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INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT

BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN DJIBOUTI AND ETHIOPIA IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION

Moumina Ahmed ROBEITE

MASTER'S THESIS

Supervisor
Asst. Prof. Dr. Şuayip TURAN

Çankırı – 2024

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SCIENTIFIC ETHICS STATEMENT

In the process from the proposal stage to the conclusion of the study titled *Bilateral Relations between Djibouti and Ethiopia in the Context of Globalization*, which I prepared as a master's thesis, I carefully followed the academic ethics and rules, that I obtained all the information in the thesis within the framework of academic ethics and tradition, that I prepared in accordance with the rules of writing the thesis. I declare that I cited every citation as a reference and that the works I have benefited from are those shown in the bibliography.

24 / 05 / 2024

Signature

Moumina Ahmed ROBEITE

THESIS ACCEPTANCE AND APPROVAL

ÇANKIRI KARATEKİN UNIVERSITY

TO THE DIRECTORATE OF THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

This study titled *Bilateral Relations between Djibouti and Ethiopia in the Context of Globalization* prepared by *Student's Moumina Ahmed Robeite* was found successful *by unanimously* as a result of the thesis defense held on *24.05.2024* and was accepted as a Master's thesis in the *Political Science and International Relations* by our jury.

THESIS JURY MEMBERS (Title, Name and Surname)

Supervisor: (Asst. Prof. Dr. Şuayip TURAN) Signature: ……..

Member: (Asst. Prof. Dr. Abdullah METİN) Signature: ……..

Member: (Asst. Prof. Dr. Faruk TÜRK) Signature: ……..

APPROVAL

This Thesis has been accepted by the jury determined in the session of Çankırı Karatekin University Graduate Studies Institute Administrative Board, dated 09/05/ 2024 and numbered 2024/21-07-C

Prof. Dr. Ersoy YILMAZ

Director of the Institution

PREFACE

The thesis “Bilateral Relations between Djibouti and Ethiopia in the Context of Globalization” was prepared based on research into the literature. This work was written to complete the master s degree of Political Science and International Relations degree requirements for graduation. Cankiri Karatekin University's Institute of Social Science served as the coordinating institution for the master's program. I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Şuayip TURAN, for all his guidance over the years. He has been an eternal source of inspiration, encouragement, and vital advice. I also appreciate the time that he spent assisting me with this study.

24/05/ 2024

Moumina Ahmed ROBEITE

ABSTRACT

Thesis Title: Bilateral Relations between Djibouti and Ethiopia in the Context of Globalization
Author of the Thesis : Moumina Ahmed ROBEITE
Supervisor : Asst. Prof. Dr. Şuayip TURAN
Department : Political Science and International Relations
Type of Thesis : Master's
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This thesis examines bilateral ties between Ethiopia and Djibouti within the framework of globalization. The research focuses on the economic, political, and cultural connections between the two nations, highlighting their historical ties and the impact of globalization on their relationship. Historically, Ethiopia and Djibouti have maintained strong ties, particularly during Emperor Haile Selassie's reign. Ethiopia was one of the first countries to recognize Djibouti's independence in 1977. Formal diplomatic relations between Djibouti and Ethiopia were established in 1984, and while their ties remained strong, they advanced to a deeper level of cooperation and mutual dependence following the Eritrean-Ethiopian War of 1998–2000. Ethiopia relied on Djibouti's ports. China's significant investments in Ethiopia and Djibouti have strengthened economic ties. This study is focused on determining the extent and nature of bilateral relations between Ethiopia and Djibouti, how these relations have evolved, and what role globalization has played in them. The thesis seeks to provide a thorough insight into the evolving connections shared by the two nations. To achieve this goal, a qualitative approach is employed. The study's findings on the relationship between these two nations within the framework of globalization reveal a profound level of interdependence. Geographic proximity and aligned economic interests have significantly influenced their historical connections. Djibouti's strategic importance, particularly its port facilities, plays a crucial role in both regional and global trade networks. This positioning has reinforced their cooperative relationship. Additionally, China's expanding influence in the region, through investments in infrastructure and trade, has further deepened their mutual integration.

Keywords: Globalization, Ethiopia, Djibouti, China, and Economy.

TURKISH ABSTRACT

Tez Adı : Küreselleşme bağlamında Cibuti ve Etiyopya arasındaki ikili ilişkiler
Tezin Yazarı : Moumina Ahmed ROBEITE
Danışman : Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Şuayip TURAN
Anabilim Dali : Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
Tez Türü : Yüksek Lisans
Tarih : 24/05/2024

Bu tez, küreselleşme bağlamında Etiyopya ve Cibuti arasındaki ikili ilişkileri incelemektedir. Araştırma, bu iki ulus arasındaki ekonomik, politik ve kültürel bağlantıları inceleyerek, tarihsel bağlarını ve küreselleşmenin ilişkileri üzerindeki etkisini vurgulamaktadır. Tarihsel olarak, Etiyopya ve Cibuti, özellikle İmparator Haile Selassie'nin saltanatı sırasında güçlü bağlar sürdürmüştür. Etiyopya, 1977'de Cibuti'nin bağımsızlığını tanıyan ilk ülkelerden biriydi. Cibuti ve Etiyopya arasındaki resmi diplomatik ilişkiler 1984'te başladı ve bağlar olumlu kalırken, 1998-2000 Eritre-Etiyopya Savaşı'ndan sonra daha yüksek düzeyde bir iş birliği ve karşılıklı bağımlılığa dönüştü. Etiyopya, Cibuti'nin limanlarına güveniyordu. Çin'in Etiyopya ve Cibuti'ye yaptığı önemli yatırımlar ekonomik bağları güçlendirdi. Bu çalışma, Etiyopya ve Cibuti arasındaki ikili ilişkilerin kapsamını ve doğasını, bu ilişkilerin nasıl geliştiğini ve küreselleşmenin bunlarda nasıl bir rol oynadığını belirlemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Tez, bu iki ülke arasındaki dinamik etkileşimlerin kapsamlı bir anlayışını sağlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu araştırma, bu hedefe ulaşmak için nitel bir yaklaşım kullanmaktadır. Çalışmanın bulguları, Etiyopya ve Cibuti arasındaki karşılıklı bağımlılığın derinliğini ortaya koymaktadır. Analiz, iki ulusun coğrafi yakınlığının ve ortak ekonomik çıkarlarının, tarihi bağlarını önemli ölçüde etkilediğini ortaya koymaktadır. Araştırma ayrıca, özellikle liman tesisleri ve uluslararası ticaret için bir merkez olarak rolü açısından Cibuti'nin stratejik önemini vurgulamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Küreselleşme, Etiyopya, Cibuti, Çin ve Ekonomi.

ABBREVIATIONS

ADF	Administration and Defense Forces
ADLI	Agriculture Development Led Industrialization
AGOA	African Growth and Opportunity Act
ALF	Aftar Liberation Front
AMRLD	Action Movement for the Revision of Law in Djibouti
APFZ	Administrator of the Port and Free Zone
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
CCCC	China Communications Construction Corporation
CGM	Companie General Maritime
CHEC	China Harbor Engineering Corporation
CLD	Committee for Liberation of Djibouti
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
DCT	Doraleh Container Terminal
DFLD	Democracy Front for the Liberation of Djibouti
DIFTZ	Djibouti International Free Trade Zone
DMP	Doraleh Multipurpose Port
DP	Doraleh Port
DPFZA	Djibouti Ports and Free Zones Authority
DPW	Department of Public Works
DWT	Dead Weight Tonnage
EASS	Eastern Africa Submarine-Cable System
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
ESLSE	Ethiopian Shipping and Logistics Services Enterprise
ETC	Ethiopian Telecommunication Corporation
EU	European Union
FCACS	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Summit
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
FRUD	Front for Restoration of Unity and Democracy
FTAAC	Free Trade Area African Continental
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income

GTP	Growth and Transformation Plan
IAPD	Intergovernmental Authority on Permanent Drought
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMFWB	International Monetary Fund and the World Bank
KM	Kilo Meter
KV	Kilo Volt
KWH	Kilo Watt-Hour
LFFSC	Liberation Front of the French Somaliland Coast
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MFED	Minister of Finance and Economic Development
MLD	Movements Liberation Djibouti
MTSC	Maritime Transport Services Corporation
MW	Mega Watts
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSR	New Silk Road
OBOR	One Belt One Road
PDSA	Port of Djibouti Society Anonyme
PLAN	People's Liberation Army Navy
PLM	People Liberation Movement
RORO	Roll-on, Roll-off
SEAMEWE	South East Asia Middle East Western Europe
STEM	Science Technology Engineering and Mathematics
TEK	Test of Economic Knowledge
TVET	Technical Vocational Education and Training
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UNI	National Union for Independence
UNMSS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
ZES	Zone Economic Specialized

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1. INTRODUCTION

A variety of factors influence relations between countries, leading countries to develop relationships with specific countries for various reasons. Their common border or direct proximity could be one factor. All types of cross-border transactions are unavoidable, requiring specific considerations between neighboring countries. In addition, the relationship between Djibouti and Ethiopia extends beyond mere proximity and shared national interests; it encompasses longstanding historical, ethnic, geographical, diplomatic, and economic connections. Official relations between the two nations commenced in 1984, following Djibouti's declaration of independence from France in 1977. The economic interests of Ethiopia and Djibouti highlight the vital importance of their bilateral relationship, particularly in the wake of the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict (1998–2000). Ethiopia, which is landlocked, depends significantly on Djibouti's ports for marine traffic. Djibouti's port trade stimulates a significant amount of economic activity. Furthermore, energy and transportation infrastructure connect the two nations. A well-travelled road network connects Ethiopia's uses to the port of Djibouti.One of Ethiopia's most on Ethiopia. Ethiopia provides most Djibouti's food needs, including fruits and vegetables, livestock, pipeline water, and hydroelectric power.

The first country to receive hydroelectric from Ethiopia is Djibouti. Thus, despite Ethiopia's lack of a sea and the fact that all of its power passes through the port of Djibouti, the two states have a great degree of interdependence, which could potentially lead to integration. Since 2016, China's financial contributions to African countries, especially two countrie in Horn Africa , have developed remarkably during recent decades, helping to expand economic relations between the two countries. Therefore, Djibouti seeks to achieve its ambitions to transform itself into a major trading center for the Horn of Africa. The Republic of China is making great efforts to finance Djibouti. Ethiopia and China are participating in a variety of projects, such as investing in railways, roads, expanding port construction, and building water pipelines. China's influence is evident in Africa, and although this investment harms Africa's environment, development, and local capabilities, China's participation in financing projects in Djibouti and Ethiopia provides the possibility of enhancing economic and

political globalization. Because of economic interdependence, globalization has significantly contributed to Djibouti and Ethiopia's economic integration. Djibouti's advantageous geographical position, granting access to both the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, has established it as a crucial hub for Ethiopia, a landlocked country heavily reliant on international trade. The development of transportation infrastructure, including the Doraleh Multipurpose Port and the Ethiopia-Djibouti Railway, exemplifies initiatives to foster economic interdependence. Commerce and capital investment. Additionally, globalization has facilitated increased trade and investment between Djibouti and Ethiopia. Due to the facilitation of cross-border trade and investment, both countries have been able to leverage their respective comparative advantages. Ethiopia's expanding economy has utilized Djibouti's port facilities to distribute its products and services, while Djibouti has benefited from Ethiopia's expansion via increased trade and investment.

Globalization has influenced the strategic aspects of Djibouti-Ethiopia relations, beyond their economic ties. Both countries acknowledge the critical nature of regional security and stability, specifically in the turbulent Horn of Africa. As a result, it has engaged in cooperative endeavors across multiple domains, including joint military operations and joint initiatives to combat transnational impacts like piracy and terrorism. (Lin-Greenberg, 2010). Global powers shape the geopolitical dynamics of the region, making a united front between Djibouti and Ethiopia even more imperative. In the end, within the framework of globalization, the bilateral links that Djibouti and the nation of Ethiopia have an intricate interaction between political, economic, and strategic considerations (Ahmed, 2022). Globalization has served as a catalyst for increased collaboration, as well as a source of complexities that demand meticulous deliberation. With the ongoing complexities of the globalized era, the relations between these two countries function as a microcosm that reflects the more extensive patterns that are influencing global affairs in the twenty-first century. The thesis centers on bilateral relations between Djibouti and Ethiopia in the context of globalization. What are the ties between Ethiopia and Djibouti? What is the connection between China, Djibouti, and Ethiopia? What is the effect of globalization on Djibouti and Ethiopian relations?

1.1. Problem Statement

Countries are increasingly aligning their economies with neighboring nations to form larger, more competitive regional markets, facilitating international trade. This is especially significant in the Horn of Africa, where, alongside relatively small economies, the effects of colonialism, poor governance, and conflict have hindered the region's participation in the global economy (Wasara 2002). Ethiopia and Djibouti have undertaken various efforts to strengthen bilateral ties and drive socioeconomic and political progress across the continent. To tackle these challenges, significant regional initiatives have been designed to promote deeper integration between the two nations. Nevertheless, over the past five decades, progress has been slow. The degree of integration differs across regions and individual states. Compared to other African areas, the Horn of Africa has underperformed in terms of economic collaboration and social development. Multiple barriers, including weak institutions, inadequate infrastructure, and a lack of political commitment, continue to obstruct economic integration between Ethiopia and Djibouti (Mohapatra 2017).

Numerous organizations operate within the region, reflecting a competitive yet largely ineffective attempt at economic integration. Alongside the distinct economic frameworks of the region's provinces, Djibouti and Ethiopia exhibit high levels of competition, with limited trade partnerships or merger. However, during the last 50 years, these two countries have made encouraging progress toward mutually beneficial economic collaboration. The economic relationship between the two nations is increasing dramatically. However, despite the potential for leveraging the economic interconnectedness between the two countries to foster fusion aspirations, its value diminishes. Thus, the focus of this research is to examine how increasing business and social cooperation between Ethiopia and Djibouti can help with integration initiatives related to globalization. Bilateral ties between Djibouti and Ethiopia have been the subject of extensive research in the field of international relations. Over time, a variety of studies in the Horn of Africa have focused on this research. This thesis aims to combine an emphasis on bilateral ties between Ethiopia and Djibouti with a globalization perspective.

1.2. Importance of the Research

Studying the bilateral relations between Djibouti and Ethiopia in the context of globalization is crucial for several reasons: Political Significance: Understanding the dynamics between two neighboring countries in Africa, is crucial for assessing regional stability and security. Both countries share strategic interests and have historically maintained close ties. Economic Implications: Examining their bilateral relations within the framework of globalization provides insights into the economic interdependence between the two nations. Ethiopia is highly dependent on Djibouti's ports for its import and export operations, which makes the relationship crucial for the trade development and progress of both nations.

Trade and investment opportunities Investigating how globalization influences trade and investment between Djibouti and Ethiopia helps identify opportunities for collaboration and expansion. Understanding the challenges and barriers to trade facilitation can inform policymakers and stakeholders about ways to enhance bilateral economic cooperation. Security and Geopolitical Considerations: Given their geostrategic position at the crossroads of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, Djibouti and Ethiopia play significant roles in regional geopolitics. Analyzing their bilateral relations helps assess geopolitical trends, security challenges, and diplomatic initiatives in the broader context of global affairs. Social and Cultural Exchanges: Globalization facilitates the exchange of ideas, cultures, and people. Researching bilateral relations can examine the social and cultural exchanges between Djibouti and Ethiopia, fostering mutual understanding and cooperation at the grassroots level.

1.3. Goal of Research

The main goal of the investigation of researching bilateral relations between Djibouti and Ethiopia in the context of globalization is multifaceted and encompasses several objectives: Understanding globalization's impact investigating how globalization influences the relationship between Djibouti and Ethiopia helps comprehend the broader forces shaping international interactions. The target of this study is to examine how the dynamics between the two nations are impacted by global financial,

commercial, and social movements. Evaluating Economic Integration: The purpose of this study is to determine how integrated the financial markets of Ethiopia and Djibouti are with the world economy, as well as how important ties between them are to this combination of factors.This involves examining trade flows, investment patterns, and infrastructure development within the context of global trade networks. Identifying opportunities and challenges the research aims to identify opportunities for deeper cooperation and integration between Djibouti and Ethiopia within the framework of globalization.

It also seeks to understand the challenges and barriers that may hinder their collaboration and inhibit the realization of mutual benefits. Enhancing Regional Stability and Prosperity: By studying bilateral relations, the research aims to contribute to the support of local stability and peace in the Horn of Africa region. Understanding the dynamics between Djibouti and Ethiopia can inform strategies for fostering closer ties and mitigating potential sources of conflict. Promoting Academic Understanding: Research on bilateral relations between Djibouti and Ethiopia contributes to the corpus of understanding about global relationships, globalization, and regional studies. It aims to deepen understanding among scholars, students, and practitioners interested in African politics, economics, and diplomacy. The aim of researching bilateral relations between Djibouti and Ethiopia in the context of globalization is to provide a comprehensive understanding of their relationship, identify opportunities for collaboration, address challenges, and contribute to regional stability and development.

1.4. Research Methodology

This thesis, “Bilateral relations between Djibouti and Ethiopia in the Context of Globalization” is based on a qualitative research approach. The use of case studies, which provide a comprehensive grasp of the case being examined,, is one of the techniques employed. The primary goal of qualitative research is to understand the phenomenon. This study focuses on the effective elements between Ethiopia and Djibouti in achieving economic integration with China. Therefore, the study employs high-quality analyses for document interpretation. This study contains independent and dependent variables. This study includes independent and dependent factors.

Globalization is the independent variable in this instance because it symbolizes the larger phenomena or process that influences bilateral dialogues between Djibouti and Ethiopia. Globalization includes various interconnected aspects such as Financial linkage, cultural exchange, and political interdependence.

The dependent variable is the bilateral relationship between Djibouti and Ethiopia. The globalization process affects the bilateral relations between Djibouti and Ethiopia, which constitute the dependent variable. These relations include diplomatic relations, trade and investment flows, security cooperation, cultural exchanges, and other forms of interaction between the two countries. The study employed a data set that covered the period from 1998 to 2022. The research also relies on a review of secondary data sources. The study produced an assessment of bilateral ties between Djibouti and Ethiopia, as well as the process of globalization. An extensive collection of researchers provides authoritative analyses and interpretations of texts and experiments. However, qualitative researchers note that the qualitative study setting is too complicated for a precise evaluation. The study put together secondary data from a range of sources, such as African and Chinese local newspaper articles, scientific investigations, reports on the Djibouti-Ethiopia attachment, infrastructure projects, books, internet sources, published materials, newsletters, and other confidential documents. Related documents address Ethiopian Djiboutian relations as well as economic, political, and social integration.

1.5. Limitation of the research

It is important to identify the limiting components of the framework. The study only collects data from the Djibouti side. Accessing literature from Ethiopia, even via the internet, has been difficult due to the Amharic language barrier, which constitutes the majority of the literature and government publications. A limitation of this study is the challenge of obtaining comprehensive and up-to-date data on the complex economic, political, and infrastructural interactions between Djibouti and Ethiopia. Investment flows and official policy documents may limit the depth and accuracy of the analysis. Additionally, reliance on translated sources and potential language barriers could affect the comprehensiveness and accuracy of both countries' views on their evolving relationship amid global economic integration. Additionally, it was one of the major

obstacles faced in writing this research is the inability to access sources and research related to the history of Djibouti, the lack of sufficient information on the Internet, the lack of sufficient funds to purchase some references, and the lack of proficiency in the English language, which complicates reading books. Articles on this topic need translation. Barriers to communication in collaborative research often involve individuals from diverse backgrounds and communication challenges, including language and curriculum differences.

2. HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ETHIOPIA–DJIBOUTI RELATIONS

2.1. Djibouti: Historical Background

Djibouti is situated in East Africa and has a long history. It is among the first human settlements in history. It serves as a transit point for travellers traveling between Africa and Asia. Large tribes dominated it in antiquity, and Islamic countries bordered it until 1862, when the French invaded the country's north and conquered the Obock area to retain control over ships passing via the Suez Canal. The Djibouti Sea Route, which regulates vessels traversing the Red Sea, has taken advantage of the situation. By developing regional ports and transportation linkages, the strategic position close to Bab al-Mandab aspires to serve as a model for infrastructure development (Ahmed, 2022). It exacerbates regional instability in Somalia, further dividing Bab al-Mandab, Djibouti, and Yemen in the south, and contributing to violence, tension, and territorial conflicts in neighboring northern Eritrea. While water impacts traditional rural lifestyles, chronic food shortages in rural regions, marked by famine, represent a significant danger to socio-economic growth. As the utility industry concentrates on making the economy more unstable by raising external debt to support its development, the economy is becoming more vulnerable (Abdallah, 2008).

France proceeded south and made Djibouti their colonial territory (Wan et al., 2020). This is due to Somalia's instability, the current state of violence in neighboring Eritrea, and the region's history of disputes. With the inauguration of the Suez Canal in 1869, Djibouti's strategic importance increased. Later, in 1896, France established the region as the administrative center of the colonies, naming it "French Somalia", constructed the railway between Ethiopia and Djibouti, and transformed the country's harbor into a significant commercial center in 1917. Djibouti, which obtained independence in internal affairs in 1967, voted in favor of joining France in a 1967 referendum. After the vote, France declared the island to be "French territory." France established the independent nation of Djibouti and awarded Djibouti independence Republic (Crisp, 1984). On June 27, 1977, the African People's Union won the independence elections and elected Hassan Guled Aptidon as president. Hassan Guled, who won the election, remained president until 1999. Hassan Guled Aptidon became the first President of the

Republic of Djibouti in 1977, serving for twenty-two years until his resignation in 1999. Following his departure, Ismail Omar Guelleh was elected as the country's leader in May 1999 (Ahmed, 2022).

2.2. Independence of Djibouti

Afar and Issa lineages ruled over what is now Djibouti for centuries prior to the establishment of the French colonial power. The modern-day Djibouti region was administered by the Afar Sultanate, which also held authority over Gobad in the south and Rheita in the north. The Issa clan, on the other hand, was under the rule of the Augas in the southeast region. However, there was neither a clear demarcation of regional boundaries nor an overarching governmental structure linking them between the Afars and the Issa. The French colonial era brought the Afar and Issa groups under one rule for the first time (Yasin, 2010). The French came for the first time to the Djibouti region in the sixties of the nineteenth century, so France entered from the Obock region in the north of the country to maintain their control over the ships that pass through the Suez Canal. In 1882, following the signing of treaties between France and the Afar sultans of Rhita and Tadjoura, Qubad formally established the French colony of Djibouti. Through this agreement, the French colonial power gained control of the port of Obock in the Red Sea (Haga, Cheik & Varet, 2012).

The French initially planned to establish Obock as the capital of their colony in Djibouti. However, due to growing discord regarding the terms of the treaty with the Sultanate of Rahita, they progressively relocated from Obock to the location that is now known as Djibouti City. This circumstance presented an additional opportunity for the French divide-and-rule strategy to erode the unity between the Issa/Somali and Afar (Abdallah, 2008). The French established their colonial authority in Djibouti. After relocating to the south, the unrest in Somalia, the unrest in Eritrea, and the ongoing regional conflicts in the region all had an impact on this decision. Their establishment increased Djibouti's strategic significance (Styan, 2016)

2.3. Djibouti After Independence

The Republic of Djibouti was established on June 27, 1977, when the African People's Union won elections for independence. Hassan Guled Aptidon was elected president of parliament. Hassan Guled, who won the elections, continued his presidency until 1999. Ali Aref's coup attempt on January 8 and 9, 1991, did not yield the desired success (Ahmed, 2022). The Republic of Djibouti chose Hassan Gouled Aptidon as its first president following its independence in 1977. The Issa/Somali clan elected him as president, and the Afars elected him as prime minister. Post-colonial Djibouti conflicts intensified and remained closely linked to government policies (Wan et al., 2020).

The problem was how to strengthen national democracy while balancing party politics and the newly formed state. All pre-colonial party politics reflected the creation and prohibition of a one-party state. However, this only served to intensify the division that the military conflict had already exacerbated. Strengthening the one-party system. In Djibouti's political system, the temporary groups serve as the formal basis for parliamentary representation (ethnic representation). Influence within the Djiboutian government waned, while Issa's group rose to prominence (Masud, Salvatore & Bruinessen, 2007).

Both the chief's and Issa's positions increased. After independence, hostilities worsened in 1978 and resulted in two bombs going off in a bar frequented by French people, which left many people dead or injured (Yasin, 2010). The operation was attributed to the People's Liberation Movement (PLM) of the Radicals, which was founded just before independence. Consequently, Djiboutian police closed off and conducted a comprehensive inspection of the Afar neighbourhoods. Five Afar ministers resigned as a consequence, alleging that the administration had been adopting dictatorial tactics. Ahmad Dini and Abdullah Kamel, the first two prime ministers, quit from their positions in the cabinet over what they saw as the Issa-dominated administration's tribal policies. Reorganising his administration three times in the first two years following autonomy, former President Hassan Guled aimed to reduce tensions between the Afars and the Issa. Brought Djibouti together was the objective. Issa kept her key roles in the administration in spite of the change in

ministers. This political process led to Afars's growing scepticism about the objectives of the governing regime (Masud an al., 2007).

The government established an "Afar Committee" to consider citizens' complaints (Markakis, 2021). The Afar speakers demanded equitable division of powers in the government jobs in the civil service, military, police, and cabinet. Soon after independence, the nation prohibited opposition parties from operating openly. The People's Liberation Movement (PLM) and the National Union for Independence (UNI) formed a new united front. The Democracy Front for the Liberation of Djibouti (DFLD) stands in opposition to the ruling party (Abdallah, 2008). The DFLD has criticized the ISSA rule for its harshness and cooperation with colonial France. Issa's side faced very little opposition. Before Djibouti gained its independence, the leader of the Liberation Front of the French Somaliland Coast (LFFSC), Adan Robleh Awaleh, was a vocal opponent of Issa. In 1986, the Intergovernmental Authority on Permanent Drought (IAPD) meeting accused Awaleh of attempting to detonate a bomb, leading to his expulsion from the ruling party and the termination of his previous tenure. The opposition in Issa has accused the administration of favoritism (Bezabeh, 2011).

2.4. Geographical Location

Djibouti is a tiny nation on the African continent, notably in East Africa at the entrance to the Red Sea, and it is a French colony, as seen in Figure 2.1. It has a population of 999,048.1 and covers 23,200 square km. Eritrea is 113 kilometre north, Ethiopia is 337 kilometres west and south, and Somalia is 58 kilometres to the southeast. The Bab al-Mandab Strait connects the Red Sea about the Gulf of Aden, and Djibouti is in the Horn of Africa, approximately between the equator (Cabestan, 2022).

The Somali Issa (Dir) group constitutes 60% of Djibouti's population, while the Afar ethnic group makes up 35%. The remaining 5% of the population consists of French, British, Arab, and Ethiopian individuals, primarily immigrants, many of whom enter the country illegally as economic migrants (Styan, 2016). The Issa clan predominantly resides in the south of the country, whereas the majority of the Afar tribe is

concentrated in the north (Mormul, 2016).The official languages are Arabic and French, and the state religion is Islam (94% of the population follows Sunni Islam). Beyond religion, Djibouti's proximity to the Arabian Peninsula is evident in its economics, where it is strengthening its commercial ties with Arab nations and the Gulf, and in its foreign policy, as it actively participates in the Arab League (Cabestan, 2022).

Figure 2.1: The location of Djibouti

Source: (Wan et al., 2020).

The fundamental reason for Djibouti's strategic relevance to regional actors is its physical location in the Horn of Africa, on the Gulf of Aden at the entry to the Red Sea, and the Bab al-Mandab Strait that separates the African continent from Asia (Elazar, 2022). Since the 1980s, the Issa/Somali tribe has ruled Djibouti, with the Afar tribe voting the prime minister. However, this arrangement could not prevent conflict between these two ethnic groups (Afar and Issa) from erupting in the form of a civil war from 1991 to 1994. Although Djibouti's government is technically semi-presidential, the nation lacked a codified constitution from 1977 to 1992. Furthermore, the Afar minority, which had been privileged throughout the French period, felt unexpectedly sidelined under the presidency of the Issa clan, whose political power is enabled by the Djiboutian political system's political structure and practice (Mormul, 2016).

2.5. Civil War Between Afar and Issa/Somali (1991-1994)

Tension between Afar and Issa/Somali arose during the era of independence and it remains one of the most significant sources of instability in the Republic of Djibouti. Issa/Somali's de facto dominance at the top levels of administration and government since independence bolstered this factor further. Consequently, the Afars made the decision to arm themselves and challenge the Djiboutian government. As a result, the various political opposition groups established the Joint Front (FURD) in August 1991 and launched a massive military offensive seen as a long-standing traditional ethnic conflict between the Afars and the Issa/Somali (Yasin, 2010).

Ethnic tensions surfaced for the first time since independence in January 1991, when the government heightened political strife by accusing the Afar community of plotting against the state and detaining prominent figures, cadres, and members of the Democratic Front for Democracy (Abdallah, 2008). This crackdown spurred hundreds of people to join guerrilla movements that were emerging in the north and southwest of the country. By June 1991, increasing numbers of young individuals from Arihiba, Tadjoura, Dikhil, Yobuki, and Obock had enlisted in the guerrilla forces. While the Afars, located in the southern districts, sought to apply political pressure without resorting to violence, hostilities soon erupted. On October 10, 1991, government forces launched an operation southwest of Aba, and two days later, the Front initiated a counteroffensive in northern Djibouti. Although both the Front and the government blamed each other for sparking the conflict, the underlying issue was that dissatisfaction between dominant and marginalized ethnic groups had the potential to escalate into broader political unrest, with the government's reaction intensifying the competition (Berhe & Adaye, 2007).

The government reacted by sending over 399 troops from the National Security Force under Issa's command. As a result of the National Security Forces' aggression, around one-third of Obock's 10,000 people fled to neighboring areas, particularly Ethiopia (Yasin, 2010). In Assa-Gweila, the Front launched a fierce military onslaught against government forces. On the night of November 11, 1991, the front lost its military leader, Mouhamwd Aramis, in the northern Tajoura region. On November 12, the second fight took place in Randa. Early on December 18, 1991, government soldiers

attacked the villagers of Arhiba. Adoyta leads FRUD, which has a 37-member general council and a nine-member executive team (Gidey, 2017).

The majority of Afars consider the Djibouti Issa/Somali-dominated regime to be the principal funder of the Issa/Somali invasion into the Ethiopian Afar region. Instead of engaging in discussions with FRUD, President Hassan Gulled organized the resignations of Afar region cabinet officials and legislators and galvanized the total Somalis in the Horn of Africa. to oppose the Afar threat. Ethiopian mercenaries, as previously indicated, comprise FRUD (Yasin, 2010).

The French, who had previously been aware of the FRUD, altered their position in February 1992 and dispatched soldiers to stop the FRUD forces from taking the town of Dikhil (Gidey, 2017). According to others, the march of FRUD led to the regime's demise. It recovered strength and travelled to the republic's southern region, where it had been a year before. On July 5, 1993, the FRUD army retreated from their fortified military base at Assa-Gweila, located to the northeast of the Tadjoura region. They then fled to the northern area, which shares a border with Eritrea. On July 5, 1993, the FRUD army removed their fortified military bastion at Assa-Gweila, located to the north of the Tadjoura region. They then fled to the republic's northern region, which shares a border with Eritrea. To avoid persecution by the Issa/Somali army, thousands of civilian Afars and a majority of FRUD soldiers (2000) fled to Ethiopia and Eritrea (Yasin, 2010).

2.6. Historical Background of Ethiopia

Ethiopia has the most prolonged independent history in Sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 2.2). Ethiopia's history stretches back to around 1000 B.C., when King Solomon received a visit from the queen of Sheba. Ras Kassa was consecrated as Emperor of Axum with the new name 'Tewodros'. In 1855, he organised an army to combine the Tigre, Amhara, and Shoa regions. Because the British quarantine of his castle in 1867, the ancient Ethiopian king remained outside of colonial control. The Italian invasion from 1936 to 1941 stands out as an exception to this rule (Fransen and Kuschminder, 2009).In 1974, a military junta led by the deposed Emperor Haile Selassie established

a communist state. Following violent coups, riots, a severe drought, and widespread refugee worries, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a rebel alliance, deposed the government in 1991. Ethiopia established a constitution in 1994, and the first multi-party elections took place in 1995. A 2.5-year border conflict with Eritrea, which ended with the signing of a peace agreement on December 12, 2000, bolstered the coalition while harming the local economy (Adamu, 2013).

Figure 2.2: Geographical location of Ethiopia

Source: (Teferi, 2019)

Ethiopia is a country in northwest Africa that shares borders with Kenya to the south, Somalia to the east and southeast, Sudan to the west, and Eritrea and Djibouti to the northeast. With an estimated latitude of 30 degrees north and longitudes ranging from 330 degrees east to 480 degrees west, the nation is located between the Equator and the Tropic of Cancer. The country has an approximate area of 1,127,127 square kilometers, which is just under twice the size of Texas. The Ethiopian frontier spans 5,311 kilometers and consists of 1,119,683 square kilometers of land and 7,444 square kilometers of ocean. Ethiopia occupies the majority of the Horn of Africa and has an area approximately three times the size of California. It is a landlocked country (Tekle & Bjorvatn, 2006).

The geographical regions that comprise Ethiopia are the sweltering lowlands and the chilly highlands. Lowlands are given to the northern and southern areas by the Great Rift Valley, which divides them. (Mushir & Hailemariam, 2015). The Northwest

highlands exhibit rugged topography. In certain locations, the erosion has produced precipitous valleys measuring several kilometers in width and 1,600 meters (5,249 feet) in depth. Additionally, the Blue Nile Valley divides the northwest highlands. Ethiopia's most significant geographical region is the Great Rift Valley. The valley represents a real-world example of the massive fault line that runs from the Middle East's Jordan Valley to a source of the Zambezi River, which flows in Mozambique. A seismic line centers Ethiopia and divides the Ethiopian Highlands in half. The Danakil Depression, a particularly hot region that is 115 meters (377 feet) below sea level, delineates the northernmost section of the rift in Ethiopia. It is in the Afar region, also known as the Afar Depression (Abay & Bjornstad, 2009).

2.7. Ethiopia-Djibouti ties under Emperor Haile Selassie

A substantial portion of the discourse concerning the relations between Ethiopia and Djibouti before the latter's independence in 1977 has focused on the interactions between the leaders of the two countries. France, as the colonial power, exercised governance over Djibouti on behalf of the nation due to its incomplete independence (Crisp, 1984). The Treaty of 1897 represented the first formal agreement between the two countries. Lagarde, the French administrator of Djibouti, and Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia signed a treaty in 1897 to serve their respective self-interests. The emperor sought French assistance in resisting Italy's territorial claims on Ethiopia and in utilizing the port of Djibouti for foreign trade, particularly the importation of weapons. In return, Menelik agreed to allow France to construct a railway from Djibouti to Addis Ababa and to establish a presence in the middle Nile region (Haber, 1992).

This period marked a critical turning point in the relationship between Ethiopia and Djibouti. Although the Fashoda incident diminished France's interest in Ethiopia as a potential eastern Nile gateway, the construction of the Addis Ababa railway in 1917 significantly heightened the economic interdependence between Ethiopia and Djibouti. Before Djibouti gained independence, the relationship between Ethiopia and Djibouti was heavily influenced by European countries, primarily France, Italy, and the United Kingdom (Gutu & Ababa, 2014).

The relations were also bidirectional, both rigid and malleable. A diplomatic agreement between France and the Ethiopian Empire officially determined the border demarcation between Ethiopia and Djibouti on March 20, 1897 (US Department of

State, 1976). Neither the Ethiopian nor Djiboutian administrations were preoccupied with the border's imprecision for many years. The Italian subjugation of Ethiopia in 1936 altered the official position on the boundary line. The intermittent conflict between France and Italy along the Ethiopia-Djiboutian border arose because of Italy's strong interpretations of the 1897 treaty (Gutu & Ababa, 2014). To become less dependent on the port and railway of Djibouti, Italy promptly began the construction of transportation infrastructure in its colony after the invasion of Ethiopia. The construction of a road to Addis Ababa and the establishment of the Assab port were initiated, aiming to directly challenge Djibouti's capabilities (Tovar, 2019).

The United Kingdom's invasion of East Africa in 1941 significantly affected Djibouti's connection with Ethiopia, particularly when Haile Selassie returned to the capital of his sovereign nation (Haber, 1992). In 1943, Bayardelle, the governor of Free France in Djibouti, decided to capture Afambo, located at the western edge of the border zone. The Ethiopian government viewed this action as France's initial attempt to assert control over the Awussa Sultanates and as an act of aggression. Consequently, French authorities quickly realized that restoring amicable relations with Ethiopia required a mutually acceptable boundary demarcation, given the complex nature of their relations. France and Ethiopia resumed diplomatic relations in April 1945 and signed two agreements in Addis Ababa. The first agreement reaffirmed the railroad company's prewar privileges, while the second established the boundary through an independent Franco-Ethiopian commission (Levin, 2016).

The commission's work was difficult due to the unapproachable frontier terrain and the disparate maps showing Ethiopian and French claims. (Crisp, 1984). In 1947, an exchange of official letters documented the agreement. France and Ethiopia reached an agreement in 1949, but the provisions faced opposition from France's internal colonial forces. Employees of the Ethiopian railroad company initiated two strikes at Dire Dawa in 1949, leading to the construction of alternative facilities at Assab. Further, the agreement mandated that Ethiopia refrain from constructing a railroad that would compete with Assab. Tensions increased as the amount of trade across the two nations increased. (Gutu & Ababa, 2014).

This development marked the beginning of a renewed period of cooperation and camaraderie between Ethiopia and Djibouti, culminating in the Franco-Ethiopian

Treaty of 1959. This treaty brought about significant changes to the railroad company's status, administration, and ownership (Haber, 1992). Emperor Haile Selassie designated Djibouti, now a part of Ethiopia, as one among the Red Sea's lost provinces of Ethiopia. The argument was supported by the area's historical presence as well as the agreements made in the nineteenth century that gave France ownership of the site. In response to France's 1894 concession for a railway from Addis Ababa to Djibouti, the treaty named Djibouti as the focus port of entry for Ethiopian goods. (Norberg, 1977).

Concurrent with the railroad's operations moving to Addis Ababa in 1959, the French recognized special claims to enter Djibouti. The emperor asserted that Ethiopia would inevitably claim Djibouti if France switched authority on September 16, 1966, making it the strongest claim to date. (Levin, 2016). Since its independence in 1960, the Republic of Somalia's that which foreign policy has been built on the attainment of Greater Somalia, according to Negussay (1984). In addition, it confirmed its lack of interest in collecting commodities that belong to others. It will continue to uphold the regulations between the two nations, regardless of their contrived nature and enforcement against the will of the populace. Somalia became frustrated by Ethiopia's aspiration for Djibouti, since Somalia too had a compelling territorial claim., 1977. The emperor hinted during a news conference on September 16, 1966, that the Ethiopian government would fight any effort by the Somali Republic to gain control of the Djibouti territory by force. The Ethiopian Emperor indicated that the government would reject any move by the Somali Republic to gain control of the Djibouti territory since this would only impact the Ethiopian government and its population (Gutu & Ababa, 2014).

The territorial claims of Somalia were essentially political, and both Ethiopia and Somalia had created substantial political parties to engage in the discussions. The Somalia Liberation Front of the Somali Coast (LFFSC), which advocated for Somalia's interests, conducted its activities in Somalia. On the other hand, Ethiopian forces supported the Dire Dawa-based Coalition for Liberation of Djibouti (CLD). In 1977, the CLD changed its name to the Movement de Liberation de Nyasaland (MLD) and relocated its headquarters from Dire Dawa to Addis Ababa (Ahmed, 2022). Utilizing the Franco-Ethiopian railway, Ethiopia wanted Djibouti to get access to its port which

was the only rail link with the sea and facilitated foreign trade. Assab and Massawa ports were vulnerable to the growing secessionist movement in Eritrea. Ethiopia and Somalia were anxious to embrace French authority in Djibouti's 1967 referendum on its future. The referendum determined whether to vote for or against independence, with the decision remaining in France's hands. The Ethiopian government supported the continuation of French authority, while Somalia feared it would jeopardize its infrastructure and maritime freedom. The 1974 overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie led to a shift in Emperor Haile Selassie's support for this objective (Levin, 2016).

2.8. Conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea (1998-2000)

In the year 1991, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) of Ethiopia and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) of Eritrea joined forces to remove the Mengistu government. (Hailu, 2014). These followed Eritrea just a few years after it achieved independence. Following the triumph, the EPRDF merged with other political factions to establish the Transitional Government of Ethiopia, whereas the EPLF seized authority in Eritrea and instituted a provisional government. Up until 1993, when Eritreans cast their votes for independence in a United Nations-supervised referendum, Eritrea was openly under the control of the provisional government (Mulugeta, 2011). Post-independence, Western leaders, and diplomats, as well as the international community at large, regarded the two rebel leaders as exemplars who offered renewed optimism for the African continent. This confidence, however, was short-lived as a confrontation ensued between them (Murphy, Kidane & Snider, 2013).

Considerations such as access to Eritrean ports, the relationship between the Eritrean and Ethiopian currencies, the precise location of their erratically delineated borders, and other trade and citizenship-related policies gave rise to hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Tensions emerged because of these issues, forcing both regimes to reject productive conversations on these as well as additional critical subjects. The thirty-year conflict with the Mengistu regime destroyed both nations' infrastructure and claimed tens of thousands of lives. Nobody anticipated that these countries would become entangled in another conflict that would cost them more than it had already

incurred to depose the Mengistu regime (Tiba, 2007). Peace appeared to have been restored, and optimism for a more promising future for both nations arose following Eritrea's independence in 1993. Nevertheless, despite this, hostilities between the two nations commenced in May 1998. It was one of the most destructive and worrisome conflicts in the Horn of Africa, with major implications for neighboring nations. Ethiopia was ill-equipped to repel the Eritrean invasion at that moment (Lata, 2003).

The expectation that Eritrea would forcibly enter Ethiopia through its border was not present, given the advantageous nature of the amicable and peaceful relations between the two brotherly nations. Relations between 1993 and 1997 were predominately concerned with commerce, citizenship concerns, and regional security policy (Mulugeta, 2011). Notwithstanding the divergences they may have expressed, the resolution of border, trade, currency, and other policy matters requires negotiation. The escalation of a minor border dispute into a significant war unexpectedly involved both countries; this was not to be expected. According to Paul Henze's book Eritrea's War, Eritrean military forces occupied the border hamlet of Badme in May 1998 (Lata, 2003).

Ethiopia regarded this military operation as an unauthorized territorial invasion. In response, a relatively minor altercation occurred between the Ethiopian armed forces and the local Eritrean security forces in the town. Before this skirmish could escalate into a full-scale war, third parties offered to mediate and resolve the issue peacefully. The United States and Rwanda subsequently dispatched a diplomatic mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea to discuss and delay the inevitable conclusion of the war. The United States and Rwanda jointly proposed a peace solution, advising both countries to return to their pre-conflict positions and seek a neutral decision on the boundary's location that would be acceptable to both parties (Murphy et al., 2013).

This, however, was rendered unjust due to Eritrea's refusal to ratify the withdrawal terms. A comparable peace proposal was also recommended by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), but it was also denied. Eritrea declined these reconciliation proposals, while Ethiopia accepted them. Within a few days, intense combat commenced consequently. Following the 1999 round of conflict, Eritrea considered the proposals put forth by the US, Rwanda, and OAU. Recognizing that the

withdrawal had already been enforced, Eritrea concluded that it had nothing to lose (Mulugeta, 2011).

Ethiopia viewed this as a strategic maneuver to conserve energy and prepare for further combat (Lata, 2003). In response, Ethiopia launched a significant offensive to secure the border and compel Eritrea to withdraw its forces to the positions held prior to May 1998. By December 2000, after three rounds of hostilities, both sides reached a resolution in Algiers to apply international border conflict resolution laws. The Organization of African Unity (OAU), the European Union (EU), and the United States served as mediators in facilitating the agreement, which established a 25-kilometer-wide Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) within Eritrea. Until Ethiopia and Eritrea resolved the border dispute as determined by the International Boundary Commission, United Nations peacekeeping forces were tasked with monitoring this zone (Mulugeta, 2011).

The absence of successful implementation of substantial parts of the Algiers agreement prevented the attainment of an enduring peace. Presently, the circumstance resembles "no war, no peace. Tensions across international borders persist, and both sides maintain massive military forces in the border region, which could spark another conflict in the future (Iyob, 2000). In addition, the border conflict has resulted in far-reaching and expensive consequences, encompassing both domestic and global ramifications. Adhering to the tenet that "the friend of my enemy is the foe of my enemy. Eritrea has supported armed opposition groups in the region to prolong the conflict. Terrorist organizations have been able to flourish in the Horn of Africa because of this deteriorating security situation. Additionally, the American effort to combat terrorism in the region was complicated. According to a 2011 United Nations Security Council report, Eritrea aids organizations engaged in destabilizing operations within the region. Eritrea's intervention in Somalia in 2009 was contrary to Security Council resolution 1907.This demonstrates a more extensive trend in intelligence and special operations, which may have involved providing financial, logistical, and training assistance to armed opposition groups in Djibouti, Ethiopia, the Sudan, and potentially Uganda as well (Iyob, 2000).

3. BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN ETHIOPIA-DJIBOUTI

Ethiopia and Djibouti share deep historical, financial, political, social, and cultural relations. Relations between the two nations have progressed through several stages throughout the course of successive governments. However, due to the mutually advantageous nature of the two nations' interests, the governments of Djibouti and Ethiopia have participated in dialogue and achieved many bilateral agreements governing port and transit services (Mormul, 2016). The agreement for the use of Djibouti port and transshipment services focuses primarily on customs, land transportation, and facilitation handling. This deal guarantees Ethiopia's permanent access to the sea and without restriction transportation over Djibouti's border. Additionally, the items will be free of taxes and customs duties. Djibouti has committed to informing Ethiopia in advance of any changes to tariffs or regulations. In the past, Djibouti's historic port faced significant strain to meet Ethiopia's substantial import requirements. Ethiopia's and Djibouti's economies will integrate because of Ethiopia's recent economic expansion. To foster their growth, it is important to establish stronger economic ties (Gutu & Ababa, 2014).

Port services are extremely important for Ethiopia's and Djibouti's economic interdependence. Djibouti obtains around 80 to 85 percent of its income from charges related to its ports and other operations. Djibouti's port has created several job opportunities in Ethiopia. By connecting their infrastructure, the transfer of Ethiopia's external traffic to Djibouti enhances economic interdependence and integration between the two nations (Olika, 2018). Ethiopia and Djibouti share similar cultures, languages, religious beliefs, and customs. Consequently, it values cross-border relations and their unique interactions. This factor can contribute positively to the integration of the two countries by eliminating barriers to communication and interaction (Gutu & Ababa, 2014).

3.1. Economic Exchange between Ethiopia – Djibouti

In 1998–2000, Eritrea separated from Ethiopia, and Ethiopia became a country that did not have a sea, so Ethiopia's dependence on Djibouti increased (Murphy, 2016).

China has tightened economic relations between Djibouti and Ethiopia, so Djibouti is pursuing its ambitions to transform itself into a major trading center for the Horn of Africa. The Republic of China is making enormous efforts to finance Djibouti and Ethiopia. China's participation ranges from many projects and includes investment in railways, roads, port construction, a water pipeline to supply Djibouti and Ethiopia, and the contribution of the first foreign military base (Pertiwi, 2021). The key drivers of Chinese enterprises' expanding presence in Djibouti include the search for new job prospects in other nations, such as infrastructure. To secure new opportunities, examine China's standards and technologies. The discussion will focus on the investments made in these projects. Communication and transportation: Djibouti and Ethiopia have many connections, such as railways, streets, and telecom of connections (Baah & Jauch, 2009).

3.1.1. Railway project

France's colonial era established a corridor between Ethiopia and Djibouti. However, due to insufficient upkeep and poor management, the prior railway tracks deteriorated, becoming antiquated and nonfunctional. From 2011 to 2016, China initiated investments in Djibouti's railway infrastructure (Downs et al., 2017). Chinese enterprises also built the Ethiopia-Djibouti railway, which is typical to strengthen Djibouti's position as a conduit to Ethiopia, one of Africa's fastest-growing business transactions. The railroad is Africa's first completely electrified transnational rail line, linking Ethiopia, a landlocked country, to the marine trade routes such as the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. Its 675-kilometer length and alternate port access contribute to the economic growth of Ethiopia shares a north and northwest areas (Wan et al., 2020).

Figure 3.1: Ethiopia - Djibouti railway



Source: (Wan et al., 2020).

The planned development of this section of the extensive corridor towards the west will connect the railway systems of Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Sudan. Consequently, it establishes a connection between North Sudan and Djibouti via Ethiopia. Before the Chinese built the new railway, Djibouti served as Ethiopia's primary port. The new route will significantly enhance the capacity for transporting freight between the two nations, allowing for a maximum load of 3,500 tons per trip. This is a sevenfold increase compared to the current railway's maximum capacity. The 470-mile railway will shorten the trip between Ethiopia's capital city of Addis Ababa and Djibouti. We could complete the current journey, which takes two days and a truck, in about 10 hours (Ahmed, 2022).

In 2015, China Railway Group and China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation secured a six-year contract to oversee the management of the railway (Mohapatra, 2017). The project, which cost $4 billion, was primarily funded by the China Exim Bank, with Ethiopia receiving 70% of the financing and Djibouti obtaining 85%. As a result, the Djiboutian government remained liable for 15% of the total cost, amounting to $58 million. Due to challenges in securing 50% of the railway's funding, China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation became a stakeholder in the Djibouti-Ethiopia joint venture corporation. To finance the project, Djibouti sold a 10% share in the joint company. Railways have historically linked the Horn of Africa subregion, and Djibouti is actively working to expand its rail network to enhance the political and economic integration of the two countries (Downs et al., 2017).

3.1.2. Investment

On November 18, 2006, Ethiopia and Djibouti signed an agreement bilaterally in Djibouti for property acquisition and investment facilitation. The purpose of the agreement was to increase and facilitate trade and investment between the two nations. The agreement functions as a governing document for bilateral investment relations. By allowing their citizens to invest in every area of the other country except banking, insurance, microcredit and savings accounts, broadcasting, and press services, the two nations agreed to this agreement. Both nations accord their respective nationals "Most Favoured Nations Treatment" in all investment-related concerns, as per the agreement (Gutu & Ababa, 2014).

Both nations mutually agreed to allow investment zones and provide positive benefits to their respective countries to the same degree as they did for their own nationals, subject to exclusions. As a result, citizens of both nations are currently involved in investment endeavors in foreign countries across various sectors. Djiboutian investors participate in a variety of Ethiopian industries, including manufacturing, food processing, construction, agricultural production and milk processing, cattle feed processing, transit forwarding, and transportation services, as well as tour operation and manufacture. (Wiersinga & De Jager, 2007).

Ismail Omar Guelleh, the president of Djibouti, participated in various investment endeavors in Ethiopia (Ahmed, 2022). Ethiopians are involved in a variety of investment endeavors in Djibouti, as illustrated in the preceding paragraph. In Djibouti, Ethiopians own a total of fifteen hotels, restaurants, and clubs, as well as over fifty-five conveyance organizations and association agents. Precise data regarding Ethiopians' current investments in Djibouti could not be found. Furthermore, an estimated 60,000 Ethiopians and individuals of Ethiopian descent reside in Djibouti and participate in a variety of activities (Gutu & Ababa, 2014).

Djiboutian remittances for the previous Ethiopian fiscal year (2005) amounted to 33.9 million USD, with the current year's first half witnessing 19.6 million USD. However, this figure is significantly higher because many individuals transfer funds in person as opposed to utilizing modern money transfer systems. Given the differences in revenue growth through Ethiopia and Djibouti, there are normally good investment ties

connecting the two states. Trade and investment agreements between Ethiopia and Djibouti would, overall, transform the two nations into virtual free trade zones (Hunde, 2017).

3.2. Ethiopia exportation to Djibouti

East Africa is a region that lacks intercontinental commerce. Ethiopia and Djibouti have maintained friendships diplomatic that have significantly strengthened and expanded since 1991. Particularly after the violence that occurred between 1998 and 2000, Ethiopia and Eritrea have strengthened their economic and political links (Lakew, 2005). Djibouti and Ethiopia have a strong economic relationship and engage in significant trade due to Ethiopia's position as Africa's third-largest export market. As previously stated, the economic ties between Ethiopia and Djibouti have significantly strengthened since 1991. and dimension both serve to strengthen these connections. All Ethiopian trade was diverted ships to the port of Djibouti because of the hostilities that broke out between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998. As a result, Ethiopia, and Djibouti's commercial, political, and security ties were strengthened. (Gutu & Ababa, 2014).

Ethiopia's economic development has significantly increased in recent decades, leading to enhanced bilateral links with Djibouti in several aspects. Djibouti and Ethiopia have reached a mutually beneficial pragmatic agreement. With the start of hydroelectric power delivery from Ethiopia to Djibouti, their economic reliance changed significantly. The first nation to get electrical power imports from Ethiopia is Djibouti. The Ethiopia-Djibouti electric power transmission project commenced in Djibouti on October 5, 2011 (Downs et al., 2017).

The covered distance is 283 kilometers. Furthermore, on July 3, 2013, it finalized a second electric power interconnection deal that would allow Djibouti to import more energy. The electricity link has significant strategic value for both nations. A further aspect of symmetrical building integration was added in January 2013, when the two nations reached an agreement to build a pipeline that would provide Djibouti with drinking water from Ethiopia. Recent events have greatly improved the relationship between Ethiopia and Djibouti (Mohapatra, 2017).

3.2.1. Water pipeline

Djibouti is one of the countries facing water shortages due to drought, hot weather, and a lack of rain most of the year. Fresh water is badly needed. Djibouti has the lowest total water resources per capita in all East Africa, at 353.4 cubic meters per year. The smallest international water shortage is five hundred cubic meters per year. Djibouti, which is desert, makes up 90% of the area. For example, if you go west of the capital, you will see nothing but rocks, except for some scattered trees that grow strongly for the beauty of the environment, because no river in Djibouti flows all year round (Wilby et al., 2010). 95% of Djibouti's water comes from groundwater, and the sea's encroachment makes the water salty and harsh. As a result, the people of Djibouti are at high risk of developing diseases of the intestines, heart, and blood vessels, as well as stones that cause salt and mineral accumulation. Moreover, they need clean drinking water (Ozer & Mahamoud, 2012).

On January 20, 2013, Ethiopia's Minister of Finance and Economic Development, Sufian Ahmed, and Djibouti's Minister of Finance, Ilyas Moussa Dawaleh, signed a project agreement in Djibouti. The agreement outlined plans for Djibouti to build a pipeline to transport water from the Ethiopian town of Adi Gala, spanning 70 kilometers to the Guelileh border and then to Djibouti City. The project aimed to deliver 100,000 cubic meters of water daily to Djibouti by the end of 2014, a significant increase from the 20,000 cubic meters it was then producing. Ethiopia sought to gain foreign currency from the project while also providing clean water to populations along the border (Gutu & Ababa, 2014).

The agreement on drinkable water aligns with the shared goal of trade integration between the two states. Therefore, the connection between Ethiopia and Djibouti via the supply of drinking water would enhance the existing ties between the two nations and contribute focus the integration of the Horn of Africa by fostering interdependence in infrastructure (Waberi, 2024). Djibouti, Ethiopia, and China led the completion of the Djibouti-Ethiopia cross-border drinking water project in May 2017. Hundreds of people turned out for the water project's inauguration, singing and dancing around the faucet to commemorate the project's completion (Downs et al., 2017).

3.2.2. Hydroelectric power

Ethiopia offers a lot of potential for hydropower. The monthly generation range of hydroelectric electricity from the GERD under a baseline scenario, assuming 5150 MW of capacity and current design specifications, is displayed in Figure 3.2. The GERD can produce 13,629 GWh of hydropower annually on average, with a peak output of 1630 GWh. Factoring causes a significant variation in the monthly production (Eldardiry & Hossain, 2021).

Figure 3.2: Hydroelectric power



Source: (Eldardiry & Hossain, 2021)

Ethiopia is striving to fulfil both its domestic needs and the demands of its neighboring countries. So, Ethiopia has begun exporting electricity to some of its neighbors, such as Djibouti. Djibouti was the first country to establish an electrical connection with Ethiopia (Sojato, 2019) They officially opened the 283-kilometer electric power transmission line on October 5, 2011. Through the 230 kilovolt (kV) transmission line, Djibouti was able to receive 35–70 megawatts (MW) electric power from Ethiopia. Energy exports would bring in at least $1.55 million for Ethiopia each month. Djibouti generates its electricity using old, inefficient oil-fired facilities. As a result, electricity bills in Djibouti are very high (Gutu & Ababa, 2014).

Djibouti is striving to build a plan to enhance regional economic integration as a result. Ethiopia and Djibouti, which, in 2011, created the first interconnectivity system in the area, kindly impacts the reciprocal advantages throughout Ethiopia and Djibouti and this electrical interconnection reinforces the existing economic interdependence between the two countries. At 70 $ per kilowatt-hour (KWH), Ethiopia exports 35 megawatts of electricity to Djibouti per month. Moreover, it has significantly reduced electricity-related problems and the cost of paying the country's bills (Gutu & Ababa, 2014).

Djibouti began to obtain hydropower from Ethiopia at a lower cost. Hydropower has unique qualities in terms of lower costs, environmental benefits, quick response, and minimal emissions. Following the connection between Djibouti and Ethiopia, there was a further decrease in electricity tariffs for retail and local industry **(**Eldardiry & Hossain, 2021). reduction not only eased the financial burden on families and businesses, but also lowered the cost of energy. More growth in society and the economy resulted from this, which in turn encouraged future economic integration between the two nations. The electricity interconnection between Ethiopia and Djibouti not only advances the development of both nations but also aligns with policies of cooperation and economic integration, promoting the construction of regional infrastructure and the integration of the capacity subsector (Asress et al., 2013).

Power connectivity is a crucial component of the Horn of Africa integration strategy and a vital link in enabling energy trade among the participating nations. It is unclear how important this connection will be in the long run because of Djibouti's low level of consumption. The nation also intends to generate a sizable quantity of power from geothermal sources in the future. Due to its considerable geothermal potential, Djibouti was chosen in 2012 to host a 300-megawatt geothermal create on Lake Assal by a Chinese petrochemical company (Gutu & Ababa, 2014). Furthermore, there is a project scheduled to commence operation in 2018 that has a production capacity of 56 megawatts (Awaleh et al., 2018).

3.2.3. Trade

Ethiopia and Djibouti officially began their first small-scale cross-border trade after Djibouti's independence, ostensibly to help rehabilitate refugees displaced by the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia (Majid, 2010). This practice ceased in the early 1990s. Djibouti's government has formally requested the resumption of commercial activities across its borders. The requested information was specific to the border area. It has identified several concerns: (I) The individuals in the border region are similar and interrelated; (II) the illegal transportation of commodities continues across the

border; and (III) there are no viable trade options available to supply the necessary items in the area (Teka & Azeze, 2002).

A obtaining permits system has been put in place by Ethiopia and Djibouti to regulate small-scale cross-border trading. That is about the liberalization of small-scale border business occurs via a bilateral agreement between the two nations. The agreement specifies the maximum value and type of items for exchange, the frequency of border crossings, and the maximum distance for travel. The border trade protocol between Ethiopia and Djibouti permits a border trader to import and export goods for sale, including animals, provided their value does not surpass birr 10,000 or its equivalent in Djibouti francs within a single month (Teka & Azeze, 2002).

Items (excluding animals) valued at less than 4,000 Ethiopian birr or the equivalent amount in Djibouti francs within a one-month period are not subject to this restriction. In either scenario, a merchant can make two monthly trips within a 90-kilometer radius of the border, provided that the total value of the goods does not surpass the specified limits (Gutu & Ababa, 2014). The items eligible for international commerce between Ethiopia and Djibouti are primarily for local use, and they do not meet the requirements for re-exportation. Djibouti imports a diverse range of food commodities from Ethiopia, such as khat, fruits and vegetables, cattle, animal feed, grains, and other goods. Djibouti is notable economically for Ethiopia. Following Somalia and Sudan, Ethiopia's exports find their third-largest market in Africa. However, it is crucial to refrain from excessively highlighting the significance of Djibouti as Ethiopia's main market for exporting goods in Africa (Melesse, 2014).

Djibouti, the least developed country, has a very small population and limited consumption capacity. Consequently, it cannot provide Ethiopia with a significant market for its goods. The bilateral trade volume (imports and exports) between the two nations has consistently increased since 2003. Djibouti often has a favorable trade balance, apart from 2003 and 2012, when Ethiopia had the upper hand. Djibouti's small population and insufficient consumption capacity limit its market, obstructing Ethiopian goods' integration (Gutu & Ababa, 2014).

Despite Ethiopia's disadvantageous trade balance, which may discourage it from conducting business with Djibouti, the significant interdependence between the two countries will ensure the continuation of their commercial links in various ways.

Significant cross-border trade exists between Djibouti and Ethiopia, illustrating their intrinsic interdependence and laying the groundwork for the establishment of effective regional integration. Disparities in agroecology and natural resources, strong social linkages between Djibouti and the eastern part of Ethiopia, and availability of regular transportation infrastructure (rail and road) all contribute positively to the expansion of trade between the two countries (Teka & Azeze, 2002).

3.2.4. Importation of Djibouti in Ethiopia

Many Djiboutian fields are not suitable for cultivation, so Djibouti imports very little. Djibouti serves as Ethiopia's main access point to international trade routes, particularly through the Port of Djibouti (Tajima, et al., 2012). Generally, Ethiopia imports a diverse array of products from Djibouti, including food items, fuel, machinery, construction materials, and consumer goods, Salt, seafood, and other industrial products are among the items imported into Ethiopia. Salt is one of the local products of Lake Assal. However, Djibouti is benefiting from its geostrategic place and connectivity to develop a productive export base while promoting regional integration to expand its companies' market access, thus facilitating economies of scale. These imports are vital for sustaining Ethiopia's economy and meeting the needs of its population (Teka & Azeze, 2002).

The relations between Djibouti and Ethiopia economic in terms of business and transportation infrastructure are significant for both countries' economic development and regional stability (Mohapatra, 2017). Any changes or updates to this relationship would likely be influenced by various geopolitical economic, and infrastructural factors. For the most current and specific information, it is advisable to consult recent trade data and geopolitical analyses. Djibouti’s strategic geographic location at a maritime crossroads, there are many prospects due to its port's closeness to the bustling COMESA (The Collective Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) marketplaces, which handle a lot of raw and unfinished commodities. Its added edge over competitors is that it serves as a landing point for subsea ICT fibre optic cables. Given these benefits, Djibouti is well-positioned to create high-value services (Gondwe, 2021).

The country's infrastructure has to be improved, exports need to become more productive, trade policies need to be more export-friendly, new target markets and standards need to be identified, and low-cost inputs need to be made available if Djiboutian enterprises are to diversify their transport expertise. A major factor in COMESA's (The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) reduced discovery costs for neighbouring markets is the lack of trade barriers and the standardization and harmonization of competition laws within the common market (supports cost discovery). To develop and successfully compete, Djiboutian enterprises will still need access to talent, finance, and more inexpensive and dependable energy sources, even with these advantages (Gondwe, 2021).

3.2.5. Telecom connections

Compared to the rest of Africa, Djibouti has many Fiber connections and serves as an interconnection hub for major submarine cables such as SEA-ME-WE and Southeast Asia-Middle East-Western Europe. EASSy (Eastern Africa Submarine Cable System). There are no higher education institutions that can benefit from the fiber optic infrastructure, but the country has the potential to provide transit routes to both Eritrea and Ethiopia. Subsea optical fibers and wave networks have linked the Republic of Ethiopia to submarine cables across Djibouti (Gutu & Ababa, 2014). Ethiopia has installed microwaves on optical fiber capacity, extending from the capital Addis Ababa to the cable landing station in Djibouti, in order to establish connections with international submarine cables. is also investing in the Ethiopian Telecom Company (ETC) ownership initiative. The network will no longer utilize this network (ETC) due to the transfer of operation and maintenance responsibilities. The network will only operate within Ethiopian territory in Djibouti (Ababa, 2019).

Djibouti has facilitated Ethiopia's connection to submarine cables via microwave and optical fiber networks. From Addis Ababa to a cable landing point in Djibouti, it has created and deployed a high-capacity microwave and optic network to make links with emerging and established international maritime cables. The Ethiopian government allocated funds to the Ethiopian Telecommunication Corporation's (ETC) ownership of the initiative, which entailed a transfer of accountability for the network's operation

and maintenance (Ermias, 2009).Ethiopia would exclusively use the ETC-established network on Djiboutian soil. The establishment of microwave and optical fiber communication infrastructures between the two countries facilitated Ethiopia's subsea cable connections with the rest of the globe (Cabestan, 2022). The country has witnessed a direct and corresponding increase in broadband adoption. Broadband has experienced a surge in subscriber growth and has become comparatively more affordable because of the integration of submarine cables. In Ethiopia, the introduction of underwater cables, such as EASSy, led to a decrease in the price of fixed broadband from 2721.4% of per capita GNI in 2008 to 1070.8%. The connectivity of the telecom sectors between Ethiopia and Djibouti is very significant, since telecom services are increasingly crucial for a nation's socioeconomic progress (Gutu & Ababa, 2014).

3.2.6. Port service of Djibouti

During France's colonial occupation in 1917, a road links Ethiopia with Djibouti. before China invested in railways in Djibouti. However, because of a lack of maintenance and bad administration, the previous rails deteriorated and became old and useless (Aden & Mccabe, 2021). In 1998-2000, due to the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict, the economic relationship shifted towards the port of Djibouti. Ethiopia was eager to establish an economic relationship with Djibouti, and its port handled Ethiopian trade. The Port of Djibouti provides export and import services for approximately 95% of Ethiopia's trade, and State Department informants strongly acknowledge that the Port of Djibouti has other services and sectors to enhance Ethiopia's economic development. In 2011, the Port of Djibouti established ESLSE (Ethiopian Shipping and Logistics Services Enterprise), a result of the merger of Ethiopian project services and dry port services, to offer marine transport services to Ethiopia, as well as coastal and international shipping services (Xu, 2018).

Imported shipments to Ethiopia and commercial shipments by FSLSE significantly increased from 2008 to 2016. However, export shipments are generally transported through enterprises, and this is an unexpected export. Trade instability and sustainable development in Ethiopia make up most of the total imports of goods, the port includes petroleum products, machinery, cars, spare parts, medical and pharmaceutical

products, industrial machinery and equipment, consumer goods, and other products (Waberi, 2024).

Equipment, fuel, and semi-finished goods. where does service (ESLSE)Increase their tonnage import service capacity and contribute significantly to enhancing capacity by increasing the number of shipments carried by Ethiopian ships. The total ships reached (333967) tons at one time, despite the decrease in performance to 952628 tons in 2016. The goods are transported by ships of the company ESLSE; (Ethiopian Shipping and Logistics Services Enterprise) and increased to 131,5517 tons (Gutu & Ababa, 2014). This means that plays a big role in Ethiopia's import. with Djibouti to get access to the ports, and Djibouti's operations increased dramatically. Ethiopia's economic contributions pass through the port of Djibouti. International commerce, which accounts for 95% of the GDP, is centered on the country's ports and free trade zone. Between 1998 and 2007, the demand for foreign commodities transported to Ethiopia rose by 18%, resulting in a rise in the number of items entering and exiting the port of Djibouti. As a result, the Djiboutian government determined that port operations must increase to continue economic development based on port services and transshipment (Aden & Mccabe, 2021).

Table 3.1: Total annual volume of imports and exports of goods

Year	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Volume of Export(Billions dallar)	0.42	0.41	0.46	3.2	3.51	3.53	2.7	4.15	4.56	5.15	3.41
Volume of Import(Billions Dallar	0.49	0.67	0.72	3.2	3.12	2.98	2.85	4.31	4.19	4.76	3.41
GDP per capita (dallar)	1227.8	1322.7	1418.5	2102.2	2239.1	2409.3	2545.7	2655.7	2755.7	2876	2918

Source: (Waberi, 2024)

3.3. Bilateral politics between Ethiopia -Djibouti

The diplomatic and political partnership among Djibouti and Ethiopia has seen unprecedented improvement since 1991, surpassing any previous period in their history. At different points in time, Djibouti and Ethiopia entered several conventions, agreements of understanding, and tight connection partnerships. The two nations have implemented more than seventy agreements, spanning various research disciplines. By expertly implementing these agreements, it will be possible to achieve shared

objectives and strengthen pre-existing ties. This clearly requires consistent and determined efforts, mutual assurance, and trust at every level (Olika, 2018).

The diplomatic connection regarding Ethiopia and Djibouti has significantly improved since 1991 because of talks on social, political, and economic concerns. A few state visits by ministers and heads of state have aided in this development. The Joint Ministerial Commission, deals with political, economic, and social issues; the Follow-Up Committee, which guarantees the actualisation of agreements and decisions made by heads of state and ministers; the Joint Border Administrators and Members Committee, which handles border security, immigration, refugees, and health matters; and the Joint Border Sub-Committees, which offer prompt resolutions to emerging issues, are just a few of the mechanisms for cooperation that the two countries have established (Olika, 2018).

Ethiopia and Djibouti have amicable political and diplomatic relations, characterized by collaboration. Moreover, since 1991, Ethiopia and Djibouti have shown a mutually beneficial relationship in terms of political affairs in their respective areas and nations. Ethiopia and the Djiboutian administration formed a collaborative alliance during the civil unrest in Djibouti in 1991, driven by the alignment of their mutual interests (Gidey, 2017). The Front for Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) consistently attacked the mostly Issa/Somali-controlled government in Djibouti, triggering the civil war. The FRUD received significant backing from the Afar-inhabited areas of Djibouti, whereas the Issa ethnic groupings have exerted control over the official government institutions since the nation gained independence. Due to concerns that the successes of the Afar people in Djibouti may inspire discontent among Afars in Ethiopia, Ethiopia, which has a significant Afar population, exerted significant pressure on the separatists. In fact, beginning in April 1992, Ethiopia actively advocated for a peaceful resolution to the crisis (Yasin, 2010).

This cooperative alliance was unusual in the Horn of Africa, where it was customary for countries to help their counterparts' enemies. Furthermore, the two countries cooperate on matters such as the initiation of IGAD and the gathering of war levies in Somalia. However, the friendly relations between Ethiopia and Djibouti since 1991 are not entirely devoid of antagonism. Ethiopia's greater size and powerful influence have significantly altered the economic relationship between Djibouti and Ethiopia,

resulting in a noticeable imbalance and frequent disagreements and confrontations. Ethiopia's dependence on Djibouti's port facilities leads to ongoing tensions over fees and taxes (Olika, 2018).

In 2000, Djibouti and Ethiopia had commercial difficulties due to Ethiopia's imposition of restrictions on some imports from Djibouti and Djibouti's decision to raise taxes on a state-owned Ethiopian company. The Indian Ocean Newsletter referenced the Maritime Transport Services Corporation (MTSC). In July 2011, Ethiopia and Djibouti had a dispute due to the Djiboutian Civil Aviation Authority's decision to ban Ethiopian Airlines from flying in Djibouti. The Djiboutians imposed the ban due to their belief that Ethiopian Airlines' Bombardier aircraft had not received adequate repairs. After discussions, they successfully settled the situation and restored normalcy. In the middle of 2012, Ethiopia faced a significant crisis due to administrative and organizational reforms (Gutu & Ababa, 2014).

The container port in Djibouti has decreased, leading to significant financial expenses. Ethiopia's establishment of the Corporation for Shipping and Logistics Services (ESLSE), a large new quasi-governmental entity responsible for combining the activities of three formerly independent agencies: shipping, maritime services, and dry port agencies, triggered the crisis. In addition, Djibouti has refused to relinquish ownership shares in port infrastructure to states of Ethiopia. This small nation of Djibouti has taken measures to safeguard its sovereignty and maintain economic autonomy with Ethiopia (Getamesay, 2021).

3.4. Cultural and Social Tie

Cultural and social ties bind Ethiopia and Djibouti closely. The heritage, languages, religious convictions, and cultural practices that unite the populations of Djibouti and northeastern Ethiopia are similar (Mormul, 2016). Most of the Issa Somalis and Afars, who make up Djibouti's two major ethnic groups, reside in Ethiopia. Both parties, therefore, maintain cross-border ties and engage in a variety of interactions. Because of their paternalistic way of life, Afars and Issa/Somalis on both sides frequently cross borders as part of their daily routines (Imbert, 2011). Both sides' observers at the 18th

Ethiopia-Djibouti joint border commissioners/administrators conference received information about the pastoralist movements. Both parties agreed to maintain the current relationship. In addition, during the summer season, many Djiboutian tourists visit Ethiopia, particularly the cities of Harar and Dire Dawa Shinile, as well as the capital Addis Ababa (Gedecho, 2015).

Since 1998, the total number of tourists from Djibouti to Ethiopia has increased, despite fluctuations. Although precise statistics are unavailable, available estimates indicate that the number of Ethiopian tourists visiting Djibouti is inconsequential. Therefore, the Ethiopian and Djiboutian agencies still have much to do to effectively promote their respective tourist destinations and attractions in one another's countries. In this regard, the existing infrastructure plays a crucial role (Gutu & Ababa, 2014). In recent years, the railway has helped to transport tourists at the lowest prices with easy access away from fatigue, particularly transportation. Interconnections between the two countries can serve to facilitate cultural exchanges and tourism flows. Cross-border social relationships make it easier to transport capital, labor, and commodities, all of which help with regional economic integration. Because trade and the management of trade routes are vital to the economic well-being of those residing in peripheral regions, these networks can foster business and commerce by bolstering commerce. Therefore, with appropriate management, the preexisting cross-border social ties between Ethiopia and Djibouti have the potential to significantly focus to the advancement of integration between the two countries (Teka & Azeze, 2002).

3.5. Peace and Security

The relations between Djibouti and Ethiopia are further complicated by the need for cooperation in the areas of peace and security. Historically, Ethiopia - Djibouti have maintained amicable neighborly relations characterized by cooperation (Teka & Azeze, 2002). They established the Joint Security Administration and Defence Forces (ADF) as an exchange mechanism linking the two nations' security and administrative agencies along their common border. The principal objective is to counter illicit activities and security risks inside the common border regions, while simultaneously

augmenting collaboration on different defence and security issues. It developed a cooperative approach to provide mutual protection, involving joint monitoring of the shared areas as part of our efforts to enhance peace and security (Gutu & Ababa, 2014).

Engaging in the mutual transfer of criminals and jointly supervising illicit activities, as well as facilitating the movement of persons over the border, is considered prohibited. Our collaborative efforts aim to fight terrorism and exchange intelligence. The goal is to encourage cooperation in security and development efforts between the administrative and military branches located in Ethiopia's Afar Regional States and Djibouti's bordering area. In 2010, the two countries established a bilateral military cooperation pact (Teka & Azeze, 2002).

As a result of this agreement, the two nations have decided to enhance and reinforce their existing bilateral connections while also strengthening the bonds of camaraderie and friendship between their respective military services. Forty students from Djibouti successfully completed their studies at the Ethiopian Defense Academy in 2013, as stipulated in Article 4(c) of the agreement on the provision of capacity-building training to military personnel. In addition, another six Djibouti military soldiers are undergoing training in Ethiopia for firing, loading, and maintenance. Consequently, both nations are fully working together possible on matters pertaining to bilateral defense and security (Gutu & Ababa, 2014).

Ethiopia and Djibouti are actively working together to guarantee peace and security. IGAD institutional mechanisms are facilitating extensive cooperation in Somalia, Sudan, and the South Sudan war. Regarding this matter, Hailemariam, who was serving as Ethiopia's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, made the following statement: Our country has made significant progress in addressing regional security concerns, particularly through our steadfast support for the populations in Sudan and Somalia. It has contributed to ensuring that the parties involved in Sudan actively pursue a mutually acceptable political resolution to the conflict (Kłosowicz, 2015).

The two countries are working together to improve the African Peacekeeping Mission's efforts in Somalia and establish peace and stability in the region. In addition, it worked together to urge the Eritrean government to change its behavior and join our collaborative initiatives aimed at fostering regional cooperation focused on achieving

peace, stability, and common interests in the area (Teka & Azeze, 2002). The two countries are actively collaborating on issues relating to human and drug trafficking, as well as terrorism, among other broader problems. On a regular basis, the Joint Border Administrators' Commissioners convene to discuss and address any security concerns that arise across the border. In relation to their mutual security concerns across borders and wider matters of peace and stability in the Horn of Africa, the two countries are generally engaging in cooperation (Atinafu, 2015).

4. RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA, DJIBOUTI, AND ETHIOPIA

4.1. Chinese Investments in Africa: A Brief History

Chinese financial involvement in Africa commenced at the start of the 21st century have remained a significant focus over time (Abodohoui & Da-Silva, 2018). This section offers a brief historical overview of C African investments made by China from the 1950s to the present. Additionally, the paper examines the political, economic, and demographic factors influencing case studies of Chinese investments, including the railway projects in Nigeria and the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway. China's foreign aid program to African countries began in the 1950s, eventually extending to other Asian nations. This development marked the onset of commercial relations between China and Africa. Until the 1960s and 1970s, China's involvement was primarily limited to aid; however, it later expanded to sponsoring infrastructure projects and supporting African independence movements (Tovar, 2019).

The tense mutual relations entre Africa and China experienced in 1990, following a period in which China's primary emphasis was on domestic economic progress. China and Africa expanded their bilateral relations to encompass development assistance, investments, and trade during this period (Alden, 2005) .

Figure 4.1: Africa countries that China has invested



Source: (Shen, 2015).

The unprecedented level of Chinese engagement in African countries throughout the 1990s can be credited to the country's development strategy of the time, which centered on the importation of natural resources such as minerals and energy (Tull, 2006). China possessed a dearth of natural resources despite its swiftly expanding population at the

time of this turn of events. Africa possesses a larger quantity of natural resources in comparison to China, rendering it a highly appealing trading partner (Alden & Alves, 2015). This means China started bringing in raw materials and exporting finished goods to Africa. A critical year in the recent history of China-Africa ties, 2006 saw the adoption of the Beijing Action Plan for 2007–2009 and a commitment to political, economic, and cultural partnership through both continents. This plan was agreed upon by China and Africa, and it called for the creation of trade zones around the continent, the encouraging of Chinese businesses to invest there, and the ongoing provision of financial support to African nations (Baah & Jauch, 2009).

China has boosted its investments in the manufacturing, infrastructure, and service sectors throughout the continent since the Beijing Action Plan was formulated. Since 2010, Chinese infrastructure investments in African nations have increased from nearly nil in 2000 to eight billion. China pledged to provide African countries with $60 billion in aid, investments, and financing at the 2018 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Summit (FCACS), these investments are expected to increase from their current annual average of 5 billion (Tovar, 2019).

The surge in Chinese investments in Africa has been prompted by a confluence of political, economic, and demographic factors, in addition to the Beijing Action. Niaz et al. (2024) have said that the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) plan has served as a political inducement for Chinese investments in Africa. With the OBOR, China hopes to expand trade and international opportunities for investment throughout Africa, Asia, and Europe (Jones & Liu, 2017).

Subsequently, China has escalated its financial allocations towards developing nations, with projections indicating a one-trillion-dollar growth within the coming decade. Thus, the OBOR has been crucial in bolstering the Chinese government's considerable political support for investments in Africa. In both the demographic and macroeconomic domains, China's economic growth is slowing down. The GDP of the nation is currently growing at a pace of about 6%, down from 10 to 15% in the early 2000s (Tovar, 2019).

Concurrently, there is about a significant overcapacity in many sectors, including manufacturing, and average wages in China are rising, which drives up production expenses. All these factors are causing a shift in China's growth strategy, which was

previously export-driven and resource-intensive, to one that emphasizes foreign investment. The escalating working-age population in Africa has presented African countries with the challenge of producing sufficient employment opportunities to accommodate their growing labor forces (Baah & Jauch, 2009).

China's overcapitalised businesses could explore unexplored areas due to the demographic shifts occurring on the continent. In simple terms, the growth of Chinese interests in Africa has been attributed to a few factors, including China's One Belt One Road initiative and changes in the economies and demography of China and Africa. Alden (2005) identified two initiatives, namely the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway linking Djibouti and Ethiopia, and the Nigerian rail line between Abuja and Kaduna.

4.2. Trilateral Relations: China, Djibouti, and Ethiopia

The Chinese, Ethiopian, and Djiboutian flags were raised on the newly constructed Nagad station, located at the departure of the capital of Djibouti, on January 10, 2017. A century after the construction of the renowned Franco-Ethiopian train that connected Addis Ababa to the port of Djibouti, China grants regional logistics and commercialization in Djibouti its due consideration (Gouriellec, 2018).

Figure 4.2: Trilateral relations



Source : (Downs et al., 2017)

Ethiopian power, on the other hand, can adapt its disorganized economic growth through this expedient maritime channel. Under the apprehensive observation of

western countries and international institutions, which are concerned about the potential over-indebtedness of African states and are mere observers of the establishment of a new global order, all parties involved enthusiastically embrace this novel partnership (Donelli, 2023). China's incursions into the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden are assisted by a strategic topographical advantage along a vital maritime corridor that is at the core of the country's New Silk Roads strategy (Styan, 2020).The principal aim of this joint initiative is to promote economic mutual dependence between more than 65 nations, which would bring together an approximate population of 4.4 billion people and more than 40% of the global GDP (Gouriellec, 2018).

That is focus integration megaproject presents itself as a novel paradigm of governance, grounded in the principles of inclusion and equality. China's maritime prowess is affirmed along the maritime route from the China sea to the Mediterranean via the Red Sea (Elazar, 2022). The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) transcends its Eurasian focus and potentially extends significantly to the African continent. Coastal regions in east Africa are directly impacted by these developments. However, "Road" and "Belt" continue to be catch-all terms that refer to a limited number of repackaged versions of pre-existing Chinese initiatives. Indeed, this initiative has many kinds of implications affecting the public and international policy of the participating governments (Alam & Asef, 2020).

The countries of the Horn Africa have diverse objectives, and it is important to comprehend how it arrives at their strategic decisions. Since the 1990, and particularly since 2000, this issue of relations between Africa and China has been the focus of an abundance of diverse studies, which have characterized these relations in various ways as a mutually beneficial opportunity, a form of neocolonialism, or even a predatory attempt to exploit African resources. In the scientific literature is generally regarded in a variety of ways either as a mechanism to advance globalization and economic integration (market, finance), or as a form of subjugation towards China (Gouriellec, 2018).

There is a diminished level of dedication towards NATO and Western countries. The literature is, overall, prejudiced and interprets Chinese intentions negatively or fails to comprehend them. This research suggests adopting an inverted approach by examining

the tactics employed by local actors. The ambitious Chinese initiative is an extension of a previous partnership with Africa. The traditional dichotomy that is utilized in the scientific literature to examine these relations (Legarda & Nouwens, 2020). This strategy concentrates primarily on the analysis of the motivations and methods employed by exogenous production participants, such as China, to invest on the African continent. Despite the importance of this strategy, it seems imperative to investigate the factors that compel African countries to embrace this interdependent relationship. This effort is being incorporated into the public policies of the regimes in Djibouti and Ethiopia (Lasserre & Djama Omar, 2021). Consequently, the purpose of this contribution is to examine this correlation through the application of the extroversion concept. The asymmetry of China's partnerships with the states in the area is asymmetrical and should not be compromised. It gains acceptance and might even be a tactic that regional regimes use to hold onto power (Donelli, 2023).

Extroversion in Africa of the mobilization of resources provided by potentially unequal relationships with the external environment or the creation and capture of a real income from dependence. Ethiopia and Djibouti are two countries in the region that attractants our interest. Particularly developed is the economic and financial partnership with China, which this supports Ethiopia's development in society and economy and the expansion of Djibouti's logistics terminal between China -Ethiopia (Tovar, 2019). Due to the Ethiopian regional power's training capacity and This small county of Djibouti is eminently geostrategic position at the mouth of the Red Sea, this appears that China is purchasing political influence in this area. Nevertheless, even though these relationships, which are frequently portrayed as "win-win in the sense that their interests are balanced, are frequently asymmetrical in terms of the dangers that menace each nation not delve into this frequently emphasized aspect. The three protagonists, each with its own set of objectives-becoming a middle-income country by 2025 for Ethiopia, becoming a global power for China, and establishing a "Singapore of the Red Sea" status for Djibouti maintain their bilateral relations primarily to accomplish these goals (Gouriellec, 2018).

4.3. Economic Aspect Between China and Djibouti

The Djibouti government has a strategic advantage in the sphere of influence over international trade because of its extensive 3,141-kilometer littoral area, China made a smart strategic decision by taking advantage of this dry region as a gateway to East Africa, which was undergoing rapid development. Djibouti's port operations form the foundation of its importance assessment (Dutton et al., 2020). By the late 19th century, French settlement in the area had already begun for this specific objective, enhancements to this port-state function are currently in progress. Nearly in this remote region of Africa that resembles a miniature western America, writes Djiboutian author Abdourahman (Waberi, 2024). To the conclusion of the hydrocarbon and container terminals at Doraleh in 2008 and 2006, respectively, the countries port capacities had been substantially expanded (Gouriellec, 2018).

The Emiratis (Dubai) initially allocated a financial expenditure towards the management of the international autonomous port of Djibouti and the enhancement of the port infrastructure mentioned earlier, in the year 2000. DP World withdrew from the management of the paid port in 2011 due to a dispute regarding the expansion of the Doraleh container terminal. In contrast, China merchants holding international obtained ownership of the port in 2013. For that sum, it obtained two-thirds of the Doraleh Container Terminal (DCT), which DP World will continue to operate until 2018. Additionally, China merchants holding international acquired 23.5% of the port's shares (Guirreh, 2017).

Political tensions involving Abdourahman Boreh, a financially successful Djiboutian industrialist who was previously connected with the Djiboutian president but is now an adversary, form the fundamental basis of the dispute between DP World and the Djiboutian regime. In preference for China, the Djiboutian regime has severed ties with this ally (Guirreh, 2017). For the most part, China is financing the development of essential facilities in Djibouti, which is indispensable to achieving its objective of transforming the country into an example of the Red Sea (Dutton et al., 2020).

The objective of the Djiboutian government is to utilize its logistical capabilities to take advantage of two crucial elements its strategic geographical positioning that provides entry to a substantial international trade transit route, thus positioning it as

the leading transshipment port in east Africa and the increasing influx of commodities entering and departing from Ethiopia. Consequently, the Djiboutian regime obtains financial support from China, demonstrating a disregard for the economic feasibility of undertakings (Gouriellec, 2018).

These vast infrastructures also serve Chinese interests concerning the development of the Bri, especially since, CMA (compagnie Maritime Africa). CGM, (Companie General Maritime) added Djibouti to its primary commercial routes and increased crossing frequency in early 2016, thereby enhancing its service portfolio and designating Djibouti as a regional transshipment hub (Dutton et al., 2020).

China's overarching objective is to designate Djibouti as its principal gateway to the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia's significant developing market, and the Common Market for eastern and southern Africa in its entirety. Additionally, the inaugural branch of SilkRoad international bank was inaugurated in Djibouti by China in January 2017. By facilitating the conversion of the dollar-indexed Djiboutian franc, this Chinese investment bank aids the triumvirate in its imports and exports (Dutton et al., 2020). in May 2018, the Minister of Finance provided a response to our inquiry concerning the potential membership of Djibouti in the Asian Infrastructure investment bank. As the finance sector expands substantially, the urban area of Djibouti is progressively changing into a center for financial transactions. Notwithstanding critiques pertaining to the small countries escalating debt and overstated ambitions, the president of Djibouti consistently conveys appreciation to the Chinese regime for its steadfast support (Gouriellec, 2018).

Participating in the development of Djibouti's logistics infrastructure serves two purposes for China (Getamesay, 2021). Priority is given to securing resources and markets, particularly crude from South Sudan. In addition, it endeavors to ascertain prospective locations for its financial reserves. Finally, its objective is to form a strategic alliance with Djibouti. Following the signature of security and defense agreements in 2014, Djibouti has been designated as the location for the inaugural permanent Chinese military base overseas). As a result, China is clearly acquiring the attributes of a global power. Before its definitive construction is undertaken near the multipurpose port of Doraleh, the location will primarily function as a port for Chinese ships. returning from patrols in the Gulf of Aden (Dutton et al., 2020).

The principal purpose of this entity is to support operational activities in Africa and contribute to the protection of a vital communication corridor that China relies on to transport approximately one-third of its exports. The facility is designed to accommodate a maximum of 10,000 military personnel. China encountered difficulties when it attempted to evacuate 500 of its citizens from Yemen in March 2015 and 12,000 of its 33,000 citizens from Libya in February 2011. Furthermore, this base was built in fulfilment of the Chinese Navy's requirements for a relay facility that would facilitate its projection into the high crossroad of the Indian Ocean (Gouriellec, 2018).

This meaning perceived convergence of immediate interests (such as strategic position and railway) can create the illusion that medium-term interests are further away (Tovar, 2019). Debt provides much of the funding for the Djibouti development initiative. Although there has been an upward trend in Chinese direct investments, their contribution to infrastructure financing funded by the public sector remains insignificant. Regarding the Gulf states in particular, Djibouti has prioritized the Ethiopian economy and "multi-alignment" as guiding principles for its development policy. Should Chinese pressure become excessive, the region could be compelled to resort to its Arab allies or western powers as a last resort. Therefore, two years to the election of the Chinese base, a Djiboutian official informed us, "The rope around our necks; should the Chinese demand a base, Djiboutian will be obligated to provide one." In a similar vein base (Gouriellec, 2018).

The Djiboutian government could face an approaching challenge in maintaining its debt levels, despite the country having not yet initiated the repayment of the principal debts' contracted capital with the Exim Bank of China. At the end of 2017, conjectures emerged regarding China's deliberate deceleration of progress, purportedly driven by the desire to apply pressure on the Djiboutian government and acquire new advantages (Mohamed, 2021). China has demonstrated its engagement in various endeavors, encompassing investment, infrastructure development, port construction, energy provision to neighboring Djibouti and Ethiopia, and the construction of the inaugural military base (Cabestan, 2022).

4.4. Projects Built by China for Djibouti

In 1998–2000, after the conflict, Ethiopia transferred its economy to Djibouti, which significantly influenced the situation in Djibouti. The port is obligated to satisfy both Ethiopian requirements and its Platformization policy (Murphy, 2016). Thus, whereas in the past, the Djiboutian approach entailed bolstering the stopover function or the service function in alternation in response to current demand, this no longer holds true. For the first time, Djibouti is presented with a dual objective: rather than sustaining one function at the expense of the other, it is now necessary to implement a concurrent strategy as opposed to a strategy alternation. Consequently, every accomplishment since 2000 has been directed toward establishing Djibouti not only as a port catering to the Ethiopian hinterland but also as a hub for transhipment for the area around the Red Sea's opening (Styan, 2020).

Presently, Djibouti is carrying out a port diversification plan in order to serve the marine transport sector and, on the one hand, improve its port infrastructure in to fulfil the increasing demand in the area. This means drawing some of the marine traffic that crosses the Bab al-Mandeb Strait to the port (such as ship maintenance and transshipment) and making the port more appealing to the hinterland. The first step in this port diversification plan is to increase the number of private partnerships (Alam & Asef, 2020).

Figure 4.3: Project China invested for Djibouti



Source: (Dutton et al., 2020)

The initial years of the port's privatization were not Dubai's only audience; other foreign investors (China, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Turkey, and India) are now participating as well, drawn to the strategic location of the republic of Djibouti. Subsequently, the imperatives of territorial planning, specifically regarding the northern regions, give rise to such a policy. Following the unsuccessful endeavor to establish a port in Obock during the early stages of colonization and the subsequent relocation of the administrative capital to Djibouti, most of the transport infrastructure was concentrated in that economic hub (Guirreh, 2017).

The change in this colonial-era condition began in the early 2000s, when transportation infrastructure was liberalized for private investment. Djibouti seeks to improve its port options by developing extra transport facilities along its coastline. This entails optimizing the utilization of the nation's maritime capabilities and expanding the economic advantages derived from transport operations to coastal areas. Ultimately, this policy endeavors to predict, among other things, the potential for a traffic diversion to alternative ports in the vicinity (Guirreh, 2017).

4.4.1. Port Doraleh oil Terminal

Chinese companies are the owners and developers of the May 2017 opening of the Doraleh Multipurpose Port. One of the main assets of Port of Djibouti Social Anonymous, a joint venture established in 2013 by China Merchants and the Djibouti Ports and Free Zones Authority, is the port. China investors paid 185 million dollars for a 23.5% stake in PDSA. The China Exim Bank then provided a 340-million-dollar loan to finance the construction of the Doraleh multifunctional port. Its building was carried out by China State building Engineering Corporation and China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (Guirreh, 2017). Undoubtedly, the construction of the multifunctional port at Doraleh would boost Djibouti's earnings from port services, which are essential to the nation's economy and account for 70% of its GDP. By virtue of the new port, Djibouti will be able to significantly augment the quantity of cargo it processes. Djibouti coordinated the transport of 6.5 million metric tons of cargo in 2016 (Dutton et al., 2020).

The May 2017 opening of Phase first section of the Doraleh Multipurpose Port will increase annual capacity by 9 metric tons, or 138%, of the volume of cargo that Djibouti can manage (Waberi, 2024). The annual capacity of the Doraleh Multipurpose Port will increase to 29 metric tons through the second section. The purpose of the Doraleh Multipurpose Port is to increase Djibouti's capacity to manage commodities of various sizes and shapes. With a harbor depth of 16–18 meters (52.5-59 feet), the port will feature one roll-on/roll-off (Ro-Ro) terminal and six multipurpose berths. Capsize vessels transporting bulk commodities like coal and iron ore will also be accommodated at Doraleh Multipurpose Port (Downs et al., 2017). In particular, the port will have the capacity to receive vessels with a maximum deadweight tonnage (DWT) of 100,000 (certain capesize ships can reach dimensions of 400,000 DWT). Djibouti's capacity to receive capsize vessels and facilitate the transfer of products to smaller ships, enabling subsequent shipment to smaller harbors, will augment its significance as a transshipment center in eastern and southern Africa (Dutton et al., 2020).

4.4.2. Tadjoura Port

Comparable to former caravan ports like Zeila (Somalia), Tadjourah, a former port, experienced a decline in activity after the establishment of Djibouti. For a significant period, it was demoted to the lowly status of a fishing port, all the while Djibouti was experiencing economic expansion. The notion of developing additional port infrastructure in the northern region of the nation emerged during the years following independence. However, its execution was impacted by the abrupt decline in port activity that followed the Ethiopian transit to Eritrean ports and the civil conflict in the northern region. One of the most significant undertakings in which China has invested in Djibouti is the Tadjoura port. The DPFZA is the Ports and Free Zone Authority of Djibouti (Haga et al., 2012).

The Tadjoura Port commenced operations in June 2017 in response to the Djiboutian government's objective of expanding its regional transportation network. While initially designed to streamline the potash export process, the port has subsequently

transformed into a multifaceted regional center. With the concurrent construction of the port and other infrastructure initiatives, including the highway that connected North Tadjoura and Bahru, the port of Tadjoura features piers measuring 12 meters in depth and 435 meters in length. A 30-hectare site featuring state-of-the-art potash processing technology and a RoRo berth extending 190 meters with the capacity to process four million tons of fertilizer per day and 2,000 tons per hour (Guirreh, 2017).

The Port of Tadjourah is intended to help reduce congestion in the capital's ports while also addressing the issue of overpopulation in the Southern Corridor, Ethiopia's primary evacuation route. Moreover, the Tadjourah port project includes a land component. This is the Tadjourah-Randa-Balho Road, which for a very long time remained a track It will be paved and expanded to link with the Assab-Addis Ababa Road, after which the road will follow the same route across the rest of Ethiopian territory (Guirreh, 2017). The development of the Tadjourah port appears to be aligned with Ethiopian interests, as the Ethiopians intend to utilize this port for the extraction of potash found in the Afar region (Haga et al.,2012). According to the Administrator of the Port and Free Zone Authorities (APFZ), potash production is expected to ensure an annual volume of regular traffic estimated at four million tons. Over time, this road will be augmented by a railway line that extends in the direction of Mekele. Considering the evolving regional geopolitical landscape, particularly the resumption of Assab, the inauguration of this northern port should serve to further solidify Djibouti's position as the primary access point to Ethiopia (Aden, 2019).

4.4.3. Damerjog Livestock Port

The port of Djibouti, like other ports (Bossaso, Berbera, etc.), also serves as a port for loading livestock destined for the Gulf countries (Mamo, 2019). Livestock exports have grown since the opening of a quarantine center in 2006 in Damerjog, a town located about ten kilometers from the capital of Djibouti. The construction cost of this center is estimated at 20 million dollars, and its management is hosted by the Abu Yasser International establishment, owned by a Saudi investor Then China invested with an efficient medical laboratory, the center welcomes both Djiboutian livestock

and livestock from neighboring countries. Indeed, estimates concerning the Djibouti livestock vary enormously from one study to another (Guirreh, 2017).

This statistical variability is due to the nomadic nature of Djiboutian livestock farming and its random mobility depending on rains and pastures. Thus, most livestock come from neighboring countries (Ethiopia and Somalia). Assured already a part of livestock exports, the opening of a regional center, the only center approved (recognized) by the Gulf States, the main importing countries, constituted an amplifying element by attracting almost all the region's exports to Djibouti. Before the quarantine center opened in 2005, livestock trafficking was estimated at around 30,000 heads per year. It went from 39,124 head in 2005 to more than 287,325 head in 2006, an increase of 86%. In 2009, it reached just over two million heads. These increases in traffic are mainly explained by the embargo imposed by Gulf countries on Somali animal imports because of rinderpest (Guirreh, 2017).

4.4.4. Ghoubet Port

The Republic of Djibouti also launched the construction of a mineral port in the Gulf of Goubet, located 120 km by road from the capital of Djibouti. Despite the environmental criticism that the project has generated, the Djiboutian government has remained in its countries. This new port, with a lower capacity than that of Tadjourah, will be dedicated primarily to the exploitation of Lake Assal salt (Teka & Azeze, 2002). This lake, located in the east of the country at an altitude of 153 meters below sea level, is considered the lowest point on the continent. The waters of Lake Assal have the advantage of producing salt in large quantities, which, once exploited, would open up very interesting economic prospects. Such exploitation is not a new fact since Lake Assal salt has, for centuries, been the subject of trade with Afar caravanners who supplied the Abyssinian markets with this salt. Today, the idea, through the construction of this port, is to ultimately develop a salt industry and make Djibouti once again a salt-exporting country (Guirreh, 2017).

This port, financed exclusively by a Chinese loan, will be equipped 400 meters long with a draft of 15 meters capable of accommodating vessels of 100,000 dwt (Guirreh,

2017). It will also have four storage docks and a storage area located 800 meters from the berthing quay. For exporting salt extracted from Lake Assal, China Harbour Engineering Corporation (CHEC) established a mineral terminal at Ghoubet port. To finance this endeavor, the government of Djibouti obtained a loan of 64 million dollars from China Eximbank. CHEC's parent company, China Communications Construction Corporation (CCCC), acquired exploration rights to Assal and a Djiboutian salt company subsequent to the terminal's 2015 completion. A salt chemical industrial complex is scheduled to be developed by CCCC in collaboration with Shandong Haiwang Chemical Company. In June 2017, the export terminal was inaugurated (Downs et al., 2017).

4.4.5. Building Roads (Street)

China has built many streets in many African countries, whether linking one country to another or within one country and one of the most important of these roads is a key highway linking a monastery and Djibouti's capital (Styan, 2020). Dire Dawa, the second capital of Ethiopia, as well as many streets within Djibouti, such as the road connecting Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa Road networks, have long connected Ethiopia and Djibouti. Even though more rail capacity is going to substitute some trucks, roads that link Djibouti's ports to internal markets are still in high demand. In contrast, rail growth comes before road building. According to some Ethiopian experts, this is intentional to encourage more people to utilise the train line, which will free up funds that Ethiopian railroads have accrued as a result of their explosive expansion (Dutton et al., 2020).

Djibouti's Route Nationale serves as the primary road linking the country to Ethiopia, stretching from Djibouti City to Galafi, through Awash, and finally to Addis Ababa. Approximately 1,000 trucks use this road daily, primarily transporting fuel and other bulk liquids. However, sections of the road are severely deteriorated, making the paved areas impassable and forcing vehicles to create detours through large expanses of desert (Dutton et al., 2020). China's Exim Bank provided financing for Ethiopia's first modern highway, connecting Addis Ababa to Adama, which opened in 2014 and links the city to the Mojo dry port, one of several industrial parks constructed by Chinese

companies. Additional Chinese-led road projects are planned around other industrial parks in the region. The Hawassa Motorway, extending from Mojo dry port southeast of Addis Ababa to Hawassa's main industrial hub, was expected to be completed by late 2020. China's Exim Bank is also funding the fourth phase of this project, connecting Negele to Hawassa. Industrial growth is driving the demand for improved roads, which could boost trucking capacity to serve the rest of Ethiopia and Djibouti's ports (Dutton et al., 2020).

4.4.6. Djibouti built an International Free Trade Zone

The Djibouti International Free Trade Zone (DIFTZ), covering 48.2 km² and located southwest of the Doraleh Multipurpose Port, is a logistics and trade hub designed to attract businesses to leverage the port's infrastructure. The zone was officially established in March 2015 through the signing of the Djibouti Free Trade Zone Project Cooperation Framework Agreement between China Merchants Group (CMG) and the Djibouti Ports and Free Zone Authority. Three Chinese companies collaborate to operate the zone, with the Dalian Port Corporation beginning its development in January 2017. The initial phase, comprising a 2.4 km² pilot zone, involved a $370 million investment as part of a larger $3.5 billion project to develop the 48 km² area, which is considered Africa's largest free trade zone (Dutton et al., 2020).

Figure 4.4: Djibouti free trade zone



Source : (Dutton et al., 2020, p.15)

China’s involvement in the Djibouti Free Trade Zone is structured through two joint ventures established in January 2017: Lac Assal Investment Holding Company Ltd. and East Aden Holding Company Ltd. (Downs et al., 2017). At the time, China Merchants Port (CM Port) extended a loan of up to $150 million for a term of no more than ten years, securing ownership stakes of 40% and 26.7% in the ventures. These joint ventures are also engaged in upgrading port facilities and developing industrial zones around the port. Initially, CM Port invested $12.3 million into the two Free Trade Zone joint ventures. By January 2019, CM Port, alongside two China Merchants Group (CMG) subsidiaries, China Merchants Investments Limited and Cheer Signal, announced further investment (Dutton et al., 2020).

The long-term goal is to develop a manufacturing cluster within the Free Trade Zone to facilitate packaging, light raw material processing, food processing, and vehicle assembly, ultimately boosting trade and enhancing the port's prosperity. Currently, the Djibouti International Free Trade Zone is still in its early stages, lacking major infrastructure or operational industrial sites. Nevertheless, 21 companies have reportedly signed agreements to operate within the zone (Dutton et al., 2020). Before its limited launch, both Djiboutian officials and Chinese executives were actively promoting business opportunities in China, emphasizing the zone’s potential to provide easy market access. In 2017, the Chairman of the Djibouti Ports and Free Zones Authority projected that the zone would become a vibrant commercial hub (Downs et al., 2017).

Table 4.1: Chinese financing in comparative context

Project	**Cost (S M)**	**Sources of financing**
Djibouti -Ethiopia railway	490	China Eximbank
Telecom connection (Cable)	69	World Bank
Water Pipeline	322	China Eximbank
Doraleh Multipurpose Port	340	
Tadjourah Port	68	China Eximbank
Damerjog livestock Port	66	China Eximbank
Ghoubet Port	64	African Development Bank
Balho Road	80	China Eximbank

International free Trade Zone	30	Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development
Total	1529	

Reference: (Downs et al.,2017, p.9).

4.5. The Debt Levels of China affects Djibouti's GDP

The IMF's warning was considerable because the high amounts of loans Djibouti borrowed from China for sustaining the large infrastructure projects and other investments resulted in high indebtedness, as opposed to the expectations of Djiboutian government (Downs et al., 2017). Even though economic experts from the country believe that "the Djiboutians make good income from the projects so that it will has a better life and is able to repay their debts" the increase in countries public and publicly guaranteed debt in percent of GDP is worrying as it can be observed from Figure 6. So, the result became very alarming for Djibouti since the investments supported by foreign debt have not been able to maintain the expected higher growth and reduction in poverty, but the worse has happened and country's public debt rose from 50% to 85% in 2017 IMF 2017 (Mohamed, 2021).

The Chinese government ordered the country to lease the Doraleh Container Terminal port for ten years (Downs et al., 2017). Foreign investment became a debt trap for Djibouti rather than a long-term tool for growth. Hence, China's significant quantity of loans to the Djiboutian government and investments in its state-owned firms resulted in Djibouti's high indebtedness. When viewed through the lens of neocolonialism, these foreign investments hampered rather than helped Djibouti's growth. China's investments and loans could have revitalized Djibouti's economy by increasing economic activity along its coasts, but it provided a loan that Djibouti is unable to repay because it has a negative impact on the country's financing capacity and repaying that debt will leave no room for Djibouti to expand its economy. Neither project is generating the revenue it should at this point, according to Djiboutian Finance Minister Ilyas Mousse Dawaleh, who traveled to Beijing to refinance the

loans. As a result, China emerged as the sole beneficiary of this economic alliance (Mohamed, 2021) .

Figure 4.5: Djibouti's total percentage of external debt



Reference: (Mohamed, 2021, p.83)

4.6. Military Relations China-Djibouti

China relies on global economic stability and the flow of energy and raw materials through safe shipping. China's work on structural, economic, and trade linkages between Asia, Europe, and Africa also reflects the "One Belt, One Road" strategic vision launched two years ago for China to invest heavily in ports along the coast. The Indian Ocean coast and the security dimension are reflected in China's readiness to combat piracy in the east African region. Which may endanger Chinese commercial ships passing through the Gulf of Aden and the Bab al-Mandab strait (Breuer, 2017). These ships need a transit station to refuel. This shows the importance of Djibouti, which, along with Kenya, serves as China's gateway to East Africa. Since 2008, the Chinese Navy has been present in the Horn of Africa. To counter the actions of pirates, China also sent a naval force to the Gulf of Aden region for the first time as part of diplomatic efforts. To protect its ships from piracy, China has since deployed more than 20 manpower from more than 60 military naval units. This allows China to focus

its attention on essential water crossings, such as the Taiwan Strait, Malka, Hormuz, and the Suez Canal (Pant & Haidar, 2017).

4.6.1. Chinese military base in Djibouti

After having been released in November 2015, work on the Chinese "Base" in Djibouti began in earnest on August 1, 2017, with the facility's ceremonial opening. The only place in the world where military personnel from the US, France, Italy, Japan, and, more recently, China are stationed simultaneously is Djibouti. In Djibouti, there are right around the corner military installations associated with Germany, Spain, Italy, France, the United States, the United Kingdom, China, and Saudi Arabia. Building military bases in the region is something that both Russia and India are interested in doing (Cabestan, 2021).

Figure 4.6: Foreign military in Djibouti

Source: (Downs et al., 2017)

This is undeniably due to the region's strategic position. Initially, hydrocarbon tankers typically transit the Red Sea between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean (Beal et al., 2000). The region's geomilitary importance is heightened by the ongoing Arab Israeli conflict. Furthermore, the region's geostrategic approach towards maritime security and counter-piracy augmented its overall importance. Attempted to elucidate some of the underlying motivations for the establishment of foreign military bases by

relating them to communication issues and channels. It has been noted that military and commercial divisions are linked to their supply bases via channels that are crucial for connecting markets and represent the primary concern in military logistics overseas (Downs et al., 2017).

The potential results of China's recent endeavors to establish a naval base in Djibouti and offer financial assistance to African armed forces, alongside other diplomatic and security cooperation initiatives, may be more consequential for China than for the African countries directly involved (Chaziza, 2018). This necessitates an expansion of its definition of global interests in tandem with the development of new security mechanisms, such as an expanding military presence abroad, because of its operations in Africa (Dutton et al., 2020). The establishment of foreign military bases in Djibouti exceeds the conventional justification of supporting the global war on terrorism and piracy. The owning states see the construction of military bases in Djibouti as a geopolitical move to advance their economic interests in the Horn of Africa region (Downs et al., 2017).

4.6.2. Reasons for China Establishing a Military Base

understanding China's considerable interests in the MENA area and the probable impediments to accomplishing those aims, the argument for establishing a military base in Djibouti must be considered in a larger context. Although it may appear contradictory, these geoeconomic and geostrategic goals serve primarily commercial interests while simultaneously supporting strategic military objectives. supplementary to its clear the finances imperatives, Beijing maintains a global posture and image in international politics, provides logistical support for Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) activities in the region, protects heavy energy investments, and ensures the liberty of navigation for maritime trade and oil imports; facilitates working together with current and potential Mideast and African allies; and protects heavy energy investments (Chaziza, 2018).

4.6.2.1. Geo-economic

Djibouti is an excellent location for Chinese commercial interests and offshore investments in the MENA area for a variety of reasons. For begin, its strategic location at the junction of one of the world's busiest navigational terms routes is highly beneficial to Chinese business interests (Ahmed, 2022). The Gulf of Aden conveys a large portion of Beijing's daily commerce with the European Union, totalling more than $1 billion, while the Indian Ocean delivers 40% of China's oil imports. Djibouti links Europe, the Far East, the Horn of Africa, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean. Djibouti's position of significance near the Red Sea's entrance makes it a desirable shipping point for goods entering and departing the MENA area (Chaziza, 2018). The region's growing marketplace offers prospects for long-term growth in the future. Furthermore, Djibouti is an ideal location for Beijing's "Belt and Road Strategy" (BRI), which proposes connecting China to the Mediterranean via the Suez Canal, the Indian Ocean, and the Red Sea (Breuer, 2017).

Building a Chinese diplomatic presence in Djibouti will encourage more trade along these geostrategic routes, boosting the country's role in the effective execution of the Belt and Road Initiative, which connects Asia, Africa, and Europe. Furthermore, even though the Bab-Al-Mandeb Strait and the heavily frequented maritime routes of the Red Sea and Djibouti account for just 3% and 4% of China's crude oil and natural gas imports, respectively, these waterways are critical strategic assets. Another factor for China's intention to establish an enduring focussing in Djibouti might be energy security. Aside from an increasing reliance on Middle Eastern petroleum, Beijing requires passage through the Persian Gulf. It is also investing extensively in the region's energy sector (Chaziza, 2018).

The Djibouti base will aid in the protection of Middle Eastern oil cargoes that return via the Indian Ocean and facilitate the passage of crude oil through the strait. In conclusion, the affinity and cooperation between China and Djibouti have been consistently expanding in recent years, encompassing practical cooperation across multiple domains (Cabestan, 2021). Following facilitating the establishment of a naval centre, the strategic partnership between the two nations strengthens Djibouti's position as a critical entry point for infrastructure, allowing for the growth of its

commerce and logistical capacity. For example, Chinese companies have completed fourteen large projects in Djibouti for a total of $14.4 billion. One of these initiatives is a subway system that cuts the travel time from Djibouti to Ethiopia's capital, Addis Abeba. Beijing is additionally financing a pipeline that would deliver natural gas to Djibouti for export to China, and the two countries have just inked a free trade deal (Chaziza, 2018).

4.6.2.2. Geo-strategic

China supports about Djibouti building initiatives, while mostly economic, might have significant strategic benefits for China **(**Downs et al., 2017). Initially, the creation of a naval station in Djibouti increased the People's Liberation Army Navy's (PLAN) ability to wield power in the MENA area and beyond. A permanent military presence in Djibouti would be another Pearl in China's String of Pearls plan. Establishing a port in Djibouti or any other appropriate area where PLAN boats may dock would not only improve the Chinese navy's worldwide capabilities but would also enable it to project power beyond China's near neighborhood. This is particularly true considering that the Chinese military has spent decades building a blue-water fleet to seek global domination; reaching this aim is likely to take another decade (Chaziza, 2018).

Figure 4.7: Djibouti strategic location

Source : (Downs et al.,2017, p.3)

The presence of regional naval bases significantly enhances operational capabilities. Establishing a permanent base in Djibouti would provide the People's Liberation Army

(PLA) with a strong platform for aerial and naval operations, extending its reach across the northwest Indian Ocean and into North, East, and Central Africa. Djibouti's foreign minister, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, noted that China has the same rights as the U.S. or France to deploy drones in the region (Beal et al., 2000). The U.S. possesses the technology, fighter jets, and drones to control global space. Thus, China, too, is justified in using similar resources to safeguard its interests in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. Furthermore, Djibouti's strategic location is crucial for China's military in combating piracy. Since 2008, China has used Djibouti as a logistical base for its anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, and off the Horn of Africa (Shay, 2023).

Chinese warships have reportedly visited Djibouti's port over fifty times since then. With the increasing frequency of regional operations and a growing number of Chinese vessels passing through the waters around the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, a permanent military base would assist China in supporting these missions. Moreover, China used Djibouti as a staging ground for noncombatant evacuation operations in 2015. In its pursuit of global influence, Beijing deploys long-range aircraft and establishes overseas bases to extend its force projection into the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and beyond, posing a potential challenge to U.S. interests (Chaziza, 2018).

China also strengthens its geopolitical standing in Africa and the Middle East through intelligence gathering and surveillance of critical military technologies. The proximity of the Chinese base to Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti—used for clandestine U.S. operations in Yemen, Somalia, and other African nations—raises concerns (Downs et al., 2017). India faces the challenge of China's growing global military presence, particularly with its expanding influence in the Indian Ocean, exemplified by its involvement in Pakistan's Gwadar port and military presence in Djibouti. Additionally, a military base in Djibouti enables Beijing to station long-range naval aircraft that can monitor the Arabian Sea and India's island territories off its western coast. China's Djibouti base plays a key role in the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Chaziza, 2018).

Beijing and Djibouti are collaborating on the maritime Silk Road, part of the BRI, aimed at increasing China's global maritime influence. The construction of a naval base in Djibouti strengthens China's ability to address security issues in Europe,

Africa, and the Middle East, while enhancing its intelligence capabilities for noncombatant evacuation operations, anti-piracy missions, and counterterrorism efforts (Alam & Asef, 2020).

4.7. China-Ethiopia relations

The Ethiopian regime views cooperation with China as an opportunity in this context (Chakrabarty, 2016). It serves to actualize the concept of co-development, which refers to a mutually advantageous collaboration that goes beyond economic factors and benefits all parties involved. The connection between China and Ethiopia is defined by economic collaboration and shared tendencies towards authoritarianism. Meles Zenawi, the former prime minister of Ethiopia, introduced a political and economic strategy called democratic developmentalism in 2001. The former prime minister of Ethiopia often cited South Korea and Taiwan as exemplary examples. Both of these nations have successfully challenged the neoliberal doctrine. Democratic developmentalism refers to a state that actively intervenes in its economy and society, allowing for rapid and widespread advancement on a global level (Gouriellec, 2018).

The governing party, through its extensive powers, should hold authority over the state. The ruling coalition is mostly characterized by centralism. Undoubtedly, the developmental state plays a crucial role within the authoritarian power structure in this specific case. The ruling party also sees it as a means of maintaining its dominance. Development, according to the Ethiopian government, is the endeavor to combat poverty, illiteracy, and backwardness. The state must play a proactive role in promoting national economic development. Indeed, African nations, including Ethiopia, lack a distinct edge in comparison to other countries (Gouriellec, 2018).

China and Ethiopia depend exclusively on rental resources, such as natural resources, assistance, and politics. As a result, the private sector is unable to create more value. The promotion of the private sector depends on its alignment with the government's goals. It is imperative that he persist in his service to the state. This exemplifies Ethiopia's own interpretation of capitalism in a fundamental sense-a system that opposes the liberal free business system (Tovar, 2019). Agriculture has a crucial role

in promoting and propelling the industrial sector within an economic strategy that focuses on large-scale infrastructure such as dams, roads, bridges, and trains. However, the Ethiopian developmental state is not open to engaging in conversation or making compromises. Identify common characteristics shared by China throughout its early developmental phase, such as a strong centralized government and a sizable population. Bilateral ties with China are the most advanced (Venkataraman, & Gofie, 2015).

Chinese companies' contracts for the realization of large railways include support for the installation's operation for a certain time, with the obligation to train Ethiopian employees who will eventually take their place within this period (Tovar, 2019). Politically, the Chinese Communist Party and the Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRF) engage in contacts and discussions about both internal matters and plans for succession. Ethiopia and China are collaborating to showcase the new development model's implementation. Contrary to the Washington consensus, China's development model emphasizes the formation of a nation under the guidance of visionary and strong political leadership. One could describe this concept as "unconditional aid" with a primary focus on infrastructure development. Furthermore, apart from having favorable political, economic, and demographic attributes, the country also emits a unique atmosphere (Gouriellec, 2018).

Funding significant infrastructure projects (energy and transportation) for which Ethiopia has traditionally reserved traditional partners, China has emerged as one of the country's most important donors (Watchefo, 2018). Since 2007, Ethiopia has been one of four African countries eligible for loans from Chinese state financial institutions, including the Exim Bank, the Chinese Development Bank, and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. As with the Gibe III dam on the Omo River in the southwestern region of the nation, China finances initiatives in which its enterprises do not have a direct stake. Therefore, the Ethiopian growth and transformation plans (Growth and Transformation Plans one and two) support Chinese banks in financing most of the substantial requirements for energy production and transport (hydroelectric dams, high-voltage lines, oil pipelines), transport infrastructure (railways, roads), and real estate (Baah & Jauch,2009).

Chinese companies also undertake these projects, frequently for the same rationales: competitive pricing, favorable financing terms backed by the government, prompt training and execution utilizing a pre-qualified workforce in China, and "integrated" projects that encompass operational support and implementation (Tull, 2006). Exim Bank loan supported the China Railway Engineering Group's 470-million-dollar construction of the Addis Ababa tramway, which was also responsible for managing it during its initial operation. September 2015 saw the construction of the inaugural tramway in sub-Saharan Africa. It serves as a potent symbol of the Chinese people's expertise and the mutually beneficial relationship between Ethiopia and China (Mulugeta et al., 2023).

Ethiopia offers financial assistance and builds the necessary infrastructure for its development, while China ensures investment prospects, aids in the global expansion of public or semi-private companies and invests in infrastructure projects to promote greater trade with Ethiopia (Chakrabarty, 2016). This cooperation is also evident in the Ethiopian manufacturing industrialization strategy, which aims to increase exports and develop the secondary sector, particularly in the textile and leather industries. Since 2010, Chinese foreign direct investment (IDI) in Ethiopia has increased at a relatively sluggish rate. At the time, Chinese investment in ideas was only 52 million dollars, which was significantly less than what India, Saudi Arabia, or the United States had invested. To augment the quantity of concepts imperative for the execution of its Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), Ethiopia subsequently directed its attention towards the establishment of agri-food and industrial parks (Gouriellec, 2018).

During its completion in 2008, the Eastern Industrial Park, located in Dukem, Ethiopia, some 35 km southeast of Addis Abeba, functioned as a Zone Economic Specialised (ZES). A Chinese partnership built and financed the facility, investing a total of $100 million. Since then, the number of industrial parks has grown significantly, drawing an increasing amount of Chinese and foreign investors (Gouriellec, 2018).

Preferred industries are those that provide job possibilities and contribute to exports, with textiles and footwear being particularly important in this context. Within the domains of diplomacy and strategy, the interests of Ethiopia and China intersect to a significant degree, even if the fundamental reasons for this convergence are different. Ethiopian foreign policy directly supports the safeguarding of Chinese interests

(Mulugeta et al., 2023). Therefore, both nations are involved in the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMSS Ethiopia accommodates a significant number of refugees from South Sudan. Chinese investments in South Sudan have mostly focused on the exploitation of hydrocarbons. Moreover, it shows its will to protect and perhaps enhance its assets by engaging in military involvement abroad during times of adversity. From 2006 until 2009, Ethiopia carried out a unilateral operation in Somalia to counter the Union of Islamic Courts and the Al Shabaab organization. Following that, it provided further assistance to the Kenyan intervention between 2012 and 2014 before formally becoming a part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (Amisom) in January 2014 (Gouriellec, 2018).

These interventions are viewed by the Ethiopian regime as both a regional collaborator in the global conflict against terrorism and a chance to establish regional tranquility (Tovar, 2019). Ogaden is located to the east of its region. A segment of the Somali people crosses their common border via the Ogaden clan. An economically and politically stable Somalia would assist the People's Republic of China in safeguarding the maritime route by effectively curbing pirate incidents in the Gulf of Aden. Furthermore, the conclusion of the Ogaden War should pave the way for the resumption of oil drilling efforts, which ceased in 2010.China has been showing support for Ethiopia's Plan for Growth and Transformation (GTP) by actively engaging and offering to provide direct financial help in important sectors like as infrastructure creation, technology transfer, and capacity building. China has supplied Ethiopia with significant financial and technical assistance, particularly in the form of renovated and newly constructed construction initiatives (Gouriellec, 2018).

4.7.1. Ethiopia Exports to China

Ethiopia observed a notable increase in its export figures in 2002, after a period of relative stagnation. Ethiopia exports agricultural products the most (Brautigam & Tang, 2012). Historically, coffee has constituted its primary export commodity; however, its significance has diminished in recent years. Coffee comprised approximately 53% of Ethiopia's total exports in 2000; however, its proportion experienced a decline to 31% by 2012. This decline was not attributable to a

deceleration in coffee exports, which experienced a compound annual growth rate of 11% during this time (Gouriellec, 2018). In contrast, Ethiopia underwent a shift in its trading pattern, placing emphasis on exporting high-value agricultural items such as cut flowers, dried chickpeas, dried legumes, fresh and chilled vegetables, and bovine animals (Brautigan & Tang, 2012).

There are two reasons why sesame seed is particularly fascinating as a commodity (Belayneh,2021). Since 2004, the quantity of sesame exports from Ethiopia has seen a significant surge, now accounting for around 15.1% of the country's overall exports. Similarly, it functions as Ethiopia's main export commodity to China, which is its largest export market. Ethiopia's exports saw notable alterations in terms of their geographical makeup. Between 2000 and 2012, the pace of growth in Ethiopian exports to China was particularly fast, averaging 63% a year. In 2005, Ethiopia's exports to China increased by a factor of six; by 2012, China had emerged as the leading export destination for the country. Its formerly leading export markets—Germany, Japan, Djibouti, and Italy—saw a substantial decline in market share. However, except for Japan, the export growth rate was strong for every country (Chakrabarty, 2016).

Sesame seeds alone are nearly responsible for the remarkable rise in Ethiopia's trade with China over the past ten years (Belayneh, 2021). Prior to 2005, Ethiopia's export of sesame seeds to China was insignificant. In 2005, however, there was a substantial surge in sesame exports to China, with a growth rate of 48 times. Exports of sesame seeds in Ethiopia grew steadily, apart from 2006 and 2007. 2012 marked the pinnacle, with a value of 272.6 million dollars, accounting for 85 percent of Ethiopia's total exports to China (Chakrabarty, 2016). Ethiopia's sesame seed exports have significantly increased, largely due to Chinese advancements. China was the world's largest manufacturing facility of sesame seeds at a time until 2012. However, beginning in 2002, the country's domestic output declined significantly, falling from an unprecedented high of 895.2 million metric tonnes to 623 million tonnes. Following this year 2002, due to a scarcity of sesame seeds inside the country, China saw a significant rise in its imports (Gouriellec, 2018).

Ethiopian sesame seed imports into China increased significantly beginning in 2005, when China began granting zero-tariff entry to agricultural exports from the least

developed countries in Africa (Chakrabarty, 2016). Currently, Ethiopia is the primary exporter of sesame seeds to China, accounting for 51.2% of the country's total imports of this product. Leather is the second-most important export product to China, behind sesame. Throughout history, Italy has always been the primary market for Ethiopian leather. Since 2004, China's importance has grown significantly. From 2004 to 2012, Ethiopian leather exports to China saw a compound annual growth rate of 41%, increasing from US$1.2 million to US$19 million. Leather made up 5.9% of Ethiopia's exports to China in 2012. Despite having limited industrial underpinnings, China's share of Ethiopia's overall leather exports saw significant growth from 0.7% (Gouriellec, 2018).

Ethiopia exhibits considerable promise in the leather industry due to its abundant livestock resources (Asegede et al., 2015). Additionally, the Ethiopian government has been actively encouraging the industrialisation of the leather value chain. The government's 2004 decision to abolish the restriction on foreign investment in tanning establishments resulted in a considerable rise in foreign capital. From 2003 to 2012, the nation awarded investment permits to 55 firms, totalling a combined value of US $109.1 million. India and China made most of these investments. China has the highest number of enterprises among all nations, with a total of 12 fully owned ventures and 2 joint ventures with other countries (Gouriellec, 2018).

Foreign investment directly contributed to the increasing technical complexity of Ethiopia's leather exports (Temesgen, 2022). Between 2004 and 2012, there was a substantial growth in the exports of processed leather made from ewe or lamb, with the value rising from $1.2 million to $60 million. In addition, there was a significant increase in the exports of processed goat or kid leather, which rose from US1.1 million dollars in 2004 to US22.7 million dollars in 2012. Conversely, there was a notable decrease in the export of tanned leather. Foreign investment directly contributed to the increasing technical complexity of Ethiopia's leather exports. Between 2004 and 2012, there was a substantial growth in the exports of processed leather made from ewe or lamb, with the value rising from $1.2 million to $60 million. In addition, there was a significant increase in the exports of processed goat or kid leather, which rose from US1.1 million dollars in 2004 to US22.7 million dollars in 2012. Conversely, there was a notable decrease in the export of tanned leather (Chakrabarty, 2016). The

implementation of an export duty on raw hides in 2008 resulted in a significant surge in the exports of processed sheep and lamb leather. Over a four-year period, the exports of cooked sheep and lamb increased tenfold, rising from US1.9 million in 2008 to a high of US19 million in 2012 (Gouriellec, 2018).,

4.7.2. China's influence on the Ethiopian economy

The narrative of Ethiopia convincingly disproves Zafar's claim that China would have a negative influence on countries, such as Ethiopia, that buy oil and cultivate coffee. Ethiopia consumes less than 1% of the world's total in terms of chocolate and coffee, in contrast to Zafar. Furthermore, when it comes to producing China's main agricultural imports—such as wheat, maize, cattle, and soybeans—the African nations do not have any discernible competitive advantages. Ethiopia is no longer one of the world's leading exporters of coffee. (Chakrabarty, 2016). Coffee remains a substantial contributor to the country's export earnings, but its significance has diminished somewhat in recent years. Due to its effective export diversification, Ethiopia is now exporting many distinctive agricultural commodities (Brautigam & Tang, 2012).

Ethiopia benefited significantly from China's policy of not imposing tariffs. In this context, two main efforts are being made: the establishment of the Ethiopia-China Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centre and the deployment of Chinese teachers for agricultural technical vocational education and training (TVET). Chinese people also need to purchase leather, which is another area in which China excels. Ethiopia also saw advantages in increasing the value of the leather industry. While coffee still plays a substantial role in the country's export earnings, its relevance has considerably diminished in recent years. Due to its effective export diversification, Ethiopia is now exporting a variety of distinctive agricultural commodities (Belayneh, 2021).

The export of colored leather saw a rapid increase after the implementation of internal policy reforms that allowed foreign investment and imposed a substantial tax on the sale of unprocessed raw hides and leather. In recent years, it has also begun providing footwear. It anticipates an increase in the nation's shoe exports in the future with the

establishment of Huajian Shoe. China has the highest amount of foreign direct investment (FDI), as reported by the World Bank (Tadesse, 2014). These investments have facilitated job creation as well as the transfer of technology and expertise. Chinese imports have had a detrimental impact on local shoemakers, particularly smaller businesses, resulting in job losses. However, the research also revealed that the presence of competition from China led to an improvement in the designs of local manufacturers, enabling some of them to withstand the challenges posed by Chinese competitors. In general, China's influence on the leather industry may be considered positive because the advantages outweigh the disadvantages. China's foreign direct investment (FDI) in Ethiopia has seen significant growth, surpassing that of affluent nations (Chakrabarty, 2016).

Chinese FDI, primarily focused on the manufacturing sector, has the potential to accelerate Ethiopia's industrialization through the "Flying Geese" approach, a strategy that has been successful in developing Southeast Asia (Gouriellec, 2018). This plan requires a push from the home country, favorable policy conditions, and local funding to succeed. For Ethiopia to draw Chinese FDI, wages must go down, the government must make it easy for businesses to do business, and the leather and leather production sector must see more technology and skill transfer. But there aren't as many joint projects between Ethiopia and China right now, which shows how important these factors are to Ethiopia's development. People think that Ethiopia's rapid rise in imports from China is beneficial for the country's poor people because it can benefit from cheap Chinese goods. Some wealthy countries, such as Germany and Italy, are losing the most because India's exports are growing so rapidly. The fact that Ethiopia doesn't have many industries besides leather doesn't mean that the flood of Chinese goods will hurt its own industries. Ethiopia's economy also benefits from importing capital items like tools and transportation gear (Temesgen, 2022).

The government's financial flows from China, which is now Ethiopia's biggest foreign contributor, have a big effect on the country's long-term growth. These funds are primarily going to important facilities such as roads, power plants, and phone lines (Tarrosy, 2020). China's investment in infrastructure has helped build roads in Ethiopia and increased the country's ability to make and give energy, both of which are necessary for development to go smoothly. There are still concerns about the unfair

nature of trade between Ethiopia and China, as well as the country's ability to pay its debts. China and Ethiopia's trade imbalance has grown quickly since 2005. This is largely due to Ethiopia's rapid growth in technology exports and sales to China. However. expects Ethiopia to benefit from higher output, improved transportation networks, and increased energy production, all contributing to the country's industrialization (Chakrabarty, 2016).

5. CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION IN ETHIOPIA -DJIBOUTI

5.1. Emergence of Globalization

The twentieth century and recent decades have not seen the emergence of globalization. In fact, it has been present for at least five centuries, as shown by several experts. Some scholars argue that the Spanish conquest of Andalusia marks the beginning of the history of globalization. (Rourke et al., 2007) .In the 1990s, the term "globalisation" grew in popularity, particularly after the fall of the Soviet Union. The United States further fuelled this by insisting that all nations sign the World Trade Agreement, aiming to enable transcontinental corporations to dominate global markets. This underscores the connection between American origins and the contemporary form of globalization. This phenomenon is not new; the primary element of the concept of globalization is the proliferation of connections between nations and individuals. The text discusses the significant events of the discovery of America and Australia, as well as industrial revolution. The text also includes companies with both terrestrial and maritime fleets (Friedman, 2004).

Globalization is not a novel or exceptional phenomenon; rather, it is an extension of the capitalist system. The two superpowers in terms of politics, the armed forces, and the economy were the Soviet Union and the United States. With the fall of the communist countries and the US being the only global leader, one of these hegemonic poles was created. In other words, to protect capital concentration and promote growth rates, economic institutions that arose from national formations at a certain period may be necessary for the progress of capitalism. The capacity of the capitalist system directly influences the duration of these structures (Friedman, 2004). Defining globalization accurately is challenging due to the multitude of definitions stemming from the diverse intellectual perspectives of scholars and philosophers, as well as their varying viewpoints on this phenomenon, whether accepting or rejecting it. By implementing standardized financial regulations, individuals from all over the globe may evaluate and compare social, mental, and political aspects without considering differences in religion, culture, country, and race. Globalization encompasses several elements, including economic, political, social, cultural, and media dimensions.

Experts may define globalization as a method for advancing human civilization in all areas (Turan & Awaleh, 2022).

The term "globalization" is derived from the English word which specifically refers to the creation of an international network within an economic and social system (Al-Rodhan & Stoudmann, 2006). The 1930 paper "Towards New Education" first used the word "globalization" to describe a comprehensive understanding of the human experience in education. The term "globe" serves as the etymological basis for the word "globalization." It is a linguistic translation of the word "global." The ball is the item under consideration. The term "globalization" in English refers to a concerted effort. The initiative aims to unite the entire planet into a single global civilization. Globalization encompasses two main aspects: the lack of progress in the world and the growing understanding of the world as a unified entity. Al-Ahmad and his colleagues (2009) argue that the aim of globalization is to remove obstacles and geographical distances between individuals, nations, and cultures, ultimately fostering a sense of shared culture, market, and community (Ahmed, 2022).

Globalization has become a prominent concept in late twentieth century social awareness, reaching a wide audience worldwide. Globalization may be defined as a collection of economic and political systems and procedures that arise from the evolving character of the products and assets that support the global political economy. This includes the growing structural diversity of these goods and assets (Rourke et al., 2007).

Many techniques exist for defining globalization, but often two fundamental approaches are used. Initially, people viewed globalization to broaden market connections via trade and foreign direct investment (Scholte, 2005). describes globalization as the comprehensive integration of the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities and services across economies worldwide. Regarding this matter, globalization and internationalization are synonymous What is the purpose of having two separate labels to denote the same occurrence? There are two distinct and evident causes. This definition style assumes an initial condition or starting point for the process, anticipating a structural change or a significant increase in internationalization. Moreover, people perceive globalization as a process that strengthens global economic ties, not an increase in the number of states and other

entities involved. Globalization, among other things, is a recently emerging phenomenon and term resulting from a variety of political, economic, and cultural factors (Turan & Awaleh, 2022). These variables had a global impact, aiming to create a sense of global interconnectedness by eliminating boundaries, governments, and civilizations and connecting all nations as if they were part of a little village. Globalization will have a pervasive influence on all facets of everyday life (Ahmed, 2022).

5.2. Globalization and the Ethiopian Economy

Ethiopia's experience demonstrates that tariff and non-tariff liberalization alone is not adequate for developing countries to realize the advantages of globalization, including increased exports, foreign exchange earnings, and focus attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI), which would assist accelerate economic growth and alleviating poverty (Tadesse, 2014).Nations that have benefited from globalization, such as having more exports and foreign direct investment (FDI) coming in, were the ones that opened their markets after building up relatively strong domestic industrial capabilities, often in the face of non-tariff and tariff barriers (Pekarskiene & Susniene, 2015). Globalization countries had equipped themselves with (I) a greater variety of productive capacities to satisfy both domestic and international demand, as well as (II) a comparatively advanced level of technology. (III) These countries have a skilled and trained workforce, which attracts foreign direct investment, particularly from developed firms seeking lower production costs through outsourcing; and (IV) they have well-established institutional and physical infrastructures, such as transportation, system telecommunications, and power. In these countries, globalization contributed to the stimulation of economic growth, the creation of substantial employment and income opportunities, and alleviation of destitution (Michael, 2004).

Several key factors distinguish the Ethiopian economy: a heavy reliance on coffee as a primary commodity export; a weak and frequently affected manufacturing sector (constituting no more than 10 percent of GDP); a limited range of technological advancements; an inadequate institutional and physical infrastructure; and a narrow primary commodity export base. Given the current circumstances, Ethiopia seems inadequately equipped to capitalize on the opportunities that the globalization process

has produced. Integration and globalization are inescapable phenomena (Berhane, 2016). Ethiopia's ability to reap the benefits of globalization by boosting its export trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows primarily hinges on its ability to promote economic growth through a comprehensive development strategy, both domestically conceived and owned, and in line with its national economic and social goals. This is not necessary for globalization and a comprehensive development strategy to be mutually exclusive (Ali, 2020).

Ethiopia must continue to integrate into the global economy by increasing its exports of value-added goods and attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) through economic measures that are consistent with its twin objectives of accelerating development and eradicating poverty, all while pursuing a sound strategy with these two goals in mind (Ali,2020). Ethiopia should implement the government's agriculture-Led Industrialization (ADLI) strategy to accelerate economic and social progress while ensuring sustainable food security, supplying raw materials for industrial advancement, and supplying exportable commodities to augment foreign exchange earnings and import capacity, particularly of capital goods for development. The ADLI strategy appears to be the right one in principle. Despite the strategy's appearance of excellence on paper, its execution has been comparatively less successful since its inception over a decade ago (Michael, 2004).

The rate of agricultural expansion remains suboptimal, with significant fluctuations occurring each year due to weather fluctuations. Ethiopia exhibits comparatively low cereal productivity per capita (Meaza, 2018). Estimates place the value added per capita from commodities at a mere US139, significantly lower than the sub-Saharan African average of US370. The current estimation of the domestic food supply per person stands at 175 kg, and it has been decreasing steadily. A structural food deficit plagues the country, leaving four to five million individuals chronically food insecure and requiring annual government food assistance. Droughts led to a rise in the population impoverished by food; in 2002–2003, an estimated 12 million individuals needed assistance due to food insecurity (Michael, 2004).

Poverty continues to be common but is declining. If Ethiopia is to play an important role in providing a strong base for expanding manufacturing industries and rapid economic transformation within the ADLI framework, it must effectively address the

obstacles impeding agricultural growth and contributing to poverty. Ethiopia can only fully capitalize on the potential advantages of globalization by implementing a swift agricultural revolution that results in economic restructuring and an expansion of its export portfolio. Ethiopia's reliance on a single commodity and the declining trend of global primary commodity prices have so far prevented it from increasing its exports and foreign exchange earnings. However, the AGOA, EU/ACP, EBA, and the global trend toward reducing trade barriers appear to have given Ethiopia a wide range of opportunities to do so (Michael, 2004).

The COMESA agreement's duty-free provision offers Ethiopia a promising opportunity to expand its exports to neighboring markets, especially for manufactured goods like leather, where it enjoys a comparative cost advantage (Guangul, 2020). To benefit from globalization, Ethiopia needs duty-free access to key markets and increased production of key agricultural and manufactured products that are strategic in terms of generating employment, income, and economic growth. The nation's extensive livestock resources are a significant avenue for entering the international market. The diversification of livestock products, including meat, milk, butter, and cheese, has the potential to generate substantial foreign exchange inflows while simultaneously enhancing the nation's food security and nutrition. Enhanced storage and transportation infrastructure, in addition to improved health and sanitation standards, are necessary to support the production of these items (Gouriellec, 2018).

Exports of leather-manufactured goods also have a substantial amount of potential, but substantial private sector investment is necessary to expand production and improve quality standards for these exports to be competitive on international markets. Ethiopia also has considerable export potential in the textile industry (Abebe & Schaefer, 2013). This will necessitate an increase in domestic cotton production. Additional commodities that hold significance in facilitating Ethiopia's access to the advantages of globalization comprise fresh and processed fruits and vegetables, poultry and eggs, vegetable and maize oil manufacturing, sugar and honey, and honey and sugar. Furthermore, if it is possible to mitigate the country's overreliance on rain-fed agriculture and effectively address its vulnerability to droughts through the implementation of water management practices, particularly in drought-prone regions, it could potentially become a surplus cereal producer (Gouriellec, 2018).

Ethiopia, a country with massive poverty, has the potential to produce and export minerals, including gold, platinum, phosphate, petroleum, metallic, and chemical minerals. To effectively contribute to globalization and poverty reduction, Ethiopia must increase agricultural, industrial, and mineral product production and exports (Gouriellec, 2018).

It will primarily judge the success of this project by increasing small farmer production and promoting both domestic and foreign private investment, particularly in productive regions. The role of the state and the private sector in the economy is critical in countries like Ethiopia, where poverty is widespread. The IMF and World Bank's neoliberal policy changes have reduced governments' roles to facilitators and regulators, emphasizing the private sector. This has led to the dissolution of essential services for small farmers, such as agricultural research, irrigation, and health services. Effective poverty management requires state support for small farmers and the rural and urban poor. In sectors that lend themselves to private initiative and in countries that have effectively addressed poverty, it is necessary to reduce the state's role as a facilitator and regulator (Michael, 2004).

5.2.1. Ethiopia Globalization and Changes in Policies

One of the few nations in Africa to have been free of colonial rule for the most of its history is Ethiopia. Apart from a short Italian invasion during World War II, the nation continued to operate as an independent monarchy during the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie (Haber, 1992). Three distinct policy regimes can categorize Ethiopia's recent economic history. During the imperial era, the period preceding 1974 was roughly described as a laissez-faire and hands-off regime. A military junta supplanted the monarchy from 1975 to 1991, governing an economically restrictive and repressive regime. During this period, import substitution, controls, and restrictions were prevalent (Ramakrishna, Krishnan, & Sukar, 2003).

In 1991, a combination of rebel groups toppled the military regime, creation of the third regime. 1994 saw the adoption of a new constitution, and 1995 marked the first multiparty election in the country. Since then, the nation has been a stable democracy.

Since 1991, the nation has implemented several economic reforms, characterized by an emphasis on globalization and liberalization. In general, the first policy decisions made under imperial authority adopted a non-interventionist stance toward the economy and supported the prevalent feudal system. Agriculture served as the primary industry, supporting the livelihoods of just 90 percent of the population (Ramakrishna et al., 2003).

The prevalence of absentee "landlordism" had a negative impact on agricultural output. Despite attempts to industrialize the economy, the manufacturing sector remained a relatively minor component, confined to a few urban enclaves. While the imperial government actively promoted foreign investment, it refrained from implementing a deliberate policy aimed at fostering domestic entrepreneurship. Protectionism distinguished the trade regime, serving to generate government revenue, maintain a sustainable balance of payments, and offer some protection to a limited number of domestic producers (Ramakrishna et al., 2003).

The economy, foreign exchange revenues were dependent on coffee exports. Imports included capital goods, basic materials, and consumer products. Despite the second period, the military junta transformed the economy from a comparatively progressive socialist system towards an inflexible and inward-oriented one. To develop the country's industry, the military administration devised a policy in which the state would not only take the lead but also have the majority ownership of the large and medium-sized manufacturing sector (Temesgen, 2022).

The military administration limited the scope of private ownership to narrow-scale industries. The public sector's substantial growth and increased importance in economic activity effectively marginalized the private sector. The imposition of prohibitive tariffs and quota restrictions on imports extended privatization and substantial protection to domestic industries (Keatinge, 2022).

The implementation of these policies precipitated a reduction in industrial productivity and efficiency. State farm expansion and rapid and extensive collectivization had comparable negative effects on the agricultural sector. The new administration, which took office in 1991, implemented a series of changes to address both the urgent need for macroeconomic recovery and the long-term structural challenges of underdevelopment (Ramakrishna et al., 2003).

The changes included market-oriented policies directed at removing price and cost distortions, encouraging the private sector, promoting exports, and opening the economy gradually while reducing the government sector's role and size (Keatinge, 2022). In brief, the reforms aimed to achieve the following: equitable and comprehensive economic expansion, reduced inflation, and a swift surge in agricultural output facilitated by productivity upgrades. The International Monetary Fund, or IMF, and the World Bank (IMFWB) provided financial support and encouragement for reform programs. The authorities had taken several measures to liberalize the economy. The liberalization measures included market-oriented exchange rate policies and a substantial reduction in tariffs (Ramakrishna et al., 2003).

5.2.2. Impact of Cultural Globalization in Ethiopia

The implications of biotechnology for the exploitation of indigenous communities have sparked a heated debate among concerned groups and social scientists. Biopiracy, defined as the acquisition of resources that have historically nourished indigenous communities and maintained monopolistic control over genetic resources through patents, has caused considerable concern (Ostergard et al., 2001). According to global legislation from 2007, it has become easier to privatize and commercialize these resources. Despite the intention to establish equitable partnerships with indigenous communities through the integration of traditional ecological knowledge (SEK) and economic knowledge (TEK) tests, research continues to exclude indigenous people as unequal collaborators and participants. Furthermore, some have expressed concern about the peril that cultural globalization poses to TEK.In today's society, when individuals link economic values with western values and judge local access in comparison to the western way of life, indigenous people have expressed concern about the erosion of traditional ideals and the loss of identity and culture.

Technological innovation has played a significant role in fostering a global culture, particularly through the introduction of disruptive technologies such as the Internet, fax machines, and satellite and cable television (Haile et al., 2013). It is essential to understand the profound nature of the emerging infosphere, its democratic potential as a universal connector and communicator, and the knowledge disseminated through

these technologies. Frechette describes these technologies as the cornerstone of progress and an emerging global asset (Kebede, 2019). The increasing popularity of international brands like McDonald's and Coca-Cola challenges local and regional products, eroding traditional cultures. According to Goldin and Reinert, these symbols of American and Western economic and cultural dominance have become targets for anti-globalization movements. Modern societies, driven by consumer culture, emphasize marketing and consumption of goods and services (Haile et al., 2017).

This consumer-driven culture promotes the notion that embracing market-based economies and technological advancements is an alluring goal. The widespread adoption of these market economies and technological innovations is seen as a "tempting forbidden fruit" capable of fundamentally altering human existence. Haile et al. (2013) suggest that adopting global cultural values could lead to the gradual assimilation of and dependency on the dominant society's institutional frameworks. On the other hand, some perspectives question the positive societal impact of globalization, particularly concerning cultural homogenization. While some argue that a more homogeneous world signifies civilization's progress, others contend that globalization may erode individuality and unique cultural identities (Kebede, 2019).

The reduction of cultural barriers, improved communication systems, and integration may help create a more stable and prosperous society. However, critics like Groenfeldt (2003) view globalization as a threat to indigenous values, arguing that it endangers cultural diversity and infringes on human rights. This critique rests on three points: first, the human rights argument advocates for the protection of individuals' rights to preserve their values; second, the cultural diversity argument suggests that a variety of values enriches human experiences; and third, indigenous values contain wisdom that modern civilization has overlooked or forgotten. Sen emphasizes that, in a globalized world, equity in both cultural and economic opportunities is crucial. Meanwhile, anti-globalization movements have sought alternatives to globalization (Kebede, 2019).

Key concerns include growing inequality between rich and poor, rejection of mainstream consumerism, and the degradation of both land and culture due to mechanized agriculture. Cultural globalization, which often replaces traditional culture with commercial values, disproportionately affects youth while traditional cultures seem to vanish with older generations. This shift increases environmental

pressures, leading to overconsumption and pollution as market-created lifestyles demand more resources (Haile et al., 2017).

Traditional societies, often referred to as non-industrial societies, maintain cultures grounded in spiritual beliefs and traditional values. According to Groenfeldt (2003), these values serve as the framework through which participants express their thoughts and emotions (Githiria & Onifade, 2020). Globalization impacts traditional cultures just as much as it shapes global cultural values. Ethiopia, for instance, has ratified numerous environmental treaties related to climate change, biodiversity, and desertification, all of which are significant from the perspective of traditional knowledge systems. Despite this, Ethiopia's current macro policies, such as the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP) developed in 2005, have made limited progress in addressing these issues, particularly concerning the loss of essential crop knowledge (Haile et al., 2017).

Ethiopia follows a free-market economy as part of its development strategy, with a focus on agricultural development-led industrialization (ADLI), a policy framework in place since 1991 (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2006). Additionally, Ethiopia has implemented poverty reduction strategies based on macro and sectoral development (Kebede, 2019). As an agrarian society, Ethiopia’s economic growth is driven by rural development and agriculture (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2002, FDRE). The emphasis on market-driven agricultural development aims to enhance Ethiopia's integration into the global economy, especially in terms of global market participation (Eshetu & Abraham, 2016). Ethiopia’s traditional farming system and rural communities provide a valuable lens through which to assess the potential of traditional economic knowledge (TEK) and its role in biodiversity management and food security. In a globalized world, examining the impacts of insufficient TEK on development efforts and policymaking is crucial for ensuring sustainable growth (Girmay et al., 2023).

5.3. Globalization and education of Djibouti

Globalization is a process that has had a wide-ranging impact on human existence, including education. As a result of western institutions admission, several developing countries experienced an increase in educational facilities accessible throughout the twentieth century because of the admission of western institutions. Some contend this strategy offers a fantastic opportunity for people in underdeveloped countries to enhance their abilities and education levels. Others think that it is merely a new sort of cultural imperialism that will lead to a worldwide, and eventually western, civilization. One aspect of educational globalization has been the formation of twinning partnerships between one western and one non-western university. Because of globalization, education has become more globalized (Addow, 2023).

The goal of transferring people from western countries to developing countries is to increase their skills and capacities. Under the influence of globalization, education is continually shifting (Mursal et al., 2016). The anticipated impacts of globalization on education include shifts in knowledge, values, and concepts within educational systems worldwide, a transformation of the roles and responsibilities of both students and instructors, and a societal transition from industrialization to an information-based paradigm. Its ushers in a new era of cultural imperialism and symbolizes its cultural impact. It facilitates rapid technological and communication progress, anticipating shifts in educational systems globally in terms of knowledge, values, and concepts (Cheng, 2003).

Globalization has influenced Djibouti in areas such as education, investment, and commerce because of the country's prior engagements with foreign cultures. As an illustration, students from Djibouti would travel to France-Paris for their academic pursuits, and to Egypt to attend Al-Azhar University well before and after the country's independence in 1977 (Hassan, 2012). The impact of globalization on Djibouti's academic policies is significant. As globalization intensifies, Djibouti must adapt to maintain its competitiveness and relevance. Cultivating a labor force capable of contending in the international marketplace has emerged as a principal consequence of globalization influencing educational policy in Djibouti (Addow, 2023).

A rise in level in the demand for skilled workers across varied industries has generated a strengthened concentration on science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education. as well as the establishment of apprenticeship initiatives. Globalization has had a remarkable impact on the educational policy of Djibouti (Gonzalez & Kuenzi, 2012). This has improved access to education above all else, particularly in remote and neglected regions. The basic education policy mandates the provision of basic education, with each objective aiming to impart life skills. Proficiency in various domains of vocational education serves as a foundation necessary for advancement to secondary and tertiary education, as well as to fortify pre-existing competencies. Aligning the school's lessons with international best practices and standards is another priority, which serves to equip students for a globally interconnected environment (Wende, 2003).

Technological advancements, including learning platforms and digital resources, have eliminated geographic limitations, and made distance education feasible (Juanes & Ruisoto, 2013). Global benchmarks influence the standard of education, prompting the establishment of standards and procedures for quality assurance. Globalization has directed foreign investment and funding towards Djibouti's education system, resulting in enhanced educational accessibility and increased school enrollment. however, this has also resulted in a lack of control over the education system and an increased reliance on external funding (Addow, 2023).

The adoption of western concepts and cultural transformations resulting from globalization have given rise to apprehensions concerning the safeguarding of traditional Djiboutian values and knowledge. Examples of educational models while globalization has led to some positive developments in Djibouti's educational policies, there are still unresolved concerns that need attention to ensure the nation's educational system adds towards satisfying needs. of its populace and remains relevant to the international economic community (Daramola & Oyinade, 2015).

5.4. Participation of Djibouti in Globalization Powers

The issues of the 21st century have become global, with multipolar trends asserting themselves and reinforcing the issues surrounding global barriers such as canals and straits. How does this trend manifest specifically for Djibouti and its port? The question arises: what does Djibouti represent for the globalization powers? In other words, what are Djibouti's interests in terms of globalization powers? Apart from the capital, Djibouti, the rest of the territory has no economic interest. The capital is the country's primary demographic (2/3 of its inhabitants) and economic, commercial, and political center. Globalization, which began with colonial expansion at the end of the 19th century and continues to influence it today, is responsible for this (Guirreh, 2017).

Following a challenging period in economic terms (such as the transfer of Ethiopian transit to Assab and the civil war), two geopolitical events significantly transformed the country's economic situation: the Eritrean-Ethiopia conflict (1998–2000), which resulted in the return of transit to Djibouti, and the takeover of the port by the Dubai operator, DPW, in 2000. Despite its small size and population, Djibouti's strategic location significantly influences the global geopolitical scene (Mulugeta, 2011).

Djibouti, positioned at the junction of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, influence navigation to the Bab-Al-Mandeb strait, which acts as a vital chokepoint for marine traffic from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea through the Red Sea. (Wan et al., 2020). In the context of globalization powers, which involve major global players vying for influence and control over key strategic regions and resources, Djibouti has become a focal point for several reasons. Military Presence Djibouti is my hometown to military bases from several world powers, particularly the United States, China, France, and Japan. These installations provide a number of strategic functions, including combating terrorism, safety at sea, and global force projection. Djibouti has made significant investments in port facilities, making it is major gateway for trade between Africa, Asia, and Europe (Sun & Zoubir, 2016).

Djibouti's ports serve as significant entry and departure points for products passing through the Suez Canal, making it an essential player in global commerce networks. Regional Stability Djibouti’s stability and strategic position make it a desirable partner for global powers wanting to continue peace in the Horn of Africa area (Sun & Zoubir,

2016). Global powers request its participation for a variety of purposes, including counterterrorism and peacekeeping missions. Economic partnerships. Djibouti has engaged. Djibouti has diplomatic connections with an extensive range of countries, enabling it to manage complicated geopolitical processes and capitalize on its strategic position. Overall, Djibouti's strategic position sets it apart in the grand game of globalized powers, drawing the attention of major global powers seeking to secure their interests in commerce, security, and geopolitical influence in the region and beyond (Guirreh, 2017).

5.4.1. Djibouti Facing Challenges through Major Powers

Considering the magnitude of the issues at hand, the great powers are no longer content to allow France, which has historically assured stability, to be the solitary supervisor at this point. The stated objective remains the security of transportation routes that are always threatened by piracy, as well as the overall instability of the region. As a result, the focal point of the storm, Djibouti, is of interest to the major powers. However, increased competition from the major powers lurks beneath these patriotic goals of peacekeeping and navigational security (Guirreh, 2017).

The USA was the first major power higher than the French presence, which had been declining methodically for the previous three decades. The current emergence of the Chinese military in the region has sparked discussions, disputes, and apprehension in the west, notably among the Japanese and US managements However, this potent interest confers Djibouti with a geopolitical significance that is disproportionate to the actual scale of the nation (Chaziza, 2018). Japanese self-defense troops, Chinese sailors, and various Western forces, including American and Italian, have visited Djibouti since its evolution from a French garrison to an international stronghold at the turn of the century. Djibouti also serves as a logistical hub for several other international navies, including those of Iran, Turkey, India, and Russia. When focusing on the country's closeness to the Bab-Al-Mandeb Strait which best transit shipping, through which over 30 percent of the world's oil passes, Djibouti permits international forces to conduct official surveillance of terrorist organizations that may impede cargo traffic on this vital maritime trade route (Sun & Zoubir, 2016).

Located at the center of a military theater, the port of Djibouti serves as a geostrategic element on the international stage (Aden & Mccabe, 2021). Djibouti is not a zone of confrontation (except for diplomatic matters); rather, it serves as a garrison from which the armed forces launch aggressive operations against neighboring countries. Due to Djibouti's geographical location, international forces can swiftly intervene in various conflict zones in Africa (South Sudan, Somalia) and the Middle East (Yemen) to safeguard their interests. However, the interest of globalized powers extends beyond geopolitical orders, as the country has become a draw for international capital since 2000 (Guirreh, 2017).

5.4.2. Djibouti Economic Centre of Globalization

Djibouti, despite its small size and population, is a significant economic hub for globalization due to its strategic location. Djibouti, located in the Horn of Africa, has a critical geopolitical position as the point of crossing into the Red Sea and the access point to the Suez Canal, one of the world's most popular maritime channels. Many key factors stemming from its strategic position contribute to Djibouti's prominence in global commerce and the economy (Styan, 2016). Trade and Logistics Hub Djibouti serves as an important commerce and logistical center, connecting Africa, Asia, and Europe. Its ports, particularly the recently completed Doraleh Multipurpose Port (DMP), are critical for international trade because they handle products bound for landlocked nations in the region, such as Ethiopia (Chaziza, 2018).

Djibouti maintains military bases for several about foreign countries, these military sites demonstrate Djibouti's strategic relevance for global security, while also contributing to the country's economic stability through rent and other services offered to these armed troops. In recent years, Djibouti has made significant investments in infrastructure development, notably in ports, railroads, and free trade zones. These initiatives seek to strengthen Djibouti's position as a transshipment center (Sun & Zoubir, 2016).

Regional cohesion efforts. Djibouti actively engages in regional integration projects such as the Free Trade Area of the African Continental (FTAAC) and the

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which seek to foster economic cooperation and integration among African nations. Strategic Partnerships Djibouti has developed strategic ties with a number of nations and organisations worldwide to capitalise on its geopolitical location for economic growth. By way of example, the Belt and Road Program of China has resulted in major Chinese investment in Djibouti infrastructure projects, boosting the country's connectivity and economic potential (Styan, 2020).

Diversification efforts Recognizing the risks associated with dependence on a few sectors, Djibouti has been working to diversify its economy beyond transportation and logistics. Efforts include promoting tourism, developing renewable energy, and about more conducive environment for foreign finanicial across various sectors. Emerging countries, starting with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and China, are supplanting traditional players, trapped by the perception that Djibouti was, at most, an economically uninteresting military point. In 1999, Djibouti was in Paris to showcase its future port; it left with a pack of business cards and remained there (Guirreh , 2017). Overall, Djibouti's role as an economic center of globalization stems from its strategic location, investments in infrastructure, and proactive engagement in regional and international initiatives. However, political stability, governance issues, and competition from neighboring ports remain significant factors that could affect its future trajectory as a global economic hub (Breuer, 2017).

Djibouti has entered globalization through Dubai, looking for an international player to revive a small port processing barely one million metric tons of goods per year. While the French players declined a request for cooperation, Dubai was the only one interested. These Emiratis wanted to extend their influence in East Africa as well, thanks to their armed wing. The port of Djibouti, although undersized when it arrived, offered the best potential. It has an advantage over Emirati capital because Dubai has invested no less than a billion dollars (US) in Djibouti's basic structure, which has elevated the country to the rank of regional logistics hub. Even though the situation between Djibouti and Dubai, particularly the port, became more complex a few years later, Djibouti's expertise and reputation in its development strategy played a significant role. This cooperation has enabled other foreign partners, notably the Chinese, to take an interest in the Djiboutian port area (Guirreh, 2017).

Economic globalization between Djibouti and Dubai involves a range of interconnected economic activities, including trade, investment, finance, and labor movements. Following this, they decided to prevent Dubai from using Djibouti's ports, particularly the port of Doraleh, to protect their interests. The Chinese, in their vast New Silk Road (NSR) program, chose Djibouti as an entry point to Northeast Africa. Djibouti and China continue to building on port infrastructure and linkages to Ethiopia's interior trains, roads, and water pipelines (Styan, 2020).

Increasingly massive Beijing presence on Djibouti soil is awakening western concerns. Beijing's construction of the multipurpose port, the establishment of the Silk Road Bank, and the facilitation of exchanges between the two parties ensure that Djibouti remains free from competition on this African facade. Estimates suggest that since 2000, the Republic of Djibouti has benefited five to seven times its gross domestic product (GDP), amounting to a billion dollars. Djibouti, therefore, represents a logistics centre of military interest, as well as a financial center integrated into globalized flows. The competition market of the opening of global economies in fact propels the country forward (Guirreh, 2017).

Given the undeniable link between Djibouti's destiny and globalization, the country must about inevitably face the impact of the triumph of the neoliberal model, the ideological foundation of globalization. International politics, depending on geography, defines its profile or scope through successive historical contexts, which are always changing because of evolution (Styan, 2016).

5.5. Effect of Globalization on Djibouti and Ethiopia Relations

Globalization has greatly influenced the proximity and economic connection between Djibouti and Ethiopia. Globalization has had numerous impacts on their interactions. Trade and economic integration are the process of combining different economies and encouraging the exchange of goods, services, and investments between them. Globalization has bolstered economic ties between Djibouti and Ethiopia, resulting in a significant rise in connecting investment activities these two countries. Djibouti's advantageous position as a seaport for landlocked Ethiopia has fostered economic

integration, since Ethiopia heavily depends on Djibouti's ports for sea market imports and also exports (Ibrahim, 2013).

Infrastructure development globalization has accelerated infrastructure development projects in Djibouti and Ethiopia, particularly in transportation and logistics. This involves building railroads, roads, and ports to improve connections and ease the transit of goods business amoug countries (Tovar, 2019). Joint infrastructure projects helped strengthen the region, fostered stronger economic connections, and encouraged increased collaboration. Regional integration refers to the process of countries within a certain geographic region coming together to form closer economic, political, and social ties. Djibouti and Ethiopia are both participants in regional trade and pease organizations, such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Globalization has facilitated increased regional integration among these states, leading to efforts to stimulate regional trade, investment, and cooperation (Gondwe, 2021).

The increased proximity between Djibouti and Ethiopia has enhanced their connections, creating opportunities for cooperation on many economic and socioeconomic concerns. Globalization has impacted security cooperation between Djibouti and Ethiopia, namely around addressing transnational threats including terrorism, piracy, and organized crime. Both nations have cooperated on security efforts with the goal of safeguarding their borders, defending vital infrastructure, and ensuring stability in the area. The shared security concerns have developed a sense of mutual trust and collaboration between Djibouti and Ethiopia (Gutu & Ababa, 2014).

Cultural exchange Globalization has created greater cultural contact between Djibouti and Ethiopia, resulting in improved engagement and understanding between the two populations (Arabahmadi, 2018). This involves the exchange of ideas, traditions, and cultural conventions, as well as the encouragement of tourism and cultural activities. The mutual cultural experiences have strengthened the bonds between Djibouti and Ethiopia, cultivating a sense of identity. In general, globalization has had a profound impact on the connections between Djibouti and Ethiopia, influencing their economic, political, and cultural relationships in substantial ways. Globalization has facilitated collaboration and mutual advantage, as well as posed difficulties that require careful handling and coordination between the two nations (Gutu & Ababa, 2014).

6. CONCLUSION

This study aims to examine the relationship between Djibouti and Ethiopia in the meaning context of globalization. It is important to clarify that this research does not focus solely on Djibouti-Ethiopia relations, nor does it evaluate the potential of these relations as a model for economic, political, and social integration in the Horn of Africa. Instead, the primary objective is to assess the current state and scope of diplomatic relations between Djibouti and Ethiopia, while exploring the potential implications of these relations for regional integration strategies. Ethiopia and Djibouti have maintained strong economic, social, and political ties for many years, with their diplomatic relations evolving under various governments. Periodically, these ties have strengthened due to the significant mutual interests shared by both nations.

The first formal agreement between the two countries was the 1897 treaty signed by Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia and the French colonial authorities in Djibouti. During this period, the two nations made significant progress in their relations, laying the groundwork for enduring connections. The construction of the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway in 1917 significantly enhanced economic interdependence, with the railway and the Port of Djibouti becoming vital links between the two nations.

In recent years, especially after the 1998–2000 conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the scope of their cooperation has expanded. After the conflict, Ethiopia rerouted most of its imports and exports through the Port of Djibouti, contributing greatly to Djibouti's economic activity. Numerous initiatives have further strengthened their ties, including infrastructure projects like roads and railways, along with increased trade and investment. Djibouti is one of Ethiopia’s key export markets, while Djibouti depends on Ethiopia for many essential goods, such as vegetables, poultry, livestock, khat, and pipeline water. Djibouti was also the first country to receive power from Ethiopia. This mutual dependence highlights the strong connection between the two nations. In the Horn of Africa, a region often associated with conflict and instability, Djibouti and Ethiopia have established a unique and amicable relationship.

The two nations' developing economic relations, which are founded on similar economic interests, have the potential to bring about considerable change. To

accomplish monetary integration in the area and build a model of regional connectivity linking Djibouti and Ethiopia, the two countries are developing a long-term strategic vision known as the "Strategies The combination Plan." By extending their current alliance, the two countries want to achieve greater economic union and stronger regional economic links. Thus, strong diplomatic relations result in positive outcomes. Both nations' initiation of railway construction has the potential to create a more expansive railway network. South Sudan has already agreed to link to the railway, oil pipeline, and telecommunications infrastructure. Additionally, there are plans to develop the Mekele-Tadjourah line beyond Sudan. Other states in the area may gain valuable insights from this country's connections. Since it is nearby and similar, this training is usually better. Currently, Ethiopia and Djibouti only work together on a bilateral basis, without using existing regional integration groups such as IGAD. As a result, governments' funding, and methods, driven by their practical interests, contribute to the promotion of infrastructure and other linkages.

After the Eritrean War of 1998–2000, Ethiopia became heavily dependent on the ports of the strategically located, small nation of Djibouti for its import-export activities, as maritime access through Assab was closed. The redirection of global trade to Djibouti significantly strengthened the political and commercial ties between the two countries, eventually leading to expanded partnerships in other sectors. However, the absence of an institutional framework within IGAD or another regional body does not diminish the importance of the bilateral cooperation between Ethiopia and Djibouti in fostering integration within the Horn of Africa. This suggests that the activities or programs in question are not governed by IGAD or other mandated Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in terms of planning, monitoring, funding, or implementation. Instead, Ethiopia and Djibouti manage their current multidimensional relationships largely through independent initiatives. While these efforts align with broader regional integration frameworks, their timelines and scope may not always fully correspond to those of formal regional institutions. Concerns pertaining to energy interconnections, transportation, and communication infrastructures are among the foremost priorities outlined in the IGAD Standard Integration Plan. As a result, relations between Ethiopia and Djibouti may serve as a crucial foundation with favorable ramifications for the development of broader integration and cooperation. It possesses considerable appeal to neighboring states. Due to the challenges and interests posed by globalizing forces.

By virtue of the convergence of Djiboutian and international interests, the nation has not only reaffirmed its position as a preeminent maritime hub but also as Ethiopia's primary entryway to complete economic transformation. Ethiopia, which was once the focus of European powers' ambitions, has since become an object of desire for emergent powers, particularly China, seeking to expand their industrial production into new markets.

This Chinese interest in Ethiopia and the continent elevates Djibouti (particularly its transport infrastructure) to the center of new issues between China and Africa. "Being situated at the crossroads of East Africa and the principal maritime axis connecting Europe and Asia, this nation is emphasized as a global hub." With respect to the global landscape of developing countries, Djibouti's military presence is unmistakable, so "Western powers are certainly not oblivious to its geostrategic value," even if it is not actively engaged in current investments and development. Presently, the former colonial power's (France) powers are engaged in competition with those of the Americans, the Japanese, the Italians, and the Chinese. While acknowledging that the geopolitical and geographical environment significantly influenced the development of the port of Djibouti in comparison to pre-existing ports in the region, this does not provide a comprehensive explanation for all aspects.

China has succeeded in formulating a strategic direction based on the application of soft power. In doing so, China has been able to establish its presence on the African continent, especially in Djibouti and Ethiopia, while also exporting an image of its people that embodies their commitment to morals, values, and principles of humanity and mutual respect. And act in the world according to these principles. On the principles of non-interference and consideration of the private affairs of others. China has effectively dealt with the challenges posed by Africa's pluralistic and diverse cultural identity, thus emphasizing its distinction from Western powers. Among its slogans are “Friendship and Partnership” and “Close Cooperation on the Principle of “Exchange of Interests” its basis is the exploitation of African countries.

Promote economic integration through collaborative partnerships and trade agreements. Both nations can investigate opportunities for collaborative ventures, investments, and the establishment of special economic zones to foster economic expansion and employment generation. Education and Cultural Exchange: To strengthen people-to-people ties, promote educational and cultural exchange programs. This can include student exchange programs, cultural events, and language training initiatives, fostering a better understanding of each other's cultures and values. Environmental Cooperation: Confront common environmental obstacles limited to climate change and water scarcity. Encourage active engagement in regional integration initiatives, including but not limited to the Free Trade Area African Continental (FTAAC). This can facilitate access to untapped markets, stimulate economic expansion, and bolster the combined clout of both nations on the international platform. It is imperative to acknowledge the ever-changing nature of the geopolitical environment and global affairs; therefore, continuous evaluation and adjustment of approaches are critical for the continued prosperity of diplomatic ties between Ethiopia and Djibouti. As mentioned before, bilateral and multilateral donors and loan providers provide the majority of the funding for joint construction projects between Djibouti and Ethiopia. The African Development Bank provided financial support for the majority (80%) of the initial electrical interconnection between Ethiopia and Djibouti. On the other hand, Arab funds supported the Djibouti port expansion project. Due to the unreliability of foreign sources in the majority of situations, it is challenging to execute initiatives as intended. Hence, it is imperative for both nations to attempt to raise capital from domestic resources. Indeed, Ethiopia's present endeavor to secure financial support for the grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is promising in this context. This practice must be extended to other sub regional sectors and initiatives. Avoid joining multiple times. A significant obstacle to regional integration promotion in Africa and the Horn of Africa specifically is the overlap in membership of RECs, which further complicates integration initiatives. For example, three AU-recognized RECs (IGAD and EAC) are in the Horn.

This phenomenon is impeding integration in various ways; for example, it undermines the capacity of countries to pool resources, generates potentially contradictory political obligations, and allows states to absolve themselves of accountability for addressing challenges by attributing blame to one or more organizations. Choosing which

member states to commit to the REC's responsibilities is the challenge. As a continentally responsible organization, the AU must therefore develop mechanisms to circumvent the membership overlap issue. It may be challenging to limit the number of memberships obligated to states, but we can achieve this by reorganizing the structure and mandate of current RECs on the continent. This may necessitate undertaking significant commitments and making radical decisions. Additionally, each state must reevaluate how it helps advance regional integration.

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