

THE EFFECT OF NEO-OTTOMANISM IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY FOR
THE BALKANS AND AFRICA IN DAVUTOĞLU PERIOD (2009-2014)



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JUNE, 2019

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APPROVAL PAGE

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT


There have always been emotional bonds between the Republic of Turkey and the former Ottoman territories which were left behind after the defeat in World War I. However, the Republic of Turkey, which was founded after the War of Liberation following World War I, had to deal with its political and economic independence during the first decades of foundation. Furthermore, due to the conditions of international politics, Turkey tried to manage political relations through a balance of politics. Therefore, during the period of the bi-polar world order, almost no political relations could be developed. After the end of Cold War by the collapse of the Soviet Union, President Turgut Özal wanted to follow more active politics with the countries in the former Ottoman geography. The base of Neo-Ottomanism was built by him in the 1990s, but it could not be practiced effectively. When Justice and Development Party came in power after the elections in 2002, Ahmet Davutoğlu, who is one of the main architects of AKP's foreign policy, focused on this term in his book entitled "Strategic Depth" and started to develop active politics for the former Ottoman territories. In this regard, within the framework of Neo-Ottomanism rhetoric, political, economic and sociocultural relations with the Balkans and Africa will be analyzed.

Keywords: *Neo-Ottomanism, Turkish Foreign Policy, the Balkans, Africa, AKP*

ÖZET

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Osmanlı Devleti'nin Birinci Dünya Savaşı sonucunda yenilmesi üzerine kaybettiği topraklar arasında her zaman bir gönül bağı olmuştur. Ancak Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nı takiben verilen Kurtuluş Savaşı galibiyeti sonucunda kurulan Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin ilk dönemleri kendi ekonomik ve siyasi bağımsızlığına yönelik uğraşlarla geçmiştir. Bu esnada uluslararası konjunktürdeki gelişmeler paralelinde Türkiye Cumhuriyeti bloklar arası ilişkileri denge politikası üzerinden yönetmeye çalışmıştır. Dolayısıyla iki kutuplu sistem süresince eski Osmanlı coğrafyasına yönelik bir politika geliştirilememiştir. İki kutuplu dünya sisteminin Sovyetler Birliği'nin çökmesi ile sona ermesi sonucunda dönemin Cumhurbaşkanı Turgut Özal, Türk Dış Politikası'nda yeni açılımlar yapmak istemiştir. Temeli 1990ların başında Özal tarafından atılan Yeni-Osmanlılık perspektifi, uygulamada karşılığını yeterince bulamamıştır. 2002 seçimleri sonrasında iktidara gelen AK Parti'nin dış politika oluşum sürecindeki etkin isimlerinden Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik kitabında bu kavramı yeniden öne çıkarmış ve eski Osmanlı coğrafyalarında Türkiye'nin aktif politikalar geliştirmesine önem vermiştir. Bu bağlamda Yeni-Osmanlılık retoriği çerçevesinde Balkanlar ve Afrika bölgeleri ile siyasi, ekonomik ve sosyo-kültürel ilişkiler ele alınmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Yeni-Osmanlılık, Türk Dış Politikası, Balkanlar, Afrika, AKP*



To my dear mom and dad
without whom I would not have succeeded in..

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AA	Anatolian News Agency
AKP	Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)
AMI	African Media Initiative
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
BİGMEV	Center for the Development of Relations with Bosna
BHF	Bosnia-Croat Federation
BYEGM	Turkish Prime Ministry's Directorate of Communications (Başbakanlık Basın Yayın ve Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü)
CEFTA	Central European Free Trade Agreement
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
DEİK	Foreign Economic Relations Board (Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu)
DP	Democrat Party
DPA	Dayton Peace Agreement
EU	European Union
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IRCICA	Research Center for Islamic History, Art and Culture
JDP	Justice and Development Party
JP	Justice Party
KDTP	Turkish Democratic Party of Kosovo
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KTAP	Kosovo Turkish Justice Party
KTB	Kosovo Union of Turks
LDK	Kosovo Democratic Union
MATÜSİTEB	Union of Turkish Community Organizations of Macedonia
MANU	Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts
MP	Motherland Party

MÜSİAD	Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
OECE	Organization of European Economic Cooperation
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Cooperation
PDT	Political Discourse Theory
PKK	Kosovo Democratic Party
RPP	Republican People's Party
RP	Welfare Party
RS	Republika Srpska
SEECF	South-East European Cooperation Process
SFOR	Stabilization Force
TDU	Turkish Democratic Union
TDP	Turkish Democratic Party
TFP	Turkish Foreign Policy
TGNA	Turkish Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi)
TİKA	Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (Türk İşbirliği ve Kalkınma Ajansı)
TMP	Turkish Movement Policy
TOBB	The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği)
TÜBİTAK	The Scientific And Technological Research Council Of Turkey (Türkiye Bilimsel ve Teknolojik Araştırma Kurumu)
TÜSİAD	Turkish Industry and Business Association (Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği)
TÜİK	Turkish Statistical Institute (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu)
TDV	Presidency of Religious Affairs (Türk Diyanet Vakfı)
TRT	Turkish Radio and Television (Türkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu)
UÇK	Kosovo Liberation Army

UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNESCO Organization	The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
USA	United States of America
USD	US Dollar
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
YEI	Yunus Emre Institute
YTB	Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanlık Yurt Dışı Türkler ve Akraba Toplulukları Başkanlığı
WWI	First World War
WWII	Second World War
WB	World Bank



INTRODUCTION

Turkey has been in search of positioning itself in the new world order after the collapse of the Soviet Union. During the Cold War period, the bipolar system dominated international politics in which Turkey built closer relations with the Western bloc. The blocs had limited interaction with each other, therefore, some drawbacks occurred for middle or smaller actors in the system.

Following the 1980 coup, Turgut Özal has become highly influential on both internal and external politics of Turkey and started to shape internal politics in line with his vision. Özal emphasized economic activism, which means finding new markets for middle-class Turkish merchandisers. At the same time, former Yugoslavian countries started to declare their independence, which led Özal to have a closer look in the Balkans. According to him, Turkey could build closer relations with these countries due to the socio-cultural bonds based on Ottoman heritage.

This research aims to analyze the implementation of soft power by Turkey on the Balkans and Africa during Justice and Development Party (AKP) term with a particular focus on Ahmet Davutoğlu's period in 2009-2014 during his ministry of foreign affairs. His doctrines and neo-Ottomanism were used as important tools of Turkish Foreign Policy. The rise of neo-Ottomanism and its implications in state relations are, therefore, critical to understand. The importance of this study is that it allows understanding the Turkish Foreign Policy of the AKP period on the Balkans and Africa from a different perspective by providing analysis of effects of a Neo-Ottomanistic vision as a tool.

To achieve this aim, six countries, three from each region, are selected for the research. For the Balkans, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Republic of Macedonia are determined as Western Balkans since the Ottoman Empire had greater influence in those parts of the region. As for Africa, Somalia, Sudan and the Gambia are selected due to their current higher level of interaction with Turkey over the Ottoman heritage and the religion.

As part of this research, the political discourse of Ahmet Davutoğlu during 2009-2014 will be analyzed. The analysis will be performed over the official material retrieved from the website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Turkish Republic. The press releases, articles and his speeches will be analyzed with a discourse analysis methodology.

The main aim of this research is to understand whether there is a relationship between political discourse and Turkey's state relations in these geographies. Although it seems that Turkey has good relations and a high level of interaction in the Balkans and Africa, this research aims to provide whether the soft power practice of Turkey is parallel with the political discourse and works for the aim of being a regional leader can be counted as effective or not.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

Political relations with the Balkans and African countries are important for Turkey due to the historical heritage of the Ottoman Empire. The importance of heritage stems cultural variables. Turkey, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, tried to build closer relations due to these reasons. The 1990s are the years when Turkey started to put more emphasis on these areas.

However, the AKP administration provided further efforts to become a major player in the area. Especially after Ahmet Davutoğlu had been appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs, this issue has been more popular, and a lot of research has been done for determining Turkey's role in the Balkans and Africa.

Firstly, understanding the power theories would be helpful to have an idea about the ways power can be used in a country by another one. By definition, power is the ability to affect the process or change the behavior of others to achieve the desired outcome. According to Hans Morgenthau, power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of one over another. Therefore, power covers all social relationships from physical to the psychological means through which one controls another (Dugan, 2003).

Frequently power is defined as a force, regardless of whether the one wielding power is the initiator or the responder. John Locke defines coercive power as the only appropriate response to the illegal use of coercive power: "In all states and conditions, the true remedy of force without authority is to oppose force to it" (Dugan, 2003). Charles W. Freeman defines power as the capacity to direct the decisions and actions of others. According to him, power stems from strength and will. Strength emerges

from the transformation of resources into capabilities. Will enables objectives to be resolved. Statecraft seeks to magnify the mass, relevance, impact, and irresistibility of power through strategy. It guides the ways the state deploys and applies its power abroad.

Definition of power is also important for the conflict resolution process. Ury, Brett, and Goldberg define power as the ability to coerce someone to do something that he would not do otherwise. It is important to understand coercive power and to develop conflict resolution and peace-building processes accordingly. Robert L. Kahn states that if A has the power to affect B's behavior, this means that A puts some force in opposition to some or all of the previously existing forces on B. For conflict resolution, Terrell A. Northrup also points out that the distribution of power between or among parties has a significant impact on the conflict (Dugan, 2003). Power is also used to describe the resources and capabilities of a state. This definition is a quantitative approach and is mostly used by geopoliticians and the military. Capabilities are explained in tangible terms.

The traditional form of power theory was first used by realists in international politics. According to realists, power should be measured by the material resources available to influence other nations. Mearsheimer states that power is based on the particular material capabilities, such as tangible assets like military capability. Kenneth Waltz also defined power in a similar way. Generally, the power is defined in terms of capabilities, such as population, territory, resources, financial capability, military strength, political stability, and etc. (Gallarotti, 2011). In this sense, strength for war is the test of great power. For realists, in the anarchic conditions of world politics, countries have to stick to their own devices to maintain their independence in

the absence of any higher international authority above states. Realism views the world from the eyes of sovereign states aiming to preserve their security, with military force as their main instrument (Nye, 2011).

According to Jeffrey Hart, we can talk about three approaches to the measurement of power in international relations. These are “control over resources, control over actors, and control over events and outcomes” (Hart, 1976). The control over resources approach is the most widely used and accepted approach. For example, the measurement of military expenditures, armed forces, gross national product, and population. It is important to note that the accuracy of control over resources as a measurement of power approach depends on the assumptions of capacity to transform this control into control over actors and/or events. Both tangible and intangible resources of a nation can be used in the prediction of the ability of a nation to take its own actions even if it faces opposition from others (Hart, 1976).

However, there are some drawbacks of the control over resources approach. Firstly, the actors may own a resource, but there is no guarantee that they will be able to use it. Secondly, the resources should be taken into consideration with the type of conflict in hand, and related resources should be counted in the measurement of power. Thirdly, it is not always easy to measure all the resources, especially the intangible ones. Hence, this may lead to subjective measurement. Fourthly, there are other actors who affect the decision of the one who holds the resources such as non-state actors. Lastly, it is not easy to understand how the actors deal with interdependence, coalitions, and collective action (Hart, 1976).

Power as control of actors approach is very similar to Robert Dahl’s definition of power. According to his definition, power is the ability of A to get B to do

something which he would not do otherwise. This definition has been first introduced in 1957 and has evolved ever since then. There may be some opposition to Dahl's definition. For example, it is not clear whether this definition is referring to positive power or negative power. The difference between positive power and negative power can be explained as follows; negative power is the ability to get someone to do the opposite of what you want. Another opposition can be on the scope of the ability. A can get B to do something, but A's ability might be limited with only that particular thing, and A cannot get B to do everything (Hart, 1976).

Power can be coercive or noncoercive. A can get B to do something with the use of threat or persuasion, which he would not have done otherwise. The persuasive power can also be called as influence. According to Klaus Knorr, noncoercive power can also be called as nonpower influence and distinguished it from power. However, Robert Dahl takes noncoercive power as a form of power (Hart, 1976). Coercive power, on the other hand, is derived from controlling others, either through violence, the threat of violence, or withholding resources necessary for survival.

Coercive force can be used in the case of imminent danger. It is also useful when the dispute involves something valuable for the threatener, both in the initial and ongoing steps. An additional advantage of coercive power is its function in assuring internal cohesion. Creating a common enemy can be the quickest way to unite a group of nations under one's leadership. If the leader does not possess any coercive power to threaten the enemy and protect the followers, then they will probably go after another leader. Therefore, to keep the leadership at hand, coercive capability can be helpful (Dugan, 2003).

When coercive power is used, the cost of it consists of creating, maintaining, and implementing it such as death or injury of soldiers and some damage to some equipment. And in the aftermath of a war, there might also be the cost of rebuilding (Dugan, 2003). Another cost of coercive force is the threat of backlash. The use of force on people to get them to do a particular thing can create an opposite effect. Even if a conflict is over, people can try to equalize the score at first opportunity. Therefore, the winner should keep the threat ongoing and maintain the status quo for his benefit so that they do not get attacked (Dugan, 2003).

Noncoercive power can be defined as the opposite of coercive power, where A gets B to do something without the use of threats. Non-coercive power allows us to do more by increasing the variety of actions. For noncoercive power, a non-zero-sum power can be valid. Non-zero-sum power is driven by innovation, exploration, new knowledge and understanding,

Another classification of power is whether it is intentional or unintentional. A change in B's behavior may result from his anticipation of a change in A's behaviour, despite the fact that A had no intention of changing his behavior or producing the change in B's behavior. The result can please or displease A, but no direct intention on whatever the effect is. Knorr calls this as 'silent power'. An example of such power in international politics can be the will of Burma to avoid any act which might disturb the People's Republic of China. If there is a great deal of silent power in a particular relationship, it may be difficult to observe and measure power because silent power is invisible to detect (Hart, 1976).

The third approach for power measurement is power as control over events and outcomes, which is developed by James S. Coleman in his book entitled 'The

Mathematics of Collective Action'. This approach is based on the rational choice theory of power, which works in cause and effect relationship. Instead of making a direct connection between actions and outcomes, Coleman provides for direct links between actions and events and between events and outcomes (Hart, 1976).

If an actor has total control over all events, then that actor has no need to control other actors. The ability to control actors and resources is considered secondary to the ability to control events unless the actors consider control over other actors or resources as valuable in themselves. If an actor does not have total control over all events, but only those events which are consequential to him, then that actor has also no need to control other actors. But generally, actors have only partial control over events which are consequential to them. Actors tend to share control over events which are mutually consequential. An example of such exercise in international politics can be the partial control over the likelihood of nuclear exchange by the United States and the Soviet Union.

Coleman's theory suggests that one start by identifying a set of actors and a set of events. This step is important because by identifying a finite set of actors and events, one is setting the limits of a system in which power can be exercised. The boundaries should coincide with the boundaries which are perceived by the actors themselves. Coleman's theory is useful for measuring power in the context of interdependence and collective action. It allows one to derive insights about bilateral power and control over resources from estimates of control over and interest in events (Hart, 1976).

While scholars tried to classify power as mainly in terms of hard power, soft power concept is suddenly entered into the literature. Soft power was born in the last

decades, specifically in the 1980s, and its roots go back to the debate between revivalists and declinists in the United States. Joseph Nye is the founder of this terminology. He published a book entitled “Bound to Lead” in 1989 as a response to Paul Kennedy, a Yale historian, stating that age of decline has started for the United States (Beng, 2008). However, according to Nye, this work was ignorant about the elements of soft power.

To understand soft power better, we should understand its components. There are different debates on the issue. However, one can put the components as benignity, brilliance, and beauty (Vuving, 2009). Benignity is an aspect of one’s relations with others, especially with the client of soft power. It refers to the positive attitudes that you express when you treat people. Among humans, it generates soft power through the production of gratitude and sympathy. What kind of relation could be built between benignity and power? Benignity is two ended: if you assert yourself, people perceive you as aggressive and resist you. If you behave nicely, people try to get along. The mechanism is called reciprocal altruism, and it can be bilateral or multilateral. In bilateral reciprocity, one acts according to how the other party acts upon on, like a mirror. In multilateral reciprocity, one may observe the others’ behaviors for others and decide about that person accordingly.

Brilliance is an aspect of one’s relations with his or her work. It refers to the high performance that one achieves in work. Brilliance as a power currency works on the tendency of human beings to learn from the successes of others. It generates soft power through the production of admiration. The connection between power and brilliance can be build by creating myths of invincibility and inevitability (Vuving,

2009). In international relations, underdeveloped or developing countries may adopt the best practices of successful countries since brilliance results in imitation.

Beauty is an aspect of one's relations with ideals, values, causes, or visions. It refers to the resonance that is evoked when you represent ideals, values, causes, or visions. Beauty generates soft power through the production of inspiration. The power of beauty comes from the fact that a particular country represents shared ideals, values, causes, or visions and the others trust on that by sharing the same ideals and values and pursuing the same causes and visions (Vuving, 2009).

The concept of soft power became important with the rise of liberalism and free-market ideas. In 2004, with his the book entitled "Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics", Nye put more emphasis on multilateral institutions to advance the goals of the United States (Vuving, 2009). According to Nye, it is necessary to get the support of the international arena on any issue. Collaboration in the system is welcome and should be done by using the means of culture, values, and ideas. Willingness is above all other capabilities. The soft power as a concept can be evaluated from narrower and broader perspectives. Narrowly, soft power can be used in the same meaning as cultural influence. Followers of this perspective can be stated as British historian Niall Ferguson, German publicist Josef Joffe, and most thinkers in China (Vuving, 2009). On the other hand, broader perspective includes economic power in addition to cultural power. The different perceptions can lead us that there is a misunderstanding of soft power by scholars. The arguments on this issue show that the concept of soft power is not clearly theorized.

Another misunderstanding comes from the tendency that confuses power with resources. Soft power is equated with some typical resources of soft power. The

advantage of this confusion is stating power as tangible and measurable. Another reason for this confusion is the use of resources to exercise power. By definition and practice, therefore, power and resources are used in the same meaning. But the problem is that a particular resource can lead to both hard power and soft power. Some suggestions are made for the distinction between power resources and power currencies. Even though both are sources of power, they are different. A power currency is a property that causes power. Power currencies are usually properties of resources or activities (Vuving, 2009).

Soft power can be implemented by using different ways such as military alliances, social actors, cultural events, etc. Cultural events, exchange programs, promoting a particular country's language, and culture are common tools of soft power. But it is important to note that they do not produce soft power directly. Governments can establish incentive programs for foreign students and youth in particular and foreign citizens in general. States can show their benignity through international forums, engaging dialogues with foreign states and can also promote peace. Other common ways are economic aid, humanitarian assistance, and diplomatic support. While humanitarian assistance is more like an indirect way of soft power, diplomatic support is a direct one.

According to Nye, many types of resources can contribute to soft power, but this does not mean that soft power is any type of behavior. Hard power is push, and soft power is pull. Hard power includes tangible resources such as force and money. Soft power, on the other hand, includes intangible resources such as institutions, ideas, values, culture and the perceived legitimacy of policies (Nye, 2011). Nye also claims that soft power represents both resources for achieving objectives and

measurable behaviors, therefore, policies like public diplomacy have become necessary instruments of soft power. To be effective, soft power should render the audience as a target, susceptible to campaigns of attraction and yet empowers them with a valuable potential of a political agency (Hayden, 2012).

The idea of soft power creates the base for justifying foreign policies and programs that leverage the assets of attraction, for soft power reveals a complementary dimension to the strategic assumptions of realist politics and justifies the reallocation of resources for policies like public diplomacy, international and strategic broadcasting (Hayden, 2012). In 2004, the term smart power was developed by Nye to overcome the misperception that soft power alone can produce effective foreign policy. He defined smart power as the ability to combine hard and soft power resources into effective strategies. Unlike soft power, smart power is an evaluative concept as well as a descriptive one. The first step of smart power and effective power-conversion strategies is to understand the full range of power resources and recognizing the problems of combining them effectively (Nye, 2011).

Following this introduction, the rest of the thesis organized as three chapters and a conclusion. Chapter 1 provides information on the theoretical framework and historical background of Turkish Foreign Policy with a particular focus on the roots of Neo-Ottomanism. In a broader sense, the milestones of Turkish Foreign Policy will be evaluated, and Neo-Ottomanism will be described with its contributions and drawbacks for Turkish Foreign Policy. The principles of Turkish Foreign Policy is discussed in order to present a concept analysis for the base of this research. One of the recent main discussion points about Turkish Foreign Policy can be defined as ‘axis shift’ , and in this chapter, the evolution of changes in Turkish Foreign Policy

will be explained. By giving historical framework and roots of Neo-Ottomanism perspective, it is aimed to find an answer for the near future roadmap of Turkish Foreign Policy. Moreover, discourse analysis will be done in order to examine the usage of Neo-Ottomanism concept.

In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, case studies will be provided to understand the implications of Neo-Ottomanism perspective in the Balkans and Africa, respectively. Case studies will be evaluated in three dimensions; state of politics, economic relations, and socio-cultural ties. These parameters are selected to examine the effects of foreign policy perspective in terms of soft power implementation. Power politics has evolved from hard to soft power and furthermore in a ‘smarter’ way. Therefore, it is crucial to keep in mind that building positive relations is quite valuable in international politics. The Balkans and Africa are selected for this analysis due to their relations with the cultural heritage of the Ottoman Empire.

In conclusion, the comparison and analysis of data given in previous chapters are explained. The existence of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans and Africa has ended due to the decline and collapse period. Although the Ottoman Empire left these lands approximately around the same decades, the return has been in different periods. Due to geographical proximity, it is more likely that the Western Balkans has been exposed to greater focus. However, Turkey has also taken the chance of linking the future with the past for relations with Africa. The importance of this chapter is that the level of effectiveness is discussed for two different geographies. Lastly, after the explanation of theory and case studies, reflections for the future of the relations with these regions will be presented. Both positive and negative points will be pointed out, and the readers will be convinced for further overview.

The originality of this thesis is that it aims to fill the absence of such analysis on Neo-Ottomanistic perspective in Turkish Foreign Policy implementation in the Balkans and Africa with discourse analysis. Therefore, it is important that data for two different geographical areas are gathered, compared, and analyzed in this research. Additionally, since the analysis is about the near past, it would be interesting to follow up the effectiveness of policy implementation, the results and have some forecasting over the near future.



METHODOLOGY

In this thesis, rhetoric and practice will be analyzed by using discourse analysis method and case studies. Firstly, discourse analysis will be performed to understand neo-Ottomanism effect and frequency of usage of this terminology for political purposes. Later on, three states for each region, the Balkans and Africa, will be examined in detail, with selected parameters, namely politics, economics, and socio-cultural.

Discourse analysis can be defined as studying the nature of communication systematically (Bavelas, Kenwood, & Phillips, 2000). The roots of discourse analysis started in branches of philosophy, sociology, linguistics, and literary theory, and have been continuing with other disciplines such as anthropology, communication, education and psychology (Bavelas, Kenwood, & Phillips, 2000). Van Dijk mentions that discourse as a term can also be used for a referral for a specific type of speaking (Bavelas, Kenwood, & Phillips, 2000). There can be different types that discourse is performed such as speaking, writing and printing. A discourse analyst should search for the questions such as "who uses language, how, why, and when" (Bavelas, Kenwood, & Phillips, 2000).

According to John Dryzek, discourse can be defined as a common way of understanding the world by gathering the information and making them meaningful as a result of interpretation process (Glynos, Norval, Howarth, & Speed, 2009). The meaning of any objects should be analyzed by itself and additionally within the particular discourse that it is used because the meaning may differ due to usage (Glynos, Norval, Howarth, & Speed, 2009).

Discourse also helps to understand different levels of meaning in terms of cognitive understanding. Therefore, discourse can be used as a way of transferring political messages by governmental institutions. Political Discourse Theory (PDT) benefits from questions such as how do proponents of PDT study discourses and how they define, claim, make a criticism, and evaluate. This way, PDT constructs a problem-driven approach to political analysis. This approach also enables a historical perspective. The origins of the discourse, the history of the change, and categorizations hold importance in historical perspective (Glynos, Norval, Howarth, & Speed, 2009).

PDT also tries to understand discursive practices and phenomena in terms of logics. In PDT, logics means the content of the retroductive form of explanation. Generally, logics not only characterize but also signifies the conditions of the practice. Social logics aims to characterize a practice or regime. Logics of atomization considers the different components of success and failure in the self-understanding of people and institutions since they are individually responsible for their successes and failures. While social logics is about characterizing practices and regimes, political logics is interested in the dynamic aspects of practice or regime. According to Laclau and Mouffe, there are two types of logic; the logic of equivalence and logic of difference. The logic of equivalence is about linking of demands into wider political projects and forces, whereas logic of difference is about separating. The emergence or transformation of regimes and practices can be understood by the political logics perspective.

There are also critics about ethical and normative dimensions of logics approach. Ethical critique points out the lack of detailed analysis of the kinds of

fantasies that underpin social and political practices. On the contrary, normative questions force the researcher to identify and characterize social relations as relations of domination, which can be challenged in the name of alternative values or principles.

Another approach to discourse analysis is Rhetorical Political Analysis (RPA). The rhetorical political analysis puts emphasis on the nature and character of rhetoric and its importance in political analysis. Like other approaches of discourse, RPA develops practical tools for the analysis of rhetoric. Since rhetorical analysis focuses on the argumentation in politics, it is needed to clarify the content and components of an argument. Ethos-centric styles of argumentation put the character or the authority of the speaker on the top place. This means expertise or experience plays an important role in the effect of the discourse. Presidential speeches or claims of Prime Ministers can be given as examples. On the other hand, Pathos-centric styles of argumentation aim to create a discourse of emotions.

Post-structuralist perspective points out the constitutive character of rhetoric/discourse. This can be explained as not only giving importance to the content and styles of argumentation but also how different subject positions are constituted for political argumentation. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's view believes that poststructuralist idea is the basis of discourse theory. It refers that it is not possible to fix the meaning. The meaning can be transformed with other discourses in the communication.

Norman Fairclough's view is the opposite of Laclau and Mouffe. He points out that discourse is crucial for shaping the social world. According to Fairclough, discourse is one of the various aspects of social practice. Structuralist and

poststructuralist linguistic philosophy form the roots of discourse analytical approaches. Discourse adds meaning for physical objects. By language, communication occurs through information and behavior. In other words, language is used for creating and constituting the social world.. A change in discourse results in a change in the social world.



CHAPTER 1. NEO-OTTOMANISM as THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1. The Historical Background of Turkish Foreign Policy and the Vision of Justice and Development Party

Turkish settlement in the Balkans was a turning point in Ottoman history. The Balkans region was important for Ottomans not only for the expansion of the lands but also for the security reasons. In order to keep the region stable for its sake, the Ottoman Empire followed some policies such as settlement policy, conciliatory policy, and ghulam system.

From the first conquests, the Ottomans implemented a well-organized settlement policy. One of the main actions was encouraging the migration of Turkmens to the region from Anatolia. By this way, the Ottomans created safer zones in the region and balanced the population dynamics. The conciliatory policy of the empire, on the other hand, created an inclusive perception in the region. In the beginning, Rumelia region was mainly Christian, but as time passed, the acceptance of Islam had increased. In addition to these policies, Ghulam system helped to raise staff of slaves for the palace who were also employed in the military.

Although the Ottoman Empire implemented a well-organized strategy, freedom of religion and cultural tolerance formed the basis of the success of the Ottomans in the Balkans. These principles were also the basic elements of the *millet* system. Therefore, the Ottoman Empire period brought peace and stability to the Balkans, which can be named as pax-Ottomana.

In the 14th century, the Ottoman Empire was one of the largest empires of Europe and the Middle East. In 1453, the conquest of Istanbul was the end of the

Middle Age and the beginning of a New Age. The Ottoman Empire extended its territory during Suleiman the Magnificent period and started to dominate the Balkans, the Middle East and Africa.

Ottomans were also interested in Africa as well as Europe and the Balkans. They included the invasion of Africa in their enlargement period. Their interest goes back to the establishment period beginning with Osman Gazi and later on continued with each and every sultan who declared their loyalty to the caliphate. Different than other conquests, Ottomans were invited to the continent willingly. Similar to the prior empires such as Romans and Byzantium, that lost their lands in North Africa, Ottomans were also aware of keeping their power over the continent.

The first engagement of Ottomans was with North Africa due to geographic proximity. In the 16th century, Ottomans lands in the continent included Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Sudan and Ethiopia. At the end of the 16th century, friendly relations were built between Ottoman Empire and Kanem-Bornu Sultanate, which was a black African Muslim state of the period. Even though there was a tough competition between Portuguese and Ottomans over the Indian Sea, Ottomans still were able to invade new lands despite the lack of a proper sea force. During Suleiman the Magnificent period, Ottomans invaded East Africa and expanded their control over the continent. Although the people of East Africa welcomed Ottomans, it can be said that Ottomans were much more Europe-oriented. According to some historians, Ottomans could control East Africa for a longer period if they could show more interest.

During the 16th century, Sudan and Ethiopia played an important role in the trade of gold and valuable stones. Therefore, the Ottoman Empire could control the

trade between Africa and Mediterranean Sea. Portuguese supported Ethiopian king and Ottomans supported a Muslim state in Harar in the north of Ethiopia. The invasion of Ethiopia was important for Ottomans because of the economic depression started in Europe. As a result, the Ottoman Empire was successful at gaining control in Ethiopia.

At the beginning of the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire targeted at Sudan and the conquests started from the lands of Egypt to Sudan. In the end, Ottoman admission was established in Sudan which was later renamed as “El Türkiyya” by Sudanese historians. El Turkiyya was a form of military admission, and Turkish was used as an official language which resulted in common words between Sudan language and Turkish. In 1853, education in Turkish was started for the first time and continued until the schools were closed in 1877. Between 1821-1885 Sudan remained as an Ottoman territory until the efforts of the United Kingdom was successful at gaining authority.

At its most powerful decades, the Ottoman Empire tried to influence world politics as well. However beginning from the 17th century, the Ottomans started to lose territory and its power in parallel. The Ottoman Empire needed to focus on foreign policy and relations with other countries more than in previous centuries. At this point, European states defined the Ottomans as ‘sick man of Europe’ , therefore, a strategy for the politics of balance could postpone the downfall of the empire.

When the African policy of Abdülhamit the Second is analyzed, his efforts to protect the unity of Africa can be understood. Considering the political conditions of the period, it can be said that his strategy was mainly to benefit from the power of being the Caliphate of Muslim world to gain support from the local people against

European states. Therefore, the main aim of following Islamist policy was to form an alliance around religion against colonial states.

Following these, the Ottoman Empire entered the First World War (WWI) on the side of Germany and lost an important size of its territory as a result. At the end of the war, the Treaty of Sevres was signed, allowing many new states to be established in the lands of the Ottoman Empire. Only a small part of Anatolia was left to Turks which could not be accepted. Therefore, the War of Liberation was fought under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and the Treaty of Lausanne was signed as a symbol of success. According to the Treaty of Lausanne, the borders of Turkey were established, the rights of minorities were defined, and the capitulations were eliminated.

After the new Turkish state was founded in 1923, a peaceful policy was adopted to establish friendly relations with the states all over the world. Atatürk's motto, "Peace in the country, peace in the world", has become one of the most important principles of Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP). Another important principle of TFP during Atatürk period was "full independence", and he avoided any effects of other states on TFP. He gave importance to the design of the constitution as a principle of being a modern, democratic and secular country. With the motto of "The sovereignty belongs to the people without any conditions", Turkey has rebuilt its image in international politics. Due to this new image, Turkey has played an active role in solving its strait and security problems. Firstly, Turkey joined the League of Nations in 1932 to keep status quo. In addition to this, the formation of the Balkan Pact with Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia in 1934 and the Sadabat Pact with Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan in 1937 created close ties between Turkey and its' neighbors.

Atatürk's foreign policy was in line with domestic politics. In order to achieve a peaceful foreign policy, he focused on the reforms inside. As symbolized by the emblem of the Republican People's Party (RPP), six arrows represent the principles of Kemalist ideology: Nationalism, Secularism, Republicanism, Populism, Etatism, and Revolutionism. Republicanism is the foundation of Kemalist ideology, and it is against the totalitarian, revisionist, and imperialist notions of being an empire. Therefore, it sets a barrier for the Sultanate and the Caliphate. Republicanism has not been only a governmental system, but also a milestone for the political philosophy of the Turkish political elite.

Secularism is an important component of both the political system and the sociocultural life. In terms of foreign policy, it means the separation of religion from the state. Shortly, it rejects the idea of Pan-Islamism, which is the union of Muslim states under the religion. This way, any possible intervention by Western states was avoided for Turkish politics.

Nationalism is the replacement of Ottomanist or Pan-Turanist ambitions with Turkish-nation state. Concept of nationalism was met by Turkish people at the beginning of the twentieth century when the Ottoman Empire began to fall. Turkish nationalist movement was against the European powers. However, there were different ethnicities in Turkish lands, and Turkish nationalism could be based on common citizenship. Additionally, the Turkish Constitution defined all citizens of Turkey as Turks.

Kemalist principles for Turkish foreign policy enabled to build good neighborhood relations and engage in international collaboration for peace (Langan, 2017). Turkey's Western-oriented foreign policy was the result of Atatürk's rejection

of the East (Yanık, 2011). He determined modernization in line with westernization. Therefore, he emphasized on establishing cultural ties with Western states.

Atatürk's statement of 'Peace at home, peace in the world' has always been one of the main principles of Turkish foreign policy. With this perspective, Turkey achieved to stay out of main crisis of war times (Hoffmann & Cemgil, 2016). Another important principle of Kemalist foreign policy is Westernism. The main motivation of Westernism is that the founders of the Turkish Republic had a western-based perspective (Dinç & Yetim, 2012). Multidimensional approach is another principle Atatürk underlined; however, during the Cold War, it could not be possible to follow. On the other hand, during Özal's administration, new approaches have been tried and 'peace at home, peace in the world' principle has been perceived as a limitation on Turkey's abilities (Çınar, 2011).

After Atatürk died in 1938, İsmet İnönü was elected as President of the Republic. He followed a neutral foreign policy to keep Turkey out of the Second World War (WWII) despite all the pressure from combatant states. Yalta and Potsdam Conferences were organized after the War at which Stalin claimed his demands on Turkey such as territory and control of Turkish Straits. Turkey rejected all these claims and joined Western organizations after the beginning of the Cold War. Turkey joined the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OECE) in 1948, Council of Europe in 1949, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952. Throughout the integration with Western organizations, Turkey aimed to protect its borders against a northern threat.

In 1950, the Democrat Party (DP) won the elections in Turkey. At this point, the aftermath of World War II was being done, and the Soviet Union was putting

more pressure on Turkey. DP criticized Republican's People Party (RPP) for its foreign policy. According to DP, avoiding relations with the Middle Eastern countries based on Ottoman heritage prevented Turkey from becoming a regional power. However, nationalist movements were rising in the Middle East, and this was not only anti-Western but also anti-Ottoman. Therefore, Turkish involvement in the regional issues was not very much welcome.

After the military coup in 1960, the Justice Party (JP) came in power in the mid-1960s. JP claimed to be the continuation of DP and had similar perspectives about foreign policy. The main issue JP faced was the Cyprus conflict in foreign politics. Cyprus crisis had been a turnpoint in Turkey's western relations (Hoffmann & Cemgil, 2016). The 1970s were tough for Turkey due to the oil crisis of 1973. This caused Turkey to participate in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) more actively and at a higher level, which shows a closer approach for the region. Turkey tried to avoid to be a part of regional conflicts and showed willingness for a mediator role between parties.

Motherland Party (MP) of Turgut Özal came in power in 1983 after the military coup in 1980. Özal's perspective on foreign policy was to widen Turkey's area of influence. He wanted to improve Western relations, which had been disappointing during the 1970s due to the Cyprus crisis and focused on the Middle East as well at the same time. He based this strategy on different factors. The first one was the economic liberalization of the Turkish economy through privatization and foreign investment. Another one was security related due to the increased uncertainty after the end of the Cold War.

The main tendency of Turgut Özal's foreign policy can be explained as Neo-Ottomanism. For liberal conservatives, the only way to be active in global politics was to reactivate Ottoman heritage. According to Cengiz Çandar, neo-Ottomanism has an imperial vision targeting old Ottoman landscape. Turgut Özal had publicized foreign politics by using neo-Ottomanism and eliminated the difference between high and low politics (Çınar, 2011).

The end of the Cold War has brought greater issues to the table for Turkey. The instability and rise of conflicts in the Balkans, Caucasus, Middle East, and the eastern Mediterranean created security challenges for Turkey (Özkan, 2014). The wellbeing of Turkish/Ottoman descendants/remnants in the Balkans and efforts for more active diplomacy in the Caucasus were the main items on Turkish foreign policy during the 1990s. This can be explained as Turkey meeting with its Ottoman heritage, which forced Turkey to move out of its traditional foreign policy. The lack of a powerful state in the territories of the Ottoman Empire created an opportunity for Turkey to influence regional politics.

Another point to consider is the influence of the military on Turkish foreign policy. Recently, the effect of the military has decreased. This change has caused the debate on axis shift. According to Şahin Alpay, since the 1960s, Turkey shifted from a limited democracy to a national security state. This shift has also been supported by the West (Sözen & Şahin, 2013). However, Hüseyin Bağcı, in his interview, stated that changing the entire foreign policy is not possible. According to him, Turkey has always chosen to be part of the West and very likely to continue to do so. In addition to this, he also points out the similarity of AKP's foreign policy to Özal period in which the background is prepared (Bağcı, 2014).

At this point, Özal wanted to change the traditional Turkish foreign policy and let it evolve for a more dynamic one. He perceived Turkey as the strategic, historical, and religious successor of the Ottoman Empire. Turkish foreign policy during Özal administration was determined as Neo-Ottomanism since the politics emphasized Ottoman identity (Langan, 2017). Neo-Ottomanism can be defined as freeing Turkish nationalism from the ethnicity and widen its influence in the former Ottoman region while increasing economic relations with the Balkans, Caucasus, and Middle East countries. Through returning to its roots of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey could achieve to be the central state once more.

According to some critics, Neo-Ottomanism has a connection with the 'Green Corridor' paradigm (Rucker-Chang, 2014). This geopolitical concept has two meanings. Firstly, it refers to the Islamists' goal of creating Muslim-dominated administrations in the Balkans. Secondly, it means increasing ethno-religious assertiveness among Muslim communities. We can consider this as four-stage process: (1) Expansion in the area of those communities' demographic dominance, (2) Expanding various entities under Muslim political control with actual or potential claim to sovereign statehood, (3) Enhancing the dominant community's Islamic character and identity within those entities, with the parallel decrease of presence and power of non-Muslim groups, and (4) Prompting Muslim communities' ambitions for bolder designs (Trifkovic, 2012).

Neo-Ottomanism as an act of constructing a new present has two main characteristics: (1) the rearticulation of Turkish nationalism and increased political and cultural tolerance for diversity as in the Ottoman past, and (2) the elimination of economic borders among the Balkan, Caucasian, and Middle Eastern countries but

respecting the political boundaries of the countries in the former Ottoman lands.

Despite its aim, neo-Ottomanism is not an anti-Western movement that challenges the universal ideals of the West (Çolak Y. , 2006). The roots for the idea of Ottomanism as an ideology became the official line in the 19th century for the Ottoman Empire. It was formulated when the Ottoman Empire faced nationalist separatist movements, especially in the Balkans. The receipt of Gülhane and The Basic Ottoman Law provided legal and political bases for Ottomanism. The basic principle of this policy was the Empire's nation system in the form of 'imperial pluralism'. Ottomanism, the idea of a common homeland and common traits based on modern patriotic citizenship and universal law, was developed to provide Ottoman unity in the context of each ethnic-religious group's efforts to develop its own nationalism. Karpas defines Ottomanism as an 'attempt by the Ottoman government to use one single citizenship as a common political identity in order to achieve equality and unity among all Ottoman subjects and supersede differences of faith, ethnicity, and language' (Çolak Y. , 2006).

Davutoğlu considers that after the declaration of the Turkish Republic, Ottoman tradition has been forgotten. Secular policies followed by the new political elite resulted in a non-alignment from the past. However, Turkey needs to admit its past and benefit from the linkage between the past and the future. According to him, Ottoman, Russian, and Chinese civilizations are continuous and Republic period can be defined as a period of pause.

In sum, Ottomanism can be defined as a state policy which aims to keep together different ethnicities and cultures of the Ottoman Empire as an opposing debate for nationalistic movements in the early 19th century. Ottomanism was created

in order to protect the unity of the lands of the Ottoman Empire. The idea of Ottomanism was effective between 1839-1913 and can be divided into four different periods. The first period started with Tanzimat and lasted between 1839-1875 and aimed to prevent separatist movements. The second phase was a reaction against the authoritarian policies of Tanzimat. New Ottomans emphasized on citizenship and constitution. The third period of Ottomanism can be considered as the closing of the assembly in 1878 because of the Ottoman-Russian War. Ottoman politicians and intellectuals formed an opposition towards Abdülhamit the Second. But among Young Turks, there was also no clear consensus about the concept of Ottomanism. The last period of Ottomanism was the second Constitutional era in 1908. During this phase, freedom of political opinions existed along with the constitution.

However, even though Ottomanism was a powerful weapon, it could not achieve to become an ideology of the whole empire. In this sense, neo-Ottomanism cannot be evaluated differently than Ottomanism. Similarly, neo-Ottomanism can be considered as a policy of creating economic unity in the new century.

Turgut Özal's administration can be considered as the first step towards neo-Ottomanism. In developing neo-Ottomanist ideas, he formed an effective cooperation with *Türkiye Günlüğü* (Ankara-based, right-wing monthly journal) (Çolak Y. , 2006). One of the main leading figures in the formulation of neo-Ottomanism was 'imperial vision' of moving towards a multicultural and multiethnic structure. Neo-Ottomanists rejected the ethnic version of Turkish nationalism and reinterpreted Turkish identity on the multiethnic and multireligious bases and universal liberal values.

In 2002, the Justice and Development Party (JDP-AKP) came in power after the frustration due to coalition governments in the 1990s. After decades of Western-

oriented foreign policy, JDP tried to implement a multi-dimensional foreign policy including the Middle East, Africa and Central Asia. This tendency was evaluated as 'axis shift' in Turkish foreign policy from West to East and correlated with the Islamic roots of the party (Hoffmann & Cemgil, 2016). This tendency could be perceived as the efforts to be active in the region rather than isolation from the conflicts. Ahmet Davutoğlu took part in this new foreign policy implementation process firstly as a foreign policy advisor to the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan from 2002 to 2009 (Özpek & Demirağ, 2012).

In 2009, Ahmet Davutoğlu was appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs by then Prime Minister Erdoğan. At this point, he started to implement the principles that he explained in his book entitled "Strategic Depth: Turkey's International Standing" published in 2001 (Özpek & Demirağ, 2012). His book can be considered as the handbook for Turkish foreign policy of his term. Strategic depth doctrine can be defined as the sum of Ahmet Davutoğlu's foreign policy thoughts. His point of view for Turkish foreign policy in the new era was replacing the importance of geopolitics of Turkey with a role of the problem-solving central country in the region through the use of soft power dynamics and increased level of cooperation (Aras, 2014).

Davutoğlu sets methodological and operational standards for Turkish foreign policy for guidance. According to him, methodological principles are as follows; a) Turkish foreign policy has only been reactive, responding to crisis especially during the Cold War period but there was a need for following an active foreign policy based on a vision, b) Turkish foreign policy for different regions should be in line with each other, and there should not be an overall contradiction, and c) Military power should

be kept due to the instability in the region. However, the use of soft power should be emphasized in order to increase regional influence. In order to implement the desired foreign policy, methodological principles should be supported with operational principles that can be defined as; a) The needs for security and democracy should be balanced, b) Level of cooperation with the neighbors should be increased, c) Proactive foreign policy can help Turkey to achieve preventive peace diplomacy, d) Multi-dimensional foreign policy should focus on cooperation rather than competition, and e) Turkey should be more involved in international politics by using a rhythmic diplomacy.

In his book, Davutoğlu does a geopolitical and historical analysis for Turkey's situation and argues that Turkey should hold a more important position in international politics based on these elements (Langan, 2017). Moreover, he criticizes that Turkey can not use its potential fully since Turkish foreign policy favors static and status quo rather than a change. Through multi-dimensional foreign policy, Davutoğlu explains that even though relations with traditional allies such as the United States of America and/or the European Union (EU) are important, efforts should be made to form new allies. As part of geographical depth, good relations with the West should be kept, but relations with the East should be focus to improve. Russia, Iran, Central Asia, and the Caucasus should be on the list to improve relations, whereas global powers such as India and China are defined as balancing actors for Turkish foreign policy.

Davutoğlu sets Turkey as the central power via a multidimensional foreign policy. By taking geopolitical advantages, Turkey should follow a zero-problem strategy with neighbors (Zeren, Yılmaz, & Akbulut, 2017). Even though this phrase

became popular, this strategy was the precondition of a more extensive policy approach. By defusing regional tension, enabling broader regional engagement, and forging economic interdependence, AKP facilitated Turkey's willingness for a new international role as a mediator and facilitator in regional and international organizations (Dalay & Friedman, 2013).

According to Davutoğlu, Turkey tries to implement a rhythmic diplomacy by pushing activism in diplomacy and also to achieve a more active role in international organizations. For this aim, Turkey hosted NATO and OIC Summits and additionally maintained an observer status in the African Union. These activities were also supported in the social level by various organizations (Dalay & Friedman, 2013). We can see some major cornerstones in Turkish politics related to the foreign policy. The appointment of Ahmet Davutoğlu as a minister can be evaluated as one since he was willing to establish some sort of Pax Ottomana with his zero-problems policy (Saz, 2011). This claim is also consistent with the Islamic background of AKP.

The rhythmic and proactive foreign policy approach underlines that despite the end of the Cold War, Turkey was not able to take the chance of diversifying its policies. According to Davutoğlu, proactive diplomacy could create an active role in international organizations. In this sense, interventions should go further than the regional crisis, and Turkey should take necessary initiatives to achieve regional peace and stability. There are four basic principles of rhythmic and proactive diplomacy: (i) indivisibility of security, (ii) dialogue, (iii) economic interdependence, and (iv) cultural harmony and mutual respect. Firstly, the indivisibility of security means a country's security is very much dependant on the security of its neighbors. Secondly, the dialogue is emphasized since it can help to resolve all the conflicts. Thirdly,

economic interdependence is important for avoiding uncertainty and maintaining peace. Lastly, cultural harmony and mutual respect are necessary for understanding each other and recognizing the cultural differences which can cause regional problems.

The zero problems with neighbors policy of Davutoğlu, seems similar to Atatürk's policy of peace at home and peace abroad. However, it may not be easy to implement. Because zero problems policy mainly works towards neighbors of Turkey with whom problems exist from the historical background. Cyprus conflict with Greece, so-called Genocide debate with Armenia and Kurdish issue with Southeastern neighbors have still not been solved, and tension continues for many of them. These disputes do not enable Turkey to act as a regional leader because the problematic neighbors do not support the leadership of Turkey.

Davutoğlu's zero-problems with neighbors principle, in a broader sense can be evaluated as in the immediate neighborhood. In this framework, Turkey played a greater role in regional integration and even was the chairman of the South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) while Europe was dealing with more internal and financial problems. On the other hand, AKP always supported membership of Balkan countries for the European Union and being part of a greater free trade zone since that would create a backdoor for Turkey's increased trade volumes. In other words, the welfare of Balkan states would also serve Turkey's interests, which results in a win-win case (Akşit, 2014).

Historically, Turkey has had problems with its neighbors. In his strategic depth doctrine, Davutoğlu mentions about zero-problems with neighbors policy to end cross-border conflicts and aims to develop closer relations in the neighborhood

(Cohen, 2016). For this aim, mutual interdependence can be created through diplomacy, international negotiation, political, economic, and socio-political mechanisms. Therefore, to increase trade volumes and to build close economic relations also improve the wellbeing of the Turkish economy while providing a contribution to zero problems with neighbors policy.

Another point to consider while analyzing current Turkish Foreign Policy, especially during AKP term, is Neo-Ottomanism. Neo-Ottomanism is a Turkish political ideology that, in its broadest sense, promotes greater engagement with areas formerly under the Ottoman Empire (Erşen, 2013). Neo-Ottomanism can be viewed as an opportunist perspective of Kemalist foreign policy about one state (Erdem, 2017). The reason for that statement is analyzed by Ömer Taşpınar's paper entitled 'Turkey's Middle East Policies: between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism' which suggests a new perspective for citizenship. Since it allows for less ethnic and more multicultural citizenship, even internal politics might be affected by the emergence of this Neo-Ottomanism. The Neo-Ottomanist foreign policy encourages increased engagement in these regions as part of Turkey's growing regional influence. This terminology is used for determining Turkish foreign policy under the Justice and Development Party (AKP). On the other hand, Neo-Ottomanism can represent a shift from the traditional Turkish foreign policy of the Kemalist ideology (Saraçoğlu & Demirkol, 2014).

Neo-Ottomanism originally is a mid-nineteenth century movement that loosely gathered intellectuals from different branches of literature, journalism, arts, and politics, where the main drive of the members of the movement was to implement reforms in the Ottoman Empire through internal dynamics. In this respect, reforms

aiming at modernization was criticized in Tanzimat (Erdem, 2017). The neo-Ottomans can be described as liberals who were focused on the romanticist ideas of freedom, and they contributed to the Constitution, which was declared in 1876.

Ali Fuat Borovali, who is specialized on this issue, explains that states which are reinvestigating great multicultural empires in the post-Cold War era, where “the notion of ethnicity, nation-state and the problem of multi-cultural co-existence” increasingly held center stage on global agenda. Moreover, he mentions that to understand the Neo-Ottomanism in the 1990s, we need to analyze three columnists closely. The first one is Hadi Uluengin, who wrote for the daily *Hürriyet*. According to Uluengin, neo-Ottomanism was not used to describe an imperialist vision but should be admitted that Turkey could have closer relations with former territories of the Ottoman Empire after the Cold War. In addition to this, Turkey should consider the need for understanding the history, including Ottoman history, which can not be evaluated apart from Turkish history. The crucial part of understanding history is to be objective about both the conflicts and the opportunities. In that sense, neo-Ottomanism provides a base for fixing the linkage between Ottomans and Republicans. Secondly, Zülfü Livaneli’s article entitled “Neo-Ottoman or Ottoman Hinterland?” in the daily *Sabah* should be analyzed deeply. In this article, Livaneli pointed out the risk of a misunderstanding about the usage of neo-Ottomanism, which could be considered as ignorance for Turkish. Therefore, he underlines that Ottoman hinterland should be perceived as a cultural aspect solely and not to go any further than this. Lastly, Cengiz Çandar wrote an article entitled “Turgut Özal: The Ottoman of the 21st Century” and mentioned about the policies of Özal which could bring a new approach for Turkish foreign policy. According to Çandar, neo-Ottomanism determines the way how it was done by Ottomans and to analyze whether if it can still

be done similarly (Yanık, 2011). Moreover, he argued that the Ottoman Empire was built by moral and cultural values rather than military power.

In Neo-Ottomanism, both domestic and foreign aspects were included. In that sense, Özal used it to determine a multicultural state like a mosaic. For its use in foreign policy, Neo-Ottomanism provides means of soft power for Turkey (Dönmez, 2015). Neo-Ottomanism does not foresee neither for imperialism nor an Islamic state but reinforces secularism for domestic politics and diplomatic activism for foreign politics.

Despite the fact that there has not been a clear definition of neo-Ottomanism, the concept has been associated with Turkish Foreign Policy of AKP era. According to the basic argument of Neo-Ottomanism, Turkey has not been engaged with former Ottoman lands such as the Balkans, Middle East, and Africa in the 20th century and needs to play greater roles in these regions. From the Islamist perspective, we can talk about some difference between the views of Davutoğlu and Necmettin Erbakan, who was an Islamist Prime Minister in Turkish history (Özkan, 2014). The main difference between their perceptions is that Erbakan aimed in building a unified Muslim World by cutting ties with the West whereas Davutoğlu defines Muslim countries and East as complimentary of each other for Turkish politics (Özpek & Demirağ, 2012).

On the other hand, we can detect some similarities between Davutoğlu and Özal in terms of their perspective about Neo-Ottomanism. First one is the willingness for restructuring state mechanism in order to be in harmony with an international positioning. Second, establishing a new political identity and culture despite the rise of nationalism. Third, efforts to link Western values and morals with new political identity. Fourth, aims for the integration with the EU. Fifth, searching for a common

strategy for alliances with the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (USA). According to Davutoğlu, Turkey should focus on closer relations not only for the needs of political diversification but also due to its natural leadership potential. Turkey has a comparative advantage of becoming globally active. He believes that Neo-Ottomanism also increases Turkey's value and image for western countries through playing an influencer role.

In this sense, historical depth is important for creating links between past, present, and future, whereas geographical depth defines the influence area such as domestic, regional, and global. The geo-cultural, geo-political, and geo-economic factors that contribute to the strategic depth of a country could only be genuinely interpreted at the intersection of these historical and geographic paradigms.

In line with Westernism, Turkey has followed a policy to build closer relations with the Western world and for the integration of Western institutions. AKP's view of foreign affairs and world politics is differentiated than Kemalists. In foreign affairs, the security-oriented view has been abandoned. In order to build common values and goals, there was a need for an active foreign policy which Davutoğlu states as rhythmic. Therefore, 'peace at home, peace in the world' principle has been reevaluated. Passive politics would not allow Turkey to achieve maintaining such a principle, but active politics would (Aktay, 2010). For this reason, Turkey can not behave recklessly for international conflicts. Unlike Kemalists, AKP has prioritized traditional conservative values and tried to combine Ottoman-Islamic culture with modern Western states, therefore we can say that AKP aims to follow a post-modernist perspective in politics. AKP separates ethnic and religious factors from nationalism by putting emphasis on Ottoman heritage, cultural and unitarial

bonds. AKP carried on the foreign policy perspective started with Özal administration. At this point, the main argument was the realization of Turkey's shift from a small state to a regional power. In order to achieve such a shift, Turkey has to build strategic relations with the cornerstones of world politics in a flexible sense. Moreover, bilateral economic relations and regional cooperation would make a positive contribution to this goal (Efegil, 2012).

According to İbrahim Kalın, who was the chief policy advisor to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Director of the Office of Public Diplomacy, Turkey's foreign policy carries both the elements of globalization and self-interest. He states that Turkey tries to adopt its needs to global politics (Kalın, 2012). In addition to this, he explains three principles of Turkish Foreign Policy: (a) the emphasis put by Turkish leaders for the base of global order to be set on justice and equality, (b) keeping a balance between security and freedom for both domestic and foreign policy, and (c) developing better political relations by keeping the international trade and investment at a certain level (Kalın, 2012).

1.2. Neo-Ottomanism as a Tool for Soft-Power Politics

After World War II (WWII), the importance of the Balkan Pact decreased due to the new circumstances because the new international conditions forced the Balkan states to choose one or the other side to be part of and they had to support the bloc politics. Turkey chose to become a part of Western bloc against the Soviet Union threat. Therefore, Balkan countries and Turkey became members of two different blocs. This resulted in almost no relations between Turkey and the Balkans during the Cold War period. Özal, during his administration, tried to increase Turkey's effect on Balkan countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Ataman, 2013). However,

these states did not want to be directed by any outside power anymore. Turkey, therefore, could not become a ‘big brother’ for them quickly. However, as the tension turned to conflicts and wars in the Balkans, Turkey became part of the issues inevitable due to both religious and cultural bonds. Between 1990-1998, the main question was about the base of the relations between Turkey and new states in the Balkans.

In the early years of the Turkish Republic, Turkey could not engage with African countries due to the lack of stability in terms of political and economic independence. After WWII, African countries declared their independence due to the rise of human rights, democracy, etc. Turkey supported their independence and immediately recognized the new states. However, these countries formed Non-Aligned Countries, and Turkey had to be part of the western world, which resulted in following different politics. African countries later on established African Union and joined the United Nations as the biggest group holding the majority of the votes.

As soon as the Cold War ended, there was a power space for the development of regional powers since the world evolved into a multi-polar system from the bi-polar system. The definition of a regional power can be understood as a state which possesses power to lead the other states in the same region and can influence their actions in terms of political and economic affairs. The regional power is even expected to play a governor role among the states and represent their welfare at global or interregional institutions.

Moreover, a regional power should be able to attract social values, cultural popularity, and a positive reputation besides its material capacity. Since the perception of regional power is highly important, the state should also focus on

demographic variables, education quality, income distribution, etc. However, the main obstacle stems from the level of differentiation between a regional power and a middle power. Middle power can be defined as a state which is not a great power but still has an international influence. A middle power cannot change the system, but a group of middle powers can create an impact. On the other hand, a regional power can hold greater power than a middle power. The same drawback is also relevant for the definition of a superpower and a great power. But in short, a regional power can create a certain level of influence in the region but not at the global level (Ataman, 2013). A regional power can act in two ways: either as a soft power or hard power. While military power capacity is the main aspect of hard power, soft power consists of variables such as regional cultural charisma, regional leadership, humanitarian values, etc. Soft power term has become more popular due to the need for creating a positive perception of other states (Ataman, 2013).

The beginning of 2000s was important for Turkey because the elections in 2002 can be counted as a turn point for political history. AKP won the elections and took the government by centering its politics around conservative democracy. 2007 was another year of elections which started the second term of AKP. According to Ziya Öniş, focusing on the use of soft power and developing friendly relations with all neighbors were important principles of AKP's foreign policy (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2009). During the 1990s, the main axis of Turkish foreign policy was Turkey-US-Israel triangle. However, during the AKP administration, the EU has become a priority for Turkish foreign policy. Recently, Turkey has been playing the role of a benign regional power by using the resources of soft power (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2009).

When AKP has become the major power in Turkey following the elections in 2002, their liberal perspective was emphasized as the main argument. During the Özal period, liberal perspective was a major tendency in foreign policy, and this tendency has resulted in some limitations in the political aspect. However, AKP has further developed this liberalism and taken more planned actions. In addition to the liberal perspective, pragmatism, conservatism, and stability have become major cornerstones of their foreign policy (Çınar, 2011).

Actually, Turkey's soft power can be described a little bit different than what is usually mentioned in literature. Turkey's soft power stems from the cultural heritage of the areas in which the Ottoman Empire existed (Meral & Paris, 2010). This Ottoman heritage can be seen as the reason to keep people together even though they represent diversity and heterogeneity. Turkey holds valuable resources, is unique, and wants to take advantage of this heritage and open up new possibilities for the geopolitical influence. In the United States, soft power is also mentioned as "carrot and stick" but to put soft power in such a way may not work all the time. In this sense, Turkey's case is different because there are not many tangible benefits provided for this aim (Kalin, 2011). Turkey's soft power depends on its young population, historical heritage, cultural relations, and its growing economy and also contributes to establishing regional and global peace (Kalin, 2012).

The reasons for Turkey's interest on soft power in the 2000s can be stated as follows: a) the demands of the EU for decreasing the influence of Turkish Army on political issues, b) Turkey's tendency for acting in line with international norms more than any other Muslim country, c) the fail of modernization process of Middle East and increasing importance of Turkish state model, and d) positive internal dynamics

and politics which enable Turkey to use soft power. According to Kemal Kirişçi, after 30 years period of liberalization, Turkey has evolved to a state which uses economic means and soft power from a state that emphasized on its military power for each and every issue (Aras, 2014). Therefore, it shows that foreign policy cannot be detached from internal politics.

The least common form of state which uses soft power is imperial states. Imperial states prefer to exercise military power on regional states. Compared with hegemonies, regional powers are more likely to use soft power. However, not all regional powers would have such an opportunity. According to Davutoğlu, Turkey has this advantage, which stems from its democratic system. Turkey aims to be the model state in the region with its democracy, good relations with Western states, possible EU membership, and common culture (Arkan & Kınacıoğlu, 2016). Despite the uncertainty of the borders and effects of soft power, Turkey's soft power is mostly defined with the active foreign politics, young population, rising economy, cultural history, being part of the Muslim world and even the popularity of Turkish TV dramas in the Balkans and the Middle East.

In the last years, a new way of soft power has emerged for Turkey: Turkish soap operas. The Balkan channels started to broadcast Turkish movies and series following one another. This increased the penetration of Turkish culture into the region. The growing popularity of these series even replaced the Balkan interest in Latin-American soap operas (Kalin, 2012). Turkish TV series also gave a modern image of Turkey for those thinking of Turkish people as warriors. Therefore they can be considered as another weapon of cultural soft power since they boost curiosity toward Turkey.

Moreover, Turkish football teams are supported for the games against European teams. Turkish media is also an important tool for becoming a regional power. Via Neo-Ottomanism, Islamic discourse as part of such political propaganda is transferred. By using this propaganda, a perspective is created, and foreign policy is used for the sake of internal politics.

In addition to all these, education is another tool for soft power implementation in foreign politics. In recent years, the number of international students has been increasing worldwide. In order to benefit from this trend, Turkey also increased the number of available scholarships for international students and consolidated all different types of scholarships under “Turkey Scholarships”. For 2012-2013 education year, interviews were done in 49 different countries, and 3,951 students have benefited from the scholarships (Yurtdışı Türkler Başkanlığı, n.d.).

In the 1990s, the competition between Kemalist foreign policy perspective and Islamist foreign policy perspective became more visible. While the first one emphasized Western-oriented foreign policy dynamics, the latter primarily focused on developing closer relations with Muslim countries. When the Welfare Party (RP) formed the coalition government in 1996, its leader Necmettin Erbakan had a chance to develop projects based on his ideology. He put the relations with the Middle East on the priority at the expense of relations with West (Özkan, 2014). AKP, which could be defined as a successor party of RP, also continued this vision, but it is possible to define AKP’s approach as a combination of both (Hoffmann & Cemgil, 2016). On the other hand, AKP’s intention to get highly involved in regional matters and soft power approach on former Ottoman territories resulted in critics of imperialism and labeled with the term ‘Neo-Ottomanism’. The elements of soft power

were defined in Strategic Depth under different principles such as the linkage between economic efforts creating warmer relations and helping to achieve zero problems with the neighbors principle (Aras, 2014).

The rise of moderate Islamist AKP and the argument on axis shift was evaluated as the turnback of Ottoman vision (Erdem, 2017). Therefore, AKP's foreign policy created a perspective of expansionist neo-Ottomanism. But according to Davutoğlu, the head architect of AKP's foreign policy, their intentions on multi-dimensional active foreign policy has nothing to do with hegemonism and only aims to form regional peace and security that all the parties would benefit from. Therefore, he rejects the Neo-Ottomanistic elements in their foreign policy (Davutoğlu, 2011). He explains their view of foreign policy as follows: "The Turkish Republic is a modern nation-state and it has equal status with countries in the region. We can build diplomatic relations of equal status with any big or small country which was previously in Ottoman lands. This is what modern diplomacy requires." Zero-problems with neighbors is another term used for describing Turkey's new foreign policy. According to this framework, in the Balkans, Turkey wants to have a stabilizing influence, that also enables to protect the Muslim population. While doing this, as Davutoğlu puts it, Turkey should act as a 'Soft power' (Progonati, 2012).

According to Islamists, Turkey should be proud of Ottoman heritage, and they perceive Kemalists' view of Ottoman heritage as negatively and limited to the weaknesses and mistakes. However, the Ottoman Empire, as a Muslim state created justice and wellbeing for the whole community. One of the American Ambassadors in Turkey, James F. Jeffrey, interpreted the Islamist perspective as all old Ottoman

landscape were in better welfare during Ottoman administration based on Davutoğlu's speech in Sarajevo in 2009 (Reynolds, 2012).

The neo-ottomanist foreign policy describes the recent interventionist and mediating foreign policies of Turkey in the Middle East and the Balkans, which carries signs of the global power and influence of the old Ottoman Empire. Neo-Ottomanism can have a leverage effect on Turkish foreign policy by letting Turkey becoming a crucial state in the international arena. This is what policymakers also believe. A Neo-Ottomanist worldview focuses on "Ottoman cosmopolitanism" that can bring different people together by historical links. But, Kemalists consider that neo-Ottomanism will result in a utopia for foreign policy and accuse the government of being adventurous on this issue. Today's Neo-Ottomanism is based on cultural 'soft power' as a doctrine, but still, in practice, it's an ongoing will of Turkey to balance East and West in its politics (Erdem, 2017). This balance of politics may help Turkey to become a more global actor rather than staying as a regional actor. However, Neo-Ottomanism might not be successful by relying only on the cultural elements of soft power. Economic and even military elements might be needed to become more powerful in the region. Turkey should develop its weapon industry independently and decrease its dependence on Western powers for this. This handicap may have negative effects on Turkey's implementation of foreign policy and also slow down its way on becoming a regional power. Today, Turkey is active in most of the areas in the world and especially with its military power, and plays an important role in humanitarian operations. This also shows the level of reliability and trust by other nations towards Turkey.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey has started to build closer relations with Balkan Muslims. A lot of activities have been arranged in terms of trade, investments, infrastructures, energy supply, tourism, and culture. In the early 2000s, the Balkans had become a priority for Turkey, and lots of investments were made in terms of education, restoration, and economy. The idea behind this was to make people a believer in the argument that a more powerful and active Turkey would also increase the quality of life in these areas. This also meant that Turkey would play the big brother role for the younger siblings (Remiddi, 2013).

Turkey's interest in the Balkans can also be evaluated as a security-oriented foreign policy due to the instability in the closer neighborhood. The end of the Cold War and communism resulted in the collapse of Yugoslavia which played an important role in the foreign policy of Turkey towards the Balkans. The instability in the area caused the rise of conflicts and war period, which also affected Turkey due to the Muslim population in the Balkans and the part of population with Balkan origins in Turkey. In order to decrease this tension, Turkey volunteered to play a mediator role by following a multidimensional foreign policy as any regional power would do (Akşit, 2014).

Turkey has so far focused on the Balkans region to include this area as part of its foreign policy since the region has been important strategically throughout history. Turkey has made some diplomatic moves to speed up the relations with, especially Western Balkan countries. Especially in the solution process of ethnic conflicts, Turkey has gained the status of soft power by itself. Turkey's role in this process was very meaningful in terms of the integration process. Peace-building activities and

efforts of Turkey was appreciated by the sides of the issue. This refers to the mediating role of Turkey in the area (Brljavac, 2011).

In Davutoğlu's opinion, the Balkans are very important for Turkey. The most important part of Ottoman history is related to the Balkans. Therefore, Turkey can not be defined without the Balkans, and vice versa. Moreover, European history can not also be understood without understanding Ottoman history. However, what makes history alive are historical buildings such as mosques, hammams, etc. In that sense, Turkey has to keep history alive by supportive activities.

In addition to the Balkans, Africa has been one of the latest focus areas for Turkey. In the early years of the Turkish Republic, Turkey could not engage with African countries due to the problems of stability in terms of political and economic independence in the region. After WWII, African countries declared their independence due to the rise of human rights, democracy, etc. Turkey supported their independence and immediately recognized the new states. However, these countries formed Non-Aligned Countries, and Turkey had to be part of the western world, which resulted in following different politics. African countries later on established African Union and joined the United Nations as the biggest group holding the majority of the votes.

In the late 1990s, İsmail Cem, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, tried to build closer relations with the region and therefore published 'African Action Plan'. However, the political instability of coalition governments in Turkey did not let any further developments. After coming to power, AKP published a wider version of this document as entitled 'Strategy of Improving Economic and Commercial Relations with African Countries' in 2003 and declared 2005 as 'Year of Africa' which

indicated that Turkey would focus on relations within this region (Akpınar, 2013). Moreover, these were followed by the declaration of Turkey as a strategic partner of the African Union in January 2008 and hosting Turkey–Africa Cooperation Summit on 18–21st of August in Istanbul.

Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained the crucial points for improving the relations with Africa as: (i) establishing high-level visits to Africa and protecting the legitimate rights and interest of African countries in international organizations, (ii) supporting Africa economically and continuing on providing humanitarian aid, (iii) acting as a mediator for conflict resolution processes, and, (iv) being part of peacekeeping activities in Africa. For this aim, Turkey has started to use soft power strategies for collaboration in the economy.

In the concept of socio-cultural relations, Turkish Prime Ministry's Directorate of Communications (BYEGM) organized "Turkey-Africa Media Forum" on 8-12th of May in 2012 in Ankara with the support of African Media Initiative (AMI). 280 attendees from 54 member countries of the African Union had the chance to discuss media, economics, trade, and cultural dimensions of bilateral relations. At the end of the forum, a declaration was published. According to this declaration, the following points were agreed: a) Building closer relations in media in addition to political and economic dimensions of Turkey-African relations, b) Creating platforms for media workers to get together, c) Using communication channels effectively by institutionalizing regional media, d) Organizing exchange programs between BYEGM and AMI, and e) Providing technical and equipment support in order to improve African media industry (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi, 2012).

Another point of contact for Turkey-Africa relations has been Religious Leaders Summit, which was organized by Diyanet of Turkey. The first one was organized on 1-3rd of November in 2006 and the second one on 21-24th of November in 2011. This summit aimed to support Turkey's African politics by sharing Turkey's history and culture, improving collaboration with African countries, providing religious information for Muslims in Africa.

The second Summit was organized with the "Equal brothers of the World" slogan. At this meeting, issues such as building formal relations between religious authorities of Turkey and African countries, the concept of student exchange programs, evaluating twin town projects were discussed (TRT Haber, 2011). As a result, a declaration was published which pointed out improving technical collaboration, supporting religious education and providing scholarships for those who want to study in Turkey, establishing "Afro-Asian Islam World Religious Authorities Union" for the stability and peace in the region, and opening religious representative offices in the region by Turkey (TRT Haber, 2011).

According to Davutoğlu, Turkey, with the aim of becoming a global power, can not stay away from the conflicts around its borders. Especially after Bosnia and Kosovo crisis, Turkey believed to point out the effect of international support in such circumstances in order to stabilize the conflicts. The basics of AKP politics also justify the interest and willingness of Turkey to build close relations in this area around religious, economic and educational bounds which can be evaluated as means of soft power (Grigoriadis, 2014).

For Davutoğlu, geopolitics and culture are the basis of Turkey's foreign policy on Balkan Muslims. In order to strengthen the bonds within the area, Turkey needs to

continue its existence in the resolution of conflicts. He also puts emphasis on international platforms such as the United Nations (UN) and NATO for the involvement of global politics. Behind Davutoğlu's doctrine, there also lies the fact that the economic crisis in the Eurozone, has led Turkey to search for new markets for its economic growth and maintaining trade volumes. Despite Turkey's efforts and agreements signed so far, it can be said that his theory on strategic depth has not been realized yet (Fekete, 2016).

Although there is not a strong anti-Western element in the formula of Turkish foreign policy, the Turkish public has some frustration about Turkey's membership for the EU. This also brings reorientation at some level in terms of trade and economics. The recent changes in the Turkish foreign policy are the result of these considerations. Therefore, Turkey embarks in a mixed approach to establish economic ties with Middle Eastern countries and seems to take Western markets for granted. According to Mr. Ömer Bollat, a former head of the Turkish business confederation as Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (MÜSİAD), the recent Turkish efforts aiming to lessen the dependence on EU markets are necessary to provide economic diversification (Saz, 2011). Mustafa Türkeş, a professor in Middle East Technical University (METU), claims that there are three main views related with Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Balkans. According to the first view, Turkey has been playing the most active role ever since in history. To accomplish this role, Turkey uses a mediator position in the conflicts among Balkan nations. Another tool for this aim is to support their membership for NATO and the EU, which means that Turkey is not taking a competitive position against Western countries over Balkan countries.

The second view is accepted mainly by a group of academicians represented by Ziya Öniş. In his article entitled “Multiple Faces of the New Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique”, he mentions about these ideas. The second group can be considered as more critical compared to the first group. The criticism arises from the fact that the active policy of Turkey has almost no clear base which may lead an unmeaningful foreign policy and relations. Related with the change in the axis of Turkish Foreign Policy, they support their critics with economic factors such as trade volumes. While trade volume increases with the East and the Middle East, we do not observe such an increase with the Western axis. Mainly, they talk about a need for a clear locus of focus. Otherwise, according to them, Turkish Foreign Policy can not be very successful (Saz, 2011). The third view states that international system sometimes can provide opportunities for the actors to take advantage of. Davutoğlu also personally believes that AKP foresees these opportunities and acts accordingly. However, according to the third group, the disadvantage stems from the fact that the opportunities are limited, and actions cannot be more than the bonds which are granted (Saz, 2011).

Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) has worked on cultural and educational fields in the area so far as elements of soft power. Many refurbishments of the Ottoman artistic and architectural heritage across the Western Balkans and Africa have been done and still ongoing. TİKA is not only the refurbishing the old ones but also building new ones. One example of this is the building of new mosques as a result of the engagement of the Presidency of Religious Affairs in a symbolic reappropriation of the Ottoman legacy of the peninsula. In terms of education, primary and secondary Turkish schools are very popular in the area, especially in areas where the Muslim population is high. The schools are popular due

to the high standards of education, openness to all ethnic groups, use of English language, and emphasis on values such as tolerance and brotherhood (Saz, 2011).

Turkey also uses the foundations and cultural centers as a means of soft power. One of them is Yunus Emre Institute, which is directly working under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The first branch of the Foundation was established in Sarajevo, then spread to Fojnica, Tirana, Skodar, Skopje, Pristina, and Prizren. Yunus Emre Institute collects public and private funds to support the restoration of mosques and madrasas in the former Yugoslavia and Albania. Other than Yunus Emre Institute, similarly, the Turgut Özal Education Company also established a network of primary and secondary schools in Albania since 1992 (Saz, 2011).

1.3. Discourse Analysis Of Ahmet Davutoğlu On Neo-Ottomanism

In this research, the rhetoric of Ahmet Davutoğlu is analyzed during the period of his ministry of foreign affairs between 2009-2014. The data has been gathered from the website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The material is categorized as speeches, press releases, and articles. The discourse analysis was performed on all data.

The vocabulary is also categorized as the first coding and second coding in terms of the level of meaning in order to understand the messages given specifically. The vocabulary of first coding means the message is given clearly and directly whereas the vocabulary of second coding means the message is not communicated directly, but instead, a type of referral in the perception is preferred.

Table 1: *The Level of Vocabulary Coding*

Wording	Level of meaning
Ottoman (Osmanlı)	First coding
Neo-Ottomanism (Neo-Osmanlıcılık)	First coding
New-Ottomanism (Yeni-Osmanlıcılık)	First coding
Regional (Bölgesel)	First coding
Power (Güç)	First coding
Balkans (Balkanlar)	First coding
Africa (Afrika)	First coding
Heritage (Miras)	Second coding
Foreign policy (Dış politika)	Second coding
Collaboration (İşbirliği)	Second coding
Brotherhood (Kardeşlik)	Second coding
Friendship (Dostluk)	Second coding
Tradition (Gelenek)	Second coding
Bonds (Bağ)	Second coding

During Davutoğlu period, 48 press releases have been published, and all of them are included in the analysis. Table 2 presents the distribution of press releases each year. As seen from the table, the number of releases decreases as the years pass before the change of duty in 2014. We see a consistency between the years 2009, 2010 and 2011. If discourse is aimed at shaping perception, we can see that the effect has started to decrease in 2012.

Table 2: *The Distribution of Press Releases Among Years* (adopted by the author)

Year	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Total
# of Press Releases	11	10	12	8	6	1	48

When the press releases are deeply analyzed, the list of selected vocabulary points out some unseen facts. According to Table 3, we can clearly see that there is no emphasis on the Ottoman Empire and Neo-Ottomanism, they are not used at all. However, on the other side, ‘brotherhood’ has been used extensively, which shows us that there is a hidden message here. Because Turkey wants to act as a bigger brother for such countries, therefore, due to the negative perception of Neo-Ottomanism, it seems that Davutoğlu preferred to use similar meanings. Moreover, the words friendship, collaboration, and regional were the most widely used in line with Turkey’s foreign policy perspective in that period.

Table 3: *The Frequency of Usage of Vocabulary List in Press Releases* (adopted by the author)

Wording	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Total
Ottoman		3	1				4
Neo-Ottomanism							0
New-Ottomanism							0
Regional	26	25	18	12	12		93
Power	9	18	18	21	15		81
Africa	9		9	4			22
Balkans	8	7	4	1	3		23
Heritage	1		1				2
Foreign policy	27	24	7	2			60
Collaboration	35	49	8	9	5		106
Brotherhood	16	13	58	34	25	3	149
Friendship	26	21	27	19	24		117
Tradition	3	7	9	5	2		26
Bounds	4	12	7	1	4		28

Total	164	179	167	108	90	3	711
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During Davutoğlu period, 83 speeches have been made, and all of them are included in the analysis. Table 4 shows the distribution of speeches among years. As seen from the table, the number of speeches started to decrease after 2012. We see a consistent increase until 2012, which is turnpoint of Davutoğlu's popularity. During the earlier years, we understand his attempt to shaping perceptions.

Table 4: *The Distribution of Speeches Among Years* (adopted by the author)

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Total
# of Speeches	6	14	14	22	16	11	83

When the speeches are analyzed in detail, the list of selected vocabulary gives us clarification about the rhetoric strategy of Davutoğlu. According to the table below, we see that there is a certain emphasis on the Ottoman Empire, but Neo-Ottomanism is not used at all. The high frequency of 'brotherhood' and 'power' gives a secondary meaning such as "Turkey is a powerful brother". When we examine the location of those speeches, we see that 69 of them were made in Turkey. Combined with the use of frequencies, it can be considered that emphasis on the Ottoman Empire is meaningful for shaping internal politics and political agenda of AKP. In line with the number of speeches, we see that the usage frequency of selected vocabulary has started to decrease in 2013.

Table 5: *The Frequency of Usage of Vocabulary List in Speeches* (adopted by the author)

Wording	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Total
Ottoman	9	17	22	11	23	13	95
Neo-Ottomanism							0
New-Ottomanism			1	1	3		5
Regional	5	39	23	42	9	8	126

Power	30	88	67	102	113	77	477
Africa	4	31	32	75	175	59	376
Balkans	1	48	61	33	29	8	180
Heritage	11	2	5	13	7	26	64
Foreign policy	20	26	31	91	69	17	254
Collaboration	20	33	10	47	8	24	142
Brotherhood	10	26	59	178	113	63	449
Friendship	17	16	51	56	55	12	207
Tradition	8	22	29	100	67	22	248
Bounds	5	16	25	25	24	14	109
Total	140	364	416	774	695	343	2732

During Davutoğlu period, 21 articles were published, and all of them are included in the analysis. Table 6 presents the distribution of articles among years. As seen from the table, 2009, the first year of his ministry is the one with the highest number of articles. We can not mention about consistency among years. Compared to the press release and speeches, we can say that articles were not given much importance as a tool for rhetoric strategy.

Table 6: *The Distribution of Articles Among Years* (adopted by the author)

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Total
# of Articles	10	2	5	3	1	0	21

In terms of location, all the articles were published, outside of Turkey. Therefore, we may understand why the frequency of ‘collaboration’ is the highest among all the vocabulary. In addition to that, weak emphasis on the Ottoman Empire and the absence of Neo-Ottomanism can be considered as a signal of how Turkey wants to be perceived by other countries.

Table 7: *The Frequency of Usage of Vocabulary List in Articles* (adopted by the author)

Wording	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Total
Ottoman	11		1	1			13
Neo-Ottomanism							0

New-Ottomanism							0
Regional	33	1	3				37
Power	33	2	4	8	4		51
Africa			6				6
Balkans	50						50
Heritage	4			1			5
Foreign policy	4			2			6
Collaboration	32	9	7	12			60
Brotherhood	3	1	3				7
Friendship	17		6	7			30
Tradition	1			1			2
Bounds	22	2	2	4			30
Total	210	15	32	36	4	0	297



CHAPTER 2. NEO-OTTOMANISM in THE BALKANS

2.1. Case Study 1: Relations With Macedonia

2.1.1. State of Politics

Turkey has supported the changes in the Balkan geography beginning from the 1990s. When the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) collapsed, for instance, Turkey tried to take advantage of new collaborations in terms of economic and political. Existence of the Muslim community in the Balkans and their support to Turkey due to historical heritage from the Ottoman Empire are the most important factors in this. In the process of the collapse of Yugoslavia, Turkey firstly supported the unity of the land. However, in the later process, Turkey could not support the newly founded republics.

On 25th of June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia; in September 1991, Macedonia; in November 1991, Bosnia and Herzegovina declared their independence. As a result of this, in April 1992, there was only Yugoslavia, Serbia, and Montenegro were left to hold the federation together (Adiyaman, Bilgesam, 2012).

On 15th of January 1992, the EU declared the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia whereas Bulgaria recognized Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in addition to the first two countries. Turkey declared the recognition of these four states on the 6th of February 1992 and started the diplomatic relations on 22nd of August 1992 by sending ambassadors to these countries. Turkey also signed Security Protocol with Macedonia, which also shows the direction of Turkish politics. As for all other Balkan countries, Turkey was desperate to build close relations with Macedonia and became a supporter in the international arena such as the EU and

NATO membership processes (Adıyaman, Bilgesam, 2012). This also has worked as an advantage for Macedonia since the newly formed country had major problems with its neighbors especially with Greece. Turkey chose to provide support to Macedonia both to protect the Turkish community in the country and keep the stability in the Balkans.

The Republic of Macedonia is located in Western Balkans and covers approximately 25.713 km² with a population of 2.077.328 according to July 2011 census of population. The population consists of %64,2 Macedonians, %25,2 Albanians, %3,9 Turks, %2,7 Roman, %1,8 Serbs, and %2,2 Bosnian. The classification in terms of religion is as follows: %64,7 Macedonian Orthodox and %33,3 Muslim. Based on these numbers, it can be argued the diversity of the country in terms of ethnicity and religion might cause tension toward the peace in the Balkans (Biçer & Doğru, 2013).

Many high-level visits were performed during the 1990s. In February 1993, Turgut Özal, the President of Turkey, visited Macedonia. In 1995, Süleyman Demirel visited Skopje and signed the “Friendship and Collaboration Agreement”. While the relations were on the fast track, it had to slow down suddenly due to the Bosnian War. The war has been a milestone for the relations, and following 1995, Macedonia’s best friend has become Greece, and the economic relations boomed up even though the political problems remained as unsolved.

Kiro Gligorov, who was elected as the President of Macedonia on 27th of January 1991, was a moderate politician on minority issues and supported the right of minorities to organize a political party. After the multi-party system has been established in Macedonia, Erdoğan Saraç established “Turkish Democratic Union

(TDU)” which was then named as “Turkish Democratic Party” (TDP) or “Demokratska Partija na Turcite”. This party holds the importance of being the first political institution for Turks in Macedonia (Biçer & Doğru, 2013).

At the elections on 5th of July in 2006, TDP had two deputies out of 120 at the Macedonian Parliament. Following this, 1st of June 2008 elections resulted in one deputy and one minister of state as part of “For a Better Macedonia” Coalition. Same results were valid also for 2011 elections on 5th of June. On 2011 elections, Turkish Movement Party has been listed as part of the coalition consisting of 16 parties with Social Democrats Union. However, the party was not listed as deputy elections. Turkish National Union Movement, which was established in 2006, also took place in the same coalition (Haberler, 2011).

Despite all of these efforts, it is hard to say that the Turkish community effectively takes place in the political environment of Macedonia. Even though Turks voted for the independence on the referendum unlike Albanians, they are not counted as “founders of the state” in the Constitution. In addition to this, Turks are not represented enough at the bureaucratic levels. All these together make it harder for the Turkish community to find the possibility to raise their specific problems and have them solved due to lack of power in the political system.

Turkey supported the membership of Macedonia for NATO at Bucharest Summit in April 2008. However, due to the veto of Greece because of the state naming problem, Macedonia could not join the organization. After that, Macedonia wanted to sign “Strategic Agreement on Strengthening Bilateral Relations” during the visit of Antonio Miloşoski, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in Turkey in November

2008. With this agreement, it was aimed to increase the collaboration in every area between two countries (Adıyaman, Bilgesam, 2012).

2009 was one of the years in which a lot of visits have been done by both sides, and Cultural Collaboration Program was signed during the visit of Elizabeta Milevska, who was the Cultural Affairs Minister of Macedonia. In November 2010, Antonio Miloşoki passed the Presidency of European Council of Minister Concele to Ahmet Davutoğlu in Strasbourg (Altuğ, 2005).

2012 is the year when the immensity of the relations occurred. On 10-13th of January Turkey-Macedonia Friendship Group of Turkish Parliament has visited Macedonia. On the 10th of April, the President of Macedonia has attended the conference in Istanbul by giving a speech entitled “The Peace of Balkans- Shaping Future with Lessons Learned from the Past”. On 11-12nd of April, Macedonian President attended the Eurasia Economic Summit organized by Marmara Group Strategic and Social Research Foundation (Marmara Group Strategic and Social Research Foundation, 2012)

On 14-16th of May, Nikola Poposki, Foreign Affairs Minister of Macedonia, visited Turkey and signed an agreement for regulating the visa conditions of both countries. According to this agreement, citizens of both countries would not need visa during their stays not exceeding 90 days in 180 days. On 17-18th of May, Cemil Çiçek, the Chief of the Turkish Parliament, visited Macedonia with a group of ministers. During his visit, the focus was put on the good relations between two countries (Altuğ, 2005). On 22-24th of June, Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdağ visited Macedonia to attend the openings of various projects accomplished by TİKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency). The projects included the

renovation and opening of Mausoleum of Sinanudin Yusuf Çelebi near Ohrid and Voska Hammam. On 18-19th of October, Foreign Affairs Minister of Macedonia attended an international conference in Istanbul for the 100th Anniversary of the Balkan Wars.

On 20-21st of December, Ahmet Davutoğlu visited Macedonia for the occasion of 20th Anniversary of diplomatic relations. He also attended Turkish National Day and the Turkish Education Festival. At the press meeting, Davutoğlu and Poposki stated that political relations between the two countries are on a concrete base and both countries aim to increase the collaboration on economic and cultural issues. Additionally, they also underlined that the cultural tolerance in Macedonia is an important indicator for the stability of the Balkans (Posta Gazetesi, 2012).

NATO meetings were held in Skopje on 21-24th of April 2013. At this meeting, the process of integration for Macedonia with Euro-Atlantic Institutions was evaluated. The issues discussed during the meeting include the naming problem, the veto of Greece for Macedonia's membership for the EU and NATO, the possible effects of the problems on democracy, security, and economy of Macedonia. One of the items that was evaluated at the meeting was the tension caused by the "Skopje Square Project". The concept of the project was criticized by the international community, and the possibility of instability was underlined. Especially due to the high budget of this project, tension occurred since the unemployment rate was rising (Eddy, 2013).

The aim of AKP has been building long-term relations with the Balkans. If they succeed, not only Turkey but Turks and Muslims in the Balkans will also benefit. Turkey is a good example for Balkan countries in terms of economy and

political relations. The Balkan countries are still at the developing stage even though they take place in the middle of Europe. Turkish politicians perform their visits to Balkan countries with many businessmen. This helps to understand the investment opportunities and increasing short-term trade relations.

More importantly, this may enable Turkey to impose more political power on these countries. Especially, after Greece has been into economic turndown, Turkey's chance to become a more powerful actor in the area has been increased. Prime Minister Erdoğan, during his visit to Macedonia, put the emphasis on Macedonia's EU membership. Erdoğan stated that Greece has to step back on the naming problem and wave the veto on the EU. Turkish Prime Minister also explained that he believes Macedonia would become a member state earlier than Turkey (TRT Haber, 2011)

Ivanov, the President of Macedonia, explains that Turkey is the first country recognizing Macedonia and opening an Embassy. Besides, there is a strategic collaboration between Turkey and Macedonia on military issues. Turkey has signed all the documents of NATO with the note of "Turkey recognizes FYROM as the Republic of Macedonia". According to Ivanov, the support of Turkey stems from common history and shared values throughout the centuries. Even though Macedonia is not a member of NATO, its military takes place in duties in Afghanistan and Iraq. This should be perceived as proof that the Balkans has been evolved from unstable geography to a more stable one working for world peace (Dünya Bülteni, 2012).

The political relations should be perceived in line with economic relations. Turkey is in the top 10 list of Macedonia's trade partners, and both countries aim to increase the trade volume to one billion Euro (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, n.d.). However, Ivanov believes that Macedonia needs to increase exports to Turkey to

benefit more since Turkey serves a big market. For trade relations, not only the Turkish community in Macedonia but even the relatives living in Turkey plays an important role in the investments. The number of Macedonian businessmen who are working in collaboration with Turkish businessmen has been increasing in the last years.

Macedonian Turks have been searching for their rights on political and social issues ever since the formation of the Republic of Macedonia in 1991. Turkish Democratic Union (TDU) was formed on the 1st of July in 1990 with the aim of organizing the Turkish Community and defending their rights. Afterward, the union has evolved into a political party named as Turkish Democratic Party. On 18th of May 1995, Turkish Movement Party (TMP) has been established as the controversy party to TDP since TDP was not producing any solutions on the problems of Turkish Community (Turan, 1996).

During the crisis in 2001, the balances of Macedonian politics have been changed. After the crisis, TDP made an explanation on criticizing the terrorist movements in the country, whereas TMP stated that they were respectful on the unity of the country. These statements resulted in the formation of a new Turkish political party. Macedonian Turks Development Party has been formed due to the injustice faced by Albanians and Turks from Macedonians. They pointed out that Turks and Albanians should be on the same side against Macedonians and underlined the importance of the collaboration between two communities. However, the party was closed almost right after the formation.

In 2006, the former president of Turkish Democratic Party, Erdoğan Saraç, formed a new party named as Turkish National Union Movement. However, this

inflation on the number of political parties decreased the political effectiveness of Turkish parties in Macedonia due to fractionalism, and it became harder and harder for Turks to act together. There are different perspectives about the current status and future possibilities for the Turkish Community in Macedonia. According to Prof. Dr. Adnan Kahil, the President of Macedonia Turks Movement Party, there is an assimilation policy towards Balkan Turks, especially on new generations. He also criticizes Turkey for not considering the different perspectives of the Turkish community but only working in collaboration with one side of the table.

He also puts emphasis on the education problem of education in Turkish. Macedonian Government is not providing proper books and teachers with the claim that there is not enough demand for that. As a result, the quality of education decreases for Turkish students. In addition, Adnan Kahil underlined that the student exchange projects are not as effective as supposed to be. Since Turkish students are not successful, they are not able to go to university at all, which means the students coming from Macedonia to Turkey are not really Turkish, only a few Turkish students get this chance (Akasyam, 2015).

A more optimistic view is held by TDP. According to Dr. Kenan Hasip, Macedonia has gradually evolved in the last years in terms of rights and freedoms. Especially, Ohrid Agreement, which was signed in 2001 can be counted as one of the milestones in the history of the country. Through this agreement, Macedonia has changed the political system in the country (Dalkılıç, 2017). Hasip believes that even though Turks have been successful in getting their rights in most areas, there is still room for improvement. Moreover, close relations with the Turkish government is also

good support for the Turkish community. The perception of Turkey in the Balkans is positive, and the support of Turkey is welcomed.

On the other hand, Erdoğan Saraç, the founder of the Turkish National Union Party, thinks that ever since the independence of Macedonia, things are not getting better and even they are getting worse. According to him, in the times of former Yugoslavia, Turks used to have some rights as part of traditional life, but these were not enhanced during the shift to a democratic regime. He criticizes, therefore, whether there are any benefits of the new political system for Turks. He also validates his thesis with some numbers. In Macedonia, while the poverty is %30 in overall, among Turks, the rate goes up to 45.7%. Another disadvantage occurs in education. In Yugoslavia, education used to be free, and students were supported with scholarships. But today, most of the schools, especially universities, are subject to tuition fees, which is a negative factor in education (Çayırılı, n.d.).

Saraç continues to explain his view on the effectiveness of non-governmental organizations formed by the Turkish community. He explains that there is a need for unity between different groups, especially to address the common problems of the community. Dr. Veli Kreci, one of the founders of Analytica, views the position of Turks differently and positively. According to him, the Balkans has been swept into political instability ever since. This instability is the root cause of the continuous inflation of the new borders and states and minorities were affected negatively at most. After the collapse of Yugoslavia, six new states were established with a great diversity of ethnicity.

Kreci defends that one of the biggest problems is that there is no consistent cultural policy even though the Turkish community can do more on culturally. The

Macedonian Turks are divided into many political groups, and they are also distributed around the country socially. He even says that the Turks do not know each other due to geographic distribution and differences. In order to benefit more from the system, the Turks need to get united among themselves and be involved in the coalitions by understanding the country's current situation wisely.

Before the last elections, the Turkish Democratic Party (TDP), arranged a meeting in Gostivar on 27th of April 2014. Foreign Affairs Minister, Nikola Popovski, attended the meeting and said that the Turkish Democratic Party takes place in the coalition and they expect the support of the Turkish community as well. Hüseyin Bürge, who is AKP Deputy for Istanbul and President of Macedonia Friendship Group President in Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA), was also at the meeting to represent their support. Besides, the Turkish community supported two candidates from Turkish parties on Presidential elections. Turkish Democratic Party announced that they would continue with the current coalition and support Ivanov. On the other hand, the Turkish Movement Party and the Turkish National Union Party announced that they would support Stevo Pendarovski (Aljazeera Türk , 2014).

Considering the short history of diplomatic relations, it can be said that there has been a good starting point for the future of Turkish-Macedonian relations. On its part, Turkey has provided political support for Macedonia in the international arena, especially on the integration process of Euro-Atlantic institutions. The value of this support has increased ever since the beginning, considering the veto of Greece. However, in the last few years, the economic power of Greece has weakened, and now, there can be a better chance for Turkey to play the big brother role for

Macedonia. Additionally, cultural heritage and economic collaboration bring two countries closer to each other. Therefore, it is important to support this friendly relation with concrete actions.

A question can arise in the minds about the future of the relations especially when the membership status of the EU and NATO is completed. Is it possible that the relations may change in favor of Macedonia? Will Turkey still be able to play the big brother? It might be hard to project; however, two options may exist. Especially after the membership of the EU, Macedonia can step into another level, and Turkey's importance may decrease due to the integration with Europe. On the other hand, it is possible that Macedonia can act as another chair to support Turkey's membership this time. Whether the relations continue well, since the options of Macedonia increases, the politics may get tougher even though Turkey's friendship may remain as valuable.

Figure 2.1 presents the distribution of agreements between 2009-2014. The areas of collaboration were on air transportation, health, social security, and cultural activities. Since the number of agreements is many and varies among subjects, we can mention a formal relationship between the two countries.




Figure 2.1. Political Agreements with Macedonia among Years (adopted by the author)

2.1.2. Economic Relations

Turkey is the first country which signed an agreement for military collaboration with the Republic of Macedonia. With this agreement, military personnel of Macedonia has got the chance of training in Turkey. In 1998, Turkey offered 20 F-5 war planes for support, but Macedonia did not accept this offer. On 29th of June 1998, Defense Minister of Macedonia, Lazar Kitonovski, visited Turkey. An agreement, worth of one million USD was signed for strengthening Macedonian Army. Between 1998-2011, the total military aid had reached 16 million USD (Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, 2012).

Free Trade Agreement between Turkey and Macedonia was put in place in September 2000. According to this agreement, Turkey removed the tariffs on some goods, whereas Macedonia removed some of the tariffs at the same time but promised to remove the remaining ones in 2008. In 2001, Macedonia also signed The Stability

and Partnership Agreement with the EU, and this agreement has brought disadvantages to 6719 goods of Turkey.

Therefore, Turkey has not benefited from the agreement signed in 2000 at the desired level. In 2003, this issue was discussed at the meeting held by Turkish-Macedonian Business Conseille. At this meeting, it was stated that the agreement with the EU had caused unfair competition. The tariffs are removed for the EU members but continue for Turkey.

In March 2008, the 5th Economic Commission Meeting was held in Turkey. Ministers of State for both Macedonia and Turkey, Adnan Kahil and Kürşat Tüzmen, explained that the aim was to increase the trade volume from 350 million USD to one billion USD. Mr. Tüzmen also noted that the customs level applied to Turkey should be decreased from 10% to 6%, which is the European standard. This would automatically help to increase Turkish investments in Macedonia.

The first shopping center was built by Koç Group in Skopje named as “Ramstore Shopping Center” and opened in June 2005. The investment amount was around 20 million USD, and twenty thousand different types of goods were sold. Another Turkish company, NETAŞ built some telecom central in the rural areas. The privatizations by Macedonian Government has also encouraged the Turkish businessman. Haznedar Refrakter bought Dolomite Vardar company which produces brick in Gostivar. One million Euro was invested in the company, and four million Euros of investment was forecasted additionally.

EU and Western Balkan countries occupy an important place in Macedonia’s foreign trade. In 2013, Turkey’s exports to Macedonia were around 314 million USD

and on the 8th place, while Macedonia's exports to Turkey were 71 million USD and in the 12th place. However, when foreign direct investment is analyzed, the top 10 list does not include Turkey. Direct investments in Macedonia were mainly dominated by Greece (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, n.d.).

According to Skopje Embassy of the Turkish Republic, the number of Turkish companies registered in Macedonia is 200, but only 40 of them are active. The total investment of these companies equals to 100 million USD. One of the biggest investments of Turkish companies is the modernization of Skopje and Ohrid airports by TAV. Ohrid Airport was opened on 10th of April in 2011 and Skopje Airport was opened on 6th of September in 2011. In addition to this, 100% Turkish capital hospital was opened on 7th of April in 2011 in Skopje named as "European Eye Hospital". Şişecam is another company that has investments in the Skopje area. Zorlu Holding also has a fabric plant in Skopje that was opened in 2007 with a local partner. Turkish reconstruction companies work for some projects in Macedonia as well. CESAŞ company renovated 30 bridges listed by NATO and finished the project in 2008 (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı).

Table 8: *The Trade Volume with Macedonia among Years* (adopted by the author)

Year	Exports (Dollar)	Exports (Euro)	Exports (TL/YTL)	Imports (Dollar)	Imports (Euro)	Imports (TL/YTL)
2009	283.463.840	202.524.046	438.144.829	39.879.037	28.704.108	62.198.679
2010	262.621.077	196.440.036	394.660.935	52.399.170	39.484.706	79.005.109
2011	298.861.240	214.595.967	503.802.447	91.963.385	66.174.868	153.543.324
2012	274.497.279	213.658.477	494.252.277	103.223.833	79.646.269	186.400.714
2013	293.976.009	221.621.327	563.400.842	81.518.387	61.481.093	155.184.551
2014	347.964.777	262.672.466	762.129.741	79.194.398	59.650.543	173.756.285

As seen above, the trend in exports and imports between Macedonia do not always show an increase among years. The trade balance between exports and

imports with Macedonia had changed positively for Turkey. The beginning balance of 243,584,803 USD increased to 268,770,379 USD in 2014. However, until 2014, the trade balance was realized less than beginning balance. Therefore, we can not mention a stable positive trend on trade.



Figure 2.2. The Trend of Exports with Macedonia among Years

(adopted by the author)

Exports decreased between 2009-2010, then, we see an increase in 2010-2011, followed by another decrease in 2011-2012. In the last two years, namely the 2012-2014 period, there is an increase. The goods mainly exported in 2014 were some type of medicines, furniture materials, hygiene towels, baby dumpers, and sanitary goods.




Figure 2.3. The Trend of Imports with Macedonia among Years

(adopted by the author)

The imports from Macedonia have continuously increased until 2012, but between 2012-2014 it decreased. The goods mainly imported in 2014 were coal, iron and steel industry materials, cotton goods, and synthetic materials.




Figure 2.4. The Trend of Total Trade Volume with Macedonia among Years

(adopted by the author)

Macedonia was Turkey's 69th largest export market in 2012. Turkish exports to Macedonia in 2012 were 274 million USD, with a decrease of 8.2% (298 million \$) from 2011, and increased by 204% (90 million \$) compared to 2001. The top export categories for 2012 were: textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles (65 million \$); electrical machinery and apparatus (20 million \$); manufactures of metals (16,1 million \$); nonferrous metals (14,8 million \$) (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu).

Macedonia was Turkey's 88th largest import market in 2012. The goods imported from Macedonia in 2012 were worth 103 million USD, increased by 12% (91 million \$) compared to 2011 and 1044% (9 million \$) compared to 2001. The top 5 imports categories (2-digit SITC) for 2012 were road vehicles (30 million \$) iron and steel (25 million \$); textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles (16 million \$); nonmetallic mineral manufactures (6,3 million \$). Turkey's trade surplus of goods with Macedonia was 171 million USD in 2012, a 16% decrease (206 million \$) compared to 2011 (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu).

2.1.3. Socio-Cultural Relations

The education problem of Macedonian Turks goes back to the Balkan Wars. After the Balkans Wars, during the first decades of the Turkish Republic, no help was received from Turkey on education issues. With the effect of migrations from Macedonia to Turkey, the number of schools teaching in Turkish decreased along with the decrease in the number of Turkish students. In 1950-1951 education year, there were 100 schools with 12493 students and in 2000-2001 education year, this decreased to 55 schools and 6950 students. This caused other problems such as the placement of teachers, books and language. Since the books are not translated into Turkish properly, this caused misunderstanding and misleading in learning. For

Macedonians and Albanians, supportive books are published, but none for Turks due to the lower demand (Çolakoğlu, 2011). The scarcity of Turkish education causes Turks to search for alternative possibilities. In the town called Koliçan nearby Skopje, around 300 students of Torbeş Turks have to travel 40 km daily to go to Tefeyyüz Elementary School because the ministry did not open a school in the town (Çolakoğlu, 2011).

There is another town called Jupa nearby Debre where Turkish population lives. Since there are no schools in this town, Turks wanted to attend Kocacık Necati Zekeriya Elementary School, but Ministry of Education did not let them do so. After then, Turks fought for their rights, and with the help of the Turkish Democratic Party, a school was opened in 1999. The problem here can be defined as a chicken-egg issue. The ministry does not want to open schools in Turkish stating that there are not many Turks. On the other hand, because they do not speak Turkish due to the lack of education in Turkish is provided, they can not speak Turkish (Çolakoğlu, 2011).

According to the Constitution, everybody has a right to have education in the preferred language. In the east side of Macedonia, the population is mainly Turkish. The schools in these towns, provide education in Turkish between 1-4th classes only. After the 4th class, they need to attend the schools in nearby towns. Due to the tough conditions, most of the kids can not continue their education. However, mandatory education is eight years in the country. This means that the Macedonian government needs to provide better conditions.

At the university level, problems also continue for Turkish students. There is not enough quota for them. Even if they accomplish to graduate, they face problems in finding a job. Some problems occur since different ethnic groups also use this

quota. In this case, you can not prove anything because nationality is not kept in the identity cards. In addition to this, Turkish students do not hold the same obligations with others at graduate levels. Therefore, only a small group of Turks have higher education and graduate from universities.

In Macedonia, Turks can have their education in Turkish. In east Macedonia, Turkish education can be provided for four years. There are approximately 264 teachers at elementary schools. Two high schools in Gostivar, one high school in Kalkandelen and one in Skopje teach in Turkish. At the university level, very few quotas are provided for Turkish people. There are also private schools which teach in Turkish and very popular among Macedonian Turks. In Macedonia, despite secondary school is mandatory, the number of students who were not registered was around 4000. Turks and Romans consist of the majority of this number. Additionally, the same case is valid also for elementary school. The Minister of Education, Pero Stoyanovski, made an explanation about the news on Dnevnik Newspaper and claimed that this number was not true, explaining that it should be around 2,600 (Ahmet, 2008).

However, when the numbers are analyzed, it is clear that Turks have problems to get an education. The number of people who have not attended the school at all is 67,358, and 7% of them are Turkish. Moreover, the number of Turks who have not completed elementary school is around 14,000. Considering that the population of Turks is around 78,000, this shows the level of the problem. For women, their parents perceive that marriage is more important than education. Even though there is a monetary penalty for not registering to elementary school, the numbers are high. The

government also wants to implement the same system for secondary school but it does not seem to work (Ahmet, 2008).

21st of December is celebrated as “Education in Turkish Festival” since 2007 in Macedonia. A reception was organized for the Education in Turkish Festival on 21st of December by Union of Turkish Community Organizations of Macedonia (MATÜSİTEB), and the opening speech was given by the president of MATÜSİTEB, Tahsin İbrahim, who stated that this day is the symbol of Turkish existence in Macedonia (Son Dakika, 2013).

Turkish has become the official language in Çayır town of Skopje. This has been decided by the members of City Council after 100 years. The idea was offered by the two Turkish members selected from Turkish Democratic Party and supported by both President of Municipality, İzzet Meciti, and other 24 members. According to the law, for any group of the minority to use their language as an official language, they should have at least 20% of the population for that location. However, if the City Council has a unanimous decision, then this condition is invalid (Dünya, 2013).

Under the Student Exchange Project, Macedonian students receive scholarships from Turkish universities at undergraduate and graduate levels every year. They do not need to take any specific exams since Turkey implements a special quota for those students. On April 2009, Cultural Affairs Minister of Macedonia, Elizabeta Kançeska, visited Turkey and during this visit “2009-2010 Cultural Collaboration Program” was signed (Adıyaman, 2012).

In the first half of May 2013, the concept of Turkology Project was launched by Yunus Emre Institute, and “Turkish Culture and Language” has been started to be

celebrated at the universities in Skopje, Kalkandelen, and Iştip. During the celebrations, on the 8th of May, the first presentation was organized at Gotse Delçev University Philology Faculty. Poems in Turkish were read, and a presentation on Turkish Tea Culture has been shared. Another point of the celebrations was the Oriental Studies Department of Kalkandelen State University Philosophy Faculty. The official opening of the Library of Turkey has been done in the scope of “100 Library of Turkey Project” (BBY Haber, 2012).

Furthermore, Saint Kiril Metody University in Skopje has also been the address of activities related to Turkish culture. The head of the Turkish Language Department, Prof. Dr. Nazım İbrahim, mentioned that they would like more attendance to the activities, and they would work for this. The lecturers of Yunus Emre Institute have started their education programs with the objective of reaching more people every year.

Today, due to the change in the form of international relations, states can not pursue their politics via only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but they also need to establish non-governmental organizations in parallel. TİKA in Turkey holds this position for increasing the frequency of the relations, especially in locations where there is a significant Turkish population. The aim is to help developing countries by doing social, cultural, and economic projects in collaboration (Adıyaman, Bilgesam, 2012). Turkey has started to renovate the Ottoman Empire cultural heritage in the last decade, and TİKA was the main institution undertaking this duty on behalf of Turkey in the Balkans. Besides the renovation works, TİKA also provides support on different areas such as educational scholarships, economic development projects, etc.

Turkey's aid for Macedonia is also welcomed by the President of the country, Ivanov. He stated that the benefit of good relations between the two countries could also be observed in various areas such as tourism. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk had memories in Macedonia, and his school and family house have a special meaning for Turkish people. After the renovation of those buildings, the number of tourists would also increase. TİKA supports 850 Turkish students in Macedonia, 250 at elementary; 300 at high schools and 300 at the university level, who continue education in Turkish. At the organization done by MATÜSİTEB and TİKA, Coordinator of Macedonian Branch of TİKA stated that they received around 1600 applications and 850 of them were selected (Haber7, 2014).

TİKA started the Program for Renovation and Construction of Schools in Macedonia for 2013-2014 education year. In this concept, new schools were built in Şaşavarlı town of İştıp Municipality and Mahmudovci town of Kırcova Municipality. Additionally, the renovation of the schools in Skudrinje town of Mavrova Rıstuşe Municipality and Dedeli town of Valandova Municipality were started. For Turkish students who study at İştıp-Gotse Delçev University, a dormitory named as Prof. Dr. Sabahattin Zaim was also renovated to host 35 students. Besides, Hamidiye Madrasah in İştıp, a high school with Turkish as education language was also renovated by TİKA. In the scope of TİKA's school project, the aim was to reach 2,400 students including Turkish but also Macedonian, Albanian, Bosnian and Roman. By this way, TİKA also promotes that they don't only work for the Turkish community but for everyone (TİKA, 2013).

TİKA renovated an old school in Çelevez, in Demirkapı Municipality, where Yoruk Turks live in Macedonia. Due to the improper conditions of the building, it

was not possible to use it as a school. In Gostivar, the biggest Turkish school of the Balkans with a capacity of 1200 students was opened. The school in Banitsa was named as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk Elementary School (T24 Bağımsız İnternet Gazetesi, 2012).

At the opening ceremony, Turkish Ambassador, Gürol Sökmensüer and Skopje Coordinator of TİKA, Dr.Mahmut Çevik, attended. Çevik explained that TİKA gives importance to schools and education since the future of a nation depends on them. He also added that there were a number of school renovations done by TİKA and they will continue to do so. At this new school, the language of education would be Turkish. The population of Demirkapı is 4.454, and one-fifth of them is Turkish (T24 Bağımsız İnternet Gazetesi, 2012). The renovation of Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts (MANU) was completed by TİKA and on the 45th anniversary of the establishment of MANU, on 10th of October 2012, Ambassador of Turkish Republic, Gürol Sökmensüer and Coordinator of TİKA, Mahmut Çevik, were rewarded for their services. This is the first time of any reward given to a foreign embassy by MANU (Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı, 2012).

Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts, was established by the Macedonian Assembly on 22th of February 1967 as the highest scientific, scholarly and artistic institution in the country with the aim of monitoring and stimulating the sciences and arts. The objectives were to search for the cultural heritage and natural resources, to assist in the planning of a national policy regarding the sciences and arts, to stimulate, coordinate, organize and conduct scientific and scholarly research and to promote artistic achievement, especially where particularly relevant to the Republic of Macedonia. Therefore, the award can be evaluated as very meaningful for Turkey.

The renovation project of Alaca (Pasha) Mosque in Tetova (Kalkandelen) by the USA was stopped due to the lack of budget. The mosque was built in the 14th century by Ottomans, and after the fire, it was renovated by Abdurrahman Paşa in 1833. The mosque is also on the list of The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Cultural Heritage. The Muslims in Tetova requested TİKA to continue this project and Turkish miniaturists to repair. They also applied the Ministry of Cultural Affairs to hand on the ownership of this project to Turkey (Bursa Şehir, 2012).

Alaca Mosque can be counted as important architectural design. It was anticipated that it was built during the 15th century by Hüsniye Hatun, who was the daughter of Kalkandelen Pasha. The Muslim visitors traditionally visit the mosque and drink from the water in the garden. However, the mosque is not only important for the Muslim community. The baroque style of the mosque attaches another importance and has been listed in the World Cultural Heritage List by UNESCO (Bursa Şehir, 2012).

A project has been started by the History Department of Saint Kiril Metody University and Turcology Department of Konya Selçuk University with the support of TİKA. The aim of this project was to prepare “Cultural Heritage Catalogue for Macedonia during the Ottoman Period”. In the scope of this project, the mosques, baths, etc. would be determined. These make up the immovable parts of the Ottoman history. In addition to these, there were some portable items such as books, swords, etc., and they were planned to be photographed, and their specifications would be provided in the catalog (Çalışkan, n.d.).

With TİKA's support, State Hospital of Skopje Children Department Emergency Service was opened. Maya Ivanova, the wife of the President of Macedonia, thanked TİKA for their support on such a successful project. The project was fully budgeted by TİKA and completed only in 60 days. Such a project was the first in the Balkans. Vice President of TİKA, Mehmet Süreyya Er, stated that even though there is no border between Turkey and Macedonia, Turkey perceives Macedonia as a neighbor. The Balkans and East Europe Department Head of TİKA Ali Maskan explained that they have been doing projects in Macedonia since 2005 (Haberler, 2013). In the frame of the collaboration agreement signed between TİKA and Radio and Television Supreme Council of Macedonia, the three studios of the state television were renewed, and for two of them, technical support was provided. The State Television cablecast in Turkish, Albanian, Roman, and Serbian (Balkan İncileri).

TİKA also provided technical support for Constitutional Court of Macedonia. In the concept of Capacity Improvement for Justice Organizations of Macedonia Program, laptops, desktops, printers, photocopiers, and telephone exchanges have been donated. The Head of Constitutional Court of Macedonia, Elena Goşeva, stated that they moved to their new building in September, and TİKA's aid was important for technical renovation (Yazete, 2013).

TİKA started two new projects in order to protect Ottoman historical heritage. İshak Çelebi (İshakiye) Mosque in Manastır and Mahmut Ağa Mosque in Radanya to be restored for protecting the common cultural heritage of both countries. İshak Çelebi Mosque was built in 1506 by the İsa Fakih who was the kadi of Manastır in memory of his son İshak Çelebi. The mosque is the highest building in Manastır and

carries the specialties of Classical Ottoman Period. Mahmut Ağa Mosque was built in 1668 by Mahmut Ağa and has been part of the history (Avrupa Türkleri Haber Portalı, 2010).

One of the biggest projects TİKA has been assigned is the renovation of Atatürk's family house. The house where Atatürk's father Ali Rıza Efendi was born in Kocacık town was renovated. The house was rebuilt in line with the conditions of the period and specifications of the original house. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan mentioned about this project at his party's group meeting that the bid was made on 8th of May in 2012 and the cost of the project would be around 723,000 Euro (Hürriyet Gazetesi, 2003).

2.2. Case Study 2: Relations with Kosovo

2.2.1. State of Politics

The political relations between Kosovo and Turkey go back to the Ottoman Empire period. The Turks have lived in this geography for 600 years, and there are also Kosovar immigrants living in Turkey which might be considered as a bridge in the relations. The importance of Kosovo for Turkey has many dimensions such as cultural and historical ties with Turkish minorities, willingness to have authority in the Balkans as a Balkan country, and for humanitarian reasons. Former Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit stated the perception of Kosovo in Turkey "as a debt it owes to its own history" and the Balkans as an inseparable part of Turkey's history and culture (Abazi, 2008).

During the Cold War period, Turkey remained as an observer in terms of foreign policy and did not take an active role in the Balkans. In the early 1990s

Turgut Özal, President of Turkey, put a focus on the Balkans referring to Ottoman Heritage (Çolak Y. , 2006). However, an effective policy could not be implemented due to the war between Bosnia and Kosovo (Abazi, 2008). When the post-Cold War period started, Kosovo's status has become another issue in international politics. Even though the Turks supported Kosovo's independence; they had to be careful about domestic problems concerning the southeast part of Turkey. Since Turkey always supported the territorial integration, the support for Kosovo's independence would be hard to explain. But Turkey explained its support in the frame of another principle of Turkish Foreign Policy: peace. It was clear that the tension would continue to rise unless the ambiguity ended (Eralp, 2010).

Turkey always supported Kosovar Albanians against Serbs because they were Muslim, and the Turkish public had positive feelings and opinions for them. Additionally, Bosnian experience demonstrated what could happen in case of such conflicts. Besides, Turkey had good relations with Albania, and it was crucial to maintain that considering the relations between Albania and Greece.

In 2000, Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit stated that the rights of Turkish minority should be protected during resolution process and his peer Albanian Prime Minister Ilir Meta explained that the rights of all minorities should be protected including but not limited to the Turks (Eralp, 2010). During the times of conflict, Turkish governments always advised Turks in Kosovo to stay silent and not to join fights between Albanians and Serbs. The reason for this was the very small number of the Turkish population. Turkish Government considered that it would be very easy to wipe out around 60.000 Turks from Kosovo, and they did not want to lose the population in the area.

However, after the NATO intervention, the right of using the Turkish language was banned, and Ecevit reminded the talks in 2000 when the Albanian government guaranteed to protect the rights of all minorities (Eralp, 2010). But the attempt of the Turkish government then showed a failure because Albanians and Kosovars were different in some sense, especially in politics. Therefore, the lack of communication with Kosovar peers ended in a change for the vision and showed that Turkish Balkan Policy was still not working in a proper manner. In 2005, Albanian and Turkish officials met at the Turkish Parliament and the Head of Turkish Interparliamentary Friendship Group, Zyhidi Pepa, explained that the problems in the Balkans would likely to continue if the uncertainty of Kosovo's status continues. In addition to this, he stated that it was necessary for Kosovo to provide equal rights for everyone; they should need the support of the USA and Turkey.

In February 2007, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Deputy Undersecretary Ahmet Acet visited Kosovo and announced that Turkey's support for Kosovo would continue even after status negotiations were completed. Prime Minister Çeku also requested Turkey's support. After the final proposal by the UN, Martti Ahtisaari was submitted to the UN Security Council in late March 2007. Turkey's approach was for the recognition of independence within the framework of the UN Security Council Resolution. This way, Turkey stayed in line with other Balkan countries, which also supported Kosovo's independence. During the negotiations, Turkey did lobbying in favor of Kosovo and asked for support from the UN Security Council members (Eralp, 2010).

By December 2007, no further achievement was gained for the negotiation process. Under these circumstances, Kosovar leaders stated that they were getting

ready for the declaration of unilateral independence. Serbian leaders explained that such an action would be followed by all diplomatic means by them. The Secretary of State of USA, Condoleezza Rice, explained that they would not give support for any negotiation after 10 December 2007. Russia continued its opposition for independence. In the EU, there were different perspectives, but the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and France were seemed as supportive. (Eralp, 2010) When Kosovo declared independence on 17th of February in 2008, Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize. The following day, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan, stated that Turkey welcomed the independence of Kosovo, underlining the importance of improving regional and bilateral relations between Turkey and Serbia as well as Turkey's will to continue to the development of Kosovo (Eralp, 2010).

During the negotiation process, Turkey tried to keep the relations calm with Serbia and Russia as well since, as Bülent Ecevit mentioned previously, a probable Orthodox Union would be more dangerous for Turkey considering the conditions in the international system (Abazi, 2008). Turkey joined the status talks and attended in military operations, including the air attacks. Prior to Kosovo's independence on 17 February 2008, Turkey stated to support an independent Kosovo with a UN Security Council resolution. In that period, Turkey also did lobbying for the peaceful solution of this issue, which was then stated as an unordinary practice of Turkish Foreign Policy since it is mainly status-quo oriented.

For Turkey, the process of independence of Kosovo can be considered as unique. Therefore, if the conditions change, decisions may also change. For Kosovo, Turkey's aim was to improve economic relations and strengthen political relations. After independence, Turkey upgraded its existence from a diplomatic mission to

embassy level (Abazi, 2008). Turkey also was listed in the first ten countries that Kosovo would open up an embassy (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 2014).

During the AKP administration, many political visits were done mutually. Former Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Kosovo several times showing the importance of Kosovo for Turkey. During his visit in October 2013, Erdoğan stated that “Turkey is Kosovo and Kosovo is Turkey” referring to the cultural and historical ties between two countries (Hürriyet Gazetesi, 2013). However, his explanation was condemned by Foreign Affairs of Serbia for such an explanation could not be referred to as friendly since Kosovo was founded on the lands of Serbia (Hürriyet, 2013). Serbia did not recognize Kosovo however in 2013, an agreement was signed for the normalization of relations which was a prerequisite of Serbia’s membership for EU negotiations. 4% of Kosovo’s population is made of Serbs, they live in the northern area of the country, and they also do not recognize Kosovo (Mynet, 2014).

During the Gezi protests in Turkey, Kosovars wanted to show their loyalty to Turkey, especially to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Therefore, they organized supportive meetings around the country. The most crowded one was in Mamusa, the only Turkish municipality, where Turkish PM was given the citizen of honor. This can be an important indicator of AKP and its effect on the Balkans since it shows the level of commitment feeling for Ottoman Heritage. While people provided such support, the media criticized the ban on Twitter and Youtube in Turkey. Kosovar TVs have stated that it exposed to a level of frustration since Turkey was evaluated as an example of democracy (Mynet, 2014).

Three political parties represent the Turkish community in Kosovo in terms of political institutions. Turkish Democratic Party of Kosovo (KDTP) is the oldest one. It was founded in 1990 and based in Prizren. The mission of the party is to protect the Turkish culture, language, and existence in Kosovo. The vision of the party is to achieve this goal by sustaining cultural tolerance between all the groups in the country. The party also has branches in Mamusa, Pristina, Gilan, Vuçitirin, Mitroviça ve Yanova (Kosova Demokratik Türk Partisi). The party had a chair in the parliamentary elections and had two more chairs for the Turkish Community. The party has also held important positions as part of the coalition government. Between 2001-2004, membership of the Presidency of Kosovo Parliament for a year, between 2007-2011 Ministry of Environmental Protection and since 2011 holds the Ministry of Public Administration (Kosova Demokratik Türk Partisi).

Other two parties, namely Kosovo Union of Turks (KTB), and Kosovo Turkish Justice Party (KTAP) was founded in October 2010 in Mamusa (Kosova Haber, 2010) and April 2013 in Mamusa. The mission of the party is to achieve pluralist democracy in the country and to create better solutions for the problems of the Turkish minority with a positive attitude. The founders of the party gather from the seven different areas of Kosovo: Prizren, Mamusa, Gilan, Pristina, Vuçitirin, Yanova, Mitroviça (Akşam, 2013).

Representation of Turks after 1990 was mainly performed by KDTP since the other two parties are relatively new parties. Until 2007, Turkey's approach was to gather the Turkish community under one umbrella. The reason for this lies on the probable split in the votes and lack of unification. But an independent candidate, Cemil Luma, opened the way to pluralism. After that, KTB and KTAP were founded.

The reason why they were founded in Mamusa is not a coincidence since it is one of the cities with a high Turkish population.

There have been two local elections in Kosovo, in 2009 and 2013. In 2009, the Turks were only represented by KDTP and for the latter three different parties ran for the elections. Considering KDTP's performance, there was a decrease both in the number of votes and in the seats gained, but still, it is the most favorable party within the community. Comparing the new parties with each other, KTAP has made a jump in the elections, causing a decrease in the votes of KDTP even if it was founded only 3 months before the elections (KDTP, 2009).

On the 7th of May in 2014, the Parliament was abrogated, and the decision was taken for early elections due to the debate on the establishment of a state army (Mynet, 2014). On the 8th of June in 2014, general elections were held throughout the country. Kosovo Democratic Party (PDK) won the highest votes among the country despite the continued economic problems of the country during its term (Bunjaku, 2014). The new mission of PDK was launched as the membership of the EU and the future of new generations (Mynet, 2014). Two of the Turkish parties took part in the elections, but Kosovo Turks Union (KTB) did not. KDTP won two seats in the parliament with 1.02% of total votes and Mahir Yağcılar, and Müfera Şinik were able to represent the Turks in the new parliament. KTAB was not able to get any seats (Mynet, 2014). However, there has been a government crisis after the elections for almost six months. Finally, on the 9th of December in 2014, Kosovo Democratic Party (PDK) and Kosovo Democratic Union (LDK) established a coalition government (Mynet, 2014). Mahir Yağcılar continued his role as Minister of Public Administration in the new government (Mynet, 2014).

The tendency of AKP's policy of putting the focus on religion for Kosovo has been criticized by some groups. The criticism arises from the fact that the relations are mainly executed via NGOs instead of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, which is considered as a mistake. For example, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's saying, "Kosovo is Turkey, Turkey is Kosovo" was misunderstood and caused different negative interpretations. Additionally, Erdoğan's attendance to propaganda meeting before elections in Kosovo was an indicator for which party Turkey supports, The Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK). PDK is a continuation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (UÇK) from the war-time, and it is known that most of the party members are possible to get arrested for executing war crime. Another problem for supporting one party is the potential harm for the relations with other parties. For example PDK was the winner of the elections. However, there was a coalition, and it is known that LDK, the main opposition party, and radical nationalist Self Determination (Vetevendosje) movement are against Turkey and Turkey's investments in Kosovo. They also criticize the free trade agreement between the two countries. Another issue of discussion in Kosovo was the removal of negative wordings from school books which reflected in the opposition media as "Turkey is changing Albanian history" and a political pronouncement was signed by Albanian community. Turkey's policy was perceived as a separator by some groups in Kosovo.

Overall, Turkey and Kosovo perceive each other as good allies in politics. Turkey's support for Kosovo in the recognition phase was very crucial. Besides, Turkey, as a member of Euro-Atlantic Institutions, continues the support for Kosovo's membership as well. Kosovo's membership for such organizations is important in terms of Kosovo's integration to the international system. However, the

tendency of Neo- Ottomanism in Turkish foreign policy is perceived as a threat by some academic groups in Kosovo (The Economist, 2016).

Between 2009-2014, you can find the distribution of agreements below. The area of agreements was collaboration on health, customs on trade, environmental protection, military training, economy, and defense industry. Since the number of agreements is high and varies among subjects, we can mention a formal relationship between the two countries.




Figure 2.5. Political Agreements with Kosovo among Years (adopted by the author)

2.2.2. Economic Relations

Due to the uncertainty about the status of Kosovo, economic developments were at a slow pace. Turkey signed the Agreement on Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investment in 2006. The aim of this trade agreement was to increase the volume of trade which had reached as \$73 million at the time of the agreement. Main part of this trade stems from the food with 90%. Turkey is in the third row in food

trade with Kosovo, where Serbia and Macedonia get the first two, respectively (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, n.d.).

Kürüm Iron and Steel Company and Tepe Defense and Security Systems Inc. are two of the biggest investments in Kosovo. Turkish Airlines also have frequent flights to Kosovo in order to ease up the travel for the business people. The total amount of Turkish investments in Kosovo is approximately 800 million Euro (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışışleri Bakanlığı) . Considering the internal market of Kosovo, we can say that the amount of demand is limited. However, opportunities in many areas exist. Additionally, Turkey can also use Kosovo as a gate to other countries due to its geographical proximity. Turkey is among the top five countries as Kosovo's trade and investment partners.

Right after the declaration of independence, the trade volume has just doubled between the two countries. Both countries do not require visas from each other. Business councils of two countries work closely on the trade and investment opportunities to warm up economic relations (Eralp, 2010). On 23rd of June in 2008, Foreign Economic Relations Board decided that there was enough demand for a separate council to track economic relations with Kosovo and started up the establishment of such council (Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu). On 30th of May in 2012, the agreement on the Mutual Protection of Investments and on 27th of September 2013 Free Trade Agreement were signed. According to 2013 data, the exports to Kosovo is 210,914 million Euro, and imports from Kosovo is 7.4 million Euro. The main export items to Kosovo are textile and food, whereas import items are mainly leather goods (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışışleri Bakanlığı).

Turkey Is Bank opened its second branch in Prizren after the first one in Pristina (Demirören Haber Ajansı, n.d.). Is Bank has chosen Kosovo as part of its enlargement strategy in foreign countries. Tamer Topaloğlu, Kosovo Embassy Trade Undersecretary of Turkey, stated that this was an important indicator for Kosovo's importance for Turkey. Salih Karadurmuş, the chief of commercial banking, explained that the total amount of Turkish investments in Kosovo reached up to 280 million USD, and added that in 2011 trade volume reached to 276 million USD by putting Turkey at the fourth place on Kosovo's imports.

Kosovo Railway Committee had a meeting with their Turkish peers in April 2013 in Turkey. The aim of the meeting was to improve collaboration in the railway area between the two countries. Both committees informed each other about their current works. As a result of the meeting, they signed a letter of intent including issues such as improvement of the passenger and loading carriage, repair and maintenance, technical collaboration, and consultancy. Hasan Ibraj stated that they want to benefit from Turkey's experience since Turkey is 8th in the World and 6th in Europe using high-speed trains. In October 2013, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan attended the opening of a new airport terminal at Kosovo. The terminal was named after Adem Yaşari, who is a national hero. The capacity aims to allow 5 million passengers per year. This was one of the most important investments by Turkey in Kosovo (HaberTürk, 2013).

Ambassador of Kosovo in Ankara, Avni Spahiu, visited Kayseri and met with the governor Orhan Düzgün. He stated that Turkey has helped Kosovo's economy to be rebuilt, and currently Turkish companies are mainly doing reconstructing business in the country. He also added that Kosovo needs foreign investments, and therefore,

they provide important advantages to the investors. He mentioned that there were around 300 Turkish companies in Kosovo, mainly operating in banking and health area, and many people know Turkish, which is helpful in employment (Haberler, 2014).

Enver Hoxay, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kosovo, explained that the government decided to establish its own army. According to the decision, it was planned to employ 5,000 active and 3,000 replacement. He also mentioned that it would be voted in the parliament. Prime Minister of Serbia, Ivitsa Daçiç, stated that according to the Bruxel Agreement that was signed for the normalization of relations, this is not possible. He also stated that they asked for a guarantee from NATO and KFOR (Kosovo Force) that the army would not be able to enter in the northern area of Kosovo without any permission from KFOR (Mynet, 2014).

NATO Parliamentary Assembly Council met with Prime Minister Haşim Taçi in June 2014 during his visit to Kosovo. Taçi thanked the Council for accepting Kosovo as an observer country and stated that the next step would be Partnership for Peace. One of the important subjects of the meeting was the establishment of the Kosovar Army. Taçi mentioned that NATO had supported the idea (Sezgin, 2016).

Emrullah İşler, Deputy Prime Minister, visited Kosovo on 22nd of April in 2014. During his visit, he claimed that Turkey supports the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia and the EU membership process since Turkey believes that Kosovo's future is the EU. Another point he mentioned was about the establishment of an army by Kosovo. On that matter, he claimed that Turkey also supports the NATO membership of Kosovo. İşler also pointed out the economic relations by stating that the highest amount of investments was made by Turkish businessmen in 2013 with 85

million Euro which also provided an important base for employment (Haberler, 2014).

Turkish soldiers have been on duty in Kosovo since 1999. The aim of military existence is mainly to preserve the continuation of peace and maintain security between groups. They operate under KFOR and also take place in civilian duties such as renovating schools, helping people in villages, etc. Turkish soldiers are very admired by the society in Kosovo (Anadolu Ajansı, 2013). New road construction started near Mamusa to connect the city to the main highway. The road was named as Mehmetçik Road after Turkish soldiers and plays an important role for reducing the distance between Mamusa and other cities like Prizren. Turkish soldiers also worked in the construction (Mynet , 2014).

Kosovar and Turkish Governments have frequently met with each other. After independence, Turkish companies have got very important public bids. For example, construction of the roads connecting Kosovo to Albania in the south and Kosovo to Serbia in the north which were planned to be built by Turkish-American Consortium Bechtel-Enka. 4,000 workers were employed in the project. The management bid of Pristina Airport also was won by Limak, another Turkish company. Some other areas that Turkish companies operate are energy, health, and education. The government's priority is to attract foreign direct investments to Kosovo. They aim to increase the volume of current operations with Turkey. Therefore, the Embassy of Kosovo organizes business forums at different cities in Turkey to convince Turkish businessmen to invest in Kosovo (Ekinci, 2013).

Even though, there is no signed agreement on defense collaboration between Turkey and Kosovo there is a strong collaboration between Kosovar Security Force

and the Turkish Army. There are some agreements between KSF and the Turkish Army, and this is for the improvement of Kosovo. The vision of Kosovo and Turkey seems common for the Balkans; both countries wish the area becomes stable, democratic, wealthy, and integrated into the EU and NATO.

Table 9: *The Trade Volume with Kosovo among Years* (adopted by the author)

Year	Exports (Dollar)	Exports (Euro)	Exports (TL/YTL)	Imports (Dollar)	Imports (Euro)	Imports (TL/YTL)
2009	278.078.176	198.177.656	428.398.267	10.178.451	7.264.580	15.658.905
2010	293.997.660	220.205.668	441.310.214	13.606.648	10.266.859	20.562.391
2011	265.828.847	190.593.762	446.634.888	10.106.181	7.264.291	16.849.957
2012	254.783.833	198.328.009	458.762.846	9.092.829	7.095.486	16.409.340
2013	278.998.210	210.729.162	533.395.840	9.950.706	7.490.435	19.030.409
2014	275.644.877	207.616.930	602.975.359	12.783.364	9.627.475	27.917.530

As seen in Table 9, the trend in exports and imports between Kosovo do not always show an increase among years. However, the trade balance between exports and imports with Kosovo had been changed negatively for Turkey. The beginning balance of \$ 267,899,725 in 2009 decreased to \$ 262,861,513 in 2014. Between 2009-2014, only twice the trade balance was realized more than beginning balance, in 2010 and 2013, \$ 280,391,012 and \$ 269,047,504 respectively.



Figure 2.6. The Trend of Exports with Kosovo among Years (adopted by the author)

The trend of exports shows quite a fluctuation among years. Between 2009-2010, exports increased, then we see a decrease in 2010-2012, which is followed by an increase in 2012-2013 and eventually decreased in 2014. The goods that are mainly exported in 2014 are carpets, some type of medicines, cotton textiles and floor covering materials.




Figure 2.7. The Trend of Imports with Kosovo among Years (adopted by the author)

The imports from Kosovo only showed an increase in 2010 and in 2014 between 2009-2014. Mainly, the total value of imports is stable among years. The goods that are mainly imported in 2014 are rubber materials, aluminium materials, and copper goods.

2.2.3. Socio-Cultural Relations

In Kosovo, Turkish is one of the three official languages. Especially in Prizren, you can communicate easily in Turkish because a lot of people know Turkish even though they are not Turk. Turkish community has put a lot of efforts on that. In 2004, in the constitution, the right of using one's mother language in education, in communication with governmental institutions and publication had been given to all minorities (Diplomatik Gözlem, n.d.).

In 2005, the Ministry of Health also started to use Turkish in patience transfer forms. In 2005, Turkish started to be used as a language in the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports. This is very important because, in practice, Turkish has been used in governmental organizations as well. In 2006, "the Act for the usage of Languages" was discussed at the parliament. Turkish Minister and the President of Kosovo Democratic Turks Party Mahir Yağcılar has suggested that the quota for language should be decreased to %5 from %6, and regardless of this quota, Turkish should be accepted as an official language in Prizren. However, this was refused at the Parliament, and after then, arguments began that Turks were not wanted in Kosovo, and they were not accepted as part of the community.

Turkish Community started to protest the act and asked for the cancellation of it. In 2007, Turkish has been accepted as one of the official languages in Prizren where most of the population is Turkish. However, this was not enough because there was still %5 quota for the other cities in the country. In 2008, a new constitution was accepted in Kosovo. According to this constitution, Turkish again was not an official language in the country, and only Albanian and Serbian has been stated in the constitution. However, municipalities, where Turks live in the majority, started to

accept Turkish as an official language. Municipality of Vıçitırın, voted and accepted Turkish as the official language of the city (Haberler, 2008). In Pristina, the same happened and İsmet Beçiri, the President of Municipality, stated that it should be an example for all cities across the country.

As a result, Turkish has been used as an official language in Pristina, Prizren, Gilan, and Mitroviça. But since it is not stated in the constitution, the municipalities may change in the future, and they can also revote and veto for Turkish. Kosovo Democratic Turks Party has been criticized for this issue because the Turkish Community thinks that they are not effective enough despite the fact that KDTP is the main Turkish Party. Turkish Community is active mostly in municipalities. In Prizren, where Turkish is one of the official languages, Kosovo Democratic Turks Party (KDTP) was given two important duties: the Office of Treasury & Economy and the Office of Land and Cadastre (Korkusuz Medya, 2014).

In terms of education language, schools taught in Turkish were closed between 1912-1951 because Yugoslavia forced Serbian to be taught in schools. In this period, Turkish existence was denied. In 1951, Turkish existence was accepted, and Turkish education classes were reorganized again in the regions where Turks lived. The main reason in this political shift stems from the fact that the Yugoslavian Government was scared of the tensions with Albanians against them, and in this way, they aimed to change the direction of the fight.

Approximately 2,500 students at 12 different primary schools were able to get an education in their mother language as Turkish. Especially in Prizren, nursery schools in Turkish are common even in different regions of the city. In 2004, the number of nursery kids was 588. In University of Pristina, the Faculty of Turkish

Language was opened in 1988, and each year 50 students have been accepted. In 2000, Balkan Turkology Research Institute was established by Turkology Faculty with the objective of protecting Turkish culture and history in the area (BalkanPazar, n.d.).

Generally, minorities do not have many problems in terms of having education in their mother language up to university level. However, at the university level, education is in Albanian. This can be a problem in the long-run because minorities will have a lower chance of getting a university diploma, and furthermore, they may have difficulties in finding jobs. Turkey and Kosovo have collaborations on student exchange. In each year, 100 students from Kosovo are provided scholarships by Turkey to study at Turkish universities (Eralp, 2010). However, this is not enough to prevent such problems considering the high number of the Turkish population in Kosovo lacking such scholarship opportunities.

In terms of publications, there were none between 1912-1951. In 1969, Tan started to be published as a newspaper. Today, in Prizren BAY, Sofra ve Türkçem journals are published. Yeni Dönem TV is also on air as a new channel in 2005 (Mustafa, 2015).

The number of Turkish NGOs have been rising in Kosovo since 1999. The main reason for this is the increase in the ability of communication with Turkey, the increasing number of students coming to Turkey for education, and Turkish TV broadcasts. The charities are mostly active in music and folklore. They aim to increase cooperation within the Turkish Community. The most active among all is Kosovo Turkish Teachers Community. They gather together in order to find better solutions for the educational problems in Kosovo for Turkish students, and they also

collaborate with the Ministry of Education in Turkey for selecting the students who will study in Turkey.

There are approximately 30 different charities of Turks, and among those, “Doğru Yol” and “Gerçek” play the most important role for the relations within the community. Doğru Yol mainly aims to build closer relations among the members of the community, whereas Gerçek focuses on Turkish art activities such as music, folklore, etc. (Balkan Günlüğü, n.d.). The most important disadvantage of Turkish charities is that they receive financial aid only from Turkey while some other religious NGOs are financed internationally.

There are also collaborations in terms of science and technology. A group of representatives from the Ministry of Education, and Science and Technology of Kosovo visited TÜBİTAK in October 2014, and an agreement was signed during the visit to increase the collaboration level between two countries (TÜBİTAK, 2014).

It is important to be aware that after September 11, the number of Saudi Arabian Islamic Humanity Aid institutions has been increasing in the area. They seem to help the renovation of Ottoman Heritage in the area. However, they use the Arabian architecture style while doing so. By this way, they erase the footprints of the Ottoman Empire and what it reminds in terms of religious roots. They also build new mosques in order to gather religious community and provide financial aid to increase the number of their followers.

In addition to NGOs, Turkey tries to be active via governmental institutions. TİKA opened a branch in 2005 in Kosovo. In addition to TİKA, Anatolian Development Agency has been active in Kosovo. However, compared to other

countries, Turkey has more way to go. The biggest challenge in Kosovo is between the USA and Germany. TİKA has been renovating many items of Ottoman Heritage in the country. The Tomb of Sultan I. Murat, Fatih Mosque in Pristina and Süleyman Paşa Mosque in Prizren are the most important ones (Eralp, 2010).

TİKA renovated another important mosque in Prizren, Terzi Mahalle Mosque from the Ottoman Empire. The Chief of TİKA, Musa Kulaklıkaya, the Head of Kosovo Religious Affairs Naim Tırnava and Kosovo Coordinator of the Turkish Republic Religious Affairs, Tevfik Yücesoy, attended the opening of the renovated mosque. Kulaklıkaya stated that the mosques in Kosovo are important, especially for the continuation of Ottoman Heritage, and therefore, TİKA will continue its activities to achieve this aim (Tabak, 2010).

İsa Bey Mosque which was built in Mitroviça with the support of Istanbul Bayrampaşa Office of Mufti was opened with the attendance of Chief of Religious Affairs Prof.Dr.Mehmet Görmez. The project of the mosque was started 2 years before in the framework of sister cities. In 1999, the mosque fell down due to Serbian attacks and was rebuilt in accordance with the original version. Görmez claimed that the mosques should be filled with young people. He also added that Kosovo is in everybody's hearts in Turkey. The chief of Religious Freedom Council in Parliament of Kosovo, Amir Ahmeti, visited the chief of Religious affairs, Prof.Dr.Mehmet Görmez in Turkey. Görmez explained that they want to build a bigger mosque in Kosovo (Bayrampaşa Belediyesi, n.d.).

Müderri Recep İsamili Mosque was built in Bresan village near Prizren. The mosque is the only one in Kosovo with four minarets. The village has around 500 households which are mainly Albanians. Even though it was opened in 2009, the

whole project finished and religious courses were given at the mosque (Akşam Gazetesi, 2014). About the religion, even though most of the population consists of Muslims, due to the missionary activities in the country, there are some tendencies for Christianity. Some groups in Kosovo think that they should change their religion in order to be a real part of Europe. In that sense, they consider believing in Catholic sect.

Diyanet is one of the active Turkish institutions in Kosovo. The reason for that is the way Kosovars adopt Islam is very similar to Turks. This can be explained as the effect of Ottoman History. The beneficial part of this lies in the advantage of building closer relations compared to other Muslim countries. On the contrary, Saudi Arabia also spends high budgets on building their own followers in Kosovo (Bilgiç & Bilgiç, 2012). This may result in charge of religious choices in the long-run.

Yunus Emre Culture Institute established branches both in Pristina and Prizren which were opened in 2011. Another one was opened in 2012 in the city of İpek. On 23 of February 2013, Cultural Center of Kosovo was also opened in Istanbul (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı). This is the first time for Kosovo to have such an organization. A group from Kosovo Islam Union including the chief Vedat Sahiti visited Turkish Religious Affairs Foundation. Mazhar Bilgin, Mustafa Tutkun and Yasin Uğraş from TDV have joined the meetings. They were informed about the aids provided to Kosovo in general and renovation of Tomb of I.Murat Hüdavendigâr. They also mentioned that students are coming to Turkey for undergraduate and graduate studies to learn Islam better.

2.3. Case Study 3: Relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina

2.3.1. State of Politics

The political relations between Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Turkey go back to the Ottoman Empire period. The Turks have lived in this geography for 600 years, and there are also Bosnian immigrants living in Turkey which might be considered as the bridge in the relations.

After Tito died in 1980, Bosnia and Herzegovina declared its independence on 1st of March 1992 following the results of the referendum. The referendum was boycotted by Serbs, but 63% of the BiH population including Croats voted for the independence by 99,4%. Firstly, the government considered postponing the declaration of independence. However, after meeting with Western states and Foreign Affairs Minister of the USA, İzzetbegović relied on the support given for independence. This caused the tension between Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks and resulted in Bosnian War period between 1992-1995 (Semercioğlu, 2017).

After the declaration of Bosnian independence, the government of Serbia and Montenegro declared that a new state was established by them named as the Yugoslavia Federal Republic. As a result of this, the Federal Army in Bosnia could not be able to act as a peace force. It was known that the Federal Army was providing arms to different Serbian groups. However, İzzetbegović trusted in and relied on the Federal Army, and Bosnia was the least powerful one in terms of the military among the new republics.

On the 17-18th of June 1992 in Istanbul, Turkey organized the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers of Islam countries for discussing the action plan for helping

Bosnia and Herzegovina. 39 Islamic countries attended this meeting, and it was decided that the Islamic Development Bank should provide monetary aid for Bosnia. Additionally, after the meeting, an office was opened inside the building of the United Nations in New York for the coordination of this aid.

Turkey wanted to play an active role in the resolution of the Bosnian War. This tendency can be evaluated as a sign of realization by Turkey that the Cold War was over. However, this was not a choice according to the conditions of the period as, Turkey had to act along with the other members of the international system. Unfortunately, international system did not take an immediate step to provide the necessary actions for ending this war. The Foreign Affairs Minister of Turkey, Hikmet Çetin, stated that he was disappointed by such latency to intervene. Turkey always supported that there should be an intervention for Serbs to spread in BiH. The reason behind this can be explained by the approximately 2 million Bosnian population in Turkey.

The reason why the Bosnian War took so long in the middle of Europe is due to the fact that powerful states could not agree on a final resolution. Finally, Bill Clinton became in charge of the problem and established the composition of NATO forces from multinational military forces for possible intervention. This was the biggest operation for NATO ever since its establishment, and Turkey also took place in the military operation in 1995. On the 14th of December 1995, the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed in Paris, ending the war and establishing the new state of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sağır, 2017).

According to DPA, the name of the state was changed as Bosnia and Herzegovina and was formed by two entities named as Bosnia-Croat Federation

(BHF) and Republika Srpska (RS). DPA also sets the boundaries on civil and military issues. Military issues are followed by SFOR (Stabilization Force) with the lead of NATO since 1996. Turkey also has a military force in Zenica. On the other hand, civil issues are followed by the Office of the High Representative. As a result of DPA, all the institutions are represented by the three ethnicities, and the responsibility is taken in rotation.

In October 2014, the first population census was done after 22 years. This is an important step for analyzing the ethnic, national, religious, and economic identity in BiH. However, one of the questions about ethnic identity could be misleading for the results. The Muslims in the country could have defined themselves as Bosnian instead of Bosniak (Rucker-Chang, 2014). This could change the numbers for the group of others since anyone else than Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs are classified as other. According to the results, the population of the country is approximately 3.8 million, which is almost 600,000 less than the population in 1991. According to the results of the census, in Bosniak-Croat Federation 52,18% is Bosniak, 22,13% Croat and 17,51% is Serbian. In the Serbian Republic, the ratios of Bosniak, Croat, and Serbian population are as follows: 28,26%, 9,40%, and 55,40%. The two different entities form 51,46% and 48,52% of BiH.

In the early 1990s, Turkey's position was to support this country for integration in terms of security and Western institutions. Turkey recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina immediately after the declaration of independence on the very first day. When the Bosnian War started, Turkey was one of the countries which diplomatically worked to mobilize the necessary military and humanitarian actions. After the war ended in 1995, "Southeast Europe Multinational Peace Force" was

established (Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe, 2012) and at the beginning of 2000, “Good Neighbourhood, Stability, Security and Collaboration Agreement” was signed.

Turkey’s support for BiH’s membership to Western institutions is very important. The aim of BiH was to become a member of NATO and the EU. However, the political structure of the country slowed down this process. In 2010, the country was given an Action Plan for NATO membership. In this framework, BiH has to perform reforms in political, economic, defense, and security areas. NATO membership is important because this may prevent the possibility of tension and secure political stability in the country (Stiglmayer, 2015).

For European Union membership, in 2008 Stability and Partnership Agreement was signed, and in 2010, visa exemption was provided for BiH for traveling to the EU countries. However, for EU membership BiH has to perform many constitutional reforms. One of them is about the right of being elected. In BiH, only Croats, Bosniaks and Serbs can be elected as president. Dervo Seydić, who is a Roman activist in BiH, and Jakob Finci, who is the representative of the Jewish community in BiH, have applied to European Court of Human Rights in 2006 for the discrimination of rights on this issue. The Court has decided that the Constitution should be revised to become in line with the European Human Rights Agreement (Önok, 2012).

Turkey also takes place in the improvement of the stability process and attends the trilateral meetings between Turkey, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first meeting was held in 2010 in Istanbul, second in Serbia and third in Ankara. The meetings were held at presidency level and minister of foreign affairs also joined

the meetings. As an outcome of these meetings, BiH opened an Embassy in Belgrad, and Serbian Parliament published a censure resolution for Srebrenitsa, and Serbian President attended the commemorative ceremony of 15th Anniversary of Srebrenitsa (Rucker-Chang, 2014).

Figure 2.8 shows the distribution of agreements between 2009-2014. The areas of agreements were on trade, cultural collaboration, taxes and military collaboration. Since the number of agreements is very small, it is hard to mention about the level of a formal relationship between the two countries.




Figure 2.8. Political Agreements with Bosnia and Herzegovina among Years

(adopted by the author)

2.3.2. Economic Relations

Soon after the collapse of Yugoslavia, Bosnia found itself in the war period at the beginning of the 1990s, and this prevented its economy from adopting the new international conditions. According to the forecasts of the World Bank (WB), the physical cost of the Bosnian War was around 15-20 billion USD. In addition to this,

the cost of lack of technological improvements falling behind the globalization and losing economic markets can be calculated as another 10 billion USD.

When the war ended in 1995, Bosnia was mostly dependent on foreign aid in economic terms. Between 1996-2002, the country received 5 billion USD as foreign aid. However, year after year, the economy improved better, and between 2008-2010, the growth rate was realized as 5%. With the effect of the global economic crisis, the industrial production declined in BiH due to the lower demands for goods. Therefore, value added components have a lesser effect on the GDP of BiH, whereas trade and agriculture form 20% of GDP. Services have an increasing trend from year to year, calculated as 66,8% in 2011, whereas industry has the opposite trend.

Unemployment in the country is very high, especially in the age group of 24-49. The main reason for that is the contradiction between the needs of economic structure and the education of the population. Inflation rate in BiH is the highest among Central and East European countries. Especially in 2008, parallel with the increasing prices of oil and food all over the world, inflation was calculated as the highest between 2000-2010. In 2008, the inflation rate jumped to 8% and started to decrease in the following years. In 2012, it was calculated as 5,3%.

Considering the foreign trade volume, Turkey takes place in the top 10 countries. According to 2009 data, Turkey is the first country which makes an investment in the BiH with the amount of 95 million CM. Turkish investors played an important role in the BiH economy. By the end of 2010, according to Central Bank of BiH, the total amount of Turkish investments was 256 million CM. Turkish businessmen perceive BiH as a small market, but the importance of BiH comes from

its geostrategic location. Actually, BiH can be a door for increasing the possible trade with Europe.

The variety of Turkish investments in the country is distributed among different areas. The biggest slice of the pie is the production with 80%. The remaining 20% is split between banking, trade, and transportation. The first Turkish investment in the country was made by Ziraat Bank. The bank opened a branch named as Turkish Ziraat Bank Bosnia in 1997 with a capital of 10 million CM. It is also the first foreign bank in BiH. Since 1997, the bank has opened many branches and currently has 23 branches with a capital 60 million CM (Ziraat Bankası , n.d.).

In 2005, Kastamonu Entegre company bought 90% of stocks of Natron-Maglaj paper and packaging company and established Natron-Hayat company. Until 2011, 90 million Euro of total investment was done. In 2006, a state-owned soda company, namely Fabrika Sode Lukavac merged with Soda Sanayi A.Ş. to establish Şişecam Soda Lukavac company. Şişecam bought 85,9% of stocks, and the remaining 14,1% still belongs to the state. Turkish Airlines owns 49% of BH Airlines. In addition to these, some other Turkish companies such as Türk Oil, Nobel Pharmacy, Kent Elite, Zorlu Group, Efes Pilsen, Koton, Colins, LC Waikiki have investments in the country (CNNTürk, 2018).

Since 2010, Turkey's interest in Western Balkans has been increasing. Especially, the Turkish Government organizes frequent visits to BiH with Turkish businessmen. In order to play a more active role in the area, Turkey should increase its economic ties in the region. After the elections in BiH in 2010, the government could not be formed and this caused a decrease in foreign investments. In addition to political tension in the country, lack of reforms, legal drawbacks and insufficient tax

system are some other negative factors that result in preventing foreign investments. Considering the foreign trade, the highest volume is shared by four countries: Croatia, Germany, Serbia, and Italy, which is approximately 60% of total volume. The share of Turkey is around 1-2%. For exports of BiH, Turkey has a share of 0.95% while the in imports is 3% (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, n.d.).

The aim of Foreign Trade Policy of BiH can be explained as the integration into the global economy by improving regional economic and trade relations with the perspective of European Union membership. Therefore, BiH signed Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) in 2006 with southeastern European countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Kosovo, Moldova, Macedonia, and Montenegro) for free trade to increase their collaboration. Bulgaria and Romania had to leave CEFTA due to their membership to the EU. Additionally, BiH and the EU signed the Stability and Partnership Agreement on the 1st of July 2008 (Janković, 2008).

A Free Trade Agreement was signed on the 1st of July 2003 between Turkey and BiH. According to this agreement, no customs tax would be implemented for the goods imported from BiH. The same rule would also be valid for Turkey. BiH also has the most favored agreements at the national level with Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and USA. According to these agreements, these countries would not implement any customs tax for the goods exported to them.

Generally, BiH gives trade deficit because the imports are higher than its exports. In order to reduce its trade deficit, BiH tries to reduce the amount of imports. However, this is not a valid tool, and BiH needs to increase its exports. Two main trade partners of BiH are its neighbors, namely Serbia and Croatia. There are

some items that play an important role in Turkey's exports to BiH. For plastic doors and windows, Turkey's share is around 90% and the closest competitor is Denmark with 1.8%. For velvet goods, Turkey has around 80% of share, and the closest competitor is Serbia, with a share of 1%. For tomato, Turkey's share was 73% and 57% for 2009 and 2010, respectively. For electrical ovens, Turkey has a share of 35% approximately, and Slovenia comes second with 28%.

Between 2000-2008, exports from Turkey to BiH had an increasing trend and according to TÜİK data, in 2008, it totaled up to 572 million USD. In the related period, the average of this increase was 54%. After 2008, exports had a decreasing trend, and in 2010, the amount was realized as 224 million USD. The list of top 25 goods that Turkey exports to BiH is as follows: pharmacy products, furniture, grain products, vegetables, paper, cacao, glass, cotton, organic products, sugar, candles and etc. As for the exports of BiH to Turkey, between 1995-2006 there is no clear trend of trade volume. But after 2006, the exports of BiH has started to increase. In 2007, the exports increased by 130% compared to 2006 and continued to increase. However, in terms of the total volume of Turkey's imports, BiH has still a very small portion.

Table 10: *The Trend of Trade with Bosnia and Herzegovina among Years* (adopted by the author)

Year	Exports (Dollar)	Exports (Euro)	Exports (TL/YTL)	Imports (Dollar)	Imports (Euro)	Imports (TL/YTL)
2009	226.566.745	161.920.512	350.112.290	52.058.789	36.563.865	79.268.048
2010	224.299.335	168.283.690	337.140.918	72.328.496	54.142.029	108.920.792
2011	268.941.651	192.791.583	452.030.902	90.252.176	64.856.072	152.699.460
2012	251.523.302	195.836.851	453.121.264	111.648.688	86.495.844	200.942.961
2013	274.086.165	206.733.066	523.861.748	124.330.053	93.967.865	235.446.339
2014	322.022.057	242.679.758	704.583.653	171.424.364	129.143.793	374.627.569

The trend for exports and imports between BiH has increased tremendously throughout the years. However, the trade balance between exports and imports with BiH changed negatively for Turkey. Both countries have benefited from the positive impact of Ottoman discourse on trade, but the beginning balance of \$174,507,956 decreased to \$150,597,693 in 2014. Between 2009-2014, only once the trade balance was realized more than beginning balance is 2011. The trade balance of 2011 is \$178,689,475.



Figure 2.9. The Trend of Exports with Bosnia and Herzegovina among Years

(adopted by the author)

Between 2009-2011, exports continued to increase, then we see a decrease in 2012, which is followed by an increase in 2013 and 2014. The goods that are mainly exported in 2014 are carpets, lingerie textiles, plastic goods and some sorts of medicines.




Figure 2.10. The Trend of Imports with Bosnia and Herzegovina among Years (adopted by the author)

The imports from BiH have continuously increased between 2009-2014. Especially after 2013, it can be seen that the ratio of the increase was bigger than in previous years. The goods that are mainly imported in 2014 are sunflower, cotton-seed oil, citrus fruits, wheat and some type of furniture goods.

To understand better the correlation of total value of Turkish foreign trade and total value of trade with BiH, you can see the illustration in Figure 2.11.

Approximately, it can be said that the percentage of total trade with BiH is 0.1 % of the total foreign trade in Turkey during 2009-2014. Even though the total amount is changing among years, the ratio seems stable.




Figure 2.11. The Trend of Total Trade Volume with Bosnia and Herzegovina among Years (adopted by the author)

When the components of foreign trade between the two countries are examined in detail, we see an unbalanced distribution. For agricultural and food products, in 2010, exports totaled up to 58 million USD. In the same year, this product group has a share of 52% of all foreign trade of Turkey, and BiH has a portion of 48% for this category. The exports of Turkey has a decreasing trend for this group of products. Agricultural production in BiH is not enough and can not meet the internal demand of the country.

Turkey's imports from BiH for the same group of products was realized as 28 million USD in 2010. This amount is almost four times the volume for 2008. This shows that Turkey started to import a higher volume of agricultural and food products. In the total of BiH's exports of grain products, Turkey has a share of 80%. Grain products were not imported by Turkey until 2007. Considering Turkey's export to BiH for industrial products, in 2010, the volume was realized as 194 million USD.

This amount corresponds to 85-93% of total exports of Turkey to BiH in overall. The products that are in this group can be counted as plastic goods, motorized vehicles, iron, and steel made goods, paper made goods, cotton, etc. The highest volume in this group belongs to plastic goods with 13%. Even though the trade volume fluctuates from year to year between Turkey and BiH, TİKA allocates a certain budget for projects with BiH. According to a 2009 report published by TİKA, BiH is in second place with 6.76% of the total budget allocated for projects. The main aim of the projects is to reduce unemployment in BiH.

In order to increase the level of economic relations, Turkey needs to build a high-level strategy in the mid-term. The perspectives should be changed on both sides. For Turkish businessmen, BiH is a small market, and according to Bosnians, Turkish goods are of low quality. But in reality, BiH is a strategic market to enable Turkish companies to trade with European countries easily. Additionally, Turkish goods are of high quality but may be due to the previous perception low-quality products are exported more. TİKA takes a very important responsibility for collaboration, but this may not be enough. More institutions, maybe country-specific, should take place in strategy development and collaboration. In this case, the Center for the Development of Relations (BİGMEV) with BiH is an important player in relations with BiH.

2.3.3. Socio-Cultural Relations

The roots of cultural relations between Turkey and Bosnia and Herzegovina go back to the Ottoman Empire period. After the conquer of Ottomans, the structure of BiH has evolved from Bosnian Church/Catholic Church/Orthodox Church to Muslim/Catholics/Orthodox. This is an indicator of the cultural effect of the Ottoman

period, especially in terms of religion. Later on, as a result of the nationalist movement, this structure has been set as Bosnians/Serbs/Croats.

During the Ottoman period, the religious structure was affected. Islam was easily spread among Bogomils and Bosnian Church members. In the 17th century, Bogomils were mainly dominated by Islam. Bosnians are called Bozanska in their language, and they are Slavs who admitted Islam as their religion. However, according to Serbian researchers, Bosnia is either Catholic or Orthodox. Before the Bosnian War started in 1992, Serbian leader Milosevic and Croat leader Tudjman met to divide the country between Serbia and Croatia.

The easiest way for Turkey to build closer cultural relations is to use Ottoman heritage as the main argument. To act against the negative image created by Greece and Serbia, Turkey has to protect the common values of both societies in every area such as diplomatic, academic, and media relations. To improve the soft power of Turkish politics, the positive image should be strengthened by pointing out the peaceful period during the Ottoman Empire.

Negotiations were performed between the Presidency of the Religious Affairs of Turkey and BiH Islamic Union within the framework of some joint studies regarding the services in the mosques and to provide financial support to be given for the renovation of the mosques. Upon the request of BiH, religious authorities during the Ramadan mounts *hafizs* from Turkey were also appointed temporarily. BiH asked the number of *hafizs* to be increased from 3 to 10. Some initiatives were made for the replacement of the students who are studying theology in BiH and wish to continue their education in the faculties of theologies in Turkey or religious high schools. Support is also given in providing training materials, the distribution of Quran,

publication of religious materials, and translating them into Bosnian language (HaberTürk, 2016).

Different cultural events are also organized, such as Turkish poetry contests, and the winner is rewarded with travel to Turkey. The tickets are afforded by Turkish Airlines. In the framework of 23rd of April Festival, folklore groups have been brought from Turkey to promote Turkish culture. Another important activity was the organization of a workshop named as “Balkan Turcologist Workshop in the Balkans”, where Turcologists are hosted from Turkey, the Balkans, and Egypt.

The effect of Turkish media is another solid proof of Turkish soft power in Balkan countries. Turkish Radio and Television (TRT) has launched a new channel called TRT Avaz, and there are programs in Balkan languages, which is important for cultural dominance (Hürriyet Gazetesi, 2009). Anatolian News Agency (AA) has also opened a new branch in Sarajevo. Additionally, it broadcasts in Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian.

Turkish is taught as a second selective foreign language at schools. Therefore, Turkish courses organized by the Yunus Emre Institute are very popular (Rucker-Chang, 2014). Yunus Emre Institute has been active in cultural and educational areas since 2009 in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Up to now, around 11.000 people have taken Turkish courses, and due to the heavy efforts, Turkish has been accepted as a selective foreign language in many of the elementary and high schools. Rahman Ademi, the Balkan Coordinator of Yunus Emre Institute, claims that their main goal is to cover all the schools in the country. There are around 39 teachers among the different areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina who teach Turkish. Yunus Emre Institute

also arranges programs for them to enable the higher quality in teaching (Yunus Emre Enstitüsü, n.d.).

Chief of Education and Science Department of Union of Islam Bosnia and Herzegovina, Prof. Dr. Enes Karić, visited the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs. The aim of this visit was to increase the level of collaboration about religious education between the two countries. In Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are six universities, two of which are Turkish and the others are international. The language of education is English, EU Bologna criteria are set, and the fees are at an affordable level. The Higher Education Council recognizes the accreditation of International Burch University and International Sarajevo University which were established by Turkish entrepreneurs and two international universities, namely American University and Sarajevo Science and Technology University (NTV Haber, 2011).

There is another Turkish department within the Oriental Institute of the University of Sarajevo. In this department, scientific research is done about the Ottoman Empire and the general and cultural history of BiH. The unfortunate events of May 1992 led to the destruction of certain documents of value including Ottoman archives, books, journals, and manuscripts existing in the library of the institute. With the help of Turkish State Archives, BiH Science and Arts Academy and Foundations Archive and the Cadastre and Land Registry Records were able to obtain parts of certain documents of primary importance for the BiH history as photocopies or in the form of microfilms and CDs.

International University in Sarajevo, which was established by the Foundation of Educational Development in Sarajevo, is one of the most important strategic

educational projects monitored and supported by various senior managers and investors in Turkey. The university signed international cooperation agreements with various universities in the world, among which are a number of Turkish universities such as Marmara University, Istanbul University, Yıldız Technical University, etc.

Another important educational institution in BiH is the Faculty of Theology. It is a unique faculty, accepted by the BiH Ministry of Education, Culture, and Science as a legal part of the state university intended to do Islamic researches. Faculty of Islamic Studies Sarajevo/BiH was established in 1977. It is the oldest, the most prestigious and important institution in South Eastern Europe. This faculty has many graduates who occupied different positions as politicians, academicians, and intellectuals, etc. In 2004, this faculty was attached to the University of Sarajevo, and it offers graduate and undergraduate programs and undertakes academic researches in the field of Islamic studies and related disciplines (Atli, 2010).

The faculty of Islamic Education in Zenica was established in 1993 to meet the needs of training public school teachers of religious education. It offers a two-year vocational program. The Faculty of Islamic Education in Bihac was founded in 1996. Although it had the best building and dormitory facilities, it was the smallest one in terms of its student population. It was initially established to offer a two-year program, but later it became a faculty with a three-year program.

In BiH, there are six *madrasas* (Islam-centered schools) and one faculty of theology. Among the *madrasas*, Gazi Hüsrev Bey and Elçi İbrahim Pasha *madrasas* in Travnik have a very strong education. It was indicated that in these *madrasas*, beside the religious courses, students were also taught modern sciences as well. In addition, it was expressed that in these *madrasas* they have also been taught the

Bosnian communities' good manners, customs, and traditions. The students who graduated from these *madradas* in BiH do not face any problems with the equivalency of the diplomas. Since the middle region of BiH is more conservative, Bosniak families living in that region send their children mainly to such religious schools.

The relations with Turkey has been growing slowly due to the local regulations and slow processes. Austria, Hungary, Slovenia, and Germany have also a significant impact on the field of education in BiH. The education system is mainly western oriented. Bologna process can also be stated as one of the reasons for the slowly progressing relations between the two countries. Although both countries are involved in the Bologna process, the implementation differs.

Granted scholarships, common culture, and opportunities for learning the Turkish language have positioned Turkey as an attractive destination to study. Since there is high unemployment in BiH, students who study abroad usually prefer to stay in where there are possible job opportunities. Therefore, the brain drain is valid for BiH. In Sarajevo, Books Fair was arranged on the 22-27th of April 2015. Turkey attended the fair with more than a thousand books which also included books about Turkish culture and literature as well as books translated to Bosniak from Turkish. Turkish universities established in BiH, Yunus Emre Cultural Center in Sarajevo and the Presidency of Religious Affairs of Turkey have determined to affect the educational relations between two countries as stakeholders. Yunus Emre Cultural Center organizes events and activities for different ethnic groups without any charge and Bosnians are very interested in Turkey and the Turkish language (Yunus Emre Enstitüsü, n.d.).

There are also joint projects conducted between the two countries.

Academicians expressed that the Oriental Institute of BiH performs joint projects with Research Center for Islamic History, Art and Culture (IRCICA). A book entitled “History of the Ottoman Empire and Civilization” published by IRCICA, which was translated in Bosnian language and presented as a scientific resource.

Scholarships are granted by the Religious Foundation of Turkey for the students who want to study in the faculties of theology in Turkey. These scholarships cover all costs of the students, including dormitory expenses. It was announced that scholarships under the name of “Turkey Scholarships” given jointly by the Religious Affairs of Turkey and the Presidency of Turks Abroad and Relative Communities.

Appointment of the instructors and lecturers to the educational institutions in BiH is another area of collaboration. In the framework of the Interministerial Joint Cultural Commission, through the Ministry of National Education of Turkey or Yunus Emre Cultural Center, in accordance to the agreements which were signed with the universities in Turkey, lecturers were appointed in the Turcology departments within the universities in Sarajevo, Zenica, and Tuzla. According to these agreements, faculties from BiH were also assigned for a period of 5 years in the Turcology departments of the universities in Turkey to gain experience. Some of the faculty members from the universities in BiH also have a master or doctoral degree from Turkey. However, exchange of faculty members between countries is not still possible.

In the framework of the Great Student Project by Turkey for BiH, the student quota is perceived as insufficient and should be increased. It should be revised by taking into consideration factors such as marital status, housing conditions, and travel

expenses. Presidency of Turks Abroad and Relative Communities carry out a study on this issue. The need to increase the student quota is that since BiH is not a candidate to the EU, the Erasmus program cannot be applied between two countries.

Teaching the Turkish language in BiH is another issue in the education area. The Turkish language is accepted as a compulsory elective course in three cantons in BiH, and there are initiatives taken for the remaining seven cantons. Ministry of Culture of Turkey provides support for the translation of books in the Turcology departments of the universities in BiH. As of 2011-2012 academic year, the sixth-grade students started to choose the Turkish language as a second foreign elective language. Approximately 990 students attend Turkish language courses. There are efforts to increase this number and expand this implementation to the high school level. Yunus Emre Cultural Center organizes Turkish courses in Sarajevo and Fojnica city. The main purpose of the Cultural Center is to promote and teach the Turkish language as well as to promote Turkish culture, art, and traditions.

According to some academicians, the cooperation in the field of education with Turkey provided opportunities for job recruitments; therefore, teaching the Turkish language is important in this sense. The Turkish series published in BiH have been found to be quite effective in dissemination of Turkish language. Every individual who learns Turkish eventually becomes a part of the dynamic that exists between two countries as volunteer cultural ambassadors. There are also efforts for opening the Bosnian language section in Turkish universities. An initiative is taken by Ankara University. TOBB University is also one of them. Such action would increase the number of students exchanged between the two countries.

There are many institutions that take place in the overall educational policy of Turkey as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Ministry of National Education of Turkey, Presidency of the Turks Living Abroad and Relative Communities, Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency. Ministry of Foreign Affairs plays a coordination role among these parties. Some other activities performed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are as follows: signing of bilateral educational cooperation agreements, organizing the visits of the Ministers of Education, the equivalency of diplomas, and joint university projects. In addition to these, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also gives support for the establishment of sister school relationships, encourage the contacts between the relevant institutions in the countries concerned for the organization of school trips, direct the organization of in-service training seminars, summer camps and summer internships programs (Yurtdışı Türkler Başkanlığı, n.d.).

Turkish Language and Literature Department in the Faculty of Philosophy at Tuzla University was established in the framework of a protocol signed between Tuzla University and TİKA in 2001 for a period of six years. According to this protocol, the academic staff is appointed by TİKA among the ranks of faculty members in Turkish universities, especially from Ankara University (College of Linguistics, History, and Geography) and Sakarya University. Additionally, books, teaching materials, and other tools needed by the department are also covered in the framework of this protocol. In addition to TİKA, institutions such as Turkish Battalion in Zenica, Sakarya University, Anatolian Development Foundation, and others also provide support to the department.

The activities regarding the restoration and reparation of the cultural monuments inherited from the Ottoman period is important for relations. The restoration of Ferhadiye mosque in Banja Luka, which was damaged during the war was done by TİKA. The reparation of the Konjic bridge and Drina Sokullu Mehmet Pasha bridge, the restoration of Kurshunlu Pasha Mosque in Maklaj were some important actions to protect Ottoman heritage by TİKA.

TİKA also takes part in some other projects in BiH. In the context of the 100 school project within Sarajevo Canton, hardware support was provided in 100 targeted education institutions by the Religious Affairs of BiH. For the project of dormitory construction in Goradje village, all equipment such as desks, chairs, beds, kitchen materials were provided by TİKA. In collaboration with Bihach University in the Krajina region, TİKA supported the establishment of two laboratories with the aim of helping the underdeveloped areas and disadvantaged groups in BiH. The first laboratory was established for the analysis of the wood products aiming to assess the quality of the wood materials in the forestry sector developed in the region. The second one is the microbiology laboratory to contribute to animal husbandry and dairy products in the food industry, also developed in the region.

Another one is mechatronics laboratory that was constructed in Mostar Machinery and Trafic High School. Rector Office of Tuzla University was also built by TİKA. Additionally, in the framework of the protocol signed with Cemal Biyedich University, which is the only educational institution Bosniaks living in the Mostar region, civil engineering faculty building and biotechnology laboratory have been established. TİKA also provides academic staff support in BiH. Within the Turcology Project, Zenica and Tuzla universities were supported by lecturers, whose monthly

salaries were paid by TİKA, and the organization of this service is now being undertaken by Yunus Emre Institute.

In collaboration with Turkey's General Directorate of Security Police Academy and Police Academy of the Ministry of Interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina, TİKA has carried out joint vocational training project within the framework of international police education cooperation. TİKA also takes part in academic conferences and symposium where common history and culture of Turkey and the Balkans are emphasized. One of the international conferences was named as "The Ottomans in the Balkans" and "Bosnia in Ottoman period" which was organized in Tuzla in 2009. In the scope of the series that were initiated by the Turkish Studies Project at the University of Utah in the USA, the conference on "The First World War and the Ottoman Empire" was organized with the contribution of TİKA in cooperation with Yıldız Technical University in Turkey and the University of Sarajevo Faculty of Philosophy.

CHAPTER 3. NEO-OTTOMANISM in AFRICA

3.1. Case Study 1: Relations with Somalia

3.1.1. State of Politics

Turkey and Somalia have been in a close relationship throughout the history. The roots of this engagement go back to the Ottoman Empire period. Ever since historical and cultural ties have formed the basis of relations for both countries. Somalia, under the Great Sahara, is an African country which is surrounded by Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, the Gulf of Aden, the coast of the Indian Ocean, and a part of the Horn of Africa. Due to the long coast on the Indian Ocean, Somalia has strategic importance for shipment transportation, and therefore, was exposed to colonial activities during its history. However, the Ottoman Empire dominated the African continent between the 16th and 20th centuries. Despite the popularity of colonial activities, the Ottoman Empire emphasized on humanism during its existence in Africa. The majority of Somalia's population is Muslim, and this increased the strategic importance of the country for the Ottoman Empire. From this perspective, the Ottomans built bonds based on cultural and religious values.

Portugal had a close interest in the area and supported Ethiopian Christians against the Muslims who were not powerful enough to fight with them. Therefore, the Ottoman Empire joined the Somalian side during the war, which ended in the 18th century. Until the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire continued to provide economic and military support for the Muslim community. After then, European countries started to be more dominant in the continent due to the beginning of the downfall of the Ottoman Empire. In the last decades of the 18th century, the rise of nationalist

movements caused riots at the different areas of the Ottoman Empire, and this weakened the bonds with Africa. At the end of World War I, the Ottoman Empire left the continent, and the European colonial activities started.

Until the 1950s, the Turkish Republic was not in much interaction with Africa. The aim of the new republic was to build a powerful economy, and therefore it needed closer relations with the Western countries. For this reason, African countries were not a priority on the political agenda. Despite such circumstances, Turkey supported the independence movements in the continent against the European countries during the 1950s.

During the Cold War period, as a member state of NATO, Turkey joined activities to avoid the spread of Communism in Africa. In that case, Turkey has been a good example for African countries, as an independent state which can still form close relations with powerful countries. For Turkey, between the 1960s and 1980s, the main issue on the table was Cyprus. For the conflict resolution process in Cyprus, Turkey needed more support in the international arena, and African countries were evaluated as a good choice. Therefore, Turkey started to open embassies in Africa to build closer relations with Non-Aligned Movement countries. During the 1970s, Turkish-African relations were established around The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). In 1979, Somalia opened an embassy in Ankara, which showed the importance of Turkey for Somalia (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı, n.d.).

In the early 1980s, Özal was in charge, and his vision was much more expansionist than the previous periods. His economic ambitions could be realized by allowing the mobility of Turkish goods and services (Langan, 2017, p.1403). His supporters who were mainly the middle Anatolian merchants started to export their

products to these countries (Warning & Kardaş, 2011). At the beginning of the 1990s, the Cold War ended, and this was the beginning of the evolution toward a multipolar world. Due to the instability, Turkey had to close its embassy in 1991. After the U.S. intervention to stop the chaos in Somalia, Özal sent 300 soldiers with the UN forces for peacekeeping activities in 1993, and they were on duty between 1993-1994 (Hürriyet, 2019).

However, the 1990s were the decades which Turkey had to deal with the problems of coalition governments, which led to a kind of divergence from Africa. Until 1998, Africa could not be on the agenda of Turkish politics. In 1998, İsmail Cem, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, initiated African Action Plan which included opening up new embassies and improving economic and politic relations with the continent. Although the document included the necessary actions, it could not go further than a goodwill claim. The problems Turkey faced internally and externally, such as terrorism and rejection of the EU membership, needed more focus on the priority. Furthermore, Turkey started millennium with the economic crisis, which resulted in the elections and the rise of the AKP. In 2003, Strategy for Improving Economic Relations with African Countries document was published as the beginning of a new era. This document was a wider and updated version of the African Action Plan, which was published in 1998.

Relations with Africa was on standby until 2005, which was named as “Year of Africa” (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı, n.d.). The aim was to build closer relations with Africa in terms of social, political, economic, and cultural dimensions. Due to such engagement, Turkey could have the chance of finding new

markets for its economic development while playing an active role in international politics, especially from a humanistic perspective.

The United Nations Somalia Conference on 21-23rd of May 2010 in Istanbul has accelerated the frequency of political relations between the two states. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was the chairman at the conference where possible peace and security actions in Somalia were evaluated. Development and stability of Somalia were emphasized, and the importance of good neighborhood relations was pointed out. Ban Ki-Mun, General Secretary of the United Nations and Ahmet Davutoğlu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs attended to the session in which the international agenda was discussed. Abdullah Gül, President of the Turkish Republic, met with Sheik Şerif Ahmed, temporary Prime Minister of Somalia as well. At this conference, Turkey claimed that training support would be provided for Somalia security forces. As a result, a declaration document was published at the end of this conference which stated the importance of independence, territorial integrity, the sovereignty of Somalia which could be achieved by long-term plans (Akpınar, 2013).

Declaration of Istanbul was published at the end of the conference of Somalia on the 21-23rd of May 2010. According to the declaration of Istanbul, with the suggestion of the Islamic Development Bank, “Duty Force” was established in order to provide infrastructure services, create opportunities for employment and improve wellbeing in the country.

Turkey continued its efforts for underlining the needs of Somalia in the international arena. Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) gathered in Istanbul for another meeting where Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Prime Minister of Turkey made the opening speech. At the end of the conference, it was decided that an amount of

\$350 million aid should be provided for Somalia. Also, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Senegal and General Secretariat of OIC formed “Somalia Duty Force” for closer engagement with Somalia. Security has been an important parameter in Turkey’s foreign policy and moved in line with regional and international institutions for the maintenance of international security. In that sense, Turkey took part in joint operations against terrorist groups, and Turkish Sea Forces had been on duty in Aden Gulf as security keeper. Moreover, Somali National Army soldiers were trained at the military base, which was built by Turkey in Mogadishu, to take over duty from the African Union Somalia Mission (Hürriyet, 2019).

In 2008, Somalia opened an embassy in Ankara, and the political engagements started to increase due to the frequent visits and meetings. In addition to all the visits by Somali politicians, many more had been performed from Turkey to Somalia. Erdoğan, then Prime Minister of Turkey, visited Mogadishu with a committee in 2011. His visit was evaluated as a milestone for Turkish-Somali relations, and in 2011, the Turkish Embassy in Mogadishu was reopened. President of Somalia pointed out the importance of this visit as a motivator for his people and a call for other leaders in the world. Turkey has always shown his support for Somalia not only with the political visits but also at the international and regional institutions for overcoming the issues Somalia faces. The United Nations Somalia Conference in 2010 and The Organization of Islamic Cooperation meeting, which was held in 2011 in Istanbul show Turkey’s efforts for the determination on the decision of an emergency aid plan. Turkey’s efforts for raising international cooperation to solve Somalia’s problems convinced other states about the maintenance of development, peace, and security in the country (Tepebaş, 2010).

In 2011, the embassy of Turkish Republic was opened in Mogadishu after 20 years of instability in the country and Cemalettin Kani Torun, Chairman of Doctors Worldwide Foundation, was appointed as Ambassador (Akpınar, 2013). The reopening of the Turkish embassy helped for better coordination of state and nonstate institutions in Somalia. Later on, in 2014, Turkish General Consulate in Hargeysa, Somaliland was opened. Turkish missions in Somali aimed to work for peace in the region and took part in the resolution process between the central government of Somalia and other autonomous areas (Hürriyet, 2019).

Turkey hosted “Preparing Somalia’s Future: Goals for 2015 Conference” on 31st May-1st of June 2012 in the context of the Second United Nations Somalia Conference in Istanbul (Öztürk, 2011). At this conference, in addition to short and mid-term strategy development for Somalia, a meeting was organized with the representatives from the private sector in order to improve commercial relations. Similar to the first Istanbul Conference in 2010, many high-level representatives from 57 countries and 11 international and regional organizations attended. It was underlined that the recent political, social and economic developments could be a sign of progress for the further achievement of stability in the country. Therefore, the importance of the elections in August 2012 arises as a possibility of a new beginning for the peace-building process in Somalia.

The aim of this collaboration was not only to define the political future of Somalia but also strengthening Turkey’s power in international politics. In that sense, Turkey gained prestige and moral value by efforts of humanitarian aid for Somalia (Davutoğlu, 2013). At this point, it can not be talked about economic benefit, but in the long-run, commercial relations can provide more economic value for both sides

when stability is achieved. The presence of Turkey in the country forces other states and international institutions to get Turkey involved in the decision making the process for issues related to Somalia and Africa in a wider sense.

In September 2012, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was elected as the new president of Somalia against the incumbent president, Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud made his first official visit to Turkey in 2012. In March 2013, Ahmed Muhammed Silanyo, President of Somaliland, which declared independence on the lands of Somalia, visited Turkey for the purpose of political engagement. Two presidents met in April 2013 in Ankara for the first time under the patronage of the Turkish Republic for a resolution process. As a result of meetings, Ankara Statement was signed, which anticipates the peaceful resolution process for the conflicts between the two states. All these steps have contributed to the reestablishment of state structure and maintenance of peace in Somalia (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışışleri Bakanlığı, n.d.).

An agreement for collaboration on information systems was signed between the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Somalian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The technical infrastructure of the ministry was planned to be shared with Somalia. A pilot project was started at the embassy of Somalia in Ankara first with a data center. With this data center, all the information flow can be followed, and the necessary needs for an update can be determined easily with a program which will be provided by Turkey.

3.1.2. Economic Relations

After the declaration of African Action Plan in 1998, Turkish Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade established the “Strategy for Improving Economic Relations with African Countries”. This strategy aimed to increase the trade volume with African countries, enabling the entrance of small and medium-sized companies into African markets, transferring technology to the region, increasing capability of engineering companies and reducing poverty through investment.

The need for new markets of the Turkish private sector accelerated Turkish political economy. This need became a drive for the efforts of increasing commercial and economic relations. In addition to Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEİK), Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD), The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB), Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (MÜSİAD) became important players for shaping national interest in terms of economic variables.

President Gül and Prime Minister Erdoğan made several visits along with nongovernmental organizations such as DEİK, TÜSİAD ve MÜSİAD committees. During those visits, important steps were taken for the improvement of better economic and commercial relations with not only developed countries but also developing countries. The businessman who joined these visits had the chance to seize the economic potential in the area for their interest and also had an opportunity to introduce their companies. On 6th of December 2012, Turkish-Somalian Trade and Investment Forum was organized in Istanbul. President of Somalia attended this conference and invited Turkish investors, especially in fishery, infrastructure, energy, engineering and building, furniture and tourism, to invest in his country.

Turkish Airlines started its operations in 2012 as the first international airlines for the last 20 years. Flights were performed four times a week to Mogadishu. Turkish Airlines played a very important role in linking Somalia with the rest of the world. Later on, Turkish Airlines started a campaign on social media with the hashtag “TurkishAirlinesHelpSomalia” and managed to carry 60 tons of aid material to Somalia (Hürriyet, 2019). Turkish companies had the management of Mogadishu Airport and planned on adding even more terminals to increase the number of flights (Harper, 2014). In September 2013, Favori LLC company took over the management of the airport. With these efforts, Mogadishu Aden Abdulle Airport was transformed into an airport with approximately 400.000 passengers yearly, 40-60 flights daily linking to four countries (Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı, 2016).

There have been many more Turkish companies operating in Somalia. Mogadishu Port has been managed by Albayrak A.Ş. since October 2014. En-Ez company works for the infrastructure of the country such as building roads, Yankı İnşaat completed a nursing school building, and PGM company operates for quality control of Somalian import and export goods. Moreover, Turkish entrepreneurs dominate furniture and infrastructure activities with their Somalian partners (Hürriyet, 2019).

Turkey mainly prioritized humanism factor in relations with Somalia, and this was appreciated by Somalian people and politicians. In the context of closer relations, it was understood that the Somalia market could play an important role in Turkish products. Turkish businessmen, as being Muslim and perceived as more trustworthy, may hold a more advantageous position.

Table 11 shows the figures of exports and imports between 2009-2014. We can see a sudden increase in 2011 for both exports and imports. Exports in 2011 were realized as nine times higher than the usual figures. In the same year, imports were almost doubled parallel to the increase in political engagements. Turkey plays an important role in Somalia's imports and is on the top 5 imports partner list with approximately 3.4% of total imports. For exports, Turkey mostly holds second or third place on the list. Therefore, it can be said that the total trade volume increased for both sides by creating economic value.

Table 11: *The Trend of Trade with Somalia among Years* (adopted by the author)

Year	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Exports (\$)	3,546,047	4,810,314	39,547,534	43,751,202	58,314,799	62,119,434
Imports (\$)	163,653	1,361,149	2,464,966	1,163,423	1,051,799	1,522,895

The goods which are exported to Somalia are macaroni, wheat flour, medicine, sunflower oil, baby diapers, carpentry products, beans, sugar, cocoa and chocolate, furniture, and clothing. The majority of the list includes basic needs such as food, health, and clothing items. The volume of exports increased in 2011 and continued to increase from year to year.



Figure 3.1. The Trend of Exports with Somalia among Years (adopted by the author)

The goods which are imported from Somalia are rosin, essential oil, oilseeds, leather and leather goods. In Figure 3.2, you can find the trend in imports between 2009-2014. In 2011, the volume of the imports was approximately as twice as the previous years. However, after 2011, the volume decreased but remained higher than the years before 2011. In 2014, the trend showed an increase again.




Figure 3.2. The Trend of Imports with Somalia among Years (adopted by the author)

3.1.3. Socio-Cultural Relations

The Ottoman Empire's historical heritage in Horn of Africa countries, including Somalia helped Turkey to form stronger bonds in the area. During the AKP term, along with historical responsibility perspective, Turkey has started to play an active role in the region both economically and politically. In this context, prior good relations during the Ottoman Empire made it easier for Turkey to build positive relations.

Even though it can be said that Neo-Ottomanism concept was first used during the Özal term, it became more popular and meaningful for the definition of foreign policy strategy during the AKP term (Erdem, 2017). This concept shows Turkey's tendency to using Ottoman heritage in the lands where penetration or influence is aimed. However, this does not involve a colonial perspective which the Ottoman Empire did not have as well. On the other hand, it can be described as a tool for soft power politics for building better relations in terms of political, economic, and socio-cultural parameters.

In this respect, Turkey and Turkish aids for Somalia, have been a convincing factor for creating a common tendency for helping Somalia. Turkey's approach to Somalia's needs and problems was much more in a humanistic perspective rather than a pragmatist. This increased the positive image of Turkey in Somalia, and Somalian people appreciated the efforts for increasing their well-being. Turkish aid and efforts aimed to build a powerful state in Somalia, ending poverty and famine, and improving health conditions in the country (Öztürk, 2011).

TİKA opened many branches in the African continent due to the increasing political and economic relations. The number of branches increased from 12 to 33

within 10 years between 2002-2012, and the branch in Somalia was one of them.

TİKA Mogadishu Office for Coordination was opened on 12th of September 2011.

As a result of TİKA's activities, the amount of aid increased to one billion 273 million US dollars in 2011 from \$85 million in 2002 (TİKA, 2011). The amount of aid was realized as \$640 million for Somalia in kind and monetary terms. TİKA has been continuing its activities in education, health, agriculture, water wells, cultural cooperation, improving infrastructure, sheltering, and renovation. TİKA supports Turkish foreign policy in terms of activities from a soft power perspective. In Somalia, TİKA coordinates the distribution of aid for necessary areas and creates projects for the development of the country. Under the leadership of TİKA, other governmental and nongovernmental institutions also take place in several projects in Somalia. In this context, Turkish Red Crescent, Presidency of Religious Affairs, General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works, Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry involved in various joint projects.

The first cargo plane which carried aid was sent to Somalia on the 8th of November 2011, and the distribution of food and medicine was done at the refugee camps. In collaboration with the Ministry of Health in Mogadishu, four hospitals were built, and until June 2014, 361 Turkish personnel provided health services for 350,000 people (Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı, 2016). TİKA, with the support of other nongovernmental organizations, opened the biggest hospital of Somalia, Şifa Hospital and the renovation of Mogadishu Airport was completed where the flights started on the 6th of March in 2012. Turkish Red Crescent has worked with TİKA to reduce the effects of hunger, drought and conflict in the country.

TİKA plays a crucial role in the normalization of daily life in the country.

Roads were renovated, and 34 km of new roads were built. This helped the transportation of goods and people. Furthermore, the lighting of cities was improved in order to reduce crime in the cities (Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı, 2016). TİKA also took part in the modernization of electronic and physical infrastructure of Mogadishu Aden Abdulle Airport, so that flights could have been started. Necessary equipment for taking off and landing were set up, entrance and exit of the airport were controlled, and renovation of the terminal building was completed (Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı, 2016).

TİKA renovated Derbil ve İleys Orphanage and provided school materials and food aid to children at the orphanage. Moreover, TİKA built two new additional buildings for the orphanages in Somaliland. In total, eight orphanages were supported (Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı, 2016). A radio station named as “Hope” started broadcasting in order to help Somalian students at the Art Faculty of Mogadishu University to gain more experience. All the equipment was provided by TİKA. Radio Hope reached more than three million people living around Mogadishu and informed them about various issues (Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı, 2016).

Turkish Red Crescent Somalian Delegation was established on the 11th of August 2011 in Mogadishu which enabled a platform for humanitarian aid efforts. One of the biggest projects of Turkish Red Crescent was building a tent city in Mogadishu with the objective of solving sheltering and food problems and providing basic services such as education, health and social activities. Hilal-ı Ahmer Children Park was built, and it was the first park after the war in Somalia. Therefore, it is an

important symbol for the normalization of daily life in the country. Somalia School of Agriculture was opened by TİKA with 20 students. The aim of this school was to teach agricultural activities such as seeding, watering, and spudding. With this project, the first greenhouse of Somalia was built, and water systems were used to cultivate vegetables such as eggplant, melon, etc.

Turkish Red Crescent has provided humanitarian aid operation since the 6th of August 2011, built tent cities for 2,600 families and provided sheltering and food more than 15,600 people in Somalia. “Ship of Goodness” started its journey from Kocaeli Derince Port carrying 5,000 tons of flour, 5,000 tons of sugar and 34,625 kilograms of macaroni to solve hunger in Somalia (Türk Kızılay, 2014).

Doctors Worldwide Foundation, performed many activities for the project named as “African Life Operation”. 15 volunteers of medical personnel were placed at Mogadishu Şifa Hospital for training, medical operation, and examination purposes. They examined more than 30,000 patients and did more than 700 operations. With the support of TİKA and Turkish Red Crescent, personnel of Mogadishu Şifa Hospital were trained in Turkey in the areas of child, female birth, emergency service and general surgeon at Bezm-i Alem Foundation Hospital. Doctors Worldwide also worked together with the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) in order to cure women and babies who suffer from poverty and famine at the medical nutrition centers. Food and medicine aid were provided to Somalia regularly by Turkey. With another project on eye health, many people who suffered from cataract due to bad living conditions and insufficient nutrition had an operation.

TİKA has worked with a mission of coordination and leadership for all governmental and nongovernmental organizations that aims to help Somalia. The advantage of TİKA's knowledge of the country helped to categorize the aids and projects. As a result, Turkey's positive image has been built with such successful activities.

In 2012, more than 1,200 students came to Turkey for educational purposes. And after graduation, these students went back to their country. In addition, Turkey has started graduation programs named "African Studies". The programs aimed to send Ph.D. students to African countries which would enable them learning Africa better and deeper rather than learning from secondary sources from western academia. In this context, 28 Somalian students visited Turkey for "Graduation Programs for African Students and Scientists Project" launched by Ankara University. This program played an important role in strengthening cultural bounds with Somalia and other African countries. As a tool of soft power politics, Turkey considered benefiting from this student exchange program when they hold bureaucratic positions in their country. This way, Turkish politicians would have continued to have closer relations with Somalia, and Turkey's benefits would also be taken care of.

All above those projects and collaboration on education, Turkey opened Turkish schools in Somalia. In 2011, with the special permission of Somalian Ministry of Interior Relations, Bedir Turkish High School, Kiblenuma Primary School, and Vifak Turkish-Somalian School were opened. At these schools, modern education facilities were provided to Somalian students, with the objective of increasing their learning capabilities. Turkish, Somalian, Arabic, and English languages were taught as primary languages. In the book named as "Bridges of Peace:

Turkish Schools Open Up to the World” under the editorial of İlber Ortaylı, Toktamış Ateş and Eser Karakaş, the importance of Turkish schools for spreading Turkish culture, language and education model is underlined.

International Turkish Foundation has organized the Turkish Language Olympics every year since 2003. Around 1,000 students from more than 100 countries attend this event each year, and this increases the level of usage of Turkish and publicity of Turkish language internationally. Somalian students won the first prize in these language olympics.

3.2. Case Study 2: Relations with Sudan

3.2.1. State of Politics

In the 16th century, following the conquest of Egypt by Yavuz Sultan Selim, the Ottoman Empire had the sovereignty over Sudan, including North of Sudan. This was the beginning of a new term during which the Ottomans dominated Africa. After the Ottomans, Islam has become powerful in Africa. Interest in Africa by the Ottomans continued during Kanuni Sultan Süleyman, and he conquered Sudan, Eritrea, Somalia, and Ethiopia. By this way, the hegemony of the Ottoman Empire increased in Africa in terms of political, military, and economic. The system established by the Ottoman Empire forms the basics of modern Sudan.

Transformation to modern agricultural system and communication tools were some of the improvements during the Ottoman Period. Additionally, current capital Khartum and the final national border were defined after the Ottomans defeated Funç Beylik. Sudan is one of the richest countries in Africa with its widest land, which is three times bigger than Turkey. Sudan has the most fertile land in the world. It has

petroleum, uranium, and copper resources. Due to its capability of economic wealth, Sudan is against western dominance in the African continent and controls the Red Sea (Time Turk, 2009).

The Ottoman Empire transformed the Mediterranean Sea into “Turkish Lake” after the conquer of North Africa (Toprak, 2012). New lands provided economic means by sea trade for the Ottoman Empire. In line with the increased opportunities, development of African welfare, thanks to the economic engagements was realized. As a result, the support of local people was gained by the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire started to weaken during the second half of the 19th century. This fastened up the conquests of European countries in Africa; Great Britain invaded Cyprus and, Egypt, while France invaded Tunisia. Ottoman-African relations played an important role in the period of decline. Because European imperialism increased, the Ottoman lands in Africa were in the target. The struggle of hegemony for African lands of the Ottoman Empire was not stoppable due to the factors such as the multiethnicity in the area, the rise of nationalist movements and economic conditions.

By some of the researchers, the Ottoman Empire can be evaluated as one of the colonial states in that period. The main reason for such circumstance can be the participation of the Ottoman Empire to Berlin conference in 1884-1885 during which the principles of colonialism were defined, and the African lands were split. However, the Ottomans rejected such an idea, and their existence in Africa postponed the colonial activities in the continent.

Sevakin Island, which was ruled by the Ottoman Empire for 400 years after the conquest of Egypt in 1517 until the British invasion in 1882, has strategic importance since it is the door for going to Mecca for the pilgrimage by the African

Muslims. According to the 17th article of Lausanne Agreement, the island was left to Egypt, which was under British invasion. After Sudan declared its independence in 1956, Sevakin became part of Sudan. Sevakin Island is also known with its port opening to the Red Sea for trade purposes. Under the Ottoman rule, Arabs, Africans, Turks, and Indians lived together on the island. However, after the big earthquake in 1918, Sevakin turned to be a ghost island and lost its importance in terms of trade but still continues to be an important location for touristic purposes (Hürriyet, 2017).

İbrahim Gandur, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sudan, stated that Turkey is eager to renovate this island for its historical and religious importance. The Ottomans built castles, mosques, Turkish baths, etc. Some important examples of the Ottoman heritage can be counted as Customs Building, Hanafi and Shafi mosques in the island. The Red Sea became an internal sea for the Ottoman Empire with Sevakin being a crucial point for trade and security. However, after Port Sudan was built only 30 km away from Sevakin, the importance of Sevakin decreased. Therefore, many people who live in Sevakin migrated to Port Sudan for employment purposes. In this sense, renovation works on the island would also create employment opportunities in the infrastructure sector first, and then, in the tourism sector (Hürriyet, 2017).

Another reason for Turkey's interest in Sevakin is for security issues since it is known as the "Door of Africa". Turkey also wants to build a naval base for the maintenance of civil and military ships. Sevakin's proximity to the Red Sea and Gulf countries increases the importance of the island for Turkey. Turkey's plans for building military bases for Somalia and Qatar are meaningful if Sevakin can also be added to the list. Therefore, some Arab states perceive Turkey's close relations and

future plans as a threat or a fierce competition in the region. However, Turkey's African policy is generally evaluated positively by African people (Çiftçi, 2019).

After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, in the first decades of the Turkish Republic, foreign policy was Western-oriented in general. Since economic and political relations with Western countries were more important, focus on Africa was not on the agenda. In the 1950s, during the independence period of African countries, the reaction of the Turkish Republic was parallel to Western countries. When the issues were raised at the UN, Turkey tended to perceive this as an internal conflict of European countries, and therefore, did not play an active role for any kind of resolution.

Following the independence of Sudan on 1st of January 1956, Turkey was one of the first countries that opened an embassy in Khartoum. After this, Sudan opened an embassy in Ankara first and later a Consulate Office in Istanbul, which means political relations were established from the very first day. However, there was not much activity in the first years until the 1960s (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı, n.d.).

In the 1960s, Turkey tried to improve relations with African countries to get support for Cyprus conflict in the UN General Assembly. Therefore, such improvement was necessary for Turkish foreign policy. However, Turkey's attendance for the Bandung Conference in 1955 and its limited previous interaction made it difficult to gain support from African countries. As a result, they supported Makarios at the UN meetings. In this context, Turkey formed three committees of politicians, diplomats, journalists, and academicians to explain Cyprus conflict in 1965. The committees visited Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Liberia, Ghana, Nigeria,

Sierra Leone, and Senegal firstly; Kamerun, Gabon, Congo, Central African Republic and Chad secondly; and Abyssinia, Kenya, Somalia, Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Malawi, Madagascar, Sudan, Libya and Tunisian thirdly. This can be counted as the first African interaction by Turkey, which resulted in a failure.

Between the 1970s-1980s, Turkish-Sudanese relations were realized around the Arab-Israel issue. Although they had opposite opinions, small engagements were possible in trade. In the early 1980s, Turgut Özal became in charge of Turkey, and his vision was improving the economy by external trade opportunities, including Africa. Therefore, many agreements were signed, and development aids were planned accordingly. 9573 numbered Law of Aid was approved on the 5th of June 1985. The aim of this law was to help Sub-Saharan African countries which suffer from drought. With this law, approximately ten million dollars aid was provided for Gambia, Guinea, Mauritania, Senegal, Somalia, and Sudan (Arslan & Kiper, 2015).

Sudan has dealt with separatist movements in its history. Clans were supported by different western countries for becoming separate states. Christians form 15% of the population in the south of the country, and western countries support the idea of establishing a new state by missionary activities. The conflicts with Christians in the south were solved after 21 years. However, another issue started in 2003, namely Darfour conflict (Time Turk, 2009).

Darfur, where six million people live, is rich in terms of natural resources. People in Darfur were under the Ottoman Empire autonomy from 1821 until the fall of the empire. The population is mainly Muslim and very religious, consisting of 60% of Arab and 40% of Africans. On 11th of February 1914, the Ottoman Sultan called for *jihad* and Sultan of Darfur, Ali Dinar, sent thousands of Sudanese and Darfuri

soldiers to fight on the side of the Ottomans. After this, the United Kingdom invaded Sudan for 40 years, and when they left all the clans in Sudan were in warfare. President of Sudan, Ömer El-Beşir visited Turkey to attend the meeting of Islam Economic and Commercial Committee, and his visit was followed by the international public. Since Ömer El-Beşir was sentenced for war crime and crime against humanity by the International Criminal Court for Darfur conflict, Turkey was criticized, and Turkish-EU relations had a crisis over this (TimeTürk, 2009).

Due to the good relations between two countries, Sudan and Turkey signed an agreement on 13th October 2010 for the removal of visa for diplomatic passport holders. According to this agreement, Turkish and Sudanese people with diplomatic passports would not need visas for their travels for 90 days within 6 months (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 2010).

A Ceasefire Agreement was signed between the Government of Sudan and Freedom and Justice Movement in Doha on the 18th of March 2010. Turkey evaluated this agreement as a step for peace-keeping in Darfur. This agreement was signed just before the Conference of the International Donors for Reconstruction and Development of Darfour which was organized under the leadership of Turkey and Egypt on the 21st of March 2010 (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 2010).

After the referendum on the independence of South Sudan, the Republic of South Sudan declared its independence on the 9th of July 2011. The Turkish Republic recognized this new state immediately. Minister of Development, Cevdet Yılmaz handed the letter of recognition at the ceremony and claimed that good relations would be continued with North and South Sudan since it has been getting more

important for Turkish businessmen in terms of the need of raw materials and improving commercial relations worldwide (Sabah, 2011).

Turkey is one of the first countries which recognized South Sudan. Turkish Consulate-General in Juba was opened in January 2011 and turned into an embassy after the declaration of independence. The independence ceremony was held on the 9th of July 2011 and Turkish Minister of Development, Cevdet Yılmaz, attended this ceremony. The South Sudan Republic opened one of its first embassies in Ankara in June 2012. Many diplomatic visits were done between the two countries. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nhial Deng Nhial was invited to Turkey for the official opening of the embassy in Ankara (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışışleri Bakanlığı).

3.2.2. Economic Relations

Sudan's economy is based on agriculture and energy, which provide an opportunity for investors in these areas. After a long period of civil war, South Sudan declared its independence from the North on the 9th of July 2011 as the 54th state in the African continent. Sudan lost 75% of its oil reserves, and economic bottleneck started in the country. In 2012, Sudan and South Sudan signed an agreement on sharing oil revenues. According to this agreement, refinery, pipeline, and ports will be on the North and receive currency revenues on South Sudan petroleum (BBC News Türkçe, 2012).

For Turkey, Sudan holds a strategic entrance for East Africa with its ports and potential for development. In order to build better commercial relations with Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) member states, (Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda,

Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe), Sudan can be used as a base. Customs exemptions between these countries may provide an advantage for investors in Sudan in the long-run.

Turkish companies in Sudan mainly operate in iron-steel, cement, leather, marble goods, grain export and import, bakery, furniture, white goods, and intercity bus transportation. There are also opportunities for Turkish infrastructure companies in Sudan since there are many roads, bridges, housing, dam projects, highways, and railways need to be built and renovated. These may enable better transportation services which can create valuable products for the economy. Moreover, the government plans on increasing production on areas where the agricultural population is higher, and this policy may enable regional development and welfare. Even though the lands are efficient, cultivation is insufficient. The main agricultural product is cotton, and as a result, there is limited textile industry. The government owes the cotton lands for foreign investors, which seems beneficial for trade with COMESA countries.

In 1980, the first economic agreement was signed between Turkey and Sudan. Cafer Numeyri, President of Sudan and Kenan Evren, President of Turkey gathered together in 1982 in Turkey to sign economic, cultural and scientific agreements. In 1988, Turkey provided a total amount of \$40,000,000 credit (Bilgin, 2010). In the 1990s, economic relations were fastened thanks to the economic protocols, and in 1995, Turkish companies started to operate in Sudan. After the announcement of the African Action Plan in 1998, Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade started to implement “Strategy of Improving Economic and Commercial Relations with African Countries” in 2003. The aim of this strategy was to increase the trade volume, facilitate the

involvement of the small and medium-size companies in the African market, transfer technology, increase activities of engineering and contract companies and make the investment to reduce poverty.

Following the announcement of this strategy, Kürşat Tüzmen, the Minister of State, had a meeting with Kemal İsmail, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sudan, and Tüzmen stated that Sudan had been such an important country for Turkey's African Strategy and the efforts toward improvement of the trade volume had positive results. In addition to this, Kemal İsmail emphasized that Sudan expects many more businessmen, especially for contracting services. In 2001, agreement for the removal of double taxation was signed, and in 2005, it became effective. This agreement enabled an increased number of commercial engagements (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı, n.d.).

Turkish companies invest in Sudan in various areas. One of them is the construction sector, and more than 30 Turkish companies operate in Sudan and take part in many projects. In addition to individual companies, organizations such as MÜSİAD invest in Africa since 2005, and MÜSİAD even opened a branch in Sudan on the 17th of July 2016 (MÜSİAD, 2016).

Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry rented a 5 million hectare of land for 99 years in which greengrocery products will be cultivated mainly. The lands are planned to be shared with the private sector also. Sample soils were analyzed to define the list of products that can be cultivated. The plan is opening model farms and selling their products to the Middle East and African markets. Additionally, the products that can not be cultivated in Turkey and/or imported to Turkey due to insufficiency can also be cultivated for economic efficiency. Since labor and watering costs are lower in Sudan

than in Turkey, the total cost of production will be lower, and therefore, prices in Turkey might be decreased (Bozkurt, 2013).

Table 12 shows the trend in exports and imports between 2009-2014. Except for the decrease in 2010, there is an increasing trend in trade volume between Turkey and Sudan. The trade balance between the two countries is always positive for Turkey. In 2012, the number of exports to Sudan made the highest amount, with approximately 280 million dollars. However, in 2013, with a decrease of 3.9%, it was realized as 269 million dollars. On the other hand, the number of imports was increased from 2012 to 2013 by 135.7% and realized as 26,3 million dollars.

Year	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Exports (\$)	247,189,928	227,743,328	243,723,074	279,611,767	268,662,344	307,872,075
Imports (\$)	7,262,198	5,214,731	9,370,069	11,171,417	26,330,095	12,150,385

Table 12: *The Trend of Trade with Sudan among Years*

(adopted by the author)

The goods which are mainly exported to Sudan are beans, flour, yeast, paper, and packaging products, automobile supplier products, agricultural machines, food processing machines, chocolate food products, and sugar products. In Figure 3.3, you can find the number of exports between 2009-2014. From year to year, the number of exports shows an increasing trend. In 2010 there is a small decline, and in 2012, there is a peak point. The goods which are imported from Sudan are seeds, gold, sheep and

cattle leather, charcoal, sugar, and cotton.



Figure 3.3. The Trend of Exports with Sudan among Years (adopted by the author)

Figure 3.4 presents the number of imports between 2009-2014. From year to year, the amount of imports shows an increasing trend. In 2010 there is a slight decline, and in 2013, the amount of imports makes the peak. But in 2014, the trend settles back to normalized values of the import trend.




Figure 3.4. The Trend of Imports with Sudan among Years (adopted by the author)

On the 7-9th of April 2009, at the 11th meeting of Turkish-Sudanese businessman, it was agreed to form a free trade area. However, there are some drawbacks which affect the trade volume negatively. First of these drawbacks is the lack of correspondence between banking services. Turkish Halk Bank and Ziraat Bank meet with Sudanese representatives to solve this problem. Turkish Halk Bank signed a correspondence agreement with Omdurman National Bank and Sudanese French Bank. Another option can be establishing the Turkish-Sudanese Bank (Dünya Bülteni, 2009).

Secondly, since the price of Turkish products is higher than Chinese or other country products, this results in unfair competition in the Sudanese market. Even though the customs tax ratio is the same, the reference values are calculated differently. Turkey is accepted as a European country, and this increases the prices. Thirdly, shipping is used for trade between Turkey and Sudan. However, there are not direct regular shipments to Gulf countries and Sudan. Moreover, shipment costs are too high that it is almost double the cost of Chinese shipments. This decreases the power of competition for Turkish products in the market. Since Saudi Arabia does not provide a transit visa for land transport, there is no alternative route for Turkish companies.

Turkey started a very important project for Sudan's future. Piomak works in collaboration with the Khartum Water Department for the Emergency Water Project. This project can be financed by Turkish Eximbank, and it is expected to cost approximately 10,823,000 Euro. The most important step of this project would be to lay pipes, and it is expected to be 14,000 meters of the pipeline. Turkish workers and

raw materials are planned to be used in the project. After the pipeline is completed, water tanks can be built (Oktay, 2009).

3.2.3. Socio-Cultural Relations

Since 2005, TİKA opened many branches in Africa for the coordination of planned projects. TİKA has been playing an important role in terms of supporting development projects together with Turkish embassies in the area. In that regard, Ethiopia, Sudan and Senegal were selected as pilot countries, and Project Coordination Office was opened in 2006 in Sudan. In this context, Turkish NGOs aimed to increase the quality level of daily life by providing food aid, clean water, and medical equipment support. Firstly, TİKA focused on water wells and established a hospital in coordination with Kızılay in 2006. In the following years, TİKA sometimes worked with other NGOs or other state institutions to support the development of the area.

In 2006, TİKA and Ankara University Faculty of Agriculture organized a Project with Khartum University Faculty of Agriculture for an applied summer school in Turkey. The aim of this program was to enable Sudanese students to specialize in agriculture and train the necessary human resource. 28 students and 2 academicians from Sudan have joined this program, and they had the chance to examine Kalecik Vineyards and Beypazarı Greenhouse (TİKA Activity Report, 2006).

In order to provide clean water, TİKA and State Water Works (DSİ) provided training for water drilling in South Kordofan. Additionally, a drilling machine was granted by DSİ. By this way, water wells were opened in two villages (TİKA Activity Report, 2006). In 2007, TİKA and Ministry of Agriculture had provided training for

Sudanese agricultural engineers and veterinaries. Total of 100 specialists of three groups was trained in different areas of Turkey with a focus on application (TİKA Activity Report, 2008). In the same year, TİKA and Çankırı Karatekin University organized another vocational training. The training was on the use of new technology equipment, support, and maintenance in the petroleum sector. In this respect, the training continued for one month on laboratory management, total quality management, and organization (TİKA Activity Report, 2007).

In 2009, an electronic library was established at Al-Fashir University in North Darfur. This project aimed to increase the quality of education and the speed of information gathering (TİKA Activity Report, 2009). In 2009, artificial seeding laboratory was opened in Gezira state, which is one of the important locations of agriculture and livestock in Sudan (TİKA Activity Report, 2009).

In 2010, Turkish Midwife Education Center was opened, and many personnel did an apprenticeship in Turkey. In addition to this, equipment support was provided to many hospitals (TİKA Activity Report, 2010). In 2011, Midwife Education Center was renovated, and the capacity was increased. Medical equipment support was given to İbrahim Malik Hospital. In addition to this, the Eye Clinic of Cüneyne Hospital provided treatment for more than a thousand patient with the support of TİKA. Sudanese doctors were invited to Turkey for training purposes, and a group of doctors and health personnel of 26 were given education in three big hospitals of Ankara (TİKA Activity Report, 2011).

In 2010 and 2011, TİKA's Project on "Enhanced Seed Distribution and Education" won the best-applied example prize at the United Nations Development Program Global South Development Exposition. The aim of this project was to

establish social cooperation and peace among the people while providing support to realize community welfare (TİKA Activity Report, 2011). In 2010, TİKA started Turkish language courses in Sudan (TİKA Activity Report, 2010).

In 2011, in the context of the occupation training program, the building in Khartoum Industrial Area was completed and opened in 2013. The program aimed to increase the educational standards of students and teachers at technical high school and universities (TİKA Activity Report, 2013). TİKA continued to support Sudan for educational purposes. Gaddarif Elementary School was supported with education equipment. Konya Selçuk University Faculty of Agriculture engaged in cooperation with Khartoum University Faculty of Agriculture and Ankara University Faculty of Veterinary supported Gezira University Faculty of Veterinary (TİKA Activity Report, 2011). A training program was designed for Sudan State Archives personnel in Istanbul Ottoman Archives Department to increase their knowledge of specific areas (TİKA Activity Report, 2011).

In 2012, in collaboration with TİKA, five personnel of the Sudan Ministry of Science and Technology was trained for 2 weeks in ODTÜ, İTÜ, and Gazi University Technocities (TİKA Activity Report, 2012). In 2013, Sudan Manar-al Huda girls dormitory was renovated (TİKA Activity Report, 2013). In 2013, Sudan Police Organization Criminal Department personnel were trained for 15 days to use technical equipment (TİKA Activity Report, 2013).

In 2013, as part of a joint project of Turkish Radio and Television and Ministry of Youth and Sport, 12 Turkish students visited three different orphanages and distributed food and clothing. Later, it was broadcasted on TRT (TİKA Activity

Report, 2013). In 2014, training on beekeeping was provided by Turkey for the national committee in Sudan (TİKA Activity Report, 2014).

3.3. Case Study 3: Relations With Gambia

3.3.1. State of Politics

In the 1830s, the Ottoman Empire started to dominate inland of the African continent with the support of local governors. Gambia was one of the parts of the continent where good relations was built until World War I. When the war started, Ottoman Sultan declared *jihad*, and this affected West African area as well as other parts of Africa. Due to the propagandas, Africans took a side on their colonial lords and fought for them to win. Gambian soldiers were sent to East Africa in order to be distributed to Palestine to fight against the Ottomans. However, there were some misfortunate events which restrained them from doing so.

In the 1980s, political relations started to accelerate. The President of Gambia, Hacı Dawda Kairaba Jawara, visited Turkey during the Iran-Iraq War, and Chairman of Turkish Red Crescent visited the Gambia in 1986. But the main issue which accelerated the relations was the existence of Turks in Bulgaria. At the end of 1984, the Turks in Bulgaria were subject to discrimination activities such as changing names, public pressure, and involuntary migration. The international system acted as deaf to this process, and Arab countries did not go any further than a few claims. However, Turkey received an unexpected level of support from the Gambia for this matter. The Gambia stood by Turkey and supported Turkey's view at the international institutions. After then, Turkey wanted to build closer relations with Gambia (Çelikdönmez, 2018).

Political relations with the Gambia officially started when the Gambia declared its independence in 1965. Since then, military relations with the Gambia is continued in addition to joint collaborative activities under the United Nations and OIC. At the end of 2011, both countries opened up embassies mutually, and after 2011, the scope of the relations has been wider. Turkey opened an embassy in the Gambia. Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs had a meeting with Mamadou Tangara, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Gambia. At the end of the meeting, Davutoğlu claimed that Turkey plans on opening an embassy in the Gambia. He mentioned that after Turkey's Africa Initiative, Gambia is the first country to open an embassy in Turkey. However, commercial relations are not at the desired level yet. Therefore, both countries need to work closely for economic relations and international institutions. Davutoğlu reminded the cultural similarity by referring to Tangara's first name, which means 'Mehmet' in Turkish (Dünya Bülteni, 2010).

In 2012, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoğlu, had a meeting with his conjoint minister in New York. During this meeting, it was agreed on the removal of visa conditions mutually. In addition to this, the reconciliation document on establishing political advisory council and Diplomacy Academy were signed between Turkey and Gambia (Sabah Gazetesi, 2012).

President Abdullah Gül, in his speech, appreciated Gambia's support on Cyprus issue for Turkey at the international institutions. He emphasized the past mutual relations and his aim of building closer relations between the two countries. The Gambia is an entrance point to the African continent, and due to this geopolitical importance, the trade opportunities should be increased. The President of Gambia, Yahya Jammeh, pointed out that Turkey has been a strategic ally for Gambia and

collaboration should be increased in all areas between two states. He openly invited Turkish investors to the Gambia, which means to reach a market of 300 million people. During this visit, Agreement on Collaboration for Health, Agreement for Technical Framework on Defense, Agreement on Removal of Double Taxation, Agreement on Collaboration for Culture, Education, Science, Youth and Sports, Agreement on Collaboration on Security were signed (Haber7, 2014).

The President of Gambia, Yahya Jammeh, visited Turkey on the 10-12th of February 2014. During his visit, the Minister of Interior Affairs for both countries had a meeting, and at the end of the meeting, “Collaboration on Security Agreement” was signed. This agreement was evaluated as a sign of increased cooperation between Turkey and the African continent on strategic issues (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İçişleri Bakanlığı, 2014).

3.3.2. Economic Relations

In the early 1990s, it can be said that there were almost no economic relations between Turkey and Gambia. Turkey did not show any interest in this geography until the 2000s. In 2004, a commercial attache was appointed to the Embassy of Senegal for the trade potential. The exports of Turkey was higher than the exports of Gambia. Since 2000, trade volume between Turkey and Gambia has increased with little efforts. Within the years, it has been possible to find Turkish products such as tomato sauce, detergent, wheat flour in the markets. Turkish products are cheaper than European products, and there is a high demand for them in the Gambia. But there are some drawbacks for Turkish products which makes it hard to reach the Gambian market.

Economic relations between Turkey and Gambia has not reached to desired levels due to the reasons such as limited amounts of trade capacity of Gambia, lack of interest of Turkish businessman and investors for the area. The insufficient infrastructure of the country, transportation problems, and poverty are the main disadvantages of the Gambia for commercial relations.

Turkey-Gambia Business Forum was organized on the 12th of February 2014 at Çırağan Palace in Istanbul. Politicians and representatives at high levels attended to the forum from both sides. At this forum, it was explained that bilateral official visits and the opening of embassies had an accelerating effect on both political and economic relations between Turkey and Gambia. Chairman of DEİK mentioned that Turkish Eximbank provides supportive loans for the development projects in the Gambia. In addition to this, Turkish Airlines would start direct flights to Banjul, which was expected to increase trade capacity as well (Hürriyet Gazetesi, 2018).

According to M. Rıfat Hirsarcıklığı, President of TOBB, Turkish private sector aims to improve collaboration at all levels with the Gambia. He also stated that the Gambia could buy any of the daily and/or industrial products from Turkey rather than any other country. He pointed out the importance of Gambia with its airport and port as a strategic point of a re-exportation center. However, in order to achieve this, firstly infrastructure projects should be focused on. In that sense, modernization of Banjul International Airport and Banjul International Port, building highways and railways, building energy facilities such as solar energy should be on the priority list of projects necessary for the development.

Due to the increase in the world population, the importance of agriculture and agricultural areas has been increased. For this aim, Turkey can transfer technology to

increase the effectiveness of agricultural activities in the Gambia. This technology transfer may increase the quality of mango, tomato, peanuts, etc. which are produced in the Gambia. Moreover, Gambia has also an opportunity for the fishing industry. All of these can be achieved with some investments in the short-term (Salih, 2014).

On the other hand, Gambia works for reducing the requirements for investments. Agreement on Removal of Double Taxation between Turkey and Gambia was signed on the 11th of February 2014 in Ankara by the Ministers of Economy of two states. The aim of this agreement is to increase the attractiveness of investments. The agreement gives the priority of taxation for the country in which revenue is earned and exempts the taxation of infrastructure projects, which are less than 12 months duration. Additionally, issues on the collaboration for the collection of taxes were also mentioned in this agreement in order to reduce tax loss (Gelir İdaresi Başkanlığı, 2014).

Moreover, Turkish-Gambian Economic Committee works in collaboration, and the first meeting was held on the 23-25th of May 2014 in Banjul. Turkish Minister of Health, Mehmet Müezzinoğlu attended this meeting, and at the end of the meeting a protocol on the health was signed between the parties (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Sağlık Bakanlığı, 2014). In addition to this, the collaboration on areas of trade free zones, taxation tariffs and fishery were discussed (Mersin Deniz Ticaret Odası, 2014).

Minister of Trade, Industry, Regional Integration and Employment in the Gambia, Abdou Kolley, stated that the Gambia views Turkey as a friendly state, and therefore, wants to improve relations for the benefit of both sides. Therefore, they would provide support for Turkish investors to increase the trade volume. He also

explained that the Gambia has a geostrategic position due to its proximity to America and Europe, which would also be an advantage for Turkish products.

Turkey and Gambia also wanted to collaborate in the energy industry.

Agreement on Collaboration for Energy, Hydrocarbons, and Mining was signed on the 24th of May 2014 in Banjul, and it was gazetted. According to this agreement, governments should collaborate on renewable energy, hydrocarbons, and mining in terms of scientific and technical development. In this context, joint educational programs should be organized; technical knowledge should be shared, energy effectiveness should be increased, electricity infrastructure should be built, support and maintenance projects should be developed. The private sector should be given incentives for investments in the energy sector, and the agreement will be valid for 3-year-periods (Enerji Günlüğü, 2016). In addition to this, Erenport company signed a goodwill agreement for building a solar energy plant of 30 megawatts with the Gambian Ministry of Trade and Industry (Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu, 2014).

Gambia, Mauritania and Senegal requested a fishing training from the Ministry of Agriculture. African countries complained that European countries do fishing with big fishing ships in their territorial waters. At first, Turkey planned to send five small boats with Turkish captains and teach Africans how to do fishing. This will enable African countries to benefit from their fishing potential and gain economic value on that. Ambassador of Gambia in Ankara, Gibril Joof, visited Karadeniz Ereğli where the small boats are produced. If the first step is achieved, the number of boats would be increased to 1,500 with an amount of approximately 5-6 million dollars. Furthermore, the opportunity for canned fish can be evaluated in the long-run (YeniÇağ Gazetesi, 2012).

Vice President of Gambia, Dr. Isatou Njie Saidy, mentioned that African countries should focus on investing in agriculture to fight against economic crisis and recession. Therefore, the Gambian government provides land incentives to support investments in agriculture. The 25th meeting of Economic and Commercial Committee of Islamic Conference Organization was gathered in Istanbul. Saidy highlighted the importance of reducing poverty in the Gambia since their country was claimed by the World Bank to be one of the most affected countries by economic crisis (Haberler, 2009).

Table 13 shows the trend in exports and imports between 2009-2014. We can see a sudden increase in 2011 for both exports and imports. Exports in 2011 were realized approximately twice the common trend. In the same year and in 2012, imports also boomed parallel to the increase in political engagements. However, still, there is a long way to go to talk about Turkey as a trade partner for the Gambia since Turkey is not in the top 10 list.

Table 13: *The Trend of Trade with Gambia among Years* (adopted by the author)

Year	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Exports (\$)	20,720,197	20,696,689	40,350,445	35,096,823	34,063,458	20,772,073
Imports (\$)	10,889	1,001	45,964	1,015,817	493,000	58,550

The goods which are exported to the Gambia are macaroni, wheat flour, cocoa and chocolate, hygiene products such as baby diapers, pastry products such as bread and pasta, water, non-alcoholic beverages, wash machines, cacao and chocolate, furniture, and tobacco. The majority of the list includes basic needs such as food, health, and clothing items. The volume of exports increased in 2011 and then

continued with a decreasing trend from year to year and almost went back to the initial point in 2014.



Figure 3.5. The Trend of Exports with Gambia among Years (adopted by the author)

The goods which are imported from the Gambia are chrome, electric transformers, static converters, wood coal, screws, bolt screw, and etc. In Figure 3.6, you can find the trend in imports between 2009-2014. In 2011, the volume of imports started to increase and reached its highest level in 2012. However, after 2012, the volume started to decrease but remained as still higher than the years before 2011.




Figure 3.6. The Trend of Imports with Gambia among Years (adopted by the author)

3.3.3. Socio-Cultural Relations

TİKA organized training for Gambia Police Department about the struggle with narcotics for two weeks, and at the end of the training, certificates were provided. The aim of this training was to increase the level of collaboration between Turkey and Gambia (Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı, 2014).

TİKA provided medical equipment and material to Gambia Ministry of Health for fighting Ebola virus. The Minister of Health, Mr.Sey, pointed out that Turkey's support in health was important for their country, and TİKA has been involved in many projects and training for this aim. In addition to this, hospital beds, oxygen machines, lab coat, medical mask, and gloves were provided to the hospitals (Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı, 2014).

“Sen de Gel” Foundation changed the lives of 200,000 Gambians. İbrahim Betil, a civil society volunteer, was the founder and created projects for the development and sustainment of Gambia. In this regard, poultry farms in 15 villages, three rice mills, and seven water wells were completed in 2014 to be used by 18,000 people. By providing healthy and clean water, contagious diseases can be prevented. Eight different carpentry ateliers were built for occupational training purposes. Furthermore, 2,086 cattle were granted for livestock production in different areas of the country, and 900 families benefited from this project. According to İbrahim Betil, they helped people to realize their potentials and their dreams without humiliation (Sen de Gel , n.d.).

The story of *Sen de Gel* Foundation started in 2011 when two representatives from the Gambia visited Community Volunteers Foundation for the purpose of

collaboration about the development of women and child care. He decided to observe the needs and expectations in the Gambia for clarifying what could be done. There were two choices of either ignoring or caring about and trying to create projects with value. As a result, the decision was for the latter, and *Sen de Gel* Foundation was established in 2012. İbrahim Betil explains that they facilitate the potential resources in terms of material and/or human for the improvement of wellbeing, and their priority is the basic needs of people such as food, water, and clothing (Sen de Gel , n.d.).

As a method of working, firstly there are two conditions: first can be the demanding country to be on the list of underdeveloped countries according to the UN criteria, and second is the request of a trustable foundation from the country for cooperation. Before starting a project, a committee of volunteers travel to the area and observe and try to understand the conditions to determine the projects. These projects need to be sustainable in the long-run, which could contribute to the development of the country. As soon as the projects are determined, they send a project coordinator for at least six months for follow-up. In this way, the project life cycle can be monitored closely in terms of monetary use and project steps. The supporters of *Sen de Gel* Foundation are mainly TİKA, The Coca Cola Foundation and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in addition to many individual volunteers (Ünlü, 2015).



CONCLUSION

In this study, it was aimed to examine whether the political discourse was parallel with the state relations in the context of Neo-Ottomanism during the period when Ahmet Davutoğlu was the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Therefore, his perspective and theoretical framework of his book entitled “Strategic Depth” are needed to be understood.

Firstly, a brief historical background of Turkish foreign policy was given in order to understand the main principles and tendencies. In this part, such analysis helped to examine the flow of Turkish foreign policy of different political parties and ideologies. After giving general information about Turkish foreign policy, the politics of the AKP was analyzed in detail. In order to do this, Ahmet Davutoğlu was the center of focus since he holds duties such as political advisory of the Prime minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister. To understand his vision of foreign policy, the main principles of his concept for Strategic Depth were analyzed. Neo-Ottomanism was one of them and in this thesis, it was put more on the center of focus.

Secondly, after defining Neo-Ottomanism, an analysis was performed for the political discourse of Ahmet Davutoğlu. For this reason, his speeches, interviews and press releases published on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were used. A list of vocabulary was selected in order to understand the usage and frequency of Neo-Ottomanism as a political discourse.

Thirdly, six case studies were performed with selected states from the Balkans and Africa. The reason why these regions were selected can be explained due to the fact of being former Ottoman territories. For the Balkans, Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Kosovo and Republic of Macedonia were selected; as for Africa Somalia, Sudan and Gambia were selected for this study. Through the examination of relations with these countries, this study aimed to understand whether the political discourse is parallel with the course of relations. In this sense, state relations were analyzed under three different parameters, namely political, economic and socio-cultural.

At the beginning of 1990s, right after the end of the Cold War, there was a need for decreasing the tension after the years of conflicts between the two superpowers. The use of hard power reached the top limits, and a new perspective was needed to define international politics. At this point, Joseph Nye, who can be counted as the founder of soft power concept, published a book entitled “Bound to Lead” in 1989 and another book entitled “Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics” in 2004. The concept of soft power became important with the rise of liberalism and free-market ideas. According to Nye, it is necessary to get the support of international arena on any issue because collaboration in the system is more than welcome, and it can be achieved by using the means of culture, values, and ideas. Moreover, willingness is above all other capabilities.

Soft power can be determined either in a narrow or broad perspective. Narrowly, it can be used in the same meaning as cultural influence. On the other hand, broader perspective includes economic power in addition to cultural power. However, it was realized that soft power was not enough to shape politics by itself. Therefore, the term of smart power was developed for defining the ability to produce an effective foreign policy by using soft power. In this sense, smart power is expected to create strategies by combining the use of hard and soft power.

As soon as the Cold War ended, there was a power space for the development of regional powers since the world evolved into a multi-polar system from the bi-polar system. The definition of a regional power can be understood as a state which possesses power to lead the other states that are part of the same geographic area and can influence their actions about political and economic affairs. The regional power is even expected to play a governor role among the states and represent their welfare at global or interregional institutions.

Moreover, a regional power should be able to attract social values, cultural popularity, and a positive reputation besides its material capacity. However, it is hard to differentiate between a regional power and a middle power. Middle power can be defined as a state which is not a great power but still has an international influence. A middle power cannot change the system, but a group of middle powers can create an impact. On the other hand, a regional power can hold greater power than a middle power. The same drawback is also relevant for the definition of a superpower and a great power. But in short, a regional power can create a certain level of influence in the region but not at the global level. A regional power can act either as a soft power or hard power.

In a world of multi-dimensional relations, Turkish foreign policy needed to develop its own way of creating an area of influence. According to Davutoğlu, the most appropriate way to do this would be focusing on the relations within the regions where previous engagement and positive image is already valid. He states that Turkey should benefit from Ottoman heritage and use this as a competitive advantage compared to other states. The focus on improving relations with the East and the Middle East has been perceived as an 'axis shift' in Turkish Foreign Policy. Since the

foundation of the Republic of Turkey, foreign politics has always been centered around the relations with the West. Therefore, this debate of axis shift arose, despite the efforts of Davutoğlu in explaining this would not be a replacement of priority but a complementary tool to increase Turkey's regional influence.

In his book, Davutoğlu does a geopolitical and historical analysis for Turkey's situation and argues that Turkey should hold a more important position in international politics based on these elements. Moreover, he criticizes that Turkey can not use its potential fully since Turkish foreign policy favors static and status quo rather than a change. According to Davutoğlu, Turkey should try to implement rhythmic diplomacy by pushing activism in diplomacy and also to achieve a more active role in international organizations. Moreover, proactive diplomacy could create an active role in international organizations. For this aim, Turkey hosted NATO and OIC Summits and additionally maintained an observer status in the African Union.

The zero problems with neighbors policy of Davutoğlu seems similar to Atatürk's policy of peace at home and peace abroad. However, it may not be easy to implement. Because zero problems policy mainly works toward neighbors of Turkey with whom problems exist from the historical background. These disputes refrain to Turkey to act as a regional leader because the problematic neighbors do not support the leadership of Turkey. Davutoğlu also mentions about zero-problems with neighbors policy to end cross-border conflicts and aims to develop closer relations in the neighborhood. For this aim, mutual interdependence can be created through diplomacy, international negotiation, political, economic and socio-political mechanisms. Therefore, to increase the trade volumes and to build close economic

relations also improve the wellbeing of the Turkish economy, while providing a contribution to zero problems with neighbors policy.

In a broader sense, it can be evaluated as the immediate neighbourhood. In this framework, Turkey played a greater role in regional integration and even was the chairman of the South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) while Europe was dealing with more internal and financial problems. On the other hand, the AKP always supported membership of Balkan countries for the EU and being part of a greater free trade zone since that would create a backdoor for Turkey's increased trade volumes. In other words, the welfare of Balkan states would also serve Turkey's interests, which would result in a win-win case. Likewise, in case of relations with Africa, in return of Turkey's efforts to help for the development in these countries, Turkey requested their support for the temporary membership of the United Nations Security Council for 2009-2010 term.

Davutoğlu defines Turkey as a center country rather than a bridge and argued that Turkey should influence its close neighborhood as a way of Pax-Ottomana by integrating them into the international system. He considers that any foreign policy without historical linkage cannot be successful.

Another point to consider while analyzing current Turkish Foreign Policy, especially during the AKP term, is Neo-Ottomanism. Neo-Ottomanism is a Turkish political ideology that in its broadest sense, promotes greater engagement with areas formerly under the Ottoman Empire. The neo-ottomanist foreign policy encourages increased engagement in these regions as part of Turkey's growing regional influence. This terminology is used for determining Turkish foreign policy under the

AKP rule. On the other hand, Neo-Ottomanism can represent a shift from the traditional Turkish foreign policy of the Kemalist ideology.

In Neo-Ottomanism, both domestic and foreign aspects were included. In that sense, Özal used it to determine a multicultural state like a mosaic. For its use in foreign policy, Neo-Ottomanism provides means of soft power for Turkey. Neo-Ottomanism does not foresee neither for imperialism nor an Islamic state but reinforces secularism for domestic politics and diplomatic activism for foreign politics. According to Davutoğlu, Turkey should focus on closer relations not only for the needs of political diversification but also due to its natural leadership potential. Turkey has a comparative advantage of becoming globally active. He believes that Neo-Ottomanism also increases Turkey's value and image for western countries through playing an influencer role.

The rhetoric of Ahmet Davutoğlu during the period of his ministry of foreign affairs between 2009-2014 is analyzed with the data gathered from the website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The material was categorized as speeches, press releases and articles. According to the analysis of his political discourse, a clear emphasis on Neo-Ottomanism could not be seen. On the other hand, some second level vocabulary such as “brotherhood”, “friendship”, “collaboration”, “power” and “regional” was used which could be a sign of an indirect subconscious message. This could be an indicator that Davutoğlu wanted to prevent negative effects of Neo-Ottomanism debate of Turkey's dreams of imperialism.

After globalization reached the top level, market conditions have started to work better for liberalization. Goods and services produced in one state can be easily transferred and sold to any other location faster than ever. This also enabled the

capacity of domestic markets to reach up to a certain level that supply and demand relations have changed. The surplus of supplies has directed the attention of companies and even states to search for higher demands in different markets. Therefore, economic relations in terms of soft power have become crucial for state politics. In that sense, states with better political relations based on cultural influence have also benefited from better economic relations and vice versa. After Turkey has achieved a better level of production and industrialization, the need for new markets arose. Özal can be considered as one of the first politicians who tried to adopt such perspective with politics. According to him, Turkey had to be active in international politics to increase its international trade from which especially his followers such as mid-level merchants would benefit. Parallel to Özal's perspective, the AKP tried to implement the same strategy in a more professional way even with a theoretical background.

In order to support this view, cultural diplomacy has been used as an effective tool by the AKP. However, the history of public diplomacy goes back to the Ottoman Empire period during II. Abdülhamit when it was used to provide aid and inform other empires through ambassadors. Public diplomacy includes nongovernmental institutions as well as state institutions, and the variety of diversification of public diplomacy tools has been increased. This way, even the regions that have been ignored for a while like Africa could be rediscovered.

In this regard, institutions such as TİKA, Yunus Emre Institute, and YTB have been established for the implementation of this policy. These institutions act as an intermediary of strengthening cultural bonds. For this aim, they renovate the buildings and/or mosques of Ottoman heritage, support Muslims and/or Turks in the regions

and provide development aid either monetary or stuff. This way, they help to keep Turkey on the agenda and create a positive image in the eyes of local communities. Among these institutions, TİKA is the one with the widest spread of branches, and it works actively in many geographies. Therefore, TİKA even undertakes a coordinator role between different institutions of the Turkish government to organize more effectively.

Turkish foreign policy towards the neighborhood especially towards the former Ottoman territory is based on the neo-Ottomanism debate. This debate started during the Özal period, and there are different perceptions of the concept. According to some views, it can be considered as an imperialistic policy while on the other hand cultural and historical background refers to the pax-Ottomana period as well. Main elements of Turkish foreign policy toward the Balkans can be counted as protecting the Ottoman heritage, creating interregional bonds, balancing power strategies, implementing regional policies, and using global tools in the policy setting process.

One of the regions Davutoğlu emphasized on was the Balkans for improving relations. Ever since the period of the rise of the Ottoman Empire, Turks have been part of Balkan geography. Even after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, close relations continued due to the Turkish and/or Muslim population living there and migrants in Turkey. Therefore, Turkey could not stay away from the agenda of the Balkans in international politics. In this study, the relations with Western Balkan states of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Macedonia and Kosovo are analyzed.

Turkey's efforts for improving relations with Balkan geography started when the Cold War ended at the beginning of the 1990s. Özal, the president of the term, wanted Turkey to be the big brother of former Yugoslavian states when they declared

their independence. However, this was not very welcomed by them. After the years under Soviet authority, they would not like a new pressure point on them. Therefore, Turkey tried to follow a supportive political strategy for those states. In addition to immediate recognition after the declaration of independence, Turkey also provided support for their integration with international institutions such as the NATO, EU, etc. Not only externally, but for their internal problems, Turkey wanted to play a mediator role in the conflict resolution processes in the area.

Besides, in terms of political support, Turkey aimed to collaborate in various areas, especially in the economy. The newly founded states were in some economic burden of Yugoslavia. Therefore, they needed foreign investment and technology transfer in order to increase their political and economic stability. Many Turkish companies were eager to do business in the Balkans, whether through investment and/or exports. However, at the first stage considering the level of economic conditions, low-quality products were exported to those countries. After a while, the perception for Turkish products was shaped as low quality, and this resulted in Turkey not benefitting enough from these markets economically since the level of competition was increased. In addition to Turkey, European countries such as Greece, Germany, Austria, and the United Kingdom, USA and Russian Federation are also interested in these markets.

In addition to trade relations, tourism is also an important tool for the economy, which does not need much investment. After the release of visas, many Turks travel to these countries to search after their ancestors in history. Since these countries are cheaper and not fully integrated with Eurozone, it creates a good opportunity for both

parties. Many tourist companies organize frequent tours for these countries, and this may also create a positive image for cultural influence.

Considering Turkey's efforts to be a regional power among the Balkan states, we can say that Turkey is involved in many matters. During the Bosnian War in the 1990s, Turkey triggered the NATO intervention process. Even after the war ended, Turkey remained in the region with its military force in a peacekeeper role as part of the NATO. Therefore, Turkey's support for BiH and Kosovo was very crucial for the political stabilization in the region since it cannot be said that conflicts were all solved. The area is still open to tension, and the importance of Turkey's existence is accepted by all the parties.

More than political, economic, and military support, Turkey's support and closeness in terms of culture has been very valuable. All three states include the Muslim population from the Ottoman Empire who still live there. Although they are minorities, Turkey gives importance to these communities. Therefore, renovation of Ottoman heritage, providing education support, supporting to resolve their daily problems are important indicators of the cultural bonds in between. However, the density of these activities mostly relies on religion or ethnicity, which may cause displeasure in other groups of the community. In this sense, while creating a positive image on one part of the community, Turkey may also increase the negative feelings for others.

On the other hand, we can also observe that there is an increased level of interest in the Balkan countries for Turkey. During Davutoğlu term, there were many visits from both sides, and Turkey's political agenda was closely followed by them. Especially, in times of elections in Turkey, it could be observed that they support the

AKP and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, which shows that they were interested in what was happening in Turkey. Moreover, the transfer of Turkish soap operas also affected the general interest of the communities for Turkey. Especially *Magnificent Century*, whose story was mainly centered around Suleiman the Magnificent, was very much popular. The reason could be either the common history or curiosity but still shows Turkey's importance on their perception.

Davutoğlu's Balkan policy can also be criticized for creating a hinterland as part of an Islamic agenda because Turkey's tendency for protecting Turks and Muslims in the region may raise a debate for whether Turkey is really interested in the humanitarian side of the issue or more than this. The question is also related to the center country theory of Davutoğlu. Hinterland exists for the protection of the center. According to Davutoğlu, Turkey is put at the center, and the Balkans, Middle East, and Caucasia are the hinterlands. Furthermore, Davutoğlu states that protection of Istanbul starts from Sarajevo, not from Edirne.

Turkey plays an important role in the region, which seems to increase in the foreseeable future. However, Turkey needs to be different for its use of soft power to brush up its image in the Balkans. Moreover, Turkey's capabilities and resources would continue to allow to play a balancer and/or influencer role. Due to the shared Ottoman past with the Balkans, the region was considered as geostrategic by Turkish politicians, and they aimed to gain the status of regional power. Although Turkey used various soft power mechanisms to increase its economic and political influence in the region, there is still room for improvement.

In addition to the Balkans, Africa has been one of the latest focus areas for Turkey. In the early years of the Turkish Republic, Turkey could not engage with

African countries due to its own problems of creating stability in terms of political and economic independence. After WWII, African countries declared their independence due to the rise of human rights, democracy, etc. Turkey supported their independence and immediately recognized the new states. However, these countries formed Non-Aligned Countries, and Turkey had to be part of the western world, which resulted in different politics. African countries, later on, established the African Union and joined the United Nations as the biggest group holding the majority of the votes.

In the 1960s, the decolonization process started in Africa, and Turkey provided support for African countries at the UN meetings. Embassies were opened in Senegal, Congo, Nigeria, and Kenya. In the late 1970s, Bülent Ecevit government emphasized on relations with Africa and opened Turkish Embassies in Somalia and Tanzania.

In the late 1990s, İsmail Cem, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, tried to build closer relations with the region, and therefore, published “African Action Plan”. However, the political instability of coalition governments in Turkey did not let any further developments. After the AKP has come into power, they published a wider version of this document as “Strategy of Improving Economic and Commercial Relations with African Countries” in 2003 and declared 2005 as “Year of Africa” which indicated that Turkey would focus on relations within this region. Moreover, these were followed by the declaration of Turkey as a strategic partner of the Africa Union in January 2008.

Although Turkey discovered the potential of Africa in the very near past, it can be said that close relations have been built with these states in a very short period.

Depending on the level of development, Turkey supports these countries more in terms of civil needs such as food, education, and health services. Turkey has been providing aid in Africa without much economic return so far, and this creates trust and positive image in the perspective of African people.

For the economic relations between Turkey and Africa, economic status of both parties has played an important role. Turkey made investments in Africa according to the needs in the region. Therefore, it can be said that a win-win strategy has been followed. Additionally, Turkey provided financial aid not only in terms of monetary aid but also as financing some important development projects. In these projects, Turkey also created an opportunity for employment for African people. Moreover, nongovernmental organizations tried to increase the level of quality for daily life in Africa with their projects. However, the scope of all these efforts has been limited within the economic status and capability of Turkey. While Turkey tries to get involved in this level, for example, China provides non-recourse loans. Therefore, it can be said that there is also a competition for being a regional power in Africa.

Turkey's operations in Africa can be evaluated as distinct compared to the other actors. Turkey operates in various areas such as infrastructure, education, agriculture, etc. for establishing development in Africa. Being Muslim, as a common religion, allows Turkey to operate in Africa easily due to the high level of trust. Turkish schools are very popular, and through education, Turkey helped to create a well-educated generations, which may hold important positions in the future. Also, at the university level, Turkish and African universities need to increase their level of

cooperation, and the number of exchange students should be increased to enhance ties.

Turkey can be evaluated as advantageous in Africa due to the following reasons: a) Turkey has not taken part in colonial activities in Africa. The Ottoman Empire built friendly relations with African states and established freedom of language, religion and ethnicity in the continent as Pax-Ottomana, b) Moreover, the Ottoman Empire played an important role for the development of national identities in Africa by postponing colonial activities of Portugal and Spain, c) Although Islam as common religion may seem to be an important tool for engagement, Christians in Africa also respect Turkish Liberty War and reforms established by Atatürk. They consider Turkey as a model state for their nation-building process, d) Turkey played an important role in humanitarian operations in Africa and gained the sympathy of the communities.

Turkey's success for Somalia case in creating peace and resolution is an important reference for Turkey's relations with Africa in general. In Somalia case, Turkey proved that Africa is not only perceived from a political and economic aspect but also from a humanitarian aspect. In general, from the point of view of African countries, Turkey can be defined as a Muslim country which has good relations with the Western world. Turkey's diversity of politics holds a good example for them. Additionally, since Turkey does not have a colonial history, they may trust Turkey more. Therefore, African countries hold a more positive attitude toward Turkey, and this may help Turkey to develop better relations with the continent in the long run. On the other hand, African countries also have expectations from Turkey. Basically, these expectations can be stated as balancing the needs of both Africa and Turkey in

relations, increased level of technology transfer, guidance for overcoming difficulties, sharing the experience of sustainable development.

Although Turkey's activities are well-known in Africa, we can raise another question of how well it is known in Turkey. The image of Africa on the eyes of Turkish people is limited to poverty, hunger, health problems, etc. Political and economic relations are not known. Furthermore, Turkish people are not much interested in Africa. The reason may be the lack of education for the historical background of relations. Therefore, Turkey may consider revising its education scope and teach historical ties with Africa. In this way, Turkish people would have general information about Africa. Moreover, the Turkish press should give much space for the news in Africa. This would increase the interest level of Turkish businessman and entrepreneurs also. Shortly, Turkey needs to focus on being on the agenda with Africa.

There may also be some criticisms about Turkey's Africa strategy. The first one can be considered as the limited opportunity of improving economic relations due to the high level of poverty. Secondly, Turkey's tendency for using Islam as a tool for improving relations can be considered as the Islamic philosophy of the AKP and its focus on the Muslims in the continent. However, this results in the elimination of other opportunities. Thirdly, there is no constant level of interaction with the continent. Turkey focuses on its benefits and acts closer when it is needed, like in the case of the temporary membership for the United Nations Security Council.

When we compare the relations with the Balkans and Africa, it can be argued that Turkey has more emphasis on the Balkans may be due to the geographical proximity or the percentage of the population who are Balkan immigrants. In addition

to this, Turkish or Muslim population in the Balkans also follow Turkey's political agenda and provide their support for the government. Therefore, we can talk about a dual interaction.

On the other hand, when we analyze the relations with Africa, it can be said that the level of awareness about Africa in the Turkish community is still quite low. Turkish community is not much interested in Africa, and news about Africa do not acquire much attention of the Turkish press as well. The reason for this may be explained as the lack of one to one interaction such as travel, common history, and common language. These may be counted as the drawbacks, which make it harder to learn about Africa and the Ottoman bonds with the region.

For both regions, Turkey faces competition for the leadership role. There is still an ongoing competition between the USA and the Russian Federation. Furthermore, the EU joined the competition as well. Compared to these parties, Turkey needs to be more dedicated to an action plan, including economic steps in addition to political ones. Because the Balkan states still need foreign investments for their development. In this respect, Turkey should consider allocating an important portion of its budget for these countries in order to be an influencer state.

So far, it can be explained that ever since the beginning of such focus on both the Balkans and Africa, Turkey gained a competitive advantage among other states. However, in the longrun Turkey needs to continue its efforts at the same level in order to hold this position. Therefore, Turkey should be politically and economically stable and internally powerful for continuing this influence. Otherwise, the strategy of being a regional power would not be sustainable.

After Davutoğlu, we can observe some changes in foreign policy implementation. Even though Davutoğlu stated that Neo-Ottomanism should not be considered as an imperialistic perspective, it resulted in a hot debate on Turkey's image. The word itself created a negative feeling for Turkey among some groups. In this regard, after Davutoğlu resigned, this term was left behind and not used by political authorities anymore. However, it can be said that the basic principles of foreign policy have continued.

Ever since 2014, the density of relations, especially with Africa, has increased. Especially at the political level, there is a high level of collaboration between the leaders of states. This also shows that Turkey's interest in the Balkans and Africa will continue in the long run to protect its position. Furthermore, Turkey can continue to act actively in international organizations for the issues related to the Balkans and Africa. This way, Turkey's power of influence would increase both regionally and worldwide.

Another point Turkey should emphasize is the number of non-governmental organizations operating in both regions. As part of public diplomacy, the Turkish government should support these institutions to create projects that would be beneficial for all parties. Turkey's current strategy solely rely on TİKA, but the number and variety of organizations need to be increased.

In the near future, Africa may become a more important strategically similar to the Middle East in the last decades. The continent is still underdeveloped with the potential of a boost in many areas such as agriculture, industrialization, etc. The cost of human capital is low, which may decrease the cost of goods produced. In this

regard, the African continent can be a place of mass production for reducing costs and creating a positive effect on the economy.

On the other hand, the Balkans may be up to some political changes in the area. Although Balkan countries are eager to join European institutions such as the EU, the economic and political problems that the EU faces may affect this decision. Besides, even if the membership occurs, the question should be asked which party should benefit from this: Turkey, Balkan states, or EU states. Turkey considers that if Balkan states become a member of the EU, they would vote positively on issues related to Turkey's membership. Furthermore, in terms of trade and investment relations, Turkey hopes to benefit from former good relations. However, Greece has been very effective among Balkan states, and the problem of state name has almost been solved. More than this, new members of the EU may need to follow a balance of politics between the EU and Turkey, which may also affect the relations with Turkey.

In the sense of foreign politics, Turkey should consider and revise its strategy according to the changes in international politics. For the aim of being a regional power, Turkey should be aware of the competition in the Balkans and Africa and act according to political changes. These regions are not very stable yet. Therefore, Turkey should engage with all the groups in order to stay in this political game. For example, governments may change, but the level of relations should be stable with these areas. Moreover, Turkey's soft power strategy should be reevaluated regularly according to its economic and political capabilities to protect its image of trust. Otherwise, Turkey may create distrust of being only a teller, not a doer.

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APPENDIX A

The Map of the Ethnicities in the Balkans



APPENDIX B

The Political Map of the Balkans after the Collapse of Yugoslavia


APPENDIX C

The Political Map of Republic of North Macedonia



APPENDIX D

The Ethnic Composition of Republic of North Macedonia




APPENDIX E

The Political Map of Kosovo




APPENDIX F

The Ethnic Composition of Kosovo




APPENDIX G

The Political Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina



APPENDIX H

The Ethnic Composition of Bosnia and Herzegovina




APPENDIX I

The Political Map of Somalia




APPENDIX J

The Groups in Somalia




APPENDIX K

The Political Map of Sudan

APPENDIX L

The Religious Composition of Sudan



APPENDIX M

The Political Map of Gambia

APPENDIX N

Dışışleri Bakanı Sn. Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun II. İstanbul Somali Konferansı Açılışında Yaptığı Konuşma, 01 Haziran 2012, İstanbul

Türkiye'nin özellikle son bir yıl içerisinde Somali'de Somalili kardeşlerimize sadece insani yardım dağıtmanın ötesine geçerek ihtiyaç duyulan her alanda yürüttüğü faaliyetleri eminim herkes biliyordur. Bu süreç Sayın Başbakanımızın ailesi, Bakanları ve aile fertleri ile birlikte geçtiğimiz yıl 19 Ağustos'ta Mogadişu'ya yapmış oldukları ziyaretle başlamıştır. Türk sivil toplum temsilcilerinin, sanatçı ve aydınlarının da yer aldıkları bu ziyaret Somali'nin 20 yıllık yalnızlığına son vermiştir. 2011 Kasım ayında Mogadişu'da açılan Büyükelçiliğimiz ve Mart ayında İstanbul'u Mogadişu'ya bağlayan THY seferlerimiz, bu sürecin diğer mihenk taşlarını oluşturmuştur.

Somali politikamızın özü şudur. Siyasi, güvenlik, ekonomi, yeniden imar, kalkınma, eğitim ve insani yardım alanlarındaki faaliyetlerin eş zamanlı ve birbirine paralel olarak yürütülmesi. Başarı için koordinasyon zorunludur. İstenilen hedeflerin ancak bu şekilde yakalanabileceğine inanıyoruz. Büyükelçiliğimiz başta olmak üzere resmi ve sivil kuruluşlarımız, örgütlerimiz bu esas üzerinden Somalili kardeşlerimize Mogadişu'da yaşayarak yardım etmektedirler.

Somali'de Ağustos sonrasında başlayacak yeni dönemin ihtiyaçlarını belirleyecek ve bu ihtiyaçların giderilmesi için atılacak adımları içerecek yeni ve daha kapsamlı bir çalışma programının hazırlıklarına şimdiden başlamamızda yarar vardır. Amacımız Somali'de normal bir hayatın sürdürülebileceği ortamı hazırlayacak devlet yapısının tesis edilmesidir. Somali'de kalıcı barış ve istikrar ancak Somali halkına temel kamu hizmetlerini sunacak ve asayiş ortamını temin edecek bir devlet yapılanması ile mümkün olabilecektir. Uluslararası toplumun Somali'nin önündeki bu imkânın açılmasına yardımcı olabilmesi için Türkiye olarak Somali'de yeni bir yapılanmaya gitmesi gerektiğine inanıyoruz ve bu yapılanmanın nasıl olabileceği dair fikir egzersizine bu konferans vesilesiyle İstanbul'da şimdi başlanmasında yarar görüyoruz.

Değerli konuklar, Somalili liderler son olarak geçtiğimiz hafta Addis Ababa'da biraraya gelerek geçiş döneminin sonlandırılması için önümüzdeki günlerde takip edilecek yol haritasının ayrıntıları üzerinde anlaşmışlardır. Somalili liderler Somali'de yeni bir dönemin başlaması için ellerinden geleni yapma iradesini böylece bir kez daha ortaya koymuşlar ve Somali'de ulusal uzlaşının sağlanabileceğini hepimize göstermişlerdir. Somali önündeki bu zorlu yolda ilerleyebilmek üzere uluslar arası toplumun yardım, yönlendirme ve maddi ve manevi desteğine her zamankinden daha fazla ihtiyaç duymaktadır. Kampala anlaşmasından bu yana yol haritası dahil, GAROWE-I ve II ilkeleri ve Galkayo İstişare Toplantısı gibi Somali'de geçiş

döneminin başarıyla tamamlaması sürecini belirleyen tüm temel belgeleri destekleyen Türkiye, Somalili kardeşleri ile geçiş dönemi sonrasında yakın işbirliği ve dayanışma gösterecektir. Son dört gündür İstanbul'da misafirimiz olan Somalili Sivil Toplum temsilcileri ülkelerinin geleceğini kurmada gerekli sağduyu ve olgunluğa sahip olduklarını vardıkları sonuçlarla kanıtlamışlardır. Somali'nin federal yapısı çerçevesinde yol haritasının imzacılarının tümünün de bugün aramızda bulunması Somali toplumunun tüm kesimleriyle ulusal uzlaşıya ne denli yakın olduğunu konferansımız vesilesiyle bizlere göstermiştir. Değerli konuklar Somali'de geçiş süreci sonrasında barışın ve devletin inşası için Türkiye tüm devlet kurumları, temsilcileri, halkı, ekonomik ve sosyal potansiyeli ile uluslararası toplumla birlikte katkı bulunmaya hazırdır. Ebediyete kadar Somalili kardeşlerimizle birlikte olacağız.

Teşekkür ederim. Şimdi açılış konuşmalarını yapmak üzere sözü Sayın Başbakanımıza arz ediyorum.



APPENDIX O

**Sayın Bakanımızın Dnevni Avaz Gazetesinde (Bosna-Hersek) 17.10.2009
Tarihinde Yayımlanan Makalesi**

TÜRKİYE B-H'in ARKASINDADIR, ŞİMDİ VE DAİMA....

B-H'in daha işlevsel bir yönetime kavuşturulması amacıyla atılacak adımlara destek vermeye hazır olduğumuzu Hillary Clinton, Carl Bildt, Olli Rehn ile paylaştım.

Daha önce pek çok kez geldiğim güzel Bosna-Hersek'i, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanı sıfatıyla ilk kez ziyaret etmenin zevk ve gururunu değerli Dnevni Avaz okurlarıyla paylaşmaktan memnuniyet duyuyorum.

Balkanlar'ın kalbindeki Bosna-Hersek, şüphesiz bizim de kalbimizde müstesna bir yere sahiptir. 90'lı yıllarda yaşanan trajedi sırasında ülkenizin içinde bulunduğu sıkıntı ve acıyı tıpkı ülkem gibi ben de kişisel planda paylaştım. Bilhassa ülkenizin akademik çevreleriyle o dönemde edindiğim dostlukları hala memnuniyetle sürdürmekteyim. Özellikle Malezya'daki akademik faaliyetlerim sırasında Bosna-Hersek'in Fahri Büyükelçisi unvanına layık görüldüğümü gururla paylaşmak isterim.

Büyük Yakınlık

Bosna-Hersek hakkında önemli ölçüde aşinalığı beraberinde getiren bu kişisel öyküyü paylaşmamın nedeni, bir dost olarak bugün güzel ülkenizin daha da ilerlemesi ve NATO ile Avrupa Birliği üyeleri arasında hak ettiği yeri alması için Türkiye'nin bugüne kadar vermiş olduğu desteği sürdüreceğini size teyit etmek istememdir. Aramızda fiziksel sınır olmamasına rağmen yanibaşımızda olduğunu bildiğimiz Bosna-Hersek'in güvenliği ve istikrarı, Barışı Uygulama Konseyindeki tüm ortaklarımızla birlikte Türkiye'nin de teminatı altındadır. Anılan Konseyde İslam Konferansı Örgütünü de temsil eden ülke olarak son dönemdeki gelişmeleri ve siyasi ortamda yaşanan gerilmeyi endişeyle izlemekteyiz.

AB ve ABD'den yüksek düzeyli temsilcilerin girişimiyle başlatılan Butmir Süreci neticesinde Bosna-Hersek'in daha işlevsel bir yönetime kavuşturulması amacıyla atılacak adımlara destek vermeye hazır olduğumuzu değerli dostlarım Sayın Hillary Clinton, Sayın Carl Bildt, Sayın Olli Rehn gibi meslektaşlarımla esasen paylaştım. Burada "kazan-kazan" yaklaşımının izlenmesi gerektiği konusunda hepsiyle

mutabıkız. Siyasi liderlerinizle yaptığım temaslarda da Bosna-Hersek'in Avrupa ve Avrupa-Atlantik perspektiflerinde ilerleme sağlanması amacıyla görüşmeler yapılmasından kaçınılmaması gerektiğini, yapılacak görüşmeler sırasında ilkelerin yapıcı bir tutumla savunulmasının elzem olduğunu ve Türkiye'nin gerek Dayton Barış Anlaşmasının prensiplerine, gerek Barışı Uygulama Konseyinin kararlarına diğer ortaklarıyla birlikte sahip çıkmaya devam edeceğini vurguladım.

Ortak tarihi mirasımızın yanısıra farklı din ve kültürlerin de kendisine yer bulduğu güzel ülkeniz, Balkanların toplumsal dokusunu bu özelliğiyle en güzel şekilde yansıtan ülkelerin başında gelmektedir. Bu özelliğiyle de bölgenin istikrarı, bizim kanaatimizce Bosna-Hersek'ten geçmektedir. Pek çok tarihçiye göre 20. yüzyılı başlatan 1. Dünya Savaşının ve sona erdiren Yugoslavya'nın dağılması sürecinin hep bu coğrafyada başlamasının tesadüf olmadığını bilincindeyiz.

Entegrasyonu Kolaylaştırmak

Balkanlar coğrafyasını sorunlarından ne kadar hızlı arındırabilirsek ve özellikle ekonomik planda entegrasyonu ne kadar çok güçlendirebilirsek, bölgemizin AB ve NATO gibi Avrupa ve Avrupa-Atlantik kurumları ile bütünleşmesini aynı ölçüde kolaylaştırabileceğiz. AB ve NATO üyelikleri tüm Balkan ülkelerinin ortak hedefidir. Her ülke açısından bu süreçlerin farklı koşulları bulunmaktadır. Fakat önemli olan bu yönelimi korumak, hep birlikte yürütmek ve geliştirmektir. Balkan ülkelerinin bu yönde güçlü bir siyasi irade sergiliyor olmaları bu noktada öne çıkmaktadır. Memnuniyetle belirtmek isterim ki, bu konuda bölge ülkeleri arasında tam bir anlayış birliği olduğunu biliyorum.

Ortak Noktalar

Türkiye 2009-2010 Güneydoğu Avrupa İşbirliği Süreci Dönem Başkanlığını üstlenmiştir. Dönem Başkanlığımızın hem bölgesel ilişkilerin güçlendirilmesi, hem de Balkanların AB perspektifi açısından somut katkılar doğurmasını arzu etmekteyiz. Son olarak bu süreç çerçevesinde geçtiğimiz hafta İstanbul'da yapılan zirvede Sayın Alkalaj ve Sayın Jeremic'in katılımıyla düzenlediğimiz ortak bir toplantıda bu ortak noktalarımızı ve Bosna-Hersek'in toprak bütünlüğüne ve istikrarına atfedilen ortak önemi teyit etme fırsatı bulduk. Değerli Hırvat meslektaşım Sayın Jandrokovic'le çeşitli vesilelerle yaptığımız görüşmelerde de bu anlayışa ortaklaşa olarak sahip çıktığımızı memnuniyetle müşahade ettim.

Yakın İlgisi

Barışı Uygulama Konseyinde aynı zamanda örgüt olarak temsil ettiğimiz İslam Konferansı Örgütünün de Bosna-Hersek'e yönelik yakın ilgisi devam etmektedir. Son

dönemde yaşanan gelişmeler hakkında fikir alışverişi yapmak amacıyla, uzun bir aradan sonra örgüt kapsamında faaliyet gösteren Bosna-Hersek Temas Grubunu teşkil eden Pakistan, Mısır, Suudi Arabistan, Senegal, İran ve Fas'tan temsilcilerin katılımıyla geniş çaplı bir görüş alışverişinde bulunduk ve Örgütün Bosna-Hersek'te oynadığı müspet rolün devam ettirilmesi konusunda mutabık kaldık. Anılan grubun önümüzdeki dönemde de yüksek seviyede görüşmelerde bulunması öngörülmektedir.

Türk İşbirliği ve Kalkınma Ajansının ülke programları arasında en büyüklerinden biri Bosna-Hersek'te yürütülüyor olmasının, Air Bosna şirketinin hisselerinin %49'unun ve işletiminin Türk Hava Yolları tarafından üstlenilmiş olmasının, Türkiye'nin en büyük bankası olan Ziraat'ın ve çok sayıdaki şirketimizin buradaki faaliyetlerinin de bize gösterdiği gibi, iki ülke arasındaki ilişkiler tüm boyutlarıyla ilerlemektedir. Mükemmel düzeyde ilerleyen ve önümüzdeki sene, karşılıklı olarak birbirimize verdiğimiz desteğin de etkisiyle, 2010 yılı boyunca birlikte BM Güvenlik Konseyinde geçici üye olarak bulunmamızla perçinleneceğini düşündüğümüz siyasi ilişkilerimizi sadece bu veçheyle yeterli göremeyiz. Türkiye, halkıyla, işadamlarıyla, üniversiteleriyle ve siyasi iradesiyle Bosna-Hersek'in yanında ve arkasındadır. Şimdi ve daima...