EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL FROM A NEO-GRAMSCIAN PERSPECTIVE: A CASE OF GREEN *TRASFORMISMO*

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ABSTRACT

EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL
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A CASE OF GREEN *TRASFORMISMO*

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"*This is Europe's 'man on the moon' moment*" is what Von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission, said to highlight the historic significance of the European Green Deal (EGD) for the European unification project in 2019, right before the COVID-19, two years after President Trump pulled the US from the Paris Agreement. In the apparent absence of the US in the formation and application of international climate policies against the global climate crisis, the EU has come forward for the role of climate leadership. This thesis problematizes why the EU has emerged as the leader while there are other international actors like US and China who have displayed a similar the ambition to green their production and consumption modes. It utilizes, develops, and expands from the Neo-Gramscian arguments on **the green *trasformismo* of capitalism** to understand how and why the EGD has become the policy priority of the European Union from the perspective of European integration process. It makes a qualitative content analysis of the documents of major EU institutions (European Commission, European Council, the Council of the European

Union and the European Parliament), the European Round Table for Industry, the European Trade Union Confederation, Green10 and Eurobarometers. By qualitatively analyzing 968 such documents, it argues that via the EGD, the EU has been pursuing **green *trasformismo* strategies** to curb the radical potentials of the environmentalist social forces on the one hand, and to gain a hegemonic position over the newly **greened** global capitalist system, on the other.

Keywords: The European Green Deal, Neo-Gramscian Approach, Green Capitalism, International Political Economy, European Integration.

ÖZ

NEO-GRAMŞİYEN BIR BAKIŞ AÇISIYLA
AVRUPA YEŞİL MUTABAKATI:
YEŞİL *TRASFORMİZM* ÖRNEĞİ

DURMAZ, Günseli
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Mart 2024, 471 sayfa

"Bu Avrupa'nın 'aydaki adam' anıdır", 2019'da Avrupa Yeşil Mutabakatının (EGD) Avrupa birleşme projesi için tarihi önemini vurgulamak için Avrupa Komisyonu Başkanı Von der Leyen'in kullandığı sözlerdi. Tarihsel olarak, EGD'nin kabulü, Başkan Trump'ın ABD'yi Paris Anlaşması'ndan çekmesinden iki yıl sonraya ve COVID-19'un dünyayı vurmasından hemen önceye denk gelmektedir. Küresel iklim krizine karşı yeni uluslararası iklim politikalarının oluşturulması ve uygulanmasında ABD'nin yokluğunda, Avrupa Birliği dünya iklim liderliği rolü için öne çıkmıştır. Bu tez, ABD ve Çin gibi üretim ve tüketim biçimlerini **yeşillendirmek** için benzer bir hırsı benimseyen başka uluslararası aktörler varken, AB'nin neden bu yeşil geçiş sürecinin lideri olarak ortaya çıktığını sorunsallaştırmaktadır. Bu tez, Avrupa entegrasyon süreci perspektifinden EGD'nin nasıl ve neden Avrupa Birliği'nin politika önceliği haline geldiğini anlayabilmek için **kapitalizmin yeşil *dönüşümü*** üzerine geliştirilmiş Neo-Gramşiyan argümanları kullanmakta, onları geliştirmekte ve genişletmektedir. Temel AB kurumları (Avrupa Komisyonu, Avrupa Konseyi, Avrupa

Birliği Konseyi ve Avrupa Parlamentosu), Avrupa Sanayi Yuvarlak Masası (ERT), Avrupa Sendikalar Konfederasyonu (ETUC), Green10 ve Eurobarometer tarafından yayınlanan 968 belgenin nitel analizini yapan bu tez, EGD yoluyla AB'nin bir yandan çevreci toplumsal güçlerin radikal potansiyellerini frenlemeyi, diğer yandan da **yeşillenen** küresel kapitalist sistem üzerinde hegemonyasını oluşturmayı amaçladığını savunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Yeşil Mutabakatı, Neo-Gramşiyan Yaklaşım, Yeşil Kapitalizm, Uluslararası Politik Ekonomi, Avrupa Bütünleşmesi.

To my family who always believed I could move the moon

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I recently realized that up to this moment, I spent most of my adult life at METU. Since I resided on the campus throughout my post-graduate studies at METU's Department of International Relations including my master's and PhD education, METU has literally become my home. In addition to being a student, I have had the privilege of serving as a research assistant in our department for a long period of time. I have been fortunate to work with a group of exceptional individuals - my cherished colleagues,

both past and present. Just as METU has become my home, in time, these exceptional people have become my family.

As an idea, this thesis has traveled with me to different countries and countless cities, but in the end, it is a product of METU, of which I am very proud. It was an honor to study and work with the people whom I was fortunate to cross paths with during my time at METU.

I could not have undertaken this journey without my dear friend and colleague Nurdan Selay Bedir (soon to have a PhD), who has been with me in every step of this way and has been my *comrade* for last decade. Since we started our first academic work experience at the same university at the same time in 2014, Nurdan and I have been part of the same academic rollercoaster, and I could not have hoped for a better companion. I would also like to express my appreciation to Dr. Şengül Yıldız, Dr. Coşkun Soysal, Dr. Tolgahan Akdan, Çağdaş Özeniş, Ahmet Akkaya, Cemile Pehlivan, Nur Seda Temur, Çağrı Sürek, Onur Çöpoğlu, İlbey Çoban, Taha Kalaycı, Bilge Ece Zeyrek and Durukan Ayan, dear friends and colleagues who have shared a similar journey and faced comparable challenges. Their unwavering companionship and solidarity have been an invaluable source of strength during the trials and tribulations of this doctoral experience.

In this moment of gratitude, I take the opportunity to express my warmest gratitude to my dearest friend Dr. Gülay Kılıç Mutlu who has been my rock for more than a decade. She is not only a brilliant academic but also the best friend one could ask for. Whenever I feel a little bit blue, she was there to lift my spirit. She listened tirelessly to my every idea, my ambitious plan and sometimes my fears about life, and for that I will be always grateful.

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because it was there that I met my wonderful friends Maria Korolenko, Dganit Peer, Maria Lo Zito and Silvia Carradori. Their warm friendship made the fact that I had chosen the year 2020 to spend my scholarship in Italy, all the more bearable.

At some point during the course of my doctoral studies, I joined Niğde Ömer Halisdemir University and I am very grateful to the Dean of the Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences and the Head of the Department of Political Science and International Relations for their helpful support and understanding in this process. I would like to express my appreciation to my colleagues and friends at Niğde Ömer Halisdemir University, who has been by my side whenever I have sought assistance.

This thesis has gone through a pandemic, a car accident (the very laptop I use to write these words was removed from back of the car) and the most devastating earthquake that this country has ever experienced. During these difficulties, I had my family always there to support, motivate and help me. Their unwavering love and care have been instrumental in navigating the difficulties of my life. Therefore, this thesis is dedicated to my family; my mother Ömür Durmaz, my father Musa Durmaz and my brother Yiğit Durmaz. Their belief that I can do anything and be anyone I want in this life, is what made me the person I am today. I will be forever indebted to their unconditional love, encouragement and pride.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

APGF	Asia Pacific Greens Federation
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
CAQDAS	Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software
CCICED	China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development
CJN	Climate Justise Now
COP	Conference of the Parties
EC	European Community
ECSC	European Coal and Steal Community
EFSF	European Financial Stability Facility
EGD	European Green Deal
EIB	European Investment Bank
EMS	European Monetary System
EMU	European Monetary Union
ERT	European Round Table for Industry
ESCB	European System of Central Banks
ESM	European Stability Mechanism
ETUC	European Trade Union Confederation
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GND	Green New Deal
Greens/EFA	The Greens/European Free Alliance
ILO	International Labor Organization

IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPCC	International Panel on Climate Change
IPE	International Political Economy
IR	International Relations
JTF	Just Transition Fund
JTM	Just Transition Mechanism
MEE	Ministry of Ecology and Environment
MOFCOM	Ministry of Commerce
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NS1	Nord Stream 1
NS2	Nord Stream 2
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SEA	Single European Act
UN	United Nations
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WB	World Bank

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Scope and Objective

In 2019, right before the COVID-19 hit the world, two years after President Trump pulled the US from the Paris Agreement, the European Commission adopted the European Green Deal (EGD). To highlight the historic significance of the EGD for the European unification project, Von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission, said that "*This is Europe's 'man on the moon' moment*".[1] In the apparent absence of the US in the formation and application of new international climate policies against the global climate crisis, it seems that the EU has come forward for the role.

In my dissertation, I aim to understand how and why the EGD has become the policy priority of the European Union from the perspective of European integration process. My analysis starts with the examination of theoretical tools that can be instrumentalized to understand not the only the historical process leading to the adoption of the EGD but also what this new legislation of the European Union comprises as its content. My initial thoughts on the EU's identification of environmental problems as the core issue of policy making and adoption of the EGD in 2019 to ensure a **green transformation** of the interrelated socio-economic and political relations, which aims eventually to ensure a **green integration** of the EU member states, have led me to re-consider the established European integration theories and revisit their main assumptions in relation to this historical development.

[1] The European Commission. (2019, Dec 11). Press remarks by President von der Leyen on the occasion of the adoption of the European Green Deal Communication https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_19_6749

As I will explain later in this study, I try to understand why the EU has emerged as leader of this **green transition** process while there are other international actors like US and China which have also displayed the ambition to **green** their production and consumption modes. This is why indeed the case of the EGD can be taken as a part of the wider transformation of capitalism, that re-adjusts the already existing web of interests and class antagonisms together with the ideas and norms that are formed around them.

The questions of how and why the European Green Deal has become the center of policymaking in the EU did not only attract my academic attention. There are various forms of understanding and modes of conceptualizing when it comes to subject matter of the European Green Deal. I analyze the mainstream European integration theories which are neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism and social constructivism, by pointing out the fundamentals of their theoretical positions, their strengths and limitations in order to understand their different perceptions of the EGD and the ***green*** turn in the EU. Although there are important points made by each theoretical tradition, I did not find any of them having the necessary theoretical capacity and scholarly will to uncover the veiled class conflicts and continuing hegemonic struggle of alternative European projects (adopting Van Apeldoorn's neoliberal, mercantilist and social Europe projects) all of which residing with the EGD.

My aim is to contribute to the emerging literature on the green transformation of European unification project through the case of EGD. Since I argue that the mainstream literature on the European integration project is limited, I will try to contribute to this emerging literature on the ***green*** turn in the EU by adopting the theoretical assumptions, arguments and tools of the Neo-Gramscian and Open-Marxist traditions. My main contribution will be my qualitative case study of the EGD, through which I will test aforementioned theoretical assumptions regarding the **green *trasformismo*** of the EU.

My second contribution will come from my unique data set, which is comprised of 9 document groups and 968 individual documents. My thesis has the ambition for

tackling data from wide range of groups, active in the process of **green *trasformismo*** of the EU. This will provide me with the unique evidence, that has not been studied together before but is necessary for making an in-depth analysis of the social forces at work in the emergence and the application of the EGD. The comprehensive analysis of the rich data set will provide the basis for future studies either as single-focused data group analyses or as comparative analyses of two or more data groups.

My third contribution results of my novel methodological approach to critical political economy studies. As I will explain later in the thesis, I will use MAXQDA, which is a software program belonging to the family of CAQDAS (computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software). With MAXQDA, I will be able to visualize the results of my large dataset, which is essential not only for making sense the data at hand but also for make comparisons between different data groups and more importantly, to test the assumptions of the Neo-Gramscian and Open-Marxist perspectives. I hope that my thesis will enhance the literature on the green transformation of the EU and inspire future studies.

1.2. Theoretical Framework of The Thesis

From a neofunctionalist perspective, the European Green Deal is not just a piece of climate policy integration, but is another step to be taken towards the "ever-closer European Union". Yet, this perspective's perception of inevitable development of more integration through spill-over, does not problematize the process and the actors. It fails to take into account member states' different interests, the sometimes-contradictory positions of EU institutions, the impact of global capitalist networks, and the increasingly more powerful role of EU citizens, green political parties and green NGOs. Intergovernmentalism, on the other side, has taken the case of the EGD where the impetus for change comes from elite groups such as business interests or from heads of state, but not from nationally based environmental groups. From an intergovernmentalist perspective, the environmental politics is defined through members states' preferences and realized by the two intergovernmental institutions of the EU, namely the European Council and the Council of the European Union.

According to social constructivist approaches, finally, the **climate neutrality**, **circular economy** and **just transition** have become the norms of the EU, which opened the way for the adoption of the EGD. And in this process, the EU has become the climate leader of world by setting global standards and formulating rules.

All these approaches study only one aspect of the reality. Neofunctionalism successfully shows how the European unification project has evolved to the EGD step-by-step through the development of union-wise environmental politics. Intergovernmentalism underlines the importance of member states' preferences in determining the direction of the European unification project. Social constructivism, very rightfully, argues that "ideas" and "norms" are an essential part of the EU. But these approaches are not enough to grasp the multi-faceted reality of the EGD while they also fail to understand the class-based dynamics constituting the process. Yes, one can argue that the EGD is the natural outcome of the spill-over effect of environmental policy integration in the EU, but it is not enough to understand the content of this transformation and why actors have chosen one mode over the another (i.e. growth vs. degrowth)[2]. Yes, some states are more enthusiastic for green transition (i.e. Germany)

[2] There is a vast the literature on the concept of degrowth, which is certainly over the limits of this study. For a detailed discussion of the notion, please see: Jackson, T. (2009). *Prosperity without growth: Economics for a finite planet*. Routledge. Latouche, S. (2009). *Farewell to growth*. Polity. Victor, P., & Rosenbluth, G. (2009). Managing without growth. In *Environment and Employment* (pp. 337-362). Routledge.

Latouche (2009: 7-8) explained "degrowth" as a slogan to silence productivists because it is clear that through exponential growth, what is promoted is profit-accumulation at the expense of environment and humanity, in general.

Since as Jackson rightfully pointed out that current economic mode based on growth does not generate prosperity for all. "The myth of growth has failed us. It has failed the 1 billion people who still attempt to live on half the price of a cup of coffee each day. It has failed the fragile ecological systems on which we depend for survival. Jackson (2009: 15)"

Victor and Rosenbluth (2009: 492) listed why developed countries should consider managing without growth: 1) continued economic growth worldwide is not an option owing to environmental and resource constraints, and so developed countries should leave room for growth in developing countries where the benefits of growth are evident; 2) in developed countries growth has become uneconomic in the sense that it detracts more from well-being than it adds; and 3) economic growth in developed countries is neither necessary nor sufficient for meeting specific policy objectives such as full employment, no poverty and protection of the environment.

Very briefly, the notion of degrowth has risen out of criticisms of unchecked economic growth. It points out the inequalities created by obsession with growth, the increasing divergence between developed and

but there are also significant concessions given to the members who still rely on carbon-intensive industries (i.e. Poland and Just Transition Fund). Yes, without a doubt, ideas are vital for the emergence and the formation of the green transition program in the EU, but there is also an important factor of 'first come, first served' strategies in the matter of regime building. The global green transformation of capitalism will eventually create its own winners and losers and will be more advantageous to be the ones who will determine the rules of the new game in town. It would be at best naïve, at worst misleading to assume that the EU, as a supranational union, has chosen this path of green capitalism solely due to its normative leadership. I admit that these explanations from different integration theories are not totally baseless, and help us understand the problem within different though limited contexts.

From a more critical perspective, neofunctionalism takes the issues, the course of actions and the decisions which are inherently very political, as parts of almost

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developing countries, and especially environmental destruction of growth-based economic models. It puts into the question the myth of economic growth and its incompatibility with the finite sources of the world.

Against the calls for a reduction of individual consumption within degrowth literature, there are also more radical studies, which rejects capitalist production and consumption models. Maher and McEvoy (2023: 1325), for instance, while criticizing the Huber's book of Climate Change as Class War: Building Socialism on a Warming Planet (2022) and his idea of "politics of more", say that:

> "The idea of continuing, let alone intensifying, existing consumption patterns in the context of non-capitalist production relations is nonsensical. In capitalism, consumption takes place through market exchange, a competitive process leading both to the cheapening of labor and the externalization of environmental costs. In socialism, democratically determined social needs would determine what is produced— and thus consumed. The social relations of production determine the structure of the labor process, but also the qualitative form—not merely the quantitative extent—that consumption takes within a particular mode of production. Not just how much we consume, but what we consume, and more fundamentally, the structure of consumption itself, is established by capitalist social relations. Envisioning a socialist future around a 'politics of more', defined as continuously increasing individual consumption, risks fetishizing capitalist production relations as eternal, and taking patterns of consumption under capitalism as representing the intrinsic material interests of the working class. Moreover, organizing a fight for socialism based on increasing personal consumption drastically downplays the scale of such a transition and the difficulties it entails. Socialism, from this perspective, is in danger of looking a lot like the capitalism of the postwar 'Golden Age', in which trade unions fixated on steadily increasing wages and consumption levels, rather than workers acquiring control over investment or the labor process."

Please see: Maher, S., & McEvoy, J. K. (2023). Between De-Growth and Eco-Modernism: Theorizing a Green Transition. *Critical Sociology*, 08969205231177370.

"automatic" and "natural" development of European integration. Neofunctionalism lacks any analysis of class antagonisms or discussion about alternative routes of actions or the specific ways of policy making. It is especially limited to explore whose interests are dominant in the adopted policy framework, why European institutions are more inclined to side with specific social groups at the expense of others. Since European integration is a fundamentally open-ended and contested process,[3] I underline the "contested" nature of the European Integration, and specifically of the European Green Deal. I argue that neofunctionalism fails to take into account member states' different interests, the sometimes-contradictory positions of EU institutions, the impact of global capitalist networks and the increasingly powerful role of EU citizens, green political parties and green NGOs.

Intergovernmentalism is also limited in its analysis of the European integration process, since it takes state as thing in itself, independent of the constitutive dynamics of social groups within one country, and of the effects of global structure of capitalism. It lacks necessary attention that should be given to the transformative role of social forces in order to grasp the complex reality of European integration process. While intergovernmentalism emphasizes the centrality of national interests in deciding the course of international relations, it ignores the analysis of different social groups within nation states, which are essential part of deciding what constitutes the national interest in the first place. Intergovernmentalist analyses of the European Green Deal through inter-state negotiations and using the available data from intergovernmental institutions of the European Council and the Council of the European Union would fail to understand how and why specific states defined their positions via environmental politics because intergovernmentalism would take these positions as given and would not question at all the process and actors involved both within and beyond the national borders.

Social constructivism takes ideas and material world as mutually transformative and constitutive spheres of reality and it perceives European integration as a process of

[3] Van Apeldoorn, B., & Horn, L. (2018). *Critical political economy*. Freie Universität Berlin. Pp. 3.

community building where groups or associations share a collective identity, causal and normative beliefs, and structures of meaning, which are all necessary to build a common community.[4] From social constructivist perspective, the European Green Deal is an outcome of ideas and norms of **climate neutrality**, **circular economy** and **just transition** and also as *the epitome of climate leadership of the EU* over the global structure of capitalism. However, while the ideas are essential for the emergence, development and adoption of the EGD, it is equally important to question, uncover and analyze their material bases. For a comprehensive analysis, a more critical approach is needed to uncover hegemonic positions of some ideas over others.

What I would like to do in this thesis is to understand why and how the project of the EGD has come to be the priority concern within the always-conflictual European integration process without falling into the traps of functionalism, statism and idealism. That is why, I am adopting what Robert Cox names as critical theory to identify and criticize the set of social circumstances of European integration and demonstrate how they came to exist so that it could be possible to contest the current setting of social reality. And for the theoretical foundation of my thesis, I adopted the methodological critiques developed by Marxist approaches, namely Open Marxism and Neo-Gramscianism, against the mainstream European integration perspectives in order to reach at some useful analytical concepts capable of analyzing the complexity of social reality in a non-reductionist way.

Marxist approaches manage to overcome the limitations of these mainstream theories by proposing alternative assumptions to the latter's separated conceptions of the "economic" and the "political" spheres, and the "domestic" and the "international" arenas; to criticize their take on nation states and institutions as class-neutral rational entities. I argue that Open Marxist and Neo-Gramscian approaches offer the critical

[4] Constructivists take European integration as a process. While intergovernmentalists recommend that the EU be studied as an instance of inter-state bargaining and comparativists think about the EU as a political system, constructivists purport to investigate the character of the move from a bargaining to a polity. See Schimmelfennig, F. (2012). Constructivist perspectives. In The Oxford Handbook of the European Union. And Christiansen, T., Jørgensen, K. E., & Wiener, A. (Eds.). (2001). *The social construction of Europe*. Sage.

framework necessary to make sense of and pose an alternative for these methodologically liberal perspectives to the European integration project. These approaches, as the two leading critical Marxist approaches to European integration, share some significant methodological assumptions in their critique of the mainstream where the perception of the latter of the "state" and "market", as two separate entities, is the very first to highlight in this regard.

The second common contribution of the critical traditions of Open-Marxism and Neo-Gramscianism is that they both reject the separation of the "international" and the "domestic", which is crucial for not only understanding but also contesting the global neoliberal politics. I adopt the arguments of Peter Burnham about how the misconception of counterpoising state and market as two opposed forms of social organization opens the way for locating "state sovereignty" or "autonomy" in an exterior relationship to "globalization" which supposedly results in "the retreat of state".[5]

As global class relations are nationally processed, the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is not in substance, but only in form, a national struggle.[6] Neo-Gramscian approaches have furthered these arguments by problematizing the ways in which class struggle is mediated through specific material social practices; resistance manage to challenge the reproduction of capitalism; and the overly theoretical and abstract propositions of Open Marxism are substantiated in everyday political and social struggles.[7]

[5] See Burnham (1994) 'Open Marxism and Vulgar International Political Economy', Review of International Political Economy, 1:2, 221–231. And Burnham, P. (1997) 'Globalisation: states, markets and class relations', Historical Materialism: Research in Critical Marxist Theory, 1, 150–160 Also Burnham, P. (2000) 'Globalisation, depoliticisation and "modern" economic management', in W. Bonefeld and K. Psychopedis (eds), The Politics of Change: Globalisation, Ideology and Critique (London: Palgrave).

[6] Burnham, P. (1995) 'State and market in international political economy: towards a Marxian alternative', Studies in Marxism, 2, 135–159. P. 152.

[7] Bieler, A., & Morton, A. D. (2003). Globalisation, the state and class struggle: a 'Critical Economy' engagement with Open Marxism. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, *5*(4), 467-499. P. 469.

Despite some of the important arguments I develop by utilizing the Open Marxist perspective in this thesis, my analysis of the European Green Deal finds its theoretical roots primarily within the Neo-Gramscian critical political economy tradition. First developed by Antonio Gramsci and later advanced by Neo-Gramscian prominent scholars like Robert Cox, Stephen Gill, Kees van der Pijl, Henk Overbeek, Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, Adam David Morton and Andreas Bieler, the analytical tools like **hegemony, commonsense, historic bloc and *trasformismo*** have provided the theoretical backbone of my thesis. Since I argue that the EGD is more than a piece of the EU-level climate politics, I rely on the Neo-Gramscian tools to study how the EGD, besides requiring policy alignment from its members in the areas of, including but not limited to energy, trade and social policies, has also serious implications for the future transformation of global political and economic relations.

Through my Neo-Gramscian analysis of the European Green Deal, I present how the European integration project has aimed to be the leading actor of green transformation of capitalism which re-adjusts the already existing web of interests and class antagonisms together with the ideas and norms that are formed around them. I perceive and problematize the emergence of the EGD as a step towards greening the global capitalist structure. My thesis builds on, develops, and expands from the Neo-Gramscian arguments on **the green *trasformismo* of capitalism** within the relevant IR debates. I firstly show how **greening** has been made the new *raison d'état* of contemporary political economy after the 2000s by the insistent struggles of environmental movements, in other words, how the green ideas and green norms have now become the inevitable dimensions of globalization as a response to the urgent climate crisis. Then, through the qualitative content analysis of the EGD, I claim that the EU has been pursuing **green *trasformismo*** strategies to curb the radical potentials of the environmentalist social forces on the one hand, and to gain a hegemonic position over the newly **greened** global capitalist structure.

For my analysis of the EGD, I adopt the theoretical framework, provided by Neo-Gramscian scholars who centered social forces for any analysis. From this perspective, European integration and the regime of EU governance are seen as a political, and

potentially hegemonic, project – or sometimes more accurately defined as the outcome of a struggle between rival projects.[8] Van Apeldoorn presented these three rival projects underlying the revival of European integration in the mid-1980s, as neoliberal Europe, mercantilist Europe and social Europe. The **neo-liberal project** emphasized the market-led, negative integration and close connection with globalization through the opening of the EU to the global economy and it was supported by big transnational companies as the globalist fraction of European capital; **the neo-mercantilist project**, supported mainly by transnational European firms as the Europeanist fraction of European capital, argued for bigger and deeper European market and protection against outside players, and lastly **the social democratic project**, supported by social democrats and trade unions to re-regulate the market and regain some control over capital lost at the national level.[9] Van Apeldoorn's three-party model of rival projects for the development of the European integration process has provided me with the necessary analytical tools to separate and then group different social forces within the EU regarding the European Green Deal. I use these categories for analytically group different social forces, like European capital or European labor, different institutions like European Commission of European Parliament and different governmental positions of member states. As I will explain later in my analysis, some groups are more inclined to the further liberalization of the European integration project and increasing its competitiveness while some are anxious for the future costs of European Green Deal on the European producers and demand for EU-level protection, and also while some are enthusiastic for the establishment of green and just Europe through the EGD.

Neo-Gramscian analyses focus on the organized interests at EU level such as "social partners" Business Europe (or European Round Table for Industrialists) and the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), together with transnational)

[8] Van Apeldoorn, B. (2003). *Transnational capitalism and the struggle over European integration*. Routledge.

[9] Bieler, A. (2006). European Integration and Eastward Enlargement. In Global Restructuring, State, Capital and Labour (pp. 71-90). Palgrave Macmillan, London. Pp. 80.

associations and lobby groups, think tanks and private forums, and expert groups. They study the European integration through the analysis of social forces -not only European but also global- and investigate the effects of globalism over the supranational governance of the EU. Following the Neo-Gramscian school, I selected my data from various groups such as European Commission, European Council, the Council of the EU, European RoundTable for Industrialists (ERT), European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), Green10, Greens/EFA and Eurobarometers as there are highlighted as expressions of social forces affecting the European integration process by the research done in this school. I followed the Neo-Gramscian focus on social forces in my analysis of the European Green Deal because I also perceive the EGD as a part of wider transformation of Western capitalist relations, of which the EU is a prominent part.

1.3. Historical Framework of The Thesis

The European Union did not adopt the European Green Deal in an isolated setting, cut-off from the global developments. In my dissertation, I place the EGD within a wider transformation process of global political economy, which prioritize environmental politics and climate change mitigation efforts. I explore the historical baseline for developments -sometimes happening separately and sometimes concomitantly, in different parts of the world, which opened the way for **green capitalism** to capture the spirit of global political economy under looming presence of climate crisis. By taking capitalism as a complex web of socio-political and economic relations which is based on infinite growth on a finite planet, I mainly try to understand how the climate politics under the premise of climate crisis has turned into an ordering principle for the next phase of capitalism.

- ***What is green capitalism?***

Firstly, green capitalism is a conception that is based on the assumption that climate crisis is a product of market failure, and thus producers of **greenhouse gases** (primarily nations in the North) can avoid the full global consequences of the resultant climate

change with appropriate counter measures while affecting though other parts of the world not responsible for their production.[10] This mode of framing the problem as a market-failure opens up the possibility of **correcting** it through **green** and more **environment-friendly** reforms. Secondly, green capitalism upholds the technological solutions as the only viable option against environmental catastrophes. The **green innovations** are believed to reduce climate change emissions by out-competing existing energy production technologies in the global marketplace.[11]

Interestingly enough, proponents of this type of argumentation do not question the capitalist mode of production and its irresolvable internal contradictions as the source of the problem. Contrariwise, critical approaches associate climate crisis with the long-term change in the average weather patterns that have come to define Earth's local, regional and global climate, driven by human activities, particularly fossil fuel burning, which increases heat-trapping greenhouse gas levels in Earth's atmosphere as well as Earth's average surface temperature.[12] For them, the problem arises due to the capitalist concerns to ensure "infinite growth on a finite planet". Still, international governance of environmental governance favors the green capitalist solutions over any other alternative solutions (like degrowth movement).

Although environmental ideas emerged mainly as a "reaction to the industrial and expansionist logic of capitalism"[13] in the 1960s and the 1970s, the gradual mainstreaming of environmental issues in domestic and international politics in subsequent decades has brought about a certain degree of reconciliation between environmentalism and the market principle.[14] The answer to both environmental and

[10] Stern, N. (2007). *The economics of climate change: The Stern Report*. Cambridge University Press.

[11] Fox, N. J. (2022). Green capitalism, climate change and the technological fix: A more-than-human assessment. *The Sociological Review*, 00380261221121232, pp. 5.

[12] NASA. What Is Climate Change?. https://climate.nasa.gov/global-warming-vs-climate-change/

[13] Goldsmith, E., & Mander, J. (2001). The case against the global economy: And for a turn towards localization. London: Earthscan.

[14] Falkner, R. (2012). Global environmentalism and the greening of international society. *International Affairs*, *88*(3), 503-522. Pp. 520.

economic problems is seemed to be found in the notion of **sustainable development**. A 'liberal environmentalist compromise' has become institutionalized at the international level, and this compromise 'predicates environmental protection on the promotion and maintenance of a liberal economic order'.[15] The concept of **sustainable development** is but one such attempt to mold environmental thinking to fit a market-based template.

- ***The Green Wave of the Contemporary Socio-political and Economic Relations***

Historically, within the multi-level and multi-actor processes of the international governance of environment, the protection of the environment has not been the only aim. These processes have always been shaped by the established international power dynamics which ultimately led, for instance, to the introduction of controversial policy measures like carbon markets. Indeed, unequal power relations have created further divergence between the developed and developing countries in the international governance of climate change.

The underdeveloped part of the world resents the developed countries for their actions, such as heavy industrialization-induced environmental pollution, deforestation, and loss of biodiversity, the burdens of which they now must shoulder. Also, they perceive the efforts toward environmental protection as if they are being robbed of their opportunity for development and economic prosperity. Climate justice movement has risen out of these lines and spread to the rest of the world. In time, the climate activism, especially from the young individuals, has taken over the global social movements and made the elites of global political economy adopt actions accordingly. The organized climate activism now demands political actors to take more radical steps than the established measures promoted in various United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Summits. Accordingly, activist efforts have not only contributed vastly towards the general acceptance of the climate crisis by the public,

[15] Steven Bernstein, *The compromise of liberal environmentalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), p. 213.

but also left political and economic elite with no choice but do something about the problem. The politicization of climate change in the public created a fertile ground for the green parties to flourish both in quality and quantity. Through these developments, the necessity to reverse climate change has become the *zeitgeist* of global politics and a central point of contention within the global political economy in the 21st century. The EGD was therefore primarily promoted as a response to this political challenge in the West, of which the EU is an important part.

The EGD should also be contextualized with respect to different positionings of the leading global environmental governance actors. Specifically, the EGD did not emerge in a vacuum but has taken its form through the cooperative and competitive encounters of the EU with the USA, China and Russia with respect to climate politics. With President Trump's decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement in 2017, the US stepped down from its leading position of introducing the necessary environmental reforms in contemporary capitalism while this marked the turning point for the rise of the EU's leadership in the field.

Having said this, it is also important to note that the EU itself is not without controversies when it comes to climate change. The intra-EU conflicts around the adoption and application of the EGD has resurfaced the veiled class antagonisms within different EU countries due to their varying levels of dependence on the carbon fuels as well as within different regions due to their varying economic development levels.

What is more, China's ecological civilization notion has made it head-to-head with the EU's leadership over the climate change measures. China has now had the opportunity to re-shape global capitalism in the way it fits to China's advantages rather than merely playing by the rules set by Western economies. In another aspect, Russia's invasion of Ukraine created new problems for the future of EU's **green transformation**. The EU's long-term plan to shut down all of its **nuclear power-plants** and using of only **clean and renewable energy** like **geothermal, hydro-electric, solar, wind, biogas, biofuel**

or biomass energy have seemed to reach a gridlock when Russia invaded Ukraine and triggered a series of events rather difficult for the EU to handle.

Within such an internally and externally contested context, the EGD has become the crux of Western capitalist efforts to **greening capitalism** and thus enhance global competitiveness of European capitalism.

1.4. Research Question and The Data of Thesis

In my thesis, my main aim is to understand how and why the EGD has become the policy priority of the European Union from the perspective of European integration process. To this end, I make a critical and empirical analysis of the European Green Deal in line with the global hegemony conceptualization of the neo-Gramscian approach to IR. I analyze why the EU is so eager to embark on a mission that comes with various problems from various fields, considering the intra-EU conflicts both at national and sub-national levels, the conflicts among developed capitalist countries as well as between the developed and the less-developed ones.

For a detailed and well-grounded analysis, I divide my research question into two parts as: "Why did the EGD become policy priority of the EU" and "How did the EGD become policy priority of the EU". Firstly, I study the "why" part of my research question where I locate the EGD within the global restructuring of capitalist relations in line with green capitalism. As I explain in chapter 3, titled "Historical Development of the Global Politics of Green Capitalism", I trace back the historical developments, events, important turning points which have brought the climate politics into the center of international political economy in order to understand why climate politics under the premise of climate crisis has turned into an ordering principle for the current transformation of global capitalism.

Within this historical framework, I look at the EU's developing interest in the matter of climate change and its following ambition to mitigate the current climate crisis. To answer the first part of my research question, I analyze 500 communications of the

European Commission between 1991 and 2023 that contain the issue of climate change. In an effort to create 'triangulation', I also examine European Commission white papers and European Council conclusions to better locate the EU's increasing attention to climate change. Thus, my data for the first half of my analysis are threefold: European Commission Communications (1991-2023), European Commission White Papers (1985-2020) and European Council Conclusions (1992-2023).

Secondly, I focus on the "how" part to understand the processes through which the EU adopt the EGD. As I explain in chapter 2, titled "Theoretical Framework", I adopt neo-Gramscian approach to unravel the contemporary setting of class antagonisms both within national boundaries and at the global level in order to understand why the European unification project takes a bead on **green capitalism** as its new phase.

To start with the "how" question, I chose the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement when the EU ascended to its global leadership position in climate change mitigation efforts. I analyze how other groups gave consent to or resisted the EU's newly acquired role as the savior of planet earth, which eventually led to the European Green Deal. I use 6 groups of sources, which are: Council of the European Union (2015-2023), European Round Table for Industry (ERT) (2017-2023), The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) (2011-2023), Green10 (2019-2023), Greens/EFA in the European Parliament (2008-2023) and Public Opinion Polls of the EU (1990-2023).

To understand the member states' position, I use the conclusions of the Council of the European Union. I look at what the European Round Table for Industry (ERT) said about the climate change in order to place the interests of the European capital when it comes to the green transition. On the opposite side, I study how the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) as the voice of workers with 45 million members in the EU re-defines its agenda in line with the climate crisis.

For the NGO side of the environmental discussion, I analyze what the Green 10, which is a coalition of ten of the largest environmental organizations and networks active at the European level, says and does with respect to the EU's new direction towards

green future. The EU has its own parliament which makes the citizens of the EU able to elect their EU-level representatives. I analyze political positions of the Greens/EFA Group to grasp how they criticize and to what extent they manage to challenge the way the European Union handles the matter. Lastly, I study the public opinion polls to see how the European public perceives climate change and its **green** remedies.

1.5. Main Argument of Thesis

As I explained above, the theoretical roots of my dissertation belong to the Neo-Gramscian critical political economy tradition. I barrow my analytical tools from Gramsci himself and I utilized them following the exemplified works of prominent Neo-Gramscian scholars on European integration process in the analysis of my case which is the European Green Deal.

- **The EU as the Integral State**

For my analysis of the European Green Deal, I take the European Union itself as an integral state in Neo-Gramscian theoretical sense. I argue that the EU has become the terrain of cooperation and competition, as much as it is one of coercion and consent, with the European Commission as being the leading actor of this process.

- **Green Growth as the Commonsense of Contemporary Capitalism**

For my analysis of the European Green Deal, I define plural but interconnected commonsenses (*sensi comuni*, in the words of Gramsci).

- **Commonsense 1:** *Climate change is a serious problem, and we must act now!*
- **Commonsense 2:** *Growth is good and desirable. It is beneficial for producers and consumers, employers and workers. Recession is dangerous for wage-laborers since it inhabits potential lay-offs and rise in unemployment.*
- *So, how can we solve the problem of climate crisis without giving up growth?*

The notion **green growth** has emerged as the most *reasonable* (within systemic efforts) answer to this question of how to reconcile capitalism which is based on "infinite growth on a finite planet" and the looming climate catastrophe. By decoupling growth from carbon-based energy use (or using only renewable energy) by producing green goods, by promoting green consumption, it has been envisaged that not only the climate crisis can be solved but also through new production methods, it can work as a catalyzer for new and different economic growth.

- **Historic Bloc of Green Capitalism**

Cox argues that the historical bloc or class configuration determines the raison d'état of given state system.[16] I borrow this term from Cox and argue that **green** now becoming the new raison d'état of contemporary political economy while green ideas and green norms are drawing the dimensions of globalization. In this framework, I use the notion of **green growth** as the hegemonic idea of contemporary capitalist class configuration, which provided the basis for an emergent historic bloc, all of its actors positioned behind this hegemonic idea.

Before it was officially adopted by the EU, **green growth** was put forward by the United Nations, OECS and the World Bank. In 2008, the UN Environment-led Green Economy Initiative was launched; in 2009 OECD members approved a declaration acknowledging that ecology and economy can (should) be reconciled; and asked the OECD to develop a framework for implementing the green growth strategy, which was realized with Towards Green Growth (2011).[17] In 2011, The United Nations Environment Programme stated "the greening of economies is... a new engine of growth"[18] while the OECD set its Green Growth agenda as "the familiar agenda of

[16] Cox, R. W. (1989) 'Production, the state and change in world order', in E-O. Czempiel and J. N. Rosenau (eds), Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s (Toronto: Lexington Books). P. 41

[17] Ossewaarde, M., & Ossewaarde-Lowtoo, R. (2020). The EU's green deal: a third alternative to green growth and degrowth?. *Sustainability*, *12*(23), 9825. Pp. 3-4.

[18] UNEP, 2011. Towards a Green Economy: A Synthesis for Policymakers. UNEP, Nairobi.

economic policy with the added realization that it can be as good for the environment as for the economy"[19].

Green growth is the core of green capitalism. The OECD strategy of **green growth** the **green economy,** and the Asian concept of **green transition** are essentially instrumental strategies of crisis prevention, to avoid raw material shortages, high energy costs, water shortages, declining crop yields, climate change or environmental damage, and their costs. [20] In 2010, the European Commission defined its strategy for Europe 2020 as smart, sustainable (promoting a **greener** and more competitive economy) and inclusive growth. [21] The European Green Deal, itself, is defined as "*the EU's **new growth strategy**, aiming to transform the EU into a fairer and more prosperous society, with a modern, resource-efficient and competitive economy, with no net emissions of greenhouse gases by mid-century*."[22] The EU has demonstrated its ambition to become the leader of this historic bloc with the adoption of European Green Deal, thus with the ambition of becoming the first climate neutral continent by 2050.

- **Green *Trasformismo***

The imminent climate crisis is acknowledged by almost every political standpoint however the only viable solution has been presented as the one with no dramatic questioning of the existing production relations, its heavy extractivism, environmental destruction and north/south injustices. By suppressing any radical solutions or simply absorbing them into the mainstream ones, green capitalism has come to the verge of a

[19] OECD, 2011. Towards Green Growth: A Summary for Policymakers. OECD, Paris.

[20] Jänicke, M. (2012). "Green growth": From a growing eco-industry to economic sustainability. *Energy policy*, *48*, 13-21. Pp. 19.

[21] EU Commission (2010): Europe 2020 – A European Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth, COM(2010)2020, 3.3.2010.

[22] *Industry and the Green Deal*. (n.d.). European Commission. https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/industry-and-green-deal_en#:~:text=The%20European%20Green%20Deal%20is,greenhouse%20gases%20by%20mid%2Dcentury.

passive revolution. **Green** has become the new face of capitalism where capitalism is no longer evil but it is enlightened and cares about creating socially and ecologically sustainable relations. Thus, the **green *trasformismo* of capitalism** is a means to save the existing web of interests by assimilating radical of counter-hegemonic alternatives which are either present or have to potential to emerge in the future.

My main argument for my dissertation is that the EGD is not only a new force to revitalize the European integration process but also the EU's attempt to regain its diminishing global competitiveness by transforming itself as the leader of this **new green wave of global capitalism**. Through the qualitative content analysis of different social forces' positions with regard to the European Green Deal, I claim that the **green *trasformismo* of capitalism** is being instrumentalized to save European unification project, which is and has always been essentially a class project.

By using Neo-Gramscian concepts, I argue that the environmental movements, NGOs, green parties and other societal groups demanding solutions to environmental problems are now **co-opting** in the **green *trasformismo* of capitalism** because the newly branded **green** capitalism has created its own hegemony by presenting the new **commonsense** as **green growth** and, more importantly, managing to gain consent from subordinate groups.

I argue that the looming presence of climate crisis has been instrumentalized by the hegemony of neoliberalism and **greening** capitalism has been presented as the only viable solution without questioning of the existing production relations, its heavy extractivism, environmental destruction and north/south injustices. By suppressing any radical solutions or simply absorbing them into the mainstream ones, **green** has become the new face of capitalism where capitalism is no longer evil, but it is enlightened and cares about creating socially and ecologically **sustainable** relations. The **green *trasformismo* of capitalism** has become the means to save the hegemony of dominant classes by assimilating radical of counter-hegemonic alternatives which are either present or have to potential to emerge in the future.

1.6. Methodology of Thesis

My methodology is a direct outcome of my theoretical approach to my subject matter. In my thesis I analyze the case of the European Green Deal from the neo-Gramscian perspective. I design my research through qualitative methods by using "directed qualitative content analysis". I use deductive coding in a computer-assisted qualitative data analysis (CAQDAS) software, which is called MAXQDA. In chapter 5, I will present methodological framework. Since I apply directed qualitative content analysis method, I deduce my codes from my critical reading of the EU's road to the 'green' capitalism, which I explain in detail in my theoretical discussion in chapter 2, historical development of the **global politics of green capitalism** in chapter 3 and from my analysis of the ***trasformismo* of green capitalism** in Europe in chapter 4. With these codes, I analyze the content of my sources in chapter 6 and provide a comprehensive understanding of the **green transition** of the EU. I investigate the national, supranational and global contexts and inter-member conflicts and class antagonisms through which the EGD has developed. In brief, I try to find answers to my research question of "how and why the EGD has become the policy priority of the European Union from the perspective of European integration process?" through my directed qualitative content analysis in MAXQDA, for which I developed my operational codes from the Neo-Gramscian approach to IR. In the coming chapters, I discuss my theoretical and historical framework in which I explore the case of the European Green Deal.

1.7. Structure of Thesis

This dissertation has seven chapters. Introduction, the first chapter, clarifies the scope and objectives, the main questions, the methodology, the theoretical framework, and the main argument of the thesis in brief.

The second chapter is on the theoretical framework of the thesis. It compares how different theories (neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism and social constructivism) perceive and analyze the subject matter of this thesis. Then, it rationalizes its own

class-based theoretical position through a focused analysis of the neo-Gramscian approach.

The third chapter provides the historical background of the research topic of this thesis. It shows how in time green capitalism has developed and been presented as the only remedy to the climate crisis. This chapter presents the multi-level and multi-actor character of the green transformation of world capitalism by introducing the positions of various actors at the national, supranational and international levels.

The fourth chapter starts with the emergence of EU as a powerful bloc and problematizes the EU as a hegemony project. It, then, presents the neo-Gramscian analysis of the political economy of Europe such as the meaning of EMU, the single currency and later developments in line with the emergence of the fiscal union (two-pack, six-pack, European semester), and finally it analyzes the emergence of European Green Deal within **the green *trasformismo* of capitalism** in Europe.

The fifth chapter is a detailed explanation on the methodology. It provides the specific content of directed qualitative content analysis and explains how it uses MAXQDA which is a CAQDAS (computer-assisted qualitative data analysis) software. It presents the data of the thesis and show the coding mechanism is used in this analysis.

The sixth chapter is the qualitative analysis part of this thesis. It applies the directed qualitative content analysis of different social forces' positions with regard to the European Green Deal (European Commission Communications (1991-2023), European Commission White Papers (1985-2020), European Council Conclusions (1992-2023), Council of the European Union (2015-2023), European Round Table for Industry (ERT) (2017-2023), The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) (2011-2023), Green10 (2019-2023), Greens/EFA in the European Parliament (2008-2023) and Public Opinion Polls of the EU (1990-2023)).

The seventh chapter concludes this thesis. It summarizes the arguments made throughout the thesis and presents its contribution to the academic literature.

CHAPTER 2

COMPETING THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL WITHIN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: THE MERITS OF NEO-GRAMCIANISM

2.1. Introduction

The EU's identification of environmental problems as the core issue of policy making and adoption of the EGD in 2019 to ensure a green integration process have forced the hitherto developed European integration theories to revisit their main assumption in relation to this historical development. In this chapter, I will overview the mainstream and critical Marxist approaches to European integration by focusing, first, on their main assumptions and arguments regarding the European integration process in general, and then, on their assessment of the rise of the EGD to a number one policy priority in this process. After underlining the weaknesses of the neo-functionalist, liberal intergovernmentalist and social constructivist integration perspectives in making sense of this challenge, I will highlight the merits of neo-Gramscian approaches in overcoming these weaknesses through a class-based political analysis that understand policy outcomes as a function of social struggles.

To briefly summarize, from a neofunctionalist perspective, the European Green Deal is not just a piece of climate policy integration, but it is another step to be taken towards "ever-closer European Union". Yet, its perception of inevitable development of "more integration" through "spill-over" does not problematize the process and the actors. It fails to take into account member states' different interests, the sometimes-contradictory positions of EU institutions, the impact of global capitalist networks and

the increasingly powerful role of EU citizens, green political parties and green NGOs. Intergovernmentalism, on the other side, has taken the case of the EGD as an impetus for change conducted by elite groups such as business or by heads of state, but not by nationally based environmental groups. From an intergovernmentalist perspective, the environmental politics is defined through more powerful members states' preferences and realized by the two intergovernmental institutions of the EU, namely the European Council and the Council of the European Union. Finally, from the perspective of social constructivism, the "climate neutrality", "circular economy" and" just transition" have become the norms of the EU, which opened the way for the adoption of the EGD, and the EU's becoming the climate leader of the world by setting global standards and formulating rules.

As I will discuss in detail below, all of these mainstream approaches are studying only one aspect of the reality. Neofunctionalism successfully show how the European unification project evolve to the EGD step-by-step through the development of union-wise environmental politics. Intergovernmentalism underline the importance of member states' preferences in determining the direction of European unification project. Social constructivism, very rightfully, argues "ideas" and "norms" are essential part of the EU. But these approaches are not enough to grasp the multi-faceted reality of the EGD. Yes, one can argue that the EGD is the natural outcome of the spill-over effect of environmental policy integration in the EU, but it is not enough to understand the content of this transformation and why actors have chosen one mode over the other (i.e. growth vs. degrowth). Yes, some states are more enthusiastic for green transition (i.e. Germany) but there are also significant concessions given to the members who still rely on carbon-intensive industries (i.e. Poland and Just Transition Fund). Yes, without a doubt, ideas are vital for the emergence and the formation of the green transition program in the EU, but there is also an important factor of "first come, first served" in the matter of regime building. This green transformation of European capitalism will eventually create its own winners and losers and it is always more advantageous to be the one who determines the rules of the new game in town. It would be at best naïve, at worst misleading to assume that the EU has chosen this path of green capitalism by solely due to its normative leadership. I admit that these

explanations from integration theories are not totally baseless. However, what I would like to do in this thesis is to understand why and how the project of the EGD has come to be the priority concern within the always-conflictual European integration process without falling into the traps of functionalism, statism and idealism.

Furthermore, the mainstream European integration theories lack not only the necessary theoretical depth to understand the complexity of social reality but also the scholarly will to uncover social inequalities inherent in the global and European hegemony of neoliberalism and, more importantly, to come up with alternative ways for the re-organization of current socio-political and economic relations. Although these theories have differed from each other on many grounds, their consensus on dismissing the central role of production relations of global capitalism and its continuous class antagonisms is notable. Understanding the reasons of this consensus requires the problematization of social reality within its complexity and the assessment of the contextually bounded events together with positioning their actors and in the global neoliberal politics. Defining such mainstream approaches as "problem-solving" theories, Robert Cox[23] underlines that they take the world as given and attempt to make the world work better within clearly defined, and limited, parameters. Here, I am adopting what Robert Cox names as critical theory to identify and criticize the set of social circumstances of European integration and demonstrate how they came to exist so that it could be possible to contest the current setting of social reality.

With this aim, I will focus in the next section on the methodological critiques developed by Marxist approaches, namely Open Marxism and Neo-Gramscianism, against mainstream European integration perspectives in order to reach at some useful analytical concepts capable of analyzing the complexity of social reality in a non-reductionist way. As I will discuss, Marxist approaches manage to overcome the limitations of these mainstream theories by proposing alternative assumptions to the latter's separated conceptions of the "economic" and the "political" spheres, and the "domestic" and the "international" arenas; to criticize their take on nation states and

[23] Cox, R. (1981), 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 10/2: 126–55.

institutions as class-neutral rational entities. By doing so, I will be able to argue how Open Marxist and Neo-Gramscian approaches offer a critical framework necessary to make sense of and pose an alternative for these methodologically liberal perspectives to the European integration project. These approaches, as the two leading critical Marxist approaches to European integration, share some significant methodological assumptions in their critique of the mainstream where the perception of the latter of the "state" and "market", as two separate entities, is the very first to highlight in this regard.

Marxist methodology is differentiated from the liberal one by its rejection of the separation of state and civil society, and of the political and the economical, and underlines the importance of social class antagonism between capital and labor to understand social reality around relations of domination and exploitation. Marxists move also beyond the internal-external divide, an assumption taken for granted in liberal methodology, by developing a theory of the state, and thus of politics, as an aspect of the social relations of production embedded within global class relations; in other words, the comprehend the constitution of national states, thus of international and global politics, within global capitalist accumulation.[24]

To start with Open Marxism, contrary to mainstream theories, the former does not take the state as a thing itself but as a form of social relations reflecting the forms of production relations and daily class antagonisms inherent in capitalist structure of life. With this problematization of state, the Open Marxists ask what is peculiar about the social relations of production under capitalism that gives rise to the separation and constitution of the economic and political as distinct moments within the same social relations.[25] The answer lies in the changing nature of production relations from

[24] Bieler, A., & Morton, A. D. (2003). Globalisation, the state and class struggle: a 'Critical Economy' engagement with Open Marxism. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, *5*(4), 467-499. P. 469.

[25] Holloway, J. and Picciotto, S. (1978) 'Towards a materialist theory of the state', in J. Holloway and S. Picciotto (eds), State and Capital: A Marxist Debate (London: Edward Arnold Publishers). And Holloway, J. (1995) 'Global capital and the national state', in W. Bonefeld and J. Holloway (eds), Global Capital, National State and the Politics of Money (London: Macmillan).

feudalism to capitalism, as the former was characterized by the extra-economic direct political enforcement of exploitation and surplus extraction, and the latter by indirect surplus appropriation and exploitation conducted through a contractual relation between those who maintain the power of appropriation, as owners of the means of production, over those who only have their labor to sell, as expropriated producers.[26] The separation of the political and economical in the capitalist exploitation opens the 'private' economic realm to the civil society for appropriators and expropriated, capital and labor, while 'public' sphere linked to the coercive political realm of the state.[27]

It is crucial to note that the state latter ultimately secures such processes through the guarantee of private property, the contractual relationship between employer and employee and the process of commodity exchange.[28] The argument of Open Marxism that capitalist state is determined by the social form of the class antagonism between capital and labor, and thus by the historical process of class struggle in and against exploitation[29], takes its roots and foundation from this very separation.

Another important contribution of Open Marxism is their rejection of the separation of the "international" and the "domestic", which is crucial for not only understanding but also contesting the global neoliberal politics. This separation is a continuation of the separation of the "economical" from the "political" which reflects itself in the mainstream liberal theories' discussions on whether state has lost its power to the

[26] Bieler, A., & Morton, A. D. (2003). Globalisation, the state and class struggle: a 'Critical Economy' engagement with Open Marxism. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, *5*(4), 467-499. P. 471.

[27] See Holloway, J. and Picciotto, S. (1977) 'Capital, crisis and the state', Capital & Class, Issue 2, 76–101. And

Meiksins Wood, E. (1995) Democracy Against Capitalism: Renewing Historical Materialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

[28] Burnham, P. (1995) 'State and market in international political economy: towards a Marxian alternative', Studies in Marxism, 2, 135–159. P. 145.

[29] Bonefeld, W. (1992) 'Social constitution and the form of the capitalist state', in W. Bonefeld, R. Gunn and K. Psychopedis (eds), Open Marxism, Vol.1: Dialectics and History (London: Pluto Press). & Bonefeld, W. (1995) 'Capital as subject and the existence of Labour', in W. Bonefeld, R. Gunn, J. Holloway and K. Psychopedis (eds), Open Marxism, Vol.3: Emancipating Marx (London: Pluto Press).

forces of globalization or not.[30] For instance, globalization has been defined as "the process whereby power is located in global social formations and expressed through global networks rather than through territorially-based states".[31] Peter Burnham argues that this misconception of counterpoising state and market as two opposed forms of social organization opens the way for locating 'state sovereignty' or 'autonomy' in an exterior relationship to 'globalization' which supposedly results in 'the retreat of state'.[32] Since Open Marxism rejects the efforts of periodization for understanding differences of capitalist relations, they also abstain from making any arguments about the peculiarity of capitalism in the current global structure. States have to be inserted within the global character of capitalist accumulation because the state itself is a form of the class relation which constitutes global capitalist relations.[33] As global class relations are nationally processed, the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is not in substance, but only in form, a national struggle.[34]

Neo-Gramscian approaches have furthered these arguments by problematizing the ways in which class struggle is mediated through specific material social practices; resistance manage to challenge the reproduction of capitalism; and the overly theoretical and abstract propositions of Open Marxism are substantiated in everyday

[30] See Susan Strange's the retreat of state argument in Strange, S. (1996). *The retreat of the state: The diffusion of power in the world economy*. Cambridge university press. Also see Strange, S. (1997). The erosion of the state. *Current History*, *96*(613), 365.; Strange, S. (1999). The westfailure system. *Review of International Studies*, *25*(3), 345-354.

[31] Thomas, C. (1997). Globalization and the South. In *Globalization and the South* (pp. 1-17). Palgrave Macmillan, London. P. 6.

[32] See Burnham (1994) 'Open Marxism and Vulgar International Political Economy', Review of International Political Economy, 1:2, 221–231. And Burnham, P. (1997) 'Globalisation: states, markets and class relations', Historical Materialism: Research in Critical Marxist Theory, 1, 150–160 Also Burnham, P. (2000) 'Globalisation, depoliticisation and "modern" economic management', in W. Bonefeld and K. Psychopedis (eds), The Politics of Change: Globalisation, Ideology and Critique (London: Palgrave).

[33] Burnham, P. (1995) 'State and market in international political economy: towards a Marxian alternative', Studies in Marxism, 2, 135–159. P. 149.

[34] Burnham, P. (1995) 'State and market in international political economy: towards a Marxian alternative', Studies in Marxism, 2, 135–159. P. 152.

political and social struggles.[35] Given the centrality of the neo-Gramscian approach in this thesis, it requires a more detailed investigation in the next part.

2.2. The Merits of Gramscian Tradition in Political Theory

Neo-Gramscian approach finds its roots in theory and practice of the Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci, who wrote the "Prison Notebooks" between 1929 and 1935 while he was imprisoned by the Mussolini regime. Robert Cox, in this point, should be given his deserved credit for revitalizing Gramsci's ideas in international relations in the early 1980s, paving the way for the development of an alternative IR school of thought. This new school has been named as Neo-Gramscianism. The prefix 'neo' is emphasized because it avoids conveying a parallel or coexistence, without any significant change, of the historical moment Gramsci occupied.[36] In the first subsection, I will try to summarize very briefly Gramsci's points on integral state, commonsense, hegemony and historical bloc and in the second subsection, I will focus on social relations of production, forms of state and world orders and finally in the third subsection I will offer the details of two very important concepts for this thesis, which are passive revolution and trasformismo. These points will not only be essential to understand Neo-Gramscian approach, but they also provide me with important analytical tools to be operationalized later in my analysis of the European Green Deal.

2.2.1 Integral State, Commonsense, Hegemony and Historic Bloc

Gramsci differentiated what he called 'Critical Economy' from 'Classical Economy' of Adam Smith and David Ricardo as 'Critical Economy' did not aim to construct abstract hypotheses based on generalized, historically indeterminate conditions of a

[35] Bieler, A., & Morton, A. D. (2003). Globalisation, the state and class struggle: a 'Critical Economy' engagement with Open Marxism. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, *5*(4), 467-499. P. 469.

[36] Morton, A.D. (2001) 'The Sociology of Theorising and Neo-Gramscian Perspectives: The Problems of "School" Formation in IPE', in A. Bieler and A.D. Morton (eds) *Social Forces in the Making of the New Europe: The Restructuring of European Social Relations in the Global Political Economy* (London: Palgrave). p. 35

generic 'homo-economicus' but rather tried to situate categories within historical circumstances and assessed them within the particular context from which they were derived.[37]

Gramsci's work on 'hegemony' was extremely influential for the next generation of critical theorists. His analytical take on 'political society' and 'civil society', which, he argued, together constitute what he defined as 'the integral state' and his concept of commonsense(s) for the formation of hegemony have been adopted, criticized and studied in various cases.

For Gramsci, 'the state is the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules'.[38] The state was not simply understood as an institution limited to the 'government of the functionaries' or the 'top political leaders and personalities with direct governmental responsibilities', it is the sum of the apparatus of government operating within the 'public' sphere (government, political parties, military) and the 'private' sphere of civil society (church, media, education) through which hegemony functions.[39] In this line of argument, state is, as a social relation, not taken as institutional category, or thing in itself, but conceived as a form of social relations through which capitalism and hegemony are expressed.[40]

The way Gramsci perceived state is also indicative for his understanding of hegemony. While state is where the actors of different classes struggle for the seizure of coercive power, civil society is where the actors from different classes try to gain consent

[37] Gramsci (1995) *Further Selections from the Prison Notebooks,* ed. and trans. D. Boothman (London: Lawrence and Wishart). P. 166–167, 171–173 and 176–179.

[38] Gramsci, A. (1971) *Selections from the Prison Notebooks,* ed. and trans. Q. Hoare and G. Nowell-Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart). P. 178, 244.

[39] Gramsci, A. (1971) *Selections from the Prison Notebooks,* ed. and trans. Q. Hoare and G. Nowell-Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart). P. 261.

[40] Poulantzas, N. (1978) *State, Power, Socialism,* trans. P. Camiller (London: Verso).

around their idea of what a good society is, i.e. around their ideology, and these two make the integral State.[41] As Thomas[42] puts it, with the concept of the integral State:

> Gramsci attempted to analyze the mutual interpenetration and reinforcement of 'political society' and 'civil society' (to be distinguished from each other methodologically, not organically) within a unified (and indivisible) state-form. According to this concept, the state (in its integral form) was not to be limited to the machinery of government and legal institutions (the 'state' understood in a limited sense). Rather, the concept of the integral state was intended as a dialectical unity of the moments of civil society and political society.

An integral State cannot function for long only on the basis of coercive power and consent alone is not enough because no ruling class however can survive forever merely by exercising force; it will survive only if it also hegemonizes ideologically the space of civil society. [43] Here, Gramsci's notion of commonsense(s) is especially important. According to Gramsci:

> every social stratum has its own 'commonsense' and its "good sense", which are basically the most widespread conception of life and of human being. Every philosophical current leaves behind a sedimentation of "commonsenses": this is the document evidence of its historical effectiveness. Commonsense is not something rigid and immobile, but is continually transforming itself, enriching itself with scientific ideas and with philosophical opinions, which have entered ordinary life. "Commonsense" is the folklore of philosophy, and is always half-way between folklore properly speaking . . . and the philosophy, science, the

[41] D'Alisa, G., & Kallis, G. (2016). A political ecology of maladaptation: Insights from a Gramscian theory of the State. *Global Environmental Change*, *38*, 230-242.

[42] Thomas, P. (2009). The Gramscian moment: philosophy, hegemony and Marxism. In *The Gramscian Moment*. Brill.

[43] D'Alisa, G., & Kallis, G. (2016). A political ecology of maladaptation: Insights from a Gramscian theory of the State. *Global Environmental Change*, *38*, 230-242.

> economics of the specialists. "Commonsense" creates the folklore of the future, that is as a relatively rigid phase of popular knowledge in a given place and time.[44]

Gramsci historicizes, relativizes and operationalizes this notion of commonsense and for him, commonsense is fundamentally plural: in any given society several *sensi comuni* (commonsenses) coexist where the hegemonic discourse articulates and prioritizes some *sensi comuni* to the detriment of others while paying the way for alternative commonsenses to mobilize to interpret differently and change the social reality. [45]

The central place given to "commonsense" by Gramsci also underlines the prominence of ideas in the formation of hegemony. Indeed, how strong a hegemony is established depends upon how successful it is the dominant class's presentation of its own interest to the other groups as common interest and how much other groups give their consent. It is not the actors that are hegemonic, but it is a certain element of commonsense: a worldview, a societal relation, or, more generally, a specific spatiotemporal discourse formation which becomes hegemonic.[46]

Another important contribution of Gramsci is the concept of historic bloc, which he defined as:

> if the relationship between intellectuals and people-nation, between the leaders and the led, the rulers and the ruled, is provided by an organic cohesion ...Only then can there take place an exchange of individual elements between the rulers

[44] Gramsci, A., Hoare, Q., & Nowell-Smith, G. (1971). Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Atonio Gramsci. P.326.

[45] D'Alisa, G., & Kallis, G. (2016). A political ecology of maladaptation: Insights from a Gramscian theory of the State. *Global Environmental Change*, *38*, 230-242. P. 233.

[46] Wullweber, J. (2019). Constructing hegemony in global politics. A discourse–theoretical approach to policy analysis. *Administrative Theory & Praxis*, *41*(2), 148-167. p.151.

> and ruled, leaders...and led, and can the shared life be realized which alone is a social force—with the creation of the "historic bloc"[47]

The historical bloc refers to an institutionalization of a set of ideas and practices constituting a structure of domination, yet this successful hegemony of a historical bloc is never complete or stable; rather it is constantly rearticulated, reinforced, and contested by various social forces.[48] Ideologies are not arbitrary but they are real historical facts to be fought and unmasked in their nature as instruments of domination in order to render the governed intellectually independent of the governors, in order to destroy one hegemony and create another, as a necessary moment in the overturning or reversal of praxis.[49] Since 'it is on the level of ideologies that men become conscious of conflicts in the world of the economy'[50], the construction of an alternative ideological culture that is actively contesting of the hegemonic ideology shakes the foundations of an hegemony by making people to think and act in a counter way.

Gramsci studied the hegemony within the interrelated relationship of national and international settings. He argued that whilst the 'national' sphere remained the starting point to eliminate class exploitation and private property, capitalism was a world historical phenomenon within uneven development.[51] The historical fact cannot have strictly defined 'national' boundaries because 'history is always "world history" and ... particular histories exist only within the frame of world history'.[52] Hence 'relations

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[47] Gramsci, A. (1971) *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. and trans. Q. Hoare and G. Nowell-Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart). P. 418

[48] Van Apeldoorn, B., & Horn, L. (2018). *Critical political economy*. Freie Universität Berlin.

[49] Stephen, M. (2011). Globalisation and resistance: struggles over commonsense in the global political economy. *Review of International Studies*, *37*(1), 209-228. P. 215.

[50] Gramsci, A. (1996) *Prison Notebooks*, vol.2, ed. and trans. J. A. Buttigieg (New York: Columbia University Press). P. 162

[51] Gramsci, A. (1977) *Selections from Political Writings, 1910-1920*, ed. Q. Hoare, trans.*]* Matthews (London: Lawrence and Wishart). P. 69–72

[52] Gramsci A. (1985) *Selections from Cultural Writings*, ed. D. Forgacs and G. Nowell-Smith, trans. W. Boelhower. (London: Lawrence and Wishart). P. 181.

within society'—involving the development of productive forces, the level of coercion, or relations between political parties—that constitute 'hegemonic systems within the state', were dealt with by the same concepts as 'relations between international forces'—involving the requisites of great powers, sovereignty and independence—that constitute 'the combinations of states in hegemonic systems'.[53]

This idea of the interconnectedness of national and international spheres later was emphasized by Neo-Gramscians who argued neoliberalism is a global hegemony project involving not only nation states, but also different actors, groups who emerged out different national settings yet have managed to take active role in the global setting to promote their class interests. The European unification project reflects the multi-layered class antagonisms both within national boundaries and beyond them.

2.2.2. Social relations of production, Forms of State, World Orders

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[53] Gramsci, A. (1971) *Selections from the Prison Notebooks,* ed. and trans. Q. Hoare and G. Nowell-Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart). P. 176.

[54] Gramsci, A. (1977) *Selections from Political Writings, 1910-1920,* ed. Q. Hoare, trans.*]* Matthews (London: Lawrence and Wishart). P. 69–72

[55] Gramsci A. (1985) *Selections from Cultural Writings,* ed. D. Forgacs and G. Nowell-Smith, trans. W. Boelhower. (London: Lawrence and Wishart). P. 181.

international forces'—involving the requisites of great powers, sovereignty and independence—that constitute 'the combinations of states in hegemonic systems'.[56]

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After briefly summarizing Gramsci's points on integral state, commonsense, hegemony and historical bloc, now I will now focus on Robert Cox's revitalization of Gramsci's ideas and the rise of Neo-Gramscian analyses. Robert Cox incorporates Gramscian understanding of mutually constituting material and ideational forces into his analysis of international relations.

Cox says:

> Production ... is to be understood in the broadest sense. It is not confined to the production of physical goods used or consumed. It covers the production and reproduction of knowledge and of the social relations, morals and institutions that are prerequisites to the production of physical goods.[57]

Cox emphasizes how changing production relations gives rise to particular social forces that become bases of power within and across states and thus within a specific world order.[58] He analyzes the hegemony within a historical structure through complex

[56] Gramsci, A. (1971) *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. and trans. Q. Hoare and G. Nowell-Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart). P. 176.

[57] Cox, R. W. (1989) 'Production, the state and change in world order', in E-O. Czempiel and J. N. Rosenau (eds), Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s (Toronto: Lexington Books). P. 39.

[58] Cox, R. W. (1987) Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History (New York: Columbia University Press). P. 4.

and interlinked spheres.[59] Unlike mainstream IR theory, which reduces hegemony to a single dimension of dominance based on the economic and military capabilities of states, a neo-Gramscian perspective developed by Cox broadens the domain of hegemony.[60] For Cox, hegemony involves both the interstate relationships and the penetration of a dominant mode of development into all countries through the activities of the ruling classes because global hegemony is expressed in *the universalized values and norms diffused through particular international institutions and mechanisms that heavily determine the framework of behaviour for states and cross-national social forces*.[61]

For Cox, different forms of state are defined by the historical bloc or class configuration, which determines its raison d'état.[62] The 'relative autonomy' of the state regulates dominant class interests in a manner consistent with the economic project of the class as a whole, without yielding to the particular interests of fractions of this

[59] Robert W. Cox (1981) argues that hegemony within a historical structure is constituted on three spheres of activity: the social relations of production, encompassing the totality of social relations in material, institutional and discursive forms that engender particular social forces; forms of state, consisting of historically contingent state-civil society complexes; and world orders, which not only represent phases of stability and conflict but also permit scope for thinking about how alternative forms of world order might emerge.

Within each of the three main spheres it is argued that three further elements reciprocally combine to constitute an historical structure: ideas, understood as intersubjective meanings as well as collective images of world order; material capabilities, referring to accumulated resources; and institutions, which are amalgams of the previous two elements and are means of stabilizing a particular order. These again are represented schematically. Social forces, as the main collective actors engendered by the social relations of production, operate within and across these spheres of activity by bringing together a coherent conjunction between ideas, understood as inter-subjective meanings as well as collective images of world order, material capabilities, referring to accumulated resources, and institutions, which are amalgams of the previous two. See Cox, R. (1981), 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 10/2: 126–55. P. 135-139.

[60] Bieler, A., & Morton, A. D. (2004). A critical theory route to hegemony, world order and historical change: neo-Gramscian perspectives in International Relations. *Capital & class*, *28*(1), 85-113. P. 87.

[61] Cox, R. W. (1983). Gramsci, hegemony and international relations: an essay in method. *Millennium*, *12*(2), 162-175.

[62] Cox, R. W. (1989) 'Production, the state and change in world order', in E-O. Czempiel and J. N. Rosenau (eds), Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s (Toronto: Lexington Books). P. 41

class.[63] From this perspective, globalization and the related emergence of new transnational social forces of capital and labor have not led to a retreat of the state but it paved the way for different forms of state through an internalization within the state itself of new configurations of social forces expressed by class struggle between different (national and transnational) fractions of capital and labor.[64] This argument provides an analytical channel for social scientists to examine the social basis of a particular state or to conceive of the historical 'content' of different states.

2.2.3. Passive Revolution and *Trasformismo*

Although Gramsci's writing is largely concerned with the specifics of Italian state formation, the framework of passive revolution is useful for a broader examination of the wider linkages between class struggle within a national social formation, and the international system.[65] Gramsci's concepts of passive revolution and *trasformismo* play a significant role in contemporary Neo-Gramscian scholars' perspectives in understanding hegemony, historic bloc, revolution and counter-revolution. As, I explained above, Gramsci defines hegemony as successful union of both coercion and consent, where the dominant class is able to present its own interest to the other classes as common interest and also gain consent in this process. Then, Gramsci develops his concept of "historic bloc" to define this ideologically united and historically particular social constellation of dominant and subordinate classes.

As I presented above, for Gramsci, hegemony is always temporary and depends on the continuous and dynamic process of hegemonic struggle. Despite being mostly in line with the hegemonic class's interests, hegemony could be established by solely supporting one group's position. Through a necessary compromise, it can be ensured

[63] Cox, R. W. (1987) Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History (New York: Columbia University Press). P. 149.

[64] Bieler, A., & Morton, A. D. (2003). Globalisation, the state and class struggle: a 'Critical Economy' engagement with Open Marxism. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, *5*(4), 467-499. P. 489.

[65] Gray, K. (2014). *Labour and development in East Asia: Social forces and passive revolution*. Routledge. Pp.22.

by either passive revolution or expansive hegemony. Expansive hegemony or political revolution of a radical-Jacobin type is obtained when "an active, direct consensus is established through promoting other classes' interests with the creation of national-popular will"[66]. Forgacs argues that for Gramsci, Jacobins represented the ability to transform the narrowly defined bourgeois revolution into one of a national/popular one under the bourgeois hegemony because they managed to acquire the active support of the urban workers and peasant masses for bourgeois rule in France not only through their universalizing discourse, but also through concrete economic sacrifices such as land reform.[67]

The concept of passive revolution is intrinsically linked to the institutionalization or expansion of capitalism though within a narrower hegemonic process.[68] The term 'passive' was employed here to denote the difference between processes shaped by a national-popular movement from below, or what Gramsci calls 'a political revolution of a radical-Jacobin type' that overthrew the old feudal classes in France, from a revolution from above or 'royal conquest' that found accommodation with them in the case of Italy.[69]

In sharp contrast with the Jacobinist strategy, Italian Moderates' passive revolutionary rule was based on a narrow class alliance with the big landowners and the pacification of the opposition leaders within the parliament through a practice defined by Gramsci as 'transformism'.[70]

Contrary to liberal views of civil society as a private realm of actors autonomous of the state, Gramsci viewed civil society as an extension of the state, where institutions

[66] Mouffe, C. (1979) "Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci" in *Gramsci and Marxist Theory* (ed.) C. Mouffe, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. Pp. 183.

[67] Forgacs, D. (1988). *A Gramsci reader* (Vol. 239). London: Lawrence and Wishart. Pp. 246-247.

[68] Morton, A. D. (2010). The continuum of passive revolution. *Capital & Class*, *34*(3), 315-342. Pp. 319.

[69] Hesketh, C. (2017). Passive revolution: A universal concept with geographical seats. *Review of International Studies*, *43*(3), 389-408. Pp.399.

[70] Forgacs, D. (1988). *A Gramsci reader* (Vol. 239). London: Lawrence and Wishart. Pp. 247.

such as schools, churches, and trade unions were the sites through which hegemony was exercised, and as such, become sites of dissemination of bourgeois hegemony, the "commonsense" in which the bourgeois worldview is deemed "natural."[71] Since hegemony is constructed, reinforced and challenged in 'civil society', including the terrain of ideology,[72] a 'passive revolution' is attempted under conditions of an 'organic crisis' when counter-hegemonic challenges to the dominant capitalist order are co-opted and neutralized through concessions.[73] The concept of passive revolution 'involves elite engineered social and political reform that draws on foreign capital and associated ideas while lacking a national-popular base'.[74]

Transformism is one of the facets of passive revolution and refers to a method of implementing a limited reform program via incorporating alter- or counter-hegemonic groups.[75] While 'passive revolution' highlights the *absence* of popular participation during such power shifts, *trasformismo* appears to capture a deliberate strategy to *prevent* popular participation and systemic change within the policies and procedures of political institutions through ideational distortion. [76]

Trasformismo serves as a strategy of assimilation and domesticating potentially dangerous ideas by adjusting them to the dominant coalition and can thereby obstruct the formation of class-based organized opposition to established social and political

[71] Gray, K. (2014). *Labour and development in East Asia: Social forces and passive revolution*. Routledge. Pp.20.

[72] Gramsci, A. (1971) *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, Ed. and transl. Hoare, Q. and Nowell Smith, G. London: Lawrence and Wishart. Pp. 12-13.

[73] Wanner, T. (2015). The new 'passive revolution'of the green economy and growth discourse: Maintaining the 'sustainable development'of neoliberal capitalism. *New Political Economy*, *20*(1), 21-41. Pp. 25.

[74] Morton, A. D. (2010). The continuum of passive revolution. *Capital & Class*, *34*(3), 315-342. Pp. 317-318.

[75] Ramos, L. C. S. (2006). Collective political agency in the XXIst century: Civil society in an age of globalization. Pp. 23-24.

[76] Paterson, B. (2009). Trasformismo at the World Trade Organization. In *Gramsci and global politics* (pp. 56-71). Routledge. Pp. 46-47.

power.[77] *Trasformismo* provides space for these alter- or counter-hegemonic groups who challenge the dominant ideas and processes of the established power structures by leading individuals, groups or social movements to "co-opt" their discourse into the established rhetoric.[78] Passive revolution perpetuates the status quo through two other Gramscian analytical tools, co-optation and trasformismo, which are means of preserving the existing civil-political structure through incremental reform and political obfuscation and co-optation is defined as "the incorporation of amenable elements of the subaltern classes' and non-dominant classes' concerns into the socio-political order, leading to temporary satisfaction. [79]

Patterson argues that alternative ideas of the subordinate groups, including **sustainable development**, the right to live, and respect for the environment, may be reflected in the official documents of the ruling groups, but the essence of the neoliberal accumulation strategy does not change.[80] Indeed, within these circumstances the politics of *trasformismo* comes to prevail (rather than genuine transformation), meaning the protracted absorption of class contradictions through, as Gramsci explains, "molecular changes which in fact progressively modify the pre-existing composition of forces, and hence become the matrix of new changes".[81]

Thus, *trasformismo* refers to the ability to accommodate pressures for more radical and disruptive change and to employ combinations of material, institutional and

[77] Cox, R. W. (1983). Gramsci, hegemony and international relations: an essay in method. *Millennium*, *12*(2), 162-175.

[78] See Patterson, W. Bill (2006), "Altering the World Order: The Alter-Globalization Movement and the World Trade Organization", Unpublished PhD Thesis, (Scotland: University of Stirling). Also see Moore, Phoebe V. (2007), Globalization and Labor Struggle in Asia. A Neo- Gramscian Critique of South Korea's Political Economy (London: Tauris).

[79] Ramos, L. C. S. (2006). Collective political agency in the XXIst century: Civil society in an age of globalization. Pp. 23-24.

[80] Patterson, W. Bill (2006), "Altering the World Order: The Alter-Globalization Movement and the World Trade Organization", Unpublished PhD Thesis, (Scotland: University of Stirling).

[81] Hesketh, C., & Morton, A. D. (2014). Spaces of uneven development and class struggle in Bolivia: Transformation or trasformismo?. *Antipode*, *46*(1), 149-169. Pp.150. And Gramsci, A. (1971) Selections from the Prison Notebooks (eds Q Hoare and G Nowell-Smith). London: Lawrence and Wishart. Pp. 109.

discursive power to ensure that shifts which do occur in socio-technical configurations do not disrupt prevailing social relations and distributions of political power. [82]

For subject matter of this thesis, which is the green transformation of European capitalism, *trasformismo* means aligning the various responses to climate change with the imperatives of capitalist accumulation, accommodating and obscuring its indictment of a fossil-fueled global political economy.[83]

2.3. Mainstream European Integration Theories and Their Neo-Gramscian Critiques

2.3.1. Neofunctionalism

Neo-functionalism, founded by Ernst B. Haas (1958)[84], is one of the main theories that has been used to understand and explain European integration in the 1950s and 1960s. From neo-functionalism, European integration project is seen as a long-term, gradual process, where political actors from different national places into aligning their loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new and larger center, whose institutions have or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states.[85]

Through questioning how cooperation in specific economic policy sector could lead to a greater economic and later a political integration in Europe, neo-functionalism

[82] Newell, P. (2019). Trasformismo or transformation? The global political economy of energy transitions. *Review of international political economy*, *26*(1), 25-48. Pp.27-28.

[83] Newell, P. (2019). Trasformismo or transformation? The global political economy of energy transitions. *Review of international political economy*, *26*(1), 25-48. Pp.28-29.

[84] By rejecting the cooperation inhibitive assumptions of realism about anarchy and its state-centrism, Haas argues that government could be separated into its constituent actors. He wrotes: "Political unification does not necessarily require absolute majority support, nor need it rest on identical aims on the part of all participants. Major interest groups as well as politicians determine their support of, or opposition to, new central institutions and policies on the basis of a calculation of advantage." See Haas, E. B (1958) The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-1957, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

[85]Haas, E. B. (1961). International integration: The European and the universal process. *International Organization*, *15*(3), 366-392. P.366-367.

emphasizes the centrality of "spill-over effect" for the transition of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) later into the European Economic Community (EEC).

Neo-functionalism takes functionalist ideas and explains the move away from the anarchic state system and towards supranational institution-building by focusing on societal and market patterns and how they pushed elites towards advocating supranational institutions within their policy areas.[86] Kahraman argues that neo-functionalism is an amalgam theory composed of liberal pluralism, functionalism, federalism and transactionalism, since in its prediction of a functional mutual dependence would eventually lead to a sectoral integration, neo-functionalism utilizes political pressures coming from non-state actors (interest groups and supranational institutions) to explain spill-over effect of integration on other sectors. [87] It is important to note that for neo-functionalism, the presence of a political will for a united Europe lies underneath the basic assumption about economic negotiations and further institutional integration policies.

Following the Empty Chair Crisis in 1965 the European Community came to a deadlock. Even Haas himself, recognized this in the preface he wrote in 1968 that De Gaulle proved the assumption of economic union would lead to political union wrong. Since Haas himself as rejected neo-functionalism as "obsolescent" (Haas, 1976), the theory was critically revised in the late 1960s and early 1970s by the students of Haas who engaged more intensely and systematically with the question of politicization.[88]

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[86] Niemann, A., Lefkofridi, Z., & Schmitter, P. C. (2019) "Neofunctionalism" In Wiener, A., Börzel, T. A., and Risse, T. (eds.): European Integration Theory, Oxford: Oxford UP, pp. 43-63.

[87] Kahraman, S. (2014) Avrupa Bütünleşmesi Kuramları: 1950-1970 Yılları. Belgin Akçay and İlke Göçmen (Ed.), Avrupa Birliği: Tarihçe, Teoriler, Kurumlar ve Politikalar (pp. 69-85). Ankara: Seçkin.

[88] See Haas, E. B. (1976). Turbulent fields and the theory of regional integration. *International organization*, *30*(2), 173-212. Also see Lindberg, L. N., & Scheingold, S. A. (1970). Europe's would-be policy.

Schmitter defines, for example, defines politicization as a "process whereby the *controversiality* of joint decision-making goes up. This in turn is likely to lead to *a widening of the audience or clientele* interested and active in integration. Somewhere along the line *a manifest redefinition of mutual objectives* will probably occur [...] along with "*a shift in actor expectations and loyalty* toward the new regional center" See Schmitter, P. C. (1969). Three neo-functional hypotheses about international integration. *International organization*, *23*(1), 161-166.

The global economic crisis of 1973 definitely contributed to the escalation of problems within the EC regarding the deepening and widening of the unification. Indeed, the period between 1973-1984 was named as Eurosclerosis or Europessimism because the European unification project was stuck and almost taken hostage by the political figures of the period.[89] From a neofunctionalist perspective, the European Green Deal is not just a piece of climate policy integration, but it is another step to be taken towards "ever-closer European Union". It has "the potential to be building block to the European economic model" since with climate and sustainability as the overarching rationale, all other policies need to be coordinated and legislation revised to fall in line with a holistic sustainability objective and carbon emission targets. [90]

[89] Eurosclerosis was used to define the period when there was significant rise in unemployment and it was attribute to the mass of rules and regulations governing many aspects of behaviour in European labour markets, and related markets, resulting in an obstacle for "labour market flexibility", this term was in two reports of OECD in 1986 "Flexibility in the Labour Market: The Current Debate" and "Labour Market Flexibility: Report by a High-Level Group of Experts".

See Burgess, S. M. (1992). A search model with job changing costs: 'Eurosclerosis' and unemployment. *Oxford Economic Papers*, *44*(1), 75-88.

For example, Giersch explained that: The diagnosis for Europe's disease can be called Eurosclerosis. It means two things:

> (i) Essential members of the body economic have become too rigid to permit a quick and painless adjustment. So they requested and obtained assistance. Instead of using it for regeneration, most of the beneficiaries took it as a protective device and asked for more of it. Measures that might have been justified along the lines of the infant industry argument for tariffs turned out to be devices for protecting senile industries. This kind of industrial policy is an almost necessary consequence of a full employment promise that has an inherent tendency to become gradually more specific, thus inducing economic agents in declining areas and industries to rely more and more on government aid, a phenomenon closely related to the well-known Samaritan's dilemma.
>
> (ii) In the problem industries and problem areas, partly as a result of actual and expected government aid, the innovative and regenerative forces turned out to be too weak to overcome the rigidities, notably the rigidities in the labour market. (Giersch, 1985: 4).

It was argued that this period was marked with a dysfunctional decision-making process, an agricultural policy out of control, a new French president, François Mitterrand, pursuing a dash for growth that further strained Community solidarity, a new British Prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, insisting on a budget rebate (an issue will preoccupy the EC for the next five years and fifteen summits) See Dinan, D. (2005). *Ever closer union: an introduction to European integration* (4th ed.). Palgrave Macmillan.

[90] Bongardt, A., & Torres, F. (2022). The European green deal: More than an exit strategy to the pandemic crisis, a building block of a sustainable European economic model. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, *60*(1), 170-185. Pp. 174.

It is especially important to note that the EGD is the latest form of supranational coordination of member state's environmental policies. The evolution of EU climate policy is well documented, from first attempts in the 1980s and 1990s to the stepwise development and strengthening of a fuller policy framework in the 2000s and 2010s and finally to the European Green Deal launched in 2019.[91] EU climate governance has 'thickened' through a stepwise layering of various economic, regulatory, procedural, and informational instruments; and this thickening has gone hand in hand with an expansion and strengthening of climate policy integration.[92]

In a sense, the integration in one aspect of environmental policy has led to the another, and in time, it has turned into a comprehensive plan to make Europe the first carbon-neutral continent by 2050. And just like "the single market and economic and monetary union (EMU)" had initiated a European regulatory model and added a monetary union to the economic union side in the past, the EGD can transform the EU by changing "competitiveness rationale" to the "competitive sustainability" and by making climate neutrality a priority in the future. [93] Therefore, for the neofunctionalist perspective, the "spill-over effect" of new environmental policies will make it necessary to form other policies for other sectors, which will eventually create ever-closer European Union on the basis of competitive sustainability or green transformation of the EU.

2.3.2. Neo-Gramscian Critique of Neo-functionalism

According to Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, Henk Overbeek and Magnus Ryner, mainstream theories fail to account for the structural power that determines the

[91] Oberthür, S., & Von Homeyer, I. (2023). From emissions trading to the European Green Deal: the evolution of the climate policy mix and climate policy integration in the EU. *Journal of European Public Policy*, *30*(3), 445-468. Pp. 445.

[92] Oberthür, S., & Von Homeyer, I. (2023). From emissions trading to the European Green Deal: the evolution of the climate policy mix and climate policy integration in the EU. *Journal of European Public Policy*, *30*(3), 445-468. Pp. 445.

[93] Bongardt, A., & Torres, F. (2022). The European green deal: More than an exit strategy to the pandemic crisis, a building block of a sustainable European economic model. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, *60*(1), 170-185. Pp. 170-171.

particular trajectory of European integration.[94] Andreas Bieler argues that for mainstream theories, integration is conditioned with the realization that certain economic problems yield higher welfare gains, if they are dealt with at the supranational level.[95] Neo-Gramscian scholars criticize neo-functionalism on the basis of its lack of focus on the internal and external power of interest groups, which made it incapable of understanding why some groups are more powerful than others in the process of establishing the European Agenda.[96] Apeldoorn claimed that neo-functionalism disregarded not only the question of power within and between groups but also of why some groups are more powerful than others, which may affect their capabilities positively in setting the agenda of European integration.[97]

This lack of intellectual attention, on part of neo-functionalist view of European integration, is the key for failing to understand why different groups are taking different positions vis-à-vis the European integration project, why some can build alliances while others can't, and most, importantly, why some groups have access to the decision making process in the supra-national level and have ability to influence the outcomes of these proceedings whereas other societal parties cannot do the same.

For supranationalist approach to the European integration project, Neo-Gramscians underline the lack of theorization since there is no explanation for the sources of transnational interests.[98] Apeldoorn claims that supranationalist accounts see the role of transnational business as a response not only to the international environment but also to the institutional changes that were already taking place, leading to a new reality

[94] Van Apeldoorn, E. B., Overbeek, H. W., & Ryner, M. (2003). Theories of European integration: a critique. *A ruined fortress? Neoliberal hegemony and transformation in Europe*, 17-45. p. 17.

[95] Bieler A. (2000) "Globalisation and Enlargement of the European Union: Austrian and Swedish social forces in the struggle over membership", Routledge, New York. Pp. 3.

[96] Van Apeldoorn, E. B., Overbeek, H. W., & Ryner, M. (2003). Theories of European integration: a critique. *A ruined fortress? Neoliberal hegemony and transformation in Europe*, 17-45. p. 22.

[97] Van Apeldoorn, B. (2002). *Transnational capitalism and the struggle over European integration*. Routledge. p. 36.

[98] Van Apeldoorn, E. B., Overbeek, H. W., & Ryner, M. (2003). Theories of European integration: a critique. *A ruined fortress? Neoliberal hegemony and transformation in Europe*, 17-45. p. 23.

that was perceived as "irreversible".[99] From the more critical positions of international political economy, these explanations of the mainstream theories regarding why the European capital was essential for the emergence and development of the Single Market on European Agenda, are extremely problematic in the sense that they almost took the form an almost inevitable natural occurrence. Apeldoorn and Horn write that European integration is a fundamentally open-ended and contested process.[100] Any theoretical approach that disregard the "contested" nature of the European Integration, starts its analysis with false premises.

Furthermore, since mainstream theories take the specific socio-political and economic development as the evidence of already present transformations, they do not even attempt to critically approach these new developments and question why specific route had been taken by the actors but not the others. For Neo-Gramscians, this makes the mainstream theories ahistorical. Bieler says that the notion of spill-over implies an inevitable, teleological process of further integration along an objective economic rationality.[101] And by focusing on solely internal dynamics of European politics, neo-functionalism only explains European integration by neglecting the effects of globalization over the very structure of the European Union.[102]

In this subsection, firstly I presented the main theoretical assumptions of neofunctionalism as separating and delegating issues into separate conceptual boxes and then claiming integration in one area of policy would eventually lead to integration in other related policy areas. I argued that this theoretical position takes the issues, course of actions and decisions which are inherently very political, as parts of almost "automatic" and "natural" development of European integration. In this theoretical approach, there is no analysis of class antagonisms, discussions about alternative

[99] Van Apeldoorn, B. (2002). *Transnational capitalism and the struggle over European integration*. Routledge. p. 37.

[100] Van Apeldoorn, B., & Horn, L. (2018). *Critical political economy*. Freie Universität Berlin. Pp. 3.

[101] Bieler A. (2000) "Globalisation and Enlargement of the European Union: Austrian and Swedish social forces in the struggle over membership", Routledge, New York. p. 4.

[102] Bieler A. (2000) "Globalisation and Enlargement of the European Union: Austrian and Swedish social forces in the struggle over membership", Routledge, New York. p. 4.

routes of actions or the specific ways of policy making. If this theoretical approach is applied to the development of the European Green Deal, it would mean that the EU is wired from the very beginning to adopt the EGD. What meant to happen, happened in the end.

As Apeldoorn and Horn write that European integration is a fundamentally open-ended and contested process,[103] I underline the "contested" nature of the European Integration, and specifically of the European Green Deal. In my criticisms of the neofunctionalist approach to the EGD, I borrow from Neo-Gramscian because I underlined the transformative power of social forces for any political development. In the beginning of this chapter, I admitted that neofunctionalism successfully show how the European unification project evolve to the EGD step-by-step through the development of union-wise environmental politics. Still, it is critical to note that neofunctionalist notion of inevitable development of "more integration" through "spill-over" is very restricted since it does not problematize the process and the actors.

From Neo-Gramscian perspective, I argue that neofunctionalism is especially limited to explore whose interests are dominant in the adopted policy framework, why European institutions are more inclined to side with specific social groups at the expense of others. I argue that neofunctionalism fails to take into account member states' different interests, the sometimes-contradictory positions of EU institutions, the impact of global capitalist networks and the increasingly powerful role of EU citizens, green political parties and green NGOs.

2.3.3. Intergovernmentalism

In his critique of neofunctionalism, Hoffman emphasized the bargaining powers of nation states and how they are able to transform the supranational decision-making. Hoffman's intergovernmentalism highlighted the dichotomy between *low* politics, which comprises areas such the economic and welfare policies and the vital national interests or *high* politics such as foreign policy, security and defense, where national

[103] Van Apeldoorn, B., & Horn, L. (2018). *Critical political economy*. Freie Universität Berlin. Pp. 3.

governments are less willing to transfer their authority to a supranational body; since national governments would try to minimize uncertainty and retain tight control over decision processes when vital interests are involved.[104] While intergovernmentalism perceived integration as a zero-sum game and argued that integration can be possible only in areas where it does not violate state sovereignty liberal intergovernmentalism recognized the role of institutions on governmental actors as not constraining but rather enhancing their capabilities. [105] Moravcsik explained how EU integration could best be understood as a series of rational choices made by national leaders by arguing that these choices responded to constraints and opportunities stemming from the economic interests of powerful domestic constituents, the relative power of states stemming from asymmetrical inter-dependence, and the role of institutions in bolstering the credibility of interstate commitments.[106] Institutions are thus not only

[104] Moga, T. L. (2009). The Contribution of the Neofunctionalist and Intergovernmentalist Theories to the Evolution of the European Integration Process. Journal of alternative perspectives in the social sciences, 1(3), 796-807. For intergovernmentalism, see Hoffmann, S. (1982). Reflections on the nation-state in Western Europe today. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, *21*(1), 21-38.

[105] For liberal intergovernmentalism see Moravcsik, A., & Schimmelfennig, F. (2009). Liberal Intergovernmentalism//European Integration Theory/ed. by Wiener A., Diez T. Although they share the assumption of states with many votes in the EU Council and high bargaining power could shape the shape outcomes in EU negotiations than states with fewer votes, intergovernmentalists kept the core arguments of realism while liberal intergovernmentalism brought together 'realist' state-centrism on the international level with a 'liberal' focus on state preference formation, and saw institutions beyond the nation state as a standard feature of international politics, even though they are largely dependent on the continued support of their member states. See Moravcsik, A. (1994). 'Why the European Community Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and International Cooperation', Center for European Studies, Working Paper Series No. 52 (Harvard University).

[106] Moravcsik, A. (1998) *The choice for Europe. Social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht*. Cornell University Press.

Pollack (2012) analyzes Moravcsik's "liberal intergovernmentalism" as a three-step model:

(1) a liberal theory of national preference formation with
(2) an intergovernmental model of EU-level bargaining and
(3) a "credible commitments" model of institutional choice

In the first or liberal stage of the model, national chiefs of government (COGs) aggregate the interests of their domestic constituencies, as well as their own interests, and articulate their respective national preferences toward the EU. Thus, national preferences are complex, reflecting the distinctive economics, parties, and institutions of each member state, and they are determined *domestically*, not shaped by participation in the EU as some neo-functionalists had proposed. In substantive terms, Moravcsik argues, national preferences are driven by issue-specific and generally economic interests, with at best a secondary role for geopolitical interests (*pace* realism) or ideology.

seen to coordinate state action and facilitate inter- national cooperation, but independently to affect states' preferences and strategies.[107]

From very early on, the development of environmental politics in the European level has attracted attention from intergovernmentalist scholars. It is perceived that any step that is taken to reach an environmental understanding in the supranational level was put on the back burner when it comes to the completion of common market. Also, the fact that the process of decision-making was limited to the elite group of policymakers and representatives of capital, made it a case that can be best studied with intergovernmentalism.

Since the Single European Act (SEA) adopted in 1987, environmental issues are started to be discussed in the supranational level and the European public has become more knowledgeable about the environmental problems while the parties with environmental focus started to gain relative success in the European Parliament. Yet, these environmental developments coincided with the ambition of completing the internal market of the European Community where the latter had significant priority over the first. The European Community remained "first and foremost a business association" where the impetus for change in the EC comes from elite groups such as business or from heads of state, and not from nationally based environmental groups.[108]

From intergovernmentalist perspective, scholars questioned how the institutions of the EU have specific roles in the development of EU-level environmental policy; namely

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Moreover, Moravcsik argued that the EU's historic intergovernmental agreements, such as the 1957 Treaties of Rome and the 1992 TEU, were not driven primarily by supranational entrepreneurs, unintended spillovers from earlier integration, or transnational coalitions of interest groups, but rather by a gradual process of preference convergence among the most powerful member states, which then struck central bargains among themselves, offered side payments to smaller member states, and delegated strictly limited powers to supranational organizations that remained more or less obedient servants. See Pollack, M. A. (2012). Realist, intergovernmentalist, and institutionalist approaches. In *The Oxford Handbook of the European Union*.

[107] Tiilikainen, T. (2019). Theory of European integration as a challenge to IR theories. *Global affairs*, *5*(4-5), 477-484.

[108] Huelshoff, M. G., & Pfeiffer, T. (1992). Environmental policy in the EC: neo-functionalist sovereignty transfer or neo-realist gate-keeping?. *International Journal*, *47*(1), 136-158. Pp. 157-158.

the two intergovernmental institutions of the European Council and the Council of the European Union together with the European Commission and how they embraced the EGD's ambition to achieve climate neutrality by 2050.[109] However, following the completion of the single market in 1992 and subsequent the liberalisation of gas and electricity markets, the European Commission and the European Parliament had enjoyed significant influence over the environmental politics of the EU together with the various non-state actors; such as industrial associations, environmental NGOs, and transnational networks, all of these developments made any intergovernmental analysis of European integration significantly problematic.[110]

2.3.4. Neo-Gramscian Critique of Intergovernmentalism

Neo-Gramscian scholars criticize the intergovernmentalist approach to European integration by pointing out its lack of attention to transformative role of social forces. Apeldoorn argues that in this approach, the state is the central actor yet it is seen as separate from society, meaning not only are transnational actors ignored in the state-centric ontology of intergovernmentalism, but social forces are excluded altogether from the analysis.[111] Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, Henk Overbeek and Magnus Ryner explained that national policy preferences are not explained, but are taken as given.[112]

While intergovernmentalism emphasizes the centrality of national interests in deciding the course of international relations, it ignores the analysis of different social groups within nation states, which are essential part of deciding what constitutes the national interest in the first place.

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[109] Rosamond, J., & Dupont, C. (2021). The European Council, the Council, and the European Green Deal. *Politics and Governance*, *9*(3), 348-359.

[110] Catuti, M. (2022). *The Governance of EU Energy and Climate Policy in the New Intergovernmentalism Era: Lessons from the Clean Energy for all Europeans Package* (Doctoral dissertation, University of York).

[111] Van Apeldoorn, B. (2002). *Transnational capitalism and the struggle over European integration*. Routledge.p. 37.

[112] Van Apeldoorn, E. B., Overbeek, H. W., & Ryner, M. (2003). Theories of European integration: a critique. *A ruined fortress? Neoliberal hegemony and transformation in Europe*, 17-45. p. 23

Bieler argues that intergovernmentalism cannot theorize the structural changes such as globalization, since it is limited in a state-centric fashion.[113] From Neo-Gramscian perspective, the statist focus of intergovernmentalism inhibits any analysis from grasping the complex reality of globalism since it is not equipped with necessary theoretical tools to analyze "change" beyond state agency. Since intergovernmentalism does not take into account class antagonisms embedded in the current structure of national, supranational and global politics, it cannot develop a comprehensive analysis of social forces, which is essential to critically probe inherent inequalities of the contemporary political economy. There is no interest in the structural inequalities that are constitutive of the balance of social forces and how these forces change over time.[114]

In this subsection, I explained the theoretical pillars of intergovernmentalism for understanding and explaining European integration process. Essentially being a statist approach, intergovernmentalism takes the development of European integration as an outcome of rational choices made by national leaders depending on where they stand in the asymmetrically interdependent relations. By adopting Neo-Gramscian approach, I tried to show how intergovernmentalism is limited its analysis of the European integration process, since it takes state as thing in itself, independent of the constitutive dynamics of social groups within one country, and of the effects of global structure of capitalism.

Intergovernmentalism does not interested in finding answers to questions like "how does a state have its own interest irrespective of its inherent class antagonisms, its position in the global political economy, more importantly via transnational capital?" or "how influential the activism of its citizens over the formation of political demands and then respective piece of policies?" or "how it is possible to demarcate domestic

[113] Bieler A. (2000) "Globalisation and Enlargement of the European Union: Austrian and Swedish social forces in the struggle over membership", Routledge, New York. p. 4.

[114] Van Apeldoorn, E. B., Overbeek, H. W., & Ryner, M. (2003). Theories of European integration: a critique. *A ruined fortress? Neoliberal hegemony and transformation in Europe*, 17-45. p. 25.

politics from global politics in the contemporary highly globalized political economy?".

Through neo-Gramscian contributions, I showed that intergovernmentalism lacks necessary attention should be given to the transformative role of social forces in order to grasp the complex reality of European integration process. In intergovernmentalist perspective, national policy preferences are not explained, but are taken as given.[115]

While intergovernmentalism emphasizes the centrality of national interests in deciding the course of international relations, it ignores the analysis of different social groups within nation states, which are essential part of deciding what constitutes the national interest in the first place. Furthermore, since the state is taken as the central focus of attention and separate from society, intergovernmentalism ignores both transnational actors and nationally located social forces.[116]

From neo-Gramscian perspective, any analysis of the European Green Deal using the theoretical assumptions, concepts and tools of intergovernmentalism, faces the dangers of being confined to a depthless endeavor. Any study of the EGD only through inter-state negotiations and using the available data from intergovernmental institutions of the European Council and the Council of the European Union would fail to understand how and why specific states defined their positions via environmental politics because intergovernmentalism would take these positions as given and would not question at all the process and actors involved both within and beyond the national borders.

2.3.5. Social Constructivism

Although the primacy given to nation states and institutions is what differentiates them from each other, neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism share a rationalist point of view to European integration process as two main European integration theories. In this sense, they are closer to rationalist theories of the neo-neo debate and then neo-

[115] Van Apeldoorn, E. B., Overbeek, H. W., & Ryner, M. (2003). Theories of European integration: a critique. *A ruined fortress? Neoliberal hegemony and transformation in Europe*, 17-45. p. 23

[116] Van Apeldoorn, B. (2002). *Transnational capitalism and the struggle over European integration*. Routledge. p. 37.

neo synthesis in IR.[117] European integration theory also has its own versions of constructivism's middle-way between rationalism and reflectivism in IR.

As constructivism emphasizes the mutually transformative process between ideas and interests, and how social ideas and discourses are effective on the formation of interests; social constructivist approaches to the EU takes European integration as a process of community building where groups or associations share a collective identity, causal and normative beliefs, and structures of meaning, which are all necessary to build a common community.[118]

From social constructivist approaches, European identities emerge (like "Europeanness" and "European citizenship") due to the internalization of norms when actors acquire their identities and establish what their interests are; in other words, their identities and interests are "constituted" by norms.[119]

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[117] Following the dissatisfaction with the Third or Inter-Paradigm Debate in IR, the rationalist and reflectivist theories started to the Fourth Debate where most of the new theories of IR like feminism and poststructuralism opposed the dominance of rationalist approaches (neorealism and neoliberalism), primarily on epistemological grounds since rationalist theories claim that their accounts are more accurate than others because, due to their systematic scientific approach, they can capture the essence of the way the world is in an empirically justifiable way. See Smith, S. (2012). Introduction: diversity and disciplinarity in international relations theory. *International relations theories: discipline and diversity*, 1-12.

In his (in)famous speech in during his ISA presidential address, Keohane claimed that reflectivism's main weakness was the lack of a research programme:

> Until the reflective scholars or others sympathetic to their arguments have delineated such a research program and shown in particular studies that it can illuminate important issues in world politics, they will remain on the margins of the field, largely invisible to the preponderance of empirical researchers, most of whom explicitly or implicitly accept one or another version of rationalistic premises... What is needed, is for reflectivist scholars to develop 'testable theories' without which 'it will be impossible to evaluate their research programme'. (quoted in Smith, 2012: 6)

[118] Constructivists take European integration as a process. While intergovernmentalists recommend that the EU be studied as an instance of inter-state bargaining and comparativists think about the EU as a political system, constructivists purport to investigate the character of the move from a bargaining to a polity. See Schimmelfennig, F. (2012). Constructivist perspectives. In The Oxford Handbook of the European Union. And Christiansen, T., Jørgensen, K. E., & Wiener, A. (Eds.). (2001). *The social construction of Europe*. Sage.

[119] Börzel, T. A., & Risse, T. (2009). The transformative power of Europe: The European Union and the diffusion of ideas.

According to constructivism, the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world.[120] Alexander Wendt, who is a prominent scholar of the social constructivism, criticizes state-centrism of liberalism and realism and argues that structure, within which action takes place, does not only consist of material capabilities, but also of intersubjectively constituted identities and interests in the states-system, and through reciprocal inter- action... that we create and instantiate the relatively enduring social structures in terms of which we define our identities and interests.[121] In "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics", Wendt writes famously that there is no logic of anarchy apart from the practices that create and instantiate one structure of identities and interests rather than another; structure has no existence or causal powers apart from process.[122]

Ian Manners (2002) argues that what differentiates the European unification project from other political forms is that it acts in a normative way.[123] And through its own mechanism, certain type of actions, policy-makings or simply preferences affect its members according to this pre-decided normative stance of the EU. This can be in the form of bargaining, exclusion-based bargaining or rules-based negotiation, depending on the type of relationship established.[124]

In the context of environmental politics, "climate neutrality", "circular economy" and" just transition" have become the norms of the EU and through the adoption of the EGD, the EU can externalize its policies effectively and that is needed when setting

[120] Adler, E. (1997). Seizing the middle ground: Constructivism in world politics. *European journal of international relations*, *3*(3), 319-363. Pp. 322.

[121] Wendt, Alexander (1999) Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp.406.

[122] Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics. *International organization*, *46*(2), 391-425. Pp. 394-395.

[123] Manners, Ian (2002), *Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction In Terms*, JCMS 2002 Volume 40(2). pp. 235–258.

[124] Young, Alasdair R., (2015) "The European Union as a global regulator? Context and comparison," *Journal of European Public Policy*, 22(9), 1233-1252. Pp. 1234.

global standards and formulating rules.[125] Thus, from a social constructivist perspective, the EGD is the epitome of normative leadership of the EU in the process of transforming not only the union itself but also the world through its various reflections over the global structure of the international political economy.

2.3.6. Neo-Gramscian Critique of Social Constructivism

Bieler and Morton criticizes social constructivism by pointing out that in this theoretical approach, "the interrelatedness and influence of the ideal/material is posed as always-already separate and combined entities" and ask important questions:

- whose values and beliefs have constituted or embodied state identities and interests and the relevant constitutional structure of the international society of states?
- which agents shape the core intersubjective beliefs of underlying social and world orders?
- why does a particular set of ideas become part of the structure and not another?[126]

As I explained before, the Gramscian argument of hegemony as the union of coercion and consent with specific focus on the transformative role of ideas. His concept of integral state as a dialectical unity of civil society and political society also has its foundation on the strong influence of specific ideology.

For Gramsci, an integral state cannot function for long only on the basis of coercive power and consent alone is not enough because no ruling class however can survive forever merely by exercising force; it will survive only if it also hegemonizes ideologically the space of civil society.[127] Ideas are instrumental for Gramsci's notion

[125] Eckert, S. (2021). The European Green Deal and the EU's Regulatory Power in Times of Crisis. JCMS: *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 59(S1), 81–91. Pp. 81-83.

[126] Bieler, A., & Morton, A. D. (2008). The deficits of discourse in IPE: Turning base metal into gold?. *International Studies Quarterly*, *52*(1), 103-128. PP.110.

[127] D'Alisa, G., & Kallis, G. (2016). A political ecology of maladaptation: Insights from a Gramscian theory of the State. *Global Environmental Change*, *38*, 230-242.

historic bloc, which is defined as the moment when the relationship between intellectuals and people-nation, between the leaders and the led, the rulers and the ruled, is provided by an organic cohesion.[128]

The historical bloc refers to an institutionalization of a set of ideas and practices constituting a structure of domination, yet this successful hegemony of a historical bloc is never complete or stable; rather it is constantly rearticulated, reinforced, and contested by various social forces.[129]

And since ideologies are essential part of Gramscian analysis, Neo-Gramscian scholars do not reject the constructivist scholars' emphasis on ideas and norm but they reject their perception of ideas independent of class antagonisms. Bieler explains two different functions of ideas as:[130]

- Establishing "intersubjective meanings" for individuals and groups to understand their social situation, and the possibilities of social change.
- Being weaponized by organic intellectuals to legitimize particular policies of a hegemonic project.

Ben Rosamond argues that the Commission is behind the social construction of the category 'European competitiveness', in order to justify neo-liberal restructuring and an expansion of its policy competencies within the EU institutional set-up.[131] He does not go into the details of why alternative and possibly rival projects of neoliberal restructuring of the European Union were not preferred by the supra-national institutions of the EU. In contrast to constructivism, neo-Gramscian perspectives

[128] Gramsci, A. (1971) *Selections from the Prison Notebooks,* ed. and trans. Q. Hoare and G. Nowell-Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart). P. 418

[129] Van Apeldoorn, B., & Horn, L. (2018). *Critical political economy*. Freie Universität Berlin.

[130] Bieler, A. (2006). European Integration and Eastward Enlargement. In Global Restructuring, State, Capital and Labour (pp. 71-90). Palgrave Macmillan, London. Pp. 78.

[131] Rosamond, B. (2002). Imagining the European economy: 'competitiveness' and the social construction of 'Europe' as an economic space. *New political economy*, *7*(2), 157-177. Pp. 162-171.

emphasize the material structure of ideas.[132] Bieler and Morton write about the relationship between ideas and the constructivist approaches as:

> Although there is a very close relationship between ideas, practice, and the overall structure within which agency operates, agency often remains under-conceptualized across social constructivist approaches. Moreover, while the latter can establish how specific ideas might become part of the overall structure, social constructivists are unable to explain why a particular set of ideas became part of the structure and not another, rival set of ideas at a particular moment in time.[133]

As I explained above, Neo-Gramscian scholars underline the centrality of ideas for the formation of hegemonic order, which consists of different social forces. Ideas are weaponized in the hands of organic intellectuals to subjugate other groups into adopting the 'commonsense' defined by the dominant groups, as their own. I explained how historic bloc builds on the successful adoption of a particular interest of the dominant classes as the source of common good by the masses.

In this subsection, I explained the theoretical pillars of social constructivism for understanding and explaining European integration process. I presented how social constructivism takes ideas and material world as mutually transformative and constitutive spheres of reality.

To constructivism, the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world. In this line theorization, European integration is seen as a process of community building where groups or associations share a collective identity, causal

[132] Bieler, A., & Morton, A. D. (2001). Introduction: neo-Gramscian perspectives in international political economy and the relevance to European integration. In *Social Forces in the Making of the New Europe: The Restructuring of European Social Relations in the Global Political Economy* (pp. 3-24). London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. p. 97.

[133] Bieler, A., & Morton, A. D. (2008). The deficits of discourse in IPE: Turning base metal into gold?. *International Studies Quarterly*, *52*(1), 103-128. PP.104.

and normative beliefs, and structures of meaning, which are all necessary to build a common community.[134]

For social constructivism, European integration is mutually constituted (since it also constitutes the latter) its European community, European identity, European norms and ideas. This is especially important to understand how social constructivism would perceive the adoption of the European Green Deal as an outcome of "climate neutrality", "circular economy" and" just transition" and also as *the epitome of climate leadership of the EU* over the global structure of capitalism.

By adopting the Neo-Gramscian approach, I argue that for the emergence, development and adoption of the EGD, the ideas are essential, but it is equally important to note their material bases. That is why for a comprehensive analysis, these questions should also be asked:

- Why did the EU have formulated the EGD but not another legal framework in an effort to fight climate change?

- Why is that the growth-based capitalist rationale was never questioned in the EGD?

Instead, why was it re-formulated in such a way that the core ideas of the global environmental activism are no longer threat to the conduct of capitalist relations of production and consumption?

I argue that the answer to these questions require a more critical approach to uncover hegemonic positions of some ideas over others, which is also essential to show their material bases are constituting these ideas in the first place.

[134] Constructivists take European integration as a process. While intergovernmentalists recommend that the EU be studied as an instance of inter-state bargaining and comparativists think about the EU as a political system, constructivists purport to investigate the character of the move from a bargaining to a polity. See Schimmelfennig, F. (2012). Constructivist perspectives. In The Oxford Handbook of the European Union. And Christiansen, T., Jørgensen, K. E., & Wiener, A. (Eds.). (2001). *The social construction of Europe*. Sage.

2.4. Marxist Conceptual Tools Applied to European Green Deal

2.4.1. Neo-Gramscian Tools Re-defined within the EGD

As opposed to mainstream theories, Neo-Gramscian scholars conceive the European Integration as an inherently class project and underline the centrality of class antagonisms within the development of supranational government of the EU. Apeldoorn and Horn explained this as:

> Understanding the European integration process as a political, and ultimately, class project points to the underlying social purpose of European integration and the particular order that has been created through this process. .... (social purpose) is above all bound up with the particular class nature of the European project. It has to do with the question of cui bono, and the power asymmetries both reflected and produced by European governance - especially European socio-economic governance, which remains primary to other policy areas, such as justice, and foreign and security policy.[135]

For Neo-Gramscian scholars, social forces are at the center of any analysis. European integration and the regime of EU governance are seen as a political, and potentially hegemonic, project – or sometimes more accurately defined as the outcome of a struggle between rival projects.[136]

Neo-Gramscian analyses focus on, for instance, the organized interests at EU level such as "social partners" Business Europe (or European RoundTable for Industrialists) and the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), together with transnational) associations and lobby groups, think tanks and private forums, and expert groups.[137] They study the European integration through analysis of the social forces -not only

[135] Van Apeldoorn, B., & Horn, L. (2018). *Critical political economy*. Freie Universität Berlin. Pp.11.

[136] Van Apeldoorn, B. (2003). *Transnational capitalism and the struggle over European integration*. Routledge.

[137] Van Apeldoorn, B., & Horn, L. (2018). *Critical political economy*. Freie Universität Berlin. Pp.10.

European but also global and investigate the effects of globalism over the supranational governance of the EU.

As I explain in the methodology chapter, in my dissertation I selected my data from various groups such as European Commission, European Council, the Council of the EU, European RoundTable for Industrialists (ERT), European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), Green10, Greens/EFA and Eurobarometers. I followed the Neo-Gramscian focus on social forces in my analysis of the European Green Deal because I perceive the EGD as a part of wider transformation of Western capitalist relations, of which the EU is a prominent part.

Historically, the European Unification project has been a struggle between rival projects, which in the end was shaped dominantly by capitalist-owners' interests but also has given significant concessions to the subordinate groups. The idea of 'social Europe'[138] was the result of this competition between liberalism and socialism within the EU.

From Neo-Gramscian perspective, there were three rival projects underlying the revival of European integration in the mid-1980s and early 1990s, when the SEA paved the way towards the Internal Market and the Treaty of Maastricht was signed including plans towards EMU: [139]

- the neo-liberal project with an emphasis on market-led, negative integration and close connection with globalization through the opening of the EU to the global economy, supported by big Transnational companies as the globalist fraction of European capital.
- the neo-mercantilist project, supported mainly by transnational European firms as the Europeanist fraction of European capital, arguing for bigger and deeper European market and protection against outside players.

[138] European Commission. The European Pillar of Social Rights in 20 principles https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1606&langId=en

[139] Bieler, A. (2006). European Integration and Eastward Enlargement. In Global Restructuring, State, Capital and Labour (pp. 71-90). Palgrave Macmillan, London. Pp. 80.

- the social democratic project, supported by social democrats and trade unions to re-regulate the market and regain some control over capital lost at the national level.

The completion of internal market in 1992, the introduction of single currency in 2002 and the establishment of independent European Central Bank to safeguard the European Monetary Union (EMU) have been the historical results of this competition between rival projects. In the end, the EU looked like more in the image of globalist European capital but not completely. The EU has introduced what-could-be-named as new protectionist measures of standardizations, certifications and other non-tariff barriers even after it has definitely taken the route of neoliberal political economy.

This process was defined as "embedded neoliberalism" by Neo-Gramscian scholars as a reflection of the hegemonic project of transnational European capital. The European unification project has taken its current form as a result of this ongoing struggle between different social forces within the EU and around the globe.

Its hegemony is never completely established since the process of hegemony includes constant attacks of counter-hegemonic ideas, social forces and groups, yet currently neoliberalism has definitely won the dominance over rival projects of the EU.

➢ The EU as the Integral State

For my analysis of the European Green Deal, I take the European Union itself as an "integral state" in Neo-Gramscian theoretical sense. I argue that the EU has become the terrain of cooperation and competition, as much as it is one of coercion and consent, with the European Commission as being the leading actor of this process. That is why I analyze the European Commission documents in long time span to show how the EU has defined and re-defined its official position to the issues related to climate change and green transition. I also study the European Parliament where the citizens of the European Union can select their EU-level representatives. I look at the Greens/EFA group's political position to the introduction of European Green Deal and the EU's overall fight against climate crisis. Furthermore, I investigate the European

Council and the Council of European Union as the two representative institutions of intergovernmental or inter-state relations, competitions and cooperations. I study various documents from the European Round Table for Industrialists (ERT) and the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) as the representatives of European capital and European labor. For the environmental groups' position towards the EU's climate change politics, I study the documents from Green10 and I look at Eurobarometers to understand where the European public stands with climate change. Here, as it can be seen, I adopt the Neo-Gramscians' emphasis on social forces to analyze the emergence of the European Green Deal. I specifically select data from different social groups to understand the hegemonic position of green politics.

- **Green Growth as the Commonsense of Contemporary Capitalism**

For my analysis of the European Green Deal, I define plural but interconnected commonsenses (*sensi comuni*, in the words of Gramsci).

- **Commonsense 1:** *Climate change is a serious problem, and we must act now!*

Scientific studies have proven that if we continue to produce and consume like we do currently, then the end of the world is near. Thus, it is commonsense that we need to save our planet since we have not alternative planet to live. Not yet.

- **Commonsense 2:** *Growth is good and desirable. It is beneficial for producers and consumers, employers and workers. Recession is dangerous for wage-laborers since it inhabits potential lay-offs and rise in unemployment.*

As I tried to explain through Open Marxism, the changing production relations from pre-capitalism to capitalism was characterized by the extra-economic direct political enforcement of exploitation and surplus extraction, which conducted through a contractual relation between those who maintain the power of appropriation, as owners of the means of production, over those who only have their labor to sell, as

expropriated producers.[140] Capitalism is about the wage-laborers' daily struggle to survive, which means being employed is the necessary condition for any other human activities. Understandably, the labor fears most the recession when the capitalist rationale of producing for profit is no longer viable. Thus, any solution to climate crisis which stays within the limits of capitalist web of social relations must meet the condition of continuing growth.

- *So, how can we solve the problem of climate crisis without giving up growth?*

The notion ***green growth*** has emerged as the most reasonable answer to this question of how to reconcile capitalism which is based on "infinite growth on a finite planet" and the looming climate catastrophe. By decoupling growth from carbon-based energy use (or using only renewable energy) by producing green goods, by promoting green consumption, it has been envisaged that not only the climate crisis can be solved but also through new production methods, it can work as a catalyzer for new and different economic growth.

The biggest supporters of the idea of "green growth" are not the environmental groups, activists or Green parties but the capital owners of multi-national cooperations. The myth of green growth enables the ruling political-administrative and corporate powers to pursue their business as usual, legitimized through the green growth discourse.[141] By the application of technological innovation, research and development, it is argued that decoupling growth from resource use is possible. Thus, green growth does not open the very fundamental reasons of the current climate crisis to the discussion but rather veils them through new ideological hegemony of green capitalism where both economic prosperity and environmental protection is possible. The EU's Green Deal puts trust in green technologies, which are mainly defined as technologies that increase

[140] Bieler, A., & Morton, A. D. (2003). Globalisation, the state and class struggle: a 'Critical Economy' engagement with Open Marxism. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, *5*(4), 467-499. P. 471.

[141] Ossewaarde, M., & Ossewaarde-Lowtoo, R. (2020). The EU's green deal: a third alternative to green growth and degrowth?. *Sustainability*, *12*(23), 9825. Pp. 4.

energy efficiency, increase the share of renewable energy sources in the so-called energy mix and come with lower CO2 emissions. [142]

- **Historic Bloc of Green Capitalism**

Cox argues that the historical bloc or class configuration determines the raison d'état of given state system.[143] I borrow this term from Cox and argue that "green" now becoming the new raison d'état of contemporary political economy while green ideas and green norms are drawing the dimensions of globalization. In the historical framework of this thesis, I explore the historical baseline for developments -sometimes happening separately and sometimes concomitantly, in different parts of the world, which opened the way for "green capitalism" to capture the spirit of global political economy under looming presence of climate crisis.

I take "capitalism" as a complex web of socio-political and economic relations which is based on "infinite growth on a finite planet" and analyze this inherent contradiction of capitalism in the framework of climate politics. In this framework, I use the notion of "green growth" as the hegemonic idea of contemporary capitalist class configuration, which provided the basis for an emergent historic bloc, all of its actors positioned behind this hegemonic idea.

Firstly, green capitalism is a conception that is based on the assumption that climate crisis is a product of market failure, and thus producers of greenhouse gases (primarily nations in the North) can avoid the full global consequences of the resultant climate change with appropriate counter measures while affecting though other parts of the world not responsible for their production.[144] This mode of framing the problem as a market-failure opens up the possibility of "correcting" it through "green" and more

[142] Ossewaarde, M., & Ossewaarde-Lowtoo, R. (2020). The EU's green deal: a third alternative to green growth and degrowth?. *Sustainability*, *12*(23), 9825. Pp. 5-6.

[143] Cox, R. W. (1989) 'Production, the state and change in world order', in E-O. Czempiel and J. N. Rosenau (eds), Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s (Toronto: Lexington Books). P. 41

[144] Stern, N. (2007). *The economics of climate change: The Stern Report*. Cambridge University Press.

"environment-friendly" reforms. Secondly, green capitalism upholds the technological solutions as the only viable option against environmental catastrophes. The 'green' innovations are believed to reduce climate change emissions by out-competing existing energy production technologies in the global marketplace.[145]

Before it was officially adopted by the EU, "green growth" was put forward by the United Nations, OECS and the World Bank. In 2008, the UN Environment-led Green Economy Initiative was launched; in 2009 OECD members approved a declaration acknowledging that ecology and economy can (should) be reconciled; and asked the OECD to develop a framework for implementing the green growth strategy, which was realized with Towards Green Growth (2011).[146]

In 2011, The United Nations Environment Programme stated "the greening of economies is... a new engine of growth"[147] while the OECD set its Green Growth agenda as "the familiar agenda of economic policy with the added realization that it can be as good for the environment as for the economy"[148].

Green growth is the core of green capitalism. The OECD strategy of ''Green Growth,'' the ''Green Economy,'' and the Asian concept of ''Green Transition'' are essentially instrumental strategies of crisis prevention, to avoid raw material shortages, high energy costs, water shortages, declining crop yields, climate change or environmental damage, and their costs. [149]

In 2010, the European Commission defined its strategy for Europe 2020 as: [150]

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[145] Fox, N. J. (2022). Green capitalism, climate change and the technological fix: A more-than-human assessment. *The Sociological Review*, 00380261221121232, pp. 5.

[146] Ossewaarde, M., & Ossewaarde-Lowtoo, R. (2020). The EU's green deal: a third alternative to green growth and degrowth?. *Sustainability*, *12*(23), 9825. Pp. 3-4.

[147] UNEP, 2011. Towards a Green Economy: A Synthesis for Policymakers. UNEP, Nairobi.

[148] OECD, 2011. Towards Green Growth: A Summary for Policymakers. OECD, Paris.

[149] Jänicke, M. (2012). "Green growth": From a growing eco-industry to economic sustainability. *Energy policy*, *48*, 13-21. Pp. 19.

[150] EU Commission (2010): Europe 2020 – A European Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth, COM (2010)2020, 3.3.2010.

- Smart growth: developing an economy based on knowledge and innovation.
- Sustainable growth: promoting a more resource efficient, ***greener*** (emphasis added) and more competitive economy.
- Inclusive growth: fostering a high-employment economy delivering social and territorial cohesion.

The European Green Deal, itself, is defined as "*the EU's* ***new growth strategy****, aiming to transform the EU into a fairer and more prosperous society, with a modern, resource-efficient and competitive economy, with no net emissions of greenhouse gases by mid-century*."[151] Green growth does essentially mean "growth results from the investment in the upgrading of the entire production system to environmental and resource-saving processes and products" [152] and it is the indispensable part of "green economy" of "low-carbon economy". The EU has demonstrated its ambition to become the leader of this historic bloc with the adoption of European Green Deal, thus with the ambition of becoming the first climate neutral continent by 2050.

- **Green *Trasformismo***

The imminent climate crisis is acknowledged by almost every political standpoint however the only viable solution has been presented as the one with no dramatic questioning of the existing production relations, its heavy extractivism, environmental destruction and north/south injustices. By suppressing any radical solutions or simply absorbing them into the mainstream ones, green capitalism has come to the verge of a passive revolution. "Green" has become the new face of capitalism where capitalism is no longer evil but it is enlightened and cares about creating socially and ecologically sustainable relations. Thus, the green *trasformismo* of capitalism is a means to save

[151] *Industry and the Green Deal*. (n.d.). European Commission. https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/industry-and-green-deal_en#:~:text=The%20European%20Green%20Deal%20is,greenhouse%20gases%20by%20mid%2Dcentury.

[152] Jänicke, M. (2012). "Green growth": From a growing eco-industry to economic sustainability. *Energy policy*, *48*, 13-21. Pp. 13.

the existing web of interests by assimilating radical of counter-hegemonic alternatives which are either present or have to potential to emerge in the future.

Through the qualitative content analysis of the European Green Deal, I claim that the green trasformismo of capitalism is being instrumentalized to gain a hegemonic position over the newly ***greened*** global capitalist structure, without dramatically challenge its inherent contradictions. By using Neo-Gramscian concepts, I argue that the environmental movements, NGOs, green parties and other societal groups demanding solutions to environmental problems are now "co-opting" in the green *trasformismo* of capitalism because the newly branded "green" capitalism has created its own hegemony by presenting the new "commonsense" as "green growth" and, more importantly, managing to gain consent from subordinate groups. Through the case of European Green Deal with Neo-Gramscian approach, I argue that the EGD is not only the EU's attempt to regain its diminishing global competitiveness but also it is the EU's ambition to capture the zeitgeist of 21st century, and managed to have a head start in the new game if not possible to rearrange the game itself.

The EGD is the terrain of cooperation and competition, as much as it is one of coercion and consent. From global, national and supranational levels, it involves a wide variety of issues, actors, interests and conflicts. It encompasses issues like global South vs global North conflict in the governance of environmental politics, the problem with historical culprits' cleaning their hands off from the ramifications of their actions, the unequal distribution of the burdens of climate change towards the already vulnerable nations and following rise of climate activism all over the world. This phenomenon also draws the lines for a new area of global competition between leading actors in the world. As the scientists warn that the world is doomed if current modes of production and consumption continue, it has become obvious that capitalism needs a re-framing, re-organizing and re-branding. The global rivalry between the USA, the EU and China has gained a new frontline to battle for winning the hegemony over others. In the absence of the USA following its withdrawal from Paris Climate Agreement, the EU has shouldered the role of a sole responsible or representative of the Western capitalism as opposed to Chinese state capitalism and thus, Chinese version of green capitalism.

2.4.2. Open-Marxist Tools Re-defined within the EGD

- ***Depoliticization and Technocratization***

Despite its overly abstract and theoretical depiction of social reality, Open Marxism is exceptional in its contributions to IR&IPE. Theorizing state as a social relation reflecting the complex social reality resulting from the continuous class antagonism, rejecting the mainstream theories' superficial separation of economics and politics (and falsely taking state as a class-neutral entity and a thing itself) and separation of what is 'international' from what is 'domestic' are Open Marxism's important contributions to the critical approaches to IR&IPE.

The theoretical framework of my dissertation is heavily benefited from the above-mentioned contributions of the Open Marxism. I especially value the "depoliticization" and "technocratization" arguments of this theoretical tradition. While criticizing the general tendency of globalization theories to argue that states lost their power to markets and Burnham argues, those theories fail to recognize that states and markets are not isolated from each other thus states cannot "lose" their "own" power to markets.[153] He continues his argument by saying that tighter labor relations in favor of capital owners have been consolidated through this depoliticized language of globalization.

Since "political" character of decision making has been omitted, the reconfiguration of labor/capital relation was managed to be presented as something natural, scientific and thus "impartial". This stance itself is highly political because it enabled proponents of globalization and de-politicization to execute policies in favor of capital at the expense of labor. In this framework, the de-politicization of 1990s is highly political because states retain their arm-length control over crucial economic process while benefiting from the distancing themselves from the effects of de-politicization.

[153] See Burnham, P. "Globalisation, Depoliticization and Modern Economic Management" in W. Bonefeld and K.Psychopedis (eds.) (2000) *The Politics of Change: Globalisation, Ideology and Critique*, Palgrave, 9-30.

What differentiates capitalism from previous periods is cutting off the essentially political issues like disposition of power to control production and appropriation, or the allocation of social labor and resources and attributing these issues to a separate sphere,[154] which has been designated as "economics" by the liberal thinkers. The discourses used by bourgeoisie political economists about liberal state as universal, normal, eternal and harmonious are all based on this separation of "economics" from "politics".

Capitalism gives the "freedom" to both exploiter and exploited from the direct intervention of politics by re-defining the role and responsibility of political ruler confined to "politics".[155] Thus, the privatized and de-politicized economic relations of capitalism is its defining character. Since the relationship between state and the capitalist mode of production is mutually enforcing, influencing and developing phenomena on the same level, capitalism itself is the state's specific presence with its own set of institutional arrangements constantly reproducing the capitalist relations. Clark argues that state exists only because the subordination of working class requires its involvement, the very existence of state depends upon the reproduction of capitalist relations.[156] Thus, it is a constructed illusion to realize the domination of capitalist classes over the masses through the use of state power, which is based on discourse of "general interest". The notion of state following general interests creates the illusion of state as being exempted from the different class interests while the notion of state having authority "above" society is creating the illusion of a higher authority which has power to order different societal groups around.

Centeno defines technocracy as the administrative and political domination of a society by a state elite and allied institutions that seek to impose a single, exclusive

[154] Wood, E.M. (1995) "The Separation of the 'Economic' and the 'Political' in Capitalism" in E. M. Wood, *Democracy against Capitalism*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 19-48. Pp. 20.

[155] Wood, E.M. (1995) "The Separation of the 'Economic' and the 'Political' in Capitalism" in E. M. Wood, *Democracy against Capitalism*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 19-48. Pp. 29.

[156] Clarke, S. (1991) "State, Class Struggle and the Reproduction of Capital" in S.Clarke (ed.) *The State Debate*, Macmillan: London, 183-203.

policy paradigm based on the application of instrumentally rational technics. [157] A technocracy implies not only the domination by a particular type of elite, but also the autonomy and influence of their institutions. [158] In the process of reformation, the power of technocratic elite to re-organize labor/capital relations is in conflict with the general premises of democracy because *societal discussion is not only seen as unnecessary but also as undesirable*. In the end, the de-politicized economics has successfully been separated from public discussions and decision-making channels. I argue that technocratic state is mere reflection of new web of relations between capital, labor and state, which was introduced to overcome state's democratic and political responsibilities with the introduction of "supra-political", "scientific", "rational", and "indisputable" technocratic elites. Because of this, de-politicization itself is extremely political.

In my dissertation, I borrow the notions of "depoliticization" and "technocratization" from Open Marxism to analyze the efforts to depoliticize climate change politics. As a continuation of separating and ignoring the very reasons of climate crisis stemming from the capitalist system itself, the depoliticized framing of climate change as a technical and scientific puzzle to be solved through innovation is extremely political. My study starts from this argument, and I argue that market-based solutions proposed by various actors are actually the means of protecting existing capitalist web of interests, all of which are veiled through the use of scientific and technocratic language.

2.5. Conclusion

In this chapter, I tried to draw the theoretical framework of my thesis. As I explained in the previous chapter, my research is developed from the question of "How can we understand the EGD's becoming policy priority of the EU from the perspective of European integration?". My main goal is to analyze the EGD within the wider

[157] Centeno, M.A. (1993) "The New Leviathan: The Dynamics and Limits of Technocracy", *Theory and Society*, Vol.22, 307-335. Pp. 314.

[158] Centeno, M.A. (1993) "The New Leviathan: The Dynamics and Limits of Technocracy", *Theory and Society*, Vol.22, 307-335. Pp. 321.

transformation of global capitalist relations. By using Neo-Gramscian concepts, I argue that the environmental movements, NGOs, green parties and other societal groups demanding solutions to environmental problems are now "co-opting" in the green *trasformismo* of capitalism because the newly branded "green" capitalism has created its own hegemony by presenting the new "commonsense" as "green growth" and, more importantly, managing to gain consent from subordinate groups. Through the case of European Green Deal with Neo-Gramscian approach, I argue that the EGD is not only the EU's attempt to regain its diminishing global competitiveness but also it is the EU's ambition to capture the zeitgeist of 21st century, and managed to have a head start in the new game if not possible to rearrange the game itself.

I argue that the looming presence of climate crisis has been instrumentalized by the hegemony of neoliberalism and "greening" capitalism has been presented as the only viable solution without questioning of the existing production relations, its heavy extractivism, environmental destruction and north/south injustices. By suppressing any radical solutions or simply absorbing them into the mainstream ones, "green" has become the new face of capitalism where capitalism is no longer evil but it is enlightened and cares about creating socially and ecologically sustainable relations. The green *trasformismo* of capitalism has become the means to save the hegemony of dominant classes by assimilating radical of counter-hegemonic alternatives which are either present or have to potential to emerge in the future.

In this chapter, I showed how the mainstream European integration theories approach to my case as climate crisis and the rise of EGD and how they are limited in their analysis. From a neofunctionalist perspective, the European Green Deal is not just a piece of climate policy integration, but it is another step to be taken towards "ever-closer European Union". Yet, its perception of inevitable development of "more integration" through "spill-over", does not problematize the process and the actors. It fails to take into account member states' different interests, the sometimes-contradictory positions of EU institutions, the impact of global capitalist networks and the increasingly powerful role of EU citizens, green political parties and green NGOs.

Intergovernmentalism has taken the case of the EGD where the impetus for change comes from elite groups such as business or from heads of state, and not from nationally based environmental groups. From intergovernmentalist perspective, the environmental politics are defined through more powerful members states' preferences and realized by the two intergovernmental institutions of the European Council and the Council of the European Union. From social constructivism, the "climate neutrality", "circular economy" and" just transition" have become the norms of the EU, which opened the way for the adoption of the EGD. And in this process, the EU has become the climate leader of world by setting global standards and formulating rules.

All of these approaches are studying the one aspect of the reality. Neofunctionalism successfully show how the European unification project evolve to the EGD step-by-step trough the development of union-wise environmental politics. Intergovernmentalism underline the importance of member states' preferences in determining the direction of European unification project. Social constructivism, very rightfully, argues "ideas" and "norms" are essential part of the EU. But these approaches are not enough to grasp the multi-faceted reality of the EGD.

Yes, one can argue that the EGD is the natural outcome of the spill-over effect of environmental policy integration in the EU, but it is not enough to understand the content of this transformation and why actors have chosen one mode over the another (i.e. growth vs. degrowth). Yes, some states are more enthusiastic for green transition (i.e. Germany) but there are also significant concessions given to the members who still rely on carbon-intensive industries (i.e. Poland and Just Transition Fund). Yes, without a doubt, ideas are vital for the emergence and the formation of the green transition program in the EU, but there is also an important factor of "first come, first served" in the matter of regime building. This global transformation of green capitalism will eventually create its own winners and losers and it is always more advantageous to be the one who determines the rules of the new game in town. It would be at best naïve, at worst misleading to assume that the EU has chosen this path of green capitalism by solely due to its normative leadership. I admit that these explanations from integration theories are not totally baseless. However, what I would

like to do in this thesis is to understand why and how the project of the EGD has come to be. My question has two parts and it is not possible to conceptualize the phenomenon of green capitalism without answering them both. That is why, my theoretical framework and conceptual tools come from Neo-Gramscian perspective.

In this chapter, I presented how I barrowed my analytical tools from Gramsci himself and I utilized them following the exemplified works of prominent Neo-Gramscian scholars on European integration process in the analysis of my case which is the European Green Deal. First, I explained how I take the European Union itself as an "integral state" in Neo-Gramscian theoretical sense. I emphasized that the EU has become the terrain of cooperation and competition, as much as it is one of coercion and consent, with the European Commission as being the leading actor of this process.

Secondly, I adopted Gramsci's commonsense to analyze how green growth has emerged as the commonsense reconciling capitalism which is based on "infinite growth on a finite planet" and the efforts to fight climate crisis by decoupling growth from carbon-based energy use (or using only renewable energy), by producing green goods and by promoting green consumption. Thirdly, I explained how green growth which is the core of green capitalism has become the new raison d'état of contemporary political economy and I argued that the notion of "green growth" provided the basis for an emergent historic bloc, all of its actors positioned behind this hegemonic idea.

Lastly, I claimed that by suppressing any radical solutions or simply absorbing them into the mainstream ones, green capitalism has come to the verge of a passive revolution. By using Neo-Gramscian concepts, I argue that the environmental movements, NGOs, green parties and other societal groups demanding solutions to environmental problems are now "co-opting" in the green *trasformismo* of capitalism because the newly branded "green" capitalism has created its own hegemony by presenting the new "commonsense" as "green growth" and, more importantly, managing to gain consent from subordinate groups. The green *trasformismo* of capitalism has become the means to save the hegemony of dominant classes by assimilating radical of counter-hegemonic alternatives which are either present or have to potential to emerge in the future.

CHAPTER 3

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF GREEN CAPITALISM

3.1. Introduction

In 2019 during the World Economic Forum's annual meeting in Davos, Swedish climate activist Greta Thunberg made a powerful speech on the urgency of climate crisis and necessary reforms. She said, very famously, "I want you to panic and act as if our house is on fire. Because it is." One year later, in the same meeting, she repeated this call again as "Our house is still on fire and your inaction is fueling the flames by the hour". The urgency of her message received mixed responses.

She was praised by Former President of the USA Obama *"At just 16 years old, Greta Thunberg is already one of our planet's greatest advocates."*, by Former Vice President Al Gore *"Nobody speaks truth to power as she does."*, by natural historian and broadcaster Sir David Attenborough *"She's achieved things that many of us who have been working on it for 20 odd years have failed to achieve.",* by Pope Francis *"Thank you for standing up for the climate and speaking the truth."*, by actor and climate activist Leonardo DiCaprio *"Greta Thunberg has become a leader of our time"* and by many others.[159]

[159] See Thunberg, G. (2019, Jan 25). 'Our house is on fire'. *The Guardian.* https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/jan/25/our-house-is-on-fire-greta-thunberg16-urges-leaders-to-act-on-climate .

McKeever, V. (2020, Jan 21). 'Our house is still on fire,' Greta Thunberg tells Davos. *CNBC.* https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/21/our-house-is-still-on-fire-greta-thunberg-tells-davos.html .

Zilber, A. (2019, Sep 17). Obama praises Greta Thunberg as 'one of our planet's greatest advocates' during meeting in Washington as 16-year-old Swede presses U.S. lawmakers on climate change.

The reason why I started to this chapter with young climate activist Greta Thunberg is to show how widely the environmental activism is supported. It is irrelevant at this point that these high-profile individuals truly supported or merely given lip-service to the cause, they are adopting the dominant **commonsense 1** that "*Climate change is a serious problem, and we must act now!*".

Whether they are sincere in their appraisal of Greta Thunberg in particular and the efforts to mitigate climate change in general or not is a subject of another discussion. In other words, I use the example of Greta Thunberg's activism to take the snapshot of contemporary global socio-political economic relations that are being re-defined around the issue of climate crisis on the basis of above-mentioned commonsense.

Of course, dominant ideology does not mean that it is absolute or all-encompassing view, shared by every member of the society. While Greta Thunberg has been praised globally, she was mocked by then president of the United States, Donald J. Trump who dismissed the climate crisis all together and made counter arguments in line with post-truth atmosphere.

Trump said "We must reject the perennial prophets of doom and their predictions of the apocalypse" and continued "They want to see us do badly, but we don't let that happen. They predicted an overpopulation crisis in the 1960s, mass starvation in the 70s, and an end of oil in the 1990s. These alarmists always demand the same thing: absolute power to dominate, transform and control every aspect of our lives. We will

Dailymail. https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7474923/Obama-praises-Greta-Thunberg-one-planets-greatest-advocates-meeting-Washington.html .

Jacobs, E. (2020, Jan 23). Al Gore praises Greta Thunberg after her Davos remarks. *NYPOST*. https://nypost.com/2020/01/23/al-gore-praises-greta-thunberg-after-her-davos-remarks/ .

Young, S. (2020, Oct 15). Sir David Attenborough and Greta Thunberg to discuss climate crisis in virtual chat. *Independent.* https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/david-attenborough-gretta-thunberg-virtual-chat-climate-change-wildscreen-festival-b1044142.html .

Lewis, S. (2019, Apr 17). *CBS NEWS.* https://www.cbsnews.com/news/pope-francis-encourages-teen-climate-activist-greta-thunberg-to-continue-fight/ .

Elassar, A. (2019, Nov 3). Leonardo DiCaprio praises Greta Thunberg as a 'leader of our time'. *CNN.* https://edition.cnn.com/2019/11/02/world/greta-thunberg-leonardo-dicaprio-trnd/index.html

never let radical socialists destroy our economy, wreck our country or eradicate our liberty."[160]

Sadly, Mr. Trump is not alone in the "climate change is a hoax" argument in the USA. While a large majority of liberal Democrats (79%) believe the Earth is warming mostly because of human activity, only about one-in-six conservative Republicans (15%) believe in anthropogenic (human-caused) climate change.[161] One famous work for climate change deniers is "The Greatest Hoax: How the Global Warming Conspiracy Threatens Your Future" written by the U.S. Senator James Inhofe in 2012.[162] Despite the hard scientific evidence on the devastating outcomes of the anthropogenic global warming, there are persistent public debates about the existence of climate change, whether it is anthropogenic and whether it constitutes a problem.[163] While scientists, activists and progressive politicians worked to inform both public and policy makers, during the powerful Republican presence in the US senate and house of representatives, the politics of climate change could not find a basis to develop in the US. I will explain later in this chapter that similar to the European Green Deal, there was an attempt of adopting a US legislation concerning the green transition, namely the Green New Deal, but it failed to attract support from the majority in US Senate in 2019.

In the apparent absence of the US in the formation and application of new international climate policies against the global climate crisis, it seems that the EU has come forward for the role. On the day The European Commission agreed on the European

[160] Forgey, Q. (2020, Jan 21). Trump cautions Davos against heeding 'prophets of doom' on climate change. *Politico.* https://www.politico.com/news/2020/01/21/donald-trump-davos-climate-change-101327

[161] Pew Research Center. (2016, Oct 4). The Politics of Climate. https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2016/10/04/public-views-on-climate-change-and-climate-scientists/

[162] Inhofe, J. M. (2012). *The greatest hoax: How the global warming conspiracy threatens your future*. Washington, DC: WND Books.

[163] Brüggemann, M., Elgesem, D., Bienzeisler, N., Gertz, H. D., & Walter, S. (2020). Mutual group polarization in the blogosphere: Tracking the hoax discourse on climate change. *International Journal of Communication*, *14*, 24. Pp. 1026.

Green Deal, Von Der Leyen emphasized the EU's leading position as "*This is Europe's 'man on the moon' moment*".[164] The next day, following the meeting of the European Council on 12 December in Brussels, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said "If we want to convince others like India or China to join, we have to be a role model. We have to be united and bold, step forward and prove that change is possible, and that it is of benefit for the people and for the economy."[165]

Here, I explore the historical baseline for developments -sometimes happening separately and sometimes concomitantly, in different parts of the world, which opened the way for "green capitalism" to capture the spirit of global political economy under looming presence of climate crisis. In this chapter, I try to trace back the historical developments, events, important turning points have brought the climate politics into the center of international political economy so that multiple green transformation projects are being discussed simultaneously and, in some cases, accepted in the world. I mainly try to answer why the climate politics under the premise of climate crisis has turned into an ordering principle for the next phase of capitalism, which is green capitalism as it is argued in this thesis. This study takes "capitalism" as a complex web of socio-political and economic relations which is based on "infinite growth on a finite planet" and it explores this inherent contradiction of capitalism in the framework of climate politics.

The structure of this chapter will be composed of two main parts. In the first part of this chapter, I will present the multi-level and multi-actor process of the international governance of environment. By pointing out different approaches to the environmental governance, I will argue that the protection of the environment is not the only aim of the international environmental governance. It has its own inherent power dynamics which has become apparent through the introduction of controversial measures like

[164] The European Commission. (2019, Dec 11). Press remarks by President von der Leyen on the occasion of the adoption of the European Green Deal Communication https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_19_6749

[165] The European Commission. (2019, Dec 13). Turning challenge into opportunity on the course to becoming the first climate-neutral continent. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/AC_19_6778

carbon markets. I will focus on how this unequal relationship creates divergence between the developed and developing countries over the international governance of climate change. I will present how the underdeveloped part of the world resents the developed countries for their actions, such as heavy industrialization-induced environmental pollution, deforestation, and loss of biodiversity, the burdens of which they now must shoulder because they perceive the efforts toward environmental protection as if they are being robbed of their opportunity for development and economic prosperity. I will explain how climate justice movement has risen out of these lines and spread to the rest of the world. In time, the climate activism, especially from the young individuals, has taken over the global social movements and made the elites of global political economy take actions accordingly. I will argue that the organized climate activism demanded political actors to take more radical steps than the established measures in the various UNFCCC Summits. Accordingly, their efforts not only contributed vastly towards the general acceptance of the climate crisis by the public, but also left political and economic elite no choice but do something about the problem. The politicization of climate change in the public created a fertile ground for the green parties to flourish both in quality and quantity. Through these developments, I will explain how climate change has become the zeitgeist of global politics and a central point of contention within the global political economy in the 21st century.

In second half of this chapter, I will focus on how the European Green Deal should be contextualized with respect to different positioning of the leading actors of global environmental governance. As I argue in this thesis, the EGD did not emerge in a vacuum. I will analyze both cooperative and competitive encounters of the EU, USA, China and Russia with respect to climate politics.

By putting the emergence of the EGD center, I will historicize the developments leading to this significant leap into global restructuring of capitalist relations in line with green capitalism. Firstly, I will provide historical background President Trump decided to withdraw from Paris Agreement in 2017 and I will argue that the US' stepping down from the leading position for the introduction and application of the necessary environmental reforms for contemporary socio-political and economic relations has marked a turning point for the rise of the EU's leadership.

In second sub-section, I will focus on the Europe and the intra-EU conflicts around the adoption and application of the EGD by explaining the domino effect that the EGD has on different classes within one country; different countries with different levels of dependence on the carbon fuels and different regions with different economic development positions.

Then, I will explore China's ecological civilization notion which makes it head-to-head with the EU's leadership over the climate change measures. I speculate that maybe China has now the opportunity to re-shape global capitalism the way it fits China's advantages rather than merely playing by the rules set by Western economies.

Finally, in the last sub-section, I will briefly touch upon the effects of Russia's invasion of Ukraine for the future of green transformation in the EU. The EU's long-term plan to shut down all of its nuclear power-plants and using only clean and renewable energy like natural gas, hydro-, solar- or wind-energy has seemed to reach a gridlock when Russia invaded Ukraine and triggered a series of events rather difficult for the EU to handle. I will argue that the EGD is more than EU-level climate politics because it not only requires policy alignment from its members in the areas of energy, trade, social policies, it has serious implications for international political and economic relations, which I will perceive as a step towards green capitalism.

3.2. Climate Change as the Zeitgeist of the 21st Century

Climate change has become the defining element of global politics and a central point of contention within the global political economy in the 21st century. Some scholars use the term "climatization" meaning "a powerful but uneven process of extension, translation, and social coordination, as climate change becomes the frame of reference through which other policy issues and forms of global activism are mediated and hierarchized"[166] to underline the centrality of the issue within the global politics. In a

[166] Aykut, S. C., & Maertens, L. (2022). The climatization of global politics: Introduction to the special issue. In *The Climatization of Global Politics* (pp. 1-18). Cham: Springer International Publishing. Pp . 501.

similar vein, I use the term of "zeitgeist" to define the way climate crisis affect and re-shape the global political economy.

In the coming sub-sections, I will show how climate change has become the zeitgeist of the 21st century though analyzing:

- the current modes of conflict and cooperation within the international governance of the climate change,
- the climate justice movement, emerged in the global south, in response to the way international community handles the climate crisis, but spread to the rest of the world,
- the rising climate activism uniting people all around the world against the incompetence and/or reluctance of global political and economic elite to take the necessary steps for climate crisis,
- the growing presence in quantity and quality of green parties within the national parliaments to find political solutions to the escalating environmental problems both in national and international levels.

In the first part of this chapter, I will start with the multi-level and multi-actor process of the international governance of environment. By pointing out different approaches to the environmental governance, I will argue that the protection of the environment is not the only aim of the international environmental governance. Through the introduction of controversial measures like carbon markets, I will show the inherent power dynamics with this multi-level and multi-actor process.

Later in the first part, I will look into the effects of actors gaining the ability to buy their way in to the international climate over the peoples of the world, which emerged in the form of environmental movements. I will argue that the global governance of climate change has created two important fault lines. Firstly, the underdeveloped part of the world resents the developed countries for their actions, such as heavy industrialization-induced environmental pollution, deforestation, and loss of biodiversity, the burdens of which they now must shoulder.

Secondly, they perceive efforts toward environmental protection as if they are being robbed of their opportunity for development and economic prosperity. Climate justice movement has risen out of these lines and spread to the rest of the world. In time, the climate activism, especially from the young individuals, has taken over the global social movements and made the elites of global political economy take actions accordingly. The organized climate activism demanded political actors to take more radical steps than the established measures in the various UNFCCC Summits. Their efforts not only contributed vastly towards the general acceptance of the climate crisis by the public, but also left political and economic elite no choice but do something about the problem. The politicization of climate change in the public created a fertile ground for the green parties to flourish both in quality and quantity.

In last sub-section of the first part, I will argue that the rising climate activism contributed to the strong presence of green political parties in local, national and supranational parliament.

3.2.1. International Governance of the Climate Change

International governance of environment is a multi-level and multi-actor process. It involves nation states, political unions, multi-national cooperations, non-governmental organizations, various interest groups, activist organizations, and single individuals. It could be an oversimplification to assume that its aim is limited to the protection of the environment.

Indeed, international governance of environment is about finding a balance between the efforts of saving the planet Earth and providing the next generations a habitable world though securing bio-diversity and sustainability on the one hand and keeping powerful global actors (nation states, regional political and economic unions, and multi-national companies) onside of environmental protection efforts through not profoundly disturbing their current interests or in case of a such loss, promising future gains on the other hand.

In this sub-section, I will try to show the fundamentals of international environmental governance, which is vital for understanding the global politics of climate change. My

aim is to draw framework of current environmental governance by tracing back the turning points in its historical development. Since environmental global politics are now dominated by the effects of climate change, I will first start with the phenomenon of climate change and the way it has been framed by the international society. The definition of "climate change" has been debated for decades but it generally refers to:

- a change in the state of the climate that can be identified by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties, and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer;[167]
- the long-term alteration of temperature and normal weather patterns in a place;[168]
- a long-term change in the average weather patterns that have come to define Earth's local, regional and global climate, driven by human activities, particularly fossil fuel burning, which increases heat-trapping greenhouse gas levels in Earth's atmosphere, raising Earth's average surface temperature.[169]

In the wake of climate change becoming the most pressing issue of the 21st century, the global management of climate change (or lack thereof) requires special attention to understand current global politics. Several steps have been taken by the global political and economic elite in the international level to mitigate climate change.

The most notable developments, in this regard, can be named as 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, the 2009 UNFCCC COP15 summit in Copenhagen, the 2015 UNFCCC COP21 summit in Paris

[167] IPCC, 2018: Annex I: Glossary [Matthews, J.B.R. (ed.)]. In: *Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty* [Masson-Delmotte, V., P. Zhai, H.-O. Pörtner, D. Roberts, J. Skea, P.R. Shukla, A. Pirani, W. Moufouma-Okia, C. Péan, R. Pidcock, S. Connors, J.B.R. Matthews, Y. Chen, X. Zhou, M.I. Gomis, E. Lonnoy, T. Maycock, M. Tignor, and T. Waterfield (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA, pp. 541-562, doi:10.1017/9781009157940.008.

[168]National Geographic. Last Updated May 20, 2022. https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/climate-change/

[169] NASA. What Is Climate Change?. https://climate.nasa.gov/global-warming-vs-climate-change/

and the 2021 UNFCCC COP26 summit in Glasgow.[170] In 1992, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted to combat climate change by limiting average global temperature increases and the resulting climate change.[171] The UNFCCC entered into force on 21 March 1994 and since then it was ratified by 198 and became the primary medium for reducing the levels of greenhouse gas (GHG) in the world.

All signatory parties have a set of common obligations under the treaty:[172]

- to inventory, report, and mitigate their human related GHG emissions, including emissions and removals from land uses;
- to cooperate in preparing to adapt to climate change; and
- to assess and review, through the COP, the effective implementation of the UNFCCC, including the commitments therein.

The UNFCCC separated developed and developing countries as Annex I Parties and non-Annex I Parties and assigned certain additional or more specific obligations for Annex I Parties like frequent reporting and providing financing and technology transfers, among others.[173] This has created significant divergence between the developing and developing countries, which will be discussed under the sub-section of climate justice movement. Following the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the next big step taken for the environmental protection was the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, adopted on 11 December 1997 and entered into force on 16 February 2005. Currently, there are 192 Parties to the Kyoto Protocol.[174] The

[170] See, the full list of Conference of the Parties (COP) over the years: https://unfccc.int/process/bodies/supreme-bodies/conference-of-the-parties-cop

[171] *History of the Convention.* United Nations Climate Change https://unfccc.int/process/the-convention/history-of-the-convention#Climate-Change-in-context

[172] Leggett, J. A. (2020). The united nations framework convention on climate change, the Kyoto protocol, and the Paris agreement: a summary. *UNFCC, New York*, *2*.

[173] Leggett, J. A. (2020). The united nations framework convention on climate change, the Kyoto protocol, and the Paris agreement: a summary. *UNFCC, New York*, *2*.

[174] https://climatepromise.undp.org/news-and-stories/carbon-justice-all-how-carbon-markets-can-advance-equitable-climate-action

most remarkable development that took place through the Kyoto Protocol is that greenhouse gas emissions began to be treated as a new commodity by the international society.

And since the greenhouse gas emissions have become commodities, see Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol[175], the "so-called" right to pollute the environment enabled countries to buy and sell unite emissions in the respective market equity. Not only countries but also companies or individuals can use carbon markets to compensate for their greenhouse gas emissions by purchasing carbon credits from entities that remove or reduce greenhouse gas emissions.[176] The Copenhagen Conference in 2009, UNFCCC COP15, outlined the contours of the future climate system through affirming sovereignty concerns, refusing of any constraints in terms of reductions and financing, and emphasizing the voluntary contributions.[177] Glasgow Conference in 2021, UNFCCC COP26, re-affirmed this understanding between the big emitters of both past and future, which allows one side to buy time on their transition and the other side to shirk financing, is now a defining axis of international arenas.[178]

Liberals argued that by entering carbon markets, developing countries can advance their socio-economic development while transitioning to a low-carbon economy in a cost-effective way that puts a price on carbon, allows for carbon trading, and stimulates new market opportunities for companies.[179] Consequently, carbon markets, designed

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[175] *Emissions Trading*. United Nations Climate Change. https://unfccc.int/process/the-kyoto-protocol/mechanisms/emissions-trading

[176]What are carbon markets and why are they important?, 2022 May 18, UNDP. https://climatepromise.undp.org/news-and-stories/what-are-carbon-markets-and-why-are-they-important

[177] Aykut, S. C., & Dahan, A. (2022). Geopolitical Boomerang: Can We Still Hope to Meet the Climate Challenge?. *GREEN*, *2*(1), 31-38. Pp. 32.

[178] Aykut, S. C., Pavenstädt, C. N., Datchoua-Tirvaudey, A., D'Amico, E., Braun, M., Hinks, E. K., ... & Rödder, S. (2022). Circles of Global Climate Governance. *Center for Sustainable Science Research Working Paper No*.

[179] *Carbon justice for all: How carbon markets can advance equitable climate action globally*. (n.d.). UNDP Climate Promise. https://climatepromise.undp.org/news-and-stories/carbon-justice-all-how-carbon-markets-can-advance-equitable-climate-action

and directed by international organizations, under the influence of powerful international actors (states, companies and individuals) became the epitome of liberal international governance of climate crisis. Actors gaining the ability to buy their way in to the international climate governance raised important issues for climate justice, which will be discussed in the next sub-section.

3.2.2. Climate Justice Movement

The global governance of climate change has triggered a serious disagreement between the developed and the developing countries. The developed countries whose "development" is the main reason of the current environmental problems, internationally campaigned for a global action against climate change. However, the developing countries argued that not only these developed countries are cleaning their hands from their former climate crimes but also, they are robbing the developing countries of their chances in development. The introduction of carbon emissions trading system has complicated the governance of climate change and created significant rift between parties on the idea of climate justice.

In the beginning of the climate justice movement, the main issue was to bring climate change onto the political agenda, which meant for activists to utilize scientific evidence to convince climate change deniers.[180] The issue started to get politicized over the course of the Kyoto Protocol, especially concerning carbon markets, North–South equity and the use of disruptive tactics. [181] In addition to Friends of the Earth International, Carbon Trade Watch and Action Aid Asia, the Climate Justice Now (CJN) coalition was formed in Bali in 2007.[182] Triggered by the unequal relationship between the Global North and the Global South, CJN used the climate justice frame to

[180] Hadden, J. (2015). *Networks in contention: The divisive politics of climate change*. Cambridge University Press.

[181] Svensson, A., & Wahlström, M. (2023). Climate change or what? Prognostic framing by Fridays for Future protesters. *Social Movement Studies, 22*(1), 1-22. Pp. 3.

[182] Hadden, J. (2015). *Networks in contention: The divisive politics of climate change*. Cambridge University Press.

politicize climate governance and organized various protests.[183] During the course of protests, some very tragic developments also took place. When thousands of activists from the Amazon to the Andes marched in Lima, Peru during UNFCCC COP20 in 2014, saying "Keep the oil in the soil," "Protect your food" and "Change the system, not the climate", an indigenous leader was tortured and killed for opposing a copper and gold mining project in Ecuador.[184] The divergence between the Global North and the Global South has become evident over the issue of ecological debt, as underdeveloped countries urge developed/industrialized countries to pay their fair share in the current climate crisis. Pablo Solón then Bolivia's ambassador to the United Nations used these strong words in 2009 during Copenhagen summit:[185]

> Admitting responsibility for the climate crisis without taking necessary actions to address it is like someone burning your house and then refusing to pay for it. Even if the fire was not started on purpose, the industrialized countries, through their inaction, have continued to add fuel to the fire. . . It is entirely unjustifiable that countries like Bolivia are now forced to pay for the crisis. This creates a huge draw on our limited resources to protect our people from a crisis created by the rich and their over-consumption... Our glaciers dwindle, droughts become ever more common, and water supplies are drying up. Who should address this? To us it seems only right that the polluter should pay, and not the poor. We are not assigning guilt, merely responsibility. As they say in the U.S., if you break it, you buy it.

Although, the representatives of the USA, the EU and Japan refused to acknowledge the debt, at least 20 heads of government or ministers explicitly mentioned the

[183] Cassegård, C., & Thörn, H. (2017). Climate justice, equity and movement mobilization. In C. Cassegård, L. Sonderyd, H. Thörn, and Å. Wettergren (Eds.), *Climate action in a globalizing world: Comparative perspectives on environmental movements in the Global North*. Routledge.

[184] Goldenberg, S. (2014, Dec 10). Thousands of marchers demand just solution at UN climate talks in Lima. *The Guardian.* https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/dec/10/thousands-marchers-demand-just-solution-un-climate-talks-lima

[185] Martínez-Alier, J. (2012). Environmental justice and economic degrowth: an alliance between two movements. *Capitalism Nature Socialism, 23*(1), 51-73. Pp. 58-59.

ecological debt (or climate debt) in their speeches, and some used the loaded word "reparations".[186]

The global governance of climate change has created two important fault lines. Firstly, the underdeveloped part of the world resents the developed countries for their actions, such as heavy industrialization-induced environmental pollution, deforestation, and loss of biodiversity, the burdens of which they now must shoulder. Secondly, they perceive efforts toward environmental protection as if they are being robbed of their opportunity for development and economic prosperity. Climate justice movement has risen out of these lines and spread to the rest of the world. In the next sub-section, I will show how the climate activism has taken over the global social movements and made the elites of global political economy take actions accordingly.

3.2.3. Rising Climate Activism

The global environmental politics have evolved from unawareness, at best, and denial, at worst, to the general acceptance of the scientific knowledge about climate change. Through the course of various environmental catastrophes like rising sea-levels, potential loss of significant habitable land of coastal lines and/or islands, increasing numbers of floods and forest fires together with the decline in the number of plant and animal species which leads significant loss of biodiversity, climate activism has become more prominent, too. Not only climate justice movement which mainly fights for the environmental rights of the Global South but also the global climate activism started to attract more and more people as the problems of climate change continued to escalate incrementally. In this sub-section, I will elaborate on the rising global climate activism, which has become the driving force for efforts of global environmental policies.

In the beginning of this section, I start with the observation that climate change has become the defining element of global politics and a central point of contention within the global political economy in the 21st century. And in this sub-section, I will continue

[186] Martínez-Alier, J. (2012). Environmental justice and economic degrowth: an alliance between two movements. *Capitalism Nature Socialism*, *23*(1), 51-73. Pp 58.

with arguing that rising climate activism has become the main pillar of this re-configuration of global political economy. Through the last couple of decades, an increasing number of people has come to the conclusion that if humanity lives and consumes as it does currently, then the end of the planet is inevitable. In 1970s and 1980s the issue of global warming has been perceived as an urgent social problem and in the 1990s it led to major protests. Then, the 2009 UNFCCC COP15 summit in Copenhagen (specialties of which were given in the sub-section of International Governance of the Climate Change) has become the turning point for transnational climate mobilizing since the world political and economic elite were seen to be reluctant to take necessary steps despite the accumulated scientific data.

The global governance of the climate change has created frustration among people who believed they need to take control of the way politics being conducted. It has been observed that global climate activism especially from young people, most of which are aged between twelve and eighteen years and are in secondary school, has grown exponentially in the past years.[187] The reason why young people are interested in the climate politics is simple. They felt that current politicians are not doing enough to prevent the end of the world so they, themselves, need to take responsibility and act now to save not only the future of the planet but also their own lives. These young individuals expressed their 'climate concern', 'climate-related despair' or 'eco-anxiety' while they struggle with the feelings of helplessness, fear and fatalism around the issue of climate change.[188] They refused to watch the inevitable end of the planet like a car crash in a slow-motion, so they chose to organize globally.

In 2018, Swedish teenager Greta Thunberg started Friday school strikes by standing in front of the Swedish parliament to draw politicians' and general public's attention

[187] Rousell, D., & Cutter-Mackenzie-Knowles, A. (2020). A systematic review of climate change education: Giving children and young people a 'voice' and a 'hand' in redressing climate change. *Children's Geographies*, *18*(2), 191-208.

[188] Stevenson, K., & Peterson, N. (2015). Motivating action through fostering climate change hope and concern and avoiding despair among adolescents. *Sustainability*, *8*(1), 6.

to the urgency to the climate change.[189] Since then, "climate strikes" emerged as a form of youth social movement demanding far-reaching action on climate change.[190] Greta Thunberg gave a powerful speech in 2019 in Davos where the world's political and economic elite annually meet to discuss the trajectory of global economy. She fiercely and ardently urged the individuals who have the power to make a change and she became the leading voice of the political will of a larger young population scattered all around the world.

It was called "The Greta Thunberg effect" to explain how Greta could affect the whole world to really look at what is going on in this earth.[191] Through leading the "Fridays for Future" movement, she made "the young" to feel like it is their responsibility to act and "the old" to feel the guilt of not doing enough.[192] Thunberg has since inspired other teenagers, leading millions of them to join her by taking to the streets and to demand actions such as an immediate reduction in greenhouse gas emissions and a fossil fuel phase-out.[193] Although Thunberg was not the first young climate activist, she quickly became one of most prominent ones.

Young activists, all over the world, raised their voice against the political elites reluctance to do what is necessary to literally save the planet. In 1992, a 12-year-old Canadian Severn Cullis-Suzuki, the founder of the Environmental Children's Organization, spoke at the Earth Summit:

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[189] Han, H., & Ahn, S. W. (2020). Youth mobilization to stop global climate change: Narratives and impact. *Sustainability*, *12*(10), 4127. Pp.1

[190] Trihartono, A., Viartasiwi, N., & Nisya, C. (2020, May). The giant step of tiny toes: youth impact on the securitization of climate change. In IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science (Vol. 485, No. 1, p. 012007). IOP Publishing. PP.2

[191] Watts J. 2019 The Greta Thunberg effect: at last, MPs focus on climate change The Guardian[Internet] Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/apr/23/greta-thunberg

[192] Trihartono, A., Viartasiwi, N., & Nisya, C. (2020, May). The giant step of tiny toes: youth impact on the securitization of climate change. In IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science (Vol. 485, No. 1, p. 012007). IOP Publishing. PP.6

[193] Han, H., & Ahn, S. W. (2020). Youth mobilization to stop global climate change: Narratives and impact. *Sustainability*, *12*(10), 4127. Pp. 2.

> We felt it was important to go. We figured it was going to be mostly old men, sitting around, making decisions that are going to affect our future and the future generation. So we wanted to go as the conscience, as a reminder to those decision-makers, who their decisions would truly affect. [194]

During the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development (known as the Earth Summit) in 1992, nine major groups were designated as channels for achieving the world's **sustainable development** goals, including women, children and youth, indigenous peoples, farmers, business and industry, labor and trade unions, science and technology, local authorities, and NGOs.[195]

These individuals succeeded in framing climate change from a justice perspective and opened the channels of a global climate activism. Indeed, 31 years ago, when Severn Cullis-Suzuki gave a speech in the UN in 1992, she ignited the wick of the youth climate movement.[196] Young people followed the path created by the activists before them. To name but a few, young activists like Xiuhtezcatl Martinez and Isra Hirsi in the United States (US), Xiuhtezcatl Martinez and Isra Hirsi in the USA, John Paul Jose in India, Luisa Neubauer in Germany have affected the youth and general public.[197] In time, young climate activists learned how the system they intended to change, work and they came up with different strategies.

At the U.N. Youth Climate Summit, Thunberg and 14 children (from Argentina, the Marshall Islands, France, Germany, and the USA) formed a formal complaint under

[194] Cullis-Suzuki, S. Speech at UN Conference on Environment and Development. 1992. Available online: https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/severnsuzukiunearthsummit.htm (accessed on 10 August 2019).

[195] Han, H., & Ahn, S. W. (2020). Youth mobilization to stop global climate change: Narratives and impact. *Sustainability*, *12*(10), 4127. Pp. 1.

[196] Chung F. 2019 Nearly 30 years before Greta Thunberg, a 12-year-old girl shamed world leaders at the United Nations.News Corp Australia.

[197] Trihartono, A., Viartasiwi, N., & Nisya, C. (2020, May). The giant step of tiny toes: youth impact on the securitization of climate change. In IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science (Vol. 485, No. 1, p. 012007). IOP Publishing. PP.2

the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child and claimed that countries' failures to address the climate crisis violated the convention.[198]

In Europe, youth activists utilized the European Citizens' Initiative (ECI) as an outlet to pressure the EU Parliament, as they managed to collect one million signatures and demanded the following: [199]

> (1) that the E.U. adjust its goals under the Paris Agreement to an 80% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 (to reach net zero by 2035), and that European climate legislation be adjusted accordingly.
> (2) that an E.U. Border Carbon Adjustment be implemented.
> (3) that no free trade treaty be signed with partner countries that did not follow a 1.5 ◦C compatible pathway (according to Climate Action Tracker); and
> (4) that the EU create free educational materials for all members about the effects of climate change.

Throughout the last few decades, the organized climate activism demanded political actors to take more radical steps than the established measures in the various UNFCCC Summits. Their efforts not only contributed vastly towards the general acceptance of the climate crisis by the public, but also left political and economic elite no choice but do something about the problem. The politicization of climate change in the public created a fertile ground for the green parties to flourish both in quality and quantity. In the next sub-section, I will explore the reflections of rising climate activism in the political realm, namely powerful emergence of green political parties.

3.2.4. Green Parties Green Parties for Greener Future?

In the last sub-section of the first part of this chapter, I will dwell into the growing presence in quantity and quality of green parties within the national parliaments to find

[198] Milman, O. Greta Thunberg Condemns World Leaders in Emotional Speech at UN. *Guardian*, 23 September 2019. Available online: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/sep/23/greta-thunberg-speech-un-2019-address (accessed on 25 September 2019).

[199] Han, H., & Ahn, S. W. (2020). Youth mobilization to stop global climate change: Narratives and impact. *Sustainability*, *12*(10), 4127. Pp. 7.

political solutions to the escalating environmental problems both in national and international levels. In the previous sub-section, I tried to demonstrate how the global climate activism has turned into a powerful force influencing and educating the general public about the devastating results of the global climate crisis. Now, I will briefly overview some examples of the green parties in different countries and then, I will conceptualize their relative success in the last few decades as a response to this aforementioned public demand to take necessary actions against the climate change. In the last part, I will explore the political positions and ideas of these green parties in different parts of the world.

I will start with green party constellation over the world. There are Green parties in about 80% of the states of Europe, about 50% of the states of Africa and the Americas, and about 20% of the states of the Asia-Pacific region.[200] These green parties performed in local, national, and supranational elections with different success ratios and some of them participated in ruling coalitions. The Green Party of the United States is not one of these successful examples since it is experiencing the difficult position of being the third party in a two-party system. Given the majoritarian US electoral system, unlimited campaign expenditure, and embedded norms such as closed primaries and party registration, the Greens face an almost impossible task to achieve any form of electoral success.[201] Although, the Green Party in the US showed strength in leading different petition callings and organizing various demonstrations through eco-action committee and peace action committee; [202] 1949 was the last time a third party was represented in the US Congress.[203]

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[200] Gahrton, P. (2015). *Green parties, green future: From local groups to the international stage*. Pluto press. pp. 1-2.

[201] Hughes, C. (2022). It's not easy being green, white, red, and blue: constituency representations versus electoral competition in the Wisconsin green party. *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, *35*(1), 27-45. Pp. 42.

[202] Green Party US. https://www.gp.org/petitions & https://www.gp.org/ecoaction_committee & https://www.gp.org/peace_action_committee

[203] Hughes, C. (2022). It's not easy being green, white, red, and blue: constituency representations versus electoral competition in the Wisconsin green party. *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, *35*(1), 27-45. Pp. 27.

Asia Pacific Greens Federation (APGF) encompasses 21 parties across the East, South and South East Asia, the Pacific and the Middle East, with Green parties existing (whether formally competing in elections or not) in perhaps a third of nations in the region.[204] The first Green party (the New Zealand Values Party) was established in 1972 in New Zealand.[205] Still, in Asia, green parties have similar success level to their American counterparts. Excluding Australia and New Zealand where green parties have become established participants in parliaments and government, there has been limited Green party representation in national or sub-national parliaments in the Asia.[206]

Without a doubt, Europe has been the place where the green parties are most influential. Since 1994 elections, European Federation of Green Parties institutionalized the cooperation between different green parties and in the 1999 election, the Greens won a record number of 38 seats in the EP. [207] After more than 30 years of presence on the political scene and despite the uneven success levels in different countries, Green parties have proven to be more than just a passing experience in Europe.[208] Although in Norway, Spain and Poland where Green parties remain fundamentally inconsequential electoral players, in countries from Italy to Ireland, Finland to France, the greens have been regular participants in governing coalitions.[209]

In the last part of this sub-section, I will point out the political positions and ideas of these various green parties. The question why Green parties declared to campaign for

[204] Jackson, S. (2022). Going Green in Asia? Green parties in a non-western setting. *Asian Journal of Political Science*, *30*(1), 1-18. Pp. 1.

[205] Richardson, D. (2006). Chapter 1 The Green challenge. In D. Richardson and C. Rootes (Eds.), *The green challenge: The development of green parties in Europe*. Routledge. Pp. 3.

[206] Jackson, S. (2022). Going Green in Asia? Green parties in a non-western setting. *Asian Journal of Political Science*, *30*(1), 1-18. Pp. 1.

[207] Brack, N., & Kelbel, C. (2016). The Greens in the European Parliament: Evolution and Cohesion. In *Green Parties in Europe* (pp. 217-237). Routledge. Pp. 219-220.
[208] Van Haute, E. (2016). Introduction. In *Green parties in Europe* (pp. 1-12). Routledge. Pp. 1.

[209] Grant, Z. P., & Tilley, J. (2019). Fertile soil: explaining variation in the success of Green parties. *West European Politics*, *42*(3), 495-516. Pp. 495.

national parliament in the 1970s and 1980s cannot be answered without examining their roots in the student movements of the 1960s, as well as the subsequent flowering of the environmental, the anti-nuclear and the peace movements. [210] For instance, the Green Party of the United States declares that it is committed to peace, ecology, social justice and democracy.[211]

The ten key values of the Greens in America are listed as grassroots democracy, social justice and equal opportunity, ecological wisdom, non-violence, decentralization, community-based economics, feminism and gender equity, respect for diversity, personal and global responsibility, future focus and sustainability.[212] Sociologically, the young, nonreligious, female, urban and educated individuals are more likely to support the Greens.[213]

In general, the Green vote was mostly considered as an issue- or value-based vote that transcended the old 'class-politics' or traditional societal divisions, and the Green electorate was depicted as socio-demographically heterogeneous.[214]

In the specific case of European green parties, Müller-Rommel noted that by criticizing the link between the economic growth and the destruction of the environment, they laid their foundation on the perceived failure of the established "catch-all parties" by either reforming or radically changing the existing way of policy making:[215]

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[210] Müller-Rommel, F. (2022). The 'Lifespan'of Green Parties in Western Europe: An Evaluation. In *Parties, Institutions and Preferences: The Shape and Impact of Partisan Politics* (pp. 123-148). Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. Pp. 127.

[211] Green Party US. https://www.gp.org/

[212] Green Party US. https://www.gp.org/ten_key_values

[213] Close, C., & Delwit, P. (2016). Green parties and elections. In *Green Parties in Europe* (pp. 217-237). Routledge. Pp. 241-264. PP. 261.

[214] Close, C., & Delwit, P. (2016). Green parties and elections. In *Green Parties in Europe* (pp. 217-237). Routledge. Pp. 241-264. PP. 253.

[215] Müller-Rommel, F. (1985). The greens in Western Europe: similar but different. *International Political Science Review*, *6*(4), 483-498. Pp. 484.

- **Pure Green Reformist Parties:** Not rejecting free economic enterprise and avoiding policy conflict with the established parties over the social welfare state and foreign policy. The reformist greens like the greens in Belgium, Great Britain, Finland, Sweden, Ireland, Switzerland, and France seek an alliance with social democratic parties rather than with radical new left parties.
- **Alternative Green Radical Parties:** Seeking fundamental changes in social and political institutions and standing for a new alternative, social-radical, democratic paradigm. These green radical parties like the green parties in the Netherlands, West Germany, Luxembourg, and Austria prefer forming alliances with radical new left parties rather than the Social Democrats.

Since 1985, when Ferdinand Müller-Rommel differentiated European greens into two groups, there has been another and very significant intervening variable coming into the picture. This variable has been the transforming presence of the Europeanisation process. Europeanisation means Green parties must now confront controversial issues (monetary union, sovereignty, further integration and enlargement) which they might otherwise choose to ignore, or on which there exists no clear 'Green' position. [216] The green parties started to merge into a more or less unified group in the supranational level of the EU, following issues other than merely environmental matters. In this process of Europeanization, their original "Green" ideology has been subjected to moderation. This transformation took place as a part of the wider phenomenon, which will be explained in this thesis as the passive revolution of green capitalism.

To sum up, in the first of half of this chapter, I argued that climate change has become the defining element of global politics and a central point of contention within the global political economy in the 21st century. That is why, I used the term of "zeitgeist" to define the way climate crisis affect and re-shape the global political economy. In this vein, I analyzed the current modes of conflict and cooperation within the

[216] Bomberg, E. (2002). The Europeanisation of green parties: Exploring the EU's impact. *West European Politics, 25*(3), 29-50. Pp. 44.

international governance of the climate change; the climate justice movement, emerged in the global south, in response to the way international community handles the climate crisis, but spread to the rest of the world; the rising climate activism uniting people all around the world against the incompetence and/or reluctance of global political and economic elite to take the necessary steps for climate crisis; and the growing presence in quantity and quality of green parties within the national parliaments to find political solutions to the escalating environmental problems both in national and international levels.

In the first part of this chapter, I presented the multi-level and multi-actor process of the international governance of environment. By pointing out different approaches to the environmental governance, I argued that the protection of the environment is not the only aim of the international environmental governance. It has its own inherent power dynamics which has become apparent through the introduction of controversial measures like carbon markets. I explained how this unequal relationship created divergence between the developed and developing countries over the international governance of climate change.

I argued that the underdeveloped part of the world resents the developed countries for their actions, such as heavy industrialization-induced environmental pollution, deforestation, and loss of biodiversity, the burdens of which they now must shoulder. They perceived the efforts toward environmental protection as if they are being robbed of their opportunity for development and economic prosperity. Climate justice movement has risen out of these lines and spread to the rest of the world. In time, the climate activism, especially from the young individuals, has taken over the global social movements and made the elites of global political economy take actions accordingly. The organized climate activism demanded political actors to take more radical steps than the established measures in the various UNFCCC Summits. Their efforts not only contributed vastly towards the general acceptance of the climate crisis by the public, but also left political and economic elite no choice but do something about the problem. The politicization of climate change in the public created a fertile ground for the green parties to flourish both in quality and quantity. Through these developments, I explained how climate change has become the zeitgeist of global

politics and a central point of contention within the global political economy in the 21st century.

3.3. International Governance of the Climate Change

In the second half of this chapter, I will focus on how the European Green Deal should be contextualized with respect to different positioning of the leading actors of global environmental governance. As I argue in this thesis, the EGD did not emerge in a vacuum. It is the long-term result of different developments happening at the same time. In the first half this chapter I explained how climate crisis reformed contemporary relations of global political economy, now I will dwell into both cooperative and competitive encounters of the EU, USA, China and Russia with respect to climate politics. By putting the emergence of the EGD center, I will historicize the developments leading to this significant leap into global restructuring of capitalist relations in line with green capitalism.

Firstly, I will provide historical background the President Trump decided to withdraw from Paris Agreement in 2017 and I will show how the political polarization over the scientific evidence about climate change created significant problems for crafting a comprehensive American climate policy. I will argue that the US' stepping down from the leading position for the introduction and application of the necessary environmental reforms for contemporary socio-political and economic relations has marked a turning point for the rise of the EU's leadership. In second sub-section, I will focus on the Europe and the intra-EU conflicts around the adoption and application of the EGD. I will explain the domino effect that the EGD has on different classes within one country; different countries with different levels of dependence on the carbon fuels and different regions with different economic development positions. Then, I will bring China into the picture through its latest ambitions of going green as quick as possible. I will explore China's ecological civilization notion which makes it head-to-head with the EU's leadership over the climate change measures. I speculate that maybe China has now the opportunity to re-shape global capitalism the way it fits China's advantages rather than merely playing by the rules set by Western economies. Finally, in the last sub-section, I will briefly touch upon the effects of Russia's invasion

of Ukraine for the future of green transformation in the EU. The EU's long-term plan to shut down all of its nuclear power-plants and using only clean and renewable energy like natural gas, hydro-, solar- or wind-energy has seemed to reach a gridlock when Russia invaded Ukraine and triggered a series of events rather difficult for the EU to handle. I will argue that the EGD is more than EU-level climate politics because it not only requires policy alignment from its members in the areas of energy, trade, social policies, it has serious implications for international political and economic relations, which I will perceive as a step towards green capitalism.

3.3.1. The US and Its Failed Attempt of "Green New Deal"

While Greta Thunberg has been praised globally, she also was mocked by then president of the United States, Donald J. Trump who dismissed the climate crisis all together and made counter arguments in line with post-truth atmosphere. He said "We must reject the perennial prophets of doom and their predictions of the apocalypse" and continued "They want to see us do badly, but we don't let that happen. They predicted an overpopulation crisis in the 1960s, mass starvation in the 70s, and an end of oil in the 1990s. These alarmists always demand the same thing: absolute power to dominate, transform and control every aspect of our lives. We will never let radical socialists destroy our economy, wreck our country or eradicate our liberty."

Sadly, Mr. Trump is not alone in the "climate change is a hoax" argument since one in three Americans do not believe in anthropogenic (human-caused) climate change (Marlon et al. 2018). One famous work for climate change deniers is "The Greatest Hoax: How the Global Warming Conspiracy Threatens Your Future" written by the U.S. Senator James Inhofe in 2012. Despite the hard scientific evidence on the devastating outcomes of the anthropogenic global warming, there are persistent public debates about the existence of climate change, whether it is anthropogenic and whether it constitutes a problem. [217] While scientists, activists and progressive politicians worked to inform both public and policy makers, during the powerful Republican

[217] Brüggemann, M., Elgesem, D., Bienzeisler, N., Gertz, H. D., & Walter, S. (2020). Mutual group polarization in the blogosphere: Tracking the hoax discourse on climate change. *International Journal of Communication*, *14*, 24. Pp. 1026.

presence in the US senate and house of representatives, the politics of climate change could not find a basis to develop in the US.

Although the Paris Agreement has its shortcomings, it has been generally considered as a positive development towards the international community's active involvement against the climate change. Yet, only after 2 years in 2017 when President Trump decided to withdraw the US from its prior commitments, this relatively positive outlook for the future of the planet Earth started to be hang on by a thread. Given the historical responsibility and political weight of the USA, the decision weakened the UNFCCC as the central forum of global climate governance.[218] The US' stepping down from the leading position for the introduction and application of the necessary environmental reforms for contemporary socio-political and economic relations has marked a turning point for the rise of the EU's leadership.

Within the framework of the whole world moving away from the carbon fuels, the progressive left pursued a campaign for a re-direction for American politics towards new post-carbon world order. On top of losing moral high ground with respect to serious of wars fought in the Middle East region, the USA is now facing a powerful rival -China who invested in the sustainable energy and green transition of production. "Green New Deal", proposed by the Democratic Party and supported ardently by the names like Alexandra Ocasio-Cortez and Bernie Sanders comes into picture within this perspective.

The Green New Deal, which proposed to reduce dependence on fossil fuels to combat climate change and achieving net-zero greenhouse gas emissions within a decade while guaranteeing Americans high-paying jobs and high-quality health care, failed on a 57-to-0 vote, with all Republicans and four Democrats blocking the resolution.[219]

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[218] Aykut, S. C., Morena, E., & Foyer, J. (2022). 'Incantatory'governance: global climate politics' performative turn and its wider significance for global politics. In *The Climatization of Global Politics* (pp. 19-40). Cham: Springer International Publishing. Pp.532

[219] Gradoni, D. & Sonmez, F. (2019, March 26). Senate defeats Green New Deal, as Democrats call vote a 'sham'. *Washington Post*. https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/green-new-deal-on-track-to-senate-defeat-as-democrats-call-vote-a-sham/2019/03/26/834f3e5e-4fdd-11e9-a3f7-78b7525a8d5f_story.html

The process turned into a political show as President Trump and Republicans ridicule the proposed legislation, and some well-known Democrat figures joined them in their criticism, like Ernest Moniz, President Barack Obama's energy secretary, saying an all-renewable energy economy by 2030 is "just unrealistic" or former Colorado governor John Hickenlooper (D), saying the plan has "laudable aims but also take an approach that limits our prospects for success" due to lack technological advancement.[220]

The GND demanded a greater state intervention in the economy, coming in the form of tighter regulation of carbon-intensive industries and sectors like energy, manufacturing, and transportation and increasing public investments in low-carbon alternatives and promoting "green jobs" necessary for phasing-out of fossil fuels.[221]Although it was prepared and put forth in the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives, it failed to pass from the Republican-controlled Senate. With the election of Joe Biden as the new president after Trump, American environmental politics started to align itself, once again, with the Western bloc. These developments were slowed down, if not halt all together, with the COVID-19 pandemic and Russian invasion of Ukraine. The future of American position with respect to climate crisis is yet to be determined.

Here, I want to emphasize the way policymakers tried to justify the GND in the United States. "Achieving net-zero greenhouse gas emissions" while "creating high-paying jobs and high-quality health care" fits both **Commonsense 1***"Climate change is a serious problem, and we must act now!"* and **Commonsense 2** "*Growth is good and desirable."* Although it failed, American version of the Green Deal also adopted ***green***

[220] Gradoni, D. & Sonmez, F. (2019, March 26). Senate defeats Green New Deal, as Democrats call vote a 'sham'. *Washington Post*. https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/green-new-deal-on-track-to-senate-defeat-as-democrats-call-vote-a-sham/2019/03/26/834f3e5e-4fdd-11e9-a3f7-78b7525a8d5f_story.html

[221]US House of Representatives. (2019). https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hres109/BILLS-116hres109ih.pdf

growth notion because it relies on technological fixes over the any other solutions that questions the capitalist mode of production and consumption.

3.3.2. The EU's "Man on the Moon" Moment with the EGD

In the apparent absence of the US in the formation and application of new international climate policies against the global climate crisis, it seems that the EU has come forward for the role. On the same day when the European Commission agreed on the European Green Deal, Von Der Leyen emphasized the EU's leading position as "*This is Europe's 'man on the moon' moment*".[222]

The next day, following the meeting of the European Council on 12 December in Brussels, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said *"If we want to convince others like India or China to join, we have to be a role model. We have to be united and bold, step forward and prove that change is possible, and that it is of benefit for the people and for the economy."*[223]

The EU's self-appointed role as the pioneer and the leader of global transitioning to a green and sustainable economy could be perceived as a reaction to growing public demands for actions against climate change. In Europe, growing concern about climate change was reflected in stronger electoral support for Green parties in the 2019 European elections, especially in some larger Western member states.[224]

It was also a reaction to the fact that climate change deniers such as Donald Trump in the US and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil took the control of their countries, which threatened the global cooperation on tackling climate change, as enshrined in the Paris

[222] The European Commission. (2019, Dec 11). Press remarks by President von der Leyen on the occasion of the adoption of the European Green Deal Communication https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_19_6749

[223] The European Commission. (2019, Dec 13). Turning challenge into opportunity on the course to becoming the first climate-neutral continent. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/AC_19_6778

[224] Grant, Z. P. and Tilley, J. (2019) Fertile soil: explaining variation in the success of Green parties. West European Politics. 42, 3: 495–516.

Climate Agreement.[225] In this global political setting, the EU has taken the lead in the war against climate change.

The project of EGD has created important controversies within the EU when the commission's ambition to become first continent that is carbon-neutral by 2050 was perceived as an extra economic burden on some less-developed members and a new source of unjust taxes for the labor within all member states. That is why, the European Green Deal has to be based on a restrictive hegemony in the sense of Gramsci's differentiation between restrictive and expansive hegemony (see Chapter 2).

The EU, especially the European Commission has crafted the legislation of the European Green Deal in such a way that only limited participation of the affected parties (like the European labor unions were not a part of legislation process while the European capital had frequent meeting with the prominent policy-makers in the Commission) and the EU members which are reluctant to shoulder the costs of green transition was given some concessions in the form of longer periods of time to complete climate neutrality and also financial aid through Just Transition funds.

Indeed, after the first waves of COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the EU member states started to question the timing of this ambitious transition plan and some members argued for scrapping the environmental measures resulting from the European Green Deal to fight with the virus.

The Prime Minister of Czech Republic, Andrej Babiš said on March 16th, 2020 that "*Europe should forget about the Green Deal now and focus on the coronavirus instead*."[226] Poland supported the idea that the pandemic should be given priority over climate change and members should re-think the already existing climate measures like the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), which is set up in 2005 as world's

[225] Fraune, C. and Knodt, M. (2018) Sustainable energy transformations in an age of populism, post-truth politics, and local resistance. Energy Research & Social Science. 43: P.1–7.

[226] Gotev, G. (2020, March 17). *Czech PM urges EU to ditch Green Deal amid virus*. www.euractiv.com. https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy-environment/news/czech-pm-urges-eu-to-ditch-green-deal-amid-virus/

first international emissions trading system. The Polish deputy minister for state assets Janusz Kowalski said on March 17th, 2020:

> "*The results of fighting coronavirus will be painful. It is obvious that countries will be looking for extra money to help their business and citizens. Poland and other countries should take care of the climate on their own, and the ETS should be removed from 1 January, 2021, or at least Poland should be excluded from the system."*[227]

The European Green Deal has become a new battle ground for allocation of the EU budget between members having different economic development levels. The relatively less-developed members urged the EU not to reflect the burdens of green transition upon their weaker economies.

The former Romanian president and current MEP for the European People's Party, Traian Basescu said on February 20th, 2020:

> *"The Green Deal will require re-skilling, job losses and investment. Many EU countries do not have the financial resources required to meet the climate and clean energy objectives of the European Green Deal. The €10 billion in EU funding currently envisaged for Romania's energy transition is "ridiculous". Our real priorities in Romania is to build infrastructure like motorways. Romania "cannot compromise" these infrastructure projects for the Green Deal because they "are a key element" of the country's development. Such discrepancies between EU and national priorities are likely to generate huge tensions inside the EU, which could lead to some countries considering the possibility of leaving the Union altogether. It is only when we have more clarity and analyze the impact of the Green Deal on our economy that we will see whether the EU will remain united or will lose two or three members."*[228]

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[227] Gotev, G. (2020, March 17). *EU should scrap emissions trading scheme, Polish official says*. https://www.euractiv.com/section/emissions-trading-scheme/news/eu-should-scrap-emissions-trading-scheme-polish-official-says/

[228] Simon, F., & Simon, F. (2020, February 20). *Basescu: European Green Deal risks pushing "two or three countries" towards EU exit*. www.euractiv.com. https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy-

But it is important to note that this rhetoric is not solely due to the pandemic. Even before the COVID-19, the same actors were arguing that the EU should come up with a plan that the already developed members would not require developing members to give up taking the same development route:[229]

> Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawieck: *"Poland must take a longer road to neutrality of carbon dioxide emissions than many other EU countries."*
> Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán: *"It is not acceptable that in the European Union's next budget we take money away from cohesion funds and transfer it to climate protection goals*"
> Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš: *"I am convinced that only member states that are most affected by the transition should have access to the Just Transition Fund."*

Indeed, a closer look to relatively less-developed members economic structure shows the basis of their arguments against green transition on an equal footing. Poland, for instance, has one third of its energy coming from coal and has to invest €13 billion per year, i.e. 1-2 percent of its GDP to achieve climate neutrality by 2050.[230] Any policy change to ensure this transition should be potentially agonizing, economically problematic and politically hard to justify. That is why the EU has come up with the Just Transition Fund (JTF) as the first pillar of Just Transition Mechanism (JTM) to support the territories most affected by the transition towards climate neutrality providing them with tailored support.[231] Though the JTM, the EU plans to "uphold

environment/interview/basescu-european-green-deal-risks-pushing-two-or-three-countries-towards-eu-exit/

[229] Bayer, L., & Tamma, P. (2020, January 14). *EU countries scrap for cash from new green scheme*. POLITICO. https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-countries-scrap-for-just-transition-cash/

[230] *Carbon-neutral Poland 2050 Turning a challenge into an opportunity*. McKinsey & Company in Poland. https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/Electric%20Power%20and%20Natural%20Gas/Our%20Insights/Carbon%20neutral%20Poland%202050%20Turning%20a%20challenge%20into%20an%20opportunity/Carbon-neutral-Poland-2050.pdf

[231] *Just Transition funding sources*. (n.d.). European Commission. https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/finance-and-green-deal/just-transition-mechanism/just-transition-funding-sources_en

productive investments in small and medium-sized enterprises, the creation of new firms, research and innovation, environmental rehabilitation, clean energy, up-and reskilling of workers, job-search assistance and active inclusion of jobseekers programmes, as well as the transformation of existing carbon-intensive installations when these investments lead to substantial emission cuts and job protection".[232]

The EU's carrot strategy seems to be working for its members since countries like Greece, Spain and Italy have pledged to transform their coal-based industries through European funds. While Greece aims to end all coal-fired power production by 2028, Italy tries to use JTP to transform its steelworks, linked with high rates of cancer in Taranto and Spain which in 2018 shut down 26 uncompetitive coal mines, argues the fund should go to regions that have tackled the transition with their own means, and not just to climate laggards. [233]

The European Green Deal has re-surfaced the already existing class antagonisms within the EU. As it will be discussed in this thesis thoroughly, the European unification project has always been a class project in itself. The EU has legalized and codified the current ambitions of capitalist class into its institutions, structures and various pieces of policies. The most obvious incident where the class conflicts regarding the consequences of the EGD was definitely France's Yellow Jackets uprising which began as a fuel tax protest by French drivers, which later turned into a wider inequality protest. Protesters from peripheral towns, cities and rural areas across France came together and stood against the parliamentary vote to rise of diesel prices. During the protests, one slogan gains special influence, which was "Fin du monde, fins de mois / Mêmes coupables, même combat" meaning "end of the world, end of the month / same culprits, same fight". The *Gilet Janues* Assembly borrowed this slogan

[232] *Just Transition funding sources*. (n.d.). European Commission. https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/finance-and-green-deal/just-transition-mechanism/just-transition-funding-sources_en

[233] *Carbon-neutral Poland 2050 Turning a challenge into an opportunity*. McKinsey & Company in Poland. https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/Electric%20Power%20and%20Natural%20Gas/Our%20Insights/Carbon%20neutral%20Poland%202050%20Turning%20a%20challenge%20into%20an%20opportunity/Carbon-neutral-Poland-2050.pdf

from Nicolas Hulot, former Minister for Ecological Transition, who resigned in protest at Macron's policies, stating: "we must address the struggle people have to make ends meet at the end of the month; but we must also confront the prospect of the end of the world".[234]

The "Gilets Jaunes" (Yellow Vests) movement sparked the recent discussions on just transition frameworks and raise concerns on the socio-economic impacts on sustainability policies as well as it illustrates the gap between what sustainability means at a local context and the universal and resolved breath of the commitments provided by the Paris Agreement.[235] The EU officials tried to get protests in France against the economic burdens of green transition out of perspective and make the incident insignificant or inconsequential for the EGD. Frans Timmermans, European Commission Executive Vice-President for the European Green Deal, rejected the idea (promoted by U.S. President Donald Trump) that the protests were an expression of mass skepticism toward greenhouse gas targets but argued that it was political clumsiness that allowed an energy policy to set off outrage at social inequality.[236]

Although the pandemic challenged the way European politicians perceived and acted on climate change with the immediate needs of pandemic and these member states even have called for climate measures to be scrapped, climate change will neither disappear nor be resolved because of the coronavirus.[237] As the labor power in the EU has suffered from serious erosion in the last four decades, the wage-laborers who are already in vulnerable positions are being skeptical for the European Green Deal because they believe it will inflict its unequal burden upon them. However, the EGD

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[234] *End of the Month, End of the World | The Land Magazine*. (n.d.). https://www.thelandmagazine.org.uk/articles/end-month-end-world

[235] Martin, M., & Islar, M. (2020). The 'end of the world' vs. the 'end of the month': Understanding social resis- tance to sustainability transition agendas, a lesson from the Yellow Vests in France. *Sustainability Science, 16*, 601–614. Pp.601.

[236] P. (2020, December 22). *The politics of the Green Deal*. POLITICO. https://www.politico.eu/article/chapter-two-the-politics-of-the-green-deal/

[237] Elkerbout, M., Egenhofer, C., Núñez Ferrer, J., Catuti, M., Kustova, I., & Rizos, V. (2020). The European Green Deal after Corona: Implications for EU climate policy. *CEPS Policy Insights*, (2020–06). Pp. 1.

should not be about choosing between protecting environment (and the future generations) or protecting their current income. If the policymakers in the EU are sincere about their ambition to stop or even slow down the pace of climate change, then the Just Transition Mechanism should be used as a remedy for the labor and its socio-political and economic loses throughout the neoliberal process.

3.3.3. China and Its Ecological Civilization Through "Going Green"

China has a unique relationship with the rest of the capitalist world resulting from the way it has been incorporated into global capitalism. David McNally defines this peculiar mode of capitalism as "Sino capitalism". It is a capitalist system that is already global in reach but one that differs from Anglo-American capitalism in important respects like it relies on informal business networks rather than on legal codes and transparent rules, or it assigns the Chinese state a leading role in fostering and guiding capitalist accumulation.[238]

The rise of China in the global capitalist system has gathered different responses from different political economic positions. Ian Bremmer, for instance, argues that Chinese capitalism is a threat to the free-market globalized system with its state-owned, state-sponsored, or private yet state-loyal corporations and wealth funds, because state capitalism is inherently incompatible with the liberal inter-national political economy and might lead developing world to reject free-market doctrine.[239]

Edward Steinfeld, on the other hand, argues that China is not posing a threat to the Western-led economic system because in time it has come to be an important part of it with its market-friendly domestic economy and its multi-firm, multi-national global production networks.[240]

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[238] McNally, C. A. (2012). Sino-capitalism: China's reemergence and the international political economy. *World politics*, *64*(4), 741-776. Pp. 744.

[239] Bremmer, I. (2010). The end of the free market: Who wins the war between states and corporations?. *European View*, *9*(2), 249-252.

[240] Steinfeld, E. S. (2010). *Playing our game: Why China's rise doesn't threaten the West*. Oxford University Press.

Chinese economic model has been going through serious structural changes in the last few years. Not only international organizations, business groups and other nation states urged China to transform its economy, but also the business networks and political elites of its own actively pressured the state to take necessary actions. For instance, the World Bank reported that:

> China's high growth based on investment, low-cost manufacturing and exports has largely reached its limits and has led to economic, social, and environmental imbalances. Reducing these imbalances requires shifts in the structure of the economy from manufacturing to high value services, from investment to consumption, and from high to low carbon intensity. Over the past few years, growth has moderated in the face of structural constraints, including declining labor force growth, diminishing returns to investment, and slowing productivity growth. The challenge going forward is to find new drivers of growth while addressing the social and environmental legacies of China's previous development path. China's rapid economic growth exceeded the pace of institutional development, and there are important institutional and reform gaps that China needs to address to ensure a high-quality and sustainable growth path. The role of the state needs to evolve and focus on providing a clear, fair and stable business environment, strengthening the regulatory system and the rule of law to further support the market system, as well as ensuring equitable access to public services to all citizens.[241]

Western, liberal world order transcript China to transition to more environmentally sustainable growth by reducing air, soil, water, and marine plastic pollution; strengthening sustainable natural resource management; promoting low-carbon transport and cities; and facilitating the transition to a lower carbon energy path.[242] However, China has experienced domestics pressures as well. In the 2000s,

[241] The World Bank. (Last Updated: Apr 20, 2023.) China Overview Context. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview

[242]The World Bank. (Last Updated: Apr 20, 2023.) China Overview Strategy. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview#2

environmental protests became an issue for the government despite that they were mostly 'not in my backyard' type protests.[243] Increasing environmental problems led individuals to demand action from the government.

In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping introduced two very important initiatives, The "Silk Road Economic Belt" and "Maritime Silk Road of the 21st Century", which aim to connect 65 countries and 4.4 billion people from across Central Asia to the Middle East, Russia and Europe from both land and sea.[244] In 2014, President Xi Jinping used the term "new normal" to the current economic situation based on sustainable and mid-to-high-speed growth model with higher efficiency and lower cost.[245]

Green and low-carbon development has been presented as the vital parts of the Belt and Road Initiative which focuses on both economic prosperity and green development.[246] Domestically, China also set the targets of green and sustainable economic transition. It has launched a new policy paradigm, "ecological civilization," to dramatically improve environmental regulations, reduce pollution, and transform industries by adopting new green technologies and higher environmental standards.[247]

However, China's domestic "green shift" policy shows some inconsistencies with its global infrastructure development mega-projects. It has been pointed out that China's plan to "go green" is based relocating its polluting productions or unsustainable

[243] Hoffmann, C., & Ergenc, C. (2022). A Greening Dragon in the Desert? China's Role in the Geopolitical Ecology of Decarbonisation in the Eastern Mediterranean. *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 1-20. Pp. 6.

[244] Du, M. M. (2016). China's "One Belt, One Road" initiative: Context, focus, institutions, and implications. *The Chinese Journal of Global Governance*, *2*(1), 30-43. Pp. 30-31.

[245] Xi's "new normal" theory. (2014, Nov 10). *China.org.cn*.http://www.china.org.cn/world/2014-11/10/content_34012582.htm

[246] Lan, Q., Tang, W., & Hu, Q. (2022). Estimation of China's Green Investment Efficiency in Belt and Road Countries-Based on SBM-Undesirable Model and Malmquist Index Model. *Frontiers in Energy Research*, *9*, 907. Pp.1.

[247] Tracy, E. F., Shvarts, E., Simonov, E., & Babenko, M. (2017). China's new Eurasian ambitions: the environmental risks of the Silk Road Economic Belt. *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, *58*(1), 56-88 pp. 56

resource extracting practices to less developed countries.[248] For instance, Tajikistan - the poorest of the former Soviet states, is the likely candidate for the relocation of Chinese cement industry, which is most polluting industry in China for both its outdated technologies and overproduction, because Tajikistan has poor environmental record and overproduction.[249]

In 2021, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) of the People's Republic of China jointly issued the "Green development guidelines for overseas investment and cooperation". It was a step away from China's traditional reliance on host country rules since it encouraged Chinese businesses to integrate green development throughout the overseas investment process, and even to follow international green rules and standards" when the local standards are insufficient.[250] Especially, the development of projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), this marked a new cornerstone for China's official stance in environmental protection. It is important to note that China is not taking these environmental protections step solely to protect environment. This new way of capitalism has opened new channels for China to increase their share from the global pie of capitalism. China concurrently has become the primary producer of the most profitable fields in green technologies; including wind power, electric cars, waste recycling, and decontamination of rivers and seas and China's share in these sectors is more than the sum of both the United States and the European Union.[251]

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[248] See Lang, G., & Chan, C. H. W. (2006). China's impact on forests in Southeast Asia. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, *36*(2), 167-194. And Munson, P., & Ronghui, Z. (2012). Fedding the Dragon: Managing Chinese Resource Acquisition in Africa. *Seattle Journal of Environmental Law*, *2*(1), 9.

[249] Tracy, E. F., Shvarts, E., Simonov, E., & Babenko, M. (2017). China's new Eurasian ambitions: the environmental risks of the Silk Road Economic Belt. *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, *58*(1), 56-88 pp. 77

[250] Nedopil, C., De Boer D., Danting F. and Tang, Y. (2021, Aug 18). What China's new guidelines on 'green development' mean for the Belt and Road. China Dialogue. https://chinadialogue.net/en/business/what-chinas-new-guidelines-on-green-development-mean-for-the-belt-and-road/

[251] Froggatt, A., & Quiggin, D. (2021). China, EU and US cooperation on climate and energy. https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-03/2021-03-26-china-eu-uscooperation-froggatt.pdf

Through adopting green capitalism's rules and regulations, China has not only bind itself another set of rules and regulations but also gained the "first come first served" type of advantages in the new chapter of capitalism which is defined as "green capitalism".

As it is stated in the beginning of this section, China has come to be an important of global capitalist system. Maybe as the first time in its history, China has now the opportunity to re-shape global capitalism the way it fits China's advantages rather than merely playing by the rules set by Western economies.

3.3.4. Russia and Its Significant Role in Europe's Green Transformation

The EGD is more than EU-level climate politics. It not only requires policy alignment from its members in the areas of energy, trade, social policies, it has serious implications for international political and economic relations. One of the most important and most recent developments regarding the future of the EGD is the Russia's military operations in Ukraine. Indeed, it is important to note that the relations between the EU and Ukraine have already been affected by the EU's increasing energy dependency on Russian natural gas, Russia's territorial claims over Ukraine and the political will on the part of Ukraine to be a member of the EU when Russian aggression against Ukraine started on February 24th, 2022.

The incident re-surfaced various discussions within European public such as abandoning nuclear energy and replacing coal with natural gas as the main source of energy, heavy dependence on Russian natural gas and its political implication for Ukraine's possible the EU membership.

The multi-actor and multilateral nature of the issue could be observed during negotiations and drafting of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. Germany and the U.S met to discuss possible compensations to Ukraine without actual Ukrainian participation and they agreed together to provide investments of $1 billion in Ukraine's energy transition; despite the fact that closer Russian-German cooperation would weaken

Germany's readiness to counter Russia's aggressive policy, which in turn would encourage Russia to escalate the conflict in the Donbas.[252]

In a political analysis made in November 2021, only three months before Russian aggression against Ukraine, it was noted that the completion of Nord Stream 2 (NS2) gas pipeline was actually strengthening Russia's position who was now able to by-pass Ukraine and reach European energy market directly and Ukraine was skeptical despite Berlin's assurance that Germany will support Ukraine if Russia uses the pipeline for geopolitical purposes and it will provide a billion-dollar "green fund" to contribute to Ukraine's energy transition.[253] Three months later, it turned out that Ukraine was right to be skeptical.

Despite their energy dependence, European leaders stood with Ukraine and agreed on a series of economic sanctions against Russia.[254] During fall of 2022, both Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 were suspected to be sabotaged to cut the gas flow from Russia to Europe. On September 26th, one leak was reported on the Nord Stream 2 and following day two leaks were detected on the Nord Stream 1 and together the incidents scupper any remaining expectations that Europe could receive fuel via Nord Stream 1 before winter.[255] Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said "This looks like an act of terrorism, possibly on a state level."[256] Following the damages in NS1 and

[252] Zaniewicz, M. & Bieliszczuk, B. (2021, August 12). Implications of Nord Stream 2's Completion for Ukraine. *The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM).* https://pism.pl/publications/implications-of-nord-stream-2s-completion-for-ukraine

[253] Laffitte, T. (2021, Nov 29). Europe's Energy Transition: Ukraine's Salvation? *European Green Journal*. https://www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu/europes-energy-transition-ukraines-salvation/

[254] European Council. EU sanctions against Russia explained. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/sanctions-against-russia-explained/#sanctions

[255] Carrel, P. & Jacobsen, S. (2022, Sept 29). EU vows to protect energy network after 'sabotage' of Russian gas pipeline. *Reuters*. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/mystery-gas-leaks-hit-major-russian-undersea-gas-pipelines-europe-2022-09-27/

[256] Reuters. (2022, Sept 29). Kremlin says Nord Stream incidents look like state-sponsored 'terrorism'. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/kremlin-says-nord-stream-gas-leaks-look-like-act-terrorism-2022-09-29/

NS2, Putin said that Russia could redirect supplies intended for the damaged Nord Stream pipelines to the Black Sea to create a European gas hub in Turkey.[257]

Erdogan welcomed Putin's proposal to turn Turkey into a regional hub for natural gas, which he hoped to use for seeking gas discounts from Russia and the ability to pay for energy in liras. It has been reported that Turkey has asked Russian-owned Gazprom for a three-year deferral on gas payments covering 25% of purchases, which it earlier agreed to settle in rubles; Russia, in return, is seeking to get state guarantees from Turkey covering the difference as well as interest payments equal to the Russian key rate.[258] President Erdoğan perceived Putin's offer as a means for his own political agenda which is opening new channels and providing new opportunities for his crisis-ridden economic management, which he instrumentalized for his 2023 presidential election win.

3.4. Conclusion

In this chapter, I explored the historical baseline for developments which opened the way for "green capitalism" to capture the spirit of global political economy under looming presence of climate crisis. I traced back the historical developments, events, important turning points have brought the climate politics into the center of international political economy so that multiple green transformation projects are being discussed simultaneously and, in some cases, accepted in the world. I analyzed how the climate politics under the premise of climate crisis has turned into an ordering principle for the next phase of capitalism, which is green capitalism as it is argued in this thesis. I took "capitalism" as a complex web of socio-political and economic relations which is based on "infinite growth on a finite planet" and centered my

[257] Soldatkin, V. & Kobzeva, O. (2022, Oct 12). Putin moots gas hub in Turkey with Nord Stream supplies. *Reuters.* https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-moots-major-gas-hub-turkey-with-nord-stream-supplies-2022-10-12/

[258] Akman, B. & Kozok, F. (2022, Oct 14). Erdogan Welcomes Putin's Idea to Make Turkey a Gas Hub. *Bloomberg.* https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-14/erdogan-welcomes-putin-s-idea-to-make-turkey-a-natural-gas-hub

analysis on this inherent contradiction of capitalism in the framework of climate politics.

This chapter is composed of two main parts. In the first part of this chapter, I presented the multi-level and multi-actor process of the international governance of environment. By pointing out different approaches to the environmental governance, I argued that the protection of the environment is not the only aim of the international environmental governance. It has its own inherent power dynamics which has become apparent through the introduction of controversial measures like carbon markets. I focused on how this unequal relationship creates divergence between the developed and developing countries over the international governance of climate change. I claimed that climate justice movement has risen out of this divergence and spread to the rest of the world and in time, the climate activism, especially from the young individuals, has taken over the global social movements and made the elites of global political economy take actions accordingly. These developments not only contributed vastly towards the general acceptance of the climate crisis by the public, but also left political and economic elite no choice but do something about the problem. The politicization of climate change in the public created a fertile ground for the green parties to flourish both in quality and quantity. Thus, I argued that climate change has become the zeitgeist of global politics and a central point of contention within the global political economy in the 21st century.

In second half of this chapter, I debated how the European Green Deal should be contextualized with respect to different positioning of the leading actors of global environmental governance. I spread my argument that the EGD did not emerge in a vacuum. By analyzing both cooperative and competitive encounters of the EU, USA, China and Russia with respect to climate politics, I historicized the developments leading to this significant leap into global restructuring of capitalist relations in line with green capitalism.

Firstly, I looked into the historical background President Trump decided to withdraw from Paris Agreement in 2017 and I argued that the US' stepping down from the leading position for the introduction and application of the necessary environmental

reforms for contemporary socio-political and economic relations has marked a turning point for the rise of the EU's leadership. Secondly, I focused on the Europe and the intra-EU conflicts around the adoption and application of the EGD by explaining the domino effect that the EGD has on different classes within one country; different countries with different levels of dependence on the carbon fuels and different regions with different economic development positions. Then, I explored China's ecological civilization notion which makes it head-to-head with the EU's leadership over the climate change measures. I speculated that maybe China has now the opportunity to re-shape global capitalism the way it fits China's advantages rather than merely playing by the rules set by Western economies. Finally, in the last sub-section, I briefly touched upon the effects of Russia's invasion of Ukraine for the future of green transformation in the EU. I argued that the EU's long-term plan to shut down all of its nuclear power-plants and using only clean and renewable energy like natural gas, hydro-, solar- or wind-energy, seem to reach a gridlock when Russia invaded Ukraine. I conclude this chapter by saying that the EGD is more than EU-level climate politics because it not only requires policy alignment from its members in the areas of energy, trade, social policies, it has serious implications for international political and economic relations, which I perceive as a step towards green capitalism.

In this chapter, I tried to depict the picture of what I argue as occurrent historic bloc of green capitalism. While it is premature to claim that the structure of international relations is now being entirely governed by the regulatory principles of green capitalism, there are important examples that show that more actors of the global order are *more actively* involved *than ever* in the expansion of the hegemonic position *of green growth*. There is a growing demand from climate activists for policymakers to take necessary steps against the climate crisis. The increased visibility of climate movements also informed the general public about the catastrophic results of climate change, which in turn created a fertile ground for green political ideologies (ie. the US, since it has a two-party political system, it is almost impossible for a green party to be powerful in the political arena, but its ideas are now being adopted by mostly leftwing political figures) or for proper green political parties in various countries. Although green capitalist ideas failed to develop ambitious legislations in the US, as I explained

in the case of the Green New Deal, the EU and China have managed take more impressive steps in this regard. China has re-aligned its statist-capitalist model in such a way that it would be not only prepared for the coming green transition of global political economy but also it would have a chance to re-define the new structure in its own image. The institutions like World Bank, OECD, UN and IMF have all been promoting the idea of green growth as the only rationale solution for climate crisis.[259] Therefore, I argue that the formation of the historical bloc of green capitalism is currently taking place.

Against this historical background, I claim that the EU has instrumentalized this process of green transition to absorb any radical alternative projects and to pacify the radical actors like environmental activists or possible future public turmoil in the event of an environmental disaster, by incorporating their discourses to the official content of the EGD. Most importantly, the EU adopts this language climate activism only after curbing the hard edges till it conforms with the existing dominant interests. As I explained my theoretical tools in the chapter 2 of my thesis, I take this process as green *trasformismo*. The project of EGD has created important controversies within the EU when the commission's ambition to become first continent that is carbon-neutral by 2050 was perceived as an extra economic burden on some less-developed members and a new source of unjust taxes for the labor within all member states. That is why, the European Green Deal has to be based on a restrictive hegemony in the sense of Gramsci's differentiation between restrictive and expansive hegemony.

The EU, especially the European Commission has crafted the legislation of the European Green Deal in such a way that only limited participation of the affected parties (like the European labor unions were not a part of legislation process while the European capital had frequent meeting with the prominent policy-makers in the Commission) and the EU members which are reluctant to shoulder the costs of green transition was given some concessions in the form of longer periods of time to complete climate neutrality and also financial aid through Just Transition funds. The EU has not only foreseen the upcoming changes in the structure of global capitalism

[259] See The Green Rush of Capitalism in the 2000s in Chapter 4.

but also envisioned a head start in this green race. Compared to the US case, the EU has proved to be more successful in managing competing interests within the European integration project precisely because of its *trasformismo* strategy. In the next chapter, I will focus on this process of green trasformismo in Europe.

CHAPTER 4

THE GREEN TRASFORMISMO OF CAPITALISM IN EUROPE

If you can't win with the existing rule of the game,
Then, change the rules.
If you can't change the rules,
Then, change the game itself.

4.1. Introduction

In the very beginning of this thesis, I conveyed what the president of the European Commission said after the adoption of the European Green Deal: "*This is Europe's 'man on the moon' moment*".[260] This is a clear reference to the period of 1960s when the US and Russia were in race against each to become the *first* nation to put a man on the moon. Although, Russians were the *first* to complete a mission to send a man into the space, it was the Americans who send one of them to the moon before any other nation. The fact that first steps on the Moon belonged to an American astronaut has become the iconic manifestation of US supremacy over its competitors.

Since then, the US has been able to capitalize this success in many ways i.e. politically, economically, scientifically and culturally. Americans consolidated their hegemony throughout the Cold War period, and after the dissolution of the USSR in 1991 there weren't any power to challenge their position. Until now.

[260] The European Commission. (2019, Dec 11). Press remarks by President von der Leyen on the occasion of the adoption of the European Green Deal Communication https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_19_6749

Today, both the EU and China are looking for new ways to work around the rules of international political economy that have been set under the US' hegemony. Now, we are seeing the hegemonic ambitions of the EU as starting to define and lead the global politics in the line with new green wave. This is a part of wider transformation which is the hegemony of green capitalism. In this chapter, I will explore the significant indicators of green capitalism and how the EU is instrumentalizing it as a possible global hegemon of the future global politics.

In the first half of the chapter, I will look at how the current green race is taking place between leading actors of international political economy by explaining the positions of American, Chinese and European political establishments. By doing so, I aim to show how green ideas are adopted by different actors and how the new hegemonic commonsense of green growth is becoming the driving force for green capitalism. Then, I will present different developments happening within the international political economy reflecting the wide range of green transformation of capitalism. Namely, I will provide more information about newly emergent green entrepreneurship, green economy, green jobs, green production and consumption, green finance, green banking, green bonds and greenwashing. Through these analyses, I will be giving contemporary examples of how green transformation is now forming a new historical bloc and setting the parameters of future global capitalism.

In the second of half of this chapter, I will analyze how the EU turned its direction towards green transition. I will argue that after 2008 global financial crisis, two pathways have taken by the EU. One is about ensuring stability as soon as possible after the EU debt crisis via introducing various rules and regulations. And the other is about ensuring the competitiveness of the EU over other global actors via transforming the global Western capitalism under the hegemony of the EU.

4.2. The Green Rush of Capitalism in the 2000s

4.2.1. Green Race

In 2009, U.S. President Obama made speech on his "climate bill" and how the future will belong to the ones who take action for climate:

> "The nation that leads in the creation of a clean energy economy will be the nation that leads the 21st century global economy. Now is the time for the United States of America to realize this too. Now is the time for us to lead...This legislation will finally make clean energy the profitable kind of energy. That will lead to the creation of new businesses and entire new industries. And that will lead to American jobs that pay well and cannot be outsourced. I have often talked about the need to build a new foundation for economic growth so that we do not return to the endless cycle of bubble and bust that led us to this recession. Clean energy and the jobs it creates, will be absolutely critical to this new foundation...Because this legislation is so balanced and sensible, it has already attracted a remarkable coalition of consumer and environmental groups; labor and business leaders; Democrats and Republicans. And I want to thank every Member of Congress who put politics aside to support this bill on Friday...There is no longer a question about whether the jobs and industries of the 21st century will be centered around clean, renewable energy. The question is, which country will create these jobs and these industries*? **I want that answer to be the United States of America*** (emphasis added)."[261]

In 2011, China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED) made a policy recommendation to the government of China as "Green Transformation of Economic Development Pattern". It said:

> "The world over the coming two decades will be characterized by an enormous growth of population, increasing living standards, a growing global middle class and a high level of urbanization. The consequences will be resource and pollution constrained patterns of development, a situation already existing in many places. Competition for resources and green solutions will be inevitable. There is a global Green Race underway—a green competition between countries to become leading suppliers of resource efficient, low polluting solutions, products and services. The 12th FYP is the starting point for

[261] *Weekly Presidential Address*. (2009, June 27). C-SPAN.org. https://www.c-span.org/video/?287322-101/weekly-presidential-address

> positioning China well in this race. Transforming the domestic economy and building demand for green solutions will create the competencies and scale for greener exports... China has a choice at this very important junction. Embrace the inevitable *Green Race* and position itself as a global leader and supplier of resource efficient, low polluting solutions. Or, try to maintain the old role as the supplier of low-cost products to a growing world population. While China's choice may seem obvious, even already made in the case of some technologies such as solar and wind energy, the Green Race is still at an early stage. There are no inherent reasons why China could not chart a Green Transformation course that will support future well-being and wealth creation. ***The future of China's positioning is mainly in the hands of its leaders and people—not in the hands of external forces*** (emphasis added)." [262]

As early as 2006, the EU was discussing and planning for "A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy" which is not only vital for mitigating climate crisis but also for "*Boosting the competitiveness of European industry*" (emphasis added). The Green Paper says:

> "Our climate is getting warmer. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), greenhouse gas emissions have already made the world 0.6 degrees warmer. If no action is taken there will be an increase of between 1.4 and 5.8 degrees by the end of the century. All regions in the world – including the EU – will face serious consequences for their economies and ecosystems... The EU has the tools to help. It is the world's second largest energy market, with over 450 million consumers. Acting together, it has the weight to protect and assert its interests. The EU has not just the scale but also the policy range to tackle the new energy landscape. The EU leads the world in demand management, in promoting new and renewable forms of energy, and in the development of low carbon technologies. If the EU backs up a new common policy with a common voice on energy questions, ***Europe can lead***

[262] CCICED, 2011. Development Mechanism and Policy Innovation of China's Green Economy. CCICED Annual General Meeting 2011, Beijing.

> ***the global search for energy solutions*** (emphasis added) ... ***One of the most important objectives of the internal energy market is to promote the competitiveness of EU industry and thus contribute to growth and jobs*** (emphasis added). Industrial competitiveness requires a well-designed, stable and predictable regulatory framework, respectful of market mechanisms. Energy policy therefore needs to favour cost-effective options and be based on a thorough economic analysis of different policy options and their impact on energy prices. Secure availability of energy at affordable prices is crucial. Integrated and competitive electricity and gas markets with the minimum of disruption are essential. The new High–Level Group on Energy, Environment and Competitiveness will play an important role in identifying ways to promote the competitiveness of all sectors of affected industry."[263]

Through these passages, I wanted to convey the ambitious positions of US, China and the EU regarding the ***greening*** of capitalism. These actors have been aware of green transformation that will take place in the near future. The challenge for them to get ahead of their competitors in setting the global framework of this transition so that they will enjoy the benefits of their leading position. From a Neo-Gramscian perspective, I argue that this process of green race should be viewed as a struggle to be the emergent hegemon of ***greened*** global capitalist structure.

4.2.2. Green Growth as Formal Strategy of Neoliberal Institutions

Before it was officially adopted by the EU, "green growth" was put forward by the United Nations, OECS and the World Bank. In 2008, the UN Environment-led Green Economy Initiative was launched; in 2009 OECD members approved a declaration acknowledging that ecology and economy can (should) be reconciled; and asked the OECD to develop a framework for implementing the green growth strategy, which

[263] *GREEN PAPER: A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy*, {SEC(2006) 317}, COM(2006) 105 final (2006, March 3). European Commission. https://europa.eu/documents/comm/green_papers/pdf/com2006_105_en.pdf

was realized with Towards Green Growth (2011).[264] In 2011, The United Nations Environment Programme stated "the greening of economies is... a new engine of growth"[265] while the OECD set its Green Growth agenda as "the familiar agenda of economic policy with the added realization that it can be as good for the environment as for the economy"[266]. Green growth is the core of green capitalism. The OECD strategy of ''Green Growth,'' the ''Green Economy,'' and the Asian concept of ''Green Transition'' are essentially instrumental strategies of crisis prevention, to avoid raw material shortages, high energy costs, water shortages, declining crop yields, climate change or environmental damage, and their costs. [267]

In 2011, OECD defined ***green growth*** as fostering economic growth and development while ensuring that natural assets continue to provide the resources and environmental services on which our well-being relies.[268] For World Bank, growth is ***green*** when it is efficient in its use of natural resources, clean in that it minimizes pollution and environmental impacts, and resilient in that it accounts for natural hazards and the role of environmental management and natural capital in preventing physical disasters.[269]

In a 2012 report, cowritten by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), ***green growth*** is defined as economic progress that fosters environmentally sustainable, low-carbon and socially inclusive development and ***greening of growth*** is argued to achieve economic growth and well-

[264] Ossewaarde, M., & Ossewaarde-Lowtoo, R. (2020). The EU's green deal: a third alternative to green growth and degrowth?. *Sustainability*, *12*(23), 9825. Pp. 3-4.

[265] UNEP, 2011. Towards a Green Economy: A Synthesis for Policymakers. UNEP, Nairobi.

[266] OECD, 2011. Towards Green Growth: A Summary for Policymakers. OECD, Paris.

[267] Jänicke, M. (2012). "Green growth": From a growing eco-industry to economic sustainability. *Energy policy*, *48*, 13-21. Pp. 19.

[268] Indicators, O. E. C. D. (2011). Towards green growth: monitoring progress.

[269] World Bank. (MAY 9, 2018). Green Growth for Sustainable Development. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/video/2018/05/09/green-growth-for-sustainable-development#:~:text=Green%20growth%20is%20a%20growth,natural%20capital%20in%20preventing%20disasters.

being while using fewer resources and generating fewer emissions in meeting demands for food production, transport, construction and housing, and energy.[270] The report, precisely says:

> ***Green growth is a prerequisite for building a green economy*** (emphasis added). A green economy is characterized by substantially increased investments in economic activities that build on and enhance the earth's natural capital or reduce ecological scarcities and environmental risks—activities such as renewable energy, low-carbon transport, energy- and water-efficient buildings, sustainable agriculture and forest management and sustainable fisheries. [271]

In the same line of world vision, ***green jobs*** have been defined as well. According to UNEP (2008) report, ***green jobs*** are that to protect ecosystems and biodiversity; reduce energy, materials, and water consumption through high efficiency strategies; de-carbonize the economy; and minimize or altogether avoid generation of all forms of waste and pollution.[272] There is a treaty-based international, inter-governmental organization, established in 2012 at the United Nations Conference on **Sustainable Development**, specifically to promote ***green growth***: The Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI). Through various channels, which are "green policy platform", "green industry platform" and "green finance platform", GGGI aims to catalyze and accelerate access to climate finance/green investment and to mobilize USD 2 billion of green investment commitments annually by 2030.[273]

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[270] Green Growth, Resources and Resilience Environmental Sustainability in Asia and the Pacific. 2021. *United Nations and Asian Development Bank publication.* https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Full-report.pdf

[271] Green Growth, Resources and Resilience Environmental Sustainability in Asia and the Pacific. 2021. *United Nations and Asian Development Bank publication.* https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Full-report.pdf

[272]Renner, M., Sweeney, S., & Kubit, J. (2008). Green Jobs: Towards decent work in a sustainable, low-carbon world: Report for United Nations Environment Programme. *UNEP: Nairobi, Kenya*.

[273] About GGGI. The Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI). https://gggi.org/about/

Against this background, it is not hard to place the EU's ambition to lead global green transformation process, which appears to be this significant turning point for the structure of future global political economy. Thus, when the European Commission defined its strategy for Europe 2020, in line with above-mentioned ***rationale*** in 2010, it puts the EU's ambition to make Europe as the first carbon-neutral continent by 2050 through the EGD in a perspective. This strategy was defined as: [274]

- Smart growth: developing an economy based on knowledge and innovation.
- Sustainable growth: promoting a more resource efficient, ***greener*** (emphasis added) and more competitive economy.
- Inclusive growth: fostering a high-employment economy delivering social and territorial cohesion.

The European Green Deal, itself, is defined as "*the EU's* ***new growth strategy****, aiming to transform the EU into a fairer and more prosperous society, with a modern, resource-efficient and competitive economy, with no net emissions of greenhouse gases by mid-century*."[275]

Green growth does essentially mean "growth results from the investment in the upgrading of the entire production system to environmental and resource-saving processes and products" [276] and it is the indispensable part of "green economy" of "low-carbon economy".

The biggest supporters of the idea of "green growth" are not the environmental groups, activists or Green parties but the capital owners of multi-national cooperations. The

[274] EU Commission (2010): Europe 2020 – A European Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth, COM(2010)2020, 3.3.2010.

[275] *Industry and the Green Deal*. (n.d.). European Commission. https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/industry-and-green-deal_en#:~:text=The%20European%20Green%20Deal%20is,greenhouse%20gases%20by%20mid%2Dcentury.

[276] Jänicke, M. (2012). "Green growth": From a growing eco-industry to economic sustainability. *Energy policy*, *48*, 13-21. Pp. 13.

myth of green growth enables the ruling political-administrative and corporate powers to pursue their business as usual, legitimized through the green growth discourse.[277] By the application of technological innovation, research and development, it is argued that decoupling growth from resource use is possible. Thus, green growth does not open the very fundamental reasons of the current climate crisis to the discussion but rather veils them through new ideological hegemony of green capitalism where both economic prosperity and environmental protection is possible. The EU's Green Deal puts trust in green technologies, which are mainly defined as technologies that increase energy efficiency, increase the share of renewable energy sources in the so-called energy mix and come with lower CO2 emissions. [278]

4.2.3. Green Capitalism

Firstly, green capitalism is a conception that is based on the assumption that climate crisis is a product of market failure, and thus producers of greenhouse gases (primarily nations in the North) can avoid the full global consequences of the resultant climate change with appropriate counter measures while affecting though other parts of the world not responsible for their production.[279] This mode of framing the problem as a market-failure opens up the possibility of "correcting" it through "green" and more "environment-friendly" reforms. Secondly, green capitalism upholds the technological solutions as the only viable option against environmental catastrophes. The 'green' innovations are believed to reduce climate change emissions by out-competing existing energy production technologies in the global marketplace.[280]

Interestingly enough, proponents of this type of argumentation do not question the capitalist mode of production and its irresolvable internal contradictions as the source

[277] Ossewaarde, M., & Ossewaarde-Lowtoo, R. (2020). The EU's green deal: a third alternative to green growth and degrowth?. *Sustainability*, *12*(23), 9825. Pp. 4.

[278] Ossewaarde, M., & Ossewaarde-Lowtoo, R. (2020). The EU's green deal: a third alternative to green growth and degrowth?. *Sustainability*, *12*(23), 9825. Pp. 5-6.

[279] Stern, N. (2007). *The economics of climate change: The Stern Report*. Cambridge University Press.

[280] Fox, N. J. (2022). Green capitalism, climate change and the technological fix: A more-than-human assessment. *The Sociological Review*, 00380261221121232, pp. 5.

of the problem. Contrariwise, critical approaches associate climate crisis with the long-term change in the average weather patterns that have come to define Earth's local, regional and global climate, driven by human activities, particularly fossil fuel burning, which increases heat-trapping greenhouse gas levels in Earth's atmosphere as well as Earth's average surface temperature.[281] For them, the problem arises due to the capitalist concerns to ensure "infinite growth on a finite planet". Still, international governance of environmental governance favors the green capitalist solutions over any other alternative solutions (like degrowth movement).

Although environmental ideas emerged mainly as a "reaction to the industrial and expansionist logic of capitalism"[282] in the 1960s and the 1970s, the gradual mainstreaming of environmental issues in domestic and international politics in subsequent decades has brought about a certain degree of reconciliation between environmentalism and the market principle.[283] The answer to both environmental and economic problems is seemed to be found in the notion of **sustainable development**. A "liberal environmentalist compromise" has become institutionalized at the international level, and this compromise 'predicates environmental protection on the promotion and maintenance of a liberal economic order'.[284] The concept of sustainable development is but one such attempt to mold environmental thinking to fit a market-based template.

4.2.4. Other Green Re-Inventions

Green entrepreneurship is defined the business activities that achieve a reduced negative impact on the environment, often through traditional pollution cleanup, energy and resource efficiency, reduced carbon emission and environmental

[281] NASA. What Is Climate Change?. https://climate.nasa.gov/global-warming-vs-climate-change/

[282] Goldsmith, E., & Mander, J. (2001). The case against the global economy: And for a turn towards localization. London: Earthscan.

[283] Falkner, R. (2012). Global environmentalism and the greening of international society. *International Affairs*, *88*(3), 503-522. Pp. 520.

[284] Steven Bernstein, *The compromise of liberal environmentalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), p. 213.

degradation, as well as more complex low-carbon and environmental solutions.[285] In 2020, International Labour Organization (ILO) praised this notion as a means to sustain a "green economy", since the newly introduced "green products and services" or "greener production techniques of existing products and services" are fundamental for creating "green jobs" and *greening* the economy, in general.[286] Currently, it is mainly the OECD countries that develop green technologies but countries such as China and India are also growing rapidly.[287] Supported by international organizations, green entrepreneurship is now spreading across the countries.

Closely related to green economy and green growth, ***green finance*** is promoted in the process of greening capitalism. The first ***green bond*** was issued by the European Investment Bank (EIB) in 2007, followed by a similar issuance by the World Bank the year after and today, the growing acceptance of the materiality of climate change at all levels of the economy is central driver for the development of green finance.[288] The concept of 'green finance' is defined as environment-friendly financing and environmentally sustainable investment.[289] Green finance involves two main group of activities: one concern the sectors or activities that can be financed with green funds and the second regards the operational standards that need to be followed for labelling a specific security, product or service as green.[290]

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[285] Demirel, P., Li, Q. C., Rentocchini, F., & Tamvada, J. P. (2019). Born to be green: new insights into the economics and management of green entrepreneurship. *Small Business Economics*, *52*, 759-771.

[286] International Labour Organization (ILO). (2020). Green entrepreneurship: Creating green jobs through sustainable enterprise development. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/documents/publication/wcms_250688.pdf

[287] Vasilescu, M. D., Dimian, G. C., & Gradinaru, G. I. (2023). Green entrepreneurship in challenging times: a quantitative approach for European countries. *Economic research-Ekonomska istraživanja*, *36*(1), 1828-1847.

[288] Berrou, R., Dessertine, P., & Migliorelli, M. (2019). An overview of green finance. *The rise of green finance in Europe: opportunities and challenges for issuers, investors and marketplaces*, 3-29. Pp. 14.

[289] Alves, J. M. (2023). European sustainable finance: introductory notes on the EU green deal and new green finance perspectives.

[290] Berrou, R., Ciampoli, N. & Marini, V. (2019). Defining Green Finance: Existing Standards and Main Challenges. *The rise of green finance in Europe: opportunities and challenges for issuers, investors and marketplaces* 31-51 Pp. 31.

The "green finance" literature focuses on the differences in the availability of bank, conventional (including philanthropic) venture capital and public funding as sources of finance; and the differentials in the objectives and timelines for expected financial returns by these funding sources.[291]

In USA, there are examples like the Californian "Green Wave" initiative implemented by the pension funds California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS) and California State Teachers Retirement System (CalSTRS), while in Germany, significant amounts of capital is given to the cleantech sector for the financing of solar and wind projects. [292]

The European Green Deal does definitely involves examples of green finance, "*aiming to a swift, efficient, solid, and balanced transition that will only be attained by engaging all market players, creating the correct incentives, and designing win-win situations*"[293]. In 2019, in association with the EU's Green Deal, the bank announced its metamorphosis into a ***Climate Bank,*** ending its fossil fuel lending after 2021.[294] While the market norms uphold green transition through various support mechanisms, there emerged as the danger of ***greenwashing***. The many products have been benefiting from a form of green advertising even though the environmental claims put forward did not present the real characteristics of the product.[295]

[291] Demirel, P., Li, Q. C., Rentocchini, F., & Tamvada, J. P. (2019). Born to be green: new insights into the economics and management of green entrepreneurship. *Small Business Economics*, *52*, 759-771. Pp. 762.

[292] Migendt, M., Polzin, F., Schock, F., Täube, F. A., & von Flotow, P. (2017). Beyond venture capital: an exploratory study of the finance-innovation-policy nexus in cleantech. *Industrial and corporate change*, *26*(6), 973-996. Pp 983-984.

[293] Alves, J. M. (2023). European sustainable finance: introductory notes on the EU green deal and new green finance perspectives.

[294] Kavvadia, H. (2022). Green Economy in the Post-pandemic Period: A Framework for Organizational Stakeholder Analysis. *Business and Economic Research*, *12*(1).

[295] See Baum, L. M. (2012). It's not easy being green. Or is it? A content analysis of environmental claims in magazine advertisements from the United States and United Kingdom. *Environmental Communication, 6*(4), 423–440 and Delmas, M. A., & Burbano, V. C. (2011). The drivers of greenwashing. *California Management Review, 54*(1), 64–87.

4.3. The Rise of the *Green* in the EU

Green vision has come to life in the post-2008 global financial crisis. The 2008 financial crisis made it necessary to "fix" capitalism in order to prevent its demise. The crisis has brought about its own opportunities for global capitalist elite to re-design the rules and the regulations of global capitalism. Following the 2008 financial crisis, the global structure of capitalism has traded its traditional environmental parameters for new and green notions of development, growth, finance, production etc. Minimizing the environmentally destructive results of capitalist production and consumption without essentially changing or even challenging the very nature of capitalism which is based on the notion of "infinite growth on a finite planet". It is evident in my analysis that not once is mentioned degrowth while discussing the environmental problems and possible end of the world. The EU, as the leading actor of the western capitalist system, adopts these green capitalist solutions over any other alternative solutions like the idea of degrowth because its main aim is to "fix" capitalism by introducing green growth by decoupling GDP from resource use, rather than solely saving the planet. In this section, I will focus on the main rationale of *greening* capitalism and its particular features.

4.3.1. The 2008 Global Financial Crisis and Europe of Austerity

The European unification project has always been the political one. Initially, the aim of establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 was to erase any possibility of war in the future, following the devastation of WWII, through linking national economies to one another so that one cannot arm itself up without the other knowing about it. Desmond Dinan has argued that while the ECSC was "important politically and institutionally" it was economically insignificant.[296] In time, through the introduction of wider and deeper cooperation among its members, it turned into European Economic Community in 1957 and then in 1993, European Union with European citizenship.

[296] Dinan, D. (2014). Europe Recast: A History of the European Union: A History of the European Union.

The neoliberalization of the European Unification project coincides with the end of Eurosclerosis period. The period from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s in the context of European integration is referred to as an era of stagnation or Eurosclerosis, meaning the successful integration experienced by the 'Original Six' from 1952 onwards ground to a halt with the 'Empty Chair Crisis' in 1965, with the European Community (EC) continuing to stand still until the 1986 Single European Act (SEA) negotiations.[297]

In 1979 of the European Monetary System (EMS) was launched establish a zone of a relative monetary stability in a world of widely fluctuating exchange rates, most with credit to the efforts of Commission president Jenkins and German Chancellor Schmidt.[298] With the EMS, originally composed of Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, the European Exchange Rate was introduced to reduce exchange rate variability among the EMS countries, which was a step toward the introduction of the common currency.

The policy of single market and single currency policy aimed to overcome intra-member differences to open the floor for free flow of capitals, commodities and peoples under the stable exchange rate and monetary policy.[299] The introduction of the "Euro" as the EU's common currency is as much related to the formation of common market as establishing an "ever-closer" Europe. With Euro, for the first time in the history, a currency independent from a nation-state has been released not just as means of deeper political integration in EU but also as a means of power accumulation in the international arena.[300]

[297] Awesti, A. (2009). The Myth of Eurosclerosis: European Integration in the 1970s. *Europe en formation*, (3), 39-53. Pp. 39.

[298] Dinan, D. (2005). *Ever closer union: an introduction to European integration*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

[299] Petrakis, P. E., Kostis, P. C., & Valsamis, D. G. (2014). European Economics and Politics in the Midst of the Crisis: From the Outbreak of the Crisis to the Fragmented European Federation. Springer Science & Business Media. Pp. 8.

[300] Kutlay, M. (2013) Euro Krizinin Politik Ekonomi ve AB'nin Uluslararası Sistemdeki Geleceği, Öniş Z. et al (Ed.), Ülke Deneyimleri Işığında Küresel Kriz ve Yeni Ekonomik Düzen, İletişim, pp. 169-185. Pp. 169.

The common currency of Euro has become the primary element of the common identity in the EU.[301]

The optimism around the Euro started to fade with the 2008 global financial crisis and 2010 debt crisis in the EU. The financial crisis proved that Euro might very well be the seed of destruction for the European unification project. During the discussions of introducing Euro as the common currency, it has been reported that European Commission was especially eager since *most of the member states were not very successful to govern their own monetary policies*.[302] Much like recent green *trasformismo*, this path of *liberalize the financial markets despite the national actors' reservations about decreasing national autonom*y was believed to be the one and only viable option.

The new vision of liberalization and increasing financialization of national markets was consolidated with the establishment of institutions, rules, laws and regulations such as ESCB (European System of Central Banks).**[303]** It was responsible for defining and implementing the monetary policy of the Community, conducting the foreign exchange operations, holding and managing the official reserves of the member States, and promoting the smooth operation of payment systems.[304]

Again, similar to current green *trasformismo,* the idea or vision that has hegemony over the other parts of the society utilized new institutions, rules, laws and regulations to secure the longevity of itself. However, the reluctance to take into economic facts and structural differences among member states to in order to create a powerful supranational authority in a changing international environment was the failure of

[301] Kaelberer, M. (2004). The euro and European identity: symbols, power and the politics of European monetary union. Review of International Studies, 30(02), 161-178. Pp. 161-162.

[302] Jabko, N. (1999). In the name of the Market: how the European Commission paved the way for monetary union. *Journal of European Public Policy*, *6*(3), 475-495.

[303] Durmaz, G. (2015). *Politics of neoliberal transformation: a comparative analysis of debt-led consumption and crisis in Turkey and Greece* (Master's thesis, Middle East Technical University).

[304] Smits, R. (1996). The European Central Bank: Institutional Aspects.*International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, *45*(02), 319-342. Pp.332.

European policy makers, which became publicly visible in the financial crisis of 2008. **305**

The way the EU preferred to handle 2008 global financial crisis and following debt crisis in Europe showed that in terms of monetary governance, the EU did not have any tendency to step-back. When Lehman Brothers was allowed to go bankrupt, but AIG (American International Group, Inc.) was effectively nationalized[306], the waves hit Europe in the forms of bailouts and nationalizations as:[307]

- In UK, Bradford & Bingley was nationalized, and its banking business sold, and the biggest mortgage lender HBOS was first taken over by Lloyds TSB, and in the end, government took 43 per cent in this group.
- Fortis (banking and insurance giant) was partly nationalized by the Netherlands.
- Dexia was saved by an injection of €6.4bn by the Belgian, French and Luxembourg governments.
- Several German banks were rescued, and the German authorities engineered a €50bn deal to save Hypo Real Estate.
- The Netherlands rescued ING.
- Sweden's government set out its own bank rescue plan, with credit guarantees to banks and mortgage lenders.
- The Icelandic government was forced to take control of the country's third-largest bank Glitnir, and then of the second largest, Landsbanki, ultimately having recourse itself to an IMF rescue package of $2.1bn.
- Switzerland threw a lifebelt of SwFrs6bn ($5.3bn) to UBS, plus a funding facility for up to $60bn of distressed assets.

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[305] Durmaz, G. (2015). *Politics of neoliberal transformation: a comparative analysis of debt-led consumption and crisis in Turkey and Greece* (Master's thesis, Middle East Technical University).

[306] Clark, A. (2017, July 15). *Federal Reserve rescues AIG*. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/sep/17/aig.insurance.wallstreet

[307] Picciotto, S. (2011) "Regulation of International Finance" in Sol Picciotto, Regulating Global Corporate Capitalism, Cambridge University Press, 258-298.

The stability of financial relations was treated as "public good" which must be ensured irrespective of its costs on the masses in the short run. As it is expected, treating financial stability as "public good" but taking all of the responsibility off the shoulders of financial institutions such as banks, hedge funds, insurance companies, credit agencies, etc. created increasing unemployment, decreasing income, privatizations and degradation of public services following the public sector downsizing policies such as significant cuts government expenditure, dismissals, and closures and mergers of public organizations ranging from schools and universities through to hospitals, health centers, and psychiatric units, as well as the implementation of very tight recruitment restrictions.[308] With the use of austerity measures, deregulation and privatization policies, EU leaders wanted to use this crisis as an opportunity to complete the neoliberal transition of Southern European countries so they projected the costs of crisis to the countries whom they made indebted via hot money, cheap credit and consumption for decades.[309] Especially German policy makers instrumentalized the crisis to spread their views on tight monetary policy and budget discipline throughout the Eurozone, Southern European countries were left alone with severe debt burden, which was believed to be caused by insufficient structural reforms, the existence of uncompetitive economies with ineffective public sector and unproductive welfare state spendings.[310]

Bailing-out the banks was the only action-plan of the heads of national governments in the EU. Indeed, new rules and regulations were introduced such European semester, two-pack and six-pack under the new and temporary governance mechanisms like European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), which eventually transformed into European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and became permeant. It is said thar to safeguard the financial stability of the entire euro area and of each euro area country,

[308] Markantonatou, M. (2013). Diagnosis, treatment, and effects of the crisis in Greece: A'special case'or a'test case'? (No. 13/3). MPIfG Discussion Paper.

[309] Tayfur, M. F. (2013) Tarihsel Süreç İçinde Güney Avrupa'nın Borç Krizi: Yunanistan, İspanya ve Portekiz, Öniş Z. et al (Ed.), *Ülke Deneyimleri Işığında Küresel Kriz ve Yeni Ekonomik Düzen,* İletişim, pp. 187-218.

[310] Kutlay, M. (2013) Euro Krizinin Politik Ekonomi ve AB'nin Uluslararası Sistemdeki Geleceği, Öniş Z. et al (Ed.), Ülke Deneyimleri Işığında Küresel Kriz ve Yeni Ekonomik Düzen, İletişim, pp. 169-185.

the ESM is established as a permanent rescue fund in 2012 to provide loans to financially distressed euro area countries, under strict conditionality.[311]

The European Commission explains these developments in a MEMO in 2013:

> Before the crisis, economic policy coordination was mostly voluntary. Member States submitted National Reform Programmes each year, setting out the economic reforms they intended to undertake the following year, but there was no binding process in place to monitor and correct the emergence of imbalances in national economies. The European Semester and the Six Pack reforms introduced a system of monitoring for economic policies, mirroring the budgetary monitoring in place under the Stability and Growth Pact. The Two Pack allows for surveillance to be gradually stepped up for euro area Member States with high deficits or debts, or for those facing difficulties with regard to their financial stability. [312]

The European Semester, six-pack and two-pack were introduced specifically for eliminating any future crisis within the Eurozone. By establishing a strict surveillance over the national budgets of Eurozone members, it is believed to ensure "member states align their budgetary and economic policies with the rules agreed at EU level"[313]. The debt crisis opened new discussion channels upon accepting the shortcomings of the current structure of the political economy.

Indeed, the EU has been restructuring its governance of the single in two different but interrelated channels. This first one was "ripping the band-aid", meaning the application of quick actions to ensure the stability in the EU. The second one, however, entails of a more comprehensive and complex plan. The Western capitalism heard (if

[311] *What is ESM?* https://www.esm.europa.eu/content/what-esm

[312] *Press corner*. (n.d.). European Commission - European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_13_318

[313] *The European Semester Explained.* The Council of the EU. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-semester/

you are liberal environmentalist who is concerned about the climate change but not necessarily ready to give up growth-based economy) or captured (if you are an ecologist who is aware that capitalist production and consumption model is the real reason of contemporary crisis of climate change and any solution disregarding this is only superficial) the momentum of climate change. I explained the phenomenon as zeitgeist of our time in the chapter 3. Here I explained the what the "ripping the band-aid" entails for the single market after the debt crisis. In the next sections, I will analyze what the second option involves.

4.3.2. The EU in the post-2008 Global Financial Crisis: The Global Climate Leadership

The European Green Deal comes into this picture with its own EU-level-cooperation and -conflicts as well as EU member states' own domestic set of concerns and confusions regarding the new path that has been decided for the future of the European unification project. The EGD has meant different things for different groups. For Euro-enthusiasts, the EGD is, in a way, a life ring life thrown to save sinking or stuck European unification project. It is particularly important to consider some developments in the recent history of the European unification project.

The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) had been signed in 2004 yet its ratification process created "Constitutional crisis" of the European Union when France and the Netherlands had voted No in 2005.[314] The two-year-long impasse resulted from this "Constitutional crisis" could only be "solved" by dropping "constitution" from the treaty in 2007. Then in 2008 global financial crisis has taken its toll over the Europe as full-down debt crisis in 2010.[315] The crisis did strike some countries more than others. The southern European countries (+ Ireland) where the EU and especially the introduction of single currency had tied hands of national

[314] Streinz, R. (2008). The European constitution after the failure of the Constitutional Treaty. *Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht*, *63*, 159-187.

[315] See Durmaz, G. (2015). *Politics of neoliberal transformation: a comparative analysis of debt-led consumption and crisis in Turkey and Greece* [M.S. - Master of Science]. Middle East Technical University.

governments for the introduction national measures, had to agree the austerity decisions adopted in the EU-level and applied by technocratic official of the EU (see Troika in Greece). [316]

Then came the migration crisis in 2015, which has shaken the moral grounds of European unification project.[317] Not long after, British citizens voted for Britain to leave the EU in 2016, which was referred since as "BREXIT". The EU was not going through a particularly comfortable period. Almost decade-long debt crisis leaving the economy fragile, Russia's continuing aggression on the eastern periphery, Hungary and Poland's sliding toward illiberal democracies, migration crisis and the following rise of Euro-sceptic and radical parties in the EU, made the idea of an ever-closer union seemed like distant dream.[318]

In this recent historical background of the EU, the European Green Deal was adopted in 2019. And it was barely three months before the whole Europe went into lock-down in 2020 when the COVID-19 has turned into a global pandemic and completely different level of crisis not just for the EU but for the whole world.

The EU had in desperate need of a new and uniting vision that would ignite, once again, the belief and desire in the European unification project. The vision was found in green capitalism and becoming the leading actor of the transition into the climate-neutral global political economy. It was, as President Von Der Leyen put it, "EU's man-on-the-moon-moment". [319]

[316] İbid.

[317] See Stępka, M. (2018). Humanitarian Securitization of the 2015 "Migration Crisis": Investigating Humanitarianism and Security in the EU Policy frames on operational Involvement in the Mediterranean. In *Migration policy in crisis* (pp. 9-30). Transnational Press London. See also, Scipioni, M. (2018). Failing forward in EU migration policy? EU integration after the 2015 asylum and migration crisis. *Journal of European Public Policy*, *25*(9), 1357-1375.

[318] Matthijs, M. (2017). Europe after Brexit: A less perfect union. *Foreign Aff.*, *96*, 85.

[319] The European Commission. (2019, Dec 11). Press remarks by President von der Leyen on the occasion of the adoption of the European Green Deal Communication https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_19_6749

The EU's quest for climate change mitigation has turned into a global climate leadership in 2015. Emanuel Macron said, during French presidency of the council of the EU:

> Europe is the place where, in Paris, in 2015, a universal climate conscience was developed. It is the continent which, with the goal of carbon neutrality in 2050, first set the most ambitious goals of the planet.[320]

In the apparent absence of the US in the formation and application of new international climate policies against the global climate crisis, it seems that the EU has come forward for the role. On the same day when the European Commission agreed on the European Green Deal, Von Der Leyen emphasized the EU's leading position as "This is Europe's 'man on the moon' moment". The next day, following the meeting of the European Council on 12 December in Brussels, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said "If we want to convince others like India or China to join, we have to be a role model. We have to be united and bold, step forward and prove that change is possible, and that it is of benefit for the people and for the economy."[321]

The EU's self-appointed role as the pioneer and the leader of global transitioning to a green and sustainable economy could be perceived as a reaction to growing public demands for actions against climate change. In Europe, growing concern about climate change was reflected in stronger electoral support for Green parties in the 2019 European elections, especially in some larger Western member states. It was also a reaction to the fact that climate change deniers such as Donald Trump in the US and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil took the control of their countries, which threatened the global cooperation on tackling climate change, as enshrined in the Paris Climate Agreement.

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[320] French Presidency of the Council of the European Union, January 19, 2022. https://presidence-francaise.consilium.europa.eu/en/news/french-president-emmanuel-macron-s-speech-at-the-european-parliament-strasbourg-19-january-2022

[321] *Press corner*. (n.d.). European Commission - European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/sk/AC_19_6778

In this global political setting, the EU has taken the lead in the war against climate change.

> COP 21 and the resulting Paris Agreement were key events for the sustainability movement and in particular for green finance. For the first time, the focus of Conference of the Parties was not only on traditional environmental themes, such as the reduction of greenhouse gases emissions and climate change adaptation but also on challenges linked to the financing of the environmental transition. Although funding had always been necessary for any of the global community's initiatives that were linked to the environment, the specific emphasis on the necessity for the participation of financial actors that was given during COP 21, was the first of its kind.[322]

The adoption of the **Sustainable Development** Goals (SDG) in September 2015 and the Paris Agreement reached in December of the same year in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) landmarked the commitment of the international community to the sustainability of human activities and to the fight against climate change. [323] With the Paris Agreement, the parties agreed to: [324]

- strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change by keeping the global temperature rise this century well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius.
- strengthen the ability of countries to deal with the impacts of climate change.

[322] Berrou, R., Dessertine, P., & Migliorelli, M. (2019). An overview of green finance. *The rise of green finance in Europe: opportunities and challenges for issuers, investors and marketplaces*, 3-29. Pp. 9.

[323] Migliorelli, M. & Dessertine, P. (2019). Green Finance Today: Summary and Concluding Remarks. *The rise of green finance in Europe: opportunities and challenges for issuers, investors and marketplaces*, 263-271. PP. 264-265.

[324] Migliorelli, M. & Dessertine, P. (2019). Green Finance Today: Summary and Concluding Remarks. *The rise of green finance in Europe: opportunities and challenges for issuers, investors and marketplaces*, 263-271. PP. 264-265.

- report regularly on their emissions and on their implementation efforts.

The European Union has accepted to role of leading other countries by setting example. The ***Green vision*** was not only a strategy to re-fuel the European integration project but also ensuring the EU's hegemony over the newly ***greened*** global capitalist structure. As I explained above, after 2008 global financial crisis, two pathways have taken by the EU. One is about ensuring stability as soon as possible after the EU debt crisis via introducing various rules and regulations. And the other is about ensuring the competitiveness of the EU over other global actors via transforming the global Western capitalism under the hegemony of the EU.

4.3.3. The EGD as a life-vest for the European Integration Project

In 2019, then-candidate and now the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen published her agenda for Europe for 2019-2024, which encompassed six principles: a European Green Deal, an economy that works for people, a Europe fit for the digital age, protecting our European way of life, a stronger Europe in the world and a new push for European democracy.[325] On top of her agenda was the European Green Deal and on 11 December 2019, the Commission published a communication on European Green Deal.[326] President Ursula von der Leyen said:

> *"The European Green Deal is our new growth strategy – for a growth that gives back more than it takes away. It shows how to transform our way of living and working, of producing and consuming so that we live healthier and make our businesses innovative. We can all be involved in the transition and we can all benefit from the opportunities. We will help our economy to be a global leader by moving first and moving fast. We are determined to succeed for the sake of this planet and life on it – for Europe's natural heritage, for*

[325] Von der Leyen, U. (2019). A Union that strives for more. *My agenda for Europe. Political guidelines for the next European Commission, 2024*, 2019.

[326] European Commission. (2019, Dec 11). PRESS RELEASE. "The European Green Deal sets out how to make Europe the first climate-neutral continent by 2050, boosting the economy, improving people's health and quality of life, caring for nature, and leaving no one behind" https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_6691

biodiversity, for our forests and our seas. By showing the rest of the world how to be sustainable and competitive, we can convince other countries to move with us."

Executive Vice-President Frans Timmermans added:

"We are in a climate and environmental emergency. The European Green Deal is an opportunity to improve the health and well-being of our people by transforming our economic model. Our plan sets out how to cut emissions, restore the health of our natural environment, protect our wildlife, create new economic opportunities, and improve the quality of life of our citizens. We all have an important part to play and every industry and country will be part of this transformation. Moreover, our responsibility is to make sure that this transition is a just transition, and that nobody is left behind as we deliver the European Green Deal."

Climate change is the biggest challenge of our times. And it is an opportunity to build a new economic model:[327]

- 55% reduction of emissions from cars by 2030
- 50% reduction of emissions from vans by 2030
- 0 emissions from new cars by 2035
- Over €100 billion is the value of EU's net-zero start-ups ecosystem in 2021, doubling since 2020
- More than 400 GW of wind and solar renewable energy production capacity in the EU in 2022, an increase of over 25% compared to 2020
- 4.5 million green jobs in the European economy in 2019 up from 3.2 million in 2000.
- 42.5% new renewable energy target for 2030 (with the ambition to reach 45%)

[327] *Delivering the European Green Deal*. (2021, July 14). European Commission. https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/delivering-european-green-deal_en

- 11.7% improvement in energy efficiency by 2030

Since the beginning, the European Green Deal has been planned as a means for transforming the European economic model. All 27 EU Member States committed to turning the EU into the first climate neutral continent by 2050. To get there, they pledged to reduce emissions by at least 55% by 2030, compared to 1990 levels.

The project of EGD has created important controversies within the EU when the commission's ambition to become first continent that is carbon-neutral by 2050 was perceived as an extra economic burden on some less-developed members and a new source of unjust taxes for the labor within all member states. Indeed, after the first waves of COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the EU member states started to question the timing of this ambitious transition plan and some members argued for scrapping the environmental measures resulting from the European Green Deal to fight with the virus. The European Green Deal has become a new battle ground for allocation of the EU budget between members having different economic development levels. The relatively less-developed members urged the EU not to reflect the burdens of green transition upon their weaker economies.

Indeed, a closer look to relatively less-developed members economic structure shows the basis of their arguments against green transition on an equal footing. Poland, for instance, has one third of its energy coming from coal and has to invest €13 billion per year, i.e. 1-2 percent of its GDP to achieve climate neutrality by 2050.[328]

Any policy change to ensure this transition should be potentially agonizing, economically problematic and politically hard to justify. That is why the EU has come up with the Just Transition Fund (JTF) as the first pillar of Just Transition Mechanism (JTM) to support the territories most affected by the transition towards climate

[328]*Carbon-neutral Poland 2050 Turning a challenge into an opportunity*. McKinsey & Company in Poland. https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/Electric%20Power%20and%20Natural%20Gas/Our%20Insights/Carbon%20neutral%20Poland%202050%20Turning%20a%20challenge%20into%20an%20opportunity/Carbon-neutral-Poland-2050.pdf

neutrality providing them with tailored support.[329] Though the JTM, the EU plans to "uphold productive investments in small and medium-sized enterprises, the creation of new firms, research and innovation, environmental rehabilitation, clean energy, up- and reskilling of workers, job-search assistance and active inclusion of jobseekers programmes, as well as the transformation of existing carbon-intensive installations when these investments lead to substantial emission cuts and job protection".[330]

The EU's carrot strategy seems to be working for its members since countries like Greece, Spain and Italy have pledged to transform their coal-based industries through European funds. While Greece aims to end all coal-fired power production by 2028, Italy tries to use JTP to transform its steelworks, linked with high rates of cancer in Taranto and Spain which in 2018 shut down 26 uncompetitive coal mines, argues the fund should go to regions that have tackled the transition with their own means, and not just to climate laggards. [331]

The European Green Deal has re-surfaced the already existing class antagonisms within the EU. As it will be discussed in this thesis thoroughly, the European unification project has always been a class project in itself. The EU has legalized and codified the current ambitions of capitalist class into its institutions, structures and various pieces of policies. The most obvious incident where the class conflicts regarding the consequences of the EGD was definitely France's Yellow Jackets uprising which began as a fuel tax protest by French drivers, which later turned into a wider inequality protest. Protesters from peripheral towns, cities and rural areas across

[329] *Just Transition funding sources*. (n.d.). European Commission. https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/finance-and-green-deal/just-transition-mechanism/just-transition-funding-sources_en

[330] *Just Transition funding sources*. (n.d.). European Commission. https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/finance-and-green-deal/just-transition-mechanism/just-transition-funding-sources_en

[331] *Carbon-neutral Poland 2050 Turning a challenge into an opportunity*. McKinsey & Company in Poland. https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/Electric%20Power%20and%20Natural%20Gas/Our%20Insights/Carbon%20neutral%20Poland%202050%20Turning%20a%20challenge%20into%20an%20opportunity/Carbon-neutral-Poland-2050.pdf

France came together and stood against the parliamentary vote to rise of diesel prices. During the protests, one slogan gains special influence, which was "Fin du monde, fins de mois / Mêmes coupables, même combat" meaning "end of the world, end of the month / same culprits, same fight". The *Gilet Janues* Assembly borrowed this slogan from Nicolas Hulot, former Minister for Ecological Transition, who resigned in protest at Macron's policies, stating: "we must address the struggle people have to make ends meet at the end of the month; but we must also confront the prospect of the end of the world".[332]

The "Gilets Jaunes" (Yellow Vests) movement sparked the recent discussions on just transition frameworks and raise concerns on the socio-economic impacts on sustainability policies as well as it illustrates the gap between what sustainability means at a local context and the universal and resolved breath of the commitments provided by the Paris Agreement.[333] The EU officials tried to get protests in France against the economic burdens of green transition out of perspective and make the incident insignificant or inconsequential for the EGD. Frans Timmermans, European Commission Executive Vice-President for the European Green Deal, rejected the idea (promoted by U.S. President Donald Trump) that the protests were an expression of mass skepticism toward greenhouse gas targets but argued that it was political clumsiness that allowed an energy policy to set off outrage at social inequality.[334]

4.4. Conclusion

In this chapter, I tried to understand the relationship between different developments that laid the foundation for the rise of ***green*** in the EU. Firstly, I argued that currently there is ***green race*** taking place between the US, China and the EU. I showed how

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[332] *End of the Month, End of the World | The Land Magazine*. (n.d.). https://www.thelandmagazine.org.uk/articles/end-month-end-world

[333] Martin, M., & Islar, M. (2020). The 'end of the world' vs. the 'end of the month': Understanding social resis- tance to sustainability transition agendas, a lesson from the Yellow Vests in France. *Sustainability Science, 16*, 601–614. Pp.601.

[334] P. (2020, December 22). *The politics of the Green Deal*. POLITICO. https://www.politico.eu/article/chapter-two-the-politics-of-the-green-deal/

green ideas are adopted by these actors and how the new hegemonic commonsense of green growth is becoming the driving force for green capitalism. I presented the ambitious positions of the US, China and the EU regarding the ***greening*** of capitalism. From a Neo-Gramscian perspective, I argued that this process of green race should be viewed as a struggle to be the emergent hegemon of ***greened*** global capitalist structure. Therefore, these actors who have been aware of green transformation that is currently underway, want to get ahead of their competitors in setting the global framework of this transition so that they will enjoy the benefits of their leading position. Then, I focused on different manifestations of green capitalism such as green entrepreneurship, green economy, green jobs, green production and consumption, green finance, green banking, green bonds and greenwashing. Through these analyses, I showed how green transformation is now forming a new historical bloc and setting the parameters of future global capitalism.

In the second half of this chapter, I made a detailed analysis how the EU turned its direction towards green transition. I argued that after 2008 global financial crisis, two pathways have taken by the EU. One is about ensuring stability as soon as possible after the EU debt crisis via introducing various rules and regulations. And the other is about ensuring the competitiveness of the EU over other global actors via transforming the global Western capitalism under the hegemony of the EU.

I argued that the European Green Deal has come into this picture when the European unification project needed a new and uniting vision that would ignite, once again, the belief and desire in the EU itself. Between 2004 and 2007, the EU has battled with the "Constitutional crisis" following the ratification problems of the Constitutional Treaty. Then in 2008 global financial crisis has taken its toll over the Europe as full-down debt crisis in 2010. Debt crisis has deepened the dissidence between Northern and economically more developed members versus Southern and relatively less developed members of the EU. The application of technocratic austerity measures has also shaken the belief in the level of democracy in the EU-level governance. Then came the migration crisis in 2015, which has shaken the moral grounds of European unification project. Not long after, British citizens voted for Britain to leave the EU in 2016, which was referred since as "BREXIT". The EU was not going through a particularly

comfortable period. Almost decade-long debt crisis leaving the economy fragile, Russia's continuing aggression on the eastern periphery, Hungary and Poland's sliding toward illiberal democracies, migration crisis and the following rise of Euro-sceptic and radical parties in the EU, made the idea of an ever-closer union seemed like distant dream. [335]

In this recent historical background of the EU, the European Green Deal was adopted in 2019. And it was barely three months before the whole Europe went into lock-down in 2020 when the COVID-19 has turned into a global pandemic and completely different level of crisis not just for the EU but for the whole world. The EU had in desperate need of a new and uniting vision that would ignite, once again, the belief and desire in the European unification project. The vision was found in green capitalism and becoming the leading actor of the transition into the climate-neutral global political economy. It was, as President Von Der Leyen put it, "EU's man-on-the-moon-moment". [336]

I claimed that the EU has instrumentalized this process of green transition to absorb any radical alternative projects and to pacify the radical actors like environmental activists or possible future public turmoil in the event of an environmental disaster, by incorporating their discourses to the official content of the EGD. Most importantly, the EU adopts this language climate activism only after curbing the hard edges till it conforms with the existing dominant interests. The project of EGD has created important controversies within the EU when the commission's ambition to become first continent that is carbon-neutral by 2050 was perceived as an extra economic burden on some less-developed members and a new source of unjust taxes for the labor within all member states. That is why, the European Green Deal has to be based on a restrictive hegemony in the sense of Gramsci's differentiation between restrictive and expansive hegemony.

[335] Matthijs, M. (2017). Europe after Brexit: A less perfect union. *Foreign Aff.*, *96*, 85.

[336] The European Commission. (2019, Dec 11). Press remarks by President von der Leyen on the occasion of the adoption of the European Green Deal Communication https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_19_6749

The EU, especially the European Commission has crafted the legislation of the European Green Deal in such a way that only limited participation of the affected parties (like the European labor unions were not a part of legislation process while the European capital had frequent meeting with the prominent policy-makers in the Commission) and the EU members which are reluctant to shoulder the costs of green transition was given some concessions in the form of longer periods of time to complete climate neutrality and also financial aid through Just Transition funds. The EU has not only foreseen the upcoming changes in the structure of global capitalism but also envisioned a head start in this green race. Compared to the US case, the EU has proved to be more successful in managing competing interests within the European integration project precisely because of its *trasformismo* strategy.

The EGD has turned out be critical for the future of the European unification project for number of reasons, which I will explain point by point:

- Because of the **green race** taking place current in the global political economy, the EU wanted to not merely a part of this process but the leader of it.
- The hegemony of the **green growth** idea in the neoliberal institutional governance has led the EU to draft its own version or the plan of green growth.
- This process of green transition has coincided with the period of series crises in the EU, which put the project of the European unification itself in question.
- The neoliberalization of the European unification project has created controversies among member states, among different classes and groups. The EU needed a new vision to restore the lost trust in itself.
- The cure was found in the **greening** of production and consumption structures in order to ensure **green growth**, provide **green jobs** and establish **green economy**.
- When the **green transformation** created its own winners and losers, the EU has crafted the legislation of the European Green Deal in such a way that potential losers are absorbed in the processes through the strategy of **green *trasformismo***.

- Via the EGD, the EU has re-arranged its already existing vision of neoliberal Europe with a **green** touch.
- However, in this restrictive hegemonic position of the EGD, there has been hints of European project and Social Europe project in Van Apeldoorn's model.
- The EU has prioritized the competitiveness of the European capital via their global counterparts. It has also provided mechanisms for social justice such as Just Transition Fund to compensate the losses during the **green** transition process.

I will go into detail of the last two points in chapter 6, where I analyzed the social forces of the EGD.

CHAPTER 5

METHODOLOGY

5.1. Introduction

As I tried to explain in chapters above, my main aim in this thesis is to understand the emergence of the European Green Deal and its becoming policy priority for the EU. And in the previous chapters, I explained how I take the case of the EGD within the wider transformation of global capitalist relations as a step towards green capitalism. I scrutinize how newly branded "green" capitalism perceives and then provides "solutions" for climate change and where the EU stands in this wider transformation.

In this chapter, I will explain how I structure my analysis and what are the important analytical aspects of it. Firstly, I will demonstrate the main problem and the research question of my thesis once again. Although I presented my main problem and research question in the introduction chapter and I explained how I use analytical tool of Neo-Gramscian approach in theoretical chapter of my thesis, here in the methodological chapter, I will tie them into my chosen qualitative content analysis method. The structure of the chapter will be as follows: main problem and research question, directed qualitative content analysis, data collection and selection processes, and codebook.

5.2. The Main Problem and Research Question of this Thesis

In my dissertation, I aim to understand how and why the EGD has become the policy priority of the European Union from the perspective of European integration process. My main concern is to problematize the rise of green capitalism amid the global climate crisis. I explore the developments opened the way for "green capitalism" to capture the spirit of global political economy under the looming presence of the

climate crisis so that climate change has become the zeitgeist of global politics and a central point of contention within the global political economy in the 21st century.

With this aim, I make a critical and empirical case analysis of the European Green Deal in line with the Neo-Gramscian hegemony approach. Through a critical reading of the EU at the macro level, I mainly question why and how the EU adopted the EGD project. In other words, I analyze why the EU is so eager to embark on a mission that comes with various problems from various fields and how it manages to resolve or workaround the intra-EU conflicts both national level and sub-national level (class), conflicts with developed countries, conflicts between developed countries and developing countries. For a detailed and well-grounded analysis, I divide my research question into two parts as:

1. Why did the EGD become the policy priority of the European Union?
2. How did the EGD become the policy priority of the European Union?

Firstly, I study the "why" part of my research question where I locate the EGD within the global restructuring of capitalist relations in line with green capitalism. To answer first part of my research question, I look at the EU's increasing interest in the matter of "climate change" and its following ambition to mitigate the current climate crisis I analyze data from European Commission and European Council.

Secondly, for "how" question, I analyzed how different groups gave their consent to or resisted the EU's newly acquired role as the savior of planet earth, which will eventually lead to the European Green Deal. I used 6 groups of sources, issued around or after the discussions and eventual adoption of Paris Climate Agreement and concerned the issue of climate change. These sources are the European Round Table for Industry (ERT), the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), Green 10, the Greens/EFA Group and the Eurobarometers.

5.3. Directed Qualitative Content Analysis

After I lay down my main problem and research question above, I will now explain my methodology in this subsection. Since my research is based on "why" and "how"

questions, I design my thesis through using qualitative methods. My method for analyzing research question in this thesis is "directed qualitative content analysis". In this subsection, I will explain what qualitative content analysis is and how directed qualitative content analysis, a branch of it, works. Then, I will clarify why I use deductive coding in a computer-assisted qualitative data analysis (CAQDAS) software, which is MAXQDA.

Qualitative analysis aims to describe and explain social phenomena through careful collection and analysis of comprehensive.[337] It makes the use of interviews, diaries, journals, classroom observations and immersions; and open-ended questionnaires to obtain, analyze, and interpret the data content analysis of visual and textual materials, and oral history.[338] The goal of the qualitative tradition is a "deep understanding of the particular".[339] It focuses on "how" and "why" a particular social phenomenon operates as it does in a particular context.[340]

Qualitative content analysis is used for systematic analysis and interpretation of contents of texts (words, phrases, statements, communications, documents, etc.), images (photos, video, etc.).[341] It is a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes and patterns.[342] There are different ways to conduct content analysis. Researchers may choose to analyze their content in an inductive or deductive manner in line with their preferred theoretical framework. In inductive content

[337] Pace, S. (2016). Contested concepts: negotiating debates about qualitative research methods such as grounded theory and autoethnography. *Constructing Methodology for Qualitative Research: Researching Education and Social Practices*, 187-200.

[338] Zohrabi, M. (2013). Mixed method research: Instruments, validity, reliability and reporting findings. *Theory and practice in language studies*, *3*(2), 254.

[339] Domholdt, E. (1993). Physical therapy research. *Principles and applications*.

[340] Mohajan, H. K. (2018). Qualitative research methodology in social sciences and related subjects. *Journal of economic development, environment and people*, *7*(1), 23-48.

[341] Kibiswa, N. K. (2019). Directed qualitative content analysis (DQlCA): A tool for conflict analysis. *The Qualitative Report*, *24*(8), 2059-2079. Pp. 2059.

[342] Hsieh, H. F., & Shannon, S. E. (2005). Three approaches to qualitative content analysis. *Qualitative health research*, *15*(9), 1277-1288. Pp. 1278.

analysis, categories, themes and codes used in the study are directly drawn from data collected while the deductive content analysis analyze data according to an existing theory, framework or code system. [343]

Table 1. Data sources

	Sources	Interval	Number
Group 1	European Commission communications	1991 - 2023	500
	European Council conclusions	1992 - 2023	179
	European Commission white papers	1985 - 2020	37
Group 2	The conclusions of the Council of the European Union	2015 - 2023	87
	Reports, expert papers, letters, statements, meetings and press releases of the European Round Table for Industry (ERT)	2017 - 2023	45
	Adopted position papers, reports, statements and press releases of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC)	2011 - 2023	26
	Open letters, statements, recommendations and petitions of Green10 (group of environmental NGOs)	2019 - 2023	15
	The Greens/EFA group's letters, publications, policy and positions papers	2009 - 2023	35
	Public opinion polls of the EU (Eurobarometer)	2008 - 2023	44

In other words, although there are different ways of application, coding is the essential part of qualitative data analysis. In the next sub-sections, I will explain my data collection and selection processes, then I will provide my code system. Coding is a

[343] Kibiswa, N. K. (2019). Directed qualitative content analysis (DQlCA): A tool for conflict analysis. *The Qualitative Report*, *24*(8), 2059-2079. Pp. 2060-2061.

means for questioning data, opening up new meanings; thus, it is not purely descriptive, it is much an analytical process that goes beyond the descriptive level and helps researchers to assess theory about their data. [344] In a deductive content analysis, codes, categories and themes are decided by the researcher before the analysis of data in order to test a theory or provide empirical data on an existing case. This research method is defined as directed qualitative content analysis. Existing theory or research can help focus the research question and it can provide predictions about the variables of interest or about the relationships among variables, thus helping to determine the initial coding scheme or relationships between codes.[345]

For large data sets, computer technology is used for data gathering, coding, analyzing and visualizing the results. This type of software that supports qualitative data analysis is usually referred to under the umbrella term of computer-assisted qualitative data analysis (CAQDAS), and MAXQDA which is one of the most used software.[346] MAXQDA is not an analysis program because researchers define their concepts, themes and unit of analysis and MAXQDA provides means to organize, display, and work with them according to researchers' instructions.[347]

5.4. Data Collection and Selection Processes

In this subsection, I will provide the list of my data sources and explain how I operationalize them to answer my research question. All of my data is open to public. I was able to find a very large data set concerning the EU's climate politics and other parties' positions with respect to this green transition of the EU. This availability provided me with the opportunity of filtering through and select according to my research agenda.

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[344] Schreier, M. (2012). Qualitative content analysis in practice. *Qualitative content analysis in practice*, 1-280. Pp. 39.

[345] Hsieh, H. F., & Shannon, S. E. (2005). Three approaches to qualitative content analysis. *Qualitative health research, 15*(9), 1277-1288. Pp. 1281.

[346] Schreier, M. (2012). Qualitative content analysis in practice. *Qualitative content analysis in practice*, 1-280. Pp. 41.

[347] Silver, C. (2017). *Qualitative Analysis Using MAXQDA: The Five-Level QDA® Method*. Routledge. Pp. 1-2.

The European Commission helps to shape the EU's overall strategy, proposes new EU laws and policies, monitors their implementation and manages the EU budget.[348] The European Commission issues communications which include policy evaluations, commentary or explanations of action-programmes or brief outlines on future policies or arrangements concerning details of current policy to evaluate policies, to identify problems in a certain policy area and to provide a framework on how to interpret policies.[349] The most important role of commission communications is to set out the direction of future policies.[350] For my thesis, I selected 500 commission communications dated between 1991 and 2023 (20 in 2023, 20 in 2022, 28 in 2021, 30 in 2020, 11 in 2019, 16 in 2018, 15 in 2017, 19 in 2016, 12 in 2015, 23 in 2014, 20 in 2013, 20 in 2012, 28 in 2011, 29 in 2010, 38 in 2009, 56 in 2008, 58 in 2007, 6 in 2006, 8 in 2005, 6 in 2004, 3 in 2003, 2 in 2002, 5 in 2001, 3 in 2000, 3 in 1999, 2 in 1998, 7 in 1997, 4 in 1996, 3 in 1995, 2 in 1994, 1 in 1993, 1 in 1992, 1 in 1991). These communications shared a common point which is that they deal with the issue of "climate change" in one way or another. I aimed to historicize the EU's developing interest in the matter of "climate change" and its following ambition to mitigate the current climate crisis.

In an effort to create "triangulation"[351], I also analyzed European Council conclusions and European Commission white papers to better locate the EU's increasing attention to "climate change". I analyzed 179 European Council conclusions between 1992 and 2023 without any selection criteria. The European Council is the EU institution that consists of the heads of state or government of the 27 EU member states, the European Council President and the President of the European Commission, and it defines the

[348] *What the European Commission does*. (n.d.). European Commission. https://commission.europa.eu/about-european-commission/what-european-commission-does_en

[349] *Communication - EU monitor*. (n.d.). https://www.eumonitor.eu/9353000/1/j9vvik7m1c3gyxp/vh7dptp45uyn

[350] *Communication - EU monitor*. (n.d.). https://www.eumonitor.eu/9353000/1/j9vvik7m1c3gyxp/vh7dptp45uyn

[351] Triangulation means using of multiple methods or data sources in qualitative research to develop a comprehensive understanding of phenomena. See Patton, M. Q. (1999). Enhancing the quality and credibility of qualitative analysis. *Health services research*, *34*(5 Pt 2), 1189.

general political direction and priorities of the European Union.[352] I studied the European Council conclusions because they guide the EU's policy agenda by identifying specific issues of concern and outlining actions to take or goals to reach.[353] I intended to show the timeline of politics of "climate change" within the ever-changing focus of the EU. European Commission white papers are documents containing proposals for European Union (EU) action in a specific area, aiming to launch a debate with the public, stakeholders, the European Parliament and the Council in order to arrive at a political consensus.[354] I also analyzed 37 white papers from 1985 to 2020 (no white paper since 2020) without any selection criteria. Though these white papers, I intended to show the commission's changing focus over the time and identify the EU's current focus on the climate change in a comparative manner to a wide range of other issues. These sources are: The European Commission communications, European Council conclusions, and European Commission white papers.

By 2015 Paris Climate Agreement, the EU has taken the role of leadership in the global efforts to mitigate climate change. My second research question is related to how other groups gave the consent to or resisted this development, which will eventually lead to the European Green Deal. Thus, for the second research question of my thesis, I used 6 groups of sources, issued around or after the Paris Climate Agreement and concerned the issue of climate change.

These sources are: the conclusions of the Council of the European Union, reports, expert papers, letters, statements, meetings, and press releases of the European Round Table for Industry (ERT), adopted position papers, reports, statements, and press releases of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), open letters, statements, recommendations, and petitions of Green10 (group of environmental NGOs), the

[352] *European Council*.https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/

[353] *European Council conclusions.* European Council. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/

[354] *White paper - EUR-Lex*. (n.d.). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:white_paper

Greens/EFA group's letters, publications, policy, and positions papers, and public opinion polls of the EU (Eurobarometer).

The Council of the EU whose members are national government ministers from each member state, grouped by policy area, negotiates and adopts EU laws.[355] Council conclusions, adopted after a debate during a Council meeting, contain a political position on a specific topic to the EU's areas of activity.[356] Although, they are not legally binding, they set up political commitments or positions for the future of the EU.[357] I used 87 council conclusions between 2015 and 2023, regarding the issue of "climate change".

European Round Table for Industry (ERT) is a forum of Chief Executives and Chairmen of major multinational companies of European parentage and it strives for "a strong, open and competitive" Europe as a driver for "inclusive growth and sustainable prosperity".[358] It proudly states that their companies generate revenues exceeding €2 trillion, provide around 5 million direct jobs worldwide - of which half are in Europe - and sustain millions of indirect jobs while investing more than €60 billion annually in R&D, largely in Europe.[359] I have selected 45 reports, expert papers, letters, statements, meetings and press releases between 2017 and 2023 that deal with "climate change".

The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) is the voice of workers and represents 45 million members from 93 trade union organizations in 41 European countries, plus 10 European Trade Union Federations.[360] The ETUC aims to ensure

[355] *What is the council.* The Council of the EU. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/what-is-the-council/

[356] *Council conclusions and resolutions*. The Council of the EU. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/conclusions-resolutions/

[357] *Council conclusions and resolutions*. The Council of the EU. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/conclusions-resolutions/

[358] *About - ERT*. (2022, September 2). ERT. https://ert.eu/about/

[359] *About - ERT*. (2022, September 2). ERT. https://ert.eu/about/

[360] *ETUC | European Trade Union Confederation*. (n.d.). ETUC. https://etuc.org/en

that the EU is not just a single market for goods and services, but is also a Social Europe, where improving the wellbeing of workers and their families is an equally important priority.[361] I selected ETUC's 26 adopted position papers, reports, statements and press releases between 2011 and 2023 that deal with "climate change".

The Green 10 is a coalition of ten of the largest environmental organizations and networks active on the European level and it works to ensure that the European Union protects the climate, the local environment, biodiversity and human health within and beyond its borders.[362] I gathered 15 open letters, statements, recommendations and petitions of Green10 between 2019 and 2023 and I analyzed how environmental NGOs defined their positions with respect to the changing "climate change" perception of the EU.

The Greens/EFA Group (made up of Green, EFA, Pirate and Independent MEPs) has 72 Members (35 women and 37 men) from 17 countries and 4 regions and it is the fourth group in the European Parliament.[363] The Greens/EFA fights for a comprehensive transformation for Europe allowing everyone to live a good life based on economic, social and environmental sustainability.[364] I selected 35 letters, publications, policy and positions papers of theirs between 2009 and 2023. Unsurprisingly, the issue of "climate change" has the central place in their agenda. I analyzed how they criticized and to what extent they managed to challenge the way the European Union handles the matter.

Eurobarometer is the polling instrument used by the European Commission, the European Parliament and other EU institutions and agencies to regularly monitor the state of public opinion in Europe on issues related to the European Union as well as

[361] *Aims and priorities*. (n.d.). ETUC | European Trade Union Confederation. https://www.etuc.org/en/aims-and-priorities

[362] *Home - Green 10*. (2023, February 10). Green 10. https://green10.org/

[363] *Who are the Greens/EFA MEPs?* (n.d.). Greens/EFA. https://www.greens-efa.eu/en/who-we-are/our-meps

[364] *What we stand for*. (n.d.). Greens/EFA. https://www.greens-efa.eu/en/what-we-stand-for

attitudes on subjects of political or social nature. Eurobarometer provides quality and relevant data for experts in public opinion, researchers, media and the public.[365] I used 10 Special Eurobarometer reports on Europeans' attitudes towards climate change from 2008 to 2023 (1 in 2008, 2 in 2009, 1 in 2011, 1 in 2014, 1 in 2015, 1 in 2017, 1 in 2019, 1 in 1 in 2021 and 1 in 2023). Additionally, I looked at Eurobarometers conducted on the issues of "sustainable consumption and production (2009)", "public awareness and acceptance of CO2 capture and storage (2011)", "resource efficiency (2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2018)", "green markets (2012, 2013, 2015, 2018)", "green products (2013)", "circular economy (2016)" and "green transition (2022)". In total I analyzed 44 Eurobarometer documents. Through these sources, my aim was to illustrate the changes in Europeans' perception towards climate change and its potential remedies, which include, but are not limited to, green markets and green products.

5.5. Codebook

In the previous subsection, I rationalized my data collection and selection process according to my research question. Although, I will explain this in detail in the chapter 6 of analysis, here I will also briefly share my coding rational and my codebook. As a part of my directed qualitative content analysis method, I deducted my codes from my critical reading of the EU's road to "green", which I explain in detail in chapter 4 of theoretical framework and from my analysis of the passive revolution of green capitalism in Europe, which is in the chapter 5 of this study.

Throughout the thesis, I argue that the case of the EGD is a part of the wider transformation of capitalism, where climate change has become the zeitgeist of global politics and a central point of contention within the global political economy in the 21st century. My code system reflects this process of capitalism's rebranding as "green capitalism". I formed five themes, under which I organized my codes and subcodes. My themes are environmental politics, sustainable and market-based solutions politics, climate change politics, green politics and ecological politics.

[365] What is the Eurobaromater. https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/about/eurobarometer

Environmental Politics Framework	Environmentally-friendly Solutions
	Nature-friendly Solutions
	Greenhouse Gas Emissions (GGS)
	Emission
	Nuclear Energy
	Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
	Environmental Crisis
	Environmental Problems
	Nuclear Waste
	Soil Pollution
	Water Pollution
	Destruction of the Ozone Layer
	Decreasing Quality of Life due to Environmental Problems
	Health Problems due to Pollution
	Clean Air
	Loss of Biodiversity
	Air Pollution
	Deforestation
	Extinction of Species
	Depletion of Natural Resources
	Growing Waste

Climate Change Framework	Climate Finance
	Climate Security
	Climate Activism
	Climate Change
	Climate Crisis
	Climate Mitigation
	Climate Neutrality
	Climate-friendly
	Global Warming
	Climate Diplomacy
	Issues with Third Countries
	Climate Geopolitics

Sustainable and Market-based Solutions Politics Framework	Sustainable Finance
	Decarbonisation
	Stability
	Sustainable Investment
	Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS)
	Greenhouse Gas Emissions
	Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS)
	Economic Growth despite Environmental / Climate Problems
	Resource Efficiency
	Low-carbon economy
	Carbon (CO2) emissions and tax
	Sustainability
	Circular economy
	Sustainable Energy
	Energy Efficiency
	Clean Energy
	Renewable Energy
	Geothermal Energy
	Hydroelectric Energy
	Wind Energy
	Solar Energy
	Biogas Energy
	Biofuel Energy
	Biomass Energy
	Sustainable Solutions
	Sustainable Development
	Innovation
	Technological Solutions
	Competitiveness
	Sustainable Growth
	Sustainable Consumption
	Sustainable Production
	Ecolabelling
	Sustainable Trade

Green Politics Framework	Green Public Procurement
	Green Technologies
	Green and Resilient Future
	Green Recovery
	Phasing out of Fossil Fuel
	Fossil-free
	Green Stimulus
	Green Investments
	Green Deal
	Green Transition
	Green Market
	Green Employment
	Green Economy
	Green Energy
	Green Finance
	Green Bonds
	Green Jobs
	Green Growth
	Green Trade
	Green Production
	Green Product
	Green Consumption

Ecological Politics Framework	Quality Jobs
	Ecological sustainability
	Socio-ecological justice
	Inequality
	Degrowth
	Redistribution
	Envronmental Justice
	Climate Justice
	Climate Reparation
	Ecological Debt
	Climate Debt
	Greenwashing
	Fair Green Transition
	Just Transition
	Ecological Transition
	Socially Fair or Beneficial Ecological Transition

Table 2. Codebook

With environmental politics, I coded:

- Environmentally friendly Solutions
  - Nature-friendly Solutions
- Greenhouse Gas Emissions (GGS)
  - Emission
- Nuclear Energy
- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
- Environmental Crisis
- Environmental Problems
  - Nuclear Waste
  - Soil Pollution
  - Water Pollution
  - Destruction of the Ozone Layer
  - Decreasing Quality of Life due to Environmental Problems
  - Health Problems due to Pollution
  - Clean Air
  - Loss of Biodiversity
  - Air Pollution
  - Deforestation Extinction of Species
  - Depletion of Natural Resources
  - Growing Waste

Sustainability is the overarching theme for my codes of:

- Sustainable Finance
- Decarbonization
- Stability Sustainable
- Investment Emissions
- Trading Scheme (ETS)
- Greenhouse Gas Emissions
- Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS)
- Economic Growth despite Environmental / Climate Problems
- Resource Efficiency
- Low-carbon economy
- Carbon (CO2) emissions and tax
- Sustainability
- Circular economy
- Sustainable Energy
  - Energy Efficiency
  - Clean Energy
- Renewable Energy
  - Geothermal Energy
  - Hydroelectric Energy
  - Wind Energy
  - Solar Energy
  - Biogas Energy
  - Biofuel Energy
  - Biomass Energy
- Sustainable Solutions
- Sustainable Development
- Innovation
- Technological Solutions
- Competitiveness
- Sustainable Growth
- Sustainable Consumption
- Sustainable Production
  - Ecolabelling
- Sustainable Trade

Climate politics is where I coded:

- Climate Finance
- Climate Security
- Climate Activism
- Climate Change
- Climate Crisis
- Climate Mitigation
- Climate Neutrality
- Climate-friendly
- Global Warming
- Climate Diplomacy
  - Issues with Third Countries
- Climate Geopolitics

Under the theme of green politics, I listed my codes of:

- Green Public Procurement
- Green Technologies
- Green and Resilient Future
- Green Recovery
- Phasing out of Fossil Fuel
  - Fossil-free
- Green Stimulus
- Green Investments
- Green Deal
- Green Transition
- Green Market
- Green Employment
- Green Economy
- Green Energy
- Green Finance
  - Green Bonds
- Green Jobs
- Green Growth
- Green Trade
- Green Production
  - Green Product
- Green Consumption

Lastly, with ecological politics I organized my codes of:

- Quality Jobs
- Ecological sustainability
- Socio-ecological justice
- Inequality
- Degrowth
- Redistribution
- Environmental Justice
- Climate Justice
- Climate Reparation
- Ecological Debt
- Climate Debt
- Greenwashing
- Fair Green Transition
  - Just Transition
- Ecological Transition
- Socially Fair or Beneficial
- Ecological Transition




Figure 1. MAXQDA Program Information Page




Figure 2. MAXQDA Opening Screen

With these codes, I will analyze the content of my sources in chapter 6 and provide "deep understanding" of green transition of the EU.

I will investigate how the European Green Deal develop out of which national, supranational, and global context, and through which inter-member conflicts and class antagonisms. I will find answers to my research question, which is "how and why the EGD has become the policy priority of the European Union" through my directed qualitative content analysis in MAXQDA, for which I developed my operational codes from Neo-Gramscian approach. In the coming chapters, I will show my theoretical and historical framework, then I will explore the case of the European Green Deal within these structures.

Below, I showed how I utilized MAXQDA program through various screenshots. In the first image, the information about the program can be seen. In the second image, the program's first opening format is visible. Then in the third and fourth images, I showed how I organized my data into 9 folders and divided them into two bigger document groups, as data group 1 and data group 2. In the figure 4, I shared how my codes are seen the program. The fifth image shows how retrieved segments tool operates when specific documents and codes are activated.




Figure 3. My Organization of 2 Data Groups, 9 Document Folders and 968 Individual Documents




Figure 4. My Code System

CHAPTER 6

DIRECTED QUALITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL

6.1. Introduction

In Chapter 5, I explained what my main problem and research question are. Then I lay down methodology to conduct the necessary analysis required by the nature of my research question. I explained why I adopted directed qualitative content analysis and I planned to apply it to my thesis. Then, I clarified my reference of computer-assisted qualitative data analysis (CAQDAS) software, which is MAXQDA. In this chapter, I will analyze my data qualitatively through MAXQDA and provide the results of my analysis, which will be the foundation of my main argument in this study.

Through the qualitative analysis of the European Green Deal with Neo-Gramscian approach, I will analyze how the EGD is not only the EU's attempt to regain its diminishing global competitiveness but also it is the EU's ambition to capture the zeitgeist of 21st century, and managed to have a head start in the new game if not possible to rearrange the game itself. I will argue that the EGD is more than a piece of the EU-level climate politics because it not only requires policy alignment from its members in the areas of, including but not limited to energy, trade and social policies, but also it has serious implications for international political and economic relations, which is a step towards green capitalism. The theoretical backbone of my argument and my thesis is **the green *trasformismo* of capitalism** developed via Neo-Gramscian approach. I will argue that **green** is the new raison d'état of contemporary political economy and **green ideas**, and **green norms** are now drawing new the dimensions of globalization as a response to the urgent climate crisis. Through the qualitative content

analysis of the European Green Deal, I will claim that the **green *trasformismo* of capitalism** is being instrumentalized to save capitalism without dramatically challenge its inherent contradictions.

To answer my research question "why and how did the EGD become the policy priority for the EU?" I use two sets data. For the why part, I analyze The European Commission communications, European Council conclusions and European Commission white papers. For the how part, I operationalize the content from the Council of the European Union; the European Round Table for Industry (ERT); the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC); Green10 (group of environmental NGOs); the Greens/EFA group; public opinion polls of the EU (Eurobarometer). Since my research is based on "why" and "how" questions, I design my thesis through using qualitative methods. My method for analyzing research question in this thesis is "directed qualitative content analysis".

I use deductive coding in a computer-assisted qualitative data analysis (CAQDAS) software, which is MAXQDA. Since I chose to apply directed qualitative content analysis method, I deducted my codes from my critical reading of the EU's road to "green", which I explain in detail in chapter 4 of theoretical framework and from my analysis of the passive revolution of green capitalism in Europe, which is in the chapter 5 of this study. My codebook is shown in the Table 2.

With these codes, I analyze the content of my data and provide "deep understanding" of green transition of the EU. I investigate how the European Green Deal develop out of which national, supranational and global context, and through which inter-member conflicts and class antagonisms. I will find answers to my research question, which is "how and why the EGD has become the policy priority of the European Union?" through my directed qualitative content analysis in MAXQDA, for which I developed my operational codes from Neo-Gramscian approach.

6.2. Why Did the EGD Become The Policy Priority of the EU?

To answer the first part of my research question as "why did the EGD become policy priority of the EU?" I analyze The European Commission communications, European

Council conclusions and European Commission white papers. I will show my codes have places with different intensities in different documents. For each document set, I will provide a document map showing the most dominant codes. Then I will use MAXQDA code comparison tool, to show how different code groups (all of which has their own code group color) are present in the large sets of documents. I will use another MAXQDA tool which is code matrix table to show which specific code is present in which specific document and with what intensity. All of these analytical tools will provide me with the necessary means to show the specificities of the EU's green transformation process.

6.2.1. Analysis of the European Commission Communications (1991-2023)

I will start with my first document group, which is European Commission conclusions. In this document group, I analyzed 500 documents from 1991 to 2023. Image 5 shows how these 500 documents are coded predominantly.

I need start with saying that I acquired these 500 documents by using the filter of "climate change" from European Commission official web page. That is why the code of "climate change" is coded 3027 times in this document group.

Secondly, the document group is shown as heavily coded with blue colored codes. It means that European Commission discusses the issue of climate change with the words coded under the "sustainable and market-based solutions politics framework". The emphasis here is definitely on the codes of "competitiveness" and "innovation".

The visible yellow codes of "greenhouse gas emissions", "emission" and "loss of biodiversity" also important to show that the European Commission perceives the climate change through a technical and scientific perspective. The lack of purple color also supports this argument since this code group signifies the presence of degrowth, ecological sustainability, socio-ecological justice, climate debt, inequality, redistribution or quality jobs.

To show, how this document group is coded, I uses code comparison table which I used MAXQDA image generating tool. And since in this document group, there are

500 documents, I formed 10 different images, each showing 50 different individual document's codes.




Figure 5. Code Map - European Commission Communications (1991-2023)

Every document is named in the for of "its publication date_document number" and this unified naming system is visible at the top of the image. The colors of yellow, blue, red, green and purple represent 5 different code groups. From 1991 to 2023, in ten images, I show how the European Commission's attention has re-directed as it re-framed the climate change with different key words.

Firstly, the heavy presence of yellow in the 90s and 00s left its place to red, which means the EC now directly uses climate change discourse to define environmental problems and possible solutions rather than solely using a technical language.

Secondly and more importantly, first green code appears in 2009 and then slowly in 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 increased its presence in the documents. It is important to note that "green growth" first emerged after the 2008 financial crisis as a way to re-vitalize the crisis-stricken world economy.

UN was the first institution to put forward the idea of green growth and then other significant players followed. As I explained in the historical chapter, World Bank prescribed green reforms to China as a way to overcome not only its environmental problems resulting from its heavy industry but also as a way out of its middle-income trap by introducing clean energy, green infrastructure and green development.

As it is expected, since 2019 when the European Green Deal first introduced, the green codes started to appear more and more frequently in the documents. Another important point is that along with the green deal, the just transition fund has been adopted. "Leave no one behind" principle guided Commissions actions in this regard so much so that purple codes become a frequent part of recent documents.

I used another MAXQDA visualization tool -Code Matrix to show that which specific code is present in which specific document. This visualization is different than code comparison visualization since in the latter code colors represent the whole different code group's presence in the document while in the first, it is the single code itself shown in the document.

Code matrix shows uses a technique similar to heat mapping as codes are shown in a scale from blue to red and different shades of purple (this purple is the mix of blue and red, none of which is identical to my color preferences in the code system).

As the one specific code's presence in one document increases, it gets more red. The opposite is true for the color blue.




Figure 6. Code Comparison Table - European Commission Communications (1991-2005)




Figure 7. Code Comparison Table - European Commission Communications (2005-2007)




Figure 8. Code Comparison Table - European Commission Communications (2007-2008)




Figure 9. Code Comparison Table - European Commission Communications (2008-2009)




Figure 10. Code Comparison Table - European Commission Communications (2009-2011)




Figure 11. Code Comparison Table - European Commission Communications (2011-2013)




Figure 12. Code Comparison Table - European Commission Communications (2013-2016)




Figure 13. Code Comparison Table - European Commission Communications (2016-2019)




Figure 14. Code Comparison Table - European Commission Communications (2019-2021)




Figure 15. Code Comparison Table - European Commission Communications (2021-2023)




Figure 16. Code Matrix - European Commission Communications (1991-2005)




Figure 17. Code Matrix - European Commission Communications (2005-2007)




Figure 18. Code Matrix - European Commission Communications (2007-2008)




Figure 19. Code Matrix - European Commission Communications (2008-2009)




Figure 20. Code Matrix - European Commission Communications (2009-2011)




Figure 21. Code Matrix - European Commission Communications (2011-2013)




Figure 22. Code Matrix - European Commission Communications (2013-2016)




Figure 23. Code Matrix - European Commission Communications (2016-2019)




Figure 24. Code Matrix - European Commission Communications (2019-2021)




Figure 25. Code Matrix - European Commission Communications (2021-2023)

6.2.2. Analysis of the European Commission White Papers (1985-2020)

With the analysis of 37 European Commission white papers (there is no selection criteria or filter), I intended to show the commission's changing focus over the time and identify the EU's current focus on the climate change in a comparative manner to a wide range of other issues. The only limitation for the document group of white papers is that there is no new white paper since 2020 when the EGD is adopted. Still, white papers are more about the future than the present so even the 2020 white paper is important in this regard.




Figure 26. Code Map - European Commission White Papers (1985-2020)




Figure 27. Code Comparison Table - European Commission White Papers (1985-2020)

As it is shown in the code map, blue codes are in the majority like the document group of European Commission Conclusions, which means "sustainable and market-based solutions politics framework" is dominant feature of white papers. And "competitiveness" is by far the most coded element with its 975 times coding record. However, the group of white papers differs from the Commissions conclusions because it also involves purple codes.




Figure 28. Code Matrix - European Commission White Papers (1985-2020)

"Redistribution" and "inequality" codes are in the minority but still important. The most important result of this map is that for white papers show, whatever the issue on the agenda of the EU, competitiveness is nearly always part of the discussion. Above, I also show the code comparison table and code matris tables, which identify specific codes present in the specific document.

6.2.3. Analysis of the European Council Conclusions (1992-2023)

As the last part of the first data group, I analyzed 179 European Council conclusions between 1992 and 2023 without any selection criteria.




Figure 29. Code Map - European Council Conclusions (1992-2023)

The European Council is the EU institution that consists of the heads of state or government of the 27 EU member states, the European Council President and the President of the European Commission, and it defines the general political direction and priorities of the European Union.[366]

I studied the European Council conclusions because they guide the EU's policy agenda by identifying specific issues of concern and outlining actions to take or goals to reach.[367]

Again, in the code map of European council conclusions, it can be seen that blue codes are in the majority. "Competitiveness", "stability" and "innovation" are the strongest codes in this document group. Also, it is worth noting that **sustainable development** has a significant presence in the document group of the European Council Conclusions.

In the following images of code matris and coda comparison tables, I show which specific codes are present in which specific document. Importantly, "green growth" appears in the documents in 2010, which is also supporting the data results of European Commission conclusions.

"Green" started to take place in not only European but in general global economy after the 2008 financial crisis. As I explained above, the green re-vitalization of global capitalism following the devastations of global financial crisis, has started take its place in the important documents of political economy.

Again, in line with previous document groups, green deal, green transition, green economy and green finance started appearing in the documents more frequently after the adoption of the EGD in 2019.

[366] *European Council*. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/

[367] *European Council conclusions.* European Council. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/




Figure 30. Code Comparison Table - European Council Conclusions (1992-2007)




Figure 31. Code Comparison Table - European Council Conclusions (2007-2013)




Figure 32. Code Comparison Table - European Council Conclusions (2013-2023)




Figure 33. Code Matrix - European Council Conclusions (1992-2007)




Figure 34. Code Matrix - European Council Conclusions (2007-2013)




Figure 35. Code Matrix - European Council Conclusions (2013-2023)

To answer the first part of my research question as "why the EGD has become the policy priority of the European Union?" I analyzed The European Commission communications, European Council conclusions and European Commission white papers. In total, I studied 716 document covering the last three decades of the EU.

For this long period to be qualitatively analyzed, I developed my own code system and then code the whole documents in MAXQDA as I already explained in the methodology chapter. In this chapter, I used various MAXQDA tools to visualize commonalities and differences of large data set such as document maps, code comparison tables and code matris tables. I also added for images of document portraits showing which codes have how much space in the specific individual documents in the appendices.

In this section, I managed to show which codes are dominant in which document groups, which specific codes have how much weight in which document. All of these analytical tools provided me with the necessary means to show the specificities of the EU's green transformation process.

My answer for "why the EGD has become the policy priority of the European Union?" has its roots in this qualitative content analysis of the European Commission communications, European Council conclusions and European Commission white papers. Historically, the European Commission discussed climate change from "sustainability and market-based solutions" framework. Up until the 2010s, the EU has used "environmental framework" which involves a much technical and scientific language to govern the issue. Following the 2008 financial crisis, the global structure of capitalism has traded its traditional environmental parameters for new and green notions of development, growth, finance, production etc. It is no coincidence that first green codes appear after 2008 in this different document sets. The 2008 financial crisis made it necessary to "fix" capitalism in order to prevent its demise. The crisis has brought about its own opportunities for global capitalist elite to re-design the rules and the regulations of global capitalism. Minimizing the environmentally destructive results of capitalist production and consumption without essentially changing or even challenging the very nature of capitalism which is based on the notion of "infinite

growth on a finite planet". It is evident in my analysis that not once is mentioned degrowth while discussing the environmental problems and possible end of the world. The EU, as the leading actor of the western capitalist system, adopts these green capitalist solutions over any other alternative solutions like the idea of degrowth because its main aim is to "fix" capitalism by introducing green growth by decoupling GDP from resource use, rather than solely saving the planet.

6.3. How did the EGD become the policy priority of the EU?

In this section, I will analyze the documents under data group 2 in order to find a well-grounded answer for "how did the EU adopt the European Green Deal?". I will operationalize the content from the Council of the European Union; the European Round Table for Industry (ERT); the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC); Green10 (group of environmental NGOs); the Greens/EFA group; public opinion polls of the EU (Eurobarometer). In this section, I analyzed 252 documents and visualized the results with MAXQDA tools of document maps, code comparison tables and code matris tables. I also added for images of document portraits showing which codes have how much space in the specific individual documents in the appendices.

As I explained in the chapter 3, I use Neo-Gramscian theoretical tools of hegemony, coercion and consent, passive revolution, trasformismo and integral state to analyze the adoption of the European Green Deal. In the chapter 4, I emphasized the contemporary setting of class antagonisms both within national boundaries and at the global level concerning the new green deals and global rivalry between leading capitalist nations as necessary parameters to understand and historicize the emergence of the European Green Deal. In the chapter 5, I questioned how the EU has ascended its global leadership position in climate change mitigation efforts following the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement. Here, in the chapter 6, I analyze how this self-appointed leadership received inside the EU. I analyzed how different groups gave the consent to or resisted the EU's newly acquired role as the savior of planet earth, which will eventually lead to the European Green Deal. To understand the member states' position, I used the conclusions of the Council of the European Union. I looked at what the European Round Table for Industry (ERT) have said about "the climate change"

in order to place the interests of the European capital when it comes to the green transition. On the opposite side, I studied how The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) as the voice of workers and represents 45 million members in the EU re-defines its agenda in line with the climate crisis.

For the NGO side of the environmental discussion, I analyzed what The Green 10, which is a coalition of ten of the largest environmental organizations and networks active on the European level, says and does with respect to the EU's new direction towards "green future". The EU has its own parliament which makes the citizens of the EU able to elect their EU-level representatives. I analyzed political positions of the Greens/EFA Group to grasp how they criticized and to what extent they managed to challenge the way the European Union handles the matter. Lastly, I studied the public opinion polls to see how the European public perceived "climate change" and its "green" remedies.

This analysis provides the basis for my argument that the EGD is, in fact, a case of green trasformismo of capitalism, re-branding the existing capitalist contradictions as new and technological solutions which are vital for a sustainable and green future. I operationalize these different actors or societal groups' positions with respect to the European Green Deal as concrete examples of the strategy of trasformismo.

6.3.1. Analysis of the Council of the European Union (2015-2023)

In the data group of the Council of the European Union, which works in fashion similar to a national council of ministers but in the supranational level, the code map shows that the climate change has been discussed within the environmental framework of loss of biodiversity, emissions and deforestations and sustainability framework of **sustainable development**, **sustainable growth, innovation, circular economy, competitiveness.**

Red and green codes have also strong presence with **climate change, climate neutrality, climate finance and climate diplomacy, green deal and green transition.** Importantly, there is no significant presence of purple codes, meaning issues like inequality, justice and fair transition are not overly looked at by the Council.

This map shows technical approach of the council towards climate change. The Council counties to rely on market-based solution while also recognizing the rise of the green discourse.




Figure 36. Code Map - Council of the European Union (2015-2023)

The introduction of green deal and new tools like climate finance signifies that the Council has been following the path that has been drawn for them by the European Commission and the European Council. Also, through the code matris and code comparison tables, I am able to show that "green" has come into the agenda of the Council following the introduction of the European Green Deal in 2019. Another

important point is that purple codes of inequality and fair transition increased their intensity following the introduction of the EGD. The council, as being the executive branch of the EU, is working for these new rules and regulations of green transition, that has been set by the Commission and European Council to be implemented in the every-day practices of the European citizens.




Figure 37. Code Comparison Table - Council of the European Union (2015-2020)




Figure 38. Code Comparison Table - Council of the European Union (2020-2023)




Figure 39. Code Matrix - Council of the European Union (2015-2019)



Figure 40. Code Matrix - Council of the European Union (2020-2023)

6.3.2. Analysis of the European Round Table for Industry (ERT) (2017-2023)




Figure 41. Code Map - European Round Table for Industry (ERT) (2017-2023)

Through my analysis of the data group of the European Round Table, I aim to show where the European "capital" is standing via the climate change and green transition.

European Round Table for Industry (ERT) defines itself as a forum of Chief Executives and Chairmen of major multinational companies of European parentage,

striving for “a strong, open and competitive” Europe, which is seen as a driver for “inclusive growth and sustainable prosperity”.[368]

It proudly states that their companies generate revenues exceeding €2 trillion, provide around 5 million direct jobs worldwide - of which half are in Europe - and sustain millions of indirect jobs while investing more than €60 billion annually in R&D, largely in Europe.[369]

I have selected 45 reports, expert papers, letters, statements, meetings and press releases between 2017 and 2023 that deal with “climate change”.

Again, similar to previous data sets, for ERT the main pillar for any discussion regarding the climate change is “competitiveness”. The framework of market-based solutions is strong with its innovation, sustainability, carbon tax and circular economy.

What I believe is significant for understanding the position of European capital with regards to the green transition is that the ERT could be the most enthusiastic actor for the revitalization of European single market through the introduction of green agenda since they perceive it is vital for remedying the EU’s decreasing competitiveness in the global economy.

Through the code matris and code comparison tables, I am able to show that while the green codes are following the blue codes as the second most coded color, the purple codes do not seem to be an important issue for the European capital.

The lack of purple codes is for the European capital that issues like degrowth, inequality, justice and fair transition are not on the agenda of European industrialists. European capital is definitely supporter of sustainable and market-based solution politics, rather than more critical perspectives which can be listed under the ecological politics framework.

[368] *About - ERT*. (2022, September 2). ERT. https://ert.eu/about/

[369] *About - ERT*. (2022, September 2). ERT. https://ert.eu/about/




Figure 42. Code Comparison Table - European Round Table for Industry (ERT) (2017-2023)




Figure 43. Code Matrix - European Round Table for Industry (ERT) (2017-2023)

6.3.3. Analysis of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) (2011-2023).




Figure 44. Code Map - The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) (2011-2023)

Following the analysis of European capital, I now turn to European labor. The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) is the voice of workers and represents 45 million members from 93 trade union organizations in 41 European countries, plus 10 European Trade Union Federations

The ETUC aims to ensure that the EU is not just a single market for goods and services, but is also a Social Europe, where improving the wellbeing of workers and their





Figure 45. Code Comparison Table - The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) (2011-2023)



CODE MATRIS Data Group 2 > The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) (2011-2023)			20111020_Adopted resolution	20131230_Report	20141022_Adopted position	20150618_Adopted position	20151217_Adopted position	20160803_Report	20190424_Adopted position	20191023_Adopted position	20191127_Statement	20200805_Report	20210101_Project	20210323_Adopted position	20210604_Adopted position	20211006_2_Adopted position	20211006_Adopted position	20211006_Adopted resolution	20211209_2_Adopted position	20211209_Adopted position	20220623_Adopted Resolution	20221028_Adopted position	20230117_Statement	20230416_Press release	20230419_Press release	20230526_Action Programme	20230526_Manifesto	20230526_Report
Environmental Politics Framework	Environmentally-friendly Solutions		0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
	Environmentally-friendly	Nature-friendly Solutions	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Greenhouse Gas Emissions (GGS)		7	3	6	1	9	10	3	10	0	3	2	1	0	0	1	1	4	5	4	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	Greenhouse Gas Emissions (GGS)	Emission	4	2	1	1	8	4	2	8	0	2	1	1	0	0	1	0	4	4	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Nuclear Energy		0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Environmental Crisis		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Environmental Problems		0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Environmental Problems	Nuclear Waste	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Soil Pollution	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Water Pollution	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Destruction of the Ozone Layer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Decreasing Quality of Life due to Environmental Problems	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Health Problems due to Pollution	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Clean Air	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Loss of Biodiversity	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	5	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
		Air Pollution	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Deforestation	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Extinction of Species	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Depletion of Natural Resources	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Growing Waste	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sustainable and Market-based Solutions Politics Framework	Sustainable Finance		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0
	Decarbonisation		0	0	2	1	2	14	3	8	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Stability		0	0	1	0	0	2	2	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	5	1	6
	Sustainable Investment		1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS)		0	0	8	0	7	8	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	23	2	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	2
	Greenhouse Gas Emissions		6	3	7	0	4	9	2	5	0	1	5	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0
	Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS)		1	0	1	0	1	5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Economic Growth despite Environmental / Climate Problems		0	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
	Resource Efficiency		4	27	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Low-carbon economy		8	24	16	2	6	61	11	1	0	1	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Carbon (CO_2) emissions and tax		6	7	2	0	4	31	5	1	0	5	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Sustainability		0	17	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	6	3	23	9	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	0	9
	Circular economy		0	0	1	0	1	7	2	3	0	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	0	0	0	2	0	1
	Sustainable Energy		0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
	Sustainable Energy	Energy Efficiency	9	34	4	0	1	19	2	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	3	2	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
		Clean Energy	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	1
	Renewable Energy		1	9	1	0	0	9	3	2	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Renewable Energy	Geothermal Energy	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Hydroelectric Energy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Wind Energy	0	2	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Solar Energy	0	4	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
		Biogas Energy	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Biofuel Energy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Biomass Energy	0	1	0	0	0	6	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Sustainable Solutions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Sustainable Development		2	60	2	1	0	3	1	1	1	2	8	20	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	4
	Innovation		5	16	3	0	7	6	2	1	0	1	21	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	4
	Technological Solutions		0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Competitiveness		2	3	5	0	0	7	2	4	2	4	14	56	1	1	0	2	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	9	0	12
	Sustainable Growth		1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	0	5	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	6
	Sustainable Consumption		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Sustainable Production		1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Sustainable Production	Ecolabelling	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Sustainable Trade		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Climate Change Framework	Climate Finance		0	0	0	0	1	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Climate Security		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Climate Activism		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Climate Change		6	25	4	3	3	10	2	8	1	210	4	0	0	0	0	1	0	4	1	1	1	0	1	6	1	5
	Climate Crisis		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Climate Mitigation		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
	Climate Neutrality		0	0	0	0	0	0	1	5	0	2	7	5	0	0	1	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	4	1	0	0
	Climate-friendly		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Global Warming		0	0	2	1	1	1	1	0	0	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
	Climate Diplomacy		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Climate Diplomacy	Issues with Third Countries	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	7	5	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
	Climate Geopolitics		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Green Politics Framework	Green Public Procurement		0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Green Technologies		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
	Green and Resilient Future		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Green Recovery		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Phasing out of Fossil Fuel		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Phasing out of Fossil Fuel	Fossil-free	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
	Green Stimulus		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Green Investments		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Green Deal		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	17	1	0	8	3	4	0	1	1	2	7	6	2	0	0	3	8	0	6
	Green Transition		0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	1	4	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	5	0	3
	Green Market		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Green Employment		0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Green Economy		1	17	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
	Green Energy		0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	Green Finance		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Green Finance	Green Bonds	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Green Jobs		1	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
	Green Growth		0	6	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Green Trade		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Green Production		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Green Production	Green Product	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Green Consumption		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ecological Politics Framework	Quality Jobs		1	0	3	1	1	2	0	6	3	1	5	4	3	0	0	3	0	4	1	0	0	0	0	15	2	8
	Ecological sustainability		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Socio-ecological justice		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Inequality		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	1
	Degrowth		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Redistribution		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	1	0	1	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0
	Environmental Justice		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Climate Justice		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Climate Reparation		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Ecological Debt		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Climate Debt		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Greenwashing		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Fair Green Transition		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Fair Green Transition	Just Transition	6	7	5	2	6	31	8	19	2	7	66	5	5	0	4	4	6	14	5	4	0	0	9	15	1	15
	Ecological Politics Framework > Ecological Transition		0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
	Ecological Transition > Socially Fair or Beneficial Ecological Transition		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Figure 46. Code Matrix - The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) (2011-2023)

families is an equally important priority. I selected ETUC's 26 adopted position papers, reports, statements and press releases between 2011 and 2023 that deal with "climate change".

The code map of the ETUC shows a rather interesting case following the previous data sets. Apart from the code of "climate change", the most frequent code is "just transition" which is a purple code, and it is the first time that a purple code is this high on the agenda. I also want to note that it is the first time that the code of "quality jobs" is coded high enough to be included on the map.

Another important point for ETUC is that its code matris and code comparison tables are showing a much more balanced distribution of code groups (with only exception to low presence of yellow coded environmental framework). They share with other data sets their significant focus on the sustainability framework, but their agenda is definitely favoring purple coded issues of quality jobs, inequality and fair transition.

6.3.4. Analysis of the Green10 (2019-2023)

For the NGO side of the environmental discussion, I analyzed what and does with respect to the EU's new direction towards "green future". The Green 10 is a coalition of ten of the largest environmental organizations and networks active on the European level and it works to ensure that the European Union protects the climate, the local environment, biodiversity and human health within and beyond its borders.[370]

I gathered 15 open letters, statements, recommendations and petitions of Green10 between 2019 and 2023 and I analyzed how environmental NGOs defined their positions with respect to the changing "climate change" perception of the EU.

What is most striking about the Green 10 is that it never uses "degrowth", "ecological justice", "climate justice", "climate debt" or "greenwashing". An organization which claims to be a "coalition of ten of the largest environmental organizations and networks active on the European level, working to ensure that the European Union protects the

[370] *Home - Green 10*. (2023, February 10). Green 10. https://green10.org/

climate, the local environment, biodiversity and human health within and beyond its borders"[371] should be at least concerned with above mentioned issues. Apparently, climate change has no borders but the politics of it has and Green 10 is currently staying within these borders.




Figure 47. Code Map - Green10 (2019-2023)

[371] *Home - Green 10*. (2023, February 10). Green 10. https://green10.org/

In the visual of code map, it can be seen that the document set of Green10 is mostly coded by green deal. Green10 is also using discourses of environmental, sustainability

CODE MATRIS Data Group 2 > Green10 (2019-2023)			20190913_Statement	20190916_Letter	20200423_Petition	20200508_Letter	20210311_Letter	20210708_Letter	20210912_Recommendation	20211018_Statement	20220128_Letter	20220316_Letter	20220408_Letter	20220516_Letter	20221014_Letter	20230411_Letter	20230901_Letter
Environmental Politics Framework	Environmentally-friendly Solutions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Environmentally-friendly	Nature-friendly Solutions	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Greenhouse Gas Emissions (GGS)		0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	Greenhouse Gas Emissions (GGS)	Emission	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	Nuclear Energy		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0
	Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Environmental Crisis		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Environmental Problems		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Environmental Problems	Nuclear Waste	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Soil Pollution	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Water Pollution	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Destruction of the Ozone Layer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Decreasing Quality of Life due to Environmental Problems	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Health Problems due to Pollution	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Clean Air	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Loss of Biodiversity	0	0	1	2	0	1	2	7	0	0	1	1	2	1	0
		Air Pollution	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Deforestation	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
		Extinction of Species	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Depletion of Natural Resources	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Growing Waste	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sustainable and Market-based Solutions Politics Framework	Sustainable Finance		1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Decarbonisation		0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
	Stability		0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
	Sustainable Investment		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
	Greenhouse Gas Emissions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
	Economic Growth despite Environmental / Climate Problems		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Resource Efficiency		1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
	Low-carbon economy		0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Carbon (CO_2) emissions and tax		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
	Sustainability		3	2	0	1	0	1	3	2	0	0	1	0	2	0	0
	Circular economy		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
	Sustainable Energy		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Sustainable Energy	Energy Efficiency	1	0	0	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	2	0	0
		Clean Energy	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Renewable Energy		0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0
	Renewable Energy	Geothermal Energy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Hydroelectric Energy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Wind Energy	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	0
		Solar Energy	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	1	0
		Biogas Energy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Biofuel Energy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Biomass Energy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Sustainable Solutions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Sustainable Development		1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Innovation		0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0
	Technological Solutions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Competitiveness		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Sustainable Growth		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Sustainable Consumption		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Sustainable Production		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Sustainable Production	Ecolabelling	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Sustainable Trade		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Climate Change Framework	Climate Finance		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Climate Security		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Climate Activism		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Climate Change		0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	Climate Crisis		1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	Climate Mitigation		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Climate Neutrality		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
	Climate-friendly		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Global Warming		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Climate Diplomacy		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	Climate Diplomacy	Issues with Third Countries	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
	Climate Geopolitics		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Green Politics Framework	Green Public Procurement		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Green Technologies		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
	Green and Resilient Future		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	Green Recovery		0	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Phasing out of Fossil Fuel		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Phasing out of Fossil Fuel	Fossil-free	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Green Stimulus		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Green Investments		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Green Deal		5	4	3	5	1	1	3	0	1	0	1	3	2	1	4
	Green Transition		0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
	Green Market		1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Green Employment		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Green Economy		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Green Energy		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Green Finance		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Green Finance	Green Bonds	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
	Green Jobs		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Green Growth		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Green Trade		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Green Production		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Green Production	Green Product	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Green Consumption		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ecological Politics Framework	Quality Jobs		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Ecological sustainability		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Socio-ecological justice		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Inequality		0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Degrowth		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Redistribution		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Environmental Justice		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Climate Justice		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Climate Reparation		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Ecological Debt		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Climate Debt		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Greenwashing		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Fair Green Transition		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Fair Green Transition	Just Transition	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Ecological Politics Framework > Ecological Transition		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Ecological Transition > Socially Fair or Beneficial Ecological Transition		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Figure 48. Code Matrix - Green10 (2019-2023)

20190913_Statement	20190916_Letter	20200423_Petition	20200508_Letter	20210311_Letter	20210708_Letter	20210912_Recommendation	20211018_Statement	20220128_Letter	20220316_Letter	20220408_Letter	20220516_Letter	20221014_Letter	20230411_Letter	20230901_Letter
7	5	10	8	0	1	5	3	2	3	3	7	3	4	9
5	3	5	0	1	1	2	2	0	0	1	8	5	2	3
3	0	0	3	0	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	4	7	0
0	0	0	8	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
0	0	1	3	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	2	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Figure 49. Code Comparison Table - Green10 (2019-2023)

and climate change framework. As I emphasized above, the purple codes are nearly absent in the documents of Green10, except for the "inequality". This is also supported by the tables of code matris and code comparison, showing the dominance of "green deal" and "sustainability".

6.3.5. Analysis of the Greens/EFA in the European Parliament (2008-2023)

The EU has its own parliament which makes the citizens of the EU able to elect their EU-level representatives. I analyzed political positions of the Greens/EFA Group to grasp how they criticized and to what extent they managed to challenge the way the European Union handles the climate change and directs its green transition. The Greens/EFA Group (made up of Green, EFA, Pirate and Independent MEPs) has 72 Members (35 women and 37 men) from 17 countries and 4 regions and it is the fourth group in the European Parliament.[372] The Greens/EFA fights for a comprehensive transformation for Europe allowing everyone to live a good life based on economic, social and environmental sustainability.[373] I selected 35 letters, publications, policy and positions papers of theirs between 2009 and 2023.

[372] *Who are the Greens/EFA MEPs?* (n.d.). Greens/EFA. https://www.greens-efa.eu/en/who-we-are/our-meps

[373] *What we stand for*. (n.d.). Greens/EFA. https://www.greens-efa.eu/en/what-we-stand-for




Figure 50. Code Map - Greens/EFA in the European Parliament (2008-2023)

The code map of the Greens/EFA shows that, apart from "climate change", the Greens are most concerned with the purple code of "just transition". Together with "inequality", "quality jobs", "ecological transition" and "socially fair transition", the document group of the Greens/EFA is the one with most coded via purple colored ecological politics framework. The Greens represents the only societal group who has more critical stance with green transition process of the EU. The comparison and code matris tables are providing the details of the Greens/EFA group's relationship with the climate change and green transition in Europe.




Figure 51. Code Comparison Table - Greens/EFA in the European Parliament (2008-2023)




Figure 52. Code Matrix - Greens/EFA in the European Parliament (2008-2023)

6.3.6. Analysis of the Public Opinion Polls of the EU (1990-2023)

Eurobarometer is the polling instrument used by the European Commission, the European Parliament and other EU institutions and agencies to regularly monitor the state of public opinion in Europe on issues related to the European Union as well as attitudes on subjects of political or social nature. Eurobarometer provides quality and relevant data for experts in public opinion, researchers, media and the public.[374] I used 10 Special Eurobarometer reports on Europeans' attitudes towards climate change from 2008 to 2023 (1 in 2008, 2 in 2009, 1 in 2011, 1 in 2014, 1 in 2015, 1 in 2017, 1 in 2019, 1 in 1 in 2021 and 1 in 2023).

Additionally, I looked at Eurobarometers conducted on the issues of "sustainable consumption and production (2009)", "public awareness and acceptance of CO2 capture and storage (2011)", "resource efficiency (2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2018)", "green markets (2012, 2013, 2015, 2018)", "green products (2013)", "circular economy (2016)" and "green transition (2022)". In total I analyzed 44 Eurobarometer documents. Through these sources, my aim was to illustrate the changes in Europeans' perception towards climate change and its potential remedies, which include, but are not limited to, green markets and green products.

The most valuable part of my data set of public opinion polls could be that it covers a long period of 33 years. A lot of things have changed in the last 33 years, one of which is definitely climate perceptions. Thus, it is very interesting to look at the EU politics from the climate change perspective.

The code map of public opinion polls shows that apart from "climate change", the document groups is heavily coded with blue colored "energy efficiency", "resource efficiency" and "carbon emissions and carbon tax", yellow colored "loss of biodiversity", "nuclear waste" and "environmentally friendly solutions" and green colored "green product", "green market" and "green transition". These is no single purple code in the map.

[374] What is the Eurobarometer. https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/about/eurobarometer




Figure 53. Code Map - Public Opinion Polls of the EU (1990-2023)

The code comparison table is showing that how the Europeans' attention changed from technical and scientific codes of environmental framework in 1990s to sustainability framework in 2010s and to green politics framework in the period of 2012 and 2022. These Eurobarometers definitely reflecting the zeitgeist their time because in 2010s sustainability has become the dominant notion in every aspect of the political economy. Similarly, the notion of green development emerged in the post-2008 global financial crisis and this table proves this transition. Furthermore, it can be seen that climate change has become more and more dominant in the public discussion over the last decade. The code matris table also supports the previous arguments.




Figure 54. Code Comparison Table - Public Opinion Polls of the EU (1990-2023)




Figure 55. Code Matrix - Public Opinion Polls of the EU (1990-2023)

6.4. Results of the Analysis

- **European Commission Communications**

The analysis of the data set of EC communications shows that it is heavily coded with blue colored codes. It means that European Commission discusses the issue of climate change with the words coded under the "sustainable and market-based solutions politics framework". The emphasis here is definitely on the codes of "competitiveness" and "innovation". The visible yellow codes of "greenhouse gas emissions", "emission" and "loss of biodiversity" also important to show that the European Commission perceives the climate change through a technical and scientific perspective. The lack of purple color also supports this argument since this code group signifies the presence of degrowth, ecological sustainability, socio-ecological justice, climate debt, inequality, redistribution or quality jobs. The code comparison demonstrates that the heavy presence of yellow in the 90s and 00s left its place to red, which means the EC now directly uses climate change discourse to define environmental problems and possible solutions rather than solely using a technical language.

Secondly and more importantly, first green code appears in 2009 and then slowly in 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 increased its presence in the documents. It is important to note that "green growth" first emerged after the 2008 financial crisis as a way to re-vitalize the crisis-stricken world economy. UN was the first institution to put forward the idea of green growth and then other significant players followed. As I explained in the historical chapter, World Bank prescribed green reforms to China as a way to overcome not only its environmental problems resulting from its heavy industry but also as a way out of its middle-income trap by introducing clean energy, green infrastructure and green development. As it is expected, since 2019 when the European Green Deal first introduced, the green codes started to appear more and more frequently in the documents.

Another important point is that along with the green deal, the just transition fund has been adopted. "Leave no one behind" principle guided Commissions actions in this regard so much so that purple codes become a frequent part of recent documents.

- **European Commission White Papers**

The code map of the data set of European Commission White Papers shows that blue codes are in the majority like the document group of European Commission Conclusions, which means "sustainable and market-based solutions politics framework" is dominant feature of white papers. And "competitiveness" is by far the most coded element with its 975 times coding record. However, the group of white papers differs from the Commissions conclusions because it also involves purple codes. "Redistribution" and "inequality" codes are in the minority but still important. The most important result of this map is that for white papers show, whatever the issue on the agenda of the EU, competitiveness is nearly always part of the discussion.

- **European Council**

My analysis of the document group of the European Council and its code map shows that the document group is mostly coded with blue codes of **competitiveness**, **stability** and **innovation**. Also, it is worth noting that **sustainable development** has a significant presence in the document group of the European Council Conclusions. The code matris and coda comparison tables demonstrates that **green growth** appears in the documents in 2010, which is also supporting the data results of European Commission conclusions. **Green** started to take place in not only European but in general global economy after the 2008 financial crisis. The green re-vitalization of global capitalism following the devastations of global financial crisis, has started take its place in the important documents of political economy. Again, in line with previous document groups, **green deal, green transition, green economy and green finance** started appearing in the documents more frequently after the adoption of the EGD in 2019.

- **Council of the European Union**

In the data group of the European Union, which works in fashion similar to a national council of ministers but in the supranational level, the code map shows that the climate change has been discussed within the environmental framework of loss of biodiversity, emissions and deforestations and sustainability framework of **sustainable**

development, **sustainable growth, innovation, circular economy, competitiveness**. Red and green codes have also strong presence with climate change, climate neutrality, climate finance and climate diplomacy, green deal and green transition. Importantly, there is no significant presence of purple codes, meaning issues like inequality, justice and fair transition are not overly looked at by the Council.

The analysis shows the council has a technical approach towards climate change. It continues to rely on market-based solutions while also recognizing the rise of the green discourse. The introduction of green deal and new tools like climate finance signifies that the Council has been following the path that has been drawn for them by the European Commission and the European Council. The analysis demonstrates that "green" has come into the agenda of the Council following the introduction of the European Green Deal in 2019. Another important point is that purple codes of inequality and fair transition increased their intensity following the introduction of the EGD. Consequently, the council, as being the executive branch of the EU, is working for these new rules and regulations of green transition, that has been set by the Commission and European Council to be implemented in the every-day practices of the European citizens.

- **The ERT**

My analysis of the data group of the European Round Table shows that the European "capital" is standing strongly with the notion of "competitiveness" via the climate change and green transition. For ERT the main pillar for any discussion regarding the climate change is "competitiveness" in addition to "innovation", "sustainability", "carbon tax" and "circular economy". What I believe is significant for understanding the position of European capital with regards to the green transition is that the ERT could be the most enthusiastic actor for the revitalization of European single market through the introduction of green agenda since they perceive it is vital for remedying the EU's decreasing competitiveness in the global economy. Additionally, while the green codes are following the blue codes as the second most coded color, the purple codes do not seem to be an important issue for the European capital. The lack of purple

codes is for the European capital that issues like degrowth, inequality, justice and fair transition are not on the agenda of European industrialists.

- **ETUC**

The code map of the ETUC shows a rather interesting case following the previous data sets. Apart from the code of "climate change", the most frequent code is "just transition" which is a purple code, and it is the first time that a purple code is this high on the agenda. I also want to note that it is the first time that the code of "quality jobs" is coded high enough to be included on the map. Another important point for ETUC is that its code matris and code comparison tables are showing a much more balanced distribution of code groups (with only exception to low presence of yellow coded environmental framework). They share with other data sets their significant focus on the sustainability framework, but their agenda is definitely favoring purple coded issues of quality jobs, inequality and fair transition.

- **Green10**

What is most striking about the Green 10 is that it never uses "degrowth", "ecological justice", "climate justice", "climate debt" or "greenwashing". An organization which claims to be a "coalition of ten of the largest environmental organizations and networks active on the European level, working to ensure that the European Union protects the climate, the local environment, biodiversity and human health within and beyond its borders"[375] should be at least concerned with above mentioned issues. Apparently, climate change has no borders but the politics of it has and Green 10 is currently staying within these borders. Green10 is mostly concerned with green deal. It is also using discourses of environmental, sustainability and climate change framework, however the purple codes are nearly absent in the documents of Green10, except for the "inequality". This is also supported by the tables of code matris and code comparison, showing the dominance of "green deal" and "sustainability".

[375] *Home - Green 10*. (2023, February 10). Green 10. https://green10.org/

- **GREENS/EFA**

The EU has its own parliament which makes the citizens of the EU able to elect their EU-level representatives. I analyzed political positions of the Greens/EFA Group to grasp how they criticized and to what extent they managed to challenge the way the European Union handles the climate change and directs its green transition. The code map of the Greens/EFA shows that, apart from "climate change", the Greens are most concerned with the purple code of "just transition". Together with "inequality", "quality jobs", "ecological transition" and "socially fair transition", the document group of the Greens/EFA is the one with most coded via purple colored ecological politics framework. The Greens represents the only societal group who has more critical stance with green transition process of the EU. The comparison and code matris tables are providing the details of the Greens/EFA group's relationship with the climate change and green transition in Europe, and supporting the previous argument.

- **Public Opinion**

The most valuable part of my data set of public opinion polls could be that it covers a long period of 33 years. A lot of things have changed in the last 33 years, one of which is definitely climate perceptions. The code map of public opinion polls shows that apart from "climate change", the document groups is heavily coded with blue colored "energy efficiency", "resource efficiency" and "carbon emissions and carbon tax", yellow colored "loss of biodiversity", "nuclear waste" and "environmentally friendly solutions" and green colored "green product", "green market" and "green transition". These is no single purple code in the map. The code comparison table is showing that how the Europeans' attention changed from technical and scientific codes of environmental framework in 1990s to sustainability framework in 2010s and to green politics framework in the period of 2012 and 2022. These Eurobarometers definitely reflecting the zeitgeist their time because in 2010s sustainability has become the dominant notion in every aspect of the political economy. Similarly, the notion of green development emerged in the post-2008 global financial crisis and this table proves this transition. Furthermore, it can be seen that climate change has become

more and more dominant in the public discussion over the last decade. The code matris table also supports the previous arguments.

6.5. What my data shows: A Neo-Gramscian rethinking of the results

In the beginning of my thesis, I presented the theoretical foundations of my study. I explained that first developed by Antonio Gramsci and later developed by Neo-Gramscian prominent scholars like Robert Cox, Stephen Gill, Kees van der Pijl, Henk Overbeek, Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, Adam David Morton and Andreas Bieler, the analytical tools like hegemony, commonsense, historic bloc and *trasformismo* have provided the theoretical backbone of my thesis. Through my Neo-Gramscian analysis of the European Green Deal in the previous chapter, I argued that the European integration project has aimed to be the leading actor of green transformation of capitalism which re-adjusts the already existing web of interests and class antagonisms together with the ideas and norms that are formed around them.

Since in the previous chapters, I already explained how I adopt Neo-Gramscian arguments of *trasformismo* strategy to understand the EGD's becoming policy priority for the EU, here, in chapter 6, I will rethink what my data showed through Neo-Gramscian perspective and I will provide the examples of how the EU has been pursuing green *trasformismo* strategies to curb the radical potentials of the environmentalist social forces on the one hand, and to gain an hegemonic position over the newly ***greened*** global capitalist structure.

Here, I will underline that I perceive the whole European integration process as struggle between rival projects. As Van Apeldoorn puts it, European integration is an outcome of political, and potentially hegemonic, projects, which are neoliberal, neo-mercantilist and social-democratic Europe projects:[376]

- **Neo-liberal project**: the market-led, negative integration and close connection with globalization through the opening of the EU to the global economy and it

[376] Bieler, A. (2006). European Integration and Eastward Enlargement. In Global Restructuring, State, Capital and Labour (pp. 71-90). Palgrave Macmillan, London. Pp. 80.

was supported by big Transnational companies as the globalist fraction of European capital.

- **Neo-mercantilist project**: supported mainly by transnational European firms as the Europeanist fraction of European capital, argued for bigger and deeper European market and protection against outside players.
- **Social democratic project**: supported by social democrats and trade unions to re-regulate the market and regain some control over capital lost at the national level.

Van Apeldoorn argued that ultimately the hegemonic struggle between these three rival projects resulted in a comprise, which he defines as 'embedded neoliberalism' since it was inherently neoliberal, but it also comprised some elements from neo-mercantilist and social democratic Europe projects to gain the consent from other societal groups.[377]

While I am absorbing, re-thinking and making sense the data I have presented above, I used the categories Van Apeldoorn put together to understand the complicated process of European integration as my main analytical categories for analytically group different social forces, like European capital or European labor, different institutions like European Commission of European Parliament and different governmental positions of member states.

Following the Neo-Gramscian theoretical tradition, I have analyzed European capital (ERT), European labor (ETUC), European environmental NGOs (Green10), European Greens (Greens/EFA) in the Parliament and the European citizens (Eurobarometers), themselves in addition to leading ruling institutions of the EU: European Commission, European Council and the Council of the EU. I will rethink my data from Neo-Gramscian perspective in 6 points.

[377] Van Apeldoorn, B. (2001). The struggle over European order: Transnational class agency in the making of 'embedded neo-liberalism'. In *Social forces in the making of the New Europe: The restructuring of European social relations in the global political economy* (pp. 70-89). London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. P. 82.

6.5.1. The ERT has still important 'Europeanist' views

As Van Apeldoorn argued that ERT was the means of 'embedded neoliberalism' for the development of the European unification project, it is still influential for the future transformation of the EU, which is in line with green capitalism. Although, for Van Apeldoorn ERT, "after an early walk-out of three 'globalist' members (the British CEOs of Unilever, Shell, and ICI), became dominated by representatives of the Europeanist fraction" [378], eventually it became the leading actor of neoliberalization of the EU through embedded neoliberalism.

My analysis showed me that despite the heavy neoliberalization that the EU has gone through immediately following the 2008 financial crisis (see chapter 5), the ERT still contains "Europeanist" notions or ideals for the future of the EU.




Figure 56. Source: ERT. (2022). European Competitiveness and Industry Benchmarking Report 2022.

[378] Van Apeldoorn, B. (2001). The struggle over European order: Transnational class agency in the making of 'embedded neo-liberalism'. In *Social forces in the making of the New Europe: The restructuring of European social relations in the global political economy* (pp. 70-89). London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. P. 78.

In 2022 ERT Benchmarking Report, the economic performance of the EU has been compared to the ones of the US and China. In a segment called "FROM LEADER TO LAGGARD", it is said that "Europe has lost 30% of global market share. European companies are being pushed out of the Fortune Global 500 by their Chinese peers, but the EU is holding its ground in exports and in high technology manufactured goods."[379]

In the same report, it is stated that while "Europe's industry has lost its global leadership position." and "Reversing the decline in labor productivity growth is a must.", ***"European companies are leading the green transition but need to become stronger."*** [380] The ERT, while acknowledging the 'problems' with current economic structure of the EU, also emphasized the strengths of the European model, which is green transition. It says:

> "European industry is a global leader in clean value creation. The EU has a perspective to successfully complete the green transition and ensure high living standards and sustainable growth for future generations. However, European (and especially EU) companies are often smaller than their American peers, limiting their ability to take advantage of the benefits of scale.
> • EU Green Deal needs to take place in a scale-up friendly environment. A more integrated Single Market with fewer barriers would enable European companies to thrive – allowing them to grow, export sustainability solutions and remain global market leaders.
> • Europe needs stronger incentives for companies to adopt technologies that produce goods and services sustainably.
> • Labelling and eco-design should promote the consumption of sustainable products and services – with a strong role for public-private cooperation." [381]

[379] ERT. (2022). European Competitiveness and Industry Benchmarking Report 2022. P. 5.

[380] ERT. (2022). European Competitiveness and Industry Benchmarking Report 2022. P. 11,12 &14.

[381] ERT. (2022). European Competitiveness and Industry Benchmarking Report 2022. P. 14.

Firstly, I would like to underline the fact that ERT is taking the EU as a unified socio-political and economic entity (rather than taking the EU-origin companies individually) and then compare it with other two leading capitalist powers, the US and China.

Secondly, while underlining the loss of competitiveness of the European companies vis-à-vis their Chinese and American counterparts as the vital problem for strength of not only the economy of the EU but also for the whole institution of the EU. For instance, in a 2027 report, ERT states that:

> "Income inequality remains high and has even risen in the EU and the euro area since the financial crisis. Europe is also creating relatively few mid-level jobs. However, the EU average is lower than in the US. Income inequality has been linked to the rise in populism. [382]

What can be inferred from the passage is that income inequality is a problem for the 'health' of economy since it entails the dangers of giving rise to more radical political parties, which criticizes the class nature of the EU and it can also trigger social galvanism or disorder, which disrupts the economic activities.

ERT has always been an enthusiastic supporter of the widening and deepening of the EU. Both admission of new members and strengthening the integration through opening more and more areas of policy between the members are desirable for the European capital. Indeed, being able to compete with the size of American capital and its sheer size, ERT supported any decision to widen and deepen the EU common market.

The ***green*** transition fits the agenda of the European capital in various respects. First, it would mean technological leap for both private and public sector in the EU, which is believed to create increase in productivity. For European capital, it is not possible to compete with Chinese counterparts via suppressing labor and thus increasing productivity because despite five-decade long neoliberalization, labor is still more

[382] ERT. (2017). European Competitiveness and Industry Benchmarking Report 2017. P. 38.

powerful than anywhere else. Thus, capital relies more on the technological development and innovation to increase productivity in Europe. Secondly, as I said above, ERT has always supported widening and deepening of the EU, thus green transition would bring ***green integration*** for the future of the EU. Through introducing new rules and regulations, possibly establishing new institutions or institutional mechanisms, ***greening*** the EU would definitely create certain *spill-over* effects in the future. Third, the EU would benefit from the hegemonic position over its competitors as the first actor to complete ***its green transition***. The hegemony over the global green capitalism would provide the EU necessary means to re-arrange global structure of green capitalism in such a way that its leading position would not be challenged but instead be secured in the future. Forth, ***green transition*** would meet demands of public for climate change mitigation. By doing so, any future possible public unrest would also be eliminated by adopting the discourses of environmental NGOs, activists, and scientific community.

6.5.2. The European labor is still powerful despite five-decade long Neoliberalization

In 2010, ETUC declared its "Resolution on a Sustainable New Deal for Europe", where it argued that:[383]

- "**The EU must adopt A Sustainable New Deal**, underpinned by a development strategy to secure Europe's recovery from recession, to adopt a **just transition,** to create millions of decent, **sustainable and green jobs**, and to make a fair and effective contribution to the global fight against climate change."
- "The financial crisis plunged Europe into the worst situation it has ever known since the 1930s: 23 million unemployed in Europe, millions of European citizens made vulnerable and insecure, and growing social tension across the continent. The center of gravity of global economic activity has also shifted

[383] ETUC. (2010). Resolution on a Sustainable New Deal for Europe and towards Cancun. https://www.etuc.org/en/document/resolution-sustainable-new-deal-europe-and-towards-cancun

outside of Europe and climate change – together with environmental damage in general - is worsening social inequalities between and within the different regions of the world."

- "The ETUC is concerned that austerity measures will lead Europe into recession and result in even more unemployment, deep cuts in salaries and pensions, insecure working conditions for young people and other workers, poverty, social exclusion and social inequalities. **It is also alarmed that recorded reductions in greenhouse gases emissions – resulting largely from the economic crisis rather than climate policies - together with austerity measures will delay and complicate the investments needed to bring about the transition to a low-carbon economy**."
- "For the ETUC, it is possible to build a more social Europe, a Europe of solidarity that offers its citizens access to quality jobs, stable jobs, training for all, the guarantee of decent pay, strong social protection as a guarantee of social cohesion and solidarity, protection of purchasing power, the guarantee of better pensions, and quality public and social services available to all; a Europe based on solidarity contributing to the respect for human and labor rights globally, through the prioritization of these rights and social conditions in all treaties, agreements and institutions and **by promoting an integrated sustainable development approach** in all international decision-making processes."
- "Europe must adopt an integrated **sustainable development** approach and put in place a development strategy that establishes the conditions for **sustainable growth**, namely concerted **green growth** that contributes to the creation and maintenance of **quality jobs** and social progress throughout the economy, because all jobs are concerned."

In this declaration, it can be clearly seen that ETUC has been concerned with the austerity measures taken in Europe following the 2008 global financial crisis and 2010 Eurozone debt crisis. As it is expected from an organization representing workers in the EU, ETUC stood against rising unemployment, cuts in social expenditures (salaries, pensions, public spending for health and education) and insecure working conditions, all which would eventually lead and deepen social inequalities within the

EU. More importantly, in 2020, ETUC promoted the notions of low-carbon economy, just transition, sustainable growth, green growth and quality jobs in the aftermath of economic crisis. In their discourse, ETUC tied the efforts to overcome economic crisis to the efforts to mitigate climate crisis, which would draw the framework of their position vis-à-vis the EGD. What I would like to emphasize is that ETUC used the atmosphere of climate change to better the conditions of working class in the EU via incorporating **just transition**, **sustainable and green jobs and green growth** into their official discourse.

In 2013, ETUC was concerned with reconciling the green vision of the EU and youth unemployment since the **greening** of the European economy entails changes in the labour market, in terms of types of jobs and skills required.[384] In 2015, ETUC urged the EU to achieve the decarbonization objectives of the European economy while ensuring a **just transition** for all workers without undermining quality of life or generating windfall profit and the EU must create a **Just Transition Fund** to support workers which would be negatively impacted by the transition to a low-carbon economy.[385] In 2019, eight months before the adoption of the EGD, ETUC demanded from the EU not only leadership on climate action as well as in building a just transition for workers and in ensuring access to clean energy so that **no one is left behind** on the way towards a zero-net emissions economy.[386]

Here, I underline ETUC's demand of the establishment of a just transition fund and I especially their discourse of "no one is left behind", because it was later officially adopted by the European Commission during the declaration of the European Green Deal.

[384] ETUC. (2013). Anticipating the transition: engaging young workers today to reach 2050 goals: analytical report. https://www.etuc.org/sites/default/files/Analytical_report_07-08_kst_ed_SGFINALVERSION_1.pdf

[385] ETUC. (2015). ETUC position on the structural reform of the EU Emissions Trading System https://www.etuc.org/sites/default/files/document/files/etuc_position_ets_en.docx_1.pdf

[386] ETUC. (2019). ETUC Position Key demands to build a Just Transition and boost climate action after the EU elections https://www.etuc.org/en/document/etuc-position-key-demands-build-just-transition-and-boost-climate-action-after-eu

In 2023, ETUC declared that: [387]

> "Trade unions all over Europe believe that the transition to climate neutrality is desirable but cannot succeed without workers being in the driving seat. The **climate policies adopted will affect jobs and increase prices**. To mitigate the labour and social consequences of the transition, we cannot let market actors define their strategies alone. The creation of **high-quality jobs** is needed to tackle social inequalities and convince workers that they and their communities will not be left behind. Failing to deliver this just transition would be politically explosive. We call on the leaders of the EU institutions and members states to deliver concrete measures that will make a just transition a reality."

From Neo-Gramscian perspective, it is important to note that labor unions, which are essentially left-wing oriented and more radical social force in the EU, **are co-opting in green *trasformismo*** of the EU. In their discourse, there is no systemic criticism or an alternative proposition to the growth-based model of capitalism. The European labor is becoming a part of the efforts of greening capitalism by demanding a just transition, employment of the funds to ensure job security and overall quality enhancement of the current employment conditions. Their consent is conditioned upon the meeting of these demands, the EU has managed to acquire their consent by incorporating this language into the legislation of the EGD. The future of these demands is yet to be determined since it would take long time to realize them.

6.5.3. The European NGOs choose to stay within the borders of the Europe

My analysis of the Green10, which is the coalition of ten of the largest environmental organizations and networks active on the European level, showed that these NGOs are taking a different position than other environmental NGOs operating in other parts of the world and significantly in the Global South. They are not questioning the very basis of environmental problems, which is the capitalist mode of production and

[387] ETUC. (2023). Fit for 55: Workers can't wait any longer for Just Transition rights https://www.etuc.org/en/pressrelease/fit-55-workers-cant-wait-any-longer-just-transition-rights

consumption but instead they are **co-opting in the process of green *trasformismo*** in Europe.

Environmental activism in global south is more concerned with capitalist extractivism and its results in climate injustices, therefore they keep the discourses of degrowth", "ecological justice", "climate justice", "climate debt" or "greenwashing" within the conversation. However, Green10, while operating in Europe, is turning blind eye to environmental crimes of European capital. Instead, they adopt the dominant discourse and co-opting in the green transition of the EU.

What can be seen as the only critical stance of them against the European Green Deal, is their rejection of the "One in, one out" principle. In 2019, during her election process, von der Leyen announced that the commission under her presidency will apply the "one in, one out" principle whereby each legislative proposal creating new burdens should relieve people and business of an equivalent existing burden at EU level in the same policy area.[388] However Green10 rejected this principle since:

> "The need for new protections does not imply that existing protections should be discarded. Yet, the logic of the "One in, one out" principle seems to imply that in order to address emerging threats, citizens would cease to be protected from existing threats such as toxic chemicals, habitat destruction or air pollution."[389]

Although, the EU adopted this principle, it is still important that Green10 declared its negative opinion through public letters. This stance is by no means making Green10 a critique of the EU's green transformation process, but only underline how they pick their specific fights in the process of this co-optation.

[388] European Commission. (2019) The Working Methods of the von der Leyen Commission: Striving for more at home and in the world. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/es/ip_19_6657

[389] Green 10. (2019). Why the European Parliament should reject the Commission proposed "One in, one out" principle and call instead for sustainability screening of all new initiatives. https://green10.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Green-10-reaction-on-_one-in-one-out_-principle_13-Sept-2019.pdf

6.5.4. The Greens in the EP are the most critical social force when it comes to the green transition of the EU

My analysis of the Greens in the European Parliament has led me to infer that Greens are the one group, which is ***least co-opting*** in the process green trasformismo in Europe in comparison to other social forces. For instance, as soon as the EGD was adopted, Greens announced that it was "a welcome and necessary step but now we need to see real action European Green Deal"[390] In the parliamentary voting of the EGD, Bas Eickhout MEP, Vice-Chair of the Environment Committee and Greens/EFA negotiator on the resolution, commented that: [391]

> "A real Green Deal needs to encompass much more than only climate and environmental protection; it must be a tool for a true social transformation that tackles inequality. The Green Deal will only succeed if the EU and its Member States ensure that the economic system leads to equal opportunities and adequate social security for all, rather than greater wealth for the few."

Although Greens praised the EGD as a step in the right direction, they kept a critical eye over its realization process. Greens are also more invested in social results of the EGD and demand establishment of an economic system that would eliminate inequalities and injustices within current structure.

Their emphasis on the "just transition", "inequality", "quality jobs", "ecological transition" and "socially fair transition", makes them the only societal group who has more critical stance with green transition process of the EU. Still, they are **co-opting in green *trasformismo*** of the EU as they do not help the capitalist mode of production and consumption accountable as the real culprit of the environmental degradation,

[390] The Greens/EFA. (2019). A welcome and necessary step but now we need to see real action European Green Deal. https://www.greens-efa.eu/en/article/press/la-crise-climatique-exige-des-actions-immediates-et-un-nouveau-modele-de-developpement

[391] The Greens/EFA. (2020). Parliament calls for more ambition in green transition European Green Deal. https://www.greens-efa.eu/en/article/press/parliament-calls-for-more-ambition-in-green-transition

climate crisis and heavy social reflections of climate change over the most vulnerable groups of the world.

6.5.5. The EU Public is getting more and more informed about the climate change

It is important to note that my data coming from the public opinion polls of the EU is limited in the sense it only shows answers of close-ended questions, where participant are required to choose from already defined list of answers. This approach does not give any space to the participants for them to reflect their individual contributions. In other words, we have the data of what European Commission to ask to European citizens.

Still, it is interesting to observe increasing attention given to the environmental problems, citizens' rising anxiety about the climate change and their growing activism with varying degrees.

Since I could not measure the change in individual discourse through the public opinion polls, I could not comment on the co-optation of European citizens into the green trasformismo of the EU.

However, this data has shed light on the direction of the European Commission's attention regarding the climate change. The EC is more invested than ever into the issue of climate change than ever (my data set of public opinion polls covers a long period of 33 years).

Although I am aware that it is the structure of questions that limits the individual contributions of the European citizens, I can also speculate that the EU did not desire to involve citizens in the ***green trasformismo***, nor did it ask for their suggestions.

From Neo-Gramscian approach, this fits into the strategy of trasformismo since popular participation is not only something undesirable but also something to be avoid ensuring restrictive hegemony of the dominant ideology. It can be far-fetched argument about the public opinion polls in the EU, but it makes sense from Neo-Gramscian theoretical perspective.

6.5.6. Depoliticization and technocratization have been consequential for the Green *Trasformismo*

In chapter 4, I analyzed the rise of ***green*** in Europe and I argued that currently there is ***green race*** taking place between the US, China and the EU and this process should be viewed as a struggle to be the emergent hegemon of ***greened*** global capitalist structure. My analysis of data I presented above has provided empirical evidence in favor of this argument. First, the notion of EU's leading the process of green transition globally is present in the legislation of EGD. Secondly, from the analysis of ERT, climate change politics are clearly defined within the competition between the EU, the US and China. From Neo-Gramscian perspective, there is currently a hegemonic struggle between different actors. Global political economy is on the verge of the emergence of a new historic bloc, organized around the Indeed, climate leadership of the EU should be seen as a rising new hegemon of the global green capitalism.

My analysis also confirmed my arguments on "green growth becoming the hegemonic idea of capitalism" since all different social forces integrate **market-based solutions to climate change** into their discourse and demands. As it can be seen in code maps, blue codes are in the absolute majority. From this data result, I would like to underline Open Marxism's contributions to the critical approaches to IR&IPE.

Quoting to Peter Burnham's arguments on depoliticization and technocratization, in chapter 2, I argued that depoliticization of climate crisis was only made possible superficial separation of economics and politics. As a continuation of separating and ignoring the very reasons of climate crisis stemming from the capitalist system itself, the depoliticized framing of climate change as a technical and scientific puzzle to be solved through innovation is extremely political.

My analysis provided empirical evidence to Burnham's argument. Data shows that climate change politics has evolved in time from simply technical issues to politics of sustainability, which I categorized as sustainable and market-based solutions framework, and more recently transitioned into the green politics framework. Up until the 2010s, the EU has used "environmental framework" which involves a much technical and scientific language to govern the issue.

Following the 2008 financial crisis, the global structure of capitalism has traded its traditional environmental parameters for new and green notions of development, growth, finance, production etc. It is no coincidence that first green codes appear after 2008 in this different document sets. The 2008 financial crisis made it necessary to "fix" capitalism in order to prevent its demise. The crisis has brought about its own opportunities for global capitalist elite to re-design the rules and the regulations of global capitalism. Minimizing the environmentally destructive results of capitalist production and consumption without essentially changing or even challenging the very nature of capitalism which is based on the notion of "infinite growth on a finite planet". These market-based solutions proposed by various actors are actually the means of protecting existing capitalist web of interests, all of which are veiled through the use of scientific and technocratic language.

Following the depoliticization of climate change, technocratization was also instrumentalized to exclude masses from the discussion of alternative options and overall decision-making processes. I use the processes of depoliticization and technocratization as analytical tools to understand transformative role of climate change politics. As I explained above, I apply the strategy of trasformismo into my analysis of the EGD and I claim that the processes of depoliticization and technocratization become an important part of the deliberate strategy of trasformismo to prevent popular participation. Mouffe wrote that:

> depoliticization operates by drawing political frontiers while simultaneously denying their political character. Those excluded from these politically drawn boundaries are not considered as legitimate political adversaries. Rather, they are considered ignorant, uneducated, unmodern, and irrelevant.[392]

I argue that in the process of technocratic governance of the climate crisis, *societal discussion is not only seen as unnecessary but also as undesirable*. Because of this, de-politicization itself is extremely political. That is why, my empirical evidence of how climate change politics have been depoliticized and technocratized through the spread of sustainable and market-based solutions is important to understand the EGD's

[392] Mouffe, Chantal (2005). On the political. New York: Routledge.

becoming policy priority in the EU within the long-term process of ***green trasformismo*** of capitalism.

6.5.7. The three rival projects for the EU have been blended in the EGD

Here I would like to emphasize, once again Van Apeldoorn's three-rival-project for the European integration process. My analysis confirmed that the EU is still a terrain of struggle between rival projects and the EGD has become the latest playing field. Below, I will explain how the EGD is neoliberal, neo-mercantilist and social democratic, all at once.

6.5.7.1. The EGD is predominantly Neoliberal

The EGD is predominantly Neoliberal. It adopts market-based solutions to climate crisis, and it projects the solutions to the current environmental problems to be solved via technological developments and innovations. As it can be seen, my data is heavily coded with blue colored sustainable and market-based solution framework. The code of "competitiveness" is present in almost every single document, and it has an undefeatable presence in the data. As I explained above, the EGD aims to increase competitiveness of the EU with respect to other prominent actors, the US and China. The EGD does not question the capitalist mode of production and consumption as the real culprit of the climate crisis. The EGD is based the hegemonic notion of ***green growth*** with makes it impossible to question the myth of growth within capitalism. Thus, it does not look for alternatives such as de-growth to mitigate climate crisis.

6.5.7.2. The EGD is comprising Neo-Mercantilist features

The EGD is Neo-Mercantilist. It adopts the position of European capital-owners, who demanded necessary EU-level policies, regulations and arrangements to increase the competitiveness of European companies, to stop the trend of decreasing productivity in Europe. In the sub-section where I rethink what the data of ERT shows from Neo-Gramscian perspective, I explained that the EGD is actually very in line with the position of the ERT. Through the EGD, European capital is able to increase productivity since ***green transition*** encourages innovation and technological

development. Moreover, with the eventual ***green integration*** of products, services, peoples, nations and markets, European capital would have wider and better integrated European market, which is also desirable development to compete with their American and Chinese counterparts.

6.5.7.3. The EGD is also slightly Social-Democratic

The EGD is also Social-Democratic. It is supported by social democrats and trade unions to re-regulate the market and regain some control over capital lost at the national level. In the sub-section where I rethink what the data of ETUC shows from Neo-Gramscian perspective, I explained that the EGD is influenced by the demands of European labor. Following the 2008 global financial crisis and 2010 Eurozone debt crisis, ETUC tied the efforts to overcome economic crisis to the efforts to mitigate climate crisis, and used the atmosphere of climate change to better the conditions of working class in the EU through ***just transition***, ***sustainable and green jobs and green growth***. While supporting the green transition of the EU, the European labor demanded some mechanisms to be established to protect those who would be negatively impacted by the transition to a low-carbon economy. Today, the European Commission is adopted ***Just Transition Fund*** to support member states whose economies still rely on carbon-intensive sectors and workers who earn their livelihoods in those sectors. The slogan of "no one is left behind" shows the social-democratic side of the EGD.

6.6. Conclusion

In this chapter, I qualitatively analyzed 2 large data groups, including 9 data sets of 968 individual documents. Through my analysis, I searched for the answers of my research question: Why and how did the EGD become the policy priority in the EU?"

- ***Why?***

To answer the first part of my research question, I analyze The European Commission communications, European Council conclusions and European Commission white papers. In total, I studied 716 document covering the last three decades of the EU.

I demonstrated my codebook and showed how my codes have places with different intensities in different documents. For each document set, I provided a document map showing the most dominant codes. Then I used MAXQDA code comparison tool, to show how different code groups (all of which has their own code group color) are present in the large sets of documents. I applied another MAXQDA tool which is code matrix table to show which specific code is present in which specific document and with what intensity. I also added for images of document portraits showing which codes have how much space in the specific individual documents in the appendices. All of these analytical tools will provide me with the necessary means to show the specificities of the EU's green transformation process.

My answer for "why did the EGD become the policy priority of the EU?" has its roots in this qualitative content analysis of the European Commission communications, European Council conclusions and European Commission white papers. Historically, the European Commission discussed climate change from "sustainability and market-based solutions" framework. Up until the 2010s, the EU has used "environmental framework" which involves a much technical and scientific language to govern the issue. Following the 2008 financial crisis, the global structure of capitalism has traded its traditional environmental parameters for new and green notions of development, growth, finance, production etc. It is no coincidence that first green codes appear after 2008 in this different document sets. The 2008 financial crisis made it necessary to "fix" capitalism in order to prevent its demise. The crisis has brought about its own opportunities for global capitalist elite to re-design the rules and the regulations of global capitalism. Minimizing the environmentally destructive results of capitalist production and consumption without essentially changing or even challenging the very nature of capitalism which is based on the notion of "infinite growth on a finite planet". It is evident in my analysis that not once is mentioned degrowth while discussing the environmental problems and possible end of the world. The EU, as the leading actor of the western capitalist system, adopts these green capitalist solutions over any other alternative solutions like the idea of degrowth because its main aim is to "fix" capitalism by introducing green growth by decoupling GDP from resource use, rather than solely saving the planet.

- ***How?***

To answer the second part of my research question, I analyzed the documents under data group 2, which are the Council of the European Union; the European Round Table for Industry (ERT); the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC); Green10 (group of environmental NGOs); the Greens/EFA group; public opinion polls of the EU (Eurobarometer). In this section, I analyzed 252 documents and visualized the results with MAXQDA tools of document maps, code comparison tables and code matrix tables. I also added for images of document portraits showing which codes have how much space in the specific individual documents in the appendices.

I analyzed how different groups gave the consent to or resisted the EU's newly acquired role as the savior of planet earth, which will eventually lead to the European Green Deal. To understand the member states' position, I used the conclusions of the Council of the European Union. I looked at what the European Round Table for Industry (ERT) have said about ***the climate change*** in order to place the interests of the European capital when it comes to the green transition. On the opposite side, I studied how The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) as the voice of workers and represents 45 million members in the EU re-defines its agenda in line with the climate crisis. For the NGO side of the environmental discussion, I analyzed what The Green 10, which is a coalition of ten of the largest environmental organizations and networks active on the European level, says and does with respect to the EU's new direction towards ***green future***. The EU has its own parliament which makes the citizens of the EU able to elect their EU-level representatives. I analyzed political positions of the Greens/EFA Group to grasp how they criticized and to what extent they managed to challenge the way the European Union handles the matter. Lastly, I studied the public opinion polls to see how the European public perceived ***climate change*** and its ***green*** remedies.

My analysis showed that the council continues to rely on market-based solutions while also recognizing the rise of the green discourse. The introduction of green deal and new tools like climate finance signifies that the Council has been following the path that has been drawn for them by the European Commission and the European Council.

The analysis demonstrates that ***green*** has come into the agenda of the Council following the introduction of the European Green Deal in 2019. Another important point is that purple codes of inequality and fair transition increased their intensity following the introduction of the EGD. Consequently, the council, as being the executive branch of the EU, is working for these new rules and regulations of green transition, that has been set by the Commission and European Council to be implemented in the every-day practices of the European citizens.

For the European Capital, the main pillar for any discussion regarding the climate change is ***competitiveness*** in addition to ***innovation***, ***sustainability***, ***carbon tax*** and "circular economy". What I believe is significant for understanding the position of European capital with regards to the green transition is that the ERT could be the most enthusiastic actor for the revitalization of European single market through the introduction of green agenda since they perceive it is vital for remedying the EU's decreasing competitiveness in the global economy. Additionally, while the green codes are following the blue codes as the second most coded color, the purple codes do not seem to be an important issue for the European capital. The lack of purple codes for the European capital shows that issues like ***degrowth, inequality, justice and fair transition*** are not on the agenda of European industrialists.

For the European labor, the most important issue seems to be "just transition" which is a purple code and it is the first time that a purple code is this high on the agenda. It is also the first time that the code of "quality jobs" is coded high enough to be included on the map. Another important point for ETUC is that its code matrix and code comparison tables are showing a much more balanced distribution of code groups (with only exception to low presence of yellow coded environmental framework). They share with other data sets their significant focus on the sustainability framework, but their agenda is definitely favoring purple coded issues of quality jobs, inequality and fair transition.

What is most striking about the Green 10 is that it never uses "degrowth", "ecological justice", "climate justice", "climate debt" or "greenwashing". An organization which claims to be a "coalition of ten of the largest environmental organizations and networks

active on the European level, working to ensure that the European Union protects the climate, the local environment, biodiversity and human health within and beyond its borders"[393] should be at least concerned with above mentioned issues. Apparently, climate change has no borders but the politics of it has and Green 10 is currently staying within these borders. Green10 is mostly concerned with green deal. It is also using discourses of environmental, sustainability and climate change framework, however the purple codes are nearly absent in the documents of Green10, except for the "inequality".

The EU has its own parliament which makes the citizens of the EU able to elect their EU-level representatives. The positions of the Greens/EFA Group towards the EU's environmental governance, climate change and green transition, can be seen in the code map of the Greens/EFA. Apart from "climate change", the Greens are most concerned with the purple code of "just transition". Together with "inequality", "quality jobs", "ecological transition" and "socially fair transition", the document group of the Greens/EFA is the one with most coded via purple colored ecological politics framework. The Greens represents the only societal group who has more critical stance with green transition process of the EU.

The most valuable part of my data set of public opinion polls could be that it covers a long period of 33 years. The code map of public opinion polls shows that apart from "climate change", the document groups is heavily coded with blue colored "energy efficiency", "resource efficiency" and "carbon emissions and carbon tax", yellow colored "loss of biodiversity", "nuclear waste" and "environmentally friendly solutions" and green colored "green product", "green market" and "green transition". These is no single purple code in the map. The code comparison table is showing that how the Europeans' attention changed from technical and scientific codes of environmental framework in 1990s to sustainability framework in 2010s and to green politics framework in the period of 2012 and 2022. These Eurobarometers definitely reflecting the zeitgeist their time because in 2010s sustainability has become the dominant notion in every aspect of the political economy. Similarly, the notion of

[393] *Home - Green 10*. (2023, February 10). Green 10. https://green10.org/

green development emerged in the post-2008 global financial crisis and this table proves this transition. Furthermore, it can be seen that climate change has become more and more dominant in the public discussion over the last decade. The code matrix table also supports the previous arguments.

My answer for "how did the EGD become the policy priority of the EU?" has its roots in this qualitative content analysis of document groups of Council of the European Union (2015-2023), European Round Table for Industry (ERT) (2017-2023), The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) (2011-2023), Green10 (2019-2023), Greens/EFA in the European Parliament (2008-2023), and Public Opinion Polls of the EU (1990-2023).

My analysis shows that green capitalism has managed to establish its hegemony over different groups and made them discuss the issue of the climate change within the parameters drawn by the dominant capitalist ideology. It is no coincidence that first usages of green development emerged in the post-2008 financial crisis. The capitalism needed a new vision, which is found in the strategy of *greening* capitalist production and consumption as much as possible without dramatically challenge the existing web of class interests. Once the consent of subordinate groups has been taken under the looming presence of climate crisis, then started with the re-designing global political economy in line with the new vision. The EU has stepped up its game, in this matter, and has become the leader of the global efforts against climate crisis.

Naturally every transformation creates its own winners and losers, almost every societal group has joined the conversation with hopes to re-direct new rules and regulations in their favor. The ERT, for instance, has emerged as the most enthusiastic supporter of the EU's new quest of green transition. Because European industrialists have been long complaining about their decreasing competitiveness with respect to China. Now, with green transition, they have found new means to make European products and services the most competitive in the global capitalist structure. Similarly, the ETUC is adopting the EU's new path but demanding more quality jobs for themselves and public support to make the transition process "fair". Green10 is also supporting EU's new rules and regulations however does not concern itself global

injustices and reparations of western capitalism. Not once, they use “degrowth” or “climate debt”. Greens/EFA group in the parliament is the most one concerned with societal consequences of green transition. They demand socially and ecologically fair transition for all. However, they also fell short for arguing or fighting for a more radical change like degrowth movement. The European public has a growing concern and interest in the matters of climate change. The analysis show that the Europeans’ attention changed from technical and scientific codes of environmental framework in 1990s to sustainability framework in 2010s and to green politics framework in the period of 2012 and 2022. It is also worth noting that not a single question has been asked to public regarding a more radical action, which could open new channels for alternative solutions to capitalist production and consumption system.

My analysis shows that the EGD is, in fact, a case of green trasformismo of capitalism, re-branding the existing capitalist contradictions as new and technological solutions which are vital for a sustainable and green future. I operationalize these different actors or societal groups’ positions with respect to the European Green Deal as concrete examples of the strategy of trasformismo.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I tried to how and why the European Green Deal has become the policy priority of the European Union from the perspective of European integration process. I started with Von Der Leyen's famous introduction of the EGD as "*This is Europe's 'man on the moon' moment*"[394] and I explained how I perceive and problematize the emergence of the EGD as a step towards ***greening*** the global capitalist structure.
My thesis builds on, develops, and expands from the Neo-Gramscian arguments on "the green *trasformismo* of capitalism" within the relevant IR debates. I firstly show how "greening" has been made the new *raison d'état* of contemporary political economy after the 2000s by the insistent struggles of environmental movements, in other words, how the green ideas and green norms have now become the inevitable dimensions of globalization as a response to the urgent climate crisis. Then, through the qualitative content analysis of the EGD, I claim that the EU has been pursuing green *trasformismo* strategies to curb the radical potentials of the environmentalist social forces on the one hand, and to gain a hegemonic position over the newly ***greened*** global capitalist structure.

The EU's identification of environmental problems as the core issue of policy making and adoption of the EGD in 2019 to ensure a green transformation of the interrelated socio-economic and political relations, which aims eventually to ensure a "green integration" of the EU member states, have led me to re-consider the established European integration theories and revisit their main assumptions in relation to this

[394] The European Commission. (2019, Dec 11). Press remarks by President von der Leyen on the occasion of the adoption of the European Green Deal Communication https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_19_6749

historical development. The questions of how and why the European Green Deal has become the center of policymaking in the EU has been tried to be answered from different theoretical perspectives. There are various forms of understanding and modes of conceptualizing when it comes to subject matter of the European Green Deal. I analyzed the mainstream European integration theories which are neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism and social constructivism, by pointing out the fundamentals of their theoretical positions, their strengths and limitations in order to understand their different perceptions of the EGD and the *green* turn in the EU. Although there are important points made by each theoretical tradition, I did not find either of them having the necessary theoretical dept and scholarly will to uncover the veiled class conflicts and continuing hegemonic struggle of alternative European projects (adopting Van Apeldoorn's neoliberal, mercantilist and social Europe projects) all of which residing with the EGD.

What I tried to do in this thesis was to understand why and how the project of the EGD has come to be the priority concern within the always-conflictual European integration process without falling into the traps of functionalism, statism and idealism. That is why, I adopted what Robert Cox names as critical theory to identify and criticize the set of social circumstances of European integration and demonstrate how they came to exist so that it could be possible to contest the current setting of social reality. And for the theoretical foundation of my thesis, I adopted the methodological critiques developed by Marxist approaches, namely Open Marxism and Neo-Gramscianism, against mainstream European integration perspectives in order to reach at some useful analytical concepts capable of analyzing the complexity of social reality in a non-reductionist way.

From this critical perspective, I approach the European integration project as a political, and potentially hegemonic, project – or sometimes more accurately defined as the outcome of a struggle between rival projects.[395] Van Apeldoorn's three-party model of rival projects (the neoliberal project, the neo-mercantilist project and the

[395] Van Apeldoorn, B. (2003). *Transnational capitalism and the struggle over European integration*. Routledge.

social democratic project) for the development of the European integration process has provided me with the necessary analytical tools to separate and then group different social forces within the EU regarding the European Green Deal.

I used these categories for analytically group different social forces, like European capital or European labor, different institutions like European Commission of European Parliament and different governmental positions of member states. And I showed how some groups are more inclined to the further liberalization of the European integration project and increasing its competitiveness while some are anxious for the future costs of European Green Deal on the European producers and demand for EU-level protection, and also while some are enthusiastic for the establishment of green and just Europe through the EGD.

I made a critical and empirical analysis of the European Green Deal in line with the global hegemony conceptualization of the neo-Gramscian approach to IR. I analyze why the EU is so eager to embark on a mission that comes with various problems from various fields, considering the intra-EU conflicts both at national and sub-national levels, the conflicts among developed capitalist countries as well as between the developed and the less-developed ones. For a detailed and well-grounded analysis, I divide my research question into two parts as: Why did the EGD become policy priority of the EU; and How did the EGD become policy priority of the EU.

Firstly, I studied the 'why' part of my research question where I located the EGD within the global restructuring of capitalist relations in line with green capitalism. I looked at the EU's developing interest in the matter of 'climate change' and its following ambition to mitigate the current climate crisis. To answer the first part of my research question, I analyzed 500 communications of the European Commission between 1991 and 2023 that contain the issue of 'climate change'. In an effort to create 'triangulation', I also examined European Commission white papers and European Council conclusions to better locate the EU's increasing attention to 'climate change'. Thus, my data for the first half of my analysis are threefold: European Commission Communications (1991-2023), European Commission White Papers (1985-2020) and European Council Conclusions (1992-2023).

Secondly, I focus on the 'how' part to understand the processes through which the EU adopt the EGD. To start with the 'how' question, I chose the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement when the EU ascended to its global leadership position in climate change mitigation efforts. I analyze how other groups gave consent to or resisted the EU's newly acquired role as the savior of planet earth, which eventually led to the European Green Deal. I used 6 groups of sources, which are: Council of the European Union (2015-2023), European Round Table for Industry (ERT) (2017-2023), The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) (2011-2023), Green10 (2019-2023), Greens/EFA in the European Parliament (2008-2023) and Public Opinion Polls of the EU (1990-2023).

To understand the member states' position, I used the conclusions of the Council of the European Union. I looked at what the European Round Table for Industry (ERT) said about 'the climate change' in order to place the interests of the European capital when it comes to the green transition. On the opposite side, I studied how the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) as the voice of workers with 45 million members in the EU re-defines its agenda in line with the climate crisis. For the NGO side of the environmental discussion, I analyzed what the Green 10, which is a coalition of ten of the largest environmental organizations and networks active at the European level, says and does with respect to the EU's new direction towards 'green future'. The EU has its own parliament which makes the citizens of the EU able to elect their EU-level representatives. I analyzed political positions of the Greens/EFA Group to grasp how they criticize and to what extent they manage to challenge the way the European Union handles the matter. Lastly, I studied the public opinion polls to see how the European public perceives 'climate change' and its 'green' remedies.

I barrowed my analytical tools from Gramsci himself and I utilized them following the exemplified works of prominent Neo-Gramscian scholars on European integration process in the analysis of my case which is the European Green Deal.

- **The EU as the Integral State**

For my analysis of the European Green Deal, I took the European Union itself as an "integral state" in Neo-Gramscian theoretical sense. I argued that the EU has become

the terrain of cooperation and competition, as much as it is one of coercion and consent, with the European Commission as being the leading actor of this process.

- **Green Growth as the Commonsense of Contemporary Capitalism**

For my analysis of the European Green Deal, I define plural but interconnected commonsenses (*sensi comuni*, in the words of Gramsci).

- **Commonsense 1:** *Climate change is a serious problem, and we must act now!*
- **Commonsense 2:** *Growth is good and desirable. It is beneficial for producers and consumers, employers and workers. Recession is dangerous for wage-laborers since it inhabits potential lay-offs and rise in unemployment.*
- *So, how can we solve the problem of climate crisis without giving up growth?*

I argued that the notion ***green growth*** has emerged as dominant answer to this question of how to reconcile capitalism which is based on "infinite growth on a finite planet" and the looming climate catastrophe. I explained that by decoupling growth from carbon-based energy use (or using only renewable energy) by producing **green goods**, by promoting **green consumption**, it has been envisaged that not only the climate crisis can be solved but also through new production methods, it can work as a catalyzer for new and different economic growth.

- **Historic Bloc of Green Capitalism**

I borrow this term- the raison d'état, from Cox and argue that **green** now becoming the new raison d'état of contemporary political economy while green ideas and green norms are drawing the dimensions of globalization. In this framework, I used the notion of **green growth** as the hegemonic idea of contemporary capitalist class configuration, which provided the basis for an emergent historic bloc, all of its actors positioned behind this hegemonic idea.

- **Green *Trasformismo***

I argued that by suppressing any radical solutions or simply absorbing them into the mainstream ones, green capitalism has come to the verge of a passive revolution. **Green** has become the new face of capitalism where capitalism is no longer evil, but

it is enlightened and cares about creating socially and ecologically sustainable relations. Thus, the **green *trasformismo* of capitalism** has meant to save the existing web of interests by assimilating radical of counter-hegemonic alternatives which are either present or have to potential to emerge in the future.

My main argument for my dissertation is that the EGD is not only a new force to revitalize the European integration process but also the EU's attempt to regain its diminishing global competitiveness by transforming itself as the leader of this new green wave of global capitalism. Through the qualitative content analysis of different social forces' positions with regard to the European Green Deal, I claimed that the **green *trasformismo* of capitalism** is being instrumentalized to save European unification project, which is and has always been essentially a class project. By using Neo-Gramscian concepts, I argued that the environmental movements, NGOs, green parties and other societal groups demanding solutions to environmental problems are now **co-opting** in the **green *trasformismo* of capitalism** because the newly branded **green capitalism** has created its own hegemony by presenting the **new commonsense** as **green growth** and, more importantly, managing to gain consent from subordinate groups.

I designed my research through qualitative methods by using "directed qualitative content analysis". I used deductive coding in a computer-assisted qualitative data analysis (CAQDAS) software, which is called MAXQDA. Since I applied directed qualitative content analysis method, I deduced my codes from my critical reading of the EU's road to the **green capitalism,** which I explained in detail in my theoretical discussion in chapter 2, historical development of the global politics of **green capitalism** in chapter 3 and from my analysis of **the *trasformismo* of green capitalism** in Europe in chapter 4. With these codes, I analyzed the content of my sources in chapter 6 and provided a comprehensive understanding of the **green transition** of the EU.

I investigated the national, supranational and global contexts and inter-member conflicts and class antagonisms through which the EGD has developed. I try to find answers to my research question of "how and why the EGD has become the policy

priority of the European Union from the perspective of European integration process?" through my directed qualitative content analysis in MAXQDA.

After completing my qualitative content analysis of the EGD, I analyzed what my data showed, and I reconsidered the results from Neo-Gramscian perspective. While I am absorbing, re-thinking and making sense the data I have presented above, I used the categories Van Apeldoorn put together to understand the complicated process of European integration as my main analytical categories for analytically group different social forces, like European capital or European labor, different institutions like European Commission of European Parliament and different governmental positions of member states.

Following the Neo-Gramscian theoretical tradition, I have analyzed European capital (ERT), European labor (ETUC), European environmental NGOs (Green10), European Greens (Greens/EFA) in the Parliament and the European citizens (Eurobarometers), themselves in addition to leading ruling institutions of the EU: European Commission, European Council and the Council of the EU. I summarized my take on the results of my data from Neo-Gramscian perspective in 6 points.

- ✓ **The ERT has still important 'Europeanist' views**

As Van Apeldoorn argued that ERT was the means of "embedded neoliberalism" for the development of the European unification project, it is still influential for the future transformation of the EU, which is in line with green capitalism. My analysis showed me that despite the heavy neoliberalization that the EU has gone through immediately following the 2008 financial crisis (see chapter 5), the ERT still contains "Europeanist" notions or ideals for the future of the EU.

The **green** transition fit the agenda of the European capital in various respects. First, it would mean technological leap for both private and public sector in the EU, which is believed to create increase in productivity. For European capital, it is not possible to compete with Chinese counterparts via suppressing labor and thus increasing productivity because despite five-decade long neoliberalization, labor is still more powerful than anywhere else. Thus, capital relies more on the technological

development and innovation to increase productivity in Europe. Secondly, as I said above, ERT has always supported widening and deepening of the EU, thus green transition would bring **green integration** for the future of the EU. Through introducing new rules and regulations, possibly establishing new institutions or institutional mechanisms, **greening** the EU would definitely create certain *spill-over* effects in the future. Third, the EU would benefit from the hegemonic position over its competitors as the first actor to complete **its green transition**. The hegemony over the global green capitalism would provide the EU necessary means to re-arrange global structure of green capitalism in such a way that its leading position would not be challenged but instead be secured in the future. Forth, **green transition** would meet demands of public for climate change mitigation. By doing so, any future possible public unrest would also be eliminated by adopting the discourses of environmental NGOs, activists, and scientific community.

- ✓ **The European labor is still powerful despite five-decade long Neoliberalization**

My data showed that ETUC has been concerned with the austerity measures taken in Europe following the 2008 global financial crisis and 2010 Eurozone debt crisis. ETUC tied the efforts to overcome economic crisis to the efforts to mitigate climate crisis, which would draw the framework of their position vis-à-vis the EGD. In other words, ETUC used the atmosphere of climate change to better the conditions of working class in the EU via incorporating **just transition**, **sustainable** and **green jobs** and **green growth** into their official discourse.

From Neo-Gramscian perspective, it is important to note that labor unions, which are essentially left-wing oriented and more radical social force in the EU, **are co-opting in green *trasformismo*** of the EU. In their discourse, there is no systemic criticism or an alternative proposition to the growth-based model of capitalism. The European labor is becoming a part of the efforts of **greening capitalism** by demanding a **just transition,** employment of the funds to ensure **job security** and **overall quality enhancement of the current employment conditions**. Their consent is conditioned upon the meeting of these demands, the EU has managed to acquire their consent by

incorporating this language into the legislation of the EGD. The future of these demands is yet to be determined since it would take long time to realize them.

- ✓ **The European NGOs choose to stay within the borders of the Europe**

My analysis of the Green10, which is the coalition of ten of the largest environmental organizations and networks active on the European level, showed that these NGOs are taking a different position than other environmental NGOs operating in other parts of the world and significantly in the Global South. They are not questioning the very basis of environmental problems, which is the capitalist mode of production and consumption but instead they are **co-opting in the process of green *trasformismo*** in Europe.

Environmental activism in global south is more concerned with capitalist extractivism and its results in climate injustices, therefore they keep the discourses of **degrowth**, **ecological justice, climate justice, climate debt or greenwashing** within the conversation. However, Green10, while operating in Europe, is turning blind eye to environmental crimes of European capital. Instead, they adopt the dominant discourse and co-opting in the green transition of the EU.

- ✓ **The Greens in the EP are the most critical social force when it comes to the green transition of the EU**

My analysis of the Greens in the European Parliament has led me to infer that Greens are the one group, which is ***least co-opting*** in the process green trasformismo in Europe in comparison to other social forces. Although Greens praised the EGD as a step in the right direction, they kept a critical eye over its realization process. Greens are also more invested in social results of the EGD and demand establishment of an economic system that would eliminate inequalities and injustices within current structure. Their emphasis on the **just transition, inequality, quality jobs, ecological transition and socially fair transition,** makes them the only societal group who has more critical stance with green transition process of the EU. Still, they are **co-opting in green *trasformismo*** of the EU as they do not help the capitalist mode of production and consumption accountable as the real culprit of the environmental degradation, climate

crisis and heavy social reflections of climate change over the most vulnerable groups of the world.

- ✓ **The EU Public is getting more and more informed about the climate change**

It is important to note that my data coming from the public opinion polls of the EU is limited in the sense it only shows answers of close-ended questions, where participant are required to choose from already defined list of answers. Still, it is interesting to observe increasing attention given to the environmental problems, citizens' rising anxiety about the climate change and their growing activism with varying degrees.

Since I could not measure the change in individual discourse through the public opinion polls, I could not comment on the co-optation of European citizens into the green trasformismo of the EU. I am aware that it is the structure of questions that limits the individual contributions of the European citizens, I can also speculate that the EU did not desire to involve citizens in the ***green trasformismo***, nor did it ask for their suggestions. From Neo-Gramscian approach, this fits into the strategy of trasformismo since popular participation is not only something undesirable but also something to be avoid ensuring restrictive hegemony of the dominant ideology. It can be far-fetched argument about the public opinion polls in the EU, but it makes sense from Neo-Gramscian theoretical perspective.

- ✓ **Depoliticization and technocratization have been consequential for the Green Trasformismo**

I analyzed the rise of **green** in Europe and I argued that currently there is **green race** taking place between the US, China and the EU and this process should be viewed as a struggle to be the emergent hegemon of **greened** global capitalist structure. My analysis of data I presented above has provided empirical evidence in favor of this argument. First, the notion of EU's leading the process of **green transition** globally is present in the legislation of EGD. Secondly, from the analysis of ERT, climate change politics are clearly defined within the competition between the EU, the US and China.

From Neo-Gramscian perspective, there is currently a hegemonic struggle between different actors. Global political economy is on the verge of the emergence of a new historic bloc, organized around the **green capitalism**. Indeed, **climate leadership of the EU should be seen as a rising new hegemon of the global green capitalism**.

My analysis also confirmed my arguments on "green growth becoming the hegemonic idea of capitalism" since all different social forces integrate **market-based solutions to climate change** into their discourse and demands. As it can be seen in code maps, blue codes are in the absolute majority. From this data result, I would like to underline Open Marxism's contributions to the critical approaches to IR&IPE.

- **The three rival projects for the EU have been blended in the EGD**

I emphasized Van Apeldoorn's three-rival-project for the European integration process. My analysis confirmed that the EU is still a terrain of struggle between rival projects and the EGD has become the latest playing field.

- **The EGD is predominantly Neoliberal**

The EGD is predominantly Neoliberal. It adopts market-based solutions to climate crisis, and it projects the solutions to the current environmental problems to be solved via technological developments and innovations. As it can be seen, my data is heavily coded with blue colored sustainable and market-based solution framework. The code of "competitiveness" is present in almost every single document, and it has an undefeatable presence in the data. As I explained above, the EGD aims to increase competitiveness of the EU with respect to other prominent actors, the US and China. The EGD does not question the capitalist mode of production and consumption as the real culprit of the climate crisis. The EGD is based the hegemonic notion of ***green growth*** with makes it impossible to question the myth of growth within capitalism. Thus, it does not look for alternatives such as de-growth to mitigate climate crisis.

- **The EGD is comprising Neo-Mercantilist features**

The EGD is partly Neo-Mercantilist, too. It adopts the position of European capital-owners, who demanded necessary EU-level policies, regulations and arrangements to

increase the competitiveness of European companies, to stop the trend of decreasing productivity in Europe. In the sub-section where I rethink what the data of ERT shows from Neo-Gramscian perspective, I explained that the EGD is actually very in line with the position of the ERT. Through the EGD, European capital is able to increase productivity since ***green transition*** encourages innovation and technological development. Moreover, with the eventual ***green integration*** of products, services, peoples, nations and markets, European capital would have wider and better integrated European market, which is also desirable development to compete with their American and Chinese counterparts.

- **The EGD is also slightly Social-Democratic**

The EGD is also slightly Social-Democratic. It is supported by social democrats and trade unions to re-regulate the market and regain some control over capital lost at the national level. In the sub-section where I rethink what the data of ETUC shows from Neo-Gramscian perspective, I explained that the EGD is influenced by the demands of European labor. Following the 2008 global financial crisis and 2010 Eurozone debt crisis, ETUC tied the efforts to overcome economic crisis to the efforts to mitigate climate crisis, and used the atmosphere of climate change to better the conditions of working class in the EU through **just transition**, **sustainable and green jobs and green growth**. While supporting the green transition of the EU, the European labor demanded some mechanisms to be established to protect those who would be negatively impacted by the transition to a low-carbon economy. Today, the European Commission is adopted **Just Transition Fund** to support member states whose economies still rely on carbon-intensive sectors and workers who earn their livelihoods in those sectors. The slogan of "no one is left behind" shows the social-democratic side of the EGD.

My analysis confirmed that the EU is still a terrain of struggle between rival projects and the EGD has become the latest playing field. I argued that although the EGD is predominantly neoliberal, it also comprises neo-mercantilist and social democratic features.

In this thesis, I claimed that the EU has instrumentalized this process of green transition to absorb any radical alternative projects and to pacify the radical actors like environmental activists or possible future public turmoil in the event of an environmental disaster, by incorporating their discourses to the official content of the EGD. Most importantly, the EU adopts this language climate activism only after curbing the hard edges till it conforms with the existing dominant interests. The project of EGD has created important controversies within the EU when the commission's ambition to become first continent that is carbon-neutral by 2050 was perceived as an extra economic burden on some less-developed members and a new source of unjust taxes for the labor within all member states. That is why, the European Green Deal has to be based on a restrictive hegemony.

I argued that the EU has crafted the legislation of the European Green Deal in such a way that only limited participation of the affected parties (like the European labor unions were not a part of legislation process while the European capital had frequent meeting with the prominent policy-makers in the Commission) and the EU members which are reluctant to shoulder the costs of green transition was given some concessions in the form of longer periods of time to complete climate neutrality and also financial aid through Just Transition funds. The EU has not only foreseen the upcoming changes in the structure of global capitalism but also envisioned a head start in this green race. Compared to the US case, the EU has proved to be more successful in managing competing interests within the European integration project precisely because of its *trasformismo* strategy.

- **Contributions of the thesis**

In this thesis, my primary aim was to contribute to the emerging literature on the green transformation of the European unification project through the case of EGD. Having perceived the mainstream literature on the European integration project as limited, I endeavored to contribute to this emerging literature on the ***green*** turn in the EU by adopting the theoretical assumptions, arguments and tools of the Neo-Gramscian and Open-Marxist traditions. My main contribution was definitely my qualitative case study of the EGD, through which I tested the aforementioned theoretical assumptions

regarding the **green *trasformismo*** of the EU. With my qualitative case study of the EGD, I have provided empirical evidence for the Neo-Gramscian and Open-Marxist approaches to the European unification project.

My second contribution has come from my unique data set, which comprises of 9 document groups and 968 individual documents. My thesis has the ambition for tackling data from wide range of groups, active in the process of **green *trasformismo*** of the EU. This provided me with unique evidence, that has not been studied together before but is necessary for making an in-depth analysis of the social forces at work in the emergence and the application of the EGD. I have used the results of my analysis of this large dataset to confirm Neo-Gramscian notion of ***trasformismo*** in the case of the EGD. I have also confirmed the theoretical assumptions of Van Apeldoorn regarding the emergence and the development of the European unification project.

My third contribution resulted of my novel methodological approach to critical political economy studies. I used MAXQDA, which is a software program belonging to the family of CAQDAS (computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software). With MAXQDA, I was able to visualize the results of my large dataset, which is essential not only for making sense the data at hand but also for make comparisons between different data groups and, more importantly, for testing the assumptions of the Neo-Gramscian and Open-Marxist perspectives. With my thesis, I have challenged the long-term methodological conservatism of critical political economy studies and used a computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software to substantiate my critical analysis.

My thesis has turned out to be a comprehensive analysis of the rich data set, laying the foundation for future studies either as single-focused data group analyses or as comparative analyses of two or more data groups. I hope that my thesis will enhance the literature on the green transformation of the EU and inspire future studies.

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
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
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
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
APPENDICES

A. EUROPEAN COMMISSION WHITE PAPERS (1985-2020) DOCUMENT PORTRAITS












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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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



Metin Portresi: Data Group 1 > European Commission White Papers > 20200219_52020DC0065





Metin Portresi: Data Group 1 > European Commission White Papers > 20200617_52020DC0253
Competitiveness Innovation
Environmentally-friendly Solutions
Issues with Third Countries

B. EUROPEAN COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS (1992-2023) DOCUMENT PORTRAITS







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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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



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


C. EUROPEAN COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS (1992-2023) DOCUMENT PORTRAITS












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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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



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



E- EUROPEAN ROUND TABLE FOR INDUSTRY (ERT) (2017-2023)

DOCUMENT PORTRAITS












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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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



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




Metin Portresi: Data Group 2 > ERT EGD > 20231113_Meeting
Competitiveness
Innovation
Decarbonisation
Hydroelectric Energy

F- THE EUROPEAN TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION (ETUC) (2011-2023) DOCUMENT PORTRAITS












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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Metin Portresi: Data Group 2 > ETUC EGD > 20230526_Manifesto




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


G- GREEN10 (2019-2023) DOCUMENT PORTRAITS


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Metin Portresi: Data Group 2 > Green 10 > 20230411_Letter




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
H- GREENS/EFA IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (2008-2023)

DOCUMENT PORTRAITS


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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



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


I- PUBLIC OPINION POLLS OF THE EU (1990-2023) DOCUMENT PORTRAITS












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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
Metin Portresi: Data Group 2 > Public Opinion in the EU > 2021_513



Metin Portresi: Data Group 2 > Public Opinion in the EU > 2022_527



Metin Portresi: Data Group 2 > Public Opinion in the EU > 2023_538



J. CURRICULUM VITAE

GÜNSELİ DURMAZ

EDUCATION

- MA, International Relations, High Honor Student, March 2015, GPA 3.71
  Middle East Technical University, Ankara, TURKEY
  Advisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pınar Bedirhanoğlu
  Thesis Title: "Politics of neoliberal transformation: a comparative analysis of debt-led consumption and crisis in Turkey and Greece"

- BA, Political Science and International Relations,
  Honor Student, June 2011, GPA 3.03
  Boğaziçi University, İstanbul, TURKEY

- Samsun Anatolian High School, Highest Ranked Student, June 2006.

RESEARCH & TEACHING AREAS

- International Political Economy, The European Union Politics, Turkey-EU Relations, Climate Politics, Food Politics, World History, History of Political Thought.

WORK EXPERIENCE

- Niğde Ömer Halisdemir University, Department of Political Science and International Relations
  Research Assistant 2022 --

- Middle East Technical University, Department of International Relations
  Research Assistant 2014 – 2022

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

- EUS 523 – Current Issues in European Politics and Governance (Course Coordinator, Guest Lecturer and Teaching Assistant)
  Middle East Technical University,
- IR102 – World History (Teaching Assistant and Mentorship)

Middle East Technical University,

- IR101 – World History (Teaching Assistant and Mentorship)
  Middle East Technical University,

- IR470 Turkey and the EC/EU (Teaching Assistant)
  Middle East Technical University,

- IR110 – History of International Political Theory (Teaching Assistant)
  Middle East Technical University,

AWARDS & SCHOLARSHIPS

- Jean Monnet Scholarship Award 2019-2020.
  Research Title: "Food Activism as a Means to Fight Poverty: The Case Of Italy"
  Advisor: Prof. Dr. Donatella Della Porta, Scuola Normale Superiore, Florence, Italy.

- Graduate Courses Performance Award for 2015-2016 Academic Year, Middle East Technical University, June 2017.

ARTICLES

- Gönenç, D., & Durmaz, G. (2020). The politics of neoliberal transformation on the periphery: a critical comparison of Greece and Turkey. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, *20*(4), 617-640.

PROJECTS

- REUNITING CYPRUS PROJECT, http://reunitingcyprus.com/
  Researcher

CONFERENCES, WORKSHOPS & TRAININGS

Conferences

- "Politics of food movements: Rethinking agrarian question in the age of neoliberalism", 9th Political Economy Conference– 12-14 September 2018, International Initiative for Promoting Political Economy (IIPPE). Pula, Croatia. http://iippe.org/9th-annual-conference-political-economy/

- "A Comparative Analysis of Debt-Led Consumption and Crisis in Greece and Turkey", 8th Political Economy Conference–13-15 September 2017, International Initiative for Promoting Political Economy (IIPPE), Berlin, Germany. http://iippe.org/8th-annual-conference-in-political-economy/

- "Troika in Greece: How much democracy is desirable and tolerable for neoliberalism?" 14. METU International Relations Conference 17-19 June 2015 Ankara, Turkey.

WORKSHOPS & TRAININGS

- MAXQDA Training and Workshop, (August 2-30, 2023), Online Summer School. Inst: Burak Varol.

- Planning for 21. Century Group, FOOD, LAND, AGRICULTURE Workshop, 11-12 October 2018, Hacettepe Universtiy, Ankara.

- FEUTURE WP2 & WP4 Joint Workshop on Political and Security Drivers, (February 20-21, 2018), Middle East Technical University Ankara.

- MAXQDA Training and Workshop, (December 2-3, 2017), METU CEC Ankara.

- PRIMO Methods Training Workshop: Network Analysis and Regional Power Studies, (June 15-19, 2015), Middle East Technical University Ankara.

LANGUAGES

- Turkish – Native Speaker, English – Fluent, Italian – B2, German – A2.

K. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

2019 yılında, COVID-19'un dünyayı vurmasından hemen önce, Başkan Trump'ın ABD'yi Paris Anlaşmasından çekmesinden tam iki yıl sonra, Avrupa Komisyonu Avrupa Yeşil Mutabakatını (EGD) kabul etti. O gün, Avrupa Komisyonu Başkanı Von der Leyen, EGD'nin Avrupa'nın bütünleşme projesi açısından tarihi önemini vurgulamak için "Bu, Avrupa'nın 'Ay'daki adam' anıdır" dedi. Açık bir 1960'lar uzay yarışına gönderme olan bu sözler, 1960'larda Ay'a ilk insan göndererek gücünü tüm dünyaya ilan eden Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin artık hegemonya yarışında Avrupa Birliği'nin gerisinde kaldığını da ima ediyordu. Çünkü günümüzde küresel iklim krizine karşı yeni uluslararası iklim politikalarının oluşturulması ve uygulanmasında ABD'nin belirgin yokluğunda, Avrupa Birliği küresel iklim liderliği rolünü üstlenmişti.

Bu tez, kapitalizmin daha kapsamlı olarak geçirdiği dönüşümünün içerisinde EGD örneğini ele almaktadır. Böylece tez EGD'nin nasıl da Avrupa Birliği düzeyinde oluşturulmuş bir iklim politikası bir parçasından daha fazlası olduğunu analiz etmektedir. Avrupa Yeşil Mutabakatı, Avrupa Birliği üyelerinden enerji, ticaret ve sosyal politikalar dahil ancak bunlarla sınırlı olmamak üzere politika uyumu talep etmenin yanı sıra, kapitalizmi yeşillendirmeye yönelik bir adım olarak ele alınmakta ve uluslararası siyasi ve ekonomik ilişkiler üzerinde yaratacağı öngörülen etkiler sorunsallaştırılmaktadır. Bu tez, ilgili Uluslararası İlişkiler tartışmaları arasında "kapitalizmin yeşil dönüşümü" üzerine geliştirilmiş Neo-Gramşiyan argümanlarını temel olarak benimsemekte, onları geliştirmekte ve genişletmektedir. İlk olarak, 2000'lerden sonra çevreci hareketlerin ısrarlı mücadeleleriyle "yeşillendirmenin" nasıl çağdaş ekonomi politiğin yeni varlık nedeni haline getirildiği, başka bir deyişle, yeşil fikirlerin ve yeşil normların acil iklim krizine bir yanıt olarak nasıl küreselleşmenin ayrılmaz parçaları haline geldiği savunulmaktadır. Ardından, EGD'nin niteliksel içerik analizi yoluyla, Avrupa Birliği'nin bir yandan çevreci toplumsal güçlerin radikal potansiyellerini frenlemek, diğer yandan da küresel hegemonik meydan okumalar

karşısında Batı kapitalizmini kurtarmak için yeşil trasformismo stratejileri izlediği iddia edilmektedir.

Tarihsel olarak, uluslararası çevre yönetişiminin çok düzeyli ve çok aktörlü süreçlerinde, çevrenin korunması tek amaç olmamıştır. Bu süreçler her zaman, karbon piyasaları gibi tartışmalı politika önlemlerinin alınmasına yol açan yerleşik uluslararası güç dinamikleri tarafından şekillendirilmiştir. Gerçekten de eşitsiz güç ilişkileri, iklim değişikliğinin uluslararası yönetişiminde gelişmiş ve gelişmekte olan ülkeler arasında daha fazla ayrışma yaratmıştır. Dünyanın az gelişmiş kesimi, gelişmiş ülkelere, ağır sanayileşmenin neden olduğu çevre kirliliği, ormansızlaşma ve biyolojik çeşitlilik kaybı gibi eylemlerinden dolayı tepki göstermektedir. Öte yandan, çevrenin korunmasına yönelik çabaları, kalkınma ve ekonomik refah fırsatlarının ellerinden alındığı şeklinde algılamakta ve gelişmiş ülkelerin kendilerine haksızlık yaptığını iddia etmektedir.

İklim adaleti hareketi bu ayrışma çizgisinden yükselmiş ve dünyanın geri kalanına yayılmıştır. Zaman içinde, özellikle genç bireylerden gelen iklim aktivizmi, küresel sosyal hareketleri ele geçirmiş ve küresel ekonomi politiğin elitlerinin bu doğrultuda adımlar atmasını zorunlu kılmıştır. Örgütlü iklim aktivizmi artık siyasi aktörlerden, birçok Birleşmiş Milletler İklim Değişikliği Çerçeve Sözleşmesi (UNFCCC) Zirvelerinde desteklenen yerleşik önlemlerden daha radikal adımlar atmalarını talep etmektedir. Bu doğrultuda, aktivist çabalar iklim krizinin kamuoyu tarafından genel kabul görmesine büyük katkı sağlamakla kalmamış, aynı zamanda siyasi ve ekonomik elitlere sorunla ilgili bir şeyler yapmaktan başka seçenek bırakmamıştır. İklim değişikliğinin kamuoyunda siyasallaşması, yeşil partilerin hem nitelik hem de nicelik olarak gelişmesi için verimli bir zemin yaratmıştır. Bu gelişmeler sayesinde, iklim değişikliğini tersine çevirme gerekliliği küresel politikanın zeitgeist'ı ve 21. yüzyılda küresel politik ekonomide merkezi bir çekişme noktası haline geldi. Dolayısıyla EGD öncelikle AB'yi de kapsayan Batı'daki yeni siyasi meydan okumalara bir yanıt olarak hararetle teşvik edilmiştir.

EGD aynı zamanda önde gelen küresel çevre yönetişimi aktörlerinin farklı konumlanışları açısından da bağlamsallaştırılmalıdır. Özellikle EGD bir boşlukta

ortaya çıkmamış, AB'nin iklim politikaları konusunda ABD, Çin ve Rusya ile iş birliği ve rekabet içinde olduğu karşılaşmalarla şekillenmiştir. Başkan Trump'ın 2017 yılında Paris Anlaşması'ndan çekilme kararıyla birlikte ABD, çağdaş kapitalizmde gerekli çevresel reformları gerçekleştirme konusundaki öncü konumundan uzaklaşırken, bu durum AB'nin bu alandaki liderliğinin yükselişi için bir dönüm noktası olmuştur. Bununla birlikte, iklim değişikliği söz konusu olduğunda AB'nin kendisinin de tartışmalardan uzak olmadığını belirtmek önemlidir. EGD'nin benimsenmesi ve uygulanmasına ilişkin AB içi çatışmalar, karbon yakıtlarına farklı düzeylerde bağımlı olmaları nedeniyle farklı AB ülkeleri ve farklı ekonomik kalkınma düzeyleri nedeniyle farklı bölgeler arasındaki üstü örtülü sınıf karşıtlıklarını yeniden su yüzüne çıkarmıştır.

Dahası, Çin'in ekolojik uygarlık nosyonu, iklim değişikliği önlemleri konusunda AB liderliğiyle kafa kafaya gelmesini sağlamıştır. Çin artık küresel kapitalizmi sadece Batılı ekonomilerin koyduğu kurallara göre oynamak yerine, Çin'in avantajlarına uyacak şekilde yeniden şekillendirme fırsatına sahip oldu. Bir başka açıdan, Rusya'nın Ukrayna'yı işgali AB'nin yeşil dönüşümünün geleceği açısından yeni sorunlar yarattı. AB'nin tüm nükleer enerji santrallerini kapatma ve sadece jeotermal, hidro-elektrik, güneş, rüzgar, biyogaz, biyoyakıt veya biyokütle enerjisi gibi temiz ve yenilenebilir enerji kullanma yönündeki uzun vadeli planı, Rusya'nın Ukrayna'yı işgal etmesi ve AB'nin başa çıkması oldukça zor bir dizi olayı tetiklemesiyle tıkanmış gibi görünmektedir. Böylesine içten ve dıştan tartışmalı bir bağlamda EGD, Batılı kapitalistlerin kapitalizmi yeşillendirme ve böylece Avrupa kapitalizminin küresel rekabet gücünü artırma çabalarının merkezinde yer almaktadır.

Tezin temel çerçevesini oluşturan “yeşil kapitalizm” kavramı iklim krizinin piyasa başarısızlığının bir ürünü olduğu ve dolayısıyla sera gazı üreticilerinin (öncelikle Kuzey'deki ülkeler) uygun karşı önlemlerle iklim değişikliğinin tüm küresel sonuçlarından kaçınabilecekleri, ancak üretimlerinden sorumlu olmayan dünyanın diğer bölgelerini etkileyebilecekleri varsayımına dayanmaktadır.2 Sorunu bir piyasa başarısızlığı olarak çerçeveleyen bu yaklaşım, "yeşil" ve daha "çevre dostu" reformlar yoluyla bu sorunları "düzeltme" olasılığının önünü açmaktadır. İkinci olarak, yeşil kapitalizm teknolojik çözümleri çevresel felaketlere karşı tek geçerli seçenek olarak savunur. 'Yeşil' inovasyonların, küresel pazardaki mevcut enerji üretim

teknolojileriyle rekabet ederek iklim değişikliği emisyonlarını azaltacağına inanılmaktadır.

İlginçtir ki, bu tür argümanların savunucuları, sorunun kaynağı olarak kapitalist üretim tarzını ve onun çözülemez iç çelişkilerini sorgulamamaktadır. Aksine, eleştirel yaklaşımlar iklim krizini, Dünya'nın atmosferindeki ısı tutucu sera gazı seviyelerini ve Dünya'nın ortalama yüzey sıcaklığını artıran insan faaliyetlerinin, özellikle de fosil yakıt yakımının neden olduğu, Dünya'nın yerel, bölgesel ve küresel iklimini tanımlayan ortalama hava modellerindeki uzun vadeli değişimle ilişkilendirmektedir. Onlara göre sorun, "sınırlı bir gezegende sonsuz büyüme" sağlamaya yönelik kapitalist kaygılar nedeniyle ortaya çıkmaktadır. Yine de uluslararası çevre yönetişimi, yeşil kapitalist çözümleri diğer alternatif çözümlere (küçülme hareketi gibi) tercih etmektedir.

Çevreci fikirler esas olarak 1960'larda ve 1970'lerde kapitalizmin endüstriyel ve yayılmacı mantığına bir tepki olarak ortaya çıkmış olsa da, sonraki on yıllarda çevresel konuların iç ve uluslararası politikada kademeli olarak yaygınlaşması, çevrecilik ile piyasa ilkesi arasında belli bir uzlaşmayı beraberinde getirmiştir. Hem çevresel hem de ekonomik sorunların cevabı "sürdürülebilir kalkınma" kavramında bulunmuş gibi görünmektedir. 'Liberal çevreci uzlaşma' uluslararası düzeyde kurumsallaşmıştır ve bu uzlaşma 'çevrenin korunmasını liberal bir ekonomik düzenin desteklenmesi ve sürdürülmesine dayandırmaktadır'. Sürdürülebilir kalkınma kavramı, çevresel düşüncenin piyasa temelli bir şablona uydurulmasına yönelik bu tür girişimlerden yalnızca bir tanesidir.

Bu tez, kendisini tek uygulanabilir çözüm olarak sunan ve iklim kriziyle mücadele ediyormuş gibi görünürken, ağır çıkarcılığa, çevresel yıkıma ve kuzey/güney adaletsizliklerine dayanan mevcut üretim ilişkilerini dramatik bir şekilde sorgulamayan bu perspektife eleştirel yaklaşmaktadır. Radikal çözümleri bastırarak ya da basitçe ana akıma dahil ederek yeşil kapitalizm pasif bir devrimin eşiğine gelmiştir. Yeşil kapitalizm perspektifinden, kapitalizmin yeni yüzü artık “yeşil”dir ve kapitalizm artık kötü değil, sosyal ve ekolojik olarak sürdürülebilir ilişkiler yaratma kaygısıyla aydınlanmış durumdadır. Bu tezde, iklim değişikliğinin uluslararası yönetişiminim bu

çok aktörlü ve çok düzeyli ilişkisinde, egemen kapitalist çıkarların bilim insanlarından, aktivistlerden, STK'lardan, sıradan vatandaşlardan ve yeşil partilerden gelen eleştirileri kabul ederek kendilerini yeniden icat ettikleri ve bu yolla hegemonyalarını sağlamlaştırdıkları savunulmaktadır. Sorunları bu şekilde kabul ederek ancak yeniden çerçevelendirerek EGD, yeni oyunun kurallarını belirleme gücüne sahip olmuş ve dahası gelecekteki ve potansiyel olarak daha yıkıcı radikal hareketleri absorbe etmeyi mümkün kılmıştır. Daha da önemlisi, bu süreçte farklı sınıf ve grupların rızasını kazanarak egemen kapitalist ilişkileri yeniden biçimlendirmenin bir aracı olmuştur.

Yeni yeşil kapitalizmin kural ve yönetmeliklerinin hazırlanmasına ilişkin karmaşık süreçte, işçi sendikaları, STK'lar veya yeşil siyasi partiler tarafından temsil edilen çıkarlar da sürece dahil edilmiş, bu grupların rızası da alınmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu çaba, çevreci örgütlerde, emek sınıfında, parlamentodaki Yeşiller grubunda büyük ölçüde başarılı olmuştur. Çünkü bu değişiklikler ya STK'lar ve yeşil partiler gibi daha iyi bir küresel iklim için iyileştirme olarak algılanmış ya da gelişmiş ülkelerdeki işçi sınıfının çalışma ve yaşam koşullarını iyileştirmek için bir fırsat olarak görülmüştür. Elbette kapitalistler yeni yeşil kapitalizmi rekabet gücünü, emek verimliliğini, teknolojik inovasyonu artırmak için çok ihtiyaç duyulan bir gelişme ve küresel ekonomi politik üzerinde Batılı kapitalist hegemonyayı yeniden tesis etmenin bir aracı olarak ayakta alkışlamaktadır. Bu nedenle, bu sürecin aslında kapitalizmin yeşil dönüşümü olduğunu ve mevcut ya da gelecekte ortaya çıkma potansiyeli olan radikal karşı-hegemonik alternatifleri asimile ederek mevcut çıkar ağını kurtarmak ve yeniden üretmek için bir fırsat olarak değerlendirildiğini savunulmaktadır.

Bu tez, teorik olarak ana akım Uluslararası İlişkiler ve entegrasyon teorilerinin iklim krizi ve EGD'nin yükselişine yaklaşımlarını incelemekte ve sınır kaldıkları alanların altını çizmektedir. Neofonksiyonalist bir perspektiften bakıldığında, Avrupa Yeşil Anlaşması sadece iklim politikası entegrasyonunun bir parçası değil, aynı zamanda 'giderek daha yakın Avrupa Birliği'ne doğru atılacak bir başka adımdır. Yine de, yayılma yoluyla daha fazla entegrasyonun kaçınılmaz gelişimi algısı, süreci ve aktörleri sorunsallaştırmamaktadır. Üye devletlerin farklı çıkarlarını, AB kurumlarının bazen çelişkili pozisyonlarını, küresel kapitalist ağların etkisini ve AB vatandaşlarının, yeşil siyasi partilerin ve yeşil STK'ların giderek daha güçlü hale gelen rolünü dikkate

almamaktadır. Hükümetlerarasıcılık, değişim için itici gücün ulusal temelli çevreci gruplardan değil, iş dünyası çıkarları veya devlet başkanları gibi elit gruplardan geldiği EGD örneğini ele almıştır. Hükümetlerarasıcı bakış açısına göre, çevre politikası üye devletlerin tercihleri ile tanımlanır ve AB'nin iki hükümetlerarası kurumu olan Avrupa Konseyi ve Avrupa Birliği Konseyi tarafından gerçekleştirilir. Sosyal inşacı yaklaşımlara göre, 'iklim nötrlüğü', 'döngüsel ekonomi' ve 'adil geçiş' AB'nin normları haline gelmiş ve bu da EGD'nin kabul edilmesinin önünü açmıştır. Bu süreçte AB, küresel standartları belirleyerek ve kuralları formüle ederek dünyanın iklim lideri haline gelmiştir.

Tüm bu yaklaşımlar gerçekliğin sadece bir yönünü incelemektedir. Neofonksiyonalizm, Avrupa'nın birleşmesi projesinin, birliğe özgü çevre politikalarının geliştirilmesi yoluyla adım adım EGD'ye nasıl evrildiğini başarılı bir şekilde göstermektedir. Hükümetlerarasıcılık, üye devletlerin tercihlerinin Avrupa birleşme projesinin yönünü belirlemedeki öneminin altını çizmektedir. Sosyal inşacılık, çok haklı olarak, 'fikirlerin' ve 'normların' AB'nin önemli bir parçası olduğunu savunur. Ancak bu yaklaşımlar EGD'nin çok yönlü gerçekliğini kavramak için yeterli olmadığı gibi, süreci oluşturan sınıf temelli dinamikleri anlamakta da başarısız olmaktadır. Evet, EGD'nin AB'deki çevre politikası entegrasyonunun yayılma etkisinin doğal bir sonucu olduğu iddia edilebilir, ancak bu dönüşümün içeriğini ve aktörlerin neden bir modu diğerine tercih ettiğini (yani büyümeye karşı küçülme) anlamak için yeterli değildir. Evet, bazı devletler yeşil dönüşüm konusunda daha hevesli (örneğin Almanya) ancak hala karbon yoğun endüstrilere dayanan üyelere de önemli tavizler veriliyor (örneğin Polonya ve Just Transition Fund). Evet, şüphesiz fikirler AB'de yeşil dönüşüm programının ortaya çıkması ve şekillenmesi için hayati önem taşımaktadır, ancak rejim inşası konusunda 'ilk gelen ilk hizmet alır' stratejileri de önemli bir faktördür. Kapitalizmin küresel yeşil dönüşümü eninde sonunda kendi kazananlarını ve kaybedenlerini yaratacak ve şehirdeki yeni oyunun kurallarını belirleyenler olmak daha avantajlı olacaktır. AB'nin uluslarüstü bir birlik olarak bu yeşil kapitalizm yolunu sadece normatif liderliği nedeniyle seçtiğini varsaymak en iyi ihtimalle saflık, en kötü ihtimalle de yanıltıcı olacaktır. Farklı entegrasyon teorilerinden gelen bu açıklamaların tamamen temelsiz olmadığını ve

sınırlı da olsa farklı bağlamlarda sorunu anlamamıza yardımcı olduğunu kabul ediyorum. Ancak benim bu tezde yapmak istediğim, Neo-Gramşiyan perspektifin teorik çerçevesini ve kavramsal araçlarını kullanarak EGD projesinin neden ve nasıl ortaya çıktığını bütüncül bir sınıf perspektifinden anlamaktır. Neo-Gramşiyan yaklaşım, sınıfa odaklanmasının yanı sıra, Avrupa kapitalizminin yeşillendirilmesinde iş başında olan süreçleri anlamak için bana çok uygun bazı kavramsal araçlar da sağlayacaktır.

Benim teorik çerçeveden EGD, zorlama ve rızanın olduğu kadar iş birliği ve rekabetin de alanıdır. Küresel, ulusal ve uluslarüstü düzeylerde çok çeşitli konuları, aktörleri, çıkarları ve çatışmaları içerir. 4'ün tarihsel bölümünde, iklim değişikliğinin küresel ilişkilerinin karmaşık resmini tasvir ettim. Çevre politikalarının yönetişiminde küresel Güney ve küresel Kuzey çatışması, tarihsel suçluların eylemlerinin sonuçlarından ellerini temizlemeleri sorunu, iklim değişikliğinin yüklerinin zaten kırılgan olan uluslara doğru eşitsiz dağılımı ve tüm dünyada iklim aktivizminin yükselişi gibi konuları kapsamaktadır. Bu olgu aynı zamanda dünyanın önde gelen aktörleri arasında yeni bir küresel rekabet alanının da sınırlarını çiziyor. Bilim insanları mevcut üretim ve tüketim biçimlerinin devam etmesi halinde dünyanın sonunun geldiği uyarısında bulunurken, kapitalizmin yeniden çerçevelenmeye, yeniden örgütlenmeye ve yeniden markalaşmaya ihtiyacı olduğu aşikâr hale gelmiştir. ABD, AB ve Çin arasındaki küresel rekabet, diğerleri üzerinde hegemonya kazanmak için savaşacak yeni bir cephe kazandı. Paris İklim Anlaşması'ndan çekilen ABD'nin yokluğunda AB, Çin devlet kapitalizmin dolayısıyla yeşil kapitalizmin Çin versiyonuna karşı Batı kapitalizminin tek sorumlusu ya da temsilcisi rolünü üstlenmiştir.

Avrupa Yeşil Mutabakatı bu resme, AB düzeyinde kendi iş birliği ve çatışmalarının yanı sıra AB üye ülkelerinin Avrupa birleşme projesinin geleceği için kararlaştırılan yeni yola ilişkin kendi iç endişeleri ve kafa karışıklıkları ile girmektedir. Beşinci Bölümde açıkladığım üzere, Avrupa Yeşil Mutabakatı farklı gruplar için farklı anlamlar ifade etmektedir. Avrupa meraklıları için EGD, bir bakıma batmakta olan veya sıkışmış Avrupa birleşme projesini kurtarmak için atılmış bir can simidi dir.

Avrupa için bir Anayasa oluşturan Antlaşma (TCE) 2004 yılında imzalanmış, ancak onay süreci 2005 yılında Fransa ve Hollanda'nın Hayır oyu vermesiyle Avrupa Birliği'nde "Anayasal kriz" yaratmıştı.8 Bu "Anayasal kriz"den kaynaklanan ve iki yıl süren çıkmaz ancak 2007 yılında "anayasa"nın antlaşmadan çıkarılmasıyla "çözülebildi". Ardından 2008'de küresel mali kriz, 2010'da tam bir borç krizi olarak Avrupa'yı etkisi altına aldı.9 Kriz bazı ülkeleri diğerlerinden daha fazla vurdu. AB'nin ve özellikle de ortak para biriminin ulusal hükümetlerin elini kolunu bağladığı güney Avrupa ülkeleri (+ İrlanda), AB düzeyinde kabul edilen ve AB'nin teknokrat yetkilileri tarafından uygulanan kemer sıkma kararlarını kabul etmek zorunda kaldı (bkz. Yunanistan'daki Troyka). Ardından 2015 yılında Avrupa'nın birleşme projesinin ahlaki temellerini sarsan göç krizi geldi. Çok geçmeden İngiliz vatandaşları 2016 yılında İngiltere'nin AB'den ayrılması yönünde oy kullandı ve bu karar o zamandan beri "BREXIT" olarak anılıyor. AB pek de rahat bir dönemden geçmiyordu. Neredeyse on yıldır süren borç krizinin ekonomiyi kırılgan hale getirmesi, Rusya'nın doğu periferisinde devam eden saldırganlığı, Macaristan ve Polonya'nın liberal olmayan demokrasilere doğru kayması, göç krizi ve bunu takiben AB'de Avrupa şüphecisi ve radikal partilerin yükselişi, daha yakın bir birlik fikrinin uzak bir hayal gibi görünmesine neden oldu.

Bu tezde, 968 ayrı belgeden oluşan 9 veri setini içeren 2 büyük veri grubunu niteliksel olarak analiz ettim. Analiz sonunda elde ettiğim sonuçlar şöyle olmuştur:

- Avrupa Komisyonu İletişimleri

Komisyon iletişimlerinin veri setinin analizi, mavi renkli kodlarla yoğun bir şekilde kodlandığını göstermektedir. Bu da Avrupa Komisyonu'nun iklim değişikliği konusunu "sürdürülebilir ve piyasa temelli çözümler politika çerçevesi" altında kodlanan kelimelerle ele aldığı anlamına geliyor. Burada vurgu kesinlikle "rekabetçilik" ve "yenilikçilik" kodları üzerindedir. "Sera gazı emisyonları", "emisyon" ve "biyoçeşitlilik kaybı" kodlarının sarı renkte görünür olması da Avrupa Komisyonu'nun iklim değişikliğine teknik ve bilimsel bir perspektiften baktığını göstermesi açısından önemli. Mor rengin eksikliği de bu argümanı desteklemektedir zira bu kod grubu küçülme, ekolojik sürdürülebilirlik, sosyo-ekolojik adalet, iklim

borcu, eşitsizlik, yeniden dağıtım veya kaliteli işlerin varlığını ifade etmektedir. Kod karşılaştırması, 90'lı ve 00'lı yıllarda sarının yoğun varlığının yerini kırmızıya bıraktığını göstermektedir; bu da AK'nin artık sadece teknik bir dil kullanmak yerine çevresel sorunları ve olası çözümleri tanımlamak için doğrudan iklim değişikliği söylemini kullandığı anlamına gelmektedir.

İkinci ve daha önemli olarak, yeşil kod ilk olarak 2009 yılında ortaya çıkmış ve ardından 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 ve 2014 yıllarında yavaş yavaş belgelerdeki varlığını artırmıştır. "Yeşil büyüme"nin ilk olarak 2008 finansal krizinden sonra krizden etkilenen dünya ekonomisini yeniden canlandırmanın bir yolu olarak ortaya çıktığını belirtmek önemlidir. Yeşil büyüme fikrini ortaya atan ilk kurum BM olmuş, bunu diğer önemli aktörler takip etmiştir. Tarihsel bölümde açıkladığım gibi, Dünya Bankası Çin'e yeşil reformları sadece ağır sanayisinden kaynaklanan çevre sorunlarının üstesinden gelmenin bir yolu olarak değil, aynı zamanda temiz enerji, yeşil altyapı ve yeşil kalkınmayı tanıtarak orta gelir tuzağından çıkmanın bir yolu olarak önerdi. Tahmin edileceği üzere, Avrupa Yeşil Mutabakatının ilk kez uygulamaya konulduğu 2019 yılından itibaren yeşil kodlar belgelerde giderek daha sık yer almaya başlamıştır. Bir diğer önemli nokta ise yeşil anlaşma ile birlikte adil geçiş fonunun da kabul edilmiş olmasıdır. "Kimseyi geride bırakma" ilkesi Komisyon'un bu konudaki eylemlerini o kadar yönlendirdi ki, mor kodlar son belgelerin sıkça bir parçası haline geldi.

- Avrupa Komisyonu Beyaz Belgeleri

Avrupa Komisyonu Beyaz Belgeleri veri setinin kod haritası, Avrupa Komisyonu Kararları belge grubunda olduğu gibi mavi kodların çoğunlukta olduğunu göstermektedir; bu da "sürdürülebilir ve piyasa temelli çözümler politika çerçevesi"nin beyaz kitapların baskın özelliği olduğu anlamına gelmektedir. "Rekabetçilik" ise 975 kez kodlanarak açık ara en çok kodlanan unsur olmuştur. Ancak, beyaz kitap grubu Komisyon sonuçlarından farklıdır çünkü mor kodlar da içermektedir. "Yeniden dağıtım" ve "eşitsizlik" kodları azınlıktadır ancak yine de önemlidir. Bu haritanın en önemli sonucu, beyaz kitapların gösterdiği üzere, AB'nin gündemindeki konu ne olursa olsun, rekabetçiliğin neredeyse her zaman tartışmanın bir parçası olduğudur.

- Avrupa Birliği Devlet ve Hükümet Başkanları Konseyi

Bu belge grubu ve kod haritası üzerinde yaptığım analiz, belge grubunun çoğunlukla "Rekabetçilik", "istikrar" ve "yenilikçilik" mavi kodlarıyla kodlandığını gösteriyor. Ayrıca, "sürdürülebilir kalkınmanın" Avrupa Konseyi Kararları belge grubunda önemli bir yer tuttuğunu da belirtmek gerekir. Kod matrisi ve koda karşılaştırma tabloları, "yeşil büyüme"nin 2010 yılındaki belgelerde yer aldığını göstermektedir ki bu da Avrupa Komisyonu kararlarının veri sonuçlarını desteklemektedir. "Yeşil", 2008 finansal krizinden sonra sadece Avrupa ekonomisinde değil genel olarak küresel ekonomide yer almaya başlamıştır. Küresel mali krizin yıkımlarının ardından küresel kapitalizmin yeşil olarak yeniden canlandırılması, ekonomi politiğin önemli belgelerinde yerini almaya başlamıştır. Yine önceki belge gruplarına paralel olarak yeşil anlaşma, yeşil geçiş, yeşil ekonomi ve yeşil finans 2019 yılında EGD'nin kabul edilmesinden sonra belgelerde daha sık yer almaya başladı.

- Avrupa Birliği Konseyi

Ulusal bakanlar kuruluna benzer şekilde ancak uluslarüstü düzeyde çalışan Avrupa Birliği veri grubunda, kod haritası iklim değişikliğinin biyoçeşitlilik kaybı, emisyonlar ve ormansızlaşma gibi çevresel çerçevede ve sürdürülebilir kalkınma, sürdürülebilir büyüme, inovasyon, döngüsel ekonomi, rekabetçilik gibi sürdürülebilirlik çerçevesinde ele alındığını göstermektedir. Kırmızı ve yeşil kodlar da iklim değişikliği, iklim nötrlüğü, iklim finansmanı ve iklim diplomasisi; yeşil anlaşma ve yeşil geçiş ile güçlü bir varlığa sahiptir. Daha da önemlisi, mor kodların kayda değer bir ağırlığı yoktur; bu da eşitsizlik, adalet ve adil geçiş gibi konuların Konsey tarafından fazla dikkate alınmadığı anlamına gelmektedir. Analiz, konseyin iklim değişikliğine yönelik teknik bir yaklaşımı olduğunu göstermektedir. Konsey, piyasa temelli çözümlere güvenmeye devam ederken yeşil söylemin yükselişini de kabul etmektedir. Yeşil anlaşma ve iklim finansmanı gibi yeni araçların devreye sokulması, Konsey'in Avrupa Komisyonu ve Avrupa Konseyi tarafından kendilerine çizilen yolu takip ettiğini göstermektedir. Analiz, 2019'da Avrupa Yeşil Anlaşması'nın yürürlüğe girmesinin ardından "yeşil "in Konsey'in gündemine girdiğini göstermektedir. Bir diğer önemli nokta ise eşitsizlik ve adil geçişin mor kodlarının EGD'nin devreye

girmesinin ardından yoğunluğunu arttırmasıdır. Sonuç olarak, AB'nin yürütme organı olan Konsey, Komisyon ve Avrupa Konseyi tarafından belirlenen bu yeni yeşil dönüşüm kural ve düzenlemelerinin Avrupa vatandaşlarının günlük uygulamalarında hayata geçirilmesi için çalışmaktadır.

- ERT

Avrupa Yuvarlak Masa veri grubu üzerinde yaptığım analiz, Avrupa "sermayesinin" iklim değişikliği ve yeşil dönüşüm yoluyla "rekabet edebilirlik" kavramının yanında güçlü bir şekilde durduğunu göstermektedir. ERT için iklim değişikliğine ilişkin her türlü tartışmanın temel dayanağı "yenilikçilik", "sürdürülebilirlik", "karbon vergisi" ve "döngüsel ekonomi"nin yanı sıra "rekabetçilik "tir. Avrupa sermayesinin yeşil dönüşüm konusundaki pozisyonunu anlamak açısından önemli olduğuna inandığım husus, ERT'nin yeşil gündemin uygulamaya konulması yoluyla Avrupa tek pazarının canlandırılması için en hevesli aktör olabileceği, zira bunun AB'nin küresel ekonomide azalan rekabet gücünü düzeltmek için hayati önem taşıdığını düşündükleridir. Buna ek olarak, yeşil kodlar en çok kodlanan ikinci renk olarak mavi kodları takip ederken, mor kodlar Avrupa sermayesi için önemli bir konu gibi görünmemektedir. Mor kodların eksikliği Avrupa sermayesi için küçülme, eşitsizlik, adalet ve adil geçiş gibi konuların Avrupalı sanayicilerin gündeminde olmadığını göstermektedir.

- ETUC

ETUC'un kod haritası, önceki veri setlerini takiben oldukça ilginç bir durum göstermektedir. "İklim değişikliği" kodu dışında en sık rastlanan kod mor bir kod olan "adil geçiş" ve ilk defa mor bir kod bu kadar gündemde. Ayrıca "kaliteli işler" kodunun da ilk kez haritada yer alacak kadar yüksek kodlandığını belirtmek isterim. ETUC için bir başka önemli nokta da kod matrisinin ve kod karşılaştırma tablolarının kod gruplarının çok daha dengeli bir dağılımını göstermesidir (sadece sarı kodlu çevresel çerçevenin düşük varlığı hariç). Sürdürülebilirlik çerçevesine olan önemli odaklanmalarını diğer veri setleriyle paylaşmaktadırlar ancak gündemleri kesinlikle mor kodlu kaliteli işler, eşitsizlik ve adil geçiş konularını tercih etmektedir.

- Yeşil10

Yeşil 10'un en dikkat çekici yanı "küçülme", "ekolojik adalet", "iklim adaleti", "iklim borcu" ya da "greenwashing" kelimelerini hiç kullanmamasıdır. "Avrupa Birliği'nin sınırları içinde ve ötesinde iklimi, yerel çevreyi, biyolojik çeşitliliği ve insan sağlığını korumasını sağlamak için çalışan, Avrupa düzeyinde faaliyet gösteren en büyük on çevre örgütü ve ağından oluşan bir koalisyon" olduğunu iddia eden bir kuruluşun en azından yukarıda belirtilen konularla ilgilenmesi gerekir. Görünüşe göre iklim değişikliğinin sınırları yok ama politikasının var ve Green 10 şu anda bu sınırlar içinde kalıyor. Green10 daha çok yeşil anlaşma ile ilgilenmektedir. Çevre, sürdürülebilirlik ve iklim değişikliği çerçevesindeki söylemleri de kullanmaktadır, ancak mor kodlar "eşitsizlik" dışında Yeşil10'un belgelerinde neredeyse yoktur. Bu durum, "yeşil anlaşma" ve "sürdürülebilirlik "in baskınlığını gösteren kod matrisi ve kod karşılaştırması tablolarıyla da desteklenmektedir.

- YEŞİLLER/EFA

AB'nin kendi parlamentosu vardır ve bu sayede AB vatandaşları AB düzeyindeki temsilcilerini seçebilmektedir. Yeşiller/EFA Grubu'nun siyasi pozisyonlarını, Avrupa Birliği'nin iklim değişikliğini ele alma ve yeşil dönüşümü yönlendirme biçimini nasıl eleştirdiklerini ve ne ölçüde meydan okumayı başardıklarını anlamak için analiz ettim. Yeşiller/EFA'nın kod haritası, Yeşillerin "iklim değişikliği" dışında en çok "adil geçiş" mor koduyla ilgilendiğini göstermektedir. Yeşiller/EFA'nın belge grubu, "eşitsizlik", "nitelikli işler", "ekolojik geçiş" ve "sosyal açıdan adil geçiş" ile birlikte mor renkli ekolojik politika çerçevesi üzerinden en fazla kodlanan belge grubudur. Yeşiller, AB'nin yeşil dönüşüm sürecine daha eleştirel yaklaşan tek toplumsal grubu temsil etmektedir. Karşılaştırma ve kod matrisi tabloları, Yeşiller/EFA grubunun Avrupa'da iklim değişikliği ve yeşil dönüşüm ile ilişkisinin ayrıntılarını sunmakta ve bir önceki argümanı desteklemektedir.

- Kamuoyu Görüşü

Kamuoyu yoklamalarından oluşan veri setimin en değerli yanı 33 yıllık uzun bir dönemi kapsaması olabilir. Son 33 yılda pek çok şey değişti, bunlardan biri de

kesinlikle iklim algıları. Kamuoyu araştırmalarının kod haritası, "iklim değişikliği" dışında, belge gruplarının mavi renkli "enerji verimliliği", "kaynak verimliliği" ve "karbon emisyonları ve karbon vergisi", sarı renkli "biyoçeşitlilik kaybı", "nükleer atık" ve "çevre dostu çözümler" ve yeşil renkli "yeşil ürün", "yeşil pazar" ve "yeşil geçiş" ile yoğun bir şekilde kodlandığını göstermektedir. Haritada tek bir mor kod bulunmamaktadır. Kod karşılaştırma tablosu, Avrupalıların dikkatinin 1990'larda çevresel çerçevenin teknik ve bilimsel kodlarından 2010'larda sürdürülebilirlik çerçevesine, 2012 ve 2022 döneminde ise yeşil politika çerçevesine nasıl değiştiğini göstermektedir. Bu Eurobarometreler kesinlikle zamanlarının zeitgeist'ini yansıtmaktadır çünkü 2010'larda sürdürülebilirlik politik ekonominin her alanında baskın bir kavram haline gelmiştir. Benzer şekilde, yeşil kalkınma kavramı da 2008 küresel mali krizi sonrasında ortaya çıkmıştır ve bu tablo da bu geçişi kanıtlamaktadır. Ayrıca, iklim değişikliğinin son on yılda kamusal tartışmalarda giderek daha baskın hale geldiği görülebilir. Kod matris tablosu da önceki argümanları desteklemektedir.

Analizim sonucunda başlangıçtaki araştırma sorularıma şu yanıtları buldum.

Neden?

Araştırma sorumun ilk bölümünü yanıtlamak için Avrupa Komisyonu yazışmalarını, Avrupa Konseyi sonuçlarını ve Avrupa Komisyonu beyaz kitaplarını analiz ettim. Toplamda, AB'nin son otuz yılını kapsayan 716 belgeyi inceledim. Tarihsel olarak Avrupa Komisyonu iklim değişikliğini "sürdürülebilirlik ve piyasa temelli çözümler" çerçevesinden ele almıştır. AB, 2010'lu yıllara kadar konuyu yönetmek için çok daha teknik ve bilimsel bir dil içeren "çevresel çerçeve "yi kullanmıştır. 2008 finansal krizinin ardından, kapitalizmin küresel yapısı geleneksel çevresel parametrelerini yeni ve yeşil kalkınma, büyüme, finans, üretim vb. kavramlarla takas etmiştir. İlk yeşil kodların 2008'den sonra bu farklı belge setlerinde ortaya çıkması tesadüf değildir. 2008 finansal krizi, kapitalizmin çöküşünü önlemek için onu "düzeltmeyi" gerekli kılmıştır. Kriz, küresel kapitalist elitin küresel kapitalizmin kurallarını ve düzenlemelerini yeniden tasarlaması için kendi fırsatlarını yarattı. "Sonlu bir gezegende sonsuz büyüme" kavramına dayanan kapitalizmin doğasını değiştirmeden ve hatta ona meydan okumadan kapitalist üretim ve tüketimin çevresel açıdan yıkıcı

sonuçlarını en aza indirmek. Analizimde, çevre sorunları ve dünyanın olası sonu tartışılırken bir kez bile küçülme fikrinden bahsedilmediği açıkça görülmektedir. Batı kapitalist sisteminin baş aktörü olan AB, bu yeşil kapitalist çözümleri küçülme fikri gibi diğer alternatif çözümlerden daha fazla benimsiyor, çünkü GSYİH'yı kaynak kullanımından ayırarak yeşil büyümeyi getirerek kapitalizmi "düzeltmek" gezegeni kurtarmak amacından önce geliyor.

Nasıl?

Araştırma sorumun ikinci bölümünü yanıtlamak için veri grubu 2 altında yer alan belgeleri analiz ettim: Avrupa Birliği Konseyi; Avrupa Sanayi Yuvarlak Masası (ERT); Avrupa Sendikalar Konfederasyonu (ETUC); Green10 (çevre STK'ları grubu); Yeşiller/EFA grubu; AB kamuoyu yoklamaları (Eurobarometer). Bu bölümde 252 belgeyi analiz ettim ve sonuçları MAXQDA araçları olan belge haritaları, kod karşılaştırma tabloları ve kod matris tabloları ile görselleştirdim. Ayrıca, hangi kodların belirli belgelerde ne kadar yer tuttuğunu gösteren belge portrelerinin görsellerini de eklere ekledim.

Farklı grupların, AB'nin dünya gezegeninin kurtarıcısı olarak yeni edindiği ve sonunda Avrupa Yeşil Anlaşması'na yol açacak olan rolüne nasıl rıza gösterdiğini veya direndiğini analiz ettim. Üye devletlerin pozisyonunu anlamak için Avrupa Birliği Konseyi'nin kararlarını kullandım. Yeşil dönüşüm söz konusu olduğunda Avrupa sermayesinin çıkarlarını ortaya koymak için Avrupa Sanayi Yuvarlak Masası'nın (ERT) "iklim değişikliği" hakkında neler söylediğine baktım. Karşı tarafta ise işçilerin sesi olan ve AB'de 45 milyon üyeyi temsil eden Avrupa Sendikalar Konfederasyonu'nun (ETUC) gündemini iklim krizi doğrultusunda nasıl yeniden tanımladığını inceledim. Çevre tartışmasının STK tarafında ise, Avrupa düzeyinde faaliyet gösteren en büyük on çevre örgütü ve ağından oluşan bir koalisyon olan Yeşil 10'un AB'nin "yeşil geleceğe" doğru yeni yönelimine ilişkin ne söylediğini ve ne yaptığını analiz ettim. AB'nin kendi parlamentosu vardır ve bu sayede AB vatandaşları AB düzeyindeki temsilcilerini seçebilmektedir. Avrupa Birliği'nin konuyu ele alış biçimini nasıl eleştirdiklerini ve ne ölçüde meydan okuyabildiklerini anlamak için Yeşiller/EFA Grubu'nun siyasi pozisyonlarını analiz ettim. Son olarak, Avrupa

kamuoyunun "iklim değişikliği" ve "yeşil" çözümleri nasıl algıladığını görmek için kamuoyu yoklamalarını inceledim.

Yaptığım analiz, Konsey'in piyasa temelli çözümlere güvenmeye devam ederken yeşil söylemin yükselişini de kabul ettiğini gösterdi. Yeşil anlaşma ve iklim finansmanı gibi yeni araçların devreye sokulması, Konsey'in Avrupa Komisyonu ve Avrupa Konseyi tarafından kendilerine çizilen yolu takip ettiğini göstermektedir. Analiz, 2019'da Avrupa Yeşil Anlaşması'nın yürürlüğe girmesinin ardından "yeşil "in Konsey'in gündemine girdiğini göstermektedir. Bir diğer önemli nokta ise eşitsizlik ve adil geçişin mor kodlarının EGD'nin devreye girmesinin ardından yoğunluğunu arttırmasıdır. Sonuç olarak, AB'nin yürütme organı olan Konsey, Komisyon ve Avrupa Konseyi tarafından belirlenen bu yeni yeşil dönüşüm kural ve düzenlemelerinin Avrupa vatandaşlarının günlük uygulamalarında hayata geçirilmesi için çalışmaktadır.

Avrupa sermayesi için iklim değişikliği ile ilgili her türlü tartışmanın ana dayanağı "yenilikçilik", "sürdürülebilirlik", "karbon vergisi" ve "döngüsel ekonomi "nin yanı sıra "rekabetçilik "tir. Avrupa sermayesinin yeşil dönüşüme ilişkin pozisyonunu anlamak açısından önemli olduğuna inandığım husus, ERT'nin yeşil gündemin uygulamaya konulması yoluyla Avrupa tek pazarının yeniden canlandırılması için en hevesli aktör olabileceği, zira bunun AB'nin küresel ekonomide azalan rekabet gücünü düzeltmek için hayati önem taşıdığını düşündükleridir. Buna ek olarak, yeşil kodlar en çok kodlanan ikinci renk olarak mavi kodları takip ederken, mor kodlar Avrupa sermayesi için önemli bir konu gibi görünmemektedir. Avrupa sermayesi için mor kodların eksikliği, küçülme, eşitsizlik, adalet ve adil geçiş gibi konuların Avrupalı sanayicilerin gündeminde olmadığını göstermektedir.

Avrupa emeği için en önemli konu mor bir kod olan "adil geçiş" olarak görünüyor ve ilk kez bir mor kod bu kadar gündemde. Aynı zamanda "kaliteli işler" kodu da ilk kez haritada yer alacak kadar yüksek kodlanıyor. ETUC için bir başka önemli nokta da kod matrisinin ve kod karşılaştırma tablolarının kod gruplarının çok daha dengeli bir dağılımını göstermesidir (sadece sarı kodlu çevresel çerçevenin düşük varlığı hariç). Sürdürülebilirlik çerçevesine olan önemli odaklanmalarını diğer veri setleriyle

paylaşmaktadırlar ancak gündemleri kesinlikle mor kodlu kaliteli işler, eşitsizlik ve adil geçiş konularını tercih etmektedir.

Yeşil 10'un en dikkat çekici yanı "küçülme", "ekolojik adalet", "iklim adaleti", "iklim borcu" ya da "greenwashing" kelimelerini hiç kullanmamasıdır. "Avrupa Birliği'nin sınırları içinde ve ötesinde iklimi, yerel çevreyi, biyolojik çeşitliliği ve insan sağlığını korumasını sağlamak için çalışan, Avrupa düzeyinde faaliyet gösteren en büyük on çevre örgütü ve ağından oluşan bir koalisyon" olduğunu iddia eden bir kuruluşun14 en azından yukarıda belirtilen konularla ilgilenmesi gerekir. Görünüşe göre iklim değişikliğinin sınırları yok ama politikasının var ve Green 10 şu anda bu sınırlar içinde kalıyor. Green10 çoğunlukla yeşil anlaşma ile ilgilenmektedir. Çevre, sürdürülebilirlik ve iklim değişikliği çerçevesindeki söylemleri de kullanmaktadır, ancak mor kodlar "eşitsizlik" dışında Yeşil10'un belgelerinde neredeyse yoktur.

AB'nin kendi parlamentosu vardır ve bu sayede AB vatandaşları AB düzeyindeki temsilcilerini seçebilmektedir. Yeşiller/EFA Grubu'nun AB'nin çevre yönetişimi, iklim değişikliği ve yeşil geçiş konularındaki pozisyonları Yeşiller/EFA'nın kod haritasında görülebilir. Yeşiller "iklim değişikliği" dışında en çok "adil geçiş" mor koduyla ilgilenmektedir. "Eşitsizlik", "nitelikli işler", "ekolojik geçiş" ve "sosyal olarak adil geçiş" ile Yeşiller/EFA'nın belge grubu, mor renkli ekolojik politika çerçevesi üzerinden en fazla kodlanan belge grubudur. Yeşiller, AB'nin yeşil dönüşüm sürecine daha eleştirel yaklaşan tek toplumsal grubu temsil etmektedir.

Kamuoyu araştırmaları veri setimin en değerli yanı 33 yıl gibi uzun bir dönemi kapsaması olabilir. Kamuoyu araştırmalarının kod haritasında "iklim değişikliği" dışında belge gruplarının mavi renkli "enerji verimliliği", "kaynak verimliliği" ve "karbon emisyonları ve karbon vergisi", sarı renkli "biyoçeşitlilik kaybı", "nükleer atık" ve "çevre dostu çözümler" ve yeşil renkli "yeşil ürün", "yeşil pazar" ve "yeşil geçiş" ile yoğun bir şekilde kodlandığı görülmektedir. Haritada tek bir mor kod bulunmamaktadır. Kod karşılaştırma tablosu, Avrupalıların dikkatinin 1990'larda çevresel çerçevenin teknik ve bilimsel kodlarından 2010'larda sürdürülebilirlik çerçevesine, 2012 ve 2022 döneminde ise yeşil politika çerçevesine nasıl değiştiğini göstermektedir. Bu Eurobarometreler kesinlikle zamanlarının zeitgeist'ini

yansıtmaktadır çünkü 2010'larda sürdürülebilirlik, politik ekonominin her alanında baskın bir kavram haline gelmiştir. Benzer şekilde, yeşil kalkınma kavramı da 2008 küresel mali krizi sonrasında ortaya çıkmıştır ve bu tablo da bu geçişi kanıtlamaktadır. Ayrıca, iklim değişikliğinin son on yılda kamusal tartışmalarda giderek daha baskın hale geldiği görülebilir. Kod matris tablosu da önceki argümanları desteklemektedir.

"AB, Avrupa Yeşil Mutabakatını nasıl benimsedi?" sorusuna verdiğim cevabın kökleri, Avrupa Birliği Konseyi (2015-2023), Avrupa Sanayi Yuvarlak Masası (ERT) (2017-2023), Avrupa Sendikalar Konfederasyonu (ETUC) (2011-2023), Green10 (2019-2023), Avrupa Parlamentosu'ndaki Yeşiller/EFA (2008-2023) ve AB Kamuoyu Yoklamaları (1990-2023) belge gruplarının bu nitel içerik analizine dayanmaktadır.

Analizim, yeşil kapitalizmin farklı gruplar üzerinde hegemonya kurmayı başardığını ve iklim değişikliği konusunu egemen kapitalist ideolojinin çizdiği parametreler çerçevesinde tartışmalarını sağladığını gösteriyor. Yeşil kalkınmanın ilk kullanımlarının 2008 finansal krizi sonrasında ortaya çıkması tesadüf değildir. Kapitalizmin yeni bir vizyona ihtiyacı vardı ve bu vizyon, mevcut sınıf çıkarları ağına dramatik bir şekilde meydan okumadan kapitalist üretim ve tüketimi mümkün olduğunca yeşillendirme stratejisinde bulundu. İklim krizinin yaklaşan varlığı karşısında alt grupların rızası alındıktan sonra, küresel politik ekonominin yeni vizyon doğrultusunda yeniden tasarlanmasına başlandı. AB bu konuda adımlarını hızlandırmış ve iklim krizine karşı küresel çabaların lideri haline gelmiştir.

Doğal olarak her dönüşüm kendi kazananlarını ve kaybedenlerini yaratır, hemen hemen her toplumsal grup yeni kural ve düzenlemeleri kendi lehlerine yeniden yönlendirme umuduyla tartışmaya katıldı. Örneğin ERT, AB'nin yeni yeşil dönüşüm arayışının en hevesli destekçisi olarak ortaya çıktı. Çünkü Avrupalı sanayiciler uzun zamandır Çin karşısında azalan rekabet güçlerinden şikâyet ediyorlardı. Şimdi ise yeşil dönüşüm ile Avrupa ürün ve hizmetlerini küresel kapitalist yapıda en rekabetçi hale getirmenin yeni yollarını buldular. Benzer şekilde

ETUC da AB'nin yeni yolunu benimsiyor ancak kendileri için daha fazla kaliteli iş ve geçiş sürecinin "adil" olması için kamu desteği talep ediyor. Green10 da AB'nin yeni kural ve düzenlemelerini destekliyor ancak batı kapitalizminin küresel adaletsizlikleri

ve telafileriyle ilgilenmiyor. Bir kez bile "küçülme" ya da "iklim borcu" ifadelerini kullanmadılar. Parlamentodaki Yeşiller/EFA grubu, yeşil dönüşümün toplumsal sonuçlarıyla en çok ilgilenen gruptur. Herkes için sosyal ve ekolojik olarak adil bir geçiş talep ediyorlar. Ancak, küçülme hareketi gibi daha radikal bir değişimi savunmak ya da bunun için mücadele etmek konusunda yetersiz kalmışlardır. Avrupa kamuoyunun iklim değişikliği konusunda artan bir endişesi ve ilgisi vardır. Analiz, Avrupalıların ilgisinin 1990'larda çevre çerçevesinin teknik ve bilimsel kodlarından 2010'larda sürdürülebilirlik çerçevesine, 2012 ve 2022 döneminde ise yeşil politika çerçevesine doğru değiştiğini göstermektedir. Ayrıca, kapitalist üretim ve tüketim sistemine alternatif çözümler için yeni kanallar açabilecek daha radikal bir eylem konusunda kamuoyuna tek bir soru bile sorulmadığını belirtmek gerekir.

Analizim, EGD'nin aslında, mevcut kapitalist çelişkileri sürdürülebilir ve yeşil bir gelecek için hayati önem taşıyan yeni ve teknolojik çözümler olarak yeniden markalaştıran bir kapitalizmin yeşil trasformismo vakası olduğunu gösteriyor. Bu farklı aktörlerin veya toplumsal grupların Avrupa Yeşil Anlaşması'na ilişkin pozisyonlarını trasformismo stratejisinin somut örnekleri olarak işlevselleştirmektedir.

Özetle, bu tez Neo-Gramşiyan perspektifin teorik çerçevesini ve kavramsal araçlarını kullanarak EGD projesinin neden ve nasıl ortaya çıktığını bütüncül bir sınıf perspektifinden ele almaktadır. 968 adet AB kurumları (Avrupa Komisyonu, Avrupa Konseyi, Avrupa Birliği Konseyi ve Avrupa Parlamentosu), Avrupa Sanayi Yuvarlak Masası (ERT), Avrupa Sendikalar Konfederasyonu (ETUC), Green10 ve Eurobarometer belgesinin nitel analizini yapan bu tez EGD'nin öncelikle AB'yi de kapsayan Batı'daki yeni siyasi meydan okumalara bir yanıt olarak teşvik edildiğini savunmaktadır. Böylece tez EGD'nin nasıl da Avrupa Birliği düzeyinde oluşturulmuş bir iklim politikası bir parçasından daha fazlası olduğunu analiz etmektedir.

Avrupa Yeşil Anlaşması, Avrupa Birliği üyelerinden enerji, ticaret ve sosyal politikalar dahil ancak bunlarla sınırlı olmamak üzere politika uyumu talep etmenin yanı sıra, kapitalizmi yeşillendirmeye yönelik bir adım olarak ele alınmakta ve uluslararası siyasi ve ekonomik ilişkiler üzerinde yaratacağı öngörülen etkiler sorunsallaştırılmaktadır. Bu çalışmada iklim krizinin her geçen ağırlaşan faturasının,

neoliberalizmin hegemonyası tarafından araçsallaştırıldığı ve kapitalizmi "yeşillendirmenin" mevcut üretim ilişkilerini, ağır çıkarcılığını, çevresel yıkımını ve kuzey/güney adaletsizliklerini sorgulamaksızın tek geçerli çözüm olarak sunulduğu iddia edilmektedir. Radikal çözümleri bastırarak ya da basitçe ana akım çözümlerin içine çekerek, "yeşil" kapitalizmin yeni yüzü haline geldi; kapitalizm artık kötü değil, aydınlanmış ve sosyal ve ekolojik olarak sürdürülebilir ilişkiler yaratmayı önemsiyor.

Kapitalizmin yeşil dönüşümü, mevcut ya da gelecekte ortaya çıkma potansiyeli olan radikal karşı hegemonik alternatifleri asimile ederek egemen sınıfların hegemonyasını kurtarmanın bir aracı haline gelmiştir. Bu tezde, ilgili Uluslararası İlişkiler tartışmaları arasında "kapitalizmin yeşil dönüşümü" üzerine geliştirilmiş Neo-Gramşiyan argümanlarını temel olarak benimsemekte, onları geliştirmekte ve genişletmektedir. İlk olarak, 2000'lerden sonra çevreci hareketlerin ısrarlı mücadeleleriyle "yeşillendirmenin" nasıl çağdaş ekonomi politiğin yeni varlık nedeni haline getirildiği, başka bir deyişle, yeşil fikirlerin ve yeşil normların acil iklim krizine bir yanıt olarak nasıl küreselleşmenin ayrılmaz parçaları haline geldiği savunulmaktadır. Ardından, EGD'nin niteliksel içerik analizi yoluyla, Avrupa Birliği'nin bir yandan çevreci toplumsal güçlerin radikal potansiyellerini frenlemek, diğer yandan da küresel hegemonik meydan okumalar karşısında Batı kapitalizmini kurtarmak için yeşil trasformismo stratejileri izlediği iddia edilmektedir.

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