EVOLVING SOCIETAL THREAT PERCEPTIONS IN QATAR: TOWARDS AN INCLUSIVE BALADNA CONCEPT

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

CİHAT BATTALOĞLU

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

JANUARY 2025

Approval of the thesis:

EVOLVING SOCIETAL THREAT PERCEPTIONS IN QATAR: TOWARDS AN INCLUSIVE BALADNA CONCEPT

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ABSTRACT

EVOLVING SOCIETAL THREAT PERCEPTIONS IN QATAR: TOWARDS AN INCLUSIVE BALADNA CONCEPT

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January 2025, 233 pages

This dissertation aims to examine the changing societal security perception in Qatar by testing a hypothesis: while migration-induced demographic imbalances and their associated existential threats created societal security concerns in Qatar akin to those in other Gulf States, the 2017 Gulf crisis marked a turning point. The crisis encouraged Qatar to adopt a more inclusive approach to societal security, expanding its core values beyond the traditional tribal framework toward an inclusive vision encapsulated by the term Baladna—a unifying symbol of national pride and collective identity. The dissertation also contributes to the theory of societal security by integrating Qatar's evolving framework into the broader literature. Initially, societal concerns in Qatar were addressed within the context of state or political security, consistent with the Copenhagen School's foundational understanding of security. During the 1990s and 2000s, Qatar's perspective evolved with an emphasis on identity-related threats, focusing on migration and horizontal competition. However, the 2017 Gulf crisis marked a departure from this trajectory. While Qatar's pre-2017 threat perceptions mirrored those of its neighbors, the crisis catalyzed the emergence of a distinct societal security perspective. This new framework, referred

to in this dissertation as Baladna, shifts focus from identity-oriented concerns to encompass life-giving functions and an all-hazards approach, paralleling the ‘New Nordic Understanding of Security’.

Keywords: Societal Security, Qatar, Migration, Demographic Imbalance

ÖZ

KATAR'DA GELİŞEN TOPLUMSAL TEHDİT ALGILARI VE GELİŞEN BALADNA KAVRAMI

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Ocak 2025, 233 sayfa

Bu tez, Katar'da değişen toplumsal güvenlik incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Geçmişte göçün neden olduğu demografik dengesizlikler ve bu dengesizliklerle ilişkili varoluşsal tehditler, Katar'da diğer Körfez ülkelerine benzer toplumsal güvenlik endişeleri yaratmıştır. Ancak, 2017 Körfez Krizi bu duruma bir dönüm noktası olmuştur. Kriz, Katar'ın toplumsal güvenlik konusunda daha kapsayıcı bir yaklaşım benimsemesini teşvik etmiş ve temel değerlerini geleneksel kabile çerçevesinin ötesine taşıyarak, ulusal ve kolektif kimliğin birleştirici bir sembolü olan Baladna (Ülkemiz) terimiyle özetlenen kapsayıcı bir vizyona yöneltmiştir.

Teorik bir çerçevede ele alındığında ise: Başlangıçta Katar'daki toplumsal kaygılar, Kopenhag Okulu'nun ortaya koydugu temel güvenlik anlayışıyla tutarlı bir şekilde, devlet ya da siyasi güvenlik bağlamında ele alınmıştır. Ancak 1990'lı ve 2000'li yıllarda, Katar'ın bu bakış açısı kimlik odaklı tehditlere vurgu yaparak ve göç ile yatay rekabete odaklanarak gelişmiştir. Bununla birlikte, 2017 Körfez Krizi bu yörüngede bir sapmaya neden olmuştur. Katar'ın kriz öncesi tehdit algıları komşularınınkine benzerken, kriz sonrasında Baladna olarak adlandırılan ve "Yeni

İskandinav Güvenlik Anlayışı" ile paralellik gösteren yeni bir toplumsal güvenlik perspektifi ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu çerçeve, kimlik odaklı kaygılardan ziyade hayat veren işlevler ve tüm tehlikeleri kapsayan bir yaklaşımı merkezine almıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Katar, Toplumsal Güvenlik, Göç, Demografik Dengesizlikler

To Aysel Sare and Hicret

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. Dr. Meliha ALTUNIŞIK, for her guidance, support, and encouragement throughout the course of my research.

I am also thankful to Prof. Dr. Mahjoob ZWEIRI and Prof. Dr. Özlem TÜR for their valuable feedback, intellectual contributions, and suggestions, which have enriched this study.

I would also like to thank Assoc. Prof. Dr. Zerrin TORUN and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Zelal ÖZDEMIR for their insightful comments and constructive critiques, which have greatly contributed to the refinement of this research.

Finally, I appreciate the time and effort of all the interviewees who supported my work. Their input has been essential in bringing this research to completion.

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CCI	Creative Cultural Industry
FIFA	International Federation of Association Football
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GLMM	Gulf Labor Markets, Migration, and Population Programme
ILO	International Labor Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
NDS	National Development Strategy
NMOQ	National Museum of Qatar
SESRI	The Social and Economic Survey Research Institute
UAE	United Arab Emirates
US	United States

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The oil boom of the mid-seventies has driven the Gulf States into breath-taking rates of economic development and widespread financial prosperity. This necessitated an extensive workforce that is qualified and high in quantity, which could not be supplied by local sources. This coupled with the political instability and weak economic performance of neighboring countries transformed the GCC region into a labor magnet, and home to the world's largest migrant workers as a proportion of all workers, which stands regionally at 70.4% according to ILO estimates[1].

Therefore, while rapid economic growth has brought widespread financial prosperity to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)[2] (namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Oman and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) states, it has also resulted in a fundamental change in the population in terms of disparities in the size, structure, distribution and profile. Particularly in Qatar, foreigners have started to constitute a majority since late 70s. The non-national population is sized more than half of the population in the majority of the GCC states and more critically in Qatar non-nationals' population has reached to 88% of the total population which is the highest in the GCC region, as shown in Gulf Labor Markets and Migration (GLMM) programs estimates[3]. This reshaping of the population in GCC states due to economically induced migration (demographic imbalance) was largely ignored in the beginning in comparison to military and political threats. The only strategy imposed

[1] ILO global estimates on migrant workers (2013) and Gulf Labour Markets and Migration (GLMM) programme data (latest between 2009 and 2013)

[2] YOUSEF, Tarik M.; GHAFAR, Adel Abdel (ed.). The Gulf Cooperation Council at Forty: Risk and Opportunity in a Changing World. Brookings Institution Press, 2022.

[3] GLMM - Gulf Labour Markets, Migration and Population. (2024). GLMM. https://gulfmigration.grc.net/

to control the demographic proportion during the beginning of the oil era was preferring the Arab workers whose cultural and religious compatibility with the local populations made them more attractive to nationals than other immigrants.

However, the Gulf War (1990-91) initiated a paradigm shift in the Gulf States when monarchies decided to move away from Arab expatriates to workers brought in from Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, who were seen as more docile, reliable, and less politically challenging than Arabs especially the Palestinians[4]. Thus, because of the Gulf War and other regional economic, political, social, ideological, and pragmatic reasons, which will be discussed in the following parts, the Gulf States have started to perceive this demographic change as a threat. As a result, new 'threats' that go beyond the conventional security threats and can be considered as 'societal threats' have become an important challenge for the region.

In 2000s, migrant communities had become a more important phenomenon for the construction of the societal 'existential threats' in the region because demographic imbalances in the Gulf have resulted in nationals becoming a minority; diminishing use of the Arabic language; and the emergence of (self-contained) sub-communities. This in turn has ignited the perception that the *Khaleeji* (Indigenous Arabian Gulf) identity is under threat. While in policy documents or scholarly discussions the concept of societal security was not used explicitly, policy recommendations that demonstrate the perception of demographic shift as a threat became widespread. As a result, in order to control the demographic proportions in balance and to maintain a highly privileged position of the nationals, a number of policies have been imposed such as the sponsorship system, the rotational system of expatriate labor to limit the duration of foreigners' stay, a forceful approach to localization, like the quota system, and curbs on the naturalization and the citizenship rights of those who have been naturalized, among others.

Nevertheless, many of these measures have not brought the expected results. Whether the security threat is real or perceived, demographic imbalances continued to have raised the level of threat perception in the Gulf region. This threat has been

[4] KAPISZEWSKI, Andrzej. Arab versus Asian migrant workers in the GCC countries. In: South Asian migration to gulf countries. Routledge India, 2017. p. 66-90.

stimulated in part the way the issues are portrayed in political and intellectual debates and media coverage. In 2010s, the concept of societal security was employed in the Gulf States with the identity-based approaches associated with the Copenhagen School of security studies and those with a more 'functionalist' and objective view of security. As the following chapters of the dissertation demonstrate in detail, at the intellectual level, while very few scholars, (such as Battaloglu[5]in 2016 and Roberts[6] in 2023) have been employed the concept of societal security, several scholars (Al-Khori, Al-Najjar and Mattar) addressed the demographic imbalances as an existential threat. They have discerned this issue as "an invasion of 'Khaleeji identity' in the Gulf. In the policy level, societal security worked as a narrative and imaginary. Related amendments in political vision promoted in national visions of each Gulf States to identify the risk to Gulf societies and identity.

Until the Gulf crisis of 2017, when neighboring Gulf states-imposed a near-total embargo on air, sea, and land traffic to and from Qatar, effectively isolating Qatar from the rest of the region, the notion of a shared Gulf States identity was still viable. However, with the emergence of the crisis, the perception of threats in the region shifted significantly. In Qatar the concept of societal threats diverged noticeably from that of other Gulf States. In 2017, during the Gulf crisis, Qatar adopted a more inclusive approach, broadening its core societal values beyond the traditional tribal framework toward an inclusive vision embodied by "Baladna". While "Baladna" means "our country" in Arabic language, after the 2017 Gulf Crisis, it represents a unifying symbol of national pride. This concept was used interchangeably with "Qabila Al Qatar" (The Tribe of Qatar), also was envisioned as "Nation as Tribe," drawing on the traditional notion of tribalism and extending it to encompass the entire nation, setting Qatar apart as a unified entity distinct from external 'tribes' or potentially threatening nations[7]. Since the early years of the Gulf Crisis, the term

[5] BATTALOGLU, C. Security Puzzle in the Gulf. New Sectors and New Challenges. The Arms Trade, Military Services and the Security Market in the Gulf States. Trends and Implications. Berlin: Gerlach Press (8–22), 2016.

[6] ROBERTS, David B. Security politics in the Gulf monarchies: continuity amid change. Columbia University Press, 2023.

[7] Aldobashi, Hussein. "Qatar, the Gulf Crisis, and Baladna: An Economic and National Symbol of Resistance." Academia.edu, October 30, 2022.

Baladna has been widely recognized as a popular phrase in Qatar, featured prominently in social media campaigns, public spaces, and government-led initiatives. Baladna was also adopted as the name of one of the country's most iconic national brands, a Qatari dairy producer that transformed the food industry by replacing Saudi and Emirati dairy products with locally produced alternatives. Today, Baladna products are prominently displayed in shops across Doha and have become a unifying symbol for the nation[8].

This new perception of society in Qatar also aligns with the trajectories observed in Nordic countries. Similar to Nordic countries' societal understandings, Qatar initially embraced a classical argument from the Copenhagen School, which viewed migration and demographic imbalances as societal security threats. Over time, Qatar's societal security perception has evolved, mirroring the more recent versions seen in the Nordic countries which involves a shift in societal security's original definition, focusing on the life-giving functions and transnational protection of interdependent infrastructures/all hazards rather than identity-oriented concerns. The protection of the life-giving function has particularly become increasingly crucial, as the blockade, with its significant political and economic implications, fostered a collective sense of vulnerability among residents. This shared concern extended to daily necessities such as food and water security, compounded by emerging threats affecting the entire society. Thus, as it will be discussed in Chapter 5, the post-2017 Gulf Crisis times witnessed a continuous and gradual enhancement in social relations in Qatar. However, it's important to note that these improvements have not been uniform across all demographic groups in the Gulf. Both Qataris and non-Qataris have emerged from the blockade with strengthened social ties and a heightened mutual appreciation within the Qatari community. This is evident in the increased trust between these two groups, as well as a heightened interest among citizens in political engagement and the responsiveness of the state. The crisis in June 2017 also marked an unprecedented unity among citizens and foreign residents in Qatar, as they rallied together in support of their shared homeland. This solidarity persisted despite longstanding reservations among Qataris regarding the size and sociocultural

[8] Aldobashi, Hussein. "Qatar, the Gulf Crisis, and Baladna: An Economic and National Symbol of Resistance." Academia.edu, October 30, 2022.

impacts of the non-national population[9]. Additionally, the blockade has also played a role in fading historical divisions among Qataris which are related to descent, fostering shared symbols and spaces for civic activism, loyalty, and resistance that transcended familial and tribal boundaries. The blockade has also created an opportunity for non-nationals to participate in the socio-political processes by expressing their opinions and engaging in behaviors that might have been considered unusual in the past.

1.1. Objectives and Research Questions

In light of this background, this dissertation aims to test the hypothesis that while migration-induced demographic imbalances and their associated existential threats created societal security concerns in Qatar similar to other Gulf States, the 2017 Gulf crisis marked a turning point for Qatar. In response to the crisis, societal security in Qatar evolved, diverging from that of other Gulf States. Qatar adopted a more inclusive approach, broadening its core societal values beyond the traditional tribal framework toward an inclusive vision, exemplified by the term of *Baladna*.

This thesis also seeks to contribute to the theory of societal security, arguing that the evolution of Qatar's societal security framework can be implemented within the broader literature on societal security. During the early years of state formation, societal issues and related existential threats were primarily addressed under state or political security, aligning with the early stages of the Copenhagen School's understanding of security, as articulated by Barry Buzan[10].

Subsequently, in the aftermath of the Gulf War in the 1990s and throughout the 2000s, Qatar's (as other Gulf States) understanding of societal security expanded, emphasizing identity and threats linked to migration and horizontal competition (as explained in the second chapter). This perspective aligned with Ole Wæver's work

[9] GENGLER, Justin. Society and State in Post-Blockade Qatar: Lessons for the Arab Gulf Region. In: Reflecting on the GCC Crisis. Routledge, 2022. p. 24-41.

[10] BUZAN, Barry. New patterns of global security in the twenty-first century. International affairs, 1991, 67.3: 431-451.

within the Copenhagen School, which highlights the identity related threats and responses in societal security[11].

While Qatar's threat perceptions shared many similarities with other Gulf States up until 2017, the Gulf crisis catalyzed the emergence of a distinct societal security perspective in Qatar. This new perspective, termed Baladna in this thesis, aligns theoretically with the 'New Nordic Understanding of Security', which focuses on life-giving functions and all-hazard approaches[12].

In order to explore this argument and demonstrate the similarities between the evolution of the concept of societal security and Qatar's specific understanding of societal security, this dissertation is continued by elucidating the theoretical foundation of the societal security and then analyze the existential threats, to present a bases to understand the evolving societal security understanding in the Gulf States and Qatar more particular. Afterward, it presents the shifting threat perception regarding societal issues in the Gulf, focusing specifically on Qatar as a distinct case. To illustrate the changes pre and post the blockade with a milestone year of 2017, the dissertation delves into the matter of demographic imbalances in the Gulf and how they are perceived as societal security threats on various levels—namely, at the state, intellectual, and societal levels before 2017. Following this, subsequent sections examine how and why the perception of threats and conceptualizations of societal security transformed during the 2017 Gulf Crisis, with a particular emphasis on Qatar. The questions posed in this chapter will be addressed by considering the Nordic definition of societal security. In that regard, this dissertation aims to answer the following research questions:

RQ1: Why and how has the migration led demographic imbalances emerged in the Gulf, more specifically in Qatar?

1.1: What kind of existential threats have appeared with the high rate of migration and demographic imbalances?

[11] WAEVER, Ole. Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe. 1993.

[12] LARSSON, Sebastian; RHINARD, Mark. Nordic societal security: Convergence and divergence. Taylor & Francis, 2021.

RQ2: How has the migration led demographic imbalances been perceived as a societal security threat at different levels before the 2017 blockade in Qatar and the Gulf.

2.1: State level: Mapping out the migration led demographic imbalances related policies

2.2: Societal level: Mapping out the regular people's opinions by using the data collected in 2016.

RQ3: How and why has the referent object and threat perception towards non-nationals evolved in Qatar after the 2017 Crisis?

3.1: The new social ties have been established after 2017

3.2: The Changing Trends at the State Level

3.3: Societal Level Perceptions towards Non-Qataris

1.2. Case Selection: Why does the case of Qatar matter?

In the Gulf countries security has come to be organized around a rather holistic conceptualization of what constitutes a threat as well as the range of governmental responsibilities required to address them. Over the last years, a shift in discourses and practices related to traditional security understanding to notions of 'societal security', 'comprehensive security, public safety and security' has been observed. These framings change in security understanding happen because of not only changing regional politics, but also alterations in domestic politics led by modernization, demographic changes and even migration.

The Gulf region is a prime area where migration leads to main demographic changes. As it is discussed in this dissertation, over the last decades the shift in demographic changes have forced the Gulf governments to adopt expanded security concepts. Yet, the discussions in the academic field are still concentrated around traditional conceptualizations of security. The gap between research and practice also lacks academic attention to new sectors of security paves the way for investigating how widespread the notions of societal security are in the Gulf region.

While the dissertation is headed by considering the Gulf region as a single unit, there is an awareness on the considerable conceptual divergence in the Gulf region related to the notion of societal security. The Gulf Countries have adopted some variant of the notion due to the degree of institutionalization which differs dramatically, from a strong take-up in Kuwait, UAE and Qatar to a marginal adoption in Bahrain, to almost no formal adoption in Saudi Arabia. New security concepts are, thus, less revolutionary, and more evolutionary in many countries.

Alongside with the level of institutionalization, the key difference for each country is also linked to the level of exposure to the migration and demographic proportions. According to the most recent available data published by GLMM, 48% of the total population of GCC states is composed of non-national but the composition of non-national population is the most dramatic in Qatar where the non-national population is sized 88% of the total population[13]. Thus, while migration and demographic trajectories are diverse in each country, because of the largest number of non-national composition, the threat of societal security is getting more critical in Qatar. As it is discussed in the upcoming chapters in more detail, Qatar has also followed different historical path especially with the 2017 Gulf Crisis when it is approaching and managing the migration and demographic imbalances, and consequently societal security. Qatar transitioned from an identity-oriented approach to a more inclusive perspective.

1.3. Research Methodology

This research employs qualitative research methods. The ontological approach is largely constructivist because instead of what societal security 'is', then how certain approaches are 'made possible' as well as what they 'do' are investigated. The epistemological base of this qualitative research thus lies in the 'interpretivist approach', allowing the empirical material to reveal patterns in unexpected ways. In qualitative research, there are wide range of data collection methods. Among those, this dissertation uses secondary data analysis, discourse analysis, and personal interviews.

[13] GLMM - Gulf Labour Markets, Migration and Population. (2024). GLMM. https://gulfmigration.grc.net/

First, this study examines a wide range of literature, covering migration, security and more specifically societal security related studies. These sources include (but not be limited to): books; academic articles; official speeches; legal texts; journal or magazine articles; local newspapers; and reports and documents from think tanks. Surveys and datasets conducted and collected by different institutions are also utilized. In this regard, the data obtained from surveys conducted by SESRI Qatar University is analyzed for the case of Qatar.

A discourse analysis in qualitative research, which involves systematically examining speeches to uncover meaning, structure, and context, is also be utilized to strengthen the findings of this dissertation. In this regard, a close examination of the speeches delivered by the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani, since he assumed leadership in 2013, is conducted. The analysis focuses on the evolving trends in his speeches, particularly his addresses at the annual openings of the Shura (Advisory) Council. These speeches were specifically selected as they are delivered yearly and serve as a platform for the Emir to address all residents of Qatar. In these speeches, the Emir evaluates the achievements of the previous year and announces plans for the year ahead. Accordingly, his Shura Council speeches from 2013 to 2024 are analyzed.

Alongside secondary data and discourse analysis, personal interviews are also conducted for the collection of qualitative data. Interviews are necessary in this research because of the number of aspects missing from the current literature on the subject at hand. For the interviews, the snowballing non-probability purposive sampling is used. Interviews are conducted with 11 experts (shows in below table) from Qatari institutions which is tasked for the implementations of culture related targets of National Development Strategies. The institutions are namely Ministry of Culture, Qatar Museums Authority, Years of Culture Program, Qatar National Committee to UNESCO, Creative Hubs, National Museum of Qatar[14] and Qatar University as an educational institute. All interviews were conducted in English,

[14] Qatar second national development strategy 2018- 2022. (2018) p.263. https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/knowledge/Documents/NDS2Final.pdf

either face-to-face or via online calls. Notes were taken in accordance with the preferences of the participants.

Table 1. 1. List of Interviewees Who Participated in the Interviews for This Thesis

1. Sheikh Abdulaziz Al Thani	Director	National Museum of Qatar
2. Sheikha Shaikha J. Al Thani	Creative Industry Researcher	Creative-Cultural Industry Working Group-Creative Hubs
3. Dr. Amr Al Azm	Professor	Qatar University
4. Dr. *Amna Abdulla Al Sadiq*	Lecturer	Qatar University
5. Maha Al Shabani	Content Coordinator	Years of Culture Program
6. Abdulrahman A. Al Korbi	Government Affairs Coordinator	Qatar Museums Authority
7. Nada Al Mahasna	Information Management Coordinator	Qatar Museums Authority
8. Fatima ***	The full names and positions have been removed at the request of the interviewees.	Ministry of Culture
9. Roudha ***		Qatar National Committee
10. Shaikha ***		Qatar University
11. Saeed ***		Ministry of Culture

To support the arguments derived from various sources, this dissertation also incorporates observations, materials, and visuals from the National Museum of Qatar (NMoQ). The NMOQ, operating under Qatar Museums, was established to strengthen identity and present a narrative of national identity and society's response to this narrative. Specifically, 89 interview transcripts, presented in Gallery 11 and conducted in 2018 and 2019, were obtained and analyzed. These interviews, accessed with special permission from the NMoQ for this dissertation , explored participants' perceptions of Qatar and its future.

1.4. Literature Review

There are a number of studies in the literature on the military and political security perspectives of the GCC states. Recently there have been more commentaries concerning the potential direct and indirect effects of migration over the Gulf

countries. Nonetheless, the literature on the migration and demographic imbalances evaluated under the theorical framework of societal security is virtually non-existent. When it comes to the case of Qatar, there is virtually no studies which examine the migration led demographic imbalances under the conceptualization of societal security theory. On the other side, the analysis on the identity of the Gulf States and Qatar show that the discussions mostly centered around the concept of Gulf identity, commonly referred to as Khaliji identity in the literature. In the context of Qatar, identity-related discussions have primarily focused on the construction of national identity among Qataris. More contemporary studies have explored the impact of national identity building in relation to the FIFA World Cup. However, only a limited number of studies have examined national identity construction during the 2017 Gulf crisis, and almost none have analyzed the inclusion of expatriates in the national identity building process and through the concept of societal security.

Against this backdrop, the literature review first takes a snapshot of the literature on the Gulf Security in general. In that part, this review presents a snapshot on a select group of writers who represent a cross-section of (neo/) realist and more contemporary security perspectives. Then, the review presents the relevant literature on migration, demographic imbalances and societal related literature which can form the basis for the societal security analysis. Following this part there will be a discussion on identity and national identity building in the Gulf with a specific focus to Qatar. The review also highlights the gaps in the related literature to create a base for the scope of the dissertation and to identify the expected contribution.

1.4.1. Literature on Gulf Security

The security of Gulf has been mostly theorized with a realist point of view. Particularly after the Gulf wars, the realist and neo-realist perspectives have dominated the security literature. The Gulf Security was analyzed by the scholars who focus on state entities as unitary actors, also regionally a power-balancing between Iran, Iraq and the other Arab countries[15]. In the (neo/) realist literature,

15 HAZBUN, Waleed. US Policy and the Geopolitics of Insecurity in the Arab World. *Geopolitics*, 2010, 15.2: 239-262.

priority has been given to present actual and potential security challenges, usually defined as conventional military threats from external powers. One of the good examples heavily based on the realist assumption is the Cordesman's book is the *Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability* which depicts the security issues in the Gulf by using power metrics including military capabilities, size, and population[16]. Cordesman with contribution of Al-Rodan also published a number of volumes to present the periodical assessment to compare the military capacities of the GCC countries with Iran to show how Iran was achieving defense self-sufficiency unlike to GCC states which remained dependent for the support of other powers particularly US[17]. Joseph Kostiner[18]and John Duke Anthony[19] also analyzed the security issues in the Gulf by using a similar realist account which presents the collective defense arrangement in the Gulf particularly developed after the Iraqi invasion to Kuwait. In his book chapter titled "The Search for Gulf Security: The Politics of Collective Defense", Kostiner discussed the conventional threats which occupy an important place in realist literature to present the reason why small GCC states, i.e. Bahrain, Kuwait preferred to sign bilateral agreements with US and UK, instead of looking towards closer cooperation within the GCC[20]. The conventional threats and power relations in the Gulf were also depicted by David Priess who built his argument on neo-realist account[21]. According to Priess, the security architecture in the Gulf was manufactured on the state's reactions to the level of threat which induced balance of threat-based policies instead of balance of power[22]. In that regard, Priess argues that

[16] Anthony H. Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability. Boulder, CO: Westview,1984.

[17] Anthony H.Cordesman, and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan. Gulf military forces in an era of asymmetric wars. (London:Greenwood Publishing Group), 2007

[18] Joseph Kostiner, "The Search for Gulf Security: The Politics of Collective Defense", Middle East Contemporary Survey, 16 (1992).

[19] John Duke Anthony, "The Persian Gulf in Regional and International Politics: The Arab Side of the Gulf", in Hossein Amirsadeghi (ed.), The Security of the Persian Gulf (London: Croom Helm, 1981), pp. 174–175.

[20] Joseph Kostiner, "The Search for Gulf Security: The Politics of Collective Defense", Middle East Contemporary Survey, 16 (1992).

[21]David Priess, "Balance-of-Threat Theory and the Genesis of the Gulf Cooperation Council", Security Studies, 5 (Summer 1996)

[22] Ibid.

because of the common threat perceptions mostly coming from Iran, the Gulf states set their rivalries down in and established the GCC to protect them from the direct and proximate threat from Iran[23].

Some studies have paid more attention to the process of internationalization, role of external powers, regional security architecture and their impacts over the Gulf region. The most of them identified the Gulf security by using the analysis on the British-Gulf and more recently US-GCC security arrangements. Among those studies, Peterson[24] and Saikal[25] identified the strong involvement of the US in regional security as a powerful deterrent to the expansionist ambitions of the two big powers of the region. For some scholars, the dependence of GCC to the military assistance of US was framed as a Rentier militarism in which Hertog[26] identified this term as the choice of regime elites to build up an 'army to watch the army' to reduce the risks of a military takeover - likely as a reaction to a number of coups planned in the 1960s and 1970s - as well as an instrument of patronage, whereby different security institutions are created to balance the ambitions of different factions within the ruling families[27].

While the realist and neo-realist approaches have dominated the security studies in the Gulf, some studies have also focused on the cognitive and discursive approaches when analyzing the security of the Gulf. In that regard, alongside the state centric balance of threat perceptions, the scholars explored how and by whom threats are constructed. For example, in his well-known book 'The International Relations of the Persian Gulf', Gause[28] described competing ideologies and trans-border threats

[23] David Priess, "Balance-of-Threat Theory and the Genesis of the Gulf Cooperation Council", Security Studies, 5 (Summer 1996)

[24] J.E. Peterson. Defending Arabia. (London: Croom Helm) 1986

[25] Amin Saikal. "The United States and Persian Gulf Security." World Policy Journal, vol. 9, no. 3, 1992, pp. 515–531

[26] Steffen Hertog. "Rentier militaries in the Gulf states: the price of coup-proofing." International Journal of Middle East Studies, 43 (3), 2011: pp. 400-402

[27] BIANCO, Cinzia; STANSFIELD, Gareth. The intra-GCC crises: mapping GCC fragmentation after 2011. International Affairs, 2018, 94.3: 613-635

[28] Gause. The International Relations of the Persian Gulf.

which emerged in the Arab region because of the multitude of trans-border identities – ethnic, sectarian, tribal, ideological – that connect people from different countries and can be easily exploited to spread any given ideology. Similarly, Barnett[29] underlined the importance of trans-national identities and ideological powers which make many Arab States insecure and vulnerable to external power influence. According to Barnett, Ideologies like pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism, especially when implying political unification to safeguard the common Arab or Muslim interests, undermined the GCC states' sovereignty[30].

While the traditional ideologies such as Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism have lost their popularity particularly after the Arab Spring, the politicization of sectarian ties has created a new dichotomy and a new security dilemma in the Gulf region. In that regard, Legrenzi argued that considering the disequilibrium of societies in Middle Eastern states, the Arab Spring has brought to the surface an identity split between states and their regime, and an absolute divergence of interests between regime and society with the latter becoming a threat to the former[31]. As proclaimed by Legrenzi, the sectarian-led divisions between the regimes and society changed not only the domestic dynamics, but also the regional dynamics where Iran feeds societal fragmentation which creates new ideological and identical threats for the Gulf states[32]. Distinctively, Gregory Gause presented sectarianism as a tool of power politics that Gulf regimes employ to balance against both domestic and foreign threats: a part of a game for regional influence that he calls the Middle East New Cold War, rather than a century-long inevitable religious dispute[33]. According to Gause, anti-Shi'a mobilization can be defined as a tool to get the support of the domestic population in GCC states around the anti-Iranian foreign policy[34].

[29] Michael Barnett, "Institutions, Roles and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System," International Studies Quarterly, 37, no. 3 (1993): 271–296.

[30] Michael Barnett, "Institutions, Roles and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System," 1993.

[31] Matteo Legrenzi (ed.). Security in the Gulf: Historical Legacies and Future Prospects (London: Routledge, 2013).

[32] Matteo Legrenzi," The Gulf's Escalating Sectarianism" POMEPS Brief #28, 5 January 2016,

[33] Gregory Gause, "Beyond Sectarianism: The New Middle East Cold War", Report, Brookings Institution, 22 July 2014

[34] Ibid.

Alongside with cognitive and discursive approaches, some scholars such as Potter[35] and Ehteshami[36] have enlarged the perspectives on the Gulf Security, in which the questions were changed from "what, how and by whom" to "security for whom". In that regard, Ehteshami and Wright widened the security perspective in the Gulf and focused on non-state actors and internal dynamics and domestic political challenges, such as the demands for greater popular participation voiced in most of the Arab Gulf states[37]. Economic security has also been discussed by the scholars who focused on security for whom. As the earliest example of them is the book chapter written by the Gregory Gause, titled "The Political Economy of National Security in the GCC States" where he recognized the economic difficulties as a security issue that accompanied the stagnation of world oil prices after the Gulf war[38].

Post- Arab Spring literature broaden the notions of threat and evaluated the Gulf security from a wider perspective. One of the best examples of these pieces can be the Ulrichsen's book of *Insecure Gulf* which adopted the constructivist approach for the analysis on the Gulf Security. According to him, Gulf security is evolving as internal political and socioeconomic changes in the Gulf states interact with the processes of globalization, and that stability in the GCC countries is threatened not only by the conventional "hard security" threats but also by so-called "soft security" challenges to human security[39]. When discussing the soft security concepts, Ulrichsen underlines the future depletion of energy resources which carry potential risks of eroding internal consensus in the oil rent GCC states[40].

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[35] Lawrence Potter, and Gary G. Sick. Security in the Persian Gulf: origins, obstacles, and the search for consensus. (New York: Macmillan), 2002

[36] Anoushiravan Ehteshami. Dynamics of change in the Persian Gulf: political economy, war and revolution. (London: Routledge), 2013.

[37] Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Steven M. Wright, (eds.) Reform in the Middle East oil monarchies. (New York: Ithaca), 2008.

[38] Gregory Gause, "The Political Economy of National Security in the GCC States", in Gary G. Sick and Lawrence G. Potter (eds), The Persian Gulf at the Millennium (New York: St Martin's, 1997)

[39] Kristian C. Ulrichsen, Insecure Gulf: the End of Certainty and the Transition to the Post-Oil Era. (New York: Columbia University Press), 2011.

[40] Ibid.

1.4.2. Demographic imbalances, Migration and Societal Security in the Gulf

In the reviewed literature, there are very few studies, such as *Security Puzzle in the Gulf: New Sectors and New Challenges*[41], that evaluates the Gulf security by implementing Copenhagen school's conceptualization of societal security. Nonetheless, the concept of societal security has mostly been used implicitly by many other scholars. In that regard, some scholars addressed the demographic imbalances as a security threat. Yet, they have discerned this issue as an invasion of the common principles in the Gulf. Al-Khouri, for example, argues, "They (nationals) are now national minorities and instigated to see this diversity as a threat to their traditional constituents, in which fear of cultural assimilation and insecurity about the future of their identity has led to sources of public debate"[42]. In the same vein, Al-Najjar notes,

> *The growing number of foreigners can be considered a socio- politic threat as well as an identity and cultural one. If the migration ballooning continues to rise in the GCC states, new international norms, pacts, and laws will start to force the Gulf countries to provide some rights to the expatriates which had been denied in the past. This would expand the political, cultural and economic realm to create equality between expatriates and native citizens, leading (it is feared) to the political domination of expatriates as well*[43].

Forstenlechner and Rutledge also marked the demographic imbalances as a socio-political risk in the region[44]. According to them, the shrinking indigenous population happens to be a socially sensitive topic and one of the greatest political challenges in the Gulf monarchies until today accompanied by loud waves of nationalism[45].

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[41] BATTALOGLU, C. Security Puzzle in the Gulf. New Sectors and New Challenges. The Arms Trade, Military Services and the Security Market in the Gulf States. Trends and Implications. Berlin: Gerlach Press (8–22), 2016.

[42] Warnings of the threat to the Arabic tongue and Identity". (Arabic reference). Al-Watan, last accessed on July, 11th, 2017 from http://www.alwatan.com.sa/Sports/News_Detail.aspx?ArticleID=144917&CategoryID=6

[43] ALNAJJAR, Baqr. Foreign Labor and Questions of Identity in the Arabian Gulf. Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies, 2013:13.

[44] FORSTENLECHNER, Ingo; RUTLEDGE, Emilie Jane. The GCC's "demographic imbalance": Perceptions, realities and policy options. Middle East Policy, 2011, 18.4: 25-43.

[45] Ibid.

While very few studies have placed the demographic and migration trends into a conceptualization of societal security, for majority of the scholars, the notion of demographic changes and migration flow has been examined by focusing on social and geographical analysis instead of societal. Among them, Birks and Sinclair[46], Beauge and Sader[47], Fargues[48], Kamrava and Babar[49] and Al-Shehabi [50] presented the analysis on the changes in the demography and nationality composition under the term of "desert miracle". In this group of literature, the main discussion has been placed into Asianization of the labor migration driven by political development in the region in the aftermath of the Gulf War and an almost unlimited supply of low-wage workers in South and Southeast Asia.

Moreover, some scholars presented an analysis on the societal impact of migration. However, they mostly ignore the impact of huge migration flow over the Gulf States, instead, they examined the situation of migrant community and their country of origin. This group of scholars (i.e. Gardner[51]; Rajan and Saxena[52]) presented the case studies to zoom out the trends connected with the chosen foreign national and ethnic groups as a case study and trace diverse variables such as their motive, occupation, status or living conditions. These topics are still a popular subject of the research, studied on large communities of expatriate Indians, Filipinos, Nepalis, Bangladeshis, Pakistanis and many other national and ethnic groups working across the Gulf as laborers, drivers, nurses or domestic workers. Authors often employ ethnographic and sociological methods concentrating their analyses in the destination country. The

[46] BIRKS, John S.; SECCOMBE, Ian J.; SINCLAIR, Clive A. Labour migration in the Arab Gulf states: patterns, trends and prospects. International Migration, 1988, 26.3: 267-286.

[47] BEAUGE, Gilbert; SADER, Makram. The pattern of employment, migration and labour in the Gulf countries. Population bulletin of ECWA, 1981, 21: 85-103.

[48] FARGUES, Philippe. Immigration without inclusion: Non-nationals in nation-building in the Gulf States. Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, 2011, 20.3-4: 273-292.

[49] KAMRAVA, Mehran. Migrant labor in the Persian Gulf. London: Hurst, 2012.

[50] AlShehabi, Omar. "Histories of Migration to the Gulf." In Transit States: Labour, Migration and Citizenship in the Gulf, edited by Omar AlShehabi, Abdulhadi Khalaf, and Adam Hanieh, 3–38. Pluto Press, 2015. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt183p1j8.5.

[51] GARDNER, Andrew M. Gulf migration and the family. Journal of Arabian Studies, 2011, 1.1: 3-25.

[52] RAJAN, S. Irudaya; SAXENA, Prem (ed.). *India's Low-Skilled Migration to the Middle East: Policies, Politics and Challenges*. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.

legal status of the migrant community has also been analyzed by many studies where mostly discussed limited rights and access to social services, segregated residential distribution, family reunification restrictions and strong dependence on the visa sponsor of migrant community. More recently, the societal impact of the huge migration flow to the Gulf have been discussed with specific focus on the second generation of migrants. In case of second-generation migrants living in the Gulf countries, the main discussion has been around the integration and societal problems of these people because of unachievable citizenship across generations. According to scholars Ali[53] and Muslu[54], current policies and system of sponsorship practically eliminate any debate on their possible citizenship, integration, and formal participation in national belonging for foreigners.

Recent studies have increasingly examined the effects of a newer wave of immigration marked by an influx of skilled and highly skilled professionals. While the Gulf states initially attracted predominantly low-skilled workers during the early years of labor migration, the proportion of skilled and highly skilled professionals began to rise significantly, especially after the 1990s. This shift has expanded the scope of analysis from demographic patterns to the broader societal impacts of migration, including its influence on language, education, and cultural dynamics. In this context, Khawla Matar highlights the emergence of new international pressures advocating for civic and political rights for expatriates, driven by the growing presence of skilled Western migrants in the Gulf [55]. Baqer Al Najjar further emphasizes that the trend led by the movement of skilled expats has introduced complex discussions in the Gulf such as the rights of foreign families, the acquisition of nationality, and property ownership, reshaping the discourse around migration in the region[56].

[53] ALI, Syed. Going and coming and going again: Second-generation migrants in Dubai. *Mobilities*, 2011, 6.4: 553-568.

[54] MUSLU, Hazal. MIGRANTS'IDENTITY: A STUDY OF SECOND-GENERATION MIGRANT LABOR IN QATAR. 2015. Master's Thesis.

[55] Matar, K. "The Attempts to Do Away with Reliance on Migrant Labor in the Gulf Region." Emirates Center for Research and Strategic Studies. 34.

[56] ALNAJJAR, Baqr. Foreign Labor and Questions of Identity in the Arabian Gulf. Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies, 2013.

Furthermore, some scholars have also interlinked migration, demographic changes, and political survival in the Gulf. Among them, Davidson[57] defined the high number of foreign labor forces in the Gulf as the bargaining power of the regime, as long as this labor remains temporary and politically silent. Forstenlechner and Rutledge[58] also identified the demographic imbalances as a part of the political system in the Gulf. According to them, Gulf monarchs and their policies require complete political control in exchange for a leisure life where the demographic imbalance represents an economic necessity[59]. The authors also identified the nationalizing policies as a part of social contract in the region. Considering nationalization policies which intend to gradually replace foreign labor in both public and private sectors with nationals (further known as processes and tools of so called Bahrainization, Emiratization, Saudization, Qatarization, Kuwaitization and Omanization). Forstenlechner and Rutledge claim that in the core of these policies lays the urgency of transforming "what they call a social contract between the generous giving state and receiving citizens into something else than an endless distribution of wealth and public-sector jobs"[60].

The reviewed literature demonstrates that most of the existing literature on the Gulf Security has been centered on the traditional realist accounts which discussed either the regional rivalry or security cooperation between the US and the Gulf States. This literature is also prioritized exogenous and conventional hard security threats. While some scholars broadened the security of the Gulf by discussing soft security threats and blurred the distinction between exogenous and endogenous threats, the attention was mostly given to the ideological factors in that part of the literature.

Moreover, there is an emerging literature focusing on the non-traditional security. Nonetheless, this literature revolves around economic and political spheres when

[57] DAVIDSON, Christopher. *After the Sheikhs: the coming collapse of the Gulf monarchies*. Hurst, 2013.

[58] FORSTENLECHNER, Ingo; RUTLEDGE, Emilie Jane. The GCC's "demographic imbalance": Perceptions, realities and policy options. Middle East Policy, 2011, 18.4: 25-43.

[59] Ibid.

[60] FORSTENLECHNER, Ingo; RUTLEDGE, Emilie Jane. The GCC's "demographic imbalance": Perceptions, realities and policy options. Middle East Policy, 2011, 18.4: 25-43.

identifying the new threats and their referent objects. Environmental issues are also included, especially when discussing the water or food security in the region. The societal security has largely been overlooked or ignored. In the literature emerging in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the analysis on the societal level have been popular in Gulf literature. Nonetheless, instead of societal as a security issue, the term societal is used to define the public who demands new political rights or the social which analyzed under socio-economic inequality.

The migration led demographic trends have also been presented in examined literature. Nonetheless, it is neglected to explore the how migration have been perceived as societal security issue as well as how those issues are governed in practice in the Gulf context, the case of Qatar is almost non-existed. More critically, most of the studies are dominated by debates on criticizing the Gulf states because of their migration management and they presented the impact over migrant community. Nevertheless, very limited literature discussed the impact of migration flow and demographic imbalances over the Gulf States despite their theoretical weaknesses. Furthermore, efforts to account for the dynamics of the new security environment in the societal level are rare and the evidence that has been brought forward often is uneven and contested.

Most analyses seem to ignore the relationship between societal threats, their impacts over the Gulf states and the responses at multiple levels. The literature is also limited in that primarily it relies on secondary documentary data rather than on empirical data. More critically, this literature does not provide a strong conceptual framework for the demographic changes and remarkable migration flow in the Gulf region. A specific theory such as ‘societal security’, therefore, can be a useful tool to understand the process better. It is crucial to highlight here that, although the upcoming chapters rely heavily on societal security as the primary theoretical framework, the term "securitization" intentionally assumes a peripheral role in theoretical discussions, without becoming the central focus. As discussed in the following theory chapter, this dissertation emphasizes the importance of ‘security’ over ‘securitization’, specifically concentrating on the cause-and-effect relationship between societal security perceptions and demographic imbalances in the Gulf. The

emphasis is on unraveling the impact of societal security perceptions rather than delving into the detailed process of securitization, ranging from the speech act to the identification of a securitized threat. Furthermore, the term or nature of 'the speech act' in the societal security issue in the Gulf is not also examined. Instead, this dissertation chooses to explore perceptions towards the migrant community or non-nationals using discourse analysis as the selected methodological approach. This nuanced exploration aims to present the discourses of both nationals and non-nationals independently, rather than solely focusing on how they interact to shape these discourses. This approach is taken to demonstrate the dynamics surrounding societal security and its implications for demographic imbalances in the Gulf region.

1.4.3. The Literature on Gulf States Identity and National Identity in Qatar

When it comes the literature of identity in the Gulf and in Qatar more specific, it is possible to talk about diverse identities which are fluid and transcends across political boundaries. During the early years of state formation in the Gulf, discussions on identity were largely absent from Gulf-related literature. However, since the 1990s, Gulf identity and the identity of Arab Gulf states have gained prominence in academic discourse. In the 1990s, Gulf identity was primarily examined within the framework of rentier state theories, with oil-rich states identified as the key regulators of identity in the region. These states were perceived as mechanisms that shaped social relations through a top-down approach. Additionally, the concept of state identity, often characterized by authoritarianism and notions of oriental despotism, emerged as a central theme in studies of Gulf identity which also impacted the social relations during this period[61].

There is no doubt that since the early years of state-building and the establishment of societal dynamics, migration, the large influx of foreign workers, demographic changes, and the influence of international actors have been pivotal in shaping Gulf society and identity. These factors became more prominent in Gulf literature in the 2000s, which also explored how massive oil wealth, rapid economic growth, and

[61] AL-ZOBY, Mazhar A.; BASKAN, Birol (ed.). State-society relations in the Arab Gulf States. Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2014.

high living standards have significantly influenced the construction of Gulf identity[62].

As highlighted by scholars such as Abdulkhaleq Abdulla[63] and Baqer Al Najjar[64], the state formation process plays a crucial role in understanding the construction of Gulf identity. To comprehend Gulf identity, it is equally important to examine the historical trajectory starting from British withdrawal and the following independence process of Gulf states. Since, unlike many states that build their identity through independence wars, struggles against enemies, or self-determination processes, the Gulf states and their societies have taken a different path in shaping their identity. They "have never experienced a revolution or national moment such as a war of unification or independence that would mobilize strategic parts of the population around a common ideological vision"[65]. In that regard, N. H. Battaloglu argued that "in the GCC the national-identity formation is being 'inward-facing' chauvinism, that is the tendency of not constructing national identity in hostility toward an external neighbor, but rather against the inflow of large number of foreign workers who are perceived as threats to local culture and identity[66]."

While the unique state formation has shaped the identity in the Gulf under the impact of traditional societal and tribal boundaries, the Gulf states has also experienced the rise to both sub-state and supra-state identities among the populace during the state building process[67]. In this regard, while the Gulf states sought to establish unique Arab Gulf identities during the independence process, distinct from the dominant

[62] ABDULLA, Abdulkhaleq. Contemporary socio-political issues of the Arab Gulf moment. 2010.

[63]Ibid..

[64] AL-NAJJAR, Baqer Salman. Civil society in the Arab world: a reality that needs reforming. *Contemporary Arab Affairs*, 2008, 1.1: 43-54.

[65] HERTOG, Steffen. The oil-driven nation-building of the Gulf states after the Second World War. The emergence of the Gulf states: Studies in modern history, 2016: 3.

[66] Battaloglu, Nesibe Hicret. "Shaping and Influencing Identity: International Determinants of the Identity Formation in the Arab Gulf States." Fifth Round Gulf Studies Forum, December 1, 2018.

[67] Raymond Hinnebusch, "The Politics of Identity In Middle East International Relations" in *International Relations of the Middle East,* ed. Louise Fawcett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 156.

identities in the broader Arab region, they were largely unsuccessful [68]. This has made defining a cohesive Gulf identity more challenging and has rendered it a subject of debate in literature. When discussing Gulf states' identity, it is challenging to define it strictly within explicit state boundaries. This identity transcends physical borders and encompasses various elements, including tribal relations and demographic imbalances resulting from a significant migrant population.

Although it is not easy to define the identity of the Gulf states, the literature highlights certain commonalities that characterize Gulf state identity. These include an identity, shaped by a regime- led, top-down policies[69], primarily shaped by the redistribution of revenues from rich hydrocarbon resources and tribalism affiliations influenced by Islamic elements and some commonalities with other Arab States. In this context, as discussed by many scholars, the role of rulers and ruling families has been a significant factor in shaping Gulf identity. According to Neil Patrick,

> *By the time of independent statehood most occupants of these lands (Gulf States) had developed identification with both the ruling sheikh and the territory of over which he sought authority, therefore placing the ruling family at the heart of the emergent state-building project. This developing awareness of belonging to a defined physical territory under a local leadership created nascent nations, albeit nations whose identity was problematically bound up with one family*[70].

Alongside regime-led identity formations, tribalism and tribal affiliations have also been prominent themes in the literature on Gulf identity. Some scholars argue that tribalism can be identified as the backbone of Gulf states' identity. Al Kuwari, for instance, suggests that tribalism in the Gulf as a component of identity represents a modern reinterpretation of the past and traditions, shaped by the emerging dynamics of the post-oil era[71]. Zarqa Pervez also highlights that tribes and tribalism are central

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[68] Madawi Al-Rasheed,"Localizing the Transnational and Transnationalizing the Local" in *Transnational Connections in the Arab Gulf,* ed. Madawi Al-Rasheed (Oxon: Routledge, 2005).

[69] Steffen Hertog, "The oil driven nation-building of the Gulf states after World War II," 2016, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/67530/

[70] Neil Patrick , "Nationalism in the Gulf states," in *Transformation of the Gulf Politics, economics and the global order,* ed David Held and Kristian Ulrichsen (Oxon: Routledge, 2012), 49.

[71] Maryam AlKuwari, "Tribal Revival in the Gulf: A Trojan Horse or a Threat to National Identities?" 2018.

to understanding the identity of the Arab Gulf states as said, "tribe was more than a name: it was a way of life[72]." In her book *Tribal Modern* Miriam Cook also bolded the term tribalism as an important element in the Gulf Identity and notes that;

> *From tribe to race to class and back to tribe, the idea of the tribe is constantly evolving and self-renewing. In today's Gulf, tribe becomes race for exclusive citizenship; race become class for a larger share of the national wealth; wealth subsidizes the production of an essentialized tribal culture, a national culture appropriate for insertion into the twenty-first-century world where these Gulf states wish to play a major role[73].*

Alongside state formation, rentier states, regime types, and tribalism, other forces such as Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism can be identified as the other variables in the construction of the Gulf states. Particularly in the context of the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981, which was formed in response to emerging threats following the Islamic Revolution in Iran, scholars examining the identity of Gulf states have increasingly discussed the role of ideological affinities that arose in the aftermath of the revolution. In that regard, Abdulhaleq Abdulla argues that

> *Cultural and ideological affinity is structurally the constant cause. It has been around for centuries and most likely will persist as an ongoing harmony among the six Arab Gulf states. Ideological affinity unequivocally set the idea of the cooperation in motion well before the official establishment of the GCC[74].*

Pan-Arabism can also be considered a significant factor in shaping ideological affinities within the Gulf region. The rise of Pan-Arabism in the Middle East, particularly under Nasserism, posed a perceived threat to Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, prompting greater unity among them. As Bahgat Korany argues, the rise of Pan-Arabism created a divide between the Gulf states and other Arab nations.

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[72] PARVEZ, Zarqa. Tribalism and National Identity in Qatar: History and Emerging Trends. GLOBAL NATIONALISM: Ideas, Movements and Dynamics in the Twenty-First Century, 2023, 213-233.

[73] Miriam cooke, Tribal Modern: Branding new nations in the Arab Gulf (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014) 63.

[74] Ibid.160.

This division contributed to the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the formation of a distinct Khaliji identity. This phenomenon can be understood as an effort at ideological balancing—countering both the Pan-Arabism of Iraq and the Pan-Islamism of Iran—through the construction of a unique sub-regional identity[75]. Similarly, Barnett and Gause mentioned that one purpose of the GCC was to provide Gulf citizens with "a rhetorical and an institutional alternative identity (beyond their state identities) that would compete with Iran's Islamic revolutionary and Iraq's secular Arab nationalist platforms"[76].

When analyzing the overall identity formation in the Gulf, often referred to as the Khaliji identity, commonalities with broader Islamic and Arab identities are evident. However, distinct differences set it apart from other states in the region due to the unique historical and socio-cultural developments of the Gulf. These distinct features, shaped by tribal traditions and the socio-economic structures of oil-based rentier states, are intertwined with elements of Islamic and Arab identities. Together, they form the key pillars of the Gulf's cultural and communal identity.

Coming to the literature on identity building in Qatar, scholars have traditionally viewed Qatari identity as part of a broader Khaliji identity. However, following the 2017 Gulf Crisis, a new body of literature has emerged that examines the development of a distinct Qatari identity. In that Kristian Ulrichsen[77] Jocelyn Sage Mitchell[78], Abdulla Al-Etaibi[79] and Qatari Scholar Mariam Al Hammadi[80] commonly

[75] Bahgat Korany, "The Arab World and the New Balance of Power" in *Middle East Dilemma: The Politics and Economics of Arab Integration* ed. Michael C. Hudson (New York: Colombia University Press, 1999) 42.

[76] Michael Barnett and Gregory Gause, "Caravans in Opposite Directions" in Security Communities, ed.Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) , 170.

[77] ULRICHSEN, Kristian Coates. Missed opportunities and failed integration in the GCC. The GCC Crisis at One Year: Stalemate Becomes New Reality. Washington DC: Arab Center, 2018, 49-58.

[78] MITCHELL, Jocelyn Sage. Transnational identity and the Gulf crisis: changing narratives of belonging in Qatar. International affairs, 2021, 97.4: 929-944.

[79] AL-ETAIBI, Abdulla. Transnational Identity and Foreign Policy: Tribal Identity and the Gulf Crisis. Journal of Arabian Studies, 2022, 12.1: 84-102.

[80] AL-HAMMADI, Mariam I. Presentation of Qatari identity at National Museum of Qatar: Between imagination and reality. *Journal of Conservation and Museum Studies*, 2018, 16.1: 3.

argues that 2017 Gulf crisis shifted Qatari citizens' perceptions of the GCC, diminishing the prominence of the transnational Khaliji identity narrative in favor of Qatari-specific forms of nationalism. In that regard, Al Etaibi argues that during the Gulf Crisis, the tribalism transformed in Qatar and "the national identity construct is oriented around a logic of unification based on political borders rather than blood ties[81]." Michell and Al Hammadi[82] further researched What do Qataris think of the new national identity narrative developed after 2017 crisis and they found out that "despite the feelings of solidarity that appeared after the blockade, a unified national identity for Qatari society is still in flux[83]." Nonetheless, they presented a new national identity building among Qataris with excluding the assessment of "expatriate role to the unity narrative[84]".

The impact of hosting 2022 World Cup on Qatar national identity has also been analyzed in the recent literature which is on the identity building in Qatar. In that regard Brannagan and Reiche presented on how Qatar's assertive foreign policy, including hosting global events like the 2022 FIFA World Cup, became key to its identity[85]. Their research was concluded that the result of the hosting world cup "is the hybridization of Qatari culture and identify, whereby modern forces are molded to fit age-old practices, and vice versa[86]."

The literature on identity in the Gulf, and Qatar more specifically has predominantly focused on tribalism and oil-driven rentier dynamics, alongside the impact of pan-Arabist and pan-Islamist movements on the establishment of Gulf identity. While

[81] AL-ETAIBI, Abdulla. Transnational Identity and Foreign Policy: Tribal Identity and the Gulf Crisis. Journal of Arabian Studies, 2022, 12.1: p.100.

[82] MITCHELL, Jocelyn Sage; AL-HAMMADI, Mariam Ibrahim. Nationalism and identity in Qatar after 2017: The narrative of the New National Museum. In: Reflecting on the GCC Crisis. Routledge, 2022. p. 42-63.

[83] Ibid. 59.

[84] Ibid.53.

[85] BRANNAGAN, Paul Michael; REICHE, Danyel; BEDWELL, Lorraine. Mass social change and identity hybridization: the case of Qatar and the 2022 FIFA World Cup. *Identities*, 2023, 30.6: 900-918.

[86] Ibid.914.

some literature addresses the demographic impact of large migrant populations, the contribution and influence of foreign populations on Gulf identities have been almost absent in academic discourse.

Regarding literature specific to Qatar, earlier studies tended to subsume Qatar under the broader Gulf identity, resulting in limited examination of its unique characteristics. However, following the 2017 Gulf crisis, an emerging body of literature has begun to explore the diminishing Gulf identity and the rise of a transnational Khaliji identity narrative. These discussions, however, have largely focused on Qatari nationals, with minimal emphasis on solidarity between Qataris and expatriates. The role of non-nationals or expatriates in shaping Qatari identity remains notably absent from the scholarship. Additionally, the hosting of the 2022 FIFA World Cup has featured in discussions on identity in Qatar, but these analyses have predominantly focused on how the event's associated modernization efforts have influenced Qatar's culture and identity. Broader perspectives on how hosting the World Cup have impacted social cohesion or identity formation within Qatar remain underexplored.

1.5. The Scope and Expected Contribution

This dissertation is expected to contribute to the study of migration and security in the Gulf region by examining the migration-led demographic imbalances in Qatar within the framework of societal security. Although a group of existing literature applies to a socio-economic lens to migration in the Gulf, there is a gap in the literature addressing migration as part of the societal security sector under Copenhagen School theory. Furthermore, the literature does not investigate the evolving threat perceptions associated with migration in Qatar, particularly within the context of adopting a new societal security agenda, a subject more commonly analyzed in Nordic countries.

To address this gap, this dissertation aims to explore the evolving concept of 'societal security' in Qatar—a unique case within the Gulf region—and to examine migration-driven demographic imbalances across multiple levels, from the state to the societal

scale. By analyzing the case of Qatar through the lens of societal security theory, incorporating both the conceptualizations of the Copenhagen School and the Nordic School, this study not only applies the theory to a distinctive case but also seeks to contribute to its broader theoretical understanding.

In that regard, the analysis of Qatar is particularly important because of the Qatar's distinctive political, social, and demographic dynamics. As discussed in the second chapter, the concept of societal security has evolved over time, with the Copenhagen School shifting the primary referent object from the state to society. Similarly, Nordic scholars have emphasized the importance of societal life-giving functions, identifying society itself as the central referent object. Qatar's case aligns with these broader theoretical developments but also offers unique insights that challenge and expand the existing frameworks. Notably, although the most recent version of societal security theory highlights the shift in the referent object from the state to the societal level, the case of Qatar suggests that this shift can also occur from state to state with an inclusivity. Inclusivity, often framed as a societal matter, can also involve the state, particularly in contexts where top-down governance plays a central role in shaping societal dynamics.

As discussed in the conclusion chapter, Qatar's unique governance model, characterized by centralized decision-making and state-driven initiatives, challenges conventional assumptions about societal security. It demonstrates that even in systems with a strong top-down approach, the state can act as both the referent object and the driving force for societal security. This duality, therefore, is expected to expand the theoretical boundaries of societal security and highlights the importance of contextual specificity in applying and refining the theory.

Moreover, by examining Qatar's unique case and its contribution to the theory, this dissertation seeks to showcase the evolution of societal security conceptualization in the Gulf, while also providing comparative insights into other Gulf countries, particularly during the period leading up to 2017. Moving beyond a purely descriptive approach, the research addresses not only the "what" and "how" questions but also the "why" questions, ensuring a more nuanced and analytical

perspective. To maintain depth and specificity and to avoid overgeneralization, Qatar remains the central focus of this study. The scope of this dissertation has also been narrowed to enhance clarity and depth. The study emphasizes the societal security framework rather than focusing on the broader concept of 'securitization.' As detailed in chapter 2, the research prioritizes the cause-and-effect relationship between migration, demographic imbalances, and societal security perceptions in the Gulf. Elements of securitization theory, such as the role of securitizing actors, referent objects, and policy implementation, are intentionally excluded to maintain this focus.

Although some comparisons with other Gulf states are included to contextualize societal security dynamics in chapter 3 and chapter 4, the primary emphasis remain on Qatar. This focus is rationalized by Qatar's unique trajectory that hosts the highest proportion of foreign residents among Gulf states, and its migration and demographic policies underwent significant divergence after the 2017 Gulf Crisis. Qatar's distinct nation-building process, which incorporates non-nationals in unique ways, is also a central theme explored in this research.

As discussed in Chapter 5, this dissertation identifies the 2017 Gulf Crisis as a pivotal turning point in Qatar's societal security and its processes of inclusive identity-building. While other events, such as modernization, globalization, the hosting of the 2022 FIFA World Cup, and the Arab Spring, have also influenced societal security perceptions, they excluded in the scope. The data presented in Chapter 5 underscores the 2017 Gulf Crisis as having the most significant impact, providing a rationale for this exclusion.

Moreover, although the Gulf Crisis changed relationships between nationals and non-nationals in Qatar, it also affected internal dynamics among Qatari tribes and families. However, these inter-tribal dynamics are excluded from the analysis, as they constitute a broader area of research requiring separate study.

Finally, in defining non-nationals in Qatar, this dissertation does not differentiate between various groups of non-Qataris, such as white-collar and blue-collar workers

or expatriates and migrant laborers. Instead, the scope has been intentionally designed to treat non-Qataris as a single unit of analysis. The reason for this choice lies in the socio-political and demographic context of the country. While many white-collar expatriates are successfully integrated into society and actively participate in daily life, the situation is significantly different for blue-collar workers. These individuals, particularly those residing in labor camps, often face a higher degree of social and physical isolation, which makes it considerably more challenging to reach and engage with them. Thus, this issue is also mentioned as one of the key limitations of the research and is discussed in detail in the conclusion chapter.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE SOCIETAL SECTOR OF SECURITY

During the years after the Second World War, where states seemed to be in constant struggle for power, the Realists conceptualized the security as a derivative of power, which reduces the concept of security to a mare synonym for power[87] . During the heightened years of the Cold war, security studies were dominated by discussions on international security, which was based on highly militarized and highly polarized ideological confrontation between the superpowers. Military threats had occupied the traditional heart of national security concerns. More military power was considered as the main element for enhancing state security.

With the end of the Cold War, however, new paths in the new world system inevitably led to the emergence of new approaches in Security Studies. The framework of security was re-defined by Copenhagen School where many scholars offer a "broader framework of security" incorporating concepts that were not previously considered to be part of security puzzle[88]. The concept of security was stretched from state level to international, societal, and individual levels of security. Copenhagen School addresses not only different levels in security understanding, but also five sectors in security studies, which are "Political, Military, Economic, Societal and Environmental". Societal security is possibly the most intriguing of the five to consider[89].

[87] STONE, Marianne. Security according to Buzan: A comprehensive security analysis. Security discussion papers series, 2009, 1: 1-11.

[88] Ibid.

[89] STONE, Marianne. Security according to Buzan: A comprehensive security analysis. Security discussion paper series, 2009.

When it comes to the Gulf cases, security studies have started to stretch beyond the state centric understandings, addressing non-military threats with non-military solutions in the late 90s. Then, more contemporary security challenges such as migration, demographic imbalances and identity crises have become the most controversial segments in security in the 2000s.

During the 1990s and 2000s, a major societal issue in the Gulf was migration led demographic imbalances and its socio-economic impacts. In many Gulf States, because of the rapid economic development and increasing needs for the foreign labor forces, the non-national population exceeded that of nationals, leading to demographic imbalances and the formation of sub-communities. This shift negatively impacted on the use of the native language, Arabic, and some cultural practices that increasingly perceived as a threat to the identity and culture of the Gulf countries. This trend renders Societal Security as one of the most intriguing of the security sectors in the Gulf, while the academic attentions were limited as discussed in Introduction chapter.

Until 2017, Qatar followed a similar approach to other Gulf States, viewing migration-induced demographic imbalances as part of the societal security agenda. Although the term "societal security" was not explicitly used, these concerns were addressed by framing demographic imbalance as a threat and its societal impacts as the existential threats. Since 2017, societal security perception has evolved in Qatar, mirroring the more recent versions seen in the Nordic countries which involves a shift in societal security's original definition, focusing on the life-giving functions and transnational protection of interdependent infrastructures rather than identity-oriented concerns.

To conceptualize these changes in Qatar, this chapter presents the discussions on the concept of societal security, which was developed by the Copenhagen School. In order to discuss the bases of the concept, the chapter starts with a discussion on the levels and sectors of security in Copenhagen School framework. Then, it tries to answer what the societal sector is. In the second part, this paper discusses how the societal sector interacts with other sectors of security in the definition of Copenhagen

School. The third part zooms in the concept and discusses its three main components: society, identity, and migration. Then, the chapter will review the new versions of the societal security discussions then are concluded with a new approach in Societal Sector to conceptualize the case of Qatar. Since the new understandings in societal security allows to understand the evolution in the societal security trends in Qatar which became a distinctive case in the Gulf.

2.1. The Sectors of Security and the Societal One

During the years when Realism dominated IR and the state was the only referent object of security, the IR scholars used to equate the concept of security with national/state security. Most of them denied the importance of individual, societal and international security. With the rise of Neo-Realism, the level of analysis has been the central issue in the debate related to security analysis. Neo-Realism preferred international security, along with national one. Neo-realist scholars such as Kenneth Waltz define the basics of international security with the concepts of war, security competition, arms races and alliance formation. Yet, as pointed out by Buzan, the concept of security was too narrowly defined in those years[90].

In his work, *People, States and Fear*, Buzan veers towards a broader understanding of security based on levels and sectors[91]. He uses broader security lens, and argues, Security is taken to be about "the pursuit of freedom from threat and ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change which they see as hostile[92]". The scholars of Copenhagen School also examine the security in the international system, which is the largest level of interacting and independent units that have no system level above them[93]. For the international level of security, Buzan states, security is a relational

[90] BUZAN, Barry. New patterns of global security in the twenty-first century. International affairs, 1991, 67.3: 431-451.

[91] STONE, Marianne. Security according to Buzan: A comprehensive security analysis. Security discussion papers series, 2009, 1: 1-11

[92] BUZAN, Barry. New patterns of global security in the twenty-first century. International affairs, 1991, 67.3: 435.

[93] BUZAN, Barry; WÆVER, Ole; DE WILDE, Jaap. Security: a new framework for analysis. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.

phenomenon. “Because security is relational, one cannot understand the national security of any given state without understanding the international pattern of security interdependence in which it is embedded[94].”

In the early years, Copenhagen School’s scholars accepted the neo-realist’s postulate that the international political system is an anarchy[95]. Nonetheless, they did not attribute international system to the balance of power and underlined the “amity and enmity among states”, which can represent a spectrum from friendship or alliances to those marked by fear[96]. The concept of security complex was also re-visited by Copenhagen school. Buzan defines the security complex as “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another[97]”.

The Copenhagen school not only contributed to the Security Studies by defining the multi levels of their analysis but also, they discussed the new sectors in security studies. Barry Buzan set out the sectors in security analysis as

> *Military security concerns the two-level interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states, and states' perceptions of each other's intentions. Political security concerns the organizational stability of states, systems of government, and the ideologies that give them legitimacy. Economic security concerns access to the resources, finances and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. Societal security concerns the ability of societies to reproduce their traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom within acceptable conditions for evolution. Environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend* [98].

[94]Ibid: 213.

[95] BUZAN, Barry. People, states & fear: an agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era. Ecpr Press, 2008:146.

[96] STONE, Marianne. Security according to Buzan: A comprehensive security analysis. Security discussion papers series, 2009, 1: 1-11

[97] BUZAN, Barry. People, states & fear: an agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era. Ecpr Press, 2008.

[98] Ibid.

More recently, Ole Weaver modified the approach in which the state is the main referent object in all sectors. Weaver proposed a reconceptualization in which non-state referent objects are labelled, such as societal security that is more related with society and identity rather than state. In this reconceptualization, societal security is retained as a sector of state security, but it remains as a referent object of security in its own right[99]. This sector is also located in a wide range of positions between individual and international security in the level of analysis.

2.2. What is Societal Security?

The term societal security was first introduced by Buzan in *People, States and Fear* (1983), as one of the sectors of his five-dimensional approach. This concept is defined as a sustainable development of traditional patterns of national identities and customs of a state[100]. In his early writings in the 1980s, the military sector remained as primary element in state security, whereas society was just treated as a subordinate sector[101].

In the 1990s, the conceptual definition of society was revisited several times in Copenhagen School's publications. In his article, '*New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty First Century'*, published in 1991, Buzan's definition of societal security was moved from state centric level towards international level. Buzan conceptualized societal security as a more prominent issue between center and periphery. He employed a new term "societal cold war" between the centers and at least part of the periphery, and specifically between the West and Islam, in which Europe would be in the front line. In his analysis on the international level societal security, migration was defined as the important societal threat, which also led to the clash of rival civilizational identities. Buzan states,

> *Migration threatens communal identity and culture by directly altering the ethnic, cultural religious and linguistic composition of the population…. the*

[99] ROE, Paul. Ethnic violence and the societal security dilemma. Routledge, 2004.

[100]Ibid: 2004.

[101] Ibid.

> *migration problem does not exist in isolation. It occurs alongside, and mingled in with, the clash of rival civilizational identities between the West and the societies of the periphery*[102].

The state has remained as the main referent object in the early writings of Copenhagen School. Nonetheless, '*In identity, migration and the new security agenda in Europe'* published in 1993, Copenhagen School's scholars re-conceptualized the five-dimensional approach of Buzan, which became untenable to present the context for societal security[103]. They discussed individual security and human collectivities as possible referent objects. Waever revisited the concept of societal security and re-defined as

> *The ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats. More specifically, it is about the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom*[104].

Weaver also underlines the duality of state and societal security, in which societies, such as Palestinians, are exemplified that either do not have a state of their own and/or do not fit with the current state borders. Thus, Weaver argues that societal security is relevant in itself…. "because communities (that don't have a state) are also significant political realities, and their reactions to threats against their identity would be politically significant"[105]. The identity is also evaluated as important as the notion of survival in state security. Weaver states, "If a state loses its sovereignty, it will not survive as a state… similarly if a society loses its identity, it will not survive as a society"[106].

Similarly, in the book of *Security: a new framework for analysis* published in 1998, Copenhagen School scholars discuss the concept of societal security as a separate

[102] BUZAN, Barry. New patterns of global security in the twenty-first century. International affairs, 1991, 67.3: 431-451.

[103] ROE, Paul. Ethnic violence and the societal security dilemma. Routledge, 2004.

[104] Wæver, Ole: 'Societal Security: The Concept",1993.

[105] Wæver, O., Buzan, B., Kelstrup, M., & Lemaitre, P.. Identity migration and the new security agenda in Europe. 1993.

[106] Ibid.

entity than the state. Besides, they underlined the misunderstandings of societal security in academic literature. They dissociate the concept of societal security from the term social security and argued that

> *Societal security is not the same as social security. Social security is about individuals and is largely economic. Societal Security is about collectiveness and their identity.... a problem with societal is that the related term society is often used to designate the wider, more vague state population, which may refer to a group that does not carry an identity…. This is not our (Copenhagen School) use of identity; we use societal for communities with which one identifies*[107].

The Copenhagen school considers the identity as an organizing concept for societal security, yet they did not limit identity with the national identity. In that, referent objects in the societal sector are more related with 'we' identity, which can be more diverse as tribes, clans, nations, civilization, religious and race. Thus, Copenhagen School's scholars argue that

> *Societal insecurity exists when communities of whatever kind define a development or potentially as a threat to their survival as a community. Despite the impression one might get from the present and especially previously presentations the definition is not in terms of nations*[108].

In the recent definition of Copenhagen School, societal security is linked with the large, self-sustaining identity groups. It varies both in time and place. Further, the societal security agenda can be designated by different actors in different time and place[109]. According Copenhagen School, the most common issues viewed as threats to societal security are[110]: (1) Migration in which the identity of a community, which is diluted and influxes by other community, can be changed by a shift in the composition of the people; (2) Horizontal competition that refers to a change in a group due to the overriding cultural and linguistic influence from neighboring

[107] BUZAN, Barry; WÆVER, Ole; DE WILDE, Jaap. Security: a new framework for analysis. Lynne Riener Publisher, 1998.

[108] Ibid.

[109] Ibid.

[110] Ibid:121.

culture; (3) Vertical competition where people will stop seeing themselves as their own identity because of an integrating projects, or a secessionist-regionalist project that pulls them towards either wider or narrower identities.; (4) Depopulation which could be whether by plague, war, famine, natural catastrophe or polices of extermination, and it threatens identity by threatening its carriers, but not specifically a part of societal sector's logic of identity[111].

Analyzing the societal sector with its diverse definition, this concept evolved over time, even among the Copenhagen school writings. It went beyond the preservation of societal markers including language and customs. The concept of societal security refers to "the sustainability within acceptable conditions for evolution of traditional patterns to language, culture, association and religious and national identity and customs"[112] in early writings of Copenhagen School. Nonetheless, more recently, the definition of societal is enlarged, where migration and sub-identities have become more important referent objects. Further, interactions between the societal sector and the other four sectors have increased and borders between the sectors become more blurred.

2.3. The relationship of Societal Security with other Sectors

When analyzing five sectors of Copenhagen School, all sectors can be identified by distinctive patterns. Yet, Buzan states that the five sectors do not operate in isolation from each other, and each defines a focal point within security problematic. They seem to be intimate parts of a security puzzle, in which the whole picture decreased the complexity of the analysis. Barry Buzan's notion of sectorial analysis of security efficiently also opens a way to understand the (new or existential) threats towards the referent objects, which can be both state and non-state actors.

Of the new sectors in security studies, societal security is possibly the most intriguing of the five to consider. The security of a society can be threatened by a number of different factors. Since societal elements (mostly identities) are dynamic;

[111] Ibid.

[112] Williams, Paul D. Security Studies: An Introduction. London: Routledge, 2008.

also, societies can be relatively open or relatively closed in terms of the range of intensity of interactions they choose to define as threats. The threats of the societal sector can be distinctive in some points, but with a detailed analysis, the source of threats and types of referent object can be seen in a similar format with the threats towards other sector.

2.3.1. Societal Security and the Military Sector

The Copenhagen School revisited the core subject of the traditional Security Studies in the 1980s[113]. For the military sector of security, Buzan mentions that military actions can and usually does threaten all the components of the state. While the state elements remain to be considered as an important referent object in the military sector[114], the societal and humanitarian elements started to be considered as a part of the military sector, in which military threats not only strike at the very essence of states basic proactive functions, but also threaten damage deep down through the layers of social and individual interest[115].

In most cases, the link between societal and military sectors can be seen as straightforward. Due to the nature of state, which is machinery for protecting independence, territorial control, and perhaps the existence of society, the military actions, particularly comes from external armed forces, threats not only state but also the society within it, unless societal element of the invaded state does not see the action as threatening[116].

The domestic side of the military policies or military establishment of its own state, on the other hand, can also be a threat to societal elements. The most obvious example of domestic military threat to society is when the armed forces act to

[113]BUZAN, Barry. People, States and Fear; The National Security Problem in International Relation. The University of North Carolina Press, 1983.

[114] BUZAN, Barry; WÆVER, Ole; DE WILDE, Jaap. Security: a new framework for analysis. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998:50.

[115] BUZAN, Barry. People, states & fear: an agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era.2008:75.

[116] WÆVER, Ole, et al. Identity migration and the new security agenda in Europe. 1993.

suppress all or part of the society either on their own behalf or on behalf of government[117]. Besides, armed forces may conduct extensive massacres and suppress their own population that mostly represent one ethnic or opposition group against others within the state[118].

Military sector can also be interlinked with the societal sector where the military policies arise a number of threats to society indirectly. For example, conscription policies can be a threat, where the state seeks to homogenize its citizens by military service as a mechanism for eroding subnational identities[119]. In most cases, military actions threaten the societal elements. Yet, the opposite situation can be observed in a state with a high number of societal problems and societal divisions. When significant sections of the population are excluded from recruitment due to doubts about their loyalty, threats can arise for the military sector in which the ability of the military to reproduce itself adequately to meet external threats and the state's armed strength is weakened[120].

2.3.2. Societal Security and the Political Sector

All military threats and defenses can be constituted and defined with political objectives (i.e. seizure of territory, the change of government of institutions, manipulation of policy or behavior). Nonetheless, some political objectives can also be pursued by political means such as the idea of the state and the institutions. In the political sectors, the issue of security is interlinked with the organizational stability of states, their governance capacity and ideologies as the sources of political legitimacy and authority in which (non-military) threats to state sovereignty have remained at the heart of this sector.

In its broad constituency, political sector can also be linked with non-military threats to political units. It can be related to the legitimacy of an authority, recognized by

[117] Ibid.

[118] Ibid.

[119] WÆVER, Ole, et al. Identity migration and the new security agenda in Europe. 1993..

[120] Ibid.

societal actor[121]. There should be, therefore, considerable complementarity between political security and societal actors that are the source of political legitimacy and eventually its security.

The relations between the political and societal sectors can also move beyond the role of society as the source of the legitimacy of political authority. The political threats to organizational stability of a state can be a matter in the societal sector, because of the classical function of political authority, in which it not only provides security for all actors of state against external threats, but also protect society from each other by providing a framework of law and enforcing law.

2.3.3. Societal Security and the Economic Sector

Economic threats are exceedingly controversial, politicized and more difficult to relate to national security than military and political one. Nonetheless, Copenhagen School addressed the economic issue as a part of their security puzzle. Despite a huge number and variety of economic threats, Buzan points out some specific economic issues as threats to national security such as, "export practices, import restrictions, price manipulations, default on debts and currency controls" [122]. In the Copenhagen school's analysis, the economic security is also linked beyond the national security; related to societal security. The relationship between societal security and the economic sector is underlined as exceptionally complex. Since, the economic sector is mostly explained only under the capitalist orders that have some paradoxical qualities in its relationship with society. In the capitalist economic order, the threats to societal security from the economic sector can be cast into a few categories: those that arise from the efficient or inefficient working of capitalism, and from the global structure of capitalism[123].

In the state level, the society and capitalism can easily work each other in mutually destructive patterns in which "the pursuit of capitalism can erode society so the

[121] Ibid: 141.

[122] WÆVER, Ole, et al. Identity migration and the new security agenda in Europe. 1993: 79-80.

[123] Ibid.

maintenance of society can erode capitalism."[124] Moreover, when capitalism does not work properly, the dynamics of threat between economy and society can possibly be changed, because of the fact that the states have fewer resources to uphold social harmony during the periods of recession or depression[125].

In the systemic level, the relationship between societal security and the economic sector can be analyzed under the global capitalist economy that gives rise to center-periphery structure. In that, Buzan argues that the commanding position of center systematically disadvantages the state and society in the periphery. Since, in the global capitalist order, the center not only dominates finance, trade, and production, but also, they set political norms, as well as rules for international society[126].

2.3.4. Societal Security and the Environmental Sector

During the early years of the Cold War, environmental issues have been considered extraneous and political or economic matters. However, the Copenhagen School defines environmental security (also called ecological security) as a new security sector[127]. The Copenhagen School considers the range of possible referent objects in the environmental sector to be very large[128]. It involves the consideration of possible ecological threats from the survival of individual species to maintenance of the planetary climate. In this sector, while "ecological threats may appear to deserve a relatively low priority compared with other forms of threat", the environmental sector of security studies has started to be get more attention[129]. This is appropriate given that environmental issues have become not only a threat to individuals and state, but also global issues, which have a widespread effect.

[124] Ibid: 53.

[125] WÆVER, Ole, et al. Identity migration and the new security agenda in Europe. 1993.

[126] Ibid.

[127] STONE, Marianne. Security according to Buzan: A comprehensive security analysis. Security discussion papers series, 2009: 5.

[128] Buzan, Barry. People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-cold War Era. Boulder, CO: L. Rienner, 1991, 75.5.

[129] Buzan, Barry. People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-cold War Era. 1991:83.

The relationship between society and ecology is much more complex and indirect compared with relations with state and individual. Threats to societal security from the environmental sector arise when collective identities have important ties to a particular landscape, which is itself threatened[130]. The strong relationship between identities and landscape is seen typical for non-urban and pre-industrial places where "a culture is highly adapted to a way of life that is strongly conditioned by the landscape"; also, certain types of threat to landscape can threatened the existence of culture and sometimes the people themselves[131]. According to Buzan, "threats to landscape come in many forms, and cultures differ markedly in their attitudes towards them[132]." Particularly, for settled people, who closely adapt to environments, environmental threats can be seen in varies forms and occurrences, as pollution, climate change or changes in land use[133]. These environmental issues can trigger many threats against not only the existence of indigenous people, but also their societal and national characters in some degree.

2.4. Societal Security and Its Components

Security is no longer perceived only as military security of the state. Different referent objects and new threats have become the subject of the new security understanding. The referent object of security has expanded beyond a government or a territorial setting, to other components of the state entity as society, identity and individuals[134]. Societal security has become the most discussed segment of the new understanding of security.

Societal security can be interlinked horizontally with all state elements (economy, politics, military), also vertically with sub-state (or unit) components such as society,

[130] WÆVER, Ole, et al. Identity migration and the new security agenda in Europe. 1993.

[131] Ibid: 55.

[132] Ibid: 56.

[133] Ibid.

[134] BILGIN, Pinar. Individual and societal dimensions of security. International Studies Review, 2003, 5.2: 203-222.

identity and migration. Thus, it is also important to de-construct the societal security and presents an analysis on its main components; society, identity, and migration.

2.4.1. Societal Security and Society

As discussed previously, societal security is not equal to social security. Since society is distinct from the term social. It more relates to individuals who constructed the world of 'we' that even involves much marginalized groups and varying from "the cool functionalism of professional association and the passionate but ephemeral quality of youth cults to the white heat of some gang, clan, national or religious identities where people are prepared to kill or die in its service[135]." Weaver defines the societal with the three essential characters that are "(1) the duality of society as social structures and as large scales of collective units of individuals; (2) the component of mutual orientation of a sense of forming or being a society; (3) a grounding in structures, institutions and practices[136]". He ends up with a definition of societal as "a clustering of institutions combined with a feeling of common identity or more poetically a rich and complex morality[137]".

Moreover, Copenhagen School differentiates the concept of society from the nation. They conceptualized society beyond a group affiliated to a territory and a state community. Weaver includes ethno-national and religious groups in society. He claims that society is able to reproduce itself independently from the state[138]. On this basis, Copenhagen School conceptualized society, which is the referent object of societal security, broader than the classical definitions of society. Based on the re-conceptualized version of society, societal security is about not only the sustainability within acceptance conditions for evolution of traditional patterns of language culture, religious and national identity[139], but also perceived threat to

[135] WÆVER, Ole, et al. Identity migration and the new security agenda in Europe. 1993.

[136] Ibid: 21.

[137] Waever, Ole. Societal Security: The Concept, quoted from GIDDENS, Anthony. The nation-state and violence. Univ of California Press, 1985.

[138] WÆVER, Ole, et al. Identity migration and the new security agenda in Europe. 1993.

[139] Ibid.

individuals, their collective settings, we' loyalties and the action taken to defend 'we' entities[140].

2.4.2. Societal Security and Identity

As society, identity is also an important referent object of the societal security[141]. In Weaver's words, "society is about identity, about the self-conception of communities and of individuals identifying themselves as members of a community[142]". Societies are units constituted by a sense of collective identity in which "we identity can vary a great deal as to the kind of group to which it applies, the intensity to which it is felt, and the reasons which create a sense of it"[143]. Thus, in most of cases, the societal threats can be perceived as a threat to the societal identity, which can be seen as object in the sense that "most members of the group adhere to, and so behave in accordance with, a particular, dominant identity construction: they become objects around which security dynamics take place[144]".

The concept of identity in the societal sector does not only relate to 'we' but also consider the other. Since, "societal security relates to the capability of a society to preserve its essential characteristics in the face of variable circumstances and despite the potential or actual threats[145]", this security is compromised "when a community perceives a threat as a threat to its identity[146]". In a simplest definition, identity can be conceptualized with a set of ideas and practices that identifies individuals as the members of a social group. Yet, in the state level, this concept remained abstract, and

[140] BUZAN, Barry; WÆVER, Ole; DE WILDE, Jaap. Security: a new framework for analysis. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.

[141] ANDERSON, Benedict. Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. Verso Books, 2006.

[142] WÆVER, Ole, et al. Identity migration and the new security agenda in Europe. 1993:25.

[143] ROE, Paul. Ethnic violence and the societal security dilemma. Routledge, 2004: 43.

[144] H.Wiberg, 'Divided Nations and Divided States as a Security Problem', COPRI, Working Paper No. 14, 1992: 15.

[145] HOUGH, Peter. Understanding global security. Routledge, 2014.

[146] PANIĆ, Branka. Societal security–security and identity. Western Balkans Security Observer, 2009:31.

threats to identity are differently perceived in different cases. In most cases, threats to identity can be seen with horizontal competition, such as migrations, or vertical competitions, such as integrations and secessions[147]. For example, the integration polices in Europe and supranational tendencies made nations more vulnerable, because national groups have started to feel threatened from foreign ideas or products. The increasing migration to Europe has also raised the threat perception among European identities to their survival as a community[148]. On the other hand, identity can be interlinked with additional sectors, such as gender or religion[149]. The threats to these additional sectors can be referent objects of societal security. For instance, gender-based identities becomes a reference object when "a gender group feels threatened, such as in the case of feminists who perceive men as a collective threat[150].

2.4.3. Societal Security and Migration

Societal security is related to society and identity as referent objects. Yet, an analysis on societal security considers migration is also important component of the subject as an important threat particularly for the West. Vertically, migration threatens not only the state, but also the societal elements including communities and individuals. While migration has always been a threat, particularly after 1980s, the migration has become an important phenomenon for the construction of the societal sector, because of its negative impact on demographic structure and society.

In the 1980s, the demographic structures of the world started to change. During the post-Cold war years, this change has gained momentum. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, not only the new borders were drawn in post-Soviet countries, but also the migration and demographic imbalances began to be significant facts in the societal reconstruction of the world. For the societal threats, it is important to

[147] ROE, Paul. Ethnic violence and the societal security dilemma. Routledge, 2004.

[148] WÆVER, Ole. The changing agenda of societal security. In: Globalization and Environmental Challenges. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2008. p. 581-593.

[149] Ibid.

[150] Ibid: 589.

underline the mass migrations during late 80s, because the international migration stock increased dramatically, the growth in migrant stock from 1985 to 1990 accounted for over 45%[151]. This dramatic change not only created the complexity of the new demographic trends (e.g., population growth rates, social change, foreign labor), but also threatened "communal identity and culture by directly altering the ethnic, cultural religious and linguistic composition of the population[152]." The high number of migrations, and eventually demographic imbalances, triggered resurgence in violent nationalism in the form of groups inspired by the self-preservation of their socially constructed nations in 1990s. The rise of far-right political parties and racist attacks in some European countries, such as France, Germany and Austria, has become the indicator of the rising societal issues in the world. Besides, anti-western discourses in some third world countries and emerging radical regionalism in Europe also seemed to embody new societal threats in the world politics[153].

During the 1980s when the international migration became a visible phenomenon, migration was clearly located in the security debate, most particularly in relation to what the Copenhagen School calls 'societal security'[154], because the tension over migration, identity and territory may occur between societies. In theory, Weaver claims that the threat of migration is fundamentally a question of how relative numbers interact with the abortive and adaptive capacities of society[155]. "This threat works on the societal level when incoming population is of a different cultural or ethnic stock from those already residents[156]." On the other hand, he also argues that migration, in practices, has continued to be seen as a significant threat in many cases, because of its potential to reshape what nations stand for[157], also ethnic and cultural

[151] The World Bank. The international migration stock. Data Bank: The World Bank, 2017.

[152] KING, Russell; LAZARIDIS, Gabriella; TSARDANIDIS, Charalambos (ed.). Eldorado or Fortress? Migration in Southern Europe. Springer, 1999.

[153] HOUGH, Peter. Understanding global security. Routledge, 2014.

[154] O'NEILL, P. E. The European Union and migration: Security versus identity?. Defence Studies, 2006, 6.3: 322-350.

[155] WÆVER, Ole, et al. Identity migration and the new security agenda in Europe. 1993.

[156] Ibid.

[157] Ibid.

parochialism that is a strong political force in almost everywhere[158]. Whether the security threat is real or perceived, migration has started to be a threat to the identity of some societal entities based on their own vulnerabilities. When this threat is securitized, the responses generally result in new security arrangements such as border control, and/or strengthening societal identity[159].

2.5. Securitization in Societal Security

In addition to the components of societal security, the process of societal security has been a subject of scholarly discussion within the Copenhagen School. Scholars like Waever[160], Buzan[161], and Williams[162] have rejuvenated the security discourse, asserting the fundamental belief that security is a speech act. Specifically, Waever contends that "security can be viewed as a speech act, where its significance lies not in serving as a sign referring to something more tangible, but in the utterance itself as the act[163]." However, when examining models of securitization built on a speech act, challenges arise in comprehending security and threats, whether existential or perceived. In this formulation, security cannot be entirely self-referential; instead, it often involves a form of reference that may be partial or biased[164].

As Balzacq discusses[165], securitization originates from unarticulated assumptions about security's symbolic power, making it a pragmatic act, sustaining argumentative

[158]Ibid.

[159] O'NEILL, P. E. The European Union and migration: Security versus identity?. Defence Studies, 2006, 6.3: 322-350.

[160] WAEVER, Ole. Identity, integration and security: Solving the sovereignty puzzle in EU studies. *Journal of international affairs*, 1995, 389-431.

[161] BUZAN, Barry; WÆVER, Ole; DE WILDE, Jaap. *Security: A new framework for analysis*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.

[162] WILLIAMS, Michael C. Identity and the Politics of Security. *European Journal of International Relations*, 1998, 4.2: 204-225.

[163] WAEVER, Ole. Identity, integration and security: Solving the sovereignty puzzle in EU studies. *Journal of international affairs*, 1995:355.

[164] BALZACQ, Thierry. A theory of securitization. *Securitization theory: How security problems emerge and dissolve*, 2010, 1-30.

[165]Ibid.

practices aimed at convincing a target audience based on their understanding of the world. This foundation leads securitization to rely on discourse analysis and process tracing. When applying the securitization framework to societal security, an approach combines the philosophy of language, focusing on the performative, reality-generating potential of discourse, with specific social and material contexts related to the audience, context, power relations, and practices and instruments[166].

From this point, the concept of 'audience' holds crucial importance in securitization theory because a key assumption is that securitization is an intersubjective process, depending on audience assent. According to Buzan et al., "the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such[167]." Surprisingly, however, the audience is one of the least developed concepts in the initial formulation of the theory. The Copenhagen School gives the audience—presented as 'those the securitizing act attempts to convince to accept exceptional procedures because of the specific security nature of some issues'—only minimal treatment[168].

In exploring how securitization works, it is also investigated the influence of power relations among securitizing actors alongside the audiences to whom they address their securitizing moves. According to Williams, the result of a securitization is conditioned "by the different capacity of actors to make socially effective claims about threats[169]." Additionally, the impact of securitization on power relations helps explain the gradual shift from the question of what security is to what it does[170].

Another crucial aspect of securitization is the context in which they occur. It has been questioned whether differences in the outcomes of securitization can be derived

[166] BALZACQ, Thierry. A theory of securitization. *Securitization theory: How security problems emerge and dissolve*, 2010, 1-30.

[167] BUZAN, Barry; WÆVER, Ole; DE WILDE, Jaap. *Security: A new framework for analysis*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998:25.

[168] BUZAN, Barry; WÆVER, Ole; DE WILDE, Jaap. Security: A new framework for analysis. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.

[169] WILLIAMS, Michael C. Words, images, enemies: Securitization and international politics. *International studies quarterly*, 2003: 514.

[170] BALZACQ, Thierry; LÉONARD, Sarah; RUZICKA, Jan. 'Securitization'revisited: Theory and cases. *International relations*, 2016, 30.4: 494-531.

from and explained by differences in contextual features[171]. In this respect, it is important to emphasize that the explanatory role of the context is not primarily found in its substantial components but in its constraining and/or enabling effects—in brief, in its epistemological underpinnings[172].

Departing from the linguistic focus on the politics of insecurity, there is a focus of securitization theory towards the techniques of government[173]. According to this perspective, security is not necessarily a rhetorical performance but can also be designed through different technical or physical modalities. This practice-oriented approach offers advantages in overcoming the challenges associated with the requirement of audience acceptance in the linguistic approach to securitization[174].

In the securitization theory, there has also been significant focus on the issue of migration where a number of comparative studies have been exploring the securitization of migration and intense debates surrounding the securitization of asylum and migration in Europe. Attention is directed towards understanding the modalities of securitization by analyzing the actors and processes that have framed asylum and migration as threats in Europe[175]. Here, migration has been portrayed as a cultural threat, a socio-economic threat, and a more conventional internal security threat. This perspective is echoed by some scholars who observe notable similarities in discourses that securitize migration, irrespective of whether they are articulated by politicians, security agencies, or the media[176].

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[171] Ibid.

[172] BUBANDT, Nils. Vernacular security: The politics of feeling safe in global, national and local worlds. *Security Dialogue*, 2005, 36.3: 275-296.

[173] BALZACQ, Thierry; LÉONARD, Sarah; RUZICKA, Jan. 'Securitization'revisited: Theory and cases. *International relations*, 2016, 30.4: 494-531.

[174] BALZACQ, Thierry; LÉONARD, Sarah; RUZICKA, Jan. 'Securitization'revisited: Theory and cases. *International relations*, 2016, 30.4: 494-531..

[175] HUYSMANS, Jef. The European Union and the securitization of migration. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2000, 38.5: 751-777.

[176] BALZACQ, Thierry; LÉONARD, Sarah; RUZICKA, Jan. 'Securitization'revisited: Theory and cases. *International relations*, 2016, 30.4: 494-531.

The examination of the securitization of identity and migration matters has also highlighted the influence of selecting a particular approach to securitization—whether linguistic or practice-based—on the analytical outcomes. Scholars like Huysmans[177] explore ways to integrate both approaches. Another significant contribution from this specific branch of securitization literature to more extensive theoretical discussions is the stress on the significance of considering the normative consequences, encompassing legal and moral aspects, of securitization.

There is no doubt that securitization proves useful in conceptualizing the deep embeddedness of security articulations in societal relations. However, this dissertation, focusing on migration-led demographic imbalances perceived as societal security threats, lacks a process-oriented focus involving a broader linguistic and more sociological discussion derived from the securitizing actor, the referent subject, the referent object, the audience, the context, and the adoption of distinctive policies, whether 'exceptional' or not. Consequently, the term ‘securitization’ will employ 'a verb' that defines the process of societal security in the Gulf and Qatar, rather than a term derived from securitization theory.

2.6. New Approaches in Societal Security: The Nordic School Conceptualization

Similar to many other concepts in Security Studies, the concept of societal security has evolved depending on political developments and regional zeitgeists. As it is discussed above, its origins can be traced back to Barry Buzan's influential work, *People, States, and Fear* published in 1983[178]. That version of the concept, societal security was closely intertwined with a state's identity, essentially serving as an extension of traditional state security. As time progressed, Ole Weaver further developed the concept of societal security, breaking away from its close association with the state[179]. In this context, 'society' was defined as an intersubjective construct,

[177] HUYSMANS, Jef. Migrants as a security problem: Dangers of ‘securitizing’societal issues. *Migration and European integration: The dynamics of inclusion and exclusion*, 1995, 53: 72.

[178] BUZAN, Barry. People, States and Fear; The National Secutity Problem in International Relation. The University of North Carolina Press, 1983.

[179] WÆVER, Ole, et al. Securitization and desecuritization. Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1993.

including nations, ethnic groups, clans, tribes, or any community that provided a source of identity for its members[180]. Gradually, the focus of societal security shifted towards the preservation of a community's identity, where 'identity' was understood as a convergence of institutions combined with a shared sense of belonging[181]. Consequently, the terms 'society' and 'identity' became closely aligned within the concept.

Nonetheless, the concept of societal security has become insufficient to explain the contemporary political phenomenon in the mid-2000s and 2010s, particularly regarding its limited focus on community identity. In those years, Nordic scholars played a significant role in expanding the concept to encompass other critical aspects, such as the functioning of government, infrastructures, and essential services during times of crisis[182]. It is important to note that there were overlaps between the conceptualization of Copenhagen School and expanded variants of societal security, yet their development occurred largely in parallel, rather than one replacing the other.

The evolved version of societal security focuses more on a society's resilience and ability to function in the case of emerging or existential threats and uncertainties. This aspect of societal security became closely associated with the life-giving function of the concept, indicating the capacity to prepare for and respond to various security challenges, moving away from the traditional emphasis on deterrence and military defense[183]. The updated understanding of societal security is not prioritizing the identity-centric definition, instead emphasizing security as the transnational protection of interdependent infrastructures. It recognized the interconnectedness of societies in a global context and adopted a comprehensive or 'all-hazards' security mindset that gained popularity at the time.

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[180] LARSSON, Sebastian; RHINARD, Mark. Nordic societal security: Convergence and divergence. Taylor & Francis, 2021.

[181] RHINARD, Mark. Societal security in theory and practice. In: Nordic Societal Security. Routledge, 2020. p. 22-42.

[182] LARSSON, Sebastian; RHINARD, Mark. Nordic societal security: Convergence and divergence. Taylor & Francis, 2021.

[183] Ibid.

In the life-giving function depiction of the Nordic School scholars[184], three pillars emerged from this version of societal security. Firstly, the nature of threats to life-giving functions was downplayed, as their unpredictable nature rendered them difficult to fully comprehend[185]. This led to the adoption of an all-hazards approach that policymakers favored. Secondly, the transnational character of these functions was acknowledged, as modern societies relied on technology and interconnected networks that extended beyond national borders[186]. Thus, the pursuit of societal security involved actions beyond the national level but did not entirely fit within the traditional international context; the term 'intermestic', which means the combination of international and domestic factors as a privileged analytical tool, was used to describe this dynamic[187].

Thirdly, the focus shifted to safeguarding the life-giving functions themselves. Analysts and practitioners dedicated significant efforts to understanding the best methods and strategies for protecting these critical aspects of society. For example, Norway's Parliament, in its 2001 inquiry, defined societal security as the ‘ability to maintain critical social functions, protect citizens' life and health, and meet basic requirements during various stress situations’[188].

The Nordic version of societal security has also been interconnected with new concepts in societal security studies such as 'resilience,' 'crisis management,' and 'risk'[189]. Resilience became closely linked with societal security, as preparing for inevitable challenges and building bounce-back capacity became key tasks for both

[184] The term Nordic Scholars is largely associated with the work of Bengt Sundelius in 2005 and 2006: Jan Hovden in 2004: Alyson Bailes in 2014, US scholar Dan Hamilton in 2005; Dalgaard-Nielsen and Hamilton in 2006, and, in a more critical fashion, Peter Burgess in 2014..

[185] RHINARD, Mark. Societal security in theory and practice. In: Nordic Societal Security. Routledge, 2020. p. 22-42.

[186] Ibid.

[187] SUNDELIUS, Bengt. Disruptions: Functional security for the EU. Disasters, Diseases, Disruptions: A New D-Drive for the European Union, 2005, 67-84.

[188] OLSEN, Odd Einar; KRUKE, Bjørn Ivar; HOVDEN, Jan. Societal safety: Concept, borders and dilemmas. Journal of contingencies and crisis management, 2007, 15.2: 69-79.

[189] LARSSON, Sebastian; RHINARD, Mark. Nordic societal security: Convergence and divergence. Taylor & Francis, 2021.

public and private authorities. The notion of crisis as an unexpected event requiring urgent response under conditions of uncertainty is also related to societal security. Societal responses to crises required a range of capabilities from prevention to recovery[190]. The concept of risk, given the increasing complexity of modern societies, was intertwined with societal security, particularly in addressing societal vulnerabilities[191].

While societal security's emphasis on life-giving functions and resilience found support among policymakers and practitioners, some scholars expressed concerns about its objectivist leanings, suggesting that a more constructivist approach might provide a more comprehensive understanding of security challenges. They proposed examining how societal security is invoked and utilized by various actors to serve specific interests.

There is no doubt that the 'Nordic societal security' model presents a unique model which is based on a coordinated effort among Nordic countries to frame a distinct approach to security, highlighting shared values and seeking to increase influence abroad. This approach involves policy exchange, informal dialogue, and harmonization of legislation, fostering a sense of community and identity-building across the Nordic region. Nonetheless, it does not mean that this model is excluded from the other cases in world politics.

Here when analyzing the case of Qatar, the evolution of the societal security perceptions in multiple level shows a similar pathway as it is observed in the Nordic countries. Especially when looking at the historical trajectories emerged in the Gulf and more specifically in Qatar, many similarities will be identified

During the early years of high migration in 1970s and 1980s, the Gulf countries, including Qatar, overlooked the demographic shift caused by economically driven

[190] COMFORT, Louise K.; BOIN, Arjen; DEMCHAK, Chris C. (ed.). Designing resilience: Preparing for extreme events. University of Pittsburgh Pre, 2010.

[191] PETERSEN, Karen Lund. Risk analysis–A field within security studies?. European journal of international relations, 2012, 18.4: 693-717.

migration, as the focus was primarily on military and political threats. During the early stages of the oil era, the sole approach to managing demographic proportions and societal security issues was to welcome Arab workers, given their cultural and religious similarity to the local population, making them a preferred choice over other immigrants. This issue emphasized as the preservation of their Khaliji cultural codes and Arabic heritage.

However, the conditions changed dramatically with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. This event prompted a shift towards diversification in the demographic elements of the Gulf region, including Qatar. As will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters, the region experienced the case of horizontal competition. This competition arose from the cultural influence of neighboring countries in the wider Middle East which has a doctrinal pan-Arabism notion over Khaliji way of living, which led to concerns about the potential dilution of the Gulf identity. To protect against this threat, the Gulf regimes decided to move away from Arab expatriates to workers brought in from Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia (who seen as more docile, reliable, and less politically challenging than Arabs). Yet, within less than a decade, the migrant communities became a prominent topic of discussion, highlighting concerns about the potential impact on the local population and identity including the Arabic language. The migration-led demographic imbalance has been part of policy agenda and started to identify as a threat while the term societal security was not commonly used. Against the emerging existential threats discussed in the upcoming chapters, some policies were implemented in the Gulf's job market to balance the high number of migrants, to control the existential threats.

However, with the 2017 Gulf Crisis, the classical societal security literature's four agendas (horizontal and vertical competition, migration and depopulation) were deemed insufficient to explain the new societal dynamics in Qatar. There arose a need for a more comprehensive theoretical approach to address the evolving dynamics. Thus, this dissertation is aiming to stretch the theoretical discussion with a focus on the Nordic definition of societal security. In this updated approach, the referent object of societal security evolved from a simple version where people's loyalties were mainly tied to families, tribes, and religion, to a broader sense of life-

giving functions encompassing larger groups. As it will be discussed in the upcoming chapters, this expanded approach will be crucial in understanding the emerging ‘Baladna’ (our country) approach in Qatar. This approach aims to integrate like-minded migrant communities living in Qatar as part of the nation instead of securitizing them. These changes occurred due to new existential threats emerging from neighboring countries, which began to impact the daily lives of the people. In this redefined version of societal security, the concept of "we" expanded to include not only Qataris or Arabs but also all migrant communities with shared interests. This broader sense of "we" created a socially compelling argument that this larger collective was now under threat.

CHAPTER 3

POTENTIAL/EXISTENTIAL SOCIETAL THREATS IN THE GULF AND THE CASE OF QATAR

Various societies exhibit distinct vulnerabilities based on how their identity is shaped. If a society's identity revolves around isolation and detachment, even a small influx of foreigners can be perceived as threat[192]. Nations that maintain control through a narrow numerical margin or by repressing a majority are susceptible to competition from a population with a higher influx or superior fertility rate. On the other side, when a national identity is closely tied to specific cultural practices, any external cultural elements may be viewed as threatening. For instance, if language plays a central role in shaping national identity, the use of other languages extensively within the community may be seen as problematic[193].

Moreover, the vulnerability of the state and societies can depend on how it is built. If it is based on integrating various ethnic groups with distinct national histories, the rise of nationalism and ideas of self-determination can be perilous[194]. On the other hand, if the state-nation is founded on a melting-pot ideology where different groups blend into a new collective, the existing national identity becomes vulnerable to a resurgence of racial and cultural distinctiveness[195]. Additionally, the level of closeness between state and society can impact vulnerability. A society closely intertwined with the state is more susceptible to processes of supra-national political

[192] BHUGRA, Dinesh; BECKER, Matthew A. Migration, cultural bereavement and cultural identity. *World psychiatry*, 2005, 4.1: 18.

[193] Ibid.

[194] LARSSON, Sebastian; RHINARD, Mark. Nordic societal security: Convergence and divergence. Taylor & Francis, 2021.

[195] Ibid.

integration compared to a nation with a tradition of operating independently of the state and having multiple political layers simultaneously[196].

When examining such vulnerabilities, the societal security framework allows for extensive discussions. In this framework, the reference object of security is not merely the state as a government or a territorial entity but, more importantly, the state as a collective identity. According to the Copenhagen school, there are a diverse range of threats to identity. These threats are differently perceived in different regions. Nonetheless, as explained above, the most common issues viewed as threats to societal security are migration, horizontal or vertical competitions and depopulation[197].

In the Gulf region, the central notion of "threat to identity" is not either depopulation or vertical competition, but rather, migration and somehow horizontal competition (especially after the 1990s). During the initial phase of high migration in the 1970s, the Gulf regimes actively embraced the influx of Arabs from the broader Middle East to address the shortage of skilled workers and to preserve of their Khaleji cultural norms and Arabic heritage. From the 1970s until the late 1980s, the Gulf states took deliberate steps to safeguard their identity by carefully managing their demographic composition, which included a substantial proportion of Arab residents. Alongside with safeguarding the Arabic language and Khaliji-Arab identity, the Middle East's regional integration movement gained momentum, particularly after the Arab Israeli war and due to the Palestinian issue. This environment also facilitated transnational movement in the Gulf, allowing Arab workers and their families to migrate across different social strata and skill levels[198]. In that regard, as noted by Michael Hudson, the flow of labor and the remittances associated with migration played a pivotal role in the process of regional integration in the Middle East [199].

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[196] LARSSON, Sebastian; RHINARD, Mark. Nordic societal security: Convergence and divergence. Taylor & Francis, 2021.

[197] PANIĆ, Branka. Societal security–security and identity. Western Balkans Security Observer, 2009:31.

[198] THIOLLET, Hélène. Managing migrant labour in the Gulf: Transnational dynamics of migration politics since the 1930s. 2016.

[199] HUDSON, Michael C. Middle East dilemma: The politics and economics of Arab integration. Columbia University Press, 1999:p.292.

Nevertheless, the non-national population trend in the Gulf States underwent a significant transformation after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991. A considerable number of Arab workers were displaced, making way for a surge in Asian labor[200]. While Qatar had implemented more moderate policies compare with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, all the Gulf States had started to resort to mass expulsions of Arab residents, specifically Yemenis and Palestinians, respectively, based on perceived support for Iraq either by the individuals or their home countries. Notably, in retaliation for their governments' support for Iraq during the war, Kuwait expelled a substantial number of Palestinian residents, and Saudi Arabia took a similar approach by expelling approximately 750,000 Yemeni workers[201].

This shift was also surfaced because of Gulf States' concerns over the potential long-term political demands of large Arab migrant populations[202]. The Gulf states had been apprehensive about the potential for Arab expatriates, especially during the rise of Arab nationalism and later pan-Islamic movements, to disseminate political ideologies and disputes among their citizenries[203]. This concern played a role in motivating the shift towards cheaper and less politically contentious Asian labor starting from late 90s. For those years of the Gulf, it can be argued that the concept of horizontal competition, as found in the literature of the Copenhagen School's Societal Security, could be applicable.

In 2000s, the migration (with the terms of Copenhagen school) has become the main agenda item in the Gulf and Qatar specifically, because of its impact on demographic structure and society. The new migration wave in the region is characterized by migrant groups having different cultural or ethnic stock from those already residents. This shift has become apparent in 2000s through a significant decline in the

[200] THIOLLET, Hélène. Managing migrant labour in the Gulf: Transnational dynamics of migration politics since the 1930s. 2016.

[201] SHAFIK, Nemat, et al. Has Labor Migration Promoted Economic Integration in the Middle East?. The World Bank, 1992.

[202] GENGLER, Justin. Society and State in Post-Blockade Qatar: Lessons for the Arab Gulf Region. In: Reflecting on the GCC Crisis. Routledge, 2022. p. 24-41.

[203] Thiollet, "Managing Migrant Labour in the Gulf: Transnational Dynamics of Migration Politics since the 1930s", International Migration Institute Working Paper 131 (2016), pp. 1–25.

population of Arab workers in the GCC countries, even in the absence of officially stated policies supporting such a shift. The replacements for Arab workers have been sourced not only from countries with a well-established presence in the GCC workforce, such as India or Pakistan, but also from nations like the Philippines, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Indonesia[204].As a result, during the 2000s, the political influence of foreigners slowly waned, migrants ultimately becoming an "adjunct rather than a challenge to monarchy" across the Gulf[205]. In the 2000s, as will be discussed in more details in the upcoming chapter, the Gulf monarchies have also made deliberate efforts to exert greater control over migration, openly embracing "anti-integration" policies designed to hinder the settlement and assimilation of migrant workers into their host societies[206].

With the emergence of the Arab Spring in 2011, the Gulf States became deeply apprehensive about the potential ramifications of political uprisings in the Middle East. This led them to adopt more stringent domestic and foreign policies concerning migration. Saudi Arabia, in particular, launched a robust "correction campaign" aimed at deporting irregular migrants, intending to demonstrate the state's commitment to better controlling and eventually reducing migration. Among the targeted group were Yemeni migrants, as neighboring Yemen was engulfed in a civil war that originated from the Arab Spring[207]. Although Qatar has not been as assertive as Saudi Arabia and the UAE in its approach towards migration, the ideological orientation of the migrant community and the influence of international/regional dynamics have remained prominent topics on the migration agenda.

Nevertheless, following the Gulf crisis of 2017 (as discussed in chapter 5), Qatar has implemented several policies that reflect a new perspective on Qatar's societal

[204] KAPISZEWSKI, Andrzej. Arab versus Asian migrant workers in the GCC countries. In: South Asian migration to gulf countries. Routledge India, 2017. p. 66-90.

[205] CHALCRAFT, John. Monarchy, migration and hegemony in the Arabian Peninsula. 2010.

[206] LONGVA, Anh Nga. Neither autocracy nor democracy but ethnocracy: Citizens, expatriates and the socio-political system in Kuwait. Monarchies and nations: Globalisation and identity in the Arab states of the Gulf, 2005, 114-135.

[207] Thiollet, "Managing Migrant Labour in the Gulf: Transnational Dynamics of Migration Politics since the 1930s", International Migration Institute Working Paper 131 (2016), pp. 1–25.

security as this dissertation presents many similarities with the Nordic way of societal security which addresses the threats to life-giving functions rather than those concerning identity. This involves integrating migrant workers[208], particularly those with specialized skills, into society under the Baladna vision. However, until 2017, Qatar's societal security perspective shared many similarities with that of other Gulf countries, where migration-induced demographic imbalances gave rise to certain existential and potential threats. These threats, whether explicitly recognized as societal security concerns or not, included the risk of nationals becoming a minority, the formation of sub-communities, and a gradual erosion of the use of the native Arabic language. These issues remain relevant and will be further discussed in the following sections of this chapter.

3.1. Nationals Becoming a Minority

Demographic change significantly impacts the social structure and composition of countries, including the Gulf region. Several factors contribute to these changes, such as high migration, increasing development levels, improved healthcare, and declining fertility rates. Among these factors, migration plays a crucial role in shaping the demographic landscape in the Gulf, alongside the relatively low birth rates.

When oil exploration commenced in Qatar in 1949, the nation's population was a mere 16,000, a significant decline from the approximately 27,000 residents recorded fifty years earlier in 1908[209]. The traditional economy, which had been reliant on pearl trading, had crumbled in the 1920s, and internal strife with Bahrain during the 1930s had caused Qatar's population to disperse[210]. This population included a diverse mix of people, including local semi-nomadic and nomadic Bedouin groups, fishermen, merchant families with slaves, and a few thousand individuals of Persian origin[211].

[208] KINNINMONT, Jane. The gulf divided: The impact of the Qatar crisis. 2019.

[209] DE BEL-AIR, Françoise. Demography, migration, and labour market in Qatar. 2014.

[210] Ibid.

[211] Ibid.

The total population of the GCC region has grown around seven times since 1970, from a population of 7.86 million to a population of 54 million in 2016, making the GCC region the fastest-growing population in the world[212]. By 2030, the GCC total population is forecasted to increase by 23% to reach 66.6 million[213], in which population is Qatar is projected to reach 3.32 million in 2030 with the 38.4% net change[214]. The phenomenal growth in population was not entirely organic. For the large part, it was a consequence of the oil boom in 1973 in which GCC states started to experience rapid development accompanied by an exponential increase in the number of expatriates. As a result, 48% of the total population of GCC states is composed of non-national as shown in Table 3.1, where 88.2% of Qatar's population is composed by non-nationals.

Table 3. 1. Total population and percentage of nationals and non-nationals in GCC countries (mid-2020)

Country	**Total population**	**Nationals**	**Foreign nationals**	**% Nationals**	**% Nonnationals**
Bahrain	1,472,204	713,263	758,941	48.4	51.6
Kuwait	4,816,592	1,442,005	3,374,587	29.9	70.1
Oman	4,578,016	2,719,500	1,858,516	59.4	40.6
Qatar	2,833,679	338,000	2,495,679	11.8	88.2
Saudi Arabia	35,013,414	21,430,128	13,583,286 61.2 38.8	61.2	38.8
UAE	9,282,410	1,215,996	8,066,414	13.1	86.9
Total	57,996,315	27,858,892	30,137,423	48	52
Source: Gulf Labor Markets and Migration (GLMM) programme					

Foreigners have had a notably greater presence in the labor force compared to their representation in the overall population. While the non-national population occupies less than 50% in total population in all the GCC average, non-nationals made up a majority of the workforce, with an average of approximately 70 percent in the years of 2000s and growing towards the upcoming years[215]. The lowest percentages were

[212] Authors calculations based on the United Nations Population Division estimates and projections

[213] United Nations. "World Population Prospects - Population Division - United Nations." United Nations, 2022, population.un.org/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/.

[214] Ibid.

[215] KAPISZEWSKI, Andrzej. Arab versus Asian migrant workers in the GCC countries. South Asian migration to Gulf countries: History, policies, development, 2006, 23: 46-70.

observed in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, where expatriates still constituted over 50 and 65 percent of the labor force, respectively. In Kuwait, a staggering 82 percent of the workforce consisted of foreign workers, while in Qatar and the UAE, it reached almost 90 percent[216].



Figure 3. 1. Population trends of non-nationals (% in total population)
Source: Gulf Labour Markets and Migration (GLMM) programme

[216] FASANO, Ugo; GOYAL, Rishi. Emerging strains in GCC labor markets. 2004.

As the figure 3.1 reveals, in the majority of GCC states, nationals now are in the minority. It is not just the recent overwhelming numbers of non-nationals that have led nationals to perceive a growing threat to their economic and cultural existence, but also the ongoing trend of an increasing proportion of non-nationals in the total population, which continues to solidify over time. (Figure 3.1).

Compare with other GCC states, the case in Qatar is more dramatic. The non-national population in Qatar occupies the highest share among the GCC which potentially triggers the concern that the national is getting minority. This issue used to garner significant attention among citizens. It also used to be at the top of the political agenda prompting numerous government agencies to commission studies on potential mitigation strategies. Addressing this imbalance is crucial as it significantly affects various aspects, including labor and immigration policies, gender issues, infrastructure, and public services.

Especially after 2010, demographic reality has become increasingly serious in the state agenda of Qatar, especially with the combination of high migrant inflows and low birth rates. While nationalist policies (which will be discussed in Chapter 4 in more details), such as Qatarization in the job market and promoting the fertility rates among nationals, have attempted to slow down the decline the proportions of non-nationals, it is a discussion in the region that managing migration more strategically appears to be the more effective approach in addressing the imbalance. In the Qataris national demographic pyramid profile, a considerable amount of the focus has shifted to examining the peculiarities of its labor markets: the "emerging strains" and growing levels of "structural employment" resulting from an over- dependence on an expatriate workforce and the government job-provision mechanism (for citizens) that lies at the heart of the social contract[217]. This triggers the economic driven migration and consequently the demographic imbalances which escalate the issue that the national become minority.

It is important to note here that the term "demographic imbalance" is frequently used in discussions to highlight disparities in population size and underline that fact that

[217] FORSTENLECHNER, Ingo; RUTLEDGE, Emilie Jane. The GCC's 'demographic imbalance': perceptions, realities and policy options. Middle East Policy, 2011, 18.4: 25-43.

the nationals become a minority. However, it is sometimes misused as a propagandistic tool to fuel anti-foreign sentiments, diverting attention from the essential development problems that contribute to the situation. In that regard, as cited from a report published by GCC Planning and the Executive Office: expatriate workers related demographic imbalance was marked a significant "threat of erosion to Gulf identity[218]." This concern is reflected in numerous newspaper articles in the Gulf, which highlight the anxiety over nationals becoming minorities in their own countries. For instance, an article in the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Rai noted: "Nationals are increasingly apprehensive about their identity as they have become a minority in their homeland. The elements of Gulf identity most at risk include social values, culture, and traditions[219]". Some scholars have examined this phenomenon by analyzing the relationship between demographic imbalance and the natural carrying capacity. In this context, it is argued that the region's primary concern should focus on the imbalance between population growth and natural resources, as the Gulf's population, encompassing both nationals and expatriates, has exceeded the region's natural carrying capacity.[220].

3.2. The diminishing Use of the Arabic Language

Initially, migrant workers in GCC states were largely composed of Arabs. By 1975, 90 per cent of the non-national workforce of Saudi Arabia was comprised of Arab migrants. In a country where the total resident population was around six million, North Yemenis numbered 280,400, Palestinians 175,000, Egyptians 95,000 and South Yemenis 55,000[221]. In Kuwait, Arab migrants totaled around 400,000 (out of a total resident population of about one million) and thus comprised about four-fifths of the total non-national workforce in 1975. Almost half of the Arab migrants were

[218] Eman Mohammed, Abu Dhabi Deputy Editor. "The Debate on UAE National Identity." Uae – Gulf News, July 24, 2019. https://gulfnews.com/uae/the-debate-on-uae-national-identity-1.106921.

[219] Organization. "الصفحة الرئيسية." Alrai, November 28, 2024. https://www.alraimedia.com/.

[220] MARTIN, Philip L.; MALIT, Froilan. A new era for labour migration in the GCC?. Migration Letters, 2017, 14.1: 113-126.

[221] Birks, J. Stace, and Clive A. Sinclair. "Arab manpower: the crisis of development." (1980).

Palestinian/Jordanian, and most of the rest were Egyptian, Syrian or Iraqi[222]. In Bahrain, in 1971, around half the non-national workforce was Arab, the majority (two-thirds) of these from Oman[223]. The absolute numbers involved in Qatar were smaller, but still proportionally significant[224]. In the UAE in 1975, a quarter (62,000) of all migrant workers (251,500) were Arab, the most numerous being Palestinian/Jordanian, Omani and Egyptian[225]. In Oman, almost half the workforce was probably non-national in 1975, an unknown but significant proportion of these being Arab[226].

While Arab workers have been an important part of the labor migrant population in the Gulf, The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait led to the explosion of many Arabs who were citizens of countries that were perceived to be aligned or sympathetic to the regime of Saddam Hussein. Specially, many citizens of Palestine, Jordan and Yemen were expelled from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. For long, Arab migrants were considered to pose a political threat to the ruling elite in GCC states and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991 highlighted the sense of threat. Arab migrants, especially Palestinians, Egyptians and Yemenis, had always been politically active and acted to transmit international and regional anti-monarchical pressures. They played a role in 'the revolutionary, Arab nationalist tide which inundated the Gulf and Arab peninsula region in the 1950s'[227]. Domestically they formed an important element in oppositional assemblages, involving renegade princes, disaffected officers, merchants, professional and intermediary classes, workers and migrants. These groups were stitched together – articulated hegemonically in a way that made diverse social elements appear as a unity – in various ways by the ideas of pan-Arabism,

[222] Russell, Sharon Stanton. "Politics and ideology in migration policy formulation: the case of Kuwait." International Migration Review (1989): 24-47.

[223] Birks, J. Stace, and Clive A. Sinclair. "Arab manpower: the crisis of development." (1980).

[224] Birks, J. Stace, and Clive A. Sinclair. "Arab manpower: the crisis of development." (1980).

[225] Ibid.

[226] Ibid

[227] Al-Naqeeb, Khaldoun. "State and society in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula. A different perspective." (1990).

Nasserism, leftism, statist developmentalism and reformism, and posed a challenge to the ruling families[228].

The increased presence of Arabs from other regions in the GCC states also raised concerns among local nationals on multiple fronts. One of the concerns was the perceived "Egyptianizing" of local dialects and culture, which was believed to have resulted from the predominance of Egyptians in the field of education[229]. Additionally, the presence of Palestinians in the GCC states led to these states becoming entangled in political matters related to the Arab-Israeli conflict, further complicating the situation. In that regard, Birks and Sinclair pointed out that "Many GCC nationals feel disconnected from Palestinians and Jordanians, lack respect for Yemenis, and harbor mistrust and dislike towards Egyptians"[230]. Mohammed Al-Fahim, a UAE businessman, captured the sentiment of locals towards non-Gulf Arabs by stating, "Because we had a common religion and for the most part, a common language, we felt we were dealing with friends not foes. In the case of our neighbors, we shared the same Arab perspective on life and the world. Or so we believed. Unfortunately, we found to our dismay that it took more than such commonalities to build a solid foundation for trustworthy relationships[231]."

Against this backdrop, the expelled Arabs were replaced with Asian workers who were considered to pose a lesser political threat. Asians were less likely to demand political rights, could more easily be marginalized and disenfranchised, and were perceived less likely to engage in politics, being in no danger of subscribing to Arab nationalism or political Islam. Nevertheless, the replacement of Arab workers has posed, social and cultural threats to the local population. One of the most prominent ones has had the effect of diminishing the use of the Arabic language. As cited from

[228] Chalcraft, John. "Monarchy, migration and hegemony in the Arabian Peninsula." (2010).

[229] GRAZ, Liesl. The Turbulent Gulf: People. Politics and Power, 2nd edition (London: IB Tauris, 1992), 1992, 147-57.

[230] BIRKS, J. Stace; SINCLAIR, Clive A. International migration and development in the Arab region. (No Title), 1980.

[231] AL FAHIM, Mohammed. From rags to riches. Dubai, UAE: London Centre of Arab Studies, 1995,160.

Russel and Teitelbaum, the proportion of expatriates who were Arabs in the GCC countries declined from 72 percent in 1975 to 56 percent ten years later[232]. Conversely, in 1970, individuals of non-Arab descent made up just 12 percent of the total workforce in the Gulf region[233]. However, as the figure 3.2 reveals, more recently (2010-2014), the proportion of non-Arabs in the total population has reached significant levels, with non-Arabs forming the majority in some GCC states. This is exemplified by the highest percentages observed in the UAE and Qatar, where they account for 76% and 73% of the population, respectively.



Figure 3. 2. Percentage of non-Arabs in total population

Source: Gulf Labour Markets and Migration (GLMM) programme. (Accurate data for Saudi Arabia was not available)

Thus, it is not surprising to see that in the Gulf region, the perception of threat to identity is no more prevalent than when it comes to the diminishing use of the Arabic language since language is not just a communication tool but also represents a fundamental expression of social identity. In addition, Arabic presents a special case as it is tied and integrated with Islam, and as such, the perceived threat to the Khaliji identity is amplified and encompasses the religious dimension of identity.

[232] RUSSELL, Sharon Stanton; TEITELBAUM, Michael S. International migration and international trade. World Bank, 1995.

[233] Ibid.

The declining use of the Arabic language in GCC states has become a topic of growing concern in discussions across the region including Qatar. Article written by a Qatari writer claim that this problem is "*a matter of concern to the people in the country (Qatar) Influencing the traditions, habits and linguistic heritage of people*"[234].

Participants in the 'Coordinating Forum for Universities and Institutions' also raised concerns about the Arabic language in the Gulf states. They discussed the impact of expatriate labor on the prevalence of Arabic in these countries and cautioned against "this danger, which threatens the national identity of these nations and, consequently, the security and stability of the region[235]." In one of the forum sessions, Dr. Lateefah Al-Najjar, a professor of Arabic at the UAE University, presented a paper discussing the impact of the Asian workforce on the Arabic language in the GCC[236]. She asserted that Khaliji children are exposed to minimal standard Arabic, as the predominant linguistic input comes from the Arabic dialect spoken at home and the pidgin language used with Asian maids and drivers. Dr. Al-Najjar concluded that the pidgin language would undoubtedly impede the acquisition of the Arabic language[237]. She recommended replacing the Asian workforce with Arabs and making Arabic language proficiency a condition of employment[238].

Similar arguments were presented in an interview with Dr. Muhammad A. Al-Kafud, the former Minister of Education of Qatar, published in the Arabic newspaper Al-Rayah. Among various factors, he attributed the decline of Arabic in the GCC countries to the presence of non-nationals cultural mixing and foreign nannies[239].

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[234] "When foreign workers threaten the language of religion". (Arabic reference). Al-Manara, last accessed on July, 11th, 2017 from http://www.menara.ma/ar/2014/12/09/

[235] AHMAD, Rizwan. Challenges of Communication and Identity in the Gulf: Insights from Qatar and the UAE. In: Social Change in the Gulf Region: Multidisciplinary Perspectives. Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore, 2023. p. 287-304.

[236] AHMAD, Rizwan. Challenges of Communication and Identity in the Gulf: Insights from Qatar and the UAE. In: Social Change in the Gulf Region: Multidisciplinary Perspectives. Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore, 2023. p. 287-304.

[237] Ibid.

[238] Ibid.

[239] Ibid.

Moreover, Al-Farajani, in his article titled "The Harmful Effects of the Influx of Asian Workforce in the Gulf Countries," published on the Al-Jazeera website claimed that the presence of Asians has resulted in negative cultural consequences, with the most significant being 'corruption of the Arabic language'[240].He claimed that due to the substantial Asian workforce, words from Asian languages have gained prominence to the extent that their Arabic equivalents are disappearing[241].

In the Arab Youth Survey also, it was found that young Arabs consider the Arabic language crucial to their identity. However, many of them express concerns about its diminishing significance due to the growing prevalence of English usage. This was one of the results of a survey conducted by international pollster Penn Schoen Berland in January and February 2015, involved 3,500 individuals aged 18 to 24. Of those surveyed, two-thirds expressed worry about the declining use of Arabic, with over a third admitting using English more frequently in their daily lives. Notably, the phenomenon is more pronounced among GCC nations, where 56% of respondents reported using English more than Arabic, compared to 24% in non-GCC countries. The survey included male and female Arab nationals from 16 countries, including the six Gulf Cooperation Council states (UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia), as well as Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia, and Yemen. In the subsequent 2022 survey, it also showed that a majority (55 percent) believed that the Arabic language held less importance for them than it did for their parents. However, only 40 percent of GCC youth shared this view[242].

The impact of this language shift is also evident in social media usage. Dr. Zeinab Ibrahim, a professor at CMU-Q and an expert from the Qatar Foundation, notes that the language predominantly used on social media is posing a threat to the future of

[240] Al-Faraj¯an¯ı, N. (2008, March 19). Mad. ¯ar Tad. akhkhum al-'Am¯alah al-¯Asiyaw¯ıyyah F¯ı al-Buld¯an al-Khal¯ıj¯ıyyah. Al-Jazeera.

[241] AHMAD, Rizwan. Challenges of Communication and Identity in the Gulf: Insights from Qatar and the UAE. In: Social Change in the Gulf Region: Multidisciplinary Perspectives. Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore, 2023. p. 287-304.

[242] AHMAD, Rizwan. Challenges of Communication and Identity in the Gulf: Insights from Qatar and the UAE. In: Social Change in the Gulf Region: Multidisciplinary Perspectives. Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore, 2023. p. 287-304.

Arabic. As digital platforms, particularly social media, increasingly shape our lives and communication, English has emerged as the dominant language in these spaces. Consequently, many young people are forsaking their native Arabic in favour of English[243].

Due to the immediacy of social media, users prioritize languages that facilitate quick and effortless communication. To adapt to this trend, some Arab youth have developed a new form of written Arabic using Latin letters and numbers, known as 'Franco-Arabic,' to represent the pronunciation of Arabic words. Dr. Zeinab Ibrahim emphasizes the importance of encouraging children to use formal Arabic and overcome their apprehensions, enabling them to practice their mother tongue confidently and correctly[244].

When analyzing the findings of the Arab Youth Survey along with broader discussions in GCC countries, it becomes evident that the use of Arabic is in decline, placing the language under threat. Although social media and other factors associated with modernization have significantly contributed to this phenomenon, the large proportion of non-Arabic speakers in the labor force and among domestic workers further exacerbates the erosion of the Arabic language. As it is argued, this poses a serious threat to Khaliji identity, where the Arabic language plays a central role.

3.3. The Emergence of Sub-communities

As discussed previously, the Gulf countries have witnessed a significant shift in the composition of their foreign labor force over the last four decades. Particularly in 1990s, Arabs were gradually replaced by a growing number of workers from countries that had already established a strong presence in the GCC workforce, such as India and Pakistan. However, the transformation was not limited to these nations alone. The Gulf countries began to attract a labor force from a multitude of Asian

[243] IBRAHIM, Zeinab; PAPADOPOULOS, Pantelis; KARATSOLIS, Andreas. ‘Arabiyyatii: An Innovative Technology-Based Curriculum for Teaching Arabic to Native Speakers. In: *Handbook for Arabic Language Teaching Professionals in the 21st Century, Volume II*. Routledge, 2017. p. 199-215.

[244] Ibid.

countries, including the Philippines, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Indonesia. This marked the inception of what is now commonly referred to as the "Asian workforce" in the Gulf[245].

Since the Asian workforce became a reality in the Gulf, the all the Gulf States has begun to pay attention of the demographic changes and the associated challenges. To manage the influx of foreign labor and diversify the proportion of migrant nationalities, the Gulf States implemented various policies. One of the notable policies introduced was the national quota system in which the policies limit the issuance of working permits for specific nationalities, effectively regulating the flow of foreign workers from different countries[246]. Another policy to control the proportions of the nationality of the migrant population is a wage protection system (WPS) which regulates wage levels by nationality[247]. While those policies have launched to control the demographic proportions of migrant in the Gulf, over the years South Asian migrants have emerged as the predominant group in terms of numbers. This has led to a complex dynamic, where nationalities from countries like India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka often find themselves occupying the labor market and creating sub-communities[248].

The prevalence of South Asian migrant workers is evident through statistical data. Numerous reports indicate significantly larger populations of specific Asian communities in the Gulf States According to Kapiszewski, Gulf states currently accommodate millions of Asians which are mostly from south Asian countries primarily from India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka [249] in which Indian citizens

[245] AHMAD, Rizwan. Challenges of Communication and Identity in the Gulf: Insights from Qatar and the UAE. In: Social Change in the Gulf Region: Multidisciplinary Perspectives. Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore, 2023. p. 287-304.

[246] HAMZA, Sara. Migrant labor in the Arabian Gulf: a case study of Dubai, UAE. Pursuit-The Journal of Undergraduate Research at the University of Tennessee, 2015, 6.1: 10.

[247] FARGUES, Philippe, et al. Migration to the Gulf: Policies in Sending and Receiving countries. Gulf Labour Markets and Migration Programme, 2018.

[248] FARGUES, Philippe, et al. Migration to the Gulf: Policies in Sending and Receiving countries. Gulf Labour Markets and Migration Programme, 2018.

[249] KAPISZEWSKI, Andrzej. Arab versus Asian migrant workers in the GCC countries. South Asian migration to Gulf countries: History, policies, development, 2006, 23: 46-70.

account almost one third of non-nationals in all around the Gulf (Figure 3.3). Such high numbers of non-nationals from a single country leads to the emergency of sub community with distinctive identity and cultural in GCC states.



Figure 3. 3. Percentage of Indian citizens in non-nationals total population

Source: Gulf Labour Markets and Migration (GLMM) program

Similar to other Gulf States, Qatar is predominantly inhabited by an Asian expatriate population, with Indians standing out as the most prominent subgroup. As of 2015-2016, Indians constituted the largest segment of foreign nationals in the country, numbering approximately 650,000 residents. This figure represented 25 percent of the entire resident population[250] and approximately 31 percent of the total estimated foreign population (Table 3.3). When considering the four most substantial national groups (India, Nepal, Bangladesh, and the Philippines), they collectively accounted for nearly three-quarters of all foreign residents in Qatar[251]. Egyptians formed the most substantial Arab national group, with an estimated population of around 200,000[252]. However, this group made up less than 10 percent of all foreigners and a

[250] DE BEL-AIR, F.; DEMOGRAPHY, Migration. Labour Market in Qatar,,,. Gulf Labour Markets and Migration, Explanatory Note, 2017, 3

[251] Ibid.

[252] DE BEL-AIR, F.; DEMOGRAPHY, Migration. Labour Market in Qatar,,,. Gulf Labour Markets and Migration, Explanatory Note, 2017, 3

mere 8.6 percent of the total population. Syrians, including newly arrived refugees, were estimated at around 54,000, while other Arab nationalities such as Sudanese, Lebanese, Jordanians, Tunisians, and Palestinians numbered between 20,000 and 50,000 individuals[253].

As numbers demonstrates that Qatar, as many other Gulf States, has displayed a distinct pattern of spatial segregation among its expatriate population, primarily to prevent the emergence of sub-communities within the country. As a result, the percentage of individuals residing in labor camps, most likely non-nationals, witnessed a significant rise commencing in 2004. By 2015, the majority of Qatar's populace, comprising 60 percent or 1,442,882 individuals, were living in such housing facilities. This segregation is particularly evident among men, as a substantial 74 percent of them were found to be residing in these labor camps[254].

However, despite efforts to prevent sub-community formation, the number of dependents has steadily increased in Qatar. As of 2015, the latest available data indicates that there were 159,874 dependents in the country, including 36,518 men and 123,356 women, all aged 15 and above[255]. The rapid growth in Qatar, as similar to other Gulf States, has given rise to a multitude of sub-communities, each with its own unique customs and culture, which are now making their presence felt in the neighborhoods. A closer look at these sub-communities reveals a notable concentration of migrant populations in specific urban areas within the Gulf, where their cultures have begun to influence the urban landscape. In all the Gulf states, parallel with the proportions of the migrant's workers, most migrant communities residing in historic city centers hail from the Indian Subcontinent (e.g., India, Nepal, and Bangladesh), South-East Asia (e.g., the Philippines), and the Middle East (e.g., Egypt, Jordan, and Sudan)[256].

[253] Ibid.

[254] Ibid.

[255] Ibid.

[256] GARDNER, Andrew, et al. A portrait of low-income migrants in contemporary Qatar. Journal of Arabian Studies, 2013, 3.1: 1-17.

In addition to a substantial percentage of migrants who come to Gulf cities alone for a limited number of years without their families, a stable and continuously growing community has developed from the first generation of migrants who decided to settle permanently after the commencement of oil production. Both these settled communities, and many migrants have given rise to distinct neighborhood and unique urban lifestyles that are influenced by their respective cultures[257]. Consequently, street life in the downtown areas of Gulf cities serves as a reflection of a significant portion of the overall population, who face challenges in being heard and integrated into today's urban environments[258].

In the context of Qatar, central urban areas such as Souq Waqif and the Al Asmakh district have become focal points for lower-income migrant communities, contributing to the dissemination of their cultural values[259]. However, this phenomenon is sometimes perceived as a cultural threat to the host society. While the concentration of some nationalities has created many positive impacts economically, the emergency of sub community is perceived as a challenge to the Khaliji identity stemming from differing cultural values and norms. Threat perception among nationals reaches, in some cases, to a point of presenting the Indian culture and identity of dominating the national one. This perception among nationals also prevents from having a rational discussion on multiculturalism and the basic development issues that lead to demographic imbalances in the first place with the unfortunate result being surrender to irrational defensive nationalistic tendencies[260].

3.4. Imbalances Prospects

As aforementioned, the population growth in the Gulf region is largely fueled by economic migration, which is interlinked by economic growth. By considering the

[257] Nagy S (2006) Making room for migrants, making sense of difference: spatial and ideological expression of social diversity in urban Qatar. Urban Stud 43(1):119–137

[258] GARDNER, Andrew M. Gulf migration and the family. Journal of Arabian Studies, 2011, 1.1: 3-25.

[259] Ibid.

[260] Ibid.

International Monetary Fund (IMF) projection which is a resurgence in GDP growth for Gulf countries in the next decade, following a dip in 2017, as oil prices recover, and non-oil economic activities pick up[261]. Even if economic growth slows down in the near future, demographic imbalances will persist. While Gulf nations have made workforce nationalization a policy objective, they still rely on a substantial number of immigrant workers, particularly in low and semi-skilled positions that locals are reluctant to fill.

Indeed, the demand for foreign workers in Gulf countries in the coming years will also depend on several factors, including the number of young nationals entering the job market, the impact of labor market nationalization policies, the economy's capacity to create new jobs, the qualifications of local workers in relation to job market needs, and the willingness of nationals to accept low-prestige jobs. Political and security considerations will also play a role[262].

Mega projects in the Gulf, such as Neom in Saudi Arabia, and the North Field Expansion (NFE) project in Qatar, as well as many international venues such as EXPO and Asian Cups continue to be unveiled, and these developments will sustain the demographic imbalances. If current trends continue, the number of expatriates is projected to increase in the rest of this decade, potentially leading to a higher percentage of foreigners in the population, at least in some countries[263]. Most of these newcomers are expected to be Asians, as they remain more attractive to GCC employers due to lower wage rates and better education, and technical training compared to non-Gulf Arab labor[264].

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[261] "Gulf Cooperation Council: The Economic Outlook and Policy Challenges in the GCC Countries." IMF, December 14, 2017. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2017/12/14/pp121417gcc-economic-outlook-and-policy-challenges.

[262] KAPISZEWSKI, Andrzej. Arab versus Asian migrant workers in the GCC countries. South Asian migration to Gulf countries: History, policies, development, 2006, 23: 46-70.

[263] Abdulsalam, Suad Al. "2020 Population Census." GCC Statistical Center - 2020 Population Census. Accessed October 12, 2023. https://gccstat.org/en/statistic/surveys/2020/population-census-2020.

[264] KAPISZEWSKI, Andrzej. Arab versus Asian migrant workers in the GCC countries. South Asian migration to Gulf countries: History, policies, development, 2006, 23: 46-70.

While many Gulf States have started to launch a number of plans and policies to control the migrant population and demographic imbalances, there is no clarity on that these ambitious plans will be fully realized, as previous attempts to reduce the foreign labor force in GCC states faced challenges[265]. In the years ahead, the projection of ILO demonstrates that foreign shares of the population are expected to increase all around the Gulf which may boost the ongoing tensions between private sector interests, state indigenization efforts, and societal security concerns[266]. Additionally, the cultural and social consequences of naturalizing a significant number of foreigners remain uncertain. As all other GCC states, Qatar's demographic challenges are also deeply intertwined with economic developments and labor and immigration policies. In terms of economic development, the World Bank projects for Qatar that the anticipated Real GDP expansion is set to decelerate to 2.8% in 2023, persisting at this level over the medium term[267]. Despite challenges like a weakened construction sector and more stringent monetary policies, there is an expectation of strong growth in non-hydrocarbon areas, reaching 3.6%[268]. This upswing is driven by the success of tourist arrivals and the staging of significant events. Qatar's global sporting prominence will be further solidified with an additional major sporting events scheduled until 2030[269].

When it comes the labor policies, National Vision 2030 Qatar (launched in 2008) underlines two primary approaches. The first involves limiting the number of foreign workers while simultaneously improving their rights. The second approach seeks to maintain high levels of immigration while reducing the demographic disparity between Qatari nationals and foreigners by blurring the distinctions of status and identity between the two groups[270].

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[265] Ibid.

[266] MALIT JR, Froilan T.; TSOURAPAS, Gerasimos. Migration diplomacy in the Gulf–non-state actors, cross-border mobility, and the United Arab Emirates. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 2021, 47.11: 2556-2577.

[267] "Economic Diversification Efforts Paying off in GCC Region but More Reforms Needed." World Bank, www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/11/22/economic-diversification-efforts-paying-off-in-gcc-region-but-more-reforms-needed.

[268] Ibid.

[269] Ibid.

[270] DE BEL-AIR, Françoise. Demography, migration, and labour market in Qatar. 2014.

Until 2017, the favored policy direction appeared to be the first option as it is underlined at the first phase of the national development strategy initiated in 2008, emphasizing challenges related to modernization, preserving tradition, and managing the size and quality of the expatriate labor force. The Qatar Population Policy of 2009 aimed to boost fertility rates among Qatari citizens and advocated for "improving recruitment policies in line with a knowledge-based economy.[271]" This involved limiting the recruitment of unskilled laborers and promoting the use of technology.

As of late 2016, the new Population Policy for 2017-2022 introduced by the Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics (MDPS) and the Permanent Population Committee aimed to strengthen previous policy directions. This included increasing the number of Qatari nationals, fostering the shift toward a knowledge-based economy, and controlling the recruitment of expatriate workers. The resident population was projected to decrease from mid-2017 due to the nearing completion of major infrastructure projects and layoffs resulting from an economic downturn. Reduced oil and gas revenues led to budget cuts, impacting the state's population, which decreased from 2,700,539 in May 2017 to 2,545,820 in June 2017. Layoffs occurred in various sectors, including the private and public sectors, and were witnessed in the Qatar Foundation, a state-owned non-profit organization.

However, since 2017, regional political tensions resulting from the blockade imposed by three Gulf States and Egypt have had additional implications for migrants in Qatar[272]. While the regional tension has started to be ease off since 2021, the policy landscape on migrant policy of Qatar has evolved, and the second option has become more favorable in policymaking. The current population of Qatar stands at 2,716,391, reflecting a 0.79% increase from 2022[273]. As will be discussed in the

[271]Permanent Population Committee, Qatar Population Status 2012,Three Years after Launching the Population Policy http://www.gsdp.gov.qa/portal/page/portal/ppc/PPC_home/ppc_news/ppc_files_upload/populations_status_2012_en.pdf.

[272] DE BEL-AIR, Françoise. Demography, migration, and labour market in Qatar. 2014.

[273] Qatar, Planing and Statistical Authority. “Figures on Total Population.” Monthly figures on total population. Accessed October 12, 2023. https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/statistics1/StatisticsSite/pages/population.aspx.

following chapters, although the demographic disparity between Qatari nationals and foreigners has intensified, the distinctions of status and identity between has been blurring among the two groups, owing to the "Baladna" or "our country" approach, as argued in this dissertation. From this point, Qatar can be identified as unique case among the Gulf states as it will be discussed with more details in chapter 5 in more details.

Although similarities exist between Qatar and other Gulf states in their responses to existential threats, the nuanced differences in Qatar's approach are particularly notable. Historically, Qatar has taken relatively moderate stances on migration issues, especially in the aftermath of significant events such as the Kuwaiti invasion of Iraq and the Arab Spring, in contrast to the more rigid responses observed in other Gulf states. The evolution of threat perception in Qatar took a more distinctive turn following the transformative events of the 2017 Gulf crisis. This crisis introduced new dimensions to societal security, shifting the focus from traditional existential threats, such as those related to identity to emerging threats that impact the fundamental life-giving functions of the state and society. As discussed in Chapter 5, those threats that emerged during the 2017 blockade cannot be attributed to specific identity groups. Since they threaten critical social functions, life and health, and the basic needs of all population both nationals and non-nationals.

Nevertheless, it remains valid to argue that until 2017, the existential threats discussed in this chapter were a consistent concern on the societal agenda in Qatar. As explored in the following chapter, Qatar's responses to these threats largely mirrored state-level approaches seen across the Gulf, albeit with less emphasis on social-level measures

CHAPTER 4

PERCEPTIONS TOWARDS MIGRATION LED DEMOGRAPHIC IMBALANCES IN QATAR AND THE GULF BEFORE 2017

As outlined in Chapter 2, scholars of Copenhagen School approach identity as a central organizing concept inherit to societal security. They emphasize that the "we" identity—which can be more varied in terms of tribes, clans, countries, culture, religion, and race—is more closely associated with the referent object in the societal sector. Societal issues do not follow an exceptional path in the Gulf region. In the last decades, the demographic issues covered in chapter three have turned into existential threats to the Gulf States' identities and shared culture such as "Khaliji" identity (Arabic Gulf indigenous).

Principles that have become embedded in the local population's mentality since their independence are important to describe identity in the Arabian Gulf countries. The first aspect of commonality in the Gulf is tribalism, where "people share common ancestry and kinship and use their tribal affiliation as their last names[274]." In Gulf culture, religious components rooted in Islamic theology, language, and clothing are unique aspects of cultural and identity communality. It is important to remember that in addition to these social norms, there are other aspects of the political and economic systems that are similar as well, such as monarchy and rentier economies dependent on oil[275].

Following the oil boom in the Gulf, the emerging dynamics led to the evolution of the way shared identity in the Gulf states. They experienced cultural and identity

[274] PARTRICK, Neil. Nationalism in the Gulf states. In: The Transformation of the Gulf. Routledge, 2013. p. 47-65.

[275] CRYSTAL, Jill. Oil /politics in the Gulf: Rulers and merchants in Kuwait and Qatar. Cambridge University Press, 1995.

division due to a combination of population imbalances, native-superiority beliefs, and cultural and social homogeneity. In the past four decades, the oil-based rentier economy and its demographic consequences have also confronted native citizens with changes and challenges to their national identity. These new threats have been stimulated in part by the issues portrayed in political debates and media coverage, as well as in intellectual discussions.

In the case of Qatar, up until the Gulf crisis of 2017, the country, like other Gulf states, focused heavily on identity as a key part of its society. This became especially important in the 2000s when many migrant workers from Asian countries arrived, causing various levels of social insecurity. Crucial at this juncture was to define societal security in Qatar as the safeguarding of a social entity, distinct and transcending the sum of its individual components. Unlike individual security, societal security goes beyond securing its constituent elements[276]. Responses to these threats in Qatar up to 2017 happened on various levels. On the state level, dealing with migration led demographic imbalances involved creating laws and tightening border controls. On the societal and individual levels, non-state methods, like tribal networks, were used to handle identity-related challenges. However, as discussed later in this chapter, individuals often perceived these issues more implicitly compared to the more decisive state-level political actions.

On an intellectual level, many scholars have also viewed demographic imbalances as a security risk. They see it as a challenge to the shared values of the Gulf region. For instance, Al-Khouri examined how migration-driven demographic imbalances have transformed nationals into a minority, prompting the securitization of foreigners as a perceived threat to core cultural values and national identity[277]. Similarly, Al-Najjar highlights...

> *The growing number of foreigners can be considered a socio- politic threat as well as an identity and cultural one. If the migration ballooning continues*

[276] PARTRICK, Neil. Nationalism in the Gulf states. In: The Transformation of the Gulf. Routledge, 2013. p. 47-65.

[277] AL-KHOURI, Ali M. The challenge of identity in a changing world: the case of GCC countries. In: Conference proceedings: the 21st-century Gulf: the challenge of identity. 2010.

> *to rise in the GCC states, new international norms, pacts, and laws will start to force the Gulf countries to provide some rights to the expatriates which had been denied in the past. This would expand the political, cultural and economic realm to create equality between expatriates and native citizens, leading (it is feared) to the political domination of expatriates as well*[278].

In addition to migration's impact on demographic shifts, the evolving profile of migrant workers and the growing number of skilled immigrants have become central to societal security discussions, particularly at an intellectual level. The influx of skilled expatriates not only influences culture and language but also sparks debates about political systems of the Gulf States, including issues of democracy, freedom, political rights, and migrant rights. This has drawn increased international attention to the Gulf states. As Matar observes, the 2000s marked a significant trend in the Gulf, with a rising number of skilled workers prompting new conversations around nationality, private ownership, and human rights. These developments have placed Gulf states under greater international scrutiny and exposed Gulf societies to increased vulnerability[279].

Discussions around societal security have, in some cases, moved beyond just state-level issues, bridging both international and domestic levels, especially during the early 2010s. While debates on demographic challenges have been a common topic within Gulf countries for a long time, Gulf states have faced increasing international scrutiny for how they manage their populations. Many Gulf states, including Qatar, have faced criticism from abroad over the harsh conditions experienced by lower-income migrant workers, who make up a significant part of the local labor market.[280]. The discourse on migrant rights emphasizes equal entitlement to basic human rights for all residents, urging the state to protect these rights. However, international concern over how Gulf states treat their migrant populations often seems out of touch with the concerns of local citizens. There is growing unease among Gulf societies

[278] ALNAJJAR, Baqr. Foreign Labor and Questions of Identity in the Arabian Gulf. Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies, 2013:13.

[279] Ibid.

[280] Franks, "Sporting Events Shine Spotlight on Qatar's Human Rights", BBC, 26 Jan. 2013; Amnesty International, The Dark Side of Migration: Spotlight on Qatar's Construction Sector Ahead of the World Cup (2013).

about becoming a minority in their own countries due to the dominance of non-national populations, which they see as a threat to their culture and identity[281].

Zooming in the case of Qatar, since the country was awarded the 2022 FIFA World Cup in 2010, international criticism of its labor practices has intensified. Human rights organizations like Human Rights Watch and global media have frequently called on Qatar to prioritize the rights and fair treatment of foreign workers[282]. They have raised concerns about issues such as passport and visa confiscation, overcrowded living conditions, hazardous work environments, debt bondage, broken contracts, and forced labor[283]. However, the national-level discourse often poses a different perspective. As Ewers et al. point out, criticisms of Qatar's treatment of guest workers are often framed through Western viewpoints, which may fail to consider how the workers themselves perceive their rights and well-being[284]. The underlying assumption is that migrants suffer from false consciousness rating their quality of life positively or placing themselves in harmful situations because they do not know how bad their lives are [285].

Although this divergence in perspectives has the potential to create tensions between Qatar and the international community in some degree, as a small Gulf state, Qatar has worked to establish a robust network of international support to safeguard its interests. Balancing these differing viewpoints on its demographic and labor policies have been always important in the political agenda of Qatar to maintain domestic stability and security while preserving its global reputation. As discussed later in this chapter, Qataris generally do not see explicitly foreigners as a societal security threat although their attitudes toward blue-collar and white-collar workers vary. However,

[281] FORSTENLECHNER, Ingo; RUTLEDGE, Emilie Jane. The GCC's 'demographic imbalance': perceptions, realities and policy options. Middle East Policy, 2011, 18.4: 25-43.

[282] EWERS, Michael, et al. Beyond vulnerability: contextualizing migrant worker views on rights and wellbeing in the Gulf Arab states. Comparative Migration Studies, 2023, 11.1: 20.

[283] "Qatar: Little Progress on Protecting Migrant Workers." Human Rights Watch, December 5, 2022. https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/08/24/qatar-little-progress-protecting-migrant-workers.

[284] EWERS, Michael, et al. Beyond vulnerability: contextualizing migrant worker views on rights and wellbeing in the Gulf Arab states. Comparative Migration Studies, 2023, 11.1: 20.

[285] Ibid.

there was notable resistance among Qataris to creating systems that would reduce the gap in rights and privileges between nationals and non-nationals.[286]. This raised questions about the appeal of creating such equality, particularly if it includes the right to permanent settlement and citizenship for the migrant population. The skepticism among Qatari citizens towards socially integrating the foreign population or easing access to citizenship adds complexity to the circumstances[287].

Until 2017, the legal framework in Qatar also struggled to gain societal support for expanding migrant rights to be on part with citizenship privileges. Economic rights, which are seen as inherent to citizenship, present a major obstacle to achieving broader inclusiveness and equality for everyone. International human rights norms, which discourage excessive privileges for specific groups, conflict with the situation in Qatar, where nationals have access to greater economic and social benefits.[288]. In that regard, critics argue that the state's emphasis on improving economic and social opportunities for its citizens has led to a neglect of the rights of foreign workers, negatively affecting their socio-economic well-being[289]. By prioritizing citizens while failing to address potential exploitation of the foreign workforce, the state's policy choices have strained international criticism.[290].

Since the 2017 Gulf crisis, there has been an increased focus on improving protections for foreign workers in Qatar, prompting the announcement of reforms in labor migration policies, which will be explored in the next chapter. At the same time, the state is working to address the concerns of nationals who worry about economic and cultural marginalization. This delicate balancing act seeks to reconcile the seemingly opposing interests of a local population that has become a numerical and privileged minority and a marginalized majority population.

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[286] BABAR, Zahra. Population, power, and distributional politics in Qatar. Journal of Arabian Studies, 2015, 5.2: 138-155.

[287] FAGOTTO, Giulia. The State-Migration Nexus in the Gulf in Light of the Arab Uprisings. Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), 2013.

[288] BABAR, Zahra. Population, power, and distributional politics in Qatar. *Journal of Arabian Studies*, 2015, 5.2: 138-155.

[289] Ibid.

[290] Ibid.

4.1. State Level Responses

In the early years of the state formation of the Gulf States, the security structure was mostly discussed and explained within the framework of the political and military sectors of the security puzzle[291]. During those years, societal sectors were not deeply explored, and discussions around societal security often revolved around the legitimacy of authority as recognized by society. Demographic challenges in the Gulf were typically addressed within the political sphere[292]. For instance, in some Gulf states, the potential social effects of reducing the Arab presence in the population became part of political conversations. On a policy level, the Qatari Labor Law of 1962, for example, prioritized Qataris for all jobs, with secondary preference given to other Arabs[293]. Only if no suitable candidates from these groups were available would jobs be offered to foreigners.[294] After the 1980s, demographic changes and migration-driven imbalances began to be increasingly framed as security issues within political discussions. In 1982, Abd al-Rahman al-Dirham from the Qatari Ministry of Labor highlighted:

> *The question of foreign labor is of great concern. Our social customs are threatened by foreigners. The problem is not just in Qatar but also in other Gulf countries. We prefer it if we can get suitable people from Arab countries who can live in the Gulf area without changing it*[295]

With the new millennium, the social consequences of demographic imbalances became more visible in the Gulf States. The GCC authorities have begun to admit publicly the negative consequences of this situation[296]. In October 2004 meeting of GCC labor ministers, Majeed Al-Alawi, the Bahraini Minister of Labor and Social

[291] BATTALOGLU, Cihat. Security Puzzle in the Gulf: New Sectors and New Challenges. Arms trade, military services and the security market in the Gulf states: trends and implications, 2016, 8-23.

[292] Ibid.

[293] The Labour Law No. 3 of 1962 3 / 1962 https://www.almeezan.qa/lawpage.aspx?id=299&language=en (1962).

[294] HEEG, Jennifer. Gender, International Trafficking Norms and Gulf Migration [online]. 2010.

[295] KAPISZEWSKI, Andrzej. Arab versus Asian migrant workers in the GCC countries. In: South Asian Migration To Gulf Countries. Routledge India, 2017. p. 66-90.

[296] Ibid.

Affairs, cautioned that non-Arab foreign workers posed a strategic threat to the region's future.[297]. A year after, Abdul Rahman Al Attiya, the GCC Secretary-General, warned about the possible consequences of the demographic imbalances in his speech:

> *The GCC countries need to look at the massive presence of expatriates as a national security issue, and not merely as an economic matter… International accords are pressing for the settlement of expatriates and giving them salaries equal to nationals and greater rights in the areas of education and health*[298].

Although societal issues became more securitized after 2000, the concept of societal security was not explicitly mentioned. Instead, these threats were often framed as strategic threats or national security issues.

Since the 1990s, Gulf states have ramped up their regulation of migration by enacting policies aimed at preventing the integration of migrant workers into their societies. They created a migration management system focused on the idea of 'temporary labor import,' emphasizing short-term contracts and regular turnover of migrant labor while restricting family reunification and access to citizenship[299]. This strategy also involves limiting socio-economic rights and carrying out deportation of unauthorized migrants. These measures collectively define what is known as the 'Gulf model' of transnational migration management.[300] Thiollet describes the 'Gulf model' of migration management as characterized by pronounced societal and labor market divisions, alongside policies that resist the integration of migrant workers. Both government and private sectors play key roles in this approach, emphasizing short-term labor contracts and limiting socio-economic rights for migrants.[301].

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[297] Al-Alawi, Majeed. "Meo." MEO, October 12, 2004. http://www.middle-east-online.com/.

[298] KAPISZEWSKI, Andrzej. Arab versus Asian migrant workers in the GCC countries. In: South Asian Migration To Gulf Countries. Routledge India, 2017. p. 66-90.

[299] Ibid.

[300] THIOLLET, Hélène. Managing migrant labour in the Gulf: Transnational dynamics of migration politics since the 1930s. 2016.

[301.] Ibid.

The combined approach of the Gulf states was also evident in their joint efforts on migration over the past two decades, especially within the context of the GCC. The Gulf States' shared migration strategies are further emphasized by their practice, starting in the 1980s of selecting migrants based on nationality. Since the 1990s, they have pursued initiatives to 'nationalize' their workforce by promoting the employment of nationals in both public and private sectors. Other common measures include urban segregation trends, changes to naturalization and citizenship laws, efforts to reform the *kafala* sponsorship system, and restrictions on the duration of migrants' stays, especially for those in low-wage jobs.[302]

In the 2000s, the Gulf model was adjusted, with societal security concerns broadening from just demographic imbalances due to large migrant populations to also include cultural impacts and the influence of modernization on emerging cultural movements. National strategies and policy shifts were put in place to tackle these challenges. As will be covered in the next chapter, following the 2017 Gulf Crisis, Qatar began to be diverted from other Gulf states and started to adopt more inclusive policies. However, before this point, Gulf countries, including Qatar, mostly framed societal threats at the policy level without explicitly referring to 'societal security.' In Qatar specifically, safeguarding Qatari values and national identity from perceived societal threats was a recurring focus in official documents.

4.1.1. The Policy Responses by National Visions in the Gulf and Qatar

The Gulf states' national vision documents address societal security challenges stemming from demographic imbalances, although they often do not explicitly use the term 'societal security.' These documents also tackle issues related to culture and identity. Some Gulf states emphasize migration led demographic imbalances as an existential threat to Khaliji identity and culture. An analysis on the national visions also demonstrates that through that documents the policymakers not only strive to promote cultural awareness, but also strengthen a sense of belonging and citizenship.

[302] THIOLLET, Hélène. Managing migrant labour in the Gulf: Transnational dynamics of migration politics since the 1930s. 2016.

Although all national visions emphasize the importance of preserving culture, heritage, and identity, some specifically highlighting Arab and Islamic identity, the ways they address existential threats vary. Certain states explicitly acknowledge such threats, whereas others, like Bahrain and Oman, focus more on economic challenges, resulting in a more cautious approach to societal elements compared to other Gulf visions. For example, in Bahrain's Vision 2030, cultural elements, rather than national identity, are highlighted as key components of societal security. This focus is detailed under the pillar titled "Society: A Just, Thriving Society." Within this pillar, it emphasizes,

> *Bahrain will continue to be home to a rich and ancient culture and a sustainable natural environment. Various initiatives will be taken to promote and protect both. Three action items specifically address the cultural preservation which are (1) Enforcing laws on cultural preservation; (2) Making archaeological and Islamic sites a more prominent part of our cultural landscape; (3) Encouraging new generations of Bahrainis to gain experience and in-depth knowledge of our cultural heritage*[303].

The Oman 2020 Vision, UAE Vision 2021 National Agenda, and Saudi Vision 2030 all reflect distinct but interconnected approaches to nation-building and societal development in the Gulf, showcasing a spectrum of priorities tied to national identity, social cohesion, and socioeconomic progress.

Oman 2020 Vision emphasizes economic development and workforce nationalization, with a focus on integrating Omani nationals across sectors through prioritization of education and training."[304]. This illustrates a strategy aimed at fostering socioeconomic resilience by equipping its people for leadership roles within a diversifying economy. The approach is less explicitly rooted in cultural or national identity compared to its neighbors, reflecting a pragmatic developmental focus.

In contrast, the UAE Vision 2021 National Agenda prioritizes building a cohesive society and preserving national identity by fostering social inclusion and maintaining

[303] Kingdom of Bahrain - EGovernment Portal. Accessed May 18, 2024. https://www.bahrain.bh/wps/portal/

[304] Supreme Council for Planning. Accessed May 18, 2024. https://www.scp.gov.om/en/Page.aspx?I=14.

cultural heritage. While it also emphasizes socioeconomic goals, it strongly advocates for integrating all social segments while nurturing family and community bonds. [305]. This dual focus on integration and preservation highlights a more holistic approach to national identity, balancing modern progress with cultural continuity. Moreover, the National Agenda aims for the UAE to be among the best in the world in the Human Development Index.

When it comes the Saudi Arabia, the concept of national identity is well emphasized. Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030, cantered around a 'Vibrant Society, With Strong Roots,' underscores national identity more explicitly through a celebration of Saudi, Arab, and Islamic heritage:

> *We recognize the importance of preserving this sophisticated heritage in order to promote national unity and consolidate true Islamic and Arab values. We will endeavor to strengthen, preserve and highlight our national identity so that it can guide the lives of future generations. We will do so by keeping true to our national values and principles, as well as by encouraging social development and upholding the Arabic language. We will continue to work on the restoration of national, Arab, Islamic and ancient cultural sites and strive to have them registered internationally to make them accessible to everyone and, in the process, create cultural events and build world-class museums which will attract visitors from near and far. This will create a living witness to our ancient heritage, showcasing our prominent place in history and on the map of civilizations*[306].

In Kuwait, discussions extend beyond just national identity, explicitly addressing demographic imbalances and the large number of migrants as both challenges and policy goals. In Kuwait Vision 2035, issues related to identity and demographics are specifically highlighted. As part of its six-pronged strategic development goals up to 2035, the vision document emphasizes two key points concerning identity and demographics, which are...

> *1.Promoting demographic policies, supportive of development strategy by: (a) Securing improvements in the demographic composition of the*

[305] "Vision 2021." Scope of Vision 2021. Accessed May 18, 2024. https://government.ae/en/information-and-services.

[306] Vision2030. Goals | Saudi Vision 2030. Accessed May 18, 2024. http://vision2030.gov.sa/en.

population; (b) Improving skill levels of indigenous population; (c) Securing improvement in the quality and productivity of expatriate workforce; and (d) Promoting the observance of human rights and, in this regard, preserving Kuwait's reputation in adherence to relevant international conventions[307].

2. Consolidating the Islamic and Arab identity through preservation of Kuwait's Islamic identity and the state's Arab orientation, in accordance with the dictates of Kuwait's constitution[308].

In the case of Qatar, specific emphasis has been placed on addressing 'societal challenges caused by demographic imbalances.' The Qatar National Vision 2030 outlines Qatari identity, culture, heritage, social norms rooted in Arab and Muslim values, human capital, and demographics as the core elements of Qatari society. The Vision also specifically highlights the major societal challenges facing Qatar. The first challenge it identifies is:

Preservation of cultural traditions is a major challenge that confronts many societies in a rapidly globalizing and increasingly interconnected world. Qatar's very rapid economic and population growth have created intense strains between the old and new in almost every aspect of life. Modern work patterns and pressures of competitiveness sometimes clash with traditional relationships based on trust and personal ties and create strains for family life. Moreover, the greater freedoms and wider choices that accompany economic and social progress pose a challenge to deep-rooted social values highly cherished by society. Yet it is possible to combine modern life with values and culture. Other societies have successfully melded modernization around local culture and traditions. Qatar's National Vision responds to this challenge and seeks to connect and balance the old and the new[309].

Additionally, the document specifically highlights the size and quality of the expatriate labor force as a challenge. It emphasizes that...

Qatar is currently experiencing high rates of population growth due mainly to massive urban development, large-scale investment projects and rising government expenditure. These factors have led to a large increase in the

[307] New Kuwait in 2035 Development Vision." Kuwait National Development Plan. February 24, 2017. Accessed May 18, 2024. http://www.newkuwait.gov.kw/en/new-kuwait-in-2035-development-vision/.

[308] Ibid.

[309] Qatar National Vision 2030. Accessed August 2, 2024. https://www.mdps.gov.qa/en/qnv1/pages/default.aspx.

> *ratio of expatriates to locals in the labor force, and a particularly sharp and unanticipated rise in the immigration of unskilled workers. The composition of a nation's population will determine the nature of its society. Qatar must determine a suitable size and quality of its expatriate labor force. It must weigh the consequences of recruiting expatriate workers in terms of their cultural rights, housing and public service needs, as well as the potential negative impact on national identity, against the anticipated economic benefits that accrue from an increase in the numbers of foreign workers in the total labor force*[310].

At the implementation level of the national vision's roadmap, Qatar's National Development Strategies (NDS) 1 (2011–2016) and NDS 2 (2017–2022) also place a strong focus on protecting Qatari culture and identity while addressing demographic imbalances as a key concern. Both strategies highlight major challenges, such as "aligning the size and quality of the expatriate labor force with the chosen path of development" and "preserving Qatari culture and traditions."[311] These issues remain central to the strategies, and NDS 3 (2023–2030) continues to emphasize the importance of both Qatari citizens and residents. This will be examined in more detail in the next chapter.

NDS 1 (2011–2016) lays out broad future trends and embodies the aspirations, goals, and cultural values of the Qatari people. This strategy was designed to bring Qatari citizens together around common future objectives. In terms of human development, it focuses on strengthening Qatari values through education and training, particularly in response to the new influences brought by the growing expatriate population. The document highlights that

> *While a large expatriate community broadens perspectives on other cultures and lifestyles, it also threatens traditional Qatari values founded in Arabic culture and Islam. For this reason, QNV 2030 specifies that education should contribute to 'a solid grounding in Qatari moral and ethical values, traditions and cultural heritage* [312]**.**

[310] Ibid.

[311] Qatar's National Development Strategies (NDS) 1 and Qatar's National Development Strategies (NDS 2). Accessed August 2, 2024. https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/nds1/Pages/default.aspx

[312] Qatar's National Development Strategies (NDS) 1. Accessed August 2, 2024. https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/nds1/Pages/default.aspx

Although academic guidance and the reinforcement of moral values imparted by Qatari families and communities are already integral parts of curricula and institutional missions, NDS 1 proposes additional measures across all phases of education and training to support its five-year goals and further strengthen Qatari values.

NDS 1 also emphasizes the need to boost the active involvement of Qatari men and women in the workforce while also attracting skilled expatriates, especially for higher-level positions. It addresses various challenges facing Qatar's labor market, such as sponsorship rules that often encourage employers to favor hiring low-cost expatriate labor over Qataris.

Additionally, the document highlights issues like automation and high immigration rates, which contribute to a low-wage, labor-heavy, and low-productivity economy[313]. It also points out that the widespread subsidization of bringing in low-skilled expatriate workers, along with the increasing presence of expatriates in critical sectors like health and education, creates significant risks for the country[314]. Therefore, it recommends a review and revision of immigration policies, regulations, sponsorship practices, and licensing to foster a more strategic approach to hiring expatriate workers, aligning this demand with the goal of recruiting and keeping the right balance of skills[315]. The document also calls for updates to Qatar's labor laws as necessary to strengthen the protection of expatriate workers' rights and ensure safety standards are met within a comprehensive social protection system that aligns with international norms. In addition, it underscores the importance of bringing in skilled expatriate professionals and tailoring career planning and professional development programs specifically for them, so they can play a more active role in mentoring and training young Qataris across different fields.[316].

[313] Qatar's National Development Strategies (NDS) 1.

[314] Ibid.

[315] Qatar's National Development Strategies (NDS) 1. Accessed August 2, 2024. https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/nds1/Pages/default.aspx

[316] Ibid.

To reach its labor market goals, the government introduced significant reforms between 2011 and 2016, focusing on building human capital to support long-term economic growth and aiding the shift toward a knowledge-based economy. The main aim was to boost labor market efficiency by aligning the supply of workers more effectively with demand in both public and private sectors. The reforms included: (1) Expanding access to high-quality training programs for Qataris; (2) Offering incentives to encourage Qataris to work in the private sector; and (3) Attracting and retaining top-tier expatriate talent.[317]

As a result of NDS 1's focus on human development, integrating policies across multiple interrelated sectors within a single strategy was identified as a solution to create a progressive and modern social agenda while upholding traditional family and cultural values. This approach respects traditional Qatari culture and Arab identity, even as necessary advances are made in social equality, protection, and justice. Qatari society is noted for "the essence of its culture and continuity with the past," which includes keeping fundamental Islamic principles, preserving the status and prestige of leading families, and upholding the family unit as the core of society. A primary and ongoing challenge is to balance modern life with the country's cultural and traditional values[318].

The Qatari identity was also central focus in the social development chapter of NDS 1, which lays out goals aimed at enhancing the nation's social well-being and that of its citizens. Throughout the document, there is a strong emphasis on "Qataris," underscoring NDS 1's commitment to "building an effective social protection system for all Qataris" that upholds their civil rights, "acknowledges their contributions to society, and ensures a sufficient income for a healthy and dignified life[319]." Additionally, it underscores the significance of Arab identity by aiming to "establish Qatar as a hub of Arab culture through a distinctive national identity, strong community cohesion, and a vibrant and creative cultural sector. [320]"

[317] Ibid.

[318] Ibid.

[319] Qatar's National Development Strategies (NDS) 1.

[320] Ibid.

NDS 1 also places a strong emphasis on enhancing Arab and Islamic values, and national identity. It identifies demographic imbalances as a critical challenge to preserving these values. The text highlights that Qatar's huge expatriate population represents a variety of cultures and includes practitioners of many other religions… which has resulted in the need for an active policy… "to maintain the essence of Qatari culture and a considerable degree of continuity from the past. [321]" To address this, NDS 1 suggests using culture as a means to cultivate national pride, encourage intercultural understanding, and protect and develop Qatar's cultural heritage. This approach aims to preserve the country's national identity and reinforce family bonds[322].

Although the National Development Strategy 2 (NDS 2) officially spans the years 2018-2022, this dissertation also examines the period leading up to its implementation, with particular attention to the policy-making processes before the Gulf Crisis of 2017. This earlier timeframe is considered because NDS 2's preparation phase took place in 2016 and early 2017, carrying over certain themes and nuances from NDS 1. Similar to its predecessor, NDS 2 highlighted the significance of Arab and Islamic values as well as the preservation of national identity. However, it also introduced a stronger emphasis on distinctly Qatari values and began to address broader segments of the community, including all residents of Qatar, not just its citizens, signaling a shift in the nation's strategic focus. While the "Baladna" approach, which encompasses all segments of Qatari society, including nationals and non-nationals, is more prominently stressed in the NDS 3 document, NDS 2 marked a notable step in extending its attention to non-nationals compared to NDS 1, thus motioning a transition to a new understanding of Qatari identity. In this context, the NDS 2 document explicitly reflected the leadership's directive to broaden its focus beyond Qataris to encompass all social groups.

> *Qatar looks forward to the building of an effective social protection system for all Qataris that ensures their civil rights, values their contribution in*

[321] Ibid.

[322] Qatar's National Development Strategies (NDS) 2. Accessed August 2, 2024. https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/nds1/Pages/default.aspx

> *developing their society, and ensures an adequate income to maintain a healthy and dignified life." In line with the QNV 2030, the country's leadership has instructed that one of the Second National Development Strategy 2018-2022 (NDS-2) themes should be: "transition from the reactive state of simple social welfare policies to a proactive state by enabling all social segments to participate in national development.* [323]

Furthermore, in the fourth section of the document concerning human development, NDS 2 focused on enhancing services for Qatar's entire population, whereas earlier documents primarily referred to "Qatari citizens." However, like NDS 1, NDS 2 also recognized the large influx of foreign residents and demographic imbalances as significant challenges in providing services. For instance, in section 4.2 on Education and Training Quality, NDS 3 highlighted the challenge posed by demographic imbalances, emphasizing its impact on service delivery.

> *The high and unsustainable level of population growth is primarily due to the continued large influx of foreign workers resulting from an uncontrolled response to the requirements of labor market and infrastructure projects. There has also been a noticeable increase in the influx of expatriate families with school-age children. This growth in the school-age population has significantly increased demand for the education system, which is expected to provide the required educational opportunities at the highest possible quality. This will entail the need to provide necessary funding, human resources and infrastructure, with effective use of resources to maintain education quality.* [324]

Another challenge which resulted from demographic structure was highlighted when setting Intermediate outcome 12 of NDS 2 which is related to increase all post-secondary learners' awareness and pride of Qatar's values and heritage, despite promoting tolerance, understanding and respect for other cultures and people. As cited from the document

> The *Qatari society has undergone many new influences over the past two decades due to increasing numbers of expatriates who work and live in Qatar and have different cultures… While adherence to national values is a fundamental principle, it still needs additional and complementary action by*

[323] Qatar's National Development Strategies (NDS) 2. Accessed August 2, 2024. https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/nds1/Pages/default.aspx

[324] Ibid.

all sectors of education and training to entrench values that are at the heart and mind of Qatari society and Qatari people. [325]

The demographic imbalance caused by the significant influx of foreign labor was also highlighted in section 4.2, which focuses on rebalancing the labor market structure. In this section, Qatar's labor market is characterized by multiple dichotomies: between the public and private sectors, between citizens and expatriate workers, and between highly skilled and low-skilled labor. To address these disparities, new employment policies have been assigned to various government entities. One of the key outcomes of these policies is to create a "labor market that provides skilled expatriate labor and achieves high labor productivity.[326].

The NDS 2 document also provided a snapshot of the situation analysis for the years until 2017. Based on the findings, it outlined key social challenges, including the effects of globalization on national cultural values, a scarcity of innovation in cultural education, limited opportunities and specialized training for young people to learn the arts, and the absence of a comprehensive framework for artists' development, as well as a database on the types and levels of cultural activities and their impact. To tackle these challenges, the document laid out specific objectives, positioning culture as a means to strengthen national identity and foster intercultural understanding[327]. A key focus was placed on preserving and developing Qatar's cultural heritage, aimed at reinforcing a sense of national identity

From this viewpoint, while NDS 1 and NDS 2 share common goals such as promoting citizenship, upholding Qatari values, and protecting Qatari heritage, NDS 2 adopts a more inclusive approach by recognizing all residents as part of Qatari values. This broader perspective is evident in the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), which now encompass non-Qataris, accounting for 22% of the total KPIs. [328]

[325] Qatar's National Development Strategies (NDS) 2. Accessed August 2, 2024. https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/nds1/Pages/default.aspx

[326] Ibid.

[327] Ibid.

[328] Authors calculation from Qatar's National Development Strategies (NDS) 2. Accessed August 2, 2024. https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/nds1/Pages/default.aspx

The development of National Development Strategies 1 and 2 has brought about substantial policy changes within the human and social pillars of the Qatar National Vision 2030. The education system has been reassessed with a strong emphasis on Qatari culture and heritage, while labor reforms have targeted managing the migrant community more effectively.

The 2009 Law on Human Resources Administration was revised in 2016 and again in 2020 to lower barriers to workforce participation and enhance the recruitment and retention of expatriate workers. As the following section will elaborate, both the sponsorship law and nationalization policies were also reviewed during 2016 and 2020.

As the chapter 5 elaborates further, NDS 3 introduced a completely new approach compared to NDS 1 and 2. It emphasized a more inclusive strategy that integrates non-Qatari expatriates into its policy considerations. This evolution demonstrates a shift in national development strategies, moving from an identity-based approach to a more inclusive model of societal security. This shift aligns with the "Baladna" concept, which is central to the dissertation. The focus on the expatriate community and the inclusive language used to describe the people of Qatar are key points that will be explored further.

4.1.2. The Policy Responses by Migration Policies in the Gulf and Qatar

In response to societal security concerns stemming from demographic imbalances and issues of culture and identity, the Gulf States have also implemented numerous migration policies aimed at protecting nationals from existential threats to their culture and identity. In the 2010s, these migration policies began to shift from a focus on rigid societal divisions and resistance to integration—where both government and private sectors played crucial roles—toward a more balanced and result-oriented approach. However, these policies continued to prioritize the protection of nationals and their identities against existential threats, as discussed in Chapter 3. Notably, the nationalization initiatives and the kafala system were heavily utilized alongside other policies to address these concerns.

4.1.2.1. The Kafala (sponsorship) System

The Kafala (sponsorship) system has been one of the central mechanisms for regulating migrant labor in GCC countries. This system has also been designed as a distribution mechanism for citizens. The Kafala, rooted in the region's historical and social fabric, was originally designed to monitor the large influx of migrant workers, which is essential for the rapid economic development in these nations[329]. However, it has also served as a means to control and restrict the rights of these workers, thereby maintaining national identities and reinforcing social hierarchies within these countries.

In the GCC countries, the Kafala system has been adapted in various ways to suit the unique socio-political contexts of each Gulf state. Despite these differences, the core principles of the system remain consistent throughout the region: foreign workers are required to have a local sponsor (kafeel) who is responsible for their visa and legal status, effectively binding the worker to their employer.[330]. This system has been instrumental in managing the large, semi-permanent foreign population that is key to the Gulf economies. These migrant workers, forming the main body of the workforce in sectors such as construction, domestic work, and service industries, are vital for maintaining the rapid pace of development and the high standard of living enjoyed by the native populations. However, the system has also been criticized for creating a power imbalance between employers and workers, leading to widespread exploitation and abuse[331].

Many GCC countries over the last three decades faced significant challenges in managing the dynamics between their reliance on foreign labor and the pressures to reform the Kafala system. These demands sometimes lead to short-term solutions that address immediate concerns but conflict with long-term development goals. The

[329] FARGUES, Philippe, et al. Migration to the Gulf: Policies in sending and receiving countries. Cambridge: Gulf Research Centre Cambridge, 2018.

[330] Ibid.

[331] BALDWIN-EDWARDS, Martin. Labour immigration and labour markets in the GCC countries: national patterns and trends. 2011.

Kafala system, originally a social practice based on personal accountability, has evolved into a complex legal framework which has started to play a central role in the regulation of labor migration and consequently demographics. This evolution has been marked by increasing formalization and regulation, but also by growing criticism of the system's restrictive and often abusive nature[332].

The exploitation of low-skilled migrant workers has been the most prominent criticism of the Kafala system. These workers, who often come from economically disadvantaged backgrounds, are particularly vulnerable to abuse due to the power dynamics inherent in the Kafala system[333]. However, it is important to note that the system's impact extends beyond low-skilled labor who, despite having better working conditions and legal protections, are still subject to the same legal framework that ties their legal status to their employer. The migration process is also fraught with challenges from the outset, starting with the recruitment process in the workers' home countries. This process is often dominated by an extra-legal market that can involve exorbitant recruitment fees, deceptive practices, and other forms of exploitation that put migrant workers at a disadvantage even before they arrive in the Gulf [334].

After arriving in the country, the Kafala system has created a semi-permanent underclass of non-citizens within the Gulf societies[335]. This stratification contradicts the original intent of the system, which was to promote a cyclical migration pattern where workers would eventually return to their home countries after completing their agreements. Instead, many workers end up staying in the Gulf for extended periods, often for decades, without ever gaining citizenship or full rights. This situation has

[332] DIOP, Abdoulaye; JOHNSTON, Trevor; LE, Kien Trung. Migration Policies across the Gcc: challenges in Reforming the Kafala. Migration to the Gulf: Policies in sending and receiving countries, 2018, 33-60.

[333] FARGUES, Philippe, et al. Migration to the Gulf: Policies in sending and receiving countries. Cambridge: Gulf Research Centre Cambridge, 2018.

[334] RAHMAN, Mizanur. Does labour migration bring about economic advantage? A case of Bangladeshi Migrants in Saudi Arabia. 2011.."

[335] FARGUES, Philippe, et al. Migration to the Gulf: Policies in sending and receiving countries. Cambridge: Gulf Research Centre Cambridge, 2018.

led to a rigid and segmented labor market, where worker mobility is severely restricted. Such restrictions not only contribute to the exploitation of workers but also have broader economic implications. For instance, the lack of mobility can stifle competition, reduce productivity, and hinder economic growth and diversification efforts in the Gulf [336].

The inefficiencies of the Kafala system go beyond legal and ethical issues; they also carry substantial economic costs[337]. Different studies[338] show that firms operating under the Kafala system are generally less efficient than those in adjacent free zones, where worker productivity is better incentivized. The system's reliance on short-term contracts, flat wages, and limited internal mobility undermines the motivation for migrant workers to exert higher levels of effort. This lack of motivation, coupled with the systemic inefficiencies, leads to productivity losses that the Gulf states—already grappling with declining revenues from energy exports—can ill afford[339].

The complexity of the Kafala system, combined with the significant economic and social factors at play, has made it difficult to enact meaningful reforms that address the root causes of its flaws. For that reason, different Gulf countries have pursued reforms to the Kafala system with varying degrees of success. Bahrain and Kuwait, for example, have introduced reforms that initially appeared promising but were ultimately diluted in practice. In 2009, Bahrain became the first GCC country to allow workers to change employers without the formal permission of their sponsors. This reform was seen as a significant step towards improving worker mobility and reducing exploitation. However, the implementation of this policy has been lacking consistency, and many of the original issues with the Kafala system remain. Similarly, Kuwait's reforms, which included the establishment of the Public

[336] ULRICHSEN, Kristian Coates. The Gulf states in international political economy. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

[337] FARGUES, Philippe, et al. Migration to the Gulf: Policies in sending and receiving countries. Cambridge: Gulf Research Centre Cambridge, 2018.

[338] Ibid.

[339] AL-GHANIM, Kaltham. Kafala system remains resilient in the GCC. In: Gulf Affairs, Labor Market Dynamics in the GCC States, Ox GAPS, Oxford Gulf & Arabian Peninsula Studies Forum. 2015. p. 6-9.."

Authority for Labor Affairs and efforts to improve labor conditions, have had limited impact on the ground. While these reforms represent progress, they have not fundamentally changed the power dynamics inherent in the Kafala system[340] .

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have also undertaken efforts to reform their labor systems, introducing measures such as wage protection systems and heightened penalties for labor violations. These initiatives aim to enhance transparency and better safeguard workers' rights. Nonetheless, like in Bahrain and Kuwait, these reforms have not addressed some of the core issues associated with the Kafala system. Practices like withholding passports and requiring exit permits continue to pose serious challenges for migrant workers in these countries. These measures effectively trap workers in their current jobs, making it difficult for them to escape abusive situations or pursue better opportunities elsewhere[341].

Oman and Qatar have similarly encountered obstacles in their efforts to reform the Kafala system. Qatar, in particular, has been heavily scrutinized due to its role as host of the 2022 FIFA World Cup which was decided in 2010. The global attention on Qatar has increased pressure for reforms to its labor practices, including the Kafala system. In response, Qatar introduced a new law in 2015 that was presented as a major overhaul intended to "end the Kafala system[342]." However, critics contend that the reforms fell short of fully removing the institutional barriers that restrict labor mobility and freedom. Rather than pursuing substantive changes, Qatar and other Gulf states have often focused on public relations campaigns, increasing the cost of enforcing the Kafala system without truly addressing its fundamental causes.[343].

Prior to the implementation of the 2015 law, Qatar’s Kafala system operated within a rigid and restrictive framework that controlled nearly every aspect of expatriate

[340] JONES, Ryan. Beyond Kafala: remedying human rights abuses of migrant workers in the Persian Gulf. 2016.."

[341] MILLER, Terry; KIM, Anthony B.; ROBERTS, James M. Economic freedom. The Heritage Foundation, 2022, 490.

[342] Ibid.

[343] Ibid.

workers' lives. This system was designed not only to manage the labor force but also to prevent potential societal threats by keeping expatriate workers largely segregated from the native population. Under this system, every migrant worker entering Qatar was required to have a local sponsor, who was responsible for managing the worker's residency and ensuring compliance with various legal requirements[344]. This sponsor held significant power over the worker, as the expatriate was legally bound to work exclusively for the sponsor. Exceptions were rare and usually involved secondment to another employer, which still needed the sponsor's approval. The sponsor was also obligated to provide basic needs such as accommodation, food, transportation, and health insurance, following the decent work standards set by the International Labor Organization[345].

One of the most contentious elements of the pre-2015 Kafala system was the requirement that expatriate workers obtain an exit permit from their employer to leave Qatar. This gave employers significant control over their employees' ability to travel and often led to situations where workers were unable to leave the country due to disputes or other issues. Furthermore, sponsors held the power to repatriate workers to their home country if their residence permits expired or if a deportation order was issued. This system created a situation where expatriate workers' rights and freedoms were severely restricted, making them almost entirely dependent on their sponsors for nearly every aspect of their lives.

The introduction of the 2015 law marked a significant shift in Qatar's labor regulations, although it did not completely abolish the Kafala system, which remained in place until 2020. One of the most notable changes was the changing of the requirement for a sponsor with a work contract directly with their employer[346].

[344] AL HAMMADI, Hind Mohammed, et al. The Impact of Abolishing the Sponsorship System (Kafala) on the Peaceful Co-existence of Population Groups in Qatar In light of the Migration Goals of the Alliance of Civilizations. *Social Sciences*, 2022, 12.4: 388-408.

[345] CHOLEWINSKI, Ryszard; GUTTMAN, Uri.Understanding the kafala migrant labor system in Qatar and the Middle East at large, with ILO senior specialist Ryszard Cholewinski. *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, 2023, 24.1: 72-77.

[346] Law No. 21 of 2015, new provisions regulating the entry, exit and residency requirements for Qatar’s workers. The law came into effect on 13 December 2016, Qatar Legal Portal - Al Mezan

This shift aimed to reduce the power imbalance inherent in the earlier system by making the relationship between the employer and employee more transparent and regulated by contractual terms rather than personal sponsorship. Workers were also granted the ability to renew their residency visas independently, without needing to go through their employer, which provided them with greater autonomy and security[347].

Another critical change introduced by the 2015 law was the increased flexibility for workers to change employers before the expiration of their contract[348]. Previously, this was nearly impossible without the employer's explicit consent, but under the new law, workers could change jobs as long as they provided notice within the period specified by law. This change represented a major improvement, as it enabled workers to pursue better opportunities or leave abusive work situations without being confined by restrictive contracts. Moreover, the new law clarified the obligations of both employers and workers by stipulating that the terms specified in the employment contract would govern their responsibilities. This shift placed greater importance on the formal contractual relationship, moving away from the informal and often exploitative practices that had long defined the Kafala system.

The 2015 reform also addressed the controversial exit permit requirement as well. Expatriate workers dependent to the Labor Law were now permitted to exit and re-enter Qatar without obtaining prior permission from their employer[349], although they still had to provide notice within the legally specified period. This change marked a significant step forward in improving expatriate workers' freedom of movement and reducing the level of control that employers wielded over their lives. As it will discuss in more detail in Chapter 5, the full cancellation of exit permits for all expatriates not subject to the labor law, as mandated by Minister of Interior Decision No. 95 of 2019, further reinforced this shift[350].

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[347] AL-HAMMADI, Hind Mohd AM; BAYOUOMI, Kawthar Abdalla; ROSMAN, Arieff Saleh Bin. Managing Population Diversity and Peaceful Coexistence in Qatar in Light of the Objectives of Qatari Migration in the Alliance of Civilizations. International Journal of Health Sciences, I: 2587-2604.

[348] Law No. 21 of 2015, new provisions regulating the entry, exit and residency requirements for Qatar's workers. The law came into effect on 13 December 2016, Qatar Legal Portal - Al Mezan

[349] Ibid.

[350] Interior Decision No. 95 of 2019, Qatar Legal Portal - Al Mezan.

The 2015 law did not completely eliminate the Kafala system, which had long been used as a tool to manage demographic imbalances and control workers who were sometimes perceived as a societal security risk. However, it laid the groundwork for several critical reforms, most of which were initiated after the 2017 Gulf Crisis, gradually shifting the balance of power in favor of expatriate workers. The transition toward a contract-based system, increased job mobility, and greater freedom of movement were all notable advancements. The situation in Qatar up to the 2020s reflects the broader challenges faced by Gulf states in reforming the Kafala system. While there have been some progressive developments, such as the introduction of minimum wage laws and the abolition of the exit permit requirement for most workers, these changes have not gone far enough to dismantle the Kafala system fully. The full abolition of the Kafala system and the introduction of additional protections for workers in 2020 were necessary to address the remaining challenges and ensure that the rights of expatriate workers in Qatar were fully protected[351]. These reforms signaled a shift in Qatar's approach to its migrant community, which had previously been viewed as a security threat and alienated through policies such as the Kafala system. Instead, the new measures sought to integrate migrants more inclusively into the societal fabric, as will be discussed in the following chapter.

4.1.2.2. Nationalization Policies

As Forstenlechner and Rutledge have discussed, nationalization policies are largely viewed as ineffective. In a similar vein, Spiess argues that these policies "should be considered, at best, incomplete successes and, at worst, absolute failures.""[352] . When examining implementation practices in the GCC states, it shows that they have largely tried to implement nationalization policies to manage demographic imbalances as part of their regulatory actions. In most cases, these efforts have generated only partial success. According to Steffen Hertog[353], in the Gulf region,

[351] AL-HAMMADI, Hind Mohd AM; BAYOUOMI, Kawthar Abdalla; ROSMAN, Arieff Saleh Bin. Managing Population Diversity and Peaceful Coexistence in Qatar in Light of the Objectives of Qatari Migration in the Alliance of Civilizations. International Journal of Health Sciences, I: 2587-2604.

[352] SPIESS, Andy. Demographic transitions and imbalances in the GCC: security risks, constraints and policy challenges. In: Conference policy paper presented at the. 2010.

[353] HERTOG, Steffen. Arab Gulf states: an assessment of nationalisation policies. 2014.

nationalization policies have been in place since at least the 1980s, and discussions surrounding these policies have grown more extensive and prominent since the 2000s.

In the 1980s and 1990s, despite limited success interventionist nationalization policies based on quotas and prohibitions were mostly enforced in the Gulf, such as mandatory local employment percentages and restrictions on specific jobs for nationals resulted in an uneven distribution of costs across businesses. These policies were challenging to monitor, leading to evasion and, in some instances, corruption between businesses and labor administrations. Consequently, as Hertog notes, various forms of "phantom employment" of nationals have emerged in the region[354]. The national quotas in employment also heightened the informal employment of foreigners who do not officially appear on companies' payrolls. As long as cheap foreign labor remains readily available, it will find its way into the market and outcompete nationals, whether formally or informally[355].

The challenges and mixed results of the initial wave of nationalization policies in the Gulf have sparked a robust debate about the regulation of labor markets in the GCC. This discussion has focused particularly on exploring alternative, market-driven mechanisms to increase national employment rates.[356]. The basic idea behind more recent reforms is that nationalization cannot be ruled. Instead, the idea that it must be ruled through market mechanisms has become more acceptable, primarily by narrowing the wage gap between locals and foreigners and by allowing foreign workers mobility in the local market. While there are many similarities in the Gulf countries in terms of the implementation of nationalization policies, it is still possible to distinguish unique characteristics in Qatar. When comparing the Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Bahrain, it is possible to argue that these three Gulf states are relatively similar in terms of oil rents, GDP per capita, prevailing wages, and the demographic ratio of citizens to foreign nationals. They have faced the most acute citizen

[354]HERTOG, Steffen. Arab Gulf states: an assessment of nationalisation policies. 2014.

[355] Ibid.

[356] BABAR, Zahra R. Understanding labour migration policies in the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries. Asianization of migrant workers in the Gulf countries, 2020, 37-53.

unemployment issues and have made the most concerted efforts at increasing nationals' private sector employment[357].

In examining Saudi Arabia, one can observe the extensive labor market reforms it has undertaken over recent decades, including the launch of the 'Nitaqat' system in 2011. This initiative was designed to enhance Saudization by imposing nationalization quotas on companies, tailored according to sector and company size. Companies that failed to comply risked restrictions on work visa issuance, while administrative costs for hiring foreign workers were increased as a further incentive for compliance[358]. Thus, Saudi labor force participation surged by 70% from 2011 to 2013, notably in sectors like construction, retail, trade, finance, and real estate[359]. Despite these efforts, Saudization faces challenges in raising the educational standards of its workforce, leading to continued reliance on foreign labor for skilled positions, thereby straining productivity and increasing financial burdens through higher wage demands from Saudi nationals.

The 'Omanisation' policy initiated in 1994 in Oman aimed to create job opportunities for nationals, initially curbing foreign population growth rates. By 2000, Omanisation intensified with a market-oriented approach, resulting in higher Omanisation rates in sectors such as banking, finance, utilities, and mineral mining, which attracted Omani workers due to capital-intensive investments[360]. However, sectors requiring advanced skills, such as education and oil & gas, struggled to meet Omanisation targets due to limited availability of skilled Omani workers[361]. Similarly, Bahrain's 'Bahrainisation' policy evolved from a quota-based approach to

[357] HERTOG, Steffen. *Arab Gulf states: an assessment of nationalisation policies*. 2014.

[358] HERTOG, Steffen. *Arab Gulf states: an assessment of nationalisation policies*. 2014.

[359] RAMADY, Mohamed. Gulf unemployment and government policies: Prospects for the Saudi labour quota or Nitaqat system. International Journal of Economics and Business Research, 2013, 5.4: 476-498.

[360] KHADRI, Sabah Anbareen. Highly-skilled professionals in the GCC: Migration policies and government outlook. Migration to the Gulf: Policies in sending and receiving countries, 2018, 81.

[361] ANSARI, Iram; MCGLADE, Jacqueline. Omanisation, youth employment and SME Firms in Oman. The Future of Labour Market Reform in the Gulf Region: Towards a Multi-Disciplinary, Evidence-Based and Practical Understanding, 2018, 55.

more market-driven models with the aim of better integrating nationals and non-nationals into the private sector. This shift sought to enhance labor productivity by encouraging the employment of skilled and mid-level national workers.[362]. Both Oman and Bahrain are continuing to tackle skill mismatches by enhancing education and vocational training programs, which are crucial for improving national labor productivity. This is especially important for highly skilled roles that demand extensive training and expertise.[363]. When it comes to the high-rent Gulf countries of Kuwait and UAE, the nationalization challenge is less acute due to a higher rent-to-citizen ratio, which makes excess public sector employment of citizens an easier option in the short run. Consequently, policy experiments in these countries are less advanced.

The UAE has launched a number of initiatives to reform its labor market and enhance the Emiratization process. These initiatives include setting quotas, reserving certain job positions for Emirati nationals, and banning foreigners from specific roles. However, these measures did not significantly advance Emiratization, prompting the UAE to adopt a strategy. In the UAE, nationalization efforts are more prominent in the public sector, with limited focus on the private sector[364]. The government's initiatives to increase Emirati participation in the private sector have primarily targeted industries such as hospitality, banking, and financial services. Positions reserved for Emiratis in these sectors are usually confined to HR managers, government relations officers, secretaries, and administrative roles[365]. A key element of the Emiratisation strategy is the focus on enhancing educational standards. The UAE is committed to developing the skills of its national population, resulting in the creation of training programs aimed at improving essential workplace competencies. The government formed partnerships with various educational institutions to

[362] Hertog, Steffen. "A Comparative Assessment of Labor Market Nationalization Policies in the GCC." In National Employment, Migration and Education in the GCC. ed. Steffen Hertog. Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2012, 65-106

[363] KHADRI, Sabah Anbareen. Highly-skilled professionals in the GCC: Migration policies and government outlook. Migration to the Gulf: Policies in sending and receiving countries, 2018, 81.

[364] KHADRI, Sabah Anbareen. Highly-skilled professionals in the GCC: Migration policies and government outlook. Migration to the Gulf: Policies in sending and receiving countries, 2018, 81.

[365] Ibid.

cultivate national skillsets, ensuring that graduates are eventually integrated into the public sector. Additionally, the UAE has mandated the implementation of on-the-job training programs within various organizations[366]. Similarly, Kuwait has implemented "Kuwaitization" policies to reduce unemployment by replacing expatriate workers with Kuwaiti nationals. However, there is limited interest among Kuwaitis in taking up lower-skilled jobs. Political tensions between the executive and legislative branches, resulting in frequent cabinet reshuffles and resistance to key fiscal reforms, have further complicated the successful implementation of these nationalization efforts[367].

Finally, Qatar, as the wealthiest country with the smallest population among the GCC members, has made less systematic efforts to "nationalize" employment in the private sector. However, it has focused more heavily on boosting nationalization in the public sector through a policy known as Qatarization.

Efforts to promote Qatarization began in the 1970s, primarily led by the oil and gas sectors. The policy aims to boost the workforce participation of Qatari nationals through a quota system and by offering education and training programs to help balance the country's demographic makeup. Additional measures include reserving certain professions exclusively for nationals, offering wage subsidies, providing state retirement plans for nationals employed in the private sector, and imposing fees and charges on foreign labor.[368].

Although Qatarization efforts date back to the 1970s, the program was officially introduced by the Emir in 2000, similar to localization initiatives across the GCC. This formal implementation utilized political, legal, and quantitative strategies, including quotas and government incentives favoring Qataris[369]. For instance, Qatar's

[366] Ibid.

[367] Ibid.

[368] Qatarization: AL MUFTAH, Hend. Demographic policies and human capital challenges. Policy-Making in a Transformative State: The Case of Qatar, 2016, 271-294.

[369] FORSTENLECHNER, Ingo. Workforce localization in emerging gulf economies: the need to fine-tune HRM. Personnel Review, 2010, 39.1: 135-152.

Ministry of Interior mandates Qatarization and the preferential employment of Qataris as a legal requirement for businesses[370]. Additionally, Labor Law No. 14, enacted by the Qatar Ministry of Labor in 2004, requires the hiring of skilled foreign workers to aid in training Qataris, with an aim to Qatarize 20 percent of private sector jobs. Furthermore, Law No. 4 (2009) was introduced to regulate the entry, exit, residence, and sponsorship of expatriates, offering skilled foreign workers attractive residency benefits for their immediate family members[371].

The Qatarization program initially aimed for a 50 percent quota of Qataris in key positions within the oil and gas industry, and 100 percent in all non-specialist government roles[372]. These goals, however, were deemed unrealistic and were not met. Despite this, many organizations in Qatar remain optimistic about their progress, with some claiming Qatarization rates as high as 85 percent for senior positions[373]. Private companies that meet the quota requirements have been rewarded with advantages in public tenders, and substantial efforts have been made to improve the education and training of Qatari nationals. Despite these initiatives, their success has been limited. Nationalization has been primarily effective in the public sector, while the Qatarization rate in the private sector remains low, with Qataris accounting for less than 10 percent of the total workforce. The low rate is due to Qataris' perception of private sector employment as offering lower wages and status, and the quota system's forceful approach has faced strong opposition from local businessmen, who view it as potentially harmful to productivity and profitability [374]. According to a 2012 report by Qatargas, the attrition rate for nationals was under 2 percent, thanks to careful monitoring of career progression, as well as training and development programs for Qataris. Likewise, the Qatar National Bank reported a

[370] AL MUFTAH, Hend. Demographic policies and human capital challenges. Policy-Making in a Transformative State: The Case of Qatar, 2016, 271-294.

[371] DE BEL-AIR, Françoise. Demography, migration, and labour market in Qatar. 2014.

[372] KAMRAVA, Mehran. Royal factionalism and political liberalization in Qatar. The Middle East Journal, 2009, 63.3: 401-420.

[373]KAMRAVA, Mehran. Royal factionalism and political liberalization in Qatar. The Middle East Journal, 2009, 63.3: 401-420.

[374] AL MUFTAH, Hend. Demographic policies and human capital challenges. Policy-Making in a Transformative State: The Case of Qatar, 2016, 271-294.

Qatarization rate of 49 percent in 2008, which, although close, still fell short of the ambitious 50 percent target.[375].

The success of Qatarization heavily relies on the implementation of effective human resource strategies, such as career planning that monitors and guides nationals, as well as ensuring a high level of job security[376]. As Forstenlechner points out, "the political, legal, and quantitative approaches to localization are only as effective as their implementation[377]". Consequently, Qatarization appears to be most effectively achieved through comprehensive training programs and robust human resources practices[378]. Despite these efforts and the optimistic outlook of some organizations, the original goals of Qatarization have not been realized. For example, Qatar Petroleum and its subsidiaries have only reached a 28 percent Qatarization rate[379]. This shortfall indicates that the targets set were overly ambitious and difficult to achieve within the given timeframe.

Until the 2020s, there was considerable evidence suggesting that the government would take a more aggressive approach to achieving Qatarization goals[380]. This renewed focus may be driven by the growing perception among many nationals that the Qatarization program is not working effectively. This perception has led to increasing animosity between nationals and expatriates, fueled in part by a sense of inequality felt by Qatari nationals[381]. Many believe that expatriates hold prejudiced views against them, which undermines the Qatarization program's objectives and

[375] AL MUFTAH, Hend. Demographic policies and human capital challenges. Policy-Making in a Transformative State: The Case of Qatar, 2016, 271-294.

[376] GALEEVA, Diana. Qatar: The practice of rented power. Routledge, 2022.

[377] FORSTENLECHNER, Ingo. Workforce localization in emerging gulf economies: the need to fine-tune HRM. Personnel Review, 2010, 39.1: 135-152.

[378] Ibid.

[379] BORCK, Tobias. Stability from Disorder in the Middle East: Comparing the Perspectives of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. University of Exeter (United Kingdom), 2021.

[380] SHEDIAC, Richard; SAMMAN, Hatem. Meeting the Employment Challenge in the GCC The Need for a Holistic Strategy.

[381] Slackman, M. (2010a), "Affluent Qataris seek what money cannot buy", The New York Times, May 13, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/14/world/middleeast/14qatar.html.

contributes to a deep sense of angst among nationals concerning their position in society [382].

There is a growing emphasis on the private sector regarding Qatarization. The anticipation is that enforcing employment quotas within specific private sectors will compel businesses to proactively develop training programs and offer incentives to attract nationals, rather than merely claiming that locals are uninterested or lack the necessary skills. Replacing expatriates with nationals gradually is a sound economic strategy, particularly given the country's demographics, but it will fail if it prioritizes job substitution over job creation. Additionally, it will not succeed whether it diminishes the competitiveness of private sector companies or discourages foreign direct investment[383].

Godwin points out that nationalization was an increasing priority in the Gulf. Demographic shifts, including rising unemployment, overemployment in the public sector, increasing costs, higher educational attainment, and heightened expectations among nationals, alongside the growing expatriate population, pose major and persistent challenges for the region.[384]. For Qatarization to be successful, it must evolve beyond achievement in numbers. It requires a strategic, long-term commitment to ensuring nationals' effective participation in the knowledge economy, alongside a thorough review of national policies related to education and labor force participation[385]. This approach requires a significant investment in human capital, with a focus on training, development, and creating an environment that enables nationals to succeed across different sectors. It also calls for a reassessment, and possibly an overhaul, of existing educational systems to better align with the needs of the labor market. Additionally, promoting a culture of continuous learning and

[382] Solutions, E. D. (n.d.). The Economist Intelligence Unit. Qatar Economy, Politics and GDP Growth Summary - The Economist Intelligence Unit. https://country.eiu.com/Qatar

[383] AL MUFTAH, Hend. Demographic policies and human capital challenges. Policy-Making in a Transformative State: The Case of Qatar, 2016, 271-294.

[384] GODWIN, Stewart M. Globalization, education and Emiratisation: A study of the United Arab Emirates. The Electronic Journal of Information Systems in Developing Countries, 2006, 27.1: 1-14.

[385] Ibid.

professional development among nationals is essential to ensuring their competitiveness in an ever-changing job market.[386].

There is no doubt that nationalization policies have played a crucial role in addressing demographic imbalances in the Gulf States, especially in Qatar and the UAE. The policies aimed to increase the workforce participation of nationals through quotas, education, and training, thus achieving a more balanced demographic makeup. These initiatives often conflicted with broader socio-economic development goals in long-term national strategies, highlighting a lack of alignment and sometimes contradictory aims. For instance, Qatar's Qatarization policy has been criticized for its lack of clear direction and focus, emphasizing numerical targets over holistic development goals. Given that a large portion of Qatar's workforce consists of foreigners, especially in technical and scientific fields, replacing skilled expatriates with equally qualified nationals is a complex and time-consuming process. Without careful planning and substantial investment in education and training, these transitions could risk reducing productivity and competitiveness in vital economic sectors.

4.2. Societal Level Responses in Qatar

The existing literature on the Gulf region indicates that only a few studies have examined public perception there, with even fewer specifically focusing on Qatar. In this context, public perception refers to the views and attitudes of the local population toward migrant workers, who make up a significant portion of Qatar's workforce. These migrant workers, originating from regions such as South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, play a critical role in the country's economic growth, particularly in sectors like construction, hospitality, and domestic services. However, these perceptions extend beyond mere economic interactions and can significantly influence broader societal issues, including social security, integration, and stability within the local community.

[386] AL MUFTAH, Hend. Demographic policies and human capital challenges. Policy-Making in a Transformative State: The Case of Qatar, 2016, 271-294.

Among the limited studies exploring societal perceptions of migrant and expatriate communities, Abdoulaye Diop's 2016 article titled "Citizens' Attitudes Towards Migrant Workers in Qatar" offers critical insights into the complex and often ambivalent views held by Qatari citizens toward the foreign workers who make up a substantial portion of the country's workforce and demographics[387]. The results of this survey found out that while Qatari citizens generally appreciate the contributions of foreign workers to the development of their nation, they also carried concerns about the impact this population has on the country's economic and health resources[388]. This duality exemplifies the tension between the necessity of migrant labor to support Qatar's workforce and the concerns about the socio-economic effects of a large non-citizen population leading to demographic imbalances.

Consequently, the article concludes that, up until 2016, most Qatari citizens preferred maintaining the sponsorship system, known as kafala, as a means of regulating the migrant population, although it does not explicitly address the issue of societal security. Zooming in, the article presents findings from a unique, nationally representative survey sample from Qatar, designed to better understand citizens' attitudes toward migrant workers. Conducted by the Social and Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI) at Qatar University, this survey was the first of its kind in the region to address migration issues from the perspective of Qatari nationals.

The survey was based on a nationally representative sample of 2,394 Qatari citizens, with a maximum sampling error of ±2.3% points[389].The survey was designed to assess how different demographic and socio-economic factors shaped support for changes in immigration policy. It specifically examined whether citizens preferred an increase or decrease in the number of foreign workers allowed into the country each year. The sample was divided into three groups: one asked about attitudes toward blue-collar workers, another focused on white-collar workers, and a control group

[387] DIOP, Abdoulaye, et al. Citizens' attitudes towards migrant workers in Qatar. Migration and Development, 2017, 6.1: 144-160.

[388] Ibid.

[389] DIOP, Abdoulaye, et al. Citizens' attitudes towards migrant workers in Qatar. Migration and Development, 2017, 6.1: 144-160.

that wasn't asked about either. This approach allowed researchers to identify subtle connections between socio-economic factors and opinions on different categories of migrant labor[390]. The findings reveal that while Qatari nationals acknowledge the positive contributions of foreign workers, particularly their role in economic development and promoting cultural openness, they also express significant concerns about the societal costs associated with this population. These concerns include traffic congestion, strains on health services, and perceived threats to traditional customs and values.[391].

In this regard, the figure 4.1 demonstrates positive attitudes toward migrant workers, showing that Qatari nationals largely recognize their contributions to the nation's economy. Over 88% of respondents agreed that migrant workers help build the country's economy. Similarly, more than 84% concurred that both white-collar and blue-collar workers have played a key role in Qatar's economic development through their hard work. Over two-thirds of the participants also agreed that migrant workers strengthen Qatar through their talents.

Respondents more frequently associate talent with white-collar workers, who often occupy professional, managerial, and administrative roles[392]. In contrast, blue-collar workers, primarily in labor-intensive or domestic positions, were less likely to be seen as bringing notable talents to the country[393]. Nevertheless, both groups were viewed as contributing positively to Qatar's cultural openness, with over two-thirds of respondents agreeing that migrant workers enhance the country's cultural inclusivity. This sentiment was particularly strong for white-collar workers, with 85% of respondents agreeing, compared to 69% for blue-collar workers. Finally, more than half of the survey participants agreed that migrant workers contribute more to the Qatari economy than they receive in social benefits and services.

[390] Ibid.

[391] Ibid.

[392] Ibid.

[393] Ibid.



Figure 4. 1. Positive attitudes towards migrant workers

Source: Abdoulaye Diop, Kien Trung Le, Trevor Johnston & Michael Ewers (2016)

Despite the positive perceptions in their contribution to the economy as shown in Figure 4.1, the figure 4.2 demonstrates more complex attitudes toward the presence of migrant workers in Qatari society. The survey results show that the influx of foreign workers is viewed as contributing to a number of societal challenges. Around three-quarters of the respondents expressed concerns that the growing presence of both white-collar and blue-collar workers threatened traditional Qatari customs and values (70% for white-collar workers and 76% for blue-collar workers). These cultural concerns were particularly acute when respondents considered non-Arab migrant workers, with 81% agreeing that this group posed a greater cultural threat compared to Arab migrant workers which is 44%[394]. More critically, almost 2/3 of participants disagree on that “workers strengthen Qatari society” although they agree that they strengthen the economy.

As shown in Figure 4.2, the survey results indicate that respondents also perceive migrant workers as contributing to social issues. An overwhelming 93% agreed that foreign workers are a major factor in increasing traffic congestion in the country. Similarly, more than half of the respondents believe that "workers take jobs from

[394] DIOP, Abdoulaye, et al. Citizens' attitudes towards migrant workers in Qatar. Migration and Development, 2017, 6.1: 144-160.

Qatari citizens," and over two-thirds perceive workers as placing a "strain on Qatar's health services."



Figure 4. 2. Negative attitudes towards migrant workers
Source: Abdoulaye Diop, Kien Trung Le, Trevor Johnston & Michael Ewers (2016)

These findings indicate that despite positive Qatari attitudes toward migrant labor, especially regarding economic contributions, foreign workers are perceived as a threat to the preservation of traditional Qatari life. The survey further explored these sentiments by asking how policies toward migrant workers should be shaped.

As shown in Figure 4.3, when asked, "Do you think the sponsorship/kafala system should be changed?" 58% of Qataris preferred to maintain the system as it is, while 30% supported tightening it to increase foreign workers' dependence on their sponsors. Only a small portion of respondents advocated loosening the system (7%) or abolishing it entirely (5%). These attitudes toward the kafala system are consistent with broader perceptions about the presence of foreign workers in Qatar. A significant majority, nearly three-quarters (74%) of Qatari respondents, feel that the number of foreign workers in the country is too high. In contrast, 22% believe the current number is appropriate, and a very small minority, just 4%, think there are too few foreign workers (see Figure 4.3).

These results suggest a prevailing sentiment among Qataris that the large expatriate workforce poses challenges to the nation's social and cultural fabric, reinforcing the

desire to maintain or even tighten the kafala system. Notably, when respondents were asked about the future influx of foreign workers, a significant portion (42%) believed that the number of new foreign workers entering Qatar should be reduced. Within this group, 25% advocated for a "substantial" reduction, while 28% felt the current levels should remain unchanged. This sentiment may be linked to the country's then ongoing need for labor as it prepares for major international events like the World Cup. Other survey questions reveal that foreign workers are perceived by some as an existential threat, particularly in terms of their influence on Qatari culture and traditions, leading to calls for stricter policies to manage their presence. Although the concept of societal security was not directly addressed in Diop's study[395], these findings suggest that concerns about societal security were likely present in Qatar before 2017 Gulf Crisis. This is evidenced by the desire to control foreign labor through policy measures aimed at preserving traditional values and customs.



Figure 4. 3. How should policy responses be formulated?
Source: Abdoulaye Diop, Kien Trung Le, Trevor Johnston & Michael Ewers (2016)

Diop et all. also compared the results of their survey with another conducted in 2010 by SESRI-Qatar University to analyze how public opinion had shifted over time. They suggested that, in 2010, Qatari citizens were more critical of foreign workers

[395] DIOP, Abdoulaye, et al. Citizens' attitudes towards migrant workers in Qatar. Migration and Development, 2017, 6.1: 144-160.

and over times attitudes had somewhat softened, with a 19% increase in the number of respondents supporting an increase in the foreign worker population[396]. This change in perspective reflects a growing recognition among Qataris that foreign labor would be crucial for the country's infrastructure development, particularly in preparation for major events like the World Cup[397]. Despite these shifts, the study also reveals that Qatari citizens remain cautious about the long-term cultural and social impacts of the growing migrant population[398]. The survey results underscore a persistent tension between the economic necessity of foreign workers and the desire to preserve traditional Qatari culture. While Qataris gradually recognize foreign workers as a necessary part of the nation's economic engine, they continue to perceive them as a potential threat to their own way of life. This dual perception highlights the complex dynamics of managing a globalized workforce while maintaining cultural identity.

In another significant study titled "Antecedents of Trust among Citizens and Non-Citizens in Qatar," by Diop et al. surveyed both citizens and immigrants to explore levels of trust among three specific groups: Qatari citizens, white-collar immigrants, and migrant laborers. Their analysis sheds light on how the determinants of trust are context-dependent, specifically in terms of interaction with members of different national and subnational communities within Qatar[399]. The study's methodological approach involved testing hypotheses using data from the Social Capital Survey of Qatar I (2011), which drew from a nationally representative sample of both citizens and immigrants. The population was divided into three distinct groups for sampling purposes: Qatari nationals, non-Qatari residents living in households (white-collar immigrants), and non-Qatari residents living in collective dwellings or labor camps (migrant laborers). In total, 2,268 interviews were conducted, comprising 800 Qatari

396. DIOP, Abdoulaye, et al. Citizens' attitudes towards migrant workers in Qatar. Migration and Development, 2017, 6.1: 144-160.

397 Ibid.

398 Ibid.

399 DIOP, Abdoulaye, et al. Antecedents of Trust among Citizens and Non-citizens in Qatar. Journal of International Migration and Integration, 2017, 18: 183-202.

nationals, 637 white-collar immigrants, and 831 migrant laborers[400]. To ensure that the data accurately represented Qatar's demographic composition, weights were applied to each group, adjusting for their probabilities of selection in the survey. This approach allowed for a more precise reflection of the diverse population in Qatar and provided a robust foundation for analyzing attitudes and social dynamics[401].

Diop et al. explored this idea by hypothesizing that generalized trust is low in Gulf countries, including Qatar, due to societal structures that have traditionally hindered the development of robust civil societies[402]." As the authors also discussed, in the Gulf region, the state has historically been the main provider of essential services like housing and employment, limiting opportunities for collective citizen efforts to take on these roles or to lobby the state for them. As a result, civil society remains underdeveloped, contributing to lower levels of generalized trust across the region. However, this perspective may not fully account for the significant changes that have occurred in Qatar and other Gulf countries in recent decades—particularly regarding immigration patterns, rapid economic growth, and the emergence of modern civic organizations. Immigration has reshaped the social fabric, leading to a more diverse and interconnected population.

One of the most prominent socioeconomic divides in the Gulf, including Qatar, is between citizens and immigrants. Qatari citizens primarily benefit from state resources, funded by oil and gas revenues, and enjoy preferential hiring policies that keep unemployment rates low[403]. They also have greater access to formal and informal dispute resolution mechanisms, affording them more political autonomy and freedom compared to immigrants. As a result, the factors influencing generalized trust among Qatari citizens may align with those seen in developed democracies, where citizens typically enjoy more social and economic privileges than non-

[400] Ibid.

[401] Ibid.

[402] DIOP, Abdoulaye, et al. Antecedents of Trust among Citizens and Non-citizens in Qatar. Journal of International Migration and Integration, 2017, 18: 183-202.

[403] CRYSTAL, Jill. Civil society in the Arabian Gulf. In: Civil Society in the Middle East, Volume 2. Brill, 1995. p. 259-286.

citizens[404]. In contrast, white-collar immigrants in Qatar, many of whom work in skilled sectors such as finance, education, and healthcare, face different challenges. Despite their professional status, they have little to no chance of gaining citizenship and are excluded from many of the state's benefits, particularly those related to political participation and social welfare[405]. This exclusion can lead to different levels of trust in government institutions and society compared to Qatari citizens[406]. For this dissertation, examining the interactions between these groups and the state provides valuable insights into the differing social perspectives between Qatari and non-Qatari populations prior to the Gulf Crisis.

Diop et al. found that Qatari citizens show the lowest levels of generalized trust, followed by white-collar immigrants from the Middle East. Interestingly, white-collar immigrants from Asia and migrant laborers, mostly from non-Middle Eastern countries, show much higher levels of generalized trust. These contrasting trust patterns across separate groups of non-citizens, and the fact that none align with the trust dynamics seen among Qatari citizens, highlight the significant role of context in shaping trust. In Qatar, trust levels are heavily influenced by nationality, social status, and access to resources[407]. The study also reveals that the factors contributing to generalized trust among Qatari nationals, such as civic engagement, gender, and religious involvement, mirror those found in developed democracies[408]. For instance, civic participation and religious service attendance are positively linked to trust, suggesting that active community and religious engagement foster higher trust levels. However, an unexpected finding is that Qatari women are more trusting than men, which contrasts with trends in many Western societies, where men generally report higher levels of trust. This finding raises questions about the gender-specific social

[404] DIOP, Abdoulaye, et al. Antecedents of Trust among Citizens and Non-citizens in Qatar. Journal of International Migration and Integration, 2017, 18: 183-202.

[405] DIOP, Abdoulaye, et al. Antecedents of Trust among Citizens and Non-citizens in Qatar. Journal of International Migration and Integration, 2017, 18: 183-202.

[406] Ibid.

[407]Ibid.

[408] Ibid.

dynamics in Qatar that merit further exploration, particularly regarding the role of women in shaping trust perceptions[409].

For non-citizens, trust levels are shaped by different social and interpersonal dynamics. White-collar immigrants and migrant laborers develop trust through distinct pathways, largely based on their particular circumstances in Qatari society. White-collar immigrants may rely on professional networks to foster trust, while migrant laborers may build trust through shared experiences of marginalization and hardship[410]. The study underscores the importance of understanding the diverse experiences within non-citizen groups to fully grasp the factors that influence trust[411].

While this study did not directly reveal Qataris' public opinion toward migrant workers or provide explicit insights into societal security perceptions, it highlights the varying levels of social interaction that shape different degrees of generalized trust among Qatari citizens, white-collar immigrants, and migrant laborers. This highlights the importance of considering both individual and group-level factors when analyzing trust within a society. The findings suggest that the lower levels of generalized trust among Qataris may be influenced by the country's demographic composition, along with other factors such as gender, citizenship status, and societal structures. Furthermore, this study has important implications for policymakers seeking to promote social cohesion and stability in Qatar, especially as the country experiences rapid development and population diversification. These dynamics have led to a more inclusive approach, embodied in the "Baladna" concept introduced after 2017, which is discussed in chapter five.

While there are some studies that examine public opinion toward migrant workers in the Gulf, almost none address the issue of societal security in this context. Societal security, which refers to a society's ability to preserve its core identity amidst

[409] Ibid.

[410] DIOP, Abdoulaye, et al. Antecedents of Trust among Citizens and Non-citizens in Qatar. Journal of International Migration and Integration, 2017, 18: 183-202.

[411] Ibid.

changing conditions and potential or actual threats—is a critical yet understudied factor when considering the impact of migrant workers in the Gulf. At the state and intellectual levels, demographic imbalances are often seen as a threat to Khaleeji identity, as previously discussed. Public opinion has been shaped by a dual perception that highlights the complex dynamics of managing a globalized workforce while maintaining cultural identity. However, the question remains: have demographic imbalances been perceived as a societal security threat or not?

A working paper by the author[412], written in 2017 and presented in 2018, explored this matter by asking: At the societal level, are demographic imbalances perceived as a threat to the Khaleeji identity? To gain insights into this question, the paper conducted face-to-face structured interviews with 11 experts who are Gulf nationals (10 of whom were Qatari) at the Gulf Research Meeting at Cambridge University in 2016. Although this is a limited sample representing a small segment of Gulf society, it is useful for understanding the extent to which state discourse aligns with societal concerns. The interviews were conducted on August 4th, October 31st, and November 1st, 2016, and included five female and six male participants[413].

The interviewees were initially asked the close-ended question:

- *Do you believe that demographic imbalances in the Gulf constitute a threat to the Khaleeji identity (culture, values, language, and religion)?*

If the interviewee answered yes, the follow up question was:

- *How do demographic imbalances threaten the Khaleeji identity?*

If the interviewee answered no, the follow up question was:

- *Why demographic imbalances do not threaten the Khaleeji identity?*

[412] BATTAOGLU, Cihat. "The Future of Population and Migration in the Gulf," 2018. https://gulfresearchmeeting.net/documents/1585226920Participants%20list%20-%20WS6%202018.pdf.

[413] Ibid.

The majority of interviewees—nine out of eleven—did not perceive demographic imbalances in the Gulf as a threat to Khaleeji identity. Notably, the only two interviewees who saw demographic imbalances as a threat were male. Several common themes emerged from their responses. One prominent theme is that Khaliji culture and identity are strong, resilient, and confident, so demographic imbalances do not pose a threat to them. Interviewee number one remarked: "*Our culture is a confident one. A confident culture is not necessarily adversely affected by migration. There are many strong cultures that are cosmopolitan.*" Interviewee number 11 claimed: "*Our national identity is resilient and strong and even thriving more than ever. Qatar is successfully maintaining its culture and the Arabic language and other markers of identity*[414]."

The tribal nature of Khaleeji societies characterized by strong family ties and cohesiveness is another common theme. According to interviewee number two:" *Because the society itself is tribal and very conservative demographic imbalances are not in a position to form a threat to its identity."* Following the same line of thinking interview number three expressed the view:

> *The people of the Gulf countries are people who place great importance on family cohesion. For this reason, it is difficult to influence their culture or values. In addition, the people of the Gulf tribes rely on customs and traditions, and they are fanatics when it comes to their culture and customs. Islam was born in the Arabian Peninsula; this is why people in the Gulf are religious people strictly adherent to religious values. People of the Gulf are proud of their customs, traditions, values and religion and are not interested in changing any of those for whatever the reason*[415].

Another theme that emerged from the interviews is that Gulf countries have always been diverse and home to large numbers of expatriates. The current demographic imbalances are nothing new and have not posed a threat to Khaleeji identity in the past, nor do they now. Interviewee number eight stated:

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[414] BATTAOGLU, Cihat. "The Future of Population and Migration in the Gulf," 2018. https://gulfresearchmeeting.net/documents/1585226920Participants%20list%20-%20WS6%202018.pdf.

[415] Ibid.

> *Although the number of expatriates has increased dramatically in the last 15 years, Qatar had always been a diverse place, and this diversity played a big role in building and developing the country. As Qataris we see always viewed expats as dear guest and an opportunity and not a threat*[416].

A similar sentiment was articulated by interviewee number four: "*No, not at all. This is not new. We always had a large number of expats. This did not threaten our identity in the past, why should it start to threaten our identity now*![417]"

Interviewee number nine was of the view that "*demographic imbalances in the gulf have their consequences*[418]"; however, interviewee number nine went on to add: "*with the right policy implemented by Gulf countries demographic imbalances have been eliminated as a potential threat to the Khaliji identity. The policies implemented by gulf countries have transformed the high percentage of immigrants to an opportunity*[419]." Interviewee number 10 expressed the idea that the issue of demographic imbalances is not on the mind of people in the Gulf. According to interviewee number 10" *People in the Gulf are occupied these days with sub identities based on sectarianism. This is why they are not discussing national identity versus a non-national identity*[420]."

The two interviewees that perceived demographic imbalances as a threat to the Khaleeji identity based their views on what they see as a threat to the Arabic language and the diminished use of it the Gulf countries. Interviewee number five declared "*Language is crucial ingredient of the Khaleej identity and demographic imbalance between Arabic and non-Arabic speakers in the Gulf will have negative impact over culture, religion …etc. There is a de-Arabization process going on*[421]."

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[416] Ibid.

[417] Ibid.

[418] Ibid.

[419] BATTAOGLU, Cihat. "The Future of Population and Migration in the Gulf," 2018. https://gulfresearchmeeting.net/documents/1585226920Participants%20list%20-%20WS6%202018.pdf.

[420] Ibid.

[421] Ibid.

Interviewee number six shared the same fears "*most expats prefer to use English or their native languages rather than learn Arabic. On the other hand, Khaleeji people learn and use English more and more. This is a problem for Gulf culture and language*[422]."

Those fears were not shared by the other interviewees. Interviewee number two stated "*English is used in education and in business; however, it has not and cannot become the language of our culture*[423]." Interviewee number eight gave the example of his father "*My father speaks six languages which he learned from different expat in addition to benefiting and learning about their cultures and norms. He did this without abandoning his identity*[424]." Finally, interviewee number seven noted "*the wide us of the English language is part of globalization. To take part in globalization everyone needs to speak English. It is just a tool to communicate with the globalized world and not a threat to our identity*[425].

Overall, as discussed above, societal awareness of demographic imbalances in Qatar has remained cautious and nuanced. On both societal and individual levels, non-state mechanisms, such as tribal networks, have played a significant role in addressing identity-related challenges. However, individuals often approach those existential challenges implicitly, in contrast to the state policies which were more assertive.

At the state level, migration-driven demographic shifts have especially been a key focus since the 2000s, often framed within national security concerns. Until 2017, Qatar, like other Gulf states, adopted aforementioned policies aimed at regulating demographic trends and addressing the impact of increased immigration on society. Measures such as the 'kafala' system, nationalization, and naturalization reflect the state's efforts to manage the perceived security risks associated with high migration rates and shifting demographics. Additionally, state-level responses have included

[422] Ibid.

[423] Ibid.

[424] Ibid.

[425] Ibid.

strengthening border controls and discussing proposals for a national identity management system[426]. However, these policies have largely remained at the discourse level in Qatar, underscoring the complexities of addressing migration-induced demographic imbalances in practice.

[426] BATTALOGLU, Cihat. Security Puzzle in the Gulf: New Sectors and New Challenges. Arms trade, military services and the security market in the Gulf states: trends and implications, 2016, 8-23.

CHAPTER 5

EVOLUTION OF SOCIETAL SECURITY AND QATAR'S PERCEPTION OF NON-NATIONALS IN POST-2017 CRISIS

As explored in Chapter 2, in the literature, the concept of societal security has undergone substantial evolution, shaped by political developments and changing regional dynamics. Initially, societal security was closely aligned with traditional, state-centric security. In this early framework, societal security was fundamentally about protecting the identity of the state, focusing on preserving the social and cultural cohesion within national boundaries[427]. This approach tied societal security directly to the integrity of the state's identity, embedding the idea that threats to societal security were threats to the very fabric of the state itself[428]. The understanding of societal security was further expanded by recognizing society itself as a distinct entity with its own security concerns, separate from the state[429]. In that regard, Wæver introduced the idea of society as an intersubjective construct—encompassing various groups such as nations, ethnicities, and tribes, each united by a shared identity[430]. This shift marked a critical reorientation from state-focused security to the preservation of communal identity, tightly linking society and identity within the context of security studies. Over time, societal security came to focus on safeguarding the identity and cohesion of these groups, addressing threats that might disrupt or dilute their shared cultural and social foundations.

[427] BUZAN, Barry. *People, states & fear: an agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era*. ECPR press, 2008.

[428] Ibid.

[429] WÆVER, Ole, et al. *Securitization and desecuritization*. Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1993.

[430] Ibid.

As global security challenges became more complex in the 2000s and 2010s, particularly in regions experiencing significant demographic shifts, the limitations of this identity-centric approach to societal security became increasingly apparent. Scholars from Nordic countries responded by broadening the scope of societal security to focus on resilience and the maintenance of "life-giving functions[431]." Rather than merely preserving a static notion of identity, this expanded approach underscored societies' capacities to endure crises, maintain critical functions, and manage essential infrastructure, thereby upholding societal stability and continuity. This "life-giving function" approach to societal security recognized the importance of resilience and preparedness, promoting resilience to all-hazards that acknowledged the unpredictable nature of modern security challenges[432]. As detailed in Chapter 2, while the Copenhagen School focuses on preserving identity, the Nordic approach emphasizes societal resilience through unity and adaptability in addressing a broad spectrum of threats.

When applying these theoretical developments to Qatar's case, the hypothesis in this dissertation is that while the Copenhagen School's theory of societal security offers a valuable framework for understanding Qatar's migration and demographic control policies from the 1970s to 2017, the Nordic way of societal security has been more applicable to the period of post-2017.

As discussed above, until 2017, Qatar's policymaking focused on protecting local identity while managing foreign worker influxes. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab workers were prioritized for their cultural compatibility, but after the Gulf War (1990–91), Qatar shifted to Asian and Sub-Saharan African workers for political stability. By the 2000s, demographic imbalances and the resulting existential threats raised concerns over national identity, aligning Qatar's response with the Copenhagen School's focus on identity preservation in societal security [433].

[431] LARSSON, Sebastian; RHINARD, Mark. Introduction: Comparing and conceptualising Nordic societal security. In: *Nordic Societal Security*. Routledge, 2020. p. 3-21.

[432] Ibid.

[433] BUZAN, Barry. *People, states & fear: an agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era*. ECPR press, 2008.

Following the 2017 Gulf Crisis, however, Qatar's societal security framework underwent a profound transformation. The blockade imposed by neighboring states forced Qatar to reassess its understanding of national identity and societal cohesion, leading to the development of a broader and more inclusive approach to security. The crisis also fostered a unifying response that expanded Qatar's sense of identity beyond Qatari nationals, recognizing non-nationals as integral contributors to the nation's resilience and social fabric.

The shift in Qatar's societal security strategy towards resilience and inclusivity reflects the understandings of the Nordic approach. Qatar's adaptation of societal security, particularly through the 'Baladna' concept, aligns with contemporary Nordic frameworks that emphasize community resilience and collective solidarity over rigid identity boundaries. 'Baladna' approach, much like the Nordic life-giving model, incorporates diverse communities within the inclusive identity framework, fostering mutual support and social cohesion between nationals and non-nationals. Unlike previous policies focused on demographic control, Qatar's recent approach encourages a sense of shared responsibility and loyalty among all residents, regardless of nationality. The events of June 2017 also played a crucial role in reshaping citizen and non-citizen relations in Qatar, as reported in media narratives and scholarly analyses. The blockade created a sudden and substantial external threat that affected all residents equally, regardless of nationality, and overshadowed existing concerns about cultural and social differences. In the immediate aftermath of the blockade, both Qataris and non-Qataris shared anxieties over physical security, the stability of their homes and assets, and their future in Qatar amid potential war or economic instability. In this environment, traditional challenges posed by cultural differences and communal segregation lost significance. Similarly, economic competition between Qatari citizens and foreign workers became less pressing compared to the looming threat of financial instability brought on by the blockade[434].

Against this backdrop, this chapter explores how and why Qatar's approach to societal security evolved in the aftermath of the 2017 crisis, focusing on the

[434] GENGLER, Justin. Society and State in Post-Blockade Qatar: Lessons for the Arab Gulf Region. In: Reflecting on the GCC Crisis. Routledge, 2022. p. 24-41.

emergence of the framework known as ‘Baladna’. It begins with a why question with a snapshoot on 2017 crisis and its impact on Qatar’s domestic environment. The chapter then examines the shifts in policymaking and societal responses that followed, highlighting the transformations at both state and societal levels in post-2017.

5.1. Why the 2017 Crisis Matters

On the morning of June 5, 2017, Qataris awoke to a surprising announcement: three member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain—along with Egypt, issued a joint statement severing all diplomatic and economic ties with Qatar. The statement announced that these countries had closed their airspaces to Qatar’s national airline, Qatar Airways, and blocked Qatari vessels and vehicles from entering their territorial waters and lands[435]. This dramatic action marked the beginning of what became known as the “Qatar blockade,” or the 2017 Gulf Crisis as neighboring Gulf states-imposed a near-total embargo on air, sea, and land traffic to and from Qatar, effectively isolating it from the rest of the region[436]. Simultaneously, the blockading nations declared Qatari diplomats and national’s *persona non grata*, ordering them to leave immediately, while calling on their own citizens residing in Qatar to return home. In the GCC, only Oman and Kuwait refrained from severing ties, advocating instead for moderation and mediation, emphasizing diplomacy to resolve the crisis[437].

During the blockade, the blockading countries accused Qatar of supporting various Islamist groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Hamas in Gaza, and Islamist factions in Syria, Libya, and Yemen. They alleged that Qatar supported terrorist organizations and maintained an excessively close relationship with Iran, Saudi Arabia’s main regional rival. The states also claimed that Qatar used its media network, Al Jazeera, to incite protests and unrest, especially during the 2011 Arab

[435] ZWEIRI, Mahjoob; RAHMAN, Md Mizanur; KAMAL, Arwa. The 2017 Gulf Crisis: An Introduction. The 2017 Gulf Crisis: An Interdisciplinary Approach, 2021, 1-18.

[436] Ibid.

[437] KRIEG, Andreas (ed.). Divided Gulf: The anatomy of a crisis. Springer, 2019.

Spring[438]. Qatar, however, countered these accusations by stating that the blockade lacked "legitimate justification" and violated its sovereignty. The initial response from the international community was mixed, with several global powers viewing the crisis as an internal GCC matter, refraining from direct intervention[439].

During the initial months of the crisis, Qatar made significant diplomatic efforts to resolve the situation. In a CBS News interview, Qatar's Emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, stated that he was willing "to walk 10,000 miles toward the brothers, if they walk one meter toward reconciliation"[440]. Despite these overtures, the blockading countries, led by Saudi Arabia, escalated their pressure, using diplomatic influence to encourage other nations—primarily developing countries—to break ties with Qatar[441]. Yemen, the Maldives, Mauritania, Comoros, and Libya's eastern government under Khalifa Haftar aligned with the Saudi bloc, while Senegal initially followed suit before later restoring relations with Qatar. Jordan, Djibouti, Chad, and Niger chose to downgrade their diplomatic relations rather than cut ties completely[442].

The blockade's purpose appeared to be extracting significant concessions from Doha, including curtailing its international influence and imposing restrictions on its internal policies. On June 22, 2017, a 13-point list of demands was presented to Qatar, effectively asking it to reduce diplomatic and military ties with Iran, close the Turkish military base, sever ties with groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, stop funding individuals and groups the Quartet deemed terrorist, and shut down Al Jazeera along with other media outlets like 'Arabi 21' and 'Rassd'[443]. The demands

[438] BAABOOD, Abdullah. The future of the GCC amid the Gulf divide. *Divided Gulf: The anatomy of a crisis*, 2019, 161-178.

[439] BAKIR, Ali. The Evolution of Turkey—Qatar Relations Amid a Growing Gulf Divide. Divided Gulf: The anatomy of a crisis, 2019, 197-215.

[440] Gulf Times, 31 October 2017. Emir ready to go the extra mile for reconciliation

[441] KRIEG, Andreas (ed.). Divided Gulf: The anatomy of a crisis. Springer, 2019.

[442] ZWEIRI, Mahjoob; RAHMAN, Md Mizanur; KAMAL, Arwa. The 2017 Gulf Crisis: An Introduction. The 2017 Gulf Crisis: An Interdisciplinary Approach, 2021, 1-18.

[443] ZWEIRI, Mahjoob; RAHMAN, Md Mizanur; KAMAL, Arwa. The 2017 Gulf Crisis: An Introduction. The 2017 Gulf Crisis: An Interdisciplinary Approach, 2021, 1-18.

also included halting the granting of Qatari citizenship to nationals wanted by the blockading states and aligning Qatar's military, political, social, and economic policies with them. Finally, it called for Qatar to cease all contact with opposition groups in other Gulf States and wider Middle East [444]. Qatar refuted these accusations and demanded evidence of its alleged support for terrorism. It also rejected the call to close Al Jazeera, citing freedom of the press. Al Jazeera's senior political analyst, Marwan Bishara, described the list as "not just a question of demands, but an insult"[445].

When considering the impracticality of these demands, on July 18, 2017, the blockading countries replaced the 13 demands with "six broad principles." These principles aimed to target extremism, prevent incitement of violence and hatred, uphold the Riyadh Agreement, comply with outcomes from the Arab–Islamic–US summit held in Riyadh in 2017, respect internal affairs of the blockading states, and confront all forms of extremism and terrorism as threats to international peace[446]. To counteract the effects of isolation, Qatar reached out to allies like Turkey and Iran, whose assistance was crucial in securing essential supplies and diplomatic backing. Saudi Arabia, perceiving Iran and Turkey as its regional competitors, considered these alignments a risk to regional stability. However, as the blockade persisted, Saudi and Emirati leaders realized that isolating Qatar was counterproductive, as it strengthened Qatar's ties with Turkey and Iran.[447]

During the years of the Gulf Crisis, Qatar always advocated to decrease the tense environment and worked for dialogue as the only path to resolution. The emir of Qatar also underlined many times the importance to have a peace and unity in the Gulf. As stated by the Emir Sheikh Tamim in his speech that

[444] Arab States issue 13 demands to end Qatar-Gulf crisis, Al Jazeera, 12 July 2017, retrieved on the 4 November 2024. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/ 06/arab-states-issue-list-demands-qatar-crisis-170623022133024.html

[445] Ibid.

[446] ZWEIRI, Mahjoob; RAHMAN, Md Mizanur; KAMAL, Arwa. The 2017 Gulf Crisis: An Introduction. The 2017 Gulf Crisis: An Interdisciplinary Approach, 2021, 1-18.

[447] Ibid.

> *It is indeed unfortunate that the ongoing Gulf crisis revealed the failure of the GCC to attain its objectives and meet the aspirations of our Gulf peoples … History teaches us that crises are destined to pass but their mishandling may linger and leave behind long-lasting repercussions. …We need to solve the problem, but the dignity and sovereignty of Qatar come before any considerations*[448].

When Qatar was working on easing off the crisis, it also implemented a number of measures to reduce its economic and social vulnerabilities in country. The government focused on mitigating the blockade's impact on its citizens and residents, particularly regarding food security, given Qatar's heavy reliance on imports from neighboring countries[449]. As claimed by Mahjoob Zweiri's book titled *2017 Gulf Crisis*, Qatar accelerated initiatives for self-sufficiency and local production, which presented new economic opportunities for local entrepreneurs. One significant impact of the blockade was felt in the realm of food security and basic necessities, with the government moving quickly to diversify suppliers and ramp up domestic production[450]. Although the early stages of the blockade were marked by logistical disruptions and economic uncertainty, within six months Qatar shifted towards new economic initiatives, notably in tourism. It launched a visa-free entry program to stimulate travel and tourism. This policy made Qatar's visa regulations the most liberal in the region[451].

Contrary to the anticipated economic and social strain, the blockade instead catalyzed Qatar's growth and resilience. The inauguration of Hamad Port enabled direct trade routes with countries such as Turkey, Oman, Pakistan, and India, reducing Qatar's dependence on former trading partners and enhancing regional cooperation. Qatar also saw an increase in global diplomatic support, with bilateral relations expanding significantly during this period [452]. Alongside strengthening

[448] Qatar Tribune. 7th November 2018. Crisis will pass, Qatar will prosper.

[449] ZWEIRI, Mahjoob; RAHMAN, Md Mizanur; KAMAL, Arwa. The 2017 Gulf Crisis: An Introduction. The 2017 Gulf Crisis: An Interdisciplinary Approach, 2021, 1-18.

[450] Ibid.

[451] The Peninsula (15 August 2017). Siege helps Qatar gain real political independence, retrieved on the 4 November 2024. https://thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/15/08/2017/Siege-helps-Qatar-gain-real-political-independence

[452] ZWEIRI, Mahjoob; RAHMAN, Md Mizanur; KAMAL, Arwa. The 2017 Gulf Crisis: An Introduction. The 2017 Gulf Crisis: An Interdisciplinary Approach, 2021, 1-18.

relations with Turkey and Iran, many countries—including France, Russia, Germany, Pakistan, and others—expressed their support to Qatar and underlined their "desire for peace in the Gulf following the initial confusion[453]."

More significantly, the 2017 crisis represented a pivotal moment for Qatar, carrying significant domestic and international repercussions and marking a turning point in the nation's evolving identity. The Gulf conflict, pitting Qatar against the Saudi-led group also catalyzed a transformative phase in how Qataris and residents alike viewed their country's sovereignty, borders, and national character.

Faced with intense sanctions and an almost complete blockade, Qatari society coalesced, fostering a sense of unity that bridged tribal, sectarian, and political divides. Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani's image became a symbol of this newfound solidarity, appearing on buildings, vehicles, street signs, and social media as an emblem of collective national pride[454]. Acknowledging Qatar's unexpected resilience, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel Al Jubeir remarked, "We must recognize that Qatar emerged from this crisis more swiftly than anticipated and succeeded in garnering international and regional support, partly due to our stringent demands[455]". As cited in Zweiri et.al., Qatar Petroleum CEO Saad al-Kaabi observed, "I want to thank the four countries for their blockade, as it has strengthened Qatar, its people, and its businesses. We will come out of this far stronger than before[456]".

It is important to highlight that 2017 Gulf crisis led to re-evaluation of a new, inclusive Qatari identity encapsulated in the term 'Baladna' encompassing both citizens and residents. This notion of 'Baladna' which makes whole 'Nation as Tribe', reflects a shared resilience, pride, and solidarity that extends across Qatar's diverse population. The pressures of the blockade gave rise to this redefined national

[453] Ibid:7.

[454] ORUC, Nurgul. Hashtag Unity: Qatar's digital nationalism in the Gulf crisis. Journal of Arab & Muslim Media Research, 2019, 12.1: 43-64.

[455] ZWEIRI, Mahjoob; RAHMAN, Md Mizanur; KAMAL, Arwa. The 2017 Gulf Crisis: An Introduction. The 2017 Gulf Crisis: An Interdisciplinary Approach, 2021;11.

[456] Ibid:14.

identity, which has since become central to Qatar's social cohesion, reinforcing its unique position within the Gulf and on the global stage.

Furthermore, the blockade imposed by neighboring Gulf states and other Arab countries instilled a sense of patriotic fervor among Qataris. This sentiment coalesced around the Emir of Qatar, with slogans such as "We are all Tamim, We are all Qatar, and You have the World, we have Tamim, quickly elevating him to a status of national hero[457]."

The aggression from neighboring Gulf countries, many of which have tribal ties to families in Qatar, also intensified feelings of isolation. This sense of being under siege transformed into widespread solidarity and support for the state of Qatar, "evoking in many the spirit of a war of independence[458]." When considering this point with the argument presented in introduction chapter's literature review emphasizes that, in the Gulf region, national identity formation has predominantly been characterized by an inward-focused approach, avoiding antagonism toward neighboring nations, 2017 Gulf crisis can be more meaningful. Since, the Gulf crisis emerged as a significant turning point for the Qatari people, acting as a form of independence struggle that strengthened and redefined their sense of national identity.

Compared to other GCC countries, Qatar is the only Gulf nation to have experienced this unique sentiment, which has led to its divergence from other Gulf states in terms of national identity formation and societal security perspectives. With the 2017 Gulf crisis, Qatar's population, comprising both citizens and expatriate workers, bore the impact of the blockade together, fostering a strong sense of solidarity and unity. During the 2017 National Day celebrations, Qatari citizen Mohamed Alsherawi reflected on this collective spirit, stating, "The Gulf siege has made us feel prouder to be part of this nation. We take pride in the unity not just among nationals but also

[457] Cajsa Wikstrom, "Glorious Tamim: 'You Won and You were Silent'", *Al Jazeera*, July 18, 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/07/glorious-tamim-won-silent-170718093327234.html.

[458] Battaloglu, Nesibe Hicret. "Shaping and Influencing Identity: International Determinants of the Identity Formation in the Arab Gulf States." Fifth Round Gulf Studies Forum, December 1, 2018.

with expatriates. We celebrate side by side, feeling genuinely happy and proud to be in Qatar[459]."

Almost a year after the onset of the Gulf crisis, the people of Qatar quickly adapted to the new reality and the new inclusive national identity has been crystallized. Nonetheless, the strengthening of national identity has reduced both the broader Gulf identity and the cross-border tribal affiliations traditionally shared across the region[460]. As discussed by Battaloglu in Gulf Studies Forum 2018, while it is not possible to say a total demise of the Khaleeji (Gulf) identity, "the Gulf crisis created a dent in the notion of Khaleeji identity, the regional identification that has started to operate beyond and below the GCC state level[461]". As quoted from an interview conducted by Battaloglu and published in Arab Center:

> *The Khaleeji identity characteristics are all about traditions, values and Islamism. Under the current gulf crisis, we see the all the three characteristics have been used against the union of Khaleeji identity by blockade countries adding that now there is two Khaleeji identities (of Qatar, Kuwait and Oman versus of Saudi and Emirati). The latest intra-GCC dispute, in this sense, exceeded the limit to be contained in the state level and started to affect regional identity formation carried out decades ago by the GCC states. Same trend may also be observed in Oman and Kuwait amid Saudi and Emirati assertiveness and aggressiveness in the region[462].*

The examination of the years surrounding the Gulf Crisis and its aftermath reveals that one of the most profound impacts of the blockade was the unifying effect it had on Qatari state and society. This period saw a significant shift in policymaking and societal responses, encompassing the entire population under the concept of Baladna notion that emphasizes self-reliance, and a strengthened sense of national solidarity.

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[459] Sorin Furcoi and Showkat Shafi, "Qatar National Day 'meaningful and symbolic' amid siege", *Al Jazeera*, December 19, 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/qatar-national-day-meaningful-symbolic-siege-171218211730002.html.

[460] Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, "How Qatar Weathered the Gulf Crisis," *Foreign Affairs*, June 11,2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2018-06-11/how-qatar-weathered-gulf-crisis.

[461] Battaloglu, Nesibe Hicret. "Shaping and Influencing Identity: International Determinants of the Identity Formation in the Arab Gulf States." Fifth Round Gulf Studies Forum, December 1, 2018.

[462] التحولات الاجتماعية في دول الخليج العربية، الهوية والقبيلة والتنمية. al-Ẓaʿāyin, Qaṭar: المركز العربي للأبحاث ودراسة السياسات، 2021.

In this context, the 2017 Gulf Crisis can be considered a pivotal catalyst for redefining Qatar's societal and security perspectives within the Gulf. Rather than focusing on identity-centered concerns, which often dominate regional discourse, Qatar's response emphasized the protection and resilience of interdependent infrastructures and services vital to the people's lifeline. This shift marks a movement toward a transnational approach to societal security, prioritizing all-hazard protection that safeguards life giving functions for the population and the sustainability of essential resources as similar to the Nordic understanding of societal security.

5.2. The State Level Responses After 2017

In Chapter 4, how earlier policies in the Gulf states developed in response to the demographic pressures of migration and protecting the Gulf identity, reshaped the relationship between nationals and non-nationals was demonstrated. Those policies created significant social and economic divisions. They were largely geared towards discouraging integration, with both governmental and private sectors actively regulating migration to maintain clear distinctions within society and the labor force. Qatar mirrored this approach, implementing measures that reinforced a separation between nationals and non-nationals. Notably, policies like the kafala (sponsorship) system and workforce nationalization were introduced to address demographic imbalances and tightly control the non-national population. Until 2010s, as Qatar faced new social and economic realities, this approach to managing demographic imbalances through restrictive policies began to adapt. Concerns surrounding societal security expanded beyond demographic control to include the influence of cultural exchange and the effects of modernization on emerging cultural dynamics.

After the 2010s, Qatar's National Vision initiatives began to guide a gradual shift in policy to address these complex challenges. Although certain restrictive policies were relaxed, overall policy decisions continued to favor nationals, maintaining an element of control over demographic composition through selective measures.

Following the 2017 Gulf Crisis, however, because the new threats came from other Gulf and Arab States, Qatar has started to focus more on the domestic realm and

societal consolidation around the figure of Sheikh Tamim. Qatar, thus, initiated a more inclusive approach at the state level, reflecting the spirit of Baladna, a concept of unity and resilience in Qatar. This shift became evident in policies affecting non-nationals, marking a departure from the historically exclusive policy landscape. The National Development Strategy 3, for instance highlights this inclusive shift, also new labor and migration policies prioritize more rights to non-Nationals. The Emir's public addresses further underscore this commitment to inclusivity, framing it as a key component of national progress.

An examination of recent policies concerning migration and non-nationals reveals a number of examples for this inclusive approach, illustrating how Qatar has undertaken significant revisions to its legal framework across several key areas related to migration. These legislative updates have resulted in the establishment of new rules and regulations that more closely align with international standards, particularly within the domain of labor rights[463] . Qatar's efforts to improve conditions for expatriate workers is reflected in the changes to the Kafala system. Qatar has progressively eased the restrictive legal conditions imposed on foreign workers. The initial move in this direction came with the enactment of "Law No. (21) 2015 Regulating the Entry, Exit, and Residence of Expatriates[464]", which replaced the Kafala system outlined in the 2004 Labor Law. This law also superseded "Law No. (4) of 2009 Regulating the Entry, Exit, Residence, and Sponsorship of Expatriates[465]."

The significant step to eliminate restrictive legal conditions for expatriates in Qatar was taken with advancements in labor rights. Law No. (1) of 2017 was enacted to amend specific provisions of Law No. (21) of 2015, followed by further progress with Law No. (13) of 2018[466]. Together, these legal measures represent a significant

[463] ZAHRA, Maysa. *Qatar's legal framework of migration*. 2013.

[464] ABOUD, Abdullah. *Labor Rights and Immigration Issues In Qatar*. 2020. Master's Thesis. Middle Tennessee State University.

[465] Al Meezan - Qatary legal portal | Legislations | Law No. 4 of 2009 regarding regulation of the expatriates entry, departure, Residence and Sponsorship. Accessed November 10, 2024. http://www.almeezan.qa/LawPage.aspx?id=2611&language=en.

[466] Maysa, Zahra. "Qatar's Legal Framework of Migration." Qatar's Legal Framework of Migration, 2018. https://gulfmigration.grc.net/media/pubs/exno/GLMM_EN_2018_04.pdf.

shift toward improving conditions for expatriates. The first key area of reform addressed exit permit procedures. According to Section (7) in the law, it was stipulated that an "expatriate worker or recruiter shall notify the competent authority of any departure from the country at least three days prior to the exit date[467]." This provision marked a departure from the prior requirement, under which the expatriate needed explicit permission from their Kafeel (sponsor) to leave the country. The new system replaced this condition with a simple 3-day advance notification. Further development of this policy under the 2017 and 2018 amendments has enabled expatriates to exit the country, either temporarily or permanently, during the term of their labor contract without the need for prior approval from their sponsor in most cases. The reforms implemented in 2018 went further, limiting the requirement for exit permissions to only 5% of a recruiter's total workforce. As outlined in Section (1), "An expatriate worker shall have the right to leave the country temporarily or permanently during the validity of the labor contract. The recruiter may submit a justified application to the Ministry of Labor, listing the names of workers who must receive prior approval due to the nature of their work, not exceeding 5% of the recruiter's employees[468]."

In order to enhance the rights of expatriate workers in cases where recruiters might obstruct their exit, the new legislation also introduced an appeals mechanism[469]. This new mechanism has paved a way for expatriates who encounter objections from their recruiters to petition a designated committee. According to the updated legal framework, "the expatriate worker… has the right to appeal to an appeals committee responsible for decisions on expatriate exits. The committee shall decide on the exit request within three working days[470]".

[467] Al Meezan - Qatary legal portal | Legislations | Law No. (21) of 2015 Regulating the Entry, Exit, and Residence of Expatriates. Accessed November 10, 2024. http://www.almeezan.qa/.

[468] Al Meezan - Qatary legal portal | Legislations | Law No. (13) of 2018. Accessed November 10, 2024. http://www.almeezan.qa/

[469] AREF, Ahmed. Social inclusion and exclusion in GCC labour policy transformations: Evidence from Qatar and Saudi Arabia. J. Pol. & L., 2021, 14: 124.

[470] Al Meezan - Qatary legal portal | Legislations | Law No. (13) of 2018. Accessed November 10, 2024. http://www.almeezan.qa/

As shown in an interview published by the Peninsula newspaper, a ministry official elaborated on the government's comprehensive approach, noting,

> *The Government of Qatar takes a holistic approach to migrant worker welfare. The new law includes multiple protections for workers throughout all stages of the migration cycle, from recruitment to repatriation. These improvements benefit all expatriates, including domestic, blue-collar, and white-collar workers. We believe that every individual contributing to our country's development deserves high-quality living and working conditions*[471].

The legislative amendments in 2017, 2018, and 2020, have also significantly reduced restrictions on expatriates' job transfer rights. Under the previous 2009 law, expatriates were unable to switch jobs without a written agreement between their current and prospective sponsors, a requirement that made job mobility nearly impossible. The 2017 amendments eased off this rigid structure, allowing expatriate workers to transfer to a new employer under specific conditions. According to Section (21),

> *an expatriate worker may transfer to another employer before the end of the labor contract, upon approval of the employer, the competent authority, and the Ministry of Labor. With approval from the competent authority and Ministry of Labor, an expatriate worker may also transfer to another employer immediately after the end of the labor contract*[472].

Subsequent amendments in 2017 and 2018 further expanded protections for workers, particularly those caught in legal disputes with their recruiters. Law No. (15) of 2017 specified that "*the Ministry shall accept the temporary transfer of an expatriate worker to another employer if there are pending lawsuits between the expatriate worker and his recruiter*[473]." This law stopped employers from using legal proceedings to indefinitely restrict workers' mobility and it decreased the control over the foreign workers.

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[471] Newspaper, The Peninsula. "Qatar Committed to Implement Labour Reforms: Minister." Peninsula, November 16, 2021. https://thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/16/11/2021/qatar-committed-to-implement-labour-reforms-minister.

[472] Al Meezan - Qatary legal portal | Legislations | Law No. (21) of 2015 and Law No.(1) of 2017. Accessed November 10, 2024. http://www.almeezan.qa/

[473] Al Meezan - Qatary legal portal | Legislations | Law No. (15) of 2017. Accessed November 10, 2024. http://www.almeezan.qa/

The adoption of Law No. 18 of 2020 on August 30 also brought new freedom for the foreign workers in Qatar by removing the requirement for a No Objection Certificate (NOC) from the current employer to change jobs. Now, workers can switch employers without their employer's consent, though they must still provide a notice period ranging from one to two months based on their service duration. This streamlined system improves job mobility and reinforces worker rights[474].

Beyond addressing job transfer rights, Qatar also introduced groundbreaking legislation to protect domestic workers which was counted at around 172,000 people according to Labor Force Survey by the Planning and Statistics Authority (2018) [475]. On August 22, 2017, Qatar enacted Law No. (15) of 2017, providing legal protections for domestic workers who were previously excluded from such provisions[476] . Sections (7) and (8) of this law addressed international criticisms regarding the treatment of domestic workers and introduced wage regulations to prevent exploitation. Section (8) mandates that "*an employer shall be responsible for paying the monthly wage in Qatari Riyals agreed upon with the domestic worker by the end of each month or no later than the third day of the following month*." Furthermore, employers must provide proof of wage payment, either through a bank deposit or a signed cash receipt. The law also prohibits employers from deducting fees, expenses, or commissions from wages for overseas recruitment procedures[477].

In 2020, further advancements were made with the establishment of the Minimum Wage Committee. Formed under Council of Ministers Resolution No. (33) of 2020, this committee is tasked with studying and reviewing the minimum wage, in

[474] Newspaper, The Peninsula. "Changing Employers in Qatar without Noc: Explained." Peninsula, September 6, 2020. https://thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/06/09/2020/Changing-employers-in-Qatar-without-NOC-explained.

[475] Labor Force Sample Survey 2017. November 10, 2024. https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/statistics/Statistical%20Releases/Social/LaborForce/2017/statistical_analysis_labor_force_2017_En.pdf.

[476] "Qatar: New Law Gives Domestic Workers Labor Rights." Human Rights Watch, March 28, 2023. https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/08/24/qatar-new-law-gives-domestic-workers-labor-rights.

[477] Al Meezan - Qatary legal portal | Legislations | Law No. (15) of 2017. Accessed November 10, 2024. http://www.almeezan.qa/

accordance with Article (2) of Law No. (17) of 2020[478]. This initiative was an essential step in promoting fair wages and ensuring that expatriate workers receive a dignified standard of living in Qatar. Qatar's legislative reforms also established a Workers' Support and Insurance Fund under Law No. (17) of 2018, marking the first time all workers were assured financial support. Historically, only white-collar expatriates and a limited portion of blue-collar workers benefited from state-provided insurance and other governmental support. With this new law, all workers, including domestic workers, are now entitled to financial protection. According to Article 5:

> *the Fund shall aim at supporting, securing, and caring for workers, guaranteeing their rights, and providing a healthy and safe work environment for them. In this regard, it shall exercise all the necessary powers and competences, and in particular it shall have to: (1) provide sustainable financial resources necessary for supporting and securing workers; (2) pay the workers' entitlements decided by Labor Disputes Settlement Committees and recover these amounts from the employer; and (3) contribute to the provision and creation of playgrounds or entertainment venues or workers' housing, in coordination with relevant state authorities*[479].

These reforms have proved the changes in the legislative structure in Qatar to improve the welfare and rights of its labor force, addressing both the mobility of workers within the labor market and the conditions under which they work. By systematically revising the legal framework surrounding labor rights, Qatar is working towards a more supportive environment for all workers. While Qatar has experienced an explicit transformation in labor policies since 2017, other inclusion amendments have taken place which gives more right the non-Qataris. Since 2017, Qatar has launched some legislative changes which allows residency to foreigners reflecting the country's pursuit of social inclusion. For example, Law No. (10) of 2018 introduced a permanent residency option for expatriates, signaling Qatar's readiness to offer stability and benefits to selected long-term residents. According to this law, expatriates who were either born in Qatar and have lived in the country for ten years or born abroad and have completed twenty years of legal residency are

[478] Al Meezan - Qatary legal portal | Legislations | Law No. (17) of 2020. Accessed November 10, 2024. http://www.almeezan.qa/

[479] Ibid.

eligible to apply for a permanent residency permit[480]. This development is not mean of granting citizenship to non-nationals but offers certain key benefits akin to those enjoyed by Qatari citizens, including secured residency, healthcare, and education privileges[481].

Permanent residency in Qatar is also extended to specific groups, which include the children of Qatari women married to non-Qataris, non-Qatari spouses of Qatari women, expatriate wives of Qatari citizens, and children of Qataris who acquired nationality through naturalization[482].

Additionally, the country has launched the "Golden Visa" program since September 2020, allowing foreign nationals who make qualifying real estate investments to obtain residency permits. Under the Qatar Residency by Investment Program, two tiers of residency permits are offered based on the level of investment: a temporary residency permit for real estate investments of at least USD 200,000 (QAR 728,000) and a permanent residency permit for investments of at least USD 1 million (QAR 3,650,000)[483]. These policy changes were enacted following approval by the Qatari Cabinet of Ministers, which, in March 2019, identified non-Qataris are permitted to own and use real estate. This resolution was a response to Law No. (16) of 2018, which previously restricted real estate ownership to Qatari nationals, thus opening a new avenue for non-Qatari population[484] .

[480] Newspaper, The Peninsula. "Eligibility for Permanent Residency in Qatar Explained in New Law." Peninsula, September 4, 2018. https://thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/04/09/2018/Eligibility-for-permanent-residency-in-Qatar-explained-in-new-law.

[481] Ibid.

[482] Ibid.

[483] Vladimir Jankovic. "Qatar's Real Estate Performance and Permanent Residency: A Guide to Navigating Residency Pathways in 2024." Real Estate - Real Estate and Construction - Qatar, September 25, 2024. https://www.mondaq.com/real-estate/1522336/qatars-real-estate-performance-and-permanent-residency-a-guide-to-navigating-residency-pathways-in-2024.

[484] Newspaper, The Peninsula. "Cabinet Approves Draft Resolution on Determining Areas for Non-Qatari Property Ownership." Peninsula, March 13, 2019. https://thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/13/03/2019/Cabinet-approves-draft-resolution-on-determining-areas-for-non-Qatari-property-ownership.

A further development came with the issuance of Law No. (1) of 2019, which redefined the landscape of foreign investment in Qatar[485]. This law grants foreign investors the right to 100 percent ownership across all sectors, creating a more favorable environment for international business in Qatar[486]. This provision stands in contrast to the prior regulation under Law No. (13) of 2000, which limited foreign investors to a maximum 49 percent share in Qatari Limited Liability Companies, while a Qatari partner retained the controlling 51 percent ownership[487]. By allowing full ownership, Qatar has significantly enhanced the right of non-Qatari business owners. This law also provides attractive incentives, including the allocation of land for non-Qatari investors to establish businesses through long-term leases and the exemption from customs duties on machinery and essential equipment. Together, as cited from the Peninsula newspaper, these legislative shifts reveal "Qatar's commitment to attracting and retaining international investment while reinforcing its image as a forward-looking, inclusive nation[488]."

An equally important policy was Qatar's introduction of a visa-free regime for nationals of numerous countries. On August 8, 2017, the Ministry of Interior, Qatar Tourism Authority, and Qatar Airways announced that citizens of 80 countries could enter Qatar visa-free. This made Qatar the most accessible country in the region in terms of visa-free entry for foreign nationals, a distinction that had both economic and political significance. At a press conference marking the announcement, Qatar Airways Group Chief Executive highlighted this development's strategic importance amid the 2017 GCC crisis, underscoring Qatar's commitment to openness and cooperation during a period of regional tension. He stated, "This historic announcement comes at a time of historical significance. While some countries in the region have taken to closing their skies and their borders, Qatar has instead opened

[485] Al Meezan - Qatary legal portal | Legislations | Law No. (1) of 2019. Accessed November 10, 2024. http://www.almeezan.qa/

[486] Ibid.

[487] Al Meezan - Qatary legal portal | Legislations | Law No. (13) of 2000. Accessed November 10, 2024. http://www.almeezan.qa/

[488] Newspaper, The Peninsula. "Amir Issues Law on Non-Qatari Capital Investment." Peninsula, January 8, 2019. https://thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/08/01/2019/Amir-issues-law-on-non-Qatari-capital-investment.

its borders to more freely welcome visitors from all corners of the world[489]". By 2024, Qatar expanded this policy to include citizens from 102 countries, further strengthening its position as an accessible destination[490].

Qatar's legislative efforts in the realms of residency, investment, and visa policy not only support its economic goals but also reflect its ambition to foster social inclusivity. As a country that has experienced rapid growth and development, Qatar has carefully curated its policy trajectory to present itself as a "transformative state," in the words of Tok and Khater, whose goal is to navigate the demands of a diversified, modern society[491]. However, while Qatar has an objective to be a transformative state, there remain areas where social inclusion could be further strengthened. For instance, while expatriates are now able to bring family members on visit visas for up to six months, permanent residency laws do not yet address the citizenship eligibility of children born to Qatari mothers and foreign fathers[492].

While recent labor policies and permanent residency laws represent substantial progress, more work is needed to broaden the scope of these inclusive initiatives[493] . In that regard, the launch of National Development Strategy 3 (NDS 3) for 2024-2030 can be marked as an important milestone for the inclusion of non-Qatari residents.

As discussed in Chapter 4, Qatar's National Development Strategies 1 and 2 introduced significant adjustments within the human and social pillars of the Qatar National Vision 2030, including an educational system review with an enhanced

[489] Newspaper, The Peninsula. "Citizens of 80 Countries Can Now Enter Qatar Visa-Free." Peninsula, August 9, 2017. https://thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/09/08/2017/Citizens-of-80-countries-can-now-enter-Qatar-visa-free.

[490] "Visas." Visas | Visit Qatar. Accessed November 10, 2024. https://visitqatar.com/intl-en/plan-your-trip/visas.

[491] TOK, M. Evren; ALKHATER, Lolwah RM; PAL, Leslie A. Policy-making in a transformative state: The case of Qatar. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016.

[492] AREF, Ahmed. Social inclusion and exclusion in GCC labour policy transformations: Evidence from Qatar and Saudi Arabia. *J. Pol. & L.*, 2021, 14: 124.

[493] Ibid.

focus on Qatari culture and heritage, as well as major labor reforms to manage the migrant workforce. Nonetheless, NDS 3 marks a notable departure from the approaches taken by its predecessors, NDS 1 and NDS 2. This latest strategy emphasizes a more inclusive framework, actively integrating non-Qatari expatriates into its policy considerations—a significant shift in Qatar's approach to national development. Unlike earlier strategies, which were primarily focused on preserving Qatari identity, NDS 3 moves toward a model that balances societal security with inclusivity. This shift aligns with the concept of "Baladna", central to the dissertation, representing a vision that embraces diversity within a secure and cohesive society. The broader, inclusive orientation in NDS 3 suggests a reimagining of societal bonds, aiming for a development model that values the contributions of all residents. Expanding on the objectives of NDS 3, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohammed Jassim Al Thani emphasized during the strategy's launch:

> *The Third National Development Strategy (NDS3) defines bold and transformative initiatives and reforms designed to achieve the remaining Qatar National Vision 2030 goals…This will involve…, making Qatar a preferred destination for foreign investment and skilled talent. Implementing NDS3 …we have also ensured that the strategy supports family cohesion and reflects our pride in our religious and cultural values and national identity. Maintaining a high quality of life for our citizens and residents is a hallmark of the strategy, as we preserve and develop the well-being achieved for our citizens while ensuring that our residents feel appreciated for their contributions to the development journey. Issuing a strategy is only the first and easiest step. A collaborative approach with collective ownership, openness to learning from past experiences, persistence to overcome barriers, and a commitment to excellence will determine if our ambitions in this strategy are achieved. I urge all stakeholders—citizens, residents, businesses, government entities, and civil society institutions—to work together and commit wholeheartedly to realizing this strategy. Together, with strong commitment, we can turn our collective vision into a tangible reality, guaranteeing prosperity for everyone on our beloved land and for future generations, and propelling our nation to be among the most advanced countries in the world*[494].

In addition to underscoring Qatar as a destination for skilled talent, the Prime Minister highlighted the strategy's focus on ensuring that residents feel valued for their contributions to Qatar's development. He called upon all stakeholders,

[494] Third Qatar National Development Strategy. Accessed November 10, 2024. https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/nds1/nds3/Documents/QNDS3_EN.pdf.

including residents and civil society, alongside Qatari citizens, to work collaboratively toward NDS 3's success. Compared to its predecessors, NDS 3 distinguishes itself by formally recognizing non-nationals as key stakeholders[495]. While NDS 2 used terms such as "residents," and "migrants" to denote beneficiaries, NDS 1 primarily addressed nationals. Thus, NDS 3 represents a notable shift, extending its vision to include all residents as integral participants in Qatar's developmental goals.

The document further emphasizes the contributions of residents throughout its planning and implementation phases. When outlining propositions to various stakeholder groups, the strategy states that it "offers all stakeholders the opportunity to participate in the country's development over the next seven years[496]." Specifically, regarding residents, the document notes that "*NDS3 will offer residents a high quality of life and a home for them and their families, enabling them to partner in the long-term sustainable development of the country*[497]." While NDS 2 mentioned quality of life for migrants and residents, NDS 3 is the first to explicitly describe Qatar as a "home" for these groups and their families. When considering this in light of the legislative changes introduced after 2017, including permanent residency grants for non-Qataris, it becomes evident that the post-2017 Gulf crisis spurred a more inclusive stance toward non-residents.

Further evidence of inclusivity can be found in the strategic national outcomes defined by NDS 3. As shown in Table 5.1, while NDS 1 and NDS 2 largely focused on a "Quality-of-Life" approach when addressing social and human development, NDS 3 broadens these goals, adding "Cohesive Society" and "Government Excellence in Services" as expected outcomes. This expanded focus reflects an evolving perspective on societal bonds, wherein both nationals and non-nationals are encouraged to contribute to and benefit from Qatar's progress.

[495] Third Qatar National Development Strategy. Accessed November 10, 2024. https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/nds1/nds3/Documents/QNDS3_EN.pdf.

[496] Ibid.

[497] Ibid.

Table 5. 1. National Vision Pillars vs National Development Strategies Sectors

National Vision 2030	NDS 1	NDS 2	NDS 3
Human Development	Effective Qatari participation in a productive labor force	An Efficient and Committed Workforce	Future-ready Workforce
	Healthy population	Comprehensive &Integrated Healthcare System	Quality of Life
	Educated and capable population	Education and Training Quality	
Social Development	Caring and cohesive society	Social Protection	Cohesive Society
		Security and Public Safety	
		Cultural Enrichment and Sports Excellence	Government Excellence
		Global Partnerships for Development (International Cooperation)	
Environmental Development	Environmental sustainability	Sustainable Development to Preserve the Environment	Environmental Sustainability
Economic Development	Sustainable economic prosperity	Economic Diversification and Private Sector Development	Sustainable Economic Growth
			Fiscal Sustainability

Source: National Planning Council. "The National Development Strategy". Accessed November 10, 2024. https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/

In a more detailed analysis, NDS 3's definition of societal cohesiveness emphasizes the need to "preserve Qatar's values and strong family bonds, fostering active citizenship[498]," a focus consistent with the first two NDS documents. However, NDS 3 expands on this by highlighting the importance of cultivating "*an integrated community and a harmonious society to thrive in a globalized world*[499]." Additionally, the document outlines the ambition to create a cohesive society by ensuring "a decent standard of living for all individuals" and promoting "a participatory community," whereas similar goals in previous NDS documents were

[498] Third Qatar National Development Strategy. Accessed November 10, 2024. https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/nds1/nds3/Documents/QNDS3_EN.pdf.

[499] Ibid.

aimed exclusively at Qatari citizens[500]. This shift reflects a more inclusive vision for societal well-being and engagement across Qatar's diverse population.

The events of the 2017 crisis taught Qatar the significance of building a national identity over tribalism, reinforcing the notion of the nation as a tribe under the Baladna concept. In line with this focus, NDS 3 continues to prioritize national identity over tribal identity as part of creating a cohesive society. The document states, "Qatar seeks to raise awareness of and celebrate its national identity, fostering the growth of local cultural content production and consumption[501]." This commitment especially the definition of 'local cultural content' instead of 'Qatari cultural content' reflects a strategic effort to strengthen unity and cultural pride across the country.

Civic engagement and volunteerism are also central to NDS 3's vision of a cohesive society. The document states that Qatar "aims to nurture a culture of responsibility and engagement, encouraging to contribute through volunteering and community service[502]." To achieve this, Qatar plans to expand civic incentive programs and support for productive families. Additionally, it aims to grow the volunteer sector, setting a target to increase active registered volunteers to 10% of the population[503]. This will involve creating more volunteer opportunities within social support organizations, strengthening the operational framework for volunteerism, and removing legal barriers to simplify procedures for civil and volunteer work in Qatar.

In the Quality-of-Life section of NDS 3, the document explicitly uses the phrase 'Qatar's people', without distinguishing between citizens and residents. It states:

> *A high quality of life is paramount to enhancing the well-being of Qatar's people and positioning the country as an appealing global destination. Qatar*

[500] Third Qatar National Development Strategy. Accessed November 10, 2024. https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/nds1/nds3/Documents/QNDS3_EN.pdf.

[501] Ibid.

[502] Ibid.

[503] Ibid.

> *aspires to gain global recognition as the nation with the highest quality of life, particularly for families. This aspiration encompasses key areas such as education, healthcare, entertainment, culture, environment, public safety, and a sense of belonging*[504].

To achieve this, NDS 3 sets an ambitious goal: a satisfaction score of over 88% among visitors and residents by 2030[505]. This inclusive vision reflects policymakers' promise to a comprehensive and cohesive approach to quality of life, aiming to create an environment where all residents feel valued and supported.

In the cultural component of the strategy, NDS 3 takes a distinct approach compared to NDS 1 and NDS 2, which primarily emphasize the protection of Qatari culture and values. Moving beyond mere cultural preservation, NDS 3 envisions a dynamic expansion of Qatar's cultural landscape, aiming to cultivate a vibrant and creative ecosystem. While previous strategies defined Qatari culture strictly within the framework of Arab and Islamic values, NDS 3 broadens this perspective by targeting creative output across all cultural domains. The document outlines Qatar's cultural objectives as follows:

> *To further enrich Qatar's cultural landscape and foster a vibrant, creative ecosystem, Qatar will enhance coordination among various entities, develop a national culture policy to nurture creativity, and update event regulations to facilitate growth. Additionally, Qatar will invest in talent development and increase creative output across all cultural domains by improving infrastructure and providing robust training for talent*[506].

This shift also reflects a more holistic approach to culture, prioritizing both heritage and the growth of a contemporary, multifaceted cultural scene[507].

The inclusion of non-Qataris is emphasized repeatedly in NDS 3's focus on government excellence, with targets set for both citizens and residents alike. As

[504] Third Qatar National Development Strategy. Accessed November 10, 2024. https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/nds1/nds3/Documents/QNDS3_EN.pdf.

[505] Ibid.

[506] Ibid.

[507] Ibid.

outlined in the document, Qatar aims to “become a world-class provider of government services to citizens, residents… for effective, efficient, and transparent governance[508].” Additionally, the document pledges to involve residents in government policymaking, stating that “Qatar will place particular emphasis on policy alignment across various government entities in line with NDS 3, systematically incorporating views from academia, citizens, residents, businesses, and non-governmental organizations[509].” The inclusion of all societal groups beyond Qataris also can be marked as a proof for Qatar's new inclusive approach at the state level, promising to engage all groups in the policymaking process.

The inclusiveness of non-Qataris in Qatar is evident not only in legislative changes but also in the evolving tone of political discourse. Non-nationals have increasingly become recognized as integral to Qatari society, contributing to its social, economic, and cultural fabric. This shift is especially visible since 2017 Gulf Crisis, a year marking a progressive step toward a more inclusive national identity.

A close examination of the speeches delivered by the Emir of Qatar since he assumed leadership in 2013 (particularly his addresses at the Shura (Advisory) Council openings, which offer a platform for the Emir to address all residents of Qatar) highlights the change in political discourse after the 2017 Gulf crisis. Before 2017, terms such as 'residents' or 'people of Qatar' were seldom used in these official addresses. The language was largely centered around the concept of the 'Qatari people,' with limited references to the broader community of residents.

However, following the regional crisis in 2017, a marked shift in tone and terminology emerged. Since 2017, the Emir has consistently employed inclusive terms like 'residents,' 'talents in Qatar,' 'people of Qatar,' and 'Qatari people' in his public statements[510]. This deliberate choice of words signifies an acknowledgment of the vital role that expatriates and non-Qatari residents play in Qatar’s development

[508] Ibid.

[509] Third Qatar National Development Strategy.

[510] Council, The Shura. “The Shura Council State of Qatar.” The Shura Council, Amir Speeches. Accessed November 10, 2024. https://www.shura.qa/en/Pages/General-Secretary/Amir-Speeches/.

and resilience. In the face of the 2017 blockade, he expressed a profound appreciation for the contributions of non-Qataris, emphasizing that the nation's strength lies in its diversity and in the dedication of all individuals within its borders. In his speech at the opening of the Shura Council, he stated, "*I reiterate my appreciation to our esteemed Qatari people and the residents of the State for standing with dignity and pride against the blockade*[511]." When discussing the Gulf Crisis, he repeatedly emphasized that it brought more blessings than challenges, stating:

> *We have benefited from this experience, as it brought out the best talents and the spirit of resilience inherent in our people. It contributed to crystallizing our national identity and strengthened the cohesion between the people and the leadership. Our government is aware that goals such as building a productive society, achieving self-sufficiency in food and medicine, enhancing national security, and establishing balanced bilateral relations based on mutual interests are essential tasks that cannot be postponed. We do not fear the boycott imposed by these countries; in fact, we are a thousand times better off without them. However, vigilance is required. Their claims of merely adopting a boycott are false*[512].

In 2018, the Emir continued to include both citizens and residents in his speeches, emphasizing the importance of national unity and solidarity among the people of Qatar. In his inaugural address to the Shura Council in 2018, he highlighted the significance of adhering to the National Vision, regardless of international pressures. This vision, he stated, "*aims at perfecting social development by upholding justice, ensuring security and safety for all citizens and residents, and fostering cultural enrichment and sports excellence*[513]."

In the same speech, he also conveyed messages to neighboring countries, affirming that the Qatari identity is inseparable from other regional and international principles. He stated, *'We have set for ourselves a path that achieves growth while meeting*

[511] Council, The Shura. "The Shura Council State of Qatar." مجلس الشورى، خطاب سموالامير في افتتاح الدورة الـ46 لمجلس الشورى, 2017. https://www.shura.qa/Pages/General-Secretary/Amir-Speeches/46th-Session-Opening.

[512] Ibid

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[513] Council, The Shura. "The Shura Council State of Qatar." مجلس الشورى، خطاب سموالامير في افتتاح الدورة ال 47 لمجلس الشورى, 2018. https://www.shura.qa/Pages/General-Secretary/Amir-Speeches/47th-Session-Opening.

contemporary standards of human civilization. This includes forming our Qatari, Arab, and Islamic identity and culture on sound moral and civilized grounds[514].”

When it comes to 2019, although the effects of the blockade began to ease, the Emir continued to emphasize the importance of unity and inclusivity within Qatari society. In his speech at the opening of the Shura council, he highlighted this commitment to national solidarity, stating: "*The Qatari people, with their noted magnanimity, stood up together as one in defense of their homeland's sovereignty and principles, because they realize that renunciation of independent decision-making is conducive to losing the homeland itself along with its wealth and potential*[515]."

The Emir also reaffirmed that the blockade served to fortify Qatar's resilience and adaptability in the face of new challenges: *"I stated that this blockade would strengthen our steadfastness and push us forward to better address the new circumstances that ensued*[516]."

In 2019, he also bolded his message on national identity extended beyond nationals, underscoring a vision of inclusivity that encompasses both citizens and residents. He reminded Qataris that being Qatari is not a privilege it is the responsibilities that come with citizenship, saying:

> *Citizenship includes rights, not privileges. It entails not only rights but also responsibilities and duties. Foremost among them is to work sincerely and with precision, each in his position, as every role is important. Rights, brothers and sisters, are not privileges or a mere sense of superiority stemming from identity or an unwarranted sense of transcendence over others. Humility is proof of self-confidence, and showing respect to others is a reflection of self-respect. The responsibilities of citizenship also require appreciation of those who have contributed to building this country, <u>including our resident brothers</u>*[517].

[514] Ibid.

[515] Council, The Shura. “The Shura Council State of Qatar.” مجلس الشورى، خطاب سموالامير في افتتاح الدورة الـ48 لمجلس الشورى, 2019. https://www.shura.qa/Pages/General-Secretary/Amir-Speeches/48th-Session-Opening.

[516] Ibid.

517 Ibid.

In the same speech, the Emir also emphasized equality within society by referencing verses from the Holy Quran, saying:

> *And for each there are degrees [of reward and punishment] for what they have done, and it is so that He may fully compensate them for their deeds, and they will not be wronged Except for those who believe and do righteous deeds. For them it is a reward uninterrupted*[518].

Reflecting this, the Emir affirmed that Qatar's resident is not here as a result of charity but due to their vital contributions to the nation, which are indispensable and deeply valued in the building of Qatar[519].

In 2020, although his speech at the opening on Shura Council was centered on the impact of COVID-19 on all people, both nationals and non-nationals, the Emir stressed the importance of solidarity under Qatar's national identity. He stated: "*This identity has crystallized over time and is best manifested in the solidarity and cohesion of our community, with its enduring moral values and love for its country, as demonstrated during the challenges of the blockade*[520]."

In his 2021 address at the Shura Council opening, the Emir emphasized the moral responsibilities of everyone living in Qatar, both Qataris and non-Qataris, and expressed concern about rising consumerism in the country. He stressed that "*no national vision or strategy can succeed without addressing core values related to identity, a sense of belonging, commitment to work ethics, and a citizen's duty toward family, neighbors, workplaces, and society as a whole*[521]". He also stated: "*Each of us should ask himself what he did and would do from his position to serve his community. What is his contribution to building this country? Is he doing his job well? Does he value the work of others*?[522]"

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[518] Ibid.

[519] Ibid.

[520] Council, The Shura. "The Shura Council State of Qatar." مجلس الشورى، خطاب سموالامير في افتتاح الدورة الـ49 لمجلس الشورى, 2020. https://www.shura.qa/Pages/General-Secretary/Amir-Speeches/49th-Session-Opening.

[521] Council, The Shura. "The Shura Council State of Qatar." مجلس الشورى، خطاب سموالامير في افتتاح الدورة الـ50 لمجلس الشورى, 2021. https://www.shura.qa/Pages/General-Secretary/Amir-Speeches/50th-Session-Opening.

[522] Ibid.

The Emir also marked the significant of national unity, placing particular emphasis on Qataris, given the significance of the 2021 Shura elections and minor social tensions at the time. However, he also acknowledged the role of non-Qataris, framing their contributions within the broader context of Qatar's national interests, saying: "*We do not seek to compete with or emulate anyone, but rather to carve out our own niche by striking a balance between our firm principles, the limits of our capabilities, and the interests of our people and the peoples of our region*[523]*."*

In 2022, as Qatar prepared to host the World Cup, the Emir's speech at the inauguration of the world cup was centered on the unity and national pride where he emphasized the unique opportunity to showcase the nation's identity which is defined as 'civilizational identity'. In this context, he used civilizational identity as synonymous with Qatar's strong community identity as he said that: "*In short, it is an occasion in which we portray 'who we are,' not only in terms of the strength of our economy and institutions, but also in terms of our civilizational identity*[524]."

He acknowledged the magnitude of the event, calling it a significant challenge for a country of Qatar's size that continues to impress the world with its achievements: "*We accepted this challenge out of our faith in our potential to tackle the mission and make it a success, and due to our awareness of the importance of hosting a major event such as the World Cup in the Arab world*[525]."

The Emir also described Qatar as a 'workshop' of preparation, where both Qataris and residents are actively engaged, supported by the cooperation of friendly nations. He highlighted that these events serve broader goals, encouraging collaboration, unity, and shared experiences and said

> *Brotherly and friendly countries have put their capabilities at our disposal. These are originally part of the goals of such events that encourage*

[523] Ibid.

[524] Council, The Shura. "The Shura Council State of Qatar." مجلس الشورى، خطاب سموالامير في افتتاح الدورة الـ51 لمجلس الشورى, 2022. https://www.shura.qa/Pages/General-Secretary/Amir-Speeches/51st-Session-Opening.

[525] Ibid.

> *cooperation, fraternity, and exchange of experiences, promoting convergence rather than divergence, because it is a championship for all, and its success is success for all*[526].

In his speech at the 2023 Shura Council opening ceremony, the Emir reiterated the importance of unity and inclusivity, emphasizing cultural interaction and acceptance of diversity. He stated:

> *You have all noticed the level of progress we could achieve when our view of ourselves integrates with our image abroad, as was the case during the World Cup matches in Qatar. You have seen that positive interaction with the outside world has led to progress at home, and vice versa. This is the same logic behind our energy industry, our sovereign fund, and our role in international mediations. It is also the logic behind a civilized interaction that embraces tolerance and acceptance of diversity. Cultural interaction and acceptance of diversity do not contradict the collective Qatari Arab Muslim identity but rather contribute to its evolution and development, aligning with the challenges of the times at every historical stage*[527].

In 2024, the Emir made a surprising announcement in his speech at the Shura Council opening, unveiling a new constitutional amendment. He stated:

> *Two goals incorporate constitutional and legislative amendments: Ensuring the unity of the people on the one hand, and equal citizenship in terms of rights and duties on the other. Equality before the law and being treated on an equal footing under the law is the foundation of a modern state, as well as a legal, moral, and constitutional obligation*[528].

The constitutional changes, implemented through a referendum in November 2024, were unexpected for two reasons. First, they granted equal citizenship rights to all Qatari citizens, regardless of whether they received citizenship before or after the 1930s; previously, the constitution provided different levels of rights based on when citizenship was granted. Second, it opened a new opportunity for non-Qatari

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[526] Ibid.

[527] Council, The Shura. "The Shura Council State of Qatar." مجلس الشورى، خطاب سموالامير في افتتاح الدورة الـ52 لمجلس الشورى, 2023. https://www.shura.qa/Pages/General-Secretary/Amir-Speeches/52-Session-Opening.

[528] Council, The Shura. "The Shura Council State of Qatar." مجلس الشورى، خطاب سموالامير في افتتاح الدورة الـ53 لمجلس الشورى, 2024. https://www.shura.qa/Pages/General-Secretary/Amir-Speeches/53-Session-Opening.

permanent residents, when granting them citizenship would come with equal rights. Since, the new constitution changes clearly bolded the importance of equality and unity across all segments of society[529].

In parallel to the prominence of the "Baladna" concept has been marked more implicitly since 2017, it can be argued that the Emir's speeches draw similarities to the Nordic school's concept of "life-giving functions." This is particularly evident in his 2019 and 2021 speeches, where he discussed moral duties, norms, and standards that are set for everyone, welcoming all who embrace these values as part of Qatari society. This is also relevant when examining the alignment of political discourse with NDS3 targets, specifically within the Cohesive Society and Quality of Life sectors as discussed above. New legislations granting permanent residency to non-nationals and new rights granting to non-nationals also illustrates a shift in the state's approach, moving from viewing migration-driven foreign demographics as potential threats to recognizing them as integral to Qatari society.

Since 2017, the Emir has increasingly emphasized themes of resilience and preparedness in response to emerging threats, particularly those stemming from the years of blockade by neighboring countries. These challenges include food security risks and restrictions on the free movement of Qataris due to land, air and sea blockades. Beyond its focus on essential life-sustaining functions, the speech analyzed above also aligns with the 'all-hazard approach'. This framework addresses preparedness against asymmetrical threats and emerging risks to fundamental societal functions, a concept emphasized by Nordic school in societal security, as discussed in Chapter 2.

5.3. The Evolving Societal Perception after 2017

As discussed above, the 2017 Gulf Crisis had significant political consequences for Qatar, influencing its policies at both domestic and international levels. However, its impact extended beyond state level and policymaking, it has also affected society as

[529] "Al Meezan - Qatary Legal Portal |." Law No. 38 of 2005 on the acquisition of Qatari nationality, 2005. https://www.almeezan.qa/ClarificationsNoteDetails.aspx?id=7870&language=en.

it reshaped the roles and perceptions of Qatari citizens and residents alike. As noted by Justin Gengler, the crisis led to a unique solidarity among Qatar's citizens and foreign residents in their support for their shared home, despite long-standing concerns within Qatar about the demographic and sociocultural impacts of its sizable non-national population[530]. The crisis also played a role in reducing historical lineage-based distinctions among Qatari citizens, fostering new symbols and spaces for civic activism, loyalty, and resistance that transcended traditional family and tribal affiliations[531] . During this period, the state permitted, and in some cases encouraged, expressions of political support that would previously have been considered unconventional. Additionally, the embargo temporarily delayed anticipated economic reforms aimed at reducing Qataris' reliance on the state's rentier economy, which could have included measures such as new taxes and subsidy cuts affecting Gulf nationals[532].

The blockade also created a space for civic culture, in which citizens and non-nationals have been joining in public movements of loyalty to Qatar. This solidarity was evident in various forms, from patriotic displays online to cars and homes adorned with national symbols, as well as campaigns supporting local products[533]. Non-Qataris joined Qataris in these public gestures, challenging stereotypes that portrayed expatriates as 'fair-weather' residents primarily motivated by economic gain[534]. The dedication shown by the expatriate community was publicly recognized by Emir Sheikh Tamim in a speech at the United Nations, where he expressed pride

[530] GENGLER, Justin. Society and State in Post-Blockade Qatar: Lessons for the Arab Gulf Region. In: Reflecting on the GCC Crisis. Routledge, 2022. p. 24-41.

[531] MITCHELL, Jocelyn Sage; AL-HAMMADI, Mariam Ibrahim. Nationalism and identity in Qatar after 2017: The narrative of the New National Museum. In: Reflecting on the GCC Crisis. Routledge, 2022. p. 42-63.

[532] GENGLER, Justin; AL-KHELAIFI, Buthaina. Crisis, state legitimacy, and political participation in a non-democracy: How Qatar withstood the 2017 blockade. The Middle East Journal, 2019, 73.3: 397-416.

[533] ORUC, Nurgul. Hashtag Unity: Qatar's digital nationalism in the Gulf crisis. Journal of Arab & Muslim Media Research, 2019, 12.1: 43-64.

[534] GENGLER, Justin. Society and State in Post-Blockade Qatar: Lessons for the Arab Gulf Region. In: Reflecting on the GCC Crisis. Routledge, 2022. p. 24-41.

in both Qatari nationals and residents[535]. This sentiment was echoed upon his return to Qatar, where large numbers of citizens and expatriates gathered at the airport to welcome him, symbolizing a shared loyalty to the nation[536].

Media and scholarly analyses have credited the events of June 2017 with fostering stronger relations between Qatari citizens and expatriates[537] . It is because of (1) the immediate and serious threats posed by the blockade—militarily and economically—created a sense of shared vulnerability among all residents of Qatar, overshadowing less pressing issues; (2) during the initial days, both Qataris and non-Qataris worried about their safety, their homes, and the country's future stability and under such circumstances, the social challenges posed by cultural differences, social inequality, and communal separation seemed less significant[538]. Similarly, the financial competition between citizens and foreigners diminished in the face of a larger economic threat, with concerns shifting to the possibility of financial collapse or wealth expropriation[539].

Although the impact of 2017 Gulf Cries on Qatar's social and political relations has received relatively limited focus from scholars and policymakers, a number of surveys was conducted on this topic. One of the important surveys was carried out by the Social and Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI) at Qatar University, which gathered public opinion data from both citizens and residents before and after June 2017. These surveys are key to understanding the blockade's short-term effects on social and political dynamics, as well as longer-term trends from 2010 to 2019. The survey findings support some qualitative accounts suggesting notable shifts in Qatar's social and political landscape after 2017 Gulf crisis, including enhanced the

[535] Ibid.

[536] Ibid.

[537] MITCHELL, Jocelyn Sage; ALLAGUI, Ilhem. The Gulf information war| Car decals, civic rituals, and changing conceptions of nationalism. International Journal of Communication, 2019, 13: 21.

[538] GENGLER, Justin. Society and State in Post-Blockade Qatar: Lessons for the Arab Gulf Region. In: Reflecting on the GCC Crisis. Routledge, 2022. p. 24-41.

[539] GENGLER, Justin. Society and State in Post-Blockade Qatar: Lessons for the Arab Gulf Region. In: Reflecting on the GCC Crisis. Routledge, 2022. p. 24-41.

trust between Qataris and non-Qataris and heightened citizen interest in political engagement and state responsiveness[540].

Qualitative observations suggest that Qataris and non-Qataris have emerged from the blockade with stronger social bonds and greater mutual appreciation. The reason of this argument was not proved qualitatively whether the blockade may have increased Qataris' appreciation of non-Qataris' roles in society or simply underscored positive attitudes toward expatriates that had developed over time. Nonetheless, the survey conducted by SESRI in 2019 demonstrates a nuanced picture that Qataris seem more accepting of foreigners since the blockade.

As shown in Figure 5.1, self-reported social trust among Qataris toward various resident groups, including Arab, South Asian, and Western nationals, as well as other Qataris. As shown in the figure 5.1, between 2011 and 2019, the average level of social trust among Qataris toward fellow citizens, on a scale from 1 to 4 (where 1 indicates no trust and 4 signifies high trust), was approximately 3.4 while the trust level in Arab expatriates averaged almost 10% lower. The trust level among residents from South Asian and Western countries was lower compared to Qataris and Arab expats but remained above 2.4, exceeding the median of 2.0 points, reflecting a generally positive level of trust.

On the other hand, the data shows positive shifts in attitudes toward certain expatriate communities, specifically Arab and Western residents. Between 2011 and 2019, the trust among Qataris towards increased by 23% in Western expatriates and 10% in Arab residents. The trust gap narrowed during the surveyed years between these groups and other Qataris by 38% and 30%, respectively, while trust levels in fellow citizens and South Asian residents remained slightly changed. This result demonstrates the positive trend in trust toward the expats particularly white-collar expatriates from Arab and Western backgrounds post-2017. Nonetheless, when it comes to South Asians, the level of trust did not increase significantly and remained comparatively lower.

[540] Ibid.



Figure 5. 1. Self-reported social trust among Qatari citizens
Source: SESRI Qatar University

While SESRI's study did not investigate the reasons behind this in detail, the lower social trust toward South Asians might be attributed to a lack of interaction between them and other social groups. As discussed in Chapter 3, South Asians predominantly reside in their own neighborhoods in Qatar, such as Souq Waqif and the Al Asmakh district, or in labor camps, which results in greater isolation and fewer opportunities for interaction with other communities[541]. Another reason could be linked to language barriers, which further limit interactions between South Asians and other social groups. As argued by Rizwan, a significant portion of Asian migrants in Qatar are "uneducated, low-skilled workers who lack proficiency in English or Arabic—languages commonly used as lingua franca[542]." This language gap creates difficulties in communication and reduces opportunities for building connections with other groups.

[541] GARDNER, Andrew, et al. A portrait of low-income migrants in contemporary Qatar. Journal of Arabian Studies, 2013, 3.1: 1-17.

[542] AHMAD, Rizwan. Challenges of Communication and Identity in the Gulf: Insights from Qatar and the UAE. In: Social Change in the Gulf Region: Multidisciplinary Perspectives. Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore, 2023. p. 287-304.



Figure 5. 2. Inter-group social trust in Qatar after the blockade (2019).
Source: SESRIC Qatar University

It is also possible to obtain a perspective on post-blockade intergroup relations by examining data demonstrating trust between Qatar's citizen and non-citizen communities. In that regard, Figure 5. 2, outlines trust levels across social groups as of 2019, reveals that while all groups report high trust toward Qataris and Arab expatriates, this sentiment is not equally reciprocated toward Western and South Asian expatriates. Although there are discrepancies in trust levels among social groups, the survey results demonstrate that overall trust remained high in 2019, two years after the Gulf Crisis. When considering these two figures, a positive trajectory in trust levels among social groups in Qatar is evident. Another key finding from the survey is the notably high level of trust Qataris have towards non-Qataris, particularly Arab expatriates.

These findings are particularly important when considering the economic impact of the Gulf Crisis which created a negative trend in national income per capita. As shown in Figure 5.3, while national income per capita exhibited a positive trend prior to the Gulf Crisis, after 2017, it declined from $48,209 in 2018 to $38,619 in 2020. This indicates a drop in annual growth, with a 4.8% decrease from 2018 to 2019 and a further 10.7% decrease from 2019 to 2020.



Figure 5. 3. National Income Per Capita
Source: World Development Indicators- World Bank

From that point, it is important to correlating the high level of trust in Qatar despite worsening economic indicators, particularly in national income per capita. As the literature indicates that economic decline typically decreases nationals' trust toward non-nationals, and fuels anti-foreigner sentiments. For example, Semyonov et al. studied the rise of anti-foreigner sentiment in Europe from 1988 to the 2000s across 12 countries, finding that anti-foreigner sentiment tends to be more pronounced in places with a high proportion of foreign populations and challenging economic conditions. Importantly, these factors' impact on anti-foreigner sentiment has remained consistent over time[543].

In Qatar, despite hosting a large expatriate population and experiencing economic challenges following the Gulf crisis, social trust between Qataris and other groups exhibited a positive trajectory. Contrary to expectations on the economic challenges heightened tension among citizens and others, the attitudes of Qataris toward non-Qataris reflected greater social trust. This shift can be attributed to the increasing feeling of solidarity during the 2017 Gulf crisis. As proclaimed by Gengler, the blockade, with its profound military and economic complications, created a sense of

[543] SEMYONOV, Moshe; RAIJMAN, Rebeca; GORODZEISKY, Anastasia. The rise of anti-foreigner sentiment in European societies, 1988-2000. American sociological review, 2006, 71.3: 426-449.

collective vulnerability among all residents who shared common concern about their daily life[544]. In such times, social or economic issues tied to cultural differences, social inequality, and communal divides became less significant[545]. Another contributing factor could be Qatar's socio-political system, which protects nationals through specific laws. Supporting this Argument, Sheikh Abdulaziz emphasized in a personal interview: "*We also don't perceive non-Qataris as economic threats or threats to our jobs, because Qataris have guarantees in place that ensure opportunities remain available without risk from external influences*[546]." Although legislation and political system in Qatar had previously prioritized protecting citizens, post-2017 marked the first time in history that Qataris experienced a significant drop in national income per capita. This period, therefore, is the unique case to test social relations during economic challenges.

Even though survey results vary among the social groups living in Qatar, there is clear evidence that the post-2017 Gulf crisis environment has strengthened trust between these groups, despite rising economic challenges. Since 2017, non-Qatari residents have also reported a growing sense of belonging and inclusion. In that regard, a compelling example of this argument is Gallery 11 at the National Museum of Qatar (NMoQ), which is dedicated to the period of Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani's reign and the 2017 Gulf crisis. The gallery illustrates how the people of Qatar were united during the crisis, showcasing the solidarity shown by both Qatari citizens and expatriates in supporting the nation's leadership. In that regard, Sheikh Abdulaziz Al Thani, Director of the National Museum of Qatar noted in a personal interview: "*Gallery 11 showcases Qatar's collective efforts and the vision of His Highness the Emir. It highlights the contributions of diverse groups and illustrates Qatar's shared success. It also demonstrates that residents of Qatar see the country as their home, emphasizing the value of inclusion and unity in shaping Qatar's future of a stronger for all, and underscores the importance of working together* [547]."

[544] GENGLER, Justin. Society and State in Post-Blockade Qatar: Lessons for the Arab Gulf Region. In: Reflecting on the GCC Crisis. Routledge, 2022. p. 24-41.

[545] Ibid.

[546] Sheikh Abdulaziz Al Thani, interviewed by Author, Doha-Qatar, November 10, 2024.

[547] Sheikh Abdulaziz Al Thani, interviewed by Author, Doha-Qatar, November 10, 2024.

A highlight of the gallery begins with an interactive wall featuring the iconic silhouette of the Emir's profile alongside the slogan 'Tamim al-Majd' (Tamim the Glorious). This wall is inspired by events following the 2017 Gulf crise, during which a Qatari artist, Ahmed al-Maadheed, created the iconic silhouette that became a symbol of unity and solidarity. At the time, people formed long queues to sign the poster, as the lower portion quickly filled with signatures, and many needed to use a crane to find an empty spot. This display powerfully represents the unity and resilience of both Qataris and non-Qataris, demonstrating their unwavering support for the state leader as shown in the photo.

The final section of Gallery 11 also displays how the inclusive approach has been widespread in Qatar after the 2017 Gulf crisis by 89 interviews conducted in 2018 and 2019. These interviews were conducted with a sample reflecting Qatar's demographic composition: 21.3% Qatari nationals, 22.6% Arab expatriates, and 55.1% non-Arab expatriates which coincide with the demographic composition of Qatar which includes around 88% non-Qatari expats. These interviews, accessed with special permission from the NMoQ/Qatar Museums for this dissertation, explored participants' perceptions of Qatar and its future. The responses provide valuable insight into expatriates' reactions to Qatar's unity narrative and the broader impact of the museum's storytelling.

When zooming into the interviews showcased in Gallery 11, several key themes can be found. One prominent commonality among all participants is their appreciation for Qatar and their support for the country's development and their trust for the future in which 58% of the participants explicitly mentioned the word 'future' when discussing their belief for the success of the country[548].

Moreover, while all participants expressed positive sentiments about the country, Qatari respondents more emphasized Qatar's emergence as a global hub over the past decade, their commitment to contributing to its success, and their support for Sheikh Tamim. For instance, Qatari interviewee, Hamad, remarked: "*Qatar has advanced in*

[548] Authors Analysis from a content of National Museum of Qatar. Gallery 11. Museum Content. Qatar Musuems.

the cultural, political, and economic sectors, and I expect it to progress even further, especially in line with the Qatar National Vision 2030[549]." Another Qatari participant, Interviewee, Abdulaziz, stated: "*Qatar will remain free and proud under the leadership of Tamim Al Majid*[550]." Many Qataris also acknowledged the contributions of both citizens and residents to the country's achievements. The Qatari interviewee, Khalifa, commented: "*I hope that God protects Qatar and its people and residents from all evil and guides us. We will achieve the Qatar National Vision 2030 with the support of the Emir*[551]."

For expatriates, Qatar is repeatedly identified as "home." Nearly all expatriates highlighted the high quality of life in Qatar, particularly in terms of security, education, and healthcare. Over 85% expressed gratitude toward the country, often using terms like "thankful" or "appreciation," and a significant majority expressed their desire to continue to live in Qatar and contribute to its success[552]. For example, Interviewee Alexandra shared: "*Qatar is a really generous country, and I am super excited to see the future. I hope I can be a part of that future. Hopefully, I'm staying indefinitely to see the country grow. I've made a lot of friends in this beautiful nation*[553]." Similarly, Interviewee, Azra, expressed solidarity and a deep connection to Qatar:

> *We've been in Qatar for 11 years now and have a wonderful life here. It's a country with an impeccable vision in healthcare, art, culture, sports, and education. We've stood by it in all its victories and in solidarity when needed*[554].

When comparing the responses of Arab expatriates to those of other expatriates, Arab expats more often emphasized Qatar's regional role and advancements as a

[549] National Museum of Qatar. *Gallery 11*. Museum Content. *Qatar Musuems*.

[550] Ibid.

[551] National Museum of Qatar. Gallery 11. Museum Content. Qatar Musuems.

[552] Authors Analysis from a content of National Museum of Qatar. Gallery 11. Museum Content. Qatar Musuems.

[553] National Museum of Qatar. *Gallery 11*. Museum Content. *Qatar Musuems*.

[554] Ibid.

model for the Middle East. For instance, Interviewee, Jawaher, envisioned: "*I imagine that in the future, Qatar will be a source of connection, creativity, and growth in the Middle East*[555]." Interviewee, Noor, shared a similar sentiment: "*I hope Qatar will be a leader in the medical field and use these skills to contribute to humanitarian projects around the world*[556]." Others, like Interviewee, Shahd, highlighted Qatar's potential in fashion and entertainment: "*I would love to see Qatar as the fashion and entertainment hub of the Middle East and North Africa*[557]."

Several interviewees also compared Qatar to their home countries, emphasizing its ability to unite diverse cultures and provide a home for expatriates. For example, Interviewee, Ania, shared:

> *I am half Polish and half American. I've lived in both places, but I've been in Qatar for six years. In the U.S., I feel more Polish and somehow out of place; in Poland, I feel very American. Qatar is the first place that truly feels like home to me because it's so diverse. Here, I can just be who I am without any cultural or personal expectations. It's been incredibly liberating*[558].

Similarly, Interviewee, Zahra, expressed:

> *For me, Qatar is home. I'm British-Iraqi, and I can't imagine myself living in Baghdad or London. I love living here—it combines traditional values with a modern way of life. I hope it gets even better, and I'm sure it will*[559].

Analyzing the interviews showcasing in Gallery 11 of NMOQ reveals a clear indication that the post-2017 Gulf crisis environment has fostered a strong sense of unity and has increasingly established Qatar as a home for expatriates. To understand Qatari perceptions toward non-Qataris on how these attitudes have evolved, particularly in the context of migration-led demographic imbalances, the dissertation has also closer examine the perception of Qataris. In that regards, 11 personal

[555] Ibid.

[556] Ibid.

[557] Ibid.

[558] National Museum of Qatar. Gallery 11. Museum Content. Qatar Musuems.

[559] Ibid.

interviews were conducted with experts, including 10 Qatari professionals and one non-Qatari scholar specializing in national identity and heritage in Qatar. Non-probability sampling was employed, targeting individuals from institutions responsible for implementing cultural and identity-related objectives outlined in the National Development Strategy 3 (NDS 3). Further details on the sampling methodology and interview process are provided in the methodology section of chapter one.

During the personal interviews, 9 out of 11 participants identified the 2017 Gulf Crisis as a significant turning point for societal relations in Qatar. In that regard Shk. Abdulaziz further mentioned that "*the events of 2017 brought people closer together, uniting us and reinforcing our sense of solidarity. This demonstrates that crises can unite people, a principle that applies broadly, not just to Qatar* [560]". Saeed also stressed the importance of Gulf Crisis by saying that "*the 2017 crisis reinforced national solidarity and highlighted the community's capacity to integrate different cultural backgrounds without compromising core values*[561]". Nada also mentioned the impact on Gulf Crisis not only on societal relations but also on the development of socio-economic resilience by nationalization of economy, having reliable international partners and food security, in that she highlighted that

> *As for the blockade I see that its positive results are more than negative, as the first lesson the Qatari people learned was to rely on the people of Qatar and work for the steadfastness of this country…Without the residents and Qatari people and by only relying on other countries, this country will not grow to a higher horizon…Here we see the importance of the unity of Qataris and residents in the society to confront this blockade and that everyone united and joined forces to overcome this ordeal. The first beautiful evidence is Qatar's support to National Company to produce large quantities that meet the people's needs without the need for other countries. In addition, it opened the door to collaborate with other countries such as Turkey and importing products from them instead of the countries that Qatar used to depend on*[562].

[560] Sheikh Abdulaziz Al Thani, interviewed by Author, Doha-Qatar, November 10, 2024.

[561] Saaed ***, interviewed by Author, Doha-Qatar, November 8, 2024.

[562] Nada Al Mahasna , interviewed by Author, Doha-Qatar, 14 November , 2024.

Although the interviews represent a small sample, they help to understand the changing attitudes of Qataris toward migration-led demographic imbalances. This trend becomes especially apparent when comparing these findings with the results of the study conducted in 2016 (as discussed in Chapter 4), which posed a similar question. In the 2016 interviews, some participants perceived demographic imbalances as a threat to society and they stressed more as a threat to Khaleeji identity. However, in interviews conducted in 2024, none of the participants described migration-led demographic imbalance as a threat. When explicitly asked, "Do you perceive migration and demographic imbalances as a threat?" all participants responded as no, though they emphasized different reasons for their perspectives.

For Shk. Abdulaziz, Shkh. Shaika, Dr. Amr, Dr. Amna, Abdurrahman, Nada and Maha, the migration, foreigners or demographic imbalance are not posing a threat because of the strong collective identity in Qatar and the state policies and programs which protecting citizens.

In that regard, Shk. Abdulaziz Al Thani mentioned that

> *The answer is no, because Qatar has a strong collective identity, reflected in high and inclusive participation in the recent national election. The government has implemented numerous initiatives to safeguard our values, focusing on Islamic and Arab identity with the Qatari identity at the center. The launch of the National Museum of Qatar aims to foster this identity and help preserve our heritage and values. Qatari society is tightly bound, with frequent interactions across generations, allowing values to be naturally passed down. Through our Majlises, three generations can meet regularly. Generations learn from each other, and the diverse cultures in Qatar create a multifaceted society while Qataris remain resilient…The community has always been inclusive in its language and approach. The Qatar's policy serves as a safeguard for Qataris, providing opportunities and extensive support through scholarships and other resources, helping to reduce the risk of conflicts*[563].

Similarly, Shkh. Shaika highlighted the role of collective identity in Qatar, emphasizing how non-Qataris serve as enablers of multiculturalism. She further stated that

[563] Sheikh Abdulaziz Al Thani, interviewed by Author, Doha-Qatar, November 10, 2024.

No, Qatar's national identity is built upon the solid foundation of cultural values that go beyond the mere public perceptions of the country. For example, a strong characteristic of our national identity comes from family-oriented models of connection and communication…the foundation of our national identity, allowing for our values and traditions to be upheld and respected amongst our circles. The 'Majlis', for example, is a by-product of this, where people gather to meet and connect with family and friends; another by-product would be traditions that are passed down through generations such as falconry and other forms of cultural activities, in addition to Qatari history that often only shared through word of mouth (oral history), also passed down through generations. It tells us that only through a connection with one another can characteristics of our national identity be formed. In this respect, outside demographics, although growing, cannot affect these structures, but can further enhance the nature of these structures by enabling a multicultural community that thrives off learning from each other's cultural and traditional values, allowing them to be bolstered through exchange of knowledge and skills that can further enhance Qatar's national identity in the public sphere. A great example would the formation of the National Museum of Qatar, where a multicultural group of thinkers, curators, exhibitions designers, researchers and more, have contributed to the research, design and curatorial practices of the museum. Although distinctively focused on Qatar, the conception of the museum came about through a merge of local experts and international experts, both learning from each other the process of communicating national identity…Even to this day, many of the exhibitions on display at this museum celebrate traditions and cultures of many of Qatar's friends, through initiatives like the Year of Culture, positioning the country on a global landscape where exchange is key element of our national identity[564].

Abudrrahman also underlined the role of strong collective identity and noted that*:*

I do not believe that these demographic imbalances are any threat to my Qatari identity. That is because, in spite of the fact that there are more foreign population residing in Qatar with us, we still remain united and together…our family live our culture, preserve our norms and identity as well as religion. Additionally, our government with its necessary tools such as laws and monitoring means are effective in protecting our cultural and religious norms[565].

Dr. Amr also focused on Qatar's socio-political system, emphasizing its role in protecting citizens. He highlighted that

[564] Sheikha Shaikha Jabor Al Thani, interviewed by Author, Doha-Qatar, November 20, 2024.

[565] Abdurahman Al Kurbi, interviewed by Author, Doha-Qatar, November 7, 2024.

> *I do not think the demographic balance in Qatar threatens national identity in a significant or meaningful way. It is almost impossible for non-Qataris/foreigners to gain citizenship or permanent residence in Qatar. Citizenship is based on sanguinity (blood ties). Qatar has tied its national identity to its citizenship. Since any form of political participation or representation is strictly tied to citizenship, then demographic imbalance (as defined above) is unlikely to have any impact*[566].

Within the concept of strong collective identity Nada mentioned that

> *I see that Qatari people have a strong identity who adhere to their religion, culture and Arabic language. Our values are that Qatari people are raised in their homes on the language of the Quran…the Qatari people still practice land and sea camping activities, as in the winter they camp in the desert or what is called "Al-Annah" and go to the animal sanctuary called "Al-Ezba" and spend family time and preserve what they were raised on and grew up on from their first ancestors*[567].

Maha, Dr. Amna, Shkh. Shaikha and Fatima also addressed government programs. However, their focus was not on the programs and policies that protect citizens but rather on those aimed at fostering harmony and unity between Qataris and non-Qataris.

In that regard, Maha said:

> *No because I believe conscious steps are strategically being made to ensure the unity of Nationals and residents to avoid threats to National identity. Qatar's strategic approach to amplify the notion of unity within the nation is evident in its recent decision to amend the national constitution to unify segregations within the nationals demographic and in turn moved to celebrate integration of different demographics while emphasizing respect to Qatari traditions, to help mitigate the alienation that might otherwise erode social harmony. This notion is similarly evident in the more informal popular expression often promoted throughout national celebrations and events "* كلنا قطر*", which translates to 'We are all Qatar', encouraging different demographics within the nation to embrace Qatar and its values*[568].

[566] Amr Al Azm, interviewed by Author, Doha-Qatar, November 12, 2024.

[567] Nada Al Mahasna , interviewed by Author, Doha-Qatar, 14 November , 2024.

[568] Maha Al Shabani, interviewed by Author, Doha-Qatar, November 17, 2024.

In a follow-up discussion on the government programs in Qatar, Maha also addressed the policies and programs in Qatar which provides preventive measure on any kind of social tension, in that Maha noted that:

> *In terms of language and cultural aspects, I believe Qatar's investment in the cultural and creative industries is a clear indication of demographic inclusion and diversity, to project a globalized yet distinctly Qatari identity, balancing tradition with modernity and inviting younger generations to aid in the preservation of national identity and pride to build a society that aims to carry and project their national identity to international audiences*[569].

In that regard, Dr. Amna made a comparison with the past and current situation and highlighted the role of government policies, and she noted that

> *No, I don't believe demographical imbalance threatens Qatar's national identity, although it might threaten other Gulf countries…Historically, Qatari society tends to be private. This means that locals do not usually contact other nationalities or blend with foreigners. For example, locals used to occupy local neighborhoods, while foreigners remain on the 'business neighborhoods': i.e., 'the Pearl and Lusail'. This separation used to be also visible in public spaces like shopping malls, beaches and parks…The government is currently playing a significant role in protecting the national identity through initiatives such as 'family day' or legislation such as 'formal dress code' at the same time they have policies for integrating foreigners…So currently foreigners feel more comfortable embracing Qatari culture and learning from locals to blend into Qatari society*[570].

Similarly, Fatima has also mentioned the role of government policies to create the social harmony and unity and more addressed National Vision and the contribution of the non- foreigners in economy particularly the creative one, as she said:

> *We don't face any demographic threats, as the state has consistently implemented policies designed to promote unity and harmony among our diverse population. Our diversity is reflected in Qatar's National Vision and National Development Strategies, particularly in recent years with the introduction of the NDS-3. These strategies emphasize inclusivity, recognizing all individuals residing in Qatar as integral members of society… Culturally, their role is more important, especially in the CCI*

[569] Ibid.

[570] Dr. Amna Abdulla , interviewed by Author, Doha-Qatar, November 20, 2024.

> *(Creative and Cultural Industry). We ensure that our country's cultural and economic development is enriched by the diverse perspectives and talents within its society*[571].

Some of the interviewees, such as Roudha, Saaed and Nada, further emphasized that migration has not led to a demographic imbalance or posed a societal threat in Qatar. They attributed this to the country's strong social and community culture, which fosters harmony and ensures freedom for all members of society. Roudha mentioned the role of social and community culture and she said that

> *No, I personally do not feel any threat to my Qatari identity from any perspective. I do not perceive the lifestyle of the foreign people in Qatar disturbing to our cultural norms. As long as I can live my own culture and religion freely, which I can at the moment, I do not mind other lifestyles around Qatar. I believe, on the contrary of being disturbed, we should get used to and be comfortable with living in a multi-cultural space*[572].

Saeed similarly mentioned that "*thanks to our (Qatar) capacity to integrate different cultural backgrounds without compromising core values, Qatar's identity remains strong, vibrant and cohesive, shaped by both heritage and inclusivity*[573]."

Nada also underlined the strong community culture in Qatar by giving examples from the school systems in that she mentioned that

> *We see social harmony in schools as there are private schools for Qatari students and other nationalities. This boost diversity, adaptation .... Schools encourages to diversify with different nationalities as we see in government schools*[574].

While many of the responses aligned with the literature and survey results discussed earlier, the interviews revealed an interesting finding: although no one identified demographic imbalances or migration as threats to society and identity, other perceived threats were highlighted, including social media and modernization. In that

[571] Fatima ***, interviewed by Author, Doha-Qatar, November 13, 2024

[572] Roudha ***, interviewed by Author, Doha-Qatar, November 11, 2024.

[573] Saaed ***, interviewed by Author, Doha-Qatar, November 8, 2024.

[574] Nada Al Mahasna , interviewed by Author, Doha-Qatar, 14 November , 2024.

Dr. Amr said that

> *….While cultural shifts are occurring constantly (and these may eventually become a threat to national identity), these are not caused as much by the influx of migrants as by the sudden increase in prosperity allowing unprecedent access by Qatari citizens to other cultures (geographic through ease of travel) and (consumer products through purchasing power). Perhaps the most important factor is the time/space compression caused by the internet and the opening of Qatari society (completely unfiltered and unchecked) to the rest of the world (ideas, culture, music, etc) through social media (FaceBook, Snapchat, Twitter, TicToc, etc)*[575].

Shaikha also highlighted the modernization and social media as the threats to culture and identity not the demographic imbalances or foreigners, she argued that

> *It is not a demographic imbalance, but we have modernization threat to our national identity in multiple dimensions. In terms of culture, many new traditions penetrated the Qatari society one example to be given is that is changing color of the black abaya. For years since our grandmothers, abaya has been always black. Recently, in the last three years, the color of abaya is changing… this is kind of related to the social media influencers and their influence*[576].

Nada further described broader threats to the Qatari society, identity and the country which are related to fertility rate and late marriage in which she said

> *According to statistics, in recent years there has been a decline in the number of Qatari births. Given the high costs of marriage and the burdens and responsibilities of modern life, young people are now thinking again before getting married, knowing the high costs that often end in bank loans and a burden on married life due to paying off these loans and the requirements of modern life, such as luxuries life, going on trips and too many costs*[577].

Overall, the interviewees agreed that migration-led demographic imbalances have not posed a threat to Qatar or its national identity. They highlighted various factors supporting this perspective, including a strong collective identity and effective government policies. Many interviewees also emphasized the positive impact of

[575] Amr Al Azm, interviewed by Author, Doha-Qatar, November 12, 2024.

[576] Shaikha ***, interviewed by Author, Doha-Qatar, November 13, 2024.

[577] Nada Al Mahasna , interviewed by Author, Doha-Qatar, 14 November , 2024.

multiculturalism, identifying non-Qataris as contributing factors to societal harmony. Supporting the argument of this dissertation, the majority of the interviewees also noted that the 2017 Gulf crisis marked a pivotal moment that enhanced collective identity and cohesion between Qataris and non-Qataris. Interestingly, while the interviews were expected to present insights related to existential threats (that are discussed in Chapter 3), none of them mentioned those threats, some interviewees instead identified social media, modernization and declining fertility rate and late marriages as existential threats. While some of the threats mentioned by the interviewees are more social than societal, the declining fertility rate might be posing significant long-term challenges to society. This concern is heightened by the fact that fertility rates have steadily declined over the past two decades in Qatar. Among Qatari nationals, the decrease in fertility has occurred almost entirely among those under 35 years of age, and the trend has become increasingly alarming in recent years because of late marriages[578]. Nonetheless, it is also important to note that fertility alone cannot address demographic imbalances. "Without the implementation of a decisive naturalization policy that grants citizenship to carefully selected foreign nationals", no substantial increase in the proportion of nationals within Qatar's resident population should be anticipated[579].

When analyzing the interview results alongside survey data collected by SESRI and materials from the National Museum of Qatar, it is evident that migration-led demographic imbalances are not perceived as a societal threat. On the contrary, social trust between Qataris and non-Qataris appears to have strengthened especially in the aftermath of the 2017 Gulf crisis. All these findings indicate that the growing trust is not limited to relationships between Qataris and non-Qataris; it has also reinforced the national identity among Qataris. Notably, the findings reflect a strong sense of identity rooted in Qatar, with little to no indication of a broader Gulf identity.

Interviews conducted by both the National Museum of Qatar and the author of this dissertation also reveal a shared sense of acceptance and mutual respect among

[578] FARGUES, Philippe. Empowering Women and Fostering Fertility: Two Conflicting Policy Goals in Qatar?. European University Institute, 2019.

[579] Ibid:7.

Qataris and non-Qataris. Respondents viewed living together positively and expressed optimism about increasing social unity and harmony. This dynamic suggests that the concept of Baladna (Our Nation) has been embraced not only at the state level but also within society, as discussed in earlier sections.

The 2017 Gulf crisis also underscored the unifying effect of the blockade on both the state and its people, fostering a renewed focus on self-reliance, resilience, and national solidarity. This critical period prompted a shift in Qatar's societal and security strategies, moving away from identity-centric concerns to prioritize the resilience and interdependence of essential infrastructures and services. Qatar's approach to societal security reflects a forward-looking, transnational perspective, resonating with the Nordic model of protecting live giving functions that support the population's well-being.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The oil boom of the mid-1970s brought remarkable economic growth and financial prosperity to the Gulf States. This rapid development created a significant demand for a skilled labor force, which exceeded the capacity of the local populations to fulfill. Consequently, the Gulf region currently hosts the highest percentage of migrant labor globally. This trend has given rise to a new body of literature focusing on the region's unique migration and demographic dynamics. As outlined in the introduction of this dissertation, a substantial body of literature has examined migration in the Gulf, primarily from economic or social perspectives, addressing both sending and receiving countries. Some have also analyzed migration and its resulting demographic imbalances, while very few have explored this phenomenon through the lens of societal security.

To address this gap in the literature, this dissertation started to examine the relationship between the Gulf's unique migration phenomenon from the state and society's perceptions. During the formulation of the preliminary hypothesis, it became evident that demographic shifts in the Gulf, primarily driven by economic migration, have a deep impact on the social fabric of the Gulf nations. The rapid population growth, fueled by economic expansion and the influx of migrant workers, has significantly transformed these countries over the years. The Gulf societies often find themselves in the minority due to migration-induced demographic imbalances.

Among the Gulf states, Qatar stands out as a unique case where nationals constitute a minority within a predominantly non-national population, driven largely by economic migration. While all Gulf states face similar demographic challenges that pose existential threats, Qatar's responses exhibit notable distinctions compared to its

regional counterparts. Unlike other Gulf states, Qatar has demonstrated nuanced differences with more moderate approaches historically to migration issues, particularly following significant events such as the Kuwait invasion of Iraq and the Arab Spring. More significantly, the evolution of Qatar's threat perceptions has also followed more distinctive trajectory, especially after transformative events like the 2017 Gulf crisis, which introduced new dimensions to societal security. This dissertation, thus, focused on Qatar not only because it hosts one of the highest proportions of non-nationals in the region, but also due to its historically nuanced and increasingly divergent migration policies and national identity politics, particularly in the aftermath of the 2017 crisis.

Based on the analysis during the preliminary phase, the dissertation has proposed/formed a hypothesis that while migration-induced demographic imbalances and their associated existential threats created societal security concerns in Qatar like other Gulf States, the 2017 Gulf crisis marked a turning point for Qatar. In response to the crisis, societal security perception in Qatar evolved, diverging from that of other Gulf States. Qatar adopted a more inclusive approach, broadening its core societal values beyond the traditional tribal network and identity-based references toward an inclusive vision, exemplified by the term of Baladna (nation as a tribe).

As demonstrated throughout the chapters, this dissertation looked for continuation and changes of the societal security perspective at both the state and the societal level. To build a base for this discussion, it started with categorizing existential threats which are the reference objects of state- and society-level responses. Chapter 3 highlights the impact of migration-led demographic imbalances in the Gulf region, where nationals find themselves as minorities due to the overwhelming presence of non-nationals, primarily driven by economic migration. This increasing trend of non-nationals in the total population presents several existential challenges. Despite efforts to address these imbalances, the impact of migration is particularly evident in the labor force. This dominance raises significant concerns regarding identity, culture, and societal values.

Among the challenges discussed in Chapter 3, the prospect of nationals becoming a minority is particularly pressing. This demographic shift, exacerbated by the influx

of foreign workers, raises critical questions about the long-term stability of Gulf societies, with Qatar being no exception. Looking ahead, Qatar's economic growth, fueled by mega projects and international events, is expected to feed these demographic imbalances. Although initiatives to nationalize the workforce were tried, the demand for immigrant labor, particularly from Asia, is projected to persist.

Alongside this demographic transformation, there has been a threat of declining in the use of the Arabic language. This linguistic shift not only reflects changing patterns of communication but also touches on the deep cultural identity that Arabic represents for the region. Additionally, the emergence of distinct sub-communities, shaped by the diverse backgrounds of migrants, has introduced new complexities to the Gulf's social fabric. These sub-communities often organized along linguistic, ethnic, or cultural lines, add a new dimension to societal security in the region. Consequently, there is growing concern that the Khaliji identity, central to the Gulf's cultural and societal framework, is under threat. Whether these concerns are grounded or largely perceived, it is undeniable that demographic imbalances have heightened the sense of societal insecurity across the Gulf, including Qatar.

This heightened awareness has compelled Gulf states to reassess and adapt their policies and strategies continuously, striving to manage the shifting demographic landscape while safeguarding the essence of their unique Khaliji identity. In that regard, Chapter 4 examines responses to migration-driven demographic imbalances and the existential threats they pose, particularly in the case of Qatar. Until the Gulf Crisis of 2017, Qatar, like other Gulf states, prioritized identity as a cornerstone of societal security. This focus became especially pronounced during the 2000s with the influx of migrant workers from Asian countries, which heightened various levels of societal insecurity.

Up until 2017, Qatar’s responses to these threats were multifaceted. At the state level, measures were primarily regulatory, involving the introduction of laws and the strengthening of border controls to manage the influx of migrants. Qatar’s state-level responses included efforts such as the kafala system, nationalization programs, and proposals for a national identity management system, while this policy remained in

the discourse stage without full or effective implementation. These policies reflect the enduring challenges of balancing demographic shifts, economic dependency on migrants, and the preservation of national identity.

In the early stages of state formation, Gulf states addressed demographic challenges predominantly within the political sphere, with concerns about the declining Arab presence becoming integral to political discourse. By the new millennium, the social consequences of demographic imbalances became more visible, prompting Gulf authorities to publicly acknowledge the negative implications of these trends.

More critically, since the 1990s, Gulf states, including Qatar, also implemented migration policies designed to prevent the integration of migrant workers into their societies. This approach emphasized "temporary labor importation," focusing on short-term contracts, regular workforce turnover, and restrictions on family reunification and citizenship. Measures also included limiting socio-economic rights and deporting unauthorized migrants. These policies collectively define the Gulf model of migration management, which was shaped by a shared strategy among Gulf states. This model incorporated the selective recruitment of migrants based on nationality and, by the 1990s, expanded to include workforce nationalization initiatives. These measures sought to promote the employment of Gulf nationals in public and private sectors while introducing urban segregation trends, restricting naturalization laws, and reforming the kafala sponsorship system. Restrictions on the duration of migrants' stays, particularly for low-wage workers, also became a defining feature of this model.

In the 2000s, the Gulf model of labor management evolved to address broader societal security concerns, including the cultural impacts of migration and the influence of modernization on emerging cultural movements. National strategies and policy shifts were implemented to address these challenges. In Qatar, safeguarding national identity and values remained a recurring theme in official discourse as exemplified in chapter 4. State-level responses to migration remained focused on mitigating demographic challenges, but they also struggled to gain societal support for expanding migrant rights to align more closely with citizenship privileges.

Economic rights, deeply intertwined with citizenship, posed significant obstacles to achieving inclusivity and equality.

Until 2017, at societal level, non-state mechanisms, such as tribal networks, played a role in addressing identity-related challenges. However, while the state took explicit political actions to tackle these issues, individuals often perceived them more implicitly. Since the 2010s, there has been a growing recognition among Qataris of the importance of foreign labor for the nation's infrastructure development, particularly in the lead-up to global events such as the FIFA World Cup. Despite this acknowledgment, Qatari citizens continue to express caution regarding the long-term cultural and social implications of the expanding migrant population. Surveys discussed in chapter 4 highlight a persistent tension between the economic necessity of foreign workers and the desire to preserve traditional Qatari culture. Survey results also reiterate that Qataris increasingly viewed foreign workers as an essential component of the nation's economic engine, they simultaneously perceived them as a potential threat to their way of life. This dual perception underscores the complexities of managing a workforce while maintaining cultural identity.

As aforementioned, the hypothesis of the dissertation proposed an evolving trend in societal security perceptions regarding migration-driven demographic imbalances, with the 2017 Gulf Crisis serving as a pivotal turning point that fostered a more inclusive approach in Qatar. Against this backdrop, the analysis in Chapter 5 begins by exploring the reasons behind these changes, asking why the 2017 Gulf Crisis was significant in reshaping societal and security dynamics in Qatar.

An analysis of the period surrounding the Gulf Crisis reveals one of its most significant impacts: the unifying effect it had on Qatari society. This era marked a pivotal shift in policymaking and societal responses, embodied by the concept of Baladna, which underscores self-reliance, resilience, and a heightened sense of national solidarity. The roots of this unity stem from a number of key factors. First, the blockade, with its profound military and economic repercussions, created a collective sense of vulnerability among residents, uniting them around shared concerns about their daily lives. Second, during this period, social and economic

tensions tied to cultural differences, social inequality, and communal divides receded in importance. Third, the aggression from neighboring Gulf countries—many of which maintain tribal ties to families in Qatar—further deepened feelings of isolation. This shared experience of being "under siege" catalyzed widespread solidarity and support for the Qatari state, evoking what many described as the spirit of a war of independence. When viewed the third point alongside the broader literature on the Gulf region, which found that national identity formation in the region has traditionally been inward-focused and avoids hostility toward neighboring nations, the 2017 Gulf Crisis stands out. The blockade in 2017 marks Qatar as the only Gulf country to have experienced a moment independence struggle mobilizing strategic segments of the population around a common ideological vision. This unique "national moment" highlights Qatar's distinct trajectory in the region.

The blockade, therefore, prompted a reevaluation of Qatar's societal security framework, moving beyond identity-centric concerns that traditionally dominated regional discourse. Instead, Qatar's response prioritized the protection and resilience of interdependent infrastructures and services vital to the population's well-being. In this sense, the 2017 Gulf Crisis acted as a catalyst for redefining Qatar's societal and security perspectives within the Gulf.

At the state level, Qatar's legislative efforts in residency, investment, and visa policies marked as a reflection of a growing ambition to foster social inclusivity. As a rapidly developing nation, Qatar has carefully shaped its policies to position itself as a 'transformative state,' adapt at navigating the complexities of a diversified, modern society. While recent labor policies and permanent residency laws represent significant progress, further expansion of these inclusive measures remains necessary. In this context, the launch of the National Development Strategy 3 (NDS-3) also marks a key milestone in integrating non-Qatari residents into Qatar's long-term vision.

The inclusiveness of non-nationals is evident not only in legislative reforms but also in the evolving tone of political discourse. Non-nationals are increasingly recognized as integral contributors to Qatar's social, economic, and cultural fabric. This shift,

particularly pronounced since the 2017 Gulf Crisis, reflects a progressive step toward a more inclusive national identity. A closer analysis of the Emir of Qatar's speeches since he assumed leadership in 2013 highlights this transformation. Between 2013 and 2017, the discourse was more focused on Qataris and Qatari identity. Following the regional crisis, however, the Emir adopted more inclusive language, addressing residents and the broader community living in Qatar to foster a sense of unity and belonging among all.

When it comes the societal level analysis, the survey data and interviews analyzed in chapter five also showed that the individuals collectively agreed that migration-led demographic imbalances do not pose a threat to Qatar or its national identity. Supporting this dissertation, the majority of the interviewees pointed to the 2017 Gulf crisis as a pivotal moment that enhanced collective identity and strengthened cohesion between Qataris and non-Qataris. When the interview findings are analyzed alongside survey data from SESRI and materials from the National Museum of Qatar, it has become evident that migration-led demographic imbalance has not been regarded as a societal threat, especially since 2017.

Further, social trust between Qataris and non-Qataris has deepened, particularly in the aftermath of the 2017 Gulf crisis. These findings suggest that this growing trust extends beyond relationships between Qataris and non-Qataris; it has also reinforced Qatar's national identity. Notably, the findings discussed in chapter 5 reflect a strong identity rooted in Qatar, with minimal indications of a broader Gulf identity. All those data also reveal a shared sense of acceptance and mutual respect among Qataris and non-Qataris. Respondents expressed positive sentiments about living together and optimism regarding increasing social unity and harmony. This dynamic highlight the societal embrace of the concept of Baladna at both the state and community levels.

This dissertation also adopts the concept of societal security to provide theoretical depth, framing the argument and contextualizing historical shifts in Qatar's state- and society-level perspectives. By applying this framework, the study seeks to contribute to the broader discourse on societal security, arguing that Qatar's evolving approach

offers valuable insights into the theoretical field. In the early years of state formation, societal issues and existential threats were primarily addressed through the lens of state or political security, consistent with the early understanding of security articulated by Barry Buzan in Copenhagen School.

Table 6. 1. Summary of Theoretical Contributions

Copenhagen School	Nordic School
• identity-centric definition • 'society' was defined as an intersubjective construct, including nations, ethnic groups, clans, tribes, or any community that provided a source of identity for its members	• society's resilience and ability to function • life-giving function, indicating the capacity to prepare for and respond to various security challenges.
Threats • **Migration:** the identity of a community, which is diluted and influxes by other community, can be changed by a shift in the composition of the people • **Horizontal competition** that refers to a change in a group due to the overriding cultural and linguistic influence from neighboring culture • **Vertical competition** where people will stop seeing themselves as their own identity because of an integrating projects • **Depopulation :**could be whether by plague, war, famine, natural catastrophe or polices of extermination, and it threatens identity by threatening its carriers	• Downplaying of Life-Threatening Risks: Policymakers downplayed risks to life-giving functions due to their unpredictable nature, leading to an **all-hazards approach** favored in policy. • Transnational Security Dynamics: Acknowledgment of the transnational nature of life-giving functions prompted actions beyond national borders.
↓ Migration and Horizontal Competition	↓ Life-giving functions by Balanda

70s to 90s	90s and 2000s	Post-2017
• The reshaping of the population in GCC states due to economically induced migration (demographic imbalance) was largely ignored in the beginning in favour of military and political threats. • The Concept of Societal Security was not common term • the influx of Arabs from the broader Middle East to address the shortage of skilled workers and to preserve of their Khaleji cultural norms and Arabic heritage	• the Gulf War (1990-91) initiated a paradigm shift in the Gulf States when monarchies decided to move away from Arab expatriates to workers brought in from Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, who were seen as more docile, reliable, and less politically challenging than Arabs especially Palestinians • In 2000s, migrant communities had become a more important phenomenon for the construction of the societal "existential threats" in the region because demographic imbalances in the Gulf and Qatar	• Both Qataris and non-Qataris have emerged from the blockade with strengthened social ties and a heightened mutual appreciation within the community. • unity among citizens and foreign residents in Qatar, as they rallied together in support of their shared homeland. • diminishing traditional distinctions among Qatari residents based on descent, fostering shared symbols and spaces for civic activism, loyalty, and resistance that transcended familial and tribal boundaries • created an opportunity for non-nationals to participate the socio-political processes by expressing their opinions and engaging in behaviors that might have been considered unusual in the past.

In the aftermath of the Gulf War in the 1990s and throughout the 2000s, Qatar's societal security framework, like those of other Gulf States, expanded to address identity-related threats linked to migration. This evolution reflected growing concerns about the demographic impact of an influx of migrant communities, which could reshape societal identity through what Ole Wæver's threat perception of 'migration' and "horizontal competition." In this process, cultural and linguistic influences from migrant and neighboring communities begin to alter the composition and identity of the host society. Consequently, the concept of "we" in Qatar similar

to other Gulf States was increasingly viewed as being under threat. These developments highlighted the growing complexity of societal security concerns in the region, necessitating more nuanced approaches to the challenges posed by migration, identity, and security.

The 2017 Gulf Crisis served as a catalyst for the emergence of a distinct societal security framework in Qatar, diverging from the approaches of its neighbors. Termed Baladna in this dissertation, this new framework aligns with the "New Nordic Understanding of Security," which prioritizes the protection of critical social functions and adopts an all-hazards approach over the securitization of threats to the identity. Since 2017 under the concept of Baladna in Qatar, non-nationals/migrants have shifted from being perceived as existential threats to becoming referent objects in addressing new and emerging threats—particularly those posed by neighboring countries to the well-being of both nationals and non-nationals.

The Nordic perspective on life-giving functions, with its emphasis on their transnational and interconnected nature, provides a useful lens for examining Qatar's trajectory after 2017. This perspective underscores resilience, inclusivity, and the interdependence between Qatari nationals and migrant communities, marking a significant shift in Qatar's approach to societal security.

As the policymakers in Nordic countries, the ruler of Qatar has also increasingly embraced an all-hazards approach, acknowledging the reliance of modern societies on networks and systems that transcend national boundaries. This perspective introduced the concept of intermestic dynamics, which highlights the intersection of international and domestic factors in shaping societal security. By integrating these insights, this dissertation contributes to a more nuanced understanding of Qatar's evolving societal security framework, offering both theoretical and practical implications for addressing the interconnected challenges of migration, identity, and security in the Gulf region.

This dissertation contributes to literature both theoretically and as a case study; however, there are a number of subject matters remaining open for further

discussion. While the dissertation predominantly identifies positive sentiments toward state policies and societal responses to the migrant community, the picture is not entirely ideal. Although Qatar is characterized as a transformative state and Baladna concept has been getting more explicit since 2017, there are areas where social inclusion could be further enhanced. For instance, although expatriates can now obtain residency, the laws regarding permanent residency have not broadened the criteria for citizenship eligibility. While the legal prerequisites for citizenship are publicly available, the actual process of applying remains opaque, in which people were unable to locate any forms or details outlining the application procedure[580]. The exact number of naturalized Qatari citizens is also undisclosed. However, as argued by Kovessy, it is likely a small group, as the law restricts naturalization to a maximum of 50 individuals annually[581].

Additionally, the dissertation portrays Qatar as a country that provides certain rights and a high level of inclusivity for non-Qataris. However, as discussed within the scope, the dissertation does not distinguish between different groups of non-Qataris, such as white-collar and blue-collar workers, or between expatriates and migrant laborers. The level of inclusivity experienced by these groups varies. Blue-collar workers, particularly those living in labor camps, do not enjoy the same level of inclusivity as other expatriates. Socio-economic disparities among non-nationals significantly influence levels of acceptance within society. As Bel-Air argues, recent reforms are highly selective, with the greatest benefits disproportionately favoring foreign investors and white-collar workers[582]. In contrast, individuals with lower skill levels, often originating from South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, are largely excluded from these advancements[583]. This dynamic risk further widens the gap in

[580] Kovessy, Peter. "The (Narrow) Path to Qatari Citizenship." Doha News | Qatar, October 15, 2014. https://dohanews.co/path-qatari-citizenship/.

[581] Kovessy, Peter. "The (Narrow) Path to Qatari Citizenship." Doha News | Qatar, October 15, 2014. https://dohanews.co/path-qatari-citizenship/.

[582] Bel-Air, Françoise De. "As the Gulf Region Seeks a Pivot, Reforms to Its Oft-Criticized Immigration Policies Remain a Work in Progress." migrationpolicy.org, December 5, 2024. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/gulf-region-gcc-migration-kafala-reforms.

[583] Ibid.

rights and inclusion between highly skilled foreign nationals and other migrants, deepening existing inequalities.

It is also essential to interpret the findings of this dissertation, derived from interviews and surveys, by considering the socio-political context of Qatar. Societal perceptions in Qatar often align closely with state-level discourse, reflecting the top-down nature of governance in the country. As a rentier state, Qatar's regime (particularly the Emir) plays a significant role in shaping public narratives, leaving regulated visibility for opposing voices. As discussed in the book, *Political Reforms in Qatar*, three key aspects of Qatar's socio-political system play a significant role on that: first, the role of patronage networks in shaping the social structure; second, the creation of a political culture centered on loyalty and state dependency; and third, the rentier distribution of wealth, which underpins a social contract that fosters an illusion of widespread satisfaction[584]. Qatari society also exhibits political apathy, with limited public demand for significant changes or freedom of opinion. The concepts of political participation, greater democracy, and freedom of opinion hold minimal importance in both national and individual agendas. Notably, only 4% of Qataris identified freedom of opinion as a desired right[585]. Against this backdrop, both Qataris and non-Qataris report high levels of satisfaction, as evidenced by the interview results collected at the National Museum of Qatar (NMoQ) and discussed in Chapter 5. However, this dissertation deliberately excludes an analysis of the socio-political context underlying this satisfaction, particularly the influence of the rentier-state social contract.

An important element to consider in this dissertation is also the time frame. The Gulf crisis and the subsequent blockade occurred only seven years ago, and the effects on societal perceptions and dynamics are still unfolding. While the findings reflect the current context, it is important to acknowledge that perceptions may continue to evolve over time. Thus, their full impact has yet to be thoroughly realized or observed.

[584] BATTALOĞLU, Cihat. Political reforms in Qatar: From authoritarianism to political grey zone. Gerlach Press, 2018.

[585] Ibid.

Moreover, while the author's current role within a government entity in the cultural sector of Qatar has provided many opportunities in data collection and firsthand observations, it may cause a natural feeling toward a favorable perspective on the country. This is particularly relevant considering the author's contributions to implementing policies aimed at extending the inclusiveness of Qatar's national identity by integrating non-Qataris into cultural institutions.

Although the dissertation provides valuable insights and exclusive findings, it also lays a strong foundation for future research. A number of subjects remain open for further exploration.

First, in terms of theoretical evaluation, this dissertation does not explore the concept of securitization, particularly its cause-and-effect relationship with societal security perceptions regarding migration and demographic imbalances in the Gulf. Future research could delve into the securitization process in the region, examining the process of migration and demographic changes are framed as existential threats.

Second, this study focuses primarily on Qatar, reflecting its unique trajectory in evaluating societal security. Nonetheless, future research can adopt a broader lens, encompassing the entire Gulf region. This would allow for a comparative analysis of societal security frameworks and identity-building processes across different Gulf states.

Third, while the dissertation identifies the 2017 Gulf Crisis as a turning point in Qatar’s societal security and inclusive identity-building efforts, other critical events such as modernization, globalization, the hosting of the 2022 FIFA World Cup, and the Arab Spring remain comparatively underexplored. Future studies can assess how these transformative events have influenced societal perceptions and identity in Qatar and the wider Gulf region.

Fourth, this research also focuses on the perspectives of Qatar’s government and state actors, with limited emphasis on migrants' perspectives. Future studies could, thus, address this imbalance by examining how migrants perceive societal security, their interactions with one another, and their connections to their countries of origin.

Finally, the gender perspective for both Qataris and non-Qataris can also be integrated to the analysis. The future research can focus on the unique challenges and contributions of women in these contexts, offering a gendered lens to enhance understanding of societal security and inclusivity.

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APPENDICES

A. APPROVAL OF THE METU HUMAN SUBJECTS ETHICS COMMITTEE



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29 KASIM 2023

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İlgi: İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu Başvurusu

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Danışmanlığını yürütttüğünüz Cihat BATTALOGLU'nun ***"Körfez'de Toplumsal Güvenliği Yeniden Kavramsallaştırmak: Katar'da Değişen Tehdit Algıları"*** başlıklı araştırmanız İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu tarafından uygun görülerek 0467-ODTUİAEK-2023 protokol numarası ile onaylanmıştır.

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Certifications

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- Project Management Professional (PMP) Seminar, 2023
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Publications

- Political Reforms in Qatar: From Authoritarianism to Political Grey Zone. Berlin, Germany: Gerlach Press, 2018.
- Security Puzzle in the Gulf: New Sectors and New Challenges in The Arms Trade, Military Services and the Security Market in the Gulf States, Berlin & London: Gerlach Press, 2016.
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Academic Presentations

- Understanding the Drivers of Youth Radicalism & Violent Extremism in OIC, First OIC Festival, Egypt, 2019.
- Demographic Imbalances and Societal Security, Gulf Research Meeting, University of Cambridge, UK, 2018.
- From Democratization to Securitization, WOCMES, University of Seville, Spain, 2018.
- Women’s Political Participation in Qatar, Gulf Research Meeting, University of Cambridge, UK, 2017.
- Demographic Imbalances and New Security Concerns in the GCC, ASEN Conference, London School of Economics, UK, 2015.
- Security Puzzle and New Security Concerns in the Gulf States, Gulf Research Meeting, University of Cambridge, UK, 2015.

C. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Yetmişli yılların ortalarında petrol gelirlerinde yaşanan artış ve buna bağlı gelişmeler, Körfez Devletlerinde ekonomik kalkınma seviyelerinin ve yaygın mali refahın öngörülemez derecede yükselmesine sebep oldu. Kalkınmanın bir sonucu ve gereği olarak, bu durum başlangıçta yerel kaynaklarla karşılanamayan, nitelik ve nicelik açısından oldukça büyük bir iş gücünü zorunlu hale getirdi. Ayrıca, bu durum Orta Doğu'daki komşu ülkelerin siyasi istikrarsızlığı ve zayıf ekonomik performansıyla birleştiğinde, yetmişli yıllar Körfez bölgesini bir iş gücü mıknatısına dönüştürdü. Uluslararası Çalışma Örgütü'nün tahminlerine göre, bu bölge %70,4 oranında iş gücü ithalatı ile dünyanın en büyük göçmen işçi nüfusuna ev sahipliği yaptı.

Hızlı ekonomik büyüme Körfez İşbirliği Konseyi (KİK) (yani Bahreyn, Kuveyt, Katar, Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri, Umman ve Suudi Arabistan Krallığı) devletlerine yaygın bir mali refah getirirken, aynı zamanda nüfus büyüklüğü, yapısı, dağılımı ve profili açısından temel değişikliklerede de yol açmıştır. Özellikle Katar'da yabancı nufus 70'lerin sonlarından itibaren toplam nufus icinde çoğunluğu oluşturmaya başlamıştır. Korfez devletlerinin çoğunda yabancı nüfus nüfusun yarısından fazlasını oluşturmaktadır ve daha da önemlisi Katar'da yabancıların nüfusu toplam nüfusun %88'ine ulaşmıştır ve bu oran Körfez İşgücü Piyasaları ve Göç (GLMM) programlarının tahminlerinde gösterildiği gibi KIK bölgesindeki en yüksek orandır.

Ekonomik gereksinimlerden dolayi tetiklenen göç nedeniyle Körfez İşbirliği Konseyi ülkelerinde nüfusun yeniden şekillenmesi (demografik dengesizlik), askeri ve politik tehditlerle karşılaştırıldığında başlangıçta büyük ölçüde göz ardı edilse de bu durm zaman icinde evrildi. Körfezde petrol devrinin başlangıc domenlerinde, demografik oranı kontrol etmek için dayatılan tek strateji, yerel halkla kültürel ve dini uyumları onları diğer göçmenlerden daha çekici kilmasi sebebiyle Arap işçileri tercih etmekti. Ancak, Körfez Savaşı (1990-91), monarşilerin Arap göçmenlerden,

özellikle Filistinliler olmak üzere Araplardan daha uyumlu, güvenilir ve politik olarak daha az meydan okuyucu olarak görülen Sahra Altı Afrika ve Asya'dan getirilen işçileri tercih etmeye karar vermesiyle Körfez Devletlerinde bir paradigma değişimini başlattı. Böylece, Körfez Savaşı ve sonraki bölümlerde tartışılacak olan diğer bölgesel olcekteki ekonomik, politik, sosyal, ideolojik ve pragmatik nedenlerden dolayı, Körfez Devletleri bu demografik değişimi ve dengesizliklari bir tehdit olarak algılamaya başladılar. Sonuç olarak, geleneksel güvenlik tehditlerinin ötesine geçen ve 'toplumsal tehditler' olarak kabul edilebilecek yeni 'tehditler' bölge için önemli bir meydan okuma haline geldi.

2000'li yillarda göçmen topluluklar, Korfez ulkelerindeki toplumsal 'varoluşsal tehditlerin' inşası acisindan daha önemli bir olgu haline geldi çünkü bu ulkelerdeki deki demografik dengesizlikler, vatandaşların azınlık haline gelmesine; Arapça dilinin kullanımının azalmasına; ve (kendi kendine yeten) alt toplulukların ortaya çıkmasına neden oldu. Bu durum da Khaliji (Yerel Arap Körfezi) kimliğinin tehdit altında olduğu algısını gelistirdi.

Bu ulkelerdeki politika belgelerinde veya akademik tartışmalarda toplumsal güvenlik kavramı açıkça kullanılmasa da, demografik değişimin bir tehdit olarak algılandığını gösteren politika önerileri yaygınlaştı. Sonuç olarak, demografik oranları dengede tutmak ve vatandaşların oldukça ayrıcalıklı konumlarini korumak için, sponsorluk sistemi, yabancıların kalış süresini sınırlamak amaciyla gocmen işgücünün rotasyon sistemi,ve ulke ve milliyet bazli kota sistemi gibi yerelleşmeye yönelik zorlayıcı bir yaklaşım ve vatandaşlığa kabul edilenlerin vatandaşlık haklarına kısıtlamalar gibi bir dizi politika dayatıldı.

Bununla birlikte, bu önlemlerin çoğu beklenen sonuçları getirmedi. Gercek ya da algilanan guvenlik tehditleri olarak ele alinsin, demografik dengesizliklar Körfez bölgesinde bu sebepten kaynaklanan tehdit algısı seviyesini yükseltmeye devam etti. Bu tehdit algisi, kısmen sorunların siyasi ve entelektüel tartışmalarda ve medya kapsamında tasvir edilme biçimiyle teşvik edildi. 2010'lu yillarda , toplumsal güvenlik kavramı Körfez ülkelerinde Kopenhag Güvenlik Çalışmaları Okulu ile ilişkilendirilen kimlik temelli yaklaşımlarla ve daha 'işlevselci' ve nesnel bir güvenlik

görüşüne sahip olanlarla birlikte kullanılmaya baslandi. Bu tezin diger bölümlerinde ayrıntılı olarak gösterdiği gibi, entelektüel düzeyde, çok az sayıda akademisyen toplumsal güvenlik kavramını kullanırken, birkaç akademisyen demografik dengesizlikleri varoluşsal bir tehdit olarak ele aldı. Bu sorun "Körfez'de 'Halk kimliğinin' istilası" seklinde algıladıl ve tartisildi. Politika düzeyinde, toplumsal güvenlik bir anlatı ve tahayyul olarak işliyordu. Her Körfez Devleti'nin ulusal vizyonlarında Körfez toplumlarına ve kimliğine yönelik riski belirlemek için siyasi vizyondaki ilgili değişiklikler teşvik edildi.

2017 Körfez Krizi'ne kadar, yani komşu Körfez devletleri Katar'a ve Katar'dan hava, deniz ve kara trafiğine neredeyse tam bir ambargo uygulayarak Katar'ı bölgenin geri kalanından etkili bir şekilde izole edene kadar, ortak bir Körfez Devletleri kimliği kavramı hala geçerliydi. Ancak, krizin ortaya çıkmasıyla, bölgedeki tehdit algısı önemli ölçüde değişti. Özellikle Katar'da, toplumsal tehdit kavramı diğer Körfez Devletleri'ninkinden belirgin şekilde farklılaştı. 2017'de, Körfez krizi sırasında Katar daha kapsayıcı bir yaklaşım benimsedi. Bu baglamda, Katar temel toplumsal değerlerini geleneksel kabile çerçevesinin ötesine, "Baladna" adi altinda somutlaştırılan kapsayıcı bir vizyona doğru genişletti. "Baladna" Arapça'da "ülkemiz" anlamına gelse de, 2017 Körfez Krizi'nden sonra, ulusal gururun birleştirici bir sembolünü temsil ediyor. Bu kavram, geleneksel kabilecilik kavramını alıp tüm ulusu kapsayacak şekilde genişleten ve Katar'ı dışarıdaki 'kabilelerden' veya potansiyel olarak tehdit oluşturan uluslardan ayrı, birleşik bir varlık olarak ayıran bir "Kabile Olarak Millet" yaklasimi olarak görülebilir.

Katar'daki bu yeni toplum algısı, İskandinav ülkelerinde gözlemlenen yörüngelerle de örtüşüyor. İskandinav ülkelerinin toplumsal anlayışlarına benzer şekilde Katar, başlangıçta göçü ve demografik dengesizlikleri toplumsal güvenlik tehditleri olarak gören Kopenhag Okulu'nun klasik bir argümanını benimsedi. Zamanla Katar'ın toplumsal güvenlik algısı, İskandinav ülkelerinde görülen daha yeni versiyonları yansıtarak, kimlik odaklı endişelerden ziyade, toplumsal güvenliğin orijinal tanımında bir değişime, yaşam veren işlevlere ve birbirine bağımlı altyapıların/tüm tehlikelerin ulusötesi korunmasına odaklanılmasına yol açtı. Tezin 5. Bölüm'de tartışıldigi üzere, 2017 Körfez Krizi sonrasini izleyen donemde Katar'daki toplumsal

ilişkiler sürekli ve kademeli bir iyileşmeye tanık oldu. Ancak, bu gelişmelerin Körfez'deki tüm demografik gruplar icin aynı olmadığını belirtmek önemlidir. Hem Katar vatandaslari hem de Katarlı olmayanlar mukimler , ablukadan güçlenen sosyal bağlar ve Katar topluluğu içinde artan karşılıklı takdirle çıktılar. Bu, bu iki grup arasındaki artan güvenin yanı sıra vatandaşların siyasi katılıma ve devletin duyarlılığına olan yüksek ilgisinden de anlaşılmaktadır. Haziran 2017'deki kriz, Katar'daki vatandaşlar ve yabancı ikamet edenler arasında ortak vatanlarını desteklemek için bir araya geldiklerinde benzeri görülmemiş bir birlik ve dayanisma oluşturdu. Bu dayanışma, Katarlılar arasında vatandas olmayan yabancı nüfusun büyüklüğü ve sosyokültürel etkileri konusundaki uzun süredir devam eden çekincelere rağmen devam etti. Ek olarak, abluka Katarlılar arasında kökenle ilgili tarihi bölünmelerin azalmasında da rol oynamış, aile ve kabile sınırlarını aşan ortak semboller ve toplumsal aktivizm, sadakat ve direniş alanlarnıı teşvik etmiştir. Abluka ayrıca vatandas olmayan mukim nufusun görüşlerini ifade ederek ve geçmişte alışılmadık olarak kabul edilebilecek eylemlerde bulunarak sosyo-politik süreçlere katılmaları için bir fırsat yaratmıştır.

Bu tarihi, soyso-politik ve sosyo-ekonomik arka plan isiginda a, bu tez Körfez'in devleteliyle gerceklestirilen benzersiz göç olgusu ile toplumsal algıı arasındaki ilişkiyi incelemeye başladı. Ön hipotezin formülasyonu sırasında, Körfez'deki demografik değişimlerin, öncelikle ekonomik göçle sekillenen , Körfez ülkelerinin sosyal yapısı üzerinde derin bir etkiye sahip olduğu ortaya çıktı. Ekonomik genişleme ve göçmen işçi akınıyla körüklenen hızlı nüfus artışı, bu ülkeleri yıllar içinde önemli ölçüde dönüştürdü. Körfez toplumları, göç kaynaklı demografik dengesizlikler nedeniyle kendilerini sıklıkla azınlıkta bulmaya basladilar

Körfez ülkeleri arasında Katar, büyük ölçüde ekonomik göçle sekillenen, çoğunlukla ulusal olmayan bir nüfus içinde vatandaşların azınlık oluşturduğu benzersiz bir örnek olarak öne çıkıyor. Tüm Körfez ülkeleri varoluşsal tehditler oluşturan benzer demografik zorluklarla karşı karşıya olsa da Katar'ın tepkileri bölgesel emsallerine kıyasla önemli farklılıklar sergiliyor. Diğer Körfez ülkelerinin aksine Katar, özellikle Irak'ın Kuveyt tarafından işgali ve Arap Baharı gibi önemli olayların ardından göç sorunlarına tarihsel olarak daha ılımlı yaklaşımlarla diger Korfez ulkelerinin

politikalarindan farklılıklar göstermiştir. Daha da önemlisi, Katar'ın tehdit algılarının evrimi de, özellikle toplumsal güvenliğe yeni boyutlar getiren 2017 Körfez krizi gibi dönüştürücü olaylardan sonra daha belirgin bir yörünge izlemiştir. Dolayısıyla bu tez, Katar'a yalnızca bölgedeki en yüksek orandaki yabancıya ev sahipliği yapması nedeniyle değil, aynı zamanda tarihsel olarak nüanslı ve giderek farklılaşan göç politikaları ve ulusal kimlik politikaları nedeniyle, özellikle 2017 krizi sonrasi surece odaklanmıştır.

Ön aşamadaki analize dayanarak, bu tez, göç kaynaklı demografik dengesizlikler ve bunlarla ilişkili varoluşsal tehditlerin Katar'da diğer Körfez Devletleri gibi toplumsal güvenlik endişeleri yaratmasına rağmen, 2017 Körfez krizinin Katar için bir dönüm noktası olduğu hipotezini önerdi/oluşturdu. Krize yanıt olarak, Katar'daki toplumsal güvenlik algısı, diğer Körfez Devletleri'nden farklılaşarak gelişti. Katar, Baladna (tek bir millet) terimiyle örneklendirilen kapsayıcı bir vizyona doğru temel toplumsal değerlerini geleneksel kabile ağı ve kimliğe dayalı referansların ötesine genişleterek daha kapsayıcı bir yaklaşım benimsedi.

Bölümler boyunca gösterildiği gibi, bu tez hem devlet hem de toplum düzeyinde toplumsal güvenlik perspektifinin devamlılığını ve değişimlerini aradı. Bu tartışma için bir temel oluşturmak amacıyla, devlet ve toplum düzeyindeki yanıtların referans nesneleri olan varoluşsal tehditleri kategorize etmekle başladı. Bu baglamda tezin 3. bölümu, Körfez bölgesinde göç kaynaklı demografik dengesizliklerin etkisini vurgulamaktadır. Burada Katar uyruklular, bilhassa ekonomik goc nedeniyle ulkeye geken yabanci uyruklularin ezici varlığı nedeniyle kendilerini kendi ulkelerinde azınlık olarak bulmaktadır. Toplam nüfus içindeki yabanci uyruklularin bu artan nufus eğilimi, çeşitli varoluşsal zorlukları beraberinde getirmektedir. Bu dengesizlikleri giderme çabalarına rağmen, göçün etkisi özellikle iş gücünde belirgindir. Bu baskınlık, kimlik, kültür ve toplumsal değerler konusunda önemli endişelere yol açmaktadır.

Ucuncu kisimda incelenen ve ele alınan zorluklar arasında, vatandaşların azınlık olma durumu özellikle acil bir tehdit olarak one ciklmaktadir. Yabancı işçi akınıyla daha da derinlesen bu demografik değişim, Katar'ın da istisna olmadığı Körfez

toplumlarının uzun vadeli istikrarı hakkında kritik sorular ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Ancak onumuzdeki donemde de , mega projeler ve uluslararası etkinliklerle desteklenen Katar'ın ekonomik büyümesinin bu demografik dengesizlikleri beslemesi beklenmektedir. İş gücünü millileştirme girişimleri denenmiş olsa da, özellikle Asya'dan gelen göçmen işgücüne olan talebin devam etmesi öngörülmektedir.

Bu demografik dönüşümün yanı sıra, Arapça dilinin kullanımında azalma tehdidi de onemli bir olgu olarak ortaya cikmaktadir. Bu dil kullanimindaki değişim, yalnızca değişen iletişim modellerini yansıtmakla kalmıyor, aynı zamanda Arapça'nın bölge için temsil ettiği derin kültürel kimliğe de değiniyor. Ek olarak, göçmenlerin çeşitli geçmişleri tarafından şekillendirilen belirgin alt toplulukların ortaya çıkması, Körfez'in toplumsal yapısına yeni karmaşıklıklar getirdi. Genellikle dilsel, etnik veya kültürel çizgiler boyunca örgütlenen bu alt topluluklar, bölgedeki toplumsal güvenliğe yeni bir boyut katmaktadir. Sonuç olarak, Körfez'in kültürel ve toplumsal çerçevesinin merkezinde yer alan Khaliji kimliğinin tehdit altında olduğuna dair artan bir endişe ortaya cikmistir. Bu endişeler yerinde olsun veya büyük ölçüde algıl seviyesinde kalsin , demografik dengesizliklerin Katar da dahil olmak üzere Körfez genelinde toplumsal güvensizlik hissini artırdığı yadsınamaz.

Bu artan farkındalık, Körfez ülkelerini politikalarını ve stratejilerini sürekli olarak yeniden değerlendirmeye ve uyarlamaya, değişen demografik manzarayı yönetmeye çalışırken ozgun/otantik Khaliji kimliklerinin özünü korumaya zorladı. Bu bağlamda, 4. Bölüm göç kaynaklı demografik dengesizliklere yonelik gelistirilen yanitlari ve özellikle Katar örneğinde ortaya koydukları varoluşsal tehditleri inceliyor. 2017 Körfez Krizi'ne kadar Katar, diğer Körfez ülkeleri gibi, kimliğe toplumsal güvenliğin temel taşı olarak öncelik veriyordu. Bu odak, özellikle 2000'lerde Asya ülkelerinden gelen göçmen işçilerin akınıyla belirginleşti ve bu da çeşitli toplumsal güvensizlik seviyelerini artırdı.

2017'ye kadar Katar'ın bu tehditlere verdiği yanıtlar çok yönlüydü ve cok boyutluydu. Devlet düzeyinde, önlemler öncelikle düzenleyici nitelikteydi. Bu onlemler göçmen akınını yönetmek için yasaların cikarilmasii ve sınır kontrollerinin

güçlendirilmesini içeriyordu. Katar'ın devlet düzeyindeki politikalari , kafala sistemi, millileştirme programları ve ulusal kimlik yönetim sistemi önerileri gibi çabaları içeriyordu, ancak bu politikalar tam veya etkili bir uygulama olmaksızın söylem aşamasında kaldı. Bu politikalar, yakindan incelendiginde, Katar'daki demografik değişimlerin, ekonomik olarak gocmen isgucune bağımlılık ve ulusal kimliğin korunması arasındaki dengeyi sağlamanın kalıcı zorluklarını yansıtmaktadir.

Devlet oluşumunun erken aşamalarında, Körfez ülkeleri demografik zorlukları ağırlıklı olarak siyasi alanda ele aldılar ve Arap dilinin ve kulturunun varlığının azalmasıyla ilgili endişeler siyasi söylemin ayrılmaz bir parçası haline geldi. Yeni binyılda, demografik dengesizliklerin sosyal sonuçları daha görünür hale geldi ve Körfez siyaset yapicilarini bu eğilimlerin olumsuz etkilerini kamuoyunda kabul etmeye yöneltti.

Daha da önemlisi, 1990'lardan beri Katar da dahil olmak üzere Körfez ülkeleri, göçmen işçilerin ev sahibi toplumlarına entegrasyonunu önlemek için tasarlanmış göç politikaları uyguladı. Bu yaklaşım, kısa vadeli sözleşmelere, düzenli iş gücü devrine ve aile birleşimi ve vatandaşlık üzerindeki kısıtlamalara odaklanarak "geçici iş gücü ithalatını" vurguladı. Önlemler arasında sosyoekonomik hakların sınırlandırılması ve izinsiz göçmenlerin sınır dışı edilmesi de vardı. Bu politikalar, Körfez ülkeleri arasında paylaşılan bir strateji tarafından şekillendirilen Körfez göç yönetimi modelini toplu olarak tanımlar. Bu model, göçmenlerin uyruğa göre seçici bir şekilde işe alınmasını içeriyordu ve 1990'lara gelindiğinde işgücü millileştirme girişimlerini de içerecek şekilde genişledi. Bu önlemler, kentsel ayrımcılık eğilimlerini destekleyip, vatandaşlığa kabul yasalarını kısıtlar ve sponsorluk sistemini yeniden düzenlerken Körfez vatandaşlarının kamu ve özel sektörlerde istihdamını teşvik etmeyi amaçlıyordu. Özellikle düşük ücretli işçiler için göçmenlerin kalış sürelerine ilişkin kısıtlamalar da bu modelin tanımlayıcı bir özelliği haline geldi.

2000'lerde Körfez emek yönetimi modeli, göçün kültürel etkileri ve modernleşmenin ortaya çıkardigi kültürel hareketler üzerindeki etkisi de dahil olmak üzere daha geniş toplumsal güvenlik endişelerini kapsayacak sekilde gelişti. Bu zorlukları ele almak

için ulusal stratejiler ve politika değişiklikleri uygulandı. Katar'da, ulusal kimliği ve değerleri korumak, 4. bölümde örneklendirildiği gibi resmi söylemde tekrar eden bir tema halini aldi.Göçe yönelik devlet düzeyindeki yanıtlar demografik zorlukları hafifletmeye odaklanmaya devam etti, ancak göçmen haklarının vatandaşlık ayrıcalıklarıyla daha yakın bir şekilde uyumlu hale getirilmesi için toplumsal destek kazanmakta da zorlandılar. Vatandaşlıkla derinden iç içe geçmiş ekonomik haklar, kapsayıcılık ve eşitliğin sağlanması önünde önemli engeller oluşturdu.

2017'ye kadar toplumsal düzeyde, kabile ağları gibi devlet dışı mekanizmalar kimlikle ilgili zorlukların ele alınmasında rol oynadı. Ancak devlet bu sorunları ele almak için açık siyasi eylemlerde bulunurken, bireyler bunları genellikle daha örtük olarak algıladı. 2010'lardan bu yana Katarlılar arasında, özellikle FIFA Dünya Kupası gibi küresel etkinliklere giden süreçte, yabancı işgücünün ülkenin altyapı gelişimi için önemi konusunda artan bir kabul var. Bu kabule rağmen, Katar vatandaşlari genişleyen göçmen nüfusunun uzun vadeli kültürel ve sosyal etkileri konusunda ihtiyatlı davranmaya devam ediyor. 4. bölümde tartışılan anketler, yabancı işçilerin ekonomik gerekliliği ile geleneksel Katar kültürünü koruma arzusu arasında devam eden bir gerginliği vurguluyor. Anket sonuçları ayrıca Katarlıların yabancı işçileri giderek daha fazla ülkenin ekonomik motorunun temel bir bileşeni olarak gördüklerini, aynı zamanda onları yaşam biçimlerine yönelik potansiyel bir tehdit olarak algıladıklarını yineliyor. Bu ikili algı, kültürel kimliği korurken bir işgücünü yönetmenin karmaşıklıklarını vurguluyor.

Yukarıda belirtildiği gibi, bu tezin hipotezi, göç kaynaklı demografik dengesizliklere ilişkin toplumsal güvenlik algılarında gelişen bir eğilimi önerdi ve 2017 Körfez Krizi, Katar'da daha kapsayıcı bir yaklaşımı teşvik eden önemli bir dönüm noktası olarak hizmet ettigi one surdu. Bu baglamda , 5. Bölüm'deki analiz, bu değişikliklerin arkasındaki nedenleri araştırarak, 2017 Körfez Krizi'nin Katar'daki toplumsal ve güvenlik dinamiklerini yeniden şekillendirmede neden önemli olduğunu sorarak başlıyor.

Körfez Krizi'ni çevreleyen dönemin analizi, bu donemin toplum uzerindeki en önemli etkilerinden birini ortaya koyuyor: Katar toplumunda yarattığı birleştirici

etki. Bu dönem, öz güveni, dayanıklılığı ve artan bir ulusal dayanışma duygusunu vurgulayan Baladna kavramıyla somutlaştırılan politika yapımında ve toplumsal tepkilerde önemli bir değişime işaret etti. Bu birliğin kökleri bir dizi temel faktörden kaynaklanıyor. Birincisi, derin askeri ve ekonomik yankılarıyla abluka, ulke mukimleri arasında kolektif bir kırılganlık duygusu yaratarak onları günlük yaşamlarıyla ilgili ortak endişeler etrafında birleştirdi. İkincisi, bu dönemde kültürel farklılıklara, toplumsal eşitsizliğe ve toplumsal bölünmelere bağlı sosyal ve ekonomik gerginlikler önemini yitirdi. Üçüncüsü, birçoğu Katar'daki ailelerle kabile bağlarını sürdüren komşu Körfez ülkelerinden gelen saldırganlık, izolasyon duygularını daha da derinleştirdi. "Kuşatma altında" olma konusundaki bu ortak deneyim, Katar devletine yönelik yaygın dayanışmayı ve desteği hızlandırdı ve birçok kişinin bağımsızlık savaşı ruhu olarak tanımladığı şeyi çağrıştırdı. Körfez bölgesiyle ilgili daha geniş literatürle birlikte üçüncü noktayı ele aldığımızda, bölgedeki ulusal kimlik oluşumunun geleneksel olarak içe odaklı olduğunu ve komşu ülkelere karşı düşmanlıktan kaçındığını belirtmej gerekir ve 2017 Körfez Krizi bu anlamda bir donum noktasi olarak öne çıkıyor. 2017'deki abluka, Katar'ı, nüfusun stratejik kesimlerini ortak bir ideolojik vizyon etrafında harekete geçiren bir anlık bağımsızlık mücadelesi yaşayan tek Körfez ülkesi olarak işaret ediyor. Bu benzersiz "ulusal an", Katar'ın bölgedeki belirgin yörüngesini vurguluyor.

Bu nedenle abluka, Katar'ın toplumsal güvenlik çerçevesinin yeniden değerlendirilmesini, geleneksel olarak bölgesel söylemi domine eden kimlik merkezli kaygıların ötesine geçilmesini teşvik etti. Bunun yerine, Katar'ın tepkisi, nüfusun refahı için hayati önem taşıyan birbirine bağlı altyapıların ve hizmetlerin korunmasını ve dayanıklılığını önceliklendirdi. Bu anlamda, 2017 Körfez Krizi, Katar'ın Körfez içindeki toplumsal ve güvenlik perspektiflerini yeniden tanımlamak için bir katalizör görevi gördü.

Devlet düzeyinde, Katar'ın ikamet, yatırım ve vize politikalarındaki mevzuat çalismalari , sosyal kapsayıcılığı teşvik etme yönündeki gelisen bir cabanin yansıması olarak ele alindi. Hızla gelişen bir ulus olarak Katar, politikalarını, kendisini 'dönüştürücü bir devlet' olarak konumlandırmak, çeşitlendirilmiş, modern bir toplumun karmaşıklıklarında gezinmek için dikkatlice şekillendirdi. Guncel

işgücü politikaları ve daimi ikamet yasaları önemli bir ilerlemeyi temsil etse de, bu kapsayıcı önlemlerin daha da genişletilmesi gerekli olmaya devam ediyor. Bu bağlamda, Ulusal Kalkınma Stratejisi 3'ün (NDS-3) başlatılması, Katar vatandasi olmayan mukimlerin Katar'ın uzun vadeli vizyonuna entegre edilmesinde de önemli bir kilometre taşını işaret ediyor.

Vatandaş olmayanlara yonelik kapsayıcılıkı yalnızca yasal reformlarda değil, aynı zamanda siyasi söylemin değişen tonunda da belirgin hale geldi.. Vatandaş olmayanlar, Katar'ın sosyal, ekonomik ve kültürel yapısına ayrılmaz katkıda bulunanlar olarak giderek daha fazla tanınmaktadır. Özellikle 2017 Körfez Krizi'nden bu yana belirginleşen bu değişim, daha kapsayıcı bir ulusal kimliğe doğru ilerici bir adımı yansıtmaktadır. Katar Emiri'nin 2013'te liderliği üstlenmesinden bu yana yaptığı konuşmaların daha yakından incelenmesi bu dönüşümü vurgulamaktadır. 2013 ile 2017 arasında söylem daha çok Katarlılar ve Katar kimliğine odaklanmıştı. Ancak bölgesel krizin ardından Emir, herkes arasında birlik ve aidiyet duygusu yaratmak için Katar'da yaşayan sakinlere ve daha geniş topluluklara hitap ederek daha kapsayıcı bir dil benimsemiştir.

Toplumsal düzeyde analiz söz konusu olduğunda, beşinci bölümde analiz edilen anket verileri ve görüşmeler, bireylerin göç kaynaklı demografik dengesizliklerin Katar veya ulusal kimliği için bir tehdit oluşturmadığı konusunda toplu olarak hemfikir olduğunu da gösterdi. Bu tezi destekleyen görüşmecilerin çoğunluğu, 2017 Körfez krizini, kolektif kimliği güçlendiren ve Katarlılar ile Katarlı olmayanlar arasındaki uyumu güçlendiren önemli bir an olarak gösterdi. Görüşme bulguları, SESRI'den alınan anket verileri ve Katar Ulusal Müzesi'nden alınan materyallerle birlikte analiz edildiğinde, göç kaynaklı demografik dengesizliğin özellikle 2017'den bu yana toplumsal bir tehdit olarak görülmediği ortaya çıktı.

Ayrıca, Katarlılar ve Katarlı olmayanlar arasındaki sosyal güven, özellikle 2017 Körfez krizi sonrasında derinleşti. Bu bulgular, bu büyüyen güvenin Katarlılar ve Katarlı olmayanlar arasındaki ilişkilerin ötesine geçtiğini; ayrıca Katar'ın ulusal kimliğini güçlendirdiğini göstermektedir. Özellikle, 5. bölümde tartışılan bulgular, daha geniş bir Körfez kimliğine dair asgari göstergelerle Katar'da kök salmış güçlü

bir kimliği yansıtmaktadır. Tüm bu veriler ayrıca Katarlılar ve Katarlı olmayanlar arasında paylaşılan bir kabul ve karşılıklı saygı duygusunu ortaya koymaktadır. Tez kapsaminda ele alinan mulakatlarda katilimcilar , birlikte yaşama konusunda olumlu duygular ve artan toplumsal birlik ve uyum konusunda iyimserlik ifade ettiler. Bu dinamik, Baladna kavramının hem devlet hem de toplum düzeylerinde toplumsal olarak benimsendiğini vurgulamaktadır.

Bu tez, teorik derinlik sağlamak, argümanı çerçevelemek ve Katar'ın devlet ve toplum düzeyindeki perspektiflerindeki tarihi değişimleri bağlamlandırmak için toplumsal güvenlik kavramını benimsiyor. Bu çerçeveyi uygulayarak, çalışma toplumsal güvenlik konusundaki daha geniş söyleme katkıda bulunmayı amaçlıyor ve Katar'ın gelişen yaklaşımının teorik alana değerli içgörüler sunduğunu savunuyor. Devlet oluşumunun ilk yıllarında, toplumsal sorunlar ve varoluşsal tehditler, Barry Buzan'ın Kopenhag Okulu'nda dile getirdiği erken güvenlik anlayışıyla tutarlı olarak, öncelikle devlet veya siyasi güvenlik merceğinden ele alınıyordu.

1990'larda ve 2000'ler boyunca Körfez Savaşı'nın ardından Katar'ın toplumsal güvenlik çerçevesi, diğer Körfez Devletleri'ninkiler gibi, göçle bağlantılı kimlikle ilgili tehditleri ele alacak şekilde genişledi. Bu evrim, Ole Wæver'in 'göç' ve 'yatay rekabet' tehdit algısı aracılığıyla toplumsal kimliği yeniden şekillendirebilecek göçmen topluluklarının akınının demografik etkisiyle ilgili artan endişeleri yansıtıyordu. Bu süreçte, göçmen ve komşu topluluklardan gelen kültürel ve dilsel etkiler, ev sahibi toplumun yapısını ve kimliğini değiştirmeye başlar. Sonuç olarak, Katar'daki "biz" kavramı, diğer Körfez Devletleri'ne benzer şekilde giderek tehdit altında olarak görülüyordu. Bu gelişmeler, bölgedeki toplumsal güvenlik endişelerinin artan karmaşıklığını vurguladı ve göç, kimlik ve güvenliğin ortaya çıkardığı zorluklara daha ayrıntılı yaklaşımlar gerektirdi.

2017 Körfez Krizi, Katar'da komşularının yaklaşımlarından farklılaşan belirgin bir toplumsal güvenlik çerçevesinin ortaya çıkması için bir katalizör görevi gördü. Bu tezde Baladna olarak adlandırılan bu yeni çerçeve, kritik toplumsal işlevlerin korunmasını önceliklendiren ve kimliğe yönelik tehditlerin güvenlikleştirilmesi yerine tüm tehlikeleri kapsayan bir yaklaşım benimseyen "Yeni Kuzey Güvenlik

Anlayışı" teorik cercevesiyle uyumludur. 2017'den bu yana Katar'da Baladna kavramı altında, yabancı uyruklular/göçmenler varoluşsal tehditler olarak algılanmaktan, özellikle komşu ülkelerin hem yabancı uyrukluların hem de yabancı uyrukluların refahına yönelik oluşturduğu yeni ve ortaya çıkan tehditlere yönelik referans nesneleri haline gelmeye doğru kaydılar.

Hayat veren işlevlere ilişkin İskandinav bakış açısı, bunların ulusötesi ve birbirine bağlı doğasına vurgu yaparak, Katar'ın 2017'den sonraki yörüngesini incelemek için yararlı bir mercek sunuyor. Bu bakış açısı, Katar vatandaşları ile göçmen topluluklar arasındaki dayanıklılığı, kapsayıcılığı ve karşılıklı bağımlılığı vurgulayarak Katar'ın toplumsal güvenliğe yaklaşımında önemli bir değişime işaret ediyor.

İskandinav ülkelerindeki politika yapıcılar gibi Katar Emiri de giderek artan bir şekilde tüm tehlikeleri göz önünde bulunduran bir yaklaşımı benimsedi ve modern toplumların ulusal sınırları aşan ağlara ve sistemlere olan bağımlılığını kabul etti. Bu bakış açısı, toplumsal güvenliği şekillendirmede uluslararası ve yerel faktörlerin kesişimini vurgulayan intermestik dinamikler kavramını tanıttı. Bu içgörüleri entegre ederek, bu tez Katar'ın gelişen toplumsal güvenlik çerçevesinin daha ayrıntılı bir şekilde anlaşılmasına katkıda bulunarak Körfez bölgesindeki göç, kimlik ve güvenliğin birbirine bağlı zorluklarını ele almak için hem teorik hem de pratik çıkarımlar sunuyor.

Bu tez, hem teorik olarak hem de bir vaka çalışması olarak literatüre katkıda bulunmaktadır; ancak, daha fazla tartışmaya açık kalan bir dizi konu bulunmaktadır. Tez, ağırlıklı olarak devlet politikalarına ve göçmen topluluğuna yönelik toplumsal tepkilere yönelik olumlu duyguları belirlese de, tablo tamamen ideal değildir. Katar, dönüştürücü bir devlet olarak nitelendirilmesine ve Baladna kavramının 2017'den beri daha açık hale gelmesine rağmen, sosyal katılımın daha da geliştirilebileceği alanlar vardır. Örneğin, mukimler artık uzun sureli ikamet izni alabilse de, daimi ikamet izniyle ilgili yasalar vatandaşlık almaya hak kazanma kriterlerini genişletmemiştir. Vatandaşlık için yasal ön koşullar kamuya açık olsa da, başvurunun gerçek süreci belirsizliğini korumaktadır ve bu süreçte insanlar başvuru prosedürünü özetleyen herhangi bir form veya ayrıntı bulamamışlardır. Vatandaşlığa

alan Katarlılarin tam sayısı da açıklanmamıştır. Ancak, iddia edildigi gibi, yasa vatandaşlığa geçmeyi yılda en fazla 50 kişiyle sınırladığından, muhtemelen küçük bir gruptur.

Ek olarak, tez Katar'ı Katarlı olmayanlar için belirli haklar ve yüksek düzeyde kapsayıcılık sağlayan bir ülke olarak tasvir ediyor. Ancak, kapsam dahilinde tartışıldığı üzere, tez beyaz yakalı ve mavi yakalı çalışanlar veya gurbetçiler ve göçmen işçiler gibi farklı Katarlı olmayan gruplar arasında ayrım yapmıyor. Bu grupların deneyimlediği kapsayıcılık düzeyi değişmektedir. Mavi yakalı çalışanlar, özellikle çalışma kamplarında yaşayanlar, diğer gurbetçilerle aynı düzeyde kapsayıcılığa sahip değiller. Yabancı uyruklular arasındaki sosyoekonomik eşitsizlikler toplum içindeki kabul düzeylerini önemli ölçüde etkiliyor. Bel-Air'in de öne sürdüğü gibi, son reformlar oldukça seçicidir ve en büyük faydalar orantısız bir şekilde yabancı yatırımcıları ve beyaz yakalı çalışanları kayırmaktadır. Buna karşılık, genellikle Güney Asya ve Sahra Altı Afrika kökenli, daha düşük beceri seviyelerine sahip kişiler bu ilerlemelerden büyük ölçüde dışlanmaktadır. Bu dinamik risk, yüksek vasıflı yabancı uyruklular ile diğer göçmenler arasındaki haklar ve katılım uçurumunu daha da genisleterek, mevcut eşitsizlikleri daha da derinleştiriyor.

Ayrıca, bu tezin, görüşmelerden ve anketlerden elde edilen bulgularını, Katar'ın sosyo-politik bağlamını da göz önünde bulundurarak yorumlamak da önemlidir. Katar'daki toplumsal algılar, genellikle ülkedeki yönetimin yukarıdan aşağıya doğasını yansıtan devlet düzeyindeki söylemle yakından örtüşmektedir. Bir rantçı devlet olarak Katar rejimi (özellikle Emir), muhalif sesler için düzenlenmiş görünürlük bırakarak kamusal anlatıları şekillendirmede önemli bir rol oynamaktadır. Katar'ın sosyo-politik sisteminin üç temel yönü bu konuda önemli bir rol oynamaktadır: birincisi, sosyal yapıyı şekillendirmede himaye ağlarının rolü; ikincisi, sadakat ve devlet bağımlılığına odaklanan bir siyasi kültürün yaratılması; ve üçüncüsü, yaygın bir memnuniyet yanılsamasını besleyen bir sosyal sözleşmenin temelini oluşturan rantçı servet dağılımı. Katar toplumu ayrıca, önemli değişiklikler veya fikir özgürlüğü için sınırlı kamu talebiyle siyasi ilgisizlik sergilemektedir. Siyasi katılım, daha fazla demokrasi ve fikir özgürlüğü kavramları, hem ulusal hem de bireysel gündemlerde asgari öneme sahiptir. Dikkat çekici bir şekilde, Katarlıların

yalnızca %4'ü fikir özgürlüğünü arzu edilen bir hak olarak tanımladı. Bu baglamdaı, hem Katarlılar hem de Katarlı olmayanlar, Katar Ulusal Müzesi'nden (NMoQ) elde edilen ve Bölüm 5'te tartışılan görüşme sonuçlarının kanıtladığı gibi, yüksek düzeyde memnuniyet bildiriyor. Ancak, bu tez, özellikle rantçı devlet sosyal sözleşmesinin bir yansimasi olarak, bu memnuniyetin altında yatan sosyo-politik bağlamın bir analizini kasıtlı olarak hariç tutuyor.

Bu tezde dikkate alınması gereken önemli bir unsur da zaman çerçevesidir. Körfez krizi ve ardından gelen abluka sadece yedi yıl önce gerçekleşti ve toplumsal algılar ve dinamikler üzerindeki etkileri hala ortaya çıkıyor. Bulgular mevcut bağlamı yansıtırken, algıların zaman içinde evrimleşmeye devam edebileceğini kabul etmek önemlidir. Bu nedenle, tam etkilerinin henüz tam olarak farkına varılmamış veya gözlemlenmemiştir.

Ayrıca, yazarın Katar'ın kültürel sektöründeki bir hükümet kuruluşundaki mevcut rolü veri toplama ve birinci elden gözlemler konusunda birçok fırsat sağlamış olsa da, ülkeye yönelik olumlu bir bakış açısına yönelik doğal bir duyguya neden olabilir. Bu, yazarın Katarlı olmayanları kültürel kurumlara entegre ederek Katar'ın ulusal kimliğinin kapsayıcılığını genişletmeyi amaçlayan politikaların uygulanmasına yaptığı katkılar düşünüldüğünde özellikle önemlidir.

Tez değerli içgörüler ve özel bulgular sağlasa da, aynı zamanda gelecekteki araştırmalar için güçlü bir temel de oluşturuyor. Birçok konu daha fazla araştırmaya açık kalmaya devam ediyor ve bu alanda anlayışı derinleştirmek için zengin fırsatlar sunuyor.

Teorik değerlendirme açısından, bu tez güvenlikleştirme kavramını, özellikle de Körfez'deki göç ve demografik dengesizliklere ilişkin toplumsal güvenlik algılarıyla neden-sonuç ilişkisini incelememektedir. Gelecekteki araştırmalar, bölgedeki güvenlikleştirme sürecini daha derinlemesine inceleyerek göç ve demografik değişimlerin varoluşsal tehditler olarak nasıl çerçevelendiğini araştırabilir. Bu tür araştırmalar ayrıca güvenlikleştirme anlatılarının Körfez ülkelerindeki politika kararlarını, toplumsal uyumu ve kimlik oluşumunu nasıl etkilediğini inceleyebilir.

Bu çalışma, toplumsal güvenliği değerlendirmedeki uygunlugu ve ozellikleri ele alinarak öncelikle Katar'a odaklanmaktadır. Ancak, gelecekteki araştırmalar tüm Körfez bölgesini kapsayan daha geniş bir bakış açısı benimseyebilir. Farklı Körfez ülkelerindeki toplumsal güvenlik çerçevelerinin ve kimlik oluşturma süreçlerinin karşılaştırmalı bir analizi, bölgedeki ortak zorluklar ve çeşitli stratejiler hakkında değerli içgörüler sağlayacaktır. Bu ayrıca Katar'ın deneyimlerini daha geniş bir bölgesel çerçeve içinde bağlamlandırmaya yardımcı olacaktır.

Tez, 2017 Körfez Krizi'ni Katar'ın toplumsal güvenliği ve kapsayıcı kimlik oluşturma çabalarında bir dönüm noktası olarak tanımlarken, modernleşme, küreselleşme, 2022 FIFA Dünya Kupası'na ev sahipliği yapma ve Arap Baharı gibi diğer kritik olaylar nispeten az araştırılmıştır. Gelecekteki çalışmalar, bu dönüştürücü olayların Katar'da ve daha geniş Körfez bölgesinde toplumsal algıları ve kimliği nasıl etkilediğini değerlendirebilir ve sosyal ve politik dinamikler üzerindeki uzun vadeli etkilerine ışık tutabilir.

Bu araştırma, göçmenlerin deneyimleri ve algılarına sınırlı vurgu yaparak, öncelikli olarak Katar hükümetinin ve devlet aktörlerinin bakış açılarına odaklanmaktadır. Gelecekteki çalışmalar, göçmenlerin toplumsal güvenliği nasıl algıladıklarını, ev sahibi topluluklar içindeki etkileşimlerini ve köken ülkeleriyle bağlantılarını inceleyerek bu dengesizliği ele alabilir. Bu tür araştırmalar, toplumsal güvenliğe dair daha ayrıntılı bir anlayış sağlayabilir ve bu dinamikleri şekillendirmede devlet dışı aktörlerin rolünü vurgulayabilir.

Ek olarak, hem Katarlılar hem de Katarlılar olmayanlar için bir cinsiyet perspektifi eklemek analizi önemli ölçüde geliştirebilir. Gelecekteki araştırmalar, toplumsal güvenliği ve kapsayıcılığı daha iyi anlamak için cinsiyet odaklı bir bakış açısı sunarak bu bağlamlarda kadınların kendine has zorluklarına ve katkılarına odaklanabilir. Cinsiyetin milliyet, sınıf ve göç durumu gibi diğer faktörlerle nasıl kesiştiğini araştırmak, Körfez'deki toplumsal güvenliğe dair daha kapsamlı bir görüş sağlayabilir.

Metodolojik değerlendirmeler gelecekteki araştırmalar için de firsatlar sunar. Bu tez, yapılandırmacı bir ontolojik yaklaşımla nitel araştırma yöntemlerini kullanır.

Araştırma, toplumsal güvenliğin "ne olduğu"na odaklanmak yerine, belirli yaklaşımların nasıl "mümkün kılındığını" ve "ne yaptıklarını" inceler. Epistemolojik temel, yorumlayıcı bir yaklaşımda yatmaktadır ve deneysel materyalin beklenmedik şekillerde kalıpları ortaya çıkarmasına olanak tanır. Metodolojik yaklaşımları genişletmek gelecekteki çalışmaları zenginleştirebilir. Örneğin, büyük ölçekli anketler veya sosyal ağ analizi gibi nicel yöntemleri entegre etmek nitel içgörüleri tamamlayabilir ve daha bütünsel bir bakış açısı sunabilir.

Çalışma, kitaplar, akademik makaleler, resmi konuşmalar, yasal metinler, yerel gazeteler, raporlar ve anketler dahil olmak üzere çok çeşitli ikincil veri kaynaklarına dayanmaktadır. Ayrıca, konuşmaları sistematik olarak incelemek ve anlam, yapı ve bağlamı ortaya çıkarmak için söylem analizini kullanır. Örneğin, Katar Emiri Şeyh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani'nin 2013'ten 2024'e kadar yaptığı konuşmaların yakından analizi, gelişen toplumsal eğilimler hakkında değerli içgörüler sağlar. Bu konuşmalar, özellikle Şura (Danışma) Konseyi'ndeki yıllık konuşmaları, ulusal başarılar üzerinde düşünmek ve gelecek planlarını ana hatlarıyla belirtmek için bir platform görevi görür. Ancak gelecekteki araştırmalar, daha geniş toplumsal perspektifleri yakalamak için medya anlatıları veya sosyal medya içerikleri gibi ek kamusal söylem türlerini analiz ederek bu yaklaşımı genişletebilir.

Kişisel görüşmeler, mevcut literatürdeki boşlukları ele alan nitel veriler sağlayan metodolojinin bir diğer önemli bileşenidir. Bu araştırma, Ulusal Kalkınma Stratejileri kapsamında kültürel hedeflerin uygulanmasında yer alan Katar kurumlarından 11 uzmanla görüşmeler gerçekleştirdi. Bu görüşmelere Kültür Bakanlığı, Katar Müzeler Otoritesi, Kültür Yılları Programı, UNESCO Katar Ulusal Komitesi, Yaratıcı Merkezler, Katar Ulusal Müzesi ve Katar Üniversitesi temsilcileri katıldı. Ancak gelecekteki araştırmalar, göçmen topluluklar, sivil toplum örgütleri ve uluslararası ortaklar gibi daha geniş bir paydaş yelpazesinden gelen sesleri içerecek şekilde görüşme havuzunu genişletebilir.

Bu tez, görüşmelere ek olarak Katar Ulusal Müzesi'nden (NMoQ) gözlemleri, materyalleri ve görselleri de içeriyor. Özellikle, Galeri 11'de sunulan ve 2018 ve 2019'da gerçekleştirilen 89 görüşme transkripti analiz edilerek katılımcıların Katar

ve geleceği hakkındaki algılarına dair benzersiz içgörüler sağlandı. Gelecekteki araştırmalar, müze arşivlerinin ve diğer kültürel kurumların toplumsal anlatıları ve kimlik oluşturma süreçlerini anlamak için değerli kaynaklar olma potansiyelini daha fazla araştırabilir.

Son olarak, gelecekteki araştırmalar, yaşanmış deneyimler ve toplum dinamikleri hakkında daha derin içgörüler elde etmek için etnografik çalışmalar veya katılımcı eylem araştırması gibi ek nitel yöntemler uygulayabilir. Metodolojik araç setini genişletmek yalnızca bulguları zenginleştirmekle kalmayacak, aynı zamanda Körfez bölgesindeki toplumsal güvenlik ve kimliği çevreleyen karmaşıklıklar hakkında daha kapsamlı bir anlayış sağlayacaktır.

Özetle, bu tez alana önemli katkılar sunmakla birlikte, gelecekteki çalışmalar için çok sayıda öneri de vurgulamakta ve yol gösterici bir rol oynamaktadır. Teorik, coğrafi ve metodolojik ufukları genişleterek, gelecekteki araştırmalar Körfez'deki toplumsal güvenlik ve kimliğin değişen dinamiklerine dair daha derin içgörüler sunmak için bu temeli kullanabilir.

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