nevertheless, corruption operated differently in each community. For example In Tubarao and Santa Ana, extortion schemes were managed at a very low level and the relationship between traffickers and police depended on specific shifts of police. These were defined as dissimilar to thin shad operations against the illicit network in the favelas.

These data show that drug dealers are very well linked to government and public actors and that their governmental plans go beyond cliéntelism, connecting them into actual rule, government administrators, NGOs, and secular organizations. They assist dealers to make use of currency made by legitimate businesses and build and reinforce their legitimacy in favelas. Connections to local leaders help traffickers deliver services to residents and minimize struggles. From side to side of these linkages, drug dealers are able to avoid problematic negotiations with law enforcement agencies (Arias 2006, p. 308). The outcome is that, illicit linkages fitting into existing state and societal resources and power use them to build secure places in which traffickers can engage in illicit actions. Supplementary rather than parallel “states” or “polities” of drug trafficking in Rio represents an appearance of changed government and social power at the local level.

## **2.7. ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING AND HARM REDUCTION POLICIES IN BRAZIL**

Brazilian drug regulation have been strongly affected by the UN drugs conventions. According to these treaties, the country's official obligation to the worldwide narcotics monitoring system and the close diplomatic link between Brazil and the United States led to the adoption of a prohibitionist methodology that was very much in line with the U.S. war on drugs.<sup>58</sup> The war on drugs represents a coercive law enforcement of drug laws, which result in violent crackdown on drug trafficking and dealer gangs as well as

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57 OSAC, 2013. <https://www.osac.gov> [accessed 10 July 2015].

58 Drug Law Reform in Latin America, 2015. Brazil: Overview of drug laws and legislative trends in Brazil. *TNI Drug Law Reform Project*, [online], <http://druglawreform.info/en/country-information/latin-america/brazil/item/201> [accessed 1 May 2015].

on the criminal prosecution of drug users. It represents a zero tolerance policy towards the drug related issues in general. In this regard, the Brazilian 2006 law permits a wide range of punishments for users and addicts, from a warning about the effects of drugs to court-ordered public service or attending educational programs during imprisonment. Without justification, a judge can deliver a verbal warning or even impose a fine on a user who refuses to complete these socio-educational tasks. While reducing punishments for users, the 2006 law also toughened punishment for drug traffickers still being tried in regular criminal courts. The minimum prison punishment was increased from three to five years and the maximum was maintained at fifteen years.<sup>59</sup> The law ended required treatment for addicts. Otherwise it granted tax relief for businesses for drug reserve, treatment, and reintegration into social enterprises.

Brazil took many actions to fight against corruption. During the Presidency of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, three times delegates took part at the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) meeting to design new practices and regulations to prevent money laundering and fight corruption. For international terrorism, Brazil took part two meetings of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) on civil aviation safety at the plenary meeting of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism, in the 3 + 1 Mechanism meetings on the Problem of the Triple Frontier of Foz do Iguaçu, with Argentina, Paraguay and the United States, and of the six meetings of the Expert Group and Permanent MERCOSUR Terrorism.

Brazil assumed the presidency of the Monitoring Mechanism for the Implementation of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption and the meetings took place of Joint Anti-Drug Commissions with the governments of Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, Paraguay and Uruguay, when they adopted concrete legislative measures of harmonization and cooperation for the control of diversion of precursor chemicals, the Bar of MERCOSUR drugs (Drug Specialized Network).<sup>60</sup>

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59 Drug Law Reform in Latin America, 2015. Brazil: Overview of drug laws and legislative trends in Brazil. *TNI Drug Law Reform Project*, [online], <http://druglawreform.info/en/country-information/latin-america/brazil/item/201> [accessed 1 May 2015].

60 Palácio Planalto Residência da República [planalto.gov.br/por](http://planalto.gov.br/por) Portal do Planalto publicado 23/10/2013 21h47, última modificação 23/10/2013 21h47 [accessed on 5 May 2015]

In spite of the 2006 development, the number of drug criminals in Brazilian prisons shows no serious decline. The law does not differentiate between personal use and drug trafficking. This difference is given as the reason for the lack of decline in numbers of drug related occupants in prisons. From 2007 to 2012, the number of people imprisoned for drug trafficking increased by 123%, from 60,000 to 134,000 (Abramovay 2010). Because of this increase, most of the time, drug users caught with small quantities are arrested for drug trafficking.

Current legislation about drugs is still an ongoing discussion in Brazil. The history of drug legislation in Brazil was affected very much by the UN drug convention. Brazil's "combating" drug trafficking is decreasing.

Expenditure and demand through any means are possible, as well as the most extreme one, criminal law.<sup>61</sup>The Single Convention on Narcotic and Drugs of United Nations was completed on 30<sup>th</sup> of March 1961.<sup>62</sup>In Brazil legislation to control drug possession, use and trafficking was only accepted during the Brazilian military dictatorship (1964-1985). This Drug Control Convention was then amended by the 1972 Protocol.<sup>63</sup> The Drug Law (Law 6368) was amended in 1976, and imposed prison sentences for these violations.<sup>64</sup>United Nations convention was in contradiction with the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988.<sup>65</sup>These discussions have gone on for 20 more years, until a new Drug Law (Law 11.343) that was accepted in 2006. According to this law, drug possession was still a well-thought-out criminal act, but was penalized by community service in contrast to prison sentence.

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61 Drug Law Reform in Latin America, 2015. Brazil: Overview of drug laws and legislative trends in Brazil. *TNI Drug Law Reform Project*, [online], <http://druglawreform.info/en/country-information/latin-america/brazil/item/201> [accessed 1 May 2015].

62 United Nations, 1973. Commentary on the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. *UNODC*, [online], [http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/organized\\_crime/DrugConvention/Commentary\\_on\\_the\\_single\\_convention\\_1961.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/organized_crime/DrugConvention/Commentary_on_the_single_convention_1961.pdf) [accessed on 5 May 2015]

63 United Nations, 2013. The international drug control conventions. *UNODC*, [online], [http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND/Int\\_Drug\\_Control\\_Conventions/Ebook/The\\_International\\_Drug\\_Control\\_Conventions\\_E.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND/Int_Drug_Control_Conventions/Ebook/The_International_Drug_Control_Conventions_E.pdf) [accessed 5 May 2015].

64 *ibid*

65 United Nations, 1988. United Nations convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, 1988. *UNODC*, [online], [http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention\\_1988\\_en.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1988_en.pdf) [accessed 1 May 2015]

Recently, drug laws in Brazil are administered by the National System of Public Policies on Drugs (SISNAD), which comprises the National Secretary on Drug Policy (SENAD). SENAD is affiliated with the Ministry of Justice and the National Council on Drug Policies (CONAD), which reports directly to the President's office.<sup>66</sup>

The Brazilian government and many civil society organizations have different views on drug policies. Brazilian NGOs working with the Global Drug Commission, whose members include Brazil's former President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and groups such as *Marcha da Maconha* (Marijuana March) or the *Pense Livre* (Think Free) network, are some of the supporters for reforming laws and public policy on marijuana and other drugs.<sup>67</sup> These groups work for political and cultural framework where all Brazilian citizens can express themselves freely and democratically on drug policy, ensuring a more transparent, fair, effective, and pragmatic elaboration of laws and policies that respect citizenship and human rights.

### **2.7.1. Harm Reduction**


One of the practical ways in which the issue of drug abuse is tackled is the so-called harm reduction approach. Harm reduction model illustrates the drug problem as a frequently imagined set of adverse consequences of drug use. These adverse consequences affect both the drug user (damaged health, reduced economic resources, and degraded social functioning) and the wider society (crime, increased public spending).

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66 National Secretariat for Drug Policies (SENAD), 2010. First nationwide survey on the use of alcohol, tobacco and other drugs among college students in the 27 Brazilian State Capitals. *Brasília: SENAD*, [online], [http://www.obid.senad.gov.br/portais/OBID/biblioteca/documentos/Dados\\_Estatisticos/Estudantes/328380.pdf](http://www.obid.senad.gov.br/portais/OBID/biblioteca/documentos/Dados_Estatisticos/Estudantes/328380.pdf).

67 Drug Law Reform in Latin America, 2015. Brazil: Overview of drug laws and legislative trends in Brazil. *TNI Drug Law Reform Project*, [online], <http://druglawreform.info/en/country-information/latin-america/brazil/item/201> [accessed 1 May 2015].

Figure 2.20 - A Simple Analytic Model of the Drug Problem



This simple model allows for three different types of prevention policies: first, policies that reduce the underlying demand for drugs; second, policies that make it difficult for the underlying level of demand to be expressed in the sustainable consumption. Thirdly, policies that alter the relationship between the given level of consumption of drugs and the individual and social negative consequences.

The use patterns are related to a set of negative consequences of drug use that are at the heart of the drug problem. These consequences can come back to, and be evaluated by consumers of drugs. For example, users have more or less impact on debilitating health, and feel more or less satisfied with their current drug habits. Otherwise, the negative consequences may grow and be valued by society. For example, drug users may commit crimes, and these crimes can affect both the individual victims and the society in general. The benefits as emerging probability of any total level given to the use of drugs, spread on a particular set of models. Thus, a propensity to use drugs underlying, expressed through an existing market for the drug, is emerging as a global distribution of usage patterns. The modes of use, in turn, can be reflected by a set of observed harm and adverse consequences.

The environmental and social conditions are important for what lies at the background of the two inclinations: individual use of drugs and the overall distribution of these addictions. If the establishment has a significant amount of poverty, racial

discrimination, and deterioration of the family as the environmental conditions, these conditions may well affect the location and form of the underlying inclinations to consume drugs. In fact, one could easily imagine that these effects could be explosive in their impact, that an establishment with a certain level of these structural conditions may be particularly susceptible to an epidemic of drug use in the same way that a population weakened by undernourishment could be vulnerable to a flu epidemic.

Secondly, the environmental and social conditions can also be very much in the foreground of the drug problem. The social conditions in which individuals find themselves can all affect the likelihood that an individual's tendency underlying the use of drugs will be expressed in a particular pattern of use.

Many commentators, who are sensitive and enlightened, propose that the best policy is all that can minimize harm. At the present time, any suggestions on how to improve current policies will be accepted if they offer the possibility of reducing the number of people who use drugs. If the damage caused per user on average has been reduced, the social total damage could go down while the number of users has increased. The most promising initiatives of harm reduction are programs of needle exchange for heroin users and the medical programs for patients whose symptoms are alleviated by smoking marijuana. These two ideas can effectively reduce the harm in the society.

Every scientific study has concluded that needle exchange programs can reduce the spread of the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) among heroin users without increasing the number of users. Also, it seems cruel to deny medication to be effective for patients with diseases such as glaucoma, whose symptoms are relieved by smoking marijuana. Only a standard fastening on the reduction of the use would reject these initiatives.



### **3. DATA AND METHOD**

In order to reach the possible conclusions and suggestions on how the situation with illicit drug consumption and trafficking can be solved, this chapter of the thesis is focused on the analysis of the policies in Brazil that are related to illicit drug trafficking as well as harm reduction policies. Furthermore, this chapter is going to explore the current debate about decriminalization and liberalization of drug use as well as the arguments against and how these reflect on the situation in Brazil. In addition, at the end of the chapter, the options to the possible solutions to the problem are suggested.

Prohibitionists often remark that higher percentage of criminals tests positive for illegitimate drugs. Phil Wheatley, director general of the prison administration in England, reported in 2002 that 80 per cent of prisoners tested positive for illegal drugs when they begin their sentence (Lecture 2004, p.15). Those who believe that drug use causes crime do not explain why the vast majority of drug users do not adopt violent behaviors.

To evaluate this result, it is possible to examine more closely how and why the punishment of users of recreational drugs can reduce violent crime. In other words, it is important to understand the nature of the connection of the crime of the drug. Social scientists have developed frameworks that are very powerful for understanding the link between drugs and crime.

At least three types of crimes may be connected to drug use. The first type is systemic. This type of crimes occur because illicit drugs are bought and sold on the black market. When something goes wrong about the production of illegal drugs or the sale, buyers and sellers do not have the remedies as they have with a legal product. If a seller cheats a buyer, or if a consumer refuses to pay a dealer, the complaining party can hardly go to the courthouse to file a complaint. Disputes of this kind normally would be resolved outside of legal channels. As a result, one might think that the illicit drug markets would be violent. The black markets were notoriously violent during the era of prohibition of alcohol. The cocaine black market today is comparable today. The systemic crimes related to illicit drug use include cases of high-profile murders because of conflicts

involving illicit drug transactions. Sometimes, innocent children are killed in gunfights between rival drug gangs. These tragedies always give rise to calls for a more stringent application of existing laws to medication. Paradoxically, a more strict application can make the treatment more cost-effective, which increases the incidence of the very systemic crimes it is designed to prevent.

The most violent crimes associated with illegal drugs are systemic. According to estimates, this category represents about 75 percent of the drug-related crimes. Acceptance of decriminalization would reduce the incidence of these systemic criminalities. Certainly, the systemic crime would be greatly reduced if the decriminalization has been extended beyond the use of drugs to include the production of drugs and the sale. Even the opponents of legalization do not predict that it would lead to a net increase of the crime.

In spite of his interest for the ban, James Q. Wilson writes: "We do not know what the application of the laws against the use of drugs would reduce crime. On the contrary, the crime may be caused by such an execution" (1990, p.26). According to this opinion, an overall increase in crime is the price we must be willing to pay for the many advantages that advance by laws that prohibit the use of drugs. Regardless of the true magnitude of the economic crime associated with illicit drugs, it is a fight to determine if such a crime is caused by drugs, or is caused by prohibition of drugs the objective of reducing economic crime could hardly be the reason to punish drug users.

The other type of crime in the context of the crime of drug is pharmacological psycho. The category of the crime is against the effects of the drugs themselves, rather than the prohibition of the use and sale of drugs. The experts are in disagreement on the causal mechanisms that might lead some drug users to become violent. The drugs can release the inhibitions that usually function within the person. Or drugs may impair judgment and perception, leading users to act unpredictably.

The investigation provides no evidence that persons under the effect of marijuana or heroin are more likely to turn out to be aggressive and violent. These drugs such as marijuana or heroin tend to have the contrary effect; their psychopharmacological properties cause users to become passive. Studies show that marijuana users are under-

represented among violent offenders while the researchers are cautious to control for other variables such as age.

The cocaine condition is slightly less certain. Cocaine users themselves, however, rarely report that the drug causes them to commit violent acts that they would not have otherwise realized. Ironically, alcohol is the drug most likely to lead to criminality. If one accepts this logic to punish users of drugs, and prohibit these drugs that cause people to become violent and aggressive, instead of offering to ban these drugs, no substance would be a better candidate for criminalization than alcohol. In 1998, the national Center on addiction and substance abuse (NCASA) had indicated that 21 percent of people in jails or state prisons for violent crimes were under the effect of alcohol and other drugs at the time of committing their crimes. Only 3 percent were under the influence of cocaine or crack alone; only 1 percent was under the influence of heroin alone.

The previous discussions are missing the point of the prohibitions of the drug. Perhaps the best justification of criminalization does not depend on the effects or consequences of the illicit drugs that contribute to disease or illness, harm, or to the cause of the crime. Instead, to punish users of drugs may be defensible as a moral imperative. U.S. President Bush once remarked that, “the legalization of drugs would undermine completely the message that drug use is wrong.” James Q. Wilson expresses this point of view eloquently: Even currently, when the threats of drug use are well understood, many well-educated individuals still continue to debate the issue of drugs in almost every way except the right way.

The ultimate justification for a prohibition may be expressed as a syllogism, which is, as an argument contains two premises and a conclusion. Although this argument admits several variants, the simplest version is the following: According to the first premise of the argument (the major premise), the criminal law should punish people who behave immorally. According to the second hypothesis (the minor premise), the use of illicit drugs for recreational purposes is immoral (Husak and Marneffe 2005, p.72). If these two premises are true, the criminal law should punish people who use illicit drugs for recreational purposes.

Many legal philosophers would reject this logic because they reject the major premise: that the criminal law should punish people who behave immorally. This premise is called legal moralism. Those who oppose legal moralism do not believe that the criminal law should punish people for immoral behavior. They differ in their reasons for rejecting 'ism' of legal morality. Some of these theorists claim to be able to make no sense of morality at all, arguing that this is a superstition or illusion. Most philosophers of law, however, admit that morality is logical (Husak and Marneffe 2008, p.34). They agree that the immorality of behavior is relevant in the case of criminalization. After all, the immorality of murder, rape and theft is at the heart of the justification of punishment of these acts. These illegal activities are criminalized because they affect victims and violate their moral rights. A more immoral behavior is necessary before the penalty is justified. These theorists emphasize that current criminal justice system makes no effort to punish all cases of immoral behavior, even those that are more clearly immoral as the use of drugs.

For at least three causes, however, the opinion polls fail to demonstrate that the recreational use of illegal drugs is immoral and should be punished. The first point is the most obvious. Controversies about morality simply cannot be resolved by investigation. It would make no sense of the assertion that the majority could be wrong on the morality if disputes of this kind could be solved by a survey. Then, it should not be surprising to learn that the answers respondents give are greatly affected by exactly how the question is formulated. When people are asked if they believe that drug use is immoral, they may think whether that is good or bad for them. Respondents are less likely to judge others would behave immorally when they consume the drug. They are even less likely to say that other people deserve to be punished when they act wrongly using drugs (Husak & Marneffe 2005, p.75).

The most provocative ones tended to draw the conclusion exactly opposite to these investigations. Legal moralists do not hesitate to punish the murderers, rapists and thieves, since no one defends the legality or morality of these acts. But 49 percent of American respondents do not agree with the assertion that any use of illicit drugs is morally unacceptable and intolerable. A recent survey by ABC News found that 69 percent of adults in the United States say that they would be in favor of the state laws

that require treatment instead of incarceration for first and second non-violent drug offences. No other crime, at least no other crime penalized with such severe punishments, gives rise to such a disagreement and ambivalence in the audience. Where a significant number of dissent, consider the possibility that the majority can be wrong and the minority might be correct. Prohibitionists who defend criminalization of drugs should be embarrassed since the data reveal the extent to which people are so deeply divided.

In a free society, people usually let the consumers themselves to determine if the activities they realize are worth it. If someone chooses to spend millions of Dollars on hoops, rocks for pets, or the latest craze of fashion, it is not the work of the government to tell us that we cannot do much less to punish us if we disagree (Husak & Marneffe 2005, p.84). In the absence of fraud or duress, healthy adults should be allowed to find value in everything they want, unless there are good reasons to prevent them from doing so. The fact that millions of people are choosing to use illicit drugs each year may be all the evidence of the value.

In addition, the prohibition of drugs is destructive to the public health. As the vast majority of illicit drugs taken for recreational purposes are purchased on the street from unlicensed sellers, consumers can have no confidence about what they are buying. Even the sellers rarely know the exact content of the substances that they distribute. The use of street drugs may contain impurities and may contribute to overdose deaths. Admittedly, significant advances in the manufacture of less dangerous drugs would require the legalization, decriminalization, extending beyond the use to include the production and sale. Huge gains could be the outcome if the government monitoring of illegal drug use were comparable to the supervision of the Food and Drug Administration food and legal drugs. We take it for granted that the substances we consume contain only the ingredients listed on the labels. But illegal drugs are not subject to quality controls.

This may not be the biggest threat to the rule of law, corruption and abuse of power by government officials. Prohibition and the huge sums of money in the illegal drug trade create irresistible temptations for the agents of law enforcement to place themselves above the law. The drug control program of United Nations has noted the unavoidable

risk of corruption of police where illegal drugs are a well-organized industry. This danger is particularly acute in the drug-producer countries. But this should not lead to under-estimation of the extent of corruption in the United States itself.

If drug decriminalization would allow production and sale to be prohibited, what benefits would it accomplish? Many of the goals that reformers seek are as follows: an elimination of the black market, tax revenue is more important, and similar results would not be achieved if it continues to punish those who produce and sell illegal drugs. Any person who is attracted to the reform of the law on drugs for economic reasons is almost certain to want to remove criminal penalties for the production and sale as well as for use.

However, the economic gain is not the best reason to oppose the ban. Current criminal laws must be fair. In this perspective, decriminalization would represent enormous progress. Since millions of Americans have been arrested, and hundreds of thousands have been jailed or imprisoned for simply using an illegal drug unfairly, decriminalization would greatly improve the current system of criminal law. This gain-of-justice would be realized, even if it continued to punish the producers and sellers of drugs and thus failed to reap the economic benefits of legalization.

Some illicit drugs are produced by who consume them. If it is used or produced for personal interests or trade purposes, these should be re-evaluated and people should not be sentenced directly. In addition, the penalty should not be imposed on those who share medicines freely they produce for consumption by their families and friends. The difficult question is not concerned with the production and sale for personal use, but commercial transactions. In other words, the difficult question is the legalization of the production and sale for profit. Once the controversy about the legalization is made clear in this sense, seeing that different principles are at stake, those relating to the decriminalization are easy. These differences appear in many other contexts, in particular, current policies with regard to freedom of expression. Although the right to speak has long been regarded as fundamental to a free society, the freedom to take advantage of the word is much less important. Thus, commercial advertising is properly regulated in the public interest. Use of recreational drugs and freedom of expression are similar in this respect. The consumption of drugs is as valuable as many other

recreational activities, and plays a particularly important role in changing the mood. Obviously, these advantages are not present in the commercial production or sale. Nobody makes or sells the drug for the pure pleasure or mood elevation.

In devising a better drug policy it would be important to examine the European policies, many of which are more willing to implement harm-reduction initiatives. The best way is to carefully monitor the approaches of foreign countries to decide what policies are most successful. The Netherlands is famous (or infamous) for tolerating the consumption of marijuana and hashish in licensed coffee shops. Since the Dutch initiated the de facto legalization of marijuana in 1976 (Husak & Marneffe 2005, p.104). Overall consumption rates in the Netherlands are probably lower than those in the United States. Recent data indicate that only 21 percent of Dutch citizens aged 12 to 18 have ever tried marijuana, compared to 38 percent of Americans at the same age (Husak & Marneffe 2005, p.104). Nor are they more inclined to use cocaine and heroin than their American counterparts. Although there are innumerable differences between Dutch culture and that of the United States, these data are surely better than pure conjecture in predicting the effects of legalization. When the data from the U.S. and Netherlands is compared, the Netherlands has a lower lifetime prevalence of marihuana use, lower past prevalence of marihuana use, lower lifetime prevalence of heroin use, lower rate of prison population per 100 000 population, lower per capita spending on criminal justice system and lower rate of homicides per 100 000 population.<sup>68</sup> It is hard to believe that the system for distributing drugs is worse than the underground market. Still, there are few real experiments from which to draw when attempting to create own legalization regime.

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<sup>68</sup> Drug war facts, n.d. Netherlands Compared With The United States [online]  
[http://www.drugwarfacts.org/cms/Netherlands\\_v\\_US#sthash.XyZooB7m.dpuf](http://www.drugwarfacts.org/cms/Netherlands_v_US#sthash.XyZooB7m.dpuf) [ accessed 16 August 2015]

*Table 3.1 - Drug Use and Crime Indicators - Comparison between the US and the Netherlands*

Social Indicator	Comparison Year	USA	Netherlands
Lifetime prevalence of marijuana use	2009	41.5% (ages 12 and up)	25.7% (ages 15-64)
Past year prevalence of marijuana use	2009	11.3% (ages 12 and up)	7.0% (ages 15-64)
Lifetime prevalence of heroin use	2009	1.5% (ages 12 and up)	0.5% (ages 15-64)
Prison Population Rate per 100,000 population	Dec. 31 2011 (US) / Sept. 30 2012 (Netherlands)	716	82
Per capita spending on criminal justice system (in Euros)	1998	€379	€223
Homicide rate per 100,000 population	2012	4.7	0.9

*Source: Drug war facts n.d.*

Among the most intriguing is a schema for drug uses to be registered to buy drugs legally. Drugs would be sold only to purchasers that have been registered. It is difficult to know if such a system should be described as legalization. The only serious objection to such a system is its practical feasibility. But before these proposals are rejected as totally unrealistic, it is important to remember how inefficient current system is in minimizing the harms of drug use.

According to the substance abuse and mental health services administration (SAMHSA), 53 percent of those who used heroin in the last years could be classified as having an addiction to heroin or as having abused it. However, according to the criteria for dependence and abuse of substances specified in the diagnostic and statistical Manual of mental disorders (DSM - IV), a person can be "in charge" of the heroin without having personal problems that are important or to cause significant harm to other. Thus, it is clear from the SAMHSA report what percentage of the users of heroin



did, in fact, abuse the drug. In addition, although this report concludes that 166 000 Americans have used heroin in the month prior to the survey, the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) concluded from this report that twice this number (404 000) had used heroin in the year prior to the survey, and more than 20 times the number of Americans over the age of 12 years (3.7 million) have used heroin at least once in their life. Taken together, these observations suggest that only a minority of consumers of heroin actually abuse it.

This is important because the use of heroin for leisure offers relaxation and pleasure, which are good things. Heroin can temporarily free the individual of negative feelings; it may, temporarily, be able to put the person in a better mood and thus has value as a means of mood control. By making heroin more difficult to acquire, more expensive and less secure, heroin prohibition imposes a burden on those who would otherwise benefit from the use of it for recreational purposes. By the way, if heroin is legalized, it is likely that only a minority of those who have used this drug during the prohibition will now abuse it in a way that has lasting negative consequences for themselves or for others. The politics of heroin prohibition sacrifices, without doubt, the freedom of the multitude, for the benefit of a few, and some may believe that for this reason, this policy violates moral rights.

The social and cultural factors shaping the tendency to consume drugs and the reasons for their use also affect the likely consequences of the use of these models. Government policies, in turn, contribute to the shaping of these environmental factors. They also affect the conditions that make medicines more or less available to individuals at a given time.

The arguments of those in favor of the legalization or decriminalization of the distribution or the uses of some or all of the drugs that are now illegal, focus on the costs that are generated by the application of the law as an instrument of the policy of the drug. However most people believe that the costs of a policy of costs of legalization that would result from the foreseeable increase in the consumption of drugs and the addiction would be much larger.

But holding such a belief and to be opposed to the abandonment of the application of the law does not allow the application of the law on measures to reduce the social costs and it does not make sense to fail to take preventive measures of the social policy, which could reduce the demand for the drug and, therefore, the amount of the application of the laws necessary to process this request. This does not mean that we should not use other social programs to compensate those who bear disproportionately the costs of the war on drugs. In different ways, these are the questions addressed by Jonathan P. Caulkins, and Philip Heymann, and then by David and Peter Reuter Boyum.

Caulkins & Heymann reject legalization and, therefore, recognize that the black market will persist. They see little reason to question the wisdom of long sentences for drug lords. But they challenge the sentences imposed on resellers on the street. Justice requires punishment for selling drugs, but not a punishment as severe and as distributed arbitrarily as it is now (Caulkins & Heymann 2001 as cited in Wilson & Petersilia 2011, p. 390).

The social policy is that it is necessary to maintain the high price of drugs and the limited availability, but not to ignore the immense costs associated with long prison sentences mandatory for most of the hundreds of thousands of people who sell illicit drugs in very small transactions. The marginal benefits of locking up large percentages of dealers in the bottom level seem to have small effect.

Caulkins & Heymann believe that the current structure of sentencing by most States and the federal government involves two forms of errors. First of all, the costs and benefits of the various options for the determination of the sentences are processed separately from the many questions related to the expenditure on the arrest, prosecution, bail, and the supervision of the community (Caulkins & Heymann 2001 as cited in Wilson & Petersilia 2011, p. 390). For example, it is likely that investment in the early stages of the law on drug enforcing (which increases the chances of arrest) would be more effective in the reduction of the consumption of drugs rather than longer prison sentences; that is highly recommended by the successful efforts of New York and Boston in the treatment of violence. Highly developed forms of supervision in the community under probation or parole prospects are just as spectacular, especially in the light of modern technology.

What is needed, Caulkins & Heymann argue, is a system that operates according to consistent guidelines that incorporate the views of local communities, and not only the points of views of the largest provinces, as to the appropriate sentence. Also, such a system should encourage the comparison of the benefits of spending more time in prison with the benefits of the resources devoted to other stages of the application of the law such as the police or parole. The authors describe how such a system could work to recognize the values of the community and the situations of the community without sacrificing the goals of predictability and uniformity that have led to the adoption of the guidelines mandatory and minimum sentences in the State and federal.

Massive efforts in the application of the law, in particular addressed to the retail trade, have revealed sharp limits to the ability to deter the use in denying access to the recovery. Also it is known that the relations between the forces of order and medical treatment, on the one hand, and the use of drugs and dependence, on the other, are complex and sometimes move in unexpected directions, or have unintended consequences.

Surprisingly, as Boyum & Reuter point out in the last chapter, there is much less exploration of the relationships between other aspects of social policy and drug use, abuse and dependence. Could we, by opening this very wide avenue of exploration and experimentation potential, supplement widely the proposal for a "regulation" of Kleiman for drug addicts, and reduce the cost of current emphasis on imprisoning dealers at low-level? This is the question central to Boyum & Reuter.

They make a powerful case that the use of drugs and the crackdown on drugs affect housing, health, education, employment, and so on. Less certainly, they argue, that the lack of access to these benefits for the poor affects the amount of consumption of drugs. They ask why we do not give more consideration to these consequences, and design the social policy or the policy of the drug: that is, why these types of policies are not neighbors more pliable and better quality to the other. The answer that they provide is a recommendation of caution for an extensive of reasons. Tracing the relations between these "neighbors" can be too hard and too uncertain. The distinctions made in trying to accomplish the drug policy by manipulating the social policy can be morally

indefensible. The social programs that will need to be redirected in some way may be too hidden in the different categories of the budgets of the different agencies.

In the final analysis, it is difficult to imagine each of the many purposes of a federal government or of the modern State as reflected in the activities of each separate agency of the government. Boyum & Reuter see little reason at the start of the trend practice that encourages each organization to focus on a few goals. They question even incorporating the reduction of the consumption of drugs among the purposes of a number of social organizations.

A question of ethics, has always divided the people concerned about the drug policy. Any form of objective analysis could fill most of the gap between those who deeply believe that the abandonment of the ability of the other to self-control either by intoxication or addiction to the drug is immoral and, if tolerated, socially destructive, and those who believe that the decision to give up a certain measure of self-control is up to the individual, as he or she does not harm others. The difference is reflected in the attitudes towards the addicts. Those in the latter group are more likely to treat addicts as being in need of help than those in the first group, as deserving of the consequences of their immoral choices. But the ethical issues that are less obvious also have very significant effects on the drug policy, as the authors discover and reveal.

Heyman, Satel, and Valiant are obviously taken with the question of how the social institutions, public or private, should treat someone with diminished responsibility (Heyman, Satel, and Valiant as cited in Heymann & Brownsberger 2001, p. 14). They reject the attitude of the “liberal” that addiction is a disease like any other, for which the individual cannot be held responsible. For them, the treatment is to create the conditions in which an individual can develop self-control. And one of these conditions, perhaps the most important, is the insistence that the person is responsible for what he does. On the other hand, they do not believe clearly that the addict deserves the benefit of the Kantian injunction that each person must always be considered as an end in itself and never as a means. They believe that certain forms of coercion and manipulation are necessary not only for the wellbeing of the addict, but also his right to be treated with the full dignity of a responsible person.

They explore a new form of ethical judgment: the right to demand that someone's lack of self-control generates a certain measure of self-control by the determination, but to make this request if it is accompanied by the creation of coercive conditions that will support the effort of the individual and which can be maintained by the individual when the processing is completed.

### **3.1.DECRIMINALIZATION**

One of the legislative approaches to tackling the problem of drug use is decriminalization. Decriminalization of drugs stands for reduced control and penalties against current laws. Supporters of the legalization of drugs generally support the use of fines and other sanctions to replace prison sentences and often provide systems allowing illicit drug users who are caught are fined, but would not receive a permanent criminal record as a consequence. A central element of drug decriminalization is the concept of harm reduction.

Conduct is constituted of an illicit offense when officials prohibit this behavior by adopting a law that subjects the persons who devote themselves to this penalty. In other words, the use of a particular drug is banned if and only if the people become eligible for penalty for the use of this medicine. Individuals become subject to or eligible for the punishment does not mean that they will be punished. Most people who violate the criminal laws are never caught, detained, prosecuted, convicted or punished. But its effect is beside the point that is about the meaning of a criminal offense. The state cannot punish people unless they have committed a crime or a criminal offense. People who suggest that a given drug should be decriminalized means that the governments should not penalize people for the use of this medicine.

The decriminalization of drugs means that drug use is not a crime. If the use of drugs is not a crime, people cannot be punished for the use of drugs. But what types of State responses to drug users are sorts of punishments, and therefore excluded by legalization? What if, for instance, police officers write tickets for people that they detect using a drug such as marijuana? These notes, again, are paid for by a fine, like parking tickets are. Those who are ticketed have the opportunity to plead guilty and pay their fine by mail or dispute the charge and go to trial. If they go to trial and lose, they

would have to pay if they had pleaded guilty. The significant point is that whether such a system penalizes the users of marijuana, and marijuana has not been decriminalized. But if such a system does not penalize the users of marijuana, then marijuana has been decriminalized.

This discussion on the types of responses of the State to drug users are some kind of punishment is significant while the well-intentioned reformers, disappointed with existing policyies suggest that drug users should be required to undergo treatment instead of being sent to prison. The movement for treating rather than imprisoning drug users continues to gain momentum. In the first place, decriminalization concerns the policies of the State that are punitive towards drug users. It was evasive about how the illegal drugs should be produced or sold. Those who support decriminalization may believe that nobody should be allowed to manufacture or distribute illegal drugs. Most advocates of the decriminalization would probably be unhappy about a policy that punished the producers or distributors of drugs. But decriminalization itself implies no position on these issues. Legalization only said that the users themselves should not be penalized. What happens to other members in the drug trade remains an open question, to be decided only after what the criminal justice system decides on the users.


The decriminalization says nothing about the producers or sellers of drugs. It is better not to consider decriminalization as a global policy for drugs. In other words, those who favor decriminalization should not be understood to offer a "solution" to drug problem. Those who advocate decriminalization may propose a number of imaginative solutions or believe that the problem has no solution at all. They can have very different opinions on what an "ideal drug policy" might look like. Their only point of agreement is that punishing drug users should not be an acceptable part of this policy.

Additionally those who favor legalization should not think that the use of drugs should be approved or tolerated by the government. The assumption of the opposing perspective has been a major problem to the understanding of decriminalization. Many people reject decriminalization because they fear that it "sends the wrong message" about drug use. According to this line of thought, decriminalization sends the message that drug use is permitted; that the use of drugs is not wrong. But decriminalization will not take a position on whether the use of drugs is wrong or not.

There are a number of actions that no one proposes to criminalize, even if almost everyone agrees that they were wrong. Similarly, decriminalization does not mean that we endorse or approve the use of drugs. In any other context, we feel that the failure to punish the people indicates that we endorse or approve of what they do. To be anti-prohibition is not to be pro-drug.

In addition, it is crucial to realize that decriminalization allows the government to criminalize the use of drugs in the precise settings in which it is particularly risky. Even if a government that has decriminalized drugs may not punish drug use in itself, it can punish those that increase various risks tangible from the use of drugs. The clearest example is to drive under the influence of drugs, which may affect their judgment or performance. All states prohibit drinking and driving, even if not all states regard it a crime to consume alcohol in itself. In order to be punished, people need to combine drug use with another activity that is especially risky. The criminal offense is therefore not the drug use itself, but the use of drugs in the risky activity. Driving is not the only activity that people may be punished for conducting under the influence of a drug that impairs judgment or performance. Prohibitions similarly could include the people who operate heavy machinery, fly airplanes, practice surgery, use fire arms, and the like. These activities are dangerous, even when they are performed by persons whose faculties are intact. When the judgment or performance is impaired by drug use, these activities become too dangerous to tolerate. Decriminalization would allow people who engage in these unsafe acts to be punished.

Figure 3.1 - The prevalence of cannabis use among all adults, young adults and youth for the year 2013



Source: Murkin George (2004) *Drug decriminalization in Portugal: setting the record*


Thus, the criminal law must not be indifferent to the subject of drugs, even without punishing the drug use itself. A controversial proposal is to treat drug use as an aggravating factor in sentencing for offenses that are non-drug related. In other words, the murderers and rapists, for example, could be punished more severely if they commit their crimes under the influence of drugs. Needless to say that decriminalization has no effect on whether people will come to consider the use of illegal drugs as fashionable and trendy, or as foolish and reprehensible. The general point should now be clear. Decriminalization is not a formula for how the society as a whole needs to reflect on the users with illicit drugs. Individuals and institutions can continue to respond negatively to the consumption of drugs with an important limitation. A state that has decriminalized the drug will not allow drug users to be punished.

Decriminalization (not to punish the drug users) can be accomplished in one of the two ways. Under legal decriminalization, all existing crimes on consumers of illegal drugs will be repealed. These laws would be removed from the books by a deliberate act of the legislature. Under decriminalization, de facto, these criminalities will not be applied. They will continue to exist as anachronisms, comparable to laws prohibiting sodomy or adultery. In fact, nobody will be detained, prosecuted, convicted or penalized for



violating these laws. The laws that still exist can be applied to the occasion and selectively. Even the sporadic application of these laws is incompatible with decriminalization. Nevertheless, the de facto decriminalization would be a lot easier to implement. New criminal laws can easily be added, but removed rarely. Obsolete criminal laws are much more likely to fall into disuse, only to be repealed directly. It is less politically controversial to simply stop the application of these laws than it is to require the legislature to remove it from current criminal codes.

*Figure 3.2 - The extent of persons who were charged for drug use, drug trafficking and trafficking consumption in Portugal*



*Source: Hughes & Stevens (2007, p.5)*

In practice in Portugal, the decriminalization approach has been decreasing the number of drug related charges in the period between 1996 and 2005 as shown in Figure 1.24. In this way, the authorities can focus on prosecuting drug traffickers instead of losing resources on prosecuting consumers.

The debate is whether or not to decriminalize “drugs”, with no further distinctions between the different types of drugs which might be decriminalized. Some drugs can be decriminalized, but not all drugs. In all cases, the case for criminalization should

proceed on a drug per drug basis. Generally speaking, each drug has different effects on individual users and on society.

Obviously, decriminalization would reduce the number of systematic crimes. This recognition puts us in a healthier situation to choose whether the selective prohibition can be justified as a means of crime prevention. The crucial issue is contested and not simply answered as whether drug use causes criminality, or whether drug use causes criminal behavior that persists even if the drug use is not prohibited. When analyzing the link with the drug crimes, most criminal behavior connected with the drug is not caused by the drugs themselves, but rather by the fact that drug use is illegitimate.

Portugal has legalized the use of all drugs, to positive results (Slavitz 2009). Anybody who is held with any kind of drugs in Portugal, if it is for individual use, will not be imprisoned. Spain and Italy have also followed Portugal's example.<sup>69</sup> In this regard, decriminalization of drugs such as cannabis might contribute to restoring social peace in Brazil. The rationale for this might be found in the fact that the most widely used drug in Brazil is marijuana. According to the prevalence of drug use data in Brazil within the percentage of the population aged 15-64, cannabis has a rate of 3.4 % (Rogers, 2012). Consequently, decriminalization of marijuana will be the answer for decreasing the number of imprisoned persons in Brazil.

### **3.2.ANTILIBERALIZATION AND LIBERALIZATION OPINIONS**

The opposite approach of decriminalization, which together with re-legalization and legalization constitutes the three options of legalization of the drug use approach, is that of anti-legalization mostly focused on the prohibition of drug use. This option maintains that drug use should remain illegal. The proponents of this option believe that prohibitionist and suppressive policies were expected to be more effective in the reduction of crime and criminals in prisons according to the imprisonment of freedom

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<sup>69</sup> Vastag, B., 2009. 5 years after: Portugal's drug decriminalization policy shows positive results. *Scientific American*, [online], <http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=portugal-drug-decriminalization> [accessed on 1 May 2015]

system (Spohn & Holleran, 2006, pp.351-355). However, this does not apply when the statistical data for the percentage of drug related offenders in Brazil are taken into consideration. As shown in Table 2.2.2, the number of detained for drug trafficking has actually increased by 100 000 individuals in the period between 2005 and 2012.

One of the proponents of anti-legalization is Joseph Califano, President of Columbia University and the National Center for Substance Abuse and Addiction. His opinions are as follows:

“Control mechanisms with successful legal practice and interventions which complicate the availability of drugs. The effective use of judicial authority and penalties act as a deterrent and reduce crime rates and use. And also police intervention is a factor that retards the rate of in-use in the deterrent effect.”

The Netherlands was already mentioned as an example of a country which has decriminalized the use of some of the drugs. However, the Netherlands reported that it continues to be one of the most important cannabis-producing countries in Europe, as well as the largest manufacturer of ecstasy in the world. As far as heroin is concerned, the case of the Netherlands is central distribution of heroin to Western Europe (UNODC, 2012, p.88). Liberal policies highlight that the Netherlands and Portugal, where drug use and possession is free, weaken the struggle with other drug offenses.

Some of the proponents of legalization argue that the drugs would be available only for adults, but this is not possible even in countries where drug and alcohol use is prohibited under the age of 18. Allowing individual preferences of drug use will result in children being the targets of drug traffickers. This is also thought to be caused by drug use and the growth of the illicit market.

The liberalization of drug use and drug possession will make drugs more attractive and easier to acquire. In the case of releasing illegal drugs, users will not be stigmatized and this will not be such a grave concern. The drug would be obtained more easily, and it would be cheap. In such case, an increase in the number of new drug users will be inevitable. Also, in the case of removing the criminal use of drugs, many alcohol users will start using heroin and other drugs that will become cheaper. Therefore, greater

health problems will arise and also increase the treatment costs of the state. Research shows that alcohol use in young people is much more prevalent than drug use. In jobs that require precision measures such as doctors, pilots, armies debate in case of removal without the use of drugs offenses (Rangel, 1998, p.2). Special arrangements should be made for these professional groups.

Combined treatment is essential for people with advanced levels of addiction. Even if an individual has not become dependent yet, it is unlikely for defenders of liberal policies to find a formula for users. Therefore, it is necessary to have a prohibitive approach and law enforcement bodies in each case.

Prisons are more secure for drug users than a life outside prison. This is because a drug user who is free can contact dealers and other users easily outside prison, but this would not be possible in prison.

The liberalization of drug use will also affect the education of young people who are at risk in their mental development (Marneffe, 2003, p.37). In addition, the drugs prevent the development of personality traits in a healthy way, which is also risky for both present and future generations.

Drug use is a health issue. Therefore, restrictions on the use of all kinds of substances harmful to health, and the ban on drugs are seen as a normal measure. For example, in many countries, parks, restaurants, or bars, smoking is prohibited. Levying high taxes on cigarettes is a way to make cigarettes more expensive for the smoker.

The first of the two reasons to substantiate this view is that it will increase the crime for the purpose of drug supply. Also, the way in which liberalizing drugs overtakes will be a certain cost of a drug use. Some drugs will become more expensive, especially when they come from remote regions. The second reason is the higher crime rates due to drugs (Dalrymple, 2012). For example, drug use and free of control marijuana sales in Amsterdam have also led to Amsterdam becoming a city with the highest number of violent crimes committed in Western European capitals.

Continuation of the ban on drug trafficking and production will enable the state to subject drug users to compulsory treatment in prison as well as outside prison<sup>70</sup>. In other words, more than half of the drug users will be directed to outpatient treatment centers due to exposure to criminal investigation, and their treatment will be mandatory.

Criminal networks will adapt to the new situation by themselves (Hutchinson, 2012). On the other hand, even if all drugs were legalized, criminal organizations, would be able to continue to make profits with the same drug trafficking since it is cheaper than paying taxes.

The studies performed were not able to prevent the drug trade prohibitionist policies. Prohibition policies, particularly on marijuana, did not prevent the increase of substance abuse (Fordham 2011, p.5). Despite the bans on drug abuse crime rates still continue to increase. Just like other addictive substances such as tobacco and alcohol, illicit drug use has to be released or renewed as well. Furthermore, there is no evidence that increasing the law enforcement significantly reduces the prevalence of drug use.

The available scientific argument suggests that drug law enforcement efforts will not significantly reduce drug-related violence and may paradoxically increase violence in society. Drug market violence appears to be the natural result of drug prohibition.

### **3.3.LEGISLATIONS AND REFORMS**

In order to have an in-depth understanding of the evolution of the issue of drug trafficking and drug use, it is essential to go through the evolution of the legislation related to this issue in Brazil. The list below shows the development of drug legislation in Brazil in the last ten years.<sup>71</sup>

- i. 1940 - Article 281: “Establishes the crime of hidden commerce or facilitation of the use of intoxicants.”

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<sup>70</sup> Scottish Consortium on Crime and Criminal Justice, 2003, p. 20. [online], <http://www.scccj.org.uk/> [accessed 5 April 2015].

<sup>71</sup> Drug Law Reform in Latin America, 2015. Brazil: Overview of drug laws and legislative trends in Brazil. *TNI Drug Law Reform Project*, [online], <http://druglawreform.info/en/country-information/latin-america/brazil/item/201> [accessed 1 May 2015].

- ii. 1966 - Law 4451: “the list of crimes included plant species from which illicit drugs can be derived.”
- iii. 1967 - “Law Decree 159 extended the legal prohibition to amphetamines and hallucinogens.”
- iv. 1968 - Law 385 is a new drug law. It was presented “at the height of a de facto regime. This law not only criminalized the behavior of users, but also associated them to traffickers, with penalties of one to five years of prison, and fines.”
- v. 1976 - Law 6,368: “Conceived in the midst of the political “opening,” aborted Article 281 of the Penal Code. Drugs represented a prediction danger to public health.”
- vi. 1990 - Law 8,072 was called “The Law of Heinous Crimes”. “It was equating drug offenses with murder and violation, and also contributed to an increase in the number of imprisoned for drugs related offenses.”
- vii. 1995 - Law 9,099 reduces the penalties for the crime of “consuming narcotic drugs.”
- viii. 1998 - Law 9,714 shows a gradient towards a certain form of “depenalization” of expenditure.
- ix. 2006 – This is the current law. “The Supreme Federal Court modifies the exposition of Law 8,072. The National System of Public Policies on Drugs (SISNAD) was created, focusing on the prevention of drug use.”

The three-law reforms are in the current plan. One of them recommends stringent detention for crack users and arises from the punishments for drug trafficking. This item is in the process of governmental support. The other reforms are about decriminalization of possession for personal use, possession of plants for personal use, and a clear segregation between the trafficker and the user.

There are some legal campaigns and projects which are executed together with the public in Brazil. One of them is the “Law on drugs: it's time to change”. This campaign established objective separation criteria between the distributors and the user. The Brazilian Commission presented the proposal to the Chamber of Deputies on Drugs and Democracy in August 2012.

The other ongoing project is the reform of the Penal Code, which was developed over seven months by a commission of legal experts and led to a draft bill. The aim of the project was to modify the Code that considers the depenalization of planting, cultivating, and harvesting plants aimed at drug production and carrying drugs for personal use, balanced to a dose for five days of consumption. It was offered to the head of the Senate on June 27, 2012.

### **3.4.BRAZIL IN THE INTERNATIONAL DEBATE ON DRUG POLICY**

As it was stated before, the United Nations has the most important global drug policy organizations. But there are also two other more important prominent structures beside the United Nations. These are Austria-Vienna stationed UNODC and INCB. The World Health Organization, The Drug Agency of the European Council: EMCDDA, INTERPOL, and EUROPOL can be considered in this context as the leading policy makers from other organizations.

Many nations from the Andean region (Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Argentina, and Chile) have signed mutual law enforcement agency and armed cooperation agreements with Brazil, but in general, The Dilma Rousseff government has assumed a low profile in universal circumstances and forums, and in the reform debate on drug policies.

During the first term of the President Lula da Silva (2003-2007), Brazil was really active about the defense of harm reduction policies in the international arena. In recent years it has lost the role of incentive reform to the drug policy. Fernando Henrique Cardoso is one of the active members of Global Commission on Drugs and Democracy.

The Global Commission on Drugs, March 2009: the delegations should concentrate on presenting a clear country situation in Vienna. Brazil's situation will center around five significant topics:

1. "Include the concept of harm reduction in every international document about drugs,"
2. "Ensure that the issue of drugs is addressed from a public health perspective,"
3. "Recognize the human rights of drug users and their right to be treated inclusively, both by society and the state,"
4. "Allow, in some conditions, a non-criminal approach to drug-related activities by granting a pardon to those imprisoned for low-level drug trafficking offenses,"
5. "Respect for Latin American cultures and traditions when developing and implementing drug policies."

In Brazil, the national proposal for a defense policy has resulted in two significant innovations, and one of them is about drug use. According to this proposal, a clear definition of drug trafficking states that a person is eligible for a pardon if the possession of drugs is not directly associated with any commercial activities.



#### 4. FINDINGS

It was noted in the previous chapters that unemployment, inequality, and poverty represent the primary causes which steer individuals into crime, including drug related crime such as trafficking and drug use. However, it has been observed that despite the economic development of Brazil reflected in the decrease of economic inequality and poverty in general, the rate of drug related crimes has been on the rise in the last decade and a half. Nevertheless, considering the fact that these types of crimes are largely related to the activities of the marginalized communities who live in the slums of Rio de Janeiro, it can be said that this theory still remains solid and backed up by the figures related to the crimes which occur in the slums. Furthermore, regarding the theory of Blau & Blau (1982), according to which it is the economic problems such as income distribution that lead to crime, rather than the subcultural values, it could be said that this theory is problematic in the case of the problem of drug trafficking and drug use in Rio de Janeiro. Brazil has a 52.7 Gini Index score as of the end of 2014. It is not a bad score at all, but Brazil has a population of almost 205 million. When considering the number of people who are affected by unequal income distribution and poverty, this score starts to sound terrible. Also, almost all the people in this situation are trying to find a way out. It is certainly true that the favelas, which are the centers of the drug trade, are populated by poor population that represents Brazil's underclass. However, it is also true that the people in the favelas have created their own particular subculture, which is related to drug trade and drug use. In fact, drug trade represents one of the few means of survival in their social environment, which is largely marginalized from the rest of the society in the city. In fact, it is the particular favela subculture which along with the economic causes perpetuates both drug trade and drug use.

The culture of poverty which exists in the favelas is transferred on to the next generation which is not able to see the opportunities for escaping the favelas' dire conditions. The poverty rate of the entire country is estimated 21.4%. And, it is not a surprise to claim that most of the poor population lives in favelas. One reason for this can be found in the fact that by the time children who live in the slums turn six or seven years of age, they have usually adopted all of the basic attitudes, behaviors, and values of the subculture that they live in, in the sense that they are no longer psychologically

equipped to use the changing environment and the increased number of opportunities that occur in their lives (Lewis 1952 as cited in Perlman, 1979, p.117). So, in this regard, the economic factors such as income inequality and the particular subcultures, which are related to the marginalized underclasses, are interrelated and both contribute to the increase of drug trafficking and drug use in Rio de Janeiro. Despite the fact that Brazil is economically developing, the individuals who are deeply embedded in poverty and the favela subcultures are not able to take advantage of the newly occurred situation and the opportunities that it offers. Furthermore, even though this paper does not represent a psychological study that can reveal the motives of the individuals to engage in drug trade and use, Miller's (1958) theory of focal concerns can be considered for the purposes of explaining the root causes of drug trade and drug use in Rio de Janeiro. According to this theory, criminality of low-income people is interpreted through the culture of the lower class whose standards and focal concerns violate some of the legal norms which have been derived from the interest of the middle classes. It is actually the subculture of the lower class that represents the prime motive for engaging in criminal activities. It can be said that in order to be able to survive as a marginalized class of people, the interests of the residents of the favelas must violate those of the middle and upper classes which are prospering even more with the development of the city and the country in general. However, due to the limitedness of the data of this research, it cannot be claimed whether the focal concerns of the residents of the favelas resemble the ones mentioned by Miller (1958), including restlessness, toughness, shrewdness, excitement, predestinarianism, and being self-ordained. However, the fact that Brazil witnesses an economic development while at the same time the crime rate keeps increasing within the favelas along with the number of the population in the favelas can be seen as a sign that the favela subculture, which is largely related to drug crime, is being transferred onto the next generations. The new generations of favela residents perpetuate the same way of life unable to see the newly occurred opportunities outside their neighborhoods.

In terms of economic stability, regarding the data shown in the previous chapter it can be said that drug trade is affecting the economic stability in marginal measures. Despite the rise of drug trafficking and the number of prisoners related to drug offences, Brazil tends to continue to develop economically. The percentage of the population which

lives below the poverty line has decreased from 35% in 2000 to 22% percent in 2014 (Chart book of income inequality, 2014). On the other hand, the number of prisoners has increased from 232 755 in 2000 to 548 033 in 2012 (International Center for Prison Studies, n.d.). For example, the already available statistics show that 80% of the prison population in the United States is represented by individuals who are abusers of alcohol or illegal drugs and 50% of the prisoners are clinical drug addicts, while 60% of the persons who are arrested for a criminal act have been under the influence of illegal drugs during the arrest. On the other hand, in Brazil, in 2012, 26% of a total of 548 033 criminals were sentenced for direct drug trade, drug trafficking, or annexed crimes. These figures could also be interpreted in the way that Brazil law enforcement has become more efficient in the last decade and a half, rather than that the rate of crime has been on the rise in this period. However, regarding the prison population, if the trends continue to increase at this pace, this might represent a further problem for Rio and Brazil. This will constitute large economic concerns for the authorities in the city. So, in this regard, they will have to take further measures for tackling this rather difficult social issue. The Brazilian authorities have been taken active measures in solving the problem.

Making drugs altogether unlawful is argued to be necessary both because there is legally created harm and there is independent harm. For instance, drugs can lead to several crimes even when their usage is legal, and the drug users should hold criminal responsibility on both accounts. It is found that the prohibition of drugs reduces the risk of premature death, accidental injury, violence, vandalism, marital instability, child abuse and neglect, and failure of the educational tasks and important professional tasks. Therefore, banning drugs is claimed to be the most effective method in fighting criminal behavior. But there are other legal substances which are closely linked to various forms of harm to society. For instance, tobacco and alcohol are legal, and alcohol is among the biggest causes of violent behavior as well as the number one reason for deaths due to drug use (NCASA n.d.; OBID n.d.). Thus, it is not clear why drugs are evaluated distinctly by the authorities, and are perceived by the general public as more damaging to society. Also, it is found that the markets were much more violent when alcohol was deemed to be illegal. The same logic can be applied to the drug market. Hence,

prohibiting can be argued to increase both the legally created harm and the independently created harm.

Another rationale for the prohibitionist drug policies is to protect the individuals from their own decisions. It is suggested that the people do not always act in their own interest, and therefore, need some protection against the worst possible potentially irresponsible consequences of their decisions. Some people are not able to self-govern, and in such cases the governments need to sanction their behavior (Bakalar and Grinspoon, 1984). Since this is also true of many people who decide to sell drugs, especially young people, protection is also needed for them in the form of a system of gradual and proportionate sanctions. As mentioned above, in the favelas drugs are mostly sold by young individuals who might be considered as not being able to make the correct decisions for them. However, punishing them harshly would not generate any protection, but on the contrary, might have heavy consequences for their future life options. For instance, a convicted drug user from a Brazilian favela has little chance of finding employment in the formal labor markets, and of integrating into the larger society.

Drugs are addictive because of the pleasure and psychological relief that they provide. People are going to choose to use drugs, even if such use results in the loss of other things of greater value for them. Therefore, drug use is “irrational” in the sense of substance. If someone chooses to use a drug because of the pleasure or psychological relief it offers, even if this results in sacrificing things that have a greater task value such as family, friendship, health, savings, and self-respect - then its use is “irrational” in the material sense intended here, and this is another way in which drugs may be addictive. Other activities, such as sex and gambling can also be addictive in this way.

Another reason for the prohibitionist drug policies is the idea of “perfectionism”. These laws might be thought to be perfectionist because their essential purpose might seem to be to discourage people from engaging in an activity that is degrading to them, impedes full development and exercise of their higher human capacities such as thinking skills, theory and practice, discrimination and the enjoyment of aesthetics, spiritual insight and growth, love and friendship, and so on. The use of drugs, or at least the high

consumption of drugs, hinders the development and exercise of these capacities, and for this reason it should be discouraged.

Some may believe that the prohibition of drugs is unpleasantly perfectionist because it violates the principle of neutrality, but this is not the case. One might think that the policy of the government is unpleasantly non-neutral each time it provides unequal benefits to two different people, in consequence of the fact that they have different conceptions of the good. If this is the case, then the prohibition of drugs would violate the principle of neutrality because it weighs on those whose conceptions of the good place value on obtaining the drug in a way that it does not load others. This, however, may not be the correct clarification of neutrality, since many perfectly neutral policies also provide the greatest benefits as a consequence of the fact that people have different conceptions of a good life. There are neutrality differences between murderers and serial killers. When analyzing the cases, this has to be clarified well. Therefore, a policy violates the principle of neutrality only if it is adopted for reasons of non-neutrality. Since the laws of murder are adopted for reasons of neutral safety and security, this policy is also neutral in a relevant sense even if it has uneven benefits for people who have different formations of the good life.

In addition to social and cultural reasons, there are many individual factors than can lead to drug use among people. Parental influence, family structure, peer influence, role models, and knowledge attitudes and beliefs can all have a big impact on whether one uses substances or not (Jiloha, 2009). The decisions about drug addiction cannot be thought in abstraction from these personal features, which means that the legal framework for drugs also has to pay attention to these. There is a strong correlation between income, education, and family resources, and all of these are negatively related to the demand of illegal drugs (Taylor, n.d.). In Brazil, the residents of the favelas are much poorer than the rest of the citizens. This suggests that they have much less access to education and social capital. In 2011, 18% of the Brazilian population was impoverished and this ratio went down to 15.9% in 2012<sup>72</sup>. This was mainly due to the number of projects launched by the Brazilian government in recognition of the lack of

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<sup>72</sup> Meyer, J., 2014. Favelas in Rio. *Borgen Project*. [online], <http://borgenproject.org/favelas-rio/> [accessed 15 August 2015].

opportunities as one of the reasons for drug trade and many other social ills. However, there are still a lot of areas that need improvement, especially in terms of economic inequalities. The strict law enforcement on drugs would not decrease the illegal traffic unless the underlying social and individual problems are resolved.

Liberalization of drugs is not equivalent to “decriminalization of drugs”, which is the removal of criminal penalties for use of drugs and for possession of small amounts. This kind of policy has been implemented in many countries including the Netherlands, Canada, Portugal, and more recently the U.S. By the 2000s, several Latin American countries also decriminalized their drug laws and made it possible to possess small amounts for use. But liberalization of drugs is broader, and can be described as a policy under which there are no criminal penalties for the manufacture and sale of drugs. Therefore, the law would treat a drug such as heroin and cocaine in much the same way as it now treats alcohol and cigarettes. None of the countries in the world currently have a fully liberal policy on drugs.

Despite the substantial uncertainties surrounding legalization, there is a prediction of which one can be confident. Namely, after the legal changes, people who use illicit drugs would not face arrest and prosecution. The lives of drug users would not be devastated by the criminal justice system repression. This is also the case for Brazil, and the decriminalization and liberalization of drugs will significantly improve the lives of many citizens. Indeed, the government reformed the drug laws in 2002 and 2006, and accepted mandatory treatment and community service instead of prison sentences for users<sup>73</sup>. But the distinction between users and dealers is not very clear, and further discussions are held to decriminalize consumption. This would help not only the drug-dominated favelas, but also the overall society, since public resources wasted on punishment recreational drug usage would be saved. Also, people would not be stigmatized and can continue with their lives without legal penalties.

Brazilian public resources, which are scarce as in any other developing country, can be allocated better. Over the last 10 years, the number of incarcerated people has doubled,

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<sup>73</sup> Youngers, C.A., & Walsh, J.M., 2009. Drug Decriminalization: A Trend Takes Shape. *Americas Quarterly*. [online], <http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/978> [accessed 15 August 2015].

and 27% of the imprisoned are convicted because of drug trafficking (Miraglia, 2015). Such a high number means that the Brazilian funds are allocated to fighting drug crimes instead of more productive uses such as building schools and employment of generations. In addition, law enforcement could focus more on crimes of violence such as rape, aggravated assault, child abuse, and murder by eliminating prohibition of all drugs for adults and establishing appropriate regulation and standards for distribution and use, and this would make communities much safer. In a regulated and controlled environment, rates of addiction and overdose deaths may be reduced by placing drug abuse in the hands of medical professionals instead of the criminal justice system.

One of the main reasons why people use drugs is because they are pleasant. If an activity is enjoyable, there is no doubt that more people will engage in it, and they will engage in it more often as it becomes easier and less expensive to do so. If drugs are legal, they will be easier to obtain because they will be sold in the local stores. They will be less expensive because they will be available in larger quantities, and their price will no longer reflect the risks of selling an illegal product, including the risk of violence, imprisonment, confiscation of property, and so on. Drugs will be safer because they will be sold at standard doses. In addition, the psychological cost of having to deal with unsavory characters in dangerous parts of the city to purchase the drug will be eliminated, as well as the stigma involved in the purchase of an illegal drug.

The arguments against legalization of drugs claim that making the substances more accessible would increase their consumption. For instance, people who were previously unable to reach drug dealers would be able to buy drugs when this is legal, and hence, the addiction rate would be higher. However, there is no empirical match between the legalization of drugs and their consumption. In the Netherlands, a much smaller share of teenagers tried certain drugs than their American counterparts where the drug laws are rigid (Husak & Marneffe, 2005). There can be various reasons for this. First of all, it can be the case that everyone who is willing to abuse drugs is already illegally using them, and abusing them as much as they would if they were legal. Furthermore, legalization can make more people aware of a drug abuse problem, and there can be

peer pressure in more responsible usage. This is definitely possible with certain drugs which are accepted by the society such as tobacco and alcohol.

However, it should also be noted that full legalization of drugs would mean that they could be advertised and promoted. Drug manufacturers will be marketing drugs in the same way that alcohol and cigarettes are being marketed now. In such situations, more people might be tempted to use substances. Thus, the advertising of currently illegal drugs would lead people to use more drugs than they would otherwise, and this would also increase drug abuse. In addition, a person is more likely to do something that she or he is tempted to do the easier and less expensive it is. Hence, it can be reasonably concluded that a person is also more likely to abuse drugs if they are legal. However, as mentioned previously, there are no empirical links between drug abuse and the legal framework. In Brazil, during the periods when the drug policy was more prohibiting, no significant reductions in addiction were achieved.

The major debate around drug policy and its effectiveness arises from the fact that drugs are addictive and cannot be considered as normal commodities. For example, heroine is identified as addictive, and people might end up in criminal acts to meet their addictions. Although many activities are addictive in one way or another, some aspects of addiction are not as relevant to the justification of legal paternalism. The mere fact that an activity, for example eating chocolate, makes people want to eat more, does not in itself strengthen the paternalistic case for the ban of such a good. It can be an activity such as exercise, which is a central activity in the life of a person in terms of the well-being it creates. The fact that the cessation of an activity will result in physical symptoms of extraction, or that it will produce the state of desire, can provide reasons for prohibiting the activity or the commodity, as this may be true of the fact that people feel ashamed to indulge their appetite for this activity or commodity. But these reasons seem to be far too low to justify something as heavy as the legal compulsion. Therefore, none of these ways of being addictive seems very relevant to the justification of paternalistic interference.

If an activity is difficult to control, however, this characteristic does not seem to strengthen the case of paternalistic interference. This is more difficult to justify in general, because it is normally under the control of people not to do what will hurt



them. If an activity is addictive, then people find it difficult to control it through the exercise of their own considered judgment, and the reasons for wanting the government to interfere with their freedom to engage in it will have more weight. In addition, if it is difficult for people to control using their own judgment whether to engage or not to engage in an activity, then the reasons of self-direction that opt for the government not to interfere with the freedom to commit to it have less weight. In fact, in these circumstances, the value of self-direction may actually be enhanced by the interference of the government. Therefore, when an activity is addictive, the value of self-direction may seem to justify the interference of the government, rather than to provide an objection decisive against it.

But governments should not limit people's freedom to engage in an activity simply because people are able to control their behaviors. The activity might not be harmful to the people or to society as a whole. Imagine someone who finds himself compulsively checking the price of his shares on the Internet every few minutes when he is alone in his office, even if he does not intend to sell. The simple fact that it is difficult for this person to control his curiosity about the current value of his stock provides a reason for there being very little justification of the interference of the government because the audit of the purchase price of the shares on the Internet, even compulsively, is not very dangerous. Once again, instead of legal penalties or limiting freedoms, education and other tools could be more useful for the person to take control back. Brazilian government initiated several assistance programs to help drug users to reintegrate and get training (Miraglia, 2015).

It can be said that the paternalistic interference with the use of highly addictive substances such as heroin, is justified because it can give major damages to an individual. Moreover, it is more likely that the cost of using addictive substances would exceed the benefits of using them. Given the fact that the consumption of addictive substances by people is almost irrational in this case, the fact that it is difficult to control it strengthens people's reasons for wanting the government to protect them against themselves, and is therefore relevant in the case of paternalist restriction. The difficulty of the control alone, however, is not sufficient to justify this policy. First, the fact that an adult will be more likely to use an addictive substance if it is legal, and that

a substance is addictive in the sixth and seventh sense means that if it is used, there is a sufficient reason for the adult to prefer a situation when the government restricts his freedom to acquire heroin, given the burden that this imposes on him, Second, the burden that a policy of prohibition is going to impose on the others needs to be justified.

The expenses for limiting drug traffic and imprisoning people, especially people who are dealing or using small amounts of drugs, can be fiscally very high. Since drug trafficking is a highly profitable business, the prohibitive measures do not usually decrease it to make it worth the efforts. Moreover, the social policy for the prevention of drug trafficking can be much less expensive and can have positive long-term consequences. Brazil, for instance, has an ineffective policing system which does not necessarily reduce the drug related crimes. And, the relative ineffectiveness becomes even clearer when it is compared to social programs such as Bracos Albertos. The program was implemented in an area where crack usage is quite common. Previously, the government tried to decrease the social harm in the area by law enforcement and mandatory treatment. But all of these were unsuccessful and the crack addiction rate even increased in the neighborhood. In 2014, Bracos Albertos was launched and managed to decrease crack usage by 50% to 70% (Miraglia, 2015). The program was successful because the local communities were supporting it, and the public health approach was put at the center rather than the harm reduction approach.

As a result of the changing views on the effectiveness of legal prevention mechanisms, there are various legal campaigns and projects that are executed together with the public in Brazil. These campaigns and projects aim to clarify the distinction between the dealers and users, and partial decriminalization is offered to the users. More recently, there have also been attempts to allow people to plant, cultivate, and harvest drug related products for personal consumption for a short period of time. These campaigns and projects could be extended to cover the petty dealers since imprisoning them is not necessarily preventing the reduction in drug addiction nor stopping the traffic.

Overall, drug trade in Brazil can be explained through a number of factors ranging from socio-economic to personal and cultural. When the drug laws are extremely prohibiting and the society has “zero tolerance”, there can be restricted positive outcomes. But the costs on users are major, since the users would face complete social disapproval, job

loss, and so on. These penalties may help users to abandon their drug use in the long-run through specific deterrence mechanism. Or, they may simply impose a loss on drug users and the rest of us, without producing real effects of deterrence. It is not clear whether deterrence can be achieved by fighting against drugs, which has been the main policy of many countries including the U.S. and Brazil. As a result of the failure of such policies, a lot of governments such as Brazil reformed their drug policy, and made it less prohibiting over the last decade.

As the theoretical and empirical research reveal, the most effective policy against the drug problem is through the primary prevention efforts. These are about changing the social conditions that influence the underlying propensities using drugs such as poverty and racial discrimination. But it is worth keeping in mind that these important efforts to prevent drug use cannot be easily distinguished from more general social policies that are justified in their own right, and not primarily as a means of preventing drug use. Brazil is a highly unequal country, and the poverty is much more widespread among certain segments of the society. As expected, these segments also have higher rates of drug addiction and conviction. Moreover, people who seek treatment for their addiction problems in the country are middle-class with high education (Ribeiro et al., 2014). Hence, the primary prevention efforts would not only decrease the drug related problems, but they would also help individuals through higher education and information when they are in need.

The tertiary prevention policies can be implemented in conjunction with the primary prevention policies. These include treatment programs that are designed not only to reduce ingesting among committed users, but also to break the connection between their continued use and their contrary separate and social significances. Brazil has a number of tertiary prevention policies that prove to be quite effective. For example, the cities that have more than 70,000 residents should have services for the individuals with substances problems through the Psychosocial Care Centers for Alcohol and Drugs (CAPS-AD). These centers aim to help drug abusers in reintegration. Also, services to drug users who live on the streets are offered through the federal government programs. Finally, a part of the hospital beds are allocated to the treatment of substance dependence. Currently, less than 4% of the hospital beds are spared for this purpose,

which is much less than the guidelines set by the WHO (Ribeiro et al., 2014). Even though the facilities for these people with drug difficulties are increasing in Brazil, there are still many other programs that can be developed. The tertiary prevention policies can be extended to cover a larger part of the population, and the help centers can be spread to the favelas.

As it was discussed in the previous chapters, it is easy to realize that Brazil shows every symptom of an emerging market, which every emerging country is facing. Some traditional citizens are faltering to adapt the rapid development in economics and the rapid integration in society, and of course, the severe effects of globalization. Some of them are not capable of handling this quick transformation. As an economic view, the constriction of the middle class pushes individuals to upper classes or lower classes. Generally, most of them are pushed out to lower classes. When inequity of income distribution lifts its effectiveness, people try to find out alternative solutions. Ghettos are full of people with dreams of becoming rich. These obvious facts are pushing people to try to make easy money. For the most part, society pumps the idea of equity, but usually, people do not know how to maintain it in a proper and legal way. After such high-voiced propaganda, people start to try to equalize their social status by making money however they can. This is a side effect of rapid development.

## 5. CONCLUSION

In order to create valid solutions for the problems of Brazilian minor and organized drug trafficking, first of all, the reasons should be understood well. Drug use, as a determining motivator of minor drug dealing, is taken as one of the most important reasons for the current case of Brazil. This study searched 2 basic questions to reveal the reasons behind this traffic and usage, which are:

1. What are the main socio-economic reasons which explain the high level of illegal drug use in Rio de Janeiro?
2. What are the effective ways to prevent illicit drug trafficking and use? Could liberalization of drug use be the effective way to reduce drug trafficking?

This research found out that Brazil represents a country which despite its economic growth in the recent years, still severely struggles with a number of social-economic issues. First of all, it is a country of great social differences and economic inequality. According to the Gini index, it is one of the countries which have the highest level of income inequality in the world. As indicated in the analyses, the increase of population and needs, and the fact that an effective respond or an effective action is not received from the government, brought economic social chaos in the country. Statistical data, indicated in the theoretical background section, showed that there is income inequality and unbalanced income distribution. As a result, social and regional divisions are observable. The correlation of each case resulted with a drug trafficking problem and violence in the country. Some regions such as Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo are more affected by this problem because of the geographical and regional advantages, while others are affected less. Despite of the decrease in the GINI Index, the rates of inequity and poverty still remain very high. This is one of the most important motivator for the tendency toward illegal activities. Also, drug use and drug trafficking is part of this system. Generally, people start to sell or carry drugs by extension of drug use.

There are multiple reasons why drugs are demanded and supplied in large quantities, and similar to other countries in Brazil, these range from macro factors to individual dispositions. Thus, the effective method of fighting against drugs needs to consider all

these issues, and has to be guided by the socio-economic conditions in the country. The economic and social inequalities in Brazil are among the highest in the world, and are argued to be closely related to violent behavior including drug addiction and trafficking (Blau & Blau 1982). Moreover, the existence of favelas in the country creates the suitable cultural and political context aggravating drug addiction. The crime subculture in the favelas enables individuals to have a common unlawful purpose, and drugs as well as other crimes are found to be more easily spread in societies that are not well-integrated (Haimer, 1997; Cohen, 1955). Given that the socio-economic inequalities and subculture in the favelas are among the main drivers of criminality in general, and drug abuse in particular, only methods of addressing these problems can be effective in Brazil. The socio-economic factors are driven by macro-economic factors and the development process of the subjected country. Countries such as Brazil, generally, sacrifice the middle-class to gain more acceleration in the development process. Expanding middle-class is a tricky but solid way for development. It takes so much time to create or structure an expanse of a new middle-class or an existing one. That is why countries such as Brazil, in most cases, sacrifice the middle-class for short-term development. This can be claimed as the reason for social inequity and inequity of income distribution.

The reason for this can be found in many complex factors which derive from the region's history, its geographical position, and the high level of population growth residing in poor and substandard locations. The favelas, which represent ghettos located in the largest cities such as Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, represent the hubs of drug trafficking gangs due to the fact that they remain outside the grip of the law enforcement authorities. The high levels of drug trafficking also occur as a fact in Brazil in general because it is being used as a transit for the supply of drugs of Western Africa and especially Western Europe. These socio-economic differences and social inequity are some of the most important motivators for drug dealing and trafficking.

In 2008, in Rio de Janeiro, the Pacifying Police Unit (UPP) was installed in 38 favelas. The unit is a contingent of the Military Police focused on one or more communities located in an urban area where territories are recognized by law. Taken precautions in 2006 in Brazil, with the frame of partial decriminalization of drug, did not give positive

returns. The Supreme Court is working on to change the code that is related to drug use in Brazil. This is a solid proof that besides the lawmakers' weak policies, it is not all about the drug-fight policy. It is not possible to overcome this problem just by replacing law and order. There are deeper reasons for drug use and drug trafficking. Economic and social factors are primary variables, which directly affect this trade.

Major international institutions such as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime do not support the idea of a drug-free world. But investigations and statistics in Brazil, at least, indicate that there is no reduction in prison drug population and drug violence with the current drug law enforcement. As it is stated in the main body of the thesis, under the drug law no. 6,368/76, from 2005 to 2009, the number of traffickers who were jailed increased from 32,800 to 91,037, while the number of inmates nearly doubled. Moreover, the Secretariat of National Drug Policy and press reports show that Brazil has the second largest market for cocaine population. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime's (UNODC) for Brazil does not encourage or simplify the illegal activities related to drug trafficking. In spite of the importance of raising awareness on drug abuse, demand reduction and treatment programs in Brazil are not yet balanced with the size of the population. The Brazilian government takes some actions for reduction of narcotic issues, but it is not on the main agenda and more encouragement is needed.

One of the possible solutions for the drug use and drug trafficking problem in Brazil is the liberalization approach. This represents a practice adopted in a number of countries and federal states around the world. The liberalization approach was mostly focused on the use of one drug in particular, marijuana. In 2013, around 30 countries experienced the liberalization of the use of cannabis. Some of these countries are Poland, Australia, and Canada, some states of America, Portugal, and the Netherlands. For example, in the United States, after legalizing the liberalization of drug use in the state of Colorado, 32 million Euros have been saved into the state government's account. Besides the state of Colorado, the use of marijuana is also liberalized in Washington and the District of Columbia. The federal government will control these two states under government administration, and with a tax advantage they could get more income. Taxing the revenue from the sale of marijuana represents another benefit from the liberalization of

its use. In this very point, legitimization of a drug can be seen as a solution to illegal drug use. On the other hand, with the right legitimization, illegal drug trafficking can be precluded at some point.

In addition, many politicians have been aware of the negative consequences that the militant war on drugs approach has created, and have become proponents of more peaceful solutions to the drug trafficking and drug use problem. For example, the former president of the United Nations, Kofi Anan, and many other state members emphasize the importance of illegal drug use and liberalization policies all around the world. Furthermore, the Drug Policies Global Commission member and former president of Brazil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, claims that legalizing the liberalization of illegal drug use will prevent the current illegal sales. Another example of the usefulness of the liberalization approach is the one of Uruguay, which similarly to Brazil has strongly suffered from high levels of drug trafficking and violence related to drug crimes. The General Assembly of Uruguay fully legalized the liberalization use of marijuana. The President of Uruguay, Mujica, states that they expect to get more positive returns by liberalizing the use of some of the illegal drugs. One of the biggest barriers in this field, illegal drug trade, comprises a multibillion dollar market. Marijuana is a soft drug to use and it is easy to liberate. On the other hand, many experts see these kinds of drug as a start-up phase of drug addiction. Hard drugs such heroin, cocaine, etc. still have a huge demand, and unfortunately, this demand is not decreasing.

Within this framework, however, there is no magic formula that can solve these problems in the short-term period, but considering that the socio economic condition of the country and the divisions, this big amount of investment on drug trafficking could be used for an alternative social development plans, as well as prevention of drug use and other interior problems. Illegal drug use might be liberalized under the control of government and related institutions with the limitation of quantity. But the problems mentioned in the previous parts are chaining the authorities for greater good.

The author holds the opinion that the development of the Brazilian economy and the increase of welfare are very important with regard to the reduction of illegal drug use and drug trafficking. In order to reduce and bring illegal drug use and trafficking under



control we need to put up a struggle. As we stated in the summary part of our study, we needed to find replies of our questions. First of all, policy makers should fully expose the problem. The target and the aim should be determined with the consideration of historical development. Instead of looking for short-term, temporary basis solutions, it is better to be evaluated with long-term projects. And then, with good observations and inspection, problems could be reduced. After giving a brief explanation, one can look for the reply of how to find a solution.

Many experts discussed the reasons behind the rise of drug trafficking and drug abuse in Brazil. Some of them saw “*poverty*” as a major reason for drug dealing. Some of them saw “*social disorganization*” as a main factor to explain the case. We cannot deny both of the ideas. Using illegal drugs can lead individuals to become minor drug dealers. They have to sell their product to satisfy their addiction. This is one important reason. On the other hand, severe poverty can lead individuals to sell this profitable product although it is an obvious crime. This is the second major reason. The third one is more complicated. It can only be explained by the help of social disorganization’s view. Social disorganization claims that there is a crucial environmental effect on individuals’ behavior and their perception of ethics.

It is not so wrong to claim that someone who rose in crime cannot see the crime in the same way as the rest of the society does. It is a must to teach them the fundamentals of crime perception and convert them to acceptable members for society.

It has to be taken into consideration that some drugs, which are more dangerous, are legal in most of the countries in the world. For example, the use of alcohol and tobacco is more risky than the use of marijuana. In 2010, in the United States, the alcohol and tobacco use related death rates were 500 million, but no one died because of cannabis. This situation brought the idea of not banning the illegal drug consumers or softening the penalties for them. This might reduce drug trafficking and also take the consumers to some other level. This struggle brought up to the agenda to keep the security of the society in the direction of intensifying the education and reducing the government’s economic burden.

The banning system is practiced in many countries in the world. Drug trafficking is an international problem. In spite of attempts to prevent this problem and taking measures by banning it, unfortunately, it is still not possible to say that this is an effective way. Yet, all around the world works and revisions about drug policies and liberalization issues also take close interest in the media. It is determined that Illegal drugs smuggled all around the world have to be isolated from the environment that causes an element of crime, and then it should be the market that falls under the control of the countries. There might be some disadvantages of legalizing the liberalization of drug use under the government's control, but it is expected that the profit or benefit of this application will be high.



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