

DOKUZ EYLÜL UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PROGRAM
MASTER'S THESIS

**RUSSIAN ORDER AND JUSTICE PERSPECTIVES IN
LIBYA AND SYRIA DURING THE ARAB SPRING**

Melis BULCA

Supervisor

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sevilay Zehra AKSOY

2024

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Date

24/10/2024

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Signature



ABSTRACT

Master's Thesis

**Russian Order and Justice Perspectives in Libya and Syria during the Arab
Spring**

Melis BULCA

Dokuz Eylül University

Graduate School of Social Sciences

Department of International Relations

International Relations Program

The English School treats the international system, international society, and world society as different levels of historical analysis. The School is the only approach in international relations that combines and accounts for the three main traditions (realism, rationalism, and revolutionism). Hedley Bull, one of the leading students of the School, in addition to introducing the pluralist-solidarity debate and the related order vs. justice debate, systematically examined the roles of primary international institutions such as balance of power, great powers, war, diplomacy, and international law in preserving and reinforcing order within the international society.

Within the framework of these concepts and debates, this thesis, by using primary and secondary resources and qualitative research method, seeks to understand Russian order and justice perspectives towards the conflicts in Libya and Syria during the Arab Spring. The importance of these two countries stemmed from their regimes' use of force against the civilians and the (actual or intended) military intervention by the international community, while political, military, and economic factors have also made them critical for Russia.

This thesis shows Russia's commitment to pluralist international society and its primary institutions such as sovereignty, great powers and diplomacy as defined by the English School also in that period. Russia took a stronger non-interventionist stance in Syria after seeing that its abstention in the Libyan case had led to a dubious military intervention by NATO. While Russian concerns for

human justice were limited in Libya and Syria, its concerns for international order remained as a priority.

Keywords: Russia, Syria, Libya, UNSC, English School, Hedley Bull, Order, Justice.



ÖZET

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

Arap Baharı Sürecinde Libya ve Suriye’de Rus Düzeni ve Adalet Perspektifleri

Melis BULCA

Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı

Uluslararası İlişkiler Programı

İngiliz Okulu, uluslararası sistem, uluslararası toplum ve dünya toplumunu tarihsel analizin farklı düzeyleri olarak ele alır. Okul, uluslararası ilişkilerde üç ana geleneği (realizm, rasyonalizm ve devrimcilik) birleştiren ve açıklayan tek yaklaşımdır. Okul’un önde gelen öğrencilerinden biri olan Hedley Bull, çoğulcu-dayanımcı ve bununla ilişkili olan düzen-adalet tartışmasını başlatmanın yanı sıra, uluslararası toplumda düzenin korunması ve güçlendirilmesinde, güç dengesi, başat güçler, savaş, diplomasi ve uluslararası hukuk gibi birincil uluslararası kurumların rollerini sistematik olarak incelemiştir.

Bu kavramlar ve tartışmalar çerçevesinde, bu tez, birincil ve ikincil kaynakları ve nitel araştırma yöntemini kullanarak, Arap Baharı sırasında Libya ve Suriye çatışmalarına yönelik Rusya’nın düzen ve adalet perspektiflerini anlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu iki ülke, rejimlerinin sivillere karşı güç kullanması ve uluslararası toplumun (gerçekleşmiş veya niyet edilmiş) askeri müdahalede bulunmuş olması nedeniyle önem taşımaktadır. Ayrıca, siyasi, askeri ve ekonomik ilişkiler bu iki ülkeyi Rusya’nın gözünde önemli kılmaktadır.

Bu tez, bu dönemde de Rusya’nın İngiliz Okulu’nun tanımladığı çoğulcu uluslararası topluma ve onun egemenlik, büyük güçler ve diplomasi gibi birincil kurumlarına olan bağlılığını göstermektedir. Rusya, Libya vakasında çekimser kalmasının NATO’nun tartışmalı askeri müdahalesine yol açtığını gördükten sonra Suriye’de daha güçlü bir müdahale karşıtı duruş sergilemiştir. Rusya’nın

insani adalete dair kaygıları Libya ve Suriye’de sınırlı kalırken, uluslararası düzene yönelik kaygıları ise öncelikli yerini korumuştur.

Anahtar kelimeler: Rusya, Suriye, Libya, BMGK, İngiliz Okulu, Hedley Bull, Düzen, Adalet.



**RUSSIAN ORDER AND JUSTICE PERSPECTIVES IN LIBYA AND SYRIA
DURING THE ARAB SPRING**

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ABBREVIATIONS

AU	African Union
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
COMINTERN	Communist International
EU	European Union
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GNA	Government of National Accord
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IR	International Relations
LoN	League of Nations
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OIC	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Council
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General
UNSMIL	United Nations Support Mission in Libya
UNSMIS	United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO	World Trade Organisation

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INTRODUCTION

Throughout history, many philosophers and politicians have engaged with the concepts of order and justice. They tried to understand their nature and implications for society, politics, and morality. These concepts played an important role in shaping the international system. Hedley Bull contributed the most to the debate on order and justice within the English School with his meticulous analysis.

The English School was chosen as a theoretical framework for this thesis because it is deemed useful to use the English School's state-centred analysis to understand Russia's order and justice perspective in the international system. From the perspective of the School's international society concept, Russia as a state is a member of international society and is subject to the rules of this international society. Being a great power, Russia also bears certain privileges and responsibilities. Thus, various conceptual lenses offered by the School are regarded to be helpful in evaluating Russia's international behaviour and responsibilities. The English School places importance on historical analysis. Thus, by using the historical method of the School, it is possible to understand Russia's relationship with Europe and other countries, its place in international society, and how Russia (re)constructs its role. The School works toward understanding many key concepts of international relations, such as balance of power, great powers, international law, international norms, international cooperation, international security, diplomacy, war, and peace. Some of those concepts, such as great powers, war, and diplomacy, are even regarded as primary institutions of international society. Russia is an important regional actor in Eurasia and is historically accepted as a great power. Its decisions and interventions in countries have come to affect the whole world. Russia's relationship with international institutions, its contribution to conflict and peace processes in international relations, and the security politics of Russia can be satisfactorily interpreted through the conceptual lenses and historical approach of the School.

Bull's ground-breaking book, *Anarchical Society*, provides a basis for understanding these concepts. Bull, in his book, evaluates justice in the context of the use of rights and privileges, and considers order as a pattern of conduct that maintains the basic aims of social life. He classifies different types of order and justice, including

human justice. Bull's concept of human justice contributed to the emergence of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept. This concept basically refers to the responsibility of states to protect populations from gross violations of human rights such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and ethnic cleansing.

The peaceful protests that began in Tunisia and spread across the Middle Eastern countries in the Arab Spring have attracted the attention of international society due to the danger of disrupting the regional and international orders as governments attempted to suppress the protests by force, resulting in massive violations of human rights. Russia got involved and actively participated in the following UNSC meetings in order to protect its own military and economic interests in the Middle East, to assert itself as a great power in international society, and possibly to distract international society from its own violations in the post-Soviet space.

The Libya and Syria cases were chosen in this study because they attracted the attention of international society much more than the uprisings in other countries. Both the regimes in Syria and Libya responded to their opponents with violent crackdowns, leading to full-scale civil wars and high casualties that raised the prospect of military intervention by the international society.¹ Due to civil war and violence in these countries, migration and terrorism followed, which disrupted the regional order and affected the entire international society in different ways.

This thesis seeks to understand the Russian order and justice perspectives during the Arab Spring towards Libya and Syria through the conceptual lens of the English School, especially that of its leading student, Hedley Bull. By exploring Russia's motivations, strategies, and justifications for its involvement in these regions, the study aims to provide an understanding of how Russia, being a great power and a permanent member of the UNSC, perceived and played out its role vis-à-vis those conflicts in the region and how it regarded humanitarian intervention.

This thesis consists of three main chapters. The first chapter looks at the perspectives of some International Relations (IR) theories towards order and justice. Robert Cox divides IR theories into problem-solving and critical theories. These theories mention order and justice concepts, but they do not define or analyse these

¹ Roland Dannreuther and Mark N. Katz, "Russia and the Arab Spring", **Russian Analytical Digest**, No. 98, 2011, p. 4.

concepts deeply and directly.² At this point, the English School emerges as a more comprehensive alternative to these theories with its approach that encompasses three main traditions (Realist/Hobbesian, Rationalist/Grotian, and Revolutionist/Kantian) with their varying degrees of emphasis on order and justice. This chapter looks into the English School and its representatives' perspectives on order and justice. Lastly, this chapter introduces Bull's concepts of order and justice, as well as other English School concepts such as the pluralism-solidarism debate and primary institutions of the English School as a guiding conceptual framework for the thesis.

The second chapter looks at the factors that affected Russian order and justice perspectives, and led to Russia's security concerns. The chapter examines Russian order and justice understandings starting from the 18th century, since its historical background and particularly its relations with Europe played a significant role in shaping the Russian identity. Russia sought to be recognized as an equal member of the emerging European international society, along with other dominant European powers. In order to realize this, Russia participated in alliances, various meetings and institutions. Russia has tried to protect its internal order from both domestic and external threats. What Russia did in this direction, how it legitimized its own invasions, and how it perceived the invasions of other countries are all examined.

In the last chapter, Bull's order and justice concepts are thoroughly deployed to understand the Russian behaviour in the UNSC meetings vis-à-vis the cases of Syria and Libya during the Arab Spring. Firstly, the reasons for the emergence of the Arab Spring and how international society perceived the uprisings, including Libya and Syria, are examined. Then, Russia's reaction to the uprisings outside Libya and Syria is explored as well as why it has come to be more interested in the uprisings in Libya and Syria. These two countries are very special in the eyes of Russia because both countries have special economic, military, and diplomatic relations with Russia. During the Arab Spring, due to the increased conflict between the government and the opposition in these two countries, Russia focused its efforts on attempts to protect its economic, military, and diplomatic interests there. Lastly, this chapter seeks to understand why Russia allowed the intervention of international society in Libya but

² Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1981, pp. 128-130.

opposed a similar intervention in Syria through the presented Russian arguments in the UNSC.

In the writing of this thesis, more than 200 sources were carefully selected from a wide range of news reports, books, articles, and international and regional organizations' documents. In the literature, it is possible to find studies about Russia's domestic or foreign politics. However, it is difficult to run into studies including Russia's order and justice understandings on specific issue areas or political developments. There are articles in the literature interpreting the UNSC resolutions, for instance. However, these articles generally interpret the resolutions, do not look at them from Russia's perspective, and do not analyse them through Bull's concepts.

During the literature review, S. Neil MacFarlane's chapter, *Russian Perspectives on Order and Justice*, published in the edited book of *Order and Justice in International Relations*, stood out as the best and one of the few successful attempts to understand Russian foreign policy through the lenses of the English School.³ MacFarlane's work analyses Russia's understandings of order and justice, starting from early Russia until 2002. However, MacFarlane does not base his analysis on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and meetings, and pursues a broader historical approach. This thesis is both inspired by MacFarlane's work and seeks to contribute to the literature by building on it. It aims at filling the gap in the literature by seeking to understand the Russian order and justice perspectives towards the uprisings in Libya and Syria by interpreting the Russian positions in the related UNSC resolutions and meetings through Bull's concepts.

³ S. Neil MacFarlane, "Russian Perspectives on Order and Justice", **Order and Justice in International Relations**, (Ed. Rosemary Foot, John Lewis Gaddis, Andrew Hurrell), Oxford University Press, New York, 2003, pp. 176, 206.

CHAPTER ONE

ORDER AND JUSTICE

This chapter, with a view to constituting a theoretical background to the case studies on Libya and Syria, firstly examines the approaches of some IR theories toward order and justice. Then, it looks at the English School and its representatives' perspectives on order and justice and tries to justify why the English School is the most appropriate theoretical approach to make sense of Russia's understandings of order and justice. Finally, it examines the solidarist-pluralist debate of the School and the concept of world society and then digs into Hedley Bull's views on order and justice.

1.1. THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO ORDER AND JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

All theories follow a perspective and view the world differently from one another. According to Robert Cox, a renowned IR scholar, IR theories serve two aims and thus can be classified accordingly. The first aim focuses on problem-solving. The second aim involves the building up of a new (transformative/emancipatory) perspective by critically analysing the existing theories. Problem-solving theories accept institutions, social relations, and power dynamics as they are. These theories effectively address the specific sources of the problem and ensure the smooth functioning of these relationships and institutions. Accordingly, they defend the status quo or, in other words, the maintenance of order. Realism, neo-realism, and liberalism can be put into this category. Critical theories emerging from the second aim, on the other hand, look into the origins and structures of institutions, social relations, and power relations with a view to identifying the unjust and unfair practices associated with them. The ultimate aim of those theories is to change the prevailing world order for the better. Thus, they can be described as order-disrupting and justice-oriented theories. Marxism, feminism, green theory, and post-colonial theory can be given as examples of critical theories.⁴ Below, examples from IR theory based on that divide are explained briefly with a view to their perspectives on order and justice.

⁴ Cox, pp. 128-130.

1.1.1. Problem-Solving Theories

As a representative of classical/modern realism, Hans J. Morgenthau views power as an immediate aim. States try to achieve their national interests and struggle for power in international politics. The struggle for power emerges from the inherent selfishness of human nature, the desire for dominance, and the need to survive in an anarchic international system. Morgenthau claims that order can be provided through the balance of power, which serves as a tool for the self-defence of nations.⁵ According to classical realists, communities, identities, and norms not only shape domestic and international order, but morality and community also play an important role in providing stability. Classical realists place importance on justice for two reasons. First, a clear dedication to justice can establish and sustain a type of community that enables actors to effectively convert power into influence. Second, dedication to justice serves as a potent form of self-restraint, and the need for restraint increases in direct correlation to one's power level.⁶

According to structural realism (neorealism), because of the anarchic international system, states must rely on self-help to ensure their own security. States attempt to gain power to protect their survival. In discussions regarding the extent of state power, neorealists are divided into offensive and defensive camps. One of the defensive realists, Kenneth Waltz, argues that states, instead of maximizing their power, want to sustain their positions in the international arena. Balances of power repeatedly emerge and this balancing seeks to stop aggressive states. Furthermore, the concern for relative gains limits the possibility of cooperation.⁷ Offensive realists, including John J. Mearsheimer, claim that against the prospect of revisionist/expansionist great power/s, great powers should seek to maximize their power and if possible, to be a hegemon; this is the safest way to ensure their survival.⁸

⁵ Hans J. Morgenthau, **Politics among Nations: Struggle for Power and Peace**, First Edition, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1948, pp. 13-157.

⁶ Richard Ned Lebow, "Classical Realism", **International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity**, Third Edition, (Eds. Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith), Oxford University Press, UK, 2013, pp. 60-67.

⁷ Kenneth N. Waltz, **Theory of International Politics**, First Edition, Addison-Wesley, USA, 1979, pp. 106-126.

⁸ John J. Mearsheimer, **The Tragedy of Great Power Politics**, First Edition, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 2001, pp. 32-33.

Liberalism, on the other hand, considers human beings as individuals and defends their individual freedom and rationality. Therefore, liberalism believes in the improvement/progress in social life and human beings' ability to solve problems through argument. Liberals consider government to be essential for ensuring order and stability in society, but this is a limited government subject to the separation of powers. In addition, their ideas on justice are based on legal and political equality.⁹ Immanuel Kant accepts that human beings are self-interested, but they can still cooperate and establish a more peaceful society through reason (federation of republics). Democratic (republican) governments, according to Kant, refrain from using force against each other. In addition to the democratic form of government, economic interdependence, international law and international institutions play crucial roles by strengthening peaceful relations between states.¹⁰

1.1.2. Critical Theories

From the perspective of Karl Marx, humans are social and material beings. Therefore, individuals need to interact productively with the natural world to ensure their survival. Humans constantly reshape their environments, including natural and social elements, as well as themselves. Marx believed that capitalism, despite providing unparalleled progress in the productive capacities of human societies, simultaneously creates disabling, exploitative and undemocratic conditions.¹¹ According to Marxism, the international system is prone to war because of the class struggle between the bourgeoisie (owners of the production) and the proletariat (the working class). Marxism argues that with the realization of class consciousness, a proletarian revolution will occur, and a classless and prosperous communist society will emerge.¹²

⁹ Andrew Heywood, **Politics**, Third Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, UK, 2007, pp. 45-46.

¹⁰ Bruce Russett, "Liberalism", **International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity**, Third Edition, (Eds. Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith), Oxford University Press, UK, 2013, pp. 95-111.

¹¹ Mark Rupert, "Marxism", **International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity**, Third Edition, (Eds. Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith), Oxford University Press, UK, 2013, pp. 155, 157.

¹² Heywood, pp. 56-57.

Feminist theories argue that the international system consists of sexual or gender inequalities, and they focus on the social role of women in this context. Feminist theories consist of many perspectives. While radical feminists point to the necessity of a sexual revolution, liberal feminists desire reform in the public realm by expanding the legal and political rights of women and providing education and career opportunities.¹³ Critical feminism investigates the ideational and material representation of gendered identities and power in world politics. By examining and interpreting texts, feminist poststructuralists strive to reveal and break down gender hierarchies. Postcolonial feminists argue that all women have different needs because of their race, culture, social class, and country.¹⁴ Postcolonialists criticize the West's view of third-world countries as backward or irrational, and the West's positioning of itself as superior to these countries. Postcolonialism argues that colonial relations between countries have affected world politics and continue to do so also today. Postcolonial scholars consider international relations to be Eurocentric and argue for the greater inclusion of the ideas and values of non-Western countries.¹⁵

1.2. THE ENGLISH SCHOOL

The English School is a rationalist IR theory that accepts the anarchical nature of international politics but at the same time allows for an order and a certain degree of justice between states¹⁶ and explains this international order with the concept of international society.¹⁷ It is possible to understand the existence of international society by referring to examples of compliance with the laws of war or keeping diplomacy

¹³ Heywood, p. 64.

¹⁴ J. Ann Tickner and Laura Sjoberg, "Feminism", **International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity**, Third Edition, (Eds. Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith), Oxford University Press, UK, 2013, pp. 209-212.

¹⁵ Mine N. Küçük, "Postcolonial Approaches in International Relations", **Critical Approaches to International Relations: Philosophical Foundations and Current Debates**, (Eds. M. Kürşad Özekin and Engin Sune), Koninklijke Brill NV, The Netherlands, 2022, pp. 160-166.

¹⁶ F. Aslı Ergül Jorgensen, "İngiliz Okulu", **Uluslararası İlişkilere Giriş: Tarih, Teori, Kavram ve Konular**, (Eds. Şaban Kardeş and Ali Balcı), Küre Yayınları, İstanbul, 2014, p. 187.

¹⁷ Hedley Bull, **Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics**, Third Edition, Palgrave, New York, 2002, pp. 8-13. Bull defines an international system as states that interact frequently and influence each other's choices. An international society emerges when states share common interests and values, and feel bound by a common set of rules in their relations. These concepts will be explained in detail in the section on Bull.

channels open. In addition, the rational behaviour tendency of states and statesmen can be considered as a sign that international society will continue to exist.¹⁸

The English School claims neither that international politics is constantly conflictual (the Hobbesian view) nor that there could be a common world state (the Kantian/liberal view). Although states are political units with different political views, aims, and national interests, they respect each other's sovereign rights and meet the minimum common requirements for maintaining international order.¹⁹ The English School emerged after the Second World War, particularly during the Cold War period when the international environment was tense.²⁰ A group of English academics began gathering in the 1950s and founded the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics in 1959, which then formed the basis of the English School.²¹ Members of the English School came from different fields, including those mostly from the disciplines of politics, history, law, and sociology. This different range of members allowed the ideas of the School to be rich and variable instead of a general one. The most important representatives of the English School are Herbert Butterfield, Martin Wight, Adam Watson, and Hedley Bull. They can also be considered as the first-period representatives of the School. The late-period ones include Tim Dunne, Hidemi Suganami, Nicolas Wheeler, Andrew Hurrell, David Long, and Peter Wilson among others.²²

The English School has a very rich theoretical foundation. It is the only approach in IR that combines and accounts for all the three main traditions (realism, rationalism and revolutionism). This framework can analyse both the analytical and normative dimensions of international politics. In addition, the School's original concept of international society allows us to better understand the dynamics of contemporary IR.²³ The predominant analytical lens adopted by the English School, the international society, is state-centred. It analyses and interprets world politics

¹⁸ Jorgensen, p. 188.

¹⁹ Jorgensen, p. 188.

²⁰ Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami, **The English School of International Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment**, First Edition, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006, pp. 96-99.

²¹ İsmail H. Elçi, "İngiliz Okulu'nun Düzen-Adalet Tartışması Bağlamında BM Barışı Destekleme Operasyonlarının Analizi", **Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi**, Vol. 77, No. 3, 2022, pp. 467.

²² Elçi, p. 167.

²³ Balkan Devlen ve Özgür Özdamar, "Uluslararası İlişkilerde İngiliz Okulu Kuramı: Kökenleri, Kavramları ve Tartışmaları", **Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi**, Vol. 7, No. 25, 2010, p. 44.

through the intersubjective practices of states.²⁴ Concerning the methodological structure of the School, it is possible to say that its students did not discuss much the issue of method in their works. However, nearly all scholars of the School used classical and historical methods. Theorists of the English School were distant from positivism and closer to classical analysis.²⁵

The English School acknowledges the coexistence of the international system, international society, and world society concurrently.²⁶ In other words, the School has a pluralistic outlook on world politics and uses all these three concepts as different levels of historical analysis. Members of the School acknowledge the impact of structural pressures at the systemic level, highlight the significance of actors and mechanisms within international society (including the dynamics between the system and society), and assess how individuals and transnational groups influence states within the broader context of world society.²⁷ The representatives of the School predominantly use the European context as their primary reference for understanding international society, which leads them to rely on the traditional instruments of European statecraft to comprehend how order was preserved during the evolution and expansion of international society within that system.²⁸

The most important contribution to the School on its way to becoming a theory on its own was made by Hedley Bull, who took the works of the other three scholars (Herbert Butterfield, Martin Wight, Adam Watson) as a basis, edited and published them after Wight's death, and then developed and theorized them with his own contributions.²⁹ In addition, Bull's contribution to the School lies in his systematic exploration of the roles of the balance of power, diplomacy, and international law in the preservation and reinforcement of order within international society. Although

²⁴ Tim Dunne, **Inventing International Society: A History of the English School**, First Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 1998, p. 187.

²⁵ Devlen ve Özdamar, p. 50.

²⁶ Barry Buzan, **From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalization**, First Edition, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2004, (World Society), p. 10.

²⁷ Balkan Devlen, Patrick James and Özgür Özdamar, "The English School, International Relations, and Progress", **International Studies Review**, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2005, p. 184.

²⁸ Devlen, James and Özdamar, p. 193.

²⁹ Devlen ve Özdamar, p. 45.

other scholars within the School have touched upon these topics, Bull's work stands out for its comprehensive and meticulous analysis.³⁰

The English School's state-centred analysis is a good start to understand Russia's justice and order perspectives in the international system. Concerning the School's key concept of international society, Russia is a member of international society and is subject to the rules of that society. The English School works toward understanding many concepts of international relations, such as balance of power, great powers, international law, international norms, international cooperation, international security, diplomacy, war, and peace. Some of those concepts such as great powers, war and diplomacy are even regarded as primary institutions of international society. Russia is an important regional actor in Eurasia and is historically accepted as a great power. Its decisions and interventions in countries have come to affect the world politics at different time periods. Bull's ideas on justice, order, and international society are deemed helpful in explaining and understanding Russia's order and justice perspectives. That's why in this study, the focus will be on Hedley Bull and his famous book *Anarchical Society*, in which he explains these concepts in depth.

1.2.1. Representatives' Perspectives on Order, Justice, and International Society

Before looking more deeply into the concept of international society and particularly the divide between Solidarists and Pluralists, it may be useful to mention the most significant students' perspectives on justice, order, and international society.

Martin Wight, one of the leading students of the School, considers international politics as a continuous long-standing dialogue among three traditions. These traditions are the Realist (Hobbesian), Rationalist (Grotian) and Revolutionist (Kantian). Any of these traditions is insufficient to help understand and explain the problems in international relations on its own. The important thing is to maintain the dialogue among them.³¹

³⁰ Devlen, James and Özdamar, p. 193.

³¹ Jorgensen, p. 191.

The Realist tradition, which describes international politics as an anarchical environment, has its origins in Niccolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. There is no single world state, and states are the only actors in world politics with different national interests. Therefore, constant conflict exists in the international arena. This tradition has a level of analysis that considers the system as closed to change. Besides, it does not believe in the existence of an international society. It claims that international law and international organizations will only continue to exist as long as powerful states believe that these institutions serve their interests.³²

The Rationalist tradition believes that statesmen have rationality that allows them to choose what is right. Hugo Grotius, a scholar of international law, affected this tradition with his ideas on international rights and duties. According to this tradition, sovereign states are the main actors in international politics. However, states are not abstract institutions; on the contrary, they are human-made institutions. Although the anarchic nature of international society (the absence of a world government) is acknowledged as a reality, the rationalist argument is that states generally respect each other's sovereignty rights and can cooperate on a basic level by making rational choices. Thus, it is possible to talk about the existence of an international society of states based on their common interests, values and institutions.³³

The Revolutionist tradition believes that people are the ultimate actors of international politics, not states. In this sense, it has a cosmopolitan view. The ideas of Immanuel Kant affected this tradition. It claims that in the future, the international environment will change completely and a world government will be established in its place. Revolutionists have a normative view that is open to progress. According to them, human beings, who are essentially good, are moving toward a great revolution and will one day achieve eternal peace in which all states will disappear.³⁴

According to Martin Wight, since an international society exists within the interactions between states, it would be overly simplistic to assume that statesmen are

³² Martin Wight, **International Theory: The Three Traditions**, First Edition, Leicester University Press, Leicester, 1991, (Three Traditions), pp. 16, 141, 162.

³³ Wight, Three Traditions, pp. 13, 29, 162.

³⁴ Wight, Three Traditions, pp. 14-24.

solely driven by the use of force and unaffected by the notions of right and justice.³⁵ However, he states that to create an international society, there is a need for a common culture among the states. The existence of a common culture is crucial for the survivability and continuity of an international society.³⁶ Martin Wight identifies international society with four specific attributes. An international society is a unique society consisting of states. Although the number of members of international society increases from time to time, it is usually small. Their members are immortals and those members are unique in terms of territorial size, geographical position and resources, population, cultural ideals and social arrangements.³⁷ For him the international society serves as the primary domain for the rationalist (Grotian) tradition, which fosters order and cooperation among states through the cultivation of shared culture, values, norms, institutions and similar mechanisms.³⁸ Although Wight accepts some attributes of realism that can be seen in his books, by giving importance to the concept of international society, he situates himself in the Grotian rationalist tradition, similar to other English School representatives. He placed particular emphasis on the significance of a diplomatic system, international law, and institutions that serve to alter the functioning of power politics. Also, for him, the entity of international law proves the entity of international society.³⁹

R. J. Vincent, another major contributor to the English School, suggests that because states are seen as rational actors, they are likely to choose a society of states that is characterized by order rather than chaos. Vincent emphasizes the importance of unity among states based on practical benefits rather than on shared legal or cultural values.⁴⁰ Although a common culture is desirable and useful in the creation of an international society, according to Vincent, such an expectation does not seem possible within the current reality of global international society.⁴¹

³⁵ Martin Wight, **Power Politics**, (Ed. Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad), First Edition, Holmes and Meier, New York, 1978, (Power Politics), p. 29.

³⁶ Martin Wight, **Systems of States**, (Ed. Hedley Bull), First Edition, Leicester University Press, Leicester, 1977, (Systems of States), p. 33.

³⁷ Wight, **Power Politics**, pp. 106-107.

³⁸ Wight, **The Three Traditions**, p. XII.

³⁹ Wight, **Power Politics**, pp. 101-107.

⁴⁰ R. J. Vincent, "Edmund Burke and the Theory of International Relations", **Review of International Studies**, Vol.10, No.3, 1984, (Burke), p. 213.

⁴¹ R. J. Vincent, **Human Rights and International Relations**, First Edition, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1986, (Human Rights), p. 51.

Vincent states that there is no cultural homogeneity in today's world and that every state has a different conception of human rights.⁴² However, the absence of consensus does not prevent the development of an international society; outsiders are observed to both adopt the values and norms of the European international system and simultaneously influence them for future developments.⁴³ He asserted that an international agreement requiring all states to uphold universally recognized fundamental human rights strengthens and solidifies international society. Moreover, international society can be fortified by addressing the disparities between the North and South.⁴⁴ He argues that the presence and evolution of an international society will generate greater cooperation, order, and justice among states.⁴⁵ According to him, the concepts of justice and order mutually affect each other and if there is a threat against order, then there is also a threat against the possibility of reaching justice as well.⁴⁶ Vincent offers a historical analysis of the intervention concept where his strong pluralist side can be seen, and how the theory and application of non-intervention have played a role in shaping the development of international society. He claimed that states were unprepared to authorize interventions aimed at promoting justice within other states.⁴⁷ Thus, he refrains from fully supporting unrestricted intervention in the name of human rights.⁴⁸ Non-intervention is a basic rule for maintaining orderly international relations, as its adherence would signify the acknowledgement by states of the existence of one another.⁴⁹

He states that any principle of humanitarian intervention grants permission for various forms of interference, often claiming to be driven by humanitarian motives with varying degrees of credibility. However, such interventions can significantly undermine the stability of the international order.⁵⁰ In his later works, he focused on

⁴² Vincent, *Human Rights*, p. 48.

⁴³ Devlen, James and Özdamar, p. 190.

⁴⁴ Vincent, *Human Rights*, pp. 146-151.

⁴⁵ Devlen, James and Özdamar, p. 188.

⁴⁶ Vincent, *Human Rights*, p. 114.

⁴⁷ R. J. Vincent, **Nonintervention and International Order**, First Edition, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1974, (Nonintervention), p. 389.

⁴⁸ Vincent, *Human Rights*, p. 114.

⁴⁹ Vincent, *Nonintervention*, p. 331.

⁵⁰ Vincent, *Human Rights*, p. 114.

human rights and moved closer to the solidarist side. For him, human or world justice and intervention may undermine the order of international society.⁵¹

Barry Buzan is accepted as a significant scholar because of his call to reconvene the English School in 1999. With this call, he aimed to foster intellectual cooperation among the like-minded scholars of IR.⁵² For Buzan, the existence of an international society increases cooperation and order between states. Thus, in his works, he discusses ways of strengthening international society to preserve order and cooperation between states.⁵³ He does not agree with Wight's ideas on common culture. According to him, international society can develop with the help of the logic of anarchy without pre-existing cultural ties.⁵⁴

Buzan distinguishes between two types of society: first-order societies and second-order societies. The former encompasses individuals, whereas the latter encompasses societies composed of individuals, such as states and companies.⁵⁵ From Buzan's perspective, international society emerges as *gemeinschaft* (civilizational) and *gesellschaft* (functional). He emphasizes the importance of proving that an international society can be deliberately constructed on the basis of the *gesellschaft* perspective with mutual recognition of each other as legal equals in an anarchical environment.⁵⁶ Buzan claims that the distinction between primary and secondary institutions offers a valuable framework for analysing international order from both a global and regional perspective. All kinds of international regimes, accompanied by an international organization or not, fall into the category of secondary institutions.⁵⁷ Within the realm of international politics, he argues, order can be maintained by strengthening the primary institutions of international society, such as diplomacy, the balance of power and international law.⁵⁸

Adam Watson, on the other hand, whose work helped to shape the English School's concept of international society, argues that international society comprises

⁵¹ Devlen, James and Özdamar pp. 191-194.

⁵² Linklater and Suganami, p. 4.

⁵³ Devlen, James and Özdamar p. 188.

⁵⁴ Barry Buzan, "From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School", **International Organization**, Vol. 47, No. 3, 1993, (International Society), pp. 333-351.

⁵⁵ Buzan, *World Society*, pp. xviii, 188.

⁵⁶ Buzan, *International Society*, pp. 333-349.

⁵⁷ Buzan, *World Society*, pp. xviii, 181.

⁵⁸ Devlen, James and Özdamar, pp. 191-194.

a group of states or independent political entities. These entities not only interact with each other, affecting each other's actions, but they also agree upon shared rules and institutions through dialogue and mutual agreement.⁵⁹ Watson examines the state systems created by different civilizations throughout history and how these systems have transformed into international societies. He claims that economic and strategic pressures hold together systems that have been formed throughout history.⁶⁰ He agrees with Wight by arguing that the foundations of any known international society are built within a dominant culture.⁶¹ According to him, order is provided by alliances and is supported by comprehensive agreements and rules that restrict and benefit all participants within the system, ultimately transforming order into a society.⁶² Watson believes that the international order can be maintained by strengthening the institutions of international society, such as diplomacy, balance of power and international law.⁶³ He claims that the existence of an international society increases cooperation and order between states. For him, common interests are sufficient for the existence and maintenance of an international society.⁶⁴ He expresses doubt about the feasibility of establishing a universally accepted concept of justice because of varying interpretations and its evolutionary nature over time, but he does not contend that such an effort would lead to the collapse of international society.⁶⁵

Robert H. Jackson, a relatively contemporary and influential US scholar of the English School, claims that international society functions as a moral and legal framework to assess foreign policy, diplomatic relations, the threat or use of military force, and other activities within the realm of international politics.⁶⁶ International society is an entity comprising sovereign and legally equal member states in the anarchic environment of world politics.⁶⁷ Jackson's pluralist side can be seen in his

⁵⁹ Adam Watson, **The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis**, Routledge, London, 1992, (The Evolution of International Society), p. 4.

⁶⁰ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, p. 311.

⁶¹ Adam Watson, "Systems of States", **Review of International Studies**, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1990, (Systems of States), p. 101.

⁶² Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, p. 14.

⁶³ Devlen, James and Özdamar p. 194.

⁶⁴ Adam Watson, "Hedley Bull, State Systems and International Studies," **Review of International Studies**, 1987, (International Studies), Vol. 13, No. 2, p. 151.

⁶⁵ Adam Watson, **Diplomacy: The Dialogue between the States**, Methuen & Co. Ltd, London, 1984, (Diplomacy), pp. 36-49.

⁶⁶ Robert H. Jackson, **The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States**, First Edition, Oxford University Press, New York, 2000, p. 39.

⁶⁷ Jackson, pp. 36, 105.

multiple arguments. He asserts that universal values, such as human rights and humanitarian action, are most effectively advanced within a pluralist framework.⁶⁸ He places statecraft at the centre of maintaining order and for him great powers have a particular duty to protect international peace and security.⁶⁹ He considers war to be the greatest danger to human rights. He states that if a choice is to be made, then the stability of international society holds greater significance over the concerns of minority rights and humanitarian safeguards in any country.⁷⁰ This is because humanitarian intervention is not capable of resolving the underlying systemic issues within societies embroiled in a civil warfare. Additionally, the parties involved in the intervention typically lack the readiness to make enduring commitments to long-term social reconstruction efforts that may last for decades.⁷¹ His belief that military intervention might disrupt the international order and that endeavours to foster solidarity could reinforce the predominant moral inclinations of the West and reinforce the West's economic and political influence over the entire international community, inclines him to align with the pluralist perspective.⁷²

For Hedley Bull, probably the most significant student of the English School, the emergence of an international society requires common interests and values. Also, units that belong to this international society feel connected by a set of rules. In his view, the concepts of justice and order have subjective definitions. They are shaped by social dynamics, the state system, and global politics.⁷³ By supporting the middle-ground approach between the conservative stance that prioritizes order and the revolutionary stance that prioritizes justice, Bull claims that maintaining order in international relations is best accomplished by addressing demands for justice, and that justice is most fully achieved within a framework of order.⁷⁴ Bull's ideas on justice, order, and international society will be explained in detail in a separate section below.

⁶⁸ Jackson, p. 289.

⁶⁹ Jackson, p. 173, 288.

⁷⁰ Jackson, p. 291.

⁷¹ Jackson, pp. 291, 310.

⁷² Linklater and Suganami, p. 142,144.

⁷³ Bull, p. 13-81.

⁷⁴ William Bain, "The Pluralist–Solidarist Debate in the English School", **Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies**, 11.01.2018, <https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-342>, (03.09.2023).

1.2.2. A Debate Within the School: Pluralism vs. Solidarism

The pluralist-solidarist debate revolves around the nature and capacity of international society, especially focusing on the real and potential scope of shared norms, rules, and institutions within the system of states.⁷⁵ The main subjects of the pluralist-solidarist debate are human rights, humanitarian intervention, and the responsibility of the West against the so-called Third World.⁷⁶

Pluralist thinking is based on the realist side of rationalism and is centred on states.⁷⁷ For pluralists, the assumption of international law is based on the positive law made by states. In the international arena, sovereignty has legal and political priority. In other words, the pluralists prioritize the importance of the sovereignty of states and their protection from intervention. Seen from this perspective, humanitarian intervention undermines the foundations of international society and hence, the justification for the non-intervention principle being the corollary principle of sovereignty.⁷⁸ From this perspective, as Buzan claims, the maintenance of order and diversity between states is more important than the fulfilment of justice.⁷⁹ Also, for pluralists, states can (and do) achieve coexistence by setting minimum goals that all parties agree upon. Therefore, attempting to impose justice-related principles on states that are not based on consensus and intervening in their internal affairs for the sake of them can have negative effects on the international order.⁸⁰

Notwithstanding the closeness of the pluralist thinking to realist tradition, they differ from each other in a number of respects in the English School. Pluralist international society has a special perspective that considers order within anarchy and believes conflict and compromise can coexist.⁸¹ States can form a society with shared

⁷⁵ Buzan, *World Society*, p. 45.

⁷⁶ Onur Ağkaya, "İngiliz Okulu ve Uluslararası Toplum Düşüncesi", *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*, Vol. 71, No. 4, 2016, p. 1076.

⁷⁷ Buzan, *World Society*, p. 46.

⁷⁸ Devlen ve Özdamar, p. 55.

⁷⁹ Devlen ve Özdamar, p. 55.

⁸⁰ Mehmet Turan Çağlar, "İngiliz Okulu Yaklaşımı Açısından Koruma Sorumluluğu Kavramı ve Plüralizm-Solidarizm Tartışması", *Küresel ve Bölgesel Sistemde Devlet ve Devlet Dışı Aktörler*, VIII. Uludağ Uluslararası İlişkiler Kongresi, Bursa, 28-29.11.2016, p. 13.

⁸¹ Bull, p. 39.

norms, rules and institutions. As Bull said, states can agree on significant aims such as sovereignty and non-intervention.⁸² In realism, institutions are weak and abused by powerful states to reach their goals. In pluralist international society, even though norms, rules, and institutions do not provide a deeper cooperation as in solidarist international society, they serve to maintain order and coexistence.⁸³ According to pluralists, some common practices, such as diplomacy and treaties, can mitigate conflict between states. While realism considers cooperation hard to achieve, pluralist international society considers it accessible with common rules and norms that decrease uncertainty. According to realism, war is inevitable and peace emerges temporarily and as a result of the balance of power. For the pluralist international society, war can still emerge, but states try to restrain the use of force or to regulate its conduct with international norms.

Solidarist thinking can be said to be a combination of cosmopolitan values and Kantian rationalism.⁸⁴ Because of their cosmopolitan concerns, in the international arena, solidarists focus on protecting the rights of individuals and not the states. They consider the individual as a subject of international law and, like Grotius, rely on natural law rather than positive law. When the works of the solidarist students are analysed, it is seen that human rights take precedence over the sovereignty rights of states. In addition, they try to understand how a more interventionist international society based on universal human rights and shared common values can emerge.⁸⁵ From their perspective, states are responsible for protecting the rights of individuals. Thus, intervention becomes obligatory and legal when individuals are subjected to injustice, their rights are violated, and they are unable to be protected by the states. Because the prosperity of international society depends on respect for human rights, their thinking prioritize justice for the individual.⁸⁶ However, their prioritization of justice does not mean that solidarists do not place importance on order. On the contrary, the concept of order is important to them, because, for solidarists, an unjust order cannot be maintained.⁸⁷ According to Buzan, solidarists usually highlight the

⁸² Wheeler and Dunne, pp. 94-95.

⁸³ Devlen ve Özdamar, p. 55.

⁸⁴ Buzan, *World Society*, p. 47.

⁸⁵ Devlen ve Özdamar, p. 55.

⁸⁶ Elçi, p. 471.

⁸⁷ Çağlar, p. 14.

importance of combining order and justice, as they believe that an order devoid of justice is undesirable and unsustainable.⁸⁸

When looking at the representatives of solidarist-pluralist debate, Hedley Bull, James Mayall, and Robert Jackson seem to be the most significant pluralist students, while Tim Dunne, R. J. Vincent (in his late works) and Nicholas Wheeler can be regarded as solidarists.⁸⁹ Hedley Bull divided international society into pluralist and solidarist types. With this separation, he initiated the pluralist-solidarist debate.⁹⁰ Even though the beginning of this debate dates back to Bull, Vincent presented the first solidarist arguments. As stated before, although Vincent's earlier works were closer to the pluralist side, his later works came closer to the solidarist side. Nevertheless, it is possible to see the marks of both sides in his works.⁹¹ According to Vincent, a solidarist international society would involve all units sharing similar internal laws and values concerning humanitarian intervention or, at the very least, accepting their collective responsibility regarding this matter.⁹²

Influenced by the works of Vincent, Nicholas Wheeler established a solidarist position that is essentially state-centred. He claims that the conflict between human rights and sovereignty/non-intervention would not emerge if all states upheld human rights within their borders. Also, Andrew Linklater primarily aligns with a state-centric solidarist perspective, even though there is a more evident cosmopolitan solidarism in his works that lies just below the surface. Linklater, like Vincent, seeks a normative foundation that represents the least common denominator to create a more solidarist society of states. Similar to Vincent's approach, his strategy includes destroying the rationale that presents sovereignty and non-intervention as inevitably conflicting with a cosmopolitan perspective on human rights.⁹³

According to Barry Buzan, the current international society is neither completely pluralist nor completely solidarist. Rather, it reflects both approaches to a

⁸⁸ Barry Buzan, **An Introduction to the English School of International Relations**, First Edition, Polity Press, UK, 2004, (English School), p. 16.

⁸⁹ Elçi, p. 470.

⁹⁰ Laura M. Herta, "The Solidarist Discourse and Humanitarian Intervention: Revisiting Sovereignty, Responsibility and Morality in Global Politics", **Redefining Community in Intercultural Context**, International Conference RCIC'19, Vlora, 2-4.05.2019, p. 206.

⁹¹ Devlen ve Özdamar, p. 56.

⁹² Vincent, Human Rights, p. 104.

⁹³ Buzan, English School, pp. 126-128.

certain extent. Buzan's solidarist perspective is primarily rooted in the pragmatic argument put forth by Hedley Bull and Charles Manning, which proposes that states can agree on arrangements based on their preferences. Grounded in this rationale, Buzan defines solidarism as encompassing any effort that shifts international society from mere coexistence to realms of collaboration and convergence.⁹⁴

Robert Jackson and James Mayall are both pluralists. Pluralism, from Jackson's perspective, concerns itself with safeguarding and fostering the political and cultural diversity and uniqueness that has evolved throughout human history.⁹⁵ In Mayall's pluralism, states have varying interests and values similar to individuals. For this reason, the scope of international society is confined to establishing a framework that allows them to coexist harmoniously to a certain extent.⁹⁶ When opposing the solidarist understanding, they use two arguments. First, attempts to create a more solidarist world are prone to disturb the current order and incapable of creating a substitute for it, because they believe that no authority apart from the state possesses the capacity to maintain order. Second, political and cultural diversity is a value that should be protected. Morally, they prioritize maintaining diversity over the advantages of humanitarian intervention.⁹⁷

1.2.3. Concept of the World Society in the English School

It is important to note that the founding scholars of the English School did not openly define the limits of world society, since, generally speaking, the English School takes the society of states as its basic framework of analysis, not world society. In this context, Buzan argues that the concept of world society has become an intellectual dustbin. Moreover, the origin of solidarist-pluralist international society debate is based on the unclear boundaries between international and world societies.⁹⁸

According to Buzan, a world society that reflects a revolutionist understanding consists of all individuals, identities, and non-state organizations. In this respect, world society (revolutionism) places the transcendence of the state system at the heart of IR

⁹⁴ Buzan, English School, pp. 84,130.

⁹⁵ Jackson, p. 408.

⁹⁶ Buzan, English School, pp. 89-90.

⁹⁷ Devlen ve Özdamar, p. 59.

⁹⁸ Ağkaya, pp. 1076-1081.

theory. Besides that, revolutionism also involves universalist forms of cosmopolitanism. Even though it includes communism and shares similarities with transnationalism, its core connection is primarily with normative political theory.⁹⁹ While Richard Little considers world society the most challenging aspect within the framework of the English School,¹⁰⁰ James Mayall views world society from a perspective that perceives humanity as a unified entity.¹⁰¹ For Robert Jackson, world society constitutes the sphere in which one's obligation is delineated by their belonging to the human race.¹⁰²

From Vincent's perspective, world society contains empirical elements, yet it lacks a normative community that possesses the ability to evaluate and put moral assertions into action. Also, he envisions a world society where states gradually align, and where transnational actors and individuals possess rights concerning each other.¹⁰³ Rather than perceiving international society and world society as distinct analytical concepts, Vincent considered them as two historical powers that must strive to reconcile their contradictions. In this regard, it is possible to argue that he desires to combine international and world society on a normative basis. In his view, a completely solidarist international society would essentially turn into a world society, as all entities would have similar domestic laws and values regarding human rights issues.¹⁰⁴ For historical representatives of the School, such as Herbert Butterfield, Martin Wight, and Adam Watson, world society is expressed through a common culture. It is also an essential condition for the existence of international society. However, Bull and other representatives were concerned that the advancement of world society could weaken the foundational principle of sovereignty within international society.¹⁰⁵

⁹⁹ Buzan, *World Society*, p. 7.

¹⁰⁰ Richard Little, "The English School's Contribution to the Study of International Relations", **European Journal of International Relations**, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2000, p. 411.

¹⁰¹ Matthew S. Weinert, "World Society as Humankind", **System, Society and the World: Exploring the English School of International Relations**, (Ed. Robert W. Murray), e-International Relations Press, UK, 2013. p. 54.

¹⁰² Jackson, p. 175.

¹⁰³ R. J. Vincent, "Western Conceptions of a Universal Moral Order", **British Journal of International Studies**, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1978, (Moral Order), pp. 37-45.

¹⁰⁴ Vincent, *Human Rights*, p. 104.

¹⁰⁵ Buzan, *World Society*, pp. 28-32.

For Bull, the world society concept not only refers to a certain level of interaction that connects all parts of the human community but also to a shared sense of interests and values that can serve as a foundation for creating common rules and institutions. In other words, the world society concept corresponds to global social interaction as a whole.¹⁰⁶

Considering these characteristics of world society, it is possible to claim that, due to its solidarist characteristics (as Buzan puts forward numerous essential sources of solidarist ideology like natural law, humanism and cosmopolitanism which have strong foundations within the context of world society),¹⁰⁷ world society prioritizes justice.

1.3. ORDER AND JUSTICE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF HEDLEY BULL

Hedley Bull went to great lengths to explain the concepts of order and justice in his seminal book of *Anarchical Society*. To start with justice, according to Bull, justice is a concept that ultimately has room only for a personal or subjective definition. His starting premise is that there are some ideas or convictions about what justice entails in international politics and that demands made in support of these concepts have an impact on how things turn out. Bull considers justice ideas as moral and ethical. Because sometimes the word justice is used synonymously with morality or virtue, declaring that an action is just is merely another way of saying that it is morally correct.¹⁰⁸

Bull argues that thoughts about justice form a specific subcategory of moral thoughts and that justice is related to equality in the use of rights and privileges. In this sense, demands for justice are demands for equal enjoyment of rights and privileges on both sides of the conflict despite their differences. In world politics, demands for justice include the elimination of privilege or discrimination along with equality in the dispensation or implementation of rights. There is a need to keep in mind precise distinctions while considering justice, which is common in theoretical analyses of the concept. The first distinction is between general justice and particular justice. The

¹⁰⁶ Bull, p. 269.

¹⁰⁷ Buzan, *World Society*, p. 21.

¹⁰⁸ Bull, p. 75.

second distinction is between substantive and formal justice. Substantive justice refers to the acceptance of rules that grant specific rights and obligations, while formal justice refers to the implementation of the same rules for similar individuals. These rules in IR may have different characteristics. For instance, while legal rule necessitates the non-intervention of states in each other's internal matters, moral rule gives self-determination right to all nations. Operational rule, on the other hand, requires that great powers respect each other's spheres of influence.¹⁰⁹

For Bull, there are three types of justice in world politics. The first is *international* or *interstate justice*. He understands these types of justice as moral rules that give rights and obligations to states and nations. For instance, the idea that all states, regardless of their size, racial makeup, or ideological dispositions, are denominated on equal terms to sovereignty rights or the idea that all nations are denominated on equal terms to the right of national self-determination. States are the primary players in world politics. Every state preserves the idea that they have rights and obligations that are both legal and moral.¹¹⁰ The second is *individual* or *human justice*. Individual or human justice refers to moral principles that give each individual human being rights and obligations. In the natural law doctrine, human justice came before the improvement of interstate or international justice. It is likely that these ideas on human justice prepared the primary intellectual basis for interstate and international justice. It was contrived that in states and nations, individuals and rulers have rights and duties, rulers are people, and nations are the sum of those people; therefore, states and nations are thought to have rights and obligations. The third is *cosmopolitan* or *world justice*. These concepts try to define what is good or right for the entire world, for a hypothetical *civitas maximum* or cosmopolitan society to which all people belong and whose interests should take precedence. These concepts are considered supporting pillars for the common good of the world. They suggest that these people should form

¹⁰⁹ Bull, pp. 75-77. Bull also makes a further distinction between arithmetical justice and proportionate justice on the one hand and between commutative/reciprocal justice and distributive justice on the other. Whereas arithmetical justice briefly means equal rights and obligations, proportionate justice means rights and obligations that may not be equal but are allocated in accordance with the aim in mind. According to commutative/reciprocal justice, a group of people mutually accepts the rights and obligations of each other through a series of negotiations and exchanges. In distributive justice, this bargaining emerges within a society as a whole and their decisions about the common good and interests.

¹¹⁰ Bull, p. 78.

a society whose common interests determine their individual rights and obligations. Such a concept of the world's common good deals with the common aims or values of world society. In this context, the views of sovereign states and the international organizations they dominate are important directives in determining the world's interests.¹¹¹

Perceptions of world order, on the other hand, vary greatly across regions and are influenced by diverse national and regional backgrounds, socio-economic circumstances, and political environments. The definition of order varies with respect to social life, the system of states, and world politics. From Hedley Bull's perspective, social order involves the acceptance of human behaviour according to the rules of conduct. In theory, order can exist in social life even without rules. These rules are not inherently tied to the concept of justice but rather serve as a means to establish order in people's social lives. Order in social life refers to a pattern of behaviour that upholds the essential, crucial, or universal objectives of social existence. In addition, order in social life entails the acceptance of predictable conduct that aligns with laws applicable to past, present, and future cases.¹¹² In all communities, order is considered a pattern of conduct that maintains the basic aims of social life. It is possible to say that order is provided by a sense of common interests in these basic aims; by rules which determine the pattern of conduct that maintains them; and through institutions that enforce these rules. A sense of common interests can emerge from a rational calculation that considers reciprocal limitations as essential to maintaining the aims of social life. It can also emerge from fear. The common interests in achieving the basic aims of social life might be unclear and fail to offer precise data on which behaviours align with these aims and which do not. Thus, rules by explaining the type of conduct that is orderly contribute to the provision of order. On the other hand, order in social life can be maintained without the support of rules. It is feasible, for instance, that men could act coherently with basic social aims by virtue of a reflex action if organized patterns of behaviour were instilled by conditioning.¹¹³

Bull points to the Marxist idea that rules function as tools to advance the particular interests of the ruling or dominant members within a society. The values and

¹¹¹ Bull, pp. 79-82.

¹¹² Bull, pp. xx, 6-7.

¹¹³ Bull, pp. 51-52.

special interests of the preponderant members in society are reflected in the definition of rules. Therefore, it is possible to see the influence of those members, for instance, upon the rules regulating property rights, limiting the resort to violence or specifying the type of agreements to be upheld. For example, from a Marxist perspective, property rules reflect the interests of the bourgeoisie class. The bourgeoisie is the owner of the means of production and exploits the labour of the working class. However, restrictions on the application of violence, the existence of property rules, and hopes about the fulfilment of agreements are also in the common interest of society members. Thus, in any society, actors who try to change the existing order desire not to abolish those rules but rather to modify them in such a way that they would stop serving the special interests of the presently preponderant members.¹¹⁴

To understand the international order, it is necessary to examine the definition of states, the system of states/international system, and the society of states/international society. States are independent political societies, each of which is led by a government, and they push their sovereignty in relation to a particular part of the world and population. A system of states/international system emerges when two or more states interact frequently enough and have enough influence over one another's choices. An international society/society of states is formed by a group of states that are aware of their common interests and values in the sense that they feel bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another.¹¹⁵

The international order is a routine of behaviour that maintains the foundational objectives of the society of states, or international society. In the international order, there are four objectives. The first objective is the protection of the system and society of states itself. Although there are differences between modern states, they have been united in their opinion that they are the main players in world politics and the main holders of rights and obligations within it. The society of states has tried to survive as the dominant form of global political organization in fact and law. However, some actors, such as a particular dominant state, supra-state actors, sub-state actors, and trans-state actors, continue to challenge the presence and privileged status of states in world politics.¹¹⁶ The second objective is to preserve individual

¹¹⁴ Bull, pp. 52-53.

¹¹⁵ Bull, pp. 8-13.

¹¹⁶ Bull, pp. 8, 16.

states' external sovereignty or independence. Any given state's main goal in joining the society of states is to be acknowledged as independent by other members, understood as its supreme control over its citizens and territory. For this to be realized, the independence and sovereignty rights of other states must be accepted. In reality, however, international society has treated the goal of maintaining the independence of great powers superior to the goal of maintaining the society of states, the latter historically having been subordinated to the former. This shows the predominant role played by the great powers in shaping international society. Throughout history, great powers, considering themselves as the custodians or guardians of international society, allowed for the violation of the sovereignty or independence of small states via spheres-of-influence agreements or agreements to establish buffer or neutralised states.¹¹⁷ The third objective is the goal of peace in the sense of avoiding war under the normal conditions of international society membership, only violated under extreme conditions. International society relies on peace to ensure the protection of the state system, while states find it necessary to wage war to guarantee this protection. This includes protecting their sovereignty and independence. This act of waging war is mostly considered as self-defence. The secondary position of peace relating to these other two objectives is marked in the United Nations Charter by the constant references to 'peace and security'. The fourth objective, as mentioned earlier, is that a society of states shares common goals in social life. These goals include the restriction of violence resulting in death or bodily damage, adherence to promises, and equitable distribution of property through rules of ownership. The thought of the necessity of war is only accepted by states when it is for a just motive. They have also continually declared their commitment to rules that follow the idea that wars should be held within certain limits necessary to allow communication at all times.¹¹⁸

World order is a human activity that maintains the foundational or basic objectives of social life among all humans. The world order is different from the international order because the international order represents the order that exists among states. However, every society is not represented by a corresponding state. Therefore, a world order is needed in such cases. Before the 19th century, it was not

¹¹⁷ Bull, pp. 16-17.

¹¹⁸ Bull, pp. 17-18.

possible to talk about a political system that covered the entire globe. Instead, numerous political systems provided order in certain regions of the world. A real global political system emerged for the first time at the beginning of the 20th century. Order on a global scale is the combination of order on a local scale provided by various political systems; this is a product of what is called a world political system. The first global political system transformed into a global system of states thanks to the enlargement of the European state system to the rest of the world and its conversion into a state system of global dimension.¹¹⁹ It is possible to achieve a world order via other versions of universal political organization. World order includes order between states, order on an internal scale that exists within specific states, and order in a larger global political system of which the state system is merely one component. For this reason, the world order is more extensive than the international order. Moreover, the world order is more essential and preliminary than the international order, because the ultimate agents of humanity's great society are individual human beings, not states or any other actors. Finally, global order takes precedence over international order ethically. If order is to be valued in world politics, it must be valued as an order between all humanity. Also, international order becomes valuable if it contributes to the goal of order in human society.¹²⁰

1.3.1. Relationship between Order and Justice

As Professor Ali Mazrui stated, the international scene carries traces of conflict between governments which try to protect order and governments which prioritize just change at the cost of order. Besides, tension shows itself between the order ensured by the system or society of states and the different demands for justice that emerge in world politics. It is possible to argue that justice, in all its manifestations, can only be realized in a condition of order. In this context, the international community, no matter how primitive, ensures a kind of order and a basis for the exercise of various rights. Also, currently, the international community with universal institutions like the United Nations (UN) and its specialized organs officially guarantees much more than the

¹¹⁹ Bull, pp. 19-20.

¹²⁰ Bull, pp. 20-21.

protection of minimum order and coexistence. For instance, it represents the aims of international/interstate justice and individual/human justice. To realize these aims, it facilitates intergovernmental cooperation in various areas. At this point, it is important to understand that the international order's framework is unwelcoming to initiatives that seek to achieve cosmopolitan or world justice. Thoughts of world or cosmopolitan justice can be fully achieved only if a world or cosmopolitan society exists. Requests for world justice intrinsically have a revolutionary nature, because requests for world justice refer to requests for the conversion of the system and society of states. Insofar as we can envision a global or cosmopolitan society that caters to both, world justice and world order may ultimately be reconcilable.¹²¹

Requests for human justice, which are very powerful elements in world politics today, are also not appropriate in the substructure of the international order. According to Professor Mazrui, human justice is a prerequisite for the international order among African and Asian states. However, from the perspective of Bull, the society of states, including African and Asian states, treat international order as prior to human justice. African and Asian states, like others, are eager to let human justice take precedence over the order in certain situations that directly affect them, but they are equally reluctant, compared to Western and Soviet Bloc states, to see the entire structure of international coexistence collapse. When certain states bring forward questions about human justice, these questions gain an outstanding place in the agenda of world politics. For instance, although penalties were given against German and Japanese leaders and soldiers for the war crimes and crimes against peace they had committed during the Second World War, there were no penalties for American, British, and Soviet leaders and soldiers who could also be guilty of neglecting their human obligations. This situation shows that the trial and penalty of war criminals by international procedure are selectively performed. In international society, issues that are not the policy of a prominent group of states are less frequently addressed and less likely to be supported by international action. The international order only offers selective protection of human rights, which is adjusted by the variabilities of international politics. Even in situations where, because of the variabilities of

¹²¹ Ali Mazrui, *Towards a Pax Africana*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1967, quoted in Hedley Bull, *Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, Palgrave Publications, New York, 2002, pp. 83-85.

international politics, international society allows action aimed at achieving human justice, this action does not directly affect specific people; rather, it is mediated by sovereign states, who undertake it to fulfil their own objectives.¹²²

When examining the stance of international society toward ideas of justice, it can be argued that while ideas of world justice may appear fundamentally incompatible with the fundamental principles of international society and ideas of human justice may be potentially challenging, ideas of interstate and international justice may strengthen the agreement of coexistence between states by incorporating a moral obligation alongside the imperatives of enlightened self-interest and the law upon which it is based. However, international order is maintained through instruments such as balance of power, war, and international law. These instruments consistently violate fundamental and widely accepted principles of international justice. In other words, institutions and mechanisms that uphold international order, even when functioning effectively, or particularly when fulfilling their roles, inherently violate the conventional concepts of justice such as human, world, and international justice. Considering these points, it is possible to argue that there is an inconsistency between the rules and institutions currently maintaining order within the society of states and the aspirations for world justice, which entail the dissolution of this society, requests for human justice, which it can only selectively and partially address, and requests for interstate and international justice, to which it is not fundamentally antagonistic, but for which it can only offer limited fulfilment.¹²³

Bull's concept of human justice requires looking into the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which is a post-Cold War development. Bull's concept of human justice may have been influential in the emergence of the R2P concept because both concepts focus on human rights and their protection (i.e. in essence the right to live). R2P refers to a political pledge aimed at stopping violence, if necessary by the use of force.¹²⁴ After international society's failure to prevent violence in the Balkans, Rwanda, and NATO's criticized military intervention in Kosovo, the liberal quarters in the international community began to discuss what

¹²² Mazrui, pp. 85-86.

¹²³ Bull, pp. 87-89.

¹²⁴ UN, "Responsibility to Protect", **Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect**, <https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.shtml>, (25.06.2024).

could be done in the event of gross and systematic violations of human rights. The establishment of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) by the Canadian government was such a response. In September 2001, the ICISS published a report underlying the responsibilities of the target state (where gross violations took (or might take) place and the international society. Those responsibilities were of three kinds: the responsibility to prevent, to react, and to rebuild.¹²⁵

Responsibility to prevent includes all possible peaceful options before attempting to intervene, including development assistance to help address the root causes of the conflict; support for domestic initiatives to improve governance, human rights and the rule of law; and good faith missions and mediation efforts to promote dialogue between the conflicting parties. The primary responsibility to prevent gross and systematic violations of human rights falls on the related sovereign state and its institutions along with its communities, and then on the international community. *Responsibility to react* comes into play when all attempts at prevention have failed to resolve or control the situation. In such cases, intrusive measures taken by other members of the community of states may be necessary. Before applying heavy coercive and intrusive measures, light ones should be considered. Coercive measures may include political, economic, and judicial measures, and military intervention as a last resort. Sanctions could be applied in the military realm, including arms embargoes or terminating military cooperation; in the economic realm, including sanctions targeting foreign assets of the country or particular leaders, restrictions on access to petroleum products, which can help restrict military operations; and in the political realm, including suspension of membership of the state from international institutions and restrictions on travel. In extreme cases where the non-intervention norm cannot be upheld, the Commission put forward six criteria to justify a military intervention. Those criteria for military intervention are just cause, right intention, last resort, proportional means, reasonable prospects, and right authority. Military intervention for humanitarian purposes can be justified under the just cause criteria, namely acts of terror, ethnic cleansing, or large-scale loss of life due to neglect, inability to act, or the

¹²⁵ ICISS, **The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty**, International Development Research Centre, Canada, 2001, pp. vii, xi.

result of deliberate state action. Finding the right intention is also important; the intervention should take place on a collective or multilateral basis and should be supported by people for the purpose of the intervention. It has to be the last resort, and all other possible diplomatic and non-military means must have been explored and exhausted. It can only be justified when the responsibility to prevent is completely fulfilled. Duration, scale and intensity of the use of force must be proportionate and minimum to achieve humanitarian objectives. Military intervention can only be justified when the act has a good possibility of preventing or averting the atrocities or suffering that triggered the intervention process. Finally, the right authority falls to the UN, with the UNSC remaining at the heart of the international law enforcement system. *Responsibility to rebuild* refers to post-conflict reconstruction through the coordinated efforts of affected states, international organisations such as the UN and non-governmental organisations to help rebuild a sustainable and stable government and society that can uphold human rights, provide opportunities for its citizens and, by doing so, prevent the possibility of another conflict.¹²⁶

In 2005, the UNGA adopted the World Summit Outcome Document and acknowledged the state sovereignty concept of the ICISS (i.e. sovereignty as responsibility). According to the document, each state has a responsibility to protect its people from gross violations of human rights, including genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. International society, through the mechanism of the UN, has the obligation to use necessary peaceful means in parallel with Chapters VI and VIII of the UN Charter to help these causes. The document included the responsibilities to prevent and to react, but not to rebuild.¹²⁷ In 2009, the concept was discussed in a new UN report resting on the document of the World Summit Outcome. It argued that the responsibility to protect consists of three pillars: *the first pillar* being the protection responsibilities of the state itself due to nature of state sovereignty and from the already existing legal obligations of state to protect its population regardless of their nationality against genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes

¹²⁶ ICISS, **The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty**, International Development Research Centre, Canada, 2001, pp. 19-49.

¹²⁷ UNGA, “2005 World Summit Outcome”, **A/RES/60/1**, 24.10.2005, https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_60_1.pdf, (25.06.2024), p. 30.

against humanity through effective and quick prevention strategies; *the second pillar* involving the international assistance and capacity-building by using the institutional strengths and comparative advantages of the UN system and through the cooperation of its members as well as regional and sub-regional arrangements to help the state apply the first pillar successfully; and timely and decisive response being *the third pillar* of the R2P and involving the collective response of UN member states under Chapter VI of the Charter (peaceful measures), under Chapter VII (coercive measures), under Chapter VIII (regional arrangements), and in extreme cases where collective work of all three pillars are denied by the state in question, a military intervention through the collective support of the UN member states. All three pillars are equipped with equal length, strength, and viability and are intended to work together in unity.¹²⁸ Since the adoption of R2P, the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) has tried to particularize the principle and protect its application in practice. At both formal and informal meetings, member states referred to the application of the principle and reconfirmed its necessity.¹²⁹

R2P is an evolving norm that includes various controversies, and states have not established a consensus on it yet. Major problems were associated with humanitarian interventions in the past, for instance, reflected in the silence of international community on Rwandan genocide (1994) or the NATO-led intervention in Kosovo, which was implemented without an authorization by the UNSC. While the emergence of R2P can be regarded as a fundamental step to overcome such problems, it could not, unfortunately, end the debate on the legitimacy of interventions. One of the main problems in implementing the R2P is the necessity of all UNSC's permanent members to refrain from using their veto power. As seen in Syria, the unresolved issues regarding the third pillar of R2P enabled some of the permanent members to veto any military action by the international community with the justification that the previous intervention in Libya, though authorized by the UNSC, had violated international law and that they could not allow the same to happen in Syria. The Arab Spring brought to

¹²⁸ UNGA, "Implementing the Responsibility to Protect", **A/63/677**, 12.01.2009, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/647126?ln=en&v=pdf>, (25.06.2024), pp. 8-28.

¹²⁹ UN, "Responsibility to Protect", **Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect**, <https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.shtml>, (25.06.2024).

the fore the old debates about the selectivity of humanitarian interventions by great powers, questioning the legitimacy of R2P-based rhetoric and action.¹³⁰

1.3.2. International Society and International Order

The concept of international society is one of the most important contributions of the English School to the discipline of IR. Even though this concept was used by nearly all English School scholars, the definition is based on the international system-international society distinction made by Hedley Bull.¹³¹ As stated before, an international system comes into being when two or more states that have constant or sufficient contact with each other, have an effect on each other's decisions, and need to consider each other's actions before making decision. States can contact each other directly if they are neighbours, partners, or competitors. They can also contact indirectly as a result of each one's relationship with another party, or simply through their solo impact on the system as a whole. The interaction between states can exist in many forms like cooperation, conflict, neutrality, or apathy.¹³² An international society, on the other hand, emerges when states accept common interests or values, consider themselves bound by a common set of rules in their relations with each other, and cooperate in the establishment and maintenance of common institutions where interstate dialogue is dominant. Respecting each other's sovereign rights, obeying agreements that were made before, and being subject to the limits in using force against each other are the essential principles in the formation and continuity of international society. It is important to emphasize that an international society assumes for its existence the prior existence of an international system; however, an international system can exist without the need for an international society.¹³³

The international society approach has a particular perspective that considers order within anarchy, where conflict and compromise can coexist. In this context, Hedley Bull draws on Martin Wight's three traditions to argue that three elements are

¹³⁰ Marella Bodur Ün and Tuğçe Kelleci, "The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in Libya and Syria: An Analysis of Competing Normative Discourses", **The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations**, Vol. 54, 2003, pp. 58-59.

¹³¹ Jorgensen, p. 193.

¹³² Bull, pp. 9-10.

¹³³ Bull, p. 13.

simultaneously present in international society: realist, liberal (revolutionary), and rationalist. While explaining the basis of international society (regional or international), Bull mentions three primary aims that all societies try to protect: limiting violence, protecting the right of property, and guaranteeing agreements.¹³⁴ Bull asserts that states, despite the differences in their domestic structures and national interests, choose to be part of the international society by their free will due to their realization that maintaining international order is in their own interest.¹³⁵

Institutions, one of the key component of international society, can be described as the totality of habits and practices that are shaped around the idea of achieving common goals. According to Bull, there are five main/primary institutions of international society that play important roles in maintaining the international order. These are diplomacy, war, international law, great powers, and balance of power.¹³⁶ Diplomacy works to maintain international order by mitigating the impact of tensions in international relations through effective communication.¹³⁷ Bull considers international law to be a body of rules that govern the interactions between states and other actors in world politics. In the international order, the primary role of international law is to define the concept of a society of sovereign states. The second role of international law is to indicate the fundamental rules of coexistence (e.g. rules concerning limitation on violence) among states and other entities within international society. The third role of international law involves facilitating adherence to the rules of international society, including the rules of coexistence and cooperation.¹³⁸

Bull defines great powers as a primary institution of international society. Great powers are powers that possess certain rights and obligations in the eyes of their own leaders and others. For instance, the international society accepted the USSR's rights and responsibilities as a great power considering its role in the UN, in arms control negotiations, and in playing a role in the settlement of political problems in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Cooperation among great powers (at least some components of it) forms one of the main pillars of the world order. The influence of great powers is unavoidable in world politics. They are more influential than other groups in

¹³⁴ Bull, pp. 39-53.

¹³⁵ Jorgensen, p. 193.

¹³⁶ Bull, p. 71.

¹³⁷ Bull, p. 165.

¹³⁸ Bull, pp. 122, 134-135.

determining situations of war, peace, security, and insecurity in the world political system. To the extent that great powers can alter their stance from confrontation to negotiation, their behaviour as such may serve the world order. Great powers cooperate to address global concerns like preventing nuclear war, to realize their specific interests like protecting political order, against potential threats to their dominant positions, and to protect their dominance within their spheres of influence. It can be argued that this cooperation would not have emerged without the special interests of great powers.¹³⁹

Great powers are entrusted with overseeing the management of international society. Great powers shape the international order by sustaining local hegemonic systems in which order is imposed from above, by cooperating to regulate the global balance of power and, on occasion, by imposing their common will on others. While doing so, the great powers (may) commit systemic injustices against the rights of smaller nations and states, e.g. the injustice faced by countries in Eastern Europe and the Caribbean because of the actions of the Soviet Union and the United States, respectively; or the unjust system of the UN that cannot be used against great powers.¹⁴⁰ Great powers attempt to legitimize their military interventions and base them as collective rather than unilateral. Sometimes, they base their interventions on ideological legitimization and use norms such as peace and security. While doing so, they demonstrate the precedence of order norms over justice norms in the positive law and practice of international society.¹⁴¹

Balance of power, as another critical primary institution in Bull's understanding, plays a role in averting the transformation of the system into a universal empire through conquest. The presence of local balances of power protects the autonomy of states in specific regions from being absorbed or dominated by a locally dominant power. The balance of power, both local and general, provides the conditions for the operation of the other institutions on which the international order is based. A contrived balance of power involves two sides where one actively works to stop the other from gaining dominance. A more complicated version appears in a three-power balance, where one side aims to prevent any of the other two from becoming dominant,

¹³⁹ Bull, pp. 98-196.

¹⁴⁰ Bull, pp. 17-89.

¹⁴¹ Bull, pp. 211-212.

not by just developing its own military capabilities, but also by aligning with whichever of the other two is weaker.¹⁴²

However, war may become a necessity when the existing balance of power is challenged by a revisionist state putting the interests of small states in jeopardy. In such a case, war plays a significant role in upholding international law, protecting the balance of power, and enacting changes that a consensus believes to be just. On the other hand, war can also destroy the rules of international law, ruin the balance of power, and prevent just changes or result in unjust changes.¹⁴³

1.3.3. Solidarism and Pluralism Perspectives of Hedley Bull

In *the Grotian Conception of International Society*, Bull describes pluralist international society as a situation where states can reach agreements only on certain minimum but very important objectives like mutual acknowledgement of sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention. Even though states may find it difficult to reach an agreement on deeper values and objectives, they still acknowledge that they are legally and morally obliged to abide by a common code of coexistence.¹⁴⁴

Bull describes solidarism as the solidarity or the possibility of solidarity among the states that make up international society concerning the enforcement of international law. For Bull, the solidarist perspective is characterized by having a clear purpose, which is to subordinate the use of force in international politics to the collective will of the society of states.¹⁴⁵ In his early writings, Bull identifies two different forms of this collective will. He called the first one a police action in which states show solidarity in their reaction to other states that breach the fundamental rules and norms of the society of states. This corresponds to the collective security concept of solidarism that affected the creators of the UN Charter. At a second and more profound level, Bull acknowledged that solidarism might entail a reconsideration of the principle of non-intervention. In this interpretation of solidarism, state leaders carry

¹⁴² Bull, pp. 100-102.

¹⁴³ Bull, p. 88.

¹⁴⁴ Nicholas J. Wheeler and Timothy Dunne, "Hedley Bull's Pluralism of the Intellect and Solidarism of the Will", **Royal Institute of International Affairs**, Vol. 72, No. 1, 1996, pp. 94-95.

¹⁴⁵ Bull, p. 230.

the responsibility of protecting human rights everywhere.¹⁴⁶ In other words, Bull's solidarist understanding assumes that conflicts of interest will persist and it attempts to restrain these conflicts by harnessing the substantial power of collectivity.¹⁴⁷ Furthermore, it upholds both the sovereign rights of states and the rights of individuals.¹⁴⁸

Bull argues that solidarist understanding gives importance to the legal status of resolutions made by the United Nations' political bodies, particularly by the General Assembly. These resolutions are considered significant evidence of growing solidarity or agreement within the international society. According to Bull, both the Grotian and solidarist doctrine of international order aims for a close cooperation between states and a strong commitment to constitutional principles of international order that they support, despite states' opposition to the world government. Bull uses the term "Grotian" here to describe the solidarist form created in opposition to the pluralist conception of international society.¹⁴⁹ The Grotian tradition highlights a middle ground between realism and idealism, whereas solidarism goes further by supporting intervention when universal norms are challenged. The vision of a states system that achieves order or harmony differs for these traditions, Grotians assume that conflicts of interests will cease to exist or be minimal and solidarists believe that conflict of interests will be concluded by the overwhelming power of collectivity.¹⁵⁰ From his perspective, both the Grotian doctrine and solidarist doctrine aims to create a more orderly world by limiting or eliminating the use of war by individual states for political purposes. In this context, military force should only be legitimately employed to serve the aims of the international community.¹⁵¹ The solidarist approach proposes a more advanced method of preserving order by aiming to make force primarily or exclusively the tool of international society as a whole. Bull argued that there was no solidarity in the developments of the 20th century. In other words, the effort to implement the solidarist approach has resulted in both the failure to establish a superior world order and the weakening or undermining of classical methods for maintaining order. For

¹⁴⁶ Wheeler and Dunne, p. 95.

¹⁴⁷ Bull, p. 236.

¹⁴⁸ Wheeler and Dunne, p. 102.

¹⁴⁹ Bull, pp. 230, 310.

¹⁵⁰ Bull, pp. 236.

¹⁵¹ Bull, pp. 143, 230.

instance, the League of Nations' unresponsiveness to Italy's invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 and the Soviet Union's invasion of Finland in 1939 not only failed to uphold the principle of collective security but also jeopardized the goal of preventing Germany from disrupting the balance of power. Even though efforts to apply a solidarist formula were a failure in the 20th century, it is possible to say that the conditions in which this formula can work might have appeared over time. This could happen when sovereign states develop the ability to build solidarity by subordinating the use of force to common aims, in cases such as protection of human rights and cosmopolitan values.¹⁵²

When Bull's preference between pluralism and solidarism is examined, it is possible to argue that in his earlier works, he supported pluralism for certain reasons. First, states do not have the necessary level of consensus on matters of justice, which is essential for the realization of solidarist objectives within the society of states. Second, Bull entrusted the great powers with the task of overseeing the management of the society of states, but he became disappointed with their failure to fulfil this responsibility. In addition, after 1945, he became increasingly worried that ideological polarization within international society could jeopardize the very order that pluralism aimed to preserve. For these reasons, he became attracted to a solidarist idea of international society that places human justice, which includes support for humanitarian interventions, international legal frameworks for human rights, and a general emphasis on global solidarity and cooperation, at the forefront of foreign policy considerations while still being mindful of the need to maintain order. In his later works, Bull argued that the concept of justice extends beyond the rights of states and nations to include the entitlements of every individual within an imagined global community. This angle shows his defence of human justice.¹⁵³

In this framework, it is important to emphasize that despite his scepticism about states' ability to serve as agents of solidarism, he became increasingly attracted to the idea that enduring order could not exist without justice. For him, an enlightened foreign policy should consistently try to find a balance between the dual objectives of justice and order.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵² Bull, pp. 231-232.

¹⁵³ Wheeler and Dunne, pp. 92-97.

¹⁵⁴ Wheeler and Dunne, pp. 100, 105.

CHAPTER TWO

ORDER AND JUSTICE UNDERSTANDINGS OF RUSSIA

Russia's order and justice understandings have come to be shaped by its historical background, geopolitical position, political ideologies and invasions by many nations. This chapter first examines Russia's geographical structure to understand the basis of Russian security concerns. Then, it analyses Russia's order and justice perspectives starting from the 18th century until the War in Ukraine (2022).

2.1. THE PRE-SOVIET PERIOD

2.1.1. A Brief History of Russia

Russia is the world's largest country in terms of land area. Located between Asia and Europe, the Russian territory has geographical diversity, including forests, lakes, rivers, frozen steppes, and mountains.¹⁵⁵ Due to its geographic location, Russia was attacked from the West by European powers, such as Sweden, Poland-Lithuania, Napoleon's France, and Nazi Germany, and from the East by various nomadic and Asian tribes, such as the Mongols, throughout history.¹⁵⁶

The reasons and motivations behind Russia's invasions have been multifaceted. First, Russia is not protected by natural barriers. This means that a significant portion of Russia's land mass, like the European and Siberian Plains, comprises mostly flat or gently undulating landscapes.¹⁵⁷ Second, at the beginning, Russia, also known as Moscow, emerged as a small village located at the heart of trade routes between the Volga River system and the rivers of the South and West.¹⁵⁸ Furthermore, the country's vast expanse is endowed with rich natural resources,

¹⁵⁵ Tim Marshall, "Russia and the Curse of the Geography", *The Atlantic*, 31.10.2015, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/russia-geography-ukraine-syria/413248/>, (04.10.2023).

¹⁵⁶ Michael G. Roskin, *Countries and Concepts: Politics, Geography and Culture*, 7th Edition, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 2004, p. 213.

¹⁵⁷ Barbara Alpern Engel and Janet Martin, *Russia in World History*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2015, p. xi.

¹⁵⁸ Geography, "Moscow", <https://geography.name/moscow/>, (05.10.2023).

including minerals, timber, and fertile land,¹⁵⁹ making it an attractive target for nations seeking economic gain. Additionally, geopolitical ambitions have driven countries to pursue territorial expansion through Russia, to access crucial waterways, such as the Black Sea and Baltic Sea, and to control strategic ports along these coastlines. Internal conflicts, periods of weak central authority, the spread of differing ideologies, and Russia's expansionist desires also contributed to the vulnerability of its borders. Due to these reasons, Russia has felt in danger and has started to follow aggressive policies for its own self-protection.

Before proceeding with this examination, it is important to note that views on order and justice are predominantly Western. This alone makes it difficult to examine Russia's order and justice understandings. Russia was a closed state against the West, and the Soviet state also imposed restrictions on the capacity of Russian specialists and their academic freedom. In other words, the Soviets' strict ideology negatively affected the development of social sciences in the country. Concerning Hedley Bull's definition that "order is a pattern of conduct which maintains the basic aims of social life", Russian understanding of this pattern focuses largely on the control and certain values of the Russian state. On the other hand, Bull's view that "justice is related to equality in the use of rights and privileges" was translated in the Russian case to achieving the status and rights that Russians believe they deserve. This perspective is rooted in a strong sense of exclusion and unequal treatment. In this context, it is possible to argue that discussions about justice in Russian discourse on international politics have primarily focused on what is just for the Russian state within the international system. Thus, Russia's understanding of international justice tends to be self-centred rather than grounded in principles of solidarity.¹⁶⁰

During the Gorbachev period, there was a significant increase in communication and collaboration between the Soviet and Western academic communities in the field of IR. This period also witnessed the emergence of a Soviet perspective on matters of order and justice that was closely aligned with "Western

¹⁵⁹ Country studies, "Natural Resources", <https://countrystudies.us/russia/59.htm#:~:text=Russia%20possesses%20rich%20reserves%20of,3>), (06.10.2023).

¹⁶⁰ S. Neil MacFarlane, "Russian Perspectives on Order and Justice", **Order and Justice in International Relations**, (Eds. Rosemary Foot, John Lewis Gaddis, Andrew Hurrell), Oxford University Press, New York, 2003, pp. 177-179.

liberal perspectives on international politics”. For instance, during this period and afterwards, Russia desired to become a part of the G-7 to protect its recognition and status. However, this increase in communication and collaboration ended with the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Due to the emergence of economic crisis, political instability, and the underdevelopment of Russian academic infrastructure, “serious Russian thinking” on order and justice has remained limited.¹⁶¹

Earlier, Russia was made up of the Kievan Rus, a combination of Slavic and Finnic tribes. The territory of the Kievan Rus was situated within the forested region of Eastern Europe and encompassed a network of rivers, including the Dnieper, Western Dvina, Lovat-Volkhov, and Volga.¹⁶² In other words, the first Russian state was at the heart of Kiev in today’s Ukraine.¹⁶³ When the Mongols invaded Kiev in the 13th century, the centre of Russian identity shifted northward into forested regions. Russia’s geographical attributes, such as being a vast country, deficiency of natural boundaries, and undeveloped infrastructure, necessitated order and hierarchy to provide control. Due to the high concern with state consolidation, Russia could not develop domestic pluralism and individual rights. In addition, recurring and significant internal crises increased Russian cultural awareness of disorder and individualist distrust. This reinforced widespread support for strengthening the state’s power at the expense of individual rights, emphasizing a strict social order. It may be claimed that these attributes prepared the basis for Russia’s leaning towards the pluralist side of the English School. In addition, the consolidation of power was reinforced by the strong connection between the state and religion, along with the veneration of the tsar, which provided religious validation for his autocratic rule. The ideological foundation for reconsolidation was Russia’s identity as the third Rome, signifying its role as the protector of Orthodox Christianity following the fall of Constantinople.¹⁶⁴

Due to Orthodox Christianity and the Mongol invasion, Russia was culturally isolated from the rest of Europe. The ideas emerging from Catholic Italy sparked the Renaissance in Western Europe, whereas Russia, due to religious sectarian differences, remained largely unaware of this intellectual movement and missed much of the

¹⁶¹ MacFarlane, pp. 178-179.

¹⁶² Gregory L. Freeze, **Russia: A History**, 2nd Edition, Oxford University Press, New York, 2002, p. 2.

¹⁶³ Roskin, p. 214.

¹⁶⁴ MacFarlane, pp. 180-181.

Enlightenment.¹⁶⁵ As Slavic nations that engaged with the West experienced the loss of their independence and, in some cases, the disintegration of their nationhood, Russia, due to its experience with the Mongol invasion, was able to develop itself more strongly, relatively free from Western influence.¹⁶⁶

In the sixteenth century, it is possible to observe the interventionist politics of the Russian state against its own people.¹⁶⁷ An illustration of this is seen during Ivan the Terrible's rule, where Russian nobles who disagreed with him were either exiled or executed by Ivan's secret police department. According to Michael Roskin, this illustration does not change the truth: most Russians like strong and cruel leaders. They favour autocracy because, in their way of thinking, if there is no strict leader in power, the system can evolve into anarchy.¹⁶⁸

2.1.2. Early Westernization Attempts

From the late seventeenth century until the mid-eighteenth century, Peter the Great reigned over the country. He made many reforms to achieve a modern and Western Russia. He tried to facilitate the Russian state's engagement with the world and, as a result, enhance its influence in the international arena by establishing a harbour city and increasing maritime activities. Due to these reforms, Russia began to gain importance in Europe's eyes.¹⁶⁹ Despite these developments, the interventionist policies of the Russian state toward society continued. Under Peter's leadership, the Russian state expanded considerably and physical isolation decreased. In addition, Russia fully joined the European state system. He made it possible for Russian embassies to be built across European capitals, with Russian ambassadors dressed in a European style. He then furnished newly acquired cities with Western techniques and imported Western goods.¹⁷⁰ Russia's previously passive process of Westernization was activated, with teachers, translators, and books of the Slavic Church supplied from Kiev to Moscow, through selective Westernization. What Peter had on his mind was

¹⁶⁵ Roskin, p. 214.

¹⁶⁶ MacFarlane, pp. 181-182.

¹⁶⁷ Freeze, p. 28.

¹⁶⁸ Roskin, pp. 215-216.

¹⁶⁹ Toğrul İsmayıl ve Uğur Tatlı, "Uluslararası İlişkilere Rusya'nın Gözüyle Bakmak", **Trakya Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi**, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2018, p. 114.

¹⁷⁰ Engel and Martin, pp. 58, 60.

an extensive industrialization that relied on an elaborate system of technological training and scientific education.¹⁷¹ Europe played a significant role in shaping that process and Russian identity since the beginning of the 18th century.¹⁷²

When Catherine the Great came to power, even though she allowed a decree on the free press, the police gained extra responsibilities, including checking the contents of published materials and the ability to restrict them.¹⁷³ Under her leadership, Westernization attempts and expansion continued. The annexation of Crimea, the North Caucasus, and many parts of Poland can be given as examples of Russian expansionism during this era.¹⁷⁴ It can be argued that with these annexations, Russia violated one of the fundamental aims of the European state system to which it belonged, namely, the preservation of individual states' external sovereignty and independence. This situation has continued throughout the history of the Russian state, reflecting its dissatisfaction with the international order, particularly its neighbourhood.

In addition, during the eighteenth century, the rights previously held by privately owned serfs diminished, resulting in a status akin to slavery.¹⁷⁵ Considering all these factors, maintaining order has become more important than providing justice in this era. During Napoleon's invasion of Russia in the nineteenth century, under the leadership of Alexander I, the Russians employed an effective military strategy, leveraging their harsh winter conditions with a retreat policy. This strategy largely worked and resulted in significant casualties for the French army. Aided by alliances against the French, Russia pursued them to Paris. The defeat of Napoleon solidified Russia's position as a dominant European power, with Tsar Alexander playing a prominent role in the Congress of Vienna. While Alexander advocated for constitutions in France and Poland at the Congress, he also defended the suppression

¹⁷¹ L. R. Lewitter, "Peter the Great, Poland, and the Westernization of Russia", **Journal of the History of Ideas**, Vol. 19, No. 4, 1958, pp. 494, 496, 506.

¹⁷² Iver B. Neumann, **Russia and the Idea of Europe: A Study in Identity and International Relations**, Routledge, New York, 1996, p. xi.

¹⁷³ "Decree on Free Press Issued", **Presidential Library**, 26.01.1973, <https://www.prlib.ru/en/history/618978>, (26.10.2023).

¹⁷⁴ Freeze, p. 130.

¹⁷⁵ Engel and Martin, p. 64.

of liberal uprisings in Spain and Southern Italy, reflecting the limitations of his liberal concerns for justice and rights.¹⁷⁶

In other words, Russia aimed to protect the international order by controlling states' behaviour in the international arena and protecting their internal structures against potential threats from below, but then, contrary to its previous policy, it appeared to be a supporter of international justice by participating in various interventions to defend the rights of oppressed minorities in other states based on its own self-interest. The early reasons behind this bizarre change in approach were due to the fear of the spread of revolutionary ideas, since the ongoing expansion of the Russian Empire into the Caucasus and later into central Asia had significantly augmented the already substantial ethnic diversity within the Empire. Thus, the simultaneous emergence of nationalist awareness among the Baltic, western Slavic, and, to some degree, Caucasian minorities caused this fear for Russia and led to the emergence of the Russification policy. However, it was modified due to Russian power-political interests in the Balkans. In 1821, Alexander I fervently advocated the involvement of the Concert of Europe's powers in the Greek War of Independence to support the cause of the Orthodox Greeks. This support was related to Russian desire to influence the southern Slavic Orthodox nations, who were under the Ottoman Empire, along with the Greeks. Russia sought to weaken the influence of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires in the Balkans by supporting the southern Slavic uprisings against them and reinforced its own.¹⁷⁷ This foreign policy, namely Pan Slavism, aimed to unite the Slavs under the Russian aegis to create a pathway to Europe and gain access to the Black Sea. Russia's religious affinity with the Balkan Slavs exposed them to Russian cultural as well as political influence.¹⁷⁸

Finally, there was a desire to protect the status quo and the balance of power. Following the Napoleonic War, at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, a system known as the Concert of Europe emerged.¹⁷⁹ Russia was included in this system, which aimed

¹⁷⁶ Engel and Martin, pp. 68, 70.

¹⁷⁷ MacFarlane, pp. 183-185.

¹⁷⁸ Cyril Bryner, "Russia and the Slavs", *Current History*, Vol. 28, No. 162, 1955, pp. 74,78.

¹⁷⁹ Erol Kurubaş, "Dünya Politikasının Dönüşümü ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Çağı", *Uluslararası İlişkilere Giriş: Tarih, Teori, Kavram ve Konular*, (Eds. Şaban Kardaş and Ali Balcı), Küre Yayınları, İstanbul, 2014, p. 24.

to preserve the territorial and political order in the continent.¹⁸⁰ In the same year, Alexander I established the Holy Alliance with the monarchist great powers of Austria, and Prussia, guided by the principles of Christianity like justice and peace, to protect and maintain the European order created in Vienna.¹⁸¹

With Napoleon's defeat and entry to Paris, the Russian nobility, who had been affected by liberal French ideas, witnessed the prosperity of people living in the absence of absolute authority.¹⁸² In addition, Russian intellectuals realized that Russia had fallen behind Europe because of outdated technologies. These intellectuals tried to restrain the autocratic powers of the tsar through a constitutional monarchy. Most of them advocated domestic reform modelled on Western politics and institutions.¹⁸³ Accordingly, the Decembrist Uprising, a rebellion against internal order, emerged in 1825. Due to emerging domestic unrest, including this uprising and the rebellion of Polish nationalists seeking independence from Russia, the Russian state maintained its focus on maintaining domestic order and paid limited attention to the demands for justice.¹⁸⁴

Throughout the nineteenth century, in addition to its victory over Napoleon, Russia has succeeded in controlling regions such as the Caucasus, Finland, and Central Asia. The autocratic and expansionist behaviour of Russia drew criticism from Western European powers, and after the Crimean War of 1853-1856, Russia's effective role in Europe was reduced.¹⁸⁵ Following the defeat in Crimea, Russia's dominance as the primary land power in Europe ended, necessitating essential reforms.¹⁸⁶ In addition, Russia understood that the European direction was closed and began expanding toward Central Asia and the Far East.¹⁸⁷ At this point, it can be argued that Russia had tried to protect its power position within the European order and sought to be recognized as an equal member of the emerging European international society, along with other dominant European powers. When viewed from this perspective, the

¹⁸⁰The Editors of Encyclopedia, "Concert of Europe", **Britannica**, <https://www.britannica.com/event/Concert-of-Europe>, (18.11.2023).

¹⁸¹ Fahir Armaoğlu, **19.Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi**, 6. Baskı, Alkım Yayınları, İstanbul, 2010, p. 163.

¹⁸² Engel and Martin, p. 70.

¹⁸³ Roskin, p. 218.

¹⁸⁴ MacFarlane, p. 184.

¹⁸⁵ İsmayıl ve Tath, pp. 114-115.

¹⁸⁶ Engel and Martin, p. 74.

¹⁸⁷ İsmayıl ve Tatlı, p. 115.

Crimean War was a means for the Russian state to assert its claim to equality. Reasons such as the Crimean defeat, a decrease in Russia's international reputation, and Russia's inability to compete with capitalist countries pushed Alexander II to emancipate the serfs and open the gates to further reforms. His Edict of Emancipation was limited because it benefited noble masters more than peasant serfs.¹⁸⁸ In addition, economic slavery continued for most of the serfs. In addition to the emancipation of serfs, he established local self-government bodies known as Zemstvos, including district and provincial assemblies.¹⁸⁹ However, despite calls for the creation of a representative, elected body with influence in government matters, the tsar declined such appeals. Autocracy continued, and the ruler's authority remained absolute.¹⁹⁰

2.2. THE SOVIET PERIOD

2.2.1. Russian Expansionism and the Birth of the Soviets

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Marxist thought began to influence Russian politics. Legal Marxists in Russia believed that given the country's underdevelopment, capitalism had to be adopted to achieve socialism. Vladimir Lenin, who believed that peasants could be revolutionary, theoretically changed Marxism to conform to Russian conditions.¹⁹¹ Also, for Lenin, the triumph of a socialist revolution in Russia would trigger revolts among workers across Europe and, eventually, globally. This would pave the way for the ascendancy of proletarian internationalism, rooted in Marx's idea of solidarity among workers, to replace middle-class nationalism (bourgeois) and eliminate the need for war.¹⁹² These Marxist-Leninist ideas, emphasizing the prospect of global workers' revolution and cooperation, align closely with the concept of world society. In essence, these ideas prioritize the concept of world justice.

Furthermore, it can be argued that Lenin gave importance to international justice, considering his support for the right to self-determination. In his view, if

¹⁸⁸ Engel and Martin, pp. 75, 77.

¹⁸⁹ Roskin, p. 218.

¹⁹⁰ Engel and Martin, p. 78.

¹⁹¹ Roskin, pp. 217-218.

¹⁹² Engel and Martin, p. 97.

nations' right to self-determination were acknowledged, they could actively participate in the global socialist revolution against imperialism.¹⁹³ Essentially, Lenin proposed that national self-determination would serve as a means to achieve the broader universal goal of the global proletarian revolution. This universalist dedication presented an important justice-centred challenge to the international order. For him, expanding the oppressed peoples' right to self-determination would weaken the influence of minority nationalism, and supporting this right in Europe would pave the way for a socialist revolution by undermining the conservative multinational empires of central Europe. In addition, the birth of smaller and consequently less powerful states in Eastern Europe would serve as a protective barrier between Russia and the longstanding challenges in central and Western Europe.¹⁹⁴

By the turn of the twentieth century, Russia began adopting a more expansionist and aggressive approach to Asia, which eventually led to a war against Japan in 1904-1905.¹⁹⁵ In spite of, or possibly because of, Russia's defeat in the war, the desire for a revived great power status and involvement in *Weltpolitik* persisted without faltering.¹⁹⁶ Defeats against Japan and growing demands from workers for improved working conditions and constitutional changes resulted in the widespread revolts known as the 1905 Revolution. Thereafter, Nicholas II declared the October Manifesto in 1905, promising civil and political liberties and an elected representative body. Nevertheless, this development did not satisfy socialists and radical workers who aimed to overthrow the monarchy, and they played a significant role in the revolutions of 1917.¹⁹⁷ One such event, the February Revolution, led to the downfall of the tsarist regime, resulting in the establishment of a state with liberal and reformist characteristics. Additionally, the Soviets emerged, backed by popular forces dedicated to democracy.¹⁹⁸ After the October Revolution, as the leader of the Bolshevik Party, Lenin initiated the establishment of the world's first socialist society.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹³ V. I. Lenin, **Seçme Yazılar: Devrim, Demokrasi, Sosyalizm**, Çev. Sungur Savran, Yordam Yayınları, İstanbul, 2009, p. 197.

¹⁹⁴ MacFarlane, pp. 185-186.

¹⁹⁵ Freeze, p. 212.

¹⁹⁶ Freeze, p. 221.

¹⁹⁷ Engel and Martin, pp. 89-92.

¹⁹⁸ Freeze, p. 238.

¹⁹⁹ Engel and Martin, p. 92.

Concerned about Russia's security and to protect internal order, Lenin established the Cheka, a clandestine police force aimed at eliminating threats to the revolution. Endowed with nearly limitless authority to arrest and execute those deemed counterrevolutionaries, the Cheka evolved into a law by itself. Furthermore, opposing the First World War from the beginning, Lenin withdrew Russia from the war. However, in 1918, the country had to accept the Brest-Litovsk Treaty with Germany, resulting in the loss of the western regions of the previous empire and some of Transcaucasia.²⁰⁰ Also, the emerging civil war in Russia and the intervention of its former wartime allies, namely, the Entente, contributed to Russia's security concerns. During the civil war, former allies supported White Leaders rather than the Red Army, signalling their opposition to communism. The initial stages of Soviet foreign policy were the combination of a significant conflict between the universalist revolutionary drive of communism and a more specific, statist, and conservative desire for power, aimed at ensuring the survival of both the state and its leadership.²⁰¹

In 1919, Comintern (Communist International) was established to supervise labour movements worldwide. As of early 1921, the regime had defeated its enemies and entered into treaties with the neighbouring nations. Although Lenin desired to regain the lost territories, he accepted the current status quo, at least for now. He felt the need to consolidate internal order and rebuild the destroyed economy.²⁰² Between 1921 and 1939, a peaceful coexistence policy was pursued vis-à-vis Western capitalist states. The Bolsheviks understood that their world revolution theory could no longer be conducted in the face of challenging international and domestic conditions.²⁰³ This led to the idea of a world revolution being pushed back to the background until the Second World War. During this period, Stalin dealt with the construction of socialism and defended his country against external intervention. In addition, he pursued a policy of neutrality and non-aggression because of the country's need for money, capital, trade, and diplomatic recognition.²⁰⁴ Stalin transformed the USSR into an industrial power in an attempt to modernize it. However, because of his politics, which included

²⁰⁰ Engel and Martin, pp. 99, 100. Cheka refers to the Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter-Revolution and Sabotage.

²⁰¹ MacFarlane, p. 186.

²⁰² Freeze, pp. 254-272.

²⁰³ Andrei P. Tsygankov, **Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin**, 1st Edition, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2012, p. 155.

²⁰⁴ Oral Sander, **Siyasi Tarih (1918-1994)**, 14. Baskı, İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, Ankara, 2005, p. 40.

forced collectivization and the Great Purge, millions of people died. In 1936, concerns about adversaries and isolation from the external world increased.²⁰⁵

Because of the emerging threats from Germany and Japan, the USSR reinforced the balance of power strategy in its European diplomacy by participating in the League of Nations (LoN) in 1934. It actively supported the principles of collective security, seeking to fortify Western democracies against the increasing threat posed by Hitler.²⁰⁶ Members of LoN desired the USSR's membership in the League, considering the predominant role played by all permanent members of the Council. For them, a "democratic Russian republic" was perceived as both a friend or ally and a Great Power.²⁰⁷ From the viewpoint of the Soviet political class, membership in the LoN meant gaining equal standing with prominent bourgeois nations that had previously withheld their recognition. However, the USSR was uncomfortable with the LoN's unresponsiveness to the invasions of Germany and Italy.²⁰⁸ Despite the USSR's participation in the LoN, disarmament conferences, and agreements with Western countries against emerging threats, collaboration for the USSR remained strategic, transient, and prone to abrupt reversal under evolving conditions.²⁰⁹ An example of this was the abandonment of the idea of containing Germany and the signing of a non-aggression treaty with its primary enemy.²¹⁰ The expulsion of the USSR from the LoN in 1939 due to its invasion of Finland could be another example.²¹¹

2.2.2. The Second World War and Soviet Perspectives

The Second World War completely changed the world order. Initially, the USSR pursued a policy of reclaiming the lost territories of the former Russian Empire.²¹² After the German invasion, the USSR joined the Allied Powers, and with

²⁰⁵ Engel and Martin, pp. 104, 106.

²⁰⁶ Vojtech Mastny, **Russia's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 1941-1945**, 1st Edition, Columbia University Press, New York, 1979, pp. 19-24.

²⁰⁷ Donald I. Buzinkai, "The Bolsheviks, The League of Nations and the Paris Peace Conference, 1919", **Soviet Studies**, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1967, p. 260.

²⁰⁸ Tsygankov, pp. 98, 100.

²⁰⁹ Presidential Library, "USSR Joins the League of Nations", <https://www.prlib.ru/en/history/619549>, (25.12.2023).

²¹⁰ Mastny, p. 24.

²¹¹ Editors of History.com, "USSR Expelled From the League of Nations", **History**, 05.11.2009, <https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/ussr-expelled-from-the-league-of-nations>, (27.12.2023).

²¹² İsmayıl ve Tatlı, p. 115.

the defeat of Germany, it achieved superpower status, reaching the pinnacle of its international standing, accompanied by unprecedented territorial expansion.²¹³ In addition, the requirements of the war against Germany somewhat mitigated the USSR's isolation, as a considerable number of Westerners were sent to the USSR, and the Red Army advanced into central Europe.²¹⁴ After the war, the USSR prioritized rebuilding the economy and applying more stringent domestic political regulations. In this context, a new economic plan was adopted, and more than one million indigenous people were deported to Kazakhstan and Siberia on charges of collaboration with the Nazis. Another priority was to restore discipline and centralized authority within the international communist movement through a campaign of terror and purges against nationalism, territorial expansion and Cominform.²¹⁵

During this period, the Soviet understanding of the international order was based on a bipolar balance of power framework. In the beginning, the concept of order was considered dependent on having and using enough force to control the buffer zone and to deter Western efforts to contest Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. As the situation stabilized in both Eastern and Western Europe and a nuclear balance emerged, the USSR began to consider collaborative approaches for managing the region. This involved pursuing legal recognition of the division of Europe and legitimizing the territorial status quo. From 1945 to 1950, Soviet diplomacy focused more on safeguarding the state's security by extensively suppressing the states and societies within the USSR's influence. This strategy aimed to create a buffer against its enemies in Western Europe. Throughout history, Russia has considered the foundation of regional order to depend on the uniformity of the internal structures of states. This understanding lasted even after Stalin's death and could be seen in the Soviet suppression of liberalization in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Moreover, Soviet involvement in the internal affairs of Eastern European nations was justified by the Brezhnev Doctrine. Although the primary area of application of the

²¹³ Engel and Martin, p. 110.

²¹⁴ MacFarlane, p. 188.

²¹⁵ Freeze, pp. 336–343. Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) tried to protect the USSR's authority in Eastern Europe.

Brezhnev doctrine was Eastern European countries, it was also extended to Afghanistan.²¹⁶

In 1945, the USSR became a founding member of the UN, which was established with a view to international cooperation, peace, and security.²¹⁷ The Soviet understanding of the UN demonstrated a limited commitment to international justice concerns, placing greater emphasis on preserving its sovereign rights and the privileges associated with being a great power. Additionally, Soviet interest in joining the UN seemed more focused on seeking recognition as a major power and having a platform to express opposition to the West during the Cold War. It was not primarily motivated by the desire to create an effective multilateral framework for international security management. The USSR believed that UN membership, particularly through the power of veto, would serve as a deterrent against the organization being used for purposes contrary to Soviet interests. Some of those interests were to reinforce the norm of sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention, particularly within the circle of great powers, and to formalize the USSR's standing within this group.²¹⁸

During the first 45 years of the UN, the USSR expressed significant doubt about the multilateralization of international security issues in the UN Security Council (UNSC). Furthermore, there was dissatisfaction with the UN's role in managing internal conflicts and expanding the autonomy of the secretary-general in global politics. During the same period, the newly independent Third World and nonaligned states joined the UN. With this development, the shift in the UN General Assembly's (UNGA) balance tilted towards a potential anti-Western direction, and the USSR considered it as an opportunity to pursue the bipolar struggle in a different manner. Moreover, in the 1960s and 1970s, the USSR vigorously promoted the initiatives of national liberation movements, advocating for their voices to be heard at the UN and seeking their recognition as the sole legitimate representatives of their respective peoples. In this context, although Soviet support for national independence movements seemed to be motivated by a concern for international justice, it was actually more related to power-political interests. To put it another way, these power-political

²¹⁶ MacFarlane, pp. 188-189. According to the Brezhnev Doctrine, no communist party could abandon its socialist principles.

²¹⁷ United Nations, "Milestones in UN History", <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/history-of-the-un/1941-1950>, (13.01.2024).

²¹⁸ MacFarlane, pp. 190-191.

interests, such as undermining Western (especially American) influence in the Third World, gaining the backing of non-aligned movements in global bipolar competition, and countering the expansion of Chinese influence in Afro-Asian states, were central to Soviet approaches to decolonization and overshadowed any normative commitment to principles of justice. In addition, the Soviet understanding of self-determination was selective and emphasized territorial considerations rather than the identities of people.²¹⁹

2.2.3. The Cold War

In the Cold War era, characterized by significant events like the Cuban missile crisis, Soviet leaders aimed to create shared understandings and frameworks that would minimize the potential for direct confrontations with the US. Treaties from the 1960s onwards regarding nuclear testing, the establishment of a hotline, and the prevention of nuclear proliferation decreased the potential negative consequences of bipolarity while maintaining the dominant position of the two superpowers in the international system.²²⁰ Soviet leaders saw the détente period, in which the limitation of the use of nuclear weapons was the most important feature, in transformative terms. For them, it was a means to engage in global competition between socialism and capitalism. They aimed to reduce the risks associated with competitive behaviour, assert the USSR's equality with the United States of America (USA), and gain benefits through cooperation in mutually advantageous areas.²²¹ Another aim was to obstruct developments that were seen as potential threats to the USSR, including the improvement in relations between China and the US.²²²

In the early and mid-1970s, the USSR promoted a movement towards a new international economic order within the UN. However, the USSR refused the idea that it should bear a share of redistributive responsibility. According to the USSR,

²¹⁹ MacFarlane, pp. 191-192.

²²⁰ George W. Breslauer, **The Rise and Demise of World Communism**, 1st Edition, Oxford University Press, New York, 2021, pp. 208-211.

²²¹ John Van Oudenaren, **Understanding Soviet Foreign Policy; The Tradition of Change in Soviet Foreign Policy**, 7th Edition, McNair Papers, Washington, 1990, pp. 7-8.

²²² Robert Sutter, "How the United States Influences Russia-China Relations", **The National Bureau of Asian Research**, 2018, p. 2.

imperialist powers were responsible for underdevelopment and therefore had the obligation to fix it.²²³

Soviet Cold War diplomacy displayed reluctance to recognize human rights as a legitimate international concern, especially civil and political rights. This opposition was clear in the preparation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). When the Declaration was presented to the UNGA in 1948, the Soviet delegation criticized it for overlooking the sovereign rights of democratic governments and emphasized the importance of national sovereignty. Following the adoption of the UDHR, the USSR applied a protracted defensive strategy, obstructing the creation of subsequent covenants to implement the Declaration's goals.²²⁴

In addition, the Soviet reluctance to recognize human rights was evident in the 1975 Helsinki Agreements. The USSR's main purpose in attending these meetings was to gain approval for Europe's existing territorial status quo following the Second World War. However, the USSR faced significant pressure from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and neutral states to incorporate provisions related to individual human rights and the freedom of movement of people and information within the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) space. The USSR opposed these provisions and reluctantly agreed to Basket III because of their belief that the language was too vague to protect their interests. In this context, it is important to understand the reasons for Soviet opposition to the internationalization of human rights. The USSR did not want foreign interference in human rights issues within its own and allied states. In addition, the liberal understanding of political and civil rights enshrined in the Declaration and the Covenants was contrary to Soviet understanding of internal order. For the USSR, useful tools in power-political competition were important. For instance, if justice concerns have no impact on power-political competition, they can be ignored. They were opposed if they threatened Soviet sovereignty or Soviet internal arrangements.²²⁵

²²³ MacFarlane, p. 193.

²²⁴ Eric D. Weitz, "The Soviet Union and the Creation of the International Human Rights System", *Zeitgeschichte*, 07.12.2018, <https://zeitgeschichte-online.de/themen/soviet-union-and-creation-international-human-rights-system>, (25.12.2023).

²²⁵ Raymond L. Garthoff, **Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations From Nixon to Reagan**, Brookings, Washington, 1985, p. 475.

2.3. THE GORBACHEV PERIOD

2.3.1. Soviet Understandings of Order and Justice

When the new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev came to power, he introduced *perestroika* (reconstruction and reform), *glasnost* (publicity and openness), and *demokratizatsiya* (democratization) to renew the socialist system and enhance its efficiency. These reforms had significant consequences for citizens' rights because they led to the emergence of a Soviet viewpoint on matters of order and justice. For instance, in his speeches, Gorbachev emphasized that political stability cannot be achieved without social justice and that every citizen should be given equal opportunities.²²⁶ Russian representatives highlighted the increasing significance of global problems like disarmament, environmental deterioration, and underdevelopment. They supported the de-ideologization of international relations, urging collaborative efforts to address these problems based on shared interests that transcend the divisions of global politics. It can be argued that Gorbachev's and his colleagues' emphasis on shared problems and common interests reflects Bull's concept of solidarist international society.²²⁷

Due to the threat of nuclear war, the concept of security began to be seen as a mutually created good, and the Gorbachev administration adopted a posture of defensive security with a view to trust-building with the West, which eventually led to a series of arms-control agreements from December 1987 onward. In addition, Soviet understanding of the UN changed with conscious attempts to resolve conflicts in the Third World. The UN started to be considered as a useful instrument for the collaborative management of international security. Permanent members exercised consultation and joint action to address the ongoing conflicts in Angola, Namibia, Cambodia, and Central America. Despite the historical ties between the USSR and Iraq, when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the USSR supported a series of resolutions that called for collective action against aggression.²²⁸

²²⁶ Freeze, pp. 384, 390.

²²⁷ Alexander Gorin and Piotr Mishchenko, "New Political Thinking as a Philosophy and a Tool of Soviet Foreign Policy", *Journal of Legislation*, Vol. 17, No. 13, 1990, pp. 15-17.

²²⁸ MacFarlane, pp. 195-196.

Gorbachev recognized the economic burden of defence costs and realized that the USSR could not compete in an arms race with the US. His new understanding of security led Gorbachev to support the promotion of security by respecting national sovereignty and non-intervention, including within the communist world.²²⁹ In addition, the USSR admitted that certain rights were unquestionable and that states had international responsibilities concerning the treatment of their citizens with respect to international treaties. It defended the establishment of international mechanisms to both monitor and prevent human rights violations. Moreover, the USSR's efforts to improve human rights can be seen in its internal order with some developments concerning freedom of speech and the press.²³⁰ On this point, it should be noted that the USSR played an important role in the emergence of the humanitarian dimension of the CSCE/OSCE in 1990-1. It was sparked by the USSR's former rejection of the proposal for a multilateral European security conference in 1954 and re-emerged through its active diplomacy.²³¹ These developments demonstrate that the Gorbachev administration gave importance to international justice.

The considerable influence of Western liberal solidarism in the USSR, particularly in the realms of development, human rights, and security, triggered an unsuccessful coup d'état in August 1991. The unsuccessful coup attempt, the loss of credibility between the party and the Soviet state, and the significant transfer of power from the central government to the republican institutions quickly led to the dissolution of the USSR into its 15 constituent republics.²³² With the dissolution of the USSR, Russia returned to its seventeenth-century borders, and a new set of buffer states separated it from Europe.

²²⁹ Freeze, p. 404.

²³⁰ John Quigley, "The Soviet Union as a State under the Rule of Law: An Overview", **Cornell International Law Journal**, Vol. 23, No. 2, 1990, pp. 218-219.

²³¹ Martin Russell, "The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE): A Pillar of the European Security Order", **European Parliament**, September 2021, [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/696190/EPRS_BRI\(2021\)696190_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/696190/EPRS_BRI(2021)696190_EN.pdf), (04.11.2023), p. 2.

²³² Breslauer, pp. 243-244.

2.3.2. Russian Understandings of Order and Justice after the Collapse of the Soviets

In the early 1990s, the former Soviet republics located along Russia's southern border experienced significant instability and were frequently dragged into civil war. Furthermore, there was a threat to the central authority all over the country due to "the self-assertion of subjects within the Russian Federation" and the ensuing "war of laws" between the central authority and the regions concerning the primacy of "legislation in areas that, constitutionally, lay in federal jurisdiction". In the first two years after the collapse, Russian foreign policy experienced a notable conflict between the remaining influences of liberal internationalism from the Gorbachev era, a resurgence of radical nationalism, and the emergence of pragmatic realism. In time, the latter became dominant. In this context, there was a widely shared belief in both academic and policy-making circles that Russia could not be a part of the West. This perspective was based on geographical and cultural factors because Russia was at the crossroads of European and Asian civilizations and drew its identity from both. In addition, Russia's interests were separate from and were at times in conflict with those of the West, particularly the USA.²³³

After the collapse of the USSR, Russian discourse changed and returned to a statist perspective. The Russian state focused on both the state and the distribution of power. Due to the unipolar and hegemonic distribution of power in the 1990s, Russia's view of the contemporary international order was largely unhappy. Russia has also been notably displeased with NATO operations conducted outside its specified areas. The US attempt to expand NATO was considered a one-sided move aimed at exploiting the vulnerabilities of other nations to solidify the US hegemonic position in European and international systems. For example, securing Russian adherence and collaboration in the IFOR/SFOR operation in Bosnia created significant difficulties. In addition, NATO's intervention in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999, without a mandate, was met with anger because it was seen as a breach of international law.²³⁴

²³³ MacFarlane, p. 198.

²³⁴ MacFarlane, p. 199.

Russian dissatisfaction with the distribution of power has caused strong support for multipolarity and an ongoing exploration of alternative arrangements that could offer a means of balancing the USA's dominance. Due to economic and security concerns, Russia actively worked to maintain and enhance ties by forming arms transfer agreements with Iran, India, and China. Also, it signed a friendship and cooperation treaty with China. In addition, an agreement was reached on a regional cooperation organization that brought China and Russia together with the four Central Asian republics in 2001.²³⁵ Another source of dissatisfaction for Russia was NATO's enlargement to include countries in the former Eastern Bloc. Russia considered post-Soviet regions to be its special area of interest. As neighbouring countries joined NATO, Russia found itself marginalized and isolated. NATO's enlargement in not only South-Eastern Europe but also Central and Northern Europe increased Russia's security concerns.²³⁶ Russia could not allow NATO to play a primary role in the management of regional conflicts. This would have limited Russia's capacity to constrain the NATO community while the Western alliance continued its efforts to restructure European security. In addition, Russia wanted to be considered a key player in European security. For example, Russian involvement in the Bosnian and Kosovo operations, despite its strong opposition to NATO's intervention, demonstrated its strong desire to maintain its status as the first among equals in Europe. Developments such as negotiations over the command chain of NATO in Bosnia, the unilateral occupation of the Pristina airport in 1999, and the campaign to gain a distinct zone of occupation in Kosovo alongside the British, German, and American zones all indicate a focus on prestige. Russia's pursuit of status can also be seen in the following events. The Russian position on national missile defence and the ABM Treaty in 2000-1 and its emphasis on the Security Council as the primary decision-making body for international security issues indicated Russia's willingness to maintain the positions gained throughout the Cold War. The Russian request to join the then G-7 indicates a desire for recognition as an equal member within the institutions of contemporary international society. In short, Russia's interests and, more importantly, its justice-based requests (i.e. "claim for equality and equal treatment") can be clearly seen in its

²³⁵ MacFarlane, p. 199.

²³⁶ Freeze, pp. 420, 438.

expressions and diplomacy regarding European security and international institutions such as the UN, the G-7, and NATO.²³⁷

The Russian rights-based reasoning can be seen in Russian thinking on the sub-regional order within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Throughout most of the post-Soviet period, Russia's vision for a sub-regional order leaned toward a hegemonic model. As a major sovereign power in the international system, Russia developed a rights-based rhetoric to justify its violation of the sovereignty of less powerful states in its neighbourhood. Accordingly, Russian authorities, official documents on foreign policy, and non-governmental elites have consistently emphasized Russia's special rights and duties in the former Soviet states.²³⁸

The actions taken by the government of Vladimir Putin, such as the suppression of political opposition, curtailing civil liberties, and silencing the independent media, violated the internationally acknowledged norms of democracy and human rights.²³⁹ This reflected the priority given to order over rights by Putin within the country. Due to the internal consolidation process, Russia has resisted accepting international norms that could limit its ability to manage its internal affairs. This resistance was noticeable in Russia's stance during the Putin administration's renewed campaign against Chechnya in 1999. Russian military actions in 1999 and 2000 seemed to deviate from the state obligations outlined in international humanitarian law, particularly Protocol II supplementary to the Geneva Convention of 1949. Furthermore, Russian official behaviour was inconsistent with the political obligations outlined in the Human Dimension of the OSCE.²⁴⁰ During the Chechen War, Western Europe condemned human rights violations committed by the Russian forces. They even temporarily revoked Russia's voting rights in the Council of Europe for a short period. Putin defined the Chechen resistance as acts of terrorism and used them as a pretext to launch a comprehensive assault on Chechnya to definitively restore Russian control.²⁴¹ In addition, the Russian government defied external criticisms on this subject and argued

²³⁷ MacFarlane, p. 200. ABM refers to anti-ballistic missile.

²³⁸ Evgeny Vinokurov, "Russian Approaches to Integration in the Post-Soviet Space in the 2000s", **The CIS, the EU and Russia: The Challenges of Integration**, (Eds. Katlijn Malfliet, Lien Verpoest and Evgeny Vinokurov), 1st edition, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007, pp. 23-28.

²³⁹ Stephen P. Hoffmann, "Huntington, World Order, and Russia", **Christian Scholar's Review**, Vol. 48, No. 3, 2019, p. 300.

²⁴⁰ MacFarlane, pp. 201-202.

²⁴¹ Freeze, pp. 440, 447.

that the Chechnya situation was an internal affair. Although Russia, acknowledging the potential political repercussions of disregarding Western opinions on the matter, initiated legal proceedings against the Russian military personnel, it considered the matter a domestic legal issue.²⁴²

Given Russia's historical concerns about sovereignty and non-intervention, particularly when directed at Russia, the consistent rejection of the idea of an evolving international norm for humanitarian intervention becomes understandable. Russian stances in the Security Council on this issue since 1991 have involved deliberate and consistent attempts to prevent individual cases from establishing cumulative impact as precedents. Russia explicitly agreed with China and most non-aligned movements, asserting that there was no right or obligation for humanitarian or broader rights-based intervention. They criticized the concept, considering it a threat to the formation of a fair and rational international order.²⁴³

In addition to the threat to sovereignty posed by the concept of humanitarian intervention, Russia believes that the rights embedded in the concept are Western-centric rather than reflecting a universal understanding. For Russia, expressing the right to humanitarian intervention is a means of justifying the pursuit of political objectives, often to the detriment of other states. Russian discourse emphasizes the absence of effective criteria for managing humanitarian intervention, highlighting its arbitrary application in practice. It should also be noted that while Russians acknowledge the potential use of force during a severe humanitarian crisis, they insist that the legitimate authority to allow such force lies with the Security Council. They have rejected Western, and particularly British, arguments that general international law could justify actions outside the Council's framework in case the Council failed to act.²⁴⁴

²⁴² MacFarlane, p. 202.

²⁴³ MacFarlane, p. 202.

²⁴⁴ MacFarlane, p. 203.

2.4. THE PUTIN PERIOD

2.4.1. From September 11, 2001 to the Arab Spring

Putin's multipolarity strategy, which aimed to limit American global hegemony, continued with some modifications after the September 11 attacks.²⁴⁵ Russia accepted the deployment of significant U.S. and allied forces in a region where it had previously opposed external military involvement. In addition, President Putin actively supported the West's fight against terrorism, emphasizing that it represented a collective effort of civilized nations against evil forces. For these reasons, Russia emerged as a key player in a global initiative (i.e. war against terrorism) led by the West.²⁴⁶ September 11 played a crucial role in bringing the US and Russia closer to cooperate on counter-terrorism. This reflects the common interest of international society in maintaining the international order.

In this context, it can be argued that the American anti-terrorist agenda was coherent with the Russian perception of the national interest. By cooperating with American-led efforts in Afghanistan, Russia sought to eliminate radical Islamism within its borders and Central Asia. At the same time, Russia wanted to protect its internal order from the possibility that this threat could spread among its Muslim societies. Furthermore, Russia used the US interest in this collaboration as an opportunity to rebalance its relationship with NATO. At the same time, by establishing a strong linkage between the Chechen resistance and al-Qaeda, Russia succeeded in gaining Western support for its campaign in Chechnya. For instance, criticism of Russia's actions in Chechnya substantially decreased as key leaders accepted the war as a fight against terrorism. The change in American and British stances implied a growing Western willingness to tolerate, if not endorse, Russian departure from the presumed consensus on rights-based principles that attenuate sovereignty. Despite increased pressure on neighbours like Georgia linked to the Chechnya campaign and

²⁴⁵ Freeze, p. 448.

²⁴⁶ Roland Dannreuther, "Russia and the Middle East: A Cold War Paradigm?", **Europe-Asia Studies**, Vol. 64, No. 3, 2012, p. 547.

broader Russian strategic goals in the southern Caucasus, Western criticism turned out to be limited.²⁴⁷

However, the rapprochement between Russia and the USA was short-lived, and some important developments led them to part ways, such as the US support for NATO enlargement into the post-Soviet space; the US military intervention in Iraq in 2003; and the future status of the US military's deployment in Central Asia. In addition, divergent opinions on the future of independent media and the human rights implications of Russia's conduct in the Chechen war resurfaced in 2002.²⁴⁸ These developments increased Russian security concerns and attempts to protect its position in international order.

Turning back to terrorism, it can be claimed that the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) by Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan was related to the protection of regional security. The SCO aims to fight terrorism, solve economic issues, and provide military cooperation and mutual confidence-building measures. At that point, attendance at the SCO reflects that Russia gave importance to the regional order and its desire to increase its influence in the international order.²⁴⁹ In addition, Russia's security concerns continued. For Russia, the Western-backed 'colour revolutions' that carried out democracy claims in late 2003 in Georgia, Ukraine in 2004, and Kyrgyzstan in 2005 were a threat. In 2006, to prevent the long-term success of these revolutions, Russia introduced the concept of sovereign democracy, which was read as a message to supporters of democracy within Russia and to the Western world. With this concept, Russia argued that the West cannot interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign states and transform them by using concepts like democracy, freedom, and human rights. Russia's anti-Western position was notably demonstrated through its military intervention in Georgia in August 2008. Following this intervention, Russia formally acknowledged the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia despite the presence and opposition of the United States, Western nations, and related institutions like

²⁴⁷ MacFarlane, pp. 204-205.

²⁴⁸ Tracey German, "From Cooperation to Confrontation: US-Russia Relations Since 9/11", **International Politics**, 2023, pp. 9, 13-14.

²⁴⁹ Pami Aalto, "Russia's Quest for International Society and the Prospects for Regional-Level International Societies", **International Relations**, Vol. 21 No. 4, 2007, p. 464.

NATO and the European Union (EU), which were aligned with Georgia.²⁵⁰ Interestingly, Russia justified its military intervention in Georgia in 2008 by referring to the concept of R2P, minority self-determination arguments, and the protection of civilians in conflict. Thus, even though Russia seemed to be a supporter of international order and non-intervention by its statements against western interference and western vision of justice, its interventionist rhetoric in Georgia was contradictory.²⁵¹ Actually, Russia's military intervention in Georgia seemed to reflect the Russian desire to create spheres of influence in its near abroad, and regain its great power status and prestige.²⁵²

In the 5961th UNSC meeting, which was held on August 8, 2008, Russia invited all UNSC members to stop the violence in Georgia, which, it argued, had created regional and international instabilities. Russia was concerned about international order because of the serious escalation in the situation.²⁵³ It should be noted that Russia's passportization policy (granting citizenship to the residents in contested territories of third country) began in 2002. This situation formed the basis for Russia's justification for its invasion by asserting its duty to protect Russian citizens in South Ossetia.²⁵⁴ However, Russia's initial statements on the protection of Russian speakers mostly included Russia's responsibility as a state to protect its citizens instead of people subjected to repression. In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs interpreted the invasion as self-defence in the context of Article 51 of the UN Charter.²⁵⁵

When examining Russia's membership in the BRICS, this membership gave Russia more influence in the international community and helped legitimize its

²⁵⁰ Güner Özkan, "Yakın Çevreden Uzak Çevreye: Rusya'nın Büyük Güç Politikasında Suriye'nin Önemi", **Kapadokya Akademik Bakış**, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2020, p. 48.

²⁵¹ Neil MacFarlane and Natalie Sabanadze, "Sovereignty and self-determination: Where are we?", **International Journal**, Vol. 68, No. 4, 2013, pp. 610, 621.

²⁵² Gökhan Alptekin, "Rusya'nın Yakın Çevresini Koruma Politikası ve Soğuk Savaş İzlenimleri (2008 RUSYA-GÜRCİSTAN SAVAŞI VE 2014 UKRAYNA KRİZİ)", **Research Studies Anatolia Journal**, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2008, p. 187.

²⁵³ UNSC, "5951th Meeting", **S/PV.5951**, 08.08.2011, <https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2FPV.5951&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False>, (02.05.2024), p. 3.

²⁵⁴ Elia Bescotti and others, "Passportization: Russia's Humanitarian Tool for Foreign Policy, Extra Territorial Governance and Military Intervention", **Global Citizenship Observatory**, 25.03.2022, <https://globalcit.eu/passportization-russias-humanitarian-tool-for-foreign-policy-extra-territorial-governance-and-military-intervention/>, (25.06.2024).

²⁵⁵ Xymena Kurowska, "Multipolarity as Resistance to Liberal Norms: Russia's Position on Responsibility to Protect", **Conflict, Security & Development**, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2014, pp. 498-500.

international activities, such as the crisis in Crimea, Ukraine, and later in Syria, by organizing political support against the Western criticism.²⁵⁶ For instance, during the Crimean crisis of 2014, the other BRICS members released a collective statement against Russia's removal from the G8 and its possible removal from G20 in support of Russia. In this way, they protected Russia from the results of the annexation.²⁵⁷ Then in the Ukraine crisis of 2022, Aside from Brazil, who voted in favour of the UNSC, UNGA, and Human Rights Council Resolutions condemning the Russian actions against Ukraine, China, India, and South Africa abstained from voting and kept using the Russian government's terminology in their speeches. Additionally, by increasing their imports of Russian petroleum, they presented a "pro-Russian neutrality".²⁵⁸

2010 witnessed the beginning of the Arab Spring. In the emergence of public revolts in several Middle Eastern countries, several factors played a crucial role: poverty, the demands of the Middle Eastern people especially in the context of economic and social issues, and changes in the international political-military order.²⁵⁹ Concerning Russian behaviour vis-à-vis those Arab uprisings, it was more of an interest-based rather than a principled nature. For instance, due to the lack of deep political and economic ties with Tunisia, Russia acted in a non-risk manner by siding with the revolutionaries who overthrew the government. Russia remained neutral toward the revolutions that occurred in Egypt and Yemen, while it considered the unrest in Bahrain an internal affair to be resolved through dialogue and did not oppose the government's use of military measures against the protestors.²⁶⁰

In Libya, Russia did not oppose the UNSC's decision to intervene in Libya by using military force. To put it another way, Russia's abstention in Resolution 1973, authorizing the armed intervention in Libya, enabled NATO to intervene and bring the Gaddafi regime to an end. However, during the execution of the resolution, Russia

²⁵⁶ Alexander Sergunin, "Russia's Strategies Towards BRICS: Theory and Practice", **Russia in the Changing International System**, (Eds. Emel P. Dal and Emre Erşen), Palgrave Macmillan, Switzerland, 2020, p. 146, 151.

²⁵⁷ Johannes N. Sjøli, "**The BRICS: An Alliance for Peace?: A Study of Discourses in Brazil, India, China and South Africa Around the Russian War in Ukraine (2014-2023)**", University of Agder (UiA), 2023, p. 37.

²⁵⁸ Laerte A. Júnior and Giovana D. Branco, "The BRICS Countries and the Russia-Ukraine Conflict", **Carta International**, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2022, pp. 3, 10-12.

²⁵⁹ Nurullah Ardiç, "Understanding the Arab Spring: Justice, Dignity, Religion and International Politics", **Afro Eurasian Studies**, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, p. 32.

²⁶⁰ Muharrem Erenler, "Russia's Arab Spring Policy", **Bilge Strateji**, Vol. 4, No. 6, 2012, pp. 175-177.

claimed that NATO had violated international law.²⁶¹ The Russian representative stated in the UNSC 6620th meeting that the mandate of the Council for managing the operation in Libya was neglected and resulted in air strikes that created civilian casualties, rendering the no-fly zone useless, whose main purpose was to avoid civilian casualties in the first place.²⁶² In addition, while Putin criticized the resolution, Medvedev, who was then the head of state, abstained from criticism and sought to align closely with the West with a view to commercial and security interests.²⁶³

After experiencing dissatisfaction with the UNSC resolution on Libya, Russia opted for a more cautious approach to the uprisings in Syria. Syria has been important for Russia because it has served as both an ally in the region and a key purchaser of Russian arms. Moreover, Russia's presence of a naval force in Syria/Tartus allowed it to play an active role in the region.²⁶⁴ In time, the Syrian uprisings turned into a civil war, resulting in the intervention of Russia in 2015. However, Russia did not see itself as an external intervener by claiming that its intervention was different because it had happened upon the request of the Syrian government against terrorism. This intervention in Syria has positioned Russia as a pivotal player in Syria's future and potentially in the broader Middle East. This affirmed Russia's international presence and aligned with its goal of continuing to be a great power in the emerging multipolar world order. Moreover, this intervention reinforced Russia's assertion that uninvited external intervention and forced regime change were major factors contributing to the violent instability and conflict in the Middle East.²⁶⁵

In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea to prevent Ukraine from participating in Western political and military institutions. By continuously supporting and provoking the Russian-speaking and pro-Moscow minority in eastern Ukraine, it kept Ukraine in a weak and problematic position in the eyes of the West.²⁶⁶ Furthermore, Russia

²⁶¹ Güner Özkan ve Elif Şimşek Özkan, "Rusya'nın Büyük Güç Siyasetinde Test Alanı Olarak Libya", **Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities Researches**, Vol. 21, No. 47, 2020, p. 111.

²⁶² UNSC, "6620th Meeting", **S/PV.6620**, 16.09.2011, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/710981?ln=en&v=pdf>, (02.05.2024), p. 3.

²⁶³ Sabir Askarov, **Rusya'nın Gürcistan, Ukrayna ve Suriye'ye Askeri Müdahalelerinin Neo-Realizm Çerçevesinde Analizi**, İstanbul, 2019, pp. 205-206.

²⁶⁴ Erenler, pp. 177-178.

²⁶⁵ Andre Gerrits, "Russia in the Changing Global Order: Multipolarity, Multilateralism and Sovereignty", **The Changing Global Order: Challenges and Prospects**, (Ed. M. O. Hosli and J. Selleslags), Springer, Switzerland, 2020, p. 91.

²⁶⁶ Özkan, p. 48.

claimed that it was protecting ethnic Russians and that the region had the right to self-determination. That view aligns with international justice. Russia, by conducting a referendum, tried to justify its annexation. However, because of low participation and Russian influence, the referendum was not recognized by international society. Independence movements emerged in Ukrainian regions bordering Russia. The troops seized twice control of the administration in Donetsk and Luhansk and, after referendums, these regions were declared independent.²⁶⁷

On 15 March 2014, a draft resolution was proposed (S/2014/189), which called upon Ukraine to uphold the first pillar of R2P (i.e. the responsibility to prevent) and claimed that the held referendum had no validity.²⁶⁸ In the 7138th meeting, which was held on the same day, Russia vetoed the draft by claiming that it contradicted the basic principles of international law, including the principle of equal rights and the self-determination of peoples, which were based on Article 1 of the UN Charter.²⁶⁹ However, the military intervention in Crimea, the conduct of a referendum on its future status, and the subsequent formal annexation of the peninsula into Russia demonstrated a clear violation of international law.²⁷⁰ Russia was then faced with economic sanctions by Western great powers and was excluded from the G-8.²⁷¹

The Minsk Agreements signed in September 2014 by the Ukrainian, Russian and OSCE Special Representatives were negotiated under the supervision of France, Germany and the OSCE. The main aspects of the agreement were to address security, economic, political, and humanitarian issues. Even though the implementation was read differently by the parties, which caused the agreement to remain only in name, it helped reduce violence in the region; Russia formally agreed to fully reintegrate the regions back into Ukraine, implying respect for Ukraine's territorial integrity.²⁷²

²⁶⁷ Yusuf Avar, "Avrupa Birliği'nin Rusya-Gürcistan ve Rusya-Ukrayna Çatışmalarına Karşı Tutumu: Almanya ve Fransa'nın Liderlikleri", **Akademik Araştırmalar ve Çalışmalar Dergisi**, Vol. 13, No. 24, 2021, p. 316.

²⁶⁸ UNSC, "Proposed Draft Resolution by Western Countries", **S/2014/189**, 14.03.2014, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_189.pdf, (10.06.2024), pp. 1-2.

²⁶⁹ UNSC, "7138th Meeting", **S/PV.7138**, 14.03.2014, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_7138.pdf, (02.06.2024), p. 2.

²⁷⁰ Gerrits, p. 92.

²⁷¹ Özkan, p. 49.

²⁷² Marie Dumoulin, "Ukraine, Russia, and the Minsk Agreements: A Post Mortem", **European Council on Foreign Relations**, 19.02.2024, <https://ecfr.eu/article/ukraine-russia-and-the-minsk-agreements-a-post-mortem/>, (05.04.2024).

In the 8516th meeting, which was held on April 25, 2019, Ukraine accused Russia of intervening in its internal affairs due to a decree signed by the President of Russia that gave Russian citizenship in a simplified procedure to the residents of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics. It was a clear violation of sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Ukraine. Also, Russia could use this citizenship card to legitimize its military presence in Ukrainian territories on behalf of protecting potential Russian citizens. According to Ukraine, Russia had already applied this tactic in Georgia. However, Russia argued that Ukrainian people had the right to keep their own citizenship, and there was no coercion on this issue. Russia built its argument on one of the institutions of international order, namely, international law. The Russian spoke person referred to the European Convention on Nationality of 1997 and Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to defend that "legitimate interests of both States and individuals" had to be taken into account in matters of nationality and that individuals had "the right to change [their] nationality".²⁷³

Shortly after Putin came to power, Russia began to follow a multidimensional foreign policy and considered international order differently. Russia went beyond its immediate neighbourhood and tried to develop its relations with the Middle Eastern and Arab countries. By doing so Russia wanted to reinforce its status as a great power and balance the US hegemony, and therefore, in many events, it tried to play a crucial role. After September 11 attacks, by cooperating with the US against terrorism, Russia participated in the protection of international society, which is one of the aims of the international order. This, it believed, would strengthen its position in the international order. Another concern that pushed Russia to be a guardian of the international order and to cooperate with regional and international organizations in that period was the possibility that Islamic radicalism might spread to its internal order. On the other hand, out of regional security concerns and the need for political support against Western criticism, Russia became a member of non-Western regional organizations such as SCO and BRICS. Russia's security concerns increased with the emergence of certain developments such as the enlargement of NATO into the post-Soviet space and the

²⁷³ UNSC, "8516th Meeting", **S/PV.8516**, 25.04.2019, <https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2FPV.8516&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False>, (02.06.2024), pp. 16-21.

Western-backed so-called colour revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. These concerns related to the possibility of a change in the balance of power in favour of the US. Russia opposed the Western intervention in the internal affairs of these states with the pretext of promotion of democracy and human rights, but it did not hesitate to refer to the R2P principle itself to justify its own intervention in Georgia. This demonstrated that power-political interests continued to shape Russia's understandings of order and justice. Russia tried to justify its invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 by adopting the principles of self-determination and international law, although, as said, power-political concerns were far greater than justice concerns in those cases. The Russian stance during the uprisings in Libya and Syria will be explained in the next chapter. But suffice to argue here that in Libya, at the beginning, Russia referred to the R2P but then regretted not to have vetoed the UNSC resolution, which had established a no-fly zone. It criticized the intervention of NATO in Libya by arguing that NATO had violated the international law by exceeding the mandate given by the resolution. In the Syrian case that followed Libya, Russia adopted a strict posture that emphasized state sovereignty and non-intervention, and vetoed any UNSC resolution that it thought would endanger the sovereignty of Syria. Overall its behaviour carried the characteristics of a great power that defended a pluralist international society, rather than a solidarist one.

2.4.2. The Recent Events

Early April 2016 witnessed the most intense fighting in the Armenian-Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) conflict since 1994, resulting in hundreds of casualties along the border. This is an important example to examine because the US and Russia were both involved in this conflict as guardians of peace.²⁷⁴ Looking at Russia's role in this conflict, it can be argued that Russia considered the South Caucasus as its sphere of influence and used this conflict as one of its foreign policy tools to re-establish its power in the region while trying to keep the conflict under its control. Russia's military and political involvement in this conflict demonstrated its

²⁷⁴ Center for Preventive Action, "Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict", 20.03.2024, <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/nagorno-karabakh-conflict>, (21.06.2024).

ability to influence the developments in the Caucasus region within the wider context of international order.²⁷⁵ Russia, together with the USA acted as both the mediators for and obstructers of a solution, since they both benefited from the fact that the issue remained unresolved. By acting bilaterally, while Russia formed a strategic alliance with Armenia, it recognized Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. Russia's reasoning behind this policy of balance was to maintain military cooperation with both sides to counterbalance Western influence and prevent possible NATO presence in the region. In 2020, a peace agreement was signed under the mediation of Russian President Vladimir Putin.²⁷⁶

In 2021, Putin stated that the Zelensky government in Ukraine had completely embraced an anti-Russian agenda,²⁷⁷ and Kyiv was actively undermining the implementation of the Minsk Agreement.²⁷⁸ Putin began an invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 as a last resort after attempts of coming to terms with the West about the national security threat caused by the advancement of NATO towards Ukraine failed and resulted in a lack of equality and willingness to cooperate with the West throughout the past years.²⁷⁹ In a speech before the invasion, Putin stated his discomfort with NATO's false promises regarding its expansion toward Eastern Europe and its disregard of international law. He justified the invasion by stating that Russians in the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics in Donbass were subjected to serious human rights violations, including genocide committed by the Kyiv Regime. He also stated that Russia had accepted the new geopolitical reality and had no intention of occupying Ukrainian territory. Russia was asked for help by the Donbass Republics recognized by Russia. He stated that, with the permission of the Russian Federation Council and following the ratification by the Federal Assembly of the agreements on friendship and mutual assistance signed between the Donetsk People's

²⁷⁵ Emin Şihaliyev and Reha Yılmaz, "Ermenistan-Azerbaycan Çatışması: Çözüm Yolundaki Temel Sorunlar ve Gelecek Senaryoları", **Bilge Strateji**, Vol. 7, No. 13, 2015, p. 35.

²⁷⁶ Ayça Eminoğlu ve Yeşim Aydın, "ABD ve Rusya Ekseninde Dağlık-Karabağ'da Çatışma Çözümünü Geciktiren Güç Dengesi Sistemi", **Akdeniz İİBF Dergisi**, 2021, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 247-253.

²⁷⁷ President of Russia, "Interview with Oliver Stone", **Events**, 19.07.2019, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/interviews/61057>, (20.06.2024).

²⁷⁸ President of Russia, "Address by the President of the Russian Federation", **Events**, 21.02.2022, <http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67828>, (20.06.2024).

²⁷⁹ Cristian Nitoiu, "The path to Russia's 2022 Invasion of Ukraine: Moscow's Framing of Conflict and Cooperation with the West Under Putin's Rule", **Southeast European and Black Sea Studies**, 2024, p. 15.

Republic, the Lugansk People's Republic, and the Russian Federation, they had initiated a collective self-defence within the framework of Article 51 of the UN Charter.²⁸⁰ Considering these Russian invasions, it can be argued that Russia's policies contradict the existing rules and norms of the international order. While Russia defends that it attaches importance to state sovereignty, it violates the territorial integrity of states through these occupations.²⁸¹

It is clear that, by taking an active and effective role in the conflicts in the post-Soviet space, Russia has tried to demonstrate or revive its great power status. Russia's reliability and prestige could be undermined in the event of a change in the existing international order. Therefore, Russia quickly acted against threats to international order, as occurred in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014.²⁸² Russia, on multiple occasions, used instruments of international order such as diplomacy, war, and international law. For instance, during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Russia positioned itself as a mediator and tried to mitigate this conflict by means of diplomacy. Russia could not allow NATO or the Western powers to play a primary role in the management of regional conflicts, especially in post-Soviet areas. This was also related to Russia's claim to equality with Western actors. In the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Russia managed to be granted an equal status alongside the US and France.²⁸³ Russia, through its engagement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, justified Bull's argument that great powers have an ability to shape international order by regulating the global balance of power. Regarding the invasion of Ukraine, Russia used war as an institution of international order after the failed attempts of diplomacy. At the beginning, Russia warned Ukraine to protect Donetsk people from genocide by referring to the first pillar of the R2P. Then it signed the Minsk Agreement with Ukraine to stop the escalating human rights violations in the Donetsk region.

²⁸⁰ President of Russia, "Address by the President of the Russian Federation", **Events**, 21.02.2022, <http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67828>, (20.06.2024).

²⁸¹ Emel P. Dal and Emre Erşen, "Russia and the Changing International System: An Introduction", **Russia in the Changing International System**, (Eds. Emel P. Dal and Emre Erşen), Palgrave Macmillan, Switzerland, 2020, pp. 4, 6.

²⁸² Dumitru Minzarari, "Russia's Stake in the Nagorno-Karabakh War: Accident or Design?", 12.11.2020, <https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/russias-stake-in-the-nagorno-karabakh-war-accident-or-design/>, (26.06.2024).

²⁸³ Dr Neil Mervin, "When the Chips Are Down: Russia's Stance in the Current Azeri-Armenian Confrontation", **RUSI**, 06.10.2020, <https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/when-chips-are-down-russias-stance-current-azeri-armenian-confrontation>, (28.06.2024).

However, Ukraine did not implement the agreement, and Russia started its military operation by referring to the third pillar of R2P. Considering the Russian support for non-intervention in many cases, Russia built its justification on R2P by referring to the so-called genocide and the invitation of the Donbass Republics. In addition, Russia used international law to justify its invasion of Ukraine in 2022 by referring to Article 51 of the UN Charter, namely self-defence.

When considering the general position of Russia in the international system, it can be argued that Russia has focused on protecting its internal order from the outset because of recurring internal crises, unrest, and invasions. Russia, being aware of the fact that threats in the internal order of states affect international order, tried to protect its internal order from outside threats by establishing particular alliances (e.g. Holly Alliance) or cooperating with regional powers (e.g. SCO) and international organizations (e.g. UN). However, Russia's understanding of justice was limited due to its focus on state power at the expense of individual rights. Russia's understanding of justice was often equated with achieving the status and rights that Russians believe they deserve. Although in some cases Russia's behaviour aligns with international justice and human justice, Russia's understanding of international justice has developed in a self-centred way. In most cases, Russia has considered its citizens' safety or used this as a pretext to intervene in post-Soviet countries. Lastly, throughout history, Russia, being a great power in several periods, has tried to be recognized as such by the rest of great powers in the international system, and played guardian and balancing roles in that order. While being an ardent supporter of equal sovereignty and non-intervention in general, it did not refrain from exercising solidarity in regions or on issues that served its power-political interests and/or out of cultural/religious affinity.

CHAPTER THREE
RUSSIAN UNDERSTANDINGS OF ORDER AND JUSTICE TOWARDS
SYRIA AND LIBYA DURING THE ARAB SPRING

This chapter, in the first section, explains the perceptions of international society and Russia towards the Arab Spring, and why Libya and Syria have been more important to Russia than other countries affected by the Arab Spring. The second section tries to comprehend the basis of their relations by looking at the Russian-Libyan relations from the Cold War to the Arab Spring. Then, it attempts to understand how international society reacted to the Libya uprisings and which developments led to intervention. By using documents from UNSC meetings and resolutions, this section attempts to analyse Russian behaviour during the Arab Spring in Libya from the perspective of the English School, especially Hedley Bull. The third section tries to understand why Russia acted differently in Syria compared with Libya and why Russia did not allow intervention by the international community in Syria.

3.1. THE ARAB SPRING AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

The so-called Arab Spring, starting first in Tunisia in 2010 and then spreading to the rest of the region, took place in the form of popular uprisings against the reigning regimes in a number of Arab countries with demands predominantly for political representativeness, social and economic justice, and equality. Those uprisings took place against a regional background that was dominated more by Hobbesian elements (the international system, through the lens of the English School) than Grotian characteristics (international society). Thus, it is apt firstly to briefly describe the general characteristics of the region through the concepts of the English School, before looking into the Arab Spring per se.

The history of the Middle East over the past century involves the intersection of three main, recurring and conflicting processes. These processes included the influence of the external great powers, independent and competitive behaviours of the regional states and the emergence of social and political uprisings as it happened in Libya and other regional countries. In the Middle East, events in one country can affect

the whole region and three political entities have stood as the main influential actors in this regard. First, states are interconnected in many areas such as security and trade with which they leverage against any opposition. Opposition movements tend to work with their favourable groups and establish recruitment networks to create an area of regional support. External powers, on the other hand, try to establish regional alliances, support regional allies and seek to impose their own regional models. Since 1918 the Middle East has been shaped by great power politics and continue to be so as exemplified by the recent Russian intervention in Syria (2015) or the continuing US support to Israel. Most countries of the modern Middle East (at least 25 or more countries) were colonial states of the post-1918 period. European countries such as the UK, France and Italy governed and shaped these states. The remaining states, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Yemen were not colonial states in the 1920s, and they were shaped by the modern and competitive interstate system, and the post-1918 international conjuncture. In this context, it is important to indicate that Middle Eastern states, compared to some other postcolonial states in the world, have more tendency to intervene in each other's internal matters like Syrian intervention in Lebanon and Jordan or Libyan intervention in Sudan and Tunisia, with artificial borders drawn by the ex-colonial powers being much responsible for that. Revolutions, as in the rest of the world, played a central and formative role in the Middle East. Revolutions in France (1789), Russia (1917) and China (1949) shaped the modern international system globally, while the revolutions in Turkey (1923), Afghanistan (1978), Iran (1979) and other Middle Eastern countries (between 1950-60) shaped the regional system in the Middle East. These changes to the modern international system included new ideologies, a shift in the balance of power, and a reshaping of state relations.²⁸⁴

The impact of western principles on the Middle East can be seen in the League of Arab States' 1945 Charter which prioritised the respect for sovereignty.²⁸⁵ Also, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation's (OIC) Charter indicated its adherence to the UN Charter and basic western norms such as peaceful settlement of all crises and non-

²⁸⁴ Fred Halliday, "The Middle East and Conceptions of International Society", **International Society and the Middle East**, (Eds. Barry Buzan and A. Gonzalez-Pelaez), Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2009, pp. 6- 22.

²⁸⁵ Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez, "The Primary Institutions of the Middle Eastern Regional Interstate Society", **International Society and the Middle East**, (Eds. Barry Buzan and A. Gonzalez-Pelaez), Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2009, p. 94.

interference in the internal matters of other states. Although these statements can be considered as a support for pluralist international society and its primary institution of international law,²⁸⁶ actual wars or threats of war became a constant feature of the region due to territorial disputes, terrorism and ideological or ethnic divisions. As such the Middle East has come closer to being an international system,²⁸⁷ characterized predominantly by self-help behaviour than an international society where respect for sovereignty and non-intervention and fewer violent conflicts are the dominant features. While Arab states held solidarist ideas at different time periods, this was not enough for collective action in different issue-areas. For instance, the Arab League remained silent against the Iranian counter-invasion of Iraq in 1982 or Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, which showed the limits of common interests and cooperation. Secondary institutions (which are the characteristics of international society) like the Arab League, OIC, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) could not develop further due to cultural differences, selfish interests of the states and authoritarian character of the Arab state. The Middle East turned into a theatre of global balance of power during the Cold War, while in the unipolar post-Cold War period new regional balance of power strategies came into play with the Sunni Arab alliance led by Egypt and Saudi Arabia siding with the US to counter the growing influence of the anti-US coalition, which came to include Iran, Syria and their sub-state allies Hezbollah and Hamas.²⁸⁸

The Arab Spring, which began in Tunisia following the self-immolation of a street-seller on December 17, 2010, took place against such a fragmented and Hobessian-like regional order which was also increasingly characterized by high unemployment, widespread poverty, all forms of corruption, lack of democracy, inflation, violations of rights, and poor living conditions in the post-Cold War period.²⁸⁹ After the incident, protests began in Tunisia and then spread to other North African and Middle Eastern countries, such as Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya, and

²⁸⁶ Simon W. Murden, "The Secondary Institutions of the Middle Eastern Regional Interstate Society", **International Society and the Middle East**, (Eds. Barry Buzan and A. Gonzalez-Pelaez), Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2009, p. 135.

²⁸⁷ For detailed information see Barry Buzan's book chapter *The Middle East through English School Theory* in *International Society and the Middle East* (Eds. Barry Buzan and A. Gonzalez-Pelaez) book, p. 25.

²⁸⁸ Murden, pp. 122-138.

²⁸⁹ Alper Y. Dede, "The Arab Uprisings: Debating the Turkish Model", **Insight Turkey**, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2011, pp. 23-24.

Syria.²⁹⁰ During the Arab Spring, civil wars and regime changes occurred in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and Syria. Protests against the authoritarian regime took place in Bahrain, but the regime prevented the escalation of the events. Other countries such as Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Lebanon were also affected by those uprisings and experienced anti-regime protests, but these were not effective.²⁹¹

The reactions of the West, including Europe and the US, toward countries that have been affected by the Arab Spring, were cautious at first. Europe, especially France, supported Ben Ali's regime until it was overthrown. When the uprisings turned into revolutions, they began to support the demands of Tunisians for liberty and democracy.²⁹² While the African Union (AU) expressed its solidarity with the Tunisian people,²⁹³ Libyan leader Muammar Al-Qaddafi criticized the uprising by supporting Ben Ali's regime.²⁹⁴ During the Egypt uprisings, at the beginning, the US publicly backed Hosni Mubarak because of their 30 years of longstanding alliance. However, the Obama Administration shifted course and called for Mubarak's resignation when they saw the people's determination to overthrow Mubarak.²⁹⁵ After this call, France, Germany, United Kingdom (UK), Italy, and Spain supported the immediate and peaceful transition of power in Egypt. As for Yemen, on other hand, the United States and Europe considered the developments in Yemen in relation to terrorism, because a revolution in Yemen would provide more opportunities for the Al-Qaeda organization. Thus, the Western powers collaborated with Saudi Arabia to remove the leader, Ali Abdullah Saleh, while leaving the system largely intact. Iran financially supported opposition forces known as the Houthis.²⁹⁶ This was the example of balancing against a rising threat (Iran's influence through the Houthis) to prevent a change in the regional balance of power. As a response to a request from Mansur Hadi (the next leader after

²⁹⁰ Ibragim Khasanov, "Rus Basınında Arap Baharı", *Üsküdar Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, Sayı: 10, 2020, p. 93.

²⁹¹ İskender Karakaya and Mehmet T. Çelik, "Ortadoğu'da Arap Baharı Süreci ve Libya İç Savaşı", *Journal of Academic Projection*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2021, p. 178.

²⁹² Mohamed Metawe, "How and Why the West Reacted to the Arab Spring: An Arab Perspective", *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2013, pp. 143-144.

²⁹³ African Union (AU), "AU Peace and Security Council Press Statement", 15.01.2011, <https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/pressstatementtunisiaeng.pdf>, (14.05.2024).

²⁹⁴ MEMRI, "Arab and Iranian Reactions to the Tunisia Uprising", *Middle East Media Research Institute*, 19.01.2011, https://www.memri.org/reports/arab-and-iranian-reactions-tunisia-uprising#_edn4, (14.05.2024).

²⁹⁵ Trevor Eck, *Arab Spring in North Africa: An Analysis of Foreign Influence and Revolutions in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia*, New York, 2019, p. 24.

²⁹⁶ Metawe, pp. 145-152.

Saleh), a coalition of Arab states led by Saudi Arabia, which included the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Bahrain, Sudan, and Kuwait, launched Operation Decisive Storm to support the ousted president.²⁹⁷ As for the unrest in Bahrain, the United States and European countries were concerned because a revolution there could increase Iran's influence in the region and jeopardize the US Fifth Fleet. If a revolution were to succeed in Bahrain, the resulting government would likely be controlled by Shia groups that had close relations with Tehran.²⁹⁸ Therefore, to support the government and suppress Bahraini protesters, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait sent troops to Bahrain. The West, Russia, and China did not oppose this Saudi-led intervention because they were all concerned about the disruption of the regional status quo.²⁹⁹ Thus, by and large the realist logic played out in the reaction of the western powers and their regional allies towards the uprisings in different countries, reinforcing the predominantly international system character of the region.

Concerning Russia's perception and behaviour vis-à-vis the Arab Spring in general, it may be argued that Russia, like the western states, was not prepared for the Arab uprisings. Russia was reluctant to lose the benefits of collaborating with the existing regimes (they were authoritarian and non-threatening to Russia) and cautious about aligning with potentially unsuccessful factions. Therefore, its approach has been characterized by hesitancy, instability and unpredictability. As stated in the previous chapter, due to the lack of deep political and economic ties with Tunisia, Russia acted in a non-risky manner by siding with the rebels who overthrew the government.³⁰⁰ Russian President Medvedev, in 2011, at the Davos World Economic Forum, indicated that what happened in Tunisia was a significant lesson for any government in the world. He said that governments should engage in dialogue with diverse groups to protect their legitimacy.³⁰¹

²⁹⁷ Marcus Montgomery, "A Timeline of the Yemen Crisis, from the 1990s to the Present", **Arab Center Washington DC**, 19.02.2021, <https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/a-timeline-of-the-yemen-crisis-from-the-1990s-to-the-present/>, (15.05.2024).

²⁹⁸ Metawe, p. 152.

²⁹⁹ Berdal Aral, "Roaring in Libya, Whispering in Others: UN Security Council's Posture During the Arab Spring", **Insight Turkey**, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2014, p. 191.

³⁰⁰ Erenler, pp. 174-175.

³⁰¹ Kremlin, "Dmitry Medvedev addressed the World Economic Forum in Davos", **Events**, 26.01.2011, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/10163>, (25.04.2024).

Russia had limited political and economic relations with Egypt. Following a wait-and-see policy, it remained neutral during the revolts in Egypt.³⁰² Russian officials, such as President Medvedev, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, and Foreign Ministry spokesperson Alexander Lukashevich, highlighted the importance of achieving a peaceful resolution to the situation. For Russia, unrest in Bahrain was an internal affair that needed to be resolved through dialogue. Russia and the West shared a similar stance regarding Bahrain, as neither desired the collapse of a Gulf monarchy because doing so could cause potential instability in neighbouring Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich Gulf monarchies. Similar to the western countries, Russia was reluctant to become involved in the increasing violence in Yemen.³⁰³ Foreign Minister Lavrov considered the successful resolution of Yemen's internal political crisis as a model. According to him, external players demonstrated exceptional patience and persistence, engaging with all parties without issuing ultimatums and fostering compromise. In addition, this example could be considered as a foundation to address the Syrian situation.³⁰⁴

However, it is possible to argue that Russia's reaction to the Libyan and Syrian revolts differed from those of the above-mentioned states. While Russia had limited relations with those other states, it had close political, military, and economic relations with Libya and Syria.³⁰⁵ In addition, both the regimes in Syria and Libya responded to their opponents with violent crackdowns, leading to full-scale civil wars and high casualties that raised the prospect of military intervention.³⁰⁶ Accordingly, when the debates in the UNSC meetings are looked into, it is seen that Russia's speeches at these meetings are mostly about Libya and Syria rather than the other states affected by the Arab Spring. Problems in these countries are still ongoing. Due to these reasons, the focus of this chapter will be on Russian relations with Libya and Syria. Examining the relations of Russia with these countries from the Cold War to the Arab Spring helps

³⁰² Erenler, p. 175.

³⁰³ Roland Dannreuther and Mark N. Katz, "Russia and the Arab Spring", **Russian Analytical Digest**, No. 98, 2011, pp. 4-5.

³⁰⁴ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, "Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov Interview to Reuters News Agency", **News**, 23.12.2011, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1645658/, (26.04.2024).

³⁰⁵ Emre Erşen, "Rusya'nın Arap Baharı Politikası", **Arap Baharı Üzerine Değerlendirmeler**, (Eds. Armağan Gözkaman and Perihan Paksoy), Detay Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2014, p. 117.

³⁰⁶ Dannreuther and Katz, p. 4.

understand the following Russian reactions toward the intervention attempts of international society during the Arab Spring.

3.2. RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LIBYA DURING THE ARAB SPRING

3.2.1. Russia-Libya Relations from the Cold War to the Arab Spring

Before looking into the Russia-Libya relations, it is important to note that the Middle East was of secondary importance to Russia during the pre-Soviet period. While Turkey and European powers dominated this region, the Russian Empire focused on other areas, such as the Caucasus, the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits, the Mediterranean Straits, Central Asia, China, and Persia. Bolshevik rulers believed that the Middle East was not strategically important and that Arab countries lacked significant revolutionary potential. However, after the Second World War, when the USSR achieved superpower status, its global ambitions expanded, marking a shift in this perspective. The USSR aimed to form alliances with Middle Eastern countries that closely aligned with its political system. As a result, its primary allies in the region became Egypt, Iraq, Algeria, and Libya.³⁰⁷

What made Libya an important ally was its oil and natural gas resources, as well as its location on the Mediterranean coast of North Africa.³⁰⁸ In the 19th century, three of the four major trade caravan routes traversing the Sahara passed through Libya, highlighting the historical significance of cities like Tripoli and Benghazi. Ports in these cities served as vital hubs for maritime trade between the Mediterranean and Central Africa.³⁰⁹ During the Soviet period, the USSR supported revolutionary movements in Africa to spread socialism. After coming to power in Libya following the 1969 coup d'état, Qaddafi adopted the ideologies of Islamic socialism and Arab nationalism. In addition to the removal of private property, Qaddafi nationalized

³⁰⁷ Alexey Malashenko, **Russia and the Arab Spring**, Carnegie Moscow Center, Moscow, 2013, pp. 3-4.

³⁰⁸ Karakaya and Çelik, p. 181.

³⁰⁹ Carole Collins, "Imperialism and Revolution in Libya", **Middle East Research and Information Project Reports**, No. 27, 1974, p. 3.

Libya's oil.³¹⁰ A sympathy for Libya emerged in the Soviet Union due to Libya's socialist regime and its intervention in Chad, which opposed the West.³¹¹

In the 1980s, Libya and the USSR both opposed the Camp David Accords, which included the first framework for peace in the Middle East, i.e. the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's US-backed peace initiative with Israel. Libya's antagonism lied in the disregard of Arab-Palestine needs and USSR's absence in the process. Libya viewed the Soviets as suppliers of weapons in opposition to the US-led United Arab alliance, while the Soviets regarded Libya as an economic market. In other words, their relations were based on mutual interest. During the 1980s, Qaddafi became militarily dependent on Russia. However, during its final period, the USSR could not effectively support Libya due to the potential for conflict with the US. Also, Libya's military debt to the USSR caused problems in their bilateral relations.³¹² After the collapse of the USSR, Russia's interest in Libya diminished because of the loss of power and the need for financial support to overcome the state's economic problems.³¹³ Accordingly, Russia supported the Western-backed UNSC Resolution 748, which included an arms embargo against Libya due to its involvement in terrorist actions and groups.³¹⁴

When Yevgeni Primakov became Foreign Minister, Russia realized that to become a powerful actor, it was not enough to focus solely on relations with neighbouring countries and the West. Close relations and cooperation with third-world countries were also necessary. Since the 2000s Russia's active policy toward African countries has followed the reasoning of economic interests rather than the ideological concerns of the former USSR period. In addition to being an important market for arms trade, Africa was also an important source of raw materials and energy for Russia.³¹⁵ In 2008, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who adopted a multidimensional foreign policy in a multipolar world, met Qaddafi in Libya. Putin offered to forgive \$4.5 billion of Libya's Soviet-era debt in exchange for favourable trade agreements

³¹⁰ Cemal Bayat, "Rusya-Libya İlişkileri ve Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi'nde Libya'ya Yönelik Askeri Müdahale Tartışmaları Sırasında Rusya'nın Politik Tutumu", **Uluslararası Kriz ve Siyaset Araştırmaları Dergisi**, Cit: 2, Sayı: 1, 2018, pp. 173-174.

³¹¹ Özkan and Özkan, p. 109.

³¹² Bayat, p. 176.

³¹³ Özkan and Özkan, p. 109.

³¹⁴ UNSC, "Resolution 748 (1992)", 31.03.1992, [https://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=S/RES/748\(1992\)&Lang=E](https://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=S/RES/748(1992)&Lang=E), (25.06.2024), pp. 1-3.

³¹⁵ Bayat, p. 177.

between Russia and Libya. The proposed deals included arms sales and Russian Railways' contract to build a railway connecting Sirte and Benghazi. In the same year, Qaddafi allowed Russia to access the port of Benghazi for its fleet.³¹⁶ However, Russia could not benefit from these agreements due to the emerging civil war in Libya.³¹⁷

3.2.2. Effects of the Arab Spring on Libya

Libya was one of the countries affected by the protests during the Arab Spring. Similar to Tunisia and Egypt, the popular uprisings in Libya were driven by socioeconomic poverty, political repression, and decades of rule under authoritarian and one-man regimes. The restrictions on the Libyans had escalated over the years. Qaddafi disabled all opposition to him, including traditional religious elements. He did not allow the establishment of independent and free political and social organizations such as parties and unions.³¹⁸ In mid-February 2011, political protests began to spread across Libya, starting in the capital, Tripoli. Unlike Tunisia and Egypt, the protests in Libya escalated into violence quickly due to Qaddafi's attempt to suppress dissent and the rapid emergence of an armed opposition group called the Interim Transitional National Council.³¹⁹ After Qaddafi declared war on the protesters and hundreds of people were killed, the West began to discuss the possibility of military intervention against the Qaddafi regime.³²⁰

3.2.3. Reactions of the International Society toward the Uprisings in Libya

The rapid response of regional organizations and the UN to the growing events in Libya was surprising. The Council of the Arab League suspended Libya's participation in all of the League's entities and meetings as a protest against the

³¹⁶ Federica S. Fasanotti, "Russia and Libya: A Brief History of an On-Again-Off-Again Friendship", 01.09.2016, **Brookings**, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russia-and-libya-a-brief-history-of-an-on-again-off-again-friendship/>, (08.05.2024).

³¹⁷ Özkan and Özkan, p. 110.

³¹⁸ Bayat, pp. 179, 180.

³¹⁹ Luke Glanville, "Intervention in Libya: From Sovereign Consent to Regional Consent", **International Studies Perspectives**, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2013, p. 333.

³²⁰ Dannreuther and Katz, p. 4.

violence being inflicted on civilians.³²¹ The UNSC welcomed the Arab League's decision and denounced the violence and use of force against civilians. It urged the immediate cessation of violence and supported efforts to meet the legitimate demands of the Libyan people,³²² fulfilling the first pillar of R2P which is to remind the state of its responsibility to protect its people from harm.

The Peace and Security Council of the AU released a statement accepting that the Libyan people's aspirations for democracy, political reform, justice, and socioeconomic development were legitimate. It also denounced the indiscriminate and excessive use of force and lethal weapons against peaceful protesters.³²³ The Council expressed its solidarity with Libya and reasserted its dedication to respect for Libya's unity and territorial integrity. Additionally, it refused any form of military intervention.³²⁴ The GCC supported the application of a no-fly zone over Libya, and going further, GCC foreign ministers demanded that the UNSC create a no-fly zone to protect the Libyan people. In addition, they asserted that Qaddafi had lost his legitimacy.³²⁵ The Arab League demanded that the UNSC follow their responsibility and create a no-fly zone over Libyan airspace to provide protection to Libyan people following the worsened situation in Libya despite its initial opposition to military intervention back in March 2011.³²⁶ What is extraordinary about this move is that it was the first time that the Arab League had suggested intervention by Western forces on an Arab territory.³²⁷

³²¹ Mervat Rishmawi, "League of Arab States in the Wake of the Arab Spring", **Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies**, <https://www.cihrs.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Arab-Leage.pdf>, (18.05.2024), p. 56.

³²² United Nations, "Security Council Press Statement on Libya", **Meetings Coverage and Press Releases**, 22.02.2011, <https://press.un.org/en/2011/sc10180.doc.htm>, (18.05.2024).

³²³ African Union, "Communique of the 261st Meeting of the Peace and Security Council", 23.02.2011, <https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-communique-on-the-situation-in-libya.pdf>, (18.05.2024).

³²⁴ African Union, "Communique of the 265th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council", 10.03.2011, <https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/communique-libya-eng.pdf>, (18.05.2024).

³²⁵ Security Council Report, "Update Report No.1: Libya", 14.03.2011, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/update-report/lookup_c_glkwlemtisg_b_6621881.php, (19.05.2024).

³²⁶ Security Council Report, "The Implications of the Current Events in Libya and the Arab Position", 12.03.2011, <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya%207360.pdf>, (18.05.2024).

³²⁷ Zeynep Ş. Mencütek, "The Rebirth of a Dead Organization?: Questioning the Role of the Arab League in the Arab Uprisings Process", **Perceptions**, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2014, p. 97.

The OIC Executive Committee convened and denounced the use of heavy weapons against civilians. The Committee expressed its opposition to any form of military intervention and affirmed its support for Libya's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Moreover, it welcomed UNSC Resolution 1973, which mandated a no-fly zone over Libyan airspace to protect civilians.³²⁸ The UN responded to Libya's events by creating an International Commission of Inquiry on Libya. The Commission found that the Gaddafi government committed crimes against humanity and war crimes against civilians.³²⁹ The UNGA suspended Libya's membership in the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) due to its systematic violations of human rights.³³⁰

The UNSC adopted Resolution 1970 in February 2011, expressing its concern over the use of force against civilians. The resolution imposed an arms embargo, asset freezing, and travel ban on Gaddafi's government. It demanded an immediate end to the violence and referred Libya's situation to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC).³³¹ However, Gaddafi's government ignored the demands of Resolution 1970 and continued its military attacks on civilians. Due to this prolonged violence against civilians and following requests from the GCC, OIC and Arab League to establish a no-fly zone, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1973 in March 2011. With this resolution, the UNSC established a no-fly zone over Libya and called for the immediate implementation of a ceasefire, as well as an end to all violence, attacks, and abuses directed at civilians. The resolution included taking all necessary precautions to protect the Libyans.³³² The resolution, drafted by France, Lebanon, UK and the USA was adopted with 10 votes in favour, none against, and five abstentions (China, Russia, India, Brazil, and Germany). Supporters of the resolution pointed to the requests from

³²⁸ Organization of Islamic Cooperation, "Final Communique Issued By the Emergency Open Ended Ministerial Meeting of the OIC Executive Committee on the Alarming Developments in Libyan Jamahiriya", 19.03.2011, <https://www.oic-oci.org/docdown/?docID=568&refID=63>, (19.05.2024).

³²⁹ UN Human Rights Council, "Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya", 08.03.2012, <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session19/A.HRC.19.68.pdf>, (20.05.2024).

³³⁰ Refworld, "Suspension of the Rights of Membership of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in the HRC", **UNGA Resolution 65/265**, 01.03.2011, <https://www.refworld.org/legal/resolution/unga/2011/en/77347>, (20.05.2024).

³³¹ UNSC, "Resolution 1970 (2011)", **S/RES/1970**, 26.02.2011, <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n11/245/58/pdf/n1124558.pdf?token=2yg0MOoCjPKPbM MMYI&fe=true>, (20.05.2024), pp. 1-4.

³³² Daniel Silander, "R2P-Principle and Practice? The UNSC on Libya", **Journal of Applied Security Research**, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2013, pp. 269-270.

regional organizations, especially the Arab League, as the rationale for authorizing forceful actions to protect civilians.³³³ It can be argued that the UNSC resolution bore the stamp of R2P by taking timely and decisive action upon the request of regional institutions, namely Arab League, and created a no-fly zone to protect the civilians that were under threat of governmental attack in line with the third pillar of R2P. The action that caused later criticism of this move was the use of heavy weapons, namely the air strikes that caused civilian casualties and led to death of the Libyan president Qaddafi. Germany and Brazil doubted the effectiveness of this action and considered the possibility that it could worsen the situation. India argued that enforcement measures, such as who will be involved and how such measures will be implemented, needed to be clarified. China expressed its opposition to the use of force in international relations. Russia was worried about the provisions of the resolution that might result in large-scale military intervention.³³⁴

NATO's humanitarian air operations began soon after Resolution 1973 was adopted, resulting in the death of Qaddafi and the fall of his government on October 20, 2011.³³⁵ Parliamentary elections in Libya were held in 2012, and the General National Congress was established. However, after the Congress refused to hold elections despite the expiry of its mandate, anti-Congress protests began in 2014. Qaddafi's former chief of military staff, Khalifa Haftar, returned to Libya from the United States in the same year to launch Operation Dignity against radical Islamist militias and the Muslim Brotherhood. Thus, the second civil war in Libya began. The UAE began to get involved in conflict by using bases in Egypt to support Haftar. The dissolution of the General National Congress and the holding of elections did not lead to a compromise between the parties; instead, it created two different governments in Tobruk and Tripoli. Turkey and Qatar supported the government in Tripoli; whereas the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt supported the government in Tobruk.³³⁶ As turmoil, migration, and terrorism increased in Libya, Western countries tried to bring peace to the country by using the UN. In 2016, the Government of National Accord (GNA),

³³³ Glanville, p. 335.

³³⁴ UNSC, "6498th Meeting", **S/PV.6498**, 17.03.2011, <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya%20S%20PV%206498.pdf>, (25.05.2024), pp. 1-10.

³³⁵ Mohammed Nuruzzaman, "The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine: Revived in Libya, Buried in Syria", *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2013, pp. 62-63.

³³⁶ Özkan and Özkan, pp. 111-112.

which was established under the presidency of Fayez Al-Sarraj, failed to gain support across the country, and the problems between Sarraj and Haftar led to a deadlock.³³⁷

Although the UN, EU, and NATO recognized the GNA as legitimate, member countries of these organizations supported Haftar to protect their political interests.³³⁸ These different views can be seen in France and Russia's support for Haftar and the USA and Italy's support for the GNA,³³⁹ being a good example of the balancing strategies of the western countries towards the region. By aligning with a different group, countries attempted to stop the other groups from gaining influence in the conflict as well as maintaining a regional balance which served their political and strategic needs. The Berlin Conference on Libya was convened and co-chaired by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres in 2020. All participants committed to non-interference in the armed conflict in Libya and pledged to increase their efforts to establish a permanent ceasefire. The conference called on the warring parties to restart the political process and demanded the implementation of the arms embargo.³⁴⁰ In the same year, under UN mediation, a permanent ceasefire agreement was signed by the 5+5 Joint Military Committee for Libya, with five representatives each from the military wing of the GNA and the Libyan National Army.³⁴¹ International society used diplomacy to provide communication between the warring parties. Later on, the Second Berlin Conference on Libya was convened, and participants expressed the cessation of hostilities. They noted that an inclusive Libya-led political dialogue continued under the auspices of the UN, involving all Libyan political parties and actors. Whereas the participants asked for the prompt withdrawal of all foreign forces and mercenaries from Libya, Turkey expressed reservation on this argument.³⁴² Later some negative developments followed. Officials within the interim government began to hinder the election process,

³³⁷ Karakaya and Çelik, p. 184.

³³⁸ Elifnur Düzsöz, "Kaos İçerisinde Düzen Arayışı: Kaddafi Dönemi ve Sonrası Libya", **Barış Araştırmaları ve Çatışma Çözümleri Dergisi**, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2021, p. 312.

³³⁹ Karakaya and Çelik, pp. 185-189.

³⁴⁰ BBC, "Berlin Konferansı- 55 Maddelik Libya Barış Planında Neler Var?", 20.01.2020, <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/51171224>, (26.05.2024).

³⁴¹ UNSMIL, "Agreement for a Complete and Permanent Ceasefire in Libya", 23.10.2020, https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/ceasefire_agreement_between_libyan_parties_english.pdf, (26.05.2024).

³⁴² UNSMIL, "The Second Berlin Conference on Libya", 23.06.2021, https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2021_berlin_2_conclusions_final_-_eng.pdf, (26.05.2024).

while General Haftar maintained control over the Eastern Libya. The elections scheduled for December 2021 did not occur, and, as of now (July 2024), unifying national institutions in Libya remains a remote objective.³⁴³

3.2.4. Russian Order and Justice Perspectives towards Libya during the Arab Spring

As previously stated, after the collapse of the USSR, Russia focused on recovering its economy and ceased providing projects and aid to African countries. However, in 2000, after Putin came to power and adopted a multidimensional foreign policy in a multipolar world, Russia began to pursue active policies towards the Middle East.³⁴⁴ This was part of Putin's ambitious foreign policy to regain the power Russia had lost through the collapse of the USSR.³⁴⁵ Putin tried to make Russia a great power again by reviving the country's economy, preventing the global hegemony of the United States by restoring Russian prestige, and suppressing the Chechen uprisings by cutting aid from Middle Eastern countries that supported the uprisings.³⁴⁶

In particular, during the Arab Spring, Russia's Middle East policy began to reshape. Russia's primary aims were to protect its political, military, and economic interests in the region; maintain its active position in the context of the global balance of power; and prevent the negative effects that the Arab Spring could have on its domestic political and social dynamics. Russia was cautious about Arab uprisings and preferred to stay in the background during the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Bahrain due to its limited relations with these countries. However, Russia's political, military, and economic relations with Libya and Syria led it to pursue an active policy when revolts broke out in these countries.³⁴⁷

³⁴³ Teresa Whitfield, "From the Outside in: The Berlin International Conference on Libya", February 2024, <https://www.c-r.org/accord/still-time-talk/outside-berlin-international-conference-libya>, (26.05.2024).

³⁴⁴ Bayat, p. 177.

³⁴⁵ Gökhan Telatar, "Rusya ve Arap Baharı: Batı ile Yeni Soğuk Savaş mı?", **AİBÜ Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi**, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2015, p. 178.

³⁴⁶ Robert O. Freedman, "Russia and the Middle East Under Putin", **Ortadoğu Etütleri**, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2010, p. 14.

³⁴⁷ Erşen, pp. 115,117.

Russia supported the Qaddafi regime, with which it had good relations, during violent conflicts in Libya, but it also faced pressure from the West to support the opposition.³⁴⁸ The UN took action when a civil war broke out between Gaddafi and opposition forces, resulting in hundreds of deaths, arbitrary detention, and inhumane treatment.³⁴⁹ Based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 1970 on 26 February 2011. This resolution welcomed the denunciations by the Arab League, the AU, and the Secretary General of the OIC about human rights and international law violations. The resolution referred to the first pillar of R2P which included the protection responsibilities of the state. In this context, it recalled Libyan authorities to uphold the R2P principle on its people and demanded an end to violence. Under Article 41 of the UN Charter, the resolution referred Libya's situation to the Prosecutor of the ICC and decided to apply an arms embargo. Additionally, it imposed a travel ban on 16 members of the Gaddafi government and an asset freeze for 6 people who were close to the regime.³⁵⁰

On the same day, at the 6491st meeting of the UNSC, Russia voted in favour of Resolution 1970. It can be argued that Russia's vote is related to its support for the first pillar of R2P, namely state responsibility. Russia expressed concern about the civilians who lost their lives and called for an end to the use of force against peaceful protesters.³⁵¹ Russia's concern about the lives of civilians seemed to reflect Hedley Bull's concept of human justice, which emphasizes individual rights and obligations, including the right to free expression. Russia indicated that any form of violence against peaceful protesters was unacceptable and that the situation in Libya could only be solved through political means, not intervention.³⁵² This argument reflected the Russian support for pluralist international society. In the meeting, Russia called upon the Libyan authorities to meet the request of the international community, including the Arab League and AU concerning the human rights violations. This was regarded

³⁴⁸ Malashenko, p. 11.

³⁴⁹ Sinem Çakır, "Rusya'nın Libya Krizi Politikası", *Topkapı Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2022, p. 96.

³⁵⁰ UNSC, "Resolution 1970 (2011)", *S/RES/1970*, 26.02.2011, <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n11/245/58/pdf/n1124558.pdf?token=2yg0MOoCjPKPbMMMYI&fe=true>, (20.05.2024), pp. 1-10.

³⁵¹ UNSC, "6491st Meeting", *S/PV.6491*, 26.02.2011, <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya%20S%20PV%206491.pdf>, (28.04.2024), p. 4.

³⁵² UNSC, 6491st Meeting, p. 4.

as essential to prevent a full-scale war and to protect Libya as a united and sovereign state with territorial integrity.³⁵³ This reflected Russia's concern about international order because the emergence of a civil war would affect not only Libya but also relations between Libya and other states. Thus, fulfilling human justice in Libya was seen as a condition of maintaining the existing pluralist international order from the Russian perspective.

However, there were also limits to the Russian concern for human justice in Libya and elsewhere. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev cautioned against the rise of fanatics in the Middle East and the spread of extremism during a meeting of the National Anti-Terrorism Committee.³⁵⁴ He argued that the West was triggering these uprisings with the ultimate goal of bringing political change to Russia. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin warned that the western efforts to impose democracy could result in the rise of Islamists and that their ascent in North Africa would negatively affect other regions, including Russia's North Caucasus, which frequently experienced terrorist attacks. In these statements, Putin and Medvedev's primary concern for maintaining the international order can be seen.³⁵⁵

The UN passed a new resolution in response to the failure to stop the fighting between Gaddafi and opposition forces, and a call from regional organizations for a no-fly zone on 17 March 2011. Resolution 1973 condemned the Libyan authorities for their non-compliance with Resolution 1970 and expressed its concern over the worsening situation, increasing violence, and the high number of civilian casualties. The widespread and systematic attacks against civilians currently occurring in Libya could lead to crimes against humanity. Similar to the previous resolution, this resolution also repeated the denunciations by the Arab League, the AU, and the Secretary General of the OIC about human rights and international law violations. It determined that the situation in Libya still poses a threat to international peace and security. Resolution 1973 referred to paragraph 26 of Resolution 1970, expressing its capacity to take additional appropriate precautions if necessary to assist in the return of humanitarian agencies and to provide humanitarian assistance in Libya through the

³⁵³ UNSC, 6491st Meeting, p. 4.

³⁵⁴ President of Russia, "Dmitry Medvedev Held a Meeting of the National Anti-Terrorism Committee in Vladikavkaz", *Events*, 22.02.2011, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/10408>, (29.05.2024).

³⁵⁵ Dannreuther and Katz, pp. 4-5.

implementation of a no-fly zone. Establishing a no-fly zone was intended to impose a ban on all flights in Libyan airspace to protect civilians,³⁵⁶ except for flights conducting humanitarian missions or those needed to enforce the ban.³⁵⁷ It can be argued that the establishment of a no-fly zone prepared a foundation to apply the last pillar of R2P (timely and decisive response) in Libya with military intervention.

Russia announced its abstention at the 6498th meeting held on the same day. It argued that its stance on the clear unacceptability of using force against Libya's civilian population had not changed. All attacks on civilians and other breaches of international humanitarian law and human rights had to be immediately and unconditionally stopped.³⁵⁸ These statements once again seemed to align with Bull's concept of human justice. Also, Bull's argument that states and nations have rights and obligations aligns with Russia's expectation that Libyan authorities had a responsibility to protect their people, which was one of the requirements of Resolution 1970. From this perspective, Russia referred to the first pillar of R2P. In the meeting, Russia indicated that there were unanswered questions, such as how the no-fly zone would be applied and what the limits on the use of force would be. Russia said that the draft exceeded the Arab League's demand for a no-fly zone and included provisions that might result in large-scale military intervention.³⁵⁹ For Russia, such intervention was a potential threat to the international order due to the involvement of many actors. Interfering in the internal affairs of a country through an external intervention was an act that Russia did not support. The realization of this situation would disrupt the peace and security not only of the civilian population in Libya but also of the entire region in North Africa and the Middle East. Therefore, from Russia's perspective, such destabilizing events had to be prevented.³⁶⁰ These statements reflected Russia's desire to protect the international order, including the fundamental pluralist principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention.

According to Alex Bellamy, Resolution 1973 was important because it marked the first instance in which the UNSC allowed the use of military force to protect human

³⁵⁶ UNSC, "Resolution 1973 (2011)", **S/RES/1973**, 17.03.2011, <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n11/268/39/pdf/n1126839.pdf?token=kmuGiX72iraZkbJRrN&fe=true>, (22.04.2024), p. 1-3.

³⁵⁷ Glanville, p. 335.

³⁵⁸ UNSC 6498th Meeting, p. 8.

³⁵⁹ UNSC 6498th Meeting, p. 8.

³⁶⁰ UNSC 6498th Meeting, p. 8.

rights without the request of a functioning government.³⁶¹ Russia, which normally argues that such an action cannot be legitimate without the consent of the sovereign state, did not oppose the resolution due to its endorsement by the relevant regional organizations, particularly the Arab League.³⁶² Russia did not veto Resolution 1973 because it aimed at the protection of civilians and the establishment of an immediate ceasefire; there was a Russian hope that it could help save many human lives.³⁶³ Russia might have been afraid of the international community's reaction and of being accused of causing more casualties if it had vetoed the resolution.³⁶⁴

Russia was caught in between the desire to keep the Russian ally Qaddafi in power and the Western pressure to allow international support to the rebels.³⁶⁵ Russia wanted to maintain good relations with the United States and the West despite its concern with the US-led military interventions.³⁶⁶ At the same time Moscow wanted to minimize the damage Russia-Libya relations would get in order to avoid the postponement of existing projects.³⁶⁷ However, after NATO's operations began, Russia began to criticize the intervention, arguing that some NATO actions in Libya were going beyond the mandate given by the UNSC.³⁶⁸

At this point, the difference of opinion between Putin and Medvedev also influenced Russia's abstention. While Putin supported vetoing the decision, Medvedev believed intervention was necessary.³⁶⁹ Even though Putin criticized military intervention as a crusade, Medvedev stated that identifying the USA/NATO action with words such as crusade was intolerable and pointed out that he did not object to the UNSC Resolution 1973 against Libya.³⁷⁰ Medvedev did not support Putin's views because there was an ongoing reset policy that included resetting the problems between Russia and the United States and restarting the dialogue between the two countries. Medvedev stated that the situation in Libya should not lead to a clash of civilizations

³⁶¹ Alex J. Bellamy, "Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm", **Ethics & International Affairs**, Vol. 25, No. 3, 2011, p. 263.

³⁶² Glanville, p. 326.

³⁶³ UNSC 6498th Meeting, p. 8.

³⁶⁴ Bayat, p. 193.

³⁶⁵ Malashenko, p. 11.

³⁶⁶ Dannreuther and Katz, p. 5.

³⁶⁷ Bayat, p. 193.

³⁶⁸ Silander, p. 278.

³⁶⁹ Bayat, p. 193.

³⁷⁰ Dannreuther and Katz, p. 5.

between the West and Russia.³⁷¹ His statement aligns with the international order's goal of peace in the sense of avoiding war under the normal conditions of international society membership, which is only violated under extreme conditions. He was also trying to align with the West on Libya to facilitate Russia's membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and to attract Western investment in the country.³⁷² Russia's desire to join this organization demonstrates its interest in participating in decisions made by international organizations, which aligns with Bull's idea that great powers are entrusted with overseeing the management of international society³⁷³ as well as its concern to be represented in many international institutions as possible to remain as a great power and share an equal status with the other great powers. Russia, by allowing Resolution 1973 to pass, aimed to open the way to NATO to provide safety to civilians by creating a no-fly zone and imposing an arms embargo, hoping that these would avoid the possible use of force. But as the NATO air strikes went astray from the framework set forth, Russia turned critical.

The UNSC passed Resolution 2009 which denounced all violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including unlawful killings, violence against civilians, and arbitrary arrests and detentions, especially targeting African migrants and minority communities. The resolution emphasized that national ownership and responsibility are essential for establishing lasting peace and that national authorities have the primary role in determining their priorities and strategies for post-conflict peace-building. It reaffirmed that the UN should lead the international society's efforts in assisting Libya in its transition and rebuilding process, aimed at establishing a democratic, independent, and united Libya. In this context, the resolution decided to create a United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), led by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General, for an initial period of three months. The mandate of UNSMIL would include the restoration of public security and order, support for transitional justice and Libyan national efforts to broaden state authority, strengthen institutions, protect human rights, and provide national reconciliation.³⁷⁴

³⁷¹ Erşen, p. 124.

³⁷² Askarov, p. 205.

³⁷³ Bull, p. 17.

³⁷⁴ UNSC, "Resolution 2009 (2011)", **S/RES/2009**, 16.09.2011, <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n11/502/44/pdf/n1150244.pdf?token=gvICFG9uoagiLIWLjf&fe=true>, (01.05.2024), pp. 1-3.

In the 6620th meeting, Russia voted in favour of the resolution and indicated that achieving peace in Libya through political and diplomatic means was a top priority.³⁷⁵ In the meeting, Russia complained about the arbitrary violations of the no-fly zone. Reminding that the purpose of establishing the no-fly zone was to protect civilians, Russia stated that it was now pointless to maintain the no-fly zone due to the air strikes that disregarded the Council's mandate for operations in Libya and caused civilian casualties. Russia indicated that a comprehensive investigation had to be conducted into all instances of human rights violations that have occurred during the Libyan conflict. Russia drew attention to the mass killing, torture, and arbitrary detention of detainees and called on the National Transitional Council to take appropriate action.³⁷⁶ Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that due to international humanitarian rules enshrined in the Geneva Conventions it was unjust to kill Qaddafi; he had been denied of the specific procedures mentioned in the Conventions involving taking into custody and providing medical assistance and trial. He also pointed out that the main objective of UNSC was to hand over Qaddafi to ICC rather than to assassinate him.³⁷⁷ In these statements, Russia's concern for human justice can be seen. Also, Russia's demand for an investigation reminds Bull's idea that an enduring order could not exist without justice. Therefore, providing justice in Libya was regarded as a condition of the stability of international order.

Russian officials were fierce about the death of Qaddafi and blamed the United States for it. Putin said, "Is that democracy? Who did this? Drones, including those of the U.S., struck his motorcade and then commandos, who were not supposed to be there, called for the so-called opposition and militants by the radio, and he was killed without an investigation or trial".³⁷⁸ The UNSC passed Resolution 2016 which envisioned a future for Libya based on national reconciliation, justice, respect for human rights, and the rule of law. It emphasized the importance of ensuring the full

³⁷⁵ UNSC, "6620th Meeting", **S/PV.6620**, 16.09.2011, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/710981?ln=en&v=pdf>, (02.05.2024), p. 3.

³⁷⁶ UNSC, 6620th Meeting, p. 3.

³⁷⁷ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation, "Answers by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to Listeners' Questions on the Voice of Russia, Radio Russia and Echo of Moscow Radio Stations, October 21, 2011", **News**, 22.10.2011, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1619045/, (25.06.2024).

³⁷⁸ Maxim Tkachenko, "Putin Points to U.S. Role in Gadhafi's Killing", CNN, 15.12.2011, <https://edition.cnn.com/2011/12/15/world/europe/russia-putin-libya/index.html>, (09.08.2024).

and effective participation of all social and ethnic groups, including equal involvement of women and minority communities, in post-conflict discussions.³⁷⁹ These statements align with Bull's concept of human justice. In this respect, those obligations fall upon the Libyan authorities to promote and protect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the Libyans. Also, the resolution expressed concern about the proliferation of arms in Libya and the potential threats it poses to regional peace and security.³⁸⁰ This statement reflects Bull's concept of international order. Preventing the spread of arms is crucial for avoiding further conflict and maintaining stability both within Libya and throughout the region. Russia's support for the resolution demonstrates its concern with human justice and domestic order within the post-intervention Libya because of the likely impact of that (dis)order for international and regional order and for the future of Russia-Libya relations.

Resolution 2017 highlighted the need to prevent the proliferation of all types of arms and related materials at national, regional and international levels. The resolution argued that there was an urgent need to protect and destroy chemical weapons stockpiles in Libya. Additionally, it warned about the increased risk of terrorism due to the proliferation of arms. By arguing that terrorism was a major threat to international peace and security, the UNSC reminded member states of their duty to combat terrorism.³⁸¹ Russia supported this resolution and expressed its concern over the uncontrolled proliferation of all kinds of weapons because any significant violation of the Security Council's arms embargo could destabilize the whole region. Libyan authorities were responsible for addressing this issue, but there was a need for constructive cooperation between Libya's neighbours and the international community to provide an effective solution. Russia indicated that united efforts in this area would be beneficial for everyone.³⁸² These statements reflect Bull's concept of international order, which asserts that a society of states shares common goals in social life. Combating terrorism and preventing arms proliferation are among the common goals of international society.

³⁷⁹ UNSC, "Resolution 2016 (2011)", **S/RES/2016**, 27.10.2011, <https://documents.un.org/>, (02.05.2024), p. 1.

³⁸⁰ UNSC Resolution 2016, p. 1.

³⁸¹ UNSC, "Resolution 2017 (2011)", **S/RES/2017**, 31.10.2011, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/714711?v=pdf>, (02.05.2024), pp. 1-2.

³⁸² UNSC, "6644th Meeting", **S/PV.6644**, 31.10.2011, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/714705?ln=en&v=pdf>, (03.05.2024), p. 2.

Apart from these most important resolutions and meetings, the remaining resolutions can be summarized as follows. These meetings, held between 2012 and 2015, included Russia's support for the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Libya; Russia's discomfort with the civilian casualties due to NATO's bombings; Russia's demand to punish those who committed crimes during the events in Libya and extend the mandate of the UNSMIL; and Russia's concern about the increasing level of terrorism threat and strengthening of the capacity of ISIL in Libya.³⁸³

Russia's Libya policy changed due to the civil war in Libya in 2014 after the NATO operation, the deterioration of relations with Libya after the operation, and the failure to realize previously signed economic agreements and projects. Additionally, the tendency of regional and global actors to pursue their own interests in the Libyan unrest³⁸⁴ and Russia's accusation of Libya of hosting foreign troops aiming to overthrow Bashar al-Assad in Syria pushed it out of the Libyan reconstruction process. However, Russia started to be influential in Libya after the civil war with its support for Haftar and the Libyan National Army. Russia sought to develop its relations with Egypt and the UAE by supporting Haftar and balancing US influence in these countries. By cooperating with Haftar, who controls a significant portion of the oil regions, Russia aimed to dominate the energy market and make Europe dependent on it by influencing the management of strategic points, and securing oil and construction agreements. Considering the presence of Russia's air and naval bases in Syria, Russia could have provided full control over the south-eastern Mediterranean with its Libyan extension. In addition, Russia wanted to take advantage of the rich underground resources in the Mediterranean and influence European migration politics.³⁸⁵ Russia's concern for protecting international order continued in the UN meetings of 2015 and afterwards. In February 2020, the UNSC passed resolution 2510 by indicating its strong support for the ongoing efforts of the UNSMIL and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, emphasizing the United Nations' crucial role in facilitating an inclusive political process led and owned by Libyans and arguing that no military solution can exist in Libya. This emphasized the urgent need for an unconditional and

³⁸³ United Nations Digital Library, "Speeches", <https://shorturl.at/q4I9Q>, (05.06.2024).

³⁸⁴ Özkan and Özkan, p. 112.

³⁸⁵ Çakır, pp. 97-98.

lasting ceasefire in Libya. The resolution supported the conclusions of the Berlin Conference and argued that these conclusions were an important part of a comprehensive solution to the Libyan situation.³⁸⁶ At some points, the resolution shared some commonalities with S/2020/63, which was the document of the Berlin Conference. For instance, they emphasized the importance of non-interference in Libya's armed conflict and internal affairs, urging all international actors to adopt the same approach. The document called on all Libyan parties to re-engage in an inclusive, Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process facilitated by UNSMIL.³⁸⁷

Russia indicated that its representatives actively participated in the preparations for the Conference by organizing a meeting between the Libyan parties.³⁸⁸ It can be argued that by employing diplomacy, one of the institutions of international society, Russia aimed to maintain international order by facilitating effective communication among the parties. Russia abstained on Resolution 2510 because it was not certain whether all Libyan parties were ready to apply the ceasefire decision. In addition, the Libyan parties themselves did not give their explicit consent. Russia emphasized that only the Libyans should decide their country's future.³⁸⁹ These statements seem relevant to international order but align also with international justice due to the idea that all states have the right to self-determination.

During the 2021 and 2022 meetings, the main subject was to extend the mandate of UNSMIL. Later on, the UNSC gathered in the 9320th meeting where Russia harshly criticized the International Criminal Court (ICC) for having become a compliant tool of the western states, having acted according to their directives and political interests while having failed to implement Resolution 1970 (2011) or the Council's requests. For Russia, investigation reports submitted by the Prosecutor of the ICC were empty provisional documents and new justifications for continued inaction, while Security Council requests remained unfulfilled. Russia argued that the

³⁸⁶ UNSC, "Resolution 2510 (2020)", **S/RES/2510**, 12.02.2020, <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n20/038/00/pdf/n2003800.pdf?token=Ahn4tRQhdpxChtTH6z&fe=true>, (06.06.2024), pp. 1-3.

³⁸⁷ For further information see website. UNSC, "The Berlin Conference on Libya", **S/2020/63**, 22.01.2020, <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n20/017/57/pdf/n2001757.pdf?token=5XBODHmwq7FMcPhhyr&fe=true>, (06.06.2024), pp. 1-4.

³⁸⁸ UNSC, "8722nd Meeting", **S/PV.8722**, 12.02.2020, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3850582?ln=en&v=pdf>, (03.06.2024), p. 4.

³⁸⁹ UNSC 8722nd Meeting, pp. 4-5.

ICC, acting under the influence of Western countries, was deeply involved in NATO's military campaign against Libya. It also defended that NATO's intervention caused a protracted civil war and increased terrorism in Libya due to civil unrest.³⁹⁰ With these arguments, Russia expressed once again its strong support for non-intervention and its desire to protect the status quo as a reflection of its preference and support for a pluralist international society. Russia was concerned about regional order in Libya because it also affected the broader international order. According to Russia, the West had used the Court as a tool to create a pretext for NATO's unprovoked and unjustified military aggression by portraying the Libyan leader Qaddafi in a negative light. Russia argued that Qaddafi had been falsely accused, that he had been killed without a trial, and that no one had been found guilty. Russia, by pointing to the injustices of the ICC, argued that the ICC remained indifferent against NATO's war crimes committed during the alliance's invasion of Libya. Considering the ICC as a puppet of the West, Russia claimed that the ICC had acted under the command of the US and could not provide justice. Russia pointed out that after the US imposed sanctions on the ICC Prosecutor and judges, preliminary investigations of ICC into war crimes committed by the Americans, British and other NATO members in Afghanistan and Iraq had been immediately closed,³⁹¹ which brings to mind Bull's idea that international order only offers selective protection of human rights. Moreover, as Bull had said there are barriers to achieving human justice within the current structure of the international order. If certain states, namely the West, did not bring forward questions about human justice, these questions could not gain an outstanding place on the agenda of world politics. In this context, it is understandable why the Americans, the British, and other NATO members did not take penalties.

On April 16, 2024, the UNSC gathered in the 9605th meeting to discuss the situation in Libya, where the two main parties to the conflict in the country have lost their legitimacy in the eyes of the Libyans due to them being elected a decade ago, pointing to the necessity of a renewed elections. Russia said that, given the ongoing duality of power in Libya, it had to be concluded that there were no prospects for a

³⁹⁰ UNSC, "9320th Meeting", **S/PV.9320**, 11.05.2023, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4011375?ln=en&v=pdf>, (03.06.2024), pp. 2-11.

³⁹¹ UNSC, "9320th Meeting", **S/PV.9320**, 11.05.2023, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4011375?ln=en&v=pdf>, (03.06.2024), pp. 2-11.

sustainable settlement. Persistent political stagnation has been worsening security, undermining order, and increasing public discontent. Thus, it was essential for all the Libyan parties to engage in Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political processes under UN protection.³⁹² Russia's reemphasizing the self-determination rights of the Libyans aligns with Bull's international justice concept which gives rights and obligations to states and nations. Russia has also wanted to see a unified government, and in this context, regarded holding parliamentary and presidential elections as crucial for maintaining stability in Libya. Russia pointed to the increasing influence of international and regional terrorist groups in the country and regarded violations of the Libyan arms embargo as a cause of great concern.³⁹³ These statements align with the aim of the international order, which is the protection of the system and society of states. Although states have differences, they have been united in their opinion that they are the main players in world politics and the main holders of rights and obligations within it. Russia indicated its active support for normalizing the situation in the country through both multilateral and bilateral meetings. It pointed to its ongoing efforts to pursue positive communication with all Libyan stakeholders, encouraging them to participate in dialogue and seek compromise.³⁹⁴ With these attempts, Russia sought to contribute to the internal order of Libya. Russia expressed its support for ending the foreign military existence in a coordinated, balanced, and step-by-step manner. It argued that the withdrawal of foreign military existence would contribute to the normalization and stabilization of the country.³⁹⁵ This argument, once again, aligns with state sovereignty and its protection, which are the main characteristics of a pluralist international society.

³⁹² UNSC, "9605th Meeting", **S/PV.9605**, 16.04.2024, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4045583?ln=en&v=pdf>, (03.06.2024), p. 2.

³⁹³ UNSC 9605th Meeting, p. 8.

³⁹⁴ UNSC 9605th Meeting, pp. 8-9.

³⁹⁵ UNSC 9605th Meeting, pp. 8-9.

3.3. RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVES DURING THE ARAB SPRING ON SYRIA

3.3.1. Russia-Syria Relations from the Cold War to the Arab Spring

After years of Ottoman and then French rule, Syria was officially recognised as an independent state in 1946. The USSR, aiming to gain influence in Syria, had already recognized the country's independence in 1944. From the USSR's perspective, Syria was important because of its Mediterranean location. Syria offered Russia not only a strategic presence in the Middle East and at the core of the Arab world but also access to a port on the Mediterranean coast. Furthermore, Syria presented significant economic opportunities for the USSR as a customer of both civilian and military products.³⁹⁶ After they signed a trade agreement in November 1955, the USSR began to provide Syria with loans and equipment for military and economic development.³⁹⁷

During the Cold War, the Baghdad Pact was established as an alliance against the USSR to prevent the spread of communism in the Middle East. Syria considered the Pact a threat to its security and established a close diplomatic relationship with the USSR. Also, in the Suez crisis, the Soviet support for Egypt brought Egypt's ally Syria closer to the USSR and enhanced the country's prestige in the Middle East.³⁹⁸ Syria experienced multiple coups d'états, frequent cabinet changes, and military dictatorships between 1949 and 1953. The occurrence of these coups was exploited by western powers, which led to the rise of anti-western sentiment among the Syrian people. The Soviets also contributed to this sentiment by supporting the anti-imperialist discourses against the US.³⁹⁹ In addition, an arms agreement signed between the USSR and Syria paved the way for the USSR to become Syria's most important arms supplier. After the 1963 coup, the Ba'athist party came to power, and the existence of socialist ideas within the party helped reinforce the relations between

³⁹⁶ Luke Bartz, "Russian-Syrian Relations: Past and Present", *Journal of Global Affairs*, Vol. 5, 2016, p. 62.

³⁹⁷ Emre Amir, *Rusya'nın Suriye Krizine Müdahalesi: Arap Ayaklanmaları ve Rus Dış Politikası*, İstanbul, 2021, p. 51.

³⁹⁸ Elvin Aghayev and Filiz Katman, "Historical Background and the Present State of the Russian-Syrian Relations", *European Researcher*, Vol. 35, No. 11-3, 2012, p. 2067.

³⁹⁹ Arda Ercan and Refik L. Tezcan, "Rusya'nın Suriye Politikasının Geçmişten Günümüze Etkileri", *Kocaeli Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, Vol. 42, 2021, pp. 70-71.

Syria and the USSR.⁴⁰⁰ In the following years, the Soviets gained the right to use Syria's ports in Latakia and Tartus.⁴⁰¹ The USSR focused on Syria when its other ally, Egypt, signed the Camp David Agreement with Israel in 1979 and chose to reconcile with Israel and the West. From then on Egypt lost its role as an ally for the USSR, and this situation led to a stronger rapprochement between Syria and the USSR.⁴⁰²

When the USSR invaded Afghanistan, Syria refused to denounce the attack, despite the Arab-Muslim public opinion. Moreover, both countries signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.⁴⁰³ With this agreement, the USSR confronted Israel because of its description of Zionism as racism. Additionally, the USSR assured Syria that it would provide aid in the event of an Israeli attack on Syria.⁴⁰⁴ The relations between the two countries declined when the USSR tried to restore diplomatic relations with Israel and allowed Soviet-Jewish immigration to the country. In addition, the Soviet armies' supply to Syria also decreased.⁴⁰⁵ Russian leader Gorbachev informed Assad that Syria was no longer the USSR's sole ally in the Middle East.⁴⁰⁶ Nevertheless, their relations continued despite Syria's arms debts and Russia's internal problems and economic crisis.⁴⁰⁷

After the collapse of the USSR, Russia focused on recovering its economy and receiving Western support in its fight against the Chechen uprising.⁴⁰⁸ Thus, Russia's relationship with Syria did not develop until 2005. Then, Russia tried to re-establish ties with Syria due to Syria's willingness to pay its debts in cash, Russia's desire to convince Syria to make peace with Israel, and the existence of the port of Tartus on the Syrian coast, which was Russia's sole naval base in the Mediterranean region. In 2005, Syrian leader Bashar Assad, who came to power in 2000, visited Moscow for

⁴⁰⁰ Askarov, p. 208.

⁴⁰¹ Aron Lund, **From Cold War to Civil War: 75 Years of Russian-Syrian Relations**, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2019, p. 7.

⁴⁰² Amir, pp. 55-56.

⁴⁰³ Lund, p. 10.

⁴⁰⁴ Bilal Karabulut, "Karadeniz'den Ortadoğu'ya Uzanan Bir Dış Politika: Geçmişten Günümüze Suriye-Rusya İlişkileri", **Karadeniz Araştırmaları Dergisi**, No. 15, 2007, p. 75.

⁴⁰⁵ Andrej Kreutz, "Syria: Russia's Best Asset in the Middle East", **Russia/NIS Center**, November 2010, <https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/kreuzengrussiasyrianov2010.pdf>, (09.06.2024), p. 7.

⁴⁰⁶ Aghayev and Katman, p. 2068.

⁴⁰⁷ Burak Çalışkan, "Rusya-Suriye İlişkileri ve Ortadoğu Krizlerine Etkisi", **İnsamer**, <https://www.insamer.com/tr/uploads/pdf/rapor-rusya-suriye-iliskileri-ve-ortadogu-krizlerine-etkisi.pdf>, (10.06.2024), p. 2.

⁴⁰⁸ Çalışkan, p. 4.

the first time and made a deal with Russia to buy an air defence missile system for Syria, despite opposition from the US and Israel. In addition, Russia wrote off a large portion of Syria's debt and made instalments on the remaining debt. The Russian Tatneft company agreed with the Assad regime to explore and develop new oil and gas deposits in Syria. Another Russian company, Stroytransgaz, signed agreements with Syria to establish gas pipelines and gas processing plants.⁴⁰⁹ Russia did not want a democratic or Sunni fundamentalist regime to come to power in Syria. Because in the event of a regime change, Russia could lose agreements, investments, and other benefits. In addition, a Sunni fundamentalist regime could support Chechen insurgents.⁴¹⁰ Russia was satisfied with the current regime's support for its policy in the Northern Caucasus and its denunciation of Chechen insurgents as terrorists. After Syria's support for Russia during the 2008 Russian-Georgian war, Russia began negotiations with Syria to transform Tartus into a permanent naval base.⁴¹¹ In 2010, during his visit to Damascus, Medvedev committed to assisting Syria in building its oil and gas infrastructure and developing a nuclear energy plant. He was also the first Russian president to visit Damascus. One year later, the uprisings in the Middle East spread to Syria.⁴¹²

3.3.2. Effect of the Arab Spring on Syria

On 15 March 2011, inspired by the successful protests in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, the Syrian people began to protest against the regime. The reasons for the protests were corruption, despotism, and widespread human rights violations.⁴¹³ Anti-regime protests that began in Deraa spread to major cities such as Damascus, Hama, and Homs. Assad responded to the protests by offering minimal reforms while ordering security forces to suppress the demonstrations with force. Upon this order, the Syrian army fired on peaceful protestors and conducted mass arrests, targeting dissidents and indiscriminately detaining men and boys. In addition to torture and

⁴⁰⁹ Mark N. Katz, "Putin's Foreign Policy Toward Syria", **Middle East Review of International Affairs**, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2006, pp. 53-56.

⁴¹⁰ Katz, p. 60.

⁴¹¹ Kreutz, pp. 12,21.

⁴¹² Lund, p. 16.

⁴¹³ Bartz, p. 64.

extrajudicial executions, the Syrian army deployed tanks to lay siege in Daraa. The civilian death rate increased, and residents were cut off from essential supplies for 11 days, including food, water, medicine, communication, and electricity. When some protesters took up arms, civil unrest broke out in the country.⁴¹⁴

3.3.3. Reactions of International Society Towards the Uprisings in Syria

Due to its concern on civil unrest in Syria, the Arab League decided to establish a Special Committee on Syria to provide dialogue between the Syrian government and opposition forces in October 2011.⁴¹⁵ The League and Assad agreed on an action plan that included an end to violence by all parties, the release of political detainees, the start of dialogue with the opposition, and the permission of observers and international media to enter Syria. However, Syria did not comply with the action plan and the League suspended Syria's right to attend its meetings. Additionally, the League applied economic and political sanctions, such as a travel ban and asset freeze, against the Syrian regime in Arab countries.⁴¹⁶ The League proposed a new peace plan calling for the establishment of a national unity government in 2012.⁴¹⁷ Also, the Council of Arab League called on the UNSC to stop attacks by the Syrian regime based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter.⁴¹⁸

The GCC called for an immediate cessation of bloodshed and violence in Syria. The states of the GCC indicated their support for maintaining the security, stability, and unity of Syria.⁴¹⁹ They supported the Arab League's action plan, which was adopted in 2012.⁴²⁰ The OIC indicated its intention to convince the Syrian regime to pursue political reform and stop the use of force against civilians. However, the OIC stressed that outside powers should not intervene because doing so could jeopardize

⁴¹⁴ Council on Foreign Relations, "Syria's Civil War: The Descent Into Horror", 14.02.2023, <https://www.cfr.org/article/syrias-civil-war>, (11.06.2024).

⁴¹⁵ Müjge Küçükkeleş, "Arab League's Syrian Policy", **SETA Policy Brief**, No. 56, 2012, p. 6.

⁴¹⁶ Rishmawi, p. 57.

⁴¹⁷ Küçükkeleş, p. 9.

⁴¹⁸ Rishmawi, p. 58.

⁴¹⁹ Al Arabiya, "GCC Urges End to Syrian Bloodshed, Calls For Reforms", **News**, 06.08.2011, <https://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011%2F08%2F06%2F161072>, (15.06.2024).

⁴²⁰ GCC, **GCC The Process and Achievements**, 8th Edition, 2014, p. 26.

the safety of the Syrian people and create regional conflict.⁴²¹ The OIC demonstrated its support for a politically peaceful solution by suspending Syria's membership.⁴²² Due to increasing violence and the intolerable human rights situation, the EU suspended all its bilateral cooperation with the government of Syria and its supporters. The EU adopted sanctions such as a travel ban, asset freeze, arms embargo, and import bans on crude oil and petroleum products from Syria.⁴²³ The UN established the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria with the aim of investigating all violations of international human rights law. The Commission identified many human rights violations, such as excessive use of force, extrajudicial executions, arbitrary detention, torture, and sexual violence committed by the Syrian military and security forces.⁴²⁴

The UNSC convened in its 6524th meeting exclusively to discuss the Syrian crisis. UN Secretary General (UNSG) in his briefing indicated that even though Assad promised to implement political, social, and economic reforms, government crackdowns had increased. The SG denounced the use of force against peaceful protestors and demanded the investigation into all killings that occurred during the protests. Western countries such as the US, UK, France, and Germany supported the statements of the SG. In addition, they argued that the Syrian regime had to immediately stop repression and meet the demands of its people. Russia and China supported Assad's reforms, such as lifting the state of emergency. They supported non-intervention in Syria's internal affairs by offering constructive dialogue between the parties.⁴²⁵

A draft resolution titled S/2011/612 was presented to the UNSC in October 2011. This included denunciation of ongoing human rights violations and the use of

⁴²¹ Brookings, "Where Does the Organization of Islamic Cooperation Stand on the Arab Uprisings", **Events**, 12.12.2011, <https://www.brookings.edu/events/where-does-the-organization-of-islamic-cooperation-stand-on-the-arab-uprisings/>, (15.06.2024).

⁴²² Asma Alsharif, "Organization of Islamic Cooperation Suspends Syria", **Reuters**, 16.08.2012, <https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSBRE87E19F/>, (15.06.2024).

⁴²³ European Council, "Syria: EU Response to the Crisis", **Policies**, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/syria/>, (15.06.2024).

⁴²⁴ HRC, "Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic", 23.11.2011, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/iici-syria/documentation>, (14.06.2024), pp. 1-14.

⁴²⁵ UNSC, "6524th Meeting", **S/PV.6524**, 27.04.2011, <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Syria%20S%20PV%206524.pdf>, (13.06.2024), pp. 1-8.

force against civilians by the Syrian government. The resolution prepared by France, Germany, Portugal and UK was vetoed by Russia and China.⁴²⁶ Three months later, another draft resolution titled S/2012/77 was presented to the UNSC. It supported the Arab League's Action Plan of November 2011 and its subsequent decisions. The resolution demanded the withdrawal of all Syrian military and armed forces from cities and towns.⁴²⁷ Although all 13 other UNSC member states supported the draft resolution, Russia and China vetoed.⁴²⁸ Through their vetoes both great powers tried to prevent a regime change in Syria because of both their general commitment to the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states and their dissatisfaction with the intervention in Libya.⁴²⁹

The UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) was established with the UNSC Resolution 2043.⁴³⁰ However, vetoes by China and Russia were clear on the third draft resolution titled S/2012/538, which proposed sanctions against Syria in cases of non-compliance with the Kofi Annan's Six-Point Plan.⁴³¹ The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which operated in Iraq, emerged in northern and eastern Syria in late 2013 under the name of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).⁴³² Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi tried to convince Emir Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of Al-Qaeda, to merge forces, but the plan failed and Zawahiri ordered the dissolution of ISIL. In the process of discarding ISIS's claim, Jabhat al-Nusra, also known as the Al-Nusra Front, sworn loyalty to al-Qaeda leader Zawahiri and

⁴²⁶ Justin Morris, "Libya and Syria: R2P and the Spectre of the Swinging Pendulum", **International Affairs**, Vol. 89, No. 5, 2013, p. 1274.

⁴²⁷ UNSC, "Including 20 UNSC Members: Draft Resolution", **S/2012/77**, 04.02.2012, <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Syria%20S2012%2077.pdf>, (17.06.2024), pp. 1-2.

⁴²⁸ Roy Allison, "Russia and Syria: Explaining Alignment With a Regime in Crisis", **International Affairs**, Vol. 89, No. 4, 2013, p. 799.

⁴²⁹ Caitlin A. Buckley, "Learning From Libya, Acting in Syria", **Journal of Strategic Security**, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2012, p. 89.

⁴³⁰ Rishmawi, p. 59.

⁴³¹ Mehmet T. Çağlar, "BMGK Daimi Üyelerinin Suriye Krizine Yaklaşımı: Uyuşmayan Talepler ve Çatışan Çözümler", **International Journal of Social Sciences Academy**, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2020, p. 982. Kofi Annan was the Joint Special Envoy of the UN and the Arab League. The Six Point Plan included respect for freedom of association and the right to protest peacefully, provide freedom of movement for journalists throughout the country, cease arbitrary arrests, provide humanitarian aid, stop violence within the country, and provide a ceasefire. For more information check <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2042> page 4.

⁴³² Aljazeera, "Twelve Years on From the Beginning of Syria's War", 15.03.2023, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/15/twelve-years-on-from-the-beginning-of-syrias-war>, (28.06.2024).

acknowledged its complete al-Qaeda alignment. In contrast to ISIS's dominant approach to the opposition, Al-Nusra built respect and reliance on other rebel groups and became a silent but important player in the resistance against the Assad regime.⁴³³ The increased number of terrorist groups in Syria made the opposition more violent and resulted in nearly impossible negotiations between the opposition and the government.

Some important resolutions that passed from the UNSC can be noted as follows. Resolution 2118 tried to mitigate the crisis created by the Assad regime due to its use of chemical weapons. Resolution 2170 accepted ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra as terrorist organizations. Resolution 2115 contributed to mitigating the humanitarian crisis through its decision to send humanitarian aid without obtaining permission from the Syrian regime.⁴³⁴ The Geneva Communiqué, also known as the Final Communiqué of the Action Group for Syria, was held to address the Syrian conflict through the implementation of Annan's Six Point Plan. The document emphasized the necessity of a local political transition to fulfil the legitimate expectations of Syrians. Members of the group agreed on principles for Syria's future, such as the emergence of a democratic and pluralistic state, solving problems through dialogue and negotiation alone, and respect for sovereignty, independence, and territorial unity.⁴³⁵ Lack of any immediate steps to form the transitional authority allowed opposition forces to refuse any communication with the regime. The western powers claimed that the first step for the formation of a transitional government required the termination of the Assad regime.⁴³⁶ Russia began its intervention in Syria after terrorist groups placed the Assad regime in a critical position by capturing Idlib in March 2015 and Palmyra in central Syria in May 2015.⁴³⁷ Following the already ongoing US-led coalition airstrikes targeting ISIS since June 2014, Russia began its own airstrikes. Russia and Iran

⁴³³ Jennifer Cafarella, **Middle East Security Report 25: Jabhat Al-Nusra in Syria (An Islamic Emirate for Al-Qaeda)**, Institute for the Study of War, Washington, 2014, pp. 12-16.

⁴³⁴ Çağlar, p. 985.

⁴³⁵ United Nations, "Final Communiqué of the Action Group for Syria", **A/66/865-S/2012/522**, 30.06.2012,

https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SY_120630_Final%20Communique%20of%20the%20Action%20Group%20for%20Syria.pdf, (27.06.2024), pp. 2-4.

⁴³⁶ Dmitri Trenin, **The Mythical Alliance: Russia's Syria Policy**, Carnegie Moscow Center, Russia, 2013, p. 20.

⁴³⁷ Robert Hamilton and others, **Russia's Intervention in Syria: Historical and Geopolitical Context**, (Ed. Thomas J. Shattuck), Foreign Policy Research Institute, September 2020, pp. 1-2.

supported the Syrian regime whereas the USA, UK, France, Turkey, and the Gulf states opposed the regime.⁴³⁸ This was another example of the balance of power played by the outside and regional powers vis-à-vis the domestic politics of an Arab state, endangering the existence of the regional society through the weakening of Syrian sovereignty.

Resolution 2254 underlined the need to combat terrorist groups in Syria, such as ISIS and Jabhar al-Nusra, calling for a cessation of any support for terrorist groups.⁴³⁹ When the Assad regime used chemical weapons to attack the rebel-held town of Khan Sheikhoun in Idlib Province, the UNSC in its 7922nd meeting on April 12, 2017 prepared a draft resolution to condemn the chemical attack and investigate what had occurred in Khan Sheikhoun, with many members claiming Russia was responsible for this incident, reminding the Russian veto on the previous draft resolution (S/2017/172) of February 2017, which could have averted the attack. While China abstained from the draft resolution, Russia once again vetoed it on the grounds that the investigations were not impartial.⁴⁴⁰

Russia explained its veto by arguing that the draft resolution determined the guilty side without independent and neutral investigations. After Putin's talks with the Turkish president Tayyip Erdoğan, they agreed on the creation of a demilitarised zone in Syria's Idlib region between Syrian government troops and the armed opposition in 2018.⁴⁴¹ The Government of Syria welcomed the agreement, and the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria thanked Russia and Turkey for their diplomacy, which had produced progress to address the challenges Idlib had faced, which represented the danger of a full-scale offensive. The UNSC hoped for the full implementation of the agreement on international humanitarian law, with sustained humanitarian access and with respect to the sovereignty, independence, unity, and integrity of Syria with

⁴³⁸ Kareem Shaheen and others, "Who backs whom in the Syrian conflict", **The Guardian**, 02.12.2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2015/oct/09/who-backs-whom-in-the-syrian-conflict>, (29.06.2024).

⁴³⁹ UNSC, "7588th meeting", **S/PV.7588**, 18.12.2015, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/814712/files/S_PV.7588-EN.pdf, (29.06.2024), p. 3.

⁴⁴⁰ UNSC, "7922nd meeting", **S/PV.7922**, 12.04.2017, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_7922.pdf, (30.06.2024), pp. 2-3.

⁴⁴¹ Maria Tsvetkova, "Russia and Turkey agree to create buffer zone in Syria's Idlib", **Reuters World**, 17.09.2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/world/russia-and-turkey-agree-to-create-buffer-zone-in-syrias-idlib-idUSKCN1LX1DU/>, (01.07.2024).

dialogue to address complex problems.⁴⁴² However, violence arose in Idlib as the Assad regime attempted to take control of the last major stronghold of the opposition force. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), after the airstrikes from the regime-ally Russia and the clashes between Syrian regime forces and armed groups, many civilians attempted to flee from Idlib while the rest waited for the violence to stop.⁴⁴³

During a meeting between Turkey and Russia's presidents, a ceasefire in Idlib was agreed, delaying the Syrian army of Bashar al-Assad from taking over the entire province but sanctioning its territorial gains in the south of Idlib.⁴⁴⁴ After being briefed about the agreement, members of the UNSC welcomed the agreement but were unable to adopt a joint statement on supporting the diplomatic action due to the position of one delegate.⁴⁴⁵ Resolution 2533 (2020) was adopted in the UNSC after the coronavirus pandemic to renew humanitarian aid decisions previously taken in Resolution 2165 (2014).⁴⁴⁶ Previous draft resolutions were rejected by the permanent Council members, Russia and China.⁴⁴⁷

In the following years, humanitarian aid continued and aimed to create a secure environment for the Syrians to return to their country. For this reason, Resolution 2642 extended the duration of humanitarian aid to six months and later Resolution 2672 extended it to another six months in 2023.⁴⁴⁸ The UNSC had its 9640th meeting to discuss the escalation of the conflict between Israel and Palestine since 2023 and

⁴⁴²UNSC, "8355th meeting", **S/PV.8355**, 18.09.2018, <https://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=S/PV.8355&Lang=E>, (01.07.2024), pp. 2-8.

⁴⁴³ NEWS WIRES, "Tens of thousands flee renewed clashes and Russian airstrikes in Syria", **France 24**, 21.12.2019, <https://f24.my/5yND>, (01.07.2024).

⁴⁴⁴Agnieszka Legucka and Karol Wasilewski, "The Turkish-Russian Agreement on Syria", **The Polish Institute of International Affairs**, 06.03.2020, https://www.pism.pl/publications/The_TurkishRussian_Agreement_on_Syria, (01.07.2024).

⁴⁴⁵ Umer Jamshaid, "UNSC Fails To Adopt Statement Backing Russia-Turkey Agreement On Idlib - Nebenzia", 07.03.2020, <https://www.urdupoint.com/en/world/unsc-fails-to-adopt-statement-backing-russia-857286.html>, (01.07.2024).

⁴⁴⁶ UNSC, "Resolution 2533 (2020)", **S/RES/2533 (2020)**, 13.07.2020, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3871720/files/S_RES_2533_%282020%29-EN.pdf?version=1, (01.07.2024).

⁴⁴⁷ UN, "In Two Separate Votes, Security Council Fails to Adopt Resolutions Extending Cross-Border Mechanism for Humanitarian Aid Delivery into Syria", 10.07.2020, <https://press.un.org/en/2020/sc14246.doc.htm>, (01.07.2024). The draft resolutions aimed for a wider range of borders and longer duration of aid, but they were reduced to include only the Bab al-Hawa border and to last for 12 months.

⁴⁴⁸ Security Council Report, "UN Documents for Syria: Security Council Resolutions", https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un_documents_type/security-council-resolutions/?ctype=Syria&cctype=syria, (01.07.2024).

Syria's involvement in the conflict with Israel in 2024. It expressed concern over the Israeli airstrikes on Syrian territory and drone attacks from the Syrian territory towards the Israeli-occupied Syrian Golan and Israel.⁴⁴⁹ While it is certain that the Syrian situation has improved since the Arab Spring with the involvement of the international community and the great powers, considering the ongoing presence of terrorism and conflict in the region, the situation is far from ending as of 2024.

3.3.4. Russian Order and Justice Perspectives towards Syria during the Arab Spring

The Libyan experience was a great lesson for Russia. Following the establishment of a no-fly zone with Resolution 1973 through NATO intervention, which resulted in a regime change in Libya, Russia adopted a far more cautious approach towards Syria.⁴⁵⁰ By using its veto power, Russia tried to limit the UNSC's involvement from the beginning.⁴⁵¹ In the 6524th meeting which was held in 2011, Russia expressed its concern over the rising tension and conflict among the army, protestors, and law enforcement personnel. Russia's expectation of implementing transparent and effective investigation and punishment of criminals by the Syrian regime aligns with the international justice concept which gives rights and obligations to states and nations. However, Russia expected from the Syrian government to find fair solutions to the existing problems.⁴⁵² This statement demonstrates Russia's pluralist side with its focus on state sovereignty and its protection. In the meeting, Russia accepted the existence of rising tensions and confrontations in Syria but argued that such tensions did not pose a threat to international peace and security. Russia pointed out that a real threat could emerge if outside powers interfered in Syria's internal affairs by providing ready-made solutions or taking sides. This could lead to lasting violence and civil war.⁴⁵³ Russia's persistent support for non-intervention and

⁴⁴⁹ UNSC, "9640th meeting", **S/PV.9640**, 30.05.2024,

https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4052423/files/S_PV.9640-EN.pdf?ln=en, (01.07.2024).

⁴⁵⁰ Sergei Lavrov, "On the Right Side of History", **Huffpost**, 14.08.2012, https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/sergei-lavrov/russia-syria-on-the-right-side-of-history_b_1596400.html, (26.06.2024).

⁴⁵¹ Allison, p. 798.

⁴⁵² UNSC 6524th Meeting, p. 7.

⁴⁵³ UNSC 6524th Meeting, p. 7.

its concern for international order can be seen in these statements, since it considered Syria a cornerstone of the Middle East security and believed that Syria's destabilization could create problems throughout the region.

A draft resolution titled S/2011/612 was discussed by the UNSC which called on the Syrian regime to stop the use of force against the civilians and reminded the regime's responsibility to protect its population from war crimes and crimes against humanity. This indicated that a solution to the Syrian crisis could only be provided through an inclusive and Syrian-led political process. Realizing this would require meeting the legitimate demands of people by allowing them to exercise their basic freedoms (i.e. freedom of expression, assembly and peaceful protest). The resolution expressed regret due to the Syrian regime's backtracking on reform. Most importantly, it called on all states to limit the direct or indirect supply or transfer of arms and all related materials to Syria. Also, it was expected that Syria would implement the resolution within 30 days; otherwise, the UNSC would consider applying measures such as suspending economic and diplomatic relations.⁴⁵⁴

In the 6627th meeting, which was held on the same day, Russia vetoed the draft resolution because of its unilateral and accusatory nature towards the Syrian regime. For Russia, the threat of an ultimatum and sanctions on the regime was intolerable. Furthermore, this perspective contradicted the principle of peaceful settlement of the crisis based on a comprehensive Syrian national dialogue. In the meeting, Russia claimed that an important number of Syrians desired gradual changes, not rapid regime changes. Russia argued that western politicians' explanations of Assad's loss of legitimacy could increase conflict in Syria and instability in the Middle East.⁴⁵⁵ Russia's concern about maintaining international order can be seen in these statements. In the meeting by evoking what had happened in Libya, Russia argued that the Syrian case could not be addressed in the Council separately from the Libyan experience.

⁴⁵⁴ UNSC, "France, Germany, Portugal and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Draft Resolution", **S/2011/612**, 04.09.2011, <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Syria%20S2011%20612.pdf>, (17.06.2024), pp. 1-3.

⁴⁵⁵ UNSC, "6627th Meeting", **S/PV.6627**, 04.09.2011, <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Golan%20Heights%20S%20PV%206627.pdf>, (13.06.2024), pp. 3-5. Similar arguments can be seen in the 6810th meeting. See UNSC, "6810th Meeting", **S/PV.6810**, 19.07.2012, <https://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=S/PV.6810&Lang=E>, (13.06.2024), pp. 8-9.

Practices such as arms embargoes and no-fly zones had to be avoided.⁴⁵⁶ These statements demonstrate Russia's support for pluralist international society and its support for non-intervention. In other words, Russia disagreed with R2P's third pillar, the timely and decisive response, which contradicts the non-intervention principle. Russia said that it was not a supporter of the Assad regime and blamed both the regime and radical opposition for the ongoing violence. Russia argued that to end the crisis there was a need to assemble all responsible members of the international society and encourage them to establish an intra-Syrian political process. In addition, Russia's work with Damascus and the constructive patriotic groups of the Syrian opposition and its attempt to mitigate tensions⁴⁵⁷ align with one of the primary institutions of pluralist international society, namely diplomacy.

Medvedev in his speech reiterated that Russia was determined to oppose any efforts to use the UNSC to legitimize unilateral sanctions intended to bring about regime change.⁴⁵⁸ The reasons for Russian opposition to regime change can be noted as follows. Syria and Russia have similar international perspectives that support the pluralist emphasis on territorial sovereignty. Both regimes rejected the normative foundation of the solidarist, human-focused perspective of many Western states, as well as externally created regime change.⁴⁵⁹ As previously stated, considering their solid arms trade, Russian investments on a gas processing plant in Syria and Russian naval resupply base in Tartus, they were long-standing allies. In addition, Russia has been always concerned about the spread of radical Islamism throughout the Middle East, which, it thought, could encourage Islamists in Dagestan and Chechnya. Russian concern increased with the Islamisation of actors in the Syrian opposition, the emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and terror attacks on US officials in Libya.⁴⁶⁰ Russia's concerns seemed to have solid grounds due to the participation of hundreds of volunteers from the North Caucasus in ISIS' ranks.⁴⁶¹

⁴⁵⁶ UNSC 6627th Meeting, pp. 3-5.

⁴⁵⁷ UNSC 6627th Meeting, pp. 3-5.

⁴⁵⁸ President of Russia, "Meeting with Security Council Members", **Events**, 07.10.2011, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/12972#sel=9:1:WVF,9:53:ov3>, (25.06.2024).

⁴⁵⁹ Allison, pp. 801-803.

⁴⁶⁰ Alex J. Bellamy, "From Tripoli to Damascus? Lesson Learning and the Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect", **International Politics**, Vol. 51, No. 1, 2014, (Lesson Learning), p. 37.

⁴⁶¹ Pavel K. Baev, "Russia as Opportunist or Spoiler in the Middle East?", **Italian Journal of International Affairs**, Vol. 50, No. 2, 2015, p. 13.

In the 6711th meeting, Russia explained the reason for its veto of a draft resolution titled S/2012/77. Russia stated that the draft resolution did not reflect the current situation in Syria and sent a biased signal to the Syrian parties. Russia blamed some effective members of international society for preventing them from finding a political solution due to their call for regime change, inciting opposition against the regime, tolerating provocation and increasing armed conflict. Russia's concern about Syria's internal order and its call for an immediate end to violence⁴⁶² align with the aim of maintaining the international order. At this point, international society had a common perspective, which was the restriction of violence in Syria. By vetoing the above resolutions, Russia showed not only its support for non-intervention but also its opposition to the use of the third pillar of R2P.

As a response to the Russian and Chinese vetoes, the Group of Friends of Syria was established with the proposition of the USA and France but could not end the conflict in the country. Russia criticised this initiative, arguing that the creation of such self-organized groups violated international law and the UN Charter, and that these groups tried to prepare the ground for military intervention.⁴⁶³ The UNSC Resolution 2043 established the UNSMIS for an initial period of 90 days. The resolution denounced the extensive violations of human rights by Syrian authorities and armed groups. It called on all parties as well as the opposition to stop all forms of armed violence and invited them to cooperate with the UN and related humanitarian organizations. In addition, it emphasised the duty of the Syrian regime to provide the safety of UNSMIS personnel.⁴⁶⁴ In the 6756th meeting, which was held on the same day, Russia considered this resolution significant in improving the process of peaceful settlement in Syria. Russia indicated that deviation from the provisions of the resolution would be unacceptable.⁴⁶⁵ These statements demonstrate Russian desire to maintain international order by providing internal order in Syria and reflect one of the

⁴⁶² UNSC, "6711th Meeting", **S/PV.6711**, 04.02.2011, <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Syria%20SPV%206711.pdf>, (13.06.2024), p. 9. Similar arguments can be seen in the 6756th meeting. See UNSC, "6756th Meeting", **S/PV.6756**, 21.04.2012, <https://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=S/PV.6756&Lang=E>, (20.06.2024), p. 2.

⁴⁶³ Allison, pp. 799-800.

⁴⁶⁴ UNSC, "Resolution 2043 (2012)", **S/RES/2043**, 21.04.2012, <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Syria%20SRES%202043.pdf>, (20.06.2024), pp. 1-3.

⁴⁶⁵ UNSC 6756th Meeting, p. 2.

common goals of international society, namely adherence to promises. Russian support for cooperation between all Syrian parties and UN observers demonstrated its goal to cease violence in the territory, which was a common goal of international society.

A draft resolution titled S/2012/538 was proposed by France, Germany, Portugal, UK and the USA. It reiterated its support for the full implementation of Annan's Six Point Plan, denounced the use of heavy weapons by the Syrian regime in population centres, and demanded an end to all forms of armed violence from all parties in Syria. The resolution decided to extend the UNSMIS mandate for 45 days.⁴⁶⁶ In the 6810th meeting, held on the same day, Russia vetoed the draft resolution arguing that it was contrary to the Geneva Communiqué and did not reflect the current situation in the country, but rather the western countries' own geopolitical interests.⁴⁶⁷

The UNSC adopted Resolution 2118 which decided to eliminate Syrian chemical weapons with an agreement between US and Russia in Geneva. The resolution expressed the need for rapid international control of chemical weapons and their components in Syria. In addition to the resolution's denunciation of the deaths of civilians due to those weapons, the resolution indicated that the use of chemical weapons was a significant violation of international law, and the proliferation of chemical weapons, including their delivery tools, posed a threat to international peace and security. The resolution fully supported the Geneva Communiqué.⁴⁶⁸ In the 7038th meeting, Russia expressed that the agreement on the elimination of chemical weapons was the result of cooperation between the US and Russia, and supported by all UNSC members.⁴⁶⁹ This reflected one of the common aims of international society, that is, to restrict violence that results in death or bodily damage. Russia indicated that it would attend to the application of the chemical-weapons disarmament process.⁴⁷⁰ Russia, by providing security in Syria, wanted to maintain regional and international order. In

⁴⁶⁶ UNSC, "France, Germany, Portugal and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: Draft Resolution", **S/2012/538**, 19.07.2012, <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Syria%20S2012%20538.pdf>, (17.06.2024), pp. 1-8.

⁴⁶⁷ UNSC 6810th Meeting, pp. 8-9.

⁴⁶⁸ UNSC, "Resolution 2118 (2013)", **S/RES/2118**, 27.09.2013, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2118.pdf, (28.06.2024), pp. 1-2.

⁴⁶⁹ UNSC, "7038th Meeting", **S/PV.7038**, 27.09.2013, <https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2FPV.7038&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False>, (28.06.2024), pp. 3-4.

⁴⁷⁰ UNSC 7038th Meeting, pp. 3-4.

addition, Russia, while fulfilling its obligations as a great power, used diplomacy as a tool of the international order. In this way, Russia demonstrated its ability to shape the international order while pursuing its own interests such as decreasing the effect of radical Islamist groups on the Muslim population within Russia.

When Russia started to intervene in Syria, Putin described it as action based on a request from the Syrian government to aid against terrorist organisations. Kremlin pointed out that they were conducting actions based on the fundamental principles of the UN Charter (i.e. international law) and that they only supported legitimate government entities unlike the USA, which provides support to illegal structures and violates international law. As he claimed, Russia was attempting to stop the creation of a power vacuum that would appear in Syria following the destruction of governmental agencies.⁴⁷¹ Some authors like Emil A. Souleimanov claimed that Russia's involvement in Syria was dependent on the West. In some cases, Russia stated that its main goal was to fight ISIS, while in other cases, it was to support the Assad regime. However, Russia's primary aim turned out to be the protection of the Assad regime rather than fighting common international jihadist forces such as ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra. Russian airstrikes mostly focused on western Syria, where the Free Syrian Army and the Shia armed groups operated.⁴⁷² Russia's approach was directly related to its own interests which resulted in the death of many civilians in the process. According to data from the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights dated 2020, whereas ISIS caused the death of 6,183 civilians, Russian airstrikes and missiles caused the death of 8,427 civilians.⁴⁷³

The UNSC adopted Resolution 2254, which referred to the Syrian authorities' responsibility to protect their people. The resolution emphasized that an inclusive and Syrian-led political process is the only sustainable solution to the Syrian crisis. Only Syrians can decide the country's future. The resolution indicated its support for a ceasefire throughout the country. It called for parties to permit rapid, safe and

⁴⁷¹ President of Russia, "Interview to American TV channel CBS and PBS", **Events**, 29.09.2015, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50380>, (28.06.2024).

⁴⁷² Emil A. Souleimanov, "Mission Accomplished? Russia's Withdrawal From Syria", **Middle East Policy**, Vol. 23, No. 2, 2016, pp. 108-109.

⁴⁷³ Syriaahr, "Nine Years of Syrian Revolution", 15.03.2020, <https://www.syriaahr.com/en/157510/>, (01.08.2024).

unhindered access to humanitarian agencies.⁴⁷⁴ It can be argued that Russia, by supporting this resolution, has referred to and supported the first pillar of R2P. In the 7588th UNSC meeting, during the talks on the situation in the Middle East, the Russian representative stated that the fight against terrorism had to be right and consistent anywhere in the world. Attempts to classify terrorists into good and bad categories were not acceptable.⁴⁷⁵ Russia's concern with terrorism was related to protecting international society and its own internal order. Russia argued that Resolution 2254 approved basic principles of political settlements, such as the self-determination rights of the Syrian people, keeping the structure of Syria unchanged (united, secular, multi-confessional and multi-ethnic state) and protecting every section of the population. According to Russia, this was a clear response against external attempts to dictate solutions to the Syrians.⁴⁷⁶ Russia's statement reflected once again its support for state sovereignty and non-intervention.

In the same month, Putin and Obama met in UNGA and kickstarted negotiations that led to a memorandum of understanding as a result of the discussions between the Pentagon and the Russian Defence Ministry, which included air safety protocols, the use of certain communication lines, and the construction of a 24-hour, on-the-ground operational communication line between US and Russian military personnel.⁴⁷⁷ The agreement to coordinate air operations in Syria between the two great powers bolstered the Russian claim to equality as a great power in international society. The Syrian ceasefire talks between the US and Russia ended after the noticeable unwillingness of the US military to cooperate with their counterparts in any way, which led Russia to seek an alternative. The Kremlin launched the Astana process in January 2017 in Kazakhstan's capital in a coalition with regional powers, namely Turkey and Iran, to hold peace talks on Syria. Results of the Astana process surpassed the short-term effects of the Geneva Communiqué, possibly because its members were regional rather than global. In a short period of time, a decrease in overall armed

⁴⁷⁴ UNSC, "Resolution 2254 (2015)", **S/RES/2254**, 18.12.2015, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2254>, (28.06.2024), pp. 1-3.

⁴⁷⁵ UNSC, "7588th meeting", **S/PV.7588**, 18.12.2015, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/814712/files/S_PV.7588-EN.pdf, (29.06.2024), p. 5.

⁴⁷⁶ UNSC 7588th meeting, p. 5.

⁴⁷⁷ Andrew S. Weiss and Nicole Ng, **Collision Avoidance: Lessons From U.S. and Russian Operations in Syria**, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Publications, Washington, March 2019, p.4.

violence in Syria was evident.⁴⁷⁸ In the same year, Assad regime used chemical weapons against the rebel-held town of Khan Sheikhoun in Idlib Province, causing over 500 injuries and 89 deaths. This repeated war crime revealed that Russia had not fulfilled its part of the agreement it had signed with the US in Geneva in 2013, approved by UNSC Resolution 2118.⁴⁷⁹ The Russian Defence Ministry claimed that a Syrian airstrike had hit a terrorist warehouse filled with chemical substances, while the Assad regime denied responsibility.⁴⁸⁰

A draft resolution titled S/2017/315 was proposed by France, Great Britain and the US, recalling Resolution 2118 and reminding Syria that it should not use, develop, produce, or obtain chemical weapons directly or indirectly. The resolution denounced the use of chemical weapons and expressed that those responsible should be judged.⁴⁸¹ In its 7922nd meeting, which was held on the same day, Russia explained its veto by arguing that the draft resolution determined the guilty side without independent and neutral investigations. It argued that the US attack on the Syrian air base three days after the incident without UNSC permission violated international law. Russia claimed that international actors did not take any substantial steps to investigate the incident. Russia expressed that common attempts had to be made to support the peace process in the Astana and Geneva platforms to enhance the ceasefire regime and fight terrorism.⁴⁸² These statements demonstrate Russia's attempt to present itself as caring for and protecting international order as well as its ability as a great power to shape international order.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the Sochi agreement which included the creation of a jointly monitored, demilitarised buffer zone in Idlib between the armed opposition forces and the Assad regime. While this agreement gained high praise from the UNSC, Russian interest was

⁴⁷⁸ Andrey Kortunov, "The MENA Region: A Great Power Competition; **The Astana Model: Methods and Ambitions of Russian Political Action**", ISP and Atlantic Council, 2019, pp. 56-57.

⁴⁷⁹ Hamilton and others, p. 4.

⁴⁸⁰ Martin Chulov and Kareem Shaheen, "Syria chemical weapons attack toll rises to 70 as Russian narrative is dismissed", **The Guardian**, 05.04.2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/04/syria-chemical-attack-idlib-province>, (01.07.2024).

⁴⁸¹ UNSC, "France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and United states of America: Draft Resolution", **S/2017/315**, 12.04.2017, <https://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=S/2017/315&Lang=E>, (30.06.2024), pp. 1-2.

⁴⁸² UNSC 7922nd meeting, pp. 6-8. The incident of the Khan Sheikhoun chemical attack occurred on April 4, 2017 and USA launched air strikes on Shayrat airbase on April 7, 2017.

focused on dealing with the terrorist groups in Idlib that were affiliated with Al-Qaeda. The Sochi agreement placed heavy responsibility on Turkey for the disarmament of radical groups, one of which was the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham led by Syria's former Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra. The National Liberation Front under Turkish supervision would move the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham out of Idlib. However, since the Turkish military was shifted elsewhere to fight their own terrorist problems, the National Liberation Front handed over the territories they held to the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and gave northern Idlib's control to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in 2019.⁴⁸³ The Russian Foreign Minister stated a week later in an interview that contrary to the agreement, 70% of Idlib was under terrorist control.⁴⁸⁴ Later that year, ignoring the agreement, Syrian and Russian planes launched a bombing campaign in Idlib, causing many civilians to flee the north toward Turkey.⁴⁸⁵ After these developments, an additional protocol was added to the Sochi agreement, underlining the need for unconditional acceptance of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic, and approving the Syrian government's territorial advances in Idlib province at Turkey's expense.⁴⁸⁶

In the 9640th meeting which was held in May 2024, Russia mentioned the ongoing escalation of military action in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and expressed its concern over the possibility of Syria's involvement in the conflict across the region. Russia described the presence of the USA's illegal armed forces in Syria as a pretext to fight terrorism. Russia referred to Resolution 2254 and reiterated its argument that there was no alternative other than improving the intra-Syrian settlement process. This indicated their constant support throughout the years for the idea that, without external pressure, Syrians should agree on all important issues.⁴⁸⁷ This was related to Syria's right to self-determination and international justice. Russia indicated that because of

⁴⁸³ Michaël Tanchum, "Turkey's In-between State of War and Peace with Russia", **Articles**, 25.03.2020, <https://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/636-turkeys-in-between-state-of-war-and-peace-with-russia.html>, (01.07.2024) .

⁴⁸⁴ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, "Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's statement and answers to media questions during a joint news conference following talks with Foreign Minister of Germany Heiko Maas, Moscow, January 18, 2019", **News**, 18.01.2019, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1451629/, (01.07.2024).

⁴⁸⁵ Hamilton and others, p. 7.

⁴⁸⁶ President of Russia, "Telephone Conversation with President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan", **Events**, 21.04.2020, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/63235>, (01.07.2024).

⁴⁸⁷ UNSC 9640th meeting, pp. 6-7.

the destructiveness of the conflict, the humanitarian situation has been continuing to worsen. Russia criticized the West for holding deceptive conferences on humanitarian issues without the attendance of legitimate Syrian authorities and claimed that the West was using humanitarian agendas for their own purposes, with dangerous implications for Syria's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Even though the sponsors of the conference assumed to help the Syrians and mentioned their donations, in reality, Russia argued, their efforts were limited to containing refugees in Syria's neighbouring countries and averting migration to Europe or returning home. Russia also expressed its concern about the establishment of an inhumane new sanction bill, namely the USA's Assad Regime Anti-Normalization Act.⁴⁸⁸

At this point one may rightly wonder whether Russia's behaviour toward R2P differed in other crises in different parts of the world that occurred around the similar time frame of the Arab Spring. Russia generally supported the preventative pillar but opposed the reactive pillar of the R2P in Libya and Syria. In other cases, Russia's emphasis on state sovereignty and non-intervention seem to persist. This finding was reached by reviewing the 2011-2012 UNSC meetings. In the 6508th meeting related to Côte d'Ivoire, for instance, Russia indicated its support for Resolution 1975 which expressed that existing attacks against civilians could amount to crimes against humanity and stressed the government's responsibility to protect civilians.⁴⁸⁹ In the 6510th meeting regarding Haiti, Russia argued that the main aim of international assistance had be to consolidate government institutions. While doing so, external assistance had be based on unconditional respect for Haitian sovereignty.⁴⁹⁰

In the 6534th meeting related to Kosovo, Russia indicated its willingness to support the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Serbia. Russia emphasized the prominent role of the Security Council in discussing the Kosovo issue.⁴⁹¹ In the 6539th meeting related to the Democratic Republic of Congo, Russia

⁴⁸⁸ UNSC 9640th meeting, pp. 6-7.

⁴⁸⁹ UNSC, "Resolution 1975 (2011)", **S/RES/1975**, 30.03.2011, <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n11/284/76/pdf/n1128476.pdf>, (28.08.2024), p. 2. For detailed information on the 6508th meeting see website, <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/pro/n11/284/00/pdf/n1128400.pdf>.

⁴⁹⁰ UNSC, "6510th meeting", **S/PV.6510**, 06.04.2011, <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/pro/n11/290/14/pdf/n1129014.pdf>, (01.09.2024), p. 16.

⁴⁹¹ UNSC, "6534th meeting", **S/PV.6534**, 12.05.2011, <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/pro/n11/333/72/pdf/n1133372.pdf>, (29.08.2024), p. 13.

argued that to maintain sustained stability, international society should help the government of Congo solve problems.⁴⁹² In the 6574th meeting related to Afghanistan, Russia expressed its concern over the deaths of civilians by military forces' disproportionate use of force and stated that all sides and international forces have a responsibility to provide security for civilians. Russia continued to emphasize the regulatory role of the UN in international attempts to find a solution to the problems in Afghanistan.⁴⁹³ In the 6576th meeting related to Sudan, Russia voted in favour of Resolution 1996 which refers to the first pillar of the R2P. The resolution points to a way forward and supports the Republic of South Sudan Government's responsibility to protect civilians in accordance with international humanitarian, human rights, and refugee law, stating that this should be achieved through national and local institutions.⁴⁹⁴

In the 6621st meeting related to international peace and security, Russia argued that most conflicts were of intrastate in nature and that interventions in countries' internal political processes did not contribute to sustained stability. According to Russia, Iraq and Libya cases provided sufficient evidence that only the people of a country can decide its future, and external military intervention can exacerbate internal conflicts within these countries.⁴⁹⁵ In the 6634th meeting regarding the Middle East, Russia voted in favour of Resolution 2014 which reminded the Yemeni Government's main responsibility to protect its population.⁴⁹⁶

In the 6729th meeting regarding Somalia, Russia reminded that Somalis themselves were responsible for advancing the broader political process, in which the use of force was only a complement. Russia emphasized the protection of Somalia's

⁴⁹² UNSC, "6539th meeting", **S/PV.6539**, 18.05.2011, <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/pro/n11/345/09/pdf/n1134509.pdf>, (01.09.2024), p. 11.

⁴⁹³ UNSC, "6574th meeting", **S/PV.6574**, 06.07.2011, <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/pro/n11/402/42/pdf/n1140242.pdf>, (01.09.2024), p. 20.

⁴⁹⁴ UNSC, "Resolution 1996 (2011)", **S/RES/1996**, 08.07.2011, <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n11/405/83/pdf/n1140583.pdf>, (02.09.2024), p. 4. For detailed information on the 6576th meeting see website, <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/pro/n11/405/29/pdf/n1140529.pdf>.

⁴⁹⁵ UNSC, "6621st meeting", **S/PV.6621**, 22.10.2011, <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/pro/n11/509/16/pdf/n1150916.pdf>, (02.09.2024), p. 23.

⁴⁹⁶ UNSC, "Resolution 2014 (2011)", **S/RES/2014**, 21.10.2011, <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n11/559/61/pdf/n1155961.pdf>, (02.09.2024), p. 4. For detailed information on the 6634th meeting see website, <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/pro/n11/558/24/pdf/n1155824.pdf>.

sovereignty and territorial integrity.⁴⁹⁷ In the 6732nd meeting regarding Haiti, Russia claimed that the government had to take quick steps to reach a national consensus and unite society. Russia argued that comprehensive assistance had to continue for Haiti, especially the consolidation of state authority structures, because in this way, Haitians could independently solve all problems on security and recovery, and achieve sustainable national development.⁴⁹⁸

In the 6735th meeting regarding Afghanistan, Russia indicated that international society had a responsibility to achieve an efficient and sustained Afghan settlement. If the Afghan government leads the process, national reconciliation can be productive. Russia argued that to provide sustained stability in Afghanistan, there is a need for a comprehensive approach by the international community and a gradual, cautious transfer of obligations to the Afghan government.⁴⁹⁹ In the 6860th meeting on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia indicated its support for the territorial integrity of the country. According to Russia, the international society's primary duty in the current stage of the Bosnian settlement process is to shift responsibility for the country's future to the Bosnians. Important issues related to the country's future and existing problems should be solved by the Bosnians themselves, with reconciliation among the three founder peoples, the Bosnians, the Serbs, and the Croats.⁵⁰⁰

In the 6822nd meeting regarding Kosovo, Russia indicated that it still did not recognize the unilaterally declared independence of Kosovo. Under the authority of the Council, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo remains the main international civil entity in the country and should play an active role in advancing the settlement process within the country.⁵⁰¹ In the 6898th meeting related to the situation in Mali, Russia expressed its vote in favour of the draft Resolution 2085, which underscored the Malian authorities' responsibility to protect the

⁴⁹⁷ UNSC, "6729th meeting", **S/PV.6729**, 05.03.2012, <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n12/250/34/pdf/n1225034.pdf>, (29.08.2024), p. 13.

⁴⁹⁸ UNSC, "6732nd meeting", **S/PV.6732**, 08.03.2012, <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/pro/n12/254/87/pdf/n1225487.pdf>, (29.08.2024), p. 16.

⁴⁹⁹ UNSC, "6735th meeting", **S/PV.6735**, 20.03.2012, <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n12/269/20/pdf/n1226920.pdf>, (29.08.2024), pp. 21-22.

⁵⁰⁰ UNSC, "6860th meeting", **S/PV.6860**, 13.11.2012, <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/pro/n12/586/81/pdf/n1258681.pdf>, (30.08.2024), p. 8.

⁵⁰¹ UNSC, "6822nd meeting", **S/PV.6822**, 21.08.2012, <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n12/466/86/pdf/n1246686.pdf>, (30.08.2024), p. 15.

population and suggested that Malian leadership should provide a sustainable solution to the crisis in Mali.⁵⁰²

Looking at Russia's behaviour in these meetings, it can be observed that Russia, as a great power, played an important role in participating in UNSC meetings and supporting UN-led efforts in countries that needed assistance. While supporting these countries, Russia has warned the international community to respect their territorial integrity and state sovereignty. Russia emphasized negotiations and not foreign intervention as a solution to the problem. In addition, most of the time, Russia was sceptical of the R2P principle because its reactive pillar, i.e. timely and decisive response, could be used as a pretext for foreign military intervention. As a matter of fact, Russia has generally used the R2P principle selectively and carefully, considering its own geopolitical interests. This can be clearly seen when Russia justified its invasions in Georgia and Ukraine on the basis of R2P, while it strictly opposed military intervention to protect the current regime in Syria after seeing that remaining silent had led to foreign intervention in Libya, which put down the regime that had economic and military significance for Russia, and led to further domestic unrest in the country with serious consequences for regional and international orders.

3.4. THE DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS

This thesis built over Macfarlane's analysis of Russian order and justice, which he covered until 2002, and sought to understand Russian views of order and justice in the international arena during the Arab Spring in Libya and Syria by looking at resolutions and meetings of the United Nations Security Council through the lens of the English School and particularly Hedley Bull.

Bull's distinction between the international system and the international society help to understand whether states act entirely in their own interests (system) or are bound by common rules and norms (society). With Bull's distinction, it is possible to differentiate between the international society coalescing around common interests

⁵⁰² UNSC, "Resolution 2085 (2012)", **S/RES/2085**, 20.12.2012, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/740273?v=pdf>, (28.08.2024), pp. 2-4. For detailed information on the 6898th meeting see website, <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/pro/n12/660/16/pdf/n1266016.pdf>.

and institutions, and the Middle East that largely remained as a system driven by power politics based on the selfish interests of states and marked by constant internal and external conflicts, the realist/Hobessian tradition.⁵⁰³ In the UN-based international society, at least in principle, respect by member states of each other's sovereign rights is the most fundamental norm. When that principle is violated, war may ensue, but even the reason and conduct of war are regulated by international treaties. However, in a pluralist international society, international treaties are signed by states but their enforcement is not always guaranteed. This is the minimum states could agree upon. States with common interests on many issues can and do cooperate by making rational choices to reach their common goals. These characteristics reflect the Rationalist/Grotian tradition.⁵⁰⁴

The Russian arguments and behaviour on the use of force and the sovereignty norm display contradictory characteristics. For instance, the case of Georgia challenges the Russian argument that the legitimate authority to allow the use of force for humanitarian purposes lies with the Security Council. Russia did not obtain the permission of the UNSC and expressed its duty to protect Russian citizens in South Ossetia.⁵⁰⁵ Russia's initial statements on the protection of Russian speakers mostly included Russia's responsibility as a state to protect its citizens living in another sovereign country. In addition, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs interpreted the invasion as self-defence in the context of Article 51 of the UN Charter.

In the case of Crimea, the Russian claim of protecting ethnic Russians and regions' right to self-determination aligns with international justice, which gives rights and obligations to states and nations. Russia attempted to justify its annexation of Crimea by citing the results of the 2014 Crimean status referendum. However, due to low voter turnout and significant Russian influence, the referendum was not recognized by the international community. Russia vetoed a draft resolution that called on Ukraine to uphold the first pillar of the R2P. According to international society, the military intervention and the formal annexation of Crimea into Russia demonstrated a clear violation of international law. Russia has continued to base its actions on international law and interpret it differently for its own purposes (i.e., granting Russian

⁵⁰³ Murden, pp. 122-138.

⁵⁰⁴ Wight, *Three Traditions*, pp. 13-162.

⁵⁰⁵ Elia Bescotti and others, p. 1.

citizenship to the Ukrainian people based on the European Convention on Nationality of 1997). As for the invasion of Ukraine, Russia resorted to war after failed attempts at diplomacy (Ukraine's unwillingness to implement the Minsk agreement). Russia started its military operation by referring to the reactive pillar of the R2P, disregarding that only the UNSC can call for a military operation. Considering Russian support for non-intervention in many cases, Russia built its justification on R2P by referring to genocide and the invitation of the Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republics. In addition, Russia used international law to justify its invasion of Ukraine by referring to Article 51 of the UN Charter, namely self-defence. Russia considered the post-Soviet regions to be its sphere of influence and found it fatal for its own safety to let NATO and Western efforts to restructure European security.⁵⁰⁶

Even though Russia complains about western politics such as humanitarian intervention and expansion of NATO to the Eastern European countries, Russia accepts the post-Cold War (Western-led) international order. This reminds Bull's argument that states choose to be part of international society by their free will due to their realization that maintaining international order is in their own interest.⁵⁰⁷ Russia has important privileges in the Western-led international order due to many factors, such as its historical position, attendance at global institutions, nuclear power status, and energy exports. Russian membership in the UN (especially its permanent seat) and veto power can be considered its most important privilege in that international society. As happened in the Syria case, Russia used its veto power on many resolutions, which could lead to intervention in Syria or cause sanctions against the Assad regime.

Numerous meetings are being held in the UNSC, and Russia, as a permanent member and an influential actor in the international order, attends most of the meetings related to various matters like reform in the UN, non-proliferation, peacekeeping operations, and crises in different countries. The presence and abundance of the meetings demonstrate the existence of the international society. Moreover, it can be claimed that Russia gives importance to international society and cooperates with the UN to protect international peace and security. This brings to mind the aims of the international order, which are the goal of peace in the sense of avoiding war, restriction

⁵⁰⁶ Freeze, p. 420.

⁵⁰⁷ Jorgensen, p. 193.

of violence resulting in death or bodily damage, and preserving individual states' external sovereignty or independence.⁵⁰⁸ In UNSC meetings, Russia constantly supported non-intervention and states' sovereignty, which are the characteristics of a pluralist international society. Also, Russia, though controversially and not accepted by many members of international society, sought to justify its invasions in the category of self-defence based on Article 51 of the UN Charter in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2022). In other words, Russia used international law as a means to justify its invasions. This Russian reliance on the institutions of international order, though instrumentally, shows that Russia has embraced the international society in which it stands and the norms of the West that suit its interests. Even though Russia supported non-intervention in the internal affairs of states throughout history, deviations from this norm were observed when Russia invaded Georgia and Ukraine, and allowed Resolution 1973 on Libya, which mandated a no-fly zone over Libyan airspace to protect civilians. After the intervention by Western powers in Libya, Russian support for non-intervention, state sovereignty, and its protection consolidated. As Zheng Chen and Hang Yin pointed out, Russia was worried that the Libyan case could set a precedent for interventions seeking regime change as R2P (especially its pillar on timely and decisive response) could be used as a pretext to intervene. Thus, Russia behaved carefully by supporting almost all R2P-related UN peacekeeping and humanitarian protection missions that do not have the possibility of causing regime change (e.g., Mali, Somalia, and Yemen).⁵⁰⁹

Russia's location between Asia and Europe, its rich resources, lack of natural barriers, and history of invasions created security concerns, leading it to prioritize state protection and power consolidation. To maintain order and control, it emphasized hierarchy and state sovereignty, often neglecting individual rights. This focus aligns Russia more with the pluralist side of the English School, emphasizing order and state sovereignty, than the solidarist side emphasizing the protection of individual rights and freedoms. However, Russia's Westernization attempts along with its attendance at the Congress of Vienna and Concert of Europe demonstrated its desire to be a part of the emerging European international society and to be recognized as an equal member of

⁵⁰⁸ Bull, pp. 16-18.

⁵⁰⁹ Zheng Chen and Hang Yin, "China and Russia in R2P Debates at the UN Security Council", *International Affairs*, Vol. 96, No. 3, 2020, pp. 787-805.

this society, along with other dominant European powers. By joining these alliances, Russia wanted to show that it was a great power and could shape the international system.

In general, Russian behaviour and discourses align with pluralist international society because Russia has a state-centric view and emphasizes state sovereignty and its protection. Considering Russian arguments in the UNSC meetings, Russia strongly supports the principle of non-intervention as seen in Syria. Russian support for the self-determination of Syrian people also demonstrated its opposition to foreign interventions under the pretext of humanitarian concerns, democracy promotion, or regime change. Russia relies on pluralist international society's institutions such as international law, war, balance of power, great powers, and diplomacy. This can be seen in the examples below.

Libya was important for Russia due to its oil and natural gas resources, as well as its location on the Mediterranean coast of North Africa. The Soviets sympathized with Libya due to Libya's socialist regime and its intervention in Chad, which opposed the West. Mutual interests were the basic characteristics of their relationship in arms sales, railway construction in Libya, and Gaddafi's granting Russia access to the port of Benghazi. Regional organizations such as the AU, OIC, and Arab League supported Libya's unity and territorial integrity. However, they also condemned the use of force against civilians by the Qaddafi regime and demanded the UNSC to establish a no-fly zone in Libya. Russian support for the Qaddafi regime and its opposition to intervention once again reflected Russia's commitment to the fundamental norms of pluralist international society. Russian support for Resolution 1970 on Libya is not surprising as it is about the preventative pillar of R2P (state responsibility), which was mentioned in the UN document *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect* (2009).⁵¹⁰ Russia's call upon the Libyan authorities to meet the request of the international community (stopping human rights violations) was related to preventing a full-scale war and protecting Libya as a united and sovereign state with territorial integrity. This reflected Russia's concern about international order. As MacFarlane puts it, Russia has considered the foundation of regional order to depend on the uniformity of the internal structures of states. Russia worried that the power vacuum in the region could be filled

⁵¹⁰ UNGA, *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect*, pp. 8-28.

by terrorist organizations, and this could, in turn, threaten the international order. Accordingly, Russia later supported Haftar in Libya.

Russia abstained from Resolution 1973 which established a no-fly zone in Libya. In the UNSC meeting held on the same day, Russia emphasized Libyan authorities' responsibility to protect their people and referred to the first pillar of R2P. Different reasons were put forward to explain the Russian abstention: the difference of opinion between Putin and Medvedev; the desire to maintain the existing projects in Libya; the ongoing reset policy⁵¹¹ between Russia and the United States; or the desire to attend WTO. If one is to judge on the basis of rhetoric, Russia did not veto Resolution 1973 because it would ensure the safety of civilians by establishing a no-fly zone and an arms embargo. This attempt to stop the possible use of force and war aligns with the international order's goal of peace. Russia later criticized NATO for acting outside the initial plan and causing more civilian casualties. This argument reflects Russian concern with human justice. By using the human justice concept to criticise NATO airstrikes and civilian casualties, Russia opposed the reactive pillar of R2P (timely and decisive response).⁵¹² Russia also strongly condemned the killing of Qaddafi by NATO airstrikes on the basis of the Geneva Conventions⁵¹³ and demanded an judicial investigation into his killing, reminding Bull's idea that an enduring order could not exist without justice.⁵¹⁴ Thus, providing human justice in Libya was seen necessary by Russia to provide stability both in Libya and the international order. Russia's concern about the proliferation of arms in Libya and the potential threats it poses to regional peace and security,⁵¹⁵ on the other hand, reflects once again the concern to protect the society of states.

Russia was also very much concerned about the instability in Libya for its own political and economic interests, which, in turn, determined its position in the balance of power in Libya. Russia started to be influential in Libya after the civil war broke out with its support for Haftar and the Libyan National Army. Russia sought to develop

⁵¹¹ Erşen, p. 124.

⁵¹² UNGA, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, pp. 8-28.

⁵¹³ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation, "Answers by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to Listeners' Questions on the Voice of Russia, Radio Russia and Echo of Moscow Radio Stations, October 21, 2011", *News*, 22.10.2011, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1619045/, (25.06.2024).

⁵¹⁴ Wheeler and Dunne, pp. 100-105.

⁵¹⁵ UNSC Resolution 2016, p. 1.

its relations with Egypt and the UAE by supporting Haftar and balancing US influence in these countries. Through its active position in Libya, Russia wanted to be recognized by international society as a great power and to increase its influence in the Mediterranean and European migration policies. Echoing Bull's insight, this shows the predominant role played by the great powers in shaping international society.⁵¹⁶ Russia used one of the institutions of international society, diplomacy,⁵¹⁷ in Libya by attending UNSC meetings and helping to organize the Berlin Conference between the Libyan parties. By using diplomacy, Russia wanted to stabilize Libya's internal situation due to its worry about the proliferation of arms and increasing terrorism.

Syria's strategic location in the Mediterranean, historical good ties with the Baath party going back to the Soviet period, the Russian permanent naval base in Tartus, arms sales, mutual diplomatic support, and economic agreements have made Syria a key partner for Russia. The support given by Damascus to Moscow in its fight against the Chechen insurgents in the Northern Caucasus further consolidated the ties between the two countries. Thus, for Moscow a regime change in Damascus in the form of a Sunni fundamentalist regime bore the danger of increasing radical Islamism within Russia's own Muslim societies, including Chechenia.⁵¹⁸

As happened in Libya, regional organizations such as the GCC, OIC, and Arab League supported Syria's security, stability, and unity, while they also condemned the use of force against the civilians. Russia, by vetoing draft resolutions on Syria, tried to limit the UNSC involvement from the beginning,⁵¹⁹ and demonstrated its general commitment to the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states and its dissatisfaction with the intervention in Libya. This aligns with Bull's argument that great powers shape the international order by imposing their common will on others.⁵²⁰ While Russia was trying to impose its non-intervention and state sovereignty concepts, it prevented the application of R2P's reactive pillar, which is a timely and decisive response.⁵²¹ This demonstrated the Russian state-centric perspective and emphasis on the pluralist international society where order has

⁵¹⁶ Bull, p. 17.

⁵¹⁷ Bull, p. 165.

⁵¹⁸ Katz, p. 60.

⁵¹⁹ Allison, p. 798.

⁵²⁰ Bull, p. 89.

⁵²¹ UNGA, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, pp. 8-28.

priority.⁵²² With Bull's definition, pluralist international society refers to the situation where states can reach agreements only on certain minimum but fundamental objectives like mutual acknowledgement of sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention.⁵²³

According to Russia, the Syrian government has a responsibility to find fair solutions to the existing problems in Syria. Russia expected it from the Syrian regime to implement a transparent and effective investigation and punishment of criminals, not from outside powers.⁵²⁴ This once again reflects the state-centric view of pluralist international society at the expense of human rights-centric solidarist international society.

In the UNSC meetings regarding Syria, Russia constantly emphasized the non-intervention principle and the need to avoid practices such as an arms embargo and no-fly zones, recalling the Libyan experience.⁵²⁵ It was uneasy about some draft resolutions, which could lead to sanctions or military operations on Syria by damaging the state sovereignty principle.⁵²⁶ Russia was worried about the deterioration of instability in Syria as this could affect and destabilize the entire region. In addition, Russia, as already mentioned, has been always concerned about the spread of radical Islamism throughout the Middle East, which, it thought, could encourage Islamists in Dagestan and Chechnya, areas within its sphere of influence. Those concerns turned out to be true, considering the participation of hundreds of volunteers from the North Caucasus in ISIS' ranks. Russia's concern about Syria's internal order and its call for an immediate end to violence⁵²⁷ along with its request from the international community to respect the provisions of Resolution 2043 reflects one of the common aims of international society, which is adherence to promises.

Russia relied on international law and the UN Charter to criticize the establishment of the Group of Friends of Syria, which as a US-led group,⁵²⁸ or to criticize the US attack on a Syrian air base without the permission of the UNSC.⁵²⁹

⁵²² Devlen ve Özdamar, p. 55.

⁵²³ Wheeler and Dunne, pp. 94-95.

⁵²⁴ UNSC 6524th Meeting, p. 7.

⁵²⁵ UNSC 6627th Meeting, pp. 3-5.

⁵²⁶ Chen and Ying, p. 790.

⁵²⁷ UNSC 6711th Meeting, p. 9.

⁵²⁸ Allison, pp. 799-800.

⁵²⁹ UNSC 7922nd meeting, pp. 6-8.

On the other hand, Russia based its own intervention in Syria on the R2P's preventative pillar, which aims at developing or improving the capabilities of states to protect their citizens.⁵³⁰ Also, the Kremlin stated that the USA violated international law by supporting illegal structures while they only supported the legitimate government in Damascus, which is not contradictory to international law. Although some of Russia's arguments in the UNSC meetings referred to the concept of human justice, the Russian military support for the Assad regime caused the deaths of more civilians than the ISIS.⁵³¹ This shows that Russia's own national interests outweighed its concern with human justice in Syria.

Russia used one of the institutions of international society, diplomacy, in Syria by attending UNSC meetings and negotiating with regional actors such as Turkey to help the resolution of the conflict. Russian cooperation with the US on the elimination of chemical weapons not only shows its diplomatic attempts but also reflects one of the common aims of international society, which is to restrict violence that results in the death or bodily damage of civilians. By launching the Astana process, Russia used diplomacy as a tool to demonstrate its claim to equality as a great power in international society. Even though the Sochi agreement between Turkey and Russia can be considered as a significant diplomacy attempt, the actual military behaviour of Russia in Syria went against the spirit of that agreement. Russia did not fulfil its responsibility and ignored the principle of adherence to promises, one of the common goals of the international society mentioned by Bull.⁵³²

Joining the WTO as well as other international organizations shows Russian interest in participating in decisions made by these organizations. This reminds Bull's idea that great powers are entrusted with overseeing the management of international society.⁵³³ Russia desired to have equal status with the other great powers and wanted to be represented in as many international institutions as possible. Russia emphasized its great power status with its rhetoric and behaviour many times by appealing to diplomacy in crisis areas as happened in Libya and Syria; by attempting to justify its invasions on the basis of international law; supporting R2P's preventative pillar which

⁵³⁰ UNGA, *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect*, pp. 8-28.

⁵³¹ Syriaahr, "Nine Years of Syrian Revolution", 15.03.2020, <https://www.syriaahr.com/en/157510/>, (01.08.2024).

⁵³² Bull, p. 18.

⁵³³ Bull, p. 17.

is about state responsibility while opposing the other pillar on timely and decisive response; by attending international organizations such as the UN to express its ideas, protect its military and economic interests and gain equal standing with the Western powers; by playing an active role in international events to balance the western influence; and by engaging with different countries in line with its multidimensional foreign policy in a multipolar world.

CONCLUSION

This thesis attempted to understand Russian behaviour in the context of the order versus justice debate of the English School during the Arab Spring with regard to two cases: Libya and Syria. Before doing so, an examination of the reasons for Russian security concerns helped understand the development of order and justice concepts in Russia. In addition, reviewing Russian behaviour vis-à-vis different non-Middle Eastern countries during the Arab Spring through the UNSC meetings helped compare Russian behaviour in Libya and Syria with other cases. It has been observed that while Russia adamantly supports non-intervention, its behaviour can also change according to circumstances and its own strategic interests.

The English School and Hedley Bull's perspectives are useful for explaining Russian order and justice understandings in the cases of Libya and Syria. In particular, Bull's treatment of the concepts of great powers, international order, and international justice, as well as the solidarist versus pluralist international society distinction, offers a solid framework for understanding Russian behaviour and actions. It is noteworthy that Bull's arguments put forward in his 1977 book *Anarchical Society* remain valid even today.

In the first chapter of this thesis, with a view to providing a theoretical background to the case study on Libya and Syria, the approaches of some IR theories towards order and justice were examined. Considering the arguments of mainstream and critical IR theories, it can be claimed that these theories do not explain or analyse order and justice concepts deeply enough in world politics. The English School offers a pluralistic perspective on world politics that acknowledges the coexistence of the international society, international system, and world society and uses all three

concepts as different levels of historical analysis. It is the only approach in international relations that combines and accounts for all of the three main traditions (realism, rationalism, and revolutionism). The English School offers not only analytical but also conceptual perspectives. Hedley Bull, one of the most important contributors of the School, comes into prominence with his systematic examination of the roles of the balance of power, diplomacy, and international law in preserving and reinforcing order within international society. Bull has a comprehensive and meticulous analysis on the solidarist-pluralist and the related order versus justice debate. Bull, considers justice as related to equality in the use of rights and privileges and regards order as a pattern of conduct that maintains the basic aims of social life. According to him, an international society is formed by a group of states that are aware of their common interests and values in the sense that they feel bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another.⁵³⁴ Bull's differentiation of the international system and the international society help understand whether states act based on their own interests as they do in an international system or are bound by common rules and norms as they do in an international society.

In the second chapter of this thesis, with a view to understanding Russia's security concerns, first Russia's geographical structure was defined. Russia's order and justice understandings, starting from the 18th century until the Ukraine War (2022), were examined. It has been observed that Russia's order and justice understandings were shaped by its historical background, position between Asia and Europe, non-existence of natural barriers, adopted political ideologies, and the invasions by many nations from the East and the West. Due to these threats, Russia has focused on protecting its internal order since its foundation. To that end, it established some organisations or cooperated with regional powers and international organisations. Throughout history, due to recurring internal crises, unrest, and incursions, Russian order understanding focused on the control and certain values of the Russian state, such as sovereignty and non-intervention. Also, due to these reasons, Russia strengthened the state's power at the expense of individual rights. Russia's justice understanding was different from Bull's because justice for Russia is often equated with achieving the status and rights that Russians believe they deserve. This

⁵³⁴ Bull, pp. 52-76.

perspective is rooted in a strong sense of exclusion and unequal treatment. Justice in Russian discourse on international politics has primarily focused on what is fair for the Russian state within the international system. Therefore, Russia's understanding of international justice remained selfish rather than grounded in principles of solidarity.⁵³⁵ In the least, Russia tried to be recognised as an equal member of international society and as a great power having similar privileges and responsibilities with other great powers. Also, Bull's claim that great powers, by imposing their collective will on others, may perpetrate systemic injustices against the rights of smaller nations and states⁵³⁶ could be seen in Russia's invasions of Ukraine and Georgia. Considering these Russian invasions, it can be argued that Russia's policies do not align with the existing rules and norms of international society. While Russia argues that it attaches great importance to state sovereignty, it clearly breaches the territorial integrity of states with its own actions.⁵³⁷ Considering Russia's overall position, it has been against the humanitarian or broader rights-based intervention concept, considering it a threat to sovereignty and to the formation of a fair and rational international order. However, Russia, from time to time, has considered its citizens' safety or used this as a pretext to intervene in the post-Soviet countries. For Russia, expressing the right to humanitarian intervention is a means of justifying the pursuit of political objectives, often to the detriment of other states. Russian discourse emphasises the absence of effective criteria for managing humanitarian intervention, which highlights its arbitrary application in practice both by Russia itself and other countries. It should also be noted that while Russians acknowledge the potential use of force during a severe humanitarian crisis, they insist that the legitimate authority to allow such force lies with the UNSC. They reject Western and, in particular, British arguments that suggest that general international law could justify intervention outside the Council's framework in the event of the Council's inability to act. By actively engaging in conflicts within the post-Soviet area, Russia sought to assert its great power status, as it could not afford to let NATO or Western powers dominate regional conflict management. This approach was also tied to Russia's pursuit of equal status with the western actors. In the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Russia elevated itself to

⁵³⁵ MacFarlane, pp. 177-179.

⁵³⁶ Bull, pp. 17-89.

⁵³⁷ Emel P. Dal and Emre Erşen, pp. 4-6.

the status of the US and France as equal mediators.⁵³⁸ This justifies Bull's argument that great powers shape international order through cooperation. Russia acted as a mediator, aiming to resolve the conflict diplomatically. In contrast, during the Ukraine invasion, Russia resorted to war as an instrument of international order after failed diplomatic efforts with the Minsk agreements. Russia referred to Ukraine's non-compliance with the agreements as a justification for its military operation, citing the coercive pillar of the R2P, despite lacking UNSC authorization. Russia's invasions in its neighbourhood during the first quarter of the century led to the deterioration of relations with the West, endangering the pluralist international society itself.⁵³⁹

The third chapter of this thesis aimed to understand the Russian perspectives on order and justice concerning the conflicts in Syria and Libya during the Arab Spring. In both cases, Russian power-political and economic interests helped shape its perspectives on order and justice. For instance, Russia did not want regime change in Libya and Syria due to the fear of spreading radical Islamism as well as the to maintain its own strategic and economic gains in both countries. In the case of Libya, at the beginning, Russia abstained from vetoing the UNSC resolution that authorized the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya. However, later it turned into a fierce critique of NATO airstrikes by arguing that NATO had violated international law by exceeding the mandate given by the resolution. Russia, by vetoing draft resolutions on Syria and reminding that the Libyan experience should not be repeated, demonstrated its support for the protection of the fundamental principles of international law, i.e., state sovereignty and non-intervention. These principles align with the characteristics of pluralist international society and serve the protection of the international order. Although the diplomatic language used by Russia showed a concern for the death of civilians due to NATO's air strikes in Libya and thus seemed to align with the human justice conception of Bull, the contradictory Russian behaviour elsewhere prior to or

⁵³⁸ Dr Neil Mervin, p. 1.

⁵³⁹ Some authors, such as Tom Sauer, also blame the West for the deterioration of relations with Russia, because, after the Cold War, the West did not include Russia in the collective security system of NATO. Russia felt particularly threatened by NATO's expansion to the East and by the start of negotiations on the membership of Georgia and Ukraine, that belonged to Russia's sphere of influence. According to Russia, extension of NATO meant expansion of the United States' sphere of influence. Even though the West had given promises to Moscow at the end of the Cold War on not expanding NATO to the East, they did not keep them. This created further mistrust between them. See Tom Sauer, "The Origin of the Ukraine Crisis and the Need for Collective Security between Russia and the West", *Global Policy*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2017, pp. 82-91.

after the Libyan case makes one to legitimately question the Russian concern as such. At most, for the Russians, fulfilling human justice in Libya and Syria was a condition of maintaining the existing pluralist international order. Russia, being aware of the fact that a civil war in Libya and Syria would affect not only those countries but also the Middle East and beyond, tried to protect the regional and international orders. There were also limits to the Russian concern for human justice in Libya and elsewhere. For example, even though Russia supported some resolutions that refer to the first pillar of R2P, which is the protection responsibilities of the state (e.g., Resolution 1970 on Libya and Resolution 2254 on Syria), or supported the second pillar of R2P, which is about international assistance and capacity building, to legitimise its own intervention in Syria with the invitation of the Assad regime to assist in the fight against terrorist groups, it adopted a stance against the third pillar of R2P, which is the timely and decisive response. Russian emphasis on state sovereignty and non-intervention can be seen in many UNSC debates and statements. This emphasis also reflected Russia's support for a pluralist international society. When Russia intervened in Syria in 2015, it became a pivotal player in Syria's future and potentially in the broader Middle East. It kept on repeating that uninvited external intervention and forced regime change were the major factors contributing to the violent instability and conflict in the Middle East.

Russia's cooperation with the US to coordinate air operations in Syria has strengthened Russia's claim to equality as a great power in international society and served its goal of promoting a multipolar world order. Russia's behaviour as such justifies Bull's argument that great powers shape the international order and cooperate to maintain the global balance of power. The intricate balances that were formed in both Libya and Syria between the US-led and Russia-led blocs can be given as another example. Such an alignment of states on different sides created a multi-polar balance within the region, with each group of states attempting to counterbalance the influence of the other.

Russia considers the Middle East as an international system with constant power struggles due to the regional focus on alliances and balance of power instead of international norms and institutions. Despite that, using one of the primary institutions of international society, diplomacy, Russia tried to play an active role in Libya and Syria, trying to be part of the peace processes under way. Participating in the Berlin

Conference on Libya as well as the Geneva and Astana processes on Syria, Russia presented itself as a mediator and key actor in the international arena.

Great powers such as the United States and Russia, despite claiming to abide by international order and justice, have gotten away with violations, as in Syria in 2017, when the United States launched an attack without a UNSC resolution on a Syrian military airfield as a retaliation for the Assad regime's use of chemical weapons in Idlib, and in Russia's unwillingness to cooperate with the UNSC to uncover the truth about the humanitarian situation in Syria by questioning the investigations and arguing that they were biased or lacked credibility. International organisations' action capabilities have not been enough to cease these violations, proving Hedley Bull's claim that "great powers use norms such as peace and security to legitimise their interventions; in doing so, they reflect the primacy of norms of order over norms of justice in the positive law and practice of international society."⁵⁴⁰ This also reminds Bull's argument that great powers may violate the rights of sovereignty, equality, and independence of less powerful states.⁵⁴¹ Luke Glanville's argument also supports Bull's argument. According to him, sometimes great power politics (especially states' material and strategic interests) can outweigh norms, and in the case of Syria, by vetoing draft resolutions, Russia prevented the application of the coercive pillar of the R2P. Because of China and Russia, the international community failed to undertake an intervention that aimed to protect the civilians in Syria.⁵⁴² However, to what extent such a humanitarian intervention would help stop the human suffering in Syria or lead to the resolution of the internal conflict or pave the way for the rebuilding of Syria is also very much open to questioning given the very complex nature that the Syrian conflict assumed over the years. Thus, in Bull's terminology, Russia prioritized order in the context of both Libya and Syria, but especially Syria, believing that justice could not be accomplished in the absence of order.

The main limitation of the study is that it did not make a detailed discourse analysis of the Russian leaders, including Putin and other important state officials, such as Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov; it mainly focused on the diplomatic discussions

⁵⁴⁰ Bull, pp. 211-212.

⁵⁴¹ Bull, p. 209.

⁵⁴² Luke Glanville, "Does R2P Matter? Interpreting the Impact of a Norm", **Cooperation and Conflict**, Vol. 51, No. 2, 2016, pp. 184-199.

that took place in the UNSC. A discourse analysis as such can help better understand the order and justice perspectives of Russian leaders vis-à-vis the cases in question.



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APPENDICES

Appendix 5

2005 World Summit Outcome Summary

The world's leaders, meeting at UN headquarters in New York from September 14–16, 2005, agreed to take action on a range of global challenges.

Development

- Strong and unambiguous commitment by all governments, in donor and developing nations alike, to achieve the Millennium Development Goals by 2015.
- Additional \$50 billion a year by 2010 for fighting poverty.
- Commitment by all developing countries to adopt national plans for achieving the Millennium Development Goals by 2006.
- Agreement to provide immediate support for quick impact initiatives to support anti-malaria efforts, education, and healthcare.
- Commitment to innovative sources of financing for development, including efforts by groups of countries to implement an International Finance Facility and other initiatives to finance development projects, in particular in the health sector.
- Agreement to consider additional measures to ensure long-term debt sustainability through increased grant-based financing, cancellation of 100 percent of the official multilateral and bilateral debt of heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs). Where appropriate, to consider significant debt relief or restructuring for low- and middle-income developing countries with unsustainable debt burdens that are not part of the HIPC initiative.
- Commitment to trade liberalization and expeditious work towards implementing the development dimensions of the Doha work program.

Terrorism

- Clear and unqualified condemnation—by all governments, for the first time—of terrorism “in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever, and for whatever purposes.”
- Strong political push for a comprehensive convention against terrorism within a year. Support for early entry into force of the Nuclear Terrorism Convention. All states are encouraged to join and implement it as well as the 12 other antiterrorism conventions.
- Agreement to fashion a strategy to fight terrorism in a way that makes the international community stronger and terrorists weaker.

Peacebuilding, Peacekeeping, and Peacemaking

- Decision to create a Peacebuilding Commission to help countries transition from war to peace, backed by a support office and a standing fund.

- New standing police capacity for UN peacekeeping operations.
- Agreement to strengthen the Secretary-General's capacity for mediation and good offices.

Responsibility to protect

- Clear and unambiguous acceptance by all governments of the collective international responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Willingness to take timely and decisive collective action for this purpose, through the Security Council, when peaceful means prove inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to do it.

Human Rights, Democracy, and Rule of Law

- Decisive steps to strengthen the UN human rights machinery, backing the action plan and doubling the budget of the High Commissioner.
- Agreement to establish a UN Human Rights Council during the coming year.
- Reaffirmation of democracy as a universal value, and welcome for new Democracy Fund which has already received pledges of \$32 million from 13 countries.
- Commitment to eliminate pervasive gender discrimination, such as inequalities in education and ownership of property, violence against women and girls, and to end impunity for such violence.
- Ratification action taken during the Summit triggered the entry into force of the Convention Against Corruption.

Management Reform

- Broad strengthening of the UN's oversight capacity, including the Office of Internal Oversight Services, expanding oversight services to additional agencies, calling for developing an independent oversight advisory committee, and further developing a new ethics office.
- Update the United Nations by reviewing all mandates older than five years, so that obsolete ones can be dropped to make room for new priorities.
- Commitment to overhauling rules and policies on budget, finance, and human resources so the organization can better respond to current needs; and a one-time staff buy-out to ensure that the United Nations has the appropriate staff for today's challenges.

Environment

- Recognition of the serious challenges posed by climate change and a commitment to take action through the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Assistance will be provided to those most vulnerable, like small island developing states.

- Agreement to create a worldwide early warning system for all natural hazards.

International Health

- A scaling up of responses to HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria, through prevention, care, treatment, and support, and the mobilization of additional resources from national, bilateral, multilateral, and private sources.
- Commitment to fight infectious diseases, including a commitment to ensure full implementation of the new International Health Regulations, and support for the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network of the World Health Organization.

Humanitarian Assistance

- Improved Central Emergency Revolving Fund to ensure that relief arrives reliably and immediately when disasters happen.
- Recognition of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement as an important international framework for the protection of internally displaced persons.

Updating the UN Charter

- A decision to revise and update the Charter by winding up the Trusteeship Council, marking completion of UN's historic decolonization role; and deleting anachronistic references to "enemy states" in the Charter.

The full text of the document is available on the Summit website at <http://www.un.org/summit2005/>.



Resolution 1970 (2011)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 6491st meeting, on
26 February 2011**

The Security Council,

Expressing grave concern at the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and condemning the violence and use of force against civilians,

Deploring the gross and systematic violation of human rights, including the repression of peaceful demonstrators, expressing deep concern at the deaths of civilians, and rejecting unequivocally the incitement to hostility and violence against the civilian population made from the highest level of the Libyan government,

Welcoming the condemnation by the Arab League, the African Union, and the Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference of the serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law that are being committed in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Taking note of the letter to the President of the Security Council from the Permanent Representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya dated 26 February 2011,

Welcoming the Human Rights Council resolution A/HRC/RES/S-15/1 of 25 February 2011, including the decision to urgently dispatch an independent international commission of inquiry to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, to establish the facts and circumstances of such violations and of the crimes perpetrated, and where possible identify those responsible,

Considering that the widespread and systematic attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against the civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity,

Expressing concern at the plight of refugees forced to flee the violence in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Expressing concern also at the reports of shortages of medical supplies to treat the wounded,

* Second reissue for technical reasons (10 March 2011).



Recalling the Libyan authorities' responsibility to protect its population,

Underlining the need to respect the freedoms of peaceful assembly and of expression, including freedom of the media,

Stressing the need to hold to account those responsible for attacks, including by forces under their control, on civilians,

Recalling article 16 of the Rome Statute under which no investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with by the International Criminal Court for a period of 12 months after a Security Council request to that effect,

Expressing concern for the safety of foreign nationals and their rights in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

Mindful of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter of the United Nations,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41,

1. *Demands* an immediate end to the violence and calls for steps to fulfil the legitimate demands of the population;

2. *Urges* the Libyan authorities to:

(a) Act with the utmost restraint, respect human rights and international humanitarian law, and allow immediate access for international human rights monitors;

(b) Ensure the safety of all foreign nationals and their assets and facilitate the departure of those wishing to leave the country;

(c) Ensure the safe passage of humanitarian and medical supplies, and humanitarian agencies and workers, into the country; and

(d) Immediately lift restrictions on all forms of media;

3. *Requests* all Member States, to the extent possible, to cooperate in the evacuation of those foreign nationals wishing to leave the country;

ICC referral

4. *Decides* to refer the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya since 15 February 2011 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court;

5. *Decides* that the Libyan authorities shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to this resolution and, while recognizing that States not party to the Rome Statute have no obligation under the Statute, urges all States and concerned regional and other international organizations to cooperate fully with the Court and the Prosecutor;

6. *Decides* that nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a State outside the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya which is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that State for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to operations in the

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya established or authorized by the Council, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by the State;

7. *Invites* the Prosecutor to address the Security Council within two months of the adoption of this resolution and every six months thereafter on actions taken pursuant to this resolution;

8. *Recognizes* that none of the expenses incurred in connection with the referral, including expenses related to investigations or prosecutions in connection with that referral, shall be borne by the United Nations and that such costs shall be borne by the parties to the Rome Statute and those States that wish to contribute voluntarily;

Arms embargo

9. *Decides* that all Member States shall immediately take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from or through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, and technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance, related to military activities or the provision, maintenance or use of any arms and related materiel, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel whether or not originating in their territories, and decides further that this measure shall not apply to:

(a) Supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, and related technical assistance or training, as approved in advance by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 24 below;

(b) Protective clothing, including flak jackets and military helmets, temporarily exported to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya by United Nations personnel, representatives of the media and humanitarian and development workers and associated personnel, for their personal use only; or

(c) Other sales or supply of arms and related materiel, or provision of assistance or personnel, as approved in advance by the Committee;

10. *Decides* that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya shall cease the export of all arms and related materiel and that all Member States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya by their nationals, or using their flagged vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;

11. *Calls upon* all States, in particular States neighbouring the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, to inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, all cargo to and from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, in their territory, including seaports and airports, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 9 or 10 of this resolution for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;

12. *Decides* to authorize all Member States to, and that all Member States shall, upon discovery of items prohibited by paragraph 9 or 10 of this resolution,

seize and dispose (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 9 or 10 of this resolution and decides further that all Member States shall cooperate in such efforts;

13. *Requires* any Member State when it undertakes an inspection pursuant to paragraph 11 above, to submit promptly an initial written report to the Committee containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds for the inspections, the results of such inspections, and whether or not cooperation was provided, and, if prohibited items for transfer are found, further requires such Member States to submit to the Committee, at a later stage, a subsequent written report containing relevant details on the inspection, seizure, and disposal, and relevant details of the transfer, including a description of the items, their origin and intended destination, if this information is not in the initial report;

14. *Encourages* Member States to take steps to strongly discourage their nationals from travelling to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to participate in activities on behalf of the Libyan authorities that could reasonably contribute to the violation of human rights;

Travel ban

15. *Decides* that all Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals listed in Annex I of this resolution or designated by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 24 below, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory;

16. *Decides* that the measures imposed by paragraph 15 above shall not apply:

(a) Where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligation;

(b) Where entry or transit is necessary for the fulfilment of a judicial process;

(c) Where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that an exemption would further the objectives of peace and national reconciliation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and stability in the region; or

(d) Where a State determines on a case-by-case basis that such entry or transit is required to advance peace and stability in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the States subsequently notifies the Committee within forty-eight hours after making such a determination;

Asset freeze

17. *Decides* that all Member States shall freeze without delay all funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories, which are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the individuals or entities listed in annex II of this resolution or designated by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 24 below, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, and decides further that all

Member States shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any individuals or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of the individuals or entities listed in Annex II of this resolution or individuals designated by the Committee;

18. *Expresses* its intention to ensure that assets frozen pursuant to paragraph 17 shall at a later stage be made available to and for the benefit of the people of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;

19. *Decides* that the measures imposed by paragraph 17 above do not apply to funds, other financial assets or economic resources that have been determined by relevant Member States:

(a) To be necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges or exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services in accordance with national laws, or fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds, other financial assets and economic resources, after notification by the relevant State to the Committee of the intention to authorize, where appropriate, access to such funds, other financial assets or economic resources and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of such notification;

(b) To be necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that such determination has been notified by the relevant State or Member States to the Committee and has been approved by the Committee; or

(c) To be the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgment, in which case the funds, other financial assets and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien or judgment provided that the lien or judgment was entered into prior to the date of the present resolution, is not for the benefit of a person or entity designated pursuant to paragraph 17 above, and has been notified by the relevant State or Member States to the Committee;

20. *Decides* that Member States may permit the addition to the accounts frozen pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 17 above of interests or other earnings due on those accounts or payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that arose prior to the date on which those accounts became subject to the provisions of this resolution, provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments continue to be subject to these provisions and are frozen;

21. *Decides* that the measures in paragraph 17 above shall not prevent a designated person or entity from making payment due under a contract entered into prior to the listing of such a person or entity, provided that the relevant States have determined that the payment is not directly or indirectly received by a person or entity designated pursuant to paragraph 17 above, and after notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention to make or receive such payments or to authorize, where appropriate, the unfreezing of funds, other financial assets or economic resources for this purpose, 10 working days prior to such authorization;

Designation criteria

22. *Decides* that the measures contained in paragraphs 15 and 17 shall apply to the individuals and entities designated by the Committee, pursuant to paragraph 24 (b) and (c), respectively;

(a) Involved in or complicit in ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the commission of serious human rights abuses against persons in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including by being involved in or complicit in planning, commanding, ordering or conducting attacks, in violation of international law, including aerial bombardments, on civilian populations and facilities; or

(b) Acting for or on behalf of or at the direction of individuals or entities identified in subparagraph (a).

23. *Strongly encourages* Member States to submit to the Committee names of individuals who meet the criteria set out in paragraph 22 above;

New Sanctions Committee

24. *Decides* to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council (herein "the Committee"), to undertake the following tasks:

(a) To monitor implementation of the measures imposed in paragraphs 9, 10, 15, and 17;

(b) To designate those individuals subject to the measures imposed by paragraphs 15 and to consider requests for exemptions in accordance with paragraph 16 above;

(c) To designate those individuals subject to the measures imposed by paragraph 17 above and to consider requests for exemptions in accordance with paragraphs 19 and 20 above;

(d) To establish such guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the measures imposed above;

(e) To report within thirty days to the Security Council on its work for the first report and thereafter to report as deemed necessary by the Committee;

(f) To encourage a dialogue between the Committee and interested Member States, in particular those in the region, including by inviting representatives of such States to meet with the Committee to discuss implementation of the measures;

(g) To seek from all States whatever information it may consider useful regarding the actions taken by them to implement effectively the measures imposed above;

(h) To examine and take appropriate action on information regarding alleged violations or non-compliance with the measures contained in this resolution;

25. *Calls upon* all Member States to report to the Committee within 120 days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 9, 10, 15 and 17 above;

Humanitarian assistance

26. *Calls upon* all Member States, working together and acting in cooperation with the Secretary General, to facilitate and support the return of humanitarian agencies and make available humanitarian and related assistance in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, and requests the States concerned to keep the Security Council regularly informed on the progress of actions undertaken pursuant to this paragraph, and expresses its readiness to consider taking additional appropriate measures, as necessary, to achieve this;

Commitment to review

27. *Affirms* that it shall keep the Libyan authorities' actions under continuous review and that it shall be prepared to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in this resolution, including the strengthening, modification, suspension or lifting of the measures, as may be needed at any time in light of the Libyan authorities' compliance with relevant provisions of this resolution;

28. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Annex I

Travel ban

1. Al-Baghdadi, Dr Abdulqader Mohammed
Passport number: B010574. Date of birth: 01/07/1950.
Head of the Liaison Office of the Revolutionary Committees. Revolutionary Committees involved in violence against demonstrators.
2. Dibri, Abdulqader Yusef
Date of birth: 1946. Place of birth: Houn, Libya.
Head of Muammar Qadhafi's personal security. Responsibility for regime security. History of directing violence against dissidents.
3. Dorda, Abu Zayd Umar
Director, External Security Organisation. Regime loyalist. Head of external intelligence agency.
4. Jabir, Major General Abu Bakr Yunis
Date of birth: 1952. Place of birth: Jalo, Libya.
Defence Minister. Overall responsibility for actions of armed forces.
5. Matuq, Matuq Mohammed
Date of birth: 1956. Place of birth: Khoms.
Secretary for Utilities. Senior member of regime. Involvement with Revolutionary Committees. Past history of involvement in suppression of dissent and violence.
6. Qadhaf Al-dam, Sayyid Mohammed
Date of birth: 1948. Place of birth: Sirte, Libya.
Cousin of Muammar Qadhafi. In the 1980s, Sayyid was involved in the dissident assassination campaign and allegedly responsible for several deaths in Europe. He is also thought to have been involved in arms procurement.
7. Qadhafi, Aisha Muammar
Date of birth: 1978. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.
Daughter of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime.
8. Qadhafi, Hannibal Muammar
Passport number: B/002210. Date of birth: 20/09/1975. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya. Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime.
9. Qadhafi, Khamis Muammar
Date of birth: 1978. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.
Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime. Command of military units involved in repression of demonstrations.

10. Qadhafi, Mohammed Muammar
Date of birth: 1970. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.
Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime.
11. Qadhafi, Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar
Date of birth: 1942. Place of birth: Sirte, Libya.
Leader of the Revolution, Supreme Commander of Armed Forces.
Responsibility for ordering repression of demonstrations, human rights abuses.
12. Qadhafi, Mutassim
Date of birth: 1976. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.
National Security Adviser. Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime.
13. Qadhafi, Saadi
Passport number: 014797. Date of birth: 25/05/1973. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.
Commander Special Forces. Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime. Command of military units involved in repression of demonstrations.
14. Qadhafi, Saif al-Arab
Date of birth: 1982. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.
Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime.
15. Qadhafi, Saif al-Islam
Passport number: B014995. Date of birth: 25/06/1972. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.
Director, Qadhafi Foundation. Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime. Inflammatory public statements encouraging violence against demonstrators.
16. Al-Senussi, Colonel Abdullah
Date of birth: 1949. Place of birth: Sudan.
Director Military Intelligence. Military Intelligence involvement in suppression of demonstrations. Past history includes suspicion of involvement in Abu Selim prison massacre. Convicted in absentia for bombing of UTA flight. Brother-in-law of Muammar Qadhafi.

Annex II

Asset freeze

1. Qadhafi, Aisha Muammar
Date of birth: 1978. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.
Daughter of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime.
 2. Qadhafi, Hannibal Muammar
Passport number: B/002210. Date of birth: 20/09/1975. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya. Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime.
 3. Qadhafi, Khamis Muammar
Date of birth: 1978. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.
Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime. Command of military units involved in repression of demonstrations.
 4. Qadhafi, Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar
Date of birth: 1942. Place of birth: Sirte, Libya.
Leader of the Revolution, Supreme Commander of Armed Forces.
Responsibility for ordering repression of demonstrations, human rights abuses.
 5. Qadhafi, Mutassim
Date of birth: 1976. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.
National Security Adviser. Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime.
 6. Qadhafi, Saif al-Islam
Passport number: B014995. Date of birth: 25/06/1972. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.
Director, Qadhafi Foundation. Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime. Inflammatory public statements encouraging violence against demonstrators.
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APPENDIX 3: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973

United Nations

S/RES/1973 (2011)



Security Council

Distr.: General
17 March 2011

Resolution 1973 (2011)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 6498th meeting, on
17 March 2011**

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 1970 (2011) of 26 February 2011,

Deploring the failure of the Libyan authorities to comply with resolution 1970 (2011),

Expressing grave concern at the deteriorating situation, the escalation of violence, and the heavy civilian casualties,

Reiterating the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population and *reaffirming* that parties to armed conflicts bear the primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilians,

Condemning the gross and systematic violation of human rights, including arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, torture and summary executions,

Further condemning acts of violence and intimidation committed by the Libyan authorities against journalists, media professionals and associated personnel and *urging* these authorities to comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law as outlined in resolution 1738 (2006),

Considering that the widespread and systematic attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against the civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity,

Recalling paragraph 26 of resolution 1970 (2011) in which the Council expressed its readiness to consider taking additional appropriate measures, as necessary, to facilitate and support the return of humanitarian agencies and make available humanitarian and related assistance in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Expressing its determination to ensure the protection of civilians and civilian populated areas and the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance and the safety of humanitarian personnel,

Recalling the condemnation by the League of Arab States, the African Union, and the Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference of the serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law that have been and are being committed in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

11-26839 (E)



Please recycle A small graphic of a recycling symbol (three chasing arrows forming a triangle).

Taking note of the final communiqué of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference of 8 March 2011, and the communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union of 10 March 2011 which established an ad hoc High Level Committee on Libya,

Taking note also of the decision of the Council of the League of Arab States of 12 March 2011 to call for the imposition of a no-fly zone on Libyan military aviation, and to establish safe areas in places exposed to shelling as a precautionary measure that allows the protection of the Libyan people and foreign nationals residing in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Taking note further of the Secretary-General's call on 16 March 2011 for an immediate cease-fire,

Recalling its decision to refer the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya since 15 February 2011 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, and *stressing* that those responsible for or complicit in attacks targeting the civilian population, including aerial and naval attacks, must be held to account,

Reiterating its concern at the plight of refugees and foreign workers forced to flee the violence in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, *welcoming* the response of neighbouring States, in particular Tunisia and Egypt, to address the needs of those refugees and foreign workers, and *calling on* the international community to support those efforts,

Deploring the continuing use of mercenaries by the Libyan authorities,

Considering that the establishment of a ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya constitutes an important element for the protection of civilians as well as the safety of the delivery of humanitarian assistance and a decisive step for the cessation of hostilities in Libya,

Expressing concern also for the safety of foreign nationals and their rights in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Welcoming the appointment by the Secretary General of his Special Envoy to Libya, Mr. Abdel-Elah Mohamed Al-Khatib and supporting his efforts to find a sustainable and peaceful solution to the crisis in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Determining that the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Demands* the immediate establishment of a cease-fire and a complete end to violence and all attacks against, and abuses of, civilians;

2. *Stresses* the need to intensify efforts to find a solution to the crisis which responds to the legitimate demands of the Libyan people and *notes* the decisions of the Secretary-General to send his Special Envoy to Libya and of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union to send its ad hoc High Level Committee to Libya with the aim of facilitating dialogue to lead to the political reforms necessary to find a peaceful and sustainable solution;

3. *Demands* that the Libyan authorities comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, human rights and refugee law and take all measures to protect civilians and meet their basic needs, and to ensure the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance;

Protection of civilians

4. *Authorizes* Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory, and *requests* the Member States concerned to inform the Secretary-General immediately of the measures they take pursuant to the authorization conferred by this paragraph which shall be immediately reported to the Security Council;

5. *Recognizes* the important role of the League of Arab States in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security in the region, and bearing in mind Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, *requests* the Member States of the League of Arab States to cooperate with other Member States in the implementation of paragraph 4;

No Fly Zone

6. *Decides* to establish a ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to help protect civilians;

7. *Decides further* that the ban imposed by paragraph 6 shall not apply to flights whose sole purpose is humanitarian, such as delivering or facilitating the delivery of assistance, including medical supplies, food, humanitarian workers and related assistance, or evacuating foreign nationals from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, nor shall it apply to flights authorised by paragraphs 4 or 8, nor other flights which are deemed necessary by States acting under the authorisation conferred in paragraph 8 to be for the benefit of the Libyan people, and that these flights shall be coordinated with any mechanism established under paragraph 8;

8. *Authorizes* Member States that have notified the Secretary-General and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take all necessary measures to enforce compliance with the ban on flights imposed by paragraph 6 above, as necessary, and *requests* the States concerned in cooperation with the League of Arab States to coordinate closely with the Secretary General on the measures they are taking to implement this ban, including by establishing an appropriate mechanism for implementing the provisions of paragraphs 6 and 7 above,

9. *Calls upon* all Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to provide assistance, including any necessary over-flight approvals, for the purposes of implementing paragraphs 4, 6, 7 and 8 above;

10. *Requests* the Member States concerned to coordinate closely with each other and the Secretary-General on the measures they are taking to implement

paragraphs 4, 6, 7 and 8 above, including practical measures for the monitoring and approval of authorised humanitarian or evacuation flights;

11. *Decides* that the Member States concerned shall inform the Secretary-General and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States immediately of measures taken in exercise of the authority conferred by paragraph 8 above, including to supply a concept of operations;

12. *Requests* the Secretary-General to inform the Council immediately of any actions taken by the Member States concerned in exercise of the authority conferred by paragraph 8 above and to report to the Council within 7 days and every month thereafter on the implementation of this resolution, including information on any violations of the flight ban imposed by paragraph 6 above;

Enforcement of the arms embargo

13. *Decides that* paragraph 11 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall be replaced by the following paragraph : “Calls upon all Member States, in particular States of the region, acting nationally or through regional organisations or arrangements, in order to ensure strict implementation of the arms embargo established by paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 1970 (2011), to inspect in their territory, including seaports and airports, and on the high seas, vessels and aircraft bound to or from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 9 or 10 of resolution 1970 (2011) as modified by this resolution, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel, *calls upon* all flag States of such vessels and aircraft to cooperate with such inspections and authorises Member States to use all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances to carry out such inspections”;

14. *Requests* Member States which are taking action under paragraph 13 above on the high seas to coordinate closely with each other and the Secretary-General and *further requests* the States concerned to inform the Secretary-General and the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 (2011) (“the Committee”) immediately of measures taken in the exercise of the authority conferred by paragraph 13 above;

15. *Requires* any Member State whether acting nationally or through regional organisations or arrangements, when it undertakes an inspection pursuant to paragraph 13 above, to submit promptly an initial written report to the Committee containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds for the inspection, the results of such inspection, and whether or not cooperation was provided, and, if prohibited items for transfer are found, further requires such Member States to submit to the Committee, at a later stage, a subsequent written report containing relevant details on the inspection, seizure, and disposal, and relevant details of the transfer, including a description of the items, their origin and intended destination, if this information is not in the initial report;

16. *Deplores* the continuing flows of mercenaries into the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and *calls upon* all Member States to comply strictly with their obligations under paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) to prevent the provision of armed mercenary personnel to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;

Ban on flights

17. *Decides* that all States shall deny permission to any aircraft registered in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya or owned or operated by Libyan nationals or companies to take off from, land in or overfly their territory unless the particular flight has been approved in advance by the Committee, or in the case of an emergency landing;

18. *Decides that* all States shall deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly their territory, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 1970 (2011) as modified by this resolution, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel, except in the case of an emergency landing;

Asset freeze

19. *Decides* that the asset freeze imposed by paragraph 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall apply to all funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories, which are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the Libyan authorities, as designated by the Committee, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, as designated by the Committee, and *decides further* that all States shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any individuals or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of the Libyan authorities, as designated by the Committee, or individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, as designated by the Committee, and directs the Committee to designate such Libyan authorities, individuals or entities within 30 days of the date of the adoption of this resolution and as appropriate thereafter;

20. *Affirms* its determination to ensure that assets frozen pursuant to paragraph 17 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall, at a later stage, as soon as possible be made available to and for the benefit of the people of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;

21. *Decides* that all States shall require their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction to exercise vigilance when doing business with entities incorporated in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya or subject to its jurisdiction, and any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and entities owned or controlled by them, if the States have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such business could contribute to violence and use of force against civilians;

Designations

22. *Decides* that the individuals listed in Annex I shall be subject to the travel restrictions imposed in paragraphs 15 and 16 of resolution 1970 (2011), and *decides further* that the individuals and entities listed in Annex II shall be subject to the asset freeze imposed in paragraphs 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution 1970 (2011);

23. *Decides* that the measures specified in paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall apply also to individuals and entities determined by the Council or the Committee to have violated the provisions of resolution 1970

(2011), particularly paragraphs 9 and 10 thereof, or to have assisted others in doing so;

Panel of Experts

24. *Requests* the Secretary-General to create for an initial period of one year, in consultation with the Committee, a group of up to eight experts ("Panel of Experts"), under the direction of the Committee to carry out the following tasks:

(a) Assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 (2011) and this resolution;

(b) Gather, examine and analyse information from States, relevant United Nations bodies, regional organisations and other interested parties regarding the implementation of the measures decided in resolution 1970 (2011) and this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance;

(c) Make recommendations on actions the Council, or the Committee or State, may consider to improve implementation of the relevant measures;

(d) Provide to the Council an interim report on its work no later than 90 days after the Panel's appointment, and a final report to the Council no later than 30 days prior to the termination of its mandate with its findings and recommendations;

25. *Urges* all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties, to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures decided in resolution 1970 (2011) and this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance;

26. *Decides* that the mandate of the Committee as set out in paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall also apply to the measures decided in this resolution;

27. *Decides* that all States, including the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, shall take the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Libyan authorities, or of any person or body in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, or of any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or body, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was affected by reason of the measures taken by the Security Council in resolution 1970 (2011), this resolution and related resolutions;

28. *Reaffirms* its intention to keep the actions of the Libyan authorities under continuous review and underlines its readiness to review at any time the measures imposed by this resolution and resolution 1970 (2011), including by strengthening, suspending or lifting those measures, as appropriate, based on compliance by the Libyan authorities with this resolution and resolution 1970 (2011).

29. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Libya: UNSCR proposed designations

<i>Number</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Justification</i>	<i>Identifiers</i>
Annex I: Travel Ban			
1	QUREN SALIH QUREN AL QADHAFI	Libyan Ambassador to Chad. Has left Chad for Sabha. Involved directly in recruiting and coordinating mercenaries for the regime.	
2	Colonel AMID HUSAIN AL KUNI	Governor of Ghat (South Libya). Directly involved in recruiting mercenaries.	

<i>Number</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Justification</i>	<i>Identifiers</i>
Annex II: Asset Freeze			
1	Dorda, Abu Zayd Umar	Position: Director, External Security Organisation	
2	Jabir, Major General Abu Bakr Yunis	Position: Defence Minister	Title: Major General DOB: --/--/1952. POB: Jalo, Libya
3	Matuq, Matuq Mohammed	Position: Secretary for Utilities	DOB: --/--/1956. POB: Khoms
4	Qadhafi, Mohammed Muammar	Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime	DOB: --/--/1970. POB: Tripoli, Libya
5	Qadhafi, Saadi	Commander Special Forces. Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime. Command of military units involved in repression of demonstrations	DOB: 25/05/1973. POB: Tripoli, Libya
6	Qadhafi, Saif al-Arab	Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime	DOB: --/--/1982. POB: Tripoli, Libya
7	Al-Senussi, Colonel Abdullah	Position: Director Military Intelligence	Title: Colonel DOB: --/--/1949. POB: Sudan

Entities

1	Central Bank of Libya	Under control of Muammar Qadhafi and his family, and potential source of funding for his regime.	
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S/RES/1973 (2011)

<i>Number</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Justification</i>	<i>Identifiers</i>
2	Libyan Investment Authority	Under control of Muammar Qadhafi and his family, and potential source of funding for his regime.	a.k.a: Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company (LAFICO) Address: 1 Fateh Tower Office, No 99 22nd Floor, Borgaida Street, Tripoli, Libya, 1103
3	Libyan Foreign Bank	Under control of Muammar Qadhafi and his family and a potential source of funding for his regime.	
4	Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio	Under control of Muammar Qadhafi and his family, and potential source of funding for his regime.	Address: Jamahiriya Street, LAP Building, PO Box 91330, Tripoli, Libya
5	Libyan National Oil Corporation	Under control of Muammar Qadhafi and his family, and potential source of funding for his regime.	Address: Bashir Saadwi Street, Tripoli, Tarabulus, Libya



Resolution 2009 (2011)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 6620th meeting, on
16 September 2011**

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Libya,

Reaffirming its previous resolutions 1674 (2006) and 1894 (2009) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, 1612 (2006), 1882 (2009), 1998 (2011) on children in armed conflict, and 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009) 1889 (2009), and 1960 (2010) on women, peace and security,

Recalling its decision to refer the situation in Libya to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, and the importance of cooperation for ensuring that those responsible for violations of human rights and international humanitarian law or complicit in attacks targeting the civilian population are held accountable,

Strongly condemning all violations of applicable human rights and international humanitarian law, including violations that involve unlawful killings, other uses of violence against civilians, or arbitrary arrests and detentions, in particular of African migrants and members of minority communities,

Also strongly condemning sexual violence, particularly against women and girls, and the recruitment and use of children in situations of armed conflict in contravention of applicable international law,

Considering that the voluntary and sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons will be a critical factor for the consolidation of peace in Libya,

Stressing that national ownership and national responsibility are key to establishing sustainable peace and the primary responsibility of national authorities in identifying their priorities and strategies for post-conflict peace-building,

Recalling the letter of the Secretary-General of 7 September 2011 (S/2011/542) and *welcoming* his intention to dispatch, at the request of the Libyan authorities, an initial deployment of personnel, to be led by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General,



Taking note of the letter of 14 September 2011 from Dr. Mahmoud Jibril, Prime Minister of the National Transitional Council of Libya, to the Secretary-General,

Expressing its gratitude to the Secretary-General's Special Envoy to Libya, Mr. Abdel-Elah Mohamed Al-Khatib, for his efforts to find a sustainable and peaceful solution in Libya,

Reaffirming that the United Nations should lead the effort of the international community in supporting the Libyan-led transition and rebuilding process aimed at establishing a democratic, independent and united Libya, *welcoming* the contributions in this regard of the Secretary-General's 26 August high-level meeting of regional organisations and the 1 September Paris Conference, and *welcoming also* the efforts of the African Union, Arab League, European Union and the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation,

Expressing concern at the proliferation of arms in Libya and its potential impact on regional peace and security,

Recalling its resolutions 1970 (2011) of 26 February 2011 and 1973 (2011) of 17 March 2011,

Recalling its determination to ensure that assets frozen pursuant to resolutions 1970 (2011) and 1973 (2011) shall as soon as possible be made available to and for the benefit of the people of Libya, *welcoming* steps taken by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) and Member States in this regard, and *underscoring* the importance of making these assets available in a transparent and responsible manner in conformity with the needs and wishes of the Libyan people,

Mindful of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter of the United Nations,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41,

1. *Takes note* of the developments in Libya, *welcomes* the improved situation there, and *looks forward* to stability in Libya;

2. *Looks forward* to the establishment of an inclusive, representative transitional Government of Libya, and *emphasises* the need for the transitional period to be underpinned by a commitment to democracy, good governance, rule of law and respect for human rights;

3. *Emphasises* the importance of promoting the equal and full participation of women and minority communities in the discussions related to the political process in the post-conflict phase;

4. *Welcomes* the statements of the National Transitional Council appealing for unity, national reconciliation and justice, and its call for Libyans of all beliefs and backgrounds to refrain from reprisals, including arbitrary detentions;

5. *Encourages* the National Transitional Council to implement its plans to:

(a) protect Libya's population, restore government services, and allocate Libya's funds openly and transparently;

(b) prevent further abuses and violations of human rights and international humanitarian law and to put an end to impunity;

(c) ensure a consultative, inclusive political process with a view to agreement on a constitution and the holding of free and fair elections;

(d) ensure the safety of foreign nationals in Libya, particularly those who have been threatened, mistreated and/or detained; and

(e) prevent the proliferation of man-portable surface-to-air missiles, small arms and light weapons, and meet Libya's arms control and non-proliferation obligations under international law;

6. *Notes* the National Transitional Council's calls to avoid acts of reprisals including against migrant workers;

7. *Calls upon* the Libyan authorities to promote and protect human rights, including those of people belonging to vulnerable groups, to comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law, and *calls for* those responsible for violations, including sexual violence, to be held accountable in accordance with international standards;

8. *Strongly urges* the Libyan authorities to ensure the protection of diplomatic personnel and premises in accordance with Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961;

9. *Expresses* its resolve to assist the people of Libya to achieve these goals, and *urges* all Member States to assist the people of Libya as appropriate;

10. *Urges* all Member States to cooperate closely with the Libyan authorities in their efforts to end impunity, in accordance with Libya's international obligations;

11. *Calls upon* the Libyan authorities to comply with the international obligations of Libya, including obligations set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, in accordance with international law, and *further calls upon* the Libyan authorities to honour extant contracts and obligations, in accordance with this and other relevant resolutions, and the law applicable to such contracts and obligations;

UN Mandate

12. *Decides* to establish a United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), under the leadership of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General for an initial period of three months, and *decides further* that the mandate of UNSMIL shall be to assist and support Libyan national efforts to:

(a) restore public security and order and promote the rule of law;

(b) undertake inclusive political dialogue, promote national reconciliation, and embark upon the constitution-making and electoral process;

(c) extend state authority, including through strengthening emerging accountable institutions and the restoration of public services;

(d) promote and protect human rights, particularly for those belonging to vulnerable groups, and support transitional justice;

(e) take the immediate steps required to initiate economic recovery; and

(f) coordinate support that may be requested from other multilateral and bilateral actors as appropriate;

Arms Embargo

13. *Decides* that the measure imposed by paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall also not apply to the supply, sale or transfer to Libya of:

(a) arms and related materiel of all types, including technical assistance, training, financial and other assistance, intended solely for security or disarmament assistance to the Libyan authorities and notified to the Committee in advance and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of such a notification;

(b) small arms, light weapons and related materiel, temporarily exported to Libya for the sole use of United Nations personnel, representatives of the media and humanitarian and development workers and associated personnel, notified to the Committee in advance and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of such a notification;

Asset Freeze

14. *Decides* that the Libyan National Oil Corporation (LNOC) and Zueitina Oil Company shall no longer be subject to the asset freeze and other measures imposed in paragraphs 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution 1970 (2011) and paragraph 19 of resolution 1973 (2011);

15. *Decides* to modify the measures imposed in paragraphs 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution 1970 (2011) and paragraph 19 of resolution 1973 (2011) with respect to the Central Bank of Libya, the Libyan Arab Foreign Bank (LAFB), the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA), and the Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio (LAIP) as follows:

(a) funds, other financial assets and economic resources outside of Libya of the entities mentioned in this paragraph above that are frozen as of the date of this resolution pursuant to measures imposed in paragraph 17 of resolution 1970 (2011) or paragraph 19 of resolution 1973 (2011) shall remain frozen by States unless subject to an exemption as set out in paragraphs 19, 20 or 21 of that resolution or paragraph 16 below;

(b) except as provided in (a), the Central Bank of Libya, the LAFB, the LIA, and the LAIP shall otherwise no longer be subject to the measures imposed in paragraphs 17 of resolution 1970 (2011), including that States are no longer required to ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any individuals or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of these entities;

16. *Decides* that in addition to the provisions of paragraph 19 of resolution 1970 (2011), the measures imposed by paragraph 17 of that resolution, as modified by paragraph 15 above and paragraph 19 of resolution 1973 (2011), do not apply to funds, other financial assets or economic resources of the Central Bank of Libya, the LAFB, the LIA and the LAIP provided that:

(a) a Member State has provided notice to the Committee of its intent to authorize access to funds, other financial assets, or economic resources, for one or

more of the following purposes and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of such a notification:

- (i) humanitarian needs;
 - (ii) fuel, electricity and water for strictly civilian uses;
 - (iii) resuming Libyan production and sale of hydrocarbons;
 - (iv) establishing, operating, or strengthening institutions of civilian government and civilian public infrastructure; or
 - (v) facilitating the resumption of banking sector operations, including to support or facilitate international trade with Libya;
- (b) a Member State has notified the Committee that those funds, other financial assets or economic resources shall not be made available to or for the benefit of the individuals subject to the measures imposed in paragraph 17 of resolution 1970 (2011) or paragraph 19 of resolution 1973 (2011);
- (c) the Member State has consulted in advance with the Libyan authorities about the use of such funds, other financial assets, or economic resources; and
- (d) the Member State has shared with the Libyan authorities the notification submitted pursuant to this paragraph and the Libyan authorities have not objected within five working days to the release of such funds, other financial assets, or economic resources;

17. *Calls upon* States to exercise vigilance when acting pursuant to paragraph 16 above and to give due consideration to the use of international financial mechanisms to promote transparency and prevent misappropriation, in light of the challenges that yet remain for the Libyan authorities;

18. *Requests* the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to work with the Libyan authorities on an assessment of Libya's public financial management framework, which would recommend steps to be taken by Libya to ensure a system of transparency and accountability with respect to the funds held by Libyan governmental institutions, including the LIA, LNOC, LAFB, LAIP and Libyan Central Bank, and *further requests* that the Committee be informed of the results of that assessment;

19. *Directs* the Committee, in consultation with the Libyan authorities, to review continuously the remaining measures imposed by resolutions 1970 (2011) and 1973 (2011) with respect to the Central Bank of Libya, the LAFB, the LIA and the LAIP, and *decides* that the Committee shall, in consultation with the Libyan authorities, lift the designation of these entities as soon as practical to ensure the assets are made available to and for the benefit of the people of Libya;

No Fly Zone and Ban on Flights

20. *Takes note* of the improved situation in Libya, *emphasises* its intention to keep the measures imposed by paragraphs 6 to 12 of resolution 1973 (2011) under continuous review and *underlines* its readiness, as appropriate and when circumstances permit, to lift those measures and to terminate authorization given to Member States in paragraph 4 of resolution 1973 (2011) in consultation with the Libyan authorities;


21. *Decides* that the measures in paragraph 17 of resolution 1973 (2011) shall cease to have effect from the date of this resolution;

Cooperation and Reporting

22. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report on implementation of this resolution in 14 days from adoption, and every month thereafter, or more frequently as he sees fit;

23. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

APPENDIX 5: United Nations Security Council Resolution 2510



United Nations

S/RES/2510 (2020)

Distr.: General
12 February 2020

Resolution 2510 (2020)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 8722nd meeting, on
12 February 2020**

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 1970 (2011) and all its subsequent resolutions on Libya, including resolutions 2259 (2015) and 2486 (2019) and the statements of its President,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Libya,

Reaffirming its strong support for the ongoing efforts of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, *recalling* that there can be no military solution in Libya and *underscoring* the importance of the United Nations central role in facilitating a Libyan-led and Libyan-owned inclusive political process,

Welcoming the Berlin Conference convened on 19 January 2020, and *thanking* the government of Germany for hosting the meeting,

Recalling the commitment of the participants at the Berlin Conference to refrain from interference in the armed conflict or in the internal affairs of Libya and their call on all international actors to do the same,

Recognising the important role of neighbouring countries and regional organisations, notably the African Union, League of Arab States and European Union, *underlining* the importance of harmonised, coordinated and strengthened efforts, inviting them to consider how they might support the UN and *welcoming* the planned African Union intra-Libyan reconciliation meeting in support of UN efforts,

Welcoming the discussions that took place on Libya at the 33rd ordinary session of the African Union Summit in Addis Ababa from 9 to 11 February 2020,

Affirming the need for a lasting ceasefire in Libya at the earliest opportunity, without pre-conditions,

Expressing grave concern over the exploitation of the conflict by terrorist and violent groups, and *reaffirming* the need to combat, in accordance with international law including the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts,

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Expressing grave concern at the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Libya including deteriorating living standards and insufficient provision of basic services, and the situation faced by migrants, refugees and internally displaced people,

Recalling that Libya's oil resources are for the benefit of all Libyans and need to remain under the exclusive control of the National Oil Corporation (NOC),

Welcoming the economic dialogue, particularly efforts to establish the Libyan Expert Economic Commission, taking place in Libya and the region and UNSMIL's role in support,

Expressing concern over the growing involvement of mercenaries in Libya,

Recalling its determination in its resolution 2213 (2015) that the situation in Libya continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

1. *Welcomes* the Berlin Conference convened on 19 January 2020 and *emphasises* the vital importance of making progress towards a political solution to end the conflict;

2. *Endorses* the Conference Conclusions as contained in the document circulated as S/2020/63 and *notes* that these represent an important element of a comprehensive solution to the situation in Libya;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take forward as quickly as possible the tasks ascribed to UNSMIL in the operationalisation paper as contained in S/2020/63 as consistent with its mandate set out in resolution 2486 (2019), and to make recommendations to the Council on the options reflected in the paper, *calls* on all relevant Libyan parties and institutions to cooperate constructively in this endeavour and for Member States to offer their support;

4. *Welcomes* the nomination of representatives to the 5+5 Joint Military Commission and *calls* for the meetings of the Joint Military Commission to continue to take place with full participation and without further delay in order to agree a permanent ceasefire including the terms of reference for a ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism, the separation of forces, confidence building measures and the establishment of associated working groups supported by the UN;

5. *Requests*, in the light of paragraph 4, the Secretary-General to submit an interim report on the necessary conditions for, and proposals on effective ceasefire monitoring under the auspices of the UN, including reporting and dispute resolution mechanisms with a view to making detailed recommendations to the Security Council as soon as possible, when a ceasefire is agreed by the Libyan parties;

6. *Condemns* the recent increase in levels of violence and *demands* the parties commit to a lasting ceasefire according to the terms agreed by the Joint Military Commission;

7. *Recalls* resolution 2441 (2018) which expresses concern about activities which could damage the integrity and unity of Libyan state financial institutions and the NOC, *condemns* the recent blockade of oil facilities and *stresses* that operations should continue unimpeded for the benefit of all Libyans;

8. *Reaffirms* its intention to ensure that assets frozen pursuant to paragraph 17 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall at a later stage be made available to and for the benefit of the Libyan people;

9. *Recalls* its decision that individuals or entities engaging in, or providing support for acts that threaten the peace, stability or security of Libya, may be designated by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 (2011) for the travel ban and asset freeze measures specified in resolution 1970 (2011)

as modified by subsequent resolutions and *stresses* that the Committee shall consider the designation of individuals or entities who breach the arms embargo or the ceasefire, once agreed;

10. *Recalls* the commitments made at Berlin to abide by the arms embargo and *demands* full compliance including by all Member States with the arms embargo imposed under resolution 1970 (2011) as modified by subsequent resolutions, including by ceasing all support for and withdrawing all armed mercenary personnel, and *demands* all Member States not to intervene in the conflict or take measures that exacerbate the conflict;

11. *Demands* that all parties to the conflict comply with their obligations under international law including international humanitarian law;

12. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to report on progress regarding the work of the International Follow-Up Committee called for at the Berlin Conference;

13. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

APPENDIX 6: UNSC, France, Germany, Portugal and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Draft Resolution S/2011/612

United Nations

S/2011/612



Security Council

Distr.: General
4 October 2011

Original: English

France, Germany, Portugal and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Expressing grave concern at the situation in Syria,

Recalling its Presidential Statement of 3 August,

Welcoming the Secretary-General's statements articulating continued concerns about the ongoing violence and humanitarian needs, calling on the Syrian Government to halt its violent offensive at once, calling for an independent investigation of all human rights violations during recent demonstrations, and stressing the need to hold to account those responsible for human rights violations,

Noting Human Rights Council's report of its 17th Special session (A/HRC/S-17/1), including the decision to dispatch an independent international commission of inquiry to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law since March 2011 in Syria,

Recalling the Syrian Government's primary responsibility to protect its population, and the Secretary-General's call for the Syrian Government to allow unhindered and sustained access for humanitarian aid and humanitarian organizations, welcoming OCHA's humanitarian assessment mission and urging the Syrian authorities to cooperate comprehensively with the United Nations,

Stressing that the only solution to the current crisis in Syria is through an inclusive and Syrian-led political process with the aim of effectively addressing the legitimate aspirations and concerns of the population which will allow the full exercise of fundamental freedoms for its entire population, including of the rights of freedom of expression, assembly and peaceful protest, and further stressing that such a political process can only be advanced through an environment free from any sort of violence, fear and intimidation,

Noting the announced commitments by the Syrian authorities to reform, and regretting the lack of progress in implementation,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Syria,

Deeply concerned by the continuing deterioration of the situation in Syria and the potential for further escalation of the violence, and reaffirming the need to resolve the current crisis in Syria peacefully,

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Welcoming the engagement of the Secretary-General and the League of Arab States, and all other diplomatic efforts aimed at addressing this situation, including those of Turkey, Russia, Brazil, India, South Africa, and regretting the lack of a substantive response by the Syrian authorities to these demands,

1. *Strongly condemns* the continued grave and systematic human rights violations and the use of force against civilians by the Syrian authorities, and expresses profound regret at the deaths of thousands of people including women and children;

2. *Demands* an immediate end to all violence and *urges* all sides to reject violence and extremism;

3. *Recalls* that those responsible for all violence and human rights violations should be held accountable;

4. *Demands* that the Syrian authorities immediately:

(a) cease violations of human rights, comply with their obligations under applicable international law, and cooperate fully with the office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights;

(b) allow the full exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms by its entire population, including rights of freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, release all political prisoners and detained peaceful demonstrators, and lift restrictions on all forms of media;

(c) cease the use of force against civilians;

(d) alleviate the humanitarian situation in crisis areas, including by allowing expeditious, unhindered and sustained access for internationally recognized human rights monitors, humanitarian agencies and workers, and restoring basic services including access to hospitals;

(e) ensure the safe and voluntary return of those who have fled the violence to their homes;

5. *Calls for* an inclusive Syrian-led political process conducted in an environment free from violence, fear, intimidation, and extremism, and aimed at effectively addressing the legitimate aspirations and concerns of Syria's population, and *encourages* the Syrian opposition and all sections of Syrian society to contribute to such a process;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to urge the Syrian Government to implement paragraphs 2 and 4 above, including by appointing at the appropriate time a Special Envoy in consultation with the Security Council, and *encourages* all States and regional organizations to contribute to this objective;

7. *Encourages* in this regard the League of Arab states to continue efforts aimed at ending the violence and promoting such an inclusive Syrian-led political process;

8. *Strongly condemns* attacks on diplomatic personnel and recalls the fundamental principle of the inviolability of diplomatic agents and the obligations on host States, including under the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, to take all appropriate steps to protect embassy premises and prevent attacks on diplomatic agents;

9. *Calls upon* all States to exercise vigilance and restraint over the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Syria of arms and related materiel of all types, as well as technical training, financial resources or services, advice, or other services or assistance related to such arms and related materiel;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report on implementation of this resolution within 30 days of its adoption and every 30 days thereafter;

11. *Expresses* its intention to review Syria's implementation of this resolution within 30 days and to consider its options, including measures under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations;

12. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

APPENDIX 7: United Nations Security Council Resolution 2043

United Nations

S/RES/2043 (2012)



Security Council

Distr.: General
21 April 2012

Resolution 2043 (2012)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 6756th meeting, on
21 April 2012**

The Security Council,

Recalling its Resolution 2042 (2012), as well as its Presidential Statements of 3 August 2011, 21 March 2012 and 5 April 2012, and also *recalling* all relevant resolutions of the General Assembly,

Reaffirming its support to the Joint Special Envoy for the United Nations and the League of Arab States, Kofi Annan, and his work, following General Assembly resolution A/RES/66/253 of 16 February 2012 and relevant resolutions of the League of Arab States,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria, and to the purposes and principles of the Charter,

Condemning the widespread violations of human rights by the Syrian authorities, as well as any human rights abuses by armed groups, *recalling* that those responsible shall be held accountable, and *expressing* its profound regret at the death of many thousands of people in Syria,

Expressing its appreciation of the significant efforts that have been made by the States bordering Syria to assist Syrians who have fled across Syria's borders as a consequence of the violence, and requesting UNHCR to provide assistance as requested by member states receiving these displaced persons,

Expressing also its appreciation of the humanitarian assistance that has been provided to Syria by other States,

Noting the Syrian government's commitment on 25 March 2012 to implement the six-point proposal of the Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States, and to implement urgently and visibly its commitments, as it agreed to do in its communication to the Envoy of 1 April 2012, to (a) cease troop movements towards population centres, (b) cease all use of heavy weapons in such centres, and (c) begin pullback of military concentrations in and around population centres, and to implement these in their entirety by no later than 10 April 2012, and *noting also* the Syrian opposition's expressed commitment to respect the cessation of violence, provided the government does so,

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Expressing concern over ongoing violence and reports of casualties which have escalated again in recent days, following the Envoy's assessment of 12 April 2012 that the parties appeared to be observing a cessation of fire and that the Syrian government had started to implement its commitments, and *noting* that the cessation of armed violence in all its forms is therefore clearly incomplete,

Supporting the Envoy's call for an immediate and visible implementation by the Syrian government of all elements of the Envoy's six-point proposal in their entirety to achieve a sustained cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties,

Taking note of the assessment by the Secretary-General that a United Nations monitoring mission deployed quickly when the conditions are conducive with a clear mandate, the requisite capacities, and the appropriate conditions of operation would greatly contribute to observing and upholding the commitment of the parties to a cessation of armed violence in all its forms and to supporting the implementation of the six-point plan,

Noting the 19 April 2012 Preliminary Understanding (S/2012/250) agreed between the Syrian Arab Republic and the United Nations which provides a basis for a protocol governing the Advance Team and, upon its deployment, the UN supervision mechanism,

Having considered the Secretary-General's letter addressed to the President of Security Council(S/2012/238),

1. *Reaffirms* its full support for and *calls for* the urgent, comprehensive, and immediate implementation of all elements of the Envoy's six-point proposal as annexed to resolution 2042 (2012) aimed at bringing an immediate end to all violence and human rights violations, securing humanitarian access and facilitating a Syrian-led political transition leading to a democratic, plural political system, in which citizens are equal regardless of their affiliations, ethnicities or beliefs, including through commencing a comprehensive political dialogue between the Syrian government and the whole spectrum of the Syrian opposition;
2. *Calls upon* the Syrian government to implement visibly its commitments in their entirety, as it agreed to do in the Preliminary Understanding and as stipulated in resolution 2042 (2012), to (a) cease troop movements towards population centres, (b) cease all use of heavy weapons in such centres, (c) complete pullback of military concentrations in and around population centres, as well as to withdraw its troops and heavy weapons from population centres to their barracks or temporary deployment places to facilitate a sustained cessation of violence;
3. *Calls upon* all parties in Syria, including the opposition, immediately to cease all armed violence in all its forms;
4. *Calls upon* the Syrian armed opposition groups and relevant elements to respect relevant provisions of the Preliminary Understanding;
5. *Decides* to establish for an initial period of 90 days a United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) under the command of a Chief Military Observer, comprising an initial deployment of up to 300 unarmed military observers as well as an appropriate civilian component as required by the Mission to fulfil its mandate, and *decides further* that the Mission shall be deployed expeditiously

subject to assessment by the Secretary-General of relevant developments on the ground, including the consolidation of the cessation of violence;

6. *Decides also* that the mandate of the Mission shall be to monitor a cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties and to monitor and support the full implementation of the Envoy's six-point proposal;

7. *Requests* that the Secretary-General and the Syrian government without delay conclude a Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA), taking into consideration General Assembly resolution 58/82 on the scope of legal protection under the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, and *notes* the agreement between the Syrian government and the United Nations that, pending the conclusion of such an agreement, the model SOFA agreement of 9 October 1990 (A/45/594) shall apply provisionally;

8. *Calls upon* the Syrian government to ensure the effective operation of UNSMIS by: facilitating the expeditious and unhindered deployment of its personnel and capabilities as required to fulfil its mandate; ensuring its full, unimpeded, and immediate freedom of movement and access as necessary to fulfil its mandate, underlining in this regard the need for the Syrian government and the United Nations to agree rapidly on appropriate air transportation assets for UNSMIS; allowing its unobstructed communications; and allowing it to freely and privately communicate with individuals throughout Syria without retaliation against any person as a result of interaction with UNSMIS;

9. *Calls upon* the parties to guarantee the safety of UNSMIS personnel without prejudice to its freedom of movement and access, and *stresses* that the primary responsibility in this regard lies with the Syrian authorities;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report immediately to the Security Council any obstructions to the effective operation of UNSMIS by any party;

11. *Reiterates* its call for the Syrian authorities to allow immediate, full and unimpeded access of humanitarian personnel to all populations in need of assistance, in accordance with international law and guiding principles of humanitarian assistance and calls upon all parties in Syria, in particular the Syrian authorities, to cooperate fully with the United Nations and relevant humanitarian organizations to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance;

12. *Invites* all Member States to consider making appropriate contributions to UNSMIS as requested by the Secretary-General;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation of this resolution within 15 days of its adoption and every 15 days thereafter, and also to submit, as necessary, to the Council proposals for possible adjustments to the UNSMIS mandate;

14. *Expresses* its intention to assess the implementation of this resolution and to consider further steps as appropriate;

15. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.



Resolution 2118 (2013)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 7038th meeting, on
27 September 2013**

The Security Council,

Recalling the Statements of its President of 3 August 2011, 21 March 2012, 5 April 2012, and its resolutions 1540 (2004), 2042 (2012) and 2043 (2012),

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic,

Reaffirming that the proliferation of chemical weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Recalling that the Syrian Arab Republic on 22 November 1968 acceded to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,

Noting that on 14 September 2013, the Syrian Arab Republic deposited with the Secretary-General its instrument of accession to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (Convention) and declared that it shall comply with its stipulations and observe them faithfully and sincerely, applying the Convention provisionally pending its entry into force for the Syrian Arab Republic,

Welcoming the establishment by the Secretary-General of the United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic (the Mission) pursuant to General Assembly resolution 42/37 C (1987) of 30 November 1987, and reaffirmed by resolution 620 (1988) of 26 August 1988, and *expressing* appreciation for the work of the Mission,

Acknowledging the report of 16 September 2013 (S/2013/553) by the Mission, *underscoring* the need for the Mission to fulfil its mandate, and *emphasizing* that future credible allegations of chemical weapons use in the Syrian Arab Republic should be investigated,

Deeply outraged by the use of chemical weapons on 21 August 2013 in Rif Damascus, as concluded in the Mission's report, *condemning* the killing of civilians that resulted from it, *affirming* that the use of chemical weapons constitutes a



serious violation of international law, and *stressing* that those responsible for any use of chemical weapons must be held accountable,

Recalling the obligation under resolution 1540 (2004) that all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, and their means of delivery,

Welcoming the Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons dated 14 September 2013, in Geneva, between the Russian Federation and the United States of America (S/2013/565), with a view to ensuring the destruction of the Syrian Arab Republic's chemical weapons program in the soonest and safest manner, and *expressing* its commitment to the immediate international control over chemical weapons and their components in the Syrian Arab Republic,

Welcoming the decision of the Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) of 27 September 2013 establishing special procedures for the expeditious destruction of the Syrian Arab Republic's chemical weapons program and stringent verification thereof, and *expressing* its determination to ensure the destruction of the Syrian Arab Republic's chemical weapons program according to the timetable contained in the OPCW Executive Council decision of 27 September 2013,

Stressing that the only solution to the current crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic is through an inclusive and Syrian-led political process based on the Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2012, and *emphasising* the need to convene the international conference on Syria as soon as possible,

Determining that the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Underscoring that Member States are obligated under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations to accept and carry out the Council's decisions,

1. *Determines* that the use of chemical weapons anywhere constitutes a threat to international peace and security;

2. *Condemns* in the strongest terms any use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, in particular the attack on 21 August 2013, in violation of international law;

3. *Endorses* the decision of the OPCW Executive Council 27 September 2013, which contains special procedures for the expeditious destruction of the Syrian Arab Republic's chemical weapons program and stringent verification thereof and calls for its full implementation in the most expedient and safest manner;

4. *Decides* that the Syrian Arab Republic shall not use, develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to other States or non-State actors;

5. *Underscores* that no party in Syria should use, develop, produce, acquire, stockpile, retain, or transfer chemical weapons;

6. *Decides* that the Syrian Arab Republic shall comply with all aspects of the decision of the OPCW Executive Council of 27 September 2013 (Annex I);

7. *Decides* that the Syrian Arab Republic shall cooperate fully with the OPCW and the United Nations, including by complying with their relevant recommendations, by accepting personnel designated by the OPCW or the United Nations, by providing for and ensuring the security of activities undertaken by these personnel, by providing these personnel with immediate and unfettered access to and the right to inspect, in discharging their functions, any and all sites, and by allowing immediate and unfettered access to individuals that the OPCW has grounds to believe to be of importance for the purpose of its mandate, and *decides* that all parties in Syria shall cooperate fully in this regard;

8. *Decides* to authorize an advance team of United Nations personnel to provide early assistance to OPCW activities in Syria, *requests* the Director-General of the OPCW and the Secretary-General to closely cooperate in the implementation of the Executive Council decision of 27 September 2013 and this resolution, including through their operational activities on the ground, and *further requests* the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Director-General of the OPCW and, where appropriate, the Director-General of the World Health Organization, to submit to the Council within 10 days of the adoption of this resolution recommendations regarding the role of the United Nations in eliminating the Syrian Arab Republic's chemical weapons program;

9. *Notes* that the Syrian Arab Republic is a party to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, *decides* that OPCW-designated personnel undertaking activities provided for in this resolution or the decision of the OPCW Executive Council of 27 September 2013 shall enjoy the privileges and immunities contained in the Verification Annex, Part II(B) of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and *calls* on the Syrian Arab Republic to conclude modalities agreements with the United Nations and the OPCW;

10. *Encourages* Member States to provide support, including personnel, technical expertise, information, equipment, and financial and other resources and assistance, in coordination with the Director-General of the OPCW and the Secretary-General, to enable the OPCW and the United Nations to implement the elimination of the Syrian Arab Republic's chemical weapons program, and *decides* to authorize Member States to acquire, control, transport, transfer and destroy chemical weapons identified by the Director-General of the OPCW, consistent with the objective of the Chemical Weapons Convention, to ensure the elimination of the Syrian Arab Republic's chemical weapons program in the soonest and safest manner;

11. *Urges* all Syrian parties and interested Member States with relevant capabilities to work closely together and with the OPCW and the United Nations to arrange for the security of the monitoring and destruction mission, recognizing the primary responsibility of the Syrian government in this regard;

12. *Decides* to review on a regular basis the implementation in the Syrian Arab Republic of the decision of the OPCW Executive Council of 27 September 2013 and this resolution, and *requests* the Director-General of the OPCW to report to the Security Council, through the Secretary-General, who shall include relevant information on United Nations activities related to the implementation of this resolution, within 30 days and every month thereafter, and *requests* further the Director-General of the OPCW and the Secretary-General to report in a coordinated

manner, as needed, to the Security Council, non-compliance with this resolution or the OPCW Executive Council decision of 27 September 2013;

13. *Reaffirms* its readiness to consider promptly any reports of the OPCW under Article VIII of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which provides for the referral of cases of non-compliance to the United Nations Security Council;

14. *Decides* that Member States shall inform immediately the Security Council of any violation of resolution 1540 (2004), including acquisition by non-State actors of chemical weapons, their means of delivery and related materials in order to take necessary measures therefore;

15. *Expresses* its strong conviction that those individuals responsible for the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic should be held accountable;

16. *Endorses* fully the Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2012 (Annex II), which sets out a number of key steps beginning with the establishment of a transitional governing body exercising full executive powers, which could include members of the present Government and the opposition and other groups and shall be formed on the basis of mutual consent;

17. *Calls* for the convening, as soon as possible, of an international conference on Syria to implement the Geneva Communiqué, and *calls upon* all Syrian parties to engage seriously and constructively at the Geneva Conference on Syria, and *underscores* that they should be fully representative of the Syrian people and committed to the implementation of the Geneva Communiqué and to the achievement of stability and reconciliation;

18. *Reaffirms* that all Member States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, and *calls upon* all Member States, in particular Member States neighbouring the Syrian Arab Republic, to report any violations of this paragraph to the Security Council immediately;

19. *Demands* that non-State actors not develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer, or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, and *calls upon* all Member States, in particular Member States neighbouring the Syrian Arab Republic, to report any actions inconsistent with this paragraph to the Security Council immediately;

20. *Decides* that all Member States shall prohibit the procurement of chemical weapons, related equipment, goods and technology or assistance from the Syrian Arab Republic by their nationals, or using their flagged vessels or aircraft, whether or not originating in the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic;

21. *Decides*, in the event of non-compliance with this resolution, including unauthorized transfer of chemical weapons, or any use of chemical weapons by anyone in the Syrian Arab Republic, to impose measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter;

22. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Annex I**OPCW Executive Council Decision****Decision on destruction of Syrian chemical weapons**

The Executive Council,

Recalling that following its Thirty-Second Meeting, 27 March 2013, the Chairperson of the Executive Council (hereinafter "the Council") issued a statement (EC-M-32/2/Rev. 1, dated 27 March 2013) expressing "deep concern that chemical weapons may have been used in the Syrian Arab Republic," and underlining that "the use of chemical weapons by anyone under any circumstances would be reprehensible and completely contrary to the legal norms and standards of the international community";

Recalling also that the Third Review Conference (RC-3/3*, 19 April 2013) expressed "deep concern that chemical weapons may have been used in the Syrian Arab Republic and underlined that use of chemical weapons by anyone under any circumstances would be reprehensible and completely contrary to the legal norms and standards of the international community";

Noting the "Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta area of Damascus on 21 August 2013," (S/2013/553, dated 16 September 2013) prepared by the United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, dated 16 September 2013, which concludes that "chemical weapons have been used in the ongoing conflict between the parties in the Syrian Arab Republic, also against civilians, including children, on a relatively large scale";

Condemning in the strongest possible terms the use of chemical weapons;

Welcoming the Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons agreed upon by the United States and the Russian Federation on 14 September 2013 (EC-M-33/NAT.1, dated 17 September 2013);

Noting also that on 12 September 2013, in its communication to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Syrian Arab Republic notified its intention to apply the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (hereinafter "the Convention") provisionally;

Noting further that on 14 September 2013, the Syrian Arab Republic deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations its instrument of accession to the Convention and declared that it shall comply with its stipulations and observe them faithfully and sincerely, applying the Convention provisionally pending its entry into force for the Syrian Arab Republic, which was notified to all States Parties by the depositary on the same date (C.N.592.2013.TREATIES-XXVI.3), and taking into account that the depositary received no communications to the contrary from the States Parties with regard to this declaration;

Noting further that the Convention enters into force for the Syrian Arab Republic on 14 October 2013;

Recognising the extraordinary character of the situation posed by Syrian chemical weapons and determined to ensure that the activities necessary for the destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons programme start immediately pending the formal entry into force of the Convention with respect to the Syrian Arab Republic, and are conducted in the most rapid and safe manner;

Recognising also the invitation of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to receive immediately a technical delegation from the OPCW and to cooperate with the OPCW in accordance with the provisional application of the Convention prior to its entry into force for the Syrian Arab Republic, and noting the designation by the Syrian Arab Republic to the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter "the Secretariat") of its National Authority;

Emphasising that the provisional application of the Convention gives immediate effect to its provisions with respect to the Syrian Arab Republic;

Noting further that the Syrian Arab Republic submitted on 19 September 2013 the detailed information, including names, types, and quantities of its chemical weapons agents, types of munitions, and location and form of storage, production, and research and development facilities;

Noting further that pursuant to paragraph 36 of Article VIII of the Convention, the Council, following its consideration of doubts or concerns regarding compliance and cases of non-compliance, shall, in cases of particular gravity and urgency, bring the issue or matter, including relevant information and conclusions, directly to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security Council;

Taking into account the Agreement Concerning the Relationship between the United Nations and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons of

17 October 2000;

Strongly urging all remaining States not Party to the Convention to ratify or accede to it as a matter of urgency and without preconditions, in the interests of enhancing their own national security as well as contributing to global peace and security; and

Recalling that, pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article IV and paragraph 10 of Article V of the Convention, a State acceding to the Convention after 2007 shall destroy its chemical weapons and its chemical weapons production facilities as soon as possible, and the Council shall determine the "order of destruction and procedures for stringent verification" of such destruction;

Hereby:

1. Decides that the Syrian Arab Republic shall:
 - (a) not later than 7 days after the adoption of this decision, submit to the Secretariat further information, to supplement that provided on 19 September 2013, on the chemical weapons as defined in paragraph 1 of Article II of the Convention that the Syrian Arab Republic owns or possesses, or has under its jurisdiction or control, in particular:
 - (i) the chemical name and military designator of each chemical in its chemical weapons stockpile, including precursors and toxins, and quantities thereof;

- (ii) the specific type of munitions, sub-munitions and devices in its chemical weapons stockpile, including specific quantities of each type that are filled and unfilled; and
- (iii) the location of all of its chemical weapons, chemical weapons storage facilities, chemical weapons production facilities, including mixing and filling facilities, and chemical weapons research and development facilities, providing specific geographic coordinates;
- (b) not later than 30 days after the adoption of this decision, submit to the Secretariat the declaration required by Article III of the Convention;
- (c) complete the elimination of all chemical weapons material and equipment in the first half of 2014, subject to the detailed requirements, including intermediate destruction milestones, to be decided by the Council not later than 15 November 2013;
- (d) complete as soon as possible and in any case not later than 1 November 2013, the destruction of chemical weapons production and mixing/filling equipment;
- (e) cooperate fully with all aspects of the implementation of this decision, including by providing the OPCW personnel with the immediate and unfettered right to inspect any and all sites in the Syrian Arab Republic;
- (f) designate an official as the main point of contact for the Secretariat and provide him or her with the authority necessary to ensure that this decision is fully implemented.

2. Decides further that the Secretariat shall:

- (a) make available to all States Parties, within five days of its receipt, any information or declaration referred to in this decision, which shall be handled in accordance with the Annex to the Convention on the Protection of Confidential Information;
- (b) as soon as possible and in any case not later than 1 October 2013, initiate inspections in the Syrian Arab Republic pursuant to this decision;
- (c) inspect not later than 30 days after the adoption of this decision, all facilities contained in the list referred to in paragraph 1 (a) above;
- (d) inspect as soon as possible any other site identified by a State Party as having been involved in the Syrian chemical weapons programme, unless deemed unwarranted by the Director-General, or the matter resolved through the process of consultations and cooperation;
- (e) be authorised to hire, on a short-term basis, qualified inspectors and other technical experts and to rehire, on a short-term basis, inspectors, other technical experts, and such other personnel as may be required whose term of service has recently expired, in order to ensure efficient and effective implementation of this decision in accordance with paragraph 44 of Article VIII of the Convention; and
- (f) report to the Council on a monthly basis on implementation of this decision including progress achieved by the Syrian Arab Republic in meeting the requirements of this decision and the Convention, activities carried out by

the Secretariat with respect to the Syrian Arab Republic, and its needs for any supplementary resources, particularly technical and personnel resources.

3. Decides further:

(a) to consider, on an urgent basis, the funding mechanisms for activities carried out by the Secretariat with respect to the Syrian Arab Republic, and to call upon all States Parties in a position to do so to provide voluntary contributions for activities carried out in the implementation of this decision;

(b) to meet within 24 hours if the Director-General reports delay by the Syrian Arab Republic in meeting the requirements of this decision or the Convention, including, inter alia, the cases referred to in paragraph 7 of Part II of the Annex to the Convention on Implementation and Verification, or a lack of cooperation in the Syrian Arab Republic or another problem that has arisen with regard to the implementation of this decision and at that meeting to consider whether to bring the matter, including relevant information and conclusions, to the attention of the United Nations Security Council in accordance with paragraph 36 of Article VIII of the Convention;

(c) to remain seized of the matter and

(d) to recognise that this decision is made due to the extraordinary character of the situation posed by Syrian chemical weapons and does not create any precedent for the future.

Annex II

Action Group for Syria Final Communiqué

30 June 2012

1. On 30 June 2012, the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and the League of Arab States, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, Turkey, Iraq (Chair of the Summit of the League of Arab States), Kuwait (Chair of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the League of Arab States) and Qatar (Chair of the Arab Follow-up Committee on Syria of the League of Arab States) and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy met at the United Nations Office at Geneva as the Action Group for Syria, chaired by the Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States to Syria.

2. The members of the Action Group came together out of grave alarm at the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic. They strongly condemn the continued and escalating killing, destruction and human rights abuses. They are deeply concerned at the failure to protect civilians, the intensification of the violence, the potential for even deeper conflict in the country and the regional dimensions of the problem. The unacceptable nature and magnitude of the crisis demands a common position and joint international action.

3. The members of the Action Group are committed to the sovereignty, independence, national unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic. They are determined to work urgently and intensively to bring about an end to the violence and human rights abuses, and to facilitate the launch of a Syrian-led political process leading to a transition that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people and enables them independently and democratically to determine their own future.

4. In order to secure these common objectives, the members of the Action Group (a) identified steps and measures by the parties to secure the full implementation of the six-point plan and Security Council resolutions 2042 (2012) and 2043 (2012), including an immediate cessation of violence in all its forms; (b) agreed on principles and guidelines for a political transition that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people; and (c) agreed on actions that they would take to implement the objectives in support of the Joint Special Envoy's efforts to facilitate a Syrian-led political process. They are convinced that this can encourage and support progress on the ground and will help to facilitate and support a Syrian-led transition.

Identified steps and measures by the parties to secure the full implementation of the six-point plan and Security Council resolutions 2042 (2012) and 2043 (2012), including an immediate cessation of violence in all its forms

5. The parties must fully implement the six-point plan and Security Council resolutions 2042 (2012) and 2043 (2012). To that end:

(a) All parties must recommit to a sustained cessation of armed violence in all its forms and to the implementation of the six-point plan immediately and

without waiting for the actions of others. The Government and armed opposition groups must cooperate with the United Nations Supervision Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic (UNSMIS), with a view to furthering the implementation of the plan in accordance with the Mission's mandate;

(b) A cessation of armed violence must be sustained, with immediate, credible and visible actions by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to implement the other items of the six-point plan, including:

(i) Intensification of the pace and scale of release of arbitrarily detained persons, including especially vulnerable categories of persons, and persons involved in peaceful political activities; the provision, without delay and through appropriate channels, of a list of all places in which such persons are being detained; the immediate organization of access to such locations; and the provision, through appropriate channels, of prompt responses to all written requests for information, access or release regarding such persons;

(ii) Ensuring freedom of movement throughout the country for journalists and a non-discriminatory visa policy for them;

(iii) Respecting freedom of association and the right to demonstrate peacefully, as legally guaranteed;

(c) In all circumstances, all parties must show full respect for the safety and security of UNSMIS and fully cooperate with and facilitate the Mission in all respects;

(d) In all circumstances, the Government must allow immediate and full humanitarian access by humanitarian organizations to all areas affected by the fighting. The Government and all parties must enable the evacuation of the wounded, and all civilians who wish to leave must be enabled to do so. All parties must fully adhere to their obligations under international law, including in relation to the protection of civilians.

Agreed principles and guidelines for a Syrian-led transition

6. The members of the Action Group agreed on the principles and guidelines for a Syrian-led transition set out below.

7. Any political settlement must deliver to the people of the Syrian Arab Republic a transition that:

(a) Offers a perspective for the future that can be shared by all in the Syrian Arab Republic;

(b) Establishes clear steps according to a firm timetable towards the realization of that perspective;

(c) Can be implemented in a climate of safety for all and of stability and calm;

(d) Is reached rapidly without further bloodshed and violence and is credible.

8. **Perspective for the future.** The aspirations of the people of the Syrian Arab Republic have been clearly expressed by the wide range of Syrians consulted. There is an overwhelming wish for a State that:

(a) Is genuinely democratic and pluralistic, giving space to established and newly emerging political actors to compete fairly and equally in elections. This also means that the commitment to multiparty democracy must be a lasting one, going beyond an initial round of elections;

(b) Complies with international standards on human rights, the independence of the judiciary, accountability of those in Government and the rule of law. It is not enough just to enunciate such a commitment. There must be mechanisms available to the people to ensure that these commitments are kept by those in authority;

(c) Offers equal opportunities and chances for all. There is no room for sectarianism or discrimination on ethnic, religious, linguistic or any other grounds. Numerically smaller communities must be assured that their rights will be respected.

9. **Clear steps in the transition.** The conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic will end only when all sides are assured that there is a peaceful way towards a common future for all in the country. It is therefore essential that any settlement provide for clear and irreversible steps in the transition according to a fixed time frame. The key steps in any transition include:

(a) The establishment of a transitional governing body that can establish a neutral environment in which the transition can take place, with the transitional governing body exercising full executive powers. It could include members of the present Government and the opposition and other groups and shall be formed on the basis of mutual consent;

(b) It is for the Syrian people to determine the future of the country. All groups and segments of society in the Syrian Arab Republic must be enabled to participate in a national dialogue process. That process must be not only inclusive but also meaningful. In other words, its key outcomes must be implemented;

(c) On that basis, there can be a review of the constitutional order and the legal system. The result of constitutional drafting would be subject to popular approval;

(d) Upon establishment of the new constitutional order, it will be necessary to prepare for and conduct free and fair multiparty elections for the new institutions and offices that have been established;

(e) Women must be fully represented in all aspects of the transition.

10. **Safety, stability and calm.** Any transition involves change. However, it is essential to ensure that the transition can be implemented in a way that ensures the safety of all in an atmosphere of stability and calm. This requires:

(a) Consolidation of full calm and stability. All parties must cooperate with the transitional governing body to ensure the permanent cessation of violence. This includes completion of withdrawals and addressing the issue of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed groups;

(b) Effective steps to ensure that vulnerable groups are protected and that immediate action is taken to address humanitarian issues in areas of need. It is also necessary to ensure that the release of the detained is completed rapidly;

(c) Continuity of governmental institutions and qualified staff. Public services must be preserved or restored. This includes the military forces and security

services. However, all governmental institutions, including the intelligence services, have to perform according to human rights and professional standards and operate under a leadership that inspires public confidence, under the control of the transitional governing body;

(d) Commitment to accountability and national reconciliation. Accountability for acts committed during the present conflict must be addressed. There also needs to be a comprehensive package for transitional justice, including compensation or rehabilitation for victims of the present conflict, steps towards national reconciliation and forgiveness.

11. **Rapid steps to come to a credible political agreement.** It is for the people of the Syrian Arab Republic to come to a political agreement, but time is running out. It is clear that:

(a) The sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic must be respected;

(b) The conflict must be resolved through peaceful dialogue and negotiation alone. Conditions conducive to a political settlement must now be put in place;

(c) There must be an end to the bloodshed. All parties must recommit themselves credibly to the six-point plan. This must include a cessation of armed violence in all its forms and immediate, credible and visible actions to implement points 2 to 6 of the six-point plan;

(d) All parties must now engage genuinely with the Joint Special Envoy. The parties must be prepared to put forward effective interlocutors to work expeditiously towards a Syrian-led settlement that meets the legitimate aspirations of the people. The process must be fully inclusive in order to ensure that the views of all segments of Syrian society are heard in shaping the political settlement for the transition;

(e) The organized international community, including the members of the Action Group, stands ready to offer significant support for the implementation of an agreement reached by the parties. This may include an international assistance presence under a United Nations mandate if requested. Significant funds will be available to support reconstruction and rehabilitation.

Agreed actions

12. Agreed actions that the members of the Group will take to implement the above in support of the Joint Special Envoy's efforts to facilitate a Syrian-led political process are as follows:

(a) Action Group members will engage as appropriate, and apply joint and sustained pressure on, the parties in the Syrian Arab Republic to take the steps and measures outlined in paragraph 5 above;

(b) Action Group members are opposed to any further militarization of the conflict;

(c) Action Group members emphasize to the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic the importance of the appointment of an effective empowered interlocutor, when requested by the Joint Special Envoy to do so, to work on the basis of the six point plan and the present communiqué;

(d) Action Group members urge the opposition to increase cohesion and to be in a position to ensure effective representative interlocutors to work on the basis of the six-point plan and the present communiqué;

(e) Action Group members will give full support to the Joint Special Envoy and his team as they immediately engage the Government and the opposition, and will consult widely with Syrian society, as well as other international actors, to further develop the way forward;

(f) Action Group members would welcome the further convening by the Joint Special Envoy of a meeting of the Action Group, should he deem it necessary to review the concrete progress taken on all points agreed in the present communiqué and to determine what further and additional steps and actions are needed from the Action Group to address the crisis. The Joint Special Envoy will also keep the United Nations and the League of Arab States informed.



Resolution 2254 (2015)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 7588th meeting, on
18 December 2015**

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 2042 (2012), 2043 (2012), 2118 (2013), 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2170 (2014), 2175 (2014), 2178 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2199 (2015), 2235 (2015), and 2249 (2015) and Presidential Statements of 3 August 2011 (S/PRST/2011/16), 21 March 2012 (S/PRST/2012/6), 5 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/10), 2 October 2013 (S/PRST/2013/15), 24 April 2015 (S/PRST/2015/10) and 17 August 2015 (S/PRST/2015/15),

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic, and to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Expressing its gravest concern at the continued suffering of the Syrian people, the dire and deteriorating humanitarian situation, the ongoing conflict and its persistent and brutal violence, the negative impact of terrorism and violent extremist ideology in support of terrorism, the destabilizing effect of the crisis on the region and beyond, including the resulting increase in terrorists drawn to the fighting in Syria, the physical destruction in the country, and increasing sectarianism, and *underscoring* that the situation will continue to deteriorate in the absence of a political solution,

Recalling its demand that all parties take all appropriate steps to protect civilians, including members of ethnic, religious and confessional communities, and *stresses* that, in this regard, the primary responsibility to protect its population lies with the Syrian authorities,

Reiterating that the only sustainable solution to the current crisis in Syria is through an inclusive and Syrian-led political process that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people, with a view to full implementation of the Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2012 as endorsed by resolution 2118 (2013), including through the establishment of an inclusive transitional governing body with full executive powers, which shall be formed on the basis of mutual consent while ensuring continuity of governmental institutions,

Encouraging, in this regard, the diplomatic efforts of the International Syria Support Group (ISSG) to help bring an end to the conflict in Syria,

15-22539 (E)



Please recycle The recycling symbol, consisting of three chasing arrows forming a triangle.



Commending the commitment of the ISSG, as set forth in the Joint Statement on the outcome of the multilateral talks on Syria in Vienna of 30 October 2015 and the Statement of the ISSG of 14 November 2015 (hereinafter the “Vienna Statements”), to ensure a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political transition based on the Geneva Communiqué in its entirety, and *emphasizing* the urgency for all parties in Syria to work diligently and constructively towards this goal,

Urging all parties to the UN-facilitated political process to adhere to the principles identified by the ISSG, including commitments to Syria’s unity, independence, territorial integrity, and non-sectarian character, to ensuring continuity of governmental institutions, to protecting the rights of all Syrians, regardless of ethnicity or religious denomination, and to ensuring humanitarian access throughout the country,

Encouraging the meaningful participation of women in the UN-facilitated political process for Syria,

Bearing in mind the goal to bring together the broadest possible spectrum of the opposition, chosen by Syrians, who will decide their negotiation representatives and define their negotiation positions so as to enable the political process to begin, *taking note* of the meetings in Moscow and Cairo and other initiatives to this end, and *noting* in particular the usefulness of the meeting in Riyadh on 9-11 December 2015, whose outcomes contribute to the preparation of negotiations under UN auspices on a political settlement of the conflict, in accordance with the Geneva Communiqué and the “Vienna Statements”, and *looking forward* to the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Syria finalizing efforts to this end,

1. *Reconfirms* its endorsement of the Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2012, *endorses* the “Vienna Statements” in pursuit of the full implementation of the Geneva Communiqué, as the basis for a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political transition in order to end the conflict in Syria, and *stresses* that the Syrian people will decide the future of Syria;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General, through his good offices and the efforts of his Special Envoy for Syria, to convene representatives of the Syrian government and the opposition to engage in formal negotiations on a political transition process on an urgent basis, with a target of early January 2016 for the initiation of talks, pursuant to the Geneva Communiqué, consistent with the 14 November 2015 ISSG Statement, with a view to a lasting political settlement of the crisis;

3. *Acknowledges* the role of the ISSG as the central platform to facilitate the United Nations’ efforts to achieve a lasting political settlement in Syria;

4. *Expresses its support*, in this regard, for a Syrian-led political process that is facilitated by the United Nations and, within a target of six months, establishes credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance and sets a schedule and process for drafting a new constitution, and *further expresses its support* for free and fair elections, pursuant to the new constitution, to be held within 18 months and administered under supervision of the United Nations, to the satisfaction of the governance and to the highest international standards of transparency and accountability, with all Syrians, including members of the diaspora, eligible to participate, as set forth in the 14 November 2015 ISSG Statement;

5. *Acknowledges* the close linkage between a ceasefire and a parallel political process, pursuant to the 2012 Geneva Communiqué, and that both initiatives should move ahead expeditiously, and in this regard *expresses its support* for a nationwide ceasefire in Syria, which the ISSG has committed to support and assist in implementing, to come into effect as soon as the representatives of the Syrian government and the opposition have begun initial steps towards a political transition under UN auspices, on the basis of the Geneva Communiqué, as set forth in the 14 November 2015 ISSG Statement, and to do so on an urgent basis;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to lead the effort, through the office of his Special Envoy and in consultation with relevant parties, to determine the modalities and requirements of a ceasefire as well as continue planning for the support of ceasefire implementation, and *urges* Member States, in particular members of the ISSG, to support and accelerate all efforts to achieve a ceasefire, including through pressing all relevant parties to agree and adhere to such a ceasefire;

7. *Emphasizes* the need for a ceasefire monitoring, verification and reporting mechanism, *requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on options for such a mechanism that it can support, as soon as possible and no later than one month after the adoption of this resolution, and *encourages* Member States, including members of the Security Council, to provide assistance, including through expertise and in-kind contributions, to support such a mechanism;

8. *Reiterates* its call in resolution 2249 (2015) for Member States to prevent and suppress terrorist acts committed specifically by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh), Al-Nusra Front (ANF), and all other individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities associated with Al Qaeda or ISIL, and other terrorist groups, as designated by the Security Council, and as may further be agreed by the ISSG and determined by the Security Council, pursuant to the Statement of the ISSG of 14 November 2015, and to eradicate the safe haven they have established over significant parts of Syria, and *notes* that the aforementioned ceasefire will not apply to offensive or defensive actions against these individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, as set forth in the 14 November 2015 ISSG Statement;

9. *Welcomes* the effort that was conducted by the government of Jordan to help develop a common understanding within the ISSG of individuals and groups for possible determination as terrorists and will consider expeditiously the recommendation of the ISSG for the purpose of determining terrorist groups;

10. *Emphasizes* the need for all parties in Syria to take confidence building measures to contribute to the viability of a political process and a lasting ceasefire, and *calls on* all states to use their influence with the government of Syria and the Syrian opposition to advance the peace process, confidence building measures and steps towards a ceasefire;

11. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council, as soon as possible and no later than one month after the adoption of this resolution, on options for further confidence building measures;

12. *Calls on* the parties to immediately allow humanitarian agencies rapid, safe and unhindered access throughout Syria by most direct routes, allow immediate, humanitarian assistance to reach all people in need, in particular in all

besieged and hard-to-reach areas, release any arbitrarily detained persons, particularly women and children, *calls on* ISSG states to use their influence immediately to these ends, and *demands* the full implementation of resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014) and any other applicable resolutions;

13. *Demands* that all parties immediately cease any attacks against civilians and civilian objects as such, including attacks against medical facilities and personnel, and any indiscriminate use of weapons, including through shelling and aerial bombardment, *welcomes* the commitment by the ISSG to press the parties in this regard, and *further demands* that all parties immediately comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law as applicable;

14. *Underscores* the critical need to build conditions for the safe and voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their home areas and the rehabilitation of affected areas, in accordance with international law, including applicable provisions of the Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, and taking into account the interests of those countries hosting refugees, *urges* Member States to provide assistance in this regard, *looks forward* to the London Conference on Syria in February 2016, hosted by the United Kingdom, Germany, Kuwait, Norway and the United Nations, as an important contribution to this endeavour, and *further expresses* its support to the post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation of Syria;

15. *Requests* that the Secretary-General report back to the Security Council on the implementation of this resolution, including on progress of the UN-facilitated political process, within 60 days;

16. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.
