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PhD THESIS

Ayşe Ayten BAKACAK



T.C.

ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT UNIVERSITY
THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

**CONCEPTUALIZATION OF *UMMAH* IN CONTEMPORARY
ISLAMIC POLITICAL THOUGHT: THE EXAMPLE OF
*İKTİBAS***

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ONAY SAYFASI

Ayşe Ayten BAKACAK tarafından hazırlanan Conceptualization of Ummah in Contemporary Islamic Political Thought: The Example Of *İktibas* adlı tez çalışması aşağıdaki jüri tarafından oy birliği ile Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Siyaset Bilimi Anabilim Dalı'nda Doktora tezi olarak kabul edilmiştir.

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.....

PLAGIARISM PAGE

I hereby declare that all information in this thesis has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work; otherwise I accept all legal responsibility.

Date: 01.04.2020

Signature:

Ayşe Ayten BAKACAK



To Erkam

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ABSTRACT

UMMAH IN *İKTİBAS*

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This study focuses on the community project in *İktibas* journal, which defines itself as radical Islamist. It would be a proper choice to examine this community project under the headline of ummahism. Just like the most similar community project of nationalism, ummahism arises from the need and search for a new community in the modern world. Again like nationalism, ummahism has three main goals: defining the community, distinguishing the *other*, and describing the state. Therefore, this study will examine how the concept of the ummah as a community is perceived, how the other of ummah is determined, and what kind of a state this ummahist community project was developed to constitute a ground for. *İktibas* is chosen as the core of this study; because, its founder Ercüment Özkan is the first radical Islamist throughout the Turkish Republican history who carried out a series of actions that aimed at overthrowing the regime and reestablishing the caliphate. For the same reason, only the issues of the journal published when Özkan was alive (1-193) were included in the scope of the study.

Key Words: İktibas, Ummah, Nation, Us versus Other, Islamic State, Democracy, Laicism, Contemporary Islamic Political Thought.

ÖZ

İKTİBAS DERGİSİNDE ÜMMET

BAKACAK, Ayşe Ayten

Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi

Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Adem ÇAYLAK

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Bu çalışma, kendisini radikal İslamcı olarak tanımlayan *İktibas* dergisindeki toplum projesine odaklanmaktadır. Bu toplum projesini ümmetçilik üst başlığı altında incelemek yerinde bir tercih olacaktır. Tıpkı benzeri bir proje olan milliyetçilik gibi, ümmetçilik de modern dünyada yeni bir toplum tanımlama ihtiyacından ve arayışından doğar. Yine milliyetçilik gibi ümmetçiliğin de üç ana amacı vardır: Toplumu tanımlamak, ötekini tanımlamak ve devleti tanımlamak. Dolayısıyla bu çalışmada *İktibas* dergisi özelinde bir toplum olarak ümmet kavramının nasıl algılandığı, ümmetin ötekisinin nasıl ve hangi kriterlere göre belirlendiği ve bu ümmet toplumu projesinin nasıl bir devlete zemin teşkil etmesi için geliştirildiği incelenecektir. *İktibas* dergisinin çalışmanın birincil materyali olarak seçilmesinin nedeni, kurucusu Ercüment Özkan'ın Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde ilk defa açık ve net bir biçimde rejimi devirerek halifeliği yeniden tesis etmeyi amaçlayan bir dizi radikal eyleme imza atmış olmasıdır. Aynı nedenle derginin sadece Özkan'ın hayatta olduğu sayıları (1-193) çalışma kapsamına dahil edilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İktibas, Ümmet, Ulus, Biz ve Öteki, İslam Devleti, Demokrasi, Laiklik, Çağdaş İslam Siyasi Düşüncesi.

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1. INTRODUCTION

İktibas (Quotation) is a journal of citations which scans periodicals and newspapers. It was established and intellectually leaded by Ercümen Özkan, who was the first radical Islamist activist in Turkey. The journal consists of quotations and compilations from agenda-oriented periodicals published both domestically and abroad. In this respect it is the first and only of its kind in Turkey. There is a wide range of quotations in *İktibas*, from **Cumhuriyet** (Republic)¹ to **Milli Gazete** (National Newspaper)² or from **Mavera** (Beyond the Visible World)³ to **Saklambaç** (Hide and Seek)⁴ in domestic press, and from **Newsweek**⁵ to **Mirror of Jihad**⁶ in foreign press. Despite all the criticisms, the journal has insisted on the diversity of ideas and has been determined not to disrupt this diversity. *İktibas* continues its publication life that started in January 1981, except for minor interruptions.

This study focuses on the community project in *İktibas* journal, which has been published by an Islamist group of people who define themselves as radical Islamists. It would be a proper choice to examine this community project under the headline of ummahism; because, ummahism is of the landmarks of radical Islamism. Nationalism has been the community project of modernism since 19th century. Ummahism was set forth against nationalism for opposing the nationalist project. So, it is obvious that ummahism arises from the need and search for a new community definition in the modern world. Like nationalism, ummahism has three main goals: defining the society, distinguishing the *other*, and describing the state. Therefore, in examining the ummahist community project of *İktibas*, this study will investigate first how the concept of the ummah as a community is perceived in the journal. Then it will be revealed that who are excluded from the definition of ummah and how the *other* of ummah is determined by the journal. Lastly, this study will explore what kind of a state this ummahist community project was developed to constitute a ground for. *İktibas* is chosen as the core of this study; because, its founder Ercümen Özkan is the

¹ A newspaper which represents the leftist-Kemalist wing.

² A newspaper represents *Milli Görüş* (National View) movement which has been the most prominent political Islamist movement since 1970s.

³ A literature magazine published by radical Islamists.

⁴ The famous magazine supplement paper to a daily newspaper (*Günaydın*)

⁵ An American weekly news magazine

⁶ A publication of Jemaah al-Islami of Afghanistan, published with the subtitle of “The Voice of Afghan Mujahideen”.

first radical Islamist throughout the Turkish Republican history who carried out a series of actions that aimed at overthrowing the regime and reestablishing the caliphate. Before him, there had been critics of the Republic's anti-religious practices before, but there had not been any organized movement which directly claimed to establish an Islamic State instead of the laic republican Turkish national state. For this reason, only the issues of the journal published when Özkan was alive (1-193) were included in the scope of the study, in order to apprehend the originality of *İktibas*.

The context of the study was chosen as *ummah*; because, ummahism is one of the trademarks of Islamism. When nationalism was spreading in waves and dividing Muslim majority lands according to nationalities in 19th century, Islamists brightened the concept of *ummah* as an alternative to nationalism. In other words, what nation and nationalism mean for secular ideologies is the ummah and ummahism mean for the Islamist ideology. The importance of the *us* versus *other* dichotomy sources from this. Because, nationalism defines its nation through the *other* of it. Each nationalism has its own definition of acceptable citizen, which also reveals the non-acceptable features for citizen. Since ummah has prescribed as an alternative to nation, it is important to know the definition of the *other* of ummah as well as the the definition of *ummah*. Therefore, in analyzing how the *ummah* concept is taken in *İktibas*, it is necessary to investigate how the *other* is depicted. Indeed, the distinctiveness of the journal's perception of *ummah* manifest itself its depiction of *other*; because, it adopts the same definition of *ummah* as of the Classical Islamic thought. The Classical Thought takes ummah as the whole Muslims around the world; and through a straight logic, it otherizes non-Muslims. This is also the general and the most famous dichotomy related to the concept of ummah. However, *İktibas* never locates non-Muslims as the *other* of ummah. According to the journal, the *other* of ummah is any kind of thought, system or ideology that has the potential to get mixed with Islam and damage the essence of the religion.

Like all the other community projects as nationalism, the ummahist community project has the aim to establish an Islamic State eventually. In Islamism, the idea of forming an Islamic State stands out as an alternative to the nation-state, just as the concept of ummah is prominent as an alternative to nation. So, it is important to find out how *İktibas* draw the outline of the idea of Islamic State as the prospective governance for *ummah*, in order to reveal the whole accurate picture about the ummah understanding in the journal.

To sum, this study will investigate how *İktibas*, the sixth child⁷ of the first radical Islamic activist in Turkey Ercüment Özkan, perceives *ummah*, describes the *other* of ummah and what kind of a *state* it prescribes for the ummah. Since the journal is one of the platforms whose name is identified with its founder, the perspective of the journal reflects the style of thought of Özkan. Therefore, only the issues of the journal between 1981 and 1995, when Özkan was alive, were included in the scope of the study. During the period in question, Özkan's idiosyncratic ideas appear dominantly in the journal; and the journal's sphere of influence was wider than it is now, although it still lasts its publication life consistently.

1.1. Background

İktibas is a radical Islamist publication, as stated above. Radical Islamism today is identified almost solely with Salafi-jihadist movements. However, the scope of radical Islamism is wider than this. In this part, the meaning of Islamism as well as its difference from Salafism will be described. Besides, the adventure of radical Islamism in Turkey will be presented, in order to make *İktibas*'s position clearer for the readers.

There are three frequently-used concepts related to the Contemporary Islamic Political Thought (CIPT): Revival (*ihya*), renewal (*tecdid*) and reform (*islah*). *Revival* means to regenerate and to bring into being. It has a general use, including others, like a roof concept. For this reason, all religious movements carrying the desire 'to bring religion back through cleaning it from innovations (*bid'ah*) and to return to its original state', which have emerged from time to time throughout the history of Islam, are revival movements. On the other hand, renewal is the name in the Islamic literature of the effort to make new interpretations in religion by returning to the essence of Islam -that is, the first sources of Islam: the Quran and Sunnah-. Again, in almost every period throughout the history, the emergence of a *renewal* movement to meet new necessities of time has been inevitable. However, such a need for renewal has never been felt as vitally as in modern times. The third concept, *reform*, means improving the condition of something. According to Yenigün, reform is the best concept for describing Contemporary Islamic Thought. Contemporary Islamic movements are essentially reform movements, because it synthesizes the movements of revival and renewal. Revivalist movements, like Wahhabism, have the potential to shift to the line of the extreme traditional ulema; renewalist movements on the other hand, have the potential to

⁷ Özkan repeatedly told that *İktibas* was his sixth child, since he already had five.

turn into excessive modernist movements through becoming fans of the West. However, reform represents the middle point between these two; namely it represents balance (Yenigün, 2014, pp. 33-34).⁸

One of the labels most frequently used for the Contemporary Islamic Thought is *Salafi*. In Arabic, the word *salaf* means those who come first. It is used for the men of knowledge who lived in and right after the period the Prophet Muhammad, i.e. they are the first two generations of Muslim intellectuals in Islamic terms (*ashab* and *tabiin*). Therefore, Salafism, in its simplest terms, expresses the desire to imitate the predecessors. Within the context of the ‘reason versus revelation’ (*aql* versus *naql*) conflict from the first century of Islam to today, The concept of Salafism is based on the tradition of Ahmet bin Hanbel who is the leading name of the revelation school. However, since Ibn Taymiyyah was the one who systemized Salafism, it named after him (Özervarlı, 2019). However, it is not possible to say that Salafism was perceived in a single way in the modern age. Unfortunately, the literature tends to put almost every movement that demands returning to the main sources (the Quran and the authentic Sunnah) into the same pot called ‘Salafist’. This leads a lot of confusion. However, for example, take Cemaleddin Afghani and Muhammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab; the differences between their ideas are so obvious that the most foreign eyes can easily notice. Since this is the case, describing both of them as Salafi naturally leaves those who are not deeply familiar to the subject with question marks. At this point, Yenigün proposes to study the Salafism under two headings: the revelation-based Salafism and the rational Salafism⁹. The revelation-based Salafism acts with a rude revival thought. Wahhabism represented exactly this line; because, it is a sect that accepts every non-existing thing of the time of *salaf* people as *bid’ah*, and tries to bring people back to the life of the *salaf* not only as an idea but

⁸ For further reading, see: Fazlur Rahman (2000). *Revival and Reform in Islam: A Study in Islamic Fundamentalism*, edited by Ebrahim Moosa. Oxford: Oneworld.

Moosa, E., & Tareen, S. (2015). Revival and Reform. In Bowering G. (Ed.), *Islamic Political Thought: An Introduction* (pp. 202-218). Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press.

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Voll, J.O. (1999). Foundations for Renewal and Reform. In Esposito J. (ed.). *The Oxford History of Islam*. New York: Oxford University Press.

⁹In the Umayyad period, a tension between the Arabs and the Mawali (non-Arab Muslim elements) emerged. For Mawali, knowledge means reasoning and understanding the logic of something; whereas “for the Arab mind it consisted of the revelation and a bit reason which is sufficient enough to handle revelation” (Evkuran, 2015, p. 74). For this reason, while the Arab scholars living in Madinah were called as *ahl al hadith*; Mawali scholars, who make reason came to the fore, especially Abu Hanifa, were called *ahl al ra’y*.

also as the form. Rational Salafism, on the other hand, is represented by Afganî and his successors, and acts with a more philosophical revival thought. Rational Salafism seeks to grasp the essence; it wants to understand the spirit of Islam and make its messages liveable in the modern era without being caught up in formal things. In this respect, although the former one is reactionary, it is an actionary movement. Rational Salafis do not regard and reject the Islamic whole tradition of centuries as *bid'ah*. As a matter of fact, unlike the revelation-based Salafis, tradition is not one of their main struggle area. Rational Salafis are reformers; therefore, their struggle with tradition is inevitable but not essential; this struggle is basically a by-product of their other struggles (Yenigün, 2014, pp. 36-37). Indeed, Islamism is the famous name of the reform and renewal school, which Yenigün offers the name of Rational Salafism.

As seen above, Islamism and Salafism are similar in terms of the idea of returning to sources. However, the question of what is meant from the sources is important here; because, there is a difference here. In the most general sense, the sources are Quran and hadith/sunnah. Hadith is the central concept in Salafism, while Quran is the central concept in Islamism. For this reason, while Wahhabis usually consider the hadith before the Quran, the Menar school¹⁰ prioritize Quran. The latter even consider the phenomenon of hadith as one of the main sources of problems; since hadiths are suspected to be said by the Prophet himself. For this reason, Menar school argued that in order for a narration to be accepted as hadith, its authenticity should be controlled in the light of the Quran. Despite all those essential differences, Rational Salafis (which we prefer to call Islamists) are equated with Revelation-based Salafis under a single frame called Salafi. However, as explicitly seen, such a use of the word Salafism in many texts without footnotes is one of the biggest obstacles to making a healthy assessment in this regard; since each group with the idea of returning to resources cannot qualified as Salafi. Therefore, Islamists will not be mentioned as Salafis in this study.

Nevertheless, it is essential to state that Islamism and Salafism think parallel in terms of the following two issues:

1) The attitude against *ta'wil* (interpreting something differently): Both Salafists and Islamists are against *ta'wil*. This is because they argue that religion is clear. What is clear

¹⁰ Afghani's successors. The Menar school was named like this due to the journal of el-Menar published in Cairo. The publisher was Rashid Rida, who is one of the students of Muhammed Abduh who is the most well-known student of Afghani. Rida became more popular in the theological circles by writing a *tafsir* named as Tafsir al Menar in the following years. Menar school supported the idea of returning to Quran, which is seen as the main source for Islam (Harb, 2004).

does not need *ta'wil*. As a particular example, applying *ta'wil* to the Quran means disrupting it; because, when an arbitrary interpretation is included, clarity disappears and the Quran becomes incomprehensible.

2) The attitude towards Sufism: Both Salafists and Islamists are opposed to Sufism, which is the institutionalized form of *ta'wil*. According to this idea, Sufism disrupts the creed (the belief principles of religion) and for this reason it is a pure *shirk* (Evkuran, 2015, pp. 74-76).

These two attitudes are one of the clearest indicators that distinguish Islamism from Political Islam¹¹. The reason why Islamism wanted to return to original sources is the idea of finding “true Islam” (believed to be under the dust for centuries) to remove it from the dirt on it, and to reveal it with all its purity. For example, Mehmet Akif wrote for the journal *Sebilürreşad* that it would be of no use to transfer a huge collection of Islamic works that had been formed for centuries up until the 19th century. According to him, Islam has not been understood properly for centuries. With the addition of new ones to the mistakes that emerged after the *Asr-ı Saadet*, this dilapidated form of Islamic understanding reached the 19th century. It should be corrected immediately (Çaha & Guida, 2013, p. 573). The main source of the “true Islam” discourse in Islamism is the aim of creating an Islamic resistance line against the multidimensional threat of modernism.

Although there are occasional revival, renewal and reform movements throughout the history of Islam, there are two important issues that distinguish those movements from the one emerged in the 19th century. The first is the width of the intellectual and actual scope of 19th century movements; similar to the global effect of modernism, which has grown and flourished with the support of science and technical developments, Islamism has also developed and spread on a global scale. The second is the psychological trauma caused by concrete defeats against modernism; because of this, Islamism was born as a modern movement against modernism.

Islamism has an urgent character during the first decades of its emergence. It has been unable to develop a deep philosophical foundation and to offer long-term goals with a methodical approach since it has engulfed in seeking solutions to the urgent problems of the day. But at this point, simply blaming the Islamists arises from running away and not being able to grasp the issue in every aspect. Because, the pressures that have caused the birth of

¹¹ The concept of Political Islam is used for the Islamic movements which tend to involve in active politics.

Islamism have an undeniable role in their efforts to act as soon as possible and to adopt the philosophy of ‘making it up as going along’. Muslim thinkers did not have time to build an in-depth philosophical foundation; because, they had to recognize and adopt modernism, despite it was the product of a completely different culture, due to military defeats. Though, the idea of Enlightenment roots date back to the 14th century had had time to become gradually developed and matured over the centuries. For the Islamists, the primary goal was *salvation*; because, there are concrete wars, defeats, occupations and both material and spiritual pressures of the colonial order.

The classical culture, which reigned until the beginning of 1700s in the Ottoman Empire, set the “truth” as the ultimate goal and centred its efforts to reach the truth in all fields of science, religion and philosophy. However, in the depression period that started with the **Karlowitz** agreement, in which the Ottoman Empire lost a large piece of land in Europe in 1699, the search for truth receded into background due to the fact that a politics-centred thought became prominent. As a matter of fact, every crisis period shines politics and the style of thought shaped around politics by putting the search for truth in parenthesis. The Industrial Revolution, by leading mass production of military technology in the West and also its rapid spread, forced Islamic world to have new searches in the fields of military and politics; so, philosophical and intellectual fields remained neglected. Therefore, no thought tradition that emerged in the Islamic world after 1700s could have metaphysical and philosophical depth (Tunaya, 2003, pp. 7-9; Fazlıoğlu, 2006; Türköne, 1990, pp. 11-15). Because, the style of thought shaped around politics cannot go beyond finding practical and pragmatic solutions to urgent problems.

In the Islamic world after the Industrial Revolution, the politics-oriented-urgent-solutions’ popularity caused the emergence of a new type of intellectual who did not see any trouble about adopting European-centred new ideas without subjecting them to any serious criticism. On the other hand, the disengagement of the ancient, brought by the search for an urgent solution, caused radical and fundamental dispersions in all directions. Against the considerable number of those intellectuals who advocated a deep Westernization, Islamism was a draft initiated by those who thought that holding onto the root would protect the Ottoman state sycamore from being completely overthrown.

As of its emergence, there were questions that the Islamist movement, like any equivalent movement, had to urgently answer. This urgent need resulted in more reactionary answers. The claim of *Islam, as a religion, is against all kinds of advancement* is one obvious

indicator of the pejorative attitude displayed by colonists, who were laid ‘*white men’s burden*’. They perceived the world in a context of ‘*us versus other*’ dichotomy and built their system of knowledge on this discourse. Their pejorative attitude was crowned by a conference held by Renan in Paris. This conference had a lot of echo¹² among the Muslim intellectuals and caused the first crucial question to be asked: Does Islam really prevent advancement? This kind of inquiry, which recognizes Western-style advancement as *a priori*, initially made it necessary to investigate the reasons of the Islamic world’s falling behind the West. Once having identified these causes correctly, there is no doubt that what is going to be done: to initiate an urgent improvement movement with appropriate reforms. However, there is an important problem regarding the extent of reforms: Yes the techniques of the West is a must, but what about its morality? Can science and technique be separated from the philosophical background which create them; or how they can it done? Initially, those who were seeking answers to these questions were indeed trying to find a solution to the question of how the state can survive. For this reason, every intellectual movement from Islamists to Westerners hypothesized a top-down method, in which the state would held all reforms.

The first Islamists embraced the ideal of *İttihad-ı Islam* in order to keep the Ottoman state alive. This ideal can be summarized as such: all Muslims living under the umbrella of the Ottoman state should unite around the religion Islam, form a set against nationalist separative movements; meanwhile Muslims outside the Ottoman Empire should support the Ottoman as a requirement of the devotion to the caliph. The first turning point in terms of the idea of *İttihad-ı Islam* was the disintegration of the Ottoman after the World War I. The second and sharpest turning point was the abolishment of the caliphate. From the death of the Prophet Muhammad until 1924, Muslims, who had always had a caliph either effective or ineffective, had been deprived of unity for the first time in their history, albeit it was symbolic. This deprivation has caused the concept of the *ummah* to come to the fore again in the fragmented Muslim majority lands, much strongly and with more political connotations. The ideal of a single and powerful Islamic State¹³ to cover the whole ummah has emerged after the abolishment of the caliphate.

¹² For the most famous answer against Renan, see: (Kemal, 2014) . For a resource where the answers from the Islamic world against the conference of Renan, see: (Cündioğlu, 1996).

¹³ The concepts such as ‘Islamic unity’, ‘ummah’ or ‘a single Islamic State which will encompass all Muslims’ became a *Kızilelma* (Red Apple) for the Muslims in the period after caliphate. However, an Islamic State which covers all *ummah Muhammad* has never achieved throughout the history. The city state of Medina can be considered as exception. The idea of ‘universal socio-political ummah’ is nothing but a utopia. But this utopia

After the abolishment of caliphate, Islamism has lasted through various branches. What is important in terms of our subject is the reformer (*ıslahçı*) branch; because, the radical movements that have kept 'Islamic State' on the agenda come from this branch. The reform movement has some general features. First of all, this movement has the claim that Islam is not guilty for of the negative experiences of Muslims against modernism and their current bad situation. According to the reformists, Islam is not guilty; but the guilt belongs to the Muslims who misunderstand and live Islam wrongly. Therefore, what needs to be corrected is not religion itself, but the way it is perceived in society. In addition, the reformist school is against Westernization and strongly criticizes modernism. Even though it prefers reason in reason-revelation dilemma, it is distinguished from the renewalists (modernists) since it does not ignore revelation completely. Also, the reform school is dynamic and organizational. It tends to work practically. It focuses on politics, economics, education and training, press and publishing rather than theology issues; because, it thinks that the real deterioration takes place not in religion but in society and administration. However, this does not mean that it avoids theological issues completely. On the contrary, it certainly put theological issues on the agenda while presenting the nature of socio-political distortions and ways of correcting. In other words, theological discussions -such as the creation of the Quran, which came to the agenda in the second century of Islam- are not presented to the public as primary issues to deal with. Reformer cadres are at a certain intellectual level and address that level within the society. They do not use a simple preaching language. Besides, they do not care about official religious education. In other words, having a diploma based on religious education, such as being a graduate of madrasah, does not make sense for the reformists. They care about one's self-upbringing. Therefore, the leaders of many groups belonging to the reformist school are not coming from a background of madrasah or theology. Even among those leaders there are engineers or journalists. In addition, reformists put the issue of the social role of women on the agenda and care about the education and participation of women in socio-political activities. They regard woman as human and individual, and respect her (Büyükkara, 2019, pp. 135-138).

Radical Islamic understandings and movements such as that of Ercümen Özkın were generally born from the reformist school (*ıslahçı ekol*). The word radical is derived from the Latin word *radix* (root). So, the word radicalism corresponds to a root-based thinking style.

is important, like all other utopias in the history, since it has the potential to show the final destination and lead Muslims to it, in both intellectual an actional terms. Therefore, the ideas of 'state' and 'universal ummah' occupy the central position within the modern Islamism.

The word fundamentalism is generally used as a synonym of radicalism. It derived from the Latin root of *fundamentum*, which means ‘the basic element’ (Çaylak & Kaymal, 2019). Here the concept of radical is used to mean “strong political opposition consciousness, which demands fundamental change and expresses it with either words or actions” (Büyükkara, 2019, p. 256).

Today, although radical Islam brings to mind a pejorative content associated with terrorism, in fact, radicalism is not equivalent to violence. “Radicalism is a term, in its correct definition, which qualifies ideologies planning the comprehensive and fast changes/transformations in the administration, politics, social values and even in the economy” (p. 254). It is not a coincidence that radicalism gradually takes on a completely negative meaning and being put against the concept of ‘moderate Islam’ as a positive image of Islam. Given that this dichotomy (radical Islam versus moderate Islam) lacks both a historical and semantic basis, it will become apparent that its purpose is quite political (Büyükkara, 2019, pp. 254-256). To sum up, movements aimed at changing not only the political regime but also the cultural structure within the framework of Islamic principles are called radical movements. It is inevitable that such movements, aiming for total and fundamental change, to be dissidents and fighters; however, the affirmation or negation of violence depends on the inner-dynamics of each separate movement.

We have pointed out that Islamism has turned its face to the ideal of destroying non-Islamic systems in the post-caliphate period, and establishing an Islamic State uniting all Muslims. This ideal has especially been carried by radical Islamism. Because radical Islamists think that Islam is a versatile system that determines not only personal religious issues in the private sphere but also all kinds of social and political orders in the public sphere. According to them, Islam is a lifestyle; thus, the existence of an Islamic state is indispensable in order to live a life of its kind. In such a state, sovereignty should belong to God only, and the main duty of the state should be to order goodness and to ban evil. Well, how radicalism has progressed in Turkey?

The actions aimed to re-establish the caliphate after its abolishment in Turkey were weak and remained within a narrow scope. The most famous among them is Sheikh Said rebellion. Aside from the ordinariness of the causes that started the revolt and the lack of organization which was revealed in the process, there was even not a planned political consciousness behind the revolt. Through the law of *Takrir-i Sükûn* (law on the maintenance of order), which was announced immediately after the revolt and remained in force for four

years, the iron-fist of the regime took up the reins throughout the country. All Kemalist reforms would be carried out under the protective umbrella of *Takrir-i Sükun* during this martial law period (Tunçay, 1989, pp. 127-142; Mardin, 2015, p. 60; Ertunç, 2011, pp. 99-105). And religion would be held under pressure for a long time.

With the prohibition of Arabic adhan in 1932, pressure on religious people continued increasingly. The application of secularism in a Jacobean manner and aggressive way created a public reaction (Tunçay, 1982). However, during the Single Party period, the ordinary people were described as “*Hasos and Memos*” and were constantly humiliated with the claim that they were “hobos” that could only be daunted by gendarmerie (Sakal, 2009, p. 158). So, people did not have the power and courage to face with the regime. Therefore, the reactions accumulated inside and moved underground. This potential power, which would be revealed at the earliest opportunity, was a consequence of the pressures. In other words, the oppressive environment of the Single Party period also paved the way for the emergence of radical Islam.

As from Demokrat Parti came to power, Islamic groups and establishments began gradually to emerge. These were primarily clustered around journals. Addressing a considerable audience of readers, the **Büyük Doğu** (Great East), **Hareket** (Movement) and **Sebilürreşad** were the effective journals of that period. Although all of them were incontestably dissidents, it is difficult to say that they were radical Islamists. Because, they do not oppose the regime completely, but they only against the principle of laicism and the way it had been practiced. Those journals were published on the nationalist-conservatist trend, and they did not fall behind showing pro-power and statist reflexes in many cases (Öz A. , 2016).

It was considered normal for nationalist reflexes to come into play even when there were Islamist movements in question. This is because, in the World War I, after the actual disintegration of the Ottoman, the Islamists shifted to the idea of “a nationalism reinforced with Islam”, since there nothing remained but a space left behind caliphate which was the symbol of unity and the fulcrum of the ideal of *İttihad-ı İslam* (Union of Islam) (Kara, 2017b, p. 30). This gap caused most Turkish Islamists to move towards Turkism and most Arab Islamists to Arabism. Therefore, while nationalism was intertwined with Islam in Turkey's early Republican era as seen in the works of Necip Fazıl or Nurettin Topçu, still in the same period, Muslimness intertwined with Arab nationalism in the Ottoman remnant lands (Çaha & Guida, 2013, p. 573).

In the Single Party period, since all kinds of religious activities including teaching how to read Quran was prohibited (Sakal, 2009, pp. 146-7), the students went to Arabic countries such as Egypt or Syria for receiving an Islamic education. They returned to Turkey in Demokrat Party period. Those students had had a chance to meet with the Ottoman thinkers, who were exiled by the Kemalist regime since they supported caliphate; and they also had contacted with the Muslim Brotherhood which was the most promising radical organization of the age. Those opportunities gave them a more extroverted and global perspective about Islam. For this reason, when they returned home, they immediately began to make translations from Arabic to Turkish. So and so, Islamism started to become radical in Turkey via those translation activities (Büyükkara, 2019, p. 260).

Translation activities led by **Hilal** publications had a great impact in the Islamic circles. Among the translations, especially two books had a great influence on the radicalization of religious perception: *Kur'ana Göre Dört Terim* (Four Terms according to Quran) and *Yoldaki İşaretler* (Signs on the Road). The author of the former is the founder of Pakistani *Jamaat al-Islami*, Abu'l A'la al-Mawdudi. In the book, it is explained that Muslims are living within shirk without realizing it, and that there are some ways to keep a solid faith without shirk. In the latter book *Signs on the Road*, which was written by Sayyid Qutub, it is claimed that the modern reign is a period similar to the era of ignorance before the Prophet came; then Muslims are told to be a pioneering society and should deliver the divine message to the masses. In the same period, *Hizbu't-Tahrir*¹⁴ started its operations in Turkey and re-instilled caliphate consciousness to the radical Islamism. *Hizbu't-Tahrir* came from the reformist school. It defined itself as “a political party whose ideology is Islam”. Initially, its founder, Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani, had been standing close to Muslim Brotherhood; but then he left due to some inconveniences and established his own party. The party's goal was “to establish a Caliphate State that encompasses all the Muslims in the world and where the provisions of Islam are applied” (p. 190). Although *Hizbu't-Tahrir* did certainly not approve violence as a method, it has been considered illegal in almost all Islamic countries due to its political attitude. The organization could not show a bright presence after Nabhani's death. However, the ‘progressive method of action’ developed by Nabhani kept considerable amount of radical Islamist movements away from violent tendencies, and Nabhani's doctrine indicating political organization's necessity contributed to the development of political consciousness of radicalism (Büyükkara, 2019, pp. 261-262). The person who leaded

¹⁴ The meaning of *Hizbu't-Tahrir* is liberation party

Hizbu't-Tahrir to find a ground in Turkey and start its activities here was Ercümen Özkan. Even though he then left from the party, he had gone into the jail due to the activities he organized in Turkey as the representative of the party in 1967.

An Anatolian-centred radicalism attracted attention in the 60s: the Malatya school. It has been a strong branch of radical Islamism in Turkey. This school was shaped around Said Çekmegil, who was a tailor. It was built on reading and understanding the Quran (Çekmegil S. , 1996). Çekmegil was also known for his opposition to Greek philosophy, Indian mysticism, Israiliyyah, and the Sufism. For this reason, he was accused of being heathen by Sufis. Çekmegil was an intellectual person, who used footnotes, quotations and paraphrases in his academic-level works, although he did not continue his education after primary school. However, since he had a sharp tongue in his criticisms, there were people who compared him with a sculptor who break the whole rock with a sledgehammer while indeed trying to shape (Öz A. , 2010, pp. 135-151).¹⁵

Mücadele Birliği (Struggle Association) should be mentioned in examining the radical Islamic movements in Turkey. It was founded at the end of the 60s as a legal group. It highlighted national elements mostly. The point that makes it interesting for this study is that some of its members, such as Cevat Akkaya or Hamza Türkmen, later became a part of radical movements; even more, they took on pioneering duties there. *Mücadele Birliği* (Fighting Association) gave importance to the Quranic works in the first years of its establishment. Its members carefully followed the translation works on the other hand. In addition, they were known to read the leftist literature with the idea of recognizing the enemy's weapon. Moreover, the organisation way of the union and its methods remained under the influence of leftist thinking. The *Mücadele Birliği* attempted to repair the nationalist-conservatist roof, precisely at a time when the roof began to shake and when the conservatives shifted to radical Islam and moved away from the nationalist wing. Several names among the Fighters, carried out important duties in several institutions and organizations as well as in the governments in Turkey after 80s (Selçuk, 2018).

Interestingly, different from the Muslims both of the Arab-Islamic world and of the Asian world, -except from some small marginal groups- radical Islamism in Turkey has not tended to Salafism, Kharijite or Takfirism. Besides, the groups such as Muslim Brotherhood or Jamaat al-Islami could not find a ground in Turkey, even though their leaders have been

¹⁵ For detailed information about Said Çekmegil, see: Sürgeç, B. (2008). *Bir Şehri Şekillendiren Adam: Said Çekmegil*. Ankara: Anahtar Yayınları.

appreciated and their translations have been followed. It is possible to mention many reasons from political and institutional mechanisms to differences in the intellectual level (Öz A. , 2016, p. 99). Still, one of the main reasons is the structure of local mainstream Islamic movements.

Although he was not a radical Islamist, Necip Fazıl was the most characteristic name of local Islamic movements in which ideology and literature were blended. He can be regarded as the most prominent typical example of nationalist-conservative wing which has been mainstream in Islamic movements in Turkey; so, he deserves to be mentioned in this background section. By highlighting Turkish motifs in his works, Fazıl promoted the ideal of a Turkey-based Big East against the West. He was not pan-Islamist nor universal, but nationalist and conservative. He was against efforts to read and understand the Quran individually. He also opposed the '*kökü dışarıda (exogeneous)*' ideas that come with translations; because, even if there would be a global Islamic movement, he believed that only Turkish people could lead it. He criticized the idea of returning to the sources as well as rationalism. Since he was also a sect member (*ehl-i tarik*), he leaned toward Sufism. He is the name, which mainstream Islamism in Turkey have walked following in his footsteps (Akın, 2016, pp. 185-206).

There was a visible development on the radical Islamic movements not only in Turkey, but also in the world after the 1980 coup d'état:

Iran had engaged in the export of revolution. The Afghan jihad was quickly succeeding. Egyptian president Sedat was killed by jihadists. The Syrian İhvan attempted a major uprising in Hama. As a result of the Hezbollah resistance, Israel and the USA had to withdraw from Lebanon. Afterwards, Hamas's revolt (*intifada*) started. With all those developments, a self-confidence developed, and the rhythm of radicalism accelerated. It was precisely in this period, the books of the men of movement such as Abdullah Azzam, who was in jihadi Salafi line; ... and they [those books] attracted lots of attention. The internal debates on radicalism, which had already begun on the issues such as the concept of *Dâr* (homeland) and Friday prayer, diversified and became more severe in this period. The takfirist peaks began to be seen in some circles. ... The journals published by those circles served as a kind of roof for radical structures and became functional in giving identity to the base (Büyükkara, 2019, p. 276).

Therefore, 1980s were a peak level for radical Islamism in Turkey, both in intellectual and operational senses. In addition, radical movements were able to benefit from technological means, and could express their intention in a more sophisticated way through tape theatres, stage theatres, marches and melodies, symposiums and panels.

It was this atmosphere where Ercüment Özkan and his friends started to publish *İktibas*.

1.2. Theoretical Framework

This study will use three analytical tools: the conceptualization of *ummah*, the depiction of *us* versus *other*, and the theorization of Islamic State. I will analyse each of them in separate chapters from the perspective of *İktibas*.

Ummah is one of the words which became popular during the fragmentation of Muslim majority lands on behalf of nation states. So, it is necessary to take ummah in relation with nation. These two concepts have become connected to each other with graft bonds due to the touch of modernity. Contrary to popular belief, nations are not natural structures, rather they are a kind of imagined communities (Anderson, 2006) that none of the many types of communities existed throughout the history was the equivalent of the nation (Renan, 1996). Racial classifications supported by archaeological studies are pointless to determine nations (Balibar & Wallerstein, 1991); because, nations are not -and even should not- be built on race. Nation is not a physical being, but a spiritual one, and it is built on two things: a re-created common past, and desirous people to shape their future under the light of this past (Renan, 1996). This spiritual community, i.e. nation, is shaped around a national consciousness, which is formed by nationalism. The thinkers of the age between two world wars reveal that ‘nationalism’ appeared before ‘nations’ (Kohn, 1944, pp. 4-18). Nationalism is the principle that argues the political unit should be compatible with the social unit (Gellner, 1992, pp. 27-28). Although there are no satisfactory criteria for classifying human communities as nation or not (Hobsbawm, 2017, p. 19), nations are indispensable for nation states. And once nation states are established, it is time to keep the consciousness of being a nation alive by using each possible means, such as symbols or “the deixis of little words” (Billig, 1995, p. 94). In the world of nations, “‘here’, ‘us’ and ‘the’ are so easy to overlook”; so nationalism is inevitably embedded in the minds of each individual that they are members of a ‘nation’ (Billig, 1995, p. 174).

Since nation was ‘imagined’ in order to meet the social needs of the secular world, it did not achieve a prestigious position among Muslims, at first. Besides, since nationalism operated as a tool to split Muslim majority countries, it led so severe traumas on Muslims that they embarked on a quest for an exit way. ‘Ummah’ and ‘ummahism’ became prominent as a result of those searches. Although ‘ummah’ existed in the pre-Islamic Arabic language, the conceptualization of the word coincided with the early years of Islam, the period immediately after the hijra. Indeed, the word *millah*, rather than *ummah*, is used in exchange for ‘religion’ in the Quran (Manzooruddin, 1971, p. 81). The ummah order was introduced by the Charter of Medina, as an attempt to establish a new society for Muslims. Considering that the Arabs were far from the idea of a state in that period, that the only system functioned politically was the tribal system, and that the only upper mechanism was a council of tribal leaders, it is explicit that the new social structure in Medina composed of many tribes deserves to be defined with a new word: Ummah (Watt, 1968, pp. 28-29). Although the ummah is the conceptual name of the new Muslim union established in Madinah, the spread of the word and its becoming a slogan term corresponds to the period (19th century) when the pains of modernization were suffered. Under the influence of the modernization process the word *millah* was completely stripped of religious connotations and started to be used as a synonym for ‘nation’. The *ummah*, on the other hand, has become a community name that is fully integrated with Islam and expresses all Muslims. In 1990s, a new debate emerged about the content of the word *ummah* in the Charter of Medina. The dispute here sources from the ambiguity whether the group described as ummah covers only the Quraysh and Yathrib Muslims, or the Jews were also included in the ummah. M. Watt, M.A. Shaban and Hamidullah are among those who believe in the second possibility. According to them, the word ummah was used to express political unity of both Muslim and Jewish tribes (Hamidullah, 2003, pp. 206-215). Some other researchers, including R.B. Serjeant, Frederick M. Denny and Al-Ahsan, say that the Jews were excluded from the definition of ummah. According to them, the concept of ummah is a supra-tribal name given to the new society (Muslims) of the new religion (Islam) (al-Ahsan, 1992, pp. 19-23). Here the prominent question is about the limits of ummah: Whom it regards as self (us) and whom it otherizes.

This bring us to the second analytical of this study; namely to *us* versus *them* dichotomy. Although the word identity has already lost its ability to explain a phenomenon due to overdose in use of the word and the excess of meanings imposed on it (Brubaker & Cooper, 2014, p. 407; Bauman, 2015, pp. 186-7; Hall, 1996, p. 1; Fearon, 03.11.1999), it

still has an undeniable function when used in its most general sense as an indicator of group belongings. Bauman (2016) describes how indispensable the categories of identity and belonging -i.e. 'us' categories- in social life and states that the nation is an enormous group of 'us' that one can meet with a very limited number of members throughout his/her lives (Bauman, 2016, p. 47-64). It is possible to say the same thing for the ummah. The problem in the issue of *us* versus *other* starts the politicization of identities. According to Schmitt, *other* is a political category and the political other should automatically be the 'enemy' (Schmitt, 2014). On the other hand, according to İlhami Güler, the Quran sets one legitimacy criterion for being enemy: Disruption of justice. Otherwise, any category of *other* cannot be regarded as an enemy to fight with. The natural conclusion of such a claim is that Muslims and non-Muslims can live together in peace (although they are religiously *others*), provided that they both adhere to the principles of justice and equity (Güler, 2015). In addition to the description of ummah in *İktibas*, this study will also examine the journal's criteria for determining others of ummah.

In radical Islamism, the idea of ummah goes hand in hand with the idea of Islamic State. That is why Iranian revolution, in its very beginning, excited the radical Islamist of all around the world. Indeed, there is no kind of concept indicating the *modern state* thought in Quran. The word *state* (*dawlah*) is used to mean *wealth* and *predominance*. Besides, the concept of state did not mean an abstract legal and political entity in the first centuries of Islam as it does today. The concepts which were equal to the political aspect of the state were *caliphate* and *imamate*; the concept which was equal to land was *Dar al-İslam* (places which are under control of Muslims and where they live and fulfil their religious duties safely); and the concept which was equal to sovereignty or authority was *mülk* (Bağdatlı, 2018, p. 100). The word state started to become a political embodiment of all those concepts in modern times. Despite today's general political apprehension, the central concept within the Classical Islamic Political Thought is not state, it is the *ruler / the head of the state*; and the ruler was depicted as a person, not as an institution (Bağdatlı, 2018, pp. 127-129). On the other hand, within the paradigm of modernism, the notion of state is based on the Contract Theories in its philosophical background. All social contract theories are human-oriented regardless of their regimes whether it is autocracy (Hobbes, 1651), constitutional monarchy (Locke, 2003) or republic (Rousseau, 1998). They all rejected the idea of a hierocracy, instead they were based on the idea of human-centered regime established by an abstract contract that assumed to be done between all people of certain land. This idea

provides also the ground for the modern nation-states. When modern state, says Koselleck (2016, p. 65), was accepted as a priori, it reached a level of reality which all the theories related to politics have to get a position accordingly. Therefore, especially after the abolition of caliphate, there remained no alternative for Muslims to cling instead of modern state. This forced Islamists (especially the radical ones) to find a new way to bring Muslims (ummah) together. The idea of Islamic State was a product of such an effort. That is why Islamic state is taken in this study as the third leg of the trivet of ummah issue.

1.3. Similar Studies

There are two doctorates and a master's thesis in Turkey related to Ercüment Özkan. They focused on Özkan's personal life and thought system. The first one is a doctoral dissertation titled *Ortadoğu'da Modernleşme ve İslami Hareketler* (Modernization and Islamic Movements in the Middle East), completed by Alev Erkilet in 1996. Thesis compares the characteristics of the radical Islamic Movements in Egypt, Iran and Turkey and presents Ercüment Özkan as the representative of the radical Islamism in Turkey. It was published as a book in 1999; however, Erkilet was dismissed from the university because of it. The second study is the doctorate dissertation which was completed in 2002 by Kürşad Atalar who was in a manner, a follower of Ercüment Özkan and one of the authors of *İktibas*. The assertion with the title *Radical Islamism in Turkey: The cases of gradualism of Ercüment Özkan and militanism of Hizbullah* was written in English and compares the Hezbollah organization and Ercüment Özkan Movement in Turkey. The last one is the Master thesis which titled *Hizbu't-Tahrir ve Ercüment Özkan'ın Siyasi ve Dini Görüşleri* (Political and Religious Opinions of *Hizbu't-Tahrir* and Ercüment Özkan). It was completed in 2008 by Yusuf Elmas. Also it is possible to find information about Ercüment Özkan in the 6th volume of the corpus named *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce* (Political Thought in the Modern Turkey) from the *İletişim Yayınları*, in the book named *Ayet ve Slogan* (Verse and Slogan) of Ruşen Çakır, in the conversation book named *Saatçi Musa* (Watchmaker Musa) of Asım Öz and in the interview which was published with the name *Ankara'da Kırk Beş Yıl* (Forty-five Years in Ankara) of Süleyman Arslantaş.

However, as it can be seen above, there is no study in the literature that directly focuses on *İktibas*. In fact, the journal made a sound much exceeded its sales rates, especially in its

early years. Nevertheless, the journal remained behind the charismatic personality of Ercüment Özkan. This study differs from previous studies due to its direct focus on *İktibas*.

1.4. Methodology

While the effect of positivism in social sciences considerably decreased, the researchers started to focus on qualitative research methods increasingly. The qualitative research methods are based on the thought that the facts cannot be presented from a single perspective, and that the social phenomena need multi-disciplinary explanations instead of experiments different from physical sciences, especially due to their multi-dimensional nature. The main problem related to the qualitative research methods is that their methodological features cannot be presented clearly and in a characteristic manner as in quantitative methods. As a matter of fact, researchers have to implement more than one method in order to conduct a qualitative research.

This study is conducted as a qualitative research and the interpretive method which was suggested by Clifford Geertz¹⁶ in 1970s is followed in order to collect and evaluate data. In other words, the concepts to focus was not determined before the study. During the study, the most distinct issues which came to the fore were discovered within the frame of the journal's production of political thought. In the process of discover, all the issues of *İktibas* published between 1981 and 1995 were scanned through the archive survey method. Since all issues of the journal were published online, it was not difficult to access to the resources. The concepts of *ummah* and *Islamic State* were chosen among the issues which were realized to be focussed on in the journal since they are related to each other and they are also related to the political thought and there were assertive ideas on them in the journal. Ummah was then within two levels: the scope of the ummah and the *others* of the ummah. The words related to the concepts of ummah and the Islamic State, and their contexts were also analysed with the support of the Conceptual History approach (Koselleck, 2016). Then the *us* and *other* concepts of the journal were analysed through a contextual text analysis, a semantic

¹⁶ The symbolic interpretive anthropologic method which was suggested by Clifford Geertz during the period of Cold War was developed within the scope of the socio-cultural anthropology, and it was a reaction for the patronizing perspective adopted by the anthropology discipline of those years. Geertz thought that the efforts made to find the equivalence of the given Western value judgments in order to understand a society is pretty misleading. According to him, a society and a culture can only be understood within its own internal dynamics. In other words; it is necessary to know the meaning of the aspects of a culture for the people from it. This method which was developed by Geertz also influenced other social sciences later (Panourgía, 2016).

map was created in accordance with it, and the model of Islamic State introduced as the journal had presented.

The technique of narrative research is used for the chapters related to the history of *İktibas* and life of Ercüment Özkan (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000; Czarniawska, 2004; Chase, 2005; Pinnegar & Daynes, 2007). For the narrative technique, the written or told memories related to the relevant person or the personal memoirs are used primarily. Besides, the historical contexts of the memoirs and memories are analysed and placed by avoiding from anachronism. The data which are collected in parts are organized through *re-narration*, i.e. putting them in a chronological order. Thus, the identity and personality of both the journal and its founder are tried to be described in a multi-dimensional and lively manner.

The Islamic political thought has been discussed and developed in the self-initiative journals, not in the academics. During the years of foundation of the Republic, the university community closed its doors even to Nurettin Topçu who had a diploma from Sorbone since he referenced Islam while evaluating nationalism. Despite the inevitable need for academicians, universities were not open to any kind of thought labelled with Islam. Therefore, development of Islamic political thought had to occur outside of the academics. It is also a fact that this thought is not unidirectional; on the contrary, it consisted of many different branches and trends. Those differences have been accepted as given so far and nearly any kind of effort has not been made to classify them. The Islamic intellectual circles knew each other and were aware of the differences and the similarities between each other due to their being few in number on the one hand and the effect of the institutional insufficiencies on the other. They have been the couch grass of the Republic project, which was a sufficient roof for encompassing a handful Islamic intellectuals; thus, they have not needed any kind of classification for years. However over years, the growth of educated middle-upper class Islamic circles and the increase in the number of associations, foundations, journals, institutions and organizations have made not only the ones who have followed the Islamic circles from outside but also the new generations younger than middle age not to understand the differences between the Islamic political thought groups. In this study, it is tried to present the relevant differences explicitly and the position of *İktibas* is presented within the frames of conjunctures, context and metanarratives. Thus, it is aimed to leave no kind of question in the mind of the readers.

This study focuses on the perception of *ummah* of *İktibas* which follows the radical Islamist trend, the definition of *us* versus *other* in the journal, and the description of a legitimate Islamic State from the perspective of the journal. Therefore, first of all a conceptual frame will be drawn for the word of *ummah*, and the historical semantic journey of the word will be followed from the perspective of Koselleck. After analysing the place and importance of the *ummah* in Contemporary Islamic Political Thought, the transformation of the relevant concept within the frame of the discussions on the Charter of Medina in 1990s will be emphasized. Within this frame, the position of *İktibas*, how it perceived the concept of *ummah* and where it stood during the discussions on the Charter of Medina will be discussed in the Chapter II.

Secondly *İktibas*'s criteria in creating *us* and *other* from the aspect of *ummah* consciousness will be focussed. The perceptions of *us* and *other*, which are referred frequently in the identity works, have been defined within a really wide range from the ways of approaches which trivializes the feeling of belongings to the Schmittian (2014) way of approach which makes them the subjects of the political opposition. Among those different sounds which have their own legitimate explanations for themselves, the unique sound of *İktibas* will be analysed in the Chapter III.

Third and finally, the kind of political structure that *İktibas* proposes within the frame of its conception of *ummah* will be analysed. In other words, the Islamic State idea in *İktibas* will be traced. The claims of the journal on the facts whether such state is necessary or whether the description of Islamic State corresponds with the nation-state boundaries, and features of its institutional structure will be clarified and presented in the Chapter IV as a whole.

2. CHAPTER I: İKTİBAS

İktibas (Quotation) is a journal whose name is always associated with its founder; just as associating *Büyük Doğu* (Great East) journal with Necip Fazıl or associating *Hareket* (Movement) with Nurettin Topçu. Even though the journal was continued to be issued after Ercümen Özkan, it significantly lost its efficiency which has with Özkan. Therefore, it is essential to learn about Ercümen Özkan in order to understand the journal accurately and then analyse it. This chapter will primarily analyse the life and mentality of Ercümen Özkan. Later, the nature and aims of *Hizbu't-Tahrir*, which caused Özkan to be sentenced, will be discussed; because the organization is one of the main factors that formed his mentality. Finally, the adventure of issuing *İktibas*, its relations with other journals and its unique characteristics will be examined in a multi-dimensioned manner and within the conjuncture of the relevant era.

2.1. Who is Ercümen Özkan?

Ercümen Özkan was born in a little town named Mucur at Kırşehir in 1938. He was a man of action. When he was only 13, he managed to get his teachers and local people of the town to establish an athletic club named *Mucur Yıldırım Spor Kulübü* (Mucur Lightning Sports Club). In 1956, he built up a library by donating his 200 books and developed it by collecting books from the local people. In the same year, he also established the *Mucur Kitabevi Kurma ve Yaşatma Derneği* (Mucur Bookstore Building and Sustentation Association) and covered the needs of the library building such as rent and heating costs with the money he collected from the association. At the end of the 1950s, though just barely, he managed to contact with Menderes who visited the town and got the library in town attached to the Directorate General of Libraries; thus, he enabled the Mucur Public Library to get book support and a librarian to be assigned (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, p. 154). His enterprising nature faded in when he is young.

Özkan enrolled in the Law School in Ankara in 1957, started to work in the central office of the *Millet Partisi* (People's Party) and joined in the activities of the *Türk Ocakları* (Turkish Hearts). However -as inspired by Tanpınar- he is neither completely inside nor outside the nationalist and *Wertkonservativ* (sacred value conservative /*mukaddesatçı*) circles. Although he attended to the Law School of Ankara University, he did not graduate. He opened a stationery store first because of financial difficulties; however, it did not last

long. In 1960, right before the 1960 Turkish coup d'état, he established *Basın Tetkik ve Haber Alma Merkezi* (Press Investigation and News Centre) which would be later called as *Basın Haber Ajansı* (Press and News Agency). By this means, he started to earn his keep. After the 1960 Turkish coup d'état, he worked as a teacher during his military service (Özkan M. , 1996; Bircan & Atalar, 1997, p. 304).

While he was doing his military service in Karabasan village of Uşak, he managed to get a drinking water facility dished in the village, a minaret built for the only mosque of the village, several thousand *melengiç* trees (nettletree) infused peanuts, a telephone line tapped between the village and the town, an 8 km highway made, irrigation channels opened, literacy courses opened in both the Latin alphabet and the Arabic alphabet -new writing and old writing-, and crutches made for the old hodja of the village. Since he was not a rich person, he collected money from local people and made use of their physical power to do all this (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, pp. 157-158). So, it is explicit that he had a versatile temperament; he was dynamic and practical.

Özkan started to question the conventional Islamic perceptions seriously after 1960s. He tried to learn Islamic culture better with his own efforts. He thought that he needed first to understand the issues explained in the Qur'an completely, and started to read the Turkish translations of the book since he did not know Arabic. It was a consequence solely of his curiosity to start reading Qur'an; he said that no one had ever made any kind of suggestion about it (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, pp. 139-141). There was no one as experienced and knowledgeable as to make these suggestions in those years anyway. Everyone tried hard to learn something gropingly. Even Musa Çağıl, who knows almost all of the Islamic circles face to face, admitted that there were a few people who based their opinions on Qur'an, and that one of the 3 people who were able to make references from Qur'an in their speeches was Ercümen Özkan (Öz A. , 2010, p. 189).

A couple of years full with intense reading and comprehending activities passed; then in 1964, he met with *Saatçi* (Watchmaker) Musa (Çağıl) and their friendship lasted until his death. Çağıl was one of the people who planned the assassination of Ahmet Emin Yalman in 1952 in Malatya. This event was characterized as "reactionary action" (Çetinkaya, 2016) by all the newspapers of the age. After getting out of the prison, he opened a watch store in Kızılay, Ankara. However, his store was rather like a bookstore since there were more books than watches in it. In a short time, this small shop became a meeting place in Ankara for

discussing Islamic issues. It becomes an indispensable destination for a handful Islamists of the period (Öz A. , 2010, pp. 169-179).

At the shop of the Watchmaker Musa, all kinds of Islamists from different cities come together with poor university students. The store became even more popular after the well-known people such as Sezai Karakoç and Necip Fazıl came there. Indeed, almost everyone who is known in the circles of Islamic thought, Islamic literature and political Islamists of the age visited Musa's place. Some of them are: Erdem Beyazıt, Nuri Pakdil, Cahit Zarifoğlu, Akif İnan, Said Çekmegil, Abdurrahman Dilipak, Fehmi Kuru, Mustafa Yazgan, Atasoy Müftüoğlu, İhsan Süreyya Sırma, Necmettin Erbakan, Fehim Adak, Korkut Özal, Turgut Özal, Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu, Oğuzhan Asiltürk, Recep Yazıcıoğlu, Süleyman Arif Emre, and so on. There were even some speculations in the press indicating that Saatçi Musa's store was the central office of the *MNP* (Milli Nizam Partisi – National Order Party). People were generally discussing some Islamic issues, talking about Muslims's conditions and making plans for the future. Poor students were provided books to be read. Then they were asked to explain what they got from those books, including the translations of the works of famous Islamist thinkers (Öz A. , 2010, pp. 184-193). As seen, the store was operating more like a cultural Islamic foundation rather than a watch store. So, it became a place where Ercüment Özkan frequently visited. He met lots of people who influenced the development of Islamic thought in Turkey, as well as people from political circles.

At the same years, some members of *Hizbu't-Tahrir* started to come to the bookstore where Özkan both works and lives since he has nowhere to go. Their actual aim was to convince Mehmet Müftüoğlu, who was the owner of the store, to join them. However, Müftüoğlu did not pay attention. Meanwhile, what *Hizbu't-Tahrir* guys were telling attracted Özkan's attention. He wanted to discuss the same issues with them, but they did not care about him much. Özkan did not give up and finally joined in *Hizbu't-Tahrir* . He rapidly advanced in the organization's carrier to become the Turkish representative of *Hizbu't-Tahrir* (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, pp. 139-141).

Özkan continued for 7 years to attend the courses of the organization and to propagandize it. For him, the greatest barrier in front of attracting more people was the organization's being exogenous. In those years, 'exogeneity (*kökü dışarıdallık*)' created a great prejudice, which was impossible to deal with, for almost all of the traditional Muslim people except from the Islamists who did not regard risky to read the translations of the works of Muslim thinkers (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, p. 148). But, the Islamists had different

kinds of concerns. They thought that, within the current conditions, the community was not ready for such an attempt aiming to bring the caliphate back. Indeed, Saatçi Musa explain this to Özkan several times, and invited him to be more cautious. However, since Özkan was a combative person, he did not listen such warnings (Öz A. , Saatçi Musa, 2010, p. 185). Even the people who liked Özkan hesitated to join in the organization, but he continued to work for it undauntedly. His self-confidence was as high as his moral courage. He did not hesitate to visit people from any level.

In 1966, the central office of *Hizbu't-Tahrir* sent a message. According to the message, caliphate will be founded in Iraq, Syria and Jordan. The role of the Turkish representatives is to make the people be ready for it and to prevent the prospective caliphate from the effects of all anti-propagandas that would surely be pumped by the Western countries. Mission was clear: the Turkish community should be informed about that the prospective state would not be a communist one; instead, it will be an Islamic state.¹⁷ The strategy of central office of the organization was to prevent a potential attack from Turkey to the prospective Islamic state. Since Turkey is one of the most powerful states in the region, it is important for the prospective caliphate, the centre of which would be Jordan, not to be attacked by Turkey. The news coming from the organization centre was so indubitable that the Turkish *Hizbu't-Tahrir* group led by Ercümen Özkan did not have any doubt about the declaration of caliphate in Jordan soon. Then they realized that they need to reach lots of people to form a public opinion. With the hope for a real Islamic state in their hearts, they started to carry out blockbuster actions to attract the press' notice. Among those non-violent actions, there were sending letters and notifications related to the prospective Islamic state to the people in chair such as the Prime Minister and the Chief of General Staff. Özkan defines this chain of actions as "67 Manoeuvre" (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, pp. 148-150). So long as the notifications were reflected to the press as terrifying reactionary (*irticai*) plans, *Hizbu't-Tahrir* became more popular in the country. Özkan achieved his goal.

Özkan was seized together with other members of *Hizbu't-Tahrir* after 67 Manoeuvre. Their trials lasted 13 months, some of which were jailed pending trial. The members of *Hizbu't-Tahrir* did not give up making sensational explanations since they thought that they can be recognized more if they speak more. For instance, the central office of the organization did not have a plan for Turkey; however, the defendants made their

¹⁷ According to Musa Çağıl, the name "green communist" was first used for Ercümen Özkan, during *Hizbu't-Tahrir* trials (Öz A. , 2010, p. 190).

statements as if Turkey will be the central region for the prospective Islamic state. As another example, Özkan stated that he would work to found an Islamic state even if he was sentenced to imprisonment for a hundred years and he has just one year to live when he gets out of the prison. Defendants' aim was to make press to mention them more. However, one day a Lebanese boy among their members let their aims slip out in the trial and then the press stopped to mention *Hizbu't-Tahrir* in the news immediately (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, pp. 152, 334, 342). As a result of the trials, Özkan was sentenced to 4 years of imprisonment and disqualified from the public services (Özkan M. , 1996).¹⁸

In fact, during the 7 years he spent within it, Özkan had a lot of disagreements with the organization. However, since he did not want to abandon the 'cause' (*dava*), he preferred to keep silent. One of the issues which produced conflicts between Özkan and other members of the organization is that the members of *Hizbu't-Tahrir* tried to blame British government about every little issue. They seemed like to believe that each organizations of each regimes in the Middle East is governed by British government. They thought that there was absolutely a British finger behind even a little step. Özkan was so uncomfortable with this kind of conspirative thoughts. Another conflict sourced from Turkey's loyalty to Hanafi sect. Since the members of the organization were strong believers of Shafiism, they were not comfortable with calling Ebu Hanife as *İmam-ı Azam* (the Greatest Imam). However, Özkan thought that it was normal in Turkey and it was not a big deal; there was nothing to be disturbed by the word *İmam-ı Azam*. He could not stop them from the unnecessary reactions in front of the people whom they were trying to bring into their fold. Besides, there was a disagreement in the issue of hadith. The members adopted all the narratives coming from the Prophet as hadith without questioning them. This annoyed Ercümen Özkan a lot, since he thought that all narratives should be reasoned out, checked based on the Qur'an and then adopted as the Prophet's true words. The final disputable issue was the opinion of Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani, the founder of *Hizbu't-Tahrir* , indicating that the Islamic state should be founded by Arabs in Arabic lands. However, Özkan thought that it was a kind of racism and strongly opposed it (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, pp. 142-145).

¹⁸ Some of the headlines used for the investigation and prosecution process for the members of *Hizbu't-Tahrir* are as follows:

"The secret society aiming to found an Islamic state was discovered",
"7 regime opponents were arrested",
"Sharia followers founded a chamber in İstanbul",
"Pro-caliphate communists desiring an Islamic Constitutional Law",
"Reactionism is waiting at the Minister's doorstep",
"Reactionism will be defeated" (İktibas, 1996, pp. 174-192)

When the differences of opinion with the organization reached an insurmountable point for himself, Özkan wrote a letter to Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani from jail. He could not get the reactions he expected. Then he left the organization since he thought that he had completed the 67 Manoeuvre and therefore he did not leave them in the lurch. He stated that he left the organization not with three *talaqs* but with nine *talaqs* (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, pp. 146, 153; Arslantaş S. , 1995).

Interestingly, Özkan claimed that he was not beaten, cursed or tortured when he was under arrest, neither during interrogation nor in the prison. According to him, there were two reasons for it. Firstly, he was clear while he was giving his statement; he explained all of the issues he knew whether he was asked or not, and he accepted and acknowledged all of the crimes accused to him. Secondly, none of the actions he led was violent and no one got harmed. Since he did not abandon his cause (*dava*), he thought that his attitude had a positive effect on the police officers. This positive atmosphere even caused some strange events. For instance; when the journalists came to police headquarters to take the photographs of the ones arrested for the case of *Hizbu't-Tahrir* , the police commissioner made Özkan sit on his own seat; he and other officers posed for the journalists by standing next to him. Özkan was sitting like the new chief officer, others were standing like the ones who had come for congratulations; and the photographs were taken. Meanwhile Özkan was explaining contentedly the regulations for the prospective Islamic state such as economy, army, civil order etc. by answering the questions of the journalists in an atmosphere like a press conference (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, pp. 154-160).

After leaving *Hizbu't-Tahrir* in the first months of imprisonment, Özkan thought that he should have started over from scratch and determined a road map for him to follow. He did not have any kind of uncertainty about his purpose: he did want to establish an Islamic state. He determined the steps and method to progress in order to achieve his final goal when he was in prison (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, pp. 163-164).

When he got out of the prison in 1970, he was determined for his final aim and method. He started to find friends who prioritize Quran and establish a working circle with them. They started with a small group of 6 people. They met and study once a week during the morning prayer. They got used to not sleeping after the morning prayers and not sitting until late at night in order not to miss the morning prayer, because of the tight admonition of Ercüment Özkan. This is because – although he received a lot of criticism due to his views on combining prayers – Özkan was someone who pays extraordinary attention to his prayers.

Özkan and his team's password was: "Whatever prayer is performed; politics is done accordingly... There is nothing divided in Islam" (p. 203). They were convinced that this holistic approach will only be possible by uniting in Quran. Süleyman Arslantaş, who was in the first team and moved with Özkan for a long time, said that his foundations were laid by Sait Çekmegil:

"Everything is according to Quran. You will interpret the Sunnah of the Prophet and whatever you encounter through Quran. If someone obeys Quran, he/she is from Islam. Çekmegil laid this beautiful foundation for us. Later on, Mr. Ercüment practiced this a little more and made it liveable" (Arslantaş S. , 2013, p. 201).

Even though there were people leaving it, the group, which expands with new participants, started to open up to different cities.

In 1974, Özkan bought the **Interpress Press** Office which had been operating in İstanbul for almost thirty years. Thus, the Ankara-based engraving compilation work has been expanded. As of 1977, preparations for İktibas began. First of all, mini journals were published in the form of small booklets with a few pages, a limited number and special for the group only. The aim is to make intellectual transfers to people in contact with Ercüment Özkan and his team from different cities. In other words; the issues discussed and agreed upon in the centre of Ankara were to reach the group members in the surrounding provinces. In this way, it was aimed to form a unity among all group members. Among the booklets which were first published, there were a Cyprus Booklet containing explanations related to the Cyprus problem, a Middle East Booklet containing information about the issues in the Middle East, a booklet containing explanations about company and cooperative issues for Islam, another booklet containing explanations about interests and banks. They were also preliminary preparations for the journal to be published (Arslantaş S. , 2013, pp. 250-251).

As the group expands, the first activity in the newly established educational circles was to interpret the world politics in the light of daily news. Here, the principle of the group was as follows: In order to make Islam liveable in daily life, it is not enough to know only religion, it is necessary to know the world where religion will be applied and to understand its dynamics. It was this principle which had already pushed the group to the idea of publishing a journal with predominantly political news. First of all, as mentioned above, İktibas which is special for the group was published: "We did not have any comments. There were only quotes from the press and they were in their original versions. We were cutting

the clippings, they were glued, duplicated and somehow distributed specially to the service” (Arslantaş S. , 2013, p. 253).

Finally, in 1981, Özkan and his team who thought that they should be open to the public, started publishing *İktibas*. He got arrested because of an article published in the journal in 1982. He was sentenced to 2 months of imprisonment. At the same year, he went to Iran upon the official invitation of the Islamic Republic to investigate the Revolution onsite with some seatmates such as Mehmet Said Hatipoğlu, Esat Coşan, Cengiz Çandar, Abdurrahman Dilipak and İhsan Süreyya Sırma. He was re-arrested in 1985 because of another article published on *İktibas* with the issue no 105. The relevant issue was pulled off the shelves. He was sentenced for 6 years of heavy imprisonment along with Mehmet Çoban, who is the actual writer of the article. Özkan’s imprisonment was then converted into a fine. Since he had a stroke in August 1987, *İktibas* was paused to be issued for 2 years (Özkan E. , İslami (Rabbani) Metod, 1990). Özkan had a heart attack at the end of the 1990 and he brought under treatment when he was about to had another in 1993. He stayed in hospital for a while because of his heart problems in 1994. He deceased as a result of a heart attack in January 1995 in Adana where he went for a conference (Özkan M. , 1996).

Ercüment Özkan had a spirited characteristic and mentality during his lifetime. He was not conservative and static but was reformist and dynamic. It is a well-known fact that Özkan, who aimed to found an Islamic state by changing the current regime and did not hesitate to talk about it, loved to listen Alevi folk songs (listening such music was found improper by the Islamists of those years). Likewise, it is a fact that Özkan, who never approved violence, stood in opposition to Islamic Sufism which was considered as the antidote for violence. He asserted that the Islamic Sufism is “a separate religion” and tried to purge Islam from Sufism. Besides, it is a fact that Özkan, who harshly criticised Western-originated thoughts such as freedom, democracy and human rights by thinking their contents were corruptive, he was very interested in the technological advancements. He followed the technology closely and utilized the technological innovations in his daily life at the level he could afford. He frequently mentioned the scientific and technological developments in *İktibas* too. In sum, Ercüment Özkan was not conservative and complete objector with his thoughts and attitudes, but he was prone to accept the ideas he deemed appropriate and he was also broadminded.

According to Ercüment Özkan, a person’s behaviours should take the same shapes with his/her opinions. In other words, he attached much importance to the consistency. He

thought that everything could not be regarded as not permissible to achieve the determined goal. He told that Muslims should do everything in a way appropriate for 'being Muslim'. The determination made by Kürşad Atalar for Özkan on this issue is as follows:

He believes that the method of an act comes from faith, and says that achieving legitimate aims could only be possible with legitimate methods. He refuses democratic method and considers it is the same as being crushed under the wheels of the system. He also says that anyone should not apply for any positions of the current regime. He compares it to a 'Muslim waiting tables in a tavern' (Atalar M. K., 1996, p. 61).

Since Özkan did not make any compromise to criticise the democracy during his lifetime, he fell out with some Islamic groups adopting the method to fight with the system by being a part of it. However, defending the things which he did not believe was against his sense of being a Muslim. Keeping silent was not a stance which he could do. Therefore, Cihan Aktaş wrote the following:

He was clear in term of his attitudes and designation. He did not feel the need to get along well with everyone. Different from the intellectual Islamists who try to protect the balance by putting their two feet on two different grounds, he was an independent man of ideas and actions. ... He could express the things which many of others could not think or tell, with his own style. It is impossible to say that he acted with an empty logic. He objected to the rough institutionalization of values and idolizing them against their essence. He was not rationalist, but he was a thinker from heart. His role in the revival of the Islam in Turkey was an incontrovertible fact. He provided lots of questions for us (Aktaş, 1996, p. 117).

İktibas was the channel to ask the questions mentioned by Aktaş. And Özkan himself was the one who generally asked and answered those questions.

It is necessary to give a few more details about *Hizbu't-Tahrir*, before starting to analyse *İktibas*. This is because; even though Özkan left the organization, it is a fact that he continued to think parallel with the organization on some points. He did not deny that either. Therefore, understanding the fundamental dynamics of the *Hizbu't-Tahrir* is important to understand the opinions of Özkan.

Hizbu't-Tahrir and Its Effects on the Opinions of Ercüment Özkan

Verbal meaning of *Hizbu't-Tahrir* is 'Salvation Party'. It is an international political party defending the Islamic union. It was established in Jerusalem in 1953 by Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani and organized in Jordan. Even though it adopts an anti-violence and anti-terrorist stance which is also one of its most significant features, *Hizbu't-Tahrir*'s name is in the list of radical organizations. The reason is related to the aim of the organization. *Hizbu't-Tahrir* declared that its aim is to reunite the Muslim majority countries, which are called as "ummah geography", under the roof of a single state based on Islamic rules completely. The method of the organization is to invite and convince the Muslims to found an Islamic state (Farouki, 2014, p. 44). The difference of the *Hizbu't-Tahrir* among many other Islamic movements and organizations of 1960s is its attitude against the Western world. Within the scope of the *Hizbu't-Tahrir*, the real danger for Muslims is not communism¹⁹; it is indeed West. The organization contradicts all kinds of ideas, values and ideology arising from Western civilization. Therefore, *Hizbu't-Tahrir* was claimed to be communist, especially by the nationalist and *Wertkonservativ* circles in Turkey.²⁰

Hizbu't-Tahrir started its activities in Turkey in 1960s. The name of the organization became widely known by means of the letters sent to lots of journalists, authors and politicians. There were some senior leaders such as Prime Minister and Chief of General Staff among the ones who received letters. In those letters, the non-Islamic structure of the current system was explained, and the leaders were invited to overturn the regime. The members of the organization targeted the society after politicians, and they started to distribute leaflets under the doors of the stores on each street. In those leaflets which they called 'awakening the Muslims from wool-gathering', they explained lots of different issues related with İslam and politics. The leaflets were only a single page mostly. In them,

¹⁹This idea was too radical for those years.

²⁰For instance: Ahmet Kabaklı, who is the founder of the Turkish Intellectual Hearts and who is also a nationalist-*Wertkonservativ*, accused the organization by writing an article named "Hizbu't-Tahrir" for the newspaper **Tercüman** (Interpreter) in 1967.

Fehmi Anlaroğlu, who would be the owner of the newspaper **Akşam** (Evening) in 70s, is the another name accusing Hizbu't-Tahrir with being exogenous and communist, in the journal named **Yol** (Way) which was a weekly journal issued by the nationalists after the 1960 coup d'état. He claimed that the organization's aim was to create anarchy and make the people fight each other (28.07.1967).

From a different perspective, İsmet Giritli, who was a Kemalist and nationalist law professor, accused the members of the organization to use Marxist words, in his article published under the heading "Rising of the sharia" in **Milliyet** (Nationality) (Erkilet, 2015, p. 175).

In the same year, the **Milliyetçiler Derneği** (Nationalist People's Association) made a public announcement and accused Hizbu't-Tahrir to play a pro-caliphate game. The association considered that the organization's hostility against America was an evidence for their partisanship with Russia and communism (Öz A. , 2016, p. 134).

sometimes being a rightist and conservative were indicated as a danger and the current political conjunctures were criticised; sometimes promises and plans such as a draft of the constitution text prepared by *Hizbu't-Tahrir* were declared. The point which was emphasized in all leaflets was that *Hizbu't-Tahrir* would provide 'ummah union' and bring the caliphate back (Atalar K. , 2014, p. 222).

When the period is considered (1960s), it can be seen that such a claim was very new: 'Muslims are pushed to the Western lap by being threatened with communism'. According to this claim, lots of organizations in Turkey, such as 'associations for fighting with communism', had an aim to convince people to believe that the communism was the real urgent danger; even the Turkish Labour Party (TİP) was established to make people feel communism too close for comfort. Hizbut-Tahrir claimed that the real duty of TİP was to frighten Muslims with communism in order to enable them to join the fight side by side with regime, and therefore to save the real but secret enemies: Western countries and laicism. Besides, according to the organization, the duties of the rightist parties were to calm people down by acting like they consider the desires of the people, to gain their support and therefore integrate them into the system (Erkilet, 2015, pp. 157-166). In other words, in the eyes of the organization, the system serves for the Western civilization with all its rightists (conservatives) and leftists (communists).

The *Hizbu't-Tahrir* was introduced as an armed terrorist organization in the Turkish press of those years; however, it has a structure preferring gradualism instead of violence. It sees Islam as a whole with its spiritual and worldly aspects; and it considers state as one of the integral parts of the whole. According to the organization, the primary thing to do is to establish a skeleton crew consisting of intellectual people. This crew should be able to comprehend the culture of the organization and explain it to the masses. So as seen, the first step is education. The second step consists of contacts with society and efforts to convince people. Since it is obvious that any of the existing regimes do not accept this step, *Hizbu't-Tahrir* warns its members from all countries to be prepared for the potential pressures they will encounter and to work hard. The third and the last step is coming to power. If the organization can reach this step and be supported by the people, it will come to power and set in an Islamic order. However, power is not an aim but a result in *Hizbu't-Tahrir* 's philosophy. Therefore, the organization strongly opposes any minor attempt to join in the existing order on grounds of the claim that such an attempt does nothing but legitimizes the system (Faruki S. T., 2014, pp. 123-165).

Although Ercüment Özkan left *Hizbu't-Tahrir* by falling into sharp opinion differences, he stated that he benefited from the basic philosophy of the organization throughout his lifetime. As a matter of fact, Özkan's group read the book named *İslam Nizami* (Islamic Order) of Nebhanî's in the courses (Arslantaş S. , 2013, p. 252). Likewise, they adopted Nebhanî's gradual transformation idea (Atalar M. K., 2002). Within the framework of this step-by-step method, it was the period between 1970 and 1980 when Özkan completed the first stage, namely, forming a core staff. Similarly, he also adopted the gradual transformation as a method (Atalar, 2002). The period between 1970 and 1980 can be considered as the period where Özkan completed creating the skeleton crew of the organization, namely the first step. *İktibas* was the product of the public offering phase, which was the second step. The third step was to be the social and political transformation movement under the guidance of *İslam Partisi* (Islamic Party); however, even the idea of establishing such a party created some problems between Özkan and people around him. Nevertheless, he attempted to establish the party, but it mired down.²¹

Another ideal arising from *Hizbu't-Tahrir* and affected Ercüment Özkan is ummah. Similarly, it can be observed that Özkan proposes to use the same methods of Tahrir for re-establishing caliphate. However, Özkan's understanding of caliphate is different from the one for *Hizbu't-Tahrir*. At the head of those differences, there are the qualifications and conditions of being caliph. The organization claims that the caliph should be an Arab; on the other hand, Özkan claims that being an Arab or Turkish does not matter; Muslims should not be racist, and therefore the caliph should not necessarily be Arab. Besides, different from the organization, Özkan thinks that it is not beneficial to bring up the subject of caliphate in the first hand. According to him, it is unnecessary to talk about it until the society has the desire to re-establish the caliphate. So, he did not dwell on the issue of caliphate when publishing *İktibas*. Rather, he tried to address the religious and worldly problems of the Muslims.

²¹For more details, see: (*İktibas*, 1996)

2.2. What is *İktibas*?

2.2.1. The Features and The Publication Line of *İktibas*

The journal *İktibas* started to be published on January 1981 and -except from a few short pauses- it is continued to be published today. As of January 2020, it turned out its 40th years and 493rd issue was published. It had been published once in 15 days for the first four years; by its fifth year -1985-, it was transformed into monthly journal. In August 1987, the journal was paused to be published for two years since the owner Ercüment Özkan had a hemiplegia. In December 1989, it was started to be re-published with the conflate October-December issue.

In addition to Ercüment Özkan, there were such names as Süleyman Arslantaş, Memduh Kars, Eflatun Saygılı and Abdullah Kızıltan in the crew which created the journal. *İktibas* is a ‘periodicals scan magazine’. This expression explicitly shows the nature of the journal; it consists of quoting and compiling some parts of the agenda-oriented periodicals which are published both domestically and abroad. In the first issue, the number of journals and newspapers analysed by *İktibas* was given as 425. Besides, it was also indicated that the journal is the first and only of a kind in Turkey (Selamlayarak, 1981, p. 1). It was started to be published as 32 pages and the number of pages were increased after it was transformed into a monthly journal.

In the first issue, Ercüment Özkan, as the owner and the chief editor of the journal, indicated the aims of *İktibas* as follows:

We want to make our people to be aware of the issues going on around them in Turkey and in the world. ... We want you to learn the opinions of both the rulers of the world and their advisors. And we also want to help remove the inevitable deficiencies of not being able to read a newspaper or a journal. Therefore ... we can contribute to our readers to obtain necessary information to think in higher levels and more comprehensively (1981, p. 1).

After Ercüment Özkan wrote about his experiences for more than twenty years on cutting collection under the Press and News Agency and indicated that they follow the news of several media organs from Formosa to Canada and from Japan to England in the text, he informed the readers about the nature of *İktibas* as follows:

We will try to present the comments, news, interviews, articles, photographs and caricatures which we determined as important from the press of several countries with a consistent manner (1981, p. 1).

By the year when the journal started to be published, the Press and News Agent (1960), which was established by Özkan with his own means, had been active for twenty years in Ankara. Besides, Özkan also bought another press office called Interpress, which was located in İstanbul and which had been serving as a clipping compilation office since 1940s. So, he extended his area of activity from Ankara to Istanbul. In other words, clipping compilation was Ercüment Özkan's profession. That is why he designed the journal on the same format.

The motto of *İktibas* is 'it provides an insight'. In accordance with its name and motto, it is possible to say that it was only consisting of the quotations at the beginning. There were scarcely any copyright chapters written by the author himself in the journal. The only copyright chapters of the journal were *Selam İle* (With Regards) and *Yorum* (Comments), until the 25th issue. *Selam İle* is the introduction chapter of the journal which generally is called as *Editorial* in most journals and magazines. But, different from the usual *Editorials*, this chapter does not only sum up the content of the relevant issue of the journal. Nearly each of those articles has its own topic. Because of this, two books consisting of the articles under *Selam İle* was published.

In the second copyright chapter, *Yorum*, there are some evaluations on the current issues of Turkey and of the world, especially the regions where the Muslims live. The primary issues of the world's politics and their effects on Turkey and other Muslim communities are the top issues of *Yorum*. Besides, the system which is ruling the world, leaders of this system and their policies are evaluated and interpreted in this chapter. In other words, those chapters are based on the local and global politics, and their authors are not indicated openly. *İktibas* is written as the author there. But it is known that Özkan was the author of the most of them.

A new chapter was added to the journal as from the 25th issue: *Kavramlar* (Concepts). Ercüment Özkan indicates the aim of this chapter as "to reveal the meanings disembodied from the conventional culture related to the concepts in the Qur'an". According to him, "starting something accurately is only possible with thinking accurately on the nature of humanity and objects" and only an accurate start can make us to reach the true result (2010, pp. 13-19). Ercüment Özkan, who considered the act of thinking as the pre-condition for

creating awareness, was observed to believe that accepting given information without questioning it and transferring it from one generation to other is not true. Even though the meanings of the words analysed in *Kavramlar* are not investigated in detail semantically, the diachronic semantic shifts and how the relevant concept separated from its original context are analysed. This chapter is generally written to create awareness for Muslims. It is seen that it was a deliberate action in order to clear the minds of people by making concepts to re-gain their original meanings. The main aim of adding this chapter to the journal can be summarized as making people be aware of the things they do while both living and believing. That is why, when the articles under this chapter were collected in a book, the book was named as *İnanmak ve Yaşamak* (Believing and Living).

The *Kavramlar* chapter has a special place for the crew of *İktibas*; because in this chapter, the journal undertakes the mission to build the intelligence of its readers. Therefore, the scope of concepts is very wide; on one hand the words and concepts from religious terminology such as are *Rab* (Lord), *din* (religion), *Rabbani yöntem* (godly method), *tevhid* (monotheism), *keramet* (prophecy), *mezhep* (religious sect), *tasavvuf* (Islamic Sufism) and *faiz* (interest); and on the other hand the words and concepts from modern terminology such as *demokrasi* (democracy), *laiklik* (laicism), *hümanizm* (humanism), *özgürlük* (freedom), *rasyonalizm* (rationalism), *deizm* (deism), *hoşgörü* (tolerance) and *liberalizm* (liberalism) were analysed (Atalar M. K., 2019, p. 228). So, it can be observed that the aim was to build a mentality which is both religious and earthly, i.e. holistic.

Since 1982, they started to add some chapters of the books in the journal. Those chapters which are presented under the chapter named *Bir Kitap* (A Book) are sometimes quoted from novels, sometimes from academic books and sometimes from non-academic books of ideas. Another chapter, (*Okuyucuya/Okuyucudan*) *Mektuplar* (Letters from/to Readers) presents the replies for the letters from readers. *İktibas* crew provides detailed explanations for especially the questions related to religious comprehension there. Those letters came to the journal and their replies were also collected and published on the second volume of the book *Selam İle*. In the following issues, it is possible to see copyright articles written and signed by the authors in *İktibas*. Although most of them were related to regional and global political issues, there were also numerous articles related to ‘understanding Islam accurately’.

The name of the expressions such as ‘understanding Islam accurately’ or ‘original Islam’ for Ercümen Özkan is ‘pure Islam’ (*arî-duru İslam*). It is necessary to consider the

expression *pure Islam* for internal definitions with Geertzian approach. This is because *pure Islam* is more explanatory conception for indicating Özkan's apprehension of Islam than the expressions such as 'original Islam' etc. Alev Erkilet summarized the content of the expression *pure Islam* as follows:

... Özkan aimed to remove the non-Islamic impurities from Islam with his intellectual and political energy. According to Özkan; Islam should be cleared of (a) the opinions which were imposed through conventional religion, but are not related to religion, and (b) the opinions imposed by the modern/Western/secular ideologies. ... It is only possible to clear Islam of the impurities coming from the conventional and secular ideologies by understanding the Qur'an and Sunnah accurately (2015, pp. 109-110).

In addition to its content, 'arî-duru' (pure) itself is an Anatolian and simple Turkish expression. By preferring this expression which is free from all academic associations, understandable by ordinary people and used in daily life; Özkan showed that his audiences are regular people. In other words, his primary aim is not to suggest academic theories, but is to reach the people and explain his opinions to them.

Özkan characterized his apprehension of *pure Islam* as 'fundamentalist' and 'radical'. He did not hesitate to state that he adopted a radical approach for Islam. He defined radicalism as going back to the basics of religion, i.e. Qur'an. According to him, all Muslims who consider Qur'an as the building block for Islam should be radical, since radicalism actually means living under the conditions of Qur'an which is the root of Islam. He thought that the only way for the Muslims who are suffering around the world to be safe is adopting radical Islam; in other words, peace is possible by clarifying the Islam conception by returning to Qur'an and sunnah which are the root of Islam. And it is the only possible way to be a true Muslim as ordered by the Creator and to show an existence which would be an alternative for all of the systems and structures in the world (Selam İle, 1985, p. 2). Since Özkan defined the concept of radical Islamist as such, it was not a problem for him to be called as radical Islamist.²² However, he is uncomfortable with the identification of radical Islam with violence (Terör (Dehşet), 1990, p. 13). He always sought for an organized, sivil

²²Ercümen Özkan thought that he is the person who brought the radical Islam -in the way which was defined by him- to Turkey (Bircan & Atalar, 1997).

and unarmed opposition. He had never supported terrorism and he always criticised the armed actions performed in the name of Islam.²³

In terms of its line, *İktibas* resembles other radical Islamic journals²⁴ started to be published before it; however, it has some methodological differences with them. First of all, it is possible to observe that *İktibas* stays out of sloganist expressions. It does not adopt a fighting method supported by the capitalized words and aggressive sentences. It does not try to present the ideas by sloganizing them for the readers. It does adopt a more methodological attitude. It makes its readers to think and also tries to provide a method for connecting one event to another in order to realize the whole. It is also explicitly indicated on every occasion that the crew's aim is to teach some methods of obtaining an accurate knowledge to their readers. Therefore, it is possible to say that it is a methodological journal. As frequently emphasized in the journal; the main target for publishing the journal consists of providing an intellectual infrastructure for the readers; and therefore, making them reach a level of awareness enabling them to make multidimensional analyses even when they are reading the daily news.

İktibas is observed to inform its readers about the recent issues in Turkey and in the world within specific periods. The significant point here is that “the journal predicted the effects of the globalization and communication technology at a very early level” (Alpman, 2019, p. 287). The crew of the journal observed that enabling Islamic thought to be effective in global level depends on its ability to follow the global developments closely and -by this means- also on being able to develop grounded strategies. Besides, as indicated above, a mentality which sees Turkey as a part of Western culture dominated Turkey in 80s. In such a conjuncture, it is emphasized in the journal that Turkey is a Muslim country, therefore it should fight against imperialism -both capitalism and communism- with the other Muslim countries (Alpman, 2019, s. 288).

In *İktibas*, the quoted news were “interpreted as open intelligence materials (*açık istihbarat malzamesi*) to reveal the games played on the Middle East” (Alpman, 2019, p.

²³Kürşad Atalar, who is one of the members of the *İktibas* crew, selected the radicalism of Ercüment Özkan against violence as a subject for his doctoral dissertation (2002) which he completed in the Department of Political Sciences of ODTÜ (Middle East Technical University). Atalar, who compares this attitude with the violence-based radicalism of Hezbollah, prepared a study revealing the different dimensions of radicalism as a concept and of the thought and action patterns of Özkan (Atalar M. K., 2002).

²⁴ Özkan, stated that “*İktibas* was started to be published in 1981; however, it was not the year when we cried as a newborn”. He indicated that his ideas and actions had a 20-year history, but they were transformed into a formal journal only in 1981 (Bircan & Atalar, 1997).

288). According to the crew, persistently following the agenda would provide a multidimensional and a strong perspective for readers in the long run. Through such persistency, the readers would be able to realize the invisible whole behind its visible parts.

Especially two points related to the references of the *İktibas* are also unusual. The first point is the wideness in the range of references: lengthening along from **Cumhuriyet** (Republic) to **Milli Gazete** (National Newspaper) or from **Mavera** (Beyond the Visible World) to **Saklambaç** (Hide and Seek) in domestic press on the one hand, and from **Newsweek** to **Mirror of Jihad** in foreign press on the other. The second point is that the leftist publications are quoted more than the conservative ones. For instance, **Cumhuriyet** is the most quoted newspaper in total 132 issues of the journal between 1981, when the journal was started to be published, and 1989, when the Soviet Union was collapsed. The total number of quotations from **Cumhuriyet** is 739. Right after came **Milliyet** newspaper with the number of 471 quotations. **Cumhuriyet** was quoted nearly twice as much as its closest rival (Bakacak, 2019). It is important to take into account that the relevant 132 issues were published within the Cold War era, when the primary danger for Muslims is coded as communism and the leftist publications are not taken kindly.

The newspaper called **Cumhuriyet** was one of the most obvious representatives of the left wing within the ideological range of the Turkish press in 1980s. It expresses its aim of existence as follows: “**Cumhuriyet** will endeavour to separate the intellect from bigotry, the science from religion; and to make society adopt the principle of laicism through the way of ‘enlightenment’ provided by Atatürk’s reforms and principles” (Cumhuriyet, 2019). Well, how could it be possible that a journal which describes itself as radical fundamental Islamist, which indicates that the current regime is taghut, and which defends the idea that the secular principle should be abolished, the current regime should be overturned and an Islamic state should be founded quoted most from a newspaper which was established by Atatürk himself and which sees itself as the guardian of the laic Kemalist regime; even in the Cold War period? The crew of *İktibas* predicted that such question would be asked by their readers. So, they immediately answer such a prospective in the second issue of the journal as follows:

The articles we include in our journal cannot be taken kindly by some of you due to the attitudes of the newspapers and journals we quoted from. And some of you even dislike some of them completely. On the contrary, some of you may like some of them totally. We do not give credit any of the foregoing criteria. As *İktibas* crew, we will present the articles

which are considered “to be definitely read by other”, regardless of the attitude of the newspaper or the journal they are published on. ... We want you to discover the truth and know the facts (Selam İle, 1981b, p. 1).

They re-mentioned this point in the fourth issue, because of the several reactions coming from the readers. They indicated that the aim of *İktibas* is “to enable the people living in Turkey to communicate each other without weapons and fights, and help them to unite on the truth” (Selam İle, 1981c). Nevertheless, it can be observed that readers continued to criticise them, since they repeated their explanations in many of the following issues.

However, the crew insisted on the diversity of ideas and was determined not to change this diversity despite all of the criticisms. This is because of the major point which is emphasized in almost each issue of the journal: not to be willing to settle for the given. According to the crew, people should do researches on the issues given to them and try to see the same issues from different perspectives, rather than settling for what is given to them; it is the only way to reach the true information. However, multi-perspectivism is not a guarantee for the right behaviour. According to the journal crew, the first and most important step for having the right behaviour is the obligation to have a right method.

Method of *İktibas* and Persistence to Be Methodological

According to Ercüment Özkan, in every subject, it is the method that will enable a thought with a potential power to be transformed from force to action. He thought that random actions which are not based on a method cannot reveal the expected results. Therefore, all kinds of actions from boiling water to announcing Islam should be performed within the frame of the relevant methods (İslami (Rabbani) Metod, 1990). It can also be observed that he adhered to a specific method in all of his articles. Simplicity and comprehensibility are the two main factors which are essential in his method. It can also be observed that other authors of *İktibas* also pay attention for those two factors. They avoid from writing extremely long and abstract articles; they rather preferred short ones with concrete examples.

A method with three stages can be observed for the articles of *İktibas*, especially for the ones written by Ercüment Özkan. At the first stage, the words and concepts related to the analysed topic are explained. The explanations start with the etymology of the words; the meanings of the relevant words are provided, their terminological uses and daily uses are

compared, and then –if any– the changes on the meanings are mentioned. At the second stage, history of the topic in question is provided by going to the possible earliest past. At the third and final stage, the relation of the topic with the human life and Islam is explained.

The main purpose of this method, which is observed on each articles of the journal crew, is to be as much clear and comprehensible as possible. The crew believe that the way to provide this is to explain exactly what it means when using a concept. Because, only in this way can a language unity be created between them and the people. According to the crew of *İktibas*, only people meaning same thing through using same words can understand each other. The ones using the same words but meaning different things cannot communicate suitably. Those people are condemned to misunderstand each other. The important thing is to be sure that the readers or respondents do not have any kind of question marks in their minds.

According to Ercüment Özkan, presenting the meanings of the concepts and perceptions, which have been imprinted on people's minds, can reveal whether they think suitable for Islam or not. Since the only possible way to achieve the right goals is walking on the right ways, those ways should be mapped semantically via the concepts whose borders are explicit. Otherwise people lose their ways in incoherencies and discrepancies. According to Özkan, the main reason for the disasters the Muslims have been exposed to for ages is that they lost their semantic maps. Since they do not have any kind of map, they lost their ties with Islam and therefore they also lost their ways. The primary thing which Muslims need in order to re-create their semantic maps is to recognize the concepts they use (*Düşmanın Silahı ile Silahlanmak*, 1984). Therefore, *İktibas* introduces not only the religious concepts, but also the modern concepts and systems which people can use or heard in their daily lives. Then it starts to analyse the relation of those concepts with Islam. Thus, a multidimensional picture is provided for all relevant concepts.

If a person does not understand and comprehend an issue in itself, it is not possible for him/her to explain it others clearly. Based on this fact, Özkan thought that each person should start explaining issues on himself/herself. By this way the person will be competent on the issue he/she wants to explain. However, being competent on an issue is not enough, it is also necessary to learn how to explain it clearly and simply. It is the comprehension method for Özkan. If a person explains an issue which he/she does not know completely, he/she can make it worse for his/her listeners; this is because it is not possible to achieve a complete and accurate result through incomplete knowledge. (*Tebliğ ve Parti*, 1990). Therefore,

people should teach themselves before others. They also should not forget to think in a multidimensional manner.

In *İktibas*, it is claimed that not only the Islamic or humanitarian attitudes, but also the political attitudes can be developed within a frame of a method. According to the journal, there are three essential rules to form a deep political opinion for a person. The first rule is to follow not only the local news, but also the global ones. If someone does not follow the news continuously, it is not possible for him/her to understand the facts underlying the events. Therefore, according to the journal, it is compulsory to follow the agenda continuously and extensively at both micro and macro levels in order to have clear opinions, to comprehend the big picture and to understand the invisible deep relations. The second rule is to reach a specific minimum level of knowledge. In order for a person to obtain useful results by following up the current issues, he/she should have a certain level of culture. Knowing accurately is more important than knowing a lot; this is often emphasized in the journal. Besides, the necessity to start with the basic information is indicated. As a matter of fact, learning is not an instant action; rather, it is a process. Since it needs time, people should give themselves time; and meanwhile, they should keep learning without persistently. They will see that their knowledge will increase day by day. In other words, people need to be patient about learning; they should make an effort to understand and should not give up when they have trouble with comprehension. The third rule for the formation of political opinion is to evaluate each event under its own unique conditions. It is not possible to comprehend the nature of an event without being aware of the context, era and conditions related to it. Neglecting leads to have inaccurate and incoherent knowledge. For instance, according to the *İktibas* crew, several verses and hadiths are ruptured from their actual contexts and used in a way that their original meaning does not indicate. This results odd thoughts and behaviours that Islam totally disapproves. Therefore, the importance of contextual thinking is emphasized a lot in the journal. The formation of political opinion is held seriously and from a methodological approach in the journal; because, according to the crew, it is a religious duty (*fardh*) for each Muslim to have a political opinion (Siyasi Düşüncenin Teşekkülü, 1985). However, having a political opinion and claim is completely different from entering politics, in the eyes of *İktibas* crew. Being a part of the politics and even voting within the current system are strongly criticised by the journal.

As seen in the section up to here, *İktibas* attaches great importance to being methodological in every issue ranking from thinking to taking action. The journal explains

the methods to learn and to make the information useful to its readers for several times. This is because the crew realized that even a little information which could be obtained in the “cold atmosphere of 12 September”²⁵ should not be underestimated. Because, the communication technologies were not as advanced as today’s technologies; there was a single channel to watch from TV, several books were banned, most press outlets were closed and the ones which had not been closed were censored. According to the journal, the important thing was making the available limited information useful. However, the only problem was not reaching the information here. It is more important to distinguish the true information from the false one and the facts from the fictions within a manipulative information chaos. In order to make it clearer, it is necessary to analyse the internal and external conjunctures of the era at stake.

2.2.2. The Conjuncture When *İktibas* Began to be Published

İktibas started to be published only a couple of months after 1980 Turkish coup d’état. The military forces were controlling the country and the martial law was still in force. It was also the era of the Cold War at the world level. Meanwhile, the Iranian Islamic Revolution had not completed its second year yet, and it was only a few more than a year since the Afghanistan Jihad had started. Therefore, the conditions of the region were pretty critical, and the two biggest dominant forces, USA and USSR, had just gave up from far Asia and had turned their eyes on the Middle East.

External Conjuncture

The phrase Cold War is used for the “controlled tension” (Erkilet, 2019, p. 139) between the USSR controlled Eastern Block and the USA controlled Western Block between 1946 and 1990. The two superpowers of the age, USA and USSR, did not fight in a hot war on their own lands. However, they controlled the proxy wars through their satellite states and finally they managed to transform the whole world into a bipolarized field by establishing a wide propaganda network (Roberts, 2017, pp. 677-682).

²⁵This expression was used by Ercüment Özkan in several texts and speeches.

In 1945, England, USA and Russia agreed to establish a cordon sanitaire for themselves, in Yalta. The benefit of this cordon sanitaire for the countries in question is that it “undertook an exterritoriality function which enable both sides of the agreement to act as they want within their own blocks and prevent them to interfere each other”. Besides, “while this cordon ensured that the parties would not fight each other, on the other hand, it allowed each of them to spread and dominate over their own sphere of influence”. Thus, an imperialist alliance was established (Erkilet, 2019, s. 139). In other words, the super powerful countries shared the world among themselves.

It was realized within the following ten years that the aforementioned sharing put all the countries of the world in a dependence spiral. USA used a heavy anti-communist discourse in the countries under its sphere of influence. In 1953, in the presidency of Eisenhower, religion and spiritual doctrines became a tool for fighting against so-called Soviet communist threat (Herzog, 2012, pp. 57-58). The image of the devout USA struggling against godlessness began to be used in order to get religious people of Muslim majority countries to take a fancy to America.

At first, Islamic political movements were supported by USA, as a means for its anti-communist aims. This support policy “served two important functions for the West in the ‘struggle against communism.’ First, it was a way of making the Muslim population of the Caucasus and Central Asia -viewed as the USSR’s ‘Achilles Heel’- less dependent on Moscow. Second, it helped create a conservative counterweight to the secular Arab nationalist regimes in the Middle East with which Moscow had forged close ties” (Özkan B. , 2019, p. 3).

As long as anti-colonist and anti-block nonalignment movements have expanded growingly (Zileli, 2006), USA started to pay more attention to the policies related to Islamic movements. The Green Belt was born in such an environment. It is a project for preventing SU from having a ground in especially Middle East, by using religion as an ideology against socialism (Çakır, 2017). The project was developed by Zbigniew Brzezinski, in 1977. According to him, Islam could have been a shield against communism in Muslim majority regions. An addition was made after 1979 Iranian revolution: Sunni religious groups should have been supported so that Shia Iran could not export revolution. In these years, the Voice of America radio station was sometimes referring to Islam, and injecting 'green antidote to red poison' through anti-communist broadcasts (Kiraz, 2007, p. 185).

1979 was a year of very interesting events for Muslims. In February, the Iranian Islamic Revolution took place and it became a source of hope for the Islamists. It was regarded like an embodiment of decades-long-dreams. In November, Juhayman al-Otaybi occupied al-Masjid al-Haram (Kaaba) and since the Saudi Arabia failed to overcome the issue, it demanded support from France. The veil of mystery on the issue has not lifted yet. However, it is a fact that Saudi Arabia became more and more radical since then and adopted assertive Wahhabism (BBC, 2019). Again in December of the same year, Afghanistan started to resist against USSR forces which occupied its lands.²⁶ The common feature of the Iranian Islamic Revolution and the Afghanistan jihad is that they made Muslim people become hopeful about a possible third way. Besides, they became a hope for all 'third world countries' in which people had believed that fighting with imperialism was just waste of time and that the order would keep to be ruled by the superpowers and they would not be able to get rid of this loop whatever they did. This is because, the so-called 'third world' countries regarded both Iranian Islamic Revolution and the Afghan resistance as evidences of breakability of the imperialist order (Erkilet, 2019, p. 141).

After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, the USA launched the Green Belt Project in this region to surround the Soviet Union and prevent it from going south. In this context, the USA propagated that jihad had been a neglected duty by Muslims for years and that the occupation of Afghanistan was a very good opportunity for Muslims to fulfil their duty. According to this propaganda, there could be no better opportunity than this; because, the Soviet Union was a godless, irreligious and evil empire which deserved to be fight against. (Kepel, 2006; Ribuffo, 2005) In this context, Muslim warriors were created that highlighted the radical interpretation of Islam and acted accordingly. Muslims, gathered from the Islamic geography, Europe and America, were put under ideological and military training in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and were fought against the Soviet Union. By promoting Political Islam, the USA also aimed at preventing local pro-independency nationalist governments from taking anti-Westernist measures. As seen, the USA chose to use religion as a tool of its hegemonic politics. In the Cold War era, the most suitable tool, from the aspect of the USA, to fight against the Soviet Union was the jihadist-ideological interpretation of Islam. In other words, Political Islam emerged as a product of the global power struggle rather than the

²⁶ The Afghanistan War "forced people to accept that the Soviet Union had a colonial war in this country. This acceptance caused serious problems especially for some people on the left wing" (Roy, 1984, p. 20)

internal conflict of Muslims; it was one of the products of the USA's Cold War winning strategy (Mamdani, 2005, pp. 20-27).

There were also some internal reasons which fed the radicalism. The main ones can be listed as follows:

- Ineffective economic management,
- The growing gap between rich oil bosses and poor people,
- Increasing unemployment due to rural-urban migration, and growth of population,
- the public's inability to disclose their complaints due to authoritarian regimes (Jawad, 1997, p. 157; Waltz, 1986, p. 665).

The Green Belt project became visible mostly in Afghanistan. USA trained anti-Soviet jihadist organizations via CIA. USA, which determined to make the Soviet Union a Vietnam-like defeat in Afghanistan, with his support for radical organizations, he turned the Afghan war into the bloodiest war among the ones in the region until then (Mamdani, 2005, p. 120). Çakır claims that the reason behind such a great support was Iranian Revolution. It disturbed USA; because, it was neither closed to America nor to Soviet Russia (Çakır, 2017). On the other hand, Mahir Kaynak claims that America got prepared the ground for a revolution under the leadership of Sheriat Medari. However, SU and France ruined America's plans by bringing Khomeini to Iran from Europe; and they changed the direction of the revolution (Kaynak, 2012).

At the end of 1979, when USA coasted the ex-shah in New York, Khomeini declared America as the Great Satan (Mamdani, 2005, p. 121). Then in 1985, American president Reagan hosted a group of Afghan mujahids and made such a statement on Media: "These gentlemen are the moral equivalent of America's founding fathers" (Mamdani, 2005, p. 119)

After the second half of the 70s, in the Islamic world, the barrel slowly began to turn towards America. USA, which had seen as 'the lesser of two evils' against the 'irreligious communism' until then, started to lose its reputation. The idea of an Islamic Union became evident among Muslims. Some exciting publications on the themes of resistance and freedom increased in number. The inner-group expressions of the 1960s based on saving the

faith and staying away from politics left its place to some efforts for 'Islamization of knowledge'²⁷ and searches for new political philosophy, especially in the 1980s.

Meanwhile, Afghan war came to the end and coasted a heavy price for USA in the forthcoming days; because, pro-violence wave of radical Islam aimed at the whole West as its new enemy. The existent authoritarian regimes in the Middle East fell behind blocking radical Islamic movements. Moreover, they were strengthening the ground of legitimacy of those organizations; because their authoritarian nature caused people to embrace radical Islam. So, America had developed another project at the end of 1980s. Moderate Islam began to be supported in order to prevent the spread of radical Islam. The aims of Moderate Islam project were: 1) restraining young people from tending towards radicalism, 2) democratizing Middle East in the long run. Muslim Brothers was one of the legs of this project the other leg is Refah Party in Turkey but the cooperation between Refah and USA did not last long. Then USA tended towards the progressive wing within Refah represented by Abdullah Gül and Recep Tayyip Erdogan. This alliance lasted until the Arab Spring. Up to this time, Moderate Islam project of USA stayed the course; Middle Eastern countries gradually adopted democracy. But, as from Arab Spring, USA abandoned at all projects related with Islam and began to put both Radical and Moderate Islam in the same equation, and to shift the blame on whole Islam. According to Çakır, USA's this attitude is a way to abnegate from at own wrong policies. USA has continuously used some organizations against some others for its self-interest, but at every turn it failed to take into account the fact that those organizations would want to support themselves without depending on USA. At the end, the ones who were supported by USA stood against it in each time and the problem was growing (Çakır, 2017).

The *third* way trend was a tendency to find a new way between communism and capitalism. It affected many Middle East countries, especially Egypt. Besides there was Non-alignment Movement which gathered the -so called- Third World countries together under the roof of the idea to get rid of any kind of alignment. Interestingly, Turkey did not interest

²⁷ İsmail Râcî Fârûkî (d. 1986) stated that they did not realize the fact that the Western information system was in conflict with Islamic epistemology, while the first Islamist generation advocated taking the science and technology of the West exactly. For this reason, knowledge must first be Islamized (Faruki İ. R., 2012). According to Farukî, "There are five basic steps towards the Islamification of knowledge. These can be listed as follows: (1) Learning modern disciplines well; (2) To penetrate the Islamic cultural heritage; (3) To provide a unique harmony and compromise between all fields of modern science and Islam; (4) To develop methods for an efficient composition between Islamic cultural heritage and modern knowledge; (5) To put Islamic thought into a framework which will perform the divine model and make it operable." (Öztürk, 2012, p. 41)

in neither of them. It maintained its position from the beginning and to the end. Even after the end of the Cold War, Turkey -with a little fear that USA would not need it anymore- was reluctant to leave the Cold War discourse and to rectify the counterinsurgency structures of the era (Örnek, 2015, pp. 32, 75).

Internal Conjecture:

During the Cold War, Turkey took its side with USA without any hesitation and never changed its position. It adopted not only an attitude towards the Soviet Union as its foreign policy, but also a strict anti-communist attitude as its domestic policy. Sometimes Turkey even behaved more anti-communist than USA which was central for the actual anti-communist attitude. This is because after the Vietnam War got into a dilemma, America's official discourse²⁸ started to be interrogated from inside. At the beginning of 1970s, some important arguments especially among academic circles were raised indicating that both the Cold War and anti-communist discourse were indeed nothing but USA hegemony's struggle for authority. Even under such circumstances, Turkey did not leave its anti-communist attitude.

When it is traced back, it can be observed that the anti-communism in Turkey started before the Cold War. For instance, during the World War II, USA was in league with the Soviet Union when the Nazis attacked to the SU. This attitude indicated that USA had not considered communism as its greatest enemy yet. However, Turkey took sides with the Nazi Germany in the same period. Nazi windblow even led the men in Turkey to prefer toothbrush moustache (preferred by Hitler) as a fashion back then. During WWII, Turkey even invited Western countries to stand against the Soviet Union by claiming that both SU and communism were a threat for the world at international level (Örnek, 2015, p. 31). From this aspect, it can be clearly observed that Turkey had had both anti-Soviet and anti-communist attitudes before having close relations with America.

²⁸ The Cold War attitude was based on the contrasts with the sense of Orientalism. According to this attitude; the "kind-hearted" and "hero" Americans fight with "irreligious" communism by putting their heart and soul into it not only for themselves but also for protecting the "freedom" of whole world and to save the people from "slavery". One of the primary reasons to emphasize the concepts of economic and social "freedom" is to decrease the sense of favour for "equality" which has an importance in socialist literature. As a matter of fact, this policy yielded results and the discussions on freedom left the discussions on equality behind during the Cold War period (Örnek, 2015, s. 23).

Russia was the leading actor responsible for Ottoman territorial lost and for the traumas following this. Besides, Europe was among wreckages of the two world wars, and so it was far remote from being a hegemonic centre. Under such circumstances, Turkey regarded that the most reasonable choice for it to have close political and military relationships with USA. On the other hand, The United States gave green light to this proximity since it realized that it can assign Turkey as the police force for Middle East. Therefore, the Cold War was a period when the USA and Turkey had not only close relations, but also a complete engagement; the American attitudes were adopted in all levels from politics to bureaucracy and even to the universities. It was also a period in which employing American experts in senior public institutions started to be normalized. In other words, American effect were everywhere. The interesting part was that the Kemalists, who adopted the ideal of complete independency without any kind of engagement as a final destination, kept silent about the clearly hegemonic relations established with USA during the Cold War. Yet they had had hesitations against all Western countries at the first years of the Republic. Even so, Kemalists collaborated with Islamists to fight against communism, although they was at daggers drawn with Islamists (Örnek, 2015, p. 30). From this aspect, anti-communism became a unifier for the two incompatible poles in Turkey.

Since 1950s, several anti-communism associations were established around Turkey. Most of them were founded by the Turkish nationalists who had previously been racist and pan-Turanist. However, they had to evolve to a more nationalist-Wertkonservativ line as a result of the later conditions. Besides, an Anti-communism Commission was established in TBMM (Grand National Assembly of Turkey) (Meşe, 2016, pp. 117-119). All those are indicators of how people perceive communism as a threatening factor. In the creation of such a perception, media had as much important role as politics. Within this context, communism became the greatest enemy uniting some different groups who were in conflict with each other in the country.

Any kind of obvious objection from the Kemalists related to the characteristics and size of the relations established with USA was not raised until 60s. Even though some objections related to USA can be observed after 60s, they were away from being essentialist and most of them could not go further from being critics for the existing government. In other words, the relations with USA were not criticized, instead the USA was used as an tool to criticise the existing government. A similar approach was adopted by the nationalists and Wertkonservatives. They represented the mainstream within the Islamism; and they also did

not criticize the manifestation of anti-Sovietism in the form of engagement with the United States (Örnek, 2015). On the contrary, close relations with USA were legitimized through the assumptions indicating that USA's people of the book were fighting with irreligiousness.²⁹

When religion factor became prominent within the anti-communist discourse, the USA bias seemed to have established a solid legitimacy ground among nationalist-Wertkonservatives. It also created such a perception that they found a common ground with West. Thus, the nationalist-Wertkonservatives who can be called as second generation Islamists³⁰ started to think that they solved the dilemma of 'adopting the technique of the Western countries, but not adopting their morality' which the first generation had got stuck in (Örnek, 2015, pp. 322, 328). The logic here worked as such: If the Western countries were also defending religion like nationalist-Wertkonservatives of Turkey, this meant that technical developments had not created religious and moral collapse; otherwise developed countries would not have defended religion. The natural result of this logic sequence was that there was no reason to take a position against West. Those claims were sufficient enough for the nationalist-Wertkonservatives to believe that moving in concert with the USA was accurate.

Although Kemalists are against communism too, it is possible to say that the nationalist- Wertkonservatives led the anti-communism movements generally. Most of them were "the members of 'sub-middle class' who were not pleased with some practices of Kemalist policies since the single-party period and who are the heartsick young men of Anatolia (*Anadolu'nun bağıri yanık çocukları*) with the concerns for protecting the national and moral values". Meşe provided some interesting information why those people were so enthusiastic about anti-communism:

The anti-communism among the members of this generation was like an olive branch they offered to the republican elites I return for a demand to have a seat in the high politics. In other words, anti-communism became a way for the ones, who cannot accept the top-down imposed concept of nation due to the social values coming from their background, to say 'we are one of you' and 'we

²⁹ For example:

Necip Fazıl Kısıkürek (10.07.1959). Amerika, Dünya ve Biz. *Büyük Doğu*, 19(10), p.1

Said Nursî (1993), *Emirdağ Lahikası*, İstanbul: Sözler Yayınevi. pp. 62-63, 147

³⁰ The differences between the first, second and third generation of Islamists will be explained in Chapter IV, part 3.

are ready for alliance' to the powers and governments against the leftist freedom demands of the people. The people involving the fight against communism tried to get rid of the effects of the disappointments they had against the government as a result of the strict and peremptory practices during the Single Party period by their anti-communist movements and they also tried to enhance the selfdom by believing that they are the real owners and protectors of the nation, state and the religion (Meşe, 2016, p. 228).

However, this dense anti-communism reached sometimes a level that the communist label "turned into a method to declare all kinds of opposing opinions as illegitimate" (Örnek, 2015, p. 63). This label became the primary tool to stigmatize³¹ all around the country. So much so that even radical Islamists such as Ercüment Özkan, who went out of the line of the main Wertkonservativ trend, were exposed to be labelled as communists. However, since calling Islamists as communists would harm the credibility of the anti-communist movement, Islamists were added the adjective 'green' in front of the label 'communists'.

The period especially between 1960 and 1980 was pretty complicated years in terms of Turkish internal politics. During this twenty years, violence and street fights continued to increase. The situation within the country got worse when the political and ideological separations, ruthless discourses and paralysed decision-making mechanism involved in the picture. The violence went beyond the street fights in 1979. The recognized people were started to be assassinated. Meanwhile, the districts were separated into groups and some rebel zones were distinguished. The power of the government was not felt in the streets. Each district was ruled by a group. Meanwhile, there were intense economic problems. The inflation rate raised to 90% at the end of the 1970s; long-term power and water cuts started

³¹ Stigmatization is a kind of labeling that categorizes "people who are pejoratively regarded by the broader society and who are devalued, shunned or otherwise lessened (...) in access to the humanizing benefit of free and unfettered social intercourse" (Alonzo & Reynolds, 1995, p. 304). The word 'stigma' has its origins in Greek. It refers to a sign on the body that is "cut or burnt into the body and advertise[s] that the bearer [is] a slave, a criminal or a traitor". It is also used to refer to "bodily signs of physical disorder". Although the original meaning of stigma indicates physical problems or scars, it is used mostly to define a psychological condition in academic circles today (Goffman, 2009, pp. 1-2). The contemporary conceptualization of stigma belongs to Erving Goffman. He wrote a book about stigma in 1963. According to him stigmatization is used to disgrace an individual or a group by marking them abnormal (Major & O'Brien, 2005, pp. 394-395). He argues that stigma is "a socially constructed deviance label" (Green, 2009, p. 14). A stigma is a mark that someone puts on to others. It is not natural but rather 'constructed'.

Stigmas are used for highlighting differences between the 'normal' and 'other'. They are used as a way of making an 'us versus them' distinction. Stigmatization is the name of the process of otherization "by which the differential attribute is devaluated and discredited and becomes synonymous with deviance" (Green, 2009, p. 15). At the end of the stigmatization process, we are expected to "believe the person with a stigma is not quite human" (Goffman, 2009, p. 5).

to become an ordinary issue; black market trafficking came into force for the basic needs such as sugar and oil; the boat services stopped due to the insufficient amount of fuel. The occasional severe devaluations pulled the value of the Turkish money down to the bottom (Zürcher, 2004, pp. 241-278). The people were so fed up with the increasing conflicts, economic incapacity and weak governments between 1960 and 1980 that almost all of them prayed for the military forces when they made a military coup in 12 September.³²

After all, in September 12th of 1980, the coup d'état was staged by TSK (Turkish Armed Forces). At 4 a.m. the TAF statement was declared on radio. The army seized the control. Paul Henze, who had worked as a CIA Chief of Turkey before, reported it to the US President Jimmy Carter with those words: “the boys in Ankara did it” (Henze, 2019). All of the political parties were dissolved, and their leaders were arrested. A State of Emergency was declared. Going abroad was prohibited. May 1st, the date which is celebrated as Spring and Flower Holiday since 1935, was no longer a festival and a holiday. Similarly, May 27th was stopped being considered as the Democracy Festival.

Since the coup plotters assigned themselves to remove the mess in the political system completely; differently from the previous military coups, they intervened to the municipalities too. All the city councils are discharged. The local commanders started to take care of the local administrations. The National Security Council became the sole hegemon of the country. Soldiers were assigned to manage the education system, chambers of commerce, unions and media organs. The party archives were destroyed. An arrestment wave was started all around the country. Almost 123.000 rightist and leftist people in total were arrested. 20 people were executed in a way “one from left and one from right” (Kızılkoyun, 2012). YÖK (Council of Higher Education) was established and all universities subordinated to it. The deans and rectors were started to be assigned by YÖK.

İktibas began to be published only 3 months after the 1980 coup d'état, under such circumstances that there existed a military control every field. However, since the preparation process of the journal dated back to months ago, the coincidence of printing was not an planned adjustment, but an event that depended on the development of conditions.

³² Evren said “we had though for a year before deciding to intervene”. The explanation approving Evren was made by his former classmate and the II. Army Commander Full General Bedrettin Demirel as: “We had planned it a year ago. But we waited for the conditions to be matured” (Aksiyon, 2009).

2.2.3. The Position of *İktibas* in Islamic Publishing

The most popular issue was saving the faith in the Islamic journals between 1960 and 1980 in Turkey. The communism and Zionism were presented in those journals as factors threatening both faith and the world's order. It is likely to see the discourse that communism was a project built by the Zionists to alienate people from the religion. According to this discourse which gives the impression that it turned into a paranoia from time to time, the aim of the Zionists was to make people whom they could manage to alienate from religions to become their slaves. On the other hand, in normal conditions of the discourse, it emphasized that the greatest enemy was Zionism and communism was its pawn.³³ Therefore; USA, which 'fights' with 'irreligious' communists, seems to be preferred in any case.

The general characteristic of the Islamic journals published between 1960 and 1980 was that they had an anti-/protesting/rejectionist language rather than a positive/promoter language. This sceptical and conspirator attitude towards the world found itself a shelter under the roof of nationalist-conservatism. Therefore, all of the Islamic journals were rightists and most of them were nationalist-conservatives until the second half of the 70s (Erkilet, 2019, p. 143).

When *İktibas* started to be published in 1980s, the intellectual characteristics of the Islamic groups had been shaped by the translated texts since 1960s. It is possible to say that a new Islamic awakening happened within the Islamic movement via the translations of the important people of their age such as Muhammed Hamidullah, Malik bin Nebi and Mevdudî. Translated texts were published by several journals, especially by **Hilal**. However, in 70s, as a result of the outbreak of the multiplexing through the public disintegration and the effects of the aforementioned translations, the adventure of the Islamic publishing nearly

³³ A couple of examples:

Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, "Dünyayı Yahudi GÜDÜYÖR" (Jews Drive the World), Büyük Doğu, 25 Ekim 1967, 13. Cilt 15. Sayı 3. Sayfa.

- "Moskova Lağımının İğrenç Fareleri" (Disgusting Mice of the Moscow Sewer), Büyük Doğu 25 Ekim 1967, 13. Cilt 15. Sayı 10. Sayfa.

- "İslamiyet'i Saran Üç Tehlike Komünizm, Siyonizm, Famosonluk" (The Three Dangers That Covered Islam Communism, Zionism, Freemasonry), İlahi Işık, 15 Nisan 1967, 1. Cilt 13. Sayı 1. Sayfa

"Millet Evladı: KOMÜNİZM NAMUS VE HAYATINI TEHDİT EDİYOR yüce din, büyük devlet, şerefli millet, bölünmez vatan ve gözbebeğin namusunun korunması için; MİLLÎ MÜCADELEMİZİ GÜÇLENDİRELİM"(Children of the Nation: COMMUNISM THREATS YOUR HONOUR AND LIFE, for the protection of the honour of the supreme religion, the great state, the proud nation, the indivisible homeland and the pupil of your eye honour; LET'S STRENGTHEN OUR NATIONAL STRUGGLE), Yeniden Milli Mücadele, 8 Eylül 1970, 1. Cilt 32. Sayı 1. Sayfa

became a “hurly-burly”. Journals have increased both in number and content. This “brought the condemnation of the conflicts between classes to a more harsh language” (Öz A. , 2016, pp. 101,103). Meanwhile, the translations which had not been considered risky in 60s were condemned in 70s, and people such as Cemaleddin Afganî, Seyyid Kutub and Muhammed Hamidullah were marginalised.

While the foregoing incidents were happening within the main rightist and conservative Islamic journalism, the generation growing up with the translation activities separated from them and they gathered under a new trend adopting a new radical attitude. This new trend had a severe and striking jargon. The 60s’ anti-communism discourse left its place for the anti-imperialism and anti-American discourse and the thoughts based Western countries such as democracy and capitalism started to be interrogated. For example, **Şûra**, **Tevhid** and **Hicret** which were published weekly at the end of the 70s live on this trend. Those journals were published between 1978 and 1980 as each other’s follow-up. They followed a radical and pro-ummah line. They were interested in the international conjuncture of their era. They were especially interested in the developments in the countries with a Muslim majority, which are called ummah geography. They were influenced from several intellectual and political movements arisen from those regions. Some of those important movements were occupation of Afghanistan, government change in Pakistan, Iranian Islamic Revolution and the transnational activities of Muslim Brothers. Those journals, which were critical against the internal politics, assumed that the moral and financial liberation of the country would be possible only if state would be an Islamic one. Therefore, they invited Muslims to turn towards to Qur’an by criticising the conventional passive Islam apprehension (Yeşil, 2016).

Especially the Iranian Revolution in 1979 caused a great excitement for the radical pan-Islamist group. Although it was Shiite based, the state was considered finally as an Islamic state and therefore it was perceived as a hope that flourished (Yeşil, 2016, pp. 420-421). Since the pan-Islamist approach advocated that all Muslims should have been in unity within the monotheist frame of Islam, the desire of a Muslim group to adopt the Islamic law voluntarily³⁴ and their revolution against a Western-oriented-government created a huge excitement, though they were from a different religious sect. From this aspect, it is possible to say that *İktibas* adopted an approach parallel to the way of thinking of the journals **Şûra**, **Tevhid** and **Hicret**. However, *İktibas* was not the follow-up of those journals, it was even

³⁴ It is the picture seen by the Islamic circles in Turkey back then.

their leaders in intellectual term. At this point, Ercüment Özkan thought that being based on the first publishing date of the journal would exactly be misleading. He emphasized that they were active with his crew before they began publishing the journal.³⁵ It is possible to interpret this as *İktibas* has an independent intellectual movement from other journals. Therefore, *İktibas* is not a follow-up of other journals and it can be described as a printed version of the activities which have lasted since the 60s (Bircan & Atalar, 1997)

It is necessary to consider the relations between *İktibas* and other Islamic printed press while analysing the place of it in the Islamic publishing. In fact; as it was indicated above, the radical trend which began with the translation activities was marginalised and isolated by the mainstream Islamic movements. Additionally, the striking side of *İktibas* and its attitudes against the conventional Islam, innovation, superstitions and Islamic philosophy caused it to be excluded by the Islamic groups completely. Ercüment Özkan had already been –as the phrase is- a persistent violator for the main rightist-Wertkonservatives and conventional Islamic groups. The ones who had accused him for being a Muslim-looking-communist –i.e. green communist- during his membership of *Hizbu't-Tahrir* began to hit below the belt after *İktibas* was published³⁶. Since *İktibas* continued its criticisms without stepping back despite them, it caused the exclusion to become an enmity; and Ercüment Özkan was declared as an unbeliever by the aforementioned conventional groups. It did not only apply for Özkan, the readers of *İktibas* were also declared as unbelievers too. There were people who were forced and threatened not to read the journal; and even some students were dismissed from the dormitories (Kaya, 1996, p. 63).

The internal enmity against *İktibas* sometimes reached to a level of devastation. Ercüment Özkan mentioned in one of his articles that they could not receive the money for the journals they sent to an Islamic news agency. The reply of the relevant news agency for the letters written for their debts was also interesting; they wrote that they did not make their payments on purpose to harm *İktibas*. The journals sent to the foreign agencies of the same newspaper were also torn up on purpose (Kaya, 1996). Years later, Kürşat Atalar confessed that it was *Milli Gazete* which did all those things (Atalar M. K., 2002, p. 141). And again, some conventional groups undertook to get rid of the journals before they went out from

³⁵ “*İktibas* was started to be published in 1981; however, it was not the year when we cried as a newborn” (Bircan & Atalar, 1997).

³⁶ Some of the accusations for Özkan were as follows: man without sect (*mezhepsiz*), agent, the one who are operating brothel (Atalar K. , 2014).

PTT (Post Office Department) –the sole shipment means of the period-, as a duty for the sake of God. When the crew of *İktibas* realized the situation, they wrote petitions to the PTT management, but those were not taken into consideration (Mektuplar, 1985, p. 3). Moreover, another radical Islamist group even went further and placed a bomb in the office of *İktibas* in Ankara; however, it was noticed before it blew up (Dindarzade, 1996). It was indicated by the ones who knew the event that the bombers were the members of *İbda-C*. More examples can be given; however, the foregoing ones are enough to show that *İktibas* was not welcomed by the other Islamic groups.

One of the reasons underlying those hostile attitudes against *İktibas* is that it became efficient among the Muslims. When its circulation passed over ten thousand copies, it started to be followed by the police like all other journals reaching this much number. Kürşad Atalar says that even though *İktibas* has not been a school yet³⁷ it managed to create its own way. A determination made by one of the authors, Mehmet Çoban³⁸, shows the characteristics of this way:

When I met Ercümen Özkan, I had already known lots of things about general culture. However, it had not established yet. The thing I learned from Ercümen Özkan was methodising the way of acquiring a culture and the acquired culture. I learned from him the ways to read things, method for acquiring a culture, methodising the acquired knowledge, ways for contriving and comprehending. Think that, you have all materials to build a house and put all of them somewhere, but you do not know how to build it. Our way to acquire knowledge was like that. We learned everything, but we could not build a house. We learned to build the house of Islam in our minds from Ercümen Özkan (1996, p. 110).

As can be seen in this quotation; since the primary aim of *İktibas* was determined as teaching how to use the given information by providing a perception, the first thing taught by the journal was interrogating. However, even though some of the questions asked by the journal were inspiring, most people were uncomfortable about them. This is because, *İktibas* caused to establish a group interrogating more, and also interrogating the conventional

³⁷ Atalar, M.K. (2015). *Düşüncenin Okullaşması*. İstanbul: Pınar Yayınları.

³⁸ Mehmet Çoban was sentenced to 6 years of imprisonment because of one of his articles published on the 105th issue of *İktibas*.

taboos. This group was growing day by day. In this respect, it can be said that *İktibas* was a pioneer.

Although the general picture was like that, some people started to avoid relatively from the introverted and conspirator approaches in the 80s. Besides, the method of *tebliğ* (explaining Islam to people) was also changed. These words summarize the qualification of the change in method : “We, as Muslims, have thought until today that if we shout the things we want to say, we could manage something; we were shouting and then we felt satisfied. However, it was necessary to try harder to make *tebliğ* more efficient” (Selam İle, 1981a). Tanıl Bora defines this method change as “an effort to address to the public, not to the cadres” (Bora, 2019, p. 100). Islamists began to interrogate the opportunities to communicate with the people outside their groups by not satisfying with the inner group discourses.

In 1980s, “radical Islamism (...) started to avoid from its ‘conservative’ identity which was used as the fine-good expression of religiosity”. Journals such as **Mavera**, **Girişim**, **Gelecek**, **Kalem ve Onur**, **Umran**, **Haksöz**, **Tezkire**, **Bilgi ve Hikmet** and **Yeni Zemin** led this trend along with *İktibas*. However, “it is possible to say that this effort to distinguish Islamism from conservatism became visible in the journals more than the communions and politic activities” (Bora, 2019, p. 104). In 1990s, the Islamism which was partially free from conservatism was tried to be freed from nationalism. The nationalist conservatism of 60s and 70s was rejected after being interrogated through Kurdish question.³⁹ The Kurdish question became a distinctive sign of Islamism in 90s.

Ercümen Özkan was one of the people who realized early that the nationalist conservatives started to turn into political Islamist by changing their direction. Therefore, he called the period after the 1980 Turkish coup d’état as “Islamization” (ABD, Özal ve İslamizasyon, 1989). The policy of reconciling the state with Muslims and of integrating Muslims into the system had been working out for decades. This policy had managed to “combine nationalism and *Wertkonservatismus* under the roof of the sovereign government discourse” (Alpman, 2019, s. 288). However, Ercümen Özkan, who objected to this combination since 60s, did not change his attitudes neither in 80s nor in 90s; and he did not also approve the post-modernist political pursuits which were the trends among the Islamist back then. His attitudes reflected to *İktibas* too. This explains why the journal fell out more with the line of **Milli Görüş** (National View) day by day.

³⁹ Örnek: “Ümmetin Yetimleri: Kürtler”, Yeni Zemin, Haziran 1994 Kapak Sayfası

When the journal is analysed, it can be observed that even it has been exposed to an inner group marginalization⁴⁰ continuously within the Muslim groups, it has not tried to revenge by making personal stigmatization. However, it has never stopped criticising them too. Though, the criticisms in the journal have kept their position at a conceptual and principal level. In other words, the journal has criticized the attitudes, behaviours or opinions it thought as inaccurate; however, it has not criticised them by personalizing the issue.

In conclusion, *İktibas* is a journal which has the priority of making its readers to acquire ability to interpret. It is against the system, is radical Islamist, does not approve violence, aims progressive social transformation, interrogates the permanent thoughts; therefore, it has been considered as a stepchild among the Islamist groups and does not still ingratiate itself with them. One of the most important characteristics of the journal is that it has a pan-Islamist and ummahist approach. The common context of the quotations, which constitute three quarters of the journal, is related to Muslims' existing conditions in the world. Thus, ummah is the key word in revealing the socio-political attitude of *İktibas*. Besides, examining the conception of ummah in *İktibas* is the first leg of the trivet of our study. So, in the second chapter, the *ummah* conception of *İktibas* will be analysed in detail.

⁴⁰ This issue is evaluated in chapter XXX in detail.

3. CHAPTER II: THE UMMAH IN İKTİBAS

Ummah is one of the prominent words which became popular during the fragmentation of Muslim majority lands on behalf of nation states. So, it is necessary to take ummah in relation with nation. These two concepts have become connected to each other with graft bonds due to the touch of modernity. Besides, both ummah and nation went through several phases of transformation before taking their present form and meaning.

Although the studies on conceptual history are relatively new, changes and transformations of concepts are not a new phenomenon. Throughout history, religions have been the most sharply changers of the words. For example, Islam radically changed the content of the concepts such as prayer (*namaz*), sacrifice (*kurban*), pilgrimage (*hac*), goodness (*birr*) and generosity that had already existed in Arab society. In addition, it conceptualized some ordinary words such as *ummah* or *jahiliya*. When modernity born out of the goal of exceeding the era of religions has been stripped of the role of God, it has become inevitable to play with concepts. Even in the absolute example of Turkey –and its Ottoman past-, it is possible to mention numerous examples of those kind of changes. For instance, concepts such as civilization⁴¹, sharia, and reactionism (*irtica*)⁴² were loaded with totally new meanings that were the exact opposite of their ancient meanings; thereby the world of senses of the society was reversed.

The *ummah* and the *nation* are of those concepts that had semantic changes. In order to understand the concept of ummah, it is not only necessary to look at the etymology and historical adventure of only the ummah concept itself, but also the idea of the nation-state against which the ummah concept was polished as an alternative. The question of whether Islamic thought is open to nationalism has caused serious controversy, and the word ummah has taken its conceptual framework through those debates. Both concepts will be discussed in this section, since the discussions about the ummah are, and have to be, held in a way related to the nation-state system.

⁴¹ A detailed analysis of the word civilization and its usages, see: Celalettin Vatandaş, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sxEMem3cERg>

⁴² The concept of reactionism (*irtica*) was used to mean to turn back to the pre-Islamic (jahiliya) period. The fact is that the concept of jahiliya does not mean ignorance, for Islam it reminds being distant from the light of the religion and therefore being in darkness. When this fact is taken into consideration, it can be more clearly understandable that why the “enlightened” modernists deemed the concept of *irtica* suitable for the actions based on religion.

For detailed information about reactionism (*irtica*), see: (Özipek, 2004; Önal, 2013)

The main focuses of this study are not such questions as what the ummah is or what it should be, whether ummah is possible, who the ummah covers or who the 'other' is. This study focuses on how the ummah was defined, how it was positioned, whom it covered and whom it excluded, according to *İktibas*. In other words, at the centre of the study there is the question of what *İktibas*'s point of view towards ummah. However, the historical and theoretical background of both ummah and nation must be known in order to understand *İktibas*'s point of view. For this reason, in this section, first of all, the etymologies and historical adventures of the idea of both ummah and nation will be emphasized. Then, the way and the context that *İktibas* handles the subject will be examined.

3.1. Nation

The *ummah* is, in essence, a community based on Islam. It was seen as an alternative branch to be held over against inevitable rise of the 'nation' in the 18th century; therefore, *ummah* was brought to the fore. It does not resemble a local nation but positioned against the international system based on the current nation-states; in this respect, it is a universal/global ideal that one might call it ecumenical or might compare it to the communist international. To put it together, today's discourse of *ummah* contains the search for an Islam-based and universal alternative to the nation. So, the differentials of the nation and the nation-state must be mentioned first.

Early studies in the nationalism literature accepted nations as given natural social structures and did not question them. These were the efforts to prove how well nations were established and to contribute to nationalism (Özkırımlı, 1999, p. 10). In the 1930-45 slot, Carleton Hayes and Hans Kohn's works were considered as pioneers in showing that nationalism was based on artificial foundations. However, fifty years ago, Ernest Renan already had revealed in his peculiar style that this was a secret known to everyone. Although the Turkish freshmen students mostly remembered Renan via the famous refusal to him written by Namık Kemal, the French historian was indeed recognized for his works on the origins of races, languages and religions. His seminar called '*What is a nation?*' is a primary source cited in almost each study of nationalism. Throughout his speech, Renan points out that the 'nation' was already a very new and modern phenomenon - as of the 19th century. According to him, none of the many types of communities that existed in history is the equivalent of the nation. Up until the 19th century, including ancient Greece and Rome, no

state had 'citizens'. Because, the notion of sovereignty⁴³ at the same rate on each square meter on a country's land up to the farthest boundaries⁴⁴ is a consequence of nation-state understanding, as well as naming the whole country as 'homeland'⁴⁵ (Renan, 1996).

According to Renan, the construction of a nation cannot be based solely on race, language, religion, interest or territory. While his contemporaries made racial classifications supported by archaeological studies (Balibar & Wallerstein, 1991), Renan first pointed out that nations are not -and even should not- be built on race because, for him, the notion of race-based nation is dangerous and fragmenting. He emphasizes that none of the nation-states established in Europe is based on race, and he argues that this is what is right for nation-building because, as evidenced by ethnographic studies, there is no pure-race, it cannot be, and it doesn't even make sense (Renan, 1996, pp. 47-49). Second, language cannot be the basis for integration. If the nations were formed around a common language, the United States and Britain would have to merge under one state for speaking the same language, and Switzerland would have to divide into 3 states for speaking 3 languages. Third, nations and nation-states cannot be built on religion; because, religion is no longer a factor that determines the boundaries of states and their fate but is left to everyone's own conscience. Fourthly, a nation or a nation-state cannot be founded around a certain union of interests. Such a relationship, which is necessary for commercial associations, is not enough for nation-building. Fifthly and lastly, land also remains insufficient to draw the boundaries

⁴³ Sovereignty is a concept introduced by modernity and is defined in relation to the borders: sovereignty is a statement that indicates the legal power of a state within its borders. So, it has made the borders more important and significant for politics.

⁴⁴ The notion of politics is the most distinctive element of the modern era. During enlightenment process and after, it is seen that especially political and management philosophy stands out among all branches of philosophy. The basis of modern politics, then, is the nation-states that dominate within their borders and their relations with each other. Here it will be useful to take a closer look at the concept of border. The border is basically an indicator that distinguishes between inside and outside. 'We' or 'ours' are separated by boundaries from 'them' or 'theirs'. For example, in small villages, The neighbors of the gardens draw a set between the two gardens to completely turn the border, or set a natural sign such as a tree or waterway and say "beyond here is yours and here is mine", and separate the one that belongs to them. In fact, it was these natural signs that determined the boundaries of the state in the ancient world. There were no artificial borders drawn on the map until modern times, ignoring the geography, dividing a settlement into two. The mindset of modernism and colonialism aiming at domination of nature have destroyed both geography and culture, and disintegrated the land with top-down designs based on power and sovereignty, and put a different nation-state dress on each piece. For further information, see: (Tekin, 2012)

⁴⁵ Namık Kemal's theatre play called "Homeland (*Vatan*) or *Silistre*" is one of the first examples of the use of the concept of homeland (*patria*) in accordance with the notion of the nation-state in the Ottoman Empire. To have a further information about the emergence of the 'homeland' concept, its relationship between borders and its meaning changes from the 19th century in both the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey, see: (Durgun, 2010).

of a nation-state and to become a basis for nation-building, since borders are no longer determined by natural geographical barriers such as mountains or rivers. Therefore, a nation-state cannot rely on geography (Renan, 1996, pp. 50-52).

Relying on the six main points explained one by one, Renan points to the fact that, as early as 1882, the nation was ‘constructed’ without any objective criteria. According to him, nation is not a material, but a spiritual being, and it is built on two things: a common past, and people who are filled with the will to shape their future under the light of this past. According to Renan, any scientific research revealing historical facts is the most serious threat to the survival of a nation. Nevertheless, in an emotional or metaphysical context, worship of ancestor is the most legitimate cult. Because they are the stories of ancestors full of glory and honor that hold nations together (Renan, 1946, pp. 103, 120). People can preserve the unity of a nation as long as they carry these stories to the future and are filled with the desire to write new epics of glory and honor like the ones in the past.

Since there is nothing left except man after secularizing the state and completely removing metaphysics and theology from politics, as per remarks of Renan, new systems based on nations and nation-states which has been formed according to man's desires and needs correspond to the need of the age. But then again it is a great mistake to think if nations and nation-states are irrevocable, firm and final. Renan takes into account that as people change their needs will change. So, he predicts that nations will not be eternal, and that they might terminate themselves for larger unions such as a “European confederation” (Renan, 1996, p. 53). This is an indication of how clear the meaning, content and purpose of the creation of a nation is in the eye of Renan.

Nation, which Renan qualifies as a spiritual being, is shaped around a national consciousness. From one aspect, nationalism benefits from religion's fall into disrepute. In the 18th century, in Western Europe, the sunset of religion-based thinking is experienced. Accordingly, religion-based community system (Christian community, Jewish community, etc.) is also affected by this sunset. Hence, the necessity of substituting a new community-system arises. Therefore, it is not a coincidence that the 18th century was the birth stage of nationalism (Anderson, 2017, p. 25).

The thinkers of the age between two world wars reveal that ‘nationalism’ appeared before ‘nations’, by confirming Renan. According to Hans Kohn (1944), modern states were established first, and then, through a process led by the nationalist ideology, people were

integrated into modern states and nationalized. The collapse of religion-based thought and the rise of laicism facilitated this process because they release the sense of belonging inherent in people which inclines to either the religion and sect or the land and relatives from the beginning of the history until the 18th century. Nationalism saved this sense of belonging from being adrift, gave it a new target or a new branch to hold (pp. 4-18).

The literature on nationalism, which began to ask challenging questions during the Second World War and increased rapidly after 1980s, revealed that nations -as opposed to popular belief- are not natural organisms. The bonds that are supposed to hold people together under the name of nation are produced and reproduced at all levels. Post-structuralist and deconstructivist nationalism literature after the 1980 has three important assertions. First, the social structure so-called nation is defined by the state, from top to bottom. Second, the consciousness of being a nation is adopted in society primarily through education. Third, it is consolidated and reproduced through written and visual media, novels, cinema, music, commemoration ceremonies, holidays, museums, political discourses and the like. At this point, it would be useful to clarify these three issues by following the ideas of the important thinkers.

Ernest Gellner, who is considered by all those working on nationalism -including the ones who disagree with his ideas- as one, if not the first, of the most contributing names to the understanding of nationalism (Özkırımlı, 1999, p. 149), argues that, like Kohn, in the relationship between nations and nationalism, the latter gave birth to the first. In other words, nationalization predated the nation and shaped it. Because, contrary to popular belief, nations are not natural structures, they do not arise from a universal necessity, they have not exist in every period and under any circumstances (Gellner, 1992, pp. 26-28).

According to Gellner's definition, nationalism is the principle that argues the political unit should be compatible with the social unit. That is to say, nationalism claims that the nation and the state can only exist shoulder to shoulder, and that one will go off at half-cocked without the other. However, as regards to Gellner's claim, the nation and the state were originated completely independently in history; so, one does not require the other. In modern age, not before, these two have seemed as if they are indispensable for each other (Gellner, 1992, pp. 27-28). From this perspective, nationalism, which presents the political unit and the social unit as Siamese twins, tries to reconstruct minds by modifying history.

As said by Hobsbawm, there are no satisfactory criteria for classifying human communities as nation or not (2017, p. 19). The common feature of everything about nation is that they are modern. (p. 30) It is misleading to think of nation together with state alone; because nation has emerged as a result of a series of developments such as the standardization of languages through printing and the increase in literacy through mass education. (p. 25) In other words, such a premise that 'modern state was established, then the ideology of nationalism was adopted and then nations were created' is quite lacking. There are a dozen additional elements that supply the creation of nation and its reproduction.

Anderson agrees with Gellner that no scientific definition can be made for 'nation', which remains a manifest phenomenon. According to him, there are three paradoxes commonly encountered in nationalism studies. Firstly, in the objective approach of historians, nation is a modern element, whereas in the subjective approach of nationalists' nation is as ancient as communities. Therefore, the studies differ according to the tendency of the researcher. Secondly, it is claimed that everyone is socio-culturally a member of a nation; namely, a human without a nation is regarded as unthinkable. However, belonging to a nation does not correspond alone to a concrete reality. What does it mean, for example, to be a Greek? Carrying a Greece passport? Having ancestors came from Greece -even though not being a Greece citizen-? Speaking Greek as a mother tongue? The phrase 'being Greek' cannot be understood without knowing the answers of many questions as above. As is seen, it needs additional explanations. Third, nationalism is politically powerful; but philosophically inconsistent, pathetic and miserable (Anderson, 2017, pp. 17-19) It is not surprising that nationalism lacks a philosophical basis, considering that it is, as stated by Renan, nothing but an epic sympathy.

According to Anderson, the nation is an imagined political community. It is not imaginary; is real, but it was invented and designed. It has been created as a supra identity and people are made to feel belonging to it. The members of a nation do not know each other. They are so numerous that there is no possibility for such a thing. Nevertheless, the imagination of their sums continues to live in the minds of each. (p. 20) Anderson compares Gellner's definition of nation with his own, and after admitting that the two are very similar, he explains the difference: When Gellner says that nations have been invented, he meant that they are fabricated frauds. However, according to Anderson, if there is something non-genuine there must be the genuine. So, if nation is non-genuine then what is the genuine community? Anderson thinks that there is none such thing, since all types of communities -

except for the primitive villages where the face-to-face contact is valid (and perhaps even them)- are imagined. In other words, not only nation, but all kinds of communities are imagined; because, even if it is not possible to meet face to face with all its members, people assume that they are part of the same community⁴⁶ (Anderson, 2017, p. 21)

According to Anderson, a nation is imagined to have three features: limitedness, sovereignty and horizontality. First, “the nation is imagined as *limited* because even the largest of them ... has finite. No nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind” (p. 7). Second, the nation “is imagined as the *sovereign* because the concept was born in the age (of) Enlightenment and Revolution” (p. 7). Finally, the nation “is imagined as a community, because, ... the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” (p. 7). Besides, each member of the nation is assumed to be equal (Anderson, 2006).

After acknowledging that the nation was imagined and invented by nationalism, John Armstrong claims that this invention is not born entirely in emptiness. There is a little ethnic belonging at the origin of nations (Armstrong, 1982). Anthony Smith, who adopted the same approach, calls this the 'ethno-symbolic approach'. According to him, the difference of ethno-symbolic theory of nationalism is that it does not see nations as purely fictions. In order to draw a more coherent framework, the connections of nations with past ethnic communities should also be taken into account; because, ethnic communities have existed for centuries and this, for Smith, is not a coincidence. Even today, there are many ethnic minorities in almost all nation-states. These minorities have not integrated into nation-states where they live with a culturally and historically conscious choice. The reason is that they are aware of their differences and have some sort of intra-group ties. Smith calls “ethnic cores” to communities with a high level of consciousness and a sense of belonging. He claims that both traditional dynasties and modern states are based on such cores (Smith, 2009, pp. 3-41). In other words, although modern nations are imagined in many aspects, ethnic cores cannot be ignored.

Once nation states are established, it is time to keep the consciousness of being a nation alive. Michael Billig states that, although nationalism manifested itself intensely in times of

⁴⁶ To see not only the nation but every community as imagined, and to connect the definition of the real community to the criteria of face-to-face acquaintance leads some questions to be raised. The first and perhaps the most important question could be this: if almost all communities are imagined, then what is the problem of the 'nation'? After all, according to Anderson's definition, the nation is one of the imagined communities. If so, what makes it "wrong"? Is it the time it was imagined? Or is it the way it was imagined? Or is it “wrong” from the beginning that people live in imagined communities?

crises, it is not such periods that cling people to nation-state and turn them into a nation. For this reason, when examining nationalism, it is quite inadequate to focus on nationalist expressions and symbols which are escalating during crises. In the age of nation-states that we live in, nationalism survives by spreading to each aspect of everyday life. Such a nationalism that is embedded in life seems so ordinary and natural that it does not even have a name of its own. The concept of nationalism with its general usage is a garish name that depicts extremes. However, “the national flag hanging outside a public building (p. 6)”, “the national emblem... on the coinage of the realm (p. 93)”, “unmemorable clichés and habits of political discourse(93)”, the national anthem sung before each national match (p. 6), the image of the patriotism that appeared in the media almost every day (p. 99), or the emphasis on “we” in political speeches and everyday media news are the factors that keep banal nationalism alive and reproduce it without anyone noticing. “This deixis⁴⁷ of little words makes the world of nations familiar, even homely ... beyond conscious awareness, like the hum of distant traffic (p. 94) ” In summary Billig asserts that:

Daily newspapers and logomaniac politicians constantly flag the world of nations. They routinely use a deixis of little words. 'Here', 'us' and 'the' are so easy to overlook. They are not words to grab the attention, but they perform an important task in the business of flagging. Banally, they address 'us' as a national first person plural; and they situate 'us' in the homeland within a world of nations (Billig, 1995, p. 174).

Thus, in the world of nations, nationalism is inevitably embedded in the minds of each individual of a 'nation'.

As it is seen, all the discussions around nationalism stem from the lack of a scientific basis for the formation of nations. Ultimately, the point is that, as Renan put forward at the beginning, nations are not a priori, they are created, and above all, they survive by leaning on emotional arguments instead of logical explanations. The importance of the debates around nationalism in terms of this thesis is the fact that nation meets the social needs of the secular world. For this very reason, the nation has not achieved a prestigious position among

⁴⁷ Deixis: The task of pointing and indicating that is fulfilled by some words in the language, such as sign pronouns, personal pronouns, and some preposition prepositions

“The crucial words of banal nationalism are often the smallest: 'we', 'this' and 'here', which are the words of linguistic 'deixis'. ... The 'the' of 'the people' is not mere decoration. In English, the definite article is continually playing its quiet part in a routine 'deixis', which banally points out 'the' homeland.” (Billig, 1995, p. 94)

Muslims. Splitting the members of a religion, which preaches all believers to be brothers⁴⁸, in line with another form of ‘brotherhood’ imposed by secular logic has led to traumas whose impact on Muslims has lasted for generations.

For this reason, while Islamists were opposing nationalism, they have adopted ummah as its alternative. The importance of the ummah lies there. It can also be said that ‘ummahism’ (or pan-Islamism) is a global opposition to the Western-originated nation-state system. Therefore, every Islamist group that adopts ummahism has their own definition of state and society, different from both official discourse and other nationalist discourses in society. Although there are no clear and comprehensive solutions for how to get out of the nation-state circle, it is possible to find traces about the system Islamists have in their mind from their writings and speeches. It is also possible to put those traces together under a framework, and to draw a rough outline. Of course, it is necessary to know the concept of *ummah* first.

3.2. Ummah

Although ‘ummah’ existed in the pre-Islamic Arabic language, the conceptualization of the word coincided with the early years of Islam, the period immediately after the emigration/hijra. The starting point of this conceptualization is considered to be the Charter of Medina. In Turkey, beginning in the 1990s, the political and social dimensions of both the Charter of Medina and the concept ‘ummah’ were discussed seriously. Before proceeding to these discussions, it would be appropriate to examine the historical adventure and semantic transformation of the word ummah.

Modern Western political theory is quite different from political thoughts in all periods known throughout history. Although it is based on the ancient Greek philosophical system, there are also indestructible effects of the social changes incidental to the Enlightenment and Reform movements as well as the development of the bourgeoisie and the industrial revolution. Thus, a new order has emerged, and a new political idea has been born. The West has experienced this age-long process assimilatingly and build its system on a solid ground. Meanwhile, it is not possible to say that the Islamic world went through similar processes simultaneously. Muslim geographies encountered all the new political theories and concepts

⁴⁸ Hujurat 10, Ali Imran 103, Mu'minin 52.

as well as all new socio-economic and cultural orders after they had sprouted and yielded in the West. Moreover, Muslims are obliged to eat these fruits they never knew. This sudden encounter has first caused a confusion and then a wave of interrogation in the Muslim regions. All the concepts coming from the Islamic tradition that are connected somehow with the society were revised and most were redefined. This is because of the reflex to refuse to surrender body and soul to the wave coming from the West. When Muslims realize that they cannot stand against this wave, they have reshaped the ideas, which the West tried to export⁴⁹, according to their own patterns by restoring the concepts existing in their own culture and traditions. Thus, they attempted to circumvent an intellectual destruction with minimal damage. The degree of success of this effort can be discussed, but here's the point: The redefinition of Islamic concepts in the modern period made it difficult to understand the ancient meanings of them in the later period.

Just as ideas and concepts based on Greek philosophy cannot be fully understood without knowing the city-state (polis) structure, Islamic concepts also cannot be understood without knowing their first context and the social conditions in which they were used. It is not possible to fully meet Islamic political concepts with Western-origin ones. Such matchings either impoverish the meaning of the concept at stake or add totally new meanings that is not contained in it. Terminologically there become either a semantic restriction or a semantic shift.

Besides all these, some amorphous concepts have emerged. One of the concepts that no one can clearly identify, that everyone makes a definition according to himself, that floats in uncertainty but is always in the limelight is The Islamic State. In his article called *Key Political Concepts in Quran*, Ahmed Manzooruddin writes about The Islamic State:

In fact, there is no clear-cut concept of modern state in Islam, but still people speak of Islamic State and in this sense the Islamic terms such as *ummah* and *khilāfah* are equated with the modern terms *state* and *government*. However, *ummah* and *khilāfah* both have their own distinctive meanings (1971, p. 77).

⁴⁹ Peter Berger and his friends describe modernization as a universal religion. Because modernization has its own unique concepts, its own way of life, its determined structures of consciousness; and what is called the process of modernization is the spread of all these specificities towards foreign cultures. (Berger, Berger, & Kellner, 2000, p. 8)

Manzooruddin then examines the meaning of above-mentioned concepts in the context of the Qur'an and the hadith sources.⁵⁰ Firstly, it would be useful to dwell on the words *ummah* and *millah*. *Millah*, which is defined as a community name like tribe or clan in Turkish, is derived from the root *imlâl* in Arabic, which means reciting and dictating. The word *millah* is used in exchange for 'religion'; because, religions base on something written or dictated. Also, the word is given the meaning 'the followed path' (Şentürk, 2005, p. 64). The Qur'anic use of the word *millah* is likewise related to religion. The *millah* has a special and unique meaning in the Qur'an. It refers only to a community connected by a certain religious bond. In other words, it is used in the sense of a community united around the religion and sharia that a prophet preached. For instance, *millah* of Abraham refers to both the religion and the followers of Abraham (Manzooruddin, 1971, p. 81). So, *millah* is a word that is directly connected to religion in terms of both its origin and its usage in the Qur'an.

Mongomery Watt, whose studies have chapters devoted to the word *ummah*, presents one of the most extensive researches on the word's meaning. He says that the word *ummah* is clearly related to religion especially in the verses revealed during Medina era. Besides, he claims that the word *qawm* (tribe) was used more than *ummah* and the difference between these two words was very small (Watt, 1968, p. 29). However, this claim was later falsified. As it is clearly seen in the quotation from Manzoruruddin above and also in the works of Bernard Lewis, it was confirmed that the word *ummah* is not used in connection with religion in the Qur'an.

Bernard Lewis claims that the word *millah* entered Arabic from Aramaic and that the original meaning is 'a word'. From this, he deduces that *millah* refers to people united around a word, i.e. a sacred revelation. On that sense, the word is much more associated with religion than *ummah*; because, religion is not among the root meanings of the latter (Lewis, 1988, p. 39).

In spite of being singular in grammatical sense, the word *ummah* is plural in its meaning, and the main definition of the word is 'community'. Regardless of conditions such as number/quantity/multiplicity, space, social belonging, language or even being human

⁵⁰ In his article, Manzooruddin discussed the concepts of jema'ah, qawm, millah, ummah, sha'b, 'ahd, 'aqd, and mithaq, amanah and wilayah, khilafah and imamah, al-dawlah, shura, al-siyadah (sovereignty) and al-mulk one by one. After giving the meaning and use of each in traditional Islamic and pre-Islamic sources, he came up with an idea of what might be equivalent from the terminology of modern social sciences to make the relevant concept more understandable. Although the author has examined the issue in terms of the Arabic language, the adventures of the words ummah, millah, khilafah and al-dawlah are the same since they are directly translated into Turkish (Manzooruddin, 1971).

ummah refers to a plural unity. In the Qur'an, this concept is used for both human and animal communities (Uzun, 2002, pp. 86-106). The analysis of the use of the word *ummah* in the Qur'an reveals such a portrait: The word is mentioned 64 times in 57 verses, 51 of which are in singular and 13 are in plural form. It is first used in the middle of Mecca period⁵¹ in order to depict other communities than Muslims. The word is used to refer 57 times to human communities, 1 time to animals and birds⁵², 2 times to period/era/reign and 1 time to the prophet Abraham. It is a fact that the use of the word is mainly concentrated on the verses which descend during Medina era.

The word *ummah* in Arabic is often used within a noun phrase. For instance, those who respond positively to the Islamic invitation and become Muslims are called *ummah-Muhammad*. Over time, one of the names in this specific noun phrase, Muhammad, has dropped. So, the nominative word *ummah* has gained a terminological identity and has begun to be ascribed to all Muslims around the world (Uzun, 2002, pp. 86-106).

In the studies on the origin of the word *ummah*, orientalist and eastern scholars have made different claims. For example, Watt says that *ummah* comes from the Hebrew word *umma*, which means folk (1968, p. 27). Lewis agrees with Watt. According to him, the origin of the word is either Hebrew or Aramaic. Because, he thinks that it is not possible for the word to come from the Arabic *umm* (mother) root when the political theories of Arab society are taken into account. To prove his claim, Lewis focuses on the meaning and value of the words mother and father as political figures in the West and the East. He explains how words, which have a direct relationship with the father such as 'paternal' or 'patriarchal', are among the most prominent elements characterizing governance in the West. He tells that politically strong father figure is a reflection of Christian 'holy father' belief. However, according to Lewis, there is no such strong fatherhood in neither Islamic communities like Arabs or Turks, nor in Islam itself. There is no figure of a holy father with political connotations in the Arabs. While the word 'ancestor' has little political connotation in Turks, directly the word 'father' lacks such a connotation. Instead, *father* has a strong association with moral connotation (respect for the elders). Lewis regards calling dervishes as fathers within moral context. Likewise, according to Lewis, the word 'mother' has no political evocation. The conclusion he derives is that the word *ummah* cannot come from the root of *umm* (mother).

⁵¹ Neml 83

⁵² Enâm 38

Therefore, the root of the word should be searched in a completely different place, which, for Lewis, is in Hebrew or Aramaic. (Lewis, 1988, p. 17) Clearly, by basing on the logical sequence above, Lewis tries to prove that the word *ummah* does not come from an Arabic root but has a foreign origin.

Similar to Western orientalists, Eastern scholars accept that *umm* is not the etymon of *ummah*. However, in contrast to orientalists, they incline to another Arabic root-word, *e-m-m*, which is also the root of the word *imam*. *E-m-m* means to face, to head towards, to come to the fore. The origin of the word *ummah* is given as *e-m-m* in the oldest sources written by Muslim scholars among which there are al-Mufredat of Ragıp el-Isfehani (written in 11th century in order to explain Qur'anic terms), Lisanu'l-Arab of Ibn-i Manzûr (one of the grandest dictionaries of Arabic written in 14th century) and the translation of Firuzabadi's al-Kamusu'l-Muhit by translator Asım Effendi (another grandest dictionary written in the second half of 14th century) (Bulut, 2012). Hence, *ummah* refers to a community gathering around a leader.

According to Ibn-Fâris, the decisive feature of the word *ummah*, which is used in a wide range of meanings from bird communities to various human communities in the Qur'an, is the sense of belonging. Any kind of unity with a sense of belonging can be called *ummah* (Çetin, 1986, p. 102). Elmalılı states that the *ummah* is formed by the unification of a community aiming for the same purpose around a certain leader (Yazır, 1993, p. 508). This could either be a leading individual or a leading idea. If *ummah* directly related to affiliation, argumentum ad contrario, it negates the ones who lack the sense of belonging and who unleash around the leading idea.

Lewis states although the word *ummah* existed before Islam, it was not commonly used. He finds the Quranic usages of the word particularly interesting; because, the Qur'an employ *ummah* for all kinds of communities including ethnic, religious, moral and ideological ones. Then he turns the perspective from the book to life and claims that the word meant "tribal confederacy" in the time of the Prophet. When it came to classical Islamic literature, *ummah* is used both in religious and ethnic terms. But Lewis gives such a detail about ethnic use that it implies to pre-Islamic conditions. For instance, if an Arab writer mentions Turkish or Persian *ummah*, he refers to pre-Islamic era. For Muslims, a single *ummah* in its nominative case is used (Lewis, 1988, p. 32). Increasingly, such a usage has become widespread, therefore, the expression 'other *ummahs*' have become a reference to communities of other religions.

While later usage added many new words to the early Islamic terminology for the ruler and the government, it added very little to the terminology used to denote the society or community as a whole. *Ummah* remains by far the commonest Word to denote both the Islamic community and those other communities, at home and abroad, with which it had dealings. (Lewis, 1988, p. 38)

After introducing the origins and uses of the word *ummah* in both pre and post Islamic eras, it would be appropriate to start examining the semantic shift of the concept since the emigration of the Prophet Muhammad. Following the first years of Islam, *ummah* became conceptualized especially during Medina era. The reason is more sociological than religious. The social structure that emerged in Medina after the Hijrah was quite different from that of the old Arabian tribal frame. So, it needs to be identified with a new word. That is why *ummah* is employed to characterize the newly formed social structure with all its elements (Manzooruddin, 1971, p. 82). In other words, the use of the *ummah* for the first time in the sense of Islamic society with all political dimension as we understand today overlaps with the period of Medina. It is not a coincidence; because, in Medina, the Prophet tried to generate a totally new structure operating exclusive dynamics under a new brand: *ummah*.

Watt emphasizes that *ummah* order, which was introduced by Charter of Medina as an attempt to establish a new society, is a new and more complex order that cannot be expressed by the term *qawm*. Considering that the Arabs were far from the idea of a state in that period, that the only system functioned politically was the tribal system, and that the only upper mechanism was a council of tribal leaders, it is explicit that the new social structure in Medina deserves to be defined with a new word (Watt, 1968, pp. 28-29). According to Watt, this was a necessity beyond deserving:

The old Arab idea of the tribe or kinship group was thus gradually modified, until it had been replaced by the community based on religion. The new body politic at Madina could perhaps have been set up simply as an alliance according to the traditional conception, but the subsequent development of that alliance and especially Muhammad's attainment of a position of leadership in it would not have been possible without the new conception. (1961, p. 148)

As it is known, there is no central state system in pre-Islamic Arabs. Instead there is a tribal system based on blood tie. According to Watt, tribe is the only concept shaping political life, in pre-Islamic Arab society. It appears that, even if the existence of great

empires like Byzantine was known, the Arab mind perceives them like a great tribe. In such a tribal-based system, the new situation that emerged after Islam had to first produce a new apprehension. Thus, it did not reject the tribal ties altogether at once (Watt, 1961, p. 145). Instead, it aimed to convert them to a supra-tribal framework gradually.

In the light of all the information above, it will not be wrong to say that the exact terminological meaning of *ummah* is the new supra-tribal socio-political order created by the new religion. That is why Qur'an defines this new society as "*ummah vahidah*"⁵³ (a single community). This unity, *ummah*, is also different from the Sha'b, the greatest unity that the Arab tribes ever brought into the body. (Manzooruddin, 1971, p. 82) So, it is unexampled for the Arab society of the age.

In fact, Watt draws attention to an interesting point about the naming of the members of the new religion: The word *Mu'minun* (believers) is much more common in the Qur'an than the word *Muslimun* (capitulants; Muslims), and it is used to express the community of believers in Prophet Mohammed. So why is the word *ummah* conceptualized instead of the word *Mu'minun*? According to Watt, the reason for this is that *Mu'minun* is just a belief-based expression. It lacks all social and political connotations (Watt, 1968, p. 30). Therefore, this statement was not found suitable for use to describe the society.

In addition to all these, it is a fact that the word *ummah*, which had been used in a noun phase as *ummah-Muhammad*, was later conceptualized in its plain form. There are two reasons for this: First, the concept of *ummah* is frequently mentioned in hadiths, which should be the main reason that gives the concept a term qualification (Bulut, 2012). The second is that the *ummah* is a community name with no special meaning and therefore is suitable for practical use. If it was named as *Muhammad's tribe*, it was perceived as Quraysh people; if it was named as *companions of the Prophet Muhammad*, it was perceived as the Muslims who lived at the same time period when he lived. Similar to this, any naming would be deprived of the wide coverage of the word *ummah*.

Yet still, there is a great difference between an intellectual talking about the *ummah* in the Middle Ages and talking about it today. The fact that the *ummah* is being discussed within the scope of identity is something that belongs to this age. In other words, although the concept of the *ummah* has emerged as a consequence of practical need because of the birth of a new society that was totally strange for that town, the context of the *ummah* issue

⁵³ Bakara 213

has changed today. The ummah issue is now being discussed in relation to the modern nation concept and is positioned according to the nation. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the actual and potential functions of the concept of ummah today.

3.3. The Contemporary Idea of Ummah against Nation

Although the ummah is the conceptual name of the new Muslim union established in Madinah, the spread of the word and its becoming a slogan term corresponds to the period (19th century) when the pains of modernization were suffered. The potential of the Muslim brotherhood phenomenon, highlighted in the Qur'anic verses, to meet the increasing expectation of internal-solidarity due to colonialism has increased the popularity of the concept of the ummah. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the usage patterns and contexts of the concept in the modern era.

If we turn the perspective to the present day after the introduction about the original meaning, context and usage *millah* and *ummah*, we see that the meanings of the words are quite different. Under the influence of the modernization process first in Ottoman center and then in Turkey, the word *millah* was completely stripped of religious connotations and started to be used as a synonym for 'nation'. The *ummah*, on the other hand, has become a community name that is fully integrated with Islam and expresses all Muslims. In this respect, we can easily say that the meanings of the words *millah* and *ummah* are subjected to semantic contraction and semantic shift as mentioned in the beginning of the chapter.

Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır states it is wrong to translate the word *millah* into Turkish as *nation*. He tells that he spoke with the Minister of Education Emrullah Effendi and convinced him; but, Emrullah Effendi could not find a chance to change this translation which had already become widespread.

Millah may be in a social situation that has not yet become operational and has not gained a state identity. However, any *millah*, which is active and has completed its legal character, corresponds to the concept of *ummah* in Islamic Sharia. The deceased Emrullah Effendi thought that the word *ummah* was related to the word *ummî* (illiterate); so, he preferred to translate the term nation as *millah*. Since then, the concept of *ummah* has been lost and subjected to an underestimation. Later, when we came together in the Terminological Committee (Istilahat Encümeni), I explained him that it was related with neither

umm (mother) nor *ummi*, but *imam*; and I managed to convince. Unfortunately, he passed away before he had a chance to correct his mistake. (Yazır, 1997)

Here, Elmalılı underlines that the difference between *millah* and *ummah* is legal and political. According to him, while *millah* expresses an un-institutionalized social situation, *ummah* is a type of association that has provided political institutionalization.

In fact, the meaning scale of the concept of nation in English is similar to the word *ummah* rather than *millah*. In Arabic, the word nation is translated as *ummah*. For example, the Arabic equivalent of United Nations is *Umem-i Muttehide*. Unlike Turkish, in modern Arabic, the use of the word *ummah* instead of *millah* is more common. “In modern Arabic *millah* and *milli* are virtually obsolete, but the Arabs have adopted a Word of equally religious content, *ummah*, to designate the Arab nation (Lewis, 1988, p. 41).” Şemseddin Sami, the author of *Kamus-u Türkî*, says that the word *millah* is used accidentally instead of *ummah* and *ummah* is used instead of *millah*. According to him, the *ummah* is the total of the people who speak the same language (Sami, 2015, p. 1400). However, nowadays, this definition is associated with *millah*, and the *ummah* exists only as a concept pointing to religious unity.

Lewis takes the *ummah* in the 20th century as a set of political communities. Ummah “... (is) the single universal Islamic community embracing all the lands in which Muslim rule is established and the Islamic law prevails (Lewis, 1988, p. 32).” However, in such a definition, there is not a place for the Muslims living in lands where Muslims are not the majority and not under Islamic rule. If, as Lewis claimed, the state of being an *ummah* entirely depends on political authority, then, for example, Muslims living in Europe are not included in the *ummah*. This contradicts with the current use of the word *ummah*.

Could the *ummah* be a political union today, as Lewis claimed? Or does it simply refer to the *Islamic Community*? Is the expression *Islamic Community* as simple and evident as it is seen? Anthropologist Gabriele Marranci, who was looking for an answer to this question, tried to understand what the reality of *ummah* is or what it could be. First of all, he observed that the term *Muslim Community* is used more frequently than its plural form, *Muslim Communities*, both in daily use and in academic texts as a result of the data he collected. Moreover, there is a remarkably large gap between the frequency of use of the expression *Muslim Community* and the frequency of use of nation-based community expressions such as *Arab community* or *Pakistani community*. The data he collected led him to the conclusion

that the perception of a single Muslim community is very strong in this day and age (Marranci, p. 101).

So, what is the nature of the community at stake? In fact, just as Christians scattered all over the world do not form a political society, Muslims do not form a political society either. However, in both Western and Eastern minds, the ummah is considered as a socio-political whole. It is this perception that makes the ummah different and interesting (Marranci, p. 104).

However, the *de facto* truth is as such: Muslims are not part of a single, homogeneous society. They differ in social, cultural and economic respects; and even their religious understanding differs. They are also aware of their differences. But almost none of them denies the idea of ummah. Moreover, they can act in certain integrity, especially in times of crises. For example, both Sunni Muslims and Shii Muslims responded similarly to the cartoon crisis in Denmark. This led Marranci to the conclusion that the ummah is an emotional association, an emotional community (Marranci, pp. 113-114). In other words, the concept of ummah potentially contains sympathy and unity of purposes, although its manifestations are not frequently encountered in practice. In short, the feeling of ummah may not force Muslims to unite around a single charismatic leader and form a single society, but it may cause, on the other hand, worldwide reactions to some local events.

The word ummah can be examined mainly from 5 aspects: theological, historical, anthropological, sociological and political. If each discipline looks only from its own perspective, it remains inadequate to illustrate the whole picture of the understanding of ummah. Yet, the biggest handicap that emerges about ummah today is due to this fragmented view.

The concept of ummah is far from being an imagined community as described by Anderson. Rather, it is closer to being a utopia or *Kızılelma* (Red Apple). Defining the ummah as a kind of collective identity, Hassan also stated that the ummah identity does not -and actually could not- break the influence of nationalism in Muslim majority countries. For Muslims living in these countries, their national identity is at least as important as the ummah identity. Therefore; “Muslims tend to have dual or multiple social identities comprised of national or ethnic, and Islamic identities” (Hassan, 2006, p. 314). It is understood that Muslims do not see their belonging to ummah in contradiction with their other identities. Therefore, being a member of ummah today does not mean to reject ethnic, national or sectarian differences. The ummah lives together with all this, as a collective identity.

However, this collective identity is not at a point above all other belongings, nor is it a constant. “Since it is a result of social construction... as these framing devices change, they also produce changes in the nature of collective identity. In other words, since Muslims, besides partaking in common faith, also live their lives in the context of their respective societies, and as these societies change under the impact of modernization, industrialization, political development and globalization, it will also have an impact upon the Muslim collective identity” (Hassan, 2006, p. 315). Moreover, ‘awareness of being an ummah’ is not a guarantee of cooperation and partnership among the Muslim countries. The ongoing fragmentation and constant rivalry, especially in the Middle East, are the most obvious indicators of this.

In fact, although there are very abstract expressions, concepts such as the *Islamic union* or the *union of the ummah* or the *integrity of the ummah*, all of which are perceived as if they correspond to a concrete truth, are actually crops of the politicized environment of modern era. These concepts emerged as an expression of resistance against *kuffar* (heathen). It is an indication that Muslims have objected to the idea of modernism and nation-state, which are exported to their geographies. In the socio-political field, the existence and undeniable weights of international Islamic organizations such as the Ikhwan al Muslimin (Muslim Brothers) can be evaluated as an expression of how these countries actually have a common denominator. However, this common denominator has not succeed in providing an *Islamic union*.

Again, the nation-state understanding that came with modernity and artificial borders between countries have divided the lands that Muslims live, in favour of the colonists. This led to the emergence of problems related to sovereignty and legitimacy between identities based on traditional concepts such as Dar al-Islam and nation-state identities (Tekin, 2012, p. 162). It can be said that the term *Islamic World* was born from this tension. Although it seems to cover all Muslims, the *Islamic World* -and similar statements- are not entirely independent of nation-state borders. In other words, within the priority scope of *Islamic World*, there is not America, for example, although there are many Muslims living in USA. Rather, regardless of the regime, *Islamic World* refers to the regions, where the nation-state model is imposed although the majority of people are Muslims. In this respect, it is possible to say that the phase *Islamic World* is the sum of the borders of some nation-states with Muslim majority (Tekin, 2012).

Throughout history, the discourse of ‘ummah as a unified Muslim community’ has been used as a political lever. It is possible to claim that this is a very strategic discourse;

because, it aims to mobilize Muslims against *kuffar*. But the level of success is discussable. For example, during the crusades, we see that the discourse of ummah was put into use. Nevertheless, it did not create the expected effect and could not unite the Muslim-Turkish principalities that dwell in different regions throughout Anatolia (Maalouf, 2012). Moreover, it did not prevent those principalities from constantly fighting each other. Or, for example, we do not come across a discourse based on ‘consciousness of being an ummah’ during the foundation and rise years of the Ottoman Empire. When the *kuffar*, i.e. the defeater West, emerged as a threat after 18th century, then the Muslims remembered that they were ummah. Apart from such exceptional times throughout the history, Muslim tribes or states have continued to conflict with each other interminably.

The deterioration of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, which holds the caliphate of Sunni Muslims, has caused the state policy to pamper more and more to the caliphate and Islam. Islamism⁵⁴, which was born as a reaction to the intellectual and military threat coming from the West, also brought the ‘emphases on ummah and Islamic Union’ to the agenda, through aiming to interlock the Muslims together and to stand up against the West.

Islamism has developed and spread especially from newspapers and journals since its early days. Lütü Sunar states that one of the most basic concepts in Islamic journals from the past to the present has been the *ummah*:

The most central concept is the ummah. Islamic unity is also a concept that is mentioned with the concept of ummah. And caliphate. In essence of Islamism, there is such an idea: caliphate is something that we Muslims have lost. Those journals do not regard caliphate as a form of government, they say that what is lost is the unity of Muslims. The desire to establish both a political unity and a morality of solidarity are one of the most immutable topics in Islamic journals (Sunar, 2017).

Even though it is the most constant issue, the emphasis on ummah and unity have either weakened or became introverted within the scope of the Islamic movement in Turkey, especially because of the flirtation of Islamic circles with nationalism. Turkish-Islam synthesis discourse has come to the fore mainly. On the other hand, it can be seen that the emphasis of the ummah has stayed very strong in the radical Islamist publications.

⁵⁴ For the birth and development of the thought of Islamism, see: Kara, İ. (2016). *Türkiye’de İslamcılık Düşüncesi*. İstanbul: Dergâh; Aktay, Y. (ed.) (2004). *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasal Düşünce* (6. Cilt). İstanbul: İletişim; Tunaya, T.Z. (1998). *İslamcılık Cereyanı*. İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Yayınları.

Although the ummah is defined paradigmatically as the sum of the believers that are equal to each other in such a way that no worldly monetary or class distinction is valid, we stand before the fact that the believers have never been under the roof of a single government throughout history. However, the dominant view is that even if they do not form a single society under any government, the believers are a single community. A different view has raised its voice especially in the 1990s. The owners of this view take the word ummah as a community without any religious connotation, by going back to pre-Islamic age. They reject the function that the word has been loaded for centuries: to express the members of the Islamic religion. They also claimed that the use of the word ummah in the period of the Prophet Muhammad was not religious; it was used only to express a political unity.

The approach, which sees the ummah as a political society rather than a religious one, is based on the Charter of Medina and forms its theory through this text. For this reason, firstly, the nature and content of the document called the Charter of Medina is examined in the following section. Then, the debates around the Charter of Medina in 1990s (which resulted in a lot of reverberation in intellectual circles) will be given. The aim of the part below is to reveal a multidimensional panorama of ummah conceptions, before examining how *İktibas* approached those discussions.

3.4. Discussions on The Charter of Medina and Pluralist Ummah in 1990s

As explained in detail in the previous part, today, the concept of *ummah* is used to signify those who belong to the religion of Islam, hence the ummah, by definition, excludes non-Muslims. However, unlike the word *millah*, it is a fact that the usage of the word *ummah* in the Quran is not directly related to religion. The problem arises from the discussion of whether the use of the ummah in the early periods of Islam was conceptualized specifically for Muslims. The claim that the concept of ummah is a political society that includes both Muslim and non-Muslim participants, i.e. it is not a concept that expresses the community of believers, initiated a debate. Since the discussion is mainly shaped around Charter of Medina, it will be analysed firstly.

The Charter of Medina, also known in Turkey as Constitution of Medina, is referred to as *kitab* (book) or *sahife* (small book consisting of written papers) in the original sources. There is no doubt and controversy about the authenticity of the Charter of Medina that was mentioned in almost all the sources in the first period starting from İbn-i Hisham (d. 833)

(Özkan M. , 2016). However, the same sources do not contain clear information about the date when the text of the charter was written (Demirci, 2012, p. 260). It is also ambiguous whether or not the entire text was written at once. While someone consider the text as a whole, some researchers, such as Hamidullah, say that the first 23 articles were written before the Battle of Badr, and from the 24th article the rest was added to the charter after the battle (Özkan M. , 2016). These kinds of estimations were because the date of the document could not be determined precisely yet. According to Hamidullah, it is impossible for Jews to sign a defensive alliance with Muslims before Badr; because Muslims have not yet proved their power politically and militarily. Therefore, at the first stage, it is not possible for Jews to support the immigrants by leaving the Mecca's polytheist Arabs aside; since the immigrants were seen as a crushed and weak community (Hamidullah, 2003). For this reason, according to Hamidullah, even if not the whole charter, but the articles about the Jews should have been written after Badr.

The reason for the charter to be named as *constitution* by scholars is that it prescribed for “the communities constituting the Medina-city-state, their relations with each other and with the foreigners, administrative and judicial structures of those communities and the individuals’ freedoms of religion and conscience” (Özkan M. , 2016). Because of this, Hamidullah says that the charter is the first written constitution in history.

Julius Wellhausen is the first one who issued and published the Charter of Medina completely as 47 articles. Although some of the following researchers increased the number of articles, they mainly benefited from this as a main source. At the time the document was written, there were two great Arab tribes in Medina that interminably competed with each other: Aws and Khazraj. In addition, there were three great Jewish tribes: Banu Nadir, Banu Qurayza and the Banu Qaynuqa. However, the balance in the city began to change with the arrival of the Muslim migrants from Mecca. In this new period, it became necessary to make an agreement in order to keep Muslims from rival tribes together, to ensure that the immigrants and the local people live in harmony, and to create a line of defence against potential war threats (Özkan M. , 2016). Watt noted that the Muslims made 2 kinds of agreements with other tribes after being politically strong. In the first one, the tribe embraces Islam in which case the members of this tribe begin to be considered as a part of the Muslim community. In the second one, the tribe does not accept Islam, but does also not have any intention to engage in an attack against Muslims; a peace agreement is made in such a case

(Watt, 1968, pp. 31-32). Especially after the first 23 articles of the Charter of Medina prescribes such kind of a peace and cooperation in case of a possible war.

The charter starts with the following two articles: “**(1)** This is a prescript of Muhammad, the Prophet and Messenger of God (to operate) between the faithful and the followers of Islam from among the Quraish and the people of Yathrib and those who may be subordinated to them, may later join them and take part in wars as their company. **(2)** They shall constitute a separate political unit (ummah) as distinguished from all the people (of the world)” (Hamidullah, 2013). The dispute here sources from the ambiguity whether the group described as ummah covers only the Quraysh and Yathrib Muslims, or the Jews are also included in the ummah.

In Article 25 of the charter, it is written that: “the Jews of Banu ‘Awf shall be considered as one political community (Ummah) along with the believers; for the Jews their religion, and for the Muslims theirs”⁵⁵ (Hamidullah, 2013). If the Charter of Medina was prepared and signed at once, article 25 shows that the concept of ummah clearly includes the Jews. However, if the articles following the article 24 was added to the text later, it can be thought that the word ummah in the second article and the word ummah in the 25th article were not used in the same meaning and context.

M. Watt, M.A. Shaban and Hamidullah are among those who believe in first possibility. According to them, the word ummah was used to express political unity; that is to say, not only Muslims, but also Jewish tribes of Madinah were included in the scope of the ummah (Hamidullah, 2003, pp. 206-215). Some other researchers, including R.B. Serjeant and Frederick M. Denny, say that the Jews were excluded from the definition of ummah. According to al-Ahsan, one other scholar of the same thought, although the concept of ummah disrupts the tribal-based political structure of the Arab society of that time, it does not include non-Muslims. Al-Ahsan states that he does not approve the Charter of Medina to be used as a tool to make the obvious Islamic nature of the ummah invisible. According to him, the concept of ummah is a supra-tribal name given to the new society (Muslims) of the new religion (Islam). So, it is misleading to see it as a project of creating a political society without any single religious base (al-Ahsan, 1992, pp. 19-23).

⁵⁵ It is indicated in the original Arabic text as follows: وأن يهود بني عوف أمة مع المؤمنين لليهود دينهم وللمسلمين دينهم مواليهم وأنفسهم

Al-Ahsan considers that the Charter of Medina does not approve of both Muslims and Jews carrying more than one identity; because, instead of referring Muslim and Jew tribes together, it enumerates each Muslim and each Jewish tribe one by one. Thus, according to Al-Ahsan, tribe identities were recognized as legitimate. In the, in addition to the tribe names, there is this expression: ‘they are a single ummah among people’ (إنهم أمة واحدة من دون الناس). It is an indication that a different unity was desired to be put into circulation. However, the main fallacy here is, for Al-Ahsan, to be under the illusion that the expression أمة واحدة (a single ummah) covers the Jews as well; since it is known that the Jews were not included in the agreement at first (al-Ahsan, 1992, p. 19). The first 24 articles of the document were designed as a union agreement between the newcomers -i.e. the immigrants- and the Arabs of Yathrib. By means of the charter, the Prophet Mohammad achieved to establish an authority in Medina. In the following periods, Muslims aimed to protect the city against the constantly growing external threat by adding new parties to the agreement when necessary (al-Ahsan, 1992, p. 21). So, al-Ahsan thinks that the first agreement was about unity and integrity. It was this first part that establishes a single ummah. The later added parts did not serve the purpose to expand the scope of the single ummah, but it answer the need to establish a common line of defense.

Besides; while the parties of the Charter were mentioned as “Muslims” in the preceding articles, after the 24th article they were mentioned as “the people of the document”⁵⁶. According to al-Ahsan; it is an evidence for the claim that the expression of the single ummah (*ummah vahidah*) did not encompass Jews. The truth of the matter is that the Charter is presented in the books as if it was written at once without separating into parts. Al-Ahsan thinks that it is confusing; however, it is not difficult for careful eyes to realize the referents of the words and concepts in the Charter. The main purpose of the concept of ‘single ummah’ in the Charter was not to form a political union which encompassed both Muslims and Jews; but the main purpose was to ensure the existing tribal commitment of Muslims to be channelized into a superstructure. Thus, it was aimed to make the tribal bounds be subordinate to the loyalty to ummah. In other words, even though the concept of tribe was not removed completely, it was pointed out that they should be in the second place as the loyalty centre. It was emphasized that the primary commitment of Muslims should be to all other Muslims (al-Ahsan, 1992, pp. 21-22). Nevertheless, al-Ahsan admitted that this

⁵⁶ أهل هذه الصحيفة

requirement, which the Charter set as a target, did not sufficiently responded both in the relevant period and then.

On the other hand, Watt claimed with a pretty disturbing style that the system set forth through the Charter of Medina was an authoritarian system based on the prestige of the one single person (Prophet):

The old Arab idea of the tribe or kinship group was thus gradually modified, until it had been replaced by the community based on religion. The new body politic at Medina could perhaps have been set up simply as an alliance according to the traditional conception, but the subsequent development of that alliance and especially Muhammad's attainment of a position of leadership in it would not have been possible without the new conception (Watt, 1961, p. 148).

However, it is clearly seen in the Charter that the principles such as "legalism", "social solidarity" and "religious pluralism" were emphasized (Öz Ş. , 2012, p. 38). Unlike the tribe system which prevailed at that time, the principles became the determiners in the socio-political arena, not individuals as a result of the Charter of Medina. This was the most obvious point where the ummah system, which was established in Medina, differentiated from the tribal system:

The Prophet replaced -through religion- the idea of tradition and tribes with the thought of the state and the law. The authority outside the tribe was very unfamiliar to Bedouins; they did not recognize any law other than the tribal tradition. However, Islam explained that the authority belongs only to Allah, it can only exist in the name of Allah, and that the administration should aim to exercise justice, to protect the ummah. ... The state was essentially accepted as a social organization, i.e. ummah; not as a political institution established on a specific land. ... In this case, the concept of *ummah* is a socio-political formation and the country grows as the ummah is extended (ed-Dûri, 2016, pp. 82-83).

However, if the concept of *ummah* encompassed Jews along with Muslims, this claim of ed-Dûri would remain meaningless.

The idea that the Charter of Medina included Jews to the political community of Medina together with Muslims came to the agenda of Turkey in 1990s. The ones who emphasized the political aspect of the Charter dealt with the issue in the context of citizenship and multiculturalism discussions, in harmony with the spirit of the 90s. Before going into the details of the discussion, it should be kept in mind that it can be quite

misleading to say that ‘the use of the concept of *ummah* in the early years of Islam was non-associated to religion and was equivalent to the concept of citizen’. Because trying to understand an ancient word (*ummah*) with a modern word (citizen) will cause anachronism. Anachronism, on the other hand, is the main mistake which prevents researchers from understanding history properly. The idea of citizenship independent from the religious context came to the fore with the rise of nation-state in the late period. Yet, in the period when the Charter was written, there was no political thought without having any religious context.

Discussions on the Charter of Medina in Turkey:

There is an uncertainty about the time and ground when the Charter of Medina became prominent as a solution proposal in modern times. Hayri Kırbaşıoğlu said that the text came to the agenda when Indian Muslims discussed the issue of splitting Pakistan from India. On the other hand, Ali Bulaç said that he was not aware of this debate but knew that there was a similar debate in Sudan. In none of the texts published in the following years on the Charter of Medina there was not any information about global discussions (Öz A. , 2014). However, this study will focus on how the issue became prominent in Turkey, instead of how it became prominent world-wide.

In the 1980s, a change/conversion process began in Turkey based on the free market economy in parallel with the rest of the world. As from the period of Turgut Özal’s Prime Ministership, the religious people were tried to be integrated into the system. They began to move towards the ‘centre’ by getting out of their line of positions owing to liberal policies which provided some space for religion. One of the biggest factors providing the ground of legitimacy was the discussion of the idea of post-modernist pluralism in connection with the essence of religion on the basis of the Charter of Medina. While the debate, which started in the 90s, was a cornerstone for the mental transformation of the Islamists of those days, it serves today as an analysis point for deciphering the codes of the mental transformation in question.

According to the modernization theory, God was dead; in other words, he has nothing to do with worldly affairs anymore. After God’s contact with the world was cut off, modernism, which did not deem the revival of religion likely, acceded to the throne. Yet, its

throne was shaken by a series of events; then post- modernism has captured the power and began to gravitate towards religion and metaphysics in the epistemological field. The post-modernist approach has apprehended and embraced religion as part of the culture, rather than rejecting it without questioning. Therefore, it did not take long for this approach to be recognized and adopted by some Islamists seeking a socio-political place for religion. Those “New Islamists”⁵⁷ began to produce a new form of religiosity in their high intellectual journals (published after the second half of the 80s) with references to international academic discussions. According to Çiçek (2019), the mental transformation experienced by religious people in the 80s and 90s was not “directly related to becoming more accurate Muslims and returning to Islam” (168). In appearance the world of concepts seemed Islamic, yet the claims and main arguments were completely postmodern and liberal. Hence, the mental transformation process experienced in those years was considered as “the process of internalizing the non-internalized modernity through postmodern method and making the religious people to adopt it”. So, it was “a kind of secular-based rational religiosity having worldly concerns” (169). In fact, the religion was still not a source of reference for worldly issues, such as state governance; however, the religious people lowered their guards and adopted the new order since they found a small place in the social life for themselves and since the strict laic attitude eased off (Çiçek, 2019, pp. 168-169). As Asım Öz stated:

The 90s were the years when it was noticed that the political crisis of Islamic thought, which met with the new interpretations of liberalism, should be put on the table. However, the political-contented discussions that started in the 90s enabled some thoughts about modernity and after to be put on the agenda, but also showed that Islamism has no clear suggestions regarding politics, contrary to what is supposed (2014).

One of the most intense political discussions was about the Charter of Medina and it focused on an alternative form of society. Since the intellectual inadequacy of political Islamism arose in the 1990s, the Charter-based pluralism debate can be considered as an attempt to fill the gap created by this inadequacy. Another issue that made this discussion important is the versatility of it. While the society was spoken on the one hand, the issue on sharing the government/authority/power, political participation and civil society were also discussed. The allegations focussed on the following point: if a social order could be

⁵⁷ New Islamism means the Islamists to adopt the democracy, to integrate into the global system, to be formed as West requires and to integrate into the system day by day. See: (Beşer, 2019, pp. 248-250).

established similar to that of the Charter of Medina, in other words “if a legal regulation can be established which would provide opportunities for the religious, ethnic, political etc. groups to live in accordance with their own laws”, then the way for the people to live together can be discovered, the notion of sovereign-nation-state can be questioned and some of the practices carried out by the Muslim administrations throughout the history can be reviewed (Öz A. , 2014).

In fact, the atmosphere after the Cold War dragged almost every segment of the society in a seek for finding alternative forms of both society and politics. Leftists, liberals and Kurds were in a similar pursuit. For this reason, the journal **Nokta** described the general atmosphere of the period in a humorous language as the days when “everyone is waiting for the ‘prince charming’ who will save them” (Sezer & Dural, 1994). The postmodernist influence intensified in those years spread an “early” optimism by indicating that both leftists and Islamic circles had overcame the modernism and a new era started for humanity (Öz A. , 2014). It is essential to realize this optimism that left its mark on the period, in order to understand the nature of the discussions more clearly. For example, simultaneously with the start of the debates about ‘second republic’ among the leftist circles, the Islamists started to work on the project of coexistence and pluralism. The claim was: the republic and Kemalism were behind the times; therefore, the system should evolve into more liberal and more democratic one. This claim was the most important factor which made Islamist, liberal, Kurdish and leftist intellectuals, who had been the opposite poles until that day, united. So, it was no longer surprising for Islamists to participate in the second republic debate, or to publish articles about the Charter of Medina in the leftist journal **Birikim**, when it had been impossible until ten years ago. The atmosphere was as if the ideological wall between those groups collapsed after the collapse of the real Berlin wall. Moreover, Islamists and leftists began to take action together, issue handouts, participate in the panels and discuss in open session programs. Liberals also often joined them. During this period which Rıfat Bali called “the era of panels”, leftist, rightist, liberal and Islamist intellectuals came together in open sessions on television, showed the greatest tolerance to each other, and thereby conveyed the message to the society that the “culture of coexistence” could and should be established. The most iconic frame that summarizes this period is perhaps the photograph of Toktamış Ateş, writer of **Cumhuriyet**, and Abdurrahman Dilipak, editorial of **Akit**, holding hands (Bali, 2005).

It was Ali Bulaç who started the discussion based on the Charter of Medina. First, he wrote an article titled as *İslam ve Totaliter Rejim Sorunu* (Islam and the Problem of Totalitarian Regime) (November, 1991) in the journal **Kitap**. He then conducted two separate seminars on the Charter of Medina in AKV (Anatolian Culture Foundation). Meanwhile, Ahmet İnsel responded to Bulaç's article, with an article published by the journal **Birikim** and made some criticisms to Bulaç. Thereupon, Bulaç sent his answer to the issue 38-39 (1992) of **Birikim** which had such a sub-title: *Aylık Sosyalist Kültür Dergisi* (Monthly Journal of Socialist Culture). The debate started thusly. Then it extended through various seminars and journal articles. The most intense period was between 1992 and 1998. Many names such as Abdurrahman Dilipak, Taner Akçam, the journal **Aktüel**, Veli Yılmaz from the newspaper **Özgür Gündem**, Kenan Çamurcu, Hayrettin Karaman, Şükrü Karatepe, İ. Süreyya Sırma, Hikmet Zeyveli, Atasoy Müftüoğlu, Kürşat Atalar, Ali Yaşar Sarıbay and Ragıp Ege from **Birikim**, Sait Çekmegil, Muharrem Toros and Necdet Subaşı became a part of this debate. The two journals directed by Bulaç (*Yeni Zemin* that came out with the motto "preparing a ground for a new formation" and **Sözleşme** which started its publishing life with the claim of being "ontological testament") represented, even only by their names, this new way of thinking that sprouted among Islamists. A number of news and articles related to the subject were quoted in *İktibas*; and journal crew wrote several articles also.

After the foregoing information, when the discussions on the Charter of Medina are taken into consideration, it can be observed that the concept of *ummah* has a central position. This is because, Ali Bulaç started the issue by claiming that ummah is not a religious but a political union. According to him, three religious groups (i.e. Muslims, Jews and Polytheists) which were the signatory parties of the Charter of Medina were described as a 'single ummah'. This was the proof, in the eyes of Bulaç, that the concept of *ummah* was used in a political sense, not a religious one, during the time of the Prophet. According to Bulaç, ummah was a project aiming at peaceful coexistence between different religious groups, and it did not remain in theory, but was implemented through the Charter. For this reason, the Charter of Medina was "the legal document of a political union" (Bulaç, 1994, p. 12). It was a partnership agreement which has been maintained as a written scripture until today.

There are two other issues which took place just before the Charter. Bulaç used them in his inferences about Charter's political union. Firstly, the Prophet had a census in Medina, including women, elderly and children. Secondly, he determined the borders of the city, marked four corners of this border, and characterized the region within those borders as the

‘protected province’ (*haram*) (Okıç, 1958, pp. 11-20). The word *haram* also refers to a territorial integrity. According to Bulaç, those are the first steps towards the political union of Medina. The Charter came right after them. Muslims, polytheists and Jews living in Medina agreed on the principles of justice, participation, economic and military security, solidarity and the rule of law. The ummah established by the Charter was “a social project that did not make discriminations between races, languages, religions, sects and ethnicity and that was based on religious, cultural and legal autonomy” (Bulaç, 1992, pp. 102-111).

Bulaç thinks that depending on two things a Muslim is considered free according to Islam: 1) to live in accordance with the shariah; 2) to be able to advice his/her religion to other people. In a social order possessing those conditions, Muslims are free and competent. The reason for the migration of the Prophet to Yathrib (Medina) was that he could not achieve to have those two conditions in Mecca. In other words, Muslims migrated because they were not free in Mecca. Based on their importance, those two conditions also formed the ground on which Muslims agreed with other religious groups in Medina. That is to say, just as Muslims could live their own shariah in Medina, other religions were also allowed to live their own shariah. And according to Bulaç, this society, where everyone lives their religion freely, was called the ummah. For this reason, Bulaç argued that the only possible way to prevent any ideology from being imposed on different religious or ideological communities is adopting pluralism. Besides; “since there is no pressure related to the religious preferences (Baccarat 256), there should be no kind of pressure on the laws set forth by any religion, philosophy or ideology. Because, a person who prefers a religion also prefers the law of the same religion which is the manifestation of the religion in question.” However, “preventing people from their preference of law while letting them prefer their own religion” as modern state does, means “intervening to the essence of the relevant religion” (Bulaç, 1994, p. 13). This range of logic indicates that all people, either believe a religion or follow an ideology, should be free to live under the rules and requirements of that religion or ideology.

Bulaç believed that the ummah project guarantees aforementioned freedom; because, the state is not a dominator but an arbitrator in this project (Bulaç, 1991, pp. 3-10). “The legal communities were assigned for legislation, culture, education, science, economy, health etc.; and the governance was limited to execution” (Bulaç, 1994, p. 14). The financial needs of the execution will be met with the potential of each community’s own population and facilities. According to Bulaç, this project is a concrete proposal that “can be an

alternative to the modern state which has been increasingly totalitarian” (Bulaç, 1994, p. 14). Bulaç thinks that modernism itself, as well as the idea of modern state, has become an obstacle that is to be overcome compulsorily. This obligation increases the importance of the Charter too.

Bulaç emphasizes that the Charter of Medina was absolutely authentic and it was written centuries before Rousseau. He also does not hesitate to wink at the leftists and to refer to Marx. There are beneficial utopias in terms of a political theory combinations: for example, Rousseau based the first form of social organization on the contract, and also Marx predicted a pluralistic social organization at the beginning of history and proposed it for the final of history. Unlike those utopias, a social contract based on the principle of pluralism is indeed a historical fact, according to Bulaç. He believes that not only in the Charter of Medina but also in the basis of Islamic political philosophy as a whole, there is contract logic. The most obvious example of this is the Aqaba allegiances. Unlike Rousseau’s hypothetical contract, Aqaba allegiances were nothing but an actual social contract. Moreover, it took place centuries before Rousseau (Bulaç, 1992, pp. 102-111).

As seen, Bulaç establishes his range of logic on such arguments that could make him bring liberals and leftists into the fold. Then he turns his face to the Islamists and gets a defence position in order to avoid from potential charges. According to Bulaç, anti-modernity should not push Islamists to reject the facts in their own history. All words such as allegiance (*biat*), agreement (*misak*), testament (*ahit*), and contract (*akit*), which are frequently mentioned in Islamic law, are based on the notion of contract completely. Besides, “the fundamental freedoms and commitments constituting the whole relations with the political administration such as a state or a government etc. are formed in accordance with the provisions of a contract signed between the rulers and ruled. In this sense, the administration in Islam takes its legitimacy from contract”. In other words, the identification of the concept of *social contract* with Rousseau “does not require Muslims to abandon the political model in Islam, which was formed on the basis of a contract both in form and content” (Bulaç, 1992, pp. 102-111).

Although leftists criticized the contractual political ummah project as much as the Islamists; in the final analysis, they were the ones who praised the project. Because, the discussions on the Charter of Medina was considered by the leftists of the period to be an intellectual peak point in terms of Islamism. This multi-layered and multidimensional discussion which included sociology, multiculturalism, coexistence and on the other hand

religion excited them. For example, Ferhat Kentel interpreted the discussions on the Charter of Medina as “it is undoubtedly one of the most important discussion topics that emanate from the Islamic intellectual segment which has affected not only intellectual groups, but also public opinion and politics” (Kentel, 2004, p. 733). Kentel was right, the subject occupied the public agenda for years.

The reactions from the Islamic circles varied. According to Şükrü Karatepe, the Charter is the answer how people belonging to different religions can protect their own belief systems in Muslim geographies while every community under the rule of Christians become Christian throughout the history (p. 31). Besides, the articles of the Charter are important since they speak of a community (ummah), the religions and freedom of belief of the people from that community, their laws, punishments, responsibilities, and all of the main issues that fall under the constitutional law of today. The idea of plural law (i.e. all religious communities should be subjected to their own laws) in the Charter was applied in the Muslim states established in the following period, which is crucial according to Karatepe (p. 32). Hayrettin Karaman agrees the importance of the Charter, but still is cautious about considering the document equivalent with the current democratic pluralism principle. Because, firstly, the Charter represents a period when the Muslims were not that strong. Secondly, it did not remain in force for a long time anyway. However, Karaman thinks that Quran and hadith should be taken into consideration for understanding the accurate meaning of the Charter; and by doing so, according to Karaman, the conclusion will be as follows: people cannot reach to their fundamental and reasonable demands such as freedom, justice or human rights through pure reason or humanly decision mechanisms without the guidance of a true religion. The egoism, pressure and exploitation cannot be eliminated without intervention of a divine religion. The Charter could be a starting point in terms of finding a middle ground; however according to Karaman, it is the last stop for Muslims (34). According to Karatepe, instead of staring the issue from such perceptions as point of departure or point of destination, it was necessary to focus on the Charter itself. Because, being sure about the existence of this kind of a Charter means accepting the existence of an agreement between the different religious communities living together. Indeed, later thinkers aim to create an environment where different elements can live in peace while putting forward their political models. This is possible only by the existence of a peace-based contract between constituent communities. The Western political law has already depended on the agreement currently. West has not a kind of governance in which a single authority

determines rules and makes the community to follow them. On the contrary, Western-style governance promises protecting the freedoms making people live together in peace as its first principle. It gains its legitimacy by this unwritten contract. Karatepe claims that a similar logic of contract underlies the Charter of Medina. In other words, according to Karatepe, the principles, which the modern law has become able to achieve recently, were applied in the period of the Prophet Muhammad. From this point of view, the Charter of Medina is the first written document of the contract tradition (İslami Toplum Düzenine Doğru Bir Adım: Medine Vesikası, 1993, pp. 31-35). Therefore, it is not against Islam to establish a political union under a contract with communities from different religion.

There are also people who did not think in this way among the Islamist intellectuals. According to them, it is inappropriate to re-conceptualize the word *ummah* with a political content. For example, Atasoy Müftüoğlu, reminded that the Charter of Medina was in effect for a very short time⁵⁸ and claimed that it was not an important document in terms of Islamic history and philosophy. According to him, presenting the Charter as a pluralistic society model is quite misleading; because, the articles and discussions on the Charter ignore the idiosyncratic logic of Islam. So, what is the idiosyncratic logic of Islam? Müftüoğlu states that the basis of this logic is the fact that Allah has the right to dominate over his creations. People who do not ignore this fact cannot defend a weird order where everyone can freely commit adultery, rebel against God and live in impiety on the one hand, while Muslims can also live their religion on the other. This is because, Islam aims not to free evil, but to prevent and destroy it and thus to rule people with goodness and virtue. Therefore, it is wrong to derive a postmodern theory of pluralism from the Charter of Medina (Müftüoğlu, 1993, pp. 24-26).

Said Çekmegil who describes the Charter as “our certificate of gratitude and honour” states that he did not like the general appearance of the discussions about the Charter. According to Çekmegil, the Charter is the document enabling a smaller number of Muslims to prevail against non-monolithic opposing groups, despite their large numbers. There was not a single article which contradicted with the domination of Allah, in the Charter. The liberation of non-Muslims in practising their own law was always a phenomenon throughout the history of Islam, but for Çekmegil, it is presented as a new discovery. Indeed, is the necessity required by the Quranic verse stating that there was no coercion in religion.

⁵⁸ The Jewish tribes exiled from Medina since they did not follow the agreement, they made with Muslims (Avcı, 2002).

Çekmegil also thinks that it is also obvious in the Charter that all other groups accepted the arbitration of the Prophet Mohammad. While this was the case, any attempts for establishing a system that would permit non-Muslims to do what was considered as a crime in Islamic law are either not wise or ill-intentional. Because, according to Çekmegil, the Charter did not contradict with Islam in essence; however, such a system of pluralism contradicts Islam definitely (Çekmegil, 1993, p. 52).

Likewise, Hikmet Zeyveli qualifies the political ummah project based on the Charter of Medina as a *bid'ah* (evil innovation). Because, according to him, drawing a pluralist post-modern project from such a document which clearly shows the dominance of Muslim in the society and the decision-making authority of the Prophet cannot be explained with another expression than *bid'ah*. Zeyveli also doubted if this issue has been brought up by Muslims themselves. For him, the discussions obstruct Muslims' way of opposition against vanity and prevent them from forming their own real agendas. The biggest concern of Zeyveli is the possibility that Muslims are brought to power before they completed their preparations. If this occurs, it is certain that they would experience a great blast (Özkan İ. , 1993, p. 42).

Dursun Çiçek⁵⁹ summarizes the reasons for criticisms rising from the Islamist circles as such:

The alternative coexistence project (*Alternatif Bir Arada Yaşama Projesi*) inspired from the Charter of Medina which was put forward by Ali Bulaç et al.⁶⁰... is not an alternative; but it is just a project enabling and legitimizing the people who have been living in a sub-culture, who have been stuck, who could not get rid of being lower and middle class and who obtained some rights after 1980. ... In fact, Bulaç and his friends de-emphasized the historical experiences of Islam and its main principles by being influenced through the indisputable and invariable characteristic of Kemalism and by making ordinary and hollow criticisms on modernism instead of dealing with it (2019, p. 195).

⁵⁹Çiçek wrote his articles with the pseudonym Hayrettin Oğuz generally.

⁶⁰ By *et. al* (and others); Çiçek meant Mehmet Metiner, Altan Tan and Yalçın Akdoğan, with whom Bulaç published the journals **Yeni Zemin** and **Sözleşme**. In addition to them, it is possible to mention the names such as Ömer Çelik, Hikmet Gök, Ömer Dinçer, Ahmet Kekeç, Kadir Canatan, İhsan Eliaçık, Kenan Çamurcu and Ümit Aktaş, who have gone through almost totally different directions from each other.

According to Asım Öz, the common characteristic of the names, who were prominent in the journals such as **Yeni Zemin** and **Sözleşme** in 90s and preferred to involve in different political bodies, was that “their intellectual directions were pretty pragmatist and fluid”. The demand for restricting the power, which was brought into question in those journals, and the theories based on restriction idea “appeared to have been on the agenda of contributing to the legitimization of the demand for free and autonomous spaces” (Öz A. , 2014).

According to Çiçek, “the main thing that new Islamists oppose is the historical experiences of Muslims”, i.e. the tradition. It is difficult to explain “sociologically the tendencies to refuse the tradition in such a quick and hectic manner”, since it is considered that they try to internalize even the Renaissance (Çiçek, 2019, p. 192). As in the criticism given above, Çiçek focuses on the instrumentalization of the Charter in his criticisms. According to him, the political pluralistic ummah project has nothing to do with the Charter of Medina, and it does not aim at it anyway. Çiçek states that the Charter’s only function in terms of the project was the value of use; thus he believed that the Charter – and therefore the ummah – have been both historically removed from its context and removed from its original meaning (Çiçek, 2019, p. 196).

In fact, the negotiations around the Charter of Medina were not born in the void; they emerged because of a need that penetrated to almost every social circle of the period, from rightists to leftists. The aim was to overcome the established situation of the Turkish nation-state and to create a new order in which people who were excluded, despised, pushed and marginalized can make their voices heard. In terms of Islamism, the significance of the discussions on the Charter was that they force Islamism to settle the score of its a century-old-history and to face with its experiences. As known, the Islamist’s goal to “Islamize” the current administration with a series of reforms in the Ottoman period evolved to the goal of establishing an Islamic State after the abolishment of the caliphate. Thus, Islamist intellectuals produced power-oriented ideas for more than a century and prioritized a top-down change. However, when the conjuncture changed essentially in the 90s, a new attitude has emerged with the suggestion that Civil Islam should take place of Political Islam. It has criticized Political Islam a lot. The Charter-based-pluralism-theory was the most concrete product of this attitude (Öz A. , 2014).

During the discussions of the Charter, the century-old Islamism was consistently referred in a negative context; but this created some problems. For example, referring to the term ‘Islamic State’ as “an effort to put an Islamic cover on the modern state” opened a door for misperceptions. The world-renowned names of Islamism, especially Reşid Rıza, Muhammed İkbal, Mevdudi and Seyyid Kutup were criticized politically, and the way those criticisms were made corroborated the initial misconceptions. The purpose of all this negativity was to pave the way for new waves called Civil Islam and to support them, according to Öz. However; those, who began to settle the score with the modern era Islamism by believing that a new ‘post-’ era was started after modernism, ironically, were recognized

as ‘Islamists’ in the public “and continued to benefit from its symbolic capital” (Öz A. , 2014).

Through analysing the Charter based discussions, there is the opportunity to follow a socio-political mentality transformation. By placing the logic of the contract on the basis of political unity, New Islamists began to wink at the Social Contract, which was the philosophical basis of the modern state, and also ironically which they claimed to overcome. It dragged the New Islamists to an ambivalent position. In addition, the claim that the *ummah* was not a religious but a political union meant renunciation of the single caliphate project, which was considered as one of the hallmarks of Islamism. Thus, the idea of the Islamic State automatically went to pot. To sum up, in the eyes of most Islamist intellectuals, the Charter based project seemed to be disconnected from the history of Islamism in all respects, to peace actually with the modern state while pretending as if opposing it, and to come to the West one step closer in a conjuncture full of uncertainties where the USSR had just collapsed. For all those reasons, the new ummah project was not adopted as it was; however, it has inevitably affected the view for both the *ummah* and the politics in the following periods.

3.5. The Concepts of Nation, Ummah and the Charter of Medina in *İktibas*

In this chapter up to here, we have provided a multidimensional sight for *ummah*, which is one of the most distinctive features of radical Islamism. The answers of such questions as how ummah conceptualized to refer Muslims, how it re-emerged in the age of nation states and how it was re-shaped in last few decades were presented. In the light of all these information, we will look at the apprehension of ummah in radical Islamist *İktibas*, in order to discover the kind of the ummahism that the journal has.

Here, ummah in *İktibas* will be submitted under three sub-titles. First, how the journal considers the notion of nation will be set forth. Then how it approaches to the notion of ummah will be given. Lastly, the response of the journal to the debates around the Charter of Medina will be displayed.

Nation:

İktibas is not a nationalist journal and besides it is against nationalism. According to the journal, since no one has a chance to choose neither a specific nation nor even a specific family, the membership alone does not have any valuableness or valuelessness. Since the only thing to be held responsible is one's conscious actions based on his/her own will, a Muslim cannot have a nationalist perspective (Kavim-Kavmiyet ve Asabiyet, 1992, pp. 9-11).

It is possible to notice in the journal that the crew had a special love for Turkish people. However, this is at a very low dose and has nothing to do with nationalism. It appears only as a manifestation of the love of the journal crew for the land they live on and the community in which they grow. In addition, the thing which is praised about the Turkish people in the journal is their function of banner bearing for Islam. *İktibas* indicates that the Turkish people have been working for Islam for more than a thousand years by embracing Islam in the first day since they were Muslims. They are also the ones who protected Islam by standing against the Crusaders. Since the time when Turkish people first met Islam, they have tried to spread it and never betrayed Islam (Sapıklık (Dalalet), 1991, s. 9-12). According to Ercümen Özkan, the greatest misfortune of the Turkish people was that they learned Islam from Abbasids. He calls this 'misfortune' because until the period of the Abbasids, many foreign substances (beliefs and ideas that did not belong to the religion) contaminated the purity of Islam. Turkish people accepted such a contaminated Islam by supposing (without knowing the truth) that it was the real İslam (Özkan E. , 2010, p. 518). According to Özkan, the Abbasids mixed Islam with other beliefs and damaged the purity of the religion, destroyed everything about the religion including the principle of monotheism, and increased the number of halidoms. However, this interestingly facilitated the adaptation of the Turkish people to Islam. This is because, the Turkish people had already believed the shamanic religion; so, the offered of Islam with increased halidoms did not seem very different from their religion. This situation paved the way for Turkish people to accept this new religion without questioning it (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, p. 112). What Islam they learned from the Abbasids, "they embraced it as the Right Religion, and from that day on they have given life, property and children for the sake of that 'true' religion" (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, p. 94). As it can be seen, the journal crew emphasizes the services of the Turkish people to Islam and gives them a semi-special position. However, it does this not with the emphasis on 'being Turkish', but with the emphasis on 'serving to religion'. In other words, the real basic

criterion for valuableness is serving to religion. For *İktibas* crew, if a tribe has superiority over others, this can only be measured by service to religion. This logic was built on a verse⁶¹ which indicates that the superiority among individuals can only be achieved by *taqwa* (piousness). Therefore, according to *İktibas*, the Turkish people are valuable because of their services to religion.

In addition, nationalism is vilified in the journal on every occasion, and articles criticising the nation-state system are quoted. The journal suggests that the nation-state system is not suitable for Islam. It indeed has a traditional pan-Islamist and international perspective. It is clearly against the tendency to blend nationalism with the religion both in Turkey and in the Arabic countries. According to the journal, the nation cannot constitute a foundation for any structure including the state, nor is nationalism legitimate under any circumstances. However, loving the nation to which a person belongs is not considered as from nationalism.

Ummah

We can begin to explain the concept of ummah in *İktibas* with an example, in order to have a general idea. For example, when we examine the 122th issue of the journal published in February 1987, we learn that the Iraq-Iran war continued to intensify the region with new developments and that the possibility of intervention of the Turkish soldier was discussed, but this possibility was not welcomed in the domestic circles (p. 1, 9). We can also understand that Turkey was not accepted as a member of European Economic Community, since some countries objected because of the Muslimness of Turkey (p. 23, 35). Moreover, we can also see that the Reagan administration in America was shaken by the claims that they sold weapons to Iran (p. 9, 27), that the German political journal *Der Spiegel* emphasized the reactionary (*irticai*) threat in Turkey (p. 9), that the Israeli troops fell back from Taba upon the interventions of the International Arbitration Council on the disputes between the Israel and Egypt (p. 15), that the administration of Hüsnü Mübarek in Egypt started to worry about the increasing number of women wearing hijab and bearded men (p. 17), that 11 of the ministries of Sierra Leone (which is an African country) are Muslims (p. 18), that Russia failed in Afghanistan and therefore the “legend of invincibility” collapsed (p. 18), that the Muslim university students in Kazakhstan started a revolt against the Russian

⁶¹Hucurat (49/13).

administration (p. 18), that the Islam Conference gathered forth time and the names of the countries participating in the conference (p. 27), that the Prime Minister Turgut Özal participated in the opening of the Marib Dam by going to Yemen (p. 31), that Cemalettin Kaplan, a mufti in Germany, claimed that the official holidays are *shirks* (sin of practicing idolatry or polytheism) and therefore the discussions on reactionism (*irtica*) in Turkey grew (p. 31, 38), that 29 people in Holland, one of whom was a priest, became Muslims (p. 38), that Islam was used as a method to fight against terrorism and separatism threats in Turkey's eastern cities and the specific areas of the cities covered with the anonymous posters with verses and hadith (p. 41), that the students graduated from the Religious-Vocational (*İmam-Hatip*) high schools generally preferred the department of Public Administration or Law schools and some of the members of the parliament were uncomfortable with the great number of students graduated from the *İmam-Hatip* high schools (p. 42), that Russia tried to make birth control obligatory in the places such as Tajikistan where the majority of the people are Muslim (p. 42).

This example is an indicator of how much the journal is actually related to real politics. Among the topics mentioned in the journal, foreign news comes first. They include both Turkish foreign policy and World politics, especially concerning Muslims. The countries which have been mentioned most are as follows: USA, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Israel, Africa, Egypt, Europe/EU, Bulgaria, Greece, Iraq, Tunis, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Far East, Russia, Indonesia, Malaysia, England, Gulf Countries, Yugoslavia, Palestine, China, Lebanon, Jordan, Latin America, Armenia, Spain, Portugal, Syria and Turkic Republics. Although the context is generally related to Islam and Muslims in some way, we can also come across the articles related to the dilemmas of the global actors, moral decompositions, weapon industry and technological developments of the Western countries. The data collected by *İktibas* from newspapers and journals on those subjects are of sufficient quantity and quality to reveal the picture of the world of the relevant period comprehensively.

As also seen, *İktibas* handles the problems of Muslims from all over the world, from Panama to Palestine or from Iran to China, but it does not offer a solution such as gathering them under one roof (one state) politically⁶². It approaches Muslims in the world within the framework of religious fraternity. In other words, the idea of *ummah* (in the context of a unity of religion) is dominant. And as the political community, the nation-state of Turkey is

⁶² It will offer this as the final step; but not here as the first step.

considered as basis. The primary purpose of the journal is to transform the existing nation-state into an Islamic state. At the next step, it is expected to extend by incorporating the other neighbouring Muslim majority countries. This is because, the journal supported the idea that there should always be a single Islamic State. To sum up, in *Īktibas*, the concept of *ummah* is used to cover all Muslims in the world; however, the primary slogan is not ‘all Muslims of the world! Unite and establish a single state’. The primary slogan may be: ‘All Muslims of the world! Be aware of each other and support each other so that the imperialists cannot swallow you.’ The journal crew, who thinks that the West is exploiting all the weak people in similar ways, sends a message to the Muslims, ‘Be vigilant and do not come into the game of the exploiters and do not backstab each other, be friendly and strong so that you can make Islam an effective political force in the world.’ In other words, the journal deals with the concept of *ummah* with its popular meaning; therefore, it turns its face to Muslims all over the world and tries to embrace them all.

Īktibas quoted the full description of the concept of *ummah* from Sir Hamilton Gibb. According to Gibb; “the keyword for everything that has to do with Islamic culture is *ummah*” (Gibb S. , 1963, p. 173). Gibb explained what he meant by Islamic culture as follows:

To a greater extent than the Christian culture, it was a culture of the *receptive* or *mediating* type, the characteristic of which is to absorb and to synthesize a variety of intellectual, aesthetic, and emotional forces derived from past experience, and to give them a new focus and vitality. In this synthesis, its tendency is always to reassert the simple and uncomplicated, to set strict limits to elaboration of all sorts -intellectual, aesthetic, and architectural- and to insist upon the morality of religion as the sole true basis of society and law as against human contrivance (Gibb S. , 1963, p. 173).

According to Gibb, there is no *ummah* perception in Christianity similar to Islam. He also thinks that *ummah* is not only a religious but also a social term and “it implies totality, as opposed to *ekklesia*” (p. 173). The meaning of the term *ummah vahidah* is “one single society welded together by community of religious purpose and the resulting social relationships and obligation” (Gibb S. , 1963, p. 173). When the conflicts following the death of the Prophet Mohammad made people begin to suggest that the unity of the *ummah* should be questioned, the Muslim intellectuals succeeded to protect the unity of the *ummah* by

successfully preventing it to be identified with the political regimes. In this way, *ummah* has always been able to survive as a social unit, while preserving its political potential.

İktibas crew agrees with this definition of Gibb; because, they are of the opinion that Allah commanded Muslims to be a single ummah and a single state (Kur'an'ı Nasıl Anlamalıyız ya da Kur'an'ı Anlamanın Önündeki Engeller, 1994, pp. 12-14). The social unit that will establish the Islamic State is the ummah. According to the journal, ummah is the abbreviated form of the common expression of the *ummah Muhammad* which covers all Muslims. The Islamic state is founded by the ummah, but it may not only consist of Muslims. According to the journal, this is perfectly normal and natural. The important thing is that Muslims establish the state, Muslims arrange the administration, and Muslims elect the authority. Muslims live together with the non-Muslims under the conditions of some specific agreements providing that they recognise Muslim authorities and follow the rules set by them (Siyaset, 1984, pp. 5-7). The important thing here is that Muslims have the main power and authority of the state. And there is no rule indicating that non-Muslims would never be able to have a duty at any level of the state. According to their qualifications, they can be employed in various ways.

Muslims living on earth are a single ummah since they are members of the same religion. But it is not true to think of it as a solid and monolithic whole, free from differences. There can be many different sects in this single ummah, according to *İktibas*; and this is what it should be as it is quite normal. Since the *mezheb* (sect) means opinion in Arabic, and since every intelligent individual has an opinion, no one is and can be without a sect (Mezheb ve Mezhebler (3), 1982, pp. 5-7). According to the journal, the problem is not being a member of a sect but considering sects as means of discrimination. The ones, who adopt their sects as religion itself, harm the unity of the *ummah*. For this reason, sects should be seen as a source of religious richness and somehow their unity should be ensured. And the only way to ensure such a unity, according to the journal, is the existence of a single political authority that encompasses all Muslims (Mezheb ve Mezhebler (4), 1982, pp. 5-7). Having more than one single leader damage *ummah*; which is what has already been happening for decades.

According to *İktibas*, if an Islamic political authority with the power to gather all Muslims can be established, conflicts within the ummah will be minimized; because, despite their differences, all sects refer themselves to the Quran and Sunnah as the main sources. Likewise, a legitimate Islamic political authority must lean on the Quran and Sunnah in any case. Since all Muslims from every sects will be liable to obey this authority based on Quran

and Sunnah, the authority will eliminate the disputes by revealing their judgments on issues they are in conflict with and thus it will be unifying (Mezheb ve Mezhebler (4), 1982, pp. 6-7). In other words, being able to establish the unity through the differences within the ummah depends on having a legitimate leader of the ummah.

Charter of Medina

According to *İktibas*, ummah is not politically worthless. On the contrary, it is the social unit that will establish the Islamic State. However, *ummah* meant by the journal is not the same as what Bulaç meant. In other words, *İktibas* does not impose on the concept of *ummah* the meaning of ‘political unity formed by every religious and ideological group within the society of a nation state’. On the contrary, the journal criticizes this understanding thoroughly.

İktibas’s perception of Islamic governance is not as ‘Islamic version of the modern state’. It is established as an answer to the modern state; however, it is not envisioned only as a modified version of the form and names while preserving its institutional structure. To explain it through an example; unlike renewalist modernists, *İktibas* does not claim that the western values have already existed in Islam by making such sentences like: ‘rationalism actually exists in Islam and it is the same thing with contemplation (*tefekür*)’ or ‘*biat* (allegiance) and *şura* (council) are actually the democracy itself’. In fact, it finds such an approach defensive and quite faulty. The journal’s approach is, for example, like this: ‘it is necessary to be smart in Islam, but this is not the same thing as rationalism, on the contrary, there is a great difference between them’. Again, for example, the journal admits that allegiance and council (*biat* and *şura*) are obligatory conditions of legitimacy but insists that this is very different from democracy. Likewise, the journal accepts the importance of the Charter of Medina in terms of the history of Islam and that several things can be learned from the Charter, it emphasizes on the other hand that an ummah project such as the Bulaç’s cannot be established by basing on the Charter.

İktibas defines the debates based upon the Charter of Medina as confusion of concepts created by redefinition of some concepts such as pluralism, democracy and dialogue. According to the journal, Charter of Medina cannot be a part of in this context. It is the duty of every Muslim not to be caught in the winds of democracy (Selam İle, 1993, p. 2). Because; although Bulaç and his friends seemed like criticizing democracy, the crew of *İktibas* thinks

that this is not a genuine criticism of democracy, that only the existing regime has been criticized in the name of democracy and that the proposed social project is still democratic:

Since the great masses do not know either democracy or Marxism actually in a way which they are introduced by their own theorists, they sometimes think that Islam includes socialism and that even democracy is an Islamic concept. ... It is necessary to know everything within the scope of their position and existence. ... Democracy has been known in the whole world for two centuries. ... You cannot make up a democracy for yourselves and cannot want to adopt your lives to Islam and then call it democracy... Therefore, we exactly say that Islam is not democracy and not also from the democracy (Demokrasi, 1993, p. 12).

According to the journal, those who think that Islam has any relation with democracy, secularism, pluralism or civil society can neither know Islam nor understand the concepts in question (Demokrasi, 1993b, p. 16). If those who raise the issue know both, the journal crew thinks that they are not well-intentioned.

According to the journal, civil society is nothing but a democratic utopia, just like communal society is a Marxist utopia. Because, it is nothing but an illusion to be able to make “communities, which consider others as equal and which think and live according to their different ways of thinking and life, live together like wolves and lambs”, without a dominant authority to resolve the disputes and regulate the issues. The journal states that “people can live with their dreams, but their lives are not dreams”; the it invites their readers to keep their feet on the ground. In the real life, by nature “every idea will demand from its owner to give it power”; since this is the natural case, “how people achieve to prevent all ideas from desiring power”? The journal crew considers this as impossible; because, if an idea ceases to demand power, it means that it has abandoned itself. For example, “if goodness allows and tolerates evil, it will not be goodness anymore” (Demokrasi, 1993b, p. 15). Therefore, the journal considers that the civil society project, as described above, is not viable on its own, beyond its incompatibility with Islam.

Moreover, according to the journal, it is very interesting that “the people who criticize the idea that the nation-state can be Islamized, for some reason do not have any hesitations to advocate that civil society can be Islamized” (Öz A. , 2014). What Bulaç was trying to do with the new model of the *ummah*, “which is non-totalitarian, non-theocratic, and also non-democratic -since democracy has some claims that are not possible in terms of Islam- (and

since democracy is a size too small)” is to create a short-term escape door (Bircan A. B., 1993, p. 13). In a period when Turkey is in labour for reorganization, having a long-term principal attitude (which maybe will last for generations) is deemed difficult by some people, according to *İktibas*. Because, for such an attitude, it is possible to pay heavy prices such as condemnation, isolation and contempt. For this reason, those who shifted into the democratic ground while appearing to criticise democracy has begun to seek interest through cyclical positions (Bircan A. B., 1993, p. 12).

Unlike some leftists who emphasize the wide framework and versatility of the debates about the Charter of Medina, who care about the involvement of many social segments to the debates, and who see it as an "intellectual peak point" (Alpman, 2019, p. 296) for Islamism, Ercümen Özkan and *İktibas* crew does not evaluate the debates as such. According to Özkan, “Ali Bulaç resembled to the leftists by flying kites with them.”⁶³ Here, ‘flying kites’ possibly means brainstorming; because, Özkan thinks that Bulaç’s ideas are not stepping on the ground. It is also possible to observe Özkan’s attitude clearly in *İktibas*. For instance, he describes Bulaç and his friends as “those who need to check their faith by leftist ideas”; and he wishes them quick recovery by accusing them “to suppose that consorting with three second-hand desperate leftists can make them counted as man” (Demokrasi, 1993b, p. 16).

In the April issue of 1993, the journal published the full text of the Charter of Medina (“the contract” as indicated by the journal). It then started to analyse the articles emphasized by Bulaç. According to the journal, it is clearly stated in 23rd Article of the Charter that all possible disputes would be presented to Muhammad. This means that the Prophet is dominant over all people of Medina. While this is so obvious, it is unacceptable to treat the Charter as a democratic pluralist text. Besides, according to *İktibas*, the word *umma* in 2nd Article of the Charter is used to refer directly to Muslims. Giving it in another meaning is nothing but an unusual-interpretation; and unusual-interpretation (*ta’wil*) is one of the main elements which disrupt Islam.⁶⁴ One other issue which is quite clear and obvious in the Charter is that certain obligations were imposed on those who accepted the terms of the contract. So; even though everyone is free to apply their own law, this does not mean that they are completely free from specific responsibilities. There were certain responsibilities imposed on each tribe, and moreover, the person who would resolve possible conflicts was

⁶³ This expression was quoted from the interview with Mukaddes Hanım, wife of Ercümen Özkan.

⁶⁴ For detailed explanation, see: (Özkan E. , 2010, pp. 207-210).

the representative of Islam. According to *İktibas*, the conclusion to be drawn here is that: the system established with the Charter of Medina does not even resemble to the democratic pluralism, nor can it open doors for it. In the Charter, rather than the equality between the elements, the dominance of Islam is the real basis (Demokrasi, 1993b, p. 17).

However, in pluralism, the dominance of a certain group is considered unacceptable. As a matter of fact, Taner Akçam (one of the leftists participating in the debate) admitted that the claim of ‘giving up the right to dominance’ would be an almost impossible threshold for every ideological position:

Whether such a debate could be held by staying within the inner boundaries of both worlds of thought is an important but also a separate problem. I am one of those who believe that it will not be possible. In other words, both worlds of thought have difficulty in giving up the right of sovereignty not only in terms of orthodox thoughts but also in terms of their establishment (Akçam, 1992, p. 8).

According to the *İktibas* crew, this fact revealed by one of the opposers with whom Bulaç is trying to compromise is also an important example of principal approach. The author of the lines (Akçam) is keeping his own ideological position instead of taking a step towards New Islamists’ line. *İktibas* crew appreciate Akçam’s principality. However, the crew believe that the same is not true for Ali Bulaç; Bulaç’s concerns are pretty pragmatic and therefore he does not hesitate to compromise his principles (Bircan A. B., 1993, p. 12).

In fact, the issue of pluralism arose from the question of what would replace the totalitarian single-party regimes of ex-communist system. In 1987, four years before Ali Bulaç launched the alternative *ummah* project, *İktibas* quoted an interview by Zbigniew Brzezinski⁶⁵, one of the most famous strategists of the era, from the newspaper **Cumhuriyet**. In those years, when the inevitable collapse of the Soviet Union was being discussed, the prominent issue in the interview was pluralism. Brzezinski said that the 21st century would be the era of post-communist pluralism, and he cited Poland and Hungary as the first examples; because, power was shared in those countries and the political system was cleared from totalitarian residues. According to Brzezinski, the social democrats would benefit from this wave of pluralism the most, since in the post-communist period, the popular attractiveness of conservatives, who would lose their support coming from the fear of

⁶⁵ The theoretician of the Green Belt Project.

communism, would also decrease (Brzezinski, 1989, pp. 51-53). This quote was an indication that pluralism had recently been on the world agenda.

For this reason, Kürşat Atalar from *İktibas* stated that the Charter based discussions and the project brought forward by Bulaç cannot be considered independent from the conjuncture. According to Atalar, it is not possible to understand the Bulaç's project by ignoring all such things as: the efforts to remove radicalism from politics since the 80s and then the demolition of the communist block, the validity of the 'end of history' thesis on all grounds, the rumours indicating that the age of ideologies is over, the West's choice of Islam as the new enemy, meanwhile, the increasing impact of liberal democracy worldwide, the loss of the attraction of socialism in the world and philosophical collapse of Kemalism, relative economic dynamism brought by the liberal policies, Muslims with higher socioeconomic and political potentials, Turkey's efforts to give up being introvert and to become an international actor. Atalar thinks that this project is quite compatible with the global conjuncture and it is navigating in parallel with it (Atalar K. , 1993, p. 11). Therefore, only discussing the eligibility of the project to Islam would be quite insufficient.

According to *İktibas*, the ones who call for democratic pluralism are those who want to adapt to the existing situation, and they are also the ones who thought that it is not possible to escape from the capitalist democracy since it is everywhere in the post-communist era. However, the idea of democratic pluralism serves nothing but separating religion from life. Therefore, democratic pluralism can never be defensible for Muslims (Özer, 1992, p. 34). This is because, without compromising Islamic principles this path cannot be walked, according to the journal crew. Indeed, they admit that the model of agreement that Bulaç wants has an open way in terms of conjuncture (Bircan A. B., 1993, p. 14).

Ali Bulaç does not deny that the pluralistic civil society project is compatible with the conjuncture. This, according to Atalar, is an indicator that Bulaç's concern is much pragmatist than principal. His desire is to create a place within the current system for Muslims who has constantly been pushed out of life. He might be in good in faith; namely, he might be struggling for making Muslims' cultural and informational accumulation as well as their trained staff capacity visible at a higher level of the state. However, according to Atalar, Bulaç's good intention does not justify him before Islam. Bulaç invites Muslims not to explain themselves to the opponent wing of the society, but to compromise with the opponent wing. Atalar thinks that those two are quite different things. He accepts the necessity for having the ability to express an idea in a way that the opponent wing can

understand. He also agrees with the essentiality to understand that wing, for mutual negotiations. However, he thinks that Bulaç has exaggerated his efforts for understanding and being understood; he searched for a compromise with such an idea: one step from us one step from them, then we can meet at halfway (Atalar K. , 1993, pp. 11-13).

Atalar gathered the main arguments of Bulaç (by quoting some of his statements from his own writings) as follows:

1. “The state is essentially oppressive, authoritarian, and totalitarian; Islam, by contrast, envisages a pluralistic, libertarian society.”

2. “Civil society envisages a structure in which different legal communities determine social life and in which the state is established above these communities through their consent.”

3. “There is no dominant state (*hakim devlet*), there is a mediator state (*hakem devlet*). The dominant state is the product of modernity, and the mediator state is essentially Islamic.”

4. “Modernity is the enemy of tradition, whereas tradition is essentially Islamic. So, the *raison d’être* of modernity must be denied.”

5. “Radicalism is an unconsciously initiated revolt against modernity. It is alien to life and is the enemy of reality. Returning traditions by opposing the rationality of modern life will be the end of radicalism.”

6. “Religion should be brought to life and history. This will be possible by harmonizing the knowledge of life and history with the knowledge of wisdom.” (Atalar K. , 1993, p. 13).

According to the Atalar, those statements clearly show that “although the aim of the project is summed up with a very innocent expression such as ‘bringing religion back to life’, in fact, all indicators point that it means the ‘adaptation of religion to life’”. Consequently, Bulaç’s new ummah project “does not have an Islamic target such as the amendment of the system, it envisages the integration to the system -albeit in an indirect way-” (Atalar K. , 1993, p. 15).

İktibas is based on the *ummah* conception of the Classical thought. The journal crew is against both the nation-state system and nationalism categorically. According to them, one of the biggest dangers for Muslims is the probability of their being completely disconnected from the political dimension of *ummah consciousness* and integrated into the system. For this reason, the crew is trying to make people adopt Quran-based Islam understanding with the support of authentic Sunnah on the one hand; they emphasize the political dimension of Islam on the other. This situation caused both the traditional group and the regime to be against the journal (Arslantaş S. , 1995, p. 17). Indeed, this was so natural; because, “the heroic discourse which hypnotize the groups; the so called Islamic conceptions protecting, defending and representing the status quo; the structures of communions based on the metaphysical utopias and their activities; the approaches with utopic aims which do not have political consciousness have been questioned in almost every issue of *İktibas* and those perceptions are settled clearly” (Müftüoğlu, 1995, p. 18). The result of this questioning is a dual *marginalization*.

Thus, in the next section the qualities of both belonging group (*ummah*) and *other* group from the eyes of *İktibas* will be examined. The *us* versus *other* dichotomy is the second leg of the trivet of this study. Because, this dichotomic positioning reveals what are included in *ummah* as well as what are excluded from it. Since everything is known through its opposite, in order to know what *İktibas* accurately think about the *ummah*, the *other* of *ummah* from the aspect of the journal must be known.

4. CHAPTER III: THE OTHER IN *İKTİBAS*

Individuals or groups identify themselves not only by specifying what they are, but also by emphasizing what they are not. The definition of *us* is made according to the definition of *them* (others). In order to have an accurate definition of anything, the negative identification is as important as the positive one. The danger in holding negative identification as an attitude is the tendency to see the *inner group* as ontologically good, while assuming the *outer group* is ontologically bad. At the point where goodness and badness are seen as essential and constitutive, the problem starts. The source of this problem is the politization of identities.

In this chapter, first of all, the definition of the concept *other* and its social functions will be set forth. Within this framework, the construction of Turkish national identity (by the founders of the Republican Turkey) will be uncovered with both what it includes and excludes. The main target of this chapter is to reveal how *İktibas* depicts *the other* of ummah. This is important; because, it is known that *the other* of the ummah (i.e. Muslims) is not the non-Muslims (the traditional/classical other of Muslims in main discourse) according to the journal. It takes the issue of *other* from a more intellectual level. In depicting both the inner and the external others of ummah, *İktibas* adheres to some criteria. It does not make otherizations excursively. By providing those criteria, we will clarify the photo of ummah in *İktibas*.

4.1. Other

The word *identity* had not had a widespread use in the social science literature until 1960s. Instead, *self* was a common term. However, especially after the Second World War, because of the increasing interest in belonging as a research field, the word *identity* has become preferred. Indeed, the word owes its popularity to the expression “identity crisis”, which was introduced in the literature in 1958 by Erik Erikson. A few years later, in 1963, Erving Goffman’s *Stigma* and Peter Berger’s *Invitation to Sociology* paves the way for the inevitable spread of identity studies (Gleason, 2014). Hence the concept of *identity* becomes increasingly popular; but as a return, the word becomes more complex and vaguer.

Although the word *identity* has already lost its ability to explain a phenomenon due to overdose in use of the word and the excess of meanings imposed on it (Brubaker & Cooper,

2014, p. 407; Bauman, 2015, pp. 186-7; Hall, 1996, p. 1; Fearon, 03.11.1999), it still has an undeniable function when used in its most general sense,. Brubaker and Cooper (2014), after describing *identity* as a terribly vague concept, chose to perceive it as a collective phenomenon in its simplest form (pp. 414-416). Essentially, *identity* implies a fundamental similarity among the members of a group. This indicates that it cannot be separated from what is social. While Taylor uses identity in a positive sense by stating that identity is vital and indispensable for belonging, Foucault places identity in a negative context by claiming that freedom can only be achieved beyond the attachments of identity (Weir, 2014, p. 107). As seen, whether it is liked or not, identity is an indicator of group belongings that no one can escape.⁶⁶

One can live in many different belongings together in society: religious belonging, ethnic belonging, ideological belonging, national belonging, gender belonging, profit-based belonging, etc. These categories, dozens of which can be counted in either large or small scales, are basically sub-clusters of three main clusters that have intersections with each other: blood ties, common interests and similar values (Tural, 1988, p. 1). Namely, the groups that people belong are shaped according to these three main categories. A person has an affiliation starting from the nuclear family and growing in circles. Therewithal, he establishes either a physical or an emotional relationship at various levels around a religion or an ideology. He also acts in unison with people whom he shares common goals or interests. All these three allegiances are natural and legitimate categories of cultural identity. Belongings are shaped around them.

Bauman (2016) describes how indispensable the categories of identity and belonging -i.e. 'us' categories- in social life by giving examples from daily life. Each individual locates himself in certain position in his own mind and determines his relationship with other people accordingly. Each of others are at different spots. Some of these spots are close, some are remote, some are big, and some are small. Here, the distance between the place where the person stands and the places -from his point of view- where the others stand is the most important factor which determines the relationship between the person and the others in social life. From one's point of view, those whose spots are at close range are the members of his 'us' groups. These groups bestow the person a sense of confidence, safety and being

⁶⁶ This is clearly stated in the 13th verse of Surat al-Hujurat: Human beings, We created you all from a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes so that you may know one another. Verily the noblest of you in the sight of Allah is the most God-fearing of you. Surely Allah is All-Knowing, All-Aware. (Maududi, 2016)

at home. 'Us' is the place where to belong and to be in tranquility. Basically 'us' doesn't have to be a single group. From small to large it is possible to talk about a wide range of 'us' at various levels. For example, the family is the most basic group of people that we know all of its members face to face with their habits. On the other hand, although it is an imagined community (Anderson, 2006), the nation is an enormous group of 'us' that we can meet with a very limited number of members throughout our lives (Bauman, 2016, pp. 47-64)

In terms of Cartesian logic -which dominates modern Western philosophical theory-, what makes us 'us' is the existence of 'other'. If *others* do not exist, the existence of *us* have no meaning at all. So who those *others*? They are the members of the groups that we do not belong to; so, we do not have complete, consistent and healthy information about them. We do not try to have, indeed. Because of this conscious lack of knowledge, we attribute an imaginary contrast to the *other* group. So what we are is not them, and we are not what they are. But, by the principle yin yang, we and them can only be understood if considered together; because, they are both descriptive and complementary for each other. Without one, the other loses its meaning (Bauman, 2016, pp. 47-64). For instance, according to Foucault, who done quite interesting studies on the *others*, governments identify their citizens via *internal other* images. Like everything under its rule, governments determine the form of their people, and the qualities that they should or should not have. Mads are the *other*, prisoners are the *other*, different sexual orientations are the *other*. These *internal others* are used for demonstrations of power. Over them, 'normal' citizens are reminded that they should remain 'normal' and within the 'limits defined by power'. Foucault states that imprisonment and exclusion are two faces of the same thing. The isolation from society practices of the old times' has been replaced by imprisonment in modern times. Foucault draws a picture that power is in complete need of the *others* to impose its own fiction of 'normal'. He claims that this is the only way that modern power can control all aspects of life, from illness to sexuality. Let's accept Baudrillard's accusation that Foucault was able to make such accurate depictions because he was dealing with a period of extinction. Then we should also accept the concomitant of this accusation: Foucault's depictions reveal the real nature of the modern state and power before the transition to post-modern times.

Nowadays , three types of relationships are established between *us* and *others*. In the first type, *us* are "good, right and perfect in absolute terms", while *others* are "bad, incomplete and unjust in absolute sense". When *others* are structured as an absolute antithesis, dialogue, empathy and peace are completely removed; a war with neither winner

nor loser goes on. In the second type, there is an *us* group who puts itself in the center and regards that only it knows the true path. *Others* are seen so inferior and worthless that they are almost ignored. *Us* is the absolute master, and *others* may only have a value to the extent that they can be slaves; otherwise, that is, when they do not accept slavery, they deserve to be destroyed. In the third type, there are an emptied *us* and diluted *others*. There is a kind of relationship between these two groups that desires to meet on the common ground by ignoring identity and belonging. Although it looks good on paper and sounds nice, it is not sustainable because of its inconsistency with human nature (Kalin, 2016, pp. 454-455).

The way Islamic philosophy defines and positions the categories of *us* and *other* is different from modern Western thought. In Islamic philosophy, between *us* and the *other* there is neither an absolute contradiction, nor an ontological hierarchy or an ambiguous attitude. Although *us* and *other* categories have widespread use because of their functionality, in Islamic thought, the subject does not define itself with reference to *other*. Definitions are principled and universal. In other words, *us* is not shaped by the reaction against *other*. The existence or absence of *other* does not alter or obscure the features that make *us*.

Once we realize that *us* and *other* categories cannot be eliminated altogether existentially, and that indeed there is no need to do so, it is essential to consider the relationship between the two. Before it is answered that what should be the kind of relationship between the two, it has to be answered that who am I; because, the source of the problem lies in self-perception. Modern self-perception appears as a radical subjectivism based on Descartes' cogito. That is, the self/subject whose existence is bound to the capability of thinking puts himself at the center; everything is shaped around the point of view of the self/subject. This kind of self-perception inevitably places the self/subject in a hierarchically superior position over other beings and makes it a small god that can determine the position of everything according to itself (Kalin, 2016, pp. 357-358). Thus, the nation, which should remain as a pure category of definition, has become a hierarchical category due to those small gods who regard themselves as superior to other people only because they belong to a particular nation. And these little gods, by attributing a number of inferior values to the *other*, have proclaimed the supremacy of themselves and riveted their place. So, they have formed the discourse which legitimized colonialism.

It is not a fundamental mistake to build the self-perception on being an independent and -to a certain extent- an able subject, after admitting the fact that another person in the

same entity category is equally independent and able. In other words, it should be accepted that every individual are equal in being human and each of them has the right to be a single subject. In this case, a kind of inter-equal relationship emerges between *us* and the *other*, which leads to healthy behavior (Kalin, 2016, pp. 460-461). In Islamic thought, each individual is a subject who has willpower and is equally valuable in terms of being human. The fact that -what Renan referred to as a big mistake⁶⁷- Ottomans did not assimilate their subjects, did not force them to speak the same language, to believe in the same religion or to be similar in many respects, makes sense when considered as a manifestation of this tradition of thought.

The problem in the issue of '*us* and *them*' starts with the loss of morality and the politicization of identities. When realism, which completely separates the fields of politics and morality through a Cartesian dualist approach, has begun to dominate politics at both micro and macro levels, morality has become politicized and lost the principality of morality. Besides, although morality is more principled at the intra-group level, moral attitude has started to change according to the positions of relativity at the outer-group level. So, The ambivalent understanding of morality has become dominant, such as the same behaviors are condemned when they are shown against *us* group members and are ignored or even approved when they are done against the *other* group. As a matter of fact, one of the most extreme examples of this case was observed through what happened in Nazi Germany during the Second World War.

Carl Schmitt, known as the legal theorist of the Nazis, is an academician who has been dismissed from the university because he refused to leave Nazism even after the end of the war. In the relationship between the state and the individual, he devalues the individual as much as possible and makes the state as absolute as possible. He has always been fond of central authority. He found democracy useless from the very beginning, i.e. from the principle of separation of powers. He was claiming that forces should be gathered in one hand, in the hands of the sovereign, and flaunted totalitarian absolutist Nazism as an exemplary model. He already was categorically opposed to communism. So, his ideas have been an invaluable source that every extreme right-wing, anti-democratic and authoritarian regime has used in order to justify themselves (Berkay, 2018).

⁶⁷ It will be explained in detail under Chapter 3, part 2.

There are two things to keep in mind when reading Schmitt. First, his famous concept 'the political' does not describe politics. He does not give information about the content of politics; instead, he describes what the political categorically corresponds to. In other words, he defines the political as a pure category. More clearly, he gives a criterion instead of listing which issues have a political quality and which ones have not and claims that whether an issue is related to politics or how, can be understood by using this criterion. Here the criterion for Schmitt is *friend* versus *enemy* dichotomy and degree of density in the relationship between these two. Schmitt fictions *the political* as a touchstone. According to him people decide who they are, what they have to be, what they want to be or what they cannot be through using the political as the reference point (Schmitt, 2014, s. 14).

This idea of Schmitt influenced not only the ones who adopted his theory, but also the ones who had hesitations against it. It has been accepted as a basis especially for the international relations. According to Schmitt, *other* is a political category and the political other should automatically be the *enemy*. This hypothesis indicates that, for the continuation of *the political*, the existence of an enemy, against which will be united and with which will be fought to death, is essential. Friendly-enemy segregation is autonomous, and not to be confused with other distinctions such as good-bad: "The political enemy does not have to be morally evil, aesthetically ugly or economically competitive. Even doing business with a political enemy may be advantageous. The important thing is that the political enemy is *the other*, the foreigner" (Schmitt, 2014, s. 57). Here, the concepts of friend and enemy should be understood in concrete terms. They do not have metaphorical or esoteric meanings. They are very concrete and clear. For Schmitt, so called 'civilized' claims such as the refusal peoples' separation as friends and enemies by labelling this attitude as primitive relic of barbarism, or the hope that this distinction will disappear on earth soon have nothing to do with the truth (Schmitt, 2014, s. 58-59). The truth is as long as *the political* exists, the *friend-enemy* distinction will exist.

According to Schmitt, liberalism, which is trying to dominate the world system, denies this undeniable fact in the relations of states with each other. Liberalism tries to convert this friend-enemy relationship into a mere commercial competition. Hereby, it is indeed trying to destroy *the political* and to substitute 'governance' instead of 'sovereign will'. However, according to Schmitt, it is necessary to create a very strong and specific form of contrast between the concepts of friend and enemy, both to solidify the people together internally, and to have a sustainable effective power externally; in other words, it is necessary to shape

the opposition between *us* and *other* in the form of *friend* and *enemy*, and to support this configuration through a very strong discourse in order to survive as an independent sovereign state (Schmitt, 2005, p. 70; Schmitt, 2014, pp. 57-60). Actually, Schmitt's theory means an endless war, in which when an enemy is eliminated, a new enemy must be replaced immediately. Embodying this with an example will make it easier to understand. For instance, in USA, the intellectual infrastructure of Neo-Conservatives, whose weights on power and government became growingly visible especially after September 11, are based on the Schmitt's philosophy and his friend-enemy distinction. The NeoCon politics launched the Clash of Civilizations thesis and have chosen terrorism (a flexible expression whose content can be filled as desired) as the new enemy, immediately after the disintegration of the USSR (i.e. the "biggest enemy communism" was destroyed). The expression of terrorism, which has already been identified with Islam and brought into circulation, has been supported by terrifying word choices. So, a strong discourse of terrorism was created, and this discourse has become the primary legitimizer for American initiated wars in various parts of the Muslim majority world. Islam, which is launched under the guise of terrorism, is not the new but the fresh *other* and *enemy* for NeoCon politics (Bilici, 2006).

From the historical perspective, it is seen that people are divided into four groups as friends and enemies in terms of: 1) race (lineage, tribe, and society), 2) religion (and/or ideology), 3) benefits, 4) morality. They are also the main elements that form the basis of social structuring. For example, those who come from the same ancestor may be organized socially on the basis of those lineage associations, and those who believe in the same religion can make this religion the basis of a social building. According to İlhami Güler, the practical existence of social structures shaped around these four elements is accepted in the Quran. However, this attitude changes when the social structures in question begin to see each other as enemies. The Quran sets one legitimacy criterion for being enemy: morality. What is meant by morality is justice. To be clearer; according to the Quran, for example, the existence of different tribes in society is a fact and is legitimate. However, belonging only to different tribes cannot be a sufficient justification for hostility and is not legitimate. The only legitimate criterion for the tribes to be enemies to each other is the emergence of injustice between the parties. For instance, if one tribe attacks the other unfairly or extorts its territory, hostility between these two tribes is considered as legitimate. Güler states that before Qur'an the legitimacy of the political *friend-enemy* distinction is connected to the balance of the two pairs of the scale of justice and persecution. Qur'an preserved its attitude

from the very beginning to the end.⁶⁸ Thus, it is obvious that according to Qur'an, non-Muslim societies are not the natural *enemies* of Muslims, although they are religious *others* of Muslims. For hostility to occur, a kind of an injustice must occur between the two groups (Güler, 2015). Otherwise, Muslims and non-Muslims can live together in peace, provided that they adhere to the principles of justice and equity. Hence, the Prophet Mohammad sent the Muslims, who were exhausted by the cruelty of Meccan people, to the Negus; it is a perfect example for the principle of Quran. It is seen that the Prophet Mohammad did not use the category of faith (Muslim versus non-Muslim) when distinguishing people; instead, he uses the category of justice. He trusted who is just, albeit non-Muslim.

In addition, there is no *constitutive outside* which constructs the category of *us* (*believers of Islam*) in Quran. The concept of *us* was defined internally; however, this definition was not sociological but principal. In other words, the existence of the category of *us* was constructed depending upon certain principles. Therefore, even in the absence of *other*, *us* is defined in the same way. This is a completely different way of thinking from the Orientalist view of Western Enlightenment (as Edward Said put forth) and the logic of the White Man's Burden. Yet, from the Enlightened Orientalist perspective, *us* puzzles its complete meaning only by positioning against the *primitive other*. If there is no *other* to compare with, then *us* will remain incomplete, and cannot find the exact value that it believes it deserves. In this respect, in the Enlightenment philosophy, a *constitutive outside* is a necessity beyond existence. However, in Islamic philosophy, there is neither such a necessity, nor an existence.

Then how could it be possible for *other* to be defined almost exclusively within the framework of Dar al-Harb (Islamic law of war) after the Prophet Mohammad? In other words, how did both the social and religious categories of *other* put under the roof of the political *other* (enemy) category? How did the atmosphere of tolerance, which enabled different *other* categories co-exist independently, transform into a permanent area of conflict where those categories were swallowed by the political *other*?

According to Güler, what makes Muslims confused about the separation between *friend* and *enemy* is that the Arab commentators have equalized the word 'fitnah' in the

⁶⁸Quran 2/193: And fight them on until there is no more persecution or oppression, and the religion becomes Allah's. But if they cease, let there be no hostility except to those who practice oppression.

Quran 8/39: And fight them on until there is no more persecution and religion becomes Allah's in its entirety; but if they cease, verily Allah doth see all that they do.

Quran verses with ‘shirk’ or ‘kufr’. In such a case, the verses ordering⁶⁹ to fight until there is no fitnah on earth would mean that there should be an interminable war until the whole world becomes Muslim, which contradicts many other verses⁷⁰ of the Quran. However, the Hanafiyyah school translates the word fitnah as persecution, torture and aggression. Thus, hostility is described as an action that is carried out not because of religion but because of a failure in justice. According to Güler, this is a healthy perception which is also in conformity with Quran (Güler, 2015). As it is seen, the acquisition of political *friend-enemy* in the Qur'an is seen legitimate within a principal framework; so, it is categorically flexible. There are not absolute categories of otherization and enmity.

As seen, *us* and *other* categories are not essentially good or bad. They are inevitable realities to be lived with. If they are used moderately and responsibly, they may ease lives. However, when those categories are politicised and become absolute, they function to banalize evil. A less dangerous but maybe more insulting otherization is the self-praise through attributing others the label of inferiority. The process of transformation of Ottoman remnants into ‘civilized’ Turkish citizens was established on such kind of an attitude. This is also one of the motivations that push some religious people to radicalism, including Ercüment Özkan. So, in order to understand the shape of individual Muslimness, the building blocks of ummah, it is necessary to have an insight about the acceptable subjects of Turkish nationality.

4.2. Turkish National Identity and Its *Other*

According to Mustafa Özel, national consciousness is a belief the society of own which is always “prominent and superior to others”. In a way, this belief is an inheritance of Protestantism; because, when non-clerical people began to read the Bible, the idea of “chosen people” spread to national narratives. For example, John Lyly called England “the new Israel”; he also defined the British people as “chosen and special”. Milton, on the other hand, crowned this expression by indicating that “God first showed himself to his British servants (Özel, 2018, p. 42).

As described in Chapter II, the modern state first defines a nation, and then rule it as the representative of that defined nation. It also names the people it will rule as citizens. In

⁶⁹ Quran 2/193; 8/39.

⁷⁰ Quran: 2/256; 10/99; 16/93;16/9 and others.

other words, when a nation-state is formed, it must first define a nation. This is because, in the current system, state exists as the representative for a nation. It constructs its legitimacy on such a ground. But nation is a description without any kind of objective criterion. In other words, each country defines nation in its own conditions and for its own sake. Therefore, the construction of nation differs from state to state, and thus, should be evaluated separately. For example, the USA, which has a highly heterogeneous society, defines the nation on the ground of loyalty to the constitution (adherence to certain political principles) and of citizenship. However, the real persona grata for American system is a secret that everyone knows: WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant). In Turkey, the nation has been built upon 'being Turkish', which is not based on race but based on a ground determined by the state. The definition of 'Turkish nation' is mostly dependent on state's territories. There is a high emphasis on the homeland (patrié).

Social scientists agree that nations are products of the modern era, whether based on ethnic foundations or not. But each nation has various definitions which differs in the number of different groups living in it. Although those definitions are similar at some points, they may be completely opposite at some other points. For example, in Turkey, while the Kemalists define the nation from a secular perspective, the conservatives prefer a definition identifying Turkishness with being Muslim. Therefore, it is impossible to talk about a single definition of 'Turkish nation'. In other words, even though nations are imagined communities, they have not been imagined from one perspective and in one way. Imagines are self-evident for every segment. The ones who gain power try to impose its notion of nation to the rest of the public through various means.

In Turkey, the concept of Turkish nation is defined from three main perspectives: the Kemalist, nationalist and conservative ones. From the foundation of the Republic until the 1950s, the Turkish national identity was shaped around the Kemalist paradigm. In this period, it is possible to see the effects of strict laicism in the creation of national identity, as in everything else about state policies. Starting with multi-party period, there was a softening on the attitudes against religion, and nationalist-conservative views started to come to the fore more and more.

The radical reformers of the newly-founded republic, showed their best efforts to prevent the Turkish nation from relying on any Islamic reference. Renan thought that nations are composed of common oblivions rather than shared memories. According to Renan, deliberate historical errors are crucial to create a nation. Although he avoided using the word

distortion instead of error due to his negative connotations, what he means is the same (Renan, What Is a Nation?, 1996, p. 45). In accordance with Renan's argument, the first duty of the young Republic of Turkey became trying to make the past forgotten. It tried to remove its ties with both the Ottoman and Islamic past through a radical transformation; and it rewrote its history via making 'deliberate errors' and by establishing relations with pre-Islamic civilizations such as the Sumerians or the Hittites. In addition to the school curriculum at all levels, the common-distant past perception, which is tried to be created and reinforced through Turkish History and Turkish Language institutions, has been considered as the determining elements of the national identity. It was not an effort specific to Turkey; indeed, such kind of processes have been experienced by all nation-states:

The most necessary condition for the nation-state 'consciousness', which capitalism needed, to be formed was a *common memory loss*. In other words, in order for a nation to be constructed, all small social units, of which the nation is composed, should draw a line especially on the recent history; they have to 'reproduce' myths, beliefs, heroes all over again. The gap remaining from the conscious elimination of recent history, is filled with material recruited from the distant history. ... The Germans did not settle for the Greek-Roman heritage and extended to Iran and India for transferring myths. The passion of our Young Republic for the Hittite and Sumer was not born in emptiness! (Özel, 2018, pp. 41, 43)

Ottoman's almost a century of unsuccessful adventure of nationalization makes the Kemalist intelligentsia realize how essential this love which was not born in emptiness. According to Renan, people in many countries of Europe, regardless of their past -whether they are the invaders or are the inhabitants- have left their differences and merged together. For example, when the Germanic people destroyed the Roman Empire, they accepted Christianity and adopted Latin, so there was no need to differentiate them in terms of their religion or language. However, the Ottoman did not achieve in this. It neither resembled those in the places it conquered nor attempted to assimilate them. Leaving everyone as they were, it developed a form of classification based on religion under the name of the *millah* system. This, in contrast to Europe, led to the conclusion that the people of the Ottomans in the nineteenth century were still separated from each other -with Renan's words- as "the day of conquest":

The Turkish policy of separating nationalities according to their religion has had much graver consequence, for it brought about the downfall of the east. If you take a city such as Salonika or Smyrna, you will find there five or six communities each of which has its own memories, and which have almost nothing in common. Yet the essence of a nation is that all individuals have many things in common, and also that they have forgotten many things. No French citizen knows whether he is a Burgundian, an Alan, a Taifale, or a Visigoth, yet every French citizen has to have forgotten the massacre of Saint Bartholomew, or the massacre that took place in the Midi in the thirteenth century. There are not ten families in France that can supply proof of their Frankish origin, and any such proof would anyway be essentially flawed, as a consequence of countless unknown alliances which are liable to disrupt any genealogical system (Renan, 1996, p. 45).

The first power owners of the Republic of Turkey, Kemalist intellectuals, were determined not to repeat the ‘mistakes’ made by the Ottoman Empire. For this reason, they aimed to gather all the small units of the society such as Laz, Circassian, Zaza, Kurdish or Albanian in the one nation depended to the land.

Two elements come to the forefront in Kemalist Republic’s definition of nation: nationalism and civilization. Nationalism is in the form which is completely removed from the Islamic reference. For example, the *Malumat-ı Vataniye* books, which reflected the school curriculum of the young Republic, defined the nation within the framework of homeland. The aim was to transfer the love of individuals from region-dependent small social units to ‘the homeland marking the nation-state borders’. Although there were various targets related to borders in the last period of the Ottoman Empire (such as Turan or Dar al-Islam), the borders of the Turkish nation-state were clear: *Misak-ı Milli* (National Pact). Every single land within these borders is called the homeland and it is taught that the natural allegiance of the nation should be displayed to homeland (Üstel, 2016, pp. 155-164). Turkish nationalism drawn a line over the Ottoman-Islamic past, and tried to connect the nation with “the pure and imaginary Turkish culture in the past”. By this way, the beneficial oblivion would have achieved from the perspective of Renan, and a message would be given to the West about how the Turkish past is compatible with ‘the civilization’. Indeed, the Sun Language Theory or the Turkish History Thesis was born as a product of this effort (Göle, 2016, p. 89).

The second element that came to the fore is civilization. Being civilized indicates conformity to the perception of Western civilization. So, civilization is not a “neutral, value-free concept; it clearly states the superiority of the West and attributes universality to its distinctive Western culture model” (Göle, 2016, p. 28). For this reason, to be civilized means to adopt a lifestyle and to take on the form offered by it from table manners (eating at the table, using forks and knives, etc.) to self-care (solid body, sports, showering, etc.) and clothing style (Üstel, 2016, pp. 174-195). Being civilized also requires being positivist and progressive; because civilization includes “the idea of progress⁷¹ encompasses something that is constantly moving forward” (Göle, 2016, p. 28). Therefore, the Turkish nation was imagined as a progressive and the idea of reaching the level of contemporary civilization was put in front of it as an utmost ideal.

In the system of nation states, each nation is defined by what it is instead of what it is not. The logic of the nation state requires defining itself through the *other*. The Kemalist Republic as a nation state has done so. It depicts the Ottoman Empire, which was positioned just the opposite of the Republic, as the *other* of the Turkish nation from its lifestyle to its architecture⁷², from its understanding of religion to its form of government. On the one hand it marked Turkish people -i.e. the *us* group- as the ones who are republican, nationalist, loyal to the principle of laicism, civilized, and know how to dress and behave in the society, are not bothered to be with women, read books, listen to opera, have a sense of responsibility towards their homeland, and -without a need for guidance of any religion- are self-disciplined, and so on. On the other hand, it negated Ottoman people -i.e. the *other* group- as the ones who were emphasizing ethnic differences, did not create social solidarity, were backward, did not dress in accordance with the modern age, were polygamous, devoid of etiquette, obese, lazy and so on. Thus, the Ottomans were recreated as the exact opposite *others* of the Turkish nation, in every aspect.

⁷¹ *Progress* has come into force as a concept that symbolizes designing the future in a way that can overcome the uncertainty of the future. This new meaning of the word differs from the previous meaning of *progress* in two ways. Firstly, the link of the word *progress* with time has been broken, as everything that progresses begins to decay after a certain point. Thus, the concept *progress* is coded as a wellness which is timeless and absolute and which will not eventually lead to aging, degeneration or collapse. Secondly, the link of the word *progress* with maturity/perfection has been broken. This is because, when someone or something reaches to the point of maturity, perfection, peak point, it has to stay there since it cannot go further or it has to go back. Since both staying and going back are the opposites of the *progress* categorically, it is not possible to talk about the *progress* anymore, if perfection is achieved. Therefore, the concept of progress is stopped being related with the maturation and coded as a “timeless perfection” (Koselleck, 2016, pp. 77-81)

⁷² Bozdoğan explained how a national architecture established by “getting rid of” the domes and glazed tiles in detailed: (Bozdoğan, 2015)

In his interview book named *Ben Atatürk'ü Çok Seviyorum* (I Love Atatürk So Much), history professor Engin Aybars stated the Republic of Turkey has provided a model for its nation. In this model, humanism is the philosophy of life and moral doctrine; republic is the political model for humanism; freedom underlies the republic; equality is the condition for freedom; populism is the indicator to reach the awareness of equality; laicism is necessary to protect people from the religious oppressions; ratio is the reference for laicism; the expected outcome of the rationalism is science; and the natural consequence of all of them is democracy (Şen, 2007, pp. 353-357). Construction of the Turkish nation on such Western ideals in this way has leaded every forms and practices based on Islam to be regarded as the other.

İsmail Kara stated that the history of the Kemalist Republic is the history of struggle against Islam and being Muslim entirely (Kara, Cumhuriyet Türkiye'sinde Bir Mesele Olarak İslam, 2012, p. 17). According to B. S. Sayyid, Kemalism is not only the name of the policies implemented by Atatürk in Turkey. All of the similar policies implemented in all Muslim majority countries can be given this name, and thus Kemalism can be used as an analysis category. Because, Kemalism was the first and the most successful of the 'nationalist', 'secularist' or 'modernizing' political movement applied in Muslim majority countries and inspired the successors; as well as "it reflects the centrality of Turkey within the Muslim world in the early twentieth century, a centrality symbolized by the caliphate and the fact that Turkey was the strongest independent Muslim state -something that the Arabocentric orientation of Islamic studies tends to forget" (Sayyid B. S., 1997, p. 52). Therefore:

Kemalism is not to provide an analysis of post-Ottoman Turkey, but rather to demonstrate the wide significance that Kemal's ideas and policies have had beyond Turkey. The abolition of the caliphate and the project of westernizing what had been the most powerful Muslim state in the world meant that Kemalism could not be treated as simply a local phenomenon, peculiar to Turkey. ... In other words, Kemalism describes a hegemonic political discourse in the Muslim world within which Islam was no longer a master signifier of the political order. (Sayyid B. S., 1997, p. 70).

Although the caliphate exists only symbolically in recent years, its abolition has destroyed the hope of a re-establishment of the Muslim union. Islamism was born out of this wreckage: "... the abolition of the caliphate had the effect of unfixing the sedimented link between the state and Islam. The effect of this was to reactivate Islam as a political

discourse". The idea of the Islamic state is the product of the same wreckage: "once the caliphate had been replaced by the discourse of Kemalism it became possible to think about the need for an Islamic state" (Sayyid B. S., 1997, p. 78). In other words, Islamism is an attempt to reverse Kemalism in its full sense. It aims to give back the role of Islam, which became de facto -and intellectually- marginalized through Kemalism, in public life. Therefore, just as Kemalism defines Islam as its own antagonistic other, Islamism defines Kemalism as its antagonistic other.

Sayyid's global scale evaluations reflected the experiences in Turkey in particular. The definition of nation made by the Kemalist state based on the Western understanding has already pushed religious groups who have been distant of the nation phenomenon from the very beginning to a pan-Islamist line. Thus, Islamists, who are coded as one of the *others* of the Kemalist nation, added Kemalism among their *others*, so a two-way *othering* practice was happened between the two groups. Especially most of radical Islamist groups labelled M. Kemal as the 'Dajjal', a kind of devil that is believed to come right before apocalypse. Here *İktibas* stands on a different point from those groups. In the part below, we will see how the *other* depicted in the journal.

4.3. The Other in *İktibas*

In *İktibas*, the belonging group is taken as all Muslims around the world, i.e. the ummah. The *external other* for the journal is not non-Muslims, but the West. While the Muslim groups considered communism as the primary enemy due to the general atmosphere in Turkey in the Cold War period, *İktibas* suggested that all kinds of Western values, especially democracy, is the *other* for the ummah. In addition, the definition of the *internal other* appears in a different way than the general one. The journal completely opposes the Greek Philosophy since it made ummah to follow the wrong questions and the culture of Islamic Philosophy since it prevented ummah's ability to question. It also includes any understanding that does not count the method from Islam and that sees every way as permissible to reach the goal. In sum, according to *İktibas*, the two main qualities that the ummah should possess are rationality with reference to the Qur'an and legitimacy in the means up to the goal; the *other* of the ummah is the secular systems from the Western origin.

4.3.1. The External Other in *İktibas*

The journal's *belonging group* consist of Muslims from Turkey and from other countries. In other words, the *belonging group* is the ummah. As usual, the journal took Islam as the reference while defining the *us* group and determined its attitude in accordance with the provision of the verse "the believers are brothers". *İktibas* focuses almost always on the problems of the ummah; and the *external other* of the ummah is the West in the eyes of the journal. In the time period this study focuses on, the mainstream discourse (the nationalist-Wertkonservativ wing) among the Muslims of Turkey apprehended communism as the most vital threat. Though, *İktibas* have never considered communism neither the most vital nor even a primary threat. Besides, it strongly opposed to calling the communism as the greatest threat within the Islamic circles. Since the opposition to the West started to spread to other Islamic groups just before the fall of communism in the 1980s, this attitude of *İktibas* can seem to be normal. However, Ercüment Özkan did not regard communism as a threat even during the fiercest periods of the Cold War. To clarify the issue with a memory, Mukaddes Özkan, together with her husband Ercüment Özkan, went to visit Alparslan Türkeş at his home on the Sacrifice Feast of 1963. Türkeş and the people around him was talking continuously about how communism was a greatest threat for Turkey. Özkan couple left there with sadness at the end of the day:

We said goodbye and left from there and listened to stories about coming of communism for years. ... from our elders and our press. But it did not come; it did not have the power to rule a Muslim country. We always told them that, however they did not listen (Özkan M. , 1995, p. 15).

According to *İktibas*, the discourse of the danger of communism is rather deceiving. It claims that the real danger is the sneaking of Western concepts, such as imperialism, capitalism, democracy, human rights and humanism, among Muslim ranks. All these concepts should be approached with caution in that they emanate from the same source and are the products of the same mindset. The journal warns Muslims that the smiling faces of Western concepts are just masks⁷³; Western concepts are the Trojans of imperialism; the so-called 'Western values' are merely laying the groundwork for moral collapse. This point of view is the common feature which *İktibas* (which has an anti-West, anti-American and anti-

⁷³ The articles in *İktibas* related to democracy and western values were then edited as a book named *Laiklik-Demokrasi ve İslam* (Laicism-Democracy and Islam).

Israeli attitude) shared with the newspaper Cumhuriyet and İlhan⁷⁴ & Turhan⁷⁵ Selçuk brothers. At this common point, the ideas of the two communities, named as the red communists⁷⁶ and the green communists by the traditional society, cross: the liberal West is the real danger with all its concepts and values, and therefore represents the *other* as a whole. It is necessary to underline that this whole covers only the mentality codes and political type of actions; it excludes the technical and technological issues. Technical information and technological developments in *İktibas* are evaluated in a different category, even if they are of Western origin. They are neither regarded as enemies nor *others*. In this respect, it can be said that the line of *İktibas* is similar to the first-generation Islamists who favoured not taking the culture but taking the science and technical developments of the West. However, it should be taken into consideration that the journal crew has more experience compared to the previous Islamists and that their thoughts are more rooted and settled since they have a better grasp on both the West and the world conditions.

Ercüment Özkan claimed that he is the one who showed the real face of the democracy which had been accepted as normal by almost everyone except from some marginal or radical rightists and leftists. He is not wrong about it; because, he started to criticise democracy in 1960s. He indicated in an interview that: “If some rumours began to be noised in Turkey about how a bad system democracy is, it can be said that we made it possible. We have explained it. We have given it a hard time. ... Its patent belongs to us [we have achieved it]. We have never seen or heard anyone, except from us, indicating that ‘democracy is bad, it is against Islam’” (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, p. 173). Although the issue whether democracy as a system could be suitable for Islam was discussed by the most prominent names for the Islamism in 60s, those discussions could not find a ground in Turkey -maybe because of the trauma of the Muslims caused by the tragic end of the *Demokrat Parti* (Democratic Party)-. In this respect, Özkan is right, he was the first person who declared in Turkey that democracy was entirely incompatible with Islam.

According to *İktibas*, laicism is one of the most recusative political principles arisen from the West for Islam. Laicism is a product of the system of thought which arose as a reaction to the dominance of the Church; thus, it is a reactional worldview. However, the

⁷⁴ He was a writer in *Milliyet* back then.

⁷⁵ *İktibas* quoted at least one of the caricatures of Turan Selçuk in almost every issue. Later, Turan Selçuk became popular in the period of 28th February with his caricature on ‘pig with hijab’.

⁷⁶ The newspaper Cumhuriyet was following the leftist trend in those years (Muradoğlu, 2007).

reactionality of a movement takes it away from making correct remarks. In other words, according to the journal, truth cannot be reached with ideas arising from reactionality (Grev, 1992, pp. 10-12). Since laicism was born in response to Christian institutions and systems, its full nature can only be understood when considered with medieval Christianity. So, there is nothing laicism can say to Eastern societies who have not had the same experience. Nevertheless, the question of why laicism was top-down imposed suddenly on Eastern societies is very important according to the journal; and only those who realize that laicism -like other tools of modernism- serves Western imperialist purposes, can answer this question (Özkan E. , 2010, pp. 506-516). Here *İktibas* crew highlights the fact that Muslim societies did not live under the oppressive and totalitarian theocratic system like of a Church.⁷⁷ Therefore, the West's struggle to get rid of this pressure has no equivalent in the Muslim world. Moreover, it is pretty hard to explain laicism and laicism, both are based on Cartesian logic, to a Muslim who thinks that religion and world are just two faces of an indivisible unity. However, the worser thing is to make those people, who have difficulties even in comprehending the logic underlying laicism, accepted it. Yet, according to *İktibas*, laicism is a certified *other* for Islam and Muslims; because laicism claims that religion and the world should be handled within the framework of separate rules, while Islam sees religion and the world as an indivisible whole.

İktibas wrote that the Muslims in Turkey have suffered from the articles of the Constitutional Law related to the laicism during the history of the Republic, therefore they united against laicism, but they could not resist against democracy in the same way. However, Muslims who opposed laicism are should have also been against democracy if they were conscious. According to the journal, laicism and democracy are the Siamese twins; the other cannot survive without one. Therefore, someone has to be against other if he/she is against one of them (İdeolojik Kirlilik, 1991, pp. 7-10).

One of the most insidious enemies from the West is democracy, for *İktibas*. Democracy is seen as a pure *other* that cannot be integrated with Islam in any way. The journal criticizes Muslim intellectuals' attempts to legitimize this system since Tanzimat era by claiming that democracy has already exists in the essence of Islam. From the journal's point of view, it is impossible for democracies dominated by Machiavellian pragmatism, which sees every means acceptable to achieve its goal, to comply with Islam, which values the principality of means at least as much as the legitimacy of the aims. *İktibas* claims that

⁷⁷ For a similar determination of Bernard Lewis, see: Chapter 2, Sections 1 and 2.

not only the means and but even also the aims themselves are not constant in democracy. According to the journal, secular democracies “have only one truth that is considered essentially invariable: to ensure that people comply with their desires. The principles of a democracy are based on what people of a defined place regard as truth in a time period”. For this reason, democracies “can never stabilize on certain values” and truths (Parti ve Niçin Parti Kuruyoruz?, 1991, pp. 8-10). This is one of the clearest reasons why democracy can never be compatible with Islam for the journal. On the one hand, there is democracy, which advocates certain cyclical values; on the other, there is Islam, which has principles that do not change according to time or place: when the picture is drawn as such, the intersection of them is a null set.

Another reason for the journal’s opposition to democracy was stated as in relation with the perception of truth: “in democracies, the truths and the wrongs are determined not by the reality of the essence of what is concerned, but by the highness or lowness of the votes cast.” (Demokrasi, 1982, p. 4). In other words, *İktibas* crew considers the ground of majoritarianism unreliable and diametrically opposite to the principality rule in Islam. According to the journal, democracy is a “new God created by the French Revolution” and the West, which has always been away from monotheism throughout its history, loved this “god of crowds”. The so-called majority, as seen in all prophets’ life stories, has always consisted of people who do not praise a single God and do not want to serve Him only. Therefore, the West and the majority complement each other. However, ‘majority’ cannot be a basis and nor can it be a rule-maker in Islam (Çokluk, Çoğunluk, Çoğulculuk, 1992, pp. 8-10). In other words, *İktibas* believes that the principle of majoritarianism is directly contradicts with Islam.

Another claim of the journal is that “natural freedom”⁷⁸, one of the bases of the democratic state, does not comply with Islam. Natural freedom’s theoretical mainstay Social Contract theory is also criticized by *İktibas*. According to this imaginary contract, the primary duty of the state is to protect human freedom based on pleasure⁷⁹ and interest⁸⁰. *İktibas* crew think that the area of these freedoms is expanding day by day – and as the phase goes- jumping the track. The most obvious example of this exceder freedom is the marriage

⁷⁸ Natural freedom is referred for the freedom of human beings that are pretended to come by birth in democratic theory.

⁷⁹ Here, the social contract of Rousseau is referred. It is written in the journal.

⁸⁰ Here, the social contract of Locke is referred. It is not written but implied in the journal.

of two men in a church in England. As known, churches are the institutions whose name are identified with religion; but, no religion of any divine origin have ever permitted such a religion. Indeed this marriage was performed in the name of democracy, according to the journal. And this is no exception; more such things will arise (Demokrasi, 1982, pp. 4-7). Since all other religiously non-acceptable acts may one day become an issue of freedom, *İktibas* believes that the democratic understanding of freedom is fundamentally in contradiction with the Islamic understanding of freedom.

İktibas, defines the two elements of democracy discourse as “market goods”: the concepts of Human Rights and Freedom. Although they are indispensable for a democratic lifestyle, they have no place and no value in Islam; because, these are the two shell concepts which are filled by “order of slickness which is called democracy” in a way it desires, and which are used by democracy in legitimization of any kind of strange practices. The journal reveals that even the theorists who put forward and developed these concepts are unable to agree with each other about the descriptions of the concepts of Human Rights and Freedom. It then gives examples from the theorists in question to embody what it means. Through those examples, the journal shows that the only point on which the theorists ally is the naturality of human rights and freedoms. This, according to *İktibas* crew, is nothing more than a fabricated fallacy. For example, in the issue of freedom, the journal takes Montesquieu’s classification of four freedoms as the unit of analysis: individual, intellectual, religious and economic freedoms. It states that each of these freedoms contradicts with Allah’s either orders or prohibitions. First, by addressing each item of the classification one by one, it shows how each freedom is defined on the bases of both worldly and physical desires and pleasures. Then it indicates that there is no method limitation for obtaining these four freedoms; the end justifies the means. Finally, the journal writes that such an understanding that offers freedom based on pleasure as the end and justifies every means to achieve this end will never be compatible with Islam; because, Muslims are limited by the orders and prohibitions of Allah, and Islam is the name of surrendering to them. In this respect, being a servant (surrendering) of God contradicts with Human Rights and Freedoms (İdeolojik Kirlilik, 1991, pp. 7-10). Consequently, according to *İktibas*, Human Rights and Freedoms -just like democracy and laicism- are *others* for Islam and Muslims.

One *other* ways of thinking originating in the West is rationalism, according to *İktibas*. Considering how a vital role the journal attributes to reason, its anti-rationalism seems interestingly odd. Here too, the journal activates its distinctive method and explains step by

step why it sees rationalism as one of the *others*. First, it mentions about the instinct of human beings to believe in a supreme power. Every religion, either true or superstitious, invites people to believe, whereas, according to the journal, Islam is the only religion that invites people to think about what is believed. As a proof of this assertion, the journal adduces that only intelligent people who have reached their maturity are regarded responsible in Islam; the rest (mads and children) are exempted from religion. Immediately afterwards, *İktibas* gives the example of Voltaire, who claims that (for Christianity) reason and religion cannot coexist at the same time. Thus, it compares how reason-religion relationship is established differently in two major religions. According to *İktibas*, Islam is not a religion of dogmatic pre-acceptances, it is a religion of reason based free will. However, all other religions except Islam are based on pre-acceptances, since “there will remain no religion as long as reason is used” (Din Bir Önkabul müdür?, 1991, pp. 9-11). Religions are deemed dogmatic by Western systems and that they are seen as opiates preventing people from using their reason. For *İktibas*, this attitude arises from the essentialist approach of Western style of thought which puts all religions in the same pot. However, it is enough to have more than 230 verses in the Quran that urge people to think and to make use of their reason in order to prove that Islam is not dogmatic (Dogma, 1992, pp. 11-13). Thus, after the journal has made some more explanation and comparison by continuously adducing evidences, it claims that the relationship between religion and reason in Islam is “like the relationship between water and concrete, which reaches to the soundness when is irrigated more and more” (Din Bir Önkabul müdür?, 1991, pp. 9-11). So why the journal that pays so much attention on reason is against rationalism?

According to *İktibas*, rationalism is related with being rational, not with wise reason; so, it has nothing to do with Islam. The first point in reason is the nature of the reason. at this point, the journal makes distinction between *smart* versus *rational*. It defines *smart* as someone use his mind wisely, and *rational* as the person glorifying the reason. Accordingly, the rational thinking system categorically rejects any transcendental power. Rational person does not accept a creator up above reason; but, the smart person accepts the existence of a creator by staring at all the signs he has witnessed. Therefore, according to the journal, “smartness stipulates surrendering to the Creator (Islam⁸¹), while rationality requires the rejection of the Creator”. In this respect, “being smart is an obligation for Muslims, while rationalism is impiety” (Akıllılık-Akılcılık, 1987). In other words, according to *İktibas*,

⁸¹ The word Islam means ‘surrender oneself to the Creator’.

rationalism has deviated from the beginning regarding the nature of reason and blessed the reason by increasing to the level of Creator. Meanwhile, the journal underlines that the description for rationalism it used does not belong to itself, rather it cites the description from those who theorized rationalism. Thus, it also emphasizes that it does not label and stigmatize anything arbitrarily.

The second point about reason is its function. According to the *İktibas* crew, the fate of reason is to think. Reason is created to contemplate. In Islam, Allah reveals, and reason obeys. Reason is the obedient, not the ruler. One other task of the reason is to judge whether the ones who claim to be Prophet are indeed revealed by Allah or not. To sum up, the reason thinks, judges, becomes persuaded, obeys; but it does not rule. Therefore, rationalism of the West, which is based on the rule of reason, has no place in Islam (Rasyonalizm, Akıl ve İslam, 1983, pp. 5-7). In other words, according to *İktibas*, reason is indispensable for any human being; but rationalism, like other Enlightenment originated thoughts, is *other* for Islam; it is a turnoff that should not be entered, it is a system of thought that should not be used by Muslims.

Another *other* is humanism. According to the journal, humanism is known quite incorrectly as ‘love for all human beings’ among the people. However, humanism has nothing to do with human love. By citing the definition of humanist theorists, the journal describes humanism as a system of thought that disconnects humanity from the transcendent (i.e. God) and puts the human at the centre. Therefore, it argues that in no way humanism can be compatible with Islam. Islam describes man as the most beautiful of creatures; however, humanism ignores humans’ being products of a creation and divinizes them. According to the journal, under the light of such a definition, it is obvious that Muslims cannot be humanist (Hümanizm ve İslam, 1983, pp. 5-7). It is understood that the journal considers all thought systems that emanate from Enlightenment essentially incompatible with Islam, since they centres the idea of removing God from the earthly level.

As can be seen so far, *İktibas* claims that all of the basic concepts of the Western political theory contradict Islam in terms of their construction and development. Because of this, for example, no concept such as “Islamic democracy” can be generated, or no movement that claims to be Islamic can use democratic means in order to get power. Likewise, from the journal’s perspective, the such denominations as ‘rational Muslim’, ‘humanist Muslim’, ‘socialist Muslim’, ‘capitalist Muslim’ or ‘feminist Muslim’ are nothing but oxymorons. Because, both the system and the structure of thought to which all these

concepts belong are diametrically *others* of an Islamic system with both its principles and methods.

Then the question to be asked is how modern Western thought has been able to hold up in Muslim geographies so much. *İktibas* answers it as follows: the West has created various ‘bogey’ to frighten non-Western countries so much so that they could become eager to import Western system of thought in order to gain Western protection against those bogeys. In the words of Ercüment Özkan, the most well-known bogey -the Frankenstein created by the United States- was Russian communism. Özkan claimed that communism was under-handedly fed by the USA. This is because, if Muslims, like all other people oppressed under imperialism, began to fight the enemy called communism, they would have had no opportunity to question their own situation, and they would have seen the West as a natural ally and saviour. So, they would have knowingly and willingly fallen on the lap of the West. USA, which was making those estimations, faced with a problem in Turkey, which it could not have taken into consideration, according to the journal: communism has remained among the intellectuals, it was not able to penetrate into the public and be adopted by masses. For this reason, Özkan argued that the USA established METU in 1956 to make communism popular among the ordinary people; and from the establishment, METU had become the home –as the phrase is- of communists. METU, which was nominally considered the vexillary of USA, was regarded as a complete failure of USA policies; but, for Özkan, it was not. METU was not a product of USA’s misvaluation. Despite, raising a communist youth was the real goal beneath the surface for the establishment of METU. It is planned that, once this youth frightened the public via intemperate actions, the USA-inclined right wing parties could come to power in Turkey easily and could stay there for a long time. Indeed, it has been so. Thus, the USA’s plan has worked out, and American influence has become settled in the country (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, pp. 321-322).

Özkan offers another proof: there has been no such a threat called ‘communist danger’ in countries under British influence. The communism has never considered as a threat in the old British colonies and in other countries within the UK’s domain. According to Özkan, creating the discourse, in which communism was presented as the greatest threat, has been one of America’s most influential policies. Through using this discourse, it took the control of many countries, and managed to break the power of Europe, especially Britain, over the world considerably (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, p. 323). Therefore, communism is never considered among the primary threats in *İktibas*; because, the journal insists that the threat

of communism is just a scarecrow. According to the journal, the main enemy is democracy and democratic elements that come under ornate masks; however, no one is trying to see underneath their masks.

For *İktibas*, both democracy and Marxism are separate religions, each of which has their separate belief system (Şirk, 1984, pp. 5-7). For example, the democratic worldview is based on the belief for freedom. The state exists only to protect the supposedly natural liberties of people. The hypothetical ‘social contract’ is also based on the protection of freedoms. In other words, individuals who have adopted the democratic world view are sure that people have some innate freedoms and no one can interfere with it. So, they have a faith in this, like a rule of a religion. This forms the doctrinal basis of their religion-esque worldview. Likewise, Marxist ideology is based on the idea of classless society, it constructs its philosophy over the means of economy and production, and it offers a distinctive lifestyle. Marxists have a faith in their ideology. Just like democracy and Marxism, there are some points that Islam wants people to have faith in. In other words, according to *İktibas*, it is not enough to surrender to religion (not enough to be Muslim), it is also necessary to be sure of /have a faith in religion (to be a believer-Mu'min), and to trust it (İman, 1985, pp. 5-7). Hence, just as a person cannot be both Jewish and Christian at the same time, he cannot be a democrat and a Muslim, nor can be a Marxist and a Muslim. He has to choose only one.

According to *İktibas*, the assertion that it is not right to call religion an ideology and an ideology as religion is nothing but a “fallacy”. Because, for a religion to be a religion, it does not have to be based on a divine source, it is enough to present a world view and a lifestyle. The human mind can also produce religion. Just because of this there is a division between true religion versus superstitious religion. True religion means a religion based on God, the source of the truth, and if it is not cut off from its source throughout its historical process, it remains as a true religion. On the other hand, superstitious religion means a religion based on either a source of superstition or a source of truth but has been disconnected from the source of the truth (God) at a stage of its historical development. According to the journal, in order to call an idea religion, it is necessary to look at its features. If the idea puts some bases to believe in, sets some rituals, establishes some rules for social life and imposes some regulations to the economic structure, then it can be called as a religion. Because, religion means a whole worldview and a lifestyle. Therefore, each ideology with all these features is qualified enough to be a religion (Din, 1983, pp. 5-7; Dindar-Dinci, 1994, pp. 8-10). Therefore, according to *İktibas*, since a person cannot believe in more than one religion,

he/she have to choose either Islam or any other ideology; however, he/she cannot merge the two.

Since every ideology struggles to establish its own social order; then Muslims should strive to dominate the order of the Islamic ideology, according to the journal. This struggle does not mean forcing everyone to be Muslim. It is already not a legitimate aim for Islam; because, it is a religion that states there can be no coercion about imposing Islam. So, Muslims should not try to make every individual Muslim by force. The important thing here is to establish and maintain the system that Islam offers (Din, 1983, s. 5-7).

As it is clearly seen in the section up to here, *İktibas* has taken Islam as a reference when determining the *external others* according to its own perspective. Political systems, ways of thinking, or ideologies that are deemed to contradict Islam essentially have been marginalized on both principle and intellectual level. However, personal marginalization is hardly ever encountered. The journal maintains the same attitude in its criticism of the current regime in Turkey: individually Mustafa Kemal was not criticized, rather Kemalism has been criticized as a system.

Kemalism, which has been trying to adapt itself to all Western values, is an *external other* according to *İktibas*. From the perspective of the journal, since Kemalism is a religion like all other -isms, it cannot be expected to be an *internal other* anyway. Because, it is an external group. In the journal, Kemalism is mentioned under the name ‘regime’ and it is often underlined that it is a ‘pure *other*’ for Islam and Muslims.

According to *İktibas*, the Committee of Union and Progress followed the Germans, led the great Ottoman collapsed and fled the country. Thus, within the country, the pro-British were left alone in the Westernist school. It is this group that established the Republic of Turkey. Until the end of the War of Independence, Sharia remained in force, one way or another; but British government stipulated to apply laicism in Turkey at Lausanne Peace Treaty. The founders of the young republic, which was already pro-England, accepted this condition. Thus, the Muslim populated Turkey has begun its adventure of laicism. Then all Western values were put into effect one by one. However, the desired result could not be fully achieved, since each of those values lacked both philosophical and social basis, and top down imposed. Still, according to the journal, “it is impossible not to be surprised about how such a big work is done so quickly”; and it is also impossible “to find another example of this like Turkey” (70. Yılında Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, 1993, p. 4). Thus, the Kemalist regime

of the Republic of Turkey, which undertakes itself the duty to remove the religion from the daily life primarily by imitating the Western secular democracies, is a perfect *other*, in the eyes of *İktibas*.

However, in *İktibas*, which chooses to focus on ideas and criticize them instead of individuals, there is not the of Mustafa Kemal. In fact, according to Ercüment Özkan, M. Kemal was someone who truly loves his country, who wanted to not only save it but also glorify it. However, since he believed that imitating the West as was is the only possible way for uplifting the state, he became the pawn of the British government. The British government supported and glorified him because they knew the mind structure of M. Kemal. Although M. Kemal did not even realize that he was working for the British government, he was made the only hero who saved the homeland without any the support, by the British government which realized his ambition. Here, Özkan does not mean that Mustafa Kemal was working on behalf of the British government since he was assigned to this job formally or informally. Özkan implies that M. Kemal's actions and attitudes suited to the British government's book; he worked in a way that the British would like. According to Özkan, once M. Kemal was converted into the one and only hero, the rest of happened in rapid succession without a need for any further intervention by the British government (p. 137). Because, "those who manage and prompt a person to do something cannot intervene or rule everything about him/her. ... They draw the general framework and create his/her mentality. ... That's enough. Anyway, all he/she does becomes in the account of the others" (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, p. 142). To clarify, according to both Özkan and the *İktibas* crew, there is no need for the *othering* Mustafa Kemal as a person. The important thing is to know his ideas, to realize how much those ideas served for the colonial forces of that time, and then to marginalize his ideas that served imperialism. It is pointless to stigmatize the individual.

Therewithal, despite the rule of a non-Islamic regime in Turkey, *İktibas* is against marginalizing the country as a whole by declaring Turkey as *Dar al-Harb* (abode of war). The journal claims that Muslims are confused about the concept of *Dar al-Harb*. The word *dâr*, which means *home* in common use, means the state in its broadest sense. There are many adjective clauses of the word *dâr*, such as *Dar al-İslam*, *Dar al-Harb*, *Dar al-Sulh*, *Dar al-Küfr*. Among all those concepts, only *Dar al-İslam* and *Dar al-Küfr* indicate a position that exists in its own. All the other adjective clause concepts related wit *dâr* are made based on the presence of an Islamic State. The position of a state against the Islamic State is defined by an adjective accordingly. For example, *Dar al-Harb* is the region where

the Islamic State is at a hot war. Or *Daru's-Sulh* means the states with which the Islamic state has made a peace agreement with them. As seen, those names are not absolute; they may vary depending on the situation. For instance, a state that was once *Dar al-Harb* can become *Dar al-Sulh* by the end of the war. Moreover, since these names are given based on the Islamic State; if there is no Islamic State, there is no *Dar al-Harb* or *Dar al-Sulh* too. On the other hand, the name *Dar al-Kufr* is not dependent to the presence of an Islamic State. *Dar al-Kufr* is all places in the world that does not have an Islamic State, and it is the obligatory duty of Muslims to announce Islam to all of them (Özkan E. , 2010, pp. 550-555). The reason for this issue to be addressed in detail in *İktibas* is that the majority of Islamists was misconceptionally calling the Republic of Turkey as *Dar al-Harb*, and they were claiming that Islamic law of war should be applied against Turkey. According to *İktibas*, this is pretty wrong, and Muslims in Turkey cannot even intend to apply the Islamic law of war.

Moreover, even if Muslims are subjected to all kinds of torture in a state, it is inappropriate to name this state as *Dar al-Harb* and to begin to act in accordance with the Islamic hot war law, for the journal. In other words, nobody's life and property can be harmed; because, violence can only be legitimate if there is an Islamic state. If there is not an Islamic state and if there is not a potential power that has the ability to establish an Islamic state, then violence will be nothing but terror. Islam never approves terror (Özkan E. , 2010, pp. 556-558). In Islamic law of war -although both have the phrase war in their name- cold war and hot war are judged differently from each other. Therefore, their provisions are also different. When the issue is this sensitive, *İktibas* crew believes that no one has a right to demand the application of fiqh of *Dar al-Harb*, which means hot war law, by hiding behind an inaccurate naming (Siyaset, 1984, pp. 5-8). Therefore, according to the journal, Turkey cannot be called as *Dar al-Harb*, and the country cannot be marginalized completely and virtually. Struggle with the state should continue to exist as on the level of thoughts.

As it is seen up to here, *İktibas* is not based on the classical 'Muslim versus non-Muslim' opposition at the first hand. According to it, the essential level is not the individual but the ideological/systemic; because they are the ideologies of regimes that directly affect individuals' lives. If a regime is not built via Islamic principles, and even diametrically opposite to Islam, it is a complete *other* according to the journal. On the other hand, it can be said that the belonging group in *İktibas* corresponds to the category of Muslim in classical term, but with one difference: the logic behind intra-group marginalization. According to the journal, this logic requires that all that does not comply with the understanding of Islam

based on the Quran should be taken out of the group. In this way, authentic Islam, where pure (*ari-duru*) Islam is experienced, can be reached. Again, the non-personalization criterion is preserved at the maximum level while performing intra-marginalization. Criticism is directed not towards individuals or groups but on the way the groups think and operate.

4.3.2. The Internal Other in *İktibas*

The attitude of *İktibas*, which reveals a different view from the Muslim versus non-Muslim dichotomy on the issue of *external other*, is again different from the classical understanding. It does not act with the logic of marginalizing those who do not perform prayers, earn interests, adulterate or violate any order of Islam based on individual worship even though they are Muslims. Here, too, the principality of journal comes into play and addresses the issue from a point higher than the individual perspective: from the point of faith. This is because, according to the journal, any kind of misinformation in those principles has the potential to throw the person to different ends and even to remove him from the circle of Islam.

According to *İktibas*, a Muslim should buy and use every good thing (idea, item, application) he/she deems suitable for Islam, regardless from whom or where it is sourced; he/she should leave what he/she realizes that it was not suitable for Islam, although he/she is induced that it is suitable for Islam (Devrim İnkılab, 1994, pp. 12-15). For this reason, *İktibas* begins criticizing the thought systems that distorts Muslim minds and somehow distanced them from the essence of Islam. So, the journal determines its own intra-group belonging area, just as it did when determining the other-group area: compatibleness to Qur'an based Islamic understanding. From the point of view of the journal, the principles and belief systems of Muslims should be cleaned of all kinds of foreign elements and superstitions. Those foreign elements have a wide scope including from the philosophical questions of Greek origin to the Indian-origin mysticism. According to the journal, only in this way, pure Islam can be reached and a way of thinking suitable for Islam can be established. Thus it will be possible to put Islam into effect again.

In *İktibas* there are two criteria for internal marginalization: first one is to stand out from all kinds of beliefs and thoughts that fall between the Muslim mind and the essence of Islam; the second one is to pay attention to the Islamicness of not only the purpose but also

the means that will accomplish the purpose. Because, for the journal, the end does not justify the means. The means should be legitimate before Islam in itself. The journal excludes philosophy and mysticism within the framework of the first criterion. It makes a wide marginalization from the traces of the Greek philosophical tradition to Sufism. Within the framework of the second criterion, it criticizes the Muslim groups operating within the current regime.

Mystic Doctrines and Philosophy: Indian, Iranian, Greek Ideas; Sufism and Paganism:

In fact, the Muslims' cooperation with the Greek Thought started quite early. According to *İktibas*, the ancient Greek Thought, which came to the agenda through translations in the second century of Islam, brought non-Islamic questions about faith and confused Muslims' minds. The most important of them is the issue of predestination. This issue included the question of whether the Quran was created or not, which has grown so much to make people label each other as heretics and kill each other. However, according to *İktibas*, predestination is not an issue in Islam's own doctrine. The destiny/fate refers to the actions that are not under the responsibility of people, such as the sunrise or sunset or unexpected plane crashes, which will not be taken into account by Allah. Predestination, on the other hand, refers to the characteristics of goods, such as 'the sun is hot' or 'the water boils at a one hundred centigrade degrees'. Again, human beings will not be taken into account by Allah in those issues. Because, it is the determination of Allah himself, not of the human beings. Therefore it is very pointless for *İktibas* that people fight tooth and nail with each other in a matter that they will not be asked in the day of reckoning. The journal states that the matter is such clear and obvious. The main source of this meaninglessness, on the other hand, is the ancient Greek philosophy (Özkan E. , 2010, pp. 113-118).

Translation activities, which first started during the Umayyad period and peaked in terms of both quantity and diversity during the Abbasid period, are not innocent in the eyes of *İktibas* crew. According to them, the aim of the Umayyad and Abbasid regimes by getting the translations from ancient Greek philosophers done was to keep the ulema busy with new and diverse questions in order to keep them away from getting involved in politics. Thus, it became easier for Umayyad and Abbasids to continue their reign. Indeed, neither Umayyad

dynasty not Abbasids one had a claim to keep Islam alive. Since their only concern was to stay in power as long as they can, they tolerated the mixture of different philosophical thoughts with Islam; and they even prompted. For the journal crew, while it is so obvious that both the Greek thought and the Christian spirituality, which is based on abstemiousness and spiritual purgatory through suffering, were pure *others* against Islam, Umayyad and Abbasid attitudes cannot be explained in any other way than betrayal to the religion. Had they not consciously done this treachery to Islam, they should have struggled to keep the purity of religion intact, which they did not (Özkan E. , 2010, p. 519). To sum up, according to *İktibas*, ancient Greek philosophy is a source of subversion that must be completely erased from Islam. It blurs the essence of the Islamic belief system. Therefore, it is an *internal other* of the Muslim thought system.

Similarly, the journal treats Sufism as an element which must be completely removed from Islam. However, while criticizing Sufism, it does not prefer to marginalize each Sufi individually. It opposes not the individuals but the logic of Sufism, the philosophy behind it, the propositions it offers, and the ways of its implementation. It claims that removing Sufism from Islam will end the different opinions of different Muslim groups and will make them to be a step closer to unity under monotheism. In other words, *İktibas* considers Sufism as a parasite on Islam and which makes it sick, and when the parasite is removed, the treatment can be achieved. For this reason, the criticisms in the journal against Sufism are quite harsh. However, this harshness has developed over the years. While *İktibas* crew made some relatively soft determinations and criticisms against Sufism in the first years of its publication, its discourses gradually became more and more severe. Finally, in 1990, in the 141st issue of the journal, Ercüment Özkan suggested his final judgement and indicated by writing an article with the title “*Tasavvuf: Ayrı Bir Din*” (Sufism: A Different Religion) that: Sufism is definitely not Islam.

In the articles within *İktibas*, there are no kind of personal attacks to specific people such as ‘x Sufi person’, ‘sheikh of y communion’, ‘follower of z communion’ etc. The journal has entered in a struggle with the whole institutional structure of Sufism. A wide range of evidence is presented in the journal that the origin of Sufism is not Islam. It is claimed that Sufistic beliefs, customs and forms of worship introduced to religion are the biggest obstacles in understanding Islam correctly. This is because; they have spoiled the purity of Islam and changed its principles; as a matter of fact, Sufism has become a new

religion. For this reason, Sufism is an unacceptable *internal other* in terms of Islamic belief, thought and behaviour.

For *İktibas*, there is no kind of discrimination between the old, new, Buddhist or Muslim religious sects. According to Ercüment Özkan, “having a piety with poverty is nothing but delusion”.⁸² Achieving self-discipline by staying away from the real world in a monastery or dervish lodge with the minimum needs for living is not acceptable for Islam. The Prophet Muhammad did not follow such a method, nor asked anyone to follow it (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, p. 349). Therefore; an Islamic movement cannot and should not be based on traditional culture since the traditional culture is based on “shamanistic ruins, Christian interference, the dominance of ancient Greek sophism, Buddhist fallout, and the pseudonyms which is mostly came from Israelite” (p. 289). Özkan says that: “the ones who consider Greek Sufism, *Vahdet-i Vücut* (Unity for Existence), astral projection, tying clothes for Shamanism and cairns, lighting candles for Christianity, organizing specific activities etc. as religion for themselves by confusing them with their illusions hang a signboard of the religion from Allah on their neck” (Özkan E. , 2010, p. 290). As it can be observed, Özkan’s attitude against Sufism is quite clear. It is possible to see the same clarity in the journal.

First of all, the formalism of Sufism is unacceptable for the journal. The *İktibas* crew object to the reduction of Islamic religion to formal things like beard or turban; since they think that the appearance cannot be regarded as a sign of religiousness. Otherwise, it becomes possible to say that Lawrence is the real pure Muslim. According to the journal, the reason for Lawrence’s success in fooling Arabs is that Muslims attach great importance to appearance. However, everyone can wear a turban; turban is not an engagement of Islam. It also does not show who is more pious. People, who comprehend Islam completely, “take the personalities, behaviours and thoughts into consideration” (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, p. 27). They do not take the image into consideration and deceive from them.

The journal, which does not limit formalism only with the external appearance, claims that formalism is also dominant in misunderstanding Quran. According to the journal, the fact that Quran is a holy book is not understood properly by the public. Quran was removed from the real life by described as sacred, and it captivated by some paganist blessing traditions. The paganist blessing rituals such as holding Quran after performing ablution, reading it by sitting on the knees or keeping it at a high place have made people think that

⁸²Ulvi Alacakaptan has a statement like it, which became anonymous later: “the thing we deemed taqwa before is actually poverty”

they will be punished by Allah if they do not do all such kinds of things. Thus, when people get into a heavy struggle for respecting Quran, they started to be afraid of it. This is just what has happened for centuries (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, pp. 96-97). The journal is of the opinion that the paganist rituals have entered Islam through mysticism and religious Sufi orders.

According to *İktibas*, it is not necessary to perform ablution before reading Quran. It is not even necessary to sit down, since there is a verse in Quran indicating that Quran can be read by lying down. Reading Quran does not require any ceremony since Islam is not a religion of ceremonies, but a religion of convenience (Ehl-i Sünet ve Ehl-i Teşeyyu, 1992, pp. 9-11). Quran must be the cornerstone for every Muslim; keeping it away from life is not an Islamic act. This comprehension was only inherited from the people's ancestors through Sufism. To test whether all other beliefs and understanding forms inherited from the ancestors and presented under the name of Islam are really suitable for Islam, the source to be used is Quran; since only Quran contains essence which has not been spoiled for centuries (Sapıklık (Dalalet), 1991, pp. 9-11). Hence, according to the journal, the ones who set aside one-on-one relationship with Quran by leaving the Sufi teachings aside, can understand how much of what is offered in the name of religion is true and how much is crooked.

It is a belief widely used in religious sects that Quran cannot be understood by individual reading. It is recommended to read the books written by prominent names of religious sects rather than Quran, since it is claimed that the correct description of Quran is presented in those books. In fact, by going a step further, it is claimed that people who try to read and understand Quran in their own language will go astray. *İktibas* strictly rejects all of them. According to the journal, the ones who say that Quran cannot be understood are the ones who want to enter between Allah and His creature. Because, when they say that the book is incomprehensible, they insidiously mean that only certain people who have passed through some spiritual rank can understand it, who is actually themselves. However, this opinion has nothing to do with Islam. Therefore, everyone should read, understand and live Quran in their language. Because, when he is resurrected after being died and reckoned, nobody will be asked about the book of any sheikh or any prominent name. So, in order to be able to give the account, it is necessary to know Quran; and so, it is necessary to read in order to know. Indeed the verb 'reading' means and aims to understand; so it does nobody any good to read without understanding the meaning. For this reason, anyone who cannot not speak Arabic should read Quran from the translations in their own language. Otherwise, it would not be possible to understand this book and live its principles (Özkan E. , 2010, p.

21). Moreover, *İktibas* is of the opinion that, unlike the traditional judgment, when Quran is read without understanding, it cannot make people acquire merits (Dogma, 1992, pp. 11-13). In other words, for example, the replicational Quran readings in Ramadan, distribution of Quranic verses and reading whole Quran do not have any kind of meaning from the journal's point of view. Because, reading it in Arabic does not contribute to establish a relationship with the meaning of Quran. If it is desired to acquire merit from reading Quran, it ü must be read in Turkish and should be understood and tried to be applied in daily life. In fact, one should not adhere to a single translation; comparisons should be made between several translations. People who do this will have deeper comprehensions. Their relations with Quran will be stronger, thus they prevent themselves from getting caught to the cults.

Critically criticizing many beliefs and practices in Sufism, *İktibas* opposes the belief that sheikhs are entitled to know through the hearts and show miracles. According to the journal, attributing some superhuman features to the sheikhs, who are indeed human beings, is nothing more than a shirk (sin of practicing idolatry or polytheism) even when the Prophet Muhammad did not experience such mysterious things in his life and stated that he did not know anything invisible/secret thing (*gaib*). Similarly, the belief of Unity of Existence in Sufism is also a shirk (Şirk, 1984, pp. 5-7). Considering how heavy the accusation of shirk is for Muslims, the importance of publishing this serious criticism against Sufism in a public journal would be more clearly understood. This was quite new for that period.

The journal also opposes the dhikrs limited in number given as duties to the members of the religious order. According to the journal crew, repeating a word more or less times is not the act of dhikr mentioning in Quran. The word dhikr in Quran means keeping Allah always in mind; in order for such a remembrance, a healthy mind is needed. However, the purpose of the dhikr in Sufism is to disrupt the mental health and numb the human. According to the journal, this is equivalent to being drunk, whereas Islam has forbidden it. The natural consequence of this series of logic is that: the dhikrs of Sufism are making people drunk, and cannot make them acquire merits they expect (Zikrullah, 1985, pp. 5-7). Likewise, according to the journal, the belief in Sufism claiming that the people of graves will help the people in their difficult times is unacceptable. People of graves are incapable even to know the situation of those in life (Kabir Ehli ve Yardım, 1983, pp. 5-6). Namely, the spirits of deceased sheiks cannot help or even wander around the people. They are now in another realm and have been disconnected from the earth.

According to the journal, the traditional understanding of Islam, which is shaped by Sufism, is passive and “it is a way of believing Islam which only has five pillars, which does not intervene administration and regime, which is waiting for the day of judgement, which makes people to live their lives introvertly and which has nothing more than some rituals to show others” (Dindar-Dinci, 1994, pp. 8-10). For this reason, although the number of Sufi Muslims is high in quantity, it does not disturb the regime in terms of quality. Because, they are compared to the flocks of sheep driven by the shepherd. If the shepherd is in harmony with the regime, his flock cannot be expected otherwise (Dengeli Fikri Beslenme, 1992, pp. 10-15). In addition, Sufi communities are seen as potential voting treasures since they are tied to their leader’s apron strings. If the leader tells or implies to his disciples which party to vote, the disciples will undoubtedly follow his command. For this reason, parties operating in the current regime somehow choose to establish a relationship with religious sects. Since all Sufi originated communities that exist institutionally in Turkey are actually illegal, they make efforts for reconciliation with some of the political parties in order to maintain their existence; therefore, they become articulated with the regime, in order to continue existing. Moreover, the votes they cast provide not only the maintenance of their existence, but also some kinds of privileges. Thus, they keep the pot boiling through their relations with regime based on mutual interests (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, pp. 308-309).

However, according to the journal, a conscious Muslim should never fit in the crowd and be motivated like a sheep. Instead, he/she should try to live Islam by using his mind in the way which Allah will be pleased. If Muslims read Quran, they can see that the Islam, which is explained in it, encourages people to think, and it aims to make them not to be influenceable. However, Sufism also falls between the person and the Quran and de-subjectifies him/her (Dengeli Fikri Beslenme, 1992, pp. 10-15).

According to *İktibas*, the fact that the Sufi religion can survive even under a secular-democratic regime without being considered as a threat for the regime means that Sufi religion is only a dead religion. It is doubtful whether members of a dead religion can be alive; because, if they are alive, they should not let their religion left in captivity of another world view, but they should try to make it dominant over life as a lifestyle and a source of law. According to the journal, if a religion is not brought to life and to power, it is doomed to die like a person who is dying from foodlessness; because, the necessary food for a religion to survive is power. Therefore, Muslims with active comprehension of Islam should try to enable Islam to become a lifestyle. Meanwhile, they should tolerate and resist against

the inevitable -not potential- difficulties. Withdrawing and leaving the square completely empty is never acceptable according to the journal (Dindar-Dinci, 1994, pp. 8-10). For this reason, *İktibas* argues that a true Muslim should be resurrected by getting rid of the passiveness of the traditional thought immersed in Sufism. Only those who have achieved this vitality are the “core group of us” for the journal. Others are only *internal others*.

The reason behind this uncompromising attitude of the journal against Sufism is that it knows that an Islamic order cannot be established without destroying the established beliefs. A Muslim should not be afraid to hit traditional culture for the sake of the Islamic cause since an Islamic understanding based on Quran cannot be created without spoiling this culture, just like the grape must cannot be vinegar without being spoiled. However, according to Özkan, the spoiled grape may also be transformed into wine instead of vinegar. So, the important thing is not only to spoil it, but also to provide it to turn into the right thing. In other words, *tabligh* (Islamic notification) should be continued while destroying the culture which was established in the society and supposed like Islam (which is not, for the journal). Only by this way the society can be protected from being blown to the different ends, and from going away from Islam (Özkan E. , 2010, pp. 290-291).

The attitudes of *İktibas* related to Sufism and marginalization of the traditional understanding of Islam caused the traditional groups to marginalize the journal. Especially the founder of the journal, Özkan, was often blamed to be a deviant heretic, and threatened with death. Even a bomb was placed in his office. However, Özkan, by preserving his unique interestingness, accepted the charges perpetrated against him without taking offense. He made people to understand that he has a distinctive style of thinking by saying that: “if deviation means straying away from the way our ancestors walked, yes we are deviants”. According to him, the Prophet Muhammad deviated from the path of his ancestors and followed the revelation of Allah. In this sense, perversion is the way of the Prophet (Sapıklık (Dalalet), 1991, pp. 9-11). Ercümen Özkan’s distinctive feature is the use of various well-known labels and concepts in a controversial way. By doing this, he is trying to show that people always speak without thinking. He draws attention and compels people to think with different definitions that almost no one can think of.

Özkan claims that Sufi circles who call him a deviant heretic are not innocent in establishing a passive understanding of Islam. According to Özkan, there is a relationship between Sufism and power similar to the one between churches and kings. He reminds that in the West and in the Middle Ages, there was a system in which the kings protected the

property belonging to the church, while the church had the only right to crown the kings. This mutual dependency provided a church-based legitimacy for the kings, which he required in all his actions. Özkan argues that the role of the church in the Islamic world has been undertaken by Sufism. According to him, Sufism has never opposed and will never oppose also to any regime, for the name of Islam (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, p. 83). Although many revivalist and reformist thinkers have criticized the passivity of Sufism since Mehmet Akif, Ercüment Özkan was the first to use such expressive, clear and harsh expressions publicly in Turkey.

Özkan summarized the republican adventure of the Sufi sects in Turkey as follows: some of the communions such as **Rifa'i**, **Jerrahi** and **Malamatiyya**, which disappeared for a while after closure of Islamic monasteries and zawiyas, started to reappear after 1940s. They sank into the effort of ensuring their survival by praising the regime in fancy words. Moreover, they have acquired many disciples from the high-level intellectuals. Those sects, all peaceful with the regime and had bureaucratic followers, preserved their existence without going underground, except for a very short time, even in the very early periods of the republic (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, pp. 377-378).

Besides, there are trends like **Nurculuk** (Nur Movement), which seemed at first to be more opposed to the regime. Said-i Nursi was presented as the owner of the biggest Islamic movement in the first years of the Republic. However, according to Özkan, Nursi never posed a danger to the regime. Even after the Demokrat Parti came to power, the followers of Nur Movement made peace with the regime by giving political support to Menderes. Underneath the support provided for the Demokrat Parti, there was reversion the adhan to be recited in Arabic again. Given that since the second half of the 1920s some mosques had been closed, some religious people had been executed, and everything related to religion had been taken from life, it becomes easier to understand how the reversion of the adhan looks great for the Muslims. It was like returning to the golden age of the Prophet, in the eyes of the Muslims. Therefore, the leading people of the Demokrat Parti were considered as representatives of Islam, not only for the followers of Nur Movement, but also for the Muslims in Turkey. However, according to Özkan, this image did not reflect the reality (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, pp. 280-282). DP was as secular as CHP; but, the party used the religious image since it was beneficial for it.

According to Özkan, all communions from the **Qadiriyya** to **Naqshi**, such as **Süleymancılık**, **Arvasilik**, **Community of İskender Paşa** and **Community of Erenköy**,

were not against the regime. The only thing of the followers of **Süleymancılık** did were to teach how to read Quran in Arabic; they did not bother to understand it. **İskender Paşa** was a sect which was seen as a vote depot due to its popularity; and **Erenköy** was a community where the rich people continue its religious courses. According to Özkan, none of the sheikhs of those communions could achieve to show any Islamic prominence neither politically nor philosophically (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, pp. 378-381). Besides, Özkan (who did criticize almost everyone from Ömer Nasuhî Bilmen to Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır or from Şeyh Said to Necip Fazıl) indicated that none of them could get beyond to the traditionalism since they were misinformed. However, he also emphasized the fact that they cannot be blamed directly due to ignorance and laziness; because, “the difficult period they live made their courage to fly away. They only showed the courage which they could save” (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, p. 304).

To sum up, *İktibas* argues that the understanding of Islam should be purified from traditional elements. According to the journal, tradition not only causes the person not to use his mind and to be a toy which plays into the hands of the regime, but it also causes the deterioration of the basic rules of faith. Muslims whose beliefs are impaired are not the same believers as described by Quran. Therefore, philosophical and mystical traditional understandings, which are completely *other*, should be cleared of Islam, for the journal.

Collaborators of Islamization

So far, we have seen that the first criterion used by the journal in forming the internal other is to get rid of all kinds of beliefs and thoughts that fall between the Muslim mind and the essence of Islam. The second criterion used by the journal is whether the tool matches the purpose. To put it more clearly, if a structure claiming to be Islamic does not hesitate to resort to non-Islamic methods in its functioning, that structure is an *internal other* for *İktibas*. Thanks to this criterion, *İktibas* team noticed the potential danger of Fethullah Gülen in the early 1990's.

Ercüment Özkan was one of the initial names, maybe the first one, to call out criticism about the Gülen group, which was regarded as a branch of Nur community among the people at that time. Later it became prominent as a different group, and progressively drifted apart from Nur community. Eventually it was named as FETÖ after July 15, 2016. Back to 1980s, Özkan did not hesitate to criticize this group frequently both in his articles in the journal and

several interviews. Under normal circumstances, Özkan adopted the principle of making his criticisms over institutions and institutionalized practices, rather than individuals; though, he did not hesitate to name Fetullah Gülen himself in his criticisms. This can be clearly seen in the example below:

For example, the man [Fethullah Gülen] votes for this regime. The regime, on the other hand, is letting Fethullah to make a show by allowing him to gather forty thousand people at the Kocatepe Mosque. And it helps to increase its popularity. ... All newspapers from Van to Edirne are playing this drum. Hundreds of buses, thousands of buses. The people all around Turkey started to think that 'how great this man is, considering that there are lots of his men around Turkey'. ... Then the man strokes the gold. ... How can you make him inefficient? He suddenly became very popular (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, pp. 191-192).

As it can be understood from there, Özkan who described Gülen's speech as a "show" also questioned that who gave this opportunity to him. Because, even the attempts of the leaders of Islamic groups and sects to give mass sermons were considered as a cautious action targeting the regime. In such an atmosphere, the actions performed by Gülen legitimated Özkan's question "who did give this opportunity to him".

The *İktibas* crew thinks that politicians prioritize voting concern and do not care about the spread of the false perception of religion. However, such communities like Gülen's provides interest to the politicians by distorting Islam:

Is there anyone who has not seen that the things presented as religion by the people with their sermons and crying shows are complete 'superstitions'? ... How will the ones explain their actions to Allah when the time comes, if they keep aching for the things told by such people by believing that they are not superstitions but facts, giving millions for their works, letting them open private schools, allowing them to collect *zakat* more than billions, providing for them to open 'student houses' and guaranteeing the minds of the students they help to be put in pledge? ... The ones who helped them to be organized to such an extreme degree that they can print the daily newspapers in the Central Asia republic countries, in Nakhcevan and in Kazakhstan are the main helpers to extend this army of superstitions with their *zakat* of billion liras they provided from the Muslim riches who are the owners of the first one hundred company in Turkey.

... They will not be able to explain to Allah. How many people are interested in the fact that such groups, which are working as interest networks, are a great infortunium for the country and its people? You will see that those people, who think that their quality will grow when they are more crowded and who know nothing but the superstitions about Islam, will drag the country into a deadlock of bigotry. Don't you see the results of that they regard using one's own mind as 'ill-gotten' (*haram*), with their being millions of people? ... How they act like the devil and how they look like the ones who say 'leave your faith then I will give you water'. Since they are crowded, it is beneficial for the laic-democratic system with their high potential for voting, and those votes are used as the operating capital of the regime. When it is considered that to whom those kinds of masses give their votes, and what kind of a system they support, it can be seen that an increase in number of those kinds of masses is demanded in Turkey. This is because, they are ready vote treasures. ... In the following days, the careful eyes will see lots of truth about the things which can be achieved through using such masses (Dengeli Fikri Beslenme, 1992, p. 15).

Time has justified *İktibas* which wrote that a structure which does not think anything but its own interests and does not hesitate to use religion as a tool for them will create great troubles for the country in some day.

The ability to make accurate predictions about FETÖ was because of the analysis capability of the journal crew's which is sourced from the the style of thinking that prioritizes principality. For example, some people (without names) are criticized in the journal as such: "they can show enough idiocy to think that they can be Muslims by adjusting themselves to the land since they hesitate from the sanctions of the political regime". While making this criticism, the journal is based on the principle that Muslimness cannot be hidden. Because, as long as the person stay hidden, he/she will move away from Islam, and even if he/she keeps claiming to be a Muslim, he/she will not be able to continue to be Muslim (İdeolojik Kirlilik, 1991, pp. 7-10). Therefore, it is never possible for the members of FETÖ, which has built its entire strategy on hiding, to remain Muslim according to the journal. However, in those days, the accusations made by the journal to the -as it was called- "**Hizmet** (service) movement" were regarded as quite severe by many Islamic groups. *İktibas* was accused to exaggerate the issue and not to know the truth about Turkey. According to the accusers, there is no other way to overturn the regime except from infiltrating to and hiding inside it. Therefore, the many groups did not hesitate to applaud FETÖ's concealment strategy, even

though they did not like it at all. Yet, the *İktibas* crew believes that it is necessary to stand outside the regime in order to overturn it in the name of Islam. Moreover, they believe that -as repeated in many issues of the journal- Islamic goals could not be achieved through non-Islamic means. Therefore, they repeated on several occasions that Islam should be cleared of any structure that resorts to illegitimate means, such as **Hizmet** movement (FETÖ).

In Turkey after 1980s, while capitalism enured to the lowest base of the society, a new way of piety winking to the politics emerged. Anyway, it was not a secret that the aim of the September 12 was to create a religious society within the framework of the regime's sense of piety. Islamists, on the other hand, did not see any trouble in taking advantage of the current situation until they cross the bridge by benefitting from the opportunity. However, in the process, they forgot their essential differences with the regime and started to perceive the post-1980s as an ideal period for Muslims. In this period, Özal was a key figure; so much so that the post-modern Islamist intellectuals, who criticize **Milli Görüş** (National Vision) parties despite their Islam-based discourse, did not hesitate to qualify Özal as an Islamist and to stand by him (Oğuz, 2001, pp. 60-63). Well, what could be the reason for this situation that seems paradoxical?

In an article he wrote in *İktibas*, Hayrettin Oğuz started from the era of Mahmut II to explain the value of Özal for the post-modern Islamists. This sultan made wearing fez obligatory which he copied from the West. Because of this, he became famous as *gavur* (infidel) sultan among people. However, the same people, who labelled him as *gavur*, re-used the same label for the ones who banned fez. According to Oğuz, this attitude change is exactly the most obvious indicator of the way the society perceives religion. Those who can make sense of it will solve how religious logic works in these lands. The founders of the republic did not realize this; thus, their projects related to Islam did not go as planned since they applied a radical and Jacobin style in their projects. Oğuz thinks that it was the right wing of CHP which first noticed the mentality of society in perceiving religion; this wing was later formed the Demokrat Parti (DP). When DP came to power, -unlike its successor- it did not try to determine the content of religion and the sacred. Instead, they joined hands with some clergymen and thinkers; hence they rehabilitated the society in the line with the benefit of the DP. After Menderes, names such as Demirel, Erbakan and Türkeş applied the same method and prepared the ground for the emergence of some people who will 'determine what is sacred'. According to Oğuz, this process took 30 years, and after the coup d'état in September 12, the first fruits of accomplishment were reaped. The first accomplishment was

legitimization of the existing lifestyle of the people with religion (Oğuz, 1995, p. 13). In other words, the people were not brought in compliance with Islam, but Islam was brought in compliance with the people.

Thus, the democratic system has succeeded what either Tanzimatists or early republican elites had failed, thanks to the clergy that was raised and polished through democratic means. The democratic system collected pious people by the means of clergymen and reconciled them with the existing regime. Oğuz thinks that the first key name in this regard is Turgut Özal. Özal is the symbol of becoming religious from every possible aspect after the 80s. With his democratic piety embodied in his personality, he became an example to the society as to ‘what kind of a religious they should be’. Besides, he himself became the driving force of this kind of religiousness. Özal was a figure which ordinary people see themselves in him; and therefore they embrace him tightly. Along with all his relatives Özal family were like a mini Turkish society (Oğuz, 1995, p. 14). Thus, almost every step of Özal was considered like it was in accordance with Islam. The society legitimized him constantly, on behalf of religion.

According to Oğuz, the second key name is Gülen, who qualified M. Kemal as ‘Genius’. As of 1995 (when Oğuz wrote his article), Gülen was still attributing himself to the Nur community; and his group was called **Nurcular** by everyone. Therefore, by calling ‘Genius’ to M. Kemal whom Said Nursi (the real leader of the Nur community) originally called the ‘Dajjal’, Gülen aimed to reconcile not only his followers, but also all religious people with the regime. Oğuz states that the religious perception of Turkish people distorted due to the restraints they have experienced for years. Although they were still qualifying themselves as Muslims, the real situation of the society has little to do with Islam. At this point, Gülen appeared on the stage, blessed the existent perception of religion by characterizing it as the ‘pure religion’, and legitimized it. In other words, Gülen, “who had dreams, who was inspired, who talks with prophet in his dreams till mornings ... who showed combined miracles ... who cries his eyes out ... who hides his real face by crying”, came to the help of the people and told them: “in a manner you are better than the companions of the Prophet Muhammad (*ashab*) ... I see the Prophet is walking among you and pats you on the back”. Thusly he assimilated the religion to the society by indicating that current condition of the society is not problematic in terms of Islam (Oğuz, 1995, p. 14).

Finally, the third and the last key name of the trivet is Ali Bulaç, according to Oğuz:

The people, who knew that they could not live and return to Islam which Allah sent through His Messenger, called Islam to their own religion, what he lived and believed; and legitimized it politically with Özal, religiously Fetullah Hoca, and intellectually Ali Bulaç his friends. ... Özal qualified his political party as -perish the thought- ‘the rope of God’ and brought reference from Quran. Fetullah Hoca have made Prophet Muhammad pated the rich people of the capitalist and liberalist economic system on the back; and he valued them above from the companions of the Prophet Muhammad ‘in a manner’. Ali Bulaç and others also identified ‘their own project for the legitimization of the system’ with the Charter of Medina. The method was determined then. ... We are getting more religious, but we cannot become more Muslims. It is enough for us to know (Oğuz, 1995, p. 15)

Oğuz defines the tree actors as trivet. The terminological expression of the process in which the trivet plays the main role is *Islamization* in *İktibas*.

Islamization means “insisting on the separation of faith and practice on purpose, ignoring the criterion of the faith in Quran, taking indigenous insights as touchstones by subjectivizing Quranic principles, emphasizing the dimensions of the religion that will not disturb the system ... and even applying some Islamic rules within the context of an anti-Islamic system by pulling them away from its real systematic” (Anglo-Sakson Laiklik Anlayışı ve Müslümanların Konumu, 1995, p. 5). Islamization is the process initiated by the West in Muslim countries in order not to give a way for the radical Islamic movements. It was put into action the Iranian Revolution. In other words, within a Muslim country, the West aimed to support the Muslim groups whose members are in harmony with West and to shine them in the public, and thusly to prevent the fundamentalist movements from finding a ground to grow and spread. It is also a strategy which can be called an extension of the green belt project (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, p. 268).

According to *İktibas*, Turgut Özal was the most skilled practitioner of the Islamization process in the political wing. It is unknown whether someone who is as skilled as him can come again. However, there is one thing, according to the journal, which is not unknown that the current laic system in Turkey will continue to exist “by using Muslims as a tool against Islam”. It is an incident in the period after the 80s that people started to be distant from Quran, as explained in detail above, and feel closer to the traditional Islam (the kind of Islam that society lives). It also means that the Muslims started to get closer with the West.

The journal crew thinks that it is nothing but fraud to present this period as “Islam is developed and extended”, while the reality is “Islam is prevented via Islam” (Özal Ne ifade Ediyordu?, 1993, p. 8).

According to *İktibas*, people were experiencing the beginning of the Islamization process when the whole process is considered. In the following years Islamization would have a darker green colour. Living with infidelity would be more acceptable and adopted (Özal Ne ifade Ediyordu?, 1993, p. 9). When *İktibas* claimed all of them, there were 3 years to 1996 elections when Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) came to power.

As can be seen, it is unacceptable for *İktibas* that Muslims have an agreement with the system and find places for themselves within it. Because, the ones who compromises with the system resort to Islamically prohibited means, and also they lose their main Islamic targets. They relinquish from Quran and from being Quranically-approved-Muslims. Therefore, the abovementioned Islamization process is only a deception according to the journal. Some highly regarded politicians, opinion leaders and thinkers are guilty for not behaving in compliance with Islam and for legitimizing the regime. In sum, *İktibas* crew considers the whole process of Islamization experienced on behalf of the system after 80s as an ‘other for Islam’.

In *İktibas*, having a political thought or claim and entering into the politics are considered as totally different. According to Ercüment Özkan, involvement into politics is religiously illegitimate during the Kemalist regime is in effect. Because such an involvement means recognizing the legitimacy of the current system, being integrated to it and even strengthening it. If a movement claims to be Islamic, it should aim to make Islam to be in power in all areas of life. An Islamic movement cannot agree with any kind of non-Islamic system and cannot resemble them. It should protect its own characteristics. Özkan applies the first years of Islam to bring an evidence for his claim: Prophet Muhammad rejected the offers of Quraysh notables for a deal between their own religion and Islam. Since the Prophet, who should be the first example to guide Muslims, did not agree with the system of Quraysh, Muslims should not agree with other systems. In sum, according to Özkan, any Muslim should not and must not adapt to the non-Islamic systems in which he/she lives; he/she should not and must not form coalition with others by staying inside the system, (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, pp. 1-11). On the other hand, having a political thought and claim is an obligatory religious duty for all Muslims and no one have the right to play a religious

duty down and make it look like something prohibited by Allah⁸³ (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, p. 350). So, from the perspective of Özkan, politics is a religious duty, however it should be carried out within the Islamic rules.

The *İktibas* crew objects to equalization of voting for the one who performs *salat* with voting for Islam. They indicate that it is the greatest misunderstanding; because, by voting (independent from who was voted for), the only thing achieved is to strengthen the current order. Therefore, the action of voting in the elections under the laic democratic system is not religiously permissible (Seçim, 1991). The crew does not blame directly the people about voting issue. According to them, the real offenders are the incompetent leaders of all the communions who encourage people to vote on behalf of the religion. They make the people to get into the system in a way by using the discourse of ‘for God’s sake’. According to the journal, existence of such faulty Islamic movements are no better than no movement (Özkan E. , 2005, pp. 303-304). Because, they make people distant from Islam through using Islamic discourses.

Here, the **Milli Görüş** parties are implicitly criticized. **Milli Görüş** is an Islamic movement which has never left the discourse of establishing an Islamic State until the end of the 1990s. However, it chose to fight by staying within the system, as a method. But, according to *İktibas*, if the method is not Islamic, the result will not be Islamic too. Since the meaning of Islam is to accept the provisions of Allah and since those provisions are not debatable; then, an Islamic system cannot be established by means of non-Islamic methods of a non-Islamic system as long as Allah does not let every means to be used in the way to reach the desired end (he absolutely does not let it under any conditions, for *İktibas*). (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, p. 29).

MNP is the first party **Milli Görüş** established. Özkan claims that from the establishment of this first party (MNP), all **Milli Görüş** parties have established with the consent and approval of the military. According to Özkan, notables of **Milli Görüş** made concessions from their principles in order to get this approval and became subservient to the regime. As a matter of fact, MSP, which was established after the 1971 memorandum, formed a coalition with the “racist MHP” and even with the “anti-religious CHP”; so, it did not disappoint military with regard to integration into the system by displaying its unprincipality (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, pp. 354-358). Özkan interprets the occasional closure

⁸³ Here the accusation goes to Said Nursi; because, in a famous phrase he said that he was resorting to Allah from the devil and politics.

of the **Milli Görüş** parties as the intervention of the laic reflex of the state from time to time. For Özkan, there is no reason for the state to not compromise with **Milli Görüş** except for this reflex.

When the regime, which cracked the door open slightly for **Milli Görüş** parties, wide opened it after the 1980 coup d'état, the religious people began to think that the system would understand and embrace them henceforth. However, according to *İktibas*, the system started to change and grind them (Oğuz, Deccal'den Dahi'ye, 1995, p. 14). Anyone who cannot perceive Islam as a holistic lifestyle has had their share from this change. The journal claims that, in order for a lifestyle to be fully adapted to life in harmony with the human personality, it must first settle within each single being fully without contradictions. So, if a Muslim is not still free from internal contradictions about his position against current non-Islamic regime, he has no chance of making Islam dominate on a socio-political level (Dengeli Fikri Beslenme, 1992, pp. 10-15).

Well, was not there anybody Özkan appreciates in the Islamic circles? Of course, there was. However, he did not hesitate to criticize them partially. For example, he approved the opinions of Tayyip Ökiç, M. Said Hatipoğlu, Hikmet Zeyveli or Hüseyin Atay; yet, he criticizes them by claiming that they had no intention to spread their thoughts to the people (pp. 301-303). On the other hand, he disapproved the opinions of ones such as Necip Fazıl by qualifying them to have insufficient knowledge about Islam, although he appreciated their ability to reach the masses. Even though Necip Fazıl and Özkan had been friends for 30 years, Özkan did not see him as a radical Islamist. He claimed that Necip Fazıl's dependency to Abdülhakim Arvasi kept himself within the traditional framework; however, since N. Fazıl considered himself as a super genius, he did not take Özkan's criticisms into consideration (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, pp. 298-300).

To sum up, while *İktibas* was determining the nature of both the *outer* and the *internal others*, it went beyond the conventions and drew a distinctive framework. Indeed, the necessity to fight against both West and tradition was an effective claim among Muslims all around the world, although there were very few people in Turkey representing this idea then. The *revivalist* and *reformist* trend in Contemporary Islam Thought soar on this kind of idea

of bilateral fight. Therefore, the radicality of *İktibas* overlaps with radical Islamism in the world. According to the journal, the *internal others* are more remarkable than the *external others* since they expose religion from within. Just as communism is not a major danger for Turkey, Kemalism is not a major danger for the Muslims in Turkey. Kemalism is an ideology that is easy to stand up against since its identity and nature are evident. Likewise, it is relatively easy to oppose to the West. The main challenge is to fight with the wrong ideas and beliefs inside. The journal crew believes this; and they fought with the ideas and beliefs that they considered as *internal other*, sometimes in a polite manner and sometimes in a severe manner.

From the beginning of the study up here, we examined two legs of the trivet: how *İktibas* perceived *ummah* and how it described the *other* of ummah. In the chapter below we will analyze what kind of a *state* the journal prescribes for the ummah. Since the discourse of the necessity of an Islamic State has been one of the distinctive features of *İktibas*, the chapter below deserves an additional care.

5. CHAPTER IV: THE ISLAMIC STATE IN *İKTİBAS*

For getting the relations between Islam and Ottoman lands and Islam and Turkish political history, it is necessary to shift the case from “posing towards modernization, religion or conservatism to, how and to what extend religion effected modernization and modernization affected religious opinions; how those interactions resulted and what this legacy meant for us (Kara, 2017a, p. 7). Otherwise, it is inevitable to fail to comprehend the crucial points of the issue by getting stuck in a narrow intellectual area.

It is impossible to think about the Contemporary Islamic Political Thought without the relation between modernisation and religion. Since Muslim people’s political theories have been established within the scope of their relations with contemporary political theories, it is not possible to comprehend the nature of those theories without comprehending the nature of topics such as the sovereignty, authority, political power, rights, freedom, obedience, God and the relationship with God and humanity.

However, it is necessary primarily to grasp the perception of state and politics within the traditional Islamic literature. Thus, the point where the separations occurred can be brought to light. Besides, since conception of *state* within the frame of *İktibas* is more similar with the traditional literature than the modern literature, it is obligatory to know the essentials of the pre-contemporary Islamic Political Thought. Therefore, first of all, the method to approach the conceptions of *state* and *power* within the scope of the Traditional Islamic Political Thought is analysed in this chapter. Secondly, in the modern times, what meaning attributed to the word ‘state’ is examined; and the separation points of the modern state and Islamic state are emphasized. Thirdly, the conceptions of *state* and *caliphate* within the CIPT (Contemporary Islamic Political Thought) are studied; and and lastly, among these views where *İktibas* more closely positions itself is analysed.

5.1. The Islamic State in The Classical Islamic Political Thought

“Any effort to discover the concept of state as understood according to modern political science is surely destined to prove futile in the context of the Quranic terminology” (Manzooruddin, 1971, p. 88). There is no kind of concept indicating the modern state thought in Quran. The word *state* is not used with its own frame, instead it is used to mean *wealth* and *predominance*. And the concept of *modern state* “refers to an abstract juridical

personality comprising the totality of elements such as a people living within a definite territory, a legally constituted government, and a supreme power within the society, and independence from foreign control” (Manzooruddin, 1971, p. 88). There is not any single concept embodying all of those meanings in the Quran or the Classical Islamic literature.

Additionally, there is no kind of theory of state in Quran similar to the modern concept. The concept of state did not mean an abstract legal and political entity in the first centuries of Islam as it does today. The concepts which were equal to the political aspect of the state were *caliphate* and *imamate*; the concept which was equal to land was *Dar al-İslam* (places which are under control of Muslims and where they live and fulfil their religious duties safely); and the concept which was equal to sovereignty or authority was *mülk* (Bağdatlı, 2018, p. 100). The word state started to become a political to embody all of the aforementioned concepts in modern times.

Adem Çaylak assigned the works written in classical Islamic political literature into four categories. The first category is composed of the letters about the caliphate. They discuss the caliphate as the form of sultanate and “adapt the tradition of patrimonial monarchy to the caliphate theory and focus on practical solutions based on sovereignty and power (*mülk*)” (Çaylak, 2018, p. 19). In other words, there is no political philosophy in the works in this category; instead, suggestions regarding the implementation of power and government mechanisms are presented. In the second category, there are adviser and political treatises. Their contents are quite rich and inclusive; however, those works generally focus on political morality. They give moral counsel to the ruler. In the third category, there are the works of Muslim philosophers and theologians. Those works create utopias that idealize as much as possible the goal to be achieved in society and politics. The content of the works is independent from the settled political process since the philosophers who wrote them were pondering upon what it should be, rather than what it was. The fourth and last category is *Muqaddimah*, written by Ibn Khaldun. The reason why this work constitutes a category alone is that there is no other work like it throughout the classical period. Ibn Khaldun dealt with not only politics, but also many issues from geography to human characters, from Asiatic to state forms, from astronomy to power. His point of view was quite realistic, scientific and rational (Çaylak, 2018, pp. 19-22). For this reason, Ibn Khaldun, as Cemil Meriç stated, is “the only star of his own sky”.

Especially the first two of the mentioned categories are the texts that shaped the practical politics in the classical period. Therefore, it would be beneficial to go through the content of those works in order to understand how classical Islamic political thought worked.

The aims of the state within the frame of the Classical Islamic Political Thought are to protect the religion, to provide the social order and to look out for the benefits of the people. The state is generally “approached as an organism consisting of organs and where the sovereign undertakes the task of the heart” (Bağdatlı, 2018, p. 125). However, there is neither a clear definition of the state, nor clear explanations about the function or regime of state in the classical works. The concepts of merit, morality and justice were emphasized more. The reason of existence of state was described through a functional perspective. From this aspect, the content of the classical political works are not similar with the modern theories of state (Bağdatlı, 2018, pp. 125-126). State is considered as the prospective result of the opinion of a required social order, since people are social entities in the classical thought. Therefore, the classic texts does not emphasize how the state should be organized. Instead, they focused on the question how the state can fulfil its tasks better. The political treatise tradition was originated from this question partially.

The central concept within the Classical Islamic Political Thought is not state, it is the ruler. The complete idea of politics takes its form around this concept. The concept of state is identified with ruler in a sense. Ruler was depicted as a person, not as an institution; and the maintenance of *mülk* was considered directly in relation with the existence of a single individual ruler. “The necessity of a ruler was considered as *fard al-kifayah*⁸⁴ for the people and it was accepted that when some people from Islamic community fulfil this duty, the others are discharged the debt” (p. 128). The necessity of a leader was accepted as a result of the following opinion: Since Allah, the owner of the shariah, assigned the prophet to execute the shariah in a specific order, then someone else should undertake to fulfil this duty after the Prophet. Since the Prophet Muhammad was the last prophet and no other prophet will be assigned after him, a leader to maintain shariah is necessary. According to the Ibn Taymiyyah, it is one of the greatest religious duties since religion can only be maintained through this way (Bağdatlı, 2018, pp. 127-129). As seen, the importance was attached to the ruler himself, not the state as a political mechanism. Because, according to the classical approach, ruler is the one who operates the state mechanism. Any state doomed to subvert if

⁸⁴ Religious duties which all the Muslims do not have to fulfil one by one if some of them have fulfil.

it does not have a head. In fact, there are several examples where states were subverted after the death of their leaders in the history.

Within the Classical Islamic Political Thought, the most important characteristics of the head of state are as follows: Fairness, intelligence, being sophisticated, religious, generous, taking care of the lower classes of the society, ability to control anger, being cautious and determinant (pp. 158-191). Here, the role of the people is to be obedient. All Muslims have to obey the head of the state. It is widely believed that the verse 59 of the Surah An-Nisa⁸⁵, which calls people for obeying *Ulu al-Amr*, requires indeed a compulsory obedience to the ruler. Disobedience, on the other hand, was considered as a sin in the classical Islamic literature; and rebellion was identified with *fitnah* directly (Bağdatlı, 2018, pp. 274-286).

The word *fitnah* was used in 60 verses with its several inflections in Quran. It was generally used in Quran to mean to test and try someone with difficulties. Within the classical Islamic literature, the word was used to mean ‘disorder caused by disobedience to the political authority and rebellion’. However, none of its uses in Quran, including Surah Al-Baqara verse 191, “... *fitnah* is worse than killing...”, ever means ‘social disorder, rebellion, anarchy and civil war caused by religious or political reasons’. Besides, none of the leading glossators have explained any of the verses related to *fitnah* in this way. However, the word *fitnah* was started to be used to mean ‘resistance against a religious/political authority, rebellion and civil war’ after several disorders in the first century of Islam (Çağrıçı, 2019). When those uses which did not match up with the ones in Quran became popular, anachronistically the word *fitnah* was attributed to such a meaning, and the people were made to feel that the disobedience to the political authority is characterized as *fitnah* in Quran and it is prohibited.

The head of state’s any decision or any order against the Shariah is the limit of obedience. Obedience is not permissible under such circumstance. Otherwise, if the head of state stays Shariah, the ones who do not obey his rules are considered as not obeying Allah. Within the frame of the classical literature, the people are encouraged not to riot against the ruler even if he is cruel. Because even if he is cruel, existence of a ruler is better than his absence (Bağdatlı, 2018, pp. 274-286). In other words, the duty of the people is determined

⁸⁵ يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا أَطِيعُوا اللَّهَ وَأَطِيعُوا الرَّسُولَ وَأُولِي الْأَمْرِ مِنْكُمْ : O you who believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and *Ulu al-Amr* among you (Nisa(4)/59).

as to obey the political authority almost under any circumstance for the sake of the maintenance of order.

In classical literature, it can be observed that the words such as caliph, imam, head of state or sultan are used as synonyms. Even though each of them has a different semantic scale, they are not separated from each other clearly. However, with the effects of political modernisation, the relevant concepts, like all other words and concepts, became split up. Besides, this old tradition began to be perceived as a burden to throw according to Westerners, and as a process making people become distant from the reality of the religion according to the Islamists. Therefore, the meanings of the words have changed like the attitudes to life. Since the main source of this change is modernism, it is necessary to analyse how the concept of state is comprehended within the modern theory.

5.2. The Social Contract Theories versus A Religion-Based Regime

Within the paradigm of modernism, the notion of state on which the international system has been built, is based on the Contract Theories in its philosophical background. Although three main contract theories developed by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau are not similar in terms of the regime models they suggest, they have a common ground: contract logic. All of them defined the notion of state as a product of an imaginary contract to be made at the humanitarian level by eliminating the role of God.

The first contract theorist -in accordance with his birth- Hobbes (b.1588-d.1679) lived in fear for his life, since it was the one of the most complicated periods in British history that began with the Thirty Years War and lasted with the British Civil War. Because of this, his theory was based on beastliness of the human nature. According to Hobbes, *homo homini lupus*; so, in the state of nature, they are doomed to fight with each other in an endless war. Due to the fear for violence and death, they do not even want to work; and therefore, they live a poor, wild and miserable life. Only an almighty state can save humanity from this beastliness. And since all religions cause nothing but problems and wars⁸⁶, humans themselves should establish their own absolutist state (Leviathan). Because, according to Hobbes, the primary aim of human is not to live a virtuous life but to live a safe life. Therefore, people should meet on a common ground, give their rights and freedoms to an

⁸⁶ The main reason for him to have such thought that the 30 Years War he witnessed.

authority to be assigned by them. The powers of this authority should be indivisible and untransferable, thus it can protect its absolute power:

This is more than consent, or concord; it is a real unity of them all in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man ... This is the generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather, to speak more reverently, of that mortal god to which we owe, under the immortal God, our peace and defence. (Hobbes, 1651)

Indeed, the whole struggle of Hobbes was for finding a humanitarian way out which could prevent civil war and anarchy, since he put the blame on religion. The reason for him to establish a theory of powerful and holistic state which surrounds everywhere like a dragon was his wish to make people feel safe under the surrounding wings of the almighty state.

Locke (b.1632-d.1704) bases his social contract approach on a different ground from Hobbes; and therefore, reaches a different conclusion. According to him, in the state of nature, each person has some rights provided by the God which are untransferable and cannot be grabbed.⁸⁷ Those are right to life, freedom and property. In other words, the state of nature does not a state of conflicts; people act in accordance with some unwritten rules under the framework of those natural rights even in the state of nature. For Locke, among the natural rights, the right to property is the most important factor that prompts people to establish a state. In Locke's contract theory, the aim of the state is to protect the personal properties. Therefore, people transfer their partial authorities to the state through a contract, which guarantees the protection of people's right to property. On the contrary to the suggestion of Hobbes, there is no kind of obligation to obey the authority; and the owners of the personal properties have a right to voice within the regime (Locke, 2003). On the other hand, similar to Hobbes, Locke is also distant from the idea of holy authority. His theory is based on the idea that people cannot settle with the state which provides only security for them, they will also desire their rights, especially the right to property, to be protected by the state.

Rousseau (1712-1778) had an optimistic suggestion quite the opposite of Hobbes. According to him, the state of nature provides the ideal case for human beings. The faults of people are not due to their creation, but due to their being misgoverned. For Rousseau, progress has not made the humanity perfect, instead it has caused moral decomposition. People have lost their innocence and their kindness because of the ambition to control the

⁸⁷ For the theory of Natural Rights, see: (Simmons, 1992)

nature, which means they have lost their humanity. Because, according to Rousseau, the thing that makes man a human is not reason but compassion/empathy. The unharmed compassion is the reason why the state of nature is the optimum for human beings; compassion prevents them to fight each other, and thus the state of nature lasts to be the most ideal state to live in. So, why should there be a state? Rousseau thinks that when people had to socialize on contrary to their nature, the personal property and hierarchy-based-task-sharing broke the equality of people. The only means to bring the equality back is to make a proper social contract, according to Rousseau. Because of this, he characterizes the contract not as a treaty between the state and the people, but as a treaty between the members of the society. If each person depends on the whole society providing that all his/her rights are conserved, there will not be a hierarchical social structure, since no one is not actually depend on each other. The thing which links individuals each other is the idea of *general will*. It is an abstract concept and is defined as a key which will enable everyone to be happy. Besides, the general will is the most important factor for the sovereignty of people. According to Rousseau sovereignty belongs to the people; neither the God nor the state. So, the people are the ones who have the right to legislation. Several offices can be created for execution; however, none of them can be assigned for sovereignty (Rousseau, 1998).

All social contract theories are human-oriented regardless of their regimes whether it is autocracy (Hobbes), constitutional monarchy (Locke) or republic (Rousseau). They all rejected the idea of divine regime, instead they are based on the idea of human regime established by an abstract contract that assumed to be done between all people of certain land. This idea provides also the ground for the modern nation-state notion. However, the real radical transformation of the notion of state corresponds to in 19th century.

Koselleck explains that the meaning and the connotation of the concept of *state* (Staat) both developed and changed in 19th century. The concept had meant *class* (Stand) in German. As from 19th century, it began to digress from meaning *class* and the concept of *state* was monopolized as the unique word describing political organization. From this point on, the sovereignty has belonged not to the king but to the state. State enacts laws, collects taxes, builds schools, audits churches and controls armies. Besides, there have been no vassals or subjects composed of different classes anymore; instead there are citizens. In this respect, the concept of state began to be a “collective singular”, which is containing lots of different meanings (Koselleck, 2016, pp. 63-65). Meanwhile, the area of usage and context of several

concepts such as king, vassal or class has also changed. Hence, the concept of caliph began to be questioned simultaneously; which will be analysed in detail in the next chapter.

The changes similar to the one which Koselleck observed in Germany can also be observed all around the modern world which has been designed according to the nation-state structure. Ottoman was not exempted from those changes. The national subjects such as Jews, Christians, Albanians, Circassians has begun to be united under the roof of citizenship during the constitutional era; because, having ethnic subjects was perceived as a threat for the central state. Therefore, gathering those subjects under a common frame (citizenship) was regarded as necessary in order to constitute a monolithic society. While the monopolist central state structure began to become prevalent as from 19th century, the concept of “*unitary state* excluded all other meanings of the concept of state which had been in effect then”. As a result, *the state* “has turned into an unalterable concept in the absence of which the social and political realities cannot be perceived” (Koselleck, 2016, p. 65). Hence, today the concept of state still keeps this function.

When modern state, as defined by Koselleck, was accepted as *a priori*, it reached a level of reality which all the theories related to politics have to get a position accordingly. Therefore, similar to any ideological theories of state, the Islamic State theories have been no other chance except to be analysed within the context of modern state.

Wael Hallaq suggested 6 main differences between the modern national state and the Islamic regime. The first difference that the modern state is human-centred and it is positivist. Therefore, it is regarded as a structure which is based on global laws, clear from biases, pure and scientific. The delusion as if it has existed throughout the history sources from there. However, modern state is a historical product of European experience and it is only applicable for the Western countries (Hallaq, 2014, p. 24). The state in its modern form has not existed either in Islamic socio-political structures or any kind of pre-modern societies. Therefore, even though modern state is perceived as an unavoidable global law, it is just a non-obligatory structure. Like its existence, -even though it does not sound possible for now- its absence is also possible.

The second difference is that the legitimacy of the modern state originates from itself, not from any kind of transcendent power. This is called the sovereignty of state. “Within a nation’s borders, there is no order higher than that of the state. Its law is the law of the land, so to speak. It cannot be countermanded and cannot, as a law, be appealed to any higher

order, for it is, after all, the expression of sovereign will” (Hallaq, 2014, p. 26). In other words, a sovereign state is a God which created itself.

Anderson states that the nation is imagined as the *sovereign* because it was born in the Enlightenment and Revolution age, in which the theocratic concepts replaced by earthly ones (Anderson, 2006, p. 7). Paul Kahn explains the common points between the sovereignty and monotheism clearly as follows:

First, it is omnipotent: all political forms are open to its choice. Second, it wholly fills time and space: it is equally present at every moment of the nation’s life and in every location within the nation’s borders. Third, we know it only by its product. We do not first become aware of the popular sovereign and then ask what it has accomplished. We know that it must exist, because we perceive the state as an expression of its will. We deduce the fact of the subject from the experience of its created product. Finally, we cannot be aware of this sovereign without experiencing it as a normative claim that presents itself as an assertion of identity. We understand ourselves as a part, and as a product, of this sovereign. In it, we see ourselves. (2005, p. 205)

Schmitt also confirmed in his book named *Political Theology* that almost all key concepts related to the modern state are the secularized versions of the ones in the Christian theology. According to him, for example, “the almighty God has become the almighty legislator”; or for example “the meaning of the state of exception for law is similar to the meaning of the miracle for theology” (Schmitt, 2016, p. 43).

Schmitt claims that the secular theory of the Protestant theology presents God as ‘completely *the other*’. Although the “contaminated terminology of the popular culture” (p.13) does not allow us to perceive it, “the sovereign is the one who decides the state of exception” (p.13). Why is it important to decide the state of exception? Because, the state of exception is unpredictable by the law, its borders cannot be fully drawn, it is uncommon. The constitution or the law can only be used to share authority in case of a state of exception, but they do not know exactly what the situation will come out. It could be a terrorist attack, could be a coup attempt, could be a riot. The ‘decision’ of what cannot be fully portrayed by the law is in the hands of the sovereign. This decision is also an indication of what is not an exception, i.e. what is normal. According to Schmitt, sovereignty cannot be understood by abstract definitions. What sovereignty is only comes to light during a case of a crisis. Under

such exceptional circumstances, the one who has the authority to show the direction of 'public salute' is the sovereign. (Schmitt, 2016, p. 14)

According to the theory of Schmitt, although the conflict in sovereignty issue seems like taking place between the People against God, the real parties in here are those who pretend to be the true representatives of God and those who identify themselves with the people (those who argue that their own interests are the interests of the people) (Schmitt, 2016, p. 17). Within the secular order which does not consider God as a reference;

the nation-state exists for its own sake. It is a means to no other end. ... As a sovereign being, the state's decision has the quality of being something like a religious miracle: it has no reference except the fact that it is. ... The citizen himself is not above being sacrificed for the highest end. ... there is nothing more precious than life except the nation-state. ... To be a citizen therefore means to live under a sovereign will that has its own metaphysics. It is to live with and under yet another god, one who can claim the believers' lives. (Hallaq, 2014, p. 28).

However, the only sovereign in Islam is the God. The state is not an aim; it is an instrument to follow the orders of God instead (Hallaq, 2014, p. 29).

The third difference is that the modern state established its own laws and does not recognise any kind of divine will beyond its own. Since the thing which is called state is indeed the legal order itself, the sovereignty of the state also means that the state makes its own laws. Even though some laws are compatible with the religious laws, the right to accept and confirm them belongs to the state. This gives the modern state a position of the God of the gods which has the right to either approve or reject the divine will. However, the laws within the Islamic regime are formed around and by depending on the general moral principles established by the God. Even the highest level of governance is not exempt from the dependency of those principles (Hallaq, 2014, pp. 29-30).

The fourth difference is that the modern state separates "truth" from "value": "crucial phenomenon of separating fact from value ... is another major and essential factor in the modern Project" (78). Thus, it legitimizes the ideas of possessing, controlling and ruling since "if matter is, in itself, devoid of value, then we can treat it as an object. We can study it and subject it to the entire range of our analytical apparatus without it making any moral demands on us" (Hallaq, 2014, p. 78). The issue can be comprehended better when it is taken into consideration that the essential characteristic of the modern West is "its obsession with

gaining knowledge of control” (Hallaq, 2014, p. 75) as claimed by Scheler. Modern science aims to control the nature and utilize it to obtain maximum benefit. Modern freedom serves for the Europe to control other regions easily. Modern metaphysics promote humanity by centralizing it; and grant it a right to control the whole nature. Like all them, modern regime seeks for controlling the humanity. This is because the modern knowledge is obtained for just one reason: to control and dominate.⁸⁸ However; this aim is concealed via the discourse of pure scientific objectivity in a way which is so brilliantly that, whether the moral concerns are taken into consideration are not questioned while obtaining and utilizing the knowledge. In fact, there has been remained no branch or basis remained for the moral accountability. The premise ‘knowledge is power’ suits best for this context (Hallaq, 2014, pp. 75-78). In other words, the modern state separates “is” from “ought” and does not consider the conformity between them. “Is” is also legal; therefore, it is the reality accepted by the modern state. On the other hand, “ought” is related with morality rather than legality. Modern state shapes its citizens as the ones who are in a continuous struggle for “is” -wild reality-, not as the ones who are continuously pursuing the “ought” -moral obligations-. On the other hand, An Islamic regime is known for its intention and struggle to accommodate “is” with “ought”. It does not separate truth from value (Hallaq, 2014, p. 158). The value and truth have a nested structure.

The fifth difference is that the modern state expects its citizens to sacrifice themselves for the sake of the state. Since on earth, there is not any of neutral zone out of the area of influence of any state, no individual can live without any citizenship, which is indeed modern state dependency. The ultimate modern state that owes its existence to itself and whose purpose is still only itself expects its citizens to be ready to die for it. According to Hallaq, there is not any kind of moral ground for the states to expect their citizens to be potential victims and “any moral argument adduced ... in the framework of state domination is, in the final analysis, nothing but a political argument, a way to legitimize political ambition.” (Hallaq, 2014, p. 93). On the other hand, Hallaq argues that in Islam, any kind of responsibility is conferred on people for the state and even for the God. Participation to jihad is based on the people’s discretion. According to Hallaq, the obligations related to hot wars are not related to secular actions such as acquiring merits or serving sentences and they are

⁸⁸ “And Francis Bacon’s maxim that ‘Knowledge is Power’ was one of the first announcements of the coming of the societal age in which we found ourselves. A major dictum of modern morality is that one must always be in perfect control of his own autonomous self. Indeed, maturity is generally defined in terms of such control, and insanity, in terms of lack of control” (Stikkers, 2013, p. 27)

left for the afterlife; and therefore, jihad is not one of the obligations which the states can confer on the individuals (Hallaq, 2014, pp. 93-95).

The sixth and the last difference is that the modern state, one of whose trivets is capitalism, considers people as *homo economicus*. *Homo economicus* means the people who are distant from moral concerns and pursue their own benefits. According to Hallaq, modern state promotes these types of people. However, Hallaq claims that, in terms of Islamic doctrine, the concept of *homo economicus* is considered as peculiarity with the gentlest expression. Besides, it is seen as heresy and going beyond the limits. Therefore, it is impossible to approach with tolerance even to its existence, aside from its dignification (Hallaq, 2014)

Thus, Hallaq explains that it is not possible to design an Islamic regime in modern state structure through the aforementioned six differences. In sum, he states that:

there can be no Islam without a moral-legal system that is anchored in a metaphysic; there can be no such moral system without or outside divine sovereignty; and, at the same time, there can be no modern state without its own sovereignty and sovereign will, for no one, I think, can reasonably argue that the modern state can do without this essential form-property of sovereignty. If all these premises are true, as they ineluctably must be, then the modern state can no more be Islamic than Islam can come to possess a modern state. (2014, p. 51)

Hallaq tries to prove that it is impossible to establish an Islamic modern state by analysing nation-state premises one by one. According to him, if an Islamic state will be established, its dynamics should be based on different grounds from the ones of the modern state; and it should also have a different operational style. This is the reason why it will not be a modern state. Therefore, since the word *state* indicates the modern state currently, Hallaq deemed the name *Impossible State* suitable for his book. However, the opinions which try to unify the concept of modern state and Islam are pretty common in the Contemporary Islamic Thought. Therefore, before analysing how *Īktibas* approaches to the concept of state within the context of ummah, the ideas about *state* and *governance* within the Contemporary Islamic Political Thought is analysed below in general terms.

5.3. State and Caliphate in Contemporary Islamic Political Thought (CIPT)

The Contemporary Islamic Political Thought (CIPT) has been almost identified with Islamism, which is the largest branch of CIPT. Islamism came to the agenda in the second half of the 19th century. It emerged as an effort to get rid of the increasing colonist and imperialist pressures of the era. The concept of *Islamism* is first used by Yusuf Akçura in Turkey. However, Akçura meant Pan-Islamism, which is an ideal of establishing a barrier against the rising wave of nationalism. The first ideological definition was made by Ziya Gökalp. However, he did not use the concept of Islamism as the name for the content he defined; rather he called it *İslamlık* (Islamness) and *İslamlaşmak* (Islamizing). Voltaire is the first one who used the word *Islamism* in a foreign language. However, he indicated Islam with this concept. The word *Islamism* had not been used for a long time after Voltaire, then it began to be used again in 1970s and functionalized to define the radical movements aiming to change the current socio-political structures in several Muslim majority lands (Çaha & Guida, 2013, p. 564).

With the shortest definition, Islamism is the line for Islamic resistance against modernism. Thorough the expressions of İsmail Kara, who is the prolific author of the Islamism; “it is a movement which involves all of the political, intellectual and scientific works, pursuits, offers and solutions with dominant activist, modernist and eclectic aspects and which is carried out to save Muslims from the Western exploitation, cruel and imperious sovereigns, slavery, imitations, superstitions ... to civilize, reunite and develop them with a rationalist method”. Namely the idea “to make Islam to be dominant again as a whole” underlies the CIPT (Kara, 2017b, p. 17). In short, even though it seems paradoxical, Islamism is a movement for both renewal and returning to the original roots.

CIPT is like a range of colours containing all kinds of hues; and it does not have a single line. However, its most deterministic feature is that it tries to “create a future by basing on the past” (Fazlıoğlu, 2018). There is not a single definition for Islamism which is agreed for everyone. However, the general characteristics can be generated from the several definitions.

According to S. Sayyid, Islamism “is an attempt to shape the societies and communities around Islam” (Sayyid S. , 2017). Even though Vahdettin Işık defined Islamism as the “Islamic political law” (*siyaset fikhı*) for the Muslims from 19th century (Işık, 2019, pp. 19-39); Alev Erkilet indicated that Islamism cannot be limited to a single period, rather

it can be used as a term for all of the resistance movements of oppositions from the time of the Prophet, which have showed up when the people who claimed to act on behalf of religion started to act against the religion. As a resistance movement, she indicated that Islamism is not static but dynamic. According to Erkilet, Islamism regards *Asr al-Saadah* (Era of Happiness – The Golden Age) as a reference guide; however, it does not hide behind the simple romantic idea of returning back to the *Asr al-Saadah*. Therefore, it is not composed of an imaginary nostalgia and heroism. On the contrary, it is an effort to provide realistic answers to the question of how one should understand and experience the religion. For Erkilet, Islamism is not obedient to the current order, but critical about it. Besides, it is against all kinds of inequalities and is anti-imperialist (Erkilet, 2015). According to Dursun Çiçek, Islamism is a concept for the efforts to make Islam liveable by believing that it is not a utopia, but a historical experience. Islamists believe that the Islamic lifestyle was experienced before and can be experienced again (Çiçek, 2019, pp. 167-203). On the other hand, Kürşat Atalar indicated that there are 4 questions to be asked in order to understand whether a movement is Islamist of merely religious:

- 1) How does it establish the relation between religion and politics?
- 2) What is its attitude towards the modernism?
- 3) What is its attitude towards traditions?
- 4) What is its method?

If the movement in question considers the relation between religion and politics as substantial, in other words, if it does not consider politics as subsidiary; if it criticizes modernism instead of joining to it; if it strikes a critical attitude against traditions; and if its method is in conformity with its principles, in other words, if it does not believe that the end justifies the means, then it is Islamist. Otherwise, it is necessary to find another concept to define the characteristics of a movement (Atalar M. K., 2019, p. 225).

From the abovementioned points, it is possible to deduce such a definition as follows: Islamism is a system of thought which regards both modernism and tradition from a critical perspective, supports renewal by returning to the original sources of the religion and has both social and political claims.

Yasin Aktay indicates that Islamism have dual legitimacy problems as a concept. While for the Republic of Turkey Islamism has been considered as “other” (e.g. one of the most important reasons to dissolve political parties), for the members of the Islamic

movements it is a conception which they have avoided to use for long years (Aktay, 2014, pp. 13-26). However, Ercüment Özkan did not hesitate to refer to the concept Islamist as he did for concept radical.

Ali Bulaç describes Islamism as the efforts of a group among Muslims, who are at a specific level of knowledge and experience, to re-interpret Islam under the conditions of modern world. He thinks that it is more beneficial to analyse the Islamists in Turkey as three generations. The first generation pursued to reawaken the Ottoman (and caliphate) by saving it from all kinds of imperialist attacks, and to make people cling Islam again. But they found themselves before the Independence Courts after the collapse of Ottomans. The second-generation Islamists appeared as from the Demokrat Parti (Democratic Party) came to power in the 50s. Cold War also an important additional element that affected their appearance. The second-generation got closer to the centre as a result of the changes on the social structure through the rural-urban migrations. While the first generation considered society as integrated with the Islamic values, the second generation thought that the society has weak bounds with the Islam. Therefore, their main goals were -at least on the level of discourse- to Islamize the state completely and to make the society reacquainted with Islam again. According to Bulaç, the third generation came right after the 1997 Turkish Military Memorandum (February 28 Process) when the religious Muslims suspended from all kinds of public institutions via a great political pressure. Even though this generation seemed to undertake the Islamization mission like the previous two generations, they are different from them in terms of their methods, world perspectives and ways of thinking (Bulaç, 2014, pp. 48-68). Although this classification of Bulaç contains some deficiencies and mistakes, it is preferred since it is suitable to practical use.

When the history of CIPT is traced back, the first names comes to mind are Namık Kemal (b.1840) and Cemaleddin Afganî (b.1838). Those two names, who are almost at the same age, can be considered as the leaders possessing symbolic significance since they opened the two main artery on which Islamism has walked through.

Namık Kemal, who became famous as the Poet of Homeland was the founder of the Young Ottomans association. This association consisted of intellectuals who had been in or had to be in Europe at a part of their lives; so, they knew about the intellectual and institutional structure and dynamics of Europe. Young Ottomans mainly adopted the concept of 'homeland' as defined on the basis of territory in addition to believing Enlightenment principles such as freedom and equality. The importance of Young Ottomans in terms of

history of Islamism is their effort to synthesize Islam with the West in a way. Different from the Westerners, those intellectuals fought for Islamizing the ideas arisen from Europe by filtering them, instead of copying them. According to Young Ottomans, Islam did not prevent developments; on the contrary, it supported progress. The thing preventing developments were the slummed traditional system. Young Ottomans thought that the equivalents of the systems such as democracy or parliament, which rose currently in the Western countries, were used centuries before within Islam. Therefore, Ottoman state should have not use the Western systems with the Western words, concepts and conceptions; it should have reveal the equivalents within Islam; because, Islam did not absolutely contradict with those ideas and systems produced through human mind. With those opinions, Young Ottomans tried to prove that the concepts such as democracy, parliament, election and public opinion had already existed in Islam. According to them; the concepts such as *adalet* (justice), *meşveret* (consultancy), *icma-i ümmet* (the case where the interpreters of the Islamic law who lived in the same century have a common opinion about a decision made for an issue of a shariah), *şura* (council), *biat* (allegiance), *ehl'ül-hal ve'l-akd* (the council consisting of people who are authorized to elect or dismiss the Islamic ruler) were equal to the concepts of the Western political system. Therefore, the problem of development and progress would be solved if the concepts within the Ottoman-Islamic tradition were revised by remaining faithful to their origins and revitalizing them. Thus, it would be possible to establish a system which belongs to Ottoman within the canon limits and without surrendering against the impositions of the West (Mardin, 1996). The Young Ottomans analysed each of the concepts within the Islamic political philosophy and tried to show their equivalents in the Western systems in order to establish an Islamic republican democracy.

According to the Young Ottomans; if the impaired order could have been improved by returning to the origins of Islam, the social and religious core could also have been protected; thus Ottomans could have found the proper ground which would have provided an opportunity to have an equal relation against modernism. Thus on the contrary to the claims Renan, it would have been proved that Islam never prevented progress. Besides equal relations with Western countries could have been re-established by eliminating the idea that West was the sole and only civilization.

Due to their abovementioned ideas, Young Ottomans are considered as the leaders of Islamism (Türküne, 1990). However, this is a kind of political Islamism; because, the Young Ottomans did not make any effort to change, improve or reform the current religious

perception; they only focused on the political literature. The Young Ottomans defined and determined their political position through the West by taking West as *a priori*. In fact, their idea of returning to the origins does not propose a re-building process within the context of Quran and Sunnah for the religious and social lives. They only prescribed re-formation at a political level and only tried to integrate modern state system with the traditional social structure. It is possible to call it an effort of synthesis. Therefore, the general tendency in the literature is towards not to consider them as the leaders of the Islamic awakening school.

The first efficient expression for more radical idea of returning to the origins came with Cemaleddin Afganî. Afganî emphasized the slummed traditional structure not only politically but also religiously. He thought that way of experiencing the religion should have been re-structured based on Quran and authentic Sunnah. In other words, he sought for reforms at the political, social and intellectual levels.

Even though there are lots of unknown points related to Afganî's life⁸⁹, it is clear that he was a man of fight instead of a thinker. He travelled continuously during his lifetime, encouraged both the people and rulers to fight with the colonists and to make the caliphate effective again; however, he was not supported efficiently when he was alive. His words were approached more seriously after his death and he inspired lots of Islam-based resistance movements. The thing which made him different from the ones who lived in the same era and also made him important is that he held Muslims responsible for the Islamic world to lag behind. Instead of praising the *Asr al-Saadah* as a golden age from a perspective of a pluralistic civilizations theory (like Young Ottomans done), he preferred to criticize the Muslim for their neglect of Quran which is the main source of the religion (Atalar K. , 2014, pp. 13-33). In other words, he took on the tradition as an opponent at his initial step.

Another interesting point related to Afganî is that he supported both Pan Islamism (*İttihad-ı İslam*) (Islamic unity) and national independency movements, at the same time. According to him, "the Islamic unity would have a chance to exist after the Islamic countries achieved their national independence movements individually" (Kara, 2017b, p. 38). Said Halim Pasha, one of the last grand viziers of the Ottoman, agrees with Afganî. Since nationality will exist as a "reality of life", it is necessary to establish Islamic unity as a superstructure in order to make it functional. If such a double-level structure can be

⁸⁹ Bedri Gencer mentioned a lot about the discussions related to Afganî in his work named *Modernization in Islam* where he analysed the modernization experiences of Ottoman and Egypt in a comparative method. Doğu-Batı Yayınları, Ankara, 2017

established, the nations can focus on their special needs on the one hand, and they can struggle for strengthening the Islamic brotherhood on the other hand (Kara, 2017b, p. 40). However, there is an important point here, which should be taken into consideration. Neither Afganî nor Said Halim did ever support dismemberment of Ottoman into small nations. On the contrary, they put a great importance on Ottoman as the centre for caliphate and thought that Ottomans' staying as a single entirety was necessary. The states of which Afghani supported the national independence movements are the ones under colonial occupation by the second half of the 1800s. In sum:

Afganî not only talked about Muslims getting to know each other and merging, but also prescribed Muslims to engage in mass movements. He also wanted to make ideology (by putting Islam as a political ideology) as a means of mass mobilization. In fact, Afghani never liked the sultans and monarchs since he was a supporter of the resistance (against imperialism) and renewal movements based on the people. ... In sum, Afganî was perhaps not a great thinker; but he was a courageous person thinking far ahead of time, a political genius, a true Islamic modernist who wanted to bring the public to the fore. -He was generally right about the things he said related to nationalism.- The point is not making Afganî a legend; it is to evaluate his role into the Islamic world accurately (Karpat, 1993, p. 174).

When they are all taken into consideration, the question of whether the new Ottomans or Afghani played a pioneering role in the CIPT remains somewhat in suspense and becomes meaningless. Because, one of them is political-oriented and pro-synthesis, and the other is more holistic and radical. Therefore, they were both pioneers for the similar consecutive thoughts. While the Young Ottomans are the pioneers of the pro-civilizational and conservative trend which came into prominence later in the Turkish Republic, Afganî is the leader of the pan-Islamist and radical school which started to rise in the ex-colonial countries around. In fact, while Namık Kemal was an important statesman who could affect the intellectual and political lives within the centre of Ottoman, Afganî was kept out of the centre or taken under supervision in the centre. Therefore, his ideas have been known in the lands outside of ex-Ottoman centre. This bifurcation at the very beginning of the road of Islamism lasted later as a fate. And the fortune of the difference between the intellectuals from the Ottoman centre (later from Turkey) and the influence of the intellectuals from periphery (all Muslim majority lands except Turkey's territories) has always been developed in this direction. While the works of the Islamic thinkers from periphery were translated to several

languages and they became the source of inspiration for anti-imperialist movements, the effects of the Islamic thinkers from the centre remained limited within the borders of Turkey.⁹⁰

In the CIPT, as in the Classical Islamic Thought, the concepts of state and politics has always discussed around the question of caliphate. Therefore, it is necessary to analyse the concept of caliphate in order to apprehend the definition of state and the political perception within CIPT.

Discussions on Caliphate within CIPT

The issue of caliphate arose after the death of the Prophet Mohammad caused bloody disputes around the question of ‘who the caliph should be?’ at first. Then the problem of turning the caliphate into a dynasty broke the legitimacy of caliphate. Finally, it became incapable of reunite the Muslims even against the attacks threatening almost the whole Islam community such as Mongolian invasions or the Crusades. However, let alone the discussions at the first years of Islam, caliphate has been one of the primary issues of CIPT especially after the second half of the 19th century.

The legitimacy of caliph had not been become an issue within the period of more than a thousand years between caliphate had become a dynasty after the first century of Islam⁹¹ and the 19th century. During this Classical Era, caliphate was more approached within the context of the advices to the caliph. Instead of the works questioning the legitimacy of the caliph, the political treatises became prominent, which provide methods for the caliph-sultans to act virtuous within the politics.⁹²

⁹⁰ A different perspective related to the Islamists from Ottoman and Turkey keeping “local” lies behind in the following anecdote: “I was asked a question ‘Why are the philosophy studies in Turkey like this?’ and I replied: ‘The philosophy will become meaningful if people who deal with philosophy in Turkey can find someone dealing with philosophy in Turkish. Speaking without addressees is just a sound that spreads into space. So; regardless of the area, the studies carried out in Turkey will be developed, enhanced and transformed if they can find addressees.” (Fazlıoğlu, 2010)

⁹¹ The Caliph begins to use the title *Zillullah fi-l Arz* (shadow of Allah) instead of *Emir al-Mu'minin* (Amir of Believers) starting from the Abbasids. The early caliphs used titles such as *Emir al-Mu'minin* and *Khalifah Rasulallah* which imply that they were the successors of the Prophet. However, the Abbasids had been exposed to intense Iranian influence both in terms of establishment conditions and the geography they dominated, and they had put many political attitudes and institutions belonging to the Iranian tradition into Islam. *Zillullah*, which means the shadow of Allah, is also an Iranian name. The caliphs, who used this title, started to claim that they were not the successor of the Prophet anymore but they were deputies of Allah (Yıldız, 1988).

⁹² For a detailed analysis of the Traditional Islamic Political Thought from the primary sources, see: (Bağdatlı, 2018)

The context in which the issue of caliph was discussed changed completely in the modern era started with a range of scientific, technical and geographical discoveries by the Europe. The first breaking point for caliphate was the Treaty of *Küçük Kaynarca* signed in 1774. Even though losing Crimea provided traumatic results for Ottoman Empire, a new era was started for caliphate with an article in the treaty indicating that the Crimean Muslims were religiously dependent to the caliph and therefore the sermons would be recited on behalf of the Ottoman caliph in the mosques. This was the first emphasis throughout the history of Ottoman that the Ottoman sultan was the sole and only caliph of whole Muslim community. Thus, Ottoman made a political achievement by using the authority of caliph. Therefore, the Treaty of *Küçük Kaynarca* was the beginning of the modern issue of caliphate at the same time. This new policy started in *Küçük Kaynarca* also provided a ground for the idea to separate the religious and political authorities, which became more prominent after the *Tanzimat* and *Islahat* addicts (Buzpinar, 2004, pp. 121-122).

When the caliphate institution came to the agenda independent from the political authority within the context of the religious authority; the colonies with Muslim communities, especially Britain, became uncomfortable. Therefore, the claims indicating that the Great Britain was the country with the largest Muslim population in the world and that it had an equal right with Ottoman to speak on behalf of Muslims started to be made. However, Abdulhamid was able to prevent those claims immediately. Then, Britain started to seek for new ways. According to the report issued by George Percy Badger, who was one of the foreign counsellors of Britain in 1873, the Ottoman caliphate was recognized as legitimate by the Asian Muslims; so, if Arabs began to think also in this way, the relations between the Britain and its colonies would started to be shaken. It was emphasized in the report that Britain should have immediately taken precautions related to this issue. According to the solution suggested, Arabs should immediately have been convinced that the organ of caliphate belonged to them, then Britain should let them establish an Arabic caliphate under British control. As a matter of fact, Britain took a stand against the Abdulhamid's Islamic unity policy then, and tried to create a public opinion for the illegitimacy of the Abdulhamid's caliphate in both British local press and in the colonies. Besides, it was kept as an issue that the caliph should have been elected by all Muslims and provided the condition of allegiance (*biat*). It was emphasized continuously that Abdulhamid's caliphate is against the Islamic laws in every aspect (Satan, 2001, pp. 23-25).

As known, Abdulhamid II was the sultan who used the title of caliph most intensely and actively. During his 30-year of throne, he tried to make not only the Muslims living in the lands of Ottoman, but also the Muslims from the lands outside of Ottoman, such as the Indian peninsula, to be dependent to the religious authority of the caliph.⁹³ Even though the power of caliph was limited practically, Abdulhamid achieved to give the impression that the caliph had an authority on the Muslim communities of several colonies of Europe by using its symbolic significance. This impression enabled him to manipulate Europe through caliphate in some cases and thus enabled him to make some political achievements. The Britain started to worry about the achievements of the caliphate policy and provoked Arabs, in addition to the provocations about nationalism, by indicating that the caliph must have been Qurayshian (Buzpınar, 2004, pp. 125-127). The project to establish an Arab caliphate under Britain's control against the efforts of Abdulhamid to strengthen the authority of Ottoman's caliphate had occupied the British parliament for a long time.

The issue indicating that the caliph must be Qurayshian was not new then; it caused severe discussions in the first centuries of Islam.⁹⁴ However, it was kept out of the agenda for the next couple of centuries. During the sultanate of Abdulhamid, the discussions on being Qurayshian, which created doubt on the legitimacy of the Ottoman's caliphate inevitably, became one of the most important tools of the policy against the Ottoman's caliphate lead by the British-Arab alliance. The British people prepared and distributed some brochures to provoke and encourage the Arabs for insurrection. As a response, Abdulhamid made the chapter related with 'imamate' removed from the books of madrasahs and high schools; because, being Qurayshian was written among the conditions of imamate (Satan, 2001, p. 20).

While the caliphate gradually fell to be more controversial, lost value and drifted to a position that is ready to be discarded during the period of Abdulhamid and afterwards, in Europe the caliphate continued to be perceived as a potential danger; because, if the caliphate could have achieved to get stronger, it would have claimed rights on the Muslims in European colonies just like European churches was trying to manipulate the internal affairs

⁹³ For a detailed analysis of the policies followed within the period of Abdülhamit II, see: (Deringil, 2007)

⁹⁴ A comprehensive review of the origin point, causes, and nature of the Qurayshism issue was made by M. Said Hatipoğlu. (1979) *İslam'da İlk Siyasi Kavmiyetçilik: Hilafetin Kureyşliliği*, *Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, 23(1), 121-213.

of the Ottomans by claiming rights on the minorities. Therefore, Europe was very sensitive about the issue of caliphate.

Before the Lausanne negotiations, some reports were published in Indian press indicating that the Allied Powers would not sign a peace agreement with the Turks, unless the caliphate would be abolished. Although those were refuted by the authorities, interestingly, Britain delayed the ratification of the agreement until April 15, 1924, while the peace agreement had been signed on July 24, 1923 in Lausanne and ratified by the Turkish Grand National Assembly on August 23. İsmet İnönü intimated that Britain waited until being sure about people's reactions against the reforms in Turkey (Satan, 2001, pp. 159-160). İnönü's meant by 'reforms' the abolishment of the caliphate on March 3, 1924. Within the next month and a half, Britain observed the responses of the Muslim population living inside and outside Turkey. Even though the Indian Muslims were the ones who were most opposed to the abolishment, all they did could not go beyond condemning the decision. Then, Britain signed the Lausanne Treaty with a delay of 9 months. This is the picture of the caliphate reflected to abroad.

In domestic politics on the other hand, even though the Pan-Islamism project was put on the shelf after the deposition of Abdulhamid II, the issue of caliphate did not fall from the agenda. The 16-year period from the declaration of the Second Constitutional Period (1908) to the abolishment of the caliphate (1924) should be examined in order to see the different approaches related to the issue of the caliphate. First of all, the features of the groups discussing the issue should be considered, and the points they opposed each other should be revealed. Secondly, the geography where the discussions arose should be taken into account. Thirdly, the effects of the constantly changing conjuncture should be emphasized.

From the first perspective, the approaches of 3 groups became prominent in both political and intellectual discussions about the issue of caliphate. The first group was the secularists, who considered the caliphate only as a religious authority and thought that it should not be involved in worldly affairs. The second group was the modernist Islamists who argued that there was no clergy in Islam, and therefore the caliphate should have only been a political authority. The third and last group was the traditional Islamists, who considered the caliphate as an absolute authority containing both the political and religious authorities together. While each group retained their independent positions during the II. Constitutional Period, the second and third groups united against the danger of abolishment of caliphate when the Ottoman lands gradually started to be dismembered and the colonial threat became

imminent during and after World War I (Ardıç, 2017, p. 303). In other words, both the nature of the discussions and the positions of the discussing groups were not stable; and they change cyclically.

From the second perspective, namely from the perspective of the geography, it is possible to observe that the discussions in the centre (Istanbul and Ankara after 1920s) and in the periphery (North Africa, Arab lands, Indian peninsula) had different discourses. While the general picture in the centre was as portrayed in the previous paragraph, the periphery focused on two things at once: 1) the symbolic importance of caliphate in resistance against colonialism, 2) the Qurayshism nourished by the British supported Arabic nationalism (Ardıç, 2017, pp. 303-304). In other words, legitimacy of the caliphate was questioned on the one hand, and its religious and political character on the other.

From the third perspective, a highly mobile conjuncture attracts the attention. As a result of both internal and external struggles, rapid and radical changes became the feature of the era; therefore, the issue of caliphate was discussed under different circumstances each time. For instance, the discussions in the caliphate centre (Istanbul) are more vigorous during the period of the Second Constitutional Period, and the discussing parties were the modernist Islamists and the traditional Islamists. However, discussions shifted to the periphery during and after World War I. Moreover, when the possibility of Arabic caliphate appeared on the horizon -both modern or traditional- Islamists of the centre united against Arab nationalists (Ardıç, 2017, pp. 304-305). After the abolishment of caliphate, the discussions evolved into an utterly different dimension.

From the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774) to the proclamation of the Republic, it can be observed that the issue of caliphate became incrementally prominent, and then it gradually became the focus of political debates. For our thesis, the important point here is that the majority of the ones who supported caliphate emphasized especially the symbolic importance of the caliph for Muslims; because, they realized that caliphate could not be politically unifying in the era of nationalism. Still, they thought that the caliphate could have been a unifier ground at least mentally among Muslims even symbolically. In this way, they hoped that the ummah could have avoided from breaking into hostile groups. Otherwise, the ones who defended the caliphate did not desire one-man's sultanate. Abdulhamit's limited influence of Pan-Islamism had already showed that the caliphate could not be politically unifying. That is why some thinkers such as Afganî or Said Halim Pasha proposed that the caliphate should have been organized as superstructure above nation-states.

The symbolic influence of the caliphate was a prominent issue in the discussions of the abolishment of the caliphate. Those who supported the maintenance of the institution of caliphate were not supporters of the reign; they only believed in the symbolic importance of the caliph. However, the increasingly dominant view especially among the Islamists in the centre was that the caliphate was immanent within the institutional body of parliament. Since the caliph's existence was to ensure the implementation of the religious rules and the enforcement of justice, then an entire state administration should be ruled by the caliph. And since the rule of a single caliph would mean dynasty, the caliph should not be a real person but a legal personality; so, the government should also be regarded as the caliph (Erdem, 1996, pp. 134-135). This idea led up to a very interesting conclusion: the Westerners, who refused to consider the caliphate as part of the political system, and the Islamists, who placed the caliph (as a legal entity) at the centre of the government, agreed on the abolishment of caliphate (as represented by a real person).

In order to observe the course of the changes in the conception of caliphate within the CIPT, the process of the abolishment functions as a litmus paper. The discussions within the Republican period were quite different from the Second Constitutional Period. Although the caliph-sultan was still the leader of the state in the Second Constitutional Period, the caliph was out of any political power in 1924. The office of caliphate had already become nominal, and its existence had no political vitality. (Erdem, 1996, p. 120). This was one of the most important factors that facilitated the abolishment of caliphate.

After the abolishment of the sultanate, some people and groups who had been in dispute with the Ankara government went İstanbul and honoured the caliph. The legal status of the caliph was not clear in those years, and the definition of his duties and powers were very ambiguous. So, the National Assembly took some measures against caliph's possible rise. This made caliph feel offended, and the rumours indicating that the caliph would resign have started and spread rapidly to foreign countries. Foreign press, especially the British one, began to publish articles about the possibility of caliph's resignation in the fall of 1923. Those articles can be considered as the beginning of the end.

Discussions in the press, in the backstage and in the national assembly are important since they show how the perception of caliphate took its form in the post-sultanate period and under the new conditions. First of all, according to Mustafa Kemal, the caliph in İstanbul had never been recognized as the caliph of all Muslims outside of the Ottoman lands. The Iranians, Afghans or Africans had never been loyal to the caliph in any time throughout the

history. M. Kemal says that “the idea of a caliph, who fulfils his supreme spiritual duty on all Islamic nations, is not a reality; it is just an idea from the books”. (p. 99) Then he underlines that the caliph has never possessed a Pope-like authority. M. Kemal also considers the idea of the Islamic Union as a fantastic utopia. According to him, the most appropriate solution is to integrate the caliphate with the national assembly. (Bozarslan, 1969, p. 99). The ideas of M. Kemal is the summary of the main trend in the National Assembly.

However, there were also ones who disagreed with his views, even if they were minority, but it is difficult to say that the ideas of the opposing ones were similar. On one hand, there were those who emphasized the symbolic importance of the caliph. According to them, if the caliphate was abolished, Turkey (with its smaller lands and decreased population) lost its power completely against both Muslim majority countries and against Europe. On the other hand, there were those who saw the existence of the caliph as essential for the rule of Islam itself. According to them, if the caliphate was abolished, even the Friday prayer could not be performed (Bozarslan, 1969, p. 116). They thought that without a caliph, the rule of Islam would disappear; so, Turkey would no longer be Dar al-İslam, which is the only territory to perform Friday prayers. The holders of this view were the traditional-orthodox wing, who were based on classical caliphate theory. Those who argued on the other hand that the caliph should continue to exist even symbolically, were some secularists⁹⁵ and some of the rational modern Islamists. Both sides shared the common ground that the caliphate should not be abolished. As seen, there were no independent positions such as ‘Islamists versus Western secularists’ in the discussion of caliphate.

Finally, during the budget negotiations held in February 1924, the issue came to the head. The amount allocated to the caliph and to the members of the dynasty from the budget suddenly sparked the discussions (Bozarslan, 1969, pp. 145-150). The predominant majority of the national assembly claimed that the caliphate united with the dynasty had been exploiting the blood of the nation for centuries. They demanded the abolishment of the caliphate by claiming that the caliphate was immanent in the assembly. However, this group did not only consist of Westerners; so, they could not dare to ignore religious legitimacy and felt the necessity to bring evidences from Shariah. For this reason, Mustafa Kemal personally assigned Seyyid Bey, who was an Islamic canonist (*faqih*) and the courthouse minister, to deliver a persuasion speech in the assembly, defending the abolition of the caliphate (Satan,

⁹⁵ For example, secular Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın started to write articles defending the caliphate in the newspaper **Tanin** from the end of 1923 (Murat & Özmen , s. 144).

2001, p. 165). Thanks to the evidences provided by Seyyid Bey, the decision to abolish the caliphate was taken unanimously, except for one (Erdem, 1996, pp. 145-146). According to the memoirs of Falih Rıfkı, Seyyid Bey, as an old Muslim preacher, ended his speech, which silenced everyone with canon evidences and persuaded them for the abolishment of the caliphate. As he got off the bench, Mustafa Kemal told those around him that he was performing his last mission (Atay, 1999, p. 55) . So, what did Seyyid Bey say in this famous speech?

According to Seyyid Bey, the source of the problem is the wrong headline. In the books, the issue of caliphate is discussed under the headline of *kalam*, instead of *fiqh*. This is so deceptive that people regard caliphate as an obligation of religious faith. However, the caliphate has nothing to do with faith. A certain form of administration does not pledge in neither the Quran nor the Sunnah anyway. Only some general principles, such as obedience to the *Ulu al-Amr* (the ones who give the orders) or *shura* (consultation), are depicted. According to Seyyid Bey's claim, as long as the general principles are applied, there is no inconvenience in having either a single person or an institution such as the assembly; because, caliphate means an Islamic administration, independent from the kind of regime. Unlike the Pope, the caliph does not have neither the right to establish new religious provisions nor the spiritual custody; rather, the institution of caliphate has just the function of maintaining the Prophet's political and administrative power. So, the caliph is only a surrogate; the successor of the Prophet, the representative and regent of the nation (Erdem, 1996, pp. 122-126). As seen, the claim of Seyyid Bey is that the caliph has no direct relationship with religion and that the caliphate is nothing but a political responsibility.

Seyyid Bey also argues that the legal nature of the caliphate is the same as attorney. According to him, there was an *attorney agreement* between the Islamic nation (ummah) and the Caliph. For the attorney agreement to be valid in Islamic law, the grantor must submit an offer to the grantee and the grantee must accept it. So, the person who made the offer assigns the person who accepts it and transfers some of his powers to him. In the Islamic law, the terminological expression for it is *tefviz* (delegation).⁹⁶ According to Seyyid Bey, the caliph is an officer who was delegated by the Islamic nation. Since the caliphate was nothing but an attorney agreement, it was immanent in the parliament; because, the National

⁹⁶ The concept of *tefviz* is defined as “referring something to someone” in the dictionary (Bakkaloğlu, 2011). For detailed information related to *attorney agreement*, also see: (Aybakan, 2013).

Assembly meets all of the provisions related to attorney in *Mecelle* (Ottoman's Code of Civil Law), so it has all the qualities of having a legitimate authority of caliphate (Erdem, 1996, pp. 128-130). For this reason, Seyyid Bey argues that there is no need for a separate individual caliph.

Besides, Seyyid Bey claims that the existing caliphate has not complied with the conditions of legitimacy for centuries. According to him, making the caliphate immanent in the national assembly equals with providing its legal legitimacy. Since there has never been an actual caliphate (*hilafet-i kamile*⁹⁷) in the Ottoman Empire, there is no problem in removing the formal caliphate (*hilafet-i sûriye*⁹⁸) (Erdem, 1996, s. 127). Seyyid Bey ends his claims⁹⁹ by stating that removing the caliphate does not mean cutting off the ties with Islam.

İsmet İnönü summarizes the discussions of the negotiations about caliphate as follows: "There is a point on which all the speakers, who either support or do not support, compromise: Through the abolishment of the caliphate, there will be no deficiencies in the protection and full enforcement of Islamic provisions. ... Although there is no kind of caliphate authority within the scope of the Republic of Turkey, all provisions and procedures for the enforcement of the Islamic religion will be completed. The truth is that." (Bozarslan, 1969, pp. 195-196). In other words, those who voted for the abolishment of caliphate in the national assembly on March 3 of 1924, just as those who were against the abolishment of the caliphate, did not vote for the abolishment of Muslimness and all Islamic provisions completely. The votes were for transferring the authorities of a symbolic earthly institution

⁹⁷ *Hilafet-i Kamile* is a form of caliphate based on election and allegiance, which is the legitimate caliphate. The legitimate caliph represents two things: first, the political authority of Prophet Mohammad; and second, the regency of the Islamic community (Erdem, 1996, p.126).

⁹⁸ Formal Caliphate or *Hilafet-i Sûriye* is a form of caliphate based on power and compulsion instead of election and allegiance. It is neither legitimate nor a true caliphate. It is a reign disguised as a caliphate. Nevertheless, the caliphs who became leaders in this way are considered legal if they act in accordance with the shariah and respect justice (Erdem, 1996, s. 127).

⁹⁹ İsmail Kara evaluated the speech of Seyyid Bey in the national assembly as follows: "The famous speech Seyyid Bey made in the Turkish Grand National Assembly during the abolition of the caliphate (which was published under the name of the *Hilafetin Mâhiyet-i Şer'iyyesi*) had greatly broken the opposition and bent the neck of those who defended the caliphate in the name of the sharia. In fact, Seyyid Bey did not say inaccurate things in this speech; he did not say, but in the name of religion and Islam, these truths, put into words as an Islamic law professor, were the reasons for the conviction of religion and Islam and the persecution of many people; they served as illegitimate acts of illegitimate treatment. Moreover, they prepared the ground for him to be removed from the Assembly, the Courthouse, with a lame excuse, and to migrate to the other world as an unknown person after a short time. We know that Seyyid Bey pursued a Civil Law that would be prepared by making use of Islamic law and Turkish traditions by taking advantage of this reputation. However, all he was asked was his speech." İsmail Kara, (Kara, Garı, Ganun, Şapka, 1990, p. 23)

(caliphate) to another earthly institution. Indeed, on that date, the general perception of public was as such.

In this study, the reason for emphasis on the abolishment of caliphate is that the arguments are important in order to understand the conception of caliph within CIPT. Besides, the conceptions of both politics and administration also lay behind those discussions. From this point of view, it is possible to summarize the main points of the caliphate description within the CIPT in the following four points: First of all, the expression that ‘the caliphate is immanent in the national assembly’ identified the caliphate with the government, namely administrative mechanism. In other words, caliphate was not seen as a religious authority but regarded as a state institution. Secondly, the legal definition of caliphate and the conditions for being a caliph were emphasized in the discussions, instead of the religious meaning of being a caliph (Erdem, 1996, p. 120). In other words, caliphate was not considered as a religious issue, but as a pure earthly matter, which was a very secular approach.

Thirdly, and perhaps the most striking point in the discussions, the legitimacy of the caliph was always addressed in the context of national will and national domination (*hakimiyet-i milliye*). In other words, the concepts of *general will* and *national sovereignty* of the modern West was accepted as cornerstones for the legitimacy and they were not questioned. The situation of the caliph was subjected to an interrogation if it was suitable to those two principles or not. In addition, the concepts of *legal attorney agreement* and *contract* used by Seyyid Bey many times during the discussions were similar to Western social contract theories (Erdem, 1996, p. 131). It can even be said that Seyyid Bey’s concepts were the adapted version of social contract theory to the Islamic community. It is obvious that all of those thoughts and claims were the products of a very different approach than the Classical Islamic thought.

Fourthly, the contents of the traditional concepts with high religious connotations such as *biat* (allegiance), power of attorney and *icma* (consensus of Muslim intellectuals) were changed in a way that they would indicate the complete modern-Western concepts such as election, republic or vote of confidence (Erdem, 1996, p. 120). In fact, this approach began to be adopted by many intellectuals since the New Ottomans. These four points are the summary of the subject of caliphate in the CIPT. Although the concepts used in Classical Islamic Political Thought were taken linguistically, in CIPT, their content has been almost completely changed in order to provide an Islamic ground of legitimacy for modern thoughts

and institutions. However, since the concept itself remained unchanged, it became inevitable to experience a confusion soon after; because, both the classical ulema and the modern Islamic thinkers from different schools began to use the same terminology for referring totally different meanings. This has been one of the important handicaps of Contemporary Islamic Political Thought.

Theories of caliphate -and therefore a possible Islamic State- in the CIPT have been essentially formed in response to the following questions:

- What is the definition of caliphate? (Is it a religious authority or a political one?)
- What is the source of the authority of the caliph? (Is it God or the people?)
- What are the limits of the authority of the caliph? (Are they absolute or limited; if limited to what?)
- How is the legitimacy of the caliph ensured?
- What should be the ethnic origin of the caliph?
- Is there a legitimacy of the Ottoman caliphate, which lasted for centuries?
- Is the caliph national or universal? (Could there be multi-caliphs?)
- Should the caliph be a person or a legal person? (Can the national assembly be considered caliph?)
- If a caliph is a person, what should his relationship be with the national assembly? (Is it above the assembly or a member of the assembly?)

All these questions still come up in and discussion about caliphate and Islamic State after the abolishment of caliphate -even today-. However, it is a fact that these questions have been answered in different ways by Muslims intellectuals with different views at different times and on different grounds. What this study is trying to do here is to find out how Ercüment Özkan and *İktibas* responded such questions, and to reveal their views on the state and politics trimly.

5.4. The Islamic State in *İktibas*

What is the Meaning of Islamic State and How It Can Be Founded?

We have mentioned that the idea of social contract began with depiction of the pre-social state of nature. For Ercüment Özkan, the state of nature is a land “where life is brutal for sustenance”, and in which the one who can defeat others live a better life. In other words, in the state of nature such a philosophy as “let the weak die; long live the strong” is dominant (p 207). According to Özkan, when the Prophet Mohammad arrived, the Arabs were living in a state of nature. The strong one defeats the weak ones, but it was considered fair because of their strength. Contrary to the contract theoreticians, who depicted the state of nature as the absence of any authority, Özkan does not talk about an authority gap. According to him, the state of nature is not the existence of social or political power, but it is a place that there is no obstacle to prevent the strong ones from using their power to defeat the weak. So, in order to depict the state of nature, it is not necessary to make hypothetical guesses about how stray human communities once lived; rather, it is sufficient to observe the institutionalization of the idea that ‘strong is always right’ in organized societies. From the perspective of Özkan, every system, which does not centre justice and where the strong ones are the authority, are nothing but the institutionalized versions of the state of nature (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, p. 207).

In this case, the answer to the question ‘why do people found states?’ will be ‘for having justice’ according to Özkan; because, the state of nature is not the absence of an organized administration, but the absence of justice, for him. So, what people need is not an institutionalized injustice, but a mechanism that can provide justice. The structure of the state is not based on freedoms, obligations, equality, or security. The state exists primarily for the establishment of justice socially, legally and financially.

According to the *İktibas* crew, if there is a need for an order somewhere, the leader should be one single person, i.e. not a community nor a commission but a single person should have the control. However, the authority is not identified with any single person and also should not be. It is essential to have someone qualified enough to fulfil the necessary duties after the one in authority leaves his place because of several reasons including death. Otherwise, the system will be destroyed after he is gone (Otorite, 1992, pp. 11-13). Although the journal states that the individual administration is essential, it does not support the idea of a kind of philosopher-king. According to Özkan, in order for a person to be a good ruler,

he does not have to be one of the most knowledgeable, honest or brave people. A good ruler is a person who has the ability to govern. If the ruler can achieve to coordinate the ones under his rule properly, he can benefit from the information at maximum level, even though he is not one of the most knowledgeable people. The same thing is valid for all other areas. So, a person needs to know how to rule efficiently before he become a ruler (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, p. 56). The qualifications such as knowledgeability or braveness are not enough to make a person a good ruler as long as they do not combine with the ability to govern.

So, is there a limit to the individual authority according to *İktibas*? The journal claims that Allah sets the rules of power and politics. Therefore, the authority is limited by the rules set by Allah. Although rule-makers change from regime to regime in earthly systems other than Islam, Allah is the only rule-maker in Islam. He teaches how to apply these rules through the prophets. Moreover, according to the journal, the rules set by Allah indicate not only the principles but also the exceptions (Siyaset, 1984, pp. 5-7). If we accept Schmitt's premise, 'the sovereign is the one who decides the exception' (Schmitt, 2016, p. 13), as accurate, Allah is the only sovereign in terms of setting rules, as well as the exceptions.

According to *İktibas*, the full application of the rules set by Allah depends on the existence of an Islamic State. In any state that does not have a structure shaped by Islam, at least some of the rules of Allah cannot be applied. As known, long before the establishment of *İktibas*, Özkan ended up in prison because of his claims about Islamic State and Caliphate in 1967. He did not give up from his dream on the Islamic State, even after he got out of the jail. As seen, Islamic State was the core of Özkan's cause. So, what is the Islamic State according to Özkan and how can it be established? The concept of Islamic State was defined in an article published in *İktibas* as follows:

The concept of Islamic State is used for the political organization founded by the people who are based on Islam, agree to apply Islamic orders, indicate that they will obey their decision (agreement) by giving *biat* to the ruler they choose, are determined to maintain the state by depending on the power of the people living in the same land and on Allah, and accept *ilayî kelimetullah* (declaring the uniqueness of Allah and dignifying Islam) as their foreign policy in their relations with other states (Devlet - Şahıs ve Laiklik, 1993, p. 12)

As it is understood from this, in *İktibas*, as in the modern state theory, it is accepted that the state consists of 3 elements: territory, human and authority (Özkan E. , 2010, p. 550).

However, while the third element is taken as ‘sovereignty’¹⁰⁰ in modern theory, it is determined as ‘authority’ in the journal. Because, according to the journal, Allah has the only sovereignty and it cannot be divided or transferred. In this regard, in order for the Islamic State to be founded, the first necessity is a group of people who are determined to establish the Islamic State. Secondly, there should be a defined territory on which the Islamic State will be built. Once people desire to establish an Islamic State on a definite land, they elect someone among the group. As the third and final step, the people give a legitimate authority to person they elected, by giving *biat* to him (cannot be her). Thus, the Islamic State is founded. The ruler struggles for maintaining the Islamic State alive by receiving support from his people who rely on Allah. Meanwhile, the relations between the Islamic State and other states are built on the principle of glorifying the name of God, not on the slippery ground of realpolitik. The state with all these features is called the Islamic State in *İktibas*.

However, according to the journal, Muslims are not allowed to behave pragmatically in statification, as in all matters. The purpose of statification is not to gain power and benefit from the blessings of the world, but to make Islam actualized. Therefore, the method to be used in statification should be taken from Islam itself. For the journal, it is vital to be rigorous about method. All means enabling achievement cannot be considered permissible (İslami (Rabbani) Metod, 1990, pp. 10-12). The journal suggests that the expression ‘*get armed with the weapon of the enemy*’ which is widely accepted among the people as hadith is incompatible with the Islamic mentality, since the enemy can resort to the ways that are considered illegitimate before Islam, but Muslims are not allowed to do so. It is a fact that the mentality of *getting armed with the weapon of the enemy* so deeply adopted by the people that makes them regard some non-Islamic means as legitimate. According to the journal, this statement has no other function but to legitimize Islamically illegitimate attitudes. Therefore, this expression can neither be a hadith nor be compatible with the logic of Islam (Düşmanın Silahı ile Silahlanmak, 1984, pp. 5-7). Therefore, the methods (weapons) of any ‘enemy’ system cannot be used in the way of statification.

According to *İktibas*, the main goal of Islam is not to be successful by any means necessary; the main goal is to fight in line with Islamic principles for the sake of the goal.

¹⁰⁰ **Three-factor Theory:** The state is an entity formed by the combination of the factors *people, territory and sovereignty*. In order for the state to be formed, those three elements must be present at the same time. In the absence of even one of them, it is not possible to talk about the existence of a state (Gözler, 2019, p. 4).

This can only be achieved by following the Godly method. The journal states that there is no compromise with the existing infidelity regimes, in the Godly method. Then it claims that being elected to the non-Islamic parliaments is not legitimate, even though this provides Muslims to have a voice in administration. According to the journal, Islam cannot be implemented through integrating the system and using democratic, secular, liberal or Marxist methods required by the system (İslami (Rabbani) Metod, 1990, pp. 10-12). Here it is clear that the journal does not approve the Muslims who establish a political party within the secular-democratic system in Turkey and involve in the operation the existing system by getting into the parliament.

Similarly, it is argued in many other copyrighted articles of *İktibas* that democracy can be neither a goal nor a tool for Muslims. From the perspective of the journal, for instance, the secular democratic system envisages to give the sovereignty not to God, but to the people; however, the absolute sovereignty in Islam belongs only to Allah. In other words, *İktibas* claims that Islam and democracy begin to contradict at the most basic/primary level. Besides the idea of using democratic means to actualize Islam is as oxymoronic as the Islamic Democracy concept itself. The democratic method is not an Islamically legitimate method for the journal, and if there is no legitimacy in the method as well as the purpose of an action, there is no consent of Allah in that action. Since Muslims claim that their only goal is to gain the consent of Allah, then they must stay away from non-Islamic methods (Parti ve Niçin Parti Kuruyoruz?, 1991, pp. 8-10). As seen, *İktibas* does not approve participating in the elections and casting vote in a democratic regime. Both cases (electing and being elected) are regarded as incompatible with Islam. A Muslim living in a democratic regime should just stay away from fulfilling the requirements of the system.

On the other hand, *İktibas* is against the idea of a bloody revolution. The journal crew have never approved and defended violence. The journal's radicalism is “nonviolent”¹⁰¹ and “gradual”¹⁰². Although they are against the system, it is not intended to destruct it with guns. Except for the actual war situation, they do not justify shedding blood. They put a distinct and sharp distance from terrorism. So, the question is: neither evolution nor revolution, how to establish an Islamic state?

¹⁰¹ Erkilet defined Ercümen Özkan as follows: “Non-Hypocritic Politics, Nonviolent Radicalism, Massless Courage” (Erkilet, 2015).

¹⁰² Related to the gradual method adopted by Özkan, see: (Atalar M. K., 2002).

According to the journal, there is a unique method for every action including founding an Islamic State. The method to be applied should be learned from the Prophet Mohammad. *İktibas* divides the life of the Prophet in 3 stages. In the first stage, the Prophet tried to believe that what had came to him was truly revelation and from Allah. He wanted to be sure of the nature of his experience by asking knowledgeable people he trusted. Just like this, Muslims should first be convinced of the correctness of the principles they try to explain. Therefore, it is essential for them to do their research properly and acquire not much but useful information; because, the usefulness of information is more important than the abundance of it.

According to Özkan, if one cannot be a state when he is alone, he cannot be a state when he has multiple fellows. So, what does it mean for one person to be a state? Özkan explains it as case in which an idea dominates a person. According to him, “if an idea does not rule one person ..., a movement that will start from this person cannot be expected to become a state in the society” (sp.18). But the vice versa is not valid. The idea that rules a person will not necessarily become state; because, statification in society is beyond someone’s power, it is depended on multiple factors. According to Özkan, the important thing is that the seed (i.e. the idea and the people who have dominated by that idea) has the potential to establish a state. He used the metaphor of plants from seed to sprout for this process. If the seed is durable, it will absolutely sprout when the conditions are suitable (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, pp. 18-19). Therefore, the first stage is the stage of being sure of the opinions and being a one-person state.

However; one person may be enough to make a change, but the essential things are caderisation and massification -arrogating the idea of change to masses, making them like and adopt it- for the transfer of the change from generation to generation by making it permanent (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, p. 99). For this reason, those who allow the idea of Islam to dominate them by comprehending the Islamic principles and concepts should go to the second stage.

In the second stage, the Prophet Muhammad talked to his close circle and first convinced them; then they altogether started to openly declare their religion (*tabligh*). Therefore, for *İktibas*, Muslims must first establish a core staff. Then they must persuade opinion leaders, who have influence especially on large masses, to form public opinion. The second stage is a caderisation and publicizing phase. Therefore, no authority has yet been

established. This is why no one has the authority to make political judgment on his own in the second stage.

The third and final stage is the stage of statification. When sufficient power is reached, the Islamic State is established with common consent and one-on-one allegiance (*biat*). Such a state has the quality of having the only legitimate authority on Muslims. During the period of the Prophet, all verses related to the state and social order revealed after the Islamic State was established. So, after the third stage, the state has the authority to enact law. The *İktibas* crew claim that every Muslim should follow this three-step method in politics. They argue that another method will not produce the desired result, i.e. the Islamic State. According to the crew, it is not possible to fight with the system by being a part of it. First, the system cannot be changed in democratic ways. Second, since a socialist revolution discourse is not Islamic, revolution cannot be an alternative for Muslims. When first and second points are added up, the natural result is this: the method to achieve an Islamic goal must be taken from Islam. Muslims should use this three-stage method since it is the method derived from the life of the Prophet Muhammad, who is a leader for Muslims, as a person providing the rules and also showing the method how to apply them (Siyaset, 1984, pp. 5-6). Here is the ‘gradual method’. Özkan adopted this method as from his years in *Hizbu’-t-Tahrir*, and *İktibas* crew adopted the same method as well.

According to *İktibas*, the fact that the person at the head of a state and even all members of the government is Muslim is not enough to make an order Islamic. For the state order to be Islamic, it must be designed in accordance with certain principles. According to the journal, the relevant principles only arise if the Quran is read and comprehended without the fanaticism of any religious sect, without a concern of “what do people say?” and with a normally working mind. To express it by combining them together: “Islamization of individual and social order means conformity to the Quran; the more it conforms, the more it is Islamic” (Kur'an'ı Nasıl Anlamalıyız ya da Kur'an'ı Anlamanın Önündeki Engeller, 1994, pp. 12-14). In other words, when Muslim cadres take the control, the state does not suddenly become an Islamic State; instead, the regime gets the Muslims inside its own wheels.

But the journal also objects to the discourse that politics is “the work of the devil”. It argues that Muslim circles who support this discourse misunderstand politics. Özkan indicates in an interview that: “Almost everything has a political value. Islam is politics itself; similarly, every idea is the product of politics, or each policy is the product of an idea.

In other words, it will be a negligence to see them separate from each other” (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, s. 214). According to the *İktibas* crew, the important thing in politics is the measures according to which the politics will be made. Of course, it is not possible for a Muslim to engage in politics by using Machiavelli’s measures. But politics cannot be equated with Machievallism only. It cannot be denied completely and declared non-Islamic (Siyaset, 1984, pp. 5-7). Because, according to the journal, the predominant aspect of Islam is politics itself. Those who do not understand this do not understand anything from the Quran they read (İdeolojik Kirlilik, 1991, pp. 7-10). It is possible to understand from here that the journal does not get the concept of politics into a narrow frame. On the contrary, the meaning and scope of the concept has been kept as wide as possible. According to the journal, politics means God’s discipline by teaching the rules of living together to His servants. Politics (*siyaset*) comes from the same root with the word *seyis* (stableman) which means the man who trains horses. Therefore, it is possible to talk about politics at every social level starting from bilateral relations. This is because Allah taught the rules of living together not only within the frame of an institutional state, but also in small units of society such as family. Thus, “Islam is a policy in itself” and “politics is a must (*farz*) for every Muslim” (Siyaset, 1984, pp. 5-7).

The question on to what extent the ideas of community and the states in *İktibas* correspond with the boundaries of the Republic of Turkey. Because the idea of an ummah that corresponds with the existing nation-state borders creates new questions. In the gradual model of Özkan mentioned above, it is aimed at the first step to establish an Islamic state within the borders of a nation-state. Since the foreign policy of such an Islamic state will be based on spreading Islam, *İktibas* crew thinks that it will gradually become a large and single Islamic state by incorporating other Muslim majority countries.

How Does Islamic State Operate?

Sultanate (*saltanat*) means having an authority (*sulta*) in terms of the root of the word. According to Özkan, this kind of a sultanate exists in Islam. What is not in Islam is the dynastical system of transferring the authority from father to son. Here, since the merit principle is eliminated, dynasty is against the Quran (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, pp. 70-71). Therefore, the state authority cannot be transferred from father to son. However, according to Özkan, sultanate cannot be denied and rejected categorically. The point which should be

criticized here is the transformation of a sultanate into a system where the authority is transferred from father to son and deformation of the intellectual structure to continue this transfer. For example, the Umayyads did not hesitate to destroy the Islamic mentality for the sake of perpetuation of their reign. According to Özkan, even today, Islam still suffers from Umayyads' deformation of the original structure. Since the core of religion destroyed once, it will take long efforts to re-give Islam its purity back (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, p. 246). All those are the destructions caused not by sultanate but by the dynastic system, for Özkan; because, sultanate means the presence of authority, which is necessary.

It is claimed in the *İktibas* that all authorities are personal. Just as the fact that God is unique and sent the prophets one by one, and just as the fact that he created all living things -no matter how many legs they have- with one had, there must be one person at the head of the state. According to the journal, collective leadership is unrealistic; it is against the creation and it is nothing but a deliberate deception presented by democracy. The journal claims that the nature of authority is not suitable for being collective. God created the nature of leadership linked with personal authority (Otorite, 1992, pp. 11-13). In other words, this is the nature of it, according to the journal. Those who claim just the opposite deceive people by hiding the facts.

The journal gave Turkey as an example in order to prove its points and asserted that the authority in Turkey has always been personal. According to the journal, the authority has never been in the National Assembly. M. Kemal was the first leader, then İnönü and finally Menderes came after him. From the 1960 Turkish coup d'état to the end of the 90's, the military forces held the real power. The MGK (National Security Council) ruled the country. According to *İktibas*, it is a fact that the the National Assembly could not enact a single law by their own throughout the history of the Republic (Riyaset - Başkanlık, 1995, pp. 15-17). Therefore, the existence of the National Assembly does not prove that leadership is collective.

So far, it can be observed that *İktibas* prospects the potential Islamic State to be built on a single and personal leadership. This perspective is also in parallel with the Classical caliphate theory. Therefore, the journal disagrees with the idea that the caliphate in Contemporary Islamic Political Thought is immanent within the legal entity of the National Assembly. Whether his name is caliph or not, the state must be governed by an individual. So how does this person take the control and what are his responsibilities?

According to *İktibas*, the leader must come to power through election in an Islamic State. Islamic administration is not a Western theocracy. Therefore, the leader is not elected by God either. He does not have any kind of extreme power. Everything happens at a humanitarian level, in accordance with the nature of the relationships between humans (Teokrasi, 1992, pp. 9-11). Except from the prophets, there is no kind of leaders elected through Godly methods in Islam. In this case, being the descendant of the Prophet cannot be a valid reason for claiming political power. According to the journal, if a Muslim is aware of the fact that he/she is descended from Adam and that there is no measure of superiority among people than *taqwa*, he/she should also understand that being descended from the Prophet Mohammad is not an indicator of any kind of superiority (Ehl-i Sünnet ve Ehl-i Teşeyyu, 1992, pp. 9-11). Since there is no significance of being member of any family in Islam, there is no point in giving the administration to a certain family. Therefore, the narrations about necessity of the caliph being from the Qurayshi family cannot be the word of the Prophet. Apart from all these, those, who claim that some people have been chosen by Allah and who find evidence by interpreting the verses for themselves, distort the essence of Islam (Özkan E. , 2010, pp. 208-209).

As can be seen; *İktibas* opposing the idea of holy leadership and states that the leader will be chosen by humans, not by God. In order for the administration to be legitimate and reliable, the ruler should be elected by the public. On the other hand, if the people are not conscious, their choice will not be healthy. Therefore, the people should first be educated about Islam. The distorted understandings in their minds should be erased. If it cannot be achieved, the election, the allegiance or eve the state to be established will not be at the standards of Islam (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, pp. 87-88). In other words, the ruler should be assigned by election; however, before the election phase, the voters should undergo a certain training. The next stage after the election is allegiance (*biat*).

The *İktibas* crew defends the view that the political authority will gain legitimacy through allegiance. On the other hand, allegiance was partially compared to gaining citizenship in a way. However, according to the journal, the allegiance of Muslims has different content from that of the non-Muslims. For instance, while Muslims are obliged to protect religion, non-Muslims have no such obligations. They only follow the rules, maintain order and defend the country with Muslims in a potential external threat (Özkan E. , 2010, pp. 572-573). Therefore, their allegiance is drawn differently, and they are given less responsibilities than Muslims.

According to the journal, the concept of allegiance can only be applied if there is an Islamic State. Otherwise, there is no place in the Islamic law for an allegiance to any sheikh, Muslim preacher or party leader. Because if there is no state power behind the person who is obeyed, the allegiance is also invalid (Özkan E. , 2010, pp. 572-575). In other words, the legitimacy of the allegiance directly depends on either the existence or the close probability of existence of a state.

Once the ruler is elected, he remains in his chair until he dies, unless he deviates from the rules of Allah. In this way, the election pressure is removed (Riyaset - Başkanlık, 1995, pp. 15-17). According to the journal; the ruler, who got rid of the pressure of election, can move away from populist policies and penetrate the essence of the issues.

After all, that is, if there is a true Islamic State authority, if the election was held and the leader was allegedly obeyed, obedience is now a must. However, in cases where the ruler is not determined by election and allegiance, such as in the Ottoman Empire, justice is taken. According to İktibas, although the Ottomans were a superpower in their own period, they did not dominate those who were not themselves. Except for the Sultanate family, the family or race of the people coming to the administration levels was not considered important. Moreover, due to being a centre of caliphate, they acted as a patron of Muslims in the non-affiliated countries. Considering all of them, the journal lean to the Ottomans as it is a strong political structure that Muslims could depend on. The journal actually does not approve the structure of thought of Ottoman; however they were so strong that even though it fell almost 100 years ago, Muslims continued to come to Turkey when they are in trouble (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, pp. 105, 422). The journal accepts Ottoman since it took Islam under its wings even though it was a dynasty state which is not considered legitimate by the journal.

Another reason for the journal to evaluate the Ottoman separately from other dynasties is the issue of the Turks taking Islam from the Abbasids as mentioned in Chapter II. According to the journal, Umayyads and Abbasids brought the dynasty intentionally although they knew it is opposed to Islamic essence. However, the Turkish people adopted and implemented the system which they saw from Abbasids by thinking that it was Islam. They did see the Prophet Mohammad and others directly. In other words, they did not make any deliberate distortion, nor did they deviate from the idea that they held true (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, p. 94). Therefore, the journal is of the opinion that the Ottoman Empire cannot be placed on the same scale as the Umayyads and the Abbasids.

Obedience and Rebellion:

According to *İktibas*, obedience is obligatory in the Islamic State as long as the orders and prohibitions of the leader do not go beyond the circle of Islam. Because the journal crew think that the verse (Nisa 4/59) mentioned in the Quran and known as the obedience verse of the Ulu al-Amr indicates this. Just as in the Classical Islamic Political literature, in *İktibas* it is argued that the obedience to the rulers who ruled in accordance with the orders and prohibitions of Allah will actually lead the person to obey Allah. To put it simply, obedience to such a ruler means obedience to God. Rebellion against him is strictly forbidden. According to the journal, the only exception to this is that the political authority goes out of the circle of religion. In such a situation, the rebellion becomes necessary instead of being permissible (Özkan E. , 2010, pp. 572-575). However, rebellion should not be perceived as a bloody civil war. Ercümen Özkan and his crew have never approved of violence. The concept of rebellion mentioned here means disobedience to the ruler. This can be called a kind of civil disobedience.

The Ruler makes some decisions within the frame of the Quran and sunnah, and Muslims are obliged to obey them according to *İktibas*. Even those who disagree with the Ruler have to follow his decisions. Because those decisions are no longer just the view of the Ruler, they are “the order involving the actions of the rules of Allah” and “bind all the ummah” (Mezheb ve Mezhebler (4), 1982, pp. 5-7). In other words, the answer to the question of why we should obey the legitimate political authority according to *İktibas* is “because it is obligatory”. This obligation comes from the Quran itself. It can be clearly seen here that the journal almost completely adopted the classical political theory.

Besides, the journal does not adopt the organism-based state approach. This approach can be best explained with the suggestion of İbn Khaldun indicating that, just like people, states can be born, grow old and die. *İktibas* objects to this approach. According to the journal, states do not die and disappear; they continue their way with another name or another form. And for the “the unity of the state and the eternal-continuation of order” (Mezheb ve Mezhebler (4), 1982, pp. 5-7). Muslims living under an Islamic State are obliged to obey legitimate authority - even if they dislike it. Otherwise, *fitnah* arises.

The concept of *fitnah*, which we deal with under the Traditional Islamic Political Thought, was used in the same meaning and context in *İktibas*. In other words, according to the journal, *fitnah* is the name given to the chaos caused by the rebellion to the legitimate

political authority, just like in the traditional literature. The point the journal insists on is as follows: in order for a chaos to be described as fitnah, that chaos should be raised in the Islamic State. In other words, rebellion to any non-Islamic order cannot be described as a fitnah. Of course, every status quo will protect itself and will label those who revolt as troublemaker. However, such a labelling means only removing the concept from its main context and distorting it. Because the real meaning of a concept is given to it by Allah, the owner of the words as well as everything else. According to *İktibas*, since Allah described the fitnah as the chaos within the Islamic order, not as all kinds of chaos; Muslims should use the word in this sense (Fitne -I-, 1984, pp. 5-6).

Additionally, *İktibas* mentions that the prophets were the first to be labelled as troublemakers (*fitneci*). In fact, they are the first to hit the established religious perceptions. According to the journal, after the Prophet Mohammad, the ones who claimed that they are the members of the Islamic community and “all kinds of beliefs and practices provided by them many years ago, which became usual, accepted without questioning and became the religion of the people” protect their existence through the discourse of fitnah. Whenever they were found to be wrong “according to the Sunnah of the Quran and the Prophet Mohammad (s.a.)” the people who showed the truth were accused of being troublemakers at first, and therefore “lots of problems” were experienced. According to the journal, “it is possible to consider the fitnah against the facts as the most effective non-real weapon from this point of view” (Fitne -II-, 1984, pp. 5-6).

When the two paragraphs above are considered together, it can be seen that the concept of fitnah has been approached through the interrogation with the Quran and sunnah. In other words, for example, the rebellion against a political authority is considered as fitnah if it complies with the Quran and sunnah. Again, for example, it is not considered as fitnah if an idea does not comply with Quran and sunnah. However, according to the journal, there is no structure/institution to question suitability for Quran and sunnah. Doing this is among the individual duties. In this case, the answer to the question “What will distinguish the legitimate corruption accusation and illegitimate corruption accusation according to *İktibas*” remains ambiguous. Of course, in the example of the prophets that the journal constantly emphasizes, the situation is quite clear. However, it become difficult to distinguish the right and wrong people among the members of the same religion; this is because they can both provide evidences from the Quran for their claims. *İktibas* has found individual considerations important in such cases. So, everyone is responsible for the reliability of their

own thoughts. Realizing the right and the right people and choosing them depend on the people's own discretion. The only evident criterion of the journal regarding fitnah is that it is a crime against the legitimate Islamic State.

Councils and Consultation:

There is no such thing as legislation-executive-judgement separation as there is only a sole authority in the Islamic State as it is described by *İktibas*. There are consultation councils based on merit that will be formed on various subjects (Riyaset - Başkanlık, 1995, pp. 15-17). Although being an individual of the authority prevents the separation of powers, it does not prevent consultation. On the contrary, it is unlikely that the work done without consulting anyone will benefit. Various consultation boards and councils will of course exist; however, these institutions are only for consultation (Otorite, 1992, pp. 11-13). The Ruler speaks to the advisory councils and takes their opinions; but he makes the final decision himself and takes responsibility for his decision (Riyaset - Başkanlık, 1995, pp. 15-17). This is because, according to *İktibas*, the final decision in the state administration should be made through individual will since consultation is nothing more than brainstorming. So, it is not obligatory. If the ruler deems appropriate; he likes, takes and applies one of the ideas that arise. If he doesn't deem appropriate, he acts in a way he desires, which is, according to the journal, is his right (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, p. 60).

Naturally, there will be some Islamic law interpreters in the Islamic State who have different views than the ruler. According to *İktibas*, they can give their judicial opinions to the ruler; however, the ruler is not obliged to accept any of them, just as there is no obligation to accept the opinions expressed in the councils. If he wishes, he does not consider those opinions and can act in a way he wishes and legalize his own views (Mezheb ve Mezhebler (4), 1982, pp. 5-7).

The one thing which the ruler cannot standardise through the laws is worship. According to the journal, the Ruler does not have the right to standardise the matters related to worship. In other words, by indicating that the hand is cut, the person became canonically unclean or it is not become canonically unclean when the person touches a woman, he cannot legalise his decision to make it obligatory for the community. Each communion is free to practice their own views in terms of worship (Mezheb ve Mezhebler (4), 1982, pp. 5-7). This is because, they are not issues affecting the origin of Islam since they are secondary issues.

Since there is no definite provision on them, a space is left open for the different views of intellectuals. This space should not be narrowed.

According to the *İktibas* crew, the Islamic State is represented by real persons, not by legal and legal personalities, such as councils, and they are fully responsible (Devlet - Şahis ve Laiklik, 1993, pp. 12-14). Besides, inspection is also individual, not institutional. It is not the institutions, but individuals, who will oversee the Ruler's possible arbitrariness. Because individuals who have freedom of thought and expression will have the power to control authority without the need for any institutional mechanism. This has been the case in history. An example for this case is the period of Umar ibn al-Khattab (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, p. 66). It will be more accurate in every respect to attach importance to individuals and their development, not institutions, as institutions are ultimately governed by individuals. In the final analysis, the existence of strong, qualified and personality individuals who can carry Islam on their shoulders will affect the institutions and the administration. At this point, it is vital that each individual can use his own mind, according to the journal. Because the most reliable states are those which have individuals who can think, not a group of people thinking in parallel with each other (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, pp. 78-80). In other words, according to the journal, the personalization of the individual comes first. If this is not the case, institutionalization will remain as a fancy but hollow discourse.

According to Ercümen Özkan, who emphasizes that corporate identities are brought to the fore by being trendy, it is not the institutions or institutional identities, but the establishment of an individual-state relationship in a reliable and sound manner. Even if there is an institutionalization after all - which will happen - this is not the purpose, but the tool. The aim is to raise people first. The state should be strong enough to protect society from decay, but not crush individuals. The primary achievement is to make individuals to have a personality and raise them as consistent and balanced. For this, individuals' intellectual freedoms should be recognized. However, according to Özkan, this also has a limit. It is not permissible for the individuals to behave enough to deprave the society. So, what matters is balance. An individual is neither put in the centre and released as much as in democracies nor is made as worthless as in communism. Özkan says that Islam proposes a system based on balance without being struck by these two extreme situations (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, p. 98).

In *İktibas*, society is described as a structure led by principles, not individuals. Personality in authority does not mean that the leader overrides Islam. This is because in

such a situation, the reality of Islam, i.e. the principal religion, is lost. Being subject to the principles is the guarantee that the actual matter will not change even if the individuals change (Fikri Liderlik, 1985, pp. 8-10).

Transparency and Legitimacy:

According to Ercüment Özkan, “a regime does not survive with the taxes given to it. It survives with the votes” (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, p. 266). For example, the most important reason for the Shah regime to survive until 1979 in Iran is that according to Özkan, the Sheriatmedari accepted the humus of the Shah. This is because, he accepted the humus for years and legitimized the Shah before people. According to Özkan, voting also has the same function. If a person goes to the ballot box and votes in any non-Islamic regime, whatever party he gives, he legitimizes the regime. However, most of the Muslims are not aware of this. Because those who want to vote from them do not inform them properly.

According to the *İktibas* crew, Muslims who come to the public with a claim must be transparent. They cannot tell what they are aiming at gradually. They cannot hide how they will achieve their goals. They should explain all this from the very beginning. They also cannot give the impression that they have a secret program. All of them are considered as voting and deceiving the public with some promises, which goes against Islamic moral values. Therefore, “a movement must absolutely reveal its thought and method clearly at the beginning” (Özkan E. , 2010, p. 289). The journal crew believes that discourses such as it not the time yet or the people are not ready have no legitimacy. Therefore, it advocates transparency from the very beginning to the very end. According to the journal, a movement with hidden agendas is condemned to be deprived of sincere public support. Even if those who are constantly hiding themselves reach to the sufficient opportunities, they cannot do what they want to accomplish (Özkan E. , 2010, p. 289). As a matter of fact, Özkan himself, who says that honesty and transparency is a Prophet's character even with the risk of incurring the wrath of the regime has been imprisoned for years due to this honesty.

According to the *İktibas* crew, transparency is essential to act principally. Muslims can never adopt the understanding of “let bygones be bygones”. The journal argues that it is pointless to try to prevent injustices against Muslims by leaning against the principles of the regime. This is because when they come to power, they will not use those principles, they should not use them. Therefore, while being disadvantageous, advocating their ideas within

a secular democratic discourse in a cyclical manner means being unprincipled; this is because one day, when the system changes and Muslims come to dominate position, they will not consider the same discourse. Therefore, rights cannot be claimed within the framework of the principles of the regime. *İktibas* attempts to embody this argument on the example of the hijab issue. According to the journal, it is wrong to advocate hijab bans with the statement that “everyone has the right to dress” within the framework of human rights and freedoms. Because one day in the future, when the targeted Islamic order is established, people will not be allowed to dress as they wish (İdeolojik Kirlilik, 1991, pp. 7-10). In such a situation, those who defend the hijab based on the principle of human freedom will fall into a liar and two-faced position. Therefore, discourses should be determined in accordance with the goals set for the future. Unprincipledness and hypocrisy should be eliminated.

According to Özkan, a party cannot be Islamic if it is suitable for the current system; and a real Islamic party cannot be legal. The ultimate goal of a true Islamic party should be to establish an Islamic State. It must declare that it will achieve this within the framework of Islamic procedures without adhering to democratic procedures. Since no regime will proclaim a formation that wants to destroy it, a truly Islamic party cannot be legal within the framework of plain logic (Tebliğ ve Parti, 1990, pp. 8-10).

From this point of view, according to the journal crew, the parties in the National Vision line, for example, which are constantly closed and re-established, have no connection with Islam. Those parties, which introduce themselves as Islamic, do two things that the *İktibas* crew thinks are absolutely non-Islamic. The first is that they enter into the councils of the non-Islamic secular order in order to have right to speak in administration. Secondly, they make misleading statements about their real purpose. According to the journal, although those parties stated that they wanted shariah in some of their discourses, they were actually only aspiring to lead the secular democratic system project. The regime uses the National Vision parties to make people love and embrace them. Therefore, *İktibas* thinks that the achievements of these parties are actually the achievements of the system (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, pp. 16-17).

Property:

According to *İktibas*, property is a manifestation of human survival instinct. Therefore, the desire to own a property is natural. Three types of property are mentioned in the journal:

private property, social property, and state property. Among them, especially the comprehension of private property is underlined, because every ideology builds its approach of economic order on the idea of private property. So, it is a fundamental idea. In the bipolar world of the 1980s, *İktibas* particularly emphasized the approaches of economic order and property of capitalist and communist ideologies. Firstly, the journal, which deals with democratic capitalism, says that this ideology advocates the right to own property by adopting a liberal approach of property. The problem here is that how property was acquired or used at first was not considered important. Properties acquired unfairly, through wide colonial network, was used to dominate the weak people as a branch of the same colonialism as it could afford it. This situation continued until Marx. However, after the social influence created by Marx's writings, the West dressed a “social” dress to the absolute property approach, whose “nudity” began to stand out in the journal and continued on its way. The understanding of social democracy spread all over the world, especially after the World War II. According to the journal, “Land Reforms seen in the practices of third world countries, nationalization of foreign trade and banking, planning practices” are the manifestations of this approach. In this way, “capitalism has renewed itself and is protected against Marxism”. In this way, “capitalism has renewed itself and is protected against Marxism” (Özkan E. , 2010, pp. 602-603). In other words, capitalism has protected itself against possible revolts by restricting the unlimited freedoms in the acquisition and use of property.

Materialist Marxism addresses matter in two types: production tools and consumer goods. In the socialist period, which is considered as a transition period between the existence of the state and communism, *İktibas* states that people have a right to private property within certain boundaries and this is limited only to consumer goods. In addition, the journal indicates that the right to property in consumer goods was restricted in the socialist period. One can only have consumer goods sufficient enough for his/her needs and will not be able to profit from it. According to the journal -as of 1982 when the article was written- Marxism has been considered as “a corpse which cannot be applied”. “Its death was maybe beneficial for capitalism and gave it the chance to live by giving him the opportunity to renew itself for a while” (Özkan E. , 2010, p. 604). The journal, which summarizes the view of private property in the ideological order of Marxism and capitalism, then describes the perception of private property in Islam.

While *İktibas* was defining private property according to Islam, it especially emphasized the points that differ from the two ideologies above. Although Allah is the real

owner of the property in Islam, he has given his servants the right to have a right of disposition. But there are some limitations. According to the journal, they are qualitative limitations, not quantitative. For example, the size of the land that the person owns does not matter. The important thing is that the land was acquired within the framework that Islam sees legitimate, i.e. within the frame of halal actions. But this is not enough. In addition, the land should not be used for actions which are not considered halal such as a pig farming, or giving the grapes produced on the land to the wine factory. In other words, both the means of obtaining and the way of use should be halal. Besides, property owners in Islam have to give a certain amount to the poor people from the property they own (Özkan E. , 2010, p. 605).

Similarly, in the journal, which states that Islam has certain limits on public property, it is stated that the materials necessary for the maintenance of life such as water cannot be subject to a certain private property according to Islam. If a person finds water in his land and wants to sell it, it is checked whether there is sufficient water supply available to everyone in the area where the land is located. If there is a sufficient amount of water in the place, that person is allowed to sell it; however, he/she is not allowed if there is not a sufficient amount of water. On the other hand, revenues from state-owned public property such as seas, mines or oil should be shared with the ummah. This is suitable for Islam according to *İktibas*. Those revenues should be calculated regularly every year and distributed to the whole community, regardless of whether they are men or women. In addition, the journal, which states that in Islam, the state cannot receive any unnecessary taxes, indicates that the purpose of the state cannot be becoming rich. In Islam, the state should take care of its people and satisfy their material and spiritual needs (Özkan E. , 2010, s. 611-620).

It is known that the first generation of Islamists defended the necessity of the national assembly by opposing the dynasty reign order they lived under. Some of them argued that the caliph should continue to exist due to its symbolic significance, while others claimed that the caliphate's political authority was transferred to the national assembly and that there was no need for the caliph anymore. However, there is a point that both parties agree on: whether

it is called the caliph, the sultan or the ruler, it is necessary to limit the individual powers of the administration. Demand for the restriction of authority against the traditional approach, which sees the caliph as the shadow of Allah on earth (zıllullah), is one of the distinguishing characteristics of Contemporary Islamic Political Thought.

The concept of allegiance in Contemporary Islamic Political Thought has been considered equal to the contract in social contract theories, as can be clearly seen in the caliphate discussion chapter above. In fact, it was tried to establish a terminology with a social contract by calling it a contract or a power of attorney. However, it is clear that *İktibas*' views on political authority and obedience are not similar to the social-contract theories. Although the journal emphasizes that facts such as election and allegiance are not godly, but occur among people, the purpose of them is to make godly will real. To put it more precisely; in social contract theories, without any intervention of transcendent power, people determine their own political formations and thus aim to eliminate the discourse of godly will from the political plane. However, *İktibas* aims to establish a administration based on precise godly will. In this respect, it stands at a different point from the main vein of Contemporary Islamic Political Thought.

In fact, the idea of the Islamic State in *İktibas* follows a much more parallel line with traditional understanding. For example, the journal, which does not adopt the idea of tripartite separation of powers, does not care about the idea of a national assembly that would restrict the powers of the government, which was given vital importance in CIPT. In *İktibas*, the national assembly is envisaged only for consultation. It is provided to give all authority to the Ruler in the journal. It has been stated that the people, not the institutions, have the authority to supervise the individual Ruler, but it is not addressed why a ruler who has the right not to listen to the national assembly should listen to the warnings of the public and whether it is practically applicable. In this respect, the idea of the Islamic State of *İktibas* is more like traditional books and political treatises on political Islamic laws, rather than a project that has been considered and put forward with its philosophical and institutional aspects within the existing nation-states system. Just like in those books, the characteristics of the legitimate sultan (or the ruler) were explained, and it was emphasized that the sultan should serve justice and Islam. However, they could only be considered as recommendations to the Ruler. In addition, it is not clear how the mechanism can be implemented and how it can function.

For example, some Islamist thinkers, such as Afganî, Said Halim Paşa or M. Hamidullah, envisaged it as a superstructure in order to bring the idea of the Islamic State into practice and to practice caliphate. Even the intellectual foundations of the European Union have not been laid at the time when they put forward this project; however, it can be said that the caliphate project of the Islamists in question is basically very similar to the structure of the European Union. According to *İktibas*, Allah ordered Muslims to be a single community (ummah) and a single state. Therefore, there must be a single Islamic State and a single ruler on earth. However; under the current conditions, while the geographies where Muslims are dominant have spread over such a wide area, while Muslims are in a constant bloody disputes due to the wide variety of disagreements, and while each of Muslim community consider themselves as the most important position in the Islamic world and thus they should suggest a caliph; the questions regarding to provide unity, acting as one and gathering under a single state continue to be ambiguous. Therefore, there is no information on how the single Islamic State project will work in *İktibas*. In this respect, it would not be right to call *İktibas* a theory. Instead, it has characteristics on bringing the traditional Islamic Political literature back to the agenda with minor changes.

İktibas crew thought that it was in vain to talk about the institutional features of the prospective Islamic State; because, the Islamic State Project was still very remote. In other words, since the Islamic State does not appear on the horizon even as a possibility, they considered that it was useless to discuss it.

5.4.1. ADDITION: The Islamic Republic of Iran in *İktibas*

Koselleck says that the word “revolution” is a perfect example to the topic of “concepts where the corresponding situation remains constant while it’s meaning changes”. In other words, the content of the concept of revolution has been restructured in the modern period. Until the French Revolution, the revolution was a concept that expresses its turn upside down and has negative connotations in this respect; however, it had been successfully romanticized just before the Revolution. Thus, the concept of *revolution* which stands out from its negative connotations has begun to refer to a “unique process that leads to a completely new future where peoples will peacefully rule themselves” (p. 63). In reality, the content of the revolution has not changed: there is still violence, war and death. However, they were hidden and the word revolution was made more innocent. The negative elements in its content are placed on the shoulders of a new concept: civil war (Koselleck, 2016, pp. 61-62).

The word *revolution* which left its negative image in the Western minds before the French Revolution and took on a brand-new dress was not loved and approved by the Muslims until the Iranian Revolution. According to *İktibas*, the revolution means turning the present upside down and it has no place as a method in Islam. This is because; when Islam comes, it does not reverse everything, it does not kill the supporters of the old regime, it does not turn the streets into a fire place, it does not harm public property. The journal, which states that “Revolutionism is not hostility to the city bus, is not feeding hostility” was criticized for the leftists’ damage to the streets and public property. This is because; “there is no one seeing a place by hitting it by hitting it”. The revolution for the journal is reactionary; however, the Muslim should be an action, not a reactionary. They should be constructive, corrective, corrective, not destructive. It is not possible to see a devastating phenomenon in the example of the prophets. For example, the Prophet Muhammad did not completely contradict the functioning of his own society and continued the existing practices as long as there was no opposite order. Based on all these examples, the point reached by *İktibas* is that revolution and revolutionism are not Muslim concepts (Devrim İnkılab, 1994, pp. 12-15).

The Iranian Revolution has made Muslims peaceful with the word revolution. Like many radical Islamist publications, *İktibas* applauded the Iranian Revolution with hope. On the other hand, there was a surprise. This is because, Muslims in Turkey were not even aware of the existence of an Islamic movement in Iran. The Islamic movements in Turkey which follow Muslim Brotherhood from Egypt, *Hizbu’l-Tahrir* from Jordan-Palestine, *Jamaah al*

Islami from Pakistan, Malik bin Nabi from North Africa, *Senusi* movement from Libya was only aware of the events in Iran a year ago from the revolution. In this respect, the revolution came from the unexpected side (Arslantaş S. , 2013, p. 318). The fact that the Iranian people who carried out the Revolution were Shiahhs caused two different attitudes: the introduction of the Sunni reflex, the wholesale rejection attitude and the change of sect due to excessive sympathy for Shiahhs. İktibas tried to capture a holistic perspective between these two by evaluating both the pros and cons.

Ercüment Özkan shared his impressions in the 28th issue of İktibas after a visit to Iran:

We want you to know and delay that what we see and experience through this travel is really pleasing and responsible. It is the impression that Iranian Muslims and Muslims who are invited from various countries of the world have left on us that they are really pursuing an Islamic union and they see the honour uniting in Islam... Let us note that those who tied the future of the regime in Iran to Khomeini's life will be left empty handed... This is because; almost all Iranian Muslims are as dependent on Islam as Khomeini (Selam İle, 1982, p. 2).

According to Özkan, an Islamic revolution which took place in a country that is one of America's most solid allies in the region, such as Shah Iran, is an unexpected event when the world is completely bipolar and everyone thinks that they cannot even breathe without permission from the superpowers. The revolution has attracted the attention of the whole world and has been a light of hope for all oppressed Muslims (Özkan E. , 2010, pp. 286-287).

Süleyman Arslantaş, who has been watching the revolution since the beginning and has visited Iran on several occasions, explained that the speeches and actions of the revolution's leading cadres and especially Khomeini far from the sect have brought indescribable hope. The team of İktibas gathered right after the revolution and discussed what their attitudes towards the revolution should be and what their responsibilities are to a newly established Islamic State as Muslims. Their conclusion was that in the face of such a development that excites Muslims all over the world, it is their responsibility to tell the masses about the revolution in question in the most accurate way and to spread the ideas they find healthy. Therefore; they decided not to postpone the launch of İktibas, which they plan to postpone due to the 1960 Coup D'état (Arslantaş S. , 2013, p. 256). In other words, the main reason that the journal appeared a few months after the coup was the excitement created by the Iranian Revolution and the sense of responsibility that came with it.

In the beginning, there was a decline in the enthusiasm about the Iranian Revolution, which has been met with such great hopes in the journal and is referenced in every number of ways. As a matter of fact, the revolution, which was constantly praised in many aspects in the 80s, started to be defined as a “non-perfect example” in the 90s. According to the journal, a political alertness was observed in Iran, thanks to Khomeini’s prudence. However, traditional culture prevailed, and the principles of faith and deeds could not be shaped according to Quran. This situation constantly pulled down the Iranian Revolution (İdeolojik Kirlilik, 1991). While Ercüment Özkan shared his impressions with his readers in İktibas after the Iranian journey in 1990, and after mentioning the void caused by Khomeini’s death, the poverty of the people, the exaggerated mourning demonstrations organized after the Khomeini, he made the following explanation:

Iran has been said to gain its original dimensions in 20 years after the Revolution... 11 years of the targeted, but 20 years have passed. In other words, the revolution was a student starting to the elementary school and it is about to start to university today through its culture. We do not really know what this culture is... It is necessary to know what is beyond the Persian Gulf like the Persian Gulf in the time of Shah... It is our approval and appreciation that (Khomeini) was the politically prudent and conservative leader of the Revolution, which has increased the beliefs that Muslims in the world can re-live as the state order of Islam... However, we are saddened by the inability to see the same clairvoyance and persistence in religion, in terms of religion and in the Islamic law. I consider him as someone who lives and thinks of religion which comes traditionally from his ancestors with all of his denomination (Özkan E. , 1990, p. 22)

From this quote, we can see that his idealism in the matter of the Islamic State did not condemn İktibas to a romantic discourse and that the journal did not act with the understanding that the arm remains broken.

In fact, the revolution was not expected to be understood by the İktibas team in its early years. Süleyman Arslantaş explained that they stayed there for a month during their first trip to Iran with Ercüment Özkan in 1980, and that they had contact with the public while meeting with senior executives including the prime minister. At that first visit, he depicted the landscape he observed while still smoking on the smoke of the revolution and when the excitement of the Muslims was fresher:

People in Iran are not Shiis since they are Muslims; they are Muslims because they are Shiis. The spruceness of Ali stemmed from being Hossein's father. The spruceness of the Prophet Muhammad also stemmed from being Hussein's grandfather. When you take Hossein out and take it, there is no such thing as Islam... Despite this determination, Khomeini and Muntazirî had a different place. This is because, they both perceived Islam above sects (Arslantaş S. , 2013, p. 257).

This Islamic sensitivity they saw in the leading staff – even though they realized that the public is unprepared on a revolutionary basis – believed that the İktibas team could not ignore the political significance of the Iranian Revolution.

As it can be seen, the opinion of the journal team about Iran was not only based on the press reports. Ercüment Özkan himself went to Iran 6 times, and the leading names of the team also visited Iran. Özkan stayed at least 20 days each time he went, and during this time, he met with ordinary people as well as many senior managers and mullahs. Therefore, most of the findings of both Özkan and the team were based on their own observations. According to the İktibas team, Iran's own people were far from grasping the revolution. Wherever it was located in any corner of the world, it has been a glimmer of hope for all Muslims. Muslims began to feel the presence of a state power behind them and began to rely on themselves by getting strength from there. This situation has created an enormous potential power. However, most of the mullahs behind the Iranian revolution have no claim to return to Islam. Some of them supported the revolution in the face of the possibility that their reputation and some of their financial interests would be compromised (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, pp. 176-179,190). And the revolution was so effective for the Muslim from all around the world, İktibas team felt themselves responsible to emphasize the aspect of the revolution which provides hope for the people. For this reason, they quoted the news that highlights the political stance and success of imperialism, not the religious identity of Iran.

While answering the question “why did not you criticize the first days of the Iranian Revolution and started to criticize it after years?” he said he started to criticize it; however, he did not mention his criticisms in the journal. He explained that the religious situation of Iran in its private environment was too weak to overcome a burden of revolution that increases the expectations of Islam. However, İktibas, which is open to the public, did not find it appropriate to speak those views. It stated that the reason for this is not to break the hope and enthusiasm of Muslims all over the world. While all Western countries were

already pushed Iran, it did not find it right to reveal the deficits of Iran and give them new trump cards (Bircan & Atalar, 1997, pp. 196-198).

According to the İktibas team, Iran has wasted the potential power of Muslims – either consciously or unconsciously – for years since it has not given up from being Shii. The team who consider Khomeini different from other mullahs in terms of awareness and political foresight think that the things are at the loose end after Khomeini. Since the 1990s, Iran started to be handled from a very critical perspective. And the journal has slowly moved away from the Iranian Revolution, which it has already found problematic in Islamic terms.



6. CONCLUSION

İktibas is an anti-violent radical Islamist journal which is also anti-imperialist, anti-Kemalist, anti-democrat, and anti-mystic. One of the most prominent features of the journal is ummahism. This study focused on how ummah and Muslim belonging defined in *İktibas*. The meanings attributed to *ummah*, *us* versus *other* and *Islamic state* by *İktibas* were examined. The findings of the study can be summarized as follows:

İktibas is a ummahist journal. It defines ummah the same as defined in Classical Islamic Thought: Whole Muslims. Besides, the journal embraced the claim that there should be a whole Muslim body under a single religious authority. In other words, *İktibas* takes ummah not only as a social entity, but also a political agent.

İktibas carries all features of pan-Islamist pro-ummah discourse: It is anti-nationalist and opposes to both the idea of nation-state and the current global nation-state system, which is called international system. The journal claims that any Islam-based political organization should find a way out of this system. The idea of ummah represents one of the publishing purposes of *İktibas*. It aims to inform Muslims of Turkey about the positions of the other Muslims on earth so as to solidify Muslim fraternity.

İktibas opposes the pluralist theory derived from the Charter of Medina. It rejects the claim that ummah was a political entity scraped from all religious connotations, in the time of the Prophet Muhammad. This claim suggests that ummah was a special name used for both Muslim and non-Muslim contractors of the Charter of Medina (622 AC); so it refers not to the universal Muslim fraternity, but to the local political frame. It is so obvious that, as analyzed in the main body of this study above, *İktibas* rejects this claim, and blames the claimers for deceiving Muslims in order to integrate them into the system. In the eyes of the journal, charter-based ummah claim is nothing but a project to prevent religious people from tending towards radicalism, which is unacceptable for a conscious Muslim.

Still, according to *İktibas* ummah is political, but not as claimed by charter theorists. Ummah is the political unit which will establish the Islamic State. Therefore, it should not lose its political consciousness by integrating existing systems. It should be awake and should not give up its long term purpose for the of short term socio political benefits.

İktibas slanted towards the idea that current realities should be analyzed within their own dynamics. According to the journal, wise people make grounded assessments and plans,

while others idling around groundless utopic ideals. Since the current reality of the world is the system based on nation-states, it is pointless to deny this system. On the other hand, the ummah reality should not be ignored. So, any effort to transform the current system into an Islamic one, which will advocate the rights of all Muslims regardless of their citizenship, should start from the level of nation-states. Because, for the journal, everyone is responsible his own sphere of influence.

Besides, *İktibas* prioritizes social transformation over political one. Because, according to the journal without raising the awareness of the society, any top down attempt to shape socio-politic area will doom to become obsolete. *İktibas* asserts that starting point of an Islamic transformation should begin with studies on Quran and authentic Sunnah.

***İktibas* depicts ummah's external other not as a group of people, but as a style of thought.** According to *İktibas*, the *other* of ummah (Muslims) is not non-Muslims. It is all of the intellectual, political and ideological systems that prevent Islam from being a holistic lifestyle. Muslimness cannot be a benchmark, from the perspective of the journal; the real benchmark is Islam based on Quran. Even Muslimness should be evaluated under the light of Islamic principles. Therefore, Muslimness cannot also be a benchmark in the determination of *other*. A legitimate *other* can only be determined on principle level. Because of this, *otherization* in *İktibas* occurs on ideological and systemic bases.

For *İktibas*, there are two kinds of *external others*: honest ones and sneaky ones. Communism and Kemalism are the examples of the first. For instance, Kemalism is a loud and clear *external other*. The journal takes Kemalism as an *outer*, because it is not from inside Muslimness. However, *İktibas* appreciates Kemalism's honesty about religion. The journal thinks that it has been an enemy that is easy to take front against, since its nature is clearly evident, non-sneaky. Because of this, Kemalism has not been a real threat for Islam and Muslims. Similarly, communism is also a loud and clear *external other* against which it is easy to oppose. So, it has not been a real threat either.

The real threat arises from sneaky *others*, which seem like friends of *us*; because, Muslims usually cannot notice their true nature. They hide their real face behind fancy words, such as liberty, equality or fraternity. As seen, *İktibas* means initially democracy and the Enlightenment ideology laid behind it. The significant point here, for *İktibas*, the *others* are not the democrats but the democracy itself as both a system and an ideology; because, the ground of democracy is secularism, separation of worldly affairs from religious ones.

However, *İktibas* claims that these two can never be separated in Islam. So, democracy is not compatible with İslam.

İktibas also opposes using democracy as a means to reach the goal of establishing an Islamic state. According to the journal, democracy only makes Muslims integrate into the system. So, Muslims need to be careful about it. They should stay away from it, even it looks like a very efficient tool. This is nothing but a mask for cooptation.

***İktibas* depicts ummah's internal others again not as a group of people, but as a style of thought.** In *İktibas* there are three benchmarks for estimating the group of belonging as well as the *internal other*: Quran, authentic Sunnah and reason. Within the ummah, which is the largest group of belonging, the journal defines its sub-group of belonging as such: the ones who behave in accordance with Quranic principles, check before adopting any so-called hadith narrations whether they are authentic or not, want to provide power for Islam, never integrate into the current systems and even never use non-Islamic means to reach their goal. *İktibas* prescribes to estimate the *internal other* in accordance with two main criteria:

- 1) All kinds of beliefs and thoughts that fall between the Muslim mind and the essence of Islam:

In *İktibas*, all thoughts and practices, which did not exist in the time of the Prophet, are regarded as devastating for Islamic essence. So, they are *internal others* to be removed, including Sufism, mysticism and Greek philosophy.

- 2) Compatibility of the means with the purpose:

According to the journal whatever prayer is performed for, politics is done accordingly. If a Muslim performs his prayer in the as described in Quran and Sunnah for the sake of Allah, he should perform politics as exemplified in Quran and Sunnah for the sake of Allah. In his case, applying any non-Islamic means (even for the sake of Allah) is unacceptable. So, the ones who think that the end justifies the means are *internal others* in the eyes of *İktibas*, since they go against the principles of Islam.

***İktibas* does not have a fully reasoned Islamic state theory.** This, indeed, is the most interesting finding of this study. There are not any well-laid plans about the Islamic state which *İktibas* points out on all occasions as the ultimate goal. It is seen that the journal takes the premises of Classical Islamic Political Thought as they are. Authority, politics, society and even institutional structure is taken from there. One reason for this is related with the journal's primary field of interest. It prefers to deal with what is happening rather than what

should happen. Therefore, it tries to provide solution for the existing problems, not to develop a grounded theory for an unknown future.

The journal approaches to the issue of state and power from a personalist point of view. The main proposition of personalism, which is a different school of thought than individualism, is that personality is the basis of all reality and values. Personalists accept that God is a superior personality. They say that human beings are superior to other creatures in nature, especially animals. According to personalists, only people have free will. Therefore, only people are ontologically real. If we look from the opposite side, the concepts that are assumed by the gathering of people such as society or institutional body of state are not ontologically real; they also have no free will. From this aspect, it can be said that *İktibas* was in favor of personalism; because it bases all its claims about state structure on real persons, rather than institutions. For the journal, institutionalization is a fancy but empty word. The important thing is to raise wise and skillful persons; because, if cadres are strong, then the institutions will be strong.

It should be kept in mind that *İktibas* is neither a philosophical journal nor an academic one. So, it has not prioritized production of thought. It is an actual political journal, which focuses on daily news and conjunctural positionings. Similarly, Ercüment Özkan was not a theorist, but an activist. Despite, this study has tried to reveal the political thought production in the journal; because, both Özkan and *İktibas* has been famous with their ideological challenges. The method Özkan has used can be called as intellectual provocation. The same method has extended each part of *İktibas* from the source choices in quotations to the nature of citations. Özkan and *İktibas* have had many effects on the shape of Contemporary Islamic Thought in Turkey. The importance of the journal sources from this fact. Even so, it should be known that *İktibas* never aimed to create a new and different political theory. It does not involve in philosophical or theological academic debates. Rather it focuses on practical reflections of thoughts and ideas. According to the journal crew, truth is sole, and the important thing is to find this sole truth.

After all, it can be seen that the criticization culture of *İktibas* is very developed. It does not use empty sloganistic statements in order to attract readers. Rather, it makes very

grounded criticisms. It also gives a high importance on being methodical. It has its own methods in nearly every issue. Besides, it receives information, which seems to be accurate, regardless of where it comes from. However, apart from all these, *İktibas* failed to create a ground on which different segments of the society can come together. Even it failed to create ground on which only Muslim segments of the society can come together. *İktibas*'s harsh criticisms have opened a door in front of fundamentalist thought, but since the journal have not supported is criticisms with well-defined solution proposals, the road has blocked at one point.

İktibas could not avoid from statism in the final analysis. Although it claims that it favors community over state, the ultimate goal to be reached is put as an authoritarian governance with unification of power. This demonstrates that the journal contradicts with itself. Nevertheless, it should be considered that this contradiction is related with the incompatibility of the nature of modernity with Islamic God-centered style of thought. The main reason why *İktibas* crew could not be able to produce a well-defined community and state project is the impossibility of this, as Hallaq asserts. An Islamic community and state project that is shaped within the framework of modern perceptions of the modern world is nothing but an oxymoron. However, during an age in which the concept of state was apprehended as if it had been a constant since primordial times, it can be seen as normal not to notice such oxymoronic nature of the subject. So, it is possible to say that *İktibas*'s ummahist community and state project is compatible with the sprit of the era, although it is non-applicable.

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APPENDIX

THE CONSTITUTION OF MEDINA

In the name of God, the Beneficent and the Merciful

(1) This is a prescript of Muhammad (صلى الله عليه وسلم), the Prophet and Messenger of God (to operate) between the faithful and the followers of Islam from among the Quraish and the people of Madina and those who may be under them, may join them and take part in wars in their company.

(2) They shall constitute a separate political unit (Ummat) as distinguished from all the people (of the world).

(3) The emigrants from the Quraish shall be (responsible) for their own ward; and shall pay their blood-money in mutual collaboration and shall secure the release of their own prisoners by paying their ransom from themselves, so that the mutual dealings between the believers be in accordance with the principles of goodness and justice.

(4) And Banu 'Awf shall be responsible for their own ward and shall pay their blood-money in mutual collaboration, and every group shall secure the release of its own prisoners by paying their ransom from themselves so that the dealings between the believers be in accordance with the principles of goodness and justice.

(5) And Banu Al-Harith-ibn-Khazraj shall be responsible for their own ward and shall pay their blood-money in mutual collaboration and every group shall secure the release of its own prisoners by paying their ransom from themselves, so that the dealings between the believers be in accordance with the principles of goodness and justice.

(6) And Banu Sa‘ida shall be responsible for their own ward, and shall pay their blood-money in mutual collaboration and every group shall secure the release of its own prisoners by paying their ransom from themselves, so that the dealings between the believers be in accordance with the principles of goodness and justice.

(7) And Banu Jusham shall be responsible for their own ward and shall pay their blood-money in mutual collaboration and every group shall secure the release of its own prisoners by paying their ransom so that the dealings between the believers be in accordance with the principles of goodness and justice.

(8) And Banu an-Najjar shall be responsible for their own ward and shall pay their blood-money in mutual collaboration and every group shall secure the release of its own prisoners by paying their ransom so that the dealings between the believers be in accordance with the principles of goodness and justice.

(9) And Banu ‘Amr-ibn-‘Awf shall be responsible for their own ward and shall pay their blood-money in mutual collaboration and every group shall secure the release of its own prisoners by paying their ransom, so that the dealings between the believers be in accordance with the principles of goodness and justice.

(10) And Banu-al-Nabit shall be responsible for their own ward and shall pay their blood-money in mutual collaboration and every group shall secure the release of its own prisoners by paying their ransom so that the dealings between the believers be in accordance with the principles of goodness and justice.

(11) And Banu-al-Aws shall be responsible for their own ward and shall pay their blood-money in mutual collaboration and every group shall secure the release of its own prisoners by paying their ransom, so that the dealings between the believers be in accordance with the principles of goodness and justice.

(12) (a) And the believers shall not leave any one, hard-pressed with debts, without affording him some relief, in order that the dealings between the believers be in accordance with the principles of goodness and justice. (b) Also no believer shall enter into a contract of clientage with one who is already in such a contract with another believer.

(13) And the hands of pious believers shall be raised against every such person as rises in rebellion or attempts to acquire anything by force or is guilty of any sin or excess or attempts to spread mischief among the believers ; their hands shall be raised all together against such a person, even if he be a son to any one of them.

(14) And no believer shall kill another believer in retaliation for an unbeliever, nor shall he help an unbeliever against a believer.

(15) And the protection of God is one. The humblest of them (believers) can, by extending his protection to any one, put the obligation on all; and the believers are brothers to one another as against all the people (of the world).

(16) And that those who will obey us among the Jews, will have help and equality. Neither shall they be oppressed nor will any help be given against them.

(17) And the peace of the believers shall be one. If there be any war in the way of God, no believer shall be under any peace (with the enemy) apart from other believers, unless it (this peace) be the same and equally binding on all.

(18) And all those detachments that will fight on our side will be relieved by turns.

(19) And the believers as a body shall take blood vengeance in the way of God.

(20) (a) And undoubtedly pious believers are the best and in the rightest course. (b) And that no associator (non-Muslim subject) shall give any protection to the life and property of a Quraishite, nor shall he come in the way of any believer in this matter.

(21) And if any one intentionally murders a believer, and it is proved, he shall be killed in retaliation, unless the heir of the murdered person be satisfied with blood-money. And all believers shall actually stand for this ordinance and nothing else shall be proper for them to do.

(22) And it shall not be lawful for any one, who has agreed to carry out the provisions laid down in this code and has affixed his faith in God and the Day of Judgment, to give help or protection to any murderer, and if he gives any help or protection to such a person, God's curse and wrath shall be on him on the Day of Resurrection, and no money or compensation shall be accepted from such a person.

(23) And that whenever you differ about anything, refer it to God and to Muhammad (صلى الله عليه وسلم)

(24) And the Jews shall share with the believers the expenses of war so long as they fight in conjunction,

(25) And the Jews of Banu 'Awf shall be considered as one political community (Ummat) along with the believers—for the Jews their religion, and for the Muslims theirs, be one client or patron. He, however, who is guilty of oppression or breach of treaty, shall suffer the resultant trouble as also his family, but no one besides.

(26) And the Jews of Banu-an-Najjar shall have the same rights as the Jews of Banu 'Awf.

(27) And the Jews of Banu-al-Harith shall have the same rights as the Jews of Banu 'Awf.

(28) And the Jews of Banu Sa'ida shall have the same rights as the Jews of Banu 'Awf

(29) And the Jews of Banu Jusham shall have the same rights as the Jews of Banu 'Awf.

(30) And the Jews of Banu al-Aws shall have the same rights as the Jews of Banu 'Awf.

(31) And the Jews of Banu Tha'laba shall have the same rights as the Jews of Banu 'Awf. Of course, whoever is found guilty of oppression or violation of treaty, shall himself suffer the consequent trouble as also his family, but no one besides.

(32) And Jafna, who are a branch of the Tha'laba tribe, shall have the same rights as the mother tribes.

(33) And Banu-ash-Shutaiba shall have the same rights as the Jews of Banu 'Awf; and they shall be faithful to, and not violators of, treaty.

(34) And the mawlas (clients) of Tha'laba shall have the same rights as those of the original members of it.

(35) And the sub-branches of the Jewish tribes shall have the same rights as the mother tribes.

(36) (a) And that none of them shall go out to fight as a soldier of the Muslim army, without the per-mission of Muhammad (صلى الله عليه وسلم). (b) And no obstruction shall be placed in the way of any one's retaliation for beating or injuries; and whoever sheds blood shall be personally responsible for it as well as his family; or else (i.e., any step beyond this) will be of oppression; and God will be with him who will most faithfully follow this code (sahifdh) in action.

(37) (a) And the Jews shall bear the burden of their expenses and the Muslims theirs.

(b) And if any one fights against the people of this code, their (i.e., of the Jews and Muslims) mutual help shall come into operation, and there shall be friendly counsel and sincere behaviour between them; and faithfulness and no breach of covenant.

(38) And the Jews shall be bearing their own expenses so long as they shall be fighting in conjunction with the believers.

(39) And the Valley of Yathrib (Madina) shall be a Haram (sacred place) for the people of this code.

(40) The clients (mawla) shall have the same treatment as the original persons (i.e., persons accepting clientage). He shall neither be harmed nor shall he himself break the covenant.

(41) And no refuge shall be given to any one without the permission of the people of the place (i.e., the refugee shall have no right of giving refuge to others).

(42) And that if any murder or quarrel takes place among the people of this code, from which any trouble may be feared, it shall be referred to God and God's Messenger, Muhammad (صلى الله عليه وسلم); and God will be with him who will be most particular about what is written in this code and act on it most faithfully.

(43) The Quraish shall be given no protection nor shall they who help them.

(44) And they (i.e., Jews and Muslims) shall have each other's help in the event of any one invading Yathrib.

(45) (a) And if they (i.e., the Jews) are invited to any peace, they also shall offer peace and shall be a party to it; and if they invite the believers to some such affairs, it shall be their (Muslims) duty as well to reciprocate the dealings, excepting that any one makes a religious war. (b) On every group shall rest the responsibility of (repulsing) the enemy from the place which faces its part of the city.

(46) And the Jews of the tribe of al-Aws, clients as well as original members, shall have the same rights as the people of this code: and shall behave sincerely and faithfully towards the latter, not perpetrating any breach of covenant. As one shall sow so shall he reap. And God is with him who will most sincerely and faithfully carry out the provisions of this code.

(47) And this prescript shall not be of any avail to any oppressor or breaker of covenant. And one shall have security whether one goes out to a campaign or remains in Madina, or else it will be an oppression and breach of covenant. And God is the Protector of him who performs the obligations with faithfulness and care, as also His Messenger Muhammad (صلى الله عليه وسلم)

Source: Hamidullah, Muhammad (1941). The First Written Constitution of the World. pp. 31–42.

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