BUILDING NEOLIBERAL ORDER THROUGH PACIFICATION: THE CASE OF TURKEY, 1980-2010

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ABSTRACT

BUILDING NEOLIBERAL ORDER THROUGH PACIFICATION:
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Based on a critical evaluation of dominant and 'critical' perspectives in studies of authoritarianism and security, this thesis offers an alternative approach to analyse the concomitant reconfiguration of security and the balance of social forces under neoliberal transformation. Employing a unique incorporation of the form-analytical account developed in relational state theory with the general propositions of the critical theory of pacification it aims to explore the modalities of the exercise of state power through which the political implications of the contradictions and crises inherent in capitalist accumulation have been contained, managed, and policed in neoliberal Turkey. The study covers the initial three decades of neoliberalism, from 1980 to 2010, a period warranting considerable attention for having laid the groundwork for profound changes within the state set to unfold in the post-2010s, particularly by securing the balance of social forces despite protracted economic crises. The thesis mainly argues that pacification, devised as a class strategy under authoritarian statism, has functioned as the main political mechanism in reproducing the contradictory totality of capitalist social relations in the crisis-ridden development of the Turkish political economy under neoliberalism. The politics of

pacification is historically analysed against the backdrop of the sociopolitical repercussions of successive phases of reforms and restructuring. The analysis focuses on a range of techniques of governing and policing embodied in the processes through which the social and economic insecurity induced by neoliberal policies have been secured: securitization of the political, making of the pacified workforce, policing of the class of poverty, reinforcement of the ideal citizen-subjectivity.

Keywords: Pacification, Neoliberalism, Authoritarian Statism, Social War, Security

ÖZ

NEOLİBERALİZMİN İNŞASINI PASİFİKASYON YAKLAŞIMIYLA İNCELEMEK: TÜRKİYE ÖRNEĞİ, 1980-2010

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Otoriterleşme ve güvenlik çalışmalarındaki hâkim ve 'eleştirel' perspektiflerin eleştirel bir değerlendirmesine dayanan bu tez, neoliberal dönüşüm altında güvenliğin ve toplumsal güçler dengesinin eşzamanlı tertibatını çözümlemek üzere alternatif bir yaklaşım sunmaktadır. İlişkisel devlet kuramında geliştirilen form-analitik yaklaşımı eleştirel pasifikasyon kuramının genel önermeleriyle özgün bir biçimde eklemleyen çalışma, neoliberal Türkiye'de kapitalist birikime içkin çelişki ve krizlerin siyasi-toplumsal dolayımlarının nasıl kontrol altına alındığını, yönetildiğini ve zapt edildiğini devlet iktidarının özgül kullanım biçimlerini inceleyerek ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır. Çalışma, neoliberal dönüşümün ilk otuz yılını kapsar; bu dönem, özellikle toplumsal güçler dengesinin sağlanması, ekonomik krizlerin hegemonya bunalımına dönüşme koşullarının soğurulması ve bu sayede 2010-sonrası yıllarda devlet-toplum ilişkilerindeki köklü değişikliklere zemin hazırlaması itibariyle kayda değer bir ilgiyi hak etmektedir. Tez temel olarak, pasifikasyonun otoriter devletçilik altında başat bir sınıf stratejisi olarak tasarlandığını ve Türkiye siyasal iktisadının kriz güdümlü gelişim sürecinde kapitalist toplumsal ilişkilerin çelişkili bütünlüğünün yeniden üretilmesine yönelik ana siyasi mekanizma olarak işlev gördüğünü savunmaktadır. Pasifikasyon

siyasetinin anılan dönem için tarihsel çözümlemesi, farklı reform ve yeniden yapılandırma süreçleri ile bu süreçlerin emek-sermaye çelişkisiyle biçimlenen sosyopolitik içerimleri bağlamında yapılmıştır. Çözümleme, neoliberalizmin ekonomik ve sosyal güvensizliğinin idare edildiği şu süreçlerde cisimleşen bir dizi yönetim ve polis tekniğine odaklanır: Siyasal olanın güvenlikleştirilmesi, barışçıllaştırılmış işgücünün inşası, yoksulluğun zapt edilmesi, ideal yurttaş-öznenin tahkimatı. Tez çalışması, pasifikasyonun alt bileşeni olarak ele aldığı güvenliği devlet-merkezci ve kurumsalcı çerçeveden türetilen askeri–sivil ikiliği ve militarizm odaklı yaklaşımların ötesinde kapitalist devlet iktidarı ölçeğinde anlam kazanan siyasi bir teknik olarak sorunlaştırarak ilgili literatürdeki eleştirel ve sınıf-temelli yaklaşımlara katkı sunmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Pasifikasyon, Neoliberalizm, Otoriteryan Devletçilik, Toplumsal Savaş, Güvenlik

To my father and his genuine smile

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP : Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
ANAP : Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party)
AP : Adalet Partisi (Justice Party)
BRSA : Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency
CGP : Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi (Republican Reliance Party)
CCT : Conditional Cash Transfer
CMK : Ceza Muhakemesi Kanunu (Criminal Procedure Law)
COIN : Counterinsurgency
CHP : Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party)
DGM : Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemesi (State Security Court)
DİSK : Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey)
DPT : Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı (State Planning Organization)
DSP : Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party)
DYP : Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party)
EM-RE-MO : Emniyet Reorganizasyon ve Modernizasyon (Reorganization and Modernization of the Police)
EMASYA : Emniyet Asayiş Yardımlaşma Protokolü (Security Protocol of Police-Military Cooperation)
EU : European Union
IDD : Internal Defense and Development
ILO : International Labour Organization
IMF : International Monetary Fund
IRA : Independent Regulatory Agency
ITO : İstanbul Ticaret Odası (Istanbul Chamber of Commerce)
MESS : Türkiye Metal Sanayicileri Sendikası (Turkish Employers' Association of Metal Industries)
MGK : Milli Güvenlik Kurulu (National Security Council)

MHP : Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party)
NATO : North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC : National Security Council
OECD : The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
ÖYM : Özel Yetkili Mahkeme (Specially Authorized Courts)
POL-DER : Polis Derneği (Police Association)
PVSK : Polis Vazife ve Selahiyet Kanunu (Law on Police Duties and Powers)
SAL : Structural Adjustment Loan
SDYV : Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Vakfı (Social Aid and Solidarity Foundation)
SHP : Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti (Social Democratic Populist Party)
SOE :State-owned Enterprise
SRMP : Social Risk Mitigation Project
SSK : Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu (Social Insurance Institution of Turkey
SYDGM : Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Vakfı Genel Müdürlüğü General Directorate of Social Aid and Solidarity
SYDVF : Sosyal Yardım ve Dayanışma Fonu (Social Aid and Solidarity Promotion Fund)
TAF : Turkish Armed Forces
TESEV : Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation)
TINA : 'There is no alternative'
TİSK : Türkiye İşveren Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations)
TMK : Terörle Mücadele Kanunu (Anti-terror Law)
TOBB : Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği (Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey)
TSEP :Transition to Strong Economy Programme
TÜRK-İŞ : Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (The Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions)
TÜSİAD : Türk Sanayicileri ve İş adamları Derneği (Turkish Industry and Business Association)

YASED : Uluslararası Yatırımcılar Derneği (International Investors Association in Turkey)

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Research Rationale

The last four decades have witnessed a series of political economic developments, practices, social and economic trends that have come to induce considerable shifts within the states and equilibrium of social forces in capitalist social formations all over the globe. As a class project in response to the 1970s global capitalist crisis this comprehensive transformation, dubbed 'neoliberalism', has been characterized by an intense onslaught of capital on the historical gains of labour in Turkey as well as globally.[1] Even a short glance on the conditions of labour would provide one with an insight into the class-driven nature of the process in question. In tandem with the enforcement of the neoliberal agenda from 1980 onwards there has been a systematic decrease in the share of wages in the total economy, indicating even an accelerated decline particularly during times of crises. As a brief example, the share of wages in manufacturing industry which was 52 percent in 1979, decreased to 31 percent in 1994 and to 21 percent in 2006, meaning a decline of 60 percent from 1979 to 2006.[2] Systematic deterioration in income distribution has also coincided with regular increases in labour productivity, most particularly in the 2000s which were marked by relatively high growth rates.[3] Despite declines during crisis years labour

[1] Gerard Duménil and Dominique Lévy, *Capital Resurgent: Roots of the Neoliberal Revolution*, Harvard University Press, 2004. D. Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, Oxford University Press, 2007. Korkut Boratav, Oktar Türel, and Erinç Yeldan, "Distributional dynamics in Turkey under "structural adjustment" of the 1980s", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 1994, 11, 43–70. Serdal Bahçe and Ahmet Haşim Köse, "Social Classes and the Neo-Liberal Poverty Regime in Turkey, 2002–2011", *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 47:4, 2017, 575–595.

[2] Özlem Onaran, "Crises and post- crisis adjustment in Turkey: Implications for Labor" in Z. Öniş & F. Şenses (eds.), *Turkey and the Global Economy: Neo-Liberal Restructuring and Integration in the Post-Crisis Era*, 2009, pp. 249-50.

[3] Erinç Yeldan, "Patterns of Adjustment in the Age of Finance: The Case of Turkey as a Peripheral Agent of Neoliberal Globalization", *The Ideas Working Paper Series*, 2009, p. 17.

productivity has never fallen greater than wages, which underscores that the distributional consequences of the market reforms and crises in particular have been disproportionately burdened on working classes. Deterioration of income distribution and consistently maintained high rates of exploitation have been accompanied by further indicators of economic and political setbacks: job insecurity, greater flexibility in the labour market with a sheer size of the informal sector, high rates of deunionization,[4] growing dependence of the majority of the population, precarious workers in particular, on indebtedness for their livelihood.[5] The overall outcome has been only a more generalized and acute bourgeois insecurity permeating all segments of working classes, which is accompanied by even more investment on security on legal-institutional, industrial and ideological levels, manifesting in various forms of violence and repression.

While such indicators could be partially explicable on the basis of the thorough changes in labour legislation throughout the processes of structural adjustment, the political and social facets of the neoliberal transformation unveil another distinctive character of its trajectory in Turkey. Neoliberal policy agenda in Turkey had been pushed forward even more profoundly and with greater depth so as to reproduce class domination amid a prolonged period of crises in due course.[6] In effect, induced by the short-term, speculative capital-led growth patterns there occurred a series of economic and financial crises which obviously gave rise to instances of political instabilities on the level of individual governments. Yet these crises were not escalated into political or hegemony crises which could be historically defined by 'the condensation of class contradictions'.[7] This sets Turkey's experience with

[4] Aziz Çelik, "Turkey's New Labour Regime Under the Justice and Development Party in the First Decade of the Twenty-First Century: Authoritarian Flexibilization", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 51:4, 2015, 618–635.

[5] Elif Karaçimen, "Interlinkages between credit, debt and the labour market: evidence from Turkey", *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, Vol. 39, No. 3, 2015, pp. 751–767.

[6] Pınar Bedirhanoğlu and Galip Yalman, "State, Class and Discourse: Reflections on the Neoliberal Transformation in Turkey" in A. Saad-Filho and G. Yalman (eds.) *Economic Transitions to Neoliberalism in Middle Income Countries*, London: Routledge, 2010, p. 116. Galip Yalman, "Crises as Driving Forces of Neoliberal "Trasformismo": The Contours of the Turkish Political Economy since the 2000s" in Alan Cafruny, Leila S. Talani, Gonzalo Pozo-Martin (eds.) *The Palgrave Handbook of Critical International Political Economy*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

[7] N. Poulantzas, *Fascism and Dictatorship: The Third International and the Problem of Fascism*, London: Verso, 1974, p. 59.

neoliberalism apart from some of its counterparts ('emerging market countries') where similar crisis processes were rather experienced as 'crisis of neoliberalism',[8] indicating a somewhat enduring hegemony of neoliberalism as a mode of discourse and economic policy. Thus it is plausible to suggest that a transformation initiated by the sheer violence of a military coup has been predominantly shielded and maintained under the civilian rule of bourgeois parliamentary democracy without being seriously confronted by the mounting pressure of popular discontent over the last three to four decades.[9] It is within these conditions that the AKP rule, known for having kept up with the neoliberal policy agenda at an unprecedented pace, both inherited and further deteriorated the equilibrium of class forces in capital's favour by heavily leveraging the very absence of a potent social dissent and credible alternative both preceding and during its tenure. Reflecting on the decades of transformation, this raises one underlying question in the face of the overwhelming social and economic insecurity engendered by the excessively crisis-prone finance-led accumulation and the state's concomitant practices attempting to narrow down the political landscape, target all conceivable forms of social common and collective wellbeing of people: "Why not resist?"

Such inquiry has an undeniably close relation with the inherently repressive nature of neoliberal capitalism in general, and with one of its key political categories in the management of class relations, security, in particular. Indeed, among mainstream and alternative/critical perspectives there appears to be little disagreement concerning the security-driven nature of what is now commonly referred to as authoritarian modes of governance: Modern authoritarian practices flourish, proceed and expand primarily on the grounds of security. Nonetheless, inquiries into the ways in which 'authoritarianism' is fuelled and underpinned by security in the case of the Turkish state reveal distinct analytical and conceptual frameworks.

[8] What this means is that the absence of any systematic alternative or a counter-hegemonic strategy caused these systemic crises to remain as crises *in* neoliberalism. G. Yalman, 2016. For a study counterposing Turkey and Argentina as to the developments in the post-2001 crisis era of both countries, see Sümercan Bozkurt Güngen, "Revisiting neoliberalism and new developmentalism: lessons from Turkey and Argentina", *Third World Quarterly*, 2023, 1–19.

[9] Such observation is not without exceptions though. Regardless of their consequential impact, the wave of public workers strikes that persisted from 1989 into the early 1990s, TEKEL (2010) and Gezi (2013) should be singled out as emblematic instances of resistance movements.

Until rather recently, the debates and scholarship on the relation between state authoritarianism and security in Turkey appear to have been dominated by accounts in some way associated with a particular reading of Turkish political history which could be defined by versions of institutionalism, state-centrism, and/or relativism. Although not exclusively confined to a single school of thought, the prevailing tendency has been to examine the coercive 'nature' attributed to the state by treating it as a somewhat autonomous entity having its own rationality and corporate interests separated from social relations, whilst security is scrutinized exclusively in relation to institutions, elites, and political regimes within such state. One of the most practical manifestations of this way of thinking in Turkey is the intellectual attention on the 'anti-democratic' nature of the security apparatus which has been heavily centred on an all-pervasive militarism evidenced in military interventions, military corporatism and regime changes.[10] Indeed, even if one sets aside the debates on the early Republican period it had been a quite popular idea that beginning from the coup d'état of 1960 and the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC) until, at best, the so-called civilianization steps of the 2000s the political realm in Turkey had been firmly militarized by the military and various practices of militarization[11] which had even determined the axis of 'grand struggle' for Turkish politics.[12] Such dominance, often referred to as 'the political regime of tutelage'[13] where the military elite and bureaucracy assumed a 'paternalistic and tutelary'[14] role

[10] This line of thinking will be examined per se in the next chapter, but to take a few examples: Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy. *Comparative Politics*, V. 29, N. 2, 1997, pp. 151-166. Taha Parla, "Mercantile Militarism in Turkey, 1960-1998", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, N.19, 1998, pp. 29–51. İhsan D. Dağı, *Turkey between Democracy and Militarism: Post Kemalist Perspectives*, 2008, Ankara: Orion. Ahmet İnsel and Ali Bayramoğlu (eds.), *Bir Zümre, Bir Parti: Türkiye'de Ordu*, İstanbul: İletişim, 2013. Tim Jacoby, "Semi-Authoritarian Incorporation and Autocratic Militarism in Turkey", *Development and Change*. V. 36, N.4, 2005, pp. 613–802.

[11] Egemen B. Bezci & Güven Gürkan Öztan, "Anatomy of the Turkish Emergency State: A Continuous Reflection of Turkish Raison d'état between 1980 and 2002", *Middle East Critique*, V. 25, N.2, 2016, 163-179. Nebi Miş, *Güvenlikleştirme teorisi ve Türkiye'de güvenlikleştirme siyaseti 1923-2003*, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Sakarya Üniversitesi, 2012.

[12] İhsan D. Dağı, 2008.

[13] Ahmet İnsel, "Otoritarizmin Sürekliliği", *Birikim*, 125-126, 1999; "The pratorian state and its owners" *Birikim*, 218, 2007.

[14] Ergun Özbudun. "Turkey's Constitutional Reform and the 2010 Constitutional Referendum", *IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook 2011*, 2011, p. 192.

had been explicitly highlighted by liberal, left-liberal intellectual and media circles within and abroad, as the main obstacle to 'democratization'. Articulated to the dominant paradigm in Turkish politics and political economy, militarization thereby persisted as a predominant explanation of security politics prior to and throughout the 2000s, giving rise to a tremendous upsurge of scholarly and non-scholarly interest in the debates revolving around the concept.

In the face of this dominant approach to security, recently there has been also a proliferation of critical works that utilized the general conceptual frameworks and categories developed in the Marxist theory of the state and political economy. Albeit with varying levels of emphasis, first and foremost these studies tend to analyse the state and its diverse forms in relation to the balance of social forces.[15] In this sense, if one is to problematize the shifts in state repression inscribed in the configuration of security and relations of force in the light of the recent political conjuncture in Turkey, it is imperative to embark on an analysis in conjunction with the neoliberal transformation initiated by the military coup of 1980.

Studies which adhere to such approach and take on predominantly security encompass contributions having a specific focus on the post-2010 years.[16] The main reason for this is that the period in question is marked by a profound transformation within the state, institutions and the political space aligning with a complex and contradictory range of economic and political developments centred around the

[15] Galip Yalman, "Türkiye'de Devlet ve Burjuvazi: Alternatif Bir Okuma Denemesi" in N. Balkan & S. Savran (eds.), *Sürekli Kriz Politikaları*, 2004. Pınar Bedirhanoğlu, "Türkiye'de neoliberal otoriter devletin AKP'li yüzü" in İlhan Uzgel and Bülent Duru (eds.) *AKP kitabı: Bir dönüşümün bilançosu*, Ankara: Phoeniz, 2009. Şebnem Oğuz, "Türkiye'de Kapitalizmin Küreselleşmesi ve Neoliberal Otoriter Devletin İnşası" *Türk Tabipler Birliği Mesleki Sağlık ve Güvenlik Dergisi* 45-46, 2012, 2–15. İsmet Akça, "Hegemonic Projects in Post-1980 Turkey and the Changing Forms of Authoritarianism" in İsmet Akça, Ahmet Bekmen and Barış Alp Özden (eds.), *Turkey Reframed: Constituting Neoliberal Hegemony*, London: Pluto Press, 2014. Barış Alp Özden, İsmet Akça and Ahmet Bekmen, "Antinomies of Authoritarian Neoliberalism in Turkey: The AKP Era" in Cemal B. Tansel (2017) *States of Discipline: Authoritarian Neoliberalism and the Contested Reproduction of Capitalist Order*, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017.

[16] Şebnem Oğuz, "Yeni Türkiye'nin Siyasal Rejimi" in Tolga Tören & Melehat Kutun (eds.) *Yeni Türkiye: Kapitalizm, Devlet, Sınıflar*, İstanbul: Sosyal Araştırmalar Vakfı, 2016. Biriz Berksoy, '2010'larda Türkiye'de "güvenlik devleti" "olağanüstü devlet" biçimine evrilirken, 2017, 11–26. Özlem Kaygusuz, "Bir Siyasal İdare Tekniği Olarak Güvenlik ve AKP Döneminde Ulusal Güvenlik Devleti", *Praksis*, 40, 2016, 85–119. Özlem Kaygusuz, "Authoritarian Neoliberalism and Regime Security in Turkey: Moving to an 'Exceptional State' under AKP", *South European Society and Politics*, V. 23, N.2, 2018, 281–302.

subsequent AKP governments. Congruent with the global trend towards the emergence of a 'neoliberal security state'[17] while still uniquely embedded within its own historical specificity, such transformation signifies an advancement of overt political violence framed by an extreme political centrism and enforcement within the politics of securitization as well as the security apparatus. Concomitantly, it is fairly argued that there has been an ongoing shift from the authoritarian to an exceptional (security) form of the Turkish state under the post-2010 AKP rule, without endorsing the widespread liberal reading[18] that the 'authoritarian turn' has somehow started by a retreat from market reforms under the so-called second term of the AKP rule.[19] On the other hand, in some of critical studies examining the historical development of the neoliberal authoritarian state in Turkey with due reference to the 1980s the treatment of security implies an oscillation between Marxism and institutionalism. In that, the concept of national security appears to be considered exclusively limited to the armed forces.[20] Rather than entailing a formal expression of security as a political technique which could be utilized by civilian administrations as well as the military, national security is employed to define the moments of military involvement in politics whose escalation leads to concepts such as the 'national security state'.[21] Given its limited scope such employment would not

[17] Following a Poulantzas-inspired framework Boukalas suggests that such security state signals the third phase within the authoritarian statist form. Christos Boukalas "Counterterrorism legislation and the US state form: Authoritarian statism phase 3", *Radical Philosophy*, V. 151, N.31, 2008, pp. 31–41.

[18] For a critical compilation of such analyses, see Pınar Bedirhanoğlu, "Global Class Constitution of the AKP's 'Authoritarian Turn' by Neoliberal Financialization." In *Regime Change in Turkey: Neoliberal Authoritarianism, Islamism and Hegemony*, edited by Errol Babacan, Melehat Kutun, Ezgi Pınar and Zafer Yılmaz. New York: Routledge, 2021.

[19] Ş. Oğuz, 2016. B. Berksoy, 2017. Ö. Kaygusuz, 2018.

[20] See, e.g. İ. Akça, 2014.

[21] İ. Akça, 2014, pp. 23-5. See also İsmet Akça and Evren Balta Paker, "Beyond Military Tutelage? Turkish Military Politics and the AKP Government" in Ebru Canan-Sokullu (ed.) *Debating Security in Turkey: Challenges and Changes in the Twenty-First Century*, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2012. The concept national security state was mainly used during the Cold War to describe most Latin American states that were governed by a set of anti-communist ideas, concepts and actions called the 'national security doctrine' and accordingly mobilized the US-led counterinsurgency warfare techniques against internal threats. It can be admitted that the institutionalization of national security in line with this doctrine in Turkey rather coincides with the neoliberal era. However, from the perspective of this thesis analysing national security with the sole focus on the NSC and the armed forces as in the Latin American examples is considered as limiting for properly understanding its actual political effects. I will on the contrary argue that national security assumed the mediating role in the transformation of martial law powers into the civilian regime by 1983.

particularly help elucidate the ways that the 'establishment of a new security regime centred on the police and judiciary in place of the military'[22] has indeed made use of and further reinforced the political recourse to the concept national security. Moreover, the militarization of politics is itself addressed as the extra-economic cause of, rather than a response to, the alleged crisis of the hegemony in the 1990s[23] in a way to subsume Poulantzas's account of hegemony into a power conflict among institutional actors.

As an endeavour to contribute to this latter line of enquiry, this thesis will attempt to demonstrate the security configuration post-1980 in Turkey as a *continuous* part of a general *pacification* strategy not only to keep the population under control but to order the social relations of power in the course of the establishment and entrenchment of the neoliberal hegemony. To this end, by extensively utilizing the conceptual framework of pacification the study will mainly focus on exploring and understanding the modalities of the exercise of state power in the securitization of the political in general, and the pacification of labour in particular in response to the increasingly generalized insecurity throughout the overarching process of neoliberalization. While the concept pacification traces back to the war practices generally associated with European colonialism from the late 16th through to 20th centuries, as a theoretical/analytical lens it has been re-appropriated and developed out of a radical critique of security[24] among a number of theorists in 'Marxist security studies' (if such designation is possible[25]). Once articulated to a relational theory of the state and historicized for diverse state forms and social formations in

[22] İ. Akça, 2014, p. 32.

[23] İ. Akça, 2014, p. 23.

[24] Mark Neocleous, *Critique of Security*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008. M. Neocleous and George Rigakos (eds.) *Anti-Security.* Ottawa: Red Quill Books. 2011. M. Neocleous, 'A Brighter and Nicer New Life': Security as Pacification. *Social & Legal Studies*, 2011, 20(2), 191–208. M. Neocleous, G. Rigakos, and Tyler Wall, "On Pacification: Introduction to the Special Issue", 9 (2013) *Socialist Studies* 1; Mark Neocleous, "The Dream of Pacification: Accumulation, Class War, and the Hunt", 9 (2013) *Socialist Studies* 7. G. Rigakos, *Security/Capital: A General Theory of Pacification*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016. Tyler Wall, Parastou Saberi, Will Jackson (eds.), *Destroy, Build, Secure: Readings on Pacification*, 2017. M. Neocleous, "Fundamentals of Pacification Theory: Twenty-Six Articles" in T. Wall, P. Saberi, W. Jackson (eds), Red Quill Books, 2017.

[25] Pınar Bedirhanoğlu, Çağlar Dölek, and Funda Hülagü, "Eleştirel Güvenlik Çalısmalarının Marksist Eleştirisine Katkı: Devlet, Zor ve Sınıf Mücadelesi Bağlamında "Güvenliği" Yeniden Düşünmek", *Praksis*, 40, 2016, 9–40.

specific conjunctures, I consider pacification as a thread which could be employed to explore the specific modalities that connect security, police, and processes of capital accumulation to each other. It is pertinent to note that pacification entails a common pattern, a *general* mode of governing and political rationality for modern capitalist states in how security, police, law, and administration actively operate in conjunction towards the political management of insecurity integral to the social order of capital. Hence, this general level of abstraction needs to be lowered if one is to deal with a case together with its historical peculiarity by exploring the ways in which 'that' specific mode of pacification is crafted within the framework of social relations of forces. I intend the empirical/conjunctural sections of this thesis to be an attempt as such.

1.2. Scope of the Study, Research Questions, and Main Hypothesis

The thesis will focus on a selected period mainly characterized by the association of the neoliberal trajectory in Turkey with enduring efforts of structural adjustment. The scope spans from, though not of a rough scheme of periodization, from the late 1970s' armed conflict up until 2010. The rationale behind this preference is that the period in question incorporates the same form of the capitalist state from its initial installation by the military regime of 1980–1983 to the unfolding of debates on the state transformation by the 2010s.

The 2010s witnessed the AKP's tactical shifts unveiled throughout and aftermath of the global financial crises of 2007-2008, concurrently with the gradual consolidation of its power within the state apparatus which most notably culminated with the 2010 referendum. These ongoing shifts have comprised a distinct political inclination in administering neoliberal practices to drift away from the regulations and institutional structures associated with the so-called 'regulatory state' towards an increasingly centralized and discretionary mode of governance that would be embodied within the changes in the institutional materiality of the state. The period preceding the 2010s on the other hand entailed a continuity in the state form as well as in the policy orientation, i.e. the attempts of keeping up with what one may call the neoliberal policy agenda. While this does not imply a denial of the historical specificity within

each decade or subperiod, from a class-based perspective it could be put that the dominant classes heavily build on the pacification efforts of the preceding subperiods so as to prompt us to conceive of pacification as an ongoing process.

This is another reason why the preceding modes of pacification warrant considerable attention: The initial three decades of the neoliberal trajectory mark a period in which protracted economic crises within neoliberalism, even if they led to political instability, did not evolve into a crisis of the state and hegemony through political class struggle and systemic alternatives. Although a flourishing body of work and debates on authoritarianism and security has been developed in the post-2010s in Turkey in line with the global scale, I suggest that for a comprehensive examination of recent developments regarding state transformation it is imperative to keep sight of the balance of forces that was secured in preceding decades, having planted the seeds of profound changes in the state–society relationship.

On theoretical and empirical levels this thesis aims to address three sets of major research questions: First, what are the roots of social insecurity integral to the order of capital and why does it give rise to a politics of security? Through what theoretical ways one can connect the underlying logic of pacification to that of capitalist accumulation? What does the concept pacification tell us regarding the range of state powers devised for 'securing the insecurity' of the neoliberal order? Moving from the general to the specific, all these questions aim to orient me well into my main theoretical inquiry towards how an alternative approach can account for the concurrent reconfiguration of security and the equilibrium of social forces in post-1980 Turkey. Second, to what extent can one conceive of the end of the political violence and the subsequent processes of neoliberal transformation in Turkey as a process of pacification? Third, what specific legal-institutional means, techniques of power and discourses can be associated with pacification which might have accompanied the constitution and reproduction of the neoliberal order? In what ways are these shaped by class relations? In what ways can these be linked as a class response to the perceptions of insecurity among state managers and the ruling class in varying conjunctures?

The major argument of this thesis is that the formation of the neoliberal order in Turkey has been devised and maintained as a large-scale plan of internal pacification within which the idea of war and social peace have been intertwined through the mediation of security. In that, the class character of the armed conflict ended by the military regime has been inscribed upon the institutions, legal regulations, and discourses of peace and security under the same regime. By its initial configuration security has been developed as a technique of power and governing in the political management of the likely social consequences of a long-standing and drastic transformation marked by economic uncertainty, vulnerability, and insecurity. Since militarism and national security are but one part of it, the deployment of security has less to do with the institutional conflict between the military and civilian structures of power than with capital–labour contradiction when it comes to securing the conditions for social cohesion. Combining the powers of war and policing for the purpose of social ordering, pacification has functioned as the main mechanism underpinning the hegemony of neoliberalism. Second and concomitantly, in the carrying out of pacification such configuration of security is not only reactive and protective but also proactive and productive in the sense that it helps build, re-build, and order the relations of power in the system of political class domination. Finally, 'authoritarian statism' constitutes the material institutional framework under which pacification efforts have been put into action.[26] Hence, the concept pacification does not entail an alternative to authoritarian statism, on the contrary, the relational and form-analytical perspective inherent in the latter is key to explore the concrete embodiment of pacification in a social formation within the state's materiality. Put different, my goal is not to explicate the changing shift in the state form with neoliberal transition through pacification, but rather to explore the concomitant

[26] When grasped at the same level of abstraction, an analytical distinction between these two might follow that while authoritarian statism as conceptualized by Poulantzas signifies the structural form assumed by the condensation of class relations, pacification points to the means and strategies through which the state power permeates the social order within this form (or, another state form). For example, the relative concentration of political power in the executive is a characteristic not of pacification but of authoritarian statism, while it defines the general framework in which pacification practices are put into action. We shall go into more detail about this in the section 2.4., but suffice to say for now that taking into account the material form of the state defined by class and political struggles is not only to historicize the modalities of pacification in a given state but also refrain from a unilateral relation from the state to civil society which might imply a 'functionalist' or 'instrumentalist' approach.

reconfiguration of security and class relations assumed in neoliberal transition *as* pacification.

1.3. Research Methods

The examined period has been divided into three chapters, each encapsulating unique dynamics concerning the development of pacification which parallels the process of neoliberal transformation. As such, the subtitling and classification of empirical material are undertaken separately for each chapter. Two methods of gathering information, primary and secondary, are used. The primary sources consist of the original materials that are used as direct evidence from the time period in question, whereas secondary sources mainly comprise the related academic literature. I rely heavily on secondary analysis of primary sources to make sense of the multifaceted layers of historical context. The sources utilized mainly involve: relevant legislation, regulations and military communiques, parliamentary minutes (Grand National Assembly and Consultative Assembly of 1981–1983), public speeches, press releases by key political figures and institutions, documents issued by individual governments and political parties (government programmes, election manifestos, policy programmes). In order to explore the historical dynamics of the class conflict as reflected by the bourgeoisie, periodicals, policy proposals and official statements issued by capital organizations are examined. In order to document the policy processes regarding economic and institutional transformation, records of governmental and international bodies are used. For key economic and labour indicators data obtained from the Turkish Institute for Statistics and the Ministry of Labour and Social Security are used along with secondary sources and reports by international organizations on Turkey. To elaborate on the discursive and material context of the developments in domestic security annual reports and strategic plans of the police institution are also put to use.

Specifically on the late 1970s and 1980s I consult two selected memoirs, one of the General Kenan Evren, head of the military junta that took over power in 1980; the other is of the General Nevzat Bölügiray, one of the prominent martial law commanders in office during 1978 to 1983. These not only serve as historical

documents but also help unravel the pacification aims lying behind the actions of the military junta given the autobiographical component they carry. To this same end I also highly utilize a source I encountered at the SOAS Library during my research, *12 September in Turkey: Before and After*, which is published by the National Security Council originally in English and includes an appendix of martial law coordination board minutes. Though not exclusively limited to the 1980s another integral component of my research is the careful examination of day-to-day newspaper archives, primarily a widely circulated one, *Milliyet*. Together with other resources, such examination aims to capture the unfolding events, discourses derived from the speeches and interviews by key political figures, public sentiments, and commentaries shedding light on the conditions, all of which shaped and reflected the sociopolitical milieu of the time.

1.4. A Roadmap for Contribution

The integration of the concept pacification in the current body of work on both security and authoritarianism in Turkey underlies the contribution that this research seeks to make. The anticipated contribution could be viewed in a twofold aspect. The first one bears on the theoretical and political insights of thinking security through the lens of pacification, the second is the place of this particular research within the works associated with pacification in Turkey.

What we consistently encounter in dozens of official documents on pacification from the Spanish conquest in the 16th century through to contemporary counterinsurgency wars is a recurring theme that connects security to pacification, which is order-building.[27] The idea of pacification encourages one to conceive security not only through repression, i.e. the development of techniques of violence to put down protests and resistance, but mainly through the establishment of an order with an ultimate goal of achieving a common sense that 'resistance is pointless'. Security as such is to be understood not only as a mere repressive apparatus but also a political technique of power which potentially carries the bags of repressive, ideological, productive effects at the same time. Working through the techniques of security as

[27] M. Neocleous, 2017.

such the process of pacification in turn unveils a whole range of state powers at work in building and keeping the 'peace and order', and producing a secure foundation for capitalist accumulation. This involves 'the creation and maintenance of the wage-labour system',[28] production and reinforcement of ideal (productive and docile) citizen-subjects, building controlled spaces[29] as well as obviously fighting/suppressing the forms of disorder through techniques of violence. When taken as a contemporary and domestic (as well as imperial) mode of governing instead of an outdated concept left in the corridors of imperial wars, the lens of pacification thus helps reveal the inherent class war dimensions of security in the fabrication and administration of bourgeois social order inside and outside beyond institutional divisions. Accordingly, it also reveals the intimate relationship between various forms of security which are conventionally studied in vastly different scholarly 'worlds' (e.g. national security, social security, economic security, etc.) as well as connect security and police to particular techniques of power (e.g. social policy measures, urban planning, etc.) that are studied, yet again, separately from each other.

As far as the security literature in Turkey is concerned there is a limited historiography on pacification with few studies.[30] In the related body of work which exposes different problematics there seems to be a general inclination to examine the process of pacification either through developments in the 'formal' police and crime punishment,[31] or through particular acts of pacifying 'something' (the adversary, the

[28] George Rigakos, "Marxist Legal Theory: Security", *Critical Legal Thinking*. https://criticallegalthinking.com/2020/06/09/marxist-legal-theory-security/

[29] George Rigakos, ""To extend the scope of productive labour": Pacification as police Project". In M. Neoclous and G Rigakos (eds), 2011.

[30] Gülden Özcan, Revisiting National Security Discourse in Turkey with a view to Pacification: From Military Power to Police Power Onto Orchestration of Labour Power, *Moment Dergi*, 2014, n.1, 37–55. Biriz Berksoy, "Güvenlik Devleti, Gözetim-Polislik Ağları ve 2000'li Yıllarda Türkiye'de Üniversite Kampüslerine Yansımaları: Kürt Özgürlük Hareketi Özelinde Bir Değerlendirme", *Praksis*, 2016, 40, 121–151. Deniz Özçetin, "The War on Purse-Snatchers: Law and Order as Pacification" in T. Wall, P. Saberi, W. Jackson (eds), 2017. Erol Subasi, *Kapitalist devlet, güvenlik ve toplumsal düzen: 12 mart 1971 muhtırasını açıklamak*, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Galatasaray Üniversitesi, 2017. Erdem Güven, "Barışçıllaştırma Üzerine Kuramsal ve Siyasal bir Tartışma", *Ayrıntı Dergi*, n. 27, 2018, 35–59. Biriz Berksoy, Bir "Dahili Pasifikasyon" Projesi Olarak "Acil Durum Hazırlığı" Mantığı, "Acil Durum Devleti"nin Ortaya Çıkışı ve 2010'lardan İtibaren Türkiye Vakası, *Praksis*, n. 61, 2023, 133–167.

'antagonistic other', a dissident social movement, etc).[32] While encompassing these aspects I will engage with the concept rather to think 'neoliberalism-as-pacification' as a social and political project. For, what especially sets this concept broader than the scope of the terms such as repression, suppression, oppression, or social control is its constitutive nature which connects to processes and mechanisms of policing to build a new social order, or rebuild the social order. Pacification of labour is certainly an integral part of the problematic, but as far as the neoliberal class project is concerned it is almost identical to pacification of the major segments of the society, for the ultimate goal of such project is 'putting an end to class-based politics'.[33] Moreover, I will integrate the neoliberal appeal to depoliticization, labour market policy and social policy as techniques of pacification so as to examine the policing of the boundaries of the political, policing of workforce, and policing of poverty respectively.

1.5. Structure of the Thesis

The thesis is organized into six chapters, including the Introduction and Conclusion chapters. The following is the theoretical chapter which incorporates discussions that will help develop the conceptual framework of the study. It begins by a critical evaluation of a selected subset of dominant and critical conceptualizations of security as an analytical concern. The lines of discussion include the militarism thesis, its repercussions within the Turkish academia, as well as critical security studies and the theory of securitization associated with the 'Copenhagen School'. Against the backdrop of a methodological and theoretical critique of both accounts I will attempt to present an alternative framework over a review of the works associated with the

[31] D. Özçetin, 2017. B. Berksoy, 2023.

[32] B. Berksoy, 2016. E. Subasi, 2017. In Subasi's work, pacification is employed in the context of the 1971 military memorandum and its suppressive outcomes for the organized left. It is asserted that the hegemonic project at issue had secured the consent of a substantial part of the subordinate classes, whereas those whose consent could not be secured (defined by the author as 'the antagonistic other') had been pacified by the state. Even though the capital–labour relationship is acknowledged as an objective antagonism in the study, pacification is narrowly defined to include only those left outside the scope of the hegemonic project. At this juncture, what differentiates between pacification and pure suppression becomes blurred.

[33] G. Yalman, *Transition to Neoliberalism: The Case of Turkey in the 1980s*, İstanbul: Bilgi University Press, 2009, p. 308; 2004, p. 62.

Marxist engagement with the concept pacification. In a first step, I will explore the theoretical possibility of incorporating a relational theory of political power heavily indebted to Poulantzas's state theory, within the theory of pacification. I aim to underline that based on the key thesis of the state as a complex and contested relationship of forces, Poulantzas's form-analytical account of the capitalist type of state could be adopted as an initial step for an analysis of pacification in a given social-historical context. The chapter then moves on to a more abstract-level of discussion on pacification. The propositions of the lens of pacification on security and violence will be grounded by elucidating the structural dynamics behind the bourgeois order being inherently a system of insecurity. The chapter will end with a reflection on the relevance of pacification theory to neoliberalism, with possible implications of the former as to neoliberal hegemony.

Chapter three is the first empirical chapter occupying the core of my research. The aim of this chapter is to examine how pacification as a war strategy had been devised in line with the efforts to restore the bourgeoisie's hegemony spanning from the late 1970s through to the 1980s. The utmost importance of the 1980s for this study is that the decade does not only entail a drastic shift within the form of the state by the military coup, but at the same time it entails the founding phase of the process of pacification which has been set to work through the neoliberal hegemony so as to underpin the latter despite economic crises and political instability in due course. In this regard, my first aim is to unravel the foundational intertwinement for pacification, which is the waging of the class war as peace, and imposition of the peace as class war. In that, I will explore the ways in which the military elites and representatives of the bourgeoisie intended to extrapolate a peace-building endeavour from the war; how they accounted for the social war through the lens of a class perspective, and sought to embark on the building of a new order of peace and security from the very same perspective. Second, I will focus on through what legal-institutional means and discourses such order-building has been achieved. This also comprises what I will call 'the liberalization of the martial law' (i.e. the mediation of the war powers) to analyse the carrying out of the pacification through civilian forces that have been institutionalized within the form of authoritarian statism. These efforts of mediating the powers of the martial law by means of security, law and

administration epitomize the military generals' approach to the construction process: the order would be able to operate *without the need* for further military prerogatives including the imposition of martial law.

Chapter four seeks to explore the developments in the pacification efforts and politics of security in parallel to the efforts of restructuring during the 1990s. The distinctive feature of this decade is that it witnessed the unfolding of the contradictory and crisis-prone nature of the neoliberal policy agenda, not least with the changing shift in the dominant pattern of accumulation strategy by the capital account liberalization of 1989. In the first part the chapter focuses on the social implications of the cycle of economic and political instability running throughout the decade; how the crisis management strategies further entrenched the neoliberal hegemony so as to lead to an enduring provocation of social insecurity and uncertainty. The second part elaborates on the relation between the perception of threat to social peace and order at the level of state managers and classes, and the further wave of securitization situated on the grounds of national security and war on terror. I will particularly discuss the implications of the realignment of the relations of force (the military, the police and emergency powers) during the crisis-ridden years of finance-led neoliberalism within the context of the ongoing process of pacification. Such attempt mainly involves the question of whether the politics of securitization with the pioneering role assumed by the military entails a rupture or a continuation within the post-1983 setting of pacification.

Chapter five focuses on the process of pacification accompanying the consecutive neoliberal restructuring process in the 2000s. The significance of this period lies in that it covers the further episode of structural adjustment, a substantial portion of which was undertaken by the AKP governments at an unprecedented rate. Concomitantly it witnesses the AKP's leveraging of the general pacification setting of the post-1980s and advancing it through new techniques introduced. The discussion will be held in the context of the politics of restructuring in the post-2001 process against the background of the devastating impact of the severe economic crisis at the turn of the century. The process of pacification will be approached along three complementary axes. First, I will examine the distinctive tactics and processes

at play in the situation of depoliticization as a governing strategy in the post-crisis period. I aim to argue that the politics of depoliticization initiated by the September 12 regime had gone beyond the technicization of economic management and had also advanced to a post-political foreclosure of politics narrowing the landscape for political action. Second section aims to account for the pacification of the workforce with reference to the role of labour market and social policy. I will discuss the measures in both policy fields that are distinctive in referring the management of capital-labour relations through insecurity, precarity, and fragmentation. If these measures could be considered as part of the police powers under consideration, the third axis that complements them is another phase of securitization. In the last section I will examine the notable shifts in the politics of securitization which comprises the incorporation of a wide array of security and police powers. Since such incorporation run parallel to the efforts of 'demilitarization' I will focus on how the AKP cadres engaged in legislating further emergency powers without renouncing the rhetoric of democratization and Europeanization, and situate the new security configuration within the broader context of the pacification post-1980.

CHAPTER 2

CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE AND THE THEORY OF PACIFICATION

2.1. Introduction

This chapter seeks to offer a critical conceptualization of pacification as an alternative approach to account for the concomitant realignment of security and the equilibrium of social forces under the neoliberal transformation in Turkey. The concept pacification can be utilized as an analytical lens to approach security through a relational critique of class politics keeping up with the fundamental discussions in Marxist theory. While the concept addresses a general logic around which the pacifying powers of the capitalist state are functionally integrated to each other, the modalities of such powers historically exhibit variability within different states.[34] This is to say that the carrying out of pacification in a given historical case is shaped and redefined within the contradictory unity of social formation. This being the case, to embark on a critique of security within the broader social and class context of a given case I consider it plausible to pursue an articulation between a critical conception of pacification and the general methodological framework developed in the relational account of the state and power in Marxist theory, drawing mainly from Gramsci and Poulantzas. Such account is crucial to a) avoid any type of reification or instrumentalization of the state, its power and its institutions; and b) empirically explore the modalities of the exercise of state power on a relatively lower level of abstraction in view of the historical specificity of a particular capitalist social formation. Thereby in this thesis my resort to a series of theoretical studies in pacification theory, although not always explicitly stated, will be underpinned by the foundational propositions of the works of both theorists particularly on topics such as hegemony, political crises, political domination and state power.

[34] M. Neocleous, 2011, p. 200.

As the first genuine state theory in Marxist tradition the relevance of Gramsci's work is as follows in brief: His account of the integral state and the dialectical unity of force–consent[35] allows for a more nuanced examination of a whole range of pacifying powers of the state in relation to each other. The methodological separation between the state and civil society enables to reflect on the state power as an object of analysis per se, yet within the integrity of social formation. His account of hegemony is intimately linked to pacification as it incorporates class strategies to make the particularity of the demands and self-interests of the ruling classes as the constitutive part of a national-popular interest, whilst pacification policies are always carried out as part of a 'silent war' enacting class domination which most prominently concerns with the disavowal of the existence of such war**.** Finally, Gramsci's work is relevant for pacification also given his engagement with the concept of war in stressing the contested nature of popular-democratic antagonisms and class struggles in advanced capitalism. In *Prison Notebooks*, he repeatedly resorts to war and military terms both for analytical and strategic concerns[36] having closely aligned with a Clausewitzian perspective of politics.[37] His appropriation of the military concept 'war of position' in relation to the state's political management of peacetime[38] bears an implication on the mediation of class war through the policies and institutions of peace and security in pacification projects.

Building upon key propositions of Gramsci, Poulantzas on the other hand developed a more nuanced framework for the examination of the capitalist state's role in the political formation of dominant classes, securing class domination and social cohesion. This is mainly owing to his view of class domination mediated by the state's materiality as a more complex and contradictory relationship than a simple transposition of the level of socio-economic relations to that of political power

[35] Antonio Gramsci. *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (Trans. and Eds.), London: Lawrence and Wishart, [1948] 1971, p. 80.

[36] Daniel Egan, *The Dialectic of Position and Maneuver: Understanding Gramsci's Military Metaphor*, Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2016, p. 30.

[37] "It [war] is a moment of political life; it is the continuation in other forms of a given policy". A. Gramsci, 1971, p. 139.

[38] Ibid, p. 243.

relations.[39] To overcome what he observed as 'subjectivist-voluntarist' reduction in Gramsci's account, he interprets hegemony and class struggle in conjunction with the concept of power bloc which inherently involves the contradictory unity of multiple class fractions. To put it more simply, "[t]he concept hegemony can be extended to an examination of the relations of socio-economic and political interests between dominant classes and fractions".[40] Such emphasis on the autonomized political level of power relations in his early studies later evolved towards a particular relational approach to state power. Particularly in the latter half of the 1970s he tended to underscore the productive dimension of state power which he defined as a form-determined condensation of the equilibrium of social forces.[41] In that, the state's positive role in securing class domination and social cohesion renders the exercise of state power to extend beyond the structuralist repression and ideology couplet, which signals a negative function of protection and false consciousness. At this juncture, although there is no special consideration Poulantzas made as to security his grasp of state power as such runs parallel with the underlying logic of pacification within the productive nature of political force, mainly pertaining to security and police, in the constitution and administration of a particular social order. Second relevance of his work for a critical study of pacification lies in the form-analytical approach to the capitalist type of state. The form-determined nature of state power mediated by the balance of social forces would also provide hints about the ways in which the work of pacification is crafted in different historical conjunctures. As we will see in the case of Turkey, the ways state power is wielded in securing social cohesion in the face of the social and political implications of capital–labour contradiction throughout the process of neoliberal restructuring take on formally distinct processes of securitization and pacification.

The subsequent discussion will start by reflecting on the place of security in two different approaches which commonly lack a relational account of state as outlined

[39] Nicos Poulantzas, "Preliminaries to the Study of Hegemony in the State" in James Martin (ed.) *The Poulantzas Reader: Marxism, Law, and the State,* London: Verso, 2008.

[40] Ibid, p. 102.

[41] Nicos Poulantzas, "Political Crisis and Crisis of the State", in James Martin (ed.) *The Poulantzas Reader: Marxism, Law, and the State,* London: Verso, 2008. Nicos Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism, London: Verso, [1978] 2000.

here. The first subject of examination is what might be called the militarism thesis and its repercussions within the Turkish academia, which is widely regarded, at least in the context of the Turkish state, as an explanatory factor for security-driven modes of authoritarianism and political violence. As we shall see, this thesis is an output of a particularly dominant paradigm in the analysis of state-society relations in Turkey. My evaluation of such account is not about whether it is accurate to put that the armed forces in Turkey have been the prevailing actor in domestic politics, or to ask how much power they have exerted on sociopolitical life, but rather a methodological and theoretical critique of the limits of examining security in capitalist state through a specific institution and state elites, along with the reification of the state as "a source of constraint on political action".[42] The second line of discussion to explore is critical security studies and the theory of securitization associated with the 'Copenhagen School'. The reason for addressing this school is the tempting nature of uncovering its shortcomings as it represents though a small but 'critical' segment of the literature. Unlike the state-centric studies that dominate the mainstream analyses on security, this account convincingly refrains from reducing security solely to national security by introducing multiple sectors of security. Yet in analysing varying dimensions of security and acts of securitization merely as discursive formation it tends to gloss over the social and class content of security politics unfolding through the ways in which it is shaped by the relations of social forces within the wider framework of political class domination.

Against this background we will delve into a discussion significant for the theoretical framework of the thesis, which undertakes an investigation into the potential incorporation of Poulantzas's relational account to the general propositions developed in pacification theory with a particular focus on the authoritarian state form, and normal–exceptional duality. My contention is that Poulantzas's analysis of power in his later works can be enriched by the positive dimension of the concept pacification in view of security and police power, while the high level of abstraction in pacification theory can be historically contextualized for concrete social formations through the form-analytical relational account of Poulantzas. From this

[42] Bob Jessop, "States and State Power: A Strategic-Relational Approach", 2015. https://bobjessop.wordpress.com/2015/02/27/states-and-state-power-a-strategic-relational-approach/

follows a more generalized framework of pacification together with its substantive themes and propositions in the light of a nuanced outlook on the relevant literature. We will begin with the role of force and violence in the constitution and reconstitution of capital by revisiting the classical debate on primitive accumulation within Marxism. This opens a pathway into the idea of systematic colonization which became a focal point of Marx's interest in his discussion of the violence of primitive accumulation in the first volume of *Capital*, given its grasp of capital as a social relation. In an extended discussion of systematic colonization I will offer this concept as a mediating category that connects primitive accumulation to pacification, for it entails the exercise of political and legal power in the administration of wage labour, the perpetuation of expropriation and proletarianization by exerting constant control over labour and constant monitoring over the conditions of labour. Because such processes and political techniques at work fall within the police power as developed in pacification theory, the sections that will follow examine the positive and productive dimension of pacification through a historical reading of the colonial and political origins of the term, as well as the class codes it entails in its relation to war, police, and security. Finally, to illustrate the connection of this general framework to the scope of the thesis, I will reflect on the implications of pacification for the enduring hegemony of neoliberal capitalism with due attention on three topics occupying a core space throughout the research: order-building, depoliticization, security.

2.2. State-centrism, Militarism Thesis, and Their Limitations

Academia in Turkey has so long been overwhelmed by a particular paradigm of state-centrism, which is endowed with a hegemonic capacity[43] to subtly but pervasively shaping general ways of thinking, i.e. 'common sense' in society, thanks to its close interaction with the media and policymaking circles. To be sure, the paradigm consists of accounts from more than one field and tradition of humanities scholarship, as well as it is intrinsically nuanced depending on the issues, terms and notions highlighted by these accounts. Yet, in their approach to the state-society

[43] Galip Yalman, Tarihsel Bir Perspektiften Türkiye'de Devlet ve Burjuvazi, *Praksis* (5), 2002, pp. 7-10.

relationship, it can be observed that these accounts draw from a broad common framework characterized by a sort of state-centrism on methodological and analytical level, which would convert into the thesis of Turkey's 'strong state tradition'[44] on historical level. The state-centric component of these accounts derives from their grasp of the modern state as a centre of power in its own right, an actor acting with its own capacity autonomously of other social forces, including the dominant class.

Though not always exclusively referred to, it could be observed that such treatment of the state as an independent variable has been evolved under the influence of, inter alia, the movement of the so-called 'bringing the state back in' as a self-declared challenge to the dominant post-war approaches to the state deemed to be 'society-centred'.[45] The statist and/or neo-statist paradigm that can be associated with this movement can be generally characterized by the theoretical premise assuming "clear and unambiguous boundaries between state apparatus and society, state managers and social forces, and state power and societal power".[46] Once the relationship between the state and society is formulated as mutually exclusive, ontologically distinct, or at best externally related entities from each other as such, the state apparatus, bureaucratic authority and its internal functioning mechanisms are viewed and analysed in isolation as the main source of explanation for social relations, social formations and change, whereas no particular interest is shown in capital accumulation processes and class struggles as class/capital theoretical accounts are glossed over. Such institutionalist view can be also closely related to elitist and subjectivist modes of explanation. For the state as an actor in itself pursuing its own interests is embodied in the distinctive role of state elites and bureaucrats who impose their own socio-political projects and recipes on society.

The analytical framework generalized here fits well within the dominant approach to state-society relations in Turkey. The statist paradigm is manifested in the Turkish academia by way of a particular (as well as the hegemonic) narration, known as the

[44] Demet Dinler, "Türkiye'de Güçlü Devlet Geleneği Tezinin Eleştirisi." *Praksis*, no. 9, 2003, 17–54.

[45] Theda Skocpol et al.(eds.), *Bringing the State Back In*, Cambridge University Press, 1985.

[46] B. Jessop, Bringing the State Back in (Yet Again): Reviews, Revisions, Rejections, and Redirections, *International Review of Sociology*, 11:2, 2001, p. 6.

'strong state thesis', in which the modern Turkish state is analysed in regard to the alleged remnants of the Ottoman history. On this view, it is asserted that a strong, central, bureaucratic, transcendental (i.e. "patrimonial" in Weberian terms) state and political tradition has been inherited from the Ottoman Empire to the present, and still constitutes the unique determining actor in shaping social relations of power in modern Turkey. From this follows a series of dichotomies such as the strong state and bureaucracy vis-à-vis the weak civil society and state-dependent bourgeoisie, strong centre vis-à-vis weak periphery, strong military elites vis-à-vis weak civilian political elites, and so on.[47]

For example, Metin Heper, a prominent advocate of such dichotomous interpretation, addresses the strong state tradition and its bureaucratic elite in Turkey as a fetter on the development of capital owners, refraining from supporting them just as in the Ottoman State.[48] The private sector is said to be excluded from the authority structure centred on the state apparatus, whereby business circles have always been subject to government constraints. For Heper, the roots of this zero-sum relationship between the state and capital lie in the one between the state and society. He argues that the absence in both the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic of the mediating structures effective in Western modernization (such as the aristocracy or the entrepreneurial middle class) has resulted in a protracted conflict between the centre and the periphery. The centre, that is the state elite, has been intolerant against the periphery's weak efforts of integration, whilst the suppressed periphery acts overly reactive. Turning into a vicious circle, such tension leads to long and significant crises of legitimacy and constitutes the main characteristic of Turkish politics.

Concomitantly, the conflicting relationship between the state/bureaucracy and society/bourgeoisie in which the former play the constituent force of power is maintained in the normative positions different from Heper's. Even in the accounts

[47] Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey*, Eothen Press, 1985. Şerif Mardin, "Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire", Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 11, No. 3, 1969; Şerif Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?", *Daedalus*, Winter, 1973. Ziya Öniş, *State and Market: The Political Economy of Turkey in Comparative Perspective*, Boğaziçi University Press, 1999. Ahmet İnsel, *Düzen ve Kalkınma Kıskacında Türkiye: Kalkınma Sürecinde Devletin Rolü*, Ayrıntı Yayınları, 1996.

[48] M. Heper, 1985, p. 101.

that acknowledge the bourgeoisie as part of the power bloc, it is still portrayed as often the victim and passive ally, owing its existence and legitimacy to its relations with the state bureaucracy. Various examples of such portrayal could be found in 'critical institutionalist' accounts. For instance, Ayşe Buğra contends that the class character of the bourgeoisie in Turkey has been generated by the state, and this historical dependency of the bourgeoisie makes it lack the self-confidence and class consciousness to enjoy a hegemonic position pursuing its own class interests.[49] For Buğra, even though its class interests are not entirely excluded from the state and political elites' development strategies, the bourgeoisie is still left to the vagaries of the state practices which qualifies its relationship with the state, at best, a "love and hate" one.[50] Such interpretation leads Buğra to conclude with a bold claim that the bourgeoisie in Turkey is neither hegemonic nor the ruling class in the *proper* sense, insofar as it lacks the power to launch its economic-political class project. In a similar vein, when discussing the alleged lack of the hegemonic character of bourgeois ideology in Turkey, it is argued by Çağlar Keyder that the state's long term tutelage over the market have hindered this class from engaging in political struggle against pre-capitalist forces throughout its history.[51] It is because, Keyder maintains, the bourgeoisie owed its economic position to the military victory and have gained the status of being a class thanks to state power since the establishment of the Republic. The only compelling struggle it went through was against the bulky bureaucratic tradition only after World War II, and this had been rather over market freedoms than being an ideational one towards political democracy. Thus, despite Keyder's claim of developing an explanation on the basis of class struggle, such basis by no means take into account the antagonistic relationship between labour and capital nor the power struggles within society, whereby the binary opposition between the state and bourgeoisie still prevails.

What is commonly implied or explicitly stated in such accounts is that the Turkish bourgeoisie has not developed a class consciousness and ideology due to the reasons

[49] Ayşe Buğra, "Class, Culture, and the State: An Analysis of Interest Representation by Two Turkish Business Associations", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 30:4, 1998, p. 523.

[50] Ibid, p. 5, 120.

[51] Ç. Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development*, Verso, 1987, p. 201.

mentioned above, the 'dependence on the strong state', so to speak. Hence, as a class it does not feel the need to engage in the advocacy of freedoms as in Western capitalism, and thus, felt compelled to compromise with the state's authoritarian practices. Among the number of analytical and normative problems of this commonplace assumption, suffice to say for now that the contested hegemonic status of the bourgeoisie is historically characterized by its intolerance towards a politicized working class which is engaged in popular democratic struggle. In other words, if the bourgeoisie has failed to establish its class hegemony as had been the case most saliently in the late 1970s, this is explicable not by reference to its dependence on the state but rather to its intolerance towards the existence of an organized working class pursuing a genuine change in social order.[52]

While devoting its entire historical reading to the supposedly external relationship between the state and the bourgeoisie, the state-centric paradigm does not made a slightest reference on what struggles have taken place in civil society that is supposedly independent of the state, most prominently, on the bourgeoisie's notorious relationship with the idea of the political representation of working classes within a democratic framework. This kind of negligence is hegemonic, to be sure. For it constitutes the generally adopted historical narrative upon which almost all other scholarly and public views are built in one way or another, as well as for it takes the capitalist basis of social relations of power as given and excludes possible efforts towards its transformation out of the question of democracy. On the other hand, and relatedly, such state-centrism displays a dissident outlook as Yalman once succinctly explained.[53] Indeed, a vast majority of the relevant accounts take as a starting point the distortive impact of the Turkish state on economic development and bourgeois class formation. For them, the long-lasting authoritarian nature of the state is characterized by the constitute role of state intervention regarding the making of the market and society. The dissident outlook thus originates from these accounts' speaking for the weakening of such role attributed to the state for a democratic transformation of state-society relations. As a result, the question of democracy is

[52] G. Yalman, 2002, p. 15.

[53] G. Yalman, 2002; "Türkiye'de Devlet ve Burjuvazi: Alternatif Bir Okuma Denemesi" in N. Balkan & S. Savran (eds.), *Sürekli Kriz Politikaları*, 2004. G. Yalman, 2016.

subsumed into a conception of political liberalism abstracted from class contradictions, which could be achieved solely by a politics of depoliticization on the basis of the separation of economy from politics, and thereby undermining of the so-called 'strong state as a problem for the consolidation of democracy'.[54] It is also hardly surprising that this sort of state-centric dissidence would embrace the anti-statist discourse that has once been the credo of the neoliberal transformation all over the world. The hegemonic state-centric paradigm has indeed helped shift the focus of accountability for the subsequent economic crises away from the neoliberal policies implemented, rather to the practitioners (political parties, state bureaucracy, etc.) as we will see further on in the discussion over the 1990s and 2000s. For now, not to go too far off the specific topic here, we shall conclude by coming to the way in which the anti-statist account is manifested on security.

It would be fair to put that militarism has long been a functional conceptual tool in explaining the relationship between politics and security in Turkey. This is in large part because both the literature on security in Turkey, which had indeed been far from fertile until the 1990s, and the dominant perspective of civil-military relations that has shown a tremendous upsurge in parallel with the so-called civilianization reform in the 2000s, commonly draw on the theoretical premises of institutionalism and elitism as well as the analytical assumptions of the thesis of "strong state tradition" outlined so far. Such influence leads to a wide tendency to problematize the securitization of political processes and the political role of security in a modern capitalist social formation from the narrow lens of the 'militarization of politics' (or 'politicization of the military') which limits its concern only with the role of the armed forces in politics. The underlying narrative is familiar: The state capacity which is grasped as a 'thing in itself' comes to be subjectified in the civil and/or military bureaucratic elite as the primary actor of the state's security politics,[55] and

[54] M. Heper, The Strong State as a Problem for the Consolidation of Democracy: Turkey and Germany Compared. *Comparative Political Studies*, 25(2), 1992.

[55] The civil/military separation employed here does not necessarily imply that the state elite, which is viewed as the dominant sociopolitical force, is confined solely to military officials. It is rather that the economic or political interventions of the state are normally evaluated as the revanchist acts of both the military and civil bureaucratic institutions of the Kemalist tutelage against the rising bourgeoisie and its representative political parties. The military and civil institutions of the regime are thus grasped together as the representatives of the military-oriented, elitist and secularist tutelage.

conceptualized as an omnipotent force oppressing all social groups including the dominant class while carrying out its self-declared guardianship role. The processes of securitization are thus explained solely with reference to the military encroachment upon the political regime, which has been accounted for as a core component of *praetorianism* attributed to the Turkish state.[56]

As it could be easily observed, the category of praetorian state, as conceptualized by Samuel Huntington,[57] fits neatly in the state-centric paradigm inasmuch as it bears on a highly Euro-centric and essentialist sketching of 'late capitalist/modern' societies alongside a notion of state developed external to power struggles and class interests. Whether or not they directly resort to the category of praetorianism, the accounts that take militarism as an explanatory factor for the state's authoritarian practices build on the presumption of the same binary confrontation: the tradition of strong state vis-à-vis a weak, incapacitated civil society. In this light, we are often told that the Republic has been characterized by a 'deep-rooted security culture' inherited from the Ottoman Empire. The long-enduring security culture is obviously a state-centric one driven by the public bureaucracy and military institution which have consistently configured themselves toward 'the preservation of the state'.[58] Others maintain that such continuity of the alleged security culture has its roots in the 'fear of abandonment and fear of loss of territory' prevailing in the late Ottoman period. Making the security and integrity of the state as a major concern, the 'traditional' discourse on security has remained vastly unchanged and even reinforced along with an increasing alarmist culture in the period from the Sevrés Treaty (1920) through to the Cold War.[59] Accordingly, frequent military interventions in politics that had been

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Nevertheless, the prominent postulation of 'the strong, class-free state' acting above and against all social classes, whether its political instruments are civilian or not, still remains as the main explanatory variable.

[56] Ahmet İnsel, 1999; 2007.

[57] Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and The State the Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations*, Cambridge: Harward University Press, 1957.

[58] Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, Transformation of Turkey's Civil-Military Relations Culture and International Environment, *Turkish Studies*, 12:2, pp. 258-59.

[59] Pınar Bilgin, Turkey's changing security discourses: The challenge of globalisation, *European Journal of Political Research*, 44, 2005, pp. 183-4.

rationalized based on the state's residual discourse of 'national security' are said to have only expanded the already existing political autonomy of the armed forces within the regime.[60] Though from a different political perspective, it is also suggested that the prevailing tradition of militarism in Turkey is a component of the state's authoritarian and Bonapartist character which issues from the absence of a proper civil society domain and political culture.[61] Yet again, a problem that is characteristic of state-centrism arises: the military is considered above social classes while the authoritarian Bonapartist character attributed to the state is misleadingly assumed to 'be emptied of its class contents'[62] and examined with regards to the [non]existence of a peculiar culture identified with Western capitalist societies.

Despite their subtle variations it is clear that the majority of those writing on the politics of security in Turkey share a wider problem with the conception of security. First, they presume a rigid continuity in the configuration of state power so as to neglect the changing relations of power with capitalist development. Hence, far from alluding to a political technique, security is predominantly examined in consideration of the domination of the state over social classes, civil and political elite, state institutions and interactions between institutions. Inasmuch as the armed forces appeared to be the privileged institutional actor of security politics, militarism had been a common theme for them to make of the security-related features of state authoritarianism. The political practices that connote the 'question of militarism' are roughly situated in the conflict alleged between military bureaucracy as the dominant and autonomous institution of the state elite on the one hand, and civilian political elite along with the bourgeoisie, on the other. In that, militarism thesis is used not only to explain the armed forces' role in domestic politics but also highlight either the weakness, or the lack of interests of civilian actors and societal institutions in proposing alternative visions of security.[63] In this grip of militarism, neither the

[60] Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 1997.

[61] Gencay Şaylan, "Ordu ve Siyaset: Bonapartizmin Siyasal Kültürü" in *Bahri Savcı'ya Armağan*. Ankara: Mülkiyeliler Birliği Vakfı Yayınları, 1988.

[62] J. Mehlman, 1977, cited in Bob Jessop, *State Power: A Strategic-Relational Approach*, 2008, pp. 83-4.

[63] P. Bilgin, 2005, p. 196.

forms of security other than national security appear in the agenda, nor national security is questioned in view of the ways in which social order and political subjectivities are reshaped by it. Even when the scope of national security is acknowledged to incorporate internal security function, this is problematized not in terms of the ideological and political capacity of security, but rather of the political and social autonomy of the military in interfering with a broad range of issues believed to have a security dimension.[64] On the other hand, 'critical' approaches calling for the widening of the scope of militarism tend to define the term as the shaping of all facets of civilian life by military values and ethos.[65] In this view, the military is no longer the unique agent of militarist practices, since militarization as such can be achieved only by the active participation and consent of civilians. Thus militarism is taken out of the context of war as its repercussions on everyday life are brought on the question. Such effort to broaden the ways to think critically about militarism may appear relatively positive compared to the narrow conceptual horizon of national security. Yet, it is of little use to think of security itself as a technique of power, since the interrelation between war and security is still considered limited to militarism. Just as those identifying the problem with security to militarization, such view also rests upon the binary relationship assumed between civil and military powers as well as between war and peace, as inherited from modern liberalism. The implication is clear that militarism must be problematized and disclosed inasmuch as war powers sneak into peace where it should not. Thus once demilitarization is properly achieved, war can be precisely separated from peace, and war powers be put into its place (against external threats).

Here, what we see is that the methodological move of detaching from each other the institutions and powers concerning the state's security practices imports into the 'dissident' and anti-statist rhetoric of the state-centric paradigm a political and

[64] Ü. Cizre Sakallıoğlu, 1997.

[65] One among many, for an illustrative example of seemingly critical accounts, see A. Altınay, 'Tabulaşan Ordu, Yok Sayılan Militarizm: Türkiye'de Metodolojik Militarizm Üzerine Notlar' in Laçiner (ed) *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce, Cilt 9:* Dönemler *ve Zihniyetler*, İletişim, 2009, pp. 1245-1257. Altınay prefers to employ the term "methodological militarism" to develop a careful critique of the scholarly discourses which are to naturalize militarism in implicit ways. While doing this, however, she apparently postulates a war-free liberal order that could be maintained only by genuinely civil means.

normative space oriented around the concept of 'demilitarization'. For, since it is only the military as an institution anticipated within the state and its war power, the ultimate objective of had long been equalized to demilitarization and the 'normalization' of civil-military relations by simply putting the military, the only securitizing actor, back in its place. In that, the ultimate annihilation of military tutelage over civilian politics would render the 'conflict' between state and political elites (read military bureaucracy and civilian governments) *rationalized* around the concept of free market in a way to transform these actors from 'hostile adversaries' to 'friendly opponents'[66] in a liberal and predictable constitutional order. Or, a 'democratic oversight and civilian control'[67] over the military would be indispensable if a 'democratic concordance'[68] cannot be accomplished to properly curtail the intervening role of the state elite on politics and economy. However, the narrative goes, such control would not be easy at all given the Turkey's specific cultural, social, and institutional context leading to pro-military societal convictions,[69] and the 'symbiotic relationship' maintained between the military and citizenry.[70]

Scripted by a firm overemphasis on the 'uniqueness of the Turkish case', what is neglected outright in all of these state-centric accounts that can be exemplified further is the fact that the widely acclaimed attempts of the so-called demilitarization

[66] M. Heper, "The Justice and Development Party Government and the Military in Turkey", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 2, June 2005, pp. 215-231.

[67] S. P. Huntington, *Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981; C. Paker, 'Foreword' in İnsel and Bayramoğlu (eds.) *Almanac Turkey 2006-2008 Security Sector and Democratic Oversight*, TESEV Publications, 2010, p. vii-viii; Ü. Cizre, *Democratic Oversight and Reform of the Security Sector in Turkey: 2005/2006 Status Report*, Lit Verlag Berlin, 2007; M. Uluçakar and A. Çağlar, "Turkish Professional Military Education and Civilian Control", *Bilig*, No 79, 2016, pp. 173-198.

[68] N. Narlı, "Civil- military relations in Turkey", *Turkish Studies*, 1:1, 2000, 107-127; M. Heper and A. Güney, "The Military and the Consolidation of Democracy: Recent Turkish Experience" in *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 26 No. 4, 2000, pp. 635-657; B. Toprak, *Türkiye'de Farklı Olmak: Din ve Muhafazakarlık Ekseninde Ötekileştirilenler*, İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Bilimsel Araştırmalar Projesi, 2008.

[69] N. Narlı, "Initiatives For Transparency-Building in Turkey: International, Regional and Domestic Factors", *Information & Security*, Vol.11, 2003, p. 36.

[70] E. Aydınlı, "A Paradigmatic Shift for the Turkish Generals and an End to the Coup Era in Turkey", *The Middle East Journal*, Volume 63, Number 4, 2009, pp. 581-596; N. Narlı, "Civil- military relations in Turkey", *Turkish Studies*, 1:1, 2000, pp. 107-127.

initiated as an inseparable part of neoliberal policy reforms of the post-2000s have paved the way for politics of securitization to reach a subtler level than ever before, particularly with regards to police powers of the state. The point is therefore not only the hegemonic strategy disguised in the rhetoric of demilitarization. But also that the securitization of the socio-political sphere, which is by no means limited to militarism, can as well bear an essential way to accompany such strategy, let alone be opposite or alternative to it. In this light, it should be concluded that regardless of how much the scope of use of the terms is expanded in a critical way, the theses of militarism and militarization clearly fail to help reveal the interlocks between series of state powers pertaining to the categories of security, police and war, as well as their relation to capital.

If the underlying problem with militarism thesis is the misconceptions of the state-centric paradigm, there appears a need for an alternative approach to security which tends to stand at a critical distance from state-centrism. A line of inquiry as such is found in the study of international relations. It covers an emerging body of work that have become known under the umbrella label of 'critical security studies'. While focusing on diverse themes of research, these studies commonly claim to develop a theoretical approach which takes as its starting point the critique of state-centrism and the narrow horizon of security studies focusing solely on military issues. They also seem worth discussing at some length as they rightfully call attention to practices of securitization instead of militarization. Now I will shortly outline the main theoretical concern of this literature and the 'securitization' approach as part of it, and then close the section with critical comments on the limitations of their critical position.

2.3. Critical Security Studies, Theory of Securitization, and Their Limitations

The 'schools' of thought associated with critical security studies have been mainly developed in the post-Cold War study of international relations as a critique of traditional security thinking associated with the intellectual hegemony of (neo)realism[71]. According to Ken Booth, who is known as the leading figure of

[71] P. Bilgin, K. Booth, R. Wyn Jones, "Security Studies: The Next Stage". *Naçao e Defesa*, 82, 1998.

'emancipatory security theory' (a.k.a. the Welsh / Aberystwyth School) the traditional approach is limited to state-centrism, it is status quo-oriented, and excessively focused on military threats.[72] The state-oriented approach is said to reveal a narrow vision of security and security threats, and fall short of explaining contemporary security concerns affecting the everyday lives of individuals and societies. Moreover, it is also a common view among critical studies that states should be analysed as part of the problem of insecurities as much as the solution. Many security problems are rooted rather in national governments' own policies and failures than in external military threats posed by other states. Such observations lead the scholars of critical security to reject considering states as the primary locus and subject, and instead offer incorporating non-state and non-military dimensions to security.[73]

It is thus apt to say that 'critical' security is developed out of the desire to broaden the conception of security outside the state and deepen the agenda of security studies in a way to disclose the politically and socially constructed character of the concept.[74] That means, the new security concept is argued to be rather society and citizen-centred than state-centred, in that security is not only about the identification and elimination of military threats, and that the objective of security politics should also ensure people's happiness and well-being.[75] Accordingly, it is also asserted that security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin as both refer to the absence of physical and human constraints on individuals and groups "which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do".[76]

Notwithstanding their emphasis on the political character of security, one may indicate more than a few common aspects shared by 'critical security studies'

[72] Ken Booth, Security and Emancipation, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1991, p. 318.

[73] K. Krause & M. Williams, *Critical Security Studies Concepts and Strategies*, Routledge, 1997.

[74] K. Booth, *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005. K. Krause & M. Williams, *Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods*, *Mershon International Studies Review*, V. 40, 1996, p. 230.

[75] P. Bilgin, Güvenlik Çalışmalarında Yeni Açılımlar: Yeni Güvenlik Çalışmaları, *Stratejik Araştırmalar*, Cilt: 8, Sayı: 14, 2010, pp. 76-7.

[76] K. Booth, 1991, 319.

apparently not 'that' critical insofar as they hardly go beyond reiterating the main categories of liberal theory in approaching the state, society, security, emancipation, relations of power, etc. However, security and depoliticization under neoliberalism being the core and interrelated elements of this study, I shall pick out the securitization theory among the body of work associated with critical security. Securitization is a conceptual contribution to security studies by those working in the theoretical approach later known as the 'Copenhagen School'. Fundamentally anchored in European security dynamics, the Copenhagen School represents another 'critical' attempt of offering a broader framework of security to overcome the US-driven realist security thinking whose focus has been questioned for being exclusively confined to state, military and national security.[77] As a way to incorporate a wide array of questions of social order, aspects of human life and non-state actors, they suggest five sectors of security (military, political, economic, societal an environmental).[78] The school's securitization approach is an outcome of considering security as an output of political and social processes rather than an objective situation. Security is "the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics."[79] Once taken as a signifier it does not describe or picture an objective condition. It rather enunciates an (in)security condition in such a way to transform social relations into security relations.[80] Therefore, the lens of securitization is not concerned with the true or false quality of the description of a security problem, since such rationalist universalism would neither politically nor analytically be helpful,[81] but instead helps to critically examine the politics of it: the question of how and why a particular public issue is presented as a security issue (that is, securitized), what outcomes it produces, in what ways the discourses and practices of security as such order social relations.

[77] J. Huysmans, Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, on the creative development of a security studies agenda in Europe, *European Journal of International Relations*, 4:4 1998a, pp. 483-7.

[78] B. Buzan, O. Waever & J. Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, Londra: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.

[79] Ibid, p. 23.

[80] J. Huysmans. Security! What Do You Mean?: From Concept to Thick Signifier, *European Journal of International Relations*, 4(2), 1998b, p. 232.

[81] B. Buzan, et.al., 1998, p. 31.

From the securitization perspective there is no natural limit to the quality and range of public issues to become securitized. Any public issue could be moved from the non-political realm to the political realm, and then be securitized.[82] Securitization takes place when an issue is staged as an "*existential threat* to a *referent object* by a *securitizing actor* who thereby generates endorsement of *emergency measures* beyond rules that would otherwise bind".[83] Therefore, securitization does not necessarily bear on an issue posing an objective threat for security per se, it is rather the securitizing actor itself who chooses to securitize an issue. Such move employs a specific rhetorical structure which constitutes the distinguishing feature of securitization (survival, emergency of the issue, immediacy of action, etc.).[84] Here, the scholars of securitization heavily draw on language/discourse theory defining the securitizing move as a 'speech act'. That is to say, it is not the issuing of a threat in real terms, but the discourse that presents something as a threat to a referent object, that is, the utterance itself is the act.[85] Finally, for a securitizing move to be successful and its referent issue to become securitized going beyond mere politicization, the audience must be convinced of it. Any practice of securitization construes the claim to require emergency measures and justify actions outside the normal operation of political procedure, and this could be realized "only if and when the audience accepts it as such".[86] This shows that the political construction of security is neither objective nor subjective, but intersubjective.

If all security threats and their countermeasures are constructed and phrased in political space, then one can define securitization as an "extreme version of politicization".[87] Yet, politicization as such is at the same time anti-political – it exerts a powerful depoliticizing effect on the handling of issues within their political context. The discourse of security often calls for extraordinary measures with less democratic control and constraint, insofar as it lifts the referent issues above politics.

[82] Ibid, p. 23.

[83] Ibid, p. 5.

[84] Ibid, p. 26.

[85] Ibid, p. 26.

[86] Ibid, p. 25.

[87] Ibid, p. 23.

Because it gives rise to the process of suspending the rules of normal politics and constantly delays the operation of political democracy, security could be seen as the key to legitimize the use of force and special powers of the state, silence opposition, prevent change, and reinforce the status quo. This being the case, the scholars of the securitization theory offer desecuritization, which means keeping issues off the security agenda, as the optimal long-run option. It is only through the efforts of desecuritization that issues be shifted out of emergency mode and into the ordinary public sphere as well as 'the normal bargaining process of the political sphere'.[88]

Taken together, the 'critical' approaches to security can be characterized with their common interest in widening the security agenda which had been narrowed down by the traditional, state-centric and realist view. It would be unfair to suggest that efforts of this kind proved futile, since, to a certain extent, they have provided some insight to the studies devoted to the exploration of the dynamics of complex security relations going beyond military issues. Moreover, much of the literature on securitization have revealed a great deal about the political construction of security as an intersubjective reality and its use as a malleable tool for different political purposes in the hands of governments.

Yet, notwithstanding the appealing and useful conceptions of security they provide, studies of securitization and the so-called critical schools adhere to the treatment of the state as an independent variable, which is obviously a common feature of realist studies they aim to overcome. What this also implies is that from a relational perspective, the problem with state-centrism among critical security studies is characterized by a normative approach rather than an analytical or methodological one. On analytical level, the binary and/or external relationship assumed between the state and society still remains the case. For instance, it is asserted that the (critical) conception of new security is 'emancipatory' insofar as it advocates the reformulation of security politics around the idea of 'human security' rather than 'statist conceptions of security'.[89] Such human-centrism, based on the contention that

[88] Ibid, p. 4. O. Wæver, "Securitization and Desecuritization," in Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.), *On Security*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.

[89] P. Bilgin et al. 1998, p. 151.

'real security could only be achieved through the emancipation of people as individuals and groups'[90] does not necessarily amount to a society-centred approach taking account of the social structure of power networks framed by different social forces as well as the inner contradictions, divisions and uneven dynamics of capitalist society which come to be crystallized in security practices, the most prominent being class antagonism. Nor does its challenge to state-centrism tend to relate state power and security politics to power relations within society, for the former is handled around the conception of a state with its own independent will. The grasp of state as such is made use of to focus on the security agendas (of 'individuals and groups') beyond national security, but it also purports to elide at the outset, for instance, the ways in which security of capital is entwined with national security and secured by the state's recourse to emergency powers.[91] This being the case, the critique of state-centrism ends up depriving the state of its primacy as the unit of analysis, whereby the conception of state as an autonomous subject acting on its own behalf, is left unquestioned. To the extent that it is situated as opposed to the state viewed as acting on its own behalf, the fashionable notion of 'human security' remains as a contested one running the risk of reflecting 'a vision of social evolution virtually indistinguishable from the (neo)liberal notion of development'[92] proposed by the WB and other international institutions.

The same pitfalls apply to the theory of securitization. The critical project of the Copenhagen School does not concern itself with the task of unmasking the historical and class character of security in bourgeois society. As outlined above, it aims at expanding security agenda through the incorporation of new 'sectors' in order to overcome the state-centric predilections of security. Yet, because it lacks a relational and coherent theory of state, it falls short to explore the interrelationship among security practices in a given historical and social context. Instead, each practice of securitization is considered in itself and within the scope of a speech act which might prove to be analytically useful in describing a particular securitizing move to silence

[90] Ibid., 1998, p. 143.

[91] J. Reynolds, *Empire, Emergency And International Law*, Cambridge University Press, 2017. M. Neocleous, 2008.

[92] Mark Berger, Heloise Weber (eds.), *War, Peace and Progress in the 21st Century: Development, Violence and Insecurity*, Routledge, 2011, p. 149.

opposition, but which also turns out telling us very little about what the general framework of bourgeois security and its police powers is about. Even though the School claims to develop its multisectoral approach to scrutinize the nexus between different sectors outside military issues, the issues of respective sectors are perceived as being externally related. Thus, the multisectoral approach leaves unchallenged the possible instances in which economic interests take the guise of national security (e.g. most obviously in suppressing labour militancy), or the relation between security discourses associated with the inside (e.g. social security) and the outside (national security).[93]

Concomitantly, the reduction of practices of securitization to speech acts and actors results in the blurring of the role assumed by security in securing the conditions for social cohesion in a capitalist social formation, whereby turns power relations into a mere discursive matter.[94] Thus, at stake are the ways in which the reach of the dominant ideology of security in a given social and historical context expands well beyond speech acts and actors, being imprinted into the legal-institutional architecture of the state and becoming an essential part of common sense. For example, as we will see in the following chapter the September 12 regime in Turkey amounts to a pacification project to initiate and maintain the hegemony of neoliberalism. The underlying characteristic of this project had been the task of building a new socio-political order that would put an end to class-based politics[95] and institutionalize (national) security as an effective technique of power within which the logic of class war is inscribed. Inasmuch as the state's continuous efforts to secure such task is glossed over no historical links could be found between, for instance, the speech acts and securitizing actors of the 1980s and 2000s, which would eventually become distinct objects of analysis on their own.

One can reasonably argue that the influence of language theory on the securitization approach is the outcome of an anti-essentialist ontology, and might provide a useful

[93] M. Neocleous, "From Social to National Security: On the Fabrication of Economic Order". *Security Dialogue*. 2006, 37(3).

[94] Kendra Briken & Volker Eick, "Commodified Pacification: Police Commercial Security and the State" in C. Burak Tansel (ed.), 2017, p. 49.

[95] G. Yalman, 2009, p. 308; 2004, p. 62.

insight that anything can be constructed as a threat. Yet, subsuming security merely into a discursive and perceptual construction is, in turn, purportedly the disavowal of the objective foundation of securitization. Put simply, anything can be constructed as a threat, but not every threat owes its existence to construction. To illustrate, militant tendencies of organized labour constitute an objective security threat to capital accumulation, and thus, to bourgeois social order. Such threat is essentially of a class and political contention, but by no means owes itself to a construction by speech acts. Nor is it a culture-dependent variable as presented in constructivist or the so-called emancipatory theory of security. Its objective and universal character originates from the antagonistic nature of the relationship between labour and capital. Plus, because labour unrest or any movement for genuine change is a security threat to capitalist order, the question how capital can control, contain and pacify labour and any source of potential disorder becomes a task of profound importance. Taken together, the role of security and policing in securing the relations of exploitation and class position in the inherently crisis-prone nature of capitalism, and particularly, the unstable character of neoliberal marketization is to be a prominent research task for any contemporary theoretical effort claiming to be 'critical'. Yet, the accounts under the umbrella of critical security theory, including the securitization approach of the Copenhagen School, commonly lack an integral idea of a social system that interlocks the 'sectors' of security and how each sector, despite possible contradictions, fits into the broader framework.

2.4. Authoritarian Statism in relation to Security: Normal/Exceptional Duality and the Law as a Strategic Terrain

Moving beyond the debates oriented around the conception of the 'state as a subject' together with the mainstream liberal, institutionalist, and 'critical' ideas about the nature of security in that state, this section is an attempt to explore the theoretical possibility of incorporating a relational theory of political power heavily indebted to Poulantzas's state theory, within the theory of pacification. Such incorporation however will be in a 'weak' sense that limits itself to the two main strands of these theories: the form-analysis, mainly to what Poulantzas termed as the authoritarian statist form of the capitalist state on the one hand, and security as radically critiqued

by the Anti-Security collective on the other. I aim to underline that based on the key thesis of the state as a complex and contested 'relationship of forces', Poulantzas's form-analytical account of the capitalist type of state could be adopted as an initial step for an analysis of pacification in a given social-historical context: First, it helps us avoid a functionalist or institutionalist reification or an instrumentalist reduction of the state power as well as to approach security beyond the military/civil dichotomy that is central to political regime analysis. In so doing, it also provides a useful analytical tool to situate the varying practices of pacification in relation to the specific forms that the capitalist state has assumed in different social formations and historical conjunctures from the 19th century onwards. For, the institutional materiality in which the complex set of class relations are inscribed in a specific state, and the interrelation between such materiality and the changing equilibrium of social forces within an economic and/or political crisis reveals a heuristic potential for making of through what means the violence of pacification is mediated in that state. While pacification can be regarded as a common pattern for capitalist states, its illustrative forms of practice as well as possible resistances against it are framed and shaped through different institutional and organizational forms.

In effect, it is beyond doubt that Poulantzas's intellectual development has subsequently evolved towards critical engagement with a relational theory of power and the state away from structuralism, however such evolution does not entail a sharp rupture. By operating with the Althusserian scheme he takes 'the political' as the main object of inquiry in his first major text *Political Power and Social Classes* (1968), but in so doing he also lays the foundation of his account of the state in relation to social relations of power by developing a number of its underlying concepts such as relative autonomy, types of state, forms of state and regime, forms of crises, periodization of the political and power bloc as a rework of Gramsci's concept of hegemony.[96] His rather later works, *Political Crisis and Crisis of the State* (1976) and *State, Power, Socialism* (1978) would address a more decisive detachment from structuralism in favour of a coherent relational theory of power and

[96] In his reply to Miliband and Laclau, Poulantzas states that the interrelationality he draws between the concept relative autonomy and class struggles was "in the direction already inherent in *Political Power*" in which he denies to have adopted an Althusserian-structuralist position. N. Poulantzas, "The Capitalist State: A reply to Miliband and Laclau", in James Martin (ed.) *The Poulantzas Reader: Marxism, Law, and the State*, Verso, 2008, p. 282.

the state. In both texts, he goes on to formulate the state as "a material condensation of a relation of forces between classes and fractions of class", which is to say that the state is thoroughly constituted and permeated by class contradictions, contrary to "the state conceived as a thing and the state conceived as a subject".[97] Second, to push further the break with structuralism by building up his focus on state power he refrains from a clear distinction between repressive and ideological state apparatuses. In that, he explains the configurations in these two types of apparatuses through collective and mutual interaction rather than in opposition to each other, the illustration of which could be found in the emergence of authoritarian statism as a permanent form.

For a start, we shall take a glance what distinguishes between the normal and exceptional forms. Building on his early works, in *State, Power, Socialism* (hereinafter *SPS*) Poulantzas extends his examination beyond the scope of exceptional regimes and what he calls the 'parliamentary-democratic state', that is the generic form of the capitalist state. He incorporates the periodization of the state combined with the analysis of the political crisis (plus hegemony crisis) of the power bloc into the distinction between this generic form and exceptional forms/regimes (Bonapartism, military dictatorships, fascism). Unlike the temporary nature of exceptional regimes in response to short-term and specific conjunctures, he observes that the normal generic form has undergone a transformation as an emerging trend in Western capitalist states since the early 1970s, which he analyses under the category of authoritarian statism. Although it concurrently adopts some of the repressive features of the exceptional forms,[98] authoritarianism is to be considered the current 'normal' form for Poulantzas. Because it is a response to the historical tendency of contemporary capitalism towards "a peculiar sharpening of the generic elements of political crisis and state crisis" which he certainly anticipated as a structural and permanent one so as not to be confused with the short-term, conjunctural crisis responded by exceptional regimes.[99]

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[97] N. Poulantzas, "Political Crisis and Crisis of the State", in James Martin (ed.) *The Poulantzas Reader: Marxism, Law, and the State,* Verso, p. 308.

[98] N. Poulantzas, *State, Power, Socialism*, London: Verso, [1978] 2000, pp. 203-210.
[99] Ibid, 2000, p. 206.

Although authoritarian statism is manifested in diverse regimes, given its incorporation of exceptional elements it denounces a general trend for the dramatic 'decline of democracy', indicating a retreat from the hitherto generic configuration of the capitalist state. Its abstraction thus appears to be predicated on its parallax gap to the 'typical' form of bourgeois politics which is mainly characterized by the rule of law, separation of powers and proper democratic institutions:

> First, a transfer of power from the legislature to the executive and the concentration of power within the latter; second, an accelerated fusion between the legislature, executive, and judiciary, accompanied by a decline in the rule of law; third, the functional decline of political parties as the leading channels for political dialogue with the administration and as the major forces in organizing hegemony; and finally, the growth of parallel power networks cross-cutting the formal organization of the state and holding a decisive share in its various activities.[100]

Nevertheless, it should be noted that such institutional modifications signified by the term authoritarian statism for Poulantzas are not a derivation of an ontological category but a theoretical outcome of an up-to-date analysis of imperialism and monopoly capitalism bound up with a periodization of distinct stages and phases.[101] Although all the evidence he adduces refer to the decline of democracy rather than an internal transformation of it,[102] it is important to add that what has been in decline (the bourgeois-parliamentary form) is not ontologically essential to the capitalist type of state, nor a sine qua non political form of capitalist mode of production. The political class domination mediated through the modern representative state has been rather a historically contingent formation defined by popular struggles that have been inscribed (though not concluded) within the state's organizational matrix framed by the fundamental formal separation between the political and the economic from the 19th century onwards. The reason why diverse state forms are mutually permeable (potentially comprised of the elements of 'other' forms) thus lies in the fact that they are ultimately defined by the political role of absorbing the contradictions and the crisis-prone character of the same mode of production:

> In opposition to those who celebrate a supposedly essential difference between the various democratic forms (the 'liberal State') and the totalitarian systems, we have to

[100] B. Jessop, 1990, p. 187.

[101] N. Poulantzas, 2000, p. 204.

[102] Bob Jessop, *State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in Its Place*. Polity Press, 1990, p. 70.

> point out this time that certain features are common to both precisely because of their shared capitalist aspect. Leaving aside the fact that the two state forms may exist in a single phase of capitalism (strengthening of the executive under Roosevelt's New Deal and the fascist States of the thirties), their common features are bound up with the roots of totalitarianism. Every democratic form of capitalist state itself carries totalitarian tendencies.[103]

Poulantzas, within the same discussion on authoritarian statism, hints that one may adopt both optimistic and pessimistic perspectives on this state form. It is 'better' in the sense that it still maintains a certain democratic reality, and it is 'worse' in that it is not an outcome of an exceptional conjuncture "which need only be reversed for shrunken liberties to be restored".[104] Both aspects indicate the incorporation of exceptional elements within a normal democratic form. Thus, as a composition of normal and exceptional elements under the dominance of the former, the rise of authoritarian statism is remarkable for the coming into view of the fascistic elements or tendencies potent in capitalist state to a much more marked degree than previously, due to the structural intensification of the generic elements of crisis.[105]

Now, if the underlying source of the fascist or totalitarian potential even in the 'democratic' forms stems from the crisis of capitalism, it is app to argue that its mobilizing political category is security. Indeed, the distinctive institutional configuration involved within authoritarian statism entails a shift embodied in the securitization of "the dangers which [a rise in popular struggles] holds for class hegemony".[106] Concomitantly, although contingent on political crises and popular struggles around them, the secret behind the smoothness of the transition from the typical democratic form to authoritarianism, without leading to an exceptional 'rupture', lies in the permanent institutionalization of the excessive and specialized development of the political technology of emergency powers in the former, which takes place under the pretext of security. Politics of security and securitization is therefore certainly a part of the state's main role in securing the conditions for social cohesion and this is most conspicuous during times of the condensation of political

[103] N. Poulantzas, 2000, p. 209.

[104] Ibid, p. 209.

[105] Ibid, p. 210.

[106] Ibid, p. 210.

crisis and class struggle. However, given the 'always-already' presence of the elements of political crisis in the reproduction of capitalist political forms, security not only remains an integral part of the legal criminal policy and law enforcement but also assumes a continuous political role in reordering of the domestic polity and social relations of power operating with the framework of class struggle.

In this respect, given the present-day proliferation of violence and insecurity induced by the rise of global neoliberal capitalism two implications concerning security might be derived from the state transformation indicated by authoritarian statism in light of Poulantzas's observations: Together with the entire institutional structure of which it is also a part, security in authoritarian statism would assume an ever-increasing role in undermining the capacity for popular struggles. As Boukalas rightfully points out, the deployment of extensive powers of counter-terrorism framed with the mantra of 'war on terror' might be the most illustrative example of how security is suited for the double restructuring of the state and neoliberal economies.[107] By a similar token, given the concentration of power within the executive, security, by conceding the prerogative/emergency powers deemed necessary at the disposal of the executive, would significantly extend the practical scope of the fascist and totalitarian tendencies integral to the political forms of capitalism, within this very form of state (comprising the 'shifts within') whereby without a necessary regime change.

Notwithstanding such theoretical potential of the form-analysis, Poulantzas did not extensively address the implications of security as a political technique as such. This is more notable particularly in his earlier studies. His sole interest on security was to consider its institutions (mainly the military and the police) as part of the repressive apparatus that he borrowed from the Althusserian scheme, and to focus attention on the latter's relation with ideological apparatuses in consideration of formal changes within the state. On the other hand, what sets apart his later works *Political Crisis and Crisis of the State* (1976) and *State, Power, Socialism* (1978), in which one can apparently witness the distinctive contribution of his state theory (the relational

[107] C. Boukalas, "Class war-on-terror: counterterrorism, accumulation, crisis", *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 8:1, 2015, 55-71.

account) plus his contention on the rise of authoritarian statism, is his shifting the focus away from the state apparatus towards state power. As such, he refrains from making a clear distinction between the functions of ideological and repressive state apparatuses.[108] Moreover, he tends to grasp state power as extending beyond the mere combination of 'repression plus ideology'. Underscoring the significance of positive measures often imposed by the struggle of popular masses he notes:

> However, to analyse the State solely with the categories of repression-prohibition and ideology-concealment obviously leads one to subjectivize the reasons for consent (why people say yes to the prohibition) and to locate them either in ideology-trickery ('fascism deluded the masses') or in the wish for repression and love of the Master. In reality, even fascism was obliged to undertake a series of positive measures (...) This essential aspect cannot be explained if the relation between state and popular masses is reduced to the couplet repression-ideology.[109]

Just as state power represents more than the repression-ideology couplet, seemingly under the influence of Foucault,[110] he also feels the need to emphasize the positive and constitutive dimension of the repressive apparatus in addition to its negative and restrictive dimension. In that, repression denotes something beyond physical violence and bodily constraint; it also incorporates the formation of "a *bodily order* which both institutes and manages bodies by bending and moulding them into shape".[111] For example, the state resorts to the use of *normalization* as a technology of power to impose homogeneity and individualization of the social body at the same time.[112] In this regard Poulantzas does not draw a sharp distinction between the moment of normalization and ideological inculcation as Foucault did (who saw the latter having

[108] N. Poulantzas, 2000, pp. 28-34. In SPS, Poulantzas pushes this nondualistic idea of state power further so as to reject the illusive split between law and violence in bourgeois state, as well as the conception of power based on the zero-sum couplet terms such as 'repression or ideology', 'physical or symbolic-internalized violence', 'law or normalization', 'punishment or control' which appeared to prevail in then-prominent contemporary leftist thinkers who tended to gloss over the role of the former terms in favour of the latter. Ibid, pp. 76-80.

[109] Ibid, p. 31.

[110] In *SPS* Poulantzas heavily draws on Foucault's analysis of power, which he saw was the first to have "furnish[ed] a materialist analysis of certain institutions of power". This however, for him, remained as an unrealized latent potential for Marxist analyses due to the ardent efforts of Foucault and his followers to buy into a rather abstract and ahistorical diagram of power at the expense of the materiality of the relations of production and social division of labour. Poulantzas, 2000, pp. 67-8.

[111] Ibid, p. 29.

[112] Ibid, p. 66-7.

less to do with material practices). Yet he discovers that the political technology of body, in other words, the positive techniques and mechanisms that function to constitute the material expression of the relations of production in capitalist bodies, go far beyond ideological inculcation and straightforward physical violence. Although he does not clearly illustrate through what institutions and discourses they are carried out, he views such mechanisms, unlike Foucault, as part of the capitalist state and its strategic terrain. Moreover he situates the process of shaping political subjectivity as a form of the political domination assumed by the state, which is in part aligned with the designation of violence as part of the productive application of politics in pacification documents.[113]

At this juncture it might be pertinent to question the consequential validity of counterposing Poulantzas's form analysis which is consistently framed with a relational account of power/state in his later works, with the general propositions of pacification theory through a duality of continuity and rupture.[114] For, although both Poulantzas and Neocleous (or, the scholars of Anti-Security studies) get to grips with the exercise of capitalist state power in a closely aligned political orientation, they engage with somewhat distinct theoretical concerns, categorizations and levels of abstraction, which might be influenced by the particular context of the historical conditions of the very era of their research. I shall end this section by opening this up a bit further.

2.4.1. What delineates the normal vs. exceptional?

While partially admitting the criticism of 'theoreticism' particularly directed at his *Political Power and Social Classes* (1968) due to the epistemological scheme he adopted at the time, in later works Poulantzas makes a more concerted effort to set a clear relationship between two modes of inquiry which he calls 'the order of exposition' and 'the order of research'.[115] In that, he endeavours to derive the

[113] M. Neocleous, 2017, pp. 21-4.

[114] For an example, see Ş. Oğuz, 2016.

[115] N. Poulantzas, "A reply to Miliband and Laclau", 2008, pp. 273-4.

theoretical process and the ways how concepts link to each other from the historical-empirical inquiry, rather than presenting the latter as mere illustrations of the former. On this methodological line, his work started with a theory of the capitalist state and subsequently developed through to a more complex theory of the forms of this state within different phases of capitalism, in consideration of particular variants of political crisis, class powers and struggles. The capitalist type of state, capitalist development and their crises constitute the link between diverse forms and regimes, which is to say that there is not an organic rupture within the transition from a normal to an exceptional form. Nor is it possible to argue that it is a difference of the degree of state violence what distinguishes different forms and regimes, but a qualitative shift within the institutional organization contingent on the specific conjunctures of class struggle. Therefore, even such an 'extreme limit' of the state as *fascism* is not of a pathological deviance nor a form alien to bourgeois political system, but rather it is the historical specificity of class struggles within a particular conjuncture of political crisis which gives rise to the actualization of the seeds of fascism potent in the capitalist type of state.[116] As such, the normal/exception distinction does not entail an organic rupture or dualism but a formal-analytical tool to comprehend the changes within the capitalist state as to the historical conjunctures of crises and popular struggles. Consequently, the veritable rupture remains between the capitalist state and its pre-capitalist counterparts.[117]

On the other hand, the relevance of the normal/exceptional distinction within the theory of pacification bears little relation with varying forms of the modern capitalist state. The body of work associated with pacification rather engages with an in depth investigation on the role of police and security in the production and perpetuation of bourgeois normality, in which the relationships of power and forms of domination are constantly naturalized and legitimized around the order of capital. Such investigation problematizes any distinction between the normality of the rule of law and the exceptionality of violence not least with respect to moments of crisis. The underlying reason for this effort lies primarily in the level of abstraction that the concept pacification mainly works on. Pacification concerns with the constitution of

[116] N. Poulantzas, *Fascism and Dictatorship*, London: New Left Books, 1974, pp. 57-9.

[117] N. Poulantzas, 2000, p. 76.

the wage-labour system and maintenance of capitalist accumulation with due attention to the functions assumed by police, security, and the law throughout the historical process of capitalist development from the practices of so-called primitive accumulation to 16th century European colonialism through to the contemporary processes of capitalist accumulation. To this end, the initial pathway of the reappropriation of the concept was grounded on the historical formation of police in its relation to the fabrication of social order and policing of poverty following the collapse of feudalism,[118] while the specific focus remains on the exercise of the pacifying powers of the *modern capitalist state* which took on its somewhat generic structural features from the late 18th and early 19th century. For, it is precisely this form of the state through which the violence integral to primitive accumulation is legitimized, and the expanded ad hoc measures of police powers in early capitalist development are professionalized through different state institutions.[119] This is to say that from the lens of pacification the first normality lies in the essential need for the deployment of police powers (of which the 'formal' police organization is but one part) in the constant constitution and administration of bourgeois social order, whereas the organization of such powers would historically vary within different forms of state and social formation.

The second argument on normality in pacification theory concerns with the exercise of emergency powers grounded on security. The rejection of 'exception vs.

[118] M. Neocleous, 2000.

[119] In *Fabrication of Social Order* (2000), Neocleous analyses police as a fundamental administrative power having been assigned to a wide array of active and positive interventions in favour of the 'good order' in parallel to the collapse of feudalism and the birth of the modern state. The central interest of this 'early' police varied from the making of the working class, the regulation of market, class and property relations to the administration of civil society in general. Although the forms of intervention took account of a whole range of issues associated with the political economy of an order of extensive poverty, with the professionalization of the police mechanisms from the late 18th and 19th centuries it has become a hegemonic discourse of liberalism reduce the police to law-enforcement and prevention of crime. This was clearly an outcome of the state/civil society separation in general and crystallization of capitalist class relations in particular, for the constitution of the wage labour inevitably required the working class to be properly separated out both from the indigent and criminal classes, which has enabled the state to remove any form of subsistence other than the wage. To the extent that the legal and ideological borders prudently dividing the poor into working class and criminal class (paupers, vagabonds, rabbles, vagrants, etc.) have been demarcated, conventional police functions have been shared among various central and local institutional authorities of political administration under different banners and notions (e.g. welfare, public health, social work, social security, social policy, urban planning, etc.), yet still with the same logic of imposing and regulating the wage-labour system. The dominant conception of police is, on the other hand, subsumed into the narrow scope of crime, criminology and 'the police' institution.

normality' as a false binary was first introduced in *Critique of Security* (2008), further developed in *War Power, Police Power* (2014) and has become a distinctive position of the pacification theory in due course.[120] Neocleous's engagement with the debate on emergency stems from a historico-specific context in which he aroused a polemical response to a certain discourse that achieved a hegemonic status in political and legal theory in the early 2000s. The discourse simply put that after '9/11' the politics of emergency has become a permanent feature of political landscape bringing with a precise abandonment of the rule of law and of the distinguishability of war and peace.[121] Whilst this idea found resonance within the circle of 'radical' thinkers as well (e.g. Agamben, Badiou, Negri, Zizek)[122] Neocleous makes two opposing points on theoretical level: First, contrary to common belief or representation the history of liberalism, both in theory and practice, adheres strongly to the idea of prerogatives, emergency and security measures. Second, the 'state of emergency' is neither outside nor beyond law. It is rather a distinctive feature of the modern state that emergency powers are *per se* entirely constitutional; they are deeply inscribed and found within the very legal framework of every state. On historical level he expounds on this by illustrating how the violent actions of the modern, liberal states in emergency cases throughout the 20th century are legitimized "*through* law on the grounds of necessity and in the name of security".[123] Likewise, on empirical level he provides more than sufficient historical evidence that the 20th century witnessed an abundance of states resorting to emergency rule and 'exceptional' measures at a frequency and range of social issues (economic crises, labour disputes, popular dissent, etc.) at which making a distinction between 'normality and exceptionality' would no longer be meaningful and significant.[124] Worse yet clinging to such distinction would amount to a form of

[120] Mark Neocleous and George S. Rigakos, "Anti-Security: A Declaration", in Mark Neocleous and George S. Rigakos (eds), *Anti-Security* (Ottawa: Red Quill Books, 2011), 15–21.

[121] M. Neocleous, "The Problem with Normality: Taking Exception to "Permanent Emergency"", *Alternatives* V.31 N. 2, 2006, 191–213.

[122] M. Neocleous, 2014, p. 2

[123] M. Neocleous, 2008, p. 71.

[124] M. Neocleous, 2006, pp. 195-206; M. Neocleous, 2008. Also see, William E. Scheuerman, "The Economic State of Emergency." *Cardozo Law Review* 21, 2000, 1869–1894.

legal fetishism which treats the law as autonomous of social relations and "abstract[s] the rule of law from its origins in class domination and oppression".[125]

Nonetheless, by questioning the law in regards to its origins in 'class domination and oppression' one should not also gloss over that the 'non-autonomous' relationship between the rule of law and social forces is a dialectical one: The rule of law is also shaped by popular struggles and it has in turn a role in shaping the strategic terrain of the state. To hold otherwise by viewing the resort to the law in a way that follows a unilateral, monolithic pattern which always yields the same outcome in the deployment of violence might lead to a sort of cynical account against what E. P. Thompson warned Marxists not to become dulled to the 'nerve of outrage' and to devalue popular struggles.[126]

As for Neocleous's critical effort, neither the idea of police as a central administrative power for the capitalist state nor the intertwining of the norm and exception have a bearing on the diverse forms of the capitalist state or an implication of the insignificance of these forms. Indeed, in his first notable work and contribution to Marxist state theory (*Administering Civil Society* (1996)), he developed the concept of 'political administration' as a set of mechanisms mediating the relationship between the state and civil society in reciprocity. Alongside positive references to Poulantzas's relational account throughout the book, he offers political administration as a historical form which is being shaped by ongoing class struggles, and in turn shapes civil society by incorporating, subsuming, and policing the challenges of these struggles. In his later works, where he somewhat replaced the concept of political administration by police and amalgamated this police with the idea of social war and war power so as to develop a critical concept of pacification, his earlier emphasis on class struggle appears to remain predominantly on the ruling class; how its underlying strategies, tactics and discourses are inscribed within the materiality of capitalist state power revolving around the practices of pacification. This is likely driven by an intention to unveil the class-based essence of the ideas,

[125] M. Neocleous, 2006, pp. 207-8.

[126] Cited in Ben Fine, *Democracy and the rule of law: liberal ideals and Marxist critiques*. Blackburn Press, 2002, p. 170.

most primarily pertaining to security and law, which have become particularly hegemonic amid the severe conditions imposed by the neoliberal reconfiguration of political class domination fuelled by the politics of counterterrorism.

Taken together, it is possible to agree with McQuade that "Neocleous builds on Poulantzas's relational theory of the state"[127] in developing his conceptions of police and pacification whereby they both reject Foucault's abstract diagram of power and commonly interrelate power to class struggle and administrative incorporation. In this sense, Neocleous's "reappropriation of police and pacification as critical concepts do much to complete Poulantzas's efforts" to develop a materialist understanding of power.[128]

The methodological trajectory I will adopt throughout this study is based on the premise that Poulantzas's relational and form-analytical account can be used as a conducive tool to make sense of the varying modes of pacification in different capitalist social formations and in different phases of capitalist development; which would help us in exploring through what institutional materiality pacification practices are shaped and carried out. Because the material organization of state power is shaped and redefined through class and political struggles, such articulation between Poulantzas and Neocleous would help us explain the prominence of certain pacification strategies over others based on struggles, and in turn, the ways in which the struggles of the popular masses are co-opted and contained through pacification. For example, an analysis on the modes of pacification primarily based on welfare provisions of the Cold War era which worked to limit the working class struggle to economic corporate interests or on increased penalization alongside a market-oriented social policy of the neoliberal era might need to take into account the respective capital accumulation regime, hegemonic struggles and class interests articulated through it.

In this thesis, the reconfiguration of the state and politics in Turkey with the military coup of 1980 will be identified through the concept of authoritarian statism

[127] Brendan McQuade, "The Prose of Pacification: Critical Theory, Police Power, and Abolition Socialism". *Social Justice*, 2020, Vol. 47, No. 3/4, p. 61.

[128] Ibid, p. 62.

established under the exceptional military regime and further reinforced under the civilian regime. Thereby, the main argument that the construction of the neoliberal order in Turkey entails a comprehensive pacification project will be analysed within the scope of authoritarian statism which, despite crises during the period in question, has evidently retained its distinctive formal features. The empirical chapters will thus focus on the ways in which the framework of pacification (political processes, institutional agents, governing techniques, discourses) have been shaped by the relation of social forces within the crisis-ridden conjunctures of neoliberal transformation from the 1980s to 2000s.

Before moving on to the empirical discussion, I will conclude this chapter with a more abstract-level discussion on pacification. The propositions of the lens of pacification on security and violence will be grounded by elucidating the structural dynamics behind the bourgeois order being inherently a system of insecurity. First drawing from a classical discussion in Marxist theory, we will briefly underscore that the reproduction of capital as a social relation is based on the constant reproduction of labour on the basis of expropriation and dispossession. This discussion, generally elaborated within the context of the so-called primitive accumulation within Marxism, will be extended with the concept of systematic colonization which Marx borrowed from Wakefield's colonial theory. It will be asserted that the thesis of permanent primitive accumulation should not be considered as limited solely to the permanent expropriation of the immediate producers, for it encompasses all possible processes and political techniques that facilitate the reproduction of the subjugation of labour to capitalist domination. Insofar as these processes and techniques entail the fabrication of a particular social order they will be grounded on police power and a constant politics of security, which pave the way for the idea of pacification. The subsequent discussion will be focus on the fundamental categories of the logic of pacification, which includes the conjunction of social war and police under the concept of peace, the construction of peace and order as part of a war strategy, and the underlying genealogical foundations of pacification drawn from the colonial history of this practice. Furthermore, at the end of the chapter the relevance of pacification theory to neoliberalism will be reflected on, examining the possible implications of the former as to neoliberal hegemony.

2.5. In Quest for a Generalized Framework of Pacification

Why do we define contemporary pacification as the 'ideological iron fist and velvet glove' of capitalist accumulation?[129] Why does it need to entail a constant violence at its heart that is to be concealed? Why do we take on the act of war it assumes as a silent and unspoken one?

The possible way to explore these questions could be found in the historically distinctive feature of capitalist social relations of production in general, and in the colonial history of pacification in particular. The concept of capital and capitalist social relations are formed by, and depend on a historically peculiar mode of social labour, which is expropriated from the means of subsistence other than the wage. Whilst such expropriation is perpetuated by capitalist reproduction on "a continually extending scale",[130] the reproduction rests on the disappearance of the use of force and violence integral to the separation. In other words, the constitutive presupposition of capital disappears so as to attribute labour a 'free' form which vanishes in its own social existence being subsumed under economic categories. Thus the violence of expropriation takes the formal appearance of contractual relations between equal and abstract legal subjects, denoting a naturalized compulsion "as if rationally acting individuals exchange on the labour market as equals in liberty and freedom".[131]

A repercussion of such displacement within bourgeois political economy is the systematic concealment of the social relation and disposition of power between the worker and the capitalist, which is disclosed by Marx as the secret of capital. It is pertinent to note that the subsumption of the set of social relations and the disposition of power between classes to the market as a peaceful 'economic sphere' might also in some ways point to the detachment between the law and violence in liberal theory, which turns out to legitimize the violence of accumulation exerted through legal

[129] G. Rigakos, *Security/Capital: A General Theory of Pacification*, Edinburgh University Press, 2016, p. 3.

[130] K. Marx, *Capital, Volume I*. Moscow, USSR: Progress Publishers, [1867] 1995, p. 505.

[131] W. Bonefeld, "Primitive Accumulation and Capitalist Accumulation: Notes on Social Constitution and Expropriation", *Science & Society*, Vol. 75, No. 3, 2011, p. 384.

means under the guise of peace and order. Bearing these in mind, what follows is thereby an introductory discussion of the so-called primitive accumulation and the logic of separation it denotes as not only an emerging moment of capitalist social relations but also the constitutive premise of these relations and capitalist reproduction. This will be further developed by a discussion on the political project of systematic colonization and the ways in which it entails the underlying logic and core of pacification since it places the emphasis on the powers of the state necessitated for the reproduction of the expropriation and subjugation of labour.

As Ellen M. Wood points out, maintenance of capitalist accumulation and capital's control over production and expropriation relies on the disposition of power between labour and capital which has as its condition "the political configuration of society as a whole" concerning both the balance of class forces and powers of the state.[132] Based on this idea, the second half of the chapter subsequent to systematic colonization will seek to articulate the grasp of pacification as a category encompassing the whole set of political techniques and processes through which the state power is proactively mobilized to fabricate and reproduce the social order conducive to the accumulation of capital. This would also incorporate an exploration on the function of 'peace and security' in carrying out of all these means as parts of a 'more or less concealed civil war'.[133] The chapter will conclude by a discussion more closely related to the historical scope of this thesis; that is, neoliberalism and neoliberal hegemony with a view to pacification, together with possible repercussions of the Turkish experience.

2.5.1. Primitive Accumulation: Historical *and* Systematic Force

> These methods depend in part on brute force, for instance the colonial system. But they all employ the power of the state, … to hasten … the process of transformation of the feudal mode of production into the capitalist mode, and to shorten the transition. *Force is the midwife of every old society which is pregnant with a new one. It is itself an economic power*.
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> Karl Marx, *Capital* V. I, Section VIII

[132] E. M. Wood, *Democracy against Capitalism*, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 20.

[133] K. Marx, 1995, pp. 193-4.

The concept primitive accumulation is originally attributed to Adam Smith, who in his *The Wealth of Nation* spoke of an 'accumulation of stock' *previous* to the division of labour that would be eventually transformed into capital inasmuch as it progressively increases in line with the introduction of a division of labour attuned to modern industrial society.[134] At the expense of keeping sight of actual social and historical developments, this depiction of 'previous accumulation' was utilized by Smith rather as a methodological starting point to ground his portrayal of a peaceful process regarding the origins of capital and capitalist formation of class distinctions. The concept was then critically reprised by Marx in depth with the German adjective *ursprünglich* (original, initial), which would be later translated in English as 'primitive' instead of the original phrase 'previous'.[135]

Seeking to set up his own discussion in contradistinction to Smith's ahistorical account of 'accumulation of stock' that is devoid of any analysis of social relations, Marx often resorts to historical narratives of the development of capitalist social relations in the chapters devoted to primitive accumulation in the first Volume of Capital. At its simplest, for Marx, the so-called primitive accumulation could be described as the historical processes beginning roughly from the end of the 15th century, in which capital and capitalist relations of production began to appear. Capital was born out of the forceful separation of the direct, independent producer from the means of production and subsistence. Moreover, the capitalist development presupposed the transformation of "the social means of subsistence and of production into capital," as well as of "the immediate producers into wage laborers". There had been a wide range of policies and methods of primitive accumulation as Marx illustrated referring to different geographies and circumstances in Capital I, but the role of force and violence, mostly brutal and sponsored by the power of the state, was common. He contends that "in actual history, it is a notorious fact that conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder, in short, force, play the greatest part"[136] contra the

[134] A. Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. University of Chicago Press. [1776] 1977, p. 361.

[135] This contested translation might be the first ground encouraging those who argue that the process of primitive accumulation reflected a one-time act in the history of capitalist development.

[136] K. Marx, 1995, p. 505.

utopian delusions of the classical political economy. The systematic use of force is the reason why Marx described capital as "dripping from head to foot, from every pore, with blood and dirt", and force as "the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one", which makes it "itself an economic power."[137]

Setting aside for a while the question whether extra-economic force and violence amount to a permanent state in capitalism, the first conclusion to be drawn here is that Marx speaks of a historical process when he speaks of primitive accumulation**.** He is clear enough about the fact that it is the processes of primitive accumulation that gave way to the preconditions of the transition to capitalism, that is, "the prehistoric stage of capital".[138] He writes already at the beginning of the chapter that the role primitive accumulation plays in political economy is the same one of "original sin" in theology. He maintains by defining the expropriation / dispossession of direct producers both in the colonies and mother countries as the "historical genesis of capitalism", which "shortened the transition from the feudal mode of production into the capitalist mode". Other than indicating a historical landmark, these phrases also strengthen the interpretation that primitive accumulation is a one-time phenomenon whose mission of transition and/or development has been historically accomplished. Moreover, while showing the difference between the methods of accumulation in the colonies and colonial countries he writes that the primitive accumulation process had been "more or less accomplished" in Western Europe. Yet, alongside all these observations, and even within the same paragraphs, he adds that capitalist production, "once on its own legs, not only *maintains* this separation [of the labourers from the means of production and subsistence] but *reproduces* it on a continually extending scale" (emphasis added).[139]

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[137] Ibid, p. 532.

[138] "The process, therefore, that clears the way for the capitalist system, can be none other than the process which takes away from the labourer the possession of his means of production; a process that transforms, on the one hand, the social means of subsistence and of production into capital, on the other, the immediate producers into wage labourers. The so-called primitive accumulation, therefore, is nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production. It appears as primitive, because it forms the prehistoric stage of capital and of the mode of production corresponding with it." Ibid, pp. 505-6.

[139] Ibid, p. 505.

As an integral part of capitalist accumulation, the extent to which this dynamic of 'maintaining' and 'reproducing' the forceful separation is actualized under the discipline of pure economic terms, or through further forms of primitive accumulation is both historically and theoretically a contested issue. Debates on the issue have been far from barren, wherein considerable accounts, despite differences among themselves, have exclusively highlighted Marx's historical remarks and employed the so-called primitive accumulation to delineate the conditions of transition from feudalism to capitalism.[140]

On the other hand, another account that grants the role of the so-called primitive accumulation in the transition but at the same time takes on this concept to explain the enduring role of extra-economic force in the reproduction of capitalist development is also theoretically possible and worth considering.[141]

Despite there are a number of more recent works, discussions on the ever-present relevance of primitive accumulation cannot be accomplished without reference to Rosa Luxemburg since contemporary debates on the issue owe important insights to her opus, *Accumulation of Capital*. In this work, Luxemburg provides us with some instructive reinterpretation of Marx's scheme on the essential character of capital accumulation, as she moves the debate over primitive accumulation to capital's constant need for the realization of surplus-value, which paves the ground for her theory of imperialism. She asserts that capitalist accumulation always presupposes an environment outside of itself in order to realize surplus value and reproduce itself. Thus, although drawing on Marx's analysis of the commodity market and the production of surplus value, her grasp of accumulation focuses on the exchange relations between capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production, which she thinks was a missing element in Marx's diagram of expanded reproduction, that is, 'capitalist reproduction requires constant market growth':

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[140] T. H. Aston, C. H. E. Philpin (eds.). *The Brenner Debate: Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Early Modern Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. M. Dobb, *Studies in Development of Capitalism*. London: G. Routledge and Sons, 1946. P. M. Sweezy, Feudalism to Capitalism Revisited. *Science and Society*, 50(1), 1986.

[141] Massimo De Angelis, "Marx and primitive accumulation: The continuous character of capital's "enclosures"", *The Commone*r 2, no. 1, 2001, 1–22.

> Marx's diagram of enlarged reproduction thus does not conform to the conditions of an accumulation in actual progress. Progressive accumulation cannot be reduced to static inter-relations and interdependence between the two great departments of social production (the departments of producer and consumer goods), as the diagram would have it. Accumulation is more than an internal relationship between the branches of capitalist economy; it is primarily a relationship between capital and a non-capitalist environment (…) Marx's diagram of accumulation is only the theoretical reflection of the precise moment when the domination of capital has reached its limits.[142]

Against this background Luxemburg situates primitive accumulation as a core and systematic element in capital's endless quest for a 'natural economy' (i.e., non-capitalist production) to expand into, without regard to geographical boundaries. On this view, the moment that Marx's diagram of expanded reproduction is achieved is paradoxically, at the same time, the one that accumulation reaches its limits and its collapse comes into sight, which elucidates much of "the contradictory behaviour of capitalism in the final stage of its historical career" –that is, imperialism.[143] More significantly, since the enforcement of exchange relations between capitalist and non-capitalist production eventually clashes with the social relations of the latter, the use of force and violence is ineluctable for capital accumulation. Thus, paradoxical though it is, it is this clash between capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production which renders extra-economic and military force a conducive instrument for capital's assault on the very environment it essentially requires:

> Yet capital in power performs the same task [dispossessing the direct producers] even to-day, and on an even more important scale —by modern colonial policy. It is an illusion to hope that capitalism will ever be content with the means of production which it can acquire by way of commodity exchange. (…) If capital were here to rely on the process of slow internal disintegration, it might take centuries.[144]

In effect, along these lines Luxemburg seems to emphasize the accelerating role of violence just as Marx suggests by alluding to "shortening the transition". Such role is, however, situated as an inevitable and permanent need for capital. The use of extra-economic force is then not a one-time act, a "historical genesis" of accumulation confined to the transition leading to capitalism, but a systematic and indefinite feature of it:

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[142] R. Luxemburg, *The Accumulation of Capital*, Routledge, [1913] 2003, p. 398.

[143] Ibid, pp. 397-8.

[144] Ibid, p. 350.

> Accumulation, with its spasmodic expansion, can no more wait for, and be content with, a natural internal disintegration of non-capitalist formations and their transition to commodity economy. (…) Force is the only solution open to capital; the accumulation of capital, seen as an historical process, employs force as a permanent weapon, not only at its genesis, but further on down to the present day. The method of violence, (…) is the most profitable and gets the quickest results, and so it is also the most expedient for capital.

Luxemburg maintains referring the British policy in India and French policy in Algeria as the classical methods of violence in capitalist colonization. Comparing the colonial domination exercised by both powers with the previous occupying states in these geographies, she finds that the unique character of the former lies in their ultimate motivation to avail themselves of the very basis of existence of the local people – that is, the land, means of production and domestic social organizations. The use of force towards this task incorporates various techniques of power in the forms of taxation, international loan system, as well as war and militarism, which are exercised by state power and more often than not mediated by domestic and international law.

Although Luxemburg's emphasis on war, militarism and other forms of extra-economic coercion retain as one of the chief reference points for the thesis of primitive accumulation as constantly reproduced accumulation, this idea has been further developed by subsequent writers following the path opened up by her along with new interpretations of imperialism that are in consideration of recent forms of dispossession during the coercive processes of neoliberalization.[145] Despite having different emphases, each of these writers, in their own right, concurs in associating the capital's systematic need for primitive accumulation with constant proletarianization and subjugation of labour. Following on from Luxemburg, David Harvey, in particular, placed the conception of 'accumulation by dispossession' within the centre of his account of the new imperialism which he characterized with the global neoliberal assault. From the standpoint of this thesis there seems no reason to challenge Harvey's account about incorporating within the context of primitive

[145] M. De Angelis, 2001. Midnight Notes, *The New Enclosures*, 1990. D. Harvey, "The 'new' imperialism: accumulation by dispossession", *Socialist Register* 40, 2004. W. Bonefeld "Primitive Accumulation and Capitalist Accumulation: Notes on Social Constitution and Expropriation, Science & Society, Vol. 75, No. 3, 2011. M. Perelman, *The Invention of Capitalism. Classical Political Economy and the Secret History of Primitive Accumulation*. Duke University Press, 2000.

accumulation (accumulation by dispossession) the excessive use of state power against popular will in the course of the practices of predatory neoliberal capitalism. However, the scope of Harvey's conception is expanded to such an extent to encompass the regular capitalist process of exploitation (on pure economic terms), that it was rightfully criticized by Robert Brenner for almost becoming analogue with capital accumulation itself.[146] Therefore, the combination of economic and extra-economic coercion has turned out to refer an organic identification in his account, so much that even an analytical distinction between them is compelling.

In this context, we shall continue to explore the systematic nature of primitive accumulation while contending that a distinction between it and capital accumulation remains possible. However, instead of further delving deeper into the question on primitive accumulation, I intend to proceed by linking it within a broader political framework, particularly its relevance to pacification. To this end, we will turn to the first volume of Capital, aiming to theoretically reprise a political project developed in settler colonies to contain all forms of resistance and impediments to the newly emerging wage labour system. This project is called systematic colonization. Complementary to his account of the so-called primitive accumulation, Marx finds this idea developed in Edward Gibbon Wakefield's project of colonization quite thought-provoking in the face of the tenets of classical political economy, for it underscores the social organization of labour as constitutive of capital.

2.5.2. Systematic Colonization: The Core of Pacification

While receiving relatively limited attention compared to others, the final chapter of the section devoted to primitive accumulation in Capital I, *Modern Theory of Colonization* assumes particular importance in Marx's notion of primitive accumulation. This chapter is the one that concluded both the volume and the discussion on primitive accumulation as a whole whereby Marx builds on his analysis of colonialism in previous chapters by a commentary on Edward G. Wakefield's writings on modern colonization. Wakefield was a notable English

[146] For a similar criticism, see D. Bin, So-called Accumulation by Dispossession, *Critical Sociology*, 44(1), 2018.

bourgeois political economist of the 19th century whose views not only influenced some of the liberal thinkers of his time, most prominently Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill,[147] but also gave way to a systematic framework of settler colonialism in the British empire's future white dominions.[148] His theory of colonization stemmed from his analysis of a particular moment of the early colonization of Western Australia where servants had forsaken a wealthy and well-connected colonist, and the absence of a land-labour formation eventually caused his capital to perish.[149]

The significance of Wakefield for our subject lies not in him being the father of modern colonial theory bearing relevance to an earlier England, but his comprehension of the nature of capital revealed in his colonial schemes, remaining "the same in its developed as in its undeveloped forms".[150] Indeed, Marx was one of the early figures who recognized Wakefield's apprehension of the role of the colonies as the paradigmatic example of the social (re)constitution of the capitalist relations of production. "It is the great merit of Wakefield", he notes, "to have discovered not anything new *about* the colonies, but *in* the colonies, the truth as *to* the conditions of capitalist production in the mother country."[151] Considered by some interpreters as part of his strategic attempt of reading bourgeois economics politically,[152] Marx's debate with Wakefield is indeed an emblematic one, illustrating that neither the appeal to dispossession nor the global expansion of the capitalist mode of production is a contingent element of the historical development of capitalism, but rather they are integral to the relations of capitalist production. He somehow ironically praises Wakefield for his honest admission about the dynamic role of the dispossession of labourers for the development of the social productive

[147] Duncan Bell, "John Stuart Mill on colonies", *Political Theory*, 38, 1, 2010. Gabriel Piterberg & Lorenzo Veracini, "Wakefield, Marx, and the World turned inside out", *Journal of Global History*, 10, 2015.

[148] G. Piterberg & L. Veracini, 2015, p. 460.

[149] Edward G. Wakefield, *England and America*, Book on Demand Ltd., [1834] 2013.

[150] Michael Perelman, *The Invention of Capitalism, Classical Political Economy and the Secret History of Primitive Accumulation*, Duke University Press, 2000, p. 29.

[151] K. Marx, 1995, p. 541.

[152] H. Cleaver, *Reading Capital Politically*, Antithesus, 2000.

power of labour and the transformation of means of production into capital. Wakefield discovered a politics of what he called 'systematic colonization' as opposed to 'spontaneous, unregulated colonisation' in the manufacture of wage-workers in the colonies where, unlike mother countries, there was too much land to enclose (e.g. North America, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, etc.). In this view, the creation of wage-workers, as well as the deployment of immigrant workers to these lands as the British capitalists mostly did, was deemed necessary for capitalist exploitation –yet this was not sufficient. This is because the struggle over the land did not last with the emergence of capitalist production, for the vast majority of cheap lands were still public property which would in due course be turned into private property and individual means of production by the dispossessed settlers and immigrants.[153]

As such, the wage-workers were able to constantly transform into independent producers in the colonies, who work for themselves and resist the labour market and wage labour. Wakefield became aware of the risk posed by a class mobilization as such. He despondently saw that the abundance of cheap land led to a state of 'dispersion' which was essentially an impediment to the development of the conditions of the labour market in such a way to undermine the level of exploitation, as well as the relation and the sentiment of dependence on the capitalist on the part of other wage-workers as well.[154] As a fierce opponent of laissez-faire principles who neither wanted to contemplate the possibility of returning to pre-capitalist conditions, he advocated for placing the settler colony on the road to 'capitalist civilization' by means of the homeland (metropole) in an aggressively interventionist manner.[155] To this end, he proposed an artificial inflation of the land prices by the government to a level that would compel the workers to work much longer to buy land. This created a unique opportunity for the settler colonists to kill two birds with one stone in Marx's words, for it would not only prevent the majority of the workers from turning themselves into independent producers, but also make it possible for the government

[153] K. Marx, 1995, p. 542.

[154] Ibid, p. 546

[155] G. Piterberg & L. Veracini, 2015, p. 462.

to use the fund gained from the sales at higher prices to import new immigrants from Europe.[156]

Nevertheless, what strikes Marx here in the first place does not seem to be the particular method of primitive accumulation employed in the colonial territories, nor the violation of the sacred law of supply and demand. The primary concern about Marx's interest on Wakefield is rather the latter's insight about the fundamental logic of the capitalist mode of production and accumulation, that is 'the great secret of systematic colonization' revealed in capital's warlike struggle for the reproduction of the wage-worker as wage-worker, which requires a compelling task of exercising constant control over labour and constant monitoring over the conditions of labour. This is why Marx concludes the chapter by noting that it is not the conditions of the colonies his discussion is mainly concerned with, but rather the underlying secret of capitalist production. In other words, the conditions of the colonies are worth discussing inasmuch as they illustrate the dynamic interrelationship between capital and labour in the mother country, 'and wherever capital might be found'.[157] The 'systematic' nature of capitalist colonization and its violence are rooted in the ways in which the dispossession of the labourer is imposed as a fundamental condition for the existence of capital.[158]

This brings us to the 'great merit' Marx finds in Wakefield and his scheme of systematic colonization. Wakefield's project reveals the great secret of systematic colonization that "the supply of labour *must* be constant and regular".[159] Against this background, Marx reiterates the social and dynamic nature of capital –a theme he insistently elaborated in his earlier manuscripts (Theory of Value) opposing the

[156] K. Marx, 1995, p. 544.

[157] Mark Neocleous, "International Law as Primitive Accumulation; Or, the Secret of Systematic Colonization", *The European Journal of International Law*, Vol. 23 no. 4. 2012, p. 961.

[158] "We are not concerned here with the conditions of the colonies. The only thing that interests us is the secret discovered in the new world by the Political Economy of the old world, and proclaimed on the housetops: that the capitalist mode of production and accumulation, (…) have for their fundamental condition the annihilation of selfearned private property; in other words, the expropriation of the labourer." K. Marx, 1995, p. 545.

[159] Ibid, p. 544. M. Neocleous, 2012, p. 961.

Ricardian narrow conception of capital as merely material 'accumulated labour'. Now, unlike others, what Wakefield truly discovered in the colonies is that property in money, means of subsistence and means of production do not themselves alone "stamp a man as a capitalist if there be wanting the correlative – the wage-worker, the other man who is compelled to sell himself of his own free will". For, "capital is not a thing but a social relation between persons, established by the instrumentality of things".[160] The first thing to derive here is that capital is a living, reciprocal social relation between two classes. It cannot be linked to wage-labour in an external way. Instead, capital and wage-labour constitute two sides of the self-same relationship, as the latter is intrinsic to the formation of the former and remains the essential prerequisite of capitalist production.

Second, the dispossession of the labourer and the creation of the free wage-worker is a precondition for selling his labour-power 'on his own free will'. This is because, only by way of dispossession the labourer becomes no longer an integral part of the means of production as slave and serf, nor does he own the means of production as small holding peasants. Thus, the definitive character of the labourer in capitalist production lies in the *double sense of freedom* as such – free from the means of production and free to sell his labour-power (free to work or free to starve, so to speak). Only with such freedom, the material conditions of work can confront labour 'as autonomous powers, an alien property and value in itself',[161] and thereby renders labour as wage-labour, the social form indispensable to capital and capitalist production. Accordingly, the conditions of labour, the means of production and subsistence become capital insofar as they become autonomous and objectified whereby they can "serve at the same time as means of exploitation and subjection of the labourer."[162] It goes without saying that the creation of the subject with free will also constitutes the precondition for the use of the legal power as an instrument towards the subjection of the worker to the wage-form as well as the exercise of discipline over the worker.

[160] K. Marx, 1995, p. 541.

[161] K. Marx, "Capital, Volume One, Unpublished Chapter VI" in Marcello Musto (ed.) Karl Marx's Writings on Alienation, 2021, p. 130.

[162] K. Marx, 1995, p. 544.

The social nature of this capital-relation might lead us to a third point that would relate to the secret of 'systematic colonization' under primitive accumulation on a more solid ground. Indeed, what is provided by the production of surplus value through the creation (dispossession) and employment of wage-labour, represented by the circuit of M-C-M', is the 'general' form of capital. At the social level, the outcome of this circuit entails the expanded reproduction of capital,[163] which requires constant reproduction of the separation of direct producers from the means of production, as well as the separation between the capitalist and free wage-worker. In other words, the expanded reproduction of capital as a social relation presupposes constant reproduction of wage-labour and expanded proletarianization: "Capitalist production, (…) under its aspect of a continuous connected process, of a process of reproduction, produces not only commodities, not only surplus-value, but it also produces and reproduces the capitalist relation; on the one side the capitalist, on the other the wage labourer".[164]

This fundamental presupposition also becomes the key to make of Marx's remark in revealing 'the secret of primitive accumulation' that capitalist production, once on its own legs, both *maintains* and *reproduces* the divorce between the conditions of labour and the labourer, which capital owes its very becoming. Moreover, once primitive accumulation is understood in light of capital's constant need to produce and reproduce the free wage-worker, it is possible to see the forceful pattern of dispossession pointed out by the theory and practice of systematic colonization as a permanent feature of capitalist accumulation, as well as a historical one. In other words, we need to think systematic colonization not as a specific colonial act but in conjunction with capitalist mode of production.

Now we can continue by formulating the relevance of Wakefield's idea of systematic colonization to our main focus, pacification, through five key points. The first two points are already discussed so far: There are a number of textural evidence in the last section of the Volume I that Marx's interest on systematic colonization did not concern the nature of settler colonization but of capitalistic relations of production.

[163] A. Saad-Filho, "Capital accumulation and the composition of capital", Zarembka, P. (ed.) *Marx's Capital and Capitalism; Markets in a Socialist Alternative* (Research in Political Economy, Vol. 19), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2001, p. 71.

[164] K. Marx, 1995, p. 405.

Along with the reasons he praised Wakefield, he clearly stated that "the nature of capital remains the same in its developed as in its undeveloped form". Wakefield, to begin with, discovered that capital is nothing but a social and class relationship that is to be permanently reproduced resting upon the manufacturing of the wage-worker through expropriation. His formulation cited by Marx in the footnotes that "labour creates capital before capital employs labour"[165] was deduced from the problem of capitalist development in the colonies, amounting to nothing but a simpler expression of Marx's observation in the motherland that "accumulation of capital is (…) the increase of the proletariat".[166]

Second, systematic colonization rests upon primitive accumulation on a permanent and constantly increasing scale just as the movement of capital 'has no limits',[167] and this is mainly why violence lies at the heart of pacification. In its constantly renewed movement, capital's expansionary needs must keep the wage labour market full for the capitalists by keeping the supply of labour regular and constant.[168] It has to constantly cut off access to the conditions of labour and assure that people are separated from a means of subsistence other than the wage. In this light, systematic colonization was (and, *is*) a response to the unstable conditions of the working class whose reproduction makes it compelling to be controlled solely by the spontaneous operation of market forces. It aims at the perpetuation of the subjugation of labour by means of the forceful expropriation (dispossession) and expanded proletarianization as the grounds of accumulation. Thus, the use of force becomes integral not only in the form of original expropriation, but also in its reproduction –the perpetuation of expropriation and proletarianization, in which the use of force turns out to exist in the forms of monitoring, policing, disciplining workers and containing their resistance to wage slavery so as to make them economically productive and politically docile. This makes primitive accumulation at the heart of systematic colonization imprinted by "ongoing extra-economic measures".[169]

[165] Wakefield cited in K. Marx, 1995, p. 425.

[166] Ibid, p. 433.

[167] Ibid, p. 107.

[168] Ibid, p. 546.

[169] G. Piterberg & L. Veracini, 2015, p. 475.

Unsurprisingly, Marx offered the following observation on taxation and modern fiscal system which constitute one of the many diverse forms that primitive accumulation can take: "In Holland, (…) where this system was first inaugurated, the great patriot, De Witt, extolled it in his Maxims as the best system for making the wage-labourer submissive, frugal, industrious (…) and overburdened with work".[170] Significant in this statement is not the diversity of practices of primitive accumulation, but rather the function they assume in labour productivity and the constitution of workers' docile subjectivity as well. Therefore, various measures carried out through state power encompassed within the scope of primitive accumulation, thereby of systematic colonization, concern not only with the pre-history of capitalism but also with the pacification of labour even in an already established capitalist order. As De Angelis rightfully puts it, the preconditions for the accumulation of capital necessitate extra-economic force "any time the producers set themselves as an obstacle to the reproduction of their separation to the means of production".[171] Such premise goes much beyond the original moments of separation in the transition. Here, obstacles to the reproduction of the producers' separation should be considered in an expanded scope, amounting to any limits posed by social forces to accumulation, against which capital is reactive more than anything. To this end, developing suitable strategies for a comprehensive pacification is an essential political condition in a given social order, in particular, integral component of the class war on the part of the bourgeoisie.

Third, as a 'war of accumulation'[172] pacification pertains to a class war that concerns with actively and pre-emptively containing the potential struggle of the subordinate classes. The nexus between pacification and systematic colonization becomes clearer when one keeps in view the ideological impetus behind the latter is 'keeping the capital's peace'. One of the motivations behind why Wakefield devised colonization as 'systematic', along with why this concept was embraced by American federalists, was his desire to tame the revolutionary potential in the new colonies established on

[170] K. Marx, 1995, p. 534.

[171] M. De Angelis, 2001, p. 13.

[172] M. Neocleous, 2010, p. 11.

'empty lands' as well as in England following the industrial revolution.[173] While the contradictions inherent in capitalist relations of production would inexorably give rise to the revolutionary option, for Wakefield, the same contradictions were something to be politically manageable. Wakefield suggested in *England and America* that "the subject order, composing the bulk of the people, are in a state of gloomy discontent", and thereby "one chief end of colonization is to *prevent tumults*, to *keep the peace*, to *maintain order*, to uphold confidence in the security of property, to *hinder interruptions* of the regular course of industry and trade" and generally avert "any serious political convulsion."[174] Thus, what goes by the category of social peace in Wakefield's bourgeois mindset, which Marx deemed of utmost significance for uncovering the reality of capitalist development, was essentially equal to hindering "interruptions of the regular course of industry and trade", which he defines in the same text as "terrible evils".

Before moving to New Zealand, Wakefield saw the rise of the Chartist and socialist movements in Britain as part of these evils on ideological terms, which were, to say the least, "representatives of discontent" having potential to "disturb the peace of the country".[175] He envisioned the spread of 'capitalist civilization' not only on the mainland but also in the colonies in view of its pacification function to contain such threats. For instance, as noted by Piterberg and Veracini, Wakefield conceived of systematic colonization, inter alia, as a long-run carrot policy to sustain the wage-workers' belief that they themselves would one day become landowners, with the intention of pacifying social conflict.[176] In other words, Wakefield's conceptualization of capital as a social relationship helped him not only devise the original moment of capital ownership but also a strategic process of reproduction that takes into account the long-term threats posed by intensive exploitation and dispossession practices. Consequently, the concern for keeping the subordinate away from revolutionary or disruptive thoughts served as another organic circuit between

[173] G. Piterberg & L. Veracini, 2015, p. 472, 475.

[174] Wakefield cited in H. O. Pappe, 'Wakefield and Marx', *Economic History Review*, 4, 1, 1951, p. 92.

[175] E. G. Wakefield, *A View of the Art of Colonization*, Batoche Books Kitchener, [1849] 2001, p. 24.

[176] G. Piterberg & L. Veracini, 2015, p. 469.

systematic colonization and pacification, imparting the fundamental logic of both, which concerns the policing of order.

Fourth, because policing order is in the first instance to 'fabricate' order,[177] systematic colonization rests upon the constitution of a new order "organized around the administration of wage labour"[178] and the conditions for uninterrupted accumulation of capital. Wakefield highlighted not only the significance of social peace for effective colonization but also that of the proactive construction of an order of peace, even though he did not use the language of pacification. Systematic colonization would allow for the birth of "a more sedate and gentlemanly social order"[179] which could be possible only "by means of a strictly enforced social constitution".[180] In this light, the notion of displacement in the colonies serves two function. The dispossession of direct producers and their replacement with a bulk of new population facilitated the establishment of the wage labour system in place of the old pre-capitalist order. Second, displacement also implies the construction of a new social order that dismantles the old system without entirely eradicating local values. Thus, it was also devised as the best method to produce social transformation along with docile bodies so as to pre-empt revolution instead of countering it once it has occurred.[181]

Fifth and finally, whereas the form of intervention varies according to historical contexts, the use of political and legal force is a common means of systematic colonization for the establishment and reproduction of capitalist social relations.[182] As Perelman points out, dispossession from the commons in the process of primitive accumulation was perfectly legal.[183] As markets evolved the bourgeoisie appealed to

[177] M. Neocleous, 2000.

[178] M. Neocleous, "The Dream of Pacification: Accumulation, Class War, and the Hunt", *Socialist Studies / Études socialistes* 9 (2) Winter 2013, p. 8.

[179] P. Ferguson, The Making of the White New Zealand Policy: Nationalism, Citizenship and the Exclusion of the Chinese, 1880-1920, Unpublished PhD Thesis, 2003, p. 73.

[180] H. O. Pappe, Wakefield and Marx, *The Economic History Review*, 4(1), 1951, p. 90.

[181] G. Piterberg & L. Veracini, 2015, p. 460.

[182] M. Neocleous, 2012.

[183] M. Perelman, 2000, pp.13-4.

the state power to create a legal structure to eliminate the traditional rights of the dispossessed peasants. Indeed, not only during the initial constitution of capital through enclosures, but also in further instances of capitalist accumulation (from taxation to the artificial inflation of land prices through to the most brutal conduct of imperial wars and militarism), the utilization of extra-economic force within legal frameworks remained a consistent reality. To be sure, these instances also include measures aimed at the perpetuation of dispossession and proletarianization demanded by the uninterrupted reproduction of capital. For this reason, in the Chapter on primitive accumulation Marx does not merely confine himself to define "the acts for enclosures of commons" as "the parliamentary form of the robbery"[184], but he goes on to devote a notable part of the Chapter to the "bloody legislation against the expropriated". Dating back to the late 15th century, this section provides the most striking examples of the law's violent and barbarian use to criminalize and punish those resisting the wage-labour (in the forms of vagabondage, begging, wandering along with other pre-capitalist forms of offense). Although his examples are derived from the English case Marx adds that there were similar counterparts in other European states.

Marx's interest in the violent role of legal force in reducing people to a 'labour force' reveals the nexus between the police power and law. In that, anything that is perceived to obstruct the reproduction of capital – which, as Neocleous argues, encompasses everything associated with 'disorderliness and criminality' in the construction of the bourgeois order[185]– becomes the subject of police power, more precisely, the subject of the constant and varied police wars. At the heart of these wars lies the law, not because they are waged lawfully, but because more often than not the law is transformed into an instrument for waging wars in favour of accumulation. In this regard, just as war is woven into the law and liberal peace, "the law is equally woven into war".[186]

This leads us to the issue of pacification and the question why pacification is a practice of 'lawfare'; situating the law at the centre of the violence of the bourgeois

[184] K. Marx, 1995, p. 511.

[185] M. Neocleous, 2014, p. 58.

[186] Ibid, p. 46.

colonization of the world –which we shall pursue in more detail in the sections which follow.

2.5.3. Pacification: Ideological Appropriation

Despite popular comments by critical and left-wing observers that war and peace have now been intertwined more than ever, there had been no 'classical age' in which a definitive distinction between war and peace ever assumed relevance.[187] Indeed, the meaning of peace connoted neither the absence of violence nor the neutralization of uneven power relations in social history. Even a quick glance at the genealogical roots of the term may be helpful in this regard. *Pax,* the Latin stem of the word peace and root-noun of the verb *pacisci*, originally meant a 'pact' that ended a conflict and resulted in submission, friendship, or alliance. Following the Rome's transition from republic to empire, the word *pax* began to be used to allude to submission to the empire instead of a pact among equals.

But it was nothing other than submission that guaranteed peaceful life for the subjects of the empire. To quote a symbolic instance, Cicero's letter to his brother, the imperium Quintus, provided Roman subjects "with protection against external and civil war"; thus the taxes they pay would be for their own *pax sempiterna* (eternal peace) and *Otium* (leisure time).[188] By the same token, the era known as Pax Romana marked a roughly two hundred years of 'peace and security' despite several revolts, wars and even expansion of the empire's borders through conquest, given the absolute domination of Roman imperialism. Consequently, absolute submission and Roman control had been the precondition for the entwinement between 'peace and security' in the empire, making *pax et securitas* a core political propaganda of Rome's imperial ideology.[189] Indeed, Romans may have been the first to discover

[187] M. Neocleous, 2014.

[188] Stefan Weinstock, 1960, p. 45. This is also why the Roman writer Cornelius Tacitus critically remarked in a famous excerpt of his opus *Agricola* that what Romans called imperium was nothing but despoil and slaughter, and pax was but ravage.

[189] Joel R. White, "'Peace and Security' (1 Thessalonians 5.3): Is It Really a Roman Slogan?", *New Testament Studies* 59(03), 2013.

that the absence of violence could only be ensured by "the forceful creation and maintenance of a political order: pacification."[190]

Alongside many similar examples that could be cited concerning the nexus between peace and pax, the first known instances of using the concept pacification in states' official discourse trace their roots back to the conquests in the age of modern colonialism. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, pacification is "an instance of achieving or restoring peace" whilst, the Dictionary reads, this 'act of peace' at the same time reflects a *euphemistic* manner referring to an "action or process of securing the cooperation or surrender of a population through military force or other forms of coercion." [191] Considered together, the definition takes us to acts of 'achieving peace while securing the cooperation of a population in often seemingly nonviolent methods as far as possible'. Interestingly enough, this concern was evident even in one of the earliest known uses of the concept dating back to the political considerations on warfare during early colonialism, one of which is attributed to Bartolomé de las Casas. Las Casas was a 16th century Spanish friar and social reformer known for being one of the first defenders of international law and human rights norms as well as for his opposition to the atrocities carried out by the colonizers against the West Indies. When he undertook the pacification of Guatemala in the place of Spanish soldiers, he wrote to the Spanish royal court about how the subjection of local population through pacification would succeed rather than the use of military force:

> we declare ourselves ready to *pacify* them and to reduce them to the service or our lord the king, ... after which we shall cause these populations to pay, each year, tributes and services to their Majesties, according to the possibilities granted them by their resources: all for the best advantage of the king of Spain and of these countries.[192]

Against the background of a more general historical perspective, pacification had been the core idea and referred as a common war strategy. Examples vary from the

[190] I. Z. Baron et al. Liberal Pacification and the Phenomenology of Violence, *International Studies Quarterly*, Volume 63, Issue 1, March 2019, p. 199.

[191] *Oxford English Dictionary*.

[192] T. Todorov, *The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other*. Harper & Row, 1982, p. 170.

European colonial wars to the Vietnam War,[193] from the French commander Joseph Gallieni's directories of pacification in light of his experience in Indochina, Sudan and Madagascar in late 19th century to T. E. Lawrence's classic guidelines (*27 Articles*) in the Arab Bulletin in 1917 through to a widely-cited contemporary 'COIN strategist' David Kilcullen's recommendations for the Coalition Forces in the midst of the escalated insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2000s.[194] Although its tactics may vary in different projects depending on the context, the consistent strategy of pacification tempts one to think about the civilianization of warfare as a matter of the construction of a 'new social order' in the guise of restoring peace and security. Thus, functioning in different ways in different states pacification can be described as the whole gamut of processes that facilitate the integration of the powers of modern capitalist state concerning not only the violent crushing of opposition but also "the shaping of the behaviour of individuals, groups and classes, and thereby ordering the social relations".[195] To this end, pacification processes incorporate a number of components, amongst which the prominent ones are the use of politics and consent building as much as force and coercion, cooperation and transformation of the local population, incorporation of counterinsurgency tactics that would repulse the emergence of insurgency beforehand. The success of a pacification project in light of the matrix of these elements would ultimately rely on its capability of "smooth manoeuvring among the liberal boundaries of peace and war, consent and coercion, military and civil spheres, police and military operations."[196]

It is from this starting point that the ideological appropriation of the term pacification needs to be understood. Pacification assumes an ideological framing that is aimed to replace various implications of the term 'conquest' not only as a label but also as an idea. In so doing, it seeks to wage the war in question in a manifestly 'peaceful' appearance in the eyes of local population. An emblematic instance of such

[193] Thomas Richardson, *Destroy and Build: Pacification in Phuoc Thuy, 1966–1972*, Cambridge University Press, 2017. Richard Hunt. *Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam's Hearts and Minds*, Westview Press, 1995.

[194] D. Kilcullen, 2006. See also, M. Neocleous, 2011; 2017.

[195] M. Neocleous, 2014, p. 31.

[196] Tyler Wall, Parastou Saberi, Will Jackson (eds.), "Introduction", in *Destroy, Build, Secure: Readings on Pacification*, Red Quill Books, 2017, p. 5.

replacement traces back to the *The Ordinance on Discovery and Population*, a royal ordinance on dispossession by pacification, issued by the Spanish crown in 1573 where the Philip II declared: "Discoveries are not to be called conquests. Since we wish them to be carried out peacefully and charitably, we do not want the use of the term 'conquest' to offer any excuse for the employment of force or the causing of injury to the Indians."[197]

Dwelling upon Spain's early conquest of the Indies, Tzvetan Todorov argues that the rhetorical cover provided by the notion of pacification was not confined to the Spanish imperial project as it had indeed been the main paradigm for subsequent invasions of European colonial powers of other parts of the world.[198] The euphemism employed here should not be underestimated as it reflects a shift in the representational perspective generating a seemingly different imperial approach towards conquest and dispossession:

> It is not conquests that are to be banished, but the word conquest; "pacification" is nothing but another word to designate the same things, but let us not suppose that this linguistic concern is a futile one. Subsequently, one is to act under cover of commerce, by manifesting love, and without showing greed.[199]

The ideological path followed through such replacement indicates a certain consistency along with more contemporary pacification projects, though often dubbed as peacekeeping, or counterinsurgency. The well-known mantra used as a shorthand for the COIN campaigns in new imperial wars including Malaya, Vietnam and Afghanistan clearly remains a throwback to the colonial commitment to this 'new-style conquest'[200]: "winning the hearts and minds". This concept was originally attributed to the French administrator Hubert Lyautey in Northern Vietnam in 1895 to outline a new war strategy to counter the threat of rebellion by bringing the subjugated population on side. What is commonly highlighted more than anything

[197] Cited in M. Neocleous, 2014, pp. 32-3.

[198] J. R. Slaughter, ""A Mouth with Which to Tell the Story": Silence, Violence, and Speech in Chinua Achebe's Things Fall Apart", in H. Bloom (ed.) *Chinua Achebe's Things Fall Apart (Bloom's Modern Critical Interpretations),* 2010, p. 70.

[199] T. Todorov, 1982, p. 174.

[200] J. H. Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America 1492–1830,* 2006, p. 77.

else in these campaigns is the importance of fabricating a new form of 'peace and order' that is intended to secure the support of the local population making them believe that it is for their own well-being and welfare. In this light, 'common good' remains as a key discursive tool to legitimate and secure (colonial) social order.[201] In his famous COIN manual David Kilcullen defines and expands on the conception: "Hearts means persuading people their best interests are served by your success. 'Minds' means convincing them that you can protect them, and that resisting you is pointless. Note that neither concept has to do with whether people like you. Calculated self-interest, not emotion, is what counts."[202]

To elaborate on this point, it seems that we need to draw upon a broader entanglement of war and peace. For now I shall explore the possibilities of contemplating on the imposition of civil peace and upholding of capitalist relations of power through the model of war. Since such attempt entails a civilized idea of warfare, it would be worth mentioning Michel Foucault's work throughout the mid-1970s, which focused on the relationship between civil war and maintenance of political power. In effect, his analytics of power starting with the series of lectures in *Punitive Society* and further developed in *Society Must Be Defended* is remarkable in its relation to the concept pacification, given not only an understanding of power as a *productive* force but also the interconnections he discovered between 'war', 'peace', and law. Yet, as we will see, it elides the class dimension of the political technologies of power he grapples with in his investigation of civil war.

2.5.4. Pacification: Coded Class War

The lectures published under the genealogical works *The Punitive Society* (1972-3) and *Society Must Be Defended* (1975-6) develop a historical and analytical framework for understanding power relations in terms of social conflict, confrontation, and most prominently, war. As an analytical model the concept 'civil war' had been central to Foucault's thought until 1977, when his analysis tools

[201] Tia Dafnos, "Pacification of Indigenous Struggles in Canada", *Socialist Studies*. 9(2) 2013, p. 59.

[202] Paul Dixon, "'Hearts and Minds'? British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 32, 2009.

gravitated more to the concept governmentality. For a long period of his work his account of power had been preoccupied by the effort to conceptualize war as a hidden presence that constantly shapes the institutions of power within modern society. Such conceptualization eventually comes up against what he calls the 'juridical' schema that refers to the juridical model of state and sovereignty emerged in the 16th century. In this model, the source of power in society lies in the sovereignty which emanates from the subjugation of subjects by means of law. "Power is war, the continuation of war by other means", he notes, whereas power relations "are essentially anchored in a certain relationship of force that was established in and through war at a given historical moment that can be historically specified."[203]

At stake here is the reason that these lectures are known as the reversal of the famous proposition of a famous theorist of war, Carl von Clausewitz, whose analysis of war had been linked to the study of politics for centuries, that "war is the continuation of politics by other means". Indeed, Foucault is precisely sure that quite the opposite holds true: politics is the continuation of war by other means rather than the other way around. Even though he admits that political power puts an end to the appearance of war and establishes a reign of peace in civil society, he also remarks that the effects of power and the disequilibrium of forces are not suspended or neutralized in such peace. Conversely, far from putting an end to the disequilibrium of forces manifested in war, political power is "perpetually to use a sort of *silent war* to reinscribe that relationship of force, and to reinscribe it in institutions, economic inequalities, language, and even the bodies of individuals" (emphasis added)[204].

This *silent war* continuously operating through political power and under the civil peace that is supposed to be established by it turns out to be something different than what goes by 'armed conflict' or 'military confrontation' and what we normally envisage when we speak of 'war'. It rather evokes Marx's phrase "the dull compulsion of economic relations" that prevails once the wage-labour/capital

[203] M. Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended (Lectures at the Collège de France 1975-1976)*, David Macay (trans.), Picador New York, [1976] 2003, p. 15.

[204] Ibid, pp. 15-6.

relation is settled by way of dispossession. Foucault contends that the conceiving of the war in question merely in the context of militarism at the expense of social relations of power is quite a modern phenomenon, a product of the historical process which he describes as the monopolization of war by the centralized 'modern' state.

On this view, the concept of war, its practices and its instruments have undergone a dramatic evolution following the rise of state powers throughout the middle ages and up to the early modern era. The most salient outcome of this process is the emergence of the army *as institution* which did not exist in the middle ages in this manner. With the monopolization of war in the hands of a central power as such, what might hitherto be called 'private warfare' or 'day-to-day warfare' between human groups and classes was eradicated from the social body. Wars have now turned into the professional and technical monopoly of the military apparatus concerning exclusively the external borders, the outer limits of independent states, as well as a violent relationship that actually or potentially exists between states.[205] Nevertheless, Foucault also underscores a paradox which goes in parallel with the modern transformation of warfare. The paradox is that a new historico-political discourse of war had emerged out of the great political struggles of the 17th century in the West, roughly following the end of the civil and religious wars of the 16th century. What was that? The discourse tells precisely the opposite of what had been observed in the practice of new militarized wars, and remarks that war itself is "a permanent social relationship, the ineradicable basis of all relations and institutions of power".[206] In the heart of the profound social, economic and political transformations of the 17th century this discourse was eagerly adopted and reformulated time and again by people such as jurists, politicians, writers and historians who represented popular movements and political struggles between different classes. Suffice to say, it had been an instrument of political organization used in bourgeois, petit bourgeois and popular struggles and polemics against the monarchy in England, while in France it backed up the struggle of the aristocracy against the establishment of the greatly centralized absolute monarchy.[207]

[205] Ibid, pp. 48-9.

[206] Ibid, p. 49.

[207] Ibid, pp. 58-9.

This discourse of perpetual war, which encourages one to contemplate on war in view of power struggles in domestic social order, was not only opposed to the transforming conception of war practices at the time. It represented also the rejection of the dominant philosophico-juridical theory which has overwhelmed the remnants of it. For, in such formulation, political power does not begin with the end of war, in contrast to the delegation of war to an accident, an abnormal situation to be avoided in modern political thought: War cannot be obviated. Being a central analytical principle, this assumption parallels the idea that power relation is never one-sided and it cannot be excluded from any social relation. This being the case Foucault notes in his lectures on the 'punitive society' delivered in 1973 that civil war constitutes the matrix of all struggles and strategies of power.[208] In so doing, his aim is not simply to turn Clausewitz's formula inside out, but to revoke the original historical discourse of war doing away with such formula –which was itself originally an inversion of an already long-standing formulation about the relationship between war and politics.[209] However, the warfare model here does not go beyond being used solely for the analysis of power relations, without particular reference to the socioeconomic reality in capitalist society.

Approaching modern political power as the matrix of relations of power around the idea of warfare also tempts one to critical, if not cynical, grasp of peace and law. Such an effort would presuppose a non-zero-sum relationship between peace and law on the one hand, and war and violence on the other. Law does not originate out of peace and consensus, as Foucault points out, "right, peace, and laws were born in the blood and mud of battles."[210] This is apparently the denial of the way in which Hobbes formulates the constitution of the law, peace and political power, even though the idea of permanent civil war is situated in his doctrine of sovereignty. First, the permanent war in question does not amount to an abstraction of 'war of all against all', but to "the war of rich against poor, of owners against those who have

[208] M. Foucault, *The Punitive Society (Lectures at the Collège de France 1972-1973).* Graham Burchell (trans.), Palgrave Macmillan, [1973] 2013, p. 13.

[209] Marcelo Hoffman, *Foucault and Power: The Influence of Political Engagement on Theories of Power*, London: Bloomsbury, 2014, p. 60.

[210] M. Foucault, 2003, p. 50.

nothing, of bosses against proletarians" – which could be seen along the lines of the modern the penal system 19th century.[211] More significantly, the Hobbesian contractualism and the law arising from it does not amount to peace-making, as war is the motor of all institutions and order —which appears under the influence of Marx's well-known dictum regarding class struggle:

> How, when, and why was it noticed or imagined that what is going on beneath and in power relations is a war? When, how and why did someone come up with the idea that it is a sort of *uninterrupted battle that shapes peace, and that the civil order*...is basically an order of battle?...Who saw war just beneath the surface of peace; who sought in the noise and confusion of war, in the mud of battles, the principle that allows us to understand order, the State, its institutions, and its history?[212] [emphasis added]

Contrary to the Hobbessian formulation that denies war within the civil power, Foucault makes it clear that war does not exhaust itself by conforming to civil laws or to sovereign power. It is a permanent war and the dissymmetries in the relationship of force transcribed in peace and civil order which are misleadingly interpreted as the absence of war. He neatly sums up which could be also considered the first formulation manifested in the history of pacification: "We are always writing the history of the same war, even when we are writing the history of peace and its institutions."[213]

If what is at work beneath political power is essentially and above all a warlike relation, one of the first axioms of the exercise of power would be the denial of such war and deploy ideological strategies and institutional techniques to conceal it.[214] The modern transformation of warfare enabled states to banish war outside the domestic order. This means that the state's normal condition is to be at peace; it sets the parameters of peace within its borders in such a way that any prospect of civil unrest would disturb peace. Second, politics entails "a technique of internal peace and order" devised as the continuation "of the military model as a fundamental

[211] M. Foucault, 2013, p. 22.

[212] M. Foucault, 2003, p. 47.

[213] Ibid, p. 17.

[214] M. Foucault, 2013, p. 13.

means of preventing civil disorder", whose ultimate reference is to automatic docility rather than fundamental rights.[215] Given the integrity of the state power, military and civil powers are two sides of the same coin regarding the prevention of civil disorder and imposition of peace.

But, what is the salient problem all along these considerations? It is a problem that runs parallel to the one in Foucault's general theory of power, and that might have its roots in the latter. He neither offers an understanding into the peculiar type of the state in question, nor does he tell much about what this perpetual war is about. In effect, all the insight Foucault provides concerning the relationship among war, peace, and law ultimately presents to us the historical relationship between capital and pacification, a subject that he conspicuously glosses over. For, while he regards law and politics as the expressions of warfare offering the conception of war as a social relationship, he mentions pacification in a manner akin to its use in the language of colonial powers and war studies, stating that "law is not pacification".[216] The reason for this shortcoming is his avoidance of considering the conception of civil war he discusses at length in conjunction with the history of capitalist development and colonization.

However, it is also interesting that just as Marx had noticed that the scheme of systematic colonization was an analytical model to understand the capitalist development also in the metropoles, Foucault was in fact one of the first to discover that the use of the techniques developed by the Western states in their imperial wars was never limited to the colonies. In effect, a whole series of colonial models including the apparatuses, institutions, and techniques of power were transferred back to the mechanisms of power in the West with a 'boomerang effect' in such a way to practice an 'internal colonialism' in these states.[217] The fact that Foucault intends not to talk much about is that the underlying dynamic behind the development of these techniques and mechanisms of power implying the practice of

[215] M. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, New York: Vintage, [1975] 1979, p. 168.

[216] M. Foucault, 2003, p. 50.

[217] Ibid, p. 103

a civil war at both domestic and global level is nothing but the ever-growing expansionary needs of capitalist accumulation. The transfer of colonial models of power was therefore not for the sake of power itself, but in the service of accumulation.

It is also worth noting that the idea of civil war as the matrix of power relations in Foucault's genealogy is originally rooted in Marx's view of class struggle as much as in a Nietzschean reading of Clausewitz. In this regard, the perpetual social war as such runs mostly parallel to Marx's usage of the concept of *Gewalt* (both meanings of power and violence)[218] as well as the systematic nature of violence integral to systematic colonization which he discusses in relation to Wakefield's theory. Marx and Engels, who also held Clausewitz's theory of warfare in high regard, used the term 'war' endowed with a militaristic discourse, but such discourse is employed rather for strengthening the metaphorical power of the 'social' and 'civil' context of collective struggle, than indicate a military confrontation.[219]

For instance, in Chapter I of *Communist Manifesto,* they described the historical development of the proletariat as a 'more or less veiled civil war raging within society', which would end up with the expropriation of the expropriators.[220] Marx likewise defined in *Capital* the struggles over the working day in the 19th century as part of "a protracted civil war, more or less dissembled, between the capitalist class and the working-class".[221] One of the major themes of Engel's interpretation of what was happening in England in the same century was nothing but 'war', "a social war of all against all".[222] He maintains that "capital, the direct or indirect control of the means of subsistence and production, is the weapon with which this social warfare is

[218] Luca Basso, The Ambivalence of Gewalt in Marx and Engels: On Balibar's Interpretation, *Historical Materialism* 17(2), June 2009.

[219] Siniša Malešević, *The Sociology of War and Violence*, Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 22-23.

[220] K. Marx & F. Engels. *The Communist Manifesto*. Verso, [1848] 1998, p. 49.

[221] K. Marx, 1995, 194. See also, M. Neocleous, 2014, pp. 6-7.

[222] F. Engels, *Condition of the Working Class in England*, Panther, [1845] 1969, p. 44.

carried on",[223] whereas the heightened frequency of the proletarian struggle which mostly manifest in incessant strikes 'are often nothing more than skirmishes in the social war'.[224] On the whole, both Marx and Engels adopt the term 'war' to underscore class exploitation as the dominant form of violence under capitalism, whilst the expropriation of and control over labour constitutes the fundamental means of the social war of capital.

However, although such use of war for depicting historical social struggles had been influential on Foucault, the idea of civil war he developed does not stem from class antagonism. Nor does the set of political techniques of power that he asserted to have been set in motion for the production of docile bodies having "replaced the more traditional and ritual methods of violence and force" represent the class dominance of the bourgeoisie. Even though he concedes the historical affinity between the accumulation of capital and the disciplinary techniques of power he analyses in *The Punitive Society* (and later developed in *Discipline and Punish*), he rather conceives of the latter historically 'constitutive' of capitalist production.[225] This assumption differs significantly from the premise of the role of the so-called primitive accumulation in the transition to capitalism, as these disciplinary methods were far from being originated from the feudal mode of production and its transformation. Foucault rather tends to read the social transformations in the West particularly between the 15th and 18th centuries through the set of techniques of power developed towards the enforcement of productive labour, whereby he clearly assigns them a constitutive role: "If it is true that the economic structure, characterized by the accumulation of capital, has the property of transforming individuals' labor-power into productive force, the aim of the structure of power which takes the form of sequestration is, prior to that stage, to transform the time of life into labor-power."[226]

Yet, as we have discussed within the scope of primitive accumulation and systematic colonization, capitalist relations of production and the accumulation of capital are

[223] K. Marx, 1995, p. 45.

[224] Ibid, p. 156.

[225] M. Foucault, 2013, pp. 231-2.

[226] Ibid, 232.

contingent upon the expropriation of direct producers and its constant reproduction as its foundational premise. In this context, all forms of political coercion that will follow the original expropriation (even though Foucault defines them as something different and more complex than physical violence, they still encompass physical, sheer violence[227]) aim to reinforce and secure perpetual proletarianization and labour's subjugation to capital. Therefore, starting from the 15th century through to the 18th century, the implementation of an extensive sequestration and discipline system that might appear to aim at increasing labour productivity is fundamentally rooted in capitalist production relations, rather than the other way around. Hence, speaking of a historical period which roughly corresponds to the abolition of serfdom and dissolution of the remnants of feudal society, the motive behind the transformation of 'the time of life into labour-power' as well as 'production of docile and productive bodies' cannot be understood without resorting to the analysis of relations of production and capital's expansionary needs. Otherwise, the appropriation of surplus value would be subsumed into a pure political relation, so would the civil war. In short, the perpetual civil war in question is essentially a war of accumulation, that is, class war. In Alliez and Lazzarato's words, "civil war is the permanent state of capitalism".[228]

Overall, to understand pacification as a social warfare, framing it within a self-referential abstraction of a rootless and subjectless power would not be conducive. Pacification is framed within the capitalist relations of production; more specifically, the need for perpetual expropriation and proletarianization underpinning the social constitution of capital-relation. Admittedly, Foucault's reversal of the Clausewitzian dictum helps one to move beyond both the Hobbesian and liberal methodologies justifying many false dichotomies including the one between the law and violence. His particular conception of civil war grasps the so-called civil peace as an unspoken and silent warfare in which the powers of the state, law and politics are at play. However, the backdrop of this civil war (as well as class war he occasionally did not hesitate to employ) is constituted by all-encompassing and non-monolithic sets of

[227] For Poulantzas's criticism of Foucault's underestimation of the role of overt physical violence in the exercise of modern political power, see Poulantzas, [1978] 2000, pp. 77-83.

[228] Eric Alliez & Maurizio Lazzarato, *Wars and Capital*, Semiotext(e), 2016, p. 274.

constantly changing power relations flowing throughout a particular social body without the existence of a dominant class.[229] Such analytics of power fails to keep sight of the interplay of class struggles across multiple domains of social formation, which mutually reinforce and reproduce each other within a historical context.

Moreover, as Poulantzas points out, such self-referential notion of power fundamentally deprives the assumption of resistance of any foundation:

> Now, for Foucault, the power relation never has any other basis than itself: it becomes a pure 'situation' in which power is always immanent; and the question *what power* and *power to do what* appears as a mere obstacle. This leads Foucault into a particular logical impasse from which there is no possible escape. … For if power is always already there, if every power situation is immanent in itself, why should there ever be resistance? From where would resistance come, and how would it be even possible?

Unlike the Foucauldian account of civil war, from the lens of pacification power is always entrenched within the framework of relations of production, social division of labour, and class struggles. Hence, to reformulate the Clausewitz's formula, pacification entails a 'class war by other means'. Despite its changing manifestations, novel methods and techniques in different historical and social contexts, it is always a social war waged by means of a whole set of state powers to "create, shape and subjugate the working class".[230] The means of this war are generally connected to the police power.[231] They incorporate a variety of positive and productive techniques of power hand in hand with repressive ones to create (productive) workers and facilitate conditions for new sites of capital accumulation. Finally, it is a war that aims at a social order secure from resistance, rebellion or revolution, whereby it is carried out based on the disavowal of a war as such.

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[229] "Of course, in this kind of general war through which power is exercised, there is a social class that occupies a privileged position and that may thereby impose its strategy, carry off a certain number of victories, accumulate them, and obtain the advantage of an effect of hyper-power, but this effect is not of the order of total possession. Power is not monolithic. It is never entirely controlled from a certain point of view by a certain number of people. At every moment it is in play in little singular struggles, with local reversals, regional defeats and victories, provisional revenges. The model of civil war should replace the model founded on the existence of a dominant class." M. Foucault, 2013, p. 228.

[230] Yari Lanci, Systematic colonisation and the secret(s) of the capitalist mode of production, *London Review of International Law*, Volume 3, Issue 2, 2015, p. 341.

[231] M. Neocleous, 2013.

2.5.5. Pacification: War to *Build*

So far we have made sure that pacification is a policy and strategy of war-making. But having the ultimate goal of achieving a common sense that 'resisting is pointless'[232] the concept leads us to explore the idea of warfare with due attention to the role of an endless (re)construction, 'the constant assertion and re-assertion of political control'[233] in the name of peace and security. As a practice, pacification at its best refers to war–police conjunction preferably predicated on the constant rebuilding of the bourgeois social order, rather than pure military destruction or breaking the resistance by overt violence. As a historical materialist lens of analysing imperialism and colonialism, its theory grapples with imperial powers' efforts "to transform societies in ways that facilitate the territorial expansion necessary to the accumulation of capital".[234] Hubert Lyautey, the French commander of the French forces and governor-general in Madagascar and Morocco succinctly summed up his experience in colonial campaigns: "To build, this is the goal, and the unique goal, of every colonial war".[235] In effect, French colonial professionals were eager to manifest that the administrative tasks they assumed were by and large technical and falling outside the political realm. Yet, as Gwendolyn Wright puts it, such assertion "cannot mask the unrelenting quest for political control and economic modernization".[236] The truth is that colonizers embarked on tasks of urban planning and regulatory population management to build cities that would function as sites of generating capital investment as well as testing out novel administrative techniques to pacify local population and make them more productive.

To pacify a population is therefore "to impose order through coercion and consent", which is by no means limited to military destruction and occupation.[237] But in

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[232] Department of the Army Counterinsurgency, *Field Manual No. 3-24 Fleet Marine Force Manual No. 3-24*, December 2006, Appendix A, A-5.

[233] Brig. Gen. Tran Dinh Tho, *Pacification: Indochina Monographs*, Washington D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980, p.v.

[234] Tia Dafnos, 2013, p. 59.

[235] Quoted in Gwendolyn Wright, *The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism*, University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 83.

[236] Ibid, p. 83.

[237] David Correia & Tyler Wall, *Police: A Field Guide*, 2018, p. 80.

essence, it does not even seem possible to make a real distinction, besides an analytical one, between the two groups of actions –that is proactive and reactive, positive and negative, reconstructive and destructive. In an emblematic speech in the NATO's strategic command in 1957, French General Allard emphasized that the war against communist and socialist movements required a combination of socio-economic planning alongside military action. He grouped these missions into two categories; destruction and construction, formulating as inseparable:

> The meaning of 'destruction' is fairly clear: the co-ordinated activity of army and associated state powers to 'chase and annihilate' and 'deal spectacular blows'. 'Construction', however, means 'building the peace', 'organizing the people', persuading the people 'by the use of education' and, ultimately 'preparing the establishment of a new order'. [T]o destroy without building up would mean useless labor; to build without first destroying would be a delusion – this is the task of pacification.[238]

This is why the concept pacification, once grasped as a critical tool, addresses the exercise of integral state power by conjoining war and police power in a way to overcome the seemingly two separate group of activities associated with two separate institutions ('the' military and 'the' police).[239] The intimate relationship between destruction and (re)construction developed in almost all pacification texts needs to be considered somewhat in tandem with Gramsci's formulation of the balance of force and consent, which abandons force 'to predominate excessively over consent'.[240] To be sure, just as consent is preferably prior as far as the 'normal' exercise of hegemony is concerned, it is politics and social engineering that count in ideal pacification.[241] Examining how the architects of the America's pacification program in Vietnam learned from their French and British predecessors, Joseph Hansen explores that the colonizing military experts were ensured that 'the campaign must avoid destruction as far as possible'.[242] This is a must not only to preserve the

[238] Cited in M. Neocleous, G. Rigakos, T. Wall, "On Pacification: Introduction to the Special Issue", *Socialist Studies / Études socialistes* 9 (2) Winter 2013, p. 1.

[239] M. Neocleous, 2013, p. 9.

[240] A. Gramsci. 1971, p. 80.

[241] M. Neocleous, "Fundamentals of Pacification Theory: Twenty-six Articles", T. Wall et al. (eds.), 2017.

[242] J. Hansen, "The Case Against "Pacification"", *International Socialist Review*, Vol.27 No.4, Fall 1966, p. 133.

productive potential of the theatre of operations but also to immediately integrate the pacified country into the imperial whole both politically and economically. In a similar vein, James Gibson explains the US failure in Vietnam by stating that the management of pacification efforts had fallen short of being productive.[243] This meant running counter to the demands not only of President Johnson's concept of 'other war' but also of Robert Komer's 'nation-building', who redefined the US strategy in a far more productive terms after being appointed as the special executor for pacification. Gibson notes that "fundamental to pacification was security", which becomes meaningful only by thinking of the general idea "as a kind of police action" unlike the destructive practices of counterinsurgency.[244]

Concomitantly, similar to the combination of force and consent in hegemony, the practices of destruction and reconstruction, together with civil and military tasks are situated on the same continuum of state power since the most effective way to counter a resistance is to pre-emptively contain the conditions for its potential emergence. Such containment would be possible only by effective means and strategies of 'reconstruction'. Drawing from his successful colonizing work in Indochina at the turn of the 20th century, General Gallieni of France stresses the significance of social engineering to fabricate a new social order in colonial warfare: "The best means for achieving pacification in our new colony is provided by combined application of force and politics. It must be remembered that, in the course of colonial struggles, we should turn to destruction only as a last resort and only as a preliminary to better reconstruction."[245] This is what all pacification programs have in common. As Neocleous points out, "violence is always presented as part and parcel of a *productive* or *constructive* or *reconstructive* application of politics in general." [emphasis in original].[246]

Now, in view of the colonial history of pacification what is to be constructed and produced needs to be clarified. Issuing the instructions of colonial rule General

[243] James William Gibson, *The Perfect War: Technowar in Vietnam*, Atlantic Monthly Press, 2000, p. 273.

[244] Ibid, p. 227.

[245] Cited in J. Hansen, 2017, p. 134.

[246] M. Neocleous, 2017, p. 23.

Gallieni illustrates various objectives including the reconstruction of the inhabited area, education and schooling, and above all, the creation of a market.[247] Inasmuch as pacification expands, Gallieni maintains, the country becomes more civilized, markets are reopened, trade is re-established all of which make the military task become secondary to administration. Therefore, the productive dimension of pacification, in the first instance, corresponds to the fabrication of a civilized society and sociopolitical order founded on the exploitation of wage labour and the opening up of spaces for capital accumulation. Second, the practice of pacification aims at the creation of productive and docile political subjectivities encroaching into various aspects of social life. Adding to his predecessor Gallieni, Lyautey suggests that the exercise of power must be developed 'not as a matter of destroying but transforming people'[248] by continuously waging an ideological war to rule through ideological, moral and intellectual leadership in Gramscian terms. Thus, the task of studying, meeting and transforming "the social requirements of the subject people" remains an integral component of "the development of colonization, which will utilize the natural resources of the soil and open the outlets for European trade."[249] This is why modern counterinsurgency is somewhat another name for pacification, as in both strategies the key of permanent rule is sought in winning the hearts and minds so as to ensure a riot-free social order.

It is worth noting, however, that it would be wrong to subsume the task of creating docile subjects solely to an ideological mask or mass delusion concerning the actuality of peace. Capital's all-encompassing social war symbolized by the long colonial history of pacification does not indicate the absence of peace. In effect, the essential problem pointed out by the study of pacification is not that peace is an outcome of a false perception of social reality, a kind of false consciousness, an illusion or deception –but that, it is entirely 'real'.[250] Capital's perpetual peace, i.e. *Pax Capital*, is the coded war that continuously structures the social world inside and

[247] Cited in J. Hansen, 1966, p. 134.

[248] Cited in G. Wright, 1991, p, 76.

[249] Cited in J. Hansen, 1966, p. 134.

[250] E. Güven, 2018, p. 43.

outside, under the rubrics such as ‘labour peace’, ‘social peace’ where the voice of the oppressed are muted, or ‘international peace’ where imperial relations come to be naturalized.

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We thus have greater insight into what the ‘social war’ of pacification is actually about, which the model of civil war, developed on a subjectless formulation of power in Foucault and his followers, seems to fail to capture adequately. In sum, pacification is productive in the sense that it aims at a new social order conducive to the accumulation of capital (which might include every detail serving a purpose) as well as the crushing of the opposition to that order. It is a strategy of class war, and waged in the name of ‘peace and security’. Even in setting out the severest extraordinary measures it abides by the *law* since its ideological concern plays heavily on the law=order equation. Because law is an order for the promotion of peace and peace comes only through law from the liberal point of view,[251] recourse to the state’s legal authority is necessary to make pacification efforts acceptable without impairing its peaceful and liberal outlook. For the same reason emergency measures of a military nature would not be a preferred choice unless absolutely necessary.

Whilst pacification in essence points to a general logic of political management of labour-capital contradiction and its social and political implications for capitalist states, it is obvious that there exists no monolithic form of it that could be generalized for different countries and historical contexts. Its manifestation in the institutional materiality of the state, in the relations of force, the level and qualitative features of the political violence it entails, and to be sure, its success on behalf of capital’s class domination in a given state are historically shaped by socio-political forces and struggles in complex ways.

As an attempt to historicize the concept pacification as to the scope of this study, the Chapter will be concluded with a discussion of possible dimensions in which

[251] H. Kelsen, *Law and Peace in International Relations: The Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures 1940-41*, W.S. Hein & Company, 1997, p. 1.

neoliberal hegemony and pacification could be related, along with empirical repercussions of the Turkish case.

2.5.6. Pacification: Links to Neoliberal Hegemony

Despite varying definitions of the term, as a class project responding to the 1970s global capitalist crisis neoliberalism addresses a series of political economic developments, strategies and practices shifted within the state and social relations of power. The transformations brought about by the neoliberal turn merit particular attention in relation to the critical focus of pacification, primarily due to the class nature of the profound shift in the balance of social forces, as well as due to the fact that such shift has been achieved by means of proactive state intervention. The state as ever assumes the chief role in constituting, protecting and reproducing the market economy defined in the neoliberal system of accumulation. Its power has been plainly discernible not only in the management of the economy in a way to deny the myth of the self-regulating market, but it has also been employed in severe forms of coercion to curb the class power of labour and create suitable conditions for the reproduction of capitalist production relations. In this light, reiterating the discussion on primitive accumulation, the excessive resort to extra-economic coercion in neoliberalism appears to bear more relation to De Angelis's class struggle-based formulation that it is concerned with any denial of subordination to the 'ordinary run of things'[252] (which can be read as 'accumulation proper', or 'the dull compulsion of economic relations'), than Luxemburg's thesis on the dependency of the expanded reproduction of capital to the annihilation of pre-capitalist formations. Indeed, whether or not examined under the category of primitive accumulation, the neoliberal project inevitably evokes a new predatory round of 'enclosures', which seems remarkably radical in attacking what proletarian struggles have imposed as rights in the course of history,[253] as well as in setting out a massive redistribution of assets and political power in favour of capital. As previously discussed under the category of systematic colonization, capital's constant struggle for removing the barriers to accumulation is an integral part of its expanded reproduction and thereby

[252] De Angelis, 2001, pp. 14-5.

[253] Midnight Notes Collective, *The New Enclosures*. Brooklyn: Desk Top Publishing, 1990, p. 3.

not novel to neoliberalism. The latter rather marks a historical phase in which such struggle has been effectively carried out as a coercive political project, with the state apparatus being attributed a constitutive and reproductive role. Hence, viewing pacification as class warfare would entail placing neoliberalism and its deployment of state power within the wider framework of class and political struggles, which is to say, it is imperative to view the implementation and outcomes of neoliberal policies both as the historical product and an ongoing site of these struggles.

Second, what concerns pacification could also be broadly identified as the management of the social consequences of neoliberal policies, for the ultimate goal of any pacification effort is simply to avoid revolt. Such task includes absorption of the social distress of neoliberal plunder and the prospect of popular struggles over it. This implies not only reactively suppressing but also containing outright the emergence of any potentially transformative upheaval in line with the contemporary logics of pre-emptive policing and counterinsurgency. The policing aspect is also intimately linked to the political mechanisms through which, what one may refer as 'neoliberal hegemony', is upheld and reproduced.

2.5.6.1. Hegemony of Neoliberalism

Parallel to the massive diffusion of the variegated economic and political tools associated with neoliberalism within nations both in the Global North and Global South since the 1980s, neoliberalism has become the hegemonic mode of discourse and practice on the world stage. By imposing the merits of market transaction as a self-sufficient ethical formation, and incorporating any discourses associated with its agenda (atomistic individualism, competitiveness, entrepreneurship, self-responsibility, consumerism, etc.) into the common-sense as a guiding principle for human behaviour, it has comprehensively transformed the dominant pattern of social relations in line with an entrepreneurial logic. The processes of neoliberalization have thereby not only dominated the political economic practices and policymaking at multiple scales, but also infiltrated the ways many of us interpret, live in, and understand the world.[254] Consequently, whilst the crises, instabilities, fluctuations

[254] D. Harvey. "Neo-Liberalism as Creative Destruction." *Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography* 88, no. 2, 2006, p. 145.

and compelling issues of social reproduction brought about by neoliberal transformation have indeed raised questions of its legitimacy, the dominant ideology of market values has so far proved successful in somewhat legitimizing, in Roy's words, "a process of barbaric dispossession on a scale that has no parallel in history".[255]

Maintaining its enduring hegemonic position, the neoliberal project, on the other hand, by no means signifies smooth, stable and coherent processes, to the extent that the questions of legitimacy are politicized on a popular scale. Given the widening social economic and spatial inequality across the globe, it has so far faced with various acts and groups of resistance, albeit often with different agendas and strategies. The subjects of resistance movements and popular protests against the wide array of neoliberal policies and forms of coercion entail a striking diversity, varying from privatizations and IMF-imposed austerity programmes to women's rights, immigrants' rights, peasant movements on the access to land, environment and habitat issues, and so forth.[256] The politics of resistance represented by the vast swaths of mostly *ad hoc*, issue-based movements against varying products of neoliberalism appear to derive their strength from becoming relevant and embedded in the politics of everyday life[257] away from the conventional, often centralized mechanisms of political representation. On the other hand, even though they are all one way or another provoked by the established political economic order, the diffuse, fragmented and contingent nature of the targets and objectives they set themselves indicate a highly contested power to counter the macro-politics of the pervasive assault of global neoliberalism. At times, such oppositional social movements rapidly fall off by succeeding in mitigating the loss of rights over the commons (such as by blocking a proposed legislation),[258] and even occasionally in reclaiming the commons, however it is more often than not that they have struggled to extract

[255] Arundhati Roy, *Power Politics*, South End Press, 2002, p. 43.

[256] Barry K. Gills (ed.) *Globalization and the Politics of Resistance*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2000. D. Harvey, *Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution,* Verso, 2012.

[257] D. Harvey, *Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution*, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 168.

[258] D. Harvey, 2012, p. 118.

themselves from their confinement to 'local and particular' contexts.[259] Moreover, as Harvey contends, most of them conceive of the struggle over the state apparatus as "not only irrelevant but an illusory diversion".[260] This poses yet another challenge to devise plausible strategies to build an encompassing framework for articulating different forms of resistance at different scales against the state-led actions of capital's encroachment.

The situation on the part of labour movement is even worse. As a project to achieve from the very beginning the restoration of class power of capital,[261] the outcomes of neoliberal policies have been particularly pronounced for the working classes who bear the greatest brunt of the political and economic impoverishment both on global and national scales.[262] Key to many neoliberal structures has been growing devaluation of labour power, deterioration of the living and working conditions of the working classes, precariousness and flexibilization of employment, adverse changes in protective regulations, rollback of collective bargaining, systematic exclusion of labour from policymaking.[263] Such deteriorating conditions have been secured by (and *for*) holding in check the working class militancy through coercive state-led means. In line with the contention of neoliberal theorists that reductions in trade union power and the formation of more flexible labour markets would encourage to simulate growth and competitiveness while reducing welfare dependency,[264] the organizational and collective power of labour measured by union

[259] D. Harvey, 2003, pp. 168-9.

[260] Ibid, p. 175.

[261] Gerard Duménil and Dominique Lévy, *Capital Resurgent: Roots of the Neoliberal Revolution,* Harvard University Press, 2004. D. Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 16–9.

[262] Giovanni Andrea Cornia, "Globalization and the distribution of income between and within countries", in Chang, H. -J. (ed.), *Rethinking Economic Development*, London: Anthem Press, 2003. Tali Kristal, "Good Times, Bad Times: Postwar Labor's Share of National Income in Capitalist Democracies", *American Sociological Review*, 75(5), 2010, 729–763.

[263] Lucio Baccaro and Chris Howell, "A Common Neoliberal Trajectory: The Transformation of Industrial Relations in Advanced Capitalism". *Politics & Society*, 39(4), 521-563. Ben Fine and Alfredo Saad-Filho, "Thirteen Things You Need to Know About Neoliberalism", *Critical Sociology* 2017, Vol. 43(4-5): 693-4.

[264] Deborah Johnston, "Poverty and Distribution: Back on the Neoliberal Agenda?" in A. Saad Filho and D. Johnston (eds.) *Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader* (Pluto Press 2005), p. 136.

density and strike activity has notably diminished in the face of increasing labour productivity and depressing real wages even in industrialized democracies since the 1980s.[265] While widespread deregulation and austerity policies have encountered the rise of militant and radical unionism in some cases throughout the 2010s,[266] attempts of radicalization often end up being destroyed or severely damaged by state repression in a way that seeks to totally remove the radical element.[267] All in all, the undermining of the political power of labour as an imperative of the neoliberal project has hindered the labour movement from extending beyond the moment of organizing within the labour process, to quote Harvey, of "finding a political and social alternative to the operation of the capitalist law of value across the world market".[268]

Against this overall background, it is hard to argue for the end of neoliberal hegemony. While it is possible to speak of the global financial crisis of 2008 as having shaken the hegemonic position of neoliberal economic governance, the so-called transition to a social and global new order, as heralded by optimistic critiques,[269] remains distant for now.[270] For, as observed by Centero and Cohen, there still 'do not appear to be any economic, political, or ideational alternatives in

[265] James A. Piazza, "Globalizing Quiescence: Globalization, Union Density and Strikes in 15 Industrialized Countries", *Economic and Industrial Democracy*, Vol. 26(2): 289–314. Bernhard Ebbinghaus, Jelle Visser, "When Institutions Matter: Union Growth and Decline in Western Europe, 1950-1995." *European Sociological Review* 15, no. 2 (1999): 135–58. Todd E. Vachon, Michael Wallace, Allen Hyde, "Union Decline in a Neoliberal Age: Globalization, Financialization, European Integration, and Union Density in 18 Affluent Democracies". *Socius*, 2 (2016).

[266] Michael Schiavone, *Austerity and the Labor Movement* (State University of New York Press, 2016). Lucila D'Urso and Julieta Longo, "Radical Political Unionism as a Strategy for Revitalization in Argentina", *Latin American Perspectives*, 45(6), 97–113.

[267] J.M. Barbalet, 'Social Movements and the State: The Case of the American Labor Movement' in Christine Jennet and Randal G. Stewart (eds.) *Politics of the Future: The Role of Social Movements*, The MacMillan Company of Australia, 1989, p. 255.

[268] D. Harvey, 2012, p.123.

[269] Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy, *The Crisis of Neoliberalism*, Harvard University Press, 2011, p. 326.

[270] A. Centeno & J. Cohen, "The arc of neoliberalism", *Annual Review of Sociology*, 38(1), 2012. C. B. Tansel, "Authoritarian Neoliberalism: Towards a New Research Agenda" in (ed. C. B. Tansel) *In States of Discipline: Authoritarian Neoliberalism and the Contested Reproduction of Capitalist Order*, 2017.

sight'.[271] Given the absence of credible challenges or alternatives to the domination of finance-led global capitalism, interpreting the institutional shifts (towards increasingly proactive role assumed by states) in the management of the capitalist economy in the post-crisis period as a retreat from the neoliberal order is therefore, at least for the time being, a misconception. Reiterating that neoliberalism is to be conceived as a class project imprinted within class and political struggles, it becomes evident that capital, speculative finance capital in particular, continues its unrestrained assault on the gains of working classes through various mechanisms and institutions of dispossession.[272] Even in shifting patterns of governance, the unpopular and anti-labour nature of neoliberalism endures.

The maintaining of the contested but enduring hegemony of neoliberalism also shows that even if the popular masses do not actively consent to its unpopular policies they are more effectively pacified over the long run compared to the political and social struggles of the Post-War capitalist world. To be sure, this is not achieved devoid of violence. On the contrary, violence is always-already integral to pacification. As already pointed out, the processes of dispossession under neoliberalism across the world signify that political violence, in terms of both quality and quantity, appears to assume pivotal role in capitalist accumulation in line with the historical logic of systematic colonization. Therefore, if one is to speak of the existence of neoliberal hegemony for almost four decades now, this comprises, on the one hand, the protection and reproduction of capitalist plunder through political violence (most directly manifest in crushing of resistance movements by state powers acting under the mantra of 'peace, security and order'), and on the other, the techniques and mechanisms of power that ensure, even tacitly, the consent of the masses. The broad conception of police employed in the lens of pacification encompasses both modes of power.

2.5.6.2. A Glance at the Turkish Context

When considered in the context of the Turkish case in particular, the hegemonic presence of neoliberalism offers relatively a more coherent process, owing in large

[271] A. Centeno & J. Cohen, 2012, p. 332.

[272] For a concise compilation of these mechanisms, see in particular D. Harvey, 2003, pp. 147-152.

part to the concurrent persistence of the state form acquired as of the military coup of 1980. In that, the distinctive nature of neoliberal hegemony in Turkey entails the entrenchment and deepening of the neoliberal policy agenda in the face of the ensuing crises in due course, let alone being challenged, which has been most salient in the continuous restructuring of the state.[273] Particularly, due mainly to the policies of financial liberalization of the 1980s (culminating with the capital account liberalization of 1989), the financial and political crises and instabilities prevailed throughout the 1990s in parallel with many other Global South countries led to individual ruling political parties losing their voter base. Yet, these crises did not divert the country (that is, the dominant policy agenda) away from the neoliberal trajectory but rather, and paradoxically, have been the driving force to accelerate the transformation process as well as reproduce the class domination of capital, in a way to affirm Poulantzas's view on the crises of capitalism.[274]

While the 1980 coup and the subsequent military regime had initially set out the economic program initiating the neoliberal transformation, what is mainly at stake from the theoretical perspective of this study is that the primary function of this regime was the thorough construction of a new social-political order aligning with new forms of capital accumulation. In effect, the hegemonic character of neoliberalism in Turkey has become more pronounced under the bourgeois parliamentary regime coming into existence as of 1987,[275] rather than the military regime defined by the immediate restriction of political and civil rights. The ensuing decades would see a climate of ideology in support of neoliberal reforms having been created at multiple levels of politics[276] and knowledge production, despite all political and social implications of the unpopular consequences of the policy agenda. The enduring perception of legitimacy, to be sure, has been shaped within class

[273] G. Yalman, 2016. P. Bedirhanoğlu & G. Yalman, 2010.

[274] P. Bedirhanoğlu & G. Yalman, 2010, p.116.

[275] Whilst the military regime officially ended in 1983 freely competitive politics resumed in 1987, when the bans on major political parties were lifted.

[276] For a critical outlook on the enduring continuity of the neoliberal policy agenda during a portion of this period, see Bağımsız Sosyal Bilimciler İktisat Grubu, *IMF gözetiminde on uzun yıl, 1998-2008: farklı hükümetler, tek siyaset*, TMMOB, 2007. The period in question also reveals that the same IMF-led policy framework was espoused even by the then-opposition political parties. Ibid, p. 13.

conflicts and struggles that have been reconfigured within the limits set by the anti-labour nature imprinted in the profoundly authoritarian state form launched by the military coup. While the anti-labour nature of the political formation is one common feature shared by all neoliberal projects including the industrialized capitalist world, it appears in the Turkish case as an integral component of a broader hegemony strategy of restoring the class domination of the bourgeoisie, defined by Yalman, as 'putting an end to class-based politics'. As we shall see in the subsequent chapters, this strategy has been embodied by the institutional architecture of the state as well as the legal and ideological framework defining the political sphere. Concomitantly, the success of neoliberal ideology in the Turkish context, as we will see in the chapters on the 1990s and 2000s, also owes much to the influence of the anti-statist rhetoric espoused by the dominant paradigm and its methodological framework that we have critically reviewed at the outset of this chapter.

It is evident that the ideological influence of the dominant paradigm contrasts with the material reality of the increasingly deepening disparities between the rich and the poor. This being the case, the question through what mechanisms and processes the tacit consent of the majority of the population to the core elements of the long march of neoliberalization could be secured and reproduced presents an intriguing issue from the lens of pacification, and it needs to be examined within the historical specificity of the Turkish case. While the circulation of neoliberal ways of thinking through civil society would address a number of institutions (corporations, academia, media, etc.) pacification is exclusively intertwined with the exercise of state power. On a higher level of abstraction, the hegemonic nature of neoliberalism aligns with pacification so as to reformulate our question: Through what means, strategies, and discourses the state power is wielded to pacify the population, in particular, to effectively impose the neoliberal form of capital's peace upon the lower classes that are most directly affected by the adverse consequences of neoliberal policies?

There is no doubt that the examination of all political, economic and cultural aspects of this subject spanning over the decades goes beyond the scope of this study. Within the scope of this thesis, the theoretical recourse to pacification rather crystallizes into three overlapping categories: order-building, depoliticization, and security. As a side

note, these categories are themselves neither exclusively unique to processes of neoliberalization, nor to pacification. Instead, building upon the studies conducted separately on these two, they will be reprised as the most relevant strands of critically grappling with neoliberalism and pacification in Turkey together in a relational manner.

As discussed previously, the primary concern underlying the theory and practice of pacification is the combination of destruction and construction. Pacification fulfils its function of counterinsurgency by *fabricating* a social and political order as a secure foundation for accumulation, whilst the crushing of resistance constitutes but one part. When construed as an expansive social and political class project rather than a particular set of economic policies, processes of neoliberal transformation also commonly entail the combined tasks of destruction and construction, in the ways which Harvey describes as 'creative destruction'. In that, the creation of neoliberal systems relies on the destruction not only of prior institutional frameworks, "but also of divisions of labour, social relations, welfare provisions, technological mixes, ways of life and thought, reproductive activities, attachments to the land and habits of the heart".[277] Hence, the pacification aspect of the neoliberal project in the first instance lies within the radical transformation of the existing order towards the restoration of capital's class power, which requires extensive processes of the reconfiguration of the social and political sphere. The comprehensive task of construction here does not only comprise the creation of appropriate institutional frameworks and structures. But it is also indispensable for the making of citizen subjectivities and shaping of social behaviour congruent with neoliberal practices, the construction of an ideological-cultural climate in which neoliberalism becomes naturalized, as well as the effective policing of the societal consequences of such practices.

In the case of Turkey, neoliberal transformation saw decades-long efforts to restructure the state. The process of state restructuring comprised subsequent phases aligning with the two complementary notions of market governance defined by

[277] D. Harvey, 2006, p. 146.

Gamble as peculiar to the neoliberal agenda.[278] First, it began with policies of liberalization and deregulation in the 1980s and later, particularly under the waves of financialization, transformed into a shift underlying the state's more positive, regulatory roles to create the right kind of institutional setting for facilitating the hegemony of international finance capital, in line with the precepts of post-Washington Consensus.

On the other hand, what makes approaching the process of order-building in view of pacification more tempting is the intensive intertwining of the actions of destruction and construction under the political administration that came alongside the 1980 military coup, which constitutes the political moment launching the neoliberal transformation. The task of order-building initiated with the September 12 regime reveals the decades of neoliberal transformation as a more or less coherent process bearing historical continuities so as to allow one to plausibly identify the hegemony of neoliberal trajectory. In some ways quite similar to the actions of modern colonizing powers, the military administration embarked on the formation of a class power configuration alongside a new system of accumulation by making use of martial law powers to ensure the 'peace and order'. The task of ensuring peace and order was in effect a construction process characterized by an all-encompassing approach that left almost no detail of public life untouched. Indeed, despite all the tragedy and notorious devastation it brought, martial law powers exercised under the military regime signified an extensive task of order-building putting into effect more than 700 legal regulations scrutinized the minutiae of everyday life.[279] As will be examined in the following Chapter, such task had been predominantly underlined by efforts to mediate the class war, which had an unmediated appearance under the martial law, through the institutions and techniques of power of somewhat a civil, modern regime under the rule of law that would be in effect following the end of the military regime. The relevant discussion will particularly underscore the significance of the comprehensive police and emergency powers that replaced military powers.

[278] Andrew Gamble, "Two Faces of Neo-liberalism". In Robison, R. (eds) *The Neo-Liberal Revolution*. International Political Economy Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2006.

[279] E. Güven, 2018, p. 49.

Despite providing indispensable insights into understanding the functioning of bourgeois state power in its various modalities, critical accounts of pacification do not seem to have thoroughly focused attention to depoliticization as an ideological and political practice of pacification. In the relevant body of work, there seem few serious efforts directly addressing depoliticization with regards to pacification, though they tend to confine it to the scope of securitization and its deployment within the context of 'war on terror'.[280] There is no doubt that the ideological power of security in bourgeois society lies in its depoliticizing effect of veiling the systemic causes of 'insecurity and universalizing the security of the social order of capital as the security of all; this constitutes one of the main strands of this study as well. However, once pacification is viewed as the set of means and strategies ultimately aiming at the neutralization of conflict, depoliticization entails a particular technique of pacification beyond security, the political form and instruments of which are shaped by class struggles.

In effect, there is a much deeper relation to depoliticization in the alienated nature of the capitalist mode of production. The detachment of the market from the political sphere, anticipated by Ellen Wood as the historically distinctive feature of capitalism, comes to evacuate the economy of its social content.[281] Such detachment imposes depoliticization as an objective condition of capitalist relations of production, for which Marx criticized bourgeois political economy to universalize and naturalize the latter by treating the social relations constitutive of it as somehow external, and thereby perpetuating the original detachment.[282]

On the other hand, neoliberal capitalism by its nature entails an augmented level of depoliticization both in the further detachment of the market from the political sphere, and in the political management of deepening social contradictions. On

[280] Will Jackson, "Securitisation as Depoliticisation: Depoliticisation as Pacification", *Socialist Studies / Études socialistes* 9 (2) Winter 2013, 146-166. Will Jackson, *The Politics of Liberty and Security: The New Human Rights Approach and its Role in the Era of the 'War on Terror'*, Unpublished PhD Thesis, 2012.

[281] E. M. Wood, 1995, p. 21.

[282] Karl Marx, "Eternalization of historic relations of production" in *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy*, [1857–61] 1973, pp. 18-22.

discursive and ideological level, though often muted and implicit, *TINA* still remains in place. On institutional level, neoliberal transformations systematically hollow out political democracy by undermining the structures of political representation so as to reduce the scope for the political expression of dissent and collective interests.[283] Moreover, as it had been the case in Turkey that could be traced in the relevant chapter consisting the reform agenda on 'structural adjustment', neoliberals prefer to naturalize the processes of economic management by insulating them from democratic pressures within a narrow scope of governance by technocratic elite. Other than providing governments with a safe shelter away from the adverse social outcomes[284] economic depoliticization tends to undermine the capacity of popular masses to intervene in decisions that are political in essence and need to be (re)politicized. Concomitantly, it naturalizes distributional relations by promoting the principle of market neutrality and technocratic legitimacy particularly in specialized domains such as monetary policy and regulatory authorities. As was the case in the post-2001 crisis, the politics of depoliticization also helps socialize financial risks and losses faced by financial capital to the cost of the working population.[285] Taken together, inasmuch as it is geared towards patrolling the boundaries of the political, depoliticization is indeed a part and parcel of the police power operating at the heart of contemporary pacification.

Nevertheless, this does not imply that the hegemonic status of neoliberalism owes merely to standard policies of depoliticization, mostly problematized as to the state economic and financial apparatus. Instead, depoliticization is but one part of the reconfiguration of the political space along neoliberal lines, which renders the strategy of neutralizing class-based politics a general pillar of the neoliberal hegemonic project. As a common trend in parallel to elsewhere in the world, the pacification process under neoliberalization in Turkey has witnessed the systematic

[283] N. Poulantzas, 2000, p. 203-216. B. Fine and A. Saad-Filho, 2017, p. 699.

[284] Colin Hay, "Depoliticisation as process, governance as practice: what did the 'first wave' get wrong and do we need a 'second wave' to put it right?", *Policy and Politics, Policy Press*, 42 (2), 2014, p. 307.

[285] Thomas Marois, *States, Banks and Crisis Emerging Finance Capitalism in Mexico and Turkey*, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2012.

disorganization of labour, the disengagement of masses from politics, the rise in individualism and consumerism, all of which appear to be the societal and governmental components of the politics of depoliticization. Depoliticization had been further accentuated with the specialization of the economic apparatus in the 2000s. Yet, it should be kept in mind that a class-centred view to depoliticization would not confine its theoretical and political concern solely to economic management. For, this runs the risk to view somewhat institutional shifts towards the 'politicization' of economic management as indicative of popularization/democratization of policy making.[286] Rather it must focus attention on the ways in which the original capitalist detachment of the economy from the political sphere is shaped (reinforced, or weakened) by social and political struggles, regardless of the policy method and means of depoliticization.

Since the insecurity embedded within the order of capital makes security a fundamental concept of bourgeois society,[287] it is only plausible to suggest that as a political technique security would come to play a notable role in political strategies of neoliberal governments. Having led to the diffusion of greater insecurity and inequality across societies, the neoliberal transformation has also brought about the restructuring of security and relations of force, in both material and ideological terms. It is thus no coincidence that the proliferation of 'critical security studies' focusing particular attention on non-military implications of security, which have been claimed to give rise to the form of a 'security state'[288] as well as a 'new security-industrial complex'[289] in the 2000s, has followed the processes of

[286] An emblematic example could be traced in the shifting governmental strategies of the AKP government in post-2010s. For a critical reading, see P. Bedirhanoğlu, "Economic Management under the Presidential System of Government in Turkey: Beyond the Depoliticization *versus* Repoliticisation Dichotomy", *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 24:1, 2022.

[287] K. Marx, 1975, p. 163.

[288] S. Hallsworth & J. Lea, "Reconstructing Leviathan: Emerging contours of the security state", *Theoretical Criminology*, 15(2), 2011.

[289] S. Hughes, *War on Terror, Inc.: Corporate Profiteering from the Politics of Fear*, New York, Verso, 2007.

neoliberalization in which insecurity is said to 'have seeped into the fabric of people's daily lived experience'.[290]

The distinctive feature of the counter-hegemonic account of pacification, on the other hand, is that it grasps security and the politics of security as *continuous* forms of political technology integral to the capitalist state, while concurrently grappling with the roles and technologies of security in changing state forms depending on class struggles. The neoliberal restructuring of security is thus essentially neither more nor less than a clearer manifestation of the state powers pertaining to police and security in the administration and reproduction of social order, along with the political management of the labour-capital contradiction, in particular. In this light, similar to liberal criticisms of the existing security regime for disrupting the alleged balance between 'liberty and security',[291] the critical accounts of scholars labelled with radical and post-Marxist school that are based on theoretical assumptions post-9/11 such as the 'permanent state of exception',[292] 'blurring of warfare and crime control',[293] 'merging of war and peace',[294] or 'militarization of the police'[295] could turn out to be equally contestable. This is due less to the actual validity of such observations than to the respective categorical dichotomies (normal/exception, war/peace, warfare/police) they commonly hold. It could be plausibly suggested that the neoliberal form of security, in effect, entails the radical mobilization of the mechanisms of legitimacy and the revelation of the draconian nature of security inherent in liberalism.[296] Such mobilization would equally apply to the broader

[290] J. Vail, "Insecure Times: Conceptualising Insecurity and Security", in John Vail et al. (eds.), *Insecure Times: Living with Insecurity in Contemporary Society*, Routledge, London, 1999, p. 1.

[291] J. Waldron, "Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance", *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, 11/2, 2003.

[292] Giorgio Agamben, *State of Exception*. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 2005.

[293] S. Hallsworth & J. Lea, 2011.

[294] A. Badiou, "Fragments of a public diary on the American war against Iraq", *Contemporary French and Francophone Studies*, 8:3, p. 226.

[295] Peter B. Kraska, "Militarization and Policing—Its Relevance to 21st Century Police", *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice*, Volume 1, Issue 4, 2007.

[296] M. Neocleous, 2008. Ö. Kaygusuz, 2016, p. 101.

historical conception of police and the scope of its powers,[297] rather than the narrow one found in 'police studies'.

In this study, changes and developments in Turkey's internal security and relations of force will be problematized through their function in the process of neoliberal order-building. In particular, the focus will be on the relationship between the state's deployment of national security as a technique of governing for the first time and the narrowing down of the political space in congruence with the reconfiguration of class relations. What would be referred as the 'liberalization of martial law/civilianization of warfare' addresses the transformation of the martial law powers into national security and emergency powers, since the use of the latter would be a better fit for the 'democratic' outlook of the subsequent civilian regime.[298] Concomitantly, the legal and institutional development of police forces in the following years will be examined within a parallel logic. Furthermore, in tandem with the second phase of neoliberal reforms and rapid financialization that would only exacerbate social and economic insecurity, impoverishment and uncertainty, one finds, on the one hand, a novel mechanism of policing poverty developed in the form of a massive network of social assistance, as well as a series of oppressive measures taken in the judiciary, police, and penal system, on the other.

[297] M. Neocleous, 2000.
[298] In effect, such transformation had been a general pattern for Western liberal states throughout the 20th century, see Mark Neocleous, "From Martial Law to the War on Terror", *New Criminal Law Review: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal*, Vol. 10, No. 4, 2007a, 489-513.

CHAPTER 3

TURKEY'S NEOLIBERAL RESTRUCTURING AS A PACIFICATION PROJECT

3.1. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to examine how pacification as a war strategy was devised in line with the efforts to restore the bourgeoisie's hegemony spanning from the late 1970s to the 1980s. It turned out by the 1970s that a union of social forces was far from possible while the conditions of political violence and armed conflict had escalated and peace and order was severely under threat. The establishment of peace and security with the 1980 military coup brought with it a radical transformation in state-society relations. As in many similar instances of neoliberal transformation elsewhere during the 1970s and 1980s, this encompassed a comprehensive state restructuring often called 'structural adjustment', entailing the establishment of an adverse political and juridical regime towards labour, defined by a new hegemony strategy concerned with the promotion of marketization, individualism and depoliticization –that could be duly dubbed "putting an end to class-based politics".[299] The utmost importance of this decade lies here, that it is the founding phase of the construction of neoliberal hegemony which has not been undermined but has even reinforced despite many economic crises and political instability in due course.

Although notorious for the violent practices it carried out, the military rule that ensued after the coup had undertaken the construction of the new order with a tremendous effort in two and a half years it stayed in power. A thorough process of construction was initiated by the military regime aligning with the constitutive logic

[299] G. Yalman, 2009, p. 308; 2004, p. 62-70.

of pacification, having recourse to the enactment of hundreds of laws and regulations one after another. The construction process that put an end to the war and was officially labelled as the 'restoration of peace and security' had been no more than the continuation of (class) war by other means.

Against this background, the core of the chapter focuses on the main underlying impetus behind the state intervention concerning the social war in question. In that, the implementation of the transformation in both the state and society along neoliberal lines strived to fabricate a socio-political environment that is as secure as possible from resistance and disruptions caused by opposing social struggles. It is further beyond that such a 'secure' environment was the ultimate objective encapsulated within the discourse of 'restoring peace and security' from the perspective of the bourgeoise and military bureaucracy. Moreover, the discernible preoccupation with the means by which the new order should be upheld also epitomizes the military generals' approach to the construction process: the order would be able to function *without the need* for further military prerogative including the imposition of martial law. The prevailing concern for legitimacy here is to inscribe the logic of war within the new order, making it civil and less overt; a matter that requires further disclosure.

The sections are somewhat organized in a chronological order. The introductory section, which provides a brief description of the historical background concerning the political and class context of leading up to the coup d'etat, will be followed by a discussion (3.3) examining September 12 as a pacification project. The latter discussion will focus on the strategies employed by the power bloc as a response to the social unrest of the late 1970s, which they approached precisely as a class war. At this juncture I place particular emphasis on the enactment of legislation entrusting the armed forces with the task of policing the streets, as well as the wide range of emergency powers associated with maintaining public security and order. In so doing I aim to demonstrate that the bourgeois state's response to a state of disorder, which it labels as war, is not confined to exceptional regimes or military prerogatives. Instead, even within the normal regime the utilization of security and administration can assume a form of war waged by purely legal means. Consequently, the attempts

to explore alternatives within the normal regime proved unsuccessful. However, this is not due to the law being an instrument of 'peace', but rather due to the influence of social forces exerting pressure on the realm of law as a battleground.

The rest of the chapter (3.4) is devoted to the examination of the distinctive political strands of the pacification process set out in the 1980s. First, we will focus on the extensive construction process carried out under the rule of martial law, so as to reveal the logic of war disguised in the discourse and establishment of security, peace and order. The subsequent section will delve into the institutionalization of two techniques of governing, namely national security and emergency powers, which were strategically devised by the military administration as a preparation for the transition, i.e. a prerogative to 'secure the insecure' within the civilian regime. Since the replacement of martial law with novel administrative powers illustrates the utilization of law as a technique of pacification rather than an instrument of peace, I reflect this process as an instance of the 'civilianization of warfare'. Finally, the process of 'civilianization' culminates in the legal and institutional enforcement of the police, which will be the primary focus of the concluding section of the chapter.

3.2. September 12 and the Politics of Security: Historical Background

Justified in the state's official discourse with respect to security problems associated with 'terror and anarchy'[300], 1980 military coup, before all else, represented a fundamentally critical juncture in the restoration of class relations and the re-establishment of social formation. What was officially presented as the crisis of peace and security underpinning the intervention was in one respect the concurrent crises of capital accumulation and hegemony that arose as a result of the social conflicts and structural contradictions led by the rapid capitalist development process that had been experienced from the 1960's onwards. Under the discourse of security lay, for instance, two and a half times increase in the relative weight of the working days lost due to strike actions between 1977 and 1980 compared to the previous three year.[301] Indeed, the crisis of accumulation within the development strategy relying on

[300] National Security Council, *Military Communique No. 1* broadcasted on 12 September 1980.

[301] K. Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi 1908 - 2009*, İmge, 2012a, p. 146. The number of the strikes increased to 190 whereas work days lost to 3,7 million in the period between 1977 and 1980. Ç. Keyder, *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, çev: Sabri Tekay, İstanbul, İletişim 1989, p. 192.

import substitution industrialization became severely apparent on the eve of the year 1980 in which high inflation rates and stagnant growth had dramatically prevailed. As a result, conventional mechanisms of appropriating the surplus, such as tax incentives, credit and exchange allocations had been invalidated.[302]

The political environment was also overwhelmed by a crisis of political representation and hegemony. Throughout the 1970's none of the political parties had truly achieved to develop successful hegemonic strategies to be able to constitute a 'historical bloc' and secure the consent of popular masses. The political crisis was further deepened with the violent response to the rise of the left and working class movement by security apparatuses as well as the neo-fascist movement. For the economic crisis was accompanied by the concurrent socio-political one in which the failure of parliamentary representation came to be accompanied by the popularization of the leftist movement and trade union militancy, the long-term reproduction of capital appeared to be at stake particularly in the eyes of the industrial bourgeoisie.[303] Thus it was easy for the bourgeoisie to come to terms with this 'organic crisis' as nothing but a 'class war'. As we will see in detail later, the highly politicized labour movement and student activism had been frequently addressed as the main reason that disrupted the 'social and labour peace'. Given the concrete achievements of labour resistance, most prominently securing relatively higher wages within the devastating conditions of crisis, the primary goal for the Turkish bourgeoisie had been the utter annihilation of trade union radicalism and social dissent with all aspects. It was the three-year period between 1977 and 1980 that the demands of big capital circles towards the cease of this 'rambling course' by disciplining of the trade unions and re-establishment of the 'peace and security' environment for capital accumulation had begun openly declared. [304]

The demands of big capital were first embodied in strict austerity measures imposed by two stand-by agreements signed with the IMF in 1978 and 1979, plus a radical policy package announced on 24 January 1980. As the former agreements met severe

[302] K. Boratav, 2012, pp. 139-146.

[303] G. Yalman, 2004, p. 64.

[304] K. Boratav, 2012, pp. 144-146.

social resistance due to measures for the reduction of wages, a series of policies even exceeding the demands of the IMF[305] were later introduced by the then-undersecretary of the prime ministry Turgut Özal in 1980, a figure who had already gained the trust of international financial institutions and big capital circles thanks to his strong connections with the WB. After being announced by the government, these policy measures (widely known as *24 January 1980 Decisions*) were going to have a notorious reputation for setting forth the historical convergence between the formal launch of the neoliberal restructuring and the violence exerted with the military coup on 12 September 1980. The programme aimed at a deep integration with the capitalist world market via acute structural adjustment and stabilization policies typically imposed by the IMF and WB on underdeveloped nations. The discourse of 'integration with world economy' was later on going to be central to the forthcoming hegemony strategy, although what was at play was only a shift in the form of such integration.[306]

The economic objective of the Decisions was roughly twofold. First, economic stabilization was aimed through export-oriented recovery and price stability. Second, more 'robust' bonds with global capital were aimed through consecutive policies of market liberalization and structural adjustments. It was therefore not baffling to see that the policy measures were hailed by international financial community as well as domestic political and business circles as a *turning point*.[307] They appeared to be sufficient in appeasing the demands of the industrial bourgeoisie organized under the biggest business organization, the TUSIAD (Turkish Industry and Business Association), which happened to convey their complaints via successive newspaper advertisements in 1979.[308] The then-head of the TUSIAD, which constituted a share

[305] F. Ahmad, *The making of modern Turkey*, London: Routledge, 2003, p. 178. K. Boratav, 2012, p. 147.

[306] G. Yalman, 2002, p. 20.

[307] P. Bedirhanoğlu and G. Yalman, 2010, p. 111.

[308] Except from the TUSIAD's several 'advisory reports' published on the eve of 24 January in order to introduce the severest critiques of government intervention on the economy, four advertisements were also placed by the organization in major newspapers in the year 1979. What was apparently intended by these advertisements was to generate political pressure on the government and mobilize large segments of the population towards the interests of the big capital; hence it is more accurate to

of 43% of the national economy, called for public support for the programme defining it as "the only programme complying with the *rules of the game* and prepared by a government which truly aims to follow a free market economy".[309] It is beyond doubt that from the perspective of the bourgeoisie the implementation of the rules of the game would necessitate a strong anti-labour legislation and a secure environment from social dissent which could be suitably accomplished only by means of an authoritarian form of state.

Therefore it would be naïve to think that the 24 January Decisions were solely of an economic stabilization programme. In effect, besides marking a new accumulation regime and a new economic role for the state, they were planned as part of a broader class war anticipated by the state/military elite and capital in the face of the political activism of the dominated classes. As remarked by Boratav, what was more prominent in the programme than stabilization was the perspective of structural adjustment which stipulated the concurrent strategies of market liberalization and undermining of labour rights in favour of domestic and international capital.[310] Yet over and above all individual economic components, what was also illustrated by the programme was the ultimate intention of the bourgeoisie to form a new political and ideological hegemony strategy setting out the political and legal superstructure in compliance with the new capital accumulation regime. For the liberalization programme was impossible to be totally implemented within the conditions of a hegemony crisis, a radical reconfiguration of the balance of forces would constitute the most pivotal agenda of such strategy. It was clear that the existing political and institutional organisations of the parliamentary democratic state was far from providing a conducive ground for such task of reconfiguration. The military coup of 1980 was indeed the product of a generalized crisis in the hegemony over the whole

interpret them as integral strategies to the class war. The topics treated in the advertisements basically revolved around the accusation of the government for undermining 'free democracy' which was identified with the notion of 'free market'. The advertisements were harshly responded and compared to "martial memorandums" by the Prime Minister Ecevit (Milliyet, 16.5.1979). Nevertheless, this did not suffice him to remain in power as he eventually lost the government to the right-wing Justice Party in the by-elections in November 1979.

[309] Quoted in Şükran Gölbaşı, *TÜSİAD'ın Söylemleri Aracılığıyla Toplumu İnşa Girişimlerinin 24 Ocak Kararları ve İzleyen Süreç Bağlamında Eleştirel Bir İncelemesi*. Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi. Akdeniz Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü. 2007, pp. 129-130.

[310] K. Boratav, 2012, 148.

society, a unique form of political crisis, which in turn produced an exceptional political form and regime of the state so as to lay the groundwork for the continuation of the construction process in the new normal form. If primitive accumulation can be seen as a permanent class war[311] the essential weapons of which are law and police[312], September 12 remains a milestone for securing the primitive accumulation of the newly established political and economic regime; a 'constitutive violence' of pacification which is to provide the conditions to discipline labour and social dissent as required for the restructuring process manifested in the neoliberal policy package.

All these considered together, it is pertinent here to relate the military coup of 1980 to its counterparts in Latin America in the 1970's (Chile, Uruguay and Argentina) not only for being "promoted internally by the upper classes with US support, provided one kind of solution"[313] but also for entailing a total and unprecedented rupture from the previous experiences of military intervention and hegemony strategies.[314] Hector Schamis points out that the military regimes of the 1970s in Latin America were considerably different from the *bureaucratic-authoritarian* model[315] that is used to account for those in southern cone in the 1960's. They rather displayed a striking similarity to the neoconservative projects of some part of advanced industrial countries. Issues associated with 'ungovernability', 'crisis of the state", 'demand overload' were already part of their agenda which aimed an introduction of unprecedented economic and social transformations even before the conservative projects of Reagan and Thatcher.[316] In this light, convincing parallels

[311] W. Bonefeld, "The Permanence of Primitive Accumulation: Commodity Fetishism and Social Constitution", *The Commoner*, no. 2 September 2001. D. Harvey, "The 'new' imperialism: Accumulation by dispossession", *Socialist Register*, 2004.

[312] M. Neocleous, "Dream of Pacification: Accumulation, Class War and the Hunt", *Socialist Studies*, December 2013.

[313] D. Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, Oxford University Press Canada, 2007, p. 16.

[314] H. Schamis, "Reconceptualizing Latin American Authoritarianism in the 1970s: From Bureaucratic Authoritarianism to Neoconservatism", *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 23, No. 2 1991.

[315] For bureaucratic-authoritarianism, see O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics*, Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1973.

[316] H. Schamis, 1991, p. 202.

could be found between the neoliberal and neoconservative traits of Latin American military regimes of the 1970s and the political economic character of the transformation initiated by military rule in Turkey in 1980. Nevertheless it is also suitable to suggest that the Turkish case marked a further divergence from its Latin American counterparts, for its radical anti-labour income policies somewhat presided over contractionary monetary and fiscal policies to achieve the aim of supressing domestic demand.[317]

The launching of the these policies was first pioneered under the repressive setting of martial law where labour organizations were quelled, then further secured by the political space narrowed against any challenges identified as class-based. The restoration of class hegemony under the discourse of 'free market' within the context of an organic crisis as such also necessitated a coherent endeavour across all facets of social life. Another deliberative attempt of depoliticization carried out through the political economic restructuring was therefore the ideological promotion of a new consumerist lifestyle,[318] the imposition of a vulgar atomistic morality into the everyday life[319], which is to be met with a particular, docile form of citizen-subject.

Nevertheless, the most distinctive character of the new regime seemed to be that its essential task of 'crushing the enemy' involved a thorough process of construction in legal and institutional terms. The reason why the exceptional regime was indeed a relatively short-lived one was that the military administration confined itself to a short but intense and substantial police mission aimed at rebuilding the order in such a way that the coming form of the state could work on its own feet. As we will see in following sections, the productive nature of September 12 shows that at stake was the fabrication of an order which would be able to function in the civilian regime on its own as much as possible, without the need for overt violence of a further martial law. The main goal of the pacification assumed by the junta was neither more nor less than the re-establishment of the peace and order as a secure haven for capital

[317] K. Boratav, 2012, p. 149.

[318] G. Yalman, 2004, p.67.

[319] G. Kazgan, *Türkiye Ekonomisinde Krizler*, Bilgi Üniversitesi: İstanbul, 2005, pp. 139-150.

accumulation sustaining itself in *civil* form, on its own motion, yet under a permanent logic of war.

It was against this background that the anti-labour and depoliticized core of the neoliberal project, which situates, in Yalman's words, "putting an end to class-based politics" as its leading hegemonic strategy,[320] also led to the formation of a peculiar practice and ideology of national security embodied in the legal-institutional materiality of authoritarian state apparatuses. To this end, a number of techniques of governing and emergency powers rationalized by the ideology of security have been introduced in a way to viably infiltrate the preemptive logic of police into civil society. Mobilized in the logic of warfare, the contours between police, emergency, law and national security had thus been essential to the end of martial law and the achievement of the so-called 'return to the normal', which I am going to problematize as the 'civilianization and liberalization of warfare'. If what makes the 1980 coup worth to discuss in view of pacification is first and foremost the fabrication of a new order, its essence lies in the institutionalization of the always-already 'ambiguity' between the law and violence, military and civil, normal and emergency, norm and exception, through which the spectre of one tends to exalt another. All in all, even though the normalization of emergency powers is quite archaic for the history of modern bourgeois state[321] 1980 coup could be singled out for Turkey with respect to the onset of a notable adjustment of the state's institutional materiality, the law and class relations to such normalization. The following sections in this chapter will provide a critical examination of the distinctive logic and means of pacification in the 1980s.

3.3. September 12 as Pacification

> We must have an administration in such a way that future governments could overcome such incidents without appealing to martial law. It is now clear that the types of wars in our world are changing. Now what is predominantly seen is an ideological and

[320] G. Yalman, 2004; 2009.

[321] M. Neocleous, *Critique of Security*, 2008.

> economic warfare without the conventional burden of fighting by armies facing armies. Here we are just out of such a war. We won the first round. However, my dear friends, the war has not yet finished. Subsequent rounds will follow. We shall be ready for the upcoming attacks, be obliged to take measures and always be alert.
>
> General Kenan Evren, 1 November 1982, İzmir[322]

Among other forms of analyses, September 12 can also be analysed as the constitutive step towards the forceful manifestation of the neoliberal social order as a pacification project, which has given way to the mobilization of novel class strategies engraved in new political apparatuses and administrative techniques. What has been founded by this regime should in no way be limited in terms of the 1982 Constitution. The Constitution which has been subject to several amendments over the years has indeed been the key document to understand the political form of the September 12 regime, but the regime accounts for more than the Constitution. Other than the drastic economic transformation one can mention two pillars of this soundness of the regime established by the military coup d'état. One is the precise placement of national security, as a technique of government as well as an ideological practice with an immense power to effectively depoliticize the class context of politics, into the common sense of the whole society. Second is the legal-institutional foundation of the police and emergency powers in law which has been never weakened through the so-called anti-statist reforms of liberalization, but can be claimed to have even been getting stronger over the years. These two pillars of the neoliberal regime could be identified with reference to each other's reality; from the legal texts through to the dominant political discourses, they mutually underpin and justify each other being instituted both as ideology and political practice in the 'common sense' of the masses.

That said, the critiques of the terrifying legacy of September 12 are overwhelmed by two dominant explanations from liberal-individualist and left-wing accounts. In the liberal narrative, the military coup is successfully externalized to a presumed 'class-free' neutrality of the state and security, and explained as an exceptional moment largely on the basis of the 'political autonomy' of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF)

[322] "Evren: "Savaş bitmedi, ilk raundu kazandık"", Milliyet, 02.11.1982.

and its 'tutelage' over civil democracy. In effect, a simple internet search can provide more than enough evidence of how the present day's hardliner liberals had wishfully backed up the coup in its violent aftermath. What is significant here is not their justification in person though, but rather the political implications of such justification on the morality of the liberal intellect. It is thanks to this sort of morality that the perfect harmony between the dichotomous approach to the state-society relations and the profound war and security machine established within new regime, along with the role played by the military intervention in securing such harmony, are ingeniously concealed. Once the main historical conflict is portrayed between the bureaucratic-authoritarianism and the class-free civil society, the decisive engagement of the military regime to the neoliberal economic program of the bourgeoisie, as well as the perfect coherence of the emerging authoritarian regime of post-1980s with the aspirations embodied by the bourgeoisie in the late 1970s are left unexplained.[323] This also tells about the well-programmed dissimulation upon which the popular discourse and politics of 'coming to terms with the past military coups' relies. Once such dissimulation is revealed it appears that the entire social and political order of the post-1980 has been constituted as a pacification project which intertwines the logic of war and peace. Hence, to properly grasp the 'war' implications of the new regime one needs to overcome the liberal narrative that problematizes the coup only in terms of the sheer and vulgar violence of the years under the military rule, and rather develop a critique of the constitutive and civilian character of the regime. Indeed, it could be even argued that the socio-political order established by the 1980 coup has been truly initiated with the official transition to the civilian regime in 1983, transition from the 'exceptional' to 'normal'; in General Evren's words, 'normal democratic order'.[324]

Although with quite diverse problematics and concerns, a similar problem could be identified within the left's grasp of September 12. There seems almost no doubt among the left critiques concerning the historical relationship of the military intervention with the neoliberal programme of the January 24. In fact, a significant part of the critical political economic analyses tends to claim even a linear

[323] Korkut Boratav, *1980'li Yıllarda Türkiye'de Sosyal Sınıflar ve Bölüşüm*, İmge, 2005, p. 19.

[324] "Evren: "Normal demokrasi düzenine geçildi"", Milliyet, 28.05.1984.

relationship between the two. However, the peculiar affinity between the economic thrust of the coup and the administrative regulations of policing which had been put in effect before the coup, or the role attributed to the armed forces in policing the militant class struggle is mostly glossed over. As another dominant tendency among the left critiques, the severe legacy of the coup, from the brutal cases of human rights violation to the narrowing of the political sphere, is problematized through the lens of the 'militarization of politics'.[325] There is no doubt that the regime had been highly militarized following the coup. Yet what it has actually envisaged is rather a broader project of security and pacification, of which the leverage of the military and militarism is but one part being able to occupy certain strands in the political sphere. This means, the question of militarism is merely a subtopic for pacification theory which helps us understand the shifts in the state intervention appealing to either military or civilian means in responding to the economic and political crises of capitalism. The shifts in the balance of power within the military and civil apparatuses of the state are doubtlessly worth analysing as they have different and significant implications for the socio-political struggles of social classes and groups. On the other hand, reducing the question of securitization to the military influence over politics would go no further than approving the civil-military dichotomy, the idea of the class-free structuration of security, and the institutionalist claim of the autonomy of the state institutions. Insofar as the 2000s are concerned, it could be seen that the ways of explanation through the lens of militarism are still at work in Marxist, or 'historical materialist' critiques, though in a quite contrary way: The weakening of the military impact in favour of the police and judiciary forces with a great effectiveness which is even close to the powers of the National Security Council (NSC) of the previous military regime is regarded indicative of such remarks as the 'militarization of the police state'.[326]

[325] E.g. İsmet Akça & Barış Alp Özden, AKP ve Türkiye'de Neoliberal Otoriteryanizmin Sınıfsal Dinamikleri, *Başlangıç*, N. 2, 2014. İsmet Akça, Türkiye'de 2000'ler: Güvenlik Merkezli Siyasetin ve Siyasal Güvencesizliğin Devamlılığı, *Başlangıç*, 2016. Şaban İba, *Ordu¸ Devlet Siyaset,* Çiviyazıları Yayınevi,1998a; *Milli Güvenlik Devleti, Dünyada ve Türkiye'de Belgeleriyle Milli Güvenlik İdeolojisi ve Kurumlaşma¸* Çiviyazıları Yayınevi,1998b. Güven Gürkan Özkan, *Türkiye'de Militarizm: Zihniyet, Pratik ve Propaganda*, Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2014.

[326] The best examples of the lens of 'militarization of the police' can be particularly found in Biriz Bersoy's works, which try to understand the transformation in the Turkish state's police power in the 2000s. E.g. "'Güvenlik Devleti'nin Ortaya Çıkışı, 'Güvenlik' Eksenli Yönetim Tekniğinin Polis

The possible limits of explanations based on the militarization thesis were already discussed previously without being limited to the military regime of September 12. Suffice to recall for now that such explanations might set a theoretical barrier to a profound understanding of the historical function of the police power and violence in the constant fabrication of capitalist social relations.[327] Yet for our specific concern on Turkey, they also fall short to comprehend the main rationale behind the legal regulations issued in the military regime, for an ontological distinction is supposed between the military prerogatives and civilian recourses to national security and emergency. For the adherents of the militarization thesis, behind the way the politics is militarized lies the anti-democratic nature of the political regime, the foundation of this nature originally by the military elite, and the political roles attributed to the military-oriented NSC, all of which would turn out to constitute what is often called the 'military tutelage'. As a result, civil cases of mobilization of the contours between police, emergency, law and national security combined in the logic of pacification could only be problematized in terms of their militarist implications.

Such problematization implies an idealized non-military zone of police defined as 'normal'. As far as a critique of September 12 is concerned, what is further unnoticed is that the major part of the regulations issued under the military rule were planned to designate the civil administrative powers and socio-political conditions in a way to operate *without the need* for another military intervention and the use of martial law, let alone to facilitate the use of it by the military.[328] Therefore, legalization of the extreme security powers of the state (those pertaining to the police and emergency)

Teşkilatındaki Tezahürleri ve Süreklileşen "Olağanüstü Hal": Akp'nin Polis Politikaları", *Birikim*, V.276, 2012. "Türkiye'de 2010'larda "Güvenlik Devleti" "Olağanüstü Devlet" Biçimine Evrilirken", *Birikim*, V. 335, 2017. "Neoliberalizm ve Toplumsalın Yeniden Kurgulanması: 1980 Sonrası Batı'da ve Türkiye'de Polis Teşkilatları Ve Geçirdikleri Yapısal Dönüşüm", Toplum ve Bilim, cilt.109, 2007. *The Policing of Social Discontent and the Construction of The Social Body: Mapping The Expansion and Militarization of the Police Organization in Turkey in The Post-1980 Period* (Unpublished PhD Thesis), Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 2007.

[327] M. Neocleous, 2000; 2008.

[328] This was emphasized by the TAF generals for many times both before and after the 1980 coup. The well-known example is by Kenan Evren, the Chief of the General Staff, in his speech on 30 August 1980: "Given the fact that in the past twenty years in our country, averagely one year of martial law corresponded to every two years, we have been required to find a solution to this through a sensible analysis of the causes, and it is believed that this task mainly belongs to our parliamentary." Milliyet, 31.08.1980.

was rather alluding to the *liberalization* and *civilianization* of the regime, i.e. the establishment of the civil order that would function by itself. The political situation of the NSC was admittedly indicative of the leverage or influence of the military over politics. However, once the political power of the armed forces comes to be exceptionalized as a 'tutelage', one comes to terms with an idealized portrayal of a popular, democratic security form of the military-free bourgeois order, which has never been a historical case at all. Moreover, as will be discussed in the further sections, despite all institutional clashes there is a considerable division of labour between the military and civil powers of politics in the administration of class and social relations all along the process of neoliberal transformation.

3.3.1. Intertwinement of War and Police Power: Military intervention as police action (1978-1980)

Although the explanations based on militarism hold true once one moves from the military/civil or war/police dualities, for the limitations that have been put so far I refrain from problematizing the post-1980 period through the terms related to militarism, as well as the theses arguing for the militarization of politics in the 1980s, or militarization of the police in the 2000s. I rather suggest that by the 1980 coup onwards pacification emerges as the comprehensive foundation of the new hegemonic set of strategies that accompanies the restructuring of the state and the whole social formation. To the extent that it is problematised as a positive act of order building and administration of the population going beyond the negative act of preventing and crushing of the resistance, the whole post-1980 regime of Turkey can thus be considered a relatively successful attempt of pacification. Indeed, the military coup of September 12 1980 not only brutally suppressed social dissent, which apparently caused the most tragic stories behind it, but more significantly it had built a new order that would dissipate the conditions of dissent from the outset. The new order has been constructed through several regulations varying from the political regime through to law, security, union regime, working life, education, culture, and so on. This has been the main critical focus of much of the works from the left which aim to expose the real intention behind the coup. It is widely claimed that the ubiquity of the legal-institutional regulations was in no way compatible with the aim

of ‘stopping the anarchy in the streets’, which originally produced the unique ground of legitimation in the eyes of the people.[329]

However, such critiques can be viewed as naïve once the military intervention is grasped as a police action which incorporates the acts of stopping, neutralising, and rebuilding as conjoined parts of it. Indeed, restoration of order does not simply mean bringing order back. The term ‘order’ first and foremost stipulates the constant fight with the ‘disorderly’ elements that happen to threaten it. Therefore, each step of restoring or securing order in fact implies a transition to a new order. The new order develops a broad range of novel techniques and mechanisms that would manage, neutralise, discipline, punish, or annihilate the disorderly elements, but also it endeavours to control the conditions of their emergence beforehand, taking lessons from the past. The 1980 military coup in this sense is not an act of restoring order, but on the contrary, of not letting it revive again in its ‘old’ sense.

In his article on the possible links of military interventions to police, by drawing on the works of Schmitt, Agamben and Hardt and Negri, Mitchell Dean gives a series of examples in which contemporary military operations have turned out to be carried out as police actions.[330] The task of keeping the peace and maintaining law and order, he states, have now been located at the centre of many military interventions in which the armed personnel are termed “police”.[331] However, late in his argument he sets forth functional distinctions between military interventions and police arguing that the latter is peculiarly about restoring and maintaining order within a territory, thus it does not confront and aim at defeating the enemy, but deals with a situation of disorder. The problem with Dean’s thesis is that he grapples with the state powers referring to war and police in two pregiven distinct categories at the very outset, respectively corresponding to the military and the police as institutional entities, as well as to the international and domestic orders. The nexus between these is therefore set only as an ‘external’ one, which immobilizes the police task of maintaining order

[329] *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, Cilt 6, İletişim yayınları, 1988, p. 2382.

[330] M. Dean, Military intervention as “police” action? in *The new police science: the police power in domestic and international governance*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006.

[331] Ibid, p. 191.

to an essentially different realm than the logic of war.[332] On the other hand, one needs to grasp the exercise of the police power in constant war against the '*enemies* of order'.[333] And this holds true for the war power as well; just as the police power is not reducible to the police, war power is not reducible to the military but depends on a whole range of technologies to form the social order. As much as the police power is linked to war against the enemies of security and order, the war power, including the martial law as a technique of government, can in turn be grasped in terms of its ordering capabilities.

Indeed, particularly following the radicalization of the left in Turkey as of the year 1977 it could be observed that the state and all fractions of the bourgeoisie had agreed to approach the crisis of 'order' in terms of class war, fairly in tune with Neocleous's suggestion. The term 'war' was indeed being widely employed both by the civil and military state officials as a concomitant term for 'anarchy'. Here, it is fair to remind that while there is no doubt that the political and economic crisis increasingly deepened by 1977 was codified as an open class war by the bourgeoisie, from the side of the political and state elites class war was rather identified to a comprehensive one on 'anarchy and terror' where the armed fights between the right and left groups incorporated extra-class dimensions as well (such as religious and ethnic) in certain provinces. Consistently with the logic of warfare, the state had already started to deploy the armed forces in the face of 'terror and anarchy'. Although the term 'military intervention' is used synonymously with the 1980 coup in almost all studies on this period, it is apparent that it was already set in motion before the coup. Drawing on certain illustrative ways of using the state power, I will now try to show how the main political impetus behind the 1980 military coup was neither an exceptional nor an exogenous moment for the existing regime.

In December 1978, martial law was declared by the CHP government in 13 provinces, following the violent incidents in Kahramanmaraş during which over 100 people were killed. It was then extended to cover 20 cities in nine months. In effect, martial law was going to gain a great, overwhelming function of political

[332] Ibid, p. 196.

[333] M. Neocleous, 2014, p. 14.

administration by the 1980 coup, but at these times it was more of an acute security reinforcement. It is also pertinent to note that the partial implementation of it by 1978 did not remove or weaken the political power from the executive and legislative branches of the government. The implementation was based on the appointment of martial commanders as the highest civil administrators in these provinces, but the powers of commanders were subject to civil parliamentary government, whereas they had their own peculiar judiciary – which was dependent to the government even more than State Security Courts.[334] It was entirely in accordance with the normal law and applicable within the boundaries of the Constitution and legal procedures. Given the way it had been exercised, it indicated rather a division of labour than a conflict between the civil government and the armed forces.[335]

The preservation of the unity of state powers was attempted in the following months under martial law. This was most embodied in the Coordination Meetings of Martial Law starting in 1978, alongside the Coordination Meetings of Internal Security. It can be observed from these meetings that the governments were eager to take action according to the possible measures asked by the martial commanders. Concomitantly, the main demands of the commanders from the CHP and the subsequent AP governments largely pertained to the non-military powers, i.e. those related to police and emergency: enactment of the law of emergency rule, strengthening of the police in terms of law, personnel and equipment, amendment of the law of associations, constitution of the State Security Courts, establishment of the judicial police department, ensuring the safety of the prisons, reinforcement of the coordination between the administration, police, intelligence and military forces.[336] This shows that the military elite were in agreement with the political elite in approaching the crisis as one integral crisis of order and security, rather than an

[334] Halit Çelenk, Yeni Baskı Yasaları: Önlemler Paketi, *Yeni Ülke Dergisi*, 10. sayı, 1980.

[335] Indeed, the harmonious concomitance of martial law with the Constitutional, free democratic regime was the most apparent point that the then-PM Ecevit had underscored in his speeches on martial law. "Ecevit: "Sıkıyönetime Gerek Var"" Milliyet, 26.12.1980; "Ecevit: "Uygulamalar saldırıları engellemek ve herkesi korumak için yapılacaktır"", Milliyet, 27.12.1980; "Ecevit Sıkıyönetim Komutanlariyla Toplantı Yaptı", Milliyet, 30.12.1980.

[336] Kenan Evren, *Kenan Evren'in Anıları*, Milliyet Yayınları, 1990, pp. 301-306.

opportunity to strengthen their unique institutional capacity. They were concerned about all technical units of police *as parts of a whole.* That is why instead of having the exclusive power to take control, they had been advising to increase the legal powers of the law enforcement agencies and civil governors which were working out of their control. It can even be said that the commanders were not happy with being at the centre of policing order. The Chief Coordinator of Martial Law, for example, particularly complained about people's high expectations from them, and called for measures to provide the active participation of the citizens and civil administrators to do their duty on the 'war on anarchy'.[337] Other than the political elite among the two biggest parties, a similar point was made by the CGP President Turhan Feyzioğlu in the opening of his party council: "We can defeat economic crisis and anarchy only together, we as people are obliged to support the relevant measures taken by the state forces in solidarity".[338]

Martial law was not the only novel instrument of police on the eve of the year 1980, as we had another one called 'measures package', which was doubtlessly the key term that overwhelmed the political agenda in this period. Soon after the first security coordination meeting under the newly-established minority government in December 1979, Prime Minister Demirel was ready to announce the milestone in Turkey's market economy, a radical neoliberal policy package known as the January 24 Decisions, based on a consensus among the technocrats of the IMF and WB, economy bureaucracy, and the dominant fractions of the bourgeoisie. Called as 'economic measures' by the government, the package was to impose a severe assault on the economic acquisitions of the working classes. Interestingly enough, it was somehow linked to the devastating security crisis by the Prime Minister in his announcement speech which he started by stating that the fundamental duty of the government was to provide peace, security and survival of the state.[339] In pursuance of such duty, the government was determined first to carry out the economic measures as soon as possible. Demirel seemed very assertive with the implementation of the 'measures', he claimed that the factories would start working

[337] Ibid, p. 305.

[338] "Feyzioğlu, milli beraberlik çağrısını yineledi", Milliyet, 10.03.1979.

[339] "Demirel: "Yoklukları kaldırmak için önlem aldık"", Milliyet, 25.01.1980.

again, poverty would end, unemployment would be minimized, and black market would be totally removed. The economic programme was itself a practice of police and discipline over all segments of the working classes and labour market, but what is more, it can be understood that the government strongly believed that all its expected outcomes would also strengthen the effectiveness in policing the streets. This however did not imply a transition to a new order for Demirel, but on the contrary an attempt to preserve the order in its broader (bourgeois) sense.[340]

On the same day with the announcement of 'economic measures', a draft law which came to empower the administrative powers of the martial commanders had also been brought to the parliament. But as can be derived from the state elites' attempts to combine economic crisis with the crisis of peace and security under the label of 'survival of the state and order', the economic policy package was going to be consistently complemented by a much broader regulation based on police powers, which was called 'measures against anarchy'.

In effect, designed by the CHP government, the so-called measures against anarchy originally can be traced back to 1978. With a number of amendments on Law of Police Duties and Powers (no. #2559), Civil Servants Law (no. #657), Law of Associations (no. 1630), and Law on Meetings and Demonstrations (no. #171), the government aimed to impose wider police powers and to severely undermine political rights to oppose order. Instead of various underground paramilitary organizations that were known to be associated with Counter-Guerrilla forces, the regulations clearly targeted the left-wing mass organizations operating on constitutional basis. However, due to the heightened social pressure from the organized left, most effectively from the DİSK (Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions), the draft regulations failed to be enacted.[341] Under an increasing twofold pressure by the military and the bourgeoisie on the verge of the transition to the new accumulation regime at the beginning of 1980, it was then the AP's turn to set up a comprehensive security package. The government adopted the previous regulations as they were, but with some notable additions such as the constitution of

[340] "Demirel: "Düzeni değiştirmiyor, muhafazaya çalışıyoruz"", Milliyet, 31.01.1980.

[341] H. Çelenk, "Terörü Önleme Yasa Tasarıları", *Yeni Ülke Dergisi*, 6. Sayı, 1979.

the State Security Courts, enactment of a regulation of emergency rule and amendment in the Provincial Administration Law (no. #5442). It can be argued that the whole package was the concrete outcome of the security coordination meetings, as well as Prime Minister Demirel's private meetings with the force commanders including Kenan Evren on the 7th and 9th January, where the generals had for the first time formally handed their legal and executive demands from the government. It is worth mentioning that in the press conference after the second meeting, Demirel stated that "The Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic is accountable to parliament in preparing the armed forces for *war*." He responded to a reporter's question about his appeal to the term '*warfare'* after both meetings, saying, "Once.. twice... three times... From now on I will always say it".[342]

When considered with the legal regulations that the government was trying to pass, Demirel's resolute words on warfare gives a hint of the relation between *raison d'état* and what will be called the 'civilianization of warfare' in the ensuing sections: Regardless of the different governments, the state strategy vis-a-vis the social turbulence preceding the 1980 coup was to mobilize law, administration, and police through the logic of warfare, whereas overt martial solutions were not seen as tempting other than the armed forces accrued with police function to cope with disorder. As declared by the Speaker of the Republican Senate, Turkey was going through extraordinary times, so the state needed nothing but extraordinary regulations.[343] The Chief Coordinator of Martial Law, on the other hand, was highlighting the significance of *legal and administrative measures* as central war instruments:

> We are obliged to make this war legally in the form of a lightning strike. We shall operate the state. We shall make laws. We shall use the legal state until its last available facilities. We shall use the laws and powers until the end. We shall take administrative measures. In addition to all this, we shall wage psychological warfare. We have to carry out the psychological war in a clever way.[344]

[342] "Komutanlar, Demirel'e yasal ve icraya ilişkin isteklerini yazılı bir metin olarak verdi", Milliyet, 10.01.1980.

[343] "Çağlayangil ile Karakaş: "Partileri yakınlaştırmak için çaba gösteriyoruz"" Milliyet, 28.01.1980.

[344] General Secretariat of the National Security Council, *12 September in Turkey: Before and After*, 1982, p. 308.

Evren would also indicate in the future that the state could not make progress in its war due to the fact that the legal regulations were not effectively enforced in due time, and this eventually made the coup inevitable.[345] All these make us question whether the legal apparatus of the state was able to maintain this war in a way to render the objective conditions of the incoming military coup vain. We can say, at least, the law had been situated as the central means of war in question, and the legal-civilian powers of the state had been forced until the last capacity *in line with* the same motivation of the incoming coup. It is apt to argue that all legal regulations were planned towards a civilian 'coup regime' without a coup d'état. Indeed, State Security Courts and Law of Emergency Rule proposed by the AP government as part of the 'measures against anarchy' would be known as the fundamental distinctive legacy of the September 12 regime. Both regulations were thought to respond to 'extraordinary times' as extraordinary measures. But the Law of Emergency is particularly worth an emphasis here.

In 1961 Constitution, two forms of emergency administration were mentioned; 'cases of emergency' and the 'martial law' (articles #123 and #124). Procedures regarding the working obligations and financial measures that were to be in effect in cases of emergency, the Constitution said, shall only be regulated by law. The Constitution did not give any clue on what defined the 'cases of emergency', but we can derive from the Commision Report on the articles that they were limited to economic crises and natural disasters whilst no explicit reference was made to security.[346] More significantly, no separate law regulating the procedures that it referred to had been promulgated. Martial law, on the other hand, was defined in terms of the 'event of war, or a situation likely to lead to war' in the Constitution and it had a separate law regulating the specific provisions related to its implementation. This means that the only emergency administration provided by the 1961 Constitution was in fact martial law which was directly related to the cases pertaining to warfare. It would be therefore telling to suggest that by attempting to

[345] Quoted in T. Demirel, "12 Eylül'e Doğru Ordu ve Demokrasi", *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*, 56-4, p. 56.

[346] "Draft Version and Commission Report of the 1961 Constitution", p. 77. https://anayasa.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/1961/1961-ilkhali/1961-sirasayisi.pdf

pass a law on emergency rule, the government and armed forces intended to impose the state of emergency as a form of political administration that could be employed within the provinces outside the scope of martial law. This would not make the existing perspective of warfare vanish. On the contrary, the exercise of emergency powers all over the country would help the state seize the central pillars of class war that were going to be targeted later by the military rule: adjustment of the labour regime in tune with the new accumulation strategies driven by the January 24 Decisions, prohibition of strikes and boycotts, removal of collective bargaining, penalization of the progressive trade union leaders and members, and so on. Like many of other regulations, the Law on Emergency Rule failed to pass and remained as draft. This is, among others, why the transition to the neoliberal order imprinted by September 12 deserves a critical glance as pacification that has successfully liberalized the warfare of martial law through the setting of the politics of national security and emergency rule as an administrative form. In terms of emergency rule, the link that enabled such liberalization was a magic term added to 'cases of emergency' in the Constitution: *public order*.

Before discussing why labour rights and the political organization of the left particularly constituted the central backdrop of war and public order, we shall continue with the final phase of the pre-coup security measures to support the argument that military intervention had already been underway as a part of the police practice before the coup.

Demirel's words on "preparing the armed forces for war", if he did not mean to call for a coup d'etat against his own government, seemed most concerned with the deployment of the military troops in policing the streets. Aside from consolidating the administrative powers of martial commanders by the regulation of martial law, the recent security package also aimed at situating war powers in the hands of civil administration by the Provincial Administration Law (#5442). Amendment in the latter was mainly pertaining to the article 11 on 'preemptive and repressive extraordinary police powers'. The previous version of the article provided that in cases of extraordinary social events the provincial governor could ask the force commanders for help, but only after the events start and the police forces turn out to

be precisely inadequate to gain control of the situation. With the amendment, the governor was now authorized to hold the armed forces at the disposal, insofar as they are deemed necessary for the extraordinary events that could 'potentially' occur. The logic behind the amendment relied on a combination of the reactionary and preemptive police of the 'potential' criminal before the occurrence of the crime since, as explained by the preamble of the amendment, 'today social incidents are often suddenly starting, rapidly expanding and becoming destructive within a very short time.'[347]

Provided that the discretion to determine on the 'potential' had been left to the administration, the military, in the provinces that were not under martial law, could now undertake the chief duty of policing the social upheavals, riots, public meetings and union strikes in conjunction with the police forces. What is further remarkable is the legal quality of such task. As can be observed from the TAF Internal Service Code[348] stipulating that "how to use the armed forces in order to ensure public order is regulated by the separate and special provisions of the relevant laws" (article #86), the military task of policing is taken out of the martial scope and left to the police regulation in relevant laws, which refers here to the Provincial Administration Law. As far as the latter regulation is concerned, for the cases in which the armed forces were attributed the task of policing public order, the military service command belongs to the top commander of the relevant troop, yet its administrative conduct, coordination and responsibility were all left to the civil governor. In other words, being temporarily out of the command chain regulated by the Internal Service Code, the commander and military forces at work had been also directly subject to the governor's commands, orders and directives. The meaning of this is that, unlike martial law, the administrative powers and responsibility of the governors were not transferred to the armed forces. The duty and action preserved its civilian character: There was only one, unique, inseparable police action which signalled nothing but the seamless harmony in the exercise of state power.

[347] S. Güran, "Toplumsal Olaylarda Askeri Kuvvetlerden Yararlanılması", *Amme İdaresi Dergisi*, Cilt: 13, Sayı: 1, 1980, pp.23-24.

[348] Official Gazette, 06.09.1961, No: 10899.

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Let me sum up the key insights that could be derived from the common trajectory of the legal and administrative forms of the state intervention in the socio-political spectrum before the coup d'état.

Despite the possible institutional clashes between the military forces and civil governments, state power, in different ways it had been set in place, accounts for much more of a unity, than of a conflict or fraction. Particularly in view of the reliable efforts of the general staff to force the governments towards new administrative techniques and increased police/emergency powers under (and out of) their authority, there seems no fair ground to claim that the TAF tended to see martial law and other security practices merely as a leverage to increase its institutional dominance over politics. Instead, the unity of state power manifested itself in the policing mechanisms it employed agains what it deemed an 'existential threat', not least the perceived rise of the radical left and the labour militancy, under the veil of 'anarchy and terror'.

The administrative deployment of the military powers in the civilian regime and the military coup bringing about a military regime (and then constituting a civilian regime) rely on the very same logic on behalf of the bourgeois state. Both cases are in general indicative of the mobilization of the state's war powers in a case of disorder coded as war, and in particular they both specify, although much more productive for the latter, the military-civil conjunction in more 'positive' tasks of administration and police in relation to 'good order'. As opposed to widespread reading, on this view military intervention is not confined to the military coup d'etat. Military intervention, at least with the exercise of martial law starting in 1978, had already been at play in policing social order, and its function had been empowered by the security measures of 1980. The military coup, on the other hand, represents a political action that would bring this partial police function to a comprehensive project of pacification. Therefore, other than being extremely repressive and violent, the martial law that would follow entails a continuity in terms of revealing an association between the police and war powers of the state. It was not baffling to see

that the term 'measures package' which was in use for the stabilization agreements with the IMF from 1978 through to 1980[349] was at the same time the key label referring the reorganization within security and police in this period[350]. In other words, from the perspective of the power bloc the insecurity of capital accumulation could in no way be handled separately from social disorder. Demirel's emphasis on 'peace and security' in his announcement of the January 24 Decisions was thereof illustrative of the continuity of the 'war as peace, order and security' that would be undertaken by the September 12 regime.

As an aside note, particular inquiries revolving around the reasons the 1980 coup was made 'late' seem to assume relevance as well. Why did it happen on September 1980, but not earlier, asks Feroz Ahmad, for example. If it was loss of life that the generals were concerned about, then they could have certainly saved many more by intervening much earlier.[351] One of the DİSK members who succeeded to escape abroad after the coup makes a similar point:

> We lived in a period where all democratic rules were suspended in the name of democracy, a period where all the instruments of propaganda were used to smash an inexperienced opposition. One of the justifications of the generals was to curb terrorism, but they had the means to curb terrorism before taking power. Martial law was in effect since 1978. And virtually, within two weeks of their taking power, the problem of terrorism was solved.[352]

A possible explanation on the timing of the coup can be that the general staff had waited for the conditions to mature for expanded public support. This view was even admitted by one the commanders of the September 12 regime in an interview.[353] However, such maturation could indicate nothing but a deepened crisis of order and

[349] Z. Öniş, Stabilization and Growth in a Semi-Industrial Economy: An Evaluation of the Recent Turkish Experiment, 1977-1984, *ODTÜ Gelişme Dergisi* (13:1-2), 1986.

[350] see e.g. just before the announcement of the January 24 Decisions, the policing powers that would be complementary to the new socio-economic regime had been discussed under the same label as 'measures package'; *Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanak Dergisi*, 38. Birleşim, 19.2.1980, p. 540. https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/CS_/t19/c046/b038/cs_190460380540.pdf, or "AP ve CHP önlem paketinin büyük bölümü üzerinde anlaşmaya vardı", Milliyet, 10.01.1980.

[351] F. Ahmad, "Military Intervention and the Crisis in Turkey" in *MERIP Reports*, 1981, p. 5.

[352] M. Kara & S. Kum "The Workers as a Class Were Defeated" in *MERIP Reports*, 1984, p. 23.

[353] Interview with Bedrettin Demirel. Milliyet, 05.07.1987.

security. Interestingly enough, it can be observed that the level of violence had increased gradually by the imposition of martial law: In the years between 1975-1978 (until the declaration of martial law), a total of 1186 fatalities were reported, while this number was 935 in the year 1979, and 2921 only in the period since January 1980 until the coup in September 1980.[354] Nevertheless, there seems no objective ground to falsify the allegations made by the general staff regarding the legislative failure of the legal and administrative regulations they insistently urged for. What we rather precisely know and should turn our interest more towards is the considerable effort spent on the mobilization of the administrative apparatuses and techniques peculiar to the modern state. Because the desired transformation would be nothing but a radical one, it would normally require forcing all institutional capacities of the existing regime radically, 'until its last facilities', as the Chief Coordinator of Martial Law had once stated.

Hence, to grasp the 1980 military coup as a moment 'immanent' to the liberal political rationality it would be a task of more profound importance to have our focus on what has been actually attempted in terms of the state intervention in the *pre-coup* political landscape. Other than the employment of the civil-military conjunction as a police task the state intervention was also continuous in the content of the measures packages as well. Though with a lower density all regulations targeted by these legislative packages in effect smacked of the class war that would be assumed by the September 12 regime in due course. The emergency rule was particularly intended to accompany the economic measures of the January 24 Decisions to undermine and police the compelling exercise of the political and economic rights. Other security measures were also designed to redefine the political and public sphere, as well as help the state constitute political subjectivities in compliance with the needs of capital. It was then no surprise that from the trade unions to leftist/progressive intellectuals, the particular pre-coup regulations of the year 1980 had been criticized for 'creating anarchy and terror under the pretext of war on anarchy and terror',[355]

[354] H. Kayhan, *Gün Sazak: Bir Şehidin Yolculuğu*, Ötüken, 2016, p. 300.

[355] E.g. The DİSK President Abdullah Baştürk in a meeting in İzmir. http://ayintarihi.byegm.gov.tr/KRjfZ/date/1980-01-30 Also see, Ali Gevgilili, "Huzur Ama Nasıl?", Milliyet, 25.01.1980. H. Çelenk, Yeni Baskı Yasaları: Önlemler Paketi, *Yeni Ülke Dergisi*, 10. sayı, 1980.

which could have been one of the most telling definitions of the September 12 regime as well.

The fact that many of these regulations failed to properly pass due to the fevered class struggle had ultimately rendered the police and military powers in the field to get associated rather with the practice of counterinsurgency. In fact, the concept of counterinsurgency already goes beyond a reactionary act of countering, and has much broader implications on the possible matters pertaining to war and police.[356] But only with September 12, the continuity of class war by the military and police powers has turned out from a practice of counterinsurgency to a positive and proactive project of constitution of order, in which martial law and emergency rule have respectively gained a function of political administration that has made all forms of social relations subject to a peculiar combination of national security and neoliberal mode of accumulation.

3.3.2. 'Our War Must Be Legal': The 'Normality' at Work

As seen in the previous section, the political elite did not hold back from calling the turmoil of the 1970s a 'war'. According to the military junta as well, what was interfered with was nothing but a war. Among many other narratives on national security and emergency, this became most apparent in their approach to law as a means of war. Law as a pivotal instrument of pacification was probably the most concerned topic in the war:

> It became clear that fighting terrorists with laws that were regulated for *normal and peaceful times* was quite difficult. We repeatedly communicated to the government, Parliament and the President the required changes that have to be made in the law. (Kenan Evren, Chief of the General Staff)[357]

> Stopping the anarchy in a state of civil war will not be possible through *normal prosecution procedures peculiar to the state of peace*. (Necdet Üruğ, Martial Commander of İstanbul)[358]

[356] M. Neocleous, 2017.

[357] Evren's press statement on 16 September 1980.

[358] General Secretariat of the National Security Council, 1982, p. 319.

> The extraordinary situation created by the organizations that do not acknowledge any rule, order, and compassion is no longer met by the *measures of normal times*. The remedy of this may possibly go beyond the normal rules of democracy. We will look for the necessary measures in the least harmful way. (The Deputy President İ. Sabri Çağlayangil)[359]

> Some regions of our country are under a peculiar administrative mode defined in our Constitution for extraordinary situations, and thus provided with the measures of ensuring the peace and security. However, it is not permissible for states to live under a permanent state of emergency. Therefore, it is useful to take *legal, administrative and judicial measures* as quickly as possible, in order to ensure the return to normal conditions by strengthening the liberal, parliamentary, democratic regime. (The Deputy President İ. Sabri Çağlayangil)[360]

To recall the proposed strategy of General Kitson of the 20th century British colonial forces, it is crucial for a modern state during an insurgency to remain within the law as much as possible yet modifying the ways in which the law is administered.[361] That is to say, the ultimate objective of the distinction between the so-called normal times and times of war (exception) in liberal theory lies in the utilization of the 'normal' law as a means of war. That is why what was primarily intended by the state intervention before the 1980 military coup, as symbolized by the quotations above, was making the war powers legal by enacting legislations compatible with the existent belligerency, i.e. the imposition of adequate police and emergency powers through *legislative* means. Accordingly, the term 'measures' used both for the new economic and security regulations, by definition, points rather a quest *within* the existing order than a transition to an extraordinary order.

The approaches that handle the 1980 coup as an exceptional and/or exogenous moment, or a Caesarist solution[362] in Gramscian terms, on the other hand, tend to issue from a contested distinction between raison d'etat and law. In *Security, Territory, Population*, Foucault, while acknowledging that coup d'etat is not an exception with regard to raison d'etat, situates the latter, in turn, within a general horizon over and above the law.[363] However, the reason that the Turkish military

[359] Quoted in Ibid, p. 472.

[360] "Çağlayangil Sıkıyönetimin Kaldırılması için Yasal Önlemler Alınmasını İstedi", Milliyet, 31.08.1980.

[361] See the 9th and 10th articles in M. Neocleous, 2017, pp. 18-9.

[362] For example, Nilgün Önder, *The Economic Transformation of Turkey: Neoliberalism and State Intervention*, I.B. Tauris, 2016, pp. 91-3.

[363] M. Foucault, 2009, pp. 262-3.

takeover of 1980 appears over and above the law is not because of an essential conflict between a so-called autonomous rule of law and raison d'etat,[364] but is precisely that the law as a strategic battleground for social and political struggle had been subject to alteration and reshaping heavily driven by the rising class war.

Moreover, there is not non-contentious evidence to assume that the TAF entirely lacked any legal basis for its takeover. The duty assigned to the military by its Internal Service Code[365] was assumed by the general staff as a quite satisfactory point of reference. Nonetheless, regardless of such litigious legitimation ground, it is still possible to argue that 'a coup regime without a coup d'état' was already underway along with its economy and policing measures, and that it would be properly put in effect through the regular means of parliamentary regime (and naturally, on the basis of the rule of law, without leading a notable change in the institutional materiality of the state form) only if such 'legitimate' attempt did not confront the 'driving back' effect of a highly politicized resistance of the popular masses. As often pointed out by General Evren, the Turkish state's frequent appeals to martial law was seen by the general staff as an inevitable consequence of the *insufficiency* of the existing legislation. That is to say, for the military forces too, sufficient emergency and police powers could as well be incorporated within the normal law. What amounts to the September 12 regime could be best illustrated by such incorporation. As Evren put it again, the panacea for the illness was to 'make the threatened rule of law and order dominant again.'[366] That was what they had done when they took over the exclusive political power.

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[364] M. Neocleous, 2006a.

[365] "[T]he duty of the armed forces is to protect and safeguard the Turkish land and the Turkish Republic as stipulated by the Constitution". General Secretariat of the National Security Council, *12 September in Turkey: Before and After*, 1982, p. 224. What is also noteworthy is that the typical statements made by the military administration on the motives of the coup were based on an implicit distinction between what is democratic and what is legal. In his press statement on 16 September, Evren noted that the recurring NSC warnings preceding the coup were in fact well-intentioned calls remained within the democratic regime. He maintained that as these calls were not sufficiently responded by the parties, the operation, as a last resort, was carried out. The justification ground underlined for the latter was not the democratic regime, but the rule of law: "the duty assigned by the law and the desire of the glorious nation have been fulfilled by the Turkish Armed Forces as a last resort."

[366] K. Evren, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaskanı Kenan Evren'in söylev ve demeçleri [12 Eylül 1980-12 Eylül 1981]*, Ankara: Basbakanlık Basımevi, 1981, p.339.

What is sought in following sections is not to reprise the 'actual' reasons behind the 1980 coup, but to reveal the class ground of the 'war' in question in a way to situate the coup as a continuity rather than a rupture with the pre-coup era, though not denying the significant change in the state form. In doing so, I aim at offering a backdrop that would help better grasp the 'productive' side of this ongoing war (i.e. the tasks of building, ordering, administering) waged by the post-1980 regime in the name of peace and security, that is pacification. Here, exposing the state and capital's peculiar way of approaching the turmoil of the 1970s might be particularly suggestive for understanding the way in which the neoliberal order building has been based upon the same lens of war which was totally 'unfolded' in the late 1970s. Such inquiry, I believe, not only illustrates the political and ideological kernels of the neoliberal regime, but also gives some insights about the seeds of the chief role that would be assigned to security and police in this regime.

3.3.3. Class Warfare and Internal Enemy

Following a two decade of retreat from the statist, protectionist, and inward-oriented strategies of the 1930s in favour of more liberal foreign trade policies, Turkey reshifted its strategies of capitalist development since the late 1950s by entering a model based heavily on the accumulation of industrial capital for domestic market.[367] As the investment policies began to be devised within the framework of planning in the 1960s, the launch of the model, widely called import-substitution, appeared to mark a difference from the 1930s and late 1950s in terms of investment distribution and priorities. In that, without excluding the contribution of foreign capital, import-substitution would include the production of intermediate goods and durable consumer goods in view of the increasing consumption demand in the country, whilst technology, capital goods and inputs were still to be imported.[368] In this respect, the model was well-confirmed with the post-War international division of labour founded on the internationalization of productive capital in core capitalist countries and its direct investments in the third world countries.[369] Accordingly, as a

[367] K. Boratav, 2012.

[368] Ibid, p. 118-9.

[369] H. Gülalp, 1993, p. 35.

relatively favoured member of the Western Bloc, Turkey availed itself of the Cold War conditions being allowed to benefit much from additional opportunities in the form of foreign aid as well as short and long term loans.[370] Along with the limits on industrial production, this, however, further contributed to the import dependency of the economy, let alone provided a positive import substitution.[371]

Notwithstanding the deepening of the problem of foreign dependency that has become protracted since the 1950s, Turkey was observed to experience a relatively smooth and high growth rate until 1976 when a major economic crisis triggered by internal and external dynamics could not be postponed anymore. The expansion of the domestic market during this period was beneficial for all socioeconomic groups, in accordance with other underdeveloped countries.[372] While the industrial bourgeoisie was strictly protected from rival national industrial sectors by high quota and tariff walls, domestic demand, as a compensation for the limited external demand, was to be expanded by a series of macro-economic policies such as high wages and redistribution in favour of working classes.[373] Secured by the legal and institutional framework on the part of political rights as well, the latter led Turkey, at least until the second half of 1970s, to become a relatively higher income country compared to its underdeveloped counterparts.[374] It is reported that the real wages in the organized sector between 1963 (when the legislation on the right to strike and collective bargaining granted by the Constitution was enacted) and 1971 (when union actions were banned for two years following the military memorandum) increased between 5% and 7% each year.[375]

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[370] K. Boratav, 2012, pp. 122-3.

[371] According to Boratav, the only positive import substitution on macroeconomic level at the time was experienced in the period of the 5 Year Development Plan (1963-67). After then, the share of imports in GNP gradually increased largely due to inadequate growth in capital goods. K. Boratav, 2012, pp. 120-1.

[372] G. Yalman, 2002, p. 14. K. Boratav, 2012, pp. 123-6. Korkut Boratav, Türkiye'de Populizm, *Yapıt*, N. 1, 1988. Ç. Keyder, 1989.

[373] Erinç Yeldan, *Küreselleşme Sürecinde Türkiye Ekonomisi*, İstanbul, İletişim, 2013, p. 38.

[374] K. Boratav, pp. 124-6.

[375] Ç. Keyder, *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar,* İstanbul, İletişim, 1989, p. 219. Although average wages declined by 10% in these two years, they bounced back with stable increases from 1974 to 1978, reaching to the peak between 1976 and 1978. K. Boratav, 2005, p. 36.

Interestingly enough, the first (and to speak as of today, the only) indication of change in the ever-present authoritarian state form of the Republic was brought about by the new Constitution (1961) which was introduced following the military coup d'état of 1960. Indeed, the new setting of state-civil society relations envisaged by the political regime launched by the 1960s was to provide the social classes and forces outside the power bloc with the power to exercise democratic rights and freedoms in one way or another. Precisely thanks to the enjoyment of rights granted by the Constitution and the following relevant regulations (most primarily, the right to strike and collective bargaining for workers, and the right to establish labour unions for public servants), working classes could reach a relatively high level of political organization throughout the 1960s. The extensive use of constitutional rights led to significant gains not least with the establishment of the DİSK in 1967, which would thereafter assume a pioneering role in labour militancy.[376] Concomitantly, founded in 1961 originally as a party of trade unionists, the Turkish Labour Party (TİP) soon brought socialists of different generations and progressive Kurds into the fold, and in 1965 became the first socialist party entering the parliament.[377] The rise of the class movement had also notable repercussions on revolutionary student and youth movements, with some having adopted armed struggle, as well as on the ranks of peasantry.

It is worth noting that other than being an organic component of the domestic market strategies formed around the existing accumulation model, the popular masses' high level of organization and their struggle to take part in formal democracy could also be elaborated in view of the political strategies of the capitalist bloc during the Cold War. It was imperative, for ceasing the spread of Soviet influence into the Western-allied societies, to allow certain participatory practices in these societies. As a significant example of a policy field fundamentally shaped by class struggles, for instance, it was a widely accepted consideration in Turkey during the Cold War that

[376] The establishment of the DİSK Confederation could indeed be seen to mark a turning point in class struggle and its influence on social relations of distribution until September 12. To illustrate, a total of 139 strikes took place prior to the establishment of the DİSK in 1967, whereas 101 strikes took place in 1967 alone. This significant change would prevail until the military coup of 1980. Yüksel Akkaya, "Düzen ve Kalkınma Kıskacında İşçi Sınıfı ve Sendikacılık", in Balkan & Savran (eds), *Neoliberalizmin Tahribatı*, İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2004, p. 149.

[377] S. Savran, 2004, p. 24.

social policy should be taken account of by the state in the context of the 'war on communism'.[378] Whether or not it can be considered in this context, significant gains with regards to social security had in fact been achieved by the working classes in the Cold War. To take two examples, with the establishment of the Social Insurance Institution (*SSK*) instead of the Labour Insurance Institution in 1964, all workers in all establishments without necessarily being subject to the Labour Law have begun to be covered by social security, as well as their relatives by sickness insurance. The social security network has been expanded with the establishment of another insurance fund in 1972, the Social Security Institution for Craftsmen, Artisans and the Self-Employed (*Bağ-Kur*), so as to include the self-employed workers first, and then the self-employed in agriculture later on. Taken together, non-wage benefits and non-monetary income had thus become a supplementary element of the secondary relations of distribution.

In fact, the relative improvement in growth and income distribution experienced in the existing model would have been expected to provide the prevalence of a certain condition of 'peace' among social classes similar to its Keynesian counterparts in the West. Especially a hegemonic strategy to encompass the struggles on wages would not even run contrary to the economic-corporate interests of the bourgeoisie, insofar as aggregate demand is considered to serve a reproductive function for capital in the existing accumulation regime. Free from the competitive pressure of the international market, the industrial bourgeoisie, for instance, was not expected to have to pay much attention to labour costs under a protected and rapidly expanding domestic market. It could effectively add the increase in labour costs to the goods prices, since the demand for consumer goods had been growing rapidly in the 1960s.[379] Moreover, apart from providing the sufficient foreign exchange required for importing parts, there was one simple challenge for the industrial bourgeoisie, which is that production should continue without interruption. Because of this objective necessity the bourgeoisie was to preserve a certain threshold of 'peace' condition within the workplace. It is only by this way that macro level welfare policies could help pacify

[378] Ayşe Buğra, *Kapitalizm, Yoksulluk ve Türkiye'de Sosyal Politika*, İletişim, 2008, p. 162.

[379] Y. Koç, "30. Yıldönümünde 12 Eylül Darbesi ve İşçi Sınıfı", *Mülkiye* Cilt: XXXIV Sayı: 268, 2010, p. 47.

the working class within the given socio-economic order and impede labour militancy, other than stimulate the domestic market.

In this sense, it can be argued that the appearance of civil society for the first time as a generic locus of political struggle could have been utilized by the bourgeoisie as an ideological foreground for the establishment of its hegemony, which would enable it to impose its 'peace' on civil society as well as on relations of production. Such utilization, however, would first and foremost require the recognition of the democratic (or corporatist) representation of the working class.[380] Yet, as far as the class behaviour of the power bloc throughout 1960s and 1970s is concerned, one could identify that the income policies in favour of working classes were less to do with the former's deliberate and programmatic hegemonic strategy, than with the populist redistribution policies of the economic model. The power bloc was apparently not reconciled with the existing political and legal setting that evoked the capacity of the subordinate classes to 'form themselves into an autonomous political force' – a sine qua non for an authentic class hegemony in Gramscian sense[381]. The reluctance of the industrial bourgeoisie to go beyond the economic-corporate moment ultimately led it to agitate even the legal validity of the rights to strike and collective bargaining, to say the least.[382] This being the case, despite a certain economic stability relying on a relative growth and welfare throughout the 1960s, it would be naïve to suggest that the political repercussions of class war ever left the stage. It was no surprise that the political acquisitions of the working class, primarily those pertaining to the right to strike, boycott and collective bargaining, were either shortly preceded or followed by the establishment of the most effective class means of the Turkish bourgeoisie: MESS (the Turkish Employers' Association of Metal Industries) in 1959, TİSK (the Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations) in 1961, ASO (the Ankara Chamber of Industry) in 1963, TESK (the Turkish Confederation of Tradesmen and Craftsmen) in 1964, TÜSİAD (the Turkish Industry and Business Association) in 1971, OSD (the Automotive Manufacturers

[380] Robert Gray, 1977 cited in G. Yalman, 2002.

[381] C. Buci-Glucksman, 1980, p. 57.

[382] G. Yalman, 2002, p. 15.

Association) in 1974, HTK (the Free Enterprise Council) in 1977. On the whole, it appeared that the bourgeoisie's approach to the heightened working class mobilization within the war perspective, rather than its intention to develop an encompassing hegemonic strategy, enforced it to develop a more holistic political consciousness, whilst still preserving its economic-corporate interests and intra-class conflicts. Equipped with adequate class means on the level of organization, the bourgeoisie's assault on labour rights would gradually take effect towards the late 1960s and be crystallized in 1970 by a legislative attempt at bringing the trade union movement under state control.[383] It was by no coincidence that such attempt came soon after the DİSK's public bulletin of May Day in which it declared its will to 'found a socialist Turkey through democratic means'.[384] The legislative attempt would be responded by the workers' massive uprising on the 15-16th June of 1970 which was ended by the declaration of two months of martial law.[385]

Martial law imposed upon the June uprising would only foreshadow the state's upcoming intervention in the radical politicization of civil society, not least the escalating youth and labour militancy symbolized by increasingly widespread university and factory occupations, public demonstrations, strikes, boycotts and political assassinations throughout the late 60s. Rising public disorder that accompanied the wave of social opposition of a magnitude and extent that had never been seen before was eventually resulted in the seizure of power by the military through a memorandum in 1971. By way of a civil assembly and 'above-party' government in three-years of interim regime, the commanders imposed a number of

[383] In fact, the draft legislation, which included amendments on the acts on Trade Unions (#274) and Collective Bargaining, Strike and Lockout (#275) implied an attempt at deactivating the DİSK by imposing on union confederations a new membership threshold in regards to the number of DİSK members. Such intention was made explicit by the Minister of Labour who commented on the legislation, 'we are going to muzzle the DİSK very soon'. Kemal Nebioğlu, *15-16 Haziran*, bianet.org.

[384] For the whole bulletin, see Yıldırım Koç, *Türkiye İşçi Sınıfı Tarihi: Osmanlı'dan 2016'ya*, 2016, Kuzgun Kitap, pp. 187-8.

[385] It is important to note that the DİSK administration did not feel at ease about the violent acts occurred in the workers' June resistance. This could be observed from the DİSK president's declaration calling on its members to 'act within the laws and Constitution'. On the other hand, one of the points highlighted by the Ministry of Interior on the declaration of martial law was the extensive radical slogans and banners such as 'the people's war has begun', "Sıkıyönetim Mecliste Onaylandı", Milliyet, 18.06.1970.

legislative and constitutional amendments either repealing or limiting democratic rights, alongside the exercise of repressive practices on leftist organizations under martial law. The narrowing of civil and political society to the detriment of subordinate classes plus the closing down of the TİP certainly weakened the ties of the working class with formal politics. However, no less true was that the power bloc's parliamentary representation would suffer heavily from the political instability prevailed both in the interim and the ensuing civilian regime that had witnessed often-changing governments with limited capacity to establish the unity of capital. What would be decisive in terms of class encounters from then on was the social and political condition enforced by the imminent balance of payment crisis, as the relative growth of the 1960s began to deteriorate from the mid-1970s.

In fact, it can be put that the effects of the 1973 oil crisis had been felt relatively later in Turkey thanks to the high rate of remittances from the migrant workers in Europe. However, a series of developments from the decrease of the workers' remittances after 1974 to the rapid increase in oil prices to the US embargo on the long-term loan and military aid due to the conflict over Cyprus, resulted in the unsustainability of the import-substitution model.[386] High inflation, decrease in foreign demand for exports which were already limited, growth of foreign exchange deficit, slowing of industrialization, stagnation and increasing debt to foreign banks and international debt institutions were the main symptoms of the deepening crisis. The manoeuvre area of the bourgeoisie began to narrow in domestic market as well. The cost of the large social security network including peasants, the newly urbanized population, squatters and industrial workers[387] had become a burden to the capital accumulation. The growth policy which could somehow survive until 1977 with significant employment rates had come to be able to meet only a small part of the growing urbanized domestic labour force after that year.[388]

The gradual polarization among the left and right groups throughout the 1970s, which towards the end of the decade culminated into a state that was overtly

[386] Ç. Keyder, 1989, p. 227. F. Ahmad, 2003, pp. 176-8.

[387] Ç. Keyder, 1989, p. 265.

[388] T. Arıcanlı & D. Rodrik, 1990, p. 1344.

described in terms linked to warfare, can thus be seen as parallel to the gradual collapse of the accumulation model. In other words, social peace had deteriorated and insecurity began to prevail as capital accumulation was no longer 'secured'. Particularly the increasing rates of unemployment among young people in urban areas inclined them to get engaged in radical right and left groups, which had been reflected in a great social polarization under the rule of the 'Nationalist Front' governments.[389] But what is more, deterioration of peace was in turn considered a threat to accumulation, because the social polarization was deemed to be deepened by the rise of working class movements in line with the condensation of the class war. The 'reserve army of labour' as a chief instrument for the discipline of labour could not generate an intimidating effect in the face of strong trade union structures, that is, organized labour solidarity. To give an example of the influence of workers' activism, the number of strikes and days lost to strikes increased rapidly, from an average of 65 strikes and just under one million days between 1973 and 1976 to 190 strikes and 3.7 million days between 1977 and 1980. On the other hand, despite the sharp decline in production particularly after 1977 the share of real wages in industry added value had either increased or remained the same in this period.[390] The picture was not different for the public servants.[391]

The utmost importance of this strong trade unionism and politicization, however, did not only stem from the economic acquisitions in terms of real wages, but that it ultimately led to the crushing of the already contentious ideological domination over the workers and thus to a devastating crisis of hegemony, which had been most effectively symbolized by the struggle on wages. Indeed, although it had always been in search of a political leadership all through the 1970s, the working class movement had for the first time been able to influence and guide hundreds of thousands of people, and found the prospect of establishing organic ties with the radical youth

[389] F. Ahmad, 2003, p. 177.

[390] Ç. Keyder, 1989, pp. 231-232. The number of strikes was 483 during the period between 1963-1970, while it raised up to 957 between the years 1971-1980, almost a quarter of them being staged in 1980. Y. Akkaya, 2004, p. 149-150.

[391] For the wage effect of collective bargaining on public sector in the eve of the 1980 coup, see F. Yağmur, *Kamu Kesimi Toplu İş Sözleşmeleri Koordinasyon Çalışmaları Raporu*, Ankara: DPT Sosyal Planlama Dairesi Planlama Şubesi Yayınları, 1981.

movement by the second half of the decade. The labour front would only be expanded by the politicization of urban classes, in particular, public employees (teachers, doctors, engineers, architects, police officers, etc.) who tended to organize through associations and professional organizations as their right to unionize was repealed by the military administration of 1971. Nonetheless, it is still hard to argue for the existence of an adequate unification of the working classes as one political subject at the time, nor was there a programmatic socialist agenda that would appeal to the rest of society, a counter-hegemonic strategy, so to speak. Yet, the perception of the bourgeoisie and the state elites was different. As argued by Akkaya, the real danger for the power bloc after 1977 came instead from the working class' efforts to divert from a wage-based struggle to a class-driven one[392] which was conceived, whether true or not, as drifting the country towards a socialist regime, in view of the complaints of various capital representatives at the late 1970s. Yalman also adds that what the bourgeoisie perceived as an acute threat to its own existence, and thus relegated the future conditions of the reproduction of industrial capital to secondary importance, was the highly politicized working class and the heightened class struggle.[393] In particular, it was rather the socialist tendency shown by the DİSK, and not merely its capacity to collective bargaining and struggle on wages, that had been mostly influential in determining the class behaviour of the bourgeoisie in 1970s.[394] It is also worth mentioning that as the fight escalated, some parts of the socialist movement turned out to adopt armed action to take power, while some districts and provinces of certain cities were declared as 'liberated zones'. After reaching a vigorous level of organizational maturity, increasingly militant class and student movements became an important force against the state-supported violence exerted by the militarist, reactionary, and anti-communist groups in the eve of 1980.[395] All in all, the second half of the decade was a period in which poverty and insecurity had

[392] Y. Akkaya, "12 Eylül'ün Turnusol Kağıdı: DİSK", www.sendika.org, September 11, 2005.

[393] G. Yalman, 2004, p. 64.

[394] Ibid, pp. 63-4.

[395] The Bloody May Day of 1977, the staggering assassinations of the professor Bedrettin Cömert who took part in a university committee set up to investigate the right-wing terror acts, the Milliyet editor Abdi İpekçi, and the DİSK President Kemal Türkler, the massacre of İstanbul University in 1978, communal attacks on the Alevi communities who were denounced as communists in Malatya, Sivas, Bingöl, Çorum, and Maraş were among the brutal incidents about which there were few people suspicious of the help and provocation of state powers.

been increasingly questioned with their links to the social order as a whole, thus 'order' became the central term of the fight. To reiterate Clarke's remark,[396] the fight on order alluded to a 'crisis in the state form' as well, for the class challenge to capital had extended to a challenge to the constitutional authority of the state in its relation to civil society.

What we encountered on the eve of 1980, then, was a crisis in the reproduction of social cohesion which could be understood in relation to a congruent series of other crises: a crisis in capital accumulation, a crisis in social security, a crisis in political representation/bourgeois hegemony, and finally, a crisis in the state form. In addition to, and in accordance with the 'security measures' discussed in the previous section, the primary objective of state intervention had been to restructure the relation between the state and capital. In this light, three ensuing stabilization agreements were signed with the IMF by different governments since 1978 onwards, the last of which was the most expanded one. All agreements were common in promoting export-oriented policies that would require considerable reduction in public expenditures, consumption and real wages. But with the last one, known as the January 24 Decisions which entailed both a stabilization and structural adjustment program, it was intended to initiate a major transformation of the balance of power between capital and labour in its widest sense.

Hence, the implementation of the programme implied a much broader social and political project that went beyond pure economic policies. What was mainly marked by the dominant discourses of 'free market', 'open economy', or 'integration to world economy' which were adopted by the big capital associations after 1979 and would be adopted by the military and civil governments after 1980,[397] was the tendency to construct a new order and class hegemony. Therefore, particularly concerning the January 24 Decisions, it seems impossible to consider the onslaught against the economic acquisitions of the working class without its broader political implications. Indeed, the confrontational forms of resistance and labour militancy

[396] S. Clarke, 1992, p. 148. G. Yalman, 2004, p. 62.

[397] G. Yalman, 2002, p.19.

rendered the organized left the main obstacle to the bourgeoisie: Since the macro economic transformation was claimed to aim an outward-oriented development strategy with trade liberalization, diminishing the political capacity of labour would be the focus of much attention to sustain capitalist profitability at the expense of domestic demand. At this juncture, besides the global dynamics imposed on Turkey within the conditions of the global accumulation crisis, it might be also pertinent to mention the limitations endemic to the competitive power of Turkey's big bourgeoisie. Due to the relatively small scales and the use of standardized technology that limited the growth of labour productivity, the economy was not able to create new foreign exchange-generating activities other than the exports of traditional agricultural and mining products (and items with limited impact such as tourism and foreign exchange by workers abroad). Given this peculiar position of the industrial bourgeoisie, it would be essential for an outward-oriented strategy without high quota and tariff walls to eradicate populist distribution policies and effective labour activism, alongside the required economic measures (liberalising the import regime, implementing incentives, devaluing the currency, etc.). This means that the nascent requirement to discipline labour market in particular, and the field of political rights in general would precipitate the stabilization/adjustment programme into an expansive political project. Open calls made by the big capital circles playing on the idea of the 'restoration of a secure order'[398] should then be read in terms of the policing of labour, the organized left and social dissent which was more urgently imperative than ever.

If the new accumulation model embodied in the IMF agreements was inextricably linked to the compelling demands for a new social order and bourgeois hegemony, the whole social transformation would take place as a profound class assault on the *politicization* of labour. To the extent that it is considered within the precise conjuncture of the prevailing class war, there is no reason to exclude 'security' from this war perspective of the state and bourgeoisie. Starting from the imposition of martial law in 1978, all policy measures taken in the name of security and economy were like two sides of the same coin. It is for this reason that PM Demirel first tried to convince the general staff, instead of the parliament, about the January 24

[398] K. Boratav, 2012, p. 146.

Decisions. Accordingly, Turgut Özal, the chief technical architect of the package, gave his only briefings to the general staff. These examples had less to do with the so-called 'weight of the armed forces over political regime' than with the entwinement of security/policing measures into the neoliberal restructuration through the perspective of warfare and counterinsurgency. It is apt to recall that one of the issues most dwelled upon in Özal's briefing meetings was workers' rights and social opposition. While much of his policy programme included technical economy decisions, most of which were austerity policies, the discipline of social opposition and the narrowing of union rights were highlighted as prerequisites for the success of the new economic direction.[399] According to Özal, it was the cooperation of strikes and anarchy that impeded the investments, and democracy was not a disorder but a disciplinary regime.[400] It is not hard to observe that the briefing meetings yielded a consensus between the economy technocracy and military generals that security and police would be the main stake for the new accumulation regime.

Concomitantly, the big bourgeoisie did not step back from reassuring this consensus. The term 'war', for example, was openly in use within the discourses of business representatives. As early as 1975, at the meeting that decided to establish the Free Enterprise Council, the representative of the Union of Agricultural Chambers argued that the regime was under the 'threat of communism', it must be told to all citizens that this was a state of war, and for this, in view of the examples in France and Italy, the establishment of such associations as the Free Enterprise Council is inescapable.[401] Aside from getting organized through the calls for solidarity and cooperation around the theme of war, pressing for the mobilization of state power towards more security and police was another class strategy of the bourgeoisie. Indeed, it can be derived from the policy proposals of the business associations particularly since the clear manifestation of the crisis in 1977, that the bourgeoisie was concerned with public security and social peace as much as it was concerned with the accumulation crisis. Common demands of different capital circles for market reforms seemed to be harmoniously compatible with their common tendency

[399] *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, 1988, p. 2376.

[400] Ibid, p. 2376.

[401] TİSK, *Türk Hür Teşebbüs Kuruluşları Toplantısı*, TİSK: İstanbul, 1975, pp. 24-5.

to securitize social dissent. In this light, a great deal of overlap could be observed between the statements of the business associations and the warnings given by the TAF to the government and political parties. 'Restoration of state authority' was the most popular theme among capital. The chairman of the Union of Chambers, for example, put forward in the Free Enterprise Council's meeting held just before the AP government was established in 1979:[402]

> The election results show that the nation has not warranted the armed and unarmed aggressors by rewarding the policies that respect free enterprise, which is the assurance of human dignity and liberal democracy. History teaches us that in no country of the world the state might count the ideas and intentions that would put an end to its own existence, as freedom of thought. Any act or behaviour that would harm this principle cannot be tolerated. Excuses like the right to resist do not legitimize disobedience to the national will.

Associating so-called 'ideological unionism' with terror acts was another strategy used by the business associations. But none of them had gone as far as TİSK in this regard. The TİSK-affiliated MESS, for example, after the collective bargaining negotiations failed in 1980, accused the DİSK member Maden-İş Union of invoking a class war, turning a struggle of economic interests into an ideological class conflict, and instrumentalizing collective bargain for its aim to replace the free democratic regime with a socialist one. The association also called 'patriotic' workers to oppose the strikes.[403] In the meantime, the general secretary of the TİSK proclaimed that to take an effective step against terrorism it was essential to stop and have strict control over ideological unionism which supports and sustains militancy.[404] The measures advocated by the TİSK with a strong insistence starting from 1977 even until the day before the military coup were also hard to discern from those by the military generals.[405] What was further interesting is that all of the measures were presented adjacent to the headline of 'economic proposals', with the subtext that production

[402] "Hür Teşebbüs Konseyi: "Hükümetten tutarlı uygulama bekliyoruz"", Milliyet, 10.11.1979.

[403] "MESS: Maden-İş çalışma barışı peşinde değil", Milliyet, 18.04.1980; "Şükrü Er: "Grevden Maden-iş zarar görüyor"", Milliyet, 26.04.1980.

[404] *İşveren*, TİSK Yayını, No.11, 1980, p. 21.

[405] A number of examples can be found in *İşveren*, TİSK Yayını, 1977-1978; ""İşverenler: "DGM çıksın,seçim yasası değişsin"", Milliyet, 16.11.1979; "İbrahimoğlu: "Grevler toplumu etkilerse durdurulmalı"", 07.04.1980; "Narin: "İdeolojik sendikacılık terörü besliyor"", 25.06.1980; "Baydur: Bazı önemli kararlara gerek var"", 11.09.1980.

would not increase unless these measures were taken: Establishment of the CHP-AP majority government, amendment in the Elections Law, enactment of the 'anarchy measures', expansion of police powers, empowerment of the powers of the martial commanders, establishment of the State Security Courts, activation of the articles in the Penal Code that impose heavy imprisonment or death punishment for those threatening the order.[406]

Given the civilian and legal character of the acts demanded, it can be argued that along with the generals, capital's representatives were also willing to mobilize all possibilities of the existing liberal framework for ensuring a civilian 'coup regime' without a coup, and without necessarily a change in the institutional form of the state. This calls into doubt the point made both by Poulantzas and Jessop[407] that 'open war' against dominated classes is peculiar to the 'exceptional' form of the state defined by the precise retreat from the rule of law, elimination of democratic institutions, suspension of the electoral principle, etc. Moreover, just as policy measures related to security and police were proposed by the bourgeoisie for securing surplus value and profitability, economic measures (such as the regulation of the labour relations and the wage regime, tax reform and contraction in domestic demand) were in turn proposed for securing social order. Likewise, just as capital's representatives and Özal, an economy technocrat, were proposing legislations on security and police, the military commanders were on the other hand making critical comments on the workers' economic-political rights.[408] The crisis associated with the state, security and order was neither more nor less than the crisis of accumulation, whereby what is known as the crisis of accumulation was in turn the crisis of the state, security and order; the organic entwinement of capital and security was imprinted by class warfare as two sides of a coin. It is this very entwinement that makes it impossible to grasp the social disorder associated with 'terror and anarchy' without its class essence. Accordingly, it gives us enough clues to who was (and

[406] Milliyet, 10.11.1979; 16.11.1979.

[407] N. Poulantzas, 1970. B. Jessop, 1982, pp. 167-8.

[408] E.g. "If this collective bargaining system won't make Turkey to collapse, nothing ever will". Commander of the Navy, B. Ulusu, quoted in *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, 1988, p. 2376.

actually, *is*) corresponding to the category of 'enemy' in this crisis labelled as 'war' – a war through which the 1980 coup and its 'exceptional' regime had been justified. Yet again it is still worth reiterating that along with its police and emergency powers the 'normal' regime was already set in motion in this war.

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There is a further point that seems to be typical of the 1970s crisis, but also might be instructive to account for the further peculiarity of the political setting in the post-1980s. The fall of the state-oriented, populist model which was predicated on a particular regime of social security[409] had been manifested as the twin crises of capital accumulation and hegemony towards the late 1970s; but it had been soon encompassed by a war rhetoric overwhelmed by extreme nationalist and ethnicist discourses that evoked fighting a foreign enemy. Put different, a crisis which was essentially economic had quickly become a matter of 'national security'. The reason why could be sought with respect to Turkey's peculiar position in the world-historical setting of the Cold War.

As a committed member of the Western alliance having close ties with the US against the Soviet Union after the World War II, it is known that Turkey was eager to utilize the Cold War discourse based on a strong anti-communist stance as a guiding principle of shaping its civil society. The political class interests of its own domestic power bloc were also so much in line with the US/CIA-based doctrine of national security. It could be observed from the mid-1970s onwards that in parallel with the gradual deepening of the hegemony crisis of the bourgeoisie, a strong nationalist mobilization against the 'threat of communism' was provoked by the 'Nationalist

[409] Even though it might be hard to argue for the existence of a properly institutionalized social security regime at the time, what I seek to indicate is rather the tangible fragments of the social state encompassed in the populist practices specific to the import-substitution model. It is possible to admit that the relatively effective forms of unionization and class-based politics plus the positive outcomes of the use of labour rights, in particular of collective bargaining agreements (such as severance pay and social security benefits) served a socio-economic compromise between labour and the state and capital until the late 1970s. Likewise, health and education services, although quite inadequate, were provided almost free of charge, while social security was regulated in the form of pension pay. Both Boratav and Keyder state that Turkey's social security regime was in much better condition amongst countries of similar development level in 1970s, K. Boratav, 2005, p.124; Ç. Keyder, 1989, p. 221. In short, the decommodification of certain social rights, though in a limited capacity, constituted a pillar of the security setting under the import substitution model.

Front' governments. Concomitantly, discursive practices of the power bloc established around 'free market' and 'integration with world economy' started to be equipped with a highly reactionary blend of nationalism, conservatism and anti-communism, and were attempted to be situated at the centre of muddling through the crisis of hegemony.

In this light, as the hegemonic crisis deepened, nationalist rhetoric grew stronger on a polarizing axis of national/authentic vs. unnational/foreign. The rise of the radical left and worker militancy against which the business elite frequently alarmed the state authorities started to be described as 'the greatest threats the nation faced.'[410] The Maden-İş Union, after having decided to go on strike following the initiation of the austerity measures of January Decisions, was accused by the MESS of acting with the political identity of a foreign country rather than a trade union.[411] The general secretary of the TİSK maintained that the strikes have already gone beyond the aim of putting pressure on the employer and started to threaten the national unity by gaining a political and ideological character.[412] The president of the TİSK, on the series of strikes in mining and textile industry, penned the following words in the journal *İşveren*:

> Today we are struggling to protect the Turkish State and its indivisibility with its country and its nation, and the free, parliamentary regime, and to destroy ideological and anarchist movements for good. (…) Those traitors who dare to sing the communist international instead of our national anthem should know that this noble state and nation that have managed to defeat all of its inside and outside enemies for centuries, will finally crush and destroy today's anarchists.[413]

It might not be surprising that the words of the TİSK president displayed a remarkable similarity with the TAF's warning letter to political parties,[414] particularly in terms of the preferential terms and phrases appealed to increase the

[410] M. Yeşilbağ, "Changing Hegemonic Strategies of Business in Turkey before and after the Neoliberal Turn", *Enterprise & Society*, V. 17, N. 1, 2016, p. 142.

[411] "Maden-İş'in toplu grev kararını MESS normal karşıladı", Milliyet, 18.03.1980.

[412] "Grevler toplumu etkilerse durdurulmalı", Milliyet, 07.04.1980.

[413] Quoted in M. Yeşilbağ, 2016, p. 142.

[414] K. Evren, 1990, p. 331-2.

nationalist tone of the anti-communist rhetoric. The very same hostile tone would also become indispensable to the post-coup speeches of General Evren. The identification of nationalism with counter-revolution, and the duality between the good and bad workers, that is, 'hardworking, patriotic, innocent Turkish workers' vs. 'the aggressors poisoned by archaic foreign ideologies' were among the most popular referential points in Evren's statements varying from economy to national education.[415] When talking about political violence as one of the justifying grounds of the coup, he was readily condemning the fascist, religious and leftist ideologies all in one sentence, but it was only the left movement that was linked to the 'outside forces', claimed to be an 'external' epidemic alien to Turkish society, and denounced as a 'traitor', 'terrorist', and 'deviationist'.[416]

In effect, if what was at stake was 'physical' insecurity and disorder in the turmoil of the 1970s, it was not a secret that behind much of political violence lay the neofascist Nationalist Movement Party which were known to have established special militia cadres against the leftist student movement,[417] and had long retained ties with the paramilitary forces known to be Counter-Guerrilla that were designated as the Turkish branch of Operation Gladio and organized as an 'underground' part of the American-oriented 'Special War Department'. However, it is also known that there had been no investigation on the allegations neither on the Nationalist Movement Party nor the Counter-Guerrilla.[418] The political and military elite had no doubt that the terrorist threat came only from the left and the violence exerted by the nationalist movement was in fact for the survival of the state in its fight against communism.

[415] E.g., press conferences on 12 September 1980, 16 September 1980; Adana speech on 30 October 1982.

[416] E.g., public declaration on 30 August 1980, press conference on 24 November 1982, Eskişehir speech on 4 October 1982, Adana speech on 30 October 1982. The NSC's comment on the Bloody May Day of 1977, which is widely known to be involved by the Counter-Guerrilla forces, is also striking: "The fanatics who chanted 'Freedom for the People' created the most bloody incident in Turkey's recent history. They had ruthlessly carried out the orders given them by foreign powers against their own countrymen." General Secretariat of the National Security Council, 1982, p. 17.

[417] Tanıl Bora & Kemal Can, *Devlet ocak dergah: 12 Eylül'den 1990'lara ülkücü hareket*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999, p. 58-60.

[418] Ahmad's comment that this was because of the Party's potential parliamentary support to the minority governments (2003, p. 179) might be inadequate, for the Party was much more functional for the regime outside the parliament. The 1970s popular slogan among the pro-Nationalist Front, "Demirel in the parliament, Türkeş [the leader of the MHP] in the street" was accurate in that sense.

The following quotation from Necdet Üruğ, the martial commander of Istanbul, reflects the military perspective on political violence of the 1970s:

> The activist right defines its ideological goals as, to clear the country from the communists and to prevent the country from becoming communist. Given the fact that most of the actions taken by their members are armed attacks, killings, assassinations and bombings against the left-wing people, it is true that their tactical goals are in line with this definition. At the same time, one point that should be emphasized is that the activist left has a common and explicit goal to unite all 35 affiliated fractions under the flag of the Marxist-Leninist movement, whereas the activist right is comprised of disorganized groups varied by theocratic, racist and fascist views. It is a fact that the right, unlike the left, is not in a systematic and scientific organization based on a revolutionary theory. The result of our one-year martial law practice is that the activist left is the primary threat to the country.[419]

Such view had been overtly shared by the members of the 'Nationalist Front' government, albeit in the more post-political language of anti-communism. "There is no such thing as right-left fight in Turkey, but a fight between the traitors who have been trying to destroy the Turkish state and nation with their dirty goals, and on the other hand, the patriots determinedly protecting the national being", declared the Minister of Justice in 1975, for instance.[420] In a newspaper interview, the PM Demirel also proclaimed that the *ülkücü* (idealist)[421] youth was the guarantee of the nation, and it was obvious that those accusing them were the ones who aimed at destroying the state.[422] As such, it was not hard to know whom General Evren referred to when he stated in 1980 that the armed forces were instead fighting with the internal enemies rather than the external ones.[423]

Notwithstanding the political tensions with the US (sparked by the conflict over Cyprus), the political developments towards the end of the 1970s witnessed a marked increase in the strategic importance of Turkey for the Western bloc. Alleged organic ties of the militancy of Turkey's radical left with the Soviet Union, the ever-increasing American opposition in Turkish society along with the 1979 Islamic

[419] General Secretariat of the National Security Council, 1982, pp. 311-2.

[420] *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, 1988, p. 2222.

[421] *Idealists* (or *Grey Wolves*) is the phrase used by the supporters of the Nationalist Movement Party to call themselves.

[422] *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, 1988, p. 2222.

[423] "Org. Evren: "Biz dış düşmanla değil, iç düşmanla uğraşmaktayız"", Milliyet, 15.02.1980.

Revolution in Iran (with the US embassy being occupied in Tehran), and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in the same year – which for some marked the end of détente and beginning of the 'Second Cold War'[424] – could be counted among the chief 'realpolitik' developments that made Turkey, a loyal Western outpost, crucial once again for the US and NATO strategists.[425]

Nevertheless, it would be more telling to suggest that the rise of the ideology of national security had less to do with the realpolitik threats ascribed to the Communist Bloc, than with the crisis of liberal hegemony both in the domestic order and in the West, at the heart of which lay the upheaval in global capitalist order. Security, once considered a principle of formation, Neocleous notes, is ultimately directed toward the fabrication of the economic order and reordering of the capitalist social reality,[426] even at times when it is practiced under the banner of national security. The 'communist threat' of the Cold War therefore went much beyond the Soviet threat; such threat was and is rather of an alternative socio-economic order, a 'potential of a counter-hegemonic power exploiting economic disorder', than of the Soviet Union as a military threat.[427] It holds also true for Turkey that in the late 1970s internal threat was successfully linked to external threat thanks to the symbolic imagery of communism as a 'common enemy', and by this means national security which normally denotes the affairs of state security in the 'global' arena has been redirected onto the main target of economic security, the domestic socio-political order, in a way to fill the gap left by the suppressed social security measures. In view of the concurrent disorder of capital 'inside' and 'outside', the category of 'enemy' which seizes the core of the ideological motivation in military/war power, could thus be subtly permeated into daily politics and everyday life, being associated with disorder and illegality within the ubiquitous grounds of police and security. For this very reason while the workers' movements were overtly encountered with 'war' and 'enemy' rhetoric, they were at the same time often asked to remain within the frame

[424] F. Ahmad, 2003, p. 174.

[425] In 1979, *the Guardian*'s correspondent wrote: "Not surprisingly Turkey is now seen as a zone of crucial strategic significance not only for the southern flank of NATO but for the West as a whole." Ibid, p. 174.

[426] M. Neocleous, 2006b, p. 367.

[427] Ibid, p. 377-8.

of law and order. This is by no means a contradiction, but merely a natural consequence of the police logic that assumes a constant warfare on the criminal enemy to bring it into the fold of bourgeois law and order, ultimately aiming to generate law-abiding citizen subjects. In a broader lens, under the banner of national security this constant war on the enemies of social and economic order would become the implicit ideological underpinning of the new socio-political setting behind the oncoming neoliberalization. Police and national security would be therefore restructured by the new regime in consideration of the permanent spectre of internal enemy, which would in turn permeate and shape the social fabric in that manner.

As a final note, if anti-communism was the name that has redirected the war powers of national security into economic disorder and into the crisis of liberal hegemony, the waging of such war could not be considered independent of the concept of counterinsurgency. Indeed, it was beyond doubt that the power bloc was highly concerned with the prospect of a civil insurrection towards the end of the 1970s. Major workers' actions of the 1970s such as the uprisings of June 1970, State Security Courts protests of 1976, the Bloody May Day of 1977, the Tariş resistance of 1980 and the following massive rallies of that era were all claimed by the business front to be 'rehearsals of a communist uprising' that would be supported by external forces.[428] A possible insurrection had also been a matter of concern both for the political and military elite. For instance in 1979, after a year with hundreds of fatalities recorded, PM Demirel indicated the absence of an insurrection under his government as a benchmark of success of the martial law practice.[429] Following the announcement of the January 24 Decisions in 1980, Ecevit warned the government that such severe austerity policies could result in an uprising of the likely victims of them.[430] Kenan Evren also admitted that a nationwide uprising was their biggest concern before and after they seized the power.[431]

[428] *İşveren*, n. 5, April 1980, p. 3.

[429] General Secretariat of the National Security Council, 1982, p. 306

[430] "Ecevit: "Hükümet yapılması en sakıncalı olanları yaptı", Milliyet, 29.01.1980.

[431] K. Evren, *Kenan Evren'in* Anıları *(2)*, 1991, p. 13; Mehmet Ali Birand (et al.), *12 Eylül/Türkiye'nin Miladı*, Doğan Kitap, 1999, pp. 197-8. In effect, such concerns were not groundless at all. In some Latin America countries such as Chile, Argentina, Peru which had undergone a similar

What makes counterinsurgency a mediating concept between the pre- and post-coup regime of Turkey is however less about eradicating 'terror and anarchy' than its broader implications on the combination of security, development and administration of population. The latter brings us closer to the lens of pacification as 'production and reproduction of social order', which was used to describe the counterinsurgency practices of the US in Vietnam.[432] The permanent spectre of internal enemy and permanent concerns over a possible insurrection could indeed be much more functional when mobilized into the formation and administration of everyday social relations. In effect, this functionality was already rooted in the conception of counterinsurgency being formulated as 'Clear-Hold-Build'.[433] Such understanding of counterinsurgency as a core practice of pacification would be much more illustrative of the post-1980 regime. But we can still trace its roots back to the pre-coup methods of fighting with 'terror and anarchy'. We can derive from the records of a Coordination Meeting of Martial Law held in the late 1979 that the government and security bureaucracy adopted a new concept and doctrine called *Internal Defense and Development* which did not limit the practice of counterinsurgency to the reactive act of countering. The following quotation is from the official introduction of this new program:

> [The] concept and doctrine of *Internal Defense and Development* aims at strangling the insurrection and the war at their inception. The purpose of internal defense is to preserve social order from destructive actions. Its scope is determined according to the degree of influence and control that the act of insurgency and anarchists can

social turmoil following the exhaustion of the state-driven import-substitution model, stabilization programmes negotiated with the IMF and WB at the same time as Turkey were faced with severe riots, popular uprisings, and strikes. The resistance in Peru resulted in the proclamation of martial law in 1978. R. Fagen, *Capitalism and the State in U.S.-Latin American Relations*, Stanford University Press, 1979, p. 167. For Turkey too, the period from the beginning of 1980 to the military coup was particularly a restless one for the workers' actions. The partial initiation of austerity measures had sparked a series of strikes and riots in principal industrial cities. The strikes of January and February in Tariş, a spinning factory in İzmir, against the dismissals of workers had shortly gained the support of the revolutionary groups and student movements in the city. The waves of action had spread all over the city, and then other cities with huge rallies and boycotts. The DİSK President spoke towards the Tariş workers who entered the field with a banner saying 'we fought and we'll fight!': "The bourgeoisie has waged war against us and we accept it", *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, 1988, p.2380. The bloody intervention by the police and gendarmerie forces led the workers into a fatal armed conflict which lasted around a month and resulted in the declaration of martial law in the city. In view of the inspiration that Tariş resistance provided in the union actions in other cities, it might be argued that the action could as well be culminated into a general upheaval.

[432] M. Neocleous, 2017, pp. 21, 24-5.

[433] Ibid, p. 24.

> exercise on people. On the other hand, internal development is to provide the balanced and healthy development of social order by building political, economic, social and educational institutions capable of responding to the needs of order. (…) The internal defense and development strategy involves the use and development of the military power of a government, including political, economic, psychological and all police and internal security forces, to counter or annihilate the insurrection. Accordingly, internal defense and development programs should be implemented *jointly and at the same time*.[434] [emphasis added]

Given the emphasis on the conjunction of the all state apparatuses pertaining both to 'crushing' and 'building', the IDD (Internal Defense and Development) program in question appears to bear a striking similarity to the counterinsurgency strategies developed by the US military for the pro-US Third World countries since the Vietnam War.[435] When considered with a view to the process of establishing a new order in line with the approach above, September 12 would reflect a much 'productive' and joint perspective of counterinsurgency and warfare that incorporates the complementary elements of defense and development. Again to note General Evren's İzmir speech,[436] 'the task of the utmost importance was to have such an administration that would strongly invoke and manage the ideological and economic war *with the minimum need of resorting to armed forces*. That was the only way to preserve the regime *without guns and bombs'*. He maintained in the same speech that 'it was only the first round of the war that the enemy had been defeated'.

Over more than thirty years to day, we do not know what round of this war we are currently in. Yet we know from the acts and discourses of the ruling class that it is continuing with a growing severity – without any implication on the ultimate moment of it, yet still under the guise of peace and order.

3.3.4. Imposition of the 'Peace and Order'

Notwithstanding harsh criticism from the progressive segments of society at the time, it was quite meaningful that the Turkish state chose to honour General Kenan Evren

[434] K. Evren, 1990, p. 321.

[435] See e.g., M. Childress, *The Effectiveness of U.S. Training Efforts in Internal Defense and Development: The Cases of El Salvador and Honduras*, National Security Research Division (RAND), 1995.

[436] "Savaş bitmedi, ilk raundu kazandık"", Milliyet, 02.11.1982.

with a 'peace award'[437] after his retirement as president. The September 12 regime which is commemorated by savage repression and brutal violence never witnessed any words from Evren contradicting with peace; and what might strike us more, he was really sincere and self-convinced in this. One of the notions highlighted by him with regards to the primary motives behind the coup was providing 'social peace'.[438] He strongly and rightfully believed that it was nothing but the condition of 'peace, tranquillity, order and security'[439] brought about by the military regime.

When we examine the pleas of the then-living putschists, Evren and Şahinkaya, in the September 12 trial in 2012, we also see that they never saw themselves staging a coup d'état. It was previously known that they widely chose to refer to their seizure of power through military terms such as 'operation' (*harekat*) and 'plan of attack'. For Şahinkaya, what they actually did was ceasing the war and preventing further bloody crimes.[440] He further put that real putschists would never hand over the government in two or three years as they did. According to Evren, September 12 was not a coup d'etat but an operation of the constitutive power on behalf of the nation's peace and tranquillity. He further denied the claims of illegality by putting forward:

> The act of the constitutive power and the act of plotters that violate the Constitution are completely different kinds of actions. The former is by no means a matter of guilt. There is no provision in the criminal legislation of civilized countries that punishes the act of the constitutive power.[441]

Evren also pointed out elsewhere[442] that September 12 did not signify 'a military coup d'état as in history books', but an '*obligatory* operation of cleaning up the plots against democratic order'. From the perspective of the generals, peace and order were then the name of the *obligation* above politics. Indeed and worse still, they

[437] Ataturk International Peace Award. See the English Press Release on http://www.ayk.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/15.05.2014.AUBO-Press-Release.pdf

[438] Press conference on 16 September 1980.

[439] Radio-television speech on 24 November 1982.

[440] TBMM, *Darbe ve Muhtıraları Araştırma Komisyon Raporu* [TGNA, Report of the Investigation Commission on the Past Coup D'états and Memorandums], Cilt.2, 2012, p. 881.

[441] Ibid, p. 956.

[442] Press conference on 16 September 1980.

were right. As cited in the official journal of General Directorate of Security which was published in the aftermath of the coup, September 12 was actually the day of 'peace and order'.[443]

Although the idea of order bears an organic connection to security, such connection is remarkably entrenched when the former is dreamed as a bodily constitution that requires constant rehabilitation. General Evren's frequent employment of medical language can be seen as illustrative of this. The metaphors he widely used such as patient, disease, paralysis, microbes, poison, medicine, treatment, surgery, amputation, bitter recipe, healthy body, etc.[444] in the way that Peter Conrad conceptualizes as 'medicalization'[445] helped the military administration impose the conception of peace and order as the precise lack of illnesses or pathological deviations. Although such discourse of medicalization did not go beyond a metaphorical context by accompanying novel development of politics of health in favour of social control,[446] as an ideological formation it was still functional to reconfigure disorderly elements (the organized left and any politicized social dissent) as acute security threats in the new regime; that is, to impose peace and order in the form of a comprehensive security project. Peace and order have been thereby rendered almost identical to security so that the enemies of the former have been identified with the enemies of the latter. As will be discussed further in detail, such identification has resulted in the institutional and ideological designation of security in the form of an all-encompassing politics of national security based upon the idea of a ubiquitous internal enemy, and a perpetual war on and policing of the infinite uncertainty posed by the enemy. Accordingly, the term national security has been redefined to incorporate 'peace and security of the society' in the new Constitution, and the new NSC Law was adjusted in the same line.

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[443] Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, *Polis*, v. 340:3, 1980.

[444] See for example, K. Evren, 1981, pp. 339-40; p. 87; also his radio-television speech on 5 October 1982.

[445] P. Conrad, "Medicalization and Social Control" *Annual Review of Sociology,* V. 18, 1992.

[446] For a historical analysis of such development in Western liberalism, see M. Foucault, "The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century" in *Foucault Studies*, no. 18, October 2014, 113-127; "Panopticism" in M. Foucault, 1979, pp. 195-228.

The political nexus that links the 1970s' war to the post-80s' peace lies in such reconfiguration of security: The new regime which has focused much more on 'peace and order building' beyond simply neutralizing the threat, has sought to secure this focus by reconfiguring the concept of national security much as a technique of government and expanding its concern more towards the *inside*, i.e. domestic security. This finds its best expression in General Evren's following words: "Ours is an era of 'Secret War'. The enemy is not attacking from the borders. Instead, by penetrating into society which is its main target, it aims at dividing the order from inside".[447] It can be put forward that this shift in the role of security more towards of peace and order building has envisioned the neoliberal restructuring less about a process of militarization than pacification and securitization. In other words, if the neoliberal order building has been set as a security project in which war and police power overlap in the name of peace and order, the question which appears to be least relevant would be the balance of power between civil and military institutions. From such perspective, for instance the temporary use of martial law in the first years of the regime, or say, the influence of the military-oriented NSC over politics are remarkable not because they reveal the institutional pillars of militarism, but because they help us contemplate on 'how functional security could be for constituting and administering a radically new set of state-society relations'.

If what lies at the core of national security is the economic security of capital, as Neocleous argues,[448] then it would be misleading to think national and social peace without labour peace. Not surprisingly, the relation between these terms was made explicit by the statements of Evren and the NSC. What was remarkably indispensable to their reflections on peace and order was economy and related terms

[447] Radio-television speech on 5 October 1982. In fact, this particular usage of the phrase 'Secret War' was not original to Evren's mindset. The domestic perspective of 'Secret War' was rather coined within the anti-communist doctrine of counterinsurgency at the height of the Cold War, and directly linked to the extraordinary war powers in the face of the 'communist threat', particularly the CIA and SIS-sponsored domestic stay-behind networks organized in NATO countries. See, for more information, G. Daniele, *NATO's Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe*, Frank Cass, 2005. It is further known that the field manuals of the TAF are developed under the strong influence of the US Army Field Manuals. In that, the TAF's counterinsurgency manual titled *Sahra Talimnamesi 31-15* and *30-31B* were direct translations of the US Field Manual 31-15 and 30-31B. Ertuğrul Mavioğlu, "Devletleşen kontrgerilla, kontrgerillalaşan devlet", *Perspectives* 1, no.12, 2012, 19.

[448] M. Neocleous, 2006b.

such as productivity, efficiency and welfare. According to the NSC, the declining rates of productivity and welfare was the outcome of the 'deterioration of labour peace' through strikes and similar action slowing down production.[449] The deterioration of labour peace was indicated by the Council as one of the reasons of the coup, and Evren was in total agreement with the capital's representatives that this was caused by those fanatics who 'provoked class struggle'.[450] It was further declared by the Military Communiqué No.1 that:

> All rights of the industrious and patriotic Turkish worker will be safeguarded within the framework of current economic conditions. However, the activities of certain labour bosses who exploit the innocent Turkish worker and resort to all kinds of pressures and tricks to use them in the direction of their own ideological views and personal interests instead of trying to protect workers' rights will never be permitted. All sorts of measures will be taken for all employers to help improve labour peace without deviating from legal rules.[451]

The pleasant-sounding narratives of liberal post-politics, 'labour peace', 'industrial peace', 'workplace peace' had somehow been among the most favourite terms of the business associations in the late 1970s. The miners who were using their formal union rights were accused by the MESS of engaging in ideological class unionism and of disturbing labour peace. On the same days, taking into account the urges of the business front the NSC issued an official warning to workers about the prospect of disrupting labour peace.[452] On the eve of the military coup, the results of a research titled "Opinions of the Top 300 Entrepreneurs in Turkey" were published in the right-wing newspaper *Tercüman* under the headline "as long as the state cannot resolve the gaps in its authority and activate the laws, no labour peace will be established".[453] All in all, it was beyond doubt that what was disrupting or disturbing for productivity was at the same time deteriorating for peace.

The view that the political regime and the general setting of state-society relations that have been invoked by September 12 indicate an illiberal, at least not a typical

[449] General Secretariat of the National Security Council, 1982, p. 27.

[450] Ankara speech on 29 October 1982. Radio-television speech on 5 October 1982.

[451] General Secretariat of the National Security Council, 1982, pp. 231-2.

[452] "Çalışma barışını bozucu tertip ve tahriklere karşı işçiler uyarıldı", Milliyet, 19.03.1980.

[453] "En büyük 300 firma yöneticilerinin görüşleri", Tercüman, 09.09.1980.

liberal order, might prove legitimate. By the same token, however, what was mainly aimed by the military administration in this new regime was to constitute a solid foundation for a *liberal peace* where the accumulation of capital, reproduction of labour and material dispossession could take place concurrently and peacefully. That is why after the military took power in September 1980, the support lent to the military by business associations was revolving around the theme 'peace and security'**,** which was also the opening terms of Demirel's speech on the January 24 Decisions. The TİSK President's infamous remarks on the new labour act ("Up until now you [the workers] laughed, now it's our turn to laugh")[454] therefore did not amount to a hostile reaction, but on the contrary, to a peace lover's celebration for the defeat of the pro-war classes and groups. By no coincidence, as early as December 1980, the most prominent figure of the industrial bourgeoisie, Vehbi Koç, would correctly envisage the upcoming transition regime as the restoration of a '3 years of labour peace' which could only precipitate an increase in production without eroding the army's prestige.[455] The hint on how to achieve such peace could be traced in Koç's letter to General Evren[456] three weeks after the takeover: 1. The punishment of anarchists and political criminals immediately and without hesitation. 2. The enactment of necessary legislation, especially those to regulate labour-capital relations and do away with labour militancy. 3. The establishment of a strong police organization.

The building blocks of peace began to be founded starting from the first day. All trade union activities including strikes and lockouts were forbidden across the country, but at the same time it was also ensured that no worker could be dismissed from work for any reason other than his or her will, health reasons or the cases not complying with goodwill and morals.[457] In addition, all bank accounts of the trade unions were blocked,[458] but at the same time it was decided to pay the workers an

[454] Y. Koç, Türkiye'de İşçi Sınıfı ve Sendikacılık Hareketi, Kaynak Yayınları, 2003, p.90.

[455] "Vehbi Koç, 3 Yıllık İş Barışı Önerdi", Milliyet, 25.12.1980.

[456] "12 Eylül'ü En Net Anlatan Mektup: "Emrinize Amadeyim"", *Sol*, 12.09.2018.

[457] The Military Communiqué No. 15. Official Gazette**,** 14.09.1980. No: 17105.

[458] The Military Communiqué No. 8. Official Gazette**,** 14.09.1980. No: 17105.

advance payment of 70 percent. In compliance with the insistent discursive appeals to the paternalistic terms as 'devoted, hardworking and patriotic' workers, such pacification tactics were doubtlessly deemed necessary for the workers' commitment to the new administration and the dual subordination to the power of state and capital, both of which are the essential parts of the imposition of peace upon them. But more essentially, these tactics were considered as another pivotal prerequisite of liberal peace that production and proletarianization should maintain constantly, without any disruption or disturbance. In this respect, while economic and social rights of workers and employers were announced to be secured by the state, all workers and public employees were obliged to go back the work as of September 15 and all public and private employers to take any necessary measures to launch their production activities (Decision no.3). This was followed by another Communiqué (no.16) declaring that the implementation of agreements and protocols with the current economy program (that is, the January 24 package) will continue.

Following the sheltering of the neoliberal program under the military rule, Turgut Özal, who served as deputy prime minister in charge of economic affairs in the first two years of the regime, had successfully convinced the public with the help of the *TINA* slogan that the economic crisis could only be overcome by applying structural adjustment policies for a long enough period.[459] Having new and secure sites of accumulation, the business elite did not avoid publicly giving the regime credit for restoring the peace and security environment.[460] The implementation of the neoliberal program under the condition of 'peace and security', however, did not merely signify an assault on the economic rights and conditions of the working classes. But at the same time, it signified the constitution of a new project of political and ideological hegemony established around the discourse of 'free market/open economy', a project of gaining the 'hearts and minds' which essentially required the

[459] G. Yalman, 2009, pp. 310-1.

[460] See for example, the statements of Rahmi Koç (Koç Holding Chairman of the Administrative Committee) and İbrahim Bodur (Chairman of İstanbul Industry Chamber) in Cumhuriyet, 26.01.1982; Halit Narin (TİSK President) in *İşveren*, no:7, April 1984, p. 22. Kenan Evren and Turgut Özal were also among those who acknowledged that without the September 12 regime it could not be possible to get an effective outcome from the programme. See respectively, "12 Eylül olmasaydı '24 Ocak' kararları fiyasko ile biterdi", Milliyet, 07.01.1991, and *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, Cilt 6, İletişim yayınları, 1988, p. 2389.

constitution of new political subjectivities, particularly the creation of not only 'hardworking and productive' but also docile and disorganized workers and subjects. As Neocleous (et al.) put it, "capital and police dream of pacification [is] a dream of workers available for work, present and correct, their papers in order, their minds and bodies docile, and a dream of accumulation thereby secure from resistance, rebellion or revolt."[461]

It is finally worth noting that other than the economy measures, all legislation acts which were once frequently urged by the general staff to substitute the existing ones that were deemed to be inadequate for being legislated in view of 'normal and peaceful times', would now become constitutive of 'peace' in this project. That is to say, the means of class war have become the means of liberal peace in view of the changing contours of war. Now the following section tackles with the core product of this concurrence of war and peace in the new regime: a number of legal and administrative regulations that were utilized to form and administer everyday social relations as well as to create the main conditions and imperatives of the capital's perpetual peace, *Pax Capital*.

3.4. Three Political Strands of the Pacification in 1980s

3.4.1. Martial Law as Police Power: Rebuilding the Order of Accumulation

> I shall classify these various missions under two categories: Destruction and Construction. These two terms are inseparable. To destroy without building up would mean useless labor; to build without first destroying would be a delusion. The meaning of 'destruction' is the co-ordinated activity of army and associated state powers to 'chase and annihilate … deal spectacular blows … and maintain insecurity'. 'Construction', however, means 'building the peace', 'organizing the people', persuading the people 'by the use of education' and, ultimately 'preparing the establishment of a new order. This is the task of pacification.
>
> General Jacques Marie Allard, Head of the French forces in Indochina and Algeria

1980 military coup and the overarching state of martial law in its aftermath represent a particular moment where the *ordering* function of pacification had gained an

[461] M. Neocleous (et al.), 2013, p. 18.

exclusive and unmediated presence. Although the three-year regime brought about by the takeover was an exceptional one, what was dreamed about by this regime was the continuation of war within a civil, normal character with regards to its political rationality. As underlined more than once already, only a few weeks before the coup General Evren declared that the current legislation did not allow the state forces to return back to the 'normal' order, therefore new regulations were needed in this regard. In that, alongside all repressive practices, what the armed forces mainly endeavoured as they took over the power was to issue these regulations which would accommodate to the war in question. Concomitantly, General Evren described this three-year period as 'building an order that would not need any further military interventions'. If any form of military intervention, in fact, depicts the unmediated involvement of the state's war powers whatever the form that the war particularly takes, what all of this means is that the neoliberal formation in Turkey has envisaged the war powers being properly situated at the heart of the everyday social relations within the logic of low-intensity warfare so as not to be over-dependent on regular military engagements or any sheer war means.

Under the three-year military dictatorship, the primary legal-administrative instrument of this situation was martial law. Martial law in this light could be considered as an effective technique of 'political administration' which undertook the main functions of the mediation between the state and civil society attune to the expansive process of the neoliberal restructuring. Yet, in a broader conception that takes on the police power as the extensive collaboration of state powers and agencies of policing through which social order, class relations and subjects are constituted, the neoliberal period starting with the military regime appears rather as a police project– a police project engaging on a wide range of *peacekeeping* acts which do not aim simply to 'defeat the enemy and take away', but instead to 'prevent, establish, construct, restore and maintain order and build a civil administration'.[462] Such multi-functional process of construction is concerned with 'good order' in its broadest sense, and thus in the sense which perfectly fits with the historical conception of police that deals with policing and administering every single minutia

[462] M. Dean, 2006, p. 195.

of capitalist social life,[463] going beyond the hegemonic liberal conception of [the] police which is assumed to deal solely with crime and law enforcement.

Reconsidering the police functions of September 12 in this broader and positive context of good order, one might find out the implicit meaning of the well-known statements of the junta that "The Operation September 12 does not indicate the precise involvement of the TAF in politics",[464] and the only remaining task was "returning back to their barracks as soon as the democratic order is established".[465] In that, the particular police function assigned to the military forces in the eve of the coup to concern with internal disorder in cooperation with the provincial administration had been advanced to an augmented level in the following three years where the military assumed all state power and regulated the whole social order on behalf of the state – where one can also point out the initiation of the comprehensive project of pacification in the making of neoliberal Turkey.[466] While the changing role of the military forces in pacification seems compatible with the historical shifts in the functionality of martial law as a technique of government,[467] this change is also related to the extensive consideration of the category of war. As tried to be shown in the previous section, a historical moment of internal disorder, the irrevocable crises

[463] M. Neocleous, 2000.

[464] K. Evren, 1982, p. 24. According to Evren, keeping away from politics was one of the distinctive qualities of the Turkish military. Central to the historical achievements of the military and its prestige in the eyes of people was its will to returning to its barracks quickly after completing its peculiar mission ('protecting the country from its internal enemies') and holding back from being politicized. K. Evren, *Kenan Evren'in Anıları* (4), 1991, Milliyet Yayınları, p. 247, and also see his speech to cadets at the War Academy on 30 September, 1980; the General Secretariat of the National Security Council, 1982, pp. 301-2. For Evren, the takeover had successfully constrained the army from entering into politics. Baskın Oran, "Kenan Evren" in *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi 11*, İletişim, 1995, p. 199. Also see M. Heper & A. Güney, The Military and Democracy in the Third Turkish Republic, *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol 22, Issue 4, 1996, pp. 624-6. The TAF's denial of the politicized character of September 12 could be regarded as a symbolic indication of the key position of the 'politics of depoliticization' within the pacification in post-1980s' Turkey.

[465] K. Evren, 1982, p. 25.

[466] Main difference between the military involvement before and after September 12 is that before the martial law of September 12 even for the cases the military involved in, there was only one, unique, inseparable police action. That means, unlike martial law, the administrative powers and responsibility of the governors were not transferred to the military. The duty and action preserved its civilian character. As of September 12 pacification process had proceeded under the exclusive control of the military forces.

[467] M. Neocleous, "Whatever happened to martial law? Detainees and the logic of emergency", *Radical Philosophy*, 143, 2007.

of accumulation and bourgeoisie hegemony had been coded in relation to the questions of warfare and enemy in the mind of the state.

It is also pertinent to note that one of the leading points often underlined by the junta was that the exercise of martial law was in fact towards a very particular, direct and concrete mission, and thus they would keep it in the most temporary and shortest period as possible. What was chiefly marked by this mission was central to the war in question: the legal-institutional foundation required for a depoliticized social order in which class movement and social dissent would gradually vanish. This could be realized only within the conditions of martial law. In this respect, in his first press conference following the takeover General Evren reported that they would accede to civil administration right after completing the legal regulations in a reasonable time.[468] The following statement in the same conference revealed the intention of the NSC in the most honest expression:

> The National Security Council is determined to remove all obstacles that did not allow the democratic order and regime to function properly so far, so as not to leave any need for further interventions. Therefore, the provisions within the existing legislation such as the Constitution, the Electoral Law, the Law on Political Parties which have drifted us into this situation will be changed. In addition, necessary laws will be enacted to strengthen the judicial organs which would effectively prevent anarchy and terrorism, and the defective parts of the Penal Code will be rehabilitated. Anarchy will be stopped from sprinkling in schools, universities, or unions in the name of freedom or independence.

Bearing all these in mind, we could rethink martial law in its internal relation with the idea of war and police which might lead us to sum up the underlying meaning of the discussion hereinafter: Martial Law of September 12 is the manifestation of an open and overt use of force to render the existing relations of force more invisible and unspoken, which would afterwards maintain itself under a certain degree of institutional separations peculiar to liberal capitalism. As I will try to show more in length later, giving way to more civil and liberal mechanisms of political administration martial law successfully led the conditions of class war and capital accumulation to be inscribed in a more secure socio-political setting. This has been achieved mostly thanks to the severe narrowing of the political sphere, mobilization

[468] Press Meeting on 16 September 1980.

of the politics of depoliticization, politics of (national) security, emergency powers – and ultimately applying to all of these, empowering of the police powers in every sense. While this process constitutes normally an unspoken systematic warfare that is occasionally called social peace, labour peace, civil peace, etc., it also indicates expanding the ground of pacification to all contours of civil society in tune with the neoliberal order. In the words of Vehbi Koç of the Koç Company whose profit margins have firmly increased shortly after the establishment of the new regime[469] such expansion in the scope of pacification is nothing more than the *process of the reconstruction of state power* as well as the restoration of peace.[470]

In line with the colonial wisdom of pacification, the law has been the primary means of the concomitant tasks of destroying and building in the setting of Turkey's post-1980 orientation. The junta was highly concerned about seeing all sorts of social development, whether it is official or civilian, within the scope of war and regulation together, as well as utilizing the legal means to lead the state power in this direction. In this regard, 669 laws and 90 statutory decrees in total had been issued from the date that the junta took over power up to the opening of the new parliament in 1983.[471] The number of laws annulled by the NSC is also notable.[472] This might give an idea about the central role played by the law in the radical construction of the new order. The regulations in questions incorporated fundamental subjects of legislation ranging from economy, labour regime, security, emergency, public order, intelligence, criminal/penal procedure, human rights, civil associations, judiciary, martial law, military affairs and military personnel regime, broadcasting, and education, and so forth. The new regime, besides the hundreds of thousands people

[469] Mustafa Sönmez, *Kırk Haramiler-Türkiye'de Holdingler*, Gözlem Yayıncılık, İstanbul 1987, s. 208.

[470] Vehbi Koç, "1939 - 1982 Son Kırk Yılın Değerlendirmesi". http://www.vehbikoc.com.tr/tr-tr/vehbi-koc-diyorki/m2.html

[471] Mehmet Semih Gemalmaz, "12 Eylül Rejimi", *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi 14*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 1996, p. 986.

[472] According to İnan and Ozansoy, 79 laws, 33 of which were directly related to the PEEs, were annulled by the NSC rule. Just to compare, the number of laws annulled under the military regime following the previous coup d'etat in 1960 was only 7. "Yasama Faaliyeti Açısından 12 Eylül", *Yapıt Dergisi*, 14, 1986, p. 11. On the other hand, basic laws amended or enacted by the NSC of 1980 were more than four times those by the National Unity Committee of 1960. Ibid, 1986, p.16.

prosecuted and thousands tortured, was the moment of a great deal of reconstruction through the use of legal power.

The powers of the NSC showed that there was no single issue left unseized by the state power on the grounds of security. Other than providing security of life and property, and undertaking the long-yearned structural transformation required securing the new contours of capital accumulation, the military mandate was also vigilantly concerned with regulating every minutiae of daily social life upon which class and dominance relations could be reproduced. Indeed, not only violence and terror but any state of disorder in streets was an excuse for the martial commanders to penetrate into civil society. Statutory powers of martial law governorates related to urban life were written down in an incredibly detailed and broad compass: Keeping provinces and districts clean and tidy, erasing graffiti and symbols on walls, prohibition of giving children names contrary to national manners and customs, changing the names of parks, streets, squares contrary to national unity, prohibition of horse carts on main streets, fining pedestrians not using crosswalks, monitoring the prices of goods as well as weighing and any kind of measuring instruments in bazaars, determining the colour of buckets in front of shops, making sure cab drivers have their beards shaved and bagel sellers wear gloves, making sure all houses on the highway are painted white and they do not look ugly, untidy and primitive, overseeing weddings to arrest those causing trouble and uproar, etc.[473] A major part of the 'elimination of terror and anarchy' thus by no means had a bearing on terror and anarchy. Rather, it was intensely concerned with regulation, constitution and policing in the name of 'good order', performing a police project as 'good ordering of society' which was to operate, for sure, on the basis of law.

There were three main judicial acts for the junta to regulate its own legal powers; the *Bylaw on the Legislative Tasks of the National Security Council* (NSC), the *Law on the NSC* (#2356), and the *Law on the Constitutional Order* (#2324). It was through these acts that the junta had organized the legal structure of the state administration and vested all legislative and executive powers in the NSC, which embodied all administrative bodies of the previous parliament. The regulations granted that the

[473] M. A. Birand (et al.), 1999, pp. 212-3.

1961 Constitution was to remain in force until the enactment of a new constitution (article 1 of the Law # 2324), but the prerogative powers assigned to the NSC were so much that the laws, decrees and communiques issued by the Council which did not conform to the existing constitution were considered to be legislative amendments.

It might be apt to note that a new cabinet adjacent to the NSC was formed immediately after September 12, which was to be followed by the formation of the Consultative Assembly (*Danışma Meclisi*) in 1981. However, from the appointment of the members of these organs to the NSC's executive and legislative tutelage over them as the final authority, all relevant legal acts set in effect were to make sure that the actual political power would be exclusively enjoyed by the NSC. It is even possible to put that the NSC could also have control over the judiciary as it was able to freely set up or change the members of martial law courts. Moreover, the judiciary was not authorized to withdraw or suspend the execution of the provisions ordered in the decrees, communiques and cabinet decisions that would be declared after September 12 (article 4 of the Law #2324). All of these mean that there remained no external will, power or norm that would limit the upper echelon of the junta.

The NSC was composed of the 5 generals who were known as the leaders of the coup d'etat. The force commanders and the General Commander of the Gendarmerie were present along with the Chief of the General Staff. Various assignments were swiftly made by the Council among the generals and admirals to the martial law governorates in the provinces. Eventually, almost all general and admiral staff of the military happened to be assigned duty and responsibility for the martial law nationwide.[474] Thus, the all-encompassing scope of martial law began to be enforced in everyday life by the military governors. Other than the legislation that were to regulate the general span of authority of the NSC, the legal act which helped the state power to have an ingenious control over civil society was the Law on Martial Law (#1402). Originally ratified following the military memorandum in 1971, this law was to regulate the expansive duties and powers of the military vis-à-vis civil society during martial law. After September 12 there have been numerous amendments to

[474] M. S. Gemalmaz, 1996, p. 977.

the law. Undoubtedly, all amendments were towards relieving the junta's concerns over the so-called insufficiency of the 1961 Constitution and the previous legislation on the military's span of control, by making sure that the state's war powers (i.e. martial/prerogative powers) are tightened further within the hands of the military.

The NSC did not spend too much time making a number of amendments in martial powers. By one of the amendments issued on September 21, military governors were authorized to dismiss the employees in central and local governments whose employment are considered 'inconvenient for public order'.[475] It is through this article that numerous legal actions were taken on 18.525 public employees in only one year, including imprisonment of civil servants, workers, teachers, judges, and provincial and municipal executives.[476] This amendment would be soon followed by another one which prescribed the discharge of all municipal administrations in office. Appointments to replace the discharged administrations would be made by the Ministry of Internal Affairs or governors upon request of the military governor of the respective province.[477] The dismissed mayors for whom a decision of return to duty was made would have their association with the political parties terminated during their term of office.[478] Accordingly, the NSC wanted to make sure that they had full control over the provincial administration by replacing 27 governors out of 67 provinces with those of military origin.[479] By another amendment, union activities such as declaration of political will and referendum were prohibited along with strikes, lockouts, boycotts, slowdowns and any acts deemed to restrict 'work freedom'.[480] Military governors might also constantly stop, restrict or make subject to permission any kinds of meeting and demonstrations in indoor and outdoor places. Control over public space had been expanded even to catering and entertainment

[475] "1402 Sayılı Sıkıyönetim Kanununun Bazı Hükümlerinin Değiştirilmesine ve Bazı Hükümler Eklenmesine Dair Kanun", Official Gazette, 21.09.1980, No: 17112, p. 1.

[476] Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi, 1988, p. 2409. The number of the dismissed public employees amounted to 30.000 in the NSC's term of office, M. A. Birand (et al.), 1999, p. 226.

[477] "3/4/1930 Tarih ve 1580 Sayılı Belediye Kanununa Ek Kanun," Official Gazette, 29.09.1980, No: 17120, p. 1.

[478] Idem, p.2.

[479] M. S. Gemalmaz, 1996, p. 976.

[480] Official Gazette**,** 21.09.1980, No: 17112, p. 1.

venues.[481] Control over education as another crucial front for the junta had been expanded to include the basic right to education. Military governors were authorized not only to suspend education at any time in primary, secondary, and higher education subject to the province they were responsible for, but even to dismiss the students who were considered 'objectionable'.[482]

Another set of amendments were relating to the legal accountability and police powers of military governors. The limits to the powers of security forces to use firearms, which was often complained about by martial commanders in the turmoil of pre-September 12, were almost removed with the new amendments, thereby the scope of the monopoly of exerting physical force had been markedly widened. Now, the right to life was not immune from suspension by martial law, as the security forces had been authorized to shoot at the target without hesitation even in cases where there is no armed response but only disobedience to summons. Arbitrary use of firearms was also encouraged with the warrant in the same regulation that the investigation process of the personnel using firearms would be without arrest. Moreover, the same amendment also regulated the judicial powers of military governors. Henceforth, the prosecutors and courts could not reject or take the decision of non-jurisdiction for criminal cases files submitted by military governors.[483] Even if the alleged crime was committed outside the borders of the district where the martial court was located, then the martial court prosecutor might request a preliminary investigation from the prosecutors of the location where the alleged crime was committed. In this case, the preliminary investigation was to be carried out 'primarily and urgently'. While fines and imprisonment were being increased for acts violating martial law within the same regulation, it was also concluded that the decisions of arrest shall be made only by one of the members of the military judge class of the court. Moreover, criminal sentences restricting freedom up to 3 years were excluded from appeal. All in all, military governors had the final say and become a power that could by no means be challenged even in the field of judiciary.

[481] Idem.

[482] Official Gazette**,** 21.09.1980, No: 17112, p. 1.

[483] Idem, p. 3.

Political parties and civil associations whose activities were banned and whose leaders were seized as the first concrete step of September 12 (Communiqué No.7) were also among the primary subjects of intervention in subsequent martial law amendments. In that, the powers of the military courts were expanded in a way to include not only the political party executives but also the directors and employees of all associations and associations deemed to be related to the parties.[484] With two other laws issued on the following days, the unions and federations along with political parties and associations were brought under the command of trustees who were going to operate under the direction of the respective military governor.[485] Moreover, the law authorized military governors to stop the activities of any association or foundation, as well as to permit new establishments.[486] The task of depoliticization proceeded with the security bureaucracy. By another law in 1981, members of the police force, including the bazaar and the night guards, were banned from establishing an association, or being a member of an association other than sports organizations.[487] Private security personnel would later be added to this ban, along with the ban on participation to demonstrations and marches.[488] While martial law was directly targeting the unions and organizations regarded by the junta as the main pillars of the politicization of civil society, the general secretary of Türk-İş, which was then the only massive non-closed union, was going to be appointed as the Minister of Social Security of the new cabinet.[489] In so doing, even if a large part of the workers could not be pacified as volunteer supporters, the junta at least planned to keep them away from a direct opposition to the new regime.

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[484] "1402 Sayılı Sıkıyönetim Kanununda Değişiklik Yapılması Hakkında Kanun", Official Gazette, 10.10.1980, No: 17131, p. 1.

[485] "Faaliyetleri Durdurulan Sendika, Federasyon ve Konfederasyonlara Kayyım Tayini Hakkında Kanun," Resmi Gazete, 11.10.1980, No: 17132, p. 3. "Faaliyetleri Durdurulan Siyasi Parti, Dernek, Federasyon ve Konfederasyonlara Kayyım Tayini Hakkında Kanun," Official Gazette, 28.10.1980, No: 17145, p. 2.

[486] "13/5/1971 Gün ve 1402 Sayılı Sıkıyönetim Kanununda Değişiklik Yapılması Hakkında Kanun," Official Gazette, 16.03.1982, No: 17635, p. 1.

[487] "3201 Sayılı Emniyet Teşkilat Kanununun Bazı Maddelerinde Değişiklik Yapılması ve Bu Kanuna Bir Geçici Madde Eklenmesi Hakkında Kanun," Resmi Gazete, 3.04.1981, No: 17299, p. 6.

[488] "Bazı Kurum ve Kuruluşların Korunması ve Güvenliklerinin Sağlanması Hakkında Kanun," Resmi Gazete**,** 24.07.1981, No: 17410, p. 5.

[489] M. S. Gemalmaz, 1996, p. 977.

Martial powers had been further fortified by individual amendments made in the forthcoming days. The level of the legal immunity of military governors was consolidated on November 1980. Military governors who were previously used to be accountable to Prime Minister for their powers and responsibilities had now become accountable to the Chief of the General Staff. Accordingly, the armed forces were going to be immune from the duty area of the State Supervisory Council which would be established to supervise all official and civil institutions and organizations. By another amendment, the trials of the 'criminal offenses that would disrupt the political, financial, economic, martial or administrative security of the state' had been included within the scope of martial courts. The establishment of new newspapers, magazines and media agencies would be subject to permission by the military administration. By an amendment to the Turkish Citizenship Law, the citizens abroad who were alleged to 'act against the internal, external, economic or financial security of the state' could be deprived of citizenship. The regulation led nearly 14.000 Turkish citizens deprived of citizenship, and 30.000 applying for asylum.[490] Another amendment was towards the state control over administration. In addition to the existing legislation (The Act #657) on the loyalty of civil servants to the Constitution and laws, an 'Oath Letter' was entailed upon civil servants which imposed a declaration to 'remain faithful to Turkish nationalism, to embrace and protect the national, moral, human, spiritual and cultural values of the Turkish nation'. The NSC's vision of identifying 'impartiality' with depoliticization resulted in a further ban on civil servants being member to civil associations. Moreover, the paragraph of the article relating to disciplinary measures had been greatly expanded with respect to political acts and affiliations of civil servants.

3.4.1.1. Psychological Warfare

In effect, the depoliticized grasp of impartiality attached to civil administration was part of a larger task of moral regulation. A formal announcement sent to all public institutions by the Defense Secretariat of the Ministry of National Education provided enough information about the moral component of the pacification efforts made to build the socio-political foundation of the September 12 regime. The

[490] M. A. Birand (et al.), 1999, p. 228.

concept of impartiality was defined in the announcement on the basis of the 'unity of the nation', highlighting the administration's duty to empower people's loyalty to the state by providing equal and impartial service where each individual was to be accepted 'as a Turk regardless of all differences'. Public officials shall be loyal to the national unity without appealing to any forms of ethnic, denominational or 'class divisiveness'.[491] The announcement maintained with a portrayal of what ideal type of people/citizens the public officials were expected to be in terms of morality. A set of moral patterns of 'proper' living and acting was provided for this, which included a long list, e.g. 'not to be friends with lazy people, to keep the soul, body, clothes clean, not to talk to strangers'.

The task to define how public officials should be and behave was closely related not only to the political administrative apparatus of the state, but also in a much larger extent, to the ways in which the new social body of citizens should be moulded. In this regard, the announcement ended the moral guideline with a section about psychological warfare and defense which was to mobilize the moral and political preparedness in the face of the endless war. It is fair to put that psychological warfare is central to pacification; as noted by Jacques Ellul, it is 'the daily bread of peace policy'.[492] 'Psychological operations or efforts to win the hearts and minds of the dissident people' was, for instance, among the main civic action themes of the pacification program in Vietnam.[493] The target of the psychological warfare of September 12 displayed a similarity to the logic in Vietnam. Given the ideological circuit between internal and external security that has been discussed before, from the viewpoint of the junta the enemy forces against which the techniques of psychological war were called to be deployed would be less to do with foreign nations than with the domestic threats to security.

The announcement underscored the vitality of preserving the national morale pointing out that no matter how successful a nation is in economic and military

[491] K. İnal, 2004, p. 125-6.

[492] J. Ellul, *Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes*, Vintage Books, 1964, p. 134.

[493] J. Ewell, *Vietnam Studies -Sharpening the combat edge: The use of analysis to reinforce military judgment*, Pickle Partners Publishing, 2014, p. 164.

terms, it would ultimately collapse if it is not morally sound, does not have high spirituality and the will to live in a state of national unity and solidarity. The urgent need for psychological warfare then followed, which would be carried out by 'destroying the morality of the enemy, weakening its spirituality and unity'. It was put in the announcement that with the practice of psychological war, the enemy would inevitably fail to use its material strength by losing its moral strength and eventually be defeated 'without the need for guns and bombs'[494] – the ultimate dream of the pacification generals of September 12.

3.4.1.2. Depoliticized Education

It was by no coincidence that such announcement was delivered by the Defense Secretariat of National Education. The announcement intended to map out the ideological framework that would back up the liberal peace which was designed to underpin the conditions of the new political-economic regime. After all, the task of pacification should keep in sight, Evren put forth, that 'the aims and methods of the enemy required nothing but the reinforcement of special legal measures, administrative regulations, the development of social conditions which would be meaningful only alongside the re-establishment of national education and business life.'[495] That was the reason why the junta's concern over education was not only limited to a destructive vision, and so it was not contented solely with the military governors' power over the basic right to education: Key both to pacification and liberal peace is not only the control over the existing political acts and subjectivities, but more essentially, the construction of new political forms of power, acts and subjectivities.

There was no doubt that training of the youth would play an essential role in the extensive processes of moral, cultural and ideological setting of the new regime. It was underlined in the Military Government's programme that 'reconstruction of national education, which constitutes the basis of the national unity, should be seen as the most important need and main target of the country'.[496] Youth, as the

[494] K. İnal, 2004, p. 127.

[495] Press Statement on 12.09.1980.

[496] "Ulusu Government Programme", *Milli Güvenlik Konseyi Tutanak Dergisi* Cilt 1 Birleşim 4, 1980, p. 5959.

fundamental constituent of the reproduction of the organic social body, should be protected by the state from outside powers that would politicize them in any possible way that would harm social cohesion. This being so, as the Minister of National Education pointed out, there were 'crucial duties accrued to Turkish teachers and intellectuals who make up a large part of them in order to achieve the aims and goals of September 12'.[497] This paternalist function underscoring the moral and ideological aspects of the war in question was apparent in various statements of General Evren at the time:

> Measures will be taken to prevent our children, who are the assurance of our future, from catching up with foreign ideologies instead of Ataturk's principles and eventually becoming anarchists. For this purpose, we will not let our teachers to be divided into different associations. The aim of the student at all levels should be remoulded with the principles and nationalism of Atatürk, and to gain the knowledge and skill towards production.[498]
>
> We will certainly protect our young generation from all kinds of bad habits without exception. We will save them from alcoholism, drugs, idleness, sexual lust, gambling, ignorance, and all impudent inclinations. We will absolutely protect our youth at all costs from all of these disasters which surround us and subtly penetrate into our home.
>
> Turkish youth will not idle away their spare time. They will spend their spare time to gain bodily and mental vigour and health. (...) We won't get our Turkish sons stolen by foreign forces, pervert ideologies, enemies of the fatherland and the nation. It will be only us to educate and protect them. We will integrate them into this society as worthy of their immaculate families and our noble nation in every aspect. For the sake of this sacred purpose, we will enter into close cooperation with parents. We will hold and dismantle the hands of all the traitors who have handed over the Turkish youth. We will not tolerate negligence in any of these matters. [499]

In the light of such concerns, the government programme of the military administration had been based entirely on a depoliticized and protective ground against what was deemed to be foreign ideologies. It was argued in the programme that 'so-called freedoms with obscure borders, the claim to impartiality and autonomy which could even be directed against the state, engaging into politics under the guise of scientificity did not conform to the very fabric of Turkey, as well as left the state defenceless in the face of enemies'. According to the junta the

[497] Tebliğler Dergisi, 1986, quoted in K. İnal, 2004, p. 140.

[498] Press Statement, 12.09.1980.

[499] Public Speech in Eskişehir, 04.10.1982.

existing education system had promoted communist propaganda allowing teachers to 'lecture about ominous topics such as the exploitation by employers, the wealth of capitalists, the poverty of workers, which were subtly injected into the minds of even the primary school kids'.[500]

Military administration has designed the formal education system in a way to meet the moral and ideological gap left by the old system vastly by a conservative ideology it called Ataturk Nationalism. Rather than its secular and Western-oriented conventional conception, this peculiar form of Kemalism has been relied on the Turkish-Islamic synthesis formulated by the right-wing intelligentsia association *Aydınlar Ocağı.* Blending the communitarian-hierarchical Islamism with Turkish nationalism and the idea of the sanctity/survival of state, this new ideology was soon incorporated as the basis of the new political regime, and needless to say, of national education. As such, "Turkish youth, the warrant of the country's future, will not be allowed to grow up with foreign ideologies and eventually be anarchists".[501] Accordingly, the objective of national education was determined in the government programme of the military administration as to 'raise citizens who adhere to the principles of Atatürk, who adopt the national, moral, humanitarian, spiritual and cultural values of the Turkish nation, who are loyal and committed to their family and nation, who are aware of their duties and responsibilities towards the state of Turkey'.[502] The programme successfully set forth the link between the need for labor force development for the development of the country and the need to keep teachers, school administrations and educational associations far from politics. In accordance with the government programme, the military administration have made amendments to the Basic Law on National Education (#1739) which were to uniform all degrees of education, including higher education, around the objective of raising citizens loyal to Ataturk nationalism (article #10) and keeping out the 'political and ideological infusions' contrary to this ideology (article #11).

The junta's projections of national education were also well reflected in the Constitution established by the military administration. The Constitution of 1982,

[500] K. Evren, 1990, p. 421.

[501] Press Statement, 12.09.1980.

[502] "Ulusu Government Programme", 1980, p. 5960.

which in all its aspects sublimates the so-called sanctity of the state under the guise of Ataturk Nationalism, has granted the state with the power to regulate education in a quite detailed context. The state, according to the Constitution, "shall take measures to ensure the education and development of the youth in the light of positive science, in line with the principles and reforms of Atatürk, and in opposition to ideas aiming at the destruction of the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation" (article #58). Thereby the so-called 'foreign ideologies' have been easily linked with the acts affiliated with the 'destruction of the state and nation'. On the other hand, the Constitution has made the course 'culture of religion and moral knowledge' compulsory for primary and secondary education (article #24) and accordingly has authorized the state to "protect youth from addiction to alcohol and drugs, crime, gambling, and similar vices, and ignorance" (article 58). It also reminded its people that the freedom of education "does not relieve the individual from loyalty to the Constitution" (article #42). The curricula of the primary and secondary education have been reformed in line with the ideological framework set by the Constitution.

Treating education as a front of 'war as construction' with utmost importance would be most apparent in the formation of higher education. Higher education was aimed to be designed as the central part of the uniform, repressive and nationalist structure imposed on education. In line with General Evren's description of the scientific and administrative autonomy of universities in the old regime as 'not autonomy but instead standing against the state'[503], a supervisory board subject to the executive branch, called The Council of Higher Education (*YÖK*), has been founded in 1981 and become the only institution responsible for governing the entire higher education. Thanks to the mediation of the *YÖK* which entails an extremely hierarchical structure with each subordinate post is under the control of its superior in chain of command, higher education system has been practically transformed into a government office. Academic work has been indirectly subject to the control and intervention by the executive branch due to the chain of command respectively between academics (that have been deprived of the right to elect the university administration), deans, rectors, and the *YÖK*.

[503] B. Oran, 1995, p. 201; M. A. Birand (et al.), 1999, p. 221.

The subordination of higher education has been empowered by the Law on Higher Education (#2547) as well. The law defines the aims and goals of higher education spotlessly in tune with the ideological setting of the new regime: 'to educate students so that they will be loyal to Ataturk nationalism', 'they will adopt the national, moral, human, spiritual and cultural values of the Turkish Nation and conscious of the privilege of being a Turk', 'they will put the common good above their own personal interests and have full devotion to family, country and nation', 'they will be fully conscious of their duties and responsibilities towards their country and will act accordingly' (article #4). All these considered, by demonising critical, progressive and radical views education has been situated as a functional tool for the formation of silent, resigned, docile citizen-subject of the new regime.

3.4.1.3. Making of the Docile Workforce

It has been stated before that the military administration's will to proceed with the existing stabilization programme of January 24 was officially declared by a Military Communiqué (no. 16). The implementation of the programme under martial law was the precondition of the transition to the neoliberal accumulation model in tandem with the so-called Washington Consensus – a phrase that would be put in use a decade later. The main pillars of the model tended to devise the role of the state as 'removing obstacles to the way in which markets function'[504] primarily through policies of deregulation, reduction of state intervention in free market, privatization, flexibility/deunionization. As discussed in the previous section *Peace and Order*, the historical peculiarity of the bourgeois order's alignment with security was obtrusive more than ever on the eve of the military takeover: It was apparently not possible to delineate between what is deemed to be public security/order, and the security of capital accumulation in the views of the political and military elite. This was well reflected in the government programme as well. Deterioration of peace and public security was identified in the programme as one of the obstacles to the functioning of market economy, and new legislations to be made on associations, assemblies and demonstrations were particularly highlighted in this respect.[505]

[504] Andrew Gamble, "Two Faces of Neo-Liberalism" in *The Politics of Economic Adjustment: International Constraints, Distributive Conflicts, and the State*, Richard Robinson (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press.

[505] "Ulusu Government Programme", 1980, p. 5952.

On the other hand, it is known that right after the coup d'état Özal, the architect of the January 24 Decisions, had submitted a report to the NSC concerning the required measures to be taken immediately. Aside from the acute need to restore security and order, one of the issues he warned about was that the economic orientation of the new regime would be closely monitored by international financial institutions so it would be apposite to give them a pledge without delay.[506] This advice of Özal seemed to be taken into account by the junta in Evren's first press meeting after the takeover, the day that all trade union activities including strikes and lockouts had been forbidden across the country. It was important that in his speech Evren not only confirmed the actuality of the current economic ('stability and structural adjustment') programme but eagerly relieved the international capital circles by declaring his administration's steady commitment to the imperial powers of the Western alliance, primarily NATO and the US, as well as the European Economic Community, European Council and 'other organizations composed of countries under liberal democracy'.[507] Aside from the takeover itself, such commitment plus the need to show it pointedly was a further indication overriding the argument for the autonomy of the military and the military regime. Hence, far from entailing a Bonapartist character,[508] the military regime had committed itself to the requirements of the neoliberal programme in question.

The first step showing this decisive commitment of the NSC was the appointment of Özal as the Deputy Prime Minister in charge of economic affairs. As a technocratic figure symbolically identified with international capital, Özal had thus officially become the economic chief of the new regime. He was to head the Turkish delegation to meet with IMF and WB officials on September 27, 1980.[509] The purpose of the trip was to convey the message of maintaining relations without interruption and to explain the main intentions behind September 12. Accordingly, international financial institutions would be asked to make significant resource

[506] M. S. Gemalmaz, 1996, p. 975. To this end, convincing both the external financial circles as well as the domestic bourgeoisie had become the top priority of the junta; G. Yalman, 2009, p. 298.

[507] Press release on 16 September 1980.

[508] G. Yalman, 2009, pp. 299-300.

[509] Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi, 1988, p. 2389.

transfers based in return for the promise that the demanded economic program would be implemented without barriers. In this regard, while debts to the US and OECD banks were relieved, external loan agreements were made in substantial amounts.[510] Dubbed Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs), around a billion dollar per year, among others, had been steadily provided by the WB,[511] which would make the latter quite instrumental in the implementation of trade policy changes and the diminishing significance of public investments.[512] The relatively favourable borrowing conditions were, however, further indicative of the policy-dependent character of the adjustment process under the financial pressure of the conditionalities required by the Western creditors.

This being the case, the policy measures both towards macroeconomic stabilization and adjustment under and after the military rule would be initiated in a way to integrate into the perspective of international financial capital circles. As a short term goal to tackle the high rate of inflation, a large number of deflationist measures and decisions had been enacted within a year, with the legal comfort of quick decision making under martial law. Presented to the public as tough monetary policy[513] the set of regulations included conventional steps of reducing money supply, reducing public spending and freezing wages and salaries, which would be accompanied by the removal of controls on prices, interest rates and exchange rates. In addition to such measures for reducing domestic demand,[514] further regulations had been put in effect to encourage foreign currency-generating economic activities. Major changes in tax legislation took place, which introduced preferential tax breaks, reductions and

[510] Ibid, 1988, p. 2390. K. Boratav, 2005, p. 84

[511] Eric Toussaint, "The World Bank's support of the dictatorship in Turkey (1980-1983)". www.cadtm.org/spip.php?page=imprimer&id_article=10752

[512] G. Yalman, 2009, pp. 259-60. Yalman adds that none of the SALs were of 'industrial restructuring' , nor did the WB accept industrial policy as a tool of structural adjustment. Contradictory enough with the basic rhetoric of the export-oriented model, this would also give an idea about the then-ensuing shift in the Turkish policymakers' orientation away from 'industrialization' to 'creditworthiness in the international financial circles'; 2009, pp. 261-2. The latter orientation would be an overwhelming question for the country's both economic and political stability in the 1990s.

[513] The General Secretariat of the National Security Council, 1982, p.264.

[514] It was reported at the end of the first year of the military administration that significant decrease in demand for consumer goods and in capital investment had been experienced, in which high interest rates were considered to play a great role. Ibid.

refunds for such initiatives in corporate sector, as well as increase in tax revenues from self-employed farmers, small entrepreneurs and professionals.[515] Concomitantly, other than the competitive edge being pursued the basis of currency depreciation,[516] a broad array of incentives and subsidies were, on the other hand, introduced particularly for industrial and construction firms which intended to turn their way towards exportation based on cheap labour force. The target of supporting the export-oriented growth by high foreign currency, cheap credit, tax refunds and falling labour costs had thus been adopted as a central pathway for the outward-oriented strategy.[517]

Unsurprisingly, this sort of export strategy had in turn yielded increased exploitation on the side of the working classes. Alongside the assault on the political rights of workers, official powers related to collective bargaining had been transferred to a corporatist body called the High Council of Arbitrators (*Yüksek Hakem Heyeti*) in December 1980, as another novel way to suppress wages and police the wage struggle. The Council, granted with the power to determine wages and salaries, was composed of representatives from the judiciary, military government, and organized capital together with Türk-iş, the apologist union of the new regime, as the only actor to represent workers. The stagnation of real wages in the face of rising inflation was achieved by the new accumulation model in a short time. Suffice it to say, in the first year following September 12 real wages of workers had fallen back to the rates in 1963, while those of civil servants to the rates in 1976.[518] Farmers also lost ground. In the wake of the commercial liberalization in agriculture, agricultural support prices had been depressed, cooperatives had been dismantled, credits to small and middle farmers had been curtailed, while incentives had been installed to favour export-oriented agribusiness and to attract foreign capital and technology.[519] The first

[515] Altan Yalpat, "Turkey's Economy Under the Generals", *MERIP reports*, March/April 1984.

[516] G. Yalman, 2009, p. 263.

[517] K. Boratav, 2012, pp.149-52.

[518] Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi, 1988, p. 2396. High wages was one of the popular themes General Evren directly targeted in his public speeches. He was occasionally complaining about the 'social injustice' of high wages of the workers in service sector (e.g. Baskın Oran, *Kenan Evren'in Yazılmamış Anıları*, Bilgi Yayınevi, 1989, p. 60), which might be read as an implicit way to provocatively divide and set at odds the working classes.

[519] A. Yalpat, 1984, p. 19. These liberalization policies resulted in a 59% decrease (from 3,4% to 1,4) in the annual growth rate of the agricultural sector in 1980-1990 compared to the previous decade.

couple of years of the new economic orientation were characterized by a shortage of buyers, whilst the 1978-79 period was characterized by shortage of goods. Taken together, vast economic and political losses in different labour market sectors were helpful not only for reducing demand but also for securing labour discipline, by provoking the insecurity –in the words of Marx and Engels, the 'everlasting uncertainty and agitation'– of the bourgeois order.

The use of martial law to discipline labour market was to be sure a key legal and political means to restructure the balance of forces exclusively in conjunction with the maximization of exploitation and surplus value. As a matter of fact, a considerable part of the hundreds of regulations under martial law was pertaining to labour regime as well as economy.[520] The fact that a series of notable anti-labour regulations had been successfully put in effect in relatively short time was also indicative of the sheer violence of the pacification efforts in question: While the authoritarian powers granted to the military administration were used to drastically reduce real wages, curtail the rights to unionize and strike, extend the work week and work year,[521] retract rights related to severance, seniority and social insurance,[522] there was conceivably no sign of confrontation from the workers' side. Labour movement, which once struck fear into the political and military elite about the prospect of a nationwide uprising both on the eve and in the course of the takeover, had been tamed and pacified under martial law unexpectedly soon. Overt violence under the martial law achieved to ruin the morale and confidence of the class movement, which in turn paved the way for more systematic violence. The DİSK Confederation, as the radical representative of the union movement and one of the main political actors of pre-September 12, had been entirely dismantled. As observed

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Roger Owen & Şevket Pamuk, *A history of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century*, London: I. B. Tauris, 1998, p. 250.

[520] See for the figures, N. İnan & C. Ozansoy, 1986, p. 40-1.

[521] According to the preamble of the Law on National Holidays, which curtailed public holidays, the total number of holidays was considered unduly long given the country's economic situation, *Cumhuriyet Ansiklopedisi 4* (1981-2000), YKY Yayınları, İstanbul, 2005, p. 4.

[522] A. Yalpat, 1984, p. 22.

both by Pekin and Boratav,[523] the capital punishment trials of the DİSK executives who were used to lead epic struggles up to a few years ago (e.g. organizing hundreds of thousands of workers in public rallies) would last for years with almost empty court halls and quite little public interest. This might be the first sign of the successful containment of the socialist left in the post-1980 period.

Under these circumstances the new Constitution in general, and particularly its chapter on labour regime could be designed in a radically anti-labour perspective so much to get objections even from Türk-iş which was given a role for the pacification of radical unionism in the new regime.[524] In conformity with one of the primary military announcements in the fiercest days of the martial rule that 'those who intend to slow down production would be arrested'[525], the forthcoming Constitution would forbid the exercise of the right to strike and lockout 'in a manner contrary to goodwill and national wealth', and all forms of workers' resistance (e.g., slowing down production, yielding productivity loss) that are 'politically-oriented' (article #54). Thus, it was not baffling that one of the popular themes in the public campaigns of the new Constitution was the prescription of an efficient regime of exploitation. General Evren, for instance, asked the audience in his opening speech of the Promotion Program of the 1982 Constitution, 'how our factories and enterprises, which hold a great place in our economy, could function efficiently with the fear of occupation and destruction?".[526] His words arguing for the 'sacred' and 'instinctual' charm of private property ('even observable in animals', the story goes) in a speech[527] within the scope of the same program, were quite instructive about what the essential, sacred component of the new order would be, adjacent to the

[523] See respectively, Faruk Pekin, "12 Eylül ve DİSK", *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi 11*, 1995, p. 227; K. Boratav, 2012, p. 122.

[524] It was widely known that the TİSK's recommendations had been the main decisive source for the new Constitution, particularly the topics related to working life and trade unionism in the Constitution. The draft version of the relevant chapters was directly written out by the TİSK secretary general, who was also a member of the Constitution Commission. See Bülent Tanör, *İki Anayasa: 1961-1982*, Beta Basım Yayım Dağıtım, 1986, p. 108-9.

[525] Military Communiqué no. 51, quoted in "Üretimi yavaşlatan tutuklanacak", Milliyet, 26.09.1980.

[526] Radio-television speech, on 24 October 1982.

[527] Public speech in Eskişehir, on 4 October 1982.

'sacred Turkish state'. For the constitution of new political subjectivities, in particular, the making of productive and docile subjects was central to the project, Evren never refrained from the discursive strategies that highlighted the vitality of 'hardworking workers' and 'virtuous citizens' for economic development. 'There was no reason for the hardworking and patriotic Turkish workers to get concerned', he asserted, 'but the evil acts of those who exploit and poison the clean Turkish workers according to their own ideological aims would never be permitted'.[528] When considered with the apparent anti-unionist bias of the new regime, such discourse would certainly serve an ideological function for the hegemonic strategy of neoliberalization, to the extent that it would help the promotion of individualism, the ideological hallmark of the new era, as well as deunionization and productivity.

Overall, the pacification efforts set in effect by the martial law of September 12 targeted a long term socio-political setting which had been built upon depoliticization and foreclosure of politics. The creation of docile, productive, uncritical and tamed workforce both as an outcome and agent of such setting was considered a precondition for securing the volatile conditions of capital accumulation. 'For a functioning social and economic life', Evren yelled in a speech, 'citizens should leave the political debate aside; they should not deal with political issues every day at home, at work, on the street and inside themselves'.[529] Depoliticization and the legal-political initiation of 'putting an end to class-based politics'[530] have been the most effective and enduring achievement of the 1980s' pacification that has been made into an overarching act encircling the new socio-political order, if not the short term economic success of the neoliberal program (decline in inflation, increase in export receipts, investments and capital inflows[531]). The military administration, who was credited by international and domestic finance capital only a year after the takeover,[532] was happy with what it achieved in this

[528] Radio-television speech, on 12 September 1980.

[529] Public Speech in Diyarbakır, on 27 October 1982.

[530] G. Yalman, 2009, p. 308.

[531] The General Secretariat of the National Security Council, 1982, pp. 262-4.

[532] A. Yalpat, 1984, p. 19.

sense. The biggest progress for the junta was the 'increased production thanks to the restoration of national unity, labour peace and stability in social life attained by the elimination of strikes and lockouts'.[533] Massive escalation of state repression, huge violations of human rights and prompt decline in working class standards were dismissed as the "incidental costs of stabilization".[534]

3.4.2. Liberalization of Martial Law, Civilianization of Warfare: National Security and Emergency Powers

> Since the law could not be enacted since 1961, even in those cases emergency rule could not be declared. In the absence of such a law on emergency rule, we were obliged to declare martial law on such incidents in one or more parts of the country.
>
> Kenan Evren, 30 October 1982, Kayseri

> Each paragraph of the constitution contains its own antithesis in itself, its own upper and lower house, namely freedom in general terms, and subversion of freedom in the glosses.
>
> Karl Marx, *Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*

The transition between martial law and the new order which was to put an end to martial law was mostly a smooth one that would further problematize the civil/military, and normal/exceptional dualisms. The junta's well-known warnings issued to the public that the military regime would continue if the new constitution failed to get approval was an apparent example showing that military and civilian regimes would readily replace each other. As another example, the repressive policing and criminalization of the use of political rights of the working class relying on the harshest communiques of the martial law would be yet again warranted in the constitutional and subsidiary legal regulations of the civilian regime. Gaining an effective ideological and political power more than ever, it can be observed that security, and in particular the concept of national security have been given a special

[533] Interview with General Evren in Leaders, quoted in *Kenan Evren'in Söylev ve Demeçleri*, TBMM Basımevi, 1987, p. 19. See also, General Secretariat of the NSC, 1982, p. 267.

[534] A. Yalpat, 1984, p. 19.

role in the establishment of the neoliberal form of state-society relations and in the maintenance of the class warfare which had before been embodied in martial law and its apparent warlike assault.

In effect, the history of prerogative governmental powers in the making of modern Turkish state is traceable at least to the late Ottoman period. In accordance with the conjoined historical development of liberal rights and security, the first Ottoman Constitution of 1876, which represented the first liberal step of transition from absolute monarchy to a constitutional one, endowed the government with the power to declare martial law in the face of a threat of takeover (article #113). Concomitantly, the Second Constitutional Era was inaugurated with mottos of liberty, justice and equality; but its positive impact on workers and union movements, in turn, prompted the Strike Law of 1909 (*Tatil-i Eşgal Kanunu*) to impose restrictions on the rights to strikes and union activities, and this was made possible under the proclamation of martial law only a few months ago. In effect, since the Second Constitutional Era the practice of martial law went beyond restricting labour rights. Martial law was also often used as a tool by the Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihat ve Terakki Partisi)*, the secular, military-originated party in power, to issue the most essential regulations towards the constitution of a Western-like bourgeois order.[535] The early Republican era was no different in this respect, for it witnessed the practice of extensive prerogative powers alongside a diverse set of institutions such as special military organizations (mobile gendarmerie and military police), martial courts, general inspectorates that were to combine civil, military and judiciary authority. Martial law and other already applicable extraordinary measures were vital for the founding elite of the Republic as well, not least in the circumstances of the War of Independence and the establishment of the new regime. For instance, the famous 'independence tribunals' were originally established for military fugitives, but they had soon started to substitute the effect of martial law being utilized for the imposition of reforms under the new regime. The severe law for the Restoration of Peace and Order (*Takrir-i Sükun*), as another example, was planned at the outset to repress the counter-revolutionary insurrections,

[535] Betül Urhan & Seydi Çelik, Türkiye'de Sistemin "Milli Güvenlik" Algısı ve Bunun İşçi Hareketleri Ve Sendikacılık Faaliyeti Üzerindeki Etkisi, *Çalışma ve Toplum*, 2010/2, pp. 114-5.

but it then became apparent that all forms of dissident movements, the press and the worker's unions had fallen within its area of concern.[536]

The appeal to similar special powers concerning both the control of dissident movements and regulation of the economic and social processes entailed a historical continuity between the one-party and multi-party period of the Republic until the 1960s. Since the 1930s the governmental practices relying on a number of extraordinary regulations on labour regime, such as Labour Law (1936), Law of Associations (1938), National Protection Law (1940), had been particularly functional to regulate the bourgeois economic and social order. All in all, the common characteristic in the use of prerogative powers since the late Ottoman through to the early Republic is that such powers was at the time an outcome of the state's perspective of security which had been firmly shaped by martial discipline under the compelling conditions of 'war' with its conventional meaning. The struggle on the acquisition of sovereignty over territory, as well as the need for the formation of a modern state and administration under the circumstances of the War of Independence and both world wars had rendered the perception of crisis and emergency, whether external or internal, not only permanent but always associated with military encounters and conflicts. This resulted in the organization of prerogative powers exclusively in the form of military administration. Locating military power into the centre of policing order and of suspension of rights and freedoms at least until the 1960s the Turkish state had not discovered either national security or any other administrative and ideological instrument which would remove the exclusively martial appearance of its war powers.

As of the coup d'état of 1960, however, the concept of national security has been taken to the scene. As the concept was enshrined in the new constitution (1961) and also has been institutionalized under the same banner (General Secretariat of the National Security Council) after the takeover, it has started to get more and more references in subsequent legal texts, smoothly replacing the concept of 'national defence'.[537] As sketched out in the section *Class Warfare and Internal Enemy*, the

[536] Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye Cumhuriyet'inde Tek-parti Yönetiminin Kurulması (1923-1931)*, Yurt Yayınları, 1981, pp. 127-171.

[537] *The National Security Council*, established in 1961, was also a replacement for the *High Council of National Defence*.

concept of national security, being originally a US-based, counter-revolutionary doctrine, has helped the NATO states reorder their security agenda with reference to the uniformity of the internal and external enemy symbolized by the 'communist threat'. On this view, it has also served for the Turkish state to soften the externality deemed to exist between its war powers and the task of policing order peculiar to early Republican era. By no coincidence, attune to the liberal pendulum between rights and their suspension, the 1961 Constitution which is widely known as the most democratic and progressive one in Turkey's political history, was followed by significant regulations referring national security for policing the exercise of certain constitutional rights. The most remarkable of them was the law on Collective Bargaining, Strike and Lockout (#275, 1963). The law definitely expanded the unions' rights and right to unionize, but also for the first time warranted the government to postpone any legal strike or lockout action on the basis of national security and public health (article #21).[538] Another example was the law on Acts that Disturb Constitutional Order, National Security and Peace (1962), which was specifically issued for the forbiddance of political acts associated with the closed Democratic Party.

Nevertheless, it is hard to say that neither national security nor emergency powers had ever been a genuine and effective technique of governing within the circumstances of the 1961 Constitution, for a number of reasons. First, at least until the extensive amendment by the 1971 military memorandum, security or any related concept was not referred in the Constitution as a central category for restricting rights and freedoms.[539] Moreover, the scope of the term national security was defined in the By-law of the NSC, which is the only source for such definition, in a more or less concrete context pertaining to the political and physical security of the state and public order ("external or internal attacks, defeatist attempts, natural disasters and conflagrations"). Second, given the politically escalated conditions of 1960s and 1970s, the political pressure exerted by the organized dissent had helped the

[538] It is not hard to assume that this specific article was borrowed from the notorious Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 in US law.

[539] On the contrary, before the amendment, the Constitution granted that "the law shall not infringe upon the essence of any right or liberty not even when it is applied for the purpose of upholding public interest, morals and order, social justice as well as national security" (article #11).

judiciary sustain its autonomy vis-à-vis executive power to a certain extent, and at least at times, limit the discretionary exercises of government.[540] Third, confined to martial law, emergency powers in effect still remained to be nothing but martial, both in terms of its logic and legal basis. There was no legal act that regulated emergency rule.

What makes the onset of the neoliberal restructuring a turning point in this respect is that it is the process whereby the logic of war disguised in security has been made much more operative during times of peace. As the military rule was a transitional interlude, such operation would be the most crucial part of a political manoeuvre which can be depicted as the 'liberalization of martial law', in other words, transformation of martial law into a form seemingly more appropriate for liberal democracies.[541] This has been made possible mostly by the institutionalization and ideological incorporation of national security and emergency powers into the new authoritarian form of the state. The first step in this respect was the political reconfiguration of security, both in terms of quality and quantity. Whether or not having a bear on security, most of the new legal act under the new regime have been extensively dominated by the discourse of national security, with the state being restructured with all institutions and organizations around the same discourse. The function of the NSC has been exclusively associated with domestic politics in the new Constitution, being defined as "safeguarding the peace and security of society" (article #118). Given this reformulation of its political function, an essential aspect of the narrowing of the political sphere by the state power had been the NSC's empowered authority on civilian politics. Unlike the 1961 Constitution which gave the majority to civil members, the composition of the NSC was redesigned by the method of enumerating its members one by one. Thus, the new composition was

[540] For example, the Constitutional Court, on its repeal of a law amendment which was to increase police powers on the basis of 'national security' and 'public order', had declared in 1974 that these two are "general concepts which are quite open to subjective interpretations and can expand according to the personal understandings of the practitioners, and thereby might lead to various types of arbitrary treatment." Official Gazette, 14.09.1974, No: 15006. The Council of State was also known to take a sceptical stance toward the vague scope of security-driven pretexts throughout 1960s and 1970s. The Council granted stay of execution of the postponement of certain strikes, due to the obscure relation between the exercise of the strike and the alleged violation of national security. See for example, Danıştay, D.D.K., K. 1969/652, 19.09.1969.

[541] M. Neocleous, 2007b, p. 13.

made to ensure that military was to outnumber civilian members in the NSC. More significantly, the provision that "the NSC decisions shall be primarily taken into consideration by the Council of Ministers" was added to the Constitution, which made the NSC more than an advisory body.

The increase in political powers of the NSC certainly had an impact on the balance of power between the military and civilian authority, in other words, on the so-called military tutelage. However, the incorporation of national security into the state's agenda as a technique of policing domestic social order and a mode of governing entails a much more political significance than the institutional and political autonomy of the military. In that, the ideology of national security has now been institutionalized so as to enable the state power encompass civil society as well as the political sphere, which could be taken advantage of anytime needed not only by the military, but more crucially by the civilian authority as well. It was not then baffling to see that national security has been officialised by the new law of the NSC with a great deal of expansion in its scope in an effort to embrace everything related to social life, and thus to offer a good replacement for martial law powers: "The protection and maintenance of the constitutional order, national presence, integrity, all political, social, cultural and economic interests in international field as well as against any kind of internal and external threats, of the State". The phrase "working in conformity with the politics of national security" has been commonly added into the organic laws of any kind of public bodies, general directorates, undersecretaries and ministries that have been founded within the new regime. From the Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) (no. #2954) to political parties (no. #2820) to higher education (no. 2547) to collective bargaining, strike and lockout (no. #2822) all newly enacted legislation has been designated to peddle the ubiquitous national security as the political fetish of the neoliberal order. Even when national security is not mentioned explicitly in the legislation, there have been lots of security-based mantras which are not less general and abstract, such as 'non-delayable cases', 'public order', 'public interest', 'public morality', 'public health', 'public peace and security', 'the security of the state', 'the security of the country', 'the entity and independence of the state', 'the unity of the country', 'the unity of the territory', 'the indivisible unity of the state and its territory', and so forth. Due to such pretexts,

judicial autonomy related to basic rights and freedoms, and in particular to freedom of association, has been significantly reduced. For example, by means of the phrases 'public order' and 'non-delayable cases' that has been used in many laws it has been made possible to make restrictive, prohibitive decisions[542] through civil authorities without judicial decision. Given the police mission of security latent in general and abstract norms in securing the bourgeois order, it might be pertinent to refer back to Marx's critique of the organic nexus between the discourse of public security and security of the bourgeoisie in the *18th Brumaire*:

> Where it [the bourgeoisie] denies these freedoms wholly to 'others' or permits enjoyment of them only under conditions which are just so many police traps, this always happens solely in the interest of 'public security', that is, the security of the bourgeoisie, as the constitution prescribes. (…) Each paragraph of the constitution contains its own antithesis in itself, its own upper and lower house, namely freedom in general terms, and subversion of freedom in the glosses.[543]

In addition to the so-called exceptions driven by security ideology, the new Constitution re-established the State Security Courts, as a replacement for martial law courts, which were to be in charge of crimes against the internal and external security of the state. As can be recalled, foundation of these courts was yearned for by the military commanders as well as the business front in the pre-coup turmoil as a means of the existing 'war', now they were to function merely as a means for keeping the 'peace'. It was not a secret then that the new Constitution has appreciated the 'security of the state' above all else, whereas the fundamental objective of the state has been formulated as 'ensuring the unity and indivisibility of the state'. The discourse of national security has been granulated under various ambiguous phrases all along the Constitution, such as 'the glorious Turkish nation', 'the eternal entity of the Republic of Turkey', 'the historical and moral values of Turkishness', among others. Moreover, although the separation of powers is ensured by the Constitution, even the judicial autonomy is presided over by security: "The

[542] These decisions include cease and desist order, as well as withdrawal of administrators from work as in the case of Law of Associations (#2908, article no. #54), Law on Turkish Medical Association (#6023, add. article no. #2), Law on the Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (#6235, add. article no. 4), Attorneys Act (#1136, article no#77).

[543] K. Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte" [1852] in Terrell Carver (ed.) *Marx: Later Political Writings*, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 43.

law may restrict the issuing of an order on suspension of execution of an administrative act in cases of state of emergency, mobilization and state of war, or on the grounds of national security, public order and public health" (article #125). Still, the most explicit reference to security has been given in the general provision for the restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms: "Fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted by law with the aim of protecting the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and its nation, national sovereignty, the Republic, national security, public order, public peace, the interest of the public, public morality, and public health" (article #13).[544] The Constitution maintains, "in times of war, mobilization, a state of emergency, the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms may be partially or entirely suspended, or measures derogating the guarantees embodied in the Constitution may be taken to the extent required by the exigencies of the situation" (article #15). The individual's right to life, the integrity of his/her corporeal and spiritual existence shall be inviolable, however, with the exception of *deaths occurring through acts in conformity with law of war*.

The so-called exceptions in which even the right to life could be suspended have been regulated by particular legal acts. The year 1983 ended with a politically symbolic overlapping in this sense. The official ending of the military regime by the new parliamentary elections on November came up with two consecutive acts on the Mobilization and State of War (#2941), and the State of Emergency (#2935). The latter act is of profound importance for it has been the first regulation incorporating emergency powers without recourse to martial law. The use of emergency powers, in effect, implies war powers without necessarily referring to the official declaration of war but to the need of fighting a war-like situation. What is significantly new both in the Constitution and the Law on State of Emergency is that 'deterioration of public order' is for the first time counted within the scope of emergency (articles #120 and

[544] This general provision of restriction has been repealed by the amendment in the so-called political reform campaign in 2001. However, while repealing the general provision the amendment has distributed the very same pretexts among various particular articles in the Constitution, such as "right to privacy" (article #20), "immunity of residence" (article #21), "freedom of communication" (article #22), "freedom to express thoughts and promote thoughts" (article #26), "freedom of press" (article #28), "right to use media other than the press owned by public corporations" (article #31), "freedom to form associations" (article #33), "right to organize meetings and demonstrations" (article #34), and "right to form unions" (article #51). It turns out that no substantial change has been made in terms of security-based restrictions.

#3, respectively), which gives notable prerogative powers to the executive branch with regards to the upholding of social order, given that the Council of Ministers is granted with the power to issue decrees having force of law and to restrict rights and freedoms in the course of the state of emergency. More to the point is that the administrative unit to undertake the exercise of emergency powers in districts shall be civil regional governors who are authorized to seek assistance from military troops when needed.

Historically speaking, emergency powers without the exercise of martial law serve an ideological function for the modern bourgeois state: Since the powers relying on the state of martial law which refers to 'no law at all' could be unpopular particularly due to the rising claims of liberal democracy about war and violence as well as about the neutrality of the liberal form of state and law, a new logic of emergency, where the streets are not roamed by marching feet, the law does not seem to be entirely suspended and ordinary courts remain open,[545] is essential for the modern configuration of the bourgeois state. Secondly, the fact that the scope of war is stripped of its martial context and expanded to incorporate the modern state's constant struggle against the elements of disorder and insecurity is crucial to stipulate the 'civilian' and 'lawful' appearance of the pacification in effect. What has been witnessed within the transition from the military to civilian regime in Turkey was no different in this sense. The urges for legislation on emergency rule which was often expressed by the leading figures of September 12 before the takeover was well-replicated in the words of a member of the Consultative Assembly**:** civil administrators should be legally given the same powers as martial commanders, if order and security was to prevail after the military rule.[546] Eventually, the institutionalized emergency powers, along with the political lens of national security that has been extended more than ever, have been the most practical and malleable instrument to civilize and impose the war powers on the normal law and order in the neoliberal Turkey.

[545] Unlike martial rule, there is not a judicial and prosecutorial system peculiar to emergency rule according to the act on the State of Emergency (article # 24).

[546] Consultative Assembly Minutes, 21.01.1982 [C:2, B:40], p. 410. https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/DM__/d02/c002/dm__02002040.pdf

Such transformation within the definition and exercise of the war disguised in security also shows the further limitations of the liberal account that considers the 'military tutelage' as the only security-related tendency of authoritarianism in the new regime, not least based on the NSC's authority over civilian politics. In fact, as Evren repeatedly pointed out, with the new regulations the constituent military junta had ultimately envisaged a security and police regime which would be normally enjoyed by the civilian administration and executive power rather than martial commanders under martial law powers, notwithstanding the NSC's exclusive discretion over the politics of national security. The tempting call of the liberal and institutional outlook of state of emergency was particularly acknowledged by senior military commanders. For example, Doğan Güreş, one of the subsequent chiefs of general staff who was known for his statements defending the TAF's depoliticized and politically non-intervening stance, believed that the conflict in southeastern Turkey could be resolved only by the emergency rule governor of the region rather than the martial law authority. According to Güneş, internal disorder was the subject of responsibility of the civilian authority to deal with, whereas the military should focus on its primary duty of defending the country against its external enemies.[547] In accordance with this popular view, the martial law practices in various provinces had been phased out to be replaced by state of emergency after the year 1983 when the act on state of emergency was enacted. The gradual abolishment of martial law was also offset by the launch of the paramilitary forces called the 'village guards' system in southeastern region in 1985. The forces would be recruited from local villagers towards the assistance to the military operations in the region. In that, the system, operating under the supervision of civil administration, would serve a local police function not only in localizing the warfare methods by mobilizing additional force of people who know the region well, but also in discerning between the loyal and disloyal Kurdish citizens. As of 1987, martial law was finally ended in the whole country whereas state of emergency had become in effect in numerous eastern and southeastern provinces[548] where the Kurdish movement, an internal enemy of the

[547] M. Heper & A. Güney, The Military and Democracy in the Third Turkish Republic, *Armed Forces & Society*, 22(4), p. 632.

[548] Bingöl, Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Hakkari, Mardin, Siirt, Tunceli and Van were the first provinces where martial law was replaced by emergency rule. And then Adıyaman, Bitlis, Muş, Batman and Şırnak

new regime, was deemed to pose a challenge to the order. The emergency rule would be extended tens of times until 2002 when it was officially ended.

All these considered together, it is apt to conclude that the restoration of the equilibrium of class forces had been initiated with the accompaniment of novel techniques of governing which offer a concrete form of the political conjunctions between the relational units of liberalism's ideological separations pertaining to security, i.e. peace and war, as well as the normal and exceptional, in favour of a more secure environment for capital accumulation and class domination. The official declaration of war is separated from the state of peace; however low-intensity war, if not open military confrontation, would be always ubiquitous and serve as a means of broadly regulating the bourgeois social order in the name of peace, order and security. Emergency rule, the exceptional, is separated from the constitutional order, the normal; however, emergency powers and security-driven exceptions would be appealed anytime *in the name of* the constitutional order. The bourgeois order would then be provided with a more skilful exercise of pacification insofar as security practices were no longer confined merely to martial implications, but instead have been directed towards ordering of social relations in a seemingly more 'liberal' setting in terms of its legal, institutional and ideological components. What is liberal in this new order is obviously not the empowered powers of the NSC in its relation to the political realm as an institution, for there are very few things that would make the adherents of liberal ideology as uncomfortable as the blurring of the institutional boundaries between civilian politics and military power. Yet there are also few things fundamental to liberalism as the idea of security serving a political and ideological function of ordering. Borrowed from the Western liberal states the discourse and ideology of national security in Turkey which was the most dominant form of security throughout the Cold War, has been thoroughly institutionalized and realigned much more towards the *inside* by the military administration of 1980–1983, thus by no coincidence, in parallel with the neoliberal restructuring of the state and society which would be heavily imprinted by insecurity. The profound task of

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were added. The practice in these provinces lasted until 2002 being extended for 46 times by the Parliament. "Türkiye'de olağanüstü hâllerin tarihi", BBC News, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-36852284

securing the insecurity of working classes, urban poor, underclass and marginalized groups was going to be assumed by prerogative powers pertaining to national security, as a replacement for the gap left by social security provisions of the previous accumulation regime. New security measures and techniques of policing were to be fulfilled under the rubric of terms such as internal enemies, peace and security of society, national security and its twin concepts (public order, public health, survival of the state and nation, etc). Whether it is public, private, political, economic, socio-cultural or moral, there is eventually no more space that could not be colonized on the grounds of peace and security. This vast expansion in the political range of security and the supra-governmental inscription of national security as a state policy has been far more crucial and permanent than the changing balance in civil-military relations in neoliberal Turkey. After all, the whole social and institutional restructuring on which radically new class relations will be imprinted would be effectively enjoyed by every civil government of the post-1980s without any reserve.

Consequently, the answer to the question how the war coded as 'peace and order' could maintain without necessarily resorting to armed forces and martial rule lies in the new security setting of 1980s discussed so far. However, there is still a missing piece of the puzzle. Constant struggle against those opposed to the newly built order leads us to the supreme function of bourgeois state power to 'secure the insecure'; a peculiar deployment of warfare – police war.

3.4.3. Return to the 'Normal': The Police Taking the Stage

The politico-juridical framework of the new regime was almost completed by 1983. While the parliamentary election in November of the same year signified the official end of the military, transition back to the civilian regime was neither more nor less than the institutionalization of the new order that has begun with the coup d'etat.

In effect, the military junta had never intended a civilianization process all at once. Other than the severe restrictions set forth by the legislation on political parties and electoral system issued under the military rule, the parliamentary election was also

held under the shadow of the NSC powers. The ban of the political parties which were closed by September 12 and of their members continued, as well as the NSC had to power to disapprove the eligibility of MP candidates handed by the parties that were allowed to participate.[549] Approximately 20 percent of the candidates of the legalized parties were denied by the NSC,[550] which, alongside the ban of hundreds of ex-political actors, had a direct impact on the parliamentary composition. However, notwithstanding Özal's historical and organic affiliation with September 12, his ANAP's remarkable victory in the elections as if a competitor to the NSC and its affiliated party MDP had initiated a relatively early process for the public legitimation of the new 'civilian' regime that led the way for the gradual ending of martial law in due course.

An important success of Özal's term in government, which consisted of two periods (1983-1987, 1987-1989), was the consolidation of class domination by relatively taking control of intra-class conflicts and passing the regulations that would entrench the economic hegemony of the bourgeoisie. Özal's rule, particularly in its first period, severely took advantage of the anti-labour components of the 1982 Constitution and other legislation issued by the military administration which aimed to purely repress the labour movement rather than pacify it. As the new Constitution goes in effect, the ban on workers' rights and trade union activities would normally be lifted, but the new legislation that was to shape industrial relations sufficed to at least partially substitute the military oppression on labour in the civilian regime. Particularly with the new law of Collective Bargaining, Strike and Lockout (no. #2822) issued on the eve of the end of the military rule in 1983, the right to use these rights was hampered by severe restrictions.[551] Trade union system devised for the civilian regime was no different. Strict restrictions were imposed by the new law of

[549] There were three political parties that stood eligible: Özal's Motherland Party (ANAP), The People's Party (HP) which was seen as the successor of the former CHP, and The Nationalist Democracy Party (MDP) founded by the junta.

[550] S. Gemalmaz, 1996, p. 993.

[551] For instance, other than the restrictions pertaining to security, the act stipulated that a labour union would be able to participate to collective bargaining only if they represented 10 % of the workers in that sector and also more than the half of the workers in its workplace (article #11). Any type of politically-oriented strike, workplace occupation, slowdown strike, general strike or solidarity strike was illegalized, whereas the right to strike was authorized only for the issues held in collective bargaining and only outside the collective bargaining period (article #25).

Trade Unions (no. 2821) on unionism in terms of establishment, membership and activity.[552] Özal government's vision of social policy by no means went beyond this repressive setting of the capital-labour relations framed by the NSC. Yet, it was no less true that the unmediated economic and political force would not be a sustainable instrument per se for the necessity of restoring the legitimacy of the bourgeois state and order which was already called in question by the military coup and its aftermath. The question of legitimacy could only get deepened, given the contradictions engendered by the increased proletarianization and dispossession following the economic transition.

Oddly enough, on the other hand, the same period had witnessed the short-term success of the prohibitive labour politics regarding the suppression of the organization of labour. The tables below illustrate the contradiction between the structural wage/productivity imbalance (increased industrial exploitation, in other words) in the new accumulation model and the decline in the organization of labour which was highly politicized until only a very short while ago. The first table reveals that the real profits doubled in the first eight years following the onset of the January 24 Decisions (i.e. until the end of Özal's first term in government), while the real wages fell by 26%. Accordingly, the share of wage-salary category in national income fell from 24% to 13%.[553]

On the other hand, notwithstanding the increase in the industrialization and the number of employed workers alongside the decline in real wages there had not been a significant increase in the rate of unionization largely due to the new legislative and political barriers. To give an idea, the number of workers increased by 37% between 1984 and 1988, the second table shows, while the increase in the rate of unionization remained only 8%. Accordingly, the number of trade unions dropped from 138 to 80 in the same period.[554]

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[552] In particular, the articles no. #3, #5, #7 (establishment), #21 (membership), and #32, #37, #38 and #39 (activity).

[553] Gülten Kazgan, *Türkiye'de Gelir Bölüşümü: Dün ve Bugün*, Friedrich Ebert Vakfı (FES), İstanbul, 1990, p. 24.

[554] T.C. Çalışma Bakanlığı, *Çalışma Hayatı İstatistikleri*, 2001.

Table 3. 1. Changes in Real Wages and Real Profits (1980-1988)[555]

Year	Real Wage	Real Profit
1980	100	100
1981	104	96
1982	97	95
1983	94	109
1984	88	153
1985	85	215
1986	81	175
1987	80	229
1988	74	202

Table 3. 2. Unionization Rate (1984-1988)[556]

Year	Number of Workers	Number of Unionized Workers	Unionization Rate %
1984	2.553.384	1.427.271	55,89
1985	2.819.517	1.828.471	64,85
1986	3.075.343	1.953.892	63,53
1987	3.268.030	2.044.797	62,56
1988	3.483.212	2.227.029	63,93

A critical explanation drawing from the rate of unionization might indicate a janus-faced nature for pacification. From a certain viewpoint, trade union movement has all along been an integral pillar of class struggle towards revolutionary socialism, which led Marx to read the struggles over work day throughout the 19th century as "protracted and more or less concealed civil war"[557] between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. On the other hand, there is also a notable ground for sceptical views that

[555] The data are of manufacturing industry. E. Yeldan, 1996 cited in K. Lordoğlu, "Çalışma Hayatının Genel Görünümü", *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi 11*, İletişim, 1995, p. 212.

[556] T.C. Çalışma Bakanlığı, *Çalışma Hayatı İstatistikleri*, 2001.

[557] K. Marx, 1995, 194.

in contemporary capitalism unionism might also act as policing agent for capital,[558] particularly insofar as it moves away from a revolutionary or radical agenda. Concerning our topic, both views commonly indicate that the civilian neoliberal regime under Özal's rule had a systematic need to find alternative ways of policing labour and relieve the tension of the radical socio-economic transition while reinforcing the social legitimacy of class dominance. The economic aspect of the latent political tension of the transition, to be sure, could not be limited to industrial labour but to dispossession and poverty in general sense. Thus, the triggers of the economic imbalance of power between social classes went beyond the decline in real wages: sharp declines in absolute farm income and stringent cuts to public spendings both of which started to show their first indications from the first year of the military government, the steadily mounting number of the underemployed (rising by seven times between 1978-1987), the privatization of a number of major SOEs as well as the nationalization of loss-making private enterprises.[559]

As a way of not only policing labour but also poverty, Özal government chose to follow a distinct type of social policy entirely based on the liberal-individualist view to poverty and inequality. It was beyond doubt that the government had, on the one hand, shown an uncompromising stance against class-based demands typically in line with the neoliberal orthodoxy of marketization. Under the influence of the hegemonic New Right project adjacent to such orthodoxy, the underlying idea behind social policy was to discipline the social body, which used to expect 'too much' from the state, through the drastic process of marketization. On the other, whether it was compatible with such view or not, Özal government mobilized an economic strategy of containment targeting the subordinate classes, urban poor and the newly immigrated ex-rural poor masses in particular. Described by Boratav as

[558] R. Luxemburg, "Social Reform or Revolution" in D. Howard (ed.) *Selected Political* Writings of Rosa Luxemburg, London: Monthly Review Press, 1971. L. Trotsky, "The Trade Unions in Britain", in *Collected Writings and Speeches on Britain Vol. III.*, London: New Park Publications, 1974. For an empirical endeavour legitimizing this account, see George Rigakos & Aysegul Ergul, "The Pacification of The American Working Class: A Time Series Analysis", *Socialist Studies / Études socialistes* 9 (2) Winter 2013; "Policing the industrial reserve army: An international study", *Crime, Law and Social Change*, V. 56, 2011. It is also pertinent to note as an example that it was boldly stated by the Turkish PM in the midst of the devastating economic crisis that trade unions constitute the main lynchpin of social peace and tranquillity, Yılmaz, "Hedeften vazgeçmedik", 10.02.1998, Milliyet.

[559] G. Kazgan, 1990, pp. 7-18.

'degenerated populism'[560] this strategy was planned to operate mostly through the creation and distribution of urban rent particularly around city municipalities. As Özal's short sighted populism was accompanied by the revival of the real estate market due to the increase of urban rent and increasing demand of the middle-upper classes towards gated communities in the periphery, urban space has been somehow the subject of rent sharing between the construction companies and squatters.[561] Through selective practices of title deeds and zoning permit/amnesty poor neighbourhoods and squatters begun to share the rent created.[562] Social policy was to be treated in the same fashion. An off-budget measure called Social Aid and Solidarity Promotion Fund (*SYDVF)* with 900 local branches was established with the aim of providing social aids, micro credit facilities and in-kind transfers for the poor.[563] By way of a number of local foundations whose main source of funding was planned to be donations from civil society, the government would thus avoid being burdened by rights-based measures such as a proper job-security scheme or unemployment insurance.

In a period where the moral economy of the poor, i.e. the conventional, informal and non-market ways of tackling with the conditions of material deprivation[564] have been increasingly abandoned in the wake of the dual process of further urbanization and marketization, such extra-class type of distribution policy[565] provided a double benefit for the government. First and foremost, by detaching the public policy ground of distribution and social protection from the political realm defined by citizenship

[560] K. Boratav, 2005, pp.118-20.

[561] A. Buğra, 2008, pp. 200-2

[562] K. Boratav, 2005, pp.118-20.

[563] Ekrem Karakoç, *Inequality After the Transition: Political Parties, Party Systems, and Social Policy in Southern and Postcommunist Europe*, Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 223.

[564] E. P. Thompson, The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century, *Past & Present*, No. 50, 1971.

[565] As noted by Boratav, the target group was codified by the government under various terms other than the working class: urbanite, squatter, poor, costumer, etc. K. Boratav, 2005, p. 120. For Yalman too, this neoliberal vision of social policy has been far from changing the balance of power between labour and capital, but rather aims at the 'empowerment of the individual' who can be definable on the axis of a particular 'community'. G. Yalman, "Tarihsel Bir Perspektiften Sosyal Politika ve Yoksulluk", Atılgan, G. & Çakar,B.Y.(Edt), *Yoksulluk ve Dışlanma, Teş-İş Dergisi*, Haziran 2007, pp. 70-1.

rights, it justified the basis for the government's pro-market vision of problem solving. This would pave an effective way for the utilization of a peculiar, charity-driven form of social policy undertaken by the neoliberal-Islamist rule in 2000s. In so doing, the same strategy also helped Özal government take the political behaviour of a large segment of the poor population under control in the short term. That said, it could be also considered as serving a function of pacification of the urban workers by securing their insecurity outside the labour market, but instead in exchange of certain individual concessions which one way or another generated a relatively positive impact on their material conditions. Therefore, as part of a long term political and ideological strategy, workers who were already exposed to the fierce policies of depoliticization and disorganization under the military rule, were now devised to get further detached from the prospect of politicization, being deprived of class consciousness and becoming an ally of free market ideology. Other than the violence of the law, working class politicization of the previous term was then besieged by the constitution of a new form of subjectivity defined by the entrepreneurial pragmatism of 'hitting the jackpot and saving the day'[566] and imposed through an intense ideological bombing promoting a blend of New Right-inspired conservatism, philanthropy, nationalism and modernism/consumerism at once. The fragility of the neoliberal accumulation process marked by high rates of inflation, unemployment and poverty should thereby shy away from the ground of class politics being absorbed not only by selective concessions but also by the promotion of consumerist and individualist subjectivity as well as social and economic missions attached to outside the state realm; e.g. family, civil associations, charitable organizations and sects that would in turn enhance the political significance of the relations of subordination related to the religious and conservative identity.

While the pacification under Özal's rule mainly focused on the social inclusion of the poor masses through a neoliberal-conservative form of social policy, it was hardly surprising that the ongoing civilianization process on the other hand pushed the division of labour between the military and police forces towards a more

[566] T. Öngen, "'Yeni Liberal' Dönüşüm Projesi ve Türkiye Deneyimi", in A. H. Köse et al. (eds.) *Küresel Düzen: Birikim, Devlet ve Sınıflar, İktisat Üzerine Yazılar*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2003, p. 84.

coherent liberal setting of pacification. As suggested all along this study, the all-encompassing insecurity inherent in bourgeois order requires the waging of a constant social war imbricated in police mandate against any prospect of social disorder and uncertainty –insurgence, disobedience, lawlessness, immorality, and so on. In fact, the situation of police as a project of pacification has not been exempt from the mind of the Turkish state at least since the 1960s when industrialization has been accelerated. The juridico-political structure of the state in the 1960s and 1970s was indeed shaped by a hegemony project relying on labour rights and social provisions as part of the import-substitution model. Nevertheless, such project lacked neither a programmatic social policy typical to Welfare State[567] nor a neoliberal-type of 'social policy as social risk mitigation'[568] which would undertake a police function on popular masses.

It was no coincidence then that a reorganization in the police institution was seen ineluctable as of the 1960s, particularly given the remarkable momentum that the social transformation gained essentially thanks to the increase in industrialization and urban migration as well as the rise in rights-based struggles in tune with the national and international political 'spirit' of the era. With the particular need for policing public acts and order, a special organization called the Society Police (*Toplum Zabıtası*) had been established and deployed initially in five provinces (Adana, Ankara, İstanbul, İzmir and Zonguldak) with a special act (#654) in 1965. Composed of specially trained personnel squads with necessary weapons, vehicles and equipment, the objective of the Society Police was determined as 'the protection of the Republic and the liberal order with democratic methods' (article #1). In this respect, it was primarily affiliated with illegal street and square incidents as well as the illegal strikes and lockouts that would cause partial or total destruction of the material and moral properties of the society or persons (article #1). This means, a police unit based on a separate act apart from the Law on the Security Organization dated 1937 and specifically associated with social movements was devised for the first time. The parliamentary deliberations on the need for such special unit

[567] G. Yalman, 2007a.

[568] Filiz Zabcı, Sosyal Riski Azaltma Projesi: Yoksulluğu Azaltmak mı, Zengini Yoksuldan Korumak mı?, *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*, 58/1, 2003.

apparently indicate that the state was to see to it that the police would be able to uphold social order primarily in the most industrialized cities inasmuch as the scope of civil society was extended by political rights granted by the 1961 Constitution.[569]

The establishment of the Society Police was followed by the enactment of the Law on the Prevention of Some Acts against Security (law no. #1481) and an amendment (law no. #1422) on the law of the Society Police in 1971, both of which intended to further the legal powers of police. In 1973, the new Law on Universities (no. #1750) had authorized the Society Police to get access to the university upon its own or the rector's request for the use in emergencies or disorder, whereby an amendment (law no. #1775) on the Law of Police Duties and Powers had increased the police authority to body search and seizure.

Nevertheless, despite these attempts for the empowerment of the police's capacity and authority to uphold social order since the second half of the 1960s, it is more telling to suggest that the police was far from sufficient to properly undertake the modern state's daily functions of counterinsurgency and internal pacification. There seems to be essentially two main reasons behind this. First, the legal and institutional powers of the police organization had been overshadowed by the TAF's political interest in policing the internal order stemming from its historical pioneering role in shaping the state's perspective of security. Although the 1960s was the first turning point in the reorganization of the state's domestic security apparatuses, the frequent resorts to prerogative powers in the form of military administration was an obstacle

[569] A few examples; "[T]here is a necessity in the establishment of the Society Police as soon as possible. In order to prevent and, where necessary, suppress collective movements, mobile police units equipped with appropriate means shall be established in the whole country." – İbrahim Etem Kılıçoğlu, MP of the AP. "Public morality is shockingly at stake in such a social climate where drug trafficking, gambling, clubbing, prostitution, smuggling and similar practices have been overwhelming all over the country (…) The development of industrial life and tourism, the growth of cities, the legislative acts on strike and lockout, the need for the monitoring and control of the variety of ideological movements, lead us to have a security organization equipped with all kinds of technical and legal means, with respect to its duties and tasks, as one of the main requirements of our democratic progress." – Oğuzdemir Tüzün, MP of the MP. "There is the flourishing of currents of ideas in democratic countries. The police closely monitors them. We do and will have such currents as well. However, one needs to bear in mind that the extreme leftist ideas and poisons will to spread in this country by hiding themselves in the shadow of the social principles mentioned by our Constitution. We want to believe that the current government is well aware of this and take the necessary measures concerning the development of our police and gendarmerie units." – Sait Mutlu, MP of the YTP (21.05.1965). Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, 21.05.1965 [D: 1, C: 40, T: 4]. https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/MM__/d01/c040/mm__01040111.pdf.

to the 'police war' at the heart of pacification to remain vastly civil. After all, throughout the 1970s and starting not least by the legislations shortly after the 1971 military memorandum, the TAF alongside the organized capital was the leading actor that pushed for the strengthening of the police organization on the basis of measures related to public order and security that are underwritten by the bourgeoisie's mindset of social/labour peace. Another significant factor was the political leverage of class warfare since the 1960s; in that, the police department had been unprecedentedly politicized as the state itself had been recognized as a part and parcel of the working class struggle. For the police department was consequently divided into two political camps by 1975, which were represented by the associations Pol-Der (the socialist/progressive camp) and Pol-Bir (the pro-MHP/counter-revolutionist camp),[570] the organization further appeared to be at odds with merely representing class power. All these being the case, until the new regime that would be brought up with September 12 the police had been neither politically nor technically[571] well-prepared to tackle with the elements of disorder and insecurity, let alone accomplish its historical function in fabricating social order. The number of police units and officers did not increase in tandem with the sharp demographic change due to intensive urbanization.[572] The legislation regulating its powers and authority was also widely deemed to be inadequate – which the military elite often complained about before the coup d'état.

[570] The socialist Pol-Der had a major representation in the organization, with its around 17.000 members, corresponding almost 1/3 of the whole police force. The association presented itself as the 'police of the people', Hikmet Çiçek, "Bir polis örgütü: Pol-Der", https://www.aydinlik.com.tr/arsiv/bir-polis-orgutu-pol-der The right-wing Pol-Bir, which was founded as a reaction to the former, on the other hand, had a far less share of representation, albeit heavily organized in the Society Police. Although the Pol-Der was decided to be closed by the Ministry of Interior of the RPP government in 1978, this decision was cancelled by the State of Council thanks to the 'driving back-effect' of the working class struggle, "Bir zamanlar 'Halkın Polisi' Pol-Der vardı", *Cumhuriyet*, 07.07.2013. It can be derived from the media speech of Kenan Evren on the day of the takeover that this ferocious polarization in the police department and the junta's fear of letting it spread to the armed forces was one of the 'legitimate' reasons in the mind of the state.

[571] The organization was also miserable at the time in terms of the quality and quantity of staff, level of education, training and specialization, stations, arms and all kinds of technical equipment. Police stations and headquarters were often defended by soldiers against sudden attacks even when no martial rule was in power. N. Bölügiray, 2001, pp. 43-59; Ali Dikici, 12 Eylül 1980 Askeri Darbesi Öncesi Türk Polis Teşkilatının Durumu (1977-1980), *Atatürk ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi Dergisi*, I/1 2017 Yaz.

[572] Seda Öz Yıldız, Kamu Yönetim Sistemini Organizasyon Tarihinden Okumak: 1970'li Yıllarda Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, *Akademik Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi*, 5/44, Nisan 2017, p. 629.

The neoliberal transition came up with lessons taken from the past for the police as well as any other units of pacification. Both the NSC and Özal government were well aware of the fact that an internal order which would operate by itself and without further military interventions required to have a police force that would suffice to undertake the task of policing social order just as the way that military prerogative was replaced by emergency powers and the new setting of security politics. As a report submitted by the British embassy officers to the Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs indicates, the police organization was strongly needed to be prepared so as to effectively assume its core task of policing in the aftermath of martial law.[573] Such reinforcement of the police, the report argues, would reassert the legitimacy of the state power insofar as it would help provide a certain division of labour between the former and the military forces.[574] Not surprisingly, it was publicly declared by the General Directorate of Security in 1982 that the organization, whose failure before 1980 was clearly admitted, was going to be restructured in tandem with the Armed Forces organization, based on 10-years of plans that put into work the modernization of staff, arms, vehicles and other kinds of material equipment.[575] The restructuration was described by the Minister of Interior as a prerequisite for the *consolidation* of the restored state authority, rule of law and order in the post-martial law period.[576]

Drawing on the standardization model used for the Armed Forces, which is called the TMK (*Teşkilat-Malzeme-Kadro*: Organization-Equipment-Staff),[577] an expansive programme of modernization and organization called EM-RE-MO ("Reorganization of the General Directorate of Security, Modernization of Weapons, Tools and Equipment in accordance with Modern Technical Developments") which was to increase the police budget and authorize the General Directorate of Security to receive extra funds was introduced and passed by the Consultative Assembly in

[573] J. Devletoğlu, *İngiliz Arşivlerinde 12 Eylül'ün Ayak Sesleri*, İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2010, p. 181.

[574] Ahmet H. Aydin, *Police Organisation and Legitimacy: case studies of England, Wales and Turkey*, Ashgate Publishing Company, 1997, p. 99.

[575] "Polis sıkıyönetim sonrası için yeniden örgütleniyor", Milliyet, 22.01.1982.

[576] Consultative Assembly Minutes, 21.01.1982 [C:2, B:40], p. 433. https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/DM__/d02/c002/dm__02002040.pdf

[577] İsmail Metin & Fetullah Aslan, "Türk Polis Örgütünün Yapısı", *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi 14*, 1996, p. 1070.

1983.[578] Given the bold references to the data on demography, urbanization, crime and the size of national police forces and police per head in Western states,[579] the preamble of the regulation was indicative of the fact that among other things the process of the sharp restructuring of the state's security apparatuses in neoliberal societies was adopted as a main guideline. The speech of a member of the Council in the negotiations, İsmail Hakkı Demirel, who was also an ex-police commissioner, further demonstrates that the police modernization was neither more nor less than the neoliberal regime's urgent need to situate the 'police war' in its place:

> Ensuring the rule of law is the primary duty of the state. This duty may be possible only with the harmonious work of the police and the law. For the state to be law-bound, the state police should be highly skilled and strong. Police force, alongside gendarmerie, is the leading component of the state police. Why should we strengthen our police then? As you know, until the September 12, the events that took place in our country, the increasing number of crimes, and our inadequacy of preventing crimes have led to a vast state of anarchy. In the face of the events, the police remained helpless and powerless. Military intervention has become inescapable. We often say "the army should not interfere"; however, we call it in when there is no other solution. The difficulties faced by the police in street movements, rallies and parade demonstrations are well known. The police forces are in great need of modern weapons and equipment. This bill will make it possible to provide the modern weapons, tools and equipment needed by the police within the scope of a long-term programmatic plan.[580]

In this light, one of the top priorities of the new market regime was therefore a broad restructuring of the police as a core accompaniment to the neoliberal distribution policies, as well as developing it as a 'pro-systemic political actor'.[581] Within the scope of the programme in question, the share of the budget allocated to the police enlarged from 10% to 37% of the public budget only in four years (1982-1986).[582]

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[578] "Danışma Meclisinin Kabul Ettiği Metin: Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğünün Yenliden Teşkilatlanması Modern Silah, Araç ve Gereçlerle Donatılması… Hakkında Kanun Tasarısı" https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/MGK_/d01/c010/b166/mgk_010101660203.pdf,

[579] Consultative Assembly, no. 543, 18.08.1983. https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/DM__/d02/c020/dm__02020148.pdf

[580] Consultative Assembly Minutes, 18.08.1983 [C:20, B:148], p. 617. https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/DM__/d02/c020/dm__02020148.pdf

[581] Funda Hülagü, *Restoring Class Power Over the Police: The Role of the International in Neoliberal Police Reform in Turkey*, Unpublished PhD Thesis, METU, 2011.

[582] S. Sözen & H. H. Çevik, "Polislik Politikası", in A. Baharçiçek (Ed.), *1980-2003 Türkiye'nin Dıs, Ekonomik, Sosyal ve İdari Politikaları*, Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2003, p. 463.

The overall investment expenditures included the establishment of new units (of Intelligence, Aviation, Foreign Relations, Communication, Supply and Maintenance, etc.) as part of the General Directorate of Security, as well as the supply of new technologies, stations, arms, and the recruitment of new staff. To give an idea how fast the enlargement was occurring, the number of police officers which was approximately 50.000 in 1980 increased more than by 50% to approximately 87.000 at the end of the decade.[583]

The eve of the outset of the civilian regime witnessed remarkable changes within the police cadres as well. First, in addition to the ban on associations for the security bureaucracy that was stated before, the politicization within the organization was tried to be entirely neutralized as the left-wing police association Pol-Der had been purged by means of a 'mandatory early retirement' law issued in 1982. Then, as one of the most important developments of the reorganization process, the inefficacious Society Police of the previous term was converted into the paramilitary riot police called Rapid Action Units (*Çevik Kuvvet*) in 1983 which were to be equipped with high-tech weapons, substantial legal powers, and more qualified and well-trained squads.[584] Just as the Society Police, these new units have been associated with policing public order but with a greater role and power. With the clauses on anti-riot powers added to Law on the General Directorate of Security (no. 3201)[585] they have been authorized to interfere in legal meetings and demonstrations under the banner of *providing order and security* (article #19/a) as well as in legal strikes and lockouts under the banner of *preventing physical ravages in workplaces* (article #19/c). That said, they have been also directly authorized to interfere in illegal meetings, demonstrations, strikes and lockouts (article #19/e). But this time, in demarcating

[583] İ. Metin & F. Aslan, 1996, p. 1069.

[584] The Society Police was criticized by the members of the Consultative Assembly of being founded as a spare unit, by a spare regulation, only in selected cities, and without a centralized plan or programme. It was argued that Society Police forces were often deployed from one city to another for acute incidents, however they often ended up failing due to lack of coordination, discipline, adequate equipment and training.
Consultative Assembly Minutes, 07.07.1982 [C: 6, No: 117], pp. 544-5. https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/DM__/d02/c006/dm__02006117.pdf

[585] The organization has been further regulated by a separate By-law on Rapid Action Units, http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/Metin.Aspx?MevzuatKod=7.5.9225&MevzuatIliski=0&sourceXmlSearch=

between the legal and illegal, and identifying the degree of the threat, they would enjoy huge discretionary powers they hold at their disposal owing to the vague restrictions in the previously mentioned new acts on meetings, demonstrations, strikes and lockouts. What is more, Rapid Action Units are also responsible to take 'preventive measures where there is any chance of occurrence of social movements that might disrupt public order' (article #19/b), which legitimizes proactive police measures on social dissent, and thus, appears to be a further example of the 'legalization of police discretion' rather than 'policing as law enforcement'.

Another significant instance of the legalization of police discretion could be found in the empowerment of arrest and prohibition powers of the police. By way of an amendment made on the Law on Police Duty and Powers in 1985,[586] the police has been authorized to take proactive measures, use excessive force and discretion in criminal cases, public gatherings, incidents of custody, concerning the acts it deems to be against 'the indivisible integrity of the State, public order and public morality' – all of which actually sounded familiar from the previous martial rule practices. The most significant change in the Law pertained to the wide discretion in the use of force, which went even beyond the powers given by the NSC rule in 1983. In that, the police was given the power to use all kinds of weapons against suspects standing ground or rioters resisting dispersal. Worse, the discretion on the level of force and the means to be used was left to the chief of the intervention force.

The whole amendment was objected by the MPs of the opponent Populist Party (*HP*),[587] and even a group of MPs from Özal's ANAP on the grounds of the rule of law.[588] Interestingly enough, the government defended the amendment on the basis of 'protecting the rule of law' as well. Özal's way of legitimizing it was crucial in this sense. For him, the legislation did not indicate an expansion of powers, but of

[586] Official Gazette, 25.06.1985, No: 18792. http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/18792.pdf

[587] See for the criticism of an MP from the HP that the legislation aimed at endowing police forces with powers enjoyed by martial commanders of military rule, *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi* 114. Birleşim, 14.06.1985, p. 617. https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d17/c018/tbmm17018114.pdf

[588] *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 112. Birleşim, 12.06.1985, pp. 304, 332-4. https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d17/c018/tbmm17018112.pdf; 114. Birleşim, 14.06.1985, pp. 533-536. https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d17/c018/tbmm17018114.pdf

duties.[589] He maintained that since such powers were already being enjoyed both by the military and police forces under martial law, the amendment simply aimed at preventing the police mandate from being illegal due to the end of martial law. Insofar as the strong liberal belief that the bourgeois law exists to limit violence is renounced, Özal was precisely right. The violence of pacification, as noted by Neocleous, is never against, outside or exceptional to law: "law follows the police power obediently and carries the bags of the war power subserviently. Pacification enacts changes in the law in order to make these powers possible, acceptable and legal."[590] Taken together, it would be more plausible to suggest that any efforts towards the reconfiguration of police powers in Özal's civil rule must be read in terms of the 'civilianization' and 'liberalization' of the police war waged on behalf of the insecure neoliberal order.

The 'normalization' process within parliamentary politics continued with the lift of the ban on popular political party leaders of the pre-1980 in 1987. This could be considered the final step indicating the TAF's intention to delegate the political leadership of the neoliberal project to the civilian bourgeois polity in a precise manner. The winds of normalization seemed to be highly welcomed by the people, for the referendum on lifting political bans had a turnout rate of 93% – being the highest one in Turkish parliamentary history.[591] Not surprisingly, in the meantime the means of pacification were also proceeding with normalization in favour of the police department. In that, further reinforcement of high-tech weapons and armored vehicles was provided, and several new departments, most prominently the Anti-Terrorism and Operation Department, were established respectively in 1986 and 1987.

All these considered together along with the replacement of martial powers with the legal prerogatives based on emergency and national security, the police war at the heart of the neoliberal order becomes apparent. As the formal politics was transferred

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[589] "Özal: Polise Yetki Değil Görev Verdik", *Milliyet*, 17.06.1985.
[590] M. Neocleous, 2017, p. 19.

[591] "Türkiye'deki referandumlar ve katılım oranları", *BBC News*, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-39614996

to the bourgeois parliamentary form, the task of upholding social order was in turn taken from the martial powers to the police and emergency powers, which shows no essential dichotomy between the civil and military means of pacification, between the police and war powers.

3.5. Concluding Remarks

The so-called aim of 'crushing the enemy' is never sufficient on its own for pacification. This was also case for the September 12 regime. The 'crushing of the enemy' involved a thorough process of construction in social and political spheres so as to reveal the 'productive' nature of security.

As a widely accepted perspective, there exists an undeniable connection between the political economic impetus behind the 1980 military coup and the efforts towards restructuring the economy through the measures of the so-called January 24. However, the manner in which state power was wielded on the path to the coup has not been sufficiently examined although it provides hints of the class dynamics of security as well as the general form of the pacification project which would follow.

First, the pre-September 12 conditions suggest that contrary to claims of clash between military and civilian forces, there existed a close cooperation between these two as per the precepts of pacification, since the war and police powers had been interlocked throughout a severe crisis of hegemony which was unfolded into a crisis of 'social order'. The armed forces had been at play in policing the order before the coup. They had already assumed control over the Southeastern provinces by martial law, moreover, they pressured governments to increase the police powers within regions which fell outside their jurisdiction by the Coordination Meetings regularly held. Second, the law was intended to be utilized as a means of quelling the war in question. The extensive legislative package called 'measures against anarchy', which was rationalized under the rubric of 'laws suitable for war', had been a common agenda of both Ecevit and Demirel governments. These legal regulations undoubtedly aimed to protect the existing social order against disorder, but they also had the capacity to reorder social relations in tune with the neoliberal policy package on the agenda. The reason that they could not be put into effect before the coup lies partly in the political crisis, but, by and large, in the autonomy vested in 'the rule of

law' in the face of the executive power, owing to the social and political struggles carried by popular masses.

The new security concept declared by the military in 1979, called *Internal Defense and Development*, reflected a modern COIN strategy concerned with not only the crushing of the enemy physically but the rebuilding of the order with all possible aspects. This would give a hint of the main statecraft strategy of the upcoming military regime, which was to wage the war on the internal enemy (the 'communist threat') in a 'productive' manner'. Thus the two distinctive moments between 1978-1980 (war–police conjunction and appeal to the legal means) would be also evident in the pacification to be initiated under the exceptional regime following the coup: not only was the militant political violence stopped but a novel social and political order had been constructed under a logic of class warfare. Hundreds of regulations were enacted towards the restoration of the hegemony of the ruling class, as well as the creation of a new form of political subjectivity and workforce, which would be more diligent, docile and obedient to the state, capital and wage-labour system. Within such construction, the laws that were tailored for a wartime context in the late 1970s were transformed into the 'laws of peace and security' to be in effect under the new authoritarian state form.

Even for the military junta which engineered a brutal coup, two critical concerns were given paramount significance: the anchoring of the pacification policy within the realm of law (at least, of 'legality'),[592] plus a pronounced predilection for civil-administrative means (police, administration, emergency powers), wherever plausible. The preference for civil strategies, except crises, underscores the earnest endeavour to keep up with the underlying claim of 'peace'.

[592] In counterposing the state security before and after September 12 in a public speech, Evren stated that approximately ten times more legal regulations were enacted in the latter, indicating this as the main reason why there would be no need for martial law anymore. Public speech in Kayseri, 30 October 1982.

CHAPTER 4

THE LEGACY OF THE 'LOST DECADE': FINANCE-LED ACCUMULATION AND PROMISING INVESTMENT IN 'SECURITY AS WAR'

4.1. Introduction

This chapter will seek to offer a general overview of the 1990s with a view to the changing shift in capital accumulation and means of pacification in the course of neoliberal hegemony as well as on the basis of the new form of state established in the 1980s. To this end, I will attempt to sketch out how the political nexus of security and relations of force had been reconfigured to 'secure the insecure', in other words, how such reconfiguration went in tandem with the overarching insecurity of social order driven by the continuous economic and political instability of the era. It might be worth recalling a main point that the ever-present insecurity of bourgeois social order does not lie only in its constant likelihood of encountering challenges from systemic crises and/or popular resistances of the subordinate classes over the inherent conflicts of market relations. Concomitantly, insecurity also stems from the intimate limits to the social reproduction, in particular, the constant reproduction of wage labour, which tend to lead the subordinate classes to be always oscillated between what Marx called the 'double sense' of freedom[593] – either the pressure of proletarianization or of being reduced to an indigent rabble, a swelling mass of masterless men defined by economic inactivity, so to speak. Predicated on a highly

[593] Unlike classical political economists, Marx analysed the original formation of capital (as a social relation) as concomitant with the dissolution of the living labour from its objective conditions of production. Throwing a mass of living labour powers to the labour market, this process of dissolution/dispossession is also what leads to the emergence of the so-called free labour in a double sense: "free from the old relations of clientship, bondage and servitude, and secondly free of all belongings and possessions, and of every objective, material form of being, free of all property; dependent on the sale of its labour capacity or on begging, vagabondage and robbery as its only source of income.". K. Marx, 2015, [1857–61], pp. 430-1. The bourgeois insecurity originally lies in the social reality of this double meaning of freedom.

depoliticized form of politics that is devised to mute class antagonisms, Turkey's experience of neoliberal transformation in general and the post-1989 finance-led pattern of it in particular bear relatively a closer relevance to this latter aspect of insecurity. In that, the state more often than not has failed to develop nascent policies of pacification in the face of its role to reproduce the working class out of the increasingly disorderly social order originating from the growing bulk of population either left outside the relations of production (but ultimately dependent on them), or at best turned into disorganized, cheap, marginalized, informal labour force.

Indeed, the most significant hallmark of the 1990s is the detrimental consequences of the capital account liberalization completed in 1989 as a complementary strategic component of the neoliberal adjustment. Marking a clear retreat from the export-led industrialization alleged to be adopted in early 1980s, this step initiated a process which has clearly manifested that the neoliberal model, just as in the Latin American experience, has been far from promoting growth with high saving and investment rates in a way to prove wrong the central claims of neoliberal orthodoxy. Concomitantly, the same era also amounts to a constant provocation of social insecurity and uncertainty largely steered by the side-effects of the economy's vast dependence on volatile capital flows and susceptibility to crises. These effects were observed to take the form of, inter alia, deindustrialization, unemployment, substantial increase in income polarization and inequality due to deteriorating distribution, high rates of inflation, decrease in purchasing power, and flexibilization/marginalization of labour market. Not necessarily problematizing the social and political implications of the economic crises, a number of observers and practitioners tend to make of the crisis-ridden 1990s as a 'lost decade'; a label similarly ascribed to Latin American countries in the 1980s.[594] Whether it was the so-called strong state tradition (the state authorities, policymakers, the bureaucracy)

[594] Ziya Öniş, "Turgut Özal and His Economic Legacy: Turkish Neo-Liberalism in Critical Perspective", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 4, 2004. Izak Atiyas & Fuat Keyman, "The Political Dimension of Global Economic Challenges: Lessons from Turkey", *Think Tank 20: Beyond Macroeconomic Policy Coordination Discussions in the G-20*, The Brookings Institution, 2011. Erinç Yeldan, "On the Imf-Directed Disinflation Program in Turkey: A Program for Stabilization and Austerity or a Recipe for Impoverishment and Financial Chaos?, *SSRN Papers*, September, 2001. Ahmet Bekmen, "State and Capital in Turkey during the Neoliberal Era" in İ. Akça, A. Bekmen & B. A. Özgen (eds.), 2014. Yüksel Görmez & Serkan Yiğit, "The Economic and Financial Stability in Turkey: A Historical Perspective", *Fourth Conference of Southeast Europe Monetary History Network (SEEMHN)*, Belgrade: South-Eastern European Monetary History Network, 2009.

or the financial transformation process itself that had been accounted for, the overall slowdown in growth, dismal macroeconomic management, rapidly expanding fiscal deficits, highly vulnerable banking sector, increasing patronage and corruption, and the failure to keep pace with the global regulatory neoliberalism had been commonly referred as the constituents of the crisis-prone economic structure in these 'lost' years.

In fact, insofar as the decade in question is recognized as a period in which the economic crises as the 'organic moments' of capitalism have somehow provided further impetus for deepening in the neoliberal trajectory,[595] it indeed stands as a lost decade for bringing about a relatively democratic transformation in the state form, and thereby for diverting toward a more 'productive' policy of pacification. For, since the social insecurity and uncertainty endemic to neoliberal capitalism is failed to be administered around a well-functioning strategy of accumulation with stable economic growth and an effective social policy regime supported by redistribution mechanisms, the result had been a salient perception of risk of a political rupture in the reproduction of social relations. Indeed, whatever their unique historical and political roots, the ever-growing upsurge of 'threats' in need of being governed, secured and pacified had been order of the day in tune with the growing economic instability towards the end of the decade. Thus, to the extent that the state's capability of coping with the diffusion of insecurities had relatively declined, security and politics of securitization came to be posited in relatively more negative functions of political violence as compared to the positive dimension of pacification, bringing along new investments on the state's war power in both institutional and ideological terms.

The following discussion is organized in two main parts. The first part offers a general portrayal of the neoliberal process of financialization in reference to the long period of economic and political instability it has induced. Since what I am particularly concerned about is the social and economic insecurity triggered by neoliberal adjustment as the background to the politics of securitization, the decade will be grasped as a whole by drawing on a macro historical perspective. That is,

[595] P. Bedirhanoğlu & G. Yalman, 2010, p. 116.

instead of undertaking a year-by-year analysis of all political actors and dynamics behind the constitution of a large number of different governments, I try to evaluate the period as much as in homogeneity as both to the attempts of keeping up with neoliberal hegemony as well as the political failures to tackle with the inescapable outcomes of financial and capital account liberalization. The second part grapples with the process of the reconfiguration of state power pertaining to war and policing in response to the potential risk of social disorder in due time. This process indicates a further wave of securitization after September 12 bringing in a generic shift on the relations of force established by the latter. Most primarily affecting the existing post-1983 division of labour between the military and police forces in the function of social control, such shift will be problematized with its possible implications on pacification during neoliberal restructuring.

4.2. Protracted Crisis of Financial Liberalization

> What is heralded in its stead is a time in which every political commandment will embrace the natural form of 'Forward! March'. Time, then, as the panacea not just for the sorrows of the heart but for all political evils.
>
> Jacques Rancière, *On the Shores of Politics*

On the whole, the 1980s had been the outset of a radical change in class relations. One of the palpable outcomes of this change that shortly took effect was the substantial transfer of income from labour to capital. Large tax rebates on export revenues, high credit utilization, and privatization efforts as a rent transfer mechanism were brought together as the main distribution policy so as to operate alongside the suppression of labour rights and the increasing marginalization of labour markets.[596] Nevertheless, particularly exhilarating the commercial, financial and rentier forms of capital, the severe change in the distributional relations would mainly owe much more to the benefits of financial liberalization than to the alleged programme of outward-orientation. For the economy eventually failed to overcome its long-standing shortages of resource, market and technology despite the extraordinary measures taken by the military administration. Whatever claimed by

[596] E., Yeldan, 2013, pp. 102-3. K. Boratav, 2012, p. 149; K. Boratav, 2005.

the international and domestic agents of structural adjustment under the January 24 programme, the neoliberal accumulation strategies tended to be essentially structured around short-term and purely financial profit making rather than manufacturing industry exports, not least with the partial lifting of capital controls from the early 1984 onwards. Indeed, the performance of the manufacturing industry in the so-called export-led growth strategy remained to be limited with sectors of production with standard and low-cost technologies, maintaining its characteristic to be specialized in unsophisticated sectors.[597] With the exceptions of iron and steel products alongside the labour-intensive industries such as textiles, competing in the export markets had eventually been a residual activity for the majority of Turkish capital groups despite significant state support.[598] If one could speak of any achievement of the manufacturing industry in export-orientation in early 1980s this was chiefly thanks to the shrinking domestic market as well as the competitive advantage retained by the depreciation of the currency and other measures such as subsidies and promoting exports.[599]

Yet, it has to be underlined that this irresolute policy of enhancing the export capacity through currency depreciation has precisely come to an end following the capital account liberalization that has been accomplished in the summer of 1989 with the declaration of the full convertibility of Turkish Lira and removal of all restrictions on capital markets (Decree no. 32).[600] The premature and uncontrolled articulation in the speculation of international money markets would be quite costly

[597] P. Bedirhanoğlu & G. Yalman, 2010, p. 112; G. Yalman, 2009, p. 278; K. Boratav & O. Türel, 1988.

[598] G. Yalman, 2009, pp. 278-9. Anne O. Krueger & Okan H. Aktan, *Swimming against the Tide: Turkish Trade Reform in the 1980's*, Ics Pr, 1992; Fuat Ercan, "The Contradictory Continuity of the Turkish Capital Accumulation Process: A Critical Perspective on the Internalization of the Turkish Economy", in N. Balkan & S. Savran (eds.), *The Ravages of Neoliberalism: Economy, Society and Gender in Turkey*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2002, p. 26. It is shown by Adly that almost 1/3 of total exports and 52% of manufacturing exports were constituted by textiles and clothing industries constituted during the 1980s. Amr Adly, *State Reform and Development in the Middle East: Turkey and Egypt in the post-liberalization era*, Routledge, 2012, p. 42.

[599] P. Bedirhanoğlu & G. Yalman, 2010, p. 112. Yalman also adds that new export market opportunities for the Turkish industry, the contractors in particular, had been provided at the time by the fortunate circumstances in the wake of the second oil crisis in 1979 and the Iran-Iraq war. G. Yalman, 2009, p. 263.

[600] G. Yalman, 2009, pp. 291-2. K. Boratav, 2012, p. 174.

in a developing country which was at the time far from obtaining positive results in foreign trade and which lacked a sufficiently competitive environment in the product markets as well as domestic financial markets with sufficient depth and maturity.[601] Unsurprisingly, from 1989 on rapidly increasing capital inflows have become the main focus of the foreign and domestic rentier activities that have been actively encouraged to exploit the arbitrage opportunities due to interest rate differentials and exchange rate movements, whilst the dominant pattern of accumulation particularly for the majority of large holding groups had been diverted towards banking and housing.[602] The most enduring outcome of this process has been a structural deterioration, that is, the situation of the dynamics of arbitrage-seeking capital movements (i.e. 'hot money flows') at the core of the 'market-oriented' restructuring with the sacrifice of the residual efforts, if any, in new investments in productive activities.[603] As shown by Yeldan, from 1990 onwards the non-operating income of industrial enterprises has become a sine qua non for their profits, rather than provided an additional source of their production income.[604] Concomitantly, the banking system has abandoned its primary duty of providing investment finance to the industrial sector and has been dragged into a finance accumulation mechanism based on interest-exchange rate arbitrage and speculative earnings.[605] The share of non-labour income in GDP has eventually become negatively correlated with labour income share in due course.[606] To illustrate, the share of capital gains (interest, dividend, and rent) in total national income increased from 1.6% in 1980 to 13% in 1995, having the highest increase among other types of income in 1990s.[607] All these have, in turn, resulted in further dependence on international financial markets as

[601] E. Yeldan, 2013, p. 128, 140.

[602] G. Yalman, 2009, pp. 284-5.

[603] A study on manufacturing industry finds that fixed investments in Turkey declined at a rate of close to 1/7 in 1989 compared to the late 1970s, while this was close to 1/4 at the beginning of the decade. Cited in Şemsa Özar & Fuat Ercan, "Labor Markets in Turkey: Maladjustment or Integration?", in N. Balkan & S. Savran (eds.), 2002, p. 166.

[604] E. Yeldan, 2013, p.156.

[605] Ibid, p. 146.

[606] DPT, *Gelir Dağılımının İyileştirilmesi ve Yoksullukla Mücadele Özel İhtisas Komisyonu Raporu*, 2001, p. 40.

[607] Ibid, p. 41.

well as in the vicious cycle of public deficits due to expensive borrowing with high interest rates to finance the budget deficit.

Consequently, the structural fragility induced by financial liberalization has been the decisive feature in Turkey's neoliberal trajectory, the severe effects of which have been unfolded from the 1990s onwards. In a short time after the year 1989 that has initiated the economy's high susceptibility to international finance capital the country went through a wave of successive crises in 1994, 1998-1999, 2000-2001. Not surprisingly, the common triggers of the crises were the highly liquid, short term, volatile in- and outflows of financial capital, while it was mainly the workers, peasants, urban poor, lower-middle class and small businesses who picked up the bill.

All in all, it would not be difficult to make of this protracted crisis milieu within the decisive context of the (post-)political trajectory founded by the September 12 regime. Nevertheless, if any intrusion of 'politics proper' is to be sought within this trajectory one would need to trace back to the late 1980s.

4.2.1. Brief flare up of the labour movement: 1987-93

Given the suspicious viability of the growth strategies adopted, it did not take long for the political leadership of Özal administration to go downfall in the late 1980s. As a result of the steady decline in export revenues, the economy has come under heavy domestic and foreign debt burdens resulting in a chronic public deficit problem steadily after 1987 so as to retain its prevalence in the following decade. This was followed by increasing inflation rates due to the hikes that were deferred before the 1987 elections.[608] On the other hand, the political climate which was witnessing the collapse of the nearby 'socialist' regimes could be seen to impose a compelling condition for the organized labour to overcome its political dissolution brought about by the September 12 regime. Nonetheless, the regime's initial achievement of the economic and political repression as a short term way of

[608] Nazım K. Ekinci, "Türkiye ekonomisinde büyüme ve kriz dinamikleri", *Toplum ve Bilim*, 77, 1998, pp. 17-9.

pacification would hardly carry on in the coming period. Nor is there any evidence that working classes could be entirely insulated from the political apparatus which has assumed the representative role of class dominance as of 1983. The organized labour movement that dramatically revived in the second half of the 1980s had set a challenge for bourgeois politics for the first time since September 12, albeit barely intended to move into a transformative political ground going beyond the economic struggle for corporate goals in Gramscian sense.

Admittedly, the main thrust of this revival was the repressive income policies of the neoliberal model. Adjacent to the political assault on the labour movement, these policies were specified in the cases of cuts in public expenditure, currency devaluation, high rates of inflation and unemployment, layoffs due to privatization / closing down of public enterprises, labour market flexibilization and rise in subcontracting. With the help of the return of competitive politics and relative political liberalization by 1987, the labour unrest started to gradually flourish especially in the industrialized area of greater İstanbul and then spread widely to other cities.[609] Varying from diverse industries both of private and public sectors (e.g. telecommunication, textiles, paper mills, iron and steel, dockyards, tobacco and alcohol enterprises, public road construction and electricity), ensuing strike actions focused mainly on demands concerning wages, payments and legal rights (e.g. economic and social security, unionization and related labour rights for public workers). The protests culminated with the Spring Actions of 1989 which thrived to the utmost of publicization with the participation of around one million workers.[610] The Spring Actions paved the way for further strike waves and sparks of politicization in early 1990s consequently bringing about the foundation of the Confederation of Public Workers' Unions (KESK) which would overwhelm the general agenda of labour struggle throughout 1990s.[611]

Whatever achievements they had brought out with regards to their demands, the cycle of movements launched at the time appeared to bear political significance on

[609] Mustafa G. Dogan, "When Neoliberalism Confronts the Moral Economy of Workers: The Final Spring of Turkish Labor Unions", *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, no.11, 2010, p.26.
[610] S. Savran, 2004, p. 32.

[611] Canan Koç & Yıldırım Koç, *KESK tarihi: Risk alanlar, yolu açanlar*, Epos, 2009.

two points. First, the movements in large part amounted to illegal strikes and protests; they were normally encountered by police violence, but eventually did not retreat.[612] The May Day demonstrations in 1989 entailed the first illegal May Day action since September 12, for instance. Despite of a number of deaths, injuries and arrests[613] they were followed by illegal popular strikes and marches in coal, iron and steel (Zonguldak-Ankara) and bottle and glass industries (Paşabahçe) respectively in 1990 and 1991. Bypassing the legal barriers set by the September 12 regime, the actions successfully showed that labour struggle could go well beyond the law and order in which liberal peace is codified. Although the workers' dissidence ended up predominantly with concrete economic concessions, at the bottom of the disobedience to formal limits lay a challenge to the new order secured by the legal setting (in particular, the new legislation on trade unions and labour rights) which at the same time devised the precise political and ideological framework that would underlie the significant change in the distribution of social income. Even the fact that the whole unrest achieved to mobilize some parts of the most unorganized and lower segments had left some marks reminding of the labour militancy of pre-September 12. Though limited in its transformative capacity, this might have been considered to contest the existing class dominance. For it, at least, revealed the questionability of the smooth implementation of repressive neoliberal policies as was in the first half of the decade. Second, the actions opened up an opportunity for the working class to elude the trauma of September 12, and to show itself as a political actor on the grounds of formal democracy yet again. Making the best of the competitive atmosphere of the upcoming referendums in 1987 and 1988[614] plus the municipal elections in 1989, it is beyond doubt that the workers succeeded to exert a considerable pressure on the parliamentary balance of power. Both referendums were lost by Özal's ANAP, but it was especially the municipal elections which marked an utter defeat for his government, whilst ANAP's main opponent, the centre-left Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP) won a clear victory in the major industrial cities thanks to its effective articulation between the labour unrest and electoral campaign.

[612] M. G. Dogan, 2010, p. 25.

[613] "İçişleri Bakanlığı açıklaması: 'Eylemciler belli bir sendikayı temsil etmiyordu'". Milliyet, 02.05.1989.

[614] Other than the one on lifting political bans in 1987, the following year saw another referendum held by the Özal government to set snap local elections.

The political climate that had partially changed back in favour of class-based demands in the late 1980s had enforced Özal administration to yield and make some populist concessions to pacify the workers' fury. A 142% pay raise for public sector workers was approved in collective bargaining agreement in the May of 1989, and this would be followed by increases in real wages for civil servants and private sector workers, as well as in agricultural subsidies.[615] The sharp change in income distribution had thus been relatively compensated through to early 1990s.

By the same token, however, the completion of the liberalization of the capital account was turning out to aggravate the fiscal problem as it necessitated a higher rate of return on domestic assets as compared to foreign currency.[616] Thanks to the 'opportunities' of open capital account regime, the financing of the accelerated public sector deficits was tried to be achieved by borrowing at unprecedented levels of interest rates. Consequently, while discouraging nonfinancial firms from financing productive investment[617] the cycle of borrowing with high interest rates signified an inveterate public deficit problem which contributed to the unsustainable rise in current account deficits and had soon become the main economic issue during the course of the ensuing neoliberal trajectory. For example, the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) increased from 5 to 12 (% of GDP) from 1988 to 1993.[618] In addition, the SOEs were led to excessive domestic and foreign borrowing in view of the increasing wage and salary costs, which would henceforth precipitate the privatization process under the rubric of structural reform.

On the part of labour, new patterns of informal employment that significantly became widespread after 1993 have functioned to limit workers' capacity to organize and struggle on wage by entering into a new kind of relationship with the formal sector through subcontracting.[619] Worse, while the unsustainability of debt financing

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[615] K. Boratav, *Emperyalizm, Sosyalizm ve Türkiye*, 2010, p. 325.

[616] Galip Yalman, "The Neoliberal Transformation of State and Market in Turkey: An Overview of Financial Developments from 1980 to 2000" in G. Yalman (eds.), *The Political Economy of Financial Transformation in Turkey*, Routledge, 2018. E. Balkan & E. Yeldan (2002) "Peripheral Development under Financial Liberalisation: The Turkish Experience" in N. Balkan & S. Savran (eds.), 2002.

[617] G. Yalman, 2018.

[618] K. Boratav, 2012, p. 177, 183.

[619] Meryem Koray, *Sosyal Politika*, 2005, pp. 368-72. Ayşe Buğra, *Kapitalizm, Yoksulluk ve Türkiye'de Sosyal* Politika, İletişim, 2008, pp. 200-1.

culminated in the complete breakdown of the financial system in 1994 ushering in subsequent economic crises in the following period, the parliamentary centre-left politics (represented by SHP, DSP and CHP) dramatically refrained from the critical ground it had once appeared to adopt. To the extent that the invigorated weight of labour had fallen off the stage both in and outside the formal politics, neoliberal adjustment hardly came out of the policy agenda throughout the 1990s. As stated by Boratav, the efforts of centre-left parties to offer class-based options in the face of neoliberal policies had been utterly abandoned by the 1994 crisis onwards. Thereby, parliamentary politics, whatever the parties were deemed to be in the political spectrum, made significant contributions to the 'bitter recipes' imposed by the stability/structural adjustment policies during the period until the end of 2002.[620] In other words, the financial crisis of 1994, along with its successors, would be the moment of the entrenchment of neoliberal hegemony,[621] let alone helping to overcome it. The fact that the revival of the organized labour movement has someway come to a halt precisely after 1994, when the growing economic and social insecurity appeared to prevail in labour markets, might thus be seen indicative of the partial function assumed by crises in the 'reproduction and perpetuation of capital'.[622]

4.2.2. Entrenchment of neoliberal hegemony: 1994 onwards

While the overt anti-labour character of the existing economic and social policies continued to prevail in 1990s, exposed to a short period of economic populism though, neoliberal adjustment would indicate a shift in policy prescriptions as to the role of the state in its relation with market forces. In that, the market fundamentalist stance of the international agents of neoliberalism that would promote counter-Keynesian measures of minimal state intervention that is symbolized by policies of liberalization and deregulation had been replaced by an emphasis on the positive role

[620] K. Boratav, 2012, 175; K. Boratav, 2010, p. 326.

[621] Such entrenchment does not necessarily imply that neoliberal hegemony had been truly challenged by the labour activation which ended up with certain concessions in real wages. It was rather to make sure that the neoliberalization process has been in full flow going forward following the crisis in 1994.

[622] N. Poulantzas, 2000, p. 173.

of the state, i.e. the need for regulatory state reforms to ensure the putting in place of market friendly administrative/institutional structures, modes of regulatory state and governance. Often dubbed 'post-Washington consensus', such turn in the state-market relationship would be a prominent policy agenda for the Turkish case as well; however, the state restructuring reforms had yet to be launched smoothly in 1990s given the severe socio-political outcomes of the contested financialization process. In effect, despite the deteriorating macroeconomic performance, the balance of class forces had in no way digressed from the neoliberal orientation since the early years of the decade. This being the case, financial interventions in money markets had continuously contributed to the erosion of labour income shares in favour of banking profits and rent revenues. Indeed, at the turn of the crisis of 1994, layoffs and substantial decreases in real wages became order of the day.[623]

In the midst of the unsustainable balance of payments current account deficit as a result of the pressure of capital movements, the crisis management of the Çiller's DYP-led coalition government (DYP-SHP) initiated a new stabilization/austerity program without sacrificing the existing neoliberal orientation. A new phase of commitment to the IMF had been launched in April 1994, which would yield to a 14-month stand-by arrangement that totalled nearly $1 billion and envisaged a sharp fiscal adjustment, 70% to 100% of price increases in SOE products, and privatization of large SOEs.[624] Even though the latter entailed an effort to institutionalize the legal framework of privatization with the enactment of a new Privatization Law and the creation of the Privatization High Council and Privatization Administration, the programme in general lacked a thorough attempt of restructuring towards the sustainability of public and external debts. The policies overall resulted in the contraction in domestic demand, a major wave of unemployment, rise in inflation, runaway interest rates in the face of volatile exchange rates, the direct impact of all of which had been exerted on working classes through public wage freezes, cuts in public spending and rise in taxes.[625] Ultimately, in terms of class relations, the post-

[623] Ş. Özar & F. Ercan, 2002, p. 167.

[624] T. Marois, 2012, p. 107.

[625] Ibid, 2012, p. 108. Mustafa Sönmez, *Türkiye'de İş Dünyasının Örgütleri ve Yönelimleri*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010, p. 38.

1994 term would be marked by a diversion away from the populist compensation pulled off by labour struggle to the defaults of the wage suppression which had been the predominant feature of the early period of neoliberal transformation. To illustrate, the level of real wages in manufacturing sector in 1996 reached that of 1980 in spite of a 160% rise in the average value-added per worker between the years 1980-1996.[626]

Nonetheless, the austerity measures launched by the mid-years of the decade were met by a relatively resigned silence on the part of labour organizations. Although the layoff rate after the privatizations of SOEs that gained momentum after 1994 would reach 68.2% in the upcoming period,[627] no serious opposition had been observed. In fact, public employees represented by the KESK confederation apparently remained the chief pillar of the bare labour resistance in the post-1994 era. The Confederation launched various forms of action from hunger strike to work stoppage in the midst of the austerity measures.[628] However, these actions did not prevent the dramatic retreat of the labour movement bound up with the widespread decline in job security, increasing subcontracting and informal employment after 1994. For example, the unionization rate in formal private sector decreased from 69% to 54% from 1994 to 2000 according to the official records.[629] The unionization rate calculated with regards to collective agreement coverage declined from 37% to 23% within the same period.[630] Accordingly, the number of strikes and working days lost due to strike actions which were respectively about 450 and 3.5 million in 1990, decreased to averagely 40 strikes and 250.000 working days lost in the last couple of years of the decade.[631] All these might be telling about the functioning of job insecurity as a

[626] E. Voyvoda & E. Yeldan, "Patterns of Productivity Growth and the Wage Cycle in Turkish Manufacturing", *Bilkent University Department of Economics Discussion Papers*, No. 99-11, 1999, p. 2.

[627] Petrol-İş, *'97-99' Petrol-İş*, İstanbul, 2000, p. 307.

[628] For a detailed discussion see "Kamu Emekçilerinin Örgütlenme Süreci" http://www.kesk.org.tr/2010/03/31/kamu-emekcilerinin-orgutlenme-sureci/, and also the sections 5.C and 5.Ç. in C. Koç & Y. Koç, 2009.

[629] T.C. Çalışma Bakanlığı, *Çalışma Hayatı İstatistikleri*, 2001.

[630] A. Çelik & K. Lordoğlu, 2006, p. 20.

[631] The figures include both public and private sectors. Çalışma Genel Müdürlüğü Sendika Üyeliği ve İstatistik Daire Başkanlığı, *Yıllara Göre Grev ve Lokavt Uygulamaları 1984 - 2015*, 2015.

discipline mechanism as well, for the demand for job security had become, above all, the leading concern for workers in due course.

After all, what was further beyond doubt for the whole 1990s was the economic and political actors' obvious lack of hesitation concerning the deepening of finance-led neoliberalism without any peer. Notwithstanding the qualitative shift in capital accumulation strategies by 1989 onwards, such consensus in the state agenda also amounts to a decisive continuity between 1980s and 1990s in terms of the operation of neoliberal transformation, and, at the expense of a significant change in the balance of class forces. The continuity of ongoing economic and social policies 'without major dislocation'[632] was going to be crystallized by a fluctuant period of ten years, starting by the Staff Monitoring Agreement signed with the IMF in 1998,[633] in which the so-called structural reforms had overwhelmingly occupied the political agenda under the guidance and supervision of Bretton Woods institutions, and effectively exercised a hegemonic function for neoliberalism.[634]

4.2.3. Social and Political Repercussions

No less significant than the deliberate continuity in the adjustment process was the weakening representational capacity of the parliamentary parties as an ineluctable price of the existing neoliberal trajectory. Since different governments in power were observed not to have a motive other than sustaining short-term capital inflows and redeeming debts, it would be quite surprising for them to remain credible enough to undertake further interventions in distributional relations. Thus it would be apt to say that the cycle of economic crises running through the 1990s has also an important bearing on the failure of parliamentary politics in designing an adequate strategy to articulate different class and intra-class interests in order to properly enable the pioneering of the further phase of adjustment, i.e. the requisites of the 'second-wave'

[632] Ziya Öniş, "Varieties and crises of neoliberal globalisation: Argentina, Turkey and the IMF", *Third World Quarterly*, 27:2, 2006, p. 249.

[633] Turkey's steady commitment to the IMF and WB-directed structural adjustment process in this period is succinctly portrayed as 'different governments, one policy', BSB, 2007.

[634] More interesting is the fact that the deepest economic crisis ever (2001) had been experienced in this period, under an IMF stand-by agreement, yet again, it gave way to another agreement with the IMF.

of regulatory reform in the second half of the decade.[635] The political implications of the crisis applied both to the existing power bloc and the subordinate classes. It was apparent that the profitability in the post-1989 era increased particularly for international finance capital and domestic big bourgeoisie whilst the intra-class conflicts among the industrial and commercial, financial, rentier forms of capital[636] had increasingly erupted parallel to the deepening finance-induced crises which originally had their roots in the sphere of production. By the same token, despite the absence of a notable class challenge to capital after 1994, the pacification of the subordinate classes was only getting harder due to their being neglected in every aspect. The growing social and economic exclusion of the suburban poor had eventually occasioned a rupture in their political representation, which was to be deepened with the help of the escalated politicization of the Kurdish ethno-nationalist and Islamist movements. In view of the urban migration accelerated by the armed struggle with the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers' Party) in the southeastern Turkey, the expanded suburbanization and the growth in marginalized, cheap labour in large metropolitan areas have turned out to reveal the uneven and corrupted development of capitalism more than ever, providing a favourable playground for potential anti-systemic movements. The ethnic and cultural solidarity among the urban poor, particularly within the Kurdish and Alevi neighborhoods, further increased the risk of them being tempted by radical encounters.[637] Moreover, the partial unveiling of the long-debated shady relations between the state bureaucracy, security apparatus (primarily, the Special Operation Unit) and mafia under the guise of 'war on terror'[638] in 1996 had culminated into acts of civil protests and public disturbance, albeit non-violent and short-lived ones, against the political order.

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[635] There had been still some efforts towards the reconfiguration of the executive branch in line with the requirements of 'regulatory state' in the first half of the decade. In 1992, under Demirel's administration (DYP-SHP coalition), the Capital Market Board has gained the status of an independent state authority (IRA) as the unique state authority in capital market. This was followed by the establishment of the Competition Agency in 1994 as a requirement of the Customs Union Treaty signed with the EU, which offered further impetus to trade liberalisation and regulatory reforms.

[636] K. Boratav, 2005, pp. 80-1.

[637] T. Öngen, 2004, p. 178.

[638] The report titled the *Susurluk Report* (on the case publicly called the *Susurluk Scandal*) submitted by Kutlu Savaş, the director of the PM Inspection Board, in 1997. http://www.geocities.ws/jeostrateji/SUSSAVAS.htm

Topping it all off, social and economic insecurity had become the norm for the whole decade largely due to rising unemployment, polarization of incomes and adverse changes in labour markets. A few examples will suffice: The unemployment rate rose from 7% to 10% in urban areas and youth unemployment doubled from October 1989 to October 1994, the term beginning from capital account liberalization to the eve of the initial crisis of the decade.[639] The labour force participation rate, which was around 80% in the 1960s and 58% in 1989, fell below 50% in the second half of the 1990s.[640] As a consequence of the increase in informal employment outside the social security system as well as high inflation, the purchasing power of wage earners in 1995, following the austerity measures of 1994, fell by half compared to 1991.[641] Throughout the decade, income share held by highest 20% was observed to be about ten times higher than the lowest income group's share, while the 80% of the population can share only half of national income[642], which would lead Turkey to be among the world's five countries having the biggest gaps in income inequality as of 1998.[643] At the end of the decade, it turned out that a total of 25% of the population remained below poverty line, only about 10% of the population could enjoy collective bargaining rights, about half of the self-employed were uninsured while the uninsured among the wage earners reached one in five.[644] The economic and social insecurity had been evident even in the prevalence of suicide rates due to economic problems, which increased steadily from 10.7% in 1989 to 20.7% in 1998 and to 26% in 2001.[645]

The potential threat posed by this overall picture of acute bourgeois insecurity was in fact well recognized and taken seriously by leading political actors so much so that as of 1997, the unprecedented rates of inflation somehow began to be perceived as a

[639] TÜİK, *Labour Statistics (1988-1999)*. http://tuik.gov.tr/

[640] DİE, *İstatistik Göstergeler 1923-2002*, 2003, p. 153.

[641] Petrol-İş, 2000, p. 503.

[642] DİE, *Türkiye İstatistik Yıllığı 2003*, 2004, p. 348.

[643] Fikret Bila, "Gözler Baykal'da", Milliyet, 05.01.1998.

[644] M. Koray, 2015, p. 30.

[645] DİE, 2003, p. 40.

question of internal security that could even constitute an impediment to maintaining social order, peace and the regime. In a speech in TİSK conference in 1997, the then PM Yılmaz stated boldly:[646]

> Any failure to fight inflation and income injustice would pose a serious threat to the regime in these conditions of uncertainty and insecurity. While fighting inflation is key to preserve social peace in Turkey, the absence of policy practices such as unemployment insurance and a proper job-security scheme, which in fact explains the lack of a functional social security regime to compensate the defects of the set of measures to fight inflation, would further deepen social insecurity.

From the President to the representatives of large capital groups and trade unions, such economic-oriented perception of insecurity as a primary stake for the reproduction of social order was explicitly shared by state and class actors, with varying terms related to social explosion, social peace, democracy, regime, and terrorism, among others.[647]

However, the dilemma here lies in that while it was a common acknowledgment that the urgent problem in question was of social insecurity that could be secured only by more social security, the social security system has been brought on the agenda merely as a part and parcel of the structural reform process promoted by the IMF and WB. In effect, considered a structural burden on the public budget, reform in social security alongside the one in the SOEs occupied a chief place in the pro-market policy prescriptions at the time, which mainly aimed to increase the state's debt repayment capacity by minimizing public service and social transfers.[648] Yet, as the table below shows succinctly, the significant part of public expenditures throughout the 1990s had been resulted from rapidly rising interest payments which went in an inverse relationship with core public service expenditures (education, health, social security).

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[646] "Yılmaz'dan rejim uyarısı", Milliyet, 07.12.1997.

[647] "Koç'tan enflasyona karşı uzlaşı çağrısı", 08.11.1997; "Fiyatları donduralım", 15.11.1997; "Sosyal patlama olabilir…Dikkat!", 10.02.1998; "Yeni Güneydoğular Yaratmayalım", 11.02.1998; "Demirel de ekonomiden rahatsız", 15.02.1998; "Böyle giderse duvara toslarız", 18.02.1998; "Enflasyon düşmezse seçime gidilsin", 24.02.1998, Milliyet.

[648] "Yapısal Dönüşüm", 05.01.1998; "IMF reformları eksik buldu", Milliyet, 22.01.1998.

Table 4. 1. Percentage share (%) in total consolidated budget expenditures[649]

	Education	Health	Interest Payments	Social Security
1990	19,1	4,7	20,8	1,8
1991	17,6	4,0	18,5	1,2
1992	20,0	4,0	18,2	1,8
1993	16,7	3,9	24,0	2,8
1994	13,5	3,5	33,2	4,4
1995	12,3	3,3	33,7	6,3
1996	9,4	3,3	38,0	8,5
1997	8,0	3,3	28,5	9,5
1998	13,5	-	39,6	9,0
1999	12,2	2,8	38,2	9,8
2000	10,1	2,3	43,5	7,1

It is revealed that public education and health expenditures had fallen by almost half (despite the increase in staff expenses in the early period), whereas interest expenditures had more than doubled at the turn of the decade. We might add that state budget transfers to the social security system for debt financing had been considerably lower than interest payments. Moreover, notwithstanding the relatively effective mobilization of the Social Aid and Solidarity Promotion Fund in view of the expanded health coverage of the Green Card (*Yeşil Kart*) programme started in 1992,[650] almost half of the employees still remained outside the social security system due to vast informal employment sector.[651] Overall, the practice of social security in 1990s was far from achieving its function of 'social police' to secure the insecure in an economic system founded on insecurity.[652]

[649] The health and education data are derived from DPT, *Sayılarla Türkiye Ekonomisi Gelişmeler (1980-2001) Tahminler (2002-2005)*, 2002, p. 57, 59, the interest payments and social security data from T.C. Kalkınma Bakanlığı, *Ekonomik ve Sosyal Göstergeler 1950-2014*, 2015, pp. 150-1.

[650] A. Buğra, 2008, pp. 213-8.

[651] M. Koray, 2005, pp. 368-9.

[652] M. Neocleous, 2000, p. 64.

Amid the dilemmatic nature of the perception of social insecurity as such, the adjustment process expectedly resulted in an unstable milieu for parliamentary politics. Witnessing the formation of ten successive coalition and minority governments in ten years, parliamentary politics was marked by a failure both to absorb the contradictions within the power bloc and to produce active consent from the majority while proceeding with the very agenda of neoliberal policy prescriptions. Hence, the cycle of crises and unsustainable rate of inflation as its most direct effect on public had consequently accelerated the loss of popular support of the existing centre-left/right political parties by directly weakening their representational capacity at the end of the decade. It was thus apparent on the eve of the devastating financial crash of 2001 that the dominant fractions of the big bourgeoisie (primarily the most integrated ones within the global neoliberal order) were in pursuit of a novel political project that would be able to articulate the interests of different social classes and groups under the rubric of state restructuring and its ideological (categorically speaking, anti-statist) implications. This could be followed from the ways in which the ever-increasing demands of the representatives of capital for the reform packages prompted by the IMF began to shape the electoral agenda in the late 1990s.[653]

Nevertheless, grasping the bourgeoisie's quest for a more stable political representation merely as a throwback to the crisis of hegemony in the late 1970s with particular regards to the concurrence of the economic and political crises of capitalism[654] might be misleading. For the latter decade of crises did not mark a crisis of hegemony as the reproduction of the relations of political and ideological domination, i.e. the reproduction of the power of capital against labour in the simplest terms, in no way encountered a severe challenge in the midst of the detrimental social impacts of the crises. Nor would it indicate a historic and organic

[653] "Ya reform ya seçim", 04.12.1997; "IMF reformları eksik buldu", 22.01.1998; "Bürokratlar seçim bekliyor", 28.01.1998, "Seçimlerin kaderi IMF'ye bağlı", 09.02.1998; "IMF'ye eli boş gidiyoruz", 14.04.1998; Milliyet. The reform packages included distributional arrangements within the scope of social security, agriculture, public banks and SOEs.

[654] İ. Akça, 2014. A. Bekmen, 2014. Evren Hoşgör, "The question of AKP hegemony: Consent without consensus", in N. Balkan et al. (Eds.), *The neoliberal landscape and the rise of Islamist capital in Turkey*, New York: Berghahn Books, 2015. Faruk Ataay & Ceren Kalfa, "Neoliberalizmin Krizi ve AKP'nin Yükselişi" in N. Mütevellioğlu & S. Sönmez (eds.), *Küreselleşme, Kriz ve Türkiye'de Neoliberal Dönüşüm*, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2009.

crisis[655] as the economic crises did not develop into a 'crisis of the state as a whole' together with the apparatuses of hegemony.[656] The apparent political instability or the 'political crisis', so to speak, after all, did not give way to the emergence of a notably new policy agenda with alternative political doctrines, nor to the prospect of changes in the given regime of accumulation and/or in the form of the state and politics as was observed in Turkey and elsewhere in the 1970s.[657]

In effect, the destabilization of political society to develop secure ties with popular masses was indicative of the fact that social unrest was not minimal at all. Indeed, despair and uncertainty had become a societal norm for the majority of public especially by the second half of the decade. As just addressed, the devastating side effects of the economic crisis at the turn of the decade began to be perceived widely as an issue of 'social order and peace' which should be managed straight of the bat. Nevertheless, given the absence of essentially opposing forces in political society,[658] neither of these indications culminated into a level of class-based politicization in a way to pose a threat to the political domination of capital, as well as to the fundamental hegemonic strategy (depoliticization) of the September 12 regime. In this regard, just as in the international cycles of finance-induced crises from 1980s through to the 2000s, the 1990s in Turkey can be marked by a systemic crisis in neoliberalism, but not that *of* neoliberalism.[659] Although it is true that the upcoming

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[655] Barış Alp Özden, İsmet Akça & Ahmet Bekmen, "Passive Revolution: Beyond a Politicist Approach", *Development and Change*, 49(1), 2018.

[656] Buci-Glucksman, 1980, p. 72. Since an organic crisis would incorporate a crisis of the state, it cannot be reducible merely to economic and political crises in capitalism. The capitalist state, notes Poulantzas, is developed in such a way that political crises can be usually reabsorbed without transforming into veritable crises of the state itself. N. Poulantzas, 2000, p. 206.

[657] Andrew Gamble, *The Free Economy and the Strong State, The Politics of Thatcherism*, MacMillan Education, 1988.

[658] One could mention as an exception the Islamist Welfare Party's (WP) programme of Just Order (*Adil Düzen*) and its short-lived rise which was brought down by military intervention over 'secular concerns' in 1997. The anti-monopolist and anti-Western discourse that the Party's programme seemed to adopt could be considered to offer an alternative to the existing power bloc, however, it by no means entailed a counter-hegemonic character. The state forces' conflict with the WP was largely explicable on the rise of the political mobilization of Islamism and on the wave of securitization of civil society in the face of the crisis, rather than on a direct antagonism of class interests. On the other hand, it could be added that behind such rise lay the state's restricted ability to absorb conflictual socio-political interests through a more inclusive settlement largely due to the instability of the neoliberal economy.

[659] Alfredo Saad-Filho, "Crisis in Neoliberalism or Crisis of Neoliberalism?", in Leo Panitch (eds.) *Socialist Register 2011: The Crisis This Time*, 2011. Galip Yalman, "Crises as Driving Forces of

period after the 2001 crisis would proceed with the establishment of a new hegemonic project to remould the unity and cohesion of social formation, this was going to be achieved by hitherto the most vigorous implementation of the neoliberal policy agenda in place, let alone any renouncement from it. Thus, the smooth reinforcement of the political hegemony of neoliberalism in 2000s would be owed not only to the successful operation of the new hegemonic project under the AKP rule, but also to the fact that the crisis in the late 1990s and early 2000s did not turn into a crisis of hegemony as such.

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In short, it has become self-evident before the end of the decade that the accumulation strategies relying on volatile capital inflows have rendered the economy to be trapped within mini cycles of growth-crisis-stabilization having the investment growth rate always below the economic growth rate. Moreover, the neoliberal trajectory at work lacked effective tools to build support from popular masses as it systematically incited the political and economic exclusion of the wide segments of society. Since the measures leading to crises and the measures considered being the recipe to rebound from them were commonly to secure the conditions for finance capital-led accumulation strategies, the bitter but inevitable consequences have been mainly shouldered by the majority. On the other hand, particularly from 1994 onwards there appeared no genuine objection to the existing policy agenda either from the ranks of the working classes or the parties at the level of political society. By this means, the intermittent wave of crises from 1994 to 2001 could eventually become 'the main driving force to ensure neoliberal transformation'.[660]

One might also note that this positive interplay between the crisis in neoliberalism and deepening neoliberalization is also intimately bound up with the distinctive anti-statist quality of the 'dissident but hegemonic' discourse in Turkey.[661] On this view,

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Neoliberal 'Trasformismo': The Contours of the Turkish Political Economy since the 2000s", in Alan Cafruny (eds.) *Palgrave Handbook of Critical International Political Economy*, 2016.

[660] P. Bedirhanoğlu & G. Yalman, 2010, p. 116.

[661] G. Yalman, 2002; 2009.

the repercussions of the crises on political level, which were indeed a symptom of the unsustainability of neoliberal financialization, were widely deemed to be the main reason for it. As was touched upon also in the section on the *militarization* thesis, the undemocratic nature of neoliberal hegemony had eventually been absorbed and subsumed into a unique question of liberalization of the Turkish state. For instance, the reason behind the economic crisis was interpreted by economic liberals who have certainly been the adherents of the previous term under Özal's technocracy, as a 'loss of the vision',[662] as if any attempt of retreat has ever been in the policy agenda. Likewise, political liberals tended to analyse it as a 'crisis of governance and legitimacy caused by the state-oriented policies that did not comply with the ethos of pluralism and vision of democratic society'.[663]

Although what was experienced from 1989 onwards was quite sufficient to falsify the liberal contention that 'capital account liberalization would constitute the lynchpin of political and economic stability',[664] it was the state and economy bureaucracy again that was accused of constituting the fetter on capital groups and the essential source of macroeconomic instability.[665] Such hegemonic view becomes functional particularly in directing discontent and demands for change in favour of the very existing trajectory, insofar as it successfully blurs the class essence of the dominant policies. Hence, portraying the main confrontation as between the state and civil society (or the bourgeoisie) and moulding this into a discussion of 'political liberalization' and 'Europeanization' it was ready to constitute the chief ideological anchor of further neoliberalization and neoliberal hegemony that would proceed under the AKP rule.

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[662] Z. Öniş, 2004. A. Bekmen, 2004, p. 54. Z. Öniş, "Globalisation and Financial Blow-Ups in the Semi-Periphery: Perspectives on Turkey's Financial Crisis of 1994", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 15 (2), 1996. Fatih Özatay, *Finansal Krizler ve Türkiye*, Doğan Kitap, 2009.

[663] Fuat Keyman, "Türkiye'de Yönetebilirlik ve Meşruiyet Krizi", *Düşünen Siyaset*, V.1, 1999. F. Keyman, & B. Koyuncu, 2005. F. Keyman & A. İçduygu, 2003.

[664] The orthodox view known as McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis remarks that financial liberalization would accelerate the rate of economic growth by simulating high saving and investment rates together with the technological improvements. However, as a common case in emerging markets Turkish experience of financial liberalization has witnessed the opposite as the foreign-source dependency of the national economy has increased, the real production structure has been pushed to fluctuations and rentier-type activities have been incited so as to further worsen the income distribution, E. Yeldan, 2013, p. 129.

[665] P. Bedirhanoğlu & G. Yalman, 2010, pp. 111-3. E. Yeldan, 2013, pp. 105-6.

We might note, however, one more ideological underpinning of the neoliberal hegemony in the 2000s which has been largely put in its place in the 1990s. In that, the state power has reconfigured itself so as to enable the further wave of securitization of civil society to be governed in a close relation with the conduct of 'war', amid the potential risk of disorder posed by the rising social and economic insecurity. We can now take this idea a little bit further.

4.3. Reconfiguration of the War Powers

As discussed previously, parallel to the restructuring of the state-market relations starting by the September 12 regime, the unceasing warfare against the enemies of order had also been restructured so as to effectively accommodate to the historical function of the police power. This restructuring aimed at a certain degree of liberalization in terms of the civilianization of martial law through a series of security and emergency powers and accordingly, the institutionalization of the division of labour between the police and the military, the internal and external security in everyday pacification. While the state's war capacity pertaining to the police and military forces continued to expand, however, the crisis environment of the 1990s witnessed a new shift in the perception of internal threat and ways of struggle. It could be suggested that this shift had been also effective on the realignment of national security as a technique of governing as well as on the interaction between the roles undertaken by the police and the military in the practice of security as war, and war as security.

In fact, following the relative success of the September 12 regime in the suppression of class movement as well as the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the state's politics of securitization has been deprived of its principal ground of legitimation, that is, the 'communist threat'. However, in the meantime, the armed separatist nationalist organization PKK, which declared war on Turkey in 1984 but were regarded a relatively negligible threat valuated as 'a few bandits with unrealistic dreams' by the state until 1990s,[666] has somehow began to constitute the political, economic and

[666] Ümit Özdağ, "The PKK and Low Intensity Conflict in Turkey" Ankara Paper5, 2004. Anouck Gabriela Côrte-réal Pinto, "A Neo-liberal Exception? The Defence Industry 'Turkification' Project", *International Development Policy*, 8, 2017, p. 308.

symbolic 'heart of the matter' of Turkey's security politics. Indeed, the existing warfare and counterinsurgency setting that was fundamentally designed by the Cold War requisites after Turkey's NATO membership proved inadequate to deter the PKK's unconventional and asymmetric strategies of rural guerrilla warfare. The situation became even more critical as the PKK-induced violence was accompanied by urban-based insurgencies erupted in the big towns of southeastern Turkey by the early 1990s.[667] The fact that the PKK's state-like practices and the armed conflict arose in the rural areas of the provinces even under emergency rule was, to be sure, an indicative of the natural limits of the existing strategies of pacification. Eventually, the rapidly increasing power of the PKK at the expense of that of the state in the region led the military and security bureaucracy to a shift in the conception of threat and warfare. Dubbed terrorists and separatists, the organization was eventually targeted by the TAF as a main threat. In 1992, ethnic separatism was officially identified as of top priority in the National Security Policy Document.[668] This also amounted to the change in the TAF's main role in the new security setting of the state, as it now reoriented its focus towards internal order again away from external security, whilst the latter was under growing pressure from all quarters due to several defects (Gulf War and the protracted instability in the Middle East, Nagorno-Karabakh War along the eastern borders, Aegean and Cyprus dispute with Greece, the uncertainties in the Balkans amidst Yugoslav Wars). The Chief of the General Staff, Doğan Güneş, who, as stated previously, was known for his seemingly congruent views regarding the state's ongoing efforts in the direction of the institutional demarcation of the security apparatuses (i.e. internal/external security), openly declared in 1993 that the internal threat symbolized by the armed Kurdish movement would be henceforth the principal priority of the TAF.[669] From now on the whole gamut of national security matters of the state, whether military or civil,

[667] Zeynep Şarlak, "Atatürkçülük'ten Milli Güvenlik Rejimine: 1990'lar Türkiye'sine Bir Bakış" in İnsel & Bayramoğlu (eds.), 2013, p. 289. Mustafa Cosar Unal, Counterinsurgency and Military Strategy: An analysis of Turkish Army's COIN efforts, *Military Operations Research*, 21(1), 2016. Adnan Çelik, "Düşük Yoğunluklu Savaş'tan Teknolojik Üstünlüklü Savaş'a: Türk Devleti'nin Yeni Savaş Konsepti Üzerine Tespitler", Yeni Yaşam Gazetesi, 14.03.2018.

[668] Z. Şarlak, 2013, p. 290.

[669] Evren Balta Paker, "Dış Tehditten İç Tehdide: Türkiye'de Doksanlarda Ulusal Güvenliğin Yeniden İnşası" in E. Balta Paker & İ. Akça (eds.) *Türkiye'de Ordu, Devlet ve Güvenlik Siyaseti*, 2010, pp. 411-5.

would be predicated on a new conception of 'war on terror' in which the armed Kurdish movement is codified as the leading internal enemy.

In effect, from a vantage point one could suggest that the political situation of national security on the grounds of war on terror as such was not essentially contradicted with the state agenda on the so-called 'liberalization of martial law' launched in the previous decade as a post-martial law strategy. Such shift in national security also reflected well the NATO's broader reconception of security defined in 1991 which counts in the "political, economic, social, and environmental elements as well as the indispensable defence dimension".[670] However, it also holds true that since such shift took place by way of the TAF's reorientation towards internal order and security yet again, the functional boundaries alleged to demarcate the powers of war and police would be blurred again. Put different, the security functions affiliated with the supposed divisions between the military and the police as organizational forms, which had been the main thrust of the new security setting to be in effect after the military administration, began to be notably overlapped due to the multidimensional deployment of these powers for the war on terror in place. There is no doubt that the rising tendency towards the securitization of civil society in response to the severe conditions of crisis was predominantly led by the military and coincided with the militarization efforts of the NSC throughout the decade. By no means, however, did such militarization entail a separate process from the policing deployment as a whole: The neoliberal securitization predicated on the proliferation of the threats alleged, on the one hand, came to pave the ground for the military to assume active role in policing social order through new administrative techniques such as crisis management, or ways of cooperation with the police department in the face of emergent social events (e.g. *EMASYA*). It on the other hand situated the police as a low-intensity force assisting to the military on its war on terror in the southeast, and besides, in view of the new anti-terror measures it provided the police with expanded discretion in its mandate on civil society.

What followed then was a steady restructuring of the destructive force of the security apparatus both in the military and the police organizations. Starting by the early

[670] "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept", 07.11.1991. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23847.htm?selectedLocale=uk

1990s, the military's warfare and counterinsurgency tactics have changed dramatically attune to a new understanding that would specify the necessary measures according to the respective threat. In this light, the transition from the concept of conventional war to 'low-intensity conflict' had been accelerated resulting in new specialized army installations in the region. In line with the imperatives of low-intensity conflict, the strategy of 'areal control' which was to utilize troops stationed in rural towns was replaced by a new one ('switch and control') based on attacks in division and corps level operations supported by land aviation.[671] The Special War Teams, the 'stay-behind' paramilitary organization of the Cold War, were dissolved and replaced by the Special Forces Command (*Özel Kuvvetler* Komutanlığı) in order to counteract the guerrilla/unconventional warfare tactics of the PKK.[672] These forces have been backed up by the Gendarmerie Special Operation (*Jandarma Özel Harekat)* consisting of specialized commando units. Presented to the public by the PM Çiller as 'being trained to fight the militants with their own methods'[673] the Special Forces soon became the main rural police force in the region.

As part of the novel counterinsurgency campaign, new psychological warfare tactics were also mobilized including the deepening of the dynamics of local conflict by the expanded use of village guards and local informants as paramilitary forces, as well as the peaceful calls made for surrender in order to benefit from the legislation known as the 'law of repentance'.[674] Not less significantly, village evacuations, unsolved political murders, enforced disappearances, cases of death by torture were systematically carried out via a semi-legal, ever-contentious unit called *JİTEM* (the Gendarmerie Intelligence and Counterterrorism).[675] It is pertinent to note here that

[671] Metin Gürcan & Mustafa Coşar Ünal, "Reaching a balance of resolve: the enduring conflict between Turkey and the PKK" in E. Lieberman (ed.), *Deterring Terrorism: A Model for Strategic Deterrence Reaching a balance of resolve: the enduring conflict between Turkey and the PKK*, Routledge, 2019.

[672] E. Balta Paker, 2010, p. 414.

[673] Human Rights Watch, *Weapons Transfers and Violations of the Laws of War in Turkey*, 1995, p. 51.

[674] "PKK'ya psikolojik savaş", Milliyet, 01.04.1995.

[675] Özgür Sevgi Göral (et al.) *The Unspoken Truth: Enforced Disappearances*, Hafıza Merkezi, 2013.

not the extrajudicial quality of such activities, but more significantly the state's open reluctance to fall within the legal framework so as to provide a broad shield of impunity could be considered a rupture in the pacification strategies by then. Ultimately, the violence of the low-intensity warfare, which was itself an outcome of the failed pacification efforts in the southeast, resulted in hundreds of civilians 'lost under custody', more than three thousand villages exposed to forced evacuation and a total of around four million civilians uprooted by the end of the decade.[676] Ending up shanty town dwellers, it is no coincidence that the major part of the displaced population has then been a high-value target of further policing practices in overcrowded cities of the western side of the crisis-ridden Turkey, where any political prospect of approaching social issues outside market dynamics have been systematically foreclosed.

Nonetheless, given both the potential threats of disorder posed by the migrant underclass in western metropolitan areas plus the already natural limits of the policies of overt violence, the state elites were well aware of the need to pacify the Kurdish populated region by way of more productive strategies of pacification that would impose peace and order at the same time. In this light, in cooperation with the NSC,[677] the PM Çiller announced two subsequent projects called 'Central Villages' and 'Return to the Villages' in 1994 and mid-1995, respectively. Complementary to the state-sanctioned *GAP* regional development project launched in 1989 which has been criticized by some for entailing the 'new chain of exploitation and colonisation of natural and human resources in the region'[678], both projects primarily aimed to incorporate an expansive housing and environment planning along with infrastructure construction in the village areas evacuated. In the first phase, in order to enable the employment of more than 20.000 dwellers, 4.450 units of social housing would be built by the Housing Development Administration Board within a

[676] Mehmet Gurses, *Anatomy of a Civil War: Sociopolitical Impacts of the Kurdish Conflict in Turkey*, University of Michigan Press Ann Arbor 2018, p. 18. Joost Jongerden, "Resettlement and Reconstruction of Identity: The
Case of the Kurds in Turkey", *Ethnopolitics* 1(1), 2001.

[677] "Kürt sorununa MGK çözümü", Milliyet, 17.08.1994.

[678] Osman Aytar, 1991 cited in V. Yadirgi, *The Political Economy of the Kurds of Turkey From the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic*, Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 46.

year in southeastern rural towns to be sold with low-interest loans,[679] and then the construction of collective production zones would follow.[680] Quite evocative of the conventional pacification's archetype of 'clear-secure-build' to promote general welfare and morale conducive to accumulation, it was stated by the PM that 'these will be secure areas, which will have easier communication among themselves, and they will have better solutions for their economic problems, including marketing, by easily reaching out to each other'.[681] The initial project was soon welcomed and promoted by mainstream media circles with the headline 'capitalism will flourish in the Southeast with Central Villages'.[682] Interestingly enough (or not), the political elite including the far-nationalist MHP came to approve and even claimed mastermind of it.[683] The projects were also adopted by the programme of Mesut Yılmaz government formed in 1996 which promised to accelerate the housing process as part of the economic and social measures to bring welfare and peace in the region.[684] Yet, despite all this uproar, whatever credibility shown by the political leaders, the village projects eventually turned out to be aborted on the grounds of lack of funding from the Social Development Fund of the Council of Europe.[685]

Notwithstanding the extrajudicial proceeding of the war and failed pacification attempts in the East, law and administration have still been the main playground of the war undertaken by police on the rest of the country. An extended Anti-terrorism Law (No. #3713) was issued in 1991 and has soon become a carrier of the state's war powers activating a large scale of policing mechanisms. The Law has increased the punishment of terror crimes and crimes committed for the purpose of terrorism and

[679] "Güneydoğu'ya nefes aldıracak proje", Milliyet, 30.07.1994. "Toplu Konut ihalelere başladı", Milliyet, 27.08.1994.

[680] "Çiller'den Toplu Çiftlik Projesi", Milliyet. 23.08.1994.

[681] Quoted in Human Rights Watch, *Turkey's Failed Policy to Aid the Forcibly Displaced in the Southeast*, 1996.

[682] "Güneydoğu'da Kapitalizm Merkez Köylerle Yeşerecek", Milliyet, 04.12.1994.

[683] "'Türkeş: Köy Projesi bizim'", Milliyet, 30.11.1994. "Köy Projesinin sahibi artıyor", Milliyet, 01.12.1994.

[684] "53rd Government Programme", 1996.

[685] Human Rights Watch, *Turkey's Failed Policy to Aid the Forcibly Displaced in The Southeast*, 1996; *Displaced and Disregarded: Turkey's Failing Village Return Program*, 2002.

authorized the State Security Courts for the relevant cases. What looks startling, on the other hand, was the number of crimes falling within the category of terrorism. As long as any intent to adopt a method defined by vague terms such as intimidation or threatening behaviour is identified, acts tending to alter the economic order, or to disrupt internal or external security, public order and public health are countered as terror crimes (article #1). The Law involves further crimes by explicitly referring to two separate legislations – the Penal Code (# 765) and State Security Court Law (#2845) (articles #3 and #4). However, the commitment of the alleged crimes in both references does not naturally imply methods affiliated to terrorism (violence, intimidation, or threatening behaviour). For example, the scale of crimes in Penal Code includes acts such as 'not reporting a crime', 'encouraging military disobedience', or 'making publications to encourage people to commit crimes'. The same logic applies to those transferred from the latter list of crimes (in the State Security Court Law): 'broadcasting or publication of illegal material', 'leaving work with at least three colleagues' (for public servants), and 'being involved in a fight ending with death or injury'. Worse yet, by means of the reference made to State Security Court Law, acts identified as 'peace and security-disrupting' in the legislation on Meetings and Demonstrations, Collective Bargaining, Strike and Lockout also came to be listed in the Anti-terrorism Law. Within this unreasonably broad and vague scope of terrorism, even 'two people having agreed around the same objective' would be deemed enough to identify a terrorist organization. On the whole, other than mobilizing a massive police operation toward the prospect of social dissent with the help of such vague terms that would definitely reinforce the arbitrary use of discretionary police power, the class component of the 'war on terror' politics becomes most tangible by the Law's potential to criminalize the use of labour rights in potential industrial disputes.

Moreover, the ever-growing fear within the state mind that the economic crisis might turn into a crisis in peace and security as in pre-September 12 further compelled the military to posit itself as an internal policing agent in the second half of the decade. In this light, adjacent to 'war on terror', whose policing scope was by no means confined to the Kurdish conflict, the foreground of national security in the 1990s was moulded by yet another administrative category: 'crisis management'. In 1997, the

PM Crisis Management Centre was established under the responsibility of the Secretary General of the NSC in order to regulate the processes of administration of dealing with 'crises'. The Centre was vested with the power to give and execute political directives on national security and to establish temporary crisis centres in provinces and districts in times of crisis. Although the Centre could be seen as an institutional pillar of the NSC's efforts of militarization of the rise of the Islamic movement symbolized by the Welfare Party government in power, significant in the political setting of crisis management was the apparent social quality of the cases categorized as 'disruptive and unexpected events' to be interfered in. The list of such events defined in the PM Crisis Management Regulation was a long one.[686] Everything from 'massive social movements targeting the tranquillity of public order' through severe economic crises to illegal strikes, lockouts and work stoppages to incidents arising from differences of ethnic, religious or sectarian identity were to be construed, alongside terror incidents and natural disasters, as the events inducing crisis and thus calling for crisis management. Given that the whole decade was overwhelmed by the systemic crisis in neoliberalization, it would not be wrong to put that crisis management was principally concerned with the likelihood of the 'emergence' of a disruption in social order out of the actual crisis in effect. Crisis management was therefore designed as an administrative technique pertaining to emergency powers. From the mindset of the state, it was directly linked to the crisis management of neoliberal capitalism.

It was clear back then that the military's orientation towards internal order and security in line with its new conception of national security was also to provide an excuse for reasserting its institutional influence over politics. Concomitantly, it is also beyond doubt that more prerogatives the military reasserts would mean more organizational shifts in the division of labour within the politics of security. Yet from a broader lens of state power that goes beyond the institutional dualities in formal politics, military prerogatives as in crisis management were neither more nor less than the institutionalization of further emergency powers that could be activated without declaring war (martial law) or state of emergency — let alone its huge ideological effect of installing more security obsession into everyday life.

[686] "Başbakanlık Kriz Yönetim Merkezi Yönetmeliği." *Official Gazette*, no. 22872, January 9, 1997.

Notwithstanding the shift or even a rupture in the so-called civil-military balance of power, such powers run parallel to the efforts towards the replacement of martial law by the politics of national security and emergency powers from 1983 onwards. As admitted by the then Secretary of the General Staff in an interview, the aim of crisis management was to impose certain directives without going into war or armed conflict.[687] Perfectly attuned to the security spirit of September 12, any threat to order would thus be gathered underneath the umbrella term of crisis so as to pave the ground for further penetration of emergency powers into the everyday administration of the population outside the scope of the constitutional status of warfare or emergency rule.

What followed in this administrative restructuring of emergency was another addition to the military role in policing order. Known as a secret blueprint called *EMASYA* (Turkish abbreviation of the Police-Military Cooperation), a security protocol was signed between the Minister of Interior and the General Staff in 1997. The protocol was drawn up on the basis of the Article 11 of the existing Provincial Administration Law (no. #5442) which allows for the deployment of military troops in cases of extraordinary social events upon the request of the provincial governor. It was devised to regulate the know-hows of such deployment, the only addition to it being the authorization of force commanders to step in emergency cases on their own responsibility, in other words, without waiting for ratification by civil governors. With the latter authorization the military, at least indirectly, availed itself of preemptive police actions, most significantly, of conducting intelligence work on the population on daily basis. The political significance of bringing the police-military cooperation back to the state agenda once more in an escalating economic and political instability since the one in the eve of September 12 was self-evident. Whilst the military was already primarily in charge of the close combat required by war on terror, its exclusive orientation to internal security by laying claim to prerogatives did account for a police war to secure the insecurity of the neoliberal order – if not a war in its narrow conception, that is, formal military engagement. On this view, it was not be of any surprise that the Retired Special Coordinator of the Counter-Terrorism Unit, commenting on the ever-controversial protocol of EMASYA, was

[687] "Mermi atmadan darbe yapma 'başarısını' övdü.", Sabah, 20.4.2012.

making it explicit how workers' act could be seen equal to war from the security perception of the state:

> If an extraordinary situation arises in a settlement, for example, the workers strike, the police intervene, the incidents begin to escalate, and it turns out that the state cannot overcome this situation with the police forces. Given this fact, taking joint decisions with the governor of the province the Armed Forces would step in. It is in our laws. For this purpose, the Armed Forces do not passively wait for the ultimate moment of intervention, but they start to do planning based on the possibilities much earlier than that. It conducts military exercises beforehand on such alternative war scenarios.[688]

Given that even the workers' strike could constitute an 'extraordinary situation' which needs to be taken measure of through 'war scenarios', it can be argued that the baseline underlying the vigorous reconfiguration in the politics of national security in 1990s was the potential risk posed by the social outcomes of the wave of crises. Notwithstanding the observable downfall of the organized labour movement and the replacement of the former anti-communist threat by the Kurdish movement as the primary internal enemy, it was still ineluctable for the state in such crisis situation to deploy its war powers in view of class war as the fundamental conflict that could potentially give way to different forms of conflict. The fragility of the economic order ultimately appeared to bring along a new setting of national security that would legitimize the state mandate on civil society over a dozen of threats alleged to exist, whether defined with regards to the category of crisis, risk, emergency, terror, or war.

The war in the name of national security that was driven largely as a police war by the military forces was by all means accompanied by the police organization throughout the decade. This accompaniment fell well within the post-1983 process of empowering the material and legal powers of the police. This means that the pioneering role of the military in policing order did in no way occasion a retreat in the powers of the police in 1990s. In this light, the expansive EM-RE-MO programme of modernization and reorganization started by 1983 had proceeded in 1990s with new purchases of equipment and gear as to heavy weapons, armoured vehicles, air force, naval force, and staff. To illustrate the expansion of its coercive

[688] Interview with General Edip Başer cited in "'TSK AKP'ye değil greve önlem alır'", soL, 22.01.2010. "Balyoz işçi sınıfına", soL, 21.01.2010.

capacity, the police by the mid-1990s already acquired its own air force having averagely 4.000 hours of control and tracking flight per year plus a land force equipped with 229 panzers, 116 armoured land rovers, and 52 armoured scorpions.[689] Likewise, given the notable renovation of weapons, for example, the replacement of classical domestic pistols with the US and French-made shotguns to be used by special teams,[690] the strategies of the so-called police deterrence of crime seemed to be replaced by the efforts of empowering the former's deadly force. The staff had also expanded in this manner. The number of police officers, which already marked a sharp bounce at the beginning of the decade compared to early 1980s, increased by 31% only in the four-year period of the 'war on terror', 1990 to 1994.[691] Thus, the number of officers per capita increased from 1:714 in 1985 to 1:514 in 1995. Additionally, about 6.000 buildings (headquarters, stations, lodgings, houses) were built for the use of the personnel.[692]

The deployment of the Rapid Action Units, the teams replaced the contested Society Police for the policing of public order, had decisively accelerated in the first half of the decade. By the end of 1994, they were organized in 63 cities and 38 towns with about 15.000 officers who could be called for help by other cities when necessary.[693] Accordingly, as the so-called low-intensity conflict began to be conducted as a police practice as well as a military engagement towards the mid-1990s, Special Operation Teams, originally part of the Counter-Terror Operation Department based in the three largest cities in the western Turkey, organized under a unique department separate from the latter.[694] Following that, the Special Operation Police Schools have been opened by a decree law in August 1993 for the training of specialized police commando teams. In effect, the driving force behind the establishment of such

[689] Halil Nebiler, "1980 Sonrası Polis", *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi 14*, 1995, p. 1074.

[690] Ibid.

[691] İ. Metin & F. Aslan, 1996, p. 1069.

[692] H. Nebiler, 1995, p. 1074.

[693] Ahmet H. Aydin, *Police Organisation and Legitimacy: Case Studies of England*, Wales and Turkey, 1997, p. 98.

[694] The establishment of the department was based on a decision of the Council of Ministers on 26.07.1993, which was, however, not published in the Official Gazette, according to Kutlu Savaş's (of the Inspection Board) *Susurluk Report*.

separate unit was a part of the shift in the state's security bureaucracy toward the need of a conjoined war against terror. In this light, the appointment of Mehmet Ağar, who was known for his defence of a hawkish policy in the fight against 'internal enemies', as the head of the General Directorate of Security in 1993 overlapped with the shift in the military's counterinsurgency tactics against the PKK by the early 1990s. For the main precept of the new hawkish administration in the Security Directorate was the 'civilianization of the war on terror',[695] it did not last long that a major part of the Special Teams who were known to be recruited from far-right Turkish nationalist groups was moved to the rural areas of the eastern and southeastern region to fulfil the counterinsurgency measures adjacent to the military forces. Enjoying quite a substantial degree of autonomy equipped with a variety of unconventional ways and methods, these forces appeared to well compensate the initial inadequacy of the military specialization in the face of the guerrilla war tactics of the PKK. Together with the Gendarmerie Special Forces, they were considered to have played a pivotal role in the state's having gained the military advantage over the PKK.[696]

However, from a certain perspective what all of these means might be seen as the sole manifestation of the overlapping modalities between war and police in the modern bourgeois state. Just as national security devised on the basis of war on terror was essentially mobilized as a technique to shape and administer internal order, so the function of the police force deployed for the war on terror in the East was never confined to that task. For war is never confined to 'the military' once it is conducted in the name of order and security. It was thus no coincidence that the war on terror in the East under emergency rule was naturally linked to the administration of security in the rest of the country. In that, superficially contradictory to what was initially needed, the police's paramilitary Special Operation Teams, composed of about 6.200 officers, were after a while dispatched to urban centres in the West on the pretext of task expiration and vast human rights violations.[697] By this means, they have henceforth served as backup squads together with the Rapid Action Units in the

[695] Ertan Beşe, "Özel Harekat Daire Başkanlığı" in Ü. Cizre (ed.), 2005, p. 116.

[696] E. Beşe, 2005.

[697] K. Savaş, 1997. E. Beşe, 2005, p. 116-7. "'Özel Tim' Batı'da eritilecek", Milliyet, 02.08.1995.

warlike conduct of security in the West as well, usually in the form of house raids in shanty towns deemed to be potentially criminal.[698] Both forces have been accompanied by the motorcycled police teams (called the Dolphins, *Yunuslar*) established in 1993 with regards to the mobile policing of public order. Overall, the approximation gradually set between the concepts public order and terror in the official discourse at the time[699] has helped blurring of the lines demarcating the tasks of all these units by further rendering the policing of terror, poverty-related crime and any potential threat of disorder as adjoined categories of security throughout 1990s.

The fortification of the state's war powers on the part of the police has unsurprisingly applied to the intensive semantic transfer from the military to the police on symbolic and ideological level, as well as that of military tactics and gear. The army look-alike police parades, marching of the police units repelling protesters with the well-known military training theme 'everything for the homeland' ('*her şey vatan için'*), according martyr status to the police officers murdered, canonizing the police deaths with military connotations such as 'homeland defence', official discourses identifying attacks against the police with those against the 'flag and nation'[700] are among various examples that might be publicly observed at the time. Although from the standard accounts of the militarization discourse this could be evaluated as the excess of the powers given to the police by the law, and even as an outcome of the civil/military, the police/army rivalry[701] what was happening was nothing but the unleashing of the relation between war and police in bourgeois order which posits them as predicative on one another.

In effect, as discussed before, the intersection between war and police was apparent even before September 12 as the security threats that were in some way linked to 'anti-communism' came to be treated by the logic of warfare. Accordingly, far from urging to a clash between the police and military, having a draconian police force

[698] B. Berksoy, 2010, p. 145.

[699] Quoted in B. Berksoy, 2007, p. 127.

[700] Tanıl Bora, Polis Devleti, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi 14*, p. 1073.

[701] Ibid.

was a prime envisagement for the September 12 junta before anyone else. Moreover, the exercise of the police war on the criminal, lawless, disorderly and disloyal has already transferred the latter into the scope of national security, construing them as internal enemy. This time, however, the political setting of national security has incorporated the war on terror and its ideological interpellations so as to render the latter as the main playground of linking the internal and external security throughout and after 1990s. Concomitantly, as the common sense of chronic insecurity installed by the September 12 regime was accompanied by the default economic insecurity of the financialization process, the police interest on fighting political dissent has been further provoked. In this sense, 1990s had marked an expansion of discretionary police powers in identifying the enemy. Most particularly, the vague textual content of the Anti-terrorism Law of 1991 was a landmark in vesting such powers. Nevertheless, by concretely referring to the use of the rights given by the legislation on Meetings and Demonstrations, Collective bargaining, Strike and Lockout, it was made sure by the Law that the category of enemy, whether actual or potential, would definitely keep a close sight on the working class yet again.

Besides identifying the enemy, the police discretion has also applied to the exercise of the right to punishment, more often than not, on a class or political basis. For instance, only in 1994, 217 people were killed by the police in 3570 incidents labelled under the category 'ideological events'.[702] Not least the local riot in the Alevi neighbourhood Gazi Mahallesi in 1995 resulting in the deaths of more than twenty people, the May Day Celebration of 1996 resulting in the deaths of three people as well as the unions' protests over the IMF-backed austerity measures of 1994 in the form of march, sit-in, hunger strike, and yearly student protests over the *YÖK* could be mentioned as paradigmatic examples of the forceful police interventions staged at the time. Moreover, hundreds of thousands of secret blacklists, tags, security investigations and archival research conducted by the police in 1990s were known to be vastly on teachers, students, public servants and workers. Due to 'political' reasons 300.000 citizens had their passports confiscated by the police, while 6680 of them were solely outcome of police trials without judicial

[702] H. Nebiler, 1995, p. 1075.

investigation.[703] Worse yet, even though many of these people were later acquitted by the court, they had to wait for the police's approval for years to recover their passports.

The same period also provides enough evidence that the police forces, which had been technically more equipped than ever, did not appear to put in the same effort to fulfil their so-called principal tasks, i.e. the detection and prevention of crime and law enforcement. According to the official annual report (1994) of the Security General Directorate, the year witnessed a large number of public security incidents and ended with a large number of police failures to detect crimes. For example, only about a quarter of 187.000 security cases in 1994 were resolved by the police, and three-quarters remained unresolved. Likewise, the offenders of only 39 of the 489 attacks directed against individuals, neighborhood communities, parties, associations, and union buildings were identified. It was also documented that throughout the year 892 explosive materials were used in the violent actions in city centers, but the police was able to seize only 83 of them.[704]

In fact, what seems contradictory here makes much sense as much as one might point to order, rather than to law, as the underpinning notion of policing and the fact that police discretion could be easily justified on the basis of preserving order in conditions of crisis as such. However, this also takes us to a dilemma of the restructuring of the relations of force in the 1990s. In that, the scope of 'policing' has been apparently expanded in line with the ideological effects of war on terror in the midst of the prevalent social and economic insecurity, yet the public legitimacy of 'the police' organization did not seem to benefit from this. On the contrary, the disputes over the impunity of the dozens of extrajudicial activities of the state's war-making practices at the time did exert its adverse effects on the legitimacy of the police, but not that of the military, in the eyes of people. The obvious political violence loaded in the conduct of security in the 1990s was indeed responded by growing concerns over the excess of the legal powers given to the police. According to the World Values Survey, for example, trust in institutions points to a significant

[703] Ibid.

[704] EGM, *1994 Faaliyet Raporu*, 1995.

difference between the police and the military in the period between 1995 and 1999 (see below). The same survey revealed that the police ranked only sixth in confidence in institutions in the same period, coming after education and the judiciary. Moreover, the legitimacy question of the police was going to be highly problematized by the TÜSİAD, among the media and academic circles, as to its vision of 'democratization' at the end of the decade.[705]



Figure 4. 1. Public Trust in the Police and the TAF (1995-1999)[706]

In fact, the ideological backdrop of this dilemmatic situation of the police could be traced back to what pacification theory actually seeks to reveal in terms of the main thrust of policing in bourgeois order. In that, from the accounts of social contract to International Relations and Internatinoal Law, liberal theory tends to grapple with the idea of war as something merely related to organized inter-state violence without bearing any relevance to the processes of building and maintaining internal order. By this means, the given dichotomy between the law (peace) and violence (war) could apply to the separation of internal and external security, thereby to policing and war. On this view, the police is implicitly formulated somehow more accountable than the military as the former has nothing to do with war but rather is to engage in the enforcement of and upholding of law. What is misleading here is not only that the scope of warfare is externalized to the process of building and securing a social order in favour of capital accumulation being confined to military activity and stripped of its class essence, but also such formulation glosses over the fact that the logic of

[705] TÜSİAD, *Türkiye'de Demokratik Standartların Yükseltilmesi*, 1999.

[706] "World Values Survey Wave 3: 1995-1999". http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp

accountability and law also encompasses the military's war-making practices, for which we are often told that war could be conducted only legally. However, as much as the modern formation of civil society is identified with the ending of war, the liberal emphasis put on law, which is deemed to exist to limit state violence, with regards to policing of internal order is of much higher importance than to inter-state military engagements. Therefore, extrajudicial acts would entail an acute contradiction to be disavowed on the part of the police. After all, there is no doubt that the liberal model of policing is devised as an apolitical one almost identical to the conduct of law enforcement and crime prevention with minimal resort to force from which the police organization shall derive its moral justification.[707]

This being said, it is hardly surprising from the lens of such contested view of legitimacy that the blurring of the police and military tasks as well as the demise of the legal and relatively more 'peaceful' conduct of policing would undermine the legitimacy of the existing relations of force, and therefore imply a shortcoming in the process of pacification. The reform demands of the big bourgeoisie for demilitarization in the police organization as well as in political structure are thus closely bound up with the appearance of the class-neutrality of security politics. In effect, for the same reason, amid the disputes over its legitimacy the police organization started to restore its public image in favour of the liberal model. The establishment of the Psychological Operation Branch Directorate as a new unit within the Anti-Terrorism and Operation Department, the new public order policing unit called the Dolphins[708] as well as the policymakers' growing interest on community-policing[709] could be considered in this respect. However, this campaign had yet to be genuinely actualized until early 2000s in line with the second reform period of neoliberal adjustment whose anti-statist underpinnings would also play on the idea of democratization through civilianization/demilitarization.

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[707] J. D Brewer, "Some Observations on Policing and Politics", *Policing and Society*, V.4, 1994, p. 176. Tomas Weiss, "The blurring border between the police and the military: A debate without foundations", *Cooperation and Conflict*, 46(3), p. 401. A. H. Aydin, 1997, pp. 89-90.

[708] According to the Istanbul Provincial Directorate of Security, the term 'Dolphins' was especially chosen for offering a sense of security, respect and geniality as well as power. http://asayis.iem.gov.tr/mottim/MotTimMenu.php

[709] A. H. Aydin, 1997, pp. 96-9.

4.4. Concluding Remarks

Overall, it can be concluded that the severe impacts of the finance-led regime of accumulation on social and economic insecurity have induced a further wave of securitization as a mode of ordering social relations. This mode, however, led to contested implications for the pacification efforts of September 12. On the one hand, given the high extent of militarization there had been a fissure in the liberal strategy of 'civilianization of warfare' which originally envisaged a certain division of labour between the military and civilian security units in everyday affairs of maintaining order, if not entirely in formal politics. The securitization of civil society predominantly pioneered by the military, which I have argued to bear a close relevance to the defective operation of neoliberal economy, had elicited an antinomy in regards to the expanded military prerogatives. On the other hand, for the same reason the prerogatives in question could be seen as a conjunctural measure to ensure the survival of a type of 'administration which would not need martial law anymore'. That is, all the new administrative means invented by the military at the time entailed behind them a political rationality that aims to uphold internal order without resorting to exclusive military administration. In this sense, the peculiar way of militarization in 1990s was, to be sure, not a preferable option in view of the logic of warfare envisaged by September 12, but still remained essentially in compliance with it.

Much more significant is that it is the empowering of the ideology and practice of security as a technique of government, rather than the efforts of militarization, that has been perpetuated and would be inherited to the upcoming period. Indeed, from crisis management to the draconian anti-terrorism law, the political content of the security prerogatives at the time incorporated class-related conflicts in one way or another. This was, to be sure, indicative of the 'negative' aspects of measures towards securing the insecurity of neoliberalism. Besides, the ideological and legal link set between internal and external security through the politics of 'war on terror' (that is, from 'disorderly' to 'illegal' to 'terror' to 'war') has served for the reinforcement of the nexus of national security as a war-like means of maintaining internal order. Whether or not referring a class-based essence, the vast proliferation

of the security threats incorporated within the scope of national security has indeed been a major anchor of securitization in the face of neoliberal insecurity and uncertainty. Given the police and emergency powers infiltrated into the ‘normal’ legal system, such expansion in national security has enabled the state to construe a wide scope of acts deemed to be potentially disobedient, dissenting or disorderly as something need to be fought as external threat. Needless to say, this renders secondary importance the question whether such powers are to be used by military or civilian authorities. As will be discussed henceforth, the restructuring of the post-2001 crisis would witness another step of liberalization through demilitarization in the relations of force, however, also (and maybe partially thanks to this way) the most draconian conduct of securitization.

CHAPTER 5

THE POST-2001 RESTRUCTURING AND THE AKP RULE

5.1. Introduction

This chapter seeks to focus on the major means and strategies of pacification set out in the 2000s under neoliberal hegemony inherited from the past two decades. The decade in question is of profound significance given that the post-2001 recovery process marked yet another moment in the expansion of the rule of capital by leading to a significant and accelerated phase in the neoliberal transformation process.[710] By the same token, the same era also includes the AKP's term in power, within which the discussions revolving around authoritarian neoliberalism that have been going on since the 1980s gained a new and important ground with nascent political and ideological implications. That said, the scope of the chapter, however, will be limited to the pre-2010s era, where the AKP avoided open conflicts with the regulations and institutional structures associated with the so-called 'regulatory state', or the 'post-Washington consensus'. In this light, though it does not imply a rigid periodization, the period 2008-2009 might be viewed as emblematic of the AKP government's tactical shift unveiled throughout and aftermath of the global financial crises, most prominently in its relationship with international actors, especially the IMF and the EU. Indeed, concurrently with the gradual consolidation of its power within the state apparatus which culminated with the 2010 referendum, the AKP has shown a distinct political inclination in administering its neoliberal practices to drift towards an increasingly centralized and discretionary mode of governance that would be embodied within the changes in the state's institutional architecture as well. The discussion here is confined to the period preceding this dominant tendency, when the AKP rule was predominantly perceived, whether fair or not, in relation to a series of

[710] P. Bedirhanoğlu & G. Yalman, 2010.

'institutional reforms' and its commitment to 'external anchors' while being promoted around a discourse of liberal democratization / Europeanization that performed a hegemonic ideological function.

The era also seems to have some preliminary implications in terms of the process of pacification under neoliberalism. First, the task of 'making and keeping of the peace' would become an ever more challenging one in view of the anti-labour character of the restructuring process after 2001 which has steadily subordinated a greater range of social relations to the discipline of finance and insecurity. It is noteworthy that the AKP managed to continuously go further in the neoliberal transformation by securing a long-standing electoral success and political credit, drawing on either active or passive support from the lower classes. On the other hand, although such success clearly signifies an advanced authoritarian phase of the political project of September 12 which mainly aimed at undermining the economic and political power of working classes, it is polished by the widespread illusion that the 'period of reform' did not appear to be overtly repressive in the exercise of state powers when examined from the formal separation of economic and extra-economic coercion. One could even go further, arguing from an ahistorical perspective of authoritarianism, that the reform process proceeded under the AKP rule had indeed entailed a democratic struggle against the state's tutelage over civil society, if not against state authoritarianism. The most concrete examples of such contention had been centred around the process of political reform identified with the EU conditionalities, a key element of which lay in the debates over civilianization / demilitarization. It is worth noting that such liberal outlook preserved to a certain extent during the period in question is intimately connected to the liberal vision of peace and rule lying at the heart of the history of pacification. Thus, it would be more consequential to come to terms with through what means and strategies the work of pacification had been carried out in this specific era, the debates over which have already been replete with contentions around the 'blend of liberalism and Islamic-conservatism'.[711]

[711] Ziya Öniş & Fuat Keyman, "A New Path Emerges", *Journal of Democracy*, 14(2), April 2003. Ahmet İnsel, "The AKP and Normalizing Democracy in Turkey", *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 102.2/3, 2003. Murat Somer, "Muslim democrats in the making? Explaining Turkey's AKP", paper presented at the Annual ISA Convention, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 17–20 March, 2004. Thomas W. Smith, Between Allah and Atatürk: Liberal Islam in Turkey, *The International Journal of Human*

Building on this background, the following discussion will be held drawing on three axes. The first section grapples with the process of depoliticization in the light of the politics of neoliberalism embarked on during the state restructuring process. As a central theme of this study, depoliticization bears a pivotal relationship with pacification,[712] yet this should not be contemplated as limited to the debates on security and securitization. On a more general plane, it amounts to a class strategy aiming at the insulation of class conflicts, struggles and democratic pressures from the realm of politics, wherein the ideology of security could be effectively utilized as well. That is why, to reiterate, the project of establishing peace and order under the September 12 regime, had in the first place incorporated "measures intended to depoliticize, demobilize, deradicalize, and deunionize society"[713] as a constant class war strategy commonly adopted in the neoliberal era in countries facing a crisis of hegemony in the late 1970s.[714] As a governing strategy depoliticization would take on a new function throughout the restructuring process after 2001. It involved the reconfiguration of the relationship between the state and the economy, leading to a genuine instant of the closure of politics through the so-called technocratic, rule-based governance geared towards the 'proper' institutionalization of the rule of market forces. By means of a certain practice and discourse of 'rationalization' aiming at overturning (or reversing) the alleged 'domination of political rationality over economic rationality',[715] it contributed to the marginalization of questions related to exploitation and distribution, and thus ultimately to the neoliberal dream that they would be no longer a matter of social or political contention. This being the case, depoliticization as such is related to the idea of police, insofar as it assumes a function of police patrolling on the borders of politics whereby potential/actual attempts of 'repoliticization' could be delegitimized.

Rights, Volume 9, 2005. Mustafa Akyol, "Turkey's Veiled Democracy", *The American Interest*, November-December 2007 https://www.the-american-interest.com/2007/11/01/turkeys-veiled-democracy/.

[712] Will Jackson, "Securitisation as Depoliticisation: Depoliticisation as Pacification", *Socialist Studies/Études Socialistes* 9(2), 2013.

[713] T. Marois, 2012, p. 102.

[714] G. Yalman, 2004; 2009.

[715] P. Bedirhanoğlu & G. Yalman, 2010, p. 114.

Another depoliticizing effect exerted by market reforms could be observed on the roots of poverty and insecurity. Bearing this in mind, the second section mainly deals with the social and labour market policy as a means of constituting, regulating, and policing the class of poverty. It should be highlighted that the post-crisis adjustment programme did not only place the burden of the crisis on the working population, but it initiated another round of transformation that would create more impoverishment and widening socio-economic inequalities. As a major site of this process, the labour market has been restructured by the AKP government towards a highly flexible, precarious, low-cost, and fragmented one. The AKP would respond to the unpopular and detrimental outcomes of this policy agendum through a populist, 'pro-poor' regime of social assistance alongside a marketized social security, both of which would enhance the poor's dependence both on the party's rule and the market while sweeping aside any consideration as to distribution and employment. Indeed, originally underpinned by the WB's framework and merged with Islamic components, the policy agenda in question has been designed to keep poverty at a sustainable level and "lock the poor into a permanent exposure to the risk of market dependence".[716] Hence, it might also lead one to contemplate on the historical and conceptual links between social policy and preventive policing.[717]

Finally, the chapter ends with a discussion on the police and security under the AKP rule, which is somehow linked to the two previous sections. In hegemonic view, the problem of security related to authoritarianism has been far from being handled in its constant role as a technique of government in reordering of politics and reshaping of society in its wider social context. It is rather problematized under the title of civil-military relations, as an issue of abolishing the military tutelage over civilian politics. Playing on the rhetoric of democratization backed by the hegemonic view as such, the AKP government has moved the military away from the centre of the authoritarian form of the state. The section will outline the main developments in the state's security functions afterwards. I seek to show that the authoritarian form of the state has been preserved and even reinforced in security as well, by sketching out

[716] Paul Cammack, "Making poverty work", in Colin Leys & Leo Panitch (eds), *A World of Contradictions*: *Socialist Register 2002*, Merlin Press, 2001, p. 200.

[717] M. Neocleous, "Social Police and the Mechanisms of Prevention", *The British Journal of Criminology*, Volume 40, Issue 4, September 2000.

how the AKP government shifted towards an augmented level of securitization in tandem with global trends in the neoliberal era. As can be seen, contrary to the popular belief, the basics of what would go by the name of neoliberal police state, punitive state, etc. used to describe the AKP rule after the 2010s, have been in the first place established in the 2000s, amidst the enthusiasm of liberal 'institutional reforms' and with due emphasis to the developments in Western states.

5.2. Depoliticization as Rationalization of Politics: The Post-Politics of Restructuring

Since one significant political tendency of an economic crisis in capitalism is that it leads to the intensification of class struggle,[718] it is fair to view the efforts towards neutralizing the political character of the post-crisis restructuring as a bourgeois strategy. Indeed, a novel mode of governance based on depoliticization was necessary to avoid questioning the orthodox policy approach in the 'period of reform' following the 2000-2001 crises which already occurred under an IMF programme. Here, I will suggest that the politics of depoliticization as a permanent feature of the post-1980s in Turkey would reveal a new function based on institutional arrangements as to the separation between politics and economic management. Moreover, the process of enforcing such separation itself entails a post-political character[719] which tended to foreclose the possibility of a transformative politics as there had been a perfect harmony to present the process as a non-political act for the common good.

In effect, the post-political and/or consensual closure of politics in the post-crisis recovery process was highly indicative of neoliberal hegemony in the previous decade. From the mid-1990s through to early 2000s policy documents varying from

[718] S. Clarke, 1991, p. 14.

[719] Post-political techniques of government differs from those of anti-politics, for they does not denote an absence of politics but a post-ideological politics of consensual foreclosure of 'politics proper'. Politics proper, referring Jacques Rancière, on the other hand implies the democratic moments of genuine political action which disrupt the established order and the distribution of roles and power within it. Post-political strategies tend to foreclosure the possibility of radical, transformative political actions by reducing politics and democracy to a consensus on the basics of the established order. Jacques Rancière. *Disagreement: politics and philosophy*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999.

those of international agencies to capital representatives to media and academic circles point out a discursive overlap concerning the deepening of the neoliberal trajectory through structural reforms. Although it is hard to say that state managers and parliamentary politics could remain outside this discursive unity, as discussed in the previous chapter the state and public sector had more often than not become the focus of criticism on the grounds of 'policy mistakes'[720] and/or 'political mismanagement'[721] (populism, public sector deficits, weakness of institutional capacity, inefficiency, corruption, etc.)[722] with regards to the cycles of instability and crises in the course of Turkey's integration to global capital markets. It is further beyond doubt that the argument that the existing state organization, regardless of what particular historical form of social and power relations it constitutes, had been a constant obstacle to economic stability was already developed as part of the hegemonic discourse in the 1990s. Whatever policy measures were put forth towards fiscal and structural reform, the alleged boundaries between the state and the economy, thereby those between the political and the non-political, have always been a central topic of discussion. Thus, given the disavowal of class reality of the state that the hegemonic discourse is leaned upon, populist distribution policies, addressed as a major cause of instability, could be easily denounced for being 'extremely politicized' whereby further transformation for sustaining capital accumulation was considered a necessity *beyond the realm of politics*. For example**,** following the 1994 crisis, prior to the new long-term agreements with the IMF, it was claimed in an exemplary TÜSİAD report[723] that a comprehensive institutional restructuring was inevitable to transform the state structure which had been acting as a barrier to the implementation of the universal principles of free market economy as well as the precepts of pluralist democracy. In its discussion over the stabilization program and public sector balance, the report simply put that state managers and institutions in

[720] G. Yalman, "The Neoliberal Transformation of State and Market in Turkey: A Overview of Financial Developments from 1980 to 2000" in G. Yalman, T. Marois & A. R. Güngen, 2019, p. 72.

[721] Ü. Cizre & E. Yeldan, "The Turkish Encounter with Neo-liberalism: Economics and Politics in the 2000/2001 Crises", *Review of International Political Economy 12 (3)*, 2005.

[722] Ziya Öniş, "Beyond The 2001 Financial Crisis: The Political Economy Of The New Phase Of Neo-Liberal Restructuring In Turkey" *Review of International Political Economy*, Vol.16, Issue:3, 2009; Ziya Öniş and Fuat Keyman, 2003); Bulent Aliriza, "Turkey's crisis: Corruption at the core", *CSIS Turkey Update*, March 2001.

[723] TÜSİAD, *Türkiye için Yeni Bir Orta Vadeli İstikrar Programına Doğru*, 1995.

Turkey have been far from 'profoundly' taking into account the interests and reactions of market actors, and this was because of the very lack of 'market discipline and culture' peculiar to democratic societies.[724] In this view, the crux of the chronic problem of macroeconomic instability lay in a long-prevailing understanding of the state and politics, the firmly strict bureaucratic organization arising out of such understanding, and the populist expectations that this organization had placed upon society.[725] On the other hand, such expectations in favour of populism were based on merely political concerns and contradicted the 'objective self-interests of individuals' which were defined as 'atomic economic decision-makers'.[726] Accordingly, as stated in the Preamble where the purpose of the report is explained, it became imperative to enable the citizens to well understand the structural problems detrimental to decision-making processes and to constantly keep the possible solutions on the societal agenda. After all, the long-term adverse effects of the populist expansionary policies of political decision makers on society would be rejected by individuals inasmuch as they approach to these policies independently from political concerns:

> Even if individuals have supported the decisions of politicians that increase public deficit spending for political or social reasons, they would indeed oppose them with their actions in the market when they see the negative effects of these decisions on themselves. This means that public deficits create instability in the markets or that *a political decision would not be approved on a non-political platform*.[727] [emphasis added].

The emphasis on providing greater autonomy for the economy by transforming the political apparatus itself as a remedy for restoring 'stability and credibility' was not confined to the policy prescriptions of financial institutions and capital groups for it was adopted as an official stance as well. The first Five-year Development Plan (1996-2000) following the post-1994 crisis policy measures, for instance, identified as one of its main themes the implementation of structural adjustment policies towards the *rationalization* of public sector and the fiscal system.[728] In this light,

[724] Ibid, p. 110.

[725] Ibid, p. 113.

[726] Ibid, p. 109.

[727] Ibid, p. 110.

[728] VII. Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı (1996-2000), 1995, p. 20.

carrying out a set of policy measures called 'Structural Transformation Projects' the state was said to limit its intervention in economic and social life with an effective *regulatory* and *supervisory* function in line with the competitiveness of free-market globalization.[729] Since the aspiration to change the form of state intervention was designed not only as part of economic policy itself but a broader public reform agenda in the 1990s, the supposed democratic aspect of anti-centralization had become an ideological pillar of the official stance to rationalize the restructuring process. For instance, in the 55th Government Programme (1997), where restructuring in public administration was for the first time put on the agenda as a topic per se, the impetus behind institutional reforms was justified under the rubric of 'uniting the state with its citizens by freeing it from unwieldiness', 'establishing a prudent and accountable state organisation', 'giving priority to trust in citizens', 'empowering local governments against central administration', and so forth.[730] Two years later, there was no less emphasis on an expansive public reform in the programme of the 57th government of Ecevit during which the external guidance and supervision had been provided within the scope of a Staff Monitoring Program (1998-1999), a stand-by arrangement (1999-2002) and the first three EU harmonization packages (2002). It was the need for a 'fair, transparent, efficient and participatory administration' that was particularly underscored in the government programme as the main thrust of restructuring.[731] Accordingly, both in the Memorandum of Economic Policies (1998) and the letters of intent announced within the spectrum of the crisis that broke out in November 2000, it was promised that structural reforms in social security, public administration, public procurement, agriculture and banking as well as a detailed privatization programme would be decisively implemented under the government guarantee.[732]

Despite their committed efforts, state managers were to blame for the crises of 2000-2001, which emerged when the schedule of relevant regulations with regards to the

[729] Ibid, pp. 22, 268-307.

[730] "55th Government Programme", 1997.

[731] "57th Government Programme, 1999.

[732] R.T. The Undersecretariat of Treasury, Memorandum of Economic Policies. https://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/062698.htm; Letters of Intent dated 9 December 1999 and 18 December 2000.

IMF-led stabilization programme was already put in place, on the grounds of their failure to implement the necessary structural adjustment reforms.[733] Once the causes of the crises were simply reduced to an administrative failure or mismanagement, the executive role set aside for political leadership which would assume the social consequences of structural reforms had become a matter of overriding priority for the bourgeoisie. Among others, claiming to speak on behalf of the major part of the business organizations the ITO president even went on to urge the NSC to take control in order to form an interim technocratic government.[734] Mobilizing extraordinary political and administrative powers for economic policy makers, the crisis management at the time would indeed be no less depoliticized and technocratic than the ITO's suggestion, if not by means of the NSC or of a technocratic government.

In the wake of the crisis, the then-WB vice president, Kemal Derviş, was appointed as the State Minister for Economic Affairs in order to conduct negotiations with the IMF and WB and lead the state restructuring process. As a neoliberal technocrat Derviş was fully in compliance with the capital groups' demand for a duly authorized and non-political figure[735]. He was appointed without leading to any formal interruption in the existing form of politics (e.g. an interim regime), albeit still with unprecedented extent of powers on the grounds that the situation was itself unprecedented.[736] Nevertheless, tensions within the power bloc became visible concerning the future of the existing government. TOBB, for instance, urged the government to resign blaming it for the depth of the crisis due to an alleged lapse in taking necessary measures, whereas both the deputy PM and TÜSİAD declared that the fall of the government would be most harmful for business circles at that precise time.[737]

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[733] E. Yeldan, "Neoliberal Global Remedies: From Speculative-Led Growth to IMF-Led Crisis in Turkey", *Review of Radical Political Economics*, 38(2), 2006, p. 204.

[734] "MGK hükümete burnunu soksun", *Milliyet*, 19.12. 2000. "'Ben söylemedim söylettiler'", *Milliyet*, 20.12.2000.

[735] "İşadamı tam yetkili bir kaptan istiyor", *Milliyet*, 01.03.2001.

[736] "Türkiye'ye yardım eden sonunda karlı çıkar", *Hürriyet*, 28.03.2001.

[737] "TOBB hükümeti istifaya çağırdı", 10.04.2001, arsiv.ntv.com.tr/news/76101.asp. "TÜSİAD'dan hükümete destek", 10.04.2001, arsiv.ntv.com.tr/news/76234.asp. "Yılmaz: Hükümetin istifasından en çok TOBB zarar görür", 11.04.2001, arsiv.ntv.com.tr/news/76257.asp.

On the other hand, the post-crisis readjustment would initiate the transformation that the bourgeoisie had long demanded. The legal and institutional framework of the regulations to be in place was set in an IMF-backed recovery programme called the Transition to Strong Economy (henceforth, 'TSEP') that was announced in April 2001, for which major capital groups demanded unconditional support from political actors.[738] The underlying objective of the programme was aligned with the targets set by with the Staff-Monitoring Programme in 1998 and stand-by arrangement in 1999, that is, to ensure macroeconomic stability and reduce inflation by means of a 'comprehensive fiscal and structural reform'.[739] The series of legal and institutional measures primarily targeted the banking sector, privatizations, public administration and social security system in particular so as to go beyond merely pursuing macroeconomic stability, and targeting the state's distributional arrangements as well. On discourse level, structural reform was this time more closely associated with the tenets of the so-called post-Washington consensus by placing greater emphasis on 'transparency, accountability, and good governance in both the private and public sectors'.[740] Implying much more than the standard policies of austerity and stabilization, the emphasis on the state's regulatory capacity and 'good governance' in this policy setting was indeed a part of the upcoming state restructuring exclusively for the benefit of capital owners, in particular, financial capital.

The TSEP appeared to rationalize the public reform by addressing the 'unsustainable domestic debt dynamic as well as the unhealthy structure of the financial sector with particular problems caused by state banks' as the main reasons for the waves of crisis in the past decade.[741] Within such perspective, however, it did not offer any fundamental change in approaching the structural problems regarding the competitiveness of domestic industry nor would it problematize the short-term, speculative capital-led growth patterns. Instead, it tended to limit its recovery approach largely to contractionary fiscal policies while imposing depoliticization as a

[738] "Patronlardan ikinci toplantı", *Milliyet*, 20.03.2001.

[739] G. Yalman, 2019, p. 76.

[740] Letter of Intent of the government of Turkey, 3 May 2001. https://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2001/tur/02/

[741] TSEP, Article #1.

governing strategy to reconfigure the boundaries between the state and market. The latter would be justified as a measure against the 'populist', 'expansionary', and 'redistributive' policies of the public sector, and this would make more sense along the phrase of 'new order'[742] used in the programme with regards to the transformation of the economy, state and public administration. The rationale behind this 'new order' would neither more nor less than adding a new facet to the 'historical wedge driven by capitalism between the economic and the political'[743] by way of the rule-based setting of neoliberal policy formation. On this basis, 'politics would respect the economy, and vice versa, in a certain separation'.[744]

5.2.1. The Specialized Economic Apparatus and Consensual Foreclosure of Politics

Indicating a shift in the form of the state's pro-capital intervention, depoliticization was going to be most visible in the formation of a specialized and insulated economic apparatus. A key instance of this has been the depoliticization of monetary policy-making by granting operational independence to the Central Bank (CB) of Turkey with the Law No. 4651 issued in late April 2001. With this amendment, the main objective of the CB has been redefined on the basis of ensuring price stability and inflation targeting through interest rates. Not surprisingly, this was a direct reflection of the neoliberal conviction that monetary policy resting in the hands of state managers constitutes the main source of monetary instability. From this viewpoint, monetary policy needs to be depoliticized by being left to technocratic decision-making while public authorities need to make themselves pre-committed to inflation targeting in order to restore anti-inflationary credibility.[745] The most

[742] The programme identified as its main goal 'to establish the infrastructure in a way that will never be turned back'. For, 'it [was] not really possible to return to the old order anymore', Article #23.

[743] As Ellen M. Wood has argued, the most effective defence mechanism available to capital is the ways in which "essentially political issues like the disposition of power to control production and appropriation, or the allocation of social labour and resources" are "cut off from the political arena and displaced to a separate sphere". E. M. Wood, 1995, p. 20.

[744] TSEP, Article #140.

[745] C. Hay, "Credibility, competitiveness and the business cycle in 'third way' political economy: a critical evaluation of economic policy in Britain since 1997", *New Political Economy*, 9(1), 2004, p. 41. Oktar Türel, T.C. Merkez Bankası'na Yeni Yasal Çerçeve: 4651 Sayılı Kanun Üzerine Gözlem ve Değerlendirmeler, *Mülkiye Dergisi,* 25 (229), 2001.

concrete manifestation of an institutionally-guaranteed depoliticization of monetary policy is believed to be an independent central bank which would in turn ensure that inflation would be saved from the long-accused populist tendency of politicians.[746] The so-called independent monetary policies are, on the one hand, claimed to ensure price stability under inflation targeting even during turbulences as well as to maintain high levels of real return in national financial markets by giving confidence to international investors.[747] This would in turn secure the rents and profits to be transferred to rent owners as well as help make public finance to mostly focus on taking necessary measures to enforce the interests of international finance capital.[748]

In addition to the imposition of financial discipline through rule-based monetary policy, debt management was also brought into a process of technicization in view of the restructuring of the relation between the state and fiscal sector. First, with the amendment in the Central Bank Law in April 2001 (# 4651) the CB short-term advances and loans provided for the Treasury and public institutions have been removed as an anti-inflationary measure. This was followed by a law on debt management (# 4749) in 2002 through which the tasks undertaken by the Treasury on budget financing were relatively insulated from political intervention being reasserted based on the principles 'transparency, accountability, fiscal discipline, risk management and performance-orientation', as was stipulated by the TSEP.[749] From a critical perspective it can be put that the post-crisis reconfiguration of the Treasure as such amounted to the depoliticization, rationalization and internationalization of public debt management, while situating the former more explicitly as an anchor for financial institutions and deepening.[750] Indeed, the backbone of the Treasury's

[746] Ziya Öniş, 2009, p. 419.

[747] Letter of Intent of the government of Turkey, January 28, 2002. https://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2002/tur/01/index.htm

[748] Erinç Yeldan, "Behind The 2000/2001 Turkish Crisis: Stability, Credibility, and Governance, for whom?", IDEAS Conference, Chennai, 2002. p. 11. BSB, "Niyet Mektubu ve 2002 Yılında Türkiye Ekonomisi", 2002. http://almanak.savportal.org/index.php/tr/item/85-niyet-mektubu-ve-2002-basinda-turkiye-ekonomisi

[749] TSEP, Article no. 55.

[750] Ali Rıza Güngen, *Debt management and financialisation as facets of state restructuring: The case of Turkey in the post-1980 period*, Unpublished PhD thesis, 2012.

responsibility has henceforth been limited to contributing to the functioning of financial markets by providing active coordination among market agents and creating predictability in these markets.[751] It can thus be concluded that the underlying rationale of the restructuring process, which was to seek the reasons behind the wave of crises in state intervention in the economy and financial markets rather than in the endless cycle of debt rollover, has also resulted in the reorganization of debt management as a vastly technical and depoliticized process.

The separation between politics and economic management would be entrenched also through an explicit legal-institutional way of depoliticization predicated on the same anti-statist rationale. Fallen under the label of 'Reforms to Raise Competition and Effectiveness in the Economy' in the TSEP, the objective to enhance state regulatory capacity brought in the establishment and strengthening of autonomous / independent regulatory agencies (IRAs).[752] In fact, as most of other policy topics the agenda on IRAs was also not novel to the post-2001 adjustment period. The supposed necessity to increase the number of the IRAs, most prominently a new supervision authority in banking sector (the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency –*BSRA*), was already a central part of the IMF conditionality started with the 1999 stand-by arrangement as well as of the EU acquis conditionality.[753] The common theme in the policy prescriptions of both actors is precisely the same logic as found in the independence of monetary policy, that is rule-based governance, which was claimed to ensure that all sorts of market-oriented regulations were to be designed in such a way that they would not be affected by the everyday operation of domestic politics and political contestation. Hence, IRAs were claimed to provide an assurance to international organizations and investors for adopting predictable, stable and credible policies during the course of Turkey's economic integration with global

[751] Ali Rıza Güngen, "Hazine Müsteşarlığı ve Borç Yönetimi: Finansallaşma Sürecinde bir Kurumun Dönüşümü", *Amme İdaresi Dergisi*, 47(1), 2014, pp.14-6.

[752] TSEP, Articles #59-64.

[753] Letters on Intent dated December 9, 1999 and September 29, 1999. EU, "2001 Regular report from the Commission on Turkey's progress towards accession", https://www.ab.gov.tr/files/AB_Iliskileri/Tur_En_Realitons/Progress/Turkey_Progress_Report_2001.pdf; "November 2000 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession" https://www.ab.gov.tr/files/AB_Iliskileri/Tur_En_Realitons/Progress/Turkey_Progress_Report_2000.pdf

financial markets. In its advocacy of the establishment of the IRAs, TÜSİAD would also make a similar point that these agencies would 'help the state effectively fulfil its regulatory and supervisory functions regarding economic and social life', though with a more specific emphasis on the widespread perception of clientalistic / patronage policies alleged to induce intra-bourgeoisie conflicts since Özal's ANAP.[754]

Notwithstanding the permanence of IRAs in the structural adjustment agenda, it has been not earlier than the post-2001 crisis and Derviş's TSE project that the specialized economic apparatus occasioned a significant institutional change in state organization. In this regard, alongside the Capital Market Board (SPK) and the Competition Agency (*Rekabet Kurumu*) of the previous decade, a number of IRAs were established, and vested with the power to make and enforce rules and regulations as well as to judge and impose sanctions in sectors deemed to be the most significant (banking, energy, telecommunication, public procurement, sugar, tobacco).[755] It should be noted that the scope of autonomy given to IRAs was claimed to lead to intra-state conflicts in the executive branch and bureaucracy during the last year of Ecevit's coalition government.[756] Such conflicts would be much more visible under the AKP's single-party rule.

Nonetheless, the IRAs at the time represented a significant instance of depoliticization devised to serve as a domestic control mechanism under the discipline of global markets. They were vested with a substantial administrative power to keep intra-class relations of distribution at a distance from the regular scope of executive power. In doing so, they would bring different fractions of the power bloc around a new compromise under the arrangements of global governance, i.e.

[754] TÜSİAD, *Bağımsız Düzenleyici Kurumlar ve Türkiye Uygulaması*, 2002, pp. 33, 43, 61, 67, 145, 169.

[755] The BRSA was originally established in 1999, however its powers and autonomy have been expanded as a central part of the TSEP. In this period, the authority to regulate and supervise the banking sector, which used to be under the duties and powers of the Treasury, has been passed to the BRSA. This was followed by the establishment of new IRAs – the Telecommunications Agency (TK), the Energy Market Regulation Agency (EPDK), the Public Procurement Agency (*Kamu İhale Kurumu*), the Sugar Agency (*Şeker Kurumu*), and the Tobacco, Tobacco Products and Alcoholic Beverages Market Regulation Agency (TAPDK).

[756] "Ecevit, 'ipin ucu kaçtı' dedi, özerklik bitiyor", *Hürriyet*, 28.03.2002.

neoliberal rules and policy framework, to be set in motion outside the realm of politics. For instance, as part of the restructuring of the banking system which was deemed to be the cornerstone of the TSEP, the state's financial regulatory apparatus (the BRSA) had assumed a vital role in reorganizing intra-capital and inter-class relations during privatization arrangements and the state-led banking rescue while socializing costs and particularizing benefits.[757] As observed by Marois, the agency was authorized to institutionally manage financial risks and the practices of financial capital without sacrificing their profits and market-oriented accumulation strategy.[758] Concurrently, to the extent that they could be insulated from the political domain of social forces as such, IRAs would help deprive the public of any genuine form of political address accountable for the negative consequences of the policies in their respective sector.

In fact, whether it be the regulatory apparatus, monetary policy or debt management, the same conclusion applies to all policy areas that are restructured based on depoliticization through rule-based governance. For the possible involvement of popular demands in policy-making processes, especially those pertaining to distributional relations, are blocked at the very outset by means of an institutional and ideological setting through which political power is wielded, or at best, appears to be concentrated in the hands of "technocratic elites whose conduct is far removed from the democratic sovereigns, the people".[759]

Concomitantly, the rule-based mode of governance does not indicate the end or absence of politics, but it is rather about about placing 'at one remove the politically contested character of decision-making'.[760] Insofar as it manages to hide decision-making behind a technocratic authority and insulate it from democratic scrutiny, critique and political contestation it is also said to provide governments with a safe

[757] T. Marois, 2012.

[758] Ibid, p. 169-70.

[759] Werner Bonefeld, "Europe, the Market and the Transformation of Democracy", *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 13:1, 2005, p. 95.

[760] Peter Burnham, "New Labour and the Politics of Depoliticisation. *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 3(2), 2001, p. 128.

shelter away from the adverse effects of neoliberal policies on public.[761] Thus, it should be added that rule-based depoliticization is by no means a non-political strategy itself, nor does it amount to the deconcentration or decentralisation of political power (i.e. less politics). On the contrary, it paradoxically contributes to the enhancement of political control over the population by rendering the political authority as unaccountable, thereby less encumbered by public pressures. The political consequence of this process goes beyond merely securing credibility for the unpopular policies of further structural adjustment as it is also concerned closely with curbing the power of labour. For instance, thanks to the label of independence ascribed to it, monetary policy under inflation targeting not only serves to repress real wages but also helps diminish the political capacity of working classes for wage struggle since it curtails fiscal policy responses to democratic activism by 'conferring on the latter the task of controlling public expenditure within balanced budget'.[762] On the whole, the ultimate outcome of this policy formation process paves the ground for the reassertion of the relationship between the political society and social classes in a way to help ensure the subordination of a broad array of social relations to financial discipline through means and policies externalized to the choice and accountability of political authority.

In congruence with the exclusion of labour from decision making processes through the institutionalization of the so-called rational and technical policy-making as such, both international and domestic capital found themselves represented within state bureaucracy through the foundation of another institutional body. Following a policy proposal by the International Investors Association in Turkey (*YASED*) when the TSEP had been in motion, a governmental decree on Improving the Investment Environment was enacted in December 2001 as part of the reform strategy to 'increase the productivity and competitiveness of firms operating in Turkey'.[763] The decree established, among other things, a policy-making body called the Coordination Council for Improvement of Investment Environment comprised of the representatives of a wide range of capital fractions and state managers under the

[761] Colin Hay, 2014, p. 307.

[762] W. Bonefeld, 2005, p. 95.

[763] Şebnem Oğuz, 2008, p. 124.

chairmanship of the State Minister for Economic Affairs. The Council is said to remove the administrative barriers to the existing business environment and bring in a global perspective to the efforts to improve the investment environment.[764] To this end, it is divided into ten 'technical policy committees' organized around the post-political consensus on neoliberal objectives, the necessity of global competitiveness being the primary one. 'Structural reforms' in key policy areas varying from labour relations to social security that have promoted increasing levels of insecurity and precariousness, are known to have been issued under the influence and guidance of the Council. Associated with a 'secret parliamentary'[765] character as such, the Council has thus reflected another depoliticized moment of rationalizing the pro-capital policy framework in the post-2001 restructuring.

In addition to the shift in state intervention in policy-making, the unprecedented status ascribed to Derviş and his stabilization programme in the conduct of formal political rules and procedures can also be mentioned concerning the foreclosure of politics in the course of wider neoliberal institutionalization. The launch of the TSEP has indeed been casted in the state's policy agenda as a non-political imperative to such an extent that public support to the programme was presented by Derviş as an 'indispensable act of the greatest patriotism'.[766] Put differently, what was demanded for the regulations that were deemed not to reflect a political nature was mere political commitment to be given not only from state managers but also from the public. Besides the lack of even the slightest societal debate, regular parliamentary procedures were practically bypassed by precipitated legislative efforts proceeded with the maxim of 'Fifteen Laws in Fifteen Days'[767] and legitimized on the grounds of securing the IMF and WB loans in May[768]. Furthermore, amid this post-political milieu operating as an overt version of the *TINA*, pejorative connotations ascribed to

[764] Yatırım Ortamını İyileştirme Koordinasyon Kurulu (YOİKK), https://www.yoikk.gov.tr/detay.cfm?MID=1%20.

[765] Yasemin Özdek, *Şirket egemenliği çağı: sosyal devletten ceza devletine*, Notabene, 2011.

[766] "Kemal Derviş: Yurtseverlik programı desteklemektir", *Ntvmsnbc*, 16.05.2001. http://arsiv.ntv.com.tr/news/82942.asp

[767] "Hükümet Meclis'te nöbet tutacak", *Milliyet*, 03.04.2001.

[768] "14 milyar dolar yolda", *Milliyet*, 27.04.2001. "Ankara uyuma! Programa sahip çık", *Milliyet*, 29.03.2001.

politics would be acknowledged even at the level of government officials. The statements of the State Minister Yüksel Yalova on the then-upcoming market-oriented transformation of the tobacco sector[769] might set a good example of this:

> ...now, the thing we all need to decide is not to enter a false battle over how successful we can do politics regarding the tobacco issue. Now at this point, as far as the TEKEL [the state-owned tobacco company] and its privatization are concerned the question we need to answer is this: Are we going to act politically in economic decisions, or are we going to take economic actions by following the global development trends?

No less interesting here is that only a couple months after his statements denying the political character of economic decisions, Yalova was forced to resign by his party's leader and Deputy Prime Minister Yılmaz as his criticisms against Derviş and the preparation of the Tobacco Law Draft were found by the latter beyond the pale, that is, probably, 'political'. What is beyond the pale, however, was simply Yalova's arguing for the inclusion of a representative from the Union of Agricultural Chamber in the Tobacco and Alcohol Market Regulatory Authority, which was considered to go beyond the technical realm of economics. Described by media outlets as 'the dismissal of the minister by the market',[770] the incident was a simple but vivid example of the post-political operation of neoliberal restructuring with regards to formal political processes.[771]

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[769] The TSEP has ended the TEKEL's support purchases for tobacco and privatized the company. Tobacco production and trade were left to the regulation of the respective IRA whereby the sector has been dominated by international companies since then.

[770] "Yalova Piyasanın Altında Kaldı", *Evrensel*, 31.05.2001. "Piyasalar Yalova'yı Görevden Aldı", *Hürriyet*, 01.06.2001. The critical statements that caused the Minister to resign is worth noting: When we urge, for example, the local people of Bitlis not to plant tobacco, in sociological terms we are asking these people to go to their relatives in Western cities to survive, or forget everything and take the hills. If a ministry sits and prepares a law with a bunch of bureaucrats and this law is treated as a regular legal procedure, you can enact it with your political majority in parliament but in the end you might fail to conform to the realities of life (…) If you legalize such mentality with a surrender politics, you can receive money from World Bank and initiate the so-called direct income support, yet, due to the sociological problem you ultimately create you would have to face the irrevocable consequences and pay for a much larger amount in the form of security spending in the next couple of years" *Evrensel*, 31.05.2001. Another example of the unmediated supervision of Bretton Woods institutions over politics in the same period was the resignation of the Minister of Transportation (Enis Öksüz) who was at variance with Derviş about the assignment to the state-owned communications company, *Türk Telekom*. "Öksüz'ün istifasını Bahçeli istedi", *NTV*, 17.07.2001. On a side note, see the critical parliament speech of a DSP MP (Cengiz Güleç) shedding light on the intense international pressure over Turkish politics; TBMM, 21. Dönem 3. Yasama Yılı 111. Birleşim, 31.05.2001.

[771] It can be added that other conflicts among state organs at the time did not either cause a break in the acceleration of the restructuring programme. For example, the articles of the draft regulation on

From one vantage point, it can be contended that the general grasp of neoliberal restructuring announced by the TSEP as an apolitical, technical fix for the crisis constituted the latter's strength to transform into a political inter-class coalition. For it was on this basis that the class and political dynamics that underpin the socialization of the financial burden of the crisis[772], and more generally, the social and economic costs of the overall restructuring[773] could be effectively disguised. As put succinctly by commentaries from international financial circles, the reform process initiated by the TSEP was found credible mostly for being 'irreversible and immune to democratic revision'.[774] Hence, as mentioned previously, under the guise of non-intervention, the politics of depoliticization facilitated in neoliberal restructuring operated by and large alongside the consolidation of political power and control – it goes without saying, in capital's favour.

It should be noted that though the central state apparatus seemingly lost a degree of power given the incidental clashes between the specialized economic apparatus, the

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banking reform as part of the IMF arrangement which granted the IRAs with the autonomy from the parliament as well as of the Court of Accounts was returned by the then-President on the grounds of violating democratic principles, yet, it was thereafter approved by the parliament without amendments. "Sezer'e yine 'aynen' iade", *Milliyet*, 31.01.2002. Another publicly known dispute on the regulations at the time was incited by the PM Ecevit's criticism on the degree of autonomy granted to the IRAs: "I must confess that we went a little beyond the limits regarding the autonomy issue. We are told that this was the requisite of market economy and democracy as well as the IMF's desire. At the end, many public agencies have fallen outside the control of the state and government (…) I believe that we should reconsider the autonomy issue and revise it towards a more balanced and well-functioning form. To this end, I have assigned my friends to devise an amendment." This unexpected reproach of Ecevit has expectedly disturbed the representatives of international and domestic capital circles, especially the IMF which was indicated by Derviş as 'watching Turkey for 24 hours'. This short-term crisis was resolved as Ecevit finally had to take a step back. "IMF zor ikna edildi", *Radikal*, 30.03.2002. See also, Sonay Bayramoğlu, *Yönetişim Zihniyeti: Türkiye'de Üst Kurullar ve Siyasal İktidarın Dönüşümü,* 2005, pp. 347-351.

[772] "Chapter 7: Richer than Croesus? Understanding the subordination of state and banks to emerging finance capitalism in Turkey" in T. Marois, 2012, pp. 167-200.

[773] It is not hard to infer that the post-crisis costs of bailing out banks on the part of working classes would be followed by more 'structural' losses induced by the restructuring process. As will be outlined in more detail in the section on social and labour market policy, the already uneven balance of power between capital and labour has been considerably disrupted throughout and following the reform process, despite the assertion in the TSEP that the financial burden would be fairly undertaken by all segments of society (Article #29). In the short term, suffice it to say that public employers who would be dismissed, pensioned off, or at best settled for lower wages as part of long-term financial savings (Article #41) as well as farmers and peasants who would lose ground due to the privatizations in agricultural SOEs and the elimination of price, input, and credit subsidies (Article #43) would be the ones most particularly aggrieved by the process in question.

[774] T. Marois, 2012, p. 168.

former in this process still had an important role which could not be confined only to the legal-institutional enforcement of the regulations. On a more general plane, its deeper significance lay in its structural role in reproducing social formation by politically managing the inevitable conflicts and discontent particularly in view of the unpopular policy measures. By no coincidence, it was starkly underscored by international actors such as the WB and OECD that manufacturing consent for privatization and regulatory reform process had been a task of vital importance for the government in the face of possible resistances to delegitimize it.[775]

This *political* task of consensus-building, indeed, indicated a distinctive feature of the post-politics of neoliberal restructuring through which public perception is desired to be manufactured and shaped in processes from which the public is evidently excluded. In this light, possible efforts toward *alternative, popular-democratic* ways of envisioning politics outside neoliberal parameters had been blocked at the very outset thanks to the intertwinement of the calls for economic and political restructuring which were deemed to be equally necessary. In other words, from the perspective of those arguing for a further episode of structural adjustment, economic recovery programme was closely linked to the so-called technocratic and non-political rationalization of the state and politics along neoliberal lines. Accordingly, much of the rhetoric heavily played on the ideas of 'democratization' and the fashionable elements of good governance (transparency, accountability, effectiveness, etc.) in such a way that the 'economic crisis management would be successful only if it would initiate a comprehensive political reform towards democratization'.[776] Paving the way for a further hollowing out of class considerations from political agenda, this political aspect, alongside the party's Islamism, would mainly constitute an effective component of the AKP government's legitimation basis for proceeding with the existing policy agenda at an unprecedented pace.

[775] WB report on *Privatization Social Support Project* (2006) cited in Galip L. Yalman & Aylin Topal, "Labour Containment Strategies and Working Class Struggles in the Neoliberal Era: The Case of TEKEL Workers in Turkey", *Critical Sociology* 45(3), 2017. OECD, *OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform: Turkey*, 2002, p. 49.

[776] "Siyasi reform yapın", *Milliyet*, 29.03.2001. "TÜSİAD-US: Ekonominin başarısı siyasi programa bağlı", *Hürriyet*, 09.11.2001.

5.2.2. AKP and Further Closure of Politics: Anti-Statism Kept in Place by the IMF and EU Anchors

The committed efforts of the tripartite coalition government for further transformation at the expense of even the most rudimentary rules and procedures of parliamentarism did not help the public credibility of the coalition parties. As mentioned before, the post-1980 hegemonic view that tends to gloss over the class essence of both the state and the dominant policies had managed to direct popular discontent and demands for change towards the very existing trajectory even in a more intense and rapid fashion. Not surprisingly, refurbished by the liberal-minded intelligentsia, scholarly and policy circles both inside Turkey and abroad following the 2001 crisis,[777] discourses over the political instability that had plagued Turkey resulted in an overwhelming emphasis on the loss of legitimacy rather on the part of the Turkish state and its 'strong-state tradition', or individual political actors and coalition governments,[778] away from the finance-led regime of accumulation and the long-standing policies associated with it. Concomitantly, the dominant perception on the enduring instability which peaked with the financial crash of 2000-2001 contributed to the widespread acknowledgment of the idea that Turkey needed a strong and stable government at all costs. It was also accentuated by the IMF staff reports under the stand-by arrangement that the uncertain political atmosphere in Turkey needed to end by the upcoming elections in November in order to properly proceed with the economic reform programme with the next tranche of loans.[779]

Debates over political uncertainty would subsequently end up by the snap general election in 2002 which resulted in the AKP's coming to power with an absolute majority in the parliament as well as the wiping out of the major political parties associated with the enduring instability. Other than utilizing the blend of political Islamism with neoliberalism, and concurrently appealing both to capital groups and lower segments (particularly, the poor) of society, the initial rise of the AKP in fact

[777] For an exposition and critique of these, see Yalman, 2016.

[778] E.g. Z. Öniş, "Domestic Politics versus Global Dynamics: Towards a Political Economy of the 2000 and 2001 Financial Crises in Turkey", *Turkish Studies 4(2),* pp, 11, 15. Aliriza, 2001.

[779] IMF, *Turkey: Third Review Under the Stand-By Arrangement*, 2002.

hardly marked a novel phase in the ongoing trajectory of neoliberal hegemony. On the contrary, whatever novel political and ideological means it has effectively induced (e.g. anti-secularism, social policy, clientelist resource-allocation mechanisms, etc.) the party has undertaken the leadership of neoliberal transformation drawing on the very basis of the pacification of working classes as well as on the narrowing down of the political spectrum that has been in place since September 12. Thus, its initial political success indicated an impeccable continuity in the post-political foreclosure of the possibilities of democratic action and debate.[780]

Oddly enough, while the AKP's strong majority government was hailed by both domestic and foreign policy actors as a legitimate agent to silence oppositional and alternative voices to the reform programme, the launching of institutional reforms was promoted as somewhat unique means to democratization. This strategy had been also inherited from the specific mode of policy-making pursued under the TSEP which juxtaposed economic and political restructuring in a way to legitimize the technocratic, rule-based setting with reference to good-governance related notions of (neo)liberal democracy. Provided with substantive support from the political campaign pioneered by the liberal adherents of the hegemonic discourse that has been designed to sweep aside any debate on the form of state as to the existing accumulation regime, the AKP appeared to further consolidate such setting under the banner of 'national will' and 'democratization'. It is important to mention that the latter agenda greatly benefited from the then-fashionable multiculturalist, identity-based axis of politics[781] that had been embodied in the wide acceptance of policy themes ranging, inter alia, from civil–military relations to the Kurdish conflict, in such a way to evacuate class-based modes of questioning pertaining to democracy, equality and freedom.[782]

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[780] The post-political foreclosure represented by the AKP's first government can be viewed as the reinforcement of a hegemonic discourse produced in the 1990s in the intellectual field. Fahriye Üstüner and Necmi Erdoğan, "1990'larda 'Siyaset Sonrası' Söylemler ve Demokrasi" in Murat Gültekingil, Tanıl Bora (eds.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 7/ Liberalizm*, 2005.

[781] G. Yalman, 2016, p. 247. P. Bedirhanoğlu & G. Yalman, 2010, p. 119.

[782] For an illustrative example of promoting the AKP's allegedly "pluralist and multi-culturalist" democratization agenda in the face of the "authoritarian, Kemalist, militaristic and state-centric tradition", see Senem Aydın & Fuat Keyman, "European Integration and the Transformation of Turkish Democracy", *Centre for European Policy Studies*, No. 2/August 2004.

In effect, the notion 'class' was not kept entirely out of the scene. On the contrary (and paradoxically), in parallel with the rise of the Islamic political movement and its aspiration to take over the neoliberal restructuring, there has been a proliferation in the number of appeals to 'class' in scholarly communication, yet in purely extra-economic terms –more often than not, as a status group, a Weberian-inspired conceptual category. Nourished by a deliberate and careful oversight over the objective conditions of class formation, this hegemonic way of dealing with class contradictions has consequently turned out to offer a multitude of social classes determined in regard to cultural affiliations and/or other identity elements. Not only the struggle alleged to exist between the state and the bourgeoisie,[783] but also the identity-based confrontations derived among these 'classes' (e.g. state elite vs. civil society, secular bourgeoisie vs. authentic bourgeoisie, modernizationists vs. traditionalists, radical laicists vs. Islamists, traditional middle class vs. new middle classes, the high (*havas*) vs. the low (*avam*), old Turkey vs. new Turkey,)[784] have been celebrated as the new axis of social struggle.[785] The proliferation of false, or at best, trickily presented dichotomies as such was certainly a product of the dominant paradigm of centre-periphery and the narrative of 'strong state tradition' to account for the state-society relations in Turkey,[786] which had been articulated to calls for

[783] Ayşe Buğra, "Class, culture, and state: An analysis of interest representation by two Turkish business associations", *International Journal of Middle East Studies, 30* (4), 1998. Metin Heper (ed.), *Strong State and Economic Interest Groups: The Post-1980 Turkish Experience*, Business & Economics, 1991. Ahmet İnsel, *Düzen ve Kalkınma Kıskacında Türkiye*, Ayrıntı, 1996. Ç. Keyder, 1989.

[784] To cite some emblematic examples, Hakan Yavuz, "Search for a New Social Contract in Turkey: Fethullah Gulen, the Virtue Party and the Kurds", *SAIS Review*, 19(1), 1999. Mehmet Altan, *II. Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Özgürlükler,* Birey Yayınları, 2004. Ahmet İnsel, "The AKP and Normalizing Democracy in Turkey", *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 102.2/3, 2003; "Türkiye'de Burjuvazinin Serüveni", *Tüsiad Görüş*, N. 76, 2012. Fuat Keyman, "Türkiye'nin Geleceğini Yeni Orta Sınıf Belirleyecek", *Tüsiad Görüş*, N. 76, 2012; F. Keyman, "Globalization, Civil Society and Islam: The Question of Democracy in Turkey", in J. Jenson (eds.), *Globalizing Institutions: Case Studies in Regulation and Innovation*, Routledge, 2000. For a methodological critique of such account, see G. Yalman, 2016, 2007b, 2004.

[785] To be sure, since the allegedly constitutive conflict between these 'social classes' is said to date from the final period of the Ottoman Empire, it might not be called a novel development according to the hegemonic view. However, as one of the prominent liberal adherents of this discourse suggested, the AKP's coming to power with a strong parliamentary majority constituted a new and important threshold in this so-called century-old conflict. What this threshold was claimed to account for was nothing but a historical opportunity for the *normalization* / *democratization* of the political regime. A. İnsel, 2003, p. 299.

[786] Şerif Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?", *Daedalus*, 102, 1973. M. Heper, 1991. Ç, Keyder, 1989. For a rigorous overview and critique of the dominant paradigm cited in

institutional reforms towards further global integration in the 1990s. Hence, as noted earlier, this way of (mis)representing the social formation has for so long paved the way for the neoliberal restructuring of the state. At this juncture in the post-2001 period, however, it also provided fertile ground for the ascent of the Islamist movement as a proper agent to undertake the restructuring, to the extent that it managed to situate the latter as a democratic agent of the peripheral civil society vis-à-vis the 'oppressive centre'.

From the beginning of its tenure in 2002, the AKP government has utilized much of the ascendancy of such considerations in the ideological realm portraying itself as the voice of the excluded masses, the 'authentic nation' repressed by the authoritarian legacy of the republican state. Besides being a permanent electoral strategy for the party, this strategy could indeed effectively manufacture popular consent to the existing restructuring efforts for it perfectly fits into neoliberalism's anti-state rhetoric. For victory over the 'oppressive state' and the 'statist-laicist elites' was associated with the implementation of market reforms without disruption, even though there was more than enough evidence that the political parties associated with the former have hardly ever accommodated divergent economic policy preferences.[787] Hence, the discourse on the 'irrational/illiberal' nature ascribed to the state and the political regime in Turkey[788] became suitable to be used by the AKP cadres, for instance, as a legitimation of the acceleration of privatization and reduction of public spending.[789] Any oppositional stand against the aggressive policy of surplus transfer via mass privatizations, which was defined by the PM Erdoğan, in tune with international actors' prescriptions, as a prerequisite for the 'rationalization of the state and economy',[790] was denounced as acting as part of a bureaucratic

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this section from a historical perspective, see G. Yalman, 2002, 2007b; D. Dinler, 2003; Nadir Özbek, "Alternatif Tarih Tahayyülleri: Siyaset, İdeoloji ve Osmanlı-Türkiye Tarihi", *Toplum ve Bilim*, (98), 2003.

[787] BSB, 2007.

[788] A, İnsel, 2003.

[789] Ömer Dinçer & Cevdet Yılmaz, "Kamu Yönetiminde Yeniden Yapılanma: Değişimin Yönetimi İçin Yönetimde Değişim", T.C. Başbakanlık, 2003.

[790] Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, *Konuşmalar - 22. Yasama Dönemi*, Ak Parti Medya Tanıtım Başkanlığı, 2003, p. 62.

and/or civil oligarchy's tutelage which was trying to impede the government's carrying out its duty with a 'merchant mindset'.[791] Accordingly, the strategy of resorting to the dichotomous relationship set between, inter alia, the state and civil society was explicitly manifested in the subsequent programs of two AKP governments founded in 2002 and 2003 in which public sector reform was featured much more in detail. As typically observed in the scholarly manifestations of the dominant paradigm, both programmes laid out the critique of the state and politics in a highly depoliticized context within which the problem of 'democracy' and 'mismanagement' in Turkey was somewhat associated with the state's problem of economic inefficiency and could only be resolved by introducing proper market reforms.[792]

It was against this background that the IMF and EU had been mobilized by the AKP government as external policy anchors to trigger further global integration and neoliberal transformation of the social formation. This was not only to ensure ongoing reforms continue (i.e. to 'lock-in the reform process'[793]), but also to indicate the party's coming to power as a further step in the closure of politics, i.e. a new post-political and/or post-conflictual framework narrowing the political landscape via consensual arrangements as to the economic and political restructuring, that is from a certain perspective, the 'normalization of the political regime'.[794]

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[791] "Erdoğan: Biz tüccar siyaset yapacağız", *Hürriyet*, 30.03.2003. "Erdoğan: Bürokratik oligarşi bizi parmağında oynatıyor", *Hürriyet*, 08.06.2003. "Heyecanla geleceğe yürüyoruz karşımıza sivil oligarşi de çıkıyor, *Hürriyet*, 22.11.2004. "Emredersiniz deyip bildiklerini okuyorlar", *Yeni Şafak*, 30.12.2004. Fahrettin Altun, "Rising criticism of Erdoğan during the Gezi protests" in Ü. Cizre (ed.), *The Turkish AK Party and its Leader: Criticism, opposition and dissent*, Routledge, 2016.

[792] State restructuring was defended in the 58th government programme (2002) through the promotion of civil society vis-a-vis the state: dissolution of the over-centralized and rigidly hierarchical structures, privatization of the SOEs that have lost their economic rationality as a result of political interventions, empowerment of civil society in parallel with the establishment of democracy and market economy, enabling effective public sector monitoring and governance, turning representative democracy into participatory democracy by enabling the active participation of the NGOs, enabling the public will to be reflected on daily basis rather than only in election periods, enabling the participation of civil society to administration by removing the legal and administrative barriers, and so on. In a similar vein, the program of the 59th government (2003) derived its justification rather drawing on the concept of decentralization and local democracy which would be empowered in accordance with the principles of efficient, effective and modern governance.

[793] Z. Öniş, "Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey-EU Relations in the post-Helsinki Era", *Turkish Studies*, 4:1, 2003.

[794] A. İnsel, 2003. F. Altun, 2016.

The intertwinement of the economic and political restructuring was first manifested in the party's 2002 programme which was deliberately titled *Development and Democratization* and in which ongoing relations with the EU, alongside the IMF and WB, was explicitly addressed as a core principle under the economic policy.[795] On the part of the IMF, despite the AKP's initial gesture of remaining somewhat sceptical towards leaving economic policy to international actors,[796] the party, starting from its official programme and election manifesto, confirmed its full policy commitment to the components of the neoliberal programme underway**,** with no policy proposals over and above it. Specifically the election manifesto identified the main pillars of the party's economic approach as primary surplus target, structural reforms, acceleration of privatizations, independence of the CB, monetary and fiscal discipline with a stale discourse crafted around the 'virtues' of neoliberal globalization.[797] Unsurprisingly, in its first letter of intent after coming to power, the AKP government reiterated its ambition to vigorously pursue the policy mandates of the IMF: "strengthen and implement the ongoing economic reform program", "implement fundamental structural reforms", "remain strictly committed to the primary surplus target (6.5 percent of GNP)", "pursue public sector fiscal program and reduce public expenditures" achieve lasting reductions in public employment" "strengthen the governance framework for state enterprises", and strengthen the IRAs which "de-politicize economic management for a well-functioning market economy and effective government".[798] Furthermore, the high interest of international financial circles in Turkey's political reform was once again reiterated given that the way to full membership of the EU and the positive response of financial markets to the election of a strong single-party government were both distinctively highlighted as an impetus to economic reform efforts. This credit ascribed to the supposedly strong majority government was, to be sure, rooted in the dominant paradigm within which the success of political reform under the EU

[795] AKP, *Kalkınma ve Demokratikleşme Programı,* 2002. p. 34.

[796] AKP, *Election Manifesto for 2002 General Elections*, 2015a, pp. 7, 71. "Bugün borç alan yarın emir alır", *Yeni Şafak*, 16.11.2001.

[797] AKP, 2002, pp. 36-7.

[798] IMF, Turkey Letter of Intent, 5 April 2003. https://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2003/tur/01/index.htm

conditionalities was considered key to economic recovery and market stability, which in turn required discrediting supposedly weak coalition governments for instability.

In short, the first (two) AKP governments' (2002-2007) economic policy had been duly depoliticized by the dictates and conditionalities of the IMF which would count on the depoliticization of economic management and fiscal policy originally initiated by the TSEP. As such, the government planned to generate new sources of revenue and surplus for capital-owners and restore the credibility of the economy, while politically externalizing the social outcomes of tight monetary policies and budgetary austerity measures which would place the burden of the crisis on working classes. This IMF-led trajectory had maintained to provide an anchor for the ruling party[799] by being extended until the global crisis of 2008 yet with another three-year stand-by agreement signed in 2005, the end of which, however, by no means indicated the AKP's turning away neither from the governing strategy of depoliticization nor from the ideological preferences of the IMF.

In accordance with the depoliticization of economic policy in which the EU was also devised as an economic anchor,[800] political space had been further overwhelmed by the reform agenda in effect, inasmuch as the process of policy making was readily reduced to the fulfilment of the political criteria for EU accession. The EU's democratization discourse centred on market-based reforms was vigorously advocated by the liberal intelligentsia both in Turkey and the West as a leverage for Turkey's modernization (*Europeanization*) which urged for the dual tasks of economic and political development in neoliberal terms. This would be deliberately instrumentalized by the AKP government in favour of the party's political and electoral credibility. For the overlap between the AKP's outwardly de-radicalized Islamist origin that was staged as a form of Western-type conservatism[801] adhering to

[799] It was also contended by the IMF committee as well that another arrangement with an exceptional financial support was key to the electoral credibility of the AKP on the eve of the 2007 election. BSB, *2008 Kavşağında Türkiye*, p. 153.

[800] Z. Öniş, 2004.

[801] Metin Heper, Şule Toktaş, "Islam, modernity, and democracy in contemporary Turkey: The case of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan", *The Muslim World*, 93/2, 2003.

religious and cultural freedom, the liberal promotion of multi-culturalism and identity-based politics had been duly overlapped so as to pose the AKP's takeover as a historical opportunity for the prolonged problems of democratization, more specifically, as a counter-balancing force to the secular Kemalist tutelage who had been widely addressed as the predominant explanatory factor for the authoritarian character of the Turkish state.[802]

It was therefore largely thanks to the EU accession process at the time that the label of democratization had been a legitimate cover for the prevailing politics of neoliberalism despite its practical functioning outside democratic policy and decision making processes. Indeed, it could be followed from the progress reports and accession partnership documents on Turkey prepared in the first half of the 2000s that the country's reform trajectory since the turn of the century was praised by the EU as the 'improvement of the broad consensus about the essentials of economic policy' whereby the AKP rule as the continuation of the reform path which was to ensure 'the free interplay of market forces'.[803] The central component of the 'democratization' process was neither more nor less than the framework of good governance and technocratic economic policy-making associated with the structural reform agenda under the supervision of by the IMF and WB. Accordingly, the substantial financial and technical support from the IMF and WB was particularly underscored by the EU for the achievement of the "institutional and regulatory modernisation process" whilst the policy approach since the beginning of the TSEP was appreciated as a shift away from the "short-term oriented ad hoc policy decisions towards a more medium-term-oriented and rule-based" one.[804] The latter shift amounted to the process of liberalisation and deregulation in general, within which the economic criteria for EU accession was crystallized: Turkey needed to – ensure the implementation of the current disinflation and structural reform programme, in particular, the control of public expenditure, —continue with market

[802] H. Yavuz, 1999. A. İnsel, 2003. S. Aydın & F. Keyman, 2004.

[803] EU, *Regular Report on Turkey's progress towards accession*, 2004, p. 60. https://www.ab.gov.tr/siteimages/birimler/kpb/tr_rep_20061998/2004_tr_rap.pdf See also, EU Accession Partnership Documents on Turkey: https://www.ab.gov.tr/accession-partnership-documents_46226_en.html.

[804] Ibid.

liberalisation, particularly accelerate the privatisation of state-owned entities, —continue the swift implementation of the financial sector reform, in particular, transparency regulations and their surveillance with international standards, —safeguard the independence of IRAs and the Central Bank, —proceed with agricultural reforms.[805]

The EU's role in the consolidation of the post-political consensus on bringing in the alleged democratization / Europeanization hand in hand with marketization and privatization had been also effective in the instrumentalization of liberal democratic norms for a functioning market economy. Perfectly consistent with the 'economic' criteria of the idea of democratization as such, the 'political' dimension of the reform agenda laid special emphasis on issues related to cultural identity and politics of recognition as devoid of socio-economic and/or class-related modes of problematization. Fitting into the AKP's long-lasting strategy through which the party's neoliberal Islamism was staged as a socio-political agent of democratization in the face of the so-called secular Kemalist tutelage, the EU-driven political agenda over democratization was by and large subsumed to the 'enhancement of the political dialogue between the state and civil society' whereby civilian control of the military, cultural diversity, cultural and minority rights could be secured so as to encourage the development of civil society.[806] In this light, a series of liberal arrangements including the enforcement of particular civil rights (e.g. legislation on racism, freedom of speech, abolishment of death penalty, State Security Courts and the ongoing state of emergency in Eastern provinces) would be significant for they were to ensure, to quote from an EU report, "the existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union".[807] Last but not least, the EU's promotion of market-oriented 'reforms' even in issue areas such as public administration, social policy, employment and local governments would be rationalized under the rubric of 'democratization' with exclusive emphasis on 'efficiency, accountability and

[805] EU, *2003 Accession Partnership Document for Turkey*, 2003.

[806] See e.g. National Programmes for the Adoption of the Acquis designed by the Turkish government, http://ab.gov.tr/national-programmes-for-the-adoption-of-the-acquis-npaa-_194_en.html

[807] EU, 2003, p. 42.

transparency'.[808] Taken together, for a major part of the Turkish society's relationship with politics throughout the 2000s the EU accession process had become an 'empty signifier' for economic and political change,[809] an omnipotent but depoliticized watchword that could handle a number of concerns ranging from ensuring macroeconomic stability and capital inflows to democratization of the state-society relations as well as of the political structure.

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Depoliticization as a governing strategy which, among other things, has been an overwhelming influence in the post-1980 period in Turkey had been characterized by more than one single tactic and/or mechanism in the post-2001 restructuring through to the AKP's 'first period' in power (2002-2007). Spurred by the policy makers' motive to gain the support of both international circles and domestic capital, the politics of depoliticization in this period, to employ Flinders and Buller's typology,[810] had rested both upon institutional and rule-based forms more distinctly than ever. However autonomous they were to operate in practice, a number of institutions and bodies were entrusted with key functions so as to design a specialized economic apparatus within the state following the restructuring process initiated with the TSEP. As discussed in this section, such apparatus had been helpful to reduce policy making and implementation to allegedly a neutral and technical task under the discipline of global markets for which the formal political authority was rendered unaccountable.

In congruence with the insulation of decision making from societal pressure as such, there has been a third tactic and/or mechanism of depoliticization, which could be called preference-shaping. This tactic can be seen as an ideological manifestation of

[808] EU, *2005 Accession Partnership Document for Turkey*, 2005, p. 36.

[809] G. Yalman & A. Göksel, "Transforming Turkey? Putting the Turkey-European Union Relations into a Historical Perspective", *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, 14(56), 2017.

[810] Matthew Flinders & Jim Buller, "Depoliticisation: Principles, Tactics and Tools", *British Politics* (1), 2006; "The Domestic Origins of Depoliticisation in the Area of British Economic Policy. *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 7(4), 2005.

the long-enduring neoliberal hegemony as it had been employed, not to bypass or neutralize societal pressure, but to *shape* beforehand societal expectations with regard to the capacity and functions of the state by encouraging the launching of neoliberal policy packages as a neutral, universal and non-negotiable imperative. In so doing it not only helps these policies seem beyond government control, but even sets out to 'supress, exclude and marginalize disagreement, dissent and polemic'.[811] The developments following the financial crash of 2000-2001, most prominently the top-down appointment of the WB technocrat Derviş with unprecedented powers, de facto abolition of parliamentary representation, imposition of the technocratic agenda as a fait accompli (symbolized with the motto 'fifteen laws in fifteen days') as well as the already lack of will/capacity of a wide array of the then-existing political parties to politicize and articulate alternative demands were of critical importance in making the neoliberal reform programme indispensable in the eyes of many.

As far as the AKP rule is concerned, it was seen that the preference-shaping tactic was substantially empowered by the ideological and rhetorical anchors such as good governance and Europeanization, both of which contributed to the claims of *democratization* of the state along neoliberal lines as they provided active support from the intellectual adherents of the post-1980 hegemonic discourse. In effect, as already observed before, the notion of good governance combined with a call for democratisation imposes a depoliticised notion of governance functioning which, while generating attractive and open markets for capital, insulates governance from the actual political process: the struggles for power, control over resources, as well as access to the decision making process.[812] It is hardly surprising then that the discourse of democratization associated with neoliberal policy packages at the time in a post-political foreclosure in which any attempt to grasp politics and democracy through viable alternatives outside the neoliberal parameters was squeezed out beforehand. As a result, the open-ended and contested nature of democratic politics shaped by constant struggle had been absorbed by a certain framework of decision-

[811] Norman Fairclough, "Dialogue in the Public Sphere", in S. Sarangi and M. Coulthard (eds.) *Discourse and Social Life*, Harlow: Longman, 2014.

[812] Jolle Demmers, Alex E. Fernández Jilberto & Barbara Hogenboom, *Good Governance in the Era of Global Neoliberalism: Conflict and depolitisation in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa*, Routledge, 2004.

making in which political contestation was subsumed to the proper implementation of policy packages.

5.3. Pacification of Labour, Policing the Class of Poverty: Social and Labour Market Policy

Whilst the efforts of restructuring and adjustment discussed so far targeted the relationship between the state and market, labour remained a vital component of the broader transformation in state-society relations. The labour market restructuring that the AKP immediately embarked on as it came to power has not only promoted the further deregulation and flexibilization of working conditions in the name of enhancing market competitiveness, but it has also seriously undermined the organizational capacity of labour to intervene in political processes. Since a significant portion of the population could face the risk of falling into the state of indigence due to high levels of dispossession, unemployment and the erosion of political capacity, the political task of managing and regulating the class of poverty has become of utmost importance.

On this background, this section incorporates a discussion of social and labour market policy with a view to the political management of the condition of labour and poverty. It starts with a critical introduction of the WB-induced poverty alleviation strategy in the midst of the 'social risk' posed by the devastating effects of the crisis. This will be followed by an overview of the AKP's labour policy agenda and its further effects on the material conditions of working classes that have been embodied in intensified proletarianization and exploitation alongside higher rates of deunionization. Building on the WB's so-called pro-poor approach to poverty alleviation, the AKP has oriented towards a new social policy suited for the existing neoliberal policy framework as well as its Islamist political agenda. Thus, the final part of the section will include two major components of this orientation – social security reform and the establishment of charity-based network of social transfers. Set in motion in line with the political economic trajectory under the post-crisis adjustment, the new orientation entails a much more complex but programmatic system than, say, Özal's previously mentioned attempts of degenerated populism or

the imprecise Green Card programme of the 1990s. Under whatever title it can be discussed (such as 'neoliberal populism' or 'neoliberal charity state', or 'neoliberal poverty regime'[813]) this peculiar type of social policy has put in place a complex network of market oriented but highly populist measures that seriously helped the party regulate and police the poor as well as extend its political hegemony among them without neither improving social welfare nor being intruded by class-based demands.

5.3.1. Overseeing the Spectre of 'Social Risk': Poverty alleviation programme

The devastating crisis of 2000-2001 is described as a 'twin crisis', that, it indicated the concurrence of a balance of payments crisis triggered by capital outflows and a banking sector crisis.[814] It struck the GDP sharply, causing growth rates to fall by 6% and per capita annual incomes by 27.3% in 2001 compared to 2000, while depreciating Turkish Lira exchange rate against USD by 53% from January 2001 to January 2002.[815] Labour market indicators, particularly employment and real wages, deteriorated significantly in 2001 as the post-crisis measures particularly related to 'public sector reform', most prominently reduction in public sector employment and wage freezes, were combined with other adverse effects of the crisis. As of 2001, employment in SOEs decreased by 7.7% whilst employment loss in private enterprises was recorded as 8.6%. It is observed that approximately 969 thousand people joined the ranks of the unemployed in this year as a result of workplace closures and real sector layoffs, which caused the unemployment rate rise from 6.3% in 2000 (Q4) to 10.6 % in 2001 (Q4), according to the official records.[816] The first

[813] Deniz Yıldırım, "AKP ve Neoliberal Populizm", in İ. Uzgel & B. Duru (eds.) *AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu*, 2009. Umut Bozkurt, "Neoliberalism with a Human Face: Making Sense of the Justice and Development Party's Neoliberal Populism in Turkey", *Science & Society*, 77(3), 2013. Serdal Bahçe & Ahmet Haşim Köse, "Social Classes and the Neo-Liberal Poverty Regime in Turkey, 2002–2011", *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 47:4, 2017. Gönenç Uysal, "Charity State: Neoliberalism, Political Islam, and Class Relations in Turkey", *Journal of Marxism and Interdisciplinary Inquiry*, 10(1), 2019.

[814] P. Bedirhanoğlu & G. Yalman, 2010, p. 116.

[815] "Turkey - Gross Domestic Product", *countryeconomy*, https://countryeconomy.com/gdp/turkey?year=2001 . "Central Bank of Turkey Republic Exchange Rates", https://tcmb.gov.tr/kurlar/200101/Jan_tr.html.

[816] DİE, *Hanehalkı İşgücü İstatistikleri: 2001 (İl Merkezleri)*, 2003, p. 3.

quarter of 2002 also saw the highest unemployment rate (11.5 %) since the 1994 crisis. In particular, the unemployment rate among educated youth soared to 29.2 in urban areas.[817] In addition to layoffs, real wages declined significantly most particularly in the private sector. Minimum wages, salaries of public employees and civil servants decreased respectively by 14%, 11% and 4% in real terms, while wages by 20% in private sector. As a result, all these four wage indices happened to be below the levels of 1993. The real wages of private sector workers who were known to be the most adversely affected were nearly a quarter below the level of 1993 in 2001.[818]

The most salient impact of this severe impoverishment seemed to be on urban food poverty, as the urban sector experienced a major contraction. The urban population who had per equivalent expenditures below the imputed value of a food basket was 17.2%,[819] almost three times that of the previous notable crisis in 1994. Food prices increased averagely by 80.2% even exceeding the inflation rate of 68.5%.[820] Using 1999 (Q4) as the base year, the poverty level income for a household of four rose by 58.7% in 2000 and by 171% in 2001, hunger threshold rose by 57.6% in 2000 and by 176% in 2001.[821] Compared to 2002, impoverishment accelerated significantly in 2003 when the outcomes of the IMF-backed TSEP could be observed more clearly, even though the acute impacts of the crisis had not been entirely neutralized in the former. In that, the number of people living in poverty increased by roughly one million in 2003, which led the poverty rate to increase from 26.96% to 28.12%. Accordingly, the hunger rate in rural areas increased from 2.01 percent to 2.35 percent in 2003 as a result of the contraction in agricultural sector only in one year.[822] Measured by the cost of basic needs, the population considered 'vulnerable',

[817] DİE, *Hanehalkı İşgücü İstatistikleri: 2002 (İl Merkezleri)*, 2004, p. 3.

[818] Murat Koyuncu & Fikret Şenses, "Kısa Dönem Krizlerin Sosyoekonomik Etkileri: Türkiye, Endonezya ve Arjantin Deneyimleri", *ERC Working Papers in Economics 04/13*, 2004, p. 22. https://erc.metu.edu.tr/en/system/files/menu/series04/0413.pdf

[819] World Bank, "Turkey : Poverty and Coping After Crises, Volume 1. Main Report." World Bank Publications - Reports 14624, 2003, p. 13.

[820] M. Koyuncu & F. Şenses, 2004, p. 27.

[821] This data are provided by Kamu-Sen cited in "Yoksulluk sınırı 534 milyon", *Hürriyet*, 10.08.2000. "Açlık sınırı 307 milyon lira", *Hürriyet*, 13.11.2001.

[822] DİE, *2003 Yoksulluk Çalışması Sonuçları*, 2005.

that is at risk of poverty in the terminology of the WB's Living Standards Assessment, increased to 56.1% in 2001 from 36.3% in 1994. To put it simply, those at risk of falling below the poverty line alongside the absolute poor had become the majority of the population after the crisis, which included the 93% of the whole Southeast.[823]

It would not be hard to see that from the perspective of state and capital the intensity and visibility of social misery and despair would render an acute security risk to be managed without delay. The matter of urgency does not only stem from the need of the physical reproduction of labour power, but also from the risk of politicization of the social by-products of the relations of production, which would ultimately mean losing control of the subordinate classes. On the other hand, it was evident that the labour movement hardly aroused the slightest signs of politicization as such, for it could not develop into any long-term type of political subjectification to drive back the pacification efforts imposed upon it since September 12. It might be still worth to mention that the Labour Platform (*Emek Platformu)*, composed of several union confederations and mass organizations from different political orientations, started to hold demonstrations and issued press releases throughout big cities right before the announcement of Derviş's upcoming programme.[824]

The motive behind the demonstrations appeared to be limited to the public announcement of an alternative economic programme proposed by the labour. Although the programme involved the labour's reasonable short-term demands for the post-crisis recovery phase (the halt of layoffs, better pay and welfare), its underlying rationale relied on the parochial framework of the 'state failure' and/or 'mismanagement' explanations that would seek the roots of the crisis in domestic shortcomings (e.g. corruption, economic inefficiency, personal incapability and irresponsibility of politicians and policymakers) rather than the structural pitfalls of Turkey's mode of integration with world capitalism.[825] What might be of more importance than the political limitation of its programme was in fact the Platform's

[823] World Bank, 2003, p. 23.

[824] "İşçinin programı sokağa indi", *Milliyet*, 01.04.2001.

[825] "Emek kesiminden Alternatif Program", *Milliyet*, 29.03.2001.

politically evasive behaviour that it had not made any effort to actualize its initially declared intent not to allow the implementation of 'any IMF-led programme that would exclude the demands of the labour market'.[826]

In addition to the contested public actions of the Labour Platform, protest marches and demonstrations against the government and its upcoming policy measures had also been held by tradesmen, owners of small businesses and farmers throughout big cities in April 2001.[827] The protests gained momentum after an Ankara tradesman facing bankruptcy threw his empty cash register at the PM. The riot police, however, had no trouble breaking up the peaceful parades which had a conscious attempt to fall within the legal framework.

After all, all the discontent among the masses was quite far from manifesting radical forms of resistance against the long-standing political and economic settlement. Nevertheless, the sharpness of the economic and social outcomes of the crisis sufficed to provide legitimate grounds in political and media circles to speak about the possibility of social explosion even much more than the late 1990s. From domestic and international commentators to leaders of unions and civil associations several remarks were made suggesting that 'the spectre of social explosion was haunting the nation'.[828] The dominant discourse on social explosion was produced widely with reference to Latin American cases, most prominently to the example of Argentina in which the popular discontent with a similar major financial crisis under the guidance of the IMF in 2001 had soon turned into a public outburst of rage against the order in the form of general strikes, riots, occupations and plunders.[829] It

[826] "Sendikalar ESK'ya karşı 'eylem' diyor", *Milliyet*, 26.03.2001.

[827] Filiz Zabcı, A poverty alleviation programme in Turkey: the social risk mitigation project, *Journal for Labour and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe,* Vol. 9, No. 1, 2006, p. 110. Douglas Frantz, "Economic Protest in Turkey Turns Into a Melee", *New York Times,* 12.04.2001, https://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/12/world/economic-protest-in-turkey-turns-into-a-melee.html."Esnaf ayaklandı", *Milliyet,* 05.04.2001; "Esnaf durulmuyor", *Milliyet,* 06.04.2001. "Anadolu ayakta", *Milliyet,* 12.04.2001.

[828] Tanıl Bora, Türkiye Üzerinde "Sosyal Patlama" Hayaleti Dolaşıyor, *Birikim*, No. 148, 2001. "Kaybolan sendikamı bana geri ver" *Hürriyet*, 08.01.2001; Mehmet Ali Kışlalı, "Patlama Olur mu?", *Radikal*, 27.02.2001; İsmet Solak, "Politika Kazanı Kaynıyor", *Hürriyet*, 26.03.2001; "Vekiller halkın içine çıkamaz oldu", *Güneş*, 27.03.2001; Cüneyt Ülsever, "'Sosyal patlama olabilir!'" *Hürriyet*, 02.07.2001; "Türkiye'de sosyal patlama endişesi var", *Hürriyet*, 22.07.2001; Yıldırım Koç, "Sosyal Patlama", *Aydınlık Dergisi*, 29.07.2001; "Sosyal patlama kapıda", *Türkiye*, 09.12.2001.

[829] "Arjantin halkı sosyal patlamanın eşiğinde", *Hürriyet*, 21.08.2001; Derya Sazak, "Arjantin'de sosyal patlama", *Milliyet*, 21.12.2001. Ahmet İnsel, "Arjantin gibi Olmak", *Radikal iki*, 13.11.2003.

appeared that the Turkish state's security bureaucracy was also alarmed amid the rising politics of fear revolving around the popular discourse on social explosion. The possibility that dire financial straits manifested through high rates of unemployment, rising taxes and hikes might lead contagious societal reactions to spiral out of control especially in the suburbs of big cities was not far-fetched at all, and this was even brought to the official agenda of the NSC as a matter of priority.[830] It was reported that the NSC's primary security concern was that the protests might gradually overflow away from the control of trade unions and mass organizations to individual street movements.[831] From the perspective of the NSC, in case of a union action, in whatever form, it would be always possible to sit down and negotiate with the union administration, however, the real threat would come with disorderly grassroot mobilizations that unions and organizations could also fail to handle. It might be pertinent here to recall the sceptical view that the non-radical unionism of post-1980s does not necessarily threaten capitalist relations more than its absence since unions might as well be adept at policing labour unrest.[832]

In the face of the overwhelming debate over social explosion, the government, on the other hand, declared to decisively rely on Derviş's economic programme (TSE) pointing out that the new programme would soon help overcome the crisis and resolve the public unrest by alleviating social imbalances. This view was eagerly acknowledged by the NSC which seemed to heal the breach with social explosion by declaring its unconditional support to the IMF-backed economic programme.[833] As the NSC's support to the programme was secured, both the PM Ecevit and Economy Minister Derviş tried to comfort the public and media circles stating, with reference to Turkish people's patience and belief in the new programme, that existing economic troubles would not culminate into a social explosion as observed in similar

[830] "Milli Güvenlik Kurulu İstanbul'da toplanıyor, Gündem: sosyal patlama", *Cumhuriyet*, 24.07.2001". "MGK gündemi 'sosyal patlama'", *Milliyet*, 25.07.2001. Filiz Zabcı, *Dünya Bankası: Yanılsamalar ve Gerçekler*, 2009, p. 98; F. Zabcı, 2006, p. 110.

[831] Murat Yetkin, "'Patlama' MGK'da: Devletin Zirvesinde Sosyal Patlama Konuşuluyor", *Radikal*, 23.07.2001.

[832] G. Rigakos & A. Ergul, "Policing the industrial reserve army: An international study", *Crime Law and Social Change*, November 2011, p. 355.

[833] "MGK'dan programa destek", *Milliyet*, 26.07.2001.

crisis countries.[834] Other than accentuating the neoliberal orthodoxy which assumes a positive relationship between economic growth with macroeconomic stability and poverty reduction, Derviş also gave clues about how to manage poverty and socio-economic inequalities in the subsequent phase of neoliberal adjustment: "At this point, assertive and rambling comments will not be consistent without examining the causes of the problem. Income inequalities can be easily resolved with sustainable growth. Besides, we will also develop social assistance programs for citizens in difficult situations."[835]

The process did not prove government officials wrong for there had not been the slightest indication that the quality and level of politicization of the crisis would present a compelling case against the existing the existing power relations and policy approach of the state managers. Nevertheless, the financial and human wreckage of the crisis still sufficed to keep the risk of social explosion on the agenda. Approximately ten months in the wake of the fiscal and structural reform programme had been put in effect, it was reported that a precautionary circular of 16 articles was issued by the Ministry of Interior to the governors, district governors and mayors 'in order to prevent social explosion'.[836] Publicly dubbed 'Argentina measures', the circular ordered the identification of the hungry and those in need of care to get urgent assistance through *SYDV* (Social Aid and Solidarity) foundations. Although the circular highlighted the inherent relationship between the tasks of providing 'effective social services' and securing 'public health and security' in a way to evoke the one between public health and (medical) police practice in the history of Western political economy,[837] it was also claimed by the Ministry that coping with social problems related to poverty should not be limited to the measures to be taken within the scope of security. In fact, it was apparent that the measures against the so-called

[834] "Ecevit: "Sosyal patlama olmaz"", *Milliyet*, 26.07.2001.

[835] Ibid, 2001.

[836] F. Zabcı, 2009, p. 98. "Arjantin genelgesi", *Hürriyet*, 5.1.2002.

[837] The emergence of 'public health' as a substitutive term for medical police following the decline of mercantilism has been more or less analogous across Europe and England with the rise of political economy in the 18th century. Rather than indicating a new political reality the idiomatic shift from police towards public health was tactical to make medical police practice more acceptable since police could be somewhat seen as the antithesis of liberty. Patrick E. Carroll, "Medical Police and the History of Public Health", *Medical History*, v. 46, 2002.

social explosion were nothing but security measures, but they relied rather on the 'social' form of it, that is, providing certain social services (e.g. care for the elderly and disabled, rehabilitation of street children, bringing beggars and homeless people to municipal shelters) under the label of 'social security practice'. In the same vein, the Constitution section on "provisions relating to labour" has been amended in November 2001 by adding the phrase "to protect the unemployed" to the necessary measures that the state shall take to "promote labour and to secure labour peace" (Article #49).

Indeed, given the compelling necessity to police and politically manage high levels of poverty as well as the socio-political cost of the upcoming structural adjustment measures a much more comprehensive dimension would be ascribed to social policy with the new era beginning with the TSEP. Since the policy design of the latter was profoundly shaped by structural market reforms associated with the so-called post-Washington consensus, the market-friendly trajectory of the new social policy framework would accompany the fashionable 'pro-poor growth' rhetoric of the international agencies since the 1990s. The first implication of this could be found in the emphasis on 'social assistance' in the Letter of Intent issued to the IMF in May 2001 as an acute recovery measure. Underlining the presumed support of the WB it was noted that targeted assistance would be provided to the most vulnerable sections of the population in order to 'help reduce the impact of the economic crisis'.[838] Besides being a merely post-crisis measure, 'protecting the social welfare of all citizens' was conspicuously highlighted in the Letter as a fundamental goal of the long-termed policy framework. What was alluded to by the protection of social welfare was in fact a peculiar understanding and policy programme of poverty alleviation, which would be most concretely devised under an agreement signed between the WB and the Turkish Government on September 2001, entitled the Social Risk Mitigation Project (SRMP).

The SRMP was reflective of the reformulation of, or a 'paradigmatic shift' as argued by some critiques,[839] in the conception, strategy and means of the poverty agenda of

[838] Letter of Intent of the government of Turkey, May 3, 2001.

[839] Metin Özuğurlu, Sosyal Politikanın Dönüşümü ya da Sıfatın Suretten Kopuşu, *Mülkiye Dergisi*, V. 27, 2003.

international agencies, the WB in particular. As a response to the socio-economic wreckage of many crisis-ridden economies since the 1990s,[840] it is argued that the new orientation of the poverty agenda of global capitalism has diverted away from the 'coping' strategies of the 1990s which focus on the impacts of a crisis only after it emerges, to a new strategy which calls for preventive measures and mechanisms towards risk 'mitigation' and 'reduction' in light of the impacts of potential economic crises particularly on the lowest income groups.[841] This preventive character has applied to the WB-proposed trajectory of poverty alleviation in Turkey within the scope of the SRMP.

It is apt to put that Turkey's new poverty alleviation agenda developed around the organizing principle of social risk management has been far beyond targeting poverty alleviation as a residual goal. Rather, it has sought to bring forward the institutional and ideological linchpin of the managerial reform in social policy as a long term political project which was obviously designed in line with the further phase of structural adjustment. In this light, the new social policy framework has tended to break with any focus on the relations of production and exclude the state's redistributive mechanisms from its very scope in favour of a highly targeted network of risk management that would focus on keeping poverty at a sustainable level. The focal point of social policy has thereby shifted dramatically from wage labour to the category of 'poor' and 'vulnerable' which would be activated for market productivity.

Not surprisingly, it could be also observed that the proposed pro-poor reorganization of social policy has fallen well within and drawn much from the discursive agenda of the post-Washington Consensus. The WB's critical overview of Turkey's existing social security network, which constituted the basis of its prescriptions, time and again pointed out the needs of the competitive and efficient market, however with an emphasis on the institutional limits of the regulatory state in Turkey.[842] Its

[840] G. Yalman, "Discourse and Practice of Poverty Reduction Strategies: Reflections on the Turkish Case in the 2000s" in İ. Eren (ed.), *Converging Europe, Transformation of Social Policy in the Enlarged European Union and in Turkey*, London: Routledge, 2011.

[841] F. Zabcı, 2006.

[842] World Bank, *Turkey: Economic Reforms, Living Standards and Social Welfare Study*, 2000.

evaluations on the need for a cost-effective and pro-poor social policy have been specifically circumscribed by good governance-related notions and themes such as sustainability, transparency, market-friendly institution building, and empowerment of social and human capital.[843] The-then existing social security system of Turkey was denounced by the Bank as an 'unsustainable state transfer mechanism' which has somehow maintained the existing income inequalities by mainly addressing the non-poor population and failing to reach the poorest and most vulnerable. Besides being 'ad hoc, patchy and limited', the social protection network was also charged for impeding a pro-poor and equitable economic growth as it was claimed to impose a notable fiscal burden on public finance.[844] Moreover, the existing system had been far from enhancing sustainable employment opportunities for the poor in consideration of the imminent risk of the 'destruction of human capital' following the financial crisis.[845]

It is thus obvious from the WB's reflections that the promotion of the new social policy regime developed around a peculiar view of risk management specifically targeting the poor would properly accompany the neoliberal policy framework already set out at the turn of the new century. Concomitantly, the long-term goals attributed to the new social policy framework were scripted in relation to the basics of Turkey's post-2001 macroeconomic policy approach and structural reform agenda. Reforms in the financial and public sectors in particular were highlighted by the Bank as a crucial step for avoiding future crisis which would likely be devastating for the poor.[846] It was asserted that the post-crisis reform package would shortly help pull the economy out of recession and restore growth in a way to minimize job loss as well as the social and poverty impact of the crisis. Accordingly, restored confidence in the financial sector would help generate new resources for economic recovery and job creation. The public sector reforms would help ensure the

[843] World Bank, *Turkey-Social Risk Mitigation Project*, Report No. PID10515, 2001a, p.8. G. Yalman, 2011, p. 234.

[844] World Bank, 2001a, p. 4.

[845] Ibid, 2001a, p. 2; *Project Appraisal Document on A Proposed Hybrid Investment/Adjustment Loan*, Report No: 22510-TU, 2001b, p. 21.

[846] World Bank, 2001b, p. 16.

quality of the fiscal adjustment and improve overall efficiency of social service delivery, while the SRMP would in turn undergird the economic reform program through 'mitigating social costs for the poorest'.[847]

Against this background, the key objective of the SRMP was declared as "to strengthen the social assistance system so that it becomes cost-effective in Turkey and is better targeted to the poorest, and which will provide not only a safety-net for the poor, but also a trampoline to help the poor escape poverty".[848] As such, the social assistance system was claimed not only to mitigate social risk but also help to 'prevent and manage' it. To this end, the Project provided a hybrid loan (adjustment plus investment portion) of $500 million from the WB with an implementation period of five years.[849] The adjustment portion ("Rapid Assistance") of $100 million would be granted based on the conditions of 'satisfactory macroeconomic framework' and progress in the conduct of the programme. This loan was devoted for the *mitigation* of the adverse impacts of the February 2001 crisis on the poorest households by responding their immediate needs for education, heating and nutrition in particular.[850] The investment portion, on the other hand, was pertaining to social risk *management* and *prevention* which would entail the improvement of the poor to cope with similar risks in the future. The major part of the loan was to be spent on these initiatives that were composed of (a) the institutional development of key government agencies to improve the coverage and targeting of the social safety-net for the poor, (b) a social assistance system *(Conditional Cash Transfers - CCT)* directed towards the poorest 6 percent of the population to finance their education and health/nutrition grants, (c) *Local Initiative programs* which included (i) income-generating projects (ii) employability training (technical and life skills) programs (iii) temporary community employment and (iv) expansion of cost-effective social services for children, youth, disabled and the elderly, for the most vulnerable 36 percent of the population.[851]

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[847] World Bank, 2001a, pp. 2-3.

[848] Ibid, p. 3.

[849] World Bank, 2001b, p. 23.

[850] T.C. Basbakanlık Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Genel Müdürlüğü, *Sosyal Riski Azaltma Projesi Kapanış Kataloğu,* Ankara: SYGM, 2007, p. 26.

[851] WB, 2001b, p. 1, pp. 23-4.

Significant here is that the labour supply measures provided in the latter initiatives of the SRMP has less to do with directly coping with the impacts of the financial crisis than with the long-term promotion of the proletarianization of the poor through the formation of 'human capital'.

The latter was thought to contribute to the reproduction of the labour power of the poor as well as to the expansion of markets, by seeking to empower the poor's ability to equip for, incorporate into, and subject to competitive labour markets.[852] In that, the poor and poverty have not only been subject to targeted control but also they would be actively mobilized to labour market as a productive force amid the increasingly precarious position they found themselves in due to the insecurity induced by further market reforms. This neoliberal identification between poverty and market-led development which could be formulated as the 'poverty reduction-cum-development'[853] strategy purports to explain the basic rationale behind the new social policy making under the guise of risk management and the poor-oriented discourse.

The post-crisis milieu has thus witnessed that the market friendly reorganization of social policy would bring in a more systematic instrument of policing social order by means of the control and management of the poor. By the same token, it would simultaneously seek to activate the unemployed population and promote the proletarianization of the poor[854] without being intruded by possible conflicts pertaining to redistribution and employment policies as well as class-based challenges.

The presence of such challenges, to be sure, depends in the first place on that of a strong organized labour. In what follows, I will briefly outline the ways in which the long period of 'peace' on the part of labour has been established throughout the 2000s.

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[852] Paul Cammack, "What the World Bank means by poverty reduction, and why it matters", *New Political Economy*, 9:2, 2004, p. 190.

[853] G. Yalman, 2011, pp.232-3.

[854] P. Cammack, 2001; 2004.

5.3.2. Pacification of Workforce through Insecurity: Labour Market and Trade Union Policy

The implementation of the neoliberal policy agenda at an unprecedented pace in the 2000s has manifested a continuous but also duly accelerated deepening of the "notorious trinity", that is deindustrialisation, privatization and deunionization which have been a commonly prevailing feature of the neoliberal models of capitalist development in Turkey and elsewhere from the early 1980s onwards.[855] As part of the post-crisis transformation that it has taken over since 2002, the AKP government managed to restructure the economic, political and ideological mechanisms with regards to labour and social policy in tandem with its discursive strategies. Notwithstanding its peculiarity on discourse level (Islamism, conservatism, democratization, etc.) such restructuring in both policy areas would build on the authoritarian management of labour initiated by the September 12 regime as well as the post-crisis adjustment. In that, the AKP's labour policy could be profoundly characterized by the very rationale of promoting competitiveness through labour market flexibility as proposed by the TSEP, and to this end, it would further ensure the political disorganization/deunionization of the working class. The outcome has been even more labour market insecurity manifested through prevalent forms of job and employment insecurity (precarious, partial, flexible modes of work), social insecurity (informality)[856] plus depressing real wages and incomes which could only be deepened by greater financial indebtedness.

Whilst the greater insecurity emerging out of both the labour market and the increasingly inclusive financial system would expand the capital's capacity to control labour power, it has been, in turn, accompanied by a new regime of social policy oriented towards the lowest echelons of the working classes. Complying with the ideological components of the AKP's governing strategies, the new regime would also entail a compatible and even a symbiotic relation with the labour policy agenda put in effect. For both policy areas would promote market competitiveness through

[855] Oktar Türel, "Turkey vis-à-vis the periphery of the EU: An economic assessment". *METU Studies in Development*, 41, 2014, p. 411.

[856] BSB, *AKP'li Yıllarda Emeğin Durumu,* 2015, p. 73.

flexibility and precariousness without any implication of introducing remedial arrangements in the labour market. Both have been diverted away from the political and class conflicts with regards to distribution and employment. Thereby, both have been devised to ensure the further foreclosure of class-based questions within the realm of politics and economy. This section will briefly sketch out labour market and trade union policy that would take a step forward the authoritarian statecraft of the 1980s by imposing precarity and disorganization as a mechanism for the pacification of labour.

It would not be a hard task to trace the pro-capital class position of the AKP even only from its official resources (basically, the party and government programmes and election manifestos) from the very outset. The party's programme published in 2002 included some brief references to freedom of association and union rights and freedoms alongside the wide range of pledges on market-oriented reforms and privatization.[857] Even these small accents somehow disappeared in the electoral manifesto of the same year; there was no promise of workers' and union rights, and the word "worker" was only mentioned on the sidelines of the overt emphasis on lowering labour costs and flexible ways of working.[858] The government programmes from 2002 to 2007 were no different in shying away from the economic and political rights of workers, whilst the emphasis on market competitiveness, economic rationality and flexibility had been the most salient themes in the government's approach to labour relations both in the public and private sectors. The latter has thus been one of the few policy orientations that the AKP rule has maintained consistently in the sense that it has gone along to keep its anti-labour stance above board since the beginning whereby the authoritarian management of the balance of class forces, the primary legacy of the September 12 regime, has been only augmented in the interest of the bourgeoisie. This was by no means limited or tempered by the EU-sponsored democratization campaign which seemed to have spread to a wide range of policy during this period. Though outwardly, neither has this indicated a contradiction insofar as democratization as such is encompassed the anti-statist thrust of

[857] "5.6. Work Life" in Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, *Kalkınma ve Demokratikleşme Programı,* 2002, pp. 86-7.

[858] Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, *2002 Genel Seçimleri Beyannamesi*, 2002.

eliminating the supposedly existing rigid structure of politics, administration and economy which is somehow associated with the principles of market rationality, efficiency, global competitiveness and deregulation.

The 'rigidity' (i.e. inflexibility) of the labour market and employment protection had been the central theme of the hegemonic discourse to legitimize the restructuring of labour relations and social security notwithstanding the vast range of informality in both areas. Not surprisingly, labour market flexibility, which, as a policy agenda, originally traces back to the early phases of the neoliberalization process, had been one of the most highlighted topics in various policy documents of key external actors (notably the WB, EU and OECD) in the course of the stand-by arrangements and structural reform agenda. The alleged rigidity of labour legislation has also increasingly become the main thrust of the domestic bourgeoisie in its compelling demand for a flexible labour regime.[859] The TİSK's workshop report on the issue, for example, went so far as to claim that the existing regime had been 'penalizing' employers and producers given the urgency to meet the requirements of the present globalized economy.[860] Thus, the underlying reason for further inflexibility and precarity in employer discourse was 'adjustment for increasing global competition and changing economic conditions in the new millennium'. On this background, demands towards the flexibilization of the labour market were first put on the agenda with the TSEP. The programme consistently adopted the labour regime framework proposed by the international agencies by bringing forward flexibility as a solution both for the alleged problem of public sector inefficiency, and that of unemployment so as to encourage direct investment by reducing business costs and providing incentive for new job creation.[861] The same point was further developed in the AKP's Urgent Action Plan declared in 2003, soon after the party came to power. In the topic Measures Against Unemployment, the policy document had envisaged issuing legislation that would regulate nonstandard and atypical working schemes,

[859] Ali Murat Özdemir & Gamze Yücesan-Özdemir, Labour Law Reform in Turkey in the 2000s: The Devil is Not Just in the Detail but Also in the Legal Texts, *Economic and Industrial Democracy* 27(2), 2006, pp. 314-5, 323. Erinç Yeldan, *Küreselleşme Sürecinde Türkiye: Bölüşüm, Birikim ve Büyüme*, İletişim Yayınları, 2001.

[860] TİSK, *Çalışma Hayatında Esneklik*, TİSK, 1999, pp. 36-7.

[861] IMF, Staff Report, November 18 2005.

along with flexible employment and performance-based compensation in the public sector.[862]

Only within five months of coming to power the AKP government developed and enacted a new individual labour law (no. #4857) in response to the demands of capital[863] and the party's neoliberal mentors for the re-regulation/deregulation of the labour market with greater flexibility. Repealing the labour act that remained in force since 1971 (no. #1475) as well as the so-called new job security legislation (no. #4773) which had been issued just before the general election of November 2002[864], the new legislation has incorporated a number of key changes in employment relations (labour contracts, work organization, job duration, inter alia) so as to extend the forms of labour's subordination to capital both at the workplace and in the labour market. The preamble of the law simply reiterated the justifications previously made by capital organizations by arguing that the rigidity of the former legislation had been unable to respond to the 'technological revolution and the dramatic transformations it has brought in labour relations'. It was also noted that the inflexibility prevailed in the former regime did not allow various procedures to be used especially in times of economic crisis, which ultimately led to de facto practices contrary to the law. The preamble thus justified the key motive behind the adoption of the law based on the need for flexibility as a *sine qua non* of global competition as well as the necessity to comply with the EU and ILO norms.[865]

Against this backdrop, the new law has become the legal basis of exercising insecurity as a disciplinary control over wage-labourers. Being the most

[862] T.C. 58. Hükümet Acil Eylem Planı, 2003, pp. 36, 81, 90.

[863] Aziz Çelik argues that the legislative process of the law has been a unique example to show the extent to which the parliament, state and party power have come under the domination of an organized minority at the expense of the interests of the majority. Aziz Çelik, "Yeni İş Yasasının Anlamı", *Türkiye Barolar Birliği Dergisi Eylül/Ekim 2003*, p. 7.

[864] The legal arrangement on job security issued in August 2002 had been enacted amid intensive confrontations between capital organizations and trade unions. It drew harsh criticism from the former who accused the state managers of electoral populism, although what it brought about was not a job security in the genuine sense but only a bare increase in the cost of arbitrary layoffs which was even confined to workers on permanent (indefinite period) contract. A. Çelik, 2003, pp. 4-6. Consequently, capital's pressure has succeeded in retrieving even this small concession with the AKP's coming to power, and it came out that the partial arrangement on job security had been in effect only for three months.

[865] TİSK, *4857 Sayılı İş Kanunu ve Gerekçesi*, Matsa Basımevi, 2009, pp. 72-4.

comprehensive legislation governing labour relations since then, it has introduced many new regulations while either changing or repealing several practices and institutions in force for over thirty years. Above all, capital has been provided with significant flexibility for dismissals. By excluding the establishments with less than thirty workers (article #18) the new law has narrowed down the scope of job security that was previously regulated by the newly issued job security legislation of 2002 (no. #4773)[866]. With this amendment, only around half of the covered workers and 3.5 percent of total establishments have fallen within the scope of the protective provisions on termination of contracts.[867] It went without saying that the new law maintained to exclude workers under definite contracts from the same scope. The protective provisions, on the other hand, would not be effective inasmuch as the employer's written notification on imposing a substantial change in working conditions (such as workplace change) is deemed to be based on a 'valid reason' (article #22). In this case, the employer entails the right to terminate the contract if the worker would not accept such change or there is 'another legitimate reason for termination'.[868] As could be followed from the law's preamble, economic cases such as crisis, general stagnation in the market, or even drop in sales have been considered among valid grounds (originating outside the workplace) for collective dismissals.[869] In other words, capital's own insecurity has been plainly imposed upon labour in the form of job insecurity.

Second, greater flexibility has also been imposed on working conditions with the introduction of atypical employment models that include temporary/on-loan, indefinite, part-time, probation contracts and on-call work (articles #7, #10, #11, #13, #14, #15). Taken together, capital's discretion to dismiss without the obligation to pay compensation has been empowered. Moreover, the deregulation and flexibilization of working conditions has been further consolidated by the employer's

[866] Job security provisions had been limited to establishments with more than ten or more workers in previous legislation.

[867] A. Çelik, 2003, p. 14.

[868] The law has also reduced reemployment compensation in case of unjust dismissals from 6-12 months wage to 4-8 months. Murat Özveri, *İşçi Sağlığı İş Güvenliği ve İş Cinayetleri*, 2015, p. 133.

[869] TİSK, 2009, p. 97.

newly-defined right to regulate/distribute weekly and daily working hours in a free manner (articles #41, #63) which could be used in a way to make the worker work more, in the same manner as 'compensatory work' (article #64). Thus, working time, popular struggles over which trace back to centuries ago, has also become indefinite in capital's favour.

The new labour legislation has also aimed at increasing the rate of exploitation and incapacitating the already weak political organization of labour by way of extending the scope of subcontracting relation. To this end, it has provided legal justification for subcontracting in all kinds of auxiliary tasks, in a certain part of the main task, or in all divided parts of the main task (articles #6, #7). The promotion of subcontracting and outsourcing mainly in sectors such as construction, cleaning, mining, shipyard and municipal services has unsurprisingly changed the composition of the labour force resulting in an increase in the number of subcontracted workers by four times in ten years since the Labour Law came into force.[870] Such spread of the subcontracting / outsourcing mechanism has paved new ways of reducing labour costs and steering clear of protective provisions binding for establishments with thirty or more workers, as well as a method of privatization and imposing precarity in the public sector. On political level, it also serves for the disunity of the working class thanks to the division of labour force into hierarchical forms of employment, the lowest category of which corresponds to easily-disposable and disciplined precarious workers.

From one vantage point, labour law can be viewed historically a site for popular democratic struggles, the acquisitions in which are eventually to secure the reproduction of labour power in the face of market-based processes of dispossession and exploitation. Yet along with other policy areas and components of social law, the neoliberal form of labour policy regime in Turkey, that has come to a head most notably by the adjustment of labour market policies to the post-2001 restructuring, has been itself a pillar of keeping wage labour under supervision and utilizing labour power as a pure commodity. The pro-market character of the employment relations

[870] DİSK, *Temel İş Gücü İstatistikleri*, November 2015. https://www.genel-is.org.tr/temel-isgucu-istatistiklerine-gore-turkiyede-iscilerin-122si-taseron-isci,2,11076#.XmKpsKgzZPb. "Taşeron yüzde 500 arttı", 10.06.2017, *Cumhuriyet*.

settled by this regime has even been criticized for being a throwback to 'wild capitalism' of the 19th century,[871] as well as accomplishing a major part of the central thrust of the September 12 regime in relation to state-class relations.

From the conceptual adoption of neoliberal discourse in labour jurisprudence[872] to the changing application of court rulings, it can thus be observed that the law has become once again a conducive instrument for the authoritarian management of wage labour and a chief site for waging class warfare. In that, the legal perception and practice of working rights has been thoroughly confined to constitutional 'freedom of contract' and 'right to property',[873] whereby work security has been largely subsumed into the security of the employer in due course.[874] On the other hand, the risk and insecurity stemming from the competitive pressure inherent to market mechanism continue to be directly imposed upon wage labour by means of the law. More specifically, all the atypical modes of employment and contracts introduced with the individual labour law of 2003 have brought substantial changes so as to institutionalize ever more violent forms of insecurity and precarity in the labour market. Consequently, the balance of power between capital and labour has been further disrupted thanks to the expanded legal grounds provided for greater flexibility and deregulation, the most prevailing employment patterns being subcontracting and definite period contracts. The outcome of this disruption could be seen most effectively with regards to the rate of exploitation and proletarianization,[875] but it is no less perplexing on political level that the same process also contributes to the consolidation of deunionization[876] as well as labour's dependence and obedience to capital to the extent that job insecurity, that is manifested most practically in the constant fear of dismissal, has served as a serious

[871] A. Çelik, 2003, p. 12.

[872] For a critical review of recent changes in the discursive conceptualization of labour's subordination to capital as manifested in the field of judiciary, see A. M. Özdemir & G. Yücesan-Özdemir, 2006.

[873] BSB, 2015, p. 56.

[874] Simten Coşar & Metin Yeğenoğlu, "The Neoliberal Restructuring of Turkey's Social Security System", *Monthly Review*, v. 60, 2009, p. 41.

[875] S. Bahçe & A. H. Köse, 2017.

[876] Aziz Çelik, "Trade unions and deunionization during ten years of AKP rule", Perspectives/ Political Analysis and Commentary from Turkey, Heinrich Böll Stiftung/Turkey Representation, 3, 2013.

impediment to the struggle for –and even the practice of– collective labour rights. For "insecure workforce is one important step toward pacified workforce".[877]

The general tendency of the post-crisis trajectory towards flexible, fragmented, disciplined, low-cost labour market has continued to be the main characteristic of the AKP government's labour policy agenda throughout the 2000s. The necessity to cope with soaring unemployment despite relatively higher economic growth during the decade, a problem which culminated especially in the wake of the global crisis of 2007-2009 whose repercussions had been prevailing in the job market, led the government to take even more expansive steps to accelerate active labour market measures, largely based on flexible and short-term working arrangements, by the late 2000s.[878] These measures were well covered by the National Employment Strategy launched by the Ministry of Labour in 2012 which was to reflect the policy trajectory of labour market in the short and medium run in view of the upsurge of unemployment following the crisis period by the late 2000s. Developed without the slightest participation of trade unions,[879] the employment strategy promoted the prevalence of flexible working schemes especially for youth and women (e.g. part-time, distance, home-based and temporary work, establishment of private employment agencies) along with the relieve employers of responsibility for the reproduction of labour power (reduction of non-wage labour costs, severance payments and social security in particular). This was a clear manifestation of the government's will to utilize the crisis conditions to further exacerbate the flexible, fragmented and insecure employment structure pervading all aspects of working life – working types, working hours, wage levels and unionization matters.

Notwithstanding the palpable flexibility and insecurity manifested in the prevalence of informal employment as well as the flexible mobility of the real wage level

[877] G. Rigakos & A. Ergul, 2013, p. 168.

[878] Sumercan Bozkurt & Galip Yalman, "AKP governments and the social and labour market policy transformations in Turkey in the 2000s", *Emerging Seven Countries Critical Policy Studies Research Project*, 2011, pp. 8-10. Erinç Yeldan, "Turkey's Response to The Global Crisis: An Initial Assessment of the Effects of Fiscal Stimulus Measures on Employment and Labor Markets", Unpublished paper, 2009. http://www.bilkent.edu.tr/~yeldane/2009ILO_G20CountryBrief_Turkey.pdf

[879] Aziz Çelik, "Ulusal İstihdam Stratejisi: Ucuzluk, Esneklik ve Güvencesizlik", Ulusal İstihdam Stratejisi Sempozyumu 13.04.2012a, Ankara. http://www.turkis.org.tr/dosya/Y3d2dCexBV5s.pdf

detached from labour productivity[880], the justification, yet again, relied on the contention of 'rigid labour market' that was believed to impede job creation and competitiveness.[881] Accordingly, the programme also proposed flexibility on the basis of the so-called 'flexicurity' as a replacement for job security.[882] Evoking the liberal myth of balance between liberty and security, such alleged balance between flexibility and security has less to do with labour's security than with capital's flexibility secured in transferring and accumulating labour power as a pure commodity.

Overall, even though some of the components in the employment programme had been postponed and distributed among subsequent policy documents largely due to short-sighted electoral concerns,[883] it still envisaged the basic ideological and legal contours of the AKP's efforts of institutionalization of insecurity in the labour market. Most crucially, ineffective legal regulations promulgated in the face of the hazardous, low-cost, precarious working conditions in subcontract employment networks[884] that have been steadily increasing following the individual labour law of 2003 has continually resulted in devastating number of deaths in fatal accidents which have been duly labelled as collective workplace murders or even massacres.

An important aspect of the decline of collective labour rights in the 2000s is the acceleration of the weakening of unionization in both qualitative and quantitative

[880] Erinç Yeldan, ""Ulusal İstihdam Stratejisi" Belgesi Üzerine Makro Ekonomik Bakış", Ulusal İstihdam Stratejisi Sempozyumu 13 Nisan 2012, Ankara.

[881] ÇSGB, *Ulusal İstihdam Stratejisi Taslağı (2012-2023)*, 2012.

[882] Ibid, articles #72, 73.

[883] For example, the ever-contested regulation on private employment agencies for rental workers, that is, a liberal form of slavery work, could be successfully issued in 2016 after being vetoed by the then-President in 2009, and then formulated by the National Employment Strategy of 2014-2022 with a more comprehensive approach.

[884] The Occupational Health and Safety Law (#6331) issued in 2012 thanks to the postponed impact of the ILO's rulings and conventions plus several amendments in the Labour Law of 2003 failed to impose adequate measures to help reduce workplace accidents. An almanac on the issue reports that regularly 1500-2000 workers, including children, have been killed every year as of the last decade, making Turkey rank third in the world in workplace accidents. *İş Cinayetleri Almanağı 2018*, 1 Umut Yayıncılık, 2019. The increasing number of fatal accidents and the rate of deunionization in relatively growing sectors such as construction, shipyard and mining indicate that such growth is largely indebted to cheap, precarious labour.

terms, which has constituted both a symptom of and an enabling condition for the new labour regime. Setting out a bilateral strategy in union policy the AKP government has stepped up a gear in the state's long-running efforts towards the authoritarian management of labour relations. On the one hand, by way of systematizing the insecure, temporary and precarious employment patterns in which it purposely passes over employers' various techniques of union-busting,[885] the government has further kept away workers from unionization or any form of political organization. On the other hand, a series of legal amendments and regulations have been rolled out in order to facilitate union membership (on entry to, and exit from unions) as well as reinforcing union administrations in both the public and private sectors.[886] Although it falls perfectly in tune with the deradicalization measures of the September 12 regime, this strategy helped the government come across as breaking with the state's prohibitive labour policy in the 1980s, especially in view of the EU and ILO standards. The fact that no limitation is prescribed in terms of union membership and union rights regarding on call-work, for instance, could be presented by the government as compensatory to all damages of flexible working.[887]

More to the point, the facilitation of membership transfers has been utilized by the AKP to develop, promote and control pro-government unions so as to police and control labour mobilization. It is pertinent to note that this strategy has already been encouraged by the existing legal framework on labour organizing with respect to the practice of collective rights. On the part of the public sector, the unionisation of public employees, prohibited by the September 12 regime, has been legalized by the Law of Public Employees' Trade Unions and Collective Bargaining (no. #4688) in 2001. Yet, the law excluded part-time and contract workers whilst the public employees' right to collective bargaining which has been legally recognized only by an amendment in 2012 did not include reference to the right to strike. Moreover, as far as the latter right is concerned, those entitled to engage in negotiations with the government are limited by the law with unions and union confederations having the largest number of members for each service branch. Above it all, it was also

[885] For an exposition of such techniques see Onur Bakır & Deniz Akdoğan, "Türkiye'de Sendikalaşma ve Özel Sektörde Sendikal Örgütlenme", *Türk-İş Dergisi*, 2009/1, V. 383.

[886] O. Türel, 2014, p. 410. BSB, 2015, pp. 70-1.

[887] BSB, 2015, p. 70.

stipulated that disputes in collective bargaining process shall be resolved by an Arbitration Board whose majority of members are appointed by the government. This restrictive logic substantially applies to union practice in the private sector as well. Although the legislation issued by the military junta on trade unions (no. #2821) and collective bargaining, strike and lockout (#2822) was finally superseded by a new law 'Trade Unions and Collective Bargaining' (no. #6356) promulgated in 2012, major shortcomings have remained not least with respect to the rights to collective bargaining and strike action. In effect, as in the case of public employees the new law has largely facilitated the procedures regarding the establishment of trade unions and membership to unions. In turn, however, it has come to significantly hamper the conduct of most fundamental union activities due to the threshold system and sectoral restrictions it imposes both on labour organizing and union activity.[888] The limitation of the right to strike solely to disputes regarding collective agreement negotiations in the legislation issued by the military regime remained precisely the same in the new law, which means that work slowdowns, strikes in solidarity or general strikes are still illegal (articles #58, #59) in a way to provide a basis for the termination of employment contracts without compensation. Accordingly, as in the former legislation, 'national security and public health' is still the pretext of postponing (read banning) strike actions upon government's decision.

The institutionalization of precarious and flexible work arrangements as well as the consolidation of neoliberal hegemony on ideological level has accelerated the steady decline in the unionization rate under the AKP rule. The labour unionization rate calculated with regards to collective bargaining coverage in the 2000s[889] hits its lowest in the last fifty years in Turkey, ranking the worst among the OECD countries.[890] Once collective bargaining schemes are taken into account, the unionization rate, which were around 25% in the late 1980s and early 1990s, was

[888] Aziz Çelik, A General Evaluation of Turkey's New Act on Trade Unions and Collective Agreements, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2012b. https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/tuerkei/12250.pdf

[889] The official figures announced by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security exclude a large part of covered workers as well as informal workers whereby the level of unionization in formal employment in the 2000s comes out even higher than the EU average, which seems by no means reliable. A. Çelik, "Sendikalaşma istatistiklerinin tuhaflıkları", *Birgün*, 02.06.2017.

[890] OECD.Stat, Collective bargaining coverage https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CBC. A. Çelik, 2013, p. 45.

seen to decline to 10-12 percent in the early 2000s and to 6-7% in the 2010s. With regards to workers enjoying collective bargaining coverage from 2002 to 2012, the unionization rate declined by around 39% (from 11.6 to 7) despite the expansion of the demographic base of unionization by 42%.[891] Collective bargaining coverage does not seem to change significantly by 2019, compared to 2012. The figures indicate that collective bargaining has been rendered largely as a formality under the AKP governments notwithstanding the inflated official rates of union density.



Figure 5. 1. Actual Unionization Rate % (1990-2010) [892]

No less surprising, the prolonged inertia of organized labour is manifested in the political impact of strike actions as well. The augmented deradicalization of labour militancy following the brief flare up against privatization efforts in the early 1990s steadily continues in the 2000s, particularly in the AKP period, accompanied with a notable long-term tendency of decline in strikes in both quantitative and qualitative (i.e. political impact) terms. To illustrate, while the average number of workers on strike in the period between 1984-2002 was around 40.000, it eventually decreased to around 5.500 between 2002-2017, falling below a thousand in the 2010s.[893] Accordingly, while the annual average number of workdays lost due to strikes in the

[891] Ibid.

[892] Actual unionization rate is derived based on the annual number of workers under a collective bargaining agreement. DİE, *Labour Statistics*, 2000-2001, pp. 257-9; the data for the period after 2001 are derived from the Labour Statistics released by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, https://www.ailevecalisma.gov.tr/tr-tr/istatistikler/calisma-hayati-istatistikleri/resmi-istatistik-programi/calisma-hayati-istatistikleri-kitabi/.

[893] DİSK-AR, *Türkiye'de Sendikalaşma, Toplu İş Sözleşmesi Kapsamı ve Grevler (2013-2019)*, 2019, p. 31. http://disk.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Sendikalasma-Arastirmasi.pdf

period from 1990 to 2001 was 1.3 million, it decreased to around 220 thousand between 2002-2017 where those in the public sector have been for the first time negligibly low due to the massive privatizations plus the spread of subcontracting.[894] The Türk-Telekom strike in 2007, which individually raises the average number of striking workers and lost workdays in this period, was considered far from generating a genuine impact in favour of workers' benefits.[895] If anything, according to the company's CEO the strike had in fact been conducive to the unceasing continuity of capital accumulation.[896] Moreover, one cannot ignore the deterrent effect of the postponement of legal strikes on the basis of national security and public health. In a milieu when nine major strikes were to be postponed by administrative decision, it was hardly surprising that the AKP's then-deputy president responsible for social policies would rationalize the postponements simply putting that "they were exceptions rather than rule, since the nation cannot risk losing markets".[897] To reiterate, far beyond being a concept confined to military and external security, national security is by all means a prerogative / discretionary power at the disposal of government, at the heart of which lies the security of capital accumulation.



Figure 5. 2. Working Days Lost Due to Strikes (thousand) (1990-2010)[898]

[894] Ibid, p. 32.

[895] Sinan Ikinci, "Turkey: 15-month strike ends with betrayal by union bureaucracy", 28.12.2007, *World Socialist Web Site*. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2007/12/turk-d28.html

[896] This is because the strike failed to cause a significant disruption in service whereas no salaries were paid during the action. "'Grevde maaş ödemedik, kayıpları bununla kapattık'", 12.12.2007, *Vatan*.

[897] Interview with Nükhet Kılıç cited in Engin Yıldırım, "Labor Pains or Achilles' Heel: Justice and Development Party and Labor in Turkey", in H. Yavuz (ed.), 2006, p. 72.

[898] The 2004 yearbook of labour statistics issued by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security contains strike and lockout data from 1963 to 2004. The data from 1990 to 2004 is obtained from this

As far as non-strike actions are concerned, it should be added that the resistances staged against the deprivation of employment and social rights due to privatizations succeeded to exceed the legal framework, yet they proved to be limited to substantially individual, local and ineffective actions failing to establish political links to each other. At best, they ended up by decelerating the respective privatization process rather than preventing it, and were eventually put off with only partial, if any, concessions on the part of workers.[899] As observed in the last remarkable action in the public sector, TEKEL resistance (2009-2010), which was hailed as the dramatic awakening of the labour militancy, the government's informal and precarious employment policy generally performs a compelling function in leading the workers' struggle to settle only for their economic-corporate interests, that is, mainly the retrieval of their legal status pertaining to job security. Hence, as a common tendency, the struggles fall short of standing against privatization efforts as a whole in solidarity, let alone projecting a counter-hegemonic strategy against neoliberalism.[900]

Parallel to the demise of the labour militancy, the AKP's union policy has developed a particular strategy to co-opt, neutralize and/or accommodate the union movement to the prevailing neoliberal logic, instead of directly restricting or launching an all-out assault on union membership. To this end, the AKP has utilized the spread of subcontracting and the existing legal framework for union rights, not least the threshold system for union representation, to develop organic and symbiotic relationships with certain unions both in the public and private sectors in return for reciprocal support. Despite the greatly hampered organizational class capacity of labour, the regulations that facilitate union membership and strengthen unions'

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yearbook. Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanlığı, *Çalışma Hayatı İstatistikleri 2004*. https://www.csgb.gov.tr/cgm/istatistikler/calisma-hayati-istatistikleri-kitabi/ The data from 2005 to 2010 is obtained from Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanlığı, *Çalışma Hayatı İstatistikleri 2010*, 2011, p. 96.

[899] Among the salient struggles against privatization in the 2000s were Paşabahçe (glass plant), SEKA (paper mill), Seydişehir (aluminium plant) and TEKEL (tobacco plant), Yatağan (thermal power plant). Facing a repressive police response was another common feature of these actions. "Polis, Paşabahçe'yi barikatla kapattı", 25.07.2002, Hürriyet; "SEKA'da polis operasyonu", 18.02.2005, *Hürriyet*; "Seydişehir Savaşı: İşçinin özelleştirme çatışması", 24.05.2005; "TEKEL işçilerine insanlık dışı polis saldırısı", 17.12.2009, *sendika.org*; "Yatağan işçilerine yine saldırı!", 26.11.2013, *SolHaber*.

[900] G. L. Yalman & A. Topal, 2017. Y. Koç, *AKP ve Emekçiler 2002-2012*, Epos, 2012, p. 232.

bureaucratic structures have been particularly useful to mobilize the close links established with major union leaderships so as to make them 'a reliable social partner' for the implementation of neoliberal structural reforms.[901] Along with the current threshold system, the workplace pressure to join pro-government unions especially in public enterprises has also been a major factor in inflating the membership base of these unions. The overall strategy has consequently resulted in the 'miraculous' growth of government-backed, Islamic and conservative union confederations as well as the co-optation of the biggest confederation, the centre-right Türk-iş by pro-government forces.[902] Given the overwhelmingly majoritarian outcomes of the threshold system for union representation,[903] this has been particularly conducive for taming and depoliticizing workers' demands in industrial and labour disputes. As in the example of the TEKEL resistance, the pro-government confederations, by and large, strive to retain the workers' stand against their loss of economic and social rights within the very logic of neoliberal transformation by concerning themselves only with demands for fringe benefits and concessions.[904]

There is no doubt that the labour market and trade union policy followed in the 2000s historically rests upon the political task of deradicalization of the labour movement set out by the September 12 regime. But still, it is somewhat distinctive to the course of neoliberalization under the AKP rule in that the restructuring of the labour market has been accompanied by the facilitation of union membership procedures and political mobilization of non-confrontational unionism through which the government can exert control over the actual and/or potential labour mobilization. Examples such as the government spokesmen's denunciatory statements on what they call "ideological unionism"[905] are not only a vivid indication

[901] M. Görkem Doğan, "The Deradicalization of Organised Labour" in Akça, Bekmen & Özden (eds.), 2014, p. 198.

[902] Efe Can Gürcan & Berk Mete, *Neoliberalism and the Changing Face of Unionism*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, p. 84.

[903] For example, the overwhelming majority of the unions reaching the sector threshold are of three major confederations. DİSK-AR, 2019, p. 11.

[904] G. Yalman & A. Topal, 2017.

[905] E.g. "Hak-İş concludes successful collective agreements for the sake of labour peace and the expansion of business opportunities. We know the struggle of many other unions; they are ideological

of the fact that the AKP's leading cadres' approach to confrontational unionism has not been less hostile than the military junta, but more significantly, of their desire for an easily controllable trade union system. The AKP's trade union policy, after all, has been successful for not only contributing to the settling of the informal, inflexible and precarious employment as the predominant form in the labour market, but also for helping this backdrop work as a containment strategy, which includes 'both the co-optation and the repression of the workers' discontent'.[906] Ultimately, it is also through this peculiar strategy that the AKP performs a police function on labour militancy, and properly imposes 'labour peace' on the working class in the face of the ongoing anti-labour legal and political environment.

5.3.3. Social Policy as Policing the Poor

The reciprocal relationship between the labour's having lost ground and the ascent of the neoliberal offensive through labour market restructuring has been reflected in the material conditions of working classes. Retaining an intense continuity with the political economy character of the 1980s, the 2000s saw intensified proletarianization and labour exploitation in parallel with the accelerated deindustrialisation, privatization and deunionization. Although the country uninterruptedly enjoyed a 7.2% average annual rate of growth in GDP from 2002 to the crisis year of 2008[907] the unemployment and labour force participation rates have soared compared to the 1990s whereas there has not been a significant decline in informal employment mostly due to mass layoffs during the crisis and a huge privatisation wave that would follow.

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unionists." "Arınç: İdeolojik sendikacılık yapıyorlar", 01.06.2011, *Hürriyet*. "The TEKEL action is provoked by ideological unionism. The workers agree with us when they sit down and talk, but things change when they go out on the streets", "TEKEL işçilerinin eylemi provoke ediliyor", 11.02.2010, http://www.akpartiistanbul.com/habergoster.asp?ID=787. This discourse on "ideological unionism" had been originally fundamental to the military junta's official union policy who incorporated the term into the preamble of the Law on Unions (#2821). After years, it appears to be adopted by the AKP-affiliated trade unions at times as well. "Hak-İş'ten 38. Yıla Görkemli Kutlama", 25.10.2013. http://www.hakis.org.tr/haberler.php?action=haber_detay&id=600 Memur-Sen, "Reaktif Değil, Proaktif Sendikacılık", 02.11.2015. http://www.memursen.org.tr/reaktif-degil-proaktif-sendikacilik.

[906] G. Yalman & A. Topal, 2017, p. 458.

[907] TURKSTAT, *Statistical Indicators 1923-2013*, 2014.



Figure 5. 3. Labour Participation and Employment Rates (2000-2010)[908]

As shown in the Figure above, the narrow (as well as the broad) unemployment rates did not drop below 10% since the TSEP had been launched, and even doubled from 2000 to the crisis years of 2008-2009. The share of unemployed youth contributed to these levels by reaching an average of 20% in the same period. By the same token, the period was also marked with relatively low labour force participation, which decreased from 49.9% in 2000 to 46.3% in 2008. It is pertinent to note that discouraged workers had been a major factor in such decline, in that, the share of them in the inactive labour force increased from 1.2% in 2001 to 4.4% in 2007. More notably, when other components of the working-age population (domestic workers, retired, students, etc.) are excluded, the share of discouraged workers rose from 5.6% to 44.5% in the same years.[909] Moreover, rapid proletarianization and dispossession had been manifested in the changing class composition as well. Accompanied by the rapid dissolution of the peasantry, the share of urban working classes in the society rose from 49.5% in 2002 to 56.8% in 2008, while the share of propertyless labourers among them rose from 18.1% to 29.3%.[910]

[908] TURKSTAT, *Statistical Indicators 1923-2011*, 2012; *Labour Force Statistics, 2017, http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreIstatistikTablo.do? istab_id=2258.*

[909] Özlem Onaran, 2009, p. 253.

[910] S. Bahçe & A. H. Köse, 2017, p. 583.

Closely associated with these key labour market indicators showing the considerable expansion of the industrial reserve army, the post-crisis period was also marked by an unprecedented gap between depressing real wages and increasing labour productivity so as to highlight an intensified exploitation on the basis of both absolute and relative surplus value.[911] The burden of the post-crisis adjustment was disproportionately absorbed by working classes whereby the decrease in the wage share in the economy by far exceeded the rate of decline in production during the crisis.[912] It is noteworthy that despite the significant increase in productivity which returned to its pre-crisis level within a year, the wage share continued to decrease, or at best, faced a negligibly slow recovery.[913] Moreover, by means of the facilitated borrowing conditions, the increasing financial impoverishment and deepening financialization have forced working households to become more dependent on indebtedness and integrated within the financial system more than ever,[914] which would in turn constitute a further obstacle to the physical and social reproduction of labour power.

Overall, this general view not only disproves the neoliberal contention recalled in the TSEP that 'falling labour costs and flexibility would eliminate unemployment' but also reveals that the growth rates and relative macroeconomic stability achieved in the 2000s –having revolved around the enticing language of 'global competitiveness'– have been mainly underpinned by low labour costs, wage discipline and increased labour productivity. The ongoing domination of capital over labour undertaken by this growth pattern, neatly dubbed 'jobless growth'[915], was going to be advanced by the policies of labour market flexibilization, deregulation and deunionization throughout the AKP rule.

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[911] Özay Göztepe, "Küreselleşme Sürecinde Türkiye İşgücü Piyasası", *Çalışma ve Toplum*, 2007/3, p. 111. E. Yeldan, "Patterns of Adjustment in the Age of Finance: The Case of Turkey as a Peripheral Agent of Neoliberal
Globalization", *The Ideas Working Paper Series*, 2009, p. 17.

[912] Ö. Onaran, 2009, p. 250.

[913] For instance, real wages as of 2007 were 21.5% lower than that in 1979. Ö. Onaran, p. 251.

[914] Elif Karaçimen, "Interlinkages between credit, debt and the labour market: evidence from Turkey", *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 2014.

[915] E. Yeldan & B. Ünüvar, An Assessment of the Turkish Economy in the AKP Era, *Research and Policy on Turkey*, 2016.

On the other hand, given the rapid impoverishment and deprivation, plus an expanding surplus population on the part of the lower socio-economic classes, a social policy regime that would be not only attuned to the existing market reforms but also responsive to the unpopular and detrimental outcomes of this policy agendum was ineluctable for the AKP governments. To this end, although the 'poverty reduction and market-led development' premise of the SRMP would prove wrong in due course, the AKP did not divert away from the existing policy approach substantially devised by the WB. On the contrary, the Bank's poverty alleviation strategy that is focused to manage social risks associated with poverty would pave the way for a targeted social assistance policy that the party has modelled largely on local governments and faith-based charities. For, in both approaches social policy and poverty alleviation are detached from the political context of class and power relations, inter alia, labour market policy. Both approaches promote a social policy orientation that is perfectly at peace with extending flexibility and deunionization which together impose more and more insecurity, thereby impoverishment, on working classes. Once taken as read, poverty could be subsumed into a policy subject to be distinctively policed through means of social protection driven away from the realm of relations of production and redistributive mechanisms.

Thus, other than being indispensable for the AKP's electoral success and legitimacy, a social policy regime that is in large extent centred on targeted social assistance would be consequential since it would help depoliticize poverty and promote social assistance as a non-wage tool to assume chief responsibility for securing the social conditions *for the reproduction of labour power.* By the same token, this regime would also undertake a policing function over the possible risk posed by the insecurity and poverty arising from labour market to threaten social order.

Committing itself to the WB's adoption of the new social policy orientation rationalized by the pro-poor rhetoric, the AKP government has chosen to articulate a social policy suited for the existing neoliberal policy framework as well as its Islamist political agenda. This process of articulation can be viewed in a twofold complementary relationship, consisting of the social security reform and the establishment of charity-based network of social transfers.

The trajectory of social security originally dates back to the mid-1990s, as almost all governments in Turkey since then announced their will to carry out a pro-market reform in social security in line with the recommendations of the IMF and WB. It was not until the coalition government of 1999-2002 that the first phase of the reform could have been introduced, albeit with a limited character mostly based on changes in the pension and retirement system.

From the side of international agencies, mainly the IMF, WB and the EU, the reform measures at the time were deemed to fall short to alleviate the imbalances of social security institutions, thus a much more comprehensive pro-market transformation of social security would be an essential component of the post-crisis structural reform agenda. The main justification for such transformation, as outlined in the previous chapter, stemmed from an anti-statist account which addressed the share of public resources allocated to the social security system, rather than the financialization process itself, as a major impediment to macroeconomic balance and financial sustainability. However, it is known that significant part of public expenditures throughout the 1990s had been resulted from rapidly rising interest payments. Along with other core social services, state budget transfers to the social security system since the 1990s had been considerably low compared to rapidly rising interest payments.[916]

Nevertheless, after taking over the restructuring process the AKP government had time and again reiterated the neoliberal mantra denouncing the social security deficit as a 'black hole' in the public budget and the main reason for almost all prolonged and chronic problems that have come up in the wake of capital account liberalization – rising public debts and interest rates, high costs of living, deteriorating income distribution, contraction in investments and rise in unemployment rates.[917] It was even argued that 'the existing social security system threatened the future of the country's social peace'.[918] Alongside this dominant discourse premised on market

[916] In 2001, for example, interest payments amounted to half of consolidated budget expenditures (50.6%) whereas the share of social security remained at 6.3%. TC Kalkınma Bakanlığı, *Ekonomik ve Sosyal Göstergeler 1950-2014*, 2015, p. 151.

[917] ÇSGB, *Sosyal Güvenlik Sisteminde Reform Önerisi,* 2005.

[918] "Başesgioğlu'ndan SSK uyarısı", 29.07.2004. https://www.internethaber.com/basesgioglundan-ssk-uyarisi-1081436h.htm

efficiency, the unpopular defects under the system, such as its fragmentally and hierarchically designed structure, were further used for public legitimation.[919]

Against this background, parliamentary approval of the reform was made a 'structural performance criterion' as well as a major part of the IMF conditionality[920], wherein measures for controlling the social security deficit, including health care expenses, became subject to IMF supervision. Aligned around the same objectives, the WB and EU were also active in pushing the reform agenda. The underlying rationale behind what was presented as 'improving public finances through efficiency gains' was to conform employment-based social benefits provided by the social security system, such as pension and health care arrangements, to market imperatives without offering any reliable solution to the persistence of high unemployment and informal employment. Eventually, the final adoption of the reform package in 2008 involved substantial efforts to cut off the state budget transfers to the social security system, weaken the rights and increase the cost of benefits of the working population while incorporating the private sector into service delivery. On the other hand, since the old system's separate schemes based on occupational differentiations represented by three different social security institutions were harmonized and unified under the banner of 'universal coverage', what seemed to be happening was an extension, at least formally, of the overall scope of social security. Although this was rationalized by AKP policymakers on the basis of removing the 'inegalitarian welfare regime' characteristics of the old system,[921] what has been brought about is, if any, a market-driven equality. For having access to the protection and services offered with regards to pension and health care would henceforth prerequire the regular payment of premiums and contributions. Nevertheless, it is a common observation that in view of the formal extension in the scope of coverage, the government's campaign for the reform has managed to appeal particularly to workers in the informal sector who were not covered by the previous formal insurance system.[922] Given the AKP's well-known broad electoral base that

[919] ÇSGB, *Sosyal Güvenlik Reformu*, 2008.

[920] Letter of Intent of the government of Turkey, July 15, 2004. https://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2004/tur/02/index.htm

[921] T.C. Başbakanlık, *Sosyal güvenlik reformu: sorunlar ve çözüm önerileri*, 2005.

[922] S. Coşar & M. Yeğenoğlu, 2009, p. 42. G. Yücesan-Özdemir in Coşar & Yücesan-Özdemir, 2014, p. 121.

used to secure consent from the lower segments of labour market, the reform to bring about a so-called 'universalized' social security system would give way to comments on the emergence of a class alliance between the bourgeoisie, the state and informal sector workers.[923]

To be sure, the roots of such alliance, if any, assume a relation to the repression of the working class capacity largely by the insecurity most directly manifested in the labour market, as much as to the hegemonic power of the EU-sponsored anti-statist rhetoric. Now, since the launch of the marketization in social security, it could be observed that the relationship between security and insecurity has been accrued with a new ideological and economic overtone. That is, the insecurity deliberately promoted by way of the rhetorical power of the terms such as efficiency, productivity, competitiveness, etc. is implicitly presented as an inevitable and objective condition that should be evaluated separately and individually. Thus, what spreads from the social security system is now more risk, uncertainty and insecurity that is brought down to the level of the individual and could be compensated only by more payment. This provides more than one function serving for the neoliberal political agenda. First, it is a viable idea for the latter's long-term social project of producing politically incompetent and obedient subjects that citizens frantically assume the risk and responsibility on their own in order to have security. Particularly when considered with the labour market restructuring, the deepening sense of risk, fear and insecurity would work as a mode of social control for subordinate classes in a way to reshape their political behaviour and expectations. Second, because the collective responsibility and demand for security is contained by the individual consumption of security as a commodity, the state and capital are once more aligned by giving way to the marketing of new security mechanisms, thereby, new sites of capital accumulation expanding from insurance to health care.[924] Just as the insecurity of capital has been simultaneously embodied as the insecurity of workers through *policies of labour market* deregulation and flexibilization, now the security pledged to working classes could be rendered as a shelter for the security of capital

[923] Tuba I. Agartan, *Turkish Health System in Transition: Historical Background and Reform Experience*, unpublished dissertation, State University of New York, 2008.

[924] Jennifer Klein, *For All These Rights*, Princeton University Press, 2003, pp. 5-11.

so long as social provisions are principally devolved to the private sector and individual economic relationships. Finally, the relocation of the realm of social provisions away from the state would help sustain a depoliticized notion of security in the face of the politically generated insecurity, which is much easier to be devised on a corporate and consumer mentality. The commodification of security as such would in turn depoliticize and naturalize the roots of insecurity as well as reshape the conception of citizenship around the (in)security regime.

This security configuration exerting a depoliticizing effect relates to social policy also in the mould of social assistance mechanisms covered by a web of charitable/philanthropic foundations where the state is expected to 'act like a charitable NGO'.[925] However, unlike the marketized provision of social security that works adjacent to the political function of labour market insecurity, the new orientation of social assistance has been designed particularly to do with the results of chronic labour market problems and the prolonged structural adjustment in general. In other words, it is directly pertaining to the policing of poverty setting in motion a wide range of populist social transfers. Moreover, the new orientation has been carried out in line with the general thrust of risk mitigation proposed by the WB. As discussed earlier, both as rhetoric and practice, the new poor-oriented approach of the Bank has sought to develop new programmes and measures for social assistance in favour of the poor without disturbing the existing balance of power and problematizing socio-economic inequalities embedded in society.

Because it would provide a launch pad for the AKP's policy agenda that stands on political and economic dispossession while at the same time helping extend the party's political hegemony especially among the unorganized urban and rural poor, a new social policy framework identified with risk management through charity-based social assistance has been eagerly espoused by the party's executives who chose to remould the components of the SRMP with an emphasis on Islamist sentiments and family-based solidarity as well as on civil society[926]. The institutional arrangement of

[925] Onur Metin, Sosyal politika açısından AKP dönemi: Sosyal yardım alanında yaşananlar, *Çalışma ve Toplum*, 28, 2011, p. 195.

[926] D. Yıldırım, 2009, G. Yücesan-Özdemir, 2014, S. Bozkurt & G. Yalman, 2011.

this new orientation has been modelled on a complex network of social assistance which relies on two main pillars – the General Directorate of Social Assistance and Solidarity (SYDGM) and local governments.

As a condition of the WB loan agreement SYDGM was founded in 2004 out of the Social Aid and Solidarity Promotion Fund which had been working under the Prime Ministry since 1986. This institutional transformation marked a substantial empowerment in the sources, scope and organizational capacity of social transfers as it has placed the Directorate beyond public scrutiny and provided it with a degree of autonomy to embark on a massive amount of off-budget spending. Having the discretion to distribute funds provided by the WB since its foundation, the Directorate has been deployed as the most effective actor in social assistance under the AKP governments. It has kept implementing the components of the WB project, most significantly the CCTs, via domestic resources after the loan agreement ended.[927] It funds and supervises its local organs, a total of nearly a thousand conservatively oriented[928] civil foundations (SYDVs – Social Aid and Solidarity Foundations) located at the city and provincial level. Working autonomously and closely in conjunction with local private partners, voluntary organizations and entrepreneurs, these foundations launch a number of assistance activities in the form of cash transfers and various types of in-kind assistance, such as health checks, school supplies, food, coal and fuel for targeted poor households on a means-tested basis.[929]

Adjacent to the ever increasing funds and transfers provided by SYDGM, there is also an explosion in the social assistance schemes implemented by local governments during the AKP government. The administrative and financial power granted to local governments by new legislations enacted in 2005[930] in parallel with

[927] D. Yükseker, 272. G. Yalman, 2011, p.239

[928] A. H. Köse & S. Bahçe, "Hayırsever Devletin Yükselişi: AKP Yönetiminde Gelir Dağılımı ve Yoksulluk" in Uzgel & Duru (eds.), 2009.

[929] T.C. Aile ve Sosyal Politikalar Bakanlığı Sosyal Yardımlar Genel Müdürlüğü, *Sosyal Yardım İstatistikler Bülteni*, Haziran 2012.

[930] No. #5393 Municipal Law, #5216 Law on Metropolitan Municipalities, #5302 Law on Special Provincial Administration.

arising local accumulation strategies has been used by the AKP-run local governments to establish units to assume greater role in social assistance, and in this regard, to provide a series of in-kind assistance similar to those of the SDYVs. Since social transfers are known to be employed as a politically expedient tool by the ruling party, it is not surprising that local assistance schemes funded largely by the same charity-based support as the SDYVs have witnessed the emergence of new forms of client-patron relationship between the party, charity groups and beneficiaries.[931]

Another institutional arrangement targeting the poor was the considerable expansion of the coverage and benefits of the Green Card programme – the mean-tested health coverage system that had been introduced back in 1992. As of 2005, in a milieu where real wages are suppressed, high levels of unemployment and informal economy prevail, the system had started to cover all health-related services for those with income levels less than one third of the minimum wage and lacking insurance. Its expenditures increased nearly by 18 times from 2000 to 2012 when it has been replaced by a universal health care scheme.[932] Though the programme had been used by the government as another tool for patronage politics which resulted in wide fluctuations before and after national elections, it still appealed to a wide segment of the poorest covering more than one-sixth of the total population.[933] This could be considered another indication of the extent of severe deprivation in the 2000s, as well as the government's efforts to contain its outcomes.

All in all, notwithstanding the political patronage and paternalist relations that have been yielded, [934] the amount of social transfers under the AKP's charity-based policy framework has increased tremendously to overwhelm the social policy area. Though it is difficult to identify the amount of each individual type of social expenditure

[931] G. Yücesan-Özdemir, 2014, p. 133. Mine S. Eder, "Retreating State? Political Economy of Welfare Regime Change in Turkey", *Middle East Law and Governance*, 2(2), 2010, p. 182.

[932] Mine S. Eder, 2010, p. 177.

[933] "Yeşil kartlı sayısı 12 milyonu aştı", Milliyet, 25.03.2010.

[934] "Sosyal yardımlar seçim öncesinde 3 kat artmış", Milliyet, 10.05.2009. "12 Katrilyonluk Narkoz", *Yeni Çağ*, 07.04.2014.

within the complex network of social expenditures, a number of figures will suffice to illustrate this point. According to official reports, expenditures for social assistance and services increased by nearly five times during the first seven years since the year the AKP came to power.[935] The share of social expenditures in GDP increased from 0.5% in 2002 to 1.42% by the end of 2011.[936] The share of periodic transfers from the Social Assistance and Solidarity Fund to SYDVs has been steadily increasing in parallel to the increase in the Fund's revenues.[937] Whilst no more than 10% of the resources of the Fund were distributed to the poor before, it has been ensured by the SRMP that all of its resources are used for social assistance.[938] Accordingly, the share of households who received in-kind assistance increased from 3.95% in 2003 to 9.08% in 2010, whereas in the same period more than one of two citizens have benefited at least once from social assistance in whatever form (food, clothing, fuel, shelter, education, health, livelihood, etc).[939] As a primary policy component of the SRMP the CCT program has been implemented over a wide target population, having reached to 2.63 million of people by 2007, and thus extended far beyond its initial target coverage.[940] Just as the regional targeting of the Green Card programme,[941] the allocation of these transfers was disproportionately directed toward the two poorest regions, Southeast and East Anatolia Region,[942] which might lead one to consider the social risk mitigation strategy in political terms as well,

[935] Devlet Denetleme Kurulu, Sosyal yardımlar ve sosyal hizmetler alanındaki yasal ve kurumsal yapının incelenmesi konulu.. Ankara: T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Devlet Denetleme Kurulu, 2009. http://www.tccb.gov.tr/ddk/ddk29.pdf , pp. 13-4.

[936] T.C. Aile ve Sosyal Politikalar Bakanlığı Sosyal Yardımlar Genel Müdürlüğü, *Sosyal Yardım İstatistikler Bülteni*, Eylül, 2012.

[937] Melike Tekindal, "Türkiye'de Sosyal Yardımların Yapısal İşlevsel Yaklaşıma Göre Analizi", *Toplum ve Sosyal Hizmet*, 29(2) 2018, p. 353.

[938] Nazır Kapusuz, "'Makarna ve kömürü' geri almak." *Başlangıç*, December 10, 2014. http://baslangicdergi.org/makarna-ve-komuru-geri-almak-nazir-kapusuz/

[939] "AKP halkın yarıdan fazlasına yardım dağıttı", *Milliyet*, 23.11.2008.

[940] The World Bank, *SRMP Implementation Completion and Results Report on the Republic of Turkey*, 26.06.2008, p. 8.

[941] Erdem Yörük, "Welfare Provision as Political Containment : The Politics of Social Assistance and the Kurdish Conflict", *Politics & Society*, 40(4) 2012.

[942] The World Bank, *The World Bank in Turkey, 1993-2004 Country Assistance Evaluation*, 20.12.2005, p. 42.

given the rapidly urbanizing Kurdish population in these regions. Additionally, more than 70 percent of local governments, including almost all AKP municipalities, are reported to be regularly taking on in-kind assistance delivery since the new local government legislation in 2005.[943] The social assistance undertaken by municipalities was estimated to have covered more than 6 million of people as of 2007.[944]

Taken together, the huge and complex network of social assistance/welfare delivery amounts to a somehow unified system where a focus on the distinction between public/private (or central/local) transfer mechanisms might not be very consequential. While the foundations situated at the centre of the system have been established by the state at the local level, the NGOs, local governments, and their private partnerships act as an organic part of the AKP's populist agenda while reinforcing its neoliberal, Islamist, conservatist, and communitarian ideological components. This could be also where the AKP's project could broadly overlap with the WB's social risk management approach insofar as it mobilizes poverty alleviation as a regulatory political mechanism to build ties of dependency out of dispossession, and to promote the 'vulnerable', insecure recipients of social assistance as a replacement for organized labour. The following section will incorporate the 'repressive' response to securing the insecurity in question.

5.4. Reinforcing the 'Normal': Preparations for a Well-equipped War Machine

This section adds to critical analyses of state transformation in Turkey in the 2000s with a view to the legal and political reconfiguration of security. It could be argued that the reinforcement of the states' internal security functions is a general phenomenon that has been going hand in hand with the neoliberal transformation. However, the hegemonic accounts which grasp the authoritarian tendency of the Turkish state mainly focusing on power struggles within the state organization tend to gloss over what had been going on in security, penal system, and the police organization before the 2010s when the state power had not been yet centralized

[943] Barış Alp Özden, "The Transformation of Social Welfare and Politics in Turkey: A Successful Convergence of Neoliberalism and Populism", İ. Akça, A. Bekmen & B. A. Özgen (eds.), 2014, p. 168.

[944] "İşte AKP yardımlarının faturası", *Milliyet*, 21.07.2007.

within the executive branch. In this discussion, we shall see the 'tricky' aspect of the 2000s in this respect. In that, the efforts of 'normalization' of the political regime in liberal terms incorporated a subtle process of securitization. Playing on its demilitarized / civilian appearance, this augmented level of securitization would be paving the way for the establishment of greater police powers alongside a new penal system setting out a ubiquitous range of preventive measures.

5.4.1. Augmented Securitization-cum-demilitarization

In the first place, it is to be remembered that the EU's Regular Progress Reports since 1998 constantly addressed the TAF's role in Turkish polity and its leverage over civilian governments as a major obstacle to the consolidation of democracy in Turkey. Effective civilian control over the military, the NSC in particular, had thus been considered a task of the utmost importance for EU accession. The EU also criticized the broad scope of national security defined in the law of the NSC,[945] but this critique was rather pertaining to the NSC as an institution due to its dominantly military nature, than the political underpinnings of the concept itself. On this view, through the NSC as its formal mechanism the military had been able to intervene in civilian politics by utilizing any matter it deemed to be affecting national security thanks to the broad scope of the concept. Not surprisingly, such view would negate the conceptualisation of security as a technique of power conducive for producing and securing a particular social order, regardless of whether it indicates a military task. Once the most contentious issues concerning national security predominantly concentrate on the military, the 'undemocratic' character of the NSC turns out to be limited solely to the military's dominance in its institutional structure. This argument has long been known to be defended as well by the representatives of the big bourgeoisie in Turkey, most prominently TÜSİAD.[946] As the dominant perspective on civilianization through demilitarization has gained hegemonic status in public discourse, it would in turn justify the AKP government's political strategy to retain

[945] Aylin Güney, "Europeanization of civil–military relations in Turkey: Civilianization without democratization?" in A. Tekin & A. Güney (eds.) *The Europeanization of Turkey: Polity and politics*, Routledge, 2015, p. 109.

[946] TÜSİAD, *Türkiye'de Demokratik Standartların Yükseltilmesi*, 1999.

active support from international policy circles and the liberal intelligentsia in its struggle with 'tutelage forces'.

In effect, Turkey's reform agenda in respect of the political conditionality under the EU accession process involved as a priority task the 'democratization of civil-military relations' since the talks gained momentum after formal candidacy was accepted in the Helsinki Summit of 1999, that is, before the AKP's coming to power. As part of the constitutional reform package in 2001, the three-party coalition government took steps to reshape the functioning and composition of the NSC. By way of an amendment made in the provisions of Article 118, the number of civilian members in the Council increased from five to nine (with the inclusion of Minister of Justice and Deputy Prime Ministers) and the status of the Council decisions changed from "being taken into consideration by the Cabinet" to "being evaluated by the Cabinet" so as to provide room for the latter. The period after 2002 was however considered the most noteworthy one due to the increasing *prospect of accession* after the Copenhagen European Council of 2002 as well as to the AKP government's way of instrumentalizing the already existing policy agenda dubbed 'democratization'. Not surprisingly, it was accentuated in the party's official programme of 2002, when strengthening of the civilian control over the military became even more prominent for EU accession, that demilitarization was a major component of the party's approach to state administration, along with democratization and decentralization.[947] It is also known that the party cadres resorted to the discourse of demilitarization time and again, albeit not always in an explicit manner, as a struggle for democratization against the tutelage controls of the 'civil and military bureaucracy', which were portrayed in the party's election manifesto as if ideologically opposing the process of EU integration, even though there had been no evidence of any such declaration or implicit statement of the latter.

After the AKP's coming to power, a number of constitutional and legal arrangements towards restructuring of civil-military relations were made in line with the EU's guidelines. Following the parliamentary approval of the sixth and seventh EU

[947] AKP, 2002, p. 59.

harmonization packages in 2003, the law of the NSC (no. #2945) was amended to comply with the constitutional amendment of 2001 concerning the composition, executive powers and functioning of the NSC and its Secretariat General. Most significantly, the NSC's role was confined to an 'advisory' one concerning the national security policy of the state, the application of which had now been left to the discretion of the PM and the Cabinet. The amendments also secured the majority representation of civilian members in the Council's internal organization. Accordingly, it was ensured that the NSC Secretary General, who was previously required to be a high-ranking general, could now be selected among civilian members, whereas the authority to assign to this post was transferred from the Chief of the General Staff's to the PM. In addition to these changes towards strengthening civilian authority, the frequency of the NSC meetings was reduced from monthly to bi-monthly, as an indirect way of undermining the Council's influence in policy making processes. This would be followed by new regulations adopted in 2004 that would enable parliamentary oversight over military expenditures via the authorization granted to the Audit Court, as well as removing the exemption of state property owned by the TAF.[948] Last but not least, the legal basis of the NSC's power to influence higher education, art and broadcasting policies was also abrogated by respective amendments in 2004 and 2005 which ended military representation in civilian supervisory boards in these areas.[949]

Demilitarization efforts in view of the EU harmonization laws in this term had also a bearing on the judicial system. As a step to civilianize the criminal procedure by eliminating one of the most emblematic practices inherited from the September 12 regime, State Security Courts were abolished by the annulment of the Constitutional article 143 and a law (no. #5190) amending the Criminal Procedure Law (*CMK*) in 2004. In a similar vein, the trial of civilians in military courts during peacetime was prohibited through an amendment to the Military Criminal Law (No. 5530) in 2006. No less significant, it had also become a major topic covered by the EU conditionality on civil-military relations since 2006 to remove the police-military

[948] A. Güney, 2015, p. 155.

[949] A. Güney & P. Karatekelioğlu, "Turkey's EU Candidacy and Civil-Military Relations: Challenges and Prospects", *Armed Forces & Society*, 31(3), 2005, p. 456.

security protocol *EMASYA*, as discussed previously, which was a vivid example depicting the warfare perspective of the state in relation to social disorder.[950] Yet, it was not until 2010 that this was to be realized.

Overall, from a liberal perspective it could be argued that a substantial degree of demilitarization was achieved as the influence of the military on politics was greatly reduced by the constitutional and legal 'reforms' as such. As expected, the efforts were widely acclaimed in scholarly circles for moving "closer to the liberal-democratic model than ever before"[951] as well as for diminishing the "anti-EU coalition" allegedly led by the "military-security establishment".[952] On the part of the EU the changes made by the government were found to comply with EU norms and, despite partial criticisms, were generally praised in annual progress reports since 2003. The so-called left-liberal intellectual circles along with various civil organizations specifically promoted by the EU (Task Force on Governance and the Military, jointly sponsored by the Center of European Security Studies and the Istanbul Policy Center, TESEV, and the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces)[953] were also among those who were particularly concerned with the process in respect of 'democratization'. The representative of big business, TÜSİAD, which often publicly appreciated the government's commitment to the IMF programme, was also known for its calls for a Western-like institutional separation between the state's defense and internal security affairs as an imperative of democratization and well-functioning market economy since the 1990s.[954] The same 'reform' steps provided credibility to the AKP government also in its relations with the US. It was reported in 2003 that the US officials were particularly satisfied

[950] "Turkey 2006 Progress Report", 2006, p. 8. https://www.avrupa.info.tr/sites/default/files/2016-11/Turkey_progress_report%202006.pdf

[951] M. Heper, "The Justice and Development Party Government and the Military in Turkey", *Turkish Studies*, 6:2, 2005, p. 227.

[952] Z. Öniş, "The Political Economy of Islam and Democracy in Turkey: From the Welfare Party to the AKP" in in D. Jung (ed.) *Democratization and Development: New Political Strategies for the Middle East*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, pp. 111-2.

[953] "Turkey 2005 Progress Report", 2005, p. 15. https://www.avrupa.info.tr/sites/default/files/2016-11/Turkey_progress_report%202006.pdf

[954] TÜSİAD, Türkiye'de Demokratikleşme Perspektifleri, 1997.

with the AKP's efforts to ensure civilian control of the military while addressing the government as the Turkish leadership which most closely matched American values since Özal.[955] Taken together, whatever extent they were successfully carried out under the AKP government, the so-called demilitarization reforms not only reinforced the depiction of the AKP as a committed agent of democratization in a way to create a room for manoeuvre in its 'war of position' within the state,[956] but also constituted an ideological shield behind which the IMF and EU-backed neoliberal restructuring would be refurbished by its hegemonic pairing of democratization.

Yet, as discussed previously, notwithstanding the assertions of democratization there is more than enough evidence that what is at issue under the post-2001 phase of restructuring had been far away from a democratic transformation in view of labour-capital and state-society relations in general. Concomitantly, this holds true in view of the operation of security, for the demilitarization efforts in question did not bring about a genuine tendency for *desecuritization* in social and political realm. On the contrary, by way of the political and ideological gains of demilitarization the AKP had found ground for even a broader configuration of security on the basis of police powers, as observed in various other national cases undergoing rapid and extensive neoliberalization imprinted by more unemployment, austerity, precarity and poverty.[957] It has to be underlined that the initial preparations for the state form, which has been an extreme example even for its counterparts of the 'neoliberal security state' and nowadays called with reference to an exceptional regime of authoritarianism, [958] had begun precisely at the heart of such discussions on liberal democratization at the time.

[955] "Amerika memnun", *Milliyet*, 28.07.2003.

[956] İ. Akça, 2014, p. 35.

[957] C. Boukalas, 2015. Greg Albo and Carlo Fanelli, "Austerity against democracy: An authoritarian phase of neoliberalism?" *Teoria Politica: An International Journal of Theory and Politics*, 2014, 65–88. C. Paye, *Global War on Liberty*, Telos Press, 2007. S. Hallsworth & J. Lea, "Reconstructing Leviathan: Emerging contours of the security state", *Theoretical Criminology*, 15(2), 2011.

[958] Özlem Kaygusuz, "Authoritarian Neoliberalism and Regime Security in Turkey: Moving to an 'Exceptional State' under AKP", *South European Society and Politics*, V. 23, 2018. B. Berksoy,

5.4.2. The New Security Configuration

What we saw concurrently with and following the EU harmonization laws discussed so far was the reconfiguration of the state power pertaining to the police and security. The first pivotal step taken toward such reconfiguration would be the penal system. The new Penal Code which was passed in 2004 replacing the old law dating back to the early Republican period (1929). Attune to the 'spirit' of the early 2000s, parliamentary debates on the law were often embellished by government officials with abundant references to European norms and standards, in particular with regards to 'rights and freedoms of the individual'.[959] The emphasis on 'public order, security, social peace' adjacent to 'individual rights and freedoms' was a preview of the ultimate precedence granted to the security of 'order' as well as what was to come regarding the range of preventive police measures granted in the name of order by the security legislation that would follow. In effect, the government officials' frequent reference to Western states in the preparation of the law was not only a political gesture of embracing the values attached to 'the individual and his/her freedoms'. It was also a deliberate resort to the myth of 'balance' between security and freedom prevailing in the liberal mode of thought[960] which practically operates through the decisive dominance of security over the rights and freedoms the states claim to secure, and potentially opens the back door to most authoritarian practices especially when it comes to confronting 'disruptive' elements of dissent. As such, it is hardly surprising that the content of the new Penal Code has been replete with security-based pretexts in a way to assume overtones of the political paranoia endemic to the neoliberal security (and/or *penal*) state. In a quite similar manner to the laws enacted under the September 12 regime, *state security* has been once again underscored as the core legal and ideological value in the law by way of numerous comprehensive and abstract mantras for a plentiful variety of offences carrying severe punishments that were not included in the previous law: 'security of the

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"2010'larda Türkiye'de "güvenlik devleti" "olağanüstü devlet" biçimine evrilirken", *Birikim*, v. 335, 2017. Ş. Oğuz, 2016.

[959] *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 124. Birleşim, 26.09.2004, p. 376. https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d22/c060/tbmm22060124.pdf

[960] M. Neocleous, 2008.

nation and the state', 'institutions and organs of the state', 'symbols and organs of sovereignty', 'state secret', 'public security', 'public peace', 'nation', 'national defense', 'Turkishness', among others. All content except chapters consisting of general principles, definitions and sanctions have been devoted to 'crimes against the nation and the state' in a law that was said to be brought to guarantee rights and freedoms.[961]

Another feature typical of the new law is that in prosecuting offences against state security it easily identifies the intention and/or the propaganda of a crime act with the act itself, in such a manner to accommodate the Anti-Terror Law of 1991. For instance, as clearly stated in the Preamble of the law, making propaganda for such acts deemed to disrupt the unity or independence of the state, which is to be determined purely by subjective interpretation, shall also be punished under the same article as these acts. Concomitantly, the most draconian nature of the pursuit of security in the law lies in its comprehension of organizational crimes and criminal organizations (article #220) which could be easily construed as terror acts and organizations in view both of the ensuing anti-terror law of 2006 and the highly polarized ideological milieu under the AKP governments. In that, from the perspective of the law even if there is not a crime committed, gathering around a supposed idea of a crime shall suffice for the existence of a criminal organization. The law also regards 'unilateral will' independent of the organizational structure as enough for being a member of a crime organization, whereby 'committing an offence on behalf of an organisation' and 'aiding an organization' shall be sentenced for the offence of being a member of that organisation regardless of whether the person belongs to the organizational structure. Taken together, the legal ground has been established for a dissident political act or organization to be easily treated as a terrorist / criminal act or organization. Even worse, the expansive definition of such acts includes those supposedly 'in preparation for crimes intended to be committed'.[962] The pre-emptive approach apparent here would later pave the ground

[961] *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 121. Birleşim, 16.09.2004, p.233. https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d22/c060/tbmm22060121.pdf *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 121. Birleşim, 15.09.2004, p.18. https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d22/c060/tbmm22060120.pdf

[962] Preamble of the Turkish Penal Code, 2004. https://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d22/1/1-0593.pdf

for a number of new policing initiatives and surveillance practices as it would be incorporated as a technique of pacification by the General Directorate of Security in the name of identifying potential criminal activity.[963]

Unsurprisingly, such penal system would be embodied in exceptional trial processes, which in turn required a political twist performed by the AKP government. As mentioned before, playing on the idea of demilitarization, the government abolished the State Security Courts in 2004. This move was proudly announced by the party as the elimination of the symbol and adjunct of interim regimes, martial law periods and emergency practices.[964] There had been no doubt that these courts constituted a hallmark of the September 12 regime and they had been regularly criticized by EU reports for representing the substantial judicial powers granted to the military in prosecuting political crimes. Yet what is at stake here is that the provisions of the defunct law on State Security Courts were substantially transferred to the new Criminal Procedure Law (#5271). On this basis, the abolishment of State Security Courts was to be soon followed by the establishment of a simply civilian version of them under the banner of special heavy penal courts, generally known as Specially Authorized Courts (*ÖYMs*). This was probably one of the most vivid examples of the AKP's subtle tendency of replacing the 'demilitarization' attempts by a further step in the politics of securitization. For these courts, in essence, were no different in the sense that they were founded on the precedence of the protection of state security over the principle of justice. They had quite the same scope and trial procedures as the former ones.[965] As the title 'specialized' suggests, they were endowed with notable emergency powers driven by a no less narrow scope of national security in prosecution and trial processes addressed for organized crimes in the new penal system. Since the new 'demilitarized' security regime would be centred on the police and the judiciary, a discrepancy in judicial system would not be an issue as it was previously. Indeed, the new courts would be exempted from questioning by those who rightfully depicted the older ones as 'a parallel legal system serving as

[963] EGM, *Stratejik Plan 2009-2013*, 2009, pp 40-1.

[964] AKP, *AK Parti İktidarında İlk & En 100*, 2005.

[965] Articles #250, #251 and #252 of the Criminal Procedure Law (#5271) promulgated in 2004. These provisions were removed in 2012.

unabashed organs of the 'deep state''.[966] Thanks to their civilian appearance, therefore, these new wines in old bottles would not initially harm the AKP's rhetoric of demilitarization and democratization. Nor did they receive a significant negative reaction from the EU and the policy circles who eagerly undertook the guidance of this rhetoric, at least until the 2010s when they had already become the symbol of the blatant removal of the right to defense and fair trial.

Aside from bringing 'special' trial procedures in, the new Criminal Procedure Law also signified an expansion in the range of police discretion through the frequent use of subjective terms such as the infamous 'reasonable suspicion', 'cases of peril in delay', 'red-handed cases', etc., the implementation of which have been put at the disposal of the police forces. As such, the police have been given a leading role in criminal investigations and prosecutions, not least with the greater powers of search, surveillance, seizure and arrest stimulated in the space created by the fairly vague and open-ended terminology of the law. Combined with the preventive logic prevailed in the penal system, police discretion vested with greater powers thus expanded to engage the entire citizenry, where everyone becomes a de facto suspect of uncommitted crimes.[967] Furthermore, bringing in practices such as secret witness (Article #58) which would become a hallmarks for the functioning of the Specially Authorized Courts, the new law has contributed to a significant erosion, or even to the abandonment of the right to defense under the AKP rule.

This broad vision of security that has accommodated the AKP's neoliberal agenda from its very inception has been reinforced with the new counter-terrorism and police legislation respectively in 2006 and 2007. The new counter-terrorism measures attached to the law of 1991 (no. #3713) were fairly draconian ones designed to target potentially all sorts of political activities in the guise of fighting terrorism. As such, they were clearly keeping up with the global trend in the politics of counterterrorism and its having become a part of the restructuring of the neoliberal state (and of the reshaping of society) in such a way to help the state 'manage

[966] Ç. Keyder, "The Turkish bell jar", *New Left Review*, July-August 2004, p. 67.

[967] C. Boukalas, "No exceptions: authoritarian statism. Agamben, Poulantzas and homeland security", *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 7:1, 2014, p. 126.

recurring economic crises, while preventing their evolution into political ones'.[968] Furthermore, arguments put forward by the AKP officials to justify the law seemed to benefit a lot from the priority of security, more precisely, the grounds of the 'necessity of security' which tends to serve as an ideological link between the liberal mode of thought and the doctrine of raison d'etat.[969] For, more often than not, it is simply not 'the good' or the rule of law but 'a security necessity' that justifies demands for executive prerogative and emergency powers in the modern bourgeois state, no matter how illiberal or unreasonable they are. [970]

The AKP's adoption of new measures of counterterrorism could thus be viewed as the legalization of such powers on the grounds of 'necessity' supposedly imposed by the challenges of a perpetual 'war on terror', rather than of a political choice. Within a political milieu where democratization was still the overriding discourse, it appeared from the speeches of government officials that they were not quite proud of such an authoritarian legislation, but in the end, necessity had to prevail over rights and freedoms:

> It is not our real wish to have a law as such. However, current circumstances of Turkey, the long-lasting terror environment revealed the necessity to make it. It is also a clear fact that all fundamental rights and freedoms could only be used within the guaranteed conditions of security and peace. (Bekir Bozdağ, MP)
>
> If only we, as the Government, had not come before you with such a law. We are aware that it is an unpleasant one, yet it is a fact that as people engaged in politics we face such difficulties from time to time. The law alone is not enough for the war on terrorism, but it is not possible without the law either. We are currently trying to regulate the legal part of this war. People who are laying down their lives for the country's unity and peace say that we need to revise anew our Anti-terror Law. So, if you say why this law came out of nowhere, it came out of need. (Cemil Çiçek, Minister of Justice)[971]

Notwithstanding all the hype about freedoms, demilitarization, Europeanization, etc. the legislation was justified also with reference to the overwhelming disorder and

[968] C. Boukalas, 2015, p. 56. G. Albo & C. Ganelli, 2014, pp. 19-25.

[969] Anders Esmark, "Limits to Liberal Government: An Alternative History of Governmentality", *Administration & Society*, 50(2), 2018, 240–268. Ö. Kaygusuz, 2016.

[970] M. Neocleous, 2008, p. 18.

[971] *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 122. Birleşim, 29.06.2006, pp. 40-1, 70. https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d22/c126/tbmm22126122.pdf

insecurity prior to 1980, like the military junta had frequently done in the 1980s. Centred once again on the so-called balance between security and freedom, such reference was a tacit acknowledgment that the neoliberal order has long been driven by the logic of emergency and the sentiment of uncertainty from the very outset until the present day.[972] Less surprising was that the government's arguments would heavily rest on the West's having oriented around the idea of 'war on terror' as a key category of policing and reshaping internal order. In this regard, the recent phase of the authoritarian restructuring of counterterrorism policy in (neo)liberal capitalist states had been a chief appeal, whereby the AKP's new police measures would not contradict the so-called integration to Europe:

> In such an environment, if no government is able to eliminate this scourge with conventional methods, old ways and powers, they would normally review their laws and regulations. Like the UK, Germany, Spain, the US and others have done so far. If you ask why this law came to the agenda, here is another pillar: There are various international organizations and conventions, of which Turkey is a founder, member, and party. We brought up and wrote down whatever is written there. We have not adopted a less ambiguous definition of terrorism than the one held by the Council of Europe's resolution in 2002. (Cemil Çiçek, Minister of Justice)[973]

In conjunction with other security legislation the new counter-terrorism measures would contribute much to the politics of depoliticization and the foreclosure of political contestation, which have been a deliberate and enduring strategy of the AKP throughout its relentless neoliberal trajectory. Most of all, despite its extensive scope the amendment left unchanged the vague and subjective excuses in the defining articles of the law (e.g. damaging the internal and external security of the State, the public order or general health) that could potentially cover any act of political dissent. More startling has been the inclusion of fifty individual crimes already defined in the new Penal Code under the heading of "crimes committed with terrorist aims" (Article 4/a). These crimes, all of which are individual or political by their

[972] "We cannot take away freedoms in the name of public order, yet we cannot either drag the country into chaos in the name of freedoms. If you do not secure public order, you have no chance of enjoying any freedom. We saw what this country lost once public order was endangered before the 1980s', and at times after the 1980s'. So, if you ask why this law is brought up, it is to establish public order, but also to guarantee rights and freedoms at the same time." (Cemil Çiçek, Minister of Justice). *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 122. Birleşim, 29.06.2006, p. 41.

[973] *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 122. Birleşim, 29.06.2006, p. 43.

nature (e.g. “prevention of a public official from performing his duty”, “alienating the public from military service”, “document forgery”, etc.), would now be prosecuted and tried within the scope of terrorism if they were interpreted as falling within the framework of the activities of a terrorist organization, even though they do not contain force, violence and threat. Take, for example, the Prevention of the Right to Education. Any non-violent march or protest of students for a reasonable demand such as free education could –and actually did, as attested in many cases– fall within the law insofar as the act is deemed as an education boycott in favour of an organization. Moreover, in line with the article no. #220 of Penal Code, acts or speeches deemed to be making propaganda for a terrorist organisation shall be sentenced under the Anti-Terror law, even though the person is not a member of the organization (Article #7). This being the case, as it would be seen much more overtly on the way to the 2010s, the legal ground has been neatly established for all kinds of oppositional acts to be potentially counted as terror crimes. The legislation has also regulated the use of firearms by the police. The authority of using firearms directly and without hesitation, which was abolished by the Constitutional Court in 1999 on the grounds of violation of the right to life,[974] has been reinstated with a small and insignificant verbal change (additional article #2).

The political scope of the war on terror being expanded to such extent, the AKP wanted to further secure the orderly alignment of everyday life in the public realm by widening the police’s powers to use force. All powers granted to the police in the criminal procedure legislation have been reiterated and consolidated with the amendment to the Law no. #2559 on the Powers and Duties of Police (*PVSK*) in 2005 and 2007. Justified on the basis of “EU norms and standards, contemporary approaches and the new security paradigm”, the amendments were presented as a complement to the ongoing reform in the penal system and as tailored towards the requirements of pre-crime policing in the wake of “changing economic and social developments”.[975] They were in fact emblematic of the greatly expanded

[974] “Polise 'doğrudan ateş yetkisi' Meclis'te”, Hürriyet, 11.06.2003.

[975] Preamble of the amendment to the Law on the Powers and Duties of Police (#2559), 29.05.2007, pp. 1-2.
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d22/c161/tbmm22161119ss1437.pdf

discretionary powers and the ultimate disassociation of surveillance from the suspicion of crime. First, in parallel with the Anti-Terror legislation, the AKP government felt it necessary for 'public security and order' to authorize the police to use force and firearms without warning whenever they feel themselves to encounter 'opposition' or 'resistance' (articles no. #13, #16). The method to be used against the supposed resistance has been left to the police, provided that it shall be superior in degree to the resistance.[976] As part of the pre-emptive / pre-crime measures, identifying suspicion of threat against security has also been exclusively left to the discretion of police forces and been addressed again as a sufficient basis[977] to use the powers of search, seizure and arrest without the need for permission from an authority (articles no. #4, #13). To the same end, the police have also been authorized to conduct surveillance and intelligence gathering, including interception and recording of communications based on a judicial decision, or a judicial approval within forty eight hours in 'cases of peril in delay' (additional article no. #7).

As an effort to increase the technological capacity of the police concerning intelligence and surveillance, electronic cameras have been installed in all streets across the country, starting from Istanbul and Diyarbakır in 2005. Although the installation of the system was justified by citing the increase in purse-snatches at first, it has then become a full-time surveillance for the whole population as well as a 'self-policing' technology, as the governor of Istanbul of the time once put it.[978] In addition, utilizing the population information network and crime mapping the police has increased its technical along with legal capacity to monitor the entire population with a presumption that 'each individual could be a potential criminal'. On the other hand, in line with the Western community-policing strategies the police department's efforts to develop close relations with 'docile citizens' to ensure the flow of local intelligence have also been among the main characteristics in this term. From the lens of the police, citizens (defined as "external customer" by the official journal of General Directorate of Security) should be moulded into 'cautious', 'suspicious' and

[976] Idem, 2007, p. 8.

[977] Idem, 2007 p. 3.

[978] Deniz Özçetin, "The War on Purse-Snatchers: Law and Order as Pacification", in T. Wall (eds), 2017, p. 217.

'informer' subjects 'responsible' for their risk management, upon which the police's public relations strategies could develop (e.g. billboards, brochures and CDs distributed to the public, etc.). All in all, the so-called preventive / pre-crime policing have thus become an effective category of expanding the legal and technical powers not only towards controlling the everyday lives of the population.

The unprecedently broad and vague scope of police control over the population was also palpable in the structural empowerment of the police forces. The post-1980 tendency toward the qualitative and quantitative expansion of the police mandate has notably accelerated in parallel with the marketization and deunionization that continued in the 2000s. The overall number of security services staff in public sector increased by 38.5% between 2002 and 2009, while the increase was 25% for health services and only 1.5% for education services.[979] Over the same period, the increase in the number of police officers reached 27% thanks to the establishment of new police academies (Police Vocational Training Centers),[980] whereby the number of officers per capita, which was 1:514 in 1995, increased to 1:336 as of 2009. Nevertheless, such increase was not deemed to be adequate for the government. In its election manifesto of 2007 in which the draconian security legislation was promoted alongside the steps of 'demilitarization', the party declared that increases in the size of the police would ensure 250 officers per capita.[981] The augmented securitization going hand in hand with the so-called demilitarization was also verified with a notably higher spending pattern for internal security. It was recorded that the share of the police department in security budget had much higher growth rates than that of the Minister of Defence throughout the early years of the AKP rule, as shown in the figure below. Moreover, according to the accessible data, the whole internal security expenditures increased (in constant prices) more than twice only from 2006 to 2010.[982]

[979] DİE, *İstatistik Göstergeler 1923-2013*, 2014, p. 164.

[980] "Son 7 yılda 65 bin polis alındı", *Akşam*, 04.05.2010.

[981] AKP, *Election Manifesto for 2007 General Elections*, 2015b, p. 104.

[982] Nurhan Yentürk, *Sosyal Yardımlardan Güvenliğe Türkiye'nin Kamu Harcamaları (2006-2017)*, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2018, p. 157



Figure 5. 4. Budget for the Minister of Defence and the Police (1998-2010)[983]

By no coincidence, the same period was marked by a notable rise in police brutality in the form of deadly and disproportionate force, whether it be a public demonstration, stop or detention. Because the law as the main playground of the police power, particularly the amendments between 2005 and 2007 expanding the discretionary power of the police could be addressed as the main backbone of the systematically increasing police violence which would be apparently notorious throughout the 2010s and beyond. Indeed, the legal changes took effect in a short time. For example, the recorded incidents of abuse and ill-treatment, including severe torture, increased by almost half in 2007 compared to the previous year, and this had increased steadily in the following years.[984] To be sure, the sweeping police powers should be interpreted in view of the all new security legislation and the accompanying security ideology as a whole, rather than solely of the individual police law. It could be argued that the new legislation passed until 2007 not only

[983] Gülay Günlük-Şenesen & Hikmet Kırık, "The AKP Era: Democratization or Resecuritization? An Assessment of the Institutional and Budgetary Reflections", *Research and Policy on Turkey*,2016, p. 6.

[984] Human Rights Watch, *Closing Ranks Against Accountability: Barriers to Tackling Police Violence in Turkey*, 2008, pp. 29-30. "Ya bir de polis devleti olsaydık! 2007'den bu yana 183 kişi 'polis marifetiyle' öldürüldü", *Diken*, 05.02.2015. http://www.diken.com.tr/ya-bir-de-polis-devleti-olsaydik-2007den-bu-yana-183-kisi-polis-marifetiyle-olduruldu/

increased the legal and material capacity of the police, but they contributed to the ideological creation of a social climate around the spectre of (in)security and (anti)terror. As an outcome of the prolific use of the legislation replete with broad and vague definitions, the number of political trials and convictions based on terrorism had skyrocketed particularly after 2006, when the AKP government was being widely praised for introducing 'advanced democracy' to Turkey. The number of terrorism convictions increased from 273 in 2005 to 6.345 in 2009.[985] This number would rise to 12.897 in 2011, prominent among which were journalists and students, accounting for one-third of all terrorism convictions worldwide since the 9/11.[986] However it is misleading to think that such tremendous increase was an indication of a growing social and political opposition. It rather indicated the AKP's permanent appeal to the discourse on the 'war on terror' and security as a malleable instrument for the narrowing of political space and the ordering of society. It is beyond doubt that since the time the AKP came to power and had been carrying out the so-called liberal democratic reforms, various forms of political dissent have been securitized as an issue of war on terror, public order and/or national security. Thus, it has been a usual practice as well in the AKP's 'first period' in power that a non-violent May Day demonstration could be brutally dispersed by riot police, or farmers who held a protest meeting could be detained by anti-terror police teams.[987] Ultimately, recalling Erdoğan's statements in the 2010 constitutional referendum accusing the opposition of being associated with terror groups,[988] one could argue that from the AKP's perspective, the ultimate division of society into acceptable citizens and terrorists, whether actual or potential, has not stood out as a nascent phenomenon in the late 2010s.

5.5. Concluding Remarks

Increasing dispossession, exploitation, and income polarization along with the deprivation of political rights have been compensated with a further extension of

[985] "Peki demokraside kaçıncıyız?", *Evrensel*, 05.11.2011.

[986] The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), *Turkey's Press Freedom in Crisis: The Dark Days of Jailing Journalists and Criminalizing Dissent*, Special Report, October 2012, p.22.

[987] "İşçiye diktatör!", *Evrensel*, 02.05.2007. "Fındık üreticisi ayakta", *Hürriyet*, 31.07.2006.

[988] "Başbakan: 'CHP, PKK, YARSAV beraber'", *Milliyet*, 31.07.2010.

policing through larger investments in security and the police organization, both legal, structural and ideological manner. Since this study builds upon a broader view of police power, such extension can be considered a complementary task to what I discussed under the topics depoliticization, labour market policy and social policy in terms of policing political action, labour militancy, and poverty, respectively. The AKP stating in its 2007 election manifesto that "preventive policing will be prioritized simultaneously with a strong social policy in order to ensure peace and security".[989]

The hegemonic implication of this process largely lay in what goes by the name of demilitarization backed by the EU conditionality. Since the political discourse revolving around military tutelage and demilitarization was driven into the heart of the anti-statist discourse encompassing the post-2001 restructuring of the state, the AKP found room for a security reconfiguration centred on the police as in many other cases where neoliberal transformation has deepened.

As such, the so-called demilitarization process amounted not only to a stake of struggle for state power among two socio-political forces ('Kemalists vs. Islamists'), but it had also become part and parcel of an ideological framework which contributed to the production of social consent for the neoliberal state restructuring under the leadership of the latter. Second, it paved the way for an augmented appeal to securitization in a new guise –with a less militarized and thereby with more legitimate appearance. That said, the same process could be considered a follow-up to, what has been called in this study, *the civilianization of warfare* following 1983. In that, the steps of demilitarization in the relations of force had continued so as to culminate into the establishment of a police and security regime par excellence as of the 2000s. Ironically or not, the legal, institutional and ideological forebear of the neoliberal-authoritarian state's security apparatus, which would later be described as even one displaying 'exceptional' (quasi-fascist / fascist) traits after 2010-2011,[990] has been fabricated at the very same time when the liberal choir both in and outside Turkey sang the praises of the 'reforms of democratization'.

[989] AKP, *Election Manifesto for 2007 General Elections*, 2015b, p. 104.

[990] Ş. Oğuz, 2016. B. Berksoy, 2017. Ö. Kaygusuz, 2018.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Based on a critical evaluation of dominant and 'critical' perspectives in studies of authoritarianism and security, this thesis has offered an alternative approach to analyse the concomitant reconfiguration of security and the balance of social forces under neoliberal transformation. Employing a unique incorporation of the general propositions of the critical theory of pacification into the form-analytical account developed in relational state theory I have sought to address the modalities of the exercise of state power through which the political implications of the contradictions and crises inherent in capitalist accumulation have been contained, managed, and policed in neoliberal Turkey.

In the major strand of this incorporation an inquiry has delved into the 'general' nature of pacification in capitalist social formation where the state and civil society are institutionally separated. In this context, it has been proposed to interpret the thesis of permanent primitive accumulation through the lens of systematic colonization. This reminds us that the perpetuation of dispossession and proletarianization as preconditions for capital-as-relation is by no means spontaneous, but rather a political, contradictory and open-ended process that requires constant control and containment over the condition of labour. Such observation, underscoring the relevance of state power for capital, connects to a range of processes and activities manifested in the broader conception of 'police' which paralleled the birth and development of the modern state, as well as the key role of the use of political and legal force in the reproduction of capitalist accumulation. This is where pacification can be used as a general thread to explore the specific modalities that connect security, police, and processes of capital accumulation to each other. As for the second strand, it has been proposed that

the concept pacification can be operationalized at a lower level of abstraction for analyses of specific historical cases and different phases of capitalist development in the light of key concepts developed in Poulantzas's relational theory such as forms of state and regime, forms of crisis, balance of forces, and power bloc.

The thesis also suggested that examining pacification in conjunction with such relational approach to the capitalist state helps to understand the ways in which the practices of pacification are circumscribed by the specific form and material organization of the state as a strategic terrain. This does not, of course, imply that the state, law, and their institutional structures themselves exercise power; but rather highlights the effects of the overall institutional materiality of the state over the process of pacification in shaping the forms of class struggles and containing the political impacts of capital–labour contradiction. Given that the material organization of state power is defined by the condensation of relation of forces between classes, such integration gives us a hint of the interplay among the state, pacification and the balance of forces in a complex relationship shaped and defined through political and class struggles.

In light of this theoretical integration, while acknowledging pacification as an ongoing *process* in which the insecurity of capitalist accumulation is secured, I sought to demonstrate that in the case of Turkey it also entails a deliberate class *strategy* devised to operate within the framework of an authoritarian statist form in the building and reinforcement of the neoliberal order, with security playing a central role. In parallel to the imperial practices of pacification the dimension of building holds great significance here. The key task of pacification goes beyond suppressing resistance after it emerges, it rather concerns with building an order and creating a common sense where resistance would be deemed pointless. As an aspect of this study that could be considered a distinctive contribution in light of prior research on pacification in Turkey, I have endeavoured to shed light on not only the reactive and protective but also the proactive and productive exercise of the state power in the sense that it helps build, re-build, and order the relations of power in the system of political class domination. Taken together, the central argument of the study revolved around that pacification has functioned as the fundamental political

mechanism in reproducing the contradictory totality of capitalist social relations in the crisis-ridden development of the Turkish political economy under neoliberalism. This is somewhat closely related to the question of neoliberal hegemony, translating into why the protracted economic crises and political instabilities experienced during the processes of neoliberal restructuring in Turkey did not transform into a crisis of hegemony through social and political struggles.[991] It is thus plausible to suggest that the practices of pacification have also assumed a role in the consolidation of neoliberal hegemony by enabling the state to order the social relations of power in the course of the crisis-ridden processes of restructuring.

To utilize the concept for a case-based research I have identified the process of pacification in relation to class contradictions, crises and insecurities within the historical development of neoliberal capitalism. As such, its politics has been historically analysed against the backdrop of the sociopolitical repercussions of successive phases of reforms and restructuring. I aimed to demonstrate how pacification had worked through the authoritarian state form, the role it played in managing the bourgeois insecurity and other social implications of capital–labour contradiction, the means it employed to order and reshape social relations of power, and thereby the ways in which it contributed to the deepening of neoliberalism over the course of three decades. I have focused on a range of techniques of governing and policing embodied in the processes through which the social and economic insecurity induced by neoliberal policies have been secured: securitization of the political, making of the pacified workforce, policing of the class of poverty, reinforcement of the ideal citizen-subjectivity.

To delineate the scope of the processes and mechanisms through which pacification takes place, the empirical research mainly focused on: Security/securitization as a mode of discourse and political technique, its legal and constitutional expression in the form of martial law, national security, emergency rule/powers/measures and executive prerogatives; Security as an apparatus in the form of the military, police and intelligence organizations; Depoliticization as a policing technique in building a

[991] G. Yalman, 2021.

secure political landscape; Labour market-trade union policy, social policy in terms of policing labour militancy and poverty. These directed me to the components of pacification having worked in conjunction in 'keeping the peace', in particular, in the political management of (in)security and other social implications of the crisis-prone development of the political economy in Turkey.

Concerning the discussion the foundational phase of the pacification project in the 1980s the first point I tried to show that the idea of war and social peace have been tightly intertwined in restoring the hegemony of the ruling class. The class character of the militant struggle underlying the war of the 1970s had been duly inscribed in the restoration of peace and security. This became evident in the discourses of the military junta, the police organization and the representatives of the bourgeoisie revolving around the term social peace. Secondly, given the relevance of its both symbolic and political implications, I laid emphasis on how the legal regulations prepared for the wartime turned into a chief instrument in building the peace. My argument here is that the founding phase of the pacification process was marked by the intertwinement of war and peace, articulated in discourse and also ingrained in material reality. Therefore, the ubiquitous reference to the term peace is not limited to an a euphemism or an ideological mask; it also indicates the material reality where class relations take form.

The same process witnessed another intertwinement pertaining to social war and police power. In that, a new security concept was declared by the military already in 1979, called *Internal Defense and Development,* which reflected an American-style counterinsurgency strategy concerned with not only the crushing of the enemy physically but the rebuilding of the order with all possible aspects. This gave a hint of the 'productive' nature of the upcoming war on the internal enemy (i.e. the disorderly, disobedient, unruly, assembled by the 'communist threat') in the new regime. Waged in the name of peace and security such war would put into effect a wide range of police power granted by the martial law in shaping the social order and reforming the society into a new mode of politics and life entailing a new regime of accumulation. The core of this mission was the making of a loyal, devoted, diligent workforce committed to the state and capital, pathologizing labour militancy,

depoliticizing labour relations and education, which had been carried out against the backdrop of the launching of the neoliberal stabilization programme. The extensive 'productive' nature of the martial rule was evident in the fabrication of a new form of state–civil society relationship facilitated by hundreds of legal regulations (669 laws and 90 statutory decrees in total) accompanying the new Constitution. The authoritarian form the state has assumed in this transformation was set to operate, undoubtedly, under a civilian regime, bringing two further strands of pacification into focus in terms of the configuration of security.

These strands addressed the normalization of the regime, i.e. the transformation of martial law into a normalized administrative form, which required the mediation of martial law powers by means of security. At this juncture, I posited that a distinctive feature of the process of pacification under neoliberalism in Turkey is that the state for the first time truly discovered national security and emergency powers for ordering the social relations of power. Alongside the new Constitution the enactment of the legal regulation on emergency rule in 1983 in concert with the end of the martial rule is emblematic in this regard. I supported this observation by delving into the legal-constitutional scope and political implications of the concept national security, emergency rule and the security-driven emergency measures to explore how they have been inscribed within the state's materiality for shaping internal order. As the second strand, what accompanied the normalization of the political regime after 1983 had been the reorganization and reinforcement in civil security apparatus, mainly the police institution aligning with the neoliberal setting. Roughly corresponding to the latter half of the 1980s this coincided with adverse effects of neoliberal policies on the equilibrium of class forces. This being the case, just as the military assumed the police power under martial rule, the police institution in turn had been set for waging a constant war on the 'disorderly' of the new order, being primarily deployed within industrialized cities.

Taken together, I argued that these consistent efforts of pacification in the 1980s assumed a great deal of construction under martial rule, yet the crucial motive had been the 'liberalization of martial law', or to put different, 'civilianization of warfare' as I referred at times throughout the thesis. This is duly illustrated by the

junta leader's widely circulated statement that "We must have such an administration that would not necessitate resorting to martial law again", which tempted me in the first instance to see such transformation from the lens of pacification. To be sure, the phrase liberalization here does not denote a form of the capitalist state. It rather underscores the significance of transforming martial powers into a seemingly more 'suitable' form to operate under authoritarian statism, owing to its ideological coherence with the founding claim of peace.

This strategy of normalization through civilianization would step back in the 1990s. A further wave of securitization efforts had been pursued being mainly led by the NSC amid an economic and political instability induced by the onset of the first phase of financialization following 1989. Although the political instability of the 1990s did not explicitly indicate a crisis of hegemony given that neither neoliberal hegemony nor the relations of political and ideological domination encountered a serious challenge by the interplay among class struggles, the contradictions of the finance-led capitalism failed to be effectively managed through a successful hegemony project and a stable polity, as would be the case in the early 2000s. Often referred in the literature as a 'lost decade' from different perspectives, the political economic milieu was also a contested one regarding the pacification process. Given the approach of state managers, representatives of large capital groups and trade unions towards the issue, the risk of the cycle of economic crises marked by unprecedented rates of inflation, unemployment and poverty transforming into a political crisis led to a general perception that it was indeed an issue of social order and security. As such, unlike the dominant liberal-institutionalist reading I put forth that the backdrop of the intense securitization efforts had less to with power struggles among institutional actors than with the contradictions underlying the intermittent crises in neoliberalism.

The securitization in question was in essence nothing but a notable expansion of the political foreground of national security. This included the legal and conceptual introduction of the 'war on terror' in domestic politics, militarized enforcement of the police organization, and new administrative techniques extending the national security prerogatives (crisis management, and the internal security protocol between

the NSC and the executive). Although these efforts addressed two tangible threats in official discourse (armed Kurdish movement and the Islamist movement), the new emergency powers, entailing a scope that incorporates class-based implications in one way or another, went far enough to reshape the social order and political landscape. Once we set aside on which grounds it is justified, the latter holds strong implications on the common inclination of modern capitalist states to approach compelling social issues, such as severe economic and financial crises, from the perspective of security and even of wartime emergency, insofar as they carry the risk of a rupture in securing the social cohesion.[992] This is confirmed both by the abundance of historical practices and the legal scope of emergency powers representing "a more or less permanent feature of political life in many liberal democracies"[993] since the 19th century.

In the Turkish case, the protracted nature of crisis during the 1990s had led to an acute social and economic insecurity needed to be secured, given the bulk of the population outside the power bloc at the risk of falling within the ranks of a marginalized impoverished mass. The bourgeois insecurity had been further provoked not least with the deepened neoliberal policy agenda with the financial crisis of 1994, targeting the gains of labour at the turn of the century. As one of the instantiations of the combined powers of war and policing, the regulation of crisis management (1996) having ubiquitous scope of the category of 'crisis' (popular movements against the tranquillity of public order, severe economic crises, illegal strikes, lockouts, work stoppages, inter alia) provided an illustration that the crisis management was deeply concerned with the likelihood of 'emergence' of a disruption in social order out of the economic crisis in effect. Thus, along with other security measures, from the mindset of state managers it was somehow linked to a preemptive strategy within the crisis management of neoliberal capitalism.

Overall, these led me to my main point that against the background of the crisis-ridden years of the 1990s the main category at stake had been securitization as to

[992] W. E. Scheuerman, 2000.

[993] Ibid, p. 1870.

pacification, rather than the shifts towards the NSC-led militarization. The police and emergency powers that had been infiltrated into the 'normal' legal system, and the further shift of the concept of national security towards social order was going to animate the work of pacification which would be inherited to the upcoming period. Contrary to the views approaching national security strictly within the confines of the armed forces, this should have rendered secondary importance the question whether such powers were to be used by military or civil authorities.

In line with the efforts of pacification in upholding the social order, the neoliberal hegemony had been entrenched. In that, the erosion in the collective capacity of working classes and their political engagement in decision making processes had maintained. The brief revival of labour militancy at the turn of the 1990s in response to the substantial deterioration of living conditions led by the policies of wage suppression since the early 1980s came to a halt by the reassertion of the political dominance of capital in the post-1994 crisis years. Notwithstanding the prevailing political instability which culminated by the devastating financial crises of 2000-2001, post-2001 phase of neoliberal transformation could thus be sustained in a social milieu secure from forms of social mobilization and confrontational popular movements. The further phase of transformation, a substantial portion of which was driven by the strong commitment of the AKP governments, was examined with regards to such problematic.

In effect, the management of the 2001 crisis made it clear that the political foreclosure facilitating the AKP's strong adherence to the existing policy agenda had already been in effect even before the party's coming to power. In particular, the strategy of depoliticization initially promoted by the technocratic crisis management led by Kemal Derviş and subsequently continued by the AKP governments amid contradictions had a profound implication concerning the distinctive political character of the politics of restructuring. Adding to the analyses on the depoliticized and rule-based forms of governing in neoliberal economic management, I suggested that the politics of restructuring post-2001 entailed a post-political foreclosure of politics. In that, it was not identified to an anti-politics in its own right but a process of post-politics which duly substituted the contested and contradictory nature of

democracy and 'politics proper' *with* a consensual form of neoliberal politics redefining and reframing fundamental questions. Owing its success in large part to the utilization of the anti-statist rhetoric centred on the notion 'rationalization' (of politics, or of the state-market-society relations), the process entailed an imposed *consensus* regarding the identification of the democratic transformation within the state with the proper implementation of market reforms. As such this discussion was included as part of the pacification process in question since it pertains to the exercise of the police power carried out in the 'building of a social order of controlled spaces'[994] in the face of devastating repercussions of a severe economic crisis.

Having put in place in this post-political condition shielded from any potential infusion, one of the goals of the neoliberal reform agenda was greater flexibility and deregulation in the labour market which led to growing economic insecurity of the working classes. The latter has been exacerbated by high rates of unemployment, intensified proletarianization, exploitation, and impoverishment that would follow as a result of the existing model of accumulation.[995] While job insecurity has functioned as a means of political discipline towards the formation of a low-cost, fragmented, precarious and thus pacified workforce, collective capacity of labour has been further undermined by the AKP's efforts to develop, promote and control pro-government unions in order to police labour mobilization. Complementary to such formation of workforce is a peculiar mode of social policy that has assumed a pivotal role in regulating and policing the poor along neoliberal lines. Initiated by the WB-induced poverty alleviation strategy in the midst of a perceived risk for imminent 'social explosion', such policy has later expanded towards a new pattern suited for the existing neoliberal policy framework as well as its Islamist political agenda. A complex network of social assistance amalgamating the central and local administration with conservatively oriented civil foundations has been developed to constitute a 'docile class of poverty' by –building ties of dependency and obedience out of dispossession and proletarianization, and –producing insecure and vulnerable recipients of social assistance as a replacement for organized labour.

[994] G. Rigakos, 2011.

[995] S. Bahçe and A. H. Köse, 2017.

With regards to the ‘repressive’ response to securing the insecurity of the neoliberal order the AKP government has also advanced the strategic framework of pacification that it has taken over by embarking on a new security configuration in alignment with its own political priorities. In this respect, the state’s post-1980 strategy of ‘normalizing’ the powers of martial law aligned smoothly with the party’s EU-backed agenda for ‘demilitarization’ within the context of political reforms.

What we have basically seen with the shift of power from the military to the police is a drastic increase in the scope of emergency powers in the policing and upholding of the social order. I have further suggested that the initial steps towards draconian security policies did not need to follow a strategic retreat away from the so-called political reforms. To illustrate, it was not even a full year in office when the AKP government brought up the increase of the police’s power by leveraging the political climate of the global post-9/11 campaign.[996] Accordingly, one could observe that the preliminary legislation on security and the police have been put into effect between 2004 and 2007. Dispersed across various sections of the criminal justice and law enforcement, what has been developed in these laws and regulations alongside the material empowerment of the police forces is the deployment of war powers in a ‘new guise’, granted exclusively to the police in policing dissent and shaping political behaviour in compliance with the pacification strategy post-1983. Ironically or not, the decisive separation between the police and the military by means of the process of demilitarization has set the groundwork for the development of the former as a war machine, which would be geared towards almost every conceivable forms of social common.

Rethinking security from the lens of pacification is an initial counter-hegemonic attempt given the increasingly hegemonic ideology of security under neoliberalism.[997] It helps demystify the social and class character behind the politics of securitization, demystify the imposition of particular kinds of peace, and opens avenues for exploring how the political management of insecurity plays a part in

[996] “Polise 'doğrudan ateş yetkisi' Meclis'te”, Hürriyet, 11.06.2003.

[997] G. Ozcan, 2014, p. 39.

(re)ordering the social relations of power, around the political class domination of capital. When neoliberalism is perceived as a class project such contours become even more evidently interrelated. For it is clear now more than ever that the use of emergency powers becomes most relevant, rendering irrelevant even the basic rules and procedures regarding the exercise of formal rights that had been once inscribed within the state, when the needs of capital accumulation are at stake.

The specific period covered in this thesis warrants considerable attention for having laid the groundwork for profound changes within the state set to unfold in the post-2010s, particularly in terms of securing the balance of social forces and policing the conditions under which economic crises would potentially transform into a crisis of hegemony. The formation of neoliberal order as internal pacification in Turkey has been successful inasmuch as the political, economic, ideological landscapes built throughout this process have been secured and reproduced with the limited presence of class-based or popular challenges despite compelling crises in due course. Hence, further shifts in the authoritarian statecraft for the last couple decades beg elaboration with this loaded legacy of pacification from the preceding decades of neoliberal transformation.

At this juncture, the question remains of how neoliberal hegemony manages to remain unthreatened by systemic alternatives notwithstanding the intensification of the generalized economic and political crisis of the world capitalist system since 2008. As for Turkey this situation not only results in the consolidation of the balance of social forces under neoliberalism but also leads to the securing of the shifts in the state form and regime steered by the AKP leadership in the face of crises and political legitimacy erosion, in such a way to challenge the definitional limits of the authoritarian statism as outlined by Poulantzas.

While another crucial question is by which concept this is to be defined, the current state of affairs firmly associates pacification yet with another category: crisis management. The persistence of the AKP government's prolonged crisis management lies in its thrust for creating new zones of pacification fuelled by a

series of police wars: war on poverty (social policy),[998] war on terror and dissent (ordering of civil society), war on the commons (drastic practices of proletarianization and primitive accumulation). On the other hand, what proves decisive in recent crisis management seems to be the gradual cessation of the law's mediating effect given the process of deconstitutionalization that takes place alongside qualitative transformations prompted within the state. In this thesis, security and law have been acknowledged as the fundamental mediating categories in the examination of the transformation of martial law into authoritarian statism. The law being leveraged as a strategic terrain paved the way for framing such transformation as the 'liberalization' of martial law. Now if a new definition of the state form and political regime is to be articulated at this juncture, the weakening role of law in mediating the exercise of violence would certainly be a defining characteristic.

My inquiry here has been concerned with the historical developments in neoliberal political economy and practices of pacification predominantly in the context of domestic sociopolitical forces, crises and political agenda in Turkey. As such, comprehensive historical research at different scales of analysis is yet to be completed. Drawing on the path that I believe the main categories and assumptions of this study could encourage, it would be valuable for national-scale case studies for future exploration to analyse the work of pacification as an interdisciplinary field of study, as well as to direct attention to the impact of the internationalization efforts, both in terms of a class strategy and structural transformations, that the bourgeois state has entailed from the very beginning.[999] In that, one prospective trajectory for a nuanced historical study of pacification in the current phase of neoliberalism would incorporate the emerging modes of the police power and technologies of governing peculiar to the deeply financialized processes of economic and social reproduction of

[998] It goes without saying that such activity of social police entails not a war on impoverishment but instead on its political repercussions, which runs parallel to the disciplining of labour through an increasingly insecure and flexible labour market.

[999] For a critical study on the internationalization of the police apparatus in Turkey, see F. Hülagü, 2011.

labour,[1000] which have a lot to do with remaking political and even human subjectivity.[1001] For sure, such attempts would be missing by omitting potential challenges and resistances to the increasingly financialized discipline of capital over all aspects of life, as well as struggles for the recreation of the commons.

[1000] B. Fine and A. Saad-Filho, 2017, p. 687.

[1001] Maurizio Lazzarato, *The Making of the Indebted Man: An Essay on the Neoliberal Condition*. South Pasadena: CA: Semiotext(e), 2011. Mark Neocleous, "Debt as Pacification." *Journal of World-Systems Research* 27, no. 1, 2021, 58–76.

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“12 Eylül'ü en net anlatan mektup: Emrinize amadeyim.” *Sol*, September 12, 2018.

APPENDICES

A. CURRICULUM VITAE

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WORKING EXPERIENCE

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EDUCATION

PhD in Political Science and Public Administration, Middle East Technical University, Ankara (01/2024, GPA: 4.0)

MSc in Political Science and Public Administration, Middle East Technical University, Ankara (09/2012, GPA: 3.8)

BSc in Political Science and Public Administration, Middle East Technical University, Ankara (06/2009, GPA: 3.1)

PUBLICATIONS

Güven, Erdem. "Güvenlik ve Sermaye Birikimi Kıskacında Covid-19'un Siyasal Yönetimi." In *Pandemide Ekonomi, Yönetim ve Yaşam*, ed. Ayşen Sivrikaya and Özgür Uğurluoğlu. Ankara: Hacettepe Üniversitesi Yayınları, (2022): 83-107.

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Güven, Erdem. “Barışçıllaştırma Üzerine Kuramsal ve Siyasal bir Tartışma” *Ayrıntı Dergi* 27 (2018): 35-59.

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INTERNATIONAL PROCEEDINGS

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Güven, Erdem. “From military to civil means of pacification: A class-based view to securitization in post-1980 Turkey”. Brunel University London Politics and History Annual PhD Conference, London, 25-27 April 2017.

Güven, Erdem. “Public governance as a way of democratic legitimacy?: A theoretical and political critique” Annual Conference of IASIA, Paris, 6-10 July 2015.

Güven, Erdem. “Mainstream Challenge to Welfare State on Political-Administrative Level: Does Proceduralist Participation Really Work?” Annual Conference on International Political Economy: Challenges to the Welfare State, İzmir, 23-25 May 2012.

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

2017: Visiting Doctoral Researcher at the Department of Social and Political Sciences, Brunel University, London.

2017: Researcher in “Kamu Yönetimine Yön Veren Eserler”, CB Strateji ve Bütçe Başkanlığı (Kalkınma Bakanlığı) Projesi, Ankara.

2014: Researcher in “Yerel Yönetimlerin Yerellik Düzeyinin Araştırılması”, CB Strateji ve Bütçe Başkanlığı (Kalkınma Bakanlığı) Projesi, Ankara.

2013-2014: Project Assistant in “Türkiye’de Parlamenter Sistem (İşleyiş ve Sorunların Ampirik Betimlemesi)”, CB Strateji ve Bütçe Başkanlığı (Kalkınma Bakanlığı) Projesi.

2012-2013: Researcher in “İl Özel İdaresi Personel Rejimi (1913'ten 2013'e)”, CB Strateji ve Bütçe Başkanlığı (Kalkınma Bakanlığı) Projesi.

2012: Project Assistant in “Türk Kamu Yönetiminde Teftiş ve İç Denetim”, CB Strateji ve Bütçe Başkanlığı (Kalkınma Bakanlığı) Projesi.

EDUCATION SCHOLARSHIPS

Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBITAK) Domestic PhD Scholarship, 2014.

Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBITAK) International PhD Research Scholarship, 2017.

B. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Son kırk yıl, dünyanın dört bir yanındaki kapitalist toplumsal bütünlükler ve toplumsal güç dengelerinde önemli dönüşüm ve kırılmalara neden olan bir dizi siyasi ekonomik gelişmeye, uygulamaya, toplumsal ve ekonomik eğilime tanıklık etmiştir. Neoliberalizm olarak adlandırılan bu kapsamlı dönüşüm, 1970'lerin küresel kapitalist krizine yanıt olan bir sınıf projesi olarak küresel ölçekte olduğu gibi Türkiye'de de emeğin tarihsel kazanımlarına yönelik yoğun bir sermaye saldırısıyla damgalanmıştır. Emeğin koşullarına kısa bir bakış dahi söz konusu sürecin sınıf odaklı doğası hakkında fikir verecektir. 1980'den itibaren neoliberal gündemin uygulanmasına paralel olarak ücretlerin toplam ekonomi içindeki payında sistematik bir düşüş yaşanmış, bu düşüş özellikle kriz dönemlerinde hızlanmıştır.[1002] Kısa bir örnek vermek gerekirse, imalat sanayinde 1979 yılında yüzde 52 olan ücretlerin payı 1994 yılında yüzde 31'e, 2006 yılında ise yüzde 21'e düşmüştür; yani 1979'dan 2006'ya yüzde 60'lık bir gerileme söz konusudur.[1003] Gelir dağılımındaki sistematik bozulma aynı zamanda işgücü verimliliğindeki düzenli artışlarla, özellikle de nispeten yüksek büyüme oranlarının yaşandığı 2000'li yıllarda devam etmiştir. Kriz yıllarındaki düşüşlere rağmen işgücü verimliliği hiçbir zaman ücretlerden daha fazla düşmemiştir; bu durum piyasa temelli reformlar ve özellikle krizlerin bölüşüm ilişkileri üzerine etkilerinin orantısız bir şekilde çalışan sınıflara yüklendiğini gösterir. Gelir dağılımındaki bozulma ve kesintisiz devam eden yüksek sömürü oranlarına ekonomik ve siyasi gerilemenin muhtelif göstergeleri de eşlik etmiştir: iş güvencesizliği, kayıt dışı sektörün ekonomide artan payı ve işgücü piyasasında daha fazla esneklik, yüksek sendikasızlaşma oranları, nüfusun

[1002] Gerard Duménil and Dominique Lévy, *Capital Resurgent: Roots of the Neoliberal Revolution,* Harvard University Press, 2004. D. Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, Oxford University Press, 2007. Korkut Boratav, Oktar Türel, and Erinç Yeldan, "Distributional dynamics in Turkey under "structural adjustment" of the 1980s", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 1994, 11, 43–70. Serdal Bahçe and Ahmet Haşim Köse, "Social Classes and the Neo-Liberal Poverty Regime in Turkey, 2002–2011", *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 47:4, 2017, 575–595.

[1003] Özlem Onaran, "Crises and post- crisis adjustment in Turkey: Implications for Labor" in Z. Öniş & F. Şenses (eds.), *Turkey and the Global Economy: Neo-Liberal Restructuring and Integration in the Post-Crisis Era,* 2009, pp. 249-50.

çoğunluğunun, bilhassa güvencesiz çalışanların geçimlerini sağlamak üzere borçlanmaya artan bağımlılığı. Sonuç, çalışan sınıfların tüm kesimlerine nüfuz eden genelleşmiş, kitlesel bir burjuva tekinsizliği ve belirsizliğidir; buna verilen yanıt, çeşitli şiddet ve baskı biçimlerinde tezahür eden yasal-kurumsal, sektörel ve ideolojik düzeylerde her zamankinden daha yoğun bir güvenlik yatırımıdır.

Emek ve sermaye arasındaki güçler dengesine ilişkin söz konusu göstergeler yapısal uyum süreçleri boyunca çalışma mevzuatında yapılan kapsamlı değişiklikler temelinde kısmen izah edilebilir olsa da, neoliberal dönüşümün siyasi ve sosyal yönleri Türkiye'deki yörüngesinin bir başka ayırt edici karakterini ortaya koymaktadır. Türkiye'nin neoliberal politika gündemi uzun krizler döngüsüne yanıt olarak sınıf egemenliğini yeniden üretmek üzere daha da derin ve kapsamlı bir şekilde derinleştirilmiştir. Aslında Türkiye'de neoliberal dönüşüm çabaları kısa vadeli, spekülatif sermaye öncülüğündeki büyüme modelleri tarafından tetiklenen bir dizi ekonomik ve mali kriz ile bu krizler boyunca tek tek hükümetler düzeyinde siyasi istikrarsızlıkları beraberinde getirmiştir. Ne var ki bu krizler, tarihsel olarak 'sınıf çelişkilerinin yoğunlaşması' ile tanımlanabilecek devlet yahut hegemonya krizlerine dönüşmemiştir. Bu durum, Türkiye'nin neoliberalizm deneyimini benzer kriz süreçlerinin daha ziyade 'neoliberalizmin krizi' olarak yaşandığı kimi muadillerinden ('yükselen piyasa ülkeleri') ayırmakta ve neoliberalizmin bir ekonomi politikası ve söylem tarzı olarak sarsılmaz ve kalıcı hegemonyasına işaret etmektedir. O halde, 1980 askeri darbesinin katıksız şiddetiyle başlatılan bir dönüşümün, son otuz-kırk yıl boyunca burjuva parlamenter demokrasinin sivil yönetimi altında, siyasi meşruiyet kaybı ve buna bağlı halk muhalefetinin siyasallaşmış baskısıyla ciddi bir şekilde yüzleşmeksizin ağırlıklı olarak korunduğunu ve sürdürüldüğünü öne sürmek makuldür. Neoliberal politika gündemine görülmemiş bir hızla ayak uydurmasıyla bilinen AKP iktidarı sınıf güçleri dengesini sermaye lehine hem devralıp hem de bu dengedeki bozulmayı daha da ileri taşırken, iktidarı öncesinde ve iktidarı sırasında neoliberalizme güçlü bir toplumsal muhalefet ve inandırıcı bir alternatiften yoksun olan bu koşullardan büyük ölçüde yararlanmıştır. Onlarca yıllık dönüşüm üzerine düşündüğümüzde, sürekli kriz eğilimli finans-temelli birikim modelinin yarattığı yakıcı sosyal ve ekonomik güvensizlik ile siyasi alanı iyiden iyiye daraltmaya teşebbüs eden, kolektif refahı ve

mümkün olan her tür toplumsal müştereği hedef alan siyasal şiddet uygulamaları karşısında bir temel soru ortaya çıkar: "Direniş neden yok?"

Bu tür bir sorgulamanın, genel olarak neoliberal kapitalizmin doğası gereği baskıcı niteliğiyle[1004], özel olarak ise sınıf ilişkilerinin yönetiminde temel siyasi kategorilerinden biri olan güvenlikle yadsınamaz derecede yakın ilişkisi vardır. Gerçekten de ana akım ve alternatif/eleştirel perspektifler arasında, günümüzde yaygın olarak otoriter yönetim biçimleri olarak adlandırılan şeyin güvenlik odaklı doğası konusunda belirli bir mutabakatın varlığından söz edilebilir: Modern otoriter uygulamalar öncelikle güvenlik temelinde harekete geçirilir, gelişir, meşrulaştırılır, genişler. Bununla birlikte, Türkiye örneğinde devlet otoriterizmi ve siyasal şiddetin güvenlik tarafından nasıl beslendiği ve çerçevelendiğine dair incelemeler farklı analitik ve kavramsal çerçeveler ortaya koyar.

Yakın zamana değin Türkiye'de otoriterleşme ve güvenlik arasındaki ilişkiye dair akademik tartışmaların kurumsalcılık, devlet merkezcilik ve/veya rölativizm türevleriyle tanımlanabilecek belirli bir Türk siyasi tarihi okumasıyla ilişkili açıklamaların hâkimiyeti altında olduğu görünmektedir. Her ne kadar tek bir düşünce ekolüyle sınırlı olmasa da hâkim eğilim devlete atfedilen şedit 'doğayı', onu kendi rasyonalitesine ve toplumsal ilişkilerden bağışık kurumsal çıkarlara sahip özerk bir varlık olarak ele alarak incelemek, güvenliği ise yalnızca bu devlet içindeki kurumlar, elitler ve siyasi rejimlerle ilişkili olarak incelemek olmuştur. Bu düşünme biçiminin Türkiye'deki en dolayımsız tezahürlerinden biri askeri müdahaleler, askeri korporatizm ve rejim değişikliklerinde kendini gösteren bir militarizm tezi üzerinde yoğunlaşan güvenlik aygıtının 'anti-demokratik' doğasına yönelik entelektüel ilgidir.[1005] Gerçekten de, erken Cumhuriyet dönemi tartışmaları bir kenara bırakılsa

[1004] Greg Albo and Carlo Fanelli, "Austerity against democracy: An authoritarian phase of neoliberalism?" *Teoria Politica: An International Journal of Theory and Politics*, 2014, 65–88.

[1005] Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy. *Comparative Politics*, V. 29, N. 2, 1997, pp. 151-166. Taha Parla, "Mercantile Militarism in Turkey, 1960-1998", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, N.19, 1998, pp. 29–51. İhsan D. Dağı, *Turkey between Democracy and Militarism: Post Kemalist Perspectives*, 2008, Ankara: Orion. Ahmet İnsel and Ali Bayramoğlu (eds.), *Bir Zümre, Bir Parti: Türkiye'de Ordu*, İstanbul: İletişim, 2013. Tim Jacoby, "Semi-Authoritarian Incorporation and Autocratic Militarism in Turkey", *Development and Change*. V. 36, N.4, 2005, pp. 613–802.

dahi,1960 darbesi ve Milli Güvenlik Kurulu'nun (MGK) kuruluşundan başlayarak, en iyi ihtimalle 2000'li yılların 'sivilleşme' adımlarına kadar, Türkiye'de siyasi alanın ordu tarafından sıkı bir şekilde militarize edildiği[1006] ve siyasetin 'ana mücadele' ekseninin militarizasyon pratikleri ile belirlenmesi oldukça popüler bir fikir olmuştur.[1007] Askeri elit ve bürokrasinin 'paternalist ve vesayetçi' bir rol üstlendiği, sıklıkla 'siyasi vesayet rejimi'[1008] olarak adlandırılan bu hâkimiyet, içeride ve dışarıda liberal, sol-liberal entelektüel ve medya çevreleri tarafından 'demokratikleşmenin' önündeki temel engel olarak açıkça vurgulanmıştır. Türkiye siyasetinde ve ekonomi politiğinde hâkim paradigmaya eklemlenen militarizasyon tezi 2000'li yıllar öncesinde ve boyunca güvenlik politikalarının baskın açıklama zemini olarak varlığını sürdürmüş, kavram etrafında dönen tartışmalara yönelik akademik ve akademik olmayan ilgide muazzam bir artışa yol açmıştır.

Otoriterleşme ve güvenliğe ilişkin bu egemen yaklaşım karşısında, son yıllarda Marksist devlet ve siyasal iktisat tartışmalarında geliştirilmiş genel kavramsal çerçeve ve kategorileri kullanan eleştirel çalışmalar da çoğalmıştır.[1009] Farklı vurgu düzeylerine sahip olmakla birlikte bu çalışmalar her şeyden önce devleti ve çeşitli biçimlerini toplumsal güçler dengesiyle ilişkili olarak çözümleme eğilimindedir. Bu doğrultuda, Türkiye'de yakın siyasi konjonktür ışığında güvenlik ve iktidar

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[1006] Egemen B. Bezci & Güven Gürkan Öztan, "Anatomy of the Turkish Emergency State: A Continuous Reflection of Turkish Raison d'état between 1980 and 2002", *Middle East Critique*, V. 25, N.2, 2016, 163-179. Nebi Miş, *Güvenlikleştirme teorisi ve Türkiye'de güvenlikleştirme siyaseti 1923-2003*, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Sakarya Üniversitesi, 2012.

[1007] İhsan D. Dağı, 2008.

[1008] Ahmet İnsel, "Otoritarizmin Sürekliliği", *Birikim*, 125-126, 1999; "The pratorian state and its owners" *Birikim*, 218, 2007.

[1009] Galip Yalman, "Türkiye'de Devlet ve Burjuvazi: Alternatif Bir Okuma Denemesi" in N. Balkan & S. Savran (eds.), *Sürekli Kriz Politikaları*, 2004. Pınar Bedirhanoğlu, "Türkiye'de neoliberal otoriter devletin AKP'li yüzü" in İlhan Uzgel and Bülent Duru (eds.) *AKP kitabı: Bir dönüşümün bilançosu*, Ankara: Phoeniz, 2009. Şebnem Oğuz, "Türkiye'de Kapitalizmin Küreselleşmesi ve Neoliberal Otoriter Devletin İnşası" *Türk Tabipler Birliği Mesleki Sağlık ve Güvenlik Dergisi* 45-46, 2012, 2–15. İsmet Akça, "Hegemonic Projects in Post-1980 Turkey and the Changing Forms of Authoritarianism" in İsmet Akça, Ahmet Bekmen and Barış Alp Özden (eds.), *Turkey Reframed: Constituting Neoliberal Hegemony*, London: Pluto Press, 2014. Barış Alp Özden, İsmet Akça and Ahmet Bekmen, "Antinomies of Authoritarian Neoliberalism in Turkey: The AKP Era" in Cemal B. Tansel (2017) *States of Discipline: Authoritarian Neoliberalism and the Contested Reproduction of Capitalist Order*, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017.

ilişkilerinin yapılandırılmasında siyasal şiddetin aldığı biçim ve değişimler sorunsallaştırılacaksa 1980 askeri darbesi ile başlatılan neoliberal dönüşümle bağlantılı bir tarihsel çözümlemeye girişmek zorunludur.

Bu yaklaşımı benimseyen ve ağırlıklı olarak güvenlik konusunu ele alan çalışmalar, bilhassa 2010 sonrası yıllara odaklanan katkıları kapsamaktadır.[1010] Bunun başlıca nedeni söz konusu döneme devlet, kurumlar ve siyasi alanda köklü bir dönüşümün damgasını vurması ve bu dönüşümün müteakip AKP hükümetleri etrafında şekillenen karmaşık ve çelişkili bir dizi ekonomik ve siyasi gelişmeyle eşlenik ilerlemesidir. 'Neoliberal güvenlik devleti' olarak anılan devlet biçiminin ortaya çıkışına yönelik küresel eğilimle uyumlu, ancak yine de kendi tarihsel özgüllüğü içinde benzersiz bir şekilde yerleşik olan söz konusu dönüşüm, güvenlik aygıtı ve güvenlikleştirme siyasetinde aşırı siyasi merkezilikle çerçevelenen siyasi şiddetin görünürlük düzeyinin artması olarak tezahür etmektedir. Buna paralel olarak, 2010 sonrası AKP iktidarında devletin otoriter biçiminden istisnai (güvenlikçi) biçimine doğru süregelen bir kayma olduğu tezi, AKP iktidarının sözüm ona 'ikinci döneminde' piyasa reformlarından bir şekilde yüz çevirmesiyle 'otoriter dönüşün' başladığı yönündeki yaygın liberal okumayı onaylamadan, tartışılmaktadır.[1011] Eleştirel tartışma hattı içindeki bu incelemeler, Türkiye'de neoliberal otoriter devletin tarihsel gelişimi ile güvenlik arasındaki ilişkiyi 2010 sonrası dönem odaklı tartışırken, söz konusu ilişkiyi 1980'lerden itibaren inceleyen diğer eleştirel çalışmalarda ise güvenliğin ele alınışı Marksizm ile kurumsalcılık arasında bir salınımı ima etmektedir. Bu bağlamda, milli güvenlik kavramının sadece silahlı kuvvetlerle sınırlı olarak ele alındığı görülmektedir. Milli güvenlik, ordu kadar sivil yönetimler tarafından da kullanılabilecek bir siyasi teknik olarak güvenliğin biçimsel bir ifadesi olarak kabul edilmek yerine, ordunun siyasete müdahil olduğu anları tanımlamak için kullanılmakta ve bu da 'milli güvenlik devleti' gibi kavramların

[1010] Şebnem Oğuz, "Yeni Türkiye'nin Siyasal Rejimi" in Tolga Tören & Melehat Kutun (eds.) *Yeni Türkiye: Kapitalizm, Devlet, Sınıflar*, İstanbul: Sosyal Araştırmalar Vakfı, 2016. Biriz Berksoy, '2010'larda Türkiye'de "güvenlik devleti" "olağanüstü devlet" biçimine evrilirken, 2017, 11–26. Özlem Kaygusuz, "Bir Siyasal İdare Tekniği Olarak Güvenlik ve AKP Döneminde Ulusal Güvenlik Devleti", *Praksis*, 40, 2016, 85–119. Özlem Kaygusuz, "Authoritarian Neoliberalism and Regime Security in Turkey: Moving to an 'Exceptional State' under AKP", *South European Society and Politics*, V. 23, N.2, 2018, 281–302.

[1011] Ş. Oğuz, 2016. B. Berksoy, 2017. Ö. Kaygusuz, 2018.

ortaya çıkmasına neden olmaktadır.[1012] Sınırlayıcı kapsamı göz önüne alındığında bu tür bir kullanım, 'ordunun yerine polis ve yargıyı merkeze alan yeni güvenlik rejiminin kurulması'[1013] olarak tespit edilen sürecin milli güvenlik söyleminin siyasi kullanımını zayıflatmadığı, aksine daha da pekiştirdiği gerçeğini aydınlatmaya özellikle yardımcı olmayacaktır. Dahası, siyasetin militarizasyonu tezi, Poulantzas'ın hegemonya açıklamasını kurumsal aktörler arasındaki bir güç çatışmasına indirgeyecek şekilde, 1990'larda yaşandığı iddia edilen 'hegemonya krizine' bir yanıt olmaktan ziyade, bu krizin ekonomi-dışı nedeni olarak ele alınmaktadır.[1014]

Bu tez, eleştirel ve sınıf-temelli sorgulama hattına katkıda bulunma çabasıyla Türkiye'de 1980 sonrası güvenlik yapılanmasını, sadece nüfusu kontrol altında tutmak için değil, aynı zamanda neoliberal hegemonyanın kurulması ve güçlendirilmesi sürecinde toplumsal iktidar ilişkilerini düzenlemek üzere hayata geçirilen genel bir pasifikasyon stratejisinin daimi bileşeni olarak incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu amaçla eleştirel pasifikasyon kuramının kavramsal çerçevesini kapsamlı bir şekilde kullanan çalışma, genel olarak siyasal olanın güvenlikleştirilmesinde ve özel olarak da neoliberal dönüşümün kapsayıcı süreçleri boyunca giderek genelleşen güvensizliğe yanıt olarak emeğin pasifikasyonunda devlet iktidarının kullanım biçimlerini araştırmaya ve anlamaya odaklanacaktır. Pasifikasyon kavramı, 16. ve 20. yüzyıllarda genellikle Avrupa sömürgeciliği ile ilişkilendirilen savaş pratiklerine kadar uzanırken, teorik/analitik bir mercek olarak 'Marksist güvenlik çalışmaları' (eğer böyle bir tanımlama mümkünse) alanındaki bir dizi teorisyen tarafından radikal bir güvenlik eleştirisinden yola çıkılarak yeniden ele alınmış ve geliştirilmiştir.[1015] İlişkisel bir devlet teorisine eklemlendiği ve belirli

[1012] İsmet Akça, 2014, pp. 23-5. Ayrıca bkz. İsmet Akça and Evren Balta Paker, "Beyond Military Tutelage? Turkish Military Politics and the AKP Government" in Ebru Canan-Sokullu (ed.) *Debating Security in Turkey: Challenges and Changes in the Twenty-First Century*, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2012.

[1013] İ. Akça, 2014, p. 32.

[1014] İ. Akça, 2014, p. 23.

[1015] Mark Neocleous, *Critique of Security*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008. M. Neocleous and George Rigakos (eds.) *Anti-Security*. Ottawa: Red Quill Books. 2011. M. Neocleous, 'A Brighter and Nicer New Life': Security as Pacification. *Social & Legal Studies*, 2011, 20(2), 191–208. M. Neocleous, G. Rigakos, and Tyler Wall, "On Pacification: Introduction to the Special Issue", 9 (2013) *Socialist Studies* 1; Mark Neocleous, "The Dream of Pacification: Accumulation, Class War,

konjonktürlerde farklılaşan devlet biçimleri ve toplumsal bütünlükler için tarihselleştirildiği ölçüde, pasifikasyonu güvenlik, polis ve sermaye birikim süreçlerini birbirine bağlayan belirli modaliteleri keşfetmek için kullanılabilecek bir eklemleyici çerçeve olarak tanımlıyorum. Burada pasifikasyonun modern devletler için güvenlik, polis, hukuk ve idarenin, kapitalist toplumsal düzeninin ayrılmaz parçası olan tekinsizliğin siyasi yönetimine ilişkin olarak nasıl bir arada ve aktif biçimde çalıştığına ilişkin bir yönetim tarzı ve/veya siyasi rasyonaliteyi içerdiğini belirtmek yerinde olacaktır. Dolayısıyla, bir vakayı tarihsel özgünlüğüyle birlikte ele almak ve o vaka özelinde anlam kazanan özgül pasifikasyon tarzının toplumsal güç ilişkileri çerçevesinde nasıl işlediğini araştırmak üzere bu genel soyutlama düzeyinin düşürülmesi kaçınılmaz olacaktır. Bu tezin ampirik/konjonktürel bölümleri böylesi bir girişimde bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Tezin kuramsal çerçevesi devlet-merkezci, kurumsalcı, liberal çerçevelerden türetilen güvenlik ve otoriterleşme anlayışlarının eleştirisi üzerine geliştirilen iki hat üzerine oturur. Ana tartışma hattında pasifikasyonun devlet ve sivil toplumun kurumsal olarak ayrıştığı kapitalist toplumsal bütünlük için 'genel' niteliği incelenmiştir. Bu doğrultuda ilksel birikimin sürekliliği tezinin 'sistematik kolonizasyon' fikri üzerinden okunması önerilmiştir. Bir burjuva iktisatçısı olan Edward G. Wakefield tarafından geliştirilen ve Karl Marx tarafından sermaye birikiminin oluşumu ve yeniden üretimi kapsamında yeniden ele alınan sistematik kolonizasyon esasında pasifikasyon ile ilksel birikim arasındaki dolayımlayıcı kategori olarak işlev görmektedir. Toplumsal ilişki olarak sermayenin önkoşulu olan mülksüzleştirme ve proleterleştirmenin devamlılığının kendiliğinden bir süreç değil, yoksulluğun yönetimi ve işçi sınıfının biçimlendirilmesi başta olmak üzere emeğin koşulları üzerinde bir dizi kontrol ve zapt etme mekanizmasını gerektiren çelişkili, açık uçlu ve siyasal bir süreç olduğu ortaya konmuştur. Bu saptama bize erken kapitalist dönemde ortaya çıkan (geniş anlamıyla) 'polis' fikrini ve sermaye birikiminin yeniden üretimi için siyasi–hukuki güç kullanımının hayati rolünü

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and the Hunt", 9 (2013) *Socialist Studies* 7. G. Rigakos, *Security/Capital: A General Theory of Pacification*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016. Tyler Wall, Parastou Saberi, Will Jackson (eds.), *Destroy, Build, Secure: Readings on Pacification*, 2017. M. Neocleous, "Fundamentals of Pacification Theory: Twenty-Six Articles" in T. Wall, P. Saberi, W. Jackson (eds), Red Quill Books, 2017.

hatırlatmaktadır. Öyleyse, sermayenin toplumsal dünyayı sürekli genişleyen ölçekte ve güvensizlikler, çelişkiler, çalkantılar üretecek biçimde[1016] sömürgeleştirme eğilimi pasifikasyon temelli siyasal yönetim stratejisini kapitalist devlet iktidarının merkezine konumlandırır.

Çalışmada ikinci olarak, pasifikasyon sürecinin özgül toplumsal bütünlükler için analizi için kavramın sermaye birikimi, güçler dengesi, ekonomik ve siyasi kriz biçimleri, devlet ve rejim biçimleri gibi (Poulantzasçı çerçeveden türetilen) diğer anahtar kavramlar ışığında daha düşük bir soyutlama düzeyine çekilebileceği önerilmiştir. Pasifikasyonun kapitalist devlete ilişkin bu tür bir ilişkisel yaklaşımla bir arada düşünülmesinin, bu sürece özgü pratiklerin stratejik bir alan olarak devletin özgül biçimi ve maddi örgütlenmesi tarafından nasıl sınırlandırıldığı ve yeniden tanımlandığını anlamaya yardımcı olduğu öne sürmüştür. Bu elbette devlet, hukuk ve bunların kurumsal yapılarının kendilerinin iktidar uyguladığı anlamına gelmez; daha ziyade devletin genel kurumsal maddiliğinin, sınıf mücadelelerine biçim verme ve sermaye–emek çelişkisinin siyasi dolayımlarını kontrol altına almada pasifikasyon süreci üzerindeki etkilerini vurgular. Devlet iktidarının maddi örgütlenmesi sınıflar arasındaki iktidar ilişkilerinin yoğunlaşmasıyla[1017] tanımlandığı düşünüldüğü ölçüde bu durum bize devlet-pasifikasyon-güçler dengesi arasındaki etkileşimin siyasi ve sınıf mücadeleleri aracılığıyla şekillenen ve sürekli yeniden tanımlanmaya açık olan karmaşık bir ilişkiselliğe işaret ettiğine dair ipucu verir.

Böylelikle çalışma pasifikasyonu kapitalist birikimin güvensizliğinin güvence altına alındığı ve tıpkı ilksel birikim gibi süregelen bir *süreç* olarak kabul ederken, Türkiye örneğinde aynı zamanda neoliberal düzenin inşası ve tahkim edilmesinde otoriter devletçi biçim çerçevesinde işlemek üzere bir *sınıf stratejisi* olarak tasarlandığını göstermeye çalışmıştır. Burada emperyal pasifikasyon uygulamalarına benzer şekilde toplumsal inşa boyutu kilit önem taşır. Pasifikasyon stratejisinin temel amacı, direnişi ortaya çıktıktan sonra bastırmanın ötesinde, direnişin ortaya çıkma koşullarını baştan soğurmaya veya zapt etmeye muktedir bir toplumsal düzenin

[1016] Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels. *The Communist Manifesto*. Verso, p. 16.

[1017] N. Poulantzas, *Fascism and Dictatorship: The Third International and the Problem of Fascism*, London: Verso, 1974, p. 59.

yeniden ve yeniden inşasıdır. Bu çalışmanın Türkiye'de pasifikasyon üzerine daha önce yapılmış çalışmalar kapsamında ayırt edici bir katkısı, devlet iktidarının yalnızca reaktif ve koruyucu değil aynı zamanda siyasi sınıf hâkimiyeti altındaki iktidar ilişkilerini inşa, yeniden inşa ve tanzim etmeye yardımcı olması anlamında proaktif ve üretken kullanımına da ışık tutmasıdır.

Çalışmanın temel argümanı, pasifikasyonun, neoliberalizm altında Türkiye siyasal iktisadının kriz-güdümlü gelişiminde kapitalist toplumsal ilişkilerin çelişkili bütünlüğünün yeniden üretilmesinde temel siyasal mekanizma olarak işlev gördüğüdür. Bu iddia şüphesiz neoliberal hegemonya sorunsalıyla da yakından ilgilidir. Bu nedenle Türkiye'de neoliberal yeniden yapılanma sürecinde yaşanan uzun erimli ekonomik/mali krizler ve siyasi istikrarsızlıkların nasıl olup da toplumsal ve siyasal mücadeleler yoluyla bir tür hegemonya krizine dönüş(türül)mediği sorusuna karşılık gelir.

Özetlenen kuramsal öneriler ışığında pasifikasyon yaklaşımı, vaka temelli bir araştırma doğrultusunda işe koşulmak üzere neoliberal kapitalizmin tarihsel gelişimi içinde süregelen sınıf çelişkileri, krizler ve güvensizlikler bağlamında somutlanmıştır. Bu doğrultuda, pasifikasyon siyasetinin üç on yıl boyunca otoriter devlet formu altında işleyiş biçimleri; sermaye–emek çelişkisinin toplumsal ve siyasal dolayımlarının idaresinde, toplumsal iktidar ilişkilerinin düzenlenmesi ve yeniden biçimlendirilmesinde üstlendiği rollerin, ve nihayetinde neoliberal dönüşümün derinleşmesine nasıl katkıda bulunduğunun gösterilmesi amaçlanmıştır. Araştırma alanının sınırlarını tayin etmek üzere pasifikasyona ilişkin süreç ve mekanizmalar, tez boyunca reformlar ve yeniden yapılanmanın farklı aşamaları çerçevesinde birbiriyle ilişkisel olarak ele alınan şu unsurlar odağında incelenmiştir: Siyasi idare tekniği ve söylem tarzı olarak güvenlik; güvenliğin sıkıyönetim, milli güvenlik, olağanüstü yetkiler, acil durum önlemleri ve imtiyazlar (*prerogatives*) bağlamında yasal ve anayasal ifadeleri; ordu, polis ve istihbarat örgütünde somutlanan devlet aygıtı olarak güvenlik; siyasal olanın zapt edilmesi ve güvenli siyasal alanın inşasına yönelik bir polis tekniği olarak depolitizasyon; işgücünün zapt edilmesi bağlamında emek piyasası politikaları; yoksulluğun zapt edilmesi bağlamında sosyal politika. Geniş anlamda zapt etme (*policing*) erkleri altında bir

araya getirilen söz konusu süreç ve mekanizmalar, pasifikasyon bileşenlerinin sınıf tahakkümü ile tanımlı 'barışı' korumada, özelde Türkiye siyasal iktisadının kriz-güdümlü gelişiminin ürettiği toplumsal çelişkilerin siyasi idaresinde bir arada çalışma yollarını göstermek için ön açıcı olmuştur.

1970'lerin sonlarına doğru enikonu militanlaşan toplumsal savaş ve onun sınıf karakteri, barış ve güvenliğin restorasyonuna da layıkıyla işlenmişti. Çalışmada bu süreklilik ilişkisi en başta askeri cunta, devlet yöneticileri ve sermaye temsilcilerinin 'savaş' ve 'sosyal barış' ifadeleri etrafında dönen söylemlerinde açığa çıkartılmıştır. İkinci olarak, hem sembolik hem de siyasi dolayımlarının önemi göz önüne alındığında, savaş dönemi için hazırlanan yasal düzenlemelerin barışın inşasında nasıl temel bir araca dönüştüğü gösterilmiştir. Buradaki iddia, pasifikasyon stratejisinin kuruluş aşamasının söylemde ifade edilen ve aynı zamanda hukuk dolayımıyla devletin maddi örgütlenmesine kazınan savaş ve barışın birbirinden ayrılmaz biçimde iç içe geçmesiyle işaretlenmiş olmasıdır. Bu nedenle en temel referans noktası olarak barış terimine yapılan atıf, bir örtmece yahut ideolojik maskeyle sınırlı değildir; aynı zamanda sınıf ilişkilerinin biçimlendiği maddi gerçekliğe de işaret eder.

Aynı süreç, savaş erki ile polis erki arasında başka bir iç içe geçmenin de işaretini verir. Hâlihazırda 1979 yılında Sıkıyönetim Koordinasyon Kurulu tarafından ilan edilen yeni güvenlik konsepti (*İç Savunma ve Geliştirme*) doğrultusunda iç düşmana ("komünist tehdit" ile imgelenen düzensiz, itaatsiz, kriminal, tehlikeli sınıflara) karşı savaş, yeni birikim rejimi etrafında yeni bir siyaset biçimini de hedefleyen etraflı bir toplumsal düzen inşası için sıkıyönetim tarafından verilen oldukça geniş bir polis erki yelpazesini uygulamaya koymuştur. Sıkıyönetimin baskı ve şiddet pratiklerine eşlik eden söz konusu inşa süreci, neoliberal istikrar programının uygulamaya konmasının arka planında devlet, sermaye ve ücretli emek sistemine karşı itaatkâr, uysal, özverili işgücünün ve yurttaş-öznelliğin inşası, emek hareketinin patolojikleştirilmesi, emek ilişkileri ve eğitimin siyaset-dışı yeniden-inşası gibi 'pozitif' faaliyetleri harekete geçirmiştir. İç düşmana karşı yürütülen savaşın üretken doğası yeni anayasaya eşlik eden yüzlerce yasal düzenlemeyle (toplamda 669 kanun ve 90 kanun hükmünde kararname) dolayımlanan yeni bir devlet-sivil toplum

ilişkisinin üretilmesinde açıkça ortaya çıkmıştır. Devletin bu dönüşümde üstlendiği otoriter biçim hiç şüphesiz sivil bir rejim altında faaliyet gösterecek ve güvenliğin tertibatı açısından iki pasifikasyon uğrağını daha gündeme getirecektir.

Çalışmanın 1983-sonrası incelemesi, bu iki uğrak üzerine ayrıntılı bir tartışma içerir. İlk olarak askeri/sivil karşıtlığını imleyen militarizm ve askeri vesayet odaklı hâkim açıklamaların aksine temel pasifikasyon stratejisinin 'sıkıyönetim hukukunun liberalleştirilmesi' olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Burada 'liberal' sıfatı bir devlet biçimine gönderme yapmadığı gibi bu tabir ile işaret edilen şey de basitçe askeri rejimden sivil rejime geçiş aracılığıyla normalleşme değildir. Sıkıyönetim hukukunun liberalleşmesi, neoliberal düzen altında düzensizliği zapt etmenin yeni biçimlerinin sıkıyönetimin temel güçlerini ve stratejik önceliklerini askeri dolayım olmaksızın harekete geçirebilmesinde yatar. Bunu mümkün kılan ideolojik bağlantı, savaş halinin kriz, isyan, ayaklanma, direniş gibi düzendışı durumları kapsayacak şekilde yeniden kavramsallaştırılmasıdır. Böylesi bir tanımın somutlandığı uygun idari ve hukuki form, neoliberalizmin inşasını çevreleyen pasifikasyon projesinin tanımlayıcı niteliği olan toplumsal savaş ve barış fikirlerinin bir kez daha birbirine karıştığı bir güvenlik ve olağanüstü hal mantığından türetilecektir. Bu doğrultuda güvenlik ve olağanüstü hal yetkileri, Batılı liberal devletlerin on dokuzuncu yüzyılın anayasal hareketleri kapsamında iç düzene doğru genişlettikleri sıkıyönetim güçlerini yirminci yüzyıl boyunca olağanüstü hale dönüştürme yönündeki ortak örüntüye koşut biçimde yeni (otoriter) devlet biçiminin kurumsal maddiliğine işlemiştir.

Söz konusu yapılanmanın incelemesinde iki sonuca ulaşılmıştır. Öncelikle neoliberalizmin inşası ile tertiplenen pasifikasyonun ayırt edici bir özelliği, her ne kadar 1960 askeri darbesi ile birlikte siyasi lügat içine girmiş olsa da, milli güvenlik ve olağanüstü hal mantığının toplumsal düzenlemelere ilişkin maharetinin ilk kez gerçekten devlet iktidarının bir parçası haline gelmiş olmasıdır. Bu gözlem doğrultusunda milli güvenlik, olağanüstü hal ve güvenlik temelli imtiyazların yönetim tekniği olarak inşası, bu inşanın kavramsal kapsamı ve siyasi etkileri incelenmiş, bunların sivil toplumun zapt edilmesi ve siyasi davranışın biçimlendirilmesine yönelik devletin kurumsal maddiliğine hangi yollarla nüfuz ettiği araştırılmıştır.

İkincisi, Anayasa ve bir dizi yasal düzenlemeye atıfla gösterildiği üzere güvenliğe dayalı imtiyazların temel mantığı, milli güvenlik kavramına atıf yaptıklarında dahi Milli Güvenlik Kurulu odaklı bir askeri vesayete kapı aralamak değil, bilakis yürütme erkine toplumsal güç ilişkilerini biçimlendirmeye yönelik siyasal manevrayı askeri imtiyazlara gerek bırakmayacak ölçüde temin etmektir. Diğer bir ifadeyle, sıkıyönetim güçleri burjuva parlamenter demokrasinin barış zamanlarında da işletilmek üzere yürütme ve mülki idare yetkileri çerçevesinde uygun siyasi ve idari biçime kavuşturulmuştur.

Dönüşümdeki 'liberal' nitelik, savaşın dolayımsız ifadesi olan sıkıyönetimin siyasi ve hukuki sisteme sızma mekanizmalarının 'barış' iddiasıyla olan ideolojik tutarlılığıdır; yani, bu güçlerin olağan hukukun askıya alınmasını gerektirmek şöyle dursun bizatihi olağan hukuktan türetilmiş ve sivil erklerin kullanımına tahsis edilmiş olmasıdır. Çalışmada bu dönüşümün, askeri darbe ve neoliberalizmin inşasında temsil edilen sınıf savaşı merceğinden okunduğu ölçüde 'savaşın sivilleşmesi' olarak tanımlanmasına ilişkin öneri, bilhassa 2000'li yıllara özgü dönüşümün işaret ettiği süreklilik ve kopuşlar kapsamında açıklayıcı olmuştur.

Sıkıyönetimin liberalleşmesi sürecini tamamlamaya yönelik bir uygulama da polis örgütünün sivil rejime geçilen 1983 yılından itibaren yasal, mali, teknik boyutlarıyla etraflı biçimde güçlendirilmesidir. Polisin başlıca iç güvenlik aygıtı ve bir siyasi aktör olarak konumlanışı, 1983 Danışma Meclisi görüşmelerinin işaret ettiği üzere, askeri cuntanın defaatle tekrarladığı hedef olan 'bir daha sıkıyönetime gerek bırakmayacak düzenin inşası' açısından hayati önemdedir. Bu durum, aynı zamanda neoliberal düzenin zapt edilmesi söz konusu olduğunda pasifikasyonun sivil ve askeri erklerini karşıtlık değil işbirliği içinde düşünmeyi gerekli kılar.

Ne var ki 1990'lı yılların çalkantılı iklimi, yerli yerine konan savaş ve polis erklerinin yeni bir güvenlikleştirme dalgası altında bir kez daha iç içe geçmesine sahne olmuştur. İç tehdidi yeniden tanımlayan yeni güvenlik paradigması olarak terörle mücadele siyaseti polis aygıtının militarizasyonunu beraberinde getirirken on yılın ikinci yarısında ordu yürürlüğe konan yeni olağanüstü hal önlemleriyle iç düzende bir kez daha polislik rolü üstlenmiştir. Çalışmada kurumsal bölünmelerin

ötesinde düşünüldüğünde her iki gelişmenin de sosyopolitik alanın yeniden düzenlenmesinde polis erklerinin güçlendirilmesine işaret ettiğini iddia edilmiştir; bu doğrultuda artan güvenlikleştirme eğilimlerinin maddi temeli, finansal krizler döngüsüyle damgalanan geniş siyasal iktisadi bağlam içine yerleştirilmiştir. Bu anlamda çalışma açısından 1990'ların en önemli ayırt edici özelliği 1989'da sermaye hareketlerinin serbestleşmesini takiben yerleşik hale gelen finans-temelli birikim modelinin ekonomik ve toplumsal sonuçlarının iyiden iyiye hissedilmesi ve sosyopolitik iklime kendisini dayatmasıdır.

Yine de 1990'ların siyasi istikrarsızlığı toplumsal güçler dengesi göz önüne alındığında bir hegemonya krizine işaret etmekten uzaktır. Özellikle 1994-sonrası kriz idaresi bir yandan neoliberal finansallaşmanın derinleşmesi diğer yandan 1980'lerin sonunda yükselişe geçen örgütlü emek hareketinin sönümlenmesiyle sonuçlanmış ve siyasal sınıf hâkimiyetinin tahkim edilmesinde ekonomik krizlerin oynadığı rol açısından örnek olmuştur. Bu anlamda 1990'lı yıllar bir hegemonya krizi olmaktan çok finansal birikim stratejisi çerçevesinde neoliberal hegemonyanın derinleşmesine sahne olmuş olsa da toplumsal gerilimlerin yönetiminde parlamenter siyasetin tartışma götürmez başarısızlığı söz konusudur. Siyasi partiler iktidar bloğunun dışında kalan geniş toplum kesimleri ile temsiliyet bağlarını büyük ölçüde yitirmiş, finans-temelli birikim modelinin çelişkileri başarılı bir hegemonya projesi ve istikrarlı siyasi liderlik ile yönetilememiştir. 1990'lı yıllar boyunca benzersiz düzeylerde seyreden enflasyon, işsizlik, yoksulluk ve güvencesizliğin damgasını vurduğu ekonomik krizler döngüsünün siyasi bir krize dönüşme riski, iktidar bloğunun farklı bileşenlerinde bir toplumsal düzen ve güvenlik meselesi olarak okunması yönünde eğilime yol açmıştır. Çalışmada güvenliğin daha geniş toplumsal bağlama yerleştiği bağlantı burada yatmaktadır. Bu nedenle 1990'lı yıllara ilişkin tartışmada hâkim liberal-kurumsalcı okumanın aksine, yoğun güvenlikleştirme çabalarının arka planının kurumsal aktörler arasındaki güç mücadelelerinden ziyade finansallaşma sürecinin aralıklı krizlerinin altında yatan çelişkilerin yönetimiyle ilgili olduğu öne sürülmüştür.

Söz konusu güvenlikleştirme iklimi, özünde milli güvenliğin siyasi oyun alanının kayda değer bir şekilde genişlemesinden başka bir şey değildi. Bu anlamda

güvenlikleştirme, ‘terörle mücadele’nin iç siyasete yasal ve kavramsal nüfuzunu, polis teşkilatının yeniden tanımlanan iç tehdit doğrultusunda militarizasyonunu ve milli güvenlik imtiyazlarını genişleten yeni idari teknikleri (kriz yönetimi ve MGK ile yürütme erki arasındaki iç güvenlik protokolü) içermiştir. Her ne kadar bu çabalar resmi söylemde somut tehdit iddialarına işaret etse de, şu ya da bu şekilde sınıf temelli dolayımlar içeren bir toplumsal bağlama içkin olan yeni olağanüstü yetkiler, toplumsal düzeni ve siyasi alanı yeniden şekillendirecek kadar kapsayıcı bir alana yayılmıştır. Hangi gerekçelerle meşrulaştırıldığını bir kenara bıraktığımızda bu genişlemeyi modern kapitalist devletlerin zorlayıcı ekonomik ve finansal krizler gibi toplumsal meselelere, toplumsal bütünlüğün sağlanmasında bir düzensizlik ve kesinti riski taşıdıkları ölçüde, güvenlik ve dahi savaş haline özgü acil durum perspektifinden yaklaşma yönündeki yaygın eğilim çerçevesinde düşünmek gerekmektedir. Bu durum, gerek tarihsel uygulamaların sıklığı gerekse erken 19. yüzyıldan bu yana birçok liberal demokraside siyasi yaşamın öyle veya böyle kalıcılaşmış bir parçası haline gelen olağanüstü hal yetkilerinin hukuksal kapsamı ile doğrulanabilmektedir.

Türkiye örneğinde, 1990’lar boyunca müzminleşen kriz ortamı, iktidar bloğunun dışında kalan nüfusun büyük kesiminin marjinalleşmiş yoksul kitle saflarına düşme riski altında olduğu düşünüldüğünde, güvence altına alınması gereken akut bir sosyal ve ekonomik güvensizliğe yol açmıştı. Sürgit çelişki ve belirsizliklerle üretilen burjuva tekinsizliği 1994 mali kriziyle birlikte emek hareketinin kısa süreli canlanışın yatıştırıcı kazanımlarını hedef alan neoliberal politika gündeminin derinleştirilmesiyle daha da kışkırtılmıştır. Savaş–polis erkleri terkibinin örneklerinden biri olarak Kriz Yönetim Masası (1996) kapsamında harekete geçirilen toplumsal içeriği alabildiğine geniş kriz tanımı (kamu düzenini bozan hareketlerden ağır ekonomik bunalım halleri ve illegal işçi eylemlerine) yürürlükteki kriz yönetiminin esasında mevcut ekonomik kriz koşullarından toplumsal düzende olası bir bozulmanın ‘ortaya çıkma’ koşullarını zapt etmek ile derinden ilgilendiğini göstermiştir.

Bu anlamda dönemin kriz yönetimi ve iç güvenlik protokolü gibi acil durum önlemleri on yılın başlarında yükselişe geçen terörle mücadele siyasetinin siyasal

alanı sınıf-temelli ve muhalif hareketlere atıfla yeniden tanımlama eğilimiyle bir arada düşünülmelidir. Çalışma bu sayede 1990'lı yıllara özgü güvenlikleştirme iklimini farklı sosyopolitik güçler arasındaki ilişkilerin özgünlüğünü ihmal etmeden neoliberal kapitalizmin kriz yönetimi içinde anlam kazanan geniş bir önleyici strateji mantığıyla bağlantılandırmıştır. Artan siyasi belirsizlik ve toplumsal düzende bozulma tehdidine koşut biçimde milli güvenliğin siyasal etki alanındaki genişleme, kurumsal aktörler arasında iddia edilen güç mücadelesinin ötesinde kapitalist devletin emek ve sivil toplumun kontrolü başta olmak üzere toplumsal bütünlüğün yeniden üretimi için gerekli koşulları sağlama işlevi doğrultusunda vermiş olduğu bir yanıttır. Dahası, olağan hukuk sistemine sızmış olan polis ve olağanüstü hal yetkileri ile milli güvenliğin toplumsal düzene doğru iyiden iyiye genişleyerek siyasi idarenin ayrılmaz bir parçası haline gelmesi önümüzdeki döneme miras kalacak olan pasifikasyon çabaları için kullanıma elverişli bir zemin hazırlayacaktı. Bu durum milli güvenliği yalnızca silahlı kuvvetlerin sınırları içinde ele alan görüşlerin aksine, bu yetkilerin askeri mi yoksa sivil otoriteler tarafından mı kullanıldığı sorusunu ikinci plana iter. Pasifikasyon üzerine eleştirel bir inceleme, askeri-sivil ikiliğinin ötesinde güvenlikleştirme sürecinin hangi sınıfsal gerilim ve çelişkilere yanıt niteliği taşıdığı, söz konusu yetkiler aracılığıyla toplumsal iktidar ilişkilerinin ne yönde düzenlendiği, hangi siyasallaşma edimlerinin karşısında hangi özgül sınıf çıkarlarının birbirine eklemlendiği sorularıyla ilgilenmelidir.

Bu çerçeveden bakıldığında 1980 askeri darbesiyle birlikte hayata geçirilen pasifikasyon stratejisinin krizlere rağmen, ve dahi krizlerin de itici etkisiyle birlikte çalışan sınıfların kolektif kapasitesindeki ve karar alma süreçlerine siyasi katılımlarındaki erozyonun aynı devlet biçimi altında sürdürülmesinde başarılı olduğu açıktır. Nitekim neoliberal yeniden yapılanmanın 2001 sonrası aşaması, 2000-2001 yıllarındaki yıkıcı mali krizlerle doruğa ulaşan siyasi istikrarsızlığa karşın toplumsal muhalefet ve halk hareketlerinden uzak bir ortamda sürdürülebilmiştir. İktidar bloğu ve Poulantzasçı tabirle 'kararsız uzlaşı dengesinin' kurumsal reform ve yeniden yapılanma süreci etrafında yeniden tanımlanması için toplumsal itirazlardan bağışıklaştırılmış bu 'güvenli' alan, sürecin önemli kısmını üstlenecek olan AKP hükümetlerinin de mevcut politika yönelimine güçlü taahhüdünü kolaylaştıran başlıca etkenlerden biri olmuştur.

Çalışmada 2001 kriz yönetimini pasifikasyon süreci ile bağlantılandıran ana kategorinin depolitizasyon olduğu ortaya konmuştur. Özellikle, Kemal Derviş liderliğindeki teknokratik kriz yönetimi tarafından desteklenen ve daha sonra AKP hükümetleri tarafından çelişkiler içinde sürdürülen bir yönetim stratejisi olarak depolitizasyon, yeniden yapılandırma siyasetinin kendine has siyasi karakterine ilişkin güçlü dolayımlara sahipti. Neoliberal ekonomi yönetiminin teknik ve kural-temelli yönetişim biçimlerine ilişkin çözümlemelerine ek olarak, çalışmanın önerisi 2001 sonrası hız kazanan neoliberal kurumsallaşma sürecinin siyasetin post-politik nitelikteki kapanımını gerektirdiğidir.

Bu türden bir kapanım 12 Eylül rejimine özgü depolitizasyon siyasetindeki gibi başlı başına bir anti-siyaset pratiğini ifade etmez. Daha çok, demokratik mücadelenin ve öznesi halk kesimleri olan 'hakiki siyasetin' uzlaşmasız çelişkili doğasını, siyaset, ekonomi ve bunların dönüşümüne ilişkin soruların piyasa temelli reformların uygulanışı etrafında yeniden formüle edildiği bir uzlaşı siyasetiyle ikame eden bir post-politika sürecidir. Yeniden yapılanmanın söz konusu aşamasının post-politik niteliği devlet-karşıtı retoriğe özgü belirli bir 'rasyonalizasyon' pratiği ve söylemi ('devlet ve yönetimin rasyonelleştirilmesi', 'ekonomik rasyonalite' üzerindeki 'siyasi rasyonalite' hâkimiyetinin tersine çevrilmesi, gibi) aracılığıyla, devletteki demokratik dönüşümün ancak piyasa güçlerinin egemenliğinin uygun şekilde kurumsallaştırılmasıyla özdeşleştirilmesi konusunda dayatılan bir mutabakat etrafında biçimlenmiştir.

Siyasal çelişkiyi piyasa rasyonalitesinin teknik uygulanışına indirgeyen bu mutabakat siyaseti sömürü, bölüşüm, devlet biçiminin demokratik dönüşümü gibi temel meselelere ilişkin soruların marjinalleşmesine katkı yaptığı ve nihayetinde bunların bundan böyle toplumsal yahut siyasi bir çekişme konusu olmayacağına dair egemen kanaati pekiştirdiği ölçüde siyasal olanın sınırlarını zapt etmeye yönelen polis erkinin bir bileşeni haline gelmiştir. Siyasi aktörler, sermaye temsilcileri, MGK ve medya çevrelerinde açıktan konuşulan 'sosyal patlama' tartışmalarının eşiğinde siyasal olanın sınırlarının ideolojik eksende zapt edilmesi, neoliberal kurumsallaşmanın verili gerçeklik olarak uygulanmasında işlevsel olmuştur. Böylelikle post-politik siyaset biçimi ağır bir ekonomik bunalımın yıkıcı yansımaları karşısında devlet ve

sermaye için 'kontrollü alanların' inşasına[1018] yönelik yürütülen polis erki uygulamasıyla yakından ilişkilendirilerek pasifikasyon stratejisi kapsamında incelenmiştir.

AKP iktidarı altında IMF ve AB 'çıpaları' ile tahkim edilen post-politik koşulda her türlü potansiyel itiraz ve muhalefete karşı güvenceli bir şekilde uygulamaya konan neoliberal reform gündeminin hedeflerinden biri, emek piyasasında daha fazla esneklik ve kuralsızlaştırma olmuştur. Emek piyasasındaki dönüşüme mevcut birikim modelinin bir sonucu olarak ortaya çıkan yüksek işsizlik oranları, yoğunlaşan proleterleşme, sömürü ve yoksullaşmanın eşlik etmesinin kaçınılmaz sonucu derinleşen ekonomik güvensizliktir. İş güvencesizliği, düşük maliyetli, parçalı, güvencesiz ve barışçıllaştırılmış (*pacified*) bir işgücünün oluşturulmasına yönelik siyasi disiplin aracı olarak işlev görürken, AKP'nin emek hareketliliğini denetlemek üzere bir dizi yasal ve fiili taktik aracılığıyla kendi kontrolündeki sendikal yapıları geliştirme, teşvik etme ve muhalif emek hareketini marjinalize etme çabaları emeğin kolektif kapasitesini daha da zayıflatmıştır.

İşgücünün bu şekilde biçimlendirilmesini tamamlayan bileşen ise yoksulluğun düzenlenmesi ve denetlenmesinde önemli bir rol üstlenen özgül sosyal politika tarzıdır. Dünya Bankası kaynaklı yoksullukla mücadele stratejisi tarafından olası bir 'sosyal patlama' riski algısının ortasında başlatılan bu politika, daha sonra mevcut neoliberal politika çerçevesine ve İslamcı siyasi gündemine uygun yeni bir modele doğru genişlemiştir. Merkezi ve yerel yönetim ile muhafazakar sivil dernek ve vakıfları bir araya getiren karmaşık ve muazzam ölçekte geniş bir sosyal yardım ağı, daha fazla mülksüzleştirme ve proleterleştirmeden daha yoğun bağımlılık ve itaat bağlarının kurulmasında, örgütlü emeğin yerine savunmasız ve edilgen sosyal yardım alıcıları üreterek 'uysal bir yoksulluk sınıfı' oluşturulmasında başlıca rolü üstlenmiştir. Böylelikle, siyasalın sınırlarını zapt eden post-politik stratejiden sonra 2000'li yıllara özgü pasifikasyon stratejisinin ikinci ekseni, çalışmada işgücü ve yoksulluğun zapt edilmesi bağlamında tartışmaya açılmıştır.

[1018] G. Rigakos, 2011.

2000'li yıllara ait incelemenin üçüncü ve nihai eksenini, önceki bölümlerden farklı olarak polis erkinin ikincil dolayımlarındansa doğrudan doğruya bir iç asayiş birimi ve siyasi aktör olarak polis örgütü özelindeki yeniden yapılanması oluşturmaktadır. İncelemede neoliberal düzene içkin güvensizliği güvence altına almaya yönelik yanıtın 'baskıcı' boyutu, ilk iki AKP hükümeti özelinde güvenlik ve polis aygıtına yapılan maddi ve ideolojik yatırım ile bu yatırımın süregelen yapısal uyum süreci bağlamındaki konumlanışı çerçevesinde tartışılmıştır. AKP iktidarı, kendi siyasi öncelikleriyle uyumlu yeni güvenlik yapılandırması aracılığıyla devraldığı pasifikasyon siyasetinin stratejik çerçevesini de ilerletmekte başarılı olmuştur. Bu bağlamda, devletin 1980 sonrası sıkıyönetim güçlerini 'liberalleştirme' stratejisi, siyasi reformlar bağlamında partinin AB destekli 'sivilleşme' gündemiyle kesintisiz ve tutarlı şekilde hizalanmıştır. İç güvenliğin anahtar rolünün ordudan polis örgütüne geçmesiyle güvenlik alanındaki temel gelişme, güvenlikleştirme sürecinde bir zayıflama (*desecuritizasyon*) eğilimi şöyle dursun, toplumsal düzenin zapt edilmesinde güvenlikten doğan imtiyaz ve olağanüstü önlemler kapsamının kayda değer bir şekilde güçlenmesidir.

İkinci olarak çalışmada, liberal ve kurumsalcı yaklaşımların hâkimiyeti altındaki ilgili yazında AKP iktidarı özelinde 'siyasi reformlar' ile güvenlik siyaseti arasında kurulan gerek konjonktürel gerek siyasal zıtlığın eleştirisine girişilmiştir. Bu anlamda, baskıcı iç güvenlik yapılanması doğrultusunda atılan ön adımların, 'siyasi reformlar' olarak anılan süreçten stratejik bir geri çekilmeyi takip etmesine gerek olmadığı savlanmıştır.

Nitekim AKP iktidarı, 11 Eylül sonrası harekete geçen küresel kampanyanın siyasi ikliminden de yararlanarak iktidarının henüz ilk yıllarında giriştiği güvenlikleştirme siyasetini dönemin 'ruhuna' uygun biçimde Batılı liberal devletlerdeki gelişmelere referansla temellendirerek hayata geçirmeyi başarmıştır. Bu bağlamda güvenlik ve polisle ilgili temel mevzuat değişikliklerinin 'siyasi reform' söyleminin halen etkin olduğu 2004 ile 2007 yılları arasında yürürlüğe girdiği, hatta polis kullanımındaki takdir yetkilerinin artırılması örneğinde olduğu gibi kimi yasal düzenlemelerin hazırlık aşamasının henüz görevde tam bir yılı bile dolmamışken başladığı tespit edilmiştir. Ceza hukuku ve güvenliğin muhtelif alanlarına dağılmış olan bu yasa ve

düzenlemelerde polis güçlerinin maddi kapasitesinin güçlendirilmesinin yanı sıra geliştirilen şey, 1983 sonrası pasifikasyon stratejisine uygun şekilde toplumsal muhalefeti kontrol etmek ve yurttaş-öznelliği biçimlendirmek üzere sivilleştirilen savaş erklerinin 'yeni bir form' altında kullanılmasıdır. Muhakkak ki demilitarizasyon süreci vasıtasıyla polis ve ordu arasındaki keskinleşen bu ayrım, aynı zamanda akla gelebilecek her türlü toplumsal müştereğe yönelecek polis temelli savaş makinesinin kuruluş anına denk düşmektedir.

Bu tezde ele alınan yaklaşık otuz yıllık dönem, özellikle sınıf temelli güçler dengesinin neoliberal yapılanmanın parametrelerine uygun biçimde muhafaza edilmesi ve ekonomik krizlerin potansiyel bir hegemonya krizine dönüşebileceği koşulların zapt edilmesi itibariyle, 2010'lardan sonra devlet içinde yaşanacak köklü değişikliklere zemin hazırladığı için dikkate değer bir ilgiyi hak etmektedir.

Türkiye'de dâhili pasifikasyon olarak neoliberal düzenin oluşumu, bu süreç boyunca tesis edilen siyasi, ekonomik, ideolojik zeminler, zorlayıcı krizlere rağmen kitlesel meydan okumaların sınırlı varlığı ile güvence altına alındığı ve yeniden üretildiği ölçüde başarılı olmuştur. Dolayısıyla, otoriter devletçilikte yaşanan daha güncel gelişmeler, neoliberal dönüşümün önceki on yıllarından kalan bu yüklü pasifikasyon mirasıyla birlikte ele alınmaya muhtaçtır. Bu noktada, 2008'den bu yana dünya kapitalist sisteminin yoğunlaşan ekonomik ve siyasi krizine rağmen neoliberal hegemonyanın nasıl olup da sistemik alternatifler tarafından tehdit edilmeden sürdürülebildiği sorusu ortaya çıkmaktadır. Türkiye örneğinde bu durum, yalnızca neoliberalizm altındaki toplumsal güçler dengesinin sağlamlaşmasıyla sonuçlanmamakta, aynı zamanda krizler ve siyasi meşruiyet kaybı karşısında AKP liderliği tarafından devlet biçimi ve siyasi rejimde gerçekleştirilen dönüşümün, Poulantzas'ın ana hatlarını çizdiği haliyle otoriter devletçiliğin sınırlarını zorlayacak şekilde güvence altına alınmasını mümkün kılmaktadır.

Hangi kavramsal araçlarla tanımlanabileceği ayrı bir soru olmakla birlikte, yakın dönemdeki bu dönüşümler pasifikasyonu başka bir kategoriyle sıkı sıkıya ilişkilendirir: kriz yönetimi. AKP hükümetinin uzun süreli kriz yönetiminin sürekliliği, bir dizi polis savaşıyla beslenen yeni pasifikasyon alanları yaratma

itkisinde yatmaktadır: yoksulluğa karşı savaş (sosyal politika),[1019] terör ve muhalefete karşı savaş (sivil toplumun düzenlenmesi), müştereklere karşı savaş (proleterleştirme ve ilkel birikimin güncel uygulamaları). Öte yandan, son dönemdeki kriz yönetiminde belirleyici olan, devlet içinde ortaya çıkan niteliksel dönüşümlerle birlikte gerçekleşen kurumsuzlaştırma süreci göz önüne alındığında, hukukun dolayımlayıcı etkisinin iyiden iyiye sona ermesi olduğu söylenebilir. Daha önce ifade edildiği üzere, bu tezde sıkıyönetimin otoriter devletçiliğe dönüşümü güvenlik ve hukukun temel dolayımlayıcı kategoriler olarak kabul edildiği kuramsal ve ampirik serimlemeler ışığında incelenmiştir. Hukukun siyasal-sınıfsal mücadeleler kapsamında stratejik bir alan olarak işlevi, söz konusu dönüşümün sıkıyönetimin 'liberalleşmesi' olarak çerçevelenmesinin yolunu açmıştır. Ne var ki gelinen noktada yeni bir devlet biçimi ve siyasi rejim tanımı yapılacak ise, hukukun siyasal şiddet pratiklerini dolayımlayıcı rolündeki belirgin zayıflama şüphesiz belirleyici bir nitelik olarak önem kazanmaktadır.

Bu çalışma, neoliberal siyasal iktisat ve pasifikasyon pratiklerindeki tarihsel gelişmeleri ağırlıklı olarak Türkiye'deki iç sosyopolitik güçler, krizler ve siyasi gündem bağlamında incelemiştir. Çalışmanın ana kategori ve varsayımlarının teşvik edebileceğine inandığım yoldan ilerleyerek, gelecekteki ulusal-ölçekli vaka çalışmaları açısından pasifikasyonun disiplinler arası bir çalışma alanı olarak ele alınması ve burjuva devletinin en başından beri hem sınıf stratejisi hem de yapısal dönüşümler bağlamında işaret ettiği uluslararasılaşma gibi farklı analiz ölçekleriyle zenginleştirilmesi değerli olacaktır.

Bu bağlamda pasifikasyonun neoliberalizmin mevcut evresinde incelenmesi için muhtemel düşünce yörüngelerinden biri, politik ve dahi insani öznelliğin yeniden inşasıyla yakından bağlantılıdır: emeğin finansallaşmış toplumsal yeniden üretim süreçlerini kapsayan[1020] yeni polis erki ve yönetim tekniği biçimlerinin

[1019] Çalışmada 'yoksullukla savaş' ifadesiyle tartışmaya açılan, kuşkusuz yoksulluğun azaltılmasına dair bir siyasi saik değildir. Sistematik yoksulluk üreten bir iktisadi rejimde bu savaş kötü yaşam koşullarının siyasi etkilerini hedef alan, yoksul sınıfının öznelliğine, davranışlarına biçim vermeye dair özgül bir sosyal politika anlayışını yansıtır. Bu tür bir sosyal politika ancak 'sosyal olanın polisliği' ve güvenlikleştirilmesi bağlamına yerleştirilerek açıklığa kavuşturulabilir.

[1020] B. Fine and A. Saad-Filho, 2017, p. 687.

keşfedilmesi.[1021] Elbette bu tür girişimlerin sermayenin finansal disiplinine karşı farklı ölçeklerde gelişen potansiyel direnişler ile müştereklerin yeniden kazanılmasına yönelik mücadeleleri de dikkate alması kaçınılmaz bir gerekliliktir.

[1021] Maurizio Lazzarato, *The Making of the Indebted Man: An Essay on the Neoliberal Condition*. South Pasadena: CA: Semiotext(e), 2011. Mark Neocleous, "Debt as Pacification." *Journal of World-Systems Research* 27, no. 1, 2021, 58–76.

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